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Full text of "Strategy and tactics of world communism"

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STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 
HEARINGS ^ 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECX)ND SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF 
WORLD COMMUNISM 



MAY 18 AND 27, 1954 



PART 1 



Printed for tlie use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
477G9 WASHINGTON : 1954 







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Boston Public i.ibrary 
Superintendent of Documents 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 



WILLIAM LANGER, 
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin' ' ' 
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 
ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 



North, LXakota, Chairman 
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
ESrES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investihatb the Admi.vistratiox of the Internal Security 
Act AND Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 



ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 



PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON. South Carolina 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Task Force Investicatino the Strategy and Tactics of World 

Communism 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

Richard Arexs, Special Counsel 
JX 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — 

Boldyreff, Constantin W _ 2 

Heimlich, William F ~ '___'__ "_ iq 

Hunter, Kent A '~_~ I _ _'_ 13 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



tuesday, may 18, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Jenner and Welker. 

Also present: Kichard Arens, special counsel; Frank W. Schroeder, 
professional staff member; and Edward R. Duffy, professional staff 
member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Among the duties of the Internal Security Subcommittee, pursuant 
to Senate Resolution 366 of the 81st Congress, is the duty to make a 
continuing investigation of — 

the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its 
Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, 
and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign 
government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any 
other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by 
force and violence. 

It is abundantly clear from the numerous projects which the 
Internal Security Subcommittee has completed pertaining to the 
Communist conspiracy m the United States, that this conspiracy here 
is only one tentacle of a worldwide octopus which has as its principal 
target the United States of America. 

If we are adequately to appraise the operation of the Communist 
conspiracy in this Nation it is essential that we keep abreast of the 
world strategy and tactics of international communism. Accordingly, 
I have appointed a task force of the Internal Security Subcommittee, 
consisting of myself as chairman with Senators Herman Welker and 
Pat McCarran as members, for the purpose of maintaining a con- 
tinuing study and investigation of the strategy and tactics of world 
communism. 

The hearing today is the first in a series of hearings on this general 
subject matter which has many facets, each of which we shall explore 
as we receive the testimony of a number of witnesses who will be 
scheduled over the course of the next several months. 

We will call the first witness in this new hearing. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, the first witness is Prof. Constantin 
W. Boldvreff. Will you kindly assume the witness stand? 



2 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn to testify? Do you solemnly 
swear the testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I do, sir, 

TESTIMONY OF CONSTANTIN W. BOLDYREFF, WASHINGTON 

D. C. 

The Chairman. You may be seated. Will you state for our com- 
mittee record your full name? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. My name is Constantin W. BoldyreflF. 
The Chairman. Will you spell that for the reporter, please? 

i •po^^Y^E^^- Constantin, C-o-n-s-t-a-n-t-i-n, Boldyreff, B-o-l-d- 
y-r-e-f-f, like Frank. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Boldyreff? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I reside in Washington, 1427 Chapin Street NW. 

i he Chairman. What is your business or profession? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I am a professor at Georgetown University, Insti- 
^^m/ rT^^^"^^®^ ^^^ Linguistics, and am on leave of absence now. 

1 he Chairman. From Georgetown University? 

Mr. Boldyreff. From Georgetown University. 

The Chairman. Where were you born? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I was born in Russia. 

The Chairman. When? 

Mr. Boldyreff. In 1909. 

The Chairman. Wlien did you leave Russia? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I left Russia for the first time in 1922 as a cadet 
in the Czarist Cadet Corps. 

The Chairman. And how many times have you returned? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I have been in Russia since then again from 1942 
to 1944 underground. 

The Chairman. Wlien was your last time that you visited Russia? 

Mr. Boldyreff. Russia proper in 1944. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed, Mr. Arens with the question- 
ing of the witness. 

Mr. Arens. And when was the last time you were in contact with 
the underground behind the Iron Curtain? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I returned about 3 weeks ago from a tour of the 
country surrounding the Soviet Empire from the Baltic Sea to Iran, 
and during my stay in Europe and Asia I was all the time in contact 
with the Russian underground. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat is the name of the Russian underground in 
popular parlance? 

Mr. Boldyreff. Its name is NTS, which stands in Enghsh for 
National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. 

Mr. Arens. And you have been in contact with that underground 
in the course of the last few weeks; is that correct? 

Mr. Boldyreff. That is correct. 

Air. Arens. Would you kindly give us before we proceed with your 
testimony on the principal subject-matter, a word of your background? 

Mr. Boldyreff. I was born in Russia. I was in the Cadet Corps 
during the Revolution. I left Russia in 1922 and finished my educa- 
tion in Yugoslavia where I graduated as an engineer. In 1930 I joined 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 3 

the Russian underground movement NTS, and have been active in this 
organization since then. 

During the war I was arrested by the Germans and put in a con- 
centration camp from which I succeeded to escape. I then went 
through the channels of the underground inside Russia to fight against 
the Communist regime and the German invaders. 

I stayed there until November 1944 and then came back to Vienna 
secretly, was again later on arrested by the Germans, and previous 
to the fall of the German regime I again succeeded to get free. 

Then I was working with the American Military Government in 
Germany, combating forced repatriation of former Soviet citizens 
who refused to go back. Later on I came to this country in 1947 
and have been living here since, having twice since 1947 visited 
Europe for longer periods. 

Mr. Arens. Professor Boldyreff, you have had executive sessions 
with the staff of the Internal Security Subcommittee with respect to 
your identification with the anti-Communist undergi'ound from behind 
the Iron Curtain and with respect to certain operations which you 
perhaps would not want to tell about publicly, but I should like to 
invite your attention now to the prepared statement which you have 
this morning for submission to the Internal Security Subcommittee. 
I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that that prepared statement 
itself now be included in the record and that the professor be per- 
mitted to give a summary of the statement. 

The Chairman. The statement of Professor Boldyreff will go 
into our record and become a part of our record. 

(The statement referred to is as follows:) 

Statement by Prof. Constantin W. Boldyreff 

The Western World today — willingly or unwittingly — digs its own grave. Its 
present policy of ambiguity, indecision, and half measures helps: (a) The Soviet 
Government to strengthen its otherwise seriously shattered positions, and tends 
to (b) paralyze the development of a spontaneously growing process of revolu- 
tionization of the Russian masses. 

There are two psychological forces at play in Russia today: Hatred of the 
regime — revolutionary stimulus, and determination to defend the country — ■ 
patriotic stimulus. 

Since the revolutionary stimulus is also inspired by patriotism, it will submit 
to the patriotic stimulus in the face of a danger threatening the nation as a whole. 
Hence, if the Government can convince the people that a war means dismember- 
ment to the country and enslavement to the population, it will have no reason — 
other than purely strategic and economic — to fear a war. 

On the other hand, the Government knows that if the people gain an assurance 
that there is no immediate threat of war, or that this war is to be waged only 
against the Kremlin clique, the patriotic stimulus will reinforce the revolutionary. 
During the initial stage of World War II (while the revolutionary senti- 
ment was still dormant in Russia) the people — believing the Germans to be 
liberators — offered them practically no resistance. (The Red Army fought 
half-heartedly, soldiers surrendered by the thousands, the population 
greeted the Germans as their friends.) During the latter stage of the war — 
when the people realized the Nazis' true intentions — they began to fight 
like lions. (Forests were seething with partisans; the Army fought doggedly 
forging from Stalingrad to Berlin.) 
The Soviet leaders know this and their only preoccupation now is to create 
psychological conditions in Russia today, like those which prevailed there during 
the latter part of the war. With the complete isolation of the Russian people 
and a formidable propaganda machine at their command, on the one hand, and 
the attitude of the West such as it is, on the other hand, this does not seem to 
be too difficult a task. 



4 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

That this may greatly increase the chances of war, does not worry them too 
much, provided it is Communist style. As things stand now, that type of blood- 
curdling slaughter, animated by racial hatred and universal mistrust, may not 
be long in coming. 

Isn't the timing of the Communist flagrant massed attacks in Indochina to 
coincide with both the Berlin and the Geneva Conferences, a clear symptom of 
how little the Kremlin masters are afraid of war. 

The Kremlin's greatest fear is revolution 

There are other symptoms, however, which show how greatly the conspirators 
in Moscow fear a revolution. 

One of such symptoms is the rash and drastic way in which they launched their 
campaign to intimidate the Russian revolutionary organization — the NTS. 

After 3 previous unsuccessful attempts to kidnap responsible NTS underground 
leaders, and 2 failures in the efforts to plant spies (Bergman and Mueller-Khorun- 
zhy) into the organization, they decided: 

(1) To kidnap in Berlin an open worker of the organization. Dr. Alexander 
Trushnovich, head of a Russian refugee welfare organization and vice presi- 
dent of a purely noncombatant anti-Communist Society of Russo-German 
Friendship, which they did, and 

(2) To send a special man (MVD Capt. Nikolai Khokhlov) with special 
weapons from Moscow to assassinate the same underground leader who was 
subject to two previous unsuccessful kidnaping expeditions. 

Here, however, the Kremlin's plans failed. 

The kidnaping of an overt worker who does not know any secrets, and the 
attempt to silence with a bullet an underground leader — are by no means measures 
conducive to the exposure of the underground's subversive activities in Russia. 

Hence, their motives were to terrorize the organization. Only people who are 
nervous and fear resort to such measures. 

The wave of defections among Soviet diplomats is another indication. Sure^ 
there is the fear of purge, but in the past a dozen of Soviet diplomats returned to 
face the purge. The regime then was stable, today — they know — it is not. And 
they are conscious of the rising wave of popular discontent. 

Symptoms of the development of a revolutionary process in Russia 

(A) The strengthening of people's resistance. — The outward manifestations of 
the rising wave of popular resistance to the regime, which started after Stalin's 
death and intensified following Beria's collapse, can be traced throughout the 
entire expanse of the Soviet Union: 

(1) The passive attitude and general reluctance of the Soviet troops of 
occupation displayed during the uprising of the East Germans in June 1953 
with numerous cases when soldiers and officers— defying orders— supported 
the insurgents. 

(2) Workers' strikes at the heavy industry centers of Samara (on the 
Volga) and in Kazakhstan. 

(3) Strikes, riots, and stubborn resistance to MVD troops by the popula- 
tion of the concentration-camps systems of Karaganda (Central Asia), 
Norilsk (North- Western Siberia), Komsomolsk (Russian Far East), and 
Vorkuta (North of European Russia). 

(4) Subversive activity of students' political organizations in Moscow, 
Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Kaluga, Blagoveshchensk, and several other places. 

(Rumors concerning the arrest of groups of students by the MVD in the 

big centers of Russia were broadly circulated among the population. This 

compelled the Government for the first time to break its curtain of silence 

and publish reports about the arrests in its own press, thereby acknowledging 

the existence of active anti-Communist groups among the younger 

generations.) 

These are the major and the most publicized facts. There are a number of 

others, though less conspicuous, but no less dramatic. All this took place against 

the general background of a marked tendency among the population toward 

greater self-reliance. Farmers, workers, intellectuals — began to act bolder, speak 

somewhat louder. Churches became more crowded, with young faces more 

conspicuous among the congregations. Several books appeared in Moscow, the 

contents of which — had they been published only 2 years ago — would have cost 

their authors at least lifetime in prison. 

(b) Weakening of the Government' s power of control. — Stalin's death and the fall 
of Beria have seriously undermined the hypnotic power of Soviet propaganda 
myths. The weird spell began to vanish. The myths of the "indestructible" 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVTUNISM 5 

unity of Stalin's loval disciples and comrade-in-anns, of the "invincibility of 
the iVIVD" and manv others were exposed in all their ridiculous absurdity. The 
people began to reaUze that the monsters in the Kremlin and their bemedaled 
MVD henchmen are but ordinary mortals. ,. c j 

The formidable 3-barreled machine of control which obediently satished any 
whim of the defunct dictator, broke up into its 3 original elements; with the 
mutually suspicious apparatus of the administration (Alalenkov) and the party 
(Khrushchev) subjecting the MVD to bilateral and jealous supervision. 

(1) Weakening of the overall Government machine.— This has not only seriously 
crippled the MVD, which cannot effectively serve two mutually distrustful 
masters, but has also powerfully shaken the entire Government structure from 
its verv summit to the very bottom. . 

In tiie back of his mind everv official, big, or little alike, constantly worries how 
he is to behave in order not to provoke the suspicion of, and eventually vengeance 
from one of the rivaling factions. Trained to demonstrate his loyalty through 
obsequious kowtowing to his seniors (no matter to what organization they belong) 
and profuse glorification of the supreme leader, he is now at a loss how to meet 
the new situation. Whom is he to eulogize? How is he to display his vigilance 
and denounce his colleagues, higher or lower in rank, if this might possibly arouse 
the wrath of one of the antagonistic groups. Thus, the system of mutual spying 
has slackened considerably. . . ^ • , u x-^ x 

Conscious of the sentiment of the population the Soviet official hestitates now 
to antagonize it verv much. In one word he is no longer as efficient a servant 
of the regime as he used to be. His main preoccupation now is to survive. 

(2) Weakening of the MVD machine— The plight of the MVD is still worse. 
The purge of the pro-Beria element is still on. It has removed a great number 
of top, middle, and rank-and-file officers. The old hands prefer to play it safe. 
They refuse to use their owai initiative and imagination. More and more they 
look up to their superiors for guidance. x x • cix ^ 

(The trial of the MVD spv Mueller-Khorunzhy w^ho was sent to inhltrate 

the NTS has shown that had he not been so dependent on the instructions 

from his bosses in East Berlin, he might have been able to carry on much 

longer than he actually did. He w^as sentenced to 12 years in jail by the 

\merican District Court in Frankfurt/ Main in January 1954.) _ _ 

The purge, the insecuritv resulting from the dual control, a clear insight into 

the true situation prevailing in the Kremlin and first-hand information concerning 

the trends which develop in the masses, and last but not least, absolute and 

hopeless loss of faith in communism, work heavily on the morale of the MVD man. 

This explains the unprecedented treck of MVD defectors to the West. _ 

(Rastovorov in Japan, the Petrov couple in Australia, Khokhlov in H est 
Germanv, and a number of others whose names are still kept secret.) 
Exposure to anti-Communist literature and leaflets, which it is their duty to 
collect, study, and criticize, also affects the MVD men, particularly the least 

corrupt of them. t. j a r^ 

(Capt. Mikhail Tulin, an ex-political commissar of the Red Army, alter 
exposure to NTS literature, became himself a convert, joined the underground 
and finally defected when his sabotage of the Soviet counterpropaganda 
measures began to attract the attention of his superiors.) 

(3) Outioard manifestations of the Government's weakness.— Co-nscioyis of the 
ever-growing threat of popular opposition, the Government decided to embark 
onto a policy of sham concessions. However, both the Government and the 
population knew very well that the former couldn't give much, and the latter 
couldn't expect much. A totalitarian government can go along the path of reforms 
only a short distance to a certain critical point. j ,, ■ 

Farmers — The last cut in prices, promise of more consumer goods, and allevia- 
tions resulted in the general slackening of the labor effort of the people, particu- 
larly in villages. People decided that since Malenkov was so concerned about 
their welfare, they might as well relax somewhat. 

Fanners began to spend more time in their own backyards and worry little 
about deliveries to the state. Malenkov's answer was the mobilization of 
50,000 "agricultural experts" from the cities to boost up production and 
punish the saboteurs. The measure, however, proved a complete flop on 

both counts. -.t i i a 

Workers — In order to win the good graces of the workers, Malenkov announcea 
an early revision of the drastic labor law (as a matter of fact the promised liberali- 
zation "of the labor law is 1 year overdue now). The workers took full advantage 
of these promises: 

47769— 54— pt. 1 2 



6 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

In sprina; 1953, a couple of hundreds of skilled workers fresh from the state- 
run vocational schools were l)rought to work in a plant in Kasakhstan Wh.n 
they arrived they found the conditions appalling; the wooden barracks were, 
old and rickety, the food indigestible. 

The workers refused to go to work. The administration ordered them to 
go. 1 hey confronted it with a set of demands and stood pat Food de- 
liveries were stopped to them. They remained adamant. Food was again 
issued to them They didn't budge. An MVD commission came to the 
barracks and threatened them with reprisals. Thev reiterated their condi- 
tions and refused to work. 

The MVD yielded. Their demands were fully satisfied, none was arrested 

(Une should bear in mind that strikes are strictlv outlawed in the 8oviet 

Union and punishable as the gravest offense against the "the people the 

people s government, and the state.") j- > 

Pr/.soners — Malenkov's amnesty to prisoners in concentration camps proved 

lopsided. It actually affected only the short-term prisoners who are in a great 

minority and most of whom are criminals. However, this and the fall of Beria 

encouraged the concentration camp inmates to demand concessions 

In the camps of Vorkuta more than 150,000 prisoners working in 20 coal 
pits lowered their tools and presented the MVD with a set of demands 

/i AT^PA''^"'"'^ f"/'f^^t' ^^•^^- ^" ^^6 ^"^'^e of 9 days representatives of 
the MVD conducted daily negotiations with prisoners. Thev agreed to 
almost all conditions, except one— the revision of the sentences and liberation 
ot the innocent. The prisoners refused to give in. On the contrary their 
resistance grew stiff er. Leaflets began to circulate in the camps, some of 
them bearing NTS symbols and slogans. 

On the lOlh day the MVD fulfilled all the demands of the prisoners (re- 
moved bars from the windows of the barracks inside the camps removed 
nuinbers from the prisoners' backs,reduced the labor day from 12 to' 10 hours 
etc.), but one concerning the revision of the sentences', which it said had to 
be decided in Moscow. At the same time it presented the workers with an 
ultimatum to go to work or else * * *. 

About 75 percent complied, the workers from shaft No 29 (who started 
the strike) refused. MVD troops were brought. The prisoners began to 
not. Machineguns rattled; about 120 prisoners were slaughtered The 
resistance was finally broken. 

^_ Much later 150 individuals were suddenly arrested and thrown into the 

isolators (individual cells in the punitive section of the camps) 

Returned German prisoners of war who served sentence in Vorkuta and 

JNonlsk (where 320,000 prisoners went on strike in Mav and June 1953) 

report that the strikers hoped that the Americans would parachute weapons 

to them. Although they submitted to force, their spirit was not broken 

All this, and many other incidents which took place in Russia and particularly 

within the Soviet Army of occupation seem to indicate, that the revolutionary 

process has begun, or is about to begin. 

Prospects of the revolution in Russia 

The revolutionary process which now develops in Russia is a natural consequence 
ot the ideological, political, social, and economic bankruptcy of the regime Hence 
**^^r_«^volution in Russia is inevitable. Yet its timing depends on various factors' 
ihe bo Viet Government is still very strong and tenacious and will fight tooth 
and nail for survival. But the destinies of the revolution do not at the present 
moment depend so much on the determination of the Government to rule or on 
the successes of the revolutionary propaganda and underground operations 

They will greatly depend on the attitudes and the policies of the free world 
For it is the free world who unwittingly helps the Soviet Government to slow down 
if not altogether temporarily interrupt, the development of a revolutionary 
situation in Russia. 

_ There is hardly anything the Soviet Government can do internally to win the 
sincere support of the oppressed masses. Malenkov and Krushchev are as hated 
as Stalin, whose name has almost vanished from the official Soviet vocabulary 
There is only one essential difference— Stalin was feared, whereas Malenkov arid 
Krushchev are feared far less. 

The physical penetration of the Iron Curtain or the mechanical dissemination 
of the word of truth, are basically but technical problems and their solution 
depends mainly on the availability of funds and equipment. 

The battle with the MVD is dangerous, costly, and obviously an exceedingly 
difficult one. Yet it is mainly a battle of wits. Insofar this was not a losing 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMAIUNISM 7 

battle (the very existence of the NTS and its permanent growth seem to bear 
witness thereof). With the present state of affairs inside AIVD and the ever- 
growing defiance of the population, the prospects do not seem too somber. 

It may sound paradoxical but it is true, that the Soviet Government's main 
source of power to control the psj^chology of its own population comes from the 
free world's indistinct and ambiguous policy. 

It is paradoxical, because the free world through the very fact of its existence 
presents an everlasting and deadly menace to the Soviet Communist regime. 
The call of freedom is irresistible. 

Yet it is precisely the Western World which provides the bulk of the ammunition 
to the Kremlin's propaganda. Every equivocal move, every attempt at com- 
promise is readily exploited by the Soviets to present to its isolated people the 
"ugly, hypocritic face of the weak and decadent West." 

The West has never stated that the only thing it wishes is the overthrow by 
the Russian people of the hated tyrants in the Kremlin. Yet in the absence of 
such a clear declaration, how should the Russian people know that the atomic 
bomb and the belt of military bases are not directed against them — the people^as 
much as against their masters, who incidentally will be the last to suffer from an 
atomic bombardment. 

They had a very bad experience at the hands of the Nazi invaders and Soviet 
propaganda (practically unchallenged as it is) takes all pains to convince them 
that the West hates the Russian people because of its greatness and strength 
and because it covets its land. 

How can the Russians gain the assurance of the West's good intentions, if they 
are perfectly aware that a lot of propaganda directed from the West to their satel- 
lite neighbors is full of venom against the Russian people and tends to incite the 
other Communist-dominated nations against them, Russians, and not against 
their common oppressors. 

These are just but a fevr examples of the things which help the Soviet Govern- 
ment to divert the people from the course of z'evolution and enlist their reluctant 
support. 

Nothing short of a revolution will destroy the Communist regime in Russia — be 
it without a war, after the war, or during the war. 

The atom bomb is no longer a deterrent 

Without the cooperation of the Russian people with the Western World the war 
may turn into a universal catastrophe (even if no atom bombs are dropped) from 
which no actual victors will emerge. 

If through fatal blunders of Western propaganda, the Soviet Government 
would succeed in maneuvering the population of Russia so as to command its 
undivided support in the cause of the defense of the country, the entire Asiatic 
Continent will stand solidly behind the Kremlin leaders. The Communist 
conspirators will have no reason more to postpone the showdown then. 

With both sides now possessing atomic and hydrogen bombs, it is hardly 
probable that any of them would make use of these weapons until really hard 
pressed. The side which will use it first may soon find that it has put its own 
chances of winning the war into serious jeopardy. For the population of the at- 
tacked country, apart from fear will be filled with a just feeling of indignation, re- 
volt, and will for revenge — its fighting spirit will rise. 

The population of the guilty country — when exposed to atomic retaliation (no 
defense measures, no matter how effective can guarantee a 100 percent bomb- 
proofness) — may come into a state of confusion with a section of the people 
blaming their own government for bringing the calamity upon their heads. No 
doubt, such would be the reaction of the Russian people and the Kremlin knows it. 

Consequently the hydrogen bomb is not any longer really a deterrent against 
Soviet aggression. 

If any weapon is, it is rather the Air Force. But it must be capable of delivering 
more bombs (any bombs for that matter) than the enemy to paralyze his industry 
and ability to strike. This, however, requires a decisive superiority in the air. 
Does this country have it? 

The real deterrent is within the Soviet Union itself — this is the anti-Communist 
sentiment of the Russian people. 

How war can be averted 

It is, therefore, the duty of the Western governments toward their own popula- 
tion to win the unequivocal confidence of the Russian people and thus paralyze 
the treacherous designs of Soviet propaganda. 



8 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

This, however, calls for a more outspoken policy. The United States shovild 
adopt such policy even if some of her allies, lacking courage and vision, would 
refuse to follow suit. 

It is a logical step. The United States having already said "A" must now 
hasten to utter "B." The American "A" was sufficiently strong to make the 
Soviets understand that this country will never retreat to the suicidal formula of 
"peaceful coexistence." 

The Communist leaders know that America would welcome a change of the 
regime in Russia, that theoretically this is the ideal political goal. Because it is 
still an implicit theoretical goal, in practice — so far — the United States is doing 
little to attain it. But the Soviets are well aware that the day will come when 
this will become the ultimate objective of a practical policy. And because this is 
inevitable, and because when this happens Malenkov's and Khrushchev's days 
will be counted, thej^ may decide to strike a preventive blow. 

But they do not necessarily have to strike in Europe, even though European 
defenses are still so weak. The blow may, and in all probability will come in 
Asia with all the ensuing consequences. That is — 

(a) confronting the United States with the dilemma — either to enter into 
a major Asiatic conflict, or finally lose all influence in Asia. The latter 
alternative would force the whole of Asia into the Soviet orbit and would 
fatally injure the prestige of the United States all over the world, Russia 
included; 

(6) retention — at least in the initial stage — of an ostensible state of neu- 
trality by the Soviet Union with all the formidable privileges of this status; 

(c) invitation to the United States to drop the first atom bomb on say, 

China, or Indochina, or whatever other place in Asia, not on Russia. (There 

hardly will be any other alternative for the United States but to drop the 

bomb if they get involved in land combat in Asia). 

The danger of war, and for that matter the chance for a revolution in Russia, 

have never been so real. Yet the revolution — sooner or later — is inevitable, 

while the war not necessarily is, provided — of course — America acts energetically. 

The first immediate step to take is to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet 

Governnient. This dramatic act will demonstrate better than any words that 

the United States does not want to deal with a government of bandits. It will 

also permit the United States to oppose the tyrannic Soviet clique with a free and 

truly democratic Russian force. What could prove better to the Russian people 

the true intentions of American people? 

If, however, a Soviet provocation still comes in Asia (and chances are that it 
will), the United States while fighting delaying actions with the help of Chinese 
Na,tionalist troops (under no condition should American sildiers be landed in 
Asia) strongly supported from the air and sea, should launch with all the might a 
crushing propaganda attack on the Soviet Union. But this could be successfully 
achieved only in close cooperation with the Russian revolutionary forces. 

The Chairman. You may now continue your testimony. 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Siuce my arrival in this country I felt that it was 
extremely important • 

Senator Welker. May we have the date of your arrival, please? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF, November 1947. I thought it was my duty to 
try to explain to the American people the enormous danger that 
threatens their very existence. Just before I have been speaking of 
it when I was requested, I feel that it is my obligation now as a man 
who has received hospitality in this country and learned to admire the 
people to speak even when I am not requested because I have seen 
things with my own eyes. I know that there is a terrific conspiracy 
against this country that is hatched in the Soviet Union in Moscow, 
and no matter how peacefully the people in this country are disposed, 
they cannot change the trend of the events unless the Soviet efforts 
are paralyzed at home. 

It is my sincere conviction that the Western World -willingly or 
unwittingly digs its own grave. The present policy of ambiguity, 
indecision, and half measures helps (a) the Soviet regime to strengthen 
its positions which otherwise have been seriously shaken and, (6) to 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 9 

paralyze the evergrowing spontaneous process of revolutionization of 
the Russian masses. There are two principal forces at play in Russia 
today One is hatred of the regime, which is the revolutionary 
stimulus The other is the determination to defend the country, 
which is the patriotic stimulus. Since the revolutionary stimulus is 
inspired by patriotism, the peonle, if faced with danger threatening 
the country as a whole, will actually be swept by their patriotic 

emotions. . , i ^i ^ 

Hence if the Government can convince the people that a war 
would lead to dismemberment of the country and the enslavement of 
the population, then the Soviet Government wdl really have no reason 
to fear a war. I mean no reason other than any country would have. 

If on the contrary, the Russian people gained the impression that 
there is no immediate threat of war or if they realize that this war, if 
it comes, will be waged only exclusively against the clique m AIoscow, 
then the patriotic stimulus will reinforce the revolutionary stimulus. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Did you say if the Russian Govermnent had no 
need to fear a war? 

Mr BoLDYREFF. If the Soviet Government can assure the people 
that a war that may come actually will lead to the dismemberment of 
the country, of the Russian State, and the enslavement of the Russian 
population, then if they succeed in convincing the people of that they 
will have no reason whatsoever to fear a war except on par with any 

other country. , ^ -n ■ r^ 

Senator Welker. It is your testimony that the Russian Govern- 
ment, you feel, would not tell the Russian people the truth? 

Air. Boldyreff. Exactly that is what I say, it will not. 

Senator Welker. It will not tell them the truth? 

Air. Boldyreff. No. 

Senator Welker. Then it is our obligation to impress the people 
of Russia rather than the Government? 

Air. Boldyreff. Exactly. 

Senator W^elker. Thank you very much. .,,,,. ^, 

Air. Boldyreff. The situation as it is today is the loUowmg: ihe 
Soviet Government is trying to do all it can to convince the Soviet 
people that the atmosphere in the world is exactly the same as it was 
when the Soviets w^ere attacked by the Germans actually when the 
Germans wanted to enslave the population. They want to create 
a similar psychological atmosphere and in the absence of any inter- 
ference on our part with that propaganda, with the isolation of the 
Soviet people as it is, and with the policies of the Western World as 
they are, it is not too great a task for the Soviet Government to 

achieve. „ . , ^ c ^.x. ■ 

That the Soviet Government is not afraid of war, a war ot their 
own type, a war such as they have started in Korea, or are now con- 
ducting in Indochina can be clearly seen, for instance, from the follow- 
ing facl: Isn't it symptomatic that the Communists have increased 
their pressure in Indochina twice, both times to coincide with the con- 
ferences in Berlin and in Geneva? 

Air. Arens. Professor, what is the Kremlin's greatest fear, ba?ed 
upon your observations and contact with the underground? 



10 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The Kremlin's greatest fear is the threat of an 
internal revolution. 

Senator Welker. And not massive retaliation from the atomic or 
hydrogen bomb? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The hydrogen bomb is no longer a deterrent. It 
is no longer a deterrent for the following reasons: First of all, the 
Soviets possess a hydrogen bomb as well as the United States and 
both countries know that the side that will drop the bomb first may 
put the chances of winning the war into serious jeopardy, for the 
population of the attacked country, apart from here, will be filled 
with a just feeling of indignation, revolt, and have the will for revenge. 

Mr. Arens. Has there been any significant revolutionary activity 
in the Soviet Union since the solidification of the Red regime? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Certainly. After the death of Stalin and the fall 
of Beria, the following dramatic events have taken place: First of 
all, you remember what was the attitude of the Red Army of occupa- 
tion during the riots of East Germans and how numerous were the 
cases when officers and soldiers, defying the orders, came in support 
of the insurgents. Second, there were strikes at the centers of heavy 
industry in Kuybj^shev on the Volga and in Kazakhstan. 

There were riots, strikes, and stubborn resistance to MVD troops 
in the concentration camp systems of Vorkuta (North Russia, 
European Russian), Norilsk (Northwest Siberia), Karaganda (Central 
Asia), and Komsomolsk (the Russian Far East). 

In Vorkuta, for instance, 150,000 prisoners refused to work in the 
coal pits, and faced the Government with a set of demands. It is 
interesting to note that for the first time the Soviet Government 
yielded to most of them. For 10 days the strike was on, and on the 
10th day the Government decided to give in and actually fulfilled all 
the demands of the prisoners except one, which was to revise the sen- 
tences and liberate the innocent prisoners. That, they said, Moscow 
could decide only. 

After they agreed to satisfy the workers on all other counts they 
ordered them to go back to work. Seventy-five percent of them con- 
tinued to riot. Machineguns were brought in and 120 individuals 
were killed. The strike was broken but the spirit is stiU on. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the will of these people was 
so strong against this type of oppression that they were willing to 
fight tanks with their bare hands; is that not correct? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Exactly that is it, and the German prisoners of 
war to whom I have spoken recently who returned from Vorkuta and 
Norilsk said that the prisoners were all the time hoping that weapons 
would be parachuted to them by Americans. Of course, their hope 
was not realized. 

Mr. Arens. Professor, what are the instrumentalities by which the 
masters in the Kremlin inidertake the control, not only over the 
people but over the people in the Iron Curtain countries which are 
captives? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Well, there are two ways of controlling the people. 
One is the psychological control, which is resulting from a special 
atmosphere which is created by Soviet propaganda, by trying to en- 
force into the mentality of the Soviet individual certain myths such 
as, for instance, as was the myth of the invincibility of the MVD. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 11 

Mr. Arexs. What is the MVD? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The Soviet secret pohce; or the myth of the unity 
of Stahn's comrades in arms. The recent events, the death of Stahn 
and the fah of Beria, have completely torpedoed these myths and the 
spell began to vanish. The people began to react. They began to 
act in a more bolder way and speak somewhat louder. Symptoms of 
that could be traced all over the country. 
Mr. Arens. Is the purge still on? 

Mr. Boldyreff. The purge is still on, particularly in the MVD, 
in the secret police, which actually contributes to the weakening of 
this service because people do no longer want to use their initiative. 
They don't want to use their imagination. They look up to the 
superiors for guidance. The unprecedented — mind you, the unprece- 
dented — trick of Soviet diplomatic, and I should say particularly 
secret police, top officers, the trick of their desertion to the W est is 
unprecedented. You have that Rastovorov in Japan. You have 
the couple of Petrovs in Australia. You have Khokhlov here. AMiy 
do they run away? 

We know that before the diplomats were also exposed to the dangers 
of facing purges in Russia — for instance, Kamennev, Maysky, Krasin, 
Joffee and so on— but they all came back. Why? Because they 
were sure that the Government was stable. Today it is the MVD, 
the secret pohce official, who sees better than anybody else what is 
going on in Moscow. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairm,an, may I inquire? 
The Chairmax. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. You have stated now with respect to the fear 
that the Communists have with respect to Russia itself. Does that 
include the fear that they have of their own army? 

.Mr. Boldyreff. Yes, to a certain extent that is true. You see, 
the 3 battle machines of oppression, that is, the party apparatus, the 
administration apparatus, the MVD, which actually obeyed Stalin's 
every wish, has today broken up into 3 elements, 3 original elements, 
with the party and^ the administration's subjecting the MVD, the 
secret police, to a jealous, suspicious supervision. 

This in itself has disorganized the control of the Government and 
has also produced or introduced a new element on the political scene 
and that is the arm.y or its top leadership. 

Mind you, all these officers, although they are carrying gilt-edged 
Communist cards in their pockets, are in their present prominent 
positions, not because of their services to the Communist Party or 
the Government, but because of their brilliant record in the war. 
Their popularity, and they know it, and their position of strength, 
and they know 'it too, depend on their popularity with the rank and 
file Red' army soldier who actually is a conscripted peasant, or a con- 
scripted w^orker, or a representative of the most unprivileged masses 
of the population. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, if I might further inquire, I will 
end my interrogation. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Senator Welker. Professor, is this a reasonable conclusion? That 
the Soviet conspiracy, or the m_asters in the Kremlin, are not only 
afraid of their own Russian people, but of the many satellites that 



12 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

they have, and that is one of the major reasons why they have never 
moved on Western Europe? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. No ; I don't think that they have moved on 
Western Europe, nor do I think that they will m,ove on Western 
Europe, because they are afraid of the satellites. I think that they 
want to do a much more effective thing. They want to drag this 
country in a major Asiatic war. 

Mr. Arens. What country? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. This counti7f . 

Senator Welker. Major, or continuing small ones? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. No ; a major one. 

The Chairman. Let m.e ask you there, Professor, what do you 
think from your knowledge are the chances of war at this time? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The chances of war at this time are very consider- 
able. I think the danger was never so real. It has never been so real 
for the following reasons: The Comn unist regiTte knows that the 
United States of America will never retreat to thf suicidal formula 
of peaceful coexistence. That is clear. Everybody knows it. Since 
they know that they also know that theoretically as an implicit goal 
the United States would like to see a change of the Soviet regime. 
Because this is still a theoretical goal in practice very little is done by 
the United States to achieve that goal, and because the Soviets know 
that, the day will come when this goal will be lowered to a more prac- 
tical level and become the object of practical policy, and because they' 
know that this is inevitable and because they know that then the days 
of IVIalenkov and Khruschev will be counted, they may strike a pre- 
ventive blow. 

The atomic bomb i? not a deterrent because both sitk^s have it. 
If any weapon is a deterrent it is the Air Force, but then this Air Force 
must have an absolute superiority. I mean it must have the capacity 
of delivering bombs, for that matter any bombs, on the ene.'ny to crip- 
ple his industry and make it impossible for him to strike back. 

The Chairman. In other words, when you refer to bombs you do 
not mean only the atom bomb? You mean the hydrogen bomb, the 
cobalt bomb, and so forth? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Any bomb, even conventional bombs, but this 
superiority of air force does not exist today, still does not exist and 
the Soviets know it, so they may strike a preventive blow. They may 
strike it in Asia, not in Europe, although Europe, as I have seen it, is 
really incapable of defending against a real attack. 

They will strike in Asia with all the ensuing consequences and that 
is confronting this country with a dilemma, either to embark into that 
terrific war in xisia, or lose completely prestige in all the Asiatic Cont- 
inent and push it into the Soviet orbit. 

Second, it will per.mit them to retain, at least for the initial stage, a 
state of ostensible neutrality with all the enormous economic, psycho- 
logical, and political advantages, and it will force the United States to 
drop the first atomic bomb on China, on Indochina or any other place 
in Asia, not on Russia, with all the consequences, because it is abso- 
lutely clear that the United States cannot win a land war against the 
Chinese on the continent. 

Mr. Arens. There would be a Soviet technical neutrality while all 
this process is going on? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Exactly, and the United States will be accused of 
having dropped that inhuman bomb. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 13 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire for a question? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Professor, would you give us your best opinion 
with respect to whether or not the Asiatics generally are united in the 
Communist cause? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I doii't think that the Asiatics are so united in the 
Communist cause, but the Asiatics are definitely prey to certain 
psychological processes which result from their past when they were 
governed by white people. This the Soviet Government exploits 
tremendously. It boosts up their nationalism and it tells them, 
''Now, for the first time for many centuries you again are among the 
most progressive nations that are bringing order for the world and 
you will fight those egotistical and selfish Em-opeans and Americans 
who preach colonial policy." 

Senator Welker. If I may have one more question, Mr. Chairman, 
I will be through. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Could you inform the committee as to your 
best knowledge of the number of devout Communists in Russia today? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I think that if I have to answer this question 
sincerely, I think that there is none. Even Malenkov and Khruschev 
themselves are not devout Communists themselves, convinced Com- 
munists. If there are convinced Communists they are outside of the 
Soviet Union and just because they are convinced and fanatic Com- 
munists and they are convinced because they have not experienced 
communism on their own skins, they are loyal to the government which 
they feel is theirs and which aspires to become a world government. 

Therefore, it sort of transcends in importance the Government of 
the United States, which is territorial. 

The Chairman. Professor, Senate Resolution 247 was recently 
introduced in the United States Senate by Senator McCarran and 
myself. I would like to read it to you and get your opinion on it. 
Then I would like to ask you what is the most important thing that 
this country can do to separate the masses of the Russian people 
away from this Kremlin control and destroy this international con- 
spiracy that is threatening the peace and the security of the entire 
world. 

The resolution reads as follows: 

(1) Whereas it is morally wrons; for the Government of the United States to 
maintain diplomatic relations with the band of Kremlin international outlaws 
who, by stealth, and ruthless power, have enslaved one-third of the people of the 
world; and whereas the outposts and advance positions of this outlaw band, 
received and tolerated under the guise of "diplomatic missions," in the United 
States and other countries of the free world are in fact nests of espionage, seditious 
propaganda, and sabotage: Therefore, it is the sense of the Senate that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States should sever diplomatic relations with the alleged 
Government of Soviet Russia and with the alleged governments of the countries 
which have been enslaved by the alleged Government of Soviet Russia. 

(2) Whereas the tentacles of international communism are ever reaching for 
new areas of conquest, and this spreading menace, can be effectively combated 
only by concerted action of the free nations: Therefore, it is the sense of the Senate 
that the Government of the United States should convoke an internation.il 
conference of the free nations of the world for the purpose of agreeing upon united 
action (a) to destroy the Communist fifth column, and (b) to resist further aggres- 
sion by international communism. 



47769— 54— pt. 1- 



14 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMAIUNISM 

I would like to know what you think of that method of procedure 
and what is the fii-st immediate step that should be taken to separate 
the Russian people from this autocratic control of the Commimist 
gang in the Ivremlin? 

^Ir. BoLDYREFF. I think that the text of this resolution actually 
is the first clear expression of the step that should be taken to achieve 
the goal you specified. 

The Chairman. Wliy do you say that. Professor? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Because I feel that the break of diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Government would in a most dramatic way show 
to the Russian people that the United States does not want to support 
the government of bandits, that it actually wants to see them free. 
Then when you \vill sever diplomatic relations, the power of the 
traditional diplomatic inhibitions which today prevent this Govern- 
ment doing to the Soviet Government what the Soviet Government 
does to the United States and has since its veiy rise to power in 
Russia — I mean to say that so far, because of the fact that you have 
diplomatic relations, you actually permit the Soviet Government to 
undermine you from within hj fifth-column activities, by all sorts of 
other provocations, whereas you strictly confine your actions to 
normal diplomatic procedure. 

Mr. Arexs. Professor, may I inqmre there? It has been suggested 
that the United States Government by maintaining diplomatic rela- 
tions with Soviet Russia and ^\-ith the Iron Curtain governments is 
enabled to procure intelligence information which we perhaps could 
not otherwise obtain. 

"\ATiat is your reaction to that suggestion? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. My reaction to that suggestion is based on, I 
think, quite reasonable information and that is, that the information^ 
the intelligence that the United States Government gets through its 
diplomatic representaj:ives is so negligible that it does not actually 
justify the maintenance of a small group in Moscow and at the same 
time permit the Soviet Government to organize a number of official 
and semiofficial Soviet representatives which are actually doing a very 
efl'ective job of spying. 

Mr. Arexs. Is not this effective job of sp^nng also. Professor, 
multiplied by the fact that they have control of the Iron Curtain 
countries, in the United States? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Absolutely. 

Mr. Arexs. In other words, they have numerous embassies, 
consulates, legations, and international organizations in the United 
States and in the other free nations of the world which are nests for 
espionage, and sabotage, and pohtical subversion while we in Soviet 
Russia have 1 or 2 establishments which are under close surveillance 
by the Soviets. Is that a true statement of the picture? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. That is true. 

The Chairmax^ Then you think this is one of the first steps that 
should be taken. 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I think that this is the real step conducive to the 
acceleration of revolutionary process in Russia. 

Mr. Arexs. Assuming that this Government of the United States 
should sever diplomatic relations with all the Iron Curtain govern- 
ments and undertake to convoke a conference of the free nations of the 
world to destroy the Communist fifth column, on the basis of your 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 15 

background and experience and contact with the underground behind 
the Iron Curtain, could you tell us what would be the reaction of the 
rank and file people to such a step? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The rank and file of the people, particularly if 
then — and I assume that this* would be natural — if then the United 
States undertakes to pass the message to the people in a more effective 
way than it is doing today. I mean by balloons and so on and so 
forth. It will create a situation in the Soviet Union which vail com- 
pletely paralyze the activity of the Soviet Government. 

For a moment, supposing that from today on the United States 
would start sending balloons with leaflets, and they are very effective — • 
I know it from experience — ^balloons to the Soviet Union with the true 
message of its intentions, and so on and so forth, and that could come 
like a tornado eveiy hour on the hour, thousands of balloons, thousands 
of leaflets, how would the Soviet Government, or how could the Soviet 
Government, under these cu'cumstances move the population to 
answer this paper attack with bullets when they know how the popu- 
lation hates and fears a war, and particularly if it were aware that the 
population now knows exactly the aims of the United States? 

Then, it would also show its absolute inability to stop this rain of 
information, rather, rain of propaganda, the truth, and the Iron Cur- 
tain would be literally smashed. Smash theu- Iron Curtain! Break 
the isolation of the people! Establish confidence among them. The 
Soviet Government wiR fold. The caU of freedom is irresistible. The 
only thing they don't know is that people here are free. 

Mr. Arexs. Professor, are you con\'inced beyond the shadow of a 
doubt that the rank and file of the people behind the Iron Curtain are 
antiregime? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Absolutely. I have given you a number of ex- 
amples. I could cite many more, but the very interesting fact is that 
the Soviet Government in order to %vin the support or the confidence, 
the sympathy of the people, started a number of concessions. Of 
course, the people know as weU as the Government that a totalitarian 
regime can go along the path of reforms only a short distance, to a 
certain critical point, or it folds. But the fact of the Soviet Govern- 
ment wanting to make these concessions has shown to the people its 
wickedness and the result was very unpleasant for the Soviet regime. 

The farmers, for instance, spent most of their tim^e in their own 
backyards and stopped worrying about deliveries to the state. The 
situation became so bad that Malenkov had to mobilize 50,000 "agri- 
cultural experts," in quotes, from the cities to send them to the agri- 
cultural areas to boost up agriculture and punish saboteurs. 

Mr. Arexs. When was this? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. That was in 1953. The result is a complete flop 
of the measure on both counts. We know that. We know that from 
the official statement of the Soviet Union, the catastrophical flop of 
the plan to till the %irgin land, and so on and so forth. 

The workers began to strike. You know that according to the law 
in the Soviet Union strikes are strictly outlawed and gravely punish- 
able as one of the gravest oflPenses against the people, the people's 
government, and the state. Yet, for instance, in 1953, in June, a 
couple of hundred of young people, freshly graduated from Soviet-run 
vocational schools tried to work in a plant in Kazakhstan. Wlien they 
came there they saw the conditions were just appaUing. The food 



16 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

was indigestible. They refused to go to work. The management 
ordered them to the workshops. They confronted it with a set of 
demands. The management refused to give them food. They didn't 
budge. The management sent food back to them. They didn't 
change their attitude. The MVD camt; in with machineguns and so 
on, and threatened them with reprisals. They reiterated their de- 
mands. The result was that the MVD yielded to all the demands, all 
were satisfied. Wliat about the fact that the Soviet press recently 
has published that the MVD, the Secret Police, has arrested groups 
of students in Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kaluga, Blagove- 
shchensk, and some other places, accused for subversive anti-Com- 
munist activities in Russia? 

This is the first time that the Soviet Government had to publish 
such reports in its own press and thereby acknowledge the existence 
of opposition among the younger generation of the population. This 
actually happened because rumors about these arrests were so broadly 
circulated in the population that they had no way but to break their 
curtain of silence. 

Mr. Arens. Professor, this question might be in the mind of the 
average or certain American citizens, and I would like to pose it to 
you. Since the Soviets profess belief in peace and creation of a peace- 
ful world why w^ould it not be well for the United States to sit down 
with the Soviet diplomats and work out some kind of a treaty, or 
pact, or understanding whereby we would have peace, whereby we 
give them what they need or what they say they need, and we would 
get what we need, and then we would proceed in a peaceful world? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. This is absolutely impossible, first of all, because 
of the nature of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government can 
exist and carry out its experiments only by force of the Secret Police, 
by totalitarian measures. The fact that there exists a section of the 
world which is free in itself is a deadly menace to the Soviet regime, 
and so long as it exists the Soviet regime will never feel secure. 

Mr. Arens. Couldn't we work out a treaty or an agreement or a 
pact of some kind with their signatures on it that would be binding 
on it? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I don't want to even discuss the value of Soviet 
signatures. We have seen the value of them many times. However, 
let's forget that for a while. The very fact of a signed document will 
not e iminate a situation in the world when the world is divided and is 
half free, half slave. Do you remember the words of President 
Lincoln who said that a state — or a world — half free or half slave 
cannot exist, that it either will become all slaves or all free, and that 
is the law of nature. 

Mr. Arens. Is an organized resistance movement possible today in 
the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Boldyreff. It is not only possible; it is developing quite 
seriously. The very fact that the Soviet Government had to kidnap 
one of the overt workers of the organization, the NTS, in Berlin and 
send a special assassin from Moscow to eliminate, to kill an under- 
ground leader shows how seriously it is concerned about the activities. 

The Chairman. Whom do you refer to there, Dr. Trushnovich, 
T-r-u-s-h-n-o-v-i-c-h? 

Mr. Boldyreff. Trushnovich, that's right. 

The Chairman. Could you give us some more information on his 
kidnapping. That happened about April 13? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 17 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. That happened on April 13. 

The Chairman. By a double agent named Glaske? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Glaske, that's right. 

The Chairman. Could you give us, the committee, information: 
further on that kidnaping? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. The kidnaping of Dr. Trushnovich was a very 
clever plan that the Soviets had in mind. It had a double-edged 
blade. First of all, they wanted to kidnap this man and pretend that 
he came of his free volition. Second, they wanted also to announce 
to the world that Trushnovich lured and kidnaped the double agent 
Glaske. Thus, they wanted to discredit the underground movement 
in the eyes of the world and then they wanted to create a halo of hero 
around the head of their own double agent, Glaske, and thereby make 
it possible for his wife and the entire net of his assistants to operate 
freely in the Western Zone. 

They also thought that it might be possible later to let Glaske 
ostensibly escape and become even a greater hero in the eyes of the 
West and have a greater opportunity to spy for them. 

However, this plan didn't work exactly as they thought because of 
the unreliability, professional unreliability, of the MVD, which is 
also a direct result of the weakening of the service w^hich started after 
the fall of Beria. The kidnapers have done a very crude job, but 
when they brought Trushnovich, who was unconscious, to the Soviet 
side, they informed their superiors that everything went according to 
plan^ — no traces were left, nobody had seen- — and the Soviet Govern- 
ment came out with the statement "Trushnovich came of his owa 
free will and brought with him one of the anti-Communist leaders in 
Germany, Glaske." 

Only 2 hours later the Berlin police came out with a statement 
which showed that the apartment from which Trushnovich was 
kidnaped was all splattered with blood and brought three \vitnesses 
who saw how the unconscious body of Trushnovich was carried to 
the car with Doctor Glaske peacefully walking beliind, sort of closing 
the procession. 

Through this professional unreliability, through the crudeness of 
the agents of the Soviet regime, the Government has been led into 
one of its greatest propaganda traps because it had issued a statement 
sealed and signed: "We have kidnaped Trushnovich because," they 
said, "he is in our hands. He came of his own free volition." That 
is what happened to Trushnovich. 

Now, you know that Trushnovich was an overt worker. He 
didn't know any of the secrets of the underground and of course, as an 
overt worker, he had never taken any precautions for his safety. 
They kidnaped him, but the leader of the underground, the actual 
sort of general staff worker, Okolovich, they tried to silence with a 
bullet, and that happened, because there were three unsuccessful 
attempts to kidnap Okolovich, and the MVD has seen that it is be- 
coming almost impossible, so what do they do? They kidnap an 
overt worker and they attempt to murder the activity leader of the 
underground. 

Logically it should be the reverse. But, since they do it this way, 
it shows how nervous the MVD must be if it resorts to methods of 
terror, because its objective definitely is to intimidate an effort, but 
you cannot intimidate a determined effort. 



18 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. Do you have a question, Senator Welker? 

Senator Welker. If he has finished that phase I wanted to ask 
him one question. A moment ago, you related how effective balloons 
and the dropping of messages from the free world on Russia might be, 
on the people who seek freedom. I will ask you this: Do you have 
any knowledge with respect to the effectiveness of Radio Free Europe 
or the Voice of America as it beams over into the Russian people? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. I must say that within the framework, within the 
limits, of the official policies of the United States, the material that 
the Voice of America sends, the content of propaganda is not bad. It 
has considerably improved as compared to what it has been doing 
before. 

Senator Welker. May I ask you this? 

Do they have many receiving sets that can receive those messages? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. That is exactly what I wanted to come to. How- 
ever, the Voice of America is a legitimate radio station and as a legit- 
imate radio station it is bound by diplomatic considerations, and it 
has to use only certain wave lengths. Its broadcasts are jammed 
and therefore a considerable proportion of what they say is actually 
wasted. 

Senator Welker. That is true especially with respect to Moscow? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. That's right. 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, you never get that Voice in 
Moscow. Is that a fair conclusion? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Sometimes vaguely you can get it, sometimes, 
but very rarely. The point is that what we need is a different thing. 
For instance, the underground has a clandestine model radio station, 
Free Russia. This is a black station and it has no inhibitions. It 
actually broadcasts on Soviet wavelengths whenever it can come, 
butting in, trying to use the pauses in the Soviet programs to throw 
in a slogan, and caustic remarks and a message, and so on. 

Then it also gives eight regular daily programs on its own wave- 
lengths, which are, of course, exposed to jamming, but it then moves 
to a neighboring wavelength, asldng the hstener to tune to it, and it 
takes some time for the Soviet jammers to tune their installations to 
a new wavelength. Thus, there is always a margin of a couple of 
minutes when the listener can get every word of the message and since 
the messages are always frequently repeated anyone who really has 
the persistence will get the entire message without fail. 

Apart from that. Radio Free Russia butts into conversations be- 
tween, for instance, Soviet flyers. You know that when Soviet 
planes fly out patrolling Germany, and so on, they have communica- 
tion among themselves all the time. They are calling each other 
giving directions and having discussions. Well, operating on these 
wavelengths, the radio can actually affect these people and since they 
are sitting there alone, or 2 or 3 of them, they can listen to it with 
impunity. 

When the planes are landed, for instance, and get directions from 
the airport, they must listen to this particular wave. If you actually 
get on the same wave, then the Communists who sit in the airport 
know very well that they can't do anything to stop the man in the 
plane from listening to the message. 

Dm-ing maneuvers the tanks, for instance, have great facilities to 
listen to underground messages. That is what Radio Free Russia 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 19 

does. Of course, compared to the Voice of America, or BBC, it is 
a mosquito, but it has potential penetrative power incomparably 
greater than that of the Voice of America, 

Senator Welker. One more question and that is this, Professor: 
What does the secret police do to discourage the possession and use 
of radios, that might receive the messages from the Russian under- 
ground or from Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America? Is there 
sort of police action against radios generally? 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Officially there is no police action against radios 
generally, but the radio sets that are capable of receiving shortwave 
broadcasts are not very numerous in shops and are very costly. Thus, 
the people who can afford to have them are those usually in the higher 
brackets and are more sort of loyal to the Government. Loyal is not 
the word. I should say they are more apprehensive than the rest of 
them. The majority of the population, however, depend on what they 
call radio dots. 

These are little loudspeakers that are fixed on the walls of practically 
every room in the Soviet Union because the Soviet Government needs 
these loudspeakers to make propaganda to the people, and these 
loudspeakers are wired to the local relay station. 

This relay station actually gets the broadcasts of the big stations 
like Moscow, Leningrad, and so on, and then relays it tlirough wire to 
the individual. If you transmit on the Moscow wave, then actually 
automatically every individual in the workshop, or in his home will 
hear your voice on that radio dot. 

The Chairman. Professor, your complete statement has been 
filed with the committee and has been made a part of our records. 
We appreciate your appearing here this morning and cooperating with 
this committee. We know that we will be in touch with you and you 
will be in touch with our staff for further conferences and further 
testimony. 

At this time we will excuse you this morning as we have another 
witness. We want to conclude before the lunch hour. 

We want to thank you very much for your testimony and for your 
statements tliis morning. 

Mr. BoLDYREFF. Thank you very much, Senator Jenner. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Call your next witness. 

Mr. Arens. The next witness is Col. William F, Heimlich. Colonel 
Heimlich, will you please come forward? 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn to testify? 

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. Heimlich. I do, 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. HEIMLICH, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman, Will you state your full name for our record? 
Mr. Heimlich. My name is William F. Heimlich. 
The Chairman. Wliere do you reside, Mr, Heimlich? 
Mr. Heimlich, Washington, D. C, sir. 
The Chairman. What is your business or profession? 
Mr. Heimlich. I am with the Gray Manufacturing Co., a business- 
man. 



20 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. Proceed with the questioning, 
Mr. Arens. Colonel, give us just a word about your background, 
with particular reference to the service which we understand you had 
in the United States Army as Chief of Intelligence in Berlin. 

Mr. Heimlich. I was designated by Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Expeditionary Forces, in February of 1945 to plan the intelligence 
phase of the Berlin operation. 

The Chairman. What year was that, sir? 

Mr. Heimlich. 1945, sir; February 6, to be exact. We were a small 
team of Americans, later American and British, a planning body which 
eventually did go to Berlin, and I was AC of S, G-2, or Chief of 
Intelligence for American Mihtary Forces in that city. 

Mr. Arens. I understand you were the initiator or operator of 
Radio RIAS for the United States Government. Is that correct? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. In early 1948 — I should say in late 1947-^ 
it was decided by the authorities in Berlin, with approval from 
Washington, that we would answer the vilifications and anti-American 
propaganda which were pouring out of the Soviet mills and their 
satellite mills, and with that we built a powerful broadcasting station 
m Berlin known as RIAS for Radio In American Sector. That is 
now one of the world's most powerful stations. 

Mr. Arens. Since your disassociation from the United States 
Army — what date was that, if you please? 

Mr. Heimlich. I left the military on the 1st of January 1947 to 
become Deputy Chief of Political Affairs for the military government 
in Berlin. I became Chief of RIAS a year later, and I left Germany 
as an American employee in the autumn of 1949 — September 15 or 20. 

Mr. Arens. Since your disassociation from that activity you have 
on occasions returned to Europe, Central Europe, there to acquire 
information; is that correct? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. When was your most recent trip to Europe to acquire 
information? 

Mr. Heimlich. In 1953, when I went to seven of the European 
countries on the perimeter of the Soviet Empire on a mission for the 
Foreign Relations Committee of this Senate. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, you have a prepared statement which you have 
brought with you this morning? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the prepared 
statement be at this point incorporated in the record, and the colonel 
proceed to discuss the contents of the statement in a conversational 
tone and manner. 

The Chairman. The statement may go into the record and become 
a part of the record of this committee. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 

Statement of William F. Heimlich 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation of your invitation to me to 
appear today before this committee. I would like to preface my remarks by 
expressing also my wholehearted support of Senate Resolution 247, which has 
been introduced in the United States Senate by Senators .Tenner and McCarran. 
Disruption of relations with the U. S. S. R. is a necessary step to be taken before 
any hope of our defeating the Communist conspiracy can be entertained. 

Five years ago this week the blockade of the city of Berlin was abandoned by 
the Soviet Union after its failure to intimidate the courageous people of Western 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 21 

Berlin and to drive out the western allies. The blockade which began in the 
spring of 1948, and continued through the grim winter of 1948-49, was one more 
move in the continuing cold war game, a move checkmated, by the determination 
of the United States to halt the spread of international communism. That move, 
indeed the entire cold war with its hot actions on the perimeter of the Soviet 
Empire, was the result of the grave miscalculations which brought about United 
States recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. That recognition gave respect- 
ability to a government of hoodlums and international cutthroats who seized 
power and kept it through force. 

Three and a half months before the end of World War II, I wa.s designated by 
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces to plan the intelligence phase 
of the Berlin Operation. I was with United States forces when we crossed the 
Elbe River and contacted the Red Army and I entered Berlin on the Fourth of 
July 1945 and remained there until the autumn of 1949. The pattern which 
Soviet imperialism took in that part of the world could serve as a model for the 
imperialist ambitions and expansionism of the U. S. S. R. in all parts of the world. 
From the vantage point of Berlin, I witnessed the collapse and destruction of the 
free forces of Poland, the enslavement of Czechoslovakia and the formation of a 
Red Government in Eastern Germany and Eastern Berlin. As Chief of Military 
Intelligence for United States forces in Berlin, in 1945-46, and responsiVjle for 
the security of those forces, I was among the first of the United States Military 
Intelligence to be confronted with the efforts of the Soviet espionage apparatus 
to penetrate subvert and destroy the military organization and foreign policy 
of the United States. Those efforts took many forms and by recounting them in 
chronological order the pattern and objectives of international communism are 
revealed. I might say that Military Intelligence then and now was unprepared 
to cope with this conspiracy. 

As early as August 1945, less than 3 months after the cessation of hostilities, a 
Soviet spy ring was uncovered in the secretarial school of the United States 
Group Control Counsel (later United States military government). German 
nationals, being trained in United States stenograj^hic and office procedures and 
methods, were threatened and intimidated by Soviet secret police into reporting 
on United States installations, commanders, directives, methods and plans. This 
was the first of many such espionage efforts which we found and destroyed. 
Members of the Soviet spy apparatus, both German and Soviet citizens, were 
found in displaced persons camps and in the case of the German nationals, in the 
em})loyment of American military government. Indeed military government 
itself had American agents of the Soviet apparatus among its officials (George 
Shaw Wheeler et al.). Because of the Soviet action in closing the frontiers of the 
Soviet Zone, we found ourselves almost from the beginning in a besieged city 
through which the Soviets could operate freely because of the international 
agreements; but where Americans were denied access to travel in the Soviet Zone 
by virtue of the Soviet determination to not honor its agreements made at London 
in November of 1944, and relating to the free travel between the various zones. 
In other words, Soviet agents could circulate freely within the American sector of 
Berlin and the other Western sectors whereas none of the Western powers could 
circidate in the Soviet Zone. The result was that German workers living in the 
Soviet sector of Berlin or in the Soviet Zone and employed in the Western Zone 
were recruited for espionage purposes by the simple expedient of holding their 
families as hostages. 

Soviet forces which entered Eastern Germany in the spring of 1945 were 
accompanied by German "quislings" who had been trained in Moscow for the 
purpose of Sovietizing Eastern German3^ The plan was exactly the same as the 
plan following World War I, which failed at that time due to the fact that early 
Soviet Government lacked military power and due to the fact that there existed 
following World War I a Government of Germany which was able to cope with 
the situation. Following World War II, the Red Army was one of the most 
powerful military organizations in the world largely because of the $12 billion 
which the United States Government granted to the U. S. S. R. during the war 
years under lend-lease. There was no German Government in 1945, thus creat- 
ing a political vacuum filled almost at once by the trained minions of the Com- 
munist international apparatus. Among those Germans trained in Russia and 
returned to head the East German Government were men like Wilhelm Pieck, 
long-time Secretary General of the German Communist Party and resident in 
Moscow during the Hitler years, and Walter Ulbricht, now Prime Minister of 
Eastern Germany and longtime Communist resident in the Soviet Union. The 
remnants of the German Sixth Army captured at Stalingrad by the Soviets had 

47769—54 — pt. 1 4 



22 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

been brainwashed and many of its personnel returned to Germany as Soviet 
agents. One of these, Paul Margraf, a high-ranking Nazi who held Hitler's 
highest decoration, returned to Berlin in the uniform of a Soviet officer and as 
Chief of the East German police. He was chief of all German police upon our 
entry into the city of Berlin. Upon capturing the city in early May 1945, the 
Soviet military commanders had established a city government made up entirely 
of dedicated Communists or Communist sympathizers and the Western Allies 
upon entering the city signed a document in the so-called Komandatura, the 
military government for Berlin, recognizing all Soviet appointments. Thus 
Berhn had, in effect, a Communist government from the outset and until the first 
free elections in the autumn of 1946 when the people of the city rejected Com- 
munist government and giving less than 20 percent of the total vote to Communist 
deputies. This number reduced radically at the next free election. 

Before elections could be held in postwar East Germany, all non-Communist 
parties were destrojed. Forced deportation, execution, kidnaping, acts of terror 
and intimidation made it impossible for normal political parties to grow, for non- 
Communist newspapers to exist, for churches to hold services or for individuals 
to speak out against the new regime. The merger of the Socialist and Communist 
Parties in Eastern Germany was not recognized by the western commandants. 

The organization of the East Berlin and East German governments begins with 
youth and so-called cultural organizations. Children were and are compelled to 
belong to young Communist organizations where indoctrination into Communist 
ideologv is accomplished in defiance of parental control, where young people are 
given intensely nationalistic, anti-Christ training and preparation for service in 
the Communist world militarj^ organizations. The propaganda mills began 
operating before the last shot had been fired. An example is Radio Berlin which 
was captured intact by the Soviet and was taking a strongly anti-American 
propaganda line even before Americans had entered the city. That radio station 
with its great studios located in the British sector of the city was denied to all . 
non-Russian and non-Communist elements, both of the Western Powers and of 
the German state. That is still true today. British authorities have refused to 
silence the station which stands in the center of their sector. 

After the elections of 1946, in which a non-Communist government was selected 
by the voters of the city of Berlin, an intensified campaign of terror was started 
against the elected officials and this culminated in September of 1948 with the 
imposition of the blockade of the citv, the expulsion of elected officials from the 
government buildings located in the Soviet sector of the city, and with the deliber- 
ate arrest and humiliation of American officials who were visiting the Eastern 
sector of Berlin in the pursuance of their assigned duties. American officers and 
civilians, including women, were repeatedlv arrested in the Soviet sector, assigned 
to humiliating tasks in filthy jails and then blandly released without apology 
after being paraded through the streets as ordinary criminals. Repeated protest 
by United States authorities in Berlin were ignored and such protests were greeted 
with jeers in the Soviet controlled press. 

While United States authorities in the citv of Berlin were undergoing the humil- 
iating task of attempting to "get along" with Soviet authorities, they were being 
denounced in the press by officially sponsored Soviet newspapers and writers with 
consequent loss of prestige in Europe. Under official policy, Americans in Ger- 
many were forced to stand helplessly by and witness the sovietization of all of 
Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The very hard core of European 
protestantism, and the imprisonment and degradation of the bishops and officials 
of the Catholic Church in the Balkan countries. United States policy was such 
that not until early 1948 were Americans able to speak out against this soviet- 
ization, this cruel expansion of the Soviet world through force and fear. Indeed, 
United States policy at that time was still being influenced by Alger Hiss, Harry 
Dexter White and others. Since 1945, Soviet and satellite writers and broad- 
casters have screamed their anti- American lies into Europe, A.sia and South Amer- 
ica. Nowhere in the world has our "Campaign of Truth" been successful in 
countering Soviet propaganda. When at long last, after years of enforced silence, 
the United States military governor was able to replv to the slanderous lies 
pumped dailv into the newspapers and over the air the Soviet took the final step 
which was to drive us out of Europe, the imposition of the blockade of Berlin. 
That blockade was the most inhuman attempt to starve out two and a Quarter 
million souls that has been made in modern historv. While there is no parallel 
to the magnificent airlift through which the United States Air Force maintained 
the life of the citv, there is also no parallel to the patience and fortitude which 
American forces in Berlin exhibited during that period. Had we then compelled 
a showdown and had we shown the proper realization of the forces and nature of 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 23 

Soviet imperialism, we might have been spared the later heartaches of Korea, of 
the Chinese collapse and of the threats to all Asia. The efforts of the military 
governor, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, only served to alert Washington to the new peril 
of international aggression. , , . . . „ 

The objectives of international communism are the eventual subjugation of all 
free peoples of the world. There can be no other interpretation of the events of 
the past 8 years. The first limited objectives have been reached. In Europe, 
we have been able onlv to deny the U. S. S. R. the rich industrial prize of Western 
Germany. The Soviet Union has been able, through strikes, sabotage, propa- 
ganda, and acts of terror, to practically eliminate the states of Italy and France 
as active opponents of communism in Europe. They have taken over the Baltic 
countries, they have annexed half of Poland and have installed their quisling 
governments in Eastern Germany, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, much 
of Austria, and have added the rich Baltic States — Latvia, Lithuania, and Es- 
tonia — to the Soviet Union. They have achieved their objectives in the Far 
East and it seems to me that they are achieving objectives in the United States by 
their attempts to divide and destroy American faith in its own institutions. 

The pattern of the Soviet imperialistic conspiracy, therefore, may be seen as 
follows: • 1 V 

(1) Through propaganda to seize the cultural media of any nation by sub- 
verting the press, radio, theater, motion pictures, and magazines to Soviet pur- 
poses. ^ , .... , . 

(2) By espionage to obtain the secrets of any country, not only military but 
industry and economic. 

(3) to destroy the morality of a state and its people by denying them access to 
their places of worship. . . 

(4) By strike, disorder, and terror to infiltrate the labor organizations and turn 
workers against entrepreneurs in a so-called class war. 

(5) To maintain steady military pressures upon the frontiers of target nations 
thus compelling huge exp"enditures for arms and diverting manpower from peace- 
ful pursuits to the wasteful pursuits of war and eventually to destroy the target 
nation either by direct military action or internal collapse. 

(6) To infiltrate the political and social body of the target nation by agents 
who appeal to so-called intellectualism, to class or creed differences and eventually 
to place such agents and dupes in positions from which they may eventually so 
affect the internal and external policies of the target nation that the ambitions of 
the Soviet Union are served. 

All of these steps are clearly visible to those of us in the United States and we 
have countless examples of the success of the Soviet planning. When the U. S. 
S. R. was granted recognition in 1933, it was a nation that was bankrupt financially 
and morally. Following that recognition and the prestige which such recognition 
brought, the U. S. S. R. masters were able to begin wholesale purges, executions, 
and deportations that eliminated most opponents of the Kremlin and terrorized 
the rest. The Soviet Embassy in Washington became a control center for espio- 
nage and subversion in the United States. There is evidence to support the belief 
that those few disloyal Americans who served the Kremlin are still free today. 
A study of the Judith Coplon file is a case in point. We have learned much 
about the Communist conspiracy in the past 9 years. But the Communists have 
also learned and improved their methods as well. Strong, militant underground 
groups exist on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Communist groups fight with 
the full force of the Kremlin behind them. The freemen still fight alone 
because our great power and prestige is shackled by our recognition of the Soviet 
Union and, under international usage and such legislation as^the Logan Act, we 
are prevented from helping forces which might destroy the Soviet Government. 

In stating some of these basic problems, it is my hope that I have been able to 
direct the attention of this committee to possible consideration of ways and means 
through which we may meet this threat to our civilization and our existence. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Colonel. 

Mr. Heimlich. Thank you, sh. 

Five years ago this week the blockade of the city of Berlin was 
abandoned by the Soviet Union after its failure to intimidate the 
courageous people of Western Berlin and to drive the Americans 
out of Berlin and out of Europe. That blockade, which began in 
the spring of 1948 and continued through the winter of 1948-49, 
was one more move in the continuing cold-war game, a move check- 



24 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

mated by the determination of the United States to halt the spread 
of international communism. That move, indeed the entire cold war 
with its hot actions on the perimeter of the Soviet Empire, was the 
result of the, to m}^ mind, grave miscalculations which brought about 
United States recognition of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1933. 
That recognition gave respectability to a government of hoodlums 
and international cutthroats who had seized power following the 
Soviet Kerensky revolution in Russia and who held onto that power 
through force and the terrorizing of its own people. 

Tlu-ee and a half months before the end of World War II I was 
designated to go to Berlin. I met the Soviet forces on the Elbe 
River and contacted the Red Ai*my, and I entered Berlin with the 
United States forces on the 4th of July 1945, and I remained there, 
as I have said, until the fall of 1949. 

The pattern which Soviet imperialism took in that part of the 
world could serve as a model for the imperialist ambitions and ex- 
pansionism of the U. S. S. R. in all parts of the world. From the 
vantage point of Berlin I witnessed the collapse and destruction of 
the free forces of Poland; I saw the enslavement of Czechoslovakia, 
and the formation of Red governments in Eastern Germany and 
Eastern Berlin. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. You witnessed this collapse of Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia, and so forth. Could you tell the committee the pattern 
used? Did they fii'st infiltrate these countries by espionage agents, 
saboteurs, and people dedicated to the radical Communist philosophy 
before the fall of these countries? 

Mr. Heimlich. I was coming to that, sir. 

Senator Welker. Very well, sir. 

Mr. PIeimlich. The pattern was not so much that as it was the 
use of their trained Quislings, nationals of those countries who had 
been members of the international Communist apparatus for many 
years, and who were trained for their postwar jobs in Moscow, and 
came in with the Red army, and there they joined with the other 
groups such as the Benes government of Czechoslovakia, which, 
through its own determination to get along with the Soviet Union, 
signed its death warrant. 

So-called liberal groups, particularly socialist groups of the cap- 
tive countries, the so-called satellites, were used as the dupes and 
tools of the trained Quislings from Moscow who eventually seized 
power, and upon the seizure of that power those who had cooperated 
were liquidated. 

As early as 1945, the autumn of 1945, less than 3 months after the 
cessation of hostilities, a Soviet spy ring was uncovered in the secre- 
tarial school of the United States Group Control Council in Berlin 
that later became the United States military government. 

Senator Welker. What was that? Under whose control was that 
organization? 

Mr. Heimlich. The United States Group Control Council, later 
United States military government, was under the control at that 
time of the deputy commander of the forces in Europe and later 
the military governor, Gen. Lucius D. Clay. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 25 

Senator Welker. That would be the Arm}^? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sh". That was the United States Army. 

The efforts which were made to destroy our prestige in Europe took 
many forms, and the objectives of international communism were 
something new to those of us in the field of military intelligence. 

I might sa}'^ that military intelligence at that time was not prepared 
to cope with this new problem, and I have the feeling that it is perhaps 
not prepared to cope with it today. 

German nationals who were being trained in stenographic office 
procedure methods in Berlin in order to fill the great gap and to allow 
American military enlisted personnel to return home, were approached 
by the Soviet Union secret police — at that time it was called the 
NKVD — and they were threatened and intimidated into reporting 
on United States installations, commanders, and plans and objectives. 

This was the first of many such espionage efforts which we found and 
destroyed. 

Members of the Soviet apparatus, both German and Soviet citizens, 
were found in displaced persons camps, and in the case of German 
nationals we found them even in the employment of American 
military government. 

Indeed, the military government itself had American agents of the 
Soviet apparatus among its officials, and I need only call your 
attention to the case of George Shaw Wlieeler to back that up. 

Senator Welker. You know of others other than George Shaw 
Wlieeler? 

Mr. Heimlich. There were others. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Heimlich. Because of the Soviet action in closing the frontiers 
of the Soviet Zone we found ourselves almost from the beginning in a 
besieged city tlii'ough which the Soviets could operate freely because 
of the international agreements, but where Americans were denied 
access to travel in the Soviet Zone by virtue of the Soviet determination 
not to honor the agreements relative to travel which had been entered 
into in I^ondon in the fall of 1944. In other words, Soviet agents 
could, and did, and do freely circidate within the American sector of 
Berlin and the other western sectors whereas none of the western 
powers are able to move in the Soviet Zone. 

The plan which the Soviet Union had for the takeover of Eastern 
Germany in 1945 was almost exactly the plan which had been con- 
templated at the close of the First World War. The difference was 
that the Soviet Government had at its disposal in 1945 one of the 
world's most powerful military forces, a force which had largely been 
built up through our nearly $12 billion worth of lend-lease equipment. 
Also, in 1945 there was no German government in Eastern Germany. 
In other words, there was created a political vacuum which the 
Communist apparatus immediately filled. 

Among those Germans trained in Russia and returned to head the 
East German government were men like Wilhelm Pieck, who was 
longtime secretary general of the German Communist Party and a 
resident in Moscow during the Hitler years, and Walter Ulbricht, 
now Prime Minister of Eastern Germany and a longtime Communist 
resident in the Soviet Union, one who at the conclusion of the First 
World War actually stole a ship belonging to the German Government 
and took it to Russia as a present for Lenin. 



26 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The remnants of the Sixth German Aj-my which were captured at 
Stalingrad were brainwashed, and many of its personnel returned to 
Germany as Soviet agents. Indeed, one of these, Paul Margraf, a 
high-ranking Nazi who held Hitler's highest decoration, returned to 
Berlin in the uniform of a Soviet major and became chief of the East 
German police. He was chief of all German police upon our entry 
into the city of Berlin. 

Now, upon the capture of the city in early May of 1945 the Soviet 
military commanders had established a city government made up 
entirely of dedicated Communists, as I pointed out, and when the 
Allies came in the western commandants, the French, British, and 
Americans, were asked to sign a document accepting the government 
appointed by the Russians. 

We did so, and this caused us untold trouble for the next 18 months 
or until the first free election could be held in the city of Berlin, when 
the people of that city rejected communism. 

Before elections could be held in Eastern Germany all non-Com- 
munist parties were destroyed. Forced deportations, executions, 
kidnapings, acts of terror and intimidation made it impossible for 
normal political parties to grow, for non-Communist newspapers to 
exist, for churches to hold services, or for individuals to speak out 
against the new regime. 

The merger of the old German Socialist Party and the new Com- 
munist Party into a so-called United Party was a shotgun wedding 
not recognized by the western commandants. 

The organization of the East Berlin and East German governments 
begins with youth and so-calied cultural organizations. Children 
were, and are, compelled to belong to young Communist organizations 
where indoctrination into Communist ideology is accomplished in 
defiance of parental control, where young people are given intense 
nationalistic antichrist training and preparation for service in the 
Communist world military organizations. 

The propaganda mills began operating in Eastern Germany and 
eastern Berlin even before the Americans arrived. An example is 
Radio Berlin, which was captured intact by the Soviets and, inci- 
dentally, the Soviets even retained all of the German personnel, 
denazified them on the spot, and they have continued to work for 
the Communists. That radio station, with its great studios among 
the finest in the world, is located in the British sector of Berlin and 
is denied to all non-Russian and non-Communist elements, both of 
the Western Powers and of the new German state. That is still true 
today. British authorities have refused to silence the station, which 
stands in the center of their sector even today. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, may I interpose this question: When you 
were chief of Radio RIAS were you under any pressure by Com- 
munists or pro-Communist forces yourself? 

Mr. Heimlich. Well, yes. We were under extreme pressure. 
There were threats made upon my life and threats made upon the 
lives of those German assistants who were the key personnel of the 
station. There were attempts made to kidnap my commentator, 
which were frustrated thi'ough the action of American military police. 
I had two reporters who were very badly beaten, so badly beaten they 
had to be hospitalized when the great Communist putsch took place 
in the city hall of Berlin when we were driven out of the eastern sector 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 27 

of the city, which contained the city hall. My station was jammed 
continuously. I was attacked in the press. Some of the attacks 
were very amusing; some of them were less amusing. And, as a 
matter of fact, I felt many of the pressures on my own side of the 
Iron Curtain as well as from the other side. 

Mr. Arens. Do you feel that your disassociation from Radio 
RIAS was in any sense because of pro-Communist pressures on this 
side of the Iron Curtain? 

Mr. Heimlich. I am convinced of one thing, sir, and that is that 
Radio RIAS was a powerful weapon for the free world until the fall of 
1949, by its militant and determined and informed attacks upon the 
U. S. S. R., and upon the Communist international apparatus, attacks 
which did not always have the approval of my superiors in Bad 
Godesberg and in Washington. I feel that the radio station no 
longer has the same spirit that it had at that time when we were said 
by General Clay to have performed an outstanding mission foi* free 
peoples everywhere. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, can you compromise with the Kremlin? 

Mr. Heimlich. It is impossible to compromise with a cons;iirary of 
the sort with which we are faced. It is like trying to compromise with 
a fire that is burning your house down. You have to put it out. 

Mr. Arens. What is the first step, in your opinion, to try to di-ive 
a wedge between the Ki'emlin and the people whom the Kreml'n has 
enslaved? 

Mr. Heimlich. I believe that there can be no consideration of any 
other step other than the dissolving of our diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Arens. Why? 

Mr. Heimlich. The pattern of the Soviet imperialistic conspiracy 
takes six forms, which I would like to enumerate for you. 

One, through propaganda and quasi-legal methods, to seize the 
cultural media of any target nation by subverting the press, the radio, 
theater, motion picture, and magazines to Soviet purposes. It is a 
type of national brainwashing. 

Two, by espionage, to obtain the secrets of any country — military, 
economic, and industrial. 

Three, to destroy the morality of a state and its people by denying 
them access to their places of worship. 

Four, by strike, disorder, and terror, to infiltrate the labor organiza- 
tions and to turn workers against entrepreneurs in so-called class 
wars. 

Five, to maintain steady military pressures upon the frontiers of a 
target nation, thus compelling huge expenditures for arms and divert- 
ing manpower from peaceful pursuits to the wasteful pursuits of war, 
and eventually to destroy the target nation either by direct military 
control or internal collapse. 

And finally, sixth, to infiltrate the political and social body of the 
target nation by agents who appeal to so-called intellectualism and to 
class or creed differences, and eventually to place such agents and 
dupes in positions from which they may eventually so affect the 
internal and external policies of the target nation that the ambitions 
of the Soviet Union are fulfilled and that nation is destroyed. 



28 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

It is possible, of course, to forestall most of these attempts, most 
of these efforts, but it requires an enlightened determination and a 
kind of hardboiled realization of the facts of political life. 

The Chairman. Colonel, you are acquainted with Senate Resolu- 
tion 247? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think that is one of the first and most 
essential things that this country could do to bring about what you 
have been testifying about here today, sir? 

Mr. Heimlich. Sir, I think that is the most important single action 
which this country can take at this time. 

The Chairman. In other words, Colonel, you can't stay in the 
middle of the road when you are dealing with a bandit conspiracy that 
is out to overthrow and destroy not only your country but the world? 
Is that correct? 

ATr. Heimlich. That is quite true. 

The Chairman. In other words, the middle of the road is a darned 
good place to get hit. 

Mr. Heimlich. That is a very good way of putting it. 

Senator Welker. Would you allow me a question? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. I notice you say in your statement that the 
Soviet Embassy in Washington became a control center for espionage 
and subversion in the United States. 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. That is your conclusion based upon your knowl- 
edge and your experience? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. And what you have learned here in the United 
States? 

Mr. Heimlich. Yes, sir. I think that the press has made that 
perfectly obvious to all of us with publication of trials such as that 
of Judith Coplon and others, that there was a direct connection, there 
was and probably still is a direct connection between the espionage 
attempts of the Soviet Union and subversion that continues inside 
our own Government, and the leadership that is exercised through the 
Soviet Embassy. 

Senator Welker. There is nothing we can do about it at the 
present, under the present diplom.atic system? 

Mr. Heimlich. Under the present system, no, sir. I think that 
the only thing we can do is to take such steps as are necessary to 
break off our diplomatic relations and to expel these people. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat are the objectives of international communism? 

Mr. Heimlich. The objectives of international communism are the 
eventual subjugation of all free peoples of the world. There can be 
no other interpretation of the events of the past 8 years, and the first 
limited objectives have been reached. In Europe we have been only 
able to deny the U. S. S. R. their principal target, which was the 
rich industrial prize of Western Germany. As a matter of fact, there 
is a song sung by the new so-called East German People's Army, 
which says, in effect, "Today we water our horses in the Oder; 
tomorrow we'll water them in the Rhine." 

The Soviets have taken over the Baltic countries, they have 
annexed to themselves the Baltic countries and half of Poland, they 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 29 

have destroyed Czechoslovakia, and Czechoslovakia today is suffering 
to a degree which makes the Nazi occupation a most pleasant memory. 

They have subjugated the Balkan countries, they have intimidated 
and jailed and tortured the priests of the Catholic Church, they have, 
to all effects, destroyed the hard core of world Protestantism which 
is the 18 million Protestants in Eastern Germany, they have achieved 
their objectives in the Far East, at least their intermediate objectives, 
and, according to yesterday's and today's press, it looks very much 
as though they are well on the way to achieving those objectives in 
our own hemisphere in South America. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions? 

If not, Colonel, we want to thank you for your cooperation. This 
is only the beginning of a series of hearings to encompass this problem 
that confronts this Nation. We appreciate your cooperation, and we 
want to be in contact with you in the future to assist and aid this 
committee. 

Mr. Heimlich. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman, Thank you very much. 

The committee will stand recessed. 

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee was recessed, subject 
to the call of the Chair.) 



47769— 54— pt. 1- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security 

Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a. m., in room 
457, Senate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Jenner, Welker, and Johnston. 
Also present: Richard Arens, special counsel; and Frank W. 
Schroeder and Edward R. Duffy, professional staff members. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Will you be sworn to testify? Do you swear that the testimony 
you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 
Mr. Hunter. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF KENT A. HUNTER, 1026 16TH STREET NW., WASH- 
INGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name for our record? 

Mr. Hunter. Kent A. Hunter, H-u-n-t-e-r, 1026 16th Street NW. 

The Chairman. Wliat is your business or profession? 

Mr. Hunter. At the present time I have an organization called 
Facts, Evaluated that is devoted to the business of getting answers to 
questions. For 35 years before that I have been a newspaperman. 
In between that 35 years as a newspaperman I have been an officer 
in the Army, Reserve and Active, World Wars I and II, part of the 
time in intelligence, part of the time in field artillery, and part of the 
time in staff work, but the point that I would like to make is that none 
of the material that I bring out here was gathered as an intelligence 
officer, but as a newspaperman. 

The Chairman. In other words you are here as a newspaperman, 
not as an intelligence officer? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is your testimony just based on newspaper 
accounts, or is it based on your own individual research, or what 
are your qualifications for your testimony here this morning? 

Air. Hunter. I have been in 4 continents and 17 countries, most 
recently in North Africa. That was last February. I have been 
since 192! a very active follower on newspaper assignmeats, particu- 
larly of the Communist and other subversive movements. 

31 



32 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. That was your special assignment for 35 years? 

Mr. Hunter. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Arens. For Hearst most of the time? 

Mr. Hunter. Largely for the Hearst newspapers. 

The Chairman. Proceed with the questions. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Hunter, you have a prepared statement which 
you have for submission to the committee? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, su*. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the pre- 
pared statement of Mr. Hunter be at this point incorporated in the 
record and that Mr. Hunter proceed to speak extemporaneously 
from his notes. 

The Chairman. It will be so ordered. 

(The statement referred to is as follows:) 

Statement of Kent A. Hunter 

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, never has the Nation faced greater danger — 
not from the power of the underground enemy, but from the faihire of a great 
mass of our people to recognize the skin-rash of local and domestic radicalism 
as the outcropping of the international Communist cancer rooted in the Kremlin. 

Not to qualify as an expert, but to give the committee something upon which 
to evaluate my testimonv, let me identifv myself. My name is Kent Hunter. 
I live at 1026 16th Street NW., Washington, D. C. I was born February 7, 1892, 
at Omaha, Nebr. I am a third generation newspaperman, or was until I estab- 
lished Facts, Evaluated, a research organization specializing in foreign, economic, 
and political fact-finding, on April 15 of this year. I am a sixth generation' 
American. 

Background for that organization is 36 years of newspaper experience, in which 
I have visited 4 continents and 17 countries. I have cumulative military service 
over 20 years, with retirement pay as a colonel, dating from December 31, 1952. 
My mihtary service took me to Europe in both World War I and World War II. 
I have the Silver Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Legion of Merit and the 
Bronze Star. My commissions have been in field artillery, military intelligence 
and as a military specialist on the staffs of Generals Drum, Lear, Fredendall and 
Patton in World War II. 

In both newspaper and military fact-finding assignments I have studied com- 
munism and subversive activities. The studied opinions given to the committee 
today are those of an American with an unswerving belief in our form of govern- 
ment, rather than of an individual who espoused an alien ideology and "discovered 
the flag and Constitution" only after expulsion by the alien organization or after 
disillusionment as to the nutritative values of the forage in the Red pasture. 

I have not cited sources in today's presentation. I will be glad to inform the 
committee however, of those sources, in executive session. 

It must be remembered that world communism — the Third International, the 
Cominform, and the Kremlin group of Red Fascists — has one objective and sec- 
tional phases for planned attainment. 

The thousands of pages of the Communist bibliography — Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Stalin and the lesser lights clearly define that one objective as world socialism, 
with communism as an intermediate step. 

Initially the first growth of communism was radicalism within the structure of 
nations. It failed, dismally, prior to World War I, because of jealousies, national 
limitations of language and cohesive movement. 

The first phase— gaining of a national base from which to operate — came not 
with the overthrow of czarist Russia. That had already happened. What the 
Bolsheviks overthrew in the closing months of World War I was the Kerensky 
government, whose aim was the establishment of a democratic form of government 
based on English parliamentary procedure. 

The second phase — consolidation of Russia under Communist control came in 
the confused economic, political, and power-play interval before World War II. 

The third phase, building up of buffer satellites, from the Baltic to the Black 
Sea, and even to "warm-water ports" on the Adriatic, followed World War II 
and gave the &emlin crew her satellite defense to the West. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 33 

Phase four, the drive for all of Asia took form during and subsequent to World 
War II. Only a fringe mopup, as the Kremlin sees it, remains to complete the 
Asiatic conquest. 

Phase five is Africa, raw material base for industrial Europe. 

The final phase is capture of Latin America, storehouse of raw materials for the 
Western Hemisphere, as a prelude to economic strangulation, in preference to an 
atomic war, to destroy these United States. 

Phase five is already underway, and South America is even now feeling the 
infiltration and propaganda stages of Kremlin action. 

This timetable for disaster is not just a sequence of words pieced together by an 
individual. As a famous, though frustrated American once said: 

"Let's look at the record." 

The trouble with most of us in America is that we seldom think things through. 
The millions of words printed about communism in the United States since we 
first began to document the record after World War I have, perhaps, served more 
to confuse rather than to clarify the issues. 

We haven't been able to see the forest because of the trees. 

Hiss and Browder, and Foster, and Whittaker Chambers and the other little 
pawns of domestic subversion have had the headlines while the key pieces on the 
world chessboard, safe behind the Kremlin walls, have been comparatively free 
to plot and plan the theft of continents from the orbit of the free world. 

The country which shows on the world map as Russia must be studied against 
the backdrop'of history before the ruthless brutaUty of the KremUn despots can 
be understood. 

As early as the second century the Goths from the Baltic invaded the territory 
east of the Carpathian mountains and in the upper basins of the Vistula, Pripet, 
Dneiper, Dvina, Dniester and Southern Bug rivers. 

Two hundred years later the Huns, under Attila, incorporated the Slavs into 
the Hunnish Empire. That era passed with the death of Attila. 

The Scandinavian Varangers, or warrior-traders, were called in by the Slav 
cities to defend them, and acquired power for over a hundred years. 

The Slavs began to federate, and spread to the lower Dnieper before the Tartar 
invasion in 1228 and it was not until 1380 that the Mongols were defeated. 

Russia as a nation, began to have a recorded history from 1251 — the map 
accompanying this presentation, visualizes the areas and eras of expansion for 
the next 700 years — until 1951. It was prepared by the Library of Congress. 

The backdrop, therefore, is one of constant wars, never-ending intrigue, revolu- 
tions, and eventual uprisings of the people to effect change. It was such a change, 
such an uprising, the result of plotting, which ended the regime of the Czars. It 
is no military secret that Lenin, Trotsky, »nd the early Bolshevik leaders were 
smuggled into Moscow by a coup financed by the Kaiser's Imperial German Staff, 
in 1918, to create revolution, overthrow the Russian Imperial House, take the 
Russian military force out of the war, to leave Germany free to fight on a single 
front in the West. For Germany the Bolshevik Revolution came too late, and 
in the backwash of the German defeat communism had time to dig the foundations 
for a dictatorship more brutal than that of Ivan the Terrible, of Genghis Khan or 
Tamerlane, or anj' of the ruthless leaders who had cowed the mass populations of 
Muscovy during the preceding centuries. 

That Stalin, under whom world communism made its greatest strides, was as 
cruel as any dictator of the past is indicated by a brief tabulation in Michael 
Padev's book Wliat Happens to Communists. Padev tabulates: 

Nine of the 11 cabinet officers holding office in 1936 have been liquidated aa 
spies or traitors. 

Five of the seven presidents of the Central Executive Committee have been 
eliminated. Forty-three of the fifty-three secretaries of the Communist Party 
central organization have been blood-purged. 

Fifteen of the twenty-seven top Communists who drafted the 1936 Communist 
Constitution have been eliminated as deviationists. 

Seventy of the 80 members of the Soviet War Council have been killed. 

Three out of every five marshals of the Soviet Army have died unnatural deaths. 

All members of Lenin's first postrevolution Politburo are dead. 

The Kremlin pictures the dictatorship of the proletariat as a government of 
freedom and enlightenment. Actually government is by the Soviet Communist 
Party. Membership in that party, in proportion to the total population under 
Soviet control, is no greater than the numerical proportion of princes, court 
favorites, and paid retainers who ruled under the Czars or even under the Mongol 
invaders of Russia's early history. Still further restricting the source of Kremlin 



34 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

power, that proletariat is controlled by a group of less than 20 top leaders in 
the Politburo and its immediately subordinated official level. 

Certainly no tight totalitarianism such as Soviet communism has a right to 
expect diplomatic equality with nations of the free world. The Jenner-McCarran 
resolution which calls for severance of diplomatic relations with Iron Curtain 
countries (S. Res. 247) spotlights that situation to a degree unequaled since the 
fight to block Soviet recognition, from 1924 to 1933. 

Dr. Boldyreff, who testified earlier in these hearings, declared that the Russian 
people today are ripe for revolt against this newest government by oppression 
that has been saddled upon them. Dr. Boldyreff is probably one of the best 
informed people in America today as to what goes on behind the Iron Curtain. 
I am willing to accept his evaluation. 

The Library of Congress map drives home one pertinent strategic fact which 
has never varied, under Czar or Politburo, in the last 700 years. The pattern 
of conquest shows a sirigle military pattern. Military leadership from Moscow 
has always been peiimeter expansion — movement into territory immediately 
contiguous to the Soviet land mass. 

That fact is basic in any analysis of the present world Communist program 
and time table to rule the entire globe. Remember the pattern of the past in 
considering the pattern of the future. 

England, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium — all the great European 
powers who, through the centuries, built industrial economies dependent on 
colonies, separated from them by wide seas and oceans, have always faced the 
need of seapower, for communications and protection of lines of supply. 

Communism has made no such mistake. She expands tentacles of the Red 
octopus to reach out and enfold only such populations, real estate, and material 
treasure as touch on her immediate borders. 

Today, England, without her formerly supreme naval power, is dependent on 
imports for 80 percent of her food, and an ever greater proportion of the raw 
materials for her almost wholly industrial economy. So India has been able to 
break out of the British Commonwealth, Egypt is challenging British control 
of the vital outlet from the Mediterranean at Suez — a bottleneck vital to the 
flow of British commerce and supplies. 

France today faces loss of Indochina, and holds her African colonies in a rising 
tide of discontent principally because the supply line is the short one across the 
Mediterranean instead of the long route through the Atlantic. 

Spain's vast colonial empire in Africa and the Western Hemisphere crumpled 
when Drake sank the Armada. What Sampson did at Santiago and Dewey 
at Manila merely laid the ghosts of what had once been the seagoing pride of 
an insolent Iberia. 

The rich islands of Indonesia are all but lost to the Netherlands because of 
the long lanes of transport to Holland. 

The Red Soviet, having grafted itself on the seats of power of the greatest 
land mass under a single flag in all the world, has no distant colonies. Colonial 
imperialism has, therefore, been a recurrent slogan of the Krennin crew from 
Lenin to Maienkov. 

Old Russia is ethnically a racial goulash resulting from the succession of inva- 
sions from Genghis Khan and Tamerlane to Hitler. Racial equality has been 
accepted by Old Russia long before Marx and Engels were out of rompers, or 
Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and the crew now seeking to rule the world were born. 

It was easy for the Soviets to emphasize the superior status of the imperialist 
citizenry in the colonies of the high living standard industrial economy nations 
as compared to the life of the backward native colonial populations. 

Time does not permit the detailed story of the territorial acquisitions of the 
Kremlin since the overthrow of the Czar and the Bolshevik seizure of power. 

This summary needs to be recorded of the passage of one unhappy people 
after another, behind the Iron Curtain from V-E Day to date. 

This tabulation shows a Soviet accretion of a land area 1.6 times that of con- 
tinental United States; aggregate populations 3.5 times that of the United States 
and raw materials including a score of those listed in our present stockpiling 
programs as strategic and in short supply. The tabulation below presents this 
picture graphically. 




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> O - 54 - pi. 1 ( Face p. 34) No. 3 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



35 



Country 



Area 
(square 
miles) 


Population 


10, 629 


1, 175, 000 


8,093 


829, 000 


42,796 


7, 160, 000 


3, 760, 339 


463, 493, 418 


49,358 


12, 340, 000 


42,112 


17, 313, 700 


18, 362 


1,134,000 


12, 173 


469, 000 


35, 902 


9, 207, 386 


48, 468 


9,000,000 


3,944 
25,402 


350, 000 
1, 950, 502 


22, 959 

19, 175 

622, 744 


2,879,070 

3, 464, 952 

900, 000 


121, 131 


24, 976, 926 


91, 584 


13, 873, 000 


11, 180 
475, 000 


800, 000 
1, 000, 000 


95, 558 


16, 338, 504 


5, 528, 839 
6,433,281 


588, 710, 838 
572,372,334 



Raw materials (principal) 



Albania 

Austria (part) 

Bulgaria 

China, Red... 

Czechozlovakia 

East Germany — 

Estonia 

Finland ' 

Hungary 

Korea, North 

Kurile Islands 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldavia 

Mongolia, Outer 

Poland 

Rumania 

Ruthenia 

Tibet - 

Yugoslavia ' - 

Total: 

With Yugoslavia. , 
Minus Yugoslavia 



Tobacco, timber, wool, hides, furs, fish, 
dairy products, olive oil, corn, cattle, 
bitumen. 

Iron, steel, textiles, paper, pulp, alu- 
minum, machine tools, chemicals, 
agricultural products. 

Agriculture, fruit, small industrial 
products. 

Agriculture, fruit, tea, sUk, cotton, 
livestock, coal, iron, tin, antimony, 
petroleum, tungsten, molybdenum, 
bismuth, salt, chemicals, paper. 

Agriculture, armament, textiles, paper, 
glass, stone, metals, iron, chemicals, 
graphite, garnets, silver, copper, 
rocksalt, pottery, leather, uranium. 

Agriculture, tobacco, fruits, coal, lig- 
nite, iron, zinc, lead, copper, salt, 
petroleum. 

TextUes, shipbuDding, railroad repair, 
largest oil shale refinery in the world. 

Timber, granite, marble, sandstone, 
mica, iron, nonferrous metals, peat, 
disbase, porphyry. 

Agriculture, bauxite, coal, sugar, hemp, 
steel. 

Timber, gold, silver, zinc, copper, 
lead, iron, tungsten, coal, graphite, 
kaolin, sUkworms, agriculture. 

Coal, fisheries, timber, metals. 

Timber, peat, agriculture, rubber 
manufactures, dyes, mineral fer- 
tilizers, glass. 

Agricultm'al, dairy cattle, hogs. 

Agriculture. 

Gold, coal, marble, livestock and 
industrial production increased four- 
fold since 1945. 

Agriculture, textiles, coal, chemicals, 
iron, zinc, lignite, petroleum, gas, 
lead, salt, potassium. 

Salt, petroleum, gas, lignite, gold, iron, 
copper, zinc, pyrites, agriculture, 
vineyards. 

Uranium, metal mining, timber. 

Musk, gold, uranium, copper, coal, 
iron, hides, wool. 

Timber, agriculture, coal, iron, copper, 
chrome ore, antimony, lead, salt, 
bauxite. 



1 Not a satellite, but dominated. 

s Yugoslavia is listed with the Communist group. Tito, though currently at odds with Moscow, still 
has a Communist form of government, and was part of the Communist-Kremlin anticapitalist, anticolonial 
alliance of the immediate post- World War II period. 

All these Communist accretions of people, land, and wealth have followed the 
historical pattern of expansion only on the perimeter. 

At this point it is well to look at the new perimeter, and examine the current 
picture in each sector. 

In Europe the defense picture is well understood through the wide presentation 
of the NATO and European Defense Community programs. A different Com- 
munist approach, in the various propaganda and trade agreement proposals from 
the Iron Curtain and Bamboo Curtain areas, is treated separately. 

The hot war actions, first in Korea and more recently as far as the United States 
is concerned in Indochina, is understood also. But the secret war in the Middle 
East, south Asia, and the Pacific generally needs exposition for a clearer under- 
standing. This phase begins at Suez and runs eastward. 

Malenkov and company have put five and a half million square miles of terri- 
tory, 588 million people, and fabulous raw material wealth into the Soviet orbit 
since World War II without firing a shot by the Red Army or entering officially 
into any of the sequences of history which brought the accretions into effect. 



36 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Malenkov and company, as did Stalin and company, have merely given "sym- 
pathetic and advisory and economic aid" to their allies. 

Malenkov and company have prated "peace" while fomenting wars in all the 
areas on the perimeter. 

Malenkov and company have sanctimoniously espoused "freedom" for the 
native colonial areas, incited uprisings to "nationalist" movements in the colonial 
areas — each move with a dual purpose. First it forces the entire anti-Communist 
world to divert vast financial programs to military use, to require a large portion 
of the industrial economy of the Western World to go to military rather than to 
civilian economic production — in which the backward Soviet industrial plant can- 
not compete with the more competent West. Second, the Kremlin-Communist 
combination is able to siphon arms, war materials, and training for war to the 
perimeter "nationalist" and "freedom" movements, using, in a majority of cases, 
World War II and other obsolete equipment, and permitting the gigantic Red 
Arrny, Red Air Force, and growing Red Navy a chance to devote its massive 
military appropriations to new and modern equipment capable of competing 
with the armed forces of the West. 

Malenkov and company are not yet ready for world war III, 

Peace — Kremlin model — calls for time in which the propaganda, the espionage, 
the sabotage machine developed since Roosevelt recognition of the Soviet in 1933 
opened the gates for entry to the very citadel of capitalism, can be expanded 
beyond its present effective range. 

Peace — Malenkov-Kremlin version — demands an opportunity to separate raw- 
material-producing Africa from the fabricating area of Europe; to split material- 
producing South America away from its natural manufacturing and industrial 
heart in the United States. The fourth section, Red Army (devoted to espionage) 
and the MVD industrial saboteurs need more time to put labor at the throat of 
capital, to put race against race, to create dissension all along the path of the sun 
around the Equator by pleading for the "rights of oppressed minorities." 

Kremlin communism wants the cadence of conquest to be no blitzkrieg in the 
1939 concept of the German General Staff. The Kremlin communism wants no 
tearing and rending and squabbling over its meat as the hyena or the jackal or 
the furtive and slinking coj'ote snaps and slashes at the carcass of some animal 
a stronger and braver foe has killed. 

Kremlin communism wants the cadence of conquest to be the beat of the Roman 
legions on the march, the rhythmic pound of heavy armored centurions — slow, 
but moving ever forward with the impression of power that breeds hopelessness 
in the minds of those who have been overrun. 

Proof of the Kremlin-Communist necessity for delay in any plan for World 
War III is amply documented. 

