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STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 
HEARINGS  ^ 

BEFORE   THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECUEITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

SECX)ND  SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF 
WORLD  COMMUNISM 


MAY  18  AND  27,  1954 


PART  1 


Printed  for  tlie  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


UNITED   STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
477G9  WASHINGTON  :   1954 


-XT' 


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Boston  Public  i.ibrary 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 


WILLIAM  LANGER, 
ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin'      '  ' 
WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana 
ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 
ROBERT   C.   HENDRICKSON,    New  Jersey 
EVERETT    MCKINLEY    DIRKSEN,    Illinois 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho 
JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland 


North, LXakota,  Chairman 
PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 
HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia 
JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 
ESrES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee 
OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 
THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  Jr.,  Missouri 
JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Subcommittee  To  Investihatb  the  Admi.vistratiox  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  AND  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 


ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho 

JOHN    MARSHALL    BUTLER,    Maryland 


PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 
JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 
OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON.  South  Carolina 
JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Task  Force  Investicatino  the  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  World 

Communism 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

Richard  Arexs,  Special  Counsel 
JX 


CONTENTS 


Testimony  of — 

Boldyreff,  Constantin  W _ 2 

Heimlich,  William  F ~   '___'__ "_  iq 

Hunter,  Kent  A '~_~ I      _   _'_  13 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


tuesday,  may  18,  1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the 

Administration  of  the  Internal 
Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10:30  a.  m.,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Jenner  and  Welker. 

Also  present:  Kichard  Arens,  special  counsel;  Frank  W.  Schroeder, 
professional  staff  member;  and  Edward  R.  Duffy,  professional  staff 
member. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Among  the  duties  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee,  pursuant 
to  Senate  Resolution  366  of  the  81st  Congress,  is  the  duty  to  make  a 
continuing  investigation  of — 

the  extent,  nature,  and  effects  of  subversive  activities  in  the  United  States,  its 
Territories  and  possessions,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  espionage,  sabotage, 
and  infiltration  by  persons  who  are  or  may  be  under  the  domination  of  the  foreign 
government  or  organizations  controlling  the  world  Communist  movement  or  any 
other  movement  seeking  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  the  United  States  by 
force  and  violence. 

It  is  abundantly  clear  from  the  numerous  projects  which  the 
Internal  Security  Subcommittee  has  completed  pertaining  to  the 
Communist  conspiracy  m  the  United  States,  that  this  conspiracy  here 
is  only  one  tentacle  of  a  worldwide  octopus  which  has  as  its  principal 
target  the  United  States  of  America. 

If  we  are  adequately  to  appraise  the  operation  of  the  Communist 
conspiracy  in  this  Nation  it  is  essential  that  we  keep  abreast  of  the 
world  strategy  and  tactics  of  international  communism.  Accordingly, 
I  have  appointed  a  task  force  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee, 
consisting  of  myself  as  chairman  with  Senators  Herman  Welker  and 
Pat  McCarran  as  members,  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  a  con- 
tinuing study  and  investigation  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  world 
communism. 

The  hearing  today  is  the  first  in  a  series  of  hearings  on  this  general 
subject  matter  which  has  many  facets,  each  of  which  we  shall  explore 
as  we  receive  the  testimony  of  a  number  of  witnesses  who  will  be 
scheduled  over  the  course  of  the  next  several  months. 

We  will  call  the  first  witness  in  this  new  hearing. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  first  witness  is  Prof.  Constantin 
W.  Boldvreff.     Will  you  kindly  assume  the  witness  stand? 


2  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  be  sworn  to  testify?  Do  you  solemnly 
swear  the  testimony  you  give  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  do,  sir, 

TESTIMONY    OF    CONSTANTIN    W.    BOLDYREFF,    WASHINGTON 

D.  C. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  be  seated.  Will  you  state  for  our  com- 
mittee record  your  full  name? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  My  name  is  Constantin  W.  BoldyreflF. 
The  Chairman.  Will  you  spell  that  for  the  reporter,  please? 

i  •po^^Y^E^^-  Constantin,  C-o-n-s-t-a-n-t-i-n,  Boldyreff,  B-o-l-d- 
y-r-e-f-f,  like  Frank. 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  reside,  Mr.  Boldyreff? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  reside  in  Washington,  1427  Chapin  Street  NW. 

i  he  Chairman.  What  is  your  business  or  profession? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  am  a  professor  at  Georgetown  University,  Insti- 
^^m/  rT^^^"^^®^  ^^^  Linguistics,  and  am  on  leave  of  absence  now. 

1  he  Chairman.  From  Georgetown  University? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  From  Georgetown  University. 

The  Chairman.  Where  were  you  born? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  was  born  in  Russia. 

The  Chairman.  When? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  In  1909. 

The  Chairman.  Wlien  did  you  leave  Russia? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  left  Russia  for  the  first  time  in  1922  as  a  cadet 
in  the  Czarist  Cadet  Corps. 

The  Chairman.  And  how  many  times  have  you  returned? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  have  been  in  Russia  since  then  again  from  1942 
to  1944  underground. 

The  Chairman.  Wlien  was  your  last  time  that  you  visited  Russia? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  Russia  proper  in  1944. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  Proceed,  Mr.  Arens  with  the  question- 
ing of  the  witness. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  when  was  the  last  time  you  were  in  contact  with 
the  underground  behind  the  Iron  Curtain? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  returned  about  3  weeks  ago  from  a  tour  of  the 
country  surrounding  the  Soviet  Empire  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  Iran, 
and  during  my  stay  in  Europe  and  Asia  I  was  all  the  time  in  contact 
with  the  Russian  underground. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  is  the  name  of  the  Russian  underground  in 
popular  parlance? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  Its  name  is  NTS,  which  stands  in  Enghsh  for 
National  Alliance  of  Russian  Solidarists. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  you  have  been  in  contact  with  that  underground 
in  the  course  of  the  last  few  weeks;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  That  is  correct. 

Air.  Arens.  Would  you  kindly  give  us  before  we  proceed  with  your 
testimony  on  the  principal  subject-matter,  a  word  of  your  background? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  I  was  born  in  Russia.  I  was  in  the  Cadet  Corps 
during  the  Revolution.  I  left  Russia  in  1922  and  finished  my  educa- 
tion in  Yugoslavia  where  I  graduated  as  an  engineer.     In  1930  I  joined 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  3 

the  Russian  underground  movement  NTS,  and  have  been  active  in  this 
organization  since  then. 

During  the  war  I  was  arrested  by  the  Germans  and  put  in  a  con- 
centration camp  from  which  I  succeeded  to  escape.  I  then  went 
through  the  channels  of  the  underground  inside  Russia  to  fight  against 
the  Communist  regime  and  the  German  invaders. 

I  stayed  there  until  November  1944  and  then  came  back  to  Vienna 
secretly,  was  again  later  on  arrested  by  the  Germans,  and  previous 
to  the  fall  of  the  German  regime  I  again  succeeded  to  get  free. 

Then  I  was  working  with  the  American  Military  Government  in 
Germany,  combating  forced  repatriation  of  former  Soviet  citizens 
who  refused  to  go  back.  Later  on  I  came  to  this  country  in  1947 
and  have  been  living  here  since,  having  twice  since  1947  visited 
Europe  for  longer  periods. 

Mr.  Arens.  Professor  Boldyreff,  you  have  had  executive  sessions 
with  the  staff  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  with  respect  to 
your  identification  with  the  anti-Communist  undergi'ound  from  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain  and  with  respect  to  certain  operations  which  you 
perhaps  would  not  want  to  tell  about  publicly,  but  I  should  like  to 
invite  your  attention  now  to  the  prepared  statement  which  you  have 
this  morning  for  submission  to  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee. 
I  respectfully  suggest,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  that  prepared  statement 
itself  now  be  included  in  the  record  and  that  the  professor  be  per- 
mitted to  give  a  summary  of  the  statement. 

The  Chairman.  The  statement  of  Professor  Boldyreff  will  go 
into  our  record  and  become  a  part  of  our  record. 

(The  statement  referred  to  is  as  follows:) 

Statement  by  Prof.  Constantin  W.  Boldyreff 

The  Western  World  today — willingly  or  unwittingly — digs  its  own  grave.  Its 
present  policy  of  ambiguity,  indecision,  and  half  measures  helps:  (a)  The  Soviet 
Government  to  strengthen  its  otherwise  seriously  shattered  positions,  and  tends 
to  (b)  paralyze  the  development  of  a  spontaneously  growing  process  of  revolu- 
tionization  of  the  Russian  masses. 

There  are  two  psychological  forces  at  play  in  Russia  today:  Hatred  of  the 
regime — revolutionary  stimulus,  and  determination  to  defend  the  country — ■ 
patriotic  stimulus. 

Since  the  revolutionary  stimulus  is  also  inspired  by  patriotism,  it  will  submit 
to  the  patriotic  stimulus  in  the  face  of  a  danger  threatening  the  nation  as  a  whole. 
Hence,  if  the  Government  can  convince  the  people  that  a  war  means  dismember- 
ment to  the  country  and  enslavement  to  the  population,  it  will  have  no  reason — 
other  than  purely  strategic  and  economic — to  fear  a  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Government  knows  that  if  the  people  gain  an  assurance 
that  there  is  no  immediate  threat  of  war,  or  that  this  war  is  to  be  waged  only 
against  the  Kremlin  clique,  the  patriotic  stimulus  will  reinforce  the  revolutionary. 
During  the  initial  stage  of  World  War  II  (while  the  revolutionary  senti- 
ment was  still  dormant  in  Russia)  the  people — believing  the  Germans  to  be 
liberators — offered  them  practically  no  resistance.     (The  Red  Army  fought 
half-heartedly,    soldiers    surrendered    by    the    thousands,    the    population 
greeted  the  Germans  as  their  friends.)      During  the  latter  stage  of  the  war — 
when  the  people  realized  the  Nazis'  true  intentions — they  began  to  fight 
like  lions.      (Forests  were  seething  with  partisans;  the  Army  fought  doggedly 
forging  from  Stalingrad  to  Berlin.) 
The  Soviet  leaders  know  this  and  their  only  preoccupation  now  is  to  create 
psychological  conditions  in  Russia  today,  like  those  which  prevailed  there  during 
the  latter  part  of  the  war.     With  the  complete  isolation  of  the  Russian  people 
and  a  formidable  propaganda  machine  at  their  command,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  attitude  of  the  West  such  as  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  this  does  not  seem  to 
be  too  difficult  a  task. 


4  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

That  this  may  greatly  increase  the  chances  of  war,  does  not  worry  them  too 
much,  provided  it  is  Communist  style.  As  things  stand  now,  that  type  of  blood- 
curdling slaughter,  animated  by  racial  hatred  and  universal  mistrust,  may  not 
be  long  in  coming. 

Isn't  the  timing  of  the  Communist  flagrant  massed  attacks  in  Indochina  to 
coincide  with  both  the  Berlin  and  the  Geneva  Conferences,  a  clear  symptom  of 
how  little  the  Kremlin  masters  are  afraid  of  war. 

The  Kremlin's  greatest  fear  is  revolution 

There  are  other  symptoms,  however,  which  show  how  greatly  the  conspirators 
in  Moscow  fear  a  revolution. 

One  of  such  symptoms  is  the  rash  and  drastic  way  in  which  they  launched  their 
campaign  to  intimidate  the  Russian  revolutionary  organization — the  NTS. 

After  3  previous  unsuccessful  attempts  to  kidnap  responsible  NTS  underground 
leaders,  and  2  failures  in  the  efforts  to  plant  spies  (Bergman  and  Mueller-Khorun- 
zhy)  into  the  organization,  they  decided: 

(1)  To  kidnap  in  Berlin  an  open  worker  of  the  organization.  Dr.  Alexander 
Trushnovich,  head  of  a  Russian  refugee  welfare  organization  and  vice  presi- 
dent of  a  purely  noncombatant  anti-Communist  Society  of  Russo-German 
Friendship,  which  they  did,  and 

(2)  To  send  a  special  man  (MVD  Capt.  Nikolai  Khokhlov)  with  special 
weapons  from  Moscow  to  assassinate  the  same  underground  leader  who  was 
subject  to  two  previous  unsuccessful  kidnaping  expeditions. 

Here,  however,  the  Kremlin's  plans  failed. 

The  kidnaping  of  an  overt  worker  who  does  not  know  any  secrets,  and  the 
attempt  to  silence  with  a  bullet  an  underground  leader —  are  by  no  means  measures 
conducive  to  the  exposure  of  the  underground's  subversive  activities  in  Russia. 

Hence,  their  motives  were  to  terrorize  the  organization.  Only  people  who  are 
nervous  and  fear  resort  to  such  measures. 

The  wave  of  defections  among  Soviet  diplomats  is  another  indication.  Sure^ 
there  is  the  fear  of  purge,  but  in  the  past  a  dozen  of  Soviet  diplomats  returned  to 
face  the  purge.  The  regime  then  was  stable,  today — they  know — it  is  not.  And 
they  are  conscious  of  the  rising  wave  of  popular  discontent. 

Symptoms  of  the  development  of  a  revolutionary  process  in  Russia 

(A)  The  strengthening  of  people's  resistance. —  The  outward  manifestations  of 
the  rising  wave  of  popular  resistance  to  the  regime,  which  started  after  Stalin's 
death  and  intensified  following  Beria's  collapse,  can  be  traced  throughout  the 
entire  expanse  of  the  Soviet  Union: 

(1)  The  passive  attitude  and  general  reluctance  of  the  Soviet  troops  of 
occupation  displayed  during  the  uprising  of  the  East  Germans  in  June  1953 
with  numerous  cases  when  soldiers  and  officers— defying  orders— supported 
the  insurgents. 

(2)  Workers'  strikes  at  the  heavy  industry  centers  of  Samara  (on  the 
Volga)  and  in  Kazakhstan. 

(3)  Strikes,  riots,  and  stubborn  resistance  to  MVD  troops  by  the  popula- 
tion of  the  concentration-camps  systems  of  Karaganda  (Central  Asia), 
Norilsk  (North- Western  Siberia),  Komsomolsk  (Russian  Far  East),  and 
Vorkuta  (North  of  European  Russia). 

(4)  Subversive  activity  of  students'  political  organizations  in  Moscow, 
Leningrad,  Kiev,  Odessa,  Kaluga,  Blagoveshchensk,  and  several  other  places. 

(Rumors  concerning  the  arrest  of  groups  of  students  by  the  MVD  in  the 

big  centers  of  Russia  were  broadly  circulated  among  the  population.     This 

compelled  the  Government  for  the  first  time  to  break  its  curtain  of  silence 

and  publish  reports  about  the  arrests  in  its  own  press,  thereby  acknowledging 

the    existence    of    active    anti-Communist    groups    among    the    younger 

generations.) 

These  are  the  major  and  the  most  publicized  facts.     There  are  a  number  of 

others,  though  less  conspicuous,  but  no  less  dramatic.     All  this  took  place  against 

the  general  background  of  a  marked  tendency  among  the  population  toward 

greater  self-reliance.     Farmers,  workers,  intellectuals —  began  to  act  bolder,  speak 

somewhat  louder.     Churches   became   more   crowded,   with   young  faces   more 

conspicuous  among  the  congregations.     Several  books  appeared  in  Moscow,  the 

contents  of  which — had  they  been  published  only  2  years  ago — would  have  cost 

their  authors  at  least  lifetime  in  prison. 

(b)  Weakening  of  the  Government' s  power  of  control. —  Stalin's  death  and  the  fall 
of  Beria  have  seriously  undermined  the  hypnotic  power  of  Soviet  propaganda 
myths.     The  weird  spell  began  to  vanish.     The  myths  of  the  "indestructible" 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMIVTUNISM  5 

unity  of  Stalin's  loval  disciples  and  comrade-in-anns,  of  the  "invincibility  of 
the  iVIVD"  and  manv  others  were  exposed  in  all  their  ridiculous  absurdity.  The 
people  began  to  reaUze  that  the  monsters  in  the  Kremlin  and  their  bemedaled 
MVD  henchmen  are  but  ordinary  mortals.  ,.  c  j 

The  formidable  3-barreled  machine  of  control  which  obediently  satished  any 
whim  of  the  defunct  dictator,  broke  up  into  its  3  original  elements;  with  the 
mutually  suspicious  apparatus  of  the  administration  (Alalenkov)  and  the  party 
(Khrushchev)  subjecting  the  MVD  to  bilateral  and  jealous  supervision. 

(1)  Weakening  of  the  overall  Government  machine.— This  has  not  only  seriously 
crippled  the  MVD,  which  cannot  effectively  serve  two  mutually  distrustful 
masters,  but  has  also  powerfully  shaken  the  entire  Government  structure  from 
its  verv  summit  to  the  very  bottom.  . 

In  tiie  back  of  his  mind  everv  official,  big,  or  little  alike,  constantly  worries  how 
he  is  to  behave  in  order  not  to  provoke  the  suspicion  of,  and  eventually  vengeance 
from  one  of  the  rivaling  factions.  Trained  to  demonstrate  his  loyalty  through 
obsequious  kowtowing  to  his  seniors  (no  matter  to  what  organization  they  belong) 
and  profuse  glorification  of  the  supreme  leader,  he  is  now  at  a  loss  how  to  meet 
the  new  situation.  Whom  is  he  to  eulogize?  How  is  he  to  display  his  vigilance 
and  denounce  his  colleagues,  higher  or  lower  in  rank,  if  this  might  possibly  arouse 
the  wrath  of  one  of  the  antagonistic  groups.  Thus,  the  system  of  mutual  spying 
has  slackened  considerably.  .  .    ^  •  ,  u     x-^  x 

Conscious  of  the  sentiment  of  the  population  the  Soviet  official  hestitates  now 
to  antagonize  it  verv  much.  In  one  word  he  is  no  longer  as  efficient  a  servant 
of  the  regime  as  he  used  to  be.     His  main  preoccupation  now  is  to  survive. 

(2)  Weakening  of  the  MVD  machine— The  plight  of  the  MVD  is  still  worse. 
The  purge  of  the  pro-Beria  element  is  still  on.  It  has  removed  a  great  number 
of  top,  middle,  and  rank-and-file  officers.  The  old  hands  prefer  to  play  it  safe. 
They  refuse  to  use  their  owai  initiative  and  imagination.  More  and  more  they 
look  up  to  their  superiors  for  guidance.  x  x     •   cix     ^ 

(The  trial  of  the  MVD  spv  Mueller-Khorunzhy  w^ho  was  sent  to  inhltrate 

the  NTS  has  shown  that  had  he  not  been  so  dependent  on  the  instructions 

from  his  bosses  in  East  Berlin,  he  might  have  been  able  to  carry  on  much 

longer  than  he  actually  did.     He  w^as  sentenced  to  12  years  in  jail  by  the 

\merican  District  Court  in  Frankfurt/ Main  in  January  1954.)  _         _ 

The  purge,  the  insecuritv  resulting  from  the  dual  control,  a  clear  insight  into 

the  true  situation  prevailing  in  the  Kremlin  and  first-hand  information  concerning 

the  trends  which  develop  in  the  masses,  and  last  but  not  least,  absolute  and 

hopeless  loss  of  faith  in  communism,  work  heavily  on  the  morale  of  the  MVD  man. 

This  explains  the  unprecedented  treck  of  MVD  defectors  to  the  West.     _ 

(Rastovorov  in  Japan,  the  Petrov  couple  in  Australia,  Khokhlov  in   H  est 
Germanv,  and  a  number  of  others  whose  names  are  still  kept  secret.) 
Exposure  to  anti-Communist  literature  and  leaflets,  which  it  is  their  duty  to 
collect,  study,  and  criticize,  also  affects  the  MVD  men,  particularly  the  least 

corrupt  of  them.  t.   j    a  r^ 

(Capt.  Mikhail  Tulin,  an  ex-political  commissar  of  the  Red  Army,  alter 
exposure  to  NTS  literature,  became  himself  a  convert,  joined  the  underground 
and  finally  defected  when  his  sabotage  of  the  Soviet  counterpropaganda 
measures  began  to  attract  the  attention  of  his  superiors.) 

(3)  Outioard  manifestations  of  the  Government's  weakness.— Co-nscioyis  of  the 
ever-growing  threat  of  popular  opposition,  the  Government  decided  to  embark 
onto  a  policy  of  sham  concessions.  However,  both  the  Government  and  the 
population  knew  very  well  that  the  former  couldn't  give  much,  and  the  latter 
couldn't  expect  much.  A  totalitarian  government  can  go  along  the  path  of  reforms 
only  a  short  distance  to  a  certain  critical  point.  j     ,,     ■ 

Farmers  — The  last  cut  in  prices,  promise  of  more  consumer  goods,  and  allevia- 
tions resulted  in  the  general  slackening  of  the  labor  effort  of  the  people,  particu- 
larly in  villages.  People  decided  that  since  Malenkov  was  so  concerned  about 
their  welfare,  they  might  as  well  relax  somewhat. 

Fanners  began  to  spend  more  time  in  their  own  backyards  and  worry  little 
about  deliveries  to  the  state.  Malenkov's  answer  was  the  mobilization  of 
50,000  "agricultural  experts"  from  the  cities  to  boost  up  production  and 
punish  the  saboteurs.     The  measure,  however,  proved  a  complete  flop  on 

both  counts.  -.t  i     i  a 

Workers  — In  order  to  win  the  good  graces  of  the  workers,  Malenkov  announcea 
an  early  revision  of  the  drastic  labor  law  (as  a  matter  of  fact  the  promised  liberali- 
zation "of  the  labor  law  is  1  year  overdue  now).  The  workers  took  full  advantage 
of  these  promises: 

47769— 54— pt.  1 2 


6  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

In  sprina;  1953,  a  couple  of  hundreds  of  skilled  workers  fresh  from  the  state- 
run  vocational  schools  were  l)rought  to  work  in  a  plant  in  Kasakhstan  Wh.n 
they  arrived  they  found  the  conditions  appalling;  the  wooden  barracks  were, 
old  and  rickety,  the  food  indigestible. 

The  workers  refused  to  go  to  work.  The  administration  ordered  them  to 
go.  1  hey  confronted  it  with  a  set  of  demands  and  stood  pat  Food  de- 
liveries were  stopped  to  them.  They  remained  adamant.  Food  was  again 
issued  to  them  They  didn't  budge.  An  MVD  commission  came  to  the 
barracks  and  threatened  them  with  reprisals.  Thev  reiterated  their  condi- 
tions and  refused  to  work. 

The  MVD  yielded.     Their  demands  were  fully  satisfied,  none  was  arrested 

(Une  should  bear  in  mind  that  strikes  are  strictlv  outlawed  in  the  8oviet 

Union  and  punishable  as  the  gravest  offense  against  the  "the  people    the 

people  s  government,  and  the  state.")  j-    > 

Pr/.soners  — Malenkov's  amnesty  to  prisoners  in  concentration   camps  proved 

lopsided.     It  actually  affected  only  the  short-term  prisoners  who  are  in  a  great 

minority  and  most  of  whom  are  criminals.     However,  this  and  the  fall  of  Beria 

encouraged  the  concentration  camp  inmates  to  demand  concessions 

In  the  camps  of  Vorkuta  more  than  150,000  prisoners  working  in  20  coal 
pits  lowered  their  tools  and  presented  the   MVD  with  a  set  of  demands 

/i  AT^PA''^"'"'^  f"/'f^^t'  ^^•^^-  ^"  ^^6  ^"^'^e  of  9  days  representatives  of 
the  MVD  conducted  daily  negotiations  with  prisoners.  Thev  agreed  to 
almost  all  conditions,  except  one— the  revision  of  the  sentences  and  liberation 
ot  the  innocent.  The  prisoners  refused  to  give  in.  On  the  contrary  their 
resistance  grew  stiff er.  Leaflets  began  to  circulate  in  the  camps,  some  of 
them  bearing  NTS  symbols  and  slogans. 

On  the  lOlh  day  the  MVD  fulfilled  all  the  demands  of  the  prisoners  (re- 
moved bars  from  the  windows  of  the  barracks  inside  the  camps  removed 
nuinbers  from  the  prisoners'  backs,reduced  the  labor  day  from  12  to' 10  hours 
etc.),  but  one  concerning  the  revision  of  the  sentences',  which  it  said  had  to 
be  decided  in  Moscow.  At  the  same  time  it  presented  the  workers  with  an 
ultimatum  to  go  to  work  or  else  *  *  *. 

About  75  percent  complied,  the  workers  from  shaft  No  29  (who  started 
the  strike)  refused.  MVD  troops  were  brought.  The  prisoners  began  to 
not.  Machineguns  rattled;  about  120  prisoners  were  slaughtered  The 
resistance  was  finally  broken. 

^_  Much  later  150  individuals  were  suddenly  arrested  and  thrown  into  the 

isolators     (individual  cells  in  the  punitive  section  of  the  camps) 

Returned  German  prisoners  of  war  who  served  sentence  in  Vorkuta  and 

JNonlsk   (where  320,000  prisoners  went  on  strike  in  Mav  and  June  1953) 

report  that  the  strikers  hoped  that  the  Americans  would  parachute  weapons 

to  them.     Although  they  submitted  to  force,  their  spirit  was  not  broken 

All  this,  and  many  other  incidents  which  took  place  in  Russia  and  particularly 

within  the  Soviet  Army  of  occupation  seem  to  indicate,  that  the  revolutionary 

process  has  begun,  or  is  about  to  begin. 

Prospects  of  the  revolution  in  Russia 

The  revolutionary  process  which  now  develops  in  Russia  is  a  natural  consequence 
ot  the  ideological,  political,  social,  and  economic  bankruptcy  of  the  regime  Hence 
**^^r_«^volution  in  Russia  is  inevitable.  Yet  its  timing  depends  on  various  factors' 
ihe  bo  Viet  Government  is  still  very  strong  and  tenacious  and  will  fight  tooth 
and  nail  for  survival.  But  the  destinies  of  the  revolution  do  not  at  the  present 
moment  depend  so  much  on  the  determination  of  the  Government  to  rule  or  on 
the  successes  of  the  revolutionary  propaganda  and  underground  operations 

They  will  greatly  depend  on  the  attitudes  and  the  policies  of  the  free  world 
For  it  is  the  free  world  who  unwittingly  helps  the  Soviet  Government  to  slow  down 
if  not  altogether  temporarily  interrupt,  the  development  of  a  revolutionary 
situation  in  Russia. 

_  There  is  hardly  anything  the  Soviet  Government  can  do  internally  to  win  the 
sincere  support  of  the  oppressed  masses.  Malenkov  and  Krushchev  are  as  hated 
as  Stalin,  whose  name  has  almost  vanished  from  the  official  Soviet  vocabulary 
There  is  only  one  essential  difference— Stalin  was  feared,  whereas  Malenkov  arid 
Krushchev  are  feared  far  less. 

The  physical  penetration  of  the  Iron  Curtain  or  the  mechanical  dissemination 
of  the  word  of  truth,  are  basically  but  technical  problems  and  their  solution 
depends  mainly  on  the  availability  of  funds  and  equipment. 

The  battle  with  the  MVD  is  dangerous,  costly,  and  obviously  an  exceedingly 
difficult  one.     Yet  it  is  mainly  a  battle  of  wits.     Insofar  this  was  not  a  losing 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMAIUNISM  7 

battle  (the  very  existence  of  the  NTS  and  its  permanent  growth  seem  to  bear 
witness  thereof).  With  the  present  state  of  affairs  inside  AIVD  and  the  ever- 
growing defiance  of  the  population,  the  prospects  do  not  seem  too  somber. 

It  may  sound  paradoxical  but  it  is  true,  that  the  Soviet  Government's  main 
source  of  power  to  control  the  psj^chology  of  its  own  population  comes  from  the 
free  world's  indistinct  and  ambiguous  policy. 

It  is  paradoxical,  because  the  free  world  through  the  very  fact  of  its  existence 
presents  an  everlasting  and  deadly  menace  to  the  Soviet  Communist  regime. 
The  call  of  freedom  is  irresistible. 

Yet  it  is  precisely  the  Western  World  which  provides  the  bulk  of  the  ammunition 
to  the  Kremlin's  propaganda.  Every  equivocal  move,  every  attempt  at  com- 
promise is  readily  exploited  by  the  Soviets  to  present  to  its  isolated  people  the 
"ugly,  hypocritic  face  of  the  weak  and  decadent  West." 

The  West  has  never  stated  that  the  only  thing  it  wishes  is  the  overthrow  by 
the  Russian  people  of  the  hated  tyrants  in  the  Kremlin.  Yet  in  the  absence  of 
such  a  clear  declaration,  how  should  the  Russian  people  know  that  the  atomic 
bomb  and  the  belt  of  military  bases  are  not  directed  against  them — the  people^as 
much  as  against  their  masters,  who  incidentally  will  be  the  last  to  suffer  from  an 
atomic  bombardment. 

They  had  a  very  bad  experience  at  the  hands  of  the  Nazi  invaders  and  Soviet 
propaganda  (practically  unchallenged  as  it  is)  takes  all  pains  to  convince  them 
that  the  West  hates  the  Russian  people  because  of  its  greatness  and  strength 
and  because  it  covets  its  land. 

How  can  the  Russians  gain  the  assurance  of  the  West's  good  intentions,  if  they 
are  perfectly  aware  that  a  lot  of  propaganda  directed  from  the  West  to  their  satel- 
lite neighbors  is  full  of  venom  against  the  Russian  people  and  tends  to  incite  the 
other  Communist-dominated  nations  against  them,  Russians,  and  not  against 
their  common  oppressors. 

These  are  just  but  a  fevr  examples  of  the  things  which  help  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment to  divert  the  people  from  the  course  of  z'evolution  and  enlist  their  reluctant 
support. 

Nothing  short  of  a  revolution  will  destroy  the  Communist  regime  in  Russia — be 
it  without  a  war,  after  the  war,  or  during  the  war. 

The  atom  bomb  is  no  longer  a  deterrent 

Without  the  cooperation  of  the  Russian  people  with  the  Western  World  the  war 
may  turn  into  a  universal  catastrophe  (even  if  no  atom  bombs  are  dropped)  from 
which  no  actual  victors  will  emerge. 

If  through  fatal  blunders  of  Western  propaganda,  the  Soviet  Government 
would  succeed  in  maneuvering  the  population  of  Russia  so  as  to  command  its 
undivided  support  in  the  cause  of  the  defense  of  the  country,  the  entire  Asiatic 
Continent  will  stand  solidly  behind  the  Kremlin  leaders.  The  Communist 
conspirators  will  have  no  reason  more  to  postpone  the  showdown  then. 

With  both  sides  now  possessing  atomic  and  hydrogen  bombs,  it  is  hardly 
probable  that  any  of  them  would  make  use  of  these  weapons  until  really  hard 
pressed.  The  side  which  will  use  it  first  may  soon  find  that  it  has  put  its  own 
chances  of  winning  the  war  into  serious  jeopardy.  For  the  population  of  the  at- 
tacked country,  apart  from  fear  will  be  filled  with  a  just  feeling  of  indignation,  re- 
volt, and  will  for  revenge — its  fighting  spirit  will  rise. 

The  population  of  the  guilty  country — when  exposed  to  atomic  retaliation  (no 
defense  measures,  no  matter  how  effective  can  guarantee  a  100  percent  bomb- 
proofness) — may  come  into  a  state  of  confusion  with  a  section  of  the  people 
blaming  their  own  government  for  bringing  the  calamity  upon  their  heads.  No 
doubt,  such  would  be  the  reaction  of  the  Russian  people  and  the  Kremlin  knows  it. 

Consequently  the  hydrogen  bomb  is  not  any  longer  really  a  deterrent  against 
Soviet  aggression. 

If  any  weapon  is,  it  is  rather  the  Air  Force.  But  it  must  be  capable  of  delivering 
more  bombs  (any  bombs  for  that  matter)  than  the  enemy  to  paralyze  his  industry 
and  ability  to  strike.  This,  however,  requires  a  decisive  superiority  in  the  air. 
Does  this  country  have  it? 

The  real  deterrent  is  within  the  Soviet  Union  itself — this  is  the  anti-Communist 
sentiment  of  the  Russian  people. 

How  war  can  be  averted 

It  is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  the  Western  governments  toward  their  own  popula- 
tion to  win  the  unequivocal  confidence  of  the  Russian  people  and  thus  paralyze 
the  treacherous  designs  of  Soviet  propaganda. 


8  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

This,  however,  calls  for  a  more  outspoken  policy.  The  United  States  shovild 
adopt  such  policy  even  if  some  of  her  allies,  lacking  courage  and  vision,  would 
refuse  to  follow  suit. 

It  is  a  logical  step.  The  United  States  having  already  said  "A"  must  now 
hasten  to  utter  "B."  The  American  "A"  was  sufficiently  strong  to  make  the 
Soviets  understand  that  this  country  will  never  retreat  to  the  suicidal  formula  of 
"peaceful  coexistence." 

The  Communist  leaders  know  that  America  would  welcome  a  change  of  the 
regime  in  Russia,  that  theoretically  this  is  the  ideal  political  goal.  Because  it  is 
still  an  implicit  theoretical  goal,  in  practice — so  far — the  United  States  is  doing 
little  to  attain  it.  But  the  Soviets  are  well  aware  that  the  day  will  come  when 
this  will  become  the  ultimate  objective  of  a  practical  policy.  And  because  this  is 
inevitable,  and  because  when  this  happens  Malenkov's  and  Khrushchev's  days 
will  be  counted,  thej^  may  decide  to  strike  a  preventive  blow. 

But  they  do  not  necessarily  have  to  strike  in  Europe,  even  though  European 
defenses  are  still  so  weak.  The  blow  may,  and  in  all  probability  will  come  in 
Asia  with  all  the  ensuing  consequences.     That  is — 

(a)  confronting  the  United  States  with  the  dilemma — either  to  enter  into 
a  major  Asiatic  conflict,  or  finally  lose  all  influence  in  Asia.  The  latter 
alternative  would  force  the  whole  of  Asia  into  the  Soviet  orbit  and  would 
fatally  injure  the  prestige  of  the  United  States  all  over  the  world,  Russia 
included; 

(6)  retention — at  least  in  the  initial  stage — of  an  ostensible  state  of  neu- 
trality by  the  Soviet  Union  with  all  the  formidable  privileges  of  this  status; 

(c)  invitation  to  the  United  States  to  drop  the  first  atom  bomb  on  say, 

China,  or  Indochina,  or  whatever  other  place  in  Asia,  not  on  Russia.      (There 

hardly  will  be  any  other  alternative  for  the  United  States  but  to  drop  the 

bomb  if  they  get  involved  in  land  combat  in  Asia). 

The  danger  of  war,  and  for  that  matter  the  chance  for  a  revolution  in  Russia, 

have  never  been  so  real.     Yet  the  revolution — sooner  or  later — is  inevitable, 

while  the  war  not  necessarily  is,  provided — of  course — America  acts  energetically. 

The  first  immediate  step  to  take  is  to  break  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet 

Governnient.     This  dramatic  act  will  demonstrate  better  than  any  words  that 

the  United  States  does  not  want  to  deal  with  a  government  of  bandits.     It  will 

also  permit  the  United  States  to  oppose  the  tyrannic  Soviet  clique  with  a  free  and 

truly  democratic  Russian  force.     What  could  prove  better  to  the  Russian  people 

the  true  intentions  of  American  people? 

If,  however,  a  Soviet  provocation  still  comes  in  Asia  (and  chances  are  that  it 
will),  the  United  States  while  fighting  delaying  actions  with  the  help  of  Chinese 
Na,tionalist  troops  (under  no  condition  should  American  sildiers  be  landed  in 
Asia)  strongly  supported  from  the  air  and  sea,  should  launch  with  all  the  might  a 
crushing  propaganda  attack  on  the  Soviet  Union.  But  this  could  be  successfully 
achieved  only  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Russian  revolutionary  forces. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  now  continue  your  testimony. 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Siuce  my  arrival  in  this  country  I  felt  that  it  was 
extremely  important • 

Senator  Welker.  May  we  have  the  date  of  your  arrival,  please? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF,  November  1947.  I  thought  it  was  my  duty  to 
try  to  explain  to  the  American  people  the  enormous  danger  that 
threatens  their  very  existence.  Just  before  I  have  been  speaking  of 
it  when  I  was  requested,  I  feel  that  it  is  my  obligation  now  as  a  man 
who  has  received  hospitality  in  this  country  and  learned  to  admire  the 
people  to  speak  even  when  I  am  not  requested  because  I  have  seen 
things  with  my  own  eyes.  I  know  that  there  is  a  terrific  conspiracy 
against  this  country  that  is  hatched  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  Moscow, 
and  no  matter  how  peacefully  the  people  in  this  country  are  disposed, 
they  cannot  change  the  trend  of  the  events  unless  the  Soviet  efforts 
are  paralyzed  at  home. 

It  is  my  sincere  conviction  that  the  Western  World  -willingly  or 
unwittingly  digs  its  own  grave.  The  present  policy  of  ambiguity, 
indecision,  and  half  measures  helps  (a)  the  Soviet  regime  to  strengthen 
its  positions  which  otherwise  have  been  seriously  shaken  and,  (6)  to 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  9 

paralyze  the  evergrowing  spontaneous  process  of  revolutionization  of 
the  Russian  masses.  There  are  two  principal  forces  at  play  in  Russia 
today  One  is  hatred  of  the  regime,  which  is  the  revolutionary 
stimulus  The  other  is  the  determination  to  defend  the  country, 
which  is  the  patriotic  stimulus.  Since  the  revolutionary  stimulus  is 
inspired  by  patriotism,  the  peonle,  if  faced  with  danger  threatening 
the  country  as  a  whole,  will  actually  be  swept  by  their  patriotic 

emotions.  .  ,  i     ^i    ^ 

Hence  if  the  Government  can  convince  the  people  that  a  war 
would  lead  to  dismemberment  of  the  country  and  the  enslavement  of 
the  population,  then  the  Soviet  Government  wdl  really  have  no  reason 
to  fear  a  war.     I  mean  no  reason  other  than  any  country  would  have. 

If  on  the  contrary,  the  Russian  people  gained  the  impression  that 
there  is  no  immediate  threat  of  war  or  if  they  realize  that  this  war,  if 
it  comes,  will  be  waged  only  exclusively  against  the  clique  m  AIoscow, 
then  the  patriotic  stimulus  will  reinforce  the  revolutionary  stimulus. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Did  you  say  if  the  Russian  Govermnent  had  no 
need  to  fear  a  war? 

Mr  BoLDYREFF.  If  the  Soviet  Government  can  assure  the  people 
that  a  war  that  may  come  actually  will  lead  to  the  dismemberment  of 
the  country,  of  the  Russian  State,  and  the  enslavement  of  the  Russian 
population,  then  if  they  succeed  in  convincing  the  people  of  that  they 
will  have  no  reason  whatsoever  to  fear  a  war  except  on  par  with  any 

other  country.  ,         ^      -n       ■       r^ 

Senator  Welker.  It  is  your  testimony  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, you  feel,  would  not  tell  the  Russian  people  the  truth? 

Air.  Boldyreff.  Exactly  that  is  what  I  say,  it  will  not. 

Senator  Welker.  It  will  not  tell  them  the  truth? 

Air.  Boldyreff.  No. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  it  is  our  obligation  to  impress  the  people 
of  Russia  rather  than  the  Government? 

Air.  Boldyreff.  Exactly. 

Senator  W^elker.  Thank  you  very  much.        .,,,,.        ^, 

Air.  Boldyreff.  The  situation  as  it  is  today  is  the  loUowmg:  ihe 
Soviet  Government  is  trying  to  do  all  it  can  to  convince  the  Soviet 
people  that  the  atmosphere  in  the  world  is  exactly  the  same  as  it  was 
when  the  Soviets  w^ere  attacked  by  the  Germans  actually  when  the 
Germans  wanted  to  enslave  the  population.  They  want  to  create 
a  similar  psychological  atmosphere  and  in  the  absence  of  any  inter- 
ference on  our  part  with  that  propaganda,  with  the  isolation  of  the 
Soviet  people  as  it  is,  and  with  the  policies  of  the  Western  World  as 
they  are,  it  is  not  too  great  a  task  for  the  Soviet  Government  to 

achieve.  „    .  ,     ^  c  ^.x.   ■ 

That  the  Soviet  Government  is  not  afraid  of  war,  a  war  ot  their 
own  type,  a  war  such  as  they  have  started  in  Korea,  or  are  now  con- 
ducting in  Indochina  can  be  clearly  seen,  for  instance,  from  the  follow- 
ing facl:  Isn't  it  symptomatic  that  the  Communists  have  increased 
their  pressure  in  Indochina  twice,  both  times  to  coincide  with  the  con- 
ferences in  Berlin  and  in  Geneva? 

Air.  Arens.  Professor,  what  is  the  Kremlin's  greatest  fear,  ba?ed 
upon  your  observations  and  contact  with  the  underground? 


10  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  Kremlin's  greatest  fear  is  the  threat  of  an 
internal  revolution. 

Senator  Welker.  And  not  massive  retaliation  from  the  atomic  or 
hydrogen  bomb? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  hydrogen  bomb  is  no  longer  a  deterrent.  It 
is  no  longer  a  deterrent  for  the  following  reasons:  First  of  all,  the 
Soviets  possess  a  hydrogen  bomb  as  well  as  the  United  States  and 
both  countries  know  that  the  side  that  will  drop  the  bomb  first  may 
put  the  chances  of  winning  the  war  into  serious  jeopardy,  for  the 
population  of  the  attacked  country,  apart  from  here,  will  be  filled 
with  a  just  feeling  of  indignation,  revolt,  and  have  the  will  for  revenge. 

Mr.  Arens.  Has  there  been  any  significant  revolutionary  activity 
in  the  Soviet  Union  since  the  solidification  of  the  Red  regime? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Certainly.  After  the  death  of  Stalin  and  the  fall 
of  Beria,  the  following  dramatic  events  have  taken  place:  First  of 
all,  you  remember  what  was  the  attitude  of  the  Red  Army  of  occupa- 
tion during  the  riots  of  East  Germans  and  how  numerous  were  the 
cases  when  officers  and  soldiers,  defying  the  orders,  came  in  support 
of  the  insurgents.  Second,  there  were  strikes  at  the  centers  of  heavy 
industry  in  Kuybj^shev  on  the  Volga  and  in  Kazakhstan. 

There  were  riots,  strikes,  and  stubborn  resistance  to  MVD  troops 
in  the  concentration  camp  systems  of  Vorkuta  (North  Russia, 
European  Russian),  Norilsk  (Northwest  Siberia),  Karaganda  (Central 
Asia),  and  Komsomolsk  (the  Russian  Far  East). 

In  Vorkuta,  for  instance,  150,000  prisoners  refused  to  work  in  the 
coal  pits,  and  faced  the  Government  with  a  set  of  demands.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  for  the  first  time  the  Soviet  Government 
yielded  to  most  of  them.  For  10  days  the  strike  was  on,  and  on  the 
10th  day  the  Government  decided  to  give  in  and  actually  fulfilled  all 
the  demands  of  the  prisoners  except  one,  which  was  to  revise  the  sen- 
tences and  liberate  the  innocent  prisoners.  That,  they  said,  Moscow 
could  decide  only. 

After  they  agreed  to  satisfy  the  workers  on  all  other  counts  they 
ordered  them  to  go  back  to  work.  Seventy-five  percent  of  them  con- 
tinued to  riot.  Machineguns  were  brought  in  and  120  individuals 
were  killed.     The  strike  was  broken  but  the  spirit  is  stiU  on. 

The  Chairman.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  will  of  these  people  was 
so  strong  against  this  type  of  oppression  that  they  were  willing  to 
fight  tanks  with  their  bare  hands;  is  that  not  correct? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Exactly  that  is  it,  and  the  German  prisoners  of 
war  to  whom  I  have  spoken  recently  who  returned  from  Vorkuta  and 
Norilsk  said  that  the  prisoners  were  all  the  time  hoping  that  weapons 
would  be  parachuted  to  them  by  Americans.  Of  course,  their  hope 
was  not  realized. 

Mr.  Arens.  Professor,  what  are  the  instrumentalities  by  which  the 
masters  in  the  Kremlin  inidertake  the  control,  not  only  over  the 
people  but  over  the  people  in  the  Iron  Curtain  countries  which  are 
captives? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Well,  there  are  two  ways  of  controlling  the  people. 
One  is  the  psychological  control,  which  is  resulting  from  a  special 
atmosphere  which  is  created  by  Soviet  propaganda,  by  trying  to  en- 
force into  the  mentality  of  the  Soviet  individual  certain  myths  such 
as,  for  instance,  as  was  the  myth  of  the  invincibility  of  the  MVD. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  11 

Mr.  Arexs.  What  is  the  MVD? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  Soviet  secret  pohce;  or  the  myth  of  the  unity 
of  Stahn's  comrades  in  arms.  The  recent  events,  the  death  of  Stahn 
and  the  fah  of  Beria,  have  completely  torpedoed  these  myths  and  the 
spell  began  to  vanish.  The  people  began  to  react.  They  began  to 
act  in  a  more  bolder  way  and  speak  somewhat  louder.  Symptoms  of 
that  could  be  traced  all  over  the  country. 
Mr.  Arens.  Is  the  purge  still  on? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  The  purge  is  still  on,  particularly  in  the  MVD, 
in  the  secret  police,  which  actually  contributes  to  the  weakening  of 
this  service  because  people  do  no  longer  want  to  use  their  initiative. 
They  don't  want  to  use  their  imagination.  They  look  up  to  the 
superiors  for  guidance.  The  unprecedented — mind  you,  the  unprece- 
dented— trick  of  Soviet  diplomatic,  and  I  should  say  particularly 
secret  police,  top  officers,  the  trick  of  their  desertion  to  the  W  est  is 
unprecedented.  You  have  that  Rastovorov  in  Japan.  You  have 
the  couple  of  Petrovs  in  Australia.  You  have  Khokhlov  here.  AMiy 
do  they  run  away? 

We  know  that  before  the  diplomats  were  also  exposed  to  the  dangers 
of  facing  purges  in  Russia — for  instance,  Kamennev,  Maysky,  Krasin, 
Joffee  and  so  on— but  they  all  came  back.  Why?  Because  they 
were  sure  that  the  Government  was  stable.  Today  it  is  the  MVD, 
the  secret  pohce  official,  who  sees  better  than  anybody  else  what  is 
going  on  in  Moscow. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairm,an,  may  I  inquire? 
The  Chairmax.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  You  have  stated  now  with  respect  to  the  fear 
that  the  Communists  have  with  respect  to  Russia  itself.  Does  that 
include  the  fear  that  they  have  of  their  own  army? 

.Mr.  Boldyreff.  Yes,  to  a  certain  extent  that  is  true.  You  see, 
the  3  battle  machines  of  oppression,  that  is,  the  party  apparatus,  the 
administration  apparatus,  the  MVD,  which  actually  obeyed  Stalin's 
every  wish,  has  today  broken  up  into  3  elements,  3  original  elements, 
with  the  party  and^  the  administration's  subjecting  the  MVD,  the 
secret  police,  to  a  jealous,  suspicious  supervision. 

This  in  itself  has  disorganized  the  control  of  the  Government  and 
has  also  produced  or  introduced  a  new  element  on  the  political  scene 
and  that  is  the  arm.y  or  its  top  leadership. 

Mind  you,  all  these  officers,  although  they  are  carrying  gilt-edged 
Communist  cards  in  their  pockets,  are  in  their  present  prominent 
positions,  not  because  of  their  services  to  the  Communist  Party  or 
the  Government,  but  because  of  their  brilliant  record  in  the  war. 
Their  popularity,  and  they  know  it,  and  their  position  of  strength, 
and  they  know 'it  too,  depend  on  their  popularity  with  the  rank  and 
file  Red'  army  soldier  who  actually  is  a  conscripted  peasant,  or  a  con- 
scripted w^orker,  or  a  representative  of  the  most  unprivileged  masses 
of  the  population. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  further  inquire,  I  will 
end  my  interrogation. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead. 

Senator  Welker.  Professor,  is  this  a  reasonable  conclusion?  That 
the  Soviet  conspiracy,  or  the  m_asters  in  the  Kremlin,  are  not  only 
afraid  of  their  own  Russian  people,  but  of  the  many  satellites  that 


12  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

they  have,  and  that  is  one  of  the  major  reasons  why  they  have  never 
moved  on  Western  Europe? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  No ;  I  don't  think  that  they  have  moved  on 
Western  Europe,  nor  do  I  think  that  they  will  m,ove  on  Western 
Europe,  because  they  are  afraid  of  the  satellites.  I  think  that  they 
want  to  do  a  much  more  effective  thing.  They  want  to  drag  this 
country  in  a  major  Asiatic  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  country? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  This  counti7f . 

Senator  Welker.  Major,  or  continuing  small  ones? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  No ;  a  major  one. 

The  Chairman.  Let  m.e  ask  you  there,  Professor,  what  do  you 
think  from  your  knowledge  are  the  chances  of  war  at  this  time? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  chances  of  war  at  this  time  are  very  consider- 
able. I  think  the  danger  was  never  so  real.  It  has  never  been  so  real 
for  the  following  reasons:  The  Comn  unist  regiTte  knows  that  the 
United  States  of  America  will  never  retreat  to  thf  suicidal  formula 
of  peaceful  coexistence.  That  is  clear.  Everybody  knows  it.  Since 
they  know  that  they  also  know  that  theoretically  as  an  implicit  goal 
the  United  States  would  like  to  see  a  change  of  the  Soviet  regime. 
Because  this  is  still  a  theoretical  goal  in  practice  very  little  is  done  by 
the  United  States  to  achieve  that  goal,  and  because  the  Soviets  know 
that,  the  day  will  come  when  this  goal  will  be  lowered  to  a  more  prac- 
tical level  and  become  the  object  of  practical  policy,  and  because  they' 
know  that  this  is  inevitable  and  because  they  know  that  then  the  days 
of  IVIalenkov  and  Khruschev  will  be  counted,  they  may  strike  a  pre- 
ventive blow. 

The  atomic  bomb  i?  not  a  deterrent  because  both  sitk^s  have  it. 
If  any  weapon  is  a  deterrent  it  is  the  Air  Force,  but  then  this  Air  Force 
must  have  an  absolute  superiority.  I  mean  it  must  have  the  capacity 
of  delivering  bombs,  for  that  matter  any  bombs,  on  the  ene.'ny  to  crip- 
ple his  industry  and  make  it  impossible  for  him  to  strike  back. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  when  you  refer  to  bombs  you  do 
not  mean  only  the  atom  bomb?  You  mean  the  hydrogen  bomb,  the 
cobalt  bomb,  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Any  bomb,  even  conventional  bombs,  but  this 
superiority  of  air  force  does  not  exist  today,  still  does  not  exist  and 
the  Soviets  know  it,  so  they  may  strike  a  preventive  blow.  They  may 
strike  it  in  Asia,  not  in  Europe,  although  Europe,  as  I  have  seen  it,  is 
really  incapable  of  defending  against  a  real  attack. 

They  will  strike  in  Asia  with  all  the  ensuing  consequences  and  that 
is  confronting  this  country  with  a  dilemma,  either  to  embark  into  that 
terrific  war  in  xisia,  or  lose  completely  prestige  in  all  the  Asiatic  Cont- 
inent and  push  it  into  the  Soviet  orbit. 

Second,  it  will  per.mit  them  to  retain,  at  least  for  the  initial  stage,  a 
state  of  ostensible  neutrality  with  all  the  enormous  economic,  psycho- 
logical, and  political  advantages,  and  it  will  force  the  United  States  to 
drop  the  first  atomic  bomb  on  China,  on  Indochina  or  any  other  place 
in  Asia,  not  on  Russia,  with  all  the  consequences,  because  it  is  abso- 
lutely clear  that  the  United  States  cannot  win  a  land  war  against  the 
Chinese  on  the  continent. 

Mr.  Arens.  There  would  be  a  Soviet  technical  neutrality  while  all 
this  process  is  going  on? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Exactly,  and  the  United  States  will  be  accused  of 
having  dropped  that  inhuman  bomb. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  13 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire  for  a  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Professor,  would  you  give  us  your  best  opinion 
with  respect  to  whether  or  not  the  Asiatics  generally  are  united  in  the 
Communist  cause? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  doii't  think  that  the  Asiatics  are  so  united  in  the 
Communist  cause,  but  the  Asiatics  are  definitely  prey  to  certain 
psychological  processes  which  result  from  their  past  when  they  were 
governed  by  white  people.  This  the  Soviet  Government  exploits 
tremendously.  It  boosts  up  their  nationalism  and  it  tells  them, 
''Now,  for  the  first  time  for  many  centuries  you  again  are  among  the 
most  progressive  nations  that  are  bringing  order  for  the  world  and 
you  will  fight  those  egotistical  and  selfish  Em-opeans  and  Americans 
who  preach  colonial  policy." 

Senator  Welker.  If  I  may  have  one  more  question,  Mr.  Chairman, 
I  will  be  through. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Could  you  inform  the  committee  as  to  your 
best  knowledge  of  the  number  of  devout  Communists  in  Russia  today? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  think  that  if  I  have  to  answer  this  question 
sincerely,  I  think  that  there  is  none.  Even  Malenkov  and  Khruschev 
themselves  are  not  devout  Communists  themselves,  convinced  Com- 
munists. If  there  are  convinced  Communists  they  are  outside  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  just  because  they  are  convinced  and  fanatic  Com- 
munists and  they  are  convinced  because  they  have  not  experienced 
communism  on  their  own  skins,  they  are  loyal  to  the  government  which 
they  feel  is  theirs  and  which  aspires  to  become  a  world  government. 

Therefore,  it  sort  of  transcends  in  importance  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  which  is  territorial. 

The  Chairman.  Professor,  Senate  Resolution  247  was  recently 
introduced  in  the  United  States  Senate  by  Senator  McCarran  and 
myself.  I  would  like  to  read  it  to  you  and  get  your  opinion  on  it. 
Then  I  would  like  to  ask  you  what  is  the  most  important  thing  that 
this  country  can  do  to  separate  the  masses  of  the  Russian  people 
away  from  this  Kremlin  control  and  destroy  this  international  con- 
spiracy that  is  threatening  the  peace  and  the  security  of  the  entire 
world. 

The  resolution  reads  as  follows: 

(1)  Whereas  it  is  morally  wrons;  for  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to 
maintain  diplomatic  relations  with  the  band  of  Kremlin  international  outlaws 
who,  by  stealth,  and  ruthless  power,  have  enslaved  one-third  of  the  people  of  the 
world;  and  whereas  the  outposts  and  advance  positions  of  this  outlaw  band, 
received  and  tolerated  under  the  guise  of  "diplomatic  missions,"  in  the  United 
States  and  other  countries  of  the  free  world  are  in  fact  nests  of  espionage,  seditious 
propaganda,  and  sabotage:  Therefore,  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  should  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  the  alleged 
Government  of  Soviet  Russia  and  with  the  alleged  governments  of  the  countries 
which  have  been  enslaved  by  the  alleged  Government  of  Soviet  Russia. 

(2)  Whereas  the  tentacles  of  international  communism  are  ever  reaching  for 
new  areas  of  conquest,  and  this  spreading  menace,  can  be  effectively  combated 
only  by  concerted  action  of  the  free  nations:  Therefore,  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  should  convoke  an  internation.il 
conference  of  the  free  nations  of  the  world  for  the  purpose  of  agreeing  upon  united 
action  (a)  to  destroy  the  Communist  fifth  column,  and  (b)  to  resist  further  aggres- 
sion by  international  communism. 


47769— 54— pt.  1- 


14  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMAIUNISM 

I  would  like  to  know  what  you  think  of  that  method  of  procedure 
and  what  is  the  fii-st  immediate  step  that  should  be  taken  to  separate 
the  Russian  people  from  this  autocratic  control  of  the  Commimist 
gang  in  the  Ivremlin? 

^Ir.  BoLDYREFF.  I  think  that  the  text  of  this  resolution  actually 
is  the  first  clear  expression  of  the  step  that  should  be  taken  to  achieve 
the  goal  you  specified. 

The  Chairman.  Wliy  do  you  say  that.  Professor? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Because  I  feel  that  the  break  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Government  would  in  a  most  dramatic  way  show 
to  the  Russian  people  that  the  United  States  does  not  want  to  support 
the  government  of  bandits,  that  it  actually  wants  to  see  them  free. 
Then  when  you  \vill  sever  diplomatic  relations,  the  power  of  the 
traditional  diplomatic  inhibitions  which  today  prevent  this  Govern- 
ment doing  to  the  Soviet  Government  what  the  Soviet  Government 
does  to  the  United  States  and  has  since  its  veiy  rise  to  power  in 
Russia — I  mean  to  say  that  so  far,  because  of  the  fact  that  you  have 
diplomatic  relations,  you  actually  permit  the  Soviet  Government  to 
undermine  you  from  within  hj  fifth-column  activities,  by  all  sorts  of 
other  provocations,  whereas  you  strictly  confine  your  actions  to 
normal  diplomatic  procedure. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Professor,  may  I  inqmre  there?  It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  United  States  Government  by  maintaining  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Soviet  Russia  and  ^\-ith  the  Iron  Curtain  governments  is 
enabled  to  procure  intelligence  information  which  we  perhaps  could 
not  otherwise  obtain. 

"\ATiat  is  your  reaction  to  that  suggestion? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  My  reaction  to  that  suggestion  is  based  on,  I 
think,  quite  reasonable  information  and  that  is,  that  the  information^ 
the  intelligence  that  the  United  States  Government  gets  through  its 
diplomatic  representaj:ives  is  so  negligible  that  it  does  not  actually 
justify  the  maintenance  of  a  small  group  in  Moscow  and  at  the  same 
time  permit  the  Soviet  Government  to  organize  a  number  of  official 
and  semiofficial  Soviet  representatives  which  are  actually  doing  a  very 
efl'ective  job  of  spying. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Is  not  this  effective  job  of  sp^nng  also.  Professor, 
multiplied  by  the  fact  that  they  have  control  of  the  Iron  Curtain 
countries,  in  the  United  States? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Absolutely. 

Mr.  Arexs.  In  other  words,  they  have  numerous  embassies, 
consulates,  legations,  and  international  organizations  in  the  United 
States  and  in  the  other  free  nations  of  the  world  which  are  nests  for 
espionage,  and  sabotage,  and  pohtical  subversion  while  we  in  Soviet 
Russia  have  1  or  2  establishments  which  are  under  close  surveillance 
by  the  Soviets.     Is  that  a  true  statement  of  the  picture? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  That  is  true. 

The  Chairmax^  Then  you  think  this  is  one  of  the  first  steps  that 
should  be  taken. 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  think  that  this  is  the  real  step  conducive  to  the 
acceleration  of  revolutionary  process  in  Russia. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Assuming  that  this  Government  of  the  United  States 
should  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  all  the  Iron  Curtain  govern- 
ments and  undertake  to  convoke  a  conference  of  the  free  nations  of  the 
world  to  destroy  the  Communist  fifth  column,  on  the  basis  of  your 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  15 

background  and  experience  and  contact  with  the  underground  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain,  could  you  tell  us  what  would  be  the  reaction  of  the 
rank  and  file  people  to  such  a  step? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  rank  and  file  of  the  people,  particularly  if 
then — and  I  assume  that  this*  would  be  natural — if  then  the  United 
States  undertakes  to  pass  the  message  to  the  people  in  a  more  effective 
way  than  it  is  doing  today.  I  mean  by  balloons  and  so  on  and  so 
forth.  It  will  create  a  situation  in  the  Soviet  Union  which  vail  com- 
pletely paralyze  the  activity  of  the  Soviet  Government. 

For  a  moment,  supposing  that  from  today  on  the  United  States 
would  start  sending  balloons  with  leaflets,  and  they  are  very  effective — • 
I  know  it  from  experience — ^balloons  to  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  true 
message  of  its  intentions,  and  so  on  and  so  forth,  and  that  could  come 
like  a  tornado  eveiy  hour  on  the  hour,  thousands  of  balloons,  thousands 
of  leaflets,  how  would  the  Soviet  Government,  or  how  could  the  Soviet 
Government,  under  these  cu'cumstances  move  the  population  to 
answer  this  paper  attack  with  bullets  when  they  know  how  the  popu- 
lation hates  and  fears  a  war,  and  particularly  if  it  were  aware  that  the 
population  now  knows  exactly  the  aims  of  the  United  States? 

Then,  it  would  also  show  its  absolute  inability  to  stop  this  rain  of 
information,  rather,  rain  of  propaganda,  the  truth,  and  the  Iron  Cur- 
tain would  be  literally  smashed.  Smash  theu-  Iron  Curtain!  Break 
the  isolation  of  the  people!  Establish  confidence  among  them.  The 
Soviet  Government  wiR  fold.  The  caU  of  freedom  is  irresistible.  The 
only  thing  they  don't  know  is  that  people  here  are  free. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Professor,  are  you  con\'inced  beyond  the  shadow  of  a 
doubt  that  the  rank  and  file  of  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  are 
antiregime? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Absolutely.  I  have  given  you  a  number  of  ex- 
amples. I  could  cite  many  more,  but  the  very  interesting  fact  is  that 
the  Soviet  Government  in  order  to  %vin  the  support  or  the  confidence, 
the  sympathy  of  the  people,  started  a  number  of  concessions.  Of 
course,  the  people  know  as  weU  as  the  Government  that  a  totalitarian 
regime  can  go  along  the  path  of  reforms  only  a  short  distance,  to  a 
certain  critical  point,  or  it  folds.  But  the  fact  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment wanting  to  make  these  concessions  has  shown  to  the  people  its 
wickedness  and  the  result  was  very  unpleasant  for  the  Soviet  regime. 

The  farmers,  for  instance,  spent  most  of  their  tim^e  in  their  own 
backyards  and  stopped  worrying  about  deliveries  to  the  state.  The 
situation  became  so  bad  that  Malenkov  had  to  mobilize  50,000  "agri- 
cultural experts,"  in  quotes,  from  the  cities  to  send  them  to  the  agri- 
cultural areas  to  boost  up  agriculture  and  punish  saboteurs. 

Mr.  Arexs.  When  was  this? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  That  was  in  1953.  The  result  is  a  complete  flop 
of  the  measure  on  both  counts.  We  know  that.  We  know  that  from 
the  official  statement  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  catastrophical  flop  of 
the  plan  to  till  the  %irgin  land,  and  so  on  and  so  forth. 

The  workers  began  to  strike.  You  know  that  according  to  the  law 
in  the  Soviet  Union  strikes  are  strictly  outlawed  and  gravely  punish- 
able as  one  of  the  gravest  oflPenses  against  the  people,  the  people's 
government,  and  the  state.  Yet,  for  instance,  in  1953,  in  June,  a 
couple  of  hundred  of  young  people,  freshly  graduated  from  Soviet-run 
vocational  schools  tried  to  work  in  a  plant  in  Kazakhstan.  Wlien  they 
came  there  they  saw  the  conditions  were  just  appaUing.     The  food 


16  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

was  indigestible.  They  refused  to  go  to  work.  The  management 
ordered  them  to  the  workshops.  They  confronted  it  with  a  set  of 
demands.  The  management  refused  to  give  them  food.  They  didn't 
budge.  The  management  sent  food  back  to  them.  They  didn't 
change  their  attitude.  The  MVD  camt;  in  with  machineguns  and  so 
on,  and  threatened  them  with  reprisals.  They  reiterated  their  de- 
mands. The  result  was  that  the  MVD  yielded  to  all  the  demands,  all 
were  satisfied.  Wliat  about  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  press  recently 
has  published  that  the  MVD,  the  Secret  Police,  has  arrested  groups 
of  students  in  Leningrad,  Moscow,  Odessa,  Kiev,  Kaluga,  Blagove- 
shchensk, and  some  other  places,  accused  for  subversive  anti-Com- 
munist activities  in  Russia? 

This  is  the  first  time  that  the  Soviet  Government  had  to  publish 
such  reports  in  its  own  press  and  thereby  acknowledge  the  existence 
of  opposition  among  the  younger  generation  of  the  population.  This 
actually  happened  because  rumors  about  these  arrests  were  so  broadly 
circulated  in  the  population  that  they  had  no  way  but  to  break  their 
curtain  of  silence. 

Mr.  Arens.  Professor,  this  question  might  be  in  the  mind  of  the 
average  or  certain  American  citizens,  and  I  would  like  to  pose  it  to 
you.  Since  the  Soviets  profess  belief  in  peace  and  creation  of  a  peace- 
ful world  why  w^ould  it  not  be  well  for  the  United  States  to  sit  down 
with  the  Soviet  diplomats  and  work  out  some  kind  of  a  treaty,  or 
pact,  or  understanding  whereby  we  would  have  peace,  whereby  we 
give  them  what  they  need  or  what  they  say  they  need,  and  we  would 
get  what  we  need,  and  then  we  would  proceed  in  a  peaceful  world? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  This  is  absolutely  impossible,  first  of  all,  because 
of  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  Government.  The  Soviet  Government  can 
exist  and  carry  out  its  experiments  only  by  force  of  the  Secret  Police, 
by  totalitarian  measures.  The  fact  that  there  exists  a  section  of  the 
world  which  is  free  in  itself  is  a  deadly  menace  to  the  Soviet  regime, 
and  so  long  as  it  exists  the  Soviet  regime  will  never  feel  secure. 

Mr.  Arens.  Couldn't  we  work  out  a  treaty  or  an  agreement  or  a 
pact  of  some  kind  with  their  signatures  on  it  that  would  be  binding 
on  it? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  don't  want  to  even  discuss  the  value  of  Soviet 
signatures.  We  have  seen  the  value  of  them  many  times.  However, 
let's  forget  that  for  a  while.  The  very  fact  of  a  signed  document  will 
not  e  iminate  a  situation  in  the  world  when  the  world  is  divided  and  is 
half  free,  half  slave.  Do  you  remember  the  words  of  President 
Lincoln  who  said  that  a  state — or  a  world — half  free  or  half  slave 
cannot  exist,  that  it  either  will  become  all  slaves  or  all  free,  and  that 
is  the  law  of  nature. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  an  organized  resistance  movement  possible  today  in 
the  Soviet  Union? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  It  is  not  only  possible;  it  is  developing  quite 
seriously.  The  very  fact  that  the  Soviet  Government  had  to  kidnap 
one  of  the  overt  workers  of  the  organization,  the  NTS,  in  Berlin  and 
send  a  special  assassin  from  Moscow  to  eliminate,  to  kill  an  under- 
ground leader  shows  how  seriously  it  is  concerned  about  the  activities. 

The  Chairman.  Whom  do  you  refer  to  there,  Dr.  Trushnovich, 
T-r-u-s-h-n-o-v-i-c-h? 

Mr.  Boldyreff.  Trushnovich,  that's  right. 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  give  us  some  more  information  on  his 
kidnapping.     That  happened  about  April  13? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  17 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  That  happened  on  April  13. 

The  Chairman.  By  a  double  agent  named  Glaske? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Glaske,  that's  right. 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  give  us,  the  committee,  information: 
further  on  that  kidnaping? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  The  kidnaping  of  Dr.  Trushnovich  was  a  very 
clever  plan  that  the  Soviets  had  in  mind.  It  had  a  double-edged 
blade.  First  of  all,  they  wanted  to  kidnap  this  man  and  pretend  that 
he  came  of  his  free  volition.  Second,  they  wanted  also  to  announce 
to  the  world  that  Trushnovich  lured  and  kidnaped  the  double  agent 
Glaske.  Thus,  they  wanted  to  discredit  the  underground  movement 
in  the  eyes  of  the  world  and  then  they  wanted  to  create  a  halo  of  hero 
around  the  head  of  their  own  double  agent,  Glaske,  and  thereby  make 
it  possible  for  his  wife  and  the  entire  net  of  his  assistants  to  operate 
freely  in  the  Western  Zone. 

They  also  thought  that  it  might  be  possible  later  to  let  Glaske 
ostensibly  escape  and  become  even  a  greater  hero  in  the  eyes  of  the 
West  and  have  a  greater  opportunity  to  spy  for  them. 

However,  this  plan  didn't  work  exactly  as  they  thought  because  of 
the  unreliability,  professional  unreliability,  of  the  MVD,  which  is 
also  a  direct  result  of  the  weakening  of  the  service  w^hich  started  after 
the  fall  of  Beria.  The  kidnapers  have  done  a  very  crude  job,  but 
when  they  brought  Trushnovich,  who  was  unconscious,  to  the  Soviet 
side,  they  informed  their  superiors  that  everything  went  according  to 
plan^ — no  traces  were  left,  nobody  had  seen- — and  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment came  out  with  the  statement  "Trushnovich  came  of  his  owa 
free  will  and  brought  with  him  one  of  the  anti-Communist  leaders  in 
Germany,  Glaske." 

Only  2  hours  later  the  Berlin  police  came  out  with  a  statement 
which  showed  that  the  apartment  from  which  Trushnovich  was 
kidnaped  was  all  splattered  with  blood  and  brought  three  \vitnesses 
who  saw  how  the  unconscious  body  of  Trushnovich  was  carried  to 
the  car  with  Doctor  Glaske  peacefully  walking  beliind,  sort  of  closing 
the  procession. 

Through  this  professional  unreliability,  through  the  crudeness  of 
the  agents  of  the  Soviet  regime,  the  Government  has  been  led  into 
one  of  its  greatest  propaganda  traps  because  it  had  issued  a  statement 
sealed  and  signed:  "We  have  kidnaped  Trushnovich  because,"  they 
said,  "he  is  in  our  hands.  He  came  of  his  own  free  volition."  That 
is  what  happened  to  Trushnovich. 

Now,  you  know  that  Trushnovich  was  an  overt  worker.  He 
didn't  know  any  of  the  secrets  of  the  underground  and  of  course,  as  an 
overt  worker,  he  had  never  taken  any  precautions  for  his  safety. 
They  kidnaped  him,  but  the  leader  of  the  underground,  the  actual 
sort  of  general  staff  worker,  Okolovich,  they  tried  to  silence  with  a 
bullet,  and  that  happened,  because  there  were  three  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  kidnap  Okolovich,  and  the  MVD  has  seen  that  it  is  be- 
coming almost  impossible,  so  what  do  they  do?  They  kidnap  an 
overt  worker  and  they  attempt  to  murder  the  activity  leader  of  the 
underground. 

Logically  it  should  be  the  reverse.  But,  since  they  do  it  this  way, 
it  shows  how  nervous  the  MVD  must  be  if  it  resorts  to  methods  of 
terror,  because  its  objective  definitely  is  to  intimidate  an  effort,  but 
you  cannot  intimidate  a  determined  effort. 


18  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  a  question,  Senator  Welker? 

Senator  Welker.  If  he  has  finished  that  phase  I  wanted  to  ask 
him  one  question.  A  moment  ago,  you  related  how  effective  balloons 
and  the  dropping  of  messages  from  the  free  world  on  Russia  might  be, 
on  the  people  who  seek  freedom.  I  will  ask  you  this:  Do  you  have 
any  knowledge  with  respect  to  the  effectiveness  of  Radio  Free  Europe 
or  the  Voice  of  America  as  it  beams  over  into  the  Russian  people? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  I  must  say  that  within  the  framework,  within  the 
limits,  of  the  official  policies  of  the  United  States,  the  material  that 
the  Voice  of  America  sends,  the  content  of  propaganda  is  not  bad.  It 
has  considerably  improved  as  compared  to  what  it  has  been  doing 
before. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  ask  you  this? 

Do  they  have  many  receiving  sets  that  can  receive  those  messages? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  That  is  exactly  what  I  wanted  to  come  to.  How- 
ever, the  Voice  of  America  is  a  legitimate  radio  station  and  as  a  legit- 
imate radio  station  it  is  bound  by  diplomatic  considerations,  and  it 
has  to  use  only  certain  wave  lengths.  Its  broadcasts  are  jammed 
and  therefore  a  considerable  proportion  of  what  they  say  is  actually 
wasted. 

Senator  Welker.  That  is  true  especially  with  respect  to  Moscow? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  That's  right. 

Senator  Welker.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  you  never  get  that  Voice  in 
Moscow.     Is  that  a  fair  conclusion? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Sometimes  vaguely  you  can  get  it,  sometimes, 
but  very  rarely.  The  point  is  that  what  we  need  is  a  different  thing. 
For  instance,  the  underground  has  a  clandestine  model  radio  station, 
Free  Russia.  This  is  a  black  station  and  it  has  no  inhibitions.  It 
actually  broadcasts  on  Soviet  wavelengths  whenever  it  can  come, 
butting  in,  trying  to  use  the  pauses  in  the  Soviet  programs  to  throw 
in  a  slogan,  and  caustic  remarks  and  a  message,  and  so  on. 

Then  it  also  gives  eight  regular  daily  programs  on  its  own  wave- 
lengths, which  are,  of  course,  exposed  to  jamming,  but  it  then  moves 
to  a  neighboring  wavelength,  asldng  the  hstener  to  tune  to  it,  and  it 
takes  some  time  for  the  Soviet  jammers  to  tune  their  installations  to 
a  new  wavelength.  Thus,  there  is  always  a  margin  of  a  couple  of 
minutes  when  the  listener  can  get  every  word  of  the  message  and  since 
the  messages  are  always  frequently  repeated  anyone  who  really  has 
the  persistence  will  get  the  entire  message  without  fail. 

Apart  from  that.  Radio  Free  Russia  butts  into  conversations  be- 
tween, for  instance,  Soviet  flyers.  You  know  that  when  Soviet 
planes  fly  out  patrolling  Germany,  and  so  on,  they  have  communica- 
tion among  themselves  all  the  time.  They  are  calling  each  other 
giving  directions  and  having  discussions.  Well,  operating  on  these 
wavelengths,  the  radio  can  actually  affect  these  people  and  since  they 
are  sitting  there  alone,  or  2  or  3  of  them,  they  can  listen  to  it  with 
impunity. 

When  the  planes  are  landed,  for  instance,  and  get  directions  from 
the  airport,  they  must  listen  to  this  particular  wave.  If  you  actually 
get  on  the  same  wave,  then  the  Communists  who  sit  in  the  airport 
know  very  well  that  they  can't  do  anything  to  stop  the  man  in  the 
plane  from  listening  to  the  message. 

Dm-ing  maneuvers  the  tanks,  for  instance,  have  great  facilities  to 
listen  to  underground  messages.     That  is  what  Radio  Free  Russia 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  19 

does.  Of  course,  compared  to  the  Voice  of  America,  or  BBC,  it  is 
a  mosquito,  but  it  has  potential  penetrative  power  incomparably 
greater  than  that  of  the  Voice  of  America, 

Senator  Welker.  One  more  question  and  that  is  this,  Professor: 
What  does  the  secret  police  do  to  discourage  the  possession  and  use 
of  radios,  that  might  receive  the  messages  from  the  Russian  under- 
ground or  from  Radio  Free  Europe  or  the  Voice  of  America?  Is  there 
sort  of  police  action  against  radios  generally? 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Officially  there  is  no  police  action  against  radios 
generally,  but  the  radio  sets  that  are  capable  of  receiving  shortwave 
broadcasts  are  not  very  numerous  in  shops  and  are  very  costly.  Thus, 
the  people  who  can  afford  to  have  them  are  those  usually  in  the  higher 
brackets  and  are  more  sort  of  loyal  to  the  Government.  Loyal  is  not 
the  word.  I  should  say  they  are  more  apprehensive  than  the  rest  of 
them.  The  majority  of  the  population,  however,  depend  on  what  they 
call  radio  dots. 

These  are  little  loudspeakers  that  are  fixed  on  the  walls  of  practically 
every  room  in  the  Soviet  Union  because  the  Soviet  Government  needs 
these  loudspeakers  to  make  propaganda  to  the  people,  and  these 
loudspeakers  are  wired  to  the  local  relay  station. 

This  relay  station  actually  gets  the  broadcasts  of  the  big  stations 
like  Moscow,  Leningrad,  and  so  on,  and  then  relays  it  tlirough  wire  to 
the  individual.  If  you  transmit  on  the  Moscow  wave,  then  actually 
automatically  every  individual  in  the  workshop,  or  in  his  home  will 
hear  your  voice  on  that  radio  dot. 

The  Chairman.  Professor,  your  complete  statement  has  been 
filed  with  the  committee  and  has  been  made  a  part  of  our  records. 
We  appreciate  your  appearing  here  this  morning  and  cooperating  with 
this  committee.  We  know  that  we  will  be  in  touch  with  you  and  you 
will  be  in  touch  with  our  staff  for  further  conferences  and  further 
testimony. 

At  this  time  we  will  excuse  you  this  morning  as  we  have  another 
witness.    We  want  to  conclude  before  the  lunch  hour. 

We  want  to  thank  you  very  much  for  your  testimony  and  for  your 
statements  tliis  morning. 

Mr.  BoLDYREFF.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator  Jenner. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Call  your  next  witness. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  next  witness  is  Col.  William  F,  Heimlich.  Colonel 
Heimlich,  will  you  please  come  forward? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  be  sworn  to  testify? 

Do  you  swear  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you,  God? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  do, 

TESTIMONY  OF  WILLIAM  F.  HEIMLICH,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

The  Chairman,  Will  you  state  your  full  name  for  our  record? 
Mr.  Heimlich.  My  name  is  William  F.  Heimlich. 
The  Chairman.  Wliere  do  you  reside,  Mr,  Heimlich? 
Mr.  Heimlich,  Washington,  D.  C,  sir. 
The  Chairman.  What  is  your  business  or  profession? 
Mr.  Heimlich.  I  am  with  the  Gray  Manufacturing  Co.,  a  business- 
man. 


20  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  Proceed  with  the  questioning, 
Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  give  us  just  a  word  about  your  background, 
with  particular  reference  to  the  service  which  we  understand  you  had 
in  the  United  States  Army  as  Chief  of  Intelligence  in  Berlin. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  was  designated  by  Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied 
Expeditionary  Forces,  in  February  of  1945  to  plan  the  intelligence 
phase  of  the  Berlin  operation. 

The  Chairman.  What  year  was  that,  sir? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  1945,  sir;  February  6,  to  be  exact.  We  were  a  small 
team  of  Americans,  later  American  and  British,  a  planning  body  which 
eventually  did  go  to  Berlin,  and  I  was  AC  of  S,  G-2,  or  Chief  of 
Intelligence  for  American  Mihtary  Forces  in  that  city. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  understand  you  were  the  initiator  or  operator  of 
Radio  RIAS  for  the  United  States  Government.     Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir.  In  early  1948 — I  should  say  in  late  1947-^ 
it  was  decided  by  the  authorities  in  Berlin,  with  approval  from 
Washington,  that  we  would  answer  the  vilifications  and  anti-American 
propaganda  which  were  pouring  out  of  the  Soviet  mills  and  their 
satellite  mills,  and  with  that  we  built  a  powerful  broadcasting  station 
m  Berlin  known  as  RIAS  for  Radio  In  American  Sector.  That  is 
now  one  of  the  world's  most  powerful  stations. 

Mr.  Arens.  Since  your  disassociation  from  the  United  States 
Army — what  date  was  that,  if  you  please? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  left  the  military  on  the  1st  of  January  1947  to 
become  Deputy  Chief  of  Political  Affairs  for  the  military  government 
in  Berlin.  I  became  Chief  of  RIAS  a  year  later,  and  I  left  Germany 
as  an  American  employee  in  the  autumn  of  1949 — September  15  or  20. 

Mr.  Arens.  Since  your  disassociation  from  that  activity  you  have 
on  occasions  returned  to  Europe,  Central  Europe,  there  to  acquire 
information;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  When  was  your  most  recent  trip  to  Europe  to  acquire 
information? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  In  1953,  when  I  went  to  seven  of  the  European 
countries  on  the  perimeter  of  the  Soviet  Empire  on  a  mission  for  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  this  Senate. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  you  have  a  prepared  statement  which  you  have 
brought  with  you  this  morning? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  prepared 
statement  be  at  this  point  incorporated  in  the  record,  and  the  colonel 
proceed  to  discuss  the  contents  of  the  statement  in  a  conversational 
tone  and  manner. 

The  Chairman.  The  statement  may  go  into  the  record  and  become 
a  part  of  the  record  of  this  committee. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  of  William  F.  Heimlich 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  wish  to  express  my  appreciation  of  your  invitation  to  me  to 
appear  today  before  this  committee.  I  would  like  to  preface  my  remarks  by 
expressing  also  my  wholehearted  support  of  Senate  Resolution  247,  which  has 
been  introduced  in  the  United  States  Senate  by  Senators  .Tenner  and  McCarran. 
Disruption  of  relations  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  a  necessary  step  to  be  taken  before 
any  hope  of  our  defeating  the  Communist  conspiracy  can  be  entertained. 

Five  years  ago  this  week  the  blockade  of  the  city  of  Berlin  was  abandoned  by 
the  Soviet  Union  after  its  failure  to  intimidate  the  courageous  people  of  Western 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  21 

Berlin  and  to  drive  out  the  western  allies.  The  blockade  which  began  in  the 
spring  of  1948,  and  continued  through  the  grim  winter  of  1948-49,  was  one  more 
move  in  the  continuing  cold  war  game,  a  move  checkmated,  by  the  determination 
of  the  United  States  to  halt  the  spread  of  international  communism.  That  move, 
indeed  the  entire  cold  war  with  its  hot  actions  on  the  perimeter  of  the  Soviet 
Empire,  was  the  result  of  the  grave  miscalculations  which  brought  about  United 
States  recognition  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1933.  That  recognition  gave  respect- 
ability to  a  government  of  hoodlums  and  international  cutthroats  who  seized 
power  and  kept  it  through  force. 

Three  and  a  half  months  before  the  end  of  World  War  II,  I  wa.s  designated  by 
Supreme  Headquarters,  Allied  Expeditionary  Forces  to  plan  the  intelligence  phase 
of  the  Berlin  Operation.  I  was  with  United  States  forces  when  we  crossed  the 
Elbe  River  and  contacted  the  Red  Army  and  I  entered  Berlin  on  the  Fourth  of 
July  1945  and  remained  there  until  the  autumn  of  1949.  The  pattern  which 
Soviet  imperialism  took  in  that  part  of  the  world  could  serve  as  a  model  for  the 
imperialist  ambitions  and  expansionism  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
From  the  vantage  point  of  Berlin,  I  witnessed  the  collapse  and  destruction  of  the 
free  forces  of  Poland,  the  enslavement  of  Czechoslovakia  and  the  formation  of  a 
Red  Government  in  Eastern  Germany  and  Eastern  Berlin.  As  Chief  of  Military 
Intelligence  for  United  States  forces  in  Berlin,  in  1945-46,  and  responsiVjle  for 
the  security  of  those  forces,  I  was  among  the  first  of  the  United  States  Military 
Intelligence  to  be  confronted  with  the  efforts  of  the  Soviet  espionage  apparatus 
to  penetrate  subvert  and  destroy  the  military  organization  and  foreign  policy 
of  the  United  States.  Those  efforts  took  many  forms  and  by  recounting  them  in 
chronological  order  the  pattern  and  objectives  of  international  communism  are 
revealed.  I  might  say  that  Military  Intelligence  then  and  now  was  unprepared 
to  cope  with  this  conspiracy. 

As  early  as  August  1945,  less  than  3  months  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  a 
Soviet  spy  ring  was  uncovered  in  the  secretarial  school  of  the  United  States 
Group  Control  Counsel  (later  United  States  military  government).  German 
nationals,  being  trained  in  United  States  stenograj^hic  and  office  procedures  and 
methods,  were  threatened  and  intimidated  by  Soviet  secret  police  into  reporting 
on  United  States  installations,  commanders,  directives,  methods  and  plans.  This 
was  the  first  of  many  such  espionage  efforts  which  we  found  and  destroyed. 
Members  of  the  Soviet  spy  apparatus,  both  German  and  Soviet  citizens,  were 
found  in  displaced  persons  camps  and  in  the  case  of  the  German  nationals,  in  the 
em})loyment  of  American  military  government.  Indeed  military  government 
itself  had  American  agents  of  the  Soviet  apparatus  among  its  officials  (George 
Shaw  Wheeler  et  al.).  Because  of  the  Soviet  action  in  closing  the  frontiers  of  the 
Soviet  Zone,  we  found  ourselves  almost  from  the  beginning  in  a  besieged  city 
through  which  the  Soviets  could  operate  freely  because  of  the  international 
agreements;  but  where  Americans  were  denied  access  to  travel  in  the  Soviet  Zone 
by  virtue  of  the  Soviet  determination  to  not  honor  its  agreements  made  at  London 
in  November  of  1944,  and  relating  to  the  free  travel  between  the  various  zones. 
In  other  words,  Soviet  agents  could  circulate  freely  within  the  American  sector  of 
Berlin  and  the  other  Western  sectors  whereas  none  of  the  Western  powers  could 
circidate  in  the  Soviet  Zone.  The  result  was  that  German  workers  living  in  the 
Soviet  sector  of  Berlin  or  in  the  Soviet  Zone  and  employed  in  the  Western  Zone 
were  recruited  for  espionage  purposes  by  the  simple  expedient  of  holding  their 
families  as  hostages. 

Soviet  forces  which  entered  Eastern  Germany  in  the  spring  of  1945  were 
accompanied  by  German  "quislings"  who  had  been  trained  in  Moscow  for  the 
purpose  of  Sovietizing  Eastern  German3^  The  plan  was  exactly  the  same  as  the 
plan  following  World  War  I,  which  failed  at  that  time  due  to  the  fact  that  early 
Soviet  Government  lacked  military  power  and  due  to  the  fact  that  there  existed 
following  World  War  I  a  Government  of  Germany  which  was  able  to  cope  with 
the  situation.  Following  World  War  II,  the  Red  Army  was  one  of  the  most 
powerful  military  organizations  in  the  world  largely  because  of  the  $12  billion 
which  the  United  States  Government  granted  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  during  the  war 
years  under  lend-lease.  There  was  no  German  Government  in  1945,  thus  creat- 
ing a  political  vacuum  filled  almost  at  once  by  the  trained  minions  of  the  Com- 
munist international  apparatus.  Among  those  Germans  trained  in  Russia  and 
returned  to  head  the  East  German  Government  were  men  like  Wilhelm  Pieck, 
long-time  Secretary  General  of  the  German  Communist  Party  and  resident  in 
Moscow  during  the  Hitler  years,  and  Walter  Ulbricht,  now  Prime  Minister  of 
Eastern  Germany  and  longtime  Communist  resident  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
remnants  of  the  German  Sixth  Army  captured  at  Stalingrad  by  the  Soviets  had 

47769—54 — pt.  1 4 


22  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

been  brainwashed  and  many  of  its  personnel  returned  to  Germany  as  Soviet 
agents.  One  of  these,  Paul  Margraf,  a  high-ranking  Nazi  who  held  Hitler's 
highest  decoration,  returned  to  Berlin  in  the  uniform  of  a  Soviet  officer  and  as 
Chief  of  the  East  German  police.  He  was  chief  of  all  German  police  upon  our 
entry  into  the  city  of  Berlin.  Upon  capturing  the  city  in  early  May  1945,  the 
Soviet  military  commanders  had  established  a  city  government  made  up  entirely 
of  dedicated  Communists  or  Communist  sympathizers  and  the  Western  Allies 
upon  entering  the  city  signed  a  document  in  the  so-called  Komandatura,  the 
military  government  for  Berlin,  recognizing  all  Soviet  appointments.  Thus 
Berhn  had,  in  effect,  a  Communist  government  from  the  outset  and  until  the  first 
free  elections  in  the  autumn  of  1946  when  the  people  of  the  city  rejected  Com- 
munist government  and  giving  less  than  20  percent  of  the  total  vote  to  Communist 
deputies.     This  number  reduced  radically  at  the  next  free  election. 

Before  elections  could  be  held  in  postwar  East  Germany,  all  non-Communist 
parties  were  destrojed.  Forced  deportation,  execution,  kidnaping,  acts  of  terror 
and  intimidation  made  it  impossible  for  normal  political  parties  to  grow,  for  non- 
Communist  newspapers  to  exist,  for  churches  to  hold  services  or  for  individuals 
to  speak  out  against  the  new  regime.  The  merger  of  the  Socialist  and  Communist 
Parties  in  Eastern  Germany  was  not  recognized  by  the  western  commandants. 

The  organization  of  the  East  Berlin  and  East  German  governments  begins  with 
youth  and  so-called  cultural  organizations.  Children  were  and  are  compelled  to 
belong  to  young  Communist  organizations  where  indoctrination  into  Communist 
ideologv  is  accomplished  in  defiance  of  parental  control,  where  young  people  are 
given  intensely  nationalistic,  anti-Christ  training  and  preparation  for  service  in 
the  Communist  world  militarj^  organizations.  The  propaganda  mills  began 
operating  before  the  last  shot  had  been  fired.  An  example  is  Radio  Berlin  which 
was  captured  intact  by  the  Soviet  and  was  taking  a  strongly  anti-American 
propaganda  line  even  before  Americans  had  entered  the  city.  That  radio  station 
with  its  great  studios  located  in  the  British  sector  of  the  city  was  denied  to  all . 
non-Russian  and  non-Communist  elements,  both  of  the  Western  Powers  and  of 
the  German  state.  That  is  still  true  today.  British  authorities  have  refused  to 
silence  the  station  which  stands  in  the  center  of  their  sector. 

After  the  elections  of  1946,  in  which  a  non-Communist  government  was  selected 
by  the  voters  of  the  city  of  Berlin,  an  intensified  campaign  of  terror  was  started 
against  the  elected  officials  and  this  culminated  in  September  of  1948  with  the 
imposition  of  the  blockade  of  the  citv,  the  expulsion  of  elected  officials  from  the 
government  buildings  located  in  the  Soviet  sector  of  the  city,  and  with  the  deliber- 
ate arrest  and  humiliation  of  American  officials  who  were  visiting  the  Eastern 
sector  of  Berlin  in  the  pursuance  of  their  assigned  duties.  American  officers  and 
civilians,  including  women,  were  repeatedlv  arrested  in  the  Soviet  sector,  assigned 
to  humiliating  tasks  in  filthy  jails  and  then  blandly  released  without  apology 
after  being  paraded  through  the  streets  as  ordinary  criminals.  Repeated  protest 
by  United  States  authorities  in  Berlin  were  ignored  and  such  protests  were  greeted 
with  jeers  in  the  Soviet  controlled  press. 

While  United  States  authorities  in  the  citv  of  Berlin  were  undergoing  the  humil- 
iating task  of  attempting  to  "get  along"  with  Soviet  authorities,  they  were  being 
denounced  in  the  press  by  officially  sponsored  Soviet  newspapers  and  writers  with 
consequent  loss  of  prestige  in  Europe.  Under  official  policy,  Americans  in  Ger- 
many were  forced  to  stand  helplessly  by  and  witness  the  sovietization  of  all  of 
Eastern  Germany,  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia.  The  very  hard  core  of  European 
protestantism,  and  the  imprisonment  and  degradation  of  the  bishops  and  officials 
of  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  Balkan  countries.  United  States  policy  was  such 
that  not  until  early  1948  were  Americans  able  to  speak  out  against  this  soviet- 
ization, this  cruel  expansion  of  the  Soviet  world  through  force  and  fear.  Indeed, 
United  States  policy  at  that  time  was  still  being  influenced  by  Alger  Hiss,  Harry 
Dexter  White  and  others.  Since  1945,  Soviet  and  satellite  writers  and  broad- 
casters have  screamed  their  anti- American  lies  into  Europe,  A.sia  and  South  Amer- 
ica. Nowhere  in  the  world  has  our  "Campaign  of  Truth"  been  successful  in 
countering  Soviet  propaganda.  When  at  long  last,  after  years  of  enforced  silence, 
the  United  States  military  governor  was  able  to  replv  to  the  slanderous  lies 
pumped  dailv  into  the  newspapers  and  over  the  air  the  Soviet  took  the  final  step 
which  was  to  drive  us  out  of  Europe,  the  imposition  of  the  blockade  of  Berlin. 
That  blockade  was  the  most  inhuman  attempt  to  starve  out  two  and  a  Quarter 
million  souls  that  has  been  made  in  modern  historv.  While  there  is  no  parallel 
to  the  magnificent  airlift  through  which  the  United  States  Air  Force  maintained 
the  life  of  the  citv,  there  is  also  no  parallel  to  the  patience  and  fortitude  which 
American  forces  in  Berlin  exhibited  during  that  period.  Had  we  then  compelled 
a  showdown  and  had  we  shown  the  proper  realization  of  the  forces  and  nature  of 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  23 

Soviet  imperialism,  we  might  have  been  spared  the  later  heartaches  of  Korea,  of 
the  Chinese  collapse  and  of  the  threats  to  all  Asia.  The  efforts  of  the  military 
governor,  Gen.  Lucius  D.  Clay,  only  served  to  alert  Washington  to  the  new  peril 
of  international  aggression.  ,      ,  .         .         .    „ 

The  objectives  of  international  communism  are  the  eventual  subjugation  of  all 
free  peoples  of  the  world.  There  can  be  no  other  interpretation  of  the  events  of 
the  past  8  years.  The  first  limited  objectives  have  been  reached.  In  Europe, 
we  have  been  able  onlv  to  deny  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  the  rich  industrial  prize  of  Western 
Germany.  The  Soviet  Union  has  been  able,  through  strikes,  sabotage,  propa- 
ganda, and  acts  of  terror,  to  practically  eliminate  the  states  of  Italy  and  France 
as  active  opponents  of  communism  in  Europe.  They  have  taken  over  the  Baltic 
countries,  they  have  annexed  half  of  Poland  and  have  installed  their  quisling 
governments  in  Eastern  Germany,  in  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Rumania,  much 
of  Austria,  and  have  added  the  rich  Baltic  States — Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Es- 
tonia— to  the  Soviet  Union.  They  have  achieved  their  objectives  in  the  Far 
East  and  it  seems  to  me  that  they  are  achieving  objectives  in  the  United  States  by 
their  attempts  to  divide  and  destroy  American  faith  in  its  own  institutions. 

The  pattern  of  the  Soviet  imperialistic  conspiracy,  therefore,  may  be  seen  as 
follows:  •       1  V 

(1)  Through  propaganda  to  seize  the  cultural  media  of  any  nation  by  sub- 
verting the  press,  radio,  theater,  motion  pictures,  and  magazines  to  Soviet  pur- 
poses. ^       ,         ....         ,     . 

(2)  By  espionage  to  obtain  the  secrets  of  any  country,  not  only  military  but 
industry  and  economic. 

(3)  to  destroy  the  morality  of  a  state  and  its  people  by  denying  them  access  to 
their  places  of  worship.  .       . 

(4)  By  strike,  disorder,  and  terror  to  infiltrate  the  labor  organizations  and  turn 
workers  against  entrepreneurs  in  a  so-called  class  war. 

(5)  To  maintain  steady  military  pressures  upon  the  frontiers  of  target  nations 
thus  compelling  huge  exp"enditures  for  arms  and  diverting  manpower  from  peace- 
ful pursuits  to  the  wasteful  pursuits  of  war  and  eventually  to  destroy  the  target 
nation  either  by  direct  military  action  or  internal  collapse. 

(6)  To  infiltrate  the  political  and  social  body  of  the  target  nation  by  agents 
who  appeal  to  so-called  intellectualism,  to  class  or  creed  differences  and  eventually 
to  place  such  agents  and  dupes  in  positions  from  which  they  may  eventually  so 
affect  the  internal  and  external  policies  of  the  target  nation  that  the  ambitions  of 
the  Soviet  Union  are  served. 

All  of  these  steps  are  clearly  visible  to  those  of  us  in  the  United  States  and  we 
have  countless  examples  of  the  success  of  the  Soviet  planning.  When  the  U.  S. 
S.  R.  was  granted  recognition  in  1933,  it  was  a  nation  that  was  bankrupt  financially 
and  morally.  Following  that  recognition  and  the  prestige  which  such  recognition 
brought,  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  masters  were  able  to  begin  wholesale  purges,  executions, 
and  deportations  that  eliminated  most  opponents  of  the  Kremlin  and  terrorized 
the  rest.  The  Soviet  Embassy  in  Washington  became  a  control  center  for  espio- 
nage and  subversion  in  the  United  States.  There  is  evidence  to  support  the  belief 
that  those  few  disloyal  Americans  who  served  the  Kremlin  are  still  free  today. 
A  study  of  the  Judith  Coplon  file  is  a  case  in  point.  We  have  learned  much 
about  the  Communist  conspiracy  in  the  past  9  years.  But  the  Communists  have 
also  learned  and  improved  their  methods  as  well.  Strong,  militant  underground 
groups  exist  on  both  sides  of  the  Iron  Curtain.  The  Communist  groups  fight  with 
the  full  force  of  the  Kremlin  behind  them.  The  freemen  still  fight  alone 
because  our  great  power  and  prestige  is  shackled  by  our  recognition  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and,  under  international  usage  and  such  legislation  as^the  Logan  Act,  we 
are  prevented  from  helping  forces  which  might  destroy  the  Soviet  Government. 

In  stating  some  of  these  basic  problems,  it  is  my  hope  that  I  have  been  able  to 
direct  the  attention  of  this  committee  to  possible  consideration  of  ways  and  means 
through  which  we  may  meet  this  threat  to  our  civilization  and  our  existence. 

The  Chairman.  Proceed,  Colonel. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Thank  you,  sh. 

Five  years  ago  this  week  the  blockade  of  the  city  of  Berlin  was 
abandoned  by  the  Soviet  Union  after  its  failure  to  intimidate  the 
courageous  people  of  Western  Berlin  and  to  drive  the  Americans 
out  of  Berlin  and  out  of  Europe.  That  blockade,  which  began  in 
the  spring  of  1948  and  continued  through  the  winter  of  1948-49, 
was  one  more  move  in  the  continuing  cold-war  game,  a  move  check- 


24  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

mated  by  the  determination  of  the  United  States  to  halt  the  spread 
of  international  communism.  That  move,  indeed  the  entire  cold  war 
with  its  hot  actions  on  the  perimeter  of  the  Soviet  Empire,  was  the 
result  of  the,  to  m}^  mind,  grave  miscalculations  which  brought  about 
United  States  recognition  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  autumn  of  1933. 
That  recognition  gave  respectability  to  a  government  of  hoodlums 
and  international  cutthroats  who  had  seized  power  following  the 
Soviet  Kerensky  revolution  in  Russia  and  who  held  onto  that  power 
through  force  and  the  terrorizing  of  its  own  people. 

Tlu-ee  and  a  half  months  before  the  end  of  World  War  II  I  was 
designated  to  go  to  Berlin.  I  met  the  Soviet  forces  on  the  Elbe 
River  and  contacted  the  Red  Ai*my,  and  I  entered  Berlin  with  the 
United  States  forces  on  the  4th  of  July  1945,  and  I  remained  there, 
as  I  have  said,  until  the  fall  of  1949. 

The  pattern  which  Soviet  imperialism  took  in  that  part  of  the 
world  could  serve  as  a  model  for  the  imperialist  ambitions  and  ex- 
pansionism of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  From  the 
vantage  point  of  Berlin  I  witnessed  the  collapse  and  destruction  of 
the  free  forces  of  Poland;  I  saw  the  enslavement  of  Czechoslovakia, 
and  the  formation  of  Red  governments  in  Eastern  Germany  and 
Eastern  Berlin. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  interrupt? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  You  witnessed  this  collapse  of  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  so  forth.  Could  you  tell  the  committee  the  pattern 
used?  Did  they  fii'st  infiltrate  these  countries  by  espionage  agents, 
saboteurs,  and  people  dedicated  to  the  radical  Communist  philosophy 
before  the  fall  of  these  countries? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  was  coming  to  that,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  Very  well,  sir. 

Mr.  PIeimlich.  The  pattern  was  not  so  much  that  as  it  was  the 
use  of  their  trained  Quislings,  nationals  of  those  countries  who  had 
been  members  of  the  international  Communist  apparatus  for  many 
years,  and  who  were  trained  for  their  postwar  jobs  in  Moscow,  and 
came  in  with  the  Red  army,  and  there  they  joined  with  the  other 
groups  such  as  the  Benes  government  of  Czechoslovakia,  which, 
through  its  own  determination  to  get  along  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
signed  its  death  warrant. 

So-called  liberal  groups,  particularly  socialist  groups  of  the  cap- 
tive countries,  the  so-called  satellites,  were  used  as  the  dupes  and 
tools  of  the  trained  Quislings  from  Moscow  who  eventually  seized 
power,  and  upon  the  seizure  of  that  power  those  who  had  cooperated 
were  liquidated. 

As  early  as  1945,  the  autumn  of  1945,  less  than  3  months  after  the 
cessation  of  hostilities,  a  Soviet  spy  ring  was  uncovered  in  the  secre- 
tarial school  of  the  United  States  Group  Control  Council  in  Berlin 
that  later  became  the  United  States  military  government. 

Senator  Welker.  What  was  that?  Under  whose  control  was  that 
organization? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  The  United  States  Group  Control  Council,  later 
United  States  military  government,  was  under  the  control  at  that 
time  of  the  deputy  commander  of  the  forces  in  Europe  and  later 
the  military  governor,  Gen.  Lucius  D.  Clay. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  25 

Senator  Welker.  That  would  be  the  Arm}^? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sh".     That  was  the  United  States  Army. 

The  efforts  which  were  made  to  destroy  our  prestige  in  Europe  took 
many  forms,  and  the  objectives  of  international  communism  were 
something  new  to  those  of  us  in  the  field  of  military  intelligence. 

I  might  sa}'^  that  military  intelligence  at  that  time  was  not  prepared 
to  cope  with  this  new  problem,  and  I  have  the  feeling  that  it  is  perhaps 
not  prepared  to  cope  with  it  today. 

German  nationals  who  were  being  trained  in  stenographic  office 
procedure  methods  in  Berlin  in  order  to  fill  the  great  gap  and  to  allow 
American  military  enlisted  personnel  to  return  home,  were  approached 
by  the  Soviet  Union  secret  police — at  that  time  it  was  called  the 
NKVD — and  they  were  threatened  and  intimidated  into  reporting 
on  United  States  installations,  commanders,  and  plans  and  objectives. 

This  was  the  first  of  many  such  espionage  efforts  which  we  found  and 
destroyed. 

Members  of  the  Soviet  apparatus,  both  German  and  Soviet  citizens, 
were  found  in  displaced  persons  camps,  and  in  the  case  of  German 
nationals  we  found  them  even  in  the  employment  of  American 
military  government. 

Indeed,  the  military  government  itself  had  American  agents  of  the 
Soviet  apparatus  among  its  officials,  and  I  need  only  call  your 
attention  to  the  case  of  George  Shaw  Wlieeler  to  back  that  up. 

Senator  Welker.  You  know  of  others  other  than  George  Shaw 
Wlieeler? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  There  were  others. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Because  of  the  Soviet  action  in  closing  the  frontiers 
of  the  Soviet  Zone  we  found  ourselves  almost  from  the  beginning  in  a 
besieged  city  tlii'ough  which  the  Soviets  could  operate  freely  because 
of  the  international  agreements,  but  where  Americans  were  denied 
access  to  travel  in  the  Soviet  Zone  by  virtue  of  the  Soviet  determination 
not  to  honor  the  agreements  relative  to  travel  which  had  been  entered 
into  in  I^ondon  in  the  fall  of  1944.  In  other  words,  Soviet  agents 
could,  and  did,  and  do  freely  circidate  within  the  American  sector  of 
Berlin  and  the  other  western  sectors  whereas  none  of  the  western 
powers  are  able  to  move  in  the  Soviet  Zone. 

The  plan  which  the  Soviet  Union  had  for  the  takeover  of  Eastern 
Germany  in  1945  was  almost  exactly  the  plan  which  had  been  con- 
templated at  the  close  of  the  First  World  War.  The  difference  was 
that  the  Soviet  Government  had  at  its  disposal  in  1945  one  of  the 
world's  most  powerful  military  forces,  a  force  which  had  largely  been 
built  up  through  our  nearly  $12  billion  worth  of  lend-lease  equipment. 
Also,  in  1945  there  was  no  German  government  in  Eastern  Germany. 
In  other  words,  there  was  created  a  political  vacuum  which  the 
Communist  apparatus  immediately  filled. 

Among  those  Germans  trained  in  Russia  and  returned  to  head  the 
East  German  government  were  men  like  Wilhelm  Pieck,  who  was 
longtime  secretary  general  of  the  German  Communist  Party  and  a 
resident  in  Moscow  during  the  Hitler  years,  and  Walter  Ulbricht, 
now  Prime  Minister  of  Eastern  Germany  and  a  longtime  Communist 
resident  in  the  Soviet  Union,  one  who  at  the  conclusion  of  the  First 
World  War  actually  stole  a  ship  belonging  to  the  German  Government 
and  took  it  to  Russia  as  a  present  for  Lenin. 


26  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  remnants  of  the  Sixth  German  Aj-my  which  were  captured  at 
Stalingrad  were  brainwashed,  and  many  of  its  personnel  returned  to 
Germany  as  Soviet  agents.  Indeed,  one  of  these,  Paul  Margraf,  a 
high-ranking  Nazi  who  held  Hitler's  highest  decoration,  returned  to 
Berlin  in  the  uniform  of  a  Soviet  major  and  became  chief  of  the  East 
German  police.  He  was  chief  of  all  German  police  upon  our  entry 
into  the  city  of  Berlin. 

Now,  upon  the  capture  of  the  city  in  early  May  of  1945  the  Soviet 
military  commanders  had  established  a  city  government  made  up 
entirely  of  dedicated  Communists,  as  I  pointed  out,  and  when  the 
Allies  came  in  the  western  commandants,  the  French,  British,  and 
Americans,  were  asked  to  sign  a  document  accepting  the  government 
appointed  by  the  Russians. 

We  did  so,  and  this  caused  us  untold  trouble  for  the  next  18  months 
or  until  the  first  free  election  could  be  held  in  the  city  of  Berlin,  when 
the  people  of  that  city  rejected  communism. 

Before  elections  could  be  held  in  Eastern  Germany  all  non-Com- 
munist parties  were  destroyed.  Forced  deportations,  executions, 
kidnapings,  acts  of  terror  and  intimidation  made  it  impossible  for 
normal  political  parties  to  grow,  for  non-Communist  newspapers  to 
exist,  for  churches  to  hold  services,  or  for  individuals  to  speak  out 
against  the  new  regime. 

The  merger  of  the  old  German  Socialist  Party  and  the  new  Com- 
munist Party  into  a  so-called  United  Party  was  a  shotgun  wedding 
not  recognized  by  the  western  commandants. 

The  organization  of  the  East  Berlin  and  East  German  governments 
begins  with  youth  and  so-calied  cultural  organizations.  Children 
were,  and  are,  compelled  to  belong  to  young  Communist  organizations 
where  indoctrination  into  Communist  ideology  is  accomplished  in 
defiance  of  parental  control,  where  young  people  are  given  intense 
nationalistic  antichrist  training  and  preparation  for  service  in  the 
Communist  world  military  organizations. 

The  propaganda  mills  began  operating  in  Eastern  Germany  and 
eastern  Berlin  even  before  the  Americans  arrived.  An  example  is 
Radio  Berlin,  which  was  captured  intact  by  the  Soviets  and,  inci- 
dentally, the  Soviets  even  retained  all  of  the  German  personnel, 
denazified  them  on  the  spot,  and  they  have  continued  to  work  for 
the  Communists.  That  radio  station,  with  its  great  studios  among 
the  finest  in  the  world,  is  located  in  the  British  sector  of  Berlin  and 
is  denied  to  all  non-Russian  and  non-Communist  elements,  both  of 
the  Western  Powers  and  of  the  new  German  state.  That  is  still  true 
today.  British  authorities  have  refused  to  silence  the  station,  which 
stands  in  the  center  of  their  sector  even  today. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  may  I  interpose  this  question:  When  you 
were  chief  of  Radio  RIAS  were  you  under  any  pressure  by  Com- 
munists or  pro-Communist  forces  yourself? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Well,  yes.  We  were  under  extreme  pressure. 
There  were  threats  made  upon  my  life  and  threats  made  upon  the 
lives  of  those  German  assistants  who  were  the  key  personnel  of  the 
station.  There  were  attempts  made  to  kidnap  my  commentator, 
which  were  frustrated  thi'ough  the  action  of  American  military  police. 
I  had  two  reporters  who  were  very  badly  beaten,  so  badly  beaten  they 
had  to  be  hospitalized  when  the  great  Communist  putsch  took  place 
in  the  city  hall  of  Berlin  when  we  were  driven  out  of  the  eastern  sector 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  27 

of  the  city,  which  contained  the  city  hall.  My  station  was  jammed 
continuously.  I  was  attacked  in  the  press.  Some  of  the  attacks 
were  very  amusing;  some  of  them  were  less  amusing.  And,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  I  felt  many  of  the  pressures  on  my  own  side  of  the 
Iron  Curtain  as  well  as  from  the  other  side. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  feel  that  your  disassociation  from  Radio 
RIAS  was  in  any  sense  because  of  pro-Communist  pressures  on  this 
side  of  the  Iron  Curtain? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  am  convinced  of  one  thing,  sir,  and  that  is  that 
Radio  RIAS  was  a  powerful  weapon  for  the  free  world  until  the  fall  of 
1949,  by  its  militant  and  determined  and  informed  attacks  upon  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.,  and  upon  the  Communist  international  apparatus,  attacks 
which  did  not  always  have  the  approval  of  my  superiors  in  Bad 
Godesberg  and  in  Washington.  I  feel  that  the  radio  station  no 
longer  has  the  same  spirit  that  it  had  at  that  time  when  we  were  said 
by  General  Clay  to  have  performed  an  outstanding  mission  foi*  free 
peoples  everywhere. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  can  you  compromise  with  the  Kremlin? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  It  is  impossible  to  compromise  with  a  cons;iirary  of 
the  sort  with  which  we  are  faced.  It  is  like  trying  to  compromise  with 
a  fire  that  is  burning  your  house  down.     You  have  to  put  it  out. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  first  step,  in  your  opinion,  to  try  to  di-ive 
a  wedge  between  the  Ki'emlin  and  the  people  whom  the  Kreml'n  has 
enslaved? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  I  believe  that  there  can  be  no  consideration  of  any 
other  step  other  than  the  dissolving  of  our  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  The  pattern  of  the  Soviet  imperialistic  conspiracy 
takes  six  forms,  which  I  would  like  to  enumerate  for  you. 

One,  through  propaganda  and  quasi-legal  methods,  to  seize  the 
cultural  media  of  any  target  nation  by  subverting  the  press,  the  radio, 
theater,  motion  picture,  and  magazines  to  Soviet  purposes.  It  is  a 
type  of  national  brainwashing. 

Two,  by  espionage,  to  obtain  the  secrets  of  any  country — military, 
economic,  and  industrial. 

Three,  to  destroy  the  morality  of  a  state  and  its  people  by  denying 
them  access  to  their  places  of  worship. 

Four,  by  strike,  disorder,  and  terror,  to  infiltrate  the  labor  organiza- 
tions and  to  turn  workers  against  entrepreneurs  in  so-called  class 
wars. 

Five,  to  maintain  steady  military  pressures  upon  the  frontiers  of  a 
target  nation,  thus  compelling  huge  expenditures  for  arms  and  divert- 
ing manpower  from  peaceful  pursuits  to  the  wasteful  pursuits  of  war, 
and  eventually  to  destroy  the  target  nation  either  by  direct  military 
control  or  internal  collapse. 

And  finally,  sixth,  to  infiltrate  the  political  and  social  body  of  the 
target  nation  by  agents  who  appeal  to  so-called  intellectualism  and  to 
class  or  creed  differences,  and  eventually  to  place  such  agents  and 
dupes  in  positions  from  which  they  may  eventually  so  affect  the 
internal  and  external  policies  of  the  target  nation  that  the  ambitions 
of  the  Soviet  Union  are  fulfilled  and  that  nation  is  destroyed. 


28  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

It  is  possible,  of  course,  to  forestall  most  of  these  attempts,  most 
of  these  efforts,  but  it  requires  an  enlightened  determination  and  a 
kind  of  hardboiled  realization  of  the  facts  of  political  life. 

The  Chairman.  Colonel,  you  are  acquainted  with  Senate  Resolu- 
tion 247? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  that  is  one  of  the  first  and  most 
essential  things  that  this  country  could  do  to  bring  about  what  you 
have  been  testifying  about  here  today,  sir? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Sir,  I  think  that  is  the  most  important  single  action 
which  this  country  can  take  at  this  time. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  Colonel,  you  can't  stay  in  the 
middle  of  the  road  when  you  are  dealing  with  a  bandit  conspiracy  that 
is  out  to  overthrow  and  destroy  not  only  your  country  but  the  world? 
Is  that  correct? 

ATr.  Heimlich.  That  is  quite  true. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  the  middle  of  the  road  is  a  darned 
good  place  to  get  hit. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  That  is  a  very  good  way  of  putting  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Would  you  allow  me  a  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  I  notice  you  say  in  your  statement  that  the 
Soviet  Embassy  in  Washington  became  a  control  center  for  espionage 
and  subversion  in  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  That  is  your  conclusion  based  upon  your  knowl- 
edge and  your  experience? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  And  what  you  have  learned  here  in  the  United 
States? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  that  the  press  has  made  that 
perfectly  obvious  to  all  of  us  with  publication  of  trials  such  as  that 
of  Judith  Coplon  and  others,  that  there  was  a  direct  connection,  there 
was  and  probably  still  is  a  direct  connection  between  the  espionage 
attempts  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  subversion  that  continues  inside 
our  own  Government,  and  the  leadership  that  is  exercised  through  the 
Soviet  Embassy. 

Senator  Welker.  There  is  nothing  we  can  do  about  it  at  the 
present,  under  the  present  diplom.atic  system? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Under  the  present  system,  no,  sir.  I  think  that 
the  only  thing  we  can  do  is  to  take  such  steps  as  are  necessary  to 
break  off  our  diplomatic  relations  and  to  expel  these  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  are  the  objectives  of  international  communism? 

Mr.  Heimlich.  The  objectives  of  international  communism  are  the 
eventual  subjugation  of  all  free  peoples  of  the  world.  There  can  be 
no  other  interpretation  of  the  events  of  the  past  8  years,  and  the  first 
limited  objectives  have  been  reached.  In  Europe  we  have  been  only 
able  to  deny  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  their  principal  target,  which  was  the 
rich  industrial  prize  of  Western  Germany.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there 
is  a  song  sung  by  the  new  so-called  East  German  People's  Army, 
which  says,  in  effect,  "Today  we  water  our  horses  in  the  Oder; 
tomorrow  we'll  water  them  in  the  Rhine." 

The  Soviets  have  taken  over  the  Baltic  countries,  they  have 
annexed  to  themselves  the  Baltic  countries  and  half  of  Poland,  they 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  29 

have  destroyed  Czechoslovakia,  and  Czechoslovakia  today  is  suffering 
to  a  degree  which  makes  the  Nazi  occupation  a  most  pleasant  memory. 

They  have  subjugated  the  Balkan  countries,  they  have  intimidated 
and  jailed  and  tortured  the  priests  of  the  Catholic  Church,  they  have, 
to  all  effects,  destroyed  the  hard  core  of  world  Protestantism  which 
is  the  18  million  Protestants  in  Eastern  Germany,  they  have  achieved 
their  objectives  in  the  Far  East,  at  least  their  intermediate  objectives, 
and,  according  to  yesterday's  and  today's  press,  it  looks  very  much 
as  though  they  are  well  on  the  way  to  achieving  those  objectives  in 
our  own  hemisphere  in  South  America. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  any  further  questions? 

If  not,  Colonel,  we  want  to  thank  you  for  your  cooperation.  This 
is  only  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  hearings  to  encompass  this  problem 
that  confronts  this  Nation.  We  appreciate  your  cooperation,  and  we 
want  to  be  in  contact  with  you  in  the  future  to  assist  and  aid  this 
committee. 

Mr.  Heimlich.  Thank  you,  sir. 

The  Chairman,  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  committee  will  stand  recessed. 

(Whereupon,  at  11:55  a.  m.,  the  committee  was  recessed,  subject 
to  the  call  of  the  Chair.) 


47769— 54— pt.  1- 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,  MAY  27,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 

Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws, 

OF  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10:15  a.  m.,  in  room 
457,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman  of 
the  subcommittee)  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Jenner,  Welker,  and  Johnston. 
Also    present:  Richard    Arens,    special    counsel;    and    Frank    W. 
Schroeder  and  Edward  R.  Duffy,  professional  staff  members. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Will  you  be  sworn  to  testify?     Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony 
you  give  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 
Mr.  Hunter.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  KENT  A.  HUNTER,  1026  16TH  STREET  NW.,  WASH- 
INGTON, D.  C. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  state  your  full  name  for  our  record? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Kent  A.  Hunter,  H-u-n-t-e-r,  1026  16th  Street  NW. 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  your  business  or  profession? 

Mr.  Hunter.  At  the  present  time  I  have  an  organization  called 
Facts,  Evaluated  that  is  devoted  to  the  business  of  getting  answers  to 
questions.  For  35  years  before  that  I  have  been  a  newspaperman. 
In  between  that  35  years  as  a  newspaperman  I  have  been  an  officer 
in  the  Army,  Reserve  and  Active,  World  Wars  I  and  II,  part  of  the 
time  in  intelligence,  part  of  the  time  in  field  artillery,  and  part  of  the 
time  in  staff  work,  but  the  point  that  I  would  like  to  make  is  that  none 
of  the  material  that  I  bring  out  here  was  gathered  as  an  intelligence 
officer,  but  as  a  newspaperman. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words  you  are  here  as  a  newspaperman, 
not  as  an  intelligence  officer? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  your  testimony  just  based  on  newspaper 
accounts,  or  is  it  based  on  your  own  individual  research,  or  what 
are  your  qualifications  for  your  testimony  here  this  morning? 

Air.  Hunter.  I  have  been  in  4  continents  and  17  countries,  most 
recently  in  North  Africa.  That  was  last  February.  I  have  been 
since  192!  a  very  active  follower  on  newspaper  assignmeats,  particu- 
larly of  the  Communist  and  other  subversive  movements. 

31 


32  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  That  was  your  special  assignment  for  35  years? 

Mr.  Hunter.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  For  Hearst  most  of  the  time? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Largely  for  the  Hearst  newspapers. 

The  Chairman.  Proceed  with  the  questions. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Hunter,  you  have  a  prepared  statement  which 
you  have  for  submission  to  the  committee? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  su*. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  pre- 
pared statement  of  Mr.  Hunter  be  at  this  point  incorporated  in  the 
record  and  that  Mr.  Hunter  proceed  to  speak  extemporaneously 
from  his  notes. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  so  ordered. 

(The  statement  referred  to  is  as  follows:) 

Statement  of  Kent  A.  Hunter 

Mr.  Chairman  and  gentlemen,  never  has  the  Nation  faced  greater  danger — 
not  from  the  power  of  the  underground  enemy,  but  from  the  faihire  of  a  great 
mass  of  our  people  to  recognize  the  skin-rash  of  local  and  domestic  radicalism 
as  the  outcropping  of  the  international  Communist  cancer  rooted  in  the  Kremlin. 

Not  to  qualify  as  an  expert,  but  to  give  the  committee  something  upon  which 
to  evaluate  my  testimonv,  let  me  identifv  myself.  My  name  is  Kent  Hunter. 
I  live  at  1026  16th  Street  NW.,  Washington,  D.  C.  I  was  born  February  7,  1892, 
at  Omaha,  Nebr.  I  am  a  third  generation  newspaperman,  or  was  until  I  estab- 
lished Facts,  Evaluated,  a  research  organization  specializing  in  foreign,  economic, 
and  political  fact-finding,  on  April  15  of  this  year.  I  am  a  sixth  generation' 
American. 

Background  for  that  organization  is  36  years  of  newspaper  experience,  in  which 
I  have  visited  4  continents  and  17  countries.  I  have  cumulative  military  service 
over  20  years,  with  retirement  pay  as  a  colonel,  dating  from  December  31,  1952. 
My  mihtary  service  took  me  to  Europe  in  both  World  War  I  and  World  War  II. 
I  have  the  Silver  Star  with  two  Oak  Leaf  Clusters,  the  Legion  of  Merit  and  the 
Bronze  Star.  My  commissions  have  been  in  field  artillery,  military  intelligence 
and  as  a  military  specialist  on  the  staffs  of  Generals  Drum,  Lear,  Fredendall  and 
Patton  in  World  War  II. 

In  both  newspaper  and  military  fact-finding  assignments  I  have  studied  com- 
munism and  subversive  activities.  The  studied  opinions  given  to  the  committee 
today  are  those  of  an  American  with  an  unswerving  belief  in  our  form  of  govern- 
ment, rather  than  of  an  individual  who  espoused  an  alien  ideology  and  "discovered 
the  flag  and  Constitution"  only  after  expulsion  by  the  alien  organization  or  after 
disillusionment  as  to  the  nutritative  values  of  the  forage  in  the  Red  pasture. 

I  have  not  cited  sources  in  today's  presentation.  I  will  be  glad  to  inform  the 
committee  however,  of  those  sources,  in  executive  session. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  world  communism — the  Third  International,  the 
Cominform,  and  the  Kremlin  group  of  Red  Fascists — has  one  objective  and  sec- 
tional phases  for  planned  attainment. 

The  thousands  of  pages  of  the  Communist  bibliography — Marx,  Engels,  Lenin, 
Stalin  and  the  lesser  lights  clearly  define  that  one  objective  as  world  socialism, 
with  communism  as  an  intermediate  step. 

Initially  the  first  growth  of  communism  was  radicalism  within  the  structure  of 
nations.  It  failed,  dismally,  prior  to  World  War  I,  because  of  jealousies,  national 
limitations  of  language  and  cohesive  movement. 

The  first  phase— gaining  of  a  national  base  from  which  to  operate — came  not 
with  the  overthrow  of  czarist  Russia.  That  had  already  happened.  What  the 
Bolsheviks  overthrew  in  the  closing  months  of  World  War  I  was  the  Kerensky 
government,  whose  aim  was  the  establishment  of  a  democratic  form  of  government 
based  on  English  parliamentary  procedure. 

The  second  phase — consolidation  of  Russia  under  Communist  control  came  in 
the  confused  economic,  political,  and  power-play  interval  before  World  War  II. 

The  third  phase,  building  up  of  buffer  satellites,  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black 
Sea,  and  even  to  "warm-water  ports"  on  the  Adriatic,  followed  World  War  II 
and  gave  the  &emlin  crew  her  satellite  defense  to  the  West. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  33 

Phase  four,  the  drive  for  all  of  Asia  took  form  during  and  subsequent  to  World 
War  II.  Only  a  fringe  mopup,  as  the  Kremlin  sees  it,  remains  to  complete  the 
Asiatic  conquest. 

Phase  five  is  Africa,  raw  material  base  for  industrial  Europe. 

The  final  phase  is  capture  of  Latin  America,  storehouse  of  raw  materials  for  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  as  a  prelude  to  economic  strangulation,  in  preference  to  an 
atomic  war,  to  destroy  these  United  States. 

Phase  five  is  already  underway,  and  South  America  is  even  now  feeling  the 
infiltration  and  propaganda  stages  of  Kremlin  action. 

This  timetable  for  disaster  is  not  just  a  sequence  of  words  pieced  together  by  an 
individual.     As  a  famous,  though  frustrated  American  once  said: 

"Let's  look  at  the  record." 

The  trouble  with  most  of  us  in  America  is  that  we  seldom  think  things  through. 
The  millions  of  words  printed  about  communism  in  the  United  States  since  we 
first  began  to  document  the  record  after  World  War  I  have,  perhaps,  served  more 
to  confuse  rather  than  to  clarify  the  issues. 

We  haven't  been  able  to  see  the  forest  because  of  the  trees. 

Hiss  and  Browder,  and  Foster,  and  Whittaker  Chambers  and  the  other  little 
pawns  of  domestic  subversion  have  had  the  headlines  while  the  key  pieces  on  the 
world  chessboard,  safe  behind  the  Kremlin  walls,  have  been  comparatively  free 
to  plot  and  plan  the  theft  of  continents  from  the  orbit  of  the  free  world. 

The  country  which  shows  on  the  world  map  as  Russia  must  be  studied  against 
the  backdrop'of  history  before  the  ruthless  brutaUty  of  the  KremUn  despots  can 
be  understood. 

As  early  as  the  second  century  the  Goths  from  the  Baltic  invaded  the  territory 
east  of  the  Carpathian  mountains  and  in  the  upper  basins  of  the  Vistula,  Pripet, 
Dneiper,  Dvina,  Dniester  and  Southern  Bug  rivers. 

Two  hundred  years  later  the  Huns,  under  Attila,  incorporated  the  Slavs  into 
the  Hunnish  Empire.    That  era  passed  with  the  death  of  Attila. 

The  Scandinavian  Varangers,  or  warrior-traders,  were  called  in  by  the  Slav 
cities  to  defend  them,  and  acquired  power  for  over  a  hundred  years. 

The  Slavs  began  to  federate,  and  spread  to  the  lower  Dnieper  before  the  Tartar 
invasion  in  1228  and  it  was  not  until  1380  that  the  Mongols  were  defeated. 

Russia  as  a  nation,  began  to  have  a  recorded  history  from  1251 — the  map 
accompanying  this  presentation,  visualizes  the  areas  and  eras  of  expansion  for 
the  next  700  years — until  1951.     It  was  prepared  by  the  Library  of  Congress. 

The  backdrop,  therefore,  is  one  of  constant  wars,  never-ending  intrigue,  revolu- 
tions, and  eventual  uprisings  of  the  people  to  effect  change.  It  was  such  a  change, 
such  an  uprising,  the  result  of  plotting,  which  ended  the  regime  of  the  Czars.  It 
is  no  military  secret  that  Lenin,  Trotsky,  »nd  the  early  Bolshevik  leaders  were 
smuggled  into  Moscow  by  a  coup  financed  by  the  Kaiser's  Imperial  German  Staff, 
in  1918,  to  create  revolution,  overthrow  the  Russian  Imperial  House,  take  the 
Russian  military  force  out  of  the  war,  to  leave  Germany  free  to  fight  on  a  single 
front  in  the  West.  For  Germany  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  came  too  late,  and 
in  the  backwash  of  the  German  defeat  communism  had  time  to  dig  the  foundations 
for  a  dictatorship  more  brutal  than  that  of  Ivan  the  Terrible,  of  Genghis  Khan  or 
Tamerlane,  or  anj'  of  the  ruthless  leaders  who  had  cowed  the  mass  populations  of 
Muscovy  during  the  preceding  centuries. 

That  Stalin,  under  whom  world  communism  made  its  greatest  strides,  was  as 
cruel  as  any  dictator  of  the  past  is  indicated  by  a  brief  tabulation  in  Michael 
Padev's  book  Wliat  Happens  to  Communists.    Padev  tabulates: 

Nine  of  the  11  cabinet  officers  holding  office  in  1936  have  been  liquidated  aa 
spies  or  traitors. 

Five  of  the  seven  presidents  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  have  been 
eliminated.  Forty-three  of  the  fifty-three  secretaries  of  the  Communist  Party 
central  organization  have  been  blood-purged. 

Fifteen  of  the  twenty-seven  top  Communists  who  drafted  the  1936  Communist 
Constitution  have  been  eliminated  as  deviationists. 

Seventy  of  the  80  members  of  the  Soviet  War  Council  have  been  killed. 

Three  out  of  every  five  marshals  of  the  Soviet  Army  have  died  unnatural  deaths. 

All  members  of  Lenin's  first  postrevolution  Politburo  are  dead. 

The  Kremlin  pictures  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  as  a  government  of 
freedom  and  enlightenment.  Actually  government  is  by  the  Soviet  Communist 
Party.  Membership  in  that  party,  in  proportion  to  the  total  population  under 
Soviet  control,  is  no  greater  than  the  numerical  proportion  of  princes,  court 
favorites,  and  paid  retainers  who  ruled  under  the  Czars  or  even  under  the  Mongol 
invaders  of  Russia's  early  history.     Still  further  restricting  the  source  of  Kremlin 


34  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

power,  that  proletariat  is  controlled  by  a  group  of  less  than  20  top  leaders  in 
the  Politburo  and  its  immediately  subordinated  official  level. 

Certainly  no  tight  totalitarianism  such  as  Soviet  communism  has  a  right  to 
expect  diplomatic  equality  with  nations  of  the  free  world.  The  Jenner-McCarran 
resolution  which  calls  for  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Iron  Curtain 
countries  (S.  Res.  247)  spotlights  that  situation  to  a  degree  unequaled  since  the 
fight  to  block  Soviet  recognition,  from  1924  to  1933. 

Dr.  Boldyreff,  who  testified  earlier  in  these  hearings,  declared  that  the  Russian 
people  today  are  ripe  for  revolt  against  this  newest  government  by  oppression 
that  has  been  saddled  upon  them.  Dr.  Boldyreff  is  probably  one  of  the  best 
informed  people  in  America  today  as  to  what  goes  on  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 
I  am  willing  to  accept  his  evaluation. 

The  Library  of  Congress  map  drives  home  one  pertinent  strategic  fact  which 
has  never  varied,  under  Czar  or  Politburo,  in  the  last  700  years.  The  pattern 
of  conquest  shows  a  sirigle  military  pattern.  Military  leadership  from  Moscow 
has  always  been  peiimeter  expansion — movement  into  territory  immediately 
contiguous  to  the  Soviet  land  mass. 

That  fact  is  basic  in  any  analysis  of  the  present  world  Communist  program 
and  time  table  to  rule  the  entire  globe.  Remember  the  pattern  of  the  past  in 
considering  the  pattern  of  the  future. 

England,  France,  Spain,  Portugal,  Holland,  Belgium — all  the  great  European 
powers  who,  through  the  centuries,  built  industrial  economies  dependent  on 
colonies,  separated  from  them  by  wide  seas  and  oceans,  have  always  faced  the 
need  of  seapower,  for  communications  and  protection  of  lines  of  supply. 

Communism  has  made  no  such  mistake.  She  expands  tentacles  of  the  Red 
octopus  to  reach  out  and  enfold  only  such  populations,  real  estate,  and  material 
treasure  as  touch  on  her  immediate  borders. 

Today,  England,  without  her  formerly  supreme  naval  power,  is  dependent  on 
imports  for  80  percent  of  her  food,  and  an  ever  greater  proportion  of  the  raw 
materials  for  her  almost  wholly  industrial  economy.  So  India  has  been  able  to 
break  out  of  the  British  Commonwealth,  Egypt  is  challenging  British  control 
of  the  vital  outlet  from  the  Mediterranean  at  Suez — a  bottleneck  vital  to  the 
flow  of  British  commerce  and  supplies. 

France  today  faces  loss  of  Indochina,  and  holds  her  African  colonies  in  a  rising 
tide  of  discontent  principally  because  the  supply  line  is  the  short  one  across  the 
Mediterranean  instead  of  the  long  route  through  the  Atlantic. 

Spain's  vast  colonial  empire  in  Africa  and  the  Western  Hemisphere  crumpled 
when  Drake  sank  the  Armada.  What  Sampson  did  at  Santiago  and  Dewey 
at  Manila  merely  laid  the  ghosts  of  what  had  once  been  the  seagoing  pride  of 
an  insolent  Iberia. 

The  rich  islands  of  Indonesia  are  all  but  lost  to  the  Netherlands  because  of 
the  long  lanes  of  transport  to  Holland. 

The  Red  Soviet,  having  grafted  itself  on  the  seats  of  power  of  the  greatest 
land  mass  under  a  single  flag  in  all  the  world,  has  no  distant  colonies.  Colonial 
imperialism  has,  therefore,  been  a  recurrent  slogan  of  the  Krennin  crew  from 
Lenin  to  Maienkov. 

Old  Russia  is  ethnically  a  racial  goulash  resulting  from  the  succession  of  inva- 
sions from  Genghis  Khan  and  Tamerlane  to  Hitler.  Racial  equality  has  been 
accepted  by  Old  Russia  long  before  Marx  and  Engels  were  out  of  rompers,  or 
Lenin,  Trotsky,  Stalin,  and  the  crew  now  seeking  to  rule  the  world  were  born. 

It  was  easy  for  the  Soviets  to  emphasize  the  superior  status  of  the  imperialist 
citizenry  in  the  colonies  of  the  high  living  standard  industrial  economy  nations 
as  compared  to  the  life  of  the  backward  native  colonial  populations. 

Time  does  not  permit  the  detailed  story  of  the  territorial  acquisitions  of  the 
Kremlin  since  the  overthrow  of  the  Czar  and  the  Bolshevik  seizure  of  power. 

This  summary  needs  to  be  recorded  of  the  passage  of  one  unhappy  people 
after  another,  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  from  V-E  Day  to  date. 

This  tabulation  shows  a  Soviet  accretion  of  a  land  area  1.6  times  that  of  con- 
tinental United  States;  aggregate  populations  3.5  times  that  of  the  United  States 
and  raw  materials  including  a  score  of  those  listed  in  our  present  stockpiling 
programs  as  strategic  and  in  short  supply.  The  tabulation  below  presents  this 
picture  graphically. 


47769  O  -  54  -  pi.  1  (  Face  p.  )4)   No.  I 


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>  O  -  54  -  pi.  1  (  Face  p.  34)   No.  3 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 


35 


Country 


Area 
(square 
miles) 

Population 

10, 629 

1, 175, 000 

8,093 

829, 000 

42,796 

7, 160, 000 

3, 760, 339 

463, 493,  418 

49,358 

12, 340, 000 

42,112 

17,  313,  700 

18, 362 

1,134,000 

12, 173 

469, 000 

35, 902 

9,  207,  386 

48, 468 

9,000,000 

3,944 
25,402 

350, 000 
1, 950,  502 

22,  959 

19, 175 

622,  744 

2,879,070 

3, 464, 952 

900, 000 

121, 131 

24, 976, 926 

91,  584 

13, 873, 000 

11, 180 
475, 000 

800, 000 
1, 000, 000 

95, 558 

16, 338, 504 

5, 528,  839 
6,433,281 

588, 710, 838 
572,372,334 

Raw  materials  (principal) 


Albania 

Austria  (part) 

Bulgaria 

China,  Red... 

Czechozlovakia 

East  Germany — 

Estonia 

Finland  ' 

Hungary 

Korea,  North 

Kurile  Islands 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Moldavia 

Mongolia,  Outer 

Poland 

Rumania 

Ruthenia 

Tibet - 

Yugoslavia ' - 

Total: 

With  Yugoslavia. , 
Minus  Yugoslavia 


Tobacco,  timber,  wool,  hides,  furs,  fish, 
dairy  products,  olive  oil,  corn,  cattle, 
bitumen. 

Iron,  steel,  textiles,  paper,  pulp,  alu- 
minum, machine  tools,  chemicals, 
agricultural  products. 

Agriculture,  fruit,  small  industrial 
products. 

Agriculture,  fruit,  tea,  sUk,  cotton, 
livestock,  coal,  iron,  tin,  antimony, 
petroleum,  tungsten,  molybdenum, 
bismuth,  salt,  chemicals,  paper. 

Agriculture,  armament,  textiles,  paper, 
glass,  stone,  metals,  iron,  chemicals, 
graphite,  garnets,  silver,  copper, 
rocksalt,  pottery,  leather,  uranium. 

Agriculture,  tobacco,  fruits,  coal,  lig- 
nite, iron,  zinc,  lead,  copper,  salt, 
petroleum. 

TextUes,  shipbuDding,  railroad  repair, 
largest  oil  shale  refinery  in  the  world. 

Timber,  granite,  marble,  sandstone, 
mica,  iron,  nonferrous  metals,  peat, 
disbase,  porphyry. 

Agriculture,  bauxite,  coal,  sugar,  hemp, 
steel. 

Timber,  gold,  silver,  zinc,  copper, 
lead,  iron,  tungsten,  coal,  graphite, 
kaolin,  sUkworms,  agriculture. 

Coal,  fisheries,  timber,  metals. 

Timber,  peat,  agriculture,  rubber 
manufactures,  dyes,  mineral  fer- 
tilizers, glass. 

Agricultm'al,  dairy  cattle,  hogs. 

Agriculture. 

Gold,  coal,  marble,  livestock  and 
industrial  production  increased  four- 
fold since  1945. 

Agriculture,  textiles,  coal,  chemicals, 
iron,  zinc,  lignite,  petroleum,  gas, 
lead,  salt,  potassium. 

Salt,  petroleum,  gas,  lignite,  gold,  iron, 
copper,  zinc,  pyrites,  agriculture, 
vineyards. 

Uranium,  metal  mining,  timber. 

Musk,  gold,  uranium,  copper,  coal, 
iron,  hides,  wool. 

Timber,  agriculture,  coal,  iron,  copper, 
chrome  ore,  antimony,  lead,  salt, 
bauxite. 


1  Not  a  satellite,  but  dominated. 

s  Yugoslavia  is  listed  with  the  Communist  group.  Tito,  though  currently  at  odds  with  Moscow,  still 
has  a  Communist  form  of  government,  and  was  part  of  the  Communist-Kremlin  anticapitalist,  anticolonial 
alliance  of  the  immediate  post- World  War  II  period. 

All  these  Communist  accretions  of  people,  land,  and  wealth  have  followed  the 
historical  pattern  of  expansion  only  on  the  perimeter. 

At  this  point  it  is  well  to  look  at  the  new  perimeter,  and  examine  the  current 
picture  in  each  sector. 

In  Europe  the  defense  picture  is  well  understood  through  the  wide  presentation 
of  the  NATO  and  European  Defense  Community  programs.  A  different  Com- 
munist approach,  in  the  various  propaganda  and  trade  agreement  proposals  from 
the  Iron  Curtain  and  Bamboo  Curtain  areas,  is  treated  separately. 

The  hot  war  actions,  first  in  Korea  and  more  recently  as  far  as  the  United  States 
is  concerned  in  Indochina,  is  understood  also.  But  the  secret  war  in  the  Middle 
East,  south  Asia,  and  the  Pacific  generally  needs  exposition  for  a  clearer  under- 
standing.    This  phase  begins  at  Suez  and  runs  eastward. 

Malenkov  and  company  have  put  five  and  a  half  million  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory, 588  million  people,  and  fabulous  raw  material  wealth  into  the  Soviet  orbit 
since  World  War  II  without  firing  a  shot  by  the  Red  Army  or  entering  officially 
into  any  of  the  sequences  of  history  which  brought  the  accretions  into  effect. 


36  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Malenkov  and  company,  as  did  Stalin  and  company,  have  merely  given  "sym- 
pathetic and  advisory  and  economic  aid"  to  their  allies. 

Malenkov  and  company  have  prated  "peace"  while  fomenting  wars  in  all  the 
areas  on  the  perimeter. 

Malenkov  and  company  have  sanctimoniously  espoused  "freedom"  for  the 
native  colonial  areas,  incited  uprisings  to  "nationalist"  movements  in  the  colonial 
areas — each  move  with  a  dual  purpose.  First  it  forces  the  entire  anti-Communist 
world  to  divert  vast  financial  programs  to  military  use,  to  require  a  large  portion 
of  the  industrial  economy  of  the  Western  World  to  go  to  military  rather  than  to 
civilian  economic  production — in  which  the  backward  Soviet  industrial  plant  can- 
not compete  with  the  more  competent  West.  Second,  the  Kremlin-Communist 
combination  is  able  to  siphon  arms,  war  materials,  and  training  for  war  to  the 
perimeter  "nationalist"  and  "freedom"  movements,  using,  in  a  majority  of  cases, 
World  War  II  and  other  obsolete  equipment,  and  permitting  the  gigantic  Red 
Arrny,  Red  Air  Force,  and  growing  Red  Navy  a  chance  to  devote  its  massive 
military  appropriations  to  new  and  modern  equipment  capable  of  competing 
with  the  armed  forces  of  the  West. 

Malenkov  and  company  are  not  yet  ready  for  world  war  III, 

Peace — Kremlin  model — calls  for  time  in  which  the  propaganda,  the  espionage, 
the  sabotage  machine  developed  since  Roosevelt  recognition  of  the  Soviet  in  1933 
opened  the  gates  for  entry  to  the  very  citadel  of  capitalism,  can  be  expanded 
beyond  its  present  effective  range. 

Peace — Malenkov-Kremlin  version — demands  an  opportunity  to  separate  raw- 
material-producing  Africa  from  the  fabricating  area  of  Europe;  to  split  material- 
producing  South  America  away  from  its  natural  manufacturing  and  industrial 
heart  in  the  United  States.  The  fourth  section,  Red  Army  (devoted  to  espionage) 
and  the  MVD  industrial  saboteurs  need  more  time  to  put  labor  at  the  throat  of 
capital,  to  put  race  against  race,  to  create  dissension  all  along  the  path  of  the  sun 
around  the  Equator  by  pleading  for  the  "rights  of  oppressed  minorities." 

Kremlin  communism  wants  the  cadence  of  conquest  to  be  no  blitzkrieg  in  the 
1939  concept  of  the  German  General  Staff.  The  Kremlin  communism  wants  no 
tearing  and  rending  and  squabbling  over  its  meat  as  the  hyena  or  the  jackal  or 
the  furtive  and  slinking  coj'ote  snaps  and  slashes  at  the  carcass  of  some  animal 
a  stronger  and  braver  foe  has  killed. 

Kremlin  communism  wants  the  cadence  of  conquest  to  be  the  beat  of  the  Roman 
legions  on  the  march,  the  rhythmic  pound  of  heavy  armored  centurions — slow, 
but  moving  ever  forward  with  the  impression  of  power  that  breeds  hopelessness 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  have  been  overrun. 

Proof  of  the  Kremlin-Communist  necessity  for  delay  in  any  plan  for  World 
War  III  is  amply  documented. 

The  Korean  truce  dragged  over  months — during  which  the  buildup  of  Nam  Il's 
Red  Chinese  Army  permitted  reinforcement  of  the  depleted  Red  Chinese  garrisons 
opposite  Formosa,  training  of  the  Red  Viet  Minh  forces  of  Ho  Chi  Minh  in  Red 
China  before  sending  them  into  the  final  drive  against  the  French  Union  forces 
in  the  8-year-old  civil  war  in  Indochina. 

The  indication  of  delay  and  eternal  stalling  at  Geneva  as  efforts  are  made  to 
bring  peace  in  Indochina  is  but  a  continuance  of  the  Korean  truce  tactics. 

Proved  aid  from  Communists  to  Taruc  and  his  Hukbalahap  insurrectionists 
in  the  Philippines,  the  eternal  and  continuous  infiltration  of  Communist  propa- 
gandists and  agitators  into  Burma,  Indonesia,  Thailand,  Malaya,  India,  Nepal, 
Bhutan,  Kashmir,  Afghanistan,  have  all  been  part  of  the  general  pattern — delay 
and  cost  to  the  West,  with  Kremlin  diplomatic  forces  remaining  on  duty  in  each 
area  to  direct  the  espionage,  sabotage,  and  propaganda  drives. 

To  counter  the  Communist  perimeter  war,  the  Western  Powers,  with  Secretary 
of  State  Dulles  as  a  pace  setter,  are  seeking  to  evolve  a  10-nation  coalition  in  the 
Pacific  to  make  further  Communist  aggression  in  the  Pacific  area  a  cause  for  united 
defense  action — in  effect  the  creation  of  an  Asian  coalition  such  as  NATO  and 
EDC  provide  in  Europe. 

The  Kremlin's  trade  and  peace  campaign  is  aimed  at  drawing  the  perimeter 
countries  into  economic  ties  with  the  Communist  orbit.  "Tradesmen"  and  visiting 
"merchants"  can,  and  habitually  have  been,  excellent  espionage  and  propaganda 
agents  for  the  Kremlin.  An  up-to-date  picture  of  the  use  of  the  trade-not-aid 
program  of  the  Kremlin  can  be  pieced  together  by  listening  to  broadcasts  from 
the  Kremlin  and  satellite  sources,  the  harangues  of  Red  commentators  and  the 
printed  propaganda  in  official  Communist  papers,  magazines,  and  other  printed 
outlets  in  this  country  and  abroad. 

Brief  mention  of  some  of  these  items  documents  the  trend  of  this  Red-led  drive 
for  trade  as  a  part  and  parcel  of  her  world  strategy  and  plan. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  37 

Alphabetically  by  countries,  and  chronologically  as  to  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  or  its  satellites,  here  are  some  notes  of  the  Soviet  use  of  trade  as  a  weapon. 
The  source  of  the  following  information  is  an  intelligence  agency  which  cannot  be 
publicly  identified. 

Afghanistan:  A  Melbourne  broadcast  on  February  10  said  Afghanistan  has 
been  invited  to  send  trade  representatives  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  September.  March 
3  a  Moscow  broadcast  claimed  a  trade  agreement  with  Afghanistan  had  been 
signed  in  January. 

Argentina:  A  Buenos  Aires  radio  said  a  trade  agreement  between  Argentina 
and  Poland  was  in  an  advanced  state.  April  2  a  Buenos  Aires  broadcast  said 
Argentina  had  delivered  71,345  tons  of  a  145,000-goods  contract  to  the  Soviet 
under  a  contract  then  8  months  old.  April  21,  the  Moscow  radio  said  Argentina 
had  completed  a  barter  contract  with  Hungary  totaling  $8,250,000.  April  29, 
Buenos  Aires  announced  a  $12  million  trade  negotiation  with  Rumania. 

Australia:  A  Melbourne  radio  announced  January  26  that  the  Soviet  and 
satellites  had  purchased  more  than  1,000,000  pounds  of  good  Australian  wool. 
March  23,  the  Melbourne  radio  said  the  Soviet  had  requested  a  long-term  contract 
to  buy  butter. 

Belgium:  February  1,  Moscow  broadcast  that  Belgium  had  agreed  to  build 
■diesel  ships,  refrigerator  ships,  floating  cranes,  boilers,  and  other  equipment  for 
delivery  to  the  Soviet  in  1954  and  1955.  February  26,  Moscow  announced  a 
formal  trade  agreement  with  the  Belgian-Netherlands-Luxembourg  Economic 
Union,  but  did  not  mention  types  or  amount  of  goods,  repeating  this  announce- 
ment on  March  3. 

Bolivia:  Moscow  forecast  a  trade  agreement  with  Bolivia  on  February  10,  but 
no  subsequent  announcement  came  of  its  being  effected. 

Britain:  January  25,  Nesterov,  president  of  the  Soviet  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
broadcast  that  a  trade  agreement  had  been  reached  with  Britain.  February  10 
Moscow  named  Britain  as  one  of  a  group  of  nations  which  would  find  trade  with 
the  East  ''more  favorable  than  trade  with  the  West."  February  26  Moscow 
again  broadcast  that  ''negotiations  had  been  successfully  completed  with  busi- 
nessmen" of  Britain,  but  gave  no  details. 

British  Borneo:  Moscow,  February  10,  said  an  invitation  had  been  sent  to 
British  Borneo  to  participate  in  a  Moscow  trade  conference  in  September. 

Burma:  Moscow  named  Burma,  on  February  10,  as  having  been  invited  to  the 
Moscow  trade  conference  in  September.  February  26,  the  Rangoon  radio  said  a 
trade  agreement  with  Communist  China,  under  discussion  for  2  months,  was 
nearing  agreement.  March  30,  the  Delhi  (India)  radio  said  the  Sino-Burmese 
trade  agreement  would  be  signed  the  next  day.  Red  China  radio,  from  Peiping, 
on  May  2,  said  the  Burmese  trade  agreement  had  been  signed  on  April  22  and 
been  widely  hailed  by  Burma  newspapers. 

Ceylon:  Moscow  said  Ceylon  had  been  invited  to  the  Moscow  trade  conference 
in  September.  Peking  radio,  March  24,  said  Ceylon  had  signed  a  trade  agreement 
with  Communist  China. 

Chile:  Moscow  listed  Chile  as  invited  to  the  September  trade  conference  in 
Moscow.  Caracas  radio,  on  March  18,  said  the  Chilean  Cabinet  had  decided  to 
seek  markets  for  Chilean  copper  throughout  the  world,  "including  countries  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain." 

Cuba:  Habana  radio  announced  that  Cuba  had  authorized  the  sale  of  20,000 
tons  of  sugar  to  the  Soviet,  but  would  not  sell  nickel  or  other  strategic  war 
raaterials  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  or  Iron  Curtain  satellites. 

Denmark:  January  25,  Moscow  said  Denmark  had  concluded  trade  agreements 
with  the  Soviet.  January  26  Copenhagen  radio  said  it  had  contracted  to  export 
another  5,000  tons  of  butter  to  the  Soviet.  February  2,  Copenhagen  said  it  was 
considering  cheese  sales  to  the  Soviet.  February  9  Bratislava  (Slovak)  radio 
said  Denmark  was  preparing  for  an  extension  of  trade  with  the  Soviet  because 
the  Danish  Government  feared  an  economic  depression  in  the  United  States. 
Copenhagen  radio,  February  16,  announced  a  1-year  agreement  to  send  seeds, 
agricultural  products  and  electrical  equipment  to  Hungary  in  exchange  for 
machines,  textiles,  and  foodstuffs.  March  10,  Stockholm  radio  said  Denmark 
was  planning  a  trade  agreement  with  the  Soviet  "of  several  years  standing." 
March  19  Copenhagen  sent  a  delegation  of  businessmen  to  Moscow  to  select 
trade  items  for  exchange.  Stockholm  radio  said  on  May  13  that  Danish-Soviet 
trade  agreement  negotiation  were  set  for  June.  Copenhagen  radio  confirmed 
this  2  days  later. 

Egypt:  February  7,  Cairo  radio  announced  a  Bulgarian  mission  was  coming 
to  Cairo  to  negotiate  a  trade  agreement.     February  25,  Cairo  radio  said  trade 


38  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

talks  had  been  completed  and  a  pact  "is  expected  soon."  March  1,  Cairo  said 
signing  had  been  tentatively  set  for  March  8.  March  10,  Cairo  said  a  trade  pact 
had  been  initialed  between  Egypt  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  same  day  Cairo 
said  a  mission  was  on  the  way  from  Hungary  to  negotiate  an  Egyptian  trade 
agreement.  March  27,  Cairo  said  the  Soviet-Egyptian  trade  pact  had  been 
signed.  May  7,  Cairo  said  Egypt  was  studying  trade  pacts  with  Red  China. 
Cairo  said  such  a  pact  "would  be  easy  to  implement  along  the  lines  of  that 
negotiated  with  East  Germany,"  though  Egypt  has  not  recognized  either  Red 
China  or  East  Germany.  Cairo  claimed  Britain  is  "endeavoring  to  stimulate 
trade"  with  Red  China. 

Finland:  Sofia  (Bulgaria)  radio  said  an  agreement  for  exchange  of  goods  with 
Finland  and  methods  of  payment  had  been  signed.  Helsinki,  on  February  18, 
announced  a  4-billion  finmark  trade  agreement  with  Czechoslovakia.  February 
24,  Helsinki  radio  announced  preparations  for  a  new  5-year  trade  agreement  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  Moscow,  February  26,  said  U.  S.  S.  R.-Finland  trade  pact 
had  been  signed.  February  26,  Helsinki  radio  announced  appointment  of  delega- 
tion to  discuss  trade  with  China  (Peking).  Moscow  on  March  3,  and  Peking, 
on  March  4,  said  "agreements  were  being  made."  Oslo  (Norway)  radio  an- 
nounced April  3  that  the  Finland-Soviet  5-year  trade  pact  called  for  Finland's 
importing  10,000  Soviet  automobiles  annually  for  the  5  years.  Helsinki,  May  18, 
said  negotiations  would  be  resumed  "shortly"  for  a  "long  term"  trade  agreement 
with  Soviet  Union. 

France:  Moscow,  February  10,  listed  France  as  a  nation  which  "would  do 
better  dealing  with  the  East  rather  than  the  West."  France  had  previously  been 
invited  to  the  coming  September  trade  conference  in  Moscow.  March  3,  Moscow 
listed  France  as  having  entered  into  a  trade  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union 
last  January. 

Greece:  Prague  radio  said  on  February  4  that  Greece  had  resumed  trade  for  1 
year  with  Czechoslovakia  under  an  agreement  signed  at  Athens.  February  5 
the  Soviet  Embassy  at  Athens  said  a  considerable  quantity  of  oil  products  would 
go  to  Greece  under  the  pact.  Bucharest  (Rumania)  radio  said  on  May  20  that 
a  trades  and  payment  agreement  between  the  two  countries  had  been  signed  at 
Bucharest  the  previous  day. 

Iceland:  Bucharest  radio  said  on  April  16  that  a  trade  and  payments  agreement 
between  Iceland  and  Rumania  was  signed  on  April  13. 

India:  Melbourne  broadcast  of  February  10  listed  India  as  1  of  12  countries 
invited  to  Moscow  trade  conference  next  September.  Delhi  radio,  March  24, 
said  India  had  signed  a  trade  pact  with  Rumania  on  March  23.  Moscow,  April  1, 
said  India  had  decided  to  increase  trade  with  Poland  following  negotiations  at 
Moscow  embassies  of  both  powers.  Poland  will  get  iron  and  machines,  mica, 
burlap,  and  other  items.  Stockholm  radio,  April  19,  said  India  extended  trade 
agreement  with  Finland  for  2  more  years,  India  to  get  newsprint,  agricultural 
machinery,  and  wire  cables, 

Indonesia:  Peking  radio,  January  23,* reported  "Jakarta  is  pleased  with  trade- 
agreement  between  Indonesia  and  Peking.  Jakarta  (Indonesia)  radio,  January 
31,  said  agreement  "enthusiastically  received  by  press  and  businessmen."  Indo- 
nesia is  invited  to  the  Moscow  trade  conference  in  September.  February  24, 
Jakarta  radio  said  that  "on  basis  of  clearing  and  balance  system"  had  difficulties 
with  trade  agreements  of  1950  with  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Hungary  and 
with  Yugoslavia  in  1953.  Said  difficulties  were  being  overcome  with  Czecho- 
slovakia and  Hungary  and  those  pacts  will  be  renegotiated  for  1954.  Jakarta 
radio,  April  23,  said  1 1  East  German  trade  negotiators  were  in  Indonesia.  Jakarta 
radio,  May  18,  said  East  German  trade  negotiations  opened  that  day. 

Israel:  Jerusalem  radio,  January  26,  said  Director  of  Israeli  Oil  Affairs  arrived 
in  Moscow  that  day  to  purchase  additional  quantities  of  oil  from  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
January  29,  Israeli  radio  said  delegation  left  for  Budapest  to  sign  trade  agreement 
with  Hungary.  Tel  Aviv  radio,  February  2,  said  Soviet  commercial  attache  had 
taken  up  expansion  of  trade  with  U.  S.  S.  R.  with  Israeli  foreign  trade  department. 
Jerusalem  radio,  February  8,  World  Zionist  organization  said  Russia  "genuinely 
interested  in  world  trade  now."  Jerusalem  radio,  March  1,  ^aid  trade  agreement 
between  Israel  and  Hungary  had  been  signed.  Jerusalem  radio,  March  5,  said 
second  oil  agreement  had  been  signed  with  U.  S.  S.  R.  by  which  U.  S.  S.  R.  will 
ship  100,000  tons  of  crude  oil  to  Israel. 

Italy:  Italy  was  listed  by  Nesterov  on  January  25  as  one  of  the  countries  with 
which  Soviet  Union  had  concluded  trade  agreements.  Rome  radio,  February  5, 
said  Italy  had  purchased  125,000  tons  of  hard  grain  from  the  Soviet  Union  "within 
the  framework  of  the  Italian-Soviet  trade  agreement  of  last  October."     Italy  was 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  39 

listed  by  Moscow  radio  on  February  10  as  one  of  the  nations  advised  to  look  to 
trade  with  the  East. 

Japan:  Melbourne  radio,  February  10,  listed  Japan  as  one  of  nations  invited  to 
Moscow  Trade  Conference  next  September.  February  17,  Japanese  newspaper 
Yomiuri  said,  "Trade  Ministry  would  pursue  policy  on  increased  barter  with  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  and  'expected'  trade  with  Communist  China  to  increase  in  the  spring." 
Moscow  (Tass),  on  May  20,  said  East  German  and  Japanese  firms  had  agreed  on 
delivery  of  goods  valued  at  $1.9  million.  Tokyo  radio  same  day  said  Red  China 
suggested  increasing  barter  of  Japanese  steel  and  iron  products  and  machinery  in 
exchange  for  China  raw  materials. 

Lebanon:  Limassol  radio,  February  2,  said  Lebanese  Parliament  had  approved 
trade  agreement  between  Lebanon  and  East  Germany.  Damascus  radio,  April 
15,  quoted  Foreign  Minister  as  saying  Lebanese  trade  agreement  with  U.  S.  S.  R. 
would  be  eonchided  shortly.  Cairo  radio,  April  24,  said  Lebanon  agreed  to  sign 
U.  S.  S.  R.  trade  treaty  and  make  May  1  an  official  holiday.  Moscow  (Tass), 
April  30,  said  trade  agreement  signed  for  1  year,  renewable  annually  unless  one 
party  or  the  other  repudiates  and  agreements  made  for  trade  representatives  in 
Lebanon  and  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Malaya:  Listed  in  Melbourne  broadcast  as  invited  to  Moscow  Trade  Conference 
in  September.  Karachi  (Pakistan)  broadcast  May  3  said  shipments  of  natural 
rubber  will  start  moving  from  Malaya  to  Soviet  Union  before  end  of  May,  but 
direct  export  of  nibber  to  Communist  China  or  North  Korea  will  remain  banned. 

Nepal:  Invitation  extended  February  10  to  attend  Moscow  Trade  Conference 
next  September. 

Netherlands:  Hilversum  (Holland)  radio,  January  29,  said  L^.  S.  S.  R.  had 
contracted  to  buy  70  million  salted  herring  from  Holland.  Hilversum  radio, 
April  27,  said  Netherlands  would  export  2  million  kilograms  of  cheese  to  U.  S.  S.  R. 
Hilversum  radio.  May  17,  said  U.  S.  S.  R.  ordered  three  cargo  ships  from  Nether- 
lands under  existing  trade  agreement.     Similar  order  for  ships  was  placed  in  1951. 

Norway:  Oslo  radio,  January  26,  said  agreement  with  U.  S.  S.  R.  for  exchange 
of  goods  provides  for  Norway  delivering  aluminum,  cellulose,  and  calcium 
carbonate.  Moscow  radio,  February  26,  said  trade  agreements  had  been  signed 
this  year  with  Norway.  Oslo  radio,  March  23,  said  Norway  agreement  with 
Czechoslovakia  calls  for  Norway  importing  Czech  goods  valued  at  53  million 
kroner,  and  exporting  goods  valued  at  45  million  kroner  to  Czechoslovakia. 
Budapest  radio,  April  1,  said  negotiations  between  Hungary  and  Norway  for 
trade  agreements  were  being  conducted. 

Pakistan:  Pakistan  invited  to  Moscow  Trade  Conference  in  September.  Has 
not  responded. 

Phihppines:  Invited  to  Moscow  Trade  Conference  in  September.  Did  not 
answer. 

Sweden:  Listed  by  Moscow  on  January  25  as  having  previously  signed 
U.  S.  S.  R.  trade  agreement.  Stockholm  radio,  February  6,  said  agreement  signed 
in  Moscow  nearly  doubling  Sweden's  trade  with  U.  S.  S.  R.  as  compared  to  1953. 
Stockholm  radio,  March  23,  said  Swedish  trade  negotiations  with  Poland  resumed 
that  date.  April  7,  Stockholm  said  U.  S.  S.  R.  placed  order  valued  at  180,000 
pounds  sterling  for  woodworking  machinery.  Stockholm  radio,  April  25,  said 
1954  double  trade  agreement  now  being  met  by  Sweden.  Sweden  agrees  to  import 
600,000  tons  of  oil  from  Russia  as  against  previous  agreement  to  take  500,000 
tons.  Russia  trying  to  increase  oil  tonnage  to  1  million.  Stockholm  radio, 
May  5,  says  Soviet  sells  oil  and  foodstuffs  to  Sweden,  but  that  Sweden  is  to 
decrease  steel  and  iron  sales  to  U.  S.  S.  R.  while  increasing  engineering  products 
and  consumer  goods. 

Syria:  Damascus  radio,  April  fl2,  says  East  Germany  wants  trade  pact. 
Syrian  Government  studying  proposal  and  "hope  to  start  talks  soon". 

Thailand:  Moscow  radio,  February  10,  said  Thailand  invited  to  Trade  Con- 
ference in  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  September.     No  Thailand  response. 

Turkey:  Ankara  broadcast  says  "temporary"  trade  protocol  governing  im- 
port and  exports  of  goods  between  Turkey  and  Rumania  signed  February  6. 
Ankara  radio,  March  28,  said  Turkej^  by  trade  agreement  with  Czechoslovakia, 
would  import  agricultural  machinery,  machine  tools,  construction  material,  steel 
rods  and  artificial  fertilizer. 

Uruguay:  Invited  February  10  to  Moscow  Trade  Conference  in  September. 
Lima  (Peru)  broadcast,  February  12,  said  Uruguay  would  export  95,000  tons  of 
pork  and  5,000  tons  of  lamb  to  U.  S.  S.  R. 

It  is  not  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  this  listing  above  covers  all  the  moves 
in  the  Soviet  cold  war  through  trade.     It  does  show  the  efforts,  however,  of  the 


40 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMCTNISM 


Soviet  and  satellites  to  establish  trade  relations  with  34  countries  outside  the  Iron 
Curtain  and  success,  to  greater  or  lesser  degree,  with  25  to  27  of  them. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  with  the  Soviet  trade  is  a  weapon,  just  as  a  tank, 
or  a  bomber,  or  a  fifth  column.  Trade  permits  the  Soviet  to  send  in  espionage 
agents,  even  where  the  Soviet  does  not  have  diplomatic  representation.  Amtorg 
Trading  Corporation  was  a  spies'  nest  in  the  United  States  years  before  the  Soviet 
was  granted  diplomatic  representation  by  an  agreement  that  was  a  trick  and  a 
fraud  in  its  very  inception,  and  has  not  varied  in  the  interim. 

Trade,  in  the  Soviet  concept,  is  a  means  to  "corner"  strategic  materials,  and 
exert  an  economic  coercion  amounting  to  strangulation. 

We  have  had  the  picture,  to  date,  of  the  growth  of  the  Soviet  juggernaut  from 
the  Muscovy  principalities  in  1251  to  the  1951  period  when  the  major  land  areas 
of  China,  Mongolia,  Manchuria,  and  Tibet  fell  into  the  Red  zone  of  influence, 
producing  the  Red  perimeter  as  of  today. 

Just  what  the  effect  will  be  on  the  Western  World  if  communism  absorbs  the 
present  "fringe"  on  the  Asian  perimeter  may  be  estimated  by  this  next  tabulation. 
It  shows  what  accretions  go  under  the  Hammer  and  Sickle  influence  in  the  im- 
mediate future  if  the  Kremlin  is  not  stopped  in  Asia — just  as  the  earlier  tabula- 
tions show  what  communism  gained  in  the  immediate  period  following  the  close 
of  World  War  II. 


Country 

Area 
(square 
miles) 

Population 

Raw  materials  (principal) 

Iran          _.      .      .  

634,413 

116, 600 

310,  236 

54,  501 

1,  221, 880 

261,  789 

50,  650 
200, 148 

286, 000 

735, 865 

13,800 
147, 690 

115, 600 

20,  COO,  000 

5, 100, 000 

33, 800, 000 
42, 000, 000 
356, 829, 485 

18, 674,  000 

5,  227, 000 
18, 836, 000 

27, 030, 000 

75,  500,  GOO 

7, 617,  753 
84, 300, 000 

20,  246, 000 

Petroleum,  rugs,  and  carpets;  fruits  and  ber- 

Iraq                               -    

ries. 
Petroleum,  barley,  and  dates. 

Pakistan: 

West 

Raw  jute,  raw  wool,  hydroelectric  power  to  be 

East 

developed;  cotton,  fisheries,  and  agriculture. 
Millet,  rice,  corn,  wheat,  tea,  sugar,  cotton, 

jute,  linseed,  coffee,  rubber,  textiles,  steel, 
petroleum,    copper,    chromite,    iron,   mica, 
magnesite.  manganese,  and  coal. 
Agriculture,     teakwood,     silver,     petroleum, 

Malaya       _       

rubies,  jade,  sapphires,  and  rice. 
Rubber,  tin,  rice,  oils,  and  spices. 

Thailand 

Timber,  rubber,  cotton,  spices,  coal,  iron,  man- 

ganese, tungsten,  antimony,  and  mercury. 
Iron,  tungsten,  manganese,  rice,  rubber,  fish, 

Indonesia 

coal,  lumber,  tin,  hides,  and  spices. 
Rubber,   tin,   oil,   coal,    bauxite,   manganese, 

Formosa --. 

copper,  nickel,  gold,  silver,  spices,  and  agri- 
cultural products. 
Rice,  tea,  sugar,  jute,  gold,  silver,  copper,  coal, 

Japan 

and  some  spices. 
Rice,  fruits,  gold,  silver,  copper,  lead,   zinc, 

Philippines 

iron,  chromite,  arsenic,  coal,  sulfur,  salt,  and 
petroleum. 
Timber,  gold,  silver,  zinc,  copper,  iron,  coal. 

petroleum   chromite,   asbestos,   manganese, 
rice,  hemp,  sugar,  copra,  fruit,  and  agricul- 
tural products. 

Total 

4, 149,  272 

715, 220, 318 

As  indicated  under  separate  areas. 

(United  States— Compare) 

3, 022, 387 

157,  269, 000 

The  "Asian  fringe,"  to  complete  communization  of  Asia,  is  an  area  IJ^  times 
that  of  the  United  States  and  4  times  the  population.  The  Red  movement 
represented  by  soapbox  orators  in  New  York's  Union  Square  and  London's 
Hyde  Park  in  the  pre- World  War  II  days  is  now  reaching  out  for  continents. 

Investigating  committees  of  the  Congress  have  produced  sworn  testimony 
from  men  who  were  there  at  the  time,  that  Soviet  Communists  were  working 
in  the  early  1920's  to  a  Chinese  Soviet  as  the  basis  for  a  Communist  Asia.  Hear- 
ings of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  documented  this  action,  as  have 
volumes  of  testimony  by  the  House  Un-American  Activities  Committee. 

Throughout  the  pattern  is  the  same.  The  Kremlin  moved  first  to  indoctrinate 
and  propagandize,  then  to  infiltrate  and  incite  to  internal  upheaval,  and  finally 
to  aid  insurrection.  Asia  today — predominantly  in  the  Red  circle — is  a  product 
of  20  years  of  ceaseless  propaganda,  intrigue,  and,  where  necessary,  physical  aid 
to  armed  revolution. 

Africa,  today,  is  in  approximately  the  same  relative  position  on  the  Red 
Pascist  timetable  for  world  control  as  Asia  was  in  the  early  1920's. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  41 

World  communism,  directed  from  Moscow,  is  proceeding  in  accordance  with 
a  program  based  on  phased  accomplishment,  tentatively  timed,  but  activated 
in  succeeding  phases  without  regard  of  the  time  consumed  to  complete  each 
successive  step. 

After  the  overthrow  of  the  Czarist  regime,  the  Communist  leadership  first  set 
about  to  establish  its  national  base,  from  the  security  of  which  Communist  in- 
filtration might  be  extended  to  other  lands  through  Communist  parties  estab- 
lished in  those  countries.  Each  of  these  Communist  parties  had  to  recognize, 
however,  that  it  was  but  a  section  of  the  Third  International,  recognizing  direction 
from  the  Kremlin. 

By  the  middle  1920's,  the  next  Russian  Communist  step — vital  as  a  protection 
to  Russia  against  Japan — had  been  fixed  as  the  absorption  of  Asia,  from  Siberia 
to  Singapore,  and  westward  to  Suez.  Against  that  backdrop,  the  Russian  oper- 
ations throughout  World  War  II  are  more  easily  understood. 

The  Soviet's  activities  since  World  War  II,  have  seen  these  steps  accomplished 
in  the  absorption  of  Asia: 

1.  Establishment  of  Red  China. 

2.  Occupation  of  Tibet  by  a  people's  army  of  liberation. 

3.  Invasion  of  Korea  and  retention  of  half  of  it. 

4.  Backing  of  Ho  Chi-minh  in  Indochina. 

5.  Abortive  eff"ort  to  aid  the  Hukbalahaps  in  the  Philippines. 

6.  Backing  of  Indonesian  independence. 

7.  Infiltration  of  Burma. 

8.  Effort  to  communize  Thailand  and  Malaya. 

9.  Consolidation  of  Balkan  satellites  as  buffers  against  the  West. 

10.  Disruption   of  most   Middle   East  governments,   other  than   Greece, 
Turkey,  and  Israel. 

After  Asia,  in  the  Communist  long-range  timetable,  is  Africa.  Just  as  the  Asian 
assimilation  was  planned  by  Borodin  in  the  early  twenties,  so  did  the  planning  for 
Operation  Africa  begin  in  1931. 

In  1931,  the  Lenin  Institute  in  Moscow  set  up  the  plan  to  train  native  Africans 
from  the  Negro  tribes  for  future  activities  in  Africa. 

In  1933,  the  first  African  representatives  appeared  at  the  Lenin  Institute,  and 
from  that  date  on,  there  have  always  been  students  at  Moscow  from  Liberia  and 
Ethiopia,  with  representatives  from  as  many  other  African  areas  as  year-to-year 
opportunities  presented  themselves. 

Russian  Communists  had  triple  motivation  for  action  against  Africa. 

First,  the  lifeline  communication  route  of  the  colonial  powers  is  through  the 
Mediterranean,  from  Gibraltar  to  Suez.  The  control  of  that  lifeline,  from  Com- 
munist bases  in  north  Africa,  could  prevent  transport  to  the  British,  French, 
Belgian,  Portuguese,  and  Netherlands  industrial  areas  of  the  raw  materials  from 
their  colonies  in  either  Africa  or  Asia.  Industrial  Europe  would  strangle  without 
a  smooth  and  uninterrupted  seaborne  flow  of  raw  materials. 

Second,  militarily,  Communist  occupation  of  north  Africa  would  place  a  Com- 
munist ring  around  half  of  Europe — -as  well  as  rob  France  and  Spain  and  Italy  of 
some  of  their  best  sources  of  military  manpower. 

Third,  Africa  is  admittedly  a  treasure  house  of  minerals  and  of  other  strategic 
materials  without  which  no  European  power  could  make  war  against  Russia.  In 
this  connection,  the  United  States  draws  upon  African  sources  for  28  strategic  raw 
materials,  and,  without  them,  could  not  produce  adequate  war  materials  over  an 
extended  period. 

Communism,  as  interpreted  by  Lenin,  has  always  preached  against  colonial- 
ism— probably  because  Russia,  as  a  continuous  land  mass,  had  neither  colonies 
nor  the  need  of  them.  Russia,  historically,  has  expanded  on  her  perimeter,  and 
has  never  reached  for  a  distant  area  without  first  acquiring  the  intervening  land. 

Communism,  also,  while  ultimately  in  avowal  against  nationalism,  invariably 
stirs  colonies  into  revolutionary  nationalism — and  then,  through  placement  of 
leaders  among  the  revolutionaries,  sets  up  a  Communist  form  of  government  which 
quickly  affiliates  with  international  communism.  For  example,  French  and 
Italian  partisans  against  the  Nazis  in  World  War  II,  have  been  the  backbone  of 
communism  in  France  and  Italy  ever  since  V-E  Day. 

In  penetrating  Africa,  the  Soviet  chose  Communists  from  India  as  basic  per- 
sonnel. There  are  360,000  Indians  in  South  Africa,  100,000  in  Kenya,  50,000  in 
Tanganyika,  and  40,000  in  Uganda.  They  are  New  Delhi  Indians  and  generally 
occupy  the  white-collar  and  clerical  jobs  in  African  industrial  and  production 
organizations. 


42  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

As  late  as  June  1953,  the  organization  of  the  Communist  infiltration  of  Africa 
was  an  espionage  and  propaganda  staff  set  up  in  Moscow  with  this  personnel: 

Director:   S.  P.  Koziarev,  Russian. 

Deputy:   Col.  Beck  Dumbadze,  Russian. 

Chief  of  Operations:   Lt.  Col.  Harald  Nuut,  Russian. 

First  Deputy:   E.  F.  Podvigin,  Russian. 

Second  Deputy:    Maj.  V.  I.  Strashev,  Russian. 

Staff  Officers:   V.  Kumanev,  Bulgarian;  and  V.  Bank,  Russian. 

Liaison  Officer  with  Arab  League:   A.  L  Chikov,  Russian. 

Director,  North  and  West  African  Department:  J.  A.  Klimentov,  Russian. 

First  Deputy:   A.  N.  Eropkin,  Russian. 

Second  Deputy:  E.  Kallos,  Hungarian. 

Liaison  Officer  with  Mogreb  Liberation  Committee:   V.  Kozarev,  Russian. 

Director,  East  Africa  and  Abyssinia  Department:  V.  A.  Kiriev,  Russian. 

Director,  Sudan  Department:   Y.  lakhim,  Czech. 

Deputy:  Y.  Siedliaczek,  probably  a  Czech. 
The  resident  agents  in  the  Sudan  were  stationed  at  Khartoum,  Abu-Hamed, 
Omdurman,   Port  Suday,   Atbara.     This  staff  handles  all  African  affairs,  with 
communication  to  Moscow  through  the  Czech  legation  in  Cairo,  using  courier 
Max  Mukhli. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  Russia  moved  into  Africa  as  soon  as  feasible  after 
the  end  of  World  War  II. 

One  of  her  greatest  concentrations  was  at  Addis  Ababa.  In  that  postwar 
period  Russia  noted  visits  of  British  and  American  industrialists — Lord  Kemsley 
of  England  and  Edward  Stettinius  of  the  United  States — as  a  move  developed 
to  provide  capital  from  abroad  for  African  industrialization.  Russian  policy 
decreed  the  planning  for  a  foothold  in  Northeast  Africa  as  the  beginning  of  a 
long-range  effort  to  eliminate  Africa  as  a  source  of  strategic  planning  for  the 
Western  powers — before  Russian  infiltration  gave  her  power  to  control  the 
African  areas  politically. 

While  this  stage  of  Russian  operations  was  formative.  Communists  in  England 
made  it  a  practice  to  meet  colonials  from  Africa,  entertain  them,  indoctrinate 
them,  and,  in  many  cases,  sent  them  back  to  Africa  as  pro-Communist. 

Communist  Russia  designated  Addis  Ababa  as  the  base  from  which  to  neu- 
tralize establishment  of  an  East  African  base  south  of  the  Sahara  by  the  Western 
powers — before  the  establishment  of  American  and  Allied  bases  in  North  Africa 
set  up  a  defense  line  on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Russian  diplomatic  personnel  at  Addis  Ababa  became  larger  than  the 
Russian  Embassy  in  Paris.  By  May  1951  Ambassador  Rikanov  had  a  staff 
of  over  100.  The  word  passed  out  by  the  propaganda  members  of  the  Russian 
staff  was  "We  shall  soon  be  at  the  Suez  Canal."  (By  early  1954,  this  prediction 
was  near  fulfillment.) 

Ras  Slum,  of  Tigre  Province,  was  told  by  Russian  agents  that  he  would  be 
given  Eritrea  after  "the  Emperor  had  been  overthrown"  and  when  communism 
prevailed.  Czech  arms,  including  light  artillery,  were  smuggled  to  Slum,  pre- 
sumably by  Russian  agents. 

By  June  1952,  Communist  propagandists  spread  the  word  that  Communist 
membership  in  the  Sudan,  the  Ivory  Coast,  and  Nigeria  had  passed  the  1  million 
mark.  Soviet  agents,  posting  as  traders,  were  used  as  messengers  and  intelligence 
agents.  Four  approaches  were  made  in  propagandizing  the  Africans.  They 
were: 

(a)   To  Asiatics  in  Africa,  "A  Communist  India,  backed  by  Russia,  can 

master  Africa." 

(6)   To  backward  Negroes  in  the  tribal  areas,  "The  tribal  chiefs  have  sold 

out  to  the  colonial  powers.     Only  the  medicine  men  can  break  this  power." 

Medicine  men  reportedly  were  taught  how  to  use  quinine  and  ipecac  to  cure 

fever  and  dysentery,  the  most  frequent  tribal  diseases,  and  so  increase  their 

influence. 

(c)  To  Negro  workers  in  urban  areas:  "You  have  been  taken  from  your 
tribes  and  made  to  slave  for  the  benefit  of  the  white  masters.  You  must 
prepare  to  win  your  freedom." 

(d)  To  African  intellectuals:  "You  must  study,  prepare  to  be  leaders,  to 
take  your  people  out  of  slavery." 

These  intellectuals,  after  careful  screening,  were  chosen  to  go  to  Lenin  Institute, 
and  later  to  Prague,  to  which  the  training  of  colonial  agent-personnel  had  been 
transferred. 

By  May  1953  it  was  established  that  packages  from  Addis  Ababa  to  Belgian, 
French  and  British  territories,  supposedly  containing  meaicines  and  commercial 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  43 

goods,  frequently  contained  propaganda  material  for  the  Communists — and  even 
weapons.     These  moved  through  the  "traders"  previously  mentioned. 

Timing  of  such  movements  as  the  Libtration  Front  in  the  Belgian  Congo;  the 
Beria  Liberation  Committee  in  Portuguese  Mozambique;  democratic  rallies  and 
shock  group  operation  in  the  French  colonies;  the  Mau  iVIau  rebellion  in  Kenya; 
the  strikes  in  Rhodesia;  the  Kaffir  and  other  riots  in  South  Africa;  the  rebel 
movements  in  Egypt  and  the  Sudan,  all  indicated  conformity  to  a  master  plan. 
From  1951  to  1953,  the  number  of  African  students  at  Prague  has  been  fixed  at 
100,  out  of  a  total  of  300  trained  there  annually. 

Specific  individuals  upon  whom  reports  have  been  received  show  these  opera- 
tions: 

Pascal  Tongomba,  in  Moscow  in  mid-1953,  director  of  the  flow  of  arms  to 
Africa  through  Addis  Ababa. 

Ignaz  Feld,  deputy  for  Tongoma,  former  Nazi  intelligence  officer  who 
entered  Soviet  service  after  the  German  surrender,  director  of  uranium 
sabotage  in  Belgian  Congo  and  keyman  in  inciting  the  tribal  medicine  men 
against  their  tribal  chiefs. 

An  American  Negro  known  as  "Butler,"  assigned  to  incite  Negro  port 
workers  to  sabotage  and  espionage  at  African  harbor  areas. 

A  "Professor  Azikiwi,"  also  known  as  Zik,  in  ?sigeria,  publisher  of  books, 
semiclandestine  weekly  paper,  and  a  leading  figure  in  the  National  Council 
for  Nigeria  and  the  Cameroons. 

X.  Bawasa,  direct  aide  of  Tongomba  in  French  West  Africa  and  in  French 
Somaliland. 
The  Mau  Mau  trouble  in  Kenya,  in  which  many  were  killed,  was  a  subject  of 
warning  to  British  colonial  governors  as  far  back  as  1947. 

Eliu  Mathu  and  Jome  Kenyatta  were  named  as  leaders.  Nothing  was  done. 
The  Mau  Mau  movement  is,  historically,  an  offshoot  of  the  Maseregu  move- 
ment, started  in  1912,  with  ramifications  from  the  cape  to  Cairo.  It  was  sup- 
pressed, but  bobbed  up  again  in  1925  and  was  again  forced  underground.  A 
missent  letter  to  Kenyatta  at  that  time  outlined  the  entire  plan  for  attacking 
all  whites  in  Africa  and  all  white  governments  by  coordinated  tribal  uprising. 
It  failed  because  the  powerful  Masai,  Kamba  and  Kavironde  tribes  would  not 
join.  Still  Kenya  authorities  failed  to  take  the  Kenyatta  threat  seriously. 
Only  when  a  letter  to  Kenyatta  from  Moscow  came  into  the  possession  of  the 
authorities  was  action  taken  against  the  Mau  Ma  us. 

The  situation  in  Liberia,  where  the  Firestone  Rubber  Co.  and  American-owned 
mines  are  the  principal  source  of  Government  revenue,  is  bad.  The  free  Negro 
Republic  has  three  divisions  of  population.  There  are  12,000  "citizens" — former 
American  slaves  who  were  repatriated  in  forming  the  Republic.  They  have 
Government  jobs.  Then  there  are  about  80,000  assimilated  natives,  who  usually 
have  the  menial  Government  jobs.  The  1,800,000  other  natives,  in  28  tribes,  hate 
the  "citizens,"  the  second  group  of  native  Government  workers,  and,  above  all 
else,  the  whites.  It  is  an  ideal  Commvmist  infiltration  setup.  The  tribesmen  are 
told  that  all  their  troubles  stem  from  the  white  men. 

Nigeria,  where  90  percent  of  American  columbite  and  tantalite— critical  short- 
supply  strategic  materials — come,  is  seething  with  Communist  incitement  to 
rebellion.     (Aziwike  and  his  aides.) 

N.  B.  A  Hamburg  report  on  April  28,  1954,  stated: 

"A  special  training  course  for  11  Indian  and  8  Nigerian  Communists  is 
currently  being  held  at  the  SED  school  in  Dresden-Heidenau.  The  course  is 
directed  by  the  Soviet  Communist  Party.  In  another  course,  8  Greek  and 
12  Spanish  Communists  are  taught  by  Soviet  Party  instructors  to  organize 
illegal  party  cells  in  their  home  countries." 
The  Indian  Communist  activities  have  centered  in  South  Africa  and  have  been 
a  big  element  in  the  "color-line"  rioting  against  the  Malan  government. 

N.  B.  An  indication  of  the  ideological  war  already  being  fought  between 
Africa  and  India  is  indicated  in  the  India  Information  Service  broadcast  from 
Delhi  on  May  6,  1954,  replying  to  a  charge  by  Dr.  Daniel  Malan,  South 
African  Prime  Minister  that  "Nehru  had  his  eyes  on  Africa",  and  that 
"Nehru  is  the  enemy  of  the  white  man."     It  said: 

"If  democratic  bodies  like  the  African  National  Congress,  the  South 
African  Indian  Congre.ss,  and  the  South  Arican  colored  people's  organizations 
are  joining  together  to  challenge  white  supremacy,  the  motive  force  is  nothing 
so  recent  as  Russian  communism,  but  springs  from  man's  unconquerable 
mind,  which  is  the  same  for  black,  brown,  and  white." 
Reports  are  that  the  India-Africa  Council,  directed  from  New  Delhi,  will  have 
a  Cairo  conference  some  time  during  1954  to  rally  all  African  radical  and  sub- 


44  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

versive  groups  to  united  action.  An  all-Africa  conference,  supersecret,  is  to  be- 
held in  interior  Africa,  according  to  report,  to  further  coordinate  tribal  rebellion 
in  all  colonial  areas. 

Combating  this  trend,  the  Africa  Capricorn  Society  is  to  confer  at  Mbeye, 
Tanganyika,  in  August  of  this  year.  The  Capricorn  Society  is  basically  a  move- 
ment to  create  a  new  state  composed  of  Uganda,  Kenya,  Tanganyika,  Southern 
Rhodesia,  and  the  northern  part  of  the  Bechuanaland  protectorate,  within  the 
British  Commonwealth. 

Such  a  proposal  would  consolidate  production  of  meat,  coal,  iron,  lime,  gold, 
copper,  tin,  magnesite,  tungsten,  and  asbestos,  with  development  of  unlimited 
hydroelectric  power,  and  give  the  new  area  a  more  solid  government  than  the 
present  separate  colony  setup. 

The  Communist  effort  to  incite  the  Negroes  south  of  the  Sahara  is  a  separate 
movement,  though  coordinated  by  the  same  Russian  staff  at  Moscow,  from  the 
incitement  of  the  Arabs  north  of  the  desert. 

N.  B.  Under  the  latest  pro-Western  trend  of  the  Iraqi  Government,  a 
broadcast  on  May  13,  1954,  stated  that  Middle  East  Arab  League  States 
"were  to  be  taken  to  combat  Communism"  in  that  area.     That  same  broad- 
cast  quoted   "American   intelligence  sources"    as   stating  there   are   about 
50,000  members  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  Middle  East.     The  use  of 
the  term  Arab  League  and  Arab  States  would  include  North  Africa. 
The  Moslem  religion  of  the  North  African  Arabs  makes  communism  and  its 
antireligious  position  anathema.     At  the  same  time  the  Arabs  listen  to  the  propa- 
ganda on  freedom  and  for  an  Arab  Nation  with  independent  status.     As  early 
as  January  1948,  Maximo v,  Russian  consul  general  in  Algiers,  advised  Moscow 
against  pushing  Algerian  nationalism  at  that  time — on  the  ground  that  if  France 
went  Communist,  it  would  be  better  to  have  a  colonial  Algeria  as  part  of  France 
than  to  have  a  separate  Arab  anti-Communist  free  state  on  the  southern  shore  of 
the  Mediterranean. 

Since  the  establishment  of  American  bases  in  North  Africa,  however,  the 
Communists  have  established  liaison  with  the  Arab  League  and  are  again  backing 
Arab  nationalism,  but  more  actively  in  Morocco  and  in  Tunisia,  where  there  are 
larger  urban  radical  populations,  than  in  the  more  highly  agricultural  economy 
of  Algeria. 

N.  B.  On  May  12,  1954,  the  Deutschlansender  broadcast,  in  German,  a 
warning  that  between  May  2  and  May  9,  over  100  agitators  and  13  agents 
had  been  sent  into  West  Germany,  with  5  of  the  13  earmarked  for  eventual 
Soviet  service  in  Morocco  and  Switzerland. 
In  summary: 

Russian  communism  feels  that  Asia  is  progressing  adequately  toward  com- 
munism. 

Africa,  today,  is  in  the  infiltration  state  where  Asia  was  from  1920  to  1945, 
Africa,  in  due  course,  is  to  be  steered  to  local  nationalism  and  freedom,  and  then 
incorporated  in  world  communism. 

Then  American  and  the  Western  Hemisphere  are  to  be  attacked  through  infiltra- 
tion of  Latin  America.  Then  the  last  source  of  raw  materials  for  industrial 
North  America  will  be  dried  up. 

As  recently  as  February  of  this  year  I  was  in  Morocco,  North  Africa.  In  a 
brief  10-day  period  two  attempts  were  made  to  assassinate  the  Sultan  of  Morocco, 
placed  in  the  position  of  ruler  by  the  French  and  the  splendidly  anti-Communist 
Resident-General  Auguste  Guilliaume.  The  official,  though  unpublicized  belief 
of  the  Moroccan  leadership  is  that  the  Arab  League  is  being  duped  by  Com- 
munist agitators  to  incite  rebellion  and  sedition  by  urging  nationalism  and 
freedom  from  colonialism  among  the  Arabs,  though  the  Arabs,  traditionally  for 
religious  grounds,  detest  communism.  A  Moroccan  upraising  against  the  West 
would,  of  course,  cost  the  United  States  the  air  and  naval  bases  south  of  the 
Mediterranean  without  which  ground  troops  in  Europe  could  not  be  protected 
in  any  aggressive  thrust  westward  by  the  Soviet  in  Europe. 

The  stake  for  which  communism  and  freedom  fight  in  Africa  is  best  visualized 
by  the  area,  population  and  wealth  involved.     Here  it  is: 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 


45 


Country 

Area  (square 
miles) 

Population 

Principal  raw  materials 

472, 500 

12, 646, 275 

Gold,  diamonds,  uranium,  coal,  copper,  tin,  iron, 

lead,  lime,  manganese,  pb'tinum,  salt,  talc, 
chrome,  mica,  graphite,  beryl,  corn,  sugar,  fruit. 

Kenya      

224. 960 
93,  981 

5,  406, 000 
5.  050, 000 

Coffee,  tea,  sisal,  dairy  products,  minerals. 

Ueandi.-..  

Undeveloped. 

Tanganyika 

362, 688 

7, 800,  COO 

Sisal,  cotton,  coffee,  hides,  beeswax,  ivory,  dia- 

monds, lead,  gold,  mica. 

Southwest  Africa.   

317,  725 

379, 000 

Not  available. 

Southern  Rhodesia 

150,333 

2, 158,  350 

Gold,  chrome,  coal,  asbestos,  corn,  cotton,  tobacco. 

Northern  Rhodesia 

390.  323 

1.866.0C0 

Copper,  zinc,  cobalt,  gold,  vanadium,  manganese. 

Nvasaland - 

47,  404 

2,  349,  OrO 

Tea,  wheat,  cotton,  rubber,  tobacco. 

Basutoland.-  

11,716 

555.  390 

Wool,  wheat  cereals  (whites  can  own  land). 

Bechuanaland.. 

294,  020 

294,  000 

Cattle  and  dairving. 

6,704 

184,  000 

Gold,  tobacco,  tin,  asbestos,  tobacco,  corn,  butter. 

livestock. 

Nigeria    -  

383, 593 

23,  973, 000 

Tin,  lead,  rubber,  palm  kernels,  cotton  lint,  cocca, 

hides,  peanuts,  tantalite. 

British  Cameroons 

34, 081 

1,  027, 000 

Cloves,  vanilla,  ginger,  pepper,  ivory,  palm  oil. 

Gambia 

4,  005 

268.  000 

Undeveloped. 

Sierra  Leone.  _- 

27, 925 

1. 880. 000 

Iron,  hides,  rice,  nuts,  chrome,  gold,  diamonds. 

Gold  Coast     .     

78.  802 
24.379 

3.  734.  000 
823. 672 

Manganese  (2d  onlv  to  U.  S.  S.  R.),  aluminum. 

Ashanti --  

Gold,  diamonds,  cacao. 

British  SomalUand 

68,000 

500. 000 

Skins,  resin,  gum,  goats,  sheep. 

Belgian  Congo 

904,  757 

11,  259,  COO 

Palm  oil,  cott-jn.  nuts,  timber,  coffee,  cocoa,  rubber, 

gum,    sugar,    ivory,    copper,    diamonds,    gold, 

cobalt,  tintalum,  silver,  uranium,  ndium. 

Egypt    

386, 000 

20.  729,  000 

Phosphate,  petrr^leum,  magnesia  ochres,  sulphate. 

talc,  gvpsum.  salt,  gold,  alum,  copper,  beryl. 

Ethiopa 

350, 000 

15,  000, 000 

Iron,  cold,  platinum,  copper,  coal,  sulphur,  potash, 

rubber  trees,  copper,  hides,  tobacco. 

Eritrea 

48,  350 

1. 080.  000 

Gold,  petroleum,  stock  raising. 

Algeria 

847,  552 

8.  676, 000 

Agricultural  products,  wine,  iron,  zinc,  lead, 
mereurv,  copper,  antimony. 

Tunisia 

43,  313 

3,231.000 

Fruits,  agriculture,  henna,  corn,  lead,  iron,  phos- 
phate, zinc. 

Morocco 

172, 104 

10, 442. 000 

Skins,  hides,  wood,  poultry,  eggs,  leather  goods, 
oil.  phosphate,  manganese. 

Angola 

481,  351 

4,111,796 

Coffee,  rubber,  wax,  sugar,  cotton,  diamonds, 
copper,  iron,  salt,  gold. 

Mozambique 

297,  731 

5, 090,  294 

Sugar,  cotton,  nuts,  copra,  sisal,  beeswax,  coal, 
samarskite,  silver,  uranium,  asbestos. 

Sudan 

967, 500 

8, 309, 000 

Copper,  gold,  salt,  gum  arabic,  sesame,  ivory,  gold, 
agricultural  products. 

Total 

6, 867, 497 

152. 801.  647 

French  West  Africa 

959,  256 

4, 386.  000 

Gold,  copper,  lead,  zinc,  diamonds,  ivory. 

French  SomalUand 

9,071 

48, 000 

Hides,  coffee,  ivory. 

Madagascar 

241,  094 

4, 350,  700 

Rice,  vanilla,  maize,  sugar,  grain,  cloves,  tobacco. 

graphite,  mica,  nickel,  gold,  radium,  agricultural 

products,  hides. 

Liberia ._    -..  . 

43.000 

2,  500.  COO 

Fiber,  rubber,  rice,  gold,  iron,  diamonds. 

Libya 

1,100,000 

1.  340.  000 

Very  little  prrduction,  poorest  area  in  world. 

Total 

9,  219,  918 

165, 426,  347 

Communism's  foothold  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  aside  from  the  United 
States,  and  Canadian  spj^  exposures  since  1946,  is  too  well  known  to  need  review 
here.  The  Central  and  South  American  infiltration  has  been  in  the  headlines 
through  the  Guatemalan  situation  revealed  recently. 

But  Guatemala  is  but  one  section  of  the  drive  that  has  been  underway  since 
the  end  of  World  War  Ilwopenly,  and  covertly  for  some  time  prior  to  that.  As 
briefly  as  possible,  I  would  like  to  put  that  into  the  record — after  all  South 
America  is,  next  after  Africa,  on  the  Soviet  timetable  for  establishment  of  the 
Communist  world. 

The  Communist  drive  in  Central  and  South  America  is  linked,  logically  enough 
with  the  failure  of  communism  to  seize  strategic  Gibraltar  as  a  result  of  the 
Spanish  civil  war  in  1937-38.  Franco,  seeking  to  oust  the  definitely  pro-Com- 
munist Loyalist  Government  in  Spain,  found  international  Communist  brigades 
fighting  against  him,  with  Russian-type  equipment  in  their  hands.  Rightfully 
or  not  he  accepted  aid  from  Nazi  sources.  When  the  Loyalists  lost  and  the 
Communist  government  sought  refuge  in  Mexico,  the  whole  Communist  propa- 
ganda machine  went  into  action  to  label  Franco  with  every  name  in  the  dictionary. 

When  World  War  II  began  Germany  occupied  France  and  exerted  every  possible 
pressure  to  force  Franco  to  yield  Gibraltar  and  the  gateway  to  the  Mediterranean 
lifeline  to  Suez  and  the  East.     Had  he  vielded  the  outcome  of  the  entire  war 


46  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

might  well  have  been  a  Nazi  victory.  An  American  landing  in  Africa  and  the 
establishment  of  a  base  there  would  have  been  far  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 

Spanish-  and  Portuguese-speaking  Central  and  South  America  became  a  hotbed 
of  Communist  propaganda,  headed  by  the  refugee  Communist  government  from 
Spain.  Mexico,  in  particular,  and  Cuba,  secondarily  became  the  Western  Hem- 
isphere bases  for  European  communism. 

Peron,  in  the  Argentine,  hated  the  United  States.  He  offered  sanctuary  to 
Nazi  naval  forces  during  the  war,  and  when  Germany  fell,  began  to  flirt  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  the  elections  in  Uruguay,  in  November  1946,  Peron  used  every 
possible  means  to  elect  an  anti-American  government  in  the  republic  to  his 
immediate  north. 

In  January  1950  a  survey  of  the  Central  American  and  South  American  area 
uncovered  these  facts,  dating  back  to  the  beginning  of  World  War  II. 

There  are  about  1,250,000  Slavs  in  South  America,  with  about  70  percent  of 
them  organized  in  language  groups,  principally  by  the  Soviet.  It  was  revealed 
that  in  November  1941  Communist  leaders  through  the  Western  Hemisphere 
met  in  Mexico  City  to  receive  new  directives  from  Moscow  after  the  Soviet's 
entry  into  the  war.  Under  direction  of  Kalnikoff  and  a  Mrs.  Nierska  the  orders 
were  drafted  for  intensive  pan-Slav  propaganda,  organization  of  armed  groups, 
but  no  open  Communist  affiliations. 

August  11,  1942,  the  Communist  Latin- American  Slav  Committee  was  estab- 
lished in  Moscow  under  direction  of  Alexander  Gondurov.  Two  months  later  a 
coordinating  committee  was  formed  in  Montevideo  under  a  Dr.  Karatev  and  one 
Michael  Lefitcharsev.  Heavy  subsidies  were  arranged  for  a  Slav  press  in  South 
America. 

By  the  end  of  1947,  60  percent  of  all  the  Slavs  in  Latin  America  belonged  to 
organizations  under  direct  control  of  the  Soviet. 

■  From  the  November  1941  conference  in  Mexico  City  the  organization  of  military 
forces  has  been  ordered  to  be  held  in  reserve  until  after  the  war  to  then  promote- 
revolutions  and  improve  the  Soviet's  world  strength  position. 

A  German,  Baron  Veith  von  Golssenau  (alias  Ludwig  Renn),  and  the  Italian 
Communist  leader,  Vittorio  Vidali,  were  given  the  1941  assignment  to  head  the 
Central  American  central  staff. 

The  Panama  Canal  Zone,  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Honduras  were  deemed 
of  sufficient  importance  to  be  listed  as  key  points  to  attack.  It  was  considered 
that  these  plans  should  be  prepared  while  relations  with  the  United  States  were 
still  friendly.     Action  was  to  come  when  World  War  II  ended. 

Vidali  traveled  tirelessly  during  the  war  years,  planning  an  international  bri- 
gade, such  as  had  been  used  in  Spain.  By  the  summer  of  1945  this  brigade  was 
reported  to  have  1,921  officers  and  11,800  men  in  the  ranks.  Units  of  the  brigade 
were  widely  scattered  but  were  strongest  in  Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Haiti, 
and  Guatemala. 

Von  Golssenau,  before  he  returned  to  Russia  in  1947  mapped  much  of  the 
Central  American  and  Caribbean  area.  He  supervised  organization  of  bases  for 
landing  arms  and  ammunition.  He  included  British  Honduras  in  his  survey. 
Vidali  assumed  command  after  Von  Golssenau  left,  helped  by  two  men  whose 
Communist  Party  names  were  Aire  and  Adi.  In  1947  Vidali  was  transferred  to 
Trieste  and  his  place  was  taken  by  a  Red  Army  officer  who  had  fought  in  the 
Spanish  civil  war  and  spoke  very  good  Spanish. 

When  United  States-Soviet  relations  began  to  deteriorate  the  Communist 
international  brigade  went  into  action.  At  one  time  in  1947  forces  were  actually 
concentrated  in  Cuba  with  a  view  to  invading  San  Domingo.  Only  firm  action 
by  Cuban  authorities,  spurred  by  strong  representations  from  Washington 
frustrated  this  plan. 

Later  the  brigade  used  detachments  in  Venezuela  during  the  disturbances 
which  put  the  leftist  Bethancourt  in  power.  It  was  also  used  during  the  riots  in 
Panama  City. 

In  1948  the  brigade  was  used  to  terrorize  San  Salvador  after  the  election  of  a 
conservative  president.  The  result  was  that  a  leftist  coalition  took  power, 
dominated  by  one  of  the  most  powerful  Kremlin  men  in  the  hemisphere. 

Before  his  death  in  1945  Constantin  Oumanski,  ostensibly  Soviet  minister  to 
Mexico,  wrote  a  report  dealing  with  espionage  and  sabotage  in  the  United  States, 
and  listing  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  locks  at  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  Mich.,  as  the 
two  most  vulnerable  strategic  spots  for  the  United  States,  in  North  America. 
He  placed  top  importance  on  Central  and  South  America  as  a  base  for  Communist 
operations  in  the  hemisphere. 

Oumanski,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  killed  when  his  plane,  which  had  just  taken 
ofiF  from  Mexico  City,  exploded.     In  November  1945,  just  after  his  death,  two 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  47 

Soviet  intelligence  officers,  using  the  names  of  Vladimir  Novak  and  Joseph  Ard- 
man,  arrived  in  Mexico  City.  After  an  extensive  survey  in  Panama  they  moved 
to  Cuba,  changed  their  names  and  in  August  1946  went  to  Florida,  and  other 
places  north  and  west  in  the  United  States.  Then  they  went  back  to  Mexico. 
By  February  1947  Moscow  had  a  complete  survey  of  the  whole  thesis  put  forward 
by  Oumanski.  By  the  spring  of  1947  there  was  a  vastly  increased  influx  of 
Soviet  agents  into  Latin  America. 

Then,  in  February  1948,  an  astonisherl  American  public  learned  that  the 
Panama  National  Assembly  had  unanimously  rejected  a  long-term  Unites'.  States 
lease  for  bases  protecting  the  canal.  This  rejection  was  a  direct  result  of  f'irec- 
tives  after  Oumanski  submitted  his  report.  The  Kremlin  ordered  that  relations 
between  the  United.  States  and  Panama  must  be  upset.  The  United  States  re- 
fused to  light  the  fuse  for  the  expected  explosion.  Moscow  sent  more  agents  into 
Panama.  Arms,  munitions,  and  explosives  began  to  arrive  from  one  source  or 
another. 

But,  after  the  departure  of  Von  Golssenau  and  Vidali  conditions  improved,  in 
Mexico,  particularly.  Centralization  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  Communist 
organization  was  ordered,  first  to  Havana  and  then  to  Montevideo.  Some  units 
went  to  Gua,temala. 

Ten  million  dollars  more  than  in  any  preceding  month  went  to  Mexican  Com- 
munist headquarters  in  May  1948.  Orders  called  for  west  coast  concentiation  of 
Communist  activities,  from  Alaska  all  the  way  to  Chile. 

Technical  espionage  was  directed  from  Latin  American  Polish  legations. 
Toledano,  in  Mexico,  blossomed  out  at  the  head  of  a  new  party.  Communist 
activity  increased,  in  S'icaragua,  Honduras,  and  Panama.  Agitation  was  stepped 
up  in  the  Ecuador  oil  fields.  The  1948  disturbances  in  Peru  were  a  ""'irect  outcome 
of  Communist  activities.  In  Bolivia  the  Communists  got  arms  and  took  over  a 
Neo-Fascist  organization  originally  set  up  by  the  Germans.  In  Venezuela  efforts 
were  made  to  organize  the  oil  fields  so  as  to  disrupt  American  oil  supplies  in  the 
event  of  World  War  III. 

Direction  shifted  from  the  Polish  to  the  Czechoslovakian  legations  in  Latin 
America.  A  former  GPU  agent  in  Paris,  Laszle  Ratwany,  using  the  name  of 
Schmidt  was  one  of  the  most  important  men  in  the  network. 

The  attempted  revolution  in  the  Dominican  Republic  in  June  1949,  was  in- 
spired by  Communists  and  helped  by  the  Caribbean  Legion.  Preparations  were 
started  for  a  revolution  in  Nicaragua  that  year.     This  included  shipment  of  arms. 

As  of  May  1950,  Col.  Alexander  Trusov,  Mexico  City  military  attach^  at  the 
Soviet  Embassy  headed  the  Soviet  intelligence  setup.  Col.  Boris  E.  Rudnev  was 
his  assistant.  Capt.  Gorgei  E.  Badan,  Col.  Gavrilovich  Garikov,  Lt.  Col.  Feodor 
V.  Dremov  were  on  the  staff. 

In  El  Salvador  communism  is  banned  by  law.  Some  underground  cells  were  in 
existence  in  mid-1950  with  one  Colonel  Castanero  in  charge  of  Communist  ac- 
tivities but  operating  from  outside  the  country. 

In  Honduras,  in  mid-1950  Armando  Rodriguez  and  Francisco  Morazan  non- 
Communists  but  professional  revolutionaries  were  active. 

British  Honduras  at  this  time  closed  off  fishing  boundaries  from  Guatemala. 

Mexico  centered  its  activities  at  this  time  on  the  Soviet  endorsed  "peace  con- 
ference." In  August  1950,  opponents  in  the  Mexican  trade-union  movement 
produced  documents  linking  Toledano  with  Louis  Saillant  and  Sergei  Rostovi, 
both  identified  Communists.  Their  program  was  outlined  as  separation  of  Central 
America  from  the  United  States  zone  of  influence  and  into  cooperation  with  the 
U.  S-  S.  R. 

As  of  December  1952,  there  was  still  a  strong  Communist  movement  in  Bolivia. 
Chile  and  Ecuador  were  less  Communist,  but  more  pro-Peron.  Colombia  and 
Venezuela  are  in  turmoil,  but  with  the  Communists  lacking  as  much  power  as 
formerly.  Neither  Peru  nor  Uruguay  have  yielded  to  the  Peron  bloc.  Generally 
the  Communists  in  South  America  have  taken  to  the  world  line  of  the  Kremlin — 
"nationalist"  support,  anti-American  and  in  constant  protest  against  "Wall 
Street  imperalists." 

Last  November,  Chile,  ordering  the  deportation  of  Jacob  Wainster,  Rumanian 
Communist,  took  a  big  step  to  the  right.  The  Argentine,  however,  entering 
into  a  Soviet  trade  pact,  boosted  Communist  undercover  activities.  As  of  this 
month  Mexico  was  moving  into  the  Communist  picture  again,  though  Guatemala, 
as  during  the  last  2  years,  was  the  obvious  Red  capital  of  the  hemisphere. 

The  South  American  and  Central  American,  picture  is  outlined  because  it  is, 
on  the  Kremlin  world-conquest  timetable,  the  next  step  after  Africa.     If  it  should 


48 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 


be  prevented,  the  free  nations  should  recognize  that  the  stake,  in  land,  people 
and  wealth  is: 


Countiy 

Area 
(square 
miles) 

Population 

Principal  raw  materials 

British  Honduras 

British  Guiana    -.. 

8, 867 
83, 000 

1, 078,  769 
416,040 

3,  288, 000 

286, 396 
439,  997 

23,000 

44,  206 
19, 332 

175,830 
45, 452 
44,411 

760,  383 

57, 145 

28,  575 

150,  515 

514, 059 

13, 176 

72, 153 

352, 150 

65, 000 
408, 000 

17,  641, 000 
3, 054, 000 

52,  619,  000 

5,  916, 000 
11,260,000 

825,  000 

5. 469, 000 
2, 167, 000 
3, 076, 933 
2,887,000 
1,  534, 000 
26,  332, 000 

1, 088, 000 

865, 285 

1, 425,  000 

8,  ,558,  000 

1,  920, 000 

2,  353, 000 
4,  985,  716 

Mahogany,  fruits,  chicle. 

Gold,   diamonds,   manganese,   mica,   bauxite,   sugar, 

sugar,  timber,  rice,  rum,  charcoal,  copra. 
Silver,  copper,  gold,  petroleum,  cattle,  agriculture. 

Tin,  silver,  copper,  lead    zinc,  antimonv,  bismuth, 

Brazil          -  

wolfram,  gold,  lime,  rubber,  cinchona,  bark,  tung- 
sten, petroleum,  coffee,  agriculture. 
Manganese,  monazite  (thorium),  gold,  mica,  nickel. 

Chile  

quartz,  tantalite,  tungsten,  iron,  coal,  coffee,  steel,^ 
cotton,  cattle,  fruit,  timber,  rice,  agricultural  prod- 
ucts. 
Nitrate,  iodine,  copper,  iron,  coal,  gold,  silver,  cobalt. 

zinc,  manganese,  mica,  mercury,  salt,  sulfur,  marble, 
ony.v,  grain,  fruit. 
Agriculture,  coffee,  rice,  cotton,  sugar,  bananas,  timber, 

Costa  Rica       

rubber,  emeralds,  gold,  silver,  copper,  lead,  mercury, 
cinnabar,   manganese,    platinum,   coal,   iron,   hme, 
salt,  petroleum. 
Coffee,  bananas,  cocoa,  abaca,  corn,  sugar,  rice,  tobacco. 

Cuba      .-  

timber,  gold,  silver,  quartz,  alabaster,   alum,   mer- 
cury, sulfur,  copper. 
Iron,  copper,  manganese,  gold,  petroleum,  salt,  sugar. 

Dominican  Republic 

tobacco,  timber,  fruits,  fibers. 
Silver,  platinum,  copper,  salt,  iron,  coal,  petroleum, 

sugar,  coffee,  rice,  tobacco. 
Silver,    petroleum,   copper,    iron,   lead,    coal,   sulfur. 

Guatemala         

agriculture,  balsa  wood. 
Coffee,  bananas,  sugar,  chicle,  sUver,  gold,  copper,  iron, 

chrome,  lead. 
Gold,  silver,  coppei,  lead,  zinc,  iron,  antimony,  coal. 

bananas,  hardwood,  coffee,  tobacco. 
Silver,  gold,  copper,  lead,  zinc,  antimony,  mercury. 

arsenic,  graphite,  molybdenum,  coal,  opals,  petro- 
leum, agriculture,  cattle,  fisheries,  timber,  cotton, 
sisal,  bananas. 
Timber,  gold,  stockraising,  sugar,  coffee,  hides. 

Timber,  stockraisirg,  bananas. 

Paraguay    

Timber,  meats,  hides,  tobacco,  cotton,  grains. 

Cotton,  sugar,  agriculture,  vanadium,  copper. 

Coffee,  gold,  sugar,  balsam. 

Uruguay       -  - 

Do. 

Venezuela..- 

Agriculture,  meat,  coffee,  petroleum,  hides,  rubber. 

Total 

7, 901,  456 

53, 488, 934 

Completely  out  of  continuity,  but  to  further  present  the  world  picture,  I  would 
like  to  include  in  this  record  a  document  that  came  to  me  from  confidential  sources 
which  I  believe  to  be  reliable.  It  is  a  translation  of  a  secret  pa,ct  reported  to 
have  been  signed  in  Moscow  on  February  12,  1950 — 4  months  before  the  aggres- 
sion by  North  Korean  forces  was  launched.  The  document  reportedly  was  signed 
for  Fed  China  by  Chou-En  Lai,  who  represents  Fed  China  at  the  current  Far 
East  peace  sessions  in  Geneva.  It  was  reportedly  signed  for  the  Soviet  by  Andrei 
N.  Vishinsky — known  to  the  Atnericans  for  his  bitter  antiwest  attitudes  while 
serving  in  this  country  on  behalf  of  the  Kremlin. 

I  have  no  proof,  naturally,  of  the  authenticity  of  a  document  intended  to  be 
held  secret  by  the  top  level,  and  first-level  satellite  of  the  Fed  conspiracy  to  rule 
the  world.  I  merely  suggest  that  public  records  of  what  has  transpired  from  early 
1950  to  date  confirm  some,  at  least,  of  the  19  articles  of  the  transcript.  It  is  my 
information  that  the  translation  was  obta,ined  by  Chinese  nationalist  intelligence 
sources  and  then  transmitted  to  this  country.  It  is  possible  that  the  committee 
may  choose  to  make  further  investigation  of  this  reported  agreement,  in  executive 
session,  with  witnesses  of  those  agencies  of  our  Government  which  would  know 
more  about  its  possible  authenticity  than  I. 

The  document,  as  sent  to  me,  reads: 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  49 

"  [Translation] 
"Articles  of  Mao-Stalin  Secret  Pact 

"Chinese  People's  Pepublic  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics — 
Special  Friendship  Pact. 

"The  Central  People's  Government  of  the  Chinese  People's  Pepublic  and  the 
Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Fepublics,  for 
the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  secret  cooperation  between  the  Chinese  People's 
Pepublic  and  the  Union  of  Socialist  Pepublic,  in  order  to  prevent  together  any 
form  of  aggressive  act  by  Imperialistic  policy  as  well  as  of  the  resurgence  of 
Japanese  Imperialism,  with  a  view  to  establish  a  new  order  in  Asia,  and  to 
strengthen  the  Chinese-Soviet  friendly,  cooperative  relationship,  especially  con- 
clude, in  addition  to  the  Two  Countries  Friendship  Alliance  Mutual  Aid  Pact, 
a  Special  Agreement,  as  well  as  each  appoint  a  Plenipotentiary  Delegate  as  below. 

"The  Chinese  People's  Government  of  the  Chinese  People's  Pepublic  specially 
appoint  as  Special  Envoy  the  Chairman  of  the  Chinese  Political  Affairs  Depart- 
ment and  Foreign  Minister,  Chou  En-Lai. 

"The  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  specially  appoint 
the  Foreign  Commissar  Andrei  Noraiwich  Vishinsky. 

"The  two  plenipotentiary  Delegates,  after  having  examined  together  the  docu- 
ment and  found  it  appropriate,  agreed  to  the  following  provisions: 

"Article  1.  The  contracting  parties,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  together 
Imperialistic  invasions  and  of  coping  with  the  third  world  war,  agree  that  the 
Chinese  People's  Republic  will  permit  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
to^stntion  troops  within  the  Chinese  boundary  with  a  view  to  protect  together 
■world  peace. 

"Article  2.  As  from  the  date  of  conclusion  of  this  pact,  the  Chinese  People's 
Republic  will  first  assign  Northeast  and  North  China  sea  and  air  bases  to  the 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  as  a  military  measure,  and  also  through  the  Chinese 
Liberation  Army,  will  assume  responsibility  of  assisting  in  the  carrying  out  of 
the  liberation  of  Southeast  Asia  so  as  to  effectuate  the  completion  of  the  Liberation 
of  the  whole  of  Asia. 

"Article  3.  The  contracting  parties  agree  to  reorganize  the  Chinese  People's 
Liberation  Army  into  (an)  International  Communist  Army,  to  be  under  the 
direct  command  of  the  highest  officer  of  the  Red  Army. 

"Article  4.  The  Chinese  Republic  will  be  responsible  for  the  mobilization  of 
ten  million  Chinese  workmen  to  assist  Soviet  Russia  to  collectively  construct  the 
Sino-Soviet  military  establishments  in  order  to  cope  with  imperialistic  activities 
and  aggression. 

"Article  5.  The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will  make  available  all  North 
China  ports  to  the  stationing  of  Soviet  troops,  as  well  as  to  provide  free  access 
and  exit.  Such  ports  will  include  Chinv/antao,  Haichow,  Chiefoo,  Weihaiwei, 
Tsingtae  and  Dairen. 

"Article  6.  The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will,  before  the  end  of  this  year, 
increase  the  number  of  soldiers  by  four  million  so  as  to  be  ready  for  meeting  the 
imperialistic  act  of  aggression. 

"Article  7.  The  population  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  must,  owing 
to  the  existing  lack  of  resources,  be  diminished  by  100,000,000,  since  otherwise 
they  cannot  be  sustained.  Its  detailed  procedures  are  to  be  determined  by  the 
Chinese  People's  government  themselves. 

"Article  8.  All  government  Departments  of  the  Central  People's  Govern- 
ment of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  should  invite  technical  personnel  from 
the  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  as  advisors. 

"Article  9.  The  two  contracting  parties  agree  to  the  sending  bj^  the  Soviet 
Government  of  technical  personnel,  to  participate  in  the  operation  of  the  main 
industries  in  the  various  distiicts  of  China.  The  Government  of  the  Chinese 
People's  Republic  agree  to  accord  them  with  favorable  treatment  in  accordance 
with  the  favorable  'supply  system.' 

"Article  10.  The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will  open  in  Soviet  trade  coastal 
ports  and  inland  markets,  as  well  as  agree  to  levy  duties  at  the  1/100  part  under 
preferential  rates. 

"Article  11.  Both  contracting  parties  agree,  under  mutually  beneficial  and 
mutually  profitable  conditionsj  to  carry  out  barter  exchange  for  commodities  in 
order  to  establish  friendly  relations. 

►  "Article  12.  The  government  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  will  have  special  right  to 
allocate  the  iron  and  other  mineral  raw  materials  within  the  boundary  of  the 
■Chinese  People's  Republic:  of  which  the  lead  mines,  with  the  exception  of  retain- 


50  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

ing  20  percent  of  the. total  yearly  production  for  self  use,  the  rest  should  be 
supplied  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  to  expand  the  heavy  industries  in  order  to  assist  in 
the  industrialization  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic, 

"Article  13.  Within  the  boundary  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  the  thir- 
teen cities — Peking,  Tientsin,  Shanghai,  Kwangchow,  Changsha,  Hangchow, 
Kiukiang,  Chungking,  Fu-hu,  Amoy,  Swatow,  Foochow, — are  to  be  demarcated 
as  to  the  central  district  to  serve  as  residential  districts  for  immediate  immigrants 
from  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 

"Article  14.  The  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  for  purposes  of  fulfilling 
the  request  of  the  Central  People's  Government  of  the  Central  (Chinese)  People's 
Republic,  extends  a  credit  of  U.  S.  $300,000,000  to  China,  (the  principle  of  utiliza- 
tion and  repayment  of  the  credit  to  be  specified  in  the  credit  agreement).  The 
Chinese  Peoi  le's  Republic,  however,  must  use  as  security  the  entire  raw  material 
production  of  the  Northeast  and  North  China  with  the  kinds  of  raw  material  to 
be  determined  according  to  its  actual  needs  by  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  at  the  time  of 
repayment. 

"Article  15.  The  contracting  parties  both  agree  that  the  Soviet  Government 
shall  share  in  the  administration  of  the  Changehun  Railway  and  the  fifty  Chinese 
miles  of  territory  along  the  railroad.  The  offices  in  which  the  delegates  from  both 
parties  are  responsible,  such  as  the  Head  of  the  Railroad  Department,  Chairman 
of  Directors  (Directors),  are  owing  to  the  present  necessity,  to  be  undertaken  by 
the  Soviet  delegates,  while  the  deputies  are  to  be  undertaken  by  the  Chinese. 

"Article  16.  According  to  the  Manchurian  Agreement  concluded  between  the 
Chinese  Communist  Party  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  shall  continue  to  enjoy  special  trading  rights.  The  Chinese  People's 
Republic  ought  to  provide  corn  and  commodities  to  the  Soviet  Government. 

"Article  17.  Both  contracting  parties  agree  to  the  establishment  of  People's 
Government  by  the  different  races  of  people  in  Inner  Mongolia,  Sinkiang,  and 
Tibet  through  both  sides  assumption  of  responsibility  in  helping  their  independ- 
ence. 

"Article  18.  The  contracted  agreement  shall,  after  ratification  by  both 
parties,  become  immediately  effective.  The  ratification  papers  are  to  be  ex- 
changed in  China. 

"Article  19.  The  contracted  agreement  pertains  to  the  nature  of  high  policy 
secret.  The  contracting  parties  both  have  duty  to  keep  it  secret  and  not  to 
publicly  announce  it. 

"Done  in  Moscow  on  February  12  in  the  year  1950  in  duplicate:  each  copy  tO' 
be  written  in  Chinese  and  Russian.  Either  copy  in  both  languages  are  equally 
eflfective. 

"Plenipotentiary  Delegate  of  the  Central  People's  Government  of  Chinese 
People's  Government — Chou  En-lai. 

"Plenipotentiary  Delegate  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics — Andrei  Noravich  Vishinsky." 

In  view  of  the  subsequent  policy  position  of  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East 
under  the  administration  then  in  control  of  the  Congress  and  the  White  House, 
a  military  intelligence  estimate  of  the  Chinese  situation  and  the  Soviet  Far 
Eastern  influence,  prepared  as  a  secret  document  in  1945,  and  subsequently 
declassified,  should  show  in  the  record  of  this  committee.  A  photostat  of  that 
report,  showing  the  name  of  the  Brigadier  General  who  submitted  it  to  higher 
military  authority,  and  also  showing  the  declassification  of  the  document,  follows. 

Unclassified  by  authority  of  the  Director  of  Intelligence,  GSUSA. 

By  Seth  Parker. 
Date  24  AugusL 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  51 

THE  CHINESE  COMMUNIST  MOVEMENT 

5  July  1945 

Military   Intelligence   Division,    War    Department,  Washington,    D.    C. 

By  Authority  of  A.  C.  of  S.,  G-2 

Dated:  July  1945  ( ) 

Initials 

War  Department,  Military  Intelligence  Division 
washington 

CHINESE  COMMUNIST  MOVEMENT 
Prepared  by  Military  Intelligence  Service 

1.  The  problem.  The  problem  of  the  Chinese  Communists  is  not  merely  one  of 
how  the  Communists  should  be  dealt  with;  even  more  difficult  has  been  the  prob- 
lem of  determining  the  facts.  "Authorities"  on  both  sides  have  disputed  the 
most  elementary  statements  of  fact. 

It  was  considered  by  the  Military  Intelligence  Service  that  this  state  of  affairs 
constituted  an  impediment  to  the  effective  prosecution  of  military  operations  in 
China  and  in  the  Pacific.  A  major  project  was  therefore  initiated  at  the  end  of 
1944,  under  which  the  most  competent  analysts — both  ci\ilian  and  military — 
were  assigned  to  the  examination  of  all  material  available,  and  to  the  compilation 
of  a  report  on  the  Chinese  Communist  movement.  The  preparation  of  the  report 
involved  the  examination  of  over  2,500  reports,  pamphlets,  and  books. 

2.  Fundaynental  conclusions.  Careful  study  of  these  materials  has  led  to  a 
number  of  basic  conclusions.  Appropriate  qualification  and  detailed  authentica- 
tion for  these  conclusions  is  contained  in  the  full  report.  The  most  important 
conclusions  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  (1)  The  "democracy"  of  the  Chinese 
Communists  is  Soviet  democracy,  (2)  The  Chinese  Communist  Movement  is  part 
of  the  international  Communist  movement,  sponsored  and  guided  by  Moscow. 
(3)  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Soviet  Russia  plans  to  create  Russian-dominated 
areas  in  Manchuria,  Korea  and  probably  North  China.  (4)  A  strong  and  stable 
China  cannot  exist  without  the  natural  resources  of  Manchuria  and  North  China. 
(5)  In  order  to  prevent  the  senaration  of  Manchuria  and  North  China  from  China, 
it  is  essential  that,  if  Soviet  Russia  participates  in  the  war,  China  not  be  divided 
(like  Europe)  into  American-British  and  Russian  zones  of  military  operations. 

3.  Basis  of  conclusions. 

a.  High  morale.  The  Chinese  Communists  are  the  best  led  and  most 
vigorous  of  present-day  organizations  in  China.  Their  morale  is  high.  Their 
policies  are  sharply  defined,  and  carried  out  with  a  devotion  which  is  fanatical. 

h.  Policy  of  establishing  communism  through  "democracy."  The  Chinese 
Communists  emphasize  two  stages  in  their  revolutionary  program:  first,  the  change 
of  the  Chinese  semi-feudal  society  into  a  "bourgeois"  (or  capitalist)  democracy; 
second,  the  establishment  of  communism.  The  first  is  their  present  goal  according 
to  their  own  claims.  They  insist,  however,  that  the  "bourgeois  democracy"  must 
have  "the  support  and  leadership  of  the  proletariat  under  Communist  guidance." 
This  objective  they  have  achieved  in  their  areas  of  control;  theirs  is  a  one-party 
controlled  "democracy". 

c.  ^^ Soviet  Democracy."  While  the  Chinese  Communists,  call  their  present 
political  system  "democracy,"  the  "democracy"  which  they  sponsor  is  in  fact 
"Soviet  democracy"  on  the  pattern  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  rather  than  democracy  in 
the  Anglo-American  sense.  It  is  a  "democracy"  more  rigidly  controlled  by  the 
Chinese  Communist  Party  than  is  the  so-called  "one-party  dictatorship"  of  the 
Chungking  Government  controlled  by  the  Kuomintang  (People's  National  Party). 
This  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  Chiang  Kai-shek  rules  by  maintaining  a  measure 
of  balance  between  the  various  factions  within  the  Kuomintang  and  by  making 
concession  to  the  non-Communist  opposition  groups  outside  the  Kuomintang  in 
Chungking-controlled  China.  Whenever  he  fails,  as  he  has  in  the  past  four  years, 
to  maintain  such  a  balance,  he  weakens  his  rule.  On  the  other  hand,  while 
minority  parties  which  wholeheartedly  accept  Communist  leadership  are  tolerated 
in  Communist-controlled  China,  real  opposition  parties  and  groups  are  summarily 
suppressed  as  "traitors."  If  the  Communists'  charge  of  Kuomintang  intolerance 
is  true,  it  is  also  true  that  the  Communists  will  be  still  more  intolerant  if  they  ever 
obtain  supreme  power  in  China. 


52  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Nevertheless,  since  the  Chinese  Communists  provide  individuals,  especially  the 
laborers  and  peasants,  with  greater  economic  opportunities  than  the  Kuomiiitang 
Nationalists  provide,  the  Communists  enjoy  wider  popular  support  in  the  areas 
held  by  their  own  armies  than  do  the  Nationalists  in  their  areas  of  control.  This 
is  the  Communists'  greatest  source  of  strength  in  China. 

d.  Part  oj  International  Communist  movement.  The  Chinese  Communist 
movement  is  a  part  of  the  international  Communist  movement.  Its  military 
strategy,  diplomatic  orientation,  and  propaganda  policies  follow  those  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  They  are  adapted  to  fit  the  Chinese  environment,  but  all  high  policy  is 
derived  from  international  Communist  policy  which  in  turn  depends  on  Soviet 
Russia.  Throughout  their  history  the  Chinese  Communists  have  loyally  supported 
and  followed  the  policies  of  Soviet  Russia  and  have  accepted  the  whole  content  of 
"Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism." 

e.  Desire  for  U.  S.  support  against  Japan  and  the  Kuomintang.  This  does 
not  prevent  the  Chinese  Communists  from  maintaining  a  friendly  attitude  toward 
the  United  States.  Their  attitude  toward  us  and  all  capitalist  democracies  is 
conditioned,  however,  by  the  extent  to  w^hich  they  can  obtain  benefits  from  us  in 
the  furtherance  of  their  own  revolutionary  aims:  the  subjugation  of  China  under 
Communist  rule  and  the  development  of  a  Communist-controlled  "capitalist 
democracy"  in  China  as  a  preliminary  to  the  introduction  of  communism. 
They  would  use  American  support  to  further  their  struggle  against  both  Japan  and 
the  Chungking  Government. 

/.  De  facto  independence.  The  Chinese  Communist  movement  today  is 
not  represented  merely  by  a  political  party;  it  is  represented  by  what  is  a  state  in 
all  but  name,  possessing  territory  (the  combined  area  of  which  is  about  the  size 
of  France  or  one-fifth  of  China  Proper),  a  population  of  probably  more  than 
70,000,000  people,  armies,  law,  and  money  of  its  own.  The  Chinese  Communist, 
state  is  economically  primitive,  but  (at  a  primitive  level)  fairly  self-sufficient. 

g.   Rivalry  with  the  Kuomintang . 

(1)  Failure  of  the  "Entente  Cordiale" .  During  the  period  of  the 
Soviet  Russian-Kuomintang  Entente  Cordiale,  1923-1927,  the  Kuomintang  and 
the  Chinese  Communists  cooperated.  The  Chinese  Communists  promised  to 
support  the  revolutionary,  nationalist,  democratic  program  of  the  Kuomintang. 
They  broke  this  promise.  It  soon  became  evident  to  the  Kuomintang  leaders 
that  the  Chinese  Communists,  urged  on  by  Soviet  Russia,  were  aspiring  to  turn 
the  revolution  into  a  class  war  in  order  to  gain  supreme  control  over  China.  In 
1927  the  Kuomintang  therefore  turned  against  the  Chinese  Communists  and 
Soviet  Russia. 

(2)  Development  of  the  "united  front"  movement.  The  ensuing  civil 
war,  1927-1937,  between  the  armies  of  the  two  Chinese  parties  was  accompanied 
by  the  bloody  excesses  characteristic  of  all  class  wars.  By  1936  the  Kuomintang 
had  almost  defeated  the  Chinese  Red  Army.  The  latter  was  saved  by  the 
Kuomintang's  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  a  "united  front"  with  the  Communists 
in  defense  of  China  against  Japan.  The  united  front  idea  had  been  developed  in 
Moscow.  It  applied  to  Communists  in  all  countries  and  involved  cooperation 
between  Communists  and  non-Com.munist  groups  and  parties  in  the  capitalist 
democracies,  as  a  means  of  safeguarding  the  Soviet  Union  against  the  threat  of 
fascist  aggression  and  of  expanding  the  influence  of  the  Communists  in  capitalist 
democracies. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  miited  front  understanding  in  China,  the  Chinese 
Communists  pledged  themselves,  as  of  1937,  to  cease  subversive  activities  against 
the  Goverimient,  to  abolish  their  separate  government  and  administration,  and 
to  integrate  the  Chinese  Red  Army  with  the  Government's  Central  Army. 

(3)  The  "war  within  the  war."  The  Chinese  Communists  did  not 
fulfill  this  promise.  Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Sino-Japanese  war,  the 
Government  assigned  to  the  Communists  certain  defense  zones.  The  Communists, 
however,  refused  to  stay  within  their  assigned  zones.  While  the  Kuomintang 
armies  in  obedience  to  the  Chinese  High  Command,  kept  within  their  assigned 
defense  zones,  the  Communist  armies  insisted  on  being  granted  entry  into  any 
Kuomintang  zone  that  they  desired  to  enter.  Whenever  the  Kuomintang  troops 
refused  to  adinit  the  Communist  troops  into  their  defense  sectors  and  to  share 
with  them  their  exceedingly  limited  resources  they  were  called  "traitors"  by  the 
Comnmnists.  When  the  National  Government  refused  to  grant  the  Communists 
permission  to  estaljlish  in  Kuomintang  areas  their  own  separate  civil  adminis- 
trations, called  "united  front  governments,"  which  flouted  the  National  authority 
of  Chungking  and  accepted  orders  only  from  the  Communist  capital,  Yenan, 
the  Communists  accused  the  Kuomintang  of  being  "anti-democratic"  and  the 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  53 

Kuomintang  troops  of  being  "experts  in  dissension."  Such  tactics  inevitably 
led  to  clashes  with  Kuomintang  troops.  The  latter  fought  in  self-defense  against 
both  the  Communists  and  the  Japanese  for  the  protection  of  their  bases. 

Internecine  strife  led  to  a  general  deterioration  of  the  Chinese  war  situation. 
After  the  United  States  entered  the  war  against  Japan  both  the  Communists 
and  the  Kuomintang  became  more  interested  in  their  own  status  vis-a-vis  each 
other  than  in  fighting  Japan.  The  inter-party  struggle  became  of  paramount 
importance.  For  the  Chinese  believed  that  America  guaranteed  victory  against 
Japan,  and  the  fruits  of  this  victory  would  obviously  go  to  the  pai;ty  that  won 
out  in  the  Kuomin tang-Communist  struggle  for  power. 

h.  Role  in  World  War  II.  In  spite  of  this  internecine  strife,  or  quasi-war, 
the  Chinese  CoTumunists  have  contributed  to  the  United  Nations  war  against 
Japan.  By  organizing  extensive  guerrilla  territories  with  areas  enclosed  by  the 
Japanese  Army  thej'  have  prevented  the  full  Japanese  exploitation  of  North 
China's  resources  in  foodstuffs,  raw  materials,  and  rnanpower.  They  have  also 
rescued  manj'  American  pilots  who  have  been  forced  down  in  Communist-con- 
trolled areas. 

Contrary  to  the  widely-advertised  reports  of  their  sympathizers,  the  Chinese 
Communists  have,  however,  fought  the  Jaiianese  far  less  than  have  the  National 
Government  troops.  The  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  his  followers  have 
yielded  ground  politically  and  militarilv  to  the  Communists  in  order  to  avoid 
an  open  break;  as  a  Nationalist,  Chiang  Kai-shek  has  been  primarily  interested  m 
the  war  against  Japan. 

i.  Military  capacity  small.  The  Chinese  Communists  now  claim  to  have 
an  army  of  910,000  troops  in  addition  to  local  militia  forces  numbering  about 
2,000,000  men.  However,  in  October  1944  the  strength  of  the  Chinese  Communist 
regular  forces  was  reliably  reported  as  475,000.  The  degree  to  which  the  increase 
since  October  of  last  year  represents  an  actual  increase  in  fighting  capacity  de- 
pends upon  the  number  of  rihes  available.  Rifles  were  available  for  only  about 
250,000  men  in  October  1944. 

j.    The  Alternative  settlements  of  the  Kuomintang-Communist  'problem. 

(1)  General.  As  far  as  can  be  seen  at  present  there  are  three  alter- 
natives for  a  settlement  of  the  internal  situation  in  China:  (1)  Civil  war  between 
the  Kuomintang  and  the  Chinese  Communists;  a  "settlement"  which  would  be 
disastrous  for  the  Chinese  people,  even  though  it  might  ultimately  decide  the 
question  of  which  party  shall  rule;  (2)  institution  of  a  National  Assembly  to 
inaugurate  a  democratic,  constitutional  form  of  government  in  which  all  parties 
find  representation;  (3)  division  of  China  into  two  (or  more)  separate  parts,  these 
parts  to  be  united  in  a  loose  "federation"  represented  by  a  "coalition  government" 
of  all  parties.  The  decisions  of  this  coalition  government  would  be  executed 
independently  by  the  Chinese  Communists  and  the  Kuomintang.  The  two 
parties  would  continue  to  maintain  their  separate  armies  and  administrations. 

Many  observers  believe  that  neither  of  the  latter  two  alternatives  is  feasible. 
Both  the  Kuoiuintang  and  the  Chinese  Communists  aspire  to  supreme  control 
over  China.  This  being  the  case  some  observers  believe  that  civil  war  is  unavoid- 
able. 

(2)  Generalissimo  sponsors  the  National  Assembl;/.  Chiang  Kai-shek 
has  proposed  the  National  Assembly,  which  is  to  convene  on  12  November  1945, 
as  the  only  possible  means  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  Kuomintang-Communist 
problem  and  for  the  re-establishment  of  unity  in  China.  He  insists,  however, 
that  no  unity  can  be  achieved  so  long  as  there  are  several  independent  partisan 
armies  in  China.  He  therefore  demands  that  the  Communists  fulfill  their  pledge 
of  1937  to  subordinate  their  army  to  the  National  Government.  He  makes 
compliance  with  this  demand  a  prerequisite  for  any  political  settlement  with  the 
Communists. 

(3)  Chinese  Com.munists  sponsor  idea  of  coalition  government.  The 
Communist  refuse  to  comply  with  this  demand.  They  have  boycotted  the 
National  Assembly  and  insist  that  the  "coalition  government"  is  the  only  solution 
of  the  inter-party  problem  in  China.  The  plan  for  a  coalition  government  might 
be  workable  if  the  Communist  would  accept  a  clear  demarcation  of  Kuomintang 
and  Communist  areas.  But  throughout  the  war  the  Kuomintang  has  vainly 
tried  to  obtain  an  agreement  with  the  Communists  for  a  demarcation  of  defense 
areas,  and  there  is  no  indication  that  the  Commimists  would  accept  any  demarca- 
tion of  Kuomintang  and  Communist  areas  if  a  coalition  government  were  to  be 
established. 

In  view  of  this,  the  coalition  government,  were  it  to  be  established  without  the 
Communists  being  committed  to  a  specific  demarcation  of  their  areas,  would  only 


54  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

serve  the  interests  of  the  Communists  in  that  their  present  areas  would  obtain 
legal  status  by  consent  of  the  Kuomintang  and  other  parties,  while  leaving  the 
Kuomintang  part  of  the  country  open  to  further  Communist  infiltration  through 
legal  or  illegal  means.  Chiang  Kai-shek  has  refused  to  accept  the  idea  of  a 
coalition  government. 

(4)  Unity  or  permanent  division  of  China,  the  issues  at  stake.  Here 
the  matter  rests  (3  July  1945).  For  the  time  being  it  is  a  question  of  the  National 
Assembly  versus  the  coalition  government.  The  former  provides  a  chance  for 
unifying  China  by  the  agreement  of  the  Chinese  armed  parties  to  submit  to  arbi- 
tration and  law  instead  of  force.  The  latter  would  continue  into  the  post-war 
period  the  system  of  territorial  division  of  China  between  the  Kuomintang  and 
the  Chinese  Communists  and  the  maintenance  of  separate  party  armies.  Real 
unity  cannot  be  achieved  on  this  basis.  Each  party  insists  on  its  own  plan. 
k.  International  implications. 

(1)  Common  policy  of  U.  S.  and  U.  S.  S.  R.  It  is  generally  believed 
that  a  peaceful  inter-party  settlement  in  China  depends  largely  upon  the  extent 
to  which  the  United  States  and  Soviet  Russia  can  follow  a  common  policy  toward 
China.  Were  the  Soviet  Union  to  decide  to  give  active  support  to  the  Chinese 
Communists,  in  terms  of  supplies  or  military  aid,  while  the  United  States  sup- 
ports the  Chungking  Government,  the  Russians  and  Americans  would  be  meeting 
head  on. 

(2)  Uncertainty  concerning  Soviet  aims  in  China.  Present  relations 
between  Chungking  and  Moscow  are  cool.  The  Soviet  press  is  strongly  denounc- 
ing the  "reactionaries"  in  the  Kuomintang  and  is  openly  sponsoring  the  plan  of 
the  Chinese  Communists  for  a  coalition  government.  There  are  indications 
that  Soviet  Russia  envisages  the  establishment  of  Soviet  domination  (along 
somewhat  the  same  lines  as  in  Outer  Mongolia  and  in  Eastern  Europe),  in  the 
areas  of  North  China  adjacent  to  Soviet  Russia;  that  is  in  Sinkiang,  Inner" 
Mongolia,  Manchuria,  and  possibly  also  the  northern  provinces  of  China  Proper. 
A  typical  statement  in  this  regard  is  one  by  a  Soviet  Russian  diplomat  in  China 
who  emphasized  that  Soviet  Russia  is  determined  that  all  her  border  states 
should  be  "free  from  unhealthy  combination  or  linkage  with  other  great  powers." 

The  Chitiese  Communists'  plan  for  a  coalition  government  would  conceivably 
further  this  aim  in  that  North  China  and  Manchuria  might  "legally"  become  the 
exclusive  spheres  of  influence  of  the  Chinese  Communists  and  hence  come  under 
a  regime  that  would  be  wholly  obedient  to  Soviet  Russia.  At  the  same  time  the 
coalition  government,  which  would  represent  all  groups  in  China,  would  lend 
China  an  outward  appearance  of  unity. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  try  to  improve 
relations  with  Chungking  on  the  basis  of  the  re-establishment  of  a  "united  front" 
between  the  Kuomintang  and  the  Chinese  Communists.  For  it  has  been  Soviet 
Russia's  experience  in  China  that  cooperation  on  a  united  front  between  the 
Kuomintang  and  the  Chinese  Communists  has  always  favored  the  Communists 
against  the  Nationalists,  no  matter  what  political  shading  the  latter  represent, 
whether  reactionary  or  liberal.  By  contrast,  the  Communist  cause  in  China 
has  suffered  whenever  the  Kuoinintang  has  fought  the  Communists  in  an  all-out 
civil  war.  It  is  possible  that  this  is  the  explanation  for  Soviet  Russia's  apparent 
willingness  to  welcome  the  visit  of  Dr.  T.  V.  Soong,  President  of  the  Executive 
Yuan  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Chinese  Government.  He  arrived 
in  Moscow  and  was  received  by  Stalin  on  30  June.  An  agreement  between 
Moscow  and  Chungking  would  have  the  advantage,  for  Soviet  Russia,  of  reduc- 
ing the  danger  of  immediate  disagreement  between  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  the  United 
States. 

(3)  The  U.  S.  and  the  situation  in  China. 

fa)  The  post-war  peace  in  the  Far  East  depends  on  re-establish- 
ment of  Chinese  independence  and  unity.  The  type  of  peace  we  shall  gain  by  our 
victory  over  Japan  depends  on  our  success  in  aiding  the  Chinese  to  regain  com- 
plete independence  and  to  establish  unity.  For  China  is  the  center  of  the  Far 
East;  political,  economic,  and  military  relationships  in  the  Far  East  have  always 
revolved  around  China.  Russia  became  one  of  the  leading  Far  Eastern  powers 
by  acquiring  vast  regions  from  China.  Russia's  growth  as  a  Far  Eastern  power 
had  depended  greatly  upon  its  success  in  extending  its  influence  in  China.  Sim- 
ilarly, Japan  grew  to  a  world  power  by  virtue  of  her  territorial  acquisitions  in 
Korea  and  Manchuria.  She  grew  into  a  world  menace  after  her  vast  conquests 
in  China  Proper  in  the  1930's. 

The  independence  and  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China,  includ- 
ing Manchuria,  have  been  key  points  of  U.  S.  policy  and  interests  in  the  Far  East. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  55 

During  the  past  eightv-five  years  Russia,  and  during  the  past  fifty  years  Russia 
and  Japan,  the  two  leading  military  land  powers  in  Asia,  have  been  the  chief 
threats  to  China's  independence.  Because  of  this,  a  considerable  part  ot  the 
international  struggle  over  China  has  been  centered  on  creating  a  balance 
between  these  two  powers.  Two  sea  powers.  Great  Britain  and  the  Lnited 
States,  have  maintained  the  balance  between  the  two  land  powers.  America  s 
concern  in  this  contest  between  Russia  and  Japan  for  control  in  China  has  been 
demonstrated  several  times.    The  livalry  between  Russia  and  Japan  has  centered 

on  Manchuria  and  Korea.  ^     .      ^^       •        -,7  ^j,    „„? 

(b)  With  the  defeat  of  Japan,  Soviet  Russia  unll  emerge  as  the  sole 
military  land  power  in  Asia.  Necessary  as  is  the  defeat  of  Japan  to  the  re-establish- 
ment  of  peace  in  the  Pacific,  the  fact  remains  that  her  defeat  will  upset  tlie  whole 
structure  of  the  international  balance  of  power  in  the  Far  Last  which  was 
developed  in  the  decades  before  1931.  Deprived  of  her  empire  in  China,  and 
with  her  cities  and  industries  smashed  to  pieces,  Japan  will  be  back  where  she 
started  at  the  dawn  of  her  modern  era;  a  group  of  relatively  worthless  islands, 
l30pulated  bv  fishermen,  primitive  farmers,  and  innocuous  warriors.  1  he  clock 
will  be  turned  back  some  eighty  years,  to  the  time  whe?  the  rivalry  between 
Russia  and  the  Western  democracies  in  China  began.  With  the  total  deteat  ot 
Japan  Russia  will  again  emerge  as  the  sole  military  land  power  of  any  account 
in  Asia.    But  she  will  be  vastly  stronger  than  at  any  time  in  the  past. 

(c)  Prevention  of  a  repetition  of  the  "Polish  situation  in  Man^ 
churia  and'Korea  is  essential  to  post-war  stability  in  the  Far  East.  The  problem  of 
post-war  peace  in  the  Far  East  revolves,  in  so  far  as  the  United  btates  is  con- 
cerned, around  two  major  questions:  (1)  How  can  the  mihtary-political  vacuuna 
in  the  Far  East  be  filled  following  the  defeat  of  Japan?  (2)  How  can  the  United 
States  promote  internal  unity  in  China?  .  c^     ■  ^  t> 

The  answer  to  both  questions  is  vitally  affected  by  the  action  of  Soviet  Russi  i, 
and  bv  the  arrangements  in  regard  to  the  Far  East  that  we  can  make  with  Soviet 
Russia.  If  it  be  assumed  that  Soviet  Russia  will  join  in  the  war  against 
Japan,  the  solution  of  these  questions  will  be  greatly  affected  by  the  extent  to 
which  we  can  prevent  the  division  of  China  along  the  same  lines  as  Europe  into 
an  American-British  and  a  Soviet  zone  of  military  operations.  For  the  elements 
of  uncertaintv  as  to  Soviet  Russia's  intentions  in  China  and  m  regard  to  the 
Chinese  Communists  are  verv  similar  to  those  in  regard  to  Eastern  Europe  during 
1943  and  1944  Many  of  the  fears  and  speculations  current  at  that  time,  to  the 
effect  that  Soviet  Russia  intended  to  develop  Eastern  Europe  as  an  exclusive 
Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  have  proved  to  be  right.  There  is  justification  for 
similar  fears  in  regard  to  North  China,  Manchuria,  and  Korea.  Just  as  Soviet 
Russia's  plans  in  Eastern  Europe  have  been  favored  by  the  absence  of  American 
and  British  forces  in  these  areas,  so  also  would  Soviet  Russia,  if  she  does  plan  to 
create  a  Soviet  sphere  of  influence  in  North  China,  Manchuria  and  Korea,  find 
herself  in  a  most  favorable  position  if  these  areas  were  assigned  to  her  exclusively 
or  even  predominantlv  as  a  zone  of  military  operations  against  Japan. 

On  the  other  hand',  if  American  forces  cooperate  on  equal  terms  with  soviet 
Russia,  Chinese,  and  British  forces  in  the  reconquest  and  occupation  of  North 
China  Manchuria,  and  Korea,  a  peace  settlement  in  complete  accord  with  the 
terms  of  the  Cairo  declaration  of  1  December  1943  can  much  more  readily  be 
achieved.  For  it  is  clear  that  if  the  war  were  to  end  with  us  m  control  of  Japan 
and  with  Chungking-Chinese,  American,  and  British  forces  in  control  of  (.entral 
and  South  China,  while  Soviet  Russian  and  Chinese  Communist  forces  held  the 
controlling  power  in  Manchuria  and  Korea,  a  peace  settlement  m  regard  to  these 
areas  might  entail  a  considerable  compromise  of  the  terms  of  the  (,  airo  declara- 
tion In  that  case,  the  plan  of  the  Chinese  Communists  for  a  coalition  govern- 
ment" might  well  be  the  onlv  feasible  way  of  settling  the  situation  in  China ; 
North  China  and  lorobablv  also  Manchuria  and  Korea  would  come  under  the 
control  of  native  Communists  dependent  upon  Soviet  Russian  support,  and  in 
these  areas  there  would  be  established  the  now  tvpical  "united  front  or  demo- 
cratic" coalition  administrations  in  which  the  Communists  hold  the  dominant 
power.  Deprived  of  the  vast  raw  material  resources  of  North  C^hina  and  iVlan- 
churia  the  present  National  Government  of  China  would  find  itself  unable  to 
compete  with  the  Communists  in  the  North  and  to  establish  a  strong  and  stable 
state.  For  this  reason  it  is  necessary,  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  m  the  l^ar 
East  and  for  the  long  range  interests  of  the  United  States,  that  the  Cairo  Declara- 
tlion  be  implemented  without  modification. 


56  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

FOR  THE  ASSISTANT  CHIEF  OF  STAFF,   G-2: 

P.  E.  PEABODY 
Brigadier  General,  GSC 
Chief,  Military  Intelligence  Service- 
DISTRIBUTION: 

USAF  POA  (10) 

SWPA  (10) 

USAF  China  (5) 

USAF  India-Burma  (3) 

ASF  (1) 

AGF  (1) 

AAF  (6) 

OSW  (1) 

OPD  (3) 

AWC  (1) 

ANSCOL  (1) 

C&OSS  (]) 

USMA  (1) 

Navy  (25) 

White  House  (15) 

State  Deot  (3) 

OSS  (1)  ^ 

KID(1; 

MIS  (21) 

Rep : 

Auth:  Col  Alfred  McCormack 

No.  of  copies:  110 

General  Willoughby,  formerh^  General  MacArthur's  intelligence  chief  in  the 
Far  East  testified  before  Senate  and  House  committees,  as  outlined  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense  revelations  about  the  Soviet  spy  ring  headed  by  Richard  Sorge. 
He  may  know  more  of  the  Peabody  report.  Similar  testimony  given  by  former 
Soviet  intelligence  officers  before  the  Senate  Internal  Security  Committee  and 
the  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  may  be  found  to  fit  into  both 
the  Peabody  report  conclusions  and  the  joint-aid  activities  of  top  Soviet  and  Red 
Chinese  officials. 

International  communism  has  consistently  sought  to  undermine  the  United 
States,  as  the  "heart  of  the  capitalist  world."  The  attack  in  this  country  took 
form  almost  on  the  heels  of  the  Bolshevik  overthrow  of  the  Czarist  regime  at  the 
end  of  World  War  I.  With  that  attack  there  was  concentration  on  infiltration  of 
Central  and  South  America  in  which  the  United  States  has  consistently  been 
pictured  as  "the  Colossus  of  the  North,"  aiming  always  at  domination  of  all  of 
Latin  America.  Our  freeing  of  Cuba  from  the  Spaniards,  followed  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  independence  of  the  Philippine  Republic  have  neutralized  this 
Communist  offensive  to  some  extent,  but  it  is  still  alive,  vibrant,  and  to  some 
degree  effective.  It  is  aimed  basically  at  pro-Communist  organization  of  unskilled 
labor,  attacks  on  "foreign  capitalists,"  revolutionary  action  to  overthrow  existing 
governments  in  Latin  America,  and  an  incessant  reiteration  that  the  protective 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  merely  a  cloak  for  "creeping  capitalist  imperialism  and 
fascism." 

The  anti-Communist  revelations  by  congressional  committees  are  too  well 
known,  too  well  documented,  and  too  clearly  understood  to  need  reiteration  here. 

It  is  pertinent,  however,  in  consideration  of  Senate  Resolution  247  and  its  pur- 
pose, to  trace  major  incidents  in  a  sequence  of  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century 
to  show  that  recognition  of  the  Soviet  should  never  have  been  granted.  It  is 
germane  to  recall  the  bitter  fight  against  that  recognition,  and  lay  where  it  be- 
longs the  responsibility  for  the  cumulative  sabotage,  espionage,  and  seditious 
operations  of  world  communism  in  this  hemisphere. 

The  real  beginning  of  what  is  now  called  communism  in  the  United  States  came 
subsequent  to  the  October  revolution  in  Czarist  Russia  in  1905,  when  an  abortive 
efi"ort  to  establish  a  worker's  government  along  lines  promulgated  by  Marx  and 
Engles  failed.  Considerable  numbers  of  the  participants  in,  or  sympathizers 
with  that  effort  fled  from  Russia  and  made  their  way  to  the  United  States. 

These  radicals  became  active  in  language  groups,  and  in  such  radical  labor 
groups  as  the  IWW,  and  the  radical  political  groups  then  generally  described  as 
"Sociahsts."  As  in  Europe,  radicals  in  the  United  States  had  two  hues  of 
thought — both  aimed  at  eventual  control  of  government.  In  substance  the 
Socialists  favored  use  of  parliamentary  means  to  achieve  their  aims.     The  Left 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMJVrUNISM  57 

Wing  Socialists  who  later  became  the  corps  of  the  Communist  Party  favored 
direct  action,  violence,  to  take  over  government  control. 

Leon  Trotsky,  then  in  the  United  States  was  in  the  direct  action  group,  as  was 
Nicolai  Lenin,  then  finding  political  refuge  in  Switzerlartti. 

World  War  I  found  Socialists,  generally,  favoring  a  boycott  of  war. 

In  1915  a  conference  at  Zimmerwald,  Switzerland,  was  called  to  make  the  war 
boycott  international.  Enough  of  the  delegates  refused  to  follow  that  demand — 
insisting  on  national  support  of  governments  by  each  government's  Sociahsts — 
to  wreck  the  Trotsky  proposal  at  that  time,  and  open  the  better  light  iDetween 
today's  Socialists  and  the  Third  International. 

Subsequently  the  German  General  Staff  conceived  the  plan  of  wrecking  the 
Russian  war  effort  by  inciting  revolution  in  Russia.  Trotsky  left  the  United 
States,  and  with  Lenin  and  some  of  the  other  Red  leaders,  was  smuggled  into 
Russia,  from  Switzerland.  Military  and  econom.ic  disintegration  followed  to  the 
extent  of  forcing  the  Czar's  abdication  and  the  Russian  separate  peace  with 
Germany. 

The  plan  came  too  late,  however,  to  prevent  German  failure  in  the  west  and 
Allied  victory  cam.e  on  November  11,  1918,  with  the  armistice. 

In  Russia  the  democratic  government  initially  set  up  by  Kerensky  was  shortly 
overcome  by  the  Bolsheviks — and  communism  had  a  national  base  from  which 
to  work  toward  domination  of  the  world. 

The  TrotsTcy-Lenin  capture  of  the  Russian  Government  apparatus  spurred 
communism  throughout  the  world. 

A  bibliography  of  the  Communist  Third  International  drive  in  the  United 
States  will  be  found  in  these  documents — all  a  matter  of  public  record,  but  all 
practically  forgotten  in  the  deluge  of  investigations  of  communism  that  dealt 
with  little  facets  of  the  big  Red  program: 

(1)  Senate  Document  No.  62  of  the  1st  session  of  the  66th  Congress:  (1919) 
covering  hearings  of  the  Judiciaiy  subcommittee  of  the  Senate  under  Senate 
resolutions  307  and  309. 

(2)  Hearings  of  the  Overman  subcommittee  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  in  January,  1920,  under  authority  of  Senate  Resolution  263  (66th 
Cong.). 

(3)  The  voluminous  New  York  legislative  hearings  beginning  in  April  1920, 
generally  referred  to  as  the  Lusk  committee  reports  (4  volumes  of  1,000  pages 
each) . 

(4)  Tlie  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Subcommittee  hearings  in  January,  1924, 
during  the  68th  Congress,  under  authoritv  of  Senate  Resolution  50. 

(5)  The  Fish  committee  (House  of  Representative)  in  1930,  held  in  cities 
"throuehout  the  Nation,  confirming  the  findings  of  the  earlier  Senate  committees 
and  bringing  them  up  to  date. 

Most  of  these  documents  are  found  only  in  committee  or  Library  of  Congress 
files.  The  Eies  committee,  the  Un-American  Activities  Committee,  the  Senate 
Internal  Security  Subcommittee  hearings,  and  the  investigations  of  this  committee 
are  all  current  and  can  be  examined  by  any  student  of  the  Third  Tnternational's 
plan  for  world  conquest  who  ^\ill  take  the  time  and  trouble  to  read  them. 

Senate  Document  14,  presented  to  the  first  session  of  the  68th  Congress  by  the 
late  Senator  Lodge  of  IVIassachusetts — grandfather  of  our  present  United  States 
Ambassador  to  the  LTnited  Nation.s — tells  how  the  Third  International,  in  Moscow, 
■sent  delegates  to  a  conference  of  radicals  on  Oveilook  Mountain,  near  Woodstock, 
N.  Y.,  on  May  15,  1921.  Jaker  Davidovich  Janson  arranged  that  meeting.  He 
had  been  head  of  Lenin's  Pan-American  Bureau,  in  charge  of  the  Red  activities 
in  the  entire  Western  Hemisphere,  under  the  alias  of  Charles  E.  Scott.  He  hau 
"taken  part  in  the  Bolshevik  revolution,  and  in  China  for  the  Soviet,  before  coming 
to  America. 

Janson,  or  Scott,  had  complete  authority  from  Lenin  to  break  the  deadlocK. 
between  the  factions  of  American  Communists  and  to  make  final  decisions  about 
the  future  of  the  party.  Janson  told  the  70  delegates  to  the  Overlook  Mountain 
conference: 

1.  The  Communist  Paity  of  America  would  be  an  underground,  or  illegal, 
party,  through  which  the  international  Communist  organization  would  give  its 
orders,  formulation  of  policies,  and  direction  of  programs. 

2.  An  "open"  or  "legal"  party  would  be  formed  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the 
underground  party,  to  aeitate  for  the  ordered  programs,  propagandize  for  man- 
power membership  in  the  labor  unions.  (The  subsequently  formed  Workers 
Party  was  given  that  role.) 


58  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

3.  Key  positions  in  the  open  party  were  to  be  held  by  members  of  the  under- 
ground party,  and  in  any  front  organizations  a  sufficient  number  of  underground 
party  members  were  to  be  placed  to  give  control. 

4.  All  funds  were  to  jse  controlled  by  the  underground  party. 

5.  No  meeting  or  convention  of  the  open  party  might  be  held  unless  agenda 
and  procedure  had  previously  been  approved  at  a  meeting  of  the  underground 
party. 

6.  Delegates  were  told  to  return  to  their  organizations  and  make  it  clear  that 
supreme  control  in  the  United  States  would  be  the  Communist  Party  of  America — 
the  underground — and  that  the  CPA  would  always  be  designated  as  a  section  of 
the  Third  International. 

7.  A  convention  of  the  same  delegates  would  be  held  late  in  the  summer  of 
that  same  year  to  get  the  reports  of  the  organizations  on  acceptance  or  refusal. 

When  that  meeting  en  Overlook  Mountain  closed,  Robert  Minor,  on  May  29, 
1921,  was  directed  to  go  to  Moscow  and  notify  Lenin  that  Communist  unity  in 
America  had  been  achieved. 

It  was  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  that  meeting  that  Moscow  communism  had 
appropriated  $135,000  for  the  unity  project,  and  that  $25,000  had  been  allotted 
to  the  two  American  factions  to  carry  out  the  unification  plans. 

Subsequently,  when  the  Workers  Party  was  formed  in  New  York,  nine  members 
of  the  Communist  Party  of  America  became  its  executive  committee. 

These  executive  committee  members  were:  Jay  Lovestone  (alias  Zack  Wheat), 
Earl  Browder  (alias  Ward  and  alias  Dixon),  James  P.  Cannon  (alias  Cooky), 
Ludvv'ig  Lore  (alias  Young),  Robert  Minor  (alias  Ballister),  A.  Bittelman  (alias 
Raphael),  Alexander  Trachtenberg,  William  W.  Weinstein  (alias  Lewis)  and 
C.  E.  Ruthenburg  (alias  Damon). 

Lovestone's  testimony  is  printed  in  volume  II  of  the  Dies  committee  hearings 
in  1939,  and  is  referred  to  in  appendix  I  of  that  committee,  issued  in  1940;  the 
hearings  on  Gerhart  Eisler  in  1947;  the  hearings  on  Leon  Josephson  and  Samuel 
Liptzen  in  1947;  House  Report  209,  issued  in  1947;  House  Report  No.  1,  1941; 
House  Report  No.  1920,  of  1948;  the  labor  union  hearings  of  August  9  to  11, 
1949;  the  hearings  covering  professional  groups  in  the  Los  Angeles  area  (January 
and  April  1952)  and  House  Report  1229,  issued  January  8,  1952.  Lovestone  is 
currently  connected  with  a  committee  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor. 
In  .preparation  for  the  illegal  party  convention  to  be  held  later  that  summer, 
international  communism,  in  Moscow,  prepared  the  specific  instruction  sheets. 
The  date  was  later  moved  forward  to  August  17  to  22,  1922,  with  Bridgeman, 
Mich.,  fixed  as  the  supersecret  meeting  place. 

Boris  Reinstein  and  A.  S.  Lozofsky,  the  international  Communist  delegates — 
using  the  aliases  "Davidson"  and  "Brooks" — laid  down  the  Lenin  directions, 
covered  in  21  specific  points. 

Specific  programs  were  organization  of  small  farmers:  incitement  of  American 
Negroes  to  rebellion;  building  up  of  a  youth  and  educational  movement  to  draw 
young  people  to  communism;  particular  efforts  to  infiltrate  unions  of  miners, 
railroad  brotherhoods,  maritime  and  docks;  steel;  foodpacking:  communications; 
Federal,  State,  and  local  government  workers;  textile  trades  and  clothing  workers. 
Federal  agencies  had  learned  of  the  Bridgeman  conference,  raided  the  meeting 
after  the  minutes  had  been  completed,  arrested  the  leaders  and  confiscated  more 
than  three  barrels  filled  with  documents. 

In  the  Overman  hearings  there  is  documentation  of  the  German  financing  of 
the  Bolshevik  revolution  which  overthrew  the  Czar.  The  Overman  hearings 
had  originally  been  authorized  to  investigate  both  Imperial  German  and  Bolshevik 
propaganda  plans.  A  meeting  in  the  Ford  Theater,  Washington,  provided  the 
first  clues- — leading  to  the  Overlook  Mountain  meeting  and  then  to  the  Bridgeman 
meeting. 

The  investigations  led,  too,  to  the  activities  in  this  country  of  Ludwig  C.  A.  K. 
Martens  unofficial  Soviet  ambassador  to  this  country.  Martens  sought  to 
obtain  formal  recognition  of  the  Bolshevik  government  by  the  United  States, 
and  Senator  William  E.  Borah  introduced  a  resolution  providing  for  that  recog- 
nition. 

By  1924  Secretary  of  State  Charles  Evans  Hughes  had  compiled  a  tremendous 
file  dealing  with  the  question  of  Russian  recognition. 

When  the  Borah  recof-;nition  resohition  (S.  Res.  50,  of  the  6Sth  Cong.)  was 
referred  to  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  a  subcommittee  with  Senator  Borah 
as  chairman  and  Senators  Lenroot,  Pepper,  and  Swanson  as  members,  held  ex- 
haustive hearings,  be£;inning  in  January  1925.  At  these  hearings  the  State 
Department  files  were  put  into  the  formal  record.     Testimony  before  the  commit- 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  59 

tee  included  that  of  J.  Edgar  Hoover,  of  the  FBI,  in  executive  session,  and  a  half 
dozen  experts  from  the  State  Department  Far  Eastern  Division.  As  a  result  of 
the  testimony  submitted  to  the  subcommittee,  the  full  committee  membership 
reported  against  Russian  recognition. 

Robert  F.  Kelley  and  A.  W.  Kliefoth  were  the  State  Department  experts  who 
documented  the  case  against  recognition  at  that  time. 

For  9  years  after  the  defeat  of  the  Borah  resolution,  recognition  of  the  Soviet 
Communist  Go\'ernment  was  blocked. 

After  the  election  of  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  as  President,  the  drive  for  recognition 
of  the  Soviet,  carefully  pro}  agandized  for  months  before,  burst  out  ■«  ith  new 
vehemence.  Evidence  had  been  adduced  that  a  general  strike,  to  start  on  the 
west  coast  among  the  longshoremen  and  then  to  si)read  through  steel,  railroad, 
communications,  food  distribution  and  other  unions  was  ]  lanned  by  American 
Communists  and  their  supporters.  Shifting  of  United  States  Federal  investiga- 
tors to  the  west-coast  area  brought  cancellation  of  those  plans  in  less  than  a  week. 

In  November  1933,  as  part  of  the  pi'ogram  to  achieve  recognition,  the  Soxiet 
Government,  in  writing,  pledged: 

1.  To  respect  scrupulously  the  indisputable  right  of  the  United  States  to  order 
its  own  life  within  its  own  jurisdiction  in  its  own  \a  ay  and  to  refrain  from  interfer- 
ing in  any  manner  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United  States,  its  Territories  or 
possessions. 

2.  To  refrain,  and  to  restrain  all  persons  in  Government  service  and  all  organi- 
zations of  the  Government  or  under  its  direct  or  indirect  control,  including  organi- 
zations in  receiot  of  financial  assistance  from  it,  from  an}'  act  o\'ert  or  covert, 
lialjle  in  any  way  whatsoex'er  to  injure  the  tranquillitv,  j  rosj  erity,  order,  or  security 
of  the  whole  or  any  j  art  of  the  United  States,  its  Territories  or  possessions,  and, 
in  particular,  from  any  act  tending  to  incite  or  encourage  armed  intervention,  or 
any  agitation  or  pro^  a'"anda  having  as  an  aim  the  \  iolation  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  United  States,  its  Territories  or  possessions,  or  the  bringing  about 
by  force  of  a  change  in  the  political  or  social  order  of  the  whole  or  any  i  art  of  the 
United  States,  its  Territories  or  possessions. 

3.  Not  to  permit  the  formation  or  residence  on  its  territory  of  any  organization 
or  group — -and  to  prevent  the  activity  on  its  territory  of  any  organization  or  group, 
or  re.)resentatives  or  officials  of  any  or^:anization  or  group — xxhich  makes  claim 
to  be  the  government  of  or  makes  attempt  on  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
United  States,  its  Territories  or  its  possessions,  and  not  to  form,  subsidize,  support, 
or  permit  on  its  territory  military  organizations  of  groups  hax  ing  the  aim  of  armed 
struggle  against  the  United  States,  its  Territories  or  possessions,  and  to  i^revent 
recruiting  on  behalf  of  such  organizations  or  groups. 

4.  Not  to  Permit  the  formation  or  residence  on  its  territory  of  any  organization 
or  group — and  to  prevent  the  actixity  on  its  territory  of  any  organization  or 
group — which  has  as  an  aim  the  overthrow  or  the  pre]  aration  for  the  o\erthrow 
of,  or  by  bringing  about  by  force  of  a  change  in  the  political  or  social  order  of  the 
whole  or  any  rart  of  the  United  States,  its  Territories  or  i  ossessions. 

That  day  the  President  of  the  United  States  accepted  the  pledge,  as  signed  by 
Maxim  Litvinoff,  who  w?,s  the  People's  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Soviet  Government.  Diplomatic  relations  were  established  between  the  Gov- 
ernn^ents  of  the  two  countries. 

Yet  Litvinoff,  preparing  96  hours  later  to  leave  for  Moscow,  was  quoted  in  the 
Daily  Worker,  official  piiblice,tion  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  United  States — ■ 
a  formal  Soviet  agency  which  would  dare  not  miscjuote  a  Soviet  official — as  stating: 

"The  Third  International  is  not  mentioned  in  this  document.  You  must  not 
read  into  it  more  than  was  intended." 

In  other  words  Litvinoff  pledged  the  Soviet  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  United  States.  But  he  specifically  pointed  out  that  the  Third 
International,  of  which  the  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  is  a  part,  had 
not  agreed  to  respect  the  territorial  uitegrity  of  the  United  States  or  to  be  bound 
by  the  document  he  signed,  and  upon  which  Roosevelt  approved  recognition. 

Robert  F.  Kelley,  of  the  State  Depai'tment  Division  of  Eastern  European 
Affairs,  had  given  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  handed  it  to  Roosevelt  on  July 
27,  1933,  a  memorandum  which  said  flatly: 

"*  *  *  The  experience  of  countries  which  have  extended  recognition  to  the 
Soviet  Government  has  shown  pretty  conchisively,  it  is  believed,  that  there  are 
serious  obstacles  in  the  way  of  establishment  of  relations  on  such  a  basis,  and 
that  as  long  as  these  obstacles  remain,  official  relations,  established  as  a  result 
of  recognition,  tend  to  become,  in  view  of  the  extraordinary  nature  of  these 
obstacles,  the  source  of  friction  and  ill  will  rather  than  a  mainspring  of  coopera- 
tion and  good  will  *  *  *." 


60  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

"The  fundamental  obstacle  in  the  way  of  establishment  with  Russia  of  the 
relations  usual  between  nations  in  diplomatic  intercourse  is  the  world  revolutionary- 
aims  and  the  prr.ctices  of  the  rulers  of  that  country  *  *  *." 

The  State  Department  pointed  out  to  the  President  the  Russian  repudiation 
,of  $192  million  of  Russian  obligations  held  by  the  United  States;  $86  million  in 
Russian  obligations  held  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  repudiated  by 
Russia;  and  finally  the  confiscation  of  $330  million  worth  of  property  rights  and 
interests  of  American  citizens  in  Russia. 

September  21,  1933,  Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull  wrote  to  the  President  a 
note  which  inch'ded  this  statement: 

"More  important  still  the  present  regime  in  Russia  has  been  unwilling,  up  to 
this  time,  to  discontinue  its  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United 

William  C.  Bullitt,  Special  Assistant  to  Secretary  Hull  and  later  Ambassador 
to  Russia  warned  the  President  against  recognition  on  October  4,  1933. 

Litvinoff  obviously  signed  the  "no  interference"  agreement  with  his  tongue 
in  his  cheek.  He  subsequently  insisted  that  the  Comintern  was  not  part  of  the 
Soviet  Government  and  not  imder  the  control  of  that  Government.  Yet  the 
storv  of  the  Comintern,  later  renamed  the  Com  inform,  but  always  headquartered 
in  Moscow,  has  been  documented  time  after  time  by  investigations  of  American 
Government  agencies. 

The  St'-.te  Department  publication  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States — the 
Soviet  Union,  1933-39  details  the  story  of  how,  from  1933  to  1939  American 
Ambassadors  in  Russia  reported  bre'-.ches  of  promise  by  the  Soviet,  on  the  Lit- 
vinoff docu.ment  and  dozens  of  others. 

The  Canadian  Royal  Commission  report,  dealing  with  Soviet  espionage  and 
propaganda  in  that  country  durmg  World  War  IT  and  after,_  shows  that  the  Com- 
munist plan  to  rule  the  world  is  not  directed  against  the  United  States  alone  on' 
this  continent. 

The  FBI  report  on  Soviet  espionage  before  World  War  II,  during  World  War  II 
and  after  World  War  II  up  to  November  1945,  has  been  revealed  in  part  before 
Senate  committee  hearings  as  the  Harry  Dexter  White  and  other  spy  hearings 
have  been  publicized. 

Political  Affairs  published  in  this  country  for  many  years  under  the  frank  decla- 
ration that  it  is  a  magazine  devoted  to  the  theory  and  practice  of  Marxism-Leninism 
is  a  recurrent  monthlv  recording  of  the  International  Commu.nist  Party  line  as 
dictated  by  Moscow  and  the  Third  International.  It  cites  instance  after  instance 
of  international  meetings  held  in  Moscow  of  International  Communist  delegates 
from  many  countries,  and  gives  instance  after  instance  of  violent  propaganda 
against  the  United  States.  Other  recordings  in  Political  Affairs  tell  of  Communist 
meetings  in  Soviet  satellite  states,  replete  with  diatribes  against  the  United  States. 
To  bring  the  situation  completely  up  to  date  I  would  like  to  put  into  the  record 
some  excerpts  from  radio  broadcasts  emanating  from  Soviet  soil,  seeking  to  under- 
mine, not  only  the  United  States  in  its  world  relations,  but  in  its  domestic  affairs. 
These  Soviet  actions  and  statements  are  just  a  few,  from  an  incessant  drumbeat 
of  hate  against  this  country. 

Tibet  has  for  ages  been  free.  It  is  rich  in  minerals,  thinly  populated,  and 
strategically  looks  "down  the  throat  of  India.  A  Red  Chinese  Army  of  Liberation 
marched  in,  using  a  conflict  between  the  Lamas  as  an  excuse,  and  "freed"  Tibet. 

One  of  the  first  foreign  groups  to  follow  the  Red  Chinese  Army  was  a  "sky 
train"  containing  Soviet  geologists,  who  began  an  immediate  mineralogical  survey 
which  reportedly  has  located  vast  resources  of  minerals  of  highest  strategic  value. 
That  act — in  the  Soviet  press  and  radio  field — was  liberation. 
The  United  States  defense  of  South  Korea,  as  agent  of  the  United  Nations,  has 
persistently  been  labeled  "imperialism"  and  "aggression"  by  the  Soviet  and  its 
puppet  states. 

Ho  Chi  Minh,  leader  of  the  Communist  faction  in  Indochina,  has  had  his  first 
successes  of  any  magnitude  since  the  Korean  truce  permitted  the  release  of  arms, 
ammunition,  and  transport  to  the  Vietnam  South  China  border,  and  their  move- 
ment to  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  forces  French  intelligence  reports  state  unequivocally 
that  the  column  of  20,000  fresh  troops  which  led  the  final  assault  on  Dien  Bien  Phu 
were  Red  Chinese,  directed  by  Soviet  advisers. 

The  Hukbalahap  banditry  in  the  Philippines,  only  recently  liquidated  by  the 
surrender  of  Louis  Taruc  and  his  lieutenants,  has  been  proved  to  have  been  Com- 
munist aided  during  its  last  G  years. 

Communist  agitators  are  the  hard  core  of  the  anti-West  Government  of  Indo- 
nesia. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  61 

Communists  have  the  rebels  in  Malaya. 

Communists  constantly  seek  overturn  of  the  Thailand  Government. 

In  Indochina  the  United  States  gave  aid  only  when  it  was  clearly  establiphed 
that  Red  Chinese  were  the  prop  holding  up  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  civil  war. 

In  the  Philippines  the  Communist  cry  of  United  States  imperialism  has  to  face 
up  with  the  historical  facts  that  the  United  States  freed  the  Philippines  from. 
Spain,  provided  a  Commonwealth  form  of  government  until  the  Philippines  was 
stabilized  and  then  withdrew  all  controls  over  the  new  "showcase  of  freedom"  in 
the  Pacific. 

The  United  States  has  meticulously  left  Indonesia  to  the  Dutch  and  to  the 
United  Nations. 

Communism  in  ^Malaya  has  been  strictly  a  problem  of  the  British. 

South  Korea  is,  and  has  been  a  free  government  since  the  North  Koreans  and 
their  Soviet-backed  Red  Chinese  i^.llies  were  tossed  back  to  the  line  from  which 
their  aggression  began.  The  United  States  position  in  Korea,  is  that  the  Koreans 
must  stay  free — 'as  we  have  pledged  defense  of  that  freedom. 

Japan,  by  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  forced  the  United  States  into  World  War 
II.  Yet  the  United  States  has  freed  Japan,  is  backing  Japan  in  maintaining  her 
newly  reacquired  national  integrity,  and  is  pledged  to  help  Japan  remain  free. 

A.gainst  these  facts  on  the  record  Investia — official  Soviet  paper^ — under  a  head- 
ing "United  States  Plotting  A.ggression  All  Over  Asia,"  included  this  paragraph: 

"All  this  feverish  activity  for  the  creating  of  new  military  blocs  and  bases  once 
more  exposes  the  falsehood  of  American  propaganda  which  is  trving  to  whitewash 
the  United  States  foreign  policy  with  chatter  of  defense  and  so  forth.  The  peoples 
of  i^.sia  see  that  United  States  plans  are  directed  primarily  toward  the  preservation 
of  colonial  slavery  by  any  available  means  toward  the  enslavement  of  peoples  who 
are  trying  to  attain  national  freedom  and  independence,  toward  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  Asiatic  countries  into  place  d'armes  and  their  population  into  cannon 
fodder  for  the  war  that  is  being  prepared  against  the  peaceloving  peoples." 

The  record  of  Soviet  veto  action  in  the  United  Nations,  preaching  of  peace 
while  building  for  war,  recurrent  charges  of  Western  espionage  during  the  entire 
time  from  1919  to  date  when  Soviet  spies  worked  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  and 
dozens  of  other  countries  with  which  the  Soviet  was  technically  at  peace,  is  a 
record  of  deceit,  broken  promises,  and  barbaric  disregard  of  every  concept  of 
diplomatic  relationship  between  nations. 

Senate  Resolution  247,  for  the  first  time  since  Soviet  recognition  in  1933 — a 
recognition  cynicallv  labeled  a  fraud  by  the  Soviet  representative  who  signed  it 
within  96  hours  of  the  time  he  put  his  pen  to  the  official  paper — calls  for  a  diplo- 
matic statement  by  the  United  States. 

The  language  of  the  resolution  calls  for  a  formalization  of  the  statement  of 
charges  against  the  Soviet  Communist  Government.  It  calls  for  official  recogni- 
tion of  espionage,  seditious  propaganda,  and  sabotage  that  have  been  written 
into  history  of  this  and  other  countries  since  the  Bolshevik  revolution. 

Senate  Resolution  247  is  strictlv  within  the  rights  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  in  calling  for  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  and  its 
satellites  as  a  result  of  the  documented  proof  of  the  Soviet's  repeated,  recurrent, 
and  continuous  misuse  of  the  diplomatic  courtesies  granted  through  an  A.mbassador 
and  an  Embassy,  consuls,  and  consular  offices;  commercial  and  trade  representa- 
tives, and  commercial  and  trade  commissions. 

Senate  Resolution  247  calls  for  a  call  of  all  free  nations  to  an  international  con- 
ference to  pool  data  and  information;  to  determine  ways  and  means  to  end  the 
fifth-column  methods  of  communism,  and  finally  to  resist  further  aggression  by 
international  communism  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  all  free  forms  of  government, 
and  the  incorporation  of  all  such  governments  in  a  Soviet  world  directed  from 
Moscow. 

As  an  American  citizen,  twuce  called  to  war  in  defense  of  these  United  States,  I 
do  not  see  how  any  other  citizen,  believing  in  the  constitution  definition  of  the 
Republic  given  us  by  the  Founding  Fathers,  can  fail  to  support  the  resolution. 

Thank  you,  gentlemen,  for  the  opportunity  to  appear  before  you. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  Mr.  Hunter,  if  you  will  kindly  proceed. 

Mr.  Hunter.  In  both  newspaper  and  military  factfinding  assign- 
ments that  I  have  had  I  have  studied  the  subversive  movements, 
communism,  fascism,  and  the  others,  over  a  period  of  35  A-ears.  It 
goes  back  to  the  Lusk  reports  of  the  New  York  Legislature  in  1922 
and  1924,  at  which  time  the  Communist  Party  really  had  its  start 


62  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

in  the  United  States  as  an  outgrowth  of  the  IWW  and  the  previous 
radical  organizations.  It  was  at  that  point  in  1922  in  Overlook 
Mountain,  N.  Y.,  that  the  radical  movement  in  the  United  States  was 
first  told  by  direct  Moscow  representation  that  they  had  to  operate 
as  a  section  of  the  Third  International,  which  was  the  world  Com- 
munist movement. 

I  have  taken  that  as  the  base  from  which  the  Communist  movement 
started  in  the  United  States  and  then  gone  back  to  study  the  reason 
why  Russia,  as  used  to  be  known,  became  the  center  of  the  Communist 
movement,  and  where  that  interlocks  and  interlinks  with  this  coimtry, 
with  the  Marx-Engels  manifesto,  then  into  the  Socialist  movement, 
and  currently  to  that  Overlook  Mountain  picture  where  it  began  in 
this   country. 

In  going  back  into  the  history  of  Russia  you  will  find  that  as  far  back 
as  1251  the  Communists  were  not  known  and  Russia  itself  was  a 
little  space  about  the  area  of  the  State  of  Connecticut,  perhaps  a  little 
larger. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  that  Senator  Johnston  is 
present. 

Mr.  Hunter.  From  1251  to  1951,  a  period  of  700  years,  according 
to  a  map  that  was  prepared  by  research  people  of  the  Library  of 
Congress,  the  Communists  have  always  expanded  on  the  perimeter.' 
They  would  always  take  contiguous  land  territory  so  never  to  be  cut 
off  by  sea  or  other  open  spaces  from  their  center  of  communications. 

The  map  that  we  have  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  shows,  first  of  all, 
that  little  area  from  which  they  started.  Then  by  1939  they  had 
expanded  to  this  red  line  [indicating].  From  1939  to  1954,  they  had 
moved  over  into  the  satellite  states. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  indicated  by  the  black  line? 

Mr.  Hunter.  By  the  black  line.  Of  course,  by  taking  over  China 
at  large,  Outer  Mongolia,  ^Manchuria,  Tibet,  and  of  particular  danger 
to  Japan,  the  south  half  of  the  Sakhalin  Island,  and  Kurile  Islands, 
which  brings  them  within  a  matter  of  8  or  10  miles  of  northern  Japan 
itself,  on  that  basis  of  expansion,  always  on  the  perimeter,  the  reason- 
able belief  would  be,  based  on  their  previous  pattern,  that  their 
expansion  will  continue  to  be  on  the  perimeter  wherever  they  are  able 
to  make  it,  which  would  be  into  the  terrifically  rich  mineral  resource 
and  population-congested  centers  of  southeast  Asia  where  we  are  now 
very  deeply  involved  in  Indochina;  could  come  on  down,  as  the 
Japanese  did,  to  Singapore,  and  Malaya,  and  from  that  point  into 
Indonesia.  It  could  move  from  Tibet  through  the  passes  of  the 
Himalaya  Mountains  as  no  one  else  ever  could  do  before  and  look 
directly  down  into  India. 

In  tiie  European  sector,  the  critical  and  vital  points  are,  of  coarse, 
Gibraltar,  between  Spain  and  Spanish  Morocco — the  entrance  to 
the  Mediterranean — and  the  outlet  from  the  Mediterranean  through 
Suez,  where  we  have  the  current  unrest  in  Egypt.  To  lose  either 
Spain  or  Morocco  would  close  the  western  gate  of  tlie  Mediterranean. 
To  lose  the  Suez  Canal,  either  through  Red  control  of  a  portion  of 
Saudi  Arabia  or  a  Soviet  drive  south  on  the  east  border  of  Turkey, 
would  close  the  eastern  end. 

Without  it  30U  could  not  send  supplies  and  men  through  from  the 
West  to  the  defense  of  Australia  or  south,  nor  could  you  get  raw  ma- 
terials from  southeast  Asia  from  which  many  of  our  most  important 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  63 

materials,  such  as  tin,  and  rubber,  and  many  of  the  metals  come, 
except  by  the  long  route  around  vSouth  Africa. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Hunter,  may  I  just  interject  this  question?  You 
have  just  in  the  course  of  the  last  several  months  returned  from  a  so- 
journ abroad  on  a  confidential  mission,  have  you  not,  which  took  you 
into  Africa  and  into  these  areas? 

Mr.  Hunter.  I  do  not  know  how  confidential  you  would  call  it. 
I  was  one  of  a  group  of  correspondents  who  went  on  an  Air  Corps  trip 
which  was  intended  to  show  the  capability  of  our  medium  bomber, 
the  B-47,  based  on  Africa  and  given  added  range  by  a  refueling  proc- 
ess. It  was  demonstrated  on  that  trip  that  our  medium  bombers, 
based  in  Africa  and  refueled  in  midair  over  friendly  territory  could 
protect  ground  forces  in  Europe  and  penetrate  into  Soviet  territory 
to  a  depth  which  v>ould  cover  practically  any  spot  within  Soviet 
Russia  itself. 

The  Chairman.  Wlien  were  you  on  this  mission? 

Mr.  Hunter.  February  12  to  22,  around  about  that  period  of 
time.  We  went  to  all  of  the  bases  for  which  we  have  paid  something 
like  half  a  billion  dollars  in  Africa.  North  Africa  that  is.  We  found 
that  those  five  bases  are  protected  under  the  agreement  with  the 
French  by  ground  forces  not  to  exceed  7,500  men. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  our  limitation? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Permanent  ground  forces.  We  do  have  and  can 
rotate  for  training  purposes  up  to  60  or  90  daj-s  as  much  as  a  wing  or 
more  air  force,  but  out  permanent  forces,  as  was  explained  to  me  in 
Africa,  are  based  on  that  limitation  of  7,500  men.  That  is  set  by  the 
French.  We  do  not  own  the  bases.  We  put  in  the  installations. 
The  French  own  them.  They  can  on  demand  take  them  back  as  I 
imderstand,  when  and  if  they  see  fit.  At  the  time  we  were  there, 
Gen.  Auguste  Guillaume,  who  is  the  Resident 

The  Chairman.  Resident  of  what? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Resident-General  of  Morocco  for  the  French.  He 
made  it  ver}-  clear  that  while  he  had  fought  against  the  landing 
forces  of  the  United  States  when  we  first  went  into  Africa  in  World 
W^ar  II,  within  a  matter  of  3  days,  I  think  he  said,  he  was  very  friendly 
with  General  Patton,  and  from  that  point  on  has  been  for  the  West. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  spell  General  Guillaume's  name  for  the 
reporter? 

Mr.  Hunter.  G-u-i-1-l-a-u-m-e  and  A-u-g-u-s-t-e.  As  perhaps  of 
today,  or  certainly  within  a  very  few  days  of  the  1st  of  June,  General 
Guillaume  is  to  be  relieved  and  a  career  diplomat.  La  Coste,  is  to 
replace  him. 

To  make  a  little  clearer  that  picture  in  Morocco,  from  about  1914 
or  1915,  or  1912,  I  believe  Youssef  was  the  Sultan  and  he  became,  if 
not  closely  allied,  certainly  in  sympathy,  b}'  his  public  utterances, 
with  a  radical  movement  in  Morocco.  It  was  among  the  Arabs,  and 
of  course  all  of  the  Arab  groups  are  by  religion  bitterly  anti-Com- 
munist, but  those  of  them  in  the  big  concentrations  of  cities,  like 
Casa  Blanca,  Rabat,  and  Dakar,  were  deeply  infitrated  by  certain 
j-adical  movements.  Whether  you  would  call  them  Communists  or 
not,  I  do  not  know.  They  v/ere  certainly  in  parallel  with  the  Com- 
munists and  Youssef  was  very  much  on  their  side. 

Senator  Johnston.  There  was  a  lot  of  anti-Americanism,  too,  was 
there  not? 


64  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Hunter.  They  were  very  much  pro-Nazi  and  on  that  ground 
very  much  against  our  being  in  Africa,  very  much  against  the  West 
being  in  Africa,  and  very  much  against  anyone  being  in  Africa  except 
the  Arabs  along  the  North  Shore. 

Senator  Johnson.  A  httle  over  a  year  ago  I  visited  that  same  terri- 
tory.    I  do  not  want  to  interrupt  you. 

Mr.  Hunter.  General  Guillaume  went  to  Morocco  in  1951  and 
found  that  there  had  been  an  effort  by  General  Juin,  who  very  recently 
had  his  run-in  with  the  French  handling  of  Indochina — I  believe  over 
the  French  Far  East  policy — to  depose  the  then  Sultan.  General  Juin 
had  favored  the  disposing  of  the  Sultan,  Youssef,  but  it  was  not  per- 
mitted to  take  place  at  that  time. 

Then,  El  Glaoui,  who  is  the  80-year-old  Pasha  of  Marrakesh  and 
has  supposedly  more  money  than  the  rest  of  Morocco  put  together, 
and  claims  the  ability  to  call  300,000  desert  riflemen  whenever  he 
needs  them,  demanded  that  Youssef  be  deposed.  He  said  that  Youssef 
was  a  representative  of  the  left  wing  elements,  that  he  did  not  represent 
Morocco,  and  demanded  that  he  get  out. 

The  Sultan  did  make  an  effort  to  rally  the  tribesmen  and  be  backed 
by  them.     He  was  not  backed  by  the  tribesmen.     El  Glaoui,  who  is 
the  strong  man  apparently  of  Morocco,  went  with  the  French  to  the 
point  of  getting  rid  of  Youssef.     The  French  Government  deposed  him . 
and  exiled  him  to  Corsica. 

An  uncle  of  the  deposed  Sultan,  Arafo,  w^io  was  the  brother  of  the 
previous  Sultan,  was  named  with  the  backing  of  El  Glaoui,  and  the 
French  Government,  to  become  the  Sultan. 

A  week  before  we  were  there  an  effort  was  made  to  assassinate  the 
new  Sultan,  Arafo.  A  week  after  we  left  a  hand  grenade  was  thrown 
at  El  Glaoui,  but  as  long  as  General  Guillaume  was  there,  there  appar- 
ently was  no  question  of  where  the  Moroccan  French  would  be. 

It  will  be  an  interesting  situation,  in  my  opinion,  at  least,  to  see 
what  position  is  taken  by  the  replacement  in  Morocco,  by  the  career- 
diplomat,  in  place  of  the  long-established  soldier. 

Mr.  Areus.  Mr.  Hunter,  what  is  the  significance  of  the  red  areas 
there,  particularly  in  Africa,  which  appear  on  the  map  of  the  Eastern. 
Hemisphere? 

Mr.  Hunter.  I  cannot  talk  to  you  from  personal  experience  as  to 
what  has  happened  by  being  in  these  areas  in  Africa,  but  over  a  period 
since  1946  various  records,  that  are  available  to  the  committee,  have 
brought  out  the  fact  that  there  have  been  definite  insurrective  radical 
troublemaking  movements  in  Africa,  that  African  officials  charge  are 
directly  traceable  to  Communist  provocation  through  agents. 

Taking  some  of  them,  the  Egyptian  movement  which  threatens 
Suez  has  been  known  ever  since  the  Wafds  in  those  areas  went  into 
the  movement  to  have  the  British  out  of  Africa.  As  long  ago  as  1941 
or  1942  the  then  Russian  consul,  in  Algiers  said  that  he  was  not  in 
favor  of  encouraging  openly  any  Communist  movement  in  Algiers  be- 
cause at  any  time  if  France  should  become  Communist,  they  would 
much  prefer  an  Algiers  that  had  not  been  taken  over  by  any  other 
group. 

There  have  been  riots  in  Tunis.  One  report  has  been  that  in  Eritrea 
the  Communist  groups  told  the  chief  of  the  El  Tigre  Province  that  if 
he  saw  fit  to  go  with  the  revolutionary  Red  movement,  he  would  he 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMIVIUNISM  65 

made  the  king  or  the  prince  of  Eritrea.  From  Addis  Ababa,  I  have 
seen  reports  that  the  Soviet  personnel  in  Addis  Ababa  is  in  excess  of 
their  Embassy  in  Paris.     The}"  have  a  greater  number  of  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  in  your  statement  here  the  names  of  the 
people  who  are  the  key  espionage  organizing  agents  of  Moscow  in 
Africa. 

Mr.  Hunter.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Arexs.  I  see  that  appears  on  page  30. 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  sir.  The  list  of  that  African  group  comes  to 
me  from  a  source  that  I  will  be  very  glad  to  give  to  the  committee 
although  I  prefer  to  do  it  in  executive  session. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Mr.  Hunter.  It  gives  the  Director,  S.  P.  Koziarev,  a  Russian. 
The  committee  supposedly  is  working  out  of  Moscow  and  not  in 
Africa.  There  is  also  the  Deputy,  Col.  Beck  Dumbadze,  a  Russian; 
Chief  of  Operations,  Lt.  Col.  Harald  Nuut,  a  Russian;  First  Deputy, 
E.  F.  Podvigin,  a  Russian;  Second  Deputy,  Maj.  V.  I.  Strashev,  a 
Russian;  Staff  Officers,  V.  Kumanev,  a  Bulgarian,  and  V.  Bank,  a 
Russian;  Liaison  Officer  with  Arab  League,  A.  I.  Chikov,  a  Russian; 
Director,  Xortli  and  West  African  Department,  J.  A.  Klimentov,  a 
Russian;  First  Deputy,  A.  N.  Erophin,  a  Russian;  Second  Deputy, 
E.  Kallos,  Hungarian;  Liaison  Officer  with  Mogreb  Liberation  Com- 
mittee, V.  Kozarev,  a  Russian;  Director  of  the  East  Africa  and 
Abyssinia  Department,  V.  A.  Kiriev,  a  Russian;  Director,  Sudan 
Department,  Y.  lakhim,  a  Czech;  and  Deputy,  Y.  Siedliaczek, 
probably  a  Czech.  The  resident  agents  in  the  Sudan  were  stationed 
at  Khartoum,  Abu-Hamad,  Omdur^nan,  Port  Suday,  and  Atbara. 
It  gives  the  name  of  a  courier  who  supposedly  carried  the  material 
from  these  people  to  the  Russians. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Hunter,  to  what  extent  does  the  So  iet  acquisition 
of  these  areas  which  have  been  drawn  into  their  orbit  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II  affect  the  stockpiling  in  the  United  States  and  the 
acquisition  and  maintenance  in  the  United  States  of  strategic  and 
critical  material? 

Mr.  Hunter.  At  West  Point,  of  which  I  am  not  a  graduate,  the 
Department  of  Social  Science  publishes  studies  from  time  to  time  on 
raw  materials  in  war  and  peace.  They  divide  these  materials  into 
four  groups,  the  most  important  of  which  is  group  A,  and  that  is 
defined  as  a  group  for  which  a  satisfactory  means  of  insuring  adequate 
supply  for  future  em.ergency  can  be  accomplished  only  by  stockpiling. 
As  of  1946,  after  World  War  II,  when  we  found  that  we  were  prac- 
tically a  have-not  nation  in  most  of  our  strategic  materials,  there  were 
some  63  or  65  of  these  strategic  materials  in  the  short-supply  group. 

A  great  many  of  them  com^e  from  the  area  which  would  go  if  the 
Russians  took  Southeast  Asia  and  from  that  into  Indonesia.  I  have 
the  list  of  them  if  you  want  them  in  the  record.  There  are  about  63. 
I  can  read  them. 

\h\  Arens.  They  are  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Hunter.  No,  they  are  not  in  the  record. 

The  Chairman.  Do  not  take  the  time  to  read  them.  We  will  just 
incorporate  them  and  make  them  a  part  of  the  record  and  save  some 
time. 


66  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COJViMUNISM 

(The  list  referred  to  follows:) 

Agar,  antimony,  Rhodesian  chrysotile.  South  African  amosite,  bauxite,  beryl- 
lium, bismuth,  cadmium,  castor  oil,  celestite,  metallurgical  and  refractory  grades 
of  chromite.  cobalt,  cocoanut  oil,  columbite,  manila  fiber,  sisal,  corundum, 
industrial  diamonds,  emetine,  amorphus  lump  graphite,  flake  graphite  hyoscine, 
iodine,  jewel  bearings,  kapok,  Indian  kyanite,  lead,  manganese  ore,  mercury, 
muscovite  block  mica,  muscovite  splittings,  and  phlogopite  splittings,  monasite, 
nickel,  opium,  palm  oil,  pepper,  platinum  metals  (platinum,  irridium)  pyretheum, 
quartz  crystals,  quebracho,  quinidine,  cjuinine,  rapeseed  oil,  crude  rubber,  natural 
latex,  rutile,  sapphire  and  ruby,  shellac,  sperm  oil,  talc  (stealite  block)  tantalite, 
tin,  tung  oil,  tungsten,  uranium,  vanadium,  zinc,  zirconium  ores. 

This  list  of  more  than  10  items  show  in  the  production  lists  of  Red  China, 
Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,  Hungary,  North  Korea,  Poland,  Rumania, 
Ruthenia,  Tibet,  and  Yugoslavia,  10  countries  out  of  18. 

Question:   Does  this  1946  strategic  material  list  still  hold? 

Answer:   Current  stockpiling  requirements,  of  course,  are  classified. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  general  subject  of 
the  Russian  trade  oflfensive  to  implement  the  acquisition  of  materiel 
which  the  Soviet  Union  has  acquired  by  actual  outright  acquisition 
of  adjacent  territory?  Do  you  have  information  in  your  statement 
respecting  th^  worldwide  trade  ofTensive  of  the  Russians? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  addition  to  the  outright  acquisitions  which  they 
have  been  able  to  maintain  because  of  taking  over  adjacent  territory. 

Mr.  Hunter.  An  intelligence  agency  with  which  the  committee  is 
undoubtedly  familiar  maintains  a  day-to-day  check  on  the  broadcasts 
of  foreign  governments  in  which  the  actions  of  the  governments  are 
more  or  less  brought  out  from  their  point  of  view,  and  since  January 
of  this  year,  the  broadcasts  have  specified  and  emphasized  the  efforts 
of  the  Russians  to  bring  into  trade  relationships,  with  either  the 
Soviet  or  the  satelites  these  countries  that  are  on  the  fringe  and  even 
Africa  and  the  areas  from  which  we  get  most  of  our  raw  materials,  at 
least  28  or  38  of  them,  and  from  which  Europe  gets  all  of  its  industrial 
potential. 

That  lists  Afghanistan,  Argentina,  Australia,  Belgium,  Bolivia, 
Britain,  British  Borneo,  Burma,  Ceylon,  Chile,  Cuba,  Denmark, 
Egypt,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Iceland,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel, 
Italy,  Japan,  Lebanon,  Malay,  Nepal,  The  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Pakistan,  Philippines,  Sweden,  Syria,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Uruguay  as 
those  to  which  overtures  have  been  made  from  the  Russians  to  send 
trade  delegations  and  to  receive  trade  delegations  to  enter  into  agree- 
ments by  which  trade  would  be  established  between  those  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  If  the  Russians  are  successful  in  the  trade  offensive  to 
work  out  trade  agreements  for  the  exchange  of  material  from  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain  with  the  countries  which  are  cmrently  free,  what  in 
your  judgment  would  be  the  net  result  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  of  America? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Whenever  a  Russian  or  a  trade  delegation  or  formal 
organization  of  any  kind  goes  into  a  country — I  think  it  was  demon- 
strated in  this  country  very  fully  by  the  operations  of  Amtorg,  and 
that  has  been  sworn  to  in  congressional  hearings — every  delegation 
that  goes  in  from.  Russia  contains  some  element  of  the  Soviet  espionage 
service.  They  acquire  military,  industrial,  and  economic  data.  They 
are  able  to  propagandize  and  to  get  their  particular  arguments  in  favor 
of  the  Soviet  before  the  American  people. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  67 

A  secondary  setup  is  that  they  can  and  do  siphon  away  from  the 
United  States  these  particularly  strategic  and  necessary  items  that 
we  need  for  defense,  as  outlined  bj^  the  stockpiling  program  recently 
brought  out  in  some  considerable  detail  by  Senator  Malone's  com- 
mittee that  have  produced  4  volumes  so  far  and  have  4  more  coming. 
Wherever  a  Communist  or  Soviet  group  can  establish  themselves  in 
an  area,  that  area  becomes  a  small  cancer  to  spread  with  their  propa- 
ganda and  dissemination  of  espionage,  sabotage,  propaganda,  and  the 
rest  of  their  motivations. 

Air.  Arens.  Aside  from  that  what  is  the  tkreat,  if  any,  from  the 
standpoint  of  economic  strangulation  control  of  w^orld  markets  by  the 
Soviets? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Europe,  an  industrial  and  fabricating  area,  cannot 
produce  without  the  raw  materials  from  Africa.  The  United  States 
cannot  produce  the  various  war  materials  without  raw  materials  from 
Africa  and  from  South  America.  Whenever  the  Soviet  can  divert  from 
industrial  Europe  or  industrial  United  States  the  necessary  products 
for  our  industrial  production,  they  hamstring  us  just  to  the  extent  of 
what  they  can  take  away. 

Trade  with  the  Soviet  is  a  weapon  just  as  much  as  a  tank,  or  a 
bomber,  or  a  fifth  column. 

Mr.  Arexs.  What  is  the  significance  from  a  militaiy  standpoint  of 
north  Africa  and  of  Spain  to  the  protection  of  the  West? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Spain  and  Franco  have  been  a  target  of  Soviet 
attack  since  1936  and  1937  when  Franco  moved  in  to  overtlu-ow  a 
Communist  government  wliich  had  been  set  up  in  Spain.  Subse- 
quently, it  will  be  recalled,  international  brigades  were  formed  all  over 
the  world,  practically,  by  the  Soviet  Tlih'd  International  to  go  in  to 
fight  against  Franco.  The  Abraham  Lincoln  Brigade  was  one  of 
those  which  was  formed  in  this  country  and  which  did  go  to  Spain 
and  did  fight.  It  has  since  been  indentified  by  the  Attorney  General 
and  I  think  has  been  investigated  by  the  Subversive  Activities  Control 
Board,  as  a  distinct  Communist  operation. 

Franco  found  that  these  international  brigades  were  definitely  Red, 
definitely  allied,  and  definitely  connected  mth  the  Third  Interna- 
tional, and  he  fought  to  keep  Spain  free  from  communism.  His  war 
was  successful.  The  leftwing  movement  in  Spain  was  forced  to  flee 
and  took  headquarters  basically  in  Mexico  and  Central  America. 

When  World  War  II  began  Spain,  of  course,  was  under  terrific 
pressure  by  the  Germans  to  let  them  come  over  the  Pyrenees  to 
Gibraltar  where  they  would  have  that  western  gateway  to  the  jSIedi- 
terranean.  It  has  been  charged  that  Franco  let  the  Germans  have 
wolfram  and  other  materials.  It  has  been  charged  that  Franco  sent 
two  blue-shirted  divisions  to  fight  with  the  Germans. 

The  Germans  had  helped  Franco  against  the  Russian  group  during 
his  civil  war  in  Spain.  When  it  came  to  the  repajanent  Franco  has 
said,  and  I  have  seen  statements  of  his  declarations  on  it,  that  he 
paid  back  man  for  man  and  dollar  for  dollar  for  aid  that  had  been 
given  him  during  the  civil  war  against  the  Communists  in  1936  and 
1937,  but  that  he  had  not  yielded  1  inch  of  Spanish  soil  and  never 
would  to  anyone.     How  right  that  statement  is  I  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  significant  is  Spain  and  North  Africa  in  a  world- 
wide military  operation  to  the  West? 


68  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Hunter.  Had  Franco  not  held  neutrality  in  World  War  II, 
General  Patton,  for  one,  has  stated  that  it  would  not  have  been  pos- 
sible to  land  at  Casablanca,  or  at  Oran,  or  the  other  ports  where  our 
World  War  II  landings  were  made. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  Rommel  was  there  and  was  all  the  way 
along  the  north  shore  of  Africa  threatening  the  Suez  Canal,  and  it 
was  only  after  we  were  able  to  land  and  build  up  the  African  offensive 
that  Rommel  was  forced  to  come  back  eventually  to  retreat  into 
Sicily  and  Italy.  Our  establishment  of  a  base  to  conduct  World 
War  II  from  Africa  tow'ard  Europe  might  never  have  been  accom- 
plished had  it  not  been  for  Franco  keeping  Spain  out  of  Nazi  hands. 

Today  the  lifeline  through  the  Mediterranean  makes  eciually  vital 
Franco's  anti-Communist  position  and  his  recent  agreement  by  which 
we  can  put  bases,  naval  and  military,  in  Spain  provides  the  protection 
by  fighter  planes  for  our  bombers  based  in  North  Africa. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  general  is  the  situation  applicable  respecting  the 
significance  of  North  Africa? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Certainly. 

Mr.  Arens.  Aside  from  the  strategic  materials  in  North  Africa  and 
the  trade  potential  of  North  Africa  and  Africa  in  general  as  a  supplier 
of  raw  materials,  are  North  Africa  and  Spain  vital  to  the  defense  of 
the  West? 

Mr.  Hunter.  The  Air  Force  maneuver  last  February  was  a  refuel- 
ing one  to  show  that  B-47's,  which  are  medium,  2,000-mile  operational 
radius  planes,  could  refuel  at  any  point  over  friendly  territory  and 
then  penetrate  2,000  miles  in  and  come  back  safely. 

With  fighter  bases  in  Spain  to  protect  the  bomber  bases  in  Africa, 
the  bomber  bases  are  safe. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  we  temporarily  direct  your  attention  to  the 
situation  in  the  Far  East  with  particular  reference  to  China,  and 
Korea,  and  Indochina? 

On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  your  experience  and  informa- 
tion to  which  you  allude  in  your  prepared  statement,  what  are  your 
overall  observations  respecting  the  Communist  strategy  and  tactics 
in  the  Far  East? 

Mr.  Hunter.  By  testimony  of  Browder  and  action  of  Borodin  the 
Soviet  have  been  operating  with  the  objective  of  taking  China  into 
the  Soviet  orbit  within  a  matter  of  2  years  from  the  time  they  had 
established  their  government  in  Moscow.  When  the  war  began  in 
Korea  and  the  Reds  drove  south  the  North  Korean  forces  were  better 
armed  and  better  equipped  than  the  South  Korean  forces  and  when 
the  United  States  went  in,  after  having  been  driven  down  to  a  very 
narrow  perimeter  near  Pusan  at  the  extreme  south,  it  was  American 
forces  which  forced  the  Red  forces  back. 

About  that  time  there  had  been  a  series  of  reports  which  came  from 
Nationalist  Chinese  intelligence.  They  stated  in  some  considerable 
detail  that  the  Red  Chinese  were  being  aided  by  the  Russians  directly 
and  that  their  sources  of  supply  had  to  depend  on  Soviet  aid.  In 
about  1952,  2  years  ago,  I  received  in  the  mail  a  document — ^I  cannot 
vouch  for  it — which  purported  to  be  a  translation  of  a  treaty  that  had 
been  signed  in  Moscow  on  February  12,  1950,  which  was  4  months 
before  the  Korean  attack,  by  Vishinsky  and  Chou  En-lai. 

I  did  not  intend  and  do  not  intend  to  ask  the  committee  to  consider 
that  report  in  any  other  way  except  in  light  of  what  has  happened 
since. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  69 

Senator  Welker.  You  mean  subsequent  events  seem  to  have  sus- 
tained what  is  included  in  the  treaty? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes.  I  would  tell  you  what  the  document  says. 
This,  as  I  say,  was  a  reported  translation.     It  said: 

The  Central  People's  Government  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  and  the 
Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  for 
the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  secret  cooperation  between  the  Chinese  People's 
Republic  and  the  Union  of  Socialist  Republics,  in  order  to  prevent  together  any 
form  of  aggressive  act  by  imperialistic  policy  as  well  as  of  tlae  resurgence  of  Jap- 
anese Imperialism,  with  a  view  to  establish  a  new  order  in  Asia,  and  to  strengthen 
the  Chinese-Soviet  friendly,  cooperative,  relationship,  especially  conclude,  in 
addition  to  the  Two  Countries  Friendship  Alliance  Mutual  Aid  Pact,  a  Special 
Agreement,  as  well  as  each  appoint  a  plenipotentiary  delegate  as  below. 

The  Chinese  People's  Government  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  specially 
appoint  as  Special  Envoy  the  Chairman  of  the  Chinese  Political  Affairs  Depart- 
ment and  Foreign  Minister,  Chou  En-Lai. 

The  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  specially  appoint  the 
Foreign  Commissar  Andrei  Noraiwich  Vishinsky. 

The  two  plenipotentiary  Delegates,  after  having  examined  together  the  docu- 
ment and  found  it  appropriate,  agreed  to  the  following  provisions: 

Article  1. — The  contracting  parties,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  together 
imperialistic  invasions  and  of  coping  with  the  third  world  war,  agree  that  the 
Chinese  People's  Republic  will  permit  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  to 
station  troops  within  the  Chinese  boundarj'  with  a  view  to  protect  together  world 
peace. 

Article  2. — As  from  the  date  of  conclusion  of  this  pact,  the  Chinese  People's 
Republic  will  first  assign  Northeast  and  North  China  sea  and  air  bases  to  the 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  as  a  military  measure,  and  also  through  the  Chinese 
Liberation  Army,  will  assume  responsibility  of  assisting  in  the  carrying  out  of  the 
liberation  of  Southeast  Asia  so  as  to  effectuate  the  completion  of  the  liberation  of 
the  whole  of  Asia. 

Article  3. — The  contracting  parties  agree  to  reorganize  the  Chinese  People's 
Liberation  Army  into  (an)  International  Communist  Army,  to  be  under  the  direct 
command  of  the  highest  officer  of  the  Red  Army. 

Article  4. — The  Chinese  Republic  will  be  responsible  for  the  mobilization  of 
ten  million  Chinese  workmen  to  assist  Soviet  Russia  to  collectively  construct  the 
Sino-Soviet  military  establishments  in  order  to  cope  with  imperialistic  activities 
and  aggression. 

Article  5. — The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will  make  available  all  North 
China  ports  to  the  stationing  of  Soviet  troops,  as  well  as  to  provide  free  access 
and  exit.  Such  ports  will  include  Chinwantao,  Haichow,  Chiefoo,  Weihaiwei, 
Tsingtae  and  Dairen. 

Article  6. — The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will,  before  the  end  of  this  year, 
increase  the  number  of  soldiers  by  four  million  so  as  to  be  ready  for  meeting  the 
imperialistic  act  of  aggression. 

Article  7. — The  population  of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  must,  owing  to 
the  existing  lack  of  resources,  be  diminished  by  100  million,  since  otherwise  they 
cannot  be  sustained.  Its  detailed  procedures  are  to  be  determined  by  the  Chinese 
People's  government  themselves. 

Article  8. — All  government  Departments  of  the  Central  People's  Government 
of  the  Chinese  People's  Republic  should  invite  technical  personnel  from  the 
Soviet  Socialist  Republic  as  advisors. 

Article  9. — The  two  contracting  parties  agree  to  the  sending  by  the  Soviet 
Government  of  technical  personnel,  to  participate  in  the  operation  of  the  main 
industries  in  the  various  districts  of  China.  The  Government  of  the  Chinese 
People's  Republic  agrees  to  accord  them  with  favorable  treatment  in  accordance 
with  the  favorable  "supply  sj'stem." 

Article  10. — -The  Chinese  People's  Republic  will  open  for  Soviet  trade  coastal 
ports  and  inland  markets,  as  well  as  agree  to  levy  duties  of  the  1/100  part  under 
preferential  rates. 

Article  11. — Both  contracting  parties  agree,  under  mutually  beneficial  and 
mutually  ])rofitable  conditions,  to  carrv  out  barter  exchange  for  commodities  in 
order  to  establish  friendly  relations. 

Article  12. — The  government  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  will  have  special  right  to 
allocate  the  iron  and  other  mineral  raw  materials  within  the  boundary  of  the 
Chinese  People's  Republic:  of  which  the  lead  mines,  with  the  exception  of  retain- 


70  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

ing  20  percent  of  the  total  yearly  production  for  self  use,  the  rest  should  be  supplied 
to  the  IT.  S.  S.  R.  to  expand  the  heavy  industries  in  order  to  assist  in  the  indus- 
trialization of  the  Chinese  People's  Reijublic. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  agreement  has 
been  incorporated  in  the  record  and  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  read 
it  in  its  entirety.  You  acquired  this  from  a  source  which  you  deemed 
to  be  reliable;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Hunter.  That  is  right.  I  was  told  that  it  was  basically 
Nationalist  Chinese  Intelligence. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  do  not  care  on  this  record  to  identify  the  document 
any  further? 

Mr.  Hunter.  No,  sir.  I  woidd  like  to  suggest,  though,  in  connec- 
tion with  that  document  that  you  examiae  it  in  the  light  of  what  has 
happened  since  1950. 

The  Chairman.  And  also  due  to  your  experience  in  military  intel- 
ligence you  have  reason  to  believe,  coupled  with  the  events  that  have 
happened,  that  it  might  be  an  authentic  treaty? 

Kir.  Hunter.  I  would  go  that  far.  It  was  given  to  me  in  good 
faith  by  a  source  I  consider  reliable. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  also  here  a  document  entitled  "The  Chinese 
Communist  Movement,"  a  photostat  of  which  I  now  have  in  my  hand, 
the  subtitle  being  "Military  Intelligence  Division,  War  Department, 
Washington,  D.  C."  That  has  been  declassified  so  that  it  can  now  be 
made  public? 

Mr.  Hunter.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  you  identify  the  document  any  fin-ther? 

Mr.  Hunter.  The  Military  Intelligence  Division,  War  Depart- 
ment, Washington,  D.  C,  under  date  of  Jidy  5,  1945,  classified  it  as 
secret.  It  was  declassified  under  the  signature  of  the  General  who 
had  originally  classified  it,  it  is  his  authority  so  to  do — on  the  24th  of 
August.  I  am  not  certain  whether  that  was  the  24th  of  August  of 
that  same  year  or  a  later  year,  but  the  declassification  over  the  signa- 
ture of  the  declassifying  officer  says:  "Declassified  August  24." 

Mr.  Arens.  So  you  feel  free  to  release  it  to  the  press  and  to  the 
public? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Certainly. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  invite  your  attention  to  a  few  comments  to 
cover  at  least  the  highlights  of  your  prepared  staterrient,  on  the  situa- 
tion in  the  Western  Hemisphere  respecting  on  a  global  basis  the 
strategy  and  tactics  of  the  Communist  movement? 

Mr.  Hunter.  The  first  major  declaratio-n  of  power  by  the  Third 
International  in  the  United  States  was  that  meeting  held  in  1922  at 
Overlook  Mountain,  at  which  time  they  flatly  told  all  of  the  Socialists 
and  the  I  WW,  and  the  rest  of  the  radical  move^nent  in  the  United 
States,  that  they  would  beco^ne  a  section  of  the  Third  International, 
responsible  to  that  group,  with  headquarters  in  Moscow. 

One  of  the  points  where  trouble  had  dev^ eloped  was  in  Winnipeg 
where  the  first  general  strike  ever  perpetrated  in  the  United  States 
tied  up  the  city  for  more  than  6  weeks. 

Senator  Welker.  The  United  States? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Canada. 

Senator  Welker.   You  stated  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Hunter.  No  ;  in  Winnipeg,  the  city  of  Winnipeg. 

Senator  Welker.  You  want  to  correct  the  record? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  71 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes.  The  general  strike  was  in  Winnipeg,  Canada. 
The  Canadian  repoil  of  the  Royal  Comniission  which  carae  out  in 
1946  developed  that  extent  to  which  the  Russians  at  peace  with 
Canada  had  used  diplomatic  resources  to  go  into  the  most  vital  and 
crucial  military  secrets  of  the  country.  The  FBI  report  which  was 
partly  revealed  in  the  hearings  of  the  Senate  Internal  Security  Com- 
mittee in  connection  with  the  Harry  Dexter  \Yliite  case  went  into  the 
Ato.nnc  Energy  infiltrations  out  in  the  West  in  and  around  Los  Angeles. 

Mr.  Arens.  Los  Alan  os,  you  mean. 

Mr.  HuNT.GR.  Los  Alamos,  and  in  Los  Angeles  in  connection  with 
Haakon,  Chevalier,  and  that  group  that  were  mentioned  in  that  Cal- 
Tech  testimony  about  the  visits  of  Steve  Nelson  and  the  rest  of  them 
to  make  contact  with  the  atomic  energy  development. 

Going  back  to  1916,  the  Phelps-Dodge  Mexican  copper  riots,  at 
Nacozari  in  which  a  great  many  were  killed,  were  part  of  the  Com- 
munist movement.     It  was  part  of  the  IWW  at  the  time. 

In  1950  a  survey  had  been  made  and  came  into  my  possession,  and 
I  will  give  you  the  sources  on  that  if  you  want  it,  which  said  that  in 
1941  the  Communist  direction  had  gone  into  Mexico,  had  been  in 
Cuba,  working  through  both  Polish  and  Czechoslovakian  Embassies, 
to  set  up  a  series  of  armed  insurrections  in  the  Central  American 
Republics.  Particularly  they  wanted  to  break  into  Panama.  They 
wanted  to  land  anywhere  in  the  area  which  would  threaten  the  Panama 
Canal,  because  the  two  strategic  targets  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
which  are  most  important  in  the  opinion  of  Constantin  Oumansky, 
who  had  been  the  director  in  that  area  while  serving  as  Ambassador 
to  Mexico  City  from  the  Soviet  west  as  director  of  all  the  Communist 
espionage  in  the  American  Continent  at  that  time — and  this  was  in  a 
report  made  prior  to  his  death — he  was  killed  when  his  plane  took  off 
in  Mexico  City  and  mysteriously  blew  up  in  the  air — are  the  Panama 
Canal  and  Sault  Ste.  Marie  locks,  in  Michigan,  which  of  course,  would 
cut  off  the  distribution  of  steel  from  the  Pittsburgh  area  if  they  could 
be  dvnamited  or  bombed. 

In  his  opinion  they  are  the  two  most  important  points  that  we  would 
have  to  guard  strategically. 

In  the  prepared  statement  I  have  given  names,  places,  and  details 
of  the  operations,  not  only  in  Central  America  but  in  the  various 
<'ountries  in  South  America  in  which  definite  Communist  movements 
were  detected,  exposed,  and  to  some  extent  stopped  and  to  other 
extents  currently  grooving. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Witness,  can  you  tell  me  with  respect  to 
Bolivia  of  any  activity  that  is  going  on  there  and  any  strategic  min- 
erals or  metals  that  we  are  daily  importing  from  there;  if  you  know? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  sir.  With  respect  to  the  Bolivian  strategic 
minerals,  I  do  not  want  to  get  into  any  hassle  as  to  what  the  require- 
ments of  the  stockpile  as  of  today  are,  whether  or  not  we  are  currently 
importing. 

Senator  Welker.  I  am  not  interested  in  that.  That  has  been 
established. 

Mr.  Hunter.  The  products  are  tin,  silver,  copper,  lead,  zinc, 
antimony,    bismuth,    wolfram,    gold,    lime,    rubber,    cinchona    bark, 


72  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMXTNISM 

tungsten,  petroleum,  and  such  agricultural  products  as  might  be 
wanted. 

Senator  Welker.  What  is  the  extent  of  the  Communist  infiltration 
in  Bolivia,  if  you  care  to  testify? 

Mr.  Hunter.  As  of  December  1952  there  was  still  a  strong  Com- 
munist movement  in  Bolivia.  I  would  be  glad  to  get  you  the  detail 
on  that  and  send  it  to  you. 

Senator  Welker.  You  have  nothing  of  more  recent  date  than  1952? 

Mr.  Hunter.  As  of  December  1952  I  have  some  additional  material. 
Frankly,  I  understood  that  the  South  American  phase  was  going  to  be 
handled  basically  in  another  way,  and  I  did  not  go  into  that  in  too 
much  detail. 

Senator  Welker.  Very  well.  Would  you  tell  us  something  about 
how  we  stand  in  Argentina? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Argentina:  silver,  copper,  gold,  and  petroleum  on 
the  exports.  Peron  hated  the  United  States  by  reason  of  the  restric- 
tions that  we  had  on  some  of  the  movements.  He  offered  sanctuary 
to  the  Nazi  naval  forces  during  the  war  and  when  Germany  fell  he 
began  to  flirt  with  the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  elections  of  Uruguay 
in  November  1946  Peron  used  every  method  that  he  could  to  effect 
an  anti-American  government  in  the  Republic,  and  when  that  failed, 
I  think  the  record  is  fairly  clear  that  Peron  has  been  anti-American,. 
anti-United  States,  since. 

At  Montevideo,  in  Uruguay,  in  1946,  Communist  orders  were  issued 
to  increase  the  Slav  propaganda  all  through  there.  There  are  about 
1,250,000  Slavs  in  South  America  and  60  percent  of  those  were  basically 
organized  in,  well,  like  the  language  fronts  that  we  have  had  in  this 
country  over  a  period  of  years. 

They  did  try  to  take  over  in  Uruguay — that  was  in  1946 — ^and  they 
were  defeated.  Peron  tried  to  aid  that  movement.  I  have  a  file  on 
that  that  I  will  always  be  glad  to  bring  up  if  you  desire  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  one  more  question. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Hunter,  based  upon  your  experience — it  has 
been  related  here  that  you  qualified  as  an  expert — do  you  think  in 
view  of  world  conditions  at  this  time  that  it  is  good  sound  policy  for 
us  to  permit  the  shipment  of  strategic  materials,  or  steel  mills,  or  any- 
thing that  might  aid  in  the  production  of  war  equipment  to,  say,. 
Argentina  or  Bolivia?  I  know  nothing  about  that  and  I  would  like 
an  answer  from  one  who  is  as  qualified  as  you  are,  sir. 

Mr.  Hunter.  To  no  country  that  is  willing  to  trade  with  the 
Soviet. 

Senator  Welker.  By  that  you  mean  that  Argentina  has  trade 
agreements  with  the  Soviets  and  the  satellites? 

Mr.  Hunter.  I  will  have  to  give  you  a  picture  on  that,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  You  do  not  need  to. 

Mr.  Hunter.  I  have  the  detailed  setup  on  it,  both  Bolivia  and 
Argentina,  but  I  could  not  give  it  to  you  without  checking.  Argen- 
tina, I  do  know  sends  beef  to  Russia.  They  have  sent  a  considerable 
poundage  of  it. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Hunter,  it  is  all  in  your  detailed  statement? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  sir.  On  April  2,  there  was  a  broadcast  report 
that  Argentina  had  delivered  71,000  tons  of  145,000-ton  food  contract 
to  the  Soviet  Union  under  contract  which  was  then  9  months  old. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  73 

Senator  Welker.  You  do  know  it  to  be  a  fact  that  not  only  do  they 
have  trade  agreements  with  Russia,  but  with  the  Iron  Curtain  satel- 
htes? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Yes,  sir;  agreements  with  Hungary  and  with  Rumania 

Senator  Welker.  Do  you  know  that  at  this  time  the  Soviet  Union 
has  trade  missions  working  in  South  America  in  Argentina  and  other 
countries  at  this  very  time? 

Mr.  HuxTER.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Hunter,  your  statement  is  rather  long  and 
detailed  and  it  is  rather  hard  to  bring  out  here  in  a  coherent  form  all 
of  the  detailed  information  that  you  have  in  this  statement.  Your 
statement  has  been  made  a  part  of  our  record.  I  would  like  to  ask 
you  this  question  in  the  way  of  summary:  In  your  opinion,  from  3'our 
experience  in  this  field  as  a  military  intelligence  man  and  a  special 
investigator  in  newspaper  work  for  35  3^ears  in  the  Communist  field, 
what  is  the  first  thing  that  this  Goverimient  should  do  to  stop  this 
growing,  creeping  spread  of  communism  all  over  the  world? 

]Mr.  Hunter.  I  would  say  pass  Senate  Resloution  247  because  you 
have  to  bring  a  showdo^vn  as  to  what  the  Communists  are  trying  to 
do.  For  25  or  30  years  we  have  looked  at  the  little  things  that  are 
close  up  and  we  have  overlooked  the  efforts  of  the  Third  International 
to  steal  continents  from  the  free  world. 

They  have  taken  most  of  Asia.  They  want  the  rest  of  it.  They 
are  movmg  for  Africa.  We  should  call  for  a  showdown  as  to  how  all 
the  nations  of  the  free  world  can  stop  the  fifth  coknnn  and  then  for  a 
conference  by  which  the  nations  of  the  free  world  could  stop  further 
aggression  to  expand,  and  stop  this  program,  first  infiltration  and  then 
seizure. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  you  this:  how  about  the  severance  of 
diplomatic  relations  from  the  standpoint  of  the  internal  security  of 
this  country? 

Mr.  Hunter.  In  1933  Litvinov  culminated  a  drive  that  had  gone 
on  for  9  years  to  obtain  recognition  of  Soviet  Russia.  I  have  given 
you  the  documentation  of  the  operation  of  the  Overman  committee 
and  the  Lodge  committee  and  the  early  organizations  which  met  to 
block  the  Borah  resolution  which  would  have  given  recognition  to 
Russia,  and  for  9  years  it  was  blocked. 

Then  Soviet  Russia  was  recognized. 

From  the  time  they  were  recognized  in  came,  under  the  protection 
of  diplomatic  and  consular  recognition  and  trade  protection,  people 
who  began  from  the  day  they  landed  to  become  spies  for  the  Soviet 
luider  the  international  Communist  consphacy  to  eventually  take 
over,  not  only  this  country,  but  the  world.  ^Yhy  we  have  allowed 
since  1933,  21  years,  the  violations  of  all  diplomatic  procedures  and 
diplomatic  protocol  and  courtesies  to  continue  is  beyond  my  under- 
standing as  a  newspaper  observer  and  a  looker  at  the  facts. 

The  Chairman.  From  yom*  experience  and  your  travels  and  re- 
search, do  you  find  that  the  other  countries  are  apprised  of  this 
situation? 

Mr.  Hunter.  Definitely  Canada  must  be.  Definitely  Australia 
must  be.  They  found  their  spy  groups  working  in  their  areas. 
France  must  know.  Germany  has  found  out.  Every  day  you  will 
find  a  list  of  the  number  of  refugees  that  come  out  and  tell  Germany 


74  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMJMTJNISM 

about  it.     Certainly  tlie  South  Africans  know  about  it,  and  the  powers 
in  Africa  have  had  ampk^  opportunity  to  discover  and  deal  with  it. 

The  Chairman.  Certainly  this  country  has  been  apprised  of  it. 

Mr.  Hunter.  Certainly.     Turkey  has  been  aware  of  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  have  one  brief  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Hunter,  Chairman  Jenner  of  this  committee 
permitted  me  to  head  a  task  force  that  held  a  hearing  in  New  York 
City  last  Friday  down  at  the  customs  house  in  which  there  had  been 
accumulated  in  a  period  of  less  than  2  weeks  better  than  three- 
quarters  of  a  mDlion  of  pieces  of  Communist  propaganda  printed  in 
Moscow  in  Chmese,  in  English,  Hungarian,  Polish,  and  all  sorts  of 
the  languages  by  those  satellites  behind  the  Iron  Curtain.  The  room 
in  which  we  held  the  hearing  was  at  least  three  times  as  large  as  this 
one.  Mail  sacks  were  stacked  nearly  to  the  ceilmg.  Four  employees 
of  the  customs  were  assigned  to  process  this  vast  accumulation  of 
propaganda.  Propaganda  from  62  boats  entering  the  harbor  at  New 
York  daily,  and  42  other  ports,  must  be  processed. 

I  take  it  you  would  approve  of  some  sort  of  legislation  to  stop  this 
sort  of  influx  of  propaganda  which  comes  in  wide  open  as  of  today? 

Mr.  Hunter.  We  are  not  permitted  to  send  American  newspapers, 
magazines,  or  other  publications  from  this  free  country  into  Russia  or- 
into  the  Soviet  zones  without  complete  and  total  censorship  clearance. 

Why  should  we  grant  them  a  privilege  that  they  refuse  to  grant  to 
our  people? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Johnston,  do  you  have  any  questions? 

Senator  Johnston.  I  had  occasion  to  be  in  New  York  and  check  on 
this  matter,  too,  last  fall.  I  was  amazed  to  see  the  amount  of  litera- 
ture coming  in  from  Russia  in  particular.  If  my  memory  serves  me 
correctly,  they  were  tearing  open  all  the  boxes  and  everything  that 
goes  out  of  America  and  checking  them  to  see  what  was  in  them,  just 
what  it  was,  but  .materials  coming  in  from  Russia  had  some  kind  of 
priority  or  something  that  they  passed  over,  especially  if  it  v\^as  read- 
ing material. 

Mr.  Hunter.  \^^ien  you  realize  that  the  World  Federation  of 
Trade  Unions — and  I  am  not  getting  into  the  labor  picture  at  all,  be- 
cause the  World  Federation  of  Trade  Unions  is  a  Communist  move- 
ment— has  in  its  leadership  Saillant  and  other  Communists  who  con- 
trol a  great  many  seagoing  personnel  on  foreign  ships,  obviously  it  is 
an  open  channel  for  the  transmission  and  movement  of  that  sort  of 
thing  into  this  country. 

In  the  Communist  mind  anything  that  is  not  Communist  is  Fascist 
and  anything  that  is  Fascist  is  anathema.  They  do  not  recognize 
any  de:'riOcracy  other  than  the  Communist  version  of  democracy, 
which  is  totalitarianism.  As  for  democracy,  they  take  the  Greek 
deviation  of  the  word,  which  means  mob  control,  and  their  mob  is  a 
smaller  proportion  of  the  total  population  of  Russia  today  than  was 
the  population  under  the  Czar,  the  population  of  governing  and  con- 
trolling interests. 

We  just  refuse  to  realize  that  we  are  gambling  blue  chips  for  con- 
tinents and  we  are  looking  at  the  little  local  outbreaks. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  you  negotiate  with  the  Russians?  Can  you  com- 
promise with  them? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  75 

Mr.  Hunter.  I  have  never  tried,  but  I  don't  know  anyone  that  ever 
did  successfully. 

The  Chairivian.  Mr.  Hunter,  we  thank  you  for  appearing  here  this 
morning.  This  is  another  of  a  series  of  hearings  that  this  committee 
is  tr^'ing  to  dev^elop  to  give  the  American  public  and  the  Congress  a 
picture  and  a  clear  picture  of  the  strategy  and  the  tactics  of  world 
communism,  and  your  statement  here  is  very  detailed. 