The Korean truce dragged over months — during which the buildup of Nam Il's 
Red Chinese Army permitted reinforcement of the depleted Red Chinese garrisons 
opposite Formosa, training of the Red Viet Minh forces of Ho Chi Minh in Red 
China before sending them into the final drive against the French Union forces 
in the 8-year-old civil war in Indochina. 

The indication of delay and eternal stalling at Geneva as efforts are made to 
bring peace in Indochina is but a continuance of the Korean truce tactics. 

Proved aid from Communists to Taruc and his Hukbalahap insurrectionists 
in the Philippines, the eternal and continuous infiltration of Communist propa- 
gandists and agitators into Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaya, India, Nepal, 
Bhutan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, have all been part of the general pattern — delay 
and cost to the West, with Kremlin diplomatic forces remaining on duty in each 
area to direct the espionage, sabotage, and propaganda drives. 

To counter the Communist perimeter war, the Western Powers, with Secretary 
of State Dulles as a pace setter, are seeking to evolve a 10-nation coalition in the 
Pacific to make further Communist aggression in the Pacific area a cause for united 
defense action — in effect the creation of an Asian coalition such as NATO and 
EDC provide in Europe. 

The Kremlin's trade and peace campaign is aimed at drawing the perimeter 
countries into economic ties with the Communist orbit. "Tradesmen" and visiting 
"merchants" can, and habitually have been, excellent espionage and propaganda 
agents for the Kremlin. An up-to-date picture of the use of the trade-not-aid 
program of the Kremlin can be pieced together by listening to broadcasts from 
the Kremlin and satellite sources, the harangues of Red commentators and the 
printed propaganda in official Communist papers, magazines, and other printed 
outlets in this country and abroad. 

Brief mention of some of these items documents the trend of this Red-led drive 
for trade as a part and parcel of her world strategy and plan. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 37 

Alphabetically by countries, and chronologically as to negotiations with the 
Soviet or its satellites, here are some notes of the Soviet use of trade as a weapon. 
The source of the following information is an intelligence agency which cannot be 
publicly identified. 

Afghanistan: A Melbourne broadcast on February 10 said Afghanistan has 
been invited to send trade representatives to the U. S. S. R. in September. March 
3 a Moscow broadcast claimed a trade agreement with Afghanistan had been 
signed in January. 

Argentina: A Buenos Aires radio said a trade agreement between Argentina 
and Poland was in an advanced state. April 2 a Buenos Aires broadcast said 
Argentina had delivered 71,345 tons of a 145,000-goods contract to the Soviet 
under a contract then 8 months old. April 21, the Moscow radio said Argentina 
had completed a barter contract with Hungary totaling $8,250,000. April 29, 
Buenos Aires announced a $12 million trade negotiation with Rumania. 

Australia: A Melbourne radio announced January 26 that the Soviet and 
satellites had purchased more than 1,000,000 pounds of good Australian wool. 
March 23, the Melbourne radio said the Soviet had requested a long-term contract 
to buy butter. 

Belgium: February 1, Moscow broadcast that Belgium had agreed to build 
■diesel ships, refrigerator ships, floating cranes, boilers, and other equipment for 
delivery to the Soviet in 1954 and 1955. February 26, Moscow announced a 
formal trade agreement with the Belgian-Netherlands-Luxembourg Economic 
Union, but did not mention types or amount of goods, repeating this announce- 
ment on March 3. 

Bolivia: Moscow forecast a trade agreement with Bolivia on February 10, but 
no subsequent announcement came of its being effected. 

Britain: January 25, Nesterov, president of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce, 
broadcast that a trade agreement had been reached with Britain. February 10 
Moscow named Britain as one of a group of nations which would find trade with 
the East ''more favorable than trade with the West." February 26 Moscow 
again broadcast that ''negotiations had been successfully completed with busi- 
nessmen" of Britain, but gave no details. 

British Borneo: Moscow, February 10, said an invitation had been sent to 
British Borneo to participate in a Moscow trade conference in September. 

Burma: Moscow named Burma, on February 10, as having been invited to the 
Moscow trade conference in September. February 26, the Rangoon radio said a 
trade agreement with Communist China, under discussion for 2 months, was 
nearing agreement. March 30, the Delhi (India) radio said the Sino-Burmese 
trade agreement would be signed the next day. Red China radio, from Peiping, 
on May 2, said the Burmese trade agreement had been signed on April 22 and 
been widely hailed by Burma newspapers. 

Ceylon: Moscow said Ceylon had been invited to the Moscow trade conference 
in September. Peking radio, March 24, said Ceylon had signed a trade agreement 
with Communist China. 

Chile: Moscow listed Chile as invited to the September trade conference in 
Moscow. Caracas radio, on March 18, said the Chilean Cabinet had decided to 
seek markets for Chilean copper throughout the world, "including countries behind 
the Iron Curtain." 

Cuba: Habana radio announced that Cuba had authorized the sale of 20,000 
tons of sugar to the Soviet, but would not sell nickel or other strategic war 
raaterials to the U. S. S. R. or Iron Curtain satellites. 

Denmark: January 25, Moscow said Denmark had concluded trade agreements 
with the Soviet. January 26 Copenhagen radio said it had contracted to export 
another 5,000 tons of butter to the Soviet. February 2, Copenhagen said it was 
considering cheese sales to the Soviet. February 9 Bratislava (Slovak) radio 
said Denmark was preparing for an extension of trade with the Soviet because 
the Danish Government feared an economic depression in the United States. 
Copenhagen radio, February 16, announced a 1-year agreement to send seeds, 
agricultural products and electrical equipment to Hungary in exchange for 
machines, textiles, and foodstuffs. March 10, Stockholm radio said Denmark 
was planning a trade agreement with the Soviet "of several years standing." 
March 19 Copenhagen sent a delegation of businessmen to Moscow to select 
trade items for exchange. Stockholm radio said on May 13 that Danish-Soviet 
trade agreement negotiation were set for June. Copenhagen radio confirmed 
this 2 days later. 

Egypt: February 7, Cairo radio announced a Bulgarian mission was coming 
to Cairo to negotiate a trade agreement. February 25, Cairo radio said trade 



38 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

talks had been completed and a pact "is expected soon." March 1, Cairo said 
signing had been tentatively set for March 8. March 10, Cairo said a trade pact 
had been initialed between Egypt and the Soviet Union. The same day Cairo 
said a mission was on the way from Hungary to negotiate an Egyptian trade 
agreement. March 27, Cairo said the Soviet-Egyptian trade pact had been 
signed. May 7, Cairo said Egypt was studying trade pacts with Red China. 
Cairo said such a pact "would be easy to implement along the lines of that 
negotiated with East Germany," though Egypt has not recognized either Red 
China or East Germany. Cairo claimed Britain is "endeavoring to stimulate 
trade" with Red China. 

Finland: Sofia (Bulgaria) radio said an agreement for exchange of goods with 
Finland and methods of payment had been signed. Helsinki, on February 18, 
announced a 4-billion finmark trade agreement with Czechoslovakia. February 
24, Helsinki radio announced preparations for a new 5-year trade agreement with 
the Soviet Union. Moscow, February 26, said U. S. S. R.-Finland trade pact 
had been signed. February 26, Helsinki radio announced appointment of delega- 
tion to discuss trade with China (Peking). Moscow on March 3, and Peking, 
on March 4, said "agreements were being made." Oslo (Norway) radio an- 
nounced April 3 that the Finland-Soviet 5-year trade pact called for Finland's 
importing 10,000 Soviet automobiles annually for the 5 years. Helsinki, May 18, 
said negotiations would be resumed "shortly" for a "long term" trade agreement 
with Soviet Union. 

France: Moscow, February 10, listed France as a nation which "would do 
better dealing with the East rather than the West." France had previously been 
invited to the coming September trade conference in Moscow. March 3, Moscow 
listed France as having entered into a trade agreement with the Soviet Union 
last January. 

Greece: Prague radio said on February 4 that Greece had resumed trade for 1 
year with Czechoslovakia under an agreement signed at Athens. February 5 
the Soviet Embassy at Athens said a considerable quantity of oil products would 
go to Greece under the pact. Bucharest (Rumania) radio said on May 20 that 
a trades and payment agreement between the two countries had been signed at 
Bucharest the previous day. 

Iceland: Bucharest radio said on April 16 that a trade and payments agreement 
between Iceland and Rumania was signed on April 13. 

India: Melbourne broadcast of February 10 listed India as 1 of 12 countries 
invited to Moscow trade conference next September. Delhi radio, March 24, 
said India had signed a trade pact with Rumania on March 23. Moscow, April 1, 
said India had decided to increase trade with Poland following negotiations at 
Moscow embassies of both powers. Poland will get iron and machines, mica, 
burlap, and other items. Stockholm radio, April 19, said India extended trade 
agreement with Finland for 2 more years, India to get newsprint, agricultural 
machinery, and wire cables, 

Indonesia: Peking radio, January 23,* reported "Jakarta is pleased with trade- 
agreement between Indonesia and Peking. Jakarta (Indonesia) radio, January 
31, said agreement "enthusiastically received by press and businessmen." Indo- 
nesia is invited to the Moscow trade conference in September. February 24, 
Jakarta radio said that "on basis of clearing and balance system" had difficulties 
with trade agreements of 1950 with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and 
with Yugoslavia in 1953. Said difficulties were being overcome with Czecho- 
slovakia and Hungary and those pacts will be renegotiated for 1954. Jakarta 
radio, April 23, said 1 1 East German trade negotiators were in Indonesia. Jakarta 
radio, May 18, said East German trade negotiations opened that day. 

Israel: Jerusalem radio, January 26, said Director of Israeli Oil Affairs arrived 
in Moscow that day to purchase additional quantities of oil from the U. S. S. R. 
January 29, Israeli radio said delegation left for Budapest to sign trade agreement 
with Hungary. Tel Aviv radio, February 2, said Soviet commercial attache had 
taken up expansion of trade with U. S. S. R. with Israeli foreign trade department. 
Jerusalem radio, February 8, World Zionist organization said Russia "genuinely 
interested in world trade now." Jerusalem radio, March 1, ^aid trade agreement 
between Israel and Hungary had been signed. Jerusalem radio, March 5, said 
second oil agreement had been signed with U. S. S. R. by which U. S. S. R. will 
ship 100,000 tons of crude oil to Israel. 

Italy: Italy was listed by Nesterov on January 25 as one of the countries with 
which Soviet Union had concluded trade agreements. Rome radio, February 5, 
said Italy had purchased 125,000 tons of hard grain from the Soviet Union "within 
the framework of the Italian-Soviet trade agreement of last October." Italy was 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 39 

listed by Moscow radio on February 10 as one of the nations advised to look to 
trade with the East. 

Japan: Melbourne radio, February 10, listed Japan as one of nations invited to 
Moscow Trade Conference next September. February 17, Japanese newspaper 
Yomiuri said, "Trade Ministry would pursue policy on increased barter with the 
U. S. S. R. and 'expected' trade with Communist China to increase in the spring." 
Moscow (Tass), on May 20, said East German and Japanese firms had agreed on 
delivery of goods valued at $1.9 million. Tokyo radio same day said Red China 
suggested increasing barter of Japanese steel and iron products and machinery in 
exchange for China raw materials. 

Lebanon: Limassol radio, February 2, said Lebanese Parliament had approved 
trade agreement between Lebanon and East Germany. Damascus radio, April 
15, quoted Foreign Minister as saying Lebanese trade agreement with U. S. S. R. 
would be eonchided shortly. Cairo radio, April 24, said Lebanon agreed to sign 
U. S. S. R. trade treaty and make May 1 an official holiday. Moscow (Tass), 
April 30, said trade agreement signed for 1 year, renewable annually unless one 
party or the other repudiates and agreements made for trade representatives in 
Lebanon and U. S. S. R. 

Malaya: Listed in Melbourne broadcast as invited to Moscow Trade Conference 
in September. Karachi (Pakistan) broadcast May 3 said shipments of natural 
rubber will start moving from Malaya to Soviet Union before end of May, but 
direct export of nibber to Communist China or North Korea will remain banned. 

Nepal: Invitation extended February 10 to attend Moscow Trade Conference 
next September. 

Netherlands: Hilversum (Holland) radio, January 29, said L^. S. S. R. had 
contracted to buy 70 million salted herring from Holland. Hilversum radio, 
April 27, said Netherlands would export 2 million kilograms of cheese to U. S. S. R. 
Hilversum radio. May 17, said U. S. S. R. ordered three cargo ships from Nether- 
lands under existing trade agreement. Similar order for ships was placed in 1951. 

Norway: Oslo radio, January 26, said agreement with U. S. S. R. for exchange 
of goods provides for Norway delivering aluminum, cellulose, and calcium 
carbonate. Moscow radio, February 26, said trade agreements had been signed 
this year with Norway. Oslo radio, March 23, said Norway agreement with 
Czechoslovakia calls for Norway importing Czech goods valued at 53 million 
kroner, and exporting goods valued at 45 million kroner to Czechoslovakia. 
Budapest radio, April 1, said negotiations between Hungary and Norway for 
trade agreements were being conducted. 

Pakistan: Pakistan invited to Moscow Trade Conference in September. Has 
not responded. 

Phihppines: Invited to Moscow Trade Conference in September. Did not 
answer. 

Sweden: Listed by Moscow on January 25 as having previously signed 
U. S. S. R. trade agreement. Stockholm radio, February 6, said agreement signed 
in Moscow nearly doubling Sweden's trade with U. S. S. R. as compared to 1953. 
Stockholm radio, March 23, said Swedish trade negotiations with Poland resumed 
that date. April 7, Stockholm said U. S. S. R. placed order valued at 180,000 
pounds sterling for woodworking machinery. Stockholm radio, April 25, said 
1954 double trade agreement now being met by Sweden. Sweden agrees to import 
600,000 tons of oil from Russia as against previous agreement to take 500,000 
tons. Russia trying to increase oil tonnage to 1 million. Stockholm radio, 
May 5, says Soviet sells oil and foodstuffs to Sweden, but that Sweden is to 
decrease steel and iron sales to U. S. S. R. while increasing engineering products 
and consumer goods. 

Syria: Damascus radio, April fl2, says East Germany wants trade pact. 
Syrian Government studying proposal and "hope to start talks soon". 

Thailand: Moscow radio, February 10, said Thailand invited to Trade Con- 
ference in U. S. S. R. in September. No Thailand response. 

Turkey: Ankara broadcast says "temporary" trade protocol governing im- 
port and exports of goods between Turkey and Rumania signed February 6. 
Ankara radio, March 28, said Turkej^ by trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, 
would import agricultural machinery, machine tools, construction material, steel 
rods and artificial fertilizer. 

Uruguay: Invited February 10 to Moscow Trade Conference in September. 
Lima (Peru) broadcast, February 12, said Uruguay would export 95,000 tons of 
pork and 5,000 tons of lamb to U. S. S. R. 

It is not intended to convey the idea that this listing above covers all the moves 
in the Soviet cold war through trade. It does show the efforts, however, of the 



40 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMCTNISM 



Soviet and satellites to establish trade relations with 34 countries outside the Iron 
Curtain and success, to greater or lesser degree, with 25 to 27 of them. 

It must be remembered that with the Soviet trade is a weapon, just as a tank, 
or a bomber, or a fifth column. Trade permits the Soviet to send in espionage 
agents, even where the Soviet does not have diplomatic representation. Amtorg 
Trading Corporation was a spies' nest in the United States years before the Soviet 
was granted diplomatic representation by an agreement that was a trick and a 
fraud in its very inception, and has not varied in the interim. 

Trade, in the Soviet concept, is a means to "corner" strategic materials, and 
exert an economic coercion amounting to strangulation. 

We have had the picture, to date, of the growth of the Soviet juggernaut from 
the Muscovy principalities in 1251 to the 1951 period when the major land areas 
of China, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tibet fell into the Red zone of influence, 
producing the Red perimeter as of today. 

Just what the effect will be on the Western World if communism absorbs the 
present "fringe" on the Asian perimeter may be estimated by this next tabulation. 
It shows what accretions go under the Hammer and Sickle influence in the im- 
mediate future if the Kremlin is not stopped in Asia — just as the earlier tabula- 
tions show what communism gained in the immediate period following the close 
of World War II. 



Country 


Area 
(square 
miles) 


Population 


Raw materials (principal) 


Iran _. . . 


634,413 

116, 600 

310, 236 

54, 501 

1, 221, 880 

261, 789 

50, 650 
200, 148 

286, 000 

735, 865 

13,800 
147, 690 

115, 600 


20, COO, 000 

5, 100, 000 

33, 800, 000 
42, 000, 000 
356, 829, 485 

18, 674, 000 

5, 227, 000 
18, 836, 000 

27, 030, 000 

75, 500, GOO 

7, 617, 753 
84, 300, 000 

20, 246, 000 


Petroleum, rugs, and carpets; fruits and ber- 


Iraq - 


ries. 
Petroleum, barley, and dates. 


Pakistan: 

West 


Raw jute, raw wool, hydroelectric power to be 


East 


developed; cotton, fisheries, and agriculture. 
Millet, rice, corn, wheat, tea, sugar, cotton, 




jute, linseed, coffee, rubber, textiles, steel, 
petroleum, copper, chromite, iron, mica, 
magnesite. manganese, and coal. 
Agriculture, teakwood, silver, petroleum, 


Malaya _ 


rubies, jade, sapphires, and rice. 
Rubber, tin, rice, oils, and spices. 


Thailand 


Timber, rubber, cotton, spices, coal, iron, man- 




ganese, tungsten, antimony, and mercury. 
Iron, tungsten, manganese, rice, rubber, fish, 


Indonesia 


coal, lumber, tin, hides, and spices. 
Rubber, tin, oil, coal, bauxite, manganese, 


Formosa --. 


copper, nickel, gold, silver, spices, and agri- 
cultural products. 
Rice, tea, sugar, jute, gold, silver, copper, coal, 


Japan 


and some spices. 
Rice, fruits, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, 


Philippines 


iron, chromite, arsenic, coal, sulfur, salt, and 
petroleum. 
Timber, gold, silver, zinc, copper, iron, coal. 




petroleum chromite, asbestos, manganese, 
rice, hemp, sugar, copra, fruit, and agricul- 
tural products. 


Total 


4, 149, 272 


715, 220, 318 


As indicated under separate areas. 






(United States— Compare) 


3, 022, 387 


157, 269, 000 





The "Asian fringe," to complete communization of Asia, is an area IJ^ times 
that of the United States and 4 times the population. The Red movement 
represented by soapbox orators in New York's Union Square and London's 
Hyde Park in the pre- World War II days is now reaching out for continents. 

Investigating committees of the Congress have produced sworn testimony 
from men who were there at the time, that Soviet Communists were working 
in the early 1920's to a Chinese Soviet as the basis for a Communist Asia. Hear- 
ings of the Internal Security Subcommittee documented this action, as have 
volumes of testimony by the House Un-American Activities Committee. 

Throughout the pattern is the same. The Kremlin moved first to indoctrinate 
and propagandize, then to infiltrate and incite to internal upheaval, and finally 
to aid insurrection. Asia today — predominantly in the Red circle — is a product 
of 20 years of ceaseless propaganda, intrigue, and, where necessary, physical aid 
to armed revolution. 

Africa, today, is in approximately the same relative position on the Red 
Pascist timetable for world control as Asia was in the early 1920's. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 41 

World communism, directed from Moscow, is proceeding in accordance with 
a program based on phased accomplishment, tentatively timed, but activated 
in succeeding phases without regard of the time consumed to complete each 
successive step. 

After the overthrow of the Czarist regime, the Communist leadership first set 
about to establish its national base, from the security of which Communist in- 
filtration might be extended to other lands through Communist parties estab- 
lished in those countries. Each of these Communist parties had to recognize, 
however, that it was but a section of the Third International, recognizing direction 
from the Kremlin. 

By the middle 1920's, the next Russian Communist step — vital as a protection 
to Russia against Japan — had been fixed as the absorption of Asia, from Siberia 
to Singapore, and westward to Suez. Against that backdrop, the Russian oper- 
ations throughout World War II are more easily understood. 

The Soviet's activities since World War II, have seen these steps accomplished 
in the absorption of Asia: 

1. Establishment of Red China. 

2. Occupation of Tibet by a people's army of liberation. 

3. Invasion of Korea and retention of half of it. 

4. Backing of Ho Chi-minh in Indochina. 

5. Abortive eff"ort to aid the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines. 

6. Backing of Indonesian independence. 

7. Infiltration of Burma. 

8. Effort to communize Thailand and Malaya. 

9. Consolidation of Balkan satellites as buffers against the West. 

10. Disruption of most Middle East governments, other than Greece, 
Turkey, and Israel. 

After Asia, in the Communist long-range timetable, is Africa. Just as the Asian 
assimilation was planned by Borodin in the early twenties, so did the planning for 
Operation Africa begin in 1931. 

In 1931, the Lenin Institute in Moscow set up the plan to train native Africans 
from the Negro tribes for future activities in Africa. 

In 1933, the first African representatives appeared at the Lenin Institute, and 
from that date on, there have always been students at Moscow from Liberia and 
Ethiopia, with representatives from as many other African areas as year-to-year 
opportunities presented themselves. 

Russian Communists had triple motivation for action against Africa. 

First, the lifeline communication route of the colonial powers is through the 
Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to Suez. The control of that lifeline, from Com- 
munist bases in north Africa, could prevent transport to the British, French, 
Belgian, Portuguese, and Netherlands industrial areas of the raw materials from 
their colonies in either Africa or Asia. Industrial Europe would strangle without 
a smooth and uninterrupted seaborne flow of raw materials. 

Second, militarily, Communist occupation of north Africa would place a Com- 
munist ring around half of Europe — -as well as rob France and Spain and Italy of 
some of their best sources of military manpower. 

Third, Africa is admittedly a treasure house of minerals and of other strategic 
materials without which no European power could make war against Russia. In 
this connection, the United States draws upon African sources for 28 strategic raw 
materials, and, without them, could not produce adequate war materials over an 
extended period. 

Communism, as interpreted by Lenin, has always preached against colonial- 
ism — probably because Russia, as a continuous land mass, had neither colonies 
nor the need of them. Russia, historically, has expanded on her perimeter, and 
has never reached for a distant area without first acquiring the intervening land. 

Communism, also, while ultimately in avowal against nationalism, invariably 
stirs colonies into revolutionary nationalism — and then, through placement of 
leaders among the revolutionaries, sets up a Communist form of government which 
quickly affiliates with international communism. For example, French and 
Italian partisans against the Nazis in World War II, have been the backbone of 
communism in France and Italy ever since V-E Day. 

In penetrating Africa, the Soviet chose Communists from India as basic per- 
sonnel. There are 360,000 Indians in South Africa, 100,000 in Kenya, 50,000 in 
Tanganyika, and 40,000 in Uganda. They are New Delhi Indians and generally 
occupy the white-collar and clerical jobs in African industrial and production 
organizations. 



42 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

As late as June 1953, the organization of the Communist infiltration of Africa 
was an espionage and propaganda staff set up in Moscow with this personnel: 

Director: S. P. Koziarev, Russian. 

Deputy: Col. Beck Dumbadze, Russian. 

Chief of Operations: Lt. Col. Harald Nuut, Russian. 

First Deputy: E. F. Podvigin, Russian. 

Second Deputy: Maj. V. I. Strashev, Russian. 

Staff Officers: V. Kumanev, Bulgarian; and V. Bank, Russian. 

Liaison Officer with Arab League: A. L Chikov, Russian. 

Director, North and West African Department: J. A. Klimentov, Russian. 

First Deputy: A. N. Eropkin, Russian. 

Second Deputy: E. Kallos, Hungarian. 

Liaison Officer with Mogreb Liberation Committee: V. Kozarev, Russian. 

Director, East Africa and Abyssinia Department: V. A. Kiriev, Russian. 

Director, Sudan Department: Y. lakhim, Czech. 

Deputy: Y. Siedliaczek, probably a Czech. 
The resident agents in the Sudan were stationed at Khartoum, Abu-Hamed, 
Omdurman, Port Suday, Atbara. This staff handles all African affairs, with 
communication to Moscow through the Czech legation in Cairo, using courier 
Max Mukhli. 

It is important to note that Russia moved into Africa as soon as feasible after 
the end of World War II. 

One of her greatest concentrations was at Addis Ababa. In that postwar 
period Russia noted visits of British and American industrialists — Lord Kemsley 
of England and Edward Stettinius of the United States — as a move developed 
to provide capital from abroad for African industrialization. Russian policy 
decreed the planning for a foothold in Northeast Africa as the beginning of a 
long-range effort to eliminate Africa as a source of strategic planning for the 
Western powers — before Russian infiltration gave her power to control the 
African areas politically. 

While this stage of Russian operations was formative. Communists in England 
made it a practice to meet colonials from Africa, entertain them, indoctrinate 
them, and, in many cases, sent them back to Africa as pro-Communist. 

Communist Russia designated Addis Ababa as the base from which to neu- 
tralize establishment of an East African base south of the Sahara by the Western 
powers — before the establishment of American and Allied bases in North Africa 
set up a defense line on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. 

The Russian diplomatic personnel at Addis Ababa became larger than the 
Russian Embassy in Paris. By May 1951 Ambassador Rikanov had a staff 
of over 100. The word passed out by the propaganda members of the Russian 
staff was "We shall soon be at the Suez Canal." (By early 1954, this prediction 
was near fulfillment.) 

Ras Slum, of Tigre Province, was told by Russian agents that he would be 
given Eritrea after "the Emperor had been overthrown" and when communism 
prevailed. Czech arms, including light artillery, were smuggled to Slum, pre- 
sumably by Russian agents. 

By June 1952, Communist propagandists spread the word that Communist 
membership in the Sudan, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria had passed the 1 million 
mark. Soviet agents, posting as traders, were used as messengers and intelligence 
agents. Four approaches were made in propagandizing the Africans. They 
were: 

(a) To Asiatics in Africa, "A Communist India, backed by Russia, can 

master Africa." 

(6) To backward Negroes in the tribal areas, "The tribal chiefs have sold 

out to the colonial powers. Only the medicine men can break this power." 

Medicine men reportedly were taught how to use quinine and ipecac to cure 

fever and dysentery, the most frequent tribal diseases, and so increase their 

influence. 

(c) To Negro workers in urban areas: "You have been taken from your 
tribes and made to slave for the benefit of the white masters. You must 
prepare to win your freedom." 

(d) To African intellectuals: "You must study, prepare to be leaders, to 
take your people out of slavery." 

These intellectuals, after careful screening, were chosen to go to Lenin Institute, 
and later to Prague, to which the training of colonial agent-personnel had been 
transferred. 

By May 1953 it was established that packages from Addis Ababa to Belgian, 
French and British territories, supposedly containing meaicines and commercial 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 43 

goods, frequently contained propaganda material for the Communists — and even 
weapons. These moved through the "traders" previously mentioned. 

Timing of such movements as the Libtration Front in the Belgian Congo; the 
Beria Liberation Committee in Portuguese Mozambique; democratic rallies and 
shock group operation in the French colonies; the Mau iVIau rebellion in Kenya; 
the strikes in Rhodesia; the Kaffir and other riots in South Africa; the rebel 
movements in Egypt and the Sudan, all indicated conformity to a master plan. 
From 1951 to 1953, the number of African students at Prague has been fixed at 
100, out of a total of 300 trained there annually. 

Specific individuals upon whom reports have been received show these opera- 
tions: 

Pascal Tongomba, in Moscow in mid-1953, director of the flow of arms to 
Africa through Addis Ababa. 

Ignaz Feld, deputy for Tongoma, former Nazi intelligence officer who 
entered Soviet service after the German surrender, director of uranium 
sabotage in Belgian Congo and keyman in inciting the tribal medicine men 
against their tribal chiefs. 

An American Negro known as "Butler," assigned to incite Negro port 
workers to sabotage and espionage at African harbor areas. 

A "Professor Azikiwi," also known as Zik, in ?sigeria, publisher of books, 
semiclandestine weekly paper, and a leading figure in the National Council 
for Nigeria and the Cameroons. 

X. Bawasa, direct aide of Tongomba in French West Africa and in French 
Somaliland. 
The Mau Mau trouble in Kenya, in which many were killed, was a subject of 
warning to British colonial governors as far back as 1947. 

Eliu Mathu and Jome Kenyatta were named as leaders. Nothing was done. 
The Mau Mau movement is, historically, an offshoot of the Maseregu move- 
ment, started in 1912, with ramifications from the cape to Cairo. It was sup- 
pressed, but bobbed up again in 1925 and was again forced underground. A 
missent letter to Kenyatta at that time outlined the entire plan for attacking 
all whites in Africa and all white governments by coordinated tribal uprising. 
It failed because the powerful Masai, Kamba and Kavironde tribes would not 
join. Still Kenya authorities failed to take the Kenyatta threat seriously. 
Only when a letter to Kenyatta from Moscow came into the possession of the 
authorities was action taken against the Mau Ma us. 

The situation in Liberia, where the Firestone Rubber Co. and American-owned 
mines are the principal source of Government revenue, is bad. The free Negro 
Republic has three divisions of population. There are 12,000 "citizens" — former 
American slaves who were repatriated in forming the Republic. They have 
Government jobs. Then there are about 80,000 assimilated natives, who usually 
have the menial Government jobs. The 1,800,000 other natives, in 28 tribes, hate 
the "citizens," the second group of native Government workers, and, above all 
else, the whites. It is an ideal Commvmist infiltration setup. The tribesmen are 
told that all their troubles stem from the white men. 

Nigeria, where 90 percent of American columbite and tantalite— critical short- 
supply strategic materials — come, is seething with Communist incitement to 
rebellion. (Aziwike and his aides.) 

N. B. A Hamburg report on April 28, 1954, stated: 

"A special training course for 11 Indian and 8 Nigerian Communists is 
currently being held at the SED school in Dresden-Heidenau. The course is 
directed by the Soviet Communist Party. In another course, 8 Greek and 
12 Spanish Communists are taught by Soviet Party instructors to organize 
illegal party cells in their home countries." 
The Indian Communist activities have centered in South Africa and have been 
a big element in the "color-line" rioting against the Malan government. 

N. B. An indication of the ideological war already being fought between 
Africa and India is indicated in the India Information Service broadcast from 
Delhi on May 6, 1954, replying to a charge by Dr. Daniel Malan, South 
African Prime Minister that "Nehru had his eyes on Africa", and that 
"Nehru is the enemy of the white man." It said: 

"If democratic bodies like the African National Congress, the South 
African Indian Congre.ss, and the South Arican colored people's organizations 
are joining together to challenge white supremacy, the motive force is nothing 
so recent as Russian communism, but springs from man's unconquerable 
mind, which is the same for black, brown, and white." 
Reports are that the India-Africa Council, directed from New Delhi, will have 
a Cairo conference some time during 1954 to rally all African radical and sub- 



44 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

versive groups to united action. An all-Africa conference, supersecret, is to be- 
held in interior Africa, according to report, to further coordinate tribal rebellion 
in all colonial areas. 

Combating this trend, the Africa Capricorn Society is to confer at Mbeye, 
Tanganyika, in August of this year. The Capricorn Society is basically a move- 
ment to create a new state composed of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Southern 
Rhodesia, and the northern part of the Bechuanaland protectorate, within the 
British Commonwealth. 

Such a proposal would consolidate production of meat, coal, iron, lime, gold, 
copper, tin, magnesite, tungsten, and asbestos, with development of unlimited 
hydroelectric power, and give the new area a more solid government than the 
present separate colony setup. 

The Communist effort to incite the Negroes south of the Sahara is a separate 
movement, though coordinated by the same Russian staff at Moscow, from the 
incitement of the Arabs north of the desert. 

N. B. Under the latest pro-Western trend of the Iraqi Government, a 
broadcast on May 13, 1954, stated that Middle East Arab League States 
"were to be taken to combat Communism" in that area. That same broad- 
cast quoted "American intelligence sources" as stating there are about 
50,000 members of the Communist Party in the Middle East. The use of 
the term Arab League and Arab States would include North Africa. 
The Moslem religion of the North African Arabs makes communism and its 
antireligious position anathema. At the same time the Arabs listen to the propa- 
ganda on freedom and for an Arab Nation with independent status. As early 
as January 1948, Maximo v, Russian consul general in Algiers, advised Moscow 
against pushing Algerian nationalism at that time — on the ground that if France 
went Communist, it would be better to have a colonial Algeria as part of France 
than to have a separate Arab anti-Communist free state on the southern shore of 
the Mediterranean. 

Since the establishment of American bases in North Africa, however, the 
Communists have established liaison with the Arab League and are again backing 
Arab nationalism, but more actively in Morocco and in Tunisia, where there are 
larger urban radical populations, than in the more highly agricultural economy 
of Algeria. 

N. B. On May 12, 1954, the Deutschlansender broadcast, in German, a 
warning that between May 2 and May 9, over 100 agitators and 13 agents 
had been sent into West Germany, with 5 of the 13 earmarked for eventual 
Soviet service in Morocco and Switzerland. 
In summary: 

Russian communism feels that Asia is progressing adequately toward com- 
munism. 

Africa, today, is in the infiltration state where Asia was from 1920 to 1945, 
Africa, in due course, is to be steered to local nationalism and freedom, and then 
incorporated in world communism. 

Then American and the Western Hemisphere are to be attacked through infiltra- 
tion of Latin America. Then the last source of raw materials for industrial 
North America will be dried up. 

As recently as February of this year I was in Morocco, North Africa. In a 
brief 10-day period two attempts were made to assassinate the Sultan of Morocco, 
placed in the position of ruler by the French and the splendidly anti-Communist 
Resident-General Auguste Guilliaume. The official, though unpublicized belief 
of the Moroccan leadership is that the Arab League is being duped by Com- 
munist agitators to incite rebellion and sedition by urging nationalism and 
freedom from colonialism among the Arabs, though the Arabs, traditionally for 
religious grounds, detest communism. A Moroccan upraising against the West 
would, of course, cost the United States the air and naval bases south of the 
Mediterranean without which ground troops in Europe could not be protected 
in any aggressive thrust westward by the Soviet in Europe. 

The stake for which communism and freedom fight in Africa is best visualized 
by the area, population and wealth involved. Here it is: 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



45 



Country 


Area (square 
miles) 


Population 


Principal raw materials 




472, 500 


12, 646, 275 


Gold, diamonds, uranium, coal, copper, tin, iron, 








lead, lime, manganese, pb'tinum, salt, talc, 
chrome, mica, graphite, beryl, corn, sugar, fruit. 


Kenya 


224. 960 
93, 981 


5, 406, 000 
5. 050, 000 


Coffee, tea, sisal, dairy products, minerals. 


Ueandi.-.. 


Undeveloped. 


Tanganyika 


362, 688 


7, 800, COO 


Sisal, cotton, coffee, hides, beeswax, ivory, dia- 








monds, lead, gold, mica. 


Southwest Africa. 


317, 725 


379, 000 


Not available. 


Southern Rhodesia 


150,333 


2, 158, 350 


Gold, chrome, coal, asbestos, corn, cotton, tobacco. 


Northern Rhodesia 


390. 323 


1.866.0C0 


Copper, zinc, cobalt, gold, vanadium, manganese. 


Nvasaland - 


47, 404 


2, 349, OrO 


Tea, wheat, cotton, rubber, tobacco. 


Basutoland.- 


11,716 


555. 390 


Wool, wheat cereals (whites can own land). 


Bechuanaland.. 


294, 020 


294, 000 


Cattle and dairving. 




6,704 


184, 000 


Gold, tobacco, tin, asbestos, tobacco, corn, butter. 




livestock. 


Nigeria - 


383, 593 


23, 973, 000 


Tin, lead, rubber, palm kernels, cotton lint, cocca, 




hides, peanuts, tantalite. 


British Cameroons 


34, 081 


1, 027, 000 


Cloves, vanilla, ginger, pepper, ivory, palm oil. 


Gambia 


4, 005 


268. 000 


Undeveloped. 


Sierra Leone. _- 


27, 925 


1. 880. 000 


Iron, hides, rice, nuts, chrome, gold, diamonds. 


Gold Coast . 


78. 802 
24.379 


3. 734. 000 
823. 672 


Manganese (2d onlv to U. S. S. R.), aluminum. 


Ashanti -- 


Gold, diamonds, cacao. 


British SomalUand 


68,000 


500. 000 


Skins, resin, gum, goats, sheep. 


Belgian Congo 


904, 757 


11, 259, COO 


Palm oil, cott-jn. nuts, timber, coffee, cocoa, rubber, 




gum, sugar, ivory, copper, diamonds, gold, 








cobalt, tintalum, silver, uranium, ndium. 


Egypt 


386, 000 


20. 729, 000 


Phosphate, petrr^leum, magnesia ochres, sulphate. 




talc, gvpsum. salt, gold, alum, copper, beryl. 


Ethiopa 


350, 000 


15, 000, 000 


Iron, cold, platinum, copper, coal, sulphur, potash, 








rubber trees, copper, hides, tobacco. 


Eritrea 


48, 350 


1. 080. 000 


Gold, petroleum, stock raising. 


Algeria 


847, 552 


8. 676, 000 


Agricultural products, wine, iron, zinc, lead, 
mereurv, copper, antimony. 


Tunisia 


43, 313 


3,231.000 


Fruits, agriculture, henna, corn, lead, iron, phos- 
phate, zinc. 


Morocco 


172, 104 


10, 442. 000 


Skins, hides, wood, poultry, eggs, leather goods, 
oil. phosphate, manganese. 


Angola 


481, 351 


4,111,796 


Coffee, rubber, wax, sugar, cotton, diamonds, 
copper, iron, salt, gold. 


Mozambique 


297, 731 


5, 090, 294 


Sugar, cotton, nuts, copra, sisal, beeswax, coal, 
samarskite, silver, uranium, asbestos. 


Sudan 


967, 500 


8, 309, 000 


Copper, gold, salt, gum arabic, sesame, ivory, gold, 
agricultural products. 


Total 


6, 867, 497 


152. 801. 647 




French West Africa 


959, 256 


4, 386. 000 


Gold, copper, lead, zinc, diamonds, ivory. 


French SomalUand 


9,071 


48, 000 


Hides, coffee, ivory. 


Madagascar 


241, 094 


4, 350, 700 


Rice, vanilla, maize, sugar, grain, cloves, tobacco. 




graphite, mica, nickel, gold, radium, agricultural 








products, hides. 


Liberia ._ -.. . 


43.000 


2, 500. COO 


Fiber, rubber, rice, gold, iron, diamonds. 


Libya 


1,100,000 


1. 340. 000 


Very little prrduction, poorest area in world. 


Total 


9, 219, 918 


165, 426, 347 





Communism's foothold in the Western Hemisphere, aside from the United 
States, and Canadian spj^ exposures since 1946, is too well known to need review 
here. The Central and South American infiltration has been in the headlines 
through the Guatemalan situation revealed recently. 

But Guatemala is but one section of the drive that has been underway since 
the end of World War Ilwopenly, and covertly for some time prior to that. As 
briefly as possible, I would like to put that into the record — after all South 
America is, next after Africa, on the Soviet timetable for establishment of the 
Communist world. 

The Communist drive in Central and South America is linked, logically enough 
with the failure of communism to seize strategic Gibraltar as a result of the 
Spanish civil war in 1937-38. Franco, seeking to oust the definitely pro-Com- 
munist Loyalist Government in Spain, found international Communist brigades 
fighting against him, with Russian-type equipment in their hands. Rightfully 
or not he accepted aid from Nazi sources. When the Loyalists lost and the 
Communist government sought refuge in Mexico, the whole Communist propa- 
ganda machine went into action to label Franco with every name in the dictionary. 

When World War II began Germany occupied France and exerted every possible 
pressure to force Franco to yield Gibraltar and the gateway to the Mediterranean 
lifeline to Suez and the East. Had he vielded the outcome of the entire war 



46 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

might well have been a Nazi victory. An American landing in Africa and the 
establishment of a base there would have been far more difficult, if not impossible. 

Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Central and South America became a hotbed 
of Communist propaganda, headed by the refugee Communist government from 
Spain. Mexico, in particular, and Cuba, secondarily became the Western Hem- 
isphere bases for European communism. 

Peron, in the Argentine, hated the United States. He offered sanctuary to 
Nazi naval forces during the war, and when Germany fell, began to flirt with the 
Soviet Union. In the elections in Uruguay, in November 1946, Peron used every 
possible means to elect an anti-American government in the republic to his 
immediate north. 

In January 1950 a survey of the Central American and South American area 
uncovered these facts, dating back to the beginning of World War II. 

There are about 1,250,000 Slavs in South America, with about 70 percent of 
them organized in language groups, principally by the Soviet. It was revealed 
that in November 1941 Communist leaders through the Western Hemisphere 
met in Mexico City to receive new directives from Moscow after the Soviet's 
entry into the war. Under direction of Kalnikoff and a Mrs. Nierska the orders 
were drafted for intensive pan-Slav propaganda, organization of armed groups, 
but no open Communist affiliations. 

August 11, 1942, the Communist Latin- American Slav Committee was estab- 
lished in Moscow under direction of Alexander Gondurov. Two months later a 
coordinating committee was formed in Montevideo under a Dr. Karatev and one 
Michael Lefitcharsev. Heavy subsidies were arranged for a Slav press in South 
America. 

By the end of 1947, 60 percent of all the Slavs in Latin America belonged to 
organizations under direct control of the Soviet. 

■ From the November 1941 conference in Mexico City the organization of military 
forces has been ordered to be held in reserve until after the war to then promote- 
revolutions and improve the Soviet's world strength position. 

A German, Baron Veith von Golssenau (alias Ludwig Renn), and the Italian 
Communist leader, Vittorio Vidali, were given the 1941 assignment to head the 
Central American central staff. 

The Panama Canal Zone, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras were deemed 
of sufficient importance to be listed as key points to attack. It was considered 
that these plans should be prepared while relations with the United States were 
still friendly. Action was to come when World War II ended. 

Vidali traveled tirelessly during the war years, planning an international bri- 
gade, such as had been used in Spain. By the summer of 1945 this brigade was 
reported to have 1,921 officers and 11,800 men in the ranks. Units of the brigade 
were widely scattered but were strongest in Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, 
and Guatemala. 

Von Golssenau, before he returned to Russia in 1947 mapped much of the 
Central American and Caribbean area. He supervised organization of bases for 
landing arms and ammunition. He included British Honduras in his survey. 
Vidali assumed command after Von Golssenau left, helped by two men whose 
Communist Party names were Aire and Adi. In 1947 Vidali was transferred to 
Trieste and his place was taken by a Red Army officer who had fought in the 
Spanish civil war and spoke very good Spanish. 

When United States-Soviet relations began to deteriorate the Communist 
international brigade went into action. At one time in 1947 forces were actually 
concentrated in Cuba with a view to invading San Domingo. Only firm action 
by Cuban authorities, spurred by strong representations from Washington 
frustrated this plan. 

Later the brigade used detachments in Venezuela during the disturbances 
which put the leftist Bethancourt in power. It was also used during the riots in 
Panama City. 

In 1948 the brigade was used to terrorize San Salvador after the election of a 
conservative president. The result was that a leftist coalition took power, 
dominated by one of the most powerful Kremlin men in the hemisphere. 

Before his death in 1945 Constantin Oumanski, ostensibly Soviet minister to 
Mexico, wrote a report dealing with espionage and sabotage in the United States, 
and listing the Panama Canal and the locks at Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., as the 
two most vulnerable strategic spots for the United States, in North America. 
He placed top importance on Central and South America as a base for Communist 
operations in the hemisphere. 

Oumanski, it will be recalled, was killed when his plane, which had just taken 
ofiF from Mexico City, exploded. In November 1945, just after his death, two 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 47 

Soviet intelligence officers, using the names of Vladimir Novak and Joseph Ard- 
man, arrived in Mexico City. After an extensive survey in Panama they moved 
to Cuba, changed their names and in August 1946 went to Florida, and other 
places north and west in the United States. Then they went back to Mexico. 
By February 1947 Moscow had a complete survey of the whole thesis put forward 
by Oumanski. By the spring of 1947 there was a vastly increased influx of 
Soviet agents into Latin America. 

Then, in February 1948, an astonisherl American public learned that the 
Panama National Assembly had unanimously rejected a long-term Unites'. States 
lease for bases protecting the canal. This rejection was a direct result of f'irec- 
tives after Oumanski submitted his report. The Kremlin ordered that relations 
between the United. States and Panama must be upset. The United States re- 
fused to light the fuse for the expected explosion. Moscow sent more agents into 
Panama. Arms, munitions, and explosives began to arrive from one source or 
another. 

But, after the departure of Von Golssenau and Vidali conditions improved, in 
Mexico, particularly. Centralization of the Western Hemisphere Communist 
organization was ordered, first to Havana and then to Montevideo. Some units 
went to Gua,temala. 

Ten million dollars more than in any preceding month went to Mexican Com- 
munist headquarters in May 1948. Orders called for west coast concentiation of 
Communist activities, from Alaska all the way to Chile. 

Technical espionage was directed from Latin American Polish legations. 
Toledano, in Mexico, blossomed out at the head of a new party. Communist 
activity increased, in S'icaragua, Honduras, and Panama. Agitation was stepped 
up in the Ecuador oil fields. The 1948 disturbances in Peru were a ""'irect outcome 
of Communist activities. In Bolivia the Communists got arms and took over a 
Neo-Fascist organization originally set up by the Germans. In Venezuela efforts 
were made to organize the oil fields so as to disrupt American oil supplies in the 
event of World War III. 

Direction shifted from the Polish to the Czechoslovakian legations in Latin 
America. A former GPU agent in Paris, Laszle Ratwany, using the name of 
Schmidt was one of the most important men in the network. 

The attempted revolution in the Dominican Republic in June 1949, was in- 
spired by Communists and helped by the Caribbean Legion. Preparations were 
started for a revolution in Nicaragua that year. This included shipment of arms. 

As of May 1950, Col. Alexander Trusov, Mexico City military attach^ at the 
Soviet Embassy headed the Soviet intelligence setup. Col. Boris E. Rudnev was 
his assistant. Capt. Gorgei E. Badan, Col. Gavrilovich Garikov, Lt. Col. Feodor 
V. Dremov were on the staff. 

In El Salvador communism is banned by law. Some underground cells were in 
existence in mid-1950 with one Colonel Castanero in charge of Communist ac- 
tivities but operating from outside the country. 

In Honduras, in mid-1950 Armando Rodriguez and Francisco Morazan non- 
Communists but professional revolutionaries were active. 

British Honduras at this time closed off fishing boundaries from Guatemala. 

Mexico centered its activities at this time on the Soviet endorsed "peace con- 
ference." In August 1950, opponents in the Mexican trade-union movement 
produced documents linking Toledano with Louis Saillant and Sergei Rostovi, 
both identified Communists. Their program was outlined as separation of Central 
America from the United States zone of influence and into cooperation with the 
U. S- S. R. 

As of December 1952, there was still a strong Communist movement in Bolivia. 
Chile and Ecuador were less Communist, but more pro-Peron. Colombia and 
Venezuela are in turmoil, but with the Communists lacking as much power as 
formerly. Neither Peru nor Uruguay have yielded to the Peron bloc. Generally 
the Communists in South America have taken to the world line of the Kremlin — 
"nationalist" support, anti-American and in constant protest against "Wall 
Street imperalists." 

Last November, Chile, ordering the deportation of Jacob Wainster, Rumanian 
Communist, took a big step to the right. The Argentine, however, entering 
into a Soviet trade pact, boosted Communist undercover activities. As of this 
month Mexico was moving into the Communist picture again, though Guatemala, 
as during the last 2 years, was the obvious Red capital of the hemisphere. 

The South American and Central American, picture is outlined because it is, 
on the Kremlin world-conquest timetable, the next step after Africa. If it should 



48 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



be prevented, the free nations should recognize that the stake, in land, people 
and wealth is: 



Countiy 


Area 
(square 
miles) 


Population 


Principal raw materials 


British Honduras 

British Guiana -.. 


8, 867 
83, 000 

1, 078, 769 
416,040 

3, 288, 000 

286, 396 
439, 997 

23,000 

44, 206 
19, 332 

175,830 
45, 452 
44,411 

760, 383 

57, 145 

28, 575 

150, 515 

514, 059 

13, 176 

72, 153 

352, 150 


65, 000 
408, 000 

17, 641, 000 
3, 054, 000 

52, 619, 000 

5, 916, 000 
11,260,000 

825, 000 

5. 469, 000 
2, 167, 000 
3, 076, 933 
2,887,000 
1, 534, 000 
26, 332, 000 

1, 088, 000 

865, 285 

1, 425, 000 

8, ,558, 000 

1, 920, 000 

2, 353, 000 
4, 985, 716 


Mahogany, fruits, chicle. 

Gold, diamonds, manganese, mica, bauxite, sugar, 




sugar, timber, rice, rum, charcoal, copra. 
Silver, copper, gold, petroleum, cattle, agriculture. 




Tin, silver, copper, lead zinc, antimonv, bismuth, 


Brazil - 


wolfram, gold, lime, rubber, cinchona, bark, tung- 
sten, petroleum, coffee, agriculture. 
Manganese, monazite (thorium), gold, mica, nickel. 


Chile 


quartz, tantalite, tungsten, iron, coal, coffee, steel,^ 
cotton, cattle, fruit, timber, rice, agricultural prod- 
ucts. 
Nitrate, iodine, copper, iron, coal, gold, silver, cobalt. 




zinc, manganese, mica, mercury, salt, sulfur, marble, 
ony.v, grain, fruit. 
Agriculture, coffee, rice, cotton, sugar, bananas, timber, 


Costa Rica 


rubber, emeralds, gold, silver, copper, lead, mercury, 
cinnabar, manganese, platinum, coal, iron, hme, 
salt, petroleum. 
Coffee, bananas, cocoa, abaca, corn, sugar, rice, tobacco. 


Cuba .- 


timber, gold, silver, quartz, alabaster, alum, mer- 
cury, sulfur, copper. 
Iron, copper, manganese, gold, petroleum, salt, sugar. 


Dominican Republic 


tobacco, timber, fruits, fibers. 
Silver, platinum, copper, salt, iron, coal, petroleum, 

sugar, coffee, rice, tobacco. 
Silver, petroleum, copper, iron, lead, coal, sulfur. 


Guatemala 


agriculture, balsa wood. 
Coffee, bananas, sugar, chicle, sUver, gold, copper, iron, 




chrome, lead. 
Gold, silver, coppei, lead, zinc, iron, antimony, coal. 




bananas, hardwood, coffee, tobacco. 
Silver, gold, copper, lead, zinc, antimony, mercury. 




arsenic, graphite, molybdenum, coal, opals, petro- 
leum, agriculture, cattle, fisheries, timber, cotton, 
sisal, bananas. 
Timber, gold, stockraising, sugar, coffee, hides. 




Timber, stockraisirg, bananas. 


Paraguay 


Timber, meats, hides, tobacco, cotton, grains. 




Cotton, sugar, agriculture, vanadium, copper. 




Coffee, gold, sugar, balsam. 


Uruguay - - 


Do. 


Venezuela..- 


Agriculture, meat, coffee, petroleum, hides, rubber. 


Total 


7, 901, 456 


53, 488, 934 









Completely out of continuity, but to further present the world picture, I would 
like to include in this record a document that came to me from confidential sources 
which I believe to be reliable. It is a translation of a secret pa,ct reported to 
have been signed in Moscow on February 12, 1950 — 4 months before the aggres- 
sion by North Korean forces was launched. The document reportedly was signed 
for Fed China by Chou-En Lai, who represents Fed China at the current Far 
East peace sessions in Geneva. It was reportedly signed for the Soviet by Andrei 
N. Vishinsky — known to the Atnericans for his bitter antiwest attitudes while 
serving in this country on behalf of the Kremlin. 

I have no proof, naturally, of the authenticity of a document intended to be 
held secret by the top level, and first-level satellite of the Fed conspiracy to rule 
the world. I merely suggest that public records of what has transpired from early 
1950 to date confirm some, at least, of the 19 articles of the transcript. It is my 
information that the translation was obta,ined by Chinese nationalist intelligence 
sources and then transmitted to this country. It is possible that the committee 
may choose to make further investigation of this reported agreement, in executive 
session, with witnesses of those agencies of our Government which would know 
more about its possible authenticity than I. 

The document, as sent to me, reads: 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 49 

" [Translation] 
"Articles of Mao-Stalin Secret Pact 

"Chinese People's Pepublic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — 
Special Friendship Pact. 

"The Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Pepublic and the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Fepublics, for 
the purpose of strengthening the secret cooperation between the Chinese People's 
Pepublic and the Union of Socialist Pepublic, in order to prevent together any 
form of aggressive act by Imperialistic policy as well as of the resurgence of 
Japanese Imperialism, with a view to establish a new order in Asia, and to 
strengthen the Chinese-Soviet friendly, cooperative relationship, especially con- 
clude, in addition to the Two Countries Friendship Alliance Mutual Aid Pact, 
a Special Agreement, as well as each appoint a Plenipotentiary Delegate as below. 

"The Chinese People's Government of the Chinese People's Pepublic specially 
appoint as Special Envoy the Chairman of the Chinese Political Affairs Depart- 
ment and Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai. 

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Socialist Republic specially appoint 
the Foreign Commissar Andrei Noraiwich Vishinsky. 

"The two plenipotentiary Delegates, after having examined together the docu- 
ment and found it appropriate, agreed to the following provisions: 

"Article 1. The contracting parties, for the purpose of preventing together 
Imperialistic invasions and of coping with the third world war, agree that the 
Chinese People's Republic will permit the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to^stntion troops within the Chinese boundary with a view to protect together 
■world peace. 

"Article 2. As from the date of conclusion of this pact, the Chinese People's 
Republic will first assign Northeast and North China sea and air bases to the 
Soviet Socialist Republic as a military measure, and also through the Chinese 
Liberation Army, will assume responsibility of assisting in the carrying out of 
the liberation of Southeast Asia so as to effectuate the completion of the Liberation 
of the whole of Asia. 

"Article 3. The contracting parties agree to reorganize the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army into (an) International Communist Army, to be under the 
direct command of the highest officer of the Red Army. 

"Article 4. The Chinese Republic will be responsible for the mobilization of 
ten million Chinese workmen to assist Soviet Russia to collectively construct the 
Sino-Soviet military establishments in order to cope with imperialistic activities 
and aggression. 

"Article 5. The Chinese People's Republic will make available all North 
China ports to the stationing of Soviet troops, as well as to provide free access 
and exit. Such ports will include Chinv/antao, Haichow, Chiefoo, Weihaiwei, 
Tsingtae and Dairen. 

"Article 6. The Chinese People's Republic will, before the end of this year, 
increase the number of soldiers by four million so as to be ready for meeting the 
imperialistic act of aggression. 

"Article 7. The population of the Chinese People's Republic must, owing 
to the existing lack of resources, be diminished by 100,000,000, since otherwise 
they cannot be sustained. Its detailed procedures are to be determined by the 
Chinese People's government themselves. 

"Article 8. All government Departments of the Central People's Govern- 
ment of the Chinese People's Republic should invite technical personnel from 
the Soviet Socialist Republic as advisors. 

"Article 9. The two contracting parties agree to the sending bj^ the Soviet 
Government of technical personnel, to participate in the operation of the main 
industries in the various distiicts of China. The Government of the Chinese 
People's Republic agree to accord them with favorable treatment in accordance 
with the favorable 'supply system.' 

"Article 10. The Chinese People's Republic will open in Soviet trade coastal 
ports and inland markets, as well as agree to levy duties at the 1/100 part under 
preferential rates. 

"Article 11. Both contracting parties agree, under mutually beneficial and 
mutually profitable conditionsj to carry out barter exchange for commodities in 
order to establish friendly relations. 

► "Article 12. The government of the U. S. S. R. will have special right to 
allocate the iron and other mineral raw materials within the boundary of the 
■Chinese People's Republic: of which the lead mines, with the exception of retain- 



50 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

ing 20 percent of the. total yearly production for self use, the rest should be 
supplied to the U. S. S. R. to expand the heavy industries in order to assist in 
the industrialization of the Chinese People's Republic, 

"Article 13. Within the boundary of the Chinese People's Republic the thir- 
teen cities — Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Kwangchow, Changsha, Hangchow, 
Kiukiang, Chungking, Fu-hu, Amoy, Swatow, Foochow, — are to be demarcated 
as to the central district to serve as residential districts for immediate immigrants 
from the U. S. S. R. 

"Article 14. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, for purposes of fulfilling 
the request of the Central People's Government of the Central (Chinese) People's 
Republic, extends a credit of U. S. $300,000,000 to China, (the principle of utiliza- 
tion and repayment of the credit to be specified in the credit agreement). The 
Chinese Peoi le's Republic, however, must use as security the entire raw material 
production of the Northeast and North China with the kinds of raw material to 
be determined according to its actual needs by the U. S. S. R. at the time of 
repayment. 

"Article 15. The contracting parties both agree that the Soviet Government 
shall share in the administration of the Changehun Railway and the fifty Chinese 
miles of territory along the railroad. The offices in which the delegates from both 
parties are responsible, such as the Head of the Railroad Department, Chairman 
of Directors (Directors), are owing to the present necessity, to be undertaken by 
the Soviet delegates, while the deputies are to be undertaken by the Chinese. 

"Article 16. According to the Manchurian Agreement concluded between the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
U. S. S. R. shall continue to enjoy special trading rights. The Chinese People's 
Republic ought to provide corn and commodities to the Soviet Government. 

"Article 17. Both contracting parties agree to the establishment of People's 
Government by the different races of people in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and 
Tibet through both sides assumption of responsibility in helping their independ- 
ence. 

"Article 18. The contracted agreement shall, after ratification by both 
parties, become immediately effective. The ratification papers are to be ex- 
changed in China. 

"Article 19. The contracted agreement pertains to the nature of high policy 
secret. The contracting parties both have duty to keep it secret and not to 
publicly announce it. 

"Done in Moscow on February 12 in the year 1950 in duplicate: each copy tO' 
be written in Chinese and Russian. Either copy in both languages are equally 
eflfective. 

"Plenipotentiary Delegate of the Central People's Government of Chinese 
People's Government — Chou En-lai. 

"Plenipotentiary Delegate of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics — Andrei Noravich Vishinsky." 

In view of the subsequent policy position of the United States in the Far East 
under the administration then in control of the Congress and the White House, 
a military intelligence estimate of the Chinese situation and the Soviet Far 
Eastern influence, prepared as a secret document in 1945, and subsequently 
declassified, should show in the record of this committee. A photostat of that 
report, showing the name of the Brigadier General who submitted it to higher 
military authority, and also showing the declassification of the document, follows. 

Unclassified by authority of the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA. 

By Seth Parker. 
Date 24 AugusL 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 51 

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 

5 July 1945 

Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

By Authority of A. C. of S., G-2 

Dated: July 1945 ( ) 

Initials 

War Department, Military Intelligence Division 
washington 

CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT 
Prepared by Military Intelligence Service 

1. The problem. The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of 
how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the prob- 
lem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the 
most elementary statements of fact. 

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs 
constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in 
China and in the Pacific. A major project was therefore initiated at the end of 
1944, under which the most competent analysts — both ci\ilian and military — 
were assigned to the examination of all material available, and to the compilation 
of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report 
involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books. 

2. Fundaynental conclusions. Careful study of these materials has led to a 
number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentica- 
tion for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important 
conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese 
Communists is Soviet democracy, (2) The Chinese Communist Movement is part 
of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. 
(3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated 
areas in Manchuria, Korea and probably North China. (4) A strong and stable 
China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. 
(5) In order to prevent the senaration of Manchuria and North China from China, 
it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided 
(like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations. 

3. Basis of conclusions. 

a. High morale. The Chinese Communists are the best led and most 
vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their 
policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical. 

h. Policy of establishing communism through "democracy." The Chinese 
Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: first, the change 
of the Chinese semi-feudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; 
second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according 
to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must 
have "the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." 
This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party 
controlled "democracy". 

c. ^^ Soviet Democracy." While the Chinese Communists, call their present 
political system "democracy," the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact 
"Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in 
the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship" of the 
Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). 
This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure 
of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making 
concession to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in 
Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, 
to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while 
minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated 
in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily 
suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance 
is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever 
obtain supreme power in China. 



52 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the 
laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomiiitang 
Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas 
held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This 
is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China. 

d. Part oj International Communist movement. The Chinese Communist 
movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military 
strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet 
Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is 
derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet 
Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported 
and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of 
"Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism." 

e. Desire for U. S. support against Japan and the Kuomintang. This does 
not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward 
the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is 
conditioned, however, by the extent to w^hich they can obtain benefits from us in 
the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims: the subjugation of China under 
Communist rule and the development of a Communist-controlled "capitalist 
democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. 
They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and 
the Chungking Government. 

/. De facto independence. The Chinese Communist movement today is 
not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in 
all but name, possessing territory (the combined area of which is about the size 
of France or one-fifth of China Proper), a population of probably more than 
70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist, 
state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient. 

g. Rivalry with the Kuomintang . 

(1) Failure of the "Entente Cordiale" . During the period of the 
Soviet Russian-Kuomintang Entente Cordiale, 1923-1927, the Kuomintang and 
the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to 
support the revolutionary, nationalist, democratic program of the Kuomintang. 
They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders 
that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn 
the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 
1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and 
Soviet Russia. 

(2) Development of the "united front" movement. The ensuing civil 
war, 1927-1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied 
by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang 
had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the 
Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists 
in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in 
Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation 
between Communists and non-Com.munist groups and parties in the capitalist 
democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of 
fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist 
democracies. 

Under the terms of the miited front understanding in China, the Chinese 
Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against 
the Goverimient, to abolish their separate government and administration, and 
to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army. 

(3) The "war within the war." The Chinese Communists did not 
fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the 
Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, 
however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang 
armies in obedience to the Chinese High Command, kept within their assigned 
defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any 
Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops 
refused to adinit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share 
with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called "traitors" by the 
Comnmnists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists 
permission to estaljlish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil adminis- 
trations, called "united front governments," which flouted the National authority 
of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, 
the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "anti-democratic" and the 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 53 

Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably 
led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against 
both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases. 

Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. 
After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists 
and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each 
other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount 
importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against 
Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the pai;ty that won 
out in the Kuomin tang-Communist struggle for power. 

h. Role in World War II. In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi-war, 
the Chinese CoTumunists have contributed to the United Nations war against 
Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories with areas enclosed by the 
Japanese Army thej' have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of North 
China's resources in foodstuffs, raw materials, and rnanpower. They have also 
rescued manj' American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-con- 
trolled areas. 

Contrary to the widely-advertised reports of their sympathizers, the Chinese 
Communists have, however, fought the Jaiianese far less than have the National 
Government troops. The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers have 
yielded ground politically and militarilv to the Communists in order to avoid 
an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested m 
the war against Japan. 

i. Military capacity small. The Chinese Communists now claim to have 
an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 
2,000,000 men. However, in October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist 
regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase 
since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity de- 
pends upon the number of rihes available. Rifles were available for only about 
250,000 men in October 1944. 

j. The Alternative settlements of the Kuomintang-Communist 'problem. 

(1) General. As far as can be seen at present there are three alter- 
natives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between 
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists; a "settlement" which would be 
disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the 
question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National Assembly to 
inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties 
find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these 
parts to be united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" 
of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed 
independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two 
parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations. 

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. 
Both the Kuoiuintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control 
over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoid- 
able. 

(2) Generalissimo sponsors the National Assembl;/. Chiang Kai-shek 
has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, 
as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist 
problem and for the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, 
that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan 
armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge 
of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes 
compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the 
Communists. 

(3) Chinese Com.munists sponsor idea of coalition government. The 
Communist refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the 
National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution 
of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might 
be workable if the Communist would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang 
and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly 
tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense 
areas, and there is no indication that the Commimists would accept any demarca- 
tion of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be 
established. 

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the 
Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only 



54 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain 
legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the 
Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through 
legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a 
coalition government. 

(4) Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake. Here 
the matter rests (3 July 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National 
Assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for 
unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbi- 
tration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the post-war 
period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and 
the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real 
unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan. 
k. International implications. 

(1) Common policy of U. S. and U. S. S. R. It is generally believed 
that a peaceful inter-party settlement in China depends largely upon the extent 
to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward 
China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese 
Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States sup- 
ports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting 
head on. 

(2) Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China. Present relations 
between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denounc- 
ing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of 
the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications 
that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination (along 
somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe), in the 
areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia; that is in Sinkiang, Inner" 
Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper. 
A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China 
who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states 
should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers." 

The Chitiese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably 
further this aim in that North China and Manchuria might "legally" become the 
exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under 
a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the 
coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend 
China an outward appearance of unity. 

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve 
relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a "united front" 
between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet 
Russia's experience in China that cooperation on a united front between the 
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists 
against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, 
whether reactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China 
has suffered whenever the Kuoinintang has fought the Communists in an all-out 
civil war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet Russia's apparent 
willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive 
Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived 
in Moscow and was received by Stalin on 30 June. An agreement between 
Moscow and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reduc- 
ing the danger of immediate disagreement between the U. S. S. R. and the United 
States. 

(3) The U. S. and the situation in China. 

fa) The post-war peace in the Far East depends on re-establish- 
ment of Chinese independence and unity. The type of peace we shall gain by our 
victory over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain com- 
plete independence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far 
East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always 
revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers 
by acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power 
had depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Sim- 
ilarly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in 
Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests 
in China Proper in the 1930's. 

The independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, includ- 
ing Manchuria, have been key points of U. S. policy and interests in the Far East. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 55 

During the past eightv-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia 
and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the chief 
threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part ot the 
international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance 
between these two powers. Two sea powers. Great Britain and the Lnited 
States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America s 
concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been 
demonstrated several times. The livalry between Russia and Japan has centered 

on Manchuria and Korea. ^ . ^^ • -,7 ^j, „„? 

(b) With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia unll emerge as the sole 
military land power in Asia. Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the re-establish- 
ment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset tlie whole 
structure of the international balance of power in the Far Last which was 
developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and 
with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she 
started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, 
l30pulated bv fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. 1 he clock 
will be turned back some eighty years, to the time whe? the rivalry between 
Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total deteat ot 
Japan Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account 
in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past. 

(c) Prevention of a repetition of the "Polish situation in Man^ 
churia and'Korea is essential to post-war stability in the Far East. The problem of 
post-war peace in the Far East revolves, in so far as the United btates is con- 
cerned, around two major questions: (1) How can the mihtary-political vacuuna 
in the Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United 
States promote internal unity in China? . c^ ■ ^ t> 

The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russi i, 
and bv the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with Soviet 
Russia. If it be assumed that Soviet Russia will join in the war against 
Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to 
which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into 
an American-British and a Soviet zone of military operations. For the elements 
of uncertaintv as to Soviet Russia's intentions in China and m regard to the 
Chinese Communists are verv similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe during 
1943 and 1944 Many of the fears and speculations current at that time, to the 
effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive 
Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for 
similar fears in regard to North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet 
Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American 
and British forces in these areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan to 
create a Soviet sphere of influence in North China, Manchuria and Korea, find 
herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her exclusively 
or even predominantlv as a zone of military operations against Japan. 

On the other hand', if American forces cooperate on equal terms with soviet 
Russia, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of North 
China Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the 
terms of the Cairo declaration of 1 December 1943 can much more readily be 
achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us m control of Japan 
and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control of (.entral 
and South China, while Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist forces held the 
controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement m regard to these 
areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms of the (, airo declara- 
tion In that case, the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition govern- 
ment" might well be the onlv feasible way of settling the situation in China ; 
North China and lorobablv also Manchuria and Korea would come under the 
control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet Russian support, and in 
these areas there would be established the now tvpical "united front or demo- 
cratic" coalition administrations in which the Communists hold the dominant 
power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources of North C^hina and iVlan- 
churia the present National Government of China would find itself unable to 
compete with the Communists in the North and to establish a strong and stable 
state. For this reason it is necessary, for the maintenance of peace m the l^ar 
East and for the long range interests of the United States, that the Cairo Declara- 
tlion be implemented without modification. 



56 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2: 

P. E. PEABODY 
Brigadier General, GSC 
Chief, Military Intelligence Service- 
DISTRIBUTION: 

USAF POA (10) 

SWPA (10) 

USAF China (5) 

USAF India-Burma (3) 

ASF (1) 

AGF (1) 

AAF (6) 

OSW (1) 

OPD (3) 

AWC (1) 

ANSCOL (1) 

C&OSS (]) 

USMA (1) 

Navy (25) 

White House (15) 

State Deot (3) 

OSS (1) ^ 

KID(1; 

MIS (21) 

Rep : 

Auth: Col Alfred McCormack 

No. of copies: 110 

General Willoughby, formerh^ General MacArthur's intelligence chief in the 
Far East testified before Senate and House committees, as outlined in the Depart- 
ment of Defense revelations about the Soviet spy ring headed by Richard Sorge. 
He may know more of the Peabody report. Similar testimony given by former 
Soviet intelligence officers before the Senate Internal Security Committee and 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities may be found to fit into both 
the Peabody report conclusions and the joint-aid activities of top Soviet and Red 
Chinese officials. 

International communism has consistently sought to undermine the United 
States, as the "heart of the capitalist world." The attack in this country took 
form almost on the heels of the Bolshevik overthrow of the Czarist regime at the 
end of World War I. With that attack there was concentration on infiltration of 
Central and South America in which the United States has consistently been 
pictured as "the Colossus of the North," aiming always at domination of all of 
Latin America. Our freeing of Cuba from the Spaniards, followed by the estab- 
lishment of the independence of the Philippine Republic have neutralized this 
Communist offensive to some extent, but it is still alive, vibrant, and to some 
degree effective. It is aimed basically at pro-Communist organization of unskilled 
labor, attacks on "foreign capitalists," revolutionary action to overthrow existing 
governments in Latin America, and an incessant reiteration that the protective 
Monroe Doctrine has been merely a cloak for "creeping capitalist imperialism and 
fascism." 

The anti-Communist revelations by congressional committees are too well 
known, too well documented, and too clearly understood to need reiteration here. 

It is pertinent, however, in consideration of Senate Resolution 247 and its pur- 
pose, to trace major incidents in a sequence of more than a quarter of a century 
to show that recognition of the Soviet should never have been granted. It is 
germane to recall the bitter fight against that recognition, and lay where it be- 
longs the responsibility for the cumulative sabotage, espionage, and seditious 
operations of world communism in this hemisphere. 

The real beginning of what is now called communism in the United States came 
subsequent to the October revolution in Czarist Russia in 1905, when an abortive 
efi"ort to establish a worker's government along lines promulgated by Marx and 
Engles failed. Considerable numbers of the participants in, or sympathizers 
with that effort fled from Russia and made their way to the United States. 

These radicals became active in language groups, and in such radical labor 
groups as the IWW, and the radical political groups then generally described as 
"Sociahsts." As in Europe, radicals in the United States had two hues of 
thought — both aimed at eventual control of government. In substance the 
Socialists favored use of parliamentary means to achieve their aims. The Left 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMJVrUNISM 57 

Wing Socialists who later became the corps of the Communist Party favored 
direct action, violence, to take over government control. 

Leon Trotsky, then in the United States was in the direct action group, as was 
Nicolai Lenin, then finding political refuge in Switzerlartti. 

World War I found Socialists, generally, favoring a boycott of war. 

In 1915 a conference at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, was called to make the war 
boycott international. Enough of the delegates refused to follow that demand — 
insisting on national support of governments by each government's Sociahsts — 
to wreck the Trotsky proposal at that time, and open the better light iDetween 
today's Socialists and the Third International. 

Subsequently the German General Staff conceived the plan of wrecking the 
Russian war effort by inciting revolution in Russia. Trotsky left the United 
States, and with Lenin and some of the other Red leaders, was smuggled into 
Russia, from Switzerland. Military and econom.ic disintegration followed to the 
extent of forcing the Czar's abdication and the Russian separate peace with 
Germany. 

The plan came too late, however, to prevent German failure in the west and 
Allied victory cam.e on November 11, 1918, with the armistice. 

In Russia the democratic government initially set up by Kerensky was shortly 
overcome by the Bolsheviks — and communism had a national base from which 
to work toward domination of the world. 

The TrotsTcy-Lenin capture of the Russian Government apparatus spurred 
communism throughout the world. 

A bibliography of the Communist Third International drive in the United 
States will be found in these documents — all a matter of public record, but all 
practically forgotten in the deluge of investigations of communism that dealt 
with little facets of the big Red program: 

(1) Senate Document No. 62 of the 1st session of the 66th Congress: (1919) 
covering hearings of the Judiciaiy subcommittee of the Senate under Senate 
resolutions 307 and 309. 

(2) Hearings of the Overman subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, in January, 1920, under authority of Senate Resolution 263 (66th 
Cong.). 

(3) The voluminous New York legislative hearings beginning in April 1920, 
generally referred to as the Lusk committee reports (4 volumes of 1,000 pages 
each) . 

(4) Tlie Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee hearings in January, 1924, 
during the 68th Congress, under authoritv of Senate Resolution 50. 

(5) The Fish committee (House of Representative) in 1930, held in cities 
"throuehout the Nation, confirming the findings of the earlier Senate committees 
and bringing them up to date. 

Most of these documents are found only in committee or Library of Congress 
files. The Eies committee, the Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee hearings, and the investigations of this committee 
are all current and can be examined by any student of the Third Tnternational's 
plan for world conquest who ^\ill take the time and trouble to read them. 

Senate Document 14, presented to the first session of the 68th Congress by the 
late Senator Lodge of IVIassachusetts — grandfather of our present United States 
Ambassador to the LTnited Nation.s — tells how the Third International, in Moscow, 
■sent delegates to a conference of radicals on Oveilook Mountain, near Woodstock, 
N. Y., on May 15, 1921. Jaker Davidovich Janson arranged that meeting. He 
had been head of Lenin's Pan-American Bureau, in charge of the Red activities 
in the entire Western Hemisphere, under the alias of Charles E. Scott. He hau 
"taken part in the Bolshevik revolution, and in China for the Soviet, before coming 
to America. 

Janson, or Scott, had complete authority from Lenin to break the deadlocK. 
between the factions of American Communists and to make final decisions about 
the future of the party. Janson told the 70 delegates to the Overlook Mountain 
conference: 

1. The Communist Paity of America would be an underground, or illegal, 
party, through which the international Communist organization would give its 
orders, formulation of policies, and direction of programs. 

2. An "open" or "legal" party would be formed to carry out the orders of the 
underground party, to aeitate for the ordered programs, propagandize for man- 
power membership in the labor unions. (The subsequently formed Workers 
Party was given that role.) 



58 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

3. Key positions in the open party were to be held by members of the under- 
ground party, and in any front organizations a sufficient number of underground 
party members were to be placed to give control. 

4. All funds were to jse controlled by the underground party. 

5. No meeting or convention of the open party might be held unless agenda 
and procedure had previously been approved at a meeting of the underground 
party. 

6. Delegates were told to return to their organizations and make it clear that 
supreme control in the United States would be the Communist Party of America — 
the underground — and that the CPA would always be designated as a section of 
the Third International. 

7. A convention of the same delegates would be held late in the summer of 
that same year to get the reports of the organizations on acceptance or refusal. 

When that meeting en Overlook Mountain closed, Robert Minor, on May 29, 
1921, was directed to go to Moscow and notify Lenin that Communist unity in 
America had been achieved. 

It was recorded in the minutes of that meeting that Moscow communism had 
appropriated $135,000 for the unity project, and that $25,000 had been allotted 
to the two American factions to carry out the unification plans. 

Subsequently, when the Workers Party was formed in New York, nine members 
of the Communist Party of America became its executive committee. 

These executive committee members were: Jay Lovestone (alias Zack Wheat), 
Earl Browder (alias Ward and alias Dixon), James P. Cannon (alias Cooky), 
Ludvv'ig Lore (alias Young), Robert Minor (alias Ballister), A. Bittelman (alias 
Raphael), Alexander Trachtenberg, William W. Weinstein (alias Lewis) and 
C. E. Ruthenburg (alias Damon). 

Lovestone's testimony is printed in volume II of the Dies committee hearings 
in 1939, and is referred to in appendix I of that committee, issued in 1940; the 
hearings on Gerhart Eisler in 1947; the hearings on Leon Josephson and Samuel 
Liptzen in 1947; House Report 209, issued in 1947; House Report No. 1, 1941; 
House Report No. 1920, of 1948; the labor union hearings of August 9 to 11, 
1949; the hearings covering professional groups in the Los Angeles area (January 
and April 1952) and House Report 1229, issued January 8, 1952. Lovestone is 
currently connected with a committee of the American Federation of Labor. 
In .preparation for the illegal party convention to be held later that summer, 
international communism, in Moscow, prepared the specific instruction sheets. 
The date was later moved forward to August 17 to 22, 1922, with Bridgeman, 
Mich., fixed as the supersecret meeting place. 

Boris Reinstein and A. S. Lozofsky, the international Communist delegates — 
using the aliases "Davidson" and "Brooks" — laid down the Lenin directions, 
covered in 21 specific points. 

Specific programs were organization of small farmers: incitement of American 
Negroes to rebellion; building up of a youth and educational movement to draw 
young people to communism; particular efforts to infiltrate unions of miners, 
railroad brotherhoods, maritime and docks; steel; foodpacking: communications; 
Federal, State, and local government workers; textile trades and clothing workers. 
Federal agencies had learned of the Bridgeman conference, raided the meeting 
after the minutes had been completed, arrested the leaders and confiscated more 
than three barrels filled with documents. 

In the Overman hearings there is documentation of the German financing of 
the Bolshevik revolution which overthrew the Czar. The Overman hearings 
had originally been authorized to investigate both Imperial German and Bolshevik 
propaganda plans. A meeting in the Ford Theater, Washington, provided the 
first clues- — leading to the Overlook Mountain meeting and then to the Bridgeman 
meeting. 

The investigations led, too, to the activities in this country of Ludwig C. A. K. 
Martens unofficial Soviet ambassador to this country. Martens sought to 
obtain formal recognition of the Bolshevik government by the United States, 
and Senator William E. Borah introduced a resolution providing for that recog- 
nition. 

By 1924 Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had compiled a tremendous 
file dealing with the question of Russian recognition. 

When the Borah recof-;nition resohition (S. Res. 50, of the 6Sth Cong.) was 
referred to the Foreign Relations Committee a subcommittee with Senator Borah 
as chairman and Senators Lenroot, Pepper, and Swanson as members, held ex- 
haustive hearings, be£;inning in January 1925. At these hearings the State 
Department files were put into the formal record. Testimony before the commit- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 59 

tee included that of J. Edgar Hoover, of the FBI, in executive session, and a half 
dozen experts from the State Department Far Eastern Division. As a result of 
the testimony submitted to the subcommittee, the full committee membership 
reported against Russian recognition. 

Robert F. Kelley and A. W. Kliefoth were the State Department experts who 
documented the case against recognition at that time. 

For 9 years after the defeat of the Borah resolution, recognition of the Soviet 
Communist Go\'ernment was blocked. 

After the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President, the drive for recognition 
of the Soviet, carefully pro} agandized for months before, burst out ■« ith new 
vehemence. Evidence had been adduced that a general strike, to start on the 
west coast among the longshoremen and then to si)read through steel, railroad, 
communications, food distribution and other unions was ] lanned by American 
Communists and their supporters. Shifting of United States Federal investiga- 
tors to the west-coast area brought cancellation of those plans in less than a week. 

In November 1933, as part of the pi'ogram to achieve recognition, the Soxiet 
Government, in writing, pledged: 

1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order 
its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own \a ay and to refrain from interfer- 
ing in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its Territories or 
possessions. 

2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in Government service and all organi- 
zations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including organi- 
zations in receiot of financial assistance from it, from an}' act o\'ert or covert, 
lialjle in any way whatsoex'er to injure the tranquillitv, j rosj erity, order, or security 
of the whole or any j art of the United States, its Territories or possessions, and, 
in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or 
any agitation or pro^ a'"anda having as an aim the \ iolation of the territorial 
integrity of the United States, its Territories or possessions, or the bringing about 
by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any i art of the 
United States, its Territories or possessions. 

3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization 
or group — -and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, 
or re.)resentatives or officials of any or^:anization or group — xxhich makes claim 
to be the government of or makes attempt on the territorial integrity of the 
United States, its Territories or its possessions, and not to form, subsidize, support, 
or permit on its territory military organizations of groups hax ing the aim of armed 
struggle against the United States, its Territories or possessions, and to i^revent 
recruiting on behalf of such organizations or groups. 

4. Not to Permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization 
or group — and to prevent the actixity on its territory of any organization or 
group — which has as an aim the overthrow or the pre] aration for the o\erthrow 
of, or by bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the 
whole or any rart of the United States, its Territories or i ossessions. 

That day the President of the United States accepted the pledge, as signed by 
Maxim Litvinoff, who w?,s the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the 
Soviet Government. Diplomatic relations were established between the Gov- 
ernn^ents of the two countries. 

Yet Litvinoff, preparing 96 hours later to leave for Moscow, was quoted in the 
Daily Worker, official piiblice,tion of the Communist Party in the United States — ■ 
a formal Soviet agency which would dare not miscjuote a Soviet official — as stating: 

"The Third International is not mentioned in this document. You must not 
read into it more than was intended." 

In other words Litvinoff pledged the Soviet not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the United States. But he specifically pointed out that the Third 
International, of which the Communist Party of the United States is a part, had 
not agreed to respect the territorial uitegrity of the United States or to be bound 
by the document he signed, and upon which Roosevelt approved recognition. 

Robert F. Kelley, of the State Depai'tment Division of Eastern European 
Affairs, had given the Secretary of State, who handed it to Roosevelt on July 
27, 1933, a memorandum which said flatly: 

"* * * The experience of countries which have extended recognition to the 
Soviet Government has shown pretty conchisively, it is believed, that there are 
serious obstacles in the way of establishment of relations on such a basis, and 
that as long as these obstacles remain, official relations, established as a result 
of recognition, tend to become, in view of the extraordinary nature of these 
obstacles, the source of friction and ill will rather than a mainspring of coopera- 
tion and good will * * *." 



60 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

"The fundamental obstacle in the way of establishment with Russia of the 
relations usual between nations in diplomatic intercourse is the world revolutionary- 
aims and the prr.ctices of the rulers of that country * * *." 

The State Department pointed out to the President the Russian repudiation 
,of $192 million of Russian obligations held by the United States; $86 million in 
Russian obligations held by citizens of the United States and repudiated by 
Russia; and finally the confiscation of $330 million worth of property rights and 
interests of American citizens in Russia. 

September 21, 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to the President a 
note which inch'ded this statement: 

"More important still the present regime in Russia has been unwilling, up to 
this time, to discontinue its interference in the internal affairs of the United 

William C. Bullitt, Special Assistant to Secretary Hull and later Ambassador 
to Russia warned the President against recognition on October 4, 1933. 

Litvinoff obviously signed the "no interference" agreement with his tongue 
in his cheek. He subsequently insisted that the Comintern was not part of the 
Soviet Government and not imder the control of that Government. Yet the 
storv of the Comintern, later renamed the Com inform, but always headquartered 
in Moscow, has been documented time after time by investigations of American 
Government agencies. 

The St'-.te Department publication Foreign Relations of the United States — the 
Soviet Union, 1933-39 details the story of how, from 1933 to 1939 American 
Ambassadors in Russia reported bre'-.ches of promise by the Soviet, on the Lit- 
vinoff docu.ment and dozens of others. 

The Canadian Royal Commission report, dealing with Soviet espionage and 
propaganda in that country durmg World War IT and after,_ shows that the Com- 
munist plan to rule the world is not directed against the United States alone on' 
this continent. 

The FBI report on Soviet espionage before World War II, during World War II 
and after World War II up to November 1945, has been revealed in part before 
Senate committee hearings as the Harry Dexter White and other spy hearings 
have been publicized. 

Political Affairs published in this country for many years under the frank decla- 
ration that it is a magazine devoted to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism 
is a recurrent monthlv recording of the International Commu.nist Party line as 
dictated by Moscow and the Third International. It cites instance after instance 
of international meetings held in Moscow of International Communist delegates 
from many countries, and gives instance after instance of violent propaganda 
against the United States. Other recordings in Political Affairs tell of Communist 
meetings in Soviet satellite states, replete with diatribes against the United States. 
To bring the situation completely up to date I would like to put into the record 
some excerpts from radio broadcasts emanating from Soviet soil, seeking to under- 
mine, not only the United States in its world relations, but in its domestic affairs. 
These Soviet actions and statements are just a few, from an incessant drumbeat 
of hate against this country. 

Tibet has for ages been free. It is rich in minerals, thinly populated, and 
strategically looks "down the throat of India. A Red Chinese Army of Liberation 
marched in, using a conflict between the Lamas as an excuse, and "freed" Tibet. 

One of the first foreign groups to follow the Red Chinese Army was a "sky 
train" containing Soviet geologists, who began an immediate mineralogical survey 
which reportedly has located vast resources of minerals of highest strategic value. 
That act — in the Soviet press and radio field — was liberation. 
The United States defense of South Korea, as agent of the United Nations, has 
persistently been labeled "imperialism" and "aggression" by the Soviet and its 
puppet states. 

Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Communist faction in Indochina, has had his first 
successes of any magnitude since the Korean truce permitted the release of arms, 
ammunition, and transport to the Vietnam South China border, and their move- 
ment to the Ho Chi Minh forces French intelligence reports state unequivocally 
that the column of 20,000 fresh troops which led the final assault on Dien Bien Phu 
were Red Chinese, directed by Soviet advisers. 

The Hukbalahap banditry in the Philippines, only recently liquidated by the 
surrender of Louis Taruc and his lieutenants, has been proved to have been Com- 
munist aided during its last G years. 

Communist agitators are the hard core of the anti-West Government of Indo- 
nesia. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 61 

Communists have the rebels in Malaya. 

Communists constantly seek overturn of the Thailand Government. 

In Indochina the United States gave aid only when it was clearly establiphed 
that Red Chinese were the prop holding up the Ho Chi Minh civil war. 

In the Philippines the Communist cry of United States imperialism has to face 
up with the historical facts that the United States freed the Philippines from. 
Spain, provided a Commonwealth form of government until the Philippines was 
stabilized and then withdrew all controls over the new "showcase of freedom" in 
the Pacific. 

The United States has meticulously left Indonesia to the Dutch and to the 
United Nations. 

Communism in ^Malaya has been strictly a problem of the British. 

South Korea is, and has been a free government since the North Koreans and 
their Soviet-backed Red Chinese i^.llies were tossed back to the line from which 
their aggression began. The United States position in Korea, is that the Koreans 
must stay free — 'as we have pledged defense of that freedom. 

Japan, by the Pearl Harbor attack, forced the United States into World War 
II. Yet the United States has freed Japan, is backing Japan in maintaining her 
newly reacquired national integrity, and is pledged to help Japan remain free. 

A.gainst these facts on the record Investia — official Soviet paper^ — under a head- 
ing "United States Plotting A.ggression All Over Asia," included this paragraph: 

"All this feverish activity for the creating of new military blocs and bases once 
more exposes the falsehood of American propaganda which is trving to whitewash 
the United States foreign policy with chatter of defense and so forth. The peoples 
of i^.sia see that United States plans are directed primarily toward the preservation 
of colonial slavery by any available means toward the enslavement of peoples who 
are trying to attain national freedom and independence, toward the transforma- 
tion of the Asiatic countries into place d'armes and their population into cannon 
fodder for the war that is being prepared against the peaceloving peoples." 

The record of Soviet veto action in the United Nations, preaching of peace 
while building for war, recurrent charges of Western espionage during the entire 
time from 1919 to date when Soviet spies worked in the United States, Canada, and 
dozens of other countries with which the Soviet was technically at peace, is a 
record of deceit, broken promises, and barbaric disregard of every concept of 
diplomatic relationship between nations. 

Senate Resolution 247, for the first time since Soviet recognition in 1933 — a 
recognition cynicallv labeled a fraud by the Soviet representative who signed it 
within 96 hours of the time he put his pen to the official paper — calls for a diplo- 
matic statement by the United States. 

The language of the resolution calls for a formalization of the statement of 
charges against the Soviet Communist Government. It calls for official recogni- 
tion of espionage, seditious propaganda, and sabotage that have been written 
into history of this and other countries since the Bolshevik revolution. 

Senate Resolution 247 is strictlv within the rights of the Senate of the United 
States in calling for severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet and its 
satellites as a result of the documented proof of the Soviet's repeated, recurrent, 
and continuous misuse of the diplomatic courtesies granted through an A.mbassador 
and an Embassy, consuls, and consular offices; commercial and trade representa- 
tives, and commercial and trade commissions. 

Senate Resolution 247 calls for a call of all free nations to an international con- 
ference to pool data and information; to determine ways and means to end the 
fifth-column methods of communism, and finally to resist further aggression by 
international communism aimed at the destruction of all free forms of government, 
and the incorporation of all such governments in a Soviet world directed from 
Moscow. 

As an American citizen, twuce called to war in defense of these United States, I 
do not see how any other citizen, believing in the constitution definition of the 
Republic given us by the Founding Fathers, can fail to support the resolution. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for the opportunity to appear before you. 

Mr. Arens. Now, Mr. Hunter, if you will kindly proceed. 

Mr. Hunter. In both newspaper and military factfinding assign- 
ments that I have had I have studied the subversive movements, 
communism, fascism, and the others, over a period of 35 A-ears. It 
goes back to the Lusk reports of the New York Legislature in 1922 
and 1924, at which time the Communist Party really had its start 



62 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

in the United States as an outgrowth of the IWW and the previous 
radical organizations. It was at that point in 1922 in Overlook 
Mountain, N. Y., that the radical movement in the United States was 
first told by direct Moscow representation that they had to operate 
as a section of the Third International, which was the world Com- 
munist movement. 

I have taken that as the base from which the Communist movement 
started in the United States and then gone back to study the reason 
why Russia, as used to be known, became the center of the Communist 
movement, and where that interlocks and interlinks with this coimtry, 
with the Marx-Engels manifesto, then into the Socialist movement, 
and currently to that Overlook Mountain picture where it began in 
this country. 

In going back into the history of Russia you will find that as far back 
as 1251 the Communists were not known and Russia itself was a 
little space about the area of the State of Connecticut, perhaps a little 
larger. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Johnston is 
present. 

Mr. Hunter. From 1251 to 1951, a period of 700 years, according 
to a map that was prepared by research people of the Library of 
Congress, the Communists have always expanded on the perimeter.' 
They would always take contiguous land territory so never to be cut 
off by sea or other open spaces from their center of communications. 

The map that we have of the Eastern Hemisphere shows, first of all, 
that little area from which they started. Then by 1939 they had 
expanded to this red line [indicating]. From 1939 to 1954, they had 
moved over into the satellite states. 

The Chairman. Is that indicated by the black line? 

Mr. Hunter. By the black line. Of course, by taking over China 
at large, Outer Mongolia, ^Manchuria, Tibet, and of particular danger 
to Japan, the south half of the Sakhalin Island, and Kurile Islands, 
which brings them within a matter of 8 or 10 miles of northern Japan 
itself, on that basis of expansion, always on the perimeter, the reason- 
able belief would be, based on their previous pattern, that their 
expansion will continue to be on the perimeter wherever they are able 
to make it, which would be into the terrifically rich mineral resource 
and population-congested centers of southeast Asia where we are now 
very deeply involved in Indochina; could come on down, as the 
Japanese did, to Singapore, and Malaya, and from that point into 
Indonesia. It could move from Tibet through the passes of the 
Himalaya Mountains as no one else ever could do before and look 
directly down into India. 

In tiie European sector, the critical and vital points are, of coarse, 
Gibraltar, between Spain and Spanish Morocco — the entrance to 
the Mediterranean — and the outlet from the Mediterranean through 
Suez, where we have the current unrest in Egypt. To lose either 
Spain or Morocco would close the western gate of tlie Mediterranean. 
To lose the Suez Canal, either through Red control of a portion of 
Saudi Arabia or a Soviet drive south on the east border of Turkey, 
would close the eastern end. 

Without it 30U could not send supplies and men through from the 
West to the defense of Australia or south, nor could you get raw ma- 
terials from southeast Asia from which many of our most important 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 63 

materials, such as tin, and rubber, and many of the metals come, 
except by the long route around vSouth Africa. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Hunter, may I just interject this question? You 
have just in the course of the last several months returned from a so- 
journ abroad on a confidential mission, have you not, which took you 
into Africa and into these areas? 

Mr. Hunter. I do not know how confidential you would call it. 
I was one of a group of correspondents who went on an Air Corps trip 
which was intended to show the capability of our medium bomber, 
the B-47, based on Africa and given added range by a refueling proc- 
ess. It was demonstrated on that trip that our medium bombers, 
based in Africa and refueled in midair over friendly territory could 
protect ground forces in Europe and penetrate into Soviet territory 
to a depth which v>ould cover practically any spot within Soviet 
Russia itself. 

The Chairman. Wlien were you on this mission? 

Mr. Hunter. February 12 to 22, around about that period of 
time. We went to all of the bases for which we have paid something 
like half a billion dollars in Africa. North Africa that is. We found 
that those five bases are protected under the agreement with the 
French by ground forces not to exceed 7,500 men. 

The Chairman. That is our limitation? 

Mr. Hunter. Permanent ground forces. We do have and can 
rotate for training purposes up to 60 or 90 daj-s as much as a wing or 
more air force, but out permanent forces, as was explained to me in 
Africa, are based on that limitation of 7,500 men. That is set by the 
French. We do not own the bases. We put in the installations. 
The French own them. They can on demand take them back as I 
imderstand, when and if they see fit. At the time we were there, 
Gen. Auguste Guillaume, who is the Resident 

The Chairman. Resident of what? 

Mr. Hunter. Resident-General of Morocco for the French. He 
made it ver}- clear that while he had fought against the landing 
forces of the United States when we first went into Africa in World 
W^ar II, within a matter of 3 days, I think he said, he was very friendly 
with General Patton, and from that point on has been for the West. 

The Chairman. Will you spell General Guillaume's name for the 
reporter? 

Mr. Hunter. G-u-i-1-l-a-u-m-e and A-u-g-u-s-t-e. As perhaps of 
today, or certainly within a very few days of the 1st of June, General 
Guillaume is to be relieved and a career diplomat. La Coste, is to 
replace him. 

To make a little clearer that picture in Morocco, from about 1914 
or 1915, or 1912, I believe Youssef was the Sultan and he became, if 
not closely allied, certainly in sympathy, b}' his public utterances, 
with a radical movement in Morocco. It was among the Arabs, and 
of course all of the Arab groups are by religion bitterly anti-Com- 
munist, but those of them in the big concentrations of cities, like 
Casa Blanca, Rabat, and Dakar, were deeply infitrated by certain 
j-adical movements. Whether you would call them Communists or 
not, I do not know. They v/ere certainly in parallel with the Com- 
munists and Youssef was very much on their side. 

Senator Johnston. There was a lot of anti-Americanism, too, was 
there not? 



64 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Hunter. They were very much pro-Nazi and on that ground 
very much against our being in Africa, very much against the West 
being in Africa, and very much against anyone being in Africa except 
the Arabs along the North Shore. 

Senator Johnson. A httle over a year ago I visited that same terri- 
tory. I do not want to interrupt you. 

Mr. Hunter. General Guillaume went to Morocco in 1951 and 
found that there had been an effort by General Juin, who very recently 
had his run-in with the French handling of Indochina — I believe over 
the French Far East policy — to depose the then Sultan. General Juin 
had favored the disposing of the Sultan, Youssef, but it was not per- 
mitted to take place at that time. 

Then, El Glaoui, who is the 80-year-old Pasha of Marrakesh and 
has supposedly more money than the rest of Morocco put together, 
and claims the ability to call 300,000 desert riflemen whenever he 
needs them, demanded that Youssef be deposed. He said that Youssef 
was a representative of the left wing elements, that he did not represent 
Morocco, and demanded that he get out. 

The Sultan did make an effort to rally the tribesmen and be backed 
by them. He was not backed by the tribesmen. El Glaoui, who is 
the strong man apparently of Morocco, went with the French to the 
point of getting rid of Youssef. The French Government deposed him . 
and exiled him to Corsica. 

An uncle of the deposed Sultan, Arafo, w^io was the brother of the 
previous Sultan, was named with the backing of El Glaoui, and the 
French Government, to become the Sultan. 

A week before we were there an effort was made to assassinate the 
new Sultan, Arafo. A week after we left a hand grenade was thrown 
at El Glaoui, but as long as General Guillaume was there, there appar- 
ently was no question of where the Moroccan French would be. 

It will be an interesting situation, in my opinion, at least, to see 
what position is taken by the replacement in Morocco, by the career- 
diplomat, in place of the long-established soldier. 

Mr. Areus. Mr. Hunter, what is the significance of the red areas 
there, particularly in Africa, which appear on the map of the Eastern. 
Hemisphere? 

Mr. Hunter. I cannot talk to you from personal experience as to 
what has happened by being in these areas in Africa, but over a period 
since 1946 various records, that are available to the committee, have 
brought out the fact that there have been definite insurrective radical 
troublemaking movements in Africa, that African officials charge are 
directly traceable to Communist provocation through agents. 

Taking some of them, the Egyptian movement which threatens 
Suez has been known ever since the Wafds in those areas went into 
the movement to have the British out of Africa. As long ago as 1941 
or 1942 the then Russian consul, in Algiers said that he was not in 
favor of encouraging openly any Communist movement in Algiers be- 
cause at any time if France should become Communist, they would 
much prefer an Algiers that had not been taken over by any other 
group. 

There have been riots in Tunis. One report has been that in Eritrea 
the Communist groups told the chief of the El Tigre Province that if 
he saw fit to go with the revolutionary Red movement, he would he 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM 65 

made the king or the prince of Eritrea. From Addis Ababa, I have 
seen reports that the Soviet personnel in Addis Ababa is in excess of 
their Embassy in Paris. The}" have a greater number of people. 

Mr. Arens. You have in your statement here the names of the 
people who are the key espionage organizing agents of Moscow in 
Africa. 

Mr. Hunter. That is right. 

Mr. Arexs. I see that appears on page 30. 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir. The list of that African group comes to 
me from a source that I will be very glad to give to the committee 
although I prefer to do it in executive session. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Hunter. It gives the Director, S. P. Koziarev, a Russian. 
The committee supposedly is working out of Moscow and not in 
Africa. There is also the Deputy, Col. Beck Dumbadze, a Russian; 
Chief of Operations, Lt. Col. Harald Nuut, a Russian; First Deputy, 
E. F. Podvigin, a Russian; Second Deputy, Maj. V. I. Strashev, a 
Russian; Staff Officers, V. Kumanev, a Bulgarian, and V. Bank, a 
Russian; Liaison Officer with Arab League, A. I. Chikov, a Russian; 
Director, Xortli and West African Department, J. A. Klimentov, a 
Russian; First Deputy, A. N. Erophin, a Russian; Second Deputy, 
E. Kallos, Hungarian; Liaison Officer with Mogreb Liberation Com- 
mittee, V. Kozarev, a Russian; Director of the East Africa and 
Abyssinia Department, V. A. Kiriev, a Russian; Director, Sudan 
Department, Y. lakhim, a Czech; and Deputy, Y. Siedliaczek, 
probably a Czech. The resident agents in the Sudan were stationed 
at Khartoum, Abu-Hamad, Omdur^nan, Port Suday, and Atbara. 
It gives the name of a courier who supposedly carried the material 
from these people to the Russians. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Hunter, to what extent does the So iet acquisition 
of these areas which have been drawn into their orbit since the end of 
World War II affect the stockpiling in the United States and the 
acquisition and maintenance in the United States of strategic and 
critical material? 

Mr. Hunter. At West Point, of which I am not a graduate, the 
Department of Social Science publishes studies from time to time on 
raw materials in war and peace. They divide these materials into 
four groups, the most important of which is group A, and that is 
defined as a group for which a satisfactory means of insuring adequate 
supply for future em.ergency can be accomplished only by stockpiling. 
As of 1946, after World War II, when we found that we were prac- 
tically a have-not nation in most of our strategic materials, there were 
some 63 or 65 of these strategic materials in the short-supply group. 

A great many of them com^e from the area which would go if the 
Russians took Southeast Asia and from that into Indonesia. I have 
the list of them if you want them in the record. There are about 63. 
I can read them. 

\h\ Arens. They are in the record. 

Mr. Hunter. No, they are not in the record. 

The Chairman. Do not take the time to read them. We will just 
incorporate them and make them a part of the record and save some 
time. 



66 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COJViMUNISM 

(The list referred to follows:) 

Agar, antimony, Rhodesian chrysotile. South African amosite, bauxite, beryl- 
lium, bismuth, cadmium, castor oil, celestite, metallurgical and refractory grades 
of chromite. cobalt, cocoanut oil, columbite, manila fiber, sisal, corundum, 
industrial diamonds, emetine, amorphus lump graphite, flake graphite hyoscine, 
iodine, jewel bearings, kapok, Indian kyanite, lead, manganese ore, mercury, 
muscovite block mica, muscovite splittings, and phlogopite splittings, monasite, 
nickel, opium, palm oil, pepper, platinum metals (platinum, irridium) pyretheum, 
quartz crystals, quebracho, quinidine, cjuinine, rapeseed oil, crude rubber, natural 
latex, rutile, sapphire and ruby, shellac, sperm oil, talc (stealite block) tantalite, 
tin, tung oil, tungsten, uranium, vanadium, zinc, zirconium ores. 

This list of more than 10 items show in the production lists of Red China, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Poland, Rumania, 
Ruthenia, Tibet, and Yugoslavia, 10 countries out of 18. 

Question: Does this 1946 strategic material list still hold? 

Answer: Current stockpiling requirements, of course, are classified. 

Mr. Arens. May I invite your attention to the general subject of 
the Russian trade oflfensive to implement the acquisition of materiel 
which the Soviet Union has acquired by actual outright acquisition 
of adjacent territory? Do you have information in your statement 
respecting th^ worldwide trade ofTensive of the Russians? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. In addition to the outright acquisitions which they 
have been able to maintain because of taking over adjacent territory. 