We  appreciate  youi*  interest  in  this  great  subject.  We  thank  you 
for  appearing  here.  We  will  continue  these  hearings  from  time  to 
time.     Thank  you  very  much,  gentlemen. 

(Thereupon,  the  hearing  recessed  at  11:25  a.  m.,  Thursday,  May 
27,  1954,  subject  to  call.) 

X 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


HEARINGS 


BEFORE  THE 


SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTEATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECUEITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 


OF  THE 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIAEY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIKD  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF 
WORLD  COMMUNISM 


JUNE  10,  15,  AND  17,  1954 


PART  2 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
47769  WASHINGTON  :  1954 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

AUG  9 -1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota,  Chairman 

ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

WILLIAM  E.  JBNNER,  Indiana  HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia 

ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  ESTES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee 

EVERETT  MCKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  Jr.,  Missouri 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Inteknal  Security 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Task  Force  Investigating  the  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  World  Communism 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

Richard  Arens,  Special  Counsel 
II 


CONTENTS 


_,     ,.               J,  Page 
Testimony  of — 

Caldwell,  John  C ^^ 

Marcus,  J.  Anthony ^21 

Wedemeyer,  Gen.  Albert  C ''"^ 

III 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WOELD  COMMUNISM 


THTJKSDAY,   JUNE   10,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 

Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  in  room 
4:57,  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)  presiding. 

Present :  Senators  Jenner  and  Welker. 

Also  present :  Richard  Arens,  staff  director,  and  Frank  W.  Schroeder 
and  Edward  R.  Duffy,  professional  staff  members. 

The  Chairman.    General  Wedemeyer,  will  you  be  sworn  and  testify  ? 

Do  you  swear  the  testimony  you  will  give  in  this  hearing  will  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.    I  do,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  The  hearing  today  is  a  continuation  of  a  series  of 
hearings  which  are  being  conducted  by  a  task  force  of  the  Internal 
Security  Subcommittee  of  the  Senate  on  the  strategy  and  tactics  of 
world  communism. 

As  I  stated  in  announcing  this  series  of  hearings  the  Communist 
conspiracy  in  the  United  States  is  only  one  tentacle  of  a  worldwide 
octopus  which  has  as  its  principal  target  the  United  States  of  America. 
It  is  therefore  essential  that  we  keep  abreast  of  the  strategy  and  tech- 
niques of  world  communism  if  we  are  to  appraise  adequately  the 
operation  of  this  conspiracy  in  our  Nation. 

The  witness  who  will  testify  today  is  a  distinguished  American 
whose  deeds  will  be  fully  recorded  in  the  history  of  our  country  which 
he  has  served  so  well. 

We  are  confident  that  from  the  wealth  of  experience  and  wisdom 
which  are  his.  Gen.  Albert  Wedemeyer  will  have  significant  contribu- 
tions to  make  to  our  committee. 

TESTIMONY  OF  GEN.  ALBERT  C.  WEDEMEYER 

The  Chairman.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Arens,  with  questioning 
General  Wedemeyer. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  for  the  purpose  of  our  record,  would  you 
kindly  give  us  a  brief  resume  of  the  various  Army  commands  which 
you  have  held  and  your  experience  in  various  theaters  of  operation 
in  the  world  ? 

77 


78  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  presume,  gentlemen,  that  you  do  not  want 
me  to  go  back  beyond  the  time  that  I  oegan  to  attain  a  little  rank  and 
responsibility,  AYhich  would  mean  about  1940;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Arens.  Yes,  sir. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Prior  to  that  time  1940  for  background,  I 
did  serve  in  China  and  in  the  Philippines ;  I  served  in  Germany,  where 
I  was  a  student  of  the  War  College  for  2  years  and  was  assigned  to 
German  troop  units  during  the  maneuver  period  in  the  summers. 
During  my  2  years  (1936-38)  in  Germany,  I  traveled  all  over  Europe. 

Immediately  prior  to  the  war  (1940),  I  was  assigned  to  the  Strategy 
and  Policy  Group  of  the  General  Stan  in  Washington  and  had  some 
responsibilities  in  the  area  of  strategic  planning  for  World  War  II. 
During  the  war  I  attended  world  conferences  at  London,  Quebec, 
Washington,  Casablanca,  and  Cairo,  as  a  member  of  General  Mar- 
shall's staff. 

In  1943  I  was  sent  to  India  to  serve  as  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  to 
Admiral  Lord  Louis  Mountbatten  in  the  Southeast  Asia  Command. 
The  headquarters  of  this  command  was  in  New  Delhi,  India. 

After  1  year  in  that  position  I  was  sent  September  1944  to  China 
to  assume  command  of  the  China  theater,  relieving  Gen.  Joseph 
Stilwell.  I  remained  in  command  of  that  theater  for  the  duration  of 
the  war  and  until  it  was  disbanded  in  May  1946. 

I  returned  to  the  United  States  and  awaited  orders  to  return  to 
China  where  I  was  scheduled  to  serve  as  Ambassador  at  the  request 
of  President  Truman. 

There  were  developments  that  caused  the  cancellation  of  that  ap- 
pointment, and  in  September  1946  I  was  given  command  of  the 
Second  Army,  with  headquarters  in*Baltimore.  This  Army  area  com- 
prised seven  Eastern  States  of  our  country. 

Then  I  returned  to  the  Pentagon  and  served  as  Deputy  Chief  of 
Staff  to  General  Eisenhower,  again  in  charge  of  strategic  or  global 
planning. 

In  1947  I  was  sent  to  the  Far  East  on  a  Presidential  mission  to  make 
a  survey  of  the  political,  economic,  psychological,  and  military  condi- 
tions in  China  and  Korea.  I  was  required,  on  that  mission,  to  analyze 
the  developments  in  that  important  area  and  to  submit  recommenda- 
tions to  the  President  in  connection  with  continued  United  States 
policy  in  that  area. 

In  1949  I  was  assigned  to  command  the  Sixth  Army,  comprising 
the  eight  Western  States  of  our  country.  While  on  that  assignment 
I  requested  retirement  July  1951  from  the  Army.  At  that  time 
the  law  permitted  an  officer  to  voluntarily  retire  at  the  conclusion  of 
30  years'  service,  and  I  took  advantage  of  that  law. 

I  am  presently  connected  with  industry,  as  vice  president  and  a  di- 
rector of  Avco  Manufacturing  Corp. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experi- 
ence, would  you  care  to  express  to  the  committee  what  you  feel  are 
the  principal  elements  of  the  Communist  global  tactics  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Gentlemen,  in  my  judgment  there  are  four 
general  areas  which  we  must  consider  when  evaluating  or  analyzing 
the  Communist  movement.  Those  areas  comprise  the  political,  eco- 
nomic, psychological,  and  military. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  79 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  you  kindly  illustrate  from  your  experience 
each  of  these  four  elements  and  how  they  operate  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  will  try  to  do  so,  sir. 

In  the  political  area,  the  Communists  have  endeavored  to  under- 
mine confidence  of  peoples  in  their  respective  governments.  They  have 
resorted  to  the  distortion  of  facts  regarding  historical  developments, 
to  lies,  to  chicanery,  even  to  murder.  In  fact  to  any  tactics  that  might 
permit  them  to  extend  gradually  the  control  of  peoples  and  nations. 
They  have  successfully  oriented  toward  the  Kremling  millions  of  peo- 
ple and  many  nations  through  those  tactics,  and  in  such  manner  as  to 
permit  their  unequivocal  control. 

While  science  has  been  improving  weapons  which  permit  the  more 
effective  destruction  of  human  lives  and  the  works  of  man,  science 
has  concurrently  improved  the  means  whereby  unscrupulous  leaders 
can  gain  and  maintain  physical  control  over  various  areas  geograph- 
ically and  mental  or  spiritual  control  over  huge  numbers  of  people. 

In  the  latter  case,  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  radio,  the  motion  picture, 
and  flying  columns,  when  they  are  required  to  employ  the  intimidation 
of  force,  and  the  various  gadgets  that  have  been  introduced  by  science 
to  facilitate  thought  control  or  brain  washing  as  well  as  physical 
control  of  peoples. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  a  comment  to  make  with  reference  to  the 
economic  element  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Within  the  economic  area,  the  Soviet  un- 
scrupulously, in  the  closing  days  of  the  war  and  immediately  there- 
after, misrepresented  the  assistance  given  to  people  in  warstricken 
areas. 

I  can  give  you  a  direct  example  in  connection  with  the  lend-lease  that 
was  sent  in  postwar  years  to  China  by  American  taxpayers.  The  Com- 
munists, Soviet  agents,  changed  the  labels  on  boxes  and  indicated  that 
the  supplies  that  were  abundantly  sent  to  help  rehabilitate  the  area, 
those  supplies,  according  to  the  changed  labels  on  the  boxes,  emanated 
in  the  Soviet  Union.  Of  course  we  know  that  the  United  States  con- 
tributed approximately  78  percent  of  the  world  lend-lease  program. 

They  resorted  freely  to  economic  pressures.  As  soon  as  they  gained 
control  of  peoples  or  areas,  they  immediately  oriented  the  economy  of 
such  areas  toward  the  Kremlin,  denyin^y  to  the  people  indigent  to  the 
areas  the  fruits  of  their  labor.  They  imposed  rigid  collectivization 
and  regimentation  of  labor,  all  industrial  and  farming  activities. 

Even  today  I  could  give  you  a  quick  example.  There  are  abundant 
oil  resources  in  Rumania,  the  Ploesti  oil  fields,  which  would  be  ade- 
quate for  the  requirements  of  that  country.  In  addition  the  Ru- 
manians would  still  have  surpluses  to  export  and  thus  help  their  econ- 
omy by  increasing  revenues.  However,  the  price  of  gasoline  in  Ru- 
mania today  is  $2.40  a  gallon,  prohibitive  in  cost,  of  course,  to  the 
people.  The  bulk  of  the  gasoline  is  taken  over  by  the  Soviet  repre- 
sentatives. They  direct  it  to  their  selfish  interest,  for  their  military  or 
for  purposes  connected  with  Soviet  trade  with  oil-thirsty  countries. 

These  are  a  few  of  the  many  examples  that  one  might  give  to  indi- 
cate the  economic  pressures  to  which  the  Soviet  subject  peoples  once 
they  gain  control  of  their  governments. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  a  comment  to  make  with  reference  to  the 
psychological  element  of  the  Communist  global  tactics? 


80  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  the  psychological  field,  the  rulers  in  the 
Kremlin  have  been  most  successful.  After  so  many  years  of  war,  with 
attendant  disruptions  and  dislocations,  with  many  people  disillusioned 
concerning  their  own  previous  ideas  and  ideologies  that  had  proved 
unsuccessful  in  that  world  struggle,  there  was  everywhere  fertile  soil 
for  the  distortions  of  facts,  the  lies,  and  false  promises  of  the  Soviet 
leaders.  Thought  control  and  brain  washing  were  included  in  the 
Communist  tactics  in  these  various  war-torn  areas.  Even  here  in  our 
own  country,  being  a  trusting  people,  many  of  us  were  deceived  by 
the  Soviet  tactics. 

We  had  just  won  a  great  war.  The  Soviet  Union  had  been  one  of 
our  principal  allies.  We  Americans  felt  that  now  we  could  enjoy  an 
era  of  peace  and  prosperity.  Some  of  us  seemed  to  hope,  certain  of  our 
leaders  and  some  gullible  American  people  hoped  that  we  now  could 
evolve  an  international  modus  operandi  whereby  peace  and  prosperity 
could  be  facilitated.  The  United  Nations  Charter  epitomized  the 
spirit  of  the  times,  and  if  carried  out  with  sincerity  of  purpose,  of 
course,  it  would  have  been  a  wonderful  approach  to  world  peace,  a 
civilized  and  realistic  approach  to  good  will  toward  all  men — to  vic- 
tors and  vanquished  alike.  But  unfortunately,  and  definitely,  the 
Soviet  had  no  intention  of  keeping  their  promises  of  abiding  by  the 
terms  of  the  United  Nations  Charter.  They  had  broken  faith  before 
and  it  was  indeed  most  unfortunate  that  our  responsible  leaders  of 
the  Government  had  not  provided  safeguards  which  would  definitely 
protect  the  military  victory  for  which  we  had  sacrificed  so  much. 

Even  back  in  1933  the  Soviet  broke  faith  with  us.  They  promised 
when  we  recognized  them  diplomatically,  when  we  exchanged  diplo- 
matic amenities,  that  they  would  not,  under  any  circumstances,  finance, 
support,  or  initiate  activities  and  organizations  that  had  for  their  pur- 
pose, interfering  in  any  way  with  our  Government,  social  structure, 
political,  and  economic  structures.  Everyone  knows  now  in  this 
country  that  the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites  have  continuously  made 
and  are  even  now  making  every  effort  to  undermine  confidence  in 
American  leaders,  both  military  and  civilian.  They  are  making  every 
effort  to  create  cleavages  between  social  classes,  between  management 
and  labor,  between  races,  white,  black,  brown,  and  between  religions, 
Catholics,  Jews,  and  Protestants. 

They  have  had  marked  success  in  the  field  of  propaganda  in  the 
"cold  war."  I  attribute  this  primarily  to  the  fact  that  we  are  a  gullible 
and  trusting  people.  These  are  traditional  characteristics  of 
Americans. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  now  your  final  element  here,  as  a  word  of  back- 
ground, if  you  please,  sir,  the  military  element  of  the  Communist 
global  strategy ;  what  is  your  comment  on  that,  if  you  please  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Immediately  after  World  War  II,  the  Soviet  did  not  decrease  mate- 
rially their  military  strength.  In  that  same  atmosphere  of  trust  and 
naivete,  we  emasculated  our  military  forces,  and  so  did  our  other 
allies,  our  friendly  allies. 

Consequently  the  military  posture  of  the  free  nations,  vis-a-vis  the 
Soviet  Union  and  satellites,  was  such  that  the  Communist  nations  en- 
joyed a  great  preponderance  of  military  strength.  Their  military 
forces  were  not  directly  employed  in  their  program  of  aggressions, 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  81 

but  their  immediate  availability,  their  very  existence  was  utilized  as 
a  weapon  of  intimidation. 

Furthermore,  they  continued  to  create  and  maintain  potential 
powder  kegs  around  their  periphery,  any  one  of  which  could  be  ignited 
at  times  and  under  conditions  of  their  choosing.  Invariably 
they  implemented  their  aggressions  and  military  operations  with 
satellite  troops,  involving  only  a  few  of  their  own  people  as  technical 
advisers,  arch  conspirators,  and  propaganda  artists. 

Korea,  China,  presently  Indochina,  are  irrefutable  evidence  that 
Ihey  have  carried  on  their  program  of  world  conspiracy  and  aggres- 
sion with  military  involvement  in  the  manner  just  described. 

In  my  judgment,  the  Soviet  Union  will  resist  assiduously  the  direct 
use  of  their  own  military  forces. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  how  late  is  it  on  the  timetable  of  the  Soviets 
for  world  conquest,  in  your  judgment'^ 

General  Wedemeyer.  As  a  private  American  citizen,  completely 
unemotionally  I  say  to  you,  sir,  that  it  is  now  very  late;  I  am  not 
completely  a  pessimist,  but  it  is  very,  very  late. 

Obviously,  immediately  after  the  war  we  should  have  been  realistic 
in  evaluating  the  world  situation.  Past  experiences  with  the  Com- 
munists— realism  demanded  that  we  take  the  steps  necessary  to  protect 
the  victories  for  which  the  American  people  made  such  great  sacrifices, 
both  human  and  material. 

But  I  am  confident  that,  if  our  political  and  military  leaders  will 
realistically  appraise  the  current  situation  and  utilize  intelligently 
and  in  an  integrated  manner  those  four  major  instruments  of  national 
policy,  political,  economic,  psychological,  and  military,  we  still  can 
emerge  victorious,  in  protecting  and  preserving  our  national  interests. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  do  you  believe  it  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  free  nations  of  the  world  to  break 
off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Iron  Curtain  countries  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  definitely  do.  I  would  have  recommended, 
had  I  been  asked,  several  years  ago  that  we  not  exchange  diplomatic 
amenities  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites. 

I  base  this  on  the  experience  that  we  have  had  and  other  countries 
have  had  in  the  field  of  international  relations  with  Communist  domi- 
nated countries.  I  base  that  statement  on  my  knowledge  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Karl  Marx,  which  I  have  read  carefully,  both  in  English  and 
German,  the  two  volumes  of  Das  Kapital  and  the  Communist  Mani- 
festo, which  spell  out  very  clearly  the  aims  and  the  objectives  of  the 
Soviet  conspiracy. 

We  all  should  have  very  vivid  recollection  of  Mein  Kampf,  which 
was  promulgated  by  Adolpli  Hitler,  and  in  which  the  objectives  of  the 
Nazis  were  clearly  spelled  out  but  unfortunately  disregarded  by  most 
Americans  and  Allies. 

The  Chairman.  General,  you  have  made  an  expression  that  you 
think  it  would  be  proper  for  the  best  interests  of  this  country  to  break 
off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Iron  Curtain  countries,  and  I  believe 
that  you  went  back  in  your  earlier  statement  stating  that  they  have 
broken  their  word  since  they  were  brought  into  the  family  of  nations 
in  1933,  that  they  immediately  set  out  to  destroy,  to  harass  and  to  set 
up  fifth  columns  in  this  country,  by  subversion,  by  sabotage,  and  by 
espionage.     And  the  record  is  clear  on  that.     Just  within  the  last 

47769— 54— pt.  2 2 


82  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

2  days,  I  think,  General  Franco  of  Spain  made  a  statement  that  re- 
ceived wide  publication  in  this  country,  that  we  also,  if  we  are  intent 
on  fighting  this  cold  w\ar,  should  break  off  trade  relations,  and  our 
allies  should  break  off  trade  relations  and  isolate  the  Soviet. 

What  is  your  opinion  on  that,  if  you  have  one  on  that,  this  morning  ? 
General  Ws:demeyer,  I  defintely  have  an  opinion  about  that,  sir. 
There  are  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  breaking  off  trade  rela- 
tions with  any  country,  but  it  is  my  conviction  that  more  advantages 
Avould  accrue  to  the  United  States  and  other  free  nations,  who  have 
objectives  compatible  with  our  own,  to  break  off  trade  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites.  We  should  not  attempt  any  of  the 
accepted  and  traditional  contacts  or  r-elations  with  Communist  coun- 
tries unless  and  until  they  give  irrefutable  evidence,  tangible  evidence, 
of  their  sincerity  of  purpose  in  connection  with  world  peace,  honest 
dealings,  equity,  and  justice  among  all  peoples. 

The  Chairman.  General,  if  we  did  break  off  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  Soviet,  what  effect  would  the  severance  of  these  diplomatic 
relations  have  upon  the  procurement  of  intelligence  information,  for 
example,  by  our  Government  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  Proponents  of  continued  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  Communist  countries  have  often  stated  that  if  we  were  to 
break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  them,  that  we  would  close  windows 
through  which  they  can  observe  developments  in  countries  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain.  Wlien  we  send  diplomatic  representatives  to  any  coun- 
try, we  do  so  in  keeping  ethical  arrangements,  whereby  our  representa- 
tives are  honor  bound  to  respect  the  laws,  the  customs,  and  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  country  in  which  they  are  serving.  Our  foreign  repre- 
sentatives behind  the  Iron  Curtain  have  experienced,  and  continue  to 
experience  insults,  humiliations,  harassments,  and  restrictions  which 
unquestionably  preclude  the  effective  performance  of  their  duties. 
Furthermore,  the  United  States  has  been  greatly  restricted,  unreason- 
ably so,  with  regard  to  the  number  of  representatives  Ave  are  permitted 
to  maintain  in  our  embassies,  legations,  or  official  agencies  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain.  Exorbitant  rents  are  charged  and  degrading  treatment 
of  our  representatives  add  to  the  mockery  and  sham  of  diplomatic 
amenities  and  common  decency  is  unknown  in  contacts  with  officials 
of  the  Communist  countries.  Conversely,  and  stupidly,  we  permit 
the  Reds  to  maintain  their  embassies,  legations,  and  agencies  within 
our  borders,  extending  naively  every  facility  and  courtesy  in  conso- 
nance with  the  traditional  diplomatic  code  of  ethics  and  international 
law.  We  must  recognize  that  every  representative  of  a  Communist 
country,  enjoying  our  hospitality  and  the  usual  diplomatic  immunities 
withm  our  borders,  is  a  provacateur,  saboteur,  propaganda  agent,  spy, 
and  potential  murderer,  for  he  is  thoroughly  indoctrinated  and  fanat- 
ically believes  that  the  end  justifies  the  means. 

The  Chairman.  And  yet  we  extend  to  their  diplomatic  corps  the 
courtesies  that  are  denied  to  us  ? 
General  Wedemeter.  Exactly,  sir. 

The  Communists  always  maintain  a  disproportionate  number  of 
representatives  in  any  area,  while  prescribing  rigidly  a  limited  num- 
ber ot  representatives  from  other  countries. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  83 

The  Chairman.  And  when  you  multiply  the  satellite  nations,  we 
are  getting  very  little  representation  and  they  are  getting  a  great  deal ; 
is  that  not  correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  agree  with  that.     Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker, 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  divert  just  a  moment  on  the  subject  matter 
that  you  brought  up  ? 

General  Wedemeyer,  it  is  certainly  a  great  honor  to  have  a  great 
American  like  you  before  our  committee.  I  want  to  thank  you  for 
coming  here  on  behalf  of,  I  am  sure,  all  of  us. 

I  want  to  ask  you  whether  or  not  you  are  familiar  with  the  hear- 
ing Senator  Jenner's  task  force  held  in  New  York  a  couple  of  weeks 
ago,  at  which  I  had  the  honor  to  be  the  chairman,  wherein  we  held  a 
hearing  down  at  the  Customs  House  and  we  found  millions  of  pieces 
of  Communist  propaganda  filling  a  room  to  the  ceiling  easily  twice  the 
size  of  this  and  perhaps  three  times  the  size  of  this  room.  This  propa- 
ganda had  been  brought  in  by  boat,  airplanes,  and  other  modes  of 
transportation  and  intercepted  by  our  very  loyal  customs  officials 
there.  And  I  might  say  we  only  have  four  in  the  huge  port  of  New 
York. 

I  will  ask  you  if  it  is  not  a  fact,  by  virtue  of  the  diplomatic  rela- 
tions we  have  with  Russia  today,  that  that  permits  the  influx  of  this 
huge  volume  of  illegal  propaganda  that  is  coming  into  this  country 
as  of  now,  sir? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Senator  Welker,  in  my  judgment,  it  does.  I 
am  familiar  with  the  incident  or  the  case  that  you  related.  Our  pres- 
ent diplomatic  status  with  Communist  countries  does  definitely  facili- 
tate the  propagandizing  of  our  people,  the  illicit  and  clandestine  oper- 
ations of  Red  conspirators,  including  the  entrance  of  subversive 
printed  matter,  which  unquestionably  is  designed  to  undermine  con- 
fidence in  our  way  of  life,  confidence  in  our  Constitution  and  Bill  of 
Rights  and  confidence  in  our  leaders. 

I  would  like  to  relate  an  experience.  Senator,  if  I  may,  along  the 
same  line. 

When  I  was  in  command  of  the  Sixth  Army  on  the  west  coast,  Mrs. 
Wedemeyer  and  I  attended  in  1950,  a  local  motion-picture  show  in 
San  Francisco.  We  were  astounded  to  see  an  obviously  Communist- 
inspired  film  being  shown.  When  Stalin's  picture  was  flashed  on  the 
screen,  which  was  frequent,  the  audience  applauded.  There  were 
nuances  and  inuendoes,  if  one  analyzed  the  theme  of  the  picture  ob- 
jectively, that  definitely  glorified  the  Soviet  and  depreciated  our  free 
enterprise  economic  system,  respect  for  the  dignity  of  the  individual. 
Similar  un-American  or  anti-Ajnerican  ideas  were  threaded  through 
this  film. 

Concurrently,  Senator  Welker,  in  Korea,  American  boys  were  dying 
to  protect  American  principles  of  liberty — the  freedoms  which  have 
made  our  country  great. 

Accordingly,  I  protested  to  the  State  Department.  I  wrote  a  com- 
munication immediately,  spelling  out  this  personal  experience  that  I 
had  had  in  an  American  motion-picture  show,  just  outside  the  gates 
of  the  Presidio  at  San  Francisco  about  2  or  3  years  ago.     I  hope  sin^ 


84  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

cerely  that  appropriate  steps  have  been  taken  by  our  Government  to 
evaluate  all  foreign  films  and  printed  matter  entering  this  country. 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  one  more  thing,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  I  think  Senator  Jenner's  committee — and  I  helped 
him  on  the  matter — was  the  first  congressional  committee  to  discover 
the  first  motion  picture  in  the  English  version  to  come  to  our  shores 
which  tried  to  influence  the  American  people,  had  it  been  shown  and 
had  it  not  been  intercepted,  that  our  loyal  Army  was  guilty  of  the  in- 
famous germ  warfare  that  they  propagandized  so  heavily  throughout 
this  country.  And  that,  I  think  you  will  agree  with  me.  General,  was 
by  virtue  of  the  fact  of  our  silly  diplomatic  relations  with  a  country 
that  is  determined  to  destroy  ours. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  agree  with  you  100  percent,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  what  would  be  the  effect  of  severance  of  diplo- 
matic relations  on  the  economy  of  our  Nation  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Mr.  Arens,  I  think  we  would  have  to  extend 
that  question  a  bit  to  include  the  economic  implications,  if  we  severed 
trade  relations  along  with  diplomatic  relations,  right? 

Mr.  Arens.  Yes ;  if  you  please,  sir. 

General  Wedemeyer.  American  industry  is  very  complex  and  highly 
integrated.  We  do  at  present  go  to  farflung  places  for  raw  materials 
that  are  important  factors  in  our  expanding  productive  capacity  and 
its  concomitant,  our  high  standard  of  living.  For  example,  we  get 
manganese,  chrome,  and  tungsten,  and  we  do  obtain  diverse  kinds  and 
quantities  of  raw  materials  from  remote  areas,  many  of  them  from 
countries  located  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

But  I  am  mindful  of  the  ingenuity  and  the  resourcefulness  of  the 
German  people  when,  during  both  World  War  I  and  II,  they  were 
denied  access  to  raw  materials  from  remote  areas.  Yet  they  carried 
on  a  stupendous  war  effort  for  a  long  period  of  time.  I  have  confi- 
dence in  the  ingenuity  and  the  resourcefulness  of  American  industry 
to  resort  to  substitutes  and  to  exploit  resources  more  readily  available 
in  lieu  of  sources  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

It  would  affect  our  economy  but  definitely  w^ould  not  be  dangerous 
to  our  economy;  nor  would  it  seriously  impair  our  security  if  those 
raw  materials  from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  were  denied  to  us. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  right  on  that  line 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  General,  you  are  certainly  informed  of  the  fact 
that,  while  we  are  doing  business  wdth  Communist-dominated  coun- 
tries, some  of  our  own  local  mines,  producing  lead,  copper,  zinc,  and 
especially  antimony,  are  shut  down,  and  people  are  going  out  of  work 
by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  we  are  doing  busines  with  these  countries  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  I  am  aware  of  that,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  And  that  is  a  tragic  situation  for  America,  I  think 
you  will  agree  with  me. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

I  would  like  to  qualify  my  concurrence  somewhat.  Senator  Welker. 

I  strongly  believe  in  the  development  of  our  own  resources.  Fur- 
ther, I  agree  with  any  program  designed  to  keep  our  American  people 
gainfully  employed.     However,  I  am  sure  you  will  agree  that  inter- 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  85 

national  trade  is  desirable  when  it  can  be  carried  on  advantageously 
to  our  own  country,  whose  interest  we  always  must  place  first.  Comity 
requires  that  advantag-e  should  accrue  to  the  countries  with  whom  we 
are  trading.  I  would  like  to  conserve  our  natural  resources  to  a  com- 
mensurate degree  and  thus  insure,  if  an  emergency  develops,  that  we 
would  not  be  dependent  upon  remote  areas,  sir. 

It  is  my  judgment — and  I  have  given  considerable  thought  and 
study  to  this  problem— that  we  are  not  dependent  upon  outside  re- 
sources for  a  healthy  economy  in  this  country  if  w^e  do  as  you  suggested, 
namely,  utilize  our  own  resources  to  an  appropriate  degree  and  prepare 
for  their  immediate  utilization  in  the  event  of  an  emergency. 

Furthermore,  sir,  I  would  like  to  state  that  there  are  excellent 
sources  of  imported  raw  materials  that  have  not  as  yet  been  developed 
north  of  us,  in  Canada  and  Alaska,  and  south  of  us  throughout  the 
Latin- American  countries. 

While  paying  so  much  attention  to  the  Far  East  and  to  Western 
Europe  and  Middle  East  developments,  in  my  judgment,  gentle- 
men, we  have  neglected  to  assist  in  the  development  of  the  natural 
resources  of  Latin  America.  Also  we  have  failed  to  create  the  good 
will  and  mutual  confidence  that  are  so  essential  to  cooperation  and 
collaboration  through  the  Latin  American  countries. 

The  Chairman.  General  Wedemeyer,  there  is  a  great  discussion 
going  on  saying  that,  no,  we  should  not  trade  with  the  Soviet  and 
her  satellites  in  strategic  materials,  but  certainly  it  is  all  right  for  us 
and  our  allies  to  trade  with  the  Soviet  and  her  satellites  in  nonstrategic 
materials. 

You,  as  a  great  military  man,  could  you  help  this  comniittee  in  dis- 
tinguishing between  strategic  and  nonstrategic  materials,  when  it 
comes  to  the  standpoint  of  trade  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Strategic  materials  are  those  which  contribute  positively  to  the 
political,  the  economic,  the  psychological,  and  military  strength  of  a 
country. 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  draw  the  line.  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  was  coming  to  that,  sir. 

In  my  judgment,  a  country  that  receives  any  product  from  beyond 
its  borders  profits  thereby  and  is  strengthened  in  a  political,  economic, 
and  military  sense.  Some  of  our  friends,  presently  carrying  on  trade 
with  Communist  countries  justify  this  by  claiming  that  the  products 
involved  could  not  be  interpreted  as  strategic  material.  Let  us  con- 
sider cotton  as  an  example.  If  we  were  to  deny  cotton  to  Red  China, 
this  would  severely  hurt  the  economy  of  that  country  and  would  con- 
tribute to  the  problems  of  the  Chinese  Communist  leaders  and  thus 
retard  or  preclude  the  consolidation  of  Communist  gains  in  that 
country. 

If  the  people  of  a  country  are  not  employed,  if  they  cannot  obtain 
the  necessities  of  life,  they  invariably  attribute  their  difficulties  or  un- 
employment situation  to  their  political  leaders.  If  they  are  gain- 
fully employed  and  can  obtain  the  necessities  of  life,  they  also  as- 
sociate their  more  favorable  plight  to  their  leaders.  In  other  words, 
economic  stability  is  a  concomitant  of  political  stability. 

I  personally  feel  that  w^e  should  not  trade  with  any  country  that  has 
for  its  proven  objective  the  destruction  of  everything  we  stand  for, 


86  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

or  is  scheming  and  plotting  to  destroy  us.  Certainly  there  can  be  no 
justification  for  trade  of  any  kind  or  description  with  countries  with 
whom  we  are  at  war  or  with  whom  our  proven  friends  are  at  war. 
If  my  firm  conviction  to  the  effect  that  any  product  imported  into  a 
countrv  irrefutably  helps  the  economy — the  industry  and  hence  the 
war  enort  of  that  country,  is  sound  and  defensible,  how  can  our  allies 
possibly  justify  trade  with  such  a  country. 

The  Chairman.  General,  to  change  the  subject  a  little  here,  would 
you  help  this  committee  in  this  respect :  What  bearing  does  the  Com- 
munist military  aggression  in  the  Far  East  have  on  the  security 
of  the  United  States  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Sir,  about  half  the  population  of  the  world, 
1,200,000,000  people,  live  generally  throughout  the  Far  East.  Only 
a  fringe,  only  a  veneer  of  those  people  have  an  education.  Approxi- 
mately 80  percent  cannot  read  or  write.  They  want  basically  food, 
shelter,  and  the  opportunity  to  improve  their  lot  and  to  live  in  peace. 

About  400  years  ago  many  Western  nations  initiated  what  might  be 
termed  the  gunboat  policy.  They  compelled  those  people  to  trade 
with  them,  utilizing  the  intimidation  of  force. 

The  orientals  have  heard  stories  about  this  gunboat  policy.  They 
have  been  handed  down  by  word  of  mouth  and  have  been  exaggerated, 
of  course,  with  the  retelling.  Furthermore,  and  concurrently  over 
the  past  few  centuries,  western  powers  colonized  and  planted  their 
flags  in  various  parts  of  the  Far  East.  They  demanded  and  received 
preferential  treatment.  Economic  exploitation  and  colonization  by 
western  powers  are  two  developments  in  the  Far  East  that  the  orien- 
tals are  really  determined  to  eliminate. 

It  is  not  communism,  nor  is  it  democracy,  that  they  understand  or 
fear.  A  strong  nationalism  is  running  rife  in  the  area,  and  Commu- 
nist propaganda  has  skillfully  given  impetus  to  this. 

Militarily,  to  return  specifically  to  your  question — if  you  will  retain 
the  information  I  have  ]ust  given  as  background — militarily  the  teem- 
ing millions  of  people,  if  oriented  toward  the  Kremlin,  would  provide 
the  Soviet  Union  with  a  vast  reservoir  of  manpower  which  they  could 
and  would  undoubtedly  use  to  implement  their  sinister  plans.  The 
people  in  the  Far  East,  the  soldiers  when  fed,  led,  trained  and 
equipped  properly,  make  valiant  fighting  men,  excellent  soldiers. 

Therefore,  manpowerwise,  if  the  Far  East  were  to  fall  under  the 
aegis  of  the  Soviet,  a  great  advantage  would  accrue  to  the  Soviet  as 
against  the  free  nations. 

If  the  Communists  capture  all  of  Asia,  southeast  Asia,  our  own 
military  security  would  be  somewhat  jeopardized.  However,  assum- 
ing that  we  retained  control  of  the  bastion  along  the  littoral,  extend- 
ing from  the  Aleutians  down  through  the  Japanese  Islands,  Okinawa, 
the  Ryukyus,  the  Philippines,  and  then  on  down  through  the  Micro- 
nesian  and  Melanesian  Islands,  the  Reds  could  be  blocked  off  effec- 
tively if  they  attempted  military  operations  to  the  east  and  south. 

I  must  emphasize  that  our  security,  if  we  retain  that  bastion,  would 
not  be  seriously  jeopardized.  I  personally  do  not  believe,  gentlemen, 
in  utilizing  American  boys  in  ground  fighting  in  any  of  the  military 
operations  on  the  Asiatic  mainland. 

The  free  people  indigenous  to  that  area,  if  they  want  their  freedom, 
if  they  want  to  oppose  those  oriental  people  who  are  unfortunate  tools 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  87 

of  the  Kremlin,  should  sacrifice  and  fight.  I  would  suggest  that  we 
make  available  to  them  the  military  equipment  and  the  technical 
know-how  to  use  it,  but  I  would  not  involve  American  manhood  in 
that  caldron  of  Asia. 

I  am  opposed  to  sending  American  gi'ound  forces  there  for  that  and 
many  other  reasons,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker  ? 

Senator  Welker.  I  assume.  General  Wedemeyer,  from  that  state- 
ment that  you  do  not  believe  that  the  American  armed  services  should 
attempt  to  fight  another  Korea  wherein  they  are  denied  the  right  to 
win  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  Definitely  not,  sir. 

I  mentioned  earlier,  Senator  Welker,  tliat  there  are  four  major 
instruments — if  you  will  pardon  the  repetition — four  major  instru- 
ments of  national  policy  available  to  any  country ;  namely,  political, 
economic,  psychological,  and  military. 

The  intelligent  and  timely  use  of  the  first  three  of  these  instru- 
ments should  preclude  the  use  of  the  fourth — the  military.  When 
the  first  three  fail  in  providing  the  security  for  our  country,  in  the 
final  analysis  we  must  resort  to  the  military,  of  course,  still  utilizing 
the  other  three  instruments  of  foreign  policy,  too. 

Once  we  resort  to  military  forces,  we  should  give  the  military  com- 
mander clear-cut  instructions  to  win  a  victory.  We  should  give  him 
the  means  to  win  that  victory,  whatever  that  might  involve.  We 
should  provide  him  with  the  benefits  of  American  ingenuity  and  in- 
dustrial might,  and  instruct  him  to  win  in  the  American  tradition, 
honorably  but  definitely.  We  should  give  him  our  loyal  support  in 
the  process. 

We  should  not  tell  him  to  go  to  the  50-yard  line  and  not  even  attempt 
to  kick  a  field  goal  from  that  position  and  then  expect  victory. 

Tlie  Chairman.  In  other  words,  Cireneral,  am  I  correct  in  this 
assumption  that  we  as  a  nation  must  be  morally  responsible  for  our 
own  commitments  on  peace  and  security  for  this  Nation  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  Completely,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  we  dare  not  commingle  troops,  commingle 
command,  and  so  forth,  where  we  morally  cannot  be  responsible  for 
the  decision  which  we  once  make  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  I  agree  with  that  completely,  sir. 

Senator,  in  my  11  years  in  the  Orient — if  this  would  help  you  and 
members  of  the  committee  to  evaluate  the  situation  there  more  objec- 
tively, may  I  add — I  do  not  believe  that  the  Koreans  or  the  Chinese 
who  observe  a  white  man,  an  American  soldier,  killing  orientals,  even 
though  those  orientals,  for  the  present  at  least  as  I  stated  earlier,  are 
tools  of  the  Kremlin,  that  such  Koreans  or  Chinese  approve  deep  in 
their  hearts  and  minds.  Actually  they  resent  the  killing  of  their 
people  by  our  people,  and  they  don't  comprehend  our  humanitarian 
motives.  Military  force  is  not  the  primary  answer  to  the  ]3roblem  in 
the  Far  East.  I  think,  again,  that  the  people  themselves,  if  they  really 
want  their  liberty,  should  fight  for  it  as  our  forefathers  fought  for 
their  freedom  here  in  this  country.  It  will  mean  more  to  them,  and 
furthermore  we  will  not  be  adding  fuel  to  the  Soviet  propaganda  that 
we  are  imperialistic  in  our  designs  and  that  we  want  to  reestablish 
colonies  or  impose  a  preferential  trade  position. 


88  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Cpiairman.  In  other  words,  you  think  that,  if  they  have  the 
heart  and  will  to  fight  for  liberty,  the  primary  responsibility  should 
be  Asians  fighting  for  Asia. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Definitely ;  I  certainly  do,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  the  encroachments  of  communism  are  grad- 
ually denying  areas  in  the  Far  East  and  even  in  Europe  to  us.  If  not 
successfully  blocked  we  may  be  driven  back  practically  to  our  own 
shores.  What  would  the  strategic  implication  of  such  a  situation  be 
to  our  military  security  and  to  our  economy  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Sir,  I  am  not  an  isolationist.  I  believe  in 
cooperating  and  in  collaborating  with  other  nations  that  have  objec- 
tives compatible  with  our  own.  I  want  to  make  it  clear,  sir,  that  I  am 
not  an  isolationist  and  that  I  would  encourage  and  welcome  mutually 
beneficial  relations  and  cooperation  with  any  nation  that  gives  irrefu- 
table evidence,  tangible  evidence,  that  it  has  objectives  compatible  with 
our  own  and  will  make  a  proportionate  contribution  toward  the  accom- 
plishment of  these  objectives. 

I  do  not  suggest  that  other  nations  should  change  their  form  of 
government,  their  economic  philosophy,  their  customs,  and  their  tradi- 
tions— not  an  iota.  I  do  maintain  that  I  would  be  willing  only  to 
cooperate  with  those  nations  when  they  give  evidence  of  sincerity  of 
purpose  and  determination  and  willingness  to  cooperate  with  us  realis- 
tically, to  make  necessary  sacrifices,  and  to  adhere  faithfully  to  estab- 
lished principles  of  decency,  loyalty,  and  honor. 

Now,  then,  the  hypothetical  situation  that  you  embodied  in  your 
question ;  namely,  a  situation  whereby  we  might  be  driven  back  to  our 
own  shores,  both  east  and  west.  In  my  judgment  we  still  could  success- 
fully defend  our  country  if,  as  suggested  earlier  by  Senator  Welker, 
we  recognize  now  that  such  a  situation  is  a  possibility,  however  remote, 
and  if  we  create  conditions  economically  wherein  we  would  be  inde- 
pendent of  sources  of  raw  materials  remote  from  our  own  country  and 
wherein  we  would  develop  the  raw  materials  available  through  the 
Latin  American  countries  and  also  to  the  north  of  us  in  Canada. 

Economically  I  believe  that  we  could  evolve  and  maintain  a  sound 
economy  in  this  country  even  though  we  were  restricted  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  In  some  respects  we  would  have  to  make  adjustments. 
Our  standard  of  living  would  be  affected,  but  it  would  be  better  to 
tighten  our  belts  and  remain  free.  Militarily,  again  I  believe  that  we 
could  successfully  defend  our  country  and  those  areas  contiguous  to 
our  country,  either  north  or  south,  if  such  a  situation  were  to  develop. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  inquire  on  a  statement  made 
by  the  distinguished  general? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  General  Wedemeyer,  I  have  noted  twice  in  your 
statement  that  you  have  advocated — as  I  think  this  entire  committee 
and  most  all  of  America  do — that  we  cultivate  the  Latin  American 
countries.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  a  very  simple  question  with  respect 
to  this. 

Should  we  cooperate  to  the  extent  that  we  should  send,  say,  a  steel 
strip  mill  to  a  South  American  country  which  is  under  a  dictatorship, 
which  has  trade  agreements  with  not  only  Russia  but  every  satellite 
of  Russia,  including  Guatemala,  and  accept  their  word  that  they 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  89 

should  not  use  this,  or  they  never  would  use  this  to  hurt  the  United 
States  of  America? 

This  has  been  a  problem  in  our  minds,  and  I  would  like  your  advice 
upon  this  because  I  am  informed  that,  if  they  do  send  out  from  this 
country  a  production  mill,  with  which  they  cannot  only  produce  steel 
but  I  believe  aluminum,  copper,  and  other  strategic  metals,  the  only 
thing  America  has  to  rely  on  in  the  event  of  a  breach  is  that  they 
broke  their  agreement.  Now  that  is  not  going  to  help  us  very  much 
militarily. 

I  would  like  your  observation  with  respect  to  that  matter. 

Let  me  further  say  that  I  read  in  the  press  that  boatloads  of  arms 
and  munitions  are  being  sent  to  some  of  our  neighboring  countries  in 
the  Latin  American  area.  I  wonder  if  you  could  help  us  on  that 
matter,  sir? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  will,  sir,  express  my  views. 

In  the  first  place,  I  believe — and  I  am  saying  this  in  a  constructively 
critical  manner — that  we  have  not  facilitated  good  relations  with  the 
Latin  Americans.  I  think  we  should  have  made  the  effort  many  years 
ago.  It  is  unfortunate  that  we  did  not  do  so,  and  some  of  the  unfor- 
tunate developments  in  that  area  can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that 
we  have  not  been  realistic  in  building  up  good  relations  there. 

Specifically,  with  reference  to  the  steel  mill  in  the  South  American 
country  to  which  you  alluded,  I  would  not  put  the  steel  mill  there 
unless  I  had  assurance,  irrefutable  evidence,  that  advantage  would 
accrue  to  my  own  country.  That  would  be  the  test,  sir,  of  any  aid  or 
assistance  that  I  gave  to  any  country,  in  any  part  of  the  world.  That 
is  international  realism. 

Senator  Welker.  General,  if  I  may  interrupt:  You  are  mindful 
of  the  fact  that  at  this  very  moment  the  Communist  conspiracy, 
Russia,  has  trade  missions  not  only  in  Guatemala  but  in  all  of  our 
South  American  and  Latin  American  countries  as  of  this  time. 

That  strikes  me  as  being  rather  dangerous,  sir. 

General  Wedemeyer.  If  the  evaluation  on  the  part  of  our  repre- 
sentatives in  this  Congress,  if  the  evaluation  of  information  along 
that  line  indicates  clearly  that  advantages  would  accrue  to  the  Com- 
munists, our  avowed  enemies,  then  I  certainly  would  not  collaborate 
or  cooperate  with  those  people. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  going  back  to  your  statement  a  moment 
ago,  that  maybe  our  economy  would  be  a  little  bit  depressed  by  virtue 
of  the  fundamental  law  of  nature,  to  wit,  the  law  of  self-defense — 
they  might  call  it  isolationism,  or  whatever  they  might  do — in  the 
event  we  are  forced  to  our  own  shores,  it  might  well  be  that  those  of  us 
in  America  trying  to  support  our  armed  services  could  well  use  that 
strip  mill  instead  of  having  it  overseas ;  would  you  not  agree  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  That  should  be  brought  out  in  the 
careful  evaluation  of  all  the  implications  as  I  mentioned,  sir. 

I  would  like  to  mention  one  point.  As  I  listened  to  the  questions 
and  as  I  reflect  upon  my  replies,  it  might  be  that  we  are  mentally  con- 
juring up  a  colossus  that  is  overwhelming,  that  is  irresistible  and  will 
inevitably  destroy  us.  I  am  sure  you  gentlemen  are  mindful  of  the 
fact  that  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  there  are  defections,  dissentions, 
and  many  serious  problems  confronting  the  Communist  leaders,  and 
as  these  people  extend  their  control,  their  difficulties  mount.    They 

47769— 54— pt.  2 3 


90  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

are  having  many  economic  difficulties,  far-reaching  psychological  and 
political  difficulties. 

I  am  not  optimistic  about  the  future,  but  I  am  encouraged  when 
men  like  yourselves,  our  representatives  in  the  senior  legislative  body 
of  the  land,  are  investigating  communism  and  all  of  its  implications, 
so  that  you  can  recommend  appropriate  steps  to  responsible  leaders 
and  to  the  American  people. 

The  Chairman.  General,  on  that  point:  What  would  be,  in  your 
judgment,  the  psychological  impact  on  the  minds  of  the  people  of  the 
Iron  Curtain  countries  of  a  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
Iron  Curtain  countries  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Senator  Jenner,  I  have  never  been  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain.  Presently  I  am  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  Tol- 
stoy Foundation.  That  foundation  facilitates  the  processing  of  Rus- 
sians who  have  been  persecuted  and  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain 
and  who  have  successfully  breached  the  curtain  and  are  now  in  proc- 
essing stations  in  Europe  or  are  en  route  to  new  lands.  Some  of  them 
are  brought  to  this  country. 

I  have  talked  to  many  in  this  category  and  obtained  interesting 
information  that  might  assist  in  answering  your  question.  These 
stories  and,  of  course,  reports  emanating  from  various  sources  abroad 
would  indicate  that  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  the  majority " 
of  them,  are  disillusioned,  imhappy,  and  would  welcome  the  op- 
portunity to  overthrow  their  present  leaders. 

The  interpretation  that  these  people  to  whom  I  talked  would  put 
on  such  a  step— namely,  severance  of  diplomatic  relations — w^ould  be  in 
my  opinion,  substantially^  as  follows:  That  at  long  last,  realism  is 
dictating  American  foreign  policy.  The  Americans  at  long  last 
recognize  that  they  cannot  carry  on  the  traditional  diplomatic 
exchange  of  amenities  and  that  now  they  are  going  to  make  it  difficult 
for  the  Soviet  to  propagandize  their  people  about  the  weakness  of 
America  or  about  United  States  friendship  as  symbolized  by  diplo- 
matic representation. 
_  Tacit  in  our  present  situation,  is  undoubtedly  the  belief  by  the  Rus- 
sian people  that  we  are  getting  along  with  the  Soviet  leaders  and 
that  they  are  doing  all  right,  maybe  that  we  even  respect  them.  I  am 
sure  the  vast  majority  of  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  want  to 
believe  that  we  do  not  admire  or  respect  their  unscrupulous  leaders, 
that  we  are  sincere  in  our  sympathetic  understanding  of  their  terrible 
predicament. 

Senator  Welicer.  May  I  have  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  General  Wedemeyer,  I  do  not  like  to  take  too 
much  of  your  valuable  time,  but  let  me  ask  this  question:  Based 
upon  your  vast  experience  in  China,  I  would  like  you  briefly  to  put  in 
the  record  some  of  your  experience  while  you  were  in  China  that 
resulted  from  the  fifth  column  of  the  Soviets  coming  in  and  under- 
mining the  thinking  of  the  people  of  China. 

I  have  had  some  information  with  respect  to  Earl  Browder.    While 
you  were  out  there,  it  seems  to  me  that  he  had  something  to  do  there 
Can  you  relate  anything  about  that? 

Mavbe  I  am  in  error. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  91 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  tlie  first  place,  for  many,  many  years  the 
Soviet  has  been  training  Chinese  and  other  nationals  for  future  use 
in  their  world  conspiracy.  The  propitious  time  arrived  in  the  closing 
days  of  World  War  II.  They  trained  Koreans,  Japanese,  and  Chinese, 
indoctrinating  them  thoroughly  so  that  they  became  fanatical  fol- 
lowers of  the  Marxist  doctrine.  Each  of  these  well-trained  fanatic 
believers  was  returned  to  his  native  land  and  became  a  potential  cell 
or  nucleus  around  which  communism  was  expanded  in  the  familiar 
pattern  of  deceit,  propaganda,  and  subversion. 

Supplemented  by  propaganda  that  emanated  from  Moscow,  Yanan, 
and  Vladivostok — propaganda  that  I,  as  commander  of  the  Chinese 
theater,  was  monitoring,  analyzing,  and  evaluating,  these  Communist 
leaders  in  the  Far  East,  particularly  in  China,  were  able  to  under- 
mine the  confidence  of  the  people  in  the  Generalissimo  and  his 
government. 

Furthermore,  propaganda  was  directed  against  the  Allies,  for  ex- 
jimple,  the  Americans,  the  British,  French,  and  so  forth,  to  the  effect 
that  we  all  were  there  as  symbols  of  imperialism  and  exploitation 
or  colonization.  After  8  years  of  war,  with  attendant  dislocations, 
disruptions,  and  so  forth,  the  Chinese  people  were  confused,  dismayed, 
and  completely  exhausted.  They  were  fertile  soil  in  which  to  plant 
seeds  of  discontent,  defection,  and  subversion.  Then  the  fact  that  the 
li'uman  administration  renounced,  more  or  less,  the  Nationalist  Gov- 
ernment of  China  added  to  the  complete  breakdown  of  Chinese  resist- 
ance to  the  Communist  aggressions  which  were  supported  by  Moscow. 

To  address  myself  more  specifically  to  your  question,  Senator 
Welker,  I  did  know  that  Browder,  also  a  woman  named  Smedley, 
and  many  others 

Mr.  Arexs.  Is  that  Agnes  Smedley  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  and  many  others  visited  China 
wliile  I  was  there.  These  alleged  Communists  were  reported  to  me 
as  being  in  contact  with  the  Chinese  Keds,  including  Mao  Tse-tung 
and  Chou  En-lai. 

I  might  relate  that  the  Ked  propaganda  against  the  United  States 
Avas  scurrilous — a  pack  of  lies.  I  mentioned  the  fact  that  my  head- 
quarters monitored  all  radio  and  press  reports  throughout  the  area. 
Every  morning  a  compilation  was  on  my  desk.  I  contacted  the  senior 
American  diplomatic  official  in  Shanghai  and  suggested  that  he  go 
to  the  senior  Soviet  diplomatic  representative  and'demand  that  this 
propaganda  against  Americans  be  stopped  at  once.  He  asked  me  to 
accompany  him  and  we  presented  firmly  our  protest  against  such 
obviously  unfriendly  acts.  The  Soviet  representative  disavowed  any 
connection  with  the  propaganda  and  assured  us  that  there  was  a  mis- 
take. I  showed  him  a  sheaf  of  reports  from  the  radio  and  the  press 
all  emanating  in  sources  controlled  by  the  Soviets  and  Chinese  Com- 
munists. Actually  we  lodged  this  protest,  the  violent  attacks  against 
us  stopped  for  about  a  week  or  10  days,  and  then  resumed  with  even 
greater  violence. 

That  is  only  one  example  of  many  that  I  could  give  you. 

China  actually  was  primarily  conquered  by  the  Communists  through 
skillful  pro]jaganda  which  caused  the  complete  demoralization  and 
broke  the  will  of  the  people  to  resist. 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  one  more  question,  Mr.  Chairman. 


92  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  General,  based  upon  your  vast  experience  not 
only  as  a  military  man  but  as  a  resident,  a  long-time  resident  of 
China,  I  will  ask  you  what  effect  it  would  have  if  Generalissimo 
Chiang  Kai-shek  should  invade  the  mainland  of  China?  Do  you  feel 
that  he  might  have  some  of  the  people  of  China  join  him — yes,  includ- 
ing generals — join  him  in  a  fight  to  overthrow  the  tyranny  that  has 
struck  that  fine  country,  heretofore  very  friendly  to  us  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Sir,  I  think  your  question  could  be  best 
answered  by  a  recent  example. 

After  the  Korean  truce  the  Chinese  Commmiist  prisoners  of  Allied 
forces  in  South  Korea  were  given  an  unintimidated  opportunity  to 
express  their  will  concerning  returning  to  their  homeland  or  to  go  to 
Formosa.  The  vast  majority,  in  fact  about  90  percent,  went  volun- 
tarily to  Formosa  and  83  percent  expressed  the  determination  to  join 
the  Chinese  Nationalist  military  forces  in  Formosa  so  that  they  could 
fight  against  the  Chinese  Communists  and  free  their  mainland. 

For  that  reason  and  many  other  important  reasons,  too.  Senator 
Welker,  I  do  not  believe  that  Red  China  should  be  admitted  to  the 
United  Nations.  The  present  government  of  Red  China  is  definitely 
not  representative  of  the  Chinese  people.  I  am  confident  if  they  had. 
the  unintimidated  opportunity  to  express  their  desires,  they  would 
remove  their  present  leaders  and  eliminate  the  alien  philosophy, 
communism. 

In  my  almost  2  years  of  daily  contact  with  Generalissimo  Chiang 
Kai-shek,  he  was  never  guilty  of  duplicity.  I  felt  that  he  epitomized 
the  best  leadership  of  China,  and  I  think  today  that  he  is  the  logical 
and  best  qualified  leader  of  a  free  China. 

However,  Communist  propaganda,  which  was  skillfully  handled  in 
our  own  country  as  well  as  throughout  the  Far  East,  has  practically 
repudiated  the  generalissimo  as  a  leader.  It  is  true  that  under  his 
leadership  in  China,  there  was  malcontent,  maladministration,  and 
corruption.  However,  I  believe  he  was  gradually  improving  condi- 
tions for  his  people,  and  striving  sincerely  to  create  a  government 
responsive  to  the  will  of  the  people.  At  all  times  the  generalissimo 
has  been  a  stanch  opponent  of  communism. 

Senator  Welker.  That  propaganda  still  exists  today  and  is  going 
about  the  country  today ;  is  that  not  true,  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  General,  from  that  standpoint:  Senator  Welker 
referred  to  a  military  action  of  the  Nationalist  Chinese  Government 
on  the  mainland  of  China.  Is  it  not  probably  true,  from  a  military 
standpoint,  that  the  longer  that  is  delayed  the  older  an  army  grows, 
the  more  opportunity  the  Chinese  Communists  on  the  mainland  have 
to  consolidate  their  forces  and  to  lead  the  people,  particularly  the 
younger  generation,  to  their  way  of  thinking  ? 

In  other  words,  is  not  delay  really  a  detriment  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  that  is  true,  Senator  Jenner.  But 
it  would  be  most  unfortunate  if  the  generalissimo's  forces  went  over 
from  Formosa  to  the  mainland  prematurely.  Before  such  an  opera- 
tion is  undertaken  the  Chinese  people  must  be  prej)ared  psychologi- 
cally and  thus  facilitate  effective  collaboration  with  the  invading 
forces. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  93 

Senator,  in  that  connection,  I  think  that  the  policy  or  the  plan  that 
has  been  proposed  by  the  Eisenhower  administration,  namely,  a  re- 
gional organization  in  the  Far  East,  would  be  a  very  constructive  step. 
The  free  nations  of  the  Far  East  should  create  an  organization  similar 
to  NATO  and  in  the  process  integrate  to  the  maximum  degree  their 
economies.  This  would  contribute  to  economic  stability,  and  to  collec- 
tive security. 

A  Far  East  organization  would  greatly  strengthen  the  position  of 
free  nations  in  that  area  and  would  help  materially  in  the  free  nations' 
struggle  against  communism. 

The  Chairman.  General,  I  have  one  last  question. 

In  attempting  to  avoid  the  catastrophe  of  a  third  world  war,  can 
we  deal  with  the  Kremlin  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No,  sir. 

The  history  of  our  past  experiences  proves  beyond  all  doubt  that 
a  normal  relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites  is  impos- 
sible. It  is  pure  fiction  to  ascribe  to  the  Communists  any  capacity  or 
will  to  keep  a  promise  or  agreement  in  good  faith. 

Under  the  present  Soviet  leadership,  with  the  current  objectives  of 
the  Politburo,  the  United  States  can  have  no  confidence  in  any  ar- 
rangement, or  in  any  treaty  involving  the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  earlier  today  you  gave  what  I  interpreted  to  be 
a  rather  dismal  appraisal  of  the  world  situation  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  security  of  our  Nation.  The  Senator  from  Indiana  and  the 
Senator  from  Nevada  introduced  in  the  Senate  some  3  weeks  ago 
Senate  Resolution  247  which  called  for  severance  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Iron  Curtain  governments,  and  for  convoking  an  inter- 
national conference  of  the  free  nations  of  the  world  for  the  purpose  of 
agreeing  upon  united  action  to  destroy  the  Communist  fifth  column 
and  to  resist  further  aggression  by  international  communism. 

Should  such  a  course  of  action  as  suggested  by  these  two  Senators 
be  taken  by  our  Government,  what  would  be  your  appraisal  of  the 
prospect  to  avoid  the  catastrophe  of  a  third  w^orld  war? 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  judgment,  a  third  world  war  would 
not  result  from  such  action,  but  it  is  a  calculated  risk  which  we  must 
be  willing,  and  prepared  to  assume. 

I  think  that  such  action  would  coalesce  the  efforts  of  all  free 
nations  that  do  have  compatible  objectives  and  sincerely  are  deter- 
mined to  protect  their  great  heritages  of  liberty  against  aggression, 
oppression  and  the  enslavement  of  Communists.  It  would  bring 
realism  to  our  international  situation.  Other  nations,  purportedly 
on  our  side  would  be  compelled  also  to  take  a  position  and  thus  give 
tangible  evidence  of  their  sincerity  of  purpose  and  determination  to 
help  us  destroy  the  world  conspiracy  of  the  Communists. 

We  cannot  buy  friends,  but  we  can  facilitate  realistic  collaboration 
and  cooperation  of  other  so-called  friendly  nations  if  we  adopt  a 
realistic  approach  and  place  our  American  views  and  aims  before 
the  bar  of  world  opinion.  We  have  every  right  to  demand  clearcut 
enunciation  on  the  part  of  our  friends  concerning  their  respective 
views,  aims,  and  the  proportionate  contribution  in  terms  of  manpow^er 
and  material  that  they  will  make  in  this  world  struggle  against  the 
Communists,  our  avowed  enemies. 


94  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  General,  I  want  to  thank  you  for  taking  your 
valuable  time  to  appear  before  this  committee.  We  appreciate  the 
testimony  you  have  given  us  here  this  morning,  and  I  am  sure  I  speak 
for  the  entire  committee  in  that  matter.     Thank  you  very  much. 

We  will  be  in  recess,  to  reconvene  subject  to  call  of  the  Chair. 

(Whereupon,  at  11:45  a.  m.  Thursday,  June  10,  1954,  the  liearing 
was  recessed  subject  to  call  of  the  Chair.) 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WOELD  COMMUNISM 


TUESDAY,   JUNE    15,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  ttie  Administration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  G. 
The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10 :  35  a.  m.  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)  presiding. 

Present :  Senators  Jenner,  Welker,  and  Johnston. 
Also   present :  Richard   Arens,   special   counsel ;    and   Frank   W. 
Schroeder,  Edward  R.  Duffy,  and  W.  E.  Lowell,  professional  staff 
members. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Caldwell,  will  you  stand  and  be  sworn  ? 

Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony  that  you  will  give  in  this  hearing 
will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help 
you  God  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  JOHN  C.  CALDWELL,  NASHVILLE.  TENN. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  state  your  full  name  for  our  record  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  John  C.  Caldwell. 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  reside,  Mr.  Caldwell  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Nashville,  Tenn. 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  is  your  business  or  profession  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  A  writer  and  lectm'er. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.     Proceed. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Caldwell,  you  were  formerly  Director  of  the  United 
States  Information  Service  in  China.     Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir.     That  is  right. 

Mr.  Arens.  At  what  period  of  time  did  you  occupy  that  post  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  In  1946  and  1947. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  kindly  tell  us  what  has  been  your  experience 
or  activity  since  you  relinquished  that  post  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  was  sent  to  Korea  first,  in  the  army  of  occupation, 
Deputy  Director  of  the  Information  Services;  when  the  occupation 
ended  I  became  Deputy  Director  of  the  United  States  Information 
Service,  State  Department,  and  was  in  Korea  in  1950  when  the  war 
broke.     I  returned  to  this  country  and  have  been  writing  ever  since. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  were  you  in  China  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  was  born  there. 

95 


96  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chaieman.  How  long  were  you  the  head  of  the  Information 
Service  in  China  ? 

Mr,  Caldwell.  I  was  head  of  the  China  Branch  for  about  a  year 
and  a  half ;  the  whole  China  program  in  China  for  about  9  months ; 
head  of  all  the  Far  East  operations  for  about  9  months. 

Mr.  Arens.  During  the  course  of  your  experience  in  the  Far  East, 
did  you  have  occasion  to  acquire  experience  with  the  Communist  tech- 
niques, Communist  propaganda,  Communist  strategy  for  the  takeover 
of  the  Far  East? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir,  very  much  so.  Beginning  in  1946  I  made 
a  study  of  Chinese-Communist  methods.  Since  that  time  in  Korea 
I  made  similar  studies,  and  since  I  left  Government  service,  as  a  writer 
and  lecturer,  I  have  returned  twice  within  the  last  9  months  to  the 
Far  East  and  have  been  very  much  interested,  of  course,  in  the  whole 
subject. 

The  Chairman.  What  parts  in  the  Far  East  did  you  visit  during 
the  last  9  months? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  went  to  Korea,  Japan,  China,  and  Formosa  in 
September  and  August,  last,  returned  to  Formosa  and  the  China  coast 
with  the  Nationalist  guerrillas  last  December  and  returned  here  in 
January,  6  months  ago. 

]\Ir.  Arens.  You  have  been  in  consultation  with  the  staff  of  the  com- 
mittee with  reference  to  your  experiences  and  have  prepared  a  state- 
ment for  insertion  in  this  record,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  respectfully  request,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  this  state- 
ment at  this  point  be  incorporated  in  tlie  record  and  that  Mr.  Caldwell 
proceed  to  highlight  the  information  contained  in  this  statement. 

The  Chairman.  The  statement  of  Mr.  Caldwell  will  go  into  the 
record  and  become  a  part  of  the  record, 

(Statement  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  of  John  C.  Caldwell,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Americans  were  shocked  by  the  germ  warfare  charges  made  by  the  Com- 
munists, by  the  fact  that  even  people  in  enlightened  Great  Britain  believed  these 
incredible  charges  against  Americans.  Yet  the  germ  warfare  theme  does  not 
constitute  any  new  pattern  of  anti-American  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Com- 
munists. Nearly  8  years  ago  I  talked  to  an  American  woman  who  had  recently 
returned  from  the  so-called  liberated  areas  of  China — the  portions  of  north  and 
northwest  China  then  held  by  the  Communists.  My  conversation,  as  reported 
to  the  Department  of  State,  included  this  statement:  "She  tells  me  that  the 
anti-American  campaign  there  has  been  vigorous,  with  lurid  posters  depicting 
GI  rape,  murder,  and  robbery  in  dozens  of  forms." 

The  report  from  which  that  sentence  was  taken  was  part  of  a  64-page  study 
of  Communist  techniques  and  propaganda  lines,  made  while  I  was  Acting 
Director,  United  States  Information  Service,  in  China.  The  report  was  released 
briefly,  then  recalled  on  that  basis  that  it  would  cause  "friction  between  the 
United  States  and  the  U.  S.  S.  R." 

The  germ  warfare  charges  of  last  year  are  merely  a  continuation  of  a  Com- 
munist pattern  which  was  revealed  in  the  Far  East  nearly  10  years  ago.  The 
basic  pattern  seems  never  to  have  been  recognized,  has  never  been  adequately 
counteracted.  It  is  my  opinion,  based  upon  years  of  residence  in  China  and 
Korea,  that  the  Communist  pattern  in  eastern  Asia  has  sought  to  implement 
two  basic  objectives : 

(1)  To  create  in  Asiatics  the  idea  that  American  soldiers,  sailors,  airmen,  and 
marines  are  brutal,  corrupt,  immoral. 

(2)  Utilizing  American  concepts  of  democracy  to  develop  among  Americans 
the  idea  that  our  logical  allies  in  Asia,  i.  e.,  the  Chiangs  and  the  Rhees,  are 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  97 

hopelessly  corrupt,  dictatorial,  without  ability  to  command  the  respect  of  their 
peoples. 

The  cleverness  of  the  Communist  technique  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that, 
whenever  possible,  Americans  have  been  used  in  the  transmission  belts  for  the 
spreading  of  these  two  ideas.  Americans  have  been  used  to  discredit  fellow 
Americans;  Americans  have  been  used  to  discredit  our  allies  in  Asia.  The  pat- 
tern has  persisted  for  nearly  a  decade.  It  was  used  to  destroy  Chiang  Kai-shek's 
influence  on  the  mainland :  it  is  still  used  against  him  on  Formosa.  It  has  been 
vigorously  used  against  Syngman  Rhee  since  1946.  It  is  probable  that  the  same 
techniques  are  used  to  magnify  the  failings  of  the  French  colonial  administra- 
tion in  Indochina.  It  is  my  opinion  that  the  same  pattern  will  soon  emerge 
against  President  Magsaysay  of  the  Philippines. 

Before  going  into  details  on  how  these  techniques  have  been  developed  I  would 
like  to  point  out  that  the  Communist  pattern  reveals  deep-seated  fears  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy.  Americans  are  discredited,  especially  American  fighting 
men,  because  of  the  fear  that  subjugated  peoples  will  rally  to  the  aid  of  Amer- 
icans (as  they  did  in  North  Koi-ea)  when  American  military  forces  confront 
Communist  military  forces.  The  fear  of  American  intervention,  even  of  Amer- 
ican support,  is  so  great  that  the  Chinese  Communists  are  even  now  inundating 
the  China  coast  area  with  special  anti-American  Army  leaflets.  A  few  months 
ago  while  visiting  a  Nationalist  guerrilla  island  base  off  the  China  coast  I  was 
able  to  secure  several  anti-American  leaflets  (floated  across  in  tiny  bamboo 
tulies)  and  am  attaching  one  photostat  of  a  typical  leaflet  to  this  statement 
in  the  hope  that  it  might  be  of  interest  to  the  committee.  The  need  to  discredit 
Americans  is  also  indicated  by  the  program  of  vilification,  imprisonment,  and 
worse,  directed  against  American  missionaries.  Indeed,  the  American  mission- 
ai'.v  and  the  American  GI  share  top  honors  in  the  Communist  vilification  parade, 
and  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  why.  The  missionary  has  built  for  America 
and  Americans  a  tremendous  reservoir  of  good  will,  has  laid  a  foundation  that 
communism  has  not  yet  been  able  to  destroy.  And  the  American  GI  represents 
still,  to  thousands  of  hopeful  Asiatics,  possible  liberation  and  a  new  life. 

I  should  like  now  to  mention  samples  of  the  Communist  pattern  in  action. 
In  1946—47  I  was  attached  to  the  Ignited  States  Embassy  in  China.  During  that 
period  United  States  Marines  were  stationed  in  north  China.  The  presence  of 
the  Marines  was  of  course  vigorously  denounced  by  the  Communists.  A  series 
of  stories  began  to  appear  in  the  leftist  press  detailing  atrocities  committed  by 
the  Marines.  Specifically  it  was  reported  that  Marines  were  using  Chinese 
farmers  for  target  practice.  The  important  point  to  this  story  is  not  that  the 
Chinese  press  carried  the  story,  but  that  Americans  in  Shanghai  and  in  Nanking 
were  equally  guilty.  It  was  inconceivable  to  me  that  American  marines  or 
soldiers  would  use  human  beings  for  target  practice.  I  made  a  trip  to  north 
China  in  early  3947  and  personally  investigated  the  situation.  I  found  that  one 
Chinese  farmer  had  been  wounded  by  a  stray  bullet  fired  from  a  Marine  target 
range.  From  this  slender  thread,  the  story  had  been  woven  into  a  first-class 
scandal,  passed  on  by  Communist-inspired  Chinese  newspapers,  by  American 
dupes  led  by  a  few  Americans  who  knew  exactly  what  they  were  doing. 

The  technique  is  still  being  used.  Last  year  a  magazine  of  national  circulation 
published  a  story  about  the  vast  number  of  illegitimate  GI  babies  in  Japan. 
I  do  not  remember  the  exact  number  given,  but  I  believe  it  was  in  excess  of 
100,000.  The  story  was,  of  course,  widely  carried  in  the  Japanese  press.  The 
implication  was  clear :  American  soldiers  are  immoral  beasts.  It  was  only  last 
fall  that  the  truth  finally  appeared.  The  Japanese  Government  itself  made  a 
complete  survey,  coming  up  with  the  astonishing  figure  of  less  than  4,000  known 
GI  babies  in  Japan.  After  years  of  occupation,  after  the  passage  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  troops  to  and  from  the  Korean  battlefront,  that  is  a  record  of  which 
we  can  be  proud.     But  for  many  Asiatics  the  damage  has  already  been  done. 

I  believe  it  is  possible  even  to  pinpoint  the  beginning  of  this  particular  Com- 
munist line.  It  first  began  to  api>ear  in  1946.  A  United  States  military  police 
detachment  was  stationed  in  Shanghai  at  that  time.  By  mid-1946  I  noted  an 
increasing  number  of  stories  regarding  the  brutality  of  American  MP's.  The 
stories  continued  all  through  1946.  In  December  of  that  year  I  made  a  detailed 
report  to  the  Department  of  State,  quoting  numerous  stories  that  appeared 
either  in  the  Chinese  leftist  press  or  over  the  Russian-operated  radio  station. 

It  is  possible  to   trace   the  same  technique,   used   against  American   troops 
during  the  occupation  of  Korea.     There   is  always   a  basis  upon  which   the 
stories   can   be    built   and   magnified.     There   are   always   incidents   wherever 
47769 — 54 — pt.  2 4 


98  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

large  numbers  of  troops  are  stationed.  The  tragedy  is  that  the  Communist 
effort  has  so  often  received  able  assists  from  Americans  and  that  no  real  effort 
has  been  made  to  combat  this  vicious  line.  Excellent  counterpropaganda  is 
available.  It  could  be  used  by  our  own  Armed  Forces,  by  our  own  writers  and 
newspapermen,  by  the  Voice  of  America  and  its  affiliated  information  services 
I  submit  with  this  statement  a  newspaper  column  I  wrote  recently  concerning 
the  outstanding  good  done  by  American  servicemen  in  Korea.  The  First  Corps 
amputee  project  in  Korea  is  one  of  many  projects  which  should  be  described 
to  the  world.  It  is  a  story  which  might  have  extremely  favorable  results  in 
India  and  the  other  neutralist  nations.  In  Korea  alone  American  GI's  have 
given  millions  of  dollars  to  alleviate  suffering,  to  rebuild  hospitals  and  orphan- 
ages, to  rehabilitate  a  suffering  land.  Official  figures  (and  these  do  not  in- 
clude hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  si>ent  or  given  without  official  knowledge) 
show  that  the  men  of  the  8th  Army  in  Korea  last  year  contributed  $1,290  000 
to  various  causes  in  Korea.  I  do  not  think  that  it  would  be  out  of  place  to 
state  that  this  record  of  giving  by  American  soldiers  is  better  than  the  record 
of  most  of  the  members  of  the  United  Nations  who  pledged  funds  for  the  re- 
habilitation of  South  Korea  and  who  now  drag  their  feet  on  the  fulfillment  of 
those  pledges. 

As  far  as  I  know  this  magnificent  story  of  American  generosity  has  never 
been  told  by  our  information  services.  It  is  told  in  fragmentarv  form  by  our 
newspaper  reporters  in  the  Far  East.  It  is  a  story  that  can' be  duplicated 
wherever  American  men  are  stationed.  It  is  a  ready-made  answer  to  the 
decade  of  vilification  directed  against  American  fighting  men  by  the  enemy 
AVhy  do  we  not  use  the  weapons  we  possess? 

The  Communists  have  been  extremely  successful  in  their  second  basic  ob- 
jective, the  vilification  of  Asia's  anti-Communist  leaders.  This  committee  has 
been  instrumental  in  uncovering  the  operations  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Re- 
lations in  its  effort  to  undermine  the  Nationalist  Government.  I  would  like  to 
confine  my  statement  to  the  activities  of  other  Americans,  for  the  most  part  in- 
nocent players  in  the  Communist  game,  but  whose  activities  even  now  contribute 
to  the  success  of  communism  in  the  Far  East. 

Let  me  cite  an  occurrence  of  3  weeks  ago  to  show  how  the  cause  of  the  free 
world  in  Asia  is  sabotaged  by  Americans. 

There  has  been  considerable  Communist  activity  along  the  China  coast  during 
the  past  month.  On  May  20,  1954,  the  United  Press  reported  in  detail  the 
Communist  threat  to  the  Taclien  Islands.  It  was  reported  that  all  civilians 
were  being  evacuated,  which  was  untrue.  The  Tachen  Islands  were  described 
in  the  UP  story  as  the  "classic  invasion  bridge  to  Form.osa."  No  statement 
could  be  more  false.  The  islands  have  never  been  an  invasion  bridge  to 
any  place.  But  the  implication  is  clear:  the  Nationalists  are  about  to  lose 
their  most  important  China  coast  holdings;  the  defense  of  Formosa  is  threat- 
ened. 

The  UP  has  presented  the  Chinese  Reds  with  a  tremendous  propaganda  victory 
through  its  inaccurate  reporting.  The  Tachen  Islands  are  the  least  heavily 
defended  islands  along  the  China  coast.  Indeed,  the  decision  to  even  attempt  a 
buildup  was  not  made  until  last  December.  The  total  area  of  all  30  islands  in 
the  group  is  30.7  square  kilometers.  The  total  population  of  all  the  islands  is 
18,500.  Most  of  the  islands  are  not  even  populated  or  garrisoned,  their  defense 
is  extremely  difficult  because  of  the  distance  from  Formosan  airfields  and  prox- 
imity to  Communist  air  and  naval  bases.  The  islands  are  of  such  relative  un- 
importance that  when  I  visited  the  guerrilla  outposts  a  few  months  ago  I  did 
not  include  them  in  my  itinerary.  How  is  it  possible  that  these  islands  suddenly 
become  so  vitally  important?  They  can  be  taken;  but  if  the  Communists  do 
decide  to  invade,  what  should  be  an  unimportant  skirmish  among  the  never- 
ending  skirmishes  along  the  China  coast  will  become  a  victory  of  tremendous 
importance,  all  because  of  inaccurate  American  reporting. 

American  action  in  the  Far  East  has  been  hampered  for  a  decade  because  the 
Communists  have  been  supremely  successful  in  poisoning  the  minds  of  Americans 
against  the  very  leaders  in  Asia  who  have  had  the  courage  to  fight  communism. 
And  Americans  have  had  a  large  part  in  the  campaign :  American  writers,  corre- 
spondents, even  a  few  missionaries. 

I  believe  that  75  percent  of  the  editors— newspaper  and  magazine— in  America 
are  so  prejudiced  against  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  Syngman  Rhee  as  individuals 
that  honest  coverage  of  Free  Asia  is  almost  impossible. 

Since  last  August  I  have  made  two  trips  to  Formosa  and  have  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  study  the  Nationalist  rural  reconstruction  program  on  that  island.    It 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  99 

is  a  magnificent  effort;  it  miglit  well  be  a  blueprint  for  Asia's  salvation.  Tlie 
JCRR  program,  as  it  is  called,  is  a  joint  Sino-American  operation.  Lp  to  W 
percent  of  the  funds  used  on  the  hundreds  of  projects  is  local  money.  Less 
than  $14  million  in  appropriated  American  dollars  has  been  used  m  a  Program 
that  lias  brought  real  land  reform  to  the  people  and  has  revolutiomzed  lural 
life  on  Formosa.  American  personnel  total  just  13  experts.  Here  to  W  mind 
is  foreign  aid  at  its  best,  its  success  based  upon  cooperation  and  local  initiatne 
rather  than  upon  vast  handouts.  i  ^„*.  fi,^ 

When  I  returned  to  this  country  I  talked  to  a  number  of  editors  about  the 
Formosa  story.  One  editor  immediately  countered  with  a  positive  statement . 
"But  evervbody  knows  all  the  Forraosans  hate  Chiang."  There  we  see  it :  Unrea- 
soned prejudice,  a  blind  refusal  to  even  listen  to  the  truth-and  the  outstanding 
Communist  success  in  the  Far  East.  „„  v,a^  hoon 

The  Communist  program  to  discredit  the  Chiangs  and  the  Rhees  has  been 
extremelv  successful ;  it  has  hamstrung  American  policy  in  Asia.  The  program 
has  been\liabolically  conceived,  its  success  due  to  Communist  exploitation  ot  the 
verv  principles  which  we  believe  in.  We  take  for  granted  that  our  freedoms 
should  be  and  can  be  applied  all  over  the  world.  We  dislike  corruption,,  chaos. 
But  what  so  many  naive  Americans,  abroad  for  the  first  time,  cannot  under- 
stand is  that  Asia  is  emerging  from  medievalism.  How  can  we  honestly  blame 
Nationalist  China  for  some  of  its  ills,  if  we  realistically  appraise  the 
problems  of  that  land,  the  lack  of  communication,  illiteracy,  superstition,  years 
of  civil  and  foreign  wars?  How  can  we  honestly  expect  Korea  to  emerge  over- 
night as  a  model  democracy— after  40  years  of  Japanese  domination  m  which 
every  vestige  of  Korean  leadership  was  destroyed  or  driven  into  exile?  How  can 
we  expect  South  Korea,  faced  with  a  million-man  Communist  Array,  with  thou- 
sands of  guerrillas  and  saboteurs  within  its  very  borders,  to  have  today  ail  or 
the  freedoms  we  Americans  have  developed  during  175  years?  ^t,        •    i 

The  Communists  have  made  use  of  American  naivete  to  so  poison  the  minas 
of  editors,  writers,  and  publishers  and  Foreign  Service  personnel  that  it  is 
difficult  to  make  an  honest  decision  today  on  either  Nationalist  China  or  Korea. 
The  Department  of  State,  like  our  courts,  operates  on  a  body  of  precedent. 
When  it  is  necessary  to  draft  a  cable  of  instructions,  an  oflicer  goes  into  the 
files  to  see  what  has  been  done,  what  has  been  reported  and  advised  previously. 
The  files  are  stacked  today  with  anti-Chiang,  anti-Nationalist  material.  ±ne 
same  situation  prevails  with  respect  to  Syngman  Rhee.  Until  several  years 
have  passed  during  which  we  have  objective.  anti-Communist  reporting  it  will  D<? 
difficult  to  expect  decisions  and  actions  favorable  to  our  friends  in  Asia. 

Newspapers,  magazines,  and  book  publishers  suffer  in  a  similar  manner.  *  or 
years  Edgar  Snow  was  a  prominent  editor  of  the  Saturday  Evening  Post.  His 
pro-Chinese  Communist  bias  is  well  known.  But  what  has  not  been  recognized 
is  the  influence  he  left  behind.  The  "body  of  precedent"  he  bequeathed  has 
undoubtedly  had  a  profound  effect  upon  the  Post's  selection  of  articles.  As  far 
as  I  know  there  has  never  been  a  best  selling  or  even  moderately  well  selling  book 
on  the  Far  East  basically  favorable  to  our  logical  allies.  There  have  been 
numerous  books  on  the  other  side.  These  titles  have  been  vigorously  promoted 
and  have  sold  well.  This  has  been  the  pattern  since  Thunder  Out  of  China  by 
White  and  Jacoby  became  a  best  seller  and  a  Book-of-the-Month  Club  selection 
in  1945  until  the  most  recent  effort  to  smear  Chiang  bookwise  appeared  m  the 
form  of  a  book  titled  "A  Pail  of  Oysters"  by  Vern  Sneider.  Published  last  fall 
this  thoroughly  dishonest  book  received  rave  reviews.  In  the  Satiirday  Review  ot 
Literature  it  was  reviewed  by  one  Pat  Frank  who  stated  that  the  book  cast  a 
bright  light  thrust  into  the  infected  peritoneum  of  Formosa  -  *  ^  it  is_  a  true 
light "  Mr  Frank  says  that  the  Nationalists  are  rightly  described  as  swme 
and  concludes  his  review  with  the  statement  that  anyone  who  reads  A  Pail  of 
Oysters  will  understand  "why  all  of  our  money  and  all  our  men  ^^^^  PU^Sr  h? 
Kai-shek  together  again."  Also  published  last  fall,  Formosa  Beachhead  by 
Geraldine  Fitch  is  a  factual,  honest  account  of  the  tremendous  progress  made  on 
Formosa,  of  the  promise  this  progress  holds  for  the  mainland  of  China.  Mrs. 
Fitch's  book  has  been  ignored  by  the  reviewers,  has  sold  less  than  3  000  copies 

The  prejudice  extends  into  purchases  of  books,  not  only  for  United  btate^ 
information  libraries,  but  for  libraries  in  this  country.  The  Library  Journal 
is  a  magazine  devoted  to  news  of  library  developments  in  America  with  a  cncuia-. 
tion  largely  limited  to  librarians.  Each  issue  devotes  considerable  space  to 
evaluations  of  recent  books.  Each  evaluation  generally  ends  with  a  statement 
ricommended  or  not  recommended.     A  study  of  this  magazine  reveals  some 


100  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

startling  facts  about  what  books  are  being  recommended  to  libraries.  For  in- 
stance, Dr.  James  Burnham's  The  Web  of  Subversion,  which  deals  in  considerable 
part  with  the  work  of  this  committee  was  not  recommended.  A  book  by  Louis 
Bromfield  which  denounces  our  past  foreign  policy,  our  spending  program  abroad, 
our  neglect  of  Asia,  was  not  recommended.  Obviously  Formosa  Beachhead  was 
not  considered  a  good  book  for  our  libraries ;  for  as  far  as  I  have  been  able  to 
ascertain  it  was  not  even  listed.  A  study  of  the  past  year's  issues  of  this  one 
magazine  reveals  the  extent  to  which  someone  has  gone  into  influencing  the 
selection  of  books  for  American  libraries.  As  important  as  books  ignored  or  not 
recommended  is  the  list  of  those  which  are  recommended.  They  include  most 
books  which  make  a  plea  for  recognition  of  Red  China  on  the  basis  of  reality, 
or  advise  us  that  we  must  not  offend  Mr.  Nehru  of  India.  Chester  Bowles"  book, 
the  works  of  Norman  Cousins,  of  Justice  William  O.  Douglas  are  all  recom- 
mended.- Mr.  Theodore  White's  new  book  Fire  in  the  Ashes  (again  selected 
by  the  Book-of-the-Month  Club)  and  a  book  which  advises,  among  other  things, 
appeasement  of  the  Comnnmists  is  heartily  recommended.  As  a  part  of  the 
general  pattern,  Elmer  Davis'  book  Bxit  We  Were  Born  Free  is  also  recommended. 
The  pimple  truth  is  that  today  it  is  well  nigh  impossible  for  the  truth  to  be  told 
about  the  Far  East.  Only  a  handful  of  publishers  are  even  willing  to  attempt 
publishing  a  book  honesty,  objectively  favorable  to  our  allies.  Very  few  maga- 
zines of  national  circulation  will  carry  similar  articles.  The  situation  is  becom- 
ing somewhat  better  with  newspapers,  but  the  deck  is  still  stacked  against  the 
Nationalists — and  against  a  realistic  American  foreign  policy. 

I  do  not  mean  to  issue  a  blanket  denunciation  of  all  who  write  on  the  Far  East. 
Reporting  on  this  part  of  the  world  is  difficult.  Among  other  problems  there  are 
those  of  language.  The  Communists  themselves  have  made  excellent  use  of  the 
situation,  have  moved  in  brilliantly  and  today  have  their  agents  among  the 
intellectuals  with  whom  American  writers  are  most  likely  to  come  in  contact. 
For  years  the  Communists  have  had  men  and  women  who  speak  fluent  English 
available  to  help  plant  favorable  news  among  American  writers.  One  of  their 
most  proficient  agents,  one  Miss  Kung  Peng,  was  stationed  in  Chungking  during 
the  days  of  the  Marshall  mission.  She  was  attractive,  vivacious,  always  willing 
to  help  an  American  reporter  get  "facts."  She  was  considered  so  important  a 
contact  that  when  I  was  sent  to  China  on  a  brief  inspection  trip  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  in  1946  I  was  rushed  from  the  plane  in  Chungking  directly  to  her 
home  so  that  I  could  have  dinner  with  her  and  could  get  the  "facts"  straight. 
Incidentally  the  dinner  engagement  was  made  without  my  knowledge,  by  mem- 
bers of  the  United  States  Embassy  staff.  On  the  same  trip  I  spent  4  days  in 
Peiping.  The  main  engagement  arranged  for  me  there  (by  Embassy  officials) 
was  for  a  dinner  with  Huang  Hua,  another  smooth  Communist  operator.  Huang 
speaks  English,  is  suave  and  polished  and  had  profound  influence  over  many 
Americans.  The  importance  of  both  Kung  Peng  and  Huang  Hua  is  indicated  by 
these  facts:  Huang  appeared  at  Panmunjom  as  a  very  important  Communist 
negotiator :  both  Hunang  and  Hung  Peng  are  now  in  Geneva,  in  charge  of  Com- 
munist public  relations.  Yet  during  a  crucial  period  in  the  Far  East  these  2 
people  influenced  90  percent  of  the  Embassy  staff,  fed  news  to  90  percent  of  the 
press  corps. 

Today  the  pattern  cannot  be  developed  so  openly.  The  Communists  place  their 
operators  among  the  Chinese,  Korean,  Indochinese  newspaper  men  and  women 
with  whom  our  writers  come  in  contact ;  they  inflltrate  the  United  States  Infor- 
mation Service  which  often  has  the  function  of  assisting  foreign  writers. 

While  I  do  not  issue  a  blanket  denunciation  of  all  our  news  gatherers,  I  think 
it  would  be  exceedingly  naive  to  believe  there  are  no  Communists  among  present 
American  writers  active  in  the  Far  East.  One  recent  example  is  the  case  of 
William  Powell,  former  OWI  official  in  China,  later  editor  of  the  China  Review, 
who  stayed  on  in  China  after  the  Communists  took  over  and  used  his  paper  to 
attack  his  own  country  along  typical  Communist  lines.  I  have  seen  one  issue  of 
the  China  Review  devoted  almost  entirely  to  American  atrocities,  with  pictures 
showing  the  mass  graves  of  thousands  of  Koreans  supposedly  massacred  by 
American  soldiers.  Mr.  Powell  and  his  wife,  who  was  active  in  Communist 
activities  in  China  in  1946  and  1947,  returned  to  this  country  from  Shanghai  a 
few  months  ago.  It  might  be  of  interest  to  state  that  I  heard  a  suggestion  made 
in  the  Far  East  that  the  Powell  return,  coinciding  as  it  did  with  the  return  of 
American  POW's,  was  not  merely  by  chance.  Perhaps  the  present  Powell 
assignment  is  to  guide  the  activities  of  the  so-called  progressives  among  the 
POW's. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  101 

I  think  it  important  to  call  attention  to  another  minor  technique  developed 
bv  the  Communists  in  Asia.  The  American  who  speaks  a  native  language— the 
son  of  missionary  parents  born  in  China,  for  instance-has  always  been  the 
special  target  of  the  Communists.  This  has  been  especially  true  of  Americans 
who  speak  fluent  Chinese.  Every  effort  is  made  to  sell  such  Americans  on  the 
Communist  point  of  view.  The  program  began  during  the  war  and  was  directed 
at  those  of  us  employed  by  the  Department  of  State  or  in  the  OWL  1  know  trom 
nersonal  experience  that  every  effort  was  made  to  indoctrinate  us  for  we  were  con- 
sidered -China  experts"  and  thus  would,  according  to  the  Communists,  have  wide 
influence  in  our  Government  and  among  the  American  people.  It  is  my  opinion 
that  much  of  the  indoctrination,  much  of  the  selling,  was  the  function  of  the 
IPR  As  far  as  I  was  personally  concerned  the  campaign  even  went  so  far  as 
outright  propositions  to  engage  in  questionable  activities.  This  technique  is 
still  employed  against  the  American  Embassy  official  or  the  USIS  employee  who 
speaks  Korean  or  Chinese.  However,  as  far  as  I  know,  this  danger  has  never 
been  recognized  by  our  authorities.  ,    <.  t 

The  Communist  techniques  which  I  have  mentioned  may  seem  obvious  .but  1 
do  not  believe  the  importance  of  these  techniques  has  ever  been  recognized.  The 
Communists  have  been  so  successful  as  to  virtually  paralyze  American  policy  in 
Asia.  Our  friends  in  Asia  are  becoming  more  and  more  confused.  They  hear 
our  oft  repeated  announcements  of  vigorous  anti-Communist  policy.  Then  they 
discover  that  no  book  in  America  can  become  a  good  seller  if  it  is  favorable  to 
our  friends.  Thev  hear  us  talk  of  stopping  communism  in  Asia,  then  wonder  why 
policy  forbids  aid  to  the  150,000  Nationalist  guerrillas  and  regulars  garrisoning 
the  islands  along  the  Communist-held  China  coast.  They  wonder  at  the  honesty 
of  American  reporting  when  the  leading  news  magazine  in  America  reports  one 
week  that  President  Syngman  Rhee  has  ruthlessly  stamped  out  all  opposition 
prior  to  the  Korean  national  election,  then  read  a  few  weeks  later  that  the 
opposition,  supposedly  stamp*-d  out,  was  such  that  Rhee  could  not  get  the  ma- 
jority support  he  plead  for.  They  cannot  understand  how  an  American  colum- 
nist can  come  to  Free  China  for  3  days,  making  no  attempt  to  even  visit  the 
guerrilla  held  islands,  and  can  then  report  to  millions  of  Americans  that  there 
are  no  Nationalist  guerrillas.  It  is  particularly  puzzling  for  the  free  peoples 
of  Asia  to  note  American  preoccupation  with  Prime  Minister  Nehru,  to  realize 
that  the  great  bulk  of  writing  on  Asia  is  favorable  to  a  man  who  has  done  little 
in  the  way  of  reform  for  his  own  country  and  has  blinded  himself  to  the  realities 
of  communism.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  understand  why  a  great  succession 
of  books  and  articles  praising  Communist  land  reform  in  China  are  eagerly  read 
and  accepted  while  the  real  land  reform  programs  of  Formosa  and  South  Korea 
are  ignored.  Above  all  it  is  impossible  to  understand  how  the  United  States 
can  promote  a  vast  alliance  in  Asia  and  not  include  the  Free  Chinese  and  the 
South  Koreans,  the  only  effective  anti-Communist  fighting  forces  in  the  Far 
East.  ,  ,. 

How  can  this  situation  in  the  Far  East  be  remedied?  I  believe  the  ending 
of  diplomatic  relations  with  Communist  nations  would  be  the  logical  first  step. 
We  must  somehow  learn  the  totality  of  Communist  plans,  must  realize  that  we  are 
already  engaged  in  a  death  struggle,  that  continued  adherence  to  diplomatic 
form  and  nicety  is  senseless. 

I  believe  the  great  newspapers,  news  services,  magazines  and  publishers  of 
this  country  have  a  duty  to  set  their  houses  in  order,  must  be  made  to  recognize 
the  part  they  have  unwittingly  played  in  Communist  successes. 

We  must  have  better  training  and  orientation  among  all  who  serve  us  overseas. 
In  1950  we  had  nearly  2.000  Americans  attached  to  our  hugh  mission  in  South 
Korea.  People  were  sent  to  Korea  without  the  slightest  training,  without  even 
a  remote  conception  of  the  forces  at  work  in  Asia.  There  is  still,  even  after 
the  Korean  war,  little  realistic  orientation  for  the  men  and  women  who  serve 
us  in  countries  like  Korea,  Japan,  and  Free  China.  There  is  little  understand- 
ing on  the  part  of  our  authorities  that  a  mere  clerk  or  stenographer  can  be 
a  person  of  immense  importance,  can  either  make  friends  or  can  make  enemies 
for  us,  can  unwittingly  become  a  link  in  the  chain  of  Communist  conspiracy. 

There  is  little  realization  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Communists  seize  upon 
any  disreputable  American  action  to  build  their  propaganda  line  that  Americans 
are  a  brutal,  corrupt,  and  money-mad  people.  There  is  for  instance  allegedly 
a  vast  prostitution  ring  in  operation  in  Okinawa  with  15-  and  16-year-old  girls 
brought  into  Okinawa  from  outlying  islands  to  service  American  soldiers.  It 
has  been  reported  to  me  that  some  of  the  American  Army  personnel  are  supposed 


102  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

sue*?  'aTjfVlnuf-^^''''''^'r  «f,t^is."ng.  Indeed,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
SUCH  a  ring  to  continue  unless  Americans  are  involved.  This  is  the  tvoe  of 
ammunition  he  Communists  need  and  use  to  discredit  us  ;bu  I  have  been 
informed  that  the  true  situation  is  that  the  Army  has  made  no  effort  to  stamn 
out  the  prostitution  business  in  Okinawa.  ^ 

f^r.V'm?'^^'^  States  must  even  be  careful  of  the  manner  in  which  its  officials 
npr  ^^^V-T  l'""^'  ?°'  ^'^^  '^^^"^  ^«  g"«t  for  the  Communist  mill.  The  man 
ner  m  which  American  personnel  lived  in  Korea  in  1950-free  houses  free 
f4fn  u.e'r?bf  th/p'^'^''^'  ^^«  ^^^vants  for  a  long  period-was  time  and  time 
rfl  J  V^""  Communists  to  prove  their  contentions  about  us.    And  at  the 

risk  of  soundmg  prudish,  I  might  say  that  the  heavy  drinking,  cocktail  type 

hiZ^f^nTT^^^^^-^l  *^"  ^'^^^  Department  abroad  does  not  ?n  any  way 
help  us  in  our  fight  against  communism. 

Finally  I  believe  the  best  possible  orientation  for  Americans  who  ar^  to 
serve  m  this  crisis  in  the  Far  East,  whether  they  be  dip  omits  poinT  4  experts 
or  newspapermen,  would  be  a  refresher  course  in  American  histo^v  A, S^«!.l' 
are  justifiably  proud  of  the  real  democracy  we  hfve  dTve^oned  But  that  v^rv 
pride  is  used  against  us  by  the  CommuniL.  InsMiSy  thev  n^hit  ou  IS 
Syngman  Rhee  or  Chiang  Kai-shek  does  not  allow  this  or  that  ^  But  how  man v 
of  us  realize  that  our  own  democracy  did  not  develop  overnlo-ht^  TheTiberak 
in  this  country  often  point  out  that  some  (they  say  mLy)  of  Chi-in- Ka^^S^^ 
fhaTfh'  T''  ^"^^^'^^^t,  that  quartermaster  LrLTere  sold  bv  the  genera  s^ 

r'.Zr't^rZll7Z^Z^^^^^^^  ^--  -em  to  Z'l.TZZri^l 

peJLS  wTwere  iW^'?  ''"^  ^'^''  "^.V  ^^^'"^'^  ^^^^^  ^o  understand  how  im- 
perrect  we  weie  just  75  years  ago.     Much  of  the  Far  East  is  emero^ino-  «fni 

ZZ  ??„.^^^^^^e  Ages.     We  cannot  expect  countrferw  th  tremSus  nrob 


[From  the  Topeka  (Kans.)  State  Journal,  November  26,  1953] 

Disillusioned  Asia  Needs  Honest  Books 

(By  John  Caldwell) 

Mr  Caldwell,  author  of  "The  Korea  Story"  and  "China  Coast 
Family"  is  a  tormer  State  Department  oflicial  He  was  Cn  on  the 
China  coast-son  of  a  missionary-speaks  the  Chinese  dialects 
spoken  on  Formosa.  He  also  speaks  Korean.  His  present  reoors 
from  the  Far  East  have  special  value  because  he  can  commScatI 

Zni  ^?T^  ]""  ?^K  language.    His  China  Coast  FamilyTs  a  Sor 
book  club  selection  for  December.  major 

Tokyo.— The  old  folks  are  slow  to  alter  their  wavs  in  this  mrt  nf  th«  w^.i^ 

seems  no  out,  no  peace  in  sight,  no  future' worth  wlitiSg'o 'preparing  for  "^  '^''' 
on   ?ho  ^"'r''*!  ''''■^  9'"^''  ^^  ^ense  the  cultural  vicuum,  quick  to  capitalize 

Nowhere  than  among  Japan's  book  stores  can  one  see  better  how  the  Commn' 
rp.Sn^'fi''"'''''.^^t''7  -e  vacuum.     The  Communistl  havf  opened  thS  first 
lending  library  in  Tokyo.    Communist  books,  both  hard-backed  and  inexnensive 
editions,  are  available  throughout  Japan.    Prices  are  tailored  t^fit  the  nnrW 
book;  in  a  student  district  handsomely  bound  books  from Tuss  a  can  be  bou^; 

neLSbSod-    n^^'-T'  '"'^  ^".^  ''''  '''•  -  «^  3  times  as  much  in  a  welRo'do 
neighboihood     U.  S.  News  magazine  reports  that  2  big  books  The  Works  of  T 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  103 

It  has  become  fashionable  for  American  reporters  to  blame  this  interest  in 
Russia  and  our  own  propaganda  failures  either  on  Senator  Joe  McCarthy  or  on 
the  fact  that  funds  for  State  Department  libraries  have  been  cut.  This  is  utter 
nonsense.  State  Department  libraries  have  never  reached  the  mass  of  people. 
The  choice  of  books  available  has  been  such  as  to  provide  an  understandable 
answer  to  the  appeal  of  communism. 

The  Russians,  for  instance,  permit  anyone  to  translate  and  market  their 
books.  The  legalistic  American  Government  frowns  on  any  publication  not  in 
accordance  with  copyright  laws.  Little  effort  is  made  to  push  for  translations 
into  local  languages.  USIS  libraries  in  Korea  have  never  carried  books  in 
Korean  and  it  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  our  Government  that  royalties  in 
Korean  Whan  would  be  useless  either  to  American  author  or  publisher. 

It  is  the  native  student,  returned  from  America,  who  most  easily  slips  into 
Asia's  cultural  vacuum.  This  student  comes  back  suddenly  to  the  squalor  of 
Korea  after  living  in  America  for  a  year  or  two  and  enjoying  our  standard  of 
living,  viewing  our  legal  processes,  and  our  freedoms.  He  finds  it  difficult  to 
make  a  living,  ofttimes  impossible  to  put  his  learning  into  practice.  I  talked  to  one 
such  bitter,  disillusioned,  drifting  student.  He  made  a  request  that  would  shock 
the  Department  of  State.  "Can't  you  send  me  an  honest  history  of  America?" 
he  asked.  "I  know  that  democracy  did  not  develop  overnight.  I  know  you 
have  had  your  problems,  your  corruption,  your  civil  war.  If  we  Koreans  could 
read  your  history  as  it  actually  developed  we  would  not  expect  miracles  here, 
vpe  would  be  more  patient." 

When  will  we  Americans  realize  that  democracy  cannot  develop  overnight, 
especially  in  countries  torn  by  subversion  and  war?  When  will  we  realize  that 
most  of  the  world  does  not  read  English?  When  will  we  understand  that  what 
many  Asiatics  need  is  not  a  bright,  beautifully  illustrated  story  of  America 
at  its  best  but  an  honest  story  of  our  struggles  before  we  became  as  we  are — 
and  one  that  admits  that  we  are  still  far  from  perfect. 

Instead  of  blaming  Joe  McCarthy  and  Congress,  it  might  be  well  to  remem- 
ber an  old  Korean  proverb  that  says : 

"When  a  man  slips  and  falls  into  the  river  it  is  foolish  to  blame  the  river." 


[From  the  Shanghai  Evening  Post,  Shanghai,  Monday,  January  27,  1947] 

U.  S.  S.  R.  Hit  fok  Anti-United  States  Trend  Here 

(By  Paul  Harrison) 

Washington,  Jan.  26. — Russian  propaganda  in  the  Far  East,  directed  chiefly 
against  the  United  States,  is  mainly  responsible  for  the  mounting  anti-American 
feeling,  the  State  Department  was  informed  today. 

John  C.  Caldwell,  United  States  public  affairs  officer  in  Shanghai,  has  re- 
ported to  the  State  Department  that  the  Soviet  radio  stations,  newspapers,  and 
books  are  bitterly  attacking  the  United  States  in  China  as  well  as  in  Eastern 
Europe. 

Caldwell  said  that  the  Russians  maintain  a  radio  station  in  Shanghai  which 
anounces  itself  as  the  "Voice  of  the  Soviet  Union,"  despite  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment's ban  on  foreign  stations. 

PROGRAMS    SLANDEROUS 

"I  have  listened  to  some  of  its  news  programs  and  they  are  very  slanderous. 
Attacks  against  American  activity  in  the  United  Nations,  against  our  occupation 
policies  in  Germany  and  Japan,  and  intervention  in  China  are  common,"  Cald- 
well declared. 

The  American  public  affairs  officer  said  that  he  had  recently  talked  to  an 
American  woman  who  had  returned  from  Tenan.  He  said :  "She  tells  me  that 
the  anti-American  campaign  there  has  been  vigorous,  with  lurid  posters  depicting 
GI  rape,  murder,  and  robbery  in  dozens  of  ways." 

FOR  HONGKONG  BY  SHIP  SATURDAY 

Caldwell  reported  that  although  the  United  States,  Britain,  France,  and 
Australia  as  well  as  Russia  have  information  offices  in  Shanghai,  the  Russians 
are  carrying  on  the  most  active  program. 


104  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

He  said  tliat  the  Russians  are  publishing  four  newspapers  and  that,  in  addition 
tJiere  are  half  a  dozen  Russian-owned  liookstores  and  publishers  in  Shanghai. 

INTELLECTUAL    "SHOPPING" 

Caldwell  said  that  the  Chinese  youth  is  tremendously  interested  in  the  United 
fetates,  but  they  are  also  interested  in  Russia,  and  they  are  doing  lots  of  intellect- 
ual shopping  around. 

Caldwell  warned  that  the  United  States  officials  need  better  teamwork  be- 
tween the  information  and  the  diplomatic  services. 


[From  the  Pontiac  Press,  Friday,  December  18,  1953] 

GI's  Help  Cake  fok  Korea's  Homeless,  Maimed  Childeen 

(By  John  C.Caldwell) 

John  C.  Caldwell,  author  of  The  Korean  Story,  former  State 
Department  official,  tells  how  American  GI's  are  winning  the  friend- 
ship of  the  Korean  people  through  their  aid  to  children  left  home- 
less or  maimed  in  the  Korean  war. 

Seoul.— The  American  GI  has  done  many  things  for  which  he  has  never 
received  credit.  He  makes  news  only  when  something  bad  can  be  pinned  on  him 
tor  instance,  he  can  be  accused  of  creating  Korea's  huge  army  of  "U  N 
madames";  he  has  fathered  many  an  illegitimate  child,  for  whom  there  is 
also  a  new  phrase  in  the  Far  East :  "U.  N.  Baby" ;  he  is  not  always  a  good 
ambassador  tor  America. 

But  the  other  day  in  Suwon,  south  of  Seoul,  I  visited  a  hospital,  1  of  the  4 
serving  a  population  of  over  2  million.  It  wasn't  much  of  a  hospital,  to  be  sure 
But  what  there  was  of  it  was  in  operation  because  the  men  of  an  Engineering 
Service  Battalion  nearby  had  presented  the  hospital  wath  a  gift  of  $5  300 

In  the  same  city  there  is  a  Children's  Nutritional  Center— built  with  an  $8,000 
gift  from  the  men  of  a  nearby  airbase. 

Nowhere  is  there  a  better  indication  of  American  Army  generosity  Nowhere 
can  be  found  a  lietter  answer  to  Communist  charges  of  germ  warfare.  I  refer  to 
the  Severance  Hospital  in  Seoul. 

In  this  American  missionary  hospital  there  is  a  project  for  the  amputees  of 
Korea.  It  began  because  of  the  compassion  of  an  American  general  It  has 
developed  because  of  the  generosity  of  thousands  of  American  soldiers  It  is 
efhciently  administered  by  American  nurses,  doctors,  missionaries  of  numerous 
faiths  and  creeds. 

Gen.  Paul  Kendall,  commanding  general  of  the  United  Nations  I  Corps,  one 
day  saw  a  Korean  child,  both  arms  blown  off  bv  a  mine.  He  was  disturbed 
by  the  sight,  especially  since  he  knew  many  others  had  suffered  similar  wounds 

General  Kendall  sent  word  down  through  division,  battalion,  and  regiment 
asking  donations  to  help  the  child  amputees  of  his  command  area.  The  response 
was  startling ;  a  total  of  $70,000  was  raised  in  short  order. 

Today  the  $76,000  has  grown  to  $81,000  and  is  held  in  trust  in  a  New  York 
bank.  The  money  is  spent  in  Korea  by  an  interreligious  board  made  un  of 
Catholic,  Methodist,  Presbyterian,  and  Seventh-Day  Adventist  missionaries'and 
two  Army  officers.  Actual  operations  are  centered  in  Severance  Hospital 
There  children  and  adults  receive  the  surgery  necessary  before  artificial  legs 
and  hooks  can  be  fitted.     Then  they  are  trained  in  the  use  of  artificial  limbs 

When  this  training  is  completed,  the  patients  old  enough  to  work  are  taught 
a  trade  in  which  their  artificial  limbs  will  not  handicap  them 

There  are  22,000  amputees  in  Korea.  Through  the  magnificent  I  Corps  project 
and  the  Korea  Amputee  Service  with  which  it  is  affiliated,  the  amputees  of  the 
land  will  be  spared  a  life  of  beggary. 

I  w^as  standing  in  front  of  Severance  Hospital  with  Paul  Kingsbury  young 
Presbyterian  missionary  in  charge  of  making  artificial  limbs,  when  a  Korean 
boy  m  his  teens  rode  up  on  a  bike.  He  nimbly  dismounted  and  walked  into 
the  building.  Kingsbury  turned  to  me  and  said  with  pride,  "There  is  one  of 
our  boys.  AYe  made  his  artificial  legs ;  we  taught  him  to  use  the  legs  •  we  have 
taught  him  to  make  a  living." 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  105 

Your  correspondent  is  probably  not  well  versed  in  psychological  warfare. 
But  it  would  seem  to  me  that  this  story,  the  many  other  stories  of  GI  generosity 
might  well  be  told  in  the  United  Nations,  might  very  well  be  broadcast  to  the 
world  by  the  Voice  of  America, 


[From  the  Roanoke  (Va.)  Times,  December  8,  1953] 

Who  Writes  for  America? 

By  John  C.  Caldwell 

Mr.  Caldwell,  author  of  the  Korea  Story  and  China  Coast 
Family,  is  a  former  State  Department  official.  He  was  born  on  the 
China  coast,  son  of  missionary,  speaks  the  Chinese  dialects  spoken 
on  Formosa  He  also  speaks  Korean.  His  present  reports  from 
the  Far  East  have  special  value  because  he  can  communicate  with 
locals  in  their  language.  His  China  Coast  Family  is  a  major  book 
club  selection  for  December. 

Korea. — Robert  Sherrod,  writing  in  the  Saturday  Evening  Post,  recently  stated 
that  all  the  Far  East  distrusts  American  morality  because  of  our  use  of  the 
atom  bomb.  This  statement  ranks  right  along  with  another,  commonly  seen  in 
our  better  publications.  It  is  the  statement  that  American  prestige  has  suf- 
fered a  great  blow  because  of  the  activities  of  Senator  Joe  McCarthy. 

Sherrod  may  be  speaking  for  Mr.  Nehru  but  not  for  the  rest  of  Asia.  Re- 
cently I  have  talked  to  hundreds  of  people  in  Korea  and  Formosa  in  their 
native  languages,  and  also  in  Japan.  Only  one  man,  of  his  own  accord,  brought 
up  the  subject  of  McCarthy.  This  man  was  bitterly  critical.  He  was  also 
scathing  of  Syngman  Rhee.     He  proudly  announced  that  he  was  a  neutralist. 

The  American  correspondent  who  reports  that  the  Far  East  is  suspicious  of 
us  because  of  our  use  of  the  A-bomb  or  because  of  Senator  McCarthy  is  simply 
not  reporting  all  the  facts. 

There  is  in  every  country  a  thin  layer  of  intellectuals  who  make  such  state- 
ments. Generally  these  same  people  advocate  trade  with  Red  China,  recogni- 
tion for  the  Chinese  Communists,  and  their  speedy  seating  in  the  United  Nations. 
Many  belong  to  that  bewildered  new  group  who  call  themselves  neutralists. 

The  writings  of  some  American  correspondents  are  bewildering  to  many 
orientals.  A  biased  reporter  can  usually  find  some  facts  to  bolster  his  views. 
There  are  bitter  and  dissatisfied  people  everywhere. 

But  to  many  orientals  it  seems  that  Americans  should  attempt  to  get  all  the 
facts  from  people  representing  all  groups  before  risking  generalizations. 

I  did  not  find  a  single  oriental  who  had  lost  faith  in  our  morality  because  we 
have  used  or  might  use  the  A-bomb.  Indeed,  I  found  the  opposite  to  be  true. 
Perhaps  this  was  best  expressed  by  an  educated  Korean  who  said :  "My  wife  and 
I  are  without  much  hope.  For  our  children  there  is  hope  for  we  expect  to  get 
them  to  America.  For  us,  maybe  5  more  years,  or  perhaps  10.  Then  all  will  be 
lost  unless  you  are  willing  to  use  your  atomic  strength,  unless  you  realize  that  it 
is  strength  alone  that  the  other  side  understands. 

The  orientals  are  realistic,  and  in  their  eyes  it  is  not  immoral  to  use  maximum 
strength  against  an  enemy.  For  them  death  by  machinegun  or  conventional 
bombs  is  equally  permanent.  And  as  one  Korean,  working  in  an  orphanage  where 
152  children  were  burned  to  death  by  jellied  gasoline  bombs  (dropped  from 
American  planes)  pointed  out,  "there  are  deaths  more  painful  than  death  from 
an  A-bomb.     At  least  that  is  instantaneous." 

There  is  a  tremendous  need  for  honest  reporting  from  the  Far  East,  as  difiicult 
as  that  is  to  accomplish.  The  shallow  judgments  of  many  correspondents  was 
expressed  for  me  one  morning  at  breakfast  in  the  Eighth  Army  correspondents' 
billet  in  Seoul. 

A  reporter  for  one  of  America's  largest  news  agencies  had  his  solution  for  all 
our  problems  in  the  Far  East. 

"What  the  Far  East  needs,"  said  my  breakfast  companion,  "is  three  good  heart 
attacks  :  one  for  Chiang  Kai-shek,  one  for  Mme.  Chiang,  one  for  Syngman  Rhee." 

It  is  time  we  began  to  answer  the  questions:  Who  speaks  for  America?  Who 
writes  for  America? 

47769—54 — pt.  2 5 


106 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 


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STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  107 

Mr.  Areks.  Kindly,  in  an  extemporaneous  manner,  summarize  here 
the  high  points  of  this  testimony  which  has  now  been  inserted  in  the 
record. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Let  me  state  tirst,  as  I  did  in  my  statement,  that  the 
brain  washing,  the  germ  warfare  charges,  the  things  that  have  come 
up  within  the  Last  few  months,  the  last  year  and  a  half,  are  not,  as  many 
Americans  seem  to  think,  new  techniques  and  new  strategies. 

As  I  have  watched  the  Connnunist  strategy  in  the  Far  East,  it  has 
become  apparent  to  me  that  their  one  aim  is  paramount,  and  that  is  to 
discredit  by  every  means  possible  the  American  soldier.  I  think  that 
is  an  important  thing  because  it  shows  a  basic  underlying  fear  of 
American  intervention. 

Now,  beginning  in  1945  and  1946,  this  campaign  started,  directed 
first  against  the  United  States  marines  in  north  China,  against  the 
military  police  detachment  in  Shanghai,  accusing  Americans  of  all 
sorts  of  brutality,  of  rape,  of  robbery ;  and  the  germ  warfare  charges 
are  the  outgrowth  actually  of  this  whole  aim  to  try  to  discredit  Ameri- 
cans abroad. 

Now,  I  think  that  we  often,  through  our  own  magazines  and  news- 
papers, help  the  Communists  a  greal  deal  in  that  very  point.  I  men- 
tioned in  my  statement  the  fact,  for  instance,  that  a  national  magazine 
last  year,  I  believe  it  was,  had  a  feature  story  claiming  that  there  were 
over  100,000  illegitimate  GI  babies  in  Japan  alone.  That  sort  of  thing 
is  grist  for  the  Communist  mill. 

It  turns  out  that  the  Japanese  Government  itself  has  been  able 
to  locate  less  than  4,000.  So  you  can  see  how  uninformed  reporting 
can  have  a  bearing,  can  actually  help  the  Communists  in  their  efforts. 

Now,  the  second  paramount  aim,  and  one  that  has  been  terribly 
successful,  has  been  the  program  to  discredit  the  people  who  must 
be  our  allies  in  Asia.  By  that  I  mean  the  Chiang  Kai-sheks  and 
Syngman  Rhees.  This  program  has  succeeded  to  such  a  degi'ee  that 
today  there  are  only  a  handful  of  magazines  in  America  that  will 
even  think  of  taking  a  pro-Chiang  or  pro-Nationalist  story.  The 
prejudice  is  so  tremendous  that  you  find  practically  all  of  our  cor- 
respondents in  the  Far  East  steeped  in  the  prejudice.  If  they  do  go 
to  Formosa,  if  they  go  to  free  China,  they  have  no  inclination  to  get 
at  the  truth,  because  they  have  so  much  prejudice. 

The  Chairman.  Didn't  the  tempo  for  that  propaganda  originally 
come  out  of  our  State  Department  when  they  tried  to  sell  the  fact 
that  the  Communists  were  just  agrarian  reformers? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  was  the  beginning.  Since  then  the  idea  has 
been  to  try  to  make  us  believe,  playing  on  our  own  belief  in  democracy, 
that  the  Chiangs  and  the  Rhees  are  not  democrats  because  they  do 
not  have  democracy  as  we  see  it,  not  taking  into  consideration  the 
tremendous  economic  factors  these  leaders  face,  the  factors  of  active 
internal  rebellion  going  on  which  we  do  not  have  in  this  country. 

Now  I  find  the  progi'am  is  beginning  to  be  directed  against  other 
countries.  I  have  a  copy  here  of  a  little  magazine  that  I  like.  It  is 
a  liberal  magazine  that  is  normally  very  good,  the  New  Leader.  They 
have  a  feature  story  on  corrupt  fascism  in  Thailand.  The  Thai  Gov- 
ernment is  raked  over  the  coals.  It  would  be  my  guesss  that  we 
would  soon  be  hearing  that  President  Magsaysay  is  not  a  good  man. 


108  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

It  is  all  part  of  the  program  to  prejudice  the  public  opinion  against 
the  leaders  in  Asia  who  have  been  stanchly  anti-Communist. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  opinion  respecting  modes  by  which 
American  officials  in  the  Far  East  have  been  subjected  to  this  slant- 
ing of  views  by  people  who  are  Communists  or  under  Communist 
discipline  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir ;  I  do.  There  were  two  very  powerful  per- 
sonalities in  the  early  days  right  after  the  end  of  the  war,  Chinese 
Communists,  one  youno;  lady  by  the  name  of  Kung  Peng,  another  a 
Chinese  gentleman  by  the  name  of  Huang  Hua.  Both  of  these  people 
were  attractive.  They  were  intelligent.  They  spoke  good  English 
and  they  had  nice  personalities,  and  they  became  almost  the  major 
sources  of  news  as  far  as  our  Government  or  our  correspondents  were 
concerned  in  1946. 

As  an  example  of  how  important  Miss  Kung  Peng  was,  I  made  a 
trip  to  the  Far  East  in  Januaiy  of  1946  for  the  State  Department. 
I  arrived  in  Chungking  late  in  the  afternoon.  Chungking  was  still 
the  capital.  I  was  whisked  immediately  to  Miss  Kung  PengV  apart- 
ment for  a  dinner  which  was  attended  by  various  State  Department 
people.  The  idea  seemed  to  be  that  she  was  very  important  as  a  source 
of  news  and  that  I  should  immediately  get  her  side  of  things. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  that  Senator  Welker  is  in 
attendance  at  the  hearing. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  mentioned  that  when  I  went  to  Chungking,  I  was 
immediately  whisked  over  to  Miss  Kung  Peng's  apartment.  Then 
I  went  to  Pieping  on  that  same  trip,  Huang  Hua  was  considered  of 
such  importance  that  I  had  a  dinner  set  up  with  him  by  a  State  De- 
partment local  personnel.  I  think  it  interesting  to  note  that  both  of 
these  characters  who  had  so  much  to  do  witli  getting  news  out  to  us 
back  in  '45  and  '46  are  now  at  Geneva.  Huang  Hua  was  at  Pan- 
munjom  playing  a  very  important  background  part  in  the  negotia- 
tions there. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  at  these  dinners,  if  you  will  recall? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  don't  recall  the  Peiping  one,  but  at  the  Chungking 
one  I  recall  was  Mrs.  Wilma  Fairbank  who  was  our  cultural  attache 
at  that  time  and  Mr.  John  Melby  who  was  our  first  or  second  secretary. 
I  forget  his  title. 

Senator  Welker.  You  said  cultural  attache.  Wliat  duties  does 
that  embrace  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  The  cultural  attache  had  charge  of  our  libraries, 
our  exchange  of  student  programs,  visiting  directories  for  the  United 
States,  and  things  of  that  kind. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  recall  anyone  else  at  that  dinner? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Those  are  the  only  two  I  recall. 

The  Chairman.  How  many  other  people  were  in  attendance  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  There  were  a  couple  of  other  Communist  func- 
tionaries ;  I  think,  but  I  am  not  sure,  that  Chou  En  Lai  was  present. 
He  was  often  present  during  those  days.  Again  he  was  a  suave  gen- 
tleman, witty  and  intelligent,  and  was  considered  a  source  of  accurate 
news  by  some  of  our  own  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  these  two  Communist  agents 
and  others  were  a  source  of  news  and  a  source  of  information  for  the 
American  officials  who  were  in  China  representing  our  Government? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  109 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Very  definitely. 

The  Chairman.  And  also  for  news  reporters'? 

Mr,  Cald-wtsll.  Also  news  reporters. 

Senator  Welker.  ]\Iay  I  have  the  question? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Upon  what  facts  do  yon  base  that,  Mr.  Witness, 
can  you  tell  us  ? 

The  Chairman.  He  gave  us  the  background  earlier,  Senator.  He 
was  with  the  State  Department  during  this  period  of  time. 

Senator  Welker.  Did  he  see  anything  of  this  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  You  saw  the  news  releases  come  out? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Did  you  know  a  man  by  the  name  of  William  Powell, 
former  OWI  official  in  China? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir.  I  have  known  him,  for  I  would  say,  10,  12 
years. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Wliat  did  he  do  in  China  and  who  is  he  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  He  was  the  son  of  a  very  well-known  American 
newspaperman  in  Shanghai,  a  very  fine  man  who  was  imprisoned  by 
the  Japanese,  who  was  the  very  best  type  of  American.  And  William 
Powell's  son  went  into  the  OWI  in  1943,  in  charge,  I  believe,  of  our 
news  branch.  He  was  transferred  to  the  State  Department  and  in 
the  Executive  order  at  the  end  of  the  war,  stayed  only  a  short  time, 
and  then  returned  to  Shanghai  to  start  his  father's  paper,  called  the 
China  Review. 

Now,  I  met  him  several  times  since  the  war.  When  the  Communists 
took  over  Shangliai  lie  stayed  on,  much  to  my  surprise  and  the  sur- 
prise of  others  who  knew  him.  His  magazine  immediately^  became 
a  violently  anti-American  magazine,  a  mouthpiece  of  the  Communists, 
and  I  have  gotten  access  to  a  few  copies  as  an  illustration  of  the  type 
of  thing  that  he  has  done. 

This  particular  issue  is  devoted  to  American  atrocities  in  Korea, 
a  typical  caption,  a  picture  of  a  mass  grave.  The  caption  states  that 
this  is  a  picture  of  the  approximately  10,000  Korean  civilians  who 
were  murdered  at  the  town  of  Hawon  by  American  troops  during  the 
occupation.  Mr.  Powell  also  began  in  the  latter  part  of  1951  to  issue 
lists  of  American  prisoners  in  his  magazine,  with  the  hometowns,  and 
the  magazines,  I  found  as  I  traveled  around  the  country  in  the  last  2  or 
3  years,  were  mailed  to  these  parents  as  a  method  of  getting  Commu- 
nist propaganda  before  them. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  the  record  show  that  the 
task  force  that  you  assigned  me  to  has  that  information  in  a  record 
of  a  prior  hearing. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.     Go  ahead,  Mr.  Caldwell. 

Mr.  Caldw^ell.  Shall  I  go  on  with  this  ? 

Senator  Welker.  I  just  want  to  make  that  observation. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Mr.  Powell  returned  suddenly  to  this  country  last 
August,  I  believe,  and  I  heard  suggestions  on  my  trips  to  the  Far 
East  that  his  return  coincided  with  the  return  of  our  few  progressive 
prisoners,  perhaps  for  a  reason,  perhaps  to  guide  the  activities  of  those 
progressives. 


110  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Now,  Mr.  Powell  was  in  Peiping,  we  know,  some  time  clnrin<^  the 
summer  of  last  year,  and  it  is  apparent  that  he  has  talked  to  some  of 
the  prisoners  in  north  China. 

Mr.  Arens.  While  you  were  in  the  Far  East  as  Director  of  the  In- 
formation Service,  did  you  have  occasion  on  which  the  so-called 
China  experts  from  the  State  Department  were  sent  to  the  Far  East 
to  indoctrinate  you  and  others  in  what  the  line  should  be  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  think  there  was  more  indoctrination  here  in  Wash- 
ington than  there  was  actually  in  the  Far  East.  Now,  there  was  a 
vigorous,  of  course  very  vigorous,  anti-Chiang,  pro-Communist  group 
in  our  foreign  service  in  China  w^ithout  question,  l^ut  there  was  a  great 
deal  of  indoctrination  which  actually  started  here  before  the  war  ended. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  was  the  line  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  The  line?  I  remember  particularly  two  cases  of 
two  downed  American  B-29  pilots.  You  may  remember  that  there 
was  a  period  when  we  bombed  Japan  from  a  base  in  western  Cliina,  and 
these  pilots  were  brought  to  the  State  Department  and  OWI  far 
eastern  meetings  to  discuss  and  describe  how  they  were  saved  by  the 
Communists,  by  the  magnificent  resistance  work  by  the  Chinese  Com- 
munists, and  I  would  say  that  that  indoctrination  was  done  in  that 
way  to  try  to  show  us  that  the  Communists  were  actually  helping  more . 
than  the  other  side;  that  they  were  fighting  more  real  battles.  I  re- 
member those  two  incidents  in  particular,  which  I  attended. 

Mr.  Arens.  Did  you  have  contact  with  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations  in  the  Far  East,  or  did  you  have  occasion  to  observe  its 
operations  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  You  couldn't  be  in  the  OWI  or  State  Department 
in  that  period  and  not  have  contact  with  the  IPR.    It  was  imposible. 

The  CiL\iRMAN.  Wliat  do  you  mean  by  that,  Mr.  Caldwell? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  To  give  you  an  example  of  what  I  mean,  in  1943 
and  1944,  when  OWI  employees  for  the  Far  East,  particularly  for 
China,  were  employed,  we  were  brought  liere  to  Washington  from  the 
New  York  overseas  office  for  orientation,  and  the  orientation  consisted 
of  your  seeing  two  people.  The  two  people  were  Mr.  Laughlin  Currie 
and  Mr.  Owen  Lattimore,  only  the  two.  From  those  people  we  were 
to  get  our  basic  philosophy,  you  might  say.  I  must  be  fair  and  say 
that  I  can't  remember  that  Mr.  Lattimore  gave  me  any  bad  philosophy 
at  the  time,  but  I  was  very  naive,  as  most  of  us  were.  We  thought  in 
terms  of  the  war  in  which  we  had  one  enemy  which  was  the  Japanese, 
and  were  enlisting  to  fight  that  enemy  and  only  that  enemy. 

There  was  another  way  in  wliich  the  IPR  had  a  great  bearing  on 
most  of  our  work.  That  was  that  it  completely  controlled  all  Far 
Eastern  activities  of  the  OWI  to  tlie  State  Department,  to  the  branch 
chiefs,  and  later  officials  who  were  formerly  IPR  members,  and  I 
could  list  several  of  those  to  give  you  an  example. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  list  them? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  The  China  Radio  Branch  in  San  Francisco  was 
headed  by  an  IPR  man.  The  Philippine  Branch  was  headed  by  an 
IPR  woman.  The  Indochina  Branch  was  headed  by  an  IPR  person. 
The  China  Branch  was  headed  by  an  IPR  person. 

At  the  time  the  coordinator  for  the  Far  East  was  an  IPR  person. 
The  coordinator  in  the  New  York  office  in  charge  of  Security  in  the 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  HI 

New  York  office  for  the  far  eastern  branches  was  an  IPR  person. 
Those  are  things  that  come  to  me  immediately. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  on  the  basis  of  your  experience  in  the  Far  East, 
Mr.  Caldwell,  can  you  help  the  committee  by  giving  an  appraisal  of 
the  method  of  operation  which  is  in  vogue  now  by  our  Government 
representatives  in  the  Far  East  in  undertaking  to  win  friends  and 
influence  people  i 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  think  there  is  great  improvement  in  what  we  are 
doing  in  the  Far  East.  There  is  still,  to  my  mind,  much  too  little 
coordination,  say,  between  what  is  happening  in  Kora  and  what  is 
happening  in  China.  To  give  an  example  of  that,  in  Formosa  we 
have  an  excellent  United  States  information  service  at  the  present 
time.    It  puts  out  some  outstanding  publications  in  Chinese. 

Now,  those  publications  would  have  been  extremely  valuable  with 
the  Chinese  POWs  in  Korea,  but  those  publications  were  never  sent 
to  Korea.  There  was  no  liaison  between  what  we  were  doing  in  free 
China  and  wliat  we  were  trying  to  do  with  the  Chinese  business. 

I  think  we  still  rely  too  much  on  radio  as  far  as  the  Chinese  on  the 
mainland  are  concerned.  We  do  too  little  in  exploiting  the  tremendous 
possibilities  of  getting  propaganda  into  the  China  coast. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  Mr.  Caldwell,  on  the  basis  of  your  background 
and  experience,  what  would  your  appraisal  be  of  a  course  of  action 
that  this  Government  should  take  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
all  Communist-controlled  governments  and  to  propose  a  conference  of 
the  free  nations  of  the  world  to  destroy  the  Communist  fifth  column 
and  to  resist  Communist  aggression  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  feel  very  strongly  that  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  would  be  an  important  step  because  perhaps  then  we  could 
make  people  understand  the  totality  of  this  conspiracy  against  us. 

Mr.  Arexs.  What  do  you  mean  by  that  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  mean  by  that  that  today  still  too  many  people 
cannot  understand  that  we  are  actually  at  war,  that  the  final  aim  of 
communism  is  our  destruction  because  we  are  the  only  powerful  force 
that  stands  in  their  way ;  that  as  long  as  we  go  on  in  a  quasi-peaceful 
situation,  we  can't  perhaps  correct  some  of  these  feelings  that  I  have 
listed  in  my  statement;  that  if  we  could  somehow  show  people  that 
we  are  in  the  state  of  hostility  with  the  Communist  world,  that  normal 
diplomatic  relations  are  not  only  injurious  but  are  broken  off,  then 
we  could  gain  slowly  the  realization  we  need  to  really  gird  ourselves 
for  the  battle  ahead. 

Mr.  Arens.  To  what  extent  did  the  Communist  espionage  propa- 
ganda and  political  subversion  center  in  the  diplomatic  and/or  semi- 
diplomatic  establishments  throughout  the  Far  East  with  which  you 
were  in  contact  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  think  the  extent  of  the  native  infiltration  has  never 
been  fully  realized.  By  that  I  mean  that  every  diplomatic  establish- 
ment must  have  a  large  number  of  Chinese  personnel  in  China,  Koreans 
if  in  Korea.  It  is  my  belief  that  the  United  States  Information  Serv- 
ice was  a  particular  target,  for  several  reasons,  of  propagandists. 
Propaganda  is  important.  Our  own  propaganda  is  important  to  the 
Communists.  Also  the  USIS  in  most  places  is  an  organization  which 
helps  and  guides  American  correspondents  who  are  visiting. 


112  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Now,  to  show  that  I  am  not  trying  to  blame  others  alone,  I  would 
like  to  mention  one  unit  of  my  own  in  Korea  of  18  people  that  I  hired 
myself,  whose  employment  I  approved.  I  was  able  to  check  on  all 
18  of  those.  After  the  war  I  found  that  seven  had  gone  over  to  the 
other  side.  Of  those  7,  I  would  say,  5  were  real  Communists  and  2 
were  opportunists  or  people  who  couldn't  get  out  of  Seoul  in  time 
and  did  what  they  did  to  eat.  That  is  a  pretty  high  percentage,  I 
think  one  of  the  things  we  should  have  done  is  to  have  made  a  study 
of  all  our  personnel  in  Korea.  It  could  have  been  done,  could  still 
perhaps  be  done,  to  find  out  just  what  the  total  percentage  of  actual 
Communists  was. 

We  had  a  total  of  between  3,000  and  5,000  Korean  employees  in  our 
mission  in  Korea.  In  that  vast  number  of  people  there  was  tremen- 
dous opportunity  for  infiltration,  and  you  can't  run  a  security  check 
on  a  Korean  or  a  Chinese.  They  have  lived  in  perhaps  40  difi'erent 
places  in  5  years.     It  is  a  difficult  job. 

I  do  not  blame  us  for  having  failed  somewhat,  but  I  don't  think 
we  have  been  careful  enough  to  realize  that  certain  units  of  our  estab- 
lishments are  targets  for  infiltration. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  have  a  question  to  clarify 
something  that  I  may  have  misunderstood  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Prior  to  the  last  answer,  did  I  understand  you 
to  say  that  it  would  be  proper  that  we  let  the  world  know  that  we  were 
at  war  with  the  Communist  conspii-acy  rather  than  to  adopt  the  at- 
titude of  quasi-peace  and  containment  with  them  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  By  war  I  do  not  mean  that  we  should  declare  a 
war. 

Senator  Welker.  Well  now,  what  did  you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  mean  that  we  should  realize  that  the  continuance 
of  diplomatic  relations  is  an  unrealistic  attitude  at  the  present  time. 
It  gives  the  Communists  a  chance  at  espionage  that  they  would  not 
liave  otherwise,  and  I  think  it  also  tends  to  becloud  the  issues  of  com- 
munism here  at  home,  that  people  do  not  realize,  cannot  understand 
that  the  Communists  are,  speaking  very  simply,  out  after  us,  that  their 
primary  aim  is  the  "defeat  of  imperialistic  America." 

Senator  Welker.  Now,  Mr.  Caldwell,  this  digresses  for  a  moment, 
but  I  think  it  is  along  the  line  you  have  suggested.  Do  you  think  it 
is  good  psychology  for  the  United  States  Government  to  sell  a  Czecho- 
slovakian  steel  mill  to  a  dictatorship  that  has  trade  alliances,  trade 
agreements  with  Russia  and  all  her  satellites,  knowing  well  that  at 
this  moment  Russia  and  the  satellites  have  trade  missions  in  this  coun- 
try to  which  they  would  propose  to  ship  this  steel  mill.  Do  you  think 
that  is  good  psychology? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Absolutely  not.  I  think  it  is  ridiculous  to  think 
that  we  can  trade  in  any  way  with  the  enemy  we  face.  May  I  digress 
there  a  moment  and  say  that  I  was  able  to  get  through  Chinese  and 
American  sources  an  exact  count  of  the  number  of  ships  that  attempted 
to  enter  or  did  enter  Communists  ports  on  the  China  coast  during  the 
month  of  November. 

Mr.  Arens.  During  what  year? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  what  year,  Mr.  Caldwell  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  113 

Mr.  Caldavell.  This  last  year.  I  was  there  in  December.  I  do  not 
have  my  notes  here,  but  I  believe  it  was  69.  Of  those  figures  69,_  all 
but  4  were  British.  The  four  that  were  not  British  were  Norwegian. 
Some  of  those  ships  carried  undoubtedly  nonstrategic  materials,  but 
one  of  them  that  was  stopped  had  over  5,000  tons  of  antibiotics,  strep- 
tomycin, penicillin.  I  saw  part  of  the  cargo  of  another  which  had 
army  blankets,  blankets  cut  in  the  army  style,  delivered  to  the  coast  of 
China  in  the  dead  of  winter. 

The  Chairman.  Let  the  record  show  that  Senator  Johnston  is  in 
attendance  at  this  hearing. 

Senator  Welker.  Now,  Mr.  Caldwell,  if  the  chairman  will  permit 
me,  what  were  some  of  these  nonstrategic  materials  in  the  other  boats? 
Would  it  be  food,  or  buttons,  or  what  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Food.  Often  as  prosaic  items  as  soap,  a  good  deal 
of  soap.  Consumers  goods.  Fruit  goes  in.  Normally  the  Chinese 
Nationalists  do  not  even  attempt  to  stop  a  ship  unless  they  have  some 
intelligence  to  the  effect  that  it  does  have  strategic  goods.  So  often 
you  cannot  tell  what  is  in  the  cargo.  They  try  to  check  from  Hong 
Kong. 

Senator  Welker.  Food  would  be  a  little  strategic,  would  it  not,  if  an 
army  were  starving  ? 

Mr.  Cald"\\tsll.  I  think  if  you  are  realistic  you  should  say  that 
almost  any  item  that  goes  into  Communist  China  is  strategic. 

The  Chinese  Communists  are  having  a  desperate  time  economically 
right  now.  Obviously  if  we  cut  off  everything  their  situation  would 
be  worsened,  and  to  me,  it  is  an  important  part  of  the  cold  war  to  make 
that  situation  as  bad  as  we  can.  It  weakens  them  and  keeps  them  from 
getting  that  final  stranglehold  which  will  keep  us  from  ever  getting 
them  out. 

Mr.  Arens.  After  you  returned  to  the  United  States,  did  you  have 
an  opportunity  to  appraise  all  the  publications  in  the  United  States, 
books  and  magazines  and  articles  on  the  Far  East  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  comment  or  observation  on  that? 

Mr.  Caldweli,.  There  is  one  indication  that  I  think  shows  the  sit- 
uation, and  that  is  the  Library  Journal  which  is,  you  might  say,  more 
or  less  the  organ  of  American  libraries.  It  is  not  official.  I  made  a 
compilation  of  the  recommendations  it  makes  on  books  on  foreign 
affairs  in  general  and  on  the  Far  East  in  particular.  You  will  find 
almost  invariably  that  a  book  favorable  to,  let's  say,  the  Nationalists, 
or  the  Rhee  point  of  view,  is  not  recommended.  Mr.  James  Burnham's 
book,  the  Web  of  Subversion,  which  dealt  a  good  deal  with  the  work 
of  this  committee,  had  a  fiat  statement,  "Not  recommended."  And 
you  find  that  pattern  runs  all  through  the  books  that  are  recommended 
"to  American  libraries. 

Mr.  Arens.  That  is  a  kind  of  bible  of  books  in  this  country  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  is  a  good  way  of  putting  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  It  is  the  Journal  which  is  the  authority  on  which  books 
are  good  and  what  books  are  not  good,  is  that  correct,  in  its  simplest 
form? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  your  testimony  is  that  this  Journal  regularly, 
habitually  recommends  books,  favorable  to  the  pro-Communist  ele- 

47769—54 — ^pt.  2 6 


114  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

ment  and  does  not  recommend  books  that  are  anti-Communist,  is 
that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  wouldn't  go  as  far  as  to  say  that  it  recommends 
books  that  are  pro-Communist.  I  think  it  is  a  little  more  devious 
than  that.  It  does  not  recommend  books  that  make  an  outright 
attack,  as  Mr.  Burnham  did,  on  the  Communist  conspiracy.  It  does 
not  recommend  books  which,  like  the  book  Formosa  Beachhead,  are 
favorable  to  Chiang  Kai-shek.  That  was  recently  published.  It 
does  not  even  list  books  like  that  normally. 

Mr.  Arens.  Did  you  have  an  experience  in  which  you  checked  on 
the  Communist  propaganda  respecting  the  alleged  target  practice 
that  the  Marines  were  supposed  to  be  engaging  in  on  the  Chinese  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes.  That  is  a  very  interesting  story  because  I 
think  it  illustrates  two  things.  It  illustrates  the  Communist  technique 
of  trying  to  degrade  our  own  people,  our  soldiers,  and  it  illustrates 
again  how  Americans  can  help  in  that  technique. 

When  I  was  Director  of  the  USIS  in  China,  I  read  in  the  Commu- 
nist paper  a  story  that  the  United  States  Marines  in  north  China 
were  using  Chinese  peasants  in  target  practice.  This  story  was  that 
they  were  bored  and  didn't  have  much  to  do  so  they  would  go  out  in 
the  country  and  get  a  peasant  and  start  him  running  and  shoot  him.- 
It  was  inconceivable  to  me  that  any  American  military  unit — they 
are  not  always  angels,  let  us  agree — would  ever  do  that  kind  of  thing. 
I  began  to  be  very  much  disturbed  when  Americans  in  our  own  estab- 
lishment began  to  pass  that  story  around,  passing  it  around  as  the 
truth  without  checking  of  any  type,  and  it  became  a  very  curt  story 
all  over  China,  so  much  so  that  I  went  to  north  Cliina  myself  to 
check  and  I  found  that  the  basis  of  the  story  was  that  near  the  city 
of  Tientsin,  near  a  target,  a  farmer  had  been  hit  by  a  stray  bullet. 

From  that  the  story  had  been  exaggerated  in  the  typical  Commu- 
nist technique,  helped  along  unfortunately  by  some  Americans  to  the 
effect  that  we  were  using  peasants  as  targets  as  a  routine  procedure. 

Senator  Welker.  Do  you  know  the  names  of  Americans  who  helped 
that  propaganda  along? 

Mr.  CatjDwell.  I  do.    I  would  rather  give  it  just  to  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  custom. 

Senator  Johnston.  Would  you  tell  the  committee  whether  or  not 
they  were  giving  it  in  good  faith  or  trying  to  injure  the  United 
States? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  would  say  both.  I  would  say  that  undoubtedly 
when  you  have  a  situation  like  that  there  may  have  been  one  key  per- 
son who  was  possibly  a  party  member  and  then  you  have  the  many 
naive  Americans  who  get  no  briefing  of  any  type,  to  whom  we  still 
give  no  real  indoctrination,  the  hundreds  of  people  we  send  overseas, 
and  I  think  that  a  gossip  can  do  as  much  harm  as  a  party  member, 
a  gossip  who  will  not  check  on  facts,  who  will  not  realize  that  this 
or  that  story  is  harmful  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  the  policy  of  this  committee  not  to  reveal  any 
names  in  public  session,  but  would  you  be  kind  enough  to  give  us  the 
names  of  these  people  in  executive  session  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  certainly  will. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  115 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Caldwell,  I  think  our  record  should  reflect  more 
clearly  the  facts  with  reference  to  William  Powell.  Specifically,  who 
is  he? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Specifically  now,  as  far  as  I  know,  he  is  unemployed. 
I  know  nothing  of  his  whereabouts  or  his  activities.  His  correct 
name  is,  I  believe,  J.  William  Powell.  It  is  on  this  masthead :  John 
William  Powell,  editor  and  publisher  of  the  China  Monthly  Review. 

Mr.  Arens.  That  China  Monthly  Review  clearly  is  a  Communist 
publication? 

Mr.  Caldw^ell.  I  don't  see  how  anything  could  be  more  so.  I  thmk, 
but  I  am  not  sure,  that  it  folded  when  he  left  last  August.  Whether 
it  is  still  in  existence,  I  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Arens.  He  was  formerly  with  the  Office  of  War  Information 
in  China,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Arens.  Over  what  period  of  time  was  he  with  the  OWI  in 
China? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  He  was  employed  in  1943  in  March.  By  Executive 
order  on  August  31, 1945,  he  was  transferred  to  the  State  Department. 
I  believe  he  resigned  within  6  months  to  go  back  and  start  up  the 
magazine  again. 

Mr.  Arens.  Over  what  period  of  time  was  he  with  the  magazine? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  From  194Y,  I  would  say,  or  possibly  1946  until 
August  of  1953. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliere  was  he  engaged  then  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  In  Shanghai. 

Mr.  Arens.  Then  he  was  .then  editor  until  1953  of  this  China  Re- 
view, is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  China  Monthly  Review. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Caldwell,  do  you  have  any  information  as 
to  whether  or  not  any  of  these  documents,  magazines,  or  pamphlets 
that  you  have  before  you  and  which  you  state  are  Communist  propa- 
ganda reach  the  American  shore,  reach  the  United  States  in  the  form 
of  propaganda  ? 

Mr.  Caldw-ell.  Yes,  sir.  In  Iowa  during  a  lecture  the  year  before 
the  last  I  heard  of  two  families  that  had  received  this  publication 
here.  Both  of  the  families  had  sons,  prisoners  of  the  Chinese.  I 
heard  of  one  family  in  my  own  town,  Nashville.  I  do  not  know  what 
the  name  of  that  family  was.  The  FBI  told  me  of  that  family  and 
of  another  family  in  Memphis.  Those  are  four  cases  in  which  this 
magazine  came  through  the  mails,  mailed  in  Hong  Kong,  and  came 
to  American  families. 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  another  observation.  Senator  Jenner  had 
me  on  a  task  force,  along  with  Mr.  Arens,  Mr.  Duffy,  and  Mr. 
Schroeder,  in  New  York  a  few  weeks  ago  in  which  we  had  millions  of 
pieces  of  literature  similar  to  that  before  you  that  came  into  our  coun- 
try and  was  freely  distributed  throughout  our  land.  Now,  based  upon 
your  experience,  sir,  what  effect  would  that  have  in  aiding  the  Com- 
munist conspiracy? 


116  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  think  it  has  this  effect :  a  family  particularly  that 
had  a  boy  who  was  a  prisoner  is  emotionally  upset  and  worried.  One 
of  the  main  lines  of  these  magazines  is  that  we  must  have  peace,  that 
the  Chinese  Communists  are  really  trying  to  have  a  square  deal,  and 
I  think  it  works,  that  people  are  likely  to  write  their  Senators  and 
Congressmen  suggesting  that  we  get  out  of  the  war.  They  are  likely 
to  become  a  little  sympathetic  to  the  Communist  cause. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  with  reference  to  Mr.  Powell  again,  we  had  him 
up  to  1953  when  he  was  editor  of  the  China  Review  and  I  understood 
you  to  say  that  he  resigned  and  returned  to  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Aeens.  What  is  the  source  of  your  information  on  the  fact  that 
he  entered  the  country  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Time  magazine.  First  I  saw  him  just  before  I  left 
and  then,  when  I  was  in  Japan  last  August,  I  inquired  and  talked  to 
one  correspondent,  an  American  correspondent  who  had  interviewed 
him  on  his  way  out  of  Hong  Kong. 

Mr.  Arens.  Did  he  return  as  an  American  citizen  or  had  he  re- 
nounced his  citizenship  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  No,  I  don't  believe  he  ever  renounced  his  citizenship. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  information  do  you  have  with  respect  to  his 
wife? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  His  wife  was  the  leader  of  the  pro-Communist 
American  forces  in  Shanghai  all  throughout  1946,  1947,  and  1948. 

Mr.  Arens.  Did  she  return  with  him  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  she  did. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  have  one  further  question.  With  what  groups  was 
she  identified  in  Shanghai? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  First  with  Madam  Sun  Yat-sen's  relief  organiza- 
tion. No,  I  believe  she  went  out  originally  perhaps  with  UNRRA.  I 
am  not  certain  of  that.  She  then  became  associated  with  Madam  Sun 
Yat-sen's  relief  organization  and,  as  you  no  doubt  know  Madame  Sun 
has  gone  over  to  the  Communists  and  is,  I  think,  at  the  present  time 
Minister  of  Cultural  Enlightenment  in  the  Communist  Government. 
She  was  associated  with  Madam  Sun  for  about  2  years. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  be  your  opinion,  in  your  judgment  of  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  people  in  the  Far  East  as  to  what  psychological 
impact  there  would  be  on  their  minds  by  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  think  it  would  be  extremely  helpful  as  far  as  non- 
Communist  Asia  is  concerned.  By  that  I  mean  Korea,  Philippines, 
Thailand,  Free  China.  It  might  also  be  very  helpful  as  far  as  Japan 
is  concerned.  Now,  the  Japanese  are  in  a  very  serious  economic  situ- 
ation. They  have  to  trade,  and  the  logical  trading  area  for  them  is 
Communist  China.  They  have  sent  within  the  last  year  two  trade 
missions  to  Communist  China.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they  must 
rely  on  us  and  T  think  one  effect  might  be  that  that  desire  to  trade  with 
Communist  China  would  be  lessened  if  we  had  no  relations  whatsoever 
with  the  Communist  world. 

The  Chairman.  Certainly  magazines  such  as  you  have  referred  to 
hers,  like  the  China  Review  would  be  stopped  as  to  propaganda  and 
transmissibility  if  diplomatic  relations  were  severed. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  117 

Mr.  Caldwell.  They  could  be  barred,  I  assume,  completely. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  information  respecting  the  situation  in 
the  Philippines  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Very  little.    I  haven't  been  there  on  recent  trips. 

Mr.  Arens.  We  have  no  further  questions,  Mr.  Chairman.  He  has 
covered  his  testimony  at  length  in  his  prepared  statement. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  has  been  incorporated  in  the  record. 

Do  you  have  any  questions.  Senator  Johnston  ? 

Senator  Johnston.  I  have  no  questions. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  questions.  Senator  Welker  ? 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  only  this  ob"Bervation,  Mr.  Chairman:  If 
Mr.  Caldwell  would  be  gracious  enough,  I  would  like  to  see  the  pam- 
phlets, the  Communist  propaganda  inserted  not  as  a  part  of  the  record, 
but  by  reference,  and  included  in  this  record.  Is  that  all  right  with 
you? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Yes,  sir.     That  is  fine.  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  They  may  become  so  incorporated. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  British  have  recognized  both  China  and  Formosa ; 
is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  It  is  a  very  curious  situation  which  I  think  might 
be  without  precedent.  They  recognize  Communist  China  but  they 
keep  one  foot  in  the  doorway  and  maintain  a  consulate  in  Free  China. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  appraisal  to  make  with  reference  to 
the  potential  strength  of  Formosa  as  an  ally  of  the  United  States? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  have  some  very  strong  convictions  on  that  point. 
I  think  the  American  people,  as  a  part  of  the  lack  of  fair  information 
on  free  China,  have  never  been  told  of  the  tremendous  guerrilla  forces 
already  within  striking  distance  of  the  China  coast.  The  Nation- 
alists today  hold  50  islands.  They  are  islands  all  the  way  from  small 
rocks  to  the  island  of  Chinmen,  which  has  approximately  75,000  excel- 
lently trained  men.  They  have  naval  bases  all  along  the  coast  which, 
if  they  were  allowed  to  do  so,  could  completely  blockade  the  China 
coast.  They  are  able  to  make  raids  at  the  present  time  almost  at  will, 
and  I  believe  of  special  significance  is  the  fact  that  on  recent  raids 
surrenders  of  Communist  soldiers  have  run  up  to  50  percent,  even  to 
90  percent  of  the  Communists  engaged  in  that  particular  raid. 

In  other  words,  the  people  are,  I  think,  very  much  for  them  on  the 
coast  of  China.  They  are  not  unrealistic  enough  to  say  that  they 
can  conquer  China  right  now.  They  do  believe  they  can  take  a  bridge- 
head and  maintain  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  When  you  were  head  of  the  Information  Service  for 
our  Government  in  China,  what  was  the  line  then  posed  with  reference 
to  Chiang  Kai-shek? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  The  general  line  was  that  he  was  a  very  fine  man 
personally  but  that  his  government  was  so  completely  corrupt  it  could 
only  be  saved  by  an  infusion  of  fine,  idealistic  Communist  blood, 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  was  the  official  line  with  reference  to  Syngman 
Khee? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  Rather  a  meandering  line,  I  would  say :  that  he  was 
a  necessary  evil  to  be  curtailed  in  every  way  possible. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  one  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 


118  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Senator  Welker.  I  take  it  from  your  testimony  that  should  Chiang 
reestablish  a  beachhead,  no  matter  how  great,  on  the  mainland,  we 
would  receive  surrenders  from  the  Red  Chinese  soldiers  as  well  as  the 
peasants  and  the  people  of  China  who  seek  freedom  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.  By  "we"  I  assume,  Senator,  that  you  mean  the 
ISJ  ationalist  Chinese  ? 

Senator  Welker.  I  mean  that.  I  think  that  they  should  be  called 
an  ally  of  ours. 

Mr.  Caldwell.  I  would  say  that  90  percent  of  the  people  south  of 
the  Yangtze  will  cooperate  with  the  Nationalists.  I  would  say  par- 
ticularly of  the  so-called  security  divisions,  the  rate  of  surrender 
would  run  close  to  50  percent.  That  is  based  on  personal  interroga- 
tions of  hundreds  of  people  in  the  mainland,  and  I  might  say  that 
tlie  State  Department  itself  has  reports  from  Hong  Kong  that  cor- 
roborate my  own  findings. 

Senator  Johnston.  What  position  would  Russia  take  then? 
Mr.  Caldwell.  I  don't  know  that  Russia  would  take  any  position 
other  than  to  supply  more  arms.  The  general  feeling  of  the  people  in 
the  Far  East  on  our  side  is  that  the  Russians,  being  very  realistic, 
will  not  at  any  time  start  a  war  with  us  unless  they  are  certain  that 
they  can  win  with  a  knockout  blow.  That  I  would  say  is  the  feeling- 
of  men  like  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  Dr.  Rhee  and  the  other  leaders 
of  free  Asia. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 
The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Caldwell,  I  will  ask  you  if  it  is  not  a  fact  that 
at  one  time  you  participated  in  that  guerrilla  raid  from  Formosa 
with  the  Nationalist  Chinese  to  the  mainland  of  China  ? 
Mr.  Caldwell.  I  participated  in  a  gunboat  raid. 
Senator  Welker.  Let  us  have  a  description  of  that,  sir. 
Mr.  Caldwell.  I  might  say  that  a  Chinese  warship  does  not  look 
like  an  American  warship.  There  is  a  feeling  as  you  go  aboard  that 
there  is  no  discipline.  There  are  5  or  G  different  types  of  uniforms. 
There  is  really  always  laundry  hanging  out  on  deck  and  always  fresh 
cabbage  all  over  the  deck  because  they  have  no  refrigeration.  The 
object  of  these  raids  is  to  try  to  capture  Connnunist  shipping,  and 
it  is  a  rather  tricky  operation,  because  the  gunboat  has  to  try  to  get 
in  toward  the  harbors  which  are  pretty  well  defended  with  heavy 
artillery,  and  catch  the  boats  before  they  are  shot  up  by  the  artillery. 
On  my  particular  raid,  which  took  1  day,  we  were  only  able  to  get 
one  Communist  ship,  and  1  think  it  is  significant  that  it  turned  out 
tJiat  that  Communist  ship  was  a  Chinese  junk  with  a  crew  of  about 
18  men  or  women  who  turned  out  to  be  com]3letely  anti-Communist. 
They  were  extremely  anxious  to  talk  to  me.  They  answered  all  of  my 
questions.  The  only  thing  that  they  asked  was  not  to  be  detained  too 
long  because  they  were  afraid  they  would  be  spotted  from  the  shore, 
and  they  assured  me  that  in  most  of  these  smaller  ships  along  the 
coast  we  would  find  that  the  crews  were  very  anti- Communist,  and 
that  is  borne  out  by  the  periodic  mutinies  which  take  place  aboard 
the  fairly  large  ships.  The  political  commissar  is  shot  and  the  ship 
brought  to  a  Nationalist  base. 

Another  thing  of  interest  that  these  crewmen  told  me  was  the 
extent  of  actual  Russian  participation  in  the  national  life  of  China 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  119 

today.  They  said  they  had  come  into  Amoy;  even  in  the  town  in 
which  I  was  born,  the  town  of  Futsing,  which  has  20,000  population, 
there  are  today  over  a  dozen  Russian  technicians.  In  other  words, 
the  Russians  are  infihrating  right  down  almost  to  the  village  level, 
and  have  a  very  complete  control  of  the  economic  life  of  China  today. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Caldwell,  you  will  furnish  to  the  staff  the 
names  earlier  referred  to  ? 

Mr.  Caldwell.   Yes,  sir;  I  will. 

The  Chairman.  We  thank  you  for  your  appearance  here  today. 
It  has  given  us  very  fine  information  on  the  picture  of  the  Communist 
infiltration  in  the  world  today  of  the  Communist  conspiracy. 

(Thereupon,  at  11:20  a.  m.,  the  hearing  was  recessed  subject  to 
call  of  the  Chair. ) 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,   JUNE    17,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  to  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  AVilliam  E.  Jenner   (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)   presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Jenner  and  Welker. 

Also  present :  Richard  Arens,  professional  staff  director ;  Edward 
R.  Duffy  and  Frank  W.  Schroeder.  professional  staff  members. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Marcus,  would  you  be  sworn  to  testify  ? 

Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the 
truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you,  God  ? 
Mr.  Marcus.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  J.  ANTHONY  MAECUS,  SCARSDALE,  N.  Y.,  PRESI- 
DENT, INSTITUTE  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE 

The  Chairman,  Will  you  state  your  full  name  for  our  record, 
please  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  'My  name  is  J.  Anthony  Marcus. 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  reside  at  Scarsdale,  N.  Y.  I  am  president  of  the 
Institute  of  Foreign  Trade,  with  offices  at  60  East  42d  Street,  New 
York  City. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  Mr.  Arens,  you  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Our  organization  is  devoted  to  the  proposition  of 
helping  American  industrial  firms,  as  well  as  exporters  and  importers, 
in  international  trade. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  you  are  also  president  of  the  Guardian 
Oil  Co.? 

Mr.  Marcus.  That  is  correct,  a  producing  company  in  Nebraslca. 

Mr.  Arens.  Before  we  proceed  with  our  informal  interrogation 
here  with  Mr.  Marcus,  ma}^  I  respectfully  suggest  to  the  chairman 
that  the  record  now  reflect  the  prepared  statement  which  you  have 
submitted  to  the  committee. 

Mr,  Marcus,  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  It  may  go  into  the  record  and  be  incorporated  as- 
a  part  of  the  record. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows:) 

121 


122  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Statement  of  J.  Anthony  Marcus,  President,  Institute  of  Foreign  Trade 

My  name  is  J.  Anthony  Marcus,  a  resident  of  Scarsdale,  N.  Y  Since  1946 
I  have  been  president  of  the  Institute  of  Foreign  Trade,  a  private  consulting 
'3f5  f""  American  industrial  and  trading  enterprises  interested  in  international 
outlets  for  their  prodiicts,  with  offices  at  60  East  42d  Street,  New  Yorli  City 
Tn^""  /t^",,  ^''^•f 'V?'"'^  ^  .''''^^  '^^^«  ^^^^t^^  president  of  the  Guardian  Oil  Co., 
Hes'nmi  n?w^- ?''  /  "  ^^^^^^^  owns  and  operates  petroleum-producing  proper- 
ties and  other  oil  and  gas  operations.  »  ^    f 

I  was  born  and  educated  in  Russia  of  prerevolutionary  days.  I  came  to  this 
country  shorly  before  the  First  World  War  as  a  lone  immigint  boy  wfth  thrS 
Engl.s^h  words  m  my  vocabulary  and  $14.28.     Like  millions  of  immTgrants  S 

0  feel  ?hnn;?r'''  ^  ''^n'  ''^}''''^^'^  by  the  generous  American  people  and  made 
to  feel  at  home  far  more  than  in  my  native  Russia.  Within  5  years  and  4  months 
after  landing  here  I  was  a  full-fledged  member  of  the  great  American  familv— 
^  "  f  7^f  t^,^.U»ited  States.  And  thanks  to  the  free^nstitutioL  S  IZrica. 
ngain.  like  millions  of  other  immigrants,  I  have  been  able  to  rise  from  laborer 
m  an  iron  and  steel  plant  to  responsible  positions  in  various  fields  of  endeavor 
v,-5f  fhf^  1?2^Vt"-^  "'^  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War  I  had  occasion'to 
Msit  the  Soviet  Union  on  numerous  occasions  as  buver,  seller,  investigator  and 
negotiator  for  some  of  our  leading  firms,  such  as  the  Studebaker  Corp  tSe 
American  Radiator  and  Standard  Sanitary  Corp.,  the  American  Hair  &  Felt  Co 

^ffin-nV^"^"^f  v"*""^''*  "^^,  "'  '^"^'''^t  "'^th  some  of  Russia's  leading  Government 
ofBciais.  including  men  like  the  present  Vice  Prime  Minister  for  Trade,  Anastasv 
I.  Mikoyan.  I  have  witnessed  the  rise  of  the  Kremlin  criminals  from  economic 
industrial  and  military  impotence  to  its  present  position  of  the  only  world 
imperialistic  aggressor.     In  recent  years,  especially  since  early  1951,  I  have  beeti 

jT^%^al\^T''^  ^^  ^^r^^r  «*■  '^^  American  Friends  of  Russian  Freedom 
Inc..  2^0  Park  Avenue,  New  York  City,  where  I  am  associated  with  such  dS 
t.nguished  ci  izens  as  Gen.  Frank  L.  Howley,  our  former  commandant  in  Berlin  • 
with  Adm^ William  S.  Maxwell;  Adm.  William  H.  Standlev,  our  former  Ambas 
sador  m  Russia;  former  Ambassador  SpruiUe  Braden ;  the  welH.nown  anti- 
Commun,st  author,  Eugene  Lyons  ;  the  former  national  commander  of  thllmer- 
can  Legion,  Mr.  James  O'Neil ;  Gen.  William  J.  Donovan ;  and  many  others  Our 
aim  Ls  to  help  cement  a  bond  of  friendship  with  the  Kremlin's  victims  in  oi-der 

nr^^^J^e^ST  ^^"-^'^^^  ^^  *'^  '^''''  ^^^"^-^-  -^■^"-  ^^  '^" 

1  have  been  lecturing  throughout  the  country  in  an  effort  to  enli-hten  onr 

I S:  of'"'  X'''''  T''^'  ''  ''''  ^^^-^'^^^^^  '^^'^«t  and  its  threat  to  Sir  security 
I  have  also  written  extensively  for  some  of  our  leading  dailies  and  monthlies  as 
we  1  as  appeared  before  the  microphone  and  on  TV  to  warn  our  people  about  tS 
LX'sovS'nSitmarl  ''"''  '^^'^^^^"^  '^^"^  '''''''  ''  ^«  ^'^-^  putting  an  enl 
I  have  been  carrying  on  this  persistent  campaign  alone  and  without  any 
assistance  from  anyone.  All  of  us  former  immigrants  owe  a  great  debt  to  our 
country,  a  debt  which  we  can  never  repay  in  full.  Now  that  oui- free  nstitutio  s 
fifle^d'^r^^  '•''  a  savage  enemy,  we  would  be  unworthy  of  our  citizeSp  if  we 
failed  to  be  m  the  forefront  in  the  struggle  with  the  implacable  foe  Un! 
fortunately,  I  must  confess  that  there  are  entirelv  too  few  of  those  everlastin-  y 
indebted  naturalized  Americans  who  are  exerting  themselves  in  behalf  of  oiS 

idZZ.''}.  '^''  "'^"''"^ ••'^'"'^^  "^  ""^  b^«^«^-^-    Let  us  hope  that  the  efforts  of  the 
httle  band  of  us  may  inspire  them  to  wake  up  to  their  responsibility 

east-west  trade 

Of  late  there  has  been  considerable  commotion  in  the  shrinking  free  world 
about  Soviet  plans  to  make  large  purchases  in  the  West.  Instelid  of  flvii 
saucers  industrialists  and  merchants  here  and  in  Europe  have  beJn  behold  i^^ 
flying  orders  from  the  Kremlin  running  into  the  many  billions  of  dollars  Th'; 
excitment  has  been  all  the  greater  because  for  the  first  time  shice  its  rise  to 
power  the  Communists  of  the  Kremlin  are  showing  interest  in  consumer  -oods 
from  he  capitalist  countries  they  hate  so  much.  This,  of  course  fs  new  This  s 
?een%r;!!"''  '^f  '"^^'  '"'^^"^  "^^o  existence  the  SoWet  Government  had  ne?e? 
seen  fit  to  import  consumer  goods.  Not  because  its  subjects  did  not  neec  s"  oes 
coats,  underwear,  hats,  pots  and  pans,  cutlery,  furniture,  and  the  i  anVother 
■hZ^'^-JV'^V^"^  considered  essential  in  civilized  countries.  Soviet  subieJts 
have  had  to  be  content  with  rags  on  their  backs,  with  hovels  even  a  pig  wo^ld 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COM]VIUNISM  123 

■scorn,  with  the  coarsest  of  food  in  their  stomachs  at  best  or  roots,  potatoes,  and 
adulterated  bread  for  brealvfast,  lunch,  and  dinner  during  the  perennial  Com- 
munist-made famines.  This  is  the  way  the  Lenin-Stalin  pledges  of  a  better  life 
under  so-called  socialism  have  lieen  fulfilled.  They  promised  bread  and  have 
given  perpetual  hunger ;  they  promised  peace  and  have  given  uninterrupted  war 
at  home  and  abroad ;  they  promised  land  to  the  peasants  and  have  robbed  them 
completely  of  their  holdings,  enslaving  tens  of  millions  and  actually  murdering 
millions  for  resisting  the  collectivization  edicts ;  they  promised  freedom  from 
■oppression  and  exploitation  and  have  established  the  most  oppressive  system  of 
political-economic  exploitation  ever  devised  by  the  despots  of  human  history. 

What  is  really  behind  this  alleged  Soviet  interest  in  East-West  trade?  Of 
■c-ourso  the  need  is  great  in  the  Soviet  Union.  But  the  need  was  much  greater 
right  after  the  Second  World  War  and  had  been  for  decades  when  there  were  no 
satellite  nations  with  a  higher  standard  of  living  to  be  looted.  For  more  than 
three  decades  the  Soviet  Government  studiously  denied  its  people  the  benefits  of 
American  and  European  consumer  goods  although  it  did  not  lack  the  means  to 
pay  with.  A  mere  corner  of  its  inexhaustible  forests  for  timber  and  pulp  exploi- 
tation by  competent  American  hands,  a  mere  fraction  of  its  gold  mined  with  tens 
of  thousands  of  slave  laborers  could  have  paid  for  billions  of  dollars'  worth  of 
«uch  purchases.  On  the  basis  of  more  than  80  years  of  intimate  contact  with 
the  Soviet  political,  economic,  and  industrial  life,  I  believe  I  know  the  answer 
to  the  riddle: 

First,  the  Soviet  Government  wants  to  buy  samples,  copy  them,  and  claim 
them  as  its  own  creations.  Second,  and  this  is  every  important,  to  find  out  the 
t.vpes  of  oxir  production  machinery  used  in  the  consumer  goods  and  system 
of  mass  production  with  a  view  to  stealing  our  technology.  The  same  pattern 
v\-as  used  to  Soviet  advantage  in  the  heavy  Industries  prior  to  1948.  And,  third, 
once  mass  production  of  consumer  goods  has  been  mastered  to  offer  us  ruinous 
competitio'i  in  world  markets.  With  tens  of  millions  of  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren toiling  in  the  factories  under  most  inhuman  exploitation,  with  other  millions 
working  as  forced  laliorers  from  predawn  to  past  sunset  in  the  numerous  slave 
labor  camps  digging  coal.  iron,  and  other  minerals  supplving  raw  materials  for 
the  industries,  it  is  not  difficult  to  visualize  the  extent  of  ruinous  competition  it 
could  offer  us  and  other  highly  industrialized  countries.  That  is  intended  not 
so  much  for  the  sake  of  profit  as  for  the  purpose  of  undermining  our  economy, 
to  create  unemployment  here,  and  cause  unrest. 

With  our  .sellers  of  con.sumer  goods  and  production  machinery  unfamiliar 
with  Soviet  tactics,  there  is  now  much  speculation  concerning  the  vast  Russian 
market.  Some  are  dreaming  aliout  bigaer  orders  in  the  future — a  future,  alas, 
■which  can  never  come  to  us.  Our  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Adm. 
Arthur  W.  Radford,  recently  told  400  newspaper  editors  (April  15)  that  "due 
to  the  massive  militant  natiire"  of  the  Communist  threat  the  world  was  in  a 
period  of  tension  that  could  last  a  century.  Anyone  imagining  that  the  Kremlin 
boys  expect  to  live  with  us  on  this  troubled  globe  for  another  century  is  deluding 
himself,  and  has  yet  to  learn  the  true  nature  of  the  Kremlin  beast.  If  they  do 
half  as  well  within  the  next  15  to  20  years  as  they  have  done  during  the  past  15 
years,  the  final  cla.sh  will  come  within  one-fifth  of  the  time  anticipated  by 
Admiral  Radford. 

Therefore,  if  we  fall  for  the  Soviet  trade  bait,  if  our  western  allies  continue 
their  present  shortsighted  course  of  trading  with  the  enemy,  the  Soviets  will 
know  how  to  make  the  most  of  the  upsurge  of  our  wishful  thinking.  The  ex- 
perience they  had  gained  in  stealing  our  industrial  secrets  in  the  heavy  indus- 
tries will  stand  them  in  good  stead  and  our  technological  know-how  in  the  light 
industries  will  be  theirs  with  little  effort  and  without  any  cash  outlays.  The 
flood  of  our  blueprints  and  shop  drawings  will  once  more  find  its  way  to  Moscow, 
Leningrad,  and  other  points.  One  day  we  will  wake  up  to  discover  that  we  had 
sold  our  birthrisfht  to  the  bitterest  enemy  for  a  mere  mess  of  pottage. 

Trade  with  the  Soviets  has  been  and  will  remain  a  one-way  street  as  long 
as  the  regime  survives.  Its  survival  is  greatly  enhanced  by  the  diplomatic  rela- 
tions which. the  United  States  and  the  free  nations  foolishly  continue  to  main- 
tain despite  our  distressinir  experiences.  Their  inexorable  goal  is  and  must 
forever  remain :  New  countries  to  conquer,  more  hundreds  of  millions  of  peo- 
ples to  enslave  with  the  aid  of  a  cold  war  if  possilde,  a  shooting  war  if  need  be 
whenever  they  are  ready.  They  are  not  ready  yet.  Thev  need  another  10  years  to 
master  their  own  people  and  to  entrench  the  Commimists  in  China  and  the  satel- 
lite nations.  Their  prayer  is  a  continuance  of  the  "peredishka" — a  breathing 
spell — and  the  gullible  West  is  offering  it  to  them  on  a  golden  platter. 


124  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Between  the  years  1945  and  1950  the  Soviet  Government  was  in  mortnl  fp«r 
Of  a  war  with  the  civilized  world,  fear  of  its  own  people  The  wesLri^c^^^^^^ 
Russian  experts  proved  so  ignorant  as  to  scare  us  with  possible  hostiMies  If 
most  any  moine^U.    That  was  working  into  the  hands  ot  the  enemy  '  ^'' 

In  the  meantime  the  Lenin-Stalin-made  hurricane  keeps  roarinir  on    while 
httle  men  in  big  posts  in  the  Western  World  are  wonderim'-  whnt  Jo  do  I,  Jl  V^ 
meet  the  Soviet  challenge.    Why  do  the  leaders  o?moieh1vntwo-tlurds  of  \^ 
^^orld  tremble  before  a   miserable  little  band  of  Red  Fascistr^  t^n  '  on   an 

So^aiu'e  '''"Th.;V-s''?.f '"•  "^^'^"^x  ^^  "«  ^'^^■^'^^^^•"  «a?d  ShlkesS^-e  "but 
i^^noiance.  That  s  the  answer!  Ignorance  of  foreign  offices  in  le-islnfivp 
branches  of  governments,  among  the  educators  and  opinion  SeVs  and  finallv 
Ignorance  among  the  wide  public  is  responsible  for  this  s^ry  s^)ec  fcle  in  a 
Chris  ban  wor  d  possessed  of  a  righteous  cause  but  lacking  in  win  to  learn  about 
T.  rfo.''"'^  ^«"y^§"?/«  «tand  up  to  the  frightened  barbarians  in  the  Krem?i^ 
moTfths'bv  M?'H^f',i^'..*'^:""'^°^  ■-^^■^"  '^^f^^^  ^  Senate  committee  in  recent 

SStof  East-Wesit  need's'"'"'  ^^J^"'!  ^^^'^^^'^^^^  Administrator,  on  the 
suujecc  or  ii^st-west  tiade.  He  argued  that  increased  "nonstrate«ic"  tV-idP  h^ 
tween  our  European  allies  and  the  Communist  bloc  would  '?arrv  a  net  art 

ST.^uddenW  r^'"-"  J'''  '"^^-^  '■''''  ^^^t  -°^^  tie  death  of  ^Staln' such 
t  ade  has  suddenly  become  top  priority  with  the  Kremlin  policymakers  is  con 

nn^l'^;?.  ^^''  r'"  '^\*  ''  ^-^  ^"^  the  interest  of  the  Comn  un  S  greinSent  ?hat 
once  more  they  want  to  be  rescued  by  the  capitalist  countriesTomThe  wrath 

o'erthe^ronS-y%^''^*  ^^  ^"^'^  '^'-  ''^  ^^^^^^^  ^«  '^'^^  ^-^  "sf  nTm^Uer  h^^ 
Ml-    Stassen  relieved  himself  o(  another  fallacy  before  the  committee     He 

goodV°t  w","S™  JhL'"''','^.,*''  rr\r'T''  ">  ^"™'-^  Hu-la  wUbTo'n"  r"  teS 
gooas  It  would,  as  he  said,  hand  to  the  Soviet  rulers  one  of  the  most  Dowerfnl 
cold-war  weapons  we  could  devise."  How  ridiculous  !  Where  do?s  he  .^et  that 
nonsense?  If  we  were  to  clamp  down  the  completest  and  tigh?esT embark  on- 
shipments  of  anything  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  satellite  mXons  as  weH  as 
on  all  imports,  the  Russian  peoples  would  bless  us  fo    it      if  ?he  Russian  people 

^fv  ffr^"  ?  '^V"  "'  ^'"'^^  t^^y  ^^'^"1^^  ^^g  ^^^  «"  their  knees  nof  to  seS  Sor  to 
buy  from  their  (Jovernment  anything.     They  have  suffered  nrivitionsf  in«  fov 

ment^'tSh- Ivr'ii's'^TreT  '''''  ^"^^^^  ^^^^^"^  as^twoll^^;;freir  Govern- 
ment,  then  tyiants.     The  worse  economic  conditions  become  in  the  Soviet  Union 

munLt  regime!  '""'  ""''  '"^^''"*^"  '''"^  "'^'^"^  ^^^^^'^^  -^^^  destroy  the  Com: 
The  same  is  true  of  another  baseless  remark  made  by  Mr.  Stassen  in  his 
testimony  when  he  said  that  East-West  trade  would  help  "maintahi  tSe  bas  ? 
friendship  of  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain."  Why,  Mr  Cha  rma  the  v  erv 
opposite  IS  true.  To  follow  Mr.  Stassen's  counsel  wiU  alienate  the  Sndship  of 
fSn?nf '''•''  ^f ''''•  ^^''''^  '^  "^^  ««^'i^t  ^iti^ens,  including  high  Government 
of  hi  ,.  ■''^'  T^''  were  parading  as  Communists  but  at  heart  were  bitter  eneS 
of  the  i^gime,  have  said  to  me :  "Why  do  you  Americans  come  to  this  countr^  to 
deal  with  our  Government?  You  are  only  enhancing  its  prestige ;  you  are  tSen 
the  noose  around  our  necks."  &c- ,  ,>uu  aie  ugnien- 


shm^ld  h.fiTi?f  telling  Mr.  Stassen  the  misleading  balderdash  above  quoted 
should  be  fired  from  the  Government  services  as  an  ignoramus.  And  anyone  who 
accepts  the  counsel  of  such  ignoramuses  is  himself  imfit  to  hold  a  commanding 
position  m  our  Government  at  such  critical  times.  coiumanam^ 

If  this  East-West  trading  insanity  is  not  choked  off  and  more  competent  counsel 
listened  to,  Lenin\s  interpretation  of  the  capitalist  mentality  willT  fulirrrne 
H.^M  '''''^-  7^^^  ^^^^  t^^"'  ^^^^^^-  together  for  the  rope/^  East-Wes? 
civmzat^on.  "'"     ''"^  ''"'"'''  "''  '""^  ""'•"  ^^^P  '''^  the  grave^f  libeiTy  and 

The  picture  is  no  brighter  in  the  ranks  of  our  businessmen.  What  for  examnle 
IS  one  to  say  of  the  steel  executive,  Mr.  Ernest  T.  Weir,  who  has  beeirpreSS 
that  our  Government  remove  restrictions  to  "coexistence"  with  the  Soviet  head" 
hunters  and,  as  he  put  it,  "establish  an  atmosphere  of  agreement— a  iSaxation  of 
tension,  a  dissipation  of  the  present  suspicion  and  distrust"?  The  trouble  wiS 
Mr.  Weir  IS  that  he  has  been  addressing  his  preachment  to  the  wrong  party  He- 
should  address  himself  to  the  mummy  in  the  Lenin  mausoleum  on  Red  Square 
Moscow  If  he  does  not  know  where  to  find  the  remains  of  the  architect  of  the 
Soviet  slave  state-Lenin.  It  would  be  a  waste  of  his  time  to  counsel  Malenkoy 
since  he  could  not  possibly  change  the  teachings  of  the  master  and  keep  his  head 
on  his  shoulders.     Relax  tension,  establish  an  atmosphere  of  agreement  between 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  125 

Communist  regimes  and  sanity  in  the  world,  that  is  just  as  possible  as  to  jump 
ofe  the  Empire  State  Building  in  New  York  and  remain  alive.  The  Soviets  want 
more  tension,  more  diagreement,  and  not  less.  They  will  never  stop  until  either 
they  or  we  are  wiped  off  this  earth.     Mr.  Weir  would  do  well  to  change  his  ghost 

A-^ain  Mr  Chairman,  what  is  one  to  think  of  a  former  Secretary  of  the  Army 
fMr"^  Kenneth  C  Royall]  who,  in  an  address  before  the  Advertising  Club  in  New 
York  some  time  ago,  advocated  free  commercial  intercourse  with  Communist 
China  to  create,  as  he  put  it.  -direct  contact  with  the  Chinese  people  and  com- 
mercial sources  of  imports  and  exports  upon  which  China  will  come  to  depend"? 
Is  it  possible  that  the  former  Secretary  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  tliat  one  of  the 
first  °-oals  of  any  Communist  government  is  the  total  destruction  of  free  domestic 
and  forei^'n  trade?  The  moment  tlie  Iron  Curtain  is  rung  down  upon  a  country, 
there  can  be  no  direct  contact  by  the  citizens  of  that  country  with  anyone  in  the 
free  world,  and  the  former  producers,  as  well  as  exporters  and  importers,  are 
either  liquidated  or  forced  into  the  bureaucracy  to  do  as  they  are  told  by  the 
Communist  hierarchv.  However,  the  former  Cabinet  officers  did  not  keep  us  long 
in  suspense  as  to  tlie  basic  reason  for  his  ignorance  of  Communist  theory  and 
practice.  "Chinese  communism,"  he  assured  his  audience,  "is  not  due  to  Russia, 
but  rather  to  the  groping  of  the  Chinese  people  for  some  way  out  of  their  misery." 
Shades  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations  fraternity  which  helped  our  Chinese 
fiasco  by  contending  that  Mao  and  his  gangsters  were  not  Communists  at  all ; 
that  thev  were  only  "agrarian  reformers." 

How  true  is  ]\Ir.  i^oyall's  statement  V  Practically  every  Communist  leader  in 
China,  from  Mao  down,  had  been  trained  in  revolutionary  tactics,  murder,  in- 
trigue' espionage,  and  sabotage  in  the  Communist  schools  of  Russia.  The  Eastern 
and  Lenin  Universities  in  Moscow  and  similar  schools  in  other  parts  of  the  Soviet 
Union  have  turned  out  countless  thousands  of  Chinese  revolutionary  leaders  since 
1918,  at  enormous  cost  to  the  Soviet  treasury,  but  it  has  paid  off  handsomely. 
Without  their  assistance  and  leadership,  the  enslavement  of  China's  million  could 
not  have  taken  place,  and  the  same  is  true  of  all  the  satellite  countries. 

For  those  who  might  still  cling  to  the  preposterous  notions  of  men  like  Mr. 
Rovall,  permit  me  to  state  that  as  early  as  1926  there  were  about  2,000  trainees 
in  the  Sun  Yat  Sen  University  in  Moscow  preparing  for  the  coming  destruction 
of  freedom  and  the  enslavement  of  China  as  part  and  parcel  of  Lenin's  plan  to 
encircle  the  United  States  in  order  that  it  might  fall,  as  he  put  it,  "like  an  over- 
ripe fruit  into  our  hands."  By  1927  the  Soviet  Government  was  turning  out  no 
less  than  5,000  trainees  per  year  to  do  its  bidding  in  the  Far  East,  and  a  gullible 
world  did  not  have  tlie  vision  to  take  cognizance  of  it. 

In  1942,  while  we  were  straining  every  nerve  to  supply  the  Soviet  Government 
with  war  materiel,  while  our  sons  were  braving  the  submarine-infested  waters 
of  the  North  Sea  trying  to  deliver  the  badly  needed  guns  and  ammunition,  food, 
and  medicine  to  the'  Russian  armies,  the  Soviet  Government  was  already  prepar- 
ing men  to  interrogate  American  and  English  prisoners  of  war. 

One  equally  looks  in  vain  for  greater  intelligence  and  enlightenment  among  the 
British  businessmen.  Said  one  of  their  leading  men  in  recent  times :  "While 
the  Communists  just  now  see  every  foreigner  as  a  spy,  there  must  eventually  be 
-a  stabilizing  period.  Then  there  will  have  to  be  higher  trade  and  British  ships 
to  carry  that  trade — say,  2,  3,  or  5  years  ahead."  Similar  nonsense  was  peddled 
around'  after  the  Russian  Communists  came  to  power.  Before  me  is  a  clipping 
from  the  New  York  Times  of  August  14,  1920.  On  page  2  is  a  dispatch  from 
Washington  quoting  the  American  Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  Mr.  Francis,  to  the 
effect  that  within  6  months  there  would  be  no  vestige  left  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. 

In  the  light  of  Britain's  recent  experience  with  the  Chinese  Communists,  the 
sort  of  thinking  above  quoted  is  all  the  more  shocking.  The  British  Socialists 
rushed  at  neck-breaking  speed  to  recognize  the  Chinese  Communist  barbarians. 
They  did  not  realize  or  did  not  care  that  while  the  voice  from  China  was  that 
of  Mao,  the  hands  pulling  the  Peiping  strings  were  those  of  Stalin.  For  4  years 
now  the  British  Government  has  been  suffering  insults  and  indignities  at  the 
hands  of  the  Communist  mercenaries  in  China,  their  Ambassador  has  been  cool- 
ing his  heels  in  Peiping  ever  since  his  arrival,  and  Mao  refuses  to  recognize  the 
British  Government.  During  the  first  6  months  of  1952,  for  example,  the  British 
sent  50  communications  to  the  Communist  government  without  even  being 
accorded  the  courtesy  of  a  single  reply.  Has  the  British  lion  lost  his  voice  and 
his  teeth? 


126  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Not  only  have  Britisb  businessmen  taken  no  iirotits  out  of  China  since  the- 
curtaiu  was  rung  down  on  that  country,  but  they  have  been  throwing  good  money 
after  bad  at  an  alarming  rate — about  500,000  pounds  sterling  monthly.  During 
the  year  1951  the  British  had  to  put  about  17  million  pounds  sterling  into  China 
to  meet  the  pai-alizing  taxes,  to  pay  outrageously  inflated  and  useless  staffs 
forced  upon  them  by  the  Communists.  All  this  is  designed  to  ruin  foreign  busi- 
ness firms  in  China  and  to  extort  valuable  foreign  exchange.  Herself  in  dire 
economic  need,  forever  crying  for  more  millions  from  the  American  taxpayers, 
Britain  nevertheless  continues  to  cling  to  the  farce  of  trying  to  do  business  with 
a  government  which  has  never  cumcealed  the  fact  that  it  is  out  to  destroy  all  non- 
Communist  nations.  Not  a  single  British  firm  has  a  chance  of  surviving  in 
China ;  not  a  cent  will  ever  be  paid  by  the  Chinese  to  the  British  or  American 
firms  expropriated  by  them,  not  until  the  Communist  government  is  destroyed 
by  its  own  people. 

And  yet  this  nonsense  of  the  British  business  leader  was  promptly  echoed 
by  an  American  colleague,  no  less  than  the  chairman  of  the  United  States 
Council  ot  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce^  who  told  the  Boston  con- 
ference on  distribution : 

"The  ultimate  results,"  said  Mr.  George  A.  Sloan,  "will  be  that  some  day 
in  the  future  the  Soviets  will  i-ealize  the  futility  of  their  efforts  in  undermining 
the  free  nations  and  will  suspend  their  struggle  for  world  domination."  Mr, 
Sloan  apparently  refuses  to  admit  that  having  enslaved  over  GOO  millions  of 
alien  peoples  in  the  course  of  one  decade  their  efforts  should  be  termed  highly 
successful  and  not  a  futile  effort  as  he  sees  it.  They  have  been  eminently  suc- 
cessful throughout  the  world,  not  excluding  our  own  country,  and  are  now 
knocking  at  the  very  major  gateway  to  the  United  States,  the  Panama  Canal,, 
with  their  eft'orts  in  Guatemala. 

The  kind  of  balderdash  we  have  been  getting  from  men  who  should  know 
better  how  to  deal  with  the  Soviet  nightmare  impels  men  of  my  background  • 
and  experience  to  exclaim  :  You  might  as  well  wait  for  the  leopard  to  change  his 
spots ;  you  might  as  well  expect  the  earth  to  change  its  course  as  to  see  the 
Soviets  abandon  their  irresponsible  and  irresistible  march  toward  world 
enslavement. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  high  time  to  admit  that  Lenin  truly  meant  business  when, 
he  assured  his  listeners  time  and  time  again :  "It  is  either  we  or  they ;  *  *  * 
We  stand  for  uninterrupted  revolution.    We  will  not  halt  halfway." 

That  such  fallacies  as  mentioned  above  are  still  being  peddled  around  by 
supposedly  intelligent  men  of  affairs  3G  years  after  the  rise  of  the  Soviet  regime 
makes  one  wonder  if  our  people  ever  will  fathom  the  seriousness  of  the  problem 
which  is  facing  them.  One  can  also  wonder  why  the  thousands  of  foundations 
with  billions  of  tax-free  dollars  have  not  had  the  commonsense  to  tackle  thi& 
problem  of  enlightening  our  people,  and  especially  those  in  strategic  positions. 
To  do  electric  wiring  or  a  plumbing  job  a  person  must  take  an  examination  and. 
secure  a  certificate  showing  that  he  is  qualified.  But  not  in  matters  affecting 
the  lives  of  every  man,  woman,  and  child  in  the  United  States — the  solving  of  the 
most  difficult  problem  of  the  era  caused  by  Soviet  communism.  Any  ignoramus  of 
this  subject,  without  having  studied  the  problem  in  Russia  or  learned  the  basic 
principles  of  Soviet  theory  and  practice  from  the  experience  of  those  who  have 
made  it  their  life's  work  to  know  the  truth  of  the  matter,  be  he  a  university 
professor,  an  editorial  writer,  a  business  executive  or  a  professional,  can  under- 
take to  pontificate  on  this  most  perplexing  problem.  Some  of  our  greatest 
scientists  who  would  laugh  themselves  sick  if  they  heard  an  ordinary  layman 
]X)ntificate  on  the  scientific  fields  in  which  they  excel,  men  like  Professors- 
Einstein  and  Kettering,  for  example,  try  to  hold  forth  in  the  field  of  inter- 
national relations  with  the  Soviet  menace  and  try  to  influence  public  opinion. 

No  less  shocking  has  been  the  propaganda  in  behalf  of  East-West  trade  by  Mrs^ 
Vera  Micheles  Dean,  research  director  of  the  American  Foreign  Policy  Associa- 
tion. Herself  an  immigrant  from  Soviet  tyranny,  Mrs.  Dean  has  never  been  back 
to  Russia  since  1919,  has  never  had  any  business  experiences  with  the  Soviet 
economy.  Yet  on  January  10,  1950,  the  members  of  the  New  York  Export  Cluh 
listened  to  her  discourse  on  "Russia's  Economic  Realities  With  the  West."  Her 
concluding  remarks  were  as  revealing  as  they  were  counter  to  our  interests : 

"In  conclusion,"  said  Mrs.  Dean,  "I  would  say  that  we  shall  have  to  make^ 
a  choice  between  two  risks :  One  risk  is  to  trade  with  Russia  and  Eastern. 
Europe,  and  there  the  risk,  of  course,  is  that  we  will  be  increasing  their  capacity 
for  waging  war — if  that  is  what  they  are  planning  to  do.     I  say  it  because  I  am 


STRATEGY    AKD    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  127 

not  at  all  clear  that  that  is  the  real  line  of  attack  that  the  Russians  will  pursue. 
The  other  risk  is  not  to  trade  with  them  and  to  continue  to  put  pressure  on  our 
ERP  friends  also  not  to  trade  too  much  with  Eastern  Europe,  and  then  we  are 
running  the  risk  of  increasing  the  economic  difficulties  of  our  friends  in  Western 
Europe.  Now,  in  making  this  choice  of  risks,  I  would  plump  for  the  risk  of 
trading  with  Eastern  Europe  and  Russia.  *  *  *" 

Five  months  later  the  Soviet  Government  ordered  the  North  Koreans  to 
invade  South  Korea,  where  for  more  than  3  years  we  fought  our  third  largest 
and  costliest  war.  But  a  short  5  months  earlier  the  research  director  of  the 
American  Foreign  Policy  Association,  fed  by  tax-exempt  dollars  from  our 
foundations  and  individuals,  was  "not  at  all  clear"  that  war  "is  the  real  line  of 
attack  that  the  Russians  will  pursue." 

And  what  is  even  more  inexcusable  about  this  lady  when  3  months  after  the 
Korean  war  began,  with  thousands  of  American  slaughtered  with  the  aid  of 
Stalin's  guns  and  military  leaders,  Mrs.  Dean  wrote  in  the  September  23,  1950, 
issue  of  the  leftist  Nation  magazine:  "How  long  will  the  pretense  be  kept  up 
that  the  Peking  regime  must  not  speak  in  the  international  affairs  on  behalf 
of  China  ?  Does  a  period  of  16  or  more  years  of  nonrecognition  by  the  United 
States  lie  ahead,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Soviet  Government  between  1917  and  1933?" 

Two  months  later,  the  Chinese  Communists,  the  darling  of  the  research  director 
of  the  American  Foreign  Policy  Association,  launched  their  savage  war  against 
the  United  Stntes.  Surelv  Malenkov,  Vishinsky.  Malik,  and  company  could 
hardly  have  done  better  by  the  Kremlin  than  did  Mrs.  Dean  with  her  talk 
before  the  Export  Managers  Club.  I  talked  to  a  number  of  people  in  the  audience 
after  the  lecture.  They  had  no  ideas  of  their  own,  but  parroted  her  arguments. 
They  admitted  that  none  of  them  had  ever  been  to  the  Soviet  Union  or  ever 
read  an  authoritative  book  on  communism  in  practice.  One  of  them  even  con- 
fessed that  although  Victor  Kravchenko's  book  I  Chose  Freedom  had  been  on 
his  library  shelf  for  2  years,  he  had  never  looked  into  it.  Such  an  uninformed 
audience,  obviously,  is  easy  prey  for  the  glib  tongue  of  the  East-West  trade 
propagandist.  But,  as  a  rule,  these  are  the  type  of  lecturers  our  trade  associa- 
tions and  clubs  invite  to  enlighten  them.     What  a  tragedy. 

The  above-quoted  remarks  have  been  selected  as  characteristic  of  the  thinking 
of  men  at  the  top  rung  of  our  business  leadership  ladder.  Similar  unenlightened 
and  confused  reasoning  among  leaders  of  other  groups  has  helped  bring  America 
to  its  present  impasse  by  permitting : 

1.  Continuance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviets  long,  far  too  long, 
after  it  had  become  apparent  that  cooperation  with  them  in  any  field  of  human 
endeavor  was  futile. 

2.  Continuation  of  trading  with  the  enemy  long  after  we  had  learned  from 
decades  of  experience  that  it  is  decidedly  detrimental  to  our  interests. 

3.  Sitting  with  the  world's  greatest  murderers  in  the  councils  of  the  United 
Nations  as  equals,  with  men  who  do  not  represent  the  Russian  peoples,  never 
represented  them  and  never  will.  Every  conference  we  sat  in  with  those  bar- 
barians proved  fatal  to  us  or  futile  at  best.  If  they  cannot  have  their  way  at  a 
conference,  they  are  determined  to  wreck  it.  They  have  done  it  time  and  time 
a^ain.  Yet  we  persist  in  begging  them  on  our  knees  to  have  some  more  sessions. 
How  long  must  this  go  on? 

In  the  present  psvchological  war  these  commissions  and  the  many  more 
omissions  are  deadlv  strikes  against  the  United  States.  In  the  meantime  the 
flower  of  the  Nation's  manhood  has  had  to  perish  on  the  hills  of  Korea  without 
eliminating  the  source  of  the  world  chaos  and  tension.  The  tens  of  thousands 
of  American  and  French  youths  who  have  laid  down  their  lives  on  the  distant 
battlefields,- the  other  tensof  thousands  of  men  whose  bodies  have  been  mutilated 
for  life  are  crving  from  their  premature  graves  and  the  hospital  beds  that  our 
statesmen  stop  blundering  and  bungling  and  deal  with  the  enemy  more 
realisticallv  and  intelligently.  ,  .,     ^r, 

Mr.  Chairman,  has  anvone  in  this  room  ever  stopped  to  think  that  while  the 
Kremlin  has  30  or  so  miilions  of  allies  in  the  free  countries,  there  are  hundreds 
of  millions  of  secret  allies  of  ours  behind  the  Iron  Curtain.  They  are  silent  to 
be  sure.  But  they  could  be  made  vocal.  They  are  looking  to  us  for  moral  and 
psychological  sympathy.  Instead  of  that  we  have  a  high  Government  function- 
ary Mr.^Stassen,  tell  us  that  sending  goods  to  Russia  would  endear  us  to  the 
people.  This  is  a  moral  and  psychological  support  to  their  enemies,  the  Kremlin 
tvrants.     Instead  of  saying  and  doing  things  which  will  boost  the  morale  of  the 


128  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

victims  of  communism,  the  great  Winston  Churchill  comes  forth  with  the  shock- 
ing statement  which  I  quote: 

"We  should  establish  with  Russia  links  which,  in  spite  of  all  distractions  and 
perils  and  contradictions,  will  convince  the  Russian  people  and  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment that  we  wish  them  peace,  happiness,  and  ever-increasing  and  ever- 
expanding  prosperity  and  enrichment  of  life  in  their  own  mighty  land  and  that 
we  long  to  see  them  play  a  proud  and  splendid  part  in  the  guidance  of  the  hu- 
man race." 

The  Russian  Government  we  cannot  convince.  Mr.  Churchill  who  had  more 
experience  than  any  one  of  us  here  ought  to  know  it  by  now.  The  only  obstacle  to 
peace,  happiness,  and  all  the  other  good  things  that  Mr.  Churchill  wishes  the 
Russian  peoples  is  the  continued  existence  of  the  Soviet  regime.  The  Russian 
people  know  that  even  if  Mr.  Churchill  and  many  of  our  own  befuddled  people 
don't.  To  wish  to  see  the  Soviet  Government  play  "a  proud  and  splendid  part 
in  the  guidance  of  the  human  race,"  to  quote  Mr.  Churchill,  sounds  like  the  little 
mouse  wishing  that  the  cat's  teeth  be  sharper,  that  the  cat's  feet  carry  her  faster 
to  the  prospective  prey.  Besides,  the  Soviet  Government  is  hardly  in  need  of 
Mr.  Churchill's  good  wishes.  It  is  doing  quite  well  on  its  own  way,  thank  you. 
The  Kremlin  feels  that  it  is  indeed  playing  "a  proud  and  splendid  part  in  the 
guidance  of  the  human  race"  that  has  already  fallen  into  its  blood-drenched 
hands,  that  it  is  guiding,  according  to  its  deranged  mentality,  its  millions  of 
stooges  throughout  the  free  world  to  bring  about  its  desired  results — the  sovieti- 
zation  of  the  world. 

It  should  be  plain  as  day  by  now  that  the  sort  of  thinking  exemplified  by  Mr. 
Churchill,  Mr.  Stassen,  Mr.  Weir,  Mr.  Royal  imperils  our  safety  and  security. 
The  destinies  of  mankind  are  not  safe  in  such  hands.  Unless  the  masses  in 
the  countries  still  fi'ce,  bestir  themselves  and  provide  more  enlightened  and 
courageous  leadership,  the  Christian  civilization  is  doomed. 

As  one  with  a  background  of  37  years  in  the  international  trade  field,  I  must 
state  categorically  that  the  whole  Soviet  trade  commotion  is  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  a  means  to  driving  a  wedge  between  the  free  nations.  It  is  designed 
to  supply  the  Communist  stooges  in  the  free  world  with  propaganda  material 
to  confuse  and  befuddle  our  thinking.  What  happened  to  the  billions  of  trade 
that  was  to  follow  the  establishment  of  relations  with  the  Kremlin V  It  was  a 
myth.  During  the  20  years  prior  to  the  Second  World  War  the  total  purchases 
amounted  to  $1,200  million — approximately  $46  million  per  annum.  Tnis  is  a 
mere  drop  in  the  ocean  in  our  vast  economy.  Some  of  the  smallest  countries 
in  Latin  America  buy  far  more  than  that  from  us  annually. 

The  Soviets  cannot  afford  to  import  heavily  from  the  capitalist  countries  for 
two  major  reasons :  First,  they  cannot  afford  to  help  the  economies  of  countries 
they  are  out  to  desti-oy,  and  they  don't  permit  friends  of  the  United  States  or 
plain  guUibles  in  Russia  to  go  around  propagandizing  that  purchases  should  be 
made  here,  as  is  the  case  with  a  good  many  such  gullibles  liere.  Second,  they 
cannot  tell  the  people  day  in  and  day  out  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  the  real 
paradise  of  the  workers,  the  country  which  has  invented  everything  under, 
above,  and  on  the  sun,  that  people  in  the  capitalist  countries  are  starving  and 
it  is  incumbent  upon  the  workers  of  the  Soviet  fatherland  to  allow  heavy  deduc- 
tions from  their  wages  to  keep  the  American  workers  alive,  and  at  the  same  time 
flood  Russia  with  goods  from  those  impoverished  capitalistic  countries.  It  just 
would  not  make  sense,  and  the  Soviet  propagandists  are  smarter  than  that,  far 
smarter  than  our  own.  Why,  then,  this  great  fuss  about  East-West  trade? 
Part  of  the  answer  has  already  been  given  before.     Here  is  another  angle : 

Take  a  look  at  the  trade  agreements  concluded  between  Russia  and  the  Euro- 
pean countries  for  delivery  this  year  and  a  few  years  hence.  They  are  all 
filled  with  tie-in  purchases.  In  1954,  for  example,  the  Soviets  have  agreed  to 
ship  to  Finland  petroleum  products,  sugar,  linseed  oil,  gasoline,  Diesel  oil,  fuel 
oil,  coal  and  coke,  fertilizer,  wheat,  fodder  cakes,  and  the  like.  But  what  is  Fin- 
land supposed  to  ship  to  Russia?  Strategic  goods  exclusively.  All  of  it  designed 
to  strengthen  the  military  might  of  our  enemy,  namely — 44  ships,  tankers,  ocean- 
fishing  trawlers,  ocean  tugboats ;  56  lake  barges ;  floating  cranes,  powerplant 
machinery  and  equipment,  and  many  more  similar  items.  Holland,  for  example, 
is  to  supply  the  Soviets  with  herring,  some  butter,  and  a  few  other  food  items 
for  the  table  of  the  Soviet  hierarchy,  but  the  major  items  she  is  to  ship  to  Russia 
are :  Cargo  vessels,  refrigerator  vessels,  suction  hopper  dredges,  bucket  dredges, 
coal  bunkering  vessels,  and  so  forth.  Every  one  of  them  a  major  strategic 
item. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  129 

Turn  to  England,  if  you  please.  She  is  to  receive  from  Russia  foodstuffs  which 
are  in  superabundance  here  and  in  Canada ;  lumber  and  timber,  which  Canada 
has  in  superabundance.  But  Britain  is  to  ship  to  Russia — take  good  note,  please  : 
30  ocean  liners  of  8,000  and  10,000  tons,  20  ships  of  5,000  tons,  60  fishing  trawlers, 
30  whalers,  1.5  salvage  tugs ;  railway  equipment  to  prop  up  the  weakest  link  of 
the  Soviet  system ;  200  caterpillar  cranes ;  110  sets  of  complete  power  stations ; 
150  steam  boilers ;  20  power  trains ;  150  diesel  electric  stations ;  electrical  equip- 
ment worth  about  $15  million ;  rolling  mill  equipment  worth  about  $40  million, 
and  m'"re  of  that  nature. 

And  this,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  being  paraded  to  us  as  nonstrategic  goods.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  practically  every  country  capable  of  supplying  ships  and 
similarly  highly  strategic  material  is  being  awarded  contracts.  This,  on  one 
hand,  takes  the  burden  off  the  Soviet  shipyards,  and,  second,  it  makes  it  possible 
for  the  Soviet  Government  to  take  possession  of  that  many  more  highly  strategic 
equipment  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  or  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  satellites  through 
whom  mischief  is  now  planned. 

Did  Mr.  Stassen  give  you  facts  or  fiction  when  he  asserted  that  such  trade 
would  "carry  a  net  advantage  to  the  free  world"? 

The  total  1948  turnover  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  trade  with  the  free  world  (both  ex- 
ports and  imports  from)  amounted  to  about  $1  billion.  In  1950  it  declined  to 
$.545  million.  In  1952  it  was  back  about  $943  million.  The  figures  for  1953  were 
about  $790  million.  We  have  given  away  annually  to  our  Euroi)ean  allies  alone 
several  times  that  much.  If  the  foreign  trade  amateurs  apparently  surrounding 
Mr.  Stassen  would  be  replaced  by  men  with  practical  foreign-trade  experience, 
not  just  book  learning,  a  way  could  be  worked  out  to  satisfy  the  international 
trade  needs  of  our  friends  in  Europe  and  at  the  same  time  clamp  down  a  com- 
plete and  tight  embargo  against  all,  absolutely  all,  shipments  to  the  Soviet  bloc. 
A  combination  of  the  know-how  and  a  fearless  determination  to  hit  the  enemy 
where  it  will  hurt  could  bring  that  about  very  easily.  But  the  will  must  be  there 
first. 

WHOM   DID   WE  RECOGNIZE? 

American  statesmen.  Democrats  and  Republicans  alike,  between  1917  and  1933 
did  not  have  to  become  diplomatic  bedfellows  with  the  Communists  in  order  to 
find  out  the  true  nature  of  the  Kremlin  beast.  They  had  known  from  the  writings 
and  utterances  of  the  Communist  leaders  beginning  with  Karl  Marx  and  ending 
with  Lenin  and  Trotsky  that  a  govexmment  headed  by  such  people  could  not  and 
would  not  live  up  to  its  international  obligations,  that  the  world  could  not  remain 
half  free  and  half  slave.  They  therefore  steadfastly  refused  to  compromise  with 
evil  and  would  not  bow  to  any  demands  for  recognition.  It  was  evident  to  them 
that  a  government  which  would  not  fulfill  its  pledges  to  its  own  people  could 
not  possibly  be  expected  to  treat  us  any  better.  They  knew  that  the  Communist 
regime,  as  mentioned  before,  had  promised  bread  to  its  people  and  has  given  them 
perpetual  hunger ;  it  promised  peace  and  has  given  them  uninterrupted  war  at 
home  and  abroad  ;  it  promised  land  to  the  peasants  and  has  robbed  them  of  all 
of  it,  murdering  millions  of  resisters  in  the  process,  bringing  upon  the  Russian 
peoples  a  famine  which  decimated  millions  more  in  the  cities :  it  promised  free- 
dom from  oppression  and  exploitation  and  has  instead  established  the  most  in- 
human system  of  exploitation  ever  known  to  mankind.  The  American  statesmen 
of  a  wiser  era — from  Woodrow  Wilson  and  including  Herbert  Hoover — refused  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  such  a  regime.    We  all  now  know  how  right  they  were. 

Whom  did  we  really  recognize?  Let  us  lift  just  a  tiny  corner  of  the  Iron 
Curtain  and  see  the  nakedness  of  the  Comnmnist  regime. 

Between  1881  and  1913.  a  period  of  32  years,  there  were  a  total  of  4,446 
executions  in  the  whole  of  Russia  under  the  Czar's  government.  Not  one  of  them 
was  executed  for  political  offenses.  All  of  them  were  serious  criminals.  But 
during  the  first  3  years  of  its  reign,  the  Soviets  exterminated  over  .300,000  men, 
women,  and  children.  As  it  became  entrenched,  it  raised  the  number  of  murders 
it  committed. 

The  sailors  of  the  Fortress  of  Kronstadt.  right  outside  of  Leningrad,  played  a 
decisive  role  in  helping  the  Lenin-Trotsky  gang  to  wrest  power  from  the  weak- 
kneed  Kerensky  provisional  government  in  November  1917.  By  the  time  the  year 
1921  turned  up  they  were  so  disillusioned,  those  plain  sons  of  the  peasants  and 
workers,  that  they  staged  a  revolt  demanding  the  original  pledges  of  the  Com- 
munists be  translated  into  action,  namely :  power  to  thi>  workers,  peasants'  and 
soldiers'  deputies,  land  for  the  peasants,  a  government  o"  law  and  not  of  edicts, 


130  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

froodom  of  press  and  assemblage,  justice,  and  liberty.  For  that  they  were  ruth- 
lessly destroyed  by  the  Lenin  regime.  Since  then  there  have  been  numerous 
revolts,  all  of  them  drovpned  in  the  blood  of  the  people.  The  peoples  of  Russia 
have  never  recognized  the  Soviet  Government  as  the  legitimate  government  of 
the  country  and  never  will.  The  more  the  people  rebelled  the  more  ferocious  the 
atrocities  of  the  regime.  We  will  now  visit  a  few  Russian  cities  to  witness  com- 
munism in  action.  Our  first  stop  is  Kharkov.  It  is  October  18,  1941,  and  Hitler's 
armies  arc  rolling  irresistibly  onward.  Millions  of  Russian  soldiers  have  already 
surrendered,  refusing  to  fight  for  Stalin  and  his  Communist  Party.  On  the 
corner  of  Chenishevsky  and  Sovnai'komsky  Streets  stands  a  building  occupied  by 
the  dreaded  secret  police.  It  has  4  stories  under  and  4  above  the  ground.  It  is 
equipped  with  the  most  modern  crematorium  to  burn  the  bodies  of  the  condemned 
without  trial,  without  proof  of  guilt.  A  cordon  of  armed  men  is  thrown  around 
the  building.  An  official  sets  the  building,  filled  with  men  and  women,  on  fire. 
As  the  flames  rise  the  cries  of  the  victims  are  piercing  the  thick  walls  of  the  fast- 
ness holding  them.  Some  dare  to  come  to  the  windows  and  are  Immediately  fired 
upon.  In  due  time  the  building  is  all  In  ashes  mixed  with  that  of  the  prisoners. 
None  escaped. 

The  perpetrators  of  this  crime  are  the  diplomatic  bedfellows  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States. 

We  now  take  you  to  Vinitza  In  the  Uki'alne.  One  of  the  perennial  purges  by 
the  Soviet  Government  is  in  full  swing.  For  possessing  a  texbook  in  a  foreign 
language,  for  corresponding  with  a  relative  or  a  friend  in  a  foreign  country,  for 
oversaltlng  pickles  on  a  collective  farm,  for  inability  to  produce  in  the  factory 
or  mine  according  to  the  heavy  schedules  imposed  by  the  Kremlin  masters,  people 
are  being  rounded  up  by  the  thousands,  herded  in  jails,  sent  off  to  certain  death 
in  distant  slave  labor  camps,  or  executed  in  the  local  houses  of  detention. 

The  local  jail  In  Vlnitza  is  filled  to  overflowing.  Rooms  designed  to  hold  16 
or  18  people  now  have  a  hundred  or  two  hundred.  For  weeks  these  people  have 
been  standing  on  their  feet.  Some  have  dropped  dead  or  fainted  from  exhaustion 
and  the  stifling  air.  But  more  and  more  victims  are  constantly  arriving  from 
the  provinces.  The  Kremlin  is  teaching  the  Russian  people  to  remember  who  Is 
boss  of  Red,  unholy  Russia.    Then  word  comes  from  Moscow  to  start  liquidations. 

Executions  take  place  nightly.  After  sundown  groups  of  Inmates  are  marched 
down  to  the  garage  below.  Heavy  duty  trucks  are  running  their  engines  with 
throttles  wide  open  to  drown  out  the  cries  of  the  victims  and  the  pistol  shots 
of  the  Kremlin  murderers.  The  men  and  women  are  ordered  to  strip  to  the 
waist.  Prisoners  are  ordered  to  face  the  wall.  Kremlin  agents  tie  the  hands 
of  the  victims  on  the  back,  just  as  the  murdered  Americans  in  Korea  were 
found  with  their  hands  tied  on  their  back.  This  is  one  of  Moscow's  Inventions. 
As  this  is  done,  other  agents  move  from  one  standing  prisoner  to  another  and 
fire  bullets  into  the  back  of  their  heads.  Presently  another  batch  of  prisoners  is 
brought  down  to  the  garage  and  ordered  to  load  the  dead  bodies  into  the  roaring 
trucks.  The  butchered  prisoners  are  then  rushed  to  the  former  pear  orchard 
near  Vlnitza  or  to  the  old  cemetery  and  thrown  into  mass  graves.  This  per- 
formance continues  throughout  the  night.  At  dawn  the  bloodstains  on  the  pave- 
ment en  route  to  the  burial  grounds  are  covered  with  sand  by  police  agents. 

In  1943  the  mass  graves  were  opened  by  the  Germans.  The  whole  city  was 
affected  by  the  stench  blown  by  the  wind  from  the  direction  of  the  pear  orchard 
and  the  old  cemetery.  The  local  population  had  been  complaining  about  it  to  the 
German  occupation  authorities,  and  they  gathered  a  commission  of  doctors  from 
Belgium,  France,  Holland,  Bulgaria,  etc.,  to  witness  the  opening  of  the  graves. 
A  total  of  9,432  bodies  were  found.  From  far  and  wide  people  streamed  to 
Vinitza  In  search  of  the  body  of  a  relative.  Among  them  was  Anna  Godovanyets. 
Her  husband  had  been  taken  out  of  his  home  in  the  middle  of  the  night  and  she 
had  never  heard  from  him.  She  had  written  to  Stalin  for  the  whereabouts  of 
her  husband.  In  time  she  received  a  reply  from  the  notorious  A^lshlnsky,  then 
chief  prosecutor  of  the  Soviet  slave  state,  stating  that  her  husband  had  been 
released.  Of  course  he  was  lying.  Isaak  Kasyanovich  Godovanyets  had  been 
released  from  his  suffering,  to  be  sure,  since  his  body  was  among  the  excavated 
thousands. 

This,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  the  work  of  our  diplomatic  bedfellow — the  Soviet 
Government  we  recognized  in  1933  and  still  maintain  friendly  relations  with. 
A  person  is  judged  by  the  company  he  keeps.  How  should  we  be  judged  for 
keeping  company  with  these  wholesale  murderers?  What  happened  in  Vlnitza 
Is  a  mere  sample  of  what  has  been  and  is  going  on  in  the  Soviet  Union  as  a 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    C03V1MUNISM  131 

whole.  It  is  a  pattern  of  the  way  the  Kremlin  maintains  itself  in  power,  and 
this  is  bound  to  continue  as  long  as  the  civilized  world  continues  to  deal  with 
those  barbarians.  . 

The  scene  now  shifts  to  Yoozovo,  an  important  railway  junction,  bince  194U 
there  has  been  in  existence  in  Russia  a  child-slave  labor  system.  Boys  of  12  to  18 
and  girls  from  14  and  up  are  recruited  in  the  same  manner  as  soldiers  and  shipped 
to  distant  points  from  their  homes  to  be  pressed  into  so-called  labor  reserves 
where  they  are  dehumanized  into  robots  to  do  the  bidding  of  the  Soviet  masters. 
Such  a  school  with  about  700  youths  was  in  Yoozovo  at  the  time  Hitler  was  mov- 
ing in  seven  league  boots  toward  Moscow.  The  boys  were  bitter  against  their 
"•overnmeut  for  having  been  torn  from  their  parents  and  their  home  environment. 
Unable  or  unwilling  to  evacuate  the  boys  to  safe  places,  orders  came  from  Moscow 
to  liquidate  them.  .  ,        ^        ^.      .^      ^ 

Toward  sunset,  a  company  of  secret  police  armed  with  automatic  rifles  drove 
them  down  to  the  outsldrts  of  the  city,  in  a  nearby  forest,  and  mowed  them  down 
with  machineguns.  A  handful  of  the  boys  managed  to  escape  in  the  darkness  to 
bring  the  account  of  the  massacre  to  the  world.  ,  ,     ,      . 

The  murderers  of  these  children  are  living  happily  withm  a  few  blocks  from 
our  White  House— in  the  Soviet  Embassy.  With  the  murderers  of  these  and 
countless  thousands  of  other  children  in  Russia  we  are  sitting  at  the  conference 
tal)le  to  bring  peace  to  the  world,  to  assure  the  independence  and  the  freedoms 
of  other  peoples.     What  a  farce.     What  a  disgrace.  ,    ,     , 

Our  recognition  of  the  Kremlin  regime  was  the  most  priceless  gift  bestowed 
upon  our  deadliest  enemy.  It  was  all  the  more  inexcusable  because  the  Com- 
munists had  never  made  a  secret  of  their  true  designs.  "We  have  never  con- 
cealed the  fact,"  said  Lenin,  "that  our  revolution  is  only  the  beginning,  that  it 
will  lead  to  a  victorious  ending  only  then  when  we  shall  have  inflamed  the  whole 
world  with  its  revolutionary  fires"  (pp.  22-23,  Collected  Works  by  Lenin,  Rus- 
sian edition).  ,     ^  .  ,    .  ^  ,. 

Within  days  after  recognizing  this  nightmare  high  officials  in  our  Government 
knew  that  a  serious  blunder  had  been  made.  Why  an  upright  man  like  Secretary 
Cordell  Hull  permitted  this  to  go  on  unchallenged  remains  a  mystery.  Today 
it  is  plain  to  anvone  who  has  eyes  to  see  and  a  mind  to  think  that  there  can 
never,  never  be  peace  on  this  earth  as  long  as  the  Soviet  regime  survives.  And 
our  continuing  to  deal  with  that  Government  is  the  greatest  contribution  toward 
its  survival  and  to  make  it  possible  for  them  to  become  stronger  in  order  to 
carry  out  Lenin's  grand  design  which  you  will  find  in  volume  X,  Collected  Works 
by  Lenin,  page  172 :  .        r.,,  .,, 

"First  we  will  take  Eastern  Europe,  then  the  masses  of  Asia.  Then  we  will 
encircle  the  United  States  of  America  which  will  be  the  last  bastion  of  capitalism. 
We  will  not  have  to  attack  it ;  it  will  fall  like  an  overripe  fruit  into  our  hands." 

If  still  further  proof  is  needed  to  insure  passage  of  Senate  Resolution  247  and 
relations  with  the  Soviet  gangster  government  severed,  let  us  turn  to  this  1,000- 
page  volume  published  by  the  State  Department  in  1952,  entitled :  "Foreign  Re- 
lations of  the  United  States— The  Soviet  Union  1933-39." 

We  learn  from  this  book  that  we  struck  our  head  into  the  Red  leopard's  mouth 
with  our  eyes  wide  open.  On  October  4,  1933,  6  days  before  President  Roosevelt 
started  the  negotiations,  Mr.  William  C.  Bullitt  sent  a  memorandum  to  the  then 
Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull  in  which  he  wrote : 

"Before  recognition  and  before  loans,  we  shall  find  the  Soviet  Government 
relatively  amenable.  After  recognition  or  loans,  we  should  find  the  Soviet 
Government  adamant." 

Upon  arrival  in  Moscow  as  our  first  Ambassador,  Mr.  Bullitt  did  not  have  to 
wait  long  before  finding  the  realization  of  his  prophecy.  In  his  dispatch  to  the 
Department  of  August  21,  1935,  he  wrote : 

"To  break  relations  would  satisfy  the  indignation  we  all  feel  and  would  he 
juridically  correct."     [Italics  mine.] 

And  then  his  Christian  upbringing  asserted  itself  in  dealing  with  a  power  which 
set  out  from  the  very  beginning  of  its  career  to  destroy  all  that  Christianity 
stands  for,  and  Mr  Bullitt  wrote :  "But  in  my  opinion  this  question  should  be 
decided  neither  on  emotional  nor  juridical  grounds  but  on  the  basis  of  a  cold 
appraisal  of  the  wisest  course  to  pursue  to  defend  the  American  people  from 
the  efforts  of  the  Soviet  Government  to  produce  bloody  revolution  in  the  United 
States." 

One  must  forgive  the  able  Mr.  Bullitt  for  this  mistake.  The  above  lines  were 
written  long  before  the  then  Communist  delinquent  had  matured  into  the  inter- 


132  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

national  and  dangerous  criminal  he  is  today.  Bullitt  could  not  possibly  have 
foreseen  the  ravages  the  Soviet  regime  would  bring  to  the  world  within  5  years. 
But  even  then  Mr.  Bullitt  fniled  to  tell  us  liow  maintaining  an  Embassy  in 
INIoscow  could  defend  the  American  people  from  the  Soviet  efforts  to  produce 
a  bloody  revolution  in  the  United  States  which  seemed  to  be  his  principal  concern 
at  the  time.  I  am  sure  that  were  he  free  to  talk  to  the  rank  and  tile  of  the 
Soviet  peoples,  they  would  have  pleaded  with  him  to  bi-eak  relations  at  once  and 
drive  their  spies  out  of  the  United  States.  That  would  have  been  a  severe  blow 
to  the  prestige  of  the  Communist  regime.  Had  this  step  been  taken  in  1935-36, 
when  the  subject  was  being  discussed  inside  the  Government,  the  world  might 
have  been  a  much  happier  place  to  live  in  today. 

Unfortunately  Mr.  Bullitt  had  many  other  rather  weak  reasons  for  not  break- 
ing relations  at  the  time.     In  the  same  report  he  wrote : 

"If  we  should  sever  relations  now  on  the  ground  that  the  Soviet  Government 
has  broken  its  pledged  word  to  us  and  cannot  be  trusted,  resumption  of  relations 
would  be  inordinately  difficult.  *  *  *" 

This  is  rather  pointless.  The  British  Government  was  among  the  very  first  to 
recognize  the  Moscow  regime  after  1917.  But  in  1927  it  discovered  the  mistake 
and  broke  relations.  Yet  it  did  not  prove  "inordinately  difficult,"  as  Mr.  Bullitt 
feared,  for  them  to  resume  the  unhappy  relations  again.  Why  would  it  have 
been  different  in  our  case?  The  oiUy  reason  I  can  think  of  is  that  he  possibly 
feared  that  once  the  American  people  learned  of  the  conditions  that  prompted 
us  to  make  the  break  they  would  not  have  permitted  our  Government  to  make 
the  mistake  a  second  time.  In  the  same  report,  Mr.  Bullitt  continued  his  irra- 
tional rationalizing  when  he  said  : 

"In  this  decade  the  Soviet  Union  either  will  be  the  center  of  attack  from 
Europe  and  the  Far  East  or  will  develop  rapidly  into  one  of  the  greatest  physical 
forces  in  the  world.  In  either  event  an  official  observation  post  of  the  Ignited. 
States  Government  in  Moscow  will  be  desirable,  to  inform  the  Government  in 
the  United  States  with  regard  to  activities  of  the  Soviet  Government  directed 
against  the  lives  and  interests  of  American  citizens." 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  lived  in  Moscow  during  those  years,  I  have  found  the 
embassies  there,  including  our  own,  to  be  nothing  more  than  prisons  for  their 
occupants.  Can  you  have  an  observation  post  in  a  prison  if  you  are  one  of  the 
prisoners?  Quite  unwittingly,  apparently,  Mr.  Bullitt  provides  the  answer  in 
his  very  next  paragraph  : 

"American  diplomatic  repi'esenta  lives  in  tlie  Soviet  Union  are  harassed  and 
restricted.  *  *  *  As  the  Soviet  Union  grows  in  strength  it  will  grow  in  arrogance 
and  aggressiveness.  *  *  *" 

And  less  than  7  months  later,  on  March  4,  1936.  to  be  sure,  he  further  dwelt 
on  the  difficulties  of  living  with  the  new  partner  when  he  said : 

"I  had  a  good  deal  during  last  winter  to  try  my  patience,  for  the  Government 
possesses  in  an  exquisite  degree,  the  art  of  worrying  a  foreign  representative 
without  giving  him  even  the  consolation  of  an  insult.  The  position  as  an 
Ambassador  here  is  far  from  being  pleasant  *  *  *  He  can  rarely  obtain  accu- 
rate information  until  events  have  transpired  *  *  *  His  own  movements  are 
closely  observed  by  eyes  that  he  never  sees  *  *  *  if  therefore  I  do  not  write 
as  often  as  may  be  desired,  this  is  my  apology.  And  if  I  do  not  furnish  matter 
of  more  interest  it  must  be  attributed,  in  part  at  least,  to  the  great  difficulty  of 
obtaining  correct  information.  No  courtesy  or  liberality  is  shown  in  this  par- 
ticular by  this  Government  *  *  *  Nothing  is  made  public  that  is  worth  knowing 
*  *  *"  And  more  to  that  effect.  Did  he  really  have  to  suffer  the  annoyances  and 
insults  while  our  State  Department  here  was  according  the  Soviet  Ambassador 
the  greatest  freedom  and  courtesies?  Since  all  relations  between  governments 
are  based  on  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  wasn't  there  a  single  official  in  the 
upper  echelons  of  our  Government  with  guts  enough  to  remind  the  Kremlin 
that  either  they  treat  our  representatives  as  they  should  be  or  the  Soviet  officials 
would  be  given  the  same  Kremlin  treatment?  Not  until  very  recently  did  our 
officials  wake  up  to  this  line  of  thinking.  In  the  meantime  our  pussyfooting 
had  done  the  damage. 

The  Soviet  Government  would  never  have  become  the  menace  she  is  today  in 
so  brief  a  period  of  time  had  it  not  been  for  the  opportunities  offered  by  our 
grave  error  of  1933  in  opening  to  her  the  vast  storehouse  of  our  technological 
know-how.  And  what  sort  of  treatment  did  our  technicians  get  from  the 
Soviets?  In  a  memorandum  of  November  24,  1937,  Mr.  George  F.  Kennan,  later 
our  Moscow  Ambassador,  wrote  to  the  Department : 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  133 

"In  1935  written  assurances  were  given  by  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  to  the 
Embassy  to  the  effect  that  American  nationals  about  to  depart  from  the  Soviet 
Union  would  be  permitted  to  be  present  during  the  examination  by  the  Soviet 
customs  of  drawings,  plans,  and  similar  documents  in  their  possession.  Never- 
theless, in  the  current  year  we  have  witnessed  the  violation  of  these  assurances 
in  the  case  of  engineers  of  Radio  Corporation  of  America  working  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  retention  by  Soviet  authorities  of  drawings,  plans,  etc.,  for  periods 
long  enough  to  permit  copies  to  be  made.  There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that 
papers  taken  by  the  Soviet  authorities  from  American  citizens  have  led  to  the 
infringement  of  important  American  patents." 

Having  been  treated  as  a  sort  of  sacred  cow  for  the  first  few  years  after  recog- 
nition, the  bully  in  the  Kremlin  felt  sure  that  he  could  get  away  with  anything, 
and  made  no  mistake  in  so  thinking.  For  some  inexplicable  reason  our  officials 
were  so  eager  to  hang  onto  the  Embassy  prison  in  Moscow  that  they  were  willing 
to  compromise  with  any  wrongdoing  on  the  part  of  the  Kremlin,  and  knowing 
that  the  Kremlin  treated  us  as  we  rightly  deserved,  with  contempt.  We  have 
no  one  to  thank  for  that  but  our  own  ignorance  and,  one  might  even  say, 
cowardice.  And,  while  our  engineers  were  not  permitted  to  take  out  their 
own  property  in  the  form  of  blueprints  and  drawings,  we  permitted  the  Soviet 
agency  in  New  York,  the  Amtorg  Trading  Corp.,  to  ship  truckloads  of  such 
drawings  stolen  or  bought  under  false  pretenses. 

The  time  for  Mr.  Bullitt  to  leave  the  Soviet  Union  was  nearing.  He  then  sent 
a  word  of  warning  to  the  Department  to  guide  it  in  its  future  dealings  with  the 
Kremlin,  which,  of  course,  fell  on  deaf  ears.  He  wrote  in  his  report  dated 
March  4,  1936: 

"We  should  not  cherish  for  a  moment  the  illusion  that  it  is  possible  to  estab- 
lish I'eally  friendly  relations  with  the  Soviet  Government  or  with  any  Com- 
munist party  or  Communist  individual.  It  is  difficult  to  conduct  conversations 
with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  because  in  that  institution  the  lie  is  normal  and 
the  truth  abnormal  and  one's  intelligence  is  insulted  by  the  happy  assumption 
that  one  believes  the  lie." 

The  fact  that  the  officials  of  that  period  did  not  have  the  good  sense  to  put  an 
end  to  such  an  unhappy  relationship  should  not  influence  our  thinking  now 
when  we  know  the  utter  futility  of  so  doing.  Of  what  earthly  good  is  it  to 
maintain  an  Embassy  when  we  have  to  deal  with  paranoiacs  and  liars,  with 
men  devoid  of  any  decency  or  courtesy,  in  a  country  where  the  Ambassador, 
as  Bullitt  admitted,  "can  rarely  obtain  accurate  information,"  where  the  Govern- 
ment does  not  want  to  have  any  friendly  relations  with  us? 

You,  gentlemen  of  this  committee,  hold  the  answer :  Pass  Senate  Resolution 
247  and  force  the  issue  of  severing  diplomatic  relations  without  further  delay. 

I  was  in  Moscow  when  Mr.  Bullitt's  successor,  Mr.  Joseph  E.  Davies,  arrived 
on  or  about  January  12,  1937.  We  met  4  days  later,  and  on  January  19  he  wrote 
a  significant  report  to  Secretary  Cordell  Hull.  He  spoke  of  his  conference  with 
Soviet  Ambassador  in  Washington,  Alexander  Troyanovsky,  before  leaving: 

"The  writer  stated  to  Ambassador  Troyanovsky,"  wrote  Mr.  Davies,  "that  if 
the  surprising  history  of  these  subsequent  negotiations  as  disclosed  in  the  files 
of  the  State  Department  ^vere  knoivn  to  the  America/n  ptiblic  as  they  loere  to  me 
it  would  result,  in  my  opinion,  in  a  most  serious  destruction  of  confidence  and 
good  tvill  the  general  public  of  the  United  States  noio  felt  toward  Russia,  and  I 
then  stated  also  that  it  was  fortunate  that  there  was  no  probability  of  such 
disclosure.  *  *  *  The  Ambassador  appeared  somewhat  downcast  but  made  no 
attempt  at  rejoinder."    [Italics  mine.] 

It  was  indeed  fortunate  for  the  Kremlin  gangsters  that  the  American  public 
and  possibly  a  good  many  Members  of  the  United  States  Congress  remained  in 
ignorance.  But  it  certainly  was  most  unfortunate  for  this  country.  Whom, 
then,  did  the  men  responsible  for  this  blunder  serve — America  or  Russia?  You 
know  the  answer. 

By  the  time  the  Second  World  War  flared  up  and  the  invasion  of  Russia  by 
Hitler  became  inevitable,  our  State  Department  files  were  bulging  with  valuable 
information  on  which  to  guide  us  in  making  sound  decisions  as  to  how  to  deal 
with  the  Kremlin  criminals.  As  example,  permit  me  to  quote  from  Bullitt's 
report  of  July  19, 1935,  in  which  he  wrote  : 

"Diplomatic  relations  with  friendly  states  are  not  regarded  by  the  Soviet 
Government  as  normal  friendly  relations  but  armistice  relations,  and  it  is  the 
conviction  of  the  leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union  that  this  armistice  can  not  possibly 
be  ended  by  a  definitive  peace  but  only  by  a  reneival  of  battle.    The  Soviet  Union 


134  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

genuinely  desires  peace  on  all  fronts  at  the  present  time,  but  this  peace  is 
looked  upon  merely  as  a  happy  respite  in  which  future  wars  may  be  prepared. 

"To  think  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  possible  ally  of  the  United  States  in  case 
of  war  with  Japan  is  to  allow  the  wish  to  be  father  to  the  thought.  The  Soviet 
XJmon  would  certainly  attempt  to  avoid  becoming  an  ally  until  Japan  had  been 
thoroughly  defeated  arid  would  then  merely  use  the  opportunity  to  acquire  Man- 
churia and  Sovietize  China."    [Italics  mine.] 

These  prophetic  warnings  should  have  guided  our  relations  with  Stalin  at 
Yalta  and  Potsdam.  America's  history  today  would  have  been  a  much  happier 
one,  I  assure  you.  We  are  now  paying  dearly  for  those  blunders  and  for  the 
negligence  in  not  properly  evaluating  Bullitt's  warnings  and  in  not  making  pub- 
lic years  ago  the  true  state  of  affairs  between  our  Government  and  the  Kremlin 
I  deem  it  of  utmost  importance  to  discuss  these  facts  now  in  the  hone  that 
present  incumbent  in  the  State  Department  will  not  continue  the  blunders  as 
from  now  on  the  consequences  to  us  might  be  far  more  frightful  than  heretofore 

Mr.  Chairman,  a  year  and  a  half  had  elapsed  since  our  new  Ambassador  Mr' 
Davies,  reached  Moscow.  He  got  a  taste  of  the  Moscow  prison  walls  De'snite 
that  his  oceangoing  yacht  riding  the  calm  waters  of  the  Baltic  Sea  was  alwavs 
at  his  disposal  to  lighten  the  torture  of  doing  his  stretch  in  the  Moscow  prison 
by  taking  trips  outside  the  stifling  Moscow  atmosphere,  he  felt  he  had  had 
enough  of  life  in  the  Communist  paradise.  On  June  6,  1938,  he  sat  down  to 
dictate  dispatch  1932,  his  sv?ansoug :  .  ,     e  »dt  uown  ro 

"In  view  of  the  shrinkage  of  the  number  of  American  citizens  now  in  the 
Soviet  Union  and  upon  many  other  grounds  a  strong  argument,  from  certain 
points  of  view,  might  be  made  that  the  continuance  of  diplomatic  relations  here 
is  unnecessary  under  present  conditions  and  inadvisable  " 

Had  he  stopped  right  there,  he  would  have  been  forgiven  for  many  other 
blunders  made  by  him  while  Ambassador  and  afterward.     But  he  counseled' 
continuance  of  relations  because  "the  Japanese  attitude  in  the  Pacific"  ignorin- 
completely  Mr.  Bullitt's  warnings  of  2  years  before  that  "To  think  of  the  Soviet 
Union  as  a  possible  ally  of  the  United  States  in  case  of  war  with  Japan  is  to 
allow  the  wish  to  be  father  to  the  thought."'    That  is  preciselv  what  happened 
as  we  now  know.    They  joined  the  war  against  Japan  when  that  country  had 
been  ;'thoroughly  defeated,"  as  Bullitt  had  forecast,  and  did  it  in  order  to 
acquire  Manchuria  and  Sovietize  China,"  as  farsighted  Bullitt  had  warned 
Mr.  Davies  had  full  access  to  the  files  and  ignored  them.  Not  only  did  hrignoie 
the  sounder  counsel  of  a  diplomat  whose  stature  Mr.  Davies  could  never  live 
to  attain,  but  he  made  himself  ridiculous  when  in  the  very  same  report  of  June 
6,  1938,  he  told  the  State  Department :  p"  t  ui.  juue 

f«f'^^*•°''  ^"yf^l^^»'  this  system  is  a  tyranny,  clothed  in  horror.  While  a  dic- 
tatorship of  the  most  ruthless  and  cruel  type  exists  here  it  annears  to  diftW 
from  a  Fascist  dictatorship,  at  least  in  one  respect  iictatorsMp  over  the^p^^^^^ 
letariat  is  not  the  objective  or  end  this  system  profess  to  seek,  asfs  the  case 
with  Fascist  Ideology.    The  fact  of  dictatorship  is  apologized  foi^  here" 

This  IS  t.alderdash  of  the  rankest  sort.  Mr.  Davies,  it  would  seem  had  swal 
oZSli'"''?'  •!""  '""'^  ''^^"''  }''^  falsehood,  dished  out  to  hmbT'the  Soviet 
ofiicials  Is  It  any  wonder  that  the  whole  history  of  our  relations  with  the 
Soviets  issues  a  stench  enough  to  reach  the  most  distant  stars'  ^'^^  *^^ 

fo^T.  \?"^^'''^^P*'''P^^f  ^"'''^  *h^  meaning  of  the  Soviet  apologies  for  the  die 
tatorship  over  the  proletariat.  They  have  been  living  with  It  for  ove?  36  veS 
JnfiT  hT.  1*  ^^'T"^  ?^^^^^  «^"  ^^^  l^"ll^t  .s  it  piei4s  through  the  back  of  the 
hnvi  'k  ^^'^^^^  ^.^^  ^^^^^°S  ^^  ^=^  th«  slave-labor  camps  by  the  millions  thev 
have  been  feeling  it  on  the  collectivized  farms  and  in  the  sociaL^d   S«,  S 

and  TTov'p?'-"  '""'l'  ^'^'"  ^^^'■^  ^«  ^  ^"«^^^  «°  th«  '^^^^^^  the"dark  of  the  night 

thtuse  tcf  enTmer\  rmr^\r  n.^'-  '^  '''''  ^^^^'^ '  ^^^^  ''^'  it-Mit  what'is 
tue  u&e  Lo  enumerate  moie.'    Mr.  Davies  was  not  aware  of  those  "hlp«!«iTiP-c"  in 

fn?e?Jh^t'Z'd'r?  ^T'P'-'^  "l^  ^P°^°^'^^  ^^  ^^^  Soviet  officLlsandXfssur^ 
ances  that  the  dictatorship  is  not  of  lasting  nature     Tt  miVhf  h«  ttt^ii  VZ    '^    ."^, 

such  people  that  we  have  been  promisee  hit  th^dictato^S  wilfSst  untTthe 
whole  world  has  been  communized,  and  that  includertheUn  tod   4^/11      t^ 

:fthX%tm^;^^"  '^'^  ^^•^^^«^'  ^^-'^^  us  L^ntre"the'^diSati?V1Stions' 

I  am  wondering  how  many  there  still  remain  in  the  State  DemrtmPTif  who 

are  as  utterly  ignorant  about  the  Communist  menace  L  Mr   Davies  was  wien 

he  was  our  Awbassftdor?    If  there  are,  J  fear  that  Sepate  Resolution  247  ^g^ 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  135 

remain  a  pious  wish  even  if  it  is  passed.  Should  that,  God  forbid,  be  the  case, 
there  are  some  people  in  this  country  who  would  undertake  to  secure  ten  or  more 
millions  of  signatures  to  thwart  the  obstructors. 

What  is  really  the  thinking  of  the  Russian  people  on  this  question  of  their 
totalitarian  regime?  I  think  in  any  of  our  dealings  with  the  Kremlin  we  must 
be  guided  by  what  reaction  our  words  or  deeds  would  produce  in  the  minds  of 
the  Russian  peoples.  They  are  going  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  world  one  day 
when  they  rise  to  destroy  their  tyranny.  In  all  our  plans  we  must  consider  their 
wishes  and  not  those  of  their  oppressors.  I  should  like,  therefore,  to  offer  a  few 
examples  and  from  the  mouths  of  Russians  born  and  reared  under  the  Kremlin 
regime.  Here  is  what  Maj.  L.  Ronzhin,  a  recent  Soviet  escapee  from  his  post 
in  Eastern  Germany,  said  : 

"Everywhere  I  had  occasion  to  be  since  my  early  adulthood  *  *  *  i  have  seen 
the  one  and  never-changing  picture  of  naked  poverty,  inhuman  toil,  semi- 
starvation  on  a  wage  which  is  barely  enough  to  buy  bread  and  potatoes,  and 
even  that  in  insufficient  quantities. 

"One  5-year  plan  followed  another,  but  the  picture  changed  only  in  detail. 
The  Communist  power  continues  to  rob  and  oppress  the  people,  to  lie,  lie,  and 
lie  *  *  *.  The  miracles  performed  by  our  patriotic  heroes  during  the  war 
against  the  German  invaders  brought  victory,  but  this  has  not  brought  us  out 
of  our  eternal  want  and  lawlessness  by  the  Government.  Everything  remained 
the  same  after  the  war.  The  only  change  made  is  the  address  toward  which 
the  main  stream  of  propaganda  of  hate  is  directed.  Formerly  it  was  addressed 
to  Hitler's  Germany ;  now  it  is  addressed  to  America.  However,  the  Fascists 
we  hated  without  propaganda,  but  toward  the  American  Nation  and  its  Army, 
our  people  are  filled  with  the  most  tender  feelings,  and  for  some  very  good 
reasons  *  *  *.  We  remember  well  the  bread  and  the  meat,  the  clothes  and 
medicines,  the  guns  and  tanks  and  ships  and  bombers  America  sent  us  to  help 
us  win  the  war  *  *  *." 

I  repeat,  this  is  the  voice  of  the  Russian  people,  this  is  the  voice  of  the  Com- 
munist generation,  and,  above  all,  the  voice  of  a  man  who  had  everything  given 
to  him  by  the  Communist  Government — education,  trust,  position,  and  all  the 
good  things  that  life  can  offer.  But  he  has  sacrificed  it  all  for  the  purpose  of 
coming  to  the  West  to  help  us  fight  against  the  enemy  planning  to  destroy  us. 
We  had  better  heed  such  men  or  we,  too,  will  be  where  the  800  million  are  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain. 

Is  the  Soviet  abscess  ripening?  What  are  the  feelings  of  the  millions  of 
Soviet  soldiers?  Major  Rouzhiu  has  the  evidence.  Entering  his  office  one 
morning  with  the  occupation  army  in  East  Prussia,  he  found  a  letter  slipped 
under  the  door.     It  read  : 

"We  are  convinced  that  you  will  not  turn  this  letter  over  to  your  political 
commissar.  Such  action  would  be  bad  for  you,  as  it  would  be  directed  to  the 
political  department  of  the  army  and  you  would  suffer,  too.  And  now  to  the 
point : 

"All  the  political  indoctrinations,  political  information,  prosecution  and  perse- 
cution by  the  political  commissar,  bringing  in  the  counterspies,  barbed  wire,  and 
locks  on  the  gates — all  that  has  become  so  repulsive  to  us  that  we  are  now  on 
the  verge  of  open  defiance  and  desertions. 

"You  don't  know  and  neither  does  the  political  commissar  that  at  night,  when 
we  are  on  guard  duty,  we  permit  our  buddies  to  go  visiting  their  girl  friends 
and  they  do  the  same  when  they  stand  guard.  We  do  this  although  we  know 
that  we  are  liable  to  get  5  to  10  years  in  prison  for  such  action. 

"We  therefore  ask  you,  comrade  officer,  to  explain  to  the  higher  command 
that  it  would  be  wise  for  them  to  remove  the  oppressive  restrictions  from  all 
soldiers  in  the  army  of  occupation  in  Germany. 

"And  now:  Do  we  correctly  understand  communism?  AVe  lived  before  the 
revolution  in  very  bad  circumstances.  That  was  prior  to  socialism.  Our  mate- 
rial conditions  did  not  improve  under  socialism.  But  here  in  Germany,  visiting 
German  homes  we  notice:  A  family  of  three  or  even  a  widow  with  a  son  or  a 
daughter.  They  have  a  living  room,  dining  room,  bedroom,  a  kitchen  with  electric 
stove,  a  bathroom  with  modern  facilities.  In  other  words,  a  home  of  3  or  4  rooms. 
The  rooms  are  well  furnished  with  soft  furniture,  with  rugs  on  the  floor,  radio, 
and  some  even  have  an  automobile. 

"We  have  therefore  come  to  the  conclusion  that  here,  apparently,  communism 
was  established  long  ago.  Hence  not  we  have  anything  to  teach  them  how  to 
live  comfortably,  well,  and  happy,  but  we  should  learn  from  them. 

(Signed)  Youe  Soldiebs." 


136  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Major  Roiizhin  added :  "I  escaped  to  the  West  to  fight  for  the  freedom  of  my 
fatherland  and  all  its  peoples." 

Victor  Mayev,  another  officer  who  has  escaped  from  the  Soviet  army  of  occu- 
pation in  Germany,  has  this  to  tell  us  : 

"Early  this  year  I  was  still  wearing  the  officer's  uniform  of  the  Soviet  army 
of  occupation  in  Germany.  Meeting  me  on  the  streets  of  the  town  where  I  was 
stationed,  Germans  no  doubt  thought  to  themselves :  'Here  he  goes,  the  Russian 
occupationist — the  source  of  all  our  misfortunes  and  unhappiness.'  At  that  very 
moment  I  was  trying  to  find  my  place  in  the  ranks  of  fighters  against  communism, 
in  the  ranks  of  fighters  for  a  brighter  future  for  my  people  *  *  *. 

"How  many  in  the  Soviet  Army  think  similar  thoughts?  As  a  former  ranking 
officer  of  the  Red  Army,  I  take  full  responsibility  for  declaring  that  the  ma- 
jority of  that  army  was  never  in  sympathy  with  and  never  approved  of  the  anti- 
national  policies  of  the  Soviet  Government  and  the  Communist  Party  *  *  * 

"Dissatisfaction  of  the  people  and  the  Red  Army  with  the  policies  of  the  Gov- 
ernment is  growing  hourly.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  armies  of  occupation 
in  Germany,  Austria,  and  the  satellite  nations.  The  Government  is  treating 
its  military  personnel  like  semiprisoners.  They  are  isolated  from  the  local  popu- 
lation. It  is  trying  to  inoculate  the  Red  Army  with  the  poison  of  distrust  and 
hatred  for  the  people  in  the  occupied  territories.  But  Europe  is  the  best  school 
for  the  Soviet  private  and  officer.  There  they  see  vividly  the  whole  deception 
and  the  falsehood  of  the  Soviet  propaganda  *  *  *." 

Igor  Matrosov,  another  recent  escapee  from  the  Soviet  Union,  offers  some  food 
for  thought,  if  we  here  will  only  listen  to  this  ringing  voice  of  the  people  whose 
friendship  is  so  badly  needed  in  order  to  rid  the  world  of  the  Soviet  nightmare : 

"The  free  world  must  take  full  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  assist  the  Rus- 
sian people  to  destroy  the  enemy  of  all  mankind— communism.  We  are  not  sug- 
gesting war.  We  are  not  asking  for  arms  and  ammunition.  We  need  the  moral 
and  psychological  assistance  which  the  West  can  and  should  give  us  *  *  *  Not 
one  decent  and  honest  person  in  the  world  wants  war.  But  peace  cannot  be 
bought;  we  must  fight  for  it  *  *  *  That  is  why  the  attempts  of  people  in  the 
West  to  come  to  terms  with  the  Kremlin  are  totally  inconceivable  to  us  Russians. 
With  stupid  compromises  the  West  can  only  rescue  Bolshevism  from  destruc- 
tion *  *  *." 

In  view  of  our  experience  with  the  Soviet  Government  since  we  took  the  fatal 
step  by  recognizing  the  regime  more  than  20  years  ago,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of 
the  vast  majority  of  the  Russian  peoples  who  are  ready  to  tear  their  Government 
to  tatters,  in  view  of  the  mischief  the  Communist  heirarchy  in  Moscow  has  been 
doing  to  us  and  the  other  civilized  nations  through  their  stooges  in  our  midst,  it 
is  indeed  a  privilige  to  congratulate  the  authors  of  the  resolution  under  discussion 
here,  Senate  Resolution  247,  introduced  by  Senators  William  E.  Jenner  and  Pat 
McCarran  urging  the  administration  to  sever  relations  with  the  enemy  of  man- 
kind— the  Soviet  Government.  If  adopted  and  the  break  takes  place,  it  will  elec- 
trify our  hundreds  of  millions  of  allies  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  it  will  inspire 
them  to  carry  on  their  struggle  with  our  common  enemy,  it  will  convince  them 
that  we  are  their  true  friends,  that  the  West  has  finally  seen  the  error  of  its  ways 
by  dealing  with  a  force  which  is  out  to  destroy  all  the  moral  and  spiritual  values 
created  by  men  throughout  the  millenia.  And  at  the  same  time  it  will  bring  con- 
sternation to  the  dictators  and  the  despots.  We  must  not  help  the  Communists 
to  prolong  the  agony  by  rescuing  them  by  selling  them  the  much-needed  consumer 
goods  and  machinery  to  continue  the  stranglehold  upon  their  victims.  To  act 
otherwise  might  lead  to  catastrophe,  as  it  might  force  the  peoples  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain  to  make  peace  with  the  despots.  And  that  is  precisely  what  the  Kremlin 
wants.  Losing  faith  in  our  determination  to  resist  the  spread  of  the  evil  Commu- 
nist force,  and  the  way  the  West  has  been  handling  the  millions  of  Communist 
fifth-column  members  in  their  own  countries  is  certainly  not  conducive  to  think- 
ing that  we  are  fully  alive  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  might  lead  the 
oppressed  tens  of  millions  in  Russia  and  the  satellites  to  the  conclusion  that 
we  are  hopeless.  We  must  not  permit  this  to  happen.  Breaking  relations  now  is 
the  only  sensible  thing  to  do  to  prove  with  deeds  and  not  mere  rhetoric. 

Today  a  year  ago  the  East  German  people  rose  spontaneously  to  defy  their 
Communist  puppet  government  and  the  Soviet  occupation  forces.  Russian  sol- 
diers and  officers  preferred  facing  a  firing  squad  rather  than  shoot  down  the 
protesting  workers  of  East  Germany.  The  rebellion,  to  be  sure,  was  put  down  by 
the  overpowering  Soviet  forces.  But  the  example  has  been  shown  to  the  rest  of 
the  victims  throughout  the  Soviet  bloc,  and  it  will  not  be  forgotten  if  we  in  the 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  137 

West  are  smart  enough  not  to  let  it  die  down.  And  one  of  the  first  and  major  steps 
^the  seveTng  of  cUlDlomatic  relations  not  alone  by  this  country  but  the  entire 
cmnzed  world  as  a  bloc.  If  this  is  accompanied  by  the  tiS^^^^V'^  Ji'Z  T,'om 
trade  embargo,  it  will  not  be  long,  I  am  sure,  before  the  masses^  behind  the  Iioa 
Curtain  will  eAd  their  nightmare  without  the  shedding  of  American  blood  witl- 
out  bending  our  backs  in  providing  the  tens  of  billions  of  dollars  which  wU 
otherwise  become  necessary  in  order  to  establish  ourselves  as  a  garrison  nation 
and  in  order  to  prop  up  our  weaker  allies.  ^^     x^        i-     t     „  ^\^^ 

In  conclusion  I  should  like  to  give  a  word  of  caution.  The  Kremlin  liars  will 
try  to  use  the  breaking  of  diplomatic  relations  in  their  P^-^Pf-^-^^da  campaign  to 
tell  their  people  that  we  are  preparing  to  wage  war  upon  them.  From  now  on 
we  must  make  it  clear  that  we  are  taking  this  step  on  strict  y  moral  grounds, 
that  we  don't  want  to  deal  with  the  murderers  of  the  Russian  peoples,  their 
onnressors  and  exploiters.  We  must  tell  them  that  we  want  to  help  them  rega  n 
?hefr  freedom  regSn  their  land,  their  religion,  and  their  place  among  honorable 
peoples  of  the  world.  We  must  tell  them  that  we  cannot  permit  criminals  like 
Vishinskv  and  Panyushkln,  whose  hands  are  dripping  with  the  blood  of  the 
Russian  peoples,  to  tread  the  sacred  soil  of  a  God-loving  nation  like  he  United 
States  We  can  and  must  assure  them  that  once  they,  the  people,  have  over- 
thrown their  illegitimate  government  and  established  one  on  the  principles  of 
true  democracy  based  on  the  free  expression  of  the  citizens  h.v  means  of  free 
and  secret  ballot,  a  system  of  govemment  where  the  individual  citizen  is  the 
sovereign  and  not  the  bureaucracy,  then  we  will  welcome  with  joy  their  repre- 
sentatives and  work  hand  in  hand  for  lasting  peace  and  human  progress. 

Mr  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  will  you  kindly  give  the  committee  a  brief 
resume  of  your  background  and  experience  with  particular  reference 
to  the  contacts  and  experience  you  have  had  m  Soviet  Kussia? 

Mr  Marcus.  I  began  my  international  career  m  the  Bureau  ot 
Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce  in  1917.  I  came  to  this  country 
from  Kussia,  old  Kussia,  in  1910  as  a  young  immigrant  boy,  and  went 
to  work  as  a  blacksmith.  Three  years  later  I  was  the  youngest  immi- 
gration officer  in  America,  at  Galveston,  Tex.  ^ 

After  passing  an  examination  for  commercial  attache,  by  some  ac- 
cident, I  was  called  by  the  FBI  to  work  for  them  m  Chicago,  and 
finally  landed  in  Washington. 

In  1920  I  resigned,  to  go  to  Kussia- 

The  Chairmax.  The  FBI,  you  say?     At  that  time  there  was  no 

FBI 

Mr.  Marcus.  At  that  time  it  was  known  as  the  Bureau  of  Investiga- 
tion of  the  Department  of  Justice.  .  t   p  v 

In  1920  I  resigned,  to  go  to  Russia  as  the  first  American  relief  direc- 
tor for  an  American  organization. 

The  Chairman.  Go  ahead.  ,^^10         j 

Mr.  Marcus.  Between  that  time  and  the  outbreak  ot  the  heconcl 
World  War  I  had  occasion  to  be  in  the  Soviet  Union  on  14  different 
occasions  as  a  representative  of  such  firms  as  the  Studebaker  Corp., 
the  American  Hair  &  Felt  Co.  of  Chicago,  the  American  Kachator  & 
Standard  Sanitary  Corp.,  the  Reed  Container  Corp.,  and  similar  firms, 
that  brought  me  into  contact  with  the  leading  people  m  Kussia  m  the 
industrial  and  commercial  field  of  the  Soviet  Government.  One  of 
them  I  might  mention,  Anastasi  Mikoyan,  the  present  head  ot  the 
Ministry  of  Trade,  and  close  collaborator  of  Stalin,  and  now  of 

Malenkov.  x     -.nr,-    -c 

I  have  seen  the  Soviet  Union  arise  from  the  ashes.  In  1920,  tor 
instance,  the  vice  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Trust 
of  Kussia  begged  me  to  find  a  capitalist  in  America  who  would  lend 


138  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

him  $750,000  to  buy  machinery  and  equipment,  they  were  so  poor  at 
that  time.  Since  then  they  have  risen  to  a  terrific  power,  not  because 
they  are  so  capable — they  are ;  I  am  not  in  any  way  underestimating 
them — but  because  of  the  aid  they  have  received  from  America  and  the 
western  nations  by  hook  or  crook,  mostly  the  latter.  They  have  stolen 
from  us  the  entire  industrial  technology  for  the  heavy  industries.  As 
a  result  of  recognition  in  1933  we  threw  open  to  them  our  laboratories 
and  our  plants,  and  they  just  helped  themselves  to  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  you  would  not  say  they  had  stolen  it.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  they  received  it  as  a  gratuity. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Well,  they  received  it  as  a  result  of  the  ignorance  of 
our  people.     I  will  give  you  one  example.     May  I  give  you  one  ? 

Senator  Welker.  Answer  the  question.  Since  we  opened  the  door 
for  them  I  cannot  assume  that  that  would  be  classed  as  stealing. 

Mr.  Marcus.  We  opened  the  door  for  them  and  it  was  under  false 
pretenses.  They  dangled  billions  of  dollars  of  trade  to  us  prior  to 
recognition,  and  our  people  were  hungry.  Our  factories,  some  of 
them  were  idle.  And  we  wanted  to  get  orders  from  them.  And  the 
Russians  said,  "Sure,  we  will  give  you  orders.  You  sell  us  machine 
so-and-so,  and  with  it  we  will  take  the  blueprints  and  the  shop  draw- 
ings." 

And  as  a  result  of  that  they  never  came  back  for  that  same  machine 
or  that  same  type  of  machine. 

I  will  give  you  one  very  concrete  example.  My  boss  in  the  American 
Radiator  &  Standard  Sanitary  Corp.,  Mr.  Clarence  M.  Wooley,  the 
chairman,  called  me  in  one  day  and  introduced  me  to  the  late  chairman 
of  the  York  Ice  Machinery  Co.,  Mr.  Shipley.  Mr.  Shipley  told  me  a 
story  that  for  3  years  he  had  been  trying  to  get  business  in  Russia  and 
couldn't  do  a  thing.  So  he  brought  in  his  engineer  and  told  me  the 
story.  He  had  been  to  Russia  on  two  occasions  and  taken  with  him 
trunks  full  of  blueprints  and  shop  drawings  to  show  them  what  they 
were  producing.  Then  the  company,  the  York  Ice  Machine  Co.,  re- 
ceived their  engineers  in  their  own  plant. 

Nothing  happened. 

And  I  said  to  Mr.  Shipley,  "Why  should  there  have  been  orders 
given  to  you  ?     You  have  given  away  your  entire  technology." 

Repeat  that  by  the  hundreds  and  hundreds  of  plants  and  you  have 
the  story. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  will  you  tell  a  little  later  on  in  your  testi- 
mony with  respect  to  other  espionage  operations  of  the  Soviets? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  for  the  purpose  of  your  background  and  building 
the  background  of  your  own  life,  you  are  presently  identified  as  a 
director  of  the  American  Friends  of  Russian  Freedom,  Inc. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct.     I  am  a  member  of  the  board. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  that  organization  are  such  men  as  Gen.  Frank  L. 
Howley,  James  O'Neil,  Gen.  William  Donovan,  and  others  of  like 
character. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Admiral  Standley,  who  was  American  Ambassador 
to  Russia,  Admiral  Maxwell,  and  Spruille  Braden,  and  many  others. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  discussed  with  the  staff  off  the  record  the 
contacts  you  have  with  the  underground,  the  anti-Communist  under- 
ground behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  139 

Mr.  Marcus.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Arexs.  And  you  and  your  associates  are  in  contact  with  that 
underground  operation  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct, 

Mr.  Arexs.  Now,  Mr.  Marcus,  may  I  explicitly  invite  your  atten- 
tion to  the  general  subject  matter  of  the  Soviet  interest  in  east-west 
trade,  the  so-called  Russian  trade  offensive,  and  ask  you,  on  the  basis 
(^f  youi'  background  and  experience,  what  you  feel  is  really  behind 
t  he  alleged  Soviet  interest  in  east- west  trade. 

Ml'.  Marcus.  I  sounded  the  alarm  about  this  coming  offensive  before 
Stalin  died  in  1052,  and  here  is  an  article  which  was  published  in  a 
trade  magazine  called  Export  Trade  and  Shipper  in  1952.  The  pur- 
pose of  this  east- west  trade  offensive 

Senator  Welker.  Excuse  me.  May  that  be  incorporated  by  refer- 
ence onl}'  ? 

The  Chairmax.  By  reference,  it  may  go  in  the  record. 

(The  article  referred  to  was  marked  "Marcus  Exhibit  No.  1"  and 
fded  for  the  information  of  the  committee.) 

Mr.  Marcus.  The  purpose  of  it  is  to  steal  our  light  industry 
technology,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  heavy  industry.  They  bought 
samples  and  that  was  the  end.  And  today  they  are  already  competi- 
tors of  ours  in  India  and  many  other  countries  of  the  world,  and  in 
South  America. 

I  am  glad  you  brought  that  up  because  we  have  got  to  discuss  it 
very  carefully. 

The  Soviet  Government  is  scared  to  death  of  a  war  with  the  United 
States.  If  war  broke  out  today  that  would  be  the  end  of  the  Soviet 
Government  because  their  people  will  tear  them  to  death.  Now  they 
want  to  destroy  the  United  States  without  a  war.  One  way  is  to 
encircle  us.  And  on  page  172,  volume  10,  in  Collected  Works  by 
Lenin  in  1923,  before  he  died  in  January  1924,  he  said  as  follows,  and 
I  quote : 

First  we  will  take  eastern  Europe,  then  the  masses  of  Asia ;  then  we  will 
encircle  the  United  States,  which  will  be  the  last  bastion  of  capitalism.  We  will 
not  have  to  attack.    It  will  fall  like  an  overripe  fruit  into  our  hands. 

Korea,  China,  Indochina — all  that  is  a  part  of  this  philosophy  of 
avoiding  a  clash  with  us  so  that  they  will  not  be  destroyed  by  their 
own  people. 

This  is  one  way,  and  they  are  succeeding  magnificently. 

The  second  way  is  by  destroying  our  $25  billion  international  trade. 

Mr.  Arexs.  In  other  words,  is  it  your  suggestion  that  the  second 
reason  for  the  Russian  trade  offensive  is  to  establish  a  ruinous  com- 
petition in  world  markets? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct. 

Mr.  Arens.  To  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Absolutely. 

Mr.  Arens.  Will  you  kindly,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and 
experience,  give  us  your  best  judgment  and  appraisal  of  that  phase 
of  the  Russian  trade  offensive  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes,  sir.  Right  after  Stalin's  death  they  started  in 
buying  consumer  goods.  Now,  right  after  the  war,  the  Russian 
people  were  in  such  dire  need  of  consumer  goods  and  yet  they  did  not 
get  it.     For  over  3  decades  they  have  been  living  on  the  barest  sub- 


140  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  \ 

sistence,  living  in  the  most  primitive  conditions.    And  I  have  been  all 
over  Russia. 

The  Chairman.  How  recently  have  you  been  in  Kussia  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Just  before  the  Second  World  War.  I  am  in  constant 
contact  with  escapees,  and  in  a  few  minutes  I  will  give  you  a  statement 
by  Major  Ronzhin  L.  Rozhin,  who  escaped  recently.  This  is  a  picture 
of  the  major. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have,  as  you  have  indicated,  underground  contacts 
through  this  organization  of  which  you  are  a  member  of  the  board 
of  directors. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct. 

Why  do  they  do  this?  For  the  very  purpose  to  buy  samples  of 
our  consumer  goods.  But  that  is  not  all.  There  is  also  a  tie-in  ar- 
rangement. "If  you  will  sell  us  the  consumer  goods  we  also  want  the 
machinery  producing  the  consumer  goods." 

And  when  they  buy  the  machinery  to  produce  the  consumer  goods 
they  also  want  the  shop  drawings  and  the  blueprints.  And,  having 
that,  that  is  the  end  of  it.  Then  they  can  use  their  millions  of  slaves, 
and  the  millions  of  slaves  in  China,  and  their  raw  materials  don't 
count  because  that  is  also  being  produced  by  slaves.  This  is  to  out- 
produce us,  to  flood  the  world  markets.  There  is  a  psychological 
reason  in  it,  too.  They  want  to  show  the  people  of  the  world  here, 
"We  are  producing  the  finest  cars,  we  are  producing  the  finest  shirts 
and  suits  and  shoes  and  so  on."  That  has  a  terrific  propaganda  value 
to  them. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  interrupt,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  You  made  the  statement,  Mr.  Marcus,  that  they 
bought  certain  goods.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  gave  them  some  tanks 
and  some  airplanes  and  so  forth  that  were  very  easily  copied  by  them, 
and  they  have  copied  them. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct. 

Senator  Welker.  And  made  probably  even  better  airplanes  than 
we  gave  them. 

Mr.  Marcus.  And  the  only  person  who  had  the  gumption  to  get  up 
and  speak  up  before  the  world  was  our  member  associate  of  the  board 
of  directors,  Admiral  Standley,  when  during  the  war,  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment was  trying  to  conceal  the  fact  that  the  tanks  and  machinery 
and  planes  and  food  and  clothing  was  being  sent  by  America,  so  he 
spoke  out  and  they  were  compelled,  Stalin  was  compelled  thereby  to 
acknowledge  the  fact  that  America  was  sending  them. 

Mr.  Arens.  As  president  of  the  Institute  of  Foreign  Trade,  have 
you  had  occasion  to  make  a  study  of  the  trade  agreements  currently 
in  vogue  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  countries  of  the  w^orld? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Definitely. 

Mr.  Arens.  With  what  other  countries  does  the  Soviet  Union  at  the 
present  time  have  trade  agreements  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  am  going  to  speak  only  of  the  years  1952  and  1953. 
There  are  the  following  countries  to  which  we  have  been  feeding  bil- 
lions of  dollars:  Sweden,  Israel,  Italy,  Norway,  United  Kingdom,  - 
Netherlands,    Iran,    Denmark,    France,    Iceland,    Australia,    India, 
Pakistan,  Greece,  and  New  Zealand. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  141 

Mr.  Arens.  You  are  specific  in  your  prepared  statement,  but  can 
you  tell  us  in  general  what  commodities  or  items  are  involved  m 
those  trade  agreements?  . 

Mr.  ]M\RCUS.  Russia  is  supplying  to  those  countries  commodities 
like  wheat,  corn,  and  various  other  foodstuffs  and  some  raw  materials, 
all  of  which  are  obtainable  in  the  United  States  in  abundance  as 
well  as  in  Canada,  timber,  pulpwood,  and  so  on.  Russia  is  receiving 
for  that  ocean  liners  of  8,000  and  10,000  tons,  freighters  of  5,000  tons, 
by  the  dozens.  I  have  here  the  number  of  them  enumerated  from 
official  sources.  Cranes,  lathes,  all  strategic.  A  $14  million  steel 
mill,  rolling  mill,  is  to  be  supplied  by  England  to  Russia.  Electrical 
equipment  running  into  the  tens  of  millions  of  dollars. 

Here  is  an  interesting  thing.  Great  Britain  is  to  supply  the  greatest 
number  of  ships.  It  is  all  enumerated  in  my  testimony.  Netherlands, 
ships ;  Denmark,  ships ;  one  of  them  is  supplying  steamers. 

Why? 

Now  when  you  supply  a  steamer  to  the  Soviet  Union  today  what 
does  it  mean?  It  means  that  much  steel,  that  much  pressure  taken 
off  the  Russian  steel  mills,  that  much  labor  taken  off,  and  it  is  faster. 
You  have  3  countries,  5  countries  producing  steamers  for  them.  They 
can  get  ready  for  the  final  clash,  as  they  call  it,  that  much  quicker. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  ask  a  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Marcus,  in  the  list  of  countries  with  which 
Russia  has  had  trade  agreements  I  did  not  notice  that  you  mentioned 
any  of  the  South  American  countries.    Do  you  have  any  information 

on  that?  . 

Mr.  Marcus.  Argentina  is  one.    I  am  sorry  I  did  not  mention  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Based  upon  your  experience,  and,  as  I  recall 
your  testimony,  you  are  an  adviser  with  respect  to  internatonal  trade? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes.  .   . 

Senator  Welker.  I  will  ask  you  what  your  opinion  would  be  with 
respect  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  sending  to  a  dictator- 
ship in  South  America  a  strip  steel  mill  which  is  capable  of  not  only 
processing  steel  but  titanium  or  aluminum  and  other  ferrous  metals- 
keep  in  mind  that  I  say  a  dictatorship— that  has  trade  agreements 
with  Russia,  and  I  thini  it  is  common  knowledge  that  trading  mis- 
sions from  Russia  and  the  satellite  countries  are  all  over  South 
America  as  of  this  moment,  sir. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct. 

Senator  Welker.  Can  you  comment  on  that,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  happen  to  be  the  one  who  wrote  a  memorandum  m 
November  1933,  when  I  was,  for  a  short  time,  foreign  trade  consultant 
in  Washington,  entitled  "How  We  Ourselves  Destroy  our  Forei^i 
Trade."  Today  there  is  a  great  deal  of  talk  about  investments  abroad. 
And  i  say  to  you  gentlemen  that  it  means  "invest  abroad  and  lose 

your  shirt."  ,      ,  -,  .-,        ^^  ■         <•  xi    i. 

That  is,  to  my  mind,  a  crime.  We  should  not  sell  anything  ot  that 
sort  to  any  country  unless  the  production  will  help  raise  the  standard 
of  living  of  that  country.  Now  in  most  instances  it  will  not  do  so, 
especially  in  Latin  America.  In  most  instances  it  is  going  to  be  used 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  foreign  trade  in  competition  with 
America. 


142  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Senator  Welker.  Further,  how  could  our  country  be  assured  that 
they  would  use  this  strip  steel  mill  to  raise  the  standard  of  living  of 
this  dictatorship  country,  or  whether  or  not  it  might  well  be  used  to 
help  Kussia  and  her  satellites? 

Mr.  Marcus.  The  only  way  is  to  have  it  specifically  stated  in  the 
agreement. 

Senator  Welker.  All  right.  What  does  an  agreement  mean,  Mr. 
Marcus?  Let's  be  frank.  It  is  a  piece  of  paper  that  can  be  torn  up. 
I  have  heard  about  agreements  ever  since  I  have  been  in  the  Senate, 
and  prior  thereto.  It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  Russia  keeps  an  agree- 
ment very  well. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Not  Russia. 

Senator  Welker.  Or  any  other  satellite  country. 

Mr.  Marcus.  We  were  speaking  about  Latin  America,  Senator. 

Senator  Welker.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Marcus.  In  speaking  about  the  Soviet  Union  there  is  absolutely 
no  possible  chance  of  their  living  up  to  their  agreements. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  you  will  allow  me  to  inquire 
further,  I  want  to  be  informed  on  this  matter. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes. 

Senator  Welker.  Will  you  tell  me  in  simple  language  what  the 
difference  is  between  a  dictatorship,  say,  in  our  Latin  American  coun- 
tries and  the  dictatorship  that  we  have  in  Soviet  Russia  ?  I  will  ask 
3^ou  if  it  is  not  a  fact  that  it  is  all  based  upon  socialism,  x^m  I  cor- 
rect? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Not  necessarily.  I  wouldn't  say  that  Peron  is  a 
Socialist. 

Senator  Welker.  Does  not  the  Government  there  in  Argentina 
own  most  everything  ? 

Mr.  IVIarcus.  In  the  Latin  American  countries — and  this  is  also 
based  upon  personal  experience — the  dictator  is  not  for  personal  ag- 
grandizement whereas  in  the  Soviet  Union  it  is  for  the  purpose  of 
sovietizing  the  whole  world. 

Senator  Welker.  Very  well.  Assuming  this  steel  mill  is  bought 
by  the  country  itself,  that  would  be  socialism,  would  it  not? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Oh,  naturally,  that  is  a  step  toward  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Can  you  help  me  on  defining  what  socialism  is, 
how  many  steps  behind  communism  it  is. 

Mr.  Marcus.  It  is  the  prelude  to  communism. 

Senator  Welker.  It  is  about  a  half  step  behind,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  A  little  bit  more,  but  it  is  a  step  in  that  direction. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  it  is  your  testimnoy  that,  based  upon  your 
experience,  you  think  it  would  not  be  a  satisfactory  solution  for  the 
protection  of  this  country,  for  our  country  to  sell  to  a  dictatorship  that 
has  trade  agreements  with  Russia  and  the  satellites  and  Guatemala, 
a  steel  mill  capable  of  giant  capacity  that  could  very  well  be  used 
in  the  United  States  of  America  as  of  this  moment,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Definitely.  In  my  own  business  I  have  many  a  time 
lost  a  client  by  telling  him  "Don't  sell  it  there.  Country  must  come 
before  profit." 

I  would  like,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  call  your  attention  to  a  very  im- 
portant statement  that  President  Eisenhower  made  yesterday.  A 
correspondent  at  the  press  conference  stated  that  Congressman  Martin 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  143 

Dies  told  the  House  yesterday  that  if  we  really  wanted  to  stop  com- 
munism dead  in  their  tracks  right  now  and  not  just  give  lipservice 
to  it,  that  we  would  cut  off  from  Kussia  the  nonstrategic  goods,  food 
and  fiber,  which  it  needs  most,  because  he  says  "She  is  spending  80 
percent  of  her  productive  energy  for  w-ar  purposes." 

And  the  President,  to  my  great  regret,  merely  replied  something 
like  Mr.  Stassen  replied  to  a  Senate  committee  here,  I  think  to  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee— the  President  said  we  must  not  con- 
sider—this is  not  quoted— this  is  from  the  New  York  Times— you  have 
to  remember  that  the  satellites,  including  Red  China,  were,  after  all, 
different  from  Russia, 

Gentlemen,  not  at  all.  I  think  somebody  is  misinforming  the 
President  to  the  detriment  of  our  country.  The  Soviet  Government 
was  the  one  that  brought  about  the  Communist  revolution  in  China 
and  in  the  satellite  countries.  Every  one  of  the  leaders,  from  Mao 
Tse-tung  down,  w^ere  educated  in  Russian  schools.  I  was  in  such  a 
school  in  1926.  I  was  passing  by  in  Kiev,  a  military  academy.  And 
I  walked  in  as  a  matter  of  curiosity.  In  those  days  Stalin  was  not  yet 
in  the  saddle. 

They  talked  to  me.  They  didn't  know  whether  I  was  an  American 
or  a  native  Russian  from  the  way  I  speak  Russian. 

With  great  pride  they  showed  me  the  department  in  the  military 
academy  where  they  were  training  Chinese  since  1921 ;  they  were  train- 
ing Chinese  there  for  the  revolution  in  China. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  spent  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars.  The 
Sun  Yat  Sen  University,  the  Lenin  University,  the  Far  East  Univer- 
sity. They  have  turned  out  as  many  as  5,000  trainees  a  year  in 
sabotage,  in  espionage. 

Senator  Welker.  You  are  speaking  now^  about  the  Lenin  School  for 
Sabotage  and  Espionage  and  the  like  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct.  Therefore,  to  say  that  they  are  different  is 
really  not  correct,  you  know,  and  I  am  afraid  that  somebody  is  mis- 
informing. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  there  such  a  thing  as  a  differentiation,  in  your  judg- 
ment, to  be  made  between  strategic  and  nonstrategic  material? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Not  even  a  pin  should  be  considered  as  nonstrategic. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  other  words,  everything  is  strategic  in  trade  with  the 
Soviets? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Everything  is  strategic  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  Why? 

Mr.  Marcus.  If  you  asked  the  Russian  people,  if  we  had  the  means 
of  speaking  to  the  200  million  people  of  Russia  freely,  they  would 
plead  with  us  on  their  knees,  "Tlease  don't  come  here.  Don't  sell 
anything  or  buy  anything  from  our  government." 

Many  a  time  Russian  functionaries,  high  functionaries  in  Russia, 
when  I  was  there  on  official  business  for  my  corporation,  have  said  to 
me,  "Why  do  you  Americans  come  here  to  deal  with  our  government  ? 
You  are  only  enhancing  its  prestige.  You  are  only  tightening  the 
noose  around  our  necks." 

Time  and  time  again.  And  I  may  mention  here  a  name,  a  fellow 
by  the  name  Serebryakov,  the  man  who  wrote  the  constitution  of  the 
Russian  Socialist  Federated  Republics. 


144  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

So  that  is  what  we  are  doing  in  shipping  food  or  machinery  or 
anything  of  the  sort ;  we  are  helping  the  Soviet  Government  to  tighten 
the  noose  around  the  necks  of  the  Russian  people.  The  worse  condi- 
tions become  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  satellite  nations,  the  better 
for  us. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  have  you  had  occasion  to  take  note  of  Sen- 
ate Resolution  247,  which  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  the  Senator 
from  Indiana  and  the  Senator  from  Nevada,  which  would  call  for 
the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Iron  Curtain  Govern- 
ments, and  the  convoking  of  an  international  conference  for  the  pur- 
pose of  taking  united  action  to  destroy  the  international  Communist 
menace? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  is  your  appraisal,  as  president  of  the  American 
Institute  of  Foreign  Trade  and  as  a  director  of  the  American  Friends 
of  Russian  Freedom,  and  as  a  man  conversant  in  international  trade, 
of  that  resolution  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Severance  of  trade  relations — of  all  relations,  diplo- 
matic and  trade  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  is  far  too  long  over- 
due. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliy  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  have  here  a  thousand-page  book  published  by  the 
United  States  State  Department  in  1952,  and  if  any  one  of  you  would 
read  carefully  the  reports  by  Bullitt  you  would  have  to  come  unavoid- 
ably to  the  conclusion  that  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
is  the  greatest  misfortune  to  our  country. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliy? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Because  it  was  the  greatest  gift  that  America  had 
given  to  the  Soviet  Union.  No.  1,  it  gave  them  world-wide  prestige. 
Right  after  our  recognition,  many  other  countries  which  w^ould  never 
have  recognized  them  went  into  action  and  recognized  the  Soviet 
Union. 

No.  2,  it  opened  to  them  the  avenues  for  espionage  and  infiltration. 

Senator  Welker.  How  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Well,  we  were  friends  with  them.  We  gave  visas  to 
their  men.  I  do  not  know  how  many  people  there  are  in  the  Soviet 
Embassy  here,  but  I  will  give  you  a  little  example. 

Australia,  which  recently  had  this  little  incident  with  the  Soviet 
Government,  they  had  9  people  in  the  Australian  Legation  in  Moscow ; 
9,  including  women  and  children.  How  many  did  Moscow  have  in 
Australia?  Fifty.  And  the  same  thing  here.  They  came  here  by 
the  thousands.  I  myself  knew  several  hundred  of  the  Russian  buying 
commissions.     They  were  nothing  but  spying  commissions. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  inquire? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  it  is  your  testimony,  I  take  it,  that  the 
Soviet  Embassies  here  are  nests  for  saboteurs,  espionage  agents,  and 
for  the  distribution  of  Communist  propaganda  throughout  our 
country  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  For  no  other  purpose. 

Mr.  Arens.  Off  the  record. 

(Discussion  off  the  record.) 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COIVIMUNISM  145 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  say  this,  that  everyone,  Vishinsky,  Panyushkin, 
Gromyko— especially  Vishinsky— every  one  of  them  are.  Their 
hands  are  dripping  with  the  blood  of  men,  women,  and  children. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  a  particular  incident  to  account  respecting 
the  massacre  in  the  Soviet  Union,  to  your  knowledge,  of  a  number  of 
children  by  people  who  are  currently  in  diplomatic  status? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Every  one  of  them  who  represents  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment is  ipso  facto  an  accessory  to  the  act  of  murder  committed. 

Mr.  Arens.  ^Vliat  was  that  act?     Could  you  tell  the  committee 

about  it  ?  ■  p      2-      £ 

I^Ir.  Marcus.  I  want  to  give  you  three  little  experiences  ot  acts  o± 
our  bedfellows,  the  diplomatic  bedfellows  that  America,  a  Christian 
nation,  has. 

The  German  armies  were  moving  irresistibly  on  toward  Moscow. 
They  were  approaching  a  very  important  railway  junction.  In  that 
city  they  had  a  bovs'  school.  ^  It  is  really  a  slave  labor  school  to  de- 
humanize children,  to  robotize  them  into  obedient  servants  of  the 
Soviet  Government.  That  subject  I  have  treated  in  an  article  called 
Dehumanizing  Children  For  Soviet  Conquest.  They  were  afraid  to 
leave  them  inl^he  city  because  they  were  very  bitter  against  the  Soviet 
Government  for  having  torn  tliem  away  from  their  mothers  and 
fathers.  They  couldn't  evacuate  them  into  a  safer  place  because  the 
rolling  system  broke  down  completely. 

I  am  the  son  of  a  famous  Russian  railroad  builder,  and  I  know  some- 
thing about  the  railroad  system  in  Russia.  It  is  the  weakest  link  m 
the  whole  structure  of  their  economy. 

So  at  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  they  rolled  up  a  company  of  secret 
police  with  trucks.  They  herded  the  boys  into  the  trucks,  drove  them 
out  into  a  ravine  and  there  mowed  them  clown  with  machineguns. 

Senator  Welker.  In  what  year  was  this,  sir? 

Mr.  Marcus.  In  1941. 

I  will  take  you  now  to  the  city  of  Kharkov  in  the  Ukraine. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  this  of  your  own  knowledge? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  know  this :  In  1950  1  delivered  a  speech  to  about 
1,400  Russian  escapees  in  the  DP  camp  known  as  Schlesheim  near 
Munich.  There  were  people  in  that  city  from  Yoozovo  who  told  me. 
A  few  of  the  children  escaped. 

I  will  take  you  now  to  Kharkov.  On  Sovnarkomsky  Street  at  a 
certain  corner  there  stood  a  4-story  building.  It  had  also  4  stories 
under  the  ground  equipped  with  the  most  modern  crematorium  to 
burn  up  the  bodies  of  the  executed.  And  there,  just  before  the  Ger- 
mans were  to  occupy,  the  building  was  surrounded  by  secret  service 
men,  and  the  building  was  set  on  fire  with  everybody  in  the  building 
destroyed. 

In  the  city  of  Vinitza — I  am  giving  you  those  as  examples — what 
happened  in  Vinitza  and  Yoozovo  and  Kharkov  as  an  example  of 
w^hat  has  been  going  on  through  the  years,  the  famous  purge  was  go- 
ing on  just  before  the  war.  And  the  jail  had  rooms  to  accommodate 
16  to  18  people,  and  they  were  filled  with  50  or  100  or  150,  and  more 
were  being  brought  in  from  the  provinces,  and  there  was  no  more 
room. 

So  Moscow  gave  orders  to  liquidate  them.  Every  night  batches  of 
those  men  and  women  would  be  brought  down,  their  hands  tied  on 


146  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

their  back,  just  like  the  American  boys  were  executed  by  the  Chinese 
in  Korea,  and  as  they  were  having  their  hands  tied  other  secret-service 
men  would  pass  by  and  fire  bullets  into  the  back  of  the  heads.  Then 
another  batch  of  prisoners  would  be  brought  down  from  the  jail  to 
load  those  dead  bodies  into  the  trucks. 

They  buried  them  in  a  former  pear  orchard  that  belonged  to  a  for- 
mer Russian  merchant,  or  into  the  old  cemetery.  When  the  Germans 
occupied  finally  the  population  began  to  plead  with  them  that  there 
was  a  terrific  stench  coming  from  the  direction  of  those  places,  and, 
in  the  presence  of  an  international  medical  commission  made  up  of 
French,  Germans,  Italians,  and  all  the  other  people  that  they  had 
already  conquered,  the  Germans  had  conquered,  they  opened  up  the 
graves  and  found  9,446  bodies.  Among  them  was  the  body  of  a  man 
by  the  name  of  Godovanyets.  His  wife  has  written  to  Vishinsky 
asking  him  what  happened  to  her  husband,  and  he  wrote  back  and 
said,  "Your  husband  has  been  released." 

Sure,  he  has  been  released,  released  from  misery  and  suffering.  He 
was  one  of  the  bodies  found  in  that  grave. 

This  is  typical  of  what  has  been  going  on  in  other  countries.  You 
know  about  the  Katyn  Forest  Massacre  of  10,000  Polish  officers.  It 
was  done  with  a  purpose.  To  show  you  how  far-sighted,  how  far 
ahead  they  were,  in  1942,  while  America  was  straining  its  economy  to 
send  them  the  guns  and  the  bombers  and  the  food  and  clothing  and 
medicines,  while  our  boys  were  braving  the  submarine-infested  North 
Sea  to  try  to  deliver  that  equipment,  the  Soviet  Government  was 
already  training  soldiers  in  English  and  in  the  method  of  interro- 
gating American  and  English  prisoners  of  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  it  ludicrous  to  suggest  even  a  possibility  that  we 
could  sit  at  a  conference  table  to  bring  peace  to  the  world  with  men  who 
have  perpetrated  these  international  outrages? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  think  it  is  unquestionably  immoral  and  absolutely 
to  the  detriment  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  interrupt  to  go  back  through  this  testi- 
mony. There  is  some  testimony  that  perhaps  I  misunderstood.  I 
want  it  eminently  clear  in  the  record  as  best  you  can  give  it  under 
oath. 

You  have  stated  that  many  times  Soviet  citizens,  including  high 
government  functionaries,  have  asked  you,  begged  you  to  stop  trad- 
ing with  Russia.  I  believe  you  omitted  to  say  that  these  high  govern- 
ment functionaries  were  parading  as  Communists. 

Mr.  Marcus.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Welker.  But  at  heart  were  bitter  enemies  of  the  Commu- 
nist Government? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct,  Senator. 

Senator  Welker.  I  wanted  to  bring  that  out  because  you  omitted 
to  say  that. 

Mr.  Marcus.  That  is  perfectly  true.  Do  you  think  this  man  Sere- 
bryakov — he  was  one  of  the  top  men,  he  was  the  one  who  wrote  the 
constitution,  as  I  said,  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federated  Soviet 
Republics.  He  made  a  remark  to  me,  he  said,  "I  wrote  the  constitu- 
tion, and  look  who  is  running  Russia,  this  illiterate  brute." 

Of  course,  he  was  taking  his  life  into  his  own  hands.  All  I  had  to 
do  was  put  in  one  telephone  call  and  he  would  have  been  shot.  He 
was  shot  anyway  on  February  1, 1937. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  147 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  ask  a  question  or  two  to  clear  up  some  of  the 
areas  of  your  testimony. 

Mr.  Marcus,  what  is  your  reaction  to  the  suggestion  that,  after  all, 
our  Embassies  and  consulates  located  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  are 
listening  posts  for  information  for  our  Government  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Gentlemen,  is  there  a  listening  post  in  a  prison  ?  Our 
Embassies  have  been,  are,  and  will  continue  to  be,  as  long  as  we  main- 
tain diplomatic  relations  with  Eussians,  prisons.  They  cannot  stick 
their  noses  out.  They  are  afraid.  They  are  being  hounded  and 
hounded.  I  wouldn't  have  to  make  any  statement.  It  is  right  here  in 
this  book,  and  I  put  it  into  my  testimony. 

Our  good  friend  Bullitt — here  I  am  going  to  quote  you  a  very  little 
from  his  statement.  On  October  4,  1933 — and  this  is  very  important ; 
I  think  it  should  be  emphasized — we  went  into  this  recognition  of  the 
Soviet  Government  with  eyes  wide  open.  Six  days  before  President 
Roosevelt  started  negotiations  for  recognition  our  future  ambassador, 
Bullitt,  wrote  a  memorandum  to  Secretary  Hull,  dated  October  4, 
1933,  page  16  in  this  book,  in  which  he  said : 

Before  recognition  and  before  loans  we  shall  find  the  Soviet  Government 
relatively  amenable;  after  recognition  or  loans  we  should  find  the  Soviet 
Government  adamant. 

Precisely. 

Bullitt  did  not  have  to  wait  very  long  to  find  the  correctness  of  his 
statement.  Here  is  a  report  of  his  dated  August  21,  1935,  page  245 
in  this  book,  the  official  book  by  the  State  Department : 

American  diplomatic  representatives  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  harassed  and 
restricted.  As  the  Soviet  Union  grows  in  strength  it  will  grow  in  arrogance  and 
aggressiveness.  To  brealj  relations  would  satisfy  the  indignation  we  all  feel  and 
would  be  juridically  correct. 

That  far  I  went  with  my  good  friend  Bullitt,  but  then  I  disagreed 
wholeheartedly.  Then  he  said,  well,  the  Soviet  Union  is  going  to  be  a 
big  country,  an  important  factor  in  world  affairs.  We  have  to  have  a 
listening  post. 

And  that,  to  my  mind,  is  one  of  the  greatest  mistakes  that  we  made. 
We  should  have  broken  relations  right  there  and  then.  It  would  have 
been  one  of  the  severest  blows  to  the  Soviet  Government  because  the 
prestige  of  that  Government  would  have  been  terribly  hurt,  and  the 
people  of  Russia  would  have  gained  a  lot  of  encouragement  and 
emboldened  to  continue  their  resistance. 

Mr.  Chairman,  why  are  10  or  20  million  Russians  in  slave-labor 
camps  today  ?  "\Vliy  have  millions  perished  in  those  slave-labor  camps 
at  the  hands  of  executioners?  Because  they  have  been  kowtowing 
and  loving  their  government?  It  is  because  they  have  been  continuing 
their  resistance. 

The  Soviet  agricultural  population  will  never,  never  surrender  to 
the  collectivization. 

I  will  give  you  a  little  experience.  After  my  speech  in  Schlesheim, 
Germany,  a  little  fellow  introduced  himself  to  me.  He  was  an  escapee, 
a  former  officer  in  the  Red  army.  And  he  told  me  his  father  was  a 
poor  peasant  who  had  only  1  horse,  1  cow  and  a  few  pigs  and  very  little 
land.  But  when  the  collectivization  movement  started  he  refused  to 
join  the  collectivists.    There  was  a  reason  for  that. 


148  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

For  centuries  the  Russian  peasants  were  serfs.  In  1861  they  were 
freed.  By  1913,  Mr.  Chairman,  75  percent  of  the  peasants  of  Russia 
were  tilling  their  own  soil.  That  was  the  dream  that  had  been  the 
dream  for  centuries.  And  then  one  of  the  principal  promises  of  the 
Communists  to  the  Russian  people  in  1917  was  bread,  and  they  have 
given  them  perpetual  hunger;  land — they  have  taken  it  away  from 
them;  peace — they  have  given  them  perpetual  war  at  home  and 
abroad ;  freedom  from  oppression  by  the  secret  police — and  they  have 
given  them  a  secret  police  system  that  the  world  has  never  been  able 
to  even  fathom  the  extent  of  it. 

Now  this  little  fellow  said  to  me,  "My  father  and  whole  family  w^ere 
bundled  up  and  shipped  to  Siberia.  Mother  died  on  the  way,  and 
father  diecl  soon  after  they  arrived." 

So  the  poor  little  boys  were  scattered  to  various  schools,  and  he 
become  an  officer,  a  lieutenant.  He  said,  "The  first  time  I  received 
orders  to  go  into  battle  against  the  Germans  I  deserted  and  took  my 
whole  company  with  me.  We  never  forgave  nor  forgot,"  quoting 
him,  "what  the  Soviet  Government  had  done  to  our  parents." 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  inquire  ? 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  A  moment  ago  you  stated  that  our  embassies  or 
our  emissaries  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  were  really  prisoners  and  not 
listening  posts.  Do  you  have  an  observation  with  respect  to  the  time 
when  Russia  invited  a  number  of  prominent  labor  leaders  to  the  Soviet 
country  and  showed  to  them  what  was  presented  to  us,  at  least,  before 
this  committee,  as  the  glorious  democracy  and  the  wonderful  economy 
and  peace  of  Russia  ?  Now  if  you  say  our  officers  are  prisoners  how 
about  this  invitation? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Senator,  those  officers  represent  the  capitalists,  and 
these  labor  leaders  represent  the  workers,  and  that  is  what  they  want, 
to  dupe  the  workers  of  America.  Do  you  know,  gentlemen,  that  in 
Russia  the  worker  is  being  assessed  from  his  wages  every  week  so  much 
to  help  maintain  the  starving  workers  in  the  United  States?  Of 
course,  the  Russian  workers  don't  believe  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  reverting  for  the  moment  into  this  ques- 
tion of  East- West  trade,  on  which  you  are  an  expert,  what  is  your 
reaction  to  the  suggestion  that  the  West  needs  certain  commodities 
which  can  be  procured  only  from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain?  In  other 
words,  to  what  extent  is  the  West  dependent  upon  East-AVest  trade? 

Mr.  Marcus.  That  is  absolutely  untrue.  The  East-West  trade 
amounted  to — it  is  known  there  is  a  lot  of  illegal  East- West  trade 
going  on,  and  I  have  treated  that  in  an  article  on  the  subject — what 
is  known,  and  this  is  from  official  sources — you  have  the  figures 
there — is  about  $550  million  a  year.  That  trade  is  absolutely  non- 
essential as  far  as  the  Europeon,  as  far  as  the  free  world  is  concerned, 
and  I  Avill  tell  you  why. 

Every  item  that  they  are  getting  from  Russia  they  could  easily 
obtain  in  the  United  States,  in  Canada  and  Latin  America.  We  are 
giving  away  billions  to  our  so-called  allies  who  are  insisting  upon 
this  East-West  trade.  It  would  be  far  cheaper  to  the  United  States 
to  subsidize  the  exportation  to  them  of  the  items  which  they  are  buy- 
ing from  Russia  today,  or  even  to  buy  some  of  the  things  that  they 
have  to  sell  in  order  to  avoid  it. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  149 

I  would  call  it  preclusive  buying  and  preclusive  selling  because  that 
would  keep  from  the  Russians  the  most  strategic  items  like  ships 
and  cranes  and  lathes  and  electrical  equipment  which,  all  of  it,  goes 
for  war  purposes. 

Also,  Mr.  Chairman,  remember  this,  and  you  will  find  this  in  volume 
18,  page  385,  Collected  AVorks  by  Lenin,  and  I  am  quoting : 

As  soon  as  we  are  strong  enough  to  destroy  the  whole  capitalist  world  we 
will  grab  him  by  the  collar — 

by  Lenin. 

Was  that  just  a  wild  boast  by  a  maniac?  Oh,  no.  Look  at  it. 
Since  1915  what  has  happened  ?  Six  hundred  and  fifty  million  people 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain.  This  is  the  answer — 650  million  people  not 
grabbed  by  the  collar  but  by  the  throat.  And  let  no  one  tell  you,  or 
Mr.  Stassen  tell  you,  the  nonsense  that  this  is  going  to  help  improve 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Russian  people. 

I  am  going  to  show  you  what  is  happening  in  an  article  in  the 
American  Legion  magazine  entitled  "The  Reds  Reach  for  Your 
Wallet." 

Mr.  Arens.  In  what  month  and  year  is  that? 

Mr.  Marcus.  August  1950. 

Half  a  million  extra  copies  were  printed  of  this  article.  You  will 
find  on  page  59,  and  this  is  something  that  I  think  President  Eisen- 
hower would  do  well  to  take  note  of : 

On  May  19,  1951,  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Communist  International 
(the  old  Comintern  now  renamed  the  Cominform)  worked  out  a  blueprint  for 
the  future  conquest  of  the  Balkan  countries.  For  example,  section  (e)  of  the 
first  paragraph  stipulates : 

"Once  power  has  been  seized  by  the  party" — 

by  the  Communist  Party — 

"foreign  policy  will  be  laid  down  by  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  who  will  receive  the  necessary  directives  from  the  Comintern." 

Paragraph  2  makes  this  significant  statement : 

"The  country  where  the  central  committee  of  the  Communist  Party  has 
recently  assumed  power  should  not  apply  for  inclusion  in  the  Soviet  Union  until 
the  necessary  instructions  to  this  effect  have  been  received  from  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Comintern,  now  the  Cominform." 

That  is  why  President  Eisenhower  is  in  error  when  he  says  that 
Red  China  and  the  satellites  are,  after  all,  different  from  Russia. 
They  are  not  different  from  Russia.  The  final  step  has  not  been 
attended  to.  '\A^iy?  They  have  time.  The  Chinese  Communists 
have  to  master,  they  have  to  execute  20  million  people  there.  That  is 
official.  That  was  brought  to  the  American  Communist  Party.  And 
Frank  Cvetic  told  me  that.  They  have  to  execute  20  million  people 
there.  They  have  in  the  satellite  countries  the  same.  They  have  to 
execute  all  the  people  like  we  are,  capitalists,  don't  you  see,  and 
intellectuals.     But  here  is  the  law 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  as  a  member  of  the  board  of  directors  of 
the  American  Friends  of  Russian  Freedom,  and  as  one  who  is  in 
intimate  contact  with  the  underground  in  Russia,  could  you  express  to 
this  committee  your  opinion  as  to  what  would  be  the  psychological 
effect  of  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  on  the  rank  and  file 
of  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  It  would  be  the  most  electrifying,  stimulating,  inspir- 
ing act  that  we  could  give  to  the  Russian  people  since  1917.   They  have 


150  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

said  to  me,  "Drive  them  out  of  the  United  Nations.  Drive  them  out 
of  your  country.  They  are  the  plague."  And  they  are.  We  are 
dealing  here  with  a  power  that  can  never,  never  change.  They  can  talk 
from  now  until  doomsday  about  coexistence,  but  they  don't  mean  it. 
It  is  all  done  for  the  purpose  of  catching  the  gullibles  and  getting 
more. 

Now,  technology  does  not  stand  still.  About  the  only  invention — 
and  now  I  am  speaking  as  a  native  Russian — the  only  invention  that 
Russia  can  boast  of  as  truly  Russian  is  the  samovar  and  the  balalaika. 
Everything  else  has  been  stolen  from  abroad.  A  samovar  is  a  con- 
traption which  boils  water  for  tea  on  the  table,  and  the  balalaika  is  a 
musical  instrument,  a  three-quarter  musical  instrument. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  be  disposed,  Mr.  Marcus,  to  give  a  brief 
thumbnail  sketch  of  the  events  causing  the  recognition  of  the  Soviet 
Union  ?  I  see  you  have  covered  that  in  your  prepared  statement,  with 
which  the  staff  has  been  conversant  heretofore. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Pardon  me.    I  didn't  quite  get  the  question. 

Mr.  Arens.  Give  a  resume  of  the  events  leading  to  the  recognition  of 
Soviet  Russia,  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  recognition. 

Mr.  Marcus.  The  statesmen  of  America,  prior  to  1933,  Republicans 
and  Democrats  alike,  did  not  have  to  become  bedfellows  of  the  Soviet 
Government  in  order  to  realize  that  it  was  absolutely  futile  and  to 
the  detriment  of  the  United  States  interests  to  have  recognition.. 
There  was  a  man  by  the  name  of  Walter  Duranty  on  the  New  York 
Times.  He  used  to  imbibe  a  great  deal  of  vodka.  He  once  drank  a 
whole  quart  of  vodka  at  my  dinner  table  in  the  Moscow  International 
Hotel.  He,  to  my  mind,  contributed  more  than  any  other  corre- 
spondent in  the  world  toward  befuddling  and  bamboozling  Americans 
into  ultimate  recognition. 

There  was  another  character  by  the  name  of  Lincoln  Steffens,  the 
late  Lincoln  Steffens.  He  and  Bullitt  were  sent  to  Moscow  in  1918 
by  the  late  President  Wilson,  just  to  take  a  look  at  things.  He  came 
back  and  upon  arriving  heralded  the  grand  news  to  the  world:  "I 
have  seen  the  future,  and  it  works." 

Imagine  a  man  who  spent  about  6  days  in  Russia,  didn't  know  a 
word  of  Russian,  and  so  early  in  the  game — when  I  told  that  to 
Mikoyan  on  board  ship,  on  the  steamship  Normandie  in  October  1936, 
I  was  traveling  with  Mikoyan  on  the  same  ship,  and  I  met  him  and 
his  wife,  and  I  was  having  business  relations  with  him.  I  tried  to 
sell  him  a  $20,300  machine  for  $185,000.  I  asked  a  quarter  of  a  million 
dollars,  but  he  wouldn't  give  it  to  me.  He  said,  "You  are  a  highway 
robber,  aren't  you  ?" 

I  told  him  very  frankly  the  machine  cost  us  $20,300  to  make.  He 
said,  "Wliy  are  you  asking  a  quarter  of  a  million  ?" 

I  said,  "I  know  what  you  are  going  to  do.  You  are  going  to  buy 
one  machine  and  copy  it."  I  said,  "You  have  to  pay  us  for  the  blue- 
prints and  so  on." 

When  I  told  him  about  this  statement  of  Lincoln  Steffens  he  said, 
"Why,  Lenin,  Trotsky,  and  I,  none  of  us,  had  that  confidence  in  our 
survival  that  this  man  had." 

For  years  and  years  they  didn't  have  any  confidence  in  their  sur- 
vival. And  it  would  have  taken  very  little,  especially  in  1921  when 
the  Kronstadt  uprising  took  place  in  Kronstadt  Fortress  near  I^enin- 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  151 

grad.  The  men  who  helped  bring  about  the  Soviet  Government  were 
the  sailors  of  Kronstadt.  When  they  saw  that  they  had  been  deceived, 
that  their  fathers  had  been  robbed  of  the  land  instead  of  having  car- 
ried out  the  promise,  they  revolted  and,  of  course,  they  were  executed, 
drowned  in  blood  by  Trotsky. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Marcus,  do  you  care  to  give  us  a  thumbnail  sketch 
of  your  experiences  regarding  the  Soviet  penetration  into  American 
finance  and  American  industry,  into  American  industrial  establish- 
ments via  their  trade  missions  and  delegations  which  have  been  oper- 
ating in  the  United  States? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Shakespeare  said,  and  I  quote,  "There  is  no  darkness 
but  ignorance."  And  ignorance  has  been  our  greatest  enemy;  the 
ignorance  prevailing  in  the  circles  of  our  financiers  and  our  indus- 
trialists is  simply  inexplicable  and  inexcusable. 

Mr.  Arens.  "\A^iat  do  you  mean  by  that? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  mean  by  that — you  take,  for  instance,  here  is  the 
president  of  a  steel  corporation,  Mr.  Weir.  He  keeps  on  telling  why 
we  should  do  everything  to  bring  about  better  coexistence.  I  think 
that  that  man  should  address  his  great  wisdom  not  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  not  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  but  to  the 
mummy  in  the  mausoleum  in  Red  Square,  to  Lenin. 

Senator  Welker.  That  same  philosophy  was  used  in  1947  after 
Czechoslovakia  had  been  taken  over  by  Russia  when  we  still  shipped 
them  railroad  trains.    Am  I  correct? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Correct.  And  it  is  the  same  mentality  as  you  will 
see  even  today.  President  Eisenliower  and  Mr.  Stassen  still  talk 
about  China  and  the  satellite  nations — "Oh,  they  are  separate  and 
apart  from  Russia."  It  is  one  big  blot.  The  trouble  with  us  is  that 
we  are  thinking  in  our  Anglo-Saxon  terminology.  Here  we  have 
allies.  It  seems  to  me  that  now,  of  all  the  times,  we  should  be  as 
tight  as  you  could  make  us,  because  we  are  fighting  for  our  existence. 
They  are  absolutely  out  to  destroy  us.  They  have  said  that  time  and 
time  again.    We  gullibles  have  not  taken  them  seriously. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  they  destroy  us  economically?  Do  they  have  the 
potential  and  capacity  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Yes.  Give  them  another  10  years,  if  there  is  no  una- 
nimity between  our  country  and,  let's  say,  England.  Right  now, 
when  we  are  still  pumping  billions  of  dollars  into  England  and  they 
go  ahead  and  supply  such  strategic  materials  as  cranes  and  lathes  and 
ships  and  everything  else  of  that  nature,  then  how  do  you  expect  there 
is  going  to  be  any  unanimity  later  with  South  and  Central  America 
when  they  start  pumping  into  those  countries  manufactured  goods  as  a 
result  of  having  stolen  our  technology  ?  You  see  we  are  really  stupid, 
and  there  is  no  possible  excuse  for  it.  I  say  ignorance  because  it  is 
exactly  the  word. 

Lenin  said,  and  I  am  quoting  liim — you  will  find  it  in  volume  17, 
pages  22-23,  Russian  edition : 

We  have  never  concealed  the  fact  that  our  revolution  is  only  the  beginning, 
that  it  vpill  lead  to  a  victorious  ending  only  then  when  we  shall  have  inflamed 
the  whole  world  with  its  revolutionary  fires. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  ask  a  few  questions  here,  and  then  I  prom- 
ise I  will  not  interrupt  any  more. 


152  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

This  witness  is  very  profound,  but  this  is  for  my  information,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Are  you  familiar  with  an  organization  known  as 
Amtorg  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  Certainly. 

Senator  Welker.  Will  you  describe  that  to  the  committee,  please? 

Mr.  Marcus.  The  Amtorg  is  a  New  York-incorporated  organization. 
There  was  only  one  American  on  the  board  of  directors,  and,  strange 
as  it  may  sound,  he  was  a  classmate  of  mine  in  the  George  Washington 
University  here.  His  name  is  Dr.  Ohsol.  He  is  a  graduate  of  Har- 
vard University,  not  a  Communist,  but  he  is  afraid  to  talk  because  he 
has  relatives  in  Latvia.    He  is  a  Latvian,  originally. 

I  was  in  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Affairs  on  the  11th 
floor,  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  for  which  he  was  working — 
he  was  one  of  the  top  investigators,  he  was  an  economist,  on  the  seventh 
floor.  So  we  met  in  the  George  Washington  University.  He  was  the 
only  board  member.  Otherwise,  it  is  a  100-percent  Soviet  Govern- 
ment-owned organization. 

That  organization  was  mistaken  by  a  great  many  American  firms  as 
an  American  organization,  and  is  just  an  agency  of  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment in  reality.  They  had  the  entree ;  they  had  very  high  type  of- 
ficials like  Bogdanoff,  Peter  Bogdanoff.  By  the  way,  he  has  already 
been  executed,  too ;  liquidated.  He  was  of  the  old  aristocracy  of  Rus- 
sia. You  see  they  used  that  kind  of  people  for  a  time,  and  now  they 
don't  need  them  any  more.  And  he  made  a  wonderful  entree  to  bank- 
ing houses  and  to  institutions,  industrial  institutions.  I  might  say 
that  I  myself  have  negotiated  a  $30  million  deal  for  the  Studebaker 
Corp.  in  Russia  in  1927  and  1928.     It  fell  through. 

Senator  Welker.  Now  that  you  have  described  Amtorg  to  us  do 
you  happen  to  know  a  gentleman  by  the  name  of  David  Davis  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  David  Davis?     No,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  You  are  not  familiar  with  the  fact  that  he  was 
the  leading  Communist  official  of  the  American  Communist  Party  and 
has  been  on  the  payroll  of  Amtorg  in  New  York,  the  Soviet  trading 
agency  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  had  dealings  with  the  engineering  department. 

Senator  Welker.  Do  you  know  a  gentleman  by  the  name  of  George 
Mink  of  the  Soviet  GPU? 

Mr.  Marcus.  George  Mink?     No,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  I  will  ask  you  this  question.  Do  you  have  any 
information  about  whether  or  not  the  Soviet  conspiracy  has  tried 
and  has,  in  effect,  infiltrated  Central  America  for  many  years? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  was  in  Mexico  City  in  April  1951.  There  was  a 
philological  congress  of  all  of  Latin  America  held  in  the  city,  and 
I  am  somewhat  of  a  T)hilologist,  although  since  I  met  a  Russian  who 
knew  41  languages  I  stopped  talking  about  myself  as  a  philologist. 

I  was  invited  to  that  congress  just  for  the  cocktail  party  and  I  was 
introduced  there  to  the  former  Ambassador  of  Mexico. 

Senator  Welker.  What  was  his  name? 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  don't  remember  his  name.  The  Mexican  Ambas- 
sador to  Russia. 

Senator  Welker.  Oumansky? 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  153 

Mr.  Marcus.  Not  Oumansky ;  he  was  dead  at  that  time.  It  is  too 
bad  he  didn't  die  before.  And  there,  the  man  who  introduced  me  to 
him  said  hiter  on  that  he  is  one  of  the  most  important  Soviet  agents 
in  Mexico.     Now  Mexico  has  been  infiltrated  to  a  terrific  extent. 

Guatemahi  at  that  time  was  ah'eady  known  to  me.  It  is  only  now 
has  it  come  to  the  forefront.  You  see,  in  Latin  America,  I  will  tell 
you  very  candidly,  3'ou  can  buy  everybody  from  the  President  down. 
And  the  Soviet  Union  doesn't  care.  What  does  it  mean  to  them? 
Tens  of  thousands  of  slaves  are  digging  gold  and  they  can  afford 
it.  For  instance,  in  1947  Russia  was  going  through  a  terrific  famine. 
Did  anybody  in  this  country  ever  hear  about  it  ?  No.  Why  ?  Because 
our  press  representatives,  they  are  also  prisoners  and  none  of  them 
know  the  Russian  language. 

So  the  result  was  this :  the  Soviet  Government,  despite  the  famine, 
shipped  shiploads  of  grain  to  Italy  and  to  France.  "\Vliy  ?  For  prop- 
aganda purposes,  to  embolden,  to  stir  up  the  workers  and  the  Com- 
munists in  those  respective  points. 

Speaking  about  the  blunders  that  we  have  made,  it  simply  would 
take  us  days  and  days,  and  inexcusable  blunders. 

Senator  Welker.  I  think  I  will  take  judical  notice  of  that. 

Mr.  Marcus.  When  the  EGA,  for  instance,  came  into  being — and 
I  am  an  old  friend  of  Paul  Hoffman,  although  I  don't  think  he  is 
going  to  be  a  friend  of  mine  now — I  pleaded  with  him  a  few  days 
after  he  came  into  office.  I  repeated  what  I  said  in  the  New  York 
University  in  November  1947,  long  before  the  EGA  Act  was  passed. 
I  told  the  students  of  the  New  York  University  that  all  the  billions 
that  the  Marshall  plan  would  pump  into  Europe  and  all  the  billions 
of  NATO  would  accomplish  nothing  unless,  parallel  to  those  two 
actions,  we  carried  on  a  terrific,  savage  campaign  in  Italy  and  France 
against  the  Gommunist  movement  in  those  respective  countries  and 
at  the  same  time  go  on  the  liberation  offensive.  That  is  what  we 
have  been  negligent  in. 

The  result  was  this:  They  pooh-poohed  that  idea.  "We  must  not 
tell  the  French  and  the  Italian  Government  what  to  do  in  their  own 
country." 

We  have  pumped  billions  and  billions  of  dollars  in,  and  look  at  it. 
One  out  of  every  three  in  Italy  is  still  voting  the  Gomnumist  Party, 
and  one  out  of  four  is  still  voting  the  Gommunist  Party  in  France 
because  we  did  nothing  in  that  respect. 

Senator  Welker.  My  final  question,  Mr.  Gliairman. 

The  Ghairman.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Marcus,  the  chairman  of  this  subcommittee. 
Senator  Jenner,  has  assigned  me  to  head  the  task  force  to  go  out  to 
the  west  coast  and  investigate  the  infiltration  of  Gommunists  who  are 
coming  to  our  country  from  the  borders  of  Mexico,  if  that  exists. 
Do  you  think  that  is  a  pretty  wholesome  thing  for  us  to  do? 

Mr.  INIarcus.  I  am  afraid.  Senator,  that  the  people  who  are  really 
doing  the  infiltrating  you  won't  catch. 

Senator  Welker.  I  must  differ  with  you  tiiere.  We  will  probably 
not  catch  them  all,  but  I  think  we  will  get  a  bite  while  somebody  else 
is  getting  a  mouthful. 

Mr.  Marcus.  I  think  a  far  better  thing  to  do  would  be,  in  my  mind, 
what  I  have  been  advocating  for  years.     History  has  catapulted 


154  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

America  into  a  very  difficult  position,  the  leader  of  the  world  to  save 
the  Christian  civilization  from  this  nightmare,  this  Commmiist  night- 
mare. And,  unfortunately,  we  have  been  going  about  it  like  amateurs. 
Every  man  that  they  have  had,  for  instance,  handling  the  psycho- 
logical warfare  was  an  amateur,  and,  to  my  mind,  anyone  who  takes 
on  a  job  of  that  nature  without  the  background  and  without  the 
training  and  experience  is  just  as  criminally  liable  as  if  I  were  to 
perform  a  surgical  operation  on  a  patient.    That  has  been  going  on. 

Now,  we  have  to  have,  just  as  the  Soviet  Government  has  spent 
money  on  training  schools  to  train  people  to  destroy  civilization  that 
we  know  and  cherish,  so  we  have  to  have  schools  and  train  men  and 
women  who  will  dedicate  their  lives,  not  just  between  golf  playing  or 
between  cat,  dog,  doll,  and  fashion  shows  like  our  women  are  indulg- 
ing, but  really  dedicate  their  lives  to  destroy  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
Soviet  Government. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Marcus,  you  realize  that  this  committee  was 
born  with  one  of  its  principal  duties  to  alert  the  American  people  to 
the  dangers  that  might  affect  the  internal  security  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  if  our  task  force  is  successful  in  showing  to  the  Amer- 
ican people  that  we,  in  fact,  do  have  hordes  of  Communists  coming 
across  the  line  on  the  west  coast,  that  would  be  some  help  at  least  in 
carrying  out  our  duties  assigned  to  us  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States. 

Mr.  Marcus.  There  is  no  question  about  it.  But  I  maintain  that  we 
should  also — for  instance,  I  have  been  wanting  the  American  business- 
men— the  international  traders  who  are  so  gullible,  so  ignorant  on  this 
subject — to  organize  a  committee  to  go  to  Latin  America  and  to  talk 
to  their  counterpart,  the  exporters  and  importers.  We  have  a  power- 
ful organization.  Do  you  know  we  could  throttle  the  Communist  bloc 
if  we  ever  got  to  do  something  because  we  know  their  tricks  ?  We  could 
stop  the  illegal  sales  of  strategic  materials  and  equipment  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  satellites.    But  you  just  can't  get  them  together. 

Senator  Welker.  They  have  been  dragging  their  feet,  in  other 
words. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Worse  than  that.  May  I  tell  that  in  the  text  of  the 
testimony?  In  1950  the  Exporters  Club— not  that  I  am  trying  to 
invite  myself— but  a  man  like  I  have  never  appeared  before  that  Ex- 
porters Club  in  New  York.  But  a  Mrs.  Vera  Dean,  the  research  direc- 
tor of  the  American  Foreign  Policy  Association,  who  has  been  preach- 
ing all  over  the  United  States  before  business  organizations  on  east- 
west  trade,  she  appeared  there.  And  when  she  got  through  I  gave  her 
plenty.  She  will  never  forget  that  tongue  lashing  I  gave  her.  I  talked 
to  a  great  many  people  in  the  audience,  and  they  all  agreed  with  her. 
Not  one  of  them,  upon  questioning  by  me,  had  been  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
Not  one  of  them  had  ever  read  a  book  about  communism  in  practice 
or  communism  in  theory.  And  one  of  them  even  made  a  confession 
that  for  2  years  he  had  had  on  his  library  shelf  Kravchenko's  book, 
I  Chose  Freedom,  but  had  never  read  a  line. 
How  do  you  expect  them  to  understand  what  I  am  talking  about  ? 
The  American  Mercury  published  an  article  of  mine  which  no 
magazine  in  the  United  States  would  publish,  entitled  "A  Boycott 
Long  Overdue." 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  155 

Senator  Welker.  What  date  is  that,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  November  1953.    I  had  it  for  a  year. 

Senator  Welker.  I  wonder  if  that  could  be  incorporated  by  refer- 
ence. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  incorporated  by  reference. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Marcus  Exhibit  No.  2"  and 
filed  for  the  information  of  the  committee.) 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  concluded  my  questions,  and  I  want  to 
thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  have  two  brief  areas  to  cover  with  you  now,  Mr. 
Marcus. 

Do  you  have  information  respecting  Soviet  pilfering  of  patents  and 
patentable  items  in  the  United  States? 

]\Ir.  Marcus.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  cover  that  extemporaneously  very  briefly, 
please  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  To  begin  with,  first,  as  to  know  what  to  pilfer,  that  is 
easy.  For  25  cents — it  used  to  cost  10  cents  and  now  25  cents  at  the 
Patent  Office,  you  can  know  exactly  what  is  going  on  in  the  American 
patent  field.  Then  you  set  out  to  reach  that  particular  industry  where 
this  is  being  produced.  And  how  is  that  done  ?  Well,  Browder  told 
the  Comintern  Conference  in  1930,  and  you  will  find  it  right  here, 
reported — no;  1935;  I  beg  your  pardon — reported  by  the  State  De- 
partment. He  told  that  as  of  1930  the  Communists  in  the  United 
States  had  500  cells  in  strategic  industries  embracing  about  1  million 
workers.  That  was  before  recognition.  Imagine  what  it  is  today.  So 
they  go  ahead  and  tell  the  boys  in  those  various — it  is  so  easy,  you 
know.  I  have  worked  in  factories.  It  is  so  easy  to  infiltrate  a  blue- 
print or  a  shop  drawing  at  night  and  have  it  photostated  during  the 
night  and  deliver  it  in  the  morning  and  nothing  has  been  detected. 
Why?  Because  our  employees  are  always  so  gullible  that  they 
haven't  the  f ainest  idea  how  to  protect  their  interests. 

The  majority  of  workers  in  American  industry  are  loyal  American 
citizens,  but  they  are  so  ignorant  about  the  Communist  conspiracy, 
and  nothing  is  being  done  to  bring  it  to  their  attention  so  they  could 
watch  those  few  infiltrated  Communists  to  keep  them  from  stealing 
them. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  just  inquire  briefly  in  one  other  area.  That  is,  on 
the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience  in  years  gone  past  before 
the  fabulous  rise  which  you  have  had  in  the  industrial  world,  have  you 
had  occasion  to  reach  conclusions  in  your  own  mind  respecting  the 
relationship  which  exists  between  the  immigration  system  in  the 
United  States  and  the  Communist  penetration?  In  other  words, 
is  the  Communist  conspiracy  in  the  United  States  a  weed  which  has 
been  transplanted  from  abroad  via  the  loopholes  in  the  immigration 
system  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  It  isn't  a  very  pleasant  thing  for  me  to  answer  that 
question  the  way  I  must  answer  it  under  oath.  Unfortunately,  very 
few  Americans,  naturalized  Americans,  feel  the  sense  of  indebtedness 
to  the  United  States  that  a  few  of  us  do  feel.  The  Socialist  move- 
ment was  brought  into  this  country  by  immigrants  to  whom  the  doors 
were  swung  wide  open.  And  the  opportunities — most  of  them  came 
without  a  shirt  on  their  backs,  and  here  they  have  amassed  fortunes ; 


156  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

here  they  have  assumed  positions  in  the  industrial  and  economic  and 
all  other  fields.  The  Communist  movement  was  a  direct  outgrowth 
of  these  alien  and  naturalized  citizens.  I  know  a  great  many  of  them. 
I  know  one  case  of  a  man  that  I  sometimes  can't  sleep  when  I  think 
of  that  man. 

There  was  a  man  who  came  to  this  country  at  the  age  of  15  and 
went  out  peddling  on  Delancey  Street.  By  the  time  he  was  40  he 
was  already  a  multimillionnaire.  He  was  one  of  the  leaders  in  the 
Socialist  movement  in  1919.  He  helped  form  the  Communist  move- 
ment and  then  went  to  Kussia  to  create  there  the  acetylene-gas  industry. 
And  they  treated  him — I  used  to  be  in  Russia  during  those  days  as  a 
buyer  for  American  Hair  &  Felt  Co.  I  used  to  come  there  to  accept 
merchandise,  cattle  hair,  raw  materials  which  we  needed  badly  at 
that  time.  And  I  found  his  wife  used  to  cry  to  me.  She  would  say, 
"They  spit  at  him ;  they  call  him  bourgeois." 

Imagine.  For  a  Communist  to  call  you  bourgeois  is  for  a  high  priest 
to  be  called  an  atheist.  And  yet  it  carried  on  and  it  carried  on,  and 
then  they  virtually  threw  him  out  of  there  and  paid  him  out  of  the 
investment  he  made,  and  he  had  a  concession  for  15  years. 

He  came  back,  and  what  did  he  do  ?  Did  he  become  a  good  Ameri- 
can ?    Oh,  no.    He  continued  to  carry  on. 

I  don't  have  to  tell  you— it  is  in  the  record  here  where  a  former 
Attorney  General  testified  before  a  Senate  committee— I  don't  know 
which— that  91.4  percent  of  the  leaders  of  the  Communist  movement 
of  the  United  States  were  of  foreign  origin  or  married  to  foreigners. 
To  me  it  is  a  very  painful  thing  and  in  which  I  think  I  have  probably 
failed  to  do  a  very  important  task,  and  that  is  to  go  after  the  natural- 
ized citizens  of  America.  I  can  talk  to  them,  whereas  they  would  not 
take  it  from  a  native  born.  I  am  sure  they  would  take  it  from  a 
naturalized  citizen  to  tell  them  they  are  not  good  Americans,  that 
they  are  betraying  the  trust  of  this  country  unless  they  become  leaders 
in  the  forefront  of  this  struggle  against  the  Soviet  Union. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  hope  nobody  will  get  the  impression  that  I  am  ad- 
vocating war.  It  isn't  necessary.  On  the  contrary,  I  am  bending  all 
my  efforts  toward  preventing  a  third  world  war,  and  we  can  still 
do  that. 

Whereas  the  Soviet  Government  has  in  this  country,  let  us  say — 
take  J.  Edgar  Hoover's  figure  of  25,000  hard-core  Communists,  or  even 
50,000  or  100,000 ;  we  have  200  millions  of  Russians  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain.  We  have  millions  in  the  satellite  countries  and  in  China 
who  are  with  us.  But  there  is  no  movement  except  the  little  thing  we 
have  tried  with  the  American  Friends  of  Russian  Freedom. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  be  a  step  to- 
ward war  or  a  step  toward  avoiding  war  ? 

Mr.  Marcus.  On  the  contrary,  it  will  scare  the  Soviet  Govermnent 
to  death  from  starting  a  war. 

Here  is  a  recent  escapee.  This  is  the  Russian,  and  this  is  a  Russian 
paper  published  in  San  Francisco.  And  the  escapee  by  name  is 
Andrei  Ivanovich  Novoshichi.  I  think  this  ought  to  go  into  the 
record;  it  is  very  interesting.  In  other  words,  he  says  that  if  the 
Soviet  Government  should  start  a  war  the  soldiers  will  not  fight  for 
the  Soviet  Government  and  will  destroy  the  Soviet  Government. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  157 

Mr.  Arens.  Through  the  years  you  have  from  time  to  time  been 
in  consultation  witli  our  staff  in  the  development  of  the  Immigra- 
tion and  Nationality  Act,  the  McCarran-Walter  Act.  On  the  basis 
of  your  background  and  experience,  what  would  be  the  effect  upon 
the  security  of  the  United  States  if  the  new  security  provisions  of  the 
McCarran-Walter  Act  were  knocked  out,  as  some  groups  and  organ- 
izations and  people  are  trying  to  do  at  the  present  time? 

Mr.  JMarcus.  I  think  it  will  be  the  greatest  service  to  the  Kremlin. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  have  no  further  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Marcus.  Not  at  all. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  is  adjourned. 

(Whereupon,  at  11 :  55  a.  m.,  the  committee  was  recessed,  subject 
to  the  call  of  the  Chair.) 

X 


^'- ..'  ,1  /c^ii 
STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM     ^ 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIED  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 
ON 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF 
WORLD  COMMUNISM 


JULY  1  AND  8,  1954 


PART  3 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  ou  the  Judiciary 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
47769°  WASHINGTON  :   1954 


Eaf/jon  Public  Library 
ouperintendent  of  Documents 

SEP  8-1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota,  Chairman 

ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana  HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia 

ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  ESTES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee 

EVERETT  MCKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  Jr.,  Missouri 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  AND  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  I'AT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Task  Force  Investigating  the  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  World  Communism 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

RiCHAUD  Arens,  Special  Counsel 

n 


CONTENTS 

Testimony  of—  Page 

Garbuny,  Siegfried 172 

Taylor,  Henry  J 189 

Utley,   Freda 159 


STKATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,  JULY   1,   1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 
or  THE  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  O, 
The  subcommittee  met  at  11 :  15  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  224, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Herman  Welker,  presiding. 
Present :  Senator  Herman  Welker. 

Also   present:   Richard   Arens,  special   counsel;    and   Frank  W. 
Schroeder  and  Edward  E.  Duffy,  professional  staff  members. 
Senator  "Welker.  The  meeting  will  come  to  order. 
'Who  is  your  first  witness  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  first 
witness  to  be  sworn  and  to  testify  is  Miss  Freda  Utley. 
Senator  Welker.  Will  you  rise. 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  will  give  before  the 
committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth, 
so  help  you  God  ? 
Miss  Utley.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  FREDA  UTLEY,  WASHINGTON,  D.  0. 

Mr.  Arens.  State  your  name,  residence,  and  occupation. 

Miss  Utley.  Freda  Utley,  1717  20th  Street  NW.,  Washington, 
D.  C.   I  am  an  author,  writer,  lecturer,  et  cetera. 

Senator  Welker.  You  may  i)roceed,  Counsel. 

Mr.  Arens.  Will  you  kindly  give  the  committee  a  brief  resume  of 
your  background  and  experience  with  particular  reference  to  your 
experience  in  the  Communist  operations.  Communist  conspiracy  ? 

Miss  Utley.  I  am  born  English,  and  I  joined  the  Communist  Party 
in  England  beginning  in  1928  when  I  was  a  fellow  at  the  London 
School  of  Economics.  Also,  when  I  was  about  to  stand  for  Parliament 
in  the  Tabor  interests.  In  joining  the  Communist  Party  I  made  a 
public  statement  to  the  press.  That  same  year  I  went  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  subsequently  to  the  Far  East  with  my  husband. 

I  married  a  Russian  in  1928  and  went  subsequently  to  live  in  the 
Soviet  Union  after  a  period  in  the  East  at  the  end  of  1930.  I  was  6 
years  living  in  Russia  as  a  Russian,  as  the  wife  of  a  Russian. 

In  1931  I  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  as  I  was 
already  completely  and  thoroughly  disillusioned  with  life  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  with  communism.  I  had  learned  the  facts ;_  the  reality  as 
against  its  pretensions.    I  ceased  to  be  a  Communist  in  1931. 

Senator  Welker.  You  learned  that  in  Russia  ? 

159 


160  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Miss  Utley.  I  learned  that  in  Russia  by  bitter  personal  experience. 
I  learned  it  very  fast.  I  had  tliought  when  I  joined  the  party — I  was 
one  of  those  young  people  who  foolishly  believed  that  communism 
would  bring  social  justice,  a  better  social  order — that  it  was  a  liberal 
movement.  I  learned  after  going  to  live  in  the  Soviet  Union  that  it 
was  the  greatest  tyranny  the  world  had  ever  seen. 

As  I  have  also  put  in  my  statement  here,  I  also  came  to  realize  by 
living  in  the  Soviet  Union  this  was  not  just  a  question  of  Stalin  having 
gotten  power,  but  the  bases  of  communism  must  lead  to  that  develop- 
ment into  a  tyranny  everywhere  in  the  world;  that  is,  a  materialist 
philosophy  and  tlieir  belief  that  the  end  justifies  the  means,  and  their 
use  of  any  methods  to  attain  their  end,  nnist  mean  that  communism 
would  lead  to  tyranny  everywhere  it  is  established.  I  am  making  that 
very  point  very  strongly  because  I  think  we  have  to  realize  this  is  not 
a  question  of  the  Russian  people ;  this  is  a  question  of  communism. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  interpose  this  question  on  your  background: 
You  have,  since  breaking  with  the  Communist  Party,  maintained  a 
continuing  interest  and  have  continually  studied  the  Communist  op- 
erations worldwide,  have  you  not  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  you  have  been  an  author  of  several  works  with 
respect  to  the  Communist  operations  in  various  areas  of  the  world, 
is  that  correct  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Yes.  I  wrote  my  first  book  exposing  the  Soviet  Union, 
a  book  called  "The  Dream  We  Lost,"  published  here  in  1940.  Sub- 
sequently, my  books  on  the  Far  East  and  on  other  subjects  have  mainly 
been  studies  of  communism  and  Communist  strategy  and  methods. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  recently  returned  from  an  inspection  tour  or 
a  study  tour  in  Central  Europe,  is  that  correct? 

Miss  Utley.  I  have  been  in  various  parts  of  Germany,  Italy,  France, 
Spain,  and  England.  I  am  writing  a  new  book  on  Europe.  My  last 
book  was  The  China  Story,  published  in  1951,  in  which  I  traced  the 
influence  of  Communists  and  Communist  sympathizers  on  American 
policy  and  showed  how  that  influence  had  caused  us  to  lose  China  to 
the  Communists. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  Miss  Utley 's  statement  be 
incorporated  in  the  record  as  if  read  and  then  Miss  Utley  now  proceed 
to  speak  extemporaneously  on  the  various  points  which  are  covered  in 
her  statement. 

Senator  Welker.  It  will  be  so  ordered. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows)  : 

Testimony  of  Freda  Utley  Before  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  of 
THE  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary — Task  Force  on  Strategy  and 
Tactics  of  World  Communism 

I  am  one  of  the  very  few  Americans  who  learned  about  communism  the  hard 
way — by  personal  experience  of  life  in  the  Soviet  Union  as  it  is  lived  by  the 
Russians.  Many  others  have  visited  Russia,  or  lived  there  as  newspaper  cor- 
respondents, diplomats,  engineers,  or  businessmen.  All  these  were,  of  necessity, 
merely  observers  looking  at  the  Russian  people  from  outside.  But  I  was  for 
6  years  the  wife  of  a  Russian  subject,  sharing  many  of  the  hardships  and  all 
the  fears  of  the  Russian  people.  I  know  what  it  means  to  live  continuously 
under  the  shadow  of  terror;  never  to  know  peace  of  mind;  to  be  constantly 
on  guard  lest  a  careless  word  bring  oneself  or  one's  loved  ones  to  death  or  im- 
prisonment in  a  slave  labor  camp.  It  is  on  account  of  my  intimate  and  terrible 
experience  of  the  Russian  way  of  life  under  the  Communist  dictatorship,  and 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  161 

because  of  my  sympathy  for  the  Russian  people,  that  I  am  testifying  today  in 
favor  of  the  Jenner-McCarran  resolution. 

Until  1928  I  had  been  a  member  of  the  British  Labor  Party.  That  year,  I 
gave  up  my  candidature  for  Parliament  in  the  Labor  interest  by  openly  join- 
ing the  Communist  Party  and  issuing  a  statement  to  the  press  explaining  why. 
That  same  year  I  was  the  Communist  candidate  in  the  London  County  Council 
elections. 

At  that  period  the  Communist  Party  was  openly  opposed  to  the  Labor  Party 
and  openly  revolutionary.  The  period  of  pretending  to  be  democratic — the 
Popular  Front  period — began  only  after  Hitler  came  to  power,  when  I  was  no 
longer  a  Communist.  My  short  period  of  membership  in  the  Communist  Party 
occurred  while  it  was  still  possible  for  a  Communist  to  be  what  I  might  call 
an  honest  revolutionary,  as  distinct  from  a  liar  and  a  cheat  pretending  to  be 
democratic  and  reformist.  In  1940  when  I  applied  for  an  immigrant  visa  to 
the  United  States  I  answered  "Yes"  to  the  Immigi-ation  authorities  when  asked 
whether  I  had  ever  belonged  to  an  organization  advocating  the  overthrow  of 
governments  by  violence.  This  caused  the  rejection  of  my  application,  but  I 
became  a  citizen  many  years  later  thanks  to  a  private  bill  in  Congress  spon- 
sored by  Congressman  Jerry  Voorhis,  of  California,  who  was  a  member  of  the 
Dies  committee. 

I  am  bringing  up  this  old  history  at  the  beginning  of  my  testimony  simply 
because  ex-Commuuists  are  ipso  facto  suspects  in  the  eyes  of  many  people. 
My  record  shows  that  although  I  was  a  Communist  Party  member  from  1928 
to  1931  I  did  not  lie  either  for  the  party  or  for  my  own  advantage  either  then 
or  subsequently. 