Mr. Hunter. An intelligence agency with which the committee is 
undoubtedly familiar maintains a day-to-day check on the broadcasts 
of foreign governments in which the actions of the governments are 
more or less brought out from their point of view, and since January 
of this year, the broadcasts have specified and emphasized the efforts 
of the Russians to bring into trade relationships, with either the 
Soviet or the satelites these countries that are on the fringe and even 
Africa and the areas from which we get most of our raw materials, at 
least 28 or 38 of them, and from which Europe gets all of its industrial 
potential. 

That lists Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Britain, British Borneo, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Malay, Nepal, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay as 
those to which overtures have been made from the Russians to send 
trade delegations and to receive trade delegations to enter into agree- 
ments by which trade would be established between those people. 

Mr. Arens. If the Russians are successful in the trade offensive to 
work out trade agreements for the exchange of material from behind 
the Iron Curtain with the countries which are cmrently free, what in 
your judgment would be the net result from the standpoint of the 
interest of the United States of America? 

Mr. Hunter. Whenever a Russian or a trade delegation or formal 
organization of any kind goes into a country — I think it was demon- 
strated in this country very fully by the operations of Amtorg, and 
that has been sworn to in congressional hearings — every delegation 
that goes in from. Russia contains some element of the Soviet espionage 
service. They acquire military, industrial, and economic data. They 
are able to propagandize and to get their particular arguments in favor 
of the Soviet before the American people. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 67 

A secondary setup is that they can and do siphon away from the 
United States these particularly strategic and necessary items that 
we need for defense, as outlined bj^ the stockpiling program recently 
brought out in some considerable detail by Senator Malone's com- 
mittee that have produced 4 volumes so far and have 4 more coming. 
Wherever a Communist or Soviet group can establish themselves in 
an area, that area becomes a small cancer to spread with their propa- 
ganda and dissemination of espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and the 
rest of their motivations. 

Air. Arens. Aside from that what is the tkreat, if any, from the 
standpoint of economic strangulation control of w^orld markets by the 
Soviets? 

Mr. Hunter. Europe, an industrial and fabricating area, cannot 
produce without the raw materials from Africa. The United States 
cannot produce the various war materials without raw materials from 
Africa and from South America. Whenever the Soviet can divert from 
industrial Europe or industrial United States the necessary products 
for our industrial production, they hamstring us just to the extent of 
what they can take away. 

Trade with the Soviet is a weapon just as much as a tank, or a 
bomber, or a fifth column. 

Mr. Arexs. What is the significance from a militaiy standpoint of 
north Africa and of Spain to the protection of the West? 

Mr. Hunter. Spain and Franco have been a target of Soviet 
attack since 1936 and 1937 when Franco moved in to overtlu-ow a 
Communist government wliich had been set up in Spain. Subse- 
quently, it will be recalled, international brigades were formed all over 
the world, practically, by the Soviet Tlih'd International to go in to 
fight against Franco. The Abraham Lincoln Brigade was one of 
those which was formed in this country and which did go to Spain 
and did fight. It has since been indentified by the Attorney General 
and I think has been investigated by the Subversive Activities Control 
Board, as a distinct Communist operation. 

Franco found that these international brigades were definitely Red, 
definitely allied, and definitely connected mth the Third Interna- 
tional, and he fought to keep Spain free from communism. His war 
was successful. The leftwing movement in Spain was forced to flee 
and took headquarters basically in Mexico and Central America. 

When World War II began Spain, of course, was under terrific 
pressure by the Germans to let them come over the Pyrenees to 
Gibraltar where they would have that western gateway to the jSIedi- 
terranean. It has been charged that Franco let the Germans have 
wolfram and other materials. It has been charged that Franco sent 
two blue-shirted divisions to fight with the Germans. 

The Germans had helped Franco against the Russian group during 
his civil war in Spain. When it came to the repajanent Franco has 
said, and I have seen statements of his declarations on it, that he 
paid back man for man and dollar for dollar for aid that had been 
given him during the civil war against the Communists in 1936 and 
1937, but that he had not yielded 1 inch of Spanish soil and never 
would to anyone. How right that statement is I do not know. 

Mr. Arens. How significant is Spain and North Africa in a world- 
wide military operation to the West? 



68 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Hunter. Had Franco not held neutrality in World War II, 
General Patton, for one, has stated that it would not have been pos- 
sible to land at Casablanca, or at Oran, or the other ports where our 
World War II landings were made. 

It will be recalled that Rommel was there and was all the way 
along the north shore of Africa threatening the Suez Canal, and it 
was only after we were able to land and build up the African offensive 
that Rommel was forced to come back eventually to retreat into 
Sicily and Italy. Our establishment of a base to conduct World 
War II from Africa tow'ard Europe might never have been accom- 
plished had it not been for Franco keeping Spain out of Nazi hands. 

Today the lifeline through the Mediterranean makes eciually vital 
Franco's anti-Communist position and his recent agreement by which 
we can put bases, naval and military, in Spain provides the protection 
by fighter planes for our bombers based in North Africa. 

Mr. Arens. In general is the situation applicable respecting the 
significance of North Africa? 

Mr. Hunter. Certainly. 

Mr. Arens. Aside from the strategic materials in North Africa and 
the trade potential of North Africa and Africa in general as a supplier 
of raw materials, are North Africa and Spain vital to the defense of 
the West? 

Mr. Hunter. The Air Force maneuver last February was a refuel- 
ing one to show that B-47's, which are medium, 2,000-mile operational 
radius planes, could refuel at any point over friendly territory and 
then penetrate 2,000 miles in and come back safely. 

With fighter bases in Spain to protect the bomber bases in Africa, 
the bomber bases are safe. 

Mr. Arens. May we temporarily direct your attention to the 
situation in the Far East with particular reference to China, and 
Korea, and Indochina? 

On the basis of your background and your experience and informa- 
tion to which you allude in your prepared statement, what are your 
overall observations respecting the Communist strategy and tactics 
in the Far East? 

Mr. Hunter. By testimony of Browder and action of Borodin the 
Soviet have been operating with the objective of taking China into 
the Soviet orbit within a matter of 2 years from the time they had 
established their government in Moscow. When the war began in 
Korea and the Reds drove south the North Korean forces were better 
armed and better equipped than the South Korean forces and when 
the United States went in, after having been driven down to a very 
narrow perimeter near Pusan at the extreme south, it was American 
forces which forced the Red forces back. 

About that time there had been a series of reports which came from 
Nationalist Chinese intelligence. They stated in some considerable 
detail that the Red Chinese were being aided by the Russians directly 
and that their sources of supply had to depend on Soviet aid. In 
about 1952, 2 years ago, I received in the mail a document — ^I cannot 
vouch for it — which purported to be a translation of a treaty that had 
been signed in Moscow on February 12, 1950, which was 4 months 
before the Korean attack, by Vishinsky and Chou En-lai. 

I did not intend and do not intend to ask the committee to consider 
that report in any other way except in light of what has happened 
since. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 69 

Senator Welker. You mean subsequent events seem to have sus- 
tained what is included in the treaty? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes. I would tell you what the document says. 
This, as I say, was a reported translation. It said: 

The Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for 
the purpose of strengthening the secret cooperation between the Chinese People's 
Republic and the Union of Socialist Republics, in order to prevent together any 
form of aggressive act by imperialistic policy as well as of tlae resurgence of Jap- 
anese Imperialism, with a view to establish a new order in Asia, and to strengthen 
the Chinese-Soviet friendly, cooperative, relationship, especially conclude, in 
addition to the Two Countries Friendship Alliance Mutual Aid Pact, a Special 
Agreement, as well as each appoint a plenipotentiary delegate as below. 

The Chinese People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic specially 
appoint as Special Envoy the Chairman of the Chinese Political Affairs Depart- 
ment and Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai. 

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Socialist Republics specially appoint the 
Foreign Commissar Andrei Noraiwich Vishinsky. 

The two plenipotentiary Delegates, after having examined together the docu- 
ment and found it appropriate, agreed to the following provisions: 

Article 1. — The contracting parties, for the purpose of preventing together 
imperialistic invasions and of coping with the third world war, agree that the 
Chinese People's Republic will permit the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
station troops within the Chinese boundarj' with a view to protect together world 
peace. 

Article 2. — As from the date of conclusion of this pact, the Chinese People's 
Republic will first assign Northeast and North China sea and air bases to the 
Soviet Socialist Republic as a military measure, and also through the Chinese 
Liberation Army, will assume responsibility of assisting in the carrying out of the 
liberation of Southeast Asia so as to effectuate the completion of the liberation of 
the whole of Asia. 

Article 3. — The contracting parties agree to reorganize the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army into (an) International Communist Army, to be under the direct 
command of the highest officer of the Red Army. 

Article 4. — The Chinese Republic will be responsible for the mobilization of 
ten million Chinese workmen to assist Soviet Russia to collectively construct the 
Sino-Soviet military establishments in order to cope with imperialistic activities 
and aggression. 

Article 5. — The Chinese People's Republic will make available all North 
China ports to the stationing of Soviet troops, as well as to provide free access 
and exit. Such ports will include Chinwantao, Haichow, Chiefoo, Weihaiwei, 
Tsingtae and Dairen. 

Article 6. — The Chinese People's Republic will, before the end of this year, 
increase the number of soldiers by four million so as to be ready for meeting the 
imperialistic act of aggression. 

Article 7. — The population of the Chinese People's Republic must, owing to 
the existing lack of resources, be diminished by 100 million, since otherwise they 
cannot be sustained. Its detailed procedures are to be determined by the Chinese 
People's government themselves. 

Article 8. — All government Departments of the Central People's Government 
of the Chinese People's Republic should invite technical personnel from the 
Soviet Socialist Republic as advisors. 

Article 9. — The two contracting parties agree to the sending by the Soviet 
Government of technical personnel, to participate in the operation of the main 
industries in the various districts of China. The Government of the Chinese 
People's Republic agrees to accord them with favorable treatment in accordance 
with the favorable "supply sj'stem." 

Article 10. — -The Chinese People's Republic will open for Soviet trade coastal 
ports and inland markets, as well as agree to levy duties of the 1/100 part under 
preferential rates. 

Article 11. — Both contracting parties agree, under mutually beneficial and 
mutually ])rofitable conditions, to carrv out barter exchange for commodities in 
order to establish friendly relations. 

Article 12. — The government of the U. S. S. R. will have special right to 
allocate the iron and other mineral raw materials within the boundary of the 
Chinese People's Republic: of which the lead mines, with the exception of retain- 



70 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

ing 20 percent of the total yearly production for self use, the rest should be supplied 
to the IT. S. S. R. to expand the heavy industries in order to assist in the indus- 
trialization of the Chinese People's Reijublic. 

Mr. Arens. May I respectfully suggest that the agreement has 
been incorporated in the record and it will not be necessary to read 
it in its entirety. You acquired this from a source which you deemed 
to be reliable; is that correct? 

Mr. Hunter. That is right. I was told that it was basically 
Nationalist Chinese Intelligence. 

Mr. Arens. You do not care on this record to identify the document 
any further? 

Mr. Hunter. No, sir. I woidd like to suggest, though, in connec- 
tion with that document that you examiae it in the light of what has 
happened since 1950. 

The Chairman. And also due to your experience in military intel- 
ligence you have reason to believe, coupled with the events that have 
happened, that it might be an authentic treaty? 

Kir. Hunter. I would go that far. It was given to me in good 
faith by a source I consider reliable. 

Mr. Arens. You have also here a document entitled "The Chinese 
Communist Movement," a photostat of which I now have in my hand, 
the subtitle being "Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 
Washington, D. C." That has been declassified so that it can now be 
made public? 

Mr. Hunter. That is right. 

Mr. Arens. Can you identify the document any fin-ther? 

Mr. Hunter. The Military Intelligence Division, War Depart- 
ment, Washington, D. C, under date of Jidy 5, 1945, classified it as 
secret. It was declassified under the signature of the General who 
had originally classified it, it is his authority so to do — on the 24th of 
August. I am not certain whether that was the 24th of August of 
that same year or a later year, but the declassification over the signa- 
ture of the declassifying officer says: "Declassified August 24." 

Mr. Arens. So you feel free to release it to the press and to the 
public? 

Mr. Hunter. Certainly. 

Mr. Arens. May I invite your attention to a few comments to 
cover at least the highlights of your prepared staterrient, on the situa- 
tion in the Western Hemisphere respecting on a global basis the 
strategy and tactics of the Communist movement? 

Mr. Hunter. The first major declaratio-n of power by the Third 
International in the United States was that meeting held in 1922 at 
Overlook Mountain, at which time they flatly told all of the Socialists 
and the I WW, and the rest of the radical move^nent in the United 
States, that they would beco^ne a section of the Third International, 
responsible to that group, with headquarters in Moscow. 

One of the points where trouble had dev^ eloped was in Winnipeg 
where the first general strike ever perpetrated in the United States 
tied up the city for more than 6 weeks. 

Senator Welker. The United States? 

Mr. Hunter. Canada. 

Senator Welker. You stated the United States. 

Mr. Hunter. No ; in Winnipeg, the city of Winnipeg. 

Senator Welker. You want to correct the record? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 71 

Mr. Hunter. Yes. The general strike was in Winnipeg, Canada. 
The Canadian repoil of the Royal Comniission which carae out in 
1946 developed that extent to which the Russians at peace with 
Canada had used diplomatic resources to go into the most vital and 
crucial military secrets of the country. The FBI report which was 
partly revealed in the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Com- 
mittee in connection with the Harry Dexter \Yliite case went into the 
Ato.nnc Energy infiltrations out in the West in and around Los Angeles. 

Mr. Arens. Los Alan os, you mean. 

Mr. HuNT.GR. Los Alamos, and in Los Angeles in connection with 
Haakon, Chevalier, and that group that were mentioned in that Cal- 
Tech testimony about the visits of Steve Nelson and the rest of them 
to make contact with the atomic energy development. 

Going back to 1916, the Phelps-Dodge Mexican copper riots, at 
Nacozari in which a great many were killed, were part of the Com- 
munist movement. It was part of the IWW at the time. 

In 1950 a survey had been made and came into my possession, and 
I will give you the sources on that if you want it, which said that in 
1941 the Communist direction had gone into Mexico, had been in 
Cuba, working through both Polish and Czechoslovakian Embassies, 
to set up a series of armed insurrections in the Central American 
Republics. Particularly they wanted to break into Panama. They 
wanted to land anywhere in the area which would threaten the Panama 
Canal, because the two strategic targets of the Western Hemisphere 
which are most important in the opinion of Constantin Oumansky, 
who had been the director in that area while serving as Ambassador 
to Mexico City from the Soviet west as director of all the Communist 
espionage in the American Continent at that time — and this was in a 
report made prior to his death — he was killed when his plane took off 
in Mexico City and mysteriously blew up in the air — are the Panama 
Canal and Sault Ste. Marie locks, in Michigan, which of course, would 
cut off the distribution of steel from the Pittsburgh area if they could 
be dvnamited or bombed. 

In his opinion they are the two most important points that we would 
have to guard strategically. 

In the prepared statement I have given names, places, and details 
of the operations, not only in Central America but in the various 
<'ountries in South America in which definite Communist movements 
were detected, exposed, and to some extent stopped and to other 
extents currently grooving. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Witness, can you tell me with respect to 
Bolivia of any activity that is going on there and any strategic min- 
erals or metals that we are daily importing from there; if you know? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir. With respect to the Bolivian strategic 
minerals, I do not want to get into any hassle as to what the require- 
ments of the stockpile as of today are, whether or not we are currently 
importing. 

Senator Welker. I am not interested in that. That has been 
established. 

Mr. Hunter. The products are tin, silver, copper, lead, zinc, 
antimony, bismuth, wolfram, gold, lime, rubber, cinchona bark, 



72 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMXTNISM 

tungsten, petroleum, and such agricultural products as might be 
wanted. 

Senator Welker. What is the extent of the Communist infiltration 
in Bolivia, if you care to testify? 

Mr. Hunter. As of December 1952 there was still a strong Com- 
munist movement in Bolivia. I would be glad to get you the detail 
on that and send it to you. 

Senator Welker. You have nothing of more recent date than 1952? 

Mr. Hunter. As of December 1952 I have some additional material. 
Frankly, I understood that the South American phase was going to be 
handled basically in another way, and I did not go into that in too 
much detail. 

Senator Welker. Very well. Would you tell us something about 
how we stand in Argentina? 

Mr. Hunter. Argentina: silver, copper, gold, and petroleum on 
the exports. Peron hated the United States by reason of the restric- 
tions that we had on some of the movements. He offered sanctuary 
to the Nazi naval forces during the war and when Germany fell he 
began to flirt with the Soviet Union. In the elections of Uruguay 
in November 1946 Peron used every method that he could to effect 
an anti-American government in the Republic, and when that failed, 
I think the record is fairly clear that Peron has been anti-American,. 
anti-United States, since. 

At Montevideo, in Uruguay, in 1946, Communist orders were issued 
to increase the Slav propaganda all through there. There are about 
1,250,000 Slavs in South America and 60 percent of those were basically 
organized in, well, like the language fronts that we have had in this 
country over a period of years. 

They did try to take over in Uruguay — that was in 1946 — ^and they 
were defeated. Peron tried to aid that movement. I have a file on 
that that I will always be glad to bring up if you desire it. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, one more question. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Hunter, based upon your experience — it has 
been related here that you qualified as an expert — do you think in 
view of world conditions at this time that it is good sound policy for 
us to permit the shipment of strategic materials, or steel mills, or any- 
thing that might aid in the production of war equipment to, say,. 
Argentina or Bolivia? I know nothing about that and I would like 
an answer from one who is as qualified as you are, sir. 

Mr. Hunter. To no country that is willing to trade with the 
Soviet. 

Senator Welker. By that you mean that Argentina has trade 
agreements with the Soviets and the satellites? 

Mr. Hunter. I will have to give you a picture on that, sir. 

Senator Welker. You do not need to. 

Mr. Hunter. I have the detailed setup on it, both Bolivia and 
Argentina, but I could not give it to you without checking. Argen- 
tina, I do know sends beef to Russia. They have sent a considerable 
poundage of it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hunter, it is all in your detailed statement? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir. On April 2, there was a broadcast report 
that Argentina had delivered 71,000 tons of 145,000-ton food contract 
to the Soviet Union under contract which was then 9 months old. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 73 

Senator Welker. You do know it to be a fact that not only do they 
have trade agreements with Russia, but with the Iron Curtain satel- 
htes? 

Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir; agreements with Hungary and with Rumania 

Senator Welker. Do you know that at this time the Soviet Union 
has trade missions working in South America in Argentina and other 
countries at this very time? 

Mr. HuxTER. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman. Mr. Hunter, your statement is rather long and 
detailed and it is rather hard to bring out here in a coherent form all 
of the detailed information that you have in this statement. Your 
statement has been made a part of our record. I would like to ask 
you this question in the way of summary: In your opinion, from 3'our 
experience in this field as a military intelligence man and a special 
investigator in newspaper work for 35 3^ears in the Communist field, 
what is the first thing that this Goverimient should do to stop this 
growing, creeping spread of communism all over the world? 

]Mr. Hunter. I would say pass Senate Resloution 247 because you 
have to bring a showdo^vn as to what the Communists are trying to 
do. For 25 or 30 years we have looked at the little things that are 
close up and we have overlooked the efforts of the Third International 
to steal continents from the free world. 

They have taken most of Asia. They want the rest of it. They 
are movmg for Africa. We should call for a showdown as to how all 
the nations of the free world can stop the fifth coknnn and then for a 
conference by which the nations of the free world could stop further 
aggression to expand, and stop this program, first infiltration and then 
seizure. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this: how about the severance of 
diplomatic relations from the standpoint of the internal security of 
this country? 

Mr. Hunter. In 1933 Litvinov culminated a drive that had gone 
on for 9 years to obtain recognition of Soviet Russia. I have given 
you the documentation of the operation of the Overman committee 
and the Lodge committee and the early organizations which met to 
block the Borah resolution which would have given recognition to 
Russia, and for 9 years it was blocked. 

Then Soviet Russia was recognized. 

From the time they were recognized in came, under the protection 
of diplomatic and consular recognition and trade protection, people 
who began from the day they landed to become spies for the Soviet 
luider the international Communist consphacy to eventually take 
over, not only this country, but the world. ^Yhy we have allowed 
since 1933, 21 years, the violations of all diplomatic procedures and 
diplomatic protocol and courtesies to continue is beyond my under- 
standing as a newspaper observer and a looker at the facts. 

The Chairman. From yom* experience and your travels and re- 
search, do you find that the other countries are apprised of this 
situation? 

Mr. Hunter. Definitely Canada must be. Definitely Australia 
must be. They found their spy groups working in their areas. 
France must know. Germany has found out. Every day you will 
find a list of the number of refugees that come out and tell Germany 



74 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMJMTJNISM 

about it. Certainly tlie South Africans know about it, and the powers 
in Africa have had ampk^ opportunity to discover and deal with it. 

The Chairman. Certainly this country has been apprised of it. 

Mr. Hunter. Certainly. Turkey has been aware of it. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I have one brief question? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Hunter, Chairman Jenner of this committee 
permitted me to head a task force that held a hearing in New York 
City last Friday down at the customs house in which there had been 
accumulated in a period of less than 2 weeks better than three- 
quarters of a mDlion of pieces of Communist propaganda printed in 
Moscow in Chmese, in English, Hungarian, Polish, and all sorts of 
the languages by those satellites behind the Iron Curtain. The room 
in which we held the hearing was at least three times as large as this 
one. Mail sacks were stacked nearly to the ceilmg. Four employees 
of the customs were assigned to process this vast accumulation of 
propaganda. Propaganda from 62 boats entering the harbor at New 
York daily, and 42 other ports, must be processed. 

I take it you would approve of some sort of legislation to stop this 
sort of influx of propaganda which comes in wide open as of today? 

Mr. Hunter. We are not permitted to send American newspapers, 
magazines, or other publications from this free country into Russia or- 
into the Soviet zones without complete and total censorship clearance. 

Why should we grant them a privilege that they refuse to grant to 
our people? 

The Chairman. Senator Johnston, do you have any questions? 

Senator Johnston. I had occasion to be in New York and check on 
this matter, too, last fall. I was amazed to see the amount of litera- 
ture coming in from Russia in particular. If my memory serves me 
correctly, they were tearing open all the boxes and everything that 
goes out of America and checking them to see what was in them, just 
what it was, but .materials coming in from Russia had some kind of 
priority or something that they passed over, especially if it v\^as read- 
ing material. 

Mr. Hunter. \^^ien you realize that the World Federation of 
Trade Unions — and I am not getting into the labor picture at all, be- 
cause the World Federation of Trade Unions is a Communist move- 
ment — has in its leadership Saillant and other Communists who con- 
trol a great many seagoing personnel on foreign ships, obviously it is 
an open channel for the transmission and movement of that sort of 
thing into this country. 

In the Communist mind anything that is not Communist is Fascist 
and anything that is Fascist is anathema. They do not recognize 
any de:'riOcracy other than the Communist version of democracy, 
which is totalitarianism. As for democracy, they take the Greek 
deviation of the word, which means mob control, and their mob is a 
smaller proportion of the total population of Russia today than was 
the population under the Czar, the population of governing and con- 
trolling interests. 

We just refuse to realize that we are gambling blue chips for con- 
tinents and we are looking at the little local outbreaks. 

Mr. Arens. Can you negotiate with the Russians? Can you com- 
promise with them? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 75 

Mr. Hunter. I have never tried, but I don't know anyone that ever 
did successfully. 

The Chairivian. Mr. Hunter, we thank you for appearing here this 
morning. This is another of a series of hearings that this committee 
is tr^'ing to dev^elop to give the American public and the Congress a 
picture and a clear picture of the strategy and the tactics of world 
communism, and your statement here is very detailed. 

We appreciate youi* interest in this great subject. We thank you 
for appearing here. We will continue these hearings from time to 
time. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

(Thereupon, the hearing recessed at 11:25 a. m., Thursday, May 
27, 1954, subject to call.) 

X 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



HEARINGS 



BEFORE THE 



SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 



OF THE 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIKD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF 
WORLD COMMUNISM 



JUNE 10, 15, AND 17, 1954 



PART 2 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
47769 WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

AUG 9 -1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

WILLIAM E. JBNNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteknal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Task Force Investigating the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

Richard Arens, Special Counsel 
II 



CONTENTS 



_, ,. J, Page 
Testimony of — 

Caldwell, John C ^^ 

Marcus, J. Anthony ^21 

Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C ''"^ 

III 



STEATEGY AND TACTICS OF WOELD COMMUNISM 



THTJKSDAY, JUNE 10, 1954 

United States Senate, 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 
4:57, Senate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Welker. 

Also present : Richard Arens, staff director, and Frank W. Schroeder 
and Edward R. Duffy, professional staff members. 

The Chairman. General Wedemeyer, will you be sworn and testify ? 

Do you swear the testimony you will give in this hearing will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

General Wedemeyer. I do, sir. 

The Chairman. The hearing today is a continuation of a series of 
hearings which are being conducted by a task force of the Internal 
Security Subcommittee of the Senate on the strategy and tactics of 
world communism. 

As I stated in announcing this series of hearings the Communist 
conspiracy in the United States is only one tentacle of a worldwide 
octopus which has as its principal target the United States of America. 
It is therefore essential that we keep abreast of the strategy and tech- 
niques of world communism if we are to appraise adequately the 
operation of this conspiracy in our Nation. 

The witness who will testify today is a distinguished American 
whose deeds will be fully recorded in the history of our country which 
he has served so well. 

We are confident that from the wealth of experience and wisdom 
which are his. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer will have significant contribu- 
tions to make to our committee. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER 

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Arens, with questioning 
General Wedemeyer. 

Mr. Arens. General, for the purpose of our record, would you 
kindly give us a brief resume of the various Army commands which 
you have held and your experience in various theaters of operation 
in the world ? 

77 



78 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

General Wedemeyer. I presume, gentlemen, that you do not want 
me to go back beyond the time that I oegan to attain a little rank and 
responsibility, AYhich would mean about 1940; is that correct? 

Mr. Arens. Yes, sir. 

General Wedemeyer. Prior to that time 1940 for background, I 
did serve in China and in the Philippines ; I served in Germany, where 
I was a student of the War College for 2 years and was assigned to 
German troop units during the maneuver period in the summers. 
During my 2 years (1936-38) in Germany, I traveled all over Europe. 

Immediately prior to the war (1940), I was assigned to the Strategy 
and Policy Group of the General Stan in Washington and had some 
responsibilities in the area of strategic planning for World War II. 
During the war I attended world conferences at London, Quebec, 
Washington, Casablanca, and Cairo, as a member of General Mar- 
shall's staff. 

In 1943 I was sent to India to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff to 
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in the Southeast Asia Command. 
The headquarters of this command was in New Delhi, India. 

After 1 year in that position I was sent September 1944 to China 
to assume command of the China theater, relieving Gen. Joseph 
Stilwell. I remained in command of that theater for the duration of 
the war and until it was disbanded in May 1946. 

I returned to the United States and awaited orders to return to 
China where I was scheduled to serve as Ambassador at the request 
of President Truman. 

There were developments that caused the cancellation of that ap- 
pointment, and in September 1946 I was given command of the 
Second Army, with headquarters in*Baltimore. This Army area com- 
prised seven Eastern States of our country. 

Then I returned to the Pentagon and served as Deputy Chief of 
Staff to General Eisenhower, again in charge of strategic or global 
planning. 

In 1947 I was sent to the Far East on a Presidential mission to make 
a survey of the political, economic, psychological, and military condi- 
tions in China and Korea. I was required, on that mission, to analyze 
the developments in that important area and to submit recommenda- 
tions to the President in connection with continued United States 
policy in that area. 

In 1949 I was assigned to command the Sixth Army, comprising 
the eight Western States of our country. While on that assignment 
I requested retirement July 1951 from the Army. At that time 
the law permitted an officer to voluntarily retire at the conclusion of 
30 years' service, and I took advantage of that law. 

I am presently connected with industry, as vice president and a di- 
rector of Avco Manufacturing Corp. 

Mr. Arens. General, on the basis of your background and experi- 
ence, would you care to express to the committee what you feel are 
the principal elements of the Communist global tactics ? 

General Wedemeyer. Gentlemen, in my judgment there are four 
general areas which we must consider when evaluating or analyzing 
the Communist movement. Those areas comprise the political, eco- 
nomic, psychological, and military. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 79 

Mr. Arens. Could you kindly illustrate from your experience 
each of these four elements and how they operate ? 

General Wedemeyer. I will try to do so, sir. 

In the political area, the Communists have endeavored to under- 
mine confidence of peoples in their respective governments. They have 
resorted to the distortion of facts regarding historical developments, 
to lies, to chicanery, even to murder. In fact to any tactics that might 
permit them to extend gradually the control of peoples and nations. 
They have successfully oriented toward the Kremling millions of peo- 
ple and many nations through those tactics, and in such manner as to 
permit their unequivocal control. 

While science has been improving weapons which permit the more 
effective destruction of human lives and the works of man, science 
has concurrently improved the means whereby unscrupulous leaders 
can gain and maintain physical control over various areas geograph- 
ically and mental or spiritual control over huge numbers of people. 

In the latter case, I refer, of course, to the radio, the motion picture, 
and flying columns, when they are required to employ the intimidation 
of force, and the various gadgets that have been introduced by science 
to facilitate thought control or brain washing as well as physical 
control of peoples. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have a comment to make with reference to the 
economic element ? 

General Wedemeyer. Within the economic area, the Soviet un- 
scrupulously, in the closing days of the war and immediately there- 
after, misrepresented the assistance given to people in warstricken 
areas. 

I can give you a direct example in connection with the lend-lease that 
was sent in postwar years to China by American taxpayers. The Com- 
munists, Soviet agents, changed the labels on boxes and indicated that 
the supplies that were abundantly sent to help rehabilitate the area, 
those supplies, according to the changed labels on the boxes, emanated 
in the Soviet Union. Of course we know that the United States con- 
tributed approximately 78 percent of the world lend-lease program. 

They resorted freely to economic pressures. As soon as they gained 
control of peoples or areas, they immediately oriented the economy of 
such areas toward the Kremlin, denyin^y to the people indigent to the 
areas the fruits of their labor. They imposed rigid collectivization 
and regimentation of labor, all industrial and farming activities. 

Even today I could give you a quick example. There are abundant 
oil resources in Rumania, the Ploesti oil fields, which would be ade- 
quate for the requirements of that country. In addition the Ru- 
manians would still have surpluses to export and thus help their econ- 
omy by increasing revenues. However, the price of gasoline in Ru- 
mania today is $2.40 a gallon, prohibitive in cost, of course, to the 
people. The bulk of the gasoline is taken over by the Soviet repre- 
sentatives. They direct it to their selfish interest, for their military or 
for purposes connected with Soviet trade with oil-thirsty countries. 

These are a few of the many examples that one might give to indi- 
cate the economic pressures to which the Soviet subject peoples once 
they gain control of their governments. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have a comment to make with reference to the 
psychological element of the Communist global tactics? 



80 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

General Wedemeyer. In the psychological field, the rulers in the 
Kremlin have been most successful. After so many years of war, with 
attendant disruptions and dislocations, with many people disillusioned 
concerning their own previous ideas and ideologies that had proved 
unsuccessful in that world struggle, there was everywhere fertile soil 
for the distortions of facts, the lies, and false promises of the Soviet 
leaders. Thought control and brain washing were included in the 
Communist tactics in these various war-torn areas. Even here in our 
own country, being a trusting people, many of us were deceived by 
the Soviet tactics. 

We had just won a great war. The Soviet Union had been one of 
our principal allies. We Americans felt that now we could enjoy an 
era of peace and prosperity. Some of us seemed to hope, certain of our 
leaders and some gullible American people hoped that we now could 
evolve an international modus operandi whereby peace and prosperity 
could be facilitated. The United Nations Charter epitomized the 
spirit of the times, and if carried out with sincerity of purpose, of 
course, it would have been a wonderful approach to world peace, a 
civilized and realistic approach to good will toward all men — to vic- 
tors and vanquished alike. But unfortunately, and definitely, the 
Soviet had no intention of keeping their promises of abiding by the 
terms of the United Nations Charter. They had broken faith before 
and it was indeed most unfortunate that our responsible leaders of 
the Government had not provided safeguards which would definitely 
protect the military victory for which we had sacrificed so much. 

Even back in 1933 the Soviet broke faith with us. They promised 
when we recognized them diplomatically, when we exchanged diplo- 
matic amenities, that they would not, under any circumstances, finance, 
support, or initiate activities and organizations that had for their pur- 
pose, interfering in any way with our Government, social structure, 
political, and economic structures. Everyone knows now in this 
country that the Soviet Union and satellites have continuously made 
and are even now making every effort to undermine confidence in 
American leaders, both military and civilian. They are making every 
effort to create cleavages between social classes, between management 
and labor, between races, white, black, brown, and between religions, 
Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. 

They have had marked success in the field of propaganda in the 
"cold war." I attribute this primarily to the fact that we are a gullible 
and trusting people. These are traditional characteristics of 
Americans. 

Mr. Arens. And now your final element here, as a word of back- 
ground, if you please, sir, the military element of the Communist 
global strategy ; what is your comment on that, if you please ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Immediately after World War II, the Soviet did not decrease mate- 
rially their military strength. In that same atmosphere of trust and 
naivete, we emasculated our military forces, and so did our other 
allies, our friendly allies. 

Consequently the military posture of the free nations, vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union and satellites, was such that the Communist nations en- 
joyed a great preponderance of military strength. Their military 
forces were not directly employed in their program of aggressions, 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 81 

but their immediate availability, their very existence was utilized as 
a weapon of intimidation. 

Furthermore, they continued to create and maintain potential 
powder kegs around their periphery, any one of which could be ignited 
at times and under conditions of their choosing. Invariably 
they implemented their aggressions and military operations with 
satellite troops, involving only a few of their own people as technical 
advisers, arch conspirators, and propaganda artists. 

Korea, China, presently Indochina, are irrefutable evidence that 
Ihey have carried on their program of world conspiracy and aggres- 
sion with military involvement in the manner just described. 

In my judgment, the Soviet Union will resist assiduously the direct 
use of their own military forces. 

Mr. Arens. General, how late is it on the timetable of the Soviets 
for world conquest, in your judgment'^ 

General Wedemeyer. As a private American citizen, completely 
unemotionally I say to you, sir, that it is now very late; I am not 
completely a pessimist, but it is very, very late. 

Obviously, immediately after the war we should have been realistic 
in evaluating the world situation. Past experiences with the Com- 
munists — realism demanded that we take the steps necessary to protect 
the victories for which the American people made such great sacrifices, 
both human and material. 

But I am confident that, if our political and military leaders will 
realistically appraise the current situation and utilize intelligently 
and in an integrated manner those four major instruments of national 
policy, political, economic, psychological, and military, we still can 
emerge victorious, in protecting and preserving our national interests. 

Mr. Arens. General, do you believe it is in the best interests of the 
United States of America and the free nations of the world to break 
off diplomatic relations with the Iron Curtain countries ? 

General Wedemeyer. I definitely do. I would have recommended, 
had I been asked, several years ago that we not exchange diplomatic 
amenities with the Soviet Union and satellites. 

I base this on the experience that we have had and other countries 
have had in the field of international relations with Communist domi- 
nated countries. I base that statement on my knowledge of the doc- 
trine of Karl Marx, which I have read carefully, both in English and 
German, the two volumes of Das Kapital and the Communist Mani- 
festo, which spell out very clearly the aims and the objectives of the 
Soviet conspiracy. 

We all should have very vivid recollection of Mein Kampf, which 
was promulgated by Adolpli Hitler, and in which the objectives of the 
Nazis were clearly spelled out but unfortunately disregarded by most 
Americans and Allies. 

The Chairman. General, you have made an expression that you 
think it would be proper for the best interests of this country to break 
off diplomatic relations with the Iron Curtain countries, and I believe 
that you went back in your earlier statement stating that they have 
broken their word since they were brought into the family of nations 
in 1933, that they immediately set out to destroy, to harass and to set 
up fifth columns in this country, by subversion, by sabotage, and by 
espionage. And the record is clear on that. Just within the last 

47769— 54— pt. 2 2 



82 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

2 days, I think, General Franco of Spain made a statement that re- 
ceived wide publication in this country, that we also, if we are intent 
on fighting this cold w\ar, should break off trade relations, and our 
allies should break off trade relations and isolate the Soviet. 

What is your opinion on that, if you have one on that, this morning ? 
General Ws:demeyer, I defintely have an opinion about that, sir. 
There are advantages and disadvantages in breaking off trade rela- 
tions with any country, but it is my conviction that more advantages 
Avould accrue to the United States and other free nations, who have 
objectives compatible with our own, to break off trade relations with 
the Soviet Union and satellites. We should not attempt any of the 
accepted and traditional contacts or r-elations with Communist coun- 
tries unless and until they give irrefutable evidence, tangible evidence, 
of their sincerity of purpose in connection with world peace, honest 
dealings, equity, and justice among all peoples. 

The Chairman. General, if we did break off diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet, what effect would the severance of these diplomatic 
relations have upon the procurement of intelligence information, for 
example, by our Government ? 

General Wedemeter. Proponents of continued diplomatic relations 
with the Communist countries have often stated that if we were to 
break off diplomatic relations with them, that we would close windows 
through which they can observe developments in countries behind the 
Iron Curtain. Wlien we send diplomatic representatives to any coun- 
try, we do so in keeping ethical arrangements, whereby our representa- 
tives are honor bound to respect the laws, the customs, and the tradi- 
tions of the country in which they are serving. Our foreign repre- 
sentatives behind the Iron Curtain have experienced, and continue to 
experience insults, humiliations, harassments, and restrictions which 
unquestionably preclude the effective performance of their duties. 
Furthermore, the United States has been greatly restricted, unreason- 
ably so, with regard to the number of representatives Ave are permitted 
to maintain in our embassies, legations, or official agencies behind the 
Iron Curtain. Exorbitant rents are charged and degrading treatment 
of our representatives add to the mockery and sham of diplomatic 
amenities and common decency is unknown in contacts with officials 
of the Communist countries. Conversely, and stupidly, we permit 
the Reds to maintain their embassies, legations, and agencies within 
our borders, extending naively every facility and courtesy in conso- 
nance with the traditional diplomatic code of ethics and international 
law. We must recognize that every representative of a Communist 
country, enjoying our hospitality and the usual diplomatic immunities 
withm our borders, is a provacateur, saboteur, propaganda agent, spy, 
and potential murderer, for he is thoroughly indoctrinated and fanat- 
ically believes that the end justifies the means. 

The Chairman. And yet we extend to their diplomatic corps the 
courtesies that are denied to us ? 
General Wedemeter. Exactly, sir. 

The Communists always maintain a disproportionate number of 
representatives in any area, while prescribing rigidly a limited num- 
ber ot representatives from other countries. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 83 

The Chairman. And when you multiply the satellite nations, we 
are getting very little representation and they are getting a great deal ; 
is that not correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. I agree with that. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker, 

Senator Welker. May I divert just a moment on the subject matter 
that you brought up ? 

General Wedemeyer, it is certainly a great honor to have a great 
American like you before our committee. I want to thank you for 
coming here on behalf of, I am sure, all of us. 

I want to ask you whether or not you are familiar with the hear- 
ing Senator Jenner's task force held in New York a couple of weeks 
ago, at which I had the honor to be the chairman, wherein we held a 
hearing down at the Customs House and we found millions of pieces 
of Communist propaganda filling a room to the ceiling easily twice the 
size of this and perhaps three times the size of this room. This propa- 
ganda had been brought in by boat, airplanes, and other modes of 
transportation and intercepted by our very loyal customs officials 
there. And I might say we only have four in the huge port of New 
York. 

I will ask you if it is not a fact, by virtue of the diplomatic rela- 
tions we have with Russia today, that that permits the influx of this 
huge volume of illegal propaganda that is coming into this country 
as of now, sir? 

General Wedemeyer. Senator Welker, in my judgment, it does. I 
am familiar with the incident or the case that you related. Our pres- 
ent diplomatic status with Communist countries does definitely facili- 
tate the propagandizing of our people, the illicit and clandestine oper- 
ations of Red conspirators, including the entrance of subversive 
printed matter, which unquestionably is designed to undermine con- 
fidence in our way of life, confidence in our Constitution and Bill of 
Rights and confidence in our leaders. 

I would like to relate an experience. Senator, if I may, along the 
same line. 

When I was in command of the Sixth Army on the west coast, Mrs. 
Wedemeyer and I attended in 1950, a local motion-picture show in 
San Francisco. We were astounded to see an obviously Communist- 
inspired film being shown. When Stalin's picture was flashed on the 
screen, which was frequent, the audience applauded. There were 
nuances and inuendoes, if one analyzed the theme of the picture ob- 
jectively, that definitely glorified the Soviet and depreciated our free 
enterprise economic system, respect for the dignity of the individual. 
Similar un-American or anti-Ajnerican ideas were threaded through 
this film. 

Concurrently, Senator Welker, in Korea, American boys were dying 
to protect American principles of liberty — the freedoms which have 
made our country great. 

Accordingly, I protested to the State Department. I wrote a com- 
munication immediately, spelling out this personal experience that I 
had had in an American motion-picture show, just outside the gates 
of the Presidio at San Francisco about 2 or 3 years ago. I hope sin^ 



84 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

cerely that appropriate steps have been taken by our Government to 
evaluate all foreign films and printed matter entering this country. 

Senator Welker. I have one more thing, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. I think Senator Jenner's committee — and I helped 
him on the matter — was the first congressional committee to discover 
the first motion picture in the English version to come to our shores 
which tried to influence the American people, had it been shown and 
had it not been intercepted, that our loyal Army was guilty of the in- 
famous germ warfare that they propagandized so heavily throughout 
this country. And that, I think you will agree with me. General, was 
by virtue of the fact of our silly diplomatic relations with a country 
that is determined to destroy ours. 

General Wedemeyer. I agree with you 100 percent, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Arens. General, what would be the effect of severance of diplo- 
matic relations on the economy of our Nation ? 

General Wedemeyer. Mr. Arens, I think we would have to extend 
that question a bit to include the economic implications, if we severed 
trade relations along with diplomatic relations, right? 

Mr. Arens. Yes ; if you please, sir. 

General Wedemeyer. American industry is very complex and highly 
integrated. We do at present go to farflung places for raw materials 
that are important factors in our expanding productive capacity and 
its concomitant, our high standard of living. For example, we get 
manganese, chrome, and tungsten, and we do obtain diverse kinds and 
quantities of raw materials from remote areas, many of them from 
countries located behind the Iron Curtain. 

But I am mindful of the ingenuity and the resourcefulness of the 
German people when, during both World War I and II, they were 
denied access to raw materials from remote areas. Yet they carried 
on a stupendous war effort for a long period of time. I have confi- 
dence in the ingenuity and the resourcefulness of American industry 
to resort to substitutes and to exploit resources more readily available 
in lieu of sources behind the Iron Curtain. 

It would affect our economy but definitely w^ould not be dangerous 
to our economy; nor would it seriously impair our security if those 
raw materials from behind the Iron Curtain were denied to us. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, right on that line 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. General, you are certainly informed of the fact 
that, while we are doing business wdth Communist-dominated coun- 
tries, some of our own local mines, producing lead, copper, zinc, and 
especially antimony, are shut down, and people are going out of work 
by virtue of the fact that we are doing busines with these countries ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; I am aware of that, sir. 

Senator Welker. And that is a tragic situation for America, I think 
you will agree with me. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

I would like to qualify my concurrence somewhat. Senator Welker. 

I strongly believe in the development of our own resources. Fur- 
ther, I agree with any program designed to keep our American people 
gainfully employed. However, I am sure you will agree that inter- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 85 

national trade is desirable when it can be carried on advantageously 
to our own country, whose interest we always must place first. Comity 
requires that advantag-e should accrue to the countries with whom we 
are trading. I would like to conserve our natural resources to a com- 
mensurate degree and thus insure, if an emergency develops, that we 
would not be dependent upon remote areas, sir. 

It is my judgment — and I have given considerable thought and 
study to this problem— that we are not dependent upon outside re- 
sources for a healthy economy in this country if w^e do as you suggested, 
namely, utilize our own resources to an appropriate degree and prepare 
for their immediate utilization in the event of an emergency. 

Furthermore, sir, I would like to state that there are excellent 
sources of imported raw materials that have not as yet been developed 
north of us, in Canada and Alaska, and south of us throughout the 
Latin- American countries. 

While paying so much attention to the Far East and to Western 
Europe and Middle East developments, in my judgment, gentle- 
men, we have neglected to assist in the development of the natural 
resources of Latin America. Also we have failed to create the good 
will and mutual confidence that are so essential to cooperation and 
collaboration through the Latin American countries. 

The Chairman. General Wedemeyer, there is a great discussion 
going on saying that, no, we should not trade with the Soviet and 
her satellites in strategic materials, but certainly it is all right for us 
and our allies to trade with the Soviet and her satellites in nonstrategic 
materials. 

You, as a great military man, could you help this comniittee in dis- 
tinguishing between strategic and nonstrategic materials, when it 
comes to the standpoint of trade ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Strategic materials are those which contribute positively to the 
political, the economic, the psychological, and military strength of a 
country. 

The Chairman. Where do you draw the line. General ? 

General Wedemeyer. I was coming to that, sir. 

In my judgment, a country that receives any product from beyond 
its borders profits thereby and is strengthened in a political, economic, 
and military sense. Some of our friends, presently carrying on trade 
with Communist countries justify this by claiming that the products 
involved could not be interpreted as strategic material. Let us con- 
sider cotton as an example. If we were to deny cotton to Red China, 
this would severely hurt the economy of that country and would con- 
tribute to the problems of the Chinese Communist leaders and thus 
retard or preclude the consolidation of Communist gains in that 
country. 

If the people of a country are not employed, if they cannot obtain 
the necessities of life, they invariably attribute their difficulties or un- 
employment situation to their political leaders. If they are gain- 
fully employed and can obtain the necessities of life, they also as- 
sociate their more favorable plight to their leaders. In other words, 
economic stability is a concomitant of political stability. 

I personally feel that w^e should not trade with any country that has 
for its proven objective the destruction of everything we stand for, 



86 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

or is scheming and plotting to destroy us. Certainly there can be no 
justification for trade of any kind or description with countries with 
whom we are at war or with whom our proven friends are at war. 
If my firm conviction to the effect that any product imported into a 
countrv irrefutably helps the economy — the industry and hence the 
war enort of that country, is sound and defensible, how can our allies 
possibly justify trade with such a country. 

The Chairman. General, to change the subject a little here, would 
you help this committee in this respect : What bearing does the Com- 
munist military aggression in the Far East have on the security 
of the United States ? 

General Wedemeyer. Sir, about half the population of the world, 
1,200,000,000 people, live generally throughout the Far East. Only 
a fringe, only a veneer of those people have an education. Approxi- 
mately 80 percent cannot read or write. They want basically food, 
shelter, and the opportunity to improve their lot and to live in peace. 

About 400 years ago many Western nations initiated what might be 
termed the gunboat policy. They compelled those people to trade 
with them, utilizing the intimidation of force. 

The orientals have heard stories about this gunboat policy. They 
have been handed down by word of mouth and have been exaggerated, 
of course, with the retelling. Furthermore, and concurrently over 
the past few centuries, western powers colonized and planted their 
flags in various parts of the Far East. They demanded and received 
preferential treatment. Economic exploitation and colonization by 
western powers are two developments in the Far East that the orien- 
tals are really determined to eliminate. 

It is not communism, nor is it democracy, that they understand or 
fear. A strong nationalism is running rife in the area, and Commu- 
nist propaganda has skillfully given impetus to this. 

Militarily, to return specifically to your question — if you will retain 
the information I have ]ust given as background — militarily the teem- 
ing millions of people, if oriented toward the Kremlin, would provide 
the Soviet Union with a vast reservoir of manpower which they could 
and would undoubtedly use to implement their sinister plans. The 
people in the Far East, the soldiers when fed, led, trained and 
equipped properly, make valiant fighting men, excellent soldiers. 

Therefore, manpowerwise, if the Far East were to fall under the 
aegis of the Soviet, a great advantage would accrue to the Soviet as 
against the free nations. 

If the Communists capture all of Asia, southeast Asia, our own 
military security would be somewhat jeopardized. However, assum- 
ing that we retained control of the bastion along the littoral, extend- 
ing from the Aleutians down through the Japanese Islands, Okinawa, 
the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and then on down through the Micro- 
nesian and Melanesian Islands, the Reds could be blocked off effec- 
tively if they attempted military operations to the east and south. 

I must emphasize that our security, if we retain that bastion, would 
not be seriously jeopardized. I personally do not believe, gentlemen, 
in utilizing American boys in ground fighting in any of the military 
operations on the Asiatic mainland. 

The free people indigenous to that area, if they want their freedom, 
if they want to oppose those oriental people who are unfortunate tools 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 87 

of the Kremlin, should sacrifice and fight. I would suggest that we 
make available to them the military equipment and the technical 
know-how to use it, but I would not involve American manhood in 
that caldron of Asia. 

I am opposed to sending American gi'ound forces there for that and 
many other reasons, sir. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker ? 

Senator Welker. I assume. General Wedemeyer, from that state- 
ment that you do not believe that the American armed services should 
attempt to fight another Korea wherein they are denied the right to 
win ? 

General Wedemeter. Definitely not, sir. 

I mentioned earlier, Senator Welker, tliat there are four major 
instruments — if you will pardon the repetition — four major instru- 
ments of national policy available to any country ; namely, political, 
economic, psychological, and military. 

The intelligent and timely use of the first three of these instru- 
ments should preclude the use of the fourth — the military. When 
the first three fail in providing the security for our country, in the 
final analysis we must resort to the military, of course, still utilizing 
the other three instruments of foreign policy, too. 

Once we resort to military forces, we should give the military com- 
mander clear-cut instructions to win a victory. We should give him 
the means to win that victory, whatever that might involve. We 
should provide him with the benefits of American ingenuity and in- 
dustrial might, and instruct him to win in the American tradition, 
honorably but definitely. We should give him our loyal support in 
the process. 

We should not tell him to go to the 50-yard line and not even attempt 
to kick a field goal from that position and then expect victory. 

Tlie Chairman. In other words, Cireneral, am I correct in this 
assumption that we as a nation must be morally responsible for our 
own commitments on peace and security for this Nation ? 

General Wedemeter. Completely, sir. 

The Chairman. And that we dare not commingle troops, commingle 
command, and so forth, where we morally cannot be responsible for 
the decision which we once make ? 

General Wedemeter. I agree with that completely, sir. 

Senator, in my 11 years in the Orient — if this would help you and 
members of the committee to evaluate the situation there more objec- 
tively, may I add — I do not believe that the Koreans or the Chinese 
who observe a white man, an American soldier, killing orientals, even 
though those orientals, for the present at least as I stated earlier, are 
tools of the Kremlin, that such Koreans or Chinese approve deep in 
their hearts and minds. Actually they resent the killing of their 
people by our people, and they don't comprehend our humanitarian 
motives. Military force is not the primary answer to the ]3roblem in 
the Far East. I think, again, that the people themselves, if they really 
want their liberty, should fight for it as our forefathers fought for 
their freedom here in this country. It will mean more to them, and 
furthermore we will not be adding fuel to the Soviet propaganda that 
we are imperialistic in our designs and that we want to reestablish 
colonies or impose a preferential trade position. 



88 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Cpiairman. In other words, you think that, if they have the 
heart and will to fight for liberty, the primary responsibility should 
be Asians fighting for Asia. 

General Wedemeyer. Definitely ; I certainly do, sir. 

Mr. Arens. General, the encroachments of communism are grad- 
ually denying areas in the Far East and even in Europe to us. If not 
successfully blocked we may be driven back practically to our own 
shores. What would the strategic implication of such a situation be 
to our military security and to our economy ? 

General Wedemeyer. Sir, I am not an isolationist. I believe in 
cooperating and in collaborating with other nations that have objec- 
tives compatible with our own. I want to make it clear, sir, that I am 
not an isolationist and that I would encourage and welcome mutually 
beneficial relations and cooperation with any nation that gives irrefu- 
table evidence, tangible evidence, that it has objectives compatible with 
our own and will make a proportionate contribution toward the accom- 
plishment of these objectives. 

I do not suggest that other nations should change their form of 
government, their economic philosophy, their customs, and their tradi- 
tions — not an iota. I do maintain that I would be willing only to 
cooperate with those nations when they give evidence of sincerity of 
purpose and determination and willingness to cooperate with us realis- 
tically, to make necessary sacrifices, and to adhere faithfully to estab- 
lished principles of decency, loyalty, and honor. 

Now, then, the hypothetical situation that you embodied in your 
question ; namely, a situation whereby we might be driven back to our 
own shores, both east and west. In my judgment we still could success- 
fully defend our country if, as suggested earlier by Senator Welker, 
we recognize now that such a situation is a possibility, however remote, 
and if we create conditions economically wherein we would be inde- 
pendent of sources of raw materials remote from our own country and 
wherein we would develop the raw materials available through the 
Latin American countries and also to the north of us in Canada. 

Economically I believe that we could evolve and maintain a sound 
economy in this country even though we were restricted to the Western 
Hemisphere. In some respects we would have to make adjustments. 
Our standard of living would be affected, but it would be better to 
tighten our belts and remain free. Militarily, again I believe that we 
could successfully defend our country and those areas contiguous to 
our country, either north or south, if such a situation were to develop. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire on a statement made 
by the distinguished general? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. General Wedemeyer, I have noted twice in your 
statement that you have advocated — as I think this entire committee 
and most all of America do — that we cultivate the Latin American 
countries. I would like to ask you a very simple question with respect 
to this. 

Should we cooperate to the extent that we should send, say, a steel 
strip mill to a South American country which is under a dictatorship, 
which has trade agreements with not only Russia but every satellite 
of Russia, including Guatemala, and accept their word that they 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 89 

should not use this, or they never would use this to hurt the United 
States of America? 

This has been a problem in our minds, and I would like your advice 
upon this because I am informed that, if they do send out from this 
country a production mill, with which they cannot only produce steel 
but I believe aluminum, copper, and other strategic metals, the only 
thing America has to rely on in the event of a breach is that they 
broke their agreement. Now that is not going to help us very much 
militarily. 

I would like your observation with respect to that matter. 

Let me further say that I read in the press that boatloads of arms 
and munitions are being sent to some of our neighboring countries in 
the Latin American area. I wonder if you could help us on that 
matter, sir? 

General Wedemeyer. I will, sir, express my views. 

In the first place, I believe — and I am saying this in a constructively 
critical manner — that we have not facilitated good relations with the 
Latin Americans. I think we should have made the effort many years 
ago. It is unfortunate that we did not do so, and some of the unfor- 
tunate developments in that area can be attributed to the fact that 
we have not been realistic in building up good relations there. 

Specifically, with reference to the steel mill in the South American 
country to which you alluded, I would not put the steel mill there 
unless I had assurance, irrefutable evidence, that advantage would 
accrue to my own country. That would be the test, sir, of any aid or 
assistance that I gave to any country, in any part of the world. That 
is international realism. 

Senator Welker. General, if I may interrupt: You are mindful 
of the fact that at this very moment the Communist conspiracy, 
Russia, has trade missions not only in Guatemala but in all of our 
South American and Latin American countries as of this time. 

That strikes me as being rather dangerous, sir. 

General Wedemeyer. If the evaluation on the part of our repre- 
sentatives in this Congress, if the evaluation of information along 
that line indicates clearly that advantages would accrue to the Com- 
munists, our avowed enemies, then I certainly would not collaborate 
or cooperate with those people. 

Senator Welker. Then going back to your statement a moment 
ago, that maybe our economy would be a little bit depressed by virtue 
of the fundamental law of nature, to wit, the law of self-defense — 
they might call it isolationism, or whatever they might do — in the 
event we are forced to our own shores, it might well be that those of us 
in America trying to support our armed services could well use that 
strip mill instead of having it overseas ; would you not agree ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. That should be brought out in the 
careful evaluation of all the implications as I mentioned, sir. 

I would like to mention one point. As I listened to the questions 
and as I reflect upon my replies, it might be that we are mentally con- 
juring up a colossus that is overwhelming, that is irresistible and will 
inevitably destroy us. I am sure you gentlemen are mindful of the 
fact that behind the Iron Curtain there are defections, dissentions, 
and many serious problems confronting the Communist leaders, and 
as these people extend their control, their difficulties mount. They 

47769— 54— pt. 2 3 



90 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

are having many economic difficulties, far-reaching psychological and 
political difficulties. 

I am not optimistic about the future, but I am encouraged when 
men like yourselves, our representatives in the senior legislative body 
of the land, are investigating communism and all of its implications, 
so that you can recommend appropriate steps to responsible leaders 
and to the American people. 

The Chairman. General, on that point: What would be, in your 
judgment, the psychological impact on the minds of the people of the 
Iron Curtain countries of a severance of diplomatic relations with the 
Iron Curtain countries ? 

General Wedemeyer. Senator Jenner, I have never been behind 
the Iron Curtain. Presently I am chairman of the board of the Tol- 
stoy Foundation. That foundation facilitates the processing of Rus- 
sians who have been persecuted and enslaved behind the Iron Curtain 
and who have successfully breached the curtain and are now in proc- 
essing stations in Europe or are en route to new lands. Some of them 
are brought to this country. 

I have talked to many in this category and obtained interesting 
information that might assist in answering your question. These 
stories and, of course, reports emanating from various sources abroad 
would indicate that the people behind the Iron Curtain, the majority " 
of them, are disillusioned, imhappy, and would welcome the op- 
portunity to overthrow their present leaders. 

The interpretation that these people to whom I talked would put 
on such a step— namely, severance of diplomatic relations — w^ould be in 
my opinion, substantially^ as follows: That at long last, realism is 
dictating American foreign policy. The Americans at long last 
recognize that they cannot carry on the traditional diplomatic 
exchange of amenities and that now they are going to make it difficult 
for the Soviet to propagandize their people about the weakness of 
America or about United States friendship as symbolized by diplo- 
matic representation. 
_ Tacit in our present situation, is undoubtedly the belief by the Rus- 
sian people that we are getting along with the Soviet leaders and 
that they are doing all right, maybe that we even respect them. I am 
sure the vast majority of the people behind the Iron Curtain want to 
believe that we do not admire or respect their unscrupulous leaders, 
that we are sincere in our sympathetic understanding of their terrible 
predicament. 

Senator Welicer. May I have a question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. General Wedemeyer, I do not like to take too 
much of your valuable time, but let me ask this question: Based 
upon your vast experience in China, I would like you briefly to put in 
the record some of your experience while you were in China that 
resulted from the fifth column of the Soviets coming in and under- 
mining the thinking of the people of China. 

I have had some information with respect to Earl Browder. While 
you were out there, it seems to me that he had something to do there 
Can you relate anything about that? 

Mavbe I am in error. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 91 

General Wedemeyer. In tlie first place, for many, many years the 
Soviet has been training Chinese and other nationals for future use 
in their world conspiracy. The propitious time arrived in the closing 
days of World War II. They trained Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese, 
indoctrinating them thoroughly so that they became fanatical fol- 
lowers of the Marxist doctrine. Each of these well-trained fanatic 
believers was returned to his native land and became a potential cell 
or nucleus around which communism was expanded in the familiar 
pattern of deceit, propaganda, and subversion. 

Supplemented by propaganda that emanated from Moscow, Yanan, 
and Vladivostok — propaganda that I, as commander of the Chinese 
theater, was monitoring, analyzing, and evaluating, these Communist 
leaders in the Far East, particularly in China, were able to under- 
mine the confidence of the people in the Generalissimo and his 
government. 

Furthermore, propaganda was directed against the Allies, for ex- 
jimple, the Americans, the British, French, and so forth, to the effect 
that we all were there as symbols of imperialism and exploitation 
or colonization. After 8 years of war, with attendant dislocations, 
disruptions, and so forth, the Chinese people were confused, dismayed, 
and completely exhausted. They were fertile soil in which to plant 
seeds of discontent, defection, and subversion. Then the fact that the 
li'uman administration renounced, more or less, the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment of China added to the complete breakdown of Chinese resist- 
ance to the Communist aggressions which were supported by Moscow. 

To address myself more specifically to your question, Senator 
Welker, I did know that Browder, also a woman named Smedley, 
and many others 

Mr. Arexs. Is that Agnes Smedley ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; and many others visited China 
wliile I was there. These alleged Communists were reported to me 
as being in contact with the Chinese Keds, including Mao Tse-tung 
and Chou En-lai. 

I might relate that the Ked propaganda against the United States 
Avas scurrilous — a pack of lies. I mentioned the fact that my head- 
quarters monitored all radio and press reports throughout the area. 
Every morning a compilation was on my desk. I contacted the senior 
American diplomatic official in Shanghai and suggested that he go 
to the senior Soviet diplomatic representative and'demand that this 
propaganda against Americans be stopped at once. He asked me to 
accompany him and we presented firmly our protest against such 
obviously unfriendly acts. The Soviet representative disavowed any 
connection with the propaganda and assured us that there was a mis- 
take. I showed him a sheaf of reports from the radio and the press 
all emanating in sources controlled by the Soviets and Chinese Com- 
munists. Actually we lodged this protest, the violent attacks against 
us stopped for about a week or 10 days, and then resumed with even 
greater violence. 

That is only one example of many that I could give you. 

China actually was primarily conquered by the Communists through 
skillful pro]jaganda which caused the complete demoralization and 
broke the will of the people to resist. 

Senator Welker. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. 



92 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. General, based upon your vast experience not 
only as a military man but as a resident, a long-time resident of 
China, I will ask you what effect it would have if Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek should invade the mainland of China? Do you feel 
that he might have some of the people of China join him — yes, includ- 
ing generals — join him in a fight to overthrow the tyranny that has 
struck that fine country, heretofore very friendly to us ? 

General Wedemeyer. Sir, I think your question could be best 
answered by a recent example. 

After the Korean truce the Chinese Commmiist prisoners of Allied 
forces in South Korea were given an unintimidated opportunity to 
express their will concerning returning to their homeland or to go to 
Formosa. The vast majority, in fact about 90 percent, went volun- 
tarily to Formosa and 83 percent expressed the determination to join 
the Chinese Nationalist military forces in Formosa so that they could 
fight against the Chinese Communists and free their mainland. 

For that reason and many other important reasons, too. Senator 
Welker, I do not believe that Red China should be admitted to the 
United Nations. The present government of Red China is definitely 
not representative of the Chinese people. I am confident if they had. 
the unintimidated opportunity to express their desires, they would 
remove their present leaders and eliminate the alien philosophy, 
communism. 

In my almost 2 years of daily contact with Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek, he was never guilty of duplicity. I felt that he epitomized 
the best leadership of China, and I think today that he is the logical 
and best qualified leader of a free China. 

However, Communist propaganda, which was skillfully handled in 
our own country as well as throughout the Far East, has practically 
repudiated the generalissimo as a leader. It is true that under his 
leadership in China, there was malcontent, maladministration, and 
corruption. However, I believe he was gradually improving condi- 
tions for his people, and striving sincerely to create a government 
responsive to the will of the people. At all times the generalissimo 
has been a stanch opponent of communism. 

Senator Welker. That propaganda still exists today and is going 
about the country today ; is that not true, General ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. General, from that standpoint: Senator Welker 
referred to a military action of the Nationalist Chinese Government 
on the mainland of China. Is it not probably true, from a military 
standpoint, that the longer that is delayed the older an army grows, 
the more opportunity the Chinese Communists on the mainland have 
to consolidate their forces and to lead the people, particularly the 
younger generation, to their way of thinking ? 

In other words, is not delay really a detriment ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; that is true, Senator Jenner. But 
it would be most unfortunate if the generalissimo's forces went over 
from Formosa to the mainland prematurely. Before such an opera- 
tion is undertaken the Chinese people must be prej)ared psychologi- 
cally and thus facilitate effective collaboration with the invading 
forces. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 93 

Senator, in that connection, I think that the policy or the plan that 
has been proposed by the Eisenhower administration, namely, a re- 
gional organization in the Far East, would be a very constructive step. 
The free nations of the Far East should create an organization similar 
to NATO and in the process integrate to the maximum degree their 
economies. This would contribute to economic stability, and to collec- 
tive security. 

A Far East organization would greatly strengthen the position of 
free nations in that area and would help materially in the free nations' 
struggle against communism. 

The Chairman. General, I have one last question. 

In attempting to avoid the catastrophe of a third world war, can 
we deal with the Kremlin ? 

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. 

The history of our past experiences proves beyond all doubt that 
a normal relationship with the Soviet Union and satellites is impos- 
sible. It is pure fiction to ascribe to the Communists any capacity or 
will to keep a promise or agreement in good faith. 

Under the present Soviet leadership, with the current objectives of 
the Politburo, the United States can have no confidence in any ar- 
rangement, or in any treaty involving the Soviet Union and satellites. 

Mr. Arens. General, earlier today you gave what I interpreted to be 
a rather dismal appraisal of the world situation from the standpoint 
of the security of our Nation. The Senator from Indiana and the 
Senator from Nevada introduced in the Senate some 3 weeks ago 
Senate Resolution 247 which called for severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Iron Curtain governments, and for convoking an inter- 
national conference of the free nations of the world for the purpose of 
agreeing upon united action to destroy the Communist fifth column 
and to resist further aggression by international communism. 

Should such a course of action as suggested by these two Senators 
be taken by our Government, what would be your appraisal of the 
prospect to avoid the catastrophe of a third w^orld war? 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment, a third world war would 
not result from such action, but it is a calculated risk which we must 
be willing, and prepared to assume. 

I think that such action would coalesce the efforts of all free 
nations that do have compatible objectives and sincerely are deter- 
mined to protect their great heritages of liberty against aggression, 
oppression and the enslavement of Communists. It would bring 
realism to our international situation. Other nations, purportedly 
on our side would be compelled also to take a position and thus give 
tangible evidence of their sincerity of purpose and determination to 
help us destroy the world conspiracy of the Communists. 

We cannot buy friends, but we can facilitate realistic collaboration 
and cooperation of other so-called friendly nations if we adopt a 
realistic approach and place our American views and aims before 
the bar of world opinion. We have every right to demand clearcut 
enunciation on the part of our friends concerning their respective 
views, aims, and the proportionate contribution in terms of manpow^er 
and material that they will make in this world struggle against the 
Communists, our avowed enemies. 



94 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. General, I want to thank you for taking your 
valuable time to appear before this committee. We appreciate the 
testimony you have given us here this morning, and I am sure I speak 
for the entire committee in that matter. Thank you very much. 

We will be in recess, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a. m. Thursday, June 10, 1954, the liearing 
was recessed subject to call of the Chair.) 



STEATEGY AND TACTICS OF WOELD COMMUNISM 



TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate ttie Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 35 a. m. in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner, Welker, and Johnston. 
Also present : Richard Arens, special counsel ; and Frank W. 
Schroeder, Edward R. Duffy, and W. E. Lowell, professional staff 
members. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Caldwell, will you stand and be sworn ? 

Do you swear that the testimony that you will give in this hearing 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. CALDWELL, NASHVILLE. TENN. 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name for our record ? 

Mr. Caldwell. John C. Caldwell. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Caldwell ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Nashville, Tenn. 

The Chairman. Wliat is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Caldwell. A writer and lectm'er. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Caldwell, you were formerly Director of the United 
States Information Service in China. Is that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. That is right. 

Mr. Arens. At what period of time did you occupy that post ? 

Mr. Caldwell. In 1946 and 1947. 

Mr. Arens. Would you kindly tell us what has been your experience 
or activity since you relinquished that post ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I was sent to Korea first, in the army of occupation, 
Deputy Director of the Information Services; when the occupation 
ended I became Deputy Director of the United States Information 
Service, State Department, and was in Korea in 1950 when the war 
broke. I returned to this country and have been writing ever since. 

The Chairman. How long were you in China ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I was born there. 

95 



96 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chaieman. How long were you the head of the Information 
Service in China ? 

Mr, Caldwell. I was head of the China Branch for about a year 
and a half ; the whole China program in China for about 9 months ; 
head of all the Far East operations for about 9 months. 

Mr. Arens. During the course of your experience in the Far East, 
did you have occasion to acquire experience with the Communist tech- 
niques, Communist propaganda, Communist strategy for the takeover 
of the Far East? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir, very much so. Beginning in 1946 I made 
a study of Chinese-Communist methods. Since that time in Korea 
I made similar studies, and since I left Government service, as a writer 
and lecturer, I have returned twice within the last 9 months to the 
Far East and have been very much interested, of course, in the whole 
subject. 

The Chairman. What parts in the Far East did you visit during 
the last 9 months? 

Mr. Caldwell. I went to Korea, Japan, China, and Formosa in 
September and August, last, returned to Formosa and the China coast 
with the Nationalist guerrillas last December and returned here in 
January, 6 months ago. 

]\Ir. Arens. You have been in consultation with the staff of the com- 
mittee with reference to your experiences and have prepared a state- 
ment for insertion in this record, is that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. That is correct. 

Mr. Arens. I respectfully request, Mr. Chairman, that this state- 
ment at this point be incorporated in tlie record and that Mr. Caldwell 
proceed to highlight the information contained in this statement. 

The Chairman. The statement of Mr. Caldwell will go into the 
record and become a part of the record, 

(Statement referred to follows:) 

Statement of John C. Caldwell, Nashville, Tenn. 

Americans were shocked by the germ warfare charges made by the Com- 
munists, by the fact that even people in enlightened Great Britain believed these 
incredible charges against Americans. Yet the germ warfare theme does not 
constitute any new pattern of anti-American activity on the part of the Com- 
munists. Nearly 8 years ago I talked to an American woman who had recently 
returned from the so-called liberated areas of China — the portions of north and 
northwest China then held by the Communists. My conversation, as reported 
to the Department of State, included this statement: "She tells me that the 
anti-American campaign there has been vigorous, with lurid posters depicting 
GI rape, murder, and robbery in dozens of forms." 

The report from which that sentence was taken was part of a 64-page study 
of Communist techniques and propaganda lines, made while I was Acting 
Director, United States Information Service, in China. The report was released 
briefly, then recalled on that basis that it would cause "friction between the 
United States and the U. S. S. R." 

The germ warfare charges of last year are merely a continuation of a Com- 
munist pattern which was revealed in the Far East nearly 10 years ago. The 
basic pattern seems never to have been recognized, has never been adequately 
counteracted. It is my opinion, based upon years of residence in China and 
Korea, that the Communist pattern in eastern Asia has sought to implement 
two basic objectives : 

(1) To create in Asiatics the idea that American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines are brutal, corrupt, immoral. 

(2) Utilizing American concepts of democracy to develop among Americans 
the idea that our logical allies in Asia, i. e., the Chiangs and the Rhees, are 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 97 

hopelessly corrupt, dictatorial, without ability to command the respect of their 
peoples. 

The cleverness of the Communist technique is indicated by the fact that, 
whenever possible, Americans have been used in the transmission belts for the 
spreading of these two ideas. Americans have been used to discredit fellow 
Americans; Americans have been used to discredit our allies in Asia. The pat- 
tern has persisted for nearly a decade. It was used to destroy Chiang Kai-shek's 
influence on the mainland : it is still used against him on Formosa. It has been 
vigorously used against Syngman Rhee since 1946. It is probable that the same 
techniques are used to magnify the failings of the French colonial administra- 
tion in Indochina. It is my opinion that the same pattern will soon emerge 
against President Magsaysay of the Philippines. 

Before going into details on how these techniques have been developed I would 
like to point out that the Communist pattern reveals deep-seated fears on the 
part of the enemy. Americans are discredited, especially American fighting 
men, because of the fear that subjugated peoples will rally to the aid of Amer- 
icans (as they did in North Koi-ea) when American military forces confront 
Communist military forces. The fear of American intervention, even of Amer- 
ican support, is so great that the Chinese Communists are even now inundating 
the China coast area with special anti-American Army leaflets. A few months 
ago while visiting a Nationalist guerrilla island base off the China coast I was 
able to secure several anti-American leaflets (floated across in tiny bamboo 
tulies) and am attaching one photostat of a typical leaflet to this statement 
in the hope that it might be of interest to the committee. The need to discredit 
Americans is also indicated by the program of vilification, imprisonment, and 
worse, directed against American missionaries. Indeed, the American mission- 
ai'.v and the American GI share top honors in the Communist vilification parade, 
and it is not difficult to understand why. The missionary has built for America 
and Americans a tremendous reservoir of good will, has laid a foundation that 
communism has not yet been able to destroy. And the American GI represents 
still, to thousands of hopeful Asiatics, possible liberation and a new life. 

I should like now to mention samples of the Communist pattern in action. 
In 1946—47 I was attached to the Ignited States Embassy in China. During that 
period United States Marines were stationed in north China. The presence of 
the Marines was of course vigorously denounced by the Communists. A series 
of stories began to appear in the leftist press detailing atrocities committed by 
the Marines. Specifically it was reported that Marines were using Chinese 
farmers for target practice. The important point to this story is not that the 
Chinese press carried the story, but that Americans in Shanghai and in Nanking 
were equally guilty. It was inconceivable to me that American marines or 
soldiers would use human beings for target practice. I made a trip to north 
China in early 3947 and personally investigated the situation. I found that one 
Chinese farmer had been wounded by a stray bullet fired from a Marine target 
range. From this slender thread, the story had been woven into a first-class 
scandal, passed on by Communist-inspired Chinese newspapers, by American 
dupes led by a few Americans who knew exactly what they were doing. 

The technique is still being used. Last year a magazine of national circulation 
published a story about the vast number of illegitimate GI babies in Japan. 
I do not remember the exact number given, but I believe it was in excess of 
100,000. The story was, of course, widely carried in the Japanese press. The 
implication was clear : American soldiers are immoral beasts. It was only last 
fall that the truth finally appeared. The Japanese Government itself made a 
complete survey, coming up with the astonishing figure of less than 4,000 known 
GI babies in Japan. After years of occupation, after the passage of tens of 
thousands of troops to and from the Korean battlefront, that is a record of which 
we can be proud. But for many Asiatics the damage has already been done. 

I believe it is possible even to pinpoint the beginning of this particular Com- 
munist line. It first began to api>ear in 1946. A United States military police 
detachment was stationed in Shanghai at that time. By mid-1946 I noted an 
increasing number of stories regarding the brutality of American MP's. The 
stories continued all through 1946. In December of that year I made a detailed 
report to the Department of State, quoting numerous stories that appeared 
either in the Chinese leftist press or over the Russian-operated radio station. 

It is possible to trace the same technique, used against American troops 
during the occupation of Korea. There is always a basis upon which the 
stories can be built and magnified. There are always incidents wherever 
47769 — 54 — pt. 2 4 



98 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

large numbers of troops are stationed. The tragedy is that the Communist 
effort has so often received able assists from Americans and that no real effort 
has been made to combat this vicious line. Excellent counterpropaganda is 
available. It could be used by our own Armed Forces, by our own writers and 
newspapermen, by the Voice of America and its affiliated information services 
I submit with this statement a newspaper column I wrote recently concerning 
the outstanding good done by American servicemen in Korea. The First Corps 
amputee project in Korea is one of many projects which should be described 
to the world. It is a story which might have extremely favorable results in 
India and the other neutralist nations. In Korea alone American GI's have 
given millions of dollars to alleviate suffering, to rebuild hospitals and orphan- 
ages, to rehabilitate a suffering land. Official figures (and these do not in- 
clude hundreds of thousands of dollars si>ent or given without official knowledge) 
show that the men of the 8th Army in Korea last year contributed $1,290 000 
to various causes in Korea. I do not think that it would be out of place to 
state that this record of giving by American soldiers is better than the record 
of most of the members of the United Nations who pledged funds for the re- 
habilitation of South Korea and who now drag their feet on the fulfillment of 
those pledges. 

As far as I know this magnificent story of American generosity has never 
been told by our information services. It is told in fragmentarv form by our 
newspaper reporters in the Far East. It is a story that can' be duplicated 
wherever American men are stationed. It is a ready-made answer to the 
decade of vilification directed against American fighting men by the enemy 
AVhy do we not use the weapons we possess? 

The Communists have been extremely successful in their second basic ob- 
jective, the vilification of Asia's anti-Communist leaders. This committee has 
been instrumental in uncovering the operations of the Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations in its effort to undermine the Nationalist Government. I would like to 
confine my statement to the activities of other Americans, for the most part in- 
nocent players in the Communist game, but whose activities even now contribute 
to the success of communism in the Far East. 

Let me cite an occurrence of 3 weeks ago to show how the cause of the free 
world in Asia is sabotaged by Americans. 

There has been considerable Communist activity along the China coast during 
the past month. On May 20, 1954, the United Press reported in detail the 
Communist threat to the Taclien Islands. It was reported that all civilians 
were being evacuated, which was untrue. The Tachen Islands were described 
in the UP story as the "classic invasion bridge to Form.osa." No statement 
could be more false. The islands have never been an invasion bridge to 
any place. But the implication is clear: the Nationalists are about to lose 
their most important China coast holdings; the defense of Formosa is threat- 
ened. 

The UP has presented the Chinese Reds with a tremendous propaganda victory 
through its inaccurate reporting. The Tachen Islands are the least heavily 
defended islands along the China coast. Indeed, the decision to even attempt a 
buildup was not made until last December. The total area of all 30 islands in 
the group is 30.7 square kilometers. The total population of all the islands is 
18,500. Most of the islands are not even populated or garrisoned, their defense 
is extremely difficult because of the distance from Formosan airfields and prox- 
imity to Communist air and naval bases. The islands are of such relative un- 
importance that when I visited the guerrilla outposts a few months ago I did 
not include them in my itinerary. How is it possible that these islands suddenly 
become so vitally important? They can be taken; but if the Communists do 
decide to invade, what should be an unimportant skirmish among the never- 
ending skirmishes along the China coast will become a victory of tremendous 
importance, all because of inaccurate American reporting. 

American action in the Far East has been hampered for a decade because the 
Communists have been supremely successful in poisoning the minds of Americans 
against the very leaders in Asia who have had the courage to fight communism. 
And Americans have had a large part in the campaign : American writers, corre- 
spondents, even a few missionaries. 

I believe that 75 percent of the editors— newspaper and magazine— in America 
are so prejudiced against Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee as individuals 
that honest coverage of Free Asia is almost impossible. 

Since last August I have made two trips to Formosa and have had an oppor- 
tunity to study the Nationalist rural reconstruction program on that island. It 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 99 

is a magnificent effort; it miglit well be a blueprint for Asia's salvation. Tlie 
JCRR program, as it is called, is a joint Sino-American operation. Lp to W 
percent of the funds used on the hundreds of projects is local money. Less 
than $14 million in appropriated American dollars has been used m a Program 
that lias brought real land reform to the people and has revolutiomzed lural 
life on Formosa. American personnel total just 13 experts. Here to W mind 
is foreign aid at its best, its success based upon cooperation and local initiatne 
rather than upon vast handouts. i ^„*. fi,^ 

When I returned to this country I talked to a number of editors about the 
Formosa story. One editor immediately countered with a positive statement . 
"But evervbody knows all the Forraosans hate Chiang." There we see it : Unrea- 
soned prejudice, a blind refusal to even listen to the truth-and the outstanding 
Communist success in the Far East. „„ v,a^ hoon 

The Communist program to discredit the Chiangs and the Rhees has been 
extremelv successful ; it has hamstrung American policy in Asia. The program 
has been\liabolically conceived, its success due to Communist exploitation ot the 
verv principles which we believe in. We take for granted that our freedoms 
should be and can be applied all over the world. We dislike corruption,, chaos. 
But what so many naive Americans, abroad for the first time, cannot under- 
stand is that Asia is emerging from medievalism. How can we honestly blame 
Nationalist China for some of its ills, if we realistically appraise the 
problems of that land, the lack of communication, illiteracy, superstition, years 
of civil and foreign wars? How can we honestly expect Korea to emerge over- 
night as a model democracy— after 40 years of Japanese domination m which 
every vestige of Korean leadership was destroyed or driven into exile? How can 
we expect South Korea, faced with a million-man Communist Array, with thou- 
sands of guerrillas and saboteurs within its very borders, to have today ail or 
the freedoms we Americans have developed during 175 years? ^t, • i 

The Communists have made use of American naivete to so poison the minas 
of editors, writers, and publishers and Foreign Service personnel that it is 
difficult to make an honest decision today on either Nationalist China or Korea. 
The Department of State, like our courts, operates on a body of precedent. 
When it is necessary to draft a cable of instructions, an oflicer goes into the 
files to see what has been done, what has been reported and advised previously. 
The files are stacked today with anti-Chiang, anti-Nationalist material. ±ne 
same situation prevails with respect to Syngman Rhee. Until several years 
have passed during which we have objective. anti-Communist reporting it will D<? 
difficult to expect decisions and actions favorable to our friends in Asia. 

Newspapers, magazines, and book publishers suffer in a similar manner. * or 
years Edgar Snow was a prominent editor of the Saturday Evening Post. His 
pro-Chinese Communist bias is well known. But what has not been recognized 
is the influence he left behind. The "body of precedent" he bequeathed has 
undoubtedly had a profound effect upon the Post's selection of articles. As far 
as I know there has never been a best selling or even moderately well selling book 
on the Far East basically favorable to our logical allies. There have been 
numerous books on the other side. These titles have been vigorously promoted 
and have sold well. This has been the pattern since Thunder Out of China by 
White and Jacoby became a best seller and a Book-of-the-Month Club selection 
in 1945 until the most recent effort to smear Chiang bookwise appeared m the 
form of a book titled "A Pail of Oysters" by Vern Sneider. Published last fall 
this thoroughly dishonest book received rave reviews. In the Satiirday Review ot 
Literature it was reviewed by one Pat Frank who stated that the book cast a 
bright light thrust into the infected peritoneum of Formosa - * ^ it is_ a true 
light " Mr Frank says that the Nationalists are rightly described as swme 
and concludes his review with the statement that anyone who reads A Pail of 
Oysters will understand "why all of our money and all our men ^^^^ PU^Sr h? 
Kai-shek together again." Also published last fall, Formosa Beachhead by 
Geraldine Fitch is a factual, honest account of the tremendous progress made on 
Formosa, of the promise this progress holds for the mainland of China. Mrs. 
Fitch's book has been ignored by the reviewers, has sold less than 3 000 copies 

The prejudice extends into purchases of books, not only for United btate^ 
information libraries, but for libraries in this country. The Library Journal 
is a magazine devoted to news of library developments in America with a cncuia-. 
tion largely limited to librarians. Each issue devotes considerable space to 
evaluations of recent books. Each evaluation generally ends with a statement 
ricommended or not recommended. A study of this magazine reveals some 



100 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

startling facts about what books are being recommended to libraries. For in- 
stance, Dr. James Burnham's The Web of Subversion, which deals in considerable 
part with the work of this committee was not recommended. A book by Louis 
Bromfield which denounces our past foreign policy, our spending program abroad, 
our neglect of Asia, was not recommended. Obviously Formosa Beachhead was 
not considered a good book for our libraries ; for as far as I have been able to 
ascertain it was not even listed. A study of the past year's issues of this one 
magazine reveals the extent to which someone has gone into influencing the 
selection of books for American libraries. As important as books ignored or not 
recommended is the list of those which are recommended. They include most 
books which make a plea for recognition of Red China on the basis of reality, 
or advise us that we must not offend Mr. Nehru of India. Chester Bowles" book, 
the works of Norman Cousins, of Justice William O. Douglas are all recom- 
mended.- Mr. Theodore White's new book Fire in the Ashes (again selected 
by the Book-of-the-Month Club) and a book which advises, among other things, 
appeasement of the Comnnmists is heartily recommended. As a part of the 
general pattern, Elmer Davis' book Bxit We Were Born Free is also recommended. 
The pimple truth is that today it is well nigh impossible for the truth to be told 
about the Far East. Only a handful of publishers are even willing to attempt 
publishing a book honesty, objectively favorable to our allies. Very few maga- 
zines of national circulation will carry similar articles. The situation is becom- 
ing somewhat better with newspapers, but the deck is still stacked against the 
Nationalists — and against a realistic American foreign policy. 

I do not mean to issue a blanket denunciation of all who write on the Far East. 
Reporting on this part of the world is difficult. Among other problems there are 
those of language. The Communists themselves have made excellent use of the 
situation, have moved in brilliantly and today have their agents among the 
intellectuals with whom American writers are most likely to come in contact. 
For years the Communists have had men and women who speak fluent English 
available to help plant favorable news among American writers. One of their 
most proficient agents, one Miss Kung Peng, was stationed in Chungking during 
the days of the Marshall mission. She was attractive, vivacious, always willing 
to help an American reporter get "facts." She was considered so important a 
contact that when I was sent to China on a brief inspection trip by the Depart- 
ment of State in 1946 I was rushed from the plane in Chungking directly to her 
home so that I could have dinner with her and could get the "facts" straight. 
Incidentally the dinner engagement was made without my knowledge, by mem- 
bers of the United States Embassy staff. On the same trip I spent 4 days in 
Peiping. The main engagement arranged for me there (by Embassy officials) 
was for a dinner with Huang Hua, another smooth Communist operator. Huang 
speaks English, is suave and polished and had profound influence over many 
Americans. The importance of both Kung Peng and Huang Hua is indicated by 
these facts: Huang appeared at Panmunjom as a very important Communist 
negotiator : both Hunang and Hung Peng are now in Geneva, in charge of Com- 
munist public relations. Yet during a crucial period in the Far East these 2 
people influenced 90 percent of the Embassy staff, fed news to 90 percent of the 
press corps. 

Today the pattern cannot be developed so openly. The Communists place their 
operators among the Chinese, Korean, Indochinese newspaper men and women 
with whom our writers come in contact ; they inflltrate the United States Infor- 
mation Service which often has the function of assisting foreign writers. 

While I do not issue a blanket denunciation of all our news gatherers, I think 
it would be exceedingly naive to believe there are no Communists among present 
American writers active in the Far East. One recent example is the case of 
William Powell, former OWI official in China, later editor of the China Review, 
who stayed on in China after the Communists took over and used his paper to 
attack his own country along typical Communist lines. I have seen one issue of 
the China Review devoted almost entirely to American atrocities, with pictures 
showing the mass graves of thousands of Koreans supposedly massacred by 
American soldiers. Mr. Powell and his wife, who was active in Communist 
activities in China in 1946 and 1947, returned to this country from Shanghai a 
few months ago. It might be of interest to state that I heard a suggestion made 
in the Far East that the Powell return, coinciding as it did with the return of 
American POW's, was not merely by chance. Perhaps the present Powell 
assignment is to guide the activities of the so-called progressives among the 
POW's. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 101 

I think it important to call attention to another minor technique developed 
bv the Communists in Asia. The American who speaks a native language— the 
son of missionary parents born in China, for instance-has always been the 
special target of the Communists. This has been especially true of Americans 
who speak fluent Chinese. Every effort is made to sell such Americans on the 
Communist point of view. The program began during the war and was directed 
at those of us employed by the Department of State or in the OWL 1 know trom 
nersonal experience that every effort was made to indoctrinate us for we were con- 
sidered -China experts" and thus would, according to the Communists, have wide 
influence in our Government and among the American people. It is my opinion 
that much of the indoctrination, much of the selling, was the function of the 
IPR As far as I was personally concerned the campaign even went so far as 
outright propositions to engage in questionable activities. This technique is 
still employed against the American Embassy official or the USIS employee who 
speaks Korean or Chinese. However, as far as I know, this danger has never 
been recognized by our authorities. , <. t 

The Communist techniques which I have mentioned may seem obvious .but 1 
do not believe the importance of these techniques has ever been recognized. The 
Communists have been so successful as to virtually paralyze American policy in 
Asia. Our friends in Asia are becoming more and more confused. They hear 
our oft repeated announcements of vigorous anti-Communist policy. Then they 
discover that no book in America can become a good seller if it is favorable to 
our friends. Thev hear us talk of stopping communism in Asia, then wonder why 
policy forbids aid to the 150,000 Nationalist guerrillas and regulars garrisoning 
the islands along the Communist-held China coast. They wonder at the honesty 
of American reporting when the leading news magazine in America reports one 
week that President Syngman Rhee has ruthlessly stamped out all opposition 
prior to the Korean national election, then read a few weeks later that the 
opposition, supposedly stamp*-d out, was such that Rhee could not get the ma- 
jority support he plead for. They cannot understand how an American colum- 
nist can come to Free China for 3 days, making no attempt to even visit the 
guerrilla held islands, and can then report to millions of Americans that there 
are no Nationalist guerrillas. It is particularly puzzling for the free peoples 
of Asia to note American preoccupation with Prime Minister Nehru, to realize 
that the great bulk of writing on Asia is favorable to a man who has done little 
in the way of reform for his own country and has blinded himself to the realities 
of communism. It is almost impossible to understand why a great succession 
of books and articles praising Communist land reform in China are eagerly read 
and accepted while the real land reform programs of Formosa and South Korea 
are ignored. Above all it is impossible to understand how the United States 
can promote a vast alliance in Asia and not include the Free Chinese and the 
South Koreans, the only effective anti-Communist fighting forces in the Far 
East. , ,. 

How can this situation in the Far East be remedied? I believe the ending 
of diplomatic relations with Communist nations would be the logical first step. 
We must somehow learn the totality of Communist plans, must realize that we are 
already engaged in a death struggle, that continued adherence to diplomatic 
form and nicety is senseless. 

I believe the great newspapers, news services, magazines and publishers of 
this country have a duty to set their houses in order, must be made to recognize 
the part they have unwittingly played in Communist successes. 

We must have better training and orientation among all who serve us overseas. 
In 1950 we had nearly 2.000 Americans attached to our hugh mission in South 
Korea. People were sent to Korea without the slightest training, without even 
a remote conception of the forces at work in Asia. There is still, even after 
the Korean war, little realistic orientation for the men and women who serve 
us in countries like Korea, Japan, and Free China. There is little understand- 
ing on the part of our authorities that a mere clerk or stenographer can be 
a person of immense importance, can either make friends or can make enemies 
for us, can unwittingly become a link in the chain of Communist conspiracy. 

There is little realization of the manner in which the Communists seize upon 
any disreputable American action to build their propaganda line that Americans 
are a brutal, corrupt, and money-mad people. There is for instance allegedly 
a vast prostitution ring in operation in Okinawa with 15- and 16-year-old girls 
brought into Okinawa from outlying islands to service American soldiers. It 
has been reported to me that some of the American Army personnel are supposed 



102 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

sue*? 'aTjfVlnuf-^^''''''^'r «f,t^is."ng. Indeed, it would be impossible for 
SUCH a ring to continue unless Americans are involved. This is the tvoe of 
ammunition he Communists need and use to discredit us ;bu I have been 
informed that the true situation is that the Army has made no effort to stamn 
out the prostitution business in Okinawa. ^ 

f^r.V'm?'^^'^ States must even be careful of the manner in which its officials 
npr ^^^V-T l'""^' ?°' ^'^^ '^^^"^ ^« g"«t for the Communist mill. The man 
ner m which American personnel lived in Korea in 1950-free houses free 
f4fn u.e'r?bf th/p'^'^''^' ^^« ^^^vants for a long period-was time and time 
rfl J V^"" Communists to prove their contentions about us. And at the 

risk of soundmg prudish, I might say that the heavy drinking, cocktail type 

hiZ^f^nTT^^^^^-^l *^" ^'^^^ Department abroad does not ?n any way 
help us in our fight against communism. 

Finally I believe the best possible orientation for Americans who ar^ to 
serve m this crisis in the Far East, whether they be dip omits poinT 4 experts 
or newspapermen, would be a refresher course in American histo^v A, S^«!.l' 
are justifiably proud of the real democracy we hfve dTve^oned But that v^rv 
pride is used against us by the CommuniL. InsMiSy thev n^hit ou IS 
Syngman Rhee or Chiang Kai-shek does not allow this or that ^ But how man v 
of us realize that our own democracy did not develop overnlo-ht^ TheTiberak 
in this country often point out that some (they say mLy) of Chi-in- Ka^^S^^ 
fhaTfh' T'' ^"^^^'^^^t, that quartermaster LrLTere sold bv the genera s^ 

r'.Zr't^rZll7Z^Z^^^^^^^ ^-- -em to Z'l.TZZri^l 

peJLS wTwere iW^'? ''"^ ^'^'' "^.V ^^^'"^'^ ^^^^^ ^o understand how im- 
perrect we weie just 75 years ago. Much of the Far East is emero^ino- «fni 

ZZ ??„.^^^^^^e Ages. We cannot expect countrferw th tremSus nrob 



[From the Topeka (Kans.) State Journal, November 26, 1953] 

Disillusioned Asia Needs Honest Books 

(By John Caldwell) 

Mr Caldwell, author of "The Korea Story" and "China Coast 
Family" is a tormer State Department oflicial He was Cn on the 
China coast-son of a missionary-speaks the Chinese dialects 
spoken on Formosa. He also speaks Korean. His present reoors 
from the Far East have special value because he can commScatI 

Zni ^?T^ ]"" ?^K language. His China Coast FamilyTs a Sor 
book club selection for December. major 

Tokyo.— The old folks are slow to alter their wavs in this mrt nf th« w^.i^ 

seems no out, no peace in sight, no future' worth wlitiSg'o 'preparing for "^ '^''' 
on ?ho ^"'r''*! ''''■^ 9'"^'' ^^ ^ense the cultural vicuum, quick to capitalize 

Nowhere than among Japan's book stores can one see better how the Commn' 
rp.Sn^'fi''"'''''.^^t''7 -e vacuum. The Communistl havf opened thS first 
lending library in Tokyo. Communist books, both hard-backed and inexnensive 
editions, are available throughout Japan. Prices are tailored t^fit the nnrW 
book; in a student district handsomely bound books from Tuss a can be bou^; 

neLSbSod- n^^'-T' '"'^ ^".^ '''' '''• - «^ 3 times as much in a welRo'do 
neighboihood U. S. News magazine reports that 2 big books The Works of T 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 103 

It has become fashionable for American reporters to blame this interest in 
Russia and our own propaganda failures either on Senator Joe McCarthy or on 
the fact that funds for State Department libraries have been cut. This is utter 
nonsense. State Department libraries have never reached the mass of people. 
The choice of books available has been such as to provide an understandable 
answer to the appeal of communism. 

The Russians, for instance, permit anyone to translate and market their 
books. The legalistic American Government frowns on any publication not in 
accordance with copyright laws. Little effort is made to push for translations 
into local languages. USIS libraries in Korea have never carried books in 
Korean and it seems never to have occurred to our Government that royalties in 
Korean Whan would be useless either to American author or publisher. 

It is the native student, returned from America, who most easily slips into 
Asia's cultural vacuum. This student comes back suddenly to the squalor of 
Korea after living in America for a year or two and enjoying our standard of 
living, viewing our legal processes, and our freedoms. He finds it difficult to 
make a living, ofttimes impossible to put his learning into practice. I talked to one 
such bitter, disillusioned, drifting student. He made a request that would shock 
the Department of State. "Can't you send me an honest history of America?" 
he asked. "I know that democracy did not develop overnight. I know you 
have had your problems, your corruption, your civil war. If we Koreans could 
read your history as it actually developed we would not expect miracles here, 
vpe would be more patient." 

When will we Americans realize that democracy cannot develop overnight, 
especially in countries torn by subversion and war? When will we realize that 
most of the world does not read English? When will we understand that what 
many Asiatics need is not a bright, beautifully illustrated story of America 
at its best but an honest story of our struggles before we became as we are — 
and one that admits that we are still far from perfect. 

Instead of blaming Joe McCarthy and Congress, it might be well to remem- 
ber an old Korean proverb that says : 

"When a man slips and falls into the river it is foolish to blame the river." 



[From the Shanghai Evening Post, Shanghai, Monday, January 27, 1947] 

U. S. S. R. Hit fok Anti-United States Trend Here 

(By Paul Harrison) 

Washington, Jan. 26. — Russian propaganda in the Far East, directed chiefly 
against the United States, is mainly responsible for the mounting anti-American 
feeling, the State Department was informed today. 

John C. Caldwell, United States public affairs officer in Shanghai, has re- 
ported to the State Department that the Soviet radio stations, newspapers, and 
books are bitterly attacking the United States in China as well as in Eastern 
Europe. 

Caldwell said that the Russians maintain a radio station in Shanghai which 
anounces itself as the "Voice of the Soviet Union," despite the Chinese Govern- 
ment's ban on foreign stations. 

PROGRAMS SLANDEROUS 

"I have listened to some of its news programs and they are very slanderous. 
Attacks against American activity in the United Nations, against our occupation 
policies in Germany and Japan, and intervention in China are common," Cald- 
well declared. 

The American public affairs officer said that he had recently talked to an 
American woman who had returned from Tenan. He said : "She tells me that 
the anti-American campaign there has been vigorous, with lurid posters depicting 
GI rape, murder, and robbery in dozens of ways." 

FOR HONGKONG BY SHIP SATURDAY 

Caldwell reported that although the United States, Britain, France, and 
Australia as well as Russia have information offices in Shanghai, the Russians 
are carrying on the most active program. 



104 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

He said tliat the Russians are publishing four newspapers and that, in addition 
tJiere are half a dozen Russian-owned liookstores and publishers in Shanghai. 

INTELLECTUAL "SHOPPING" 

Caldwell said that the Chinese youth is tremendously interested in the United 
fetates, but they are also interested in Russia, and they are doing lots of intellect- 
ual shopping around. 

Caldwell warned that the United States officials need better teamwork be- 
tween the information and the diplomatic services. 



[From the Pontiac Press, Friday, December 18, 1953] 

GI's Help Cake fok Korea's Homeless, Maimed Childeen 

(By John C.Caldwell) 

John C. Caldwell, author of The Korean Story, former State 
Department official, tells how American GI's are winning the friend- 
ship of the Korean people through their aid to children left home- 
less or maimed in the Korean war. 

Seoul.— The American GI has done many things for which he has never 
received credit. He makes news only when something bad can be pinned on him 
tor instance, he can be accused of creating Korea's huge army of "U N 
madames"; he has fathered many an illegitimate child, for whom there is 
also a new phrase in the Far East : "U. N. Baby" ; he is not always a good 
ambassador tor America. 

But the other day in Suwon, south of Seoul, I visited a hospital, 1 of the 4 
serving a population of over 2 million. It wasn't much of a hospital, to be sure 
But what there was of it was in operation because the men of an Engineering 
Service Battalion nearby had presented the hospital wath a gift of $5 300 

In the same city there is a Children's Nutritional Center— built with an $8,000 
gift from the men of a nearby airbase. 

Nowhere is there a better indication of American Army generosity Nowhere 
can be found a lietter answer to Communist charges of germ warfare. I refer to 
the Severance Hospital in Seoul. 

In this American missionary hospital there is a project for the amputees of 
Korea. It began because of the compassion of an American general It has 
developed because of the generosity of thousands of American soldiers It is 
efhciently administered by American nurses, doctors, missionaries of numerous 
faiths and creeds. 

Gen. Paul Kendall, commanding general of the United Nations I Corps, one 
day saw a Korean child, both arms blown off bv a mine. He was disturbed 
by the sight, especially since he knew many others had suffered similar wounds 

General Kendall sent word down through division, battalion, and regiment 
asking donations to help the child amputees of his command area. The response 
was startling ; a total of $70,000 was raised in short order. 

Today the $76,000 has grown to $81,000 and is held in trust in a New York 
bank. The money is spent in Korea by an interreligious board made un of 
Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Seventh-Day Adventist missionaries'and 
two Army officers. Actual operations are centered in Severance Hospital 
There children and adults receive the surgery necessary before artificial legs 
and hooks can be fitted. Then they are trained in the use of artificial limbs 

When this training is completed, the patients old enough to work are taught 
a trade in which their artificial limbs will not handicap them 

There are 22,000 amputees in Korea. Through the magnificent I Corps project 
and the Korea Amputee Service with which it is affiliated, the amputees of the 
land will be spared a life of beggary. 

I w^as standing in front of Severance Hospital with Paul Kingsbury young 
Presbyterian missionary in charge of making artificial limbs, when a Korean 
boy m his teens rode up on a bike. He nimbly dismounted and walked into 
the building. Kingsbury turned to me and said with pride, "There is one of 
our boys. AYe made his artificial legs ; we taught him to use the legs • we have 
taught him to make a living." 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 105 

Your correspondent is probably not well versed in psychological warfare. 
But it would seem to me that this story, the many other stories of GI generosity 
might well be told in the United Nations, might very well be broadcast to the 
world by the Voice of America, 



[From the Roanoke (Va.) Times, December 8, 1953] 

Who Writes for America? 

By John C. Caldwell 

Mr. Caldwell, author of the Korea Story and China Coast 
Family, is a former State Department official. He was born on the 
China coast, son of missionary, speaks the Chinese dialects spoken 
on Formosa He also speaks Korean. His present reports from 
the Far East have special value because he can communicate with 
locals in their language. His China Coast Family is a major book 
club selection for December. 

Korea. — Robert Sherrod, writing in the Saturday Evening Post, recently stated 
that all the Far East distrusts American morality because of our use of the 
atom bomb. This statement ranks right along with another, commonly seen in 
our better publications. It is the statement that American prestige has suf- 
fered a great blow because of the activities of Senator Joe McCarthy. 

Sherrod may be speaking for Mr. Nehru but not for the rest of Asia. Re- 
cently I have talked to hundreds of people in Korea and Formosa in their 
native languages, and also in Japan. Only one man, of his own accord, brought 
up the subject of McCarthy. This man was bitterly critical. He was also 
scathing of Syngman Rhee. He proudly announced that he was a neutralist. 

The American correspondent who reports that the Far East is suspicious of 
us because of our use of the A-bomb or because of Senator McCarthy is simply 
not reporting all the facts. 