A  quarter  of  a  century  ago  when  I  joined  the  Communist  Party,  I  imagined 
that  the  Communists  aimed  at  the  emancipation  of  mankind,  and  would  create 
a  just  social  order  and  give  freedom  to  oppressed  colonial  peoples  everywhere 
in  the  world.  Brought  up  in  the  English  liberal  tradition  the  Communist  ideal 
seemed  to  me  to  be  the  fulfillment  of  man's  age-long  struggle  for  freedom  and 
justice.  It  took  only  a  few  months  of  life  in  the  Soviet  Union,  in  the  winter 
of  1930-31,  to  make  me  realize  how  profoundly  mistaken  I  had  been.  I  quickly 
understood  that  the  Soviet  Government  was  a  greater  and  more  terrible  tyr- 
anny than  any  the  world  had  yet  seen,  but  I  also  soon  learned  that  anyone 
who  spoke  against  it  got  liquidated.  I  was  caught  in  the  web  through  my  hus- 
band who,  being  a  Russian  subject,  could  not  leave  the  Soviet  Union  once  he 
had  returned  there.  I  stayed  in  Russia  for  6  years,  until  he  was  arrested  in 
1936  and  sent  without  trial  to  a  concentration  camp  where,  presumably,  he  died 
many  years  ago.  I  was  able  to  escape  with  our  son,  then  2  years  old,  only  be- 
cause I  had  retained  my  British  passport. 

I  did  not  transfer  to  the  Russian  Communist  Party  after  going  to  live  in 
Russia,  although  I  had  learned  that  to  be  a  Communist  in  Russia  is  to  belong 
to  the  ruling  class  which  enjoys  both  material  privileges  and  a  monopoly  of 
power.  My  husband  was  not  a  Communist  but  a  Socialist  who  had  voluntarily 
returned  to  Russia  from  abroad  in  the  false  belief  that  a  better  world  was 
being  built  in  the  Soviet  Union.  Both  of  us  soon  realized  not  only  that  Stalin 
was  the  greatest  tyrant  who  has  ever  lived,  but  also  that  the  materialist  phi- 
losophy of  the  Communists  must  inevitably  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  similar 
tyranny  wherever  Communists  win  power. 

Together,  in  Russia,  we  shared  the  life  of  the  unprivileged,  nonparty  people. 
We  were  better  off  than  most  Russians  since  he  was  a  "specialist"  in  trade  and 
finance,  entitled  to  an  above  average  food  ration,  and  I  had  a  "foreign  specialist" 
ration  card.  But  since  we  did  not  enjoy  the  food,  housing,  transport,  and  other 
privileges  and  prerequisites  of  the  Communist  aristocracy,  we  were  close  to  the 
mass  of  the  Russian  people  who  never  knew  what  it  meant  to  have  enough  to  eat, 
and  who  live  in  perpetual  fear  of  starvation  and  imprisonment.  I  told  the  story 
of  my  life  in  Russia  in  1940  in  a  book  called,  The  Dream  We  Lost. 

This  experience  of  mine  eJiables  me  to  state  with  certainty  that  the  fundamental 
misconception  upon  which  United  States  policy  has  been  based  is  that  the  Rus- 
sian people  support  their  Communist  Government  by  choice  or  conviction.  I  am 
certain  that  the  very  great  majority  of  the  Russian  people  and  other  peoples 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain  hate,  as  well  as  fear,  the  Soviet  Government.  The  trouble 
is  that  no  one  has  any  hope  of  overthrowing  it  without  outside  help.  The  fact 
that  so  many  millions  of  Russians  went  over  to  the  Germans  in  the  first  stages  of 
the  war  is  a  proof  of  what  I  have  always  contended  concerning  the  attitude  of  the 
Russian  people.    The  Germans  might  have  retained  or  won  the  support  of  the 


162  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

overwhelming  majority  of  the  Russian  people  had  it  not  been  for  the  stupid  and 
cruel  behavior  of  the  Nazis.  We  should  take  care  that  we  do  not  ourselves  make 
the  mistake  of  forcing  the  Russian  people  to  support  their  Communist  Government 
by  regarding  them,  instead  of  communism,  as  the  enemy.  Today  many  of  the 
very  same  people  who  have  been  most  sympathetic  to  Communism  in  the  past 
are  busy  telling  us  that  we  should  hate  the  Russians.  They  are  today,  wittingly 
or  unwittingly,  furthering  the  Communist  cause  by  diverting  our  enmity  away 
from  communism  as  such  to  Russia.  This  kind  of  upside-down  Communist  prop- 
aganda has  been  so  effective  that  Dr.  Ward  V.  Evans,  in  his  minority  report  on 
Dr.  Oppenheimer,  cited  as  "evidence"  of  Dr.  Oppenheimer's  loyalty  the  fact  that 
"he  hates  Russia." 

I  consider  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  woiild 
put  fresh  heart  into  the  forces  of  resistance  to  Communist  tyranny  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain.  It  would  help  to  wipe  out  the  impression  we  created  during  and 
after  the  war  that  w^e  approved  of  Communist  tyranny.  It  is  a  true  but  tragic  fact 
that  at  the  war's  end  America  and  her  allies  helped  Stalin  to  reestablish  his  dic- 
tatorship in  full  force  over  the  Russian  people.  By  the  many  pronouncements 
of  our  Government  leaders,  by  the  attitude  of  our  newspapers,  and  radio  com- 
mentators, we  made  it  all  too  clear  that  we  were  behind  Stalin  and  that  we  gave 
him,  instead  of  the  Russian  people,  the  credit  for  the  heroism  of  the  Red  army. 
By  turning  back  uncounted  numbers  of  Russian  deserters,  displaced  persons,  and 
others,  who  knew  that  they  would  be  shot  or  sent  to  concentration  camps  when 
returned  to  the  Soviet  Union,  we  must  have  helped  establish  the  belief  in  the 
hearts  of  the  Russian  people  that  there  was  no  hope  to  be  expected  from  the  West. 
It  is  necessary  that  we  do  everything  possible  to  wipe  out  the  Impression  given 
in  the  war  and  postwar  periods  that  we  are  ready  to  support  Communist  tyranny 
so  long  as  that  tyranny  does  not  menace  us.  And  nothing  could  be  better  calcu- 
lated to  achieve  this  purpose  than  Implementation  of  the  Jenner-McCarran 
resolution. 

I  could  quote  many  statements  by  past  and  present  representatives  of  the 
American  people  showing  their  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  communism,  of 
its  aims  and  its  methods,  and  of  the  basis  of  its  terrible  power.  The  past  two  ad- 
ministrations made  repeated  statements  implying  that  we  believed  that  Soviet 
communism  is  a  progressive  power.  As  late  as  July  16,  1950,  President  Truman 
said: 

"By  making  possible  the  formulation  and  execution  of  liberal  reforms  such  as 
the  nationalization  of  certain  industries  and  land  redistribution,  which  are  de- 
sired by  a  majority  of  Koreans,  this  policy  should  also  help  to  broaden  the  basis 
for  an  understanding  with  the  Russians." 

The  only  possible  meaning  which  can  be  read  into  this  statement  of  Mr. 
Truman's  is  that  the  Communists  are  liberal  and  progressive,  and  that  if  we 
emulate  them  we  can  get  along  with  them.  In  other  words,  the  basic  assump- 
tion upon  which  the  Truman-Acheson  foreign  policy  was  based  was  that  America 
could  insure  world  peace  if  we  showed  evidence  that  our  economic,  social,  and 
political  policies  are  as  progressive  as  those  of  the  Communists. 

The  second  great  illusion  about  communism  which  has  distorted  our  policy 
is  a  corollary  of  the  first.  It  is  the  belief  that  communism  conquers  not  by  force 
and  terror,  but  through  popular  support.  For  instance,  Mr.  Acheson,  on  January 
12,  1950,  declared  that  the  best  way  of  stopping  communism  in  Asia  was  to: 
"develop  a  soundness  and  administration  of  these  new  governments  and  to  de- 
velop their  i-esources  and  their  technical  skills  so  that  they  are  not  subject  to 
penetration  either  through  ignorance  or  because  they  believe  these  false  premises, 
or  because  there  is  real  distress  in  their  areas.  If  we  can  help  that  develop- 
ment, if  we  can  go  forward  with  it,  then  we  have  brought  about  the  best  way 
that  anyone  knows  of  stopping  this  spread  of  communism." 

In  other  words  the  Acheson  school  of  thought  believes  that  good  works  and 
the  redistribution  of  wealth  can  stop  communism. 

The  third  great  illusion  w^hich  formerly  permitted  the  State  Department  to 
view  Communist  conquests,  such  as  that  of  China,  with  complacency,  is  the  belief 
that  once  the  Chinese  or  any  other  people  learn  that  communism  does  not  give 
the  benefits  expected  they  can  discard  it.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  a  nation  which  has  come  under  Communist  tyranny  to  find  a  way  of 
overthrowing  it  without  outside  help. 

It  would  seem  that  in  spite  of  all  the  lessons  of  the  past  few  years  our  thinking 
and  our  policy  are  still  permeated  with  the  old  illusions.  Tor  instance,  on 
June  IG,  last.  President  Eisenhower,  in  opposing  the  breaking  off  of  all  trade 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COM]VIUNISM  163 

with  the  Iron  Curtain  countries,  stated  that  the  satellite  countries  would  then 
have  no  place  to  go  but  Russia  for  anything  they  needed.  He  further  stated 
that  it  should  be  our  objective  "to  encourage  the  centrifugal  forces,"  and  he 
implied  that  this  could  be  done  by  continuing  to  trade  with  the  Soviet  Empire. 

The  plain  fact  is,  as  the  Jcnner-McCarrau  resolution  recognizes,  that  breaking 
of£  diplomatic  and  trading  relations  with  the  Soviet  countries  would  both  weaken 
the  Soviet  Empire  and  strengthen,  not  weaken,  the  ties  between  us  and  the 
Russian  people.  For  it  would  give  them  hope  that  the  tyrannical  regime  which 
rules  over  them  could  collapse,  thanks  to  our  pressure.  And  far  from  hurting 
the  people  of  the  Soviet  Empire  materially  it  might  help  them.  The  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment is  able  to  export  only  by  squeezing  its  subjects  and  depriving  them  of 
food  and  other  necessities,  while  using  imports  almost  exclusively  to  build  up 
its  war  potential.  Consequently,  the  Russian  people  and  those  of  the  satellite 
countries,  far  from  deriving  any  benefit  from  increased  trade  with  the  free  world, 
would  in  all  probability  be  hungrier  than  ever  now. 

It  will  be  fatal  should  we  listen  to  the  contrary  advice  given  by  Sir  Winston 
Churchill,  and  the  Americans  who  share  his  illusion  that  the  Soviet  Government 
represents  the  Russian  people;  and  that  we  can  have  peace  and  security  by 
appeasing  the  Communists  either  in  the  Far  East  or  in  Europe. 

Those  who  like  and  those  who  hate  the  Russians  are  equally  wi;ong  in  imagin- 
ing that  the  Russian  people  have  any  say  in  determining  Soviet  policy,  and 
equally  dangerous  as  advisers  as  to  what  American  policy  should  be. 

When  I  read  Sir  Winston  Churchill's  statement  last  Monday  to  the  National 
Press  Club,  I  was  appalled  at  his  ignorance  and  the  bad  advice  which  he  is  giving, 
thanks  to  that  ignorance.  He  based  his  plea  for  a  try  at  "peaceful  coexistence" 
with  the  Soviet  Empire  on  "the  mood  of  the  people  of  Russia,"  and  on  "the 
great  wish  in  Russia  to  have  a  better  time  among  the  masses  of  the  people."  He 
urged  us  to  "make  sure  that  the  Russian  people  would  not  feel  that  they  might 
gain  far  more  by  a  quarter  of  a  century  of  peaceful  development  of  their  own 
country"  than  by  war.  And  he  begged  us  "to  leave  no  stone  unturned"  to  give 
the  Russian  people  "a  chance  to  grasp  the  prospects  of  great  material  well-being 
which  will  be  offered  to  all  these  millions."  In  a  word,  he  urged  us  to  base  our 
policy  on  the  erroneous  assumption  that  the  wishes  of  the  Russian  people  deter- 
mine Communist  policy. 

I  am  convinced  from  my  own  experience,  as  well  as  from  my  years  of  study 
of  Communist  aims,  methods,  and  strategy,  that  the  policy  being  urged  upon  us 
by  the  British  Government,  and  the  American  supporters  of  this  policy,  would 
destroy  all  hope  of  liberation  among  the  Russian  people  and  other  peoples  under 
Communist  rule,  and  thus  immeasurably  strengthen  the  Soviet  tyranny,  and 
increase  both  its  capacity  for,  and  will  to,  aggression. 

There  was,  no  doubt,  a  time  in  its  early  stages  when  communism  appealed,  as 
it  did  once  to  me,  to  the  desires  of  people  for  social  justice  and  emancipation. 
Today,  with  the  abundant  evidence  available  to  us  of  what  goes  on  imder  Com- 
munist rule,  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  believe  in  Communist  professions  or 
propaganda.  Today,  Communist  power  advances  not  because  people  believe  that 
it  offers  hope  of  a  better  world,  but  because  people  fear  it,  and  have  too  little 
confidence  in  the  will  to  resist  it  in  the  Western  world. 

It  is  difficult  for  an  American  to  understand  what  terror  means.  People  who 
have  never  been  hungry  cannot  imagine  what  it  is  to  be  without  bread.  People 
who  have  never  known  the  fear  of  death  or  slavery,  not  only  for  themselves, 
but  for  their  loved  ones,  under  a  totalitarian  tyranny,  cannot  realize  what  it 
means  to  be  without  freedom.  Americans  cannot  imagine  what  it  means  to  be 
under  a  regime  iu  which  every  man  fears  his  neighbor  and  even  his  friends, 
because  anyone  may  be  a  member  of  the  secret  police,  or  be  driven  sooner  or  later 
to  betray  his  friend  or  neighbor  by  intolerable  pressures  to  accuse  others  in  order 
to  escape  himself.  This  terror  which  keeps  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain 
subservient  als.o  has  a  terrible  effect  on  the  countries  close  to  the  Soviet  Union 
and  menaced  by  communism.  There,  the  fear  is  of  what  will  happen  to  you 
or  to  your  family  if  and  when  the  Communists  seize  power.  People  in  the  lauds 
which  fear  Communist  conquest  sometimes  give  money  to  the  Communists,  or 
in  other  ways  assist  the  Communists,  not  because  they  have  any  illusions  about 
communism,  but  as  a  sort  of  insurance  policy  for  the  future.  If  in  those  coun- 
tries there  were  no  poverty  the  Communists  would  still  have  strength,  because 
of  the  fear  of  the  terrible  penalties  which  await  all  who  dare  to  oppose 
communism. 

47709°— 54— pt.  3 2 


164  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  only  way  to  ovorcome  that  debilitating  fear  is  to  arouse  confidence  and 
hope  that  there  is  a  banner  on  our  side  to  which  brave  men  can  repair  with  some 
hope  of  saving  their  countries,  their  families,  and  their  faith.  Every  time  we 
give  way  to  Communist  pressures  or  bolster  up  Communist  governments  by 
diplomatic  dickering  and  nice  words,  such  as  Mr.  Churchill  is  so  fond  of  ad- 
dressing to  the  Soviet  Union,  we  strike  fear  into  the  hearts  of  millions  of  people. 
Thoy  have  seen  how,  in  the  past,  we  have  been  ready  to  grasp  the  bloody  luind 
of  the  Communist  tyrants  in  friendship  and  they  are  always  afraid  we  may 
do  it  again  if  it  suits  our  purpose — and  then  what  would  happen  to  those  who 
had  been  on  our  side? 

The  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  as  recommended  by  Senators  Jenner 
and  McCarran  would  allay  such  fears  by  recreating  confidence  in  American 
leadership  of  the  free  world. 

The  people  who  have  already  had  personal  experience  of  what  Communist 
rule  means  are  today  our  most  reliable  allies.  We  have  seen  this  in  the  case 
of  the  people  of  Berlin  and  East  Germany.  Today,  I  consider  that  the  Germans 
and  probably  also  the  Spaniards  are  our  most  reliable  allies  in  Europe — thanks 
to  the  fact  that  they  have  seen  for  themselves  what  Soviet  Russia  is  like,  or 
what  communism  means.  The  Spaniards  experienced  the  horror  of  communism 
in  their  civil  war.  In  the  case  of  the  Germans,  they  do  not  only  know  what 
their  brothers  are  suffering  in  Soviet  Germany;  almost  every  German  family 
has  a  member  who  fought  in  Russia  or  who  was  a  prisoner  in  Russia,  or  died 
of  starvation  there.  Others  know  W'hat  Communist  conquest  means  by  their 
experience  of  the  raping,  looting,  and  murder  of  the  Red  Army.  These  people 
can  be  counted  upon  to  prefer  death  to  Soviet  slavery. 

You  will  have  heard  that  the  slogan  which  the  late  Ernst  Reuter,  mayor  of 
Berlin,  gave  to  his  people  dui-ing  the  blockade  was  "Better  a  horrible  end  than 
horror  without  end."  A  year  ago  the  people  of  East  Berlin  and  East  Germany 
gave  signal  proof  in  their  unarmed  uprising  against  the  Communist  power  that 
they  are  prepared  to  die  for  liberty.  But  here  again  we  must  recognize  the 
fact  that  men  must  have  hope  and  the  right  of  self-defense  if  they  are  to  re- 
main on  our  side.  The  Germans  are  still  denied  the  right  of  self-defense. 
Thanks  to  French  stalling  on  the  EDC  treaty  we  have  still  not  accepted  the 
West  Germans  as  our  allies.  We  may  succeed  in  forcing  them  to  try  to  save 
themselves  by  coming  to  terms  with  Moscow,  if  we  convince  them  that  this  is 
the  only  way  in  which  they  can  hope  to  reunite  their  country,  or  avoid  the  fate 
of  being  conquered  by  the  Communists  because  we  refused  to  let  them  rearm. 

As  we  know,  the  Communist  technique  is  always  to  divide  and  rule.  In  the 
case  of  our  former  enemies,  the  Communists  and  their  friends  and  dupes  have 
continued  successfully  to  divide  us  by  keeping  the  old  hate  fires  burning. 

There  is  another  point  which  I  think  we  should  take  into  consideration  in  con- 
sidering the  techniques  of  communism  and  the  manner  in  which  it  has  success- 
fully advanced  its  power  so  fast  and  so  far.  I  refer  here  to  what  one  might  call 
the  demand  for  perfection.  We  have  seen  how,  in  the  case  of  one  of  our  most 
loyal  allies,  Chiang  Kai-shek,  the  charge  continually  made  by  the  Communists, 
and  echoed  by  many  good,  but  deluded,  Americans,  was  that  the  Nationalist  Gov- 
ernment of  China  was  so  undemocratic  and  corrupt  that  we  should  cease  to  give 
it  any  aid.  This  propaganda  was  so  successful  that  we  abandoned  our  Chinese 
allies,  denied  them  arms  and  ammunition  in  the  most  critical  period  of  the  civil 
war,  and  thus  helped  bring  the  Communists  to  power  in  China. 

The  same  game,  in  a  minor  way,  has  been  played  on  Syngman  Rhee.  It  is 
clear  that  the  Communists  and  their  friends  and  dupes  have  been  extremely 
successful  in  undermining  and  vilifying  some  of  our  best  allies  by  making  im- 
possible demands  for  the  premature  establishment  of  American  democratic  in- 
stitutions and  methods  of  government  lu  backward  countries  fighting  against 
communism. 

I  was  in  China  in  1945-46  during  the  period  of  General  Marshall's  mission, 
and  saw  how  United  States  policy  was  distorted  by  the  influence  of  the  Com- 
munists and  their  dupes,  and  by  the  "dumb  liberals,"  who  failed  to  realize  that 
Chinese  Communist  rule  would  be  a  calamity  for  us  as  well  as  for  the  Chinese 
people.  I  warned  against  the  consequences  of  the  Marshall-Acheson  policy  in 
a  book  called  Last  Chance  in  China,  published  in  1947.  But  my  voice,  like  that 
of  others  who  realized  what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  Truman-Acheson 
China  policy,  was  drowned  by  the  IPR  chorus  and  other  friends  of  the  Chinese 
Communists.  In  1951,  in  The  China  Story,  I  told  the  story  of  those  tragic  post- 
war years,  during  which  American  policy  was  based  on  a  complete  misunder- 
standing of  the  nature  and  aims  of  communism. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  165 

Even  today  this  misunderstanding  continues  in  tlie  Western  World  in  a  revised 
form,  as  illustrated  by  my  quotations  from  Sir  Winston  Churchill's  most  recent 
statement. 

Today  we  are  in  danger  of  disheartening  the  resistance  forces  in  the  Com- 
munist world,  not  because  we  any  longer  believe  in  the  false  promises  of  the 
Soviet  Government,  but  because  we  fear  to  provoke  the  Communists  by  resolute 
action.  This  was  made  clear  to  me  In  Berlin  in  February.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  conference,  thanks  to  the  fine  speeches  being  made  by  the  representatives 
of  the  Western  powers,  hopes  were  raised  that  at  long  last  we  were  going  to 
stand  up  to  the  Soviet  Union.  By  the  end  of  the  second  week  of  the  confer- 
ence, it  had  become  clear  that  the  Communists  had  once  again  succeeded  in  mak- 
ing us  climb  down.  We  agreed  to  discuss  the  Far  East  at  a  news  conference 
in  Geneva  without  any  quid  pro  quo  in  the  shape  of  concessions  on  German 
unification. 

The  streets  along  which  the  representatives  of  the  victorious  powers  passed 
in  their  automobiles  each  day  on  the  way  to  the  conference  were  thickly  lined 
with  crowds,  standing  for  hours  in  the  bitter  cold  in  both  the  West  and  East 
sectors  of  the  city.  Every  one  I  spoke  to  among  those  crowds  expressed  the 
hope  that  America  would  show  sufficient  strength  and  will  to  force  the  Soviet 
Union  to  retreat.  But  during  the  last  days  I  was  there,  disillusionment  had 
already  set  in.  It  was  felt  that  we  or  our  allies  had  displayed  such  a  lack  of 
power  and  resolution  that  it  was  unlikely  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  ever 
make  any  concessions.  If,  at  any  time,  instead  of  arranging  another  conference 
with  the  Soviets,  the  Jenner-jMcCarran  resolution  had  been  passed,  I  am  certain 
that  these  despairing  people  would  once  again  have  had  confidence  in  us. 

If  the  Berliners  and  East  Berliners  who  are  in  the  frontline  of  the  battle 
hope  that  we  will  not  make  concessions  to  the  Soviet  Union,  surely  we  in  the 
far  rear  should  not  be  governed  by  our  fears,  or  give  way  to  the  desire  of  the 
British  and  the  French  for  peace  at  any  price. 

It  seems  to  me  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Communists  and  their  sympa- 
thizers no  longer  hold  important  posts  in  our  Government  and  the  press,  radio, 
and  imiversities,  people  with  a  soft  attitude  toward  communism  and,  above  all, 
people  who  have  no  understanding  of  the  nature,  aims,  or  methods  of  communism, 
still  hold  the  commanding  heights  in  the  press,  radio,  and  other  media  which 
influence  public  opinion. 

I  use  the  words  "commanding  heights"  because  I  recall  that  Lenin  used 
this  expression  in  1921  when  he  instituted  the  new  economic  policy  which  per- 
mitted some  private  ownership  of  land  and  small-scale  industry.  He  then  said 
that,  provided  the  Soviet  state  continued  to  own  all  large-scale  industry  and 
the  banks,  its  possession  of  these  "commanding  heights"  would  insure  the  victory 
of  socialism.  So  today  it  seems  to  me  the  influence  in  the  press  and  radio 
of  Communist  sympathizers  and  dupes,  and  of  those  who  know  nothing  about 
communism,  is  still  sufficient,  if  continued,  to  insure  a  Communist  victory. 

So  long  as  those  who  form  public  opinion  and  those  who  direct  our  foreign 
policy  hold  fallacious  opinions  as  regards  the  nature  of  communism  and  how  to 
combat  it,  we  can  have  no  hope  of  winning  the  struggle  for  the  world. 

We  also  face  a  certain  danger  from  those  who  say  "A  plague  on  all  your  houses." 
and  think  that  at  this  stage  of  history  we  can  return  to  isolationism.  It  is 
of  vital  importance  that  we  should  do  two  things  if  we  are  to  survive. 

One  is  to  give  moral  and  material  support  to  our  real  allies :  that  is  to  say, 
to  the  people  who  can  be  counted  upon  to  stick  by  us,  and  fight  with  us  if 
necessary,  and  not  to  those  who  want  to  be  neutral,  but  whom  we  hope  to  win 
over  to  our  side  by  bribes,  or  by  following  their  appeasement  policies. 

Secondly,  we  must  try  to  keep  hopes  of  liberation  alive  among  the  Russians, 
the  Chinese,  and  the  other  people  under  Communist  rule.  This  we  can  do  only 
if  we  give  proof  of  our  own  standfast  opposition  to  Soviet  tyranny ;  and  convince 
them  that  we  shall  never  again  betray  other  people  for  our  own  illusory  ad- 
vantage, as  we  did  at  Teheran.  Yalta,  and  Potsdam.  This  is  why  it  seem.s  to  me 
that  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  Government  would 
have  such  an  excellent  effect.  I  see  the  Soviet  empire  as  a  structure  which 
would  fall  very  rapidly  if  once  a  revolt  started  against  It  with  a  little  hope  of 
success.  If  the  oppressed  people  of  the  Soviet  empire  believe  that  we  would  help 
them  they  might  free  themselves  of  the  fear  which  pararlyses  them.  And  if 
a  revolt  once  started  it  would  spread  like  wildfire. 

The  Jenner-McCarran  resolution  should  awaken  the  American  people  to  the 
Immediate  necessity  for  the  "agonizing  reappraisal"  of  our  foreign  policy,  which 
Mr.  Dulles  said  a  year  ago  might  have  to  be  undertaken.    I  am  glad  of  this 


1C6  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

opportunity  to  testify  in  favor  of  tliis  resolution  from  tlie  standpoint  of  an 
American  who  knows  from  experience  how  greatly  it  would  be  welcomed  by 
the  subjects  of  the  dictator  of  all  the  Russians. 

Miss  Utley.  I  feel  this  is  important  because  of  the  suspicion  in 
which  ex-Communists  are  held.  I  have  not  been  a  Communist  since 
1931,  and  second,  when  I  was  a  Communist  I  did  not  lie  about  any 
affiliations.  I  did  not  lie  for  myself  or  the  party.  IVlien  I  tried  to 
immigrate  to  the  United  States  in  1940  and  was  asked  at  Ellis  Island 
whether  I  had  ever  belonged  to  an  organization  advocating  the  over- 
throw of  the  Government  by  violence,  I  said  yes  and  was  rejected. 
I  can  claim,  although  I  was  a  Communist,  I  have  never  been  one  of 
the  peo]:)le  who  lied  and  deceived.  "\Mien  I  found  I  had  to  do  those 
tilings,  I  left  the  party. 

Senator  Welker.  You  understand  you  are  testifying  under  oath 
and  any  statement  on  the  material  fact  which  is  not  true  constitutes 
perjury? 

Miss  Utley;  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  observe  in  your  prepared  statement,  your  thesis,  that 
there  are  fundamenta,l  misconceptions  in  the  United  States  policy 
with  respect  to  the  Communist  government  having  the  support  of 
the  Russian  people.  I  should  like  to  ask  you  now  if  you  will  kindly 
direct  your  attention  to  that  theme. 

Miss  Utley.  I  am  trying  to  counteract  the  impression  which  lias 
been  created  by  so  many  statements  on  the  part  of  the  past  adminis- 
trations; the  quotes  I  have  given  from  Mv.  Acheson  and  President 
Truman  in  my  statement ;  tlie  idea  that  the  Russian  people  support 
their  regime;  that  the  Russian  people  are  the  same  thing  as  the  Soviet 
Government;  that  we  can,  by  establishing  good  relations  with  the 
Russian  people,  have  peace  and  solve  the  problem. 

I  have  particularly  drawn  attention  to  what  I  consider  the  most 
pernicious  thing,  which  is  the  statement  just  recently  made  by  Sir 
Winston  Churchill  here  in  Washington  in  which  he  speaks  all  the 
time  as  if  we  could  have  peace  by  agreement,  by  getting  along  Avith, 
or  helping,  the  peo]Dle  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  is  on  page  7  of  my  statement : 

lie  based  his  plea  for  a  try  at  "peaceful  coexistence"  with  the  Soviet  Empire 
on  "the  mood  of  the  people  of  Russia,"  and  on  "the  great  wish  in  Russia  to 
have  a  better  time  nnioiis  the  masses  of  the  people."  He  urs;ed  us  to  "make 
sure  that  the  Russian  people  would  not  feel  that  they  might  gain  far  more  by 
a  quarter  of  a  century  of  peaceful  development  of  their  own  country,"  than  by 
war. 

The  whole  implication  of  Churchill's  statement  is  that  if  we  con- 
vince tiie  Russian  people  they  can  have  a  better  life  by  living  at  peace 
with  us,  we  shall  have  peace.  That  implies  that  the  Russian  people 
determine  Soviet  policy.  I  think  that  is  the  great  fallacy  of  our 
time.  That  is  what  I  have  been  trying  to  establish,  also,  by  these 
quotations  which  I  gave  before. 

Senator  Welker.-  As  a  matter  of  fact,  then,  it  is  your  opinion  that 
the  Russian  people  have  nothing  whatsoever  to  do  with  the  policy  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Nothing  whatsoever. 

Senator  Welker.  It  conies  from  the  Kremlin,  the  Politburo,  and 
the  masters  of  the  Kremlin  ? 

Miss  Utley.-  Yes.  Any  Russian  subject — I  prefer  to  call  them 
subjects — who  criticizes  the  Government  i^oiicy  in  the  tiniest  degree 


STRATEGY   ANU    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  167 

knows  that  he  will  either  be  sent  to  prison  or  executed.  He  will  be 
arrested,  all  right.  Nobody  dares  to  open  his  mouth  and  criticize  the 
Government.: 

]\Ir.  Aeens.  On  the  basis  of  your  best  information,  what  suggestion 
could  you  make  to  the  committee  with  respect  to  the  number  of  slave 
laborers,  people  who  are  actually  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  ? 

Miss  Utley.  You  mean  the  actual  number  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  Yes.   What  would  be  your  estimate  ? 

Miss  Utlet.  The  estimates  vary  between  14  and  20  million.  I  would 
say  not  less  than  15  million.   It  may  be  more. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  say  the  people  who  are  not  actually  in  slave 
labor  camps  are  themselves  enslaved  in  the  sense  they  are  not  free  ? 

Miss  Utley.  They  are  absolutely  enslaved.  They  are  really  slave 
laborers.  Even  the  people  not  in  concentration  camps  are  not  far 
removed  from  slaves.  They  have  none  of  the  normal  civil  rights  which 
we  take  for  granted. 

Mr.  Arens.  Miss  Utley,  what,  in  your  Judgment,  based  on  your 
experience  through  the  years  both  as  a  Communist  and  as  a  student 
of  international  communism,  would  be  the  first  elemental  step  for  our 
Nation  to  take  in  undertaking  to  stem  the  tide  of  encroachment  of 
international  communism  ? 

Miss  Utley.  That  is  why  I  welcome  very  much  this  resolution,  the 
Jenner-McCarran  resolution,  because  I  think  breaking  off  diplomatic 
relations  and  all  trade  relations  as  well  with  the  Soviet  Empire  would 
be  of  the  greatest  help  in  heartening  the  people  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  whole  point  is  that  we  unfortunately  during  and  after  the  war 
gave  rise  to  the  belief  in  Russia  that  we  supported  the  Soviet  tyranny 
by  turning  back  all  the  deserters  and  very  many  displaced  persons. 
By  our  every  action  and  praise  of  Stalin  as  our  great  ally  we  helped 
to  clamp  down  again  the  tyranny  on  the  Soviet  people.  By  breaking 
off  relations,  it  seems  to  me  we  are  giving  some  hope  to  the  enslaved 
peoples  of  Russia  that  sometime  or  other  our  pressure  may  bring  down 
the  Soviet  Government. 

Mr.  Arens.  Under  date  of  June  18, 1954,  the  Senator  from  Indiana, 
Mr.  Jenner,  and  the  Senator  from  Nevada,  Mr.  McCarran,  and  tlie 
Senator  from  Idaho,  Mr.  Welker,  introduced  S.  3632  making  it  a 
felony  to  import  or  ship  in  interstate  commerce  any  commodity  or 
goods  produced  by  slave  labor.  Should  that  bill  become  law,  what  in 
your  judgment  would  be  the  effect  on  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Cur- 
tian? 

Miss  Utley.  I  think  it  is  such  an  excellent  resolution  that  it  might 
ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  people  in  the  slave  labor  camps.  Here 
I  speak  from  experience.  In  the  early  thirties  when  I  was  in  Russia 
there  was  a  big  campaign  against  slave  labor  on  the  matter  of  timber. 
I  think  Canada  in  particular  was  concerned  with  this  matter.  I  re- 
mem.ber  at  the  time  this  caused  tremendous  worry  and  anxiety  in 
Russia,  and  it  was  said  that  conditions  had  been  slightly  improved  in 
the  timber  slave  labor  camps  as  a  consequence  of  this  agitation  to  stop 
buying  goods  produced  by  slave  labor.  I  think  the  resolution  is  so 
good  because  it  would  hurt  the  Soviet  Government,  and  it  might  also 
possibly  force  the  Soviet  Government  somewhat  to  ameliorate  the  con- 
dition of  the  slaves. 

Senator  Welker.  How  will  we  find  out  whether  or  not  these  goods 
are  produced  by  slave  labor  ? 


168  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Miss  XJtley.  In  the  case  of  certain  things  like  timber,  we  actually 
know  that  is  all  produced  by  slave  labor.  I  think  the  intensive  studies 
that  have  been  made  of  all  the  slave  labor  camps,  the  mines,  timber  and 
all  the  other  things  that  are  produced,  it  would  not  be  too  difficult  to 
tell.  In  a  sense,  all  goods  in  Russia  are  produced  by  slave  labor.  But 
that  is  carrying  it  too  far,  perhaps,  in  the  sense  the  workers  have  no 
rights.  They  have  to  work  as  long  as  they  are  told  for  whatever  wages 
are  decreed.  They  haven't  the  right  to  strike.  They  can  be  arrested 
and  ]:)unished  for  being  a  few  minutes  late  at  work.  I  do  not  know 
how  far  that  resolution  is  intended  to  carry. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  suggest  that  S.  3632  and  the  statement  which  ac- 
companied it  at  the  time  of  its  introduction  be  incorporated  in  this 
record. 

Senator  Welker.  It  will  be  so  ordered. 

(The  material  referred  to  follows:) 

Prohibition  of  Importation  ob  Transportation  in  Interstate  Commerce  of 
Goods  Produced  by  Slave  LAboe 

Statement  by  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner,  of  Indiana,  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  Friday,  June  18,  1954 

Mr.  Jenner.  Mr.  President,  on  behalf  of  myself,  the  Senator  from  Nevada 
(Mr.  McCarran),  and  the  Senator  from  Idaho  (Mr.  Welker),  I  introduce  for  ap- 
propriate reference  a  bill  making  it  a  felony  to  import  or  ship  in  interstate  com- 
merce any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave  labor.  I  ask  unanimous  con- 
sent that  a  statement  by  me  pertaining  to  the  bill  be  printed  in  the  Record  at  this 
point,  as  a  part  of  my  remarks. 

The  Presiding  Officer.  The  bill  will  be  received  and  appropriately  referred ; 
and,  without  objection,  the  statement  will  be  printed  in  the  Record, 

The  bill  (S.  3632)  making  it  a  felony  to  import  or  ship  in  interstate  commerce 
any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave  labor.  Introduced  by  Mr.  Jenner  (for 
himself,  Mr.  McCarran,  and  Mr.  Welker),  was  received,  read  twice  by  its  title, 
and  referred  to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  as  follows : 

"A  bill  making  It  a  felony  to  Import  or  ship  In  interstate  commerce  any  commodity  or 
goods  produced  by  slave  labor 

"Be  it  enacted  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Repi'esentatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That,  from  and  after  the  effective  date  of 
this  act,  it  shall  be  unlawful  to  import  into  the  United  States  or  to  ship  in  inter- 
state commerce  in  the  United  States  any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave 
labor. 

"Sec.  2.  Any  person  who  shall  violate  this  act  shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony,  and 
upon  conviction  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  of  not  more  than  2 
years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $1,000,  or  both." 

The  statement  by  Senator  Jenner  is  as  follows : 

"Statement  by  Senator  Jenner 

"In  the  recent  past,  as  chairman  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  of  the 
Senate,  I  appointed  a  task  force  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  a  continuing 
study  and  investigation  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism.  This 
task  force,  which  consists  of  myself  as  chairman,  with  Senators  Herman  Welker 
and  Pat  McCarran  as  members,  has  been  conducting  a  series  of  hearings  on 
this  general  subject  because  we  know  that  to  adequately  appraise  the  operation 
of  the  Communist  conspiracy  in  this  Nation  it  is  essential  that  we  keep  abreast 
of  the  world  strategy  and  tactics  of  international  communism. 

"In  the  hearings  which  we  have  thus  far  conducted  one  of  the  principal  subjects 
which  has  been  under  consideration  is  the  worldwide  trade  offensive  of  the 
Kremlin  which  has  as  its  ultimate  goal  economic  strangulation  of  the  West 
through  ruinous  competition  of  the  products  of  slave  labor.  This  threat  presents 
to  us  not  only  the  issue  of  protecting  the  American  workingman  in  his  job,  but  it 
also  presents  a  moral  issue  of  the  highest  order.    Every  shipload  of  goods  pro- 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  169 

duced  by  slave  labor  In  Iron  Curtain  countries  which  we  import  into  this 
country  merely  whets  the  appetite  of  the  Kremlin  for  greater  numbers  to  be 
subjected  to  this  inhuman  exploitation. 

"Accordingly,  the  bill  (S.  3G32)  has  been  patterned  after  our  laws  which  pro- 
hibit the  shipment  in  interstate  commerce  of  goods  produced  by  child  labor.  If 
those  laws  are  right,  then  this  bill  is  right.  If  it  is  right  to  protect  the  American 
workingman  from  ruinous  competition  by  slave  labor  then  this  bill  is  right. 
If  it  is  right  to  protect  ourselves  and  the  free  world  from  the  spreading  menace 
of  international  communism  then  this  bill  is  right." 


[S.  3632,  83d  Cong.,  2d  sess.] 

A  BILL  Making  It  a  felony  to  import  or  ship  in  Interstate  commerce  any  commodity  or 
goods  produced  by  slave  labor 

Be  it  enacted  ty  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  ot  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That,  from  and  after  the  effective  date  of  this 
Act,  it  shall  be  unlawful  to  import  into  the  United  States  or  to  ship  in  inter- 
state commerce  in  the  United  States  any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave 
labor. 

Sec.  2.  Any  person  who  shall  violate  this  Act  shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony, 
and  upon  conviction  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  of  not  more 
than  two  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $1,000,  or  both. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  the  course  of  the  recent  past,  under  date  of  June  24, 
the  Senator  from  Idaho  presented  to  the  Senate  and  it  was  recently 
approved  unanimously  by  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  a  resolu- 
tion, No.  169,  authorizing  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  pro- 
claim the  first  Sunday  of  each  month  for  a  period  of  12  months  for 
prayer  for  people  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience,  I  ask  you,  aside 
from  the  actual  petition  to  the  divine  for  intervention,  what  effect 
would  the  proclamation  called  for  in  this  resolution  have  on  the  minds 
and  hearts  of  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Again  I  think  it  would  have  an  excellent  result,  an  ex- 
cellent effect,  because  again  it  would  sliow  the  people  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain  we  care  a  little,  which  they  have  not  had  much  reason  to  sup- 
pose in  the  past. 

May  I  add  to  that,  I  think  the  excellent  effect,  also,  of  this  proposal 
by  Senator  Welker  is  that  it  might  help  to  awaken  the  American  peo- 
ple a  little  as  to  the  sufferings  of  people  under  communism.  What  I 
am  getting  at,  we  all  know  there  has  never  been  in  the  press  or  on  the 
radio  or  in  any  way  in  the  United  States  any  comparable  campaign  to 
arouse  the  people  of  America  to  a  knowledge  of  what  communism 
means  and  what  Communist  terror  is,  what  life  is  like  in  the  Soviet 
Empire,  anything  comparable  to  what  was  done  in  the  case  of  Nazi 
Germany^  Every  American  knew  of  the  horrors  in  Nazi  Germany,  but 
there  has  never  been  anything  comparable  to  arouse  opinion  here  con- 
cerning the  horrors  and  terrors  in  the  Soviet  Empire. 

Mr.  Aeens.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  this  record  now  reflect  the 
contents  of  Senate  Joint  Resolution  169  and  of  the  very  brief  state- 
ment which  was  made  by  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  under  date 
of  June  29  in  reporting  Senate  Joint  Eesolution  169  unanimously 
favorably  to  the  Senate. 

Senator  Welker.  It  is  so  ordered. 


170  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

(The  material  referred  to  follows:) 

IS.  Kept.  1659,  83d  Cong.,  2d  sess.I 

Authorizing  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to  Proclaim  the 
First  Sunday  of  Each  Month  for  a  Period  of  12  Months  for  Prayer  foe 
People  Enslaved  Behind  the  Iron  Curtain 

Tiie  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  to  wliich  was  referred  tlie  joint  resolution 
(S.  J.  Res.  169)  authorizing  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
proclaim  the  first  Sunday  of  each  month  for  a  period  of  12  months  for  prayer  for 
people  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  having  considered  the  same,  reports 
favorably  thereon  without  amendment  and  recommends  that  the  joint  resolution 
be  agreed  to. 

statement 

The  people  of  the  United  States  share  in  their  hearts  the  suffering  of  the  mil- 
lions of  fellow  human  beings  who  are  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain.  It  is 
the  judgment  of  the  committee  that  periodic  prayer  on  behalf  of  these  fellow 
human  beings  would  not  only  open  the  channels  for  Divine  intervention  to  allevi- 
ate their  suffering,  but  would  strengthen  the  bonds  of  understanding  between 
them  and  the  American  people. 

The  committee,  after  consideration  of  all  the  facts,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the 
joint  resolution  (S.  J.  lies.  169)  should  be  agreed  to. 


[S.  J.  Res.  109,  83d  Cong.,  2d  sess.J 

JOINT  RESOLUTION  Authorizing  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  to 
proclaim  the  first  Sunday  of  each  month  for  a  period  of  twelve  months  for  prayer  for 
people  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain 

Resolved  "by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  of 
America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  au- 
thorized and  directed  to  issue  a  proclamation  inviting  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  pause  on  the  first  Sunday  of  each  month  during  the  course  of  a  period  of 
twelve  months  for  prayer  on  behalf  of  the  millions  of  fellow  human  beings  who 
are  enslaved  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

Miss  Utley.  What  I  am  trying  to  say  in  my  answer  is  that  what  we 
need  to  do  is  to  approach  this  whole  problem  of  Soviet  aggression 
and  of  communism  from  the  opposite  point  of  view  from  which  it 
has  been  approached  in  the  past.  We  have  to  approach  it  from  the 
knowledge  that  the  Russian  people  are  groaning  under  tyranny.  We 
have  got  to  hearten  them  by  measures  showing  that  we  are  anti-Com- 
munist, anti-Soviet  Govermnent ;  whereas,  the  approach  to  now  has 
been,  "Let's  get  along  with  the  Soviet  Union,  let's  convince  the  Rus- 
sian people  of  how  good  and  kind  and  progressive  and  friendly  we 
are." 

Mr.  Arens.  You  were  in  Germany  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Con- 
ference in  February,  were  you  not  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  observations  to  make  on  the  basis 
of  your  background  and  experience  as  to  the  strategy  of  the  Western 
Powers  at  Berlin  in  the  conference  ? 

Miss  Utley.  Yes.  I  have  something  in  my  statement  on  that.  I 
was  there  during  the  conference,  and  I  spoke  to  the  people  who  lined 
the  streets  to  watch  Dulles,  Eden  and  others  drive  to  the  confer- 
ence. I  talked  to  a  lot  of  people  in  the  street.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  conference  there  was  a  real  hope  that  the  United  States  was  going 
to  be  firm  enough  and  strong  enough  to  force  the  Soviet  Union  to 
make  concessions.    At  the  end  of  the  second  week  when  we  agreed 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  171 

to  meet  again  in  Geneva  to  discuss  the  Far  East,  which  we  formerly 
refused  to  do  and  without  getting  anything  in  return,  no  quid  pro 
quo,  the  Germans  were  beginning  to  say,  "Well,  it  is  hopeless.  The 
United  States  and  its  allies  haven't  got  what  it  takes  to  stand  up 
to  the  Soviet  Union  or  to  force  the  Soviet  Union  back." 

I  think  the  effect  of  all  this  dickering  and  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions has  been  altogether  bad  for  that  reason,  because  it  is  always  we 
who  make  the  concessions.    We  always  seem  to  be  the  weaker  side. 

Mr.  Arens.  Finally,  I  observe  in  your  statement  reference  to  two 
courses  of  action  which  you  suggest  if  we  and  the  West  are  to  survive. 
I  should  like  to  invite  your  comments  on  those  two  courses  of  action. 

IVIiss  Utlet.  In  my  concluding  section  I  make  the  very  strong  point 
that  we  have  to  convince  the  people  of  the  Soviet  empire  that  we  are 
anti-Communist,  anti-Soviet ;  that  we  are  for  them  and  not  for  their 
Government;  that  these  resolutions  are  designed  to  do  precisely  that, 
to  keep  alive  some  hope  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  that  eventually  our 
pressures  may  bring  down  their  Government. 

Secondly,  that  this  breaking  off  of  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
which  is  of  the  greatest  importance — here  again  I  think  we  are  far 
from  doing  any  hurt  to  the  peoples  of  the  Soviet  empire.  We  will 
again  actually  help  them.  I  know  from  my  experience  in  the  Soviet 
jfmon  that  exports  from  Eussia  are  squeezed  out  of  the  people.  In 
the  period  when  they  were  exporting  for  the  5-year  plans  they  were 
taking  food,  wheat,  butter,  textiles,  and  exporting  them  in  order 
to  import  material  for  their  war  machine.  That  is,  by  increasing 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  we  merely  make  the  life  of  the  people 
more  miserable.  By  refusing  to  trade  with  them  there  is  more  for 
them  to  consume  at  home.  Therefore,  the  whole  argument  which  is 
made,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  even  by  the  President,  that  we  have  to  do 
some  trade  because  we  have  to  encourage  the  centrifugal  forces—to 
try  and  lessen  the  dependence  of  the  satellites  on  the  Soviet  Union— is, 
I  think,  an  entirely  false  argument.  What  they  import  is  imported 
for  their  war  machine.  There  is  no  advantage  to  the  people  in  trad- 
ing with  us. 

May  I  add  one  other  thing  to  that— again  on  this  point  on  page  4 
of  my  testimony— that  we  should  be  awfully  careful  not  to  make  the 
same  kind  of  mistakes  that  the  Germans  made  in  Eussia  in  a  different 
form.  What  I  am  referring  to  is  that  we  know  millions  of  the  Eus- 
sians  went  over  to  the  Germans  in  the  first  stage  of  the  war.  Then 
because  of  the  behavior  of  the  Nazis  in  Eussia,  they  turned  back  to 
the  Soviet  Government  and  fought  for  their  country  against  the  Ger- 
mans. AVhat  I  am  afraid  of  is  that  by  this  identification  of  com- 
munism with  the  Eussian  people  which  is  made  by  so  many— Winston 
Churchill  and  continually  by  the  State  Department  under  :Mr.  Ache- 
son,  talking  about  the  Eussians  or  Eussia  when  w^e  mean  communism— 
if  we  do  that,  we  are  going  to  force  the  Eussian  people  to  support 
their  Government  because  of  the  hatred  of  the  world  against  them 
instead  of  against  communism. 

Here  I  point  out  on  page  4  what  seemed  to  be  a  most  significant 
statement  by  Dr.  Evans,  who  issued  that  minority  report  in  favor  of 
Dr.  Oppeniieimer.  He  actually  gives  i>s  a  proof  of  Dr.  Oppen- 
heimers  loyaty  that  "he  hates  Eussia,"  as  if  that  made  him  a  loyal 
citizen.    This  is  the  kind  of  thing  I  am  trying  to  get  at ;  that  it  should 

47760'— 54— pt  3 3 


172  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

be  ai-r^ued  that  anybody  who  hates  Russia  is  a  jiood  man,  when  what 
we  sliould  be  hating  is  communism  and  not  tlie  Russian  people. 

We  must  get  the  American  people  to  understand  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  bad,  that  the  Soviet  peoi)le  have  no  say  in  their  destiny  at 
all.  These  resolutions  and  this  efl'ort  by  this  committee  to  really  get 
to  understand  the  strategy  of  communism  and  the  real  situation  be- 
hind the  Iron  Curtain  are  most  valuable.  If  we  could  only  get  this 
to  the  American  public,  there  would  be  a  different  attitude.  That  is 
what  we  need  so  badly  if  we  are  to  save  ourselves. 

I  am  one  of  the  very  few  Americans  who  ever  lived  the  life  of  the 
Russian  people.  I  was  not  observing  it  from  outside  as  a  diplomat 
or  from  a  journalist's  point  of  view,  but  as  a  Russian  sees  it.  I  was 
not  one  of  the  privileged  Russians,  either.  I  know  what  it  means  to 
be  under  that  government,  to  know  what  real  terror  is  so  you  dare 
not  speak  to  anybody;  that  you  are  afraid  of  your  friends  and  neigh- 
bors because  even  if  they  are  not  in  the  secret  police,  they  may  be 
forced  to  accuse  you  in  order  to  save  themselves. 

I  do  not  think  Americans  have  any  conception  or  any  idea  of  what 
terror  means.  We  have  got  to  try  and  make  them  understand  what 
it  means.  You  have  got  to  have  experienced  it  before  you  can  explain. 
If  the  public  here  understood  what  it  means  to  live  under  this  kind 
of  terror,  they  would  not  make  this  foolish  mistake  of  identifying  the 
Russians  with  the  Communist  government.  This  seems  to  me  at  the 
]-)resent  moment  a  tremendously  important  thing  because  we  have 
Sir  Winston  Churchill  and  the  whole  influence  of  the  British  press 
designed  to  make  us  make  that  mistake,  and  establish  more  trade  with 
the  Soviet  ITnion  on  the  false  assumption  that  we  can  get  along  by 
establishing  good  relations  with  the  Russian  people,  which  we  cannot 
do  anyhow  because  we  are  not  allow^ed  to  talk  to  them. 

Senator  Welker.  On  behalf  of  Chairman  Jenner  of  the  full  Com- 
mittee of  the  Internal  Security  and  every  member  thereof  and  the 
staff,  I  want  to  thank  you  profusely  for  your  significant  contribution 
to  the  hearings.  It  is  gratifying  for  you  people  to  take  your  time 
and  effort  to  come  here  and  help  us  in  the  problem  that  is  ours  so  that 
we  can  do  our  best  to  carry  out  the  obligation  we  owe  to  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  to  protect  the  internal  security  of  our  United  States. 

Again  I  say  thank  you,  and  may  you  keep  up  your  splendid  crusade. 

IVIiss  Utley.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  next  witness  is  Mr.  Siegfried  Garbuny. 

Senator  Welker.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  testimony  you  will 
give  before  the  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  noth- 
ing but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  SIEGFRIED  GARBUNY,  NEW  YORK,  N.  Y. 

Senator  Welker.  State  your  name,  residence,  and  occupation. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  IMy  address  is  120  West  105th  Street,  New  York, 
N.  Y.   My  profession  is  economist. 

Senator  Welker.  Where  were  you  born  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  In  Germany,  sir.  I  am  an  American  citizen  and 
came  to  this  country  in  1938. 

Senator  Welker.  What  is  your  age  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  am  39  now,  sir. 

Senator  Y/elker.  You  may  proceed,  Counsel. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  173 

Do  you  have  a  prepared  statement  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Kindly  give  us  a  brief  sketch  of  your  ex]3erience  in  the 
field  in  which  you  are  engaged  as  an  economist,  with  particular  refer- 
ence to  your  experience  in  international  trade. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  state  that  I  do  not  belong 
to  any  political  party,  never  have  been  enrolled  in  any  political  party, 
and  have  voted  always  on  the  issue.  I  like  to  think  of  myself  as  a  con- 
servative or  perhaps  a  bit  on  the  right  side,  but  certainly  as  a  con- 
servative. 

My  experience  in  international  economics  is  merely  academic,  with 
the  exception  of  brief  periods  I  served  in  the  Department  of  State 
after  I  was  separated  from  the  service  of  the  Ajiierican  Army.  Before 
the  Department  of  State,  I  worked  in  the  Office  of  Strategic  Services 
and  Research  and  Analysis  and  happened  to  be  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  di- 
vision of  that  service.  It  was  actually  in  OSS  that  my  interest  in  Rus- 
sian affairs  was  aroused,  and  I  have  never  begged  it  in  studying  the 
issue,  not  only  officially  but  for  myself. 

Since  my  chosen  field  is  international  trade  and  finance,  this  was 
almost  a  matter  of  cause  to  do  after  I  left  Government  service  and 
turned  to  teaching  the  field  of  international  trade  in  New  York  City. 

In  international  trade  I  notice  in  my  academic  studies  that  a  very 
interesting  pattern  is  shaping  up ;  namely,  the  pattern  of  international 
trade  as  we  are  used  to  it  as  western  and  democratic  trade,  foreign  trade 
to  increase  our  standard  of  living,  to  make  things  better.  Then  a  pe- 
culiar type  of  international  trade  which  I  would  like  to  refer  to  as 
Soviet  foreign  trade  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  improvement  of 
standards  of  living,  but  as  it  is  at  the  present  moment,  really  a  type  of 
trade  which  is  an  instrmnent  of  consequences. 

The  Soviets  seem  to  me  to  use  international  trade  for  outright  ag- 
grandizement of  their  political  and  military  power  wherever  they 
can  set  foot.  This  pattern  I  have  particularly  studied  over  the  years 
and  have  published,  sporadically,  articles  on  the  subject,  one  of  which 
has  a  similar  title  to  the  statement  here,  "Foreign  Trade — Road  to 
Conquest,"  which  I  published  in  the  Commercial  International  Chron- 
icle in  New  York  in  February  of  1953. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  prepared  statement  of 
Mr.  Garbuny  be  incorporated  into  the  record  at  this  point  as  if  read 
and  that  Mr.  Garbuny  be  permitted  to  proceed  to  summarize  his  vari- 
ous points  extemporaneously. 

Senator  Welker.  It  will  be  so  ordered. 

(The  material  referred  to  follows)  : 

Testimony  of  Siegfried  Gabbuny  Before  the  Internal  Security  Subcom- 
mittee OF  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary — Task  Force  on  Strategy 
AND  Tactics  of  World  Communism 

soviet  foreign  trade — instrument  of  conquest 

Commerce  amoug  nations  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  means  to  establish 
friendly  relations  among  the  partners  and  as  a  symbol  of  peace.  This  has  been 
a  time-honored  maxim ;  but  the  Soviet  Russians  have  taught  the  world  differ- 
ently. They  have  shown  that  this  instrument  of  peace  can  easily  be  turned  into 
a  mighty  weapon  of  warfare  and  into  an  emblem  of  slavery. 

Immediately  after  their  advent  to  power  the  Bolsheviks,  then  led  by  Lenin, 
reserved  in  April  1918  foreign  trade  for  the  state  as  a  government  monopoly. 
No  private  Individual  was  allowed  to  engage  in  commerce  over  the  borders.    The 


174  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

state  through  government  corporations  inside  and  outside  Russia  took  complete 
charge  of  the  international  exchange  of  goods.  The  trade  program  was  simple ; 
only  what  the  Communist  state  needed  for  its  survival  would  he  imported,  the 
needs  and  demand  of  the  individual  Russian  citizen  was  no  longer  of  any  con- 
cern. Foreign  trade  would  no  longer  serve  to  increase  the  Russian  standard  of 
living. 

True  enough,  as  long  as  the  Russians  were  busy  with  their  internal  affairs, 
the  volume  of  Russian  foreign  trade  remained  relatively  small.  Yet,  the  Soviet 
state  learned  soon  that  the  foreign  trade  monopoly  offered  special  extra  advan- 
tages to  the  Communist  regime.  It  kept  the  citizens  so  much  better  in  complete 
isolation  and  bondage  at  home,  and  yet  it  could  be  used  for  economic  chicanery 
abroad.  Soviet  Russia's  foreign  exchange  dumping  maneuvers  in  the  1920's 
to  upset  foreign  markets  and  to  obtain  much  desired  foreign  currencies  are  still 
remembered.  The  foreign  trade  monopoly  therefore  remained  one  of  the  sheet 
anchors  of  the  Soviet  economy,  and  the  decree  of  1918  was  incorporated  in  arti- 
cle 14  of  Russia's  so-called  constitution. 

It  was,  however,  only  after  the  Second  World  War  that  the  Russians  under- 
stood the  formidable  dynamic  power  that  they  could  unleash  through  foreign 
trade  on  their  road  to  conquest.  Commercial  policy  became  therefore  a  vigorous 
part  of  their  general  foreign  policy.  After  World  War  II  a  systematic  effort  was 
undertaken  to  conquer  not  only  by  arms  but  also  by  foreign  trade.  It  might  be 
said  indeed  that  foreign  trade  became  an  alternative  to  armed  intervention  and 
propaganda.  In  conjunction  with  the  military  and  propaganda  apparatus  stands 
therefore  now  foreign  economic  penetration  as  a  means  of  conquest.  The  post- 
war world  suddenly  saw  Russia  as  the  newest  champion  of  international  trade. 
That  of  course  was  something  really  sensational.  With  the  voices  of  the  sirens 
the  Russians  were  now  singing  the  praise  of  international  cooperation.  In  all 
their  pronouncements,  verbal  and  written,  the  Russians  were  using  the  ter- 
minology of  the  democratic  world,  stressing  the  sovereignty  and  the  equal  rights 
of  all  trading  partners  as  well  as  the  mutual  benefits  of  international  trade.  All 
the  technical  terms  that  we  find  in  the  commercial  treaties  of  the  western  world 
were  used.  Yes,  indeed,  the  Russians  became  almost  treaty-happy  engaging  in 
a  multitude  of  treaties  and  trade  agreements  wherever  they  could  lodge  them. 
In  addition,  trade  fairs  were  sponsored  and  even  a  world  economic  conference 
could  be  assembled  in  Moscow  in  April  1952.    And  yet,  it  was  Satan  at  work. 

From  the  very  beginning,  in  spite  of  all  their  efforts,  the  Russians  could  never 
conceal  their  total  inability  to  collaborate  in  foreign  commerce  on  an  interna- 
tional plane.  Their  role  in  world  political  organizations  is  too  well  known  to  be 
repeated  here  ;  but  perhaps  a  reminder  of  their  attitude  toward  the  International 
IMonetary  Fund  and  the  World  Bank  is  still  in  order.  To  make  membership  in 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  palatable  to  the  Russians,  the  Bretton  Woods 
Agreements  provided  that  a  country  whose  currency  was  only  domestically  used 
should  not  have  to  bare  its  financial  affairs  to  the  fund  authorities. 

This  provision  actually  referred  to  the  Russian  situation,  since  the  ruble, 
though  allegedly  on  a  gold  basis,  is  not  an  international  currency  and  is  used 
only  for  internal  circulation.  The  Russians  could  therefore  have  joined  the 
fund  without  the  duty  of  information  about  their  own  financial  affairs,  a  matter 
in  which  they  have  always  been  very  sensitive;  yet,  they  would  still  have  re- 
tained the  privilege  to  learn  about  the  economic  status  of  their  colleagues,  a 
jioint  of  everlasting  interest  to  them.  But  even  this  extraordinary  concession 
was  not  enough.  The  Russians  did  not  join.  International  cooperation  would 
have  meant  the  abandonment  of  their  goal  to  conquer  the  world.  Cooperation 
always  means  equal  rights  for  all  the  partners.  The  Russians  would  have  been 
forced  to  become  truly  democratic  and  to  give  up  the  fight  for  the  world  revolu- 
tion for  which  they  saw  again  propitious  conditions. 

This  attitude  of  the  Soviets  toward  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and 
the  World  Bank  is  typical  of  Russia's  "will  to  international  cooperation"  and 
has  been  duplicated  many  times.  Even  if  the  Russians  join  an  international 
economic  or  for  that  matter  political  organization,  it  will  be  for  destructive  and 
not  for  constructive  purposes.  This  is  inherent  in  their  dictatorial  quest  for 
power.  We  just  must  realize  that  the  Soviets  are  incapable  of  international  co- 
operation in  any  sphere.  All  the  more  it  is  necessary  to  study  how  they  wielded 
the  hammer  of  foreign  trade  and  what  their  future  strategy  is  going  to  be. 

The  story  of  the  subjugation  of  Russia's  satellites  and  of  the  establishment 
of  puppet  regimes  is  well  known,  but  less  known  are  their  economic  consequences. 
No  matter  what  their  past  economic  setup  and  orientation  were,  all  satellite 
countries  turned  into  planned  economies  with  their  center  in  Moscow.    The 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMAIUNISM  175' 

Soviet  "plan  area"  thus  created  includes  now  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  proper,  Red  China, 
North  (Red)  Korea.  Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Albania,  East  Germany,  Poland. 
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  Mongolia.  To  keep  up  appearances,  all  these 
countries  had  so  far  economic  plans  of  their  own,  well  attuned  of  course  to  the 
Soviet  5-year  plan ;  but  there  is  now  substantial  evidence  that  even  this  last 
sham  will  fall,  and  that  the  future  Soviet  5-year  plan  will  also  cover  the 
satellite  economies,  which  will  then  be  in  form  as  well  as  in  fact  Russian 
dependencies. 

Already  now  the  Soviet  plan  area  has  all  the  characteristics  of  the  Orossraum 
of  Hitler's  Germany  and  of  the  coprosperity  sphere  of  prewar  Japan.  The  plans 
of  the  satellites,  originally  2  or  3  years  in  duration,  are  at  the  moment  orthodox 
5-year  plans  in  step  with  Russia's  own  program.  Just  as  they  did  for  Russia, 
the  plans  provide  for  the  industrialization  of  the  satellites.  A  raw  materials 
pool  is  envisaged  by  which  each  country  exports  raw  materials  in  relative 
abundance  for  goods  in  short  supply  that  can  be  had  from  one  or  the  other 
partner.  This  traffic,  however,  must  not  be  imagined  as  smooth  commercial 
intercourse  based  on  the  profit  motive  and  individual  prosperity,  but  rather  as 
directed  by  what  the  Soviet  Union  deems  necessary  in  its  own  interest. 

The  Soviets  have  gone  so  far  as  to  send  specialists  to  the  satellites  to  super- 
vise production  and  to  train  skilled  labor  in  order  to  step  up  production.  They 
receive  trainees  from  satellite  countries  who  learn  next  to  the  party  doctrine 
mechanical  skills  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  On  a  higher  level  the  Russians  established 
mixed  commissions  for  scientific  and  technological  cooperation.  So  far  there 
exist  only  a  Soviet-Polish,  a  Soviet-Albanian,  a  Soviet-Czech,  a  Soviet-Bulgarian, 
and  a  Soviet-East  German  commission.  It  is  the  task  of  these  commissions 
to  impart  Soviet  know-how  to  the  satellites  in  those  industrial  areas  in  which 
the  Soviets  wish  a  rapid  increase  of  output. 

Where  it  is  necessary,  the  Russians  send  equipment  and  even  ship  whole 
factories  to  underindustrialized  areas.  In  this  connection  the  Russians  boast 
that  they  have  given  Rumania  badly  needed  oil  refineries  and  take  full  credit 
for  whatever  improvements  in  equipment  Finland's  Industries  can  show. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  orbit  moved  to  establish  uniform  prices,  tariffs, 
measures,  and  railroad  gages.  The  brotherhood  is  pushed  even  further  in  some 
areas,  where  the  Russians  established  by  force,  of  course,  mixed  corporations 
with  joint  management  as  in  the  case  of  SovRom,  the  Russian-Rumanian  oil 
concern,  or  in  that  of  the  mixed  Russian-Chinese  civil  aeronautics  lines. 

To  give  all  this  activity  a  harmless  appearance  and  to  convince  those  who 
are  gullible  enough  of  their  peaceful  intentions,  the  Russians  have  based  this 
system  of  economic  annexation  on  a  mesh  of  commercial  treaties.  Anyone  who 
reads  the  speech  of  Mikoyan,  the  past  architect  of  Russian  foreign  trade,  before 
the  19th  party  congress  in  Moscow  in  October  1952  will  be  indeed  surprised 
by  the  minister's  constant  reference  to  international  law,  commercial  treaties, 
respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  treaty  partners — in  brief,  to  all  the  concepts  for- 
ever advocated  by  bourgeois  jurisprudence.  For  their  own  case,  Mr.  Mikoyan 
and  his  collaborators  praise  the  fact  that  Russia's  commercial  treaties  with  the 
"people's  republics" — which  is  Russia's  term  for  the  satellites — are  long-term 
understandings.  This,  so  they  say,  guarantees  a  smooth  development  of  the 
satellite  industries.  It  protects  them  against  crises  and  gives  them  confidence 
in  their  future  by  securing  adequate  raw  material  supply  and  markets  for  their 
products.  The  Russians,  of  course,  never  mention  the  fact  that  these  treaties 
make  the  satellites  completely  dependent  on  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  this  not  only 
for  a  short  period,  but  rather  for  a  long  time  to  come.  Indeed  through  proto- 
cols to  the  existing  agreements  or  through  renegotiation  closer  and  closer  ties 
are  continually  established,  as  was  recently  evidenced  by  the  protocol  of  Janu- 
ary 1954  to  the  Russian-Chinese  trade  agreement  of  February  1950.  This 
protocol  increased  the  items  of  exchange  between  the  two  countries  in  a  con- 
siderable fashion,  although  the  original  agreement  had  already  provided  for 
the  closest  cooperation. 

In  other  words,  the  commercial  treaties  of  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  satellites 
serve  as  the  legal  basis  for  the  annexation  to  the  Russian  Grossraum.  The  con- 
sequences of  this  annexation  are  clear.  Soviet  trade  with  the  satellites  and  the 
trade  of  the  satellites  among  themselves  have  tremendously  increased,  in  some 
instances  as  in  the  case  of  the  Russian-Finnish  trade  in  machinery  and  machine 
tools  as  much  as  10  times  over  prewar  operations.  By  the  same  token,  of 
course,  the  satellite  trade  with  the  western  countries  has  rapidly  decreased  in 
Bpite  of  some  occasional  flickering  here  and  there.  This  is  a  fact  of  tremendous 
significance  wMcli  cannot  be  stressed  enough,  because  originally  the  trade  of 


176  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

especially  the  European  satellites  with  Russia  was  relatively  small.  The 
economies  of  Russia  and  of  the  satellites  were  not  complementary,  but  in  many 
ways — though  of  course  in  different  dimensions — rather  parallel.  For  buying 
and  selling  the  satellites  had  therfore  normally  turned  to  Central  and  Western 
Europe  as  their  natural  markets. 

This  again  is  significant,  because  it  shows  that  the  satellites'  turn  to  the 
Soviet  Union  must  be  accompanied  by  a  structural  change  of  their  economies 
as  well  as  by  a  strong  decline  of  their  standard  of  living,  at  least  until  this 
structural  change  and  the  consequent  integration  into  the  Soviet  orbit  are  fully 
completed.  The  Russians  will  not  worry  about  all  this,  since  they  look  on  the 
Soviet  plan  area  as  something  similar  to  a  war  economy  where  the  citizens' 
welfare  is  nothing  compared  to  the  state's  defense.  The  feelings  of  the  sub- 
jected nations  are  of  course  a  different  matter  which  the  democracies  will  do 
well  to  remember. 

For  the  time  being,  the  world  must  realize  that  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  conquered 
the  satellite  area  through  its  foreign  trade  policies.  The  next  question  is  there- 
fore, whether  Russia's  conquest  through  foreign  trade  is  on  the  march  else- 
where. The  answer  is,  alas,  positive.  The  Russians  have  found  their  new 
weapon  a  good  one,  and  are  determined  to  use  it  to  the  fullest  degree,  whereby 
they  discriminate  with  infernal  instinct  between  their  victims  and  apply  the 
medicine  in  different  doses. 

While  Stalin  was  still  philosophizing  about  the  two  separate  world  markets — 
the  capitalist  and  the  Communist — the  Soviet  Government  invited  representa- 
tives of  both  from  all  over  the  world  to  an  international  economic  conference 
at  Moscow  in  April  1952.  From  all  reports  this  conference  must  have  been  a 
rather  smooth  and  "Bourgeois"  affair  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr.  Nesterov, 
the  president  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Here,  the 
Soviets  proclaimed  to  all  who  wanted  to  listen  their  readiness  to  trade  with  any 
nation  that  wanted  to  enter  into  commerce  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  The  Russians 
soon  found  that  there  was  more  of  a  response  than  perhaps  even  they  had 
expected.  Respectable  Britishers  like  Lord  John  Boyd  Orr  cheered  enthusi- 
astically, the  South  Americans  lent  a  willing  ear,  the  Near  East  and  Central 
Asia  seemed  ripe  victims. 

The  Soviets  of  course  realized  that  the  game  here  would  not  be  as  easy  as 
with  the  satellites  and  that  the  approach  would  have  to  be  different,  but  they 
set  out  to  work  immediately.  Since  they  are  not  in  a  hurry  and  are  used  to 
waiting  many  years  if  necessary,  as  in  the  case  of  China,  where  the  battle 
took  25  years,  they  will  be  satisfied  in  the  beginning  with  moderate  results,  much 
more  moderate  than  in  the  plan  area,  as  long  as  they  get  results.  For  the 
democracies,  however,  every  Russian  success  is  a  tocsin  of  danger  which  must 
not  be  ignored.  Disaster  is  bound  to  come,  unless  the  Russian  conquest  through 
trade  is  not  brought  to  a  halt  in  due  time. 

Some  of  the  new  Russian  successes  shall  be  recorded  here ;  but  for  all  of  them 
It  is  an  established  fact  that  the  Russians  are  hardly  interested  in  the  economic 
advantages  that  might  come  to  them  from  their  new  foreign  trade  connections, 
but  much  rather  in  the  establishment  of  a  political  hold  on  their  new  trade 
partners. 

The  Near  East,  the  Arab  world,  has  always  been  of  special  interest  to  the 
Russians.  Two  major  trade  agreements  are  noteworthy  in  this  respect,  the 
Egyptian- Soviet  Payments  Agreement  of  November  195.3  and  the  Lebanese-Rus- 
sian Trade  and  Payments  Agreement  of  June  1954.  The  latter  agreement  is 
rather  elaboi-ate  and  provides  for  an  exchange  of  goods  in  each  direction  in  the 
amount  of  LLIO  million.'  The  Soviets  will  deliver  industrial  goods;  and  the 
Lebanese  agricultural  products.  This  agreement  also  contains  through  its  spe- 
cial handling  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause  a  Soviet  recognition  of  the 
Arab  countries  as  a  whole  large  unit,  an  idea  from  which  some  day  not  only 
the  Arabs  but  also  the  Soviets  may  draw  profit.  The  agreement  also  ties  the 
method  of  establishing  the  exchange  rate  between  tlie  ruble  and  the  Lebanese 
pound  to  the  gold  content  of  the  ruble,  and  makes  the  ruble  this  way  for  once 
an  international  gold-based  currency,  quite  contrary  to  its  usual  merely  domestic 
function.  This  may  have  no  practical  significance,  but  it  reveals  once  more 
the  independent  and  arbitrary  way  in  which  the  Russians  see  fit  to  arrange 
their  economic  and  financial  relations  with  their  various  trade  partners. 

Yet,  the  two  Near  Eastern  agreements  pale  in  the  light  of  the  Ru.sso-Indiiin 
trade  agreement  which  constitutes  a  significant  milestone  on  Russia's  road  to 
conquest. 

*  Lebanese  liras. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMJVIUNISM  177 

On-  December  2,  1953,  Russia  and  India  concluded  a  trade  and  payments  agree- 
ment whicli  will  run  for  5  years  after  which  it  can  be  extended  by  negotiations 
which  must  begin  3  months  before  the  expiration  date.  Both  parties  have  agreed 
to  give  one  another  preferential  treatment  in  shipping  and  other  facilities. 
Russia  will  render  technical  assistance  on  the  installation  and  operation  of 
equipment  that  it  supplies,  a  clause  that  reminds  very  much  of  the  agreements 
with  the  satellite  plan  area.  All  payments  are  to  be  made  in  Indian  rupees; 
for  this  purpose,  the  State  Bank  of  Russia  will  maintain  accounts  with  the 
Reserve  Bank  of  India  and  one  or  more  commercial  banks  in  India.  The  bal- 
ances in  these  accounts  will  be  convertible  into  sterling  on  demand.  The  agree- 
ment provides  for  the  exchange  of  a  large  number  of  goods.  Among  the  20  items 
exportable  from  India  during  the  first  year  of  the  agreement  are  jute  goods,  tea, 
coffee,  tobacco,  spices,  shellac,  wool,  hides,  and  skins,  vegetable  and  essential  oils, 
coir  yarn  and  ropes,  live  animals,  chemical  films,  books,  and  cottage  products. 
Among  the  39  items  available  for  export  from  Russia  are  wheat,  barley,  crude 
petroleum  and  petroleum  products,  timber  and  paper,  optical  goods,  dyestuffs, 
chemicals,  medicines,  printed  matter,  films,  and  a  wide  range  of  industrial  equip- 
ment, machinery  and  machine  tools. 

India's  imports  from  Russia  were  valued  at  ''R2.3  million  (about  $480,000)  in 
1950-51,  R13.S  million  in  1951-52,  and  R2.4  million  in  1952-53.  Exports  to  Rus- 
sia during  those  3  years  amounted  to  R13.4  million,  R6.7  million,  and  R8.5  million 
respectively. 

This  agreement  is  doubtless  of  great  political  and  psychological  importance, 
for  both  India  and  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Leading  Indian  newspapers  have  therefore 
hailed  this  compact  in  glowing  terms.  The  Bengali  Ananda  Bazar  Patrika  of 
Calcutta  stres.sed  in  an  enthusiastic  leading  article  Russia's  willingness  to  send 
machinery  and  to  give  technical  assistance  to  the  unskilled  Indians.  And  since 
western  experience  has  already  shown  that  the  best  capital  equipment  can  be 
useless  in  India  because  of  the  lack  of  native  skill,  it  may  well  be  that  the  Rus- 
sian teachers  will  be  permanent  in  India,  as  they  once  were  in  China,  and  that 
they  may  repeat  the  Chinese  lesson  there. 

Another  Indian  paper,  the  Hindu  Ted  of  Delhi,  on  the  other  hand  stressed  the 
fact  that  the  agreement  adopted  the  Indian  rupee  as  the  unit  of  account  and  that 
thus  Russia  was  the  first  great  power  to  acknowledge  India's  sovereign  currency. 
This  was  valued  by  the  paper  as  a  great  success  in  prestige.  In  other  words, 
India  hailed  the  agreement  not  only  as  a  commercial  progress,  but  as  a  national 
victory.  Russian  commercial  policy  hit  indeed  the  target.  Yet,  analogies  with 
the  beginnings  of  Russia's  battle  for  China  cannot  be  removed  from  the  student's 
mind.  In  that  case.  Dr.  Sun-Yat-sen  had  invited  the  Russians  to  help  to  estab- 
lish China's  national  might  through  a  Russian-trained  Chinese  army.  The  Rus- 
sians came  and  actually  never  left,  until  China  became  fully  subservient  to  the 
Soviet  Union. 

Russia  has  not  stopped  courting  the  western  European  democracies.  Agree- 
ments with  France,  England,  Italy,  the  Scandinavian  countries,  the  Benelux  area 
are  still  the  order  of  the  day  in  spite  of  Russia's  unmitigated  hatred  of  and  oppo- 
sition to  any  western  bloc  such  as  the  Council  of  Europe,  or  the  European  Coal 
and  Steel  Community,  not  to  mention  the  Marshall  plan  which  they  sabotaged 
from  its  very  beginning.  Sensing  economic  difficiilties  in  England,  the  Soviets 
did  not  hesitate  to  come  forward  with  grandiose  offers  as  at  the  time  of  the 
Foreign  Ministers'  Conference  in  Berlin  in  February  1954,  when  the  present 
Russian  Foreign  Trade  Minister  Kabanov  submitted  to  a  British  trade  delega- 
tion in  Moscow  orders  to  the  tune  of  $1,120,000. 

Without  doubt,  such  offers,  even  if  they  do  not  become  contracts,  leave  a  deep 
impression  on  the  business  world  in  any  country,  and  this  is  perhaps  the  main 
reason  why  they  were  made.  Other  western  countries  received  similar  "favors" 
from  the  Soviet  Union.  The  intention  is  clear.  The  Russians  want  to  use 
such  foreign  trade  to  wean  the  western  countries  from  their  American  ally. 
Beyond  that  they  try  to  break  the  American  export  controls  which  is  evident 
from  the  lists  of  goods  they  submitted  to  the  Byitish.  These  lists  contained 
goods  that  could  not  be  shipped  to  the  Soviets  under  the  present  mutual  defense 
assistance  system.  The  Russians  doubtless  believe  that,  with  the  end  of 
American  economic  aid  to  Europe  in  sight,  they  wiU  be  able  to  play  the  field 
again  strongly  and  they  don't  want  to  delay  the  start. 

Very  striking,  however,  are  the  Russian  attempts  to  conquer  South  America 
through  trade.    Two  Latin  American  countries  have  recently  concluded  trade 


'Bussian  rubles. 


178  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

agreements  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  for  the  first  time  in  their  national  existence : 
Argentina  in  August  1053  and  Uruguay  in  Fehruary  1954.  The  Argentine 
a^'reement  is  the  first  Soviet  trade  agreement  in  Latin  America.  It  is  so  strik- 
ing in  its  contents  and  reveals  so  vk^ell  the  Russian  modus  operandi  that  a  de- 
tailed account  of  it  has  been  appended  to  this  statement.  Already  here  it  may 
be  said  that  th(3  agreement  clearly  shows  the  craftiness  and  the  Machiavellian 
disguise  by  which  the  Russians  try  to  establish  a  political  beachhead  through 
the  friendly  way  of  commerce.  ^v,TToeT5^-c 

There  are  then  four  different  groups  of  countries  where  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  tries 
to  infiltrate  its  power  through  foreign  trade.  Firstly,  the  plan  area  of  the 
satellites  where  the  operation  was  fully  successful,  then  the  Near  East  and 
India  where  there  is  a  very  successful  beginning ;  thirdly,  the  old  West  where 
economic  crises  may  play  into  the  hands  of  the  Russian  schemers,  and  finally 
the  Latin  American  countries  where  virgin  ground  was  just  brolien. 

The  question  may  well  be  asked:  Why  do  these  countries  conclude  trade 
agreements  with  the  Soviet  Union?  The  Soviet  record  is,  after  all,  obvious.  The 
answer  cannot -be  given  in  one  statement;  for  the  reasons  are  different  for  the 
various  nations.  But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  each  nation  hopes  that  it  will  be 
spared  the  extreme,  though  the  basis  for  such  hope  is  not  rational ;  on  the  other 
hand  each  such  nation  is  always  driven  to  the  Russians  by  some  emergency. 
This  emergency,  whichever  it  may  be,  has  always  been  cleverly  understood 
and  exploited  to  the  full  by  the  Russians.  Economic  difficulties  in  England 
make  English  businessmen  amenable  to  Russian  approaches  which  are  only 
too  gladly  forthcoming ;  similarly,  the  difficulty  to  find  a  market  for  its  products 
and  a  cheap  source  of  supply  drives  Argentina  into  Soviet  hands;  Indian  in- 
dependence and  indigence  find  the  Russians  as  teachers  and  psychological  and 
economic  supports;  the  Arab  world  may  take  a  similar  view.  The  satellites 
were  under  Russian  military  occupation,  but  with  Germany's  destruction  at 
the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  Russia  was  anyhow  a  logical  power  to  turn 
to.    All  these  are  possible  answers  to  the  query  at  issue. 

Indeed  at  the  moment  of  writing,  infiuential  circles  in  West  Germany  look 
to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  for  help  in  their  fight  for  German  reunification.  Dr.  Bruen- 
ing's  recent  ominous  reference  to  the  Rapallo  Treaty  of  1922  is  ill-boding. 
Through  their  agreement  with  the  Russians  at  Rapallo  the  Germans  played 
Russia  oif  against  the  West.  It  marked  the  beginning  of  their  new  military  and 
economic  rise  as  a  sovereign  power,  but  it  also  fortified  tremendously  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  world. 

Since  Ur.  Adenauer  and  his  government,  as  well  as  the  Western  Powers  have 
shelved  the  question  of  German  reunification  for  the  time  being,  the  Russians 
have  here  an  opening  to  win  over  those  West  German  circles  who  place  Ger- 
many's reunification  highest  on  the  agenda.  Premier  Malenkov  has  understood 
this,  and  in  his  interview  with  East  Germany's  Premier  Otto  Grotewohl  earlier 
this'  month  already  expressed  his  desire  for  cultural  and  economic  relations 
with  West  Germany.  It  would  be  fatal  if  Dr.  Adenauer  could  not  prevail  in  his 
Western  policy  against  those  influential  circles  in  Germany,  including  the  three 
former  Reichschancellors,  Drs.  Bruening,  Luther,  and  Wirth,  who  would  pact 
with  the  Devil  to  reunite  Germany.  All  this  is  a  matter  of  conjecture ;  but  the 
Soviets  sense  here  once  again  one  of  these  psychological  moments  which  may  lead 
West  Germany  toward  them  for  another  Rapallo. 

A  last  problem  of  Russian  foreign  trade  should  be  mooted.  That  is  the  ques- 
tion of  Soviet  gold.  Does  Soviet  gold,  as  an  Instrument  of  foreign  trade  quite 
independent  from  the  Soviet  treaty  system,  constitute  a  danger  to  the  Western 
World?  Not  too  much  can  be  said  about  this  issue.  A  few  things,  however, 
are  certain.  The  Soviets  have,  so  far,  not  used  gold  as  an  instrument  of  eco- 
nomic warfare.  Their  gold  production  is  a  matter  of  estimate;  nor  is  much 
known  about  the  extent  of  Russian  gold  deposits,  especially  in  the  Lena  and 
Kolyma  regions.  Soviet  gold  sales  have  recently  taken  place  in  the  free  mar- 
kets of  Europe,  including  London ;  but  there  is  no  report  of  disturbances  of  the 
market  through  Russian  gold  sales.  The  question  of  how  much  Russia  would 
benefit  from  a  rise  in  the  price  of  gold  and  whether  she  would  benefit  more  than 
such  an  underdeveloped  area  as  the  Union  of  South  Africa  is  therefore  difficult  to 
answer.  Yet,  the  immediate  problem  here  is  whether  Russian  gold  does  not 
make  its  way  into  the  American  Treasury.  It  is  quite  likely,  considering  the 
low  cost  of  remelting,  that  Soviet  gold  freed  of  the  hammer-and-sickle  emblem 
Is  shipped  to  the  United  States  by  Russia's  European  trade  partners.  By  accept- 
ing such  gold  without  knowing  the  actual  origin  the  American  Treasury  would 
facilitate  Russian  trade  with  Western  Europe,  which  is  certainly  a  doubtful 
result. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  179 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  stated  that  militarily,  economically,  and  politically 
tlie  Soviet  Union  has  only  one  firm  and  strong  opponent :  the  United  States  of 
America.  For  this  reason  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  reserved  all  its  abuse  and  in- 
vectives for  this  country.  Its  propaganda  against  the  United  States  of  America 
in  other  countries  is  formidable.  With  each  trade  agreement  it  concludes,  it  also 
extends  its  propaganda  radius.  With  the  wares  it  sends,  it  passes  along  its  anti- 
American  hatred.  Against  that  the  United  States  has  to  take  the  strongest 
stand.  This  propaganda  must  not  be  underrated.  Everything  must  be  done  to 
counteract  it.  Especially  now  that  economic  aid  may  decrease  or  cease,  the 
United  States  must  be  vigilant  to  lieep  the  loyalty  of  the  former  aid  recipients. 
Beyond  that,  it  is  especially  important  to  vitiate  the  Soviet  trade  effort.  Having 
recognized  Soviet  foreign  trade  as  an  instrument  of  conquest,  everything  must 
be  done  by  the  United  States  to  attract  the  world's  trade  to  its  own  shnv<js  or 
to  help  to  establish  conditions  in  which  the  free  world  can  trade  with  each  other 
without  Russia's  participation.  Export  controls  as  established  in  the  Export 
Control  Act  of  1949  and  the  Battle  Act  of  1951  should  be  continued  in  one  way 
or  another.  That  they  were  extremely  successful  is  evidenced  by  the  violent 
Russian  reaction  against  them.  That  they  hurt  the  Russian  orbit  much  more 
than  the  Western  World  is  evidenced  by  the  statistics.  Through  a  proper  tariff 
policy  and  technical  assistance  the  United  States  can  continue  to  help  the  free 
world  to  stay  free  and  beyond  that  stop  the  Soviet  march  to  conquest. 

It  would  be  unrealistic  to  hope  for  complete  commercial  isolation  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.,  but  the  cordon  sanitaire  can  be  tucked  tighter  and  tighter.  If  the 
United  States  remains  a  market  for  foreign  products  and  a  supplier  of  credit, 
raw  materials,  and  finished  products,  if  trade,  not  aid,  becomes  the  regular  fea- 
ture of  American  relations  with  other  nations,  then  the  free  nations  wiU  have  no 
reason  to  fall  for  Russia's  siren  song. 

It  is  clear  that  Russia's  foreign  trade  serves  one  purpose  only :  to  aggrandize 
the  Soviet  power.   It  is  one  more  instrument  of  conquest. 

In  such  circumstances  It  is  the  task  of  the  United  States  to  stop  not  only  the 
Russian  soldier,  but  also  the  Russian  trader. 

Appendix 

the  soviet-abgentine  teade  agreement  * 

Late  in  October  1953,  Buenos  Aires  announced  the  first  shipment  of  goods  for 
the  Soviet  Union  under  the  Russian-Argentine  trade  agreement  signed  in  August 

1953 

The  Importance  of  this  agreement  lies  in  its  political  aspects,  Including  economic 
policy,  and  not  in  its  detailed  provisions.  The  first  trade  agreement  between  the 
two  countries,  It  furthers  a  general  rapprochement  between  the  partners  and  also 
establishes  a  lively  exchange  of  goods,  which  heretofore  was  small,  since  1949 
almost  nonextant  The  agreement,  concluded  for  1  year,  is  renewable  at  the 
parties'  wish.  „     , 

It  Is  easy  to  understand  Argentine's  new  course.  Her  hard  currency  reserves 
accrued  during  the  war  were  soon  exhausted.  This  resulted  from  Argentina's 
increased  import  requirements  due  to  the  growth  of  her  population  and  indus- 
trialization. Furthermore,  orders  unfilled  on  account  of  the  war  and  substantial 
price  increases  in  Argentina's  traditional  purveyor  countries  aggravated  the  situ- 
ation. To  offset  current  imports  through  exports  was  difficult  for  the  Argentines 
because  of  their  creditors'  unwillingness  to  accept  their  goods.  The  Argentines 
looked  therefore  for  cheap  supplies  from  nations  that  were  willing  to  buy  Argen- 
tine goods.    They  found  Russia. 

The  agreement  also  reflects  Argentina's  wish  for  independence  from  one  par- 
ticular exporter  or  group  of  exporters,  e.  g.,  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
and  for  prosperous  trade  with  many  countries.  Argentina  hopes  to  thus  secure 
that  freedom  which  might  grant  her  at  the  time  of  Industrial  maturity  a  formid- 
able position  in  South  America  and  the  world  over.  This  attitude  is  stressed  by 
Argentina's  renewed  intensive  trading  with  West  Germany. 

In  comparison  with  Argentina's  American  and  British  trade  the  dimensions 
of  the  Russian-Argentine  agreement  are  moderate.  Very  likely  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  will  continue  to  loom  large  in  Argentine  trade,  though  both 
countries  have  lost  substantial  ground  to  Germany.  But  the  important  point  is 
that  the  goods  which  Argentina  buys  from  the  United  States  and  the  United 

»  OriginaUy  published  as  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  New  York  Times,  December  14,  195S. 


180  STRATEGY    AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Kingdom  parallel  those  in  tbe  Russian  convention ;  and  there  is  nothing  to  stop 
her  from  expanding  her  trade  with  the  new  partner. 

A  look  at  Russia  reveals  that  the  economic- consequences  of  this  compact  are 
Insignificant  for  the  Soviet  Union.  Economically  the  agreemerit  is  important  only 
for  the  Latin-American  partner.  Why  then  did  the  Soviet  Union  conclude  this 
agreement?    A  scrutiny  of  Russian  foreign  trade  pacts  gives  the  answer. 

In  the  Soviet  economy  foreign  trade  has  always  played  a  secondary  role  and 
served  more  political  than  economic  purposes.  Mter  the  Second  World  War 
trade  pacts  have  been  a  studied  instrument  for  economic  penetration  and  politi- 
cal domination.  The  trade  agreements  with  Russia's  European  satellites  are  an 
object  lesson.  These  coiiutries  turned  their  trade  to  Russia  and  objected  their 
existence  to  Soviet  tutelage.  All  these  pacts,  economically  significant  for  Rus- 
sia's partners,  are  unimportant  for  the  Soviet  economy  and  constitute  a  Soviet 
attempt  to  win  control  over  the  partner  via  the  partner's  economy. 

The  significance  of  the  Russo-Argentine  agreement  for  the  Soviet  Union 
lies  therefore  exclusively  in  the  extension  of  its  political  power  to  Argentina. 
The  Russians  will  try  to  tie  the  Latin  American  Republic  more  to  the  Soviet 
orbit  by  putting  the  agreement  in  the  future  on  a  larger  scale.  The  economic 
bond  tightened,  Soviet  propaganda  will  increase  to  wean  Argentina  from  her 
North  American  and  European  partners.  That  Argentina  is  just  the  beginning 
of  Russian  penetration  of  South  America  is  obvious  and  is  evidenced  by  the 
willingness  of  President  Ibanez  of  Chile  to  open  trade  negotiations  with  the 
Russians. 

When  Stalin  criticized  Argentina  to  President  Roosevelt,  Peron  was  not  yet 
the  head  of  that  nation.  Since  then  peronismo  has  come  into  ascendancy. 
Peron  borrowed  the  idea  of  the  5-year  plans  and  established  a  complete  dictator- 
ship. Russia's  present  cordial  relations  with  Argentina  led  to  the  speculation 
that  dictatorships,  no  matter  what  their  differences,  always  attract  each  other. 
This  affinity  may  spell  dire  political  and  economic  consequences  for  the  Western 
countries.  This  is  the  deeper  warning  of  tlie  Russian-Argentine  trade  agree-' 
ment  for  the  democratic  world. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  Soviet  plan  area 
which  you  alhide  to  in  your  statement  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  Soviet  plan  area  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  You  mav  recall  that  at  the  end  of  the  war  the 
neighboring  states  of  the  Soviet  Union  were  under  Eussian  military 
occupation.  They  had  no  choice  to  do  anything  but  what  the  Rus- 
sians told  them.  Germany  was  utterly  prostrated  and  destroyed. 
Germany  didn't  exist.  So  they  had  to  do  what  the  Russian  masters 
ordered.  The  Russians,  in  order  to  give  their  policy  a  peaceful  garb, 
began  to  establish  a  mesh  of  international  trade  treaties,  in  particular 
with  practically  all  neighboring  areas  and  even  areas  a  little  bit 
farther  removed  from  the  Soviet  border. 

This  plan  area  which  was  created  by  trade  agreements  includes  to- 
day Red  China — if  I  may  call  Communist  China  simply  Red  China — 
North  Korea,  Albania,  East  Germany,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Hun- 
gary, and  the  Mongolian  Republic. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  does  this  Soviet  plan  area  operate  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  There  is  a  central  plan  in  Moscow  dictating  to  all 
these  satellites,  as  we  are  used  to  calling  them,  what  they  have  to  do 
agriculturally,  industrially,  commercially,  et  cetera.  Up  to  now  these 
satellite  countries  had  plans  of  their  own  which  were  put  in  step  with 
the  master  plan  in  Moscow.  Quite  recently — I  think  this  last  disguise 
will  fall  and  there  will  be  one  5-year  plan  in  Moscow  simply  taking 
in  all  these  countries  as  a  subcategory  of  the  plan. 

Mr.  Arens.  "Wliat  is  the  objective  of  the  plan  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  To  use  these  countries  for  Russian  economy  and  just 
to  make  them  colonies  or  servants  of  the  Soviet  economy  without  any 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  181 

sovereignty  of  their  own,  without  any  economic  or  political  life  of 
their  own. 

Mr.  Areists.  Let  us  move  to  the  Soviet  trade  offensive  outside  of  this 
plan  area.  First,  however,  tlie  plan  area  embracing  the  satellite 
countries,  if  you  will  kindly  address  yourself  to  the  Soviet  trade  of- 
fensive outside  of  the  plan  area. 

Mr'.  Garbuny.  I  shall  be  glad  to  do  that. 

On  page  7, 1  begin  with  the  story  of  the  Soviet  offensive  elsewhere. 
I  like  to  distinguish  here  three  different  groups.  This  is  a  mass  of- 
fensive, but  there  are  three  different  approaches.  One  approach  or 
one  offensive  is  directed  to  the  Near  East.  I  would  prefer  the  word 
'•Xear  East"  to  "Middle  East"  because  it  is  actually  the  old  Near  East, 
the  Arab  world.  It  may  well  go  into  North  Africa  and  up  to  Spanish 
Morocco  if  that  is  not  stopped. 

Then  connected  with  the  attack,  the  commercial  attack,  on  the  near 
eastern  world  is  the  attempt  to  rope  India  into  the  Russia  orbit.  I 
believe  the  Russian-Indian  trade  agreement  of  1954  is  perhaps  the 
most  portraj^ed  agreement  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  concluded  re- 
cently. 

Mr.ARENS.  Why? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  It  is  an  agreement  which  branches  out  into  practi- 
cally every  sphere  of  economic  activity — exports  and  imports — com- 
prising dilTerent  major  categories  of  commodities.  You  will  realize 
that  59  major  categories  actually  mean  all  the  trade.  That  this  is  so 
is  also  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  the  Russians  will  not  only  deliver 
equipment  but  they  will  send — and  this  is  the  dangerous  part — the 
trainers,  the  instructors  with  the  equipment  to  train  the  Indians.  It 
does  not  take  much  imagination  that  these  instructors,  if  past  history 
in  China  is  any  example,  will  bring  not  only  machinery  and  know- 
how  but  doctrine  and  the  Communist  Party  line. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  you  conversant  with  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
Senate  Subcommittee  on  Strategic  Materials  reports  that  we  procure 
from  India — by  "we"  I  mean  the  United  States — certain  very  stra- 
tegic materials  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  am  not  familiar  with  this  particular  report  you 
mentioned,  but  I  am  from  my  war  activity,  of  course,  familiar  with  the 
fact  that  we  got  a  good  deal  from  India ;  for  instance,  very  special  type 
of  mica  which  was  very  important  then.  Take  Finland,  if  I  may  go 
back  to  the  plan  area.  We  used  to  do  a  lot  of  trade  with  Finland. 
But  that  is  taken  away.  The  sa.me  thing  may  happen  in  India  if  we 
don't  watch. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  say  the  Communist  trade  offensive  in  the 
Middle  East  and  in  India  is  part  of  a  political  strategy  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Absolutely,  absolutely.  I  am  absolutely  convinced 
of  that. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  third  area  now  of  the  Communist  trade 
offensive  ?  You  have  spoken  first  of  all  of  your  Communist  trade  plan 
area  with  the  satellites;  secondly,  of  the  Communist  trade  to  offen- 
sive in  the  Middle  East;  and  now  what  is  the  third  area  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  The  third  area  is  what  I  would  like  to  call  the  old 
democracies.  It  is  no  reflection  because  of  the  word  "old."  By  this 
I  mean  a  trade  offense  which  is  almost  surreptitiously  undertaken  on 
countries  like  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries, and  quite  recently  in  a  very  indirect  way  with  the  West  German 
Republic. 


182  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  How  about  South  ximerica  ?    Is  that  inckided  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  No,  sir.  That  would  be  the  fourth  area  for  very 
special  reasons. 

Mr.  Arens.  Let  us  maintain  our  interest  on  the  third  area,  then. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  The  offensive  here,  as  far  as  I  can  see  it,  and  this  I 
must  say  again  is  only  based  on  theoretical  studies,  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  Soviets'  move  in  the  moment  they  notice  there  is  a  crisis.  It  does 
not  take  much  reading  to  know  there  are  crises  continually  in  these 
countries  because  they  are  not  back  to  their  normal  position  from  the 
ravages  of  the  Second  World  War  and  all  the  strain  they  have  been 
under  after  that. 

As  an  example,  one  of  the  most  striking  examples,  I  felt,  was  the 
offer  made  to  some  British  industrialists  as  reported  in  the  New  York 
Times  in  February — a  Mr.  Scott — an  offer  of  over  a  billion  dollars  of 
goods  to  be  delivered  from  England  to  the  Soviet  Union.  This  offer 
was  made  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Foreign  Ministers  Conference.  It 
wag  like  a  bombshell.  Everyone  was  upset.  If  the  Kussians  can  give 
so  much  business  to  England  and  no  strings  attached — they  want  to 
pay — why  shouldn't  we  trade  with  Russia  then  ? 

This  is  an  almost  normal  reaction.  This  is  devilish  psychology  ap- 
plied by  the  Russian  Foreign  Trade  Ministry.  They  do  the  same 
thing  in  France  and  England.  You  would  not  believe  the  Russians 
even  have  a  trade  agreement  with  such  far-out  islands  as  the  Faeroe 
Islands,  which  is  the  Danish  unit  north  of  the  British  Isles,  and  in  the 
same  relation  to  the  Danish  King  that  that  island  was  before  it  became 
independent. 

The  Faeroe  Islands  deliver  on  the  basis  of  a  trade  agreement  of 
January  or  February  of  this  year  to  the  Soviet  Union  their  fish  catch 
almost  exclusively.  The  Faeroe  Islands  do  not  need  any  other  coun- 
try. They  exist  on  what  the  Russians  give  them.  This  is  a  very  small 
example.  I  could  multiply  it  with  Iceland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Italy. 
May  I  call  your  attention  to  the  way  the  Russians  have  handled  the 
100  million  reparations  payment  on  which  they  insisted  from  Italy? 

When  the  Italians  showed  a  weakness,  they  did  that.  But  at  the 
same  time  Mr.  Togliatti  was  going  all  over  the  country.  There  seemed 
to  be  a  possibility  of  a  quick  kill.  "Those  assets  you  hold  in  Rumania, 
in  Albania,  in  Bulgaria,  and  which  we  have  taken  over,  will  be  counted 
as  part  of  the  reparation,"  they  said,  which  means  the  Italians,  I  don't 
know  exactly  what  amount,  but  they  will  pay  only  a  very  small  amount 
of  this  hundred  million  dollars.  This  is  the  way  in  which  the  western 
democracy  is  lured  into  the  Soviet  orbit. 

Mr.  Arens.  They  are  lured  into  the  political  orbit  because  of  being 
lured  into  the  economic  orbit  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Absolutely. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  area  of  Latin  Amer- 
ica or  South  America  as  a  fourth  area  of  the  Communist  trade  offen- 
sive? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Gladly.  I  may  call  to  your  attention  that  on  page 
17  I  have  inserted  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  New  York  Times  that 
I  took  the  liberty  to  write  in  December  of  1953  on  the  Soviet- Argen- 
tine trade  agreement. 

Senator  Welker.  Was  it  printed  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Yes,  on  December  14  in  the  New  York  Times.  This 
agreement  went  by,  unnoticed  in  America.   I  have  been  watchinff  and 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COIMMUNISM  183 

■waiting.  Wlien  I  noticed  this  agreement  in  the  Pravda  in  August,  I 
made  a  mental  note  that  I  might  write  about  it  if  nobody  else  men- 
tions it. 

]\Ir.  Aeens.  Maybe  it  went  unnoticed  to  your  judgment,  but  there 
are  those  on  the  internal  subcommittee  who  did  take  note  of  it. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  was  thinking  actually  of  the  commercial  journals 
and  the  daily  papers  which  reported  the  fact,  but  not  the  importance 
of  the  agreement. 

"When  I  noticed  nobody  took  the  initiative,  I  began  to  write  this 
letter.  "\^^iat  I  said  then  still  stands,  and  I  felt  it  might  be  best  to  at- 
tach it  here.  That  is  a  very  significant  agreement  for  many  reasons. 
The  first  reason  is  that  it  is  the  first  straight  agreement  which  the 
Soviet  Union  concluded  with  any  Latin  American  country.  The 
second  reason  is  that  Argentina,  which  in  our  mind  has  always  been, 
if  I  may  say  so,  a  conservative  and  careful  country,  extended  its  hand 
to  atheist  Communist  countries.  That  was  the  second  important 
reason. 

The  third  reason  was  this  agreement  is  economically  of  absolutely 
no  importance  to  the  Soviet  Union.  One  hundred  fifty  million  dollars 
of  goods  each  way  is  a  drop  in  the  bucket  for  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
goods  that  go  over  have  absolutely  no  relevance  for  the  Soviet  economy. 

Senator  Welker.  "What  are  the  goods,  wheat  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Yes.  Hides,  skins,  oil,  seed — similar  agricultural 
goods  which  the  Soviet  Union  can  get  from  the  Soviet  countries.  One 
hundred  fifty  million  dollars,  on  the  other  hand,  is  important  for 
Argentina's  economy.  So  the  favor  economically  in  this  agreement  is 
for  Argentina.  They  got  machinery,  transportation  equipment, 
trucks,  railroads,  electrical  equipment,  refrigerators,  etc. 

Senator  "Welker.  "Wliat  do  you  have  to  say  with  respect  to  whether 
or  not  this  trade  agreement  with  Argentina  does  not  amount  to,  in  fact, 
a  chance  for  the  Soviet  Union — for  the  Communists,  should  I  say — to 
send  in  technicians  under  the  guise  of  being  technicians  but  who  are 
espionage  agents,  saboteurs,  and  men  sent  there  destined  to  sell  the 
Communist  philosophy  to  the  people  of  Argentina  ? 

]Mr.  Garbuny,  Sir,  this  agreement  does  not  provide,  as  the  Indian 
agreement  does,  for  sending  of  instructors  or  skilled  personnel  to 
establish  plans.  The  Argentines  apparently  have  that.  But  with  each 
commercial  treaty  and  with  each  unfolding  of  the  treaty,  because 
there  will  always  be  a  trade  mission,  there  will  always  be  controlled 
personnel,  there  will  always  be  a  ship  and  a  crew  of  sailors  that  come 
with  the  cargo.  Though  I  have  no  knowledge  of  that,  experience  in 
trade  matters  tells  me  tliat  as  soon  as  you  have  trade  going  the  Russian 
way,  you  need  trade  representation  in  Buenos  Aires. 

Senator  "Welker.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  you  know — and  I  think  this 
committee  has  had  some  testimony  to  the  effect — that  the  trade  mis- 
sions are  infiltrated  with  nothing  but  Communist  agents  destined  to 
sell  their  philosophy  to  this  country. 

Mv.  Garbuny.  Absolutely,  There  is  no  doubt  about  it.  Such  a 
trade  agreement  will  establish  such  a  trade  mission  parallel  to  Am- 
torg  in  this  country.  This  agi'eement,  I  may  say,  is  in  addition  not 
a  single  agreement.  Shortly  after  that  Argentina  concluded  an  agree- 
ment with  Poland;  in  other  words,  with  another  country  that  belongs 
to  the  Soviet  orbit — 


184  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Senator  Welker.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  doesn't  Kussia  have  trade 
agreements  with  all  of  the  satellite  countries  now  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Not  with  all,  sir.  I  cannot  give  you  the  list,  but  with 
a  substantial  amount.  I  am  sure,  but  my  knowledge  may  be  deficient. 
I  must  admit  that. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  Kremlin  has  the  satellite  countries  integrated  in 
various  stages  in  their  economic  system,  whether  by  trade  agreement 
or  pact  or  just  by  outright  order? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  There  is  no  doubt  about  that,  but  special  trade  agree- 
ments which  I  have  come  across  as  far  as  Argentina  is  concerned  is 
only  the  Argentine-Russian  agreement  and  the  Argentine-Polish 
agreement. 

Senator  Welker.  I  would  like  to  ask  your  opinion  about  the  politi- 
cal philosophy  of  Argentina.  Is  that  a  dictatorship  or  a  republic,  or  is 
it  destined,  as  you  say,  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  or  liberal  or  what  ? 
How  would  you  describe  that  to  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  This  has  been  much  on  my  mind,  sir.  I  must  say 
this :  From  all  I  can  see,  and  I  wish  to  be  somewhat  careful  in  wording 
this,  Peronismo,  the  government  of  General  Peron,  is  a  diclatorship. 
It  is  a  dictatorship  the  Latin  way,  which  means  a  milder  form  of 
dictatorship.  It  is  not  a  dictatorship  exclusive  to  the  right.  In  the 
Peronismo  you  have  the  proletarian,  if  I  may  use  this  word  without 
reflection,  as  in  the  center  of  the  movement.  The  Descamisados,  the 
shirtless  which  are  often  referred  to  in  the  press  and  the  literature, 
stand  in  the  center  of  the  Peron  movement  or  o-overnment.  If  you 
read  the  late  Mrs.  Peron's  book,  the  Eeason  of  My  Life,  then  you 
will  find  many  passages  that  have  almost,  in  my  mind,  a  Communist 
ring. 

Senator  Welker.  Would  you  say  it  was  socialistic? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Yes;  that  certainly  is  true,  except  they  have  not 
formally  adopted  the  Socialist  dogma.  They  do  not  speak  about  Marx 
and  the  other  Socialist  theorists.  You  won't  find  that.  You  don't 
have  the  authors,  but  you  have  the  substance. 

Senator  Welker.  Being  the  very  profound  expert  that  you  are^  I 
wonder  if  you  could  refresh  my  memory  with  respect  to  the  activity 
of  Argentina  at  the  Caracas  Conference  when  our  Secretary  of  State 
went  there.  As  I  recall  from  the  press,  there  was  a  movement  then 
that  all  of  the  Americas — Latin  xVmerica,  North  America — should 
unite  together  against  communism.  Do  you  know  how  Argentina 
voted  on  that  matter? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  do  not  know.  I  am  not  sure,  but  I  do  know  that 
Argentina  was  not  among  the  countries  that  abstained  from  vote  as 
Mexico  did.    I  believe  that  is  correct. 

Senator  Welker.  I  had  the  impression  that  Argentina  abstained 
from  voting,  and  I  am  not  sure. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  I  would  not  know,  sir. 

Senator  Welker.  I  believe  the- record  will  show  that  she  did  abstain 
from  voting  along  with  Mexico. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  That  is  interesting. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Garbuny,  can  you  express  to  this  committee  the 
potential  threat  of  Soviet  gold  to  destroy  the  economy  of  this  country  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  185 

Mr.  Garbunt,  This  question  is  more  of  an  afterthought  with  me. 
It  has  cropped  up  in  the  press  time  and  again,  and  esj)ecially  in  the 
liearings.  I  believe  it  is  the  Bridges-Reece  bill,  I  notice  Mr.  Ran- 
dolph Burgess  of  the  Treasury  brought  out  the  point  that  rise  in  the 
price  of  gold  is  not  desirable  because  the  Soviet  Union  would  be  prof- 
iting from  it.  I  am  not  authorized  to  interpret  Mr.  Burgess,  but  it 
seems  to  me  this  statement  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  Rus- 
sians are  using  gold  wholesale  to  attract  trade  and  that  they  still  have 
more  to  use  to  disrupt  the  normal  channel.  If  the  price  of  gold  is 
raised,  then  they  would  have  still  more  poAver. 

Senator  Welker.  May  1  interrupt  at  this  point,  and  I  will  ask  you 
if  it  is  not  a  great  duty  of  ours  to  try  to  make  friends  in  the  Latin 
American  countries,  to  have  them  on  our  side,  and  to  have  them  appre- 
ciate our  way  of  life  and  we  appreciate  their  way  of  life  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Certainly,  sir.  Every  eli'ort  unsparingly  should  be 
made  to  win  over  every  Latin  American  country.  They  are  our  most 
natural  allies  on  this  side  of  the  hemisphere.  If  I  may  utter  a  word 
of  hope,  I  believe  it  is  possible.    It  can  be  done. 

Senator  "VVelker.  But  I  take  it  you  agree  with  me  we  must  use 
sane,  sensible  approaches  and  not  to  go  overboard  to  try  to  help  a 
country  which  might  turn  against  us  in  the  hour  of  crisis. 

;Mr.  Garbuny.  A  hundred  percent  I  agree  with  that. 

Mr.  Akens.  Do  the  Russians  have  their  own  gold  mines  and  access 
to  the  gold  resources  of  the  world  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Russian  gold  has  always  been  a  matter  of  guess. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Russians  have  gold.  They  have  gold,  cer- 
tainl}^,  in  the  Lena  region,  in  the  Lena  River  in  Siberia.  The}^  have 
gold  in  the  Kolyma  region.  There  are  two  questions  we  must  ask. 
The  first  question  is,  How  large  are  the  deposits?  Wliat  are  the 
results  of  prospecting,  and  have  the  results  been  made  public? 

The  second  question  is,  Even  if  they  have  large  deposits  about 
which  we  do  not  know,  do  they  mine  them?  Are  they  in  a  position 
to  mine  them,  or  is  mining  possible  ?  Both  questions  have  never  been 
reliably  answered. 

If  you  follow  our  published  statistics  or  those  of  the  World  Bank  or 
the  International  Monetary  Fund,  you  will  always  come  across  the 
remark  "estimated."  We  have  some  evidence,  however,  that  the  Rus- 
sians must  have  some  gold  and  gold  of  their  own  because  there  are 
gold  sales  from  time  to  time.  The  Russians  sold  substantial  amounts 
of  gold  in  the  free  gold  markets  of  Western  Europe  recently,  say 
since  last  October.  They  did  sell  some  gold,  the  reports  were,  to  the 
London  firm  of  ]\Iontague  &  Coe  with  the  intention  this  gold  would 
reach  eventually  the  Bank  of  England,  and  apparently  it  has  reached 
the  Bank  of  England. 

There  were  sales  of  gold  in  France.  Wliether  these  sales  were  sub- 
stantial so  that  they  could  be  considered  an  economic  weapon  is  pretty 
much  up  in  the  air. 

I  brought  in  this  question  because  there  is  the  question  of  the  Union 
of  South  Africa.  You  may  ask,  'Wliat  is  the  connection  here  ?  Let  me 
state  it  briefly  please.  The  South  African  Finance  Minister  has  been 
carrying  on  a  very  strong  up-hill  fight  for  a  rise  in  the  gold  price 
and  never  succeeded  so  far,  with  minor  concessions  excluded.  He 
believes  that  his  country  would  profit  immensely  from  a  rise  in  the 
price  of  gold. 


186  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

That  is  obvious  because  South  Africa  is  a  large  gold  producer. 
South  Africa  should  be  considered  an  underdeveloped  area.  If  the 
rise  in  the  price  of  gold  becomes  the  truth,  this  undeveloped  area 
would  have  additional  funds  for  development.  Considering  that  the 
Russians,  of  course,  have  also  an  art  in  stirring  up  trouble,  one  should 
reconsider  the  question  and  perhaps  say  that  in  the  consideration  of 
a  rise  of  the  price  of  gold  that  Soviet  gold  should  not  be  an  issue.  That 
was  the  idea  that  I  had  in  mind  when  I  spoke  about  Soviet  gold. 

Senator  Welker.  You  are  speaking  about  South  Africa  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  The  Union  of  South  Africa. 

Senator  Welker.  Have  you  made  any  study  with  respect  to  anti- 
mony down  there  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  No,  sir ;  I  have  not. 

Sentaor  Welker.  But  I  take  it  if  our  country  imported  antimony 
from  South  Africa  or  the  Gold  Coast  or  wherever  it  is  mined  there, 
which  is  much  cheaper  than  our  domestic  mines,  and  as  a  result  there- 
of the  largest  domestic  mine  in  the  United  States  has  been  closed  since 
August  1, 1951,  that  might  be  of  some  assistance. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  No  doubt  about  that. 

Mr,  Arens.  Mr.  Garbuny,  what  in  your  judgment  are  the  basic  steps 
which  should  be  taken  as  a  matter  of  policy  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  in  order  to  stem  this  tide  of  Communist  encroach- 
ment, worldwide  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Sir,  I  can  of  course  speak  only  from  the  point  of 
view  of  trade  and  economic  measures.  That  is  the  only  field  I  am 
competent  or  believe  to  be  competent  in.  In  the  other  fields  there  are 
too  many  issues  which  I  do  not  know  enough  of  in  order  to  have  a 
sound  judgment. 

There  is  one  thing  to  me  of  paramount  importance.  Since  the  Rus- 
sians have  a  trade  war,  we  must  retaliate.  We  must  do  everything  to 
get  the  trade  of  those  countries  who  have  not  yet  fully  fallen  into  the 
claws  of  the  Soviet  to  see  that  these  countries  do  not  trade  with  the 
Soviet  Union  but  rather  with  us  or  among  themselves.  In  the  inter- 
est of  our  own  domestic  economy  we  cannot  take  over  all  the  trade  of 
all  the  world.  That  would  not  be  possible.  But  we  can  do  an  awful 
lot  through  financial  measures,  tariif  measures,  to  attract  imports  and 
stimulate  that  way  exports  to  countries  which  would  otherwise  trade 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Senator  Welker.  How  about  these  imports  we  are  enticing  our 
friends  to  give  us ;  are  they  destroying  the  domestic  economy  of  our 
own  country  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  This  is  a  very  serious  problem,  sir.  There  are  two 
possibilities.  First  of  all,  there  would  be  the  question  of  simply  buy- 
ing up  and  storing,  depending  on  the  goods,  until  some  time  these 
goods  can  be  resold  by  the  United  States  elsewhere.  The  question  of 
subsidy  to  industries  which  suffer  from  imports  should  be  vented. 
Certainly  it  might  be  possible  to  advise  potential  exporters  to  us  to  do 
a  little  shifting  in  their  industrial  base. 

Secondly,  we  could  extend  credits  to  other  countries  so  that  they 
may  be  in  a  position  to  buy  what  we  do  not  want  to  buy.  If  I  may 
take  a  hypothetical  case  which  has  at  the  moment  no  real  rational 
basis,  if  we  gave  an  extensive  credit  to  a  South  American  republic 
that  is  still  an  underdeveloped  area  to  buy  machinery  from  Great  Brit- 
ain, that  would  be  such  a  thing  where  we  could  help  immediately  and 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    CORIMUNISM  187 

divert  British  trade  with  Russia  to  this  hemisphere.  Long-term  credit 
or  medium-term  credit  would  grant  us  a  return  later  on.  There  is  al- 
ways the  hope  that  during  the  time  we  are  engaged  in  such  an  opera- 
tion there  is  a  change  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Senator  Welker.  I  have  only  this  observation  to  make  with  respect 
to  your  subsidy  philosophy :  I  believe  it  was  Lenin  or  Stalin  who  said 
they  would  destroy  our  country  economically  without  firing  a  shot, 
and  if  we  keep  on  with  this  subsidj^  business,  that  is  just  exactly  wliere 
we  are  going  because  that  is  just  taking  it  out  of  the  pocket  of  the 
taxpayer  and  giving  it  away. 

I  do  not  want  to  engage  with  a  learned  gentleman  such  as  you  with 
respect  to  a  problem  so  acute  and  so  serious  because  I  do  not  profess 
to  be  fully  advised  on  the  matter.  But  a  conference  of  Western  Sen- 
ators meeting  with  the  mining  industry  just  a  few  days  ago  in  which 
the  mining  industry,  which  is  paralyzed  with  respect  to  lead,  zinc, 
and  antimony  due  to  our  imports  from  overseas — they  blankly  made 
the  statement  that  subsidy  was  not  the  answer.  Tariff  would  have 
to  be  our  only  relief.  The  Tariff  Commission,  I  think  you  are  advised, 
so  recommended  to  the  President  in  May  of  this  year. 

]\Ir.  Garbuny.  Sir,  that  is  very  interesting.  I  spoke  in  general 
terms.  We  would  have  to  go  from  industry  tc  industry.  This  would 
be  a  case  where  perhaps  our  industry  would  have  to  produce  for  the 
home  market,  and  the  exports  that  come  to  us  from  other  countries 
would  have  to  be  shunted  on  another  rail  to  another  country.  Possibly 
that  could  be  done  through  long-term  contract  which  has  been  given 
from  this  country  to  some  group  or  syndicate  in  South  America.  These 
things  are  not  entirely  new. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  it  possible  to  have  a  peaceful  coexistence  economi- 
cally with  the  Soviets  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Sir,  from  what  I  have  said,  I  don't  think  so.  I  just 
do  not  think  so.   All  the  indications  are  contrary  to  that. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  in  your  judgment  would  be  the  effect  if  this 
Nation  should  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  all  the  Iron  Curtain 
governments  and  thereby,  so  far  as  possible,  sever  trade  relationships  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  That  is  a  very  difficult  question  for  me  to  answer 
because  there  are  many  other  points  involved.  There  is  one  thing,  sir, 
that  I  would  like  to  say  here  which  occurred  to  me  when  I  heard 
about  this  for  the  first  time.  The  Embassy  here  on  16th  Street,  o^ 
wherever  it  is,  is  probably  a  listening  post  and  nothing  more. 

Senator  Welker.  Not  only  a  listening  post — I  do  not  think  you 
want  to  limit  it  to  that,  do  you  ? 

Mr.  Garbuny.  No.  Whatever  you  want  to  call  it,  it  is  not  an 
embassy  in  the  sense  of  international  law.  If  you  send  them  home, 
you  have  another  problem  on  your  hands.  That  is  the  problem  of  the 
delegation  in  New  York,  the  United  Nations.  It  is  a  problem  of 
Russian  citizens  in  the  secretariat.  It  is  a  problem  of  who  works  with 
other  groups  or  nationalities  there.  So  that  the  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations,  if  it  extends  only  to  the  Soviet  Embassy  on  16th  Street,  is 
of  not  much  practical  effect  in  terms  of  internal  security. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  about  extending  it  right  down  the  line  ? 

Mr,  Garbuny.  That  is  an  entirely  different  thing.  I  do  not  find 
that  in  S.  247.  If  you  do  that,  you  have  them  out.  But  it  would  be 
for  a  man  in  international  relations  to  tell  you,  not  for  me  as  I  am  only 


188  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS   OF   WORLD   COMMUNISM 

in  economics,  what  generally  the  result  of  such  severance  is.  Whether 
you  have  still  the  possibility  of  negotiating — take  the  Berlin  situation. 
How  would  that  internationally  affect  the  Berlin  situation  for  occu- 
pying forces  ?  You  have  the  question  of  the  armistice  in  Korea.  About 
ail  this  I  do  not  have  the  technical  equipment  to  answer. 

I  was  very  intrigued  when  I  saw  Senate  247,  and  it  started  me 
thinking;  but  I  have  no  real  answer  on  that  because  I  feel  there  are 
so  many  angles  that  have  to  be  vented.  Perhaps  one  thing,  sir — that 
is  the  psychological  effect. 

Senator  Welker.  Let  me  interrupt  to  say  we  have  been  planning 
psychology  until  we  are  going  to  psychology  ourselves  right  out  of 
existence,  in  my  opinion.  I  have  been  listening  ever  since  I  have  been 
in  the  Senate  and  prior  to  coming  here  about  this  psychological  war- 
fare. We  have  taken  last  in  every  move  I  have  been  conversant  with. 
So  I  am  not  going  to  be  impressed  with  this  psychological  business. 
I  think  it  is  about  time  that  America  stood  up  on  its  own  feet  for  a 
change  and  stopped  making  fools  of  themselves  because  while  wc  are 
playing  psychology,  as  we  have  done  for  all  these  years,  you  have  seen 
this  country  go  down  and  down  and  down  and  communism  gain  and 
gain  and  gain.  Some  800  million  people  since  we  started  that  wonder- 
ful philosophy  of  psychological  warfare,  or  whatever  you  might  term 
it,  have  been  enslaved. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  You  absolutely  stated  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  We  appreciate  very  much,  indeed,  your  testimony  today.- 
Thank  you  for  your  appearance. 

Senator  Welker.  On  behalf  of  Chairman  Jenner,  the  entire  Com- 
mittee of  Internal  Security,  and  the  staff,  we  certainly  appreciate 
your  coming  here  at  time  and  expense  to  help  us  in  our  problem.  You 
have  been  a  profound  witness.  We  appreciate  your  contribution  to 
our  cause.   Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Garbuny.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Welker.  We  will  now  be  in  recess. 

(Whereupon,  at  12 :  35  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  subject  to  call.) 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,  JULY  8,   1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  In\testigate  the  Administration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  0. 
The  subcommitte  met  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)  presiding. 
Present:  Senators  Jenner  (presiding)  and  Welker. 
Present  also :  Richard  Arens,  special  counsel ;  Frank  W.  Schroeder, 
professional  staff  member ;  and  Edward  R.  Duffy,  investigator. 
Senator  Jenner.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Taylor,  will  you  be  sworn  to  testify.   Do  you  swear  the  testimony 
you  will  give  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 
Mr.  Taylor.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  HENRY  J.  TAYLOR,  NEW  YORK  CITY 

Senator  Jenner.  For  our  record,  will  you  give  us  your  full  name  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Henry  J.  Taylor. 

Senator  Jenner.  Where  do  you  reside,  Mr.  Taylor  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  230  Park  Avenue,  New  York. 

Senator  Jenner.  "^^^lat  is  your  business  or  profession? 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  am  a  journalist  and  economist.  I  have  spent  my  life 
on  the  question  of  international  economics. 

Senator  Jenner.  With  that  background,  Mr.  Arens,  you  may  pro- 
ceed with  the  questioning. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Taylor,  at  the  request  of  the  Internal  Security 
Subcommittee,  you  have  prepared  a  statement  for  submission  for  the 
record,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  respectfully  suggest  that  Mr.  Taylor's 
statement  be  at  this  point  incorporated  in  the  record,  and  that  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  custom  of  the  committee,  you  now  proceed  to  speak 
extemporaneously  on  the  subject  matter. 

Senator  Jenner.  The  prepared  statement  may  go  in  the  record  and 
become  a  part  of  the  record.  Then  you  may  proceed,  Mr.  Taylor,  in 
your  own  way. 

(Mr.  Taylor's  prepared  statement  follows :) 

189 


190  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Testimony  of  Henky  J.  Taylor  Before  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee 
OF  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary — Task  Force  on  Strategy  and 
Tactics  of  World  Communism 

Gentlemen  of  the  Senate,  this  subcommittee  Is  dealing  with  a  subject  very 
dear  to  my  heart.  I  appreciate  your  invitation  to  appear  before  you  and  I 
would  be  very  grateful  were  it  possible  for  me  to  make  even  the  smallest  con- 
tribution  to  your  considerations. 

I  note  your  chairman's  remark  during  an  earlier  testimony  on  June  10,  that 
"the  Communist  conspiracy  in  the  United  States  is  only  one  tentacle  of  a  world- 
wide octopus  which  has  as  its  principal  target  the  United  States  of  America." 
May  I  suggest  that  one  of  the  other  tentacles  is  the  Soviet  potential  through 
East- West  trade  from  the  Soviet  point  of  view. 

We  read  about  a  new  treaty  nearly  every  day,  made  by  England,  France, 
Italy,  Switzerland,  Greece,  Sweden,  Norway— countries  that  not  long  ago  thought 
and  feared  that  by  now  they  might  be  at  war  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Top  Red  economic  commissars  in  the  Gosplan  Bureau,  which  controls  the  na- 
tion's entire  economy,  back  up  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  in  greeting  visiting 
treatymakers  and  European  businessmen  who  follow  close  behind ;  such  as  the 
33  British  businessmen  who  recently  arrived  in  special  Soviet  airline  planes. 
This,  of  itself,  brought  about  the  biggest  burst  of  Anglo-Soviet  business  ac- 
tivity ever  known  in  the  Russian  capital ;  directors  and  technicians  of  12  Brit- 
ish firms  negotiating  with  5  Soviet  trading  agencies.  And  what  these  buyers 
have  found  in  Moscow  has  made  their  eyes  pop  with  wonder. 

The  Official  Soviet  memorandum  they  received  from  Gosplan's  Central  Sta- 
tistical Board  listed  things  now  in  good  supply  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The  list 
makes  amazing — and  thought-provoking — reading : 

Oil,  iron,  manganese  ore,  gasoline,  kerosene,  aluminum,  large  boilers,  diesel 
engines,  roller  and  ball  bearings,  synthetic  rubber,  chemicals,  dyes — and  moun- 
tains of  wheat  and  tea. 

Take  oil,  for  example.  Russia  was  supposed  to  be  pinched  for  oil.  Yet  Russia 
is  selling  petroleum  products  freely  to  Finland  and  two  of  the  British  merchants 
were  able  to  sign  a  series  of  five  contracts  to  buy  three  and  a  quarter  million 
dollars'  worth  of  high-grade  Russian  refined  oil  products  the  first  dav  they 
arrived.  The  British  negotiators  said  they  were  buying  100,000  tons  of  these 
products  mainly  (interestingly  enough)  for  resale  in  European  markets. 

In  turn,  the  Gosplan  chiefs  bought  50,000  tons  of  refined  sugar  from  another 
Britisher,  the  biggest  such  sale  in  more  than  20  years.  Had  she  wished,  Russia 
could  have  bought  this  from  her  satellite  states.  Several  are  exporting  sugar. 
And  after  the  contracts  were  signed  the  British  merchant  asked  the  Gosplan 
man  the  equivalent  of  "How  come?" 

"Trade,  not  aid,"  he  answered  in  unsmiling  parody  of  our  free-world  slogan. 
The  delegation  from  Paris  announced  that  Russia's  buying  under  a  6-months- 
old  French  trade  agreement  would  now  be  increased.  Greek,  Argentine,  Swiss, 
Swedish,  Norwegian  and  Italian  delegations  have  made  similar  announcements, 
or  new  treaties,  since  Malenkov  took  over.  In  Zurich  Swiss  international  bank- 
ers estimated  to  me  that  more  than  20,000  freight  cars  of  materials  from  Italy 
alone  have  found  their  way  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  in  recent  months. 

Like  the  bells  on  the  pigeons  of  mythical  Shangri-La,  the  siren  song  of  Soviet 
trade,  backed  up  by  Soviet  gold,  sounds  sweet  in  Europe's  ears,  especially  with 
American  subsidies  and  aid  declining.  But  the  bells  should  be  ringing  out  a 
warning. 

Right  now,  Russia,  buying  at  high  prices,  looks  good.  Beyond  that,  West-East 
trade  looks  so  good  (and  profitable)  that  it  obscures  the  fateful  prospect  of  what 
will  happen  when  giant  Russia,  already  consolidated,  turns  into  a  seller  of  many 
products  Europe  makes  today. 

Products,  you  say?  We  laugh  at  most  Russian  products  we  see  illustrated; 
and  certainly  what  is  being  handed  to  Soviet  civilians  is  of  mighty  low  order. 
But  come  with  me  for  a  moment  to  Finland.  It  was  there  I  had  my  first  awaken- 
ing to  what  the  Russians  can  produce  when  they  want  to. 

With  three  Finnish  Army  reconnaissance  scouts  I  was  traveling  along  the 
Russian  frontier  in  the  Arctic  forests.  A  Russian  patrol  passed  and  paused  on 
Its  side  of  the  boundary. 

Now,  Russian-made  radio  sets  for  civilian  entertainment  are  fully  as  jerry- 
built,  shoddy  and  prfmitive  as  we  imagine.  Yet  here  stood  that  Red  Army  patrol 
communicating  with  its  command  post  over  a  Russian-made  military  walkie- 
talkie  as  good  as  any  to  be  seen  anywhere  in  Europe  or  America. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    CORCMUNISM  191 

In  Helsinki  the  Cliief  of  Staff  of  the  Finnish  Army,  hardly  a  man  to  over- 
estimate anything  Russian,  coiitirmed  to  me  that  the  quality  of  Russia's  military 
radios,  radar  stations,  complicated  army  communication  layouts  and  devices  is 
excellent  in  workmanship  and  design,  and  amazingly  abundant. 

The  Red  civilian  automobile,  the  Probeda,  the  'iieople's  automobile,"  is  a  notori- 
ous dud ;  so  is  the  civilian  Moskovitch  car.  Both  are  poorly  made  and  collapse 
quickly.  '  Yet  Russian-made  military  trucks  are  solidly  built  and  efficient.     So 

are  Soviet  tanks.  ^  ,  -r.       .  ■,         .  •,, 

Russian  civilian  ironwork  is  crude  and  clumsy.  Yet  Russian-made  artillery 
of  the  most  intricate  type  is  the  equal  today  of  any  in  the  world.  It  laid  down 
barrages  on  us  In  Korea  heavier  than  any  we  encountered  from  the  Germans  in 

tliG  Inst  wnr. 

"When  the  Russians  concentrate  on  getting  something  done,"  Finland's  Chief 
of  Staff  explained,  "it's  clear  to  us  that  they  can  get  it  done— done  surprisingly 

Under  Stalin  they  simply  concentrated  on  military  output,  that's  all.  And  of 
course  there  remain  numerous  bottlenecks  and  woes  obstructing  Russia's  pro- 
ductivity under  jMalenkov.     But  when  they  concentrate  on  consumers'  goods, 

watch  out !  .  „     .  X     i .  mi 

For  that  is  the  key  to  the  Red  mystery  of  the  East:  concentration.  They 
concentrated  on  jet  airplanes,  made  a  lot  of  them,  and  good  ones.  They  con- 
centrated on  artillprv,  made  a  lot  of  it,  and  good  artillery.  They  concentrated 
on  tanks  made  a  lot  of  them,  and  good  tanks.  They  concentrated  on  intricate 
radar  interception  devices,  and  ended  up  with  a  warning  network  far  more  exten- 
sive and  fully  as  efiicient  as  ours.  .  ,  ,  ^ 

The  giant  consolidated  nation  that  can  do  these  things  can  make  an  awful  lot 
of  alarm  clocks  and  whatnot  any  time  it  wants  to  and  sell  them — or  barter 
them— cheaper  than  Europe  can  imagine  today.  ,.,x^„    ^,  ., 

Americans,  above  all  others,  should  respect  that  word  "consolidated.  While 
Western  Europe  is  still  chopped  up  into  some  18  separate  nations,  walled  off 
from  each  other  by  barbed-wire  entanglements  of  tariffs,  currencies,  cartels,  etc., 
the  Soviets  have  constructed  a  vast  unified  trade  area  bigger  than  anything  the 
world  has  ever  seen.  It  stretches  from  Berlin  to  Shanghai.  It  includes  Russia 
and  all  its  satellites,  comprising  some  700  million  people.  Think  what  that 
means  in  terms  of  both  the  economics  and  the  economies  of  mass  production, 
with  unlimited  and  unrestricted  access  to  raw  materials  and  to  markets.  Even 
our  own  United  (48)  States  are  small  in  comparison. 

Both  as  a  buyer  and  a  seller  of  consumer  goods  this  vast  Soviet  trade  area 
can  have  an  overpowering  political  effect  on  a  divided  Europe.  As  in  the  Nazi 
era  markets  can  be  wiped  out  through  the  dumping  of  Russian  products.  Or 
conversely,  Soviet  orders  can  be  switched  about  from  country  to  country  m  such 
a  way  a.s  to  produce  crisis,  unemployment,  and  political  upheaval  within  those 

countrias.  .  .    ■,     .  •  i 

The  grim  and  inescapable  fact  Is  that  there  has  been  enormous  industrial 
and  technical  progress  in  the  Soviet  Union  since  the  war  ;  stupendous  by  Russian 
standards  and  enormous  even  by  our  own. 

Considering  Europe  only,  there  are  two  population  blocs  exactly  the  same  size. 
Western  Europe  is  a  disunified  grouping  of  200  million  people.  The  Soviet  Union 
has  200  million  people  all  its  own,  completely  unified.  Russia  already  produces 
three-fifths  as  much  steel  as  all  Western  Europe  and  more  than  half  as  much 
coal  and  electricity.  But  it  is  the  rate  of  acceleration,  the  high  speed,  in  the 
overtaking  of  Western  Europe  by  Russia  that  counts  the  most. 

Britain,  for  exam])le,  as  largest  coal  producer,  still  has  not  recovered  her  pre- 
war coal  output.  She  now  plans  to  increase  it  20  million  tons  a  year  by  the  end 
of  the  next  12  years.  Russia  has  increased  her  annual  coal  production  40  mil- 
lion tons  since  19.50.  . 

Western  European  steelmakers,  even  with  Marshall  plan  aid,  have  increased 
annual  capacity  only  8  million  tons  since  the  war.  The  Russians  have  added 
twice  that  capacity  since  the  war  and  are  building  mills  to  double  today's  total 
capacity  by  1930.  It  is  estimated  that  by  1965  Russia  will  equal  or  surpass  all 
Western  Europe  in  basic  industrial  production. 

Further,  much  of  this  output  is  coming  from  new,  and  therefore,  modern, 
machines ;  and  the  evil  Communist  system,  of  course,  contains  its  own  built-in 
labor  supplv.  Even  aside  from  slave  labor,  such  as  at  Dalstroy,  general  man- 
power is  unlimited— and  pitiably  cheap.  Actually  the  Russian  workman  is  taught 
that  it  is  patriotic  to  be  exploited  for  the  motherland. 

This,  then  is  the  accelerating  power  for  commercial  aggression  and  world 
upheaval  contained  in  that  peasant  race  now  emerging  in  the  industrial  age. 


192  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

It  was  fear  of  the  dangers  and  unimaginable  horrors  of  another  war,  coming 
from  Russia,  that  aroused  and  pressed  Western  Europe  toward  quarantining  this 
aggressor,  its  satellites,  and  its  appendages  like  Red  China,  by  measures  both 
military  and  economic.  Fear  is  the  chief  cement  which  has  bound  those  quaran- 
tine efforts  together.  But  as  Malenkov  holds  out  the  cat-bait  of  "peace"  and 
fear  recedes,  the  will  is  weakened,  the  cement  crumbles,  the  quarantine  edifice 
tends  to  fall.  In  fact,  the  incredible  idea  seems  to  take  its  place :  that  the  way 
to  make  communism  fail  is  to  help  it  to  succeed. 

In  the  long  run,  I  do  not  see  how  the  dangers  in  ignoring  the  results  can  be 
underestimated  if  Western  Europe's  employment  fs  to  be  protected,  her  standard 
of  living  preserved  and  her  very  life  itself  defended  against  the  newly  competi- 
tive Soviet  Union  that  is  to  come. 

For  our  part,  I  assume  that  everything  we  do  in  national  policy  will  be  dedi- 
cated to  combating  the  fallacious  idea  that  the  way  to  make  communism  fail 
is  to  help  it  to  succeed. 

Thank  you  again  for  your  invitation  to  be  with  you  today. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  ask  you,  first  of  all,  Mr.  Taylor,  on  the  basis  of 
your  background  and  experience  and  observation  of  the,  situation 
pertaining  to  the  world  Communist  movement,  who,  in  your  opinion, 
has  the  initiative  in  the  "cold  war"  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Russia. 

Mr.  Arens.  Upon  what  do  you  base  that  observation  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  think  the  initiative  divides  itself  into  three  parts : 

First,  the  military  initiative.  That  they  retain  because  they  are 
aggressors,  and  the  initiative  is  always  with  the  aggressor  in  the  early 
part  of  any  conflict. 

Next,  economic.  Certainly  they  retain  the  economic  initiative  by 
their  infiltration  and  aggression  m  Europe  and  the  Far  East.  The 
tragedy,  from  my  viewpoint,  is  that  the  Russians  are  consolidating 
their  economic  strength  faster  than  Western  Europe  is  consolidating 
its  economic  strength. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  pause  to  elaborate  on  that,  please,  Mr.  Tay- 
lor. What  do  you  mean  by  the  consolidation  of  the  economic  strength 
of  the  Soviets  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Europe  is  an  area  of  18  countries  divided  by  a  patch 
quilt  of  tariff  Avails  and  barriers  and  quotas.  The  Soviet  Union  is  ap- 
proximately the  same  population  block,  200  million  people,  without 
any  of  these  obstructions  at  all.  They  are  consolidated  by  the  tyranny 
of  the  Communist  movement  and  by  their  control  over  the  satellite 
states,  much  of  which  is  financial. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now  if  you  will  kindly  proceed  with  your  overall  state- 
ment. 

Mr.  Tayi.or.  The  third  way  they  retain  the  initiative  is  psychologi- 
cal. They  hit  on  the  racket  of  using  conferences  as  a  cheap  propa- 
ganda tool,  and  employ  this  again  and  again  and  again. 

They  work  us  into  an  awkward  position  when  it  comes  up  on  the 
calendar  to  hold  another  propaganda  conference,  which  they  do  with 
the  regularity  that  "Uncle  Tom's  Cabin"  used  to  show  up  in  certain 
towns.  Then  if  we  don't  go  to  the  conference,  they  make  it  sound  as 
if  we  are  not  interested  in  peace.  Accordingly,  after  a  certain  buildup 
period,  in  which  they  accuse  America  of  not  being  interested  in  peace 
unless  they  attend  a  propaganda  conference,  they  create  enough  back 
pressure  so  that  we  finally  show  up.  Then  we  have  it  again.  We  sit 
there  and  listen  while  they  speak  to  the  world. 

I  have  spent  a  great  deal  of  time  in  the  Far  East.  Speeches  that  go 
over  our  heads  as  Western  people  are  very  impressive  in  the  Far  East. 
I  remember  going  to  the  U.  N.  and  listening  to  this  bandit  from  North 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMIMUNISM  193 

Kore<a  come  and  call  our  country,  in  our  own  borders,  all  that  lie  did. 
You  remember  the  little  general.  That  was  so  pre]30sterous  tliat  it 
sounded  plain  outrageous  and  insulting  to  us,  but  it  was  very  impres- 
sive to  oriental  ears,  because  here  was  a  man  from  Indochina  on  the 
home  plate  of  great  America,  challenging  us  to  do  our  worst.  This, 
coming  from  an  oriental,  is  music  in  oriental  ears.  Every  statement 
Malenkov  makes  is  dedicated  to  the  Far  East. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  made  a  study,  have  you  not,  ]\Ir.  Taylor,  and 
traveled  worldwide  in  the  pursuit  of  that  study,  of  the  Russian  trade 
offensive  ? 

I\Ir.  Taylor.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  j'^ou  tell  the  committee  in  essence,  in  summary 
form,  those  elements  in  your  statement  with  regard  to  the  degree  to 
which  the  Russian  trade  offensive  is  destroying  the  world  markets 
for  the  West? 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  wrote  a  piece  about  that  in  This  Week  magazine, 
distributed  across  the  country  to  about  11  million  people.  The  prob- 
lem with  the  Russian  trade  offensive  is  not  their  position  today,  but 
the  rate  at  which  they  are  overtaking  Western  Europe.  The  figures 
are  very  complicated.   I  can  give  you  a  few. 

Mr.  Arens.  If  you  would,  please,  in  summary  form. 

Mr.  Taylor.  All  right.  Let's  take  the  list  of  commodities,  and  so 
forth,  that  the  Russians  offer  to  the  trade  missions  who  come  to  the 
Soviet  Union  today.  This  is  the  official  list  supplied  by  the  Gosplan 
central  statistical  board,  the  Gosplan  bureau  being  the  bureau  that 
controls  the  entire  Russian  economy.  When  our  British  friends  and 
others  arrived  in  Moscow  recently,  they  were  given  a  list,  for  their 
guidance,  of  things  that  were  in  good  supply  now  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
That  wasn't  a  propaganda  list,  because  they  were  standing  there  to 
do  business  on  these  items.  So,  Senator,  wouldn't  you  agree  this  was 
not  something  that  they  had  just  pulled  out  of  the  air  ? 

That  list  included,  it  seems  to  me,  some  amazing  and  very  thought- 

Erovoking  items.  For  example:  oil,  iron,  manganese  ore,  gasoline, 
erosene,  aluminum,  large  boilers,  engines,  diesel  engines,  roller  and 
ball  bearings,  synthetic  rubber,  chemicals,  dyes,  wheat,  and  tea. 

The  first  day  these  men  were  there,  British  merchants  were  able 
to  sign  a  series  of  5  contracts  to  buy  three  and  a  quarter  million  dol- 
lars worth  of  high-grade  Russian  refined  oil,  anct  they  were  buying 
100,000  tons  of  these  products,  mainly  for  resale  in  the  European 
market.  The  Russians  bought  50,000  tons  of  refined  sugar  from  an- 
other British  concern,  and  that  was  the  largest  single  sale  in  more 
than  20  years. 

Interestingly  enough,  they  could  have  bought  that  sugar  from  some 
of  their  own  satelite  states,  because,  although  it  isn't  commonly 
known,  their  satellite  states  are  exporters  of  sugar.  But  they  didn't. 
Because  of  this  whole  cat-bait  idea  of  peace,  they  bought  it  from  the 
British. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  is  the  significance  of  that,  in  your  opinion  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  To  crack  up  the  Anglo-American  alliance  and  the  eco- 
nomic front,  as  they  are  trying  to  do  on  the  military  front,  because 
the  main  line  of  Soviet  policy,  in  my  small  opinion,  is  to  separate 
Britain  and  America. 


194  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  AiJENS.  Is  there,  in  your  opinion,  any  distinction  or  any  conse- 
quence to  be  made  between  strategic  and  non-strategic  material  in 
international  trade? 

Mr.  Taylok.  In  effect,  I  think  it  is  Tweedledum  and  Tweedledee. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Senator  Jenner.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  With  respect  to  the  sale  of  oil  that,  allegedly, 
Russia  was  pinched  for,  I  will  ask  if  it  is  not  a  fact  that  at  the  time 
she  sold  oil  to  Britain  she  also  sold  oil  to  Finland  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Senator,  I  was  in  Finland.  Sure,  she  is  a  ready  seller 
of  oil  to  Finland. 

Senator  Welker.  Vast  quantities,  sir  ?      ^ 

Mr.  Taylor.  No,  because  they  don't  require  vast  quantities. 

Senator  Welker.  All  they  require,  or  most  all  they  require  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Sure.  There  is  the  rub  in  these  statistics.  I  appreciate 
your  comment  about  that.  When  folks  say,  "After  all,  this  doesn't 
amount  to  much  because  they  only  sold  a  little,"  that  doesn't  prove  they 
couldn't  sell  a  lot  if  there  was  a  market  for  it.  That  is  nearly  as 
bad  as  saying,  "After  all,  they  only  stole  $100  out  of  the  bank." 
Well,  believe  me,  if  there  had  been  more  money  in  the  bank,  the  burglar 
would  have  got  it.  It  isn't  his  fault  that  he  didn't  steal  more  than 
$100.  I  will  bet  you  that  the  United  States  could  buy  enormous  quan- 
tities of  oil  from  Eussia  today  if  they  wanted  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliat  is  the  significance  of  the  Eussian  gold  supply  in 
the  manipulations  of  the  Soviets  in  the  world  economy  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Gold  from  any  country  is  as  good  as  any  other  gold. 
It  is  very  dirty  gold  because  it  is  mined,  b;^  Soviet  slave  labor.  Their 
projects  are  vast,  and  they  have  quit  giving  out  any  figures.  They 
used  to  give  their  figures  to  the  World  Bank.  Wlien  they  made  their 
new  gold  strikes  in  the  Dalstroy  plains  area  in  Siberia,  they  quit 
giving  any  production  figures. 

Eussia  is  generally  regarded  as  the  No.  2  gold  producer,  after 
Africa.  Today  they  very  possibly  are  No.  1.  Many  experts  believe 
that  there  is  substantially  more  gold  in  the  Eussian  gold  stock  today 
than  we  have  at  Fort  Knox.  We  don't  have  quite  as  much  gold  in 
Fort  Knox,  you  know,  as  the  impression  is  when  compared  to  the  needs 
of  the  world.  We  couldn't  go  very  far  financing  the  needs  of  the 
world  with  $22  billion. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  ask  a  question  at  this  point. 

Mr.  Taylor,  with  respect  to  our  domestic  mining  of  gold,  you  realize 
it  to  be  a  fact  that  many  of  our  gold  mines  have  been  forced  to  shut 
down  because  of  the  high  cost  of  labor  and  the  tremendous  expense 
involved  in  the  operation  and  prospecting  for  gold?  Is  that  a  fair 
statement,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Senator,  I  not  only  realize  it,  but  I  consider  it  an  eco- 
nomic tragedy.  This  is  likewise  true,  as  you  know  better  than  I,  in 
Alaska.  While  our  gold  mines  are  shutting  down,  the  Eussians  are 
all  out,  with  slave  labor,  producing  gold  by  the  mountainload.  I  think 
the  best  information  we  have  is  that  they  are  even  rotating  120,000 
people  through  their  gold  fields.  Wlien  these  pitiable  millions  die, 
they  just  replace  them. 

The  thing  that  is  shutting  our  gold  mines  down,  as  you  kaow  so 
well,  is  our  high  costs.   Tlie  Eussians  don't  have  that.   It  is  slave  labor. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  195 

Russia  produces  enough  gold,  and  she  will  buy  what  she  wants. 
Gold  is  convertible  to  any  currency.  In  the  gold  markets  of  the  world, 
in  Zurich,  Russia  can  sell  her  gold  as  well  as  anybody.  "WHien  they  sell 
it,  what  do  they  get  for  it  ?  Any  currency  or  bank  credit  on  earth,  in- 
cluding American  dollars. 

Mr.  Arens.  Then  do  you  consider  the  Russian  gold  supply  produced 
by  slave  labor  as  a  threat  to  the  economy  of  the  West  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  In  the  economic  area,  I  think  it  is  their  secret  weapon. 

!Mr.  Arens.  "Wliat,  in  your  opinion,  is  the  production  potential  of 
the  Russians  and  of  the  Soviets  to  produce  or  outproduce  Europe  and 
perhaps  the  West  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  They  are  away  up  there  now,  but  they  are  growing, 
and  that  is  the  problem. 

May  I  digress  on  this  question  of  gold  for  one  moment.  You  no- 
tice also  they  don't  need  to  retain  any  gold  reserve  for  their  own  cur- 
rency.  I  have  some  figures  on  that,  if  I  might  submit  them. 

Mr.  Arens.  They  are  in  your  prepared  statement.  I  wonder  if  you 
could  just  extemporaneously  now  summarize  them,  Mr.  Taylor,  please. 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  will.  Let's  start  with  a  few  basic  factors.  This  is 
on  the  point  of  the  acceleration,  Russia  is  producing  now  about  three- 
fifths  as  much  steel  as  all  of  Western  Europe  and  more  than  half  as 
much  coal  and  electricity.  But  again,  it  is  the  rate  of  speed  of 
acceleration. 

Great  Britain,  as  the  largest  coal  producer,  still  has  not  recovered 
her  prewar  coal  production.  She  isn't  back  up  there  yet,  and  the 
war  has  been  over  9  years.  She  plans  to  increase  it  20  million  tons  a 
year  by  the  end  of  the  next  12  years ;  20  million  tons  increase  by  the  end 
of  the  next  12  years  in  Eng:land,  the  biggest  coal  producer  in  Western 
Europe;  whereas  the  Russians  have  increased  their  annual  coal  pro- 
duction 40  million  tons  since  1950. 

Senator  Jenner.  Forty  million  in  less  than  4  years. 

Mr.  Taylor.  This  on  the  statement  of  the  Swiss,  Swedish  and  other 
engineers  who  put  in  the  machinery. 

One  of  the  fallacies  of  our  day,  in  my  small  opinion,  is  that  we  don't 
know  anything  about  Russia.  It  is  the  same  thing  that  used  to  happen 
to  me  when  I  came  back  from  Germany.  Again  and  again  during  the 
Nazi  buildup,  people  would  say,  "What  could  you  see  in  Germany?" 
The  answer  is,  of  course,  you  can't  see  how  many  airplanes  they  are 
making,  you  don't  know  how  many  proximity  fuses  they  have  or 
whether  they  have  it  or  not,  but  you  can  see  industry  operating  in  a 
country. 

"Wliat  did  people  think  they  were  doing  when  plants  were  running 
day  and  night,  and  chrome  was  disappearing  out  of  the  inventory? 
It  certainly  wasn't  going  on  bathtubs.    It  was  going  into  armaments. 

Take  the  steelmakers  in  Western  Europe.  I  have  never  seen  a 
breakdown  of  how  much  of  our  Marshall  plan  aid  went  into  the  recon- 
struction of  the  steel  programs  in  Europe,  but  as  everybody  knows,  a 
vast  amount  of  it  did.  Yet,  with  all  our  Marshall  plan  aid  since  the 
warj  the  European  steel  producers  have  increased  their  capacity  only 
8  million  tons.  The  Russians  at  the  same  time  have  added  twice  that 
capacity  since  the  war,  and  they  are  building  today  mills  to  double 
their  today's  capacity  by  1960.  Nothing  like  that  is  happening  in 
Western  Europe. 


196  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

It  is  estimated  that  by  lOGo,  whicli  is  only  11  years  from  now,  Russia 
will  equal  or  surpass  all  Western  Europe  in  basic  industrial  produc- 
tion.   It  is  the  speed  of  this  pickup  tliat  concerns  me. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Taylor,  under  date  of  May  13,  the  Senator  from 
Indiana,  Mr.  Jenner,  and  the  Senator  from  Nevada,  Mr.  McCarran, 
introduced  in  the  Senate  a  resolution.  Senate  Resolution  247,  which 
would  call  upon  our  Government  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  Soviets  and  to  take  the  initiative  in  convoking  an  international 
conference  for  the  purpose  of  stemming  this  tide. 

In  the  basis  of  your  extensive  background  and  experience  and  years 
of  study  of  the  rising  menace  of  the  Communists,  what  would  be  your 
reaction  and  appraisal  of  that  resolution  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  That  is  a  very  embracing  question  and  a  complex  one. 
In  principle  I  would  support  that  resolution,  but  not  as  an  isolated 
measure.  I  think  that  resolution  is  of  great  importance  and  value, 
and  I  would  like  to  see  it  enacted  as  a  part  of  a  general  program  by 
which  we  seized  the  initiative.  So  long  as  we  don't  have  the  initiative 
in  the  diplomatic,  psychological,  military,  or  economic  areas,  the  Rus- 
sians will  in  time  win  the  "cold  war"  as  they  are,  in  my  opinion,  doing 
today. 

Senator  Welker.  Ma-y  I  ask  a  question  ? 

Senator  Jenner.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker,  Mr.  Taylor,  do  you  have  an  observation  with  re- 
spect to  the  effect  that  resolution  might  have  upon  the  freedom-loving 
peoples  of  Russia  and  the  satellites,  who,  from  certain  testimony  we 
have  had  here  before  us,  would  love  to  see  that,  from  the  psychological 
standpoint,  the  fact  that  we  are  not  going  clown  the  road  of  the  Com- 
munist dictators  who  control  so  many  millions  of  people. 

Mr.  Taylor.  Senator,  I  would  believe — and  I  might  be  completely 
wrong  about  this — that  you  would  have  to  separate  the  effect  in  terms 
of  its  effect  inside  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  satellite  states.  I  think 
they  would  be  different.  I  think  it  would  be  very  much  more  effective 
in  the  satellite  states — that  is  a  great  advantage,  a  great  plus — than 
within  the  Soviet  Union  itself. 

Mr.  Arens.  Under  date  of  June  18,  the  Senator  from  Indiana,  Mr. 
Jenner,  the  Senator  from  Nevada,  Mr.  McCarran,  and  the  Senator 
from  Idaho,  Mr.  Welker,  introduced  a  bill,  S.  3632,  which  would  make 
it  a  felony  to  import  into  the  United  States  or  to  ship  in  interstate 
commerce  any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave  labor  as  a  part 
of  this  program  of  quarantining  the  Soviets.  Wliat  is  your  impression 
or  reaction  to  that  proposal  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  think  it  is  indispensable. 

Mr.  Arens.  Indispensable  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Taylor,  the  Senator  from  Idaho  a  short  time  ago 
introduced  a  resolution,  Senate  Resolution  169,  which  would  call  upon 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to  proclaim  1  day  a  month  for  a 
period  of  a  year  as  a  day  of  prayer,  on  which  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  pray  and  ask  for  divine  intercession  and  guidance  in  be- 
half of  the  millions  of  people  who  have  been  enslaved  by  the  Soviets. 

On  the  basis  of  your  extensive  experience,  what  is  your  reaction  to 
that  proposal  ? 

Mr.  Taylor,  Quite  aside  from  any  experience  I  may  have  had,  pure- 
ly as  an  American,  I  think  that  it  is  a  source  of  pride  and  stimulation 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  197 

to  realize  that  a  distinguished  United  States  Senator  would  concern 
himself  with  the  spiritual  values.  It  seems  to  me  this  resolution  is 
extremely  desirable,  very  useful,  and  I  would  not  feel  it  proper  to 
allow  this  occasion  to  pass  without  attempting  to  congratulate  the 
Senator. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  ApvExs.  On  the  basis  of  your  experience,  Mr.  Taylor,  can  you 
express  to  the  committee  your  view  as  to  whether  or  not  our  Nation 
and  its  policies  can  cooperate  and  negotiate  with  the  Soviets  on  any 
sound  foundation,  or  are  those  in  the  Kremlin  people  with  whom  you 
can  in  good  faith  negotiate  and  cooperate? 

Mr.  Taylor.  Gentlemen,  I  could  answer  that  question  if  anybody 
could  tell  me  how  you  do  business  with  unreliable  people.  I  don't 
know  how  to  do  business  with  unreliable  people.  ^  In  my  opinion, 
nobody  else  does.  The  word  "coexistence"  has  been  kicked  around  like 
other  words,  and  has  attained  something  of  a  nice  sound.  I  believe 
we  are  going  to  exist  with  the  Russians  for  centuries  and  centuries.  ^  I 
don't  think  they  are  going  to  evaporate.  I  don't  think  Communist 
control  over  the  Soviet  Union  is  going  to  disappear. 

That  doesn't  imply  either  a  happy  life  or  a  successful  life.  I  think 
the  statement  that  we  are  not  in  an  instant  of  tension  but  an  age  of  ten- 
sion is  well  made.  In  the  meanwhile,  in  American  national  policy  I 
assume  that,  contrary  to  some  of  our  friends  abroad,  we  are  going  to 
do  everything  we  can,  so  help  me,  to  beat  down  the  fallacious  idea  that 
the  way  to  make  communism  fail  is  to  help  it  to  succeed. 

Senator  Jenner.  In  other  words,  you  think  the  policy  that  is  being 
followed  has  been  building  up  and  fattening  communism  rather  than 
destroying  it? 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  wouldn't  make  that  criticism  of  American  policy. 
I  wouldn't  make  that  criticism  of  the  coalition  policy  with  which  we 
proposed  to  face  the  Soviet  Union.  Napoleon  once  said,  "Give  me  a 
coalition  to  fight  against."  Every  coalition  is  difficult,  but  to  the  ex- 
tent that  we  think  that  if  you  give  the  Communists  enough  rope  they 
will  hang  themselves,  in  my  opinion  the  more  rope  they  get  the  more 
people  they  will  hang. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  our  private  conversation  prior  to  this  session,  Mr. 
Taylor,  you  alluded  to  the  Russian  trade  offensive  as  a  siren's  song 
or  "bait.    Would  you  elaborate  on  that,  please  ? 

Mr.  Taylor.  This  is  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  facing  Dr. 
Adenauer.  I  went  to  Bonn  to  see  Dr.  Adenauer.  He  is  a  very  coura- 
geous and  honorable  man.  The  Germans  have  now  for  the  first  time 
m  my  lifetime  honorable  and  good  leadership.  I  think  the  open  prayer 
of  the  free  world  is  that  the  German  race  will  go  in  a  direction  that 
would  be  new  for  them,  under  leadership  so  dramatically  different 
from  the  Kaisers  or  Hitler. 

Dr.  Bruening  is  making  a  bid  for  return  to  political  power  in  Ger- 
many. As  you  may  recall,  he  left  Germany  in  1932,  after  he  had  been 
Chancellor,  and  came  to  Harvard  University  and  taught  there  in  gov- 
ermnent  for  13  years.  He  is  now  professor  at  the  University  of 
Cologne,  and  Dr.  Bruening  is  proposing  German  neutrality.  He  says 
there  will  be  a  depression  in  the  United  States,  and  tliat  trade  with 
Russia  will  be  indispensable  to  the  Germans. 


198  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Trade  means  employment.  Employment  is  a  pressure  that  vesy 
few  political  figures  can  resist  and  hold  their  jobs.  This  is  the  pres- 
sure behind  England.  It  is  very  difficult  for  the  British  to  have  cotton, 
mills  idle  in  Manchester  and  turn  down  textile  orders  from  Eussia. 
That  is  generally  attributed,  I  think,  to  an  affection  by  the  British 
Labor  Party  for  the  Soviet  Union.  I  think  it  is  much  more  limited 
in  influence  than  it  is  generally  regarded.  I  think  it  is  primarily  an 
employment  question,  and  that  cuts  across  all  parties. 

Senator  Wei/Ker.  May  I  ask  a  question,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Senator  Jenner.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  By  like  token,  Mr.  Taylor,  I  hope  you  will  agree 
with  me  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  a  family-owned  mine,  the  largest 
domestic  producer  of  antimony  in  the  United  States,  located  at  Stib- 
nite,  Idaho,  in  my  home  State,  to  be  closed  down  since  August  of  1951, 
possessing  the  world's  finest  antimony  smelter,  when  at  the  same  time 
we  are  importing  antimony  at  a  premium  price  far  above  that  offered 
to  our  domestic  producers,  from  Bolivia,  the  Gold  Coast  of  South 
Africa,  and  other  areas. 

I  trust  you  will  agree  with  me  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  these  people 
to  stand  that,  too. 

Mr.  Taylor.  As  Americans,  from  my  viewpoint  it  is  incredible  that 
they  should  be  called  upon  to  stand  it.  Senator. 

Senator  Welker.  I  will  not  go  into  the  lead  and  zinc  and  other 
tragedies  that  we  have  debated  so  many  times  on  the  floor,  but  thej 
are  in  the  same  dilemma  that  the  antimony  situation  is.  Our  workers 
have  been  cut  back.  Lead  and  zinc  are  being  imported  at  prices  far 
in  excess  of  that  offered  to  our  domestic  producers.  It  is  difficult 
indeed,  it  is  sad  indeed,  for  the  domestic  mming  industry  here. 

Mr.  Taylor.  I  am  not  familiar  with  this  subject,  but  in  principle 
I  think  that  most  reasonably  minded  men  would  have  to  agree,  if  they 
thought  it  through,  that  protection,  per  se,  is  not  necessarily  evil,  you 
know.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  not  very  many  thoughtful  people 
who  don't  realize  the  importance  of  world  trade.  I  get  a  little  tired 
hearing  the  importance  of  world  trade  talked  all  the  time.  I  have 
spent  my  life  in  it.  This  is  like  telling  you  or  me  something  about  the 
importance  of  water.  But  there  are  other  things  that  are  important, 
too.    One  is  domestic  prosperity. 

Obviously  you  have  to  strike  a  balance  between  those.  If  you  are 
going  to  have  world  trade  at  the  expense  of  domestic  prosperity,  then 
the  importance  of  world  trade  decreases  and  the  evils  of  unemploy- 
ment take  its  place. 

So  obviously  you  have  to  consider  both  factors,  and  each  one  of 
these  problems,  it  seems  to  me,  has  to  be  resolved  in  terms  of  balance. 
You  can't  say  that  we  will  trade  with  the  world  no  matter  what  hap- 
pens to  our  condition  here  at  home. 

Senator  Welker.  Even  though  it  results  in  the  weakening  of  our 
country. 

Mr.  Taylor.  If  you  weaken  the  country,  in  the  long  period  you  are 
not  going  to  be  in  a  position  to  trade  with  anybody. 

Senator  Welker.  Right.  Some  day,  I  assume  you  will  agree  with 
me,  it  might  be  necessary — we  hope  it  will  never  be  necessary — that  we 
may  have  to  go  back  to  the  fundamental  law  of  nature,  to  wit,  the  law 
of  self-defense,  and  we  need  these  industries  working  here. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  199 

Mr.  Taylor.  My  understanding  is  that  wo  are  in  that  position  today, 
that  we  are  talking  self-defense  here,  and  that  we  are  using  world 
trade  as  an  instrument  of  self-defense. 

But  in  my  opinion  it  is  a  very  complex  instrument,  and  when  the 
effect  of  its  use  is  to  undermine  the  productivity  of  America,  then  I 
think  that  use  is  wrong. 

Senator  Welker.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Aeens.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Senator  Jenner.  Any  further  questions,  Senator  ? 

Senator  Welker.  No  further  questions. 

Senator  Jenner.  IMr.  Taylor,  we  want  to  thank  you  for  your  state- 
ment, and  appreciate  your  appearing  here. 

]\Ir.  Taylor.  I  appreciate  the  invitation. 

(Whereupon,  at  11  a.  m.,  the  subcommittee  recessed,  subject  to  call.) 

X 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 
ON 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF 
WORLD  COMMUNISM 


JULY  15  AND  22,  1954 


PART  4 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
«769  WASHINGTON  :  1954 


Boston  Public  Library- 
superintendent  of  Documents 

OCT  2  7  1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota,  Chairman 

ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

WILLIAM  B.  JENNER,  Indiana  HARLEY  M.  KILGORB,  West  Virginia 

ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

ROBERT  C.  HBNDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  ESTBS  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee 

EVERETT  Mckinley  DIRKSEN,  Ulinols  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  THOMAS  C.  HBNNINGS,  JR.,  Missouri 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Secueitt 
Aor  AND  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Task  Force  Investigating  the  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  World  Communism 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada 

Richard  Aeens,  Special  Counsel 

n 


CONTENTS 


Testimony  of —  Paeo 

Amoss,  Ulius  Louis 241-260 

Goncliaroff,  Nicholas  T 201-217 

Nakaslan,  Samuel 260-267 

Smyth,  William  Harris 217-240 


m 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WOELD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,  JULY  15,  1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 
or  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  G. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  1  p.  m.,  pursuant  to  «all,  in  room  457,  Sen- 
ate Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner  (chairman)  presiding. 
Present:  Senators  Jenner  (presiding)  and  Welker. 
Present  also :  Eichard  Arens,  special  counsel ;  and  Frank  W.  Schroe- 
dcr  and  Edward  E.  Duffy,  professional  staff  members. 
Chairman  Jenner.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Mr.  Arens.  The  first  witness  will  be  Mr.  Nicholas  T.  Goncharoff. 
Chairman  Jenner.  Will  you  come  forward,  please?    Will  you  be 
sworn  to  testify? 