There is in every country a thin layer of intellectuals who make such state- 
ments. Generally these same people advocate trade with Red China, recogni- 
tion for the Chinese Communists, and their speedy seating in the United Nations. 
Many belong to that bewildered new group who call themselves neutralists. 

The writings of some American correspondents are bewildering to many 
orientals. A biased reporter can usually find some facts to bolster his views. 
There are bitter and dissatisfied people everywhere. 

But to many orientals it seems that Americans should attempt to get all the 
facts from people representing all groups before risking generalizations. 

I did not find a single oriental who had lost faith in our morality because we 
have used or might use the A-bomb. Indeed, I found the opposite to be true. 
Perhaps this was best expressed by an educated Korean who said : "My wife and 
I are without much hope. For our children there is hope for we expect to get 
them to America. For us, maybe 5 more years, or perhaps 10. Then all will be 
lost unless you are willing to use your atomic strength, unless you realize that it 
is strength alone that the other side understands. 

The orientals are realistic, and in their eyes it is not immoral to use maximum 
strength against an enemy. For them death by machinegun or conventional 
bombs is equally permanent. And as one Korean, working in an orphanage where 
152 children were burned to death by jellied gasoline bombs (dropped from 
American planes) pointed out, "there are deaths more painful than death from 
an A-bomb. At least that is instantaneous." 

There is a tremendous need for honest reporting from the Far East, as difiicult 
as that is to accomplish. The shallow judgments of many correspondents was 
expressed for me one morning at breakfast in the Eighth Army correspondents' 
billet in Seoul. 

A reporter for one of America's largest news agencies had his solution for all 
our problems in the Far East. 

"What the Far East needs," said my breakfast companion, "is three good heart 
attacks : one for Chiang Kai-shek, one for Mme. Chiang, one for Syngman Rhee." 

It is time we began to answer the questions: Who speaks for America? Who 
writes for America? 

47769—54 — pt. 2 5 



106 



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STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 107 

Mr. Areks. Kindly, in an extemporaneous manner, summarize here 
the high points of this testimony which has now been inserted in the 
record. 

Mr. Caldwell. Let me state tirst, as I did in my statement, that the 
brain washing, the germ warfare charges, the things that have come 
up within the Last few months, the last year and a half, are not, as many 
Americans seem to think, new techniques and new strategies. 

As I have watched the Connnunist strategy in the Far East, it has 
become apparent to me that their one aim is paramount, and that is to 
discredit by every means possible the American soldier. I think that 
is an important thing because it shows a basic underlying fear of 
American intervention. 

Now, beginning in 1945 and 1946, this campaign started, directed 
first against the United States marines in north China, against the 
military police detachment in Shanghai, accusing Americans of all 
sorts of brutality, of rape, of robbery ; and the germ warfare charges 
are the outgrowth actually of this whole aim to try to discredit Ameri- 
cans abroad. 

Now, I think that we often, through our own magazines and news- 
papers, help the Communists a greal deal in that very point. I men- 
tioned in my statement the fact, for instance, that a national magazine 
last year, I believe it was, had a feature story claiming that there were 
over 100,000 illegitimate GI babies in Japan alone. That sort of thing 
is grist for the Communist mill. 

It turns out that the Japanese Government itself has been able 
to locate less than 4,000. So you can see how uninformed reporting 
can have a bearing, can actually help the Communists in their efforts. 

Now, the second paramount aim, and one that has been terribly 
successful, has been the program to discredit the people who must 
be our allies in Asia. By that I mean the Chiang Kai-sheks and 
Syngman Rhees. This program has succeeded to such a degi'ee that 
today there are only a handful of magazines in America that will 
even think of taking a pro-Chiang or pro-Nationalist story. The 
prejudice is so tremendous that you find practically all of our cor- 
respondents in the Far East steeped in the prejudice. If they do go 
to Formosa, if they go to free China, they have no inclination to get 
at the truth, because they have so much prejudice. 

The Chairman. Didn't the tempo for that propaganda originally 
come out of our State Department when they tried to sell the fact 
that the Communists were just agrarian reformers? 

Mr. Caldwell. That was the beginning. Since then the idea has 
been to try to make us believe, playing on our own belief in democracy, 
that the Chiangs and the Rhees are not democrats because they do 
not have democracy as we see it, not taking into consideration the 
tremendous economic factors these leaders face, the factors of active 
internal rebellion going on which we do not have in this country. 

Now I find the progi'am is beginning to be directed against other 
countries. I have a copy here of a little magazine that I like. It is 
a liberal magazine that is normally very good, the New Leader. They 
have a feature story on corrupt fascism in Thailand. The Thai Gov- 
ernment is raked over the coals. It would be my guesss that we 
would soon be hearing that President Magsaysay is not a good man. 



108 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

It is all part of the program to prejudice the public opinion against 
the leaders in Asia who have been stanchly anti-Communist. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have any opinion respecting modes by which 
American officials in the Far East have been subjected to this slant- 
ing of views by people who are Communists or under Communist 
discipline ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir ; I do. There were two very powerful per- 
sonalities in the early days right after the end of the war, Chinese 
Communists, one youno; lady by the name of Kung Peng, another a 
Chinese gentleman by the name of Huang Hua. Both of these people 
were attractive. They were intelligent. They spoke good English 
and they had nice personalities, and they became almost the major 
sources of news as far as our Government or our correspondents were 
concerned in 1946. 

As an example of how important Miss Kung Peng was, I made a 
trip to the Far East in Januaiy of 1946 for the State Department. 
I arrived in Chungking late in the afternoon. Chungking was still 
the capital. I was whisked immediately to Miss Kung PengV apart- 
ment for a dinner which was attended by various State Department 
people. The idea seemed to be that she was very important as a source 
of news and that I should immediately get her side of things. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Welker is in 
attendance at the hearing. 

Mr. Caldwell. I mentioned that when I went to Chungking, I was 
immediately whisked over to Miss Kung Peng's apartment. Then 
I went to Pieping on that same trip, Huang Hua was considered of 
such importance that I had a dinner set up with him by a State De- 
partment local personnel. I think it interesting to note that both of 
these characters who had so much to do witli getting news out to us 
back in '45 and '46 are now at Geneva. Huang Hua was at Pan- 
munjom playing a very important background part in the negotia- 
tions there. 

The Chairman. Who was at these dinners, if you will recall? 

Mr. Caldwell. I don't recall the Peiping one, but at the Chungking 
one I recall was Mrs. Wilma Fairbank who was our cultural attache 
at that time and Mr. John Melby who was our first or second secretary. 
I forget his title. 

Senator Welker. You said cultural attache. Wliat duties does 
that embrace ? 

Mr. Caldwell. The cultural attache had charge of our libraries, 
our exchange of student programs, visiting directories for the United 
States, and things of that kind. 

The Chairman. Do you recall anyone else at that dinner? 

Mr. Caldwell. Those are the only two I recall. 

The Chairman. How many other people were in attendance ? 

Mr. Caldwell. There were a couple of other Communist func- 
tionaries ; I think, but I am not sure, that Chou En Lai was present. 
He was often present during those days. Again he was a suave gen- 
tleman, witty and intelligent, and was considered a source of accurate 
news by some of our own people. 

Mr. Arens. Is it your testimony that these two Communist agents 
and others were a source of news and a source of information for the 
American officials who were in China representing our Government? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 109 

Mr. Caldwell. Very definitely. 

The Chairman. And also for news reporters'? 

Mr, Cald-wtsll. Also news reporters. 

Senator Welker. ]\Iay I have the question? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Upon what facts do yon base that, Mr. Witness, 
can you tell us ? 

The Chairman. He gave us the background earlier, Senator. He 
was with the State Department during this period of time. 

Senator Welker. Did he see anything of this ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. You saw the news releases come out? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Did you know a man by the name of William Powell, 
former OWI official in China? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. I have known him, for I would say, 10, 12 
years. 

Mr. Arexs. Wliat did he do in China and who is he ? 

Mr. Caldwell. He was the son of a very well-known American 
newspaperman in Shanghai, a very fine man who was imprisoned by 
the Japanese, who was the very best type of American. And William 
Powell's son went into the OWI in 1943, in charge, I believe, of our 
news branch. He was transferred to the State Department and in 
the Executive order at the end of the war, stayed only a short time, 
and then returned to Shanghai to start his father's paper, called the 
China Review. 

Now, I met him several times since the war. When the Communists 
took over Shangliai lie stayed on, much to my surprise and the sur- 
prise of others who knew him. His magazine immediately^ became 
a violently anti-American magazine, a mouthpiece of the Communists, 
and I have gotten access to a few copies as an illustration of the type 
of thing that he has done. 

This particular issue is devoted to American atrocities in Korea, 
a typical caption, a picture of a mass grave. The caption states that 
this is a picture of the approximately 10,000 Korean civilians who 
were murdered at the town of Hawon by American troops during the 
occupation. Mr. Powell also began in the latter part of 1951 to issue 
lists of American prisoners in his magazine, with the hometowns, and 
the magazines, I found as I traveled around the country in the last 2 or 
3 years, were mailed to these parents as a method of getting Commu- 
nist propaganda before them. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may the record show that the 
task force that you assigned me to has that information in a record 
of a prior hearing. 

The Chairman. Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Caldwell. 

Mr. Caldw^ell. Shall I go on with this ? 

Senator Welker. I just want to make that observation. 

Mr. Caldwell. Mr. Powell returned suddenly to this country last 
August, I believe, and I heard suggestions on my trips to the Far 
East that his return coincided with the return of our few progressive 
prisoners, perhaps for a reason, perhaps to guide the activities of those 
progressives. 



110 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Now, Mr. Powell was in Peiping, we know, some time clnrin<^ the 
summer of last year, and it is apparent that he has talked to some of 
the prisoners in north China. 

Mr. Arens. While you were in the Far East as Director of the In- 
formation Service, did you have occasion on which the so-called 
China experts from the State Department were sent to the Far East 
to indoctrinate you and others in what the line should be ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I think there was more indoctrination here in Wash- 
ington than there was actually in the Far East. Now, there was a 
vigorous, of course very vigorous, anti-Chiang, pro-Communist group 
in our foreign service in China w^ithout question, l^ut there was a great 
deal of indoctrination which actually started here before the war ended. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat was the line ? 

Mr. Caldwell. The line? I remember particularly two cases of 
two downed American B-29 pilots. You may remember that there 
was a period when we bombed Japan from a base in western Cliina, and 
these pilots were brought to the State Department and OWI far 
eastern meetings to discuss and describe how they were saved by the 
Communists, by the magnificent resistance work by the Chinese Com- 
munists, and I would say that that indoctrination was done in that 
way to try to show us that the Communists were actually helping more . 
than the other side; that they were fighting more real battles. I re- 
member those two incidents in particular, which I attended. 

Mr. Arens. Did you have contact with the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in the Far East, or did you have occasion to observe its 
operations ? 

Mr. Caldwell. You couldn't be in the OWI or State Department 
in that period and not have contact with the IPR. It was imposible. 

The CiL\iRMAN. Wliat do you mean by that, Mr. Caldwell? 

Mr. Caldwell. To give you an example of what I mean, in 1943 
and 1944, when OWI employees for the Far East, particularly for 
China, were employed, we were brought liere to Washington from the 
New York overseas office for orientation, and the orientation consisted 
of your seeing two people. The two people were Mr. Laughlin Currie 
and Mr. Owen Lattimore, only the two. From those people we were 
to get our basic philosophy, you might say. I must be fair and say 
that I can't remember that Mr. Lattimore gave me any bad philosophy 
at the time, but I was very naive, as most of us were. We thought in 
terms of the war in which we had one enemy which was the Japanese, 
and were enlisting to fight that enemy and only that enemy. 

There was another way in wliich the IPR had a great bearing on 
most of our work. That was that it completely controlled all Far 
Eastern activities of the OWI to tlie State Department, to the branch 
chiefs, and later officials who were formerly IPR members, and I 
could list several of those to give you an example. 

The Chairman. Would you list them? 

Mr. Caldwell. The China Radio Branch in San Francisco was 
headed by an IPR man. The Philippine Branch was headed by an 
IPR woman. The Indochina Branch was headed by an IPR person. 
The China Branch was headed by an IPR person. 

At the time the coordinator for the Far East was an IPR person. 
The coordinator in the New York office in charge of Security in the 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM HI 

New York office for the far eastern branches was an IPR person. 
Those are things that come to me immediately. 

Mr. Arens. Now, on the basis of your experience in the Far East, 
Mr. Caldwell, can you help the committee by giving an appraisal of 
the method of operation which is in vogue now by our Government 
representatives in the Far East in undertaking to win friends and 
influence people i 

Mr. Caldwell. I think there is great improvement in what we are 
doing in the Far East. There is still, to my mind, much too little 
coordination, say, between what is happening in Kora and what is 
happening in China. To give an example of that, in Formosa we 
have an excellent United States information service at the present 
time. It puts out some outstanding publications in Chinese. 

Now, those publications would have been extremely valuable with 
the Chinese POWs in Korea, but those publications were never sent 
to Korea. There was no liaison between what we were doing in free 
China and wliat we were trying to do with the Chinese business. 

I think we still rely too much on radio as far as the Chinese on the 
mainland are concerned. We do too little in exploiting the tremendous 
possibilities of getting propaganda into the China coast. 

Mr. Arens. Now, Mr. Caldwell, on the basis of your background 
and experience, what would your appraisal be of a course of action 
that this Government should take to sever diplomatic relations with 
all Communist-controlled governments and to propose a conference of 
the free nations of the world to destroy the Communist fifth column 
and to resist Communist aggression ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I feel very strongly that severance of diplomatic 
relations would be an important step because perhaps then we could 
make people understand the totality of this conspiracy against us. 

Mr. Arexs. What do you mean by that ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I mean by that that today still too many people 
cannot understand that we are actually at war, that the final aim of 
communism is our destruction because we are the only powerful force 
that stands in their way ; that as long as we go on in a quasi-peaceful 
situation, we can't perhaps correct some of these feelings that I have 
listed in my statement; that if we could somehow show people that 
we are in the state of hostility with the Communist world, that normal 
diplomatic relations are not only injurious but are broken off, then 
we could gain slowly the realization we need to really gird ourselves 
for the battle ahead. 

Mr. Arens. To what extent did the Communist espionage propa- 
ganda and political subversion center in the diplomatic and/or semi- 
diplomatic establishments throughout the Far East with which you 
were in contact ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I think the extent of the native infiltration has never 
been fully realized. By that I mean that every diplomatic establish- 
ment must have a large number of Chinese personnel in China, Koreans 
if in Korea. It is my belief that the United States Information Serv- 
ice was a particular target, for several reasons, of propagandists. 
Propaganda is important. Our own propaganda is important to the 
Communists. Also the USIS in most places is an organization which 
helps and guides American correspondents who are visiting. 



112 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Now, to show that I am not trying to blame others alone, I would 
like to mention one unit of my own in Korea of 18 people that I hired 
myself, whose employment I approved. I was able to check on all 
18 of those. After the war I found that seven had gone over to the 
other side. Of those 7, I would say, 5 were real Communists and 2 
were opportunists or people who couldn't get out of Seoul in time 
and did what they did to eat. That is a pretty high percentage, I 
think one of the things we should have done is to have made a study 
of all our personnel in Korea. It could have been done, could still 
perhaps be done, to find out just what the total percentage of actual 
Communists was. 

We had a total of between 3,000 and 5,000 Korean employees in our 
mission in Korea. In that vast number of people there was tremen- 
dous opportunity for infiltration, and you can't run a security check 
on a Korean or a Chinese. They have lived in perhaps 40 difi'erent 
places in 5 years. It is a difficult job. 

I do not blame us for having failed somewhat, but I don't think 
we have been careful enough to realize that certain units of our estab- 
lishments are targets for infiltration. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, could I have a question to clarify 
something that I may have misunderstood ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Prior to the last answer, did I understand you 
to say that it would be proper that we let the world know that we were 
at war with the Communist conspii-acy rather than to adopt the at- 
titude of quasi-peace and containment with them ? 

Mr. Caldwell. By war I do not mean that we should declare a 
war. 

Senator Welker. Well now, what did you mean ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I mean that we should realize that the continuance 
of diplomatic relations is an unrealistic attitude at the present time. 
It gives the Communists a chance at espionage that they would not 
liave otherwise, and I think it also tends to becloud the issues of com- 
munism here at home, that people do not realize, cannot understand 
that the Communists are, speaking very simply, out after us, that their 
primary aim is the "defeat of imperialistic America." 

Senator Welker. Now, Mr. Caldwell, this digresses for a moment, 
but I think it is along the line you have suggested. Do you think it 
is good psychology for the United States Government to sell a Czecho- 
slovakian steel mill to a dictatorship that has trade alliances, trade 
agreements with Russia and all her satellites, knowing well that at 
this moment Russia and the satellites have trade missions in this coun- 
try to which they would propose to ship this steel mill. Do you think 
that is good psychology? 

Mr. Caldwell. Absolutely not. I think it is ridiculous to think 
that we can trade in any way with the enemy we face. May I digress 
there a moment and say that I was able to get through Chinese and 
American sources an exact count of the number of ships that attempted 
to enter or did enter Communists ports on the China coast during the 
month of November. 

Mr. Arens. During what year? 

The Chairman. Yes, what year, Mr. Caldwell ? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 113 

Mr. Caldavell. This last year. I was there in December. I do not 
have my notes here, but I believe it was 69. Of those figures 69,_ all 
but 4 were British. The four that were not British were Norwegian. 
Some of those ships carried undoubtedly nonstrategic materials, but 
one of them that was stopped had over 5,000 tons of antibiotics, strep- 
tomycin, penicillin. I saw part of the cargo of another which had 
army blankets, blankets cut in the army style, delivered to the coast of 
China in the dead of winter. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Johnston is in 
attendance at this hearing. 

Senator Welker. Now, Mr. Caldwell, if the chairman will permit 
me, what were some of these nonstrategic materials in the other boats? 
Would it be food, or buttons, or what ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Food. Often as prosaic items as soap, a good deal 
of soap. Consumers goods. Fruit goes in. Normally the Chinese 
Nationalists do not even attempt to stop a ship unless they have some 
intelligence to the effect that it does have strategic goods. So often 
you cannot tell what is in the cargo. They try to check from Hong 
Kong. 

Senator Welker. Food would be a little strategic, would it not, if an 
army were starving ? 

Mr. Cald"\\tsll. I think if you are realistic you should say that 
almost any item that goes into Communist China is strategic. 

The Chinese Communists are having a desperate time economically 
right now. Obviously if we cut off everything their situation would 
be worsened, and to me, it is an important part of the cold war to make 
that situation as bad as we can. It weakens them and keeps them from 
getting that final stranglehold which will keep us from ever getting 
them out. 

Mr. Arens. After you returned to the United States, did you have 
an opportunity to appraise all the publications in the United States, 
books and magazines and articles on the Far East ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. What is your comment or observation on that? 

Mr. Caldweli,. There is one indication that I think shows the sit- 
uation, and that is the Library Journal which is, you might say, more 
or less the organ of American libraries. It is not official. I made a 
compilation of the recommendations it makes on books on foreign 
affairs in general and on the Far East in particular. You will find 
almost invariably that a book favorable to, let's say, the Nationalists, 
or the Rhee point of view, is not recommended. Mr. James Burnham's 
book, the Web of Subversion, which dealt a good deal with the work 
of this committee, had a fiat statement, "Not recommended." And 
you find that pattern runs all through the books that are recommended 
"to American libraries. 

Mr. Arens. That is a kind of bible of books in this country ? 

Mr. Caldwell. That is a good way of putting it. 

Mr. Arens. It is the Journal which is the authority on which books 
are good and what books are not good, is that correct, in its simplest 
form? 

Mr. Caldwell. That is correct. 

Mr. Arens. And your testimony is that this Journal regularly, 
habitually recommends books, favorable to the pro-Communist ele- 

47769—54 — ^pt. 2 6 



114 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

ment and does not recommend books that are anti-Communist, is 
that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. I wouldn't go as far as to say that it recommends 
books that are pro-Communist. I think it is a little more devious 
than that. It does not recommend books that make an outright 
attack, as Mr. Burnham did, on the Communist conspiracy. It does 
not recommend books which, like the book Formosa Beachhead, are 
favorable to Chiang Kai-shek. That was recently published. It 
does not even list books like that normally. 

Mr. Arens. Did you have an experience in which you checked on 
the Communist propaganda respecting the alleged target practice 
that the Marines were supposed to be engaging in on the Chinese ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes. That is a very interesting story because I 
think it illustrates two things. It illustrates the Communist technique 
of trying to degrade our own people, our soldiers, and it illustrates 
again how Americans can help in that technique. 

When I was Director of the USIS in China, I read in the Commu- 
nist paper a story that the United States Marines in north China 
were using Chinese peasants in target practice. This story was that 
they were bored and didn't have much to do so they would go out in 
the country and get a peasant and start him running and shoot him.- 
It was inconceivable to me that any American military unit — they 
are not always angels, let us agree — would ever do that kind of thing. 
I began to be very much disturbed when Americans in our own estab- 
lishment began to pass that story around, passing it around as the 
truth without checking of any type, and it became a very curt story 
all over China, so much so that I went to north Cliina myself to 
check and I found that the basis of the story was that near the city 
of Tientsin, near a target, a farmer had been hit by a stray bullet. 

From that the story had been exaggerated in the typical Commu- 
nist technique, helped along unfortunately by some Americans to the 
effect that we were using peasants as targets as a routine procedure. 

Senator Welker. Do you know the names of Americans who helped 
that propaganda along? 

Mr. CatjDwell. I do. I would rather give it just to the committee. 

The Chairman. That is the custom. 

Senator Johnston. Would you tell the committee whether or not 
they were giving it in good faith or trying to injure the United 
States? 

Mr. Caldwell. I would say both. I would say that undoubtedly 
when you have a situation like that there may have been one key per- 
son who was possibly a party member and then you have the many 
naive Americans who get no briefing of any type, to whom we still 
give no real indoctrination, the hundreds of people we send overseas, 
and I think that a gossip can do as much harm as a party member, 
a gossip who will not check on facts, who will not realize that this 
or that story is harmful to the policy of the United States. 

The Chairman. It is the policy of this committee not to reveal any 
names in public session, but would you be kind enough to give us the 
names of these people in executive session ? 

Mr. Caldwell. I certainly will. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 115 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Caldwell, I think our record should reflect more 
clearly the facts with reference to William Powell. Specifically, who 
is he? 

Mr. Caldwell. Specifically now, as far as I know, he is unemployed. 
I know nothing of his whereabouts or his activities. His correct 
name is, I believe, J. William Powell. It is on this masthead : John 
William Powell, editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review. 

Mr. Arens. That China Monthly Review clearly is a Communist 
publication? 

Mr. Caldw^ell. I don't see how anything could be more so. I thmk, 
but I am not sure, that it folded when he left last August. Whether 
it is still in existence, I do not know. 

Mr. Arens. He was formerly with the Office of War Information 
in China, is that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. That is correct. 

Mr. Arens. Over what period of time was he with the OWI in 
China? 

Mr. Caldwell. He was employed in 1943 in March. By Executive 
order on August 31, 1945, he was transferred to the State Department. 
I believe he resigned within 6 months to go back and start up the 
magazine again. 

Mr. Arens. Over what period of time was he with the magazine? 

Mr. Caldwell. From 194Y, I would say, or possibly 1946 until 
August of 1953. 

Mr. Arens. Wliere was he engaged then ? 

Mr. Caldwell. In Shanghai. 

Mr. Arens. Then he was .then editor until 1953 of this China Re- 
view, is that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. China Monthly Review. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Caldwell, do you have any information as 
to whether or not any of these documents, magazines, or pamphlets 
that you have before you and which you state are Communist propa- 
ganda reach the American shore, reach the United States in the form 
of propaganda ? 

Mr. Caldw-ell. Yes, sir. In Iowa during a lecture the year before 
the last I heard of two families that had received this publication 
here. Both of the families had sons, prisoners of the Chinese. I 
heard of one family in my own town, Nashville. I do not know what 
the name of that family was. The FBI told me of that family and 
of another family in Memphis. Those are four cases in which this 
magazine came through the mails, mailed in Hong Kong, and came 
to American families. 

Senator Welker. I have another observation. Senator Jenner had 
me on a task force, along with Mr. Arens, Mr. Duffy, and Mr. 
Schroeder, in New York a few weeks ago in which we had millions of 
pieces of literature similar to that before you that came into our coun- 
try and was freely distributed throughout our land. Now, based upon 
your experience, sir, what effect would that have in aiding the Com- 
munist conspiracy? 



116 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Caldwell. I think it has this effect : a family particularly that 
had a boy who was a prisoner is emotionally upset and worried. One 
of the main lines of these magazines is that we must have peace, that 
the Chinese Communists are really trying to have a square deal, and 
I think it works, that people are likely to write their Senators and 
Congressmen suggesting that we get out of the war. They are likely 
to become a little sympathetic to the Communist cause. 

Mr. Arens. Now, with reference to Mr. Powell again, we had him 
up to 1953 when he was editor of the China Review and I understood 
you to say that he resigned and returned to the United States ? 

Mr. Caldwell. That is correct. 

Mr. Aeens. What is the source of your information on the fact that 
he entered the country ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Time magazine. First I saw him just before I left 
and then, when I was in Japan last August, I inquired and talked to 
one correspondent, an American correspondent who had interviewed 
him on his way out of Hong Kong. 

Mr. Arens. Did he return as an American citizen or had he re- 
nounced his citizenship ? 

Mr. Caldwell. No, I don't believe he ever renounced his citizenship. 

Mr. Arens. What information do you have with respect to his 
wife? 

Mr. Caldwell. His wife was the leader of the pro-Communist 
American forces in Shanghai all throughout 1946, 1947, and 1948. 

Mr. Arens. Did she return with him ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, she did. 

Mr. Arens. I have one further question. With what groups was 
she identified in Shanghai? 

Mr. Caldwell. First with Madam Sun Yat-sen's relief organiza- 
tion. No, I believe she went out originally perhaps with UNRRA. I 
am not certain of that. She then became associated with Madam Sun 
Yat-sen's relief organization and, as you no doubt know Madame Sun 
has gone over to the Communists and is, I think, at the present time 
Minister of Cultural Enlightenment in the Communist Government. 
She was associated with Madam Sun for about 2 years. 

Mr. Arens. What would be your opinion, in your judgment of the 
rank and file of the people in the Far East as to what psychological 
impact there would be on their minds by severance of diplomatic 
relations. 

Mr. Caldwell. I think it would be extremely helpful as far as non- 
Communist Asia is concerned. By that I mean Korea, Philippines, 
Thailand, Free China. It might also be very helpful as far as Japan 
is concerned. Now, the Japanese are in a very serious economic situ- 
ation. They have to trade, and the logical trading area for them is 
Communist China. They have sent within the last year two trade 
missions to Communist China. But, on the other hand, they must 
rely on us and T think one effect might be that that desire to trade with 
Communist China would be lessened if we had no relations whatsoever 
with the Communist world. 

The Chairman. Certainly magazines such as you have referred to 
hers, like the China Review would be stopped as to propaganda and 
transmissibility if diplomatic relations were severed. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 117 

Mr. Caldwell. They could be barred, I assume, completely. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have information respecting the situation in 
the Philippines ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Very little. I haven't been there on recent trips. 

Mr. Arens. We have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. He has 
covered his testimony at length in his prepared statement. 

The Chairman. And that has been incorporated in the record. 

Do you have any questions. Senator Johnston ? 

Senator Johnston. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Do you have questions. Senator Welker ? 

Senator Welker. I have only this ob"Bervation, Mr. Chairman: If 
Mr. Caldwell would be gracious enough, I would like to see the pam- 
phlets, the Communist propaganda inserted not as a part of the record, 
but by reference, and included in this record. Is that all right with 
you? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir. That is fine. Senator. 

The Chairman. They may become so incorporated. 

Mr. Arens. The British have recognized both China and Formosa ; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Caldwell. It is a very curious situation which I think might 
be without precedent. They recognize Communist China but they 
keep one foot in the doorway and maintain a consulate in Free China. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have any appraisal to make with reference to 
the potential strength of Formosa as an ally of the United States? 

Mr. Caldwell. I have some very strong convictions on that point. 
I think the American people, as a part of the lack of fair information 
on free China, have never been told of the tremendous guerrilla forces 
already within striking distance of the China coast. The Nation- 
alists today hold 50 islands. They are islands all the way from small 
rocks to the island of Chinmen, which has approximately 75,000 excel- 
lently trained men. They have naval bases all along the coast which, 
if they were allowed to do so, could completely blockade the China 
coast. They are able to make raids at the present time almost at will, 
and I believe of special significance is the fact that on recent raids 
surrenders of Communist soldiers have run up to 50 percent, even to 
90 percent of the Communists engaged in that particular raid. 

In other words, the people are, I think, very much for them on the 
coast of China. They are not unrealistic enough to say that they 
can conquer China right now. They do believe they can take a bridge- 
head and maintain it. 

Mr. Arens. When you were head of the Information Service for 
our Government in China, what was the line then posed with reference 
to Chiang Kai-shek? 

Mr. Caldwell. The general line was that he was a very fine man 
personally but that his government was so completely corrupt it could 
only be saved by an infusion of fine, idealistic Communist blood, 

Mr. Arens. Wliat was the official line with reference to Syngman 
Khee? 

Mr. Caldwell. Rather a meandering line, I would say : that he was 
a necessary evil to be curtailed in every way possible. 

Senator Welker. May I have one question ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 



118 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Senator Welker. I take it from your testimony that should Chiang 
reestablish a beachhead, no matter how great, on the mainland, we 
would receive surrenders from the Red Chinese soldiers as well as the 
peasants and the people of China who seek freedom ? 

Mr. Caldwell. By "we" I assume, Senator, that you mean the 
ISJ ationalist Chinese ? 

Senator Welker. I mean that. I think that they should be called 
an ally of ours. 

Mr. Caldwell. I would say that 90 percent of the people south of 
the Yangtze will cooperate with the Nationalists. I would say par- 
ticularly of the so-called security divisions, the rate of surrender 
would run close to 50 percent. That is based on personal interroga- 
tions of hundreds of people in the mainland, and I might say that 
tlie State Department itself has reports from Hong Kong that cor- 
roborate my own findings. 

Senator Johnston. What position would Russia take then? 
Mr. Caldwell. I don't know that Russia would take any position 
other than to supply more arms. The general feeling of the people in 
the Far East on our side is that the Russians, being very realistic, 
will not at any time start a war with us unless they are certain that 
they can win with a knockout blow. That I would say is the feeling- 
of men like Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Rhee and the other leaders 
of free Asia. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question, Mr. Chairman ? 
The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Caldwell, I will ask you if it is not a fact that 
at one time you participated in that guerrilla raid from Formosa 
with the Nationalist Chinese to the mainland of China ? 
Mr. Caldwell. I participated in a gunboat raid. 
Senator Welker. Let us have a description of that, sir. 
Mr. Caldwell. I might say that a Chinese warship does not look 
like an American warship. There is a feeling as you go aboard that 
there is no discipline. There are 5 or G different types of uniforms. 
There is really always laundry hanging out on deck and always fresh 
cabbage all over the deck because they have no refrigeration. The 
object of these raids is to try to capture Connnunist shipping, and 
it is a rather tricky operation, because the gunboat has to try to get 
in toward the harbors which are pretty well defended with heavy 
artillery, and catch the boats before they are shot up by the artillery. 
On my particular raid, which took 1 day, we were only able to get 
one Communist ship, and 1 think it is significant that it turned out 
tJiat that Communist ship was a Chinese junk with a crew of about 
18 men or women who turned out to be com]3letely anti-Communist. 
They were extremely anxious to talk to me. They answered all of my 
questions. The only thing that they asked was not to be detained too 
long because they were afraid they would be spotted from the shore, 
and they assured me that in most of these smaller ships along the 
coast we would find that the crews were very anti- Communist, and 
that is borne out by the periodic mutinies which take place aboard 
the fairly large ships. The political commissar is shot and the ship 
brought to a Nationalist base. 

Another thing of interest that these crewmen told me was the 
extent of actual Russian participation in the national life of China 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 119 

today. They said they had come into Amoy; even in the town in 
which I was born, the town of Futsing, which has 20,000 population, 
there are today over a dozen Russian technicians. In other words, 
the Russians are infihrating right down almost to the village level, 
and have a very complete control of the economic life of China today. 

The Chairman. Mr. Caldwell, you will furnish to the staff the 
names earlier referred to ? 

Mr. Caldwell. Yes, sir; I will. 

The Chairman. We thank you for your appearance here today. 
It has given us very fine information on the picture of the Communist 
infiltration in the world today of the Communist conspiracy. 

(Thereupon, at 11:20 a. m., the hearing was recessed subject to 
call of the Chair. ) 



STEATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration 
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. AVilliam E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Jenner and Welker. 

Also present : Richard Arens, professional staff director ; Edward 
R. Duffy and Frank W. Schroeder. professional staff members. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Marcus, would you be sworn to testify ? 

Do you swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God ? 
Mr. Marcus. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF J. ANTHONY MAECUS, SCARSDALE, N. Y., PRESI- 
DENT, INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN TRADE 

The Chairman, Will you state your full name for our record, 
please ? 

Mr. Marcus. 'My name is J. Anthony Marcus. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside? 

Mr. Marcus. I reside at Scarsdale, N. Y. I am president of the 
Institute of Foreign Trade, with offices at 60 East 42d Street, New 
York City. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Arens, you may proceed. 

Mr. Marcus. Our organization is devoted to the proposition of 
helping American industrial firms, as well as exporters and importers, 
in international trade. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, you are also president of the Guardian 
Oil Co.? 

Mr. Marcus. That is correct, a producing company in Nebraslca. 

Mr. Arens. Before we proceed with our informal interrogation 
here with Mr. Marcus, ma}^ I respectfully suggest to the chairman 
that the record now reflect the prepared statement which you have 
submitted to the committee. 

Mr, Marcus, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and be incorporated as- 
a part of the record. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 

121 



122 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Statement of J. Anthony Marcus, President, Institute of Foreign Trade 

My name is J. Anthony Marcus, a resident of Scarsdale, N. Y Since 1946 
I have been president of the Institute of Foreign Trade, a private consulting 
'3f5 f"" American industrial and trading enterprises interested in international 
outlets for their prodiicts, with offices at 60 East 42d Street, New Yorli City 
Tn^"" /t^",, ^''^•f 'V?'"'^ ^ .''''^^ '^^^« ^^^^t^^ president of the Guardian Oil Co., 
Hes'nmi n?w^- ?'' / " ^^^^^^^ owns and operates petroleum-producing proper- 
ties and other oil and gas operations. » ^ f 

I was born and educated in Russia of prerevolutionary days. I came to this 
country shorly before the First World War as a lone immigint boy wfth thrS 
Engl.s^h words m my vocabulary and $14.28. Like millions of immTgrants S 

feel ?hnn;?r''' ^ ''^n' ''^}''''^^'^ by the generous American people and made 
to feel at home far more than in my native Russia. Within 5 years and 4 months 
after landing here I was a full-fledged member of the great American familv— 
^ " f 7^f t^,^.U»ited States. And thanks to the free^nstitutioL S IZrica. 
ngain. like millions of other immigrants, I have been able to rise from laborer 
m an iron and steel plant to responsible positions in various fields of endeavor 
v,-5f fhf^ 1?2^Vt"-^ "'^ outbreak of the Second World War I had occasion'to 
Msit the Soviet Union on numerous occasions as buver, seller, investigator and 
negotiator for some of our leading firms, such as the Studebaker Corp tSe 
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., the American Hair & Felt Co 

^ffin-nV^"^"^f v"*""^''* "^^, "' '^"^'''^t "'^th some of Russia's leading Government 
ofBciais. including men like the present Vice Prime Minister for Trade, Anastasv 
I. Mikoyan. I have witnessed the rise of the Kremlin criminals from economic 
industrial and military impotence to its present position of the only world 
imperialistic aggressor. In recent years, especially since early 1951, I have beeti 

jT^%^al\^T''^ ^^ ^^r^^r «*■ '^^ American Friends of Russian Freedom 
Inc.. 2^0 Park Avenue, New York City, where I am associated with such dS 
t.nguished ci izens as Gen. Frank L. Howley, our former commandant in Berlin • 
with Adm^ William S. Maxwell; Adm. William H. Standlev, our former Ambas 
sador m Russia; former Ambassador SpruiUe Braden ; the welH.nown anti- 
Commun,st author, Eugene Lyons ; the former national commander of thllmer- 
can Legion, Mr. James O'Neil ; Gen. William J. Donovan ; and many others Our 
aim Ls to help cement a bond of friendship with the Kremlin's victims in oi-der 

nr^^^J^e^ST ^^"-^'^^^ ^^ *'^ '^'''' ^^^"^-^- -^■^"- ^^ '^" 

1 have been lecturing throughout the country in an effort to enli-hten onr 

I S: of'"' X''''' T''^' '' '''' ^^^-^'^^^^^ '^^'^«t and its threat to Sir security 
I have also written extensively for some of our leading dailies and monthlies as 
we 1 as appeared before the microphone and on TV to warn our people about tS 
LX'sovS'nSitmarl ''"'' '^^'^^^^"^ '^^"^ ''''''' '' ^« ^'^-^ putting an enl 
I have been carrying on this persistent campaign alone and without any 
assistance from anyone. All of us former immigrants owe a great debt to our 
country, a debt which we can never repay in full. Now that oui- free nstitutio s 
fifle^d'^r^^ '•'' a savage enemy, we would be unworthy of our citizeSp if we 
failed to be m the forefront in the struggle with the implacable foe Un! 
fortunately, I must confess that there are entirelv too few of those everlastin- y 
indebted naturalized Americans who are exerting themselves in behalf of oiS 

idZZ.''}. '^'' "'^"''"^ ••'^'"'^^ "^ ""^ b^«^«^-^- Let us hope that the efforts of the 
httle band of us may inspire them to wake up to their responsibility 

east-west trade 

Of late there has been considerable commotion in the shrinking free world 
about Soviet plans to make large purchases in the West. Instelid of flvii 
saucers industrialists and merchants here and in Europe have beJn behold i^^ 
flying orders from the Kremlin running into the many billions of dollars Th'; 
excitment has been all the greater because for the first time shice its rise to 
power the Communists of the Kremlin are showing interest in consumer -oods 
from he capitalist countries they hate so much. This, of course fs new This s 
?een%r;!!"'' '^f '"^^' '"'^^"^ "^^o existence the SoWet Government had ne?e? 
seen fit to import consumer goods. Not because its subjects did not neec s" oes 
coats, underwear, hats, pots and pans, cutlery, furniture, and the i anVother 
■hZ^'^-JV'^V^"^ considered essential in civilized countries. Soviet subieJts 
have had to be content with rags on their backs, with hovels even a pig wo^ld 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COM]VIUNISM 123 

■scorn, with the coarsest of food in their stomachs at best or roots, potatoes, and 
adulterated bread for brealvfast, lunch, and dinner during the perennial Com- 
munist-made famines. This is the way the Lenin-Stalin pledges of a better life 
under so-called socialism have lieen fulfilled. They promised bread and have 
given perpetual hunger ; they promised peace and have given uninterrupted war 
at home and abroad ; they promised land to the peasants and have robbed them 
completely of their holdings, enslaving tens of millions and actually murdering 
millions for resisting the collectivization edicts ; they promised freedom from 
■oppression and exploitation and have established the most oppressive system of 
political-economic exploitation ever devised by the despots of human history. 

What is really behind this alleged Soviet interest in East-West trade? Of 
■c-ourso the need is great in the Soviet Union. But the need was much greater 
right after the Second World War and had been for decades when there were no 
satellite nations with a higher standard of living to be looted. For more than 
three decades the Soviet Government studiously denied its people the benefits of 
American and European consumer goods although it did not lack the means to 
pay with. A mere corner of its inexhaustible forests for timber and pulp exploi- 
tation by competent American hands, a mere fraction of its gold mined with tens 
of thousands of slave laborers could have paid for billions of dollars' worth of 
«uch purchases. On the basis of more than 80 years of intimate contact with 
the Soviet political, economic, and industrial life, I believe I know the answer 
to the riddle: 

First, the Soviet Government wants to buy samples, copy them, and claim 
them as its own creations. Second, and this is every important, to find out the 
t.vpes of oxir production machinery used in the consumer goods and system 
of mass production with a view to stealing our technology. The same pattern 
v\-as used to Soviet advantage in the heavy Industries prior to 1948. And, third, 
once mass production of consumer goods has been mastered to offer us ruinous 
competitio'i in world markets. With tens of millions of men, women, and chil- 
dren toiling in the factories under most inhuman exploitation, with other millions 
working as forced laliorers from predawn to past sunset in the numerous slave 
labor camps digging coal. iron, and other minerals supplving raw materials for 
the industries, it is not difficult to visualize the extent of ruinous competition it 
could offer us and other highly industrialized countries. That is intended not 
so much for the sake of profit as for the purpose of undermining our economy, 
to create unemployment here, and cause unrest. 

With our .sellers of con.sumer goods and production machinery unfamiliar 
with Soviet tactics, there is now much speculation concerning the vast Russian 
market. Some are dreaming aliout bigaer orders in the future — a future, alas, 
■which can never come to us. Our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. 
Arthur W. Radford, recently told 400 newspaper editors (April 15) that "due 
to the massive militant natiire" of the Communist threat the world was in a 
period of tension that could last a century. Anyone imagining that the Kremlin 
boys expect to live with us on this troubled globe for another century is deluding 
himself, and has yet to learn the true nature of the Kremlin beast. If they do 
half as well within the next 15 to 20 years as they have done during the past 15 
years, the final cla.sh will come within one-fifth of the time anticipated by 
Admiral Radford. 

Therefore, if we fall for the Soviet trade bait, if our western allies continue 
their present shortsighted course of trading with the enemy, the Soviets will 
know how to make the most of the upsurge of our wishful thinking. The ex- 
perience they had gained in stealing our industrial secrets in the heavy indus- 
tries will stand them in good stead and our technological know-how in the light 
industries will be theirs with little effort and without any cash outlays. The 
flood of our blueprints and shop drawings will once more find its way to Moscow, 
Leningrad, and other points. One day we will wake up to discover that we had 
sold our birthrisfht to the bitterest enemy for a mere mess of pottage. 

Trade with the Soviets has been and will remain a one-way street as long 
as the regime survives. Its survival is greatly enhanced by the diplomatic rela- 
tions which. the United States and the free nations foolishly continue to main- 
tain despite our distressinir experiences. Their inexorable goal is and must 
forever remain : New countries to conquer, more hundreds of millions of peo- 
ples to enslave with the aid of a cold war if possilde, a shooting war if need be 
whenever they are ready. They are not ready yet. Thev need another 10 years to 
master their own people and to entrench the Commimists in China and the satel- 
lite nations. Their prayer is a continuance of the "peredishka" — a breathing 
spell — and the gullible West is offering it to them on a golden platter. 



124 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Between the years 1945 and 1950 the Soviet Government was in mortnl fp«r 
Of a war with the civilized world, fear of its own people The wesLri^c^^^^^^ 
Russian experts proved so ignorant as to scare us with possible hostiMies If 
most any moine^U. That was working into the hands ot the enemy ' ^'' 

In the meantime the Lenin-Stalin-made hurricane keeps roarinir on while 
httle men in big posts in the Western World are wonderim'- whnt Jo do I, Jl V^ 
meet the Soviet challenge. Why do the leaders o?moieh1vntwo-tlurds of \^ 
^^orld tremble before a miserable little band of Red Fascistr^ t^n ' on an 

So^aiu'e '''"Th.;V-s''?.f '"• "^^'^"^x ^^ "« ^'^^■^'^^^^•" «a?d ShlkesS^-e "but 
i^^noiance. That s the answer! Ignorance of foreign offices in le-islnfivp 
branches of governments, among the educators and opinion SeVs and finallv 
Ignorance among the wide public is responsible for this s^ry s^)ec fcle in a 
Chris ban wor d possessed of a righteous cause but lacking in win to learn about 
T. rfo.''"'^ ^«"y^§"?/« «tand up to the frightened barbarians in the Krem?i^ 
moTfths'bv M?'H^f',i^'..*'^:""'^°^ ■-^^■^" '^^f^^^ ^ Senate committee in recent 

SStof East-Wesit need's'"'"' ^^J^"'! ^^^'^^^'^^^^ Administrator, on the 
suujecc or ii^st-west tiade. He argued that increased "nonstrate«ic" tV-idP h^ 
tween our European allies and the Communist bloc would '?arrv a net art 

ST.^uddenW r^'"-" J''' '"^^-^ '■'''' ^^^t -°^^ tie death of ^Staln' such 
t ade has suddenly become top priority with the Kremlin policymakers is con 

nn^l'^;?. ^^'' r'" '^\* '' ^-^ ^"^ the interest of the Comn un S greinSent ?hat 
once more they want to be rescued by the capitalist countriesTomThe wrath 

o'erthe^ronS-y%^''^* ^^ ^"^'^ '^'- ''^ ^^^^^^^ ^« '^'^^ ^-^ "sf nTm^Uer h^^ 
Ml- Stassen relieved himself o( another fallacy before the committee He 

goodV°t w","S™ JhL'"''','^.,*'' rr\r'T'' "> ^"™'-^ Hu-la wUbTo'n" r" teS 
gooas It would, as he said, hand to the Soviet rulers one of the most Dowerfnl 
cold-war weapons we could devise." How ridiculous ! Where do?s he .^et that 
nonsense? If we were to clamp down the completest and tigh?esT embark on- 
shipments of anything to the Soviet Union and the satellite mXons as weH as 
on all imports, the Russian peoples would bless us fo it if ?he Russian people 

^fv ffr^" ? '^V" "' ^'"'^^ t^^y ^^'^"1^^ ^^g ^^^ «" their knees nof to seS Sor to 
buy from their (Jovernment anything. They have suffered nrivitionsf in« fov 

ment^'tSh- Ivr'ii's'^TreT ''''' ^"^^^^ ^^^^^"^ as^twoll^^;;freir Govern- 
ment, then tyiants. The worse economic conditions become in the Soviet Union 

munLt regime! '""' ""'' '"^^''"*^" '''"^ "'^'^"^ ^^^^^'^^ -^^^ destroy the Com: 
The same is true of another baseless remark made by Mr. Stassen in his 
testimony when he said that East-West trade would help "maintahi tSe bas ? 
friendship of people behind the Iron Curtain." Why, Mr Cha rma the v erv 
opposite IS true. To follow Mr. Stassen's counsel wiU alienate the Sndship of 
fSn?nf '''•'' ^f ''''• ^^''''^ '^ "^^ ««^'i^t ^iti^ens, including high Government 
of hi ,. ■''^' T^'' were parading as Communists but at heart were bitter eneS 
of the i^gime, have said to me : "Why do you Americans come to this countr^ to 
deal with our Government? You are only enhancing its prestige ; you are tSen 
the noose around our necks." &c- , ,>uu aie ugnien- 



shm^ld h.fiTi?f telling Mr. Stassen the misleading balderdash above quoted 
should be fired from the Government services as an ignoramus. And anyone who 
accepts the counsel of such ignoramuses is himself imfit to hold a commanding 
position m our Government at such critical times. coiumanam^ 

If this East-West trading insanity is not choked off and more competent counsel 
listened to, Lenin\s interpretation of the capitalist mentality willT fulirrrne 
H.^M '''''^- 7^^^ ^^^^ t^^"' ^^^^^^- together for the rope/^ East-Wes? 
civmzat^on. "'" ''"^ ''"'"''' "'' '""^ ""'•" ^^^P '''^ the grave^f libeiTy and 

The picture is no brighter in the ranks of our businessmen. What for examnle 
IS one to say of the steel executive, Mr. Ernest T. Weir, who has beeirpreSS 
that our Government remove restrictions to "coexistence" with the Soviet head" 
hunters and, as he put it, "establish an atmosphere of agreement— a iSaxation of 
tension, a dissipation of the present suspicion and distrust"? The trouble wiS 
Mr. Weir IS that he has been addressing his preachment to the wrong party He- 
should address himself to the mummy in the Lenin mausoleum on Red Square 
Moscow If he does not know where to find the remains of the architect of the 
Soviet slave state-Lenin. It would be a waste of his time to counsel Malenkoy 
since he could not possibly change the teachings of the master and keep his head 
on his shoulders. Relax tension, establish an atmosphere of agreement between 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 125 

Communist regimes and sanity in the world, that is just as possible as to jump 
ofe the Empire State Building in New York and remain alive. The Soviets want 
more tension, more diagreement, and not less. They will never stop until either 
they or we are wiped off this earth. Mr. Weir would do well to change his ghost 

A-^ain Mr Chairman, what is one to think of a former Secretary of the Army 
fMr"^ Kenneth C Royall] who, in an address before the Advertising Club in New 
York some time ago, advocated free commercial intercourse with Communist 
China to create, as he put it. -direct contact with the Chinese people and com- 
mercial sources of imports and exports upon which China will come to depend"? 
Is it possible that the former Secretary is ignorant of the fact tliat one of the 
first °-oals of any Communist government is the total destruction of free domestic 
and forei^'n trade? The moment tlie Iron Curtain is rung down upon a country, 
there can be no direct contact by the citizens of that country with anyone in the 
free world, and the former producers, as well as exporters and importers, are 
either liquidated or forced into the bureaucracy to do as they are told by the 
Communist hierarchv. However, the former Cabinet officers did not keep us long 
in suspense as to tlie basic reason for his ignorance of Communist theory and 
practice. "Chinese communism," he assured his audience, "is not due to Russia, 
but rather to the groping of the Chinese people for some way out of their misery." 
Shades of the Institute of Pacific Relations fraternity which helped our Chinese 
fiasco by contending that Mao and his gangsters were not Communists at all ; 
that thev were only "agrarian reformers." 

How true is ]\Ir. i^oyall's statement V Practically every Communist leader in 
China, from Mao down, had been trained in revolutionary tactics, murder, in- 
trigue' espionage, and sabotage in the Communist schools of Russia. The Eastern 
and Lenin Universities in Moscow and similar schools in other parts of the Soviet 
Union have turned out countless thousands of Chinese revolutionary leaders since 
1918, at enormous cost to the Soviet treasury, but it has paid off handsomely. 
Without their assistance and leadership, the enslavement of China's million could 
not have taken place, and the same is true of all the satellite countries. 

For those who might still cling to the preposterous notions of men like Mr. 
Rovall, permit me to state that as early as 1926 there were about 2,000 trainees 
in the Sun Yat Sen University in Moscow preparing for the coming destruction 
of freedom and the enslavement of China as part and parcel of Lenin's plan to 
encircle the United States in order that it might fall, as he put it, "like an over- 
ripe fruit into our hands." By 1927 the Soviet Government was turning out no 
less than 5,000 trainees per year to do its bidding in the Far East, and a gullible 
world did not have tlie vision to take cognizance of it. 

In 1942, while we were straining every nerve to supply the Soviet Government 
with war materiel, while our sons were braving the submarine-infested waters 
of the North Sea trying to deliver the badly needed guns and ammunition, food, 
and medicine to the' Russian armies, the Soviet Government was already prepar- 
ing men to interrogate American and English prisoners of war. 

One equally looks in vain for greater intelligence and enlightenment among the 
British businessmen. Said one of their leading men in recent times : "While 
the Communists just now see every foreigner as a spy, there must eventually be 
-a stabilizing period. Then there will have to be higher trade and British ships 
to carry that trade — say, 2, 3, or 5 years ahead." Similar nonsense was peddled 
around' after the Russian Communists came to power. Before me is a clipping 
from the New York Times of August 14, 1920. On page 2 is a dispatch from 
Washington quoting the American Ambassador in Petrograd, Mr. Francis, to the 
effect that within 6 months there would be no vestige left of the Soviet Govern- 
ment. 

In the light of Britain's recent experience with the Chinese Communists, the 
sort of thinking above quoted is all the more shocking. The British Socialists 
rushed at neck-breaking speed to recognize the Chinese Communist barbarians. 
They did not realize or did not care that while the voice from China was that 
of Mao, the hands pulling the Peiping strings were those of Stalin. For 4 years 
now the British Government has been suffering insults and indignities at the 
hands of the Communist mercenaries in China, their Ambassador has been cool- 
ing his heels in Peiping ever since his arrival, and Mao refuses to recognize the 
British Government. During the first 6 months of 1952, for example, the British 
sent 50 communications to the Communist government without even being 
accorded the courtesy of a single reply. Has the British lion lost his voice and 
his teeth? 



126 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Not only have Britisb businessmen taken no iirotits out of China since the- 
curtaiu was rung down on that country, but they have been throwing good money 
after bad at an alarming rate — about 500,000 pounds sterling monthly. During 
the year 1951 the British had to put about 17 million pounds sterling into China 
to meet the pai-alizing taxes, to pay outrageously inflated and useless staffs 
forced upon them by the Communists. All this is designed to ruin foreign busi- 
ness firms in China and to extort valuable foreign exchange. Herself in dire 
economic need, forever crying for more millions from the American taxpayers, 
Britain nevertheless continues to cling to the farce of trying to do business with 
a government which has never cumcealed the fact that it is out to destroy all non- 
Communist nations. Not a single British firm has a chance of surviving in 
China ; not a cent will ever be paid by the Chinese to the British or American 
firms expropriated by them, not until the Communist government is destroyed 
by its own people. 

And yet this nonsense of the British business leader was promptly echoed 
by an American colleague, no less than the chairman of the United States 
Council ot the International Chamber of Commerce^ who told the Boston con- 
ference on distribution : 

"The ultimate results," said Mr. George A. Sloan, "will be that some day 
in the future the Soviets will i-ealize the futility of their efforts in undermining 
the free nations and will suspend their struggle for world domination." Mr, 
Sloan apparently refuses to admit that having enslaved over GOO millions of 
alien peoples in the course of one decade their efforts should be termed highly 
successful and not a futile effort as he sees it. They have been eminently suc- 
cessful throughout the world, not excluding our own country, and are now 
knocking at the very major gateway to the United States, the Panama Canal,, 
with their eft'orts in Guatemala. 

The kind of balderdash we have been getting from men who should know 
better how to deal with the Soviet nightmare impels men of my background • 
and experience to exclaim : You might as well wait for the leopard to change his 
spots ; you might as well expect the earth to change its course as to see the 
Soviets abandon their irresponsible and irresistible march toward world 
enslavement. 

Mr. Chairman, it is high time to admit that Lenin truly meant business when, 
he assured his listeners time and time again : "It is either we or they ; * * * 
We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We will not halt halfway." 

That such fallacies as mentioned above are still being peddled around by 
supposedly intelligent men of affairs 3G years after the rise of the Soviet regime 
makes one wonder if our people ever will fathom the seriousness of the problem 
which is facing them. One can also wonder why the thousands of foundations 
with billions of tax-free dollars have not had the commonsense to tackle thi& 
problem of enlightening our people, and especially those in strategic positions. 
To do electric wiring or a plumbing job a person must take an examination and. 
secure a certificate showing that he is qualified. But not in matters affecting 
the lives of every man, woman, and child in the United States — the solving of the 
most difficult problem of the era caused by Soviet communism. Any ignoramus of 
this subject, without having studied the problem in Russia or learned the basic 
principles of Soviet theory and practice from the experience of those who have 
made it their life's work to know the truth of the matter, be he a university 
professor, an editorial writer, a business executive or a professional, can under- 
take to pontificate on this most perplexing problem. Some of our greatest 
scientists who would laugh themselves sick if they heard an ordinary layman 
]X)ntificate on the scientific fields in which they excel, men like Professors- 
Einstein and Kettering, for example, try to hold forth in the field of inter- 
national relations with the Soviet menace and try to influence public opinion. 

No less shocking has been the propaganda in behalf of East-West trade by Mrs^ 
Vera Micheles Dean, research director of the American Foreign Policy Associa- 
tion. Herself an immigrant from Soviet tyranny, Mrs. Dean has never been back 
to Russia since 1919, has never had any business experiences with the Soviet 
economy. Yet on January 10, 1950, the members of the New York Export Cluh 
listened to her discourse on "Russia's Economic Realities With the West." Her 
concluding remarks were as revealing as they were counter to our interests : 

"In conclusion," said Mrs. Dean, "I would say that we shall have to make^ 
a choice between two risks : One risk is to trade with Russia and Eastern. 
Europe, and there the risk, of course, is that we will be increasing their capacity 
for waging war — if that is what they are planning to do. I say it because I am 



STRATEGY AKD TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 127 

not at all clear that that is the real line of attack that the Russians will pursue. 
The other risk is not to trade with them and to continue to put pressure on our 
ERP friends also not to trade too much with Eastern Europe, and then we are 
running the risk of increasing the economic difficulties of our friends in Western 
Europe. Now, in making this choice of risks, I would plump for the risk of 
trading with Eastern Europe and Russia. * * *" 

Five months later the Soviet Government ordered the North Koreans to 
invade South Korea, where for more than 3 years we fought our third largest 
and costliest war. But a short 5 months earlier the research director of the 
American Foreign Policy Association, fed by tax-exempt dollars from our 
foundations and individuals, was "not at all clear" that war "is the real line of 
attack that the Russians will pursue." 

And what is even more inexcusable about this lady when 3 months after the 
Korean war began, with thousands of American slaughtered with the aid of 
Stalin's guns and military leaders, Mrs. Dean wrote in the September 23, 1950, 
issue of the leftist Nation magazine: "How long will the pretense be kept up 
that the Peking regime must not speak in the international affairs on behalf 
of China ? Does a period of 16 or more years of nonrecognition by the United 
States lie ahead, as in the case of the Soviet Government between 1917 and 1933?" 

Two months later, the Chinese Communists, the darling of the research director 
of the American Foreign Policy Association, launched their savage war against 
the United Stntes. Surelv Malenkov, Vishinsky. Malik, and company could 
hardly have done better by the Kremlin than did Mrs. Dean with her talk 
before the Export Managers Club. I talked to a number of people in the audience 
after the lecture. They had no ideas of their own, but parroted her arguments. 
They admitted that none of them had ever been to the Soviet Union or ever 
read an authoritative book on communism in practice. One of them even con- 
fessed that although Victor Kravchenko's book I Chose Freedom had been on 
his library shelf for 2 years, he had never looked into it. Such an uninformed 
audience, obviously, is easy prey for the glib tongue of the East-West trade 
propagandist. But, as a rule, these are the type of lecturers our trade associa- 
tions and clubs invite to enlighten them. What a tragedy. 

The above-quoted remarks have been selected as characteristic of the thinking 
of men at the top rung of our business leadership ladder. Similar unenlightened 
and confused reasoning among leaders of other groups has helped bring America 
to its present impasse by permitting : 

1. Continuance of diplomatic relations with the Soviets long, far too long, 
after it had become apparent that cooperation with them in any field of human 
endeavor was futile. 

2. Continuation of trading with the enemy long after we had learned from 
decades of experience that it is decidedly detrimental to our interests. 

3. Sitting with the world's greatest murderers in the councils of the United 
Nations as equals, with men who do not represent the Russian peoples, never 
represented them and never will. Every conference we sat in with those bar- 
barians proved fatal to us or futile at best. If they cannot have their way at a 
conference, they are determined to wreck it. They have done it time and time 
a^ain. Yet we persist in begging them on our knees to have some more sessions. 
How long must this go on? 

In the present psvchological war these commissions and the many more 
omissions are deadlv strikes against the United States. In the meantime the 
flower of the Nation's manhood has had to perish on the hills of Korea without 
eliminating the source of the world chaos and tension. The tens of thousands 
of American and French youths who have laid down their lives on the distant 
battlefields,- the other tensof thousands of men whose bodies have been mutilated 
for life are crving from their premature graves and the hospital beds that our 
statesmen stop blundering and bungling and deal with the enemy more 
realisticallv and intelligently. , ., ^r, 

Mr. Chairman, has anvone in this room ever stopped to think that while the 
Kremlin has 30 or so miilions of allies in the free countries, there are hundreds 
of millions of secret allies of ours behind the Iron Curtain. They are silent to 
be sure. But they could be made vocal. They are looking to us for moral and 
psychological sympathy. Instead of that we have a high Government function- 
ary Mr.^Stassen, tell us that sending goods to Russia would endear us to the 
people. This is a moral and psychological support to their enemies, the Kremlin 
tvrants. Instead of saying and doing things which will boost the morale of the 



128 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

victims of communism, the great Winston Churchill comes forth with the shock- 
ing statement which I quote: 

"We should establish with Russia links which, in spite of all distractions and 
perils and contradictions, will convince the Russian people and the Soviet Gov- 
ernment that we wish them peace, happiness, and ever-increasing and ever- 
expanding prosperity and enrichment of life in their own mighty land and that 
we long to see them play a proud and splendid part in the guidance of the hu- 
man race." 

The Russian Government we cannot convince. Mr. Churchill who had more 
experience than any one of us here ought to know it by now. The only obstacle to 
peace, happiness, and all the other good things that Mr. Churchill wishes the 
Russian peoples is the continued existence of the Soviet regime. The Russian 
people know that even if Mr. Churchill and many of our own befuddled people 
don't. To wish to see the Soviet Government play "a proud and splendid part 
in the guidance of the human race," to quote Mr. Churchill, sounds like the little 
mouse wishing that the cat's teeth be sharper, that the cat's feet carry her faster 
to the prospective prey. Besides, the Soviet Government is hardly in need of 
Mr. Churchill's good wishes. It is doing quite well on its own way, thank you. 
The Kremlin feels that it is indeed playing "a proud and splendid part in the 
guidance of the human race" that has already fallen into its blood-drenched 
hands, that it is guiding, according to its deranged mentality, its millions of 
stooges throughout the free world to bring about its desired results — the sovieti- 
zation of the world. 

It should be plain as day by now that the sort of thinking exemplified by Mr. 
Churchill, Mr. Stassen, Mr. Weir, Mr. Royal imperils our safety and security. 
The destinies of mankind are not safe in such hands. Unless the masses in 
the countries still fi'ce, bestir themselves and provide more enlightened and 
courageous leadership, the Christian civilization is doomed. 

As one with a background of 37 years in the international trade field, I must 
state categorically that the whole Soviet trade commotion is nothing more nor 
less than a means to driving a wedge between the free nations. It is designed 
to supply the Communist stooges in the free world with propaganda material 
to confuse and befuddle our thinking. What happened to the billions of trade 
that was to follow the establishment of relations with the Kremlin V It was a 
myth. During the 20 years prior to the Second World War the total purchases 
amounted to $1,200 million — approximately $46 million per annum. Tnis is a 
mere drop in the ocean in our vast economy. Some of the smallest countries 
in Latin America buy far more than that from us annually. 

The Soviets cannot afford to import heavily from the capitalist countries for 
two major reasons : First, they cannot afford to help the economies of countries 
they are out to desti-oy, and they don't permit friends of the United States or 
plain guUibles in Russia to go around propagandizing that purchases should be 
made here, as is the case with a good many such gullibles liere. Second, they 
cannot tell the people day in and day out that the Soviet Union is the real 
paradise of the workers, the country which has invented everything under, 
above, and on the sun, that people in the capitalist countries are starving and 
it is incumbent upon the workers of the Soviet fatherland to allow heavy deduc- 
tions from their wages to keep the American workers alive, and at the same time 
flood Russia with goods from those impoverished capitalistic countries. It just 
would not make sense, and the Soviet propagandists are smarter than that, far 
smarter than our own. Why, then, this great fuss about East-West trade? 
Part of the answer has already been given before. Here is another angle : 

Take a look at the trade agreements concluded between Russia and the Euro- 
pean countries for delivery this year and a few years hence. They are all 
filled with tie-in purchases. In 1954, for example, the Soviets have agreed to 
ship to Finland petroleum products, sugar, linseed oil, gasoline, Diesel oil, fuel 
oil, coal and coke, fertilizer, wheat, fodder cakes, and the like. But what is Fin- 
land supposed to ship to Russia? Strategic goods exclusively. All of it designed 
to strengthen the military might of our enemy, namely — 44 ships, tankers, ocean- 
fishing trawlers, ocean tugboats ; 56 lake barges ; floating cranes, powerplant 
machinery and equipment, and many more similar items. Holland, for example, 
is to supply the Soviets with herring, some butter, and a few other food items 
for the table of the Soviet hierarchy, but the major items she is to ship to Russia 
are : Cargo vessels, refrigerator vessels, suction hopper dredges, bucket dredges, 
coal bunkering vessels, and so forth. Every one of them a major strategic 
item. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 129 

Turn to England, if you please. She is to receive from Russia foodstuffs which 
are in superabundance here and in Canada ; lumber and timber, which Canada 
has in superabundance. But Britain is to ship to Russia — take good note, please : 
30 ocean liners of 8,000 and 10,000 tons, 20 ships of 5,000 tons, 60 fishing trawlers, 
30 whalers, 1.5 salvage tugs ; railway equipment to prop up the weakest link of 
the Soviet system ; 200 caterpillar cranes ; 110 sets of complete power stations ; 
150 steam boilers ; 20 power trains ; 150 diesel electric stations ; electrical equip- 
ment worth about $15 million ; rolling mill equipment worth about $40 million, 
and m'"re of that nature. 

And this, Mr. Chairman, is being paraded to us as nonstrategic goods. It is 
worthy of note that practically every country capable of supplying ships and 
similarly highly strategic material is being awarded contracts. This, on one 
hand, takes the burden off the Soviet shipyards, and, second, it makes it possible 
for the Soviet Government to take possession of that many more highly strategic 
equipment in the event of a conflict or for the purpose of aiding satellites through 
whom mischief is now planned. 

Did Mr. Stassen give you facts or fiction when he asserted that such trade 
would "carry a net advantage to the free world"? 

The total 1948 turnover of the U. S. S. R. trade with the free world (both ex- 
ports and imports from) amounted to about $1 billion. In 1950 it declined to 
$.545 million. In 1952 it was back about $943 million. The figures for 1953 were 
about $790 million. We have given away annually to our Euroi)ean allies alone 
several times that much. If the foreign trade amateurs apparently surrounding 
Mr. Stassen would be replaced by men with practical foreign-trade experience, 
not just book learning, a way could be worked out to satisfy the international 
trade needs of our friends in Europe and at the same time clamp down a com- 
plete and tight embargo against all, absolutely all, shipments to the Soviet bloc. 
A combination of the know-how and a fearless determination to hit the enemy 
where it will hurt could bring that about very easily. But the will must be there 
first. 

WHOM DID WE RECOGNIZE? 

American statesmen. Democrats and Republicans alike, between 1917 and 1933 
did not have to become diplomatic bedfellows with the Communists in order to 
find out the true nature of the Kremlin beast. They had known from the writings 
and utterances of the Communist leaders beginning with Karl Marx and ending 
with Lenin and Trotsky that a govexmment headed by such people could not and 
would not live up to its international obligations, that the world could not remain 
half free and half slave. They therefore steadfastly refused to compromise with 
evil and would not bow to any demands for recognition. It was evident to them 
that a government which would not fulfill its pledges to its own people could 
not possibly be expected to treat us any better. They knew that the Communist 
regime, as mentioned before, had promised bread to its people and has given them 
perpetual hunger ; it promised peace and has given them uninterrupted war at 
home and abroad ; it promised land to the peasants and has robbed them of all 
of it, murdering millions of resisters in the process, bringing upon the Russian 
peoples a famine which decimated millions more in the cities : it promised free- 
dom from oppression and exploitation and has instead established the most in- 
human system of exploitation ever known to mankind. The American statesmen 
of a wiser era — from Woodrow Wilson and including Herbert Hoover — refused to 
have anything to do with such a regime. We all now know how right they were. 

Whom did we really recognize? Let us lift just a tiny corner of the Iron 
Curtain and see the nakedness of the Comnmnist regime. 

Between 1881 and 1913. a period of 32 years, there were a total of 4,446 
executions in the whole of Russia under the Czar's government. Not one of them 
was executed for political offenses. All of them were serious criminals. But 
during the first 3 years of its reign, the Soviets exterminated over .300,000 men, 
women, and children. As it became entrenched, it raised the number of murders 
it committed. 

The sailors of the Fortress of Kronstadt. right outside of Leningrad, played a 
decisive role in helping the Lenin-Trotsky gang to wrest power from the weak- 
kneed Kerensky provisional government in November 1917. By the time the year 
1921 turned up they were so disillusioned, those plain sons of the peasants and 
workers, that they staged a revolt demanding the original pledges of the Com- 
munists be translated into action, namely : power to thi> workers, peasants' and 
soldiers' deputies, land for the peasants, a government o" law and not of edicts, 



130 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

froodom of press and assemblage, justice, and liberty. For that they were ruth- 
lessly destroyed by the Lenin regime. Since then there have been numerous 
revolts, all of them drovpned in the blood of the people. The peoples of Russia 
have never recognized the Soviet Government as the legitimate government of 
the country and never will. The more the people rebelled the more ferocious the 
atrocities of the regime. We will now visit a few Russian cities to witness com- 
munism in action. Our first stop is Kharkov. It is October 18, 1941, and Hitler's 
armies arc rolling irresistibly onward. Millions of Russian soldiers have already 
surrendered, refusing to fight for Stalin and his Communist Party. On the 
corner of Chenishevsky and Sovnai'komsky Streets stands a building occupied by 
the dreaded secret police. It has 4 stories under and 4 above the ground. It is 
equipped with the most modern crematorium to burn the bodies of the condemned 
without trial, without proof of guilt. A cordon of armed men is thrown around 
the building. An official sets the building, filled with men and women, on fire. 
As the flames rise the cries of the victims are piercing the thick walls of the fast- 
ness holding them. Some dare to come to the windows and are Immediately fired 
upon. In due time the building is all In ashes mixed with that of the prisoners. 
None escaped. 

The perpetrators of this crime are the diplomatic bedfellows of the Government 
of the United States. 

We now take you to Vinitza In the Uki'alne. One of the perennial purges by 
the Soviet Government is in full swing. For possessing a texbook in a foreign 
language, for corresponding with a relative or a friend in a foreign country, for 
oversaltlng pickles on a collective farm, for inability to produce in the factory 
or mine according to the heavy schedules imposed by the Kremlin masters, people 
are being rounded up by the thousands, herded in jails, sent off to certain death 
in distant slave labor camps, or executed in the local houses of detention. 

The local jail In Vlnitza is filled to overflowing. Rooms designed to hold 16 
or 18 people now have a hundred or two hundred. For weeks these people have 
been standing on their feet. Some have dropped dead or fainted from exhaustion 
and the stifling air. But more and more victims are constantly arriving from 
the provinces. The Kremlin is teaching the Russian people to remember who Is 
boss of Red, unholy Russia. Then word comes from Moscow to start liquidations. 

Executions take place nightly. After sundown groups of Inmates are marched 
down to the garage below. Heavy duty trucks are running their engines with 
throttles wide open to drown out the cries of the victims and the pistol shots 
of the Kremlin murderers. The men and women are ordered to strip to the 
waist. Prisoners are ordered to face the wall. Kremlin agents tie the hands 
of the victims on the back, just as the murdered Americans in Korea were 
found with their hands tied on their back. This is one of Moscow's Inventions. 
As this is done, other agents move from one standing prisoner to another and 
fire bullets into the back of their heads. Presently another batch of prisoners is 
brought down to the garage and ordered to load the dead bodies into the roaring 
trucks. The butchered prisoners are then rushed to the former pear orchard 
near Vlnitza or to the old cemetery and thrown into mass graves. This per- 
formance continues throughout the night. At dawn the bloodstains on the pave- 
ment en route to the burial grounds are covered with sand by police agents. 

In 1943 the mass graves were opened by the Germans. The whole city was 
affected by the stench blown by the wind from the direction of the pear orchard 
and the old cemetery. The local population had been complaining about it to the 
German occupation authorities, and they gathered a commission of doctors from 
Belgium, France, Holland, Bulgaria, etc., to witness the opening of the graves. 
A total of 9,432 bodies were found. From far and wide people streamed to 
Vinitza In search of the body of a relative. Among them was Anna Godovanyets. 
Her husband had been taken out of his home in the middle of the night and she 
had never heard from him. She had written to Stalin for the whereabouts of 
her husband. In time she received a reply from the notorious A^lshlnsky, then 
chief prosecutor of the Soviet slave state, stating that her husband had been 
released. Of course he was lying. Isaak Kasyanovich Godovanyets had been 
released from his suffering, to be sure, since his body was among the excavated 
thousands. 

This, Mr. Chairman, is the work of our diplomatic bedfellow — the Soviet 
Government we recognized in 1933 and still maintain friendly relations with. 
A person is judged by the company he keeps. How should we be judged for 
keeping company with these wholesale murderers? What happened in Vlnitza 
Is a mere sample of what has been and is going on in the Soviet Union as a 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD C03V1MUNISM 131 

whole. It is a pattern of the way the Kremlin maintains itself in power, and 
this is bound to continue as long as the civilized world continues to deal with 
those barbarians. . 

The scene now shifts to Yoozovo, an important railway junction, bince 194U 
there has been in existence in Russia a child-slave labor system. Boys of 12 to 18 
and girls from 14 and up are recruited in the same manner as soldiers and shipped 
to distant points from their homes to be pressed into so-called labor reserves 
where they are dehumanized into robots to do the bidding of the Soviet masters. 
Such a school with about 700 youths was in Yoozovo at the time Hitler was mov- 
ing in seven league boots toward Moscow. The boys were bitter against their 
"•overnmeut for having been torn from their parents and their home environment. 
Unable or unwilling to evacuate the boys to safe places, orders came from Moscow 
to liquidate them. . , ^ ^. .^ ^ 

Toward sunset, a company of secret police armed with automatic rifles drove 
them down to the outsldrts of the city, in a nearby forest, and mowed them down 
with machineguns. A handful of the boys managed to escape in the darkness to 
bring the account of the massacre to the world. , , , . 

The murderers of these children are living happily withm a few blocks from 
our White House— in the Soviet Embassy. With the murderers of these and 
countless thousands of other children in Russia we are sitting at the conference 
tal)le to bring peace to the world, to assure the independence and the freedoms 
of other peoples. What a farce. What a disgrace. , , , 

Our recognition of the Kremlin regime was the most priceless gift bestowed 
upon our deadliest enemy. It was all the more inexcusable because the Com- 
munists had never made a secret of their true designs. "We have never con- 
cealed the fact," said Lenin, "that our revolution is only the beginning, that it 
will lead to a victorious ending only then when we shall have inflamed the whole 
world with its revolutionary fires" (pp. 22-23, Collected Works by Lenin, Rus- 
sian edition). , ^ . , . ^ ,. 

Within days after recognizing this nightmare high officials in our Government 
knew that a serious blunder had been made. Why an upright man like Secretary 
Cordell Hull permitted this to go on unchallenged remains a mystery. Today 
it is plain to anvone who has eyes to see and a mind to think that there can 
never, never be peace on this earth as long as the Soviet regime survives. And 
our continuing to deal with that Government is the greatest contribution toward 
its survival and to make it possible for them to become stronger in order to 
carry out Lenin's grand design which you will find in volume X, Collected Works 
by Lenin, page 172 : . r.,, .,, 

"First we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. Then we will 
encircle the United States of America which will be the last bastion of capitalism. 
We will not have to attack it ; it will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands." 

If still further proof is needed to insure passage of Senate Resolution 247 and 
relations with the Soviet gangster government severed, let us turn to this 1,000- 
page volume published by the State Department in 1952, entitled : "Foreign Re- 
lations of the United States— The Soviet Union 1933-39." 

We learn from this book that we struck our head into the Red leopard's mouth 
with our eyes wide open. On October 4, 1933, 6 days before President Roosevelt 
started the negotiations, Mr. William C. Bullitt sent a memorandum to the then 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in which he wrote : 

"Before recognition and before loans, we shall find the Soviet Government 
relatively amenable. After recognition or loans, we should find the Soviet 
Government adamant." 

Upon arrival in Moscow as our first Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt did not have to 
wait long before finding the realization of his prophecy. In his dispatch to the 
Department of August 21, 1935, he wrote : 

"To break relations would satisfy the indignation we all feel and would he 
juridically correct." [Italics mine.] 

And then his Christian upbringing asserted itself in dealing with a power which 
set out from the very beginning of its career to destroy all that Christianity 
stands for, and Mr Bullitt wrote : "But in my opinion this question should be 
decided neither on emotional nor juridical grounds but on the basis of a cold 
appraisal of the wisest course to pursue to defend the American people from 
the efforts of the Soviet Government to produce bloody revolution in the United 
States." 

One must forgive the able Mr. Bullitt for this mistake. The above lines were 
written long before the then Communist delinquent had matured into the inter- 



132 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

national and dangerous criminal he is today. Bullitt could not possibly have 
foreseen the ravages the Soviet regime would bring to the world within 5 years. 
But even then Mr. Bullitt fniled to tell us liow maintaining an Embassy in 
INIoscow could defend the American people from the Soviet efforts to produce 
a bloody revolution in the United States which seemed to be his principal concern 
at the time. I am sure that were he free to talk to the rank and tile of the 
Soviet peoples, they would have pleaded with him to bi-eak relations at once and 
drive their spies out of the United States. That would have been a severe blow 
to the prestige of the Communist regime. Had this step been taken in 1935-36, 
when the subject was being discussed inside the Government, the world might 
have been a much happier place to live in today. 

Unfortunately Mr. Bullitt had many other rather weak reasons for not break- 
ing relations at the time. In the same report he wrote : 

"If we should sever relations now on the ground that the Soviet Government 
has broken its pledged word to us and cannot be trusted, resumption of relations 
would be inordinately difficult. * * *" 

This is rather pointless. The British Government was among the very first to 
recognize the Moscow regime after 1917. But in 1927 it discovered the mistake 
and broke relations. Yet it did not prove "inordinately difficult," as Mr. Bullitt 
feared, for them to resume the unhappy relations again. Why would it have 
been different in our case? The oiUy reason I can think of is that he possibly 
feared that once the American people learned of the conditions that prompted 
us to make the break they would not have permitted our Government to make 
the mistake a second time. In the same report, Mr. Bullitt continued his irra- 
tional rationalizing when he said : 

"In this decade the Soviet Union either will be the center of attack from 
Europe and the Far East or will develop rapidly into one of the greatest physical 
forces in the world. In either event an official observation post of the Ignited. 
States Government in Moscow will be desirable, to inform the Government in 
the United States with regard to activities of the Soviet Government directed 
against the lives and interests of American citizens." 

Mr. Chairman, I have lived in Moscow during those years, I have found the 
embassies there, including our own, to be nothing more than prisons for their 
occupants. Can you have an observation post in a prison if you are one of the 
prisoners? Quite unwittingly, apparently, Mr. Bullitt provides the answer in 
his very next paragraph : 

"American diplomatic repi'esenta lives in tlie Soviet Union are harassed and 
restricted. * * * As the Soviet Union grows in strength it will grow in arrogance 
and aggressiveness. * * *" 

And less than 7 months later, on March 4, 1936. to be sure, he further dwelt 
on the difficulties of living with the new partner when he said : 

"I had a good deal during last winter to try my patience, for the Government 
possesses in an exquisite degree, the art of worrying a foreign representative 
without giving him even the consolation of an insult. The position as an 
Ambassador here is far from being pleasant * * * He can rarely obtain accu- 
rate information until events have transpired * * * His own movements are 
closely observed by eyes that he never sees * * * if therefore I do not write 
as often as may be desired, this is my apology. And if I do not furnish matter 
of more interest it must be attributed, in part at least, to the great difficulty of 
obtaining correct information. No courtesy or liberality is shown in this par- 
ticular by this Government * * * Nothing is made public that is worth knowing 
* * *" And more to that effect. Did he really have to suffer the annoyances and 
insults while our State Department here was according the Soviet Ambassador 
the greatest freedom and courtesies? Since all relations between governments 
are based on the principle of reciprocity, wasn't there a single official in the 
upper echelons of our Government with guts enough to remind the Kremlin 
that either they treat our representatives as they should be or the Soviet officials 
would be given the same Kremlin treatment? Not until very recently did our 
officials wake up to this line of thinking. In the meantime our pussyfooting 
had done the damage. 

The Soviet Government would never have become the menace she is today in 
so brief a period of time had it not been for the opportunities offered by our 
grave error of 1933 in opening to her the vast storehouse of our technological 
know-how. And what sort of treatment did our technicians get from the 
Soviets? In a memorandum of November 24, 1937, Mr. George F. Kennan, later 
our Moscow Ambassador, wrote to the Department : 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 133 

"In 1935 written assurances were given by the Soviet Foreign Office to the 
Embassy to the effect that American nationals about to depart from the Soviet 
Union would be permitted to be present during the examination by the Soviet 
customs of drawings, plans, and similar documents in their possession. Never- 
theless, in the current year we have witnessed the violation of these assurances 
in the case of engineers of Radio Corporation of America working in the Soviet 
Union and the retention by Soviet authorities of drawings, plans, etc., for periods 
long enough to permit copies to be made. There is good reason to believe that 
papers taken by the Soviet authorities from American citizens have led to the 
infringement of important American patents." 

Having been treated as a sort of sacred cow for the first few years after recog- 
nition, the bully in the Kremlin felt sure that he could get away with anything, 
and made no mistake in so thinking. For some inexplicable reason our officials 
were so eager to hang onto the Embassy prison in Moscow that they were willing 
to compromise with any wrongdoing on the part of the Kremlin, and knowing 
that the Kremlin treated us as we rightly deserved, with contempt. We have 
no one to thank for that but our own ignorance and, one might even say, 
cowardice. And, while our engineers were not permitted to take out their 
own property in the form of blueprints and drawings, we permitted the Soviet 
agency in New York, the Amtorg Trading Corp., to ship truckloads of such 
drawings stolen or bought under false pretenses. 

The time for Mr. Bullitt to leave the Soviet Union was nearing. He then sent 
a word of warning to the Department to guide it in its future dealings with the 
Kremlin, which, of course, fell on deaf ears. He wrote in his report dated 
March 4, 1936: 

"We should not cherish for a moment the illusion that it is possible to estab- 
lish I'eally friendly relations with the Soviet Government or with any Com- 
munist party or Communist individual. It is difficult to conduct conversations 
with the Soviet Foreign Office because in that institution the lie is normal and 
the truth abnormal and one's intelligence is insulted by the happy assumption 
that one believes the lie." 

The fact that the officials of that period did not have the good sense to put an 
end to such an unhappy relationship should not influence our thinking now 
when we know the utter futility of so doing. Of what earthly good is it to 
maintain an Embassy when we have to deal with paranoiacs and liars, with 
men devoid of any decency or courtesy, in a country where the Ambassador, 
as Bullitt admitted, "can rarely obtain accurate information," where the Govern- 
ment does not want to have any friendly relations with us? 

You, gentlemen of this committee, hold the answer : Pass Senate Resolution 
247 and force the issue of severing diplomatic relations without further delay. 

I was in Moscow when Mr. Bullitt's successor, Mr. Joseph E. Davies, arrived 
on or about January 12, 1937. We met 4 days later, and on January 19 he wrote 
a significant report to Secretary Cordell Hull. He spoke of his conference with 
Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Alexander Troyanovsky, before leaving: 

"The writer stated to Ambassador Troyanovsky," wrote Mr. Davies, "that if 
the surprising history of these subsequent negotiations as disclosed in the files 
of the State Department ^vere knoivn to the America/n ptiblic as they loere to me 
it would result, in my opinion, in a most serious destruction of confidence and 
good tvill the general public of the United States noio felt toward Russia, and I 
then stated also that it was fortunate that there was no probability of such 
disclosure. * * * The Ambassador appeared somewhat downcast but made no 
attempt at rejoinder." [Italics mine.] 

It was indeed fortunate for the Kremlin gangsters that the American public 
and possibly a good many Members of the United States Congress remained in 
ignorance. But it certainly was most unfortunate for this country. Whom, 
then, did the men responsible for this blunder serve — America or Russia? You 
know the answer. 

By the time the Second World War flared up and the invasion of Russia by 
Hitler became inevitable, our State Department files were bulging with valuable 
information on which to guide us in making sound decisions as to how to deal 
with the Kremlin criminals. As example, permit me to quote from Bullitt's 
report of July 19, 1935, in which he wrote : 

"Diplomatic relations with friendly states are not regarded by the Soviet 
Government as normal friendly relations but armistice relations, and it is the 
conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union that this armistice can not possibly 
be ended by a definitive peace but only by a reneival of battle. The Soviet Union 



134 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

genuinely desires peace on all fronts at the present time, but this peace is 
looked upon merely as a happy respite in which future wars may be prepared. 

"To think of the Soviet Union as a possible ally of the United States in case 
of war with Japan is to allow the wish to be father to the thought. The Soviet 
XJmon would certainly attempt to avoid becoming an ally until Japan had been 
thoroughly defeated arid would then merely use the opportunity to acquire Man- 
churia and Sovietize China." [Italics mine.] 

These prophetic warnings should have guided our relations with Stalin at 
Yalta and Potsdam. America's history today would have been a much happier 
one, I assure you. We are now paying dearly for those blunders and for the 
negligence in not properly evaluating Bullitt's warnings and in not making pub- 
lic years ago the true state of affairs between our Government and the Kremlin 
I deem it of utmost importance to discuss these facts now in the hone that 
present incumbent in the State Department will not continue the blunders as 
from now on the consequences to us might be far more frightful than heretofore 

Mr. Chairman, a year and a half had elapsed since our new Ambassador Mr' 
Davies, reached Moscow. He got a taste of the Moscow prison walls De'snite 
that his oceangoing yacht riding the calm waters of the Baltic Sea was alwavs 
at his disposal to lighten the torture of doing his stretch in the Moscow prison 
by taking trips outside the stifling Moscow atmosphere, he felt he had had 
enough of life in the Communist paradise. On June 6, 1938, he sat down to 
dictate dispatch 1932, his sv?ansoug : . , e »dt uown ro 

"In view of the shrinkage of the number of American citizens now in the 
Soviet Union and upon many other grounds a strong argument, from certain 
points of view, might be made that the continuance of diplomatic relations here 
is unnecessary under present conditions and inadvisable " 

Had he stopped right there, he would have been forgiven for many other 
blunders made by him while Ambassador and afterward. But he counseled' 
continuance of relations because "the Japanese attitude in the Pacific" ignorin- 
completely Mr. Bullitt's warnings of 2 years before that "To think of the Soviet 
Union as a possible ally of the United States in case of war with Japan is to 
allow the wish to be father to the thought."' That is preciselv what happened 
as we now know. They joined the war against Japan when that country had 
been ;'thoroughly defeated," as Bullitt had forecast, and did it in order to 
acquire Manchuria and Sovietize China," as farsighted Bullitt had warned 
Mr. Davies had full access to the files and ignored them. Not only did hrignoie 
the sounder counsel of a diplomat whose stature Mr. Davies could never live 
to attain, but he made himself ridiculous when in the very same report of June 
6, 1938, he told the State Department : p" t ui. juue 

f«f'^^*•°'' ^"yf^l^^»' this system is a tyranny, clothed in horror. While a dic- 
tatorship of the most ruthless and cruel type exists here it annears to diftW 
from a Fascist dictatorship, at least in one respect iictatorsMp over the^p^^^^^ 
letariat is not the objective or end this system profess to seek, asfs the case 
with Fascist Ideology. The fact of dictatorship is apologized foi^ here" 

This IS t.alderdash of the rankest sort. Mr. Davies, it would seem had swal 
oZSli'"''?' •!"" '""'^ ''^^"'' }''^ falsehood, dished out to hmbT'the Soviet 
ofiicials Is It any wonder that the whole history of our relations with the 
Soviets issues a stench enough to reach the most distant stars' ^'^^ *^^ 

fo^T. \?"^^'''^^P*'''P^^f ^"'''^ *h^ meaning of the Soviet apologies for the die 
tatorship over the proletariat. They have been living with It for ove? 36 veS 
JnfiT hT. 1* ^^'T"^ ?^^^^^ «^" ^^^ l^"ll^t .s it piei4s through the back of the 
hnvi 'k ^^'^^^^ ^.^^ ^^^^^°S ^^ ^=^ th« slave-labor camps by the millions thev 
have been feeling it on the collectivized farms and in the sociaL^d S«, S 

and TTov'p?'-" '""'l' ^'^'" ^^^'■^ ^« ^ ^"«^^^ «° th« '^^^^^^ the"dark of the night 

thtuse tcf enTmer\ rmr^\r n.^'- '^ ''''' ^^^^'^ ' ^^^^ ''^' it-Mit what'is 
tue u&e Lo enumerate moie.' Mr. Davies was not aware of those "hlp«!«iTiP-c" in 

fn?e?Jh^t'Z'd'r? ^T'P'-'^ "l^ ^P°^°^'^^ ^^ ^^^ Soviet officLlsandXfssur^ 
ances that the dictatorship is not of lasting nature Tt miVhf h« ttt^ii VZ '^ ."^, 

such people that we have been promisee hit th^dictato^S wilfSst untTthe 
whole world has been communized, and that includertheUn tod 4^/11 t^ 

:fthX%tm^;^^" '^'^ ^^•^^^«^' ^^-'^^ us L^ntre"the'^diSati?V1Stions' 

I am wondering how many there still remain in the State DemrtmPTif who 

are as utterly ignorant about the Communist menace L Mr Davies was wien 

he was our Awbassftdor? If there are, J fear that Sepate Resolution 247 ^g^ 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 135 

remain a pious wish even if it is passed. Should that, God forbid, be the case, 
there are some people in this country who would undertake to secure ten or more 
millions of signatures to thwart the obstructors. 

What is really the thinking of the Russian people on this question of their 
totalitarian regime? I think in any of our dealings with the Kremlin we must 
be guided by what reaction our words or deeds would produce in the minds of 
the Russian peoples. They are going to decide the fate of the world one day 
when they rise to destroy their tyranny. In all our plans we must consider their 
wishes and not those of their oppressors. I should like, therefore, to offer a few 
examples and from the mouths of Russians born and reared under the Kremlin 
regime. Here is what Maj. L. Ronzhin, a recent Soviet escapee from his post 
in Eastern Germany, said : 

"Everywhere I had occasion to be since my early adulthood * * * i have seen 
the one and never-changing picture of naked poverty, inhuman toil, semi- 
starvation on a wage which is barely enough to buy bread and potatoes, and 
even that in insufficient quantities. 

"One 5-year plan followed another, but the picture changed only in detail. 
The Communist power continues to rob and oppress the people, to lie, lie, and 
lie * * *. The miracles performed by our patriotic heroes during the war 
against the German invaders brought victory, but this has not brought us out 
of our eternal want and lawlessness by the Government. Everything remained 
the same after the war. The only change made is the address toward which 
the main stream of propaganda of hate is directed. Formerly it was addressed 
to Hitler's Germany ; now it is addressed to America. However, the Fascists 
we hated without propaganda, but toward the American Nation and its Army, 
our people are filled with the most tender feelings, and for some very good 
reasons * * *. We remember well the bread and the meat, the clothes and 
medicines, the guns and tanks and ships and bombers America sent us to help 
us win the war * * *." 

I repeat, this is the voice of the Russian people, this is the voice of the Com- 
munist generation, and, above all, the voice of a man who had everything given 
to him by the Communist Government — education, trust, position, and all the 
good things that life can offer. But he has sacrificed it all for the purpose of 
coming to the West to help us fight against the enemy planning to destroy us. 
We had better heed such men or we, too, will be where the 800 million are behind 
the Iron Curtain. 

Is the Soviet abscess ripening? What are the feelings of the millions of 
Soviet soldiers? Major Rouzhiu has the evidence. Entering his office one 
morning with the occupation army in East Prussia, he found a letter slipped 
under the door. It read : 

"We are convinced that you will not turn this letter over to your political 
commissar. Such action would be bad for you, as it would be directed to the 
political department of the army and you would suffer, too. And now to the 
point : 

"All the political indoctrinations, political information, prosecution and perse- 
cution by the political commissar, bringing in the counterspies, barbed wire, and 
locks on the gates — all that has become so repulsive to us that we are now on 
the verge of open defiance and desertions. 

"You don't know and neither does the political commissar that at night, when 
we are on guard duty, we permit our buddies to go visiting their girl friends 
and they do the same when they stand guard. We do this although we know 
that we are liable to get 5 to 10 years in prison for such action. 

"We therefore ask you, comrade officer, to explain to the higher command 
that it would be wise for them to remove the oppressive restrictions from all 
soldiers in the army of occupation in Germany. 

"And now: Do we correctly understand communism? AVe lived before the 
revolution in very bad circumstances. That was prior to socialism. Our mate- 
rial conditions did not improve under socialism. But here in Germany, visiting 
German homes we notice: A family of three or even a widow with a son or a 
daughter. They have a living room, dining room, bedroom, a kitchen with electric 
stove, a bathroom with modern facilities. In other words, a home of 3 or 4 rooms. 
The rooms are well furnished with soft furniture, with rugs on the floor, radio, 
and some even have an automobile. 

"We have therefore come to the conclusion that here, apparently, communism 
was established long ago. Hence not we have anything to teach them how to 
live comfortably, well, and happy, but we should learn from them. 

(Signed) Youe Soldiebs." 



136 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Major Roiizhin added : "I escaped to the West to fight for the freedom of my 
fatherland and all its peoples." 

Victor Mayev, another officer who has escaped from the Soviet army of occu- 
pation in Germany, has this to tell us : 

"Early this year I was still wearing the officer's uniform of the Soviet army 
of occupation in Germany. Meeting me on the streets of the town where I was 
stationed, Germans no doubt thought to themselves : 'Here he goes, the Russian 
occupationist — the source of all our misfortunes and unhappiness.' At that very 
moment I was trying to find my place in the ranks of fighters against communism, 
in the ranks of fighters for a brighter future for my people * * *. 

"How many in the Soviet Army think similar thoughts? As a former ranking 
officer of the Red Army, I take full responsibility for declaring that the ma- 
jority of that army was never in sympathy with and never approved of the anti- 
national policies of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party * * * 

"Dissatisfaction of the people and the Red Army with the policies of the Gov- 
ernment is growing hourly. This is particularly true of the armies of occupation 
in Germany, Austria, and the satellite nations. The Government is treating 
its military personnel like semiprisoners. They are isolated from the local popu- 
lation. It is trying to inoculate the Red Army with the poison of distrust and 
hatred for the people in the occupied territories. But Europe is the best school 
for the Soviet private and officer. There they see vividly the whole deception 
and the falsehood of the Soviet propaganda * * *." 

Igor Matrosov, another recent escapee from the Soviet Union, offers some food 
for thought, if we here will only listen to this ringing voice of the people whose 
friendship is so badly needed in order to rid the world of the Soviet nightmare : 

"The free world must take full advantage of the opportunity to assist the Rus- 
sian people to destroy the enemy of all mankind— communism. We are not sug- 
gesting war. We are not asking for arms and ammunition. We need the moral 
and psychological assistance which the West can and should give us * * * Not 
one decent and honest person in the world wants war. But peace cannot be 
bought; we must fight for it * * * That is why the attempts of people in the 
West to come to terms with the Kremlin are totally inconceivable to us Russians. 
With stupid compromises the West can only rescue Bolshevism from destruc- 
tion * * *." 

In view of our experience with the Soviet Government since we took the fatal 
step by recognizing the regime more than 20 years ago, in view of the attitude of 
the vast majority of the Russian peoples who are ready to tear their Government 
to tatters, in view of the mischief the Communist heirarchy in Moscow has been 
doing to us and the other civilized nations through their stooges in our midst, it 
is indeed a privilige to congratulate the authors of the resolution under discussion 
here, Senate Resolution 247, introduced by Senators William E. Jenner and Pat 
McCarran urging the administration to sever relations with the enemy of man- 
kind — the Soviet Government. If adopted and the break takes place, it will elec- 
trify our hundreds of millions of allies behind the Iron Curtain, it will inspire 
them to carry on their struggle with our common enemy, it will convince them 
that we are their true friends, that the West has finally seen the error of its ways 
by dealing with a force which is out to destroy all the moral and spiritual values 
created by men throughout the millenia. And at the same time it will bring con- 
sternation to the dictators and the despots. We must not help the Communists 
to prolong the agony by rescuing them by selling them the much-needed consumer 
goods and machinery to continue the stranglehold upon their victims. To act 
otherwise might lead to catastrophe, as it might force the peoples behind the Iron 
Curtain to make peace with the despots. And that is precisely what the Kremlin 
wants. Losing faith in our determination to resist the spread of the evil Commu- 
nist force, and the way the West has been handling the millions of Communist 
fifth-column members in their own countries is certainly not conducive to think- 
ing that we are fully alive to the gravity of the situation, and might lead the 
oppressed tens of millions in Russia and the satellites to the conclusion that 
we are hopeless. We must not permit this to happen. Breaking relations now is 
the only sensible thing to do to prove with deeds and not mere rhetoric. 

Today a year ago the East German people rose spontaneously to defy their 
Communist puppet government and the Soviet occupation forces. Russian sol- 
diers and officers preferred facing a firing squad rather than shoot down the 
protesting workers of East Germany. The rebellion, to be sure, was put down by 
the overpowering Soviet forces. But the example has been shown to the rest of 
the victims throughout the Soviet bloc, and it will not be forgotten if we in the 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 137 

West are smart enough not to let it die down. And one of the first and major steps 
^the seveTng of cUlDlomatic relations not alone by this country but the entire 
cmnzed world as a bloc. If this is accompanied by the tiS^^^^V'^ Ji'Z T,'om 
trade embargo, it will not be long, I am sure, before the masses^ behind the Iioa 
Curtain will eAd their nightmare without the shedding of American blood witl- 
out bending our backs in providing the tens of billions of dollars which wU 
otherwise become necessary in order to establish ourselves as a garrison nation 
and in order to prop up our weaker allies. ^^ x^ i- t „ ^\^^ 

In conclusion I should like to give a word of caution. The Kremlin liars will 
try to use the breaking of diplomatic relations in their P^-^Pf-^-^^da campaign to 
tell their people that we are preparing to wage war upon them. From now on 
we must make it clear that we are taking this step on strict y moral grounds, 
that we don't want to deal with the murderers of the Russian peoples, their 
onnressors and exploiters. We must tell them that we want to help them rega n 
?hefr freedom regSn their land, their religion, and their place among honorable 
peoples of the world. We must tell them that we cannot permit criminals like 
Vishinskv and Panyushkln, whose hands are dripping with the blood of the 
Russian peoples, to tread the sacred soil of a God-loving nation like he United 
States We can and must assure them that once they, the people, have over- 
thrown their illegitimate government and established one on the principles of 
true democracy based on the free expression of the citizens h.v means of free 
and secret ballot, a system of govemment where the individual citizen is the 
sovereign and not the bureaucracy, then we will welcome with joy their repre- 
sentatives and work hand in hand for lasting peace and human progress. 

Mr Arens. Mr. Marcus, will you kindly give the committee a brief 
resume of your background and experience with particular reference 
to the contacts and experience you have had m Soviet Kussia? 

Mr Marcus. I began my international career m the Bureau ot 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1917. I came to this country 
from Kussia, old Kussia, in 1910 as a young immigrant boy, and went 
to work as a blacksmith. Three years later I was the youngest immi- 
gration officer in America, at Galveston, Tex. ^ 

After passing an examination for commercial attache, by some ac- 
cident, I was called by the FBI to work for them m Chicago, and 
finally landed in Washington. 

In 1920 I resigned, to go to Kussia- 

The Chairmax. The FBI, you say? At that time there was no 

FBI 

Mr. Marcus. At that time it was known as the Bureau of Investiga- 
tion of the Department of Justice. . t p v 

In 1920 I resigned, to go to Russia as the first American relief direc- 
tor for an American organization. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. ,^^10 j 

Mr. Marcus. Between that time and the outbreak ot the heconcl 
World War I had occasion to be in the Soviet Union on 14 different 
occasions as a representative of such firms as the Studebaker Corp., 
the American Hair & Felt Co. of Chicago, the American Kachator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., the Reed Container Corp., and similar firms, 
that brought me into contact with the leading people m Kussia m the 
industrial and commercial field of the Soviet Government. One of 
them I might mention, Anastasi Mikoyan, the present head ot the 
Ministry of Trade, and close collaborator of Stalin, and now of 

Malenkov. x -.nr,- -c 

I have seen the Soviet Union arise from the ashes. In 1920, tor 
instance, the vice chairman of the board of the Iron and Steel Trust 
of Kussia begged me to find a capitalist in America who would lend 



138 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

him $750,000 to buy machinery and equipment, they were so poor at 
that time. Since then they have risen to a terrific power, not because 
they are so capable — they are ; I am not in any way underestimating 
them — but because of the aid they have received from America and the 
western nations by hook or crook, mostly the latter. They have stolen 
from us the entire industrial technology for the heavy industries. As 
a result of recognition in 1933 we threw open to them our laboratories 
and our plants, and they just helped themselves to it. 

Senator Welker. Then you would not say they had stolen it. As 
a matter of fact, they received it as a gratuity. 

Mr. Marcus. Well, they received it as a result of the ignorance of 
our people. I will give you one example. May I give you one ? 

Senator Welker. Answer the question. Since we opened the door 
for them I cannot assume that that would be classed as stealing. 

Mr. Marcus. We opened the door for them and it was under false 
pretenses. They dangled billions of dollars of trade to us prior to 
recognition, and our people were hungry. Our factories, some of 
them were idle. And we wanted to get orders from them. And the 
Russians said, "Sure, we will give you orders. You sell us machine 
so-and-so, and with it we will take the blueprints and the shop draw- 
ings." 

And as a result of that they never came back for that same machine 
or that same type of machine. 

I will give you one very concrete example. My boss in the American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Mr. Clarence M. Wooley, the 
chairman, called me in one day and introduced me to the late chairman 
of the York Ice Machinery Co., Mr. Shipley. Mr. Shipley told me a 
story that for 3 years he had been trying to get business in Russia and 
couldn't do a thing. So he brought in his engineer and told me the 
story. He had been to Russia on two occasions and taken with him 
trunks full of blueprints and shop drawings to show them what they 
were producing. Then the company, the York Ice Machine Co., re- 
ceived their engineers in their own plant. 

Nothing happened. 

And I said to Mr. Shipley, "Why should there have been orders 
given to you ? You have given away your entire technology." 

Repeat that by the hundreds and hundreds of plants and you have 
the story. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, will you tell a little later on in your testi- 
mony with respect to other espionage operations of the Soviets? 

Mr. Marcus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Now, for the purpose of your background and building 
the background of your own life, you are presently identified as a 
director of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, Inc. 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. I am a member of the board. 

Mr. Arens. In that organization are such men as Gen. Frank L. 
Howley, James O'Neil, Gen. William Donovan, and others of like 
character. 

Mr. Marcus. Admiral Standley, who was American Ambassador 
to Russia, Admiral Maxwell, and Spruille Braden, and many others. 

Mr. Arens. You have discussed with the staff off the record the 
contacts you have with the underground, the anti-Communist under- 
ground behind the Iron Curtain. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 139 

Mr. Marcus. That is correct. 

Mr. Arexs. And you and your associates are in contact with that 
underground operation ? 

Mr. Marcus. Correct, 

Mr. Arexs. Now, Mr. Marcus, may I explicitly invite your atten- 
tion to the general subject matter of the Soviet interest in east-west 
trade, the so-called Russian trade offensive, and ask you, on the basis 
(^f youi' background and experience, what you feel is really behind 
t he alleged Soviet interest in east- west trade. 

Ml'. Marcus. I sounded the alarm about this coming offensive before 
Stalin died in 1052, and here is an article which was published in a 
trade magazine called Export Trade and Shipper in 1952. The pur- 
pose of this east- west trade offensive 

Senator Welker. Excuse me. May that be incorporated by refer- 
ence onl}' ? 

The Chairmax. By reference, it may go in the record. 

(The article referred to was marked "Marcus Exhibit No. 1" and 
fded for the information of the committee.) 

Mr. Marcus. The purpose of it is to steal our light industry 
technology, just as in the case of the heavy industry. They bought 
samples and that was the end. And today they are already competi- 
tors of ours in India and many other countries of the world, and in 
South America. 

I am glad you brought that up because we have got to discuss it 
very carefully. 

The Soviet Government is scared to death of a war with the United 
States. If war broke out today that would be the end of the Soviet 
Government because their people will tear them to death. Now they 
want to destroy the United States without a war. One way is to 
encircle us. And on page 172, volume 10, in Collected Works by 
Lenin in 1923, before he died in January 1924, he said as follows, and 
I quote : 

First we will take eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia ; then we will 
encircle the United States, which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will 
not have to attack. It will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands. 

Korea, China, Indochina — all that is a part of this philosophy of 
avoiding a clash with us so that they will not be destroyed by their 
own people. 

This is one way, and they are succeeding magnificently. 

The second way is by destroying our $25 billion international trade. 

Mr. Arexs. In other words, is it your suggestion that the second 
reason for the Russian trade offensive is to establish a ruinous com- 
petition in world markets? 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. 

Mr. Arens. To the United States ? 

Mr. Marcus. Absolutely. 

Mr. Arens. Will you kindly, on the basis of your background and 
experience, give us your best judgment and appraisal of that phase 
of the Russian trade offensive ? 

Mr. Marcus. Yes, sir. Right after Stalin's death they started in 
buying consumer goods. Now, right after the war, the Russian 
people were in such dire need of consumer goods and yet they did not 
get it. For over 3 decades they have been living on the barest sub- 



140 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM \ 

sistence, living in the most primitive conditions. And I have been all 
over Russia. 

The Chairman. How recently have you been in Kussia ? 

Mr. Marcus. Just before the Second World War. I am in constant 
contact with escapees, and in a few minutes I will give you a statement 
by Major Ronzhin L. Rozhin, who escaped recently. This is a picture 
of the major. 

Mr. Arens. You have, as you have indicated, underground contacts 
through this organization of which you are a member of the board 
of directors. 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. 

Why do they do this? For the very purpose to buy samples of 
our consumer goods. But that is not all. There is also a tie-in ar- 
rangement. "If you will sell us the consumer goods we also want the 
machinery producing the consumer goods." 

And when they buy the machinery to produce the consumer goods 
they also want the shop drawings and the blueprints. And, having 
that, that is the end of it. Then they can use their millions of slaves, 
and the millions of slaves in China, and their raw materials don't 
count because that is also being produced by slaves. This is to out- 
produce us, to flood the world markets. There is a psychological 
reason in it, too. They want to show the people of the world here, 
"We are producing the finest cars, we are producing the finest shirts 
and suits and shoes and so on." That has a terrific propaganda value 
to them. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. You made the statement, Mr. Marcus, that they 
bought certain goods. As a matter of fact, we gave them some tanks 
and some airplanes and so forth that were very easily copied by them, 
and they have copied them. 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. 

Senator Welker. And made probably even better airplanes than 
we gave them. 

Mr. Marcus. And the only person who had the gumption to get up 
and speak up before the world was our member associate of the board 
of directors, Admiral Standley, when during the war, the Soviet Gov- 
ernment was trying to conceal the fact that the tanks and machinery 
and planes and food and clothing was being sent by America, so he 
spoke out and they were compelled, Stalin was compelled thereby to 
acknowledge the fact that America was sending them. 

Mr. Arens. As president of the Institute of Foreign Trade, have 
you had occasion to make a study of the trade agreements currently 
in vogue between the Soviet Union and other countries of the w^orld? 

Mr. Marcus. Definitely. 

Mr. Arens. With what other countries does the Soviet Union at the 
present time have trade agreements ? 

Mr. Marcus. I am going to speak only of the years 1952 and 1953. 
There are the following countries to which we have been feeding bil- 
lions of dollars: Sweden, Israel, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, - 
Netherlands, Iran, Denmark, France, Iceland, Australia, India, 
Pakistan, Greece, and New Zealand. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 141 

Mr. Arens. You are specific in your prepared statement, but can 
you tell us in general what commodities or items are involved m 
those trade agreements? . 

Mr. ]M\RCUS. Russia is supplying to those countries commodities 
like wheat, corn, and various other foodstuffs and some raw materials, 
all of which are obtainable in the United States in abundance as 
well as in Canada, timber, pulpwood, and so on. Russia is receiving 
for that ocean liners of 8,000 and 10,000 tons, freighters of 5,000 tons, 
by the dozens. I have here the number of them enumerated from 
official sources. Cranes, lathes, all strategic. A $14 million steel 
mill, rolling mill, is to be supplied by England to Russia. Electrical 
equipment running into the tens of millions of dollars. 

Here is an interesting thing. Great Britain is to supply the greatest 
number of ships. It is all enumerated in my testimony. Netherlands, 
ships ; Denmark, ships ; one of them is supplying steamers. 

Why? 

Now when you supply a steamer to the Soviet Union today what 
does it mean? It means that much steel, that much pressure taken 
off the Russian steel mills, that much labor taken off, and it is faster. 
You have 3 countries, 5 countries producing steamers for them. They 
can get ready for the final clash, as they call it, that much quicker. 

Senator Welker. May I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Marcus, in the list of countries with which 
Russia has had trade agreements I did not notice that you mentioned 
any of the South American countries. Do you have any information 

on that? . 

Mr. Marcus. Argentina is one. I am sorry I did not mention it. 

Senator Welker. Based upon your experience, and, as I recall 
your testimony, you are an adviser with respect to internatonal trade? 

Mr. Marcus. Yes. . . 

Senator Welker. I will ask you what your opinion would be with 
respect to the Government of the United States sending to a dictator- 
ship in South America a strip steel mill which is capable of not only 
processing steel but titanium or aluminum and other ferrous metals- 
keep in mind that I say a dictatorship— that has trade agreements 
with Russia, and I thini it is common knowledge that trading mis- 
sions from Russia and the satellite countries are all over South 
America as of this moment, sir. 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. 

Senator Welker. Can you comment on that, sir ? 

Mr. Marcus. I happen to be the one who wrote a memorandum m 
November 1933, when I was, for a short time, foreign trade consultant 
in Washington, entitled "How We Ourselves Destroy our Forei^i 
Trade." Today there is a great deal of talk about investments abroad. 
And i say to you gentlemen that it means "invest abroad and lose 

your shirt." , , -, .-, ^^ ■ <• xi i. 

That is, to my mind, a crime. We should not sell anything ot that 
sort to any country unless the production will help raise the standard 
of living of that country. Now in most instances it will not do so, 
especially in Latin America. In most instances it is going to be used 
for the purpose of increasing the foreign trade in competition with 
America. 



142 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Senator Welker. Further, how could our country be assured that 
they would use this strip steel mill to raise the standard of living of 
this dictatorship country, or whether or not it might well be used to 
help Kussia and her satellites? 

Mr. Marcus. The only way is to have it specifically stated in the 
agreement. 

Senator Welker. All right. What does an agreement mean, Mr. 
Marcus? Let's be frank. It is a piece of paper that can be torn up. 
I have heard about agreements ever since I have been in the Senate, 
and prior thereto. It does not seem to me that Russia keeps an agree- 
ment very well. 

Mr. Marcus. Not Russia. 

Senator Welker. Or any other satellite country. 

Mr. Marcus. We were speaking about Latin America, Senator. 

Senator Welker. That is right. 

Mr. Marcus. In speaking about the Soviet Union there is absolutely 
no possible chance of their living up to their agreements. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me to inquire 
further, I want to be informed on this matter. 

Mr. Marcus. Yes. 

Senator Welker. Will you tell me in simple language what the 
difference is between a dictatorship, say, in our Latin American coun- 
tries and the dictatorship that we have in Soviet Russia ? I will ask 
3^ou if it is not a fact that it is all based upon socialism, x^m I cor- 
rect? 

Mr. Marcus. Not necessarily. I wouldn't say that Peron is a 
Socialist. 

Senator Welker. Does not the Government there in Argentina 
own most everything ? 

Mr. IVIarcus. In the Latin American countries — and this is also 
based upon personal experience — the dictator is not for personal ag- 
grandizement whereas in the Soviet Union it is for the purpose of 
sovietizing the whole world. 

Senator Welker. Very well. Assuming this steel mill is bought 
by the country itself, that would be socialism, would it not? 

Mr. Marcus. Oh, naturally, that is a step toward it. 

Senator Welker. Can you help me on defining what socialism is, 
how many steps behind communism it is. 

Mr. Marcus. It is the prelude to communism. 

Senator Welker. It is about a half step behind, is it not ? 

Mr. Marcus. A little bit more, but it is a step in that direction. 

Senator Welker. Then it is your testimnoy that, based upon your 
experience, you think it would not be a satisfactory solution for the 
protection of this country, for our country to sell to a dictatorship that 
has trade agreements with Russia and the satellites and Guatemala, 
a steel mill capable of giant capacity that could very well be used 
in the United States of America as of this moment, sir ? 

Mr. Marcus. Definitely. In my own business I have many a time 
lost a client by telling him "Don't sell it there. Country must come 
before profit." 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to call your attention to a very im- 
portant statement that President Eisenhower made yesterday. A 
correspondent at the press conference stated that Congressman Martin 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 143 

Dies told the House yesterday that if we really wanted to stop com- 
munism dead in their tracks right now and not just give lipservice 
to it, that we would cut off from Kussia the nonstrategic goods, food 
and fiber, which it needs most, because he says "She is spending 80 
percent of her productive energy for w-ar purposes." 

And the President, to my great regret, merely replied something 
like Mr. Stassen replied to a Senate committee here, I think to the 
Foreign Relations Committee— the President said we must not con- 
sider—this is not quoted— this is from the New York Times— you have 
to remember that the satellites, including Red China, were, after all, 
different from Russia, 

Gentlemen, not at all. I think somebody is misinforming the 
President to the detriment of our country. The Soviet Government 
was the one that brought about the Communist revolution in China 
and in the satellite countries. Every one of the leaders, from Mao 
Tse-tung down, w^ere educated in Russian schools. I was in such a 
school in 1926. I was passing by in Kiev, a military academy. And 
I walked in as a matter of curiosity. In those days Stalin was not yet 
in the saddle. 

They talked to me. They didn't know whether I was an American 
or a native Russian from the way I speak Russian. 

With great pride they showed me the department in the military 
academy where they were training Chinese since 1921 ; they were train- 
ing Chinese there for the revolution in China. 

The Soviet Union has spent hundreds of millions of dollars. The 
Sun Yat Sen University, the Lenin University, the Far East Univer- 
sity. They have turned out as many as 5,000 trainees a year in 
sabotage, in espionage. 

Senator Welker. You are speaking now^ about the Lenin School for 
Sabotage and Espionage and the like ? 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. Therefore, to say that they are different is 
really not correct, you know, and I am afraid that somebody is mis- 
informing. 

Mr. Arens. Is there such a thing as a differentiation, in your judg- 
ment, to be made between strategic and nonstrategic material? 

Mr. Marcus. Not even a pin should be considered as nonstrategic. 

Mr. Arens. In other words, everything is strategic in trade with the 
Soviets? 

Mr. Marcus. Everything is strategic ? 

Mr. Arens. Why? 

Mr. Marcus. If you asked the Russian people, if we had the means 
of speaking to the 200 million people of Russia freely, they would 
plead with us on their knees, "Tlease don't come here. Don't sell 
anything or buy anything from our government." 

Many a time Russian functionaries, high functionaries in Russia, 
when I was there on official business for my corporation, have said to 
me, "Why do you Americans come here to deal with our government ? 
You are only enhancing its prestige. You are only tightening the 
noose around our necks." 

Time and time again. And I may mention here a name, a fellow 
by the name Serebryakov, the man who wrote the constitution of the 
Russian Socialist Federated Republics. 



144 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

So that is what we are doing in shipping food or machinery or 
anything of the sort ; we are helping the Soviet Government to tighten 
the noose around the necks of the Russian people. The worse condi- 
tions become in the Soviet Union and the satellite nations, the better 
for us. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, have you had occasion to take note of Sen- 
ate Resolution 247, which was introduced in the Senate by the Senator 
from Indiana and the Senator from Nevada, which would call for 
the severance of diplomatic relations with the Iron Curtain Govern- 
ments, and the convoking of an international conference for the pur- 
pose of taking united action to destroy the international Communist 
menace? 

Mr. Marcus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat is your appraisal, as president of the American 
Institute of Foreign Trade and as a director of the American Friends 
of Russian Freedom, and as a man conversant in international trade, 
of that resolution ? 

Mr. Marcus. Severance of trade relations — of all relations, diplo- 
matic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, is far too long over- 
due. 

Mr. Arens. Wliy ? 

Mr. Marcus. I have here a thousand-page book published by the 
United States State Department in 1952, and if any one of you would 
read carefully the reports by Bullitt you would have to come unavoid- 
ably to the conclusion that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
is the greatest misfortune to our country. 

Mr. Arens. Wliy? 

Mr. Marcus. Because it was the greatest gift that America had 
given to the Soviet Union. No. 1, it gave them world-wide prestige. 
Right after our recognition, many other countries which w^ould never 
have recognized them went into action and recognized the Soviet 
Union. 

No. 2, it opened to them the avenues for espionage and infiltration. 

Senator Welker. How ? 

Mr. Marcus. Well, we were friends with them. We gave visas to 
their men. I do not know how many people there are in the Soviet 
Embassy here, but I will give you a little example. 

Australia, which recently had this little incident with the Soviet 
Government, they had 9 people in the Australian Legation in Moscow ; 
9, including women and children. How many did Moscow have in 
Australia? Fifty. And the same thing here. They came here by 
the thousands. I myself knew several hundred of the Russian buying 
commissions. They were nothing but spying commissions. 

Senator Welker. May I inquire? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Then it is your testimony, I take it, that the 
Soviet Embassies here are nests for saboteurs, espionage agents, and 
for the distribution of Communist propaganda throughout our 
country ? 

Mr. Marcus. For no other purpose. 

Mr. Arens. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COIVIMUNISM 145 

Mr. Marcus. I say this, that everyone, Vishinsky, Panyushkin, 
Gromyko— especially Vishinsky— every one of them are. Their 
hands are dripping with the blood of men, women, and children. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have a particular incident to account respecting 
the massacre in the Soviet Union, to your knowledge, of a number of 
children by people who are currently in diplomatic status? 

Mr. Marcus. Every one of them who represents the Soviet Govern- 
ment is ipso facto an accessory to the act of murder committed. 

Mr. Arens. ^Vliat was that act? Could you tell the committee 

about it ? ■ p 2- £ 

I^Ir. Marcus. I want to give you three little experiences ot acts o± 
our bedfellows, the diplomatic bedfellows that America, a Christian 
nation, has. 

The German armies were moving irresistibly on toward Moscow. 
They were approaching a very important railway junction. In that 
city they had a bovs' school. ^ It is really a slave labor school to de- 
humanize children, to robotize them into obedient servants of the 
Soviet Government. That subject I have treated in an article called 
Dehumanizing Children For Soviet Conquest. They were afraid to 
leave them inl^he city because they were very bitter against the Soviet 
Government for having torn tliem away from their mothers and 
fathers. They couldn't evacuate them into a safer place because the 
rolling system broke down completely. 

I am the son of a famous Russian railroad builder, and I know some- 
thing about the railroad system in Russia. It is the weakest link m 
the whole structure of their economy. 

So at 5 o'clock in the afternoon they rolled up a company of secret 
police with trucks. They herded the boys into the trucks, drove them 
out into a ravine and there mowed them clown with machineguns. 

Senator Welker. In what year was this, sir? 

Mr. Marcus. In 1941. 

I will take you now to the city of Kharkov in the Ukraine. 

The Chairman. Do you know this of your own knowledge? 

Mr. Marcus. I know this : In 1950 1 delivered a speech to about 
1,400 Russian escapees in the DP camp known as Schlesheim near 
Munich. There were people in that city from Yoozovo who told me. 
A few of the children escaped. 

I will take you now to Kharkov. On Sovnarkomsky Street at a 
certain corner there stood a 4-story building. It had also 4 stories 
under the ground equipped with the most modern crematorium to 
burn up the bodies of the executed. And there, just before the Ger- 
mans were to occupy, the building was surrounded by secret service 
men, and the building was set on fire with everybody in the building 
destroyed. 

In the city of Vinitza — I am giving you those as examples — what 
happened in Vinitza and Yoozovo and Kharkov as an example of 
w^hat has been going on through the years, the famous purge was go- 
ing on just before the war. And the jail had rooms to accommodate 
16 to 18 people, and they were filled with 50 or 100 or 150, and more 
were being brought in from the provinces, and there was no more 
room. 

So Moscow gave orders to liquidate them. Every night batches of 
those men and women would be brought down, their hands tied on 



146 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

their back, just like the American boys were executed by the Chinese 
in Korea, and as they were having their hands tied other secret-service 
men would pass by and fire bullets into the back of the heads. Then 
another batch of prisoners would be brought down from the jail to 
load those dead bodies into the trucks. 

They buried them in a former pear orchard that belonged to a for- 
mer Russian merchant, or into the old cemetery. When the Germans 
occupied finally the population began to plead with them that there 
was a terrific stench coming from the direction of those places, and, 
in the presence of an international medical commission made up of 
French, Germans, Italians, and all the other people that they had 
already conquered, the Germans had conquered, they opened up the 
graves and found 9,446 bodies. Among them was the body of a man 
by the name of Godovanyets. His wife has written to Vishinsky 
asking him what happened to her husband, and he wrote back and 
said, "Your husband has been released." 

Sure, he has been released, released from misery and suffering. He 
was one of the bodies found in that grave. 

This is typical of what has been going on in other countries. You 
know about the Katyn Forest Massacre of 10,000 Polish officers. It 
was done with a purpose. To show you how far-sighted, how far 
ahead they were, in 1942, while America was straining its economy to 
send them the guns and the bombers and the food and clothing and 
medicines, while our boys were braving the submarine-infested North 
Sea to try to deliver that equipment, the Soviet Government was 
already training soldiers in English and in the method of interro- 
gating American and English prisoners of war. 

Mr. Arens. Is it ludicrous to suggest even a possibility that we 
could sit at a conference table to bring peace to the world with men who 
have perpetrated these international outrages? 

Mr. Marcus. I think it is unquestionably immoral and absolutely 
to the detriment of the United States. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt to go back through this testi- 
mony. There is some testimony that perhaps I misunderstood. I 
want it eminently clear in the record as best you can give it under 
oath. 

You have stated that many times Soviet citizens, including high 
government functionaries, have asked you, begged you to stop trad- 
ing with Russia. I believe you omitted to say that these high govern- 
ment functionaries were parading as Communists. 

Mr. Marcus. That is right. 

Senator Welker. But at heart were bitter enemies of the Commu- 
nist Government? 

Mr. Marcus. Correct, Senator. 

Senator Welker. I wanted to bring that out because you omitted 
to say that. 

Mr. Marcus. That is perfectly true. Do you think this man Sere- 
bryakov — he was one of the top men, he was the one who wrote the 
constitution, as I said, of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet 
Republics. He made a remark to me, he said, "I wrote the constitu- 
tion, and look who is running Russia, this illiterate brute." 

Of course, he was taking his life into his own hands. All I had to 
do was put in one telephone call and he would have been shot. He 
was shot anyway on February 1, 1937. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 147 

Mr. Arens. May I ask a question or two to clear up some of the 
areas of your testimony. 

Mr. Marcus, what is your reaction to the suggestion that, after all, 
our Embassies and consulates located behind the Iron Curtain are 
listening posts for information for our Government ? 

Mr. Marcus. Gentlemen, is there a listening post in a prison ? Our 
Embassies have been, are, and will continue to be, as long as we main- 
tain diplomatic relations with Eussians, prisons. They cannot stick 
their noses out. They are afraid. They are being hounded and 
hounded. I wouldn't have to make any statement. It is right here in 
this book, and I put it into my testimony. 

Our good friend Bullitt — here I am going to quote you a very little 
from his statement. On October 4, 1933 — and this is very important ; 
I think it should be emphasized — we went into this recognition of the 
Soviet Government with eyes wide open. Six days before President 
Roosevelt started negotiations for recognition our future ambassador, 
Bullitt, wrote a memorandum to Secretary Hull, dated October 4, 
1933, page 16 in this book, in which he said : 

Before recognition and before loans we shall find the Soviet Government 
relatively amenable; after recognition or loans we should find the Soviet 
Government adamant. 

Precisely. 

Bullitt did not have to wait very long to find the correctness of his 
statement. Here is a report of his dated August 21, 1935, page 245 
in this book, the official book by the State Department : 

American diplomatic representatives in the Soviet Union are harassed and 
restricted. As the Soviet Union grows in strength it will grow in arrogance and 
aggressiveness. To brealj relations would satisfy the indignation we all feel and 
would be juridically correct. 

That far I went with my good friend Bullitt, but then I disagreed 
wholeheartedly. Then he said, well, the Soviet Union is going to be a 
big country, an important factor in world affairs. We have to have a 
listening post. 

And that, to my mind, is one of the greatest mistakes that we made. 
We should have broken relations right there and then. It would have 
been one of the severest blows to the Soviet Government because the 
prestige of that Government would have been terribly hurt, and the 
people of Russia would have gained a lot of encouragement and 
emboldened to continue their resistance. 

Mr. Chairman, why are 10 or 20 million Russians in slave-labor 
camps today ? "\Vliy have millions perished in those slave-labor camps 
at the hands of executioners? Because they have been kowtowing 
and loving their government? It is because they have been continuing 
their resistance. 

The Soviet agricultural population will never, never surrender to 
the collectivization. 

I will give you a little experience. After my speech in Schlesheim, 
Germany, a little fellow introduced himself to me. He was an escapee, 
a former officer in the Red army. And he told me his father was a 
poor peasant who had only 1 horse, 1 cow and a few pigs and very little 
land. But when the collectivization movement started he refused to 
join the collectivists. There was a reason for that. 



148 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

For centuries the Russian peasants were serfs. In 1861 they were 
freed. By 1913, Mr. Chairman, 75 percent of the peasants of Russia 
were tilling their own soil. That was the dream that had been the 
dream for centuries. And then one of the principal promises of the 
Communists to the Russian people in 1917 was bread, and they have 
given them perpetual hunger; land — they have taken it away from 
them; peace — they have given them perpetual war at home and 
abroad ; freedom from oppression by the secret police — and they have 
given them a secret police system that the world has never been able 
to even fathom the extent of it. 

Now this little fellow said to me, "My father and whole family w^ere 
bundled up and shipped to Siberia. Mother died on the way, and 
father diecl soon after they arrived." 

So the poor little boys were scattered to various schools, and he 
become an officer, a lieutenant. He said, "The first time I received 
orders to go into battle against the Germans I deserted and took my 
whole company with me. We never forgave nor forgot," quoting 
him, "what the Soviet Government had done to our parents." 

Senator Welker. May I inquire ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. A moment ago you stated that our embassies or 
our emissaries behind the Iron Curtain were really prisoners and not 
listening posts. Do you have an observation with respect to the time 
when Russia invited a number of prominent labor leaders to the Soviet 
country and showed to them what was presented to us, at least, before 
this committee, as the glorious democracy and the wonderful economy 
and peace of Russia ? Now if you say our officers are prisoners how 
about this invitation? 

Mr. Marcus. Senator, those officers represent the capitalists, and 
these labor leaders represent the workers, and that is what they want, 
to dupe the workers of America. Do you know, gentlemen, that in 
Russia the worker is being assessed from his wages every week so much 
to help maintain the starving workers in the United States? Of 
course, the Russian workers don't believe it. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, reverting for the moment into this ques- 
tion of East- West trade, on which you are an expert, what is your 
reaction to the suggestion that the West needs certain commodities 
which can be procured only from behind the Iron Curtain? In other 
words, to what extent is the West dependent upon East-AVest trade? 

Mr. Marcus. That is absolutely untrue. The East-West trade 
amounted to — it is known there is a lot of illegal East- West trade 
going on, and I have treated that in an article on the subject — what 
is known, and this is from official sources — you have the figures 
there — is about $550 million a year. That trade is absolutely non- 
essential as far as the Europeon, as far as the free world is concerned, 
and I Avill tell you why. 

Every item that they are getting from Russia they could easily 
obtain in the United States, in Canada and Latin America. We are 
giving away billions to our so-called allies who are insisting upon 
this East-West trade. It would be far cheaper to the United States 
to subsidize the exportation to them of the items which they are buy- 
ing from Russia today, or even to buy some of the things that they 
have to sell in order to avoid it. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 149 

I would call it preclusive buying and preclusive selling because that 
would keep from the Russians the most strategic items like ships 
and cranes and lathes and electrical equipment which, all of it, goes 
for war purposes. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, remember this, and you will find this in volume 
18, page 385, Collected AVorks by Lenin, and I am quoting : 

As soon as we are strong enough to destroy the whole capitalist world we 
will grab him by the collar — 

by Lenin. 

Was that just a wild boast by a maniac? Oh, no. Look at it. 
Since 1915 what has happened ? Six hundred and fifty million people 
behind the Iron Curtain. This is the answer — 650 million people not 
grabbed by the collar but by the throat. And let no one tell you, or 
Mr. Stassen tell you, the nonsense that this is going to help improve 
relations between the United States and the Russian people. 

I am going to show you what is happening in an article in the 
American Legion magazine entitled "The Reds Reach for Your 
Wallet." 

Mr. Arens. In what month and year is that? 

Mr. Marcus. August 1950. 

Half a million extra copies were printed of this article. You will 
find on page 59, and this is something that I think President Eisen- 
hower would do well to take note of : 

On May 19, 1951, the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(the old Comintern now renamed the Cominform) worked out a blueprint for 
the future conquest of the Balkan countries. For example, section (e) of the 
first paragraph stipulates : 

"Once power has been seized by the party" — 

by the Communist Party — 

"foreign policy will be laid down by the diplomatic representatives of the 
U. S. S. R. who will receive the necessary directives from the Comintern." 

Paragraph 2 makes this significant statement : 

"The country where the central committee of the Communist Party has 
recently assumed power should not apply for inclusion in the Soviet Union until 
the necessary instructions to this effect have been received from the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern, now the Cominform." 

That is why President Eisenhower is in error when he says that 
Red China and the satellites are, after all, different from Russia. 
They are not different from Russia. The final step has not been 
attended to. '\A^iy? They have time. The Chinese Communists 
have to master, they have to execute 20 million people there. That is 
official. That was brought to the American Communist Party. And 
Frank Cvetic told me that. They have to execute 20 million people 
there. They have in the satellite countries the same. They have to 
execute all the people like we are, capitalists, don't you see, and 
intellectuals. But here is the law 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, as a member of the board of directors of 
the American Friends of Russian Freedom, and as one who is in 
intimate contact with the underground in Russia, could you express to 
this committee your opinion as to what would be the psychological 
effect of the severance of diplomatic relations on the rank and file 
of the people behind the Iron Curtain ? 

Mr. Marcus. It would be the most electrifying, stimulating, inspir- 
ing act that we could give to the Russian people since 1917. They have 



150 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

said to me, "Drive them out of the United Nations. Drive them out 
of your country. They are the plague." And they are. We are 
dealing here with a power that can never, never change. They can talk 
from now until doomsday about coexistence, but they don't mean it. 
It is all done for the purpose of catching the gullibles and getting 
more. 

Now, technology does not stand still. About the only invention — 
and now I am speaking as a native Russian — the only invention that 
Russia can boast of as truly Russian is the samovar and the balalaika. 
Everything else has been stolen from abroad. A samovar is a con- 
traption which boils water for tea on the table, and the balalaika is a 
musical instrument, a three-quarter musical instrument. 

Mr. Arens. Would you be disposed, Mr. Marcus, to give a brief 
thumbnail sketch of the events causing the recognition of the Soviet 
Union ? I see you have covered that in your prepared statement, with 
which the staff has been conversant heretofore. 

Mr. Marcus. Pardon me. I didn't quite get the question. 

Mr. Arens. Give a resume of the events leading to the recognition of 
Soviet Russia, the circumstances surrounding the recognition. 

Mr. Marcus. The statesmen of America, prior to 1933, Republicans 
and Democrats alike, did not have to become bedfellows of the Soviet 
Government in order to realize that it was absolutely futile and to 
the detriment of the United States interests to have recognition.. 
There was a man by the name of Walter Duranty on the New York 
Times. He used to imbibe a great deal of vodka. He once drank a 
whole quart of vodka at my dinner table in the Moscow International 
Hotel. He, to my mind, contributed more than any other corre- 
spondent in the world toward befuddling and bamboozling Americans 
into ultimate recognition. 

There was another character by the name of Lincoln Steffens, the 
late Lincoln Steffens. He and Bullitt were sent to Moscow in 1918 
by the late President Wilson, just to take a look at things. He came 
back and upon arriving heralded the grand news to the world: "I 
have seen the future, and it works." 

Imagine a man who spent about 6 days in Russia, didn't know a 
word of Russian, and so early in the game — when I told that to 
Mikoyan on board ship, on the steamship Normandie in October 1936, 
I was traveling with Mikoyan on the same ship, and I met him and 
his wife, and I was having business relations with him. I tried to 
sell him a $20,300 machine for $185,000. I asked a quarter of a million 
dollars, but he wouldn't give it to me. He said, "You are a highway 
robber, aren't you ?" 

I told him very frankly the machine cost us $20,300 to make. He 
said, "Wliy are you asking a quarter of a million ?" 

I said, "I know what you are going to do. You are going to buy 
one machine and copy it." I said, "You have to pay us for the blue- 
prints and so on." 

When I told him about this statement of Lincoln Steffens he said, 
"Why, Lenin, Trotsky, and I, none of us, had that confidence in our 
survival that this man had." 

For years and years they didn't have any confidence in their sur- 
vival. And it would have taken very little, especially in 1921 when 
the Kronstadt uprising took place in Kronstadt Fortress near I^enin- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 151 

grad. The men who helped bring about the Soviet Government were 
the sailors of Kronstadt. When they saw that they had been deceived, 
that their fathers had been robbed of the land instead of having car- 
ried out the promise, they revolted and, of course, they were executed, 
drowned in blood by Trotsky. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Marcus, do you care to give us a thumbnail sketch 
of your experiences regarding the Soviet penetration into American 
finance and American industry, into American industrial establish- 
ments via their trade missions and delegations which have been oper- 
ating in the United States? 

Mr. Marcus. Shakespeare said, and I quote, "There is no darkness 
but ignorance." And ignorance has been our greatest enemy; the 
ignorance prevailing in the circles of our financiers and our indus- 
trialists is simply inexplicable and inexcusable. 

Mr. Arens. "\A^iat do you mean by that? 

Mr. Marcus. I mean by that — you take, for instance, here is the 
president of a steel corporation, Mr. Weir. He keeps on telling why 
we should do everything to bring about better coexistence. I think 
that that man should address his great wisdom not to the President 
of the United States, not to the people of the United States but to the 
mummy in the mausoleum in Red Square, to Lenin. 

Senator Welker. That same philosophy was used in 1947 after 
Czechoslovakia had been taken over by Russia when we still shipped 
them railroad trains. Am I correct? 

Mr. Marcus. Correct. And it is the same mentality as you will 
see even today. President Eisenliower and Mr. Stassen still talk 
about China and the satellite nations — "Oh, they are separate and 
apart from Russia." It is one big blot. The trouble with us is that 
we are thinking in our Anglo-Saxon terminology. Here we have 
allies. It seems to me that now, of all the times, we should be as 
tight as you could make us, because we are fighting for our existence. 
They are absolutely out to destroy us. They have said that time and 
time again. We gullibles have not taken them seriously. 

Mr. Arens. Can they destroy us economically? Do they have the 
potential and capacity ? 

Mr. Marcus. Yes. Give them another 10 years, if there is no una- 
nimity between our country and, let's say, England. Right now, 
when we are still pumping billions of dollars into England and they 
go ahead and supply such strategic materials as cranes and lathes and 
ships and everything else of that nature, then how do you expect there 
is going to be any unanimity later with South and Central America 
when they start pumping into those countries manufactured goods as a 
result of having stolen our technology ? You see we are really stupid, 
and there is no possible excuse for it. I say ignorance because it is 
exactly the word. 

Lenin said, and I am quoting liim — you will find it in volume 17, 
pages 22-23, Russian edition : 

We have never concealed the fact that our revolution is only the beginning, 
that it vpill lead to a victorious ending only then when we shall have inflamed 
the whole world with its revolutionary fires. 

Senator Welker. May I ask a few questions here, and then I prom- 
ise I will not interrupt any more. 



152 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

This witness is very profound, but this is for my information, sir. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Are you familiar with an organization known as 
Amtorg ? 

Mr. Marcus. Certainly. 

Senator Welker. Will you describe that to the committee, please? 

Mr. Marcus. The Amtorg is a New York-incorporated organization. 
There was only one American on the board of directors, and, strange 
as it may sound, he was a classmate of mine in the George Washington 
University here. His name is Dr. Ohsol. He is a graduate of Har- 
vard University, not a Communist, but he is afraid to talk because he 
has relatives in Latvia. He is a Latvian, originally. 

I was in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Affairs on the 11th 
floor, and the Federal Trade Commission, for which he was working — 
he was one of the top investigators, he was an economist, on the seventh 
floor. So we met in the George Washington University. He was the 
only board member. Otherwise, it is a 100-percent Soviet Govern- 
ment-owned organization. 

That organization was mistaken by a great many American firms as 
an American organization, and is just an agency of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment in reality. They had the entree ; they had very high type of- 
ficials like Bogdanoff, Peter Bogdanoff. By the way, he has already 
been executed, too ; liquidated. He was of the old aristocracy of Rus- 
sia. You see they used that kind of people for a time, and now they 
don't need them any more. And he made a wonderful entree to bank- 
ing houses and to institutions, industrial institutions. I might say 
that I myself have negotiated a $30 million deal for the Studebaker 
Corp. in Russia in 1927 and 1928. It fell through. 

Senator Welker. Now that you have described Amtorg to us do 
you happen to know a gentleman by the name of David Davis ? 

Mr. Marcus. David Davis? No, sir. 

Senator Welker. You are not familiar with the fact that he was 
the leading Communist official of the American Communist Party and 
has been on the payroll of Amtorg in New York, the Soviet trading 
agency ? 

Mr. Marcus. I had dealings with the engineering department. 

Senator Welker. Do you know a gentleman by the name of George 
Mink of the Soviet GPU? 

Mr. Marcus. George Mink? No, sir. 

Senator Welker. I will ask you this question. Do you have any 
information about whether or not the Soviet conspiracy has tried 
and has, in effect, infiltrated Central America for many years? 

Mr. Marcus. I was in Mexico City in April 1951. There was a 
philological congress of all of Latin America held in the city, and 
I am somewhat of a T)hilologist, although since I met a Russian who 
knew 41 languages I stopped talking about myself as a philologist. 

I was invited to that congress just for the cocktail party and I was 
introduced there to the former Ambassador of Mexico. 

Senator Welker. What was his name? 

Mr. Marcus. I don't remember his name. The Mexican Ambas- 
sador to Russia. 

Senator Welker. Oumansky? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 153 

Mr. Marcus. Not Oumansky ; he was dead at that time. It is too 
bad he didn't die before. And there, the man who introduced me to 
him said hiter on that he is one of the most important Soviet agents 
in Mexico. Now Mexico has been infiltrated to a terrific extent. 

Guatemahi at that time was ah'eady known to me. It is only now 
has it come to the forefront. You see, in Latin America, I will tell 
you very candidly, 3'ou can buy everybody from the President down. 
And the Soviet Union doesn't care. What does it mean to them? 
Tens of thousands of slaves are digging gold and they can afford 
it. For instance, in 1947 Russia was going through a terrific famine. 
Did anybody in this country ever hear about it ? No. Why ? Because 
our press representatives, they are also prisoners and none of them 
know the Russian language. 

So the result was this : the Soviet Government, despite the famine, 
shipped shiploads of grain to Italy and to France. "\Vliy ? For prop- 
aganda purposes, to embolden, to stir up the workers and the Com- 
munists in those respective points. 

Speaking about the blunders that we have made, it simply would 
take us days and days, and inexcusable blunders. 

Senator Welker. I think I will take judical notice of that. 

Mr. Marcus. When the EGA, for instance, came into being — and 
I am an old friend of Paul Hoffman, although I don't think he is 
going to be a friend of mine now — I pleaded with him a few days 
after he came into office. I repeated what I said in the New York 
University in November 1947, long before the EGA Act was passed. 
I told the students of the New York University that all the billions 
that the Marshall plan would pump into Europe and all the billions 
of NATO would accomplish nothing unless, parallel to those two 
actions, we carried on a terrific, savage campaign in Italy and France 
against the Gommunist movement in those respective countries and 
at the same time go on the liberation offensive. That is what we 
have been negligent in. 

The result was this: They pooh-poohed that idea. "We must not 
tell the French and the Italian Government what to do in their own 
country." 

We have pumped billions and billions of dollars in, and look at it. 
One out of every three in Italy is still voting the Gomnumist Party, 
and one out of four is still voting the Gommunist Party in France 
because we did nothing in that respect. 

Senator Welker. My final question, Mr. Gliairman. 

The Ghairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Marcus, the chairman of this subcommittee. 
Senator Jenner, has assigned me to head the task force to go out to 
the west coast and investigate the infiltration of Gommunists who are 
coming to our country from the borders of Mexico, if that exists. 
Do you think that is a pretty wholesome thing for us to do? 

Mr. INIarcus. I am afraid. Senator, that the people who are really 
doing the infiltrating you won't catch. 

Senator Welker. I must differ with you tiiere. We will probably 
not catch them all, but I think we will get a bite while somebody else 
is getting a mouthful. 

Mr. Marcus. I think a far better thing to do would be, in my mind, 
what I have been advocating for years. History has catapulted 



154 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

America into a very difficult position, the leader of the world to save 
the Christian civilization from this nightmare, this Commmiist night- 
mare. And, unfortunately, we have been going about it like amateurs. 
Every man that they have had, for instance, handling the psycho- 
logical warfare was an amateur, and, to my mind, anyone who takes 
on a job of that nature without the background and without the 
training and experience is just as criminally liable as if I were to 
perform a surgical operation on a patient. That has been going on. 

Now, we have to have, just as the Soviet Government has spent 
money on training schools to train people to destroy civilization that 
we know and cherish, so we have to have schools and train men and 
women who will dedicate their lives, not just between golf playing or 
between cat, dog, doll, and fashion shows like our women are indulg- 
ing, but really dedicate their lives to destroy the Soviet Union, the 
Soviet Government. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Marcus, you realize that this committee was 
born with one of its principal duties to alert the American people to 
the dangers that might affect the internal security of the United States 
of America, and if our task force is successful in showing to the Amer- 
ican people that we, in fact, do have hordes of Communists coming 
across the line on the west coast, that would be some help at least in 
carrying out our duties assigned to us by the Congress of the United 
States. 

Mr. Marcus. There is no question about it. But I maintain that we 
should also — for instance, I have been wanting the American business- 
men — the international traders who are so gullible, so ignorant on this 
subject — to organize a committee to go to Latin America and to talk 
to their counterpart, the exporters and importers. We have a power- 
ful organization. Do you know we could throttle the Communist bloc 
if we ever got to do something because we know their tricks ? We could 
stop the illegal sales of strategic materials and equipment to the Soviet 
Union and the satellites. But you just can't get them together. 

Senator Welker. They have been dragging their feet, in other 
words. 

Mr. Marcus. Worse than that. May I tell that in the text of the 
testimony? In 1950 the Exporters Club— not that I am trying to 
invite myself— but a man like I have never appeared before that Ex- 
porters Club in New York. But a Mrs. Vera Dean, the research direc- 
tor of the American Foreign Policy Association, who has been preach- 
ing all over the United States before business organizations on east- 
west trade, she appeared there. And when she got through I gave her 
plenty. She will never forget that tongue lashing I gave her. I talked 
to a great many people in the audience, and they all agreed with her. 
Not one of them, upon questioning by me, had been to the Soviet Union. 
Not one of them had ever read a book about communism in practice 
or communism in theory. And one of them even made a confession 
that for 2 years he had had on his library shelf Kravchenko's book, 
I Chose Freedom, but had never read a line. 
How do you expect them to understand what I am talking about ? 
The American Mercury published an article of mine which no 
magazine in the United States would publish, entitled "A Boycott 
Long Overdue." 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 155 

Senator Welker. What date is that, sir ? 

Mr. Marcus. November 1953. I had it for a year. 

Senator Welker. I wonder if that could be incorporated by refer- 
ence. 

The Chairman. It will be incorporated by reference. 

(The document referred to was marked "Marcus Exhibit No. 2" and 
filed for the information of the committee.) 

Senator Welker. I have concluded my questions, and I want to 
thank you very much. 

Mr. Arens. I have two brief areas to cover with you now, Mr. 
Marcus. 

Do you have information respecting Soviet pilfering of patents and 
patentable items in the United States? 

]\Ir. Marcus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Would you cover that extemporaneously very briefly, 
please ? 

Mr. Marcus. To begin with, first, as to know what to pilfer, that is 
easy. For 25 cents — it used to cost 10 cents and now 25 cents at the 
Patent Office, you can know exactly what is going on in the American 
patent field. Then you set out to reach that particular industry where 
this is being produced. And how is that done ? Well, Browder told 
the Comintern Conference in 1930, and you will find it right here, 
reported — no; 1935; I beg your pardon — reported by the State De- 
partment. He told that as of 1930 the Communists in the United 
States had 500 cells in strategic industries embracing about 1 million 
workers. That was before recognition. Imagine what it is today. So 
they go ahead and tell the boys in those various — it is so easy, you 
know. I have worked in factories. It is so easy to infiltrate a blue- 
print or a shop drawing at night and have it photostated during the 
night and deliver it in the morning and nothing has been detected. 
Why? Because our employees are always so gullible that they 
haven't the f ainest idea how to protect their interests. 

The majority of workers in American industry are loyal American 
citizens, but they are so ignorant about the Communist conspiracy, 
and nothing is being done to bring it to their attention so they could 
watch those few infiltrated Communists to keep them from stealing 
them. 

Mr. Arens. May I just inquire briefly in one other area. That is, on 
the basis of your background and experience in years gone past before 
the fabulous rise which you have had in the industrial world, have you 
had occasion to reach conclusions in your own mind respecting the 
relationship which exists between the immigration system in the 
United States and the Communist penetration? In other words, 
is the Communist conspiracy in the United States a weed which has 
been transplanted from abroad via the loopholes in the immigration 
system ? 

Mr. Marcus. It isn't a very pleasant thing for me to answer that 
question the way I must answer it under oath. Unfortunately, very 
few Americans, naturalized Americans, feel the sense of indebtedness 
to the United States that a few of us do feel. The Socialist move- 
ment was brought into this country by immigrants to whom the doors 
were swung wide open. And the opportunities — most of them came 
without a shirt on their backs, and here they have amassed fortunes ; 



156 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

here they have assumed positions in the industrial and economic and 
all other fields. The Communist movement was a direct outgrowth 
of these alien and naturalized citizens. I know a great many of them. 
I know one case of a man that I sometimes can't sleep when I think 
of that man. 

There was a man who came to this country at the age of 15 and 
went out peddling on Delancey Street. By the time he was 40 he 
was already a multimillionnaire. He was one of the leaders in the 
Socialist movement in 1919. He helped form the Communist move- 
ment and then went to Kussia to create there the acetylene-gas industry. 
And they treated him — I used to be in Russia during those days as a 
buyer for American Hair & Felt Co. I used to come there to accept 
merchandise, cattle hair, raw materials which we needed badly at 
that time. And I found his wife used to cry to me. She would say, 
"They spit at him ; they call him bourgeois." 

Imagine. For a Communist to call you bourgeois is for a high priest 
to be called an atheist. And yet it carried on and it carried on, and 
then they virtually threw him out of there and paid him out of the 
investment he made, and he had a concession for 15 years. 

He came back, and what did he do ? Did he become a good Ameri- 
can ? Oh, no. He continued to carry on. 

I don't have to tell you— it is in the record here where a former 
Attorney General testified before a Senate committee— I don't know 
which— that 91.4 percent of the leaders of the Communist movement 
of the United States were of foreign origin or married to foreigners. 
To me it is a very painful thing and in which I think I have probably 
failed to do a very important task, and that is to go after the natural- 
ized citizens of America. I can talk to them, whereas they would not 
take it from a native born. I am sure they would take it from a 
naturalized citizen to tell them they are not good Americans, that 
they are betraying the trust of this country unless they become leaders 
in the forefront of this struggle against the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope nobody will get the impression that I am ad- 
vocating war. It isn't necessary. On the contrary, I am bending all 
my efforts toward preventing a third world war, and we can still 
do that. 

Whereas the Soviet Government has in this country, let us say — 
take J. Edgar Hoover's figure of 25,000 hard-core Communists, or even 
50,000 or 100,000 ; we have 200 millions of Russians behind the Iron 
Curtain. We have millions in the satellite countries and in China 
who are with us. But there is no movement except the little thing we 
have tried with the American Friends of Russian Freedom. 

Mr. Arens. Would severance of diplomatic relations be a step to- 
ward war or a step toward avoiding war ? 

Mr. Marcus. On the contrary, it will scare the Soviet Govermnent 
to death from starting a war. 

Here is a recent escapee. This is the Russian, and this is a Russian 
paper published in San Francisco. And the escapee by name is 
Andrei Ivanovich Novoshichi. I think this ought to go into the 
record; it is very interesting. In other words, he says that if the 
Soviet Government should start a war the soldiers will not fight for 
the Soviet Government and will destroy the Soviet Government. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 157 

Mr. Arens. Through the years you have from time to time been 
in consultation witli our staff in the development of the Immigra- 
tion and Nationality Act, the McCarran-Walter Act. On the basis 
of your background and experience, what would be the effect upon 
the security of the United States if the new security provisions of the 
McCarran-Walter Act were knocked out, as some groups and organ- 
izations and people are trying to do at the present time? 

Mr. JMarcus. I think it will be the greatest service to the Kremlin. 

Mr. Arens. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Marcus. Not at all. 

The Chairman. The committee is adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., the committee was recessed, subject 
to the call of the Chair.) 

X 



^'- ..' ,1 /c^ii 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM ^ 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIED CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF 
WORLD COMMUNISM 



JULY 1 AND 8, 1954 



PART 3 



Printed for the use of the Committee ou the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
47769° WASHINGTON : 1954 



Eaf/jon Public Library 
ouperintendent of Documents 

SEP 8-1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act AND Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah I'AT McCARRAN, Nevada 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Task Force Investigating the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

RiCHAUD Arens, Special Counsel 

n 



CONTENTS 

Testimony of— Page 

Garbuny, Siegfried 172 

Taylor, Henry J 189 

Utley, Freda 159 



STKATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. O, 
The subcommittee met at 11 : 15 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 224, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Herman Welker, presiding. 
Present : Senator Herman Welker. 

Also present: Richard Arens, special counsel; and Frank W. 
Schroeder and Edward E. Duffy, professional staff members. 
Senator "Welker. The meeting will come to order. 
'Who is your first witness ? 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that the first 
witness to be sworn and to testify is Miss Freda Utley. 
Senator Welker. Will you rise. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 
Miss Utley. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF FREDA UTLEY, WASHINGTON, D. 0. 

Mr. Arens. State your name, residence, and occupation. 

Miss Utley. Freda Utley, 1717 20th Street NW., Washington, 
D. C. I am an author, writer, lecturer, et cetera. 

Senator Welker. You may i)roceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Arens. Will you kindly give the committee a brief resume of 
your background and experience with particular reference to your 
experience in the Communist operations. Communist conspiracy ? 

Miss Utley. I am born English, and I joined the Communist Party 
in England beginning in 1928 when I was a fellow at the London 
School of Economics. Also, when I was about to stand for Parliament 
in the Tabor interests. In joining the Communist Party I made a 
public statement to the press. That same year I went to the Soviet 
Union and subsequently to the Far East with my husband. 

I married a Russian in 1928 and went subsequently to live in the 
Soviet Union after a period in the East at the end of 1930. I was 6 
years living in Russia as a Russian, as the wife of a Russian. 

In 1931 I ceased to be a member of the Communist Party, as I was 
already completely and thoroughly disillusioned with life in the Soviet 
Union and with communism. I had learned the facts ;_ the reality as 
against its pretensions. I ceased to be a Communist in 1931. 

Senator Welker. You learned that in Russia ? 

159 



160 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Miss Utley. I learned that in Russia by bitter personal experience. 
I learned it very fast. I had tliought when I joined the party — I was 
one of those young people who foolishly believed that communism 
would bring social justice, a better social order — that it was a liberal 
movement. I learned after going to live in the Soviet Union that it 
was the greatest tyranny the world had ever seen. 

As I have also put in my statement here, I also came to realize by 
living in the Soviet Union this was not just a question of Stalin having 
gotten power, but the bases of communism must lead to that develop- 
ment into a tyranny everywhere in the world; that is, a materialist 
philosophy and tlieir belief that the end justifies the means, and their 
use of any methods to attain their end, nnist mean that communism 
would lead to tyranny everywhere it is established. I am making that 
very point very strongly because I think we have to realize this is not 
a question of the Russian people ; this is a question of communism. 

Mr. Arens. May I interpose this question on your background: 
You have, since breaking with the Communist Party, maintained a 
continuing interest and have continually studied the Communist op- 
erations worldwide, have you not ? 

Miss Utley. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. And you have been an author of several works with 
respect to the Communist operations in various areas of the world, 
is that correct ? 

Miss Utley. Yes. I wrote my first book exposing the Soviet Union, 
a book called "The Dream We Lost," published here in 1940. Sub- 
sequently, my books on the Far East and on other subjects have mainly 
been studies of communism and Communist strategy and methods. 

Mr. Arens. You have recently returned from an inspection tour or 
a study tour in Central Europe, is that correct? 

Miss Utley. I have been in various parts of Germany, Italy, France, 
Spain, and England. I am writing a new book on Europe. My last 
book was The China Story, published in 1951, in which I traced the 
influence of Communists and Communist sympathizers on American 
policy and showed how that influence had caused us to lose China to 
the Communists. 

Mr. Arens. I respectfully suggest that Miss Utley 's statement be 
incorporated in the record as if read and then Miss Utley now proceed 
to speak extemporaneously on the various points which are covered in 
her statement. 

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered. 

(The statement referred to follows) : 

Testimony of Freda Utley Before the Internal Security Subcommittee of 
THE Senate Committee on the Judiciary — Task Force on Strategy and 
Tactics of World Communism 

I am one of the very few Americans who learned about communism the hard 
way — by personal experience of life in the Soviet Union as it is lived by the 
Russians. Many others have visited Russia, or lived there as newspaper cor- 
respondents, diplomats, engineers, or businessmen. All these were, of necessity, 
merely observers looking at the Russian people from outside. But I was for 
6 years the wife of a Russian subject, sharing many of the hardships and all 
the fears of the Russian people. I know what it means to live continuously 
under the shadow of terror; never to know peace of mind; to be constantly 
on guard lest a careless word bring oneself or one's loved ones to death or im- 
prisonment in a slave labor camp. It is on account of my intimate and terrible 
experience of the Russian way of life under the Communist dictatorship, and 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 161 

because of my sympathy for the Russian people, that I am testifying today in 
favor of the Jenner-McCarran resolution. 

Until 1928 I had been a member of the British Labor Party. That year, I 
gave up my candidature for Parliament in the Labor interest by openly join- 
ing the Communist Party and issuing a statement to the press explaining why. 
That same year I was the Communist candidate in the London County Council 
elections. 

At that period the Communist Party was openly opposed to the Labor Party 
and openly revolutionary. The period of pretending to be democratic — the 
Popular Front period — began only after Hitler came to power, when I was no 
longer a Communist. My short period of membership in the Communist Party 
occurred while it was still possible for a Communist to be what I might call 
an honest revolutionary, as distinct from a liar and a cheat pretending to be 
democratic and reformist. In 1940 when I applied for an immigrant visa to 
the United States I answered "Yes" to the Immigi-ation authorities when asked 
whether I had ever belonged to an organization advocating the overthrow of 
governments by violence. This caused the rejection of my application, but I 
became a citizen many years later thanks to a private bill in Congress spon- 
sored by Congressman Jerry Voorhis, of California, who was a member of the 
Dies committee. 

I am bringing up this old history at the beginning of my testimony simply 
because ex-Commuuists are ipso facto suspects in the eyes of many people. 
My record shows that although I was a Communist Party member from 1928 
to 1931 I did not lie either for the party or for my own advantage either then 
or subsequently. 

A quarter of a century ago when I joined the Communist Party, I imagined 
that the Communists aimed at the emancipation of mankind, and would create 
a just social order and give freedom to oppressed colonial peoples everywhere 
in the world. Brought up in the English liberal tradition the Communist ideal 
seemed to me to be the fulfillment of man's age-long struggle for freedom and 
justice. It took only a few months of life in the Soviet Union, in the winter 
of 1930-31, to make me realize how profoundly mistaken I had been. I quickly 
understood that the Soviet Government was a greater and more terrible tyr- 
anny than any the world had yet seen, but I also soon learned that anyone 
who spoke against it got liquidated. I was caught in the web through my hus- 
band who, being a Russian subject, could not leave the Soviet Union once he 
had returned there. I stayed in Russia for 6 years, until he was arrested in 
1936 and sent without trial to a concentration camp where, presumably, he died 
many years ago. I was able to escape with our son, then 2 years old, only be- 
cause I had retained my British passport. 

I did not transfer to the Russian Communist Party after going to live in 
Russia, although I had learned that to be a Communist in Russia is to belong 
to the ruling class which enjoys both material privileges and a monopoly of 
power. My husband was not a Communist but a Socialist who had voluntarily 
returned to Russia from abroad in the false belief that a better world was 
being built in the Soviet Union. Both of us soon realized not only that Stalin 
was the greatest tyrant who has ever lived, but also that the materialist phi- 
losophy of the Communists must inevitably lead to the establishment of a similar 
tyranny wherever Communists win power. 

Together, in Russia, we shared the life of the unprivileged, nonparty people. 
We were better off than most Russians since he was a "specialist" in trade and 
finance, entitled to an above average food ration, and I had a "foreign specialist" 
ration card. But since we did not enjoy the food, housing, transport, and other 
privileges and prerequisites of the Communist aristocracy, we were close to the 
mass of the Russian people who never knew what it meant to have enough to eat, 
and who live in perpetual fear of starvation and imprisonment. I told the story 
of my life in Russia in 1940 in a book called, The Dream We Lost. 

This experience of mine eJiables me to state with certainty that the fundamental 
misconception upon which United States policy has been based is that the Rus- 
sian people support their Communist Government by choice or conviction. I am 
certain that the very great majority of the Russian people and other peoples 
behind the Iron Curtain hate, as well as fear, the Soviet Government. The trouble 
is that no one has any hope of overthrowing it without outside help. The fact 
that so many millions of Russians went over to the Germans in the first stages of 
the war is a proof of what I have always contended concerning the attitude of the 
Russian people. The Germans might have retained or won the support of the 



162 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

overwhelming majority of the Russian people had it not been for the stupid and 
cruel behavior of the Nazis. We should take care that we do not ourselves make 
the mistake of forcing the Russian people to support their Communist Government 
by regarding them, instead of communism, as the enemy. Today many of the 
very same people who have been most sympathetic to Communism in the past 
are busy telling us that we should hate the Russians. They are today, wittingly 
or unwittingly, furthering the Communist cause by diverting our enmity away 
from communism as such to Russia. This kind of upside-down Communist prop- 
aganda has been so effective that Dr. Ward V. Evans, in his minority report on 
Dr. Oppenheimer, cited as "evidence" of Dr. Oppenheimer's loyalty the fact that 
"he hates Russia." 

I consider the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union woiild 
put fresh heart into the forces of resistance to Communist tyranny behind the 
Iron Curtain. It would help to wipe out the impression we created during and 
after the war that w^e approved of Communist tyranny. It is a true but tragic fact 
that at the war's end America and her allies helped Stalin to reestablish his dic- 
tatorship in full force over the Russian people. By the many pronouncements 
of our Government leaders, by the attitude of our newspapers, and radio com- 
mentators, we made it all too clear that we were behind Stalin and that we gave 
him, instead of the Russian people, the credit for the heroism of the Red army. 
By turning back uncounted numbers of Russian deserters, displaced persons, and 
others, who knew that they would be shot or sent to concentration camps when 
returned to the Soviet Union, we must have helped establish the belief in the 
hearts of the Russian people that there was no hope to be expected from the West. 
It is necessary that we do everything possible to wipe out the Impression given 
in the war and postwar periods that we are ready to support Communist tyranny 
so long as that tyranny does not menace us. And nothing could be better calcu- 
lated to achieve this purpose than Implementation of the Jenner-McCarran 
resolution. 

I could quote many statements by past and present representatives of the 
American people showing their misunderstanding of the nature of communism, of 
its aims and its methods, and of the basis of its terrible power. The past two ad- 
ministrations made repeated statements implying that we believed that Soviet 
communism is a progressive power. As late as July 16, 1950, President Truman 
said: 

"By making possible the formulation and execution of liberal reforms such as 
the nationalization of certain industries and land redistribution, which are de- 
sired by a majority of Koreans, this policy should also help to broaden the basis 
for an understanding with the Russians." 

The only possible meaning which can be read into this statement of Mr. 
Truman's is that the Communists are liberal and progressive, and that if we 
emulate them we can get along with them. In other words, the basic assump- 
tion upon which the Truman-Acheson foreign policy was based was that America 
could insure world peace if we showed evidence that our economic, social, and 
political policies are as progressive as those of the Communists. 

The second great illusion about communism which has distorted our policy 
is a corollary of the first. It is the belief that communism conquers not by force 
and terror, but through popular support. For instance, Mr. Acheson, on January 
12, 1950, declared that the best way of stopping communism in Asia was to: 
"develop a soundness and administration of these new governments and to de- 
velop their i-esources and their technical skills so that they are not subject to 
penetration either through ignorance or because they believe these false premises, 
or because there is real distress in their areas. If we can help that develop- 
ment, if we can go forward with it, then we have brought about the best way 
that anyone knows of stopping this spread of communism." 

In other words the Acheson school of thought believes that good works and 
the redistribution of wealth can stop communism. 

The third great illusion w^hich formerly permitted the State Department to 
view Communist conquests, such as that of China, with complacency, is the belief 
that once the Chinese or any other people learn that communism does not give 
the benefits expected they can discard it. The fact is, however, that it is impos- 
sible for a nation which has come under Communist tyranny to find a way of 
overthrowing it without outside help. 

It would seem that in spite of all the lessons of the past few years our thinking 
and our policy are still permeated with the old illusions. Tor instance, on 
June IG, last. President Eisenhower, in opposing the breaking off of all trade 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COM]VIUNISM 163 

with the Iron Curtain countries, stated that the satellite countries would then 
have no place to go but Russia for anything they needed. He further stated 
that it should be our objective "to encourage the centrifugal forces," and he 
implied that this could be done by continuing to trade with the Soviet Empire. 

The plain fact is, as the Jcnner-McCarrau resolution recognizes, that breaking 
of£ diplomatic and trading relations with the Soviet countries would both weaken 
the Soviet Empire and strengthen, not weaken, the ties between us and the 
Russian people. For it would give them hope that the tyrannical regime which 
rules over them could collapse, thanks to our pressure. And far from hurting 
the people of the Soviet Empire materially it might help them. The Soviet Gov- 
ernment is able to export only by squeezing its subjects and depriving them of 
food and other necessities, while using imports almost exclusively to build up 
its war potential. Consequently, the Russian people and those of the satellite 
countries, far from deriving any benefit from increased trade with the free world, 
would in all probability be hungrier than ever now. 

It will be fatal should we listen to the contrary advice given by Sir Winston 
Churchill, and the Americans who share his illusion that the Soviet Government 
represents the Russian people; and that we can have peace and security by 
appeasing the Communists either in the Far East or in Europe. 

Those who like and those who hate the Russians are equally wi;ong in imagin- 
ing that the Russian people have any say in determining Soviet policy, and 
equally dangerous as advisers as to what American policy should be. 

When I read Sir Winston Churchill's statement last Monday to the National 
Press Club, I was appalled at his ignorance and the bad advice which he is giving, 
thanks to that ignorance. He based his plea for a try at "peaceful coexistence" 
with the Soviet Empire on "the mood of the people of Russia," and on "the 
great wish in Russia to have a better time among the masses of the people." He 
urged us to "make sure that the Russian people would not feel that they might 
gain far more by a quarter of a century of peaceful development of their own 
country" than by war. And he begged us "to leave no stone unturned" to give 
the Russian people "a chance to grasp the prospects of great material well-being 
which will be offered to all these millions." In a word, he urged us to base our 
policy on the erroneous assumption that the wishes of the Russian people deter- 
mine Communist policy. 

I am convinced from my own experience, as well as from my years of study 
of Communist aims, methods, and strategy, that the policy being urged upon us 
by the British Government, and the American supporters of this policy, would 
destroy all hope of liberation among the Russian people and other peoples under 
Communist rule, and thus immeasurably strengthen the Soviet tyranny, and 
increase both its capacity for, and will to, aggression. 

There was, no doubt, a time in its early stages when communism appealed, as 
it did once to me, to the desires of people for social justice and emancipation. 
Today, with the abundant evidence available to us of what goes on imder Com- 
munist rule, it is no longer possible to believe in Communist professions or 
propaganda. Today, Communist power advances not because people believe that 
it offers hope of a better world, but because people fear it, and have too little 
confidence in the will to resist it in the Western world. 

It is difficult for an American to understand what terror means. People who 
have never been hungry cannot imagine what it is to be without bread. People 
who have never known the fear of death or slavery, not only for themselves, 
but for their loved ones, under a totalitarian tyranny, cannot realize what it 
means to be without freedom. Americans cannot imagine what it means to be 
under a regime iu which every man fears his neighbor and even his friends, 
because anyone may be a member of the secret police, or be driven sooner or later 
to betray his friend or neighbor by intolerable pressures to accuse others in order 
to escape himself. This terror which keeps the people behind the Iron Curtain 
subservient als.o has a terrible effect on the countries close to the Soviet Union 
and menaced by communism. There, the fear is of what will happen to you 
or to your family if and when the Communists seize power. People in the lauds 
which fear Communist conquest sometimes give money to the Communists, or 
in other ways assist the Communists, not because they have any illusions about 
communism, but as a sort of insurance policy for the future. If in those coun- 
tries there were no poverty the Communists would still have strength, because 
of the fear of the terrible penalties which await all who dare to oppose 
communism. 

47709°— 54— pt. 3 2 



164 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The only way to ovorcome that debilitating fear is to arouse confidence and 
hope that there is a banner on our side to which brave men can repair with some 
hope of saving their countries, their families, and their faith. Every time we 
give way to Communist pressures or bolster up Communist governments by 
diplomatic dickering and nice words, such as Mr. Churchill is so fond of ad- 
dressing to the Soviet Union, we strike fear into the hearts of millions of people. 
Thoy have seen how, in the past, we have been ready to grasp the bloody luind 
of the Communist tyrants in friendship and they are always afraid we may 
do it again if it suits our purpose — and then what would happen to those who 
had been on our side? 

The breaking off of diplomatic relations as recommended by Senators Jenner 
and McCarran would allay such fears by recreating confidence in American 
leadership of the free world. 

The people who have already had personal experience of what Communist 
rule means are today our most reliable allies. We have seen this in the case 
of the people of Berlin and East Germany. Today, I consider that the Germans 
and probably also the Spaniards are our most reliable allies in Europe — thanks 
to the fact that they have seen for themselves what Soviet Russia is like, or 
what communism means. The Spaniards experienced the horror of communism 
in their civil war. In the case of the Germans, they do not only know what 
their brothers are suffering in Soviet Germany; almost every German family 
has a member who fought in Russia or who was a prisoner in Russia, or died 
of starvation there. Others know W'hat Communist conquest means by their 
experience of the raping, looting, and murder of the Red Army. These people 
can be counted upon to prefer death to Soviet slavery. 

You will have heard that the slogan which the late Ernst Reuter, mayor of 
Berlin, gave to his people dui-ing the blockade was "Better a horrible end than 
horror without end." A year ago the people of East Berlin and East Germany 
gave signal proof in their unarmed uprising against the Communist power that 
they are prepared to die for liberty. But here again we must recognize the 
fact that men must have hope and the right of self-defense if they are to re- 
main on our side. The Germans are still denied the right of self-defense. 
Thanks to French stalling on the EDC treaty we have still not accepted the 
West Germans as our allies. We may succeed in forcing them to try to save 
themselves by coming to terms with Moscow, if we convince them that this is 
the only way in which they can hope to reunite their country, or avoid the fate 
of being conquered by the Communists because we refused to let them rearm. 

As we know, the Communist technique is always to divide and rule. In the 
case of our former enemies, the Communists and their friends and dupes have 
continued successfully to divide us by keeping the old hate fires burning. 

There is another point which I think we should take into consideration in con- 
sidering the techniques of communism and the manner in which it has success- 
fully advanced its power so fast and so far. I refer here to what one might call 
the demand for perfection. We have seen how, in the case of one of our most 
loyal allies, Chiang Kai-shek, the charge continually made by the Communists, 
and echoed by many good, but deluded, Americans, was that the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment of China was so undemocratic and corrupt that we should cease to give 
it any aid. This propaganda was so successful that we abandoned our Chinese 
allies, denied them arms and ammunition in the most critical period of the civil 
war, and thus helped bring the Communists to power in China. 

The same game, in a minor way, has been played on Syngman Rhee. It is 
clear that the Communists and their friends and dupes have been extremely 
successful in undermining and vilifying some of our best allies by making im- 
possible demands for the premature establishment of American democratic in- 
stitutions and methods of government lu backward countries fighting against 
communism. 

I was in China in 1945-46 during the period of General Marshall's mission, 
and saw how United States policy was distorted by the influence of the Com- 
munists and their dupes, and by the "dumb liberals," who failed to realize that 
Chinese Communist rule would be a calamity for us as well as for the Chinese 
people. I warned against the consequences of the Marshall-Acheson policy in 
a book called Last Chance in China, published in 1947. But my voice, like that 
of others who realized what must be the consequence of the Truman-Acheson 
China policy, was drowned by the IPR chorus and other friends of the Chinese 
Communists. In 1951, in The China Story, I told the story of those tragic post- 
war years, during which American policy was based on a complete misunder- 
standing of the nature and aims of communism. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 165 

Even today this misunderstanding continues in tlie Western World in a revised 
form, as illustrated by my quotations from Sir Winston Churchill's most recent 
statement. 

Today we are in danger of disheartening the resistance forces in the Com- 
munist world, not because we any longer believe in the false promises of the 
Soviet Government, but because we fear to provoke the Communists by resolute 
action. This was made clear to me In Berlin in February. At the beginning 
of the conference, thanks to the fine speeches being made by the representatives 
of the Western powers, hopes were raised that at long last we were going to 
stand up to the Soviet Union. By the end of the second week of the confer- 
ence, it had become clear that the Communists had once again succeeded in mak- 
ing us climb down. We agreed to discuss the Far East at a news conference 
in Geneva without any quid pro quo in the shape of concessions on German 
unification. 

The streets along which the representatives of the victorious powers passed 
in their automobiles each day on the way to the conference were thickly lined 
with crowds, standing for hours in the bitter cold in both the West and East 
sectors of the city. Every one I spoke to among those crowds expressed the 
hope that America would show sufficient strength and will to force the Soviet 
Union to retreat. But during the last days I was there, disillusionment had 
already set in. It was felt that we or our allies had displayed such a lack of 
power and resolution that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would ever 
make any concessions. If, at any time, instead of arranging another conference 
with the Soviets, the Jenner-jMcCarran resolution had been passed, I am certain 
that these despairing people would once again have had confidence in us. 

If the Berliners and East Berliners who are in the frontline of the battle 
hope that we will not make concessions to the Soviet Union, surely we in the 
far rear should not be governed by our fears, or give way to the desire of the 
British and the French for peace at any price. 

It seems to me that in spite of the fact that the Communists and their sympa- 
thizers no longer hold important posts in our Government and the press, radio, 
and imiversities, people with a soft attitude toward communism and, above all, 
people who have no understanding of the nature, aims, or methods of communism, 
still hold the commanding heights in the press, radio, and other media which 
influence public opinion. 

I use the words "commanding heights" because I recall that Lenin used 
this expression in 1921 when he instituted the new economic policy which per- 
mitted some private ownership of land and small-scale industry. He then said 
that, provided the Soviet state continued to own all large-scale industry and 
the banks, its possession of these "commanding heights" would insure the victory 
of socialism. So today it seems to me the influence in the press and radio 
of Communist sympathizers and dupes, and of those who know nothing about 
communism, is still sufficient, if continued, to insure a Communist victory. 

So long as those who form public opinion and those who direct our foreign 
policy hold fallacious opinions as regards the nature of communism and how to 
combat it, we can have no hope of winning the struggle for the world. 

We also face a certain danger from those who say "A plague on all your houses." 
and think that at this stage of history we can return to isolationism. It is 
of vital importance that we should do two things if we are to survive. 

One is to give moral and material support to our real allies : that is to say, 
to the people who can be counted upon to stick by us, and fight with us if 
necessary, and not to those who want to be neutral, but whom we hope to win 
over to our side by bribes, or by following their appeasement policies. 

Secondly, we must try to keep hopes of liberation alive among the Russians, 
the Chinese, and the other people under Communist rule. This we can do only 
if we give proof of our own standfast opposition to Soviet tyranny ; and convince 
them that we shall never again betray other people for our own illusory ad- 
vantage, as we did at Teheran. Yalta, and Potsdam. This is why it seem.s to me 
that breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government would 
have such an excellent effect. I see the Soviet empire as a structure which 
would fall very rapidly if once a revolt started against It with a little hope of 
success. If the oppressed people of the Soviet empire believe that we would help 
them they might free themselves of the fear which pararlyses them. And if 
a revolt once started it would spread like wildfire. 

The Jenner-McCarran resolution should awaken the American people to the 
Immediate necessity for the "agonizing reappraisal" of our foreign policy, which 
Mr. Dulles said a year ago might have to be undertaken. I am glad of this 



1C6 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

opportunity to testify in favor of tliis resolution from tlie standpoint of an 
American who knows from experience how greatly it would be welcomed by 
the subjects of the dictator of all the Russians. 

Miss Utley. I feel this is important because of the suspicion in 
which ex-Communists are held. I have not been a Communist since 
1931, and second, when I was a Communist I did not lie about any 
affiliations. I did not lie for myself or the party. IVlien I tried to 
immigrate to the United States in 1940 and was asked at Ellis Island 
whether I had ever belonged to an organization advocating the over- 
throw of the Government by violence, I said yes and was rejected. 
I can claim, although I was a Communist, I have never been one of 
the peo]:)le who lied and deceived. "\Mien I found I had to do those 
tilings, I left the party. 

Senator Welker. You understand you are testifying under oath 
and any statement on the material fact which is not true constitutes 
perjury? 

Miss Utley; Yes. 

Mr. Arens. I observe in your prepared statement, your thesis, that 
there are fundamenta,l misconceptions in the United States policy 
with respect to the Communist government having the support of 
the Russian people. I should like to ask you now if you will kindly 
direct your attention to that theme. 

Miss Utley. I am trying to counteract the impression which lias 
been created by so many statements on the part of the past adminis- 
trations; the quotes I have given from Mv. Acheson and President 
Truman in my statement ; tlie idea that the Russian people support 
their regime; that the Russian people are the same thing as the Soviet 
Government; that we can, by establishing good relations with the 
Russian people, have peace and solve the problem. 

I have particularly drawn attention to what I consider the most 
pernicious thing, which is the statement just recently made by Sir 
Winston Churchill here in Washington in which he speaks all the 
time as if we could have peace by agreement, by getting along Avith, 
or helping, the peo]Dle of the Soviet Union. 

This is on page 7 of my statement : 

lie based his plea for a try at "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Empire 
on "the mood of the people of Russia," and on "the great wish in Russia to 
have a better time nnioiis the masses of the people." He urs;ed us to "make 
sure that the Russian people would not feel that they might gain far more by 
a quarter of a century of peaceful development of their own country," than by 
war. 

The whole implication of Churchill's statement is that if we con- 
vince tiie Russian people they can have a better life by living at peace 
with us, we shall have peace. That implies that the Russian people 
determine Soviet policy. I think that is the great fallacy of our 
time. That is what I have been trying to establish, also, by these 
quotations which I gave before. 

Senator Welker.- As a matter of fact, then, it is your opinion that 
the Russian people have nothing whatsoever to do with the policy ? 

Miss Utley. Nothing whatsoever. 

Senator Welker. It conies from the Kremlin, the Politburo, and 
the masters of the Kremlin ? 

Miss Utley.- Yes. Any Russian subject — I prefer to call them 
subjects — who criticizes the Government i^oiicy in the tiniest degree 



STRATEGY ANU TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 167 

knows that he will either be sent to prison or executed. He will be 
arrested, all right. Nobody dares to open his mouth and criticize the 
Government.: 

]\Ir. Aeens. On the basis of your best information, what suggestion 
could you make to the committee with respect to the number of slave 
laborers, people who are actually enslaved behind the Iron Curtain ? 

Miss Utley. You mean the actual number ? 

Mr. Arens. Yes. What would be your estimate ? 

Miss Utlet. The estimates vary between 14 and 20 million. I would 
say not less than 15 million. It may be more. 

Mr. Arens. Would you say the people who are not actually in slave 
labor camps are themselves enslaved in the sense they are not free ? 

Miss Utley. They are absolutely enslaved. They are really slave 
laborers. Even the people not in concentration camps are not far 
removed from slaves. They have none of the normal civil rights which 
we take for granted. 

Mr. Arens. Miss Utley, what, in your Judgment, based on your 
experience through the years both as a Communist and as a student 
of international communism, would be the first elemental step for our 
Nation to take in undertaking to stem the tide of encroachment of 
international communism ? 

Miss Utley. That is why I welcome very much this resolution, the 
Jenner-McCarran resolution, because I think breaking off diplomatic 
relations and all trade relations as well with the Soviet Empire would 
be of the greatest help in heartening the people of the Soviet Union. 
The whole point is that we unfortunately during and after the war 
gave rise to the belief in Russia that we supported the Soviet tyranny 
by turning back all the deserters and very many displaced persons. 
By our every action and praise of Stalin as our great ally we helped 
to clamp down again the tyranny on the Soviet people. By breaking 
off relations, it seems to me we are giving some hope to the enslaved 
peoples of Russia that sometime or other our pressure may bring down 
the Soviet Government. 

Mr. Arens. Under date of June 18, 1954, the Senator from Indiana, 
Mr. Jenner, and the Senator from Nevada, Mr. McCarran, and tlie 
Senator from Idaho, Mr. Welker, introduced S. 3632 making it a 
felony to import or ship in interstate commerce any commodity or 
goods produced by slave labor. Should that bill become law, what in 
your judgment would be the effect on the people behind the Iron Cur- 
tian? 

Miss Utley. I think it is such an excellent resolution that it might 
ameliorate the condition of the people in the slave labor camps. Here 
I speak from experience. In the early thirties when I was in Russia 
there was a big campaign against slave labor on the matter of timber. 
I think Canada in particular was concerned with this matter. I re- 
mem.ber at the time this caused tremendous worry and anxiety in 
Russia, and it was said that conditions had been slightly improved in 
the timber slave labor camps as a consequence of this agitation to stop 
buying goods produced by slave labor. I think the resolution is so 
good because it would hurt the Soviet Government, and it might also 
possibly force the Soviet Government somewhat to ameliorate the con- 
dition of the slaves. 

Senator Welker. How will we find out whether or not these goods 
are produced by slave labor ? 



168 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Miss XJtley. In the case of certain things like timber, we actually 
know that is all produced by slave labor. I think the intensive studies 
that have been made of all the slave labor camps, the mines, timber and 
all the other things that are produced, it would not be too difficult to 
tell. In a sense, all goods in Russia are produced by slave labor. But 
that is carrying it too far, perhaps, in the sense the workers have no 
rights. They have to work as long as they are told for whatever wages 
are decreed. They haven't the right to strike. They can be arrested 
and ]:)unished for being a few minutes late at work. I do not know 
how far that resolution is intended to carry. 

Mr. Arens. I suggest that S. 3632 and the statement which ac- 
companied it at the time of its introduction be incorporated in this 
record. 

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered. 

(The material referred to follows:) 

Prohibition of Importation ob Transportation in Interstate Commerce of 
Goods Produced by Slave LAboe 

Statement by Hon. William E. Jenner, of Indiana, in the Senate of the United 
States, Friday, June 18, 1954 

Mr. Jenner. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Nevada 
(Mr. McCarran), and the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Welker), I introduce for ap- 
propriate reference a bill making it a felony to import or ship in interstate com- 
merce any commodity or goods produced by slave labor. I ask unanimous con- 
sent that a statement by me pertaining to the bill be printed in the Record at this 
point, as a part of my remarks. 

The Presiding Officer. The bill will be received and appropriately referred ; 
and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the Record, 

The bill (S. 3632) making it a felony to import or ship in interstate commerce 
any commodity or goods produced by slave labor. Introduced by Mr. Jenner (for 
himself, Mr. McCarran, and Mr. Welker), was received, read twice by its title, 
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, as follows : 

"A bill making It a felony to Import or ship In interstate commerce any commodity or 
goods produced by slave labor 

"Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Repi'esentatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That, from and after the effective date of 
this act, it shall be unlawful to import into the United States or to ship in inter- 
state commerce in the United States any commodity or goods produced by slave 
labor. 

"Sec. 2. Any person who shall violate this act shall be guilty of a felony, and 
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than 2 
years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." 

The statement by Senator Jenner is as follows : 

"Statement by Senator Jenner 

"In the recent past, as chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the 
Senate, I appointed a task force for the purpose of maintaining a continuing 
study and investigation of the strategy and tactics of world communism. This 
task force, which consists of myself as chairman, with Senators Herman Welker 
and Pat McCarran as members, has been conducting a series of hearings on 
this general subject because we know that to adequately appraise the operation 
of the Communist conspiracy in this Nation it is essential that we keep abreast 
of the world strategy and tactics of international communism. 

"In the hearings which we have thus far conducted one of the principal subjects 
which has been under consideration is the worldwide trade offensive of the 
Kremlin which has as its ultimate goal economic strangulation of the West 
through ruinous competition of the products of slave labor. This threat presents 
to us not only the issue of protecting the American workingman in his job, but it 
also presents a moral issue of the highest order. Every shipload of goods pro- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 169 

duced by slave labor In Iron Curtain countries which we import into this 
country merely whets the appetite of the Kremlin for greater numbers to be 
subjected to this inhuman exploitation. 

"Accordingly, the bill (S. 3G32) has been patterned after our laws which pro- 
hibit the shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor. If 
those laws are right, then this bill is right. If it is right to protect the American 
workingman from ruinous competition by slave labor then this bill is right. 
If it is right to protect ourselves and the free world from the spreading menace 
of international communism then this bill is right." 



[S. 3632, 83d Cong., 2d sess.] 

A BILL Making It a felony to import or ship in Interstate commerce any commodity or 
goods produced by slave labor 

Be it enacted ty the Senate and House of Representatives ot the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That, from and after the effective date of this 
Act, it shall be unlawful to import into the United States or to ship in inter- 
state commerce in the United States any commodity or goods produced by slave 
labor. 

Sec. 2. Any person who shall violate this Act shall be guilty of a felony, 
and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment of not more 
than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 

Mr. Arens. In the course of the recent past, under date of June 24, 
the Senator from Idaho presented to the Senate and it was recently 
approved unanimously by the Committee on the Judiciary a resolu- 
tion, No. 169, authorizing the President of the United States to pro- 
claim the first Sunday of each month for a period of 12 months for 
prayer for people enslaved behind the Iron Curtain. 

On the basis of your background and experience, I ask you, aside 
from the actual petition to the divine for intervention, what effect 
would the proclamation called for in this resolution have on the minds 
and hearts of the people behind the Iron Curtain ? 

Miss Utley. Again I think it would have an excellent result, an ex- 
cellent effect, because again it would sliow the people behind the Iron 
Curtain we care a little, which they have not had much reason to sup- 
pose in the past. 

May I add to that, I think the excellent effect, also, of this proposal 
by Senator Welker is that it might help to awaken the American peo- 
ple a little as to the sufferings of people under communism. What I 
am getting at, we all know there has never been in the press or on the 
radio or in any way in the United States any comparable campaign to 
arouse the people of America to a knowledge of what communism 
means and what Communist terror is, what life is like in the Soviet 
Empire, anything comparable to what was done in the case of Nazi 
Germany^ Every American knew of the horrors in Nazi Germany, but 
there has never been anything comparable to arouse opinion here con- 
cerning the horrors and terrors in the Soviet Empire. 

Mr. Aeens. I respectfully suggest that this record now reflect the 
contents of Senate Joint Resolution 169 and of the very brief state- 
ment which was made by the Committee on the Judiciary under date 
of June 29 in reporting Senate Joint Eesolution 169 unanimously 
favorably to the Senate. 

Senator Welker. It is so ordered. 



170 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

(The material referred to follows:) 

IS. Kept. 1659, 83d Cong., 2d sess.I 

Authorizing the President of the United States of America to Proclaim the 
First Sunday of Each Month for a Period of 12 Months for Prayer foe 
People Enslaved Behind the Iron Curtain 

Tiie Committee on the Judiciary, to wliich was referred tlie joint resolution 
(S. J. Res. 169) authorizing the President of the United States of America to 
proclaim the first Sunday of each month for a period of 12 months for prayer for 
people enslaved behind the Iron Curtain, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution 
be agreed to. 

statement 

The people of the United States share in their hearts the suffering of the mil- 
lions of fellow human beings who are enslaved behind the Iron Curtain. It is 
the judgment of the committee that periodic prayer on behalf of these fellow 
human beings would not only open the channels for Divine intervention to allevi- 
ate their suffering, but would strengthen the bonds of understanding between 
them and the American people. 

The committee, after consideration of all the facts, is of the opinion that the 
joint resolution (S. J. lies. 169) should be agreed to. 



[S. J. Res. 109, 83d Cong., 2d sess.J 

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing the President of the United States of America to 
proclaim the first Sunday of each month for a period of twelve months for prayer for 
people enslaved behind the Iron Curtain 

Resolved "by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is au- 
thorized and directed to issue a proclamation inviting the people of the United 
States to pause on the first Sunday of each month during the course of a period of 
twelve months for prayer on behalf of the millions of fellow human beings who 
are enslaved behind the Iron Curtain. 

Miss Utley. What I am trying to say in my answer is that what we 
need to do is to approach this whole problem of Soviet aggression 
and of communism from the opposite point of view from which it 
has been approached in the past. We have to approach it from the 
knowledge that the Russian people are groaning under tyranny. We 
have got to hearten them by measures showing that we are anti-Com- 
munist, anti-Soviet Govermnent ; whereas, the approach to now has 
been, "Let's get along with the Soviet Union, let's convince the Rus- 
sian people of how good and kind and progressive and friendly we 
are." 

Mr. Arens. You were in Germany at the time of the Berlin Con- 
ference in February, were you not ? 

Miss Utley. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have any observations to make on the basis 
of your background and experience as to the strategy of the Western 
Powers at Berlin in the conference ? 

Miss Utley. Yes. I have something in my statement on that. I 
was there during the conference, and I spoke to the people who lined 
the streets to watch Dulles, Eden and others drive to the confer- 
ence. I talked to a lot of people in the street. At the beginning of 
the conference there was a real hope that the United States was going 
to be firm enough and strong enough to force the Soviet Union to 
make concessions. At the end of the second week when we agreed 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 171 

to meet again in Geneva to discuss the Far East, which we formerly 
refused to do and without getting anything in return, no quid pro 
quo, the Germans were beginning to say, "Well, it is hopeless. The 
United States and its allies haven't got what it takes to stand up 
to the Soviet Union or to force the Soviet Union back." 

I think the effect of all this dickering and diplomatic negotia- 
tions has been altogether bad for that reason, because it is always we 
who make the concessions. We always seem to be the weaker side. 

Mr. Arens. Finally, I observe in your statement reference to two 
courses of action which you suggest if we and the West are to survive. 
I should like to invite your comments on those two courses of action. 

IVIiss Utlet. In my concluding section I make the very strong point 
that we have to convince the people of the Soviet empire that we are 
anti-Communist, anti-Soviet ; that we are for them and not for their 
Government; that these resolutions are designed to do precisely that, 
to keep alive some hope behind the Iron Curtain that eventually our 
pressures may bring down their Government. 

Secondly, that this breaking off of trade with the Soviet Union, 
which is of the greatest importance — here again I think we are far 
from doing any hurt to the peoples of the Soviet empire. We will 
again actually help them. I know from my experience in the Soviet 
jfmon that exports from Eussia are squeezed out of the people. In 
the period when they were exporting for the 5-year plans they were 
taking food, wheat, butter, textiles, and exporting them in order 
to import material for their war machine. That is, by increasing 
trade with the Soviet Union we merely make the life of the people 
more miserable. By refusing to trade with them there is more for 
them to consume at home. Therefore, the whole argument which is 
made, I am sorry to say, even by the President, that we have to do 
some trade because we have to encourage the centrifugal forces—to 
try and lessen the dependence of the satellites on the Soviet Union— is, 
I think, an entirely false argument. What they import is imported 
for their war machine. There is no advantage to the people in trad- 
ing with us. 

May I add one other thing to that— again on this point on page 4 
of my testimony— that we should be awfully careful not to make the 
same kind of mistakes that the Germans made in Eussia in a different 
form. What I am referring to is that we know millions of the Eus- 
sians went over to the Germans in the first stage of the war. Then 
because of the behavior of the Nazis in Eussia, they turned back to 
the Soviet Government and fought for their country against the Ger- 
mans. AVhat I am afraid of is that by this identification of com- 
munism with the Eussian people which is made by so many— Winston 
Churchill and continually by the State Department under :Mr. Ache- 
son, talking about the Eussians or Eussia when w^e mean communism— 
if we do that, we are going to force the Eussian people to support 
their Government because of the hatred of the world against them 
instead of against communism. 

Here I point out on page 4 what seemed to be a most significant 
statement by Dr. Evans, who issued that minority report in favor of 
Dr. Oppeniieimer. He actually gives i>s a proof of Dr. Oppen- 
heimers loyaty that "he hates Eussia," as if that made him a loyal 
citizen. This is the kind of thing I am trying to get at ; that it should 

47760'— 54— pt 3 3 



172 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

be ai-r^ued that anybody who hates Russia is a jiood man, when what 
we sliould be hating is communism and not tlie Russian people. 

We must get the American people to understand that the Soviet 
Union is bad, that the Soviet peoi)le have no say in their destiny at 
all. These resolutions and this efl'ort by this committee to really get 
to understand the strategy of communism and the real situation be- 
hind the Iron Curtain are most valuable. If we could only get this 
to the American public, there would be a different attitude. That is 
what we need so badly if we are to save ourselves. 

I am one of the very few Americans who ever lived the life of the 
Russian people. I was not observing it from outside as a diplomat 
or from a journalist's point of view, but as a Russian sees it. I was 
not one of the privileged Russians, either. I know what it means to 
be under that government, to know what real terror is so you dare 
not speak to anybody; that you are afraid of your friends and neigh- 
bors because even if they are not in the secret police, they may be 
forced to accuse you in order to save themselves. 

I do not think Americans have any conception or any idea of what 
terror means. We have got to try and make them understand what 
it means. You have got to have experienced it before you can explain. 
If the public here understood what it means to live under this kind 
of terror, they would not make this foolish mistake of identifying the 
Russians with the Communist government. This seems to me at the 
]-)resent moment a tremendously important thing because we have 
Sir Winston Churchill and the whole influence of the British press 
designed to make us make that mistake, and establish more trade with 
the Soviet ITnion on the false assumption that we can get along by 
establishing good relations with the Russian people, which we cannot 
do anyhow because we are not allow^ed to talk to them. 

Senator Welker. On behalf of Chairman Jenner of the full Com- 
mittee of the Internal Security and every member thereof and the 
staff, I want to thank you profusely for your significant contribution 
to the hearings. It is gratifying for you people to take your time 
and effort to come here and help us in the problem that is ours so that 
we can do our best to carry out the obligation we owe to the Senate of 
the United States to protect the internal security of our United States. 

Again I say thank you, and may you keep up your splendid crusade. 

IVIiss Utley. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Arens. The next witness is Mr. Siegfried Garbuny. 

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will 
give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Garbuny. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF SIEGFRIED GARBUNY, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

Senator Welker. State your name, residence, and occupation. 

Mr. Garbuny. IMy address is 120 West 105th Street, New York, 
N. Y. My profession is economist. 

Senator Welker. Where were you born ? 

Mr. Garbuny. In Germany, sir. I am an American citizen and 
came to this country in 1938. 

Senator Welker. What is your age ? 

Mr. Garbuny. I am 39 now, sir. 

Senator Y/elker. You may proceed, Counsel. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 173 

Do you have a prepared statement ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Kindly give us a brief sketch of your ex]3erience in the 
field in which you are engaged as an economist, with particular refer- 
ence to your experience in international trade. 

Mr. Garbuny. First of all, I would like to state that I do not belong 
to any political party, never have been enrolled in any political party, 
and have voted always on the issue. I like to think of myself as a con- 
servative or perhaps a bit on the right side, but certainly as a con- 
servative. 

My experience in international economics is merely academic, with 
the exception of brief periods I served in the Department of State 
after I was separated from the service of the Ajiierican Army. Before 
the Department of State, I worked in the Office of Strategic Services 
and Research and Analysis and happened to be in the U. S. S. R. di- 
vision of that service. It was actually in OSS that my interest in Rus- 
sian affairs was aroused, and I have never begged it in studying the 
issue, not only officially but for myself. 

Since my chosen field is international trade and finance, this was 
almost a matter of cause to do after I left Government service and 
turned to teaching the field of international trade in New York City. 

In international trade I notice in my academic studies that a very 
interesting pattern is shaping up ; namely, the pattern of international 
trade as we are used to it as western and democratic trade, foreign trade 
to increase our standard of living, to make things better. Then a pe- 
culiar type of international trade which I would like to refer to as 
Soviet foreign trade which has nothing to do with improvement of 
standards of living, but as it is at the present moment, really a type of 
trade which is an instrmnent of consequences. 

The Soviets seem to me to use international trade for outright ag- 
grandizement of their political and military power wherever they 
can set foot. This pattern I have particularly studied over the years 
and have published, sporadically, articles on the subject, one of which 
has a similar title to the statement here, "Foreign Trade — Road to 
Conquest," which I published in the Commercial International Chron- 
icle in New York in February of 1953. 

Mr. Arens. I respectfully suggest that the prepared statement of 
Mr. Garbuny be incorporated into the record at this point as if read 
and that Mr. Garbuny be permitted to proceed to summarize his vari- 
ous points extemporaneously. 

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered. 

(The material referred to follows) : 

Testimony of Siegfried Gabbuny Before the Internal Security Subcom- 
mittee OF the Senate Committee on the Judiciary — Task Force on Strategy 
AND Tactics of World Communism 

soviet foreign trade — instrument of conquest 

Commerce amoug nations has always been regarded as a means to establish 
friendly relations among the partners and as a symbol of peace. This has been 
a time-honored maxim ; but the Soviet Russians have taught the world differ- 
ently. They have shown that this instrument of peace can easily be turned into 
a mighty weapon of warfare and into an emblem of slavery. 

Immediately after their advent to power the Bolsheviks, then led by Lenin, 
reserved in April 1918 foreign trade for the state as a government monopoly. 
No private Individual was allowed to engage in commerce over the borders. The 



174 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

state through government corporations inside and outside Russia took complete 
charge of the international exchange of goods. The trade program was simple ; 
only what the Communist state needed for its survival would he imported, the 
needs and demand of the individual Russian citizen was no longer of any con- 
cern. Foreign trade would no longer serve to increase the Russian standard of 
living. 

True enough, as long as the Russians were busy with their internal affairs, 
the volume of Russian foreign trade remained relatively small. Yet, the Soviet 
state learned soon that the foreign trade monopoly offered special extra advan- 
tages to the Communist regime. It kept the citizens so much better in complete 
isolation and bondage at home, and yet it could be used for economic chicanery 
abroad. Soviet Russia's foreign exchange dumping maneuvers in the 1920's 
to upset foreign markets and to obtain much desired foreign currencies are still 
remembered. The foreign trade monopoly therefore remained one of the sheet 
anchors of the Soviet economy, and the decree of 1918 was incorporated in arti- 
cle 14 of Russia's so-called constitution. 

It was, however, only after the Second World War that the Russians under- 
stood the formidable dynamic power that they could unleash through foreign 
trade on their road to conquest. Commercial policy became therefore a vigorous 
part of their general foreign policy. After World War II a systematic effort was 
undertaken to conquer not only by arms but also by foreign trade. It might be 
said indeed that foreign trade became an alternative to armed intervention and 
propaganda. In conjunction with the military and propaganda apparatus stands 
therefore now foreign economic penetration as a means of conquest. The post- 
war world suddenly saw Russia as the newest champion of international trade. 
That of course was something really sensational. With the voices of the sirens 
the Russians were now singing the praise of international cooperation. In all 
their pronouncements, verbal and written, the Russians were using the ter- 
minology of the democratic world, stressing the sovereignty and the equal rights 
of all trading partners as well as the mutual benefits of international trade. All 
the technical terms that we find in the commercial treaties of the western world 
were used. Yes, indeed, the Russians became almost treaty-happy engaging in 
a multitude of treaties and trade agreements wherever they could lodge them. 
In addition, trade fairs were sponsored and even a world economic conference 
could be assembled in Moscow in April 1952. And yet, it was Satan at work. 

From the very beginning, in spite of all their efforts, the Russians could never 
conceal their total inability to collaborate in foreign commerce on an interna- 
tional plane. Their role in world political organizations is too well known to be 
repeated here ; but perhaps a reminder of their attitude toward the International 
IMonetary Fund and the World Bank is still in order. To make membership in 
the International Monetary Fund palatable to the Russians, the Bretton Woods 
Agreements provided that a country whose currency was only domestically used 
should not have to bare its financial affairs to the fund authorities. 

This provision actually referred to the Russian situation, since the ruble, 
though allegedly on a gold basis, is not an international currency and is used 
only for internal circulation. The Russians could therefore have joined the 
fund without the duty of information about their own financial affairs, a matter 
in which they have always been very sensitive; yet, they would still have re- 
tained the privilege to learn about the economic status of their colleagues, a 
jioint of everlasting interest to them. But even this extraordinary concession 
was not enough. The Russians did not join. International cooperation would 
have meant the abandonment of their goal to conquer the world. Cooperation 
always means equal rights for all the partners. The Russians would have been 
forced to become truly democratic and to give up the fight for the world revolu- 
tion for which they saw again propitious conditions. 

This attitude of the Soviets toward the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank is typical of Russia's "will to international cooperation" and 
has been duplicated many times. Even if the Russians join an international 
economic or for that matter political organization, it will be for destructive and 
not for constructive purposes. This is inherent in their dictatorial quest for 
power. We just must realize that the Soviets are incapable of international co- 
operation in any sphere. All the more it is necessary to study how they wielded 
the hammer of foreign trade and what their future strategy is going to be. 

The story of the subjugation of Russia's satellites and of the establishment 
of puppet regimes is well known, but less known are their economic consequences. 
No matter what their past economic setup and orientation were, all satellite 
countries turned into planned economies with their center in Moscow. The 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMAIUNISM 175' 

Soviet "plan area" thus created includes now the U. S. S. R. proper, Red China, 
North (Red) Korea. Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany, Poland. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia. To keep up appearances, all these 
countries had so far economic plans of their own, well attuned of course to the 
Soviet 5-year plan ; but there is now substantial evidence that even this last 
sham will fall, and that the future Soviet 5-year plan will also cover the 
satellite economies, which will then be in form as well as in fact Russian 
dependencies. 

Already now the Soviet plan area has all the characteristics of the Orossraum 
of Hitler's Germany and of the coprosperity sphere of prewar Japan. The plans 
of the satellites, originally 2 or 3 years in duration, are at the moment orthodox 
5-year plans in step with Russia's own program. Just as they did for Russia, 
the plans provide for the industrialization of the satellites. A raw materials 
pool is envisaged by which each country exports raw materials in relative 
abundance for goods in short supply that can be had from one or the other 
partner. This traffic, however, must not be imagined as smooth commercial 
intercourse based on the profit motive and individual prosperity, but rather as 
directed by what the Soviet Union deems necessary in its own interest. 

The Soviets have gone so far as to send specialists to the satellites to super- 
vise production and to train skilled labor in order to step up production. They 
receive trainees from satellite countries who learn next to the party doctrine 
mechanical skills in the U. S. S. R. On a higher level the Russians established 
mixed commissions for scientific and technological cooperation. So far there 
exist only a Soviet-Polish, a Soviet-Albanian, a Soviet-Czech, a Soviet-Bulgarian, 
and a Soviet-East German commission. It is the task of these commissions 
to impart Soviet know-how to the satellites in those industrial areas in which 
the Soviets wish a rapid increase of output. 

Where it is necessary, the Russians send equipment and even ship whole 
factories to underindustrialized areas. In this connection the Russians boast 
that they have given Rumania badly needed oil refineries and take full credit 
for whatever improvements in equipment Finland's Industries can show. 

At the same time, the Soviet orbit moved to establish uniform prices, tariffs, 
measures, and railroad gages. The brotherhood is pushed even further in some 
areas, where the Russians established by force, of course, mixed corporations 
with joint management as in the case of SovRom, the Russian-Rumanian oil 
concern, or in that of the mixed Russian-Chinese civil aeronautics lines. 

To give all this activity a harmless appearance and to convince those who 
are gullible enough of their peaceful intentions, the Russians have based this 
system of economic annexation on a mesh of commercial treaties. Anyone who 
reads the speech of Mikoyan, the past architect of Russian foreign trade, before 
the 19th party congress in Moscow in October 1952 will be indeed surprised 
by the minister's constant reference to international law, commercial treaties, 
respect for the sovereignty of treaty partners — in brief, to all the concepts for- 
ever advocated by bourgeois jurisprudence. For their own case, Mr. Mikoyan 
and his collaborators praise the fact that Russia's commercial treaties with the 
"people's republics" — which is Russia's term for the satellites — are long-term 
understandings. This, so they say, guarantees a smooth development of the 
satellite industries. It protects them against crises and gives them confidence 
in their future by securing adequate raw material supply and markets for their 
products. The Russians, of course, never mention the fact that these treaties 
make the satellites completely dependent on the U. S. S. R. and this not only 
for a short period, but rather for a long time to come. Indeed through proto- 
cols to the existing agreements or through renegotiation closer and closer ties 
are continually established, as was recently evidenced by the protocol of Janu- 
ary 1954 to the Russian-Chinese trade agreement of February 1950. This 
protocol increased the items of exchange between the two countries in a con- 
siderable fashion, although the original agreement had already provided for 
the closest cooperation. 

In other words, the commercial treaties of the Soviet Union with the satellites 
serve as the legal basis for the annexation to the Russian Grossraum. The con- 
sequences of this annexation are clear. Soviet trade with the satellites and the 
trade of the satellites among themselves have tremendously increased, in some 
instances as in the case of the Russian-Finnish trade in machinery and machine 
tools as much as 10 times over prewar operations. By the same token, of 
course, the satellite trade with the western countries has rapidly decreased in 
Bpite of some occasional flickering here and there. This is a fact of tremendous 
significance wMcli cannot be stressed enough, because originally the trade of 



176 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

especially the European satellites with Russia was relatively small. The 
economies of Russia and of the satellites were not complementary, but in many 
ways — though of course in different dimensions — rather parallel. For buying 
and selling the satellites had therfore normally turned to Central and Western 
Europe as their natural markets. 