Do  you  swear  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 
Mr.  Goncharoff.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  NICHOLAS  T.  GONCHAROFF,  BROOKLYN,  N.  Y. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Will  you  state  your  full  name  for  the  record, 
please  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  Nicholas  T.  Goncharoff. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  In  Brooklyn,  329  Snediker  Avenue. 

Chairman  Jenner.  AVhat  is  your  business  or  profession  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  I  am  working  at  the  present  time — here  is  a 
paper — Avith  the  international  committee  of  the  YMCA's  for  a  special 
project,  to  study  strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism  and  pre- 
paring the  Christian  attitude  to  it. 

Chairman  Jenner.  We  will  put  this  notice  of  his  employment  into 
our  record  and  make  it  a  part  of  the  record. 

(The  material  referred  to  follows:) 

National  Council  of  the  Young  Men's  Christian  Associations 

OF  THE  United  States  of  America, 

Jiew  York,  N.  Y.,  July  1,  195ft. 
To  Whom  It  May  Concern: 

This  is  to  confirm  that  Nicholas  T.  Goncharoff  of  New  York  is  employed  by  the 
National  Board  of  the  YMCA's  of  the  United  States  on  a  special  assignment  in 
connection  with  the  Russian  publication  program  of  its  international  committee, 
and  in  particular  to  undertake  research  on  Communist  methods  and  tactics  with 
u  view  to  presenting  the  Christian  alternative  to  them  in  forms  that  might  be 

201 


202  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

useful  to  Christian  publishing  houses  not  only  in  the  United  States  but  in  other 
parts  of  the  world. 

His  present  appointment  is  for  a  period  of  6  months  ending  November  30, 
1954. 

Herbeet  p.  Lansdale,  Jr., 

Executive  Secretary. 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  have  filed  a  prepared  statement  of  testi- 
money.  Without  objection  it  will  be  incorporated  into  the  record  and 
be  made  a  part  of  the  record. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  by  Nicholas  T.  Goncharoff 

My  name  is  Nicholas  T.  Goncharoff,  a  resident  of  Brooklyn,  N.  Y.  I  was  born 
in  1921  in  Kiev,  Southern  Russia,  now  Uliraininn  Soviet  Socialist  Republic.  I 
am  only  one  representative  of  the  millions  of  Russians  who  belong  to  the  new 
generation,  raised  and  educated  in  the  Soviet  Union.  I  lived  in  the  Ulsranian 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics  about  24  years,  went  to  a  Soviet  school,  and  served  in 
the  Soviet  Red  Army.  Lilie  most  young  Russirns  I  never  had  a  chance  to  see 
life  beyond  the  borders  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Occupation  of  Poland  in  1939  and 
World  War  II  temporarily  battered  down  the  Iron  Curtain.  In  1941,  I  was 
mobilized  into  the  Tank  Corps  and  nearly  1  yeaj  later  was  captured  by  the 
German  Army.  Interned,  at  first,  in  a  prisoner-of-war  camp  in  Ukraine,  later 
I  was  moved  to  a  forced-labor  camp  in  Germany.  Early  in  1945  in  Bavaria  I  wag 
liberated  by  the  Third  American  Army.  After  regaining  freedom  I  decided  to 
remain  in  the  west,  like  the  thousands  of  other  foi'mer  Soviet  citizens.  How- 
ever, the  period  from  1945  to  1947  was  full  of  hardship  because,  according  to 
special  agreements,  we  former  prisoners-of-war  were  subject  to  forced  repatria- 
tion. Many  were  repatriated  and  perished  in  jails  and  camps  in  the  "socialist 
land."  Many  fled,  went  into  hiding,  changed  their  names,  in  order  to  escape 
repatriation.  I  was  among  those.  I  made  my  way  to  Munich  and  in  November 
of  that  year  entered  the  Uuivei'sity  of  Munich  and  newly  organized  University 
of  UNRRA  also  in  Munich  for  refugees.  Six  years  later,  in  1952,  I  completed 
my  study  at  the  Munich  University. 

In  194G,  I  made  my  first  contacts  witii  the  World  Students  Christian  Move- 
ment and  being  in  the  refugee  camp  I  met  Young  Men's  Christian  Association 
leaders  from  the  United  States  of  America.  Young  Men's  Christian  Association, 
as  we  had  seen,  was  primarily  concerned  about  the  youth :  Their  physical  well- 
being,  their  strength  of  mind,  and  above  all,  their  Christian  character.  I,  as 
many  other  young  people,  having  a  great  spiritual  hunger  for  better  ideas  than 
communism  with  its  biggest  lie  in  theory  and  practice,  began  to  organize  this 
kind  of  program  in  our  camps.  In  1948  I  was  elected  as  a  president  of  the 
Young  Men's  Christian  Association  for  Russians  in  Western  Germany,  serving 
at  the  same  time  as  a  secretary  of  the  Russian  Christian  Students  Movement  in 
Western  Germany.  I  had  a  chance  to  represent  the  Young  Men's  Christian  Asso- 
ciation for  Russians  at  international  conferences  in  Switzerland,  Denmark,  and 
France.  From  1950  to  1952  I  was  elected  to  direct  Young  Men's  Christian 
Association  leadership  training  program  in  the  American  and  French  Zones  of 
Germany. 

On  Washington's  birthday,  February  22,  1952,  I  arrived  in  the  United  States. 
A  few  days  later,  the  Tolstoy  Foundation,  Inc.  asked  me  to  serve  as  a  director 
of  the  Free  Russian  Youth  CUib,  Inc.,  in  New  York  City.  It  is  an  organization 
of  younger  Russian  refugees  who  have  escaped  the  tyranny  of  the  Soviet  regime 
and  who  are  now  living  in  the  United  States.  Its  purpose  is  to  help  Russian 
youth  learn  and  participate  in  the  American  way  of  life.  I  took  active  part  in 
the  activities  of  the  Tolstoy  Foundation,  remembering  the  wonderful  help 
given  by  them  to  the  thousands  of  refugees  to  reach  the  United  States,  which  this 
organization  under  the  leadership  of  Countess  Alexandra  Tolstoy  provides.  The 
name  of  Tolstoy  for  us  remains  as  a  great  symbol  of  freedom,  justice,  and  deep 
religious  personal  example. 

For  8  months,  beginning  in  August  1953,  I  traveled  across  the  United  States 
under  the  auspices  of  the  National  Council  of  Young  Men's  Christian  Associa- 
tions, undertaking  a  program  of  educational  visits  to  the  Young  Men's  Christian 
Associations  groups,  different  clubs  like  Kiwanis,  Lions,  Rotary,  Women's  Clubs, 
Army  units,  union's  groups,  church  groups,  high  schools,  universities,  and  so 
forth.     The  main  purpose  in  this  lecture  tour  through  various  parts  of  the  coun- 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMATUNISM  203 

try  was  to  aid  groups  of  youth,  especially  in  understanding  present  day  comniu- 
nism  and  its  challenge  to  Christian  faith  and  democracy. 

In  September  of  1953,  I  received  a  scholarship  from  the  Research  Program 
of  U.  S.  S.  R.  by  the  Russian  Institute  of  Columbia  University.  This  program 
was  sponsored  by  the  East  European  Fund,  Inc.  I  was  very  happy  to  take  some 
important  courses  in  political  science  in  the  graduate  school. 

June  1,  I  took  a  new  assignment  on  the  staff  of  the  International  Com- 
mittee of  Young  Men's  Christian  Associations  working  on  the  special  project : 
Study  of  world  communism,  its  tactics  and  strategy  in  different  countries  of 
the  world  and  creation  of  Christian  literature  program  to  meet  the  Communist 
literature  program. 

I  am  deeply  convinced  from  my  experience  and  thousands  of  others,  that  we 
can't  defeat  communism  as  an  idea  by  being  only  anti-it,  ignoring  it,  or  shooting 
it.  We  can  only  meet  this  or  other  negative  ideas  with  a  superior  idea.  This 
could  be  only  democracy  with  its  vitality  and  Christianity  if  we  are  able  to  create 
much  more  unity  between  the  Christians  themselves  and  especially  between 
their  missions  abroad. 

SOVIET  METHODS  OF  INDOCTKINATION 

As  one  who  has  experienced  the  oppression  of  the  enslaved  world,  I  am  very 
glad  to  share  with  you  the  way,  methods,  and  tactics  which  are  used  in  the 
process  of  Marxistic  education  of  the  youth  in  U.  S.  S.  R.  Youth,  at  all  times 
and  in  all  countries,  is  highly  idealistic  and  inclines  to  revolution.  Russian 
youth  is  no  exception.  Communistic  leaders  everywhere  take  and  use  very  care- 
fully this  kind  of  idealism  and  sincerity  of  the  youth  in  Russia  and  abroad  for 
their  propaganda.  One  of  the  main  principles  in  the  communistic  education  is 
to  have  a  complete  control  over  their  way  of  life  "from  cradle  to  grave." 

"Complete  control"  should  be  understood  not  in  a  direct  sense.  The  ways  of 
influence  are  very  different.  Tactics  could  be  changed  very  rapidly,  but  never 
the  aim.  Each  new  generation  in  its  entirety  is  subjected  to  a  course  of  edu- 
cation whose  fundamental  purpose  is  in  the  creation  of  a  "Soviet  personality." 

To  achieve  this  purpose,  the  Communist  Party  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  established 
well-organized  control  over  the  millions  of  Soviet  teachers  and  it  possesses  an 
intricate  system  of  numerous  specialized  institutions.  Theoretical  problems  of 
Communist  education  are  entrusted  to  a  special  branch  of  the  Central  Committee 
of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union.  This  branch  is  attached  to  the 
Party's  Department  of  Agitation  and  Propaganda. 

The  application  of  the  theories  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Komsomol.  However, 
the  Komsomol  influence  upon  the  youth  has  been  steadily  declining.  Now  prac- 
tically only  administration  duties  have  been  left  to  the  Komsomol  and  to  the 
organization  of  Young  Pioneers,  attached  to  it.  Theoretical  education  of  the 
Communistic  League  of  the  Youth  (Komsomol)  is  controlled  by  the  party.  An 
intricate  system  of  cross-controls  as  well  as  compulsory  four-term  programs  for 
every  subject  were  introduced.  The  teacher  works  under  the  control  of  the 
government,  the  Komsomol  and,  of  course,  the  party. 

I  saw  how  cunningly  the  Communist  regime  had  exercised  its  influence  over 
the  credulous  minds  and  hearts  of  the  youth.  I  felt  myself  how  skillfully  and 
gradually  our  idealism  and  sincerity  were  used  as  a  means  for  attaining  goals 
completely  alien  to  us.  Schools,  theaters,  press,  radio,  and  other  media  were 
implanting  in  us  the  illusion  of  "social  greatness".  They  tried  to  win  us  over 
at  an  early  age,  promising  us  future  "Communistic  paradise".  But  promises 
were  followed  by  warnings  that  we  must  be  prepared  for  endless  sacrifices  and 
deprivations  until  we  liberate  "the  proletariat  of  the  world"  from  "the  yoke 
of  universal  capitalism."  We  were  told :  "So  long  as  we  are  surrounded  by 
sharks  of  the  capitalist  world,  the  U.S.S.R.  cannot  develop  peacefully;  and  so 
long  as  capitalism  exists,  there  will  be  deprivations."  There  is  always  one 
thought  behind  this  slogan:  To  convince  the  population  in  the  U.S.S.R.  and  in 
other  countries  of  the  world  that  the  capitalist  system  is  an  obvious  evil  prevent- 
ing "peaceful"  development  of  the  "social  paradise  in  the  U.S.S.R." 

Communism  understood  from  the  very  beginning  to  create  a  leadership.  They 
have  special  educators  and  teachers  who  know  how  to  use  the  potentialities 
of  the  younger  generation.  They  are  very  well  prepared  to  give  the  answers 
to  the  problems  of  the  young  man  and  girl. 

When  I  became  6  years  of  age,  I  went  to  the  kindergarten  for  the  first  time. 
The  introduction  which  was  made  by  a  Communist  teacher  was : 

"Boys  and  girls,  the  first  day  in  your  life  you  are  a  free  person.  You  do  not 
know  what  you  will  know  later.    You  are  slaves  of  your  surroundings  being 


204  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

with  your  families,  your  fatliers,  and  mothers.  Your  fathers  and  mothers  are 
sood  people,  but  they  belong  to  an  old  society.  The  society  which  was  educated 
under  Czarist  government  and  their  mood  is  old  fashioned.  If  you  would 
like  to  be  free,  you  must  be  free  from  your  family.  You  do  not  have  to  listen 
to  your  parents.  We  are  your  educators,  we  give  you  the  way  of  life.  You 
share  with  us  everything  that  your  parents  tell  to  you." 

Slowly  and  kindly  the  idea  was  put  in  our  hearts,  to  listen  to  our  educators. 
There  began  a  process  which  is  very  well  organized  in  CJommunist  countries — 
indirect  division  of  children  from  parents.  But,  despite  the  influence  of  the 
kindergarten  and  later  schools,  the  influence  of  my  family,  of  the  older  genera- 
tion, and  of  older  friends  never  vanished.  Communists  take  this  difficulty  for 
them  into  account.  They  are  very  dissatisfied  with  the  growing  of  religious 
belief  among  the  population  of  the  U.S.S.R. 

Religion  seems  to  be  the  strongest  power  and  the  greatest  danger  for  com- 
munism. From  the  very  beginning,  having  taken  some  excursions  to  several 
places,  our  teachers  would  say,  ''Children,  look  at  this  wonderful  nature.  You 
know  who  takes  care  of  this  nature?  Our  Communist  Party;  our  leaders  care 
a  great  deal  about  it.  You  see  the  trees ;  therefore,  they  exist.  Only  the  things 
exist  which  you  can  see,  feel,  and  touch.  Everything  else  is  only  the  opiate  and 
means  of  the  people.  Religion  is  the  opiate  of  the  people  because  it  has  tried  to 
keep  them  sleeping.  Don't  believe  in  God.  God  does  not  exist.  You  cannot 
see  him." 

I  remember  the  first  day  in  the  elementary  school.  We  young  boys  and  girls 
had  a  "pleasure"  to  have  a  special  examination.  We  came  into  the  class.  If  you 
remember  childhood,  it  is  a  special  time,  when  you  enter  for  the  first  time  into 
school.  The  teachers  knew  this.  They  said  to  us,  "Now  you  are  entirely  free 
from  the  slavery  and  darkness  of  the  old  religious  traditions.  We  do  not  need 
lo  pray  any  more  before  our  lessons  start.  If  you  pray  at  home,  you  must  know 
that  you  pray  only  for  nothing.  And  now  we  will  have  a  little  experiment  that 
will  show  you  that  there  is  no  sense  to  prayer."  Then  followed  immediately  the 
question,  "Who  prays?"  Several  hands  were  raised.  Many  of  us  still  at  home 
liad  the  opportunity  to  pronounce  our  prayers  according  to  the  Orthodox  re- 
ligion. 

We  came  to  the  table.  I  remember  very  clearly,  this  table.  We  stood  in  one 
row,  and  teacher  gave  orders.  "All  right,  you  have  a  chance  now  to  pray  as  you 
do  at  home.  A  3-minute  time  is  set.  You  can  pray  to  your  God  and  ask  your 
God  that  He  should  give  you  a  box  of  candy."  Some  of  us  were  7  years  old,  some 
of  us  6.  We  were  moved  emotionally ;  we  could  not  understand  this  lie.  We 
knelt  and  began  to  pray.  After  exactly  3  minutes  the  teacher  gave  us  the  com- 
mand to  stand  up.  And  he  said,  "Look,  you  are  fools,  you  prayed  and  nothing 
happened.  Where  is  the  box  with  candy?"  The  other  children  sitting  in  the 
room  began  to  laugh.  We  were  so  confused.  In  one  moment  without  any  ob- 
jective interpretation,  many  of  us  saw  that  our  parents  were  wrong.  Here  is 
the  real  answer. 

We  were  put  in  one  corner  and  some  of  us  began  to  cry.  The  others  who  did 
not  pray  were  called  to  the  table  and  the  teacher  announced,  "You  will  have  a 
chance  to  see  a  miracle.  You  have  only  2i/^  minutes — even  just  2  minutes  to 
pray — but  you  can  pray  to  someihing  visible.  You  can  pray  to  Comrade  Stalin 
and  the  Communist  Party,  and  you  ask  them  for  a  box  of  candy  and  you  will 
see  what  will  happen." 

They  began  to  pray  to  Stalin  and  in  less  than  2  minutes  the  door  opened  and 
another  teacher  walked  in  bringing  a  big  box  of  candy.  They  began  to  laugh 
and  clap  their  hands.  No  answer  was  given.  Teacher  smiled  at  us.  We  went 
to  our  homes  and  we  explained  this  story  to  our  parents.  I  have  seen  my  mother 
and  my  father  very  upset.  They  were  afraid  to  tell  me  because  I  could  tell 
tomorrow  what  they  told  to  me  and  I  could  denounce,  without  my  knowledge, 
the  same  parents  and  probably  they  would  lose  their  lives. 

This  situation,  which  continued  through  many  years,  created  in  us,  the  younger 
generation  of  Russia,  a  sense  of  great  struggle.  We  have  not  seen  normal  life. 
If  we  played  sport  it  was  not  play  for  just  playing.  Large-scale  development 
of  sport  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  as  its  aims : 

1.  To  utilize  the  large-scale  development  of  sport  for  a  perpetual  training  of 
the  masses  of  the  population  for  socialistic  labor  (which  is  equivalent  to  shock 
"Stakhanovite"  exhausting  labor),  as  well  as  for  the  defense  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
and  to  keep  them  in  a  constant  state  of  mol  ilized  readiness. 

2.  To  use  sport  for  the  purpose  of  indoctrination  of  the  masses  of  the  popu- 
lation with  communistic  theories,  and  thus  fortifying  world  Communist  domi- 
nation. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  205 

Sport  activities,  social  gattierings,  summer  camping  programs  are  completely 
controlled  by  the  Communist  Party  organizations. 

Living  in  the  Soviet  Union  we,  the  young  people,  saw  how  gradually  we  were 
cut  off  from  our  parents  and  how  suspicion,  enmity,  and  hatred  toward  them 
were  incited  in  us.  I  grew  under  these  conditions,  like  millions  of  others.  I 
remember  the  year  1933.  Hunger,  organized  by  the  Soviet  Government  and 
the  party,  took  away  millions  of  people,  my  mother  among  them.  In  the  year 
1937  there  were  fearful  arrests,  trials,  deportations.  My  father,  a  priest  at 
that  time,  was  also  deported.  The  nation  was  living  in  poverty  and  injustice. 
To  buy  something  like  bread  or  meat  or  sugar,  it  was  necessary  to  stand  in 
line  for  a  long  time,  sometimes  for  3,  5,  and  6  hours,  but  before  the  great  shops 
we  read  the  slogan :  "The  life  is  much  happier.     The  life  is  much  better." 

At  the  age  of  17  and  later  we  usually  had  a  chance  to  see  enough  to  ask 
ourselves,  "Why  do  we  have  constant  limitations  in  food,  clothing,  evei'ything? 
Why  can't  we  read  foreign  books,  newspapers?  ♦  *  *  Why  is  it  forbidden  to  go 
abroad?  *  *  *  Whither  are  we  being  led?  Wliy  do  we  have  hunger,  poverty, 
having  a  territory  which  is  one-sixth  part  of  the  earth  ?  *  *  *  Why  lack  of  free- 
dom? Why  arrests?  *  *  *  Those  little  questions — why? — grew  in  our  every- 
day life  to  a  big  why?  There  was  no  satisfactory  official  answer  to  them.  New 
doubts  were  born.  Suspicion  grew.  Searchings  began.  Suspicion  gradually 
turned  into  dissatisfaction,  which  in  turn  brought  forth  desires  to  protest.  But 
the  presence  of  the  terroristic  police  system  and  empty  hands  made  it  impossible 
to  protest. 

Communists  say,  "There  are  no  such  forts  that  could  not  be  taken."  Com- 
munist dictatorship  is  almost  perfect,  but  only  almost.  A  wish  to  be  free  has 
no  borders.  Freedom  is  not  something  that  could  be  only  educated  in  the  family, 
or  in  the  school,  or  in  the  society.  Freedom,  I  believe  now  (much  more  after 
my  experience)  is  an  inborn  capacity.  Therefore,  no  kind  of  indoctrination  is 
able  to  kill  this  spirit,  and  the  feeling  of  freedom,  especially  if  you  are  slaves. 
Slaves  are  much  more  sensitive.  They  are  dreaming  constantly  of  freedom. 
Here  is  the  greatest  hope  for  the  future. 

In  35  years  the  strange  Communist  dictatorship  in  Russia  cost  us  nearly  30 
million  people ;  more  than  10  million  have  died  from  hunger — organized  hunger, 
not  natural.  Now  more  than  16  million  people  are  in  concentration  camps, 
men  and  women  living  under  the  most  horrible  conditions.  I  think  this  is  the 
best  sign  for  everybody  in  a  free  world  to  know  that  opposition  is  there  in 
permanence.  Too  few  people  know  about  it  because  the  Soviet  Union  is  closed 
for  usual  visits.  And  if  some  diplomats  or  newspaper  men  can  travel  across 
some  sections,  believe  me,  they  will  be  controlled  enough  not  to  see  concentra- 
tion camps  in  operation,  for  example. 

The  party's  endeavors  to  mass  produce  the  "Soviet  personality"  continue 
to  meet  many  obstacles,  for  thus  is  innate  conflict  between  party  doctrine  and 
party  morality  on  one  side  and  truth  and  natural  human  instincts  on  the  other. 

Among  young  people  in  the  age  class  of  14  to  16,  that  is,  pupils  in  the  fifth  to 
seventh  grade  of  middle  school,  does  Communist  education  achieve  some  success. 
This  fact  probably  has  led  to  the  following  two  measures :  Introduction  of 
tuition  fees  as  from  the  eighth  grade,  i.  e.,  after  attainment  of  the  politically 
crucial  age  period,  and  reduction  of  the  age  limit  prescribed  for  membership  in 
the  Komsomol.  The  first  measure  was  introduced  before  the  last  war,  the 
second,  after  its  termination  in  1949. 

Communist  education  concentrates  its  efforts  especially  upon  this  age  of  the 
youth.  They  never  forget  that  the  young  people  would  not  only  like  to  listen 
to  some  suggestion  on  the  period  of  their  young  years,  but  they  would  like  to 
listen  to  certain  clear  and  definite  ideas.     What  should  never  be  forgotten : 

Communism  tries  everywhere  to  bring  not  information  to  everybody,  but 
conviction ;  it  is  also  able  to  claim  and  harness  such  good  qualities  as  loyalty, 
zeal,  devotion  to  a  cause,  willingness  to  sacrifice,  and  to  use  them  for  its  own 
ends.     It  promises  immediate  results  for  every  problem. 

Communism  is  able  to  attract  and  hold  these  young  people,  sometimes  for  a 
long  time.  Not  only  that.  It  appears,  particularly  for  those  who  have  never 
had  to  live  under  communism,  as  an  alluring  idea,  presenting  "clear  problems 
and  solutions  to  the  world."  Communism  constantly  changes  its  strategy,  its 
tactics  and  morals,  but  always  holds  to  its  final  goal — world  revolution.  It 
accepts  other  morals  only  as  they  serve  the  final  aim  of  world  communism — 
conquer  the  universe. 

Communism  is  strong  and  effective  because  of  its  form  of  organization ;  be- 
cause of  its  methods  of  work ;  because  it  is  restricted  by  no  moral  or  ethical  con- 
47769°— 54— pt.  4 2 


206  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

siderations ;  because  of  the  way  in  which  it  develops  its  members  to  become 
"cadres" ;  because  it  uses  those  leaders  to  the  best  possible  advantage ;  because 
it  has  a  vast  fund  of  loyalty  and  enthusiasm  on  whicli  to  draw,  stimulated  and 
maintained  by  a  pseudo-scientific  theory  which  promises  an  early  victory  and 
because  its  enemies  are  divided,  while  it  is  inflexibly  united. 

Communism  today  in  its  propaganda  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  especially 
abroad,  tries  to  give  .  oung  men  and  women  a  sense  of  direction,  a  purpose  in  life, 
a  cause  to  fight  for,  an  ideal  to  sacrifice  for  and,  if  needs  be,  die  for.  It  claims 
their  zeal,  their  devotion,  their  loyalty.  These  are  things  which  belong  to 
religion.  Communism  originates  from  unbelief  and  frustration  to  which  it  gives 
rise.  Being  international  and  atheistic,  communism  uses  nationalism  and  reli- 
gion in  Asia  and  Africa  because  it  helps  them  for  a  certain  period  of  time  to 
achieve  its  aims.     Communist  morality  has  no  boundaries : 

"Morality  is  that  which  serves  to  destroy  the  old  exploiting  society  and  unite 
the  toilers  around  the  proletariat,  which  is  creating  a  new  Communist  society" 
(Lenin,  vol.  XVII,  pp.  321-322). 

And  something  more : 

"Our  morality  is  entirely  subordinated  to  the  interest  of  the  class  struggle  of 
the  proletariat  *  *  •  destroying  the  capitalist  class  *  ♦  *"  (Lenin). 

Supporting  religion  at  the  moment  in  some  parts  of  the  world,  communism 
never  forgets  that  "atheism  is  a  natural  and  inseparable  part  of  Marxism,  of 
the  theory  and  practice  of  socialism"  (Lenin). 

After  sending  to  "Siberia  more  than  100,000  priests  and  destroying  thousands 
of  churches  in  Russia,  Communists  oijened  some  churches  during  the  Second 
World  War  only  because  of  the  pressure  from  the  population.  And  at  the  same 
time  Stalin  said : 

"The  party  cannot  be  neutral  toward  the  bearers  of  religious  prejudices,  toward 
the  reactionary  clergy  who  poison  the  minds  of  the  toiling  masses.  Have  we 
suppressed  the  reactionary  clergy?  Yes,  we  have.  The  unfortunate  thing  is 
that  it  hasn't  been  completely  liquidated  *  *  *" 

Communism  is  not,  first  and  foremost,  a  social  or  political  problem.  It  is  a 
spiritual  problem  and  only  if  we  understand  this  shall  we  see  why  it  has  spread 
in  this  particular  age  and  no  other.  It  certainly  uses  with  the  full  dynamics 
for  its  propaganda — poverty,  squalor,  social  injustice,  bad  conditions — everything 
on  its  way.  But  they  are  not  the  things  from  which  it  originates.  Social  in- 
justice is  the  thing  upon  which  it  feeds,  not  its  originator. 

Being  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  I  felt  that  entire  education  and  indoctrination,  besides 
many  secondary  aims,  had  one  aim  of  the  greatest  importance  for  them :  To 
create  a  "new  man"  only  through  the  power  of  man  alone.  Personality  and 
personal  initiative  are  neglected.  Collectivism  in  every  aspect  of  life  is  the 
leading  force. 

The  strength  of  communism  lies  in  the  iron  discipline  of  the  Communist  Party 
in  the  world,  which  rests  on  the  "infallibility"  of  Communist  theory  and  prac- 
tice. Their  "truth"  is  not  a  constant  one,  but  is  actually  created  to  meet  their 
intent. 

Observing  commtmism  and  its  present  methods  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  we  have  seen 
that  it  is  revolutionary  Marxism  in  practice,  which  is  entirely  based  on  the 
philosophy  of  Karl  Marx.  Communists  do  not  intend  to  achieve  their  aims  by 
way  of  gradual  reform.  We  were  told  that  their  entire  strategy  must  be  di- 
rected toward  an  eventual  seizure  of  power  by  armed  force,  remembering  that 
tactics  can  be  changed  everywhere  very  quickly : 

"When  one  enjoys  an  overwhelming  majority  of  forces,  one  can  succeed  by 
direct  frontal  attack.  When  forces  are  inadequate,  detours,  waiting  periods, 
zigzags,  retreats,  and  so  on  and  so  forth,  may  be  necessary"  (Lenin). 

The  final  goal  for  every  Communist  remains  the  same  all  the  time:  to  work 
and  to  live  for  the  revolution.  This  often  becomes  almost  an  end  in  itself  in 
his  mind.  He  has  plenty  of  revolutionary  literature  on  which  to  feed.  Marx 
said : 

"This  revolution  is  necessary,  therefore,  not  only  because  the  ruling  class  can- 
not be  overthrown  in  any  other  way,  but  also  because  the  class  overthrowing  it 
can  only,  in  revolution,  succeed  in  ridding  itself  of  all  the  muck  of  the  ages  and 
become  fitted  to  found  society  anew." 

He  did  not  forget  that  the  social  problem  could  be  used  in  this  revolution  most 
successfully : 

"The  war  of  the  poor  against  the  rich  will  be  the  bloodiest  ever  waged  *  *  * 
combat  or  death,  bloody  struggle  or  extinction.  It  is  thus  that  the  question  is 
inexorably  put"  (Marx). 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  207 

And  again  it  is  permissible  for  Cominform,  which  is  the  world  government  of 
International  communism  in  our  days,  to  change  the  tactic  very  rapidly  on  a 
big  scale  using  "world  movement  for  peace  and  the  fact  that  it  may  develop 
here  and  there  into  a  fight  for  socialism  and  become  a  movement  for  the  over- 
throw of  capitalism  *  *  *"  (Stalin). 

The  Communist  magazine  New  Times  (No.  12,  March  18,  1953)  published  in 
Moscow  in  Russian,  English,  French,  German,  Spanish,  Polish,  Czech,  Rumanian, 
and  Swedish  gives  definite  advice  to  the  "proletarian  of  the  world" : 

"The  founders  of  Marxism  showed  that  the  working  class  can  perform  its  his- 
torical mission  as  the  gravedigger  of  capitalism  and  builder  of  socialism  only 
by  means  of  a  proletarian  revolution  which  would  overthrow  the  rule  of  the 
bourgeoisie  and  establish  the  dictatorship  of  proletariat.  *  *  *  In  Stalin's  classic 
definition,  Marxism  is  'the  science  of  the  revolution  of  the  oppressed  and  ex- 
ploited masses,  the  science  of  the  victory  of  socialism  in  all  coimtries,  the  science 
of  the  building  of  a  communistic  society.'  *  *  *" 

And  here  is  given  one  of  many  suggestions  how  "to  build  a  communistic  society 
in  the  world" : 

"A  Communist  must  be  prepared  to  make  every  sacrifice  and,  if  necessary, 
even  resort  to  all  sort  of  schemes  and  stratagems,  employ  illegitimate  methods, 
conceal  the  truth,  in  order  to  get  into  the  trade  unions,  stay  there,  and  conduct 
the  revolutionary  work  within.  *  *  *"  (Lenin,  Collected  Works,  vol.  XVII, 
p.  142.) 

It  is  time  to  understand  the  real  nature  of  world  communism  and  to  know  that 
it  has  one  definite  goal :  Conquest  of  the  world.  It  is  a  most  serious  situation, 
but  what  is  the  use  of  saying  it  over  and  over  again.  We  in  the  free  world  need 
a  definite  program  of  action,  only  on  a  big  scale,  to  combat  the  menace  of  com- 
munism. We  must  take  offensive,  initiative  in  our  hands.  Communism  is  pre- 
pared to  take  every  risk ; 

"It  would  not  matter  a  jot  if  three-quarters  of  the  human  race  were  destroyed ; 
the  important  thing  is  that  the  surviving  quarter  should  be  Communist"  (Lenin). 

How  can  we  believe  then  in  the  possible  success  of  any  negotiation  with  the 
communistic  world?  How  much  time  will  the  leaders  of  the  free  world  need 
to  understand  the  nature  of  our  enemy?  At  the  present  time  we  are  still  in 
spiritual  defense. 

Knowing  communism  too  well,  I,  as  a  newcomer  to  this  free  country  and  as 
a  citizen-to-be,  would  like  to  share  with  every  American  the  real  danger  we  are 
facing,  but  how  many  people  are  prepared  to  listen  seriously  and  more  than  that, 
to  take  some  definite  action — study  communism,  know  all  its  strategy,  its 
methods,  its  falsehood,  and  face  this  danger  with  a  positive  program—dynamic 
ideology  of  democracy  which  must  have  reborn  Christian  belief,  represented 
through  the  personal  example.  I  think  we  should  know  other  religions  and  find 
out  the  common  ethics  which  can  unite  us  with  the  rest  of  a  free  world.  Then 
it  will  be  a  faith  which  grips  men  and  nations.  It  gives  a  philosophy,  a  passion, 
and  a  plan  to  change  the  world.  And  it  creates  force  of  people  to  do  it.  The 
future  depends  on  an  idea  that  grips  the  minds  of  the  millions.  This  kind  of 
leadership  we  need  right  now. 

I  think  that  the  Senate  Resolution  247  (proposed  severance  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions— it  should  be  said  not  with  Russia  but  with  the  Soviet  Union)  could  have 
success  only : 

First,  if  responsible  leaders  of  the  United  States  will  openly  announce  that  the 
American  people  understand  the  peoples  of  Russia,  their  sufferings  and  struggle 
with  the  strange  dictatorship  in  their  own  country.  And  make  a  clear  distinc- 
tion between  the  peoples  of  Russia  who  become  the  first  victims  of  the  Commu- 
nists and  the  leaders  of  communism. 

Second,  the  peoples  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  need  mostly  hope  to  know  that  they 
are  not  forgotten  in  their  struggle  for  freedom  by  the  free  world.  That  the 
free  people  will  not  rest  without  helping  those  enslaved  people  in  their  fight 
for  deliverance.     And  will  not  rest,  therefore,  for  their  own  safety. 

Third,  if  the  free  world  will  support  the  revolutionary  movements  of  libera- 
tion, the  promised  policy  of  liberation  should  be  consequent.  Why  not  attack 
communism  in  its  own  backyard  and  with  its  own  weapons?  Subversion  is 
1.000  times  more  dangerous  to  Moscow  than  to  Washington.  Suspicion  and  fear 
should  not  have  a  place  in  our  free  society  but  they  are  cracking  the  Soviet 
Empire.  If  America  will  ally  herself  with  the  enslaved  peoples  who  hate  their 
Communist  masters,  we  can  turn  the  dagger  of  the  world  revolution  back  against 
the  Kremlin. 


208  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  framework  of  revolution  already  exists 

The  Communists  cannot  trust  their  own  army.  At  least  3  million  Red  army 
troops  surrendered  to  the  Germans  in  World  War  11  rather  than  to  fight  for 
communism.  The  Nazis  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  promised  they  would  liberate 
us,  but  they  brought  to  us  only  colonization.  Since  1945  thousands  have  deserted 
to  the  West  with  little  or  no  encouragement  from  us.  The  Communist  regime 
has  to  keep  millions  of  Soviet  citizens  (my  father  among  them,  sent  to  Siberia 
in  1937  as  a  priest  of  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church)  in  concentration  camps. 
Most  of  these  people  have  been  accused  of  trying  to  overthrow  the  government. 
The  communistic  government  employs  nearly  2  million  security  police. 

There  is  an  underground  networli  in  Russia,  and  the  captive  countries  of 
Europe  have  already  risen  in  open  revolt.  Endless  purges  show  that  distrust  and 
hatred  divide  the  Communists  from  the  people,  the  Red  army  from  the  secret 
police,  the  party  bureaucrats  from  the  worljers.  What  we  need— propaganda  on 
the  big  scale — clever,  concrete,  and  dynamic.  Words  of  friendship  keep  alive 
the  hope  of  freedom,  but  words  alone  cannot  dissolve  a  police  state.  So  long  as 
we  negotiate  with  Communist  criminals  who  have  enslaved  the  people  of 
Russia,  our  allies  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  will  not  be  certain  of  our  sympathy 
and  support. 

Fourth,  developing  this  kind  of  action  it  will  be  logical  to  withdraw  recogni- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Government.  We  know  that  the  men  in  the  Kremlin  do  not 
rule  with  the  consent  of  the  governed,  therefore  their  form  of  government  is  an 
illegal  one.  .    ■,  u 

Determinate  and  consequent  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  supported  by 
well-informed  public  opinion,  giving  definite  hope  and  program  to  our  secret 
allies— the  peoples  of  Russia  and  peoples  of  other  enslaved  countries— can  create 
dynamics  and  power  to  start  the  revolution  of  liberation.  If  we  are  prepared  to 
do  that,  then  proposed  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
has  a  deep  sense  and  vital  significance. 

We  must  also  encourage  defection  from  Soviet  Army  forces. 
There  are  some  organizations  here  in  America  which  have  the  aim  to  help 
cement  a  bond  of  friendship  with  the  Red  Kremlin  victims  in  order  to  bring  about 
the  ultimate  overthrow  of  the  Soviet  dictatorship  by  the  Russian  peoples  them- 
selves. I  mean  those  organizations  like  American  Friends  of  Russian  Freedom, 
Inc.,  Alliance  of  Russian  Solidarists  (NTS),  Movement  for  the  Liberation  of  the 
Peoples  of  Russia,  Alliance  of  the  Post-World  War  II  Escapees,  etc. 

I  wanted  in  this  statement  to  give  the  briefest  description  about  the  task  force 
on  strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism,  especially  in  regard  to  the  youth 
education  and  indoctrination.  I  am  very  glad  to  have  the  opportunity  to  share 
with  members  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  some  concrete  thoughts 
and  plans  which,  I  deeply  believe,  can  help  us  in  united  action  to  combat  world 
communism. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  like  to  mention  probably  the  greatest  hope  for  the  future 
liberation  from  communism — the  younger  generation  of  Russia,  to  which  I  also 
belong.  I  am  speaking  now  about  the  boys  and  girls  in  their  twenties.  The 
actual  facts  of  life  contradict  oflicial  slogans.  As  soon  as  its  critical  faculties  are 
awakened,  the  younger  generation  is  met  with  disappointments:  not  many  of 
them  who  are  over  16  years  of  age  continue  being  eager  to  join  the  Komsomol. 
In  these  years  we  observed  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  a  general  indifference  to  politics. 
Natural  human  instinct  rebels  agains  Communist  education.  The  antihuman 
postulates  of  Communist  morality  are  in  constant  conflict  with  human  feelings 
of  personal  attachments  and  family  tradition.  It  is  in  particular  the  concept 
of  the  family  as  the  basic  cell  of  any  normal  community  of  human  beings  which 
forever  struggles  with  Communist  power. 

The  last  war  brought  an  end  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.'s  years  of  isolation  from  the  rest 
of  the  vi'orld,  or  seemed  to.  Entirely  new  spiritual  horizons  were  opened  to  Soviet 
youth.  But  with  frustration  where  peace  was  concerned,  came  their  hopes  for 
liberal  change.  The  official  Soviet  press  itself  admits  that  the  "opposition  of  the 
growing  generation  to  the  government  system  is  on  the  increase."  It  further 
stated : 

"In  recent  years  many  representatives  of  our  Komsomol  movement  become  in- 
different to  our  program  and  activities.  They  do  not  have  dynamics  and  wish 
to  be  communistic  leaders  of  highest  type.  Many  of  them  even  believe  in  God. 
*  *  *  The  apathy,  indifference  is  growing.  *  *  *" 

The  answer  is  very  clear.  Many  of  us  saw  the  outside  world.  We  have  seen 
how  deeply  we  were  deceived,  again  and  again.  Those  of  us  who  had  a  chance  to 
escape  from  Soviet  slavery,  like  myself,  feel  that  we  have  a  certain  definite 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  209 

mission  in  our  life — to  fight  for  the  freedom  of  the  peoples  of  Russia  and  that 
means  to  fight  for  our  own  freedom  here  in  this  free  country,  where  many  people 
take  too  much  for  granted. 

I  would  be  sincerely  glad  to  be  of  any  assistance  to  every  sincere  American, 
or  groups  of  people  in  my  new  country  to  help  them  through  lectures,  discussions, 
seminars  (what  I  did  before  for  1  year)  or  by  other  means  to  know  in  detail  the 
strategy,  tactics,  nature  of  godless  communism  in  order  to  combat  it  in  a  positive 
way.  I  believe  in  the  spiritual  richness  of  democracy  and  I  believe  in  the  power 
of  the  individual.  I  think  that  upon  him  should  rest  the  greatest  possible 
amount  of  responsibilities.  In  our  age  we  are  facing  the  fight  for  the  mind  of 
a  man,  especially  young  men — the  younger  generation. 

The  younger  generation  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  is  searching  for  truth,  liberty 
and  freedom.  Very  often,  being  disappointed  by  the  entire  communistic  philos- 
ophy of  life  and  brutal  realities,  they  need  a  sense  of  direction,  a  purpose  in  life, 
a  cause  to  fight  for.  They  are  accustomed  to  having  a  definite  aim  for  their 
life. 

And  very  little  is  done  for  them,  thus  losing  this  spendid  opportunity  to  fulfill 
the  great  vacuum  which  was  created  in  their  minds  and  hearts.  The  Voice  of 
America  and  the  Radio  Station  of  Liberation  have  a  good  program  for  the  people 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  presenting  to  them  the  truth  about  the  free  world.  But 
both  radio  stations  have  no  program  designed  for  the  youth.  And  here  we  have 
such  a  rare  opportunity  to  win  the  people  who  are  going  to  decide  the  future  of 
their  countries  and  of  the  world. 

We  must  have  this  kind  of  program  for  the  youth,  giving  them  encouragement, 
hope,  new  ideas,  new  dynamics. 

I  believe  that  we  can  still  win  this  ideological  global  battle  for  the  minds 
of  the  people.  Democracy  has  every  richness,  spiritual  and  material.  It  has 
wonderful  leaders,  tradition,  experience.  Only  there  is  not  enough  unity  of 
purpose.    And  this  is  what  we  need  indeed. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  view  of  the  fact  your  prepared  statement  is  in  the 
record,  we  will  proceed  now  with  an  extemporaneous  summary  by  you 
of  the  various  points.  I  should  like  to  ask  you  first  of  all  to  give  just  a 
thumbnail  sketch  of  your  own  personal  background,  where  you  were 
born,  and  how  you  happened  to  come  to  this  country— a  word  of  your 
personal  history. 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  Thank  you.  I  was  born  in  1921  in  Kiev,  capital  of 
the  Ukrame,  now  one  of  the  16  Soviet  Socialist  Kepublics.  I  spent 
nearly  24  years  in  the  Soviet  Union  being  educated  there  in  element- 
ary and  secondary  schools  and  attending  3  years  at  Odessa  University. 

By  the  start  of  the  Second  World  War  ,  I  was  mobilized  in  the  Eed 
army  and  served  as  a  lieutenant  in  the  tank  corps.  During  the  War  I 
was  early  captured  by  the  Nazis  and  put  in  a  POW  camp.  Later,  I 
was  transferred  from  the  Ukraine  to  Bavaria  in  Germany.  In  1945  we 
were  liberated  by  the  American  Third  Army,  General  Patton. 

After  liberation  it  was  announced  that  former  Soviet  citizens  would 
have  a  chance  to  go  home  but  I  refused  repatriation  for  these  reasons. 
First,  we  realized  that  we  had  been  deeply  deceived  by  the  entire  Soviet 
propaganda  and  indoctrination.  Usually,  up  to  16  years  of  age,  the 
whole  indoctrination  seemed  very  alluring  and  convincing.  But  when 
we  finished  schooling  and  had  to  face  the  realities  of  Soviet  life,  these 
realities  were  far  removed  from  the  earlier  promises  made  us.  I 
found  myself  constantly  struggling  with  my  conscience  and  began  to 
question  the  earlier  ideological  training  and  material  promises. 
_  For  example,  I  found  myself  1  day  before  a  shopwindow  where 
signs  as  everywhere,  proclaimed:  "Soviet  life  has  become  easier  and 
happier,"  yet  outside  the  shop,  long  lines  of  people  waited,  sometimes 
for  many  hours,  to  get  a  loaf  of  bread  or  bottle  of  milk. 

I  began  to  think,  why  is  it  that  when  Eussia  has  one-sixth  of  the 
•world's  territory  and  sufficient  natural  resources  to  support  twice  her 
population,  we  have  such  continuous  poverty  ? 


210  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

All  this  was  quite  opposite  to  those  promises  made  us  by  the  Com- 
munists in  1917  in  simple  slogans:  "All  land — to  the  peasants",  "Fac- 
tories, management  and  ])rofits — to  the  workers",  "Liberty,  brother- 
hood, social  justice  for  all",  "Peaceful  little  homes,  war  against  the 
palaces." 

At  that  time,  no  one  dreamed  what  the  later  realities  would  be, 
just  as  today,  the  peoples  of  Asia  and  Africa  follow  the  same  Com- 
munist slogans  and  propaganda,  blindly  believing  they  will  lead  to 
the  solution  of  their  problems. 

This  same  inconsistency  became  evident  in  much  that  I  saw  around 
me,  not  only  in  physical  conditions  but  also  in  the  spiritual  field. 
Gradually  these  constant  psychological  and  political  pressures  created 
in  us  a  continual  sense  of  inner  conflict  until  only  one  wish  remained: 
to  be  free. 

That  many  felt  as  I  did  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  later  when  the 
Germans  attacked  the  U.  S.  S.  R  in  1941,  promising  our  peoples  libera- 
tion from  communism,  over  3  millions  of  them  voluntarily  surrendered 
to  them. 

I  mentioned  pressures  in  the  spiritual  field.  These  were  complex 
and  created  a  spiritual  hunger  coming  from  a  kind  of  inner  vacuum 
created  by  the  absence  of  anything  to  satisfy  a  searching  mind  which, 
in  my  case,  was  influenced  by  the  religious  education  I  received  in  my 
childhood  from  my  father  w^ho  was  a  priest. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience  as  one 
who  has  lived  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  who  has  escaped  from  the  Soviet 
tyranny,  do  you  have  any  way  you  can  characterize,  for  this  commit- 
tee, any  distinction  to  be  made  between  the  people  and  the  leaders  of 
the  Soviet  Union? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  Mr.  Arens,  I  am  sincerely  glad  that  you  asked 
me  this  question.  I  make  a  very  definite  distinction  between  the 
Russian  peoples  and  their  present  Soviet  Government. 

First,  the  experience  of  the  last  36  years  under  Soviet  communism 
has  sliown  the  people  clearly  that  everything  promised  in  the  begin- 
ning by  the  Communist  leaders  was  nothing  but  deceitful  lies.  What 
they  really  got  in  no  way  really  represented  the  true  aspirations  of 
the  Russian  peoples —  for  like  Americans,  they  love  liberty,  freedom, 
and  justice.  They  soon  found  they  were  simply  victims  of  an  imported 
philosophy,  completely  foreign  to  their  natural  instincts. 

Marxism  and  Marxistic  philosophy  and  tactics  w^ere  introduced 
into  Russia  by  leaders  trained  abroad  and  sent  into  Russia  by  the 
German  High  Command  under  General  Ludendorf  in  World  War  I 
in  order  to  stimulate  revolution  in  Russia  and  thus  weaken  the  Rus- 
sian Empire  and  its  Western  allies,  Great  Britain  and  France.  It  is 
not  a  creation  of  Russian  philosophy  and  thinking. 

Some  responsible  leaders  in  Great  Britain  knew  of  this  plot  against 
Russia,  then  an  ally  in  World  War  I,  but  made  no  efforts  to  stop  it 
following  the  traditional  British  policy  of  "Divide  and  Conquer" 
which  from  their  point  of  view  may  have  been  justified  but  proved 
short  sighted  and  at  the  present  time,  is  proving  disastrous. 

Since  1917,  the  world  has  learned  that  Russia  was  used  as  the  first 
big  laboratory  to  test  out  communism  as  an  experiment  in  tactics  of 
world  conquest. 

In  the  past  36  years,  millions  of  the  Russian  people  have  been  liq- 
uidated both  as  individuals  and  as  whole  classes,  and  this  mass 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM      .      211 

slaughter  is  not  considered  a  crime  under  Communistic  philosophy 
which,  as  expressed  by  Lenin,  states : 

It  would  not  matter  a  jot  if  three  quarters  of  the  human  race  were  destroyed ; 
the  important  thing  is  that  the  surviving  quarter  should  be  Communist. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Goncharoff,  you  are  currently  and  have  been  in  the 
recent  past  in  intimate  contact  with  the  anti- Communist  underground 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience  as  one 
who  has  lived  for  many  years  under  the  Soviet  regime  and  as  one  who 
has  escaped  from  the  Soviet  regime,  as  one  who  is  currently  in  contact 
with  tlie  underground  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  what  would  be  your 
appraisal  of  a  course  of  action  to  be  taken  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Government  of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Governments  of  the  satellite  states  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  Please  excuse  me  from  making  a  definite  state- 
ment on  this  question.  This  is  a  public  hearing  and  I  hesitate  to  ex- 
press my  views  fully  on  the  subject,  at  this  time. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  interrupt  ? 

Chairman  Jenner.  Senator  "Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  ask  you.  Is  it  your  opinion,  based  on  your 
experience,  your  living  there  in  Eussia  with  the  people  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain,  that  the  ordinary  person,  the  peasant,  the  worker,  actu- 
ally wants  freedom  as  could  be  given  to  them  by  the  Western  World  ? 
_  Mr.  Goncharoff.  Yes,  Senator  and  this  is  based  on  their  clisillu- 
sionment.  A  year  ago  in  traveling  across  the  United  States  of 
America  under  the  auspices  of  the  National  Council  of  YMCA's 
especially  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  Minnesota,  and  Iowa ;  I  was  impressed  by 
the  similarity  of  your  American  farmers  and  our  Russian  peasants 
in  their  love  of  the  land  and  their  closeness  to  it.  Both  want  to  own 
their  own  land  and  farm  it  as  private  individuals. 

In  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  20  years  of  collective  farming  has  not  stifled  the 
Russian  peasant's  craving  for  his  own  piece  of  land  promised  him  in 
1917.  But  since  1928,  even  the  little  land  he  owned  was  taken  from 
him  under  the  Soviet  collectivization  program. 

As  for  the  workers  who  are  today  completely  State-controlled  de- 
spite that  earlier  promise  that  "The  factories,  management,  and 
profit— to  the  workers,"  they  are  completely  disillusioned  for  even 
their  unions,  which  unions  in  America  safeguard  the  worker's  welfare, 
in  the  Soviet  Union,  are  practically  an  indirect  Department  of  the 
Communist  Party  whose  main  task  is  to  indoctrinate  the  workers  in 
Marxist  philosophy  and  not  in  any  sense,  to  protect  their  rights  as 
workers. 

Senator  Welker.  Since  I  have  been  working  with  Senator  Jenner 
and  this  committee,  I  have  been  distressed  at  times  to  hear  witnesses 
refer  in  an  antagonistic  way  to  Russia.  I  hope  you  will  agree  with 
the  chairman  and  with  the  whole  committee  that  we  are  not  antago- 
nistic to  Russia  but  we  are  against  the  Soviet  regime,  the  Communists 
who  are  oppressing  the  Russian  peoples  as  you  have  related.  Would 
it  not  be  wise  for  us  to  watch  our  language  more  and  our  use  of  words, 
so  that  we  can  let  the  Russian  people  know  that  we  distinguish  be- 
between  them  and  their  hated  Soviet  regime  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  What  you  are  saying  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
for  the  attitude  of  the  free  world  and  especially  that  of  America  to- 


212  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

ward  the  peoples  of  Kussia  as  distinguished  from  their  present  Soviet 
rulers,  may  well  determine  the  outcome  of  World  War  III  should  that 
come.     Let  me  explain  my  reasons  for  this  statement. 

In  World  War  II,  when  the  Nazi  armies  invaded  the  U.  S.  S.  E. 
with  promises  at  first  of  liberation  from  communism,  over  3  million  of 
our  soldiers,  mostly  young  men  brought  up  under  Communist  indoc- 
trination, believing  the  Nazis  came  as  liberators,  voluntarily  surren- 
dered to  them  while  millions  more  of  our  civilian  population  greeted 
the  Germans  as  friends  and  liberators,  offering  them  bread  and  salt  in 
our  traditional  Kussian  way  of  showing  very  warm  hospitality. 

But  Hitler's  stupid  diplomacy  and  master  race  ideas  plus  the  failure 
to  use  this  psychological  ripeness  of  the  peoples  for  liberation  from 
Communist  oppression,  played  into  the  hands  of  Soviets.  When 
these  invading  armies  began  to  treat  the  friendly  population  as 
unter  mensch  whose  country  they  proposed  to  colonize,  the  deep 
patriotic  instinct  of  all  Kussian  people  for  their  motherland  rose  up 
in  protest  and  was  very  cleverly  supported  in  every  way  by  new  tactics 
on  the  part  of  their  Soviet  rulers.  These  now  began  to  recall  from 
the  past,  many  ideas  which  they  had  scoffed  at  so  constantly — as  capi- 
talistic and  bourgeois — religion,  nationalism,  old  Army  traditions, 
et  cetera.  Former  heroes  of  the  czarist  regime  overnight  became 
heroes  again  and  the  word  "Hussia"  which  since  1924  by  decree  had 
become  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  was  revived  to  deepen  the  patriotic  feelings 
of  the  people  to  fight  in  this  "holy  war  against  invaders  and  coloniza- 
tion." 

In  our  present  cold  war  and  even  more  in  World  War  III  shoulcl  it 
come,  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  peoples  may  well  become  the  decisive 
factor  in  victory.  If  convinced  of  the  sincere  friendship  and  under- 
standing of  the  free  world,  millions  may  come  over  to  fight  with  us, 
as  allies  against  a  common  enemy  and  hence  save  many  thousands  of 
American  lives. 

The  important  thing  right  now  is  to  counteract  all  the  violent  anti- 
American  propaganda  being  carried  on  within  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
by  every  means  possible,  get  over  to  the  Kussian  peoples,  the  ideas  you 
mentioned  to  convince  them  now  that  they  will  be  treated  as  friends 
and  allies  when  the  time  comes. 

But  propaganda  must  be  geared  to  the  people  you  want  to  influ- 
ence, particularly  the  younger  generation  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  who 
will  decide  the  future.  These  I  feel  you  have  failed  to  reach  so  far, 
despite  the  fact  that  there  are  plenty  of  former  Soviet  citizens  now  in 
this  country  who  could  give  you  effective  help  in  this. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Can  you  think  of  any  way  that  would  be  better 
to  tell  the  Russian  people  what  our  Government's  feeling  is  toward 
the  Soviet  Union  than  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  those  di- 
recting the  Soviet  Union's  government? 

Mr.  GoNCHAEOFF.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  would  have  great  effect  among  tlie 
peoples  of  Russia  if  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  of 
America  were  accompanied  both  before  the  act  and  afterward  by  wise 
and  consistent  propaganda  and  a  carefully  planned  policy  program. 

Today  the  American  press,  radio  and  TV  all  powerful  here;  yet 
often,  unwittingly,  play  mto  the  hands  of  the  Soviet  by  using  wrong 
terminology— often  confusing  Russia  with  the  Soviet  regime  in  a 
way  to  be  capitalized  effectively  by  the  Soviet  press.    For  example, 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  213 

Soviet  delegates  to  the  U.  N.  are  often  referred  to  as  Russian  delegates, 
implying  they  represent  the  Russian  peoples;  or,  referring  to  world 
Communist  conquest,  they  state  Russian  imperialism,  which  is  im- 
mediately quoted  by  the  Soviet  press  to  persuade  the  peoples  of  Russia 
that  the  Western  World  is  fighting,  not  against  Communist  conquest, 
but  against  them. 

Such  factors  on  top  of  their  experience  with  the  Nazi  invaders  plus 
their  later  experience  with  the  forced  repatriation  agreements  of 
Yalta  have  understandingly  made  the  Russian  people  highly  distrust- 
ful of  the  Western  World's  intentions. 

Unless  American  reasons  for  severing  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  are  made  clear  to  the  Russian  peoples  in  advance,  Soviet 
propaganda  will  skillfully  turn  that  act  to  its  own  advantage  by 
representing  it  as  further  evidence  of  American  imperialism  presag- 
ing imminent  hostilities  requiring  new  sacrifices  from  the  people. 

If  the  United  States  of  America  does  sever  relations  with  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.,  this  act  alone,  unaccompanied  by  previous  preparation 
of  the  Russian  peoples  for  it  and  not  followed  by  a  carefully  designed 
program  of  subsequent  action,  can  be  more  harmful  than  helpful. 

To  carry  out  an  effective  program  of  action  to  win  the  confidence 
of  the  peoples  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  America  and  the  free  world 
should  be  ready  at  all  times  to  encourage  any  liberation  efforts  of 
enslaved  peoples.  In  my  opinion,  they  lost  a  gi-eat  opportunity  when, 
at  the  time  of  the  east  German  uprisings  last  year,  they  took  a  passive 
course  and,  instead  of  giving  wholehearted  support  to  this  first  real 
revolt  of  Soviet  dominated  peoples,  put  food  parcels  in  their  empty 
hands  instead  of  the  means  for  their  liberation. 

This  lack  of  support  lost  many  potential  Soviet  defectors  from  the 
Soviet  occupation  forces,  many  of  whom  had  bravely  refused  to  fire 
on  the  German  demonstrators,  thus  indicating  their  sympathy  with 
the  revolt — revolt  which  is  the  greatest  Soviet  nightmare. 

The  Soviet  is  well  aware  of  the  mood  of  its  armed  forces  and  hesi- 
tates to  take  any  step  leading  to  outright  warfare  involving  the  Soviet 
Army.  So  far,  they  have  been  highly  successful  in  the  strategy  of  let- 
ting others  fight  for  them. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  mean  they  are  getting  what  they  want  without  war  ? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  This  is  obvious  wiien  we  realize  that  in  only  9 
years — from  1945  to  1954 — more  than  600  million  people  and  5  million 
square  miles  of  territory  have  been  captured  by  them  without  the  Red 
army  firing  a  shot. 

Communist  actions  are  carefully  planned  and  coordinated  for  years 
ahead  and  much  of  their  success  is  due  to  the  psychological  cleverness 
of  their  many  planning  boards,  all  working  under  one  overall  coordi- 
nating agency,  the  World  Communist  Government,  better  known  as 
the  Cominform  which  was  established  in  March  1919. 

Communists  are  complete  opportunists  in  their  methods — although 
atheistic  themselves,  they  play  up  religion  when  to  their  advantage; 
although  complete  internationalists  themselves,  they  play  upon  ex- 
tremes of  nationalistic  feelings  to  gain  their  ends;  everywhere,  they 
thrive  on  conditions  of  poverty  by  promising  tempting  social  programs 
always  relevant  to  the  special  existing  local  conditions,  whether  in 
Africa,  Asia,  or  South  America.  Their  watchful  patience  borders 
on  fanaticism  for  their  planning  is  long-ranged  with  variable  time- 

47769°— 54— pt.  4 3 


214  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

tables  but  has  one  sole  objective — the  ultimate  Communist  conquest  of 
the  entire  world. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Goncharoff,  the  Senator  who  was  addressing  you  a 
moment  ago,  the  Senator  from  Idaho,  Mr.  Welker,  introduced  in  the 
Senate  some  time  ago  a  resolution  which  would  request  the  President  of 
the  United  States  to  designate  periodic  days  for  prayer  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  on  behalf  of  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 
I  ask  you,  aside  from  personal  religious  convictions  which  we  all  have 
on  a  matter  of  that  kind,  what  would  be  the  psychological  reaction  of 
the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  if  that  course  of  action  should 
come  to  pass? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  I  know  this  resolution.  I  am,  myself,  a  Christian, 
not  by  formal  religious  training  but  through  the  influence  of  my 
family. 

The  power  of  prayer,  particularly  if  sincere,  and  especially  through 
a  nationwide  effort,  I  think,  could  be  very  effective.  The  people  of 
Russia  are  still  a  deeply  religious  people.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
in  35  years,  this  belief  could  vanish. 

If  you  allow  me  half  a  minute  to  say  to  you  that  the  most  barbaric 
propaganda  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  against  religion.  Now  they  use 
religion  because  they  were  not  able  to  combat  it  to  the  last  extent. 
They  realized  there  is  some  force  which  could  not  be  taken  over.  In 
1935,  the  Minister  of  Education  used  to  say : 

We  hate  Christianity  and  Christians.  Even  the  best  of  them  must  be  con- 
sidered our  worst  enemies.  They  preach  love  of  one's  neighbor  and  mercy  which 
is  contrary  to  our  principles.  Christian  love  is  an  obstacle  to  the  development 
of  the  revolution.  Down  with  love  of  our  neighbor.  What  we  want  is  hatred. 
We  must  know  ho'"  to  hate.     Only  thus  will  we  conquer  the  universe. 

This  resolution  could  be  the  first  effective  step  in  a  spiritual  offensive 
against  communism. 

Mr.  Arens.  That  is  the  prayer  resolution  ? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience,  could 
you  tell  this  committee  what  the  reaction  is  of  the  average  person 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain  when  he  sees  the  diplomats  in  the  Kremlin 
portrayed  in  diplomatic  session  with  the  diplomats  of  the  West  in  the 
various  conferences  and  affairs  in  which  they  engage? 

Mr.  Goncharoff.  Mr.  Arens,  excuse  me  if  I  say  that  we  very  often — 
I  am  speaking  about  those  who  already  understand  the  whole  menace 
of  communism — we  cannot  understand  how  it  is  possible  that  the  free 
^s  orld,  in  the  last  35  years,  having  all  possible  sources  and  information, 
having  many  Soviet  emigrants  and  escapees  telling  the  truth  about  the 
Soviet,  cannot  understand  the  real  nature  of  world  communism  which 
is  moving  to  conquer  the  rest  of  the  world  and  those  free  countries 
which  maintain  relationships  with  the  Communists. 

Yet  in  1944  and  1945  they  made  agreements  with  Stalin.     I  think 
tliose  leaders  of  the  Western  World  should  know  exactly  with  whom 
they  are  dealing.    Communists  make  no  secret  of  their  final  goals. 
Lenin  said  openly — 
The  way  to  Paris  is  not  the  Way  through  Berlin  but  through  Peiping. 

They  know  another  statement  of  his  which  said — 

At  first  we  will  talie  Eastern  Europe,  then  the  masses  of  Asia.  Later  we  will 
encircle  the  United  States  which  will  be  the  last  bastion  of  capitalism.  We  will 
not  need  to  attaclj  it,  it  will  fall  like  an  overripe  fruit  into  our  hands. 

This  is  exactly  what  they  have  done  and  are  doing. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  215 

Allow  me  to  make  another  statement  which  is  important.  The  basic 
ditference  between  diplomacy  of  the  free  world  and  diplomacy  of  com- 
munism is  that  the  diplomacy  of  the  free  world  maintains  relationships 
with  other  countries,  establishing  trade  relationships  and  neighbor 
relationships.  The  diplomacy  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  only  a  part  of 
the  whole  setup  of  the  Cominform  which  is  the  world  government  of 
communism.  In  this  whole  process,  Soviet  diplomacy  through  its 
representatives,  cultural  attaches,  military  attaches,  trade  representa- 
tives, serve  not  for  maintaining  those  relationships ;  but  serve  the  Com- 
inform in  a  whole  network  of  subversive  activities. 

Western  diplomats  are  well  informed  about  the  true  nature  of  Com- 
munist diplomats  and  diplomacy,  and  the  Western  World  should  sur- 
round them  with  the  same  restrictions  imposed  on  foreign  diplomats  in 
Moscow. 

The  Russian  peoples  know  well  that  the  Soviet  diplomats  do  not  in 
any  way  represent  them  but  only  the  Communist  Party  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  They  liope  the  free  world  will  eome  to  understand  that 
tliey  cannot  and  do  not  speak  for  the  peoples  of  Russia  who  are  still  in 
enforced  silence. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  many  slave  laborers  are  there  behind  the  Iron  Cur- 
tain?    May  I  see  the  statement  you  just  read  about  the  way  to  Paris? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  I  have  it  here. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  many  slave  laborers  are  there  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain  ? 

Mr.  GoNCHARorr.  Nobody  can  say  the  exact  number.  According 
to  the  official  Soviet  statistics  which  list  those  camps  as  labor  camps, 
we  know  the  number  varies  between  14  million  and  16  million  people, 
possibly  more.  We  know  that  these  millions  represent  a  force  of 
opposition  to  the  Soviet  regime,  but  a  force  which  cannot  speak  their 
wishes. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  you  think  of  a  course  of  action  suggested 
in  a  bill  which  was  introduced  by  the  Senator  from  Indiana,  Mr. 
Jenner;  the  Senator  from  Nevada,  Mr.  McCarran;  and  the  Senator 
from  Idaho,  Mr.  Welker,  which  would  preclude  shipment  into  the 
United  States  of  any  goods  or  commodities  produced  by  slave  labor? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  I  tliiuk  this  is  not  only  a  deep  humanitarian  act, 
but  this  is  again  one  next  step  which  will  give  help  and  hope  to  the 
Russian  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  think  it  would  be  well  received  by  the  Russian 
people  themselves? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  Without  any  doubt.  Why?  The  free  world, 
particularly  the  businessmen  of  Great  Britain  more  or  less  agree  not 
to  send  strategic  goods  to  the  Soviet  Union,  but  they  don't  realize  a 
very  simple  fact  that  by  sending  nonstrategic  goods  they  release 
Soviet  labor  to  make  strategic  goods.  For  example,  it  is  necessary 
for  the  Soviets  to  have  a  certain  number  of  tons  of  butter.  If  they 
can  get  this  butter  from  Great  Britain  and  not  have  to  produce  it 
themselves,  then  they  liberate  a  certain  number  of  workers,  who  pro- 
duce butter,  for  the  defense  industries  which  produce  strategic  goods. 
So,  indirectly,  such  kinds  of  trade  help  them  to  build  up  strategic 
offensives. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  a  question  ? 

Chairman  Jenner.  Senator  Welker. 


216  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Senator  Welrer.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  if  we  permitted  slave  labor 
goods  to  be  imported  into  this  country,  it  would  deprive  the  people 
of  Russia  of  the  things  that  they  need  and  so  there  would  be  nothing 
left  for  thorn  when  they  ship  it  all  overseas.  Is  that  a  correct 
assumption  ? 

Mr.  (3ONC11AROFF.  Possibly. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  many  security  police  are  in  Russia  at  tlie  present 
time  on  the  basis  of  your  contact  with  the  underground? 

Mr.  GoNCiiAROFF.  About  2  million  people.  There  was  a  big  shake- 
up  after  Beria's  death.  The  long  existing  myth  about  an  all  powerful 
MVD  was  shaken.  During  the  interfighting  which  followed  Beria's 
liquidation,  the  people  came  to  realize  that  the  man  who  personified 
total  MVD  brutality  was  easily  removed  by  his  own  men  and  that 
Malenkov's  order  to  remove  Beria  was  not  clue  to  Beria's  viciousness 
or  any  humanitarian  motive  of  Malenkov's  but  purely  a  play  on  his 
part  for  supreme  power  and  control. 

In  this  connection,  I  believe  we  should  not  give  too  much  im- 
portance to  the  testimony  of  recent  MVD  defectors,  especially  those 
who  defected  after  Beria's  death,  but  should  place  more  confidence  in 
the  less  sensational  testimony  of  the  many  simple  soldiers  and  officers 
who  escaped  to  the  West,  not  to  save  their  own  necks  but  for  ideolog- 
ical reasons,  for  they  better  represent  the  true  feelings  and  wishes 
of  the  masses  of  the  peoples  of  Russia. 

I  would  like  to  make  one  last  point  in  connection  with  security 
police  and  subversive  activities  in  this  country.  Keep  in  mind  that 
here  in  America,  as  in  every  other  country,  communism  has  created 
a  system  of  double  leadership  for  their  activities.  It  will  be  a  big 
mistake  to  believe  that  the  American  Communist  Party  and  par- 
ticularly, those  who  carry  party  membership  cards,  are  the  only,  or 
greatest  danger.  These  can  be  fairly  easily  identified,  and  their  main 
function  is  fighting  openly  for  communism  through  more  or  less  legal 
channels.  Many  of  these  are  naive,  idealistic  but  often  frustrated 
personalities  and  do  not  always  represent  the  most  dangerous  and 
extreme  Communist  elements. 

This  other  element  is  a  hidden,  anonymous  group,  carefully 
screened  and  selected  directly  by  the  security  department  of  the  Com- 
inform  and  responsible  only  to  it.  They  are  not  officially  members 
of  any  Communist  Party  and  are  not  known  to  any  but  Cominform 
officials.  These  are  the  most  dangerous  agents  of  subversion,  operat- 
ing in  complete  secrecy  and  assigned  to  prepare  for  the  final  over- 
throw of  the  existing  Government. 

Chairman  Jenner.  If  there  are  no  further  questions,  we  want  to 
thank  you  for  appearing  here  before  this  committee.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  your  statement,  I  did  not  quite  understand.  You  were  born, 
of  course,  in  Russia? 

Mr.  Gonciiaroff.  Yes,  in  Kiev. 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  lived  there  how  long  ? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  About  8  years  in  Kiev. 

Chairman  Jenner.  And  in  Russia? 

Mr.  GoNCHAROFF.  About  24  years. 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  lived  in  Kiev  8  years  ? 

Mr.  Gonciiaroff.  Yes. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Then  where  did  you  live? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  217 

Mr.  GoKCHAROFF,  111  Pavlogracl,  Odessa,  Kostov — the  southern  re- 
gions of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  the  Ukraine. 

Chairman  Jenxer.  You  came  as  an  escapee  to  Avhat  country? 

Mr.  GoxcHAROFF.  I  was  liberated  by  American  forces  in  1945  in 
Germany,  being  a  prisoner  of  war;  tlien  remained  in  West  Geniianj', 
studied  there  in  IMunich  University,  and  2  years  ago  I  came  as  a  dis- 
phiced  person  to  tliis  country  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  Tolstoy 
Foundation. 

Chairman  Jenxer.  Thank  you  yeiy  much  for  appearing.  We 
appreciate  your  testimony. 

Mr.  Arexs,  The  next  witness  is  Mr.  W.  H.  Smyth. 

Chairman  Jexxer.  Will  you  be  sworn  to  testify. 

Do  you  swear  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  'i 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  W.  H.  SMYTH,  NEW  YOEK  CITY 

Chairman  Jex'xer.  Will  you  give  us  your  full  name  ? 

Mr.  Smyth.  William  Harris  Smyth. 

Chairman  Jexx'^er.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Mr.  Smyth.  44  West  44th  Street,  New  York  City. 

Chainnan  Jex-xer.  What  is  your  business  or  profession  ? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  am  president  of  the  Threadmiller  Corp.,  a  small 
company  making  lathe  tools.  I  am  also  interested  in  general  business 
brokerage. 

Chairman  Jex^xer.  Do  you  have  a  prepared  statement  that  you 
have  submitted  to  this  committee? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Jenxer.  It  will  go  into  the  record  and  become  a  part  of 
the  record. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  by  W.  H.  Smyth 

Mr.  Chairman  and  gentlemen,  Senate  Resolution  247,  calling  for  our  severance 
of  diplomatic  relations  witli  the  alleged  Government  of  Soviet  Russia  and  the 
alleged  governments  of  countries  which  have  been  enslaved  by  Soviet  Russia, 
and  for  the  convocation  of  an  international  conference  of  the  free  nations  of 
the  world  for  the  purpose  of  agreeing  upon  a  united  action  to  destroy  the  Com- 
munist fifth  column  and  to  resist  further  aggression  by  international  com- 
munism, vitally  concerns  all  Americans,  hence,  merits  discussion. 

In  my  opinion,  we  Americans  too  often  attribute  knowledge  to  titles  and 
names,  consequently  often  mistakenly  and  to  our  sorrow  accept  as  intelligent 
and  authoritative  the  statements  of  persons  with  titles  or  names  without  asking 
whether  the  owner  of  the  title  or  name  has  the  background  and  experience 
in  the  matter  under  discussion  to  justify  his  opinion  being  considered  at  all. 
In  my  opinion,  people  are  entitled  to  know  the  background  and  experience  of 
anyone  making  a  public  statement.  Therefore,  the  following  is  given  in  the 
hope  it  will  justify  you  for  having  honored  me  with  your  invitation  to  appear 
before  yoii. 

I  was  born  of  American  Methodist  missionary  parents  in  Foochow,  China, 
May  23,  1890;  came  to  America  with  my  parents,  in  1899;  attended  high  school 
in  Berkeley,  Calif. ;  was  graduated  as  a  civil  engineer  from  the  University  of 
California,  in  1912 ;  and  worked  5  years  as  an  engineer  in  San  Francisco  prior  to 
my  entering  the  United  States  Army  in  May  1917.  I  served  as  a  field  artillery 
captain  in  France  and  Germany  in  "World  War  I,  and  for  4  months  previous  to 
my  demobilization  in  September  1919,  traveled  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  as 
an  Army  courier  with  station  at  Vienna.    During  that  courier  duty,  just  after 


218  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

the  Bela  Kun  Communist  regime  wns  overthrown  in  Hunj^ary,  a  trip  to  Budapest 
gave  me  my  first  chance,  35  years  ago,  to  see  the  frightful  results  of  even  a 
short  133-day  Communist  rule  in  a  country. 

After  demobilization  I  went  to  Turkey  for  an  American  company  and  from 
January  1920,  until  the  Bolshevist  conquest  of  the  three  small  republics  of 
Azerbajdjan,  Armenia  and  Georgia,  formed  after  World  War  I,  forced  us  to 
leave  in  March  1921,  I  was  manager  for  its  work  in  the  Caucasus  and  North 
Persia.  Direct  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Commercial  Mission  in  Tiflis,  my 
experiences  in  connection  with  the  evacuations  of  Novorossisk,  Petrovsk,  Baku, 
Tiflis  and  Batoum,  and  reports  from  the  many  refugees  who  arrived  from  Kussia 
continued  my  education  in  what  may  be  expected  from  dealings  with  Communists. 

A  4-week  visit  to  Belgrade  in  August  1920,  to  report  on  possibilities  in  Yugo- 
slavia, gave  me  my  first  real  idea  of  the  rich  natural  resources  of  that  country  and 
of  the  worth  of  its  hard-working.  God-fearing  peasant  population.  Yugoslavia 
was  then,  as  our  country  is  today,  on  the  Soviet  blueprint  for  conquest. 

En  route  home  in  April  1921,  I  revisited  Belgrade,  founded  my  own  comi)any — 
"W.  H.  Smyth" — and  for  the  following  20  years,  until  obliged  to  leave  by  the 
German  occupation  and  the  closing  of  our  consulate  in  July  1941,  operated  my 
offices  in  Belgrade  and  Zagreb,  importing  and  distributing  American  motorcars, 
trucks,  tractors,  tires,  oil,  machinery,  and  selling  aviation  engines  and  equipment 
and  oilfield  supplies  as  an  agent  to  the  Government. 

The  wide  contacts  with  people  in  all  walks  of  life  resulting  from  handling  so 
many  lines,  constant  traveling  through  most  of  the  country,  the  acquisition  of  a 
good  knowledge  of  Serbo-Croatian,  and  my  memberships  in  social,  technical,  trade 
and  athletic  clubs  and  associations,  gave  me  over  20  years,  an  experience  with 
Yugoslavs  and  Yugoslavia  possessed  probably  by  no  other  American.  Tito's 
Government  must  have  believed  that,  for  through  their  letter  No.  7491  of  July 
30, 1948  (photostat  and  translation  attached)  frora  the  Committee  on  Water  Hus- 
bandry of  the  Peoples  Government  of  Serbia,  they  requested  my  cooperation  on 
their  purchase  of  heavy  equipment  and  dredges  required  according  to  their 
initial  5-year  plan,  and  a  statement  from  me  of  the  terms  on  which  I  would 
work  with  them.  Much  as  I  regret  the  money  which  could  have  been  earned  I 
did  not  accept  their  offer. 

When  our  American  consulate  was  closed  in  Belgrade  in  July  1941,  I  turned 
my  business  over  to  an  employee  and  left  with  my  wife.  We  were  6  months  in 
Hungary,  left  for  Lisbon  with  the  personnel  of  the  United  States  Foreign  Service 
in  Budapest,  and  reached  New  York  City,  March  1,  1942.  During  1942  and  1943, 
I  devoted  considerable  time  to  making  reports  on  Danube  Valley  and  Balkan 
countries  for  our  armed  services,  at  my  expense. 

Since  arriving  here,  outside  of  the  time  given  to  the  Threadmiller  Corp.,  a 
very  small  maker  of  first-class  tools  for  threading  and  tapping  on  lathes,  of 
which  company  I  am  president,  most  of  my  time  has  been  spent  in  trying  to 
keep  the  closest  possible  contact  with  Yugoslavs  and  other  refugees  here  and 
in  other  countries,  which  has  enabled  me  to  follow  the  development  of  Tito's 
Communistic  dictatorship  in  particular  and  of  international  or  world  communism 
in  general. 

In  this  connection,  a  few  months  ago,  photostats  came  of  2  pages  from  a  Yugo- 
slav Communist  Party  textbook,  pages  193-194,  entitled  "Extract  From  Political 
Courses  for  Candidates  for  the  Communist  Party  of  Yugoslavia"  (photostat  and 
translation  attached).  Their  context,  of  which  paragraphs  1  and  2  from  page 
194  are  quoted  below  as  an  exan]i)le.  should  convince  anyone  that  Tito's  Com- 
munists are  simply  plain  international  Communists,  and  that  it  is  simply  ridicu- 
lous for  an  intelligent  person  to  think  or  speak  of  them  as  "National"  or  "nicer" 
Connnunists,  ones  we  can  get  on  with : 

"Revolution  is  the  action  of  forceful  overthrow  of  capitalistic  society  and  the 
building  of  a  new  society  on  the  basis  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

"Not  a  single  isolated  revolution,  as  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  in  Yugoslavia,  is 
ended  until  revolution  will  have  been  terminated  successfully  in  the  whole  world, 
because  danger  from  foreign  intervention  always  threatens.  Therefore  it  is 
a  fundamental  task  of  all  Communists  to  assist  revolutionary  forces  in  the  world." 

This  fear  of  foreign  intervention  seems  to  me  to  be  a  fear  that  foreigners, 
freemen  from  outside  the  enslaved  states,  will  come  in  contact  with  the  ordinary 
people,  the  slaves  of  the  Communist  states.  This  was  shown  by  the  Soviet's 
refusal  for  a  long  time  to  allow  our  planes  in  World  War  II  to  land  in  Russia, 
and  for  our  pilots  to  fly  into  Russia  the  planes  we  were  giving  them.  It  was 
brought  out  by  Tito's  agreement  with  the  German  Nazis  for  joint  collaboration 
in  resisting  Allied  landings  on  the  Yugoslav  coast,  should  such  landings  be  at- 
tempted.    Tito's  present  Anil)assador  in  London,  Velebit,  who  was  one  of  his 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMTHSTISM  219 

liaison  officers  witli  tlie  German  and  Croatian  Nazis  in  Zap;reb,  tlie  capital  of 
tlie  Independent  State  of  Croatia,  is  reported  to  have  taken  part  in  these  nejrotia- 
tious  regarding  joint  Tito-Nazi  resistance  to  Anglo-American  forces. 

The  Communists  reasoned  correctly  that  Germany  would  lose  the  war.  There- 
fore, and  also  because  of  the  Yugoslavs'  feelings  against  the  Nazis,  Tito's  people 
felt  that  Germans  operating  with  their  men  would  be  only  transients  who  could 
cause  him  no  trouble.  On  the  contrary,  they  knew  that  Anglo-American  troops 
landing  in  Yugoslavia  would  be  welcomed  by  the  people — not  by  the  Communists, 
but  by  the  people — and  their  presence  in  large  enough  numbers  would  mean  the 
end  of  communism  in  Yugoslavia. 

Tito,  like  his  Moscow  mentors,  only  sends  abroad  persons  who  have  been 
checked  and  doublechecked  by  his  UDBA  or  secret  police.  The  test  of  this  is 
the  very  small  number  who  request  asylum  to  remain  here.  Yet  we  allow  these 
people  to  visit  our  defense  plants,  to  learn  to  operate  our  special  equipment 
such  as  jet  planes,  tanks,  armored  cars,  etc.,  and  allow  his  students,  prepared 
in  propaganda  during  their  Yugoslav  processing,  to  attend  our  universities. 
They  have  facilities  to  see  more  than  they  should  and  to  talk  in  meetings  in 
our  schools.     Does  that  make  sense  from  the  point  of  view  of  internal  security? 

Regarding  the  fundamental  task  of  all  Communists  to  assist  revolutionary 
forces  in  the  world,  it  is  worth  while  noting  how  Yugoslavia  sends  missions  to 
places  like  Burma,  India,  Mexico,  and  other  countries  with  which  it  has  had 
little  if  any  trade,  and  even  sent  her  chief  of  the  general  staff  to  Addis  Ababa 
to  confer  high  Yugoslav  medals  on  the  Emperor  of  Ethiopia  and  several  high 
assistants.  Could  it  be  that  the  medals  were  given  to  create  good  will  in  con- 
nection with  facilitating  the  work  of  Soviet  Russia's  mission  of  well  over  200 
persons  in  Addis  Ababa,  apparently  a  distribution  point  for  northeast  Africa 
for  Communist  propaganda  and  plans?  The  Emperor's  visit  to  Belgrade  this 
next  month  will  offer  Tito  the  chance  to  turn  on  his  charm,  but  let  us  hope  with 
less  effect  than  it  seemed  to  have  on  prominent  American  visitors  to  Yugloslavia. 

The  work  of  such  Yugoslav  Communist  missions,  like  the  work  of  Tito's  Gen. 
Ljubomir  Ilich,  who  for  the  past  few  years  seems  to  have  been  a  general  organizer 
or  supervisor  of  worii  among  the  Communist  groups  in  the  Yugoslav  colonies  in 
Latin  America,  with  headquarters  in  Mexico,  might  seem  to  be  covered  by  para- 
graph 5,  page  194  of  the  Instructions  for  Candidates  for  the  Communist  Party 
of  Yugoslavia,  mentioned  above,  wliich  reads,  translated : 

"All  national,  especially  colonial  questions  must  be  inflamed,  becaiise  they 
basically  are  revolutionary,  hence  help  the  process  of  the  world  revolution." 

Incidentally,  these  two  photostats  were  sent  to  me  by  a  Serbian  friend  just 
after  the  Puerto  Riean  shootings  in  our  House  of  Representatives  in  Washing- 
ton, D.  C,  with  the  remark  that  paragraph  5  applied  perfectly  to  the  Puerto 
Rican  situation.  Who  knows?  General  Hitch  may  have  connections  there. 
And  when  he  wishes  to  visit  the  United  States  he  has  a  perfect  excuse  in  the 
form  of  his  wife.  Mme.  Zdenka  Milanov,  the  well-known  artist  of  the  Metro- 
politan Opera  in  New  York  City. 

Why  did  Yugoslavia  keep  Mr.  Rafo  Ivaucevic,  an  experienced  maritime  and 
naval  liaison  ofiicer  in  San  Francisco  as  consul  general  for  3  years?  His  area 
included  our  entire  Pacific  coast  with  its  important  shipyards  and  naval  instal- 
lations. For  a  country  with  almost  no  navy  and  a  relatively  small  merchant 
marine,  it  would  seem  strange  to  use  a  man  of  Mr.  Ivancevic's  qualifications  in 
San  Francisco  unles.s — and  here  is  the  big  question — it  was  considered  a  seafar- 
ing man  like  Ivancevic  could  propagandize  better  among  our  Yugoslav  groups 
on  the  Pacific  coast  than  a  regular  consular  officer ;  an(t  unless  it  was  considered 
important  to  have  first-class  reports  on  our  naval  installations — just  in  case  same 
day  the  big  Communist  attack  will  come  against  us. 

Gentlemen,  this  matter  of  Tito  and  his  Communists  seems  important  enough 
to  warrant  some  real  thought  and  study.  In  an  attempt  to  help  you,  I  would 
like  to  lay  before  you  the  following  information  and  observations  based  on  a 
lot  of  work. 

One  of  the  most  debated  questions  of  our  foreign  policy  is  whether  or  not  we 
should  aid  Tito  and  his  regime.  I  cannot  understand  how  the  United  States,  the 
leading  Christian  nation  in  the  world,  can  back  a  Communist.  Nor  can  I  under- 
stand how  any  American,  a  citizen  of  a  free  country,  is  willing  that  we  assist  a 
Communist  dictator  to  hold  17  million  human  beings  in  slavery,  an  institution 
we  abolished  90  years  ago  as  evil  and  wrong  in  human  relations. 

It  appears  that  the  Americans  who  wish  to  aid  Tito  must  in  some  way  over- 
look that  basic  matter  of  right  and  wrong,  possibly  having  been  led  to  believe 


220  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

by  Tito's  exjinlsion  from  the  Soviet  bloc — tbe  Cominform — in  June  1948,  that  he 
was  against  coniniiinisni.  Had  they  taken  the  trouble  they  easily  could  have 
confirmed  that  the  Yugoslav  Communists  are  in  no  way  lesser  Communists  than 
those  of  the  So\  iet  bloc.  On  the  contrary,  they  scream  their  supercommunism. 
Tito's  conununism  is  ncjt  national  but  international  like  that  of  all  Communists. 
Judge  liini  by  his  acts,  not  his  words.  This  unfortunate  usage  of  the  term 
"national"  in  referring  to  Yugoslav  coiwnuunsm  has  been  a  big  factor  in  mis- 
leading and  confusing  the  thinking  of  the  Western  peoples  about  Tito  and  his 
slave-state. 

TITO CREATION     OF     SOVIETS,     INSTALLED     IN     POWER     RY     SOVIETS 

First  of  all,  Tito  was  a  creation  of  the  Soviets.  Malenkov,  present  chief  in 
Moscow,  nominated  him  to  be  secretary  general  of  the  Yugoslav  Communist  Party 
in  1937. 

The  party,  whose  activity  had  been  banned  by  the  Royal  Yugoslav  Government 
in  1921,  had  continued  as  an  underground  organization.  Its  leaders,  working 
abroad  in  large  part,  were  oixlinary  Soviet  agents.  In  1940,  when  Allied  pressure 
forced  the  Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia  to  recognize  Soviet  Russia,  there  were  only 
12,000  party  members. 

Secondly,  Tito  did  not  liberate  Yugoslavia.  His  military  efforts,  interrupted 
by  the  capture  of  his  headquarters  in  Drvar,  western  Bosnia,  in  May  1944, 
would  have  seemed  to  be  terminated  by  his  desertion  of  his  men  and  flight  to  Italy 
in  an  Allied  airplane  which  saved  him.  We  ignored  the  opportunity  to  eliminate 
Tito,  and  to  back  General  Mihailovich,  our  loyal  ally,  who.se  fighting  in  1942 
prevented  the  German  nse  of  the  short  supply  line  through  Serbia  and  Macedonia 
to  Greece  and  contributed  to  the  saving  of  Egypt. 

We  put  the  runaway  Tito  on  the  Yugoslav  island  of  Vis,  guarded  him,  and  let 
him  fly  away  on  a  Russian  plane  to  Moscow.  There  he  got  Stalin's  consent  to 
send  a  Soviet  Army  into  Yugoslavia,  against  Allied  agreements,  and  thus  enable' 
Tito,  in  September  1944,  to  take  over  the  government.  Once  in  power,  Tito  and 
his  Communists  followed  blindly  all  instructions  received  from  Moscow.  He 
stated  himself,  in  a  speech  before  the  Yugoslav  Parliament  on  January  26,  1950 — 
that  was  after  their  expulsion  from  the  Cominform — "The  Yugoslav  Communist 
Party,  until  it  was  expelled  from  the  Cominform  on  .Tune  28,  1948,  nurtured  too 
many  illusions  and  without  enough  criticism  received  and  transplanted  to  Yugo- 
slavia all  that  was  done  in  the  Soviet  Union  without  discussing  whether  the 
measures  were  good  or  not." 

During  that  period  of  taking  over  of  power,  the  Yugoslav  Communists  killed 
about  300,000  Yugoslavs  known  or  suspected  of  being  anti-Communist.  They 
arrested  millions  of  others.  Because  of  this  normal  Communist  terror  no 
one  dared  oppose  them.  They  shot  down  our  airplanes  near  Trieste.  Their 
press  and  their  leaders  in  speeches  attacked  all  the  Western  Powers,  especially 
the  United  States,  doing  so  in  a  manner  far  worse  than  that  of  the  Soviets 
themselves. 

Under  the  subterfuge  that  people  had  collaborated  with  the  enemy  occupa- 
tion forces,  properties,  factories,  and  companies  were  taken  away  from  them, 
even  from  Americans  who  had  lived  and  worked  in  Yugoslavia  prior  to  World 
War  I  and  who  during  that  war  were  not  in  Y'ugoslavla  but  in  the  United  States. 

EXPULSION   FROM    THE   COMINFORM   OF   THE   YUGOSLAV   COMMUNIST   PARTY 

People  ask,  "Why  was  the  Yugoslav  Communist  Party  expelled  from  the 
Cominform  when  it  was  so  loyal  to  the  Soviet  Union?"  The  answer  is  simple 
if  present  Soviet  policy  in  relation  to  Soviet  satellites  be  studied. 

The  Soviets  always  changed  satellite  leaders  when  they  wished.  They  did 
it  whenever  tliey  thought  anyone  acted  against  their  decisions.  But  to  know 
about  such  actions  they  had  to  have  a  spy  net  in  each  country,  and  set  up  one  in 
Yugoslavia  as  a  matter  of  course.  Tita,  D.iilas,  his  chief  of  propaganda,  and 
Alexander  Raukovic,  his  chief  of  secret  police,  finding  that  the  Soviets  were 
spying  on  their  every  action,  began  to  seek  a  way  of  freeing  themselves  of  such 
control. 

They  did  not  oppose  Soviet  mixing  into  Yugoslav  affairs,  actually  were 
obedient  in  that  regard  as  confirmed  by  Tito's  remarks  noted  above.  But  they 
knew  that  as  a  result  of  the  spying  the  same  fate  might  befall  them  which  had 
met  many  leading  Communists  in  other  countries,  whom  they  knew  often  were 
tried  and  shot.  They  did  not  like  it.  When  Tito,  who  held  the  army,  and 
Kankovic  with  his  police,  restricted  the  work  of  Soviet  agents  in  spying  on  them, 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMIVIUNISM  221 

explanaticus  and  recriminations  followed  between  the  Soviets  and  the  Yugo- 
slav Communist  Party  with  the  result  that  the  latter  were  expelled  from  the 
Cominform.     The  main  thing  is  they  were  expelled,  and  they  tried  to  get  back  in. 

The  Yugoslav  Communists  formed  a  central  committee  or  Politburo  of  the 
party,  started  plans  to  collectivize  the  peasants,  both  being  matters  on  which 
they  were  criticized  by  the  Cominform.  But  at  the  beginning  of  1950,  they 
reached  a  hopeless  situation  because  of  the  5-year  plan  they  had  adopted  in 
1947.  Having  noted  the  5-year  plans  of  Soviet  Russia  and  acting  like  the  frog 
in  the  peasant  proverb  that  "The  frog  saw  the  horse  being  shod,  so  he  lifted  up 
his  foot,"  the  Tito  Communists  undertook  to  execute  in  a  5-year  plan  that  which 
no  one,  not  even  the  Soviets  had  been  able  to  do  under  similar  conditions. 

They  planned  that  In  a  5-year  period  they  would  invest  on  the  average  of  42 
percent  of  what  had  been  the  national  income  in  1939 — doing  this  with  no 
regard  to  the  fact  that  the  national  income  in  1947  was  less  than  prewar  because 
of  the  immense  damage  the  country  had  suffered  from  military  operations 
during  World  War  II  on  its  territory.  They  planned  first  to  build  a  heavy 
industry  with  which  to  make  the  machines  needed  for  the  reconstruction  of 
the  country,  and  for  the  development  of  a  light  industry.  To  try  to  do  this 
they  mobilized  millions  of  people  into  forced  labor.  Additionally,  and  for  the 
same  purpose  they  used  practically  all  they  received  on  account  of  war  repara- 
tions from  Germany,  Hungary,  and  Italy,  as  well  as  a  large  part  of  their 
UXRRA  aid. 

Practically  all  foreign  collections  received  from  exports,  which  were  far 
smaller  than  prewar,  were  used  for  the  purchase  of  machines  and  equipment 
for  heavy  industry.  They  attempted  the  entire  building  of  a  heavy  industry, 
without  preliminary  studies,  and  to  execute  it  immediately  following  the  con- 
ception of  the  plan  itself. 

Yugoslavia  had  plenty  of  cement  and  other  construction  materials  except 
steel.  Instead  of  using  them  for  needed  repairs  to  put  existing  plants  into 
production,  the  Yugoslav  Communists  for  the  various  construction  projects 
connected  with  their  projected  new  factories,  used  vast  quantities  of  those  ma- 
terials and  employed  nearly  1  million  agricultural  w'orkers  (peasants)  taken  with 
their  animal-drawn  vehicles  from  the  farms. 

Working  thus,  they  commenced  many  projects  but  completed  few.  Accord- 
ing to  their  own  chief  for  the  5-year  plan,  Boris  Kidric,  they  erred  in  starting 
so  many  projects  and  in  completing  so  few.  Across  Yugoslavia,  construction 
projects  were  started  which  never  were  finished  because  of  the  lack  of  windows, 
plumbing,  electrical,  and  various  iron  and  steel  components. 

Tito  stated  they  failed,  for  example,  in  one  place — in  that  without  the  re- 
quired preliminary  study  they  began  construction  of  an  electrical  powerplant 
at  a  place,  only  to  see  after  a  large  esi)enditure  of  labor  and  material  that  the  site 
was  totally  unsuitable,  and  they  were  obliged  to  transfer  the  project  to  another 
location.  Practically  everyone  who  was  in  Yugoslavia  at  that  time  confirmed  the 
country  was  turned  into  a  vast  building  project,  with  much  started  and  little 
completed. 

Probably  the  best  example  of  this  is  New  Belgrade,  which  was  to  have  been 
built  across  the  Save  River  from  Belgrade,  the  Yugo.slav  capital.  The  Yugo- 
slav Communists  undertook  a  new  development  at  New  Belgrade  to  house  the 
Yugoslav  administration,  the  Yugoslav  Communist  Party,  and  other  party  or- 
ganizations. Today,  the  frames  of  those  unfinished  buildings  stand  in  their 
sandy  area  as  a  symbol  of  all  that  is  unrealistic  in  the  work  of  Tito's  Yugoslav 
Communists. 

When  they  actually  went  bankrupt  in  1950  because  of  such  practices,  the  Yugo- 
slav Communists  turned  to  the  AVest  for  help,  especially  to  the  United  States. 
That  year  a  mission  from  the  World  Bank  visited  Belgrade  and  saw  at  firsthand 
how  bad  things  really  were.  The  mission  informed  Tito  and  his  Yugoslav 
leaders  that  their  5-year  plan  must  be  changed  radically;  that  a  new  economy 
policy  was  needed  if  they  wanted  to  balance  the  Yugoslav  economy.  The  mission 
told  them  that  making  the  needed  change  was  a  ))asic  condition  for  consideration 
by  the  bank  of  any  request  for  a  loan  from  Yugoslavia. 

The  Yugoslav  Government,  needing  money,  accepted  the  mission's  proposal 
and  reduced  the  objectives  of  their  plan  by  one-half.  Additionally  a  financial 
program  for  Yugoslavia  was  worked  out  and  a  determination  was  made  of  the 
amount  of  money  the  Western  I'owers  would  have  to  give  Yugoslavia,  so  that 
the  reduced  5-year  plan  would  be  completed  and  Yugoslavia's  finances  stabilized 
in  1954. 

47769°— 54— pt.  4 4 


222  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

From  1950  to  the  present,  the  United  States,  England,  and  France  gave  Yugo- 
slavia free,  as  aid  about  $360  million  in  addition  to  large  but  unannounr-ed 
amounts  of  aid  in  military  material.  If  .'Ji-lSO  million  received  from  UNHRA  is 
counted,  it  is  seen  that  from  the  non-Communist  countries  of  the  West,  three- 
fourths  of  which  was  from  the  United  States,  Yugoslavia,  after  World  War  II, 
received  $796  million  until  mid-1953,  this  having  been  in  addition  to  other  credits 
of  $360  million,  making  a  total  of  $1,156  million  again  not  counting  military  ma- 
terial and  supplies  or  amounts  given  in  the  1953-54  fiscal  year. 

But  in  place  of  Yugoslavia's  economical  situation  being  stabilized  in  1954. 
as  had  been  anticipated,  the  entire  world  press  announced  earlier  this  year 
that  Yugoslavia  was  unable  to  meet  her  financial  obligations  and  requested 
a  moratorium  for  payments.  In  addition,  from  the  explanations  (quarreiings) 
between  the  Yugoslav  Communists  6  months  ago  it  came  out  that  the  standard  of 
living  in  Yugoslavia  was  lower  than  anywhere  in  Europe. 

TITO'S  COMMUNIST  EXPERIMENTS 

A  fair  question  might  be:  "Was  the  World  Bank  advice  or  proposal  bad,  if 
Yugoslavia,  working  in  accordance  with  it  fell  into  bankruptcy  exactly  in  the 
year  set  by  that  bank  for  her  tinancial  stabilization?" 

The  answer  is  "No."  The  desjierate  1954  situation  in  Yugoslavia  is  due  solely 
to  Communist  experimentation  and  mismanagement.  It  would  seem  that  such 
organizations  as  the  World  BauK,  and  also  countries  such  as  ours,  should  have 
some  opportunity  to  control  or  to  insist  on  proper  handling  of  moneys  they  loan 
or  give  to  governments  unable  to  finance  themselves.  That  is  merely  my  obser- 
vation. 

l"ou  probably  read  several  years  ago  statements  in  which  Tito  and  his  nench- 
men  criticized  the  Soviets  for  not  being  real  Communists.  They  often  said  they 
were  truer  Communists  than  the  Soviets.  Finally,  after  Tito's  above-mentioned- 
speech  in  January  1950,  in  which  he  confirmed  they  were  in  a  bad  situation,  by 
implication,  due  to  the  fact  he  noted  that  they  had  too  blindly  copied  Soviet 
methods,  the  Yugoslav  Communists  reviewed  Marxist  literature  to  find,  if  possi- 
ble, some  form  of  organization  more  communistic  than  the  Soviets  had.  They 
found  it  in  the  so-called  Paris  Commune,  the  Communist  organization  founded 
in  Paris  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1871,  which  France  lost. 

The  Yugoslav  adaptation  of  the  Paris  Commune  starts  with  the  Communist 
organization  of  large  cities  and  districts.  Such  communes,  about  370  of  them, 
are  in  their  final  phase  of  organization  now  in  that  formerly  free  country. 
Every  commune  theoretically  is  a  separate  economic  unit.  Everything  in  it 
is  organized  economically.  Agriculture  which  is  not  yet  collectivized  entirely 
will  be  collectivized  before  Tito  is  through  with  it.  The  communes  are  linked 
together  with  the  Yugoslav  Parliament,  their  final  guide,  at  the  top. 

The  communes  are  not  free.  The  Communists  direct  them.  Thus,  in  the 
final  analysis,  through  the  Yugoslav  Communist  Party,  which  controls  Parlia- 
ment, everything  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  Tito  and  his  closest  associates. 
That  is  the  real  situation  in  Yugoslavia.  Essentially  there  is  no  difference 
between  the  organization  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  of  Yugoslavia. 

World  opinion,  including  ours  in  America,  has  been  brought  into  confusion 
about  the  Yugoslav  situation.  For  example,  until  recently  the  New  York 
Times  carried  frequent  dispatches  from  its  Belgrade  correspondent.  Frequent 
mention  was  made  of  the  Communist  reorganization  of  the  country.  But  as  re- 
ports from  totalitarian  states  are  subject  to  censorship,  those  Times  reports 
struck  me  as  being  misleading.  They  spoke  of  economic  competition,  of  free- 
dom of  business,  and  of  other  economic  matters  known  to  students  of  events 
in  Yugoslavia. 

Persons  reading  those  reports  and  the  similar  ones  published  in  other  papers 
could  believe  that  Tito  was  changing  Yugoslavia  into  a  country  with  liberty 
and  a  chance  for  private  initiative.  What  was  not  brought  out,  it  seemed  to  me 
and  to  others  familiar  with  the  situation,  was  the  fact  that  the  business 
and  projects  reported  were  matters  between  the  communes  or  other  subsidiary 
organizations  and  that  such  business  and  projects  bear  no  resemblance  to  cor- 
responding affairs  in  our  country. 

Actually  it  was  the  continued  attempt  to  operate  Yugoslavia  as  a  Com- 
munist laboratory  based  on  the  employment  of  slave  labor — the  most  un- 
productive form  of  labor — and  the  use  so  often  of  goons  instead  of  good  com- 
petent men  in  management,  which  wrecked  Yugoslavia  in  spite  of  excellent  ad- 
vice and  financial  help  from  tlie  World  Bank. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMIVIUNISM  223 

In  Yugoslavia,  as  in  all  Communist  countries,  everything  must  be  done  ac- 
cording to  plan.  The  plans  may  look  good  to  foreigners  as  they  are  nicely 
written  and  printed,  and  the  unsuspecting  foreigner,  even  a  good  one,  probably 
will  have  trouble  in  getting  into  what  is  back  of  the  interesting  figures  laid  be- 
fore him.  Yugoslavia  makes  an  economic  plan  every  year.  Probably  it  is 
made  just  as  carefully  as  the  statement  prepared  by  a  crooked  merchant  in 
applying  for  tire  insurance  while  filling  his  fire  extinguishers  with  gasoline. 

In'  1950,  after  calling  on  the  West  for  help  and  the  receipt,  as  mentioned 
above,  of  sound  advice  from  the  World  Bank  Mission,  Tito  cut  his  o-year  plan 
objectives  in  half,  probably  promised  to  follow  the  advice,  and  got  a  loan.  Al- 
though that  was  supposed  to  stabilize  his  economic  situation  by  1954,  the  next 
year,  1951,  he  needed  money  again.  This  time  he  called  on  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  This  bank  also  sent  a  mission  to  Belgrade,  in  September  1951, 
and  on  the  basis  of  figures  supplied  by  the  Yugoslav  IMinistry  of  Finance,  they 
also  made  him  a  loan. 

In  connection  with  the  efforts  of  these  two  excellent  banks  to  bring  financial 
stability  to  Yugoslavia's  economy,  I  would  like,  as  a  businessman,  to  call  your 
attention  to  some  figures,  rather  interesting  and  instructive,  I  think,  in  the 
Yugoslav  Government  data  on  their  so-called  national  economy.  These  seem 
to  be  worth  reviewing  because  they  probably  were  shown  to  the  two  banks'  mis- 
sions on  their  visits  to  Belgrade. 

Article  8  of  the  law  of  the  5-year  plan  1947-51  of  Yugoslavia  shows  the  fol- 
lowing data  regarding  Yugoslavia's  national  gross  production  and  national 
income : 

[Millions  of  Dinars] 


National  ?ross  production. 

Amortization  ' 

National  income  i 


1939  actual        1951  estimated 


203, 000 
2  71, 000 
132, 000 


366, 000 

3  111,000 

255, 000 


>  The  figure  amortization  used  by  the  Yugoslavs  to  cover,  it  would  seem,  the  cost  of  producing  the  national 
gross  production,  was  not  shown  in  the  table  itself,  but  was  arrived  at  by  subtracting  national  income  from 
Kross  production.  This  was  done  to  have  figures  to  compare  with  the  figures  for  amortization  shown  .n 
following  tables. 

2  34 ).i  percent. 

3  30  percent. 

I  do  not  know  how  they  arrived  at  it  but  it  appears  from  the  figures  that  the 
amortization  figure  was  taken  at  34.5  percent  for  1939  for  the  figures  for  the 
Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia  (prewar  Yugoslavia)  and  at  30  percent  for  1951,  post- 
war Communist  Yugoslavia. 

The  International  Monetary  Fund's  report  on  Yugoslavia,  appendix  table  I  of 
December  19,  1951.  shows  the  following  figures  on  national  income,  received  by 
their  mission  from  the  Yugoslav  Ministry  of  Finance: 

[Millions  of  dinars] 
National  income : 

1949 233,171 

1950 212,022 

1951 234,932 

11)52 237,  400 

Presumably  these  figures,  together  with  those  supplied  by  the  Yugoslav  Govern- 
ment to  the  mission  of  this  bank,  were  connected  in  .some  way  with  their  decision 
to  make  a  loan  to  Yugoslavia.  They  showed  a  great  improvement  in  the  Yugo- 
slav national  income  as  compared  with  the  figure  of  only  132  millions  of  dinars 
shown  in  the  preceding  table  for  1939  when  Yugoslavia  was  a  free  kingdom. 

Yet  in  the  period  from  1947  to  1952,  in  spite  of  Tito's  and  his  Yugoslav  Com- 
munists' belief  that  they  could  regulate  things  to  suit  their  plans,  the  working 
of  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  was  such  that  prices  of  everything  in  Yugo.slavia 
had  risen  so  greatly  that  Yugoslavia  was  obliged  on  January  1,  1952,  just  2  weeks 
after  the  publication  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund's  Report  on  Yugoslavia, 
mentioned  above,  to  devalue  the  dinar,  and  sixfold  at  that.  Where  until  the 
end  of  1951  it  had  been  officially  50  dinars  for  1  United  States  dollar,  it  was 
worth  only  300  dinars  for  1  American  dollar  on  January  1,  1952. 


224 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 


This  brings  up  a  very  interesting  situation,  well  worth  noting  as  an  indication 
of  the  lengths  to  which  "Tito  &  Co."  will  go  to  make  it  appear  that  anything  they 
do  is  better  than  its  counterpart  under  the  free  kingdom  of  Yugoslavia. 

Apparently  the  Yugoslav  Government,  after  the  January  1,  1052,  devaluation 
of  the  dinar,  in  making  its  plans  for  the  1952  and  1953  economy,  either  paid  no 
regard  to  the  figures  it  used  for  national  gross  production  and  national  income 
in  its  previous  plans,  or  else  possibly  thought  nobody  else  would  bother  to  check 
the  new  figures  against  the  old  ones.  They  must  have  been  in  a  dilemma, 
properly  on  the  "spot."  Their  previous  plans  always  showed  that  the  estimated 
or  planned  figures  had  been  met.  (I  don't  say  they  actually  were  met  in  the 
sense  that  production  and  income  really  had  been  as  planned,  but  in  their  plans 
they  showed  they  were  met.) 

But  in  making  the  plan  for  1952  they  must  have  seen  that  actual  results  for  past 
years,  not  the  results  shown  to  the  two  banks  mentioned  above,  were  far  below 
the  estimates.  It  well  can  be  that  the  checking  done  by  those  two  b;.nks  caused 
Tito's  people  to  look  into  the  figures  more  realistically  themselves.  What  they 
found  was  that  the  best  figures  they  dared  estimate  for  1952  and  later  in  the  year 
for  1953  would  be  under  the  actual  figures  for  1939 — for  the  last  normal  pre- 
World  War  II  year  of  the  free  Kingdom  of  Yugoslavia. 

Obviously  it  would  not  do  for  Communist  Yugoslavia  to  show  results  worse 
than  those  of  the  predecessor  kingdom.  They  saw  that  using  the  same  figure 
of  34.5  percent  for  amortization,  in  the  difference  between  gross  production  and 
national  income,  which  held  in  1939,  the  result  for  their  national  income,  the 
only  figure  that  counts,  would  be  considerably  below  that  for  1939,  as  follows : 


Millions  o 

dinars' 

1939 

1952 

1953 

Gross  national  production 

£03, 000 
71,000 

167,393 
57,  75B 

163,  223 

56, 332 

132, 000 

109,  637 

106,  891 

How  did  the  Tito  people  get  around  this  difficulty?  Very  simply  as  you'll  see 
in  the  following  table.  They  simply  kept  the  same  old  figure  of  34.5  percent 
for  amortization  for  the  1939  figures,  but  used  a  lower  figure,  roughly  10  per- 
cent, for  the  deductions  for  amortization  for  the  1952  and  1953  calculations. 
The  following  table  for  the  1952  and  1953  figures  is  taken  from  the  Yugoslav 
Official  Gazette,  the  1952  figures  from  issue  No.  17  of  April  1,  1952,  the  1953 
figures  from  issue  No.  62  of  December  30,  1952  with  the  figures  in  the  Official 
Gazette  divided  by  6  to  put  them  on  the  same  parity  as  the  1939  figures,  made 
before  the  value  of  the  dinar  was  reduced  from  50  to  300  to  1  American  dollar : 


[Millions  of  dinars] 

1939  actual 

1952  esti- 
mated 

1953  esti- 
mated 

Gross  national  production. 

203,  000 
71,000 

167,  393 
15,  770 

103,  223 

16,  750 

National  income  -       -  - 

132, 000 

151,623 

146,  473 

This  with  their  dishonest  methods,  even  in  financial  matters,  for  it  is  dis- 
honest to  change  an  amortization  figure  without  noting  the  fact,  especially  when 
resulting  figures  will  be  used  for  comparison,  the  Yuoslav  Communists  present 
their  facts  in  a  manner  to  show  they  have  increased  their  national  income  10 
percent  to  15  percent  compared  with  1939.  When  by  using  genuinely  compara- 
tive figures  as  in  my  previous  table,  the  figures  show  that  the  national  income 
actually  had  dropped  15  percent  on  the  data  from  the  Communists,  which  may 
or  may  not  have  been  true  and  correct.     But  at  any  rate  it  was  their  data. 

They  can  make  financial  manipulations  such  as  these,  all  they  want,  but  they 
cannot  change  the  miserable  conditions  under  which  the  Yugoslav  people  live — 
that  is  all  but  those  who  help  the  Communist  regime.  Out  of  17  million  Yugo- 
slavs there  may  be  400,000  to  500,000  such  people,  not  necessarily  Communists, 
but  people  who  probably  for  reasons  of  existence  work  with  the  Communists 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  225 

and  as  reward  get  a  relatively  acceptable  standard  of  living.  All  the  other 
Yugoslavs  live  in  want,  waiting  the  day  when  the  Communist  yoke  may  be  lifted 
from  their  backs.  Why  should  we  Americans  recognize,  the  crooked,  cruel, 
despotic  regime  which  holds  those  people  in  slavery?  How  can  we  expect  the 
enslaved  peoples  to  believe  we  are  anti-Communist  when  we  support  Tito  and 
his  totalitarian  Communist  government? 

AGRICULTURE 

According  to  a  Belgrade  dispatch  in  the  New  York  Times  of  March  9,  1954, 
Svetozar  Vukmanovitch-Tempo,  one  of  Tito's  vice  presidents,  and  his  Economic 
Chief  for  Yugoslavia,  stated: 

"That  the  yield  of  postwar  Communist  Yugoslavia's  agriculture  is  still  below 
that  of  the  prewar  Yugoslavia.  On  the  basis  of  ofhical  statistical  data,  it  is 
seen  that  in  the  period  1930-39  the  average  annual  production  of  the  5  principal 
cereals  *  *  *  wheat,  corn,  rye,  barley  and  oats  *  *  *  amounted  to  1,1.'^5  pounds 
per  capita.    In  the  period  1945-52  it  was  only  780  pounds  per  capita." 

Corn  is  extremely  important  for  Yugoslavia,  especially  for  fattening  pigs. 
Because  of  the  reduction  in  produtcion,  and  of  the  export  of  corn  as  soon  as 
available,  Yugoslavia  was  not  able  to  raise  and  fatten  as  many  pigs  in  the  post- 
war as  in  the  prewar  period.  Therefore,  beginning  in  1949,  Yugoslavia  con- 
stantly has  imported  lard,  although  in  1936  and  1937  her  export  of  pigs  was  one- 
seventh  of  the  entire  world  production. 

According  to  the  Belgrade  Politika  of  May  27,  19.54,  Yugoslavia  in  this  eco- 
nomic year  will  import  twice  the  quantity  of  wheat  which  she  exported  on  the 
average  in  prewar  years.  At  the  third  congress  of  the  Association  of  Commu- 
nists of  Croatia,  Vladimir  Bakaric,  a  leading  Communist  in  Croatia,  said :  "The 
import  of  wheat  becomes  a  requirement  of  our  economy  and  not  merely  a  result 
of  dry  years." 

The  droughts  in  Yugoslavia  in  1946,  1950,  and  1952,  were  such  that  without 
foreign  help  the  Yugoslav  population  would  have  been  threatened  with  starva- 
tion. A  drought  is  predicted  for  1954.  which  probably  is  good  publicity  backing 
for  the  new  Yugoslav  Ambassador's  request  made  a  few  months  ago  in  Wash- 
ington for  360,000  tons  of  wheat. 

Why  should  Yugoslavia  suddenly  have  droughts  since  the  Communists  took 
power?  Why  don't  they  have  corn  to  fatten  pigs  in  Communist  Yugoslavia? 
During  my  20  years  in  Yugoslavia — 1921  to  1941 — we  had  some  droughts  and  some 
floods,  some  were  bad,  but  Yugoslavia  never  had  to  call  for  outside  help  to  free 
herself  under  its  former  government,  its  constitutional  monarchy. 

Two  of  Tito's  recognized  leading  agricultural  experts,  Lazar  Erzigovac  of  the 
agricultural  station  at  Zemun,  and  Lazar  Stojkovic,  chief  of  the  agricultural 
station  at  Novi-Sad,  announced  after  a  thorough  investigation  that  the  droughts 
in  Yugoslavia  are  the  results  of  bad  soil  conservation — in  plain  language  of  poor 
or  insufficient  or  wrongly  timed  plowing.  Yugoslavs  outside  of  Yugoslavia  have 
known  that  a  long  time. 

Climatic  conditions  in  Yugoslavia  are  better  than  in  many  countries  as  regards 
sunshine  but  worse  as  regards  moisture.  In  the  majority  of  Yugoslavia's  most 
fertile  districts  a  sufficient  moisture  (rainfall)  exists,  but  in  some  years  too 
much  falls  followed  by  dry  months. 

Yugoslavia  did  not  need  irrigation  projects  to  avoid  di ought,  because  conser- 
vation of  rainfall  obtained  by  proper  plowing  as  practiced  by  the  peasants  for 
years  without  end,  had  sufficed.  They  plowed  before  the  rains  started  to  break 
up  the  soil  and  form  reservoirs  for  moisture  all  through  it.  Thus  prior  to  World 
War  II  such  conservation,  even  if  it  did  not  meet  the  needs  of  the  country  100 
percent,  yet  was  followed  enough  to  avoid  the  droughts  so  common  to  the 
Communists. 

Beginning  with  1945,  the  first  full  year  of  Communist  control,  conservation  of 
moisture  was  done  but  little.  According  to  the  highest  Yugoslav  authorities  of  the 
program  for  the  advancement  of  agriculture  for  the  period  1953-62,  not  more 
than  15  percent  of  the  required  moisture  conservation  is  contained  in  it.  Noth- 
ing else  is  possible. 

The  individual  farmers  (peasants)  with  their  small  holding  of  probably  20 
acres,  half  arable,  still  own  about  70  percent  of  the  arable  land  in  Yugoslavia. 
They  are  badly  off  for  animal-drawn  plows  and  their  holdings  are  too  small  for 
tractors.  Don't  blame  them  for  the  lack  of  animal-drawn  plows.  It's  not  their 
fault. 

An  animal-drawn  plow  generally  lasted  12  years.  Therefore  the  prewar  plows 
are  worn  out  by  now.    Yugoslavia  imported  very  few  such  plows  during  the  war 


226  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

and  made  almost  none.  Under  the  postwar  Communist  government  they  im- 
ported none  as  far  as  I  know. 

Erzigovac,  Tito's  above-mentioned  agricultural  expert,  stated  that  Yugoslavia 
produces  38,790  animal-drawu  plows  annually  and  that  115,000  are  needed  for 
the  individual  small  peasants.  But  as  the  great  part  of  the  plows  that  were  pro- 
duced in  Yugoslavia  went  to  the  peasant  working  cooperatives  (Kolhozzes)  and 
to  the  government  estates,  the  individual  peasants  have  been  obliged  to  plow  their 
land  with  worn-out  prewar  plows.  Obviously  they  could  not  plow  as  they  did 
prewar  when  those  plows  were  new  or  in  good  serviceable  condition  which  todav 
is  not  the  case. 

The  bad  results  obtained  from  the  various  peasant  working  associations  (Kol- 
hozzes) was  such  that  the  Yugoslav  Government  in  1953  was  obliged  to  permit 
their  liquidation  if  the  members  so  wished.  However,  as  announced  by  the 
government  this  was  not  to  be  construed  as  indicating  any  giving  up  of  its  final 
aim  which  is  to  have  all  peasants  in  collectives  of  some  kind,  whatever  their 
nomenclature  will  be. 

The  Yugoslav  Communists  plan  to  purchase  agricultural  equipment  for  the 
large  collectivized  groups  they  hope  to  build  up  with  their  program  of  the  ad- 
vancement of  agriculture  for  the  period  1953-62.  They  may  call  them  the  work- 
ing associations  or  sometliing  else.  It's  a  great  question  whether  they  will  suc- 
ceed any  better  than  they  have  to  date.  But  in  any  case,  because  of  the  woruout 
condition  of  the  peasants'  plows,  and  the  insufficient  number  of  these  animal- 
drawn  plows  and  of  the  animals  to  pull  them,  hunger,  like  the  Sword  of  Damo- 
cles, will  hang  over  the  head  of  Yugoslavia's  population  as  long  as  Tito  and  his 
Communists  rule  them. 

KELIGION 

The  Yugoslav  Communist  Party  like  that  in  Russia  forbids  its  members  to 
belong  to  a  religion.  In  Yugoslavia  those  who  openly  or  officially  belong  to  the 
church  do  not  get  better  jobs.  Not  much  imagination  is  needed"  to  understand 
what  that  means  in  a  country  where  the  government  is  the  sole  employer. 

Children  are  not  allowed  to  receive  religious  instruction  without  tlie  written 
consent  of  the  parents.  As  many  parents  were  persecuted  for  giving  such  per- 
mits, it's  understandable  that  great  numbers  of  parents  have  not  given  them. 

In  numerous  other  ways  the  Yugoslav  Communists  are  trying  to  destroy  re- 
ligion, the  worship  of  God,  in  Yugoslavia.  T.  y  have  set  iip  various  priests' 
a.ssociations  which  must  work  as  the  party  wishc.;.  The  majority  of  Yugoslavia's 
priests,  both  Orthodox  and  Koman  Catholic,  have  not  johied  tliose  associations, 
the  Yugoslav  Communist  police  harass  them  constantly  and  it  would  seem  in 
many  ways. 

Hundreds  of  priests  have  been  arrested  and  sentenced  to  short  or  long  terms 
of  prison.  Among  them  numerous  bishops  and  one  cardinal.  Bishops  have 
been  mobilized  and  forced  to  serve  as  ordinary  soldiers.  The  Communists  went 
so  far,  according  to  reports  from  people  who  can  be  l)elieved,  that  when  trans- 
ferring Bishop  Nastich  of  Sarejevo,  an  American-born  Serbian  (Orthodox  bishop, 
the  Roman  Catholic  Bishop  of  Mostar  and  a  high-ranking  Moslem  religious 
leader,  together  with  other  clergy  of  the  various  faiths,  from  one  prison  to 
another,  the  railroad  car  in  which  they  rode  was  so  set  on  a  siding  that  it  was 
hit  by  a  passing  express  train.  Jlany  of  tb.e  clergy  were  wounded.  Bishop 
Nastich  having  had  both  legs  broken,  as  reported.  Although  hard  for  Americans 
to  believe,  it  must  ha  remembered  we  are  dealing  with  an  organized  crowd  of 
murderers,  scoundrels,  and  enemies  of  our  country  as  thev  are  of  any  other 
free  country.  The  people  who  would  shoot  down  12,000  Serbs  and  Slovenes  at 
Kochevija  Forest  in  Slovenia,  and  thousands  of  Croatians  dc'livered  to  them 
at  Dravograd,  and  execute  several  thousand  Yugoslavs  while  fastening  their 
tentacles  on  the  country,  would  not  hold  back  from  murdering  or  maiming  a 
few  religious  leaders. 

Yugoslavia,  having  been  expelled  from  the  Soviet  bloc  in  1948,  and  having  re- 
mained loyal  to  international  communism,  as  demonstrated  in  the  United  Nations, 
in  their  press  and,  through  speeches  of  their  leaders,  is  RIoscow's  Trojan  Horse 
today.  Yugoslav  Communists,  whether  on  diplomatic  or  commercial  missions,  are 
accepted  as  "different"  or  "less  bad"  or  even  as  "harmless  friendly"  Communists 
Thus  they  have  entree  whether  Soviet  or  so-called  satellite  Communists  might 
not  be  received.  That  enables  them  to  do  first-class  work  for  international 
communism  one  of  whose  aims  is  the  overthrow  of  our  United  States.  They 
do  this  largely  at  our  expense.  It  seems  to  me  it  is  a  matter  which  definitely 
concerns  our  internal  security  and  could  be  cured  through  Senate  Resolution  247. 
The  enormous  material  and  financial  aid  given  by  the  United  States  to  Tito 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  227 

and  his  Yugoslav  Comiuiinists  has  shaken  greatly  the  trust  of  the  Yugoslavs  and 
other  enslaved  people  in  us.  They  cannot  see  how  we  can  be  anti-Communist, 
when  through  our  continued  support  of  Tito  and  his  murderous  regime,  we  enable 
him  to  hold  a  once  free  people,  our  former  allies,  in  slavery. 

What  makes  it  worse  for  us,  in  my  opinion,  in  this  case  of  the  Yugoslav  peo- 
ple, and  it's  a  point  not  known  to  most  Americans,  is  that  we  share  a  great 
moral  responsibility  for  their  present  fate.  That's  because  it  was  largely 
through  pressure  and  promises  of  our  diplomatic  representatives  that  the  un- 
fortunate Yugoslav  people  were  pushed  into  World  War  II. 

In  January  1941  our  diplomatic  representatives,  with  our  country  not  in  the 
war,  gave  the  then  Royal  Yugoslav  Government  the  choice  of  coming  out  for 
the  British-American  combination  or  the  Axis  Powers.  According  to  Mr.  Dema- 
ree  Bess'  excellent  article,  Our  Frontier  on  the  Danube,  a  first-class  description 
of  our  historic  blundering  in  the  Balkans,  in  the  May  24,  1941,  issue  of  the 
Saturday  Evening  Post,  we  warned  the  Yugoslavs  that  if  they  made  a  deal  witli 
Germany  we  would  regard  Yugoslavia  as  our  enemy  both  during  and  after 
the  war.  But  we  assured  them  that  if  they  refused  to  collaborate  with  Germany 
the  American  people  would  see  to  it  that  they  came  out  on  the  winning  side. 
That's  about  what  was  heard  in  Belgrade  at  that  time. 

The  then  heads  of  the  Royal  Yugoslav  Government,  responsible  men,  whose 
job  it  was  to  try  to  save  their  own  country,  knew  that  Yugoslavia  could  not 
defy  Germany,  even  if  there  had  been  anything  to  defy  Germany  about.  They 
knew  Yugoslavia  could  not  resist  the  force  which  had  overrun  Poland,  Norway, 
Holland,  Belgium,  and  France  and  had  driven  the  Briti.sh  Army  into  the  Chan- 
nel. They  knew  that  aid  from  the  United  States,  even  if  it  could  be  sent — 
which  was  questionable — could  not  arrive  in  time  to  save  Yugoslavia  should 
Germany  attack.  They  had  no  reason  to  defy  Germany,  their  best  customer, 
and  like  the  Swedes  who  also  did  not  defy  Germany  yet  are  respected  and 
exist  as  a  nation  today,  these  Yugoslav  leaders  decided  that  the  sole  way  to 
preserve  their  country  was  to  remain  neutral  as  Sweden  did.  Hence,  on 
March  25,  1941,  in  Vienna  they  signed  a  nonmilitary  agreement  of  neutrality 
with  the  Axis  Powers. 

Two  days  later,  March  27,  1941,  a  small  group  of  Serbians,  whose  leaders,  in 
my  opinion  were  irresponsible  seekers  for  personal  advancement  rather  than 
patriots,  staged  a  coup  d'etat,  overthrew  the  Royal  Government  which  had 
signed  the  March  25th  agreement,  and  formed  their  reconstructed  government. 
However,  as  an  American  who  lived  20  years  in  Yugoslavia,  and  knows  the  almost 
naive  faith  people  in  the  Balkans  had  in  the  United  States,  I  believe  that  our 
diplomatic  representatives'  assurances  that  in  any  case  Americans  would  see  that 
Yugoslavia  would  be  on  the  winning  side  in  the  end,  must  have  played  a  great 
role  in  causing  those  conspirators  to  stage  their  coup  d'etat.  Therein  lies  our 
great  moral  responsibility. 

Ten  days  later  Hitler  attacked.  The  conspirators  of  March  27,  faced  with  the 
result  of  their  folly,  with  few  exceptions,  and  most  of  their  new  government, 
fled  the  country  at  once,  leaving  the  Yugoslav  people  to  their  fate.  The  Army, 
faced  with  overwhelming  odds,  capitulated  shortly. 

The  foreign  occupations,  chaos  and  civil  war  which  followed,  gave  Tito  his 
chance,  which  he  acknowledges  by  celebrating  March  27  as  the  start  of  his 
slave  state.  Incidentally  it  was  the  opening  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
Belgrade  and  Moscow,  done  in  early  1940  through  pressure  put  on  Yugoslavia  by 
the  Allies  which  enabled  the  Yugoslav  Communist  Party,  underground  since 
1921,  to  start  to  organize  again.  That  is  another  case  of  the  folly  of  opening 
relations  with  the  Soviets. 

We  are  not  concerned  here  with  those  poor  men  who  so  thoughtlessly  brought 
destruction  to  their  country.  We  are  concerned  with  the  fact  that  our  diplo- 
matic representatives  gave  promises  which  those  men,  the  conspirators  of  the 
March  27  coup,  believed.  We  are  concerned  with  the  1,700,000  Yugoslavs  of 
all  groups  who  died  in  the  war,  civil  war,  and  massacres  which  followed  that 
fatal  act.  We  are  concerned  with  the  fact  that  we  enable  Tito  to  keep  17  mil- 
lion Yugoslavs  in  slavery.  Doesn't  it  seem  we  should  do  something  about 
all  this? 

We  cannot  redress  those  wrongs  with  money.  We  can,  however,  redress 
them  to  some  extent  by  helping  the  Yugoslavs  to  get  back  that  which  we  helped 
them  to  lose — their  freedom. 

Senate  Resolution  247  will  be  a  first  step  toward  that.  Our  severance  of  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  Soviet  Russia  and  the  so-called  satellite  nations,  in- 
cluding Yugoslavia,  will  serve  notice  on  the  world  that  we  really  are  anti- 
Communist,  that  we  have  stopped  temporizing  about   communism.     We  will 


228  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

give  hope  to  liuiulreds  of  millions  of  people  a  good  share  of  whom  are  slaves 
because  of  our  until  now  fatal  foreign  policy — fatal  to  our  friends  and  to  us. 

We  are  at  war  with  the  Soviets — cold  or  hot  it  is  war.  Ali  materials  or 
goods  shipped  to  the  Soviets  are  strategic — even  doll  clothes.  Think  about 
it  and  you  will  see  that  all  articles  we  ship  to  our  enemies,  even  for  consumers 
such  as  children,  mean  that  a  Soviet  worker  does  not  have  to  produce  those 
articles.     His  corresponding  time  has  been  released  for  war  production. 

Senate  Resolution  247  should  be  applied  to  Tito's  Yugoslavia  along  with  the 
other  Communist  countries  to  prevent  Yugoslavia  being  used  as  a  transmission 
line  for  Moscow's  work.  At  the  same  time,  it  would  seem  proper  to  inform  the 
Soviets  and  their  satellites  that  any  move  on  their  part  into  Yugoslavia  means 
war  with  us.  That  will  give  the  Yugoslav  people  their  chance  to  settle  their 
own  score  with  communism  and  Tito  and  regain  the  freedom  we  helped  them 
lose. 


[Translation  by  W.  H.  Smyth,  New  York,  N.  Y.] 

Peoples  Republic  of  Serbia, 
Committee  foe  Water  Husbandry, 

Belgrade,  July  30,  19 iS. 
Mr.  Smyth  :  For  the  execution  of  the  regulatory  works  included  in  the  5-year 
plan  which  is  being  carried  out  by  our  institution  we  require  certain  construction 
machinery  which  is  produced  in  the  United  States  of  America.  Insofar  as  it 
may  be  possible  to  secure  it  under  favorable  terms,  we  address  ourselves  to  you 
because  you  were  the  representative  of  several  of  the  companies  mentioned 
below,  and  request  your  cooperation  in  this  business. 
Principally  these  firms  are  known  to  us  : 

1.  Caterpillar  Tractor  Co.,  1937  Walker  Street,  Peoria,  111.,  produces  elevating 
graders,  graders,  bulldozers,  scrapers,  and  tractors. 

2.  Austin  Western  Co.,  1945  Barrows  Street,  Aurora,  111.,  which  produces  parts 
for  dredges  (probably  they  mean  graders). 

3.  Northwest  Engineering  Co.,  1S27  Steger  Building,  28  East  Jackson,  Chicago, 
111.,  which  produces  dredges  (mean  dragline  scraper),  cranes,  and  parts  for 
dredges  and  cranes. 

4.  Buckeye  Traction  Digger  Co.,  Boyce  and  Crystal  Avenues,  Findlay,  Ohio, 
which  produces  ditchdigging  machines,  dredge  accessories,  graders,  and 
bulldozers. 

5.  Bucyrus-Erie  Co.,  1046  Monroe  Avenue,  South  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  which  pro- 
duces self-propelled  dredges  and  excavators  with  diesel,  gas,  and  steam  power. 

6.  Allis-Chalmers  Manufacturing  Co.,  1126  South  70th  Street,  Milwaukee,  Wis., 
which  produces  bulldozers  and  other  material. 

In  as  far  as  you  also  have  connections  with  other  companies  they  also  may 
come  into  consideration. 

We  need  machines  as  follows : 

I.   dredges — DRY  LAND 

(a)  Chain-bucket  type  on  caterpillars  or  rails,  effective  capacity  70  to  100 
cubic  meters  per  hour,  or  120-150  m'h  theoretically.  Buckets  to  be  of  about  80 
liter  capacity  mounted  on  articulated  steel  links.  The  steel  link  belts  must  be 
such  that  they  may'be  lengthened  or  shortened.  The  length  of  the  steel  link 
belts  must  be  about  20  meters.  For  casting  out  the  excavated  earth  the  dredge 
(excavator)  should  be  directly  or  separately  connected  to  a  conveyor  20  or  25 
meters  long  mounted  on  wheels,  with  a  rubber  belt  approximately  70  centimeters 
wide.  Because  of  its  great  length  the  conveyor  may  have  to  be  supported. 
Besides  the  conveyor  the  dredge  should  be  equipped  with  an  arm  for  loading 
wagons  and  wagonettes  right  alongside  the  dredge. 

(6)  Shovels  on  caterpillars  (tracks)  with  articulated  latticed  arms.  The 
articulated  arm  must  have  a  bucket  of  about  0.60  m '  capacity  and  must  be  so 
constructed  that  it  may  dig  to  a  depth  of  7  meters  and  lift  to  a  height  of  4 
meters  for  discharge  into  wagons ;  the  effective  capacity  of  this  equipment  must 
be  about  60  to  70  m^h.  The  latticed  arm  must  be  of  2  parts — that  is  of  1  basic 
arm  and  2  extension  pieces  (short  and  long).  For  work  with  the  short  arm 
a  bucket  is  required  of  1.0  to  1.25  cubic  meters  capacity.     The  effective  capacity 


STRATEGY    AXD    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  229 

of  the  excavator  with  the  short  arm  must  be  50  to  60  m'  per  hour.  The  lensth 
of  this  arm  must  be  about  10  meters.  For  work  with  the  long;  arm  a  bucl<et  is 
required  of  0.75  to  1.00  m'  capacity.  The  effective  capacity  of  the  shovel  with 
the  long  arm  must  be  40  to  50  m'  hourly.  The  length  of  this  long  arm  must  be 
about  14  meters. 

(e)  Self-propelled  steam-floating  dredges,  bucket  and  suction  types  whose 
capacity  will  be — 

1.  Working  with  suction  lines  (sandy  material)  250  m^h. 

2.  Working  with  buckets  in  sandy  material  180  m'h. 

3.  Working  with  buckets  in  gravelly  material  150  m^h. 

4.  Working  with  heavy  buckets  with  teeth  in  strong  material  50  m"h. 
The  dredges  must  have  the  following  engines  : 

1.  For  work  with  buckets.  2  engines  each  of  about  250  horsepower. 

2.  For  work  with  suction  lines,  one  engine  of  about  250  hor.sepower. 

3.  For  weighing  (?)  lifting  while  working  and  for  lighting,  3  engines  of 
about  70  horsepower  each. 

II.    BULLDOZERS 

The  dredges  must  be  equipped  with  the  following  accessories  : 

1.  100  pontoons  each  with  a  suction  hose  5  meters  long  on  it. 

2.  20  pieces  of  suction  5  meters  long  for  shore-work. 

The  dredge  must  be  equipped  with  cabins  for  the  crew,  with  lighting  for 
maintenance  work  and  with  steam  heating  for  the  winter. 

The  machines  which  come  into  consideration  are  those  made  by  American 
factories,  types  D-8;  D-7;  and  HD-14.  Bulldozers  must  be  easily  maneuver- 
able,  with  motors  of  80  to  120  horsepower  with  adjustable  blades  3  to  4  meters 
long. 

III.    SCEAPEKS 

(a)  Bowl  capacity  5m',  type  D-7;  HD-14  and  HD-10  with  tractors  of  cor- 
responding strength. 

(b)  Bowl  capacity  Sm'',  type  D-S ;  D-7  and  HD-14  with  tractors  of  corre- 
sponding power. 

(c)  Turnapuils  with  bowl  capacity  12  m'  with  tractors  of  corresponding  power. 

IV.    ELECTRIC    CENTRALS     (GENERATING     SETS)      MOVABLE 

Capacity  60-120  kilowatts,  that  is  80-100  horsepower  with  distributing  table 
cables  and  other  necessary  equipment  for  the  conduct  of  electric  current  to  a 
distance  of  3  kilometers.  These  generating  .sets  must  serve  to  drive  pumps  and 
other  machine  tools  as  well  as  to  light  the  work  place — gi-ounds. 

Insofar  as  it  may  be  possible  to  cover  our  requirements  in  the  United  States 
of  America  we  request  you  to  send  us  catalogs  with  detailed  specifications  of  the 
machines  so  that  it  may  be  possible  to  decide  from  these  and  such  others  not 
listed  above  but  which  we  could  employ  profitably  in  our  work. 

As  we  have  .stated  above  all  these  machines  are  highly  necessary  for  the  im- 
provement of  agriculture  in  our  country,  therefore  we  request  you  to  secure 
exact  infoi-mation  for  us  concerning  the  following: 

1.  Method  of  closing  contracts  directly  with  factories   (companies). 

2.  Method  of  payment  (through  cash  or  the  exchange  of  goods,  state  what 
goods  would  come  into  consideration  for  export  from  our  country). 

3.  Time  of  delivery  (if  possible  at  the  earliest  date — even  from  stocks  if  this 
can  be  done). 

4.  Method  of  taking  delivery. 

5.  Means  of  transport  and  other  eventualities  we  cannot  foresee. 

Insofar  as  the  conditions  of  the  ol't'ers  from  the  mentioned  firms  would  suit 
us,  we  would  inform  you  as  to  the  quantities  of  the  various  machines  which 
would  be  required. 

In  case  of  necessity  you  may  put  yourself  in  contact  with  our  commercial 
attache,  Beuo  Habjanic,  1818  24th  Street,  Washington,  D.  C. 

We  hope  for  your  early  reply  and  request  you  to  tell  us  the  terms  for  this 
business. 

Engineer  Dkagoslav  Mutapovio, 
Minister  in  the  Government  of  the  Peoples  Republic  of  Serbia. 
47769  ° -^54— pt.  4 5 


230  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

[TrnnslntloD  by  W.  H.  Smyth] 

ExTBACTs  From  Poi.jtical  Courses  for  Candidates  for  the  Communist  Party 

OF  Yugoslavia 

Page  193 : 

In  Older  to  increase  its  membership  the  Communist  Party  of  Yugoslavia 
organizes  political  courses  in  which  candidates  for  the  party  must  gain  linowl- 
edge  of  the  following  sul)jects: 

1.  Teachings  of  Marx-Engels. 

2.  The  development  of  society. 

3.  History  of  the  labor  movement. 

4.  Teachings  about  the  party. 

5.  Tlieory  of  revolution. 

6.  Nationality  questions. 

7.  Peasant  question. 

8.  Anti-Fascist  Front  of  Women  (AFZ). 

9.  Council  of  Communist  Youth  of  Yugoslavia  (SKOJ). 

10.  Peoples  Front. 

11.  Development  of  perspectives. 

Most  of  the  above  themes  come  out  in  the  form  of  lectures. 
We  give  the  main   themes  from   the  subjects:  The  Party,  Revolution,  Na- 
tionality Questions  (which  are  worked  out  fully  according  to  Stalin's  papers), 
Peasant  Question,  Peoples  Front. 

Instruction  about  the  party :  The  working  class  is  a  part  of  society  and  the 
party  is  a  part  of  the  working  class.  The  working  class  enters  the  final  fight 
for  the  destruction  of  capitalistic  society.  This,  as  a  revolutionary  fighting 
force  must  have  its  shock  staff,  as  a  revolutionary  core  which  stands  above  the 
working  class.  That  core  is  the  Communist  Party.  The  basic  principles  of 
the  party  are : 

1.  The  Bolshevist  Party  is  the  advance  guard  of  the  working  class,  the  lead- 
ing organization  of  the  working  class. 

2.  The  party  is  an  organized,  ordered,  disciplined  organization. 

3.  The  party  is  the  largest  form  of  the  working  class  organization,  larger 
than  all  others,  which  others  must  be  subordinate  to  it.  Tlie  party  to  all  a 
united  goal  and  direction. 

4.  The  party  is  the  weapon  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in  the  build- 
ing of  socialistic  society. 

5.  The  party  personifies  the  unity  of  will.  The  party  strengthens  itself  when 
it  cleans  itself  of  opportunistic  elements.  Opportunism  and  splitting  into 
fractions  will  not  be  allowed. 

Page  194 : 

The  program  is  the  foundation  of  the  party.  Tactics  decide  the  manner  of 
fighting  to  reach  near  and  far  goals.  Organizational  principles  strengthen  the 
internal  structure  of  the  party.  Absolute  unity  and  correlation  must  exist  be- 
tween program,  tactics,  and  organization.  The  statutes  contain  the  essence  of 
the  organization.  The  statutes  set  the  form  of  the  organization,  prescribe  the 
duties  of  members  and  regulate  the  conditions  for  reception  of  members  into 
the  party.  A  member  of  the  party  must  recognize  the  party  program,  work  in 
one  of  its  organizations  and  conform  to  the  decisions  of  the  party.  For  entry 
into  the  party  a  candidacy  and  a  probation  is  held.  The  party  accepts  as 
members  the  candidates  who  have  met  the  probationary  requirements,  passed 
the  course  for  basic  political  knowledge  and  accept  the  program  and  conceptions 
of  the  party.  The  cell  is  the  basic  organizational  unit  and  may  be  street,  village, 
military,  a  cell  in  a  factory,  or  in  an  institution.  A  secretary  leads  the  cell  but 
if  it  be  big  it  may  have  its  committee  of  4  or  5  of  the  best  party  members.  The 
management  is  made  of  a  committee,  regional,  district,  county,  state,  or  central. 

THEORY  OF   REVOLUTION   CONTAINS   THE  FOLLOWING   THEMES 

1.  Revolution  is  action  for  the  violent  destruction  of  capitalistic  society  and 
the  building  of  a  new  society  on  the  basis  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

2.  Not  a  single  isolated  revolution,  as  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  in  Yugoslavia  is 
ended  until.revolution  will  have  been  terminated  successfully  in  the  whole  world 
because  danger  from  foreign  intervention  always  threatens.  Therefore  it  is  a 
fundamental  task  of  all  Communists  to  assist  revolutionary  forces  in  the  world. 

3.  There  is  no  destruction  of  the  old  order  of  society  without  revolution,  there 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  231 

is  no  revolution  without  the  proletariat,  there  is  no  .understanding  proletariat 
without  the  Communist  Party  which  is  the  staff  and  the  directing  organ  for 
revolution. 

4.  The  workers  and  peasants  are  the  main  revolutionary  force  and  their  council 
is  the  principal  means  of  revolution. 

5.  All  nationality,  especially  colonial  questions  must  be  inflamed,  because  they 
basically  are  revolutionary,  hence  help  the  process  of  the  world  revolution. 

G.  The  international  reaction  assists  the  bourgeoisie  who  are  falling,  therefore 
the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  as  rulers  of  the  bourgeoisie,  must  cultivate 
hate  of  the  bourgeoisie  by  plan. 

7.  The  Soviets  are  the  basic  symbol  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

NATIONALITY  QUESTION 

The  nationality  question  must  be  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  world 
revolution.  With  regard  to  that,  the  nationality  question  actually  is  a  nationality 
colonial  question.  Leninism  showed,  and  imperial  war  and  revolution  in  Russia 
confirmed,  that  the  nationality  question  can  be  decided  only  in  connection  with 
and  on  the  basis  of  the  revolution  of  the  proletariat,  for  the  road  to  victory  leads 
through  the  revolutionary  council  with  the  liberation  movement  of  the  colonies 
and  countries  concerned  against  imperialism.  The  nationality  question  is  a 
part  of  the  general  question  of  the  proletarian  revolution,  a  part  of  the  question 
of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat. 

It  is  worth  while  to  hold  to  the  formula  of  Lenin ;  the  nationality  question  is 
nationality  by  form,  but  by  its  meaning  is  international. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Will  you  kindly  give  the  committee  just  a  brief  resume 
of  your  personal  history  with  particular  emphasis  upon  that  part  of 
your  life  which  you  spent  in  southern  and  eastern  Europe? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  went  to  France  in  the  United  States  Army  as  a  field 
artillery  captain,  91st  Division,  in  1918.  After  my  demobilization  I 
elected  to  stay  on  the  other  side  to  go  into  business.  I  first  went  to 
the  Caucasus  for  a  New  York  company  and  remained  there  all  of 
1920  and  the  early  part  of  1921.  It  was  a  New  York  group  which 
had  planned  to  trade  with  Russia  and  had  hoped  that  bolshevism 
soon  would  be  stopped. 

There  in  the  Caucasus  I  began  to  get  an  idea  of  what  communism 
really  was — although  I  had  seen  results  of  it  in  the  summer  of  1919 
on  trips  from  my  station  in  Vienna  to  Budapest  after  the  Bela  Kun 
Communist  government  was  overthrown  in  Hungary.  The  Hun- 
garian Communists  were  in  power  for  133  days  and  did  a  terrific 
amount  of  damage  in  that  short  time. 

During  my  stay  in  the  Caucasus  I  was  in  the  evacuation  of  Petrovsk, 
now  called  Makhachkala,  on  the  northwest  shore  of  the  Caspian  Sea. 
I  got  out  of  Baku  with  a  suit  of  clothes  and  a  raincoat.  Early  in  1921 
I  left  Tiflis  a  few  days  ahead  of  the  Bolshevists'  entry,  and  finally 
embarked  for  safety  at  Batoum  shortly  before  the  Communists  cap- 
tured that  Black  Sea  port. 

My  employers  decided  to  liquidate  their  business  in  that  part  of  the 
world  and  paid  us  off.  I  started  back  for  California,  but  visited  a 
friend  in  Yugoslavia,  wdiere  the  previous  year  I  had  spent  a  month 
on  an  investigation  of  commercial  possibilities,  and,  like  the  man  who 
came  to  dinner,  stayed  there  20  years.  I  liked  the  place  and  the  people. 
I  was  young,  started  my  own  company  on  a  shoestring,  and  over  20 
years  built  up  a  fairly  large  business  there. 

My  company  became  distributor  for  Packard,  Chrysler,  Plymouth 
automobiles.  Caterpillar  tractors,  Goodyear  tires,  and  some  other  good 
American  companies.  We  exported  various  Yugoslav  products  in 
order  to  secure  dollars  to  help  pay  for  our  imports. 


232  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Chairman  Jenner,  When  did  you  leave  Yugoslavia  and  why? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  left  Yugoslavia  July  14, 1941,  because  of  the  German 
occupation  which  commenced  in  April  that  year.  Our  legation  was 
shut  in  May,  but  left  a  skeleton  consulate  which  was  closed  the  middle 
of  July,  a  month  after  the  Axis  consulates  and  legations  in  the  United 
States  were  closed  by  our  Government. 

Mr.  Arens.  Since  you  left  you  have  been  maintaining  contact  with 
what  you  have  heretofore  described  to  us  as  the  underground  in  Yugo- 
slavia; is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  would  not  call  it  that  and  don't  like  to  talk  about 
an  underground.  I  have  maintained  relations  with  people  over  there. 
Nearly  every  month  I  see  persons  who  have  just  come  out,  or  hear 
tlirough  reliable  people  who  have  talked  with  them,  what  conditions 
are  in  Yugoslavia.  Further,  I  get  Yugoslav  newspapers.  Inciden- 
tally, Communist  newspapers  having  to  do  with  Yugoslavia  are  pub- 
lished in  Prague  and  Moscow  as  well  as  in  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  Tito  a  real  Communist? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Tito  certainly  is  a  real  Communist.  There  is  no  ques- 
tion about  it.  He  was  a  Communist  before  he  was  taken  prisoner  by 
the  Russians  in  World  War  I.  I  would  say  he  took  his  postgraduate 
course  in  communism  in  Eussia,  first  as  a  prisoner,  and  later  when  he 
remained  there  after  his  release.  He  came  out  definitely  for  com- 
munism, and  certainly  was  sent  back  to  Yugoslavia  for  Communist 
work.  Tito  was  nominated  to  be  secretary  general  of  the  Yugoslav 
Communist  Party  by  Malenkov  in  1937,  the  No.  1  man  in  Russia  today, 
which  gives  an  idea  of  the  tieup  he  now  must  have. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  about  the  common  impression  that  Tito  is  a  na- 
tional or  a  different  sort  of  Communist? 

Mr.  Smyth.  The  best  way  to  discuss  that,  in  my  opinion,  is  by  using 
Tito's  own  words.  First,  I'd  like  to  say  there  is  a  common  belief  in  this 
country  that  Tito  broke  with  the  Soviets.  But  that's  not  the  case.  He 
did  not  break  with  them;  they  kicked  him  out.  At  the  Cominform 
meeting  in  Bucharest  on  June  28, 1948,  Tito  and  his  Yugoslav  Commu- 
nists were  expelled  from  the  Cominform.  In  my  opinion  the  reasons 
were  largely  personal. 

As  explained  in  my  written  statement,  Tito  and  his  top  men  were 
perfectly  willing  to  spy  on  other  people  but  they  did  not  like  it  when 
they  saw  the  Soviets  were  spying  on  them.  There  was  nothing  unusual 
in  that  spying.  It  was  just  Soviet  standard  practice.  But  Tito  and 
his  men  knew  that  many  Communist  leaders  had  been  liquidated 
through  such  spying,  so  they  opposed  it  in  Yugoslavia.  That  led  to 
bad  feeling  and  to  their  expulsion  from  the  Cominform.  The  prin- 
cipal formal  reasons  given  were  that  they  (the  Yugoslav  Communists) 
had  not  formed  a  central  committee  of  the  party  and  that  they  had 
done  practically  nothing  about  the  collectivization  of  the  peasants. 

There  was  a  lot  of  talk  about  it.  The  Soviets  claimed  Tito  and  his 
Yugoslav  Communists  were  not  good  Communists.  They  expelled  the 
Yugoslavs  from  the  Cominform. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  233 

Now,  regardino;  the  matter  of  Tito's  being  a  national  Communist, 
1  believe  that  in  Tito's  talk  on  June  26, 1950,  before  the  Yugoslav  Par- 
liament, you  have  the  reason  why  people  think  of  him  as  a  national 
Communist.    The  following  is  my  translation  of  a  part  of  his  remarks : 

The  essence  of  our  road  to  socialism,  or,  better  said,  communism — 

note  that  Tito  himself  stated  "better  said,  communism" — 

can  be  defined  in  a  few  words.  Our  road  to  socialism  is  composed  of  our  applica- 
tion of  Marxist  science  in  the  closest  harmony  with  the  special  conditions  which 
exist  in  our  country. 

Many  people  probably  stopped  listening  or  stopped  reading  at  that 
point.  They  decided  he  was  a  national  Communist  because  he  had  said 
■'the  special  conditions  which  exist  in  our  country." 

But  Mr.  Tito  went  on  with  the  following,  and  this  is  a  part  of  the 
same  statement : 

We  try  to  introduce  the  spirit  of  that  science  into  all  our  works,  and  every 
deviation  from  the  principles  of  that  science,  no  matter  under  what  pretense, 
would  be  revisionism  and  treason  not  only  to  the  working  class  but  also  to  pro- 
gressive humanity  of  the  entire  world. 

When  he  says  "progressive  humanity"  and  "the  working  class,"  there 
IS  no  limitation  to  it.    It  is  international  or  world  communism. 

I  would  like  to  go  back  to  the  matter  of  Tito's  being  a  real  Com.- 
munist.  In  1952  the  Yugoslav  Party  had  what  they  called  their  sixth 
congress.  At  that  time  they  proposed  and  voted  a  new  constitution, 
which  is  practically  identical  with  the  present  Soviet  Constitution. 
I've  compared  them  paragraph  by  paragraph  and  they  make  interest- 
ing reading.  But  using  the  phrase  our  President  and  our  Secretary  of 
State  have  been  employing  lately,  "We  will  judge  by  actions  and  not 
by  words,"  I'd  say,  let's  judge  Tito  and  his  Communists  by  their 
actions  and  not  by  their  words. 

You  take  first  the  matter  of  the  clergy  and  religion.  The  Yugoslav 
Communists  have  done  everything  possible  to  destroy  religion.  The 
priests,  both  Orthodox  and  Roman  Catholic,  have  put  up  a  wonderful 
battle  for  religion.  Tito  has  established  so-called  priests'  associations, 
and  has  tried  to  herd  the  priests  into  these  associations  so  he  can  con- 
trol them  there.  Some  priests  have  gone  in,  but  to  the  honor  of  the 
Yugoslav  clergy  it  can  be  said  that  the  vast  majority  have  not  gone  into 
those  associations. 

Here  in  America  we  all  connect  children  with  Sunday  school.  It 
is  not  a  matter  of  who  you  are  for  generally,  children  of  all  faiths  go 
for  religious  instruction  once  a  week.  In  Yugoslavia  children  can 
go  for  religious  instruction  only  on  a  written  permit  issued  by  their 
parents.  In  a  place  where  the  sole  employer  is  the  state,  and  that 
state  is  opposed  to  religion,  it  is  rather  dangerous  for  a  parent  to 
give  a  permit  for  his  children  to  attend  religious  instruction.  He 
can  lose  his  job.  Nobody  in  Yugoslavia  who  openly  professes  his 
religion,  who  makes  anything  of  it,  will  have  a  good  job,  or  let's  say 
a  better  job. 

Then  take  the  matter  of  private  property.     They  just  took  it  over. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Did  they  take  over  your  property  ? 


234  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Smyth.  Yes,  sir.  They  seized  my  company — W.  H.  Smyth. 
Part  of  it,  for  example,  was  taken  over  by  Jugauto,  the  automotive 
section  of  the  Yugoshiv  Government. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Were  you  compensated  for  it? 

Mr.  Smyth,  I  may  be,  some  day,  from  the  International  CLaims 
Commission.     I  hope  so. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Do  you  make  a  distinction  between  international  com- 
munism and  Kremlin  communism  ? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Kremlin  communism  is  international  or  world  com- 
munism. There  is  really  only  one  communism.  Communism  is  out 
to  communize  the  whole  world. 

Senator  Welker.  Do  you  make  any  distinction  between  national 
communism  and  international  communism? 

Mr.  Smyth.  No,  sir.  It  just  does  not  exist.  With  my  written 
statement  I  submitted  a  photostat  of  two  pages  which  a  Serb  friend 
of  mine  stole  from  a  Tito  textbook.  That  section  is  called,  "Extract 
From  Political  Courses  for  Candidates  for  the  Communist  Party  of 
Yugoslavia."  The  following  is  the  translation  of  a  very  significant 
paragraph  from  these  courses : 

Not  a  single  isolated  revolution,  as  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  in  Yugoslavia,  is 
ended  until  revolution  will  have  been  terminated  successfully  in  the  whole  world, 
because  danger  from  foreign  intervention  always  threatens.  Therefore  it  is  a 
fundamental  task  of  all  Communists  to  assist  revolutionary  forces  In  the  whole 
world. 

You  will  see  Tito's  missions  all  over  the  world.  They  are  written 
up  in  the  papers  sometimes  as  contacting  Socialist  groups.  But,  re- 
member, Tito  in  his  own  statement,  which  I  just  now  read  to  you, 
said,  "socialism,  or  better  said,  communism." 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  feeling  about  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Iron  Curtain  countries  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  think  that  will  be  the  first  positive  move  we  will  have 
made  against  communism  for  years. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  you  think  about  including  Yugoslavia  in 
that  bloc? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Yugoslavia  is  today  a  Communist  country.  Tito  and 
his  crowd  say  they  are  better  Communists  than  the  Russians,  I  will 
stand  corrected.  As  Mr.  Goncharoff,  the  previous  witness,  so  well 
said,  we  should  not  say  "the  Russians"  when  talking  about  the  Soviets, 
but  we  should  say,  "the  Soviets."  I  know  the  Russians.  I  lived  in 
the  Caucasus  for  well  over  a  year.  In  Belgrade  I  had  11  Russians 
among  my  35  employees.     I  had  several  of  them  in  Zagreb. 

The  Russians  are  just  like  nice  people  anywhere  else.  There  is  a 
difference  between  the  Russian  people  and  the  Bolshevists — the 
Soviets.  In  Yugoslavia  there  is  a  difference  between  the  Yugoslav 
people  and  the  Communists.  We  have  the  same  difference  here  in 
America  between  our  good  Americans  and  our  Communists  with  their 
standard  international  Communist  way  of  thinking. 

We  should  include  Yugoslav  with  the  Soviet  bloc  for  this  reason — 
our  moral  position  is  bad,  has  been  since  the  moment  we  recognized 
the  Soviets  diplomatically,  I  think  it  has  been  especially  bad  since 
we  began  to  support  Tito,  There  is  no  question  about  it — the  present 
Yugoslav  Government  is  a  Communist  government.  How  can  we  say 
we  are  anti-Communist  when  we  maintain  in  power  Tito  and  his 
peojile  who  hold  17  million  Yugoslavs  in  slavery? 


STRATEGY    A^D    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  235 

We  fouo;ht  a  ^var  90  years  ago,  the  greatest  war  in  history  until  tlien, 
the  War  Between  the  States,  to  abolish  slavery  in  our  country.  Yet 
our  Government,  through  giving  aid  and  money,  over  a  billion  dollars 
in  the  last  8  or  9  years,  has  enabled  Tito  to  hold  those  17  million  Yugo- 
slavs in  slavery. 

Mr.  Areks.  Do  you  feel  Tito  is  loyal  to  the  Soviets  ? 

Mr.  Smyth.  He  has  proved  it  right  along.  People  here  do  not 
realize  that  when  Tito  and  his  Communists  were  thrown  out  of  the 
Cominform  in  June  1948,  that  they  did  their  best  in  every  way  for 
over  a  year  to  get  back  in.  An  interesting  sidelight  on  this  when 
they  signed  their  commercial  agreement  with  the  Soviets  at  the  end 
of  1948  for  the  1949  period,  they  got  a  worse  trade  agreement  with 
the  Soviets  than  they  had  had  for  1948.  Previously  they  had  pro- 
tested over  the  1948  agreement  because  they  claimed  they  were  cliarged 
too  much  for  Russian  products  and  credited  too  little  for  their  own 
Yugoslav  products  sold  to  the  Soviets.  Yet  to  show  their  steadfast 
devotion  to  Moscow,  they  accepted  a  worse  agreement  for  themselves 
even  after  their  expulsion  from  the  Cominform. 

The  Russians  saw  what  was  happening.  They  are  realists.  Unfor- 
tunately, western  diplomats  apparently  only  investigated  to  find  out 
whether  the  Yugoslav  Communists  had  been  put  out  of  the  Cominform 
or  not.  When  they  say  the  Yugoslavs  had  bsen  put  out,  they  said, 
"That  is  enough."'  But  not  the  Soviet  diplomats.  They  studied  the 
situation.  They  saw  Tito  was  worth  more  outside  the  Iron  Curtain 
than  in,  because  with  people  saying  Tito  was  a  National  Communist, 
a  nice  Communist,  a  different  one,  Tito's  people  could  go  all  around 
the  world,  mix  everywhere,  even  where  Soviet  representatives  could 
not. 

In  my  opinion,  one  can  characterize  Tito's  Communists  by  saying 
that  Yugoslavia  became  the  Trojan  Horse  of  INIoscow.  IMay  7  this 
year,  in  my  talk  before  the  Commonwealth  Club  of  California  on  the 
subject  they  proposed,  "Yugoslavia — Whose  Trojan  Horse?"  I 
showed  how  Communist  Yugoslavia  was  a  perfect  setup  as  a  Trojan 
Horse.  The  Yugoslav  Communists  were  theoretically  outside  the 
Iron  Curtain.  Therefore  people  all  over  the  world  received  them  as 
being  different,  not  the  real  Moscow  Communists.  Tito  has  had  mis- 
sions in  Burma,  in  India,  even  in  Ethiopia  and  other  places  where 
Yugoslavia  had  no  or  practically  no  commerce. 

Yugoslavia  used  to  import  a  relatively  small  amount  of  jute  from 
India  for  making  bags,  but  Tito  has  had  some  of  his  highest  men  out 
there.  Why  ?  Making  contact  of  course  in  those  countries  with  their 
so-called  Socialist  parties.  But  remember,  Tito  himself  said  "social- 
ism, better  said  communism."  He  could  send  his  missions  to  places 
where  the  Soviets  could  not  be  sure  how  their  own  emissaries  would 
be  received.  He  has  been  of  immense  value  in  this  way  to  the  Soviets 
and  to  international  communism. 

]Mr.  Arens.  In  the  event  of  war,  could  the  United  States  count  on 
the  Yugoslav  Army? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  look  at  it  this  way.  The  Yugoslavs  today  are  in  a 
slave  state.  Tito  is  the  head  of  it,  and  his  government  is  in  power. 
The  people  know  that  if  the  Soviets  should  take  over,  they  still  would 
be  in  a  slave  state.  If  they  think  we  will  keep  Tito  in  power  in  case 
we  win  the  war,  they  naturally  can  say,  "Why  should  we  fight  to 
remain  slaves  ?    If  Tito  will  be  on  top,  we'll  be  slaves  under  Tito.    We 


236  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

would  be  slaves  under  Malenkov.  Then  why  fight?"  That  is  to  me  a 
basic  point. 

Secondly,  Tito  cannot  be  sure  of  his  own  army.  He  does  not  know 
which  officers  he  can  count  on  in  it — that  he,  he  knows  some  are  per- 
sonally loyal  to  him,  but  generally  speaking  he  cannot  say  who  are 
Cominform  people  and  who  are  not. 

Mr.  Arens.  Should  we  trade  with  the  Kremlin  or  with  Tito? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  would  say  no;  not  with  either. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why? 

Mr.  Smyth.  I  notice  there  are  a  lot  of  ladies  present  here,  so  I  will 
mention  doll  clothes.  If  somebody  would  export  doll  clothes,  which 
seem  absolutely  innocuous,  to  a  Communist  country  like  Soviet  Russia 
or  any  other,  those  doll  clothes  would  be  strategic  materials.  That 
is  not  foolish.  Just  think  of  it.  Those  doll  clothes  and  other  con- 
sumer goods  sent  over  there  release  man-hours  and  woman-hours,  as 
they  work  their  women  the  same  as  their  men.  That  releases  a  cor- 
responding number  of  work  hours  of  their  own  people  for  work  on 
war  production. 

Mr.  Arens.  Should  we  import  goods  from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain 
into  this  country? 

Mr.  Smyth.  No;  not  in  my  opinion. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why  not? 

Mr.  Smyth.  If  we  import  from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  countries 
we  take  goods  from  that  area.  We  have  to  pay  with  our  good  dollars. 
Those  dollars  are  what  the  Soviets  need  to  buy  the  stuff  they  can  buy 
only  for  dollars  or  for  gold — strategic  materials.  Incidentally  they 
have  a  very  large  gold  production  in  the  Lena  gold  fields  in  Siberia. 
It  costs  them  only  about  $7  an  ounce  to  produce  their  gold — that  is 
with  their  slave  labor.  Our  Government  pays  $35  an  ounce  for  gold. 
So  the  Soviets  can  outbid  us  for  anj^thing  they  want.  When  they  use 
their  cheap  gold  and  buy  consumer  goods  in  Europe  or  other  places 
to  ameliorate  the  conditions  for  the  people  in  Russia,  they  are  making 
their  enslaved  people  think  things  are  better  than  they  really  are. 
And  by  spending  their  cheap  gold  they  are  acquiring  a  large  labor 
force  working  for  them  outside  of  their  Communist  bloc.  That  re- 
leases their  own  labor  for  war  production.  That  all  will  come  back 
against  us.  There  is  no  question  about  it.  We  are  at  war,  whether 
you  call  it  hot  war  or  cold  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Smyth,  why  would  Tito  enter  into  a  military  pact 
such  as  he  has  entered  into  with  Greece  and  Turkey  ? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Last  year  he  entered  into  a  pact,  a  pact  of  friendship 
and  collaboration  with  Greece  and  Turkey.  I  feel  quite  sure  he 
went  into  that  pact  purely  and  simply  to  get  more  material  and  finan- 
cial aid  from  us  by  making  our  people  think  we  were  winning  him  over 
to  our  side.  Signing  a  political  pact  means  nothing  to  a  Communist. 
It  is  high  time  our  people  should  realize  that  is  just  a  part  of  the 
strategy  and  tactics  of  international  communism,  of  world  commu- 
nism. 

It  seems  that  our  officials,  our  Government,  still  hold  to  the  idea 
that,  "Well  Tito  is  different.  He  broke  with  the  Russians."  They 
don't  seem  to  understand  Tito  did  not  break  with  the  Soviets ;  he  was 
kicked  out  by  them.  It  was  a  very  good  move  for  the  Soviets.  I  do 
not  think  they  knew  what  a  good  job  they  did  when  they  put  him  out, 
because  this  busineos  of  being  able  to  say  that  Tito  is  a  national  Com- 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  237 

mimist  is  wonderful  publicity  and  very  effective  for  international  com- 
munism.   That  has  enabled  Tito  to  get  his  men  in  all  over  the  place. 