This again is significant, because it shows that the satellites' turn to the 
Soviet Union must be accompanied by a structural change of their economies 
as well as by a strong decline of their standard of living, at least until this 
structural change and the consequent integration into the Soviet orbit are fully 
completed. The Russians will not worry about all this, since they look on the 
Soviet plan area as something similar to a war economy where the citizens' 
welfare is nothing compared to the state's defense. The feelings of the sub- 
jected nations are of course a different matter which the democracies will do 
well to remember. 

For the time being, the world must realize that the U. S. S. R. has conquered 
the satellite area through its foreign trade policies. The next question is there- 
fore, whether Russia's conquest through foreign trade is on the march else- 
where. The answer is, alas, positive. The Russians have found their new 
weapon a good one, and are determined to use it to the fullest degree, whereby 
they discriminate with infernal instinct between their victims and apply the 
medicine in different doses. 

While Stalin was still philosophizing about the two separate world markets — 
the capitalist and the Communist — the Soviet Government invited representa- 
tives of both from all over the world to an international economic conference 
at Moscow in April 1952. From all reports this conference must have been a 
rather smooth and "Bourgeois" affair under the chairmanship of Mr. Nesterov, 
the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the Soviet Union. Here, the 
Soviets proclaimed to all who wanted to listen their readiness to trade with any 
nation that wanted to enter into commerce with the U. S. S. R. The Russians 
soon found that there was more of a response than perhaps even they had 
expected. Respectable Britishers like Lord John Boyd Orr cheered enthusi- 
astically, the South Americans lent a willing ear, the Near East and Central 
Asia seemed ripe victims. 

The Soviets of course realized that the game here would not be as easy as 
with the satellites and that the approach would have to be different, but they 
set out to work immediately. Since they are not in a hurry and are used to 
waiting many years if necessary, as in the case of China, where the battle 
took 25 years, they will be satisfied in the beginning with moderate results, much 
more moderate than in the plan area, as long as they get results. For the 
democracies, however, every Russian success is a tocsin of danger which must 
not be ignored. Disaster is bound to come, unless the Russian conquest through 
trade is not brought to a halt in due time. 

Some of the new Russian successes shall be recorded here ; but for all of them 
It is an established fact that the Russians are hardly interested in the economic 
advantages that might come to them from their new foreign trade connections, 
but much rather in the establishment of a political hold on their new trade 
partners. 

The Near East, the Arab world, has always been of special interest to the 
Russians. Two major trade agreements are noteworthy in this respect, the 
Egyptian- Soviet Payments Agreement of November 195.3 and the Lebanese-Rus- 
sian Trade and Payments Agreement of June 1954. The latter agreement is 
rather elaboi-ate and provides for an exchange of goods in each direction in the 
amount of LLIO million.' The Soviets will deliver industrial goods; and the 
Lebanese agricultural products. This agreement also contains through its spe- 
cial handling of the most-favored-nation clause a Soviet recognition of the 
Arab countries as a whole large unit, an idea from which some day not only 
the Arabs but also the Soviets may draw profit. The agreement also ties the 
method of establishing the exchange rate between tlie ruble and the Lebanese 
pound to the gold content of the ruble, and makes the ruble this way for once 
an international gold-based currency, quite contrary to its usual merely domestic 
function. This may have no practical significance, but it reveals once more 
the independent and arbitrary way in which the Russians see fit to arrange 
their economic and financial relations with their various trade partners. 

Yet, the two Near Eastern agreements pale in the light of the Ru.sso-Indiiin 
trade agreement which constitutes a significant milestone on Russia's road to 
conquest. 

* Lebanese liras. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMJVIUNISM 177 

On- December 2, 1953, Russia and India concluded a trade and payments agree- 
ment whicli will run for 5 years after which it can be extended by negotiations 
which must begin 3 months before the expiration date. Both parties have agreed 
to give one another preferential treatment in shipping and other facilities. 
Russia will render technical assistance on the installation and operation of 
equipment that it supplies, a clause that reminds very much of the agreements 
with the satellite plan area. All payments are to be made in Indian rupees; 
for this purpose, the State Bank of Russia will maintain accounts with the 
Reserve Bank of India and one or more commercial banks in India. The bal- 
ances in these accounts will be convertible into sterling on demand. The agree- 
ment provides for the exchange of a large number of goods. Among the 20 items 
exportable from India during the first year of the agreement are jute goods, tea, 
coffee, tobacco, spices, shellac, wool, hides, and skins, vegetable and essential oils, 
coir yarn and ropes, live animals, chemical films, books, and cottage products. 
Among the 39 items available for export from Russia are wheat, barley, crude 
petroleum and petroleum products, timber and paper, optical goods, dyestuffs, 
chemicals, medicines, printed matter, films, and a wide range of industrial equip- 
ment, machinery and machine tools. 

India's imports from Russia were valued at ''R2.3 million (about $480,000) in 
1950-51, R13.S million in 1951-52, and R2.4 million in 1952-53. Exports to Rus- 
sia during those 3 years amounted to R13.4 million, R6.7 million, and R8.5 million 
respectively. 

This agreement is doubtless of great political and psychological importance, 
for both India and the U. S. S. R. Leading Indian newspapers have therefore 
hailed this compact in glowing terms. The Bengali Ananda Bazar Patrika of 
Calcutta stres.sed in an enthusiastic leading article Russia's willingness to send 
machinery and to give technical assistance to the unskilled Indians. And since 
western experience has already shown that the best capital equipment can be 
useless in India because of the lack of native skill, it may well be that the Rus- 
sian teachers will be permanent in India, as they once were in China, and that 
they may repeat the Chinese lesson there. 

Another Indian paper, the Hindu Ted of Delhi, on the other hand stressed the 
fact that the agreement adopted the Indian rupee as the unit of account and that 
thus Russia was the first great power to acknowledge India's sovereign currency. 
This was valued by the paper as a great success in prestige. In other words, 
India hailed the agreement not only as a commercial progress, but as a national 
victory. Russian commercial policy hit indeed the target. Yet, analogies with 
the beginnings of Russia's battle for China cannot be removed from the student's 
mind. In that case. Dr. Sun-Yat-sen had invited the Russians to help to estab- 
lish China's national might through a Russian-trained Chinese army. The Rus- 
sians came and actually never left, until China became fully subservient to the 
Soviet Union. 

Russia has not stopped courting the western European democracies. Agree- 
ments with France, England, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, the Benelux area 
are still the order of the day in spite of Russia's unmitigated hatred of and oppo- 
sition to any western bloc such as the Council of Europe, or the European Coal 
and Steel Community, not to mention the Marshall plan which they sabotaged 
from its very beginning. Sensing economic difficiilties in England, the Soviets 
did not hesitate to come forward with grandiose offers as at the time of the 
Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin in February 1954, when the present 
Russian Foreign Trade Minister Kabanov submitted to a British trade delega- 
tion in Moscow orders to the tune of $1,120,000. 

Without doubt, such offers, even if they do not become contracts, leave a deep 
impression on the business world in any country, and this is perhaps the main 
reason why they were made. Other western countries received similar "favors" 
from the Soviet Union. The intention is clear. The Russians want to use 
such foreign trade to wean the western countries from their American ally. 
Beyond that they try to break the American export controls which is evident 
from the lists of goods they submitted to the Byitish. These lists contained 
goods that could not be shipped to the Soviets under the present mutual defense 
assistance system. The Russians doubtless believe that, with the end of 
American economic aid to Europe in sight, they wiU be able to play the field 
again strongly and they don't want to delay the start. 

Very striking, however, are the Russian attempts to conquer South America 
through trade. Two Latin American countries have recently concluded trade 



'Bussian rubles. 



178 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

agreements with the U. S. S. R. for the first time in their national existence : 
Argentina in August 1053 and Uruguay in Fehruary 1954. The Argentine 
a^'reement is the first Soviet trade agreement in Latin America. It is so strik- 
ing in its contents and reveals so vk^ell the Russian modus operandi that a de- 
tailed account of it has been appended to this statement. Already here it may 
be said that th(3 agreement clearly shows the craftiness and the Machiavellian 
disguise by which the Russians try to establish a political beachhead through 
the friendly way of commerce. ^v,TToeT5^-c 

There are then four different groups of countries where the U. S. S. R. tries 
to infiltrate its power through foreign trade. Firstly, the plan area of the 
satellites where the operation was fully successful, then the Near East and 
India where there is a very successful beginning ; thirdly, the old West where 
economic crises may play into the hands of the Russian schemers, and finally 
the Latin American countries where virgin ground was just brolien. 

The question may well be asked: Why do these countries conclude trade 
agreements with the Soviet Union? The Soviet record is, after all, obvious. The 
answer cannot -be given in one statement; for the reasons are different for the 
various nations. But it is safe to say that each nation hopes that it will be 
spared the extreme, though the basis for such hope is not rational ; on the other 
hand each such nation is always driven to the Russians by some emergency. 
This emergency, whichever it may be, has always been cleverly understood 
and exploited to the full by the Russians. Economic difficulties in England 
make English businessmen amenable to Russian approaches which are only 
too gladly forthcoming ; similarly, the difficulty to find a market for its products 
and a cheap source of supply drives Argentina into Soviet hands; Indian in- 
dependence and indigence find the Russians as teachers and psychological and 
economic supports; the Arab world may take a similar view. The satellites 
were under Russian military occupation, but with Germany's destruction at 
the end of the Second World War Russia was anyhow a logical power to turn 
to. All these are possible answers to the query at issue. 

Indeed at the moment of writing, infiuential circles in West Germany look 
to the U. S. S. R. for help in their fight for German reunification. Dr. Bruen- 
ing's recent ominous reference to the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 is ill-boding. 
Through their agreement with the Russians at Rapallo the Germans played 
Russia oif against the West. It marked the beginning of their new military and 
economic rise as a sovereign power, but it also fortified tremendously the posi- 
tion of the Soviet Union in the world. 

Since Ur. Adenauer and his government, as well as the Western Powers have 
shelved the question of German reunification for the time being, the Russians 
have here an opening to win over those West German circles who place Ger- 
many's reunification highest on the agenda. Premier Malenkov has understood 
this, and in his interview with East Germany's Premier Otto Grotewohl earlier 
this' month already expressed his desire for cultural and economic relations 
with West Germany. It would be fatal if Dr. Adenauer could not prevail in his 
Western policy against those influential circles in Germany, including the three 
former Reichschancellors, Drs. Bruening, Luther, and Wirth, who would pact 
with the Devil to reunite Germany. All this is a matter of conjecture ; but the 
Soviets sense here once again one of these psychological moments which may lead 
West Germany toward them for another Rapallo. 

A last problem of Russian foreign trade should be mooted. That is the ques- 
tion of Soviet gold. Does Soviet gold, as an Instrument of foreign trade quite 
independent from the Soviet treaty system, constitute a danger to the Western 
World? Not too much can be said about this issue. A few things, however, 
are certain. The Soviets have, so far, not used gold as an instrument of eco- 
nomic warfare. Their gold production is a matter of estimate; nor is much 
known about the extent of Russian gold deposits, especially in the Lena and 
Kolyma regions. Soviet gold sales have recently taken place in the free mar- 
kets of Europe, including London ; but there is no report of disturbances of the 
market through Russian gold sales. The question of how much Russia would 
benefit from a rise in the price of gold and whether she would benefit more than 
such an underdeveloped area as the Union of South Africa is therefore difficult to 
answer. Yet, the immediate problem here is whether Russian gold does not 
make its way into the American Treasury. It is quite likely, considering the 
low cost of remelting, that Soviet gold freed of the hammer-and-sickle emblem 
Is shipped to the United States by Russia's European trade partners. By accept- 
ing such gold without knowing the actual origin the American Treasury would 
facilitate Russian trade with Western Europe, which is certainly a doubtful 
result. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 179 

In conclusion, it may be stated that militarily, economically, and politically 
tlie Soviet Union has only one firm and strong opponent : the United States of 
America. For this reason the U. S. S. R. has reserved all its abuse and in- 
vectives for this country. Its propaganda against the United States of America 
in other countries is formidable. With each trade agreement it concludes, it also 
extends its propaganda radius. With the wares it sends, it passes along its anti- 
American hatred. Against that the United States has to take the strongest 
stand. This propaganda must not be underrated. Everything must be done to 
counteract it. Especially now that economic aid may decrease or cease, the 
United States must be vigilant to lieep the loyalty of the former aid recipients. 
Beyond that, it is especially important to vitiate the Soviet trade effort. Having 
recognized Soviet foreign trade as an instrument of conquest, everything must 
be done by the United States to attract the world's trade to its own shnv<js or 
to help to establish conditions in which the free world can trade with each other 
without Russia's participation. Export controls as established in the Export 
Control Act of 1949 and the Battle Act of 1951 should be continued in one way 
or another. That they were extremely successful is evidenced by the violent 
Russian reaction against them. That they hurt the Russian orbit much more 
than the Western World is evidenced by the statistics. Through a proper tariff 
policy and technical assistance the United States can continue to help the free 
world to stay free and beyond that stop the Soviet march to conquest. 

It would be unrealistic to hope for complete commercial isolation of the 
U. S. S. R., but the cordon sanitaire can be tucked tighter and tighter. If the 
United States remains a market for foreign products and a supplier of credit, 
raw materials, and finished products, if trade, not aid, becomes the regular fea- 
ture of American relations with other nations, then the free nations wiU have no 
reason to fall for Russia's siren song. 

It is clear that Russia's foreign trade serves one purpose only : to aggrandize 
the Soviet power. It is one more instrument of conquest. 

In such circumstances It is the task of the United States to stop not only the 
Russian soldier, but also the Russian trader. 

Appendix 

the soviet-abgentine teade agreement * 

Late in October 1953, Buenos Aires announced the first shipment of goods for 
the Soviet Union under the Russian-Argentine trade agreement signed in August 

1953 

The Importance of this agreement lies in its political aspects, Including economic 
policy, and not in its detailed provisions. The first trade agreement between the 
two countries, It furthers a general rapprochement between the partners and also 
establishes a lively exchange of goods, which heretofore was small, since 1949 
almost nonextant The agreement, concluded for 1 year, is renewable at the 
parties' wish. „ , 

It Is easy to understand Argentine's new course. Her hard currency reserves 
accrued during the war were soon exhausted. This resulted from Argentina's 
increased import requirements due to the growth of her population and indus- 
trialization. Furthermore, orders unfilled on account of the war and substantial 
price increases in Argentina's traditional purveyor countries aggravated the situ- 
ation. To offset current imports through exports was difficult for the Argentines 
because of their creditors' unwillingness to accept their goods. The Argentines 
looked therefore for cheap supplies from nations that were willing to buy Argen- 
tine goods. They found Russia. 

The agreement also reflects Argentina's wish for independence from one par- 
ticular exporter or group of exporters, e. g., the United States and Great Britain, 
and for prosperous trade with many countries. Argentina hopes to thus secure 
that freedom which might grant her at the time of Industrial maturity a formid- 
able position in South America and the world over. This attitude is stressed by 
Argentina's renewed intensive trading with West Germany. 

In comparison with Argentina's American and British trade the dimensions 
of the Russian-Argentine agreement are moderate. Very likely the United States 
and Great Britain will continue to loom large in Argentine trade, though both 
countries have lost substantial ground to Germany. But the important point is 
that the goods which Argentina buys from the United States and the United 

» OriginaUy published as a letter to the editor of the New York Times, December 14, 195S. 



180 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Kingdom parallel those in tbe Russian convention ; and there is nothing to stop 
her from expanding her trade with the new partner. 

A look at Russia reveals that the economic- consequences of this compact are 
Insignificant for the Soviet Union. Economically the agreemerit is important only 
for the Latin-American partner. Why then did the Soviet Union conclude this 
agreement? A scrutiny of Russian foreign trade pacts gives the answer. 

In the Soviet economy foreign trade has always played a secondary role and 
served more political than economic purposes. Mter the Second World War 
trade pacts have been a studied instrument for economic penetration and politi- 
cal domination. The trade agreements with Russia's European satellites are an 
object lesson. These coiiutries turned their trade to Russia and objected their 
existence to Soviet tutelage. All these pacts, economically significant for Rus- 
sia's partners, are unimportant for the Soviet economy and constitute a Soviet 
attempt to win control over the partner via the partner's economy. 

The significance of the Russo-Argentine agreement for the Soviet Union 
lies therefore exclusively in the extension of its political power to Argentina. 
The Russians will try to tie the Latin American Republic more to the Soviet 
orbit by putting the agreement in the future on a larger scale. The economic 
bond tightened, Soviet propaganda will increase to wean Argentina from her 
North American and European partners. That Argentina is just the beginning 
of Russian penetration of South America is obvious and is evidenced by the 
willingness of President Ibanez of Chile to open trade negotiations with the 
Russians. 

When Stalin criticized Argentina to President Roosevelt, Peron was not yet 
the head of that nation. Since then peronismo has come into ascendancy. 
Peron borrowed the idea of the 5-year plans and established a complete dictator- 
ship. Russia's present cordial relations with Argentina led to the speculation 
that dictatorships, no matter what their differences, always attract each other. 
This affinity may spell dire political and economic consequences for the Western 
countries. This is the deeper warning of tlie Russian-Argentine trade agree-' 
ment for the democratic world. 

Mr. Arens. May I invite your attention to the Soviet plan area 
which you alhide to in your statement ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. What is the Soviet plan area ? 

Mr. Garbuny. You mav recall that at the end of the war the 
neighboring states of the Soviet Union were under Eussian military 
occupation. They had no choice to do anything but what the Rus- 
sians told them. Germany was utterly prostrated and destroyed. 
Germany didn't exist. So they had to do what the Russian masters 
ordered. The Russians, in order to give their policy a peaceful garb, 
began to establish a mesh of international trade treaties, in particular 
with practically all neighboring areas and even areas a little bit 
farther removed from the Soviet border. 

This plan area which was created by trade agreements includes to- 
day Red China — if I may call Communist China simply Red China — 
North Korea, Albania, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun- 
gary, and the Mongolian Republic. 

Mr. Arens. How does this Soviet plan area operate ? 

Mr. Garbuny. There is a central plan in Moscow dictating to all 
these satellites, as we are used to calling them, what they have to do 
agriculturally, industrially, commercially, et cetera. Up to now these 
satellite countries had plans of their own which were put in step with 
the master plan in Moscow. Quite recently — I think this last disguise 
will fall and there will be one 5-year plan in Moscow simply taking 
in all these countries as a subcategory of the plan. 

Mr. Arens. "Wliat is the objective of the plan ? 

Mr. Garbuny. To use these countries for Russian economy and just 
to make them colonies or servants of the Soviet economy without any 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 181 

sovereignty of their own, without any economic or political life of 
their own. 

Mr. Areists. Let us move to the Soviet trade offensive outside of this 
plan area. First, however, tlie plan area embracing the satellite 
countries, if you will kindly address yourself to the Soviet trade of- 
fensive outside of the plan area. 

Mr'. Garbuny. I shall be glad to do that. 

On page 7, 1 begin with the story of the Soviet offensive elsewhere. 
I like to distinguish here three different groups. This is a mass of- 
fensive, but there are three different approaches. One approach or 
one offensive is directed to the Near East. I would prefer the word 
'•Xear East" to "Middle East" because it is actually the old Near East, 
the Arab world. It may well go into North Africa and up to Spanish 
Morocco if that is not stopped. 

Then connected with the attack, the commercial attack, on the near 
eastern world is the attempt to rope India into the Russia orbit. I 
believe the Russian-Indian trade agreement of 1954 is perhaps the 
most portraj^ed agreement that the Soviet Union has concluded re- 
cently. 

Mr.ARENS. Why? 

Mr. Garbuny. It is an agreement which branches out into practi- 
cally every sphere of economic activity — exports and imports — com- 
prising dilTerent major categories of commodities. You will realize 
that 59 major categories actually mean all the trade. That this is so 
is also borne out by the fact that the Russians will not only deliver 
equipment but they will send — and this is the dangerous part — the 
trainers, the instructors with the equipment to train the Indians. It 
does not take much imagination that these instructors, if past history 
in China is any example, will bring not only machinery and know- 
how but doctrine and the Communist Party line. 

Mr. Arens. Are you conversant with the fact that the United States 
Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Materials reports that we procure 
from India — by "we" I mean the United States — certain very stra- 
tegic materials ? 

Mr. Garbuny. I am not familiar with this particular report you 
mentioned, but I am from my war activity, of course, familiar with the 
fact that we got a good deal from India ; for instance, very special type 
of mica which was very important then. Take Finland, if I may go 
back to the plan area. We used to do a lot of trade with Finland. 
But that is taken away. The sa.me thing may happen in India if we 
don't watch. 

Mr. Arens. Would you say the Communist trade offensive in the 
Middle East and in India is part of a political strategy ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Absolutely, absolutely. I am absolutely convinced 
of that. 

Mr. Arens. What is the third area now of the Communist trade 
offensive ? You have spoken first of all of your Communist trade plan 
area with the satellites; secondly, of the Communist trade to offen- 
sive in the Middle East; and now what is the third area ? 

Mr. Garbuny. The third area is what I would like to call the old 
democracies. It is no reflection because of the word "old." By this 
I mean a trade offense which is almost surreptitiously undertaken on 
countries like Great Britain, France, Italy, the Scandinavian coun- 
tries, and quite recently in a very indirect way with the West German 
Republic. 



182 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Arens. How about South ximerica ? Is that inckided ? 

Mr. Garbuny. No, sir. That would be the fourth area for very 
special reasons. 

Mr. Arens. Let us maintain our interest on the third area, then. 

Mr. Garbuny. The offensive here, as far as I can see it, and this I 
must say again is only based on theoretical studies, it seems to me that 
the Soviets' move in the moment they notice there is a crisis. It does 
not take much reading to know there are crises continually in these 
countries because they are not back to their normal position from the 
ravages of the Second World War and all the strain they have been 
under after that. 

As an example, one of the most striking examples, I felt, was the 
offer made to some British industrialists as reported in the New York 
Times in February — a Mr. Scott — an offer of over a billion dollars of 
goods to be delivered from England to the Soviet Union. This offer 
was made at the time of the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference. It 
wag like a bombshell. Everyone was upset. If the Kussians can give 
so much business to England and no strings attached — they want to 
pay — why shouldn't we trade with Russia then ? 

This is an almost normal reaction. This is devilish psychology ap- 
plied by the Russian Foreign Trade Ministry. They do the same 
thing in France and England. You would not believe the Russians 
even have a trade agreement with such far-out islands as the Faeroe 
Islands, which is the Danish unit north of the British Isles, and in the 
same relation to the Danish King that that island was before it became 
independent. 

The Faeroe Islands deliver on the basis of a trade agreement of 
January or February of this year to the Soviet Union their fish catch 
almost exclusively. The Faeroe Islands do not need any other coun- 
try. They exist on what the Russians give them. This is a very small 
example. I could multiply it with Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Italy. 
May I call your attention to the way the Russians have handled the 
100 million reparations payment on which they insisted from Italy? 

When the Italians showed a weakness, they did that. But at the 
same time Mr. Togliatti was going all over the country. There seemed 
to be a possibility of a quick kill. "Those assets you hold in Rumania, 
in Albania, in Bulgaria, and which we have taken over, will be counted 
as part of the reparation," they said, which means the Italians, I don't 
know exactly what amount, but they will pay only a very small amount 
of this hundred million dollars. This is the way in which the western 
democracy is lured into the Soviet orbit. 

Mr. Arens. They are lured into the political orbit because of being 
lured into the economic orbit ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Absolutely. 

Mr. Arens. May I invite your attention to the area of Latin Amer- 
ica or South America as a fourth area of the Communist trade offen- 
sive? 

Mr. Garbuny. Gladly. I may call to your attention that on page 
17 I have inserted a letter to the editor of the New York Times that 
I took the liberty to write in December of 1953 on the Soviet- Argen- 
tine trade agreement. 

Senator Welker. Was it printed ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Yes, on December 14 in the New York Times. This 
agreement went by, unnoticed in America. I have been watchinff and 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COIMMUNISM 183 

■waiting. Wlien I noticed this agreement in the Pravda in August, I 
made a mental note that I might write about it if nobody else men- 
tions it. 

]\Ir. Aeens. Maybe it went unnoticed to your judgment, but there 
are those on the internal subcommittee who did take note of it. 

Mr. Garbuny. I was thinking actually of the commercial journals 
and the daily papers which reported the fact, but not the importance 
of the agreement. 

"When I noticed nobody took the initiative, I began to write this 
letter. "\^^iat I said then still stands, and I felt it might be best to at- 
tach it here. That is a very significant agreement for many reasons. 
The first reason is that it is the first straight agreement which the 
Soviet Union concluded with any Latin American country. The 
second reason is that Argentina, which in our mind has always been, 
if I may say so, a conservative and careful country, extended its hand 
to atheist Communist countries. That was the second important 
reason. 

The third reason was this agreement is economically of absolutely 
no importance to the Soviet Union. One hundred fifty million dollars 
of goods each way is a drop in the bucket for the Soviet Union. The 
goods that go over have absolutely no relevance for the Soviet economy. 

Senator Welker. "What are the goods, wheat ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Yes. Hides, skins, oil, seed — similar agricultural 
goods which the Soviet Union can get from the Soviet countries. One 
hundred fifty million dollars, on the other hand, is important for 
Argentina's economy. So the favor economically in this agreement is 
for Argentina. They got machinery, transportation equipment, 
trucks, railroads, electrical equipment, refrigerators, etc. 

Senator "Welker. "Wliat do you have to say with respect to whether 
or not this trade agreement with Argentina does not amount to, in fact, 
a chance for the Soviet Union — for the Communists, should I say — to 
send in technicians under the guise of being technicians but who are 
espionage agents, saboteurs, and men sent there destined to sell the 
Communist philosophy to the people of Argentina ? 

]Mr. Garbuny, Sir, this agreement does not provide, as the Indian 
agreement does, for sending of instructors or skilled personnel to 
establish plans. The Argentines apparently have that. But with each 
commercial treaty and with each unfolding of the treaty, because 
there will always be a trade mission, there will always be controlled 
personnel, there will always be a ship and a crew of sailors that come 
with the cargo. Though I have no knowledge of that, experience in 
trade matters tells me tliat as soon as you have trade going the Russian 
way, you need trade representation in Buenos Aires. 

Senator "Welker. As a matter of fact, you know — and I think this 
committee has had some testimony to the effect — that the trade mis- 
sions are infiltrated with nothing but Communist agents destined to 
sell their philosophy to this country. 

Mv. Garbuny. Absolutely, There is no doubt about it. Such a 
trade agreement will establish such a trade mission parallel to Am- 
torg in this country. This agi'eement, I may say, is in addition not 
a single agreement. Shortly after that Argentina concluded an agree- 
ment with Poland; in other words, with another country that belongs 
to the Soviet orbit — 



184 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, doesn't Kussia have trade 
agreements with all of the satellite countries now ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Not with all, sir. I cannot give you the list, but with 
a substantial amount. I am sure, but my knowledge may be deficient. 
I must admit that. 

Mr. Arens. The Kremlin has the satellite countries integrated in 
various stages in their economic system, whether by trade agreement 
or pact or just by outright order? 

Mr. Garbuny. There is no doubt about that, but special trade agree- 
ments which I have come across as far as Argentina is concerned is 
only the Argentine-Russian agreement and the Argentine-Polish 
agreement. 

Senator Welker. I would like to ask your opinion about the politi- 
cal philosophy of Argentina. Is that a dictatorship or a republic, or is 
it destined, as you say, to the right or to the left or liberal or what ? 
How would you describe that to the committee ? 

Mr. Garbuny. This has been much on my mind, sir. I must say 
this : From all I can see, and I wish to be somewhat careful in wording 
this, Peronismo, the government of General Peron, is a diclatorship. 
It is a dictatorship the Latin way, which means a milder form of 
dictatorship. It is not a dictatorship exclusive to the right. In the 
Peronismo you have the proletarian, if I may use this word without 
reflection, as in the center of the movement. The Descamisados, the 
shirtless which are often referred to in the press and the literature, 
stand in the center of the Peron movement or o-overnment. If you 
read the late Mrs. Peron's book, the Eeason of My Life, then you 
will find many passages that have almost, in my mind, a Communist 
ring. 

Senator Welker. Would you say it was socialistic? 

Mr. Garbuny. Yes; that certainly is true, except they have not 
formally adopted the Socialist dogma. They do not speak about Marx 
and the other Socialist theorists. You won't find that. You don't 
have the authors, but you have the substance. 

Senator Welker. Being the very profound expert that you are^ I 
wonder if you could refresh my memory with respect to the activity 
of Argentina at the Caracas Conference when our Secretary of State 
went there. As I recall from the press, there was a movement then 
that all of the Americas — Latin xVmerica, North America — should 
unite together against communism. Do you know how Argentina 
voted on that matter? 

Mr. Garbuny. I do not know. I am not sure, but I do know that 
Argentina was not among the countries that abstained from vote as 
Mexico did. I believe that is correct. 

Senator Welker. I had the impression that Argentina abstained 
from voting, and I am not sure. 

Mr. Garbuny. I would not know, sir. 

Senator Welker. I believe the- record will show that she did abstain 
from voting along with Mexico. 

Mr. Garbuny. That is interesting. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Garbuny, can you express to this committee the 
potential threat of Soviet gold to destroy the economy of this country ? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 185 

Mr. Garbunt, This question is more of an afterthought with me. 
It has cropped up in the press time and again, and esj)ecially in the 
liearings. I believe it is the Bridges-Reece bill, I notice Mr. Ran- 
dolph Burgess of the Treasury brought out the point that rise in the 
price of gold is not desirable because the Soviet Union would be prof- 
iting from it. I am not authorized to interpret Mr. Burgess, but it 
seems to me this statement is based on the assumption that the Rus- 
sians are using gold wholesale to attract trade and that they still have 
more to use to disrupt the normal channel. If the price of gold is 
raised, then they would have still more poAver. 

Senator Welker. May 1 interrupt at this point, and I will ask you 
if it is not a great duty of ours to try to make friends in the Latin 
American countries, to have them on our side, and to have them appre- 
ciate our way of life and we appreciate their way of life ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Certainly, sir. Every eli'ort unsparingly should be 
made to win over every Latin American country. They are our most 
natural allies on this side of the hemisphere. If I may utter a word 
of hope, I believe it is possible. It can be done. 

Senator "VVelker. But I take it you agree with me we must use 
sane, sensible approaches and not to go overboard to try to help a 
country which might turn against us in the hour of crisis. 

;Mr. Garbuny. A hundred percent I agree with that. 

Mr. Akens. Do the Russians have their own gold mines and access 
to the gold resources of the world ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Russian gold has always been a matter of guess. 
There is no doubt that the Russians have gold. They have gold, cer- 
tainl}^, in the Lena region, in the Lena River in Siberia. The}^ have 
gold in the Kolyma region. There are two questions we must ask. 
The first question is, How large are the deposits? Wliat are the 
results of prospecting, and have the results been made public? 

The second question is, Even if they have large deposits about 
which we do not know, do they mine them? Are they in a position 
to mine them, or is mining possible ? Both questions have never been 
reliably answered. 

If you follow our published statistics or those of the World Bank or 
the International Monetary Fund, you will always come across the 
remark "estimated." We have some evidence, however, that the Rus- 
sians must have some gold and gold of their own because there are 
gold sales from time to time. The Russians sold substantial amounts 
of gold in the free gold markets of Western Europe recently, say 
since last October. They did sell some gold, the reports were, to the 
London firm of ]\Iontague & Coe with the intention this gold would 
reach eventually the Bank of England, and apparently it has reached 
the Bank of England. 

There were sales of gold in France. Wliether these sales were sub- 
stantial so that they could be considered an economic weapon is pretty 
much up in the air. 

I brought in this question because there is the question of the Union 
of South Africa. You may ask, 'Wliat is the connection here ? Let me 
state it briefly please. The South African Finance Minister has been 
carrying on a very strong up-hill fight for a rise in the gold price 
and never succeeded so far, with minor concessions excluded. He 
believes that his country would profit immensely from a rise in the 
price of gold. 



186 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

That is obvious because South Africa is a large gold producer. 
South Africa should be considered an underdeveloped area. If the 
rise in the price of gold becomes the truth, this undeveloped area 
would have additional funds for development. Considering that the 
Russians, of course, have also an art in stirring up trouble, one should 
reconsider the question and perhaps say that in the consideration of 
a rise of the price of gold that Soviet gold should not be an issue. That 
was the idea that I had in mind when I spoke about Soviet gold. 

Senator Welker. You are speaking about South Africa ? 

Mr. Garbuny. The Union of South Africa. 

Senator Welker. Have you made any study with respect to anti- 
mony down there ? 

Mr. Garbuny. No, sir ; I have not. 

Sentaor Welker. But I take it if our country imported antimony 
from South Africa or the Gold Coast or wherever it is mined there, 
which is much cheaper than our domestic mines, and as a result there- 
of the largest domestic mine in the United States has been closed since 
August 1, 1951, that might be of some assistance. 

Mr. Garbuny. No doubt about that. 

Mr, Arens. Mr. Garbuny, what in your judgment are the basic steps 
which should be taken as a matter of policy by the Government of 
the United States in order to stem this tide of Communist encroach- 
ment, worldwide ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Sir, I can of course speak only from the point of 
view of trade and economic measures. That is the only field I am 
competent or believe to be competent in. In the other fields there are 
too many issues which I do not know enough of in order to have a 
sound judgment. 

There is one thing to me of paramount importance. Since the Rus- 
sians have a trade war, we must retaliate. We must do everything to 
get the trade of those countries who have not yet fully fallen into the 
claws of the Soviet to see that these countries do not trade with the 
Soviet Union but rather with us or among themselves. In the inter- 
est of our own domestic economy we cannot take over all the trade of 
all the world. That would not be possible. But we can do an awful 
lot through financial measures, tariif measures, to attract imports and 
stimulate that way exports to countries which would otherwise trade 
with the Soviet Union. 

Senator Welker. How about these imports we are enticing our 
friends to give us ; are they destroying the domestic economy of our 
own country ? 

Mr. Garbuny. This is a very serious problem, sir. There are two 
possibilities. First of all, there would be the question of simply buy- 
ing up and storing, depending on the goods, until some time these 
goods can be resold by the United States elsewhere. The question of 
subsidy to industries which suffer from imports should be vented. 
Certainly it might be possible to advise potential exporters to us to do 
a little shifting in their industrial base. 

Secondly, we could extend credits to other countries so that they 
may be in a position to buy what we do not want to buy. If I may 
take a hypothetical case which has at the moment no real rational 
basis, if we gave an extensive credit to a South American republic 
that is still an underdeveloped area to buy machinery from Great Brit- 
ain, that would be such a thing where we could help immediately and 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD CORIMUNISM 187 

divert British trade with Russia to this hemisphere. Long-term credit 
or medium-term credit would grant us a return later on. There is al- 
ways the hope that during the time we are engaged in such an opera- 
tion there is a change in the Soviet Union. 

Senator Welker. I have only this observation to make with respect 
to your subsidy philosophy : I believe it was Lenin or Stalin who said 
they would destroy our country economically without firing a shot, 
and if we keep on with this subsidj^ business, that is just exactly wliere 
we are going because that is just taking it out of the pocket of the 
taxpayer and giving it away. 

I do not want to engage with a learned gentleman such as you with 
respect to a problem so acute and so serious because I do not profess 
to be fully advised on the matter. But a conference of Western Sen- 
ators meeting with the mining industry just a few days ago in which 
the mining industry, which is paralyzed with respect to lead, zinc, 
and antimony due to our imports from overseas — they blankly made 
the statement that subsidy was not the answer. Tariff would have 
to be our only relief. The Tariff Commission, I think you are advised, 
so recommended to the President in May of this year. 

]\Ir. Garbuny. Sir, that is very interesting. I spoke in general 
terms. We would have to go from industry tc industry. This would 
be a case where perhaps our industry would have to produce for the 
home market, and the exports that come to us from other countries 
would have to be shunted on another rail to another country. Possibly 
that could be done through long-term contract which has been given 
from this country to some group or syndicate in South America. These 
things are not entirely new. 

Mr. Arens. Is it possible to have a peaceful coexistence economi- 
cally with the Soviets ? 

Mr. Garbuny. Sir, from what I have said, I don't think so. I just 
do not think so. All the indications are contrary to that. 

Mr. Arens. What in your judgment would be the effect if this 
Nation should sever diplomatic relations with all the Iron Curtain 
governments and thereby, so far as possible, sever trade relationships ? 

Mr. Garbuny. That is a very difficult question for me to answer 
because there are many other points involved. There is one thing, sir, 
that I would like to say here which occurred to me when I heard 
about this for the first time. The Embassy here on 16th Street, o^ 
wherever it is, is probably a listening post and nothing more. 

Senator Welker. Not only a listening post — I do not think you 
want to limit it to that, do you ? 

Mr. Garbuny. No. Whatever you want to call it, it is not an 
embassy in the sense of international law. If you send them home, 
you have another problem on your hands. That is the problem of the 
delegation in New York, the United Nations. It is a problem of 
Russian citizens in the secretariat. It is a problem of who works with 
other groups or nationalities there. So that the rupture of diplomatic 
relations, if it extends only to the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street, is 
of not much practical effect in terms of internal security. 

Mr. Arens. How about extending it right down the line ? 

Mr, Garbuny. That is an entirely different thing. I do not find 
that in S. 247. If you do that, you have them out. But it would be 
for a man in international relations to tell you, not for me as I am only 



188 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

in economics, what generally the result of such severance is. Whether 
you have still the possibility of negotiating — take the Berlin situation. 
How would that internationally affect the Berlin situation for occu- 
pying forces ? You have the question of the armistice in Korea. About 
ail this I do not have the technical equipment to answer. 

I was very intrigued when I saw Senate 247, and it started me 
thinking; but I have no real answer on that because I feel there are 
so many angles that have to be vented. Perhaps one thing, sir — that 
is the psychological effect. 

Senator Welker. Let me interrupt to say we have been planning 
psychology until we are going to psychology ourselves right out of 
existence, in my opinion. I have been listening ever since I have been 
in the Senate and prior to coming here about this psychological war- 
fare. We have taken last in every move I have been conversant with. 
So I am not going to be impressed with this psychological business. 
I think it is about time that America stood up on its own feet for a 
change and stopped making fools of themselves because while wc are 
playing psychology, as we have done for all these years, you have seen 
this country go down and down and down and communism gain and 
gain and gain. Some 800 million people since we started that wonder- 
ful philosophy of psychological warfare, or whatever you might term 
it, have been enslaved. 

Mr. Garbuny. You absolutely stated it. 

Mr. Arens. We appreciate very much, indeed, your testimony today.- 
Thank you for your appearance. 

Senator Welker. On behalf of Chairman Jenner, the entire Com- 
mittee of Internal Security, and the staff, we certainly appreciate 
your coming here at time and expense to help us in our problem. You 
have been a profound witness. We appreciate your contribution to 
our cause. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Garbuny. Thank you. 

Senator Welker. We will now be in recess. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 35 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to call.) 



STEATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, JULY 8, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To In\testigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. 0. 
The subcommitte met at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 
Present: Senators Jenner (presiding) and Welker. 
Present also : Richard Arens, special counsel ; Frank W. Schroeder, 
professional staff member ; and Edward R. Duffy, investigator. 
Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Taylor, will you be sworn to testify. Do you swear the testimony 
you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Taylor. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF HENRY J. TAYLOR, NEW YORK CITY 

Senator Jenner. For our record, will you give us your full name ? 

Mr. Taylor. Henry J. Taylor. 

Senator Jenner. Where do you reside, Mr. Taylor ? 

Mr. Taylor. 230 Park Avenue, New York. 

Senator Jenner. "^^^lat is your business or profession? 

Mr. Taylor. I am a journalist and economist. I have spent my life 
on the question of international economics. 

Senator Jenner. With that background, Mr. Arens, you may pro- 
ceed with the questioning. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Taylor, at the request of the Internal Security 
Subcommittee, you have prepared a statement for submission for the 
record, is that correct ? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that Mr. Taylor's 
statement be at this point incorporated in the record, and that in ac- 
cordance with the custom of the committee, you now proceed to speak 
extemporaneously on the subject matter. 

Senator Jenner. The prepared statement may go in the record and 
become a part of the record. Then you may proceed, Mr. Taylor, in 
your own way. 

(Mr. Taylor's prepared statement follows :) 

189 



190 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Testimony of Henky J. Taylor Before the Internal Security Subcommittee 
OF the Senate Committee on the Judiciary — Task Force on Strategy and 
Tactics of World Communism 

Gentlemen of the Senate, this subcommittee Is dealing with a subject very 
dear to my heart. I appreciate your invitation to appear before you and I 
would be very grateful were it possible for me to make even the smallest con- 
tribution to your considerations. 

I note your chairman's remark during an earlier testimony on June 10, that 
"the Communist conspiracy in the United States is only one tentacle of a world- 
wide octopus which has as its principal target the United States of America." 
May I suggest that one of the other tentacles is the Soviet potential through 
East- West trade from the Soviet point of view. 

We read about a new treaty nearly every day, made by England, France, 
Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Sweden, Norway— countries that not long ago thought 
and feared that by now they might be at war with the Soviet Union. 

Top Red economic commissars in the Gosplan Bureau, which controls the na- 
tion's entire economy, back up the Soviet Foreign Office in greeting visiting 
treatymakers and European businessmen who follow close behind ; such as the 
33 British businessmen who recently arrived in special Soviet airline planes. 
This, of itself, brought about the biggest burst of Anglo-Soviet business ac- 
tivity ever known in the Russian capital ; directors and technicians of 12 Brit- 
ish firms negotiating with 5 Soviet trading agencies. And what these buyers 
have found in Moscow has made their eyes pop with wonder. 

The Official Soviet memorandum they received from Gosplan's Central Sta- 
tistical Board listed things now in good supply in the Soviet Union. The list 
makes amazing — and thought-provoking — reading : 

Oil, iron, manganese ore, gasoline, kerosene, aluminum, large boilers, diesel 
engines, roller and ball bearings, synthetic rubber, chemicals, dyes — and moun- 
tains of wheat and tea. 

Take oil, for example. Russia was supposed to be pinched for oil. Yet Russia 
is selling petroleum products freely to Finland and two of the British merchants 
were able to sign a series of five contracts to buy three and a quarter million 
dollars' worth of high-grade Russian refined oil products the first dav they 
arrived. The British negotiators said they were buying 100,000 tons of these 
products mainly (interestingly enough) for resale in European markets. 

In turn, the Gosplan chiefs bought 50,000 tons of refined sugar from another 
Britisher, the biggest such sale in more than 20 years. Had she wished, Russia 
could have bought this from her satellite states. Several are exporting sugar. 
And after the contracts were signed the British merchant asked the Gosplan 
man the equivalent of "How come?" 

"Trade, not aid," he answered in unsmiling parody of our free-world slogan. 
The delegation from Paris announced that Russia's buying under a 6-months- 
old French trade agreement would now be increased. Greek, Argentine, Swiss, 
Swedish, Norwegian and Italian delegations have made similar announcements, 
or new treaties, since Malenkov took over. In Zurich Swiss international bank- 
ers estimated to me that more than 20,000 freight cars of materials from Italy 
alone have found their way behind the Iron Curtain in recent months. 

Like the bells on the pigeons of mythical Shangri-La, the siren song of Soviet 
trade, backed up by Soviet gold, sounds sweet in Europe's ears, especially with 
American subsidies and aid declining. But the bells should be ringing out a 
warning. 

Right now, Russia, buying at high prices, looks good. Beyond that, West-East 
trade looks so good (and profitable) that it obscures the fateful prospect of what 
will happen when giant Russia, already consolidated, turns into a seller of many 
products Europe makes today. 

Products, you say? We laugh at most Russian products we see illustrated; 
and certainly what is being handed to Soviet civilians is of mighty low order. 
But come with me for a moment to Finland. It was there I had my first awaken- 
ing to what the Russians can produce when they want to. 

With three Finnish Army reconnaissance scouts I was traveling along the 
Russian frontier in the Arctic forests. A Russian patrol passed and paused on 
Its side of the boundary. 

Now, Russian-made radio sets for civilian entertainment are fully as jerry- 
built, shoddy and prfmitive as we imagine. Yet here stood that Red Army patrol 
communicating with its command post over a Russian-made military walkie- 
talkie as good as any to be seen anywhere in Europe or America. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD CORCMUNISM 191 

In Helsinki the Cliief of Staff of the Finnish Army, hardly a man to over- 
estimate anything Russian, coiitirmed to me that the quality of Russia's military 
radios, radar stations, complicated army communication layouts and devices is 
excellent in workmanship and design, and amazingly abundant. 

The Red civilian automobile, the Probeda, the 'iieople's automobile," is a notori- 
ous dud ; so is the civilian Moskovitch car. Both are poorly made and collapse 
quickly. ' Yet Russian-made military trucks are solidly built and efficient. So 

are Soviet tanks. ^ , -r. . ■, . •,, 

Russian civilian ironwork is crude and clumsy. Yet Russian-made artillery 
of the most intricate type is the equal today of any in the world. It laid down 
barrages on us In Korea heavier than any we encountered from the Germans in 

tliG Inst wnr. 

"When the Russians concentrate on getting something done," Finland's Chief 
of Staff explained, "it's clear to us that they can get it done— done surprisingly 

Under Stalin they simply concentrated on military output, that's all. And of 
course there remain numerous bottlenecks and woes obstructing Russia's pro- 
ductivity under jMalenkov. But when they concentrate on consumers' goods, 

watch out ! . „ . X i . mi 

For that is the key to the Red mystery of the East: concentration. They 
concentrated on jet airplanes, made a lot of them, and good ones. They con- 
centrated on artillprv, made a lot of it, and good artillery. They concentrated 
on tanks made a lot of them, and good tanks. They concentrated on intricate 
radar interception devices, and ended up with a warning network far more exten- 
sive and fully as efiicient as ours. . , , ^ 

The giant consolidated nation that can do these things can make an awful lot 
of alarm clocks and whatnot any time it wants to and sell them — or barter 
them— cheaper than Europe can imagine today. ,.,x^„ ^, ., 

Americans, above all others, should respect that word "consolidated. While 
Western Europe is still chopped up into some 18 separate nations, walled off 
from each other by barbed-wire entanglements of tariffs, currencies, cartels, etc., 
the Soviets have constructed a vast unified trade area bigger than anything the 
world has ever seen. It stretches from Berlin to Shanghai. It includes Russia 
and all its satellites, comprising some 700 million people. Think what that 
means in terms of both the economics and the economies of mass production, 
with unlimited and unrestricted access to raw materials and to markets. Even 
our own United (48) States are small in comparison. 

Both as a buyer and a seller of consumer goods this vast Soviet trade area 
can have an overpowering political effect on a divided Europe. As in the Nazi 
era markets can be wiped out through the dumping of Russian products. Or 
conversely, Soviet orders can be switched about from country to country m such 
a way a.s to produce crisis, unemployment, and political upheaval within those 

countrias. . . ■, . • i 

The grim and inescapable fact Is that there has been enormous industrial 
and technical progress in the Soviet Union since the war ; stupendous by Russian 
standards and enormous even by our own. 

Considering Europe only, there are two population blocs exactly the same size. 
Western Europe is a disunified grouping of 200 million people. The Soviet Union 
has 200 million people all its own, completely unified. Russia already produces 
three-fifths as much steel as all Western Europe and more than half as much 
coal and electricity. But it is the rate of acceleration, the high speed, in the 
overtaking of Western Europe by Russia that counts the most. 

Britain, for exam])le, as largest coal producer, still has not recovered her pre- 
war coal output. She now plans to increase it 20 million tons a year by the end 
of the next 12 years. Russia has increased her annual coal production 40 mil- 
lion tons since 19.50. . 

Western European steelmakers, even with Marshall plan aid, have increased 
annual capacity only 8 million tons since the war. The Russians have added 
twice that capacity since the war and are building mills to double today's total 
capacity by 1930. It is estimated that by 1965 Russia will equal or surpass all 
Western Europe in basic industrial production. 

Further, much of this output is coming from new, and therefore, modern, 
machines ; and the evil Communist system, of course, contains its own built-in 
labor supplv. Even aside from slave labor, such as at Dalstroy, general man- 
power is unlimited— and pitiably cheap. Actually the Russian workman is taught 
that it is patriotic to be exploited for the motherland. 

This, then is the accelerating power for commercial aggression and world 
upheaval contained in that peasant race now emerging in the industrial age. 



192 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

It was fear of the dangers and unimaginable horrors of another war, coming 
from Russia, that aroused and pressed Western Europe toward quarantining this 
aggressor, its satellites, and its appendages like Red China, by measures both 
military and economic. Fear is the chief cement which has bound those quaran- 
tine efforts together. But as Malenkov holds out the cat-bait of "peace" and 
fear recedes, the will is weakened, the cement crumbles, the quarantine edifice 
tends to fall. In fact, the incredible idea seems to take its place : that the way 
to make communism fail is to help it to succeed. 

In the long run, I do not see how the dangers in ignoring the results can be 
underestimated if Western Europe's employment fs to be protected, her standard 
of living preserved and her very life itself defended against the newly competi- 
tive Soviet Union that is to come. 

For our part, I assume that everything we do in national policy will be dedi- 
cated to combating the fallacious idea that the way to make communism fail 
is to help it to succeed. 

Thank you again for your invitation to be with you today. 

Mr. Arens. May I ask you, first of all, Mr. Taylor, on the basis of 
your background and experience and observation of the, situation 
pertaining to the world Communist movement, who, in your opinion, 
has the initiative in the "cold war" ? 

Mr. Taylor. Russia. 

Mr. Arens. Upon what do you base that observation ? 

Mr. Taylor. I think the initiative divides itself into three parts : 

First, the military initiative. That they retain because they are 
aggressors, and the initiative is always with the aggressor in the early 
part of any conflict. 

Next, economic. Certainly they retain the economic initiative by 
their infiltration and aggression m Europe and the Far East. The 
tragedy, from my viewpoint, is that the Russians are consolidating 
their economic strength faster than Western Europe is consolidating 
its economic strength. 

Mr. Arens. Would you pause to elaborate on that, please, Mr. Tay- 
lor. What do you mean by the consolidation of the economic strength 
of the Soviets ? 

Mr. Taylor. Europe is an area of 18 countries divided by a patch 
quilt of tariff Avails and barriers and quotas. The Soviet Union is ap- 
proximately the same population block, 200 million people, without 
any of these obstructions at all. They are consolidated by the tyranny 
of the Communist movement and by their control over the satellite 
states, much of which is financial. 

Mr. Arens. Now if you will kindly proceed with your overall state- 
ment. 

Mr. Tayi.or. The third way they retain the initiative is psychologi- 
cal. They hit on the racket of using conferences as a cheap propa- 
ganda tool, and employ this again and again and again. 

They work us into an awkward position when it comes up on the 
calendar to hold another propaganda conference, which they do with 
the regularity that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" used to show up in certain 
towns. Then if we don't go to the conference, they make it sound as 
if we are not interested in peace. Accordingly, after a certain buildup 
period, in which they accuse America of not being interested in peace 
unless they attend a propaganda conference, they create enough back 
pressure so that we finally show up. Then we have it again. We sit 
there and listen while they speak to the world. 

I have spent a great deal of time in the Far East. Speeches that go 
over our heads as Western people are very impressive in the Far East. 
I remember going to the U. N. and listening to this bandit from North 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIMUNISM 193 

Kore<a come and call our country, in our own borders, all that lie did. 
You remember the little general. That was so pre]30sterous tliat it 
sounded plain outrageous and insulting to us, but it was very impres- 
sive to oriental ears, because here was a man from Indochina on the 
home plate of great America, challenging us to do our worst. This, 
coming from an oriental, is music in oriental ears. Every statement 
Malenkov makes is dedicated to the Far East. 

Mr. Arens. You have made a study, have you not, ]\Ir. Taylor, and 
traveled worldwide in the pursuit of that study, of the Russian trade 
offensive ? 

I\Ir. Taylor. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Could j'^ou tell the committee in essence, in summary 
form, those elements in your statement with regard to the degree to 
which the Russian trade offensive is destroying the world markets 
for the West? 

Mr. Taylor. I wrote a piece about that in This Week magazine, 
distributed across the country to about 11 million people. The prob- 
lem with the Russian trade offensive is not their position today, but 
the rate at which they are overtaking Western Europe. The figures 
are very complicated. I can give you a few. 

Mr. Arens. If you would, please, in summary form. 

Mr. Taylor. All right. Let's take the list of commodities, and so 
forth, that the Russians offer to the trade missions who come to the 
Soviet Union today. This is the official list supplied by the Gosplan 
central statistical board, the Gosplan bureau being the bureau that 
controls the entire Russian economy. When our British friends and 
others arrived in Moscow recently, they were given a list, for their 
guidance, of things that were in good supply now in the Soviet Union. 
That wasn't a propaganda list, because they were standing there to 
do business on these items. So, Senator, wouldn't you agree this was 
not something that they had just pulled out of the air ? 

That list included, it seems to me, some amazing and very thought- 

Erovoking items. For example: oil, iron, manganese ore, gasoline, 
erosene, aluminum, large boilers, engines, diesel engines, roller and 
ball bearings, synthetic rubber, chemicals, dyes, wheat, and tea. 

The first day these men were there, British merchants were able 
to sign a series of 5 contracts to buy three and a quarter million dol- 
lars worth of high-grade Russian refined oil, anct they were buying 
100,000 tons of these products, mainly for resale in the European 
market. The Russians bought 50,000 tons of refined sugar from an- 
other British concern, and that was the largest single sale in more 
than 20 years. 

Interestingly enough, they could have bought that sugar from some 
of their own satelite states, because, although it isn't commonly 
known, their satellite states are exporters of sugar. But they didn't. 
Because of this whole cat-bait idea of peace, they bought it from the 
British. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat is the significance of that, in your opinion ? 

Mr. Taylor. To crack up the Anglo-American alliance and the eco- 
nomic front, as they are trying to do on the military front, because 
the main line of Soviet policy, in my small opinion, is to separate 
Britain and America. 



194 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. AiJENS. Is there, in your opinion, any distinction or any conse- 
quence to be made between strategic and non-strategic material in 
international trade? 

Mr. Taylok. In effect, I think it is Tweedledum and Tweedledee. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Jenner. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. With respect to the sale of oil that, allegedly, 
Russia was pinched for, I will ask if it is not a fact that at the time 
she sold oil to Britain she also sold oil to Finland ? 

Mr. Taylor. Senator, I was in Finland. Sure, she is a ready seller 
of oil to Finland. 

Senator Welker. Vast quantities, sir ? ^ 

Mr. Taylor. No, because they don't require vast quantities. 

Senator Welker. All they require, or most all they require ? 

Mr. Taylor. Sure. There is the rub in these statistics. I appreciate 
your comment about that. When folks say, "After all, this doesn't 
amount to much because they only sold a little," that doesn't prove they 
couldn't sell a lot if there was a market for it. That is nearly as 
bad as saying, "After all, they only stole $100 out of the bank." 
Well, believe me, if there had been more money in the bank, the burglar 
would have got it. It isn't his fault that he didn't steal more than 
$100. I will bet you that the United States could buy enormous quan- 
tities of oil from Eussia today if they wanted it. 

Mr. Arens. Wliat is the significance of the Eussian gold supply in 
the manipulations of the Soviets in the world economy ? 

Mr. Taylor. Gold from any country is as good as any other gold. 
It is very dirty gold because it is mined, b;^ Soviet slave labor. Their 
projects are vast, and they have quit giving out any figures. They 
used to give their figures to the World Bank. Wlien they made their 
new gold strikes in the Dalstroy plains area in Siberia, they quit 
giving any production figures. 

Eussia is generally regarded as the No. 2 gold producer, after 
Africa. Today they very possibly are No. 1. Many experts believe 
that there is substantially more gold in the Eussian gold stock today 
than we have at Fort Knox. We don't have quite as much gold in 
Fort Knox, you know, as the impression is when compared to the needs 
of the world. We couldn't go very far financing the needs of the 
world with $22 billion. 

Senator Welker. May I ask a question at this point. 

Mr. Taylor, with respect to our domestic mining of gold, you realize 
it to be a fact that many of our gold mines have been forced to shut 
down because of the high cost of labor and the tremendous expense 
involved in the operation and prospecting for gold? Is that a fair 
statement, sir ? 

Mr. Taylor. Senator, I not only realize it, but I consider it an eco- 
nomic tragedy. This is likewise true, as you know better than I, in 
Alaska. While our gold mines are shutting down, the Eussians are 
all out, with slave labor, producing gold by the mountainload. I think 
the best information we have is that they are even rotating 120,000 
people through their gold fields. Wlien these pitiable millions die, 
they just replace them. 

The thing that is shutting our gold mines down, as you kaow so 
well, is our high costs. Tlie Eussians don't have that. It is slave labor. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 195 

Russia produces enough gold, and she will buy what she wants. 
Gold is convertible to any currency. In the gold markets of the world, 
in Zurich, Russia can sell her gold as well as anybody. "WHien they sell 
it, what do they get for it ? Any currency or bank credit on earth, in- 
cluding American dollars. 

Mr. Arens. Then do you consider the Russian gold supply produced 
by slave labor as a threat to the economy of the West ? 

Mr. Taylor. In the economic area, I think it is their secret weapon. 

!Mr. Arens. "Wliat, in your opinion, is the production potential of 
the Russians and of the Soviets to produce or outproduce Europe and 
perhaps the West ? 

Mr. Taylor. They are away up there now, but they are growing, 
and that is the problem. 

May I digress on this question of gold for one moment. You no- 
tice also they don't need to retain any gold reserve for their own cur- 
rency. I have some figures on that, if I might submit them. 

Mr. Arens. They are in your prepared statement. I wonder if you 
could just extemporaneously now summarize them, Mr. Taylor, please. 

Mr. Taylor. I will. Let's start with a few basic factors. This is 
on the point of the acceleration, Russia is producing now about three- 
fifths as much steel as all of Western Europe and more than half as 
much coal and electricity. But again, it is the rate of speed of 
acceleration. 

Great Britain, as the largest coal producer, still has not recovered 
her prewar coal production. She isn't back up there yet, and the 
war has been over 9 years. She plans to increase it 20 million tons a 
year by the end of the next 12 years ; 20 million tons increase by the end 
of the next 12 years in Eng:land, the biggest coal producer in Western 
Europe; whereas the Russians have increased their annual coal pro- 
duction 40 million tons since 1950. 

Senator Jenner. Forty million in less than 4 years. 

Mr. Taylor. This on the statement of the Swiss, Swedish and other 
engineers who put in the machinery. 

One of the fallacies of our day, in my small opinion, is that we don't 
know anything about Russia. It is the same thing that used to happen 
to me when I came back from Germany. Again and again during the 
Nazi buildup, people would say, "What could you see in Germany?" 
The answer is, of course, you can't see how many airplanes they are 
making, you don't know how many proximity fuses they have or 
whether they have it or not, but you can see industry operating in a 
country. 

"Wliat did people think they were doing when plants were running 
day and night, and chrome was disappearing out of the inventory? 
It certainly wasn't going on bathtubs. It was going into armaments. 

Take the steelmakers in Western Europe. I have never seen a 
breakdown of how much of our Marshall plan aid went into the recon- 
struction of the steel programs in Europe, but as everybody knows, a 
vast amount of it did. Yet, with all our Marshall plan aid since the 
warj the European steel producers have increased their capacity only 
8 million tons. The Russians at the same time have added twice that 
capacity since the war, and they are building today mills to double 
their today's capacity by 1960. Nothing like that is happening in 
Western Europe. 



196 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

It is estimated that by lOGo, whicli is only 11 years from now, Russia 
will equal or surpass all Western Europe in basic industrial produc- 
tion. It is the speed of this pickup tliat concerns me. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Taylor, under date of May 13, the Senator from 
Indiana, Mr. Jenner, and the Senator from Nevada, Mr. McCarran, 
introduced in the Senate a resolution. Senate Resolution 247, which 
would call upon our Government to sever diplomatic relations with 
the Soviets and to take the initiative in convoking an international 
conference for the purpose of stemming this tide. 

In the basis of your extensive background and experience and years 
of study of the rising menace of the Communists, what would be your 
reaction and appraisal of that resolution ? 

Mr. Taylor. That is a very embracing question and a complex one. 
In principle I would support that resolution, but not as an isolated 
measure. I think that resolution is of great importance and value, 
and I would like to see it enacted as a part of a general program by 
which we seized the initiative. So long as we don't have the initiative 
in the diplomatic, psychological, military, or economic areas, the Rus- 
sians will in time win the "cold war" as they are, in my opinion, doing 
today. 

Senator Welker. Ma-y I ask a question ? 

Senator Jenner. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker, Mr. Taylor, do you have an observation with re- 
spect to the effect that resolution might have upon the freedom-loving 
peoples of Russia and the satellites, who, from certain testimony we 
have had here before us, would love to see that, from the psychological 
standpoint, the fact that we are not going clown the road of the Com- 
munist dictators who control so many millions of people. 

Mr. Taylor. Senator, I would believe — and I might be completely 
wrong about this — that you would have to separate the effect in terms 
of its effect inside the Soviet Union and in the satellite states. I think 
they would be different. I think it would be very much more effective 
in the satellite states — that is a great advantage, a great plus — than 
within the Soviet Union itself. 

Mr. Arens. Under date of June 18, the Senator from Indiana, Mr. 
Jenner, the Senator from Nevada, Mr. McCarran, and the Senator 
from Idaho, Mr. Welker, introduced a bill, S. 3632, which would make 
it a felony to import into the United States or to ship in interstate 
commerce any commodity or goods produced by slave labor as a part 
of this program of quarantining the Soviets. Wliat is your impression 
or reaction to that proposal ? 

Mr. Taylor. I think it is indispensable. 

Mr. Arens. Indispensable ? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Taylor, the Senator from Idaho a short time ago 
introduced a resolution, Senate Resolution 169, which would call upon 
the President of the United States to proclaim 1 day a month for a 
period of a year as a day of prayer, on which the people of the United 
States would pray and ask for divine intercession and guidance in be- 
half of the millions of people who have been enslaved by the Soviets. 

On the basis of your extensive experience, what is your reaction to 
that proposal ? 

Mr. Taylor, Quite aside from any experience I may have had, pure- 
ly as an American, I think that it is a source of pride and stimulation 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 197 

to realize that a distinguished United States Senator would concern 
himself with the spiritual values. It seems to me this resolution is 
extremely desirable, very useful, and I would not feel it proper to 
allow this occasion to pass without attempting to congratulate the 
Senator. 

Senator Welker. Thank you. 

Mr. ApvExs. On the basis of your experience, Mr. Taylor, can you 
express to the committee your view as to whether or not our Nation 
and its policies can cooperate and negotiate with the Soviets on any 
sound foundation, or are those in the Kremlin people with whom you 
can in good faith negotiate and cooperate? 

Mr. Taylor. Gentlemen, I could answer that question if anybody 
could tell me how you do business with unreliable people. I don't 
know how to do business with unreliable people. ^ In my opinion, 
nobody else does. The word "coexistence" has been kicked around like 
other words, and has attained something of a nice sound. I believe 
we are going to exist with the Russians for centuries and centuries. ^ I 
don't think they are going to evaporate. I don't think Communist 
control over the Soviet Union is going to disappear. 

That doesn't imply either a happy life or a successful life. I think 
the statement that we are not in an instant of tension but an age of ten- 
sion is well made. In the meanwhile, in American national policy I 
assume that, contrary to some of our friends abroad, we are going to 
do everything we can, so help me, to beat down the fallacious idea that 
the way to make communism fail is to help it to succeed. 

Senator Jenner. In other words, you think the policy that is being 
followed has been building up and fattening communism rather than 
destroying it? 

Mr. Taylor. I wouldn't make that criticism of American policy. 
I wouldn't make that criticism of the coalition policy with which we 
proposed to face the Soviet Union. Napoleon once said, "Give me a 
coalition to fight against." Every coalition is difficult, but to the ex- 
tent that we think that if you give the Communists enough rope they 
will hang themselves, in my opinion the more rope they get the more 
people they will hang. 

Mr. Arens. In our private conversation prior to this session, Mr. 
Taylor, you alluded to the Russian trade offensive as a siren's song 
or "bait. Would you elaborate on that, please ? 

Mr. Taylor. This is one of the most serious problems facing Dr. 
Adenauer. I went to Bonn to see Dr. Adenauer. He is a very coura- 
geous and honorable man. The Germans have now for the first time 
m my lifetime honorable and good leadership. I think the open prayer 
of the free world is that the German race will go in a direction that 
would be new for them, under leadership so dramatically different 
from the Kaisers or Hitler. 

Dr. Bruening is making a bid for return to political power in Ger- 
many. As you may recall, he left Germany in 1932, after he had been 
Chancellor, and came to Harvard University and taught there in gov- 
ermnent for 13 years. He is now professor at the University of 
Cologne, and Dr. Bruening is proposing German neutrality. He says 
there will be a depression in the United States, and tliat trade with 
Russia will be indispensable to the Germans. 



198 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Trade means employment. Employment is a pressure that vesy 
few political figures can resist and hold their jobs. This is the pres- 
sure behind England. It is very difficult for the British to have cotton, 
mills idle in Manchester and turn down textile orders from Eussia. 
That is generally attributed, I think, to an affection by the British 
Labor Party for the Soviet Union. I think it is much more limited 
in influence than it is generally regarded. I think it is primarily an 
employment question, and that cuts across all parties. 

Senator Wei/Ker. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Jenner. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. By like token, Mr. Taylor, I hope you will agree 
with me that it is very difficult for a family-owned mine, the largest 
domestic producer of antimony in the United States, located at Stib- 
nite, Idaho, in my home State, to be closed down since August of 1951, 
possessing the world's finest antimony smelter, when at the same time 
we are importing antimony at a premium price far above that offered 
to our domestic producers, from Bolivia, the Gold Coast of South 
Africa, and other areas. 

I trust you will agree with me that it is very difficult for these people 
to stand that, too. 

Mr. Taylor. As Americans, from my viewpoint it is incredible that 
they should be called upon to stand it. Senator. 

Senator Welker. I will not go into the lead and zinc and other 
tragedies that we have debated so many times on the floor, but thej 
are in the same dilemma that the antimony situation is. Our workers 
have been cut back. Lead and zinc are being imported at prices far 
in excess of that offered to our domestic producers. It is difficult 
indeed, it is sad indeed, for the domestic mming industry here. 

Mr. Taylor. I am not familiar with this subject, but in principle 
I think that most reasonably minded men would have to agree, if they 
thought it through, that protection, per se, is not necessarily evil, you 
know. It seems to me that there are not very many thoughtful people 
who don't realize the importance of world trade. I get a little tired 
hearing the importance of world trade talked all the time. I have 
spent my life in it. This is like telling you or me something about the 
importance of water. But there are other things that are important, 
too. One is domestic prosperity. 

Obviously you have to strike a balance between those. If you are 
going to have world trade at the expense of domestic prosperity, then 
the importance of world trade decreases and the evils of unemploy- 
ment take its place. 

So obviously you have to consider both factors, and each one of 
these problems, it seems to me, has to be resolved in terms of balance. 
You can't say that we will trade with the world no matter what hap- 
pens to our condition here at home. 

Senator Welker. Even though it results in the weakening of our 
country. 

Mr. Taylor. If you weaken the country, in the long period you are 
not going to be in a position to trade with anybody. 

Senator Welker. Right. Some day, I assume you will agree with 
me, it might be necessary — we hope it will never be necessary — that we 
may have to go back to the fundamental law of nature, to wit, the law 
of self-defense, and we need these industries working here. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 199 

Mr. Taylor. My understanding is that wo are in that position today, 
that we are talking self-defense here, and that we are using world 
trade as an instrument of self-defense. 

But in my opinion it is a very complex instrument, and when the 
effect of its use is to undermine the productivity of America, then I 
think that use is wrong. 

Senator Welker. Thank you. 

Mr. Aeens. I have no further questions. 

Senator Jenner. Any further questions, Senator ? 

Senator Welker. No further questions. 

Senator Jenner. IMr. Taylor, we want to thank you for your state- 
ment, and appreciate your appearing here. 

]\Ir. Taylor. I appreciate the invitation. 

(Whereupon, at 11 a. m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to call.) 

X 






STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF 
WORLD COMMUNISM 



JULY 15 AND 22, 1954 



PART 4 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
«769 WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library- 
superintendent of Documents 

OCT 2 7 1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORB, West Virginia 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HBNDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTBS KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Ulinols OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HBNNINGS, JR., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secueitt 
Aor AND Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Task Force Investigating the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

Richard Aeens, Special Counsel 

n 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Paeo 

Amoss, Ulius Louis 241-260 

Goncliaroff, Nicholas T 201-217 

Nakaslan, Samuel 260-267 

Smyth, William Harris 217-240 



m 



STEATEGY AND TACTICS OF WOELD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The subcommittee met at 1 p. m., pursuant to «all, in room 457, Sen- 
ate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman) presiding. 
Present: Senators Jenner (presiding) and Welker. 
Present also : Eichard Arens, special counsel ; and Frank W. Schroe- 
dcr and Edward E. Duffy, professional staff members. 
Chairman Jenner. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Arens. The first witness will be Mr. Nicholas T. Goncharoff. 
Chairman Jenner. Will you come forward, please? Will you be 
sworn to testify? 

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Goncharoff. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS T. GONCHAROFF, BROOKLYN, N. Y. 

Chairman Jenner. Will you state your full name for the record, 
please ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. Nicholas T. Goncharoff. 

Chairman Jenner. Where do you reside? 

Mr. Goncharoff. In Brooklyn, 329 Snediker Avenue. 

Chairman Jenner. AVhat is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. I am working at the present time — here is a 
paper — Avith the international committee of the YMCA's for a special 
project, to study strategy and tactics of world communism and pre- 
paring the Christian attitude to it. 

Chairman Jenner. We will put this notice of his employment into 
our record and make it a part of the record. 

(The material referred to follows:) 

National Council of the Young Men's Christian Associations 

OF THE United States of America, 

Jiew York, N. Y., July 1, 195ft. 
To Whom It May Concern: 

This is to confirm that Nicholas T. Goncharoff of New York is employed by the 
National Board of the YMCA's of the United States on a special assignment in 
connection with the Russian publication program of its international committee, 
and in particular to undertake research on Communist methods and tactics with 
u view to presenting the Christian alternative to them in forms that might be 

201 



202 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

useful to Christian publishing houses not only in the United States but in other 
parts of the world. 

His present appointment is for a period of 6 months ending November 30, 
1954. 

Herbeet p. Lansdale, Jr., 

Executive Secretary. 

Chairman Jenner. You have filed a prepared statement of testi- 
money. Without objection it will be incorporated into the record and 
be made a part of the record. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 

Statement by Nicholas T. Goncharoff 

My name is Nicholas T. Goncharoff, a resident of Brooklyn, N. Y. I was born 
in 1921 in Kiev, Southern Russia, now Uliraininn Soviet Socialist Republic. I 
am only one representative of the millions of Russians who belong to the new 
generation, raised and educated in the Soviet Union. I lived in the Ulsranian 
Soviet Socialist Republics about 24 years, went to a Soviet school, and served in 
the Soviet Red Army. Lilie most young Russirns I never had a chance to see 
life beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Occupation of Poland in 1939 and 
World War II temporarily battered down the Iron Curtain. In 1941, I was 
mobilized into the Tank Corps and nearly 1 yeaj later was captured by the 
German Army. Interned, at first, in a prisoner-of-war camp in Ukraine, later 
I was moved to a forced-labor camp in Germany. Early in 1945 in Bavaria I wag 
liberated by the Third American Army. After regaining freedom I decided to 
remain in the west, like the thousands of other foi'mer Soviet citizens. How- 
ever, the period from 1945 to 1947 was full of hardship because, according to 
special agreements, we former prisoners-of-war were subject to forced repatria- 
tion. Many were repatriated and perished in jails and camps in the "socialist 
land." Many fled, went into hiding, changed their names, in order to escape 
repatriation. I was among those. I made my way to Munich and in November 
of that year entered the Uuivei'sity of Munich and newly organized University 
of UNRRA also in Munich for refugees. Six years later, in 1952, I completed 
my study at the Munich University. 

In 194G, I made my first contacts witii the World Students Christian Move- 
ment and being in the refugee camp I met Young Men's Christian Association 
leaders from the United States of America. Young Men's Christian Association, 
as we had seen, was primarily concerned about the youth : Their physical well- 
being, their strength of mind, and above all, their Christian character. I, as 
many other young people, having a great spiritual hunger for better ideas than 
communism with its biggest lie in theory and practice, began to organize this 
kind of program in our camps. In 1948 I was elected as a president of the 
Young Men's Christian Association for Russians in Western Germany, serving 
at the same time as a secretary of the Russian Christian Students Movement in 
Western Germany. I had a chance to represent the Young Men's Christian Asso- 
ciation for Russians at international conferences in Switzerland, Denmark, and 
France. From 1950 to 1952 I was elected to direct Young Men's Christian 
Association leadership training program in the American and French Zones of 
Germany. 

On Washington's birthday, February 22, 1952, I arrived in the United States. 
A few days later, the Tolstoy Foundation, Inc. asked me to serve as a director 
of the Free Russian Youth CUib, Inc., in New York City. It is an organization 
of younger Russian refugees who have escaped the tyranny of the Soviet regime 
and who are now living in the United States. Its purpose is to help Russian 
youth learn and participate in the American way of life. I took active part in 
the activities of the Tolstoy Foundation, remembering the wonderful help 
given by them to the thousands of refugees to reach the United States, which this 
organization under the leadership of Countess Alexandra Tolstoy provides. The 
name of Tolstoy for us remains as a great symbol of freedom, justice, and deep 
religious personal example. 

For 8 months, beginning in August 1953, I traveled across the United States 
under the auspices of the National Council of Young Men's Christian Associa- 
tions, undertaking a program of educational visits to the Young Men's Christian 
Associations groups, different clubs like Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary, Women's Clubs, 
Army units, union's groups, church groups, high schools, universities, and so 
forth. The main purpose in this lecture tour through various parts of the coun- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMATUNISM 203 

try was to aid groups of youth, especially in understanding present day comniu- 
nism and its challenge to Christian faith and democracy. 

In September of 1953, I received a scholarship from the Research Program 
of U. S. S. R. by the Russian Institute of Columbia University. This program 
was sponsored by the East European Fund, Inc. I was very happy to take some 
important courses in political science in the graduate school. 

June 1, I took a new assignment on the staff of the International Com- 
mittee of Young Men's Christian Associations working on the special project : 
Study of world communism, its tactics and strategy in different countries of 
the world and creation of Christian literature program to meet the Communist 
literature program. 

I am deeply convinced from my experience and thousands of others, that we 
can't defeat communism as an idea by being only anti-it, ignoring it, or shooting 
it. We can only meet this or other negative ideas with a superior idea. This 
could be only democracy with its vitality and Christianity if we are able to create 
much more unity between the Christians themselves and especially between 
their missions abroad. 

SOVIET METHODS OF INDOCTKINATION 

As one who has experienced the oppression of the enslaved world, I am very 
glad to share with you the way, methods, and tactics which are used in the 
process of Marxistic education of the youth in U. S. S. R. Youth, at all times 
and in all countries, is highly idealistic and inclines to revolution. Russian 
youth is no exception. Communistic leaders everywhere take and use very care- 
fully this kind of idealism and sincerity of the youth in Russia and abroad for 
their propaganda. One of the main principles in the communistic education is 
to have a complete control over their way of life "from cradle to grave." 

"Complete control" should be understood not in a direct sense. The ways of 
influence are very different. Tactics could be changed very rapidly, but never 
the aim. Each new generation in its entirety is subjected to a course of edu- 
cation whose fundamental purpose is in the creation of a "Soviet personality." 

To achieve this purpose, the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. established 
well-organized control over the millions of Soviet teachers and it possesses an 
intricate system of numerous specialized institutions. Theoretical problems of 
Communist education are entrusted to a special branch of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This branch is attached to the 
Party's Department of Agitation and Propaganda. 

The application of the theories is in the hands of the Komsomol. However, 
the Komsomol influence upon the youth has been steadily declining. Now prac- 
tically only administration duties have been left to the Komsomol and to the 
organization of Young Pioneers, attached to it. Theoretical education of the 
Communistic League of the Youth (Komsomol) is controlled by the party. An 
intricate system of cross-controls as well as compulsory four-term programs for 
every subject were introduced. The teacher works under the control of the 
government, the Komsomol and, of course, the party. 

I saw how cunningly the Communist regime had exercised its influence over 
the credulous minds and hearts of the youth. I felt myself how skillfully and 
gradually our idealism and sincerity were used as a means for attaining goals 
completely alien to us. Schools, theaters, press, radio, and other media were 
implanting in us the illusion of "social greatness". They tried to win us over 
at an early age, promising us future "Communistic paradise". But promises 
were followed by warnings that we must be prepared for endless sacrifices and 
deprivations until we liberate "the proletariat of the world" from "the yoke 
of universal capitalism." We were told : "So long as we are surrounded by 
sharks of the capitalist world, the U.S.S.R. cannot develop peacefully; and so 
long as capitalism exists, there will be deprivations." There is always one 
thought behind this slogan: To convince the population in the U.S.S.R. and in 
other countries of the world that the capitalist system is an obvious evil prevent- 
ing "peaceful" development of the "social paradise in the U.S.S.R." 

Communism understood from the very beginning to create a leadership. They 
have special educators and teachers who know how to use the potentialities 
of the younger generation. They are very well prepared to give the answers 
to the problems of the young man and girl. 

When I became 6 years of age, I went to the kindergarten for the first time. 
The introduction which was made by a Communist teacher was : 

"Boys and girls, the first day in your life you are a free person. You do not 
know what you will know later. You are slaves of your surroundings being 



204 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

with your families, your fatliers, and mothers. Your fathers and mothers are 
sood people, but they belong to an old society. The society which was educated 
under Czarist government and their mood is old fashioned. If you would 
like to be free, you must be free from your family. You do not have to listen 
to your parents. We are your educators, we give you the way of life. You 
share with us everything that your parents tell to you." 

Slowly and kindly the idea was put in our hearts, to listen to our educators. 
There began a process which is very well organized in CJommunist countries — 
indirect division of children from parents. But, despite the influence of the 
kindergarten and later schools, the influence of my family, of the older genera- 
tion, and of older friends never vanished. Communists take this difficulty for 
them into account. They are very dissatisfied with the growing of religious 
belief among the population of the U.S.S.R. 

Religion seems to be the strongest power and the greatest danger for com- 
munism. From the very beginning, having taken some excursions to several 
places, our teachers would say, ''Children, look at this wonderful nature. You 
know who takes care of this nature? Our Communist Party; our leaders care 
a great deal about it. You see the trees ; therefore, they exist. Only the things 
exist which you can see, feel, and touch. Everything else is only the opiate and 
means of the people. Religion is the opiate of the people because it has tried to 
keep them sleeping. Don't believe in God. God does not exist. You cannot 
see him." 

I remember the first day in the elementary school. We young boys and girls 
had a "pleasure" to have a special examination. We came into the class. If you 
remember childhood, it is a special time, when you enter for the first time into 
school. The teachers knew this. They said to us, "Now you are entirely free 
from the slavery and darkness of the old religious traditions. We do not need 
lo pray any more before our lessons start. If you pray at home, you must know 
that you pray only for nothing. And now we will have a little experiment that 
will show you that there is no sense to prayer." Then followed immediately the 
question, "Who prays?" Several hands were raised. Many of us still at home 
liad the opportunity to pronounce our prayers according to the Orthodox re- 
ligion. 

We came to the table. I remember very clearly, this table. We stood in one 
row, and teacher gave orders. "All right, you have a chance now to pray as you 
do at home. A 3-minute time is set. You can pray to your God and ask your 
God that He should give you a box of candy." Some of us were 7 years old, some 
of us 6. We were moved emotionally ; we could not understand this lie. We 
knelt and began to pray. After exactly 3 minutes the teacher gave us the com- 
mand to stand up. And he said, "Look, you are fools, you prayed and nothing 
happened. Where is the box with candy?" The other children sitting in the 
room began to laugh. We were so confused. In one moment without any ob- 
jective interpretation, many of us saw that our parents were wrong. Here is 
the real answer. 

We were put in one corner and some of us began to cry. The others who did 
not pray were called to the table and the teacher announced, "You will have a 
chance to see a miracle. You have only 2i/^ minutes — even just 2 minutes to 
pray — but you can pray to someihing visible. You can pray to Comrade Stalin 
and the Communist Party, and you ask them for a box of candy and you will 
see what will happen." 

They began to pray to Stalin and in less than 2 minutes the door opened and 
another teacher walked in bringing a big box of candy. They began to laugh 
and clap their hands. No answer was given. Teacher smiled at us. We went 
to our homes and we explained this story to our parents. I have seen my mother 
and my father very upset. They were afraid to tell me because I could tell 
tomorrow what they told to me and I could denounce, without my knowledge, 
the same parents and probably they would lose their lives. 

This situation, which continued through many years, created in us, the younger 
generation of Russia, a sense of great struggle. We have not seen normal life. 
If we played sport it was not play for just playing. Large-scale development 
of sport in the U. S. S. R. has as its aims : 

1. To utilize the large-scale development of sport for a perpetual training of 
the masses of the population for socialistic labor (which is equivalent to shock 
"Stakhanovite" exhausting labor), as well as for the defense of the U. S. S. R. 
and to keep them in a constant state of mol ilized readiness. 

2. To use sport for the purpose of indoctrination of the masses of the popu- 
lation with communistic theories, and thus fortifying world Communist domi- 
nation. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 205 

Sport activities, social gattierings, summer camping programs are completely 
controlled by the Communist Party organizations. 

Living in the Soviet Union we, the young people, saw how gradually we were 
cut off from our parents and how suspicion, enmity, and hatred toward them 
were incited in us. I grew under these conditions, like millions of others. I 
remember the year 1933. Hunger, organized by the Soviet Government and 
the party, took away millions of people, my mother among them. In the year 
1937 there were fearful arrests, trials, deportations. My father, a priest at 
that time, was also deported. The nation was living in poverty and injustice. 
To buy something like bread or meat or sugar, it was necessary to stand in 
line for a long time, sometimes for 3, 5, and 6 hours, but before the great shops 
we read the slogan : "The life is much happier. The life is much better." 

At the age of 17 and later we usually had a chance to see enough to ask 
ourselves, "Why do we have constant limitations in food, clothing, evei'ything? 
Why can't we read foreign books, newspapers? ♦ * * Why is it forbidden to go 
abroad? * * * Whither are we being led? Wliy do we have hunger, poverty, 
having a territory which is one-sixth part of the earth ? * * * Why lack of free- 
dom? Why arrests? * * * Those little questions — why? — grew in our every- 
day life to a big why? There was no satisfactory official answer to them. New 
doubts were born. Suspicion grew. Searchings began. Suspicion gradually 
turned into dissatisfaction, which in turn brought forth desires to protest. But 
the presence of the terroristic police system and empty hands made it impossible 
to protest. 

Communists say, "There are no such forts that could not be taken." Com- 
munist dictatorship is almost perfect, but only almost. A wish to be free has 
no borders. Freedom is not something that could be only educated in the family, 
or in the school, or in the society. Freedom, I believe now (much more after 
my experience) is an inborn capacity. Therefore, no kind of indoctrination is 
able to kill this spirit, and the feeling of freedom, especially if you are slaves. 
Slaves are much more sensitive. They are dreaming constantly of freedom. 
Here is the greatest hope for the future. 

In 35 years the strange Communist dictatorship in Russia cost us nearly 30 
million people ; more than 10 million have died from hunger — organized hunger, 
not natural. Now more than 16 million people are in concentration camps, 
men and women living under the most horrible conditions. I think this is the 
best sign for everybody in a free world to know that opposition is there in 
permanence. Too few people know about it because the Soviet Union is closed 
for usual visits. And if some diplomats or newspaper men can travel across 
some sections, believe me, they will be controlled enough not to see concentra- 
tion camps in operation, for example. 

The party's endeavors to mass produce the "Soviet personality" continue 
to meet many obstacles, for thus is innate conflict between party doctrine and 
party morality on one side and truth and natural human instincts on the other. 

Among young people in the age class of 14 to 16, that is, pupils in the fifth to 
seventh grade of middle school, does Communist education achieve some success. 
This fact probably has led to the following two measures : Introduction of 
tuition fees as from the eighth grade, i. e., after attainment of the politically 
crucial age period, and reduction of the age limit prescribed for membership in 
the Komsomol. The first measure was introduced before the last war, the 
second, after its termination in 1949. 

Communist education concentrates its efforts especially upon this age of the 
youth. They never forget that the young people would not only like to listen 
to some suggestion on the period of their young years, but they would like to 
listen to certain clear and definite ideas. What should never be forgotten : 

Communism tries everywhere to bring not information to everybody, but 
conviction ; it is also able to claim and harness such good qualities as loyalty, 
zeal, devotion to a cause, willingness to sacrifice, and to use them for its own 
ends. It promises immediate results for every problem. 

Communism is able to attract and hold these young people, sometimes for a 
long time. Not only that. It appears, particularly for those who have never 
had to live under communism, as an alluring idea, presenting "clear problems 
and solutions to the world." Communism constantly changes its strategy, its 
tactics and morals, but always holds to its final goal — world revolution. It 
accepts other morals only as they serve the final aim of world communism — 
conquer the universe. 

Communism is strong and effective because of its form of organization ; be- 
cause of its methods of work ; because it is restricted by no moral or ethical con- 
47769°— 54— pt. 4 2 



206 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

siderations ; because of the way in which it develops its members to become 
"cadres" ; because it uses those leaders to the best possible advantage ; because 
it has a vast fund of loyalty and enthusiasm on whicli to draw, stimulated and 
maintained by a pseudo-scientific theory which promises an early victory and 
because its enemies are divided, while it is inflexibly united. 

Communism today in its propaganda in the Soviet Union, and especially 
abroad, tries to give . oung men and women a sense of direction, a purpose in life, 
a cause to fight for, an ideal to sacrifice for and, if needs be, die for. It claims 
their zeal, their devotion, their loyalty. These are things which belong to 
religion. Communism originates from unbelief and frustration to which it gives 
rise. Being international and atheistic, communism uses nationalism and reli- 
gion in Asia and Africa because it helps them for a certain period of time to 
achieve its aims. Communist morality has no boundaries : 

"Morality is that which serves to destroy the old exploiting society and unite 
the toilers around the proletariat, which is creating a new Communist society" 
(Lenin, vol. XVII, pp. 321-322). 

And something more : 

"Our morality is entirely subordinated to the interest of the class struggle of 
the proletariat * * • destroying the capitalist class * ♦ *" (Lenin). 

Supporting religion at the moment in some parts of the world, communism 
never forgets that "atheism is a natural and inseparable part of Marxism, of 
the theory and practice of socialism" (Lenin). 

After sending to "Siberia more than 100,000 priests and destroying thousands 
of churches in Russia, Communists oijened some churches during the Second 
World War only because of the pressure from the population. And at the same 
time Stalin said : 

"The party cannot be neutral toward the bearers of religious prejudices, toward 
the reactionary clergy who poison the minds of the toiling masses. Have we 
suppressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we have. The unfortunate thing is 
that it hasn't been completely liquidated * * *" 

Communism is not, first and foremost, a social or political problem. It is a 
spiritual problem and only if we understand this shall we see why it has spread 
in this particular age and no other. It certainly uses with the full dynamics 
for its propaganda — poverty, squalor, social injustice, bad conditions — everything 
on its way. But they are not the things from which it originates. Social in- 
justice is the thing upon which it feeds, not its originator. 

Being in the U. S. S. R. I felt that entire education and indoctrination, besides 
many secondary aims, had one aim of the greatest importance for them : To 
create a "new man" only through the power of man alone. Personality and 
personal initiative are neglected. Collectivism in every aspect of life is the 
leading force. 

The strength of communism lies in the iron discipline of the Communist Party 
in the world, which rests on the "infallibility" of Communist theory and prac- 
tice. Their "truth" is not a constant one, but is actually created to meet their 
intent. 

Observing commtmism and its present methods in the U. S. S. R. we have seen 
that it is revolutionary Marxism in practice, which is entirely based on the 
philosophy of Karl Marx. Communists do not intend to achieve their aims by 
way of gradual reform. We were told that their entire strategy must be di- 
rected toward an eventual seizure of power by armed force, remembering that 
tactics can be changed everywhere very quickly : 

"When one enjoys an overwhelming majority of forces, one can succeed by 
direct frontal attack. When forces are inadequate, detours, waiting periods, 
zigzags, retreats, and so on and so forth, may be necessary" (Lenin). 

The final goal for every Communist remains the same all the time: to work 
and to live for the revolution. This often becomes almost an end in itself in 
his mind. He has plenty of revolutionary literature on which to feed. Marx 
said : 

"This revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class can- 
not be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it 
can only, in revolution, succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of the ages and 
become fitted to found society anew." 

He did not forget that the social problem could be used in this revolution most 
successfully : 

"The war of the poor against the rich will be the bloodiest ever waged * * * 
combat or death, bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is 
inexorably put" (Marx). 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 207 

And again it is permissible for Cominform, which is the world government of 
International communism in our days, to change the tactic very rapidly on a 
big scale using "world movement for peace and the fact that it may develop 
here and there into a fight for socialism and become a movement for the over- 
throw of capitalism * * *" (Stalin). 

The Communist magazine New Times (No. 12, March 18, 1953) published in 
Moscow in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Polish, Czech, Rumanian, 
and Swedish gives definite advice to the "proletarian of the world" : 

"The founders of Marxism showed that the working class can perform its his- 
torical mission as the gravedigger of capitalism and builder of socialism only 
by means of a proletarian revolution which would overthrow the rule of the 
bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of proletariat. * * * In Stalin's classic 
definition, Marxism is 'the science of the revolution of the oppressed and ex- 
ploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all coimtries, the science 
of the building of a communistic society.' * * *" 

And here is given one of many suggestions how "to build a communistic society 
in the world" : 

"A Communist must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, 
even resort to all sort of schemes and stratagems, employ illegitimate methods, 
conceal the truth, in order to get into the trade unions, stay there, and conduct 
the revolutionary work within. * * *" (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. XVII, 
p. 142.) 

It is time to understand the real nature of world communism and to know that 
it has one definite goal : Conquest of the world. It is a most serious situation, 
but what is the use of saying it over and over again. We in the free world need 
a definite program of action, only on a big scale, to combat the menace of com- 
munism. We must take offensive, initiative in our hands. Communism is pre- 
pared to take every risk ; 

"It would not matter a jot if three-quarters of the human race were destroyed ; 
the important thing is that the surviving quarter should be Communist" (Lenin). 

How can we believe then in the possible success of any negotiation with the 
communistic world? How much time will the leaders of the free world need 
to understand the nature of our enemy? At the present time we are still in 
spiritual defense. 

Knowing communism too well, I, as a newcomer to this free country and as 
a citizen-to-be, would like to share with every American the real danger we are 
facing, but how many people are prepared to listen seriously and more than that, 
to take some definite action — study communism, know all its strategy, its 
methods, its falsehood, and face this danger with a positive program—dynamic 
ideology of democracy which must have reborn Christian belief, represented 
through the personal example. I think we should know other religions and find 
out the common ethics which can unite us with the rest of a free world. Then 
it will be a faith which grips men and nations. It gives a philosophy, a passion, 
and a plan to change the world. And it creates force of people to do it. The 
future depends on an idea that grips the minds of the millions. This kind of 
leadership we need right now. 

I think that the Senate Resolution 247 (proposed severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions — it should be said not with Russia but with the Soviet Union) could have 
success only : 

First, if responsible leaders of the United States will openly announce that the 
American people understand the peoples of Russia, their sufferings and struggle 
with the strange dictatorship in their own country. And make a clear distinc- 
tion between the peoples of Russia who become the first victims of the Commu- 
nists and the leaders of communism. 

Second, the peoples behind the Iron Curtain need mostly hope to know that they 
are not forgotten in their struggle for freedom by the free world. That the 
free people will not rest without helping those enslaved people in their fight 
for deliverance. And will not rest, therefore, for their own safety. 

Third, if the free world will support the revolutionary movements of libera- 
tion, the promised policy of liberation should be consequent. Why not attack 
communism in its own backyard and with its own weapons? Subversion is 
1.000 times more dangerous to Moscow than to Washington. Suspicion and fear 
should not have a place in our free society but they are cracking the Soviet 
Empire. If America will ally herself with the enslaved peoples who hate their 
Communist masters, we can turn the dagger of the world revolution back against 
the Kremlin. 



208 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The framework of revolution already exists 

The Communists cannot trust their own army. At least 3 million Red army 
troops surrendered to the Germans in World War 11 rather than to fight for 
communism. The Nazis at the beginning of the war promised they would liberate 
us, but they brought to us only colonization. Since 1945 thousands have deserted 
to the West with little or no encouragement from us. The Communist regime 
has to keep millions of Soviet citizens (my father among them, sent to Siberia 
in 1937 as a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church) in concentration camps. 
Most of these people have been accused of trying to overthrow the government. 
The communistic government employs nearly 2 million security police. 

There is an underground networli in Russia, and the captive countries of 
Europe have already risen in open revolt. Endless purges show that distrust and 
hatred divide the Communists from the people, the Red army from the secret 
police, the party bureaucrats from the worljers. What we need— propaganda on 
the big scale — clever, concrete, and dynamic. Words of friendship keep alive 
the hope of freedom, but words alone cannot dissolve a police state. So long as 
we negotiate with Communist criminals who have enslaved the people of 
Russia, our allies behind the Iron Curtain will not be certain of our sympathy 
and support. 

Fourth, developing this kind of action it will be logical to withdraw recogni- 
tion of the Soviet Government. We know that the men in the Kremlin do not 
rule with the consent of the governed, therefore their form of government is an 
illegal one. . ■, u 

Determinate and consequent foreign policy of the United States, supported by 
well-informed public opinion, giving definite hope and program to our secret 
allies— the peoples of Russia and peoples of other enslaved countries— can create 
dynamics and power to start the revolution of liberation. If we are prepared to 
do that, then proposed severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
has a deep sense and vital significance. 

We must also encourage defection from Soviet Army forces. 
There are some organizations here in America which have the aim to help 
cement a bond of friendship with the Red Kremlin victims in order to bring about 
the ultimate overthrow of the Soviet dictatorship by the Russian peoples them- 
selves. I mean those organizations like American Friends of Russian Freedom, 
Inc., Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS), Movement for the Liberation of the 
Peoples of Russia, Alliance of the Post-World War II Escapees, etc. 

I wanted in this statement to give the briefest description about the task force 
on strategy and tactics of world communism, especially in regard to the youth 
education and indoctrination. I am very glad to have the opportunity to share 
with members of the Internal Security Subcommittee some concrete thoughts 
and plans which, I deeply believe, can help us in united action to combat world 
communism. 

In conclusion, I would like to mention probably the greatest hope for the future 
liberation from communism — the younger generation of Russia, to which I also 
belong. I am speaking now about the boys and girls in their twenties. The 
actual facts of life contradict oflicial slogans. As soon as its critical faculties are 
awakened, the younger generation is met with disappointments: not many of 
them who are over 16 years of age continue being eager to join the Komsomol. 
In these years we observed in the U. S. S. R. a general indifference to politics. 
Natural human instinct rebels agains Communist education. The antihuman 
postulates of Communist morality are in constant conflict with human feelings 
of personal attachments and family tradition. It is in particular the concept 
of the family as the basic cell of any normal community of human beings which 
forever struggles with Communist power. 

The last war brought an end to the U. S. S. R.'s years of isolation from the rest 
of the vi'orld, or seemed to. Entirely new spiritual horizons were opened to Soviet 
youth. But with frustration where peace was concerned, came their hopes for 
liberal change. The official Soviet press itself admits that the "opposition of the 
growing generation to the government system is on the increase." It further 
stated : 

"In recent years many representatives of our Komsomol movement become in- 
different to our program and activities. They do not have dynamics and wish 
to be communistic leaders of highest type. Many of them even believe in God. 
* * * The apathy, indifference is growing. * * *" 

The answer is very clear. Many of us saw the outside world. We have seen 
how deeply we were deceived, again and again. Those of us who had a chance to 
escape from Soviet slavery, like myself, feel that we have a certain definite 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 209 

mission in our life — to fight for the freedom of the peoples of Russia and that 
means to fight for our own freedom here in this free country, where many people 
take too much for granted. 

I would be sincerely glad to be of any assistance to every sincere American, 
or groups of people in my new country to help them through lectures, discussions, 
seminars (what I did before for 1 year) or by other means to know in detail the 
strategy, tactics, nature of godless communism in order to combat it in a positive 
way. I believe in the spiritual richness of democracy and I believe in the power 
of the individual. I think that upon him should rest the greatest possible 
amount of responsibilities. In our age we are facing the fight for the mind of 
a man, especially young men — the younger generation. 

The younger generation behind the Iron Curtain is searching for truth, liberty 
and freedom. Very often, being disappointed by the entire communistic philos- 
ophy of life and brutal realities, they need a sense of direction, a purpose in life, 
a cause to fight for. They are accustomed to having a definite aim for their 
life. 

And very little is done for them, thus losing this spendid opportunity to fulfill 
the great vacuum which was created in their minds and hearts. The Voice of 
America and the Radio Station of Liberation have a good program for the people 
behind the Iron Curtain, presenting to them the truth about the free world. But 
both radio stations have no program designed for the youth. And here we have 
such a rare opportunity to win the people who are going to decide the future of 
their countries and of the world. 

We must have this kind of program for the youth, giving them encouragement, 
hope, new ideas, new dynamics. 

I believe that we can still win this ideological global battle for the minds 
of the people. Democracy has every richness, spiritual and material. It has 
wonderful leaders, tradition, experience. Only there is not enough unity of 
purpose. And this is what we need indeed. 

Mr. Arens. In view of the fact your prepared statement is in the 
record, we will proceed now with an extemporaneous summary by you 
of the various points. I should like to ask you first of all to give just a 
thumbnail sketch of your own personal background, where you were 
born, and how you happened to come to this country— a word of your 
personal history. 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. Thank you. I was born in 1921 in Kiev, capital of 
the Ukrame, now one of the 16 Soviet Socialist Kepublics. I spent 
nearly 24 years in the Soviet Union being educated there in element- 
ary and secondary schools and attending 3 years at Odessa University. 

By the start of the Second World War , I was mobilized in the Eed 
army and served as a lieutenant in the tank corps. During the War I 
was early captured by the Nazis and put in a POW camp. Later, I 
was transferred from the Ukraine to Bavaria in Germany. In 1945 we 
were liberated by the American Third Army, General Patton. 

After liberation it was announced that former Soviet citizens would 
have a chance to go home but I refused repatriation for these reasons. 
First, we realized that we had been deeply deceived by the entire Soviet 
propaganda and indoctrination. Usually, up to 16 years of age, the 
whole indoctrination seemed very alluring and convincing. But when 
we finished schooling and had to face the realities of Soviet life, these 
realities were far removed from the earlier promises made us. I 
found myself constantly struggling with my conscience and began to 
question the earlier ideological training and material promises. 
_ For example, I found myself 1 day before a shopwindow where 
signs as everywhere, proclaimed: "Soviet life has become easier and 
happier," yet outside the shop, long lines of people waited, sometimes 
for many hours, to get a loaf of bread or bottle of milk. 

I began to think, why is it that when Eussia has one-sixth of the 
•world's territory and sufficient natural resources to support twice her 
population, we have such continuous poverty ? 



210 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

All this was quite opposite to those promises made us by the Com- 
munists in 1917 in simple slogans: "All land — to the peasants", "Fac- 
tories, management and ])rofits — to the workers", "Liberty, brother- 
hood, social justice for all", "Peaceful little homes, war against the 
palaces." 

At that time, no one dreamed what the later realities would be, 
just as today, the peoples of Asia and Africa follow the same Com- 
munist slogans and propaganda, blindly believing they will lead to 
the solution of their problems. 

This same inconsistency became evident in much that I saw around 
me, not only in physical conditions but also in the spiritual field. 
Gradually these constant psychological and political pressures created 
in us a continual sense of inner conflict until only one wish remained: 
to be free. 

That many felt as I did was proved by the fact that later when the 
Germans attacked the U. S. S. R in 1941, promising our peoples libera- 
tion from communism, over 3 millions of them voluntarily surrendered 
to them. 

I mentioned pressures in the spiritual field. These were complex 
and created a spiritual hunger coming from a kind of inner vacuum 
created by the absence of anything to satisfy a searching mind which, 
in my case, was influenced by the religious education I received in my 
childhood from my father w^ho was a priest. 

Mr. Arens. On the basis of your background and experience as one 
who has lived in the Soviet Union and who has escaped from the Soviet 
tyranny, do you have any way you can characterize, for this commit- 
tee, any distinction to be made between the people and the leaders of 
the Soviet Union? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. Mr. Arens, I am sincerely glad that you asked 
me this question. I make a very definite distinction between the 
Russian peoples and their present Soviet Government. 

First, the experience of the last 36 years under Soviet communism 
has sliown the people clearly that everything promised in the begin- 
ning by the Communist leaders was nothing but deceitful lies. What 
they really got in no way really represented the true aspirations of 
the Russian peoples — for like Americans, they love liberty, freedom, 
and justice. They soon found they were simply victims of an imported 
philosophy, completely foreign to their natural instincts. 

Marxism and Marxistic philosophy and tactics w^ere introduced 
into Russia by leaders trained abroad and sent into Russia by the 
German High Command under General Ludendorf in World War I 
in order to stimulate revolution in Russia and thus weaken the Rus- 
sian Empire and its Western allies, Great Britain and France. It is 
not a creation of Russian philosophy and thinking. 

Some responsible leaders in Great Britain knew of this plot against 
Russia, then an ally in World War I, but made no efforts to stop it 
following the traditional British policy of "Divide and Conquer" 
which from their point of view may have been justified but proved 
short sighted and at the present time, is proving disastrous. 

Since 1917, the world has learned that Russia was used as the first 
big laboratory to test out communism as an experiment in tactics of 
world conquest. 

In the past 36 years, millions of the Russian people have been liq- 
uidated both as individuals and as whole classes, and this mass 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM . 211 

slaughter is not considered a crime under Communistic philosophy 
which, as expressed by Lenin, states : 

It would not matter a jot if three quarters of the human race were destroyed ; 
the important thing is that the surviving quarter should be Communist. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Goncharoff, you are currently and have been in the 
recent past in intimate contact with the anti- Communist underground 
behind the Iron Curtain ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. That is correct. 

Mr. Arens. On the basis of your background and experience as one 
who has lived for many years under the Soviet regime and as one who 
has escaped from the Soviet regime, as one who is currently in contact 
with tlie underground behind the Iron Curtain, what would be your 
appraisal of a course of action to be taken by the Government of the 
United States to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of 
the Soviet Union and the Governments of the satellite states ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. Please excuse me from making a definite state- 
ment on this question. This is a public hearing and I hesitate to ex- 
press my views fully on the subject, at this time. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt ? 

Chairman Jenner. Senator "Welker. 

Senator Welker. May I ask you. Is it your opinion, based on your 
experience, your living there in Eussia with the people behind the 
Iron Curtain, that the ordinary person, the peasant, the worker, actu- 
ally wants freedom as could be given to them by the Western World ? 
_ Mr. Goncharoff. Yes, Senator and this is based on their clisillu- 
sionment. A year ago in traveling across the United States of 
America under the auspices of the National Council of YMCA's 
especially in Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, and Iowa ; I was impressed by 
the similarity of your American farmers and our Russian peasants 
in their love of the land and their closeness to it. Both want to own 
their own land and farm it as private individuals. 

In the U. S. S. R., 20 years of collective farming has not stifled the 
Russian peasant's craving for his own piece of land promised him in 
1917. But since 1928, even the little land he owned was taken from 
him under the Soviet collectivization program. 

As for the workers who are today completely State-controlled de- 
spite that earlier promise that "The factories, management, and 
profit— to the workers," they are completely disillusioned for even 
their unions, which unions in America safeguard the worker's welfare, 
in the Soviet Union, are practically an indirect Department of the 
Communist Party whose main task is to indoctrinate the workers in 
Marxist philosophy and not in any sense, to protect their rights as 
workers. 

Senator Welker. Since I have been working with Senator Jenner 
and this committee, I have been distressed at times to hear witnesses 
refer in an antagonistic way to Russia. I hope you will agree with 
the chairman and with the whole committee that we are not antago- 
nistic to Russia but we are against the Soviet regime, the Communists 
who are oppressing the Russian peoples as you have related. Would 
it not be wise for us to watch our language more and our use of words, 
so that we can let the Russian people know that we distinguish be- 
between them and their hated Soviet regime ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. What you are saying is of the greatest importance 
for the attitude of the free world and especially that of America to- 



212 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

ward the peoples of Kussia as distinguished from their present Soviet 
rulers, may well determine the outcome of World War III should that 
come. Let me explain my reasons for this statement. 

In World War II, when the Nazi armies invaded the U. S. S. E. 
with promises at first of liberation from communism, over 3 million of 
our soldiers, mostly young men brought up under Communist indoc- 
trination, believing the Nazis came as liberators, voluntarily surren- 
dered to them while millions more of our civilian population greeted 
the Germans as friends and liberators, offering them bread and salt in 
our traditional Kussian way of showing very warm hospitality. 

But Hitler's stupid diplomacy and master race ideas plus the failure 
to use this psychological ripeness of the peoples for liberation from 
Communist oppression, played into the hands of Soviets. When 
these invading armies began to treat the friendly population as 
unter mensch whose country they proposed to colonize, the deep 
patriotic instinct of all Kussian people for their motherland rose up 
in protest and was very cleverly supported in every way by new tactics 
on the part of their Soviet rulers. These now began to recall from 
the past, many ideas which they had scoffed at so constantly — as capi- 
talistic and bourgeois — religion, nationalism, old Army traditions, 
et cetera. Former heroes of the czarist regime overnight became 
heroes again and the word "Hussia" which since 1924 by decree had 
become the U. S. S. R., was revived to deepen the patriotic feelings 
of the people to fight in this "holy war against invaders and coloniza- 
tion." 

In our present cold war and even more in World War III shoulcl it 
come, the attitude of the Russian peoples may well become the decisive 
factor in victory. If convinced of the sincere friendship and under- 
standing of the free world, millions may come over to fight with us, 
as allies against a common enemy and hence save many thousands of 
American lives. 

The important thing right now is to counteract all the violent anti- 
American propaganda being carried on within the Soviet Union, and 
by every means possible, get over to the Kussian peoples, the ideas you 
mentioned to convince them now that they will be treated as friends 
and allies when the time comes. 

But propaganda must be geared to the people you want to influ- 
ence, particularly the younger generation in the U. S. S. R. who 
will decide the future. These I feel you have failed to reach so far, 
despite the fact that there are plenty of former Soviet citizens now in 
this country who could give you effective help in this. 

Chairman Jenner. Can you think of any way that would be better 
to tell the Russian people what our Government's feeling is toward 
the Soviet Union than to sever diplomatic relations with those di- 
recting the Soviet Union's government? 

Mr. GoNCHAEOFF. Mr. Chairman, I believe severance of diplomatic 
relations with the U. S. S. R. would have great effect among tlie 
peoples of Russia if such action on the part of the United States of 
America were accompanied both before the act and afterward by wise 
and consistent propaganda and a carefully planned policy program. 

Today the American press, radio and TV all powerful here; yet 
often, unwittingly, play mto the hands of the Soviet by using wrong 
terminology— often confusing Russia with the Soviet regime in a 
way to be capitalized effectively by the Soviet press. For example, 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 213 

Soviet delegates to the U. N. are often referred to as Russian delegates, 
implying they represent the Russian peoples; or, referring to world 
Communist conquest, they state Russian imperialism, which is im- 
mediately quoted by the Soviet press to persuade the peoples of Russia 
that the Western World is fighting, not against Communist conquest, 
but against them. 

Such factors on top of their experience with the Nazi invaders plus 
their later experience with the forced repatriation agreements of 
Yalta have understandingly made the Russian people highly distrust- 
ful of the Western World's intentions. 

Unless American reasons for severing diplomatic relations with the 
U. S. S. R. are made clear to the Russian peoples in advance, Soviet 
propaganda will skillfully turn that act to its own advantage by 
representing it as further evidence of American imperialism presag- 
ing imminent hostilities requiring new sacrifices from the people. 

If the United States of America does sever relations with the 
U. S. S. R., this act alone, unaccompanied by previous preparation 
of the Russian peoples for it and not followed by a carefully designed 
program of subsequent action, can be more harmful than helpful. 

To carry out an effective program of action to win the confidence 
of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, America and the free world 
should be ready at all times to encourage any liberation efforts of 
enslaved peoples. In my opinion, they lost a gi-eat opportunity when, 
at the time of the east German uprisings last year, they took a passive 
course and, instead of giving wholehearted support to this first real 
revolt of Soviet dominated peoples, put food parcels in their empty 
hands instead of the means for their liberation. 

This lack of support lost many potential Soviet defectors from the 
Soviet occupation forces, many of whom had bravely refused to fire 
on the German demonstrators, thus indicating their sympathy with 
the revolt — revolt which is the greatest Soviet nightmare. 

The Soviet is well aware of the mood of its armed forces and hesi- 
tates to take any step leading to outright warfare involving the Soviet 
Army. So far, they have been highly successful in the strategy of let- 
ting others fight for them. 

Mr. Arens. You mean they are getting what they want without war ? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. This is obvious wiien we realize that in only 9 
years — from 1945 to 1954 — more than 600 million people and 5 million 
square miles of territory have been captured by them without the Red 
army firing a shot. 

Communist actions are carefully planned and coordinated for years 
ahead and much of their success is due to the psychological cleverness 
of their many planning boards, all working under one overall coordi- 
nating agency, the World Communist Government, better known as 
the Cominform which was established in March 1919. 

Communists are complete opportunists in their methods — although 
atheistic themselves, they play up religion when to their advantage; 
although complete internationalists themselves, they play upon ex- 
tremes of nationalistic feelings to gain their ends; everywhere, they 
thrive on conditions of poverty by promising tempting social programs 
always relevant to the special existing local conditions, whether in 
Africa, Asia, or South America. Their watchful patience borders 
on fanaticism for their planning is long-ranged with variable time- 

47769°— 54— pt. 4 3 



214 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

tables but has one sole objective — the ultimate Communist conquest of 
the entire world. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Goncharoff, the Senator who was addressing you a 
moment ago, the Senator from Idaho, Mr. Welker, introduced in the 
Senate some time ago a resolution which would request the President of 
the United States to designate periodic days for prayer by the people 
of the United States on behalf of the people behind the Iron Curtain. 
I ask you, aside from personal religious convictions which we all have 
on a matter of that kind, what would be the psychological reaction of 
the people behind the Iron Curtain if that course of action should 
come to pass? 

Mr. Goncharoff. I know this resolution. I am, myself, a Christian, 
not by formal religious training but through the influence of my 
family. 

The power of prayer, particularly if sincere, and especially through 
a nationwide effort, I think, could be very effective. The people of 
Russia are still a deeply religious people. It is difficult to believe that 
in 35 years, this belief could vanish. 

If you allow me half a minute to say to you that the most barbaric 
propaganda in the Soviet Union was against religion. Now they use 
religion because they were not able to combat it to the last extent. 
They realized there is some force which could not be taken over. In 
1935, the Minister of Education used to say : 

We hate Christianity and Christians. Even the best of them must be con- 
sidered our worst enemies. They preach love of one's neighbor and mercy which 
is contrary to our principles. Christian love is an obstacle to the development 
of the revolution. Down with love of our neighbor. What we want is hatred. 
We must know ho'" to hate. Only thus will we conquer the universe. 

This resolution could be the first effective step in a spiritual offensive 
against communism. 

Mr. Arens. That is the prayer resolution ? 

Mr. Goncharoff. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. On the basis of your background and experience, could 
you tell this committee what the reaction is of the average person 
behind the Iron Curtain when he sees the diplomats in the Kremlin 
portrayed in diplomatic session with the diplomats of the West in the 
various conferences and affairs in which they engage? 

Mr. Goncharoff. Mr. Arens, excuse me if I say that we very often — 
I am speaking about those who already understand the whole menace 
of communism — we cannot understand how it is possible that the free 
^s orld, in the last 35 years, having all possible sources and information, 
having many Soviet emigrants and escapees telling the truth about the 
Soviet, cannot understand the real nature of world communism which 
is moving to conquer the rest of the world and those free countries 
which maintain relationships with the Communists. 

Yet in 1944 and 1945 they made agreements with Stalin. I think 
tliose leaders of the Western World should know exactly with whom 
they are dealing. Communists make no secret of their final goals. 
Lenin said openly — 
The way to Paris is not the Way through Berlin but through Peiping. 

They know another statement of his which said — 

At first we will talie Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. Later we will 
encircle the United States which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will 
not need to attaclj it, it will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands. 

This is exactly what they have done and are doing. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 215 

Allow me to make another statement which is important. The basic 
ditference between diplomacy of the free world and diplomacy of com- 
munism is that the diplomacy of the free world maintains relationships 
with other countries, establishing trade relationships and neighbor 
relationships. The diplomacy of the Soviet Union is only a part of 
the whole setup of the Cominform which is the world government of 
communism. In this whole process, Soviet diplomacy through its 
representatives, cultural attaches, military attaches, trade representa- 
tives, serve not for maintaining those relationships ; but serve the Com- 
inform in a whole network of subversive activities. 

Western diplomats are well informed about the true nature of Com- 
munist diplomats and diplomacy, and the Western World should sur- 
round them with the same restrictions imposed on foreign diplomats in 
Moscow. 

The Russian peoples know well that the Soviet diplomats do not in 
any way represent them but only the Communist Party of the 
U. S. S. R. They liope the free world will eome to understand that 
tliey cannot and do not speak for the peoples of Russia who are still in 
enforced silence. 

Mr. Arens. How many slave laborers are there behind the Iron Cur- 
tain? May I see the statement you just read about the way to Paris? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. I have it here. 

Mr. Arens. How many slave laborers are there behind the Iron 
Curtain ? 

Mr. GoNCHARorr. Nobody can say the exact number. According 
to the official Soviet statistics which list those camps as labor camps, 
we know the number varies between 14 million and 16 million people, 
possibly more. We know that these millions represent a force of 
opposition to the Soviet regime, but a force which cannot speak their 
wishes. 

Mr. Arens. What would you think of a course of action suggested 
in a bill which was introduced by the Senator from Indiana, Mr. 
Jenner; the Senator from Nevada, Mr. McCarran; and the Senator 
from Idaho, Mr. Welker, which would preclude shipment into the 
United States of any goods or commodities produced by slave labor? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. I tliiuk this is not only a deep humanitarian act, 
but this is again one next step which will give help and hope to the 
Russian people. 

Mr. Arens. You think it would be well received by the Russian 
people themselves? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. Without any doubt. Why? The free world, 
particularly the businessmen of Great Britain more or less agree not 
to send strategic goods to the Soviet Union, but they don't realize a 
very simple fact that by sending nonstrategic goods they release 
Soviet labor to make strategic goods. For example, it is necessary 
for the Soviets to have a certain number of tons of butter. If they 
can get this butter from Great Britain and not have to produce it 
themselves, then they liberate a certain number of workers, who pro- 
duce butter, for the defense industries which produce strategic goods. 
So, indirectly, such kinds of trade help them to build up strategic 
offensives. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question ? 

Chairman Jenner. Senator Welker. 



216 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Senator Welrer. Is it not a fact that if we permitted slave labor 
goods to be imported into this country, it would deprive the people 
of Russia of the things that they need and so there would be nothing 
left for thorn when they ship it all overseas. Is that a correct 
assumption ? 

Mr. (3ONC11AROFF. Possibly. 

Mr. Arens. How many security police are in Russia at tlie present 
time on the basis of your contact with the underground? 

Mr. GoNCiiAROFF. About 2 million people. There was a big shake- 
up after Beria's death. The long existing myth about an all powerful 
MVD was shaken. During the interfighting which followed Beria's 
liquidation, the people came to realize that the man who personified 
total MVD brutality was easily removed by his own men and that 
Malenkov's order to remove Beria was not clue to Beria's viciousness 
or any humanitarian motive of Malenkov's but purely a play on his 
part for supreme power and control. 

In this connection, I believe we should not give too much im- 
portance to the testimony of recent MVD defectors, especially those 
who defected after Beria's death, but should place more confidence in 
the less sensational testimony of the many simple soldiers and officers 
who escaped to the West, not to save their own necks but for ideolog- 
ical reasons, for they better represent the true feelings and wishes 
of the masses of the peoples of Russia. 

I would like to make one last point in connection with security 
police and subversive activities in this country. Keep in mind that 
here in America, as in every other country, communism has created 
a system of double leadership for their activities. It will be a big 
mistake to believe that the American Communist Party and par- 
ticularly, those who carry party membership cards, are the only, or 
greatest danger. These can be fairly easily identified, and their main 
function is fighting openly for communism through more or less legal 
channels. Many of these are naive, idealistic but often frustrated 
personalities and do not always represent the most dangerous and 
extreme Communist elements. 

This other element is a hidden, anonymous group, carefully 
screened and selected directly by the security department of the Com- 
inform and responsible only to it. They are not officially members 
of any Communist Party and are not known to any but Cominform 
officials. These are the most dangerous agents of subversion, operat- 
ing in complete secrecy and assigned to prepare for the final over- 
throw of the existing Government. 

Chairman Jenner. If there are no further questions, we want to 
thank you for appearing here before this committee. At the begin- 
ning of your statement, I did not quite understand. You were born, 
of course, in Russia? 

Mr. Gonciiaroff. Yes, in Kiev. 

Chairman Jenner. You lived there how long ? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. About 8 years in Kiev. 

Chairman Jenner. And in Russia? 

Mr. GoNCHAROFF. About 24 years. 

Chairman Jenner. You lived in Kiev 8 years ? 

Mr. Gonciiaroff. Yes. 

Chairman Jenner. Then where did you live? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 217 

Mr. GoKCHAROFF, 111 Pavlogracl, Odessa, Kostov — the southern re- 
gions of the U. S. S. R. and the Ukraine. 

Chairman Jenxer. You came as an escapee to Avhat country? 

Mr. GoxcHAROFF. I was liberated by American forces in 1945 in 
Germany, being a prisoner of war; tlien remained in West Geniianj', 
studied there in IMunich University, and 2 years ago I came as a dis- 
phiced person to tliis country under the sponsorship of the Tolstoy 
Foundation. 

Chairman Jenxer. Thank you yeiy much for appearing. We 
appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Arexs, The next witness is Mr. W. H. Smyth. 

Chairman Jexxer. Will you be sworn to testify. 

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God 'i 

Mr. Smyth. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF W. H. SMYTH, NEW YOEK CITY 

Chairman Jex'xer. Will you give us your full name ? 

Mr. Smyth. William Harris Smyth. 

Chairman Jexx'^er. Where do you reside? 

Mr. Smyth. 44 West 44th Street, New York City. 

Chainnan Jex-xer. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Smyth. I am president of the Threadmiller Corp., a small 
company making lathe tools. I am also interested in general business 
brokerage. 

Chairman Jex^xer. Do you have a prepared statement that you 
have submitted to this committee? 

Mr. Smyth. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Jenxer. It will go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 

Statement by W. H. Smyth 

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, Senate Resolution 247, calling for our severance 
of diplomatic relations witli the alleged Government of Soviet Russia and the 
alleged governments of countries which have been enslaved by Soviet Russia, 
and for the convocation of an international conference of the free nations of 
the world for the purpose of agreeing upon a united action to destroy the Com- 
munist fifth column and to resist further aggression by international com- 
munism, vitally concerns all Americans, hence, merits discussion. 

In my opinion, we Americans too often attribute knowledge to titles and 
names, consequently often mistakenly and to our sorrow accept as intelligent 
and authoritative the statements of persons with titles or names without asking 
whether the owner of the title or name has the background and experience 
in the matter under discussion to justify his opinion being considered at all. 
In my opinion, people are entitled to know the background and experience of 
anyone making a public statement. Therefore, the following is given in the 
hope it will justify you for having honored me with your invitation to appear 
before yoii. 

I was born of American Methodist missionary parents in Foochow, China, 
May 23, 1890; came to America with my parents, in 1899; attended high school 
in Berkeley, Calif. ; was graduated as a civil engineer from the University of 
California, in 1912 ; and worked 5 years as an engineer in San Francisco prior to 
my entering the United States Army in May 1917. I served as a field artillery 
captain in France and Germany in "World War I, and for 4 months previous to 
my demobilization in September 1919, traveled Eastern and Central Europe as 
an Army courier with station at Vienna. During that courier duty, just after 



218 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

the Bela Kun Communist regime wns overthrown in Hunj^ary, a trip to Budapest 
gave me my first chance, 35 years ago, to see the frightful results of even a 
short 133-day Communist rule in a country. 

After demobilization I went to Turkey for an American company and from 
January 1920, until the Bolshevist conquest of the three small republics of 
Azerbajdjan, Armenia and Georgia, formed after World War I, forced us to 
leave in March 1921, I was manager for its work in the Caucasus and North 
Persia. Direct negotiations with the Soviet Commercial Mission in Tiflis, my 
experiences in connection with the evacuations of Novorossisk, Petrovsk, Baku, 
Tiflis and Batoum, and reports from the many refugees who arrived from Kussia 
continued my education in what may be expected from dealings with Communists. 

A 4-week visit to Belgrade in August 1920, to report on possibilities in Yugo- 
slavia, gave me my first real idea of the rich natural resources of that country and 
of the worth of its hard-working. God-fearing peasant population. Yugoslavia 
was then, as our country is today, on the Soviet blueprint for conquest. 

En route home in April 1921, I revisited Belgrade, founded my own comi)any — 
"W. H. Smyth" — and for the following 20 years, until obliged to leave by the 
German occupation and the closing of our consulate in July 1941, operated my 
offices in Belgrade and Zagreb, importing and distributing American motorcars, 
trucks, tractors, tires, oil, machinery, and selling aviation engines and equipment 
and oilfield supplies as an agent to the Government. 

The wide contacts with people in all walks of life resulting from handling so 
many lines, constant traveling through most of the country, the acquisition of a 
good knowledge of Serbo-Croatian, and my memberships in social, technical, trade 
and athletic clubs and associations, gave me over 20 years, an experience with 
Yugoslavs and Yugoslavia possessed probably by no other American. Tito's 
Government must have believed that, for through their letter No. 7491 of July 
30, 1948 (photostat and translation attached) frora the Committee on Water Hus- 
bandry of the Peoples Government of Serbia, they requested my cooperation on 
their purchase of heavy equipment and dredges required according to their 
initial 5-year plan, and a statement from me of the terms on which I would 
work with them. Much as I regret the money which could have been earned I 
did not accept their offer. 

When our American consulate was closed in Belgrade in July 1941, I turned 
my business over to an employee and left with my wife. We were 6 months in 
Hungary, left for Lisbon with the personnel of the United States Foreign Service 
in Budapest, and reached New York City, March 1, 1942. During 1942 and 1943, 
I devoted considerable time to making reports on Danube Valley and Balkan 
countries for our armed services, at my expense. 

Since arriving here, outside of the time given to the Threadmiller Corp., a 
very small maker of first-class tools for threading and tapping on lathes, of 
which company I am president, most of my time has been spent in trying to 
keep the closest possible contact with Yugoslavs and other refugees here and 
in other countries, which has enabled me to follow the development of Tito's 
Communistic dictatorship in particular and of international or world communism 
in general. 

In this connection, a few months ago, photostats came of 2 pages from a Yugo- 
slav Communist Party textbook, pages 193-194, entitled "Extract From Political 
Courses for Candidates for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" (photostat and 
translation attached). Their context, of which paragraphs 1 and 2 from page 
194 are quoted below as an exan]i)le. should convince anyone that Tito's Com- 
munists are simply plain international Communists, and that it is simply ridicu- 
lous for an intelligent person to think or speak of them as "National" or "nicer" 
Connnunists, ones we can get on with : 

"Revolution is the action of forceful overthrow of capitalistic society and the 
building of a new society on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

"Not a single isolated revolution, as in the U. S. S. R. and in Yugoslavia, is 
ended until revolution will have been terminated successfully in the whole world, 
because danger from foreign intervention always threatens. Therefore it is 
a fundamental task of all Communists to assist revolutionary forces in the world." 

This fear of foreign intervention seems to me to be a fear that foreigners, 
freemen from outside the enslaved states, will come in contact with the ordinary 
people, the slaves of the Communist states. This was shown by the Soviet's 
refusal for a long time to allow our planes in World War II to land in Russia, 
and for our pilots to fly into Russia the planes we were giving them. It was 
brought out by Tito's agreement with the German Nazis for joint collaboration 
in resisting Allied landings on the Yugoslav coast, should such landings be at- 
tempted. Tito's present Anil)assador in London, Velebit, who was one of his 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMTHSTISM 219 

liaison officers witli tlie German and Croatian Nazis in Zap;reb, tlie capital of 
tlie Independent State of Croatia, is reported to have taken part in these nejrotia- 
tious regarding joint Tito-Nazi resistance to Anglo-American forces. 

The Communists reasoned correctly that Germany would lose the war. There- 
fore, and also because of the Yugoslavs' feelings against the Nazis, Tito's people 
felt that Germans operating with their men would be only transients who could 
cause him no trouble. On the contrary, they knew that Anglo-American troops 
landing in Yugoslavia would be welcomed by the people — not by the Communists, 
but by the people — and their presence in large enough numbers would mean the 
end of communism in Yugoslavia. 

Tito, like his Moscow mentors, only sends abroad persons who have been 
checked and doublechecked by his UDBA or secret police. The test of this is 
the very small number who request asylum to remain here. Yet we allow these 
people to visit our defense plants, to learn to operate our special equipment 
such as jet planes, tanks, armored cars, etc., and allow his students, prepared 
in propaganda during their Yugoslav processing, to attend our universities. 
They have facilities to see more than they should and to talk in meetings in 
our schools. Does that make sense from the point of view of internal security? 

Regarding the fundamental task of all Communists to assist revolutionary 
forces in the world, it is worth while noting how Yugoslavia sends missions to 
places like Burma, India, Mexico, and other countries with which it has had 
little if any trade, and even sent her chief of the general staff to Addis Ababa 
to confer high Yugoslav medals on the Emperor of Ethiopia and several high 
assistants. Could it be that the medals were given to create good will in con- 
nection with facilitating the work of Soviet Russia's mission of well over 200 
persons in Addis Ababa, apparently a distribution point for northeast Africa 
for Communist propaganda and plans? The Emperor's visit to Belgrade this 
next month will offer Tito the chance to turn on his charm, but let us hope with 
less effect than it seemed to have on prominent American visitors to Yugloslavia. 

The work of such Yugoslav Communist missions, like the work of Tito's Gen. 
Ljubomir Ilich, who for the past few years seems to have been a general organizer 
or supervisor of worii among the Communist groups in the Yugoslav colonies in 
Latin America, with headquarters in Mexico, might seem to be covered by para- 
graph 5, page 194 of the Instructions for Candidates for the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia, mentioned above, wliich reads, translated : 

"All national, especially colonial questions must be inflamed, becaiise they 
basically are revolutionary, hence help the process of the world revolution." 

Incidentally, these two photostats were sent to me by a Serbian friend just 
after the Puerto Riean shootings in our House of Representatives in Washing- 
ton, D. C, with the remark that paragraph 5 applied perfectly to the Puerto 
Rican situation. Who knows? General Hitch may have connections there. 
And when he wishes to visit the United States he has a perfect excuse in the 
form of his wife. Mme. Zdenka Milanov, the well-known artist of the Metro- 
politan Opera in New York City. 

Why did Yugoslavia keep Mr. Rafo Ivaucevic, an experienced maritime and 
naval liaison ofiicer in San Francisco as consul general for 3 years? His area 
included our entire Pacific coast with its important shipyards and naval instal- 
lations. For a country with almost no navy and a relatively small merchant 
marine, it would seem strange to use a man of Mr. Ivancevic's qualifications in 
San Francisco unles.s — and here is the big question — it was considered a seafar- 
ing man like Ivancevic could propagandize better among our Yugoslav groups 
on the Pacific coast than a regular consular officer ; an(t unless it was considered 
important to have first-class reports on our naval installations — just in case same 
day the big Communist attack will come against us. 

Gentlemen, this matter of Tito and his Communists seems important enough 
to warrant some real thought and study. In an attempt to help you, I would 
like to lay before you the following information and observations based on a 
lot of work. 

One of the most debated questions of our foreign policy is whether or not we 
should aid Tito and his regime. I cannot understand how the United States, the 
leading Christian nation in the world, can back a Communist. Nor can I under- 
stand how any American, a citizen of a free country, is willing that we assist a 
Communist dictator to hold 17 million human beings in slavery, an institution 
we abolished 90 years ago as evil and wrong in human relations. 

It appears that the Americans who wish to aid Tito must in some way over- 
look that basic matter of right and wrong, possibly having been led to believe 



220 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

by Tito's exjinlsion from the Soviet bloc — tbe Cominform — in June 1948, that he 
was against coniniiinisni. Had they taken the trouble they easily could have 
confirmed that the Yugoslav Communists are in no way lesser Communists than 
those of the So\ iet bloc. On the contrary, they scream their supercommunism. 
Tito's conununism is ncjt national but international like that of all Communists. 
Judge liini by his acts, not his words. This unfortunate usage of the term 
"national" in referring to Yugoslav coiwnuunsm has been a big factor in mis- 
leading and confusing the thinking of the Western peoples about Tito and his 
slave-state. 

TITO CREATION OF SOVIETS, INSTALLED IN POWER RY SOVIETS 

First of all, Tito was a creation of the Soviets. Malenkov, present chief in 
Moscow, nominated him to be secretary general of the Yugoslav Communist Party 
in 1937. 

The party, whose activity had been banned by the Royal Yugoslav Government 
in 1921, had continued as an underground organization. Its leaders, working 
abroad in large part, were oixlinary Soviet agents. In 1940, when Allied pressure 
forced the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to recognize Soviet Russia, there were only 
12,000 party members. 

Secondly, Tito did not liberate Yugoslavia. His military efforts, interrupted 
by the capture of his headquarters in Drvar, western Bosnia, in May 1944, 
would have seemed to be terminated by his desertion of his men and flight to Italy 
in an Allied airplane which saved him. We ignored the opportunity to eliminate 
Tito, and to back General Mihailovich, our loyal ally, who.se fighting in 1942 
prevented the German nse of the short supply line through Serbia and Macedonia 
to Greece and contributed to the saving of Egypt. 

We put the runaway Tito on the Yugoslav island of Vis, guarded him, and let 
him fly away on a Russian plane to Moscow. There he got Stalin's consent to 
send a Soviet Army into Yugoslavia, against Allied agreements, and thus enable' 
Tito, in September 1944, to take over the government. Once in power, Tito and 
his Communists followed blindly all instructions received from Moscow. He 
stated himself, in a speech before the Yugoslav Parliament on January 26, 1950 — 
that was after their expulsion from the Cominform — "The Yugoslav Communist 
Party, until it was expelled from the Cominform on .Tune 28, 1948, nurtured too 
many illusions and without enough criticism received and transplanted to Yugo- 
slavia all that was done in the Soviet Union without discussing whether the 
measures were good or not." 

During that period of taking over of power, the Yugoslav Communists killed 
about 300,000 Yugoslavs known or suspected of being anti-Communist. They 
arrested millions of others. Because of this normal Communist terror no 
one dared oppose them. They shot down our airplanes near Trieste. Their 
press and their leaders in speeches attacked all the Western Powers, especially 
the United States, doing so in a manner far worse than that of the Soviets 
themselves. 

Under the subterfuge that people had collaborated with the enemy occupa- 
tion forces, properties, factories, and companies were taken away from them, 
even from Americans who had lived and worked in Yugoslavia prior to World 
War I and who during that war were not in Y'ugoslavla but in the United States. 

EXPULSION FROM THE COMINFORM OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY 

People ask, "Why was the Yugoslav Communist Party expelled from the 
Cominform when it was so loyal to the Soviet Union?" The answer is simple 
if present Soviet policy in relation to Soviet satellites be studied. 

The Soviets always changed satellite leaders when they wished. They did 
it whenever tliey thought anyone acted against their decisions. But to know 
about such actions they had to have a spy net in each country, and set up one in 
Yugoslavia as a matter of course. Tita, D.iilas, his chief of propaganda, and 
Alexander Raukovic, his chief of secret police, finding that the Soviets were 
spying on their every action, began to seek a way of freeing themselves of such 
control. 

They did not oppose Soviet mixing into Yugoslav affairs, actually were 
obedient in that regard as confirmed by Tito's remarks noted above. But they 
knew that as a result of the spying the same fate might befall them which had 
met many leading Communists in other countries, whom they knew often were 
tried and shot. They did not like it. When Tito, who held the army, and 
Kankovic with his police, restricted the work of Soviet agents in spying on them, 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM 221 

explanaticus and recriminations followed between the Soviets and the Yugo- 
slav Communist Party with the result that the latter were expelled from the 
Cominform. The main thing is they were expelled, and they tried to get back in. 

The Yugoslav Communists formed a central committee or Politburo of the 
party, started plans to collectivize the peasants, both being matters on which 
they were criticized by the Cominform. But at the beginning of 1950, they 
reached a hopeless situation because of the 5-year plan they had adopted in 
1947. Having noted the 5-year plans of Soviet Russia and acting like the frog 
in the peasant proverb that "The frog saw the horse being shod, so he lifted up 
his foot," the Tito Communists undertook to execute in a 5-year plan that which 
no one, not even the Soviets had been able to do under similar conditions. 

They planned that In a 5-year period they would invest on the average of 42 
percent of what had been the national income in 1939 — doing this with no 
regard to the fact that the national income in 1947 was less than prewar because 
of the immense damage the country had suffered from military operations 
during World War II on its territory. They planned first to build a heavy 
industry with which to make the machines needed for the reconstruction of 
the country, and for the development of a light industry. To try to do this 
they mobilized millions of people into forced labor. Additionally, and for the 
same purpose they used practically all they received on account of war repara- 
tions from Germany, Hungary, and Italy, as well as a large part of their 
UXRRA aid. 

Practically all foreign collections received from exports, which were far 
smaller than prewar, were used for the purchase of machines and equipment 
for heavy industry. They attempted the entire building of a heavy industry, 
without preliminary studies, and to execute it immediately following the con- 
ception of the plan itself. 

Yugoslavia had plenty of cement and other construction materials except 
steel. Instead of using them for needed repairs to put existing plants into 
production, the Yugoslav Communists for the various construction projects 
connected with their projected new factories, used vast quantities of those ma- 
terials and employed nearly 1 million agricultural w'orkers (peasants) taken with 
their animal-drawn vehicles from the farms. 

Working thus, they commenced many projects but completed few. Accord- 
ing to their own chief for the 5-year plan, Boris Kidric, they erred in starting 
so many projects and in completing so few. Across Yugoslavia, construction 
projects were started which never were finished because of the lack of windows, 
plumbing, electrical, and various iron and steel components. 

Tito stated they failed, for example, in one place — in that without the re- 
quired preliminary study they began construction of an electrical powerplant 
at a place, only to see after a large esi)enditure of labor and material that the site 
was totally unsuitable, and they were obliged to transfer the project to another 
location. Practically everyone who was in Yugoslavia at that time confirmed the 
country was turned into a vast building project, with much started and little 
completed. 

Probably the best example of this is New Belgrade, which was to have been 
built across the Save River from Belgrade, the Yugo.slav capital. The Yugo- 
slav Communists undertook a new development at New Belgrade to house the 
Yugoslav administration, the Yugoslav Communist Party, and other party or- 
ganizations. Today, the frames of those unfinished buildings stand in their 
sandy area as a symbol of all that is unrealistic in the work of Tito's Yugoslav 
Communists. 

When they actually went bankrupt in 1950 because of such practices, the Yugo- 
slav Communists turned to the AVest for help, especially to the United States. 
That year a mission from the World Bank visited Belgrade and saw at firsthand 
how bad things really were. The mission informed Tito and his Yugoslav 
leaders that their 5-year plan must be changed radically; that a new economy 
policy was needed if they wanted to balance the Yugoslav economy. The mission 
told them that making the needed change was a ))asic condition for consideration 
by the bank of any request for a loan from Yugoslavia. 

The Yugoslav Government, needing money, accepted the mission's proposal 
and reduced the objectives of their plan by one-half. Additionally a financial 
program for Yugoslavia was worked out and a determination was made of the 
amount of money the Western I'owers would have to give Yugoslavia, so that 
the reduced 5-year plan would be completed and Yugoslavia's finances stabilized 
in 1954. 

47769°— 54— pt. 4 4 



222 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

From 1950 to the present, the United States, England, and France gave Yugo- 
slavia free, as aid about $360 million in addition to large but unannounr-ed 
amounts of aid in military material. If .'Ji-lSO million received from UNHRA is 
counted, it is seen that from the non-Communist countries of the West, three- 
fourths of which was from the United States, Yugoslavia, after World War II, 
received $796 million until mid-1953, this having been in addition to other credits 
of $360 million, making a total of $1,156 million again not counting military ma- 
terial and supplies or amounts given in the 1953-54 fiscal year. 

But in place of Yugoslavia's economical situation being stabilized in 1954. 
as had been anticipated, the entire world press announced earlier this year 
that Yugoslavia was unable to meet her financial obligations and requested 
a moratorium for payments. In addition, from the explanations (quarreiings) 
between the Yugoslav Communists 6 months ago it came out that the standard of 
living in Yugoslavia was lower than anywhere in Europe. 

TITO'S COMMUNIST EXPERIMENTS 

A fair question might be: "Was the World Bank advice or proposal bad, if 
Yugoslavia, working in accordance with it fell into bankruptcy exactly in the 
year set by that bank for her tinancial stabilization?" 

The answer is "No." The desjierate 1954 situation in Yugoslavia is due solely 
to Communist experimentation and mismanagement. It would seem that such 
organizations as the World BauK, and also countries such as ours, should have 
some opportunity to control or to insist on proper handling of moneys they loan 
or give to governments unable to finance themselves. That is merely my obser- 
vation. 

l"ou probably read several years ago statements in which Tito and his nench- 
men criticized the Soviets for not being real Communists. They often said they 
were truer Communists than the Soviets. Finally, after Tito's above-mentioned- 
speech in January 1950, in which he confirmed they were in a bad situation, by 
implication, due to the fact he noted that they had too blindly copied Soviet 
methods, the Yugoslav Communists reviewed Marxist literature to find, if possi- 
ble, some form of organization more communistic than the Soviets had. They 
found it in the so-called Paris Commune, the Communist organization founded 
in Paris after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, which France lost. 

The Yugoslav adaptation of the Paris Commune starts with the Communist 
organization of large cities and districts. Such communes, about 370 of them, 
are in their final phase of organization now in that formerly free country. 
Every commune theoretically is a separate economic unit. Everything in it 
is organized economically. Agriculture which is not yet collectivized entirely 
will be collectivized before Tito is through with it. The communes are linked 
together with the Yugoslav Parliament, their final guide, at the top. 

The communes are not free. The Communists direct them. Thus, in the 
final analysis, through the Yugoslav Communist Party, which controls Parlia- 
ment, everything is concentrated in the hands of Tito and his closest associates. 
That is the real situation in Yugoslavia. Essentially there is no difference 
between the organization of the Soviet Union and that of Yugoslavia. 

World opinion, including ours in America, has been brought into confusion 
about the Yugoslav situation. For example, until recently the New York 
Times carried frequent dispatches from its Belgrade correspondent. Frequent 
mention was made of the Communist reorganization of the country. But as re- 
ports from totalitarian states are subject to censorship, those Times reports 
struck me as being misleading. They spoke of economic competition, of free- 
dom of business, and of other economic matters known to students of events 
in Yugoslavia. 

Persons reading those reports and the similar ones published in other papers 
could believe that Tito was changing Yugoslavia into a country with liberty 
and a chance for private initiative. What was not brought out, it seemed to me 
and to others familiar with the situation, was the fact that the business 
and projects reported were matters between the communes or other subsidiary 
organizations and that such business and projects bear no resemblance to cor- 
responding affairs in our country. 

Actually it was the continued attempt to operate Yugoslavia as a Com- 
munist laboratory based on the employment of slave labor — the most un- 
productive form of labor — and the use so often of goons instead of good com- 
petent men in management, which wrecked Yugoslavia in spite of excellent ad- 
vice and financial help from tlie World Bank. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM 223 

In Yugoslavia, as in all Communist countries, everything must be done ac- 
cording to plan. The plans may look good to foreigners as they are nicely 
written and printed, and the unsuspecting foreigner, even a good one, probably 
will have trouble in getting into what is back of the interesting figures laid be- 
fore him. Yugoslavia makes an economic plan every year. Probably it is 
made just as carefully as the statement prepared by a crooked merchant in 
applying for tire insurance while filling his fire extinguishers with gasoline. 

In' 1950, after calling on the West for help and the receipt, as mentioned 
above, of sound advice from the World Bank Mission, Tito cut his o-year plan 
objectives in half, probably promised to follow the advice, and got a loan. Al- 
though that was supposed to stabilize his economic situation by 1954, the next 
year, 1951, he needed money again. This time he called on the International 
Monetary Fund. This bank also sent a mission to Belgrade, in September 1951, 
and on the basis of figures supplied by the Yugoslav IMinistry of Finance, they 
also made him a loan. 

In connection with the efforts of these two excellent banks to bring financial 
stability to Yugoslavia's economy, I would like, as a businessman, to call your 
attention to some figures, rather interesting and instructive, I think, in the 
Yugoslav Government data on their so-called national economy. These seem 
to be worth reviewing because they probably were shown to the two banks' mis- 
sions on their visits to Belgrade. 

Article 8 of the law of the 5-year plan 1947-51 of Yugoslavia shows the fol- 
lowing data regarding Yugoslavia's national gross production and national 
income : 

[Millions of Dinars] 



National ?ross production. 

Amortization ' 

National income i 



1939 actual 1951 estimated 



203, 000 
2 71, 000 
132, 000 



366, 000 

3 111,000 

255, 000 



> The figure amortization used by the Yugoslavs to cover, it would seem, the cost of producing the national 
gross production, was not shown in the table itself, but was arrived at by subtracting national income from 
Kross production. This was done to have figures to compare with the figures for amortization shown .n 
following tables. 

2 34 ).i percent. 

3 30 percent. 

I do not know how they arrived at it but it appears from the figures that the 
amortization figure was taken at 34.5 percent for 1939 for the figures for the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (prewar Yugoslavia) and at 30 percent for 1951, post- 
war Communist Yugoslavia. 

The International Monetary Fund's report on Yugoslavia, appendix table I of 
December 19, 1951. shows the following figures on national income, received by 
their mission from the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance: 

[Millions of dinars] 
National income : 

1949 233,171 

1950 212,022 

1951 234,932 

11)52 237, 400 

Presumably these figures, together with those supplied by the Yugoslav Govern- 
ment to the mission of this bank, were connected in .some way with their decision 
to make a loan to Yugoslavia. They showed a great improvement in the Yugo- 
slav national income as compared with the figure of only 132 millions of dinars 
shown in the preceding table for 1939 when Yugoslavia was a free kingdom. 

Yet in the period from 1947 to 1952, in spite of Tito's and his Yugoslav Com- 
munists' belief that they could regulate things to suit their plans, the working 
of the law of supply and demand was such that prices of everything in Yugo.slavia 
had risen so greatly that Yugoslavia was obliged on January 1, 1952, just 2 weeks 
after the publication of the International Monetary Fund's Report on Yugoslavia, 
mentioned above, to devalue the dinar, and sixfold at that. Where until the 
end of 1951 it had been officially 50 dinars for 1 United States dollar, it was 
worth only 300 dinars for 1 American dollar on January 1, 1952. 



224 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



This brings up a very interesting situation, well worth noting as an indication 
of the lengths to which "Tito & Co." will go to make it appear that anything they 
do is better than its counterpart under the free kingdom of Yugoslavia. 

Apparently the Yugoslav Government, after the January 1, 1052, devaluation 
of the dinar, in making its plans for the 1952 and 1953 economy, either paid no 
regard to the figures it used for national gross production and national income 
in its previous plans, or else possibly thought nobody else would bother to check 
the new figures against the old ones. They must have been in a dilemma, 
properly on the "spot." Their previous plans always showed that the estimated 
or planned figures had been met. (I don't say they actually were met in the 
sense that production and income really had been as planned, but in their plans 
they showed they were met.) 

But in making the plan for 1952 they must have seen that actual results for past 
years, not the results shown to the two banks mentioned above, were far below 
the estimates. It well can be that the checking done by those two b;.nks caused 
Tito's people to look into the figures more realistically themselves. What they 
found was that the best figures they dared estimate for 1952 and later in the year 
for 1953 would be under the actual figures for 1939 — for the last normal pre- 
World War II year of the free Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 

Obviously it would not do for Communist Yugoslavia to show results worse 
than those of the predecessor kingdom. They saw that using the same figure 
of 34.5 percent for amortization, in the difference between gross production and 
national income, which held in 1939, the result for their national income, the 
only figure that counts, would be considerably below that for 1939, as follows : 





Millions o 


dinars' 










1939 


1952 


1953 


Gross national production 


£03, 000 
71,000 


167,393 
57, 75B 


163, 223 




56, 332 












132, 000 


109, 637 


106, 891 







How did the Tito people get around this difficulty? Very simply as you'll see 
in the following table. They simply kept the same old figure of 34.5 percent 
for amortization for the 1939 figures, but used a lower figure, roughly 10 per- 
cent, for the deductions for amortization for the 1952 and 1953 calculations. 
The following table for the 1952 and 1953 figures is taken from the Yugoslav 
Official Gazette, the 1952 figures from issue No. 17 of April 1, 1952, the 1953 
figures from issue No. 62 of December 30, 1952 with the figures in the Official 
Gazette divided by 6 to put them on the same parity as the 1939 figures, made 
before the value of the dinar was reduced from 50 to 300 to 1 American dollar : 





[Millions of dinars] 










1939 actual 


1952 esti- 
mated 


1953 esti- 
mated 


Gross national production. 


203, 000 
71,000 


167, 393 
15, 770 


103, 223 




16, 750 








National income - - - 


132, 000 


151,623 


146, 473 







This with their dishonest methods, even in financial matters, for it is dis- 
honest to change an amortization figure without noting the fact, especially when 
resulting figures will be used for comparison, the Yuoslav Communists present 
their facts in a manner to show they have increased their national income 10 
percent to 15 percent compared with 1939. When by using genuinely compara- 
tive figures as in my previous table, the figures show that the national income 
actually had dropped 15 percent on the data from the Communists, which may 
or may not have been true and correct. But at any rate it was their data. 

They can make financial manipulations such as these, all they want, but they 
cannot change the miserable conditions under which the Yugoslav people live — 
that is all but those who help the Communist regime. Out of 17 million Yugo- 
slavs there may be 400,000 to 500,000 such people, not necessarily Communists, 
but people who probably for reasons of existence work with the Communists 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 225 

and as reward get a relatively acceptable standard of living. All the other 
Yugoslavs live in want, waiting the day when the Communist yoke may be lifted 
from their backs. Why should we Americans recognize, the crooked, cruel, 
despotic regime which holds those people in slavery? How can we expect the 
enslaved peoples to believe we are anti-Communist when we support Tito and 
his totalitarian Communist government? 

AGRICULTURE 

According to a Belgrade dispatch in the New York Times of March 9, 1954, 
Svetozar Vukmanovitch-Tempo, one of Tito's vice presidents, and his Economic 
Chief for Yugoslavia, stated: 

"That the yield of postwar Communist Yugoslavia's agriculture is still below 
that of the prewar Yugoslavia. On the basis of ofhical statistical data, it is 
seen that in the period 1930-39 the average annual production of the 5 principal 
cereals * * * wheat, corn, rye, barley and oats * * * amounted to 1,1.'^5 pounds 
per capita. In the period 1945-52 it was only 780 pounds per capita." 

Corn is extremely important for Yugoslavia, especially for fattening pigs. 
Because of the reduction in produtcion, and of the export of corn as soon as 
available, Yugoslavia was not able to raise and fatten as many pigs in the post- 
war as in the prewar period. Therefore, beginning in 1949, Yugoslavia con- 
stantly has imported lard, although in 1936 and 1937 her export of pigs was one- 
seventh of the entire world production. 

According to the Belgrade Politika of May 27, 19.54, Yugoslavia in this eco- 
nomic year will import twice the quantity of wheat which she exported on the 
average in prewar years. At the third congress of the Association of Commu- 
nists of Croatia, Vladimir Bakaric, a leading Communist in Croatia, said : "The 
import of wheat becomes a requirement of our economy and not merely a result 
of dry years." 

The droughts in Yugoslavia in 1946, 1950, and 1952, were such that without 
foreign help the Yugoslav population would have been threatened with starva- 
tion. A drought is predicted for 1954. which probably is good publicity backing 
for the new Yugoslav Ambassador's request made a few months ago in Wash- 
ington for 360,000 tons of wheat. 

Why should Yugoslavia suddenly have droughts since the Communists took 
power? Why don't they have corn to fatten pigs in Communist Yugoslavia? 
During my 20 years in Yugoslavia — 1921 to 1941 — we had some droughts and some 
floods, some were bad, but Yugoslavia never had to call for outside help to free 
herself under its former government, its constitutional monarchy. 

Two of Tito's recognized leading agricultural experts, Lazar Erzigovac of the 
agricultural station at Zemun, and Lazar Stojkovic, chief of the agricultural 
station at Novi-Sad, announced after a thorough investigation that the droughts 
in Yugoslavia are the results of bad soil conservation — in plain language of poor 
or insufficient or wrongly timed plowing. Yugoslavs outside of Yugoslavia have 
known that a long time. 

Climatic conditions in Yugoslavia are better than in many countries as regards 
sunshine but worse as regards moisture. In the majority of Yugoslavia's most 
fertile districts a sufficient moisture (rainfall) exists, but in some years too 
much falls followed by dry months. 

Yugoslavia did not need irrigation projects to avoid di ought, because conser- 
vation of rainfall obtained by proper plowing as practiced by the peasants for 
years without end, had sufficed. They plowed before the rains started to break 
up the soil and form reservoirs for moisture all through it. Thus prior to World 
War II such conservation, even if it did not meet the needs of the country 100 
percent, yet was followed enough to avoid the droughts so common to the 
Communists. 

Beginning with 1945, the first full year of Communist control, conservation of 
moisture was done but little. According to the highest Yugoslav authorities of the 
program for the advancement of agriculture for the period 1953-62, not more 
than 15 percent of the required moisture conservation is contained in it. Noth- 
ing else is possible. 

The individual farmers (peasants) with their small holding of probably 20 
acres, half arable, still own about 70 percent of the arable land in Yugoslavia. 
They are badly off for animal-drawn plows and their holdings are too small for 
tractors. Don't blame them for the lack of animal-drawn plows. It's not their 
fault. 

An animal-drawn plow generally lasted 12 years. Therefore the prewar plows 
are worn out by now. Yugoslavia imported very few such plows during the war 



226 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

and made almost none. Under the postwar Communist government they im- 
ported none as far as I know. 

Erzigovac, Tito's above-mentioned agricultural expert, stated that Yugoslavia 
produces 38,790 animal-drawu plows annually and that 115,000 are needed for 
the individual small peasants. But as the great part of the plows that were pro- 
duced in Yugoslavia went to the peasant working cooperatives (Kolhozzes) and 
to the government estates, the individual peasants have been obliged to plow their 
land with worn-out prewar plows. Obviously they could not plow as they did 
prewar when those plows were new or in good serviceable condition which todav 
is not the case. 

The bad results obtained from the various peasant working associations (Kol- 
hozzes) was such that the Yugoslav Government in 1953 was obliged to permit 
their liquidation if the members so wished. However, as announced by the 
government this was not to be construed as indicating any giving up of its final 
aim which is to have all peasants in collectives of some kind, whatever their 
nomenclature will be. 

The Yugoslav Communists plan to purchase agricultural equipment for the 
large collectivized groups they hope to build up with their program of the ad- 
vancement of agriculture for the period 1953-62. They may call them the work- 
ing associations or sometliing else. It's a great question whether they will suc- 
ceed any better than they have to date. But in any case, because of the woruout 
condition of the peasants' plows, and the insufficient number of these animal- 
drawn plows and of the animals to pull them, hunger, like the Sword of Damo- 
cles, will hang over the head of Yugoslavia's population as long as Tito and his 
Communists rule them. 

KELIGION 

The Yugoslav Communist Party like that in Russia forbids its members to 
belong to a religion. In Yugoslavia those who openly or officially belong to the 
church do not get better jobs. Not much imagination is needed" to understand 
what that means in a country where the government is the sole employer. 

Children are not allowed to receive religious instruction without tlie written 
consent of the parents. As many parents were persecuted for giving such per- 
mits, it's understandable that great numbers of parents have not given them. 

In numerous other ways the Yugoslav Communists are trying to destroy re- 
ligion, the worship of God, in Yugoslavia. T. y have set iip various priests' 
a.ssociations which must work as the party wishc.;. The majority of Yugoslavia's 
priests, both Orthodox and Koman Catholic, have not johied tliose associations, 
the Yugoslav Communist police harass them constantly and it would seem in 
many ways. 

Hundreds of priests have been arrested and sentenced to short or long terms 
of prison. Among them numerous bishops and one cardinal. Bishops have 
been mobilized and forced to serve as ordinary soldiers. The Communists went 
so far, according to reports from people who can be l)elieved, that when trans- 
ferring Bishop Nastich of Sarejevo, an American-born Serbian (Orthodox bishop, 
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Mostar and a high-ranking Moslem religious 
leader, together with other clergy of the various faiths, from one prison to 
another, the railroad car in which they rode was so set on a siding that it was 
hit by a passing express train. Jlany of tb.e clergy were wounded. Bishop 
Nastich having had both legs broken, as reported. Although hard for Americans 
to believe, it must ha remembered we are dealing with an organized crowd of 
murderers, scoundrels, and enemies of our country as thev are of any other 
free country. The people who would shoot down 12,000 Serbs and Slovenes at 
Kochevija Forest in Slovenia, and thousands of Croatians dc'livered to them 
at Dravograd, and execute several thousand Yugoslavs while fastening their 
tentacles on the country, would not hold back from murdering or maiming a 
few religious leaders. 

Yugoslavia, having been expelled from the Soviet bloc in 1948, and having re- 
mained loyal to international communism, as demonstrated in the United Nations, 
in their press and, through speeches of their leaders, is RIoscow's Trojan Horse 
today. Yugoslav Communists, whether on diplomatic or commercial missions, are 
accepted as "different" or "less bad" or even as "harmless friendly" Communists 
Thus they have entree whether Soviet or so-called satellite Communists might 
not be received. That enables them to do first-class work for international 
communism one of whose aims is the overthrow of our United States. They 
do this largely at our expense. It seems to me it is a matter which definitely 
concerns our internal security and could be cured through Senate Resolution 247. 
The enormous material and financial aid given by the United States to Tito 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 227 

and his Yugoslav Comiuiinists has shaken greatly the trust of the Yugoslavs and 
other enslaved people in us. They cannot see how we can be anti-Communist, 
when through our continued support of Tito and his murderous regime, we enable 
him to hold a once free people, our former allies, in slavery. 

What makes it worse for us, in my opinion, in this case of the Yugoslav peo- 
ple, and it's a point not known to most Americans, is that we share a great 
moral responsibility for their present fate. That's because it was largely 
through pressure and promises of our diplomatic representatives that the un- 
fortunate Yugoslav people were pushed into World War II. 

In January 1941 our diplomatic representatives, with our country not in the 
war, gave the then Royal Yugoslav Government the choice of coming out for 
the British-American combination or the Axis Powers. According to Mr. Dema- 
ree Bess' excellent article, Our Frontier on the Danube, a first-class description 
of our historic blundering in the Balkans, in the May 24, 1941, issue of the 
Saturday Evening Post, we warned the Yugoslavs that if they made a deal witli 
Germany we would regard Yugoslavia as our enemy both during and after 
the war. But we assured them that if they refused to collaborate with Germany 
the American people would see to it that they came out on the winning side. 
That's about what was heard in Belgrade at that time. 

The then heads of the Royal Yugoslav Government, responsible men, whose 
job it was to try to save their own country, knew that Yugoslavia could not 
defy Germany, even if there had been anything to defy Germany about. They 
knew Yugoslavia could not resist the force which had overrun Poland, Norway, 
Holland, Belgium, and France and had driven the Briti.sh Army into the Chan- 
nel. They knew that aid from the United States, even if it could be sent — 
which was questionable — could not arrive in time to save Yugoslavia should 
Germany attack. They had no reason to defy Germany, their best customer, 
and like the Swedes who also did not defy Germany yet are respected and 
exist as a nation today, these Yugoslav leaders decided that the sole way to 
preserve their country was to remain neutral as Sweden did. Hence, on 
March 25, 1941, in Vienna they signed a nonmilitary agreement of neutrality 
with the Axis Powers. 

Two days later, March 27, 1941, a small group of Serbians, whose leaders, in 
my opinion were irresponsible seekers for personal advancement rather than 
patriots, staged a coup d'etat, overthrew the Royal Government which had 
signed the March 25th agreement, and formed their reconstructed government. 
However, as an American who lived 20 years in Yugoslavia, and knows the almost 
naive faith people in the Balkans had in the United States, I believe that our 
diplomatic representatives' assurances that in any case Americans would see that 
Yugoslavia would be on the winning side in the end, must have played a great 
role in causing those conspirators to stage their coup d'etat. Therein lies our 
great moral responsibility. 

Ten days later Hitler attacked. The conspirators of March 27, faced with the 
result of their folly, with few exceptions, and most of their new government, 
fled the country at once, leaving the Yugoslav people to their fate. The Army, 
faced with overwhelming odds, capitulated shortly. 

The foreign occupations, chaos and civil war which followed, gave Tito his 
chance, which he acknowledges by celebrating March 27 as the start of his 
slave state. Incidentally it was the opening of diplomatic relations between 
Belgrade and Moscow, done in early 1940 through pressure put on Yugoslavia by 
the Allies which enabled the Yugoslav Communist Party, underground since 
1921, to start to organize again. That is another case of the folly of opening 
relations with the Soviets. 

We are not concerned here with those poor men who so thoughtlessly brought 
destruction to their country. We are concerned with the fact that our diplo- 
matic representatives gave promises which those men, the conspirators of the 
March 27 coup, believed. We are concerned with the 1,700,000 Yugoslavs of 
all groups who died in the war, civil war, and massacres which followed that 
fatal act. We are concerned with the fact that we enable Tito to keep 17 mil- 
lion Yugoslavs in slavery. Doesn't it seem we should do something about 
all this? 

We cannot redress those wrongs with money. We can, however, redress 
them to some extent by helping the Yugoslavs to get back that which we helped 
them to lose — their freedom. 

Senate Resolution 247 will be a first step toward that. Our severance of dip- 
lomatic relations with Soviet Russia and the so-called satellite nations, in- 
cluding Yugoslavia, will serve notice on the world that we really are anti- 
Communist, that we have stopped temporizing about communism. We will 



228 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

give hope to liuiulreds of millions of people a good share of whom are slaves 
because of our until now fatal foreign policy — fatal to our friends and to us. 

We are at war with the Soviets — cold or hot it is war. Ali materials or 
goods shipped to the Soviets are strategic — even doll clothes. Think about 
it and you will see that all articles we ship to our enemies, even for consumers 
such as children, mean that a Soviet worker does not have to produce those 
articles. His corresponding time has been released for war production. 

Senate Resolution 247 should be applied to Tito's Yugoslavia along with the 
other Communist countries to prevent Yugoslavia being used as a transmission 
line for Moscow's work. At the same time, it would seem proper to inform the 
Soviets and their satellites that any move on their part into Yugoslavia means 
war with us. That will give the Yugoslav people their chance to settle their 
own score with communism and Tito and regain the freedom we helped them 
lose. 



[Translation by W. H. Smyth, New York, N. Y.] 

Peoples Republic of Serbia, 
Committee foe Water Husbandry, 

Belgrade, July 30, 19 iS. 
Mr. Smyth : For the execution of the regulatory works included in the 5-year 
plan which is being carried out by our institution we require certain construction 
machinery which is produced in the United States of America. Insofar as it 
may be possible to secure it under favorable terms, we address ourselves to you 
because you were the representative of several of the companies mentioned 
below, and request your cooperation in this business. 
Principally these firms are known to us : 

1. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 1937 Walker Street, Peoria, 111., produces elevating 
graders, graders, bulldozers, scrapers, and tractors. 

2. Austin Western Co., 1945 Barrows Street, Aurora, 111., which produces parts 
for dredges (probably they mean graders). 

3. Northwest Engineering Co., 1S27 Steger Building, 28 East Jackson, Chicago, 
111., which produces dredges (mean dragline scraper), cranes, and parts for 
dredges and cranes. 

4. Buckeye Traction Digger Co., Boyce and Crystal Avenues, Findlay, Ohio, 
which produces ditchdigging machines, dredge accessories, graders, and 
bulldozers. 

5. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 1046 Monroe Avenue, South Milwaukee, Wis., which pro- 
duces self-propelled dredges and excavators with diesel, gas, and steam power. 

6. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 1126 South 70th Street, Milwaukee, Wis., 
which produces bulldozers and other material. 

In as far as you also have connections with other companies they also may 
come into consideration. 

We need machines as follows : 

I. dredges — DRY LAND 

(a) Chain-bucket type on caterpillars or rails, effective capacity 70 to 100 
cubic meters per hour, or 120-150 m'h theoretically. Buckets to be of about 80 
liter capacity mounted on articulated steel links. The steel link belts must be 
such that they may'be lengthened or shortened. The length of the steel link 
belts must be about 20 meters. For casting out the excavated earth the dredge 
(excavator) should be directly or separately connected to a conveyor 20 or 25 
meters long mounted on wheels, with a rubber belt approximately 70 centimeters 
wide. Because of its great length the conveyor may have to be supported. 
Besides the conveyor the dredge should be equipped with an arm for loading 
wagons and wagonettes right alongside the dredge. 

(6) Shovels on caterpillars (tracks) with articulated latticed arms. The 
articulated arm must have a bucket of about 0.60 m ' capacity and must be so 
constructed that it may dig to a depth of 7 meters and lift to a height of 4 
meters for discharge into wagons ; the effective capacity of this equipment must 
be about 60 to 70 m^h. The latticed arm must be of 2 parts — that is of 1 basic 
arm and 2 extension pieces (short and long). For work with the short arm 
a bucket is required of 1.0 to 1.25 cubic meters capacity. The effective capacity 



STRATEGY AXD TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 229 

of the excavator with the short arm must be 50 to 60 m' per hour. The lensth 
of this arm must be about 10 meters. For work with the long; arm a bucl<et is 
required of 0.75 to 1.00 m' capacity. The effective capacity of the shovel with 
the long arm must be 40 to 50 m' hourly. The length of this long arm must be 
about 14 meters. 

(e) Self-propelled steam-floating dredges, bucket and suction types whose 
capacity will be — 

1. Working with suction lines (sandy material) 250 m^h. 

2. Working with buckets in sandy material 180 m'h. 

3. Working with buckets in gravelly material 150 m^h. 

4. Working with heavy buckets with teeth in strong material 50 m"h. 
The dredges must have the following engines : 

1. For work with buckets. 2 engines each of about 250 horsepower. 

2. For work with suction lines, one engine of about 250 hor.sepower. 

3. For weighing (?) lifting while working and for lighting, 3 engines of 
about 70 horsepower each. 

II. BULLDOZERS 

The dredges must be equipped with the following accessories : 

1. 100 pontoons each with a suction hose 5 meters long on it. 

2. 20 pieces of suction 5 meters long for shore-work. 

The dredge must be equipped with cabins for the crew, with lighting for 
maintenance work and with steam heating for the winter. 

The machines which come into consideration are those made by American 
factories, types D-8; D-7; and HD-14. Bulldozers must be easily maneuver- 
able, with motors of 80 to 120 horsepower with adjustable blades 3 to 4 meters 
long. 

III. SCEAPEKS 

(a) Bowl capacity 5m', type D-7; HD-14 and HD-10 with tractors of cor- 
responding strength. 

(b) Bowl capacity Sm'', type D-S ; D-7 and HD-14 with tractors of corre- 
sponding power. 

(c) Turnapuils with bowl capacity 12 m' with tractors of corresponding power. 

IV. ELECTRIC CENTRALS (GENERATING SETS) MOVABLE 

Capacity 60-120 kilowatts, that is 80-100 horsepower with distributing table 
cables and other necessary equipment for the conduct of electric current to a 
distance of 3 kilometers. These generating .sets must serve to drive pumps and 
other machine tools as well as to light the work place — gi-ounds. 

Insofar as it may be possible to cover our requirements in the United States 
of America we request you to send us catalogs with detailed specifications of the 
machines so that it may be possible to decide from these and such others not 
listed above but which we could employ profitably in our work. 

As we have .stated above all these machines are highly necessary for the im- 
provement of agriculture in our country, therefore we request you to secure 
exact infoi-mation for us concerning the following: 

1. Method of closing contracts directly with factories (companies). 

2. Method of payment (through cash or the exchange of goods, state what 
goods would come into consideration for export from our country). 

3. Time of delivery (if possible at the earliest date — even from stocks if this 
can be done). 

4. Method of taking delivery. 

5. Means of transport and other eventualities we cannot foresee. 

Insofar as the conditions of the ol't'ers from the mentioned firms would suit 
us, we would inform you as to the quantities of the various machines which 
would be required. 

In case of necessity you may put yourself in contact with our commercial 
attache, Beuo Habjanic, 1818 24th Street, Washington, D. C. 

We hope for your early reply and request you to tell us the terms for this 
business. 

Engineer Dkagoslav Mutapovio, 
Minister in the Government of the Peoples Republic of Serbia. 
47769 ° -^54— pt. 4 5 



230 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

[TrnnslntloD by W. H. Smyth] 

ExTBACTs From Poi.jtical Courses for Candidates for the Communist Party 

OF Yugoslavia 

Page 193 : 

In Older to increase its membership the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
organizes political courses in which candidates for the party must gain linowl- 
edge of the following sul)jects: 

1. Teachings of Marx-Engels. 

2. The development of society. 

3. History of the labor movement. 

4. Teachings about the party. 

5. Tlieory of revolution. 

6. Nationality questions. 

7. Peasant question. 

8. Anti-Fascist Front of Women (AFZ). 

9. Council of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ). 

10. Peoples Front. 

11. Development of perspectives. 

Most of the above themes come out in the form of lectures. 
We give the main themes from the subjects: The Party, Revolution, Na- 
tionality Questions (which are worked out fully according to Stalin's papers), 
Peasant Question, Peoples Front. 

Instruction about the party : The working class is a part of society and the 
party is a part of the working class. The working class enters the final fight 
for the destruction of capitalistic society. This, as a revolutionary fighting 
force must have its shock staff, as a revolutionary core which stands above the 
working class. That core is the Communist Party. The basic principles of 
the party are : 

1. The Bolshevist Party is the advance guard of the working class, the lead- 
ing organization of the working class. 

2. The party is an organized, ordered, disciplined organization. 

3. The party is the largest form of the working class organization, larger 
than all others, which others must be subordinate to it. Tlie party to all a 
united goal and direction. 

4. The party is the weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the build- 
ing of socialistic society. 

5. The party personifies the unity of will. The party strengthens itself when 
it cleans itself of opportunistic elements. Opportunism and splitting into 
fractions will not be allowed. 

Page 194 : 

The program is the foundation of the party. Tactics decide the manner of 
fighting to reach near and far goals. Organizational principles strengthen the 
internal structure of the party. Absolute unity and correlation must exist be- 
tween program, tactics, and organization. The statutes contain the essence of 
the organization. The statutes set the form of the organization, prescribe the 
duties of members and regulate the conditions for reception of members into 
the party. A member of the party must recognize the party program, work in 
one of its organizations and conform to the decisions of the party. For entry 
into the party a candidacy and a probation is held. The party accepts as 
members the candidates who have met the probationary requirements, passed 
the course for basic political knowledge and accept the program and conceptions 
of the party. The cell is the basic organizational unit and may be street, village, 
military, a cell in a factory, or in an institution. A secretary leads the cell but 
if it be big it may have its committee of 4 or 5 of the best party members. The 
management is made of a committee, regional, district, county, state, or central. 

THEORY OF REVOLUTION CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING THEMES 

1. Revolution is action for the violent destruction of capitalistic society and 
the building of a new society on the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

2. Not a single isolated revolution, as in the U. S. S. R. and in Yugoslavia is 
ended until.revolution will have been terminated successfully in the whole world 
because danger from foreign intervention always threatens. Therefore it is a 
fundamental task of all Communists to assist revolutionary forces in the world. 

3. There is no destruction of the old order of society without revolution, there 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 231 

is no revolution without the proletariat, there is no .understanding proletariat 
without the Communist Party which is the staff and the directing organ for 
revolution. 

4. The workers and peasants are the main revolutionary force and their council 
is the principal means of revolution. 

5. All nationality, especially colonial questions must be inflamed, because they 
basically are revolutionary, hence help the process of the world revolution. 

G. The international reaction assists the bourgeoisie who are falling, therefore 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, as rulers of the bourgeoisie, must cultivate 
hate of the bourgeoisie by plan. 

7. The Soviets are the basic symbol of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

NATIONALITY QUESTION 

The nationality question must be regarded from the point of view of the world 
revolution. With regard to that, the nationality question actually is a nationality 
colonial question. Leninism showed, and imperial war and revolution in Russia 
confirmed, that the nationality question can be decided only in connection with 
and on the basis of the revolution of the proletariat, for the road to victory leads 
through the revolutionary council with the liberation movement of the colonies 
and countries concerned against imperialism. The nationality question is a 
part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part of the question 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

It is worth while to hold to the formula of Lenin ; the nationality question is 
nationality by form, but by its meaning is international. 

Mr. Arexs. Will you kindly give the committee just a brief resume 
of your personal history with particular emphasis upon that part of 
your life which you spent in southern and eastern Europe? 

Mr. Smyth. I went to France in the United States Army as a field 
artillery captain, 91st Division, in 1918. After my demobilization I 
elected to stay on the other side to go into business. I first went to 
the Caucasus for a New York company and remained there all of 
1920 and the early part of 1921. It was a New York group which 
had planned to trade with Russia and had hoped that bolshevism 
soon would be stopped. 

There in the Caucasus I began to get an idea of what communism 
really was — although I had seen results of it in the summer of 1919 
on trips from my station in Vienna to Budapest after the Bela Kun 
Communist government was overthrown in Hungary. The Hun- 
garian Communists were in power for 133 days and did a terrific 
amount of damage in that short time. 

During my stay in the Caucasus I was in the evacuation of Petrovsk, 
now called Makhachkala, on the northwest shore of the Caspian Sea. 
I got out of Baku with a suit of clothes and a raincoat. Early in 1921 
I left Tiflis a few days ahead of the Bolshevists' entry, and finally 
embarked for safety at Batoum shortly before the Communists cap- 
tured that Black Sea port. 

My employers decided to liquidate their business in that part of the 
world and paid us off. I started back for California, but visited a 
friend in Yugoslavia, wdiere the previous year I had spent a month 
on an investigation of commercial possibilities, and, like the man who 
came to dinner, stayed there 20 years. I liked the place and the people. 
I was young, started my own company on a shoestring, and over 20 
years built up a fairly large business there. 

My company became distributor for Packard, Chrysler, Plymouth 
automobiles. Caterpillar tractors, Goodyear tires, and some other good 
American companies. We exported various Yugoslav products in 
order to secure dollars to help pay for our imports. 



232 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Chairman Jenner, When did you leave Yugoslavia and why? 

Mr. Smyth. I left Yugoslavia July 14, 1941, because of the German 
occupation which commenced in April that year. Our legation was 
shut in May, but left a skeleton consulate which was closed the middle 
of July, a month after the Axis consulates and legations in the United 
States were closed by our Government. 

Mr. Arens. Since you left you have been maintaining contact with 
what you have heretofore described to us as the underground in Yugo- 
slavia; is that correct? 

Mr. Smyth. I would not call it that and don't like to talk about 
an underground. I have maintained relations with people over there. 
Nearly every month I see persons who have just come out, or hear 
tlirough reliable people who have talked with them, what conditions 
are in Yugoslavia. Further, I get Yugoslav newspapers. Inciden- 
tally, Communist newspapers having to do with Yugoslavia are pub- 
lished in Prague and Moscow as well as in the United States. 

Mr. Arens. Is Tito a real Communist? 

Mr. Smyth. Tito certainly is a real Communist. There is no ques- 
tion about it. He was a Communist before he was taken prisoner by 
the Russians in World War I. I would say he took his postgraduate 
course in communism in Eussia, first as a prisoner, and later when he 
remained there after his release. He came out definitely for com- 
munism, and certainly was sent back to Yugoslavia for Communist 
work. Tito was nominated to be secretary general of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party by Malenkov in 1937, the No. 1 man in Russia today, 
which gives an idea of the tieup he now must have. 

Mr. Arens. What about the common impression that Tito is a na- 
tional or a different sort of Communist? 

Mr. Smyth. The best way to discuss that, in my opinion, is by using 
Tito's own words. First, I'd like to say there is a common belief in this 
country that Tito broke with the Soviets. But that's not the case. He 
did not break with them; they kicked him out. At the Cominform 
meeting in Bucharest on June 28, 1948, Tito and his Yugoslav Commu- 
nists were expelled from the Cominform. In my opinion the reasons 
were largely personal. 

As explained in my written statement, Tito and his top men were 
perfectly willing to spy on other people but they did not like it when 
they saw the Soviets were spying on them. There was nothing unusual 
in that spying. It was just Soviet standard practice. But Tito and 
his men knew that many Communist leaders had been liquidated 
through such spying, so they opposed it in Yugoslavia. That led to 
bad feeling and to their expulsion from the Cominform. The prin- 
cipal formal reasons given were that they (the Yugoslav Communists) 
had not formed a central committee of the party and that they had 
done practically nothing about the collectivization of the peasants. 

There was a lot of talk about it. The Soviets claimed Tito and his 
Yugoslav Communists were not good Communists. They expelled the 
Yugoslavs from the Cominform. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 233 

Now, regardino; the matter of Tito's being a national Communist, 
1 believe that in Tito's talk on June 26, 1950, before the Yugoslav Par- 
liament, you have the reason why people think of him as a national 
Communist. The following is my translation of a part of his remarks : 

The essence of our road to socialism, or, better said, communism — 

note that Tito himself stated "better said, communism" — 

can be defined in a few words. Our road to socialism is composed of our applica- 
tion of Marxist science in the closest harmony with the special conditions which 
exist in our country. 

Many people probably stopped listening or stopped reading at that 
point. They decided he was a national Communist because he had said 
■'the special conditions which exist in our country." 

But Mr. Tito went on with the following, and this is a part of the 
same statement : 

We try to introduce the spirit of that science into all our works, and every 
deviation from the principles of that science, no matter under what pretense, 
would be revisionism and treason not only to the working class but also to pro- 
gressive humanity of the entire world. 

When he says "progressive humanity" and "the working class," there 
IS no limitation to it. It is international or world communism. 

I would like to go back to the matter of Tito's being a real Com.- 
munist. In 1952 the Yugoslav Party had what they called their sixth 
congress. At that time they proposed and voted a new constitution, 
which is practically identical with the present Soviet Constitution. 
I've compared them paragraph by paragraph and they make interest- 
ing reading. But using the phrase our President and our Secretary of 
State have been employing lately, "We will judge by actions and not 
by words," I'd say, let's judge Tito and his Communists by their 
actions and not by their words. 

You take first the matter of the clergy and religion. The Yugoslav 
Communists have done everything possible to destroy religion. The 
priests, both Orthodox and Roman Catholic, have put up a wonderful 
battle for religion. Tito has established so-called priests' associations, 
and has tried to herd the priests into these associations so he can con- 
trol them there. Some priests have gone in, but to the honor of the 
Yugoslav clergy it can be said that the vast majority have not gone into 
those associations. 

Here in America we all connect children with Sunday school. It 
is not a matter of who you are for generally, children of all faiths go 
for religious instruction once a week. In Yugoslavia children can 
go for religious instruction only on a written permit issued by their 
parents. In a place where the sole employer is the state, and that 
state is opposed to religion, it is rather dangerous for a parent to 
give a permit for his children to attend religious instruction. He 
can lose his job. Nobody in Yugoslavia who openly professes his 
religion, who makes anything of it, will have a good job, or let's say 
a better job. 

Then take the matter of private property. They just took it over. 

Chairman Jenner. Did they take over your property ? 



234 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Smyth. Yes, sir. They seized my company — W. H. Smyth. 
Part of it, for example, was taken over by Jugauto, the automotive 
section of the Yugoshiv Government. 

Chairman Jenner. Were you compensated for it? 

Mr. Smyth, I may be, some day, from the International CLaims 
Commission. I hope so. 

Mr. Arexs. Do you make a distinction between international com- 
munism and Kremlin communism ? 

Mr. Smyth. Kremlin communism is international or world com- 
munism. There is really only one communism. Communism is out 
to communize the whole world. 

Senator Welker. Do you make any distinction between national 
communism and international communism? 

Mr. Smyth. No, sir. It just does not exist. With my written 
statement I submitted a photostat of two pages which a Serb friend 
of mine stole from a Tito textbook. That section is called, "Extract 
From Political Courses for Candidates for the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia." The following is the translation of a very significant 
paragraph from these courses : 

Not a single isolated revolution, as in the U. S. S. R. and in Yugoslavia, is 
ended until revolution will have been terminated successfully in the whole world, 
because danger from foreign intervention always threatens. Therefore it is a 
fundamental task of all Communists to assist revolutionary forces In the whole 
world. 

You will see Tito's missions all over the world. They are written 
up in the papers sometimes as contacting Socialist groups. But, re- 
member, Tito in his own statement, which I just now read to you, 
said, "socialism, or better said, communism." 

Mr. Arens. What is your feeling about severance of diplomatic 
relations with the Iron Curtain countries by the Government of the 
United States? 

Mr. Smyth. I think that will be the first positive move we will have 
made against communism for years. 

Mr. Arens. What would you think about including Yugoslavia in 
that bloc? 

Mr. Smyth. Yugoslavia is today a Communist country. Tito and 
his crowd say they are better Communists than the Russians, I will 
stand corrected. As Mr. Goncharoff, the previous witness, so well 
said, we should not say "the Russians" when talking about the Soviets, 
but we should say, "the Soviets." I know the Russians. I lived in 
the Caucasus for well over a year. In Belgrade I had 11 Russians 
among my 35 employees. I had several of them in Zagreb. 

The Russians are just like nice people anywhere else. There is a 
difference between the Russian people and the Bolshevists — the 
Soviets. In Yugoslavia there is a difference between the Yugoslav 
people and the Communists. We have the same difference here in 
America between our good Americans and our Communists with their 
standard international Communist way of thinking. 

We should include Yugoslav with the Soviet bloc for this reason — 
our moral position is bad, has been since the moment we recognized 
the Soviets diplomatically, I think it has been especially bad since 
we began to support Tito, There is no question about it — the present 
Yugoslav Government is a Communist government. How can we say 
we are anti-Communist when we maintain in power Tito and his 
peojile who hold 17 million Yugoslavs in slavery? 



STRATEGY A^D TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 235 

We fouo;ht a ^var 90 years ago, the greatest war in history until tlien, 
the War Between the States, to abolish slavery in our country. Yet 
our Government, through giving aid and money, over a billion dollars 
in the last 8 or 9 years, has enabled Tito to hold those 17 million Yugo- 
slavs in slavery. 

Mr. Areks. Do you feel Tito is loyal to the Soviets ? 

Mr. Smyth. He has proved it right along. People here do not 
realize that when Tito and his Communists were thrown out of the 
Cominform in June 1948, that they did their best in every way for 
over a year to get back in. An interesting sidelight on this when 
they signed their commercial agreement with the Soviets at the end 
of 1948 for the 1949 period, they got a worse trade agreement with 
the Soviets than they had had for 1948. Previously they had pro- 
tested over the 1948 agreement because they claimed they were cliarged 
too much for Russian products and credited too little for their own 
Yugoslav products sold to the Soviets. Yet to show their steadfast 
devotion to Moscow, they accepted a worse agreement for themselves 
even after their expulsion from the Cominform. 

The Russians saw what was happening. They are realists. Unfor- 
tunately, western diplomats apparently only investigated to find out 
whether the Yugoslav Communists had been put out of the Cominform 
or not. When they say the Yugoslavs had bsen put out, they said, 
"That is enough."' But not the Soviet diplomats. They studied the 
situation. They saw Tito was worth more outside the Iron Curtain 
than in, because with people saying Tito was a National Communist, 
a nice Communist, a different one, Tito's people could go all around 
the world, mix everywhere, even where Soviet representatives could 
not. 

In my opinion, one can characterize Tito's Communists by saying 
that Yugoslavia became the Trojan Horse of INIoscow. IMay 7 this 
year, in my talk before the Commonwealth Club of California on the 
subject they proposed, "Yugoslavia — Whose Trojan Horse?" I 
showed how Communist Yugoslavia was a perfect setup as a Trojan 
Horse. The Yugoslav Communists were theoretically outside the 
Iron Curtain. Therefore people all over the world received them as 
being different, not the real Moscow Communists. Tito has had mis- 
sions in Burma, in India, even in Ethiopia and other places where 
Yugoslavia had no or practically no commerce. 

Yugoslavia used to import a relatively small amount of jute from 
India for making bags, but Tito has had some of his highest men out 
there. Why ? Making contact of course in those countries with their 
so-called Socialist parties. But remember, Tito himself said "social- 
ism, better said communism." He could send his missions to places 
where the Soviets could not be sure how their own emissaries would 
be received. He has been of immense value in this way to the Soviets 
and to international communism. 

]Mr. Arens. In the event of war, could the United States count on 
the Yugoslav Army? 

Mr. Smyth. I look at it this way. The Yugoslavs today are in a 
slave state. Tito is the head of it, and his government is in power. 
The people know that if the Soviets should take over, they still would 
be in a slave state. If they think we will keep Tito in power in case 
we win the war, they naturally can say, "Why should we fight to 
remain slaves ? If Tito will be on top, we'll be slaves under Tito. We 



236 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

would be slaves under Malenkov. Then why fight?" That is to me a 
basic point. 

Secondly, Tito cannot be sure of his own army. He does not know 
which officers he can count on in it — that he, he knows some are per- 
sonally loyal to him, but generally speaking he cannot say who are 
Cominform people and who are not. 

Mr. Arens. Should we trade with the Kremlin or with Tito? 

Mr. Smyth. I would say no; not with either. 

Mr. Arens. Why? 

Mr. Smyth. I notice there are a lot of ladies present here, so I will 
mention doll clothes. If somebody would export doll clothes, which 
seem absolutely innocuous, to a Communist country like Soviet Russia 
or any other, those doll clothes would be strategic materials. That 
is not foolish. Just think of it. Those doll clothes and other con- 
sumer goods sent over there release man-hours and woman-hours, as 
they work their women the same as their men. That releases a cor- 
responding number of work hours of their own people for work on 
war production. 

Mr. Arens. Should we import goods from behind the Iron Curtain 
into this country? 

Mr. Smyth. No; not in my opinion. 

Mr. Arens. Why not? 

Mr. Smyth. If we import from behind the Iron Curtain countries 
we take goods from that area. We have to pay with our good dollars. 
Those dollars are what the Soviets need to buy the stuff they can buy 
only for dollars or for gold — strategic materials. Incidentally they 
have a very large gold production in the Lena gold fields in Siberia. 
It costs them only about $7 an ounce to produce their gold — that is 
with their slave labor. Our Government pays $35 an ounce for gold. 
So the Soviets can outbid us for anj^thing they want. When they use 
their cheap gold and buy consumer goods in Europe or other places 
to ameliorate the conditions for the people in Russia, they are making 
their enslaved people think things are better than they really are. 
And by spending their cheap gold they are acquiring a large labor 
force working for them outside of their Communist bloc. That re- 
leases their own labor for war production. That all will come back 
against us. There is no question about it. We are at war, whether 
you call it hot war or cold war. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Smyth, why would Tito enter into a military pact 
such as he has entered into with Greece and Turkey ? 

Mr. Smyth. Last year he entered into a pact, a pact of friendship 
and collaboration with Greece and Turkey. I feel quite sure he 
went into that pact purely and simply to get more material and finan- 
cial aid from us by making our people think we were winning him over 
to our side. Signing a political pact means nothing to a Communist. 
It is high time our people should realize that is just a part of the 
strategy and tactics of international communism, of world commu- 
nism. 

It seems that our officials, our Government, still hold to the idea 
that, "Well Tito is different. He broke with the Russians." They 
don't seem to understand Tito did not break with the Soviets ; he was 
kicked out by them. It was a very good move for the Soviets. I do 
not think they knew what a good job they did when they put him out, 
because this busineos of being able to say that Tito is a national Com- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 237 

mimist is wonderful publicity and very effective for international com- 
munism. That has enabled Tito to get his men in all over the place. 

Senator Welker. It has fooled a lot of people, 

Mr. Smyth. Yes, it has. You asked why he went into the Balkan 
pact. That is a very interesting thing. The age-old policy of the 
Czarist Government, and now of the Soviet Government has been to 
get down through the Balkans, to get down where they could cut the 
Mediterranean supply line of the British Empire. But now the 
Mediterranean is a lifeline for the United States, between our country 
and such countries as Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. We have 
just signed agreements with them about military aid. Those countries 
have good fighting men. By all their ideology they are opposed to com- 
munism, but they do not have war industries. They will have to 
depend on us to supply materiel and munitions. The Mediterranean 
is our lifeline for doing that, to enable our allies to keep on fighting 
when the time comes. 

How could Tito join up with the Greeks and Turks in a pact which 
obviously is designed to prevent the Soviets from conquering the 
Balkans and accomplishing the age-old aim of Russia? It is very 
simple. What is it for Tito or any Communist leader such as he is, 
to sign a pact? 

If you will go back to the end of August 1939, the British and 
French representatives were in Moscow. They thought they were 
signing an agreement with Stalin. Von Ribbentrop, the German 
Foreign Minister, arrived. He was in Moscow only 3 or 4 days but 
apparently made a better offer to the Soviets than the British and the 
French, so Stalin signed with him. Why wouldn't Tito do the same 
thing ? It is to his advantage. He surely entered the Balkan pact just 
to get aid from us and to fool us further into thinking that he is 
with us. 

Mr. Arens. What would be the effect on the average person in Yugo- 
slavia of a severance of diplomatic relations by the United States with 
Tito? 

Mr. Smyth. Personally, I believe he would be glad. Even in spite 
of the fact that it would be harder on him. If we would sever diplo- 
matic relations with the Soviets and Yugoslavia today, we probably 
would cut down on supplies we have been sending to Yugoslavia. It 
would be harder for the people, but they are so fed up with being 
slaves and with this Tito regime, that I am quite sure they and also 
the people in Hungary and in the other enslaved countries would be 
glad because it would give a clean, clear situation. They would say, 
"The United States now definitely is anti-Communist." That would 
give them hope. Tito is in a desperate situation today. He has 
almost wrecked the economy of the country. If it had not been for the 
aid we sent him he would have been finished before this. We have 
saved him continually, yet one of his cardinal Communist aims is to 
destroy our free United States, 

In connection with all this I'd like to say a word about the Yugo- 
slav peasants. Our average American farmers, thank God, have fairly 
good-sized farms. But in Yugoslavia the average peasant probably 
has about 8 hectares, roughly 20 acres. Probably his arable land will 
be 10 acres. The other 4 hectares or 10 acres will be meadowland and 
forest or swamp or whatever there is. 



238 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The peasant is a very interesting person and he is a darn good man. 
He is the foundation of the country. A peasant, in a way, with his 
wife and family was a sort of integrated industry. They grew their 
own food, raised their sheep, and got wool. The women spun and wove 
it into clothes. They raise a few pigs. They will have a few chickens 
and ducks and a couple of cows. It is a very close balance in "getting 
by." If the man was, say a carpenter, he would make some things at 
home to take in and sell at the village market. Formerly they bought 
cotton thread from which the women also wove cloth. But in recent 
years under communism they could not get the cotton thread, and as 
Tito took their w^ool away from them, they could neither make nor buy 
clothes. This situation became so bad last year that Tito had to ease 
up and let them keep some of their wool. Tito tried to drive these 
peasants into his collectives through various oppressive measures — 
taxation, confiscation, and terror. 

Last year Tito announced they could get out of the collectives. 
Things had become so bad that he said in effect, "Well, you can break 
up these collectives if you want, but remember, this has nothing to do 
with the ultimate aim of our Government, which is to have all peasants 
and everybody in collectives or associations run by the Government." 
This driving of peasants into collectives and factories — the prole- 
tarianization of the peasants — is a main point in the program of world 
communism. 

Why should we, the United States, back a government which is 
operating a slave state? In this connection, I heartily recommend 
Senate bill S. 3632 whicl) would make it a felony to import or ship in 
interstate commerce any commodity or goods produced by slave labor. 
Certainly we here are all against slave labor. Then why back slavery 
in other countries? 

I read in the paper last night that in regard to the mess in Indo- 
china, probably there will be a "voluntary" change in population. 
Some of the Indochinese will be moved at their wishes from the north- 
ern part south, and others from the southern part north, so we will 
be able to feel virtuously that we will not be forcing people to live in 
slavery. The Indochinese who don't want communism will be allowed 
to move south, to try to start again after losing everything they had. 

If we are so worried about the guilt connected with forcing people 
into slavery why don't we worry about the 17 million Yugoslavs who 
we help keep in slavery through our aid to Tito paid for from our 
regular governmental budgets? You take this appropriation bill 
being discussed in the Senate now, or is it possibly in the joint com- 
mittee? We send aid to Tito. Why .should we send tanks, artillery, 
heavy equipment, jet planes to Tito ? That special equipment is used by 
his most loyal specialists. They have been checked and doublechecked 
by Tito's secret police, and as a group, probably are loyal to him. 
That equipment helps him to hold the Yugoslavs down. Why should 
we do that ? We helped shove the Yugoslavs into war to their destruc- 
tion. It was none of the Yugoslav people's doing. It seems to me we 
have a record there which we Americans should try to correct. 

There was no reason for letting the Soviets take over China, but even 
in that sellout Tito was very useful, playing his part in world Com- 
munist strategy. I am a businessman and don't have to wear striped 
pants to understand that. In 1948 and later, all that talk about Tito, 
that we were getting him away from the Soviets, that smokescreen 
continually put up in the papers about Tito and Yugoslavia, that 



STRATEGY AXD TACTICS OF WORLD COMJVIUNISM 239 

through him as bait or example we were going to get Mao Tse-tung 
and other leaders of Soviet-dominated countries to "break" with 
Moscow — all that diversion which you remember in the newspapers 
certainly was a part of the strategy and tactics of world communism. 

That propaganda, partly put out, possibly innocently, by our own 
people, greatly helped the Soviets to take over China, 450 million 
people, with practically no noise. That lies on my heart. I was born 
in China. My father and mother were missionaries there. Although I 
left China as a boy I've maintained contact with people who know 
China well. Everyone knows that for 100 years the Chinese have been 
our friends. We never forced them to import opium. You know about 
the opium war when the British fought the Chinese to force them to 
permit the importation of opium from India. We had a clean record 
in China. After the Boxer War we didn't ask for indemnity, as the 
European nations did. We arranged that China should use what 
would have been indemnity payments to send Chinese students to the 
United States to study in our universities. Then during and after 
World AVar II we let China be sold down the river, while our people's 
eyes were diverted away by Tito and his Yugoslav Communists. 

Frankly we sold the Yugoslav people down the river, too. I'd be 
willing to go to bat on that and discuss it but it's late now. The best 
article, in my opinion, on the betrayal of the Yugoslav people was Mr. 
Demaree Bess' Our Frontier on the Danube in the Saturday Evening 
Post of May 24, 1941, previously mentioned in my written statement. 

Why should the people south of the new line to be set in Indochina 
trust us? How can the people in Thailand go to sleep now without 
worrying as to when their turn wnll come ? The thing moves along. It 
has been our words against Soviet actions. They have been pushing 
out, expanding their Communist world empire. One place where it 
was American actions against Soviet words was the Berlin airlift. 
That did a great deal to raise the prestige of the United States. That 
is something we all ?an be proud of. There was no reason for its being 
required but that's a different matter. 

I am in favor of Senate Resolution 247 calling for the severance of 
diplomatic relations with the Soviets and satellites and would make 
it include Communist Yugoslavia. If peoj^le who think Tito is a '"dif- 
ferent" Communist would like to make a special matter of this case, 
they could say to Tito : "Tito, we are going to sever diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Government and satellite countries. As far as 
j^ou're concerned, we'll give you this alternative. You sever relations 
with the Soviets, too. You put democratic processes and order into 
your countr}', give your people a chance to say who will be elected 
mayor of the town, the councilmen, and all other officials. Let us 
supervise the distribution of the supplies we send to Yugoslavia." If 
he's honest he'll do it. 

Why should we send our tanks, planes and other military equipment 
to Yugoslavia and not have our men there on the spot to see who gets 
it and how they use it? Every American who would be over there, 
whether officer, noncom, private or civilian, telling them how to use 
our equipment, and teaching them our methods, would be a missionary 
for our free way of doing things. Instead of that we let them send 
their people here to go around our factories and our installations. 
They see everything we have. I have talked with Yugoslavs in New 
York who speak with these Communist Yugoslav visitors. 



240 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

When they finish their courses and are on their way back, they say, 
"What fools the Americans are. They let us go around and see every- 
thing." Of course, those are picked men who are sent over here. The 
proof they are picked is that out of all the Communist Yugoslavs who 
have come over here, only about three or four have come out and said 
they wanted to stay here. There Avas a case last year, three men in 
the air force who asked asylum in America. 

I doubt that Tito would agree to come along with us. In a free 
election he'd be out of his job. If he would not come along, I would 
inform the Soviets that if they or any satellite would move into Yugo- 
slavia it would mean war with us. That would give the Yugoslav 
people a chance. I hope that when the demarcation line Avill be set in 
Indochina we similarly will tell the Communists that if they move 
south of it in any way that will mean war. We have got to do it 
sometime, so why not now" ? 

I strongly approve of Senate Resolution 247. I think it will be 
the first positive step in 21 years in making people see that without 
any equivocation we are against communism. It will restore the 
world's faith, especially the faith of the enslaved peoples, in our 
United States, and to me faith is the most important thing. There's 
no use in telling the enslaved peoples that everybody over here has a 
car and a refrigerator. That won't make anyone want to fight on our 
side. But faith in us will. 

Our forefathers fought for liberty in our War of the Revolution. 
That was the main thing for George Washington and the others. God 
knows they had a tough time, but they had a burning ideal — liberty. 
What we must do is to give the enslaved peoples of the world hope for 
liberty. I believe that the breaking oil of diplomatic relations wdth 
Soviet Russia and her satellites including Communist Yugoslavia will 
give them that hope hence help in the battle against world communism. 

Chairman Jenner. Further questions? 

Thank you for appearing before us. We appreciate it very much. 

(Whereupon, at 3 : 10 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to call.) 



stratectY and tactics of world communism 



THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Ina^stigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. William E, Jenner (chairman of the sub- 
committee) presiding. 
Present : Senator Jenner. 

Also present : Eichard Arens, special counsel ; Frank W. Schroeder 
and Edward R. Duffy, professional staff members. 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
Do 3^011 swear that the testimony given in this hearing will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Mr. Amoss. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF ULIUS LOUIS AMOSS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL 
SERVICES or INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC. 

The Chairman. Will you state for our record your full name? 

Mr. Amoss. Ulius Louis Amoss. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside ? 

Mr. Amoss. Gibson Island, Md. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Amoss. I am president of International Services of Informa- 
tion Foundation. 

The Chairman. Would you give us some detail of that organiza- 
tion? 

Mr. Amoss. It is a nonprofit organization, established to collect and 
disseminate information from overseas countries. 

The Chairman. How long have you been president of this organi- 
zation? 

Mr. Amoss. Since its inception in 1946. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Arens. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel Amoss, you have prepared at the request of 
the Internal Security Subcommittee your testimony in documentary 
form? 

The Chairman, Mr. AniosSj the press people cannot hear you. 
Would you speak a little louder and raise your voice ? 

You have a prepared statement you have submitted to the com- 
mittee? 

241 



242 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Amoss. I have, sir. 

The Chairman. That statement will go into the record and become 
a part of the record. 

(Mr. Amoss' prepared statement follows :) 

Testimony of Col. Ulius Amoss 

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, my name is Ulius Amoss. I am a reserve 
colonel, Air Force. Throushout 1942 I was Chief, Eastern European Section for 
Secret Intelligence for the Intelligence Division, Office of the Coordinator of 
Information, later the OfPce of Strategic Services. In January 1943 I was sta- 
tioned in Cairo as Deputy for the Middle Eastern Theater of Operations, OSS, 
and Chief of Operations, for Intelligence, Sabotage, Guerrilla Warfare, and 
Psychological Warfare, and was simultaneously Commanding Officer, Experi- 
mental Detachment, G-3, United States Armed Forces in the Middle East. My 
theater ran from Italy and Poland to India and Ethiopia. 

When Gen. L. H. Brereton, Theater Commander and Commanding General 
of the Ninth Air Force, was transferred (fall of 1943) to the British Isles to- 
gether with an enlarged Ninth Air Force to provide tactical support for the 
invasion of Normandy, he took me with him as Deputy Chief of Staff. I served 
General Vandenberg in the same capacity when he took over command of the 
Ninth Air Force. My duties included direction of relationships with allied 
governments, civil and military government, tactical liaison with allied air 
forces, operations in concert with European underground formations, and special 
intelligence. 

At the end of 1945, I was assigned to special dutic?s with General Vanden- 
berg, then Director of Operations, United States Air Force. In May 1946, I 
requested separation from the armed services and immediately started the pri-- 
vate intelligence services in which I am engaged today. 

I am the unsalaried president of the International Services of Information 
Foundation, Inc. This is a nonprofit, volunteer organization engaged in the col- 
lection of information from many countries of the world, including all states 
within the Soviet orbit and the dissemination of such information to our sub- 
scribers. The trustees of the foundation are : 

Richard F. Cleveland, chairman (lawyer, Baltimore) 

U. L. Amoss, president 

Maj. Gen. Henry Evans, Maryland National Guard, broker. 

Brig. Gen. William Purnell, INIaryland National Guard, general counsel. Western 

INIaryland Railroad 
Brig. Gen. Thomas Catron, USA retired 
Ma.i. Gen. Donald Connolly, USA retired 
Ma.i. Gen. E. S. Hughes, USA retired 
Brig. Gen. Claude Thiele, USA retired 
]\Iiss IMary Veronica Grogan (Mrs. U. L. Amoss) 
Mr. Joseph IVIuUan, president. Champion Brick Co. 
Col. Shipley Thomas, USAR retired 
Mr. Stuart Bushong, lawyer, Hagerstown, Md. 

Neither this foundation nor I have any connection, overt or covert, with any 
department or agency of the United States nor, of course, with any other gov- 
ernment. 

I do not claim to be an expert on Russia nor am I an outstanding specialist on 
communism. However, I am supported by some of the world's greatest authori- 
ties on Russia and on Russian communism. For personal safety, these men must 
remain anonymous since they are in constant contact with Soviet sources or are 
easily available to hostile intervention. 

My alarm over the intentions of Soviet Russia and the Communist Parties 
under control of the Soviet Communist Party was iirst awakened in the fall of 
1944. A small task fcn-ce under my command, looking for German saboteurs in 
the neighborhood of Chantilly, France, seized some papers from a house we later 
discovered to be the clandestine headquarters of a French militant Communist 
underground formation. Included in tiie papers were Moscow orders instructing 
this group, in coordination with others, to attack the rear of American military 
forces in France in the event American troops managed to cut their way across 
the Rhine before Soviet troops in the East had advanced sufficiently to deny a 
further American advance. The orders were detailed and specified attacks of a 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 243 

guerrilla nature, cutting of American communications, sabotage of fuel supply 
dumps, of United States airplanes, and for the assassination of United States 
commanders. 

Other Moscow instructions contained in the papers we had seized instructed 
French militant Communists to file applications for postwar military training, 
emphasizing that in the postwar French military establishment it was desirable 
for as many Communist battalion commanders as possible to qualify. The in- 
structions said that this was the rank that could control the French Army. 
Listed also, were the names of several cooperating officers of general rank. One 
paper from Moscow was signed by Maurice Thorez. 

It was then that I realized that world war III had begun before World War II 
had actually been won. I believe, but do not know of my own knowledge, that it 
was about this time that Mr. A. A. Berle made a public statement to the effect 
that he distrusted Soviet intentions. I do not know whether the intelligence to 
which I have referred above had reached Mr. Berle. 

For some years military and political writers have been speculating as to the 
advisability of launching a "preventative war." Already, in 1944, it was too late 
to prevent world war III. A war-in-being cannot be prevented. All that remains 
to be done is to win it. 

World war III, so far, is a limited war, restricted to certain weapons, to cer- 
tain means, and to certain areas. But it has ever been spilling into new areas. 
Until now, it has been the Soviet Communists who have chosen the weapons, 
the means, the place, and the time of attack. Initiative lies in Soviet hands. 
Military commanders believe that victory goes to him who possesses the initia- 
tive, defeat to him who remains on the defensive. The Maginot Line did not save 
France. There is not even the possibility of a Maginot Line in subversion. 

Even so, some of our faltering allies accuse us of using too much initiative. 
They say that they are afraid that we will drag them into war. They complain 
that we are too new, too "green" in the conduct of affairs. "Childish," "emo- 
tional," "unstable," they call us. They suggest that we should put our resources 
back of their diplomatic leadership and allow their skilled diplomats with "long 
tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs" to lead us. 

I submit that it was not American diplomacy that brought forth two world 
wars. We dragged no nation into those wars ; it might be said that we were 
dragged into them. The only war into which even an unfair criticism might 
accuse America of dragging others, is the Korean war. But even here, the South 
Koreans and we furnished the bulk of the lighting forces and virtually all of the 
material. For the sake of permitting the Korean war to be a United Nations 
and not an American affair, we accepted small token forces and paid for them by 
submitting ourselves to the criticisms of our allies and by allowing them to in- 
fluence us to settle for less than a military decision. Though diplomacy is out 
of my sphere and I have no competence in foreign policy, yet as a plain citizen 
I remain unmoved by the criticisms of our allies in a sphere in which they have 
displayed no brilliance for decades. 

I am attracted by Senator Tenner's remarks of May 13, 1954, proposing sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations with Russia. As a plain citizen it makes sense to me 
that we should recognize Russia— but recognize her for what she is, a de- 
clared enemy of the United States, a belligerent committing hostile acts against 
this country, its citizens and their free institutions. 
I submit the following propositions : 

1. It is too late to prevent world war III. 

2. The first line of defense for any nation is intelligence. 

3. Defense is not sufficient. 

4. Though the present conflict is limited, earlier limits were exceeded and 
it is not guaranteed that present limits will be observed until we may pass from 
a half to a three-quarters or even to a total war. 

5. To avoid a civilization-destroying total war, it is necessary to win the war 
that has been thrust upon us. The best way to prevent a general war is to make 
it unprofitable, even impossible, for the enemy to wage one. 