Senator  Welker.  It  has  fooled  a  lot  of  people, 

Mr.  Smyth.  Yes,  it  has.  You  asked  why  he  went  into  the  Balkan 
pact.  That  is  a  very  interesting  thing.  The  age-old  policy  of  the 
Czarist  Government,  and  now  of  the  Soviet  Government  has  been  to 
get  down  through  the  Balkans,  to  get  down  where  they  could  cut  the 
Mediterranean  supply  line  of  the  British  Empire.  But  now  the 
Mediterranean  is  a  lifeline  for  the  United  States,  between  our  country 
and  such  countries  as  Turkey,  Iraq,  Iran,  and  Pakistan.  We  have 
just  signed  agreements  with  them  about  military  aid.  Those  countries 
have  good  fighting  men.  By  all  their  ideology  they  are  opposed  to  com- 
munism, but  they  do  not  have  war  industries.  They  will  have  to 
depend  on  us  to  supply  materiel  and  munitions.  The  Mediterranean 
is  our  lifeline  for  doing  that,  to  enable  our  allies  to  keep  on  fighting 
when  the  time  comes. 

How  could  Tito  join  up  with  the  Greeks  and  Turks  in  a  pact  which 
obviously  is  designed  to  prevent  the  Soviets  from  conquering  the 
Balkans  and  accomplishing  the  age-old  aim  of  Russia?  It  is  very 
simple.  What  is  it  for  Tito  or  any  Communist  leader  such  as  he  is, 
to  sign  a  pact? 

If  you  will  go  back  to  the  end  of  August  1939,  the  British  and 
French  representatives  were  in  Moscow.  They  thought  they  were 
signing  an  agreement  with  Stalin.  Von  Ribbentrop,  the  German 
Foreign  Minister,  arrived.  He  was  in  Moscow  only  3  or  4  days  but 
apparently  made  a  better  offer  to  the  Soviets  than  the  British  and  the 
French,  so  Stalin  signed  with  him.  Why  wouldn't  Tito  do  the  same 
thing  ?  It  is  to  his  advantage.  He  surely  entered  the  Balkan  pact  just 
to  get  aid  from  us  and  to  fool  us  further  into  thinking  that  he  is 
with  us. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  be  the  effect  on  the  average  person  in  Yugo- 
slavia of  a  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  by  the  United  States  with 
Tito? 

Mr.  Smyth.  Personally,  I  believe  he  would  be  glad.  Even  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  it  would  be  harder  on  him.  If  we  would  sever  diplo- 
matic relations  with  the  Soviets  and  Yugoslavia  today,  we  probably 
would  cut  down  on  supplies  we  have  been  sending  to  Yugoslavia.  It 
would  be  harder  for  the  people,  but  they  are  so  fed  up  with  being 
slaves  and  with  this  Tito  regime,  that  I  am  quite  sure  they  and  also 
the  people  in  Hungary  and  in  the  other  enslaved  countries  would  be 
glad  because  it  would  give  a  clean,  clear  situation.  They  would  say, 
"The  United  States  now  definitely  is  anti-Communist."  That  would 
give  them  hope.  Tito  is  in  a  desperate  situation  today.  He  has 
almost  wrecked  the  economy  of  the  country.  If  it  had  not  been  for  the 
aid  we  sent  him  he  would  have  been  finished  before  this.  We  have 
saved  him  continually,  yet  one  of  his  cardinal  Communist  aims  is  to 
destroy  our  free  United  States, 

In  connection  with  all  this  I'd  like  to  say  a  word  about  the  Yugo- 
slav peasants.  Our  average  American  farmers,  thank  God,  have  fairly 
good-sized  farms.  But  in  Yugoslavia  the  average  peasant  probably 
has  about  8  hectares,  roughly  20  acres.  Probably  his  arable  land  will 
be  10  acres.  The  other  4  hectares  or  10  acres  will  be  meadowland  and 
forest  or  swamp  or  whatever  there  is. 


238  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  peasant  is  a  very  interesting  person  and  he  is  a  darn  good  man. 
He  is  the  foundation  of  the  country.  A  peasant,  in  a  way,  with  his 
wife  and  family  was  a  sort  of  integrated  industry.  They  grew  their 
own  food,  raised  their  sheep,  and  got  wool.  The  women  spun  and  wove 
it  into  clothes.  They  raise  a  few  pigs.  They  will  have  a  few  chickens 
and  ducks  and  a  couple  of  cows.  It  is  a  very  close  balance  in  "getting 
by."  If  the  man  was,  say  a  carpenter,  he  would  make  some  things  at 
home  to  take  in  and  sell  at  the  village  market.  Formerly  they  bought 
cotton  thread  from  which  the  women  also  wove  cloth.  But  in  recent 
years  under  communism  they  could  not  get  the  cotton  thread,  and  as 
Tito  took  their  w^ool  away  from  them,  they  could  neither  make  nor  buy 
clothes.  This  situation  became  so  bad  last  year  that  Tito  had  to  ease 
up  and  let  them  keep  some  of  their  wool.  Tito  tried  to  drive  these 
peasants  into  his  collectives  through  various  oppressive  measures — 
taxation,  confiscation,  and  terror. 

Last  year  Tito  announced  they  could  get  out  of  the  collectives. 
Things  had  become  so  bad  that  he  said  in  effect,  "Well,  you  can  break 
up  these  collectives  if  you  want,  but  remember,  this  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  ultimate  aim  of  our  Government,  which  is  to  have  all  peasants 
and  everybody  in  collectives  or  associations  run  by  the  Government." 
This  driving  of  peasants  into  collectives  and  factories — the  prole- 
tarianization of  the  peasants — is  a  main  point  in  the  program  of  world 
communism. 

Why  should  we,  the  United  States,  back  a  government  which  is 
operating  a  slave  state?  In  this  connection,  I  heartily  recommend 
Senate  bill  S.  3632  whicl)  would  make  it  a  felony  to  import  or  ship  in 
interstate  commerce  any  commodity  or  goods  produced  by  slave  labor. 
Certainly  we  here  are  all  against  slave  labor.  Then  why  back  slavery 
in  other  countries? 

I  read  in  the  paper  last  night  that  in  regard  to  the  mess  in  Indo- 
china, probably  there  will  be  a  "voluntary"  change  in  population. 
Some  of  the  Indochinese  will  be  moved  at  their  wishes  from  the  north- 
ern part  south,  and  others  from  the  southern  part  north,  so  we  will 
be  able  to  feel  virtuously  that  we  will  not  be  forcing  people  to  live  in 
slavery.  The  Indochinese  who  don't  want  communism  will  be  allowed 
to  move  south,  to  try  to  start  again  after  losing  everything  they  had. 

If  we  are  so  worried  about  the  guilt  connected  with  forcing  people 
into  slavery  why  don't  we  worry  about  the  17  million  Yugoslavs  who 
we  help  keep  in  slavery  through  our  aid  to  Tito  paid  for  from  our 
regular  governmental  budgets?  You  take  this  appropriation  bill 
being  discussed  in  the  Senate  now,  or  is  it  possibly  in  the  joint  com- 
mittee? We  send  aid  to  Tito.  Why  .should  we  send  tanks,  artillery, 
heavy  equipment,  jet  planes  to  Tito  ?  That  special  equipment  is  used  by 
his  most  loyal  specialists.  They  have  been  checked  and  doublechecked 
by  Tito's  secret  police,  and  as  a  group,  probably  are  loyal  to  him. 
That  equipment  helps  him  to  hold  the  Yugoslavs  down.  Why  should 
we  do  that  ?  We  helped  shove  the  Yugoslavs  into  war  to  their  destruc- 
tion. It  was  none  of  the  Yugoslav  people's  doing.  It  seems  to  me  we 
have  a  record  there  which  we  Americans  should  try  to  correct. 

There  was  no  reason  for  letting  the  Soviets  take  over  China,  but  even 
in  that  sellout  Tito  was  very  useful,  playing  his  part  in  world  Com- 
munist strategy.  I  am  a  businessman  and  don't  have  to  wear  striped 
pants  to  understand  that.  In  1948  and  later,  all  that  talk  about  Tito, 
that  we  were  getting  him  away  from  the  Soviets,  that  smokescreen 
continually  put  up  in  the  papers  about  Tito  and  Yugoslavia,  that 


STRATEGY    AXD    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMJVIUNISM  239 

through  him  as  bait  or  example  we  were  going  to  get  Mao  Tse-tung 
and  other  leaders  of  Soviet-dominated  countries  to  "break"  with 
Moscow — all  that  diversion  which  you  remember  in  the  newspapers 
certainly  was  a  part  of  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism. 

That  propaganda,  partly  put  out,  possibly  innocently,  by  our  own 
people,  greatly  helped  the  Soviets  to  take  over  China,  450  million 
people,  with  practically  no  noise.  That  lies  on  my  heart.  I  was  born 
in  China.  My  father  and  mother  were  missionaries  there.  Although  I 
left  China  as  a  boy  I've  maintained  contact  with  people  who  know 
China  well.  Everyone  knows  that  for  100  years  the  Chinese  have  been 
our  friends.  We  never  forced  them  to  import  opium.  You  know  about 
the  opium  war  when  the  British  fought  the  Chinese  to  force  them  to 
permit  the  importation  of  opium  from  India.  We  had  a  clean  record 
in  China.  After  the  Boxer  War  we  didn't  ask  for  indemnity,  as  the 
European  nations  did.  We  arranged  that  China  should  use  what 
would  have  been  indemnity  payments  to  send  Chinese  students  to  the 
United  States  to  study  in  our  universities.  Then  during  and  after 
World  AVar  II  we  let  China  be  sold  down  the  river,  while  our  people's 
eyes  were  diverted  away  by  Tito  and  his  Yugoslav  Communists. 

Frankly  we  sold  the  Yugoslav  people  down  the  river,  too.  I'd  be 
willing  to  go  to  bat  on  that  and  discuss  it  but  it's  late  now.  The  best 
article,  in  my  opinion,  on  the  betrayal  of  the  Yugoslav  people  was  Mr. 
Demaree  Bess'  Our  Frontier  on  the  Danube  in  the  Saturday  Evening 
Post  of  May  24, 1941,  previously  mentioned  in  my  written  statement. 

Why  should  the  people  south  of  the  new  line  to  be  set  in  Indochina 
trust  us?  How  can  the  people  in  Thailand  go  to  sleep  now  without 
worrying  as  to  when  their  turn  wnll  come  ?  The  thing  moves  along.  It 
has  been  our  words  against  Soviet  actions.  They  have  been  pushing 
out,  expanding  their  Communist  world  empire.  One  place  where  it 
was  American  actions  against  Soviet  words  was  the  Berlin  airlift. 
That  did  a  great  deal  to  raise  the  prestige  of  the  United  States.  That 
is  something  we  all  ?an  be  proud  of.  There  was  no  reason  for  its  being 
required  but  that's  a  different  matter. 

I  am  in  favor  of  Senate  Resolution  247  calling  for  the  severance  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Soviets  and  satellites  and  would  make 
it  include  Communist  Yugoslavia.  If  peoj^le  who  think  Tito  is  a  '"dif- 
ferent" Communist  would  like  to  make  a  special  matter  of  this  case, 
they  could  say  to  Tito :  "Tito,  we  are  going  to  sever  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Government  and  satellite  countries.  As  far  as 
j^ou're  concerned,  we'll  give  you  this  alternative.  You  sever  relations 
with  the  Soviets,  too.  You  put  democratic  processes  and  order  into 
your  countr}',  give  your  people  a  chance  to  say  who  will  be  elected 
mayor  of  the  town,  the  councilmen,  and  all  other  officials.  Let  us 
supervise  the  distribution  of  the  supplies  we  send  to  Yugoslavia."  If 
he's  honest  he'll  do  it. 

Why  should  we  send  our  tanks,  planes  and  other  military  equipment 
to  Yugoslavia  and  not  have  our  men  there  on  the  spot  to  see  who  gets 
it  and  how  they  use  it?  Every  American  who  would  be  over  there, 
whether  officer,  noncom,  private  or  civilian,  telling  them  how  to  use 
our  equipment,  and  teaching  them  our  methods,  would  be  a  missionary 
for  our  free  way  of  doing  things.  Instead  of  that  we  let  them  send 
their  people  here  to  go  around  our  factories  and  our  installations. 
They  see  everything  we  have.  I  have  talked  with  Yugoslavs  in  New 
York  who  speak  with  these  Communist  Yugoslav  visitors. 


240  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

When  they  finish  their  courses  and  are  on  their  way  back,  they  say, 
"What  fools  the  Americans  are.  They  let  us  go  around  and  see  every- 
thing." Of  course,  those  are  picked  men  who  are  sent  over  here.  The 
proof  they  are  picked  is  that  out  of  all  the  Communist  Yugoslavs  who 
have  come  over  here,  only  about  three  or  four  have  come  out  and  said 
they  wanted  to  stay  here.  There  Avas  a  case  last  year,  three  men  in 
the  air  force  who  asked  asylum  in  America. 

I  doubt  that  Tito  would  agree  to  come  along  with  us.  In  a  free 
election  he'd  be  out  of  his  job.  If  he  would  not  come  along,  I  would 
inform  the  Soviets  that  if  they  or  any  satellite  would  move  into  Yugo- 
slavia it  would  mean  war  with  us.  That  would  give  the  Yugoslav 
people  a  chance.  I  hope  that  when  the  demarcation  line  Avill  be  set  in 
Indochina  we  similarly  will  tell  the  Communists  that  if  they  move 
south  of  it  in  any  way  that  will  mean  war.  We  have  got  to  do  it 
sometime,  so  why  not  now"  ? 

I  strongly  approve  of  Senate  Resolution  247.  I  think  it  will  be 
the  first  positive  step  in  21  years  in  making  people  see  that  without 
any  equivocation  we  are  against  communism.  It  will  restore  the 
world's  faith,  especially  the  faith  of  the  enslaved  peoples,  in  our 
United  States,  and  to  me  faith  is  the  most  important  thing.  There's 
no  use  in  telling  the  enslaved  peoples  that  everybody  over  here  has  a 
car  and  a  refrigerator.  That  won't  make  anyone  want  to  fight  on  our 
side.     But  faith  in  us  will. 

Our  forefathers  fought  for  liberty  in  our  War  of  the  Revolution. 
That  was  the  main  thing  for  George  Washington  and  the  others.  God 
knows  they  had  a  tough  time,  but  they  had  a  burning  ideal — liberty. 
What  we  must  do  is  to  give  the  enslaved  peoples  of  the  world  hope  for 
liberty.  I  believe  that  the  breaking  oil  of  diplomatic  relations  wdth 
Soviet  Russia  and  her  satellites  including  Communist  Yugoslavia  will 
give  them  that  hope  hence  help  in  the  battle  against  world  communism. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Further  questions? 

Thank  you  for  appearing  before  us.     We  appreciate  it  very  much. 

(Whereupon,  at  3  :  10  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  subject  to  call.) 


stratectY  and  tactics  of  world  communism 


THURSDAY,  JULY  22,   1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  Ina^stigate  the  Administration 

OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10  a.  m.,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E,  Jenner  (chairman  of  the  sub- 
committee) presiding. 
Present :  Senator  Jenner. 

Also  present :  Eichard  Arens,  special  counsel ;  Frank  W.  Schroeder 
and  Edward  R.  Duffy,  professional  staff  members. 
The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 
Do  3^011  swear  that  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the 
truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 
Mr.  Amoss.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  ULIUS  LOUIS  AMOSS,  PRESIDENT,  INTERNATIONAL 
SERVICES  or  INFORMATION  FOUNDATION,  INC. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  state  for  our  record  your  full  name? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Ulius  Louis  Amoss. 

The  Chairman.  Where  do  you  reside  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Gibson  Island,  Md. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  your  business  or  profession  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  am  president  of  International  Services  of  Informa- 
tion Foundation. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  give  us  some  detail  of  that  organiza- 
tion? 

Mr.  Amoss.  It  is  a  nonprofit  organization,  established  to  collect  and 
disseminate  information  from  overseas  countries. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  have  you  been  president  of  this  organi- 
zation? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Since  its  inception  in  1946. 

The  Chairman.  Proceed,  Mr.  Arens. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel  Amoss,  you  have  prepared  at  the  request  of 
the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  your  testimony  in  documentary 
form? 

The  Chairman,  Mr.  AniosSj  the  press  people  cannot  hear  you. 
Would  you  speak  a  little  louder  and  raise  your  voice  ? 

You  have  a  prepared  statement  you  have  submitted  to  the  com- 
mittee? 

241 


242  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  have,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  statement  will  go  into  the  record  and  become 
a  part  of  the  record. 

(Mr.  Amoss'  prepared  statement  follows :) 

Testimony  of  Col.  Ulius  Amoss 

Mr.  Chairman  and  gentlemen,  my  name  is  Ulius  Amoss.  I  am  a  reserve 
colonel,  Air  Force.  Throushout  1942  I  was  Chief,  Eastern  European  Section  for 
Secret  Intelligence  for  the  Intelligence  Division,  Office  of  the  Coordinator  of 
Information,  later  the  OfPce  of  Strategic  Services.  In  January  1943  I  was  sta- 
tioned in  Cairo  as  Deputy  for  the  Middle  Eastern  Theater  of  Operations,  OSS, 
and  Chief  of  Operations,  for  Intelligence,  Sabotage,  Guerrilla  Warfare,  and 
Psychological  Warfare,  and  was  simultaneously  Commanding  Officer,  Experi- 
mental Detachment,  G-3,  United  States  Armed  Forces  in  the  Middle  East.  My 
theater  ran  from  Italy  and  Poland  to  India  and  Ethiopia. 

When  Gen.  L.  H.  Brereton,  Theater  Commander  and  Commanding  General 
of  the  Ninth  Air  Force,  was  transferred  (fall  of  1943)  to  the  British  Isles  to- 
gether with  an  enlarged  Ninth  Air  Force  to  provide  tactical  support  for  the 
invasion  of  Normandy,  he  took  me  with  him  as  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff.  I  served 
General  Vandenberg  in  the  same  capacity  when  he  took  over  command  of  the 
Ninth  Air  Force.  My  duties  included  direction  of  relationships  with  allied 
governments,  civil  and  military  government,  tactical  liaison  with  allied  air 
forces,  operations  in  concert  with  European  underground  formations,  and  special 
intelligence. 

At  the  end  of  1945,  I  was  assigned  to  special  dutic?s  with  General  Vanden- 
berg, then  Director  of  Operations,  United  States  Air  Force.  In  May  1946,  I 
requested  separation  from  the  armed  services  and  immediately  started  the  pri-- 
vate  intelligence  services  in  which  I  am  engaged  today. 

I  am  the  unsalaried  president  of  the  International  Services  of  Information 
Foundation,  Inc.  This  is  a  nonprofit,  volunteer  organization  engaged  in  the  col- 
lection of  information  from  many  countries  of  the  world,  including  all  states 
within  the  Soviet  orbit  and  the  dissemination  of  such  information  to  our  sub- 
scribers.    The  trustees  of  the  foundation  are  : 

Richard  F.  Cleveland,  chairman  (lawyer,  Baltimore) 

U.  L.  Amoss,  president 

Maj.  Gen.  Henry  Evans,  Maryland  National  Guard,  broker. 

Brig.  Gen.  William  Purnell,  INIaryland  National  Guard,  general  counsel.  Western 

INIaryland  Railroad 
Brig.  Gen.  Thomas  Catron,  USA  retired 
Ma.i.  Gen.  Donald  Connolly,  USA  retired 
Ma.i.  Gen.  E.  S.  Hughes,  USA  retired 
Brig.  Gen.  Claude  Thiele,  USA  retired 
]\Iiss  IMary  Veronica  Grogan  (Mrs.  U.  L.  Amoss) 
Mr.  Joseph  IVIuUan,  president.  Champion  Brick  Co. 
Col.  Shipley  Thomas,  USAR  retired 
Mr.  Stuart  Bushong,  lawyer,  Hagerstown,  Md. 

Neither  this  foundation  nor  I  have  any  connection,  overt  or  covert,  with  any 
department  or  agency  of  the  United  States  nor,  of  course,  with  any  other  gov- 
ernment. 

I  do  not  claim  to  be  an  expert  on  Russia  nor  am  I  an  outstanding  specialist  on 
communism.  However,  I  am  supported  by  some  of  the  world's  greatest  authori- 
ties on  Russia  and  on  Russian  communism.  For  personal  safety,  these  men  must 
remain  anonymous  since  they  are  in  constant  contact  with  Soviet  sources  or  are 
easily  available  to  hostile  intervention. 

My  alarm  over  the  intentions  of  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Communist  Parties 
under  control  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  was  iirst  awakened  in  the  fall  of 
1944.  A  small  task  fcn-ce  under  my  command,  looking  for  German  saboteurs  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Chantilly,  France,  seized  some  papers  from  a  house  we  later 
discovered  to  be  the  clandestine  headquarters  of  a  French  militant  Communist 
underground  formation.  Included  in  tiie  papers  were  Moscow  orders  instructing 
this  group,  in  coordination  with  others,  to  attack  the  rear  of  American  military 
forces  in  France  in  the  event  American  troops  managed  to  cut  their  way  across 
the  Rhine  before  Soviet  troops  in  the  East  had  advanced  sufficiently  to  deny  a 
further  American  advance.     The  orders  were  detailed  and  specified  attacks  of  a 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  243 

guerrilla  nature,  cutting  of  American  communications,  sabotage  of  fuel  supply 
dumps,  of  United  States  airplanes,  and  for  the  assassination  of  United  States 
commanders. 

Other  Moscow  instructions  contained  in  the  papers  we  had  seized  instructed 
French  militant  Communists  to  file  applications  for  postwar  military  training, 
emphasizing  that  in  the  postwar  French  military  establishment  it  was  desirable 
for  as  many  Communist  battalion  commanders  as  possible  to  qualify.  The  in- 
structions said  that  this  was  the  rank  that  could  control  the  French  Army. 
Listed  also,  were  the  names  of  several  cooperating  officers  of  general  rank.  One 
paper  from  Moscow  was  signed  by  Maurice  Thorez. 

It  was  then  that  I  realized  that  world  war  III  had  begun  before  World  War  II 
had  actually  been  won.  I  believe,  but  do  not  know  of  my  own  knowledge,  that  it 
was  about  this  time  that  Mr.  A.  A.  Berle  made  a  public  statement  to  the  effect 
that  he  distrusted  Soviet  intentions.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  intelligence  to 
which  I  have  referred  above  had  reached  Mr.  Berle. 

For  some  years  military  and  political  writers  have  been  speculating  as  to  the 
advisability  of  launching  a  "preventative  war."  Already,  in  1944,  it  was  too  late 
to  prevent  world  war  III.  A  war-in-being  cannot  be  prevented.  All  that  remains 
to  be  done  is  to  win  it. 

World  war  III,  so  far,  is  a  limited  war,  restricted  to  certain  weapons,  to  cer- 
tain means,  and  to  certain  areas.  But  it  has  ever  been  spilling  into  new  areas. 
Until  now,  it  has  been  the  Soviet  Communists  who  have  chosen  the  weapons, 
the  means,  the  place,  and  the  time  of  attack.  Initiative  lies  in  Soviet  hands. 
Military  commanders  believe  that  victory  goes  to  him  who  possesses  the  initia- 
tive, defeat  to  him  who  remains  on  the  defensive.  The  Maginot  Line  did  not  save 
France.    There  is  not  even  the  possibility  of  a  Maginot  Line  in  subversion. 

Even  so,  some  of  our  faltering  allies  accuse  us  of  using  too  much  initiative. 
They  say  that  they  are  afraid  that  we  will  drag  them  into  war.  They  complain 
that  we  are  too  new,  too  "green"  in  the  conduct  of  affairs.  "Childish,"  "emo- 
tional," "unstable,"  they  call  us.  They  suggest  that  we  should  put  our  resources 
back  of  their  diplomatic  leadership  and  allow  their  skilled  diplomats  with  "long 
tradition  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs"  to  lead  us. 

I  submit  that  it  was  not  American  diplomacy  that  brought  forth  two  world 
wars.  We  dragged  no  nation  into  those  wars ;  it  might  be  said  that  we  were 
dragged  into  them.  The  only  war  into  which  even  an  unfair  criticism  might 
accuse  America  of  dragging  others,  is  the  Korean  war.  But  even  here,  the  South 
Koreans  and  we  furnished  the  bulk  of  the  lighting  forces  and  virtually  all  of  the 
material.  For  the  sake  of  permitting  the  Korean  war  to  be  a  United  Nations 
and  not  an  American  affair,  we  accepted  small  token  forces  and  paid  for  them  by 
submitting  ourselves  to  the  criticisms  of  our  allies  and  by  allowing  them  to  in- 
fluence us  to  settle  for  less  than  a  military  decision.  Though  diplomacy  is  out 
of  my  sphere  and  I  have  no  competence  in  foreign  policy,  yet  as  a  plain  citizen 
I  remain  unmoved  by  the  criticisms  of  our  allies  in  a  sphere  in  which  they  have 
displayed  no  brilliance  for  decades. 

I  am  attracted  by  Senator  Tenner's  remarks  of  May  13,  1954,  proposing  sever- 
ance of  diplomatic  relations  with  Russia.  As  a  plain  citizen  it  makes  sense  to  me 
that  we  should  recognize  Russia— but  recognize  her  for  what  she  is,  a  de- 
clared enemy  of  the  United  States,  a  belligerent  committing  hostile  acts  against 
this  country,  its  citizens  and  their  free  institutions. 
I  submit  the  following  propositions : 

1.  It  is  too  late  to  prevent  world  war  III. 

2.  The  first  line  of  defense  for  any  nation  is  intelligence. 

3.  Defense  is  not  sufficient. 

4.  Though  the  present  conflict  is  limited,  earlier  limits  were  exceeded  and 
it  is  not  guaranteed  that  present  limits  will  be  observed  until  we  may  pass  from 
a  half  to  a  three-quarters  or  even  to  a  total  war. 

5.  To  avoid  a  civilization-destroying  total  war,  it  is  necessary  to  win  the  war 
that  has  been  thrust  upon  us.  The  best  way  to  prevent  a  general  war  is  to  make 
it  unprofitable,  even  impossible,  for  the  enemy  to  wage  one. 

It  would  be  repetitious  to  repeat  the  record  of  Soviet  aggression.  We  know 
that  Soviet-sponsored  arms  have  killed  Americans  on  the  battlefield.  We  know 
that  Soviet  agents  have  subverted  American  citizens.  We  know  about  the  sub- 
versive war  they  wage  on  our  docks,  aboard  our  ships,  in  our  factories  and,  even 
in  our  free  institutions.  We  are  familiar  with  their  ugly  propaganda  and  the 
slanderous  lies  they  publish  against  honorable,  leading  Americans.  We  know 
that  the  Soviets  have  kept  vast  armies  in  being  and  that  they  are  furiously  arm- 


244  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

ing.    We  know  that  Moscow-ordered  agents  have  and  are  attempting  to  seize 
control  of  still-free  governments.     But  let  us  look  at  the  record  as  of  today : 

The  Soviets  are  rearming.  From  sources  in  Moscow  I  learn  that  the  informed 
man-in-the-street  generally  believes  that  Soviet  Russia  will  be  engaged  in  a 
general  war  within  5  years.  Some  informants  believe  the  general  war  may  come 
much  earlier. 

STRATEGY 

Until  now,  Russia's  military  strategy  has  been  based  on  a  land  mass  controlled 
by  massed  armies.  The  role  of  the  Russian  Navy  has  been  the  defense  of  the 
Russian  Army's  sea  flanks.     Stalin  followed  Mackinder  who  claimed: 

Stalin  depended  on  his  mass  army  to  dominate  the  world.  The  Soviet  Navy 
and  Air  Force  were  but  adjuncts  to  his  land  forces.  Stalin  denied  the  theory 
that  sea  dominion  is  a  prerequisite  to  power;  believed  a  land  mass  could  win 
adequate  water  transport. 

Stalin  harked  back  50  years  for  his  concepts  of  a  strategy  that  would  win  a 
world  for  Soviet  Russia ;  borrowed  his  tlieme  from  H.  J.  Mackinder  who,  about 
the  year  1900,  presented  the  Geographical  Pivot  of  History  to  the  Royal  Geo- 
graphic Society.     (Mackinder  was  a  teacher  in  the  London  School  of  Economics.) 

Mackinder  claimed: 

1.  The  maritime  age  has  passed. 

2.  From  now  (1900),  land  power  will  be  decisive. 

3..  Explorations  have  been  completed ;  the  world  now  is  a  closed  system ;  any 
exnansion  of  any  power  will  lead  to  disturbances  on  a  world  scale. 

4.  The  greatest  land  mass  lies  in  the  Old  World.  Its  heart  lies  in  Russia — 
out  of  reach  of  sea  power. 

5.  The  character  of  this  "heartland"  has  altered.  No  longer  the  scene  of 
horse-and-camel-borne  nomadic  raids  which,  until  now,  devastated  settled 
lands  on  its  periphery.  This  great  area  is  the  home  of  vast  populations,  served 
by  modern  communications.  It  is,  thus,  the  source  of  enormous  potential  power ; 
occupies  the  most  valuable  strategic  position  in  the  world.  It  enjoys  remark- 
able interior  lines  of  communication.     It  is  the  pivotal  state. 

6.  Outside  the  "heartland,"  there  is  an  inner  crescent  of  marginal  continental 
states — the  European  coasts,  the  deserts,  and  the  mousoon  coasts. 

7.  Expansion  of  the  pivotal  state  over  the  marginal  lands  will  enable  Russia 
to  become  a  naval  power ;  if  industrialization  is  achieved,  this  power  could  build 
great  fleets,  a  further  enablement  to  reach  the  goal  of  world  supremacy. 

8.  Dominance  over  or  alliance  with  Germany  could  assure  this  aim. 

9.  Against  this  threat,  the  "lands  of  the  outer  insular  crescent" — (Great 
Britain,  America,  Japan,  Australia)— should  build  and  jealously  maintain 
bridgeheads  in  France,  Italy,  Egypt,  India— and  Korea.  Only  thus  can  the 
pivotal  state  be  prevented  from  world  dominion.     (This  was  written  in  1900.) 

Mackinder  thought  in  two  elements,  the  sea  and  the  land.  He  worked  and 
thought  before  the  airplane  had  made  the  air  a  third  strategic  space. 

Bomber  and  atom  bomb  forced  Stalin  to  alter  his  original  planning;  the 
threat  of  the  devastation  of  the  atom  had  to  be  countered.  The  invulnerable 
"heartland"  became  susceptible  to  potentially  mortal  wounds. 

Mackinder  said,  and  Stalin  believed: 

Who  rules  East  Europe — commands  the  "heartland." 

Who  rules  the  "heartland" — commands  the  "world  island." 

Who  rules  the  "world  island" — commands  the  world. 

The  great  "heartland"  lies  within  Russia;  Russia  is  the  "pivotal  power"  on 
whose  axis  world  power  might  revolve. 

So,  Soviet  Russia,  moved  according  to  pattern.  She  pushed  her  armies  to  the 
Elbe  and  Vienna ;  ruled  East  Europe.  She  commenced  the  fortification  of  the 
shores  of  the  "world  island,"  the  shores  of  the  Arctic,  the  Baltic  and  the  Black 
Sea. 

The  Black  Sea  was  defended  by  naval  bases  from  Burgos,  Bulgaria,  to  Batum, 
Transcaucasia.  Airfields  provide  cover  for  the  entire  Black  Sea.  The  Black 
Sea  is  sealed ;  has  become  a  part  of  the  "heartland." 

The  Baltic  Sea,  relatively  long  and  narrow,  is  effectively  commanded  by  a 
series  of  naval  bases  in  Poland  and  the  Soviet  Union ;  from  Stettin  to  Porkkala 
(Finland),  Together  with  bases  in  East  Germany;  with  a  well-integrated  sys- 
tem of  airfields  and  with  guided-missile  bases,  and  especially  because  of  the 
easily  mined  narrow  straits,  the  Baltic  can  be  denied  to  Western  naval  forces. 
(Soviet  Russia  will  seize  the  Danish  island  of  Bornholm.)  The  Baltic  is  a  part 
of  the  "heartland." 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    TrOP!LD    CO^MATUNISM  245 

The  Arctic  Sea  was  cousidered  by  Mackinder  an  impassable  barrier.  New 
arctic  navigational  developments :  the  opening  of  the  Great  Northern  Sea  Rout^ 
from  Murmansk  along  the  Siberian  coast  to  the  Bering  Straits  and  Vladivostock ; 
and  the  sensational  development  of  airpower  have  partially  invalidated  Mackin- 
der. Soviet  Russia  took  measures,  among  which  was  the  development  of  the 
northern  shores  and  the  northern  islands.  They  connected  the  Polar  cap  with 
the  Arctic  section  lying  between  172°  west  and  32°  east. 

A  special  northern  sea  route  administration  was  established,  including  in  its 
authority  Soviet  lands  north  of  the  62°  parallel.  Ports,  naval  stations,  settle- 
ments, weather  stations,  and  airfields  are  rapidly  being  built,  one  after  the 
other.    East  of  Lena,  the  zone  is  under  the  administration  of : 

The  Dalstroy,  where  in  1951  new  airfields  and  weather  stations  were  being 
added  to  1950's  200  weather  stations;  2,500  planes  provide  aerial  transport;  50 
icebreakers,  some  of  them  American  property,  keep  the  sea  route  open  so  that 
ships  can  ply  the  northern  sea  route  150  days  in  a  normal  year. 

Two  conflicting  military  doctrines  faced  each  other  in  Korea.  The  Russian- 
supported  land-based  massed  armies  of  North  Korea  and  Communist  China 
against  the  sea-supplied  forces  of  the  United  States.  The  Soviet  high  command 
apparently  drew  a  lesson  from  that  conflict. 

There  now  has  been  launched  a  naval  strategy  and  Soviet  Russia  is  bent  on 
becoming  a  naval  power,  supported  by  airpower. 

It  seems  to  me  that  too  little  public  attention  has  been  paid  to  newest  Soviet 
naval  plans.  (I  assume  that  the  very  efficient  United  States  Naval  Intelligence 
is  progressively  informed.) 

The  Russian  planners  have  also  drawn  a  naval  lesson  from  Hitler.  When 
Hitler  invaded  Poland  on  September  1, 1939,  Germany  was  not  ready  for  a  major 
war  at  sea.  The  German  surface  fleet  consisted  of  no  more  than  2  old  battle- 
ships, 2  battle  cruisers,  3  pocket  battleships,  8  cruisers,  and  22  destroyers.  A 
few  heavy  ships  were  still  building,  but  only  2  battleships  and  1  cruiser  were 
completed  during  the  war. 

The  German  Naval  Staff  had  insisted  on  a  larger  Navy  before  engaging  Great 
Britain  in  war.  Admiral  Doenitz  had  insisted  that  Germany  needed  800  U-boats 
before  fighting  England.  But  the  war  started  with  but  26  U-boats  suitable  for 
Atlantic  operations  and  of  these,  only  8  or  9  could  be  kept  in  the  Atlantic  at  a 
time. 

Yet,  commencing  the  war  with  less  than  10  percent  of  the  calculated  mini- 
mum of  submarines,  Germany  all  but  starved  the  British  Isles.  Before  America 
entered  the  war,  a  British  intelligence  officer  told  me  that  the  average  life  expect- 
ancy of  a  British  freighter  was  less  than  6  months. 

Soviet  Russia  has  in  being  more  than  10  times  the  number  of  submarines  Hitler 
had  when  he  started  the  war.  And  the  bulk  of  these  are  improvements  on  the 
German  snorkel  which  never  saw  battle  in  the  Atlantic.  Russian  submarines 
are  roving  the  seven  seas ;  they  have  made  landings  in  Central  America  and  on 
the  English  coast.  It  is  believed,  though  not  proved,  by  my  sources  that  they 
have  been  in  contact  with  clandestine  parties  on  America's  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
shores. 

Soviet  Russia  has  a  numerous  destroyer  fleet,  a  number  of  cruisers  of  the 
Sverdlov  class  which  are  virtually  smaller  editions  of  Germany's  pocket  bat- 
tleships. She  is  reported  to  be  building  aircraft  carriers.  I  do  not  here  cite 
figures  obtained  from  my  own  sources  because  they  do  not  agree  with  figures 
published  from  United  States  naval  sources  and  I  assume  the  latter  to  be  correct. 

With  Soviet  strategy  including  plans  for  offensive  as  well  as  defensive  naval 
warfare,  the  direction  of  Soviet  global  strategy  has  changed  from  east-west  to 
north-south. 

Until  and  unless  Soviet  Russia  can  effectively  neutralize  American  and  British 
seapower,  Russian  planners  believe  in  transpolar  attack.  They  believe  that  their 
present  and  anticipated  gains  in  the  Far  East  plus  the  belt  of  European  satellite 
states  afford  adequate  defense  on  both  flanks. 

In  this  case,  it  is  well  to  look  at  recent  Russian  action,  plans  and  propaganda. 

Major  preparations  for  transpolar  war  are  being  made  on  the  northern  coast 
of  Siberia.  Virtually  every  Soviet  Arctic  island  is  equipped  with  antiaircraft 
warning  systems.  Longrange  rocket  installations  have  been  established  in  (1) 
Magadan  Oblast,  (2)  Taymyr  Peninsula,  (3)  Arkhangelsk  Oblast  and,  (4)  Kola 
Peninsula. 

Soviet  antiaircraft  artillery  commanders  and  the  Taymyr  rocket  command  have 
been  ordered  to  be  in  battle  readiness  this  year. 


246  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

My  sources  believe  that  the  Soviet  seventh  and  eighth  Antarctic  whaling  ex- 
peditions carried  sulimarines,  submarine  crews  and  base  staff  to  the  Antarctic. 
With  the  respect  I  have  for  United  States  Naval  Intelligence,  I  have  no  doubt 
that  a.  search  is  iieing  made  for  traces  of  these  alleged  new  bases.  The  "Aleut" 
whaling  flotilla  (based  on  the  Kurile  Islands)  and  the  Kurilskaya  whaling  flo- 
tilla (based  in  the  Northern  Pacific)  are  believed  to  be  serving  Soviet  naval 
interests. 

While  the  direction  of  Soviet  armed  attaclr,  as  now  viewed  in  the  Kremlin 
would  be  north-south,  the  direction  of  immediate  expansion  is  indicated  by  the 
term  often  heard  in  Soviet  military  circles ;  the  Moscow-Sydney  axis,  as  I  have 
long  pointed  out  to  my  readers.  The  final  goal  is  Australia,  as  was  more  or  less 
indicated  by  Mr.  Petrov's  revelations  when  he  defected.  This  ultimate  aim  is 
also  indicated  the  stubbornness  of  Communist  pressure  on  Viet  Nam,  Laos, 
Cambodia,  Malaya,  and  Indonesia  and  by  mounting  Communist  pressure  on  the 
Philippines. 

In  an  address  I  made  at  a  closed  meeting  at  the  Lord  Baltimore  Hotel  in  Balti- 
more, October  19,  1953,  I  repeated  my  previous  warnings  about  Guatemala  and 
listed  the  countries  where  Soviet  Communists  were  making  or  had  made  bids 
to  take  over  local  governments  as  follows  : 

"Guatemala — in  Red  political  hands.  British  Guiana,  opposite  to  which  is 
the  Gold  Coast  of  Africa  and  Nigeria  where  local  Communists  are  making  a  strong 
bid  for  control.  Kenya.  Goa  in  Portuguese  India  where  Communists  are  having 
their  own  way.  Still  farther  East,  the  vast  new  Communist  state  of  Audhra, 
and  Malaya  and  Indochina  where  the  struggle  goes  on." 

With  this  oversimplified  detailing  of  States  where  local  subversive  forces  are 
making  or  have  made  sti'ong  attempts  to  take  over  local  governments,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  there  is  an  attempt  to  create  a  world-spanning  framework  of  poten- 
tial colonial  republics.  Against  the  Communist  complaint  of  capitalist  encircle- 
ment, it  is  interesting  to  ask.  Who  is  encircling  whom? 

The  schene  is  simple.  Take  a  primitive  people.  Create  a  Communist-domi- 
nated government  or  administration.  Demand  recognition  from  Moscow  and  the 
Soviet  Orbit.  That  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  create  a  chain  of  submarine  and  air 
bases  spanning  the  world. 

But  two  events  happened.  The  British  Government  acted  swiftly  in  British 
Guiana.  Anti-Communist  forces  drove  the  Communist-dominated  government 
out  of  Guatemala.    From  this  latter  event,  there  was  an  unexpected  second  gain. 

Soviet  propaganda  blasted  the  United  States  and  accused  this  coimtry  of  hav- 
ing caused  and  managed  the  revolution.  This  propaganda  has  backfired.  Among 
those  who  heard  it  were  many  who  secretly  hate  their  Red  masters  and  who 
had  despaired  of  the  great  Nation  of  America  standing  up  to  any  jiart  of  the 
constant  whittling  away  at  the  perimeters  of  the  free  world.  My  sources  within 
the  Soviet  orbit  tell  me  that  the  Soviet-disseminated  "news"  that  America  had 
forestalled  another  Red  base  electrified  these  people,  put  new  heart  into  their 
secret  resistance,  and  raised  American  prestige. 

From  the  welter  of  information  regularly  flowing  from  Soviet  and  Soviet  orbit 
sources,  I  select  the  following  4  items,  1  the  slow  propaganda  buildup  for  possible 
later  agitation,  and  1  describing  1  section  of  Soviet  rocket  firing  experimentation  ; 
the  third,  an  item  of  naval  interest ;  the  last,  an  item  that  suggests  Russian  self- 
sufiiciency  in  the  supply  of  uranium. 

Even  so  strange  a  thing  as  strongly  hinted  Soviet  claims  to  Alaska  have  ap- 
peared. A  Soviet  lecturer  at  the  Warsaw  Political  Academy  in  1952  said  that 
Soviet  Russia  will  claim  Alaska  perhaps  during  the  year  1958.  Other  Alaska 
propaganda  has  appeared. 

One  of  my  informants  attended  a  feast  at  Murmansk  given  for  the  crews  of  the 
Soviet  icebreakers  Lenin,  Georgiy  Syedov,  and  LevanevsJci.  He  heard  the 
following : 

"Long-range  rocket  tests  have  been  and  are  being  carried  out  from  5  launching 
sites  on  the  Kola  Peninsula  for  a  range  up  to  3,105  miles.  Soviet  rocket  engineers 
claim  they  can  reach  6,210  miles.  However,  the  most  accurate  range  was  1,250 
miles.  Rockets  used  in  the  tests  are  improvements  on  the  German  2-stage  M-103's, 
developments  having  been  perfected  at  Khimki,  near  Moscow." 

The  Mariinsky  Canal  has  been  rebuilt.  Its  significance  is  the  fact  that  Soviet 
naval  vessels  including  submarines  and  up  to  destroyers  can  pass  on  guarded 
interior  lines  of  communication  between  the  North,  Baltic,  Caspian,  and  Black 
Seas,  as  originally  planned. 

Polish,  Czechoslovak,  and  East  German  uranium  mines  are  to  pass  to  the  con- 
trol of  a  Polish-Czech-German  combine  in  which  Russians  will  have  only  a  techni- 
cal advisory  capacity.    My  informants  believe  this  indicates  that  the  Russians 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  247 

believe  themselves  to  be  self-sufficieut  in  the  supply  of  uranium  from  Russian 
sources. 

TACTICS 

I  cite  here  the  classic  example  of  Soviet  escai)e  from  ol)literation,  the  per- 
fect example  of  successful  subversion  on  such  a  scale  that  all  history  cannot 
provide  a  case  that  equals  it.  This  secret  history  has  never  been  released  to 
the  general  public. 

It  began  in  the  early  1920's,  The  Bolshevik  regime  seemed  doomed.  As  al- 
ways when  in  trouble,  the  Soviets  appealed  for  a  peaceful  coexistence  with 
capitalist  countries.  With  tongue  in  cheek,  they  seemed  to  renounce  their  tenet 
that  communism  and  capitalism  could  not  live  side  by  side. 

Revolution  after  revolution  had  torn  the  Russians.  Between  April  2.5  and 
October  12,  1920,  through  the  insubordination  of  Stalin  and  Budenny,  the  Rus- 
sians lost  a  war  with  Poland  tbat  they  had  already  won.  By  1921,  Russian 
economy  had  all  but  collapsed.  There  were  peasant  uprisings;  factory  work- 
ers rioted.  Red  sailors  mutinied  and  were  defeated  only  after  much  bloodshed. 
Czarist  troops  had  massed  on  Russian  frontiers. 

Soviet  leaders  were  at  each  other's  throats.  To  placate  their  furious  popula- 
tions, freedom  of  trade  was  partially  restored.  Private  commercial  establish- 
ments were  allowed.  Russia  joined  in  the  economic  conference  at  Geneva  and 
expressed  a  willingness  to  cooperate  with  non-Communist  countries. 

While  Communist  Russia  was  buying  time,  her  subversive  machinery  was 
working.  By  exercise  of  terror  tactics,  a  Czarist  civil  servant,  Alexander 
Alexandrovitch  Yakushev  was  chosen  as  the  instrument  which  eventually  de- 
stroyed the  threat  of  the  patriotic  million  of  the  Russian  emigration,  who  crip- 
pled westei-n  intelligence  so  completely  that  its  Russian  services  have  never 
fully  recovered. 

Yakushev  became  the  instrument  of  death  of  countless  thousands  of  his  own 
kind.  If  there  had  been  no  Yakushev,  it  is  probable  that  there  would  have  been 
no  American  white  crosses  in  Korea.  Without  him,  it  is  probable  that  the 
world  would  not  now  be  suffering  a  half-world  war  III,  a  limited  war  that 
threatens  to  become  a  total  conflict  using  all  means  of  mass  destruction  and  in- 
volving all  the  people  of  the  earth. 

Yakushev,  guided  by  Secret  Police  Commissar  Kiyakovski,  assistant  chief 
for  counterintelligence,  W.  A.  Styrne,  and  Chief  Military  Censor  A.  A.  Langvoy, 
left  Russia,  He  established  himself  as  a  genuine  monarchist  with  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas  Nicolaivitch  and  convinced  him  that  secret  monarchist  movements 
existed  everywhere  in  Russia.  He  convinced  the  grand  duke  that  an  under- 
estimation of  the  virility  of  the  new  anti-Communist  Russia  would  be  a  fatal 
blunder,  because,  if  cooperation  with  western  forces  continued,  xenophobe  Rus- 
sia would  rally  around  the  Communists. 

Yakushev  convinced  the  emigre  Russians  that  their  activities  should  cease,  be- 
cause their  opposite  numbers  in  Russia  would  supply  all  intelligence  and  would 
execute  any  intelligence  assignment. 

The  emigre  press  changed  its  tone,  having  been  warned  that  exaggerated  zeal 
in  auticommunism  could  defeat  their  purposes.  i5migr4  public  organs  condemned 
warmongers  and  pointed  with  pride  to  the  great,  spontaneous  revival  in  the 
fatherland. 

Emigre  officers  introduced  Yakushev  to  various  European  army  general  staffs. 
The  heads  of  European  intelligence  services  were  charmed,  swallowed  the  bait, 
and  eagerly  cooperated  with  the  giant  network  covering  the  entire  Soviet  struc- 
ture. 

The  Soviet  secret  service  provided  Yakushev  with  authentic  military,  political, 
and  economic  documents,  and  provided  him  with  approximately  true  answers  to 
the  questionnaires  Western  intelligence  officers  had  given  him. 

European  offickils  helped  Yakushev  to  smuggle  alleged  Russian  monarchists 
into  Europe  and,  in  exchange,  European  intelligence  agents  were  smuggled  into 
Russia  where  they  attended  many  meetings  of  Soviet  agents  who  pretended  to  be 
monarchists,  until  even  the  most  skeptical  Western  agents  were  convinced  that 
a  monarchist  revolution  was  about  to  overwhelm  the  Bolsheviks. 

A  vast  flood  of  information  innundated  European  intelligence  services  which 
then  relinquished  their  existing  systems  within  Russia. 

Yakushev,  the  miracle  man,  got  his  men  attached  to  European  general  staffs. 
These  sent  critical  intelligence  to  the  Soviets ;  created  intrigues  within  Western 
military  establishments  and  stimulated  jealousies  between  contending  secret 
services. 


248  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMISrUNISM 

The  Grand  Duke  Cyril  Vladiniirovitch  was  convinced  that  the  monarchists  in 
Russia  were  near  success  and,  in  1927,  proclaimed,  "The  Soviet  constitution  is 
right  and  good,  only  the  top  strata  of  the  government  need  be  removed." 

Ii]migre  activity  liad  all  but  ceased;  all  ^migrfi  plans  were  known  to  the  Com- 
munists. Eleven  non-Communist  intelligence  services  had  relinquished  their  own 
networks.  The  real  anti-Bolshevik  leaders  in  Russia  were  uncovered  and  liqui- 
dated. The  threat  of  a  European-supported  reentry  of  a  million  Russians  into 
their  homeland  was  ended. 

For  7  years,  European  intelligence  chiefs  had  been  duped.  Until  this  day, 
Russian  sections  of  European  intelligence  systems  suffer  from  history's  greatest 
Intelligence  hoax  and  communism,  promising  peaceful  coexistence  with  the  demo- 
cratic world,  was  saved,  soon  to  destroy  many  of  the  very  states  with  whom  they 
had  promised  to  coexist. 

The  Russians  code-named  the  fantastic  operation  the  "Trust."  The  old  Trust 
is  dead,  but  a  new  Trust  is  at  work.  Already  it  has  planted  false  intelligence. 
Overseas  emigre  organizations  are  thoroughly  penetrated  by  Soviet  agents  of 
the  new  Trust. 

A  parade  of  informers  cross  western  lines — and  recross  into  the  Soviet  orbit 
with  ease.  False  underground  movements  are  established,  come  into  contact 
with  the  emigres  and,  through  them  establish  relationships  with  western  in- 
telligence and  with  western  military  officials. 

One  of  the  "lines"  used  is  that  any  attack  on  "eternal  Russia"  would  reunite 
dissident  Russians  now  "reluctantly"  serving  under  Red  command.  It  is  perti- 
nent to  ask  whether  it  is  honorable  to  sacrifice  the  lives  and  liberties  of  the 
numerous  non-Russian  Russians  and  of  non-Russian  Europeans  to  the  prob- 
lematical sentiments  of  the  enslaved  Russians  who,  it  is  claimed,  prefer  con- 
tinued enslavement  to  rescue  and  whose  condition  is  not  vastly  different  from 
that  which  their  forefathers  patiently  endured  for  six  centuries. 

Russian  Communists  use  many  vehicles  and  many  means  to  spread  contagion". 
A  plywood  company  in  a  western  capital  sends  agents  to  Africa.  A  western 
ship  has  agents  planted  among  its  crew.  Remnants  of  the  old  Nazi  secret  in- 
telligence systems  have  been  employed  in  Soviet  service.  (In  this  case  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  bulk  of  the  files  and  recoi'ds  of  the  Nazi  intelligence 
and  secret  police  systems  were  seized  by  the  Russians.)  Through  these,  they 
traced  Nazi  lines  to  western  countries.  By  blackmail,  they  have  compelled 
former  Nazi  secret  agents  in  Western  Europe  to  serve  Soviet  intelligence  and 
even  sabotage  purposes. 

New  schools  of  sabotage  and  intelligence  have  been  formed,  at  least  two  of  them 
In  Eastern  Germany.  One  of  these  schools  instructs  "students"  from  all  western 
countries.  The  graduate  "student"  returns  to  his  homeland,  but  under  a  new 
identity  to  a  new  community. 

There  is  presumptive  evidence  that  "students"  of  one  of  these  schools  are  prac- 
ticing in  France  and  England ;  perhaps  in  America.  It  is  believed  by  informants 
that  some  cases  of  sabotage  in  Great  Britain  were  perpetrated  by  graduate 
students  as  a  test  of  plans  drawn  for  more  serious  acts  of  sabotage  to  be  com- 
mitted at  a  later  date  at  a  given  signal. 

From  the  newspapers,  I  am  familiar  with  some  of  the  exploits  of  the  FBI  and 
of  other  United  States  security  agencies  and  I  have  read  something  of  the  careful 
work  of  this  committee.  But,  I  submit  that  the  work  of  even  so  great  and  com- 
petent an  institution  as  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  is  made  nearly  in- 
tolerable by  the  fact  that,  until  now,  we  have  acted  on  the  defensive.  We  al- 
low our  enemies  full  latitude  of  selecting  the  time,  the  place  and  the  weapon. 
But  we  do  not  place  him  on  the  defensive. 

I  suggest  that,  as  many  blows  as  we  have  suffered  at  the  hands  of  Soviet  agents. 
we  are  less  vulnerable  than  Soviet  Russia. 

Before  developing  this  theme,  I  would  like  to  insert  an  observation :  Commu- 
nism, as  sponsored  by  Moscow,  includes  the  doctrine  of  social  revolution  and  the 
use  of  violence  in  the  overthrow  of  the  existing  democratic  order.  It  sponsors 
class  warfare,  the  forcible  abolition  of  private  property  and  the  physical  liquida- 
tion of  the  bourgeois  class.  Communist  dogma  calls  for  totalitarian  dictation  by 
one  social  class,  led  by  the  Communist  Party. 

Communist  parties  in  the  Western  World  are  subordinate  to  the  Soviet  Com- 
munist Party  and  are  compelled  to  serve  the  interests  of  the  Soviet  state.  All 
modern  communism  is  called  on  to  serve  the  Soviet  Russian  state. 

Communism  thus  is  a  belligerent  and  threatens  the  state  by  violence.  Western 
Communist  parties  are  used  for  subversive  purposes,  such  as  espionage  and 
sabotage.  Therefore,  these  parties  and  their  members  must  be  dealt  with  under 
existing  criminal  codes. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  249 

I  am  dismayed  when  I  read  the  speeches  of  some  well-meaning  Americans  who 
call  for  us  to  develop  some  new  ideology,  some  grand  new  social-political-economic 
doctrine  and  then  to  proclaim  to  the  world  "what  we  are  for."  The  West  has 
enough  social,  economic,  and  political  programs.  Its  choice  of  them  and  the  appli- 
cation of  its  choice  properly  form  a  part  of  the  revolutionary  processes  of  demo- 
cratic society.  It  is  not  a  lack  of  positive  aims,  but  their  abundance  that  char- 
acterizes democracy.  The  problem  lies  in  the  choice  and  application  of  aims 
democratically  chosen,  and  this  is  the  duty  of  political  parties,  congresses,  govern- 
ments, and  even  oi  private  institutions. 

In  confronting  the  menace  of  Russian  communism,  I  submit  that  we  must  know 
Communist  aims,  evalute  Communist  means,  anticipate  Communist  methods  and 
seize  the  initiative  in  the  battle  that  has  been  thrust  upon  us.  We  should  carry 
that  battle  to  the  Communist  homeland. 

Russia  is  more  vulnerable  than  we. 

I  have  indicated  that  Soviet  Russia  calls  for  such  things  as  "peaceful  co- 
existence" whenever  she  is  in  trouble.  Soviet  Russia  is  in  trouble  and  Soviet 
Russia  is  vulnerable  to  a  clandestine  war  similar  to  that  she  wages  against  us. 

From  my  sources  I  draw  these  facts : 

1.  Of  the  approximately  200  million  peoples  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics,  only  about  75  million  are  Great  Russians.  The  true  Russian  is  a 
minority  in  his  own  country. 

2.  Bolshevism  rose  to  iwwer  on  the  shoulders  of  the  peasantry  and  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  workers.  The  peasantry  is  disillusioned.  The  peasant  has  been 
taken  from  his  small  holding  where,  even  with  a  wooden  plow,  he  was  able  to 
eke  out  a  living.  But,  on  the  collective  farm,  he  needs  machinery.  Many 
Russian  plants  turned  from  making  tools  of  peace  to  the  manufactures  of  war. 
Russia  began  to  import  agricultural  machinery  from  the  West.  The  embargo, 
as  violated  as  it  has  been,  has  forced  a  hard  decision  on  the  Kremlin.  Should 
munitions  factories  be  turned  back  to  the  manufacture  of  farm  machinery?  Or 
should  they  continue  to  battle  their  farmers  who,  unable  to  earn  their  keep 
w^ithout  machinery,  attempt  in  droves  to  escape.  The  workers  have  discovered 
that  their  unions,  rather  than  representing  their  interests,  are  Instruments  of 
the  state,  practicing  the  speedup  systems  so  hated  by  free  workers.  The  work- 
ers are  in  an  ugly  mood  and  there  has  been  repeated  trouble. 

3.  Russia's  collective  dictatorship  is  in  the  midst  of  vicious  intrigues.  It  is 
being  discovered  that  tyranny  is  indivisible.  There  can  be  no  one  thirty-sixth 
of  a  tyrant  nor  thirty-six  thirty-sixths  of  despotism.  Russia  now  is  uneasily 
governed.  Even  now,  a  contest  is  waging.  The  Malenkov  group  is  being 
attacked  by  a  combination  headed  by  Marshal  Voroshilov,  Foreign  Minister 
Molotov,  Marshal  Bulganin  and  the  new  party  boss,  Krushchev.  The  Malenkov 
group  is  fighting  back.  So  far  it  is  a  guerrilla  struggle.  Each  group  attacks 
the  aides,  supporter,  and  proteges  of  the  other.  The  Great  Russian  sneers  at  the 
"little"  Russian.  They  purged  the  Ukrainian  Government.  Krushchev  and  his 
lieutenant,  Kirichanko,  have  flown  their  colors  by  wearing  the  national  Ukrain- 
ian shirt.  This  may  seem  childish  by  western  standards,  but  the  challenge 
has  been  thrown  and  has  been  accepted. 

4.  The  climate  in  the  satellites  is  stormy.  No  longer  does  Russia  trust  satel- 
lite armed  forces.  Russian  officers  are  being  assigned  to  command  satellite 
forces  down  to  regimental  level.  The  noted  defections  from  the  Polish  Air 
Force  and  other  attempts  to  escape,  never  publicized,  have  caused  Poland's 
overlords  to  ground  the  entire  Polish  Air  Force  on  more  than  one  occasion. 
Ecapes  from  Polish  ships  have  caused  Russia  to  place  guards  aboard  these  ships, 
so  many  of  which  carry  arms  to  Communist  China. 

5.  Soviet  Russia's  massive  force  of  security  troops  is  not  large  enough  to 
cope  with  the  growing,  flaming  resistance.  Even  the  loyalty  of  some  of  the 
security  officers  is  doubted  as  a  search  for  pro-Beria  officers  continues. 

Communist  Russia  is  preparing  for  a  general  war. 

During  preparations,  and  to  gain  time  to  put  its  own  house  in  order,  Moscow 
proposes  a  truce,  a  peaceful  "coexistence."  While  proposals  for  "peace"  are 
being  offered,  a  new^  trust  is  operating,  new  acts  of  sabotage  are  being  com- 
mitted and  attempts  are  being  made  to  take  over  control  of  small  governmenta 
all  over  the  world. 

To  drop  our  military  guard  would  be  fatal.  To  improve  our  intelligence 
services  is  essential.     To  react  to  Soviet  subversion  is  necessary. 

Communist  Russia  and  Communist  satellites  are  in  a  ferment  and  Russian 
leaders  are  conducting  a  private  war  among  themselves. 

Voices  from  the  lands  of  our  allies  attack  the  United  States  for  even  the  small 
initiative  it  has  shown.     But  lack  of  initiative  has  given  them,  and  us,  defeat 


250  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

after  defeat.  Tlie  number  of  our  potential  allies  is  greater  within  the  Soviet 
orbit  than  without. 

We  are  engaged  in  a  limited  war  not  of  our  choosing.  If  we  lose  the  half  war, 
we  lose  everything.  If  we  win  the  half  war,  we  stand  our  best  chance  of 
preventing  a  total  war. 

AVithout  sponsoring  open  rebellion  in  the  Soviet  orbit  (though  Russia  does 
sponsor  rebellion  in  ours),  it  is  probable  that  the  Red  regime  could  be  neutralized 
and  might  be  overthrown. 

An  open  hearing  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  possible  ways  and  means  of 
achieving  the  aims  to  which  I  have  alluded.  Nor  am  I  the  one  most  qualified 
to  do  so.     But  someone  should. 

If  v.-e  don't  win  the  half  war,  we  will  surrender  to  the  Communist  will  or 
eventually  will  be  forced  to  fight  a  total  war. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  now  proceed. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  will  you  kindly  recite  a  word  of  your  personal 
background  and  personal  history  with  particular  emphasis  to  the 
experience  which  you  have  had  in  intelligence  work? 

Mr.  Amoss.  In  1942,  the  early  part  of  1942, 1  joined  the  then  Office 
of  the  Coordinator  of  Information,  which  later  became  the  Office  of 
Strategic  Services,  under  General  Donovan.  My  initial  responsibil- 
ity was  intelligence,  secret  intelligence,  from  eastern  Europe.  In 
January  of  1943  I  was  transferred  to  Egypt,  where  I  was  deputy 
for  secret  intelligence,  sabotage,  guerrilla  warfare,  psychological  w^ar- 
fare,  in  the  theater  that  ran  from  Italy  to  India  and  from  Poland  to 
Ethiopia. 

In  1944  I  was  taken  by  General  Brereton,  who  was  the  then  theater 
commander  of  the  Middle  East  and  commanding  General  of  the  Ninth 
Air  Force,  to  England  where  the  Ninth  Air  Force  was  scheduled  to 
give  tactical  support  for  the  invasion  of  Normandy. 

I  served  him  in  a  capacity  as  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  with  special 
responsibilities  for  special  intelligence  and  a  number  of  other  activ- 
ities, which  I  have  detailed  in  this  paper. 

In  1946  I  was  separated  from  the  services  and  organized  the  first 
foundation,  because  it  seemed  to  me  that,  in  effect,  citizens  of  the 
United  States  needed  more  information  than  they  were  getting  about 
plans,  particularly  of  potential  enemy  countries,  before  those  plans 
could  become  events. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  you  publish  certain  literature  from  time  to  time  in 
which  you  set  forth  on  the  basis  of  the  intelligence  reports  which  you 
receive  in  the  worldwide  network  of  international  services,  informa- 
tion respecting  the  i^lans  and  strategy  and  tactics  of  the  Soviets,  is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  That  is  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  may  I  respectfully  suggest  that  you  proceed 
now  to  speak  extemporaneously  on  the  various  items  which  you  have 
detailed  in  your  prepared  statement? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Perhaps  the  most  operative  thing  that  happened  to  me 
during  World  War  II  was  the  incident  of  a  small  task  force  that  I 
commanded  raiding  several  houses  in  a  French  village  near  Chantilly 
to  look  for  traces  of  German  saboteurs  who  had  been  left  behind  in 
that  area.  These  chaps  brought  back  a  series  of  papers  that  had  been 
left  behind  by  a  French  Communist  militant  underground  group. 

In  those  papers  we  discovered  that  there  had  been  orders  issued  by 
direction  of  Moscow  for  French  militant  Communist  groups  to  attack 
our  rear,  our  supply,  try  to  cut  our  communications  in  the  event  that 
American  forces  reached  and  crossed  the  Rhine  before  Soviet  forces 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  251 

were  in  a  position  to  contest  further  advance.  There  were  a  number 
of  other  items  in  these  papers  that  were  electrifying  to  us.  They  sug- 
gested in  that  event  that  there  should  be  assassination  of  certain 
American  general  officers,  and  one  thing  that  interested  us  was  that 
one  of  the  papers  was  signed  by  Maurice  Thorez,  who  had  deserted 
the  French  army  and  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Moscow  and  was  giving 
orders  to  French  forces  in  the  interior. 

There  was  another  item  that  seemed  to  me  to  be  important  and  that 
was  the  fact  that  members  of  the  Communist  underground  in  France 
were  instructed  as  far  as  possible  to  apply  for  instruction  and  train- 
ing in  postwar  military  schools  attempting  to  reach  the  grade  of  com- 
mandant or  major,  because  the  paper  went  on  to  say  that  this  grade 
could  control  the  French  Army. 

It  then  occurred  to  me,  and  I  had  no  reason  to  change  my  mind, 
that  world  war  III  had  begun  before  World  War  II  had  been  won. 
I  have  noticed  discussions  in  the  public  press  and  heard  it  on  the 
radio,  certain  people  have  from  time  to  time  suggested  that  we  should 
fight  a  war  to  prevent  world  war  III.  But  it  is  too  late  to  do  that, 
because  we  already  have  it. 

In  my  opinion,  the  only  thing  that  can  be  done  as  far  as  world 
war  III  is  concerned  is  to  surrender  to  the  limited  war  which  is  now 
going  on,  or  to  fight  that  limited  war  and  win  that  limited  war,  or  we 
will  face  a  total,  all-out  world  war  III. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  on  the  basis  of  the  intelligence  reports  which 
you  receive  from  the  worldwide  network  established  by  your  founda- 
tion, would  you  kindly  address  yourself  to  the  subject  of  the  present 
military  strategy  of  the  Soviets? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Until  comparatively  recently,  Soviet  military  strategy 
in  my  opinion  has  been  based  on  the  possession  of  a  huge  land  mass 
and  the  use  of  massed  armies.  Before  the  Soviets,  the  Russian  navy, 
has  been  principally  the  defense  of  the  sea  flanks  of  the  land  armies. 

Stalin  before  his  death  had  followed  pretty  much  the  theory  of 
Mackinder,  who  spoke  of  the  heartland  of  Europe  and  said  back  as 
early  as  1900  tliat  he  who  controlled  Russia  and  possibly  Germany 
could  control  the  world. 

But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  Soviet  General  Staff  must  have  taken 
some  note  of  the  war  in  Korea,  where  the  North  Korean  and  Chinese 
massed  armies  faced  sea-supplied  South  Korean  and  American 
Armies. 

It  is  from  about  that  time  that  w^e  have  noticed  steady  acceleration 
in  the  building  of  naval  vessels  for  Soviet  Russia.  The  thing  that  is 
interesting  to  me  in  observing  this  thing  is  that  Admiral  Doenitz 
advised  Hitler  not  to  start  World  War  II  until  he  had  at  least  300 
submarines  of  battle  quality  in  being.  At  the  time  Hitler  started 
World  War  II  they  were  able  to  put  to  sea  only  from  8  to  9  sub- 
marines at  a  time.  Yet,  during  the  early  part  of  World  War  II  they 
nearly  starved  the  British  Isles  with  that  small  pack  of  submarines. 

Further  than  that,  apparently  Soviet  Russia  has  gone  into  the 
building  of  very  modern  sumbarines,  the  snorkel,  the  hydrogen- 
peroxide-powered  submarine,  and  I  understand,  though  I  am  not 
competent  to  pass  judgment  on  this  thing,  that  ordinary  radar,  under- 
sea radar,  is  ineffective  against  this.  We  believe  that  Russia  has 
approximately  300  snorkel  submarines  in  being. 


252  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

From  evidence  that  some  of  my  informants  have  given  me,  we  are 
certain  that  some  of  these  submarines  are  roaming  in  the  free  seas. 
We  have  presumptive,  but  not  completely  established,  evidence  that 
the  Ninth  and  I  think  it  was  the  Seventh  and  Eighth  Antarctic  Whal- 
ing Expeditions  of  Russia  have  taken  submarines,  submarine  crews 
and  base  crews,  to  the  Antarctic.  If  it  is  true,  as  we  believe,  that 
Soviet  Eussia  has  now  changed  the  direction  of  her  strategy  from 
east  to  west  to  north  to  south,  it  is  an  important  point  to  be  ex- 
amined by  countries'  intelligence  agencies,  because  if  the  Panama 
Canal  is  shot  out,  the  submarine  bases  down  in  the  Antarctic  and 
perhaps  clandestine  bases  in  South  America  could  interdict  our  free 
communication  between  the  seas. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  observations  to  make,  Colonel,  with 
respect  to  the  attempt  of  the  Soviets  to  encircle  the  United  States 
from  the  standpoint  of  bases  for  operation  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Yes,  sir.  It  has  always  seemed  to  me  to  be  an  almost 
amusing  thing,  that  according  to  Soviet  propaganda,  she  is  being  en- 
circled by  capitalistic  countries.  In  the  first  place,  it  depends  upon 
which  projection  of  a  map  you  look  at.  On  the  Mercator  projection, 
perhaps  they  could  interpret  a  slight  encirclement.  But  if  you  take 
a  globe  instead  of  a  flat  map  the  question  comes  up  as  to  who  is  en- 
circling whom.  A  thing  that  has  appeared  to  me  to  be  operatively 
very  important  is  the  attempts  being  made  by  Soviet  agents  in  a 
great  number  of  countries,  in  Guatemala,  British  Guiana,  the  Gold 
Coast  of  Africa  and  Nigeria,  which  of  course  are  just  across  the  sea 
from  Guiana. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  significance  of  those  penetrations  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  The  Soviet  agents  are  attempting  to  create,  through 
local  Communist  forces  and  committees,  a  penetration  of,  and  taking 
over  of  the  local  governments  or  the  administrative  services  of  these 
countries. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why?  What  is  the  particular  significance  of  these 
areas  to  the  world  strategy  of  the  Soviets  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  think  you  want  to  carry  on  that  statement,  because  the 
same  efforts  are  being  made  in  Kenya,  Goa,  in  Portuguese  India,  and 
they  have  already  taken  over  the  great  new  Communist  state  of 
Andhra,  India,  and  we  know  what  they  are  trying  to  do  in  Korea  and 
China. 

Following  this  on  the  map,  you  would  have  a  complete  encirclement 
of  our  sphere.  In  these  areas  if  there  were  hidden  airfields,  secret 
submarine  bases,  the  United  States  would  be  militarily  surrounded  by 
very  effective  packs  that  would  affect  a  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  the  intelligence  reports  which  you  re- 
ceived, and  which  your  agency  is  undertaking  to  appraise,  are  the 
Soviets  at  the  present  time  engaged  in  this  encirclement  process  which 
you  have  been  recounting  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Yes,  sir ;  they  are.  And  it  is  active  and  operative  now. 
There  have  been  two  incidents,  as  has  been  shown  by  the  press,  the 
British  Government  moving  quickly  in  British  Guiana,  and  the  affair 
in  Guatemala.  That  one,  I  think,  is  rather  amusing  and  very  im- 
portant. The  Soviet  propaganda  machine  thundered  out  accusations 
that  the  United  States  had  sponsored,  fostered,  and  pushed  this  opera- 
tion. Irrespective  of  whether  tliere  is  any  truth  or  not  in  it,  the  man 
in  the  street  in  the  Soviet  orbit  took  that  propaganda,  believed  it,  and 
it  gave  him  a  sliot  in  the  arm.     There  was  new  prestige. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  253 

He  said,  "At  last  we  see  that  the  United  States  of  America  is  not 
allowing  our  masters  to  whittle  away  the  perimeters  of  her  safety."' 

And  it  gave  him  some  hope  that  that  at  least  some  initiative  is  be- 
ing seized  by  this  country. 

Mr.  Akens.  Is  Alaska  an  anchor  point  on  the  offensive  of  the  Sovi- 
ets to  undertake  to  encircle  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Akens.  What  efforts  are  being  made,  on  the  basis  of  your  infor- 
mation, by  the  Soviets  to  evidence  designs  on  Alaska  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Well,  No.  1,  the  Siberia  area  bases  on  Alaska  are  being 
heavily  armed  with  long-range  guided  missiles,  but  it,  of  course,  is 
true  that  initial  Eussian  propaganda  sometimes  and  very  often  gives 
a  clue  to  future  aims.  And  there  has  been,  beginning  I  thiiik  in 
1951  or  1952,  the  release  of  a  number  of  claims  to  Alaska. 

Mr.  Arens.  By  whom  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  By  Soviet  lecturers  and  political  academies  like  the 
Frunze  Academy  in  Moscow.  I  have  in  my  files  which  I  did  not  bring 
here  a  lot  of  copies  of  their  propaganda  in  their  own  papers,  in  their 
scientific  journals,  giving  the  argument  that  Alaska  was  virtually 
stolen.  Then  I  do  have  one  map  which  shows  Alaska  reverting  to 
Soviet  Russia. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  Colonel,  may  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  in- 
formation which  is  in  your  files,  and  the  intelligence  reports  which 
you  have  received  worldwide,  with  reference  to  Soviet  military  prep- 
arations in  the  field  of  rockets. 

Mr.  Amoss.  Yes.  At  the  return  of  three  Soviet  icebreakers  to 
Murmansk,  the  crews  were  given  a  celebration.  One  of  my  in- 
formants attended,  and  he  heard  these  things,  that  long-range  rocket 
tests  have  been  and  are  being  carried  out  from  different  launching 
sites  on  the  Kola  Peninsula  for  a  range  of  up  to  3,105  miles.  Soviet 
rocket  engineers,  however,  claim  that  they  can  reach  6,210  miles.  My 
informant  said  he  was  told  that  the  most  accurate  range  was  1,250 
miles.  Rockets  used  in  these  tests  are  improvements  on  the  German 
2-stage  M-103  and  they  were  developed  and  perfected  at  Khimki,  near 
Moscow.  There  is  a  thing  which  I  didn't  put  in  the  paper  which  has 
a  little  interest.  These  firings  have  been  going  on  all  winter,  and 
have  chopped  up  the  ice  formations  which  have  moved  out  north  into 
the  Gulf  Stream  and  have  taken  all  semblance  of  summer  away  from 
Great  Britain.  It  is  a  fact  that  in  almost  every  British  home  fires  are 
lighted,  there  are  fogs.  My  people  are  speculating  as  to  the  possi- 
bility that  the  ice  moving  out  of  these  winter-long  tests  has  affected  the 
climate  of  Great  Britain  at  least  temporarily. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  before  we  get  on  to  the  subject  of  the  intrigues 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  which  I  feel  will  be  very  important  for  you 
to  address  the  committee  on,  let  me  ask  you  this,  on  the  basis  of  your 
background  and  experience,  as  an  intelligence  officer  and  as  a  person 
who,  during  the  late  war,  had  direction  of  relationships  with  Allied 
Governments  on  underground  formations,  and  on  the  basis  of  the 
information  currently  available  to  you  through  this  network,  what 
is  your  judgment  as  to  how  late  it  is  on  the  Soviet  time  table  for 
world  conquest? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Well,  I  think  the  hand  is  right  at  midnight. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  you  conversant,  Colonel,  with  the  essence  of  a 
resolution  which  was  introduced  in  the  United  States  Senate  by  the 


254  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Senator  from  Indiana,  Senator  Jenner,  and  the  Senator  from  Nevada, 
Senator  McCarran,  calling  for  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  Iron  Curtain  governments? 
Mr.  Amoss.  Yes,  sir ;  I  am. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  appraisal  of  that  course  of  action? 
Mr.  Amoss.  Of  course  diplomacy  and  statesmanship  are  out  of  my 
sphere,  but  as  an  ordinary  American  citizen,  I  think  it  is  a  good 
resolution,  and  one  that  I,  as  a  common  citizen,  would  support;  because 
I  think  it  is  time  to  recognize  these  fellow^s  but  recognize  them  for 
what  they  are,  as  enemies  of  the  country. 

Mr.  Arens.  Now,  Colonel,  may  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  gen- 
eral subject  of  the  intrigues  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  and  the  forces 
which  are  contesting  for  power.  I  will  ask  you  if  you  will  kindly 
address  the  committee  on  that  subject. 

Mr.  Amoss.  Mr.  Arens,  would  it  be  appropriate  for  me  to  give  the 
classic  case  of  false  espionage? 
Mr.  Arens.  Yes,  I  think  that  would  be  very  helpful. 
Mr.  Amoss.  I  think  this  is  important  because  it  is  the  pattern  that 
Soviet  Russia  is  following  again  today.     I  am  referring  to  what  they 
code  named  the  Trust  case.    As  far  as  I  know,  this  has  never  been 
published  for  the  public.     It  was  back  in  the  1920's,  and  the  affair 
ran  for  7  years.    Bolshevik  Russia  was  in  grave  trouble.    There  had 
been  revolutionary  armies  and  revolutionary  forces.    The  workers 
had  rioted,  the  peasants  had  revolted,  even  the  Soviet  Navy  had 
mutinied ;  and  the  mutiny  had  been  put  down  only  with  great  blood- 
shed.    Outside  the  borders  of  Bolshevik  Russia  at  that  time  there 
were  massed  great  armies  of  the  old  Czarist  Regime.    These  armies 
had  been  supplied,  equipped  and  trained  by  European  nations.    In- 
side of  Russia  there  was  a  movement  which  was  spreading,  a  mon- 
archist movement,  an  underground  movement,  tied  into  the  mon- 
archist forces  outside  of  Russia.    It  was  at  that  time  that  a  man 
named  Yakushev,  who  had  been  an  old  Czarist  civil  servant,  from 
the  lesser  nobility,  had  been  suborned  into  being  an  agent  of  the  Soviet 
machine  by  force  of  terror.    He  was  sent  out  of  Soviet  Russia. 
He  made  his  first  contact  with  the  two  grand  dukes  living  in  France, 
and  little  by  little  he  convinced  them  that  he  was  a  representative  of 
the  underground  monarchy  movement  in  Russia.    He  proved  his 
case  because  he  was  supplied  with  documents  and  military  informa- 
tion by  the  Soviet  Secret  Police,  authentic  documents.    He  was  then 
introduced  to  the  chiefs  of  the  general  staffs  of  the  European  nations. 
He  told  them  he  could  execute  any  intelligence  assignment  that  they 
w^anted.    He  started  a  flow  of  vital  documents,  true  documents,  also 
given  him  by  the  intelligence  services  of  Soviet  Russia.    He  was  then 
taken  to  the  intelligence  services  of  the  Allied  Nations.    He  per- 
formed the  same  functions  for  them.    Then,  with  the  help  of  the  Rus- 
sian forces  outside  of  Russia,  and  the  Allied  Governments,  he  smuggled 
alleged  monarchists  outside  of  Russia  into  Europe. 

Of  course,  these  were  Soviet  agents.  As  a  turnabout,  he  offered 
to  take  Allied  intelligence  officers  inside  Russia  where  they  could  see 
for  themselves  the  strength  of  the  monarchist  movement.  And  he 
took  them  in. 
Mr.  Arens.  This  was  all  apparently  a  hoax,  as  I  gather  ? 
Mr.  Amoss.  This  is  a  complete  hoax.  He  took  them  in  and  they  met 
at  numerous  meetings  of  people  in  cellars,  and  in  the  woods,  who 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  255 

claimed  to  be  monarchists.  In  every  case  they  were  staged  meetings 
of  Soviet  agents. 

The  agents  came  back,  the  Western  agents  came  back  into  the  West 
and  reported  that  the  movement  was  so  strong  that  the  regime  could 
not  last  more  than  a  few  more  months.  He  also  persuaded  the 
emigre  press  to  quit  criticizing  the  government  because  he  said  in- 
ternal Russia  is  about  to  throw  off  her  jailers,  but  the  minute  you  start 
to  get  Western  attention  they  will  rally  around  the  Communists. 

So,  even  the  Grand  Duke  Cyril  made  his  public  statement  that  the 
Soviet  Constitution  is  right  and  good ;  it  is  only  necessary  to  remove 
the  top  strata  of  the  Government. 

By  force  of  this  operation  which  carried  on,  as  I  said,  for  7  years, 
Allied  intelligence  services  canceled  all  of  their  networks  inside  Rus- 
sia. The  names  of  the  real  monarchists  underground  in  Russia  were 
given  to  the  secret  police  and  they  were  all  executed. 

In  my  opinion,  the  Western  intelligence  services  in  their  Russian 
sections  have  not  recovered  to  this  day  from  that  disaster.  The  rea- 
son I  believe  it  important  to  cite  this  secret  history  is  because  today 
a  second  trust  is  operating.  We  don't  know,  at  least  I  don't  know, 
who  the  modern  young  Yakushev  is,  but  there  is  a  flow  of  defectors 
or  alleged  defectors  coming  across  the  lines  into  the  west,  and  there 
is  two-way  traffic. 

I  am  quite  convinced  that  we  are  having  planted  on  us,  in  general, 
a  great  deal  of  false  intelligence.  I  know  of  one  group  with  one  of  its 
legs  in  Paris,  where  you  can  go  in  and  ask  for  a  document  describing 
any  Soviet  political  or  military  or  engineering  thing,  and  if  you  give 
them  a  month,  pay  them  a  certain  amount  of  money,  you  can  get  it, 
and  it  will  be  95  percent  correct.  But  it  will  be  printed  in  a  Soviet 
underground  press  in  Paris. 

This  classic  example  also  shows,  as  it  has  between  then  and  now, 
every  time  that  Soviet  Russia  is  in  trouble,  every  time  they  have 
quarrels  among  themselves,  they  then  start  to  ask  for  peaceful  coexist- 
ence. They  have  trouble  now.  There  is  a  quarrel  between  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Soviet  hierarchy.  There  are  more  than  the  usual  12  or  13 
members  of  the  politburo  now  who  form  the  collective  dictatorship  of 
Soviet  Russia.  There  are  3G.  But  they  are  finding  out  what  history 
has  always  proven,  that  tyranny  is  indivisible.  You  can't  have  one 
thirty-sixth  of  a  tyrant  or  thirty-six  thirty-sixths  of  a  despot.  They 
have  to  be  all  or  nothing.  The  Malenkov  group  is  now  being  attacked 
by  intrigues  by  another  group  with  Voroshilov • 

Mr.  Arens.  Who  is  he? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Marshall  Voroshilov.  I  have  listed  the  names  here  of 
the  new  intrigue.  Molotov,  Marshal  Bulganin,  and  Khrushchev  who 
has  taken  the  party  leadership  away  from  Malenkov.  But  it  is  more 
than  this.  The  two  classes  on  whose  shoulders  bolshevism  rose  to 
power,  the  two  great  classes,  are  the  peasantry  and  the  rank  and  file 
of  the  workers.  These  are  the  two  classes  who  are  now  in  under- 
ground violent  opposition  to  the  regime,  because  both  feel  that  they 
have  been  deluded  and  cheated. 

I  read  in  the  paper,  I  believe  it  was  this  morning,  that  they  are  now 
recruiting  0-year-oIds  and  up  to  try  to  get  in  the  harvest.  The  harvest 
that  Soviet  Russia  boasted  of  so  much  last  year  gave  less  grain,  per 
capita,  than  the  last  year  of  tlie  Czarist  regime.    The  peasants  have 


256  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

been  taken  off  their  small  holdings  where  even  with  a  wooden  plow  they 
could  eke  out  a  living.  They  have  been  put  on  collective  farms  where 
they  have  to  have  machinery  and  there  is  not  enough  machinery  to  go 
around  because  the  Soviet  factories  which  should  be  building  ma- 
chinery are  building  munitions  of  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  the  Soviets  preparing  for  an  all-out  general  war? 

Mr.  Amoss.  They  are.  But  I  want  to  speak  on  the  question  of  the 
alleged  blockade  or  embargo.  They  have  depended  on  Western  Eu- 
porean  countries  to  furnish  them  the  agricultural  machinery  that 
they  need  to  run  the  collective  farms.  As  poor  as  this  embargo  has 
been,  as  violated  as  it  has  been,  it  has  created  a  state  of  near  revolt  on 
the  collective  farms. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  situation  on  the  Beria  forces  within  Soviet 
Kussia  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  On  the  Beria  forces  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Amoss.  It  is  generally  believed  in  the  Georgian  Eepublic  that 
Beria  is  still  alive.  Whether  he  is  alive  or  whether  he  is  dead,  a  legend 
has  been  built  up,  and  a  search  is  being  made,  and  a  purge  is  in  con- 
stant execution,  trying  to  purge  the  security  forces,  mainly  of  Beria 
adherents. 

I  think,  and  I  am  pretty  sure,  that  such  desertions  as  you  have  had 
in  the  West  are  Beria  men,  and  I  expect  that  you  will  find  some  other 
and  even  more  sensational  desertions  within  the  next  60  days. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  significance  of  the  Soviet  proposal  for  co- 
existence  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  It  is  a  temporary  expedient  to  gain  time. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Because  with  pressures  relieved  from  them,  it  gives 
them  time  to  further  divide  Western  Allies,  it  gives  them  time  to  settle 
their  own  political  differences  at  the  highest  level  in  the  Kremlin, 
it  gives  them  time,  and  time  they  must  have  to  quiet  the  sullen  and 
potentially  rebelling  masses  on  the  farms  and  in  the  factories. 

The  Cpiairman.  According  to  your  information,  what  effect  do  you 
think  constant  trade  from  our  Western  Allies  with  the  Soviet  Union 
is  having  on  this  entire  program  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Senator  Jenner,  it  is  perpetuating  a  regime  which,  in 
my  opinion,  could  be  made  to  fall. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  extensive  is  the  worldwide  network  of  the  Soviets, 
intelligence  network  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  It  is  worldwide.  It  is  not  only  present;  it  is  every- 
where. 

Mr..  Arens.  How  would  it  compare  in  actual  volume  with  the  in- 
telligence network  of  the  West  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Well,  I  would  say  100  to  1  would  be  optimistic  from 
our  point  of  view. 

_  Mr.  Arens.  Do  the  Soviets  use  their  trade  missions  and  interna- 
tional organizations  and  consuls  and  embassies  as  nerve  centers  for 
espionage  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  They  do.  But  they  use  more  than  that.  They  use 
established  trading  companies.  In  many  capitals  they  have  trading 
companies  which  had  been  set  up  originally  by  the  Nazi  intelligence 
system,  and  which  still  continued  existence  after  the  Nazis  had  lost  the 
war.   They  have  taken  over  these  companies.   They  are  sending  travel- 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMJVUTNISM  257 

ers,  particularly  into  primitive  countries,  the  Gold  Coast  of  Africa, 
for  example. 

The  Chairman.  As  far  as  this  country  is  concerned,  has  your  organ- 
ization revealed  any  information  or  evidence  that  they  are  infiltrating 
every  phase  of  American  life  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Senator  Jenner,  I  have  made  it  sort  of  a  practice  of  mme 
not  to  inquire  into  what  is  going  on  in  our  country,  because  I  conceive 
my  front  to  be  the  other  side.  All  that  I  hear  about  American  ac- 
tivities I  hear  from  enemy  mouths  on  the  other  side. 

The  Chairman.  Colonel,  for  example,  this  Internal  Security  Sub- 
committee of  the  Senate  just  the  other  day  had  a  man  before  it  in 
public  session  who  was  a  graduate  of  an  outstanding  university  of 
this  country,  who  was  a  Phi  Beta  Kappa,  and  yet  today  he  is  a  hod 
carrier  in  Wheaton,  111.  Of  course,  when  I  asked  questions  in  regard 
to  his  Communist  activities  and  political  beliefs  and  so  forth,  he  took 
the  fifth  amendment.  But  your  organization  does  not  deal  with  the 
infiltration  into  labor  unions  and  various  phases  of  American  life  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  No,  sir.  We  stop  at  the  foreign  shores.  But  there  is 
one  piece  of  information  we  got.  We  are  not  able  to  say  whether 
it  was  planted  on  us  or  whether  it  is  authentic. 

I  have,  of  course,  turned  it  over  to  the  operative  security  agencies 
of  this  Government.     It  lists  the  names 

The  Chairman.  You  do  cooperate  with  the  various  phases  of  our 
Government  in  regard  to  security  of  this  country  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  What  I  get  I  give  them.  What  they  do  with  it,  I  don't 
know.  How  th&j  appraise  it,  I  don't  know.  But  this  paper  listed  25 
American  factories  to  be  infiltrated  by  saboteurs.  A  curious  thing  in 
the  listing  of  these  names,  all  except  I  tliink  three  were  secondary 
industries  and  not  primary  industries.  That  led  us  into  a  study  over- 
seas with  a  staff  that  we  have,  which  is  extremely  competent,  into  the 
meaning  of  the  infiltration  and  possible  sabotage  plans  for  secondary 
industries. 

We  believe  this  paper,  and  it  is  a  great  paper,  illustrated  by  maps 
and  lectures  and  instructions  and  so  on,  we  believe  it  to  be  a  dry  run  for 
new  agents  now  being  sent  to  the  United  States  after  having  been 
trained  at,  we  believe  but  cannot  establish  for  sure,  Karinhalla,  out- 
side of  Potsdam,  which  was  the  former  estate  of  Goering.  We  believe 
that  school  is  operating  there  and  is  taking  in  nationals  from  the 
United  States  as  well  as  from  other  countries.  Certainly  it  is  true  if 
it  isn't  there  it  is  established  somewhere  else,  and  that  these  American 
citizens  who  have  been  taken  to  this  school  are  trained  and  then  given 
another  identity  and  sent  back  to  the  United  States,  not  to  their 
own  community  where  they  might  be  identified  but  to  some  other 
community. 

We  believe  that  many  of  the  acts  of  apparent  sabotage  committed  in 
the  United  States  and  certainly  the  acts  committed  in  the  Eoyal  Navy 
of  Great  Britain,  are  tests  to  see  how  a  mass  sabotage  program  w^ould 
-svork  out  in  time  of  real  emergency. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  central  target  of  the  Soviets?  What  is 
their  objective? 

Mr.  Amoss.  They  have  written  it.     Their  simple  target  is  dominion. 
Mr.  Arens.  World  dominion  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  World  dominion.  It  is  written,  again  and  again  and  is 
repeated. 


258  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  Of  the  eighty-six-odd  nations  of  the  world  there  is  only 
one  presently  standing  in  the  pathway  of  that  world  domination,  isn't 
that  correct,  Colonel? 

Mr.  Amoss.  That,  sir,  is  absolutely  correct.  I  would  like  to  add 
another  thing,  that  such  sometimes  faltering  allies  as  we  have  are  less 
numerous  than  the  strong  allies  that  we  have  inside  the  Soviet  orbit. 

Mr,  Arens.  Would  you  elaborate  on  that  point  a  little  bit? 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  believe  that  Soviet  Kussia  is  more  vulnerable  to  sub- 
version than  the  United  States  of  America.    I  mean,  I- 

Mr.  Arens.  Why  ?     What  makes  you  reach  that  conclusion  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  read  and  I  see  the  cases  of  subversion  in  this  country, 
the  subverting  of  American  citizens,  penetration  of  all  our  installa- 
tions— incidentally,  my  information  here  all  comes  from  the  press, 
none  of  this  is  mine— I  read  about  all  of  this,  and  in  spite  of  it,  even 
if  what  we  read  is  doubled  or  quadrupled,  we  have  back  of  the  Iron 
Curtain  hundreds  of  millions  of  people  w-ho  don't  like  life  as  they 
find  it.  This  is  no  ideological  war  as  far  as  they  are  concerned,  it  is 
a  question  of  getting  enough  food  in  their  stomachs  and  enough  se- 
curity to  be  sure  that  their  children  are  going  to  be  able  to  be  brought 
up  in  safety.  I  have  interviewed,  I  suppose,  thousands  of  people 
from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain.  One  thing  that  adds  to  the  discontent 
in  the  Soviet  orbit  is  the  fact  that  particularly  among  the  Russians 
serving  the  Soviet,  venality  is  widespread,  bribery  is  everywhere.  The 
little  town  major  lives  in  the  best  house  that  he  can  seize  in  the  town. 
His  wife  wears  the  best  furs  that  they  have  been  able  to  take,  and  the 
fellow  who  gets  along  a  little  better  in  that  town  is  the  man  who  has 
paid  him.  That  is  true  not  in  one  village,  but  it  is  true  in  tens  of 
thousands  of  villages  throughout  Russia. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  be  the  reaction  of  that  typical  person  be- 
hind the  Iron  Curtain  to  a  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviets  and  the  satellite  governments? 

Mr.  Amoss.  I  believe  they  would  appraise  that  as  a  piece  of  realism. 

The  Chairman.  And  give  them  hope  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  And  give  them  hope.  You  are  not  going  to  destroy  hope 
by  recognizing  the  fact  that  an  enemy  is  an  enemy. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  feel  that  we  are  definitely  now,  this  instant,  at 
war? 

Mr.  Amoss.  We  are  at  war  and  we  have  been  effectively  at  war 
since  1944. 

The  Chairman.  You  said  it  was  just  about  midnight,  something  to 
that  effect,  in  response  to  a  previous  question  as  to  how  late  it  is  on  the 
Soviet  timetable  for  world  domination.  ^Vliy  do  you  reach  that 
conclusion,  that  it  is  just  about  midnight? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Well,  first,  military  preparations ;  second,  the  success  of 
their  subversion  in  whittling  away  the  perimeters  of  our  safety,  to 
which  I  would  say  that  if  there  is  any  more  whittling  going  on  they 
have  all  the  chips,  they  can  call  the  turns. 

The  Chairman.  Who  has  the  offensive  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  They  have  the  offensive.  It  is  certainly  true  in  sub- 
version as  well  as  it  is  true  in  any  military  action,  that  there  is  no 
Maginot  Line  that  can  ever  protect  a  country — there  is  no  Maginot 
Line,  not  even  a  pretended  one  in  subversion.   I  think  your  committee, 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  259 

I  think  the  FBI,  and  the  security  agencies,  of  the  United  States  are 
phxced  under  an  intolerable  burden  by  allowing  them  to  take  the  initia- 
tive, to  choose  the  time,  the  place,  the  weapon,  and  the  method,  with- 
out reaction  in  their  own  backyard.  And  in  carrying  on  the  fiction 
of  friendly  relations. 

As  I  said  a  moment  or  so  ago,  they  are  more  vulnerable  than  we  are, 
but  we  are  not  taking  advantage  of  their  vulnerability.  I  said  it  was 
midnight  because  if  we  don't  take  advantage  of  it,  and  almost  right 
away,  they  won't  be  so  vulnerable.  They  will  be  able  to  take  measures 
to  protect  themselves,  to  eliminate  the  leaders  that  are  springing  up, 
new  leaders.  I  would  like  to  add  one  thing  there.  During  World 
War  II,  one  of  the  most  effective  groups  of  allies  we  had  were  the 
underground  systems  of  Europe.  As  you  know,  when  a  country  is 
occupied,  it  has  as  many  underground  systems  as  it  has  major  political 
parties.  There  are  two  reasons  for  that:  One,  the  political  party 
has  its  organization,  it  has  its  ward  organization,  its  precinct  organi- 
zation, its  captains.  Consequently,  it  is  the  only  structure  that  could 
carry  on  an  underground  war. 

I  would  guess  that  if  our  country  were  occupied  we  would  have  two 
underground  systems,  a  Republican  one  and  a  Democratic  one.  There 
is  another  reason  for  the  political  parties  acting  in  underground  sys- 
tems.   That  is  because  each  party  wants  to  come  back  to  control. 

First  they  know,  the  leaders  know,  if  their  party  has  not  given  effec- 
tive resistance  to  an  invader,  they  have  not  a  chance  to  come  back  to 
power.  As  a  consequence,  World  War  II  gave  us,  in  the  case  of 
Poland,  seven  major  underground  parties  or  organizations.  But  the 
Soviet  Communists  saw  that  thing  operating  during  World  War  II, 
and  so  they  penetrated  every  European  political  party.  That  means 
that  every  underground,  every  large  underground  system  in  the  Soviet 
orbit  and  even  outside  of  it,  is  completely  penetrated.  The  people 
inside  the  orbit  know  they  are  penetrated,  and  they  are  lying  "doggo" 
because  they  don't  dare  move.  They  do  not  know  who  the  penetrator 
is.    It  is  a  question  of  life  and  death. 

But  just  as  nature  abhors  a  vacuum,  so  does  clandestine  war  abhor  a 
vacuum,  and  a  new  phenomenon  has  sprung  up  in  the  Soviet  orbit,  a 
plienomenon  that  I  call  leaderless  resistance.  Throughout  the  entire 
orbit  there  are  tens  of  thousands  of  groups  of  5  or  10  people.  The 
groups  usually  don't  grow  any  larger  than  that,  because  no  man  is  quite 
sure  of  his  neighbor.  Every  one  of  these  members  of  these  tens  of 
thousands  of  small  groups  is  eager  to  perform  his  own  little  personal 
act  of  apostacy.  But  nobody  gives  tliem  any  direction  as  far  as  I 
can  see. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  may  I  just  ask  you  a  naive  question  which  I 
am  sure  is  in  the  mind  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  American  people 
at  the  crossroads.  Do  you  think  we  can  build  peace  in  the  world  with 
the  Soviets  by  sitting  down  with  them  at  the  council  table  and  having 
agreements,  pacts,  and  understanding? 

Mr.  Amoss.  There  is  only  one  kind  of  peace  that  you  can  build,  and 
that  is  a  resignation  of  all  of  your  native  rights. 

Mr.  Arens.  Why? 

ISIr.  Amoss.  Because  at  each  conference  they  pick  up  something 
more. 


260  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  say  that  was  true  of  the  settlement  that 
was  made  yesterday  on  Indochina? 
Mr.  Amoss.  Absolutely;  yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  we  trust  what  they  agreed  to  on  the  settlement 
on  Indochina? 

Mr.  Amoss.  You  have  never  been  able  to  trust  what  they  agreed 
to  yet.  I  think  it  is  entirely  a  cynical  agreement  just  as  all  of  their 
agreements  have  been  cynical.  I  think  it  was  a  great  victory  for  the 
Communist  world. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  are  there  any  other  items  that  you  have  not 
covered  extemporaneously,  at  least  in  highlight?  I  know  your  state- 
ment is  very  detailed  and  thoroughly  documented  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Amoss.  No,  sir;  I  think  I  have  nothing  further  to  add. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Colonel,  for  appearing  be- 
fore us,  and  we  appreciate  your  testimony. 

Mr.  Amoss.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Arens.  Colonel,  you  have  given  the  staff  other  material  and 
will  be  in  session  with  the  staff,  on  other  material,  in  executive  session 
which  we  understand  cannot  be  revealed  publicly. 

Mr.  Amoss.  Yes;  there  is  material  where  an  indiscreet  revelation 
would  cost  life  and  that  I  think  I  can  only  give  in  executive  session. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  as  to  your  source  of  information  and  so 
forth  ? 

Mr.  Amoss.  Also  as  to  some  plans. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much,  Colonel. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  next  witness  is  Mr.  Samuel  Nakasian. 

Will  you  kindly  come  forward,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  be  sworn  to  testify. 

Do  you  swear  the  testimony  given  in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  SAMUEL  NAKASIAN,  APPEARING  IN  BEHALF  OF 
THE  WASHINGTON  BOARD  OF  TRADE,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  give  us  your  full  name  for  our  record  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  It  is  Samuel  Nakasian. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  reside  in  Washington? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Where? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  reside  at  5021  V  Street  NW.,  and  I  have  a  law 
office,  which  lawyers  like  to  mention,  at  the  American  Security 
Building.  "^ 

The  Chairman.  And  outside  of  being  in  the  legal  profession,  what 
is  your  business  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  am  in  the  general  practice  of  law  with  a  consid- 
erable emphasis  on  international  trade  and  foreign  investments  by 
American  companies. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  associated  with  any  trade  organization 
or  any  American  organization  of  that  type? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  am  speaking  today,  Senator,  on  behalf  of  the 
Washington  Board  of  Trade. 

The  Chairman.  In  what  capacity  are  you  associated  with  the 
Washington  Board  of  Trade  ? 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  261 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  am  a  member  of  the  world  trade  committee  of  the 
Washington  Board  of  Trade. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  inquire,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian,  will  you  kindly  identify  the  Washington  Board  of 
Trade  from  the  standpoint  of  membership  and  from  the  standpoint 
of  concentration  of  commercial  intelligence  in  that  organization  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  The  Washington  Board  of  Trade  has  a  member- 
ship of  6,000.  Most  of  the  members  are  from  business,  financial, 
and  professional  circles.  In  Washington  most  of  the  large  corpora- 
tions are  represented  by  an  officer  or  by  a  top-level  employee.  These 
large  corporations  do  the  bulk  of  America's  business  abroad. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  it  be  safe  to  say  that  there  is  a  concentration 
here  of  interest  in  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade  of  the  worldwide 
trade  operations? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Very  definitely.  And  channeled  through  these 
organizations,  these  commercial  organizations,  we  do  a  great  deal  of 
intelligence  on  trade  and  Soviet  tactics  in  world  markets. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  wonder  before  we  proceed  further,  Mr.  Nakasian,  if 
you  would  kindly  at  this  point  give  us  just  a  brief  resume  of  your  own 
personal  history  with  particular  emphasis  upon  the  background  you 
had  in  trade  matters  in  Europe,  and  with  particular  emphasis  there  on 
your  activities  in  the  Middle  East. 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  was  on  the  staff  of  the  EGA,  commencing  in  1948, 
when  the  Marslmll  plan  operation  was  launched,  and  was  in  that  or- 
ganization for  3  years.  I  traveled  extensively  throughout  Western 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East.  More  recently  I  spent  7  months  in 
Iran,  a  country  which  is  under  the  shadow  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  you  pause  there  to  give  us  your  appraisal  of  the 
situation  in  the  Middle  East,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  potential 
threat  of  the  Soviets  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  At  this  particular  time  I  think  that  the  poverty 
belt,  if  I  may  use  that  expression,  which  includes  Iran,  most  of  the 
Middle  East,  and  Pakistan,  is  especially  vulnerable  to  what  I  would 
like  to  call,  if  I  may  use  the  expression,  the  new  look  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  It  is  a  new  look  which  has  been  described  to  us  as  a  con- 
sumer goods  production  program.  It  has  been  rationalized  here  by, 
I  think  to  a  great  degree,  wishful  thinking,  that  the  Soviet  Union  is 
shifting  from  heavy  goods  production,  from  the  emphasis  on  heavy 
goods  production  into  consumer  production,  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
economic  wants  of  the  Russian  people. 

It  is  my  opinion  that  these  consumer  goods,  as  they  are  produced, 
will  be  used  as  a  weapon  of  economic  expansion  abroad,  the  same  as 
propaganda  and  fifth-column  exports  have  been  used  as  a  Communist 
weapon  in  the  conquest  of  foreign  areas. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  the  Soviets  have  an  advantage  in  foreign  trade  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  The  Soviet  Union  is  unencumbered  by  such  details 
as  costs,  profits,  supply,  and  demand.  The  limit  of  their  ability  to 
hit  foreign  markets  for  strategic  purposes  as  against  what  might  be 
called  economic  purposes  of  trade,  is  limited  only  by  the  degree  of 
liuman  sacrifice  that  they  can  exact  from  their  people. 

Programs  of  production  are  scheduled,  and  the  amount  of  that  pro- 
duction which  is  set  aside  for  domestic  use  is  a  matter  of  Kremlin 
policy.  The  excess,  however  much  it  might  be  needed  at  home,  can  be 
exported. 


262  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  In  other  words,  are  you  saying  that  there  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  relationship  between  the  economic  benefit  to  the  Soviet  Union 
and  its  trade  policy  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  There  isn't  at  all.  I  think  there  is  a  much  closer 
relationship  between  the  Soviet  export  policy  and  its  political  ambi- 
tions abroad,  a  far  closer  understanding  of  that. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  you  give  us  an  illustration,  and  I  direct  your  atten- 
tion specifically  to  the  area  which  we  have  previously  discussed,  of 
Iceland? 

Mr,  Nakasian.  I  would  like  to  say  before  I  answer  that  question, 
Mr.  Arens,  that  I  have  a  prepared  statement  here  which  is  the  position 
of  the  board  of  trade  on  this  question. 

The  Chairman.  That  statement  may  go  into  our  record  and  become 
a  part  of  our  record.    You  may  proceed  to  testify. 

(The  document  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  of  Samuel  Nakasian,  Washington  Board  of  Teade 

My  name  is  Samuel  Nakasian.  I  am  a  practicing  attorney  and  am  here  today  to 
represent  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade,  an  organization  of  approximately 
6,000  business,  financial,  and  professional  leaders  of  Washington.  I  am  a  member 
of  the  world  trade  committee  of  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade  which  has  in 
its  membership  local  representatives  of  American  corporations  which  do  a  large 
portion  of  American  business  abroad. 

The  strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism  is  a  subject  of  very  great  impor- 
tance to  members  of  our  organization  and  to  American  businessmen  in  general. 
Last  spring  the  world  trade  committee  of  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade 
created  a  subcommittee  to  study  Soviet  export  trade,  its  potential,  and  the  role, 
if  any,  it  might  play  in  the  cold  war.  As  a  result  of  this  study,  a  recommendation 
was  made  by  the  board  of  trade  in  a  letter  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
The  board  of  trade  has  requested  me  to  offer  this  letter  for  inclusion  in  the 
record  of  this  hearing. 

(Attached  letter  submitted:) 

Washington  Board  of  Trade, 
Washington,  D.  C,  June  7,  195fi. 
The  President, 

The  White  House, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

My  Dear  Mr.  President  :  The  Washington  Board  of  Trade  views  with  serious 
concern  the  evidence  that  the  Soviet  bloc  may  now  be  exporting  products  for  the 
principal  purpose  of  undermining  the  position  of  private  enterprise  in  free- 
world  markets  rather  than  for  the  customary  purpose  of  gaining  economic 
benefits  from  trade. 

Free-world  markets  supplied  for  the  most  part  by  private  companies  are 
especially  vulnerable  to  collectivized  purchases  and  sales  by  totalitarian  nations. 
Such  nations  may  disregard  cost  and  profit  considerations  with  impunity  and 
utilize  the  economic  power  of  purchases  and  sales  for  the  achievement  of 
imperialistic  objectives. 

It  appears  that  socialized  exports  of  Iron  Curtain  countries  are  neither  re- 
stricted nor  expanded  by  such  factors  as  costs  or  profits ;  nor  directly  related 
to  the  supply  of  the  product.  When  it  suits  their  strategic  purpose,  a  product 
even  in  short  supply  may  be  requisitioned  for  export  and  sold  or  exchanged  at 
a  price  in  world  markets  which  bears  no  relation  to  the  cost  of  production.  By 
virtue  of  totalitarian  control,  exports  can  be  and  reportedly  are  governed  in 
volume  by  the  degree  of  subsidy  in  human  sacrifices  imposed  by  the  state. 

If  present  signs  are  understood,  the  Soviet  bloc  has  discovered  that  its  power 
to  export  products  regardless  of  cost  is  an  effective  weapon  in  assaulting  the 
free  institutions  of  the  free  world  through  the  marketplace.  Understandably, 
in  view  of  their  reportedly  limited  physical  plants,  this  weapon  must  be  used 
selectively  for  the  time  being,  aimed  at  special  areas  most  responsive  to  the 
strategic  and  psychological  impact  of  such  trade. 

The  emergence  of  exports  as  an  offensive  weapon  in  the  cold  war  raises 
several  questions  of  public  policy.  Should  private  companies  he  expected  to 
stand  alone  ayainst  competition  which  is  subsidized  by  human  sacrifices  imposed 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  263 

by  the  totalitarian  state?  When  Iron  Curtain  countries  have  moved  in,  taken 
over  a  market  from  private  companies,  and  later  withdraw  to  strike  in  another 
market,  is  it  expected  that  private  companies  are  to  reenter  and  start  attain 
from  scratch?  Does  not  the  disruption  if  not  the  destruction  of  these  private 
channels  of  distribution  in  world  markets  weaken  the  facilities  for  the  defense 
of  the  free  world? 

These  questions  indicate  that  East-West  trade  is  more  than  a  problem  of 
balancing  the  benefits  in  the  exchange  of  products.  It  seems  clear  that  of  equal 
if  not  creater  importance  is  the  extent  to  which  Soviet  bloc  exports  are  being 
employed  to  weaken  or  to  destroy  American  and  free-world  commercial  facili- 
ties in  world  markets. 

Our  Government's  efforts  to  encourage  private  investment  abroad  is  also 
endangered  by  the  above  policy  concerning  strategic  exports.  The  presence  of 
this  threat  i«*fatal  to  the  program  of  encouraging  private  investment  abroad. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  the  board  of  trade  recommends  that  the 
President  consider  the  appointment  of  an  advisory  board  to  study  the  problems 
of  Soviet  bloc  strategic  exports  to  free-world  markets  and  to  recommend  to 
the  President  such  remedial  action  as  may  be  appropriate  for  insuring  the 
survival  of  commercial  channels  of  trade  in  free-world  markets. 

This  recommendation  is  offered  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  and  service.     The 
Washington  Board  of  Trade  holds  itself  at  your  service  and  desires  to  take 
this  opportunity  of  expressing  confidence  in   the  efforts  you  are  making   on 
behalf  of  expanding  the  national  economy  and  world  trade. 
Very  respectfully  yours, 

(Signed)     Harry  L.  Mebrick. 

Mr  Chairman,  the  Soviet  Union  is  rapidly  getting  into  a  position  to  wield 
economic  power  in  the  cold  war  with  the  West.  Large  volume  exports  and  imports 
manipulated  under  totalitarian  control  provide  the  Kremlin  with  a  powerful 
weapon  in  competing  for  the  favor  of  border  and  strategically  situated  states. 
Strategic  trade  is  also  a  powerful  Soviet  weapon  for  undermining  the  portion  of 
]>rivate  corporations  operating  in  free  world  markets  and  thereby  weakening 
the  facilities  for  the  defense  of  the  free  world.  Private  corporations  are  no 
match  for  Soviet  competition  but,  I  venture  to  say  with  confidence,  if  an  adequate 
United  States  program  were  established,  American  enterprise  would  be  equal  to 
the  task  of  meeting  the  challenge  of  Soviet  raids  on  free  world  markets. 

The  recommendation  made  to  the  President  by  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade 
recognizes  the  importance  of  this  Soviet  economic  threat.  The  problem  is  complex. 
It  involves  our  relations  with  our  allies,  the  role  of  American  companies  abroad, 
and  a  host  of  ancillary  but  vital  questions  which  ought  to  be  explained.  These 
questions  are  preliminary  to  the  formulation  of  a  sound  United  States  policy 
and  program  of  meeting  the  Soviet  trade  threat  in  free  world  markets.  Obviously 
this  recommendation  is  very  broadly  stated  which  we  believe  might  be  expected 
since  the  Washington  Board  of  Trade  has  not  the  resources  nor  the  facilities 
at  its  command  to  enable  it  to  get  full  information  as  to  detail  which  would  be 
necessary  to  the  formulation  of  sound  policy  recommendations  respecting  spe- 
cific aspects  of  the  problem. 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  would  like  to  say  that  I  am  speaking  beyond  this 
statement,  but  consistent  with  it.  In  speaking  beyond  this  statement 
I  am  speaking  as  a  matter  of  personal  opinion  and  from  personal  expe- 
rience and  I  am  not  committing  the  board  of  trade  to  responses  which 
I  make  to  your  questions,  which  they  have  not  yet  considered  fully. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  response  to  this  line  of  inquiry  which  we  were  pur- 
suing a  few  moments  ago,  may  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  trade 
arrangements  between  the  Soviets  and  Iceland  and  ask  you  to  add.-ess 
yourself  to  that  situation? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Yes. 

Well,  at  the  moment  the  Russians  have  a  commodity  which  they  find 
that  they  can  export  with  great  strategic  profit,  and  that  commodity 
is  petroleum.  Petroleum  is  a  unique  product  in  that  it  sells  for  dollars 
or  for  sterling  in  the  world  markets.  Many  countries  of  the  world  are 
short  on  both  sterling  and  dollars.  Iceland  happens  to  be  one  of 
those  countries.    But  Iceland  is  not  short  on  fish. 


264  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  Soviets,  in  the  last  year,  have  made  a  barter  agreement  with 
Iceland  shipping  petroleum  for  fish.  This  agreement  falls  somewhat 
short  of  an  economic  transaction,  because  I  don't  think  that  Iceland's 
fish  is  of  that  much  importance  to  the  Soviet.  But  nevertheless  the 
Soviet  takes  Iceland's  fish  because  Iceland  apparently  cannot  find  any- 
body in  the  world  to  pay  hard  currency  for  that  fish. 

Mr.  Arens.  Tell  us  why  they  do  that.  What  is  the  basic  underlying 
reason  for  this  arrangement? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  if  you  ask  this  question  in  the  context  of  the 
Soviet  strategic  policy,  it  falls  very  consistently  in  line  that  Iceland 
is  a  place  where  they  would  take  fish  in  return  for  oil.  Iceland  is  a 
very  strategic  country  from  a  military  standpoint  of  the  United 
States  and  the  West. 
Mr.  Arens.  We  have  military  bases- there,  do  we  not? 
Mr.  Nakasian.  We  have  very  substantial  military  bases  there  which 
are  fed  with  petroleum,  and  it  is  not  enough  that  the  Soviets  merely 
supply  the  petroleum  at  the  price  of  fish,  but  it  also  gives  them  an 
opportunity  to  get  their  petroleum  into  the  consuming  mechanisms. 
There  is  a  danger  that  in  the  event  of  a  catastrophe,  at  a  time  the 
Soviets  could  pick,  that  oil  could  be  doctored  in  such  a  way  as  to 
sabotage  that  equipment  and  facilities. 
^  Mr.  Arens.  In  passing,  may  I  ask  you  this :  Do  you  have  informa- 
tion as  to  whether  or  not  any  of  that  oil  which  is  being  shipped  into 
Iceland  from  the  Soviets  is  actually  being  utilized  at  our  bases  by 
our  forces? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  that.  I  would  say  that — 
the  general  policy  is  that  the  armed  services  petroleum  procurement 
agency  procures  the  petroleum  for  all  of  our  military  uses.  Whether 
they  dip  into  local  stocks  at  all,  I  don't  know.  But  I  am  sure  that 
there  are  many  ancillary  facets,  such  as  power  stations  and  so  on, 
which  would  be  served  by  these  Soviet  imports. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  you  suggesting  the  possibility,  at  least,  that  in  the 
event  of  armed  conflict,  the  Soviets  could  so  adulterate  the  oil  as  to 
make  it  useless,  to  sabotage  the  operations  in  Iceland  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian,  I  am  advised  by  technical  people  that  that  could  be 
done  very  easily,  and  it  would  be  rather  difficult  to  detect,  unless  you 
established  an  elaborate  testing  mechanism. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  effect  does  this  arrangement  between  the  Soviet 
and  the  Government  of  Iceland  have  on  the  markets  between  the 
United  States  and  Iceland,  aside  from  the  Soviet  potential  for  sabo- 
tage or  espionage  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  I  don't  think  that  the  Iceland  petroleum  mar- 
ket is  of  any  great  importance  as  far  as  volume  is  concerned  to  the 
American  countries  that  had  served  it.  But  I  think  it  is  important 
as  an  indication  of  things  to  come.  This  isn't  the  only  country  that 
the  Soviets  have  raided  in  this  way.  Denmark  is  another  country 
which  has  a  surplus  of  products  which  the  Russians  are  prepared  to 
take,  namely  butter,  and  all  of  the  output  of  Danish  butter  available 
for  export  cannot  be  sold  for  dollars  and  sterling. 

Consequently,  the  Danes  are  anxious  to  get  rid  of  it,  and  particularly 
get  rid  of  it  for  a  dollar  import  commodity,  such  as  petroleum,  which 
they  would  otherwise  have  to  pay  dollars  or  sterling  for. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  265 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  see  any  significance  in  tlie  fact  that  the  Soviets 
are  exporting  a  consumer  goods,  a  finished  product,  such  as  petroleum 
products  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  there  is  a  threat,  and  I  use  this  term  advisedly, 
because  I  don't  think  it  has  by  any  means  reached  its  full  potential. 

Getting  back  to  what  I  said  earlier,  the  emphasis  which  the  Soviet 
Union  is  now  putting  on  the  production  of  consumer  goods,  I  think  is 
designed  to  get  an  export  of  consumer  goods  into  not  so  much  Western 
Europe,  but  into  the  poverty  belt,  into  that  southern  area  south  of 
Russia,  particularly  the  Middle  East.    I  was  there  for  7  months. 

The  poverty  of  the  mass  of  people  in  the  Middle  East  is  beyond  all 
description  to  an  American.  I  just  couldn't  describe  the  conditions, 
and  it  is  not  a  warm  area.  It  is  warm  in  the  summer  but  frightfully 
cold  in  the  winter.  There  is  no  food  and  no  clothes.  How  these  people 
survive,  I  don't  know.  These  people  are  vulnerable  to  any  Soviet 
move  to  bring  in  consumer  goods.    It  is  just  an  elementary  thing. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  do  you  mean  by  vulnerable  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  think  these  people  would  kiss  the  hand  that  would 
feed  them  and  clothe  them,  and  the  ideology  would  not  embarrass 
them  at  all.  The  ideblogy  of  the  donor  of  the  goods  would  not  em- 
barrass them  at  all.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  makes  very  little  difference 
what  the  political  beliefs  and  precepts  of  a  benefactor  is  to  these 
people. 

The  Chairman.  Under  that  policy  of  feeding  and  clothing,  you 
know  this  Government  has  been  rather  generous  to  various  nations  of 
the  world.  You  were  connected  with  EGA  and  you  know  that  to 
be  a  fact.  It  runs  into  the  billions  of  dollars  that  we  have  given  to  our 
friends  and  allies  all  over  the  world.  Do  you  think  they  are  kissing 
our  hand  today,  or  are  they  kicking  us  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  think  there  is  some  question  about  how  grateful 
they  are.  Senator.  I  think  that  the  aid,  however,  which  we  have  given 
them  has  been  compensated  primarily  in  Western  Europe. 

There  has  been  practically — there  has  been  an  infinitesimal  amount 
of  aid  that  has  been  given  to  the  really  impoverished  areas  that  I  speak 
of,  of  the  Middle  East :  Pakistan,  Iran,  Iraq. 

iSIr.  Arens.  What  significance  do  those  countries  have  from  a  mili- 
tary standpoint  to  our  Nation  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  think  this  is  a  more  critical  area  than  the  area 
which  seems  to  occupy  most  of  our  minds,  namely  Western  Europe. 

Mr.  Arens.  Wliy  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  the  Middle  East  is  a  vulnerable  area,  the  Mid- 
dle East  could  get  away  from  us.  It  lies  right  on  the  periphery  of 
the  Soviet  Union.  The  Soviet  Union  has  a  long-term  ambition  of  get- 
ting into  the  Persian  Gulf.  At  this  particular  time  three-quarters  of 
the  world  reserves  of  oil  are  in  the  Middle  East,  on  which  the  free 
world  is  completely  dependent  now,  as  against  a  few  years  ago  when 
the  Middle  East  was  merely  a  marginal  supplier  of  oil.  The  liussians 
have  a  twofold  purpose  of  getting  that  area.  I  think  a  consumer 
goods  export  program  on  the  part  of  the  Russians  could  turn  that 
area  of  the  world  against  us. 

Mr.  Arens.  Has  our  diplomacy  in  your  opinion  been  designed  to 
cement  the  friendship  of  the  Arab  States  or  to  isolate  the  friendship 
of  the  Arab  States? 


266  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  there  is  more  than  the  Arab  States  involved. 
Mr.  Arens.  Well,  principally  the  Arab  States. 
Mr.  Nakasian.  Actually  Iran  and  Pakistan  are  outside  the  Arab 
fetates. 

Mr.  Arens.  Let's  put  it  as  the  Middle  East  States,  then. 
Mr.  Nakasian.  I  thmk  that  the  efforts  that  have  recently  been  made 
to  cement  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Pakistan  is  a  verv 
lavorable  development.  I  think  that  there  was  some  promise  of  a 
development  of  better  conditions  in  Iran,  and  there  may  be  some  hope 
ot  better  conditions  m  Iraq.  But  this  is  where  the  fight  is  ^o'm<r  to 
be,  as  I  see  it,  because  the  Soviet  impact  in  that  area  can  come  throuc^h 
the  pinpointing  of  exports.  I  think  they  have  just  about  run  their 
course  on  export  of  propaganda  and  fifth  columns.  I  think  they  have 
to  support  It  with  something  new,  and  I  think  they  will  support  it 
with  consumer  goods. 

_  Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  think  that  their  trade  offensive  is  actually  de- 
signed to  destroy  world  markets  of  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  it  has  that  effect.  You  cannot  make  a  broad 
statement  on  this  point  because  Soviet  exports  have  not  yet  reached 
the  volume  with  which  they  can  cross  the  free  world  market,  and  go 
m  and  undermine  them  and  wreck  them.  But  the  Soviets  don't  trade 
on  any  broad  basis,  they  trade  on  a  specialized  basis.  They  can  pick 
the  area  that  they  want.  They  can  hit  this  one  this  year  and  they  can 
hit  that  one  next  year.  They  are  necessarily  committed  to  a  stren<rth- 
ened  export  policy  for  the  reason  that  their  plants  and  facilities^are 
not  yet  developed  to  the  point  where  they  can  broadcast  their  efforts. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  actually,  on  the  basis  of  your  observations  and 
study,  and  travel,  background  and  experience,  feel  that  the  Soviet 
trade  offensive  is  an  assault  against  the  free  institutions  of  the  West, 
via  the  market  place  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  definitely  do.  I  think  it  is  in  the  threat  stage. 
I  thmk  we  have  not  yet  fully  geared  ourselves  and  prepared  ourselves 
to  deal  with  it,  as  we  have  recommended,  as  the  board  of  trade  has 
recommended,  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  that  an  advisory 
committee  be  set  up  to  go  into  this  problem  and  decide  what  can  be 
done  about  it. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  a  copy  of  your  letter  to  the  President  in  the 
statement  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian,  Yes ;  it  is  in  the  statement.  As  it  stands  now,  there 
are  two  economic  blocs :  The  Soviet  economic  bloc  and  the  Western 
economic  bloc.  The  Soviets  have  an  integrated  one;  ours  is  not  so 
integrated.  The  western  bloc  is  cut  up  into  dollar  trading  areas, 
sterling  trading  areas,  Soviet  currency  trading  areas,  and  the  exports 
of  one  country  which  are  important  to  that  country  and  which  are 
needed  by  another  country,  do  not  get  exchange  because  the  importing 
country  probably  doesn't  have  the  currency  that  the  exporting  country 
wants.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  Denmark,  which  is  certainly  not  a 
pro-Communist  country,  finds  itself  in  a  position  of  having  to  deal 
with  the  Kussians  in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  butter. 

That  butter  could  just  as  well  be  used  in  another  part  of  the  free 
world.  But  we  don't  have  a  mechanism  for  multilateral  trading 
within  the  free  world  economic  bloc,  which  will  keep  the  Soviets  from 
raiding  our  own  sphere  of  economics. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  267 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  other  points,  Mr.  Nakasian,  that  you 
want  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  committee  today,  in  addition  to 
what  is  in  your  prepared  statement? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Only  to  emphasize  that  we  ought  to  get  prepared  to 
deal  with  the  Soviet  world  strategy  as  something  more  than  a  military 
propaganda  and  fifth  column  threat.  I  think  we  are  now  approaching 
a  new  area  of  Soviet  economic  penetration. 

Mr.  Arens.  To  what  extent  is  our  Nation  economically  dependent 
upon  foreign  trade  as  distinct  from  internal  transactions  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  Well,  in  the  narrow  sense,  you  can  say  that  we  are 
not  so  terribly  dependent  upon  it.  The  borders  of  the  United  States 
have  gone  well  beyond  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  I 
think  that  the  United  States,  as  the  powerful,  economic  nation  in  the 
free  world,  is  now  dependent  on  keeping  the  markets  of  the  free  world 
in  a  healthy  condition ;  and  if  these  markets  collapse,  we  not  only  lose 
political  and  military  strength,  but  we  also  suffer  economically  as 
well,  because  we  are  depenctent,  increasingly  dependent,  on  foreign 
raw  materials,  and  to  a  large  extent  on  foreign  markets  for  our  manu- 
factured goods. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  see  on  the  horizon  an  increasing  potential  of  this 
Soviet  trade  offensive?  Do  you  feel  it  has  a  prospect  of  slackening 
off,  or  only  holding  its  own  ? 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  see  the  Soviet  trade  offensive  increasing  in  mag- 
nitude. I  think,  to  give  you  an  example,  petroleum  exports  in  1948, 
the  Soviet  Union  exported  about  100,000  tons  of  oil.  This  year  they 
will  be  exporting  close  to  5  million  tons  of  oil.  At  other  times  they 
export  grain,  even  though  their  people  may  be  starving.  This  year 
they  are  not  exporting  so  much  grain.  But  they  can  choose  the  com- 
modity.    They  can  choose  the  market. 

ISIr.  Arens.  Don't  you  fear,  ISIr.  Nakasian— this  is  just  a  little  be- 
yond your  realm,  as  an  economist — don't  you  fear  the  threat  of  the 
Soviets  integrating  nations  in  their  political  orbit  with  whom  they 
have  economic  trade  agreements,  that  the  integration  in  this  political 
orbit  would  only  be  a  second  step  after  an  integration  of  the  economic 

ties?  . 

Mr.  Nakasian.  I  very  definitely  feel  that  there  is  a  byproduct  of 
political  affinity  which  results  from  economic  trade.  I  was  in  London 
at  the  time  that  the  trade  agreement,  just  this  last  spring,  at  the  time 
the  British  trade  agreement  was  announced  with  the  Soviets.  The 
newspapers  were  singing  the  praises  of  the  Soviets,  the  newspapers  in 
London.     I  think  it  is  just  inescapable. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you  very  much. 

We  will  stand  in  recess. 

(Whereupon,  at  11 :  53  a.  m.,  the  committee  was  recessed  subject  to 
call.) 

X 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM      " 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTEENAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 

OF  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 

ON 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


JULY  29  AND  SEPTEMBER  22,  1954 


PART  5 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


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GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
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COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM  LANGER,  North  Dakota,  Chairman 

ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada  » 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana  HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  Mississippi 

ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 

ROBERT  C.  IlENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey  ESTES  KEFAUVER,  Tennessee 

EVERETT  McKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  Jr.,  Missouri 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

WILLIAM  E,  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada  ^ 

ROBERT  C.  HENDRICKSON,  New  Jersey        JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina 

JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 


Task  Force  Investigating  the  Strategy  and  Tactics  of  World  Communism 

WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana,  Chairman 
HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho  PAT  McCARRAN,  Nevada  > 

Richard  ArenSj  Special  Counsel 


*  The  late  Honorable  Pat  McCarran,  while  a  member  of  this  committee,  died  September 
28,  1954. 


CONTENTS 

Page 
Testimony  of — 

Budenz,  Louis  F 803 

Biishey,  Hon.  Fred  E 280 

Klimov,  Grigoriy  Petrovich 269 

III 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  Of  WOELD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,   JULY  29,   1954 

United  States  Senate, 

Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 

Security  Laws  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington^  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  William  E.  Jenner  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Jenner  (presiding)  and  Welker. 

Also  present :  Richard  Arens,  special  counsel ;  and  Frank  W. 
Schroeder  and  EdAvard  R.  Dufi'y,  professional  staff  members. 

Chairman  Jenner,  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Call  the  first  Avitness. 

ISIr.  Arens.  The  first  witness,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  Mr.  Grigoriy  Pet- 
rovicli  Klimov. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony  you  will  give 
in  this  hearing  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  po  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  I  do. 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  are  here  this  morning  with  an  interpreter. 

Will  3'ou  be  sworn  to  testify?  Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony 
given  in  this  hearing  will  be  truly  interpreted? 

Mr.  Serebrennikov.   I  do. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Will  you  state  your  full  name  ? 

TESTIMONY   OF   GRIGORIY  PETROVICH  KLIMOV,   MUNICH,   GER- 
MANY, THROUGH  INTERPRETER,  E.  S.  SEREBRENNIKOV 

Mr.  Klimov.  Grigoriy  Petrovich  Klimov. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Munich,  Germany. 

Chairman  Jenner.  What  is  your  business  or  profession  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  A  writer  and  journalist. 

Chairman  Jenner.  How  long  have  you  been  in  this  country  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Three  weeks. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Where  do  you  come  from? 

Mr.  Klimov.  From  Munich. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Munich,  Germany? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Are  you  a  resident  of  Germany? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Chairman  Jenner.  How  long  have  you  resided  in  Germany? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Since  1947. 

Cliairman  Jenner.  Where  did  you  reside  prior  to  that  ? 

2G9 


270  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

]\Ir,  Kltmov.  In  Berlin,  in  the  Soviet  side;  the  headquarters  of  the 
Soviet  military  administration  in  Karlhorst,  in  Germany. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Where  did  you  reside  prior  to  that  time? 

]\[r,  Klimov.  In  the  city  of  Novocherl^assk. 

Chairman  Jenner.  How  louij  did  you  reside  there? 

Mr.  Klimov.  From  1018  to  1941. 

Chairman  Jennei;.  Wliere  were  you  born? 

]\Ir.  Klijmov.  In  No^'ocherkahsk. 

Chaii'maii  Jenner.  When? 

Mr.  Klimov.  'J'wenty  sixth  of  September  1918. 

Chairrian  Jenner.  In  other  words,  you  lived  where  you  were  born 
up  until  yon  made  this  last  move? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Are  you  a  married  man? 

Mr.  Klimov.  A  sinj^le  one. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Have  you  ever  been  married? 

Mr.  Klimov.  No. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Yon  may  proceed  with  the  questioning. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  a  prepared  statement  which  you  have  sub- 
mitted for  incorporation  in  the  record  of  the  Internal  Security  Sub- 
committee of  the  Senate;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  this  prepared  statement 
of  Mr.  Klimov  be  incorporated  in  the  record  at  this  point  and  that  he 
now  proceed  extemporaneously. 

Chairman  Jenner.  It  may  go  into  the  record  and  become  a  part  of 
it. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows:) 

Statement  of  Ghigoiuy  Petkovich  Klimov 
peksonal  history 

I,  Grigoriy  Petrovich  Klimov,  wfis  born  in  Novocherkassk,  in  nortliern 
Caucasus,  on  Septenibor  2(),  1918.  My  father  was  a  medical  doctor,  and  my 
mother  a  nurso.  From  102(i  to  VX'>C>  I  studiod  in  the  10-year  school  from  which  I 
was  graduated.  From  IHJUi  to  1941  I  studied  in  the  Industrial  Institute  in 
Ordzhonikidze,  and  sraduated  in  1!)41  with  a  diploma  in  electrical  engineering. 
I  worked  as  engineer-constructor  in  plant  No.  645  in  Gor'kiy  from  1941  to  1943. 
In  1948,  I  was  mobilized  in  the  lied  Army  and  fought  in  the  Leningrad  sector 
of  the  front.  I  was  wounded,  and  upon  leaving  the  hospital  I  was  sent  to  the 
Special  Reserve  Officer  Regiment  No.  96  (OPKOS  96).  In  the  summer  of 
1944,  I  was  assigned  to  the  Red  Army  Military  Institute  of  Foreign  Languages, 
where  I  was  admitted  to  the  last  grade  of  the  German  faculty  because  of  my 
knowledge  of  German.  Upon  graduating  from  the  institute,  in  June  1945,  and 
being  a  German-speaking  engineer,  I  was  sent  to  the  main  headquarters  of  the 
Soviet  occupation  troops  in  Germany,  SVAG  in  Berlin-Karlhorst.  From  June 
1945  to  February  1946  I  worked  as  economic  adviser  of  General  Shabalin,  chief 
of  the  economic  administration  in  the  SVAG.  Following  the  reorganization  of 
the  economic  administration  in  February  1946  I  was  transferred  to  the  industrial 
administration  of  the  SVAG,  headed  by  A.  Aleksandrov,  where  I  occupied  the 
position  of  chief  engineer  for  electrical  industry  until  February  1947. 

After  being  demobilized  and  sent  back  to  the  Ministry  of  Electrical  Industry 
in  Moscow,  I  decided  to  break  away  from  the  Soviet  regime,  and  to  flee  West. 
My  demobilization  and  the  transfer  to  Moscow  were  due  to  the  fact  that,  although 
I  was  an  officer  and  an  engineer,  I  was  not  a  party  member.  After  the  war  all 
SVAG  employees  were  thoroughly  investigated  for  political  reliability.  About  20 
percent  were  deemed  politically  unreliable  and  were  sent  back  to  Moscow.  I  was 
cue  of  them. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  271 

In  February  1947  I  crossed  the  border  into  the  American  zone  of  Germany 
where,  after  being  checked,  I  was  granted  political  asylum.  Since  then,  I  lived 
first  in  Stuttgart,  and  then  in  Munich,  where  I  worked  as  journalist,  and  wrote 
the  book,  The  Berlin  Kreml,  about  my  work  in  the  SVAG.  The  book  was  pub- 
lislied  in  Russian,  German,  French,  and  English  (the  English  title  is  the  Machine 
of  Terror). 

In  15)52,  I  started  to  publish  the  magazine  Svoboda  (Freedom),  in  cooperation 
with  a  group  of  piistwar  emigres  from  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  In  1952  we  organized  the 
Cential  Union  of  Postwar  Emigres  from  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  (TsOPE),  with  the 
magazine  Svoboda  as  its  official  publication.  TsOPE  carried  on  active  anti- 
Communist  work  beyond  the  Iron  Curtain,  through  pamphlets  and  radio 
broadcasts. 

The  [turpose  of  my  visit  to  the  United  States  is  to  organize  the  work  of  the 
TsOI'E  members  here,  in  order  to  increase  the  anti-Communist  struggle  beyond 
the  Iron  Curtain;  it  is  also  to  reestablish  contacts  with  the  United  States  public 
circles  in  order  to  get  their  support  for  our  work,  and  to  present  them  our  goals 
and  problems  in  the  struggle  against  communism.  Moreover,  we  also  seek  the 
support  of  tlie  United  States  public  and  of  the  United  States  Program  for  the 
Support  of  Emigres  (USI<]P)  in  order  to  improve  the  social  conditions  of  the 
postwar  emigres  frcmi  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 

I  do  not  wfuit  to  repeat  the  well-known  truisms  regarding  the  Communist 
system,  and  I  shall  merely  stress  a  few  facts  I  know,  which  confirm  tiie  ag- 
gressiveness aiming  at  the  world  domination  by  tlie  Communists. 

In  surveying  the  Soviet  policies  toward  Americans,  of  the  period  which  fol- 
lowed immediately  the  end  of  the  war,  the  most  striking  facts  are  related  to  the 
attitude  of  the  Soviet  representatives  in  the  Allied  Control  Commission  in  Berlin. 
My  chief,  General  Shabalin,  equally  represented  the  Soviets  in  the  Economic 
Management  of  the  Control  Commission.  His  colleagues  were  General  Draper 
for  the  United  States.  Sir  Percy  Mills  for  the  United  Kingdom,  and  General 
Sergent  for  France.  From  the  first  day  of  the  commission's  work.  General 
Shabalin  applied  all  the  means  available  to  sabotage  the  operations  of  the 
Economic  Management,  whose  primary  assignment  was  to  implement  the  Plan 
for  the  Economic  Demilitarization  of  Germany  which  was  adopted  at  the  Pots- 
dam Conference.  The  purpose  of  this  sabotage  by  the  Soviets  was  to  slow  down 
and  to  delay  the  implementation  of  the  plan  which  aimed  at  either  the  destruc- 
tion or  at  the  demilitarization  of  the  German  war  industry.  In  fact,  the  Soviets 
were  not  interested  in  the  destruction  of  the  German  war  industry,  but  rather 
in  its  transfer  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.    This  was  what  they  actually  achieved. 

While  General  Shabalin  applied  all  his  skill  to  delay  the  application  of  the 
demilitarization  plan  signed  in  Potsdam  by  Stalin,  the  Soviet  dismantling  teams, 
from  May  1945  to  March  1946,  took  apart  and  shipped  to  tlie  U.  S.  S.  R.  practically 
all  the  military,  semimilitary,  and  basic  industries  of  the  Soviet  zone  of  Germany. 
This  was  done  in  spite  of  the  demilitarization  plan  providing  that  all  the  war 
Industry  was  to  be  destroyed  on  the  spot.  General  Shabalin  followed  direct 
orders  from  the  Kremlin,  with  which  he  was  connected  b.\  telephone  and  from 
which  he  received  his  daily  instructions.  Thus,  immediately  after  the  end  of 
the  war.  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  set  the  increase  of  its  own  war  potentialities  as  its  main 
task.  In  the  meantime,  everybody,  including  Soviet  officers  of  the  Control 
Commission,  knew  that  the  United  States  demobilized  completely  both  their 
army  and  their  industry. 

Siniultaneousiy  the  Soviets  were  busily  occupied  with  economic  espionage  in 
the  American  occupational  zone  of  Germany.  I  know  of  a  case  when  aiajor  Filiu 
officially  a  worker  in  the  editorial  offices  of  Taegliche  Rundschau,  and  unofficially 
an  officer  of  Soviet  economic  intelligence,  handed  over  to  General  Shabalin  for 
his  use  a  file  of  secret  material  on  German  economy.  This  file,  which  was  handed 
over  to  me  for  processing,  contained  materials  of  the  (Imperial  (?))  Reich 
Institute  of  Economic  Statistics,  which  reached  Soviet  hands  through  unofficial 
ways,  i.  e.,  through  Soviet  agents,  from  the  headquarters  of  the  American  eco- 
nomic intelligence  (it  seems  that  this  is  in  Heidelberg).  Since  I  was  familiar 
with  the  signature  stamps  affixed  to  the  Soviet  and  American  secret  and  unclassi- 
fied documents,  which  I  learned  through  my  work  with  the  documents  passing 
through  the  control  council,  it  was  perfectly  obvious  for  me  that  these  docu- 
ments could  have  gotten  into  Soviet  hands  only  through  undercover  ways,  i.  e., 
through  Soviet  agents  in  the  American  Army.  Such  documents  were  regularly 
received  in  the  economic  administration  of  the  SVAG,  I  knew  of  it,  but  tliey  all 
passed  not  through  my  hands,  but  through  the  secret  section  of  the  SVAG. 


272  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

At  that  time  the  American  side,  basing  itself  on  the  Potsdam  agreement, 
regularly  and  carefully  transmitted  to  the  Soviet  side  through  the  Allied  Con- 
trol Commission  official  economic  information  about  everything  which  the 
Americans  considered  worthy  of  attention  in  their  zone  of  Germany.  This  in- 
formation was  honest  and  conscientious ;  it  was  very  useful  to  the  Soviets,  and 
we,  the  Soviet  economic  officers,  often  wondered  at  the  naivete  of  the  Americans, 
since  the  Soviet  side  either  did  not  give  the  Americans  similar  information  on 
the  Soviet  zone  at  all,  using  silly  excuses,  like  shortage  of  typists  and  so  on, 
or  gave  them  deliberately  incomplete  and  distorted  information. 

Besides  the  dismantling  of  German  war  industries  for  the  purpose  of  increasing 
their  own  war  potentials,  the  Soviets  gave  especial  attention  to  the  utilization  of 
German  scientists,  working  on  military  research  and  inventions.  The  chief  of 
the  science  and  technical  section  of  the  SVAG  was  Colonel  Kondakov,  whose 
tasks  included  the  bringing  out  of  resolutions  on  such  questions.  I  will  give 
one  separate  example. 

In  June  1946  Colonel  Kondakov  asked  me  to  accompany  him  to  Potsdam, 
where  he  was  to  question  a  German  scientist  held  under  arrest  by  the  MVD. 
The  story  follows : 

''The  German  scientist,  whose  name  I  was  never  given,  woi'ked  during  the 
last  years  of  the  war  with  other  scientists  on  the  construction  of  rockets,  directed 
by  remote  control,  and  destined  for  fighting  enemy  planes.  This  work  was  not 
completed  by  the  end  of  the  war.  Therefore,  after  the  end  of  the  war,  this 
German,  who  lived  in  the  French  Zone  of  occupation  applied  to  the  French 
occupational  authorities  for  assistance  in  completing  his  work,  and  in  exchange 
he  offered  his  invention  to  the  French  Government  for  their  use.  The  Soviet 
Communist  network  in  the  French  occupational  armies  instead  notified  the 
respective  Soviet  organs  of  the  matter.  As  a  result,  the  scientist  was  kidnapped 
by  the  Soviet  secret  police,  and  had  been  held  for  several  months  in  the  in- 
vestigation jail  of  the  Potsdam  MVD.  They  tried  here  to  force  the  German 
to  work  for  the  Soviets,  but  he  insisted  that  in  order  to  continue  his  work 
he  needs  all  his  drawings  and  figures,  which  are  in  the  hands  of  his  fellow 
workers  in  the  French  Zone,  and  therefore  he  requested  permission  to  take  a 
trip  to  the  French  Zone  in  order  to  obtain  these  drawings.  The  Soviets  could 
not  agree  to  this,  siijce  they  did  not  believe  that  he  would  come  back.  Therefore, 
the  Soviets  tried  to  force  him  to  resume  his  work,  while  the  German  insisted 
that  this  work  was  the  result  of  research  by  an  entire  group  of  scientists  over 
a  period  of  several  years.  Therefore,  he  was  actually  unable  to  resume 
his  work.  The  Soviets  decided  that  this  was  sabotage.  Colonel  Kondakov  had 
to  make  a  decision  on  this  affair.  As  a  result  the  German  was  to  be  sent  under 
guard  to  work  on  the  Soviet  scientific  research  station  of  Peenemiinde,  where  the 
German  and  Soviet  scientists  continued  research  work  on  improvements  of  the 
rocket-type  missiles  of  the  type  of  the  German  VI,  V2.  etc." 

On  the  same  day  Colonel  Kondakov  conducted  the  questioning  of  another  Ger- 
man scientist,  who  had  also  been  kidnapped  by  the  MVD  from  the  Western  Zone 
of  Germany.  This  was  a  specialist  in  low-voltage  technique,  who  was  working 
on  the  invention  of  a  peculiar  apparatus  of  the  radar  type.  Colonel  Kondakov 
ordered  to  have  him  sent  under  guard  for  work  in  the  scientific  research  Soviet 
base  in  Arnstadt,  where  Colonel  Vasil'yev  was  chief.  On  the  same  day  Colonel 
Vasil'yev  received  for  his  decision  a  number  of  scientific  research  subjects  and 
materials  pertaining  to  war,  which  were  carried  out  by  various  German  scien- 
tists residing  in  the  Western  Zones  of  Germany.  All  this  material  was 
received  through  the  channels  of  the  German  Communist  Party  in  Western  Ger- 
many or  through  the  Soviet  network  in  the  Soviet  occupational  armies.  This 
shows  the  extent  of  the  interest  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  war  research  of 
German  scientists.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  the  thoughts  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment were  directed  toward  preparation  for  war. 

Since  the  very  beginning  of  the  Soviet  occupation  of  Eastern  Germany,  the 
Soviets  were  not  convinced  that  they  would  be  able  to  stay  in  Germany  for  a 
long  time.  Out  of  this  premise,  their  economic  policy  aimed  at  dismantling  and 
taking  out  of  Germany  in  the  shortest  possible  time  everything  which  had  any 
value  at  all  as  a  military  or  economic  potential.  During  1945-46  the  Soviets 
dismantled  everything,  even  things  which  they  would  have  urgently  needed 
in  the  near  future  if  they  thought  at  that  time  of  staying  in  Germany  for  any 
length  of  time.  Therefore,  in  1947,  when  the  Soviets  became  convinced  that 
they  could  stay  in  Germany  in  the  future,  they  were  forced  to  rebuild  with 
German  labor,  time  and  again,  the  enterprises  which  they  had  dismantled  in 
1945.    These  enterprises  turned  out  to  be  essential  for  the  Soviets  for  satisfying 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMJMUNISM  273 

requirements  of  the  Soviet  occupational  forces  in  Germany  and  for  the  supply 
of  products  to  the  Soviet  Union  as  reparations.  Had  the  Soviets  from  the  very 
beginning  thougtit  of  staying  in  Germany  for  a  lengthy  time,  they  would  never 
have  taken  apart  the  enterprises,  which  later  proved  to  be  essential  for  supply- 
ing the  needs  of  their  own  occupational  forces  and  for  reparations. 

How  can  one  explain  this  uncertainty  of  the  Soviets  that  they  would  be  able  to 
establish  themselves  in  Germany  for  a  lengthy  time?  The  Soviets  approached 
the  question  from  the  angle  of  their  own  ideology :  The  one  who  is  strong  domi- 
nates the  situation.  At  that  time  Soviet  Armies  were  thoroughly  exhausted, 
while  the  American  Armies  had  only  just  reached  their  normal  battle  strength.  If 
the  American  Armed  Forces  had  been  controlled  by  a  dictatorship,  a  simple  ulti- 
matum would  have  sufficed,  and  the  Soviet  Armies  would  have  been  forced  to 
clear  out  not  only  of  Eastern  Germany,  but  of  the  whole  of  Eastern  Europe. 
Reasoning  from  their  own  ideology  the  Soviets  considered  this  possibility  and 
tried  to  get  out  of  Germany  everything  they  needed. 

At  that  time  the  Soviets  carried  out  a  policy  of  bluffing.  On  one  hand  they 
behaved  provocatively  in  the  Allied  Control  Commission  and  demanded  maxi- 
mum concessions  from  the  Western  Allies,  and  in  general  the  maximum  of  every- 
thing in  the  field  of  politics  and  economics.  On  the  other  hand,  they  considered 
the  possibility  that  the  West  might  not  agree  to  these  demands  and  make  some 
demands  of  its  own — including  the  evacuation  of  Soviet  Armies  of  occupation 
from  Eastern  Germany.  And  the  Soviets  seriously  considered  this  eventuality. 
This  can  be  clearly  seen  from  the  fact  that  during  the  first  year  of  occupation 
the  Soviets  applied  themselves  practically  only  to  the  dismantling,  all  the  other 
changes  in  principles  of  economic  and  political  structure  of  Eastern  Germany 
were  begun  by  the  Soviets  considerably  later. 

I  arrived  at  this  conclusion  from  the  reading  of  many  oflicial  documents  which 
passed  thi-ough  the  private  office  of  the  cliief  of  Economic  Administration  of  the 
SVAG,  where  I  was  employed,  and  also  from  the  personal  directives,  orders,  and 
words  of  General  Shabalin. 

The  Soviet  occupational  forces  did  not  feel  sure  of  their  position  in  Germany, 
and  this  was  especially  noticeable  at  headquarters ;  this  is  confirmed  by  the 
fact,  the  simple  human  fact  that  many  of  the  officers  who  had  their  families, 
wives,  and  children,  with  them,  always  kept  an  emergency  reserve  of  gasoline 
in  their  cellars.  This  emergency  reserve  which  was  kept  in  the  cellar  of  the 
liome  of  almost  every  officer  having  a  family,  consisted  of  20  or  30  cans  of 
gasoline,  and  was  kept  for  the  eventuality  that  they  may  have  to  retreat  from 
Germany  in  a  disorderly  manner,  more  plainly — to  flee  under  bombardments  from 
the  front  and  from  the  rear,  as  happened  to  the  Soviet  military  in  the  P.nltic  area 
during  the  first  days  of  the  1941  war.  The  Soviet  oflicers  in  Karlshoi'st  knew 
how  provocative  and  insolent  was  the  policy  conducted  l>y  the  Soviets  in  the 
Allied  Control  Commission.  They  also  considered  the  strength  of  the  Western 
side  and  acknowledged  the  possibility  of  military  actions  on  tlie  part  of  the 
Americans,  including  the  possibility  of  war.  When,  early  in  ll)4(i,  tlie  Soviet 
military  authorities  forbade  any  contacts  of  the  Soviet  military  with  the  Western 
Allies  and  introduced  restrictions  bordering  on  wartime  restrictions,  this  served 
as  further  proof  for  the  Soviet  officers  that  war  was  possible. 

This  is  the  difference  between  the  psychology  of  the  Soviets  and  the  psychology 
of  the  West. 

One  year  after  the  end  of  the  war,  when  the  Soviets  realized  that  the  West 
was  giving  in  to  them  in  everything  and  that  it  was  po.ssible  for  them  to  establish 
themselves  in  Germany  for  a  long  time,  the  Soviets  began  working  on  reforms 
of  a  long-range  nature,  which  would  guarantee  to  them  economic  and  political 
domination  of  the  country  for  a  long  time.  This  was  the  plan  for  the  enslave- 
ment of  Germany. 

The  economic  enslavement  of  Germany  was  chiefly  carried  out  by  two 
measures:  (a)  The  agrarian  reform,  and  {h)  the  socialization  of  industry.  Let 
us  take  a  look  at  both  measures  : 

<A)    THE  AGRARIAN   REKOUM 

The  purpose  of  the  agrarian  reform  was  the  liijuidation  of  the  class  of  inde- 
pendent farmers-producers,  who,  obviously,  were  opposed  to  the  regime  of  the 
so-called  people's  democracy.  The  Soviets  first  took  their  land  away  from  them, 
and  then  liquidated  them  as  an  independent  antagonistic  class.  On  the  other 
hand  they  distributed  the  land  confiscated  to  landless  peasants,  former  farm  hired 
labor,  etc.,  hoping  to  create  thus  a  new  class  of  landowners,  ^^ho  would  be 

477C9°— 54— pt.  5 2 


274  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

sympathetic  to  the  new  ref;irae  if  it  were  only  because  they  had  received  land 
from  this  regime. 

The  plans  for  the  ajjjrarian  reform,  the  maximum  size  of  land  allotments,  and 
all  the  instructions  for  carrying  out  the  reform  had  been  worked  out  in  advance 
by  the  Soviets.  On  the  surface  there  was  the  fiction  that  they  were  received 
in  the  shape  of  applications  from  the  local  German  landrats  (administrators) 
so  as  to  create  the  impression  that  this  plan  of  agrarian  reform  was  proposed 
by  the  Germans  themselves  and  was  only  approved  by  the  SVAG. 

I  personally  had  occasion  to  observe  how  the  German  landrats,  commonly 
members  of  the  Communist  Party,  repeatedly  called  on  General  Shabalin  to  hand 
over  their  plans,  which  they  had  to  rewrite  until  "these  plans"  fully  corresponded 
to  the  Soviet  instructions.  Time  and  again  the  Communist  landrats  tried  to  pro- 
test against  obviously  senseless  and  economically  harmful  clauses  in  the  Soviet 
instructions,  but  they  could  not  do  anything  and  were  compelled  to  submit  to  the 
SVAG. 

Economically,  the  agrarian  reform  in  Eastern  Germany  has  only  decreased  the 
effectiveness  and  productivity  of  agriculture.  But  that  was  not  important  to  the 
Soviets.  They  had  liquidated  opposition  to  the  "new  order"  in  agriculture.  Be- 
sides, they  had  created  a  new  social  layer  among  the  peasantry,  which  was  sup- 
posed to  l>e  in  sympathy  with  them.  The  new  structure  of  agricultural  economy 
insured  the  subordination  of  agricultural  economy  to  the  State  authorities.  Thus 
the  Soviets  laid  their  heavy  hand  on  German  agricultural  economy. 

<B)    SOCIALIZATION  OF  INDUSTKT 

The  socialization  of  industry  was  carried  out  on  orders  of  the  RVA  in  the  shape 
of  the  establishment  of  "Landeseignene  Betriebe"  (State-owned  enterprises). 
This  meant  that  a  considerable  portion  of  small  and  medium  industries  of  Ger- 
many was  taken  away  from  their  owners  without  indemnity  and  transferred  to  the 
local  city  self-governments.  This  was  done  so  as  to  liquidate  a  second  independ- 
ent class  of  German  society :  Industrialists-entrepreneurs,  whom  the  Soviet  rulers 
considered  as  enemies.  Since  the  local  German  self-governments  were  completely 
controled  by  the  SVAG,  the  socialized  enter|)rises  in  the  form  of  "Landeseigene- 
Betriebe"  were  also  completely  controlled  by  the  SVAG.  Thereby  was  created 
the  fictitious  appearance  that  socializ  'd  industry  was  transferred  into  "the  hands 
of  the  German  people."  Thereby  the  SVAG  was  hoping  to  earn  additional  political 
capital. 

Thus,  all  the  economic  enterprises  of  the  Soviets  in  Eastern  Germany  served 
to  weaken  economically  (dismantling,  reparations)  and  enslave  economically 
(agrarian  reform,  socialization  of  industry)  Germany.  The  purpcises  of  this  eco- 
nomic enslavement  served  as  bases  for  a  silmultaneous  political  enslavement, 
which  was  most  sirikingly  expressed  in  the  creation  of  an  artificial  political 
party— the  SED. 

OPPOSITION  OF  THE  SOVIETS  TO  THE  VNIFICATION  OF  WESTERN  AND  EASTERN  GERMANY 

While  the  Soviets  were  carrying  out  the  above  measure  for  the  economic  and 
political  enslavement  of  Eastern  Germany,  they  opposed  by  all  possible  means  the 
reunification  of  Western  and  Eastern  Germany.  This  was  not  advantageous  to 
them  economically,  because,  if  there  is  even  the  question  of  commodity  circulation 
between  the  zones,  this  would  have  interfered  with  deliveries  on  account  of  re- 
ptirations,  out  of  current  production.  A  part  of  the  production,  earmarked  for 
deliveries  under  reparations  to  the  Soviet  Union,  would  have  gone  out  from  under 
the  control  of  the  Soviet  authorities.  In  the  administration  of  industry  of  the 
SVAG  special  meetings  of  the  leading  engineers  of  the  administration  were  held, 
at  which  the  chief  of  the  administration,  A.  Aleksandrov,  stressed  the  impos- 
sibility for  the  Soviet  Union  of  commodity  circulation  between  the  zones,  because 
this  would  have  ruined  the  plans  for  reparation  deliveries.  The  Soviets  are  only 
shouting  about  the  unification  of  Germany  in  their  propaganda,  but  they  will 
never  voluntarily  agree  to  it. 

In  spite  of  the  agreement  on  ending  reparations  concluded  between  Moscow  and 
Pankow,  the  reparations  are  still  being  levied,  but  only  in  another  form :  The 
Soviets  fix  prices,  without  any  basis,  and  very  low,  for  products  manufactured  on 
orders  from  the  Soviets,  and  at  the  same  time  sell  their  own  raw  materials  in 
Eastern  Germany  at  very  high  prices. 

The  Soviets  will  never  agree  to  the  unification  of  Germany  through  free  elec- 
tions.   This  would  mean  a  complete  defeat  for  the  puppet  government  of  Eastern 


i 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  275 

Germany.     The  Soviets  cannot  permit  free  elections,  since  all  their  system  is 
based  not  on  freedom,  but  on  compulsion. 

On  the  basis  of  my  experiences  as  a  Soviet  officer  working  in  the  SVAG,  and 
at  present  through  the  contacts  of  our  organization  among  the  Soviet  occupa- 
tional armies  in  Eastern  Germany,  in  which  we  are  considerably  helped  by  the 
population  of  Eastern  Germany,  I  can  state  that  I  am  fully  convinced  in  the 
following:  the  German  people  of  Eastern  Germany  are  our  allies,  allies  of  the 
free  West,  and  the  Soviet  regime  in  Eastern  Germany  is  maintained  mainly 
through  terrorism  and  force,  in  the  same  degree  as  on  the  territory  of  the  Soviet 
Union  itself.  On  the  front  lines  of  anti-Communist  fighting  the  German  popula- 
tion and  the  soldiers  of  the  Soviet  occupational  army  often  feel  that  they  are 
allies.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  riots  among  German  workers  on  July  17  of  last 
year,  when  hundreds  of  German  workers  gave  their  lives  for  the  cause  of  freedom, 
and  when  dozens  of  Soviet  soldiers  and  officers  were  shot  by  the  field  court- 
martial  because  of  their  refusal  to  fire  at  the  rioting  German  workers.  It  is 
on  this  base  of  mutual  struggle  of  all  the  people  enslaved  by  communism  that 
the  West  must  build  its  struggle  of  liberation  against  the  Communist  system. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  are  in  the  United  States  only  temporarily  for  a 
mission  which  we  will  get  into  in  just  a  few  moments;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  It  is  a  mission  to  develop  contacts  for  iinderground 
work  which  you  are  conducting  against  the  Soviet  regime;  is  that 
correct  ? 

]\Ir.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Will  you  in  your  own  pace  in  a  conversational  manner 
here  now  just  tell  the  committee  a  word  of  your  personal  background 
and  personal  history  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  I,  Grigoriy  Petrovich  Klimov,  was  born  in  Novocher- 
kassk, in  northern  Caucasus,  on  September  26,  1918.  My  father  was  a 
medical  doctor,  and  my  mother  a  nurse.  From  1926  to  1936  I  studied 
in  the  10-year  school  from  which  I  was  graduated.  From  1936  to 
1941 1  studied  in  the  Industrial  Institute  in  Ordzhonikidze,  and  gradu- 
ated in  1941  with  a  diploma  in  electrical  engineering. 

I  worked  as  an  engineer-constructor  in  plant  No.  645  in  Gor'kiy 
from  1941  to  1943.  In  1943  I  was  mobilized  in  the  Red  Army  and 
fought  in  the  Leningrad  sector  of  the  front.  I  was  wounded,  and 
upon  leaving  the  hospital  I  was  sent  to  the  Special  ReserA-e  Officer 
Regiment  No.  96  (OPROS  96).  In  the  summer  of  1944  I  was  assigned 
to  the  Red  Army  Military  Institute  of  Foreign  Languages,  where  I 
was  admitted  to  the  last  grade  of  the  Germany  faculty  because  of 
my  knowledge  of  German. 

Senator  IVelker.  I  wonder  if  counsel  could  not  ask  questions? 
He  has  a  statement  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  do  not  think  he  understood  the  way  I  was  suggesting 
we  proceed.  I  am  suggesting  that  you  give  a  conversational  resume 
of  your  background.  As  indicated  in  your  statement,  you  have  been 
an  official  of  the  Soviet  Government,  is  that  correct  ? 

]Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  were  an  official  of  the  Soviet  Government  in 
Berlin  as  an  economic  adviser  to  the  chief  of  the  Economic  Admin- 
istration in  Berlin,  is  that  correct? 

]\Ir.  Klimov.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Arens.  During  that  time  you  had  considerable  experience  in 
the  political  subversion  in  Berlin  and  in  Germany  which  was  con- 
ducted by  the  Soviets,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes,  it  is. 


276  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  you  just  tell  us  in  your  own  words  just  in- 
formally here  now  about  the  operations  of  the  representatives  of  the 
Soviets  on  the  Allied  Control  Commission  in  Berlin  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  My  first  experience  in  Germany  indicated  to  me  from 
the  very  beginning  that  the  Soviet  side  did  not  want  to  collaborate 
with  the  western  allies,  including,  of  course,  the  American  allies. 
Inasmuch  as  I  was  one  of  the  first  Soviet  officers  within  the  framework 
of  the  Control  Council,  I  was  especially  impressed  by  the  colossal 
difl'erence  when  on  one  side,  and  when  I  say  "we"  I  mean  we,  the 
Soviet  officers  and  soldiers,  expected  to  meet  Americans  and  see  in 
them  our  real  allies,  not  only  during  the  war  but  also  during  peace. 

The  whole  Soviet  people,  the  whole  Soviet  army,  had  the  same  ideas. 
And  then  I  was  especially  impressed  and  astonished  at  being  one  of 
the  few  Soviet  officers  who  had  an  opportunity  to  work  for  the  Control 
Council  and  then  I  learned  the  official  Soviet  policy  in  regard  to 
America.  While  Soviet  officers  and  Soviet  soldiers  would  encounter 
Americans,  French,  and  British  on  the  streets  of  Berlin,  they  con- 
tinued to  feel  that  they  were  their  allies  and  were  happy  to  have  at  least 
a  modicum  of  contact  with  the  world  that  is  unknown  to  them  but 
which  Avas  friendly  to  them.  When  we  people  who  passed  through 
the  war  and  who  even  before  the  war  knew  the  reality  of  Soviet  life, 
we  were  happy  in  our  thinking  that  peace  had  come. 

During  my  very  first  days  in  my  work  with  the  Control  Council, 
I  was  literally  astounded  when  I  saw  that  the  official  representatives  at' 
the  Control  Council,  General  Shabalin,  was  completely  subverting  all 
hopes  not  only  of  the  Russian  people  but  of  every  Russian  officer  and 
soldier,  all  hopes  about  peace.  The  actions  of  my  superior.  General 
Shabalin,  were  so  much  in  conflict  with  hopes  and  ideas  of  all  Soviet 
people,  of  all  Russian  people  and  the  Army  personnel  that  I  at  first 
personally  had  the  tendency  to  ascribe  his  actions  either  to  his  per- 
sonal stupidity,  or  I  thought  he  was  simply  mistaken. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  have  a  question  ? 

Chairman  Jenner.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welker.  Mr.  Witness,  I  take  it  you  are  referring  now  to 
when  the  Soviets  started  to  reform  Eastern  Germany,  their  long-range 
plan  of  reform ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.   Yes. 

Senator  Welker.  That  first  took  place  by  what,  the  socialization  of 
industry  and  then  the  agrarian  reform  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  At  first  they  were  dismantling. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  what  happened  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  The  next  was  the  land  reform. 

Senator  Welker.  Wliat  did  they  do  in  the  land  reform,  if  you  will 
tell  us? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Instructions  were  received  from  Moscow  on  how  to 
implement  the  land  reform,  and  this  reform  was  prepared  in  Moscow 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  was  supposed  to  destroy  completely  inde- 
pendent landowners. 

Senator  Welker.  Then  from  land  reform  you  went  into  the  sociali- 
zation of  industry  and  business? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Senator  Welker,  I  take  it  from  your  answers  given  heretofore  that 
those  three  things  that  you  have  enumerated  caused  you  to  believe 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISAI  277 

tliat  the  Soviets  were  doino;  that  to  the  Russian  people,  the  peasants, 
the  poor  people  who  love  freedom,  and  they  did  not  like  it? 

Mr.  Arens.  In  addition  to  that,  there  was  political  subversion  by  the 
Soviets  in  the  Allied  Control  Council,  was  there  not? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes.  Political  subversion  is  always  connected  with 
economic  subversion.  Communists  are  Marxists  and  materialists, 
and  they  know  they  can  implement  politics  only  when  there  is  economic 
base  for  it. 

Air.  Arens.  Will  you  kindly  summarize  the  techniques  of  Soviet 
diplomacy  with  respect  to  Germany  while  you  were  identified  with 
the  Allied  Control  Commission? 

Mr.  Klimov.  To  continue  what  I  said,  the  Bolsheviks  tried  in  their 
first  attempts  to  create  an  economic  basis  or  economic  base.  Because 
of  this  they  went  through  these  three  reforms  I  mentioned  before; 
that  is,  dismantling,  land  reform,  and  socialization  of  industry.  Only 
after  this  were  they  ready  to  embark  upon  the  political  subversion 
measure,  and  that  is  the  creation  of  the  United  Socialist  Party. 

Mr.  Arexs.  What  were  the  techniques  of  the  Bolsheviks  or  the 
Soviets  in  the  Allied  Control  Commission  itself? 

Mr.  Klimov.  The  first  example  had  to  do  with  the  decision  of  the 
Potsdam  Conference  to  carry  through  the  economic  demilitarization 
of  Germany.  The  Soviet  representatives  at  the  Allied  Control  Coun- 
cil completely  subverted  this  decision  of  the  Potsdam  Conference  and 
they  were  fighting  against  it.  The  result  was  that  instead  of  liquidat- 
ing the  military  industry,  the  war  industry  of  Germany,  as  they 
were  supposed  to,  what  they  did  was  to  dismantle  it  and  carried  it 
completely  out  of  Germany  to  the  Soviet  Union.  If  you  will  allow 
me  to  present  another  instance  which  is  of  considerable  value,  accord- 
ing to  the  Potsdam  decision  the  Soviets,  together  with  other  allies, 
were  bound  to  promote  the  unity  of  demilitarized  Germany. 