It would be repetitious to repeat the record of Soviet aggression. We know 
that Soviet-sponsored arms have killed Americans on the battlefield. We know 
that Soviet agents have subverted American citizens. We know about the sub- 
versive war they wage on our docks, aboard our ships, in our factories and, even 
in our free institutions. We are familiar with their ugly propaganda and the 
slanderous lies they publish against honorable, leading Americans. We know 
that the Soviets have kept vast armies in being and that they are furiously arm- 



244 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

ing. We know that Moscow-ordered agents have and are attempting to seize 
control of still-free governments. But let us look at the record as of today : 

The Soviets are rearming. From sources in Moscow I learn that the informed 
man-in-the-street generally believes that Soviet Russia will be engaged in a 
general war within 5 years. Some informants believe the general war may come 
much earlier. 

STRATEGY 

Until now, Russia's military strategy has been based on a land mass controlled 
by massed armies. The role of the Russian Navy has been the defense of the 
Russian Army's sea flanks. Stalin followed Mackinder who claimed: 

Stalin depended on his mass army to dominate the world. The Soviet Navy 
and Air Force were but adjuncts to his land forces. Stalin denied the theory 
that sea dominion is a prerequisite to power; believed a land mass could win 
adequate water transport. 

Stalin harked back 50 years for his concepts of a strategy that would win a 
world for Soviet Russia ; borrowed his tlieme from H. J. Mackinder who, about 
the year 1900, presented the Geographical Pivot of History to the Royal Geo- 
graphic Society. (Mackinder was a teacher in the London School of Economics.) 

Mackinder claimed: 

1. The maritime age has passed. 

2. From now (1900), land power will be decisive. 

3.. Explorations have been completed ; the world now is a closed system ; any 
exnansion of any power will lead to disturbances on a world scale. 

4. The greatest land mass lies in the Old World. Its heart lies in Russia — 
out of reach of sea power. 

5. The character of this "heartland" has altered. No longer the scene of 
horse-and-camel-borne nomadic raids which, until now, devastated settled 
lands on its periphery. This great area is the home of vast populations, served 
by modern communications. It is, thus, the source of enormous potential power ; 
occupies the most valuable strategic position in the world. It enjoys remark- 
able interior lines of communication. It is the pivotal state. 

6. Outside the "heartland," there is an inner crescent of marginal continental 
states — the European coasts, the deserts, and the mousoon coasts. 

7. Expansion of the pivotal state over the marginal lands will enable Russia 
to become a naval power ; if industrialization is achieved, this power could build 
great fleets, a further enablement to reach the goal of world supremacy. 

8. Dominance over or alliance with Germany could assure this aim. 

9. Against this threat, the "lands of the outer insular crescent" — (Great 
Britain, America, Japan, Australia)— should build and jealously maintain 
bridgeheads in France, Italy, Egypt, India— and Korea. Only thus can the 
pivotal state be prevented from world dominion. (This was written in 1900.) 

Mackinder thought in two elements, the sea and the land. He worked and 
thought before the airplane had made the air a third strategic space. 

Bomber and atom bomb forced Stalin to alter his original planning; the 
threat of the devastation of the atom had to be countered. The invulnerable 
"heartland" became susceptible to potentially mortal wounds. 

Mackinder said, and Stalin believed: 

Who rules East Europe — commands the "heartland." 

Who rules the "heartland" — commands the "world island." 

Who rules the "world island" — commands the world. 

The great "heartland" lies within Russia; Russia is the "pivotal power" on 
whose axis world power might revolve. 

So, Soviet Russia, moved according to pattern. She pushed her armies to the 
Elbe and Vienna ; ruled East Europe. She commenced the fortification of the 
shores of the "world island," the shores of the Arctic, the Baltic and the Black 
Sea. 

The Black Sea was defended by naval bases from Burgos, Bulgaria, to Batum, 
Transcaucasia. Airfields provide cover for the entire Black Sea. The Black 
Sea is sealed ; has become a part of the "heartland." 

The Baltic Sea, relatively long and narrow, is effectively commanded by a 
series of naval bases in Poland and the Soviet Union ; from Stettin to Porkkala 
(Finland), Together with bases in East Germany; with a well-integrated sys- 
tem of airfields and with guided-missile bases, and especially because of the 
easily mined narrow straits, the Baltic can be denied to Western naval forces. 
(Soviet Russia will seize the Danish island of Bornholm.) The Baltic is a part 
of the "heartland." 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF TrOP!LD CO^MATUNISM 245 

The Arctic Sea was cousidered by Mackinder an impassable barrier. New 
arctic navigational developments : the opening of the Great Northern Sea Rout^ 
from Murmansk along the Siberian coast to the Bering Straits and Vladivostock ; 
and the sensational development of airpower have partially invalidated Mackin- 
der. Soviet Russia took measures, among which was the development of the 
northern shores and the northern islands. They connected the Polar cap with 
the Arctic section lying between 172° west and 32° east. 

A special northern sea route administration was established, including in its 
authority Soviet lands north of the 62° parallel. Ports, naval stations, settle- 
ments, weather stations, and airfields are rapidly being built, one after the 
other. East of Lena, the zone is under the administration of : 

The Dalstroy, where in 1951 new airfields and weather stations were being 
added to 1950's 200 weather stations; 2,500 planes provide aerial transport; 50 
icebreakers, some of them American property, keep the sea route open so that 
ships can ply the northern sea route 150 days in a normal year. 

Two conflicting military doctrines faced each other in Korea. The Russian- 
supported land-based massed armies of North Korea and Communist China 
against the sea-supplied forces of the United States. The Soviet high command 
apparently drew a lesson from that conflict. 

There now has been launched a naval strategy and Soviet Russia is bent on 
becoming a naval power, supported by airpower. 

It seems to me that too little public attention has been paid to newest Soviet 
naval plans. (I assume that the very efficient United States Naval Intelligence 
is progressively informed.) 

The Russian planners have also drawn a naval lesson from Hitler. When 
Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Germany was not ready for a major 
war at sea. The German surface fleet consisted of no more than 2 old battle- 
ships, 2 battle cruisers, 3 pocket battleships, 8 cruisers, and 22 destroyers. A 
few heavy ships were still building, but only 2 battleships and 1 cruiser were 
completed during the war. 

The German Naval Staff had insisted on a larger Navy before engaging Great 
Britain in war. Admiral Doenitz had insisted that Germany needed 800 U-boats 
before fighting England. But the war started with but 26 U-boats suitable for 
Atlantic operations and of these, only 8 or 9 could be kept in the Atlantic at a 
time. 

Yet, commencing the war with less than 10 percent of the calculated mini- 
mum of submarines, Germany all but starved the British Isles. Before America 
entered the war, a British intelligence officer told me that the average life expect- 
ancy of a British freighter was less than 6 months. 

Soviet Russia has in being more than 10 times the number of submarines Hitler 
had when he started the war. And the bulk of these are improvements on the 
German snorkel which never saw battle in the Atlantic. Russian submarines 
are roving the seven seas ; they have made landings in Central America and on 
the English coast. It is believed, though not proved, by my sources that they 
have been in contact with clandestine parties on America's Atlantic and Pacific 
shores. 

Soviet Russia has a numerous destroyer fleet, a number of cruisers of the 
Sverdlov class which are virtually smaller editions of Germany's pocket bat- 
tleships. She is reported to be building aircraft carriers. I do not here cite 
figures obtained from my own sources because they do not agree with figures 
published from United States naval sources and I assume the latter to be correct. 

With Soviet strategy including plans for offensive as well as defensive naval 
warfare, the direction of Soviet global strategy has changed from east-west to 
north-south. 

Until and unless Soviet Russia can effectively neutralize American and British 
seapower, Russian planners believe in transpolar attack. They believe that their 
present and anticipated gains in the Far East plus the belt of European satellite 
states afford adequate defense on both flanks. 

In this case, it is well to look at recent Russian action, plans and propaganda. 

Major preparations for transpolar war are being made on the northern coast 
of Siberia. Virtually every Soviet Arctic island is equipped with antiaircraft 
warning systems. Longrange rocket installations have been established in (1) 
Magadan Oblast, (2) Taymyr Peninsula, (3) Arkhangelsk Oblast and, (4) Kola 
Peninsula. 

Soviet antiaircraft artillery commanders and the Taymyr rocket command have 
been ordered to be in battle readiness this year. 



246 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

My sources believe that the Soviet seventh and eighth Antarctic whaling ex- 
peditions carried sulimarines, submarine crews and base staff to the Antarctic. 
With the respect I have for United States Naval Intelligence, I have no doubt 
that a. search is iieing made for traces of these alleged new bases. The "Aleut" 
whaling flotilla (based on the Kurile Islands) and the Kurilskaya whaling flo- 
tilla (based in the Northern Pacific) are believed to be serving Soviet naval 
interests. 

While the direction of Soviet armed attaclr, as now viewed in the Kremlin 
would be north-south, the direction of immediate expansion is indicated by the 
term often heard in Soviet military circles ; the Moscow-Sydney axis, as I have 
long pointed out to my readers. The final goal is Australia, as was more or less 
indicated by Mr. Petrov's revelations when he defected. This ultimate aim is 
also indicated the stubbornness of Communist pressure on Viet Nam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Malaya, and Indonesia and by mounting Communist pressure on the 
Philippines. 

In an address I made at a closed meeting at the Lord Baltimore Hotel in Balti- 
more, October 19, 1953, I repeated my previous warnings about Guatemala and 
listed the countries where Soviet Communists were making or had made bids 
to take over local governments as follows : 

"Guatemala — in Red political hands. British Guiana, opposite to which is 
the Gold Coast of Africa and Nigeria where local Communists are making a strong 
bid for control. Kenya. Goa in Portuguese India where Communists are having 
their own way. Still farther East, the vast new Communist state of Audhra, 
and Malaya and Indochina where the struggle goes on." 

With this oversimplified detailing of States where local subversive forces are 
making or have made sti'ong attempts to take over local governments, it is easy 
to see that there is an attempt to create a world-spanning framework of poten- 
tial colonial republics. Against the Communist complaint of capitalist encircle- 
ment, it is interesting to ask. Who is encircling whom? 

The schene is simple. Take a primitive people. Create a Communist-domi- 
nated government or administration. Demand recognition from Moscow and the 
Soviet Orbit. That is all that is necessary to create a chain of submarine and air 
bases spanning the world. 

But two events happened. The British Government acted swiftly in British 
Guiana. Anti-Communist forces drove the Communist-dominated government 
out of Guatemala. From this latter event, there was an unexpected second gain. 

Soviet propaganda blasted the United States and accused this coimtry of hav- 
ing caused and managed the revolution. This propaganda has backfired. Among 
those who heard it were many who secretly hate their Red masters and who 
had despaired of the great Nation of America standing up to any jiart of the 
constant whittling away at the perimeters of the free world. My sources within 
the Soviet orbit tell me that the Soviet-disseminated "news" that America had 
forestalled another Red base electrified these people, put new heart into their 
secret resistance, and raised American prestige. 

From the welter of information regularly flowing from Soviet and Soviet orbit 
sources, I select the following 4 items, 1 the slow propaganda buildup for possible 
later agitation, and 1 describing 1 section of Soviet rocket firing experimentation ; 
the third, an item of naval interest ; the last, an item that suggests Russian self- 
sufiiciency in the supply of uranium. 

Even so strange a thing as strongly hinted Soviet claims to Alaska have ap- 
peared. A Soviet lecturer at the Warsaw Political Academy in 1952 said that 
Soviet Russia will claim Alaska perhaps during the year 1958. Other Alaska 
propaganda has appeared. 

One of my informants attended a feast at Murmansk given for the crews of the 
Soviet icebreakers Lenin, Georgiy Syedov, and LevanevsJci. He heard the 
following : 

"Long-range rocket tests have been and are being carried out from 5 launching 
sites on the Kola Peninsula for a range up to 3,105 miles. Soviet rocket engineers 
claim they can reach 6,210 miles. However, the most accurate range was 1,250 
miles. Rockets used in the tests are improvements on the German 2-stage M-103's, 
developments having been perfected at Khimki, near Moscow." 

The Mariinsky Canal has been rebuilt. Its significance is the fact that Soviet 
naval vessels including submarines and up to destroyers can pass on guarded 
interior lines of communication between the North, Baltic, Caspian, and Black 
Seas, as originally planned. 

Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German uranium mines are to pass to the con- 
trol of a Polish-Czech-German combine in which Russians will have only a techni- 
cal advisory capacity. My informants believe this indicates that the Russians 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 247 

believe themselves to be self-sufficieut in the supply of uranium from Russian 
sources. 

TACTICS 

I cite here the classic example of Soviet escai)e from ol)literation, the per- 
fect example of successful subversion on such a scale that all history cannot 
provide a case that equals it. This secret history has never been released to 
the general public. 

It began in the early 1920's, The Bolshevik regime seemed doomed. As al- 
ways when in trouble, the Soviets appealed for a peaceful coexistence with 
capitalist countries. With tongue in cheek, they seemed to renounce their tenet 
that communism and capitalism could not live side by side. 

Revolution after revolution had torn the Russians. Between April 2.5 and 
October 12, 1920, through the insubordination of Stalin and Budenny, the Rus- 
sians lost a war with Poland tbat they had already won. By 1921, Russian 
economy had all but collapsed. There were peasant uprisings; factory work- 
ers rioted. Red sailors mutinied and were defeated only after much bloodshed. 
Czarist troops had massed on Russian frontiers. 

Soviet leaders were at each other's throats. To placate their furious popula- 
tions, freedom of trade was partially restored. Private commercial establish- 
ments were allowed. Russia joined in the economic conference at Geneva and 
expressed a willingness to cooperate with non-Communist countries. 

While Communist Russia was buying time, her subversive machinery was 
working. By exercise of terror tactics, a Czarist civil servant, Alexander 
Alexandrovitch Yakushev was chosen as the instrument which eventually de- 
stroyed the threat of the patriotic million of the Russian emigration, who crip- 
pled westei-n intelligence so completely that its Russian services have never 
fully recovered. 

Yakushev became the instrument of death of countless thousands of his own 
kind. If there had been no Yakushev, it is probable that there would have been 
no American white crosses in Korea. Without him, it is probable that the 
world would not now be suffering a half-world war III, a limited war that 
threatens to become a total conflict using all means of mass destruction and in- 
volving all the people of the earth. 

Yakushev, guided by Secret Police Commissar Kiyakovski, assistant chief 
for counterintelligence, W. A. Styrne, and Chief Military Censor A. A. Langvoy, 
left Russia, He established himself as a genuine monarchist with Grand Duke 
Nicholas Nicolaivitch and convinced him that secret monarchist movements 
existed everywhere in Russia. He convinced the grand duke that an under- 
estimation of the virility of the new anti-Communist Russia would be a fatal 
blunder, because, if cooperation with western forces continued, xenophobe Rus- 
sia would rally around the Communists. 

Yakushev convinced the emigre Russians that their activities should cease, be- 
cause their opposite numbers in Russia would supply all intelligence and would 
execute any intelligence assignment. 

The emigre press changed its tone, having been warned that exaggerated zeal 
in auticommunism could defeat their purposes. i5migr4 public organs condemned 
warmongers and pointed with pride to the great, spontaneous revival in the 
fatherland. 

Emigre officers introduced Yakushev to various European army general staffs. 
The heads of European intelligence services were charmed, swallowed the bait, 
and eagerly cooperated with the giant network covering the entire Soviet struc- 
ture. 

The Soviet secret service provided Yakushev with authentic military, political, 
and economic documents, and provided him with approximately true answers to 
the questionnaires Western intelligence officers had given him. 

European offickils helped Yakushev to smuggle alleged Russian monarchists 
into Europe and, in exchange, European intelligence agents were smuggled into 
Russia where they attended many meetings of Soviet agents who pretended to be 
monarchists, until even the most skeptical Western agents were convinced that 
a monarchist revolution was about to overwhelm the Bolsheviks. 

A vast flood of information innundated European intelligence services which 
then relinquished their existing systems within Russia. 

Yakushev, the miracle man, got his men attached to European general staffs. 
These sent critical intelligence to the Soviets ; created intrigues within Western 
military establishments and stimulated jealousies between contending secret 
services. 



248 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMISrUNISM 

The Grand Duke Cyril Vladiniirovitch was convinced that the monarchists in 
Russia were near success and, in 1927, proclaimed, "The Soviet constitution is 
right and good, only the top strata of the government need be removed." 

Ii]migre activity liad all but ceased; all ^migrfi plans were known to the Com- 
munists. Eleven non-Communist intelligence services had relinquished their own 
networks. The real anti-Bolshevik leaders in Russia were uncovered and liqui- 
dated. The threat of a European-supported reentry of a million Russians into 
their homeland was ended. 

For 7 years, European intelligence chiefs had been duped. Until this day, 
Russian sections of European intelligence systems suffer from history's greatest 
Intelligence hoax and communism, promising peaceful coexistence with the demo- 
cratic world, was saved, soon to destroy many of the very states with whom they 
had promised to coexist. 

The Russians code-named the fantastic operation the "Trust." The old Trust 
is dead, but a new Trust is at work. Already it has planted false intelligence. 
Overseas emigre organizations are thoroughly penetrated by Soviet agents of 
the new Trust. 

A parade of informers cross western lines — and recross into the Soviet orbit 
with ease. False underground movements are established, come into contact 
with the emigres and, through them establish relationships with western in- 
telligence and with western military officials. 

One of the "lines" used is that any attack on "eternal Russia" would reunite 
dissident Russians now "reluctantly" serving under Red command. It is perti- 
nent to ask whether it is honorable to sacrifice the lives and liberties of the 
numerous non-Russian Russians and of non-Russian Europeans to the prob- 
lematical sentiments of the enslaved Russians who, it is claimed, prefer con- 
tinued enslavement to rescue and whose condition is not vastly different from 
that which their forefathers patiently endured for six centuries. 

Russian Communists use many vehicles and many means to spread contagion". 
A plywood company in a western capital sends agents to Africa. A western 
ship has agents planted among its crew. Remnants of the old Nazi secret in- 
telligence systems have been employed in Soviet service. (In this case it is 
interesting to note that the bulk of the files and recoi'ds of the Nazi intelligence 
and secret police systems were seized by the Russians.) Through these, they 
traced Nazi lines to western countries. By blackmail, they have compelled 
former Nazi secret agents in Western Europe to serve Soviet intelligence and 
even sabotage purposes. 

New schools of sabotage and intelligence have been formed, at least two of them 
In Eastern Germany. One of these schools instructs "students" from all western 
countries. The graduate "student" returns to his homeland, but under a new 
identity to a new community. 

There is presumptive evidence that "students" of one of these schools are prac- 
ticing in France and England ; perhaps in America. It is believed by informants 
that some cases of sabotage in Great Britain were perpetrated by graduate 
students as a test of plans drawn for more serious acts of sabotage to be com- 
mitted at a later date at a given signal. 

From the newspapers, I am familiar with some of the exploits of the FBI and 
of other United States security agencies and I have read something of the careful 
work of this committee. But, I submit that the work of even so great and com- 
petent an institution as the Federal Bureau of Investigation is made nearly in- 
tolerable by the fact that, until now, we have acted on the defensive. We al- 
low our enemies full latitude of selecting the time, the place and the weapon. 
But we do not place him on the defensive. 

I suggest that, as many blows as we have suffered at the hands of Soviet agents. 
we are less vulnerable than Soviet Russia. 

Before developing this theme, I would like to insert an observation : Commu- 
nism, as sponsored by Moscow, includes the doctrine of social revolution and the 
use of violence in the overthrow of the existing democratic order. It sponsors 
class warfare, the forcible abolition of private property and the physical liquida- 
tion of the bourgeois class. Communist dogma calls for totalitarian dictation by 
one social class, led by the Communist Party. 

Communist parties in the Western World are subordinate to the Soviet Com- 
munist Party and are compelled to serve the interests of the Soviet state. All 
modern communism is called on to serve the Soviet Russian state. 

Communism thus is a belligerent and threatens the state by violence. Western 
Communist parties are used for subversive purposes, such as espionage and 
sabotage. Therefore, these parties and their members must be dealt with under 
existing criminal codes. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 249 

I am dismayed when I read the speeches of some well-meaning Americans who 
call for us to develop some new ideology, some grand new social-political-economic 
doctrine and then to proclaim to the world "what we are for." The West has 
enough social, economic, and political programs. Its choice of them and the appli- 
cation of its choice properly form a part of the revolutionary processes of demo- 
cratic society. It is not a lack of positive aims, but their abundance that char- 
acterizes democracy. The problem lies in the choice and application of aims 
democratically chosen, and this is the duty of political parties, congresses, govern- 
ments, and even oi private institutions. 

In confronting the menace of Russian communism, I submit that we must know 
Communist aims, evalute Communist means, anticipate Communist methods and 
seize the initiative in the battle that has been thrust upon us. We should carry 
that battle to the Communist homeland. 

Russia is more vulnerable than we. 

I have indicated that Soviet Russia calls for such things as "peaceful co- 
existence" whenever she is in trouble. Soviet Russia is in trouble and Soviet 
Russia is vulnerable to a clandestine war similar to that she wages against us. 

From my sources I draw these facts : 

1. Of the approximately 200 million peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, only about 75 million are Great Russians. The true Russian is a 
minority in his own country. 

2. Bolshevism rose to iwwer on the shoulders of the peasantry and the rank 
and file of the workers. The peasantry is disillusioned. The peasant has been 
taken from his small holding where, even with a wooden plow, he was able to 
eke out a living. But, on the collective farm, he needs machinery. Many 
Russian plants turned from making tools of peace to the manufactures of war. 
Russia began to import agricultural machinery from the West. The embargo, 
as violated as it has been, has forced a hard decision on the Kremlin. Should 
munitions factories be turned back to the manufacture of farm machinery? Or 
should they continue to battle their farmers who, unable to earn their keep 
w^ithout machinery, attempt in droves to escape. The workers have discovered 
that their unions, rather than representing their interests, are Instruments of 
the state, practicing the speedup systems so hated by free workers. The work- 
ers are in an ugly mood and there has been repeated trouble. 

3. Russia's collective dictatorship is in the midst of vicious intrigues. It is 
being discovered that tyranny is indivisible. There can be no one thirty-sixth 
of a tyrant nor thirty-six thirty-sixths of despotism. Russia now is uneasily 
governed. Even now, a contest is waging. The Malenkov group is being 
attacked by a combination headed by Marshal Voroshilov, Foreign Minister 
Molotov, Marshal Bulganin and the new party boss, Krushchev. The Malenkov 
group is fighting back. So far it is a guerrilla struggle. Each group attacks 
the aides, supporter, and proteges of the other. The Great Russian sneers at the 
"little" Russian. They purged the Ukrainian Government. Krushchev and his 
lieutenant, Kirichanko, have flown their colors by wearing the national Ukrain- 
ian shirt. This may seem childish by western standards, but the challenge 
has been thrown and has been accepted. 

4. The climate in the satellites is stormy. No longer does Russia trust satel- 
lite armed forces. Russian officers are being assigned to command satellite 
forces down to regimental level. The noted defections from the Polish Air 
Force and other attempts to escape, never publicized, have caused Poland's 
overlords to ground the entire Polish Air Force on more than one occasion. 
Ecapes from Polish ships have caused Russia to place guards aboard these ships, 
so many of which carry arms to Communist China. 

5. Soviet Russia's massive force of security troops is not large enough to 
cope with the growing, flaming resistance. Even the loyalty of some of the 
security officers is doubted as a search for pro-Beria officers continues. 

Communist Russia is preparing for a general war. 

During preparations, and to gain time to put its own house in order, Moscow 
proposes a truce, a peaceful "coexistence." While proposals for "peace" are 
being offered, a new^ trust is operating, new acts of sabotage are being com- 
mitted and attempts are being made to take over control of small governmenta 
all over the world. 

To drop our military guard would be fatal. To improve our intelligence 
services is essential. To react to Soviet subversion is necessary. 

Communist Russia and Communist satellites are in a ferment and Russian 
leaders are conducting a private war among themselves. 

Voices from the lands of our allies attack the United States for even the small 
initiative it has shown. But lack of initiative has given them, and us, defeat 



250 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

after defeat. Tlie number of our potential allies is greater within the Soviet 
orbit than without. 

We are engaged in a limited war not of our choosing. If we lose the half war, 
we lose everything. If we win the half war, we stand our best chance of 
preventing a total war. 

AVithout sponsoring open rebellion in the Soviet orbit (though Russia does 
sponsor rebellion in ours), it is probable that the Red regime could be neutralized 
and might be overthrown. 

An open hearing is not the place to discuss possible ways and means of 
achieving the aims to which I have alluded. Nor am I the one most qualified 
to do so. But someone should. 

If v.-e don't win the half war, we will surrender to the Communist will or 
eventually will be forced to fight a total war. 

The Chairman. You may now proceed. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, will you kindly recite a word of your personal 
background and personal history with particular emphasis to the 
experience which you have had in intelligence work? 

Mr. Amoss. In 1942, the early part of 1942, 1 joined the then Office 
of the Coordinator of Information, which later became the Office of 
Strategic Services, under General Donovan. My initial responsibil- 
ity was intelligence, secret intelligence, from eastern Europe. In 
January of 1943 I was transferred to Egypt, where I was deputy 
for secret intelligence, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, psychological w^ar- 
fare, in the theater that ran from Italy to India and from Poland to 
Ethiopia. 

In 1944 I was taken by General Brereton, who was the then theater 
commander of the Middle East and commanding General of the Ninth 
Air Force, to England where the Ninth Air Force was scheduled to 
give tactical support for the invasion of Normandy. 

I served him in a capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff with special 
responsibilities for special intelligence and a number of other activ- 
ities, which I have detailed in this paper. 

In 1946 I was separated from the services and organized the first 
foundation, because it seemed to me that, in effect, citizens of the 
United States needed more information than they were getting about 
plans, particularly of potential enemy countries, before those plans 
could become events. 

Mr. Arens. And you publish certain literature from time to time in 
which you set forth on the basis of the intelligence reports which you 
receive in the worldwide network of international services, informa- 
tion respecting the i^lans and strategy and tactics of the Soviets, is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Amoss. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, may I respectfully suggest that you proceed 
now to speak extemporaneously on the various items which you have 
detailed in your prepared statement? 

Mr. Amoss. Perhaps the most operative thing that happened to me 
during World War II was the incident of a small task force that I 
commanded raiding several houses in a French village near Chantilly 
to look for traces of German saboteurs who had been left behind in 
that area. These chaps brought back a series of papers that had been 
left behind by a French Communist militant underground group. 

In those papers we discovered that there had been orders issued by 
direction of Moscow for French militant Communist groups to attack 
our rear, our supply, try to cut our communications in the event that 
American forces reached and crossed the Rhine before Soviet forces 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 251 

were in a position to contest further advance. There were a number 
of other items in these papers that were electrifying to us. They sug- 
gested in that event that there should be assassination of certain 
American general officers, and one thing that interested us was that 
one of the papers was signed by Maurice Thorez, who had deserted 
the French army and who had taken refuge in Moscow and was giving 
orders to French forces in the interior. 

There was another item that seemed to me to be important and that 
was the fact that members of the Communist underground in France 
were instructed as far as possible to apply for instruction and train- 
ing in postwar military schools attempting to reach the grade of com- 
mandant or major, because the paper went on to say that this grade 
could control the French Army. 

It then occurred to me, and I had no reason to change my mind, 
that world war III had begun before World War II had been won. 
I have noticed discussions in the public press and heard it on the 
radio, certain people have from time to time suggested that we should 
fight a war to prevent world war III. But it is too late to do that, 
because we already have it. 

In my opinion, the only thing that can be done as far as world 
war III is concerned is to surrender to the limited war which is now 
going on, or to fight that limited war and win that limited war, or we 
will face a total, all-out world war III. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, on the basis of the intelligence reports which 
you receive from the worldwide network established by your founda- 
tion, would you kindly address yourself to the subject of the present 
military strategy of the Soviets? 

Mr. Amoss. Until comparatively recently, Soviet military strategy 
in my opinion has been based on the possession of a huge land mass 
and the use of massed armies. Before the Soviets, the Russian navy, 
has been principally the defense of the sea flanks of the land armies. 

Stalin before his death had followed pretty much the theory of 
Mackinder, who spoke of the heartland of Europe and said back as 
early as 1900 tliat he who controlled Russia and possibly Germany 
could control the world. 

But it seems to me that the Soviet General Staff must have taken 
some note of the war in Korea, where the North Korean and Chinese 
massed armies faced sea-supplied South Korean and American 
Armies. 

It is from about that time that w^e have noticed steady acceleration 
in the building of naval vessels for Soviet Russia. The thing that is 
interesting to me in observing this thing is that Admiral Doenitz 
advised Hitler not to start World War II until he had at least 300 
submarines of battle quality in being. At the time Hitler started 
World War II they were able to put to sea only from 8 to 9 sub- 
marines at a time. Yet, during the early part of World War II they 
nearly starved the British Isles with that small pack of submarines. 

Further than that, apparently Soviet Russia has gone into the 
building of very modern sumbarines, the snorkel, the hydrogen- 
peroxide-powered submarine, and I understand, though I am not 
competent to pass judgment on this thing, that ordinary radar, under- 
sea radar, is ineffective against this. We believe that Russia has 
approximately 300 snorkel submarines in being. 



252 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

From evidence that some of my informants have given me, we are 
certain that some of these submarines are roaming in the free seas. 
We have presumptive, but not completely established, evidence that 
the Ninth and I think it was the Seventh and Eighth Antarctic Whal- 
ing Expeditions of Russia have taken submarines, submarine crews 
and base crews, to the Antarctic. If it is true, as we believe, that 
Soviet Eussia has now changed the direction of her strategy from 
east to west to north to south, it is an important point to be ex- 
amined by countries' intelligence agencies, because if the Panama 
Canal is shot out, the submarine bases down in the Antarctic and 
perhaps clandestine bases in South America could interdict our free 
communication between the seas. 

Mr. Arens. Do you have any observations to make, Colonel, with 
respect to the attempt of the Soviets to encircle the United States 
from the standpoint of bases for operation ? 

Mr. Amoss. Yes, sir. It has always seemed to me to be an almost 
amusing thing, that according to Soviet propaganda, she is being en- 
circled by capitalistic countries. In the first place, it depends upon 
which projection of a map you look at. On the Mercator projection, 
perhaps they could interpret a slight encirclement. But if you take 
a globe instead of a flat map the question comes up as to who is en- 
circling whom. A thing that has appeared to me to be operatively 
very important is the attempts being made by Soviet agents in a 
great number of countries, in Guatemala, British Guiana, the Gold 
Coast of Africa and Nigeria, which of course are just across the sea 
from Guiana. 

Mr. Arens. What is the significance of those penetrations ? 

Mr. Amoss. The Soviet agents are attempting to create, through 
local Communist forces and committees, a penetration of, and taking 
over of the local governments or the administrative services of these 
countries. 

Mr. Arens. Why? What is the particular significance of these 
areas to the world strategy of the Soviets ? 

Mr. Amoss. I think you want to carry on that statement, because the 
same efforts are being made in Kenya, Goa, in Portuguese India, and 
they have already taken over the great new Communist state of 
Andhra, India, and we know what they are trying to do in Korea and 
China. 

Following this on the map, you would have a complete encirclement 
of our sphere. In these areas if there were hidden airfields, secret 
submarine bases, the United States would be militarily surrounded by 
very effective packs that would affect a war. 

Mr. Arens. On the basis of the intelligence reports which you re- 
ceived, and which your agency is undertaking to appraise, are the 
Soviets at the present time engaged in this encirclement process which 
you have been recounting ? 

Mr. Amoss. Yes, sir ; they are. And it is active and operative now. 
There have been two incidents, as has been shown by the press, the 
British Government moving quickly in British Guiana, and the affair 
in Guatemala. That one, I think, is rather amusing and very im- 
portant. The Soviet propaganda machine thundered out accusations 
that the United States had sponsored, fostered, and pushed this opera- 
tion. Irrespective of whether tliere is any truth or not in it, the man 
in the street in the Soviet orbit took that propaganda, believed it, and 
it gave him a sliot in the arm. There was new prestige. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 253 

He said, "At last we see that the United States of America is not 
allowing our masters to whittle away the perimeters of her safety."' 

And it gave him some hope that that at least some initiative is be- 
ing seized by this country. 

Mr. Akens. Is Alaska an anchor point on the offensive of the Sovi- 
ets to undertake to encircle the United States ? 

Mr. Amoss. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Akens. What efforts are being made, on the basis of your infor- 
mation, by the Soviets to evidence designs on Alaska ? 

Mr. Amoss. Well, No. 1, the Siberia area bases on Alaska are being 
heavily armed with long-range guided missiles, but it, of course, is 
true that initial Eussian propaganda sometimes and very often gives 
a clue to future aims. And there has been, beginning I thiiik in 
1951 or 1952, the release of a number of claims to Alaska. 

Mr. Arens. By whom ? 

Mr. Amoss. By Soviet lecturers and political academies like the 
Frunze Academy in Moscow. I have in my files which I did not bring 
here a lot of copies of their propaganda in their own papers, in their 
scientific journals, giving the argument that Alaska was virtually 
stolen. Then I do have one map which shows Alaska reverting to 
Soviet Russia. 

Mr. Arens. Now, Colonel, may I invite your attention to the in- 
formation which is in your files, and the intelligence reports which 
you have received worldwide, with reference to Soviet military prep- 
arations in the field of rockets. 

Mr. Amoss. Yes. At the return of three Soviet icebreakers to 
Murmansk, the crews were given a celebration. One of my in- 
formants attended, and he heard these things, that long-range rocket 
tests have been and are being carried out from different launching 
sites on the Kola Peninsula for a range of up to 3,105 miles. Soviet 
rocket engineers, however, claim that they can reach 6,210 miles. My 
informant said he was told that the most accurate range was 1,250 
miles. Rockets used in these tests are improvements on the German 
2-stage M-103 and they were developed and perfected at Khimki, near 
Moscow. There is a thing which I didn't put in the paper which has 
a little interest. These firings have been going on all winter, and 
have chopped up the ice formations which have moved out north into 
the Gulf Stream and have taken all semblance of summer away from 
Great Britain. It is a fact that in almost every British home fires are 
lighted, there are fogs. My people are speculating as to the possi- 
bility that the ice moving out of these winter-long tests has affected the 
climate of Great Britain at least temporarily. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, before we get on to the subject of the intrigues 
behind the Iron Curtain, which I feel will be very important for you 
to address the committee on, let me ask you this, on the basis of your 
background and experience, as an intelligence officer and as a person 
who, during the late war, had direction of relationships with Allied 
Governments on underground formations, and on the basis of the 
information currently available to you through this network, what 
is your judgment as to how late it is on the Soviet time table for 
world conquest? 

Mr. Amoss. Well, I think the hand is right at midnight. 

Mr. Arens. Are you conversant, Colonel, with the essence of a 
resolution which was introduced in the United States Senate by the 



254 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Senator from Indiana, Senator Jenner, and the Senator from Nevada, 
Senator McCarran, calling for the severance of diplomatic relations 
with the Iron Curtain governments? 
Mr. Amoss. Yes, sir ; I am. 

Mr. Arens. What is your appraisal of that course of action? 
Mr. Amoss. Of course diplomacy and statesmanship are out of my 
sphere, but as an ordinary American citizen, I think it is a good 
resolution, and one that I, as a common citizen, would support; because 
I think it is time to recognize these fellow^s but recognize them for 
what they are, as enemies of the country. 

Mr. Arens. Now, Colonel, may I invite your attention to the gen- 
eral subject of the intrigues behind the Iron Curtain, and the forces 
which are contesting for power. I will ask you if you will kindly 
address the committee on that subject. 

Mr. Amoss. Mr. Arens, would it be appropriate for me to give the 
classic case of false espionage? 
Mr. Arens. Yes, I think that would be very helpful. 
Mr. Amoss. I think this is important because it is the pattern that 
Soviet Russia is following again today. I am referring to what they 
code named the Trust case. As far as I know, this has never been 
published for the public. It was back in the 1920's, and the affair 
ran for 7 years. Bolshevik Russia was in grave trouble. There had 
been revolutionary armies and revolutionary forces. The workers 
had rioted, the peasants had revolted, even the Soviet Navy had 
mutinied ; and the mutiny had been put down only with great blood- 
shed. Outside the borders of Bolshevik Russia at that time there 
were massed great armies of the old Czarist Regime. These armies 
had been supplied, equipped and trained by European nations. In- 
side of Russia there was a movement which was spreading, a mon- 
archist movement, an underground movement, tied into the mon- 
archist forces outside of Russia. It was at that time that a man 
named Yakushev, who had been an old Czarist civil servant, from 
the lesser nobility, had been suborned into being an agent of the Soviet 
machine by force of terror. He was sent out of Soviet Russia. 
He made his first contact with the two grand dukes living in France, 
and little by little he convinced them that he was a representative of 
the underground monarchy movement in Russia. He proved his 
case because he was supplied with documents and military informa- 
tion by the Soviet Secret Police, authentic documents. He was then 
introduced to the chiefs of the general staffs of the European nations. 
He told them he could execute any intelligence assignment that they 
w^anted. He started a flow of vital documents, true documents, also 
given him by the intelligence services of Soviet Russia. He was then 
taken to the intelligence services of the Allied Nations. He per- 
formed the same functions for them. Then, with the help of the Rus- 
sian forces outside of Russia, and the Allied Governments, he smuggled 
alleged monarchists outside of Russia into Europe. 

Of course, these were Soviet agents. As a turnabout, he offered 
to take Allied intelligence officers inside Russia where they could see 
for themselves the strength of the monarchist movement. And he 
took them in. 
Mr. Arens. This was all apparently a hoax, as I gather ? 
Mr. Amoss. This is a complete hoax. He took them in and they met 
at numerous meetings of people in cellars, and in the woods, who 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 255 

claimed to be monarchists. In every case they were staged meetings 
of Soviet agents. 

The agents came back, the Western agents came back into the West 
and reported that the movement was so strong that the regime could 
not last more than a few more months. He also persuaded the 
emigre press to quit criticizing the government because he said in- 
ternal Russia is about to throw off her jailers, but the minute you start 
to get Western attention they will rally around the Communists. 

So, even the Grand Duke Cyril made his public statement that the 
Soviet Constitution is right and good ; it is only necessary to remove 
the top strata of the Government. 

By force of this operation which carried on, as I said, for 7 years, 
Allied intelligence services canceled all of their networks inside Rus- 
sia. The names of the real monarchists underground in Russia were 
given to the secret police and they were all executed. 

In my opinion, the Western intelligence services in their Russian 
sections have not recovered to this day from that disaster. The rea- 
son I believe it important to cite this secret history is because today 
a second trust is operating. We don't know, at least I don't know, 
who the modern young Yakushev is, but there is a flow of defectors 
or alleged defectors coming across the lines into the west, and there 
is two-way traffic. 

I am quite convinced that we are having planted on us, in general, 
a great deal of false intelligence. I know of one group with one of its 
legs in Paris, where you can go in and ask for a document describing 
any Soviet political or military or engineering thing, and if you give 
them a month, pay them a certain amount of money, you can get it, 
and it will be 95 percent correct. But it will be printed in a Soviet 
underground press in Paris. 

This classic example also shows, as it has between then and now, 
every time that Soviet Russia is in trouble, every time they have 
quarrels among themselves, they then start to ask for peaceful coexist- 
ence. They have trouble now. There is a quarrel between the mem- 
bers of the Soviet hierarchy. There are more than the usual 12 or 13 
members of the politburo now who form the collective dictatorship of 
Soviet Russia. There are 3G. But they are finding out what history 
has always proven, that tyranny is indivisible. You can't have one 
thirty-sixth of a tyrant or thirty-six thirty-sixths of a despot. They 
have to be all or nothing. The Malenkov group is now being attacked 
by intrigues by another group with Voroshilov • 

Mr. Arens. Who is he? 

Mr. Amoss. Marshall Voroshilov. I have listed the names here of 
the new intrigue. Molotov, Marshal Bulganin, and Khrushchev who 
has taken the party leadership away from Malenkov. But it is more 
than this. The two classes on whose shoulders bolshevism rose to 
power, the two great classes, are the peasantry and the rank and file 
of the workers. These are the two classes who are now in under- 
ground violent opposition to the regime, because both feel that they 
have been deluded and cheated. 

I read in the paper, I believe it was this morning, that they are now 
recruiting 0-year-oIds and up to try to get in the harvest. The harvest 
that Soviet Russia boasted of so much last year gave less grain, per 
capita, than the last year of tlie Czarist regime. The peasants have 



256 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

been taken off their small holdings where even with a wooden plow they 
could eke out a living. They have been put on collective farms where 
they have to have machinery and there is not enough machinery to go 
around because the Soviet factories which should be building ma- 
chinery are building munitions of war. 

Mr. Arens. Are the Soviets preparing for an all-out general war? 

Mr. Amoss. They are. But I want to speak on the question of the 
alleged blockade or embargo. They have depended on Western Eu- 
porean countries to furnish them the agricultural machinery that 
they need to run the collective farms. As poor as this embargo has 
been, as violated as it has been, it has created a state of near revolt on 
the collective farms. 

Mr. Arens. What is the situation on the Beria forces within Soviet 
Kussia ? 

Mr. Amoss. On the Beria forces ? 

Mr. Arens. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Amoss. It is generally believed in the Georgian Eepublic that 
Beria is still alive. Whether he is alive or whether he is dead, a legend 
has been built up, and a search is being made, and a purge is in con- 
stant execution, trying to purge the security forces, mainly of Beria 
adherents. 

I think, and I am pretty sure, that such desertions as you have had 
in the West are Beria men, and I expect that you will find some other 
and even more sensational desertions within the next 60 days. 

Mr. Arens. What is the significance of the Soviet proposal for co- 
existence ? 

Mr. Amoss. It is a temporary expedient to gain time. 

Mr. Arens. Why ? 

Mr. Amoss. Because with pressures relieved from them, it gives 
them time to further divide Western Allies, it gives them time to settle 
their own political differences at the highest level in the Kremlin, 
it gives them time, and time they must have to quiet the sullen and 
potentially rebelling masses on the farms and in the factories. 

The Cpiairman. According to your information, what effect do you 
think constant trade from our Western Allies with the Soviet Union 
is having on this entire program ? 

Mr. Amoss. Senator Jenner, it is perpetuating a regime which, in 
my opinion, could be made to fall. 

Mr. Arens. How extensive is the worldwide network of the Soviets, 
intelligence network ? 

Mr. Amoss. It is worldwide. It is not only present; it is every- 
where. 

Mr.. Arens. How would it compare in actual volume with the in- 
telligence network of the West ? 

Mr. Amoss. Well, I would say 100 to 1 would be optimistic from 
our point of view. 

_ Mr. Arens. Do the Soviets use their trade missions and interna- 
tional organizations and consuls and embassies as nerve centers for 
espionage ? 

Mr. Amoss. They do. But they use more than that. They use 
established trading companies. In many capitals they have trading 
companies which had been set up originally by the Nazi intelligence 
system, and which still continued existence after the Nazis had lost the 
war. They have taken over these companies. They are sending travel- 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMJVUTNISM 257 

ers, particularly into primitive countries, the Gold Coast of Africa, 
for example. 

The Chairman. As far as this country is concerned, has your organ- 
ization revealed any information or evidence that they are infiltrating 
every phase of American life ? 

Mr. Amoss. Senator Jenner, I have made it sort of a practice of mme 
not to inquire into what is going on in our country, because I conceive 
my front to be the other side. All that I hear about American ac- 
tivities I hear from enemy mouths on the other side. 

The Chairman. Colonel, for example, this Internal Security Sub- 
committee of the Senate just the other day had a man before it in 
public session who was a graduate of an outstanding university of 
this country, who was a Phi Beta Kappa, and yet today he is a hod 
carrier in Wheaton, 111. Of course, when I asked questions in regard 
to his Communist activities and political beliefs and so forth, he took 
the fifth amendment. But your organization does not deal with the 
infiltration into labor unions and various phases of American life ? 

Mr. Amoss. No, sir. We stop at the foreign shores. But there is 
one piece of information we got. We are not able to say whether 
it was planted on us or whether it is authentic. 

I have, of course, turned it over to the operative security agencies 
of this Government. It lists the names 

The Chairman. You do cooperate with the various phases of our 
Government in regard to security of this country ? 

Mr. Amoss. What I get I give them. What they do with it, I don't 
know. How th&j appraise it, I don't know. But this paper listed 25 
American factories to be infiltrated by saboteurs. A curious thing in 
the listing of these names, all except I tliink three were secondary 
industries and not primary industries. That led us into a study over- 
seas with a staff that we have, which is extremely competent, into the 
meaning of the infiltration and possible sabotage plans for secondary 
industries. 

We believe this paper, and it is a great paper, illustrated by maps 
and lectures and instructions and so on, we believe it to be a dry run for 
new agents now being sent to the United States after having been 
trained at, we believe but cannot establish for sure, Karinhalla, out- 
side of Potsdam, which was the former estate of Goering. We believe 
that school is operating there and is taking in nationals from the 
United States as well as from other countries. Certainly it is true if 
it isn't there it is established somewhere else, and that these American 
citizens who have been taken to this school are trained and then given 
another identity and sent back to the United States, not to their 
own community where they might be identified but to some other 
community. 

We believe that many of the acts of apparent sabotage committed in 
the United States and certainly the acts committed in the Eoyal Navy 
of Great Britain, are tests to see how a mass sabotage program w^ould 
-svork out in time of real emergency. 

Mr. Arens. What is the central target of the Soviets? What is 
their objective? 

Mr. Amoss. They have written it. Their simple target is dominion. 
Mr. Arens. World dominion ? 

Mr. Amoss. World dominion. It is written, again and again and is 
repeated. 



258 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Arens. Of the eighty-six-odd nations of the world there is only 
one presently standing in the pathway of that world domination, isn't 
that correct, Colonel? 

Mr. Amoss. That, sir, is absolutely correct. I would like to add 
another thing, that such sometimes faltering allies as we have are less 
numerous than the strong allies that we have inside the Soviet orbit. 

Mr, Arens. Would you elaborate on that point a little bit? 

Mr. Amoss. I believe that Soviet Kussia is more vulnerable to sub- 
version than the United States of America. I mean, I- 

Mr. Arens. Why ? What makes you reach that conclusion ? 

Mr. Amoss. I read and I see the cases of subversion in this country, 
the subverting of American citizens, penetration of all our installa- 
tions — incidentally, my information here all comes from the press, 
none of this is mine— I read about all of this, and in spite of it, even 
if what we read is doubled or quadrupled, we have back of the Iron 
Curtain hundreds of millions of people w-ho don't like life as they 
find it. This is no ideological war as far as they are concerned, it is 
a question of getting enough food in their stomachs and enough se- 
curity to be sure that their children are going to be able to be brought 
up in safety. I have interviewed, I suppose, thousands of people 
from behind the Iron Curtain. One thing that adds to the discontent 
in the Soviet orbit is the fact that particularly among the Russians 
serving the Soviet, venality is widespread, bribery is everywhere. The 
little town major lives in the best house that he can seize in the town. 
His wife wears the best furs that they have been able to take, and the 
fellow who gets along a little better in that town is the man who has 
paid him. That is true not in one village, but it is true in tens of 
thousands of villages throughout Russia. 

Mr. Arens. What would be the reaction of that typical person be- 
hind the Iron Curtain to a severance of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the Soviets and the satellite governments? 

Mr. Amoss. I believe they would appraise that as a piece of realism. 

The Chairman. And give them hope ? 

Mr. Amoss. And give them hope. You are not going to destroy hope 
by recognizing the fact that an enemy is an enemy. 

Mr. Arens. Do you feel that we are definitely now, this instant, at 
war? 

Mr. Amoss. We are at war and we have been effectively at war 
since 1944. 

The Chairman. You said it was just about midnight, something to 
that effect, in response to a previous question as to how late it is on the 
Soviet timetable for world domination. ^Vliy do you reach that 
conclusion, that it is just about midnight? 

Mr. Amoss. Well, first, military preparations ; second, the success of 
their subversion in whittling away the perimeters of our safety, to 
which I would say that if there is any more whittling going on they 
have all the chips, they can call the turns. 

The Chairman. Who has the offensive ? 

Mr. Amoss. They have the offensive. It is certainly true in sub- 
version as well as it is true in any military action, that there is no 
Maginot Line that can ever protect a country — there is no Maginot 
Line, not even a pretended one in subversion. I think your committee, 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 259 

I think the FBI, and the security agencies, of the United States are 
phxced under an intolerable burden by allowing them to take the initia- 
tive, to choose the time, the place, the weapon, and the method, with- 
out reaction in their own backyard. And in carrying on the fiction 
of friendly relations. 

As I said a moment or so ago, they are more vulnerable than we are, 
but we are not taking advantage of their vulnerability. I said it was 
midnight because if we don't take advantage of it, and almost right 
away, they won't be so vulnerable. They will be able to take measures 
to protect themselves, to eliminate the leaders that are springing up, 
new leaders. I would like to add one thing there. During World 
War II, one of the most effective groups of allies we had were the 
underground systems of Europe. As you know, when a country is 
occupied, it has as many underground systems as it has major political 
parties. There are two reasons for that: One, the political party 
has its organization, it has its ward organization, its precinct organi- 
zation, its captains. Consequently, it is the only structure that could 
carry on an underground war. 

I would guess that if our country were occupied we would have two 
underground systems, a Republican one and a Democratic one. There 
is another reason for the political parties acting in underground sys- 
tems. That is because each party wants to come back to control. 

First they know, the leaders know, if their party has not given effec- 
tive resistance to an invader, they have not a chance to come back to 
power. As a consequence, World War II gave us, in the case of 
Poland, seven major underground parties or organizations. But the 
Soviet Communists saw that thing operating during World War II, 
and so they penetrated every European political party. That means 
that every underground, every large underground system in the Soviet 
orbit and even outside of it, is completely penetrated. The people 
inside the orbit know they are penetrated, and they are lying "doggo" 
because they don't dare move. They do not know who the penetrator 
is. It is a question of life and death. 

But just as nature abhors a vacuum, so does clandestine war abhor a 
vacuum, and a new phenomenon has sprung up in the Soviet orbit, a 
plienomenon that I call leaderless resistance. Throughout the entire 
orbit there are tens of thousands of groups of 5 or 10 people. The 
groups usually don't grow any larger than that, because no man is quite 
sure of his neighbor. Every one of these members of these tens of 
thousands of small groups is eager to perform his own little personal 
act of apostacy. But nobody gives tliem any direction as far as I 
can see. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, may I just ask you a naive question which I 
am sure is in the mind of the rank and file of the American people 
at the crossroads. Do you think we can build peace in the world with 
the Soviets by sitting down with them at the council table and having 
agreements, pacts, and understanding? 

Mr. Amoss. There is only one kind of peace that you can build, and 
that is a resignation of all of your native rights. 

Mr. Arens. Why? 

ISIr. Amoss. Because at each conference they pick up something 
more. 



260 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Chairman. Would you say that was true of the settlement that 
was made yesterday on Indochina? 
Mr. Amoss. Absolutely; yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. Could we trust what they agreed to on the settlement 
on Indochina? 

Mr. Amoss. You have never been able to trust what they agreed 
to yet. I think it is entirely a cynical agreement just as all of their 
agreements have been cynical. I think it was a great victory for the 
Communist world. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, are there any other items that you have not 
covered extemporaneously, at least in highlight? I know your state- 
ment is very detailed and thoroughly documented in the record. 

Mr. Amoss. No, sir; I think I have nothing further to add. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Colonel, for appearing be- 
fore us, and we appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Amoss. Thank you. 

Mr. Arens. Colonel, you have given the staff other material and 
will be in session with the staff, on other material, in executive session 
which we understand cannot be revealed publicly. 

Mr. Amoss. Yes; there is material where an indiscreet revelation 
would cost life and that I think I can only give in executive session. 

The Chairman. That is as to your source of information and so 
forth ? 

Mr. Amoss. Also as to some plans. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Colonel. 

Mr. Arens. The next witness is Mr. Samuel Nakasian. 

Will you kindly come forward, sir? 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn to testify. 

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL NAKASIAN, APPEARING IN BEHALF OF 
THE WASHINGTON BOARD OF TRADE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. Would you give us your full name for our record ? 

Mr. Nakasian. It is Samuel Nakasian. 

The Chairman. And you reside in Washington? 

Mr. Nakasian. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Mr. Nakasian. I reside at 5021 V Street NW., and I have a law 
office, which lawyers like to mention, at the American Security 
Building. "^ 

The Chairman. And outside of being in the legal profession, what 
is your business ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I am in the general practice of law with a consid- 
erable emphasis on international trade and foreign investments by 
American companies. 

The Chairman. Are you associated with any trade organization 
or any American organization of that type? 

Mr. Nakasian. I am speaking today, Senator, on behalf of the 
Washington Board of Trade. 

The Chairman. In what capacity are you associated with the 
Washington Board of Trade ? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 261 

Mr. Nakasian. I am a member of the world trade committee of the 
Washington Board of Trade. 

Mr. Arens. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman ? 

Mr. Nakasian, will you kindly identify the Washington Board of 
Trade from the standpoint of membership and from the standpoint 
of concentration of commercial intelligence in that organization ? 

Mr. Nakasian. The Washington Board of Trade has a member- 
ship of 6,000. Most of the members are from business, financial, 
and professional circles. In Washington most of the large corpora- 
tions are represented by an officer or by a top-level employee. These 
large corporations do the bulk of America's business abroad. 

Mr. Arens. Would it be safe to say that there is a concentration 
here of interest in the Washington Board of Trade of the worldwide 
trade operations? 

Mr. Nakasian. Very definitely. And channeled through these 
organizations, these commercial organizations, we do a great deal of 
intelligence on trade and Soviet tactics in world markets. 

Mr. Arens. I wonder before we proceed further, Mr. Nakasian, if 
you would kindly at this point give us just a brief resume of your own 
personal history with particular emphasis upon the background you 
had in trade matters in Europe, and with particular emphasis there on 
your activities in the Middle East. 

Mr. Nakasian. I was on the staff of the EGA, commencing in 1948, 
when the Marslmll plan operation was launched, and was in that or- 
ganization for 3 years. I traveled extensively throughout Western 
Europe and the Middle East. More recently I spent 7 months in 
Iran, a country which is under the shadow of the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Arens. Could you pause there to give us your appraisal of the 
situation in the Middle East, from the standpoint of the potential 
threat of the Soviets ? 

Mr. Nakasian. At this particular time I think that the poverty 
belt, if I may use that expression, which includes Iran, most of the 
Middle East, and Pakistan, is especially vulnerable to what I would 
like to call, if I may use the expression, the new look of the Soviet 
Union. It is a new look which has been described to us as a con- 
sumer goods production program. It has been rationalized here by, 
I think to a great degree, wishful thinking, that the Soviet Union is 
shifting from heavy goods production, from the emphasis on heavy 
goods production into consumer production, in order to satisfy the 
economic wants of the Russian people. 

It is my opinion that these consumer goods, as they are produced, 
will be used as a weapon of economic expansion abroad, the same as 
propaganda and fifth-column exports have been used as a Communist 
weapon in the conquest of foreign areas. 

Mr. Arens. Do the Soviets have an advantage in foreign trade ? 

Mr. Nakasian. The Soviet Union is unencumbered by such details 
as costs, profits, supply, and demand. The limit of their ability to 
hit foreign markets for strategic purposes as against what might be 
called economic purposes of trade, is limited only by the degree of 
liuman sacrifice that they can exact from their people. 

Programs of production are scheduled, and the amount of that pro- 
duction which is set aside for domestic use is a matter of Kremlin 
policy. The excess, however much it might be needed at home, can be 
exported. 



262 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Arens. In other words, are you saying that there is not neces- 
sarily a relationship between the economic benefit to the Soviet Union 
and its trade policy ? 

Mr. Nakasian. There isn't at all. I think there is a much closer 
relationship between the Soviet export policy and its political ambi- 
tions abroad, a far closer understanding of that. 

Mr. Arens. Can you give us an illustration, and I direct your atten- 
tion specifically to the area which we have previously discussed, of 
Iceland? 

Mr, Nakasian. I would like to say before I answer that question, 
Mr. Arens, that I have a prepared statement here which is the position 
of the board of trade on this question. 

The Chairman. That statement may go into our record and become 
a part of our record. You may proceed to testify. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

Statement of Samuel Nakasian, Washington Board of Teade 

My name is Samuel Nakasian. I am a practicing attorney and am here today to 
represent the Washington Board of Trade, an organization of approximately 
6,000 business, financial, and professional leaders of Washington. I am a member 
of the world trade committee of the Washington Board of Trade which has in 
its membership local representatives of American corporations which do a large 
portion of American business abroad. 

The strategy and tactics of world communism is a subject of very great impor- 
tance to members of our organization and to American businessmen in general. 
Last spring the world trade committee of the Washington Board of Trade 
created a subcommittee to study Soviet export trade, its potential, and the role, 
if any, it might play in the cold war. As a result of this study, a recommendation 
was made by the board of trade in a letter to the President of the United States. 
The board of trade has requested me to offer this letter for inclusion in the 
record of this hearing. 

(Attached letter submitted:) 

Washington Board of Trade, 
Washington, D. C, June 7, 195fi. 
The President, 

The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. President : The Washington Board of Trade views with serious 
concern the evidence that the Soviet bloc may now be exporting products for the 
principal purpose of undermining the position of private enterprise in free- 
world markets rather than for the customary purpose of gaining economic 
benefits from trade. 

Free-world markets supplied for the most part by private companies are 
especially vulnerable to collectivized purchases and sales by totalitarian nations. 
Such nations may disregard cost and profit considerations with impunity and 
utilize the economic power of purchases and sales for the achievement of 
imperialistic objectives. 

It appears that socialized exports of Iron Curtain countries are neither re- 
stricted nor expanded by such factors as costs or profits ; nor directly related 
to the supply of the product. When it suits their strategic purpose, a product 
even in short supply may be requisitioned for export and sold or exchanged at 
a price in world markets which bears no relation to the cost of production. By 
virtue of totalitarian control, exports can be and reportedly are governed in 
volume by the degree of subsidy in human sacrifices imposed by the state. 

If present signs are understood, the Soviet bloc has discovered that its power 
to export products regardless of cost is an effective weapon in assaulting the 
free institutions of the free world through the marketplace. Understandably, 
in view of their reportedly limited physical plants, this weapon must be used 
selectively for the time being, aimed at special areas most responsive to the 
strategic and psychological impact of such trade. 

The emergence of exports as an offensive weapon in the cold war raises 
several questions of public policy. Should private companies he expected to 
stand alone ayainst competition which is subsidized by human sacrifices imposed 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 263 

by the totalitarian state? When Iron Curtain countries have moved in, taken 
over a market from private companies, and later withdraw to strike in another 
market, is it expected that private companies are to reenter and start attain 
from scratch? Does not the disruption if not the destruction of these private 
channels of distribution in world markets weaken the facilities for the defense 
of the free world? 

These questions indicate that East-West trade is more than a problem of 
balancing the benefits in the exchange of products. It seems clear that of equal 
if not creater importance is the extent to which Soviet bloc exports are being 
employed to weaken or to destroy American and free-world commercial facili- 
ties in world markets. 

Our Government's efforts to encourage private investment abroad is also 
endangered by the above policy concerning strategic exports. The presence of 
this threat i«*fatal to the program of encouraging private investment abroad. 

In view of these considerations the board of trade recommends that the 
President consider the appointment of an advisory board to study the problems 
of Soviet bloc strategic exports to free-world markets and to recommend to 
the President such remedial action as may be appropriate for insuring the 
survival of commercial channels of trade in free-world markets. 

This recommendation is offered in a spirit of cooperation and service. The 
Washington Board of Trade holds itself at your service and desires to take 
this opportunity of expressing confidence in the efforts you are making on 
behalf of expanding the national economy and world trade. 
Very respectfully yours, 

(Signed) Harry L. Mebrick. 

Mr Chairman, the Soviet Union is rapidly getting into a position to wield 
economic power in the cold war with the West. Large volume exports and imports 
manipulated under totalitarian control provide the Kremlin with a powerful 
weapon in competing for the favor of border and strategically situated states. 
Strategic trade is also a powerful Soviet weapon for undermining the portion of 
]>rivate corporations operating in free world markets and thereby weakening 
the facilities for the defense of the free world. Private corporations are no 
match for Soviet competition but, I venture to say with confidence, if an adequate 
United States program were established, American enterprise would be equal to 
the task of meeting the challenge of Soviet raids on free world markets. 

The recommendation made to the President by the Washington Board of Trade 
recognizes the importance of this Soviet economic threat. The problem is complex. 
It involves our relations with our allies, the role of American companies abroad, 
and a host of ancillary but vital questions which ought to be explained. These 
questions are preliminary to the formulation of a sound United States policy 
and program of meeting the Soviet trade threat in free world markets. Obviously 
this recommendation is very broadly stated which we believe might be expected 
since the Washington Board of Trade has not the resources nor the facilities 
at its command to enable it to get full information as to detail which would be 
necessary to the formulation of sound policy recommendations respecting spe- 
cific aspects of the problem. 

Mr. Nakasian. I would like to say that I am speaking beyond this 
statement, but consistent with it. In speaking beyond this statement 
I am speaking as a matter of personal opinion and from personal expe- 
rience and I am not committing the board of trade to responses which 
I make to your questions, which they have not yet considered fully. 

Mr. Arens. In response to this line of inquiry which we were pur- 
suing a few moments ago, may I invite your attention to the trade 
arrangements between the Soviets and Iceland and ask you to add.-ess 
yourself to that situation? 

Mr. Nakasian. Yes. 

Well, at the moment the Russians have a commodity which they find 
that they can export with great strategic profit, and that commodity 
is petroleum. Petroleum is a unique product in that it sells for dollars 
or for sterling in the world markets. Many countries of the world are 
short on both sterling and dollars. Iceland happens to be one of 
those countries. But Iceland is not short on fish. 



264 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The Soviets, in the last year, have made a barter agreement with 
Iceland shipping petroleum for fish. This agreement falls somewhat 
short of an economic transaction, because I don't think that Iceland's 
fish is of that much importance to the Soviet. But nevertheless the 
Soviet takes Iceland's fish because Iceland apparently cannot find any- 
body in the world to pay hard currency for that fish. 

Mr. Arens. Tell us why they do that. What is the basic underlying 
reason for this arrangement? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, if you ask this question in the context of the 
Soviet strategic policy, it falls very consistently in line that Iceland 
is a place where they would take fish in return for oil. Iceland is a 
very strategic country from a military standpoint of the United 
States and the West. 
Mr. Arens. We have military bases- there, do we not? 
Mr. Nakasian. We have very substantial military bases there which 
are fed with petroleum, and it is not enough that the Soviets merely 
supply the petroleum at the price of fish, but it also gives them an 
opportunity to get their petroleum into the consuming mechanisms. 
There is a danger that in the event of a catastrophe, at a time the 
Soviets could pick, that oil could be doctored in such a way as to 
sabotage that equipment and facilities. 
^ Mr. Arens. In passing, may I ask you this : Do you have informa- 
tion as to whether or not any of that oil which is being shipped into 
Iceland from the Soviets is actually being utilized at our bases by 
our forces? 

Mr. Nakasian. I have no knowledge of that. I would say that — 
the general policy is that the armed services petroleum procurement 
agency procures the petroleum for all of our military uses. Whether 
they dip into local stocks at all, I don't know. But I am sure that 
there are many ancillary facets, such as power stations and so on, 
which would be served by these Soviet imports. 

Mr. Arens. Are you suggesting the possibility, at least, that in the 
event of armed conflict, the Soviets could so adulterate the oil as to 
make it useless, to sabotage the operations in Iceland ? 

Mr. Nakasian, I am advised by technical people that that could be 
done very easily, and it would be rather difficult to detect, unless you 
established an elaborate testing mechanism. 

Mr. Arens. What effect does this arrangement between the Soviet 
and the Government of Iceland have on the markets between the 
United States and Iceland, aside from the Soviet potential for sabo- 
tage or espionage ? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, I don't think that the Iceland petroleum mar- 
ket is of any great importance as far as volume is concerned to the 
American countries that had served it. But I think it is important 
as an indication of things to come. This isn't the only country that 
the Soviets have raided in this way. Denmark is another country 
which has a surplus of products which the Russians are prepared to 
take, namely butter, and all of the output of Danish butter available 
for export cannot be sold for dollars and sterling. 

Consequently, the Danes are anxious to get rid of it, and particularly 
get rid of it for a dollar import commodity, such as petroleum, which 
they would otherwise have to pay dollars or sterling for. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 265 

Mr. Arens. Do you see any significance in tlie fact that the Soviets 
are exporting a consumer goods, a finished product, such as petroleum 
products ? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, there is a threat, and I use this term advisedly, 
because I don't think it has by any means reached its full potential. 

Getting back to what I said earlier, the emphasis which the Soviet 
Union is now putting on the production of consumer goods, I think is 
designed to get an export of consumer goods into not so much Western 
Europe, but into the poverty belt, into that southern area south of 
Russia, particularly the Middle East. I was there for 7 months. 

The poverty of the mass of people in the Middle East is beyond all 
description to an American. I just couldn't describe the conditions, 
and it is not a warm area. It is warm in the summer but frightfully 
cold in the winter. There is no food and no clothes. How these people 
survive, I don't know. These people are vulnerable to any Soviet 
move to bring in consumer goods. It is just an elementary thing. 

Mr. Arens. What do you mean by vulnerable ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I think these people would kiss the hand that would 
feed them and clothe them, and the ideology would not embarrass 
them at all. The ideblogy of the donor of the goods would not em- 
barrass them at all. As a matter of fact, it makes very little difference 
what the political beliefs and precepts of a benefactor is to these 
people. 

The Chairman. Under that policy of feeding and clothing, you 
know this Government has been rather generous to various nations of 
the world. You were connected with EGA and you know that to 
be a fact. It runs into the billions of dollars that we have given to our 
friends and allies all over the world. Do you think they are kissing 
our hand today, or are they kicking us ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I think there is some question about how grateful 
they are. Senator. I think that the aid, however, which we have given 
them has been compensated primarily in Western Europe. 

There has been practically — there has been an infinitesimal amount 
of aid that has been given to the really impoverished areas that I speak 
of, of the Middle East : Pakistan, Iran, Iraq. 

iSIr. Arens. What significance do those countries have from a mili- 
tary standpoint to our Nation ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I think this is a more critical area than the area 
which seems to occupy most of our minds, namely Western Europe. 

Mr. Arens. Wliy ? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, the Middle East is a vulnerable area, the Mid- 
dle East could get away from us. It lies right on the periphery of 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has a long-term ambition of get- 
ting into the Persian Gulf. At this particular time three-quarters of 
the world reserves of oil are in the Middle East, on which the free 
world is completely dependent now, as against a few years ago when 
the Middle East was merely a marginal supplier of oil. The liussians 
have a twofold purpose of getting that area. I think a consumer 
goods export program on the part of the Russians could turn that 
area of the world against us. 

Mr. Arens. Has our diplomacy in your opinion been designed to 
cement the friendship of the Arab States or to isolate the friendship 
of the Arab States? 



266 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, there is more than the Arab States involved. 
Mr. Arens. Well, principally the Arab States. 
Mr. Nakasian. Actually Iran and Pakistan are outside the Arab 
fetates. 

Mr. Arens. Let's put it as the Middle East States, then. 
Mr. Nakasian. I thmk that the efforts that have recently been made 
to cement relations between the United States and Pakistan is a verv 
lavorable development. I think that there was some promise of a 
development of better conditions in Iran, and there may be some hope 
ot better conditions m Iraq. But this is where the fight is ^o'm<r to 
be, as I see it, because the Soviet impact in that area can come throuc^h 
the pinpointing of exports. I think they have just about run their 
course on export of propaganda and fifth columns. I think they have 
to support It with something new, and I think they will support it 
with consumer goods. 

_ Mr. Arens. Do you think that their trade offensive is actually de- 
signed to destroy world markets of the United States ? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, it has that effect. You cannot make a broad 
statement on this point because Soviet exports have not yet reached 
the volume with which they can cross the free world market, and go 
m and undermine them and wreck them. But the Soviets don't trade 
on any broad basis, they trade on a specialized basis. They can pick 
the area that they want. They can hit this one this year and they can 
hit that one next year. They are necessarily committed to a stren<rth- 
ened export policy for the reason that their plants and facilities^are 
not yet developed to the point where they can broadcast their efforts. 

Mr. Arens. Do you actually, on the basis of your observations and 
study, and travel, background and experience, feel that the Soviet 
trade offensive is an assault against the free institutions of the West, 
via the market place ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I definitely do. I think it is in the threat stage. 
I thmk we have not yet fully geared ourselves and prepared ourselves 
to deal with it, as we have recommended, as the board of trade has 
recommended, to the President of the United States, that an advisory 
committee be set up to go into this problem and decide what can be 
done about it. 

Mr. Arens. You have a copy of your letter to the President in the 
statement ? 

Mr. Nakasian, Yes ; it is in the statement. As it stands now, there 
are two economic blocs : The Soviet economic bloc and the Western 
economic bloc. The Soviets have an integrated one; ours is not so 
integrated. The western bloc is cut up into dollar trading areas, 
sterling trading areas, Soviet currency trading areas, and the exports 
of one country which are important to that country and which are 
needed by another country, do not get exchange because the importing 
country probably doesn't have the currency that the exporting country 
wants. It is for that reason that Denmark, which is certainly not a 
pro-Communist country, finds itself in a position of having to deal 
with the Kussians in order to get rid of the butter. 

That butter could just as well be used in another part of the free 
world. But we don't have a mechanism for multilateral trading 
within the free world economic bloc, which will keep the Soviets from 
raiding our own sphere of economics. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 267 

Mr. Arens. Do you have any other points, Mr. Nakasian, that you 
want to bring to the attention of the committee today, in addition to 
what is in your prepared statement? 

Mr. Nakasian. Only to emphasize that we ought to get prepared to 
deal with the Soviet world strategy as something more than a military 
propaganda and fifth column threat. I think we are now approaching 
a new area of Soviet economic penetration. 

Mr. Arens. To what extent is our Nation economically dependent 
upon foreign trade as distinct from internal transactions ? 

Mr. Nakasian. Well, in the narrow sense, you can say that we are 
not so terribly dependent upon it. The borders of the United States 
have gone well beyond the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific. I 
think that the United States, as the powerful, economic nation in the 
free world, is now dependent on keeping the markets of the free world 
in a healthy condition ; and if these markets collapse, we not only lose 
political and military strength, but we also suffer economically as 
well, because we are depenctent, increasingly dependent, on foreign 
raw materials, and to a large extent on foreign markets for our manu- 
factured goods. 

Mr. Arens. Do you see on the horizon an increasing potential of this 
Soviet trade offensive? Do you feel it has a prospect of slackening 
off, or only holding its own ? 

Mr. Nakasian. I see the Soviet trade offensive increasing in mag- 
nitude. I think, to give you an example, petroleum exports in 1948, 
the Soviet Union exported about 100,000 tons of oil. This year they 
will be exporting close to 5 million tons of oil. At other times they 
export grain, even though their people may be starving. This year 
they are not exporting so much grain. But they can choose the com- 
modity. They can choose the market. 

ISIr. Arens. Don't you fear, ISIr. Nakasian— this is just a little be- 
yond your realm, as an economist — don't you fear the threat of the 
Soviets integrating nations in their political orbit with whom they 
have economic trade agreements, that the integration in this political 
orbit would only be a second step after an integration of the economic 

ties? . 

Mr. Nakasian. I very definitely feel that there is a byproduct of 
political affinity which results from economic trade. I was in London 
at the time that the trade agreement, just this last spring, at the time 
the British trade agreement was announced with the Soviets. The 
newspapers were singing the praises of the Soviets, the newspapers in 
London. I think it is just inescapable. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

We will stand in recess. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 53 a. m., the committee was recessed subject to 
call.) 

X 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM " 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTEENAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



JULY 29 AND SEPTEMBER 22, 1954 



PART 5 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
47769° WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Puo. . ... ,^^y 
:uperintc-ri-icnt of Documents 

NOV 2 4 1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin PAT McCARRAN, Nevada » 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORE, Mississippi 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. IlENDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E, JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah PAT McCARRAN, Nevada ^ 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Task Force Investigating the Strategy and Tactics of World Communism 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho PAT McCARRAN, Nevada > 

Richard ArenSj Special Counsel 



* The late Honorable Pat McCarran, while a member of this committee, died September 
28, 1954. 



CONTENTS 

Page 
Testimony of — 

Budenz, Louis F 803 

Biishey, Hon. Fred E 280 

Klimov, Grigoriy Petrovich 269 

III 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS Of WOELD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1954 

United States Senate, 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Hon. William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present: Senators Jenner (presiding) and Welker. 

Also present : Richard Arens, special counsel ; and Frank W. 
Schroeder and EdAvard R. Dufi'y, professional staff members. 

Chairman Jenner, The committee will come to order. 

Call the first Avitness. 

ISIr. Arens. The first witness, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Grigoriy Pet- 
rovicli Klimov. 

Chairman Jenner. Do you swear that the testimony you will give 
in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, po help you God ? 

Mr. Klimov. I do. 

Chairman Jenner. You are here this morning with an interpreter. 

Will 3'ou be sworn to testify? Do you swear that the testimony 
given in this hearing will be truly interpreted? 

Mr. Serebrennikov. I do. 

Chairman Jenner. Will you state your full name ? 

TESTIMONY OF GRIGORIY PETROVICH KLIMOV, MUNICH, GER- 
MANY, THROUGH INTERPRETER, E. S. SEREBRENNIKOV 

Mr. Klimov. Grigoriy Petrovich Klimov. 

Chairman Jenner. Where do you reside? 

Mr. Klimov. Munich, Germany. 

Chairman Jenner. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Klimov. A writer and journalist. 

Chairman Jenner. How long have you been in this country ? 

Mr. Klimov. Three weeks. 

Chairman Jenner. Where do you come from? 

Mr. Klimov. From Munich. 

Chairman Jenner. Munich, Germany? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Chairman Jenner. Are you a resident of Germany? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Chairman Jenner. How long have you resided in Germany? 

Mr. Klimov. Since 1947. 

Cliairman Jenner. Where did you reside prior to that ? 

2G9 



270 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

]\Ir, Kltmov. In Berlin, in the Soviet side; the headquarters of the 
Soviet military administration in Karlhorst, in Germany. 

Chairman Jenner. Where did you reside prior to that time? 

]\[r, Klimov. In the city of Novocherl^assk. 

Chairman Jenner. How louij did you reside there? 

Mr. Klimov. From 1018 to 1941. 

Chairman Jennei;. Wliere were you born? 

]\Ir. Klijmov. In No^'ocherkahsk. 

Chaii'maii Jenner. When? 

Mr. Klimov. 'J'wenty sixth of September 1918. 

Chairrian Jenner. In other words, you lived where you were born 
up until yon made this last move? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Chairman Jenner. Are you a married man? 

Mr. Klimov. A sinj^le one. 

Chairman Jenner. Have you ever been married? 

Mr. Klimov. No. 

Chairman Jenner. Yon may proceed with the questioning. 

Mr. Arens. You have a prepared statement which you have sub- 
mitted for incorporation in the record of the Internal Security Sub- 
committee of the Senate; is that correct? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. I respectfully suggest that this prepared statement 
of Mr. Klimov be incorporated in the record at this point and that he 
now proceed extemporaneously. 

Chairman Jenner. It may go into the record and become a part of 
it. 

(The statement referred to follows:) 

Statement of Ghigoiuy Petkovich Klimov 
peksonal history 

I, Grigoriy Petrovich Klimov, wfis born in Novocherkassk, in nortliern 
Caucasus, on Septenibor 2(), 1918. My father was a medical doctor, and my 
mother a nurso. From 102(i to VX'>C> I studiod in the 10-year school from which I 
was graduated. From IHJUi to 1941 I studied in the Industrial Institute in 
Ordzhonikidze, and sraduated in 1!)41 with a diploma in electrical engineering. 
I worked as engineer-constructor in plant No. 645 in Gor'kiy from 1941 to 1943. 
In 1948, I was mobilized in the lied Army and fought in the Leningrad sector 
of the front. I was wounded, and upon leaving the hospital I was sent to the 
Special Reserve Officer Regiment No. 96 (OPKOS 96). In the summer of 
1944, I was assigned to the Red Army Military Institute of Foreign Languages, 
where I was admitted to the last grade of the German faculty because of my 
knowledge of German. Upon graduating from the institute, in June 1945, and 
being a German-speaking engineer, I was sent to the main headquarters of the 
Soviet occupation troops in Germany, SVAG in Berlin-Karlhorst. From June 
1945 to February 1946 I worked as economic adviser of General Shabalin, chief 
of the economic administration in the SVAG. Following the reorganization of 
the economic administration in February 1946 I was transferred to the industrial 
administration of the SVAG, headed by A. Aleksandrov, where I occupied the 
position of chief engineer for electrical industry until February 1947. 

After being demobilized and sent back to the Ministry of Electrical Industry 
in Moscow, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime, and to flee West. 
My demobilization and the transfer to Moscow were due to the fact that, although 
I was an officer and an engineer, I was not a party member. After the war all 
SVAG employees were thoroughly investigated for political reliability. About 20 
percent were deemed politically unreliable and were sent back to Moscow. I was 
cue of them. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 271 

In February 1947 I crossed the border into the American zone of Germany 
where, after being checked, I was granted political asylum. Since then, I lived 
first in Stuttgart, and then in Munich, where I worked as journalist, and wrote 
the book, The Berlin Kreml, about my work in the SVAG. The book was pub- 
lislied in Russian, German, French, and English (the English title is the Machine 
of Terror). 

In 15)52, I started to publish the magazine Svoboda (Freedom), in cooperation 
with a group of piistwar emigres from the U. S. S. R. In 1952 we organized the 
Cential Union of Postwar Emigres from the U. S. S. R. (TsOPE), with the 
magazine Svoboda as its official publication. TsOPE carried on active anti- 
Communist work beyond the Iron Curtain, through pamphlets and radio 
broadcasts. 

The [turpose of my visit to the United States is to organize the work of the 
TsOI'E members here, in order to increase the anti-Communist struggle beyond 
the Iron Curtain; it is also to reestablish contacts with the United States public 
circles in order to get their support for our work, and to present them our goals 
and problems in the struggle against communism. Moreover, we also seek the 
support of tlie United States public and of the United States Program for the 
Support of Emigres (USI<]P) in order to improve the social conditions of the 
postwar emigres frcmi the U. S. S. R. 

I do not wfuit to repeat the well-known truisms regarding the Communist 
system, and I shall merely stress a few facts I know, which confirm tiie ag- 
gressiveness aiming at the world domination by tlie Communists. 

In surveying the Soviet policies toward Americans, of the period which fol- 
lowed immediately the end of the war, the most striking facts are related to the 
attitude of the Soviet representatives in the Allied Control Commission in Berlin. 
My chief, General Shabalin, equally represented the Soviets in the Economic 
Management of the Control Commission. His colleagues were General Draper 
for the United States. Sir Percy Mills for the United Kingdom, and General 
Sergent for France. From the first day of the commission's work. General 
Shabalin applied all the means available to sabotage the operations of the 
Economic Management, whose primary assignment was to implement the Plan 
for the Economic Demilitarization of Germany which was adopted at the Pots- 
dam Conference. The purpose of this sabotage by the Soviets was to slow down 
and to delay the implementation of the plan which aimed at either the destruc- 
tion or at the demilitarization of the German war industry. In fact, the Soviets 
were not interested in the destruction of the German war industry, but rather 
in its transfer to the U. S. S. R. This was what they actually achieved. 

While General Shabalin applied all his skill to delay the application of the 
demilitarization plan signed in Potsdam by Stalin, the Soviet dismantling teams, 
from May 1945 to March 1946, took apart and shipped to tlie U. S. S. R. practically 
all the military, semimilitary, and basic industries of the Soviet zone of Germany. 
This was done in spite of the demilitarization plan providing that all the war 
Industry was to be destroyed on the spot. General Shabalin followed direct 
orders from the Kremlin, with which he was connected b.\ telephone and from 
which he received his daily instructions. Thus, immediately after the end of 
the war. the U. S. S. R. set the increase of its own war potentialities as its main 
task. In the meantime, everybody, including Soviet officers of the Control 
Commission, knew that the United States demobilized completely both their 
army and their industry. 

Siniultaneousiy the Soviets were busily occupied with economic espionage in 
the American occupational zone of Germany. I know of a case when aiajor Filiu 
officially a worker in the editorial offices of Taegliche Rundschau, and unofficially 
an officer of Soviet economic intelligence, handed over to General Shabalin for 
his use a file of secret material on German economy. This file, which was handed 
over to me for processing, contained materials of the (Imperial (?)) Reich 
Institute of Economic Statistics, which reached Soviet hands through unofficial 
ways, i. e., through Soviet agents, from the headquarters of the American eco- 
nomic intelligence (it seems that this is in Heidelberg). Since I was familiar 
with the signature stamps affixed to the Soviet and American secret and unclassi- 
fied documents, which I learned through my work with the documents passing 
through the control council, it was perfectly obvious for me that these docu- 
ments could have gotten into Soviet hands only through undercover ways, i. e., 
through Soviet agents in the American Army. Such documents were regularly 
received in the economic administration of the SVAG, I knew of it, but tliey all 
passed not through my hands, but through the secret section of the SVAG. 



272 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

At that time the American side, basing itself on the Potsdam agreement, 
regularly and carefully transmitted to the Soviet side through the Allied Con- 
trol Commission official economic information about everything which the 
Americans considered worthy of attention in their zone of Germany. This in- 
formation was honest and conscientious ; it was very useful to the Soviets, and 
we, the Soviet economic officers, often wondered at the naivete of the Americans, 
since the Soviet side either did not give the Americans similar information on 
the Soviet zone at all, using silly excuses, like shortage of typists and so on, 
or gave them deliberately incomplete and distorted information. 

Besides the dismantling of German war industries for the purpose of increasing 
their own war potentials, the Soviets gave especial attention to the utilization of 
German scientists, working on military research and inventions. The chief of 
the science and technical section of the SVAG was Colonel Kondakov, whose 
tasks included the bringing out of resolutions on such questions. I will give 
one separate example. 

In June 1946 Colonel Kondakov asked me to accompany him to Potsdam, 
where he was to question a German scientist held under arrest by the MVD. 
The story follows : 

''The German scientist, whose name I was never given, woi'ked during the 
last years of the war with other scientists on the construction of rockets, directed 
by remote control, and destined for fighting enemy planes. This work was not 
completed by the end of the war. Therefore, after the end of the war, this 
German, who lived in the French Zone of occupation applied to the French 
occupational authorities for assistance in completing his work, and in exchange 
he offered his invention to the French Government for their use. The Soviet 
Communist network in the French occupational armies instead notified the 
respective Soviet organs of the matter. As a result, the scientist was kidnapped 
by the Soviet secret police, and had been held for several months in the in- 
vestigation jail of the Potsdam MVD. They tried here to force the German 
to work for the Soviets, but he insisted that in order to continue his work 
he needs all his drawings and figures, which are in the hands of his fellow 
workers in the French Zone, and therefore he requested permission to take a 
trip to the French Zone in order to obtain these drawings. The Soviets could 
not agree to this, siijce they did not believe that he would come back. Therefore, 
the Soviets tried to force him to resume his work, while the German insisted 
that this work was the result of research by an entire group of scientists over 
a period of several years. Therefore, he was actually unable to resume 
his work. The Soviets decided that this was sabotage. Colonel Kondakov had 
to make a decision on this affair. As a result the German was to be sent under 
guard to work on the Soviet scientific research station of Peenemiinde, where the 
German and Soviet scientists continued research work on improvements of the 
rocket-type missiles of the type of the German VI, V2. etc." 

On the same day Colonel Kondakov conducted the questioning of another Ger- 
man scientist, who had also been kidnapped by the MVD from the Western Zone 
of Germany. This was a specialist in low-voltage technique, who was working 
on the invention of a peculiar apparatus of the radar type. Colonel Kondakov 
ordered to have him sent under guard for work in the scientific research Soviet 
base in Arnstadt, where Colonel Vasil'yev was chief. On the same day Colonel 
Vasil'yev received for his decision a number of scientific research subjects and 
materials pertaining to war, which were carried out by various German scien- 
tists residing in the Western Zones of Germany. All this material was 
received through the channels of the German Communist Party in Western Ger- 
many or through the Soviet network in the Soviet occupational armies. This 
shows the extent of the interest of the Soviet Government in war research of 
German scientists. It is therefore clear that the thoughts of the Soviet Govern- 
ment were directed toward preparation for war. 

Since the very beginning of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Germany, the 
Soviets were not convinced that they would be able to stay in Germany for a 
long time. Out of this premise, their economic policy aimed at dismantling and 
taking out of Germany in the shortest possible time everything which had any 
value at all as a military or economic potential. During 1945-46 the Soviets 
dismantled everything, even things which they would have urgently needed 
in the near future if they thought at that time of staying in Germany for any 
length of time. Therefore, in 1947, when the Soviets became convinced that 
they could stay in Germany in the future, they were forced to rebuild with 
German labor, time and again, the enterprises which they had dismantled in 
1945. These enterprises turned out to be essential for the Soviets for satisfying 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMJMUNISM 273 

requirements of the Soviet occupational forces in Germany and for the supply 
of products to the Soviet Union as reparations. Had the Soviets from the very 
beginning thougtit of staying in Germany for a lengthy time, they would never 
have taken apart the enterprises, which later proved to be essential for supply- 
ing the needs of their own occupational forces and for reparations. 

How can one explain this uncertainty of the Soviets that they would be able to 
establish themselves in Germany for a lengthy time? The Soviets approached 
the question from the angle of their own ideology : The one who is strong domi- 
nates the situation. At that time Soviet Armies were thoroughly exhausted, 
while the American Armies had only just reached their normal battle strength. If 
the American Armed Forces had been controlled by a dictatorship, a simple ulti- 
matum would have sufficed, and the Soviet Armies would have been forced to 
clear out not only of Eastern Germany, but of the whole of Eastern Europe. 
Reasoning from their own ideology the Soviets considered this possibility and 
tried to get out of Germany everything they needed. 

At that time the Soviets carried out a policy of bluffing. On one hand they 
behaved provocatively in the Allied Control Commission and demanded maxi- 
mum concessions from the Western Allies, and in general the maximum of every- 
thing in the field of politics and economics. On the other hand, they considered 
the possibility that the West might not agree to these demands and make some 
demands of its own — including the evacuation of Soviet Armies of occupation 
from Eastern Germany. And the Soviets seriously considered this eventuality. 
This can be clearly seen from the fact that during the first year of occupation 
the Soviets applied themselves practically only to the dismantling, all the other 
changes in principles of economic and political structure of Eastern Germany 
were begun by the Soviets considerably later. 

I arrived at this conclusion from the reading of many oflicial documents which 
passed thi-ough the private office of the cliief of Economic Administration of the 
SVAG, where I was employed, and also from the personal directives, orders, and 
words of General Shabalin. 

The Soviet occupational forces did not feel sure of their position in Germany, 
and this was especially noticeable at headquarters ; this is confirmed by the 
fact, the simple human fact that many of the officers who had their families, 
wives, and children, with them, always kept an emergency reserve of gasoline 
in their cellars. This emergency reserve which was kept in the cellar of the 
liome of almost every officer having a family, consisted of 20 or 30 cans of 
gasoline, and was kept for the eventuality that they may have to retreat from 
Germany in a disorderly manner, more plainly — to flee under bombardments from 
the front and from the rear, as happened to the Soviet military in the P.nltic area 
during the first days of the 1941 war. The Soviet oflicers in Karlshoi'st knew 
how provocative and insolent was the policy conducted l>y the Soviets in the 
Allied Control Commission. They also considered the strength of the Western 
side and acknowledged the possibility of military actions on tlie part of the 
Americans, including the possibility of war. When, early in ll)4(i, tlie Soviet 
military authorities forbade any contacts of the Soviet military with the Western 
Allies and introduced restrictions bordering on wartime restrictions, this served 
as further proof for the Soviet officers that war was possible. 

This is the difference between the psychology of the Soviets and the psychology 
of the West. 

One year after the end of the war, when the Soviets realized that the West 
was giving in to them in everything and that it was po.ssible for them to establish 
themselves in Germany for a long time, the Soviets began working on reforms 
of a long-range nature, which would guarantee to them economic and political 
domination of the country for a long time. This was the plan for the enslave- 
ment of Germany. 

The economic enslavement of Germany was chiefly carried out by two 
measures: (a) The agrarian reform, and {h) the socialization of industry. Let 
us take a look at both measures : 

<A) THE AGRARIAN REKOUM 

The purpose of the agrarian reform was the liijuidation of the class of inde- 
pendent farmers-producers, who, obviously, were opposed to the regime of the 
so-called people's democracy. The Soviets first took their land away from them, 
and then liquidated them as an independent antagonistic class. On the other 
hand they distributed the land confiscated to landless peasants, former farm hired 
labor, etc., hoping to create thus a new class of landowners, ^^ho would be 

477C9°— 54— pt. 5 2 



274 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

sympathetic to the new ref;irae if it were only because they had received land 
from this regime. 

The plans for the ajjjrarian reform, the maximum size of land allotments, and 
all the instructions for carrying out the reform had been worked out in advance 
by the Soviets. On the surface there was the fiction that they were received 
in the shape of applications from the local German landrats (administrators) 
so as to create the impression that this plan of agrarian reform was proposed 
by the Germans themselves and was only approved by the SVAG. 

I personally had occasion to observe how the German landrats, commonly 
members of the Communist Party, repeatedly called on General Shabalin to hand 
over their plans, which they had to rewrite until "these plans" fully corresponded 
to the Soviet instructions. Time and again the Communist landrats tried to pro- 
test against obviously senseless and economically harmful clauses in the Soviet 
instructions, but they could not do anything and were compelled to submit to the 
SVAG. 

Economically, the agrarian reform in Eastern Germany has only decreased the 
effectiveness and productivity of agriculture. But that was not important to the 
Soviets. They had liquidated opposition to the "new order" in agriculture. Be- 
sides, they had created a new social layer among the peasantry, which was sup- 
posed to l>e in sympathy with them. The new structure of agricultural economy 
insured the subordination of agricultural economy to the State authorities. Thus 
the Soviets laid their heavy hand on German agricultural economy. 

<B) SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTKT 

The socialization of industry was carried out on orders of the RVA in the shape 
of the establishment of "Landeseignene Betriebe" (State-owned enterprises). 
This meant that a considerable portion of small and medium industries of Ger- 
many was taken away from their owners without indemnity and transferred to the 
local city self-governments. This was done so as to liquidate a second independ- 
ent class of German society : Industrialists-entrepreneurs, whom the Soviet rulers 
considered as enemies. Since the local German self-governments were completely 
controled by the SVAG, the socialized enter|)rises in the form of "Landeseigene- 
Betriebe" were also completely controlled by the SVAG. Thereby was created 
the fictitious appearance that socializ 'd industry was transferred into "the hands 
of the German people." Thereby the SVAG was hoping to earn additional political 
capital. 

Thus, all the economic enterprises of the Soviets in Eastern Germany served 
to weaken economically (dismantling, reparations) and enslave economically 
(agrarian reform, socialization of industry) Germany. The purpcises of this eco- 
nomic enslavement served as bases for a silmultaneous political enslavement, 
which was most sirikingly expressed in the creation of an artificial political 
party— the SED. 

OPPOSITION OF THE SOVIETS TO THE VNIFICATION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN GERMANY 

While the Soviets were carrying out the above measure for the economic and 
political enslavement of Eastern Germany, they opposed by all possible means the 
reunification of Western and Eastern Germany. This was not advantageous to 
them economically, because, if there is even the question of commodity circulation 
between the zones, this would have interfered with deliveries on account of re- 
ptirations, out of current production. A part of the production, earmarked for 
deliveries under reparations to the Soviet Union, would have gone out from under 
the control of the Soviet authorities. In the administration of industry of the 
SVAG special meetings of the leading engineers of the administration were held, 
at which the chief of the administration, A. Aleksandrov, stressed the impos- 
sibility for the Soviet Union of commodity circulation between the zones, because 
this would have ruined the plans for reparation deliveries. The Soviets are only 
shouting about the unification of Germany in their propaganda, but they will 
never voluntarily agree to it. 

In spite of the agreement on ending reparations concluded between Moscow and 
Pankow, the reparations are still being levied, but only in another form : The 
Soviets fix prices, without any basis, and very low, for products manufactured on 
orders from the Soviets, and at the same time sell their own raw materials in 
Eastern Germany at very high prices. 

The Soviets will never agree to the unification of Germany through free elec- 
tions. This would mean a complete defeat for the puppet government of Eastern 



i 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 275 

Germany. The Soviets cannot permit free elections, since all their system is 
based not on freedom, but on compulsion. 

On the basis of my experiences as a Soviet officer working in the SVAG, and 
at present through the contacts of our organization among the Soviet occupa- 
tional armies in Eastern Germany, in which we are considerably helped by the 
population of Eastern Germany, I can state that I am fully convinced in the 
following: the German people of Eastern Germany are our allies, allies of the 
free West, and the Soviet regime in Eastern Germany is maintained mainly 
through terrorism and force, in the same degree as on the territory of the Soviet 
Union itself. On the front lines of anti-Communist fighting the German popula- 
tion and the soldiers of the Soviet occupational army often feel that they are 
allies. This is confirmed by the riots among German workers on July 17 of last 
year, when hundreds of German workers gave their lives for the cause of freedom, 
and when dozens of Soviet soldiers and officers were shot by the field court- 
martial because of their refusal to fire at the rioting German workers. It is 
on this base of mutual struggle of all the people enslaved by communism that 
the West must build its struggle of liberation against the Communist system. 

Mr. Arens. You are in the United States only temporarily for a 
mission which we will get into in just a few moments; is that correct? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. It is a mission to develop contacts for iinderground 
work which you are conducting against the Soviet regime; is that 
correct ? 

]\Ir. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. Will you in your own pace in a conversational manner 
here now just tell the committee a word of your personal background 
and personal history ? 

Mr. Klimov. I, Grigoriy Petrovich Klimov, was born in Novocher- 
kassk, in northern Caucasus, on September 26, 1918. My father was a 
medical doctor, and my mother a nurse. From 1926 to 1936 I studied 
in the 10-year school from which I was graduated. From 1936 to 
1941 1 studied in the Industrial Institute in Ordzhonikidze, and gradu- 
ated in 1941 with a diploma in electrical engineering. 

I worked as an engineer-constructor in plant No. 645 in Gor'kiy 
from 1941 to 1943. In 1943 I was mobilized in the Red Army and 
fought in the Leningrad sector of the front. I was wounded, and 
upon leaving the hospital I was sent to the Special ReserA-e Officer 
Regiment No. 96 (OPROS 96). In the summer of 1944 I was assigned 
to the Red Army Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where I 
was admitted to the last grade of the Germany faculty because of 
my knowledge of German. 

Senator IVelker. I wonder if counsel could not ask questions? 
He has a statement in the record. 

Mr. Arens. I do not think he understood the way I was suggesting 
we proceed. I am suggesting that you give a conversational resume 
of your background. As indicated in your statement, you have been 
an official of the Soviet Government, is that correct ? 

]Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. You were an official of the Soviet Government in 
Berlin as an economic adviser to the chief of the Economic Admin- 
istration in Berlin, is that correct? 

]\Ir. Klimov. That is right. 

Mr. Arens. During that time you had considerable experience in 
the political subversion in Berlin and in Germany which was con- 
ducted by the Soviets, is that correct ? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes, it is. 



276 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Mr. Arens. Would you just tell us in your own words just in- 
formally here now about the operations of the representatives of the 
Soviets on the Allied Control Commission in Berlin ? 

Mr. Klimov. My first experience in Germany indicated to me from 
the very beginning that the Soviet side did not want to collaborate 
with the western allies, including, of course, the American allies. 
Inasmuch as I was one of the first Soviet officers within the framework 
of the Control Council, I was especially impressed by the colossal 
difl'erence when on one side, and when I say "we" I mean we, the 
Soviet officers and soldiers, expected to meet Americans and see in 
them our real allies, not only during the war but also during peace. 

The whole Soviet people, the whole Soviet army, had the same ideas. 
And then I was especially impressed and astonished at being one of 
the few Soviet officers who had an opportunity to work for the Control 
Council and then I learned the official Soviet policy in regard to 
America. While Soviet officers and Soviet soldiers would encounter 
Americans, French, and British on the streets of Berlin, they con- 
tinued to feel that they were their allies and were happy to have at least 
a modicum of contact with the world that is unknown to them but 
which Avas friendly to them. When we people who passed through 
the war and who even before the war knew the reality of Soviet life, 
we were happy in our thinking that peace had come. 

During my very first days in my work with the Control Council, 
I was literally astounded when I saw that the official representatives at' 
the Control Council, General Shabalin, was completely subverting all 
hopes not only of the Russian people but of every Russian officer and 
soldier, all hopes about peace. The actions of my superior. General 
Shabalin, were so much in conflict with hopes and ideas of all Soviet 
people, of all Russian people and the Army personnel that I at first 
personally had the tendency to ascribe his actions either to his per- 
sonal stupidity, or I thought he was simply mistaken. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question ? 

Chairman Jenner. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Witness, I take it you are referring now to 
when the Soviets started to reform Eastern Germany, their long-range 
plan of reform ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Senator Welker. That first took place by what, the socialization of 
industry and then the agrarian reform ? 

Mr. Klimov. At first they were dismantling. 

Senator Welker. Then what happened ? 

Mr. Klimov. The next was the land reform. 

Senator Welker. Wliat did they do in the land reform, if you will 
tell us? 

Mr. Klimov. Instructions were received from Moscow on how to 
implement the land reform, and this reform was prepared in Moscow 
in such a manner that it was supposed to destroy completely inde- 
pendent landowners. 

Senator Welker. Then from land reform you went into the sociali- 
zation of industry and business? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Senator Welker, I take it from your answers given heretofore that 
those three things that you have enumerated caused you to believe 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISAI 277 

tliat the Soviets were doino; that to the Russian people, the peasants, 
the poor people who love freedom, and they did not like it? 

Mr. Arens. In addition to that, there was political subversion by the 
Soviets in the Allied Control Council, was there not? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. Political subversion is always connected with 
economic subversion. Communists are Marxists and materialists, 
and they know they can implement politics only when there is economic 
base for it. 

Air. Arens. Will you kindly summarize the techniques of Soviet 
diplomacy with respect to Germany while you were identified with 
the Allied Control Commission? 

Mr. Klimov. To continue what I said, the Bolsheviks tried in their 
first attempts to create an economic basis or economic base. Because 
of this they went through these three reforms I mentioned before; 
that is, dismantling, land reform, and socialization of industry. Only 
after this were they ready to embark upon the political subversion 
measure, and that is the creation of the United Socialist Party. 

Mr. Arexs. What were the techniques of the Bolsheviks or the 
Soviets in the Allied Control Commission itself? 

Mr. Klimov. The first example had to do with the decision of the 
Potsdam Conference to carry through the economic demilitarization 
of Germany. The Soviet representatives at the Allied Control Coun- 
cil completely subverted this decision of the Potsdam Conference and 
they were fighting against it. The result was that instead of liquidat- 
ing the military industry, the war industry of Germany, as they 
were supposed to, what they did was to dismantle it and carried it 
completely out of Germany to the Soviet Union. If you will allow 
me to present another instance which is of considerable value, accord- 
ing to the Potsdam decision the Soviets, together with other allies, 
were bound to promote the unity of demilitarized Germany. 

From the very beginning the Soviets subverted this point at the 
Potsdam Conference. First of all, they wanted to carry out all of 
the military industry from Germany to the Soviet Union. Then it 
was necessary for them to take reparations out. These two factors 
could not be coordinated with the unity of Germany. 

Then they created the Socialist Party of Germany which actuallv 
is nothing else but a puppet of the Soviet regime in Germany. All 
these measures ipso facto make impossible the unity of Germany. If 
the Soviets were to agree today to the unity of Germany accomplished 
on the basis of free democratic elections, then tomorrow the Soviets 
would have to leave Germany. In this manner, while actually being 
the main enemies of the unity of Germany, the Soviets actually want 
to portray in their propaganda that that is what they are for. 

Mr. Arens. You were sent back from Berlin by the Soviets because 
they regarded you as politically unreliable? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arexs. They sent you back to Moscow? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. You thereafter crossed over into the Allied zones of 
Germany and have been active as president of this Central Associa- 
tion of Postwar Refugees of the Soviet Union ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes. 

Mr. Arens. May I ask you a few general questions with respect to 
the situation behind the Iron Curtain on the basis of your background 



278 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

and experience? First of all, ^\'liat percentage of the population of 
Soviet Eussia were the Bolsheviks when they tooli over ? 

Mr. Klimov. Thirty thousand people out of 150 million population. 

Mr. Akens. That would be about the same percentage of the hard- 
core Communists in the United States to the total population of the 
United States; is that correct? 

Mr. Klimov. Yes; it is so. 

Mr. Arens. What is the percentage of the Communists now in 
Soviet Russia to the total population ? 

Mr. Klimov, Six million Communist Party members to the popula- 
tion of 200 million. In percentage relation there are more Communists 
in France and in Italy than there are in the U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Arens. What is the attitude of the rank and tile of the people 
behind the Iron (yurtain toward the Soviet regime? 

Mr. Kltmov. Eighty percent of them are against the Soviet system. 

^Ir. Arens. How many slave laborers are there on the basis of your 
best information as a former Soviet official in Soviet Russia? 

Mr. Klimov. About 15 million. Permit me to say that all relatives 
of political exiles are included in the group of politically unreliable 
people. And so if we were to come to total numbers of political exiles, 
political convicts ever since the inception of the Soviet power to<iether 
with all their relatives, then we will find they comprise the biggest 
single class of the Soviet population. 

The Soviet regime continues all these relatives as political unreli- ' 
ables. In other words, this class is foreign to Soviet power, and the 
Soviet power counts them