From  the  very  beginning  the  Soviets  subverted  this  point  at  the 
Potsdam  Conference.  First  of  all,  they  wanted  to  carry  out  all  of 
the  military  industry  from  Germany  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Then  it 
was  necessary  for  them  to  take  reparations  out.  These  two  factors 
could  not  be  coordinated  with  the  unity  of  Germany. 

Then  they  created  the  Socialist  Party  of  Germany  which  actuallv 
is  nothing  else  but  a  puppet  of  the  Soviet  regime  in  Germany.  All 
these  measures  ipso  facto  make  impossible  the  unity  of  Germany.  If 
the  Soviets  were  to  agree  today  to  the  unity  of  Germany  accomplished 
on  the  basis  of  free  democratic  elections,  then  tomorrow  the  Soviets 
would  have  to  leave  Germany.  In  this  manner,  while  actually  being 
the  main  enemies  of  the  unity  of  Germany,  the  Soviets  actually  want 
to  portray  in  their  propaganda  that  that  is  what  they  are  for. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  were  sent  back  from  Berlin  by  the  Soviets  because 
they  regarded  you  as  politically  unreliable? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arexs.  They  sent  you  back  to  Moscow? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  thereafter  crossed  over  into  the  Allied  zones  of 
Germany  and  have  been  active  as  president  of  this  Central  Associa- 
tion of  Postwar  Refugees  of  the  Soviet  Union ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  ask  you  a  few  general  questions  with  respect  to 
the  situation  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  on  the  basis  of  your  background 


278  STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

and  experience?    First  of  all,  ^\'liat  percentage  of  the  population  of 
Soviet  Eussia  were  the  Bolsheviks  when  they  tooli  over  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Thirty  thousand  people  out  of  150  million  population. 

Mr.  Akens.  That  would  be  about  the  same  percentage  of  the  hard- 
core Communists  in  the  United  States  to  the  total  population  of  the 
United  States;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes;  it  is  so. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  percentage  of  the  Communists  now  in 
Soviet  Russia  to  the  total  population  ? 

Mr.  Klimov,  Six  million  Communist  Party  members  to  the  popula- 
tion of  200  million.  In  percentage  relation  there  are  more  Communists 
in  France  and  in  Italy  than  there  are  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  attitude  of  the  rank  and  tile  of  the  people 
behind  the  Iron  (yurtain  toward  the  Soviet  regime? 

Mr.  Kltmov.  Eighty  percent  of  them  are  against  the  Soviet  system. 

^Ir.  Arens.  How  many  slave  laborers  are  there  on  the  basis  of  your 
best  information  as  a  former  Soviet  official  in  Soviet  Russia? 

Mr.  Klimov.  About  15  million.  Permit  me  to  say  that  all  relatives 
of  political  exiles  are  included  in  the  group  of  politically  unreliable 
people.  And  so  if  we  were  to  come  to  total  numbers  of  political  exiles, 
political  convicts  ever  since  the  inception  of  the  Soviet  power  to<iether 
with  all  their  relatives,  then  we  will  find  they  comprise  the  biggest 
single  class  of  the  Soviet  population. 

The  Soviet  regime  continues  all  these  relatives  as  political  unreli-  ' 
ables.    In  other  words,  this  class  is  foreign  to  Soviet  power,  and  the 
Soviet  power  counts  them  to  be  its  enemy. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  attitude  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Soviet 
people,  the  Russian  people,  toward  the  United  States  and  toward  the 
West? 

Mr.  KrjTNrov.  Exce]>tional  svm)~)athy  born  of  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  be  the  attitude,  in  your  judgment  as  a 
former  Soviet  official,  of  th,e  rank  and  file  of  the  people  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain  if  the  Government  of  the  United  States  should  sever 
diplomatic  relations  with  all  the  Iron  Curtain  governments? 

Mr.  Kltmov.  That  would  drive  a  wediie  between  the  people  and  the 
Soviet  regime.  Then  the  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  would  look 
upon  this  action  as  support  of  the  people  who  are  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain — support  by  the  free  Avorld. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  would  be  the  reaction  of  the  people  behind  the 
Iron  Curtain,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience,  if  the 
United  States  should,  in  addition  to  severing  diplomatic  relations, 
undertake  to  promote  a  worldwide  embargo  to  sever  all  trade  rela- 
tionship with  the  Iron  C\irtain  countries? 

Mr.  Klimov.  I  could  answer  it  on  the  basis  of  the  embargo  wdiich 
w^as  placed  by  Great  Britain  on  Soviet  goods  in  the  beginning  of  1930. 
The  Avhole  Soviet  people  knew  of  it  and  they  were  glad  to  hear  it  and 
they  probably  considered  this  as  the  best  piece  of  news  for  all  of 
the  1930's. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Would  it  increase  the  suffering  of  the  people  and 
deprive  them  of  necessities? 

Mr.  Kltmov.  Not  at  all. 
Chairman  Jenner.  Why  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  279 

Mr.  Klimov.  Because,  as  a  rule,  what  the  Soviets  get  from  the  West 
is  not  the  consumer  goods,  not  the  food  and  clothing,  but  machinery 
which  is  necessary  for  them  either  for  armaments  production  or  for 
heavy  industry. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience  as  a 
former  Soviet  ofHcial  in  the  echelon  which  would  be  attached  to  the 
Soviet  Control  Council,  could  you  tell  this  committee  the  degree  to 
which  the  Soviet  Communist  international  conspiracy  relies  upon 
political  subversion  for  the  attainment  of  its  objectives? 

Mr.  Klimov.  The  political  subversion  is  the  primary  and  main  pur- 
pose of  all  Soviet  diplomats  here  and  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the 
West. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  do  j'oii  mean  by  political  subversion  ?  Would  you 
just  give  us  a  word  picture  of  what  political  subversion  is? 

Mr.  Kloiov.  Whenever  Vishinsky  speaks  from  the  forum  of  the 
United  Nations,  he  does  not  speak  to  the  members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions and  he  does  not  speak  to  the  American  delegates;  he  speaks  only 
to  the  press  so  that  his  words  will  be  disseminated  throughout  the 
world  and  so  they  will  produce  the  desired  effect.  He  is  not  interested 
in  the  truth;  he  is  interested  only  in  the  effect  which  will  be  carried  by 
his  w^ords  by  means  of  the  press. 

Mr.  Arens.  To  what  extent  is  the  Communist  apparatus  in  the 
United  States  a  part  of  the  international  Communist  conspiracy? 

Mr.  Klimov.  According  to  the  charter  of  the  Communist  Party, 
all  Communist  parties  are  subject  to  the  same  discipline.  In  other 
words,  they  are  supposed  to  execute  the  will  of  the  directing  authority, 
and  the  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  is  not  an  independent 
organization.  It  is  bound  to  obey  and  implement  what  the  Kremlin 
tells  the  Communist  Party. 

Chairman  Jexxer.  Where  we  have  teachers  in  our  schools  and  col- 
leges who  are  members  of  the  Communist  Party  and  where  we  have 
labor  union  officials  who  are  members  of  the  Communist  Party  and 
where  we  have  Government  officials  who  are  members  of  the  Com- 
munist Party — in  other  words,  Communists  in  any  and  all  phases  of 
our  life — they  cannot  be  free  people ;  they  have  to  do  the  bidding  of 
the  Communist  organization  directed  from  Moscow;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  On  the  basis  of  your  background  and  experience,  could 
you  kindly  give  to  the  American  people  your  appraisal  of  communism 
and  the  seriousness  of  the  Communist  threat  ? 

Mr.  Klimov.  First  of  all,  the  American  people  must  recognize,  must 
know,  the  danger  of  communism.  In  order  to  bring  this  about  so 
that  the  people  would  know  the  danger  and  would  recognize  and 
realize  it,  help  is  needed — help  on  the  part  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment. 

Mr.  Arexs.  You  are  temporarily  here  for  the  purpose  of  organizing 
certain  phases  of  your  work,  to  develop  contacts  so  you  will  shortly 
return  to  carry  on  this  underground  activity  against  the  Soviet  regime, 
is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Klimov.  Yes ;  I  will  go  back  to  Germany. 

Chairman  Jexxer.  Thank  you  very  much  for  your  testimony  here. 
We  appreciate  it. 

Congressman  Fred  Busbey  will  you  be  sworn  to  testify  ? 


280  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony  ^iven  before  this  committee  will 
be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you 
God? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  HON.  FEED  E.  BUSBEY,  A  REPEESENTATIVE  IN 
CONGEESS  FKOM  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS 

Chairman  Jenner.  Your  name  is  Congressman  Fred  E.  Busbey  ? 

Rei^resentative  Busbey.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Where  is  your  legal  residence? 

Eepresentative  Busbey.  9144  South  Hoyne  Avenue,  Chicago,  111. 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  are  ])resently  a  Member  of  Congress  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  am. 

Chairman  Jenner.  How  long  have  you  served  in  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  am  finishing  my  fourth  term  as  a  Member 
of  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Proceed. 

Senator  Welker.  Before  proceeding,  may  I  make  an  observation 
for  the  record?  I  want  to  congratulate  the  chairman  and  the  staff 
for  bringing  this  able  man  before  us.  I  have  always  felt  that  Con- 
gressman Busbey  was  one  of  the  greatest  Americans  I  have  ever  known, 
having  dedicated  better  than  three  decades  of  his  life  to  fighting  the 
Communist  conspiracy  wherever  it  existed.  I  am  proud  to  be  a  mem- 
ber of  this  committee  and  sit  here  and  see  before  us  such  an  able  man 
as  my  colleague  from  over  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Representative  Busbey.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

Mr.  Arens.  Representative  Busbey,  you  have  prepared  a  statement 
wdiich  I  respectfully  suggest  to  the  chairman  be  now  incorporated  in 
the  record. 

Chairman  Jenner.  It  may  go  into  the  record  and  become  a  part  of 
the  record. 

(The  statement  referred  to  follows)  : 

Statement  of  Hon.  Fred  E.  Busbey,  a  Representative  in  Congress  From  the 

State  of  Illinois 

Jlr.  Chfiirnian  and  members  of  the  subcommittee,  I  am  Frod  E.  Busbey, 
Representative  in  Congress  from  the  Third  District  of  Illinois,  located  wholly 
within  the  city  of  Chicago. 

I  wish  at  the  outset  to  express  my  appreciation  to  the  subcommittee  for  inviting 
me  to  appear  here  this  morning  on  certain  phases  of  the  strategy  and  tactics 
of  world  communism. 

As  background  for  certain  conclusions  I  will  present  to  the  subcommittee,  I 
should  like,  with  your  permission,  briefly  to  give  a  little  background  which  I 
believe  is  not  only  fundamental  to  the  problem  under  considei'ation,  but  is 
essential  in  understanding  my  very  positive  program  of  action  for  defeating  the 
international  Marxist  menace  that  is  responsible  for  most  of  the  troubles  of  the 
world  today. 

My  opposition  to  communism  is,  I  believe,  well  known  to  the  members  of  this 
subconunittee.  I  have  sought  to  expose  it,  and  its  adherents,  for  over  three 
decades.  That  covers  the  period  when  international  communism  and  the  outlaws 
at  the  head  of  the  Russian  Government  moved  in  an  air  of  respectability  in 
New  Deal  circles. 

Communism,  either  doctrinaire  or  the  Kremlin  variety  of  geopolitical  com- 
munism, has  never  been  respectable,  even  when  Russia  was  a  cobelligerent  in 
the  war  to  overcome  another  form  of  outlawry  known  as  fascism.    The  Commu- 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  281 

nists'  pniposes  were  just  as  anti-American  and  prejudicial  to  lawful  process 
from  11)41  to  1945  as  they  were  in  1919,  wlien  they  destroyed  the  Russian  demo- 
cratic-republican government  which  followed  the  fall  of  the  czarist  regime. 

The  recognition  which  was  finally  granted  the  Kremlin  outlaws  in  1933  under 
the  Roosevelt  administration,  was  as  unwarranted  then  as  it  was  in  1919.  The 
guiding  philosophy  which  accorded  recognition  and  diplomatic  status  to  the 
Stalin  gangsters  in  1933  was  much  the  same  as  that  which,  in  post-World  War  II 
years,  aided  and  abetted  the  ascendancy  of  the  Red  Chinese,  and  now  seeks 
to  admit  them  to  the  United  Nations. 

From  1919  to  1933,  the  Democratic  and  Republican  leadership  of  that  era 
regarded  the  Lenin-Stalin  gang  as  a  group  of  political  schemers  who  were 
using  communism  as  a  deceptive  instrument  for  building  a  Russian-centered 
geopolitical  front  against  the  West.  In  those  days,  the  non-Russian  leaders 
of  the  1919  Communist  pact  were  looked  upon  as  alien  political  opportunists, 
rather  tlian  revolutionary  heroes. 

Somewhere  during  the  post-1933  period,  these  political  outlaws,  in  and  outside 
Russia,  were  disguised  by  an  ideological  cloak,  and  heralded  as  modern  saviors  of 
democracy.  The  resulting  confusion  in  the  public  minds  at  home  and  abroad  has 
brought  the  non-Russian  world,  and  particularly  the  United  States,  to  the  brink 
of  disaster. 

We  have  so  thoroughly  confused  age-old  social  evolutionary  processes  with  the 
niachinations  of  political  opportunists  at  home  and  abroad  that  we  do  not  know 
half  of  the  time  whether  we  are  fighting  for  or  against  Russian  imperialism.  In 
the  name  of  democracy,  we  saved  Stalin's  Russian  imperialism  in  the  1940's, 
while  crushing  Nazi  imperialism.  Our  emotionalism  and  misunderstanding  of 
the  internal  and  external  forces  which  were  working  at  that  time  against  the 
American  institution,  led  us  into  alliances  which  consolidated  the  long-sought 
Russian  imperialist  objectives  and  left  a  vacuum  of  economic  strength  and 
leadership  on  both  the  eastern  and  western  borders  of  Russia.  It  would  be  inter- 
esting, I  am  sure,  to  trace  to  the  source,  the  policy  of  unconditionl  surrender 
which  wrecked  the  livelihood  of  70  million  Germans,  while  eradicating  the  Nazi 
outlaws. 

Who  were  the  guiding  geniuses  in  the  political  maneuvering,  the  geopolitical 
debacle,  which  accompanied  military  victory?  You  know  the  answer.  They 
were  the  same  theorists  who  were  taken  in  by  the  Russian  schemers  not  only  in 
the  thirties  and  forties,  but  in  1919  as  well. 

Is  it  any  wonder  that  our  friends  and  allies  abroad,  in  the  fight  against  these 
political  gangsters,  scrutinize  our  policies  with  trepidation?  Is  it  any  wonder 
that  a  whole  host  of  Asiatic  countries  are  confused  by  the  spectacle  of  Russian 
realism  and  American  vacillation  in  deciding  which  is  friend  or  foe  in  the 
countless  internal  struggles  of  those  countries?  We  have  placed  confidence  and 
leadership  in  persons  right  here  at  home  who  are  the  most  violent  foes  of  pro- 
gressive evolutionary  Socialist  processes  and  have  fought  the  Socialist  Party, 
as  well  as  the  Democi-atic  and  Republican  Parties.  We  have  turned  the  cold-war 
strategy  over  to  a  group  of  revolutionary  opportunists  who  are  as  dangerous 
as  the  Mao  Tse-tungs  and  Ho  Chi-Minhs. 

Gentlemen,  I  .submit  that  the  steady  trend  of  reverses  which  have  marked 
our  belated  awakening  to  communism  and  jeopardized  our  position  in  Asia 
and  even  in  Europe  is  only  a  reflection  of  misplaced  confidence  and  an  appalling 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  communism,  as  well  as  the  individuals  who 
have  been  in  and  out  of  it  for  personal  gain  over  the  past  So  years.  How  can 
we  trust,  as  responsible  representatives  of  our  Nation,  men  who  helped  create 
the  Communist  Party ;  were  afiiliated  with  it  for  10  years ;  and  then  lied  about 
their  Communist  activities  after  banishment  from  the  party  in  1929? 

I  am  100  percent  in  favor  not  only  of  diplomatic,  but  even  of  economic,  curbs 
on  the  Kremlin  outlaws.  This  alone,  however,  without  counteracting  the  influ- 
ence of  internal  political  outlaws  like  Wolfe  and  Lovestone,  will  not  destroy 
the  menace  to  the  lawful  processes  of  America  and  other  non-Russian 
governments. 

I  regret  to  say  that  the  present  conflict  over  communism  is  narrowing  down 
to  a  political  contest  between  western  revolutionary  theorists  and  Russian  geo- 
political strategists.  It  is  essentially  a  conflict  between  Russian  state  socialism 
and  western  international  revolutionary  socialism.  On  the  sidelines  in  this 
global  struggle  are  moderate  Socialists,  nationalists,  and  religious  and  ideolog- 
ical groups,  who  are  being  manipulated  one  against  the  other  at  the  wi'l  of 
Communist  and  ex-Communist  strategists. 
47769°— 54— pt.  5 3 


282  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Whether  we  want  to  recognize  it  or  not,  we  have  placed  our  military-economic 
machine  in  the  hands  of  a  group  of  Marxist  theorists,  who  helieve.  that  today's 
conflict  is  a  materialist  struggle  between  a  western  international  superstate 
and  the  Russian-dominated  eastern  suijerstate.  Religious  ideals,  national  iden- 
tity, and  lingering  remnants  of  national  patriotism  have  long  been  banished  in 
this  material  conflict,  which  the  ex-Communist  strategists  call  a  managerial 
revolution  between  Russia  and  the  United  States. 

The  paradox  of  all  this,  of  course,  is  that,  in  the  past  7  years  of  hysteria  over 
communism,  religious  groups,  as  well  as  lawful  jjolitical  parties,  have  been 
drawn  into  a  bitter  and  nearly  disastrous  internal  strife  over  the  manner  of 
coping  with  communism.  Liberal  as  well  as  conservative  groups — with  no 
intention  whatsoever  of  plotting  with  Russia — have  been  maneuvered  unwit- 
tingly into  a  name-calling  contest  which  serves  only  to  weaken  religious  and 
political  solidarity  against  a  common  international  enemy  of  our  political- 
legislative  framework. 

In  this  7-year  period,  we  have  neither  come  to  grips  with  the  Russian  military 
machine  nor  have  we  stemmed  the  growth  of  Communist  philosophy.  In  fact, 
it  can  be  said  that  our  absorption  with  anticommunism  has  been  confined  to 
struggles  with  a  number  of  dissimilar  revolutionary  and  evolutionary  processes — 
any  one  of  which,  if  taken  separately,  would  be  found  to  be  anti-Russian  and 
equally  antiwestern. 

Thus,  if  we  analyzed  the  policy  which  has  hamstrung  any  attempt  to  come  to 
grips  with  Russia  itself,  we  would  find  that  our  anti-Communist  policy  has  in- 
creased anti-Western  and  anti-American  sentiment.  A  further  analysis  of  this 
anti-American  sentiment  would  reveal  that  it  stems  from  two  main  sources ; 
namely,  (1)  American  vacillation,  as  far  as  military  encounter  with  Russia  is 
concerned  ;  and  (2)  the  gradual  identification  of  anticommunism  with  obstruction 
of  countless  non-Russian  evolutionary  aims  throughout  the  world.  Asiatic,  as 
well  as  east  European,  countries,  whatever  their  preference  between  American 
and  Russian  policies,  are  being  forced  ultimately  into  a  choice  between  annihila-  ■ 
tion  and  American  compromise. 

It  is  a  dilemma  which  America  has  reached  not  entirely  by  accident.  It  is 
traceable  to  the  original  creation  of  communism  by  Lenin  in  1919  as  a  deceptive 
instrument  for  controlling  the  world's  diverse  revolutionary  processes,  both  good 
and  bad,  while  transforming  Russia  into  a  modern  state  capitalist  empire.  Com- 
munism was  a  deceptive  instrument  for  containing  both  western  state  capitalist 
and  revolutionary  Marxist  combines,  while  Russia  concentrated  on  the  more 
susceptible  Asiatic  and  Eastern  European  social  political  climates. 

The  western  Marxist  revolutionaries  fell  for  this  original  "containment"  policy 
in  1919,  W'hen  they  abandoned  socialism  for  communism.  They  did  so,  however, 
with  the  full  knowledge  that  such  an  alliance  with  geopolitical  Russia  violated 
basic  Marxist  theory  and  jeopardized  the  revolution  in  the  West,  as  well  as  con- 
solidated western  Socialist  geopolitical  strength  against  potential  Russian  mili- 
tary-economic might.  Opportunism — the  prospect  of  a  short-cut  route  to  Marxian 
western  socialism — pushed  them,  however,  into  the  Communist  alliance  with 
Lenin. 

Although  the  Marxist  theorists — including  the  Russian,  Trotsky — knew  this 
ignored  Marxist  warnings  against  revolution  in  Russia  before  revolution  in  the 
West,  they  were  so  filled  with  the  desire  for  power,  and  so  confident  of  their 
ability  to  cope  with  the  Russians,  that  they  made  the  pact  anyway.  Ultimately, 
after  being  contained  and  pitted  one  against  the  other,  most  of  the  old  Bolshevists 
were  exiled  and  purged  from  the  party  by  the  Russian  geopolitical  Communists. 

Oddly  enough,  these  exiled  Bolshevist  opportunists,  like  the  Lovestoneites,  still 
continued  to  idolize  Lenin  and  to  blame  their  predicament  on  their  betrayal  by 
Stalin,  and  the  other  Russian  geopolitical  strategists  in  what  they  liked  to  describe 
as  the  Thermidor  of  Communist  idealism  following  the  death  of  Lenin. 

By  the  strangest  of  ideological  fiipflops,  these  Lovestone  Bolshevists — who 
paid  allegiance  to  Stalin  from  1919  to  1929,  and  who  fought  the  Stalinists  from 
1929  to  1941  for  return  to  the  party  fold — came  to  be  identified  by  latter-day  cold- 
war  officials  as  "ex-Communists,"  and  even  "anti-Comnmnists."  Lenin's  original 
stratagem  thus  ran  a  full  cycle  of  deception — from  hoodwinking  the  western 
Marxist  revolutionaries  to  deceiving  anti-Communist  America. 

Men  who  engaged  in  this  inter-Communist  confiict  with  Russian  leadership 
after  1929,  have  come  to  be  identified  as  "ex-Commvuiists"  and-"anti-Communists," 
because  of  their  banishment  from  the  party  in  1929. 

If  time  would  permit,  it  would  be  possible  to  present  himdreds  upon  hun- 
dreds of  examples  showing  how  the  Kremlin  has  entered  into  agreements  with 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  283 

no  intention  whatsoever  of  keeping  them,  but  I. present  only  the  few  which  follow 
to  illustrate  the  point  that  you  cannot  trust  nor  do  business  with  the  Kremlia 
under  any  circumstances. 

It  was  on  November  16,  1933,  that  President  Roosevelt  signed  a  pact,  establish- 
ing diplomatic  recognition  of  Soviet  Russia,  with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Commissar, 
Maxim  Litvinov,  wherein  Soviet  Russia  agreed,  among  other  things : 

1.  To  respect  scrupulously  the  indisputable  rights  of  the  United  States  to  order 
its  own  life  within  its  own  jurisdiction  in  its  own  way  and  to  refr^iin  from  inter- 
fering in  any  manner  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United  States,  its  Territories, 
or  possessions. 

2.  To  refrain  and  restrain  all  persons  *  *  *  under  its  direct  or  indirect  con- 
trol *  *  *  from  any  act,  overt  or  covert,  liable  in  any  way  to  injure  the  tran- 
quillity, prosperity,  order,  or  security  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  United 
States. 

3.  To  refrain  and  restrain  all  persons  in  Government  service  and  all  organi- 
zations of  the  Government  or  under  its  direct  or  indirect  control  *  *  *  frt)m 
an  act  overt  or  covert  liable  in  any  way  to  injure  the  tranquility,  prosperity, 
order,  or  security  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  United  States. 

The  ink  on  that  agreement  had  hardly  had  time  to  dry  before  it  was  necessary 
to  protest  to  the  Soviet  Government  about  their  violation  of  the  agreement.  The 
unfortunate  thing  about  it  is  that  our  State  Department  has  been  sending 
"strong,"  perfumed  letters  of  pcotest  continuously  ever  since  then. 

The  value  of  the  November  16,  11J33,  agreement  with  the  Soviet  Union  is  prob- 
ably best  expressed  in  the  words  of  former  Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull,  who 
in  February  l'J35,  said  : 

"There  seemjs  to  be  scarcely  any  reason  to  doubt  that  the  negotiations,  which 
seemed  so  promising  at  the  start,  must  now  be  regarded  as  having  come  to 
an  end." 

During  the  summer  of  1935,  the  State  Department  was  compelled  to  send  a 
protest  about  a  Comintern  meeting  in  Moscow,  attended  by  American  Commu- 
nists, at  which  was  discussed  ways  and  means  of  undermining  the  United  States 
Government.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  view  of  what  we  have  learned 
of  the  creation  and  operation  of  the  Comintern,  Litvinov  replied  that  the  Soviet 
Government  had  no  jurisdiction  over  the  Comintern. 

However,  the  violation  of  diplomatic  agreements  by  the  Soviet  Union  has  not 
been  confined  to  those  made  with  the  United  States.  On  September  18,  1934,  the 
Soviet  Union  joined  the  League  of  Nations — signing  the  covenant  outlawing  war 
and  promising  to  abide  by  law  as  a  rule  of  conduct  among  nations — and  agreed 
to  respect  all  treaty  obligations  in  dealing  with  other  powers  and  to  respect  the 
territorial  integrity  of  other  nations. 

The  Soviet  Union  ignored  these  obligations,  and  it  was  expelled  from  the 
League  of  Nations  for  attacking  Poland  in  September  19.39,  and  Finland  in  No- 
vember 19,39.  Further,  the  Soviet  Union,  in  cooperation  with  Nazi  Germany,  par- 
titioned Poland  and  in  March  1949  annexed  16,173  square  miles  of  Finnish 
territory. 

On  January  1,  1942,  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  to  the  Atlantic  Charter ;  pledging 
not  to  seek  aggrandizement,  territorial  or  other  ;  to  support  no  territorial  changes 
that  did  not  accord  with  the  freely  expressed  wishes  of  the  people  concerned  ;  and 
to  respect  the  right  of  all  people  to  choose  the  form  of  government  under  which 
they  will  live. 

These  promises,  like  others,  fell  by  the  wayside,  when  the  Soviet  Union  annexed 
part  of  Rumania  in  194.5 ;  annexed  part  of  Mongolia  in  1945 ;  and  set  up  a  puppet 
government  in  Poland  in  1945 ;  in  Rumania  in  1945 ;  in  Bulgaria  in  1945 ;  in 
Yugoslavia  in  1944;  in  Albania  in  1945;  and  in  Czechoslovakia  in  1948 — as  well 
as  moving  frontiers  and  shifting  whole  populations  without  consulting  either  the 
wishes  of  the  people  concerned  or  her  allies. 

At  Potsdam  on  August  2,  1945.  Russia,  Britain,  and  the  United  States  signed 
an  agreement  saying  the  final  delimitation  of  the  German-Polish  frontier  should 
await  the  peace  settlement. 

The  Soviet  Union  had  already  fixed  the  Oder-Neisse  line  as  the  Polish  frontier ; 
and  after  taking  over  that  area,  insisted  that  its  prior  decision  was  iri-evocable. 

On  May  24,  1946,  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  that  each  of  the  occupying  powers 
would  submit  reports  on  reparations  and  removals  from  their  zone ;  then  it 
refused  to  submit  a  report. 

At  Yalta  on  February  12,  1945,  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States 
agreed  that,  during  the  postwar  period,  they  would  assist  the  peoples  liberated 
from  Axis  domination  and  help  them  solve  their  problems  by  democratic  means. 


284  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Instead,  Soviet  Russia  lias  helped  the  Communist  Party  crush  all  democratic 
parties  set  up  in  Hungary,  Rumania,  etc.,  and  has  set  up  satellite  states — exiling, 
jailins,  and  assassinating  opposition  leaders. 

Time  does  not  permit  a  recital  of  the  long  list  of  treaty  obligations  ignored 
or  cast  aside  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  its  merciless  march  toward  its  goal  of  world 
domination.  Time  and  again  the  Soviet  Union  has  proven  to  the  world  that 
she  is  not  worthy  of  belief  and  cannot  be  trusted  to  keep  her  solemn  obligations. 

It  was  Patrick  Henry,  when  addressing  the  second  Virginia  convention  in 
1775,  who  said,  "I  know  of  no  way  of  judging  of  the  future  but  by  the  past." 

I\Ir.  Chairman,  there  was  ample  evidence  before  1933  to  have  more  than  justi- 
fied our  refusing  to  recognize  the  Soviet  Government  at  that  time,  but  surely, 
with  all  the  evidence  since  then,  thei'e  is  no  reason  whatsoever  for  nations  who 
profess  to  be  anti-Communist  to  continue  such  diplomatic  relations  any  longer. 

Just  recently  I  returned  from  Europe  where  I  was  one  of  the  members  of  the 
Select  Committee  To  Investigate  Communist  Aggression  that  held  hearings  over 
a  period  of  4  weeks  in  London,  Munich,  and  Berlin.  Dui'ing  that  time  well  over 
100  witnesses  appeared  before  our  committee.  Each  of  them  gave  us  direct,  eye- 
witness testimony  concerning  the  tactics,  methods,  and  objectives  of  communism. 
These  witnesses  came  from  every  walk  of  life.  There  were  clergymen  of  all 
denominations,  farmers,  former  diplomats,  professors,  factory  workers,  union 
leaders,  housewives,  and  journalists.  The  testimony  presented  to  our  com- 
mittee (a  good  deal  of  it  supported  by  documents  and  corroborated  by  other 
reliable  sources)  and  my  33  years'  experience  with  the  subject  lead  me  to  these 
inevitable  conclusions : 

1.  That  communism  is  in  every  respect  an  international  criminal  conspiracy. 

2.  That  this  criminal  conspiracy  will  not  be  satisfied,  in  its  lust  for  power, 
until  it  has  destroyed  all  the  still  free  nations,  and  all  the  people  of  the  world 
are  brought  under  the  ruthless  hand  of  Moscow  tyranny. 

3.  That  this  conspiracy  will  use  any  means  to  accomplish  its  ends.  The 
tactics  they  employ  are  dictated  by  the  given  situation  or  opportunity  confront- 
ing them.  The  final  objective  of  this  conspiracy  never  changes,  but  the  tactics 
employed  to  attain  this  objective  are  very  elastic  and  adjustable  to  local  require- 
ments. 

4.  That  the  United  States  stands  as  the  only  real  obstacle  to  the  Russian 
Communist  plan  for  world  conquest.  The  madmen  in  the  Kremlin  realize  that 
we  must  be  disposed  of  either  by  internal  subversives,  military  conquest,  or  a 
combination  of  both,  before  their  plan  of  world  domination  can  be  accomplished. 

5.  That  coexistence  between  the  still-free  nations  and  the  Russian  Commu- 
nist empire  is  impossible.  One  or  the  other  must  triumph  because  communism, 
both  in  theory  and  practice,  requires  us  to  decide  between  war  or  surrender;  it 
gives  us  no  other  choice. 

6.  That  we  must  treat  the  present  leaders  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  as  uncommon 
criminals  and  that,  accordingly,  all  our  dealings  with  them  should  be  governed 
by  the  methods  we  have  long  used  in  dealing  with  uncommon  criminals.  The 
same  applies  to  their  puppets  and  obedient  proconsuls  who  are  charged  with  the 
tyrannical  control  of  the  satellite  states. 

7.  That  it  is  impossible  to  establish  any  type  of  treaty,  especially  those 
dealing  with  peace  and  nonaggression,  with  the  leaders  of  this  criminal  con- 
spiracy. They  will  break  such  treaties  every  time  and  under  circumstances 
and  conditions  which  best  serve  their  timetable  for  world  domination.  The 
Communists  use  the  conference  table  as  a  stalling  device  and  a  place  where  they 
can  lay  the  groundwork  for  intensive  propaganda  programs  against  the  free 
world,  and  especially  the  United  States.  A  good  example  of  this  point  is 
reflected  in  the  statement  made  by  Ho  Chi  Minh  2  days  after  the  signing  of 
the  so-called  Indochina  cease  fire.  This  same  Ho  Chi  Minh,  after  signing  for  the 
puppet  Communist  forces  in  Indochina,  stated  that  he  had  committed  himself  to 
the  all-out  "liberation"  of  Indochina,  which  means  putting  all  of  Indochina 
under  Communist  rule. 

8.  That  we  must  look  upon  the  expanded  empire  of  communism,  now  enslaving 
over  800  million  individuals,  as  the  "prison  of  nations."  The  leaders  of  the 
internationally  ci'iminal  conspiracy  are  now  busily  engaged  in  an  effort  to  absorb 
all  the  non-Russian  nations  into  the  expanded  empire.  To  accomplish  this,  they 
seek  to  prevent  every  interruption  of  their  nefarious  work  by  creating  a 
tremendous  Iron  Curtain,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  prevent  the  enslaved 
people  from  escaping  and  also  to  prevent  the  still-free  people  from  seeing  what 
actually  goes  on  in  their  "paradise." 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  285 

9.  That  time  runs  against  the  United  States  and  in  favor  of  the  Moscow 
conspirators.  The  technique  of  the  Kremlin  is  to  consolidate  its  newly  won 
empire  while,  at  the  same  time,  weakening  the  United  States  through  internal 
subversion  and  disunity  among  our  people.  We  may  be  sure  that,  as  soon  as 
their  calculations  indicate  that  they  have  an  even  chance  of  winning  a  hot  war 
against  the  United  States,  they  will  not  hesitate  to  engage  in  an  all-out  military 
attack  against  us. 

10.  That  we  must  put  our  own  house  in  order,  and  then  take  the  initiative 
and  launch  a  real  political  offensive  against  the  international  criminal  conspiracy. 

It  is  one  thing  to  ctiU  for  the  development  of  a  political  offensive  against  com- 
munism, and  another  thing  to  get  it  started  and  carried  through.  In  my  opinion, 
the  best  way  to  launch  a  political  offensive  against  the  Communists  would  be 
to  take  the  following  two  steps :  First,  for  all  free  nations  to  break  cff  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  Communist  Poland,  Com- 
munist Czechoslovakia,  Communist  Hungary,  Communist  Rumania,  and  all  satel- 
lite countries.  The  second  step  would  be  the  breakoff  of  all  East-West  trade.  In 
order  to  put  this  plan  into  operation,  the  United  States  should  take  the  lead  in 
calling  a  meeting  for  this  purpose. 

The  traditional  functions  of  a  United  States  diplomatic  mission  to  any  foreign 
country  has  been  for  purposes  of  representation,  negotiation,  and  reporting. 
Recently,  the  only  argument  advanced  for  maintaining  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  its  stooge  satellites  has  been  the  need  for  having  an  outpost 
in  these  enslaved  nations,  so  that  Communist  events  and  happenings  could  be 
reported  back  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  President,  and  the  people.  Ex- 
perience has  taught  us  that  negotiation  with  communism  is  impossible  and  that 
it  is  both  impractical  and  unwise  for  us  to  make  any  representations  to  the 
Communists,  because  they  will  be  treated  with  utter  contempt.  This  lead-s  me 
to  the  question  of  whether  the  information  and  material  collected  by  our 
diplomatic  missions  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  the  satellites  are  fulfilling  the  purposes 
for  which  they  were  intended,  and  whether  they  are  able  to  balance  their  weight 
on  the  political  scales. 

I  made  a  special  effort,  while  in  Europe  as  a  member  of  the  select  committee 
on  Communist  aggression,  to  a.sk  a  large  mimber  of  the  witnesses  who  appeared 
before  us,  what  they  thought  about  the  United  States  maintaining  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  the  Communist  satellites.  Without  exception, 
their  answers  followed  this  pattern  : 

1.  That,  whether  we  like  it  or  not,  the  millions  of  enslaved  people  behind 
the  Iron  Curtain  consider  our  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Communist  govern- 
ments to  be  recognition  of  those  governments  as  the  rightful  governments  :  and 
that  we  thereby  acquiesce  in,  and  indeed  condone,  the  brutal  and  criminal  acts 
of  those  regimes — including  their  enslavement  of  the  people. 

2.  That  our  diplomatic  repre.sentatives  in  each  of  these  countries,  by  attending 
t4ie  various  social  functions,  cocktail  parties,  and  holiday  celebrations  (such  as 
May  Day  and  Red  Army  Day),  leave  no  alternative  for  the  enslaved  people  but 
to  accept  the  belief  that  we  will  continue  our  friendly  relations  with  their 
oppressors,  and  that  we  do  not  intend  to  do  anything  to  bring  about  their 
freedom  from  Moscow's  tyranny. 

.3.  That,  so  long  as  the  United  States  and  the  other  free  nations  continue 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Communist  regimes,  it  will  not  be  possible  to 
develop  a  worthwhile  political  and  psychological  objective  again.st  the  inter- 
national Communist  conspiracy.  This  is  .so  because  the  United  States,  unlike  the 
masters  of  the  Kremlin,  does  not  engage  in  duplicity,  either  in  the  conduct  of 
its  international  affairs  or  in  other  relations  among  nations.  The  best  protec- 
tion the  Communists  have  for  the  preservation  of  their  slave  empire  is  the 
continuation  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  free  world,  and  particularly  the 
United  States. 

It  has  been  contended  that  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Com- 
munist governments  would  be  considered  by  them  as  undue  provocation,  and 
possibly  an  act  of  war.  This  Idea  is  being  fostered  in  an  obvious  effort  to 
frighten  us  into  maintaining  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Communist  con- 
spirators, irre.'spective  of  the  cost  to  our  own  national  security.  In  my  opinion, 
it  could  not  be  considered  as  an  act  of  war  against  the  Communist  governments, 
because  they  have  already  declared  war  and  are  carrying  on  war  against  tlie 
United  States  and  all  other  non-Communist  nations.  As  to  the  possibilities  of 
provoking  the  Russian  Communists,  I  thiak  it  is  about  time  we  call  a  spade  a 
spade  and  serve  notice  on  the  world  in  general  that  we  do  not  intend  to  surrender 
by  default  to  the  Couuuunist  plan  of  world  conquest. 


286  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  respectfully  suggest  that  you  proceed  to  comment 
extemporaneously  on  the  principal  points  of  your  prepared  statement, 
and  then  I  am  sure  the  committee  will  have  some  questions  which 
they  will  want  to  ask  you  as  we  proceed  here  with  your  testimony. 

Representative  Busbey.  Mr.  Arens,  I  think  the  prepared  statement 
can  be  summed  up  very  briefly  in  this  respect:  First  of  all,  there  has 
been  a  very  small  realization  in  this  country  of  the  true  techniques 
and  purposes  of  communism ;  particularly  as  it  pertains  to  the  people 
of  this  country  in  the  Communist  Party  during  its  early  history  from 
1919  to  1929,  and  their  activities  after  that.  Putting  it  in  very  simple 
language,  many  of  these  people  who  were  exceedingly  active  Com- 
munists— top  party  leaders — were  purged  in  1929,  but  they  then 
proceeded  to  organize  what  we  know  as  the  American  Communist 
opposition  party. 

Because  they  are  so  violently  anti-Stalin  in  all  their  acts,  in  all  their 
thinking,  the  public  at  large  and  officials  of  our  Government — and 
when  I  say  officials  of  our  Government,  I  mean  the  Roosevelt  regime, 
the  Truman  regime,  and  the  present  regime — have  never  realized,  and 
do  not  realize  to  this  day,  that,  although  these  men,  and  some  women, 
are  violently  anti-Stalin  in  everything  they  say  and  do,  they  are 
not  anti-Marxist.  They  have,  in  many  instances,  put  out  reams  of 
magazine  articles,  books,  and  propaganda  against  the  Stalinist  regime 
in  Moscow — in  the  Kremlin — but  I  dare  say  that,  if  you  read  their 
writings  very  carefully,  you  will  detect  that  they  have  never  written 
anything  that  could  be  construed  as  anti-Marxist.  It  is  for  that  reason, " 
in  my  humble  judgment,  that  the  Voice  of  America  and  Radio  Free 
Europe  have  been  so  ineffective  in  carrying  on  the  ideological  and 
psychological  war  which  I  think  is  so  important  to  victory. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  have  just  returned  from  an  extensive  tour  and  an 
intensive  study  of  the  Communist  apparatus  abroad,  particularly  in 
Europe,  have  you  not  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  have. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  wonder  if,  in  conjunction  with  your  theme  here,  you 
would  care  to  relate  to  the  committee  significant  experiences  you  have 
had  on  that  study  tour. 

Representative  Busbey.  I  think  one  of  the  main  things  that  im- 
pressed me — and  I  say  this  not  as  an  individual  but  for  the  committee 
as  a  whole,  because  I  have  talked  to  the  other  members  of  the  com- 
mittee, and  we  are  in  accord — you  cannot  trust,  nor  do  business  with, 
the  Kremlin. 

Mr.  Arens.  That  is,  the  House  committee  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  That  is  the  House  Committee  to  Investi- 
gate Communist  Aggression  by  the  U.  S.  S.  R. — sometimes  known  as 
the  Kersten  committee,  because  Congressman  Charles  Kersten  intro- 
duced the  resolution  that  created  the  committee  in  1953,  and  is  its 
chairman.  We  had  one  witness  before  us  in  London  whose  testimony 
I  hope  everyone  in  the  United  States  will  be  able  to  read.  He  was  a 
very  prominent  Polish  lawj^er. 

Incidentally,  I  learned  just  this  week  that  Mr.  Walter  Besterman, 
of  the  Immigration  Subcommittee  of  the  House  Judiciary  Committee, 
was  a  classmate  of  this  man — his  name  is  Zbigniew  Stypulkowski. 
He  was  1  of  the  16  men  who  were  invited  to  Moscow  to  sign  a  Soviet- 
Polish  friendship  pact. 

Mr.  Arens.  When,  please? 


STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  287 

Representative  Busbey.  March  1945. 

When  that  committee  of  16  arrived  to  sio;n  the  Soviet  friendship 
pact,  all  16  were  thrown  in  the  famous  Lubianka  prison  in  Moscow. 
He  described  in  detail,  from  the  minute  he  entered  the  prison  until  he 
was  convicted,  the  techniques  and  the  methods  that  were  applied  to 
him,  and  that  everyone  in  his  position  received  what  we  commonly  refer 
to  as  brainwashing.  How  anyone  can  possibly  endure  the  brainwash- 
ing they  received  is  just  beyond  comprehension.  The  Soviets  have 
techniques  and  methods  of  torture  that  cannot  be  imagined  by  anyone 
with  humane  instincts. 

He  is  one  of  the  two  men  who  are  known  to  be  alive  today  out  of  the 
16  who  went  to  Moscow  to  sign  that  Soviet  "friendship"  pact.  An- 
other witness  whose  testimony  I  consider  very  significant  was  Colonel 
Burlitski,  who  was  a  former  member  of  the  NKVD,  and  then  the 
MVD  and  the  Soviet  Army. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  are  alluding  to  the  secret  police  organizations? 

Representative  Busbey.  Yes.  He  was  a  lieutenant  colonel  in  the 
Soviet  Army.  He  defected  to  the  West  during  last  June.  He  was 
held,  I  may  say,  incognito  to  the  public  until  he  was  permitted  to 
testify  before  our  committee  in  Munich.  I  also  sincerely  hope  that 
everyone  in  the  United  States  will  read  his  testimony,  because  Colonel 
liurlitski  described  to  our  committee  in  detail  the  technique  used  in 
the  mass  evacuation  of  the  population  of  a  whole  country.  He  related 
how  the  members  of  the  NKVD  went  into  the  Province  of  Chechen- 
Ingush,  under  the  pretense  that  they  were  members  of  the  Soviet 
Army  who  had  been  fighting  on  the  front  at  that  time  against  the 
(Tcrmans,  and  were  sent  there  for  a  little  rest  and  additional  training 
before  they  went  back  in  the  lines  for  more  active  duty. 

He  declared  that,  all  the  time  they  were  there,  they  were  cataloging 
and  making  a  list  containing  the  name  of  every  single  individual  in 
that  populace — every  man,  woman,  and  child.  Then  came  the  day 
when  the  entire  population,  of  over  500,000  people,  was  evacuated 
within  less  than  21  hours.  The  Soviets  did  not  leave  a  single  inhabi- 
tant ;  not  one. 

He  described  the  big  "friendship"  celebration  they  held  on  this  day 
of  mass  extermination  of  this  population.  They  even  had  a  band  down 
in  the  village  square  to  welcome  the  Chechen-Ingushi  to  this  friend- 
ship celebration.  They  had  some  of  the  high  officials  of  the  Soviet 
Government  from  Moscow  there  to  greet  the  people  as  they  came  into 
the  square,  carrying  banners  expressing  friendship  toward  Stalin  and 
the  Communist  regime. 

After  several  of  these  high  Soviet  officials  had  pledged  their  friend- 
ship to  the  people  of  the  Chechen-Ingush  Province  and  after  some  of 
the  leaders  of  this  province  and  this  particular  community  of  Chechen- 
Ingush,  got  up  on  the  stand  and,  in  turn,  expressed  their  aj^preciation 
of  the  Soviet  troops'  being  in  their  community  and  the  friendship  that 
had  developed  while  they  were  in  the  community;  then  came  the 
psychological  moment.  When  everybody  was  feeling  fine  and  friendli- 
ness and  good  will  were  running  high,  one  man  got  up  and  read  an 
edict  to  the  people ;  the  edict  being  that  they  were  guilty  of  collaborat- 
ing with  the  Germans,  that  they  were  guilty  of  this  and  guilty  of  that, 
and  he  enumerated  the  various  things  of  which  the  people  in  the  com- 
munity were  declared  guilty  by  the  Kremlin. 


288  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

As  a  punishment  for  tlieir  guilt,  he  said  they  were  to  be  evacuated — 
every  one  of  them — to  what  he  called  far-off  distance  places ;  without 
naming  the  section  of  Soviet  Russia  to  which  they  were  to  be  trans- 
ported. He  also  informed  the  people  that  it  would  do  no  good  for 
them  to  resist,  stating  that  if  they  would  turn  around  and  look  at 
the  hills,  they  would  see  the  Soviet  guns  that  had  been  moved  in  on 
the  hills  while  they  were  celebrating  this  day  of  friendship,  and 
Avhich  were  trained  on  the  square  of  the  village. 

He  said,  "If  you  will  look  around  the  perimeter  of  the  square,  you 
will  find  that,  while  we  have  been  here,  the  Soviet  soldiers  have  moved 
in  with  their  machineguns.  If  you  dare  to  resist,  you  will  be  mowed 
down." 

Senator  Welkerj  May  I  interrupt,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Chairman  Jenner.  You  may. 

Senator  Welker.  Were  these  unfortunate  people  allowed  to  go 
home  to  get  any  clothing,  any  food,  or  any  of  their  provisions? 

Representative  Busbey.  Not  one  of  them.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  what 
happened  was  this,  as  Colonel  Burlitski  described  it:  They  had  the 
Soviet  soldiers  and  the  NKVD  line  up  in  2  columns  facing  each  other 
at  a  distance  of  about  3  to  4  feet,  and  they  made  every  one  of  these 
people  march  down  that  corridor  between  the  columns.  They  were 
searched  and  then  they  were  loaded  into  trucks.  I  was  indeecl  sorry 
to  hear  Burlitski's  answer  when  he  was  asked  what  kind  of  trucks 
they  were.  He  replied  that  they  were  brandnew  United  States  Chev- 
rolets  and  Studebakers. 

Senator  Welker.  Did  that  surprise  you? 

Representative  Busbey.  No,  sir.  They  were  loaded  into  these  trucks 
and  taken  into  a  field  outside  of  the  village — into  what  the  witness 
termed  a  "gathering  place."  After  the  Soviets  had  removed  the  people 
from  the  square,  they  went  through  the  village.  Within  1  hour's 
time,  they  had  gone  through  every  home  in  the  village,  had  taken 
cut  every  individual,  had  loaded  them  on  the  trucks,  and  had  driven 
them  out  to  this  gathering  place. 

After  they  had  herded  all  the  people  into  this  gathering  place,  they 
put  them  in  trucks  again  and  took  them  to  the  nearest  railroad  station. 
No  one  except  the  Soviets  has  ever  known  to  this  day  where  they  were 
taken,  or  what  happened  to  them.  That  was  a  country  of  over  500,000 
people  who  were  exterminated  within  24  hours. 

Chairman  Jenner.  It  was  a  province,  was  it  not  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  It  was  really  a  country  of  its  own — a  very 
historical  country.  They  were  very  rugged  individualists  and  the 
Communists  knew  they  could  never  bring  them  into  the  Communist- 
Soviet  orbit. 

Mr.  Arens.-  Aside  from  the  shocking  implications  of  this  incident 
which  3'ou  have  related,  which  would  shock  any  person's  conscience, 
is  there  any  threat,  in  your  judgment,  of  similar  objectives  by  the 
Soviets  in  other  areas  of  the  world  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  There  is  always  that  threat.  If  they  feel 
that  the  people  cannot  be  subjugated  by  the  techniques  of  the  "peace" 
in  the  Kremlin,  they  will  do  the  same  thing  to  all  who  fall  under  their 
domination. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  target  of  the  Kremlin  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  28i) 

Representative  Busbey.  The  target  of  the  Kremlin  is  naturally  the 
United  States  of  America,  That  is  the  ultimate  target.  If  I  may 
inject  here  just  a  little  side  thought,  I  have  always  gotten  a  great  deal 
of  >vry  amusement  from  the  utterances  of  some  of  these  orators  who 
get  up  on  lecture  ])latforms  to  talk  against  communism  and  who 
always  use  this  old  phrase  to  get  aj^plause  from  the  crowd :  "If  they 
don't  like  the  United  States  of  America,  let's  send  them  back  to  Soviet 
Russia."  The  truth  is  that  they  like  the  United  States  of  America  and 
would  like  to  take  it  over.  They  admit  that  the  United  States  of 
America  is  the  greatest  country  on  the  face  of  the  earth.  That  is  the 
reason  they  are  here,  working  against  our  capitalistic  system  of 
government,  and  to  gain  control  of  it  and  our  vast  resources. 

Mr.  AitENS.  Congressman,  on  your  tour  in  Europe  you  had  occasion, 
as  I  understand  it.  to  interview  a  number  of  people  Avho  escaped  from 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain;  is  that  correct? 

Representative  Busbey.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  you  kindly  relate  to  this  committee  the  con- 
sensus among  those  people  with  res]5ect  to  the  many  issues  which  are 
involved  in  this  Communist  cons]>iracy  ? 

Representative  J5usbey.  Will  you  state  that  again? 

Mr.  Akens.  What  is  the  opinion  of  the  people  who  have  escaped 
from  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  with  reference  to  the  threat  of  the  Com- 
munist conspirac}^  with  reference  to  what  could  be  done  in  order  to 
head  oii',  if  possible,  the  world  enci'oachment  of  the  Communist  con- 
spiracy ? 

Representative  Bdsbey.  I  do  not  like  to  take  issue  with  counsel,  but 
could  I  for  the  record  assure  him  that  this  Avas  not  a  tour? 

Mr.  Arens.  I  did  not  mean  to  use 

Representative  Busbey'.  We  sat  in  meetings  from  9 :  30  in  the  morn- 
ing until  6  or  6:30  in  the  evening,  and  then  sat  up  until  11  or  12 
o'clock  at  night  interviewing  individuals,  talking  to  important  people, 
and  conferring  with  the  connnittee  staff. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  it  was  a  pleasure  tour. 

Representative  Busbey.  W^e  had  no  time  for  any  touring,  I  assure 
you. 

The  consensus  of  these  people,  frankly,  is  that,  if  an  armed  conflict 
was  started  against  the  Kremlin,  that  from  80  to  90  percent  of  the 
people  in  tlie  Soviet-controlled  countries  could  be  depended  upon  not 
to  stay  loyal  to  the  Soviets. 

Chairman  Jenxer.  Congressman,  from  j-our  intensive  study  of  this 
very  important  subject  and  from  interviewing  these  people  and  your 
long  experience  in  the  study  of  the  Communist  cons])iracy,  we  have  a 
new  phrase  going  about  in  the  world  today  called  peaceful  coexistence. 
What  would  you  say  as  to  the  chance  of  a  peaceful  coexistence  with 
the  Soviet  Union  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  Senator,  the  testimony  of  every  one  of 
nearly  a  hundred  witnesses  we  had  before  us  in  Europe  confirmed  what 
I  have  been  preaching  all  through  the  years :  that  there  cannot  possibly 
be  any  coexistence  with  the  beasts  in  the  Kremlin,  or  with  their  phi- 
losophy of  life,  under  any  circumstances.    I  do  not  care  who  they  are. 

Chairman  Jenxer.  Would  you  say  they  had  the  offensive  today  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  They  not  only  have  the  offensive  today 
but  they  have  had  the  ofl'ensive  all  along,  and  I  will  tell  you  wdiy. 

47709°— 54— pt.  5 4 


290  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

It  has  been  the  ])olicy  of  the  so-called  Western  Powers,  inchiding  the 
United  States,  to  wait — wait — wait.  To  wait  for  what?  We  wait 
for  the  Soviets  to  make  a  move  and  then  we  make  a  very  ineffective 
countermove.  We  wait  for  the  Soviets  to  act  and  then  we  react  in  a 
very  ineffectual  way.  This  is  convincing  proof  to  me  that,  ever  since 
we  recognized  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  in  March  19;53,  the  ])eople  in  our  Govern- 
ment who  have  been  responsible  for  our  foreign  policy,  from  that  day 
to  this,  have  not  been  aware  of  the  real  conspiracy  that  confronts  the 
world.  It  seems  they  have  not  wanted  to  learn  because  anyone  who 
does  know  the  problem,  Avho  has  studied  it  for  years  and  years,  and 
whose  anti-Communist  efforts  and  patriotism  cannot  be  doubted,  just 
will  not  be  considered  for  employment  in  the  agencies  of  our  Govern- 
ment that  should  be  coping  with  this  problem. 

Chairman  Jenner.  How  can  we  take  that  offensive  away  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  We  can  take  the  offensive  aAvay — may  I 
refer  to  just  one  thing  I  called  for  this  morning  in  connection  with  my 
other  statement? 

Chairman  elENNER.  Surely. 

Representative  Busbet.  This  is  no  reflection  on  the  individual  whose 
testimony  I  will  read  from  the  original  transcript.  I  am  using  it  only 
to  show  that  the  people  in  the  high  places  of  our  Government  who 
are  responsible  for  this  do  not  understand  the  problem.  If  I  may, 
I  will  read  from  the  hearings  of  September  29,  1952,  a  de])osition 
given  by  Gen.  Walter  Bedell  Smith,  the  Under  Secretary  of  State  at 
the  present  time,  in  the  suit  between  former  Senator  William  Benton 
and  Senator  Jose])h  R.  McCarthy. 

As  I  previously  said,  this  is  no  reflection  on  the  patriotism  nor  the 
integrity  of  the  gentleman.  I  think  he  is  one  of  the  finest  patriotic 
men  we  have  in  America.  But  when  you  must  have  a  very  delicate 
operation  on  your  eye  you  do  not  go  to  a  butcher;  you  do  not  go  to  a 
chiropodist;  you  go  to  one  of  the  very  finest  eye  ph3^sicians  you  know 
in  the  entire  United  States. 

I  will  read  every  question  and  answer  that  pertains  to  this  matter. 
This,  incidentally,  is  the  cross-examination  by  his  own  counsel,  a  Mr. 
McGee.  I  do  not  believe  Mr.  ]\IcGee  intended  to  ask  any  questions 
that  would  be  embarrassing  to  the  general.  A  man's  counsel  is  gener- 
ally supposed  to  ask  questions  that  will  be  helpful  to  his  client. 

I  think  I  should  start  right  here  on  page  12 : 

Question.  I  am  asking  you  specifically,  General,  about  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Answer.  As  far  as  I  know,  Mr.  Acheson  is  so  considered. 

Question.  How  do  you  know  that.  General? 

Answer.  From  my  observation  of  the  policies  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment as  translated  in  various  documents  which  I  am  not  at  liberty  to  discuss. 

Question.  When  did  yon  first  realize  that  this  Soviet  danger  was  a  great  danger 
to  tlie  United  States? 

Mark  this  next  answer  now. 

Answer.  It  is  very  difficult  for  me  to  give  you  a  date,  hour,  and  minute.  I 
should  say  it  was  a  growing  realization.  In  common  with  most  people  who 
had  been  under  illusions  during  the  early  days  of  our  cobelligerency  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  specifically  I  began  to  realize  the  latent  hostility,  the  basic  hos- 
tility of  the  Soviet  Union  during  the  early  days  of  the  campaign  in  North 
Africa. 

Question.  Give  us  this  date  in  years.    In  what  year  was  that? 

Answer.  That  was  in  1943. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  291 

Question.  1943?  Prior  to  1943,  did  you  know  there  was  an  international 
Soviet  conspiracy  wliich  aimed  to  overthrow  the  United  States  Government 
by  force  and  violence? 

Answer.  Communist ;  yes. 

Question.  Communist? 

Answer.  Yes. 

Question.  And  did  you  know  that  the  control  of  that  conspiracy  or  at  least 
one  of  its  loci  was  in  this  Kremlin  you  speak  about? 

Answer.  I  heard  it  said,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  paid  little  attention  to  that 
since  I  was  occupied  specifically  with  other  things  and  was  specializing. 

Question.  Had  you  engaged  in  any  intelligence  work  in  the  Army  of  the 
United  States  prior  to  taking  over  your  occupation  as  head  of  the  CIA? 

Answer.  I  had. 

Question.  And  in  the  course  of  that  intelligence  work,  had  you  ever  seen  any 
confidential  reports  that  disclo.sed  the  existence  of  such  a  conspiracy? 

Answer.  No._  My  intelligence  work  began  with  my  entry  into  the  Army  at  the 
First  World  War  and  was  combat  intelligence  exclusively. 

Question.  Was  there  any  indication  in  those  intelligence  reports  of  the  danger 
of  that  Soviet  con.spiracy? 

Answer.  >so..  What  I  dealt  with  was  exclusive  combat  intelligence.  Combat 
intelligence  ha.s  to  do  with  the  order  of  battle,  equipment,  and  the  tactical  oper- 
ations of  the  enemy  which  confronts  you.    That  in  those  days  was  the  Germans. 

I  may  say  that  I  am  taking  the  time  to  read  this — and  there  is  only 
a  page  and  a  half  more — because  I  wish  to  make  what  I  believe  to  be 
some  very  important  comments  on  the  whole  international  situation. 

Question.  Well,  you  are  now  satisfied,  are  you  not,  General,  that  there  is  an 
international  conspiracy,  Communist  conspiracy,  which  .seeks  to  overthrow  the 
United  States  by  force  and  violence? 

You  could  say  that  these  were  leading  questions  to  assist  his  client 
in  making  a  good  impression. 

Answer.  I  am,  indeed. 

Question.  When  did  you  come  to  that  conclusion? 

Answer.  Specifically?    Are  you  a.sking  me  to  be  specific? 

Question.  Yes. 

Answer.  In  the  days  immediately  following  the  armistice  and  since  you  have 
asked  the  question  that  way  and  I  must  elaborate  by  saying  that  I  went  through 
a  period,  as  many  other  people  did,  of  thinking  it  possible  that  the  leopard  might 
have  changed  its  si)ots  because  I  think  many  other  people  thought  so,  too;  that 
we  might— there  might  be  a  way  of  working  out  a  modus  vivendi  with  the  Com- 
munist countries.     You  see,  I  had  not  at  that  time  studied  Marx  and  Stalin. 

Senator  Welkek.  May  I  interrupt  the  witness  here? 

Chairman  Jenkeh.  Senator  Welker. 

Senator  Welkek.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Congressman,  2  years 
after  signing  the  pact  with  Russia,  recognizing  them,  Cordell  JFIull, 
then  Secretary  of  State,  made  a  very  significant  statement.  I  think 
you  have  it  in  your  remarks  on  page  6  wherein  he  says: 

There  seems  to  be  scarcely — 

This  is  in  February  of  1935.  The  friendship  agreement  or  the  recog- 
nition agreement  was  signed  November  16,  1933,  when  the  then  Secre- 
tary of  State  stated : 

There  seems  to  be  scarcely  any  reason  to  doubt  that  the  negotiations  which 
seemed  so  promising  at  the  start  must  now  be  regarded  as  having  come  to  an  end. 

That  is  pretty  strong  notice  from  a  very  high  Cabinet  official ;  is  it  not  ? 
Representative  Busbey.  It  certainly  is.     I  agree  with  his  statement, 
with  this  exception  :  I  do  not  see  why  he,  or  anyone  else,  had  any  reason 
to  believe  it  should  have  been  so  promising  from  the  start. 


292  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

I  am  almost  tliroiigh  reading  General  Smith's  testimony. 

Question.  Wore  you  co<,niiz:int  of  lliis  conspiracy  during  the  period  of  time 
W'lien  you  were  Ainhnssador  to  Moscow,  wliicb  was  the  period 

Answer.  I!t4(;  to  March  194!)? 

Question.  Yes. 

Now,  knowing  of  the  existence  of  such  a  conspiracy,  do  you  think  it  is  dangerous 
to  tlie  interests  of  the  United  Slates  to  have  in  positions  of  importance,  let  us 
say  in  the  State  Department  of  the  United  States,  either  Communists  or  fellow 
travelers? 

Answer.  Dangerous? 

Question.  Is  it? 

Answer.  DecidedJ.v. 

Question.  As  a  military  man,  as  the  present  head  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  of  the  United  States,  you  would  recommend  the  ferreting  out  of  tliose 
Communists  and  fellow  travelers  and  relieving  them  of  their  duties  and  positions 
of  trust  in  tiie  Government  of  the  United  States? 

Answer.  I  would. 

Question.  If  you  yourself  knew  of  the  existence  of  these  people  in  positions  of 
employment  hy  the  United  States,  you  would  take  affirmative  steps,  would  you 
not.  General,  to  remove  them? 

Answer.  I  would. 

That  is  all  of  the  testimony  that  has  to  do  with  the  comments  I 
"wish  to  make.  Why  have  we  been  in  such  a  helpless  position  all  during 
the  period  from  1920  to  date?  There  was  no  excuse  for  anyone  who 
was  interested  in  protecting  the  sovereignty  of  his  country,  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  who  was  willing  to  determine  what  (he  menace 
was,  not  being  acquainted  with  tins  subject. 

I  do  not  claim  to  be  any  great  expert  on  this  subject — there  are  many 
men  in  the  United  States  who  have  dealt  with  this  problem  as  long 
as  I  have  and  who  know  much  more  than  1  do.  Their  services  were 
available  to  the  agencies  of  our  Government,  but  has  any  one  agency 
ever  called  upon  them  for  the  benefit  of  their  knowh'dge  and  advice? 
Not  one.  I  do  not  know  of  a  single  instance,  because  all  patriots  who 
dare  to  fight  communism  publicly,  are  iimnediately  smeared,  by  what 
1  term  the  smear  bund,  as  Fascists,  as  Nazis,  as  everything  undesirable. 
That  is  part  of  the  technique  of  the  Communists.  That  subject  is  not 
before  the  committee  this  morning,  but  I  should  like  to  talk  on  that 
for  honrs  and  hours. 

As  proof  of  why  there  was  no  excuse  for  anybody — especially  one 
who  was  charged  with  the  responsibility — not  understanding  the 
menace,  I  humbly  submit  a  little  clipping  from  the  Chicago  Tribune  of 
November  7,  1923.  The  heading  says :  "First  Presbyterians  To  Read 
Plot  Expose  Tonight." 

The  article  reads: 

Fred  E.  Busbey,  World  War  veteran  and  leader  in  American  Legion  efforts 
to  combat  pacitist  propaganda,  will  speak  at  a  pre-Armistice  Day  meeting  tonight 
at  the  First  Presbyterian  Church,  Grand  Boulevard  and  41st  Street.  He  will  give 
firsthand  information  on  investigations  of  Communist  and  Soviet  plots  to  spread 
sedition.    Resolutions  advocating  patriotism  will  be  read. 

Chairman  Jenner.  1923? 

Representative  Busbey.  1923.  I  made  my  first  lecture  against  com- 
munism in  the  spring  of  1921. 

Here  is  an  article  from  the  Chicago  Herald-Examiner  of  Monday^ 
December  8,  1924: 

Fred  Busbey  warns  of  pink  danger.  "Well  meaning  citizens  misguided  by 
Communist  propaganda,"  he  says  in  speech. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  293 

And  I  went  on,  as  the  article  stated,  to  tell  the  audience  how  the  Com- 
munist forces  in  this  country  and  all  over  the  world  worked  through 
what  we  are  calling  Communist-front  organizations. 

They  worked  through  front  organizations  in  the  early  twenties. 
They  work  through  Communist-front  organizations  now,  and  they 
will  always  work  through  front  organizations  in  any  country  where 
they  think  it  is  necessary  to  gain  their  objectives.  You  see,  this  subject 
of  Marxist  communism  is  something  in  which  the  techniques  are 
just  as  true  today  as  they  were  20  years  ago,  and  will  be  just  as  true 
60  years  from  now. 

Where  we  have  been  so  ineffective,  and  why  we  have  not  been  able 
to  cope  with  this  situation  more  intelligently  and  more  specifically 
through  our  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  I  should  like  to  tell  you, 
because  I  think  it  has  a  very  direct  bearing  on  the  study  of  strategy 
and  tactics  of  world  communism.     May  I  do  that  briefly  ? 

Chairman  Jenner.  Please,  sir. 

Representative  Busbey.  I  believe  I  know  a  little  something  of  which 
I  speak,  because  I  was  a  member  of  the  subcommittee  in  the  House 
that  heard  the  testimony  when  the  CIA  was  set  up.  What  I  am  going 
to  say  is  not  top  secret,  because  I  have  said  it  from  public  platforms, 
and  I  propose  to  say  it  manj^  more  times. 

I  carried  on  three  fights  in  the  subcommittee  when  the  CIA  was 
constituted.  In  one  of  them,  I  was  successful;  in  the  other  two,  I 
was  not  successful.  The  one,  and  I  thought  it  very  important,  in 
which  I  was  successful  was  the  fight  I  made  against  incorporating 
the  FBI  into  the  CIA.  The  two  in  which  I  was  unsuccessful,  were 
as  follows:  First,  I  tried  to  have  it  enacted  into  the  law  that  the 
head  of  the  CIA  would  be  a  civilian  who  was  qualified  by  experience 
to  head  up  that  agency — like  J.  Edgar  Hoover  is  the  head  of  the 
FBI — a  man  who  would  be  permanent  and  continue  on  year  after 
year,  regardless  of  whether  Democrats  or  Republicans  were  in  con- 
trol of  the  administration;  a  man  who  would  have  the  confidence 
of  not  only  the  Congress,  but  the  entire  population  of  the  United 
States,  as  J.  Edgar  Hoover  has.  No;  they  wanted  to  staff  it  with 
men  who  would  be  on  temporary  assignments,  knowing  that  they 
were  to  be  back  in  the  services  in  a  little  while.  I  think  that  has  been 
one  of  the  main  weaknesses  in  our  whole  intelligence  situation,  and 
that  it  should  be  corrected  at  the  very  earliest  possible  date. 

One  of  the  other  things  that  I  thought  was  very  important  was 
that  the  CIA  should  not  evaluate  its  own  findings.  If  I  may  say  so, 
I  have  personally  worked  in  Intelligence  for  a  considerable  number 
of  years,  and  the  CIA  is  the  only  intelligence  agency  I  have  known 
of  that  evaluates  its  own  findings.  In  my  training  and  experience 
in  Intelligence  all  through  the  years,  it  has  always  been  my  under- 
standing that  a  gathering  agency  should  never  evaluate  its  reports. 
I  think  that  method  is  very,  very  weak,  and  wrong. 

Another  thing  that  has  worked  against  us,  in  trying  to  combat  this 
Communist  conspiracy,  is,  in  my  humble  judgment  and  opinion,  the 
lack  of  training  in  Intelligence  of  the  individuals  who  were  employed 
by  the  CIA.  At  the  beginning  before  the  CIA  was  established — and 
I  think  this  should  be  on  record — we  had  what  was  known  as  SI, 
Secret  Intelligence. 

I  had  as  high  as  esteem  and  respect  for  that  agency  as  I  have  for 
the  FBI,  and  that  is  saying  a  lot.    But  instead  of  making  use  of  these 


294  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

SI  agents  we  had  around  the  world,  what  did  they  do?  They 
blanketed  in  some  of  the  pro-Communists  from  the  OSS  and  other 
agencies,  who  were  not  qualified  in  Intelligence  at  all.  I  will  not 
mention  any  places  or  names,  but  I  dare  say  that  if  it  were  possible 
for  a  congressional  committee  to  evaluate  the  qualifications  of  the 
men  whom  we  have  in  various  CIA  posts  of  the  world  for  the  respon- 
sibilities they  have,  they  Avould  be  found  lacking  in  many  respects. 
Congress  has  been  stopped,  because  every  time  there  is  any  question 
about  CIA,  it  is  the  same  old  stuff:  "Oh,  we  can't  talk  about  that." 
You  know,  that  hush-hush  business. 

Frankly,  I  think  it  is  time  that  somebody  looks  into  CIA  and  cleans 
up  the  mess  down  there,  in  order  that  we  may  have  an  intelligent  and 
efficient  intelligence  staff  around  the  world. 

Until  we  do,  I  do  not  believe  the  intelligence  that  we  are  getting 
from  our  so-called  listening  posts  all  over  the  world  through  CIA 
will  amount  to  a  tinker's  damn.  The  proof  of  that  is  this :  Show  me 
one  instance  where  the  information  secured  by  the  CIA  has  been  of 
assistance,  or  has  done  one  thing  to  contain  or  stop  this  march  of 
the  Marxist  Communists  in  their  program  for  world  revolution.  That 
is  the  proof  of  the  pudding. 

There  are  two  problems  confronting  not  only  the  United  States, 
but  the  world,  in  trying  to  combat,  subdue,  and  eliminate  Marxist  com- 
munism from  the  world.  May  I  make  it  abundantly  clear  to  the  mem- 
bers of  this  subcommittee  that  if  we  had  an  Army  and  a  Navy  and  an 
Air  Force  a  100  times  greater  than  they  are  today,  we  could  not 
eliminate  communism  from  the  w^orld.  Communism  is  an  ideology. 
It  is  a  way  of  life.  It  is  a  crusade.  It  is  a  fanatical  form  of  religion 
to  those  people  who  embrace  it. 

Senator  Welker.  Without  any  dedication  to  God,  of  course. 

Representative  Busbey.  Naturally. 

Incidentally,  up  until  about  25  years  ago,  a  person  had  to  be  an 
avowed  atheist  before  he  could  be  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party ; 
but,  as  they  believe  that  the  end  justifies  the  means,  they  withdrew 
that  restriction  and  took  in  people  who  believed  in  God,  and  then  tried 
to  make  atheists  out  of  them. 

You  cannot  defeat  an  ideology  with  armed  might.  You  must  have 
more  than  armed  might  to  defeat  an  ideology.  In  order  to  do  it,  you 
must  not  only  stop  and  contain  communism,  but  you  must  push  back 
the  Iron  Curtain.  We  all  know  that.  I  think  if  we  went  to  war, 
the  men  in  the  Kremlin  would  fold  and  their  whole  philosophy  would 
fold  very  fast,  because  of  their  knowledge  that  the  people  not  only  in 
Soviet  Russia,  but  in  the  satellite  countries,  would  not  support  the 
Kremlin  regime.  Most  of  these  citizens  are  not  Communists;  they 
are  the  subjects  and  victims  of  communism. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Isn't  there  another  method  besides  war? 

Representative  Busbey.  Yes.     I  will  get  to  that  in  just  a  minute. 

You  know  and  I  know  that  the  people  will  not  stand  for  a  declara- 
tion of  war.  The  other  method  is  this,  very  simply,  and  there  are  two 
steps.  The  first  step  is  incorporated  in  your  Senate  Resolution  247, 
which  I  endorse ;  but,  in  my  humble  opinion,  it  does  not  go  far  enough. 
I  think  it  would  be  very  bad  if  the  United  States  of  America  alone 
would  cut  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Soviet  Russia.  I  think  the 
way  to  approach  that  problem  is  to  call  all  the  nations  of  the  so-called 
free  world  together  in  a  conference. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  295 

Chairman  Jenner,  That  is  what  the  resolution  provides. 

Representative  Busbey.  I  have  not  read  it  recently.  I  am  glad 
it  does. 

Mr.  Arens.  Maybe  it  would  be  helpful  if  we  would  interpose  the 
essence  of  the  resolution.  It  calls  for  the  serverance  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Iron  Curtain  government  and  the  convoking  of  a 
conference  of  the  free  nations  of  the  world  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
united  action  to  destroy  the  Communist  fifth  column  worldwide  and 
to  resist  Communist  aggression. 

Representative  Busbey.  I  think  that  is  very  important,  and  I  think 
that  is  the  first  step.  Some  people  will  say  to  you  that  we  need  these 
contacts  for  listening  posts  in  the  satellite  countries.  Gentlemen,  if 
they  cannot  listen  any  better  in  the  future  than  they  have  listened 
in  the  past,  I  truly  believe  we  would  be  far  better  off  without  listening 
posts. 

Senator  Welker.  In  other  words,  you  think  they  are  pretty  hard 
of  hearing? 

Representative  Busbey.  Xo  ;  I  think  they  are  not  so  hard  of  hearing, 
but  that  they  do  not  hear  right. 

Senator  Welker.  May  I  inquire  of  the  distinguished  Congressman  ? 
1  must  leave,  and  if  you  will  allow  me  to  ask  this 

Chairman  Jenner.  Proceed. 

Senator  Welker.  Congressman,  I  would  like  to  listen  to  your  state- 
ment all  afternoon,  but  I  have  two  guests  from  my  State. 

I  w'ant  to  ask  you,  because  I  know  you  have  been  one  who  has  re- 
ceived smears  and  abuse  when  you  are  trying  to  do  something  for 
your  country — it  is  not  a  pleasant  task  for  any  of  us  to  work  long 
and  unusual  hours  to  try  to  alert  the  American  people.  But  will  you 
agree  with  me  and  with  J.  Edgar  Hoover  when  he  states  that  the 
greatest  dilemma  in  our  combat  against  communism  at  home  is  the 
complacency  of  the  American  people? 

Representative  Busbey.  Yes,  sir;  I  will  agree  with  that.  I  will 
not  add  to  it,  but,  so  far,  I  agree  with  it  100  percent.  On  that  par- 
ticular question,  I  noticed  the  other  day  that  the  American  Bar  Asso- 
ciation has  advocated  the  teaching  of  communism  in  our  schools.  I 
would  like  to  say  to  the  members  of  this  subcommittee  that  I  have 
advocated  that  for  many,  many  years.  If  the  children  of  our  ele- 
mentary and  high  schools,  and  our  colleges  and  universities  are  taught 
what  communism  really  is,  I  have  no  fear  concerning  the  road  they 
will  take.  But  the  danger  and  the  tragedy  of  it  is  that  professors 
in  our  universities  and  colleges  and  teachers  in  our  high  schools  have 
been  teaching  these  students  and  children  Marxist-communism  under 
the  guise  of  social  science,  or  any  other  subject.  They  bring  in  the 
Communist  technique,  and  they  do  not  tell  them  they  are  teaching 
them  communism,  but  they  are  learning  it  just  the  same.  That  is 
the  reason  why  so  many  of  our  young  people  today  are  coming  out 
of  these  universities  and  schools  with  such  strange  ideas,  as  we  would 
call  them. 

Senator  Welker.  I  excuse  myself.  Again  may  I  thank  my  dis- 
tinguished friend  from  Illinois  for  appearing  before  this  committee. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Congressman  Busbey,  you  had  started  to  tes- 
tify that  there  was  another  method  short  of  war  that  might  be  bene- 
ficial, and  you  testified  to  launch  a  political  offensive  against  the 


296  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Communists  would  be  to  take  the  following  two  steps.  I  think  you 
covered  the  first  one.  The  first  one  is  for  all  free  nations  to  break 
off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics, 
Communist  Poland,  Communist  Czechoslovakia,  Communist  Rumania, 
and  all  satellite  countries.  Would  you  tell  us  about  the  second  step 
you  think  would  be  ben.eficial? 

Representative  Busbey.  The  second  step,  Senator,  is  to  enforce  a 
100-percent  economic  blockade.  In  other  words,  to  stop  completely  all 
so-called  East- West  trade. 

Chairman  Jenner.  Did  you  hear  the  testimony  of  the  gentleman 
who  testified  just  previous  to  you  who  was  born  and  reared  in  Russia 
and  who  has  now  defected  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  No,  I  did  not.  I  was  working  on  some  of 
my  material. 

Chairman  Jenner.  He  advocated  that  same  position. 

Representative  Busbey.  I  am  acquainted  with  the  stock  argument 
that  is  made  against  that,  and  it  is  this :  What  are  we  going  to  do  to 
support  the  economies  of  these  countries,  such  as  the  western  European 
countries  and  the  South  American  countries?  How  are  you  going  to 
support  their  economies  ? 

Another  argument  is :  Isn't  that  going  to  be  very  hard  on  the  people 
back  of  the  Iron  Curtain  ?  Yes,  it  would  be  hard,  but  it  will  be  much 
harder  if  we  let  the  Communists  continue  their  march  toward  their 
goal  of  world  domination, 

Mr.  Arens.  There  is  still  another  argument :  If  we  trade  with  the 
Iron  Curtain  governments,  particularly  now  with  China,  that  we  will 
woo  China  and  woo  the  captive  nations  away  from  the  Soviet  orbit. 
What  do  you  think  of  that  argument  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  think  it  is  just  nonsense. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  know  it  is  made  and  advocated  with  greater 
sincerity  by  people  high  in  this  Government  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  I  do  not  care  by  whom  it  is  made;  it  is 
still  silly.  Unfortunately,  they  have  not  given  the  time  and  study  to 
this  subject  that  a  great  many  of  us  throughout  the  United  States 
have  given  it. 

I  will  tell  you  what  you  will  run  up  against  on  my  first  step — and 
I  think  this  is  important  to  your  resolutions,  because  you  will  have  to 
face  it.  I  will  take  you  back  to  September  27, 1943,  when  I  introduced 
the  following  very  short,  simple  resolution  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, a  concurrent  resolution : 

Resolved  hy  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  Senate  conenrring,  That  the 
Congress  hereby  petitions  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  invite  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  Nations  to  a  meeting  to  be  held  in  the  United  States 
where  peace  aims  of  their  respective  countries  will  be  submitted  in  writing  as  a 
basis  for  formulating  a  program  for  world  peace. 

That  resolution  was  sent  to  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the 
House.  At  that  time,  a  very  distinguished  Member  of  the  House 
from  New  York,  Sol  Bloom,  was  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee.  Week  after  week,  I  would  confront  him  with  the  same 
question:  "When  are  you  going  to  let  me  come  in  and  testify  before 
your  committee  in  behalf  of  this  resolution  ?" 

Finally,  after  many  weeks,  he  said  to  me : 

Fred,  you  might  just  as  well  realize  it ;  you  are  not  going  to  get  a  hearing  on 
that  resolution. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COAIIMUNISM  297 

Bein<;  one  of  tliose  individuals  who  are  more-or-less  persistent,  I  said, 
'^Wliy?"     He  said: 

Because  you  know  and  I  know  that  all  the  nations  would  be  perfectly  willing  to 
state  their  peace  aims  in  writing,  with  the  exception  of  our  great  ally,  Soviet 
Russia. 

I  said : 

Sol,  I  will  l)uy  the  first  part,  but  I  won't  buy  the  second  part,  because  I  never 
have  admitted,  and  never  will  admit,  that  Soviet  Russia  was  at  any  time  an  ally 
of  ours.    She  was  a  cobelligerent  and  nothing  else. 

As  I  said,  being  rather  persistent,  I  asked : 

Well,  why  am  I  not  going  to  get  a  hearing  on  my  resolution? 

He  replied — 

You  might  just  as  well  know  it.  I  have  orders  from  the  White  House  not  to  give 
you  a  hearing  on  your  resolution. 

I  had  explained  in  a  speech  on  the  floor  of  the  House  that  we  had 
invited  all  the  nations  in  for  the  food  conference  down  at  Hot  Springs, 
Va.,  to  distribute  the  food  all  over  the  world.  We  had  invited  them  in 
at  Atlantic  City  to  set  up  the  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Conference^ 
UNRRA — and  it  has  already  been  proven  that  the  Commies  got  most 
of  the  goods,  and  that  it  was  a  job  haven  for  Commies,  to  see  that  they 
run  the  show.  We  called  them  together  at  Bretton  Woods  for  the 
monetary  conference ;  so  I  said : 

Why  not  call  them  together  for  the  peace  conference? 

What  has  that  to  do  Avith  Senate  Resolution  247?  I  will  tell  you. 

The  argument  will  be  presented  that  Great  Britain  Avould  not  agree 
to  anything  like  that.  And  I  do  not  believe  she  will.  But  if  she  will 
not,  should  we  not  find  it  out  now,  rather  than  later?  There  will  be  a 
lot  of  other  countries  that  will  not  be  willing  to  sign  it.  But  should 
not  the  American  people  and  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  have 
that  information  now,  instead  of  doing  nothing,  as  was  done  when  my 
resolution  died  in  the  committee  back  in  1943  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  In  other  Avords,  you  are  saying  it  is  time  to  choose  up 
sides  to  know,  who  our  friends  are  and  who  are  not  our  friends? 

Representative  Busbey.  Yes;  but,  unfortunately — and  I  think  a 
great  many  people  know  it — you  would  not  get  very  many  people  to  go 
along  with  you  on  this  thing.  I  will  give  you  a  good  illustration. 
When  I  was  in  Europe  with  the  Kersten  committee,  we  concluded  our 
hearings  on  a  Friday  night  in  London.  We  could  not  open  the  hear- 
ings in  Munich  until  the  following  Wednesday,  because  Mr.  Kersten 
could  not  have  an  appointment  with  Comrade  Adenauer  until  Tuesday 
afternoon.  But,  in  my  capacity  as  chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on 
Appropriations  in  the  House  for  the  Department  of  Labor,  and  related 
agencies,  and  the  Dejiartment  of  Health,  Education,  and  Welfare,  I 
was  particularly  interested  in  the  conference  that  was  going  on  in 
Geneva — the  International  Labor  Organization  Conference — because 
we  had  representatives  there  from  our  own  Department.  That  comes 
under  the  Labor  Department,  and  I  have  the  chairmanship  of  that 
Subcommittee  on  Appropriations. 

So,  I  took  a  plane  to  Geneva  early  Saturday  morning,  and  I  attended 
some  of  the  sessions  of  the  ILO.    I  was  there  on  the  most  historic  day 


298  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

in  the  37  years  of  that  oroanization.  As  you  probably  know,  that  is 
the  only  oroanization  set  up  in  the  Leaiiue  of  Nations,  wliich  survived. 

What  was  tlie  situation?  Soviet  Eussia,  and  I  think  this  is  very 
important  to  what  j^ou  are  exploring  here  with  your  resolution — 
Soviet  Russia  and  five  of  her  satellites  applied  for  admission  into  the 
ILO.  They  could  not  be  denied  on  one  ground,  because,  at  what  was 
known  as  the  Philadelphia  Convention  in  1946,  the  rules  of  the  ILO 
were  changed  to  permit  any  member  nation  of  the  United  Nations  to 
join  the  ILO.  But  the  big  fight  at  that  convention  was  on  this  issue: 
Did  the  representatives  of  labor  and  the  representatives  of  manage- 
ment for  Soviet  Russia  and  her  satellite  countries  really  represent 
labor  and  really  represent  management,  or  did  they  actua,lly  represent 
government  ? 

The  ILO  has  always  been  a  tripartite  organization;  two  delegates 
from  a  nation  representing  government,  one  representing  labor,  and 
one  representing  management.  For  instance,  for  the  United  States, 
the  labor  delegate  was  Mr,  Delaney,  who  is  one  of  the  officials  of 
the  American  Federation  of  Labor.  The  man  re])resenting  manage- 
ment Avas  Mr.  Will  McGrath,  of  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  delegated  by  the 
United  States  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  the  National  Manufacturers^ 
Association.  The  two  men  representing  government  were  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Labor,  Mr.  J.  Ernest  AVilkins,  and  Governor  Langlie  of 
the  State  of  W^ashington. 

Mr.  Wilkins  was  the  chairman  of  our  delegation.  If  I  may  digress 
at  this  point,  Mr.  Wilkins  is  one  of  our  most  prominent  Negro  lawyers 
from  the  city  of  Chicago.  Everybody  at  the  conference — all  the  ad- 
visers, all  our  delegates  representing  management,  labor,  and  govern- 
ment— everyone  of  them — agreed  that  it  was  only  through  the  eiforts 
of  Mr.  Wilkins  that  all  three  segments  of  the  United  States  delegation 
"were  woven  into  a  solid  front  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the 
ILO.     I  think  that  is  a  credit  to  him. 

But  when  the  chips  were  down  and  the  votes  were  taken  on  whether 
these  delegates  of  labor  and  management  really  represented  labor 
and  management,  or  actually  represented  the  government,  very  few 
of  the  nations  all  over  the  world  stayed  with  the  United  States  in 
opposing  the  seating  of  these  delegates. 

Out  of  the  entire  Far  Eastern  bloc  at  the  ILO  Conference,  the  only 
one  that  voted  with  the  United  States  was  Nationalist  China  on  the 
island  of  Formosa.  All  the  others  deserted  us,  and  voted  with  the 
U.  S.  S.  R. 

You  might  reasonably  ask:  What  has  this  to  do  with  the  strategy 
and  tactics  of  Avorld  communism,  wdiich  the  subcommittee  is  consid- 
ering at  this  time?  Do  you  think  it  is  by  accident  that  Soviet  Russia 
and  her  satellites  have  come  back  into  UNESCO?  Do  you  think  it  is 
by  accident  that  they  applied  for  admission  to  the  ILO?  No.  It  is 
by  design,  because  they  see  this  way  to  get  back  into  these  international 
organizations. 

They  will  be  having  their  agents  in  these  organizations  stationed 
in  every  country  of  the  world,  and  those  agents  will  be  top-trained 
Communist  technicians.  They  will  be  going  into  our  point  4  program, 
and  that  is  because,  as  the  Director  General  explained  it  to  me,  it  is 
almost  impossible  to  get  technicians  from  the  United  States  interested 
in  going  into  that  program.     So,  the  Soviets  will  come  up  with  the 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  299 

trained  technicians  and  they  will  be  operating  as  agents  of  the  Krem- 
lin. That  means  1  more  individual  or  2  more  individuals  in  these 
countries  as  contact  agents  between  the  internal  Communist  forces  of 
these  countries  and  the  outside. 

I  would  like  to  make  one  more  statement,  and  then  finish,  unless 
there  are  some  questions,  because  there  is  so  much  to  this  that  I  could 
continue  for  weeks. 

One  thing  that  was  brought  home  very  forcibly  to  our  Kersten 
committee  over  in  EurojDe  by  the  witnesses  who  testified  concerning 
how  the  Kremlin  took  over  the  governments  of  the  various  countries 
was  this :  That,  generally  speaking,  the  first  ones  to  be  liquidated  were 
the  people  who  had  led  the  Communist  fight  within  these  countries  to 
overthrow  the  incumbent  regimes.  In  other  words,  the  leaders  of  the 
Communist  movement  in  a  country — those  people  who  were  collabo- 
rating with  the  Kremlin  and  who  were  responsible  in  a  great  degree 
for  the  Kremlin's  being  able  to  take  over  the  country — were  the  first 
to  be  liquidated.  The  Communists  will  not  take  any  chances  on  these 
nationals,  unless  they  have  uses  for  them,  and,  then,  only  up  to  the 
]:)oint  where,  in  their  judgment,  it  is  inadvisable  to  keep  them  any 
longer.    When  that  time  comes,  these  nationals  go. 

I  should  like  to  call  one  other  thing  to  the  attention  of  the  subcom- 
mittee. I  have  not  read  this  article  for  some  time,  and  I  will  not 
impose  on  the  subcommittee's  time  by  reading  it  now,  but  it  is  an 
article  from  page  2-B  of  the  Washington  Post  of  Sunday,  July  15, 
1951,  entitled,  "Frail,  Secretive  Ho  Chi  Minh  Is  No.  1  Red  of  Asia 
Gateway." 

Mr.  Aretsts.  I  wonder  if  you  would  identify  the  article  just  more 
precisely  for  the  purpose  of  the  record. 

Representative  Busbey.  It  is  by  Seymour  Topping,  and  it  is  date- 
lined  Saigon,  Indochina. 

Mr.  Arens.  It  appeared  in  what  paper  ? 

Representative  Busbey.  The  Washington  Post,  Sunday,  July  16, 
1951.  The  significant  thing  about  it  is  tliis :  The  article  tells  how  Ho 
Chi  Minh  was  employed  by  the  United  States  Government  in  the  OSS, 
and  also  the  United  States  IS.  It  does  not  do  our  hearts  any  good  to 
see  things  handled  in  such  a  terrible  way  as  they  have  been  handled  in 
Korea  and  Indochina,  when  there  was  no  excuse  whatever  for  such 
mishandling. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  think  it  would  be  helpful  if  you  would  elaborate  a  bit 
more  on  the  significance  of  that  article  so  the  record  would  reflect 
clearly  your  interpretation  of  it. 

Rej^resentative  Busbey.  The  only  reason  I  referred  to  it  is  that  we 
accepted  these  people  into  our  governmental  agencies  all  over  the 
world;  practically  saying  that  they  believed  in  the  same  ideals  we  do. 

I  have  here  a  copy  of  testimony — received  just  this  morning — taken 
by  our  committee  in  Berlin,  that  is  very  pertinent.  One  of  the  wit- 
nesses had  been  a  top  Soviet  agent  who  had  performed  in  every  way 
for  the  Kremlin  for  many,  many  years,  but  had  eventually  come  into 
disfavor  with  the  gangsters  in  the  Kremlin.  He  was  exiled  to  the 
slave-labor  camp  known  as  Vorkuta,  which  is  known  as  probably  the 
worst  slave-labor  camp  in  all  of  Soviet  Russia,  and  from  which  they 
get  a  great  deal  of  their  coal. 


300  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

This  testimony  illustrates  my  point  that  we  did  not  realize  what  the 
problem  was,  or  that  if  we  did  realize  what  the  problem  was,  someone 
certainly  should  be  taken  to  task.  This  man  and  several  of  our  other 
"witnesses  in  Berlin  testified  under  names  other  than  their  own, 
although  their  backgrounds  and  real  names  are  known  to  the  com- 
mittee and  their  records  are  in  the  file.  Our  connnittee  was  satisfied 
as  to  the  authenticity  of  their  testimony  and  their  qualifications  as 
witnesses.  Ironically  enough,  one  of  the  witnesses  testified  under  the 
name  of  Herr  John. 

I  will  read  part  of  the  testimony  of  the  witness  who  was  exiled  to 
Vorkuta : 

Question.  How  did  you  happen  to  obtain  your  release  from  Vorkuta? 

Answer.  Tlie  Soviets  released  15,000  Germans  in  order  to  prepare  a  good 
atmosphere  for  the  Berlin  Conference.  These  1.5,000  people  partly  consisted  of 
prisoners  of  war  and  partly  of  civilians.  From  Vorkuta  itself  about  100  male 
and  about  20  female  prisoners  were  released,  and  I  was  among  those  100  men. 

So  you  see  that  this  man  has  not  been  out  from  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain  too  long. 

Question.  This,  then,  was  a  Soviet  gesture  on  the  eve  of  the  happening  of  the 
Four-Power  Conference  in  Berlin;  is  that  correct? 

Answer.  Yes  ;  that  was  our  opinion  of  it. 

Question.  Now,  who  was  the  man.  Doctor,  that  caused  your  arrest  in  the  East 
Zone  of  Berlin? 

Answer.  It  was  the  representative  of  the  Moscow  faction  in  the  Ministry 
of  Health  in  which  I  worked  at  the  time,  Dr.  Coutelle,  who  caused  my  arrest. 

Question.  Dr.  Coutelle  was  a  Comintern  agent;  is  that  correct? 

Answer.  Yes. 

Question.  Can  you  tell  us  something  about  Dr.  Coutelle,  who  he  is  and  what 
he  did? 

Answer.  He  is  about  45  years  old  ;  was  born  in  Germany.  Previous  to  1933  he 
was  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party.  After  1933  he  went  to  Moscow  and 
was  trained  for  this  .special  task  of  the  Comintern. 

Question.  How  do  you  spell  Coutelle? 

Answer.  C-o-u-t-e-l-l-e. 

Question.  Go  right  ahead. 

Answer.  In  193C  he  went  to  Spain  and  remained  there  imtil  the  end  of  the 
civil  war.  There,  he  was  a  member  of  the  international  brigade.  After  the 
termination  of  the  civil  war  he  was  living  in  England,  and  in  approximately 
1941  or  1942  he  received  the  order  from  the  section  of  German  immigrants  of  the 
Comintern  to  volunteer  as  a  doctor  for  the  American  Army.  He  did  so  and  then 
served  as  a  doctor  in  the  American  Army  at  the  Burmese  front. 

Question.  Is  that  on  the  Burma  front  under  General  Stilwell? 

Answer.  Yes. 

Question.  Now,  he  I'eceived — this  Comintern  agent  that  you  are  talking  about, 
Dr.  Coutelle — received  a  commission  in  the  United  States  Army  as  a  dotcor ;  is 
that  correct? 

Answer.  Yes.  He  was  an  American  military  physician  and  he  worked  in  the 
American  Army  as  a  physician 

Question.  As  a  physician?     But  he  had  a  commission.     He  was  in  uniform. 

Answer.  Yes,  he  was  in  uniform. 

Question.  And  he  was  assigned  to  the  Burma  front  under  General  Stilwell  j 
is  that  correct? 

An.swer.  That  is  correct. 

Question.  You  are  testifying  from  your  own  knowledge  on  that ;  is  that  correct? 

Answer.  Yes.  I  know  his  personnel  tiles  very  well.  When  he  came  back,  at 
that  time  I  was  in  ciiarge  of  the  Personnel  Department. 

Question.  Of  what? 

Answer.  Of  the  Ministry  of  Health.  He  came  hack  to  Berlin,  approximately 
the  beginning  of  1946,  and  still  was  in  American  uniform. 

The  ('haikman.  Just  a  minute.  Where  were  you  when  you  saw  his  personnel 
file,  Mr.  Witness? 

The  Witness.  I  was  in  charge  of  the  Personnel  Department  of  the  Ministry 
of  Health  in  East  Germany. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  301 

Question.  What  date  was  this? 

Answer.  That  was  in  1946. 

Question.  On  what  month  and  day,  if  you  can  recall? 

Answer.  Approximately  January  or  February  1946.     About  that  period. 

Question.  And  in  what  city  or  place? 

Answer.  In  East  Berlin. 

Question.  And  at  that  time,  the  East  Berlin  Government  was  under  the  Com- 
munists ;  was  it? 

Answer.  OfBcially  it  was,  and  formerly  it  was  nonpartisan  and  all  parties  par- 
ticipated. However,  this  government  was  not  fully  competent  as  a  government 
at  that  period.     That  was  done  before  1949. 

He  went  on  to  testify  concerning  another  agent  of  the  Comintern 
whom  they  sent  over  to  be  given  a  commission  in  the  United  States 
Army,  and  who  also  served  nnder  General  Stilwell  in  the  Burmese 
campaign.  I  bring  that  up  for  this  reason :  To  these  people  who  say 
we  should  not  adopt  Senate  Resolution  247  because  we  need  these 
listening  posts  in  all  these  countries  of  the  world,  I  say,  Who  are  out 
in  these  listening  posts  ?  Back  in  the  80th  Congress  in  194:7  and  1948, 
I  spent  a  year  and  a  half  making  a  one-man  investigation  of  the  State 
Department. 

One  of  the  divisions  I  investigated  that  year  was  the  Foreign  Serv- 
ice Institute.  Lo  and  behold,  whom  did  I  find  at  the  head  of  this 
Foreign  Service  Institute,  whose  responsibility  it  was  to  train  all  these 
3'oung  fellows  entering  our  Foreign  Service  to  be  sent  out  to  these 
listening  posts?  A  man  by  the  name  of  William  Maddox.  Who  is 
William  Maddox?  William  Maddox  was  in  charge  of  the  OSS  sta- 
tion at  Beri,  Italy,  during  World  War  II.  He  was  in  charge  there 
when  the  United  States  Army  sent  into  Yugoslavia  an  intelligence 
detail  under  Colonel  McDowell,  who,  in  my  estimation,  was  one  of  the 
best  intelligence  officers  we  had  in  G-2.  I  have  not  heard  of  him  for 
some  time ;  but  the  last  time  I  did,  he  was  still  in  G-2. 

You  will  recall  that  up  until  about  the  end  of  November  1913,  all 
you  read  about  in  our  papers  concerning  Yugoslavia  was  General 
Mihailovich  and  his  techniques.  But  then,  just  as  if  you  took  a  sharp 
knife  and  cut  it  off  in  the  press,  you  never  heard  another  word  about 
him.  All  you  heard  about  M'ere  Tito  and  the  ]3.artisans.  That  was 
when  Mr.  Churchill  was  very  successful  in  persuading  our  Govern- 
ment to  support  Communist  Tito. 

After  Colonel  McDowell  took  this  mission  into  Yugoslavia,  he 
started  sending  in  his  reports.  Being  a  military  man  and  an  intel- 
ligence man,  he  naturally  made  factual  reports.  As  far  as  I  have 
been  able  to  ascertain  from  my  conversations  with  various  people  who 
know  this  situation  very  vv'ell  and  in  whom  I  have  every  confidence, 
William  Maddox,  the  head  of  our  OSS  station  in  Beri,  Italy,  pre- 
ferred court-martial  charges  against  Colonel  McDowell  because  his 
rejDorts  were  not  slanted  in  favor  of  the  Communists. 

After  some  time.  Gen.  George  Marshall,  who  was  then  Chief 
of  Staff  finally  quashed  the  court-martial  charges  against  Colonel 
McDowell.  But  this  William  Maddox  was  down  there  training  our 
bo3'S  in  the  Foreign  Service  Institute  for  duty  overseas.  I  think 
members  of  this  committee  will  agree  with  me  that,  in  the  study  of 
strategy  and  tactics  of  world  communism,  and  in  order  really  to 
put  up  an  effective  effort  against  the  Communists,  these  boys  certainly 
should  be  oriented  in  the  right  way  on  the  subject  of  communism 
before  they  go  out  in  the  field — before  they  leave  the  United  States 
shores.  • 


302  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  . 

But,  would  Mr.  William  Madclox,  who  was  in  cliarf^e  of  the  Institute, 
permit  anyone  in  that  Institute  who  was  well  qualitied  to  talk  on  the 
subject  of  anticommunism  from  a  realistic  viewpoint,  to  talk  to 
these  boys?  Not  one.  The  only  ones  who  got  into  that  Institute 
were  the  Owen  Lattimores,  the  John  Emersons,  the  Philip  Jessups, 
the  John  Davies,  and  that  ilk.  They  were  the  only  ones  who  could 
get  in  to  tell  these  boys  about  communism  and  to  orient  them  before 
they  went  to  these  listening  posts.  That  is  one  of  the  reasons,  among 
many  others,  why  our  listening  posts  have  been  ineffective.  As  far 
as  I  am  concerned,  it  blows  into  bits  any  arguments  that  could  be 
presented  concerning  the  necessity  for  these  listening  posts. 

In  addition  to  that,  I  have  visited  during  the  last  4  years  24  of  these 
so-called  listening  posts.  From  all  I  could  gather,  we  would  have  been 
much  better  off  if  we  had  had  no  information  coming  back,  rather 
than  some  of  the  information  which  was  sent  back. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  feel  that  I  have  already  imposed  too  much  on  the 
time  of  the  subcommittee.  If  there  are  any  further  questions,  I  shall 
be  more  than  happy  to  answer  them  to  the  best  of  my  ability. 

Chairman  Jenner.  I  am  sure  the  committee  is  deeply  appreciative 
of  your  testimony  and  will  give  it  very  serious  consideration  as  it 
studies  and  pursues  this  challenging  subject  of  the  strategy  and 
tactics  of  world  communism. 

On  behalf  of  the  committee  I  want  to  thank  you  for  the  time  and 
efforts  you  have  put  forth  on  preparing  this  statement  and  in  pre- 
senting your  views  and  the  information  which  you  have  now  sub- 
mitted to  the  subcommittee. 

Representative  Busbey.  Thank  you  very  kindly. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:30  p.  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  subject  to 
call.) 


STEATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WOELD  COMMUNISM 


WEDNESDAY,   SEPTEMBER   22,   1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  In\t:stigate  the  Administration 
OF  the  Internal  Security  Act  and  Other  Internal 
Security  Laws,  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary, 

Washington,  D.  C. 
The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  35  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  call,  in  room  457, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Jolm  M.  Butler  (member  of  the  sub- 
committee) presiding. 

Present:  Senator  Butler  (presiding). 

Present  also :  Richard  Arens,  special  counsel ;  and  Frank  W.  Schroe- 
der,  professional  staff  member. 

Senator  Butler.  The  subcommittee  will  come  to  order. 
This  sessio?!  is  a  continuation  of  the  series  of  hearings  by  the  special 
task  force  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  on  Strategy  and 
Tactics  of  World  Communism. 

The  witness  today  is  Mr.  Louis  Budenz.  I  am  very  happy  to 
have  you  with  us  today,  and  shall  listen  with  great  interest  to  your 
testimony. 

Will  you  please  rise  and  raise  your  right  hand?    Do  you  solemnly 
promise  in  the  presence  of  Almighty  God  that  the  evidence  you  will 
give  before  this  task  force  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth  ? 
Mr.  Budenz.  I  do. 
Senator  Butler.  The  witness  is  sworn.    Counsel  may  proceed. 

TESTIMONY  OF  LOUIS  BUDENZ 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  for  the  purpose  of  the  record,  will  you 
kindly  give  us  a  brief  resume  of  your  background  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir.;  I  am  at  present  a  member  of  the  faculty 
of  Fordham  University,  although  I  have  now  requested  and  received 
a  year's  leave  of  absence  because  of  the  many  subpenas  I  have  received 
from  the  Government.  I  am  also  engaging  at  the  present  moment 
in  extensive  classes  among  community  leaders  on  the  strategy  and 
tactics  of  communism,  and  as  a  result  I  have  produced  a  textbook 
which  is  just  out,  on  the  techniques  of  communism.  That,  I  should 
say,  is  my  main  concentration  at  the  present  moment. 

In  the  past  I  was,  of  course,  an  active  member  of  the  Communist 
Party,  from  1935  to  1945,  and  among  other  posts  that  I  held  in  the 
Communist  conspiracy  was  labor  editor  of  the  Daily  Worker;  editor 
of  the  Midwest  Daily  Record,  the  Communist  paper  in  Chicago,  for 
a  period  of  time  from  1937  to  1940;  then  managing  editor  of  the 
Daily  Worker,  and  president  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Press  Co.,  Inc. 

303 


304  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

During  a  considerable  period  of  that  time  I  was  a  member  of  the 
national  committee  of  the  Communist  Party,  and  both  as  a  member 
of  that  committee  and  particuLarly  as  being  responsible  for  the  Daily 
"Worker,  I  attended  politburo  meetings.  That  is  the  governing  body 
of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  United  States. 

JMr.  Aeens.  Mv.  Budenz,  on  the  basis  of  your  extensive  background 
and  exiDerience  in  the  world  Communist  movement,  what  conclusions 
do  you  draw  on  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  the  world  Communist 
movement  today? 

Mr.  Budenz.  If  our  Nation  wishes  to  remain  the  United  States  of 
America  and  not  become  in  a  comparatively  short  time  a  satellite  of 
the  world  Soviet  dictatorship,  we  must  break  off  relations  with  Soviet 
Russia  and  the  satellite  regimes  at  once.  We  cannot  do  business  with 
Moscow.  The  longer  that  we  attempt  to  do  it,  the  more  will  we  sink 
into  the  mire  of  defeat  after  defeat,  which  in  general  has  been  the 
history  of  the  past  20  years  of  relations  with  Soviet  Russia. 

Senator  Butler.  Mr.  Budenz,  will  you  direct  your  remarks  to  the 
oft-stated  position  that  we  need  to  have  relations  with  Moscow  so  that 
we  can  have  a  listening  post  behind  the  Iron  Curtain?  Is  there 
any  validity  to  that  contention,  in  your  opinion? 

Mr.  Budenz.  There  is  none  whatsoever. 

Senator  Butler.  Will  you  explain  why? 

Mr.  Budenz.  May  I  say,  Mr.  Senator,  before  explaining  that,  that 
this  conclusion  that  I  gave  you  in  my  first  answer  arises  from  the 
nature  of  Soviet  communism,  which  is  inherently  determined  to  con- 
quer the  world,  and  upon  that  basis  arouses  the  fanaticism  and  devo- 
tion of  its  followers.  It  is  also  based  on  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  the 
Communist  conspiracy  as  laid  down  by  Joseph  Stalin  and  other 
leaders,  which  flows  from  this  philosophy  of  communism  or  the  nature 
of  Soviet  communism. 

It  is  based,  likewise,  on  the  supermilitary  organization  of  the  Com- 
munist conspiracy  to  bring  about  the  destruction  of  all  other  nations 
so  that  they  will  become  members  of  the  world  Soviet  dictatorship  or 
subjects  of  the  world  Soviet  dictatorship. 

In  regard  to  your  question,  in  Soviet  Russia  we  cannot  have  a  true 
listening  post  because  everything  is  shut  off  to  us.  There  is  no  freedom 
of  transportation,  there  is  no  freedom  of  examination.  How  many 
of  our  representatives  can  go  into  the  slave  labor  camps  of  Soviet 
Russia  today  and  see  there  the  millions  of  victims  of  the  Kremlin? 

Senator  Butler.  Is  there  anything  to  be  gained  merely  by  having 
cur  people  there  coming  in  contact  with  the  Russian  people  and  the 
people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  for  an  exchange  of  ideas? 

Mr.  Budenz.  There  is  no  exchange  of  ideas  which  can  be  made  with 
the  Russian  people.  They  are  constantly  watched  by  the  Soviet 
Secret  Police.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  under  the  "yellow  dog"  contract 
of  the  Soviet  Government,  everyone,  as  a  condition  of  employment, 
must  report  to  the  Soviet  Secret  Police  on  his  neighbors,  his  friends, 
and  his  associates. 

Senator  Butler.  But  we  have  heard  so  much  about  the  small  per- 
centage of  people  within  the  Communist  orbit  who  are  really  hard- 
core Communists,  and  that  it  may  do  some  good  to  have  people  there 
to  talk  to  the  people  who  are  not  Communists  so  they  could  learn 
something. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COINCVIUNISM  305 

Mr.  BuDEXz.  The  greatest  good  we  could  do  is  to  give  hope  to  the 
Kussian  people,  to  make  them  our  allies,  to  give  them  hope  by  letting 
them  know  that  we  are  not  conducting  secret  negotiations  with  their 
masters,  that  we  are  not  coming  to  compromises  and  accommodations 
which  are  alwaj'S  in  favor  of  Soviet  Russia  and  which  spread  despair 
among  them. 

Senator  Butler.  Do  we  weaken  our  position  in  that  regard  if  we 
cut  off  all  relationships  with  them  ? 

]\Ir.  BuDEXZ.  No ;  we  strengthen  our  position,  and  for  a  specific  rea- 
son. The  only  listening  posts  that  exist  today  are  those  of  Soviet 
Russia  in  the  United  States  in  the  espionage  nests  which  are  called 
embassies,  and  also  in  the  Tass  News  Agency,  which  is  also  another 
center  of  espionage  in  this  country. 

I  say  that  with  due  and  deliberate  consideration,  but  it  has  been 
confirmed  for  us  now  by  the  testimony  of  Vladimir  Petrov,  the  former 
Soviet  diplomat,  with  documentary  support.  This  te*timony  has  just 
been  given  before  the  Royal  Commission  on  Espionage  in  Australia, 
and  I  have  read  it  day  by  day  through  copies  of  the  Sydney  Morning 
Herald  which  have  been  sent  to  me  kindly  by  a  friend.  This  will  soon 
be  available  to  this  committee,  by  the  way,  because  I  understand  the 
Australian  Government  is  about  to  print  the  hearings  of  the  Royal 
Commission  on  Espionage,  and  they  are  startling.  They  indicate  five 
different  directorates  of  espionage  functioning  out  of  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Office  under  Mr.  Molotov,  in  every  country  of  the  world. 
•  These  various  directorates  are  one  on  political  information,  one  on 
military  intelligence,  one  on  sabotage,  and  another  which  I  have  for- 
gotten for  the  moment,  and  as  an  addition  to  that,  one  for  the  assassina- 
tion of  Soviet  enemies.  The  existence  of  these  directorates  is  not  only 
shown,  as  I  recall,  by  IMr.  Petrov's  sworn  testimony,  but  by  written 
documents  of  instruction  to  him  which  he  turned  over  to  the  Royal 
Commission  on  Espionage. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  on  the  basis  of  your  background,  experi- 
ence, and  intimate  knowledge  of  the  world  Communist  conspiracy, 
would  you  give  your  appraisal  to  this  subcommittee  of  the  Soviet 
timetable.  How  late  is  it  on  the  Soviet  timetable  for  world 
domination  ? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  The  Soviet  timetable  does  not  go  by  years ;  it  goes  by 
periods.  We  have  I  consider  the  best  of  all  authorities  in  Joseph  V. 
Stalin.  He  is  the  best  of  all  authorities,  because  the  Communists  have 
continuously  acclaimed  him  to  be  the  leader,  teacher,  and  guide  of  the 
oppressed  of  the  world.  In  his  Foundations  of  Leninism,  published  in 
1934,  Stalin  says  on  page  91  of  the  Little  Lenin  Library  edition — and 
I  want  to  emphasize  this — that  this  present  period,  following  the 
October  revolution,  that  is,  following  the  Bolshevik  revolution  in 
Russia,  has  as  its  objective — 

To  consolidate  the  clictatorsliip  of  the  proletariat  in  one  country,  using  it  as  a 
base  for  the  overthrow  of  imperialism  in  all  countries. 

That  is  for  the  overthrow  of  all  other  governments. 

The  revolution  is  spreading  beyond  the  confines  of  one  country.     The  period  of 
world  revolution  has  commenced. 

It  is  in  this  present  period  that  Soviet  Russia  intends  to  conquer 
the  worlds    That  is  its  program  and  it  is  moving  forward  to  it  under 


306  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMJMUNISM 

the  policy  of  encirclement  which  Stalin  laid  down  in  19.39  and  which 
is  ]iroceeding  according  to  schedule. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  peaceful  coexistence  with  the  Soviets  possible,  in  your 
judgment? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  Peaceful  coexistence  is  utterly  impossible.  Peaceful 
coexistence  was  the  slogan  raised  by  Stalin  in  1927  for  the  deceit  of 
the  non-Soviet  world.  Almost  at  the  same  moment  that  he  raised 
that  slogan  for  tlifise  strategic  purposes  to  deceive  the  rest  of  the 
world,  he  was  writing  for  the  Communists  the  Problems  of  Leninism. 

Senator  Butler.  May  I  ask  you  this  question:  If  this  conspiracy 
has  a  well-defined  objective  which  we  all  believe  it  does  have,  why 
is  it  that  we  were  able  in  America  under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Browder 
to  have  the  Communist  Party  depart  from  its  basic  objective  of  over- 
throwing by  force  and  violence  and  pursuing  the  tactic  that  he 
suggested  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  Senator,  it  really  didn't  depart  from  that  objective. 
If  you  will  read  Mr.  Browder's  own  works,  you  will  see  that  he 
stands  on  the  foundations  of  Lenin  and  Stalin,  and  their  foundation 
is  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 

Seator  Butler.  But  he  did  adopt  peaceful  methods  for  a  period  of 
years ;  did  he  not  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  He  did  it  under  instructions  from  Moscow.  So  did 
Stalin  speak  about  peace.     Stalin  made  the  Teheran  pact 

Senator  Butler.  In  other  words,  that  was  just  part  of  the  pose  to 
throw  the  free  world  off  balance  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  That  is  right,  and  Browder  was  made  the  victim  of 
Soviet  policy  later  on  because  they  had  to  have  a  scapegoat  in  order 
to  show  that  now  the  war  was  on  against  the  United  States.  There 
was  nothing  that  could  show  that  better  than  to  demote  Browder  for 
standing  for  peace.     That  electrified  the  Communists  of  the  world. 

Senator  Butler.  Without  naming  names  or  even  referring  to  any 
one  organization  over  another,  do  you  think  that  there  is  any  other 
ideological  organization  in  the  world  today  that  can  successfully 
combat  communism  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  I  think  the  LTnited  States  of  America,  because  of  its 
great  productive  capacity  which  could  cause  Mr.  James  Byrnes,  as 
head  of  the  Office  of  War  Mobilization,  to  state  toward  the  end  of 
World  War  II  that  we  could  produce  and  were  about  to  produce  as 
much  as  the  Allies  and  the  Axis  combined,  and  with  the  ingenuity  of 
the  American  people,  with  the  great  prestige  that  the  United  States 
has,  although  I  must  confess  it  is  losing  it  somewhat  under  Com- 
munist propaganda  throughout  the  world  to  whicli  we  do  not  retort — 
the  United  States  has  been  placed  in  a  historic  position  to  be  the 
moral  leader  of  the  world  in  the  battle  against  this  evil,  the  great 
evil  of  our  times,  and  it  can  defeat  it.  But  it  must  know  it  in  order 
to  defeat  it. 

Senator  Butler.  But  there  is  no  organization,  as  distinct  from  a 
governmental  unit,  that  could  defeat  communism,  in  your  opinion. 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  Ther-e  are  moral  forces  into  which  I  do  not  wish  to 
go  in  this  inquiry.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  immediately  as  of  this 
moment  the  United  States  has  the  responsibility  and  can  discharge  it, 
if  it  does  not  constantly  fall  victim  to  Communist  propaganda,  the 
Communist  line,  as  it  has  done,  most  unfortunately,  in  too  large  a 
measure  for  a  long  series  of  years. 


STRATEGY    AXD    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  307 

Senator  Butler.  Would  it  be  fair  to  say  that  your  testimony  up  to 
tliis  time  would  amount  to  this:  That  we  break  off  relations  with 
Russia  and  that  we  go  about  our  own  business  in  fighting  communism 
in  our  own  way,  and  not  say  too  much  about  what  we  are  doing,  but 
nevertheless  effectively  fight  communism? 

Mr.  BtDENz.  Say  what  we  are  doing  in  part,  but  also  not  say  what 
we  are  doing  in  part.  We  would  immediately  obtain  allies  among  the 
enslaved  people  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  who  are  todaj^  in  a  position 
of  despair.  We  would  obtain  allies  who  would  stand  by  us  and  in 
whom  we  could  trust  and  who  would  not  be  lukewarm,  who  would  not 
use  every  occasion — Soviet  trade,  or  the  balance-of -power  theory,  or 
their  own  weakness,  or  Red  propaganda  within,  for  instance,  France 
against  the  remilitarization  of  Western  Germany — to  desert  us  at  a 
critical  moment.  We  would  know,  in  other  words,  for  the  security 
of  the  United  States,  where  we  stand  in  the  world  arena. 

Today  we  have  no  such  knowledge,  because  our  allies  are  constantly 
changing  their  policy  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  giving  aid  and 
comfort  very  frequently  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

May  I  add  here  just  one  thought,  because  I  wanted  to  mention  the 
fraud  of  this  peaceful  coexistence  which  is  being  put  forward  as  the 
chief  basis  of  the  Communist  line  today,  resurrected  from  Stalin's 
statement  in  1927  for  the  deceit  of  the  United  States.  At  the 
moment  that  Stalin  raised  that  slogan  he  was  writing  the  Problems 
of  Leninism,  in  which  he  said  that  the  core  of  Leninism  was  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  and  he  states  here  on  page  19  that 
this  must  be  achieved  on  a  worldwide  scale  because  conflict  between 
the  Soviet  Republic  and  the  non-Soviet  world  is  inevitable.  Then  he 
proceeded  to  state: 

Can  such  a  radical  transformation  of  tlie  old  bourgeois  system  of  society  be 
achieved  without  a  violent  revolution,  without  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat? 
Obviously  not.  To  thinii  that  such  a  revolution  can  be  carried  out  peacefully 
within  ttie  framework  of  bourgeois  democracy  *  *  *  means  1  of  2  things.  It 
means  either  madness  and  the  loss  of  normal  human  understanding  or  else  an 
open  and  gross  repudiation  of  the  proletarian  revolution. 

In  other  words,  here  in  two  pages  Stalin  says  we  must  conquer  the 
world,  quoting  Lenin,  and  he  saj^s  it.  must  be  done  by  violence.  There 
is  no  other  way  in  which  to  achieve  that  purpose. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  does  the  Communist  line  operate  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  The  Communist  line  is  first  stated  in  the  declarations 
of  the  leaders  of  the  Kremlin.  The  present  line,  which  is  advancing 
too  successfully  in  the  LTnited  States,  was  dictated  basically  by  Stalin 
and  Malenkov  in  October  1952  at  the  19th  Congress  of  the  Communist 
Party  of  the  Soviet  L'nion.  This  is  embodied  in  3  documents,  1 
of  which  I  ha\e  with  me,  the  one  by  Malenkov.  Stalin's  document 
was  called  Economic  Problems  of  Socialism  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Then 
there  was  his  statement  on  bourgeois  liberties  in  imperialist  countries 
which,  by  the  way,  is  reprinted  in  the  October  1952  Political  Affairs. 

Mr.  Arexs.  Identify  that  document. 

Mr.  BuDExz.  Political  Afl'airs  is  the  official  theoretical  organ  of  the 
Communist  Party.  These  three  statements  are  the  basis  of  the  present 
Communist  line.  They  have  been  given  new  development  by  Malenkov 
in  his  address  to  the  Supreme  Soviet  in  August  1953  and  his  statement 
in  April  1954. 


308  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

They  are  carried  out  to  the  international  Communist  work!  through 
th^se  two  particuhir  publications  in  my  hand,  although  there  are 
others — the  organ  of  the  Cominform,  the  successor  of  the  Communist 
International,  which  comes  in  here  every  week  in  English  translation, 
as  it  goes  into  all  the  major  countries  of  the  world  in  their  respective 
tongues;  and  the  New  Times,  coming  directly  from  Moscow,  likewise 
in  English  translation,  as  it  is  translated  into  many  other  languages. 

Then  it  is  refined  for  American  consumption  in  Political  Affairs. 
We  have  here  as  an  illustration  the  leading  article  in  the  August  1954 
Political  Affairs,  William  Z.  Foster,  The  Question  of  Peaceful  Co- 
existence of  the  U.  S.  A.  and  U.  S.  S.  R. 

Tliis  is  a  document  which  everyone  should  read.  In  this  document 
Foster  says  that  the  Communists  would  forward  peaceful  coexistence 
in  order  to  bring  about  the  total  disarmament  of  America,  the  end  of 
all  our  atomic  stockpile — in  other  words,  all  those  conditions  which 
mean  that  the  United  States  will  be  unguarded  and  unprepared 
against  attack  by  Soviet  Eussia.  But  there  is  one  quote  here  I  would 
like,  with  your  permission,  particularly  to  emphasize  because,  while 
stating  that  peaceful  coexistence  must  be  advanced  as  a  slogan  and  as 
a  thought,  and  that  it  will  lead,  if  the  Communists  can  bring  it  about, 
gradually  to  the  disarmament  of  the  United  States,  Foster  then  says, 
because  tlie  Communists  must  know  this  is  not  truly  peace — they  must 
deceive  others  but  never  fall  victims  to  their  own  deceit,  and  that  is 
why  this  Aesopian  or  double-talk  language  must  always  be  a  feature 
of  Communist  directives — therefore,  Foster  says : 

Stalin  among  his  last  statements  reemphasized  Lenin's  position  that  so  long 
as  imi)erialism  lasts  there  will  be  danger  of  war,  a  warning  which  is  doubly 
pertinent  with  regard  to  American  imperialism. 

What  does  that  mean  ?  That  means  that  the  only  road  to  peace  is 
by  the  world  Soviet  dictatorship,  when  American  imperialism  or  the 
American  Government  as  it  is  today  will  be  at  an  end.  That,  of  course, 
is  completely  in  accordance  with  the  Communist  fundamental  con- 
cepts as  laid  down  in  the  progi"am  of  the  Communist  International, 
wdiere  the  necessity  for  the  world  Soviet  dictatorship  is  so  emphasized 
and  the  means  to  obtain  it  even  in  detail  through  violence  are  outlined. 
That  is  the  emphasis  put  in  the  Foundations  of  Leninism  by  Stalin  and 
in  his  Problems  of  Leninism,  in  addition,  of  course,  to  many  other 
fundamental  works  which  I  could  quote. 

These,  by  the  way,  are  works  which  the  Communists  read  right  to 
this  moment.  These  can  be  bought  in  Communist  book  shops — if  I 
could  get  into  the  Communist  Party  I  could  buy  it  within  the  party 
branches,  such  as  they  are,  very  secret  and  underground — for  the 
guidance  of  the  Communists.  These  works  are  studied  constantly, 
referred  to  in  discussions,  and  are  the  basis  of  Communist  thought 
and  action. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  in  the  course  of  the  last  few  years  there 
has  obviously  developed  in  the  United  States  a  strong  anti-Com- 
munist sentiment  which  is  reflected  in  the  Congress  by  legislation, 
which  is  reflected  in  the  press,  reflected  at  the  crossroads  of  America. 
What  is  your  appraisal,  as  of  the  moment,  of  the  strength  of  the 
Communist  conspiracy  in  the  United  States,  say,  as  compared  to  what 
it  was,  say,  5  or  10  or  15  years  ago?  Is  it  a  greater  menace  today 
than  ever  before  ?    Is  it  a  less  menace  ?    What  is  your  appraisal  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  309 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  It  is  a  greater  menace  today  because,  despite  all  the 
assaults  made  upon  it,  it  is  determining  to  too  great  a  measure  what 
American  public  opinion  is,  and  is  doing  this  through  the  victory  of 
the  Conmiunist  line. 

JVIr.  Akexs.  How  powerful  is  this  Communist  Party  as  a  political 
force  todaj'  ? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  It  is  the  most  powerful  political  force  in  the  United 
States.  Let  me  show  this  so  it  won't  be  considered  to  be  an  extrava- 
gant statement. 

The  Communists  had  a  secret  conference  in  September  of  last  year, 
and  the  substance  of  this  conference  is  presented  in  this  report  in  my 
hand  Avhich  was  issued  for  the  Communists  to  read  and  study,  New 
Opportunities  in  the  Fight  for  Peace  and  Democracy.  In  this  docu- 
Ujent  the  Communists  emphasize  the  need  for  big  power  negotiation,  as 
Malenkov  had  stated  in  August ;  they  stress  the  need  for  the  five-power 
meeting ;  they  stress  those  things  which  occurred  at  Berlin  and  Geneva. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  you  go  through  this  document  you  will  be 
amazed  at  the  many  items  which  tliey  have  stressed  which  have  come 
into  being  in  the  United  States,  at  least  to  the  extent  that  they  are 
echoed  out  through  some  agencies  of  public  opinion  and  information. 

The  center  of  this  was  the  attack  upon  McCarthyism.  I  want  you  to 
note  this  in  this  report.  The  attack  upon  McCarthyism,  the  struggle 
against  JNIcCarthyism,  was  to  be  linked  with  tlie  struggle  for  peace — 
in  other  words,  with  the  struggle  for  further  Soviet  aggression.  If 
you  study  that  document  you  will  see  how  much  of  it  has  come  to 
life  in  America  and  how  successful  the  Communist  program  has  been 
of  paralyzing  us  through  the  cries  against  McC^arthyism  and  McCar- 
ranism.  I  have  to  use  those  phrases  because  they  are  their  phrases, 
Communist  phrases. 

They  have  produced  this  national  election  conference  report  which 
I  now  show  you,  which  is  just  a  continuation  of  their  directives 
during  the  last  2  years  calling  for  the  defeat  in  the  congressional  elec- 
tions of  every  McCarthyite  and  McCarranite  candidate. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  there  a  fallacy  in  numbers  in  undertaking  to  appraise 
the  Communist  strength  in  America  ?  We  know  from  reports  which 
have  been  made  public  from  intelligence  agencies  that  the  actual 
numerical  strength  of  the  Communist  Party  operators  has  been  re- 
duced in  the  course  of  the  last  few  years.  Is  there  a  fallacy  in  ap- 
praising the  Communist  Party  strength  on  the  basis  of  numbers? 

Mr.  BunENZ.  It  has  been  reduced,  but  not  to  the  extent  that  is  sup- 
posed. There  are  750,000  members  who  have  left  the  Communist 
Party,  let  us  say,  in  the  last  15  years,  but  a  great  number  of  them 
haven't  left  because  they  are  not  Communists.  They  have  left  be- 
cause they  cannot  stand  the  strain  of  being  assigned  to  penetrate  five 
organizations  each,  which  is  what  the  normal  Communist  is  supposed 
to  do.  Many  of  these  people  are  still  on  good  terms  with  the  party  and, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  know  of  situations  in  which  we  called  upon 
persons  of  that  type  to  cooperate  with  the  party  in  emergencies,  and 
they  responded.     That  has  occurred  time  and  time  again. 

Aside  from  the  numbers  today,  it  must  be  understood  that  the  Com- 
munist Party  does  not  measure  itself  in  numbers.  It  measures  itself 
by  the  discipline  of  its  membership  and  their  ability  to  penetrate  key 
positions. 

Mr.  Aeeists.  How  do  you  appraise  their  strength  ? 


310  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  I  appraise  it  as  they  appraise  it,  because  it  is  realistic. 
Malenkov  stated  in  1948,  in  a  document  which  showed  he  was  going 
to  become  the  leader  of  international  communism,  "In  the  party  we 
do  not  want  quantity,  but  quality."  That  has  always  been  empha- 
sized. The  Communist  Party  is  the  vanguard,  it  is  the  chosen  few,  it 
is  those  who  can  accept  discipline  from  Moscow  and  who  can  carry 
out  orders  as  members  of  an  invading  army  would,  except  this  is  under 
psychological  pressure. 

One  Alger  Hiss  is  worth  more  to  the  Kremlin  than  3  million  of 
people  calling  themselves  Communists  and  loosely  organized,  who 
wouldn't  accept  discipline  and  wouldn't  be  responsive  to  orders.  It 
is  the  method  of  penetration  that  the  Communists  use  following  out 
Stalin's  injunction  that  every  nonparty  organization — and  that  in- 
cludes governmental  agencies  when  possible  and  other  agencies  in,  for 
instance,  American  life — must  be  made  a  transmission  belt  for  the 
Communist  line.  That  is  Stalin's  statement  in  Foundations  of  Lenin- 
ism. That  is  the  theory  on  which  the  Communists  work.  Never  has 
communism  been  successful  in  coming  forward  with  open  banners  be- 
fore the  people.  It  has  always  succeeded  first  by  undermining  and 
penetrating  through  concealed  Communists. 

Mr.  Arens.  Then  you  would  say,  Mr.  Budenz,  that  our  legislative 
program  to  date  has  had  no  adverse  effect  on  our  fight  against  com- 
munism ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  It  has  not  had  any  adverse  effect  on  our  fight  against' 
communism.    The  only  difficulty  is  that  it  is  not  carried  forward  in 
an  atmosphere  which  is  really  coping  with  the  reality  of  the  Commu- 
nist conspiracy. 

In  the  first  place,  that  is  why  I  feel  there  would  also  be  an  internal 
reaction — I  don't  use  that  in  the  sense  of  reactionary — that  there  would 
be  an  internal  reaction  from  the  breaking  off  of  relations  with  Soviet 
Russia.  Everyone  would  realize  that  Soviet  Eussia  is  what  it  is  mak- 
ing itself,  an  enemy  of  the  United  States.  Everyone  would  realize  that 
the  sole  reason  we  are  endeavoring  to  cope  with  the  Communist  Party 
here  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  sending  human  beings  to  jail,  but  for 
the  purpose  of  dealing  with  the  fifth  column,  an  espionage  and  infiltra- 
tion agency  of  a  power  which  is  determined  to  destroy  us,  which  is 
determined  upon  world  conquest. 

Mr.  Arens.  Would  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  be  a  step 
toward  war,  in  your  judgment? 

Mr.  Budenz.  It  would  not.  To  the  contrary,  if  we  continue  to  fol- 
low the  path  of  alleged  j^eaceful  coexistence  w^e  will  have  constant 
periphery  warfare  as  we  have  had  in  Korea,  Indochina,  and  other 
places,  and  we  will  go  from  war  to  war.  If  we  endeavor  to  halt  Soviet 
aggression  we  will  weaken  our  economy  and  our  personnel.  This  is 
the  program  of  Stalin  since  1039,  when  he  c-tated,  "In  our  day  wars 
are  not  declared,  they  are  made."  The  Kremlin  is  making  war  under 
the  name  of  peace,  constantly  crying  peace  and  itself  guilty  of 
aggression. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  you  said  a  few  moments  ago  in  effect  that 
the  Communist  conspiracy  in  this  country  was,  in  your  judgment,  the 
strongest  political  force  in  America.  Could  you  elaborate  on  that  and 
tell  us  how  that  political  force  operates  to  obtain  its  objectives  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes ;  I  can  answer  that,  but  I  would  like  to  answer  this 
question  about  war  first  because  it  is  very  important. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  311 

We  are  today  in  world  war  III.  according  to  Stalin's  pattern.  This 
is  world  war  III  because,  according  to  the  Communists,  every  day  is 
an  engagement  in  the  class  war,  and  truce,  negotiation,  courtroom 
scenes,  activity  of  a  political  character — all  of  that  is  war.  The  Com- 
munists have  a  favorite  method  of  citing  the  quotation  of  General 
Clausewitz,  the  Prussian  general  whom  Lenin  admired  so  much,  who 
stated  that  war  is  the  extension  of  politics  by  other  means.  They  add, 
as  Lenin  did,  in  thought  at  least,  inversely,  likewise,  politics  is  war. 

The  Communists,  every  time  they  meet  us,  at  Berlin,  Geneva,  and 
in  an  alleged  Korean  truce,  are  planning  war  against  us.  If  war  by 
diplomatic  means  serves  their  purposes,  they  will  use  it.  If  necessary, 
then  they  will  attack  Indochina — whatever  serves  their  jiurpose. 

Soviet  Russia  dare  not  have  a  frontal  war  with  the  United  States. 
We  have  been  frightening  ourselves  to  death  with  the  myth  about 
Soviet  Russia's  warring  upon  us  today — while  we  are  still  strong. 
Soviet  Russia  dare  not  have  a  frontal  war  against  tlie  United  States. 

There  Avas  no  country  more  badly  routed  than  Soviet  Russia  by 
Hitler.  It  was  the  United  States  which  saved  Soviet  Russia.  Soviet 
Russia  dare  not  have  a  frontal  war  with  the  United  States  today  or 
during  the  present  period,  at  least,  because  it  has  slave  labor,  which 
is  very  bad  labor  for  productive  puri)oses.  You  can  see  that  the 
Soviet  Union  is  buying  tractors  now.  Tractors  have  been  released 
to  them  for  their  farm  purposes.  Their  workers  cannot  turn  out 
ejiough.  Soviet  Russia  also  has  the  labor  passport  system  under  which 
the  free  worker  dares  not  leave  his  job  without  the  consent  of  the 
Government  bureaucracy.  That  is  what  they  call  the  dictatorship 
of  the  proletariat.  The  workers  are  under  a  dictatorship,  but  it  is  the 
dictatorship  of  the  Communist  Party  led  by  Malenkov.  No  worker 
dares  leave  his  job  in  Soviet  Russia  without  a  labor  passport,  the  con- 
sent of  the  Government  bureaucracy. 

This  does  not  make  for  a  good  labor  force.  We  know  that  machinery 
and  free  labor  go  together. 

Then  in  addition,  we  have  the  conditions  in  the  satellite  countries. 
The  revolt  in  East  Germany  under  difficult  circumstances  indicates 
a  condition  of  unrest  which  we  should  understand,  because  the  Poles 
certainly  were  99  percent  against  communism,  and  the  Hungarians 
voted  overwhelmingly  against  comnnniism,  but  they  were  defeated 
by  the  so-called  United  Front  coalition  government  forced  upon  them 
and  the  methods  which  the  Communists  used,  and  then  force  was 
used. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  about  Czechoslovakia? 

Mr.  Bi'DENz.  Czechoslovakia  likewise.  Although  that  country  had 
a  large  Communist  Party  toward  the  end,  nevertheless  the  people 
were  strongly  for  the  Czechoslovakian  Republic. 

In  every  event  the  achievement  was  brought  about  through  what 
they  call  coalition  governments,  that  is,  the  Communists  getting  cer- 
tain key  ministries  which  allowed  them  to  control  education  and  the 
police,  and  then  the  Communists  would  have  big  demonstrations, 
guerrilla  attacks  on  governmental  forces,  and  there  would  be  no 
action  against  them.  In  that  way  the  crisis  continued,  the  confusion 
increased,  until  it  was  evident  that  those  who  were  forced  into  co- 
operating with  the  Communists  were  either  going  to  be  destroyed, 
had  to  commit  suicide,  or  had  to  endeavor  to  flee  into  exile.  Soviet: 
rule  then  prevailed. 


312  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

JNIr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  to  revert  to  the  question  which  we  were 
dealing  with  a  few  moments  ago,  you  stated  in  effect  earlier  in  your 
testimony  that  the  Communist  Party  was  the  strongest  political  force 
in  America.  Could  you  elaborate  on  that  and  tell  us  how  the  Commu- 
nist Party  accomplishes  its  objectives  of  political  subversion  'i 

Mr.  BuDENz.  We  have  a  peculiar  situation.  So  strong  is  the  senti- 
ment against  communism  among  the  common  people  of  this  country 
that  there  is  no  doubt  that,  for  example,  this  attempt  to  outlaw  the 
Communist  Party  represented  what  the  people  want  done  in  some  form 
or  other.  The  common  people  want  forthright  action,  when  you  speak 
of  communism  alone,  the  Communist  Party  alone.  But  where  the 
difficulty  comes  in  is  that  the  Communist  Party,  through  concealed 
Communists,  making  transmission  belts,  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  cer- 
tain agencies  of  opinion-making,  persuade  them  on  non-Communist 
bases  to  follow  the  Communist  line.  That  has  been  the  secret  of  the 
Communist  strength  in  this  country  for  a  number  of  years.  We  have 
had  this  study  by  the  subcommittee  on  internal  security,  of  the  Insti- 
tute of  Pacific  Relations.  That  is  a  very  splendid  example  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  Communists  forward  the  line  through  infiltra- 
tion by  a  very  few  people  getting  into  key  posts. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  are  the  political  objectives  of  the  Communist 
Party  now,  the  legislative  program  objectives  of  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  Budenz.  The  legislative  objectives  of  the  Communist  Party 
have  to  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the  Communist  attitude  toward 
reform,  which  is  the  third  item  I  would  like  to  bring  to  your  atten- 
tion. The  first  was  the  nature  of  Soviet  communism,  which  I  haven't 
really  examined  but  wdiich  I  hinted  at.  The  second  is  the  Communist 
line  and  the  way  it  operates.  The  third  is  the  Communist  attitude 
on  reforms. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  confusion  about  the  Communist  attitude  on 
reforms,  because  in  this  election  program  of  theirs  they  talk  about 
all  sorts  of  reforms  they  are  for,  and  many  people  have  been  misled 
into  believing  that  the  Communists  stand  for  reforms. 

Anyone  who  has  been  a  Communist  knows  very  well  and  Mr.  Stalin 
has  advised  very  definitely  that  if  they  actually  stand  for  reforms, 
they  are  reformists,  and  that  is  a  very  serious  offense,  a  very  serious 
deviation.  That  makes  them  enemies  of  the  Communist  cause.  They 
must  not  entangle  themselves  with  the  belief  that  reforms  can  attain 
anything. 

Stalin  says  on  page  104  of  Foundations  of  Leninism : 

To  a  revolutionary — 

that  is,  a  Communist — 

the  main  tiling  is  revolutionary  work.  The  revolutionary  will  receive  reform 
in  order  to  use  it  as  an  aid  in  combining  legal  work  with  illegal  work,  to  intensify 
under  its  cover  the  illegal  work  for  the  revolutionary  preparation  of  the  masses 
for  the  overthrow  of  the  bourgeoisie. 

In  other  words,  very  frankly  here  Stalin  says  that  reforms  are  used 
as  a  screen  or  cover  for  the  illegal  activities  of  the  Communist  con- 
spiracy to  bring  about  the  dictatorship.  That  is  precisely  the  way  in 
which  they  are  used.  Therefore,  we  must  discount  the  reforms  that 
they  were  always  advocating. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  313 

When  "we  get  to  tlie  Communist  line,  they  wish  to  have  those  can- 
didates elected  who  will  stand  for  peaceful  coexistence,  thereby  echo- 
ing Stalin,  who  will  stand  for  still  more  big  power  negotiations,  who 
will  stand  for  recognition  of  Red  China,  not  yet  attained,  who  will 
stand  for  a  continuance  of  moves  to  break  down  any  effort  to  defend 
Europe,  who  will  oppose  rearmament  of  West  Germany.  There  is 
a  whole  series  of  proposals,  all  in  the  same  direction. 

Mr.  Arexs.  What  is  their  attitude  on  the  McCarran-Walter  Im- 
migration and  Nationality  Act? 

!^Ir.  BuDEXz.  It  is  right  here  very  prominently  in  the  repoit  on 
their  secret  conference  for  the  repeal  of  the  Walter-McCarran  Act. 

Mr.  Ajrens.  What  is  their  attitude  on  congressional  investigating 
committees  ^ 

Mr.  BuDENz.  The  complete  wiping  out  of  those  congressional  com- 
mittees under  the  cry  of  IMcCarthyism.  In  a  very  interesting  article, 
by  the  way,  called  the  Anatomy  of  McCarthyism,  in  the  May  1954 
Political  Affaii*s,  the  Communist  Party  declared  that  under  that  title 
they  included  all  congressional  investigations,  also  all  the  informers 
who  aided  the  Government. 

Mr.  Arens.  Witnesses  before  congressional  committees? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  That  is  right.  I  am  using  their  own  language.  And 
likewise  they  struck  out  at  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation.  As 
early  as  1950,  Gil  Green,  who  is  now  a  fugitive  from  justice  in  the 
United  States,  having  been  convicted  in  a  Smith  Act  case,  spoke  out  as 
one  of  the  leaders  of  the  party — and  he  was  following  up  Gus  Hall's 
directives  under  the  title  of  "The  Battle  Against  McCarthyism,"  which 
they  opened  up  then,  March  23,  1950,  when  they  began  this  anti-Mc- 
Carthy campaign  officially  at  an  extraordinary  national  committee 
meeting.  And  Gil  Green  as  his  contribution  linked  it  up  with  the 
destruction  of  all  the  "informers  and  stoolpigeons" — those  are  exact 
quotes — and  also  the  destruction  of  the  "gestapolike"  Federal  Bureau 
of  Investigation.  (These  statements  appear  in  Political  Affairs  of 
May  1950.) 

Mr.  Arens.  How  do  they  accomplish  these  objectives?  You  ha^■e 
said,  Mr.  Buclenz,  that  the  Communist  Party  is  the  strongest  political 
force  in  America.  You  have  told  us  what  the  objectives  are — to  dis- 
credit congressional  committees,  to  do  various  things.  Now  give  us 
the  modus  oj^erandi.  How  do  they  actually  accomplish  these  objec- 
tives ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  They  do  it  in  several  ways.  First  of  all,  within  the 
hearings  themselves — anyone  who  has  read  these  congressional  hear- 
ings will  bear  this  out — tlie  Communist  witnesses  resort  to  the  utmost 
insults  to  the  representatives  of  the  American  people.  I  have  just  been 
reading  the  hearings  of  the  Velde  committee,  which  is  supposed  to  be 
a  rather  mild  committee,  and  there  I  see  witnesses  calling  the  Con- 
gressmen idiots,  and  many  other  names,  hurling  epithets  at  them. 

I  wonder  if  there  is  any  dignity  left  in  this  American  Republic  if 
we  can  permit  these  traitors  to  insult  the  representatives  of  the  people 
in  this  fashion. 

Then  while  that  is  going  on,  the  concealed  Communists  and  their 
friends  persuade  certain  representative  organs  of  opinion  to  weep  over 
these  Communists  as  victims  of  the  methods  of  the  congressional 
investigations. 


314  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  tliey  work  through  other  people  who  are  not  Com- 
munists but  who  are  dupes  ? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  Oh,  yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  Tell  us  how  they  do  that. 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  That  is  an  old  story.  They  do  it  in  two  ways.  I 
could  give  many  illustrations  from  the  past  out  of  my  own  experience, 
but  I  think  that  would  be  consuming  the  subcommittee's  time.  There 
is  so  much  of  a  record  of  it  that  I  hesitate  to  begin. 

However,  it  is  done  very  simply,  and  that  is,  cultivating  certain 
public  figures,  certain  people  who  are  sources  of  information  and 
public  opinion,  sometimes  open  Communists  doing  so,  as  I  did.  I 
cultivated  plenty  of  them.  I  cultivated  Harry  Hopkins  and  Repre- 
sentative Adolph  Sabath,  former  chairman  of  the  Rules  Committee, 
who  told  me  the  Communists  knew  how  to  defend  the  New  Deal 
better  than  the  New  Dealers  themselves. 

Then  also,  many  people  who  have  control  of  public  opinion.  But 
if  I,  as  an  open  Communist,  could  do  that,  you  can  understand  how  a 
concealed  Communist,  who  is  not  at  all  supposed  to  be  a  member  of  the 
conspiracy,  could  do  it.    That  is  one  method. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  pose  a  case  to  you  in  point,  and  see  if  you  could 
help  us  on  it.  The  gentleman  who  is  presiding  today,  the  Senator 
from  Maryland,  was  the  author  of  legislation  which  passed  this  last 
session  of  the  Congress  which,  among  other  things,  undertook  to  give 
the  Government  weapons  to  drive  Communists  out  of  labor  organiza- 
tions. The  Congress  was  barraged  with  communications  condemning 
the  proposed  legislation  because  it  was  said  that  it  was  antiunion, 
rather  than  anti-Communist. 

Can  you  tell  us  how  that  came  about;  wdiat  part  the  Communist 
Party,  in  your  judgment,  had  to  play  in  that  propaganda  drive? 

Mr.  Budenz.  The  Communist  Party  was  the  main  driving  force  in 
that  drive.  Anyone  who  examined  the  Daily  Worker,  which  then 
retails  out  into  life  what  Political  Ali'airs  has  set  down  for  it,  but  does 
it  on  a  day -by-day  basis,  could  see  that  the  Communists  originated  this 
attack.    Then  it  was  taken  up  by  non-Communists. 

There  are  Communists  concealed  in  many  organizations,  not  only 
labor — let's  not  center  on  labor,  because  this  phenomenon  prevails 
in  education  and  in  many  other  fields.  It  also  prevails  among  some  of 
our  industrialists  who  have  those  at  their  elbows  who  are  constantly 
counseling  them  into  a  position  which  is  in  accordance  with  the  Com- 
munist line. 

The  thing  is,  the  Communists  have  several  ways  of  doing  this.  They 
bring  the  thing  in  to  the  union  meeting,  and  many  times  they  are  not 
known  as  Communists,  or  bring  it  into  some  other  organization  meet- 
ing. They  make  the  whole  issue  an  attack  upon  the  organization 
involved. 

Incidentally,  that  is  not  only  applied  to  this  measure.  It  is  applied 
to  every  ett'ort  to  uproot  subversives  in  any  area  of  activity.  If  you 
will  review  the  past  efforts,  from  Hollywood  to  education,  to  inves- 
tigate subversives,  you  will  find  that  in  every  instance  the  Commu- 
nists have  succeeded  in  persuading  many  loyal  Americans  that  the 
institution  involved  was  in  danger  by  the  fact  that  it  was  being  inves- 
tigated for  subversives  rather  than  the  fact  that  if  it  were  cleaned  up 
it  would  be  much  stronger  and  healthier.  That  is  a  phenomenon  we 
witness  right  alonir. 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMUNISM  315 

There  is  one  other  way  that  Communists  affect  this  thing  that  I 
think  we  should  know,  and  that  is  by  creating  a  fad  or  fashion  among 
the  sophisticated  readers  of  the  New  Yorker,  for  instance,  people 
who  substitute  sophistication  for  intellect,  people  who  want  to  be 
allegedly  up  to  date  in  their  thinking.  The  Communists  have  a  great 
facility  through  their  concealed  members — and  we  must  remember  if 
we  look  at  the  Communist  front  lists  and  know  that  90  percent  of  the 
Communist  fronters  are  Communists — you  will  have  to  take  my  word 
for  that,  but  I  think  events  will  prove  that  as  we  go  forward — you 
can  appreciate  they  have  ])eople  Avho  are  in  important  positions  and 
can  com.mand  some  respect  to  carry  on  these  undertakings.  These 
people  are  not  known  specifically  as  Communists,  and  therefore  their 
word  is  much  stronger.  They  thereby  create  this  fad  or  fashion  that 
what  the  Communists  want  is  the  correct  way  to  think  and  act. 

I  will  give  you  an  example  from  the  past  so  it  won't  seem  to 
be  too  current  and  won't  step  on  too  many  toes. 

There  was  the  case  of  Representative  Dies  and  Shirley  Temple. 
Representative  Dies  was  attacked,  as  everyone  is  who  endeavors  to 
touch  the  Communist  conspiracy  at  any  nerve  center.  He  was  driven 
to  the  point  of  nervous  exhaustion.  One  of  the  things  brought  up 
about  him  Avas — even  my  good  friend,  Heywood  Broun,  continued 
to  popularize  this,  laughing  about  it  in  an  idiotic  way — the  alleged 
fact  that  Dies  had  called  Shirley  Temple  a  Communist  and  she  was 
merely  a  little  girl.  Nothing  of  the  sort  had  occurred.  It  was  an 
absolute  falsehood.  What  had  occurred  was  that  on  a  list  of  Com- 
munist-front members  which  Dies  had  put  into  the  record  Shirley 
Temple's  name  appeared.  That  was  correct.  But  no  one  had  accused 
her  of  being  a  Communist.  Yet  there  was  great  laughter  everywhere 
among  the  sophisticated  that  Dies,  this  low-brow  Texan,  had  named 
Shirley  Temple  as  a  Communist. 

It  is  in  that  fashion  that  they  proceed.  That  is  the  way  they 
destroyed  the  book  by  William  White,  the  report  on  the  Russians. 
I  remember  exactly  how  that  operation  was  carried  into  effect;  how 
they  got  reviews  in  certain  publications  v>'hich  destroyed  that  book. 
They  planned  to  do  it.  If  they  can  destroy  a  book,  they  can  destroy 
a  person,  and  also,  in  addition  to  that,  they  can  forward  Communist- 
coined  ideas. 

_  Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and  expe- 
rience, what  is  your  appraisal  of  the  Soviet  trade  offensive  2 

Mr.  Budenz.  This  is  another  great  current  victory  for  what  Moscow 
orders  the  Communists  to  do ;  in  oth.er  words,  a  victory  for  the  Com- 
munist line.  In  April  1952,  there  was  held  in  Moscow  the  World 
Economic  Conference.  At  that  time  it  was  reported  that  this  confer- 
ence Avas  not  a  very  great  success.  Only  a  few  Avestern  businessmen 
of  any  prominence  attended  it.  But  those  who  observed  that  did  not 
understand  the  Communists.  The  Reds  immediately  began  a  barrage 
in  all  of  these  directive  papers  of  theirs  throughout  the  Avorld.  They 
began  their  work  among  their  various  underground  peojile  in  all  the 
agencies  that  they  could  think  of.  You  emphasized  everywhere,  East- 
West  trade,  East-West  trade.  It  appears  in  all  the  current  documents 
that  I  have  before  me.  Eventually  Ave  had  the  condition  where  Great 
Britain  broke  doAvn  and  AA-here,  incidentally,  also  other  nations  broke 
down,  and  where  eventually  the  United  States  broke  doAvn,  because 


316  STRATEGY   AND   TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMMTJNISM 

today  there  is  an  enlar<Ted  list  of  materials  which  can  go  to  Soviet 
Russia,  the  latest  edition  being  made  in  August.  This  includes  gen- 
erators, machine  tools,  tractors. 

]\Tr.  Arens.  Isn't  there  such  a  thing  as  a  critical  and  noncritical  list? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  In  actuality,  there  is  no  such  thing. 

Mr.  Arens.  And  upon  what  basis  do  you  make  that  observation  ? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  I  mal^e  that  observation  on  a  number  of  bases.  If  we 
realistically  understand  that  what  is  being  waged  is  world  war  III 
by  the  Soviet  Union — and  that  is  what  it  is,  and  it  will  continue  to  be 
such  as  long  as  we  do  not  bring  things  to  a  halt  by  recognizing  reality — 
then  anything  which  aids  the.  Soviet  world  to  correct  its  own  gross 
deficiencies  helps  it  to  build  up  its  war  machine. 

Winston  Churchill  gave  us  a  lesson  in  that  in  World  War  II.  You 
remember  that  Mr.  Hoover,  out  of  the  goodness  of  his  heart — I  refer 
to  Herbert  Hoover — wished  to  send  food  and  clothing  to  the  children 
of  the  Low  Countries  when  those  countries  were  occupied  by  Hitler. 
Mr.  Churchill  refused,  saying  that  that  would  give  aid  and  comfort 
to  the  enemy,  would  be  used  for  the  prestige  of  the  enemy,  the  morale 
of  the  population  under  the  enemy,  and  also  to  help  stabilize  the 
economy  under  the  enemy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  wliat  is  noncritical 
material  anyway?  All  things  are  used  in  war.  You  have  to  feed 
your  armies.  You  need  tractors  to  do  that.  You  have  to  have  ma- 
chine tools  for  all  sorts  of  war  production  as  well  as  for  production 
which  in  itself  is  not  of  a  warlike  nature  all  the  time,  but  which  is 
strained  to  the  utmost  in  time  of  war.  It  is  quite  clear  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  "critical"  and  "noncritical"  materials. 

Then,  in  addition  to  that,  you  have  the  fact  that  East-West  trade  is 
used  as  a  political  weapon,  and  always  has  been,  by  Soviet  Russia.  It 
was  used  before  World  War  II  as  a  political  weapon  over  a  number 
of  countries.  If  we  go  into  trade  with  Soviet  Russia  and  other  na- 
tions do  the  same,  they  are  going  to  rue  the  day,  because  they  are  deal- 
ing with  a  controlled  economy  under  a  dictatorship.  Whenever 
Soviet  Russia  wants  to  create  a  depressed  condition  in  certain  of  our 
industries,  at  least  percentagewise,  it  can  do  so  by  halting  the  trade 
after  it  is  established.     That  is  a  most  serious  thing. 

By  the  way,  a  writer  in  the  New  York  Times  about  2  weeks  ago 
pointed  to  that  very  emphatically,  and  I  think  very  correctly. 

Mr.  Arens,  Mr.  Budenz,  several  weeks  ago  we  had  before  the  In- 
ternal Security  Subcommittee  Mr.  Abner  Green,  who  is  the  executive 
secretary  of  the  American  Committee  for  the  Protection  of  Foreign 
Born,  at  which  time  we  interrogated  him  with  respect  to  the  activities 
of  himself  and  his  organization  in  undertaking  to  destroy  the  Immi- 
gration and  Nationality  Act,  to  cause  it  to  be  repealed  or  to  be  weak- 
ened by  emasculating  amendments. 

Would  you  express  yourself  with  reference  to  the  subject  of  why 
the  Comnumist  Party  would  be  interested  in  destroying  the  Immi- 
gration and  Nationality  Act? 

INIr.  BuDENz.  That  is  very  clear.  It  is  due  to  the  fact  that  this 
act  puts  certain  safeguards  against  Communist  infiltration  into  the 
United  States. 

Mr,  Arens.  Is  there  any  relationship  or  is  there  an  intimate  rela- 
tionship between  the  immigration  system  in  this  country  and  the  Com- 
munist conspiracy  which  operates  in  this  country  ? 

Mr.  BuuKNz.  Most  decidedly. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  317 

Mr.  Arens.  Could  you  elaborate  on  that  on  the  basis  of  your  back- 
ground and  experience? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  Yes;  I  could. 

Without  naming  names,  because  it  is  a  matter  of  national  security, 
just  the  other  day  I  was  presented  by  an  intelligence  agency  with  a 
picture  of  a  young  person,  at  the  time  the  photo  was  taken,  who  was 
a  Soviet  espionage  agent  in  Europe  under  another  name  than  that 
which  I  recognized  later.  I  was  asked  who  that  person  was.  I  said, 
"That  is  one  of  the  leading  members  of  the  Communist  Party  of 
the  United  States  today."  There  is  a  constant  interrelation  between 
the  espionage  agencies  of  Soviet  Russia  in  Europe  and  other  countries 
and  certain  leading  members  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  United 
States. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  number  of  those  are  engaged  in  espionage 
right  here,  such  as  Boleslaw  Gebert  was  when  he  was  one  of  the 
leading  members  of  the  Communist  Party,  now  one  of  the  leading 
members  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Poland. 

In  addition  to  that,  there  is  a  constant  interrelation  between  the 
Soviet  and  satellite  consulates  in  the  Communist  Party  under  a  pro- 
gram which  Gebert  outlined  for  me  in  1945,  and  about  which  I  have 
testified  before  this  subcommittee  several  years  ago. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  does  the  Communist  Party  and  the  Communists 
operate  or  dupe  organizations  and  do-gooders,  people  in  this  Nation, 
to  follow  their  line,  such  as  the  line  to  repeal  or  emasculate  the 
Immigration  and  Nationality  xVct  ?  What  is  the  modus  operandi  on 
that? 

Mr.  BuDENZ.  Of  course,  they  appeal  to  the  instinct  to  reform  of 
many  good  people.  They  appeal  to  certain  prejudices  as  passions. 
They  appeal  maybe  to  certain  weaknesses  in  the  act  which  are  not 
fundamental.  They  appeal,  in  other  words,  to  this  idea  of  reform, 
whereas  they  are  the  greatest  enemies  of  reform. 

As  an  example,  the  Communists  cry  out  all  the  time — and  this 
gives  them  entree  into  the  camp  of  reform — that  they  are  in  the  fore- 
front of  the  fight  for  labor  rights.  "\Mierever  they  establish  Soviet 
power  they  crush  the  trade  unions.  They  establish  shells  cynically 
called  unions  which  are  production  machines,  which  dare  not  represent 
the  grievances  of  the  workers,  which  dare  not  have  strikes,  which  dare 
not  act  as  a  regular  trade  union  would. 

Thus  it  is  in  other  matters  of  that  sort. 

Incidentally,  in  regard  to  the  importance  of  the  Immigration  Act 
to  the  Communist  conspiracy,  let  us  remember  Gerhart  Eisler,  the 
Communist  international  representative,  sneaked  over  here.  Let  us 
remember  Jacob  Golos,  who  was  in  charge  of  Communist  espionage 
through  the  World  Tourists,  was  here  as  an  alien.  Let  us  remember 
that  J.  Peters,  who  directed  Whittaker  Chambers  and  xVlger  Hiss, 
was  likewise  one  of  the  same  character.  All  of  these  people  were 
smuggled  in  here  in  the  Communist  International  apparatus,  and  I 
could  name  scores  of  them,  some  of  whom  have  been  deported,  some 
of  whom  are  still  here.  The  head  of  the  International  Workers 
Order  up  until  recently,  this  man  known  as  A.  W.  Mills  or  Saul 
Milgrom,  an  illegal  alien  in  this  country,  is  an  example.  The  entire 
controlling  factors  in  the  Communist  apparatus  are  composed  of 
aliens,  and  most  of  them  aliens  entering  in  some  illegal  manner. 


318  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Budenz,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and 
experience,  can  you  give  us  an  appraisal  as  to  "whether  or  not  the 
dii^lomatic  establishments  in  this  country  of  the  Iron  Curtain  coun- 
tries are  legitimate  diplomatic  establishments. 

Mr.  Budenz.  Well,  we  have  not  only  what  Gebert  advised  me  was 
to  be  the  use  of  these  governments  as  links  with  the  Communist 
Party  and  espionage  in  this  country.  We  have  back  of  that  the  pre- 
vious procedure  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,  w^hich  was  nothing  but  an 
espionage  agency  here  in  this  country,  to  my  own  knowledge.  That 
is  to  say,  you  had  a  man  like  Sergei  Kournakoff,  who  was  a  constant 
runner  between  the  Soviet  consulate  and  the  Communist  Party  leaders, 
giving  directives  on  espionage  and  infiltration.  You  have  had  all  of 
these  various  couriers  like  Felix  Kusman  and  others  brought  up  in 
hearings  over  and  over  again,  and  I  am  not  going  to  repeat  them. 
When  the  Soviet  Embassy  was  the  sole  Ked  diplomatic  agency  here, 
it  directed  the  espionage. 

This  is  all  brought  out  now  in  the  testimony  of  this  Vladimir 
Petrov  once  more,  in  Australia.  I  again  recommend  to  the  subcom- 
mittee for  its  consideration  the  report  of  the  Eoyal  Commission  on 
Esi)ionage,  in  which  he  shows  that  practically  every  consulate  and 
di|)lomatic  officer  of  Soviet  Russia  and  its  satellite  regimes  was  a 
representative  or  officer  of  one  of  these  directorates  of  espionage. 
Practically  everyone,  the  First  Secretary,  the  Second  Secretary,  and 
the  Third  Secretary,  were  engaged  in  one  or  the  other  of  these  direc- 
torates of  infiltrating  the  country  in  order  to  establish  espionage  nests. 

Mr.  Arens.  Are  there  Communist  Party  members  in  the  United 
States  today,  members  as  such,  as  you  and  I  would  join  the  Rotary 
Club? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  an  interesting  question,  because  there  never 
were  very  many  members  running  around  showing  cards.  The  Com- 
munists never  introduce  themselves  to  each  other  by  cards.  I  have 
only  seen  about  six  Communist  Party  cards  in  my  entire  Communist 
career,  and  I  was  very  active.  The  Communists  do  not  go  up  to 
anyone  and  say,  "This  is  my  card,  Comrade." 

i\Ir.  Arens.  In  other  words,  conspirators  don't  advertise  their 
conspiracy. 

Mr.  Budenz.  You  are  introduced  to  another  comrade  whom  you 
didn't  know,  by  his  superior  officer.  Theirs  is  a  supermilitary  organ- 
ization. If  I  want  to  meet  a  man  for  any  particular  purpose,  whether 
it  be  open  Communist  Party  work  or  underground  work,  I  go  to  the 
officer  above  him,  the  functionary  above  him,  and  he  introduces  me 
to  this  man  and  says,  "This  is  Comrade  Budenz,  who  is  to  be  relied 
upon  and  whose  instructions  you  are  to  take."  Just  like  a  soldier, 
only  even  more  so,  the  Communists  obey  every  order  given  them 
then  by  this  person. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  have  only  one  further  question,  Mr.  Chairman,  and 
then  perhaps  Mr.  Budenz  may  want  to  volunteer  some  observations. 

Mr.  Budenz,  on  the  basis  of  your  extensive  experience  and  close 
study  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  worldwide,  where  do  we  go  from 
here  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  First  of  all,  I  have  recommended  the  basis  of  all  our 
future  historical  travel  so  far  as  I  can  see,  and  that  is  the  recognition 
of  reality,  the  breaking  off  of  relations  with  Soviet  Russia.    If  that  is 


STRATEGY   AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COINTMUNISM  319 

done,  No.  1,  we  will  no  longer  have  the  experience  of  the  bitter  defeats 
we  have  had  from  Yalta  to  Geneva.  We  will  no  longer  have  the 
United  States  eagerly  acquiescing  in  its  own  defeat,  as  it  did  on  a 
number  of  occasions.  I  mean,  for  example,  when  we  handed  China  and 
Poland  over  to  Soviet  Russia,  and  history  shows  that  that  was  what 
took  place. 

"VVe  will  have  an  understanding  that  we  are  now  the  world  leader 
in  a  moral  sense  of  those  forces  with  which  to  preserve  freedom 
against  the  Soviets. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  you  negotiate  with  the  Soviets  on  a  sound,  honest 
basis  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  You  cannot  negotiate  with  them  at  all.  They  will  not 
negotiate  on  anything  but  winning  a  victory  for  themselves  or  accus- 
ing you  in  propaganda  of  breaking  up  the  conference  which  they 
have  broken  up  because  they  couldn't  get  their  objectives.  That  is  the 
whole  history  of  our  Soviet  relations. 

Mr.  Arens.  Is  any  pledge  or  agreement  of  the  Soviets  worth  the 
paper  it  is  written  on  ? 

Mr.  BuDENz.  We  have  had  enough  experience  in  tliat  respect.  The 
very  first  pledge  they  made  they  broke  immediately.  That  was  the 
pledge  when  we  recognized  Soviet  Kussir.  in  1933,  the  pledge  that 
there  would  be  no  subversive  activities  in  the  United  States.  At  that 
very  moment  Moscow  had  ordered  the  Communist  Party  to  extend  its 
infiltration  through  the  open  letter  to  the  party,  which  is  a  very  famous 
document,  referred  to  from  time  to  time  by  the  Communists.  It  was 
precisely  in  that  year  1933  that  the  whole  Washington  cell — Lee  Press- 
man, Alger  Hiss,  John  Abt,  Nathan  Witt — went  into  the  Department 
of  Agriculture  under  the  benign  wing  of  Henry  Agard  Wallace  and 
used  that  as  a  beachhead  to  infiltrate  the  Government.  The  very  first 
contact  we  had  with  Soviet  Russia  in  the  way  of  recognition  was  an 
act  of  betrayal  by  Soviet  Russia  of  its  pledges,  and  the  subsequent 
history  has  been  a  history  of  the  same  sort. 

May  I  be  privileged,  Mr.  Arens,  to  add  a  word  about  the  nature 
of  Soviet  communism? 

Mr.  Arens.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  BuDENz.  I  think  this  is  very  important,  even  though  it  may 
feeem  a  bit  philosophical. 

Soviet  communism  is  not  generally  understood,  and  that  is  one  of 
the  difficulties  in  confronting  this  whole  world  situation.  Soviet 
communism  is  not  a  social  or  economic  theory  so  much.  It  is  a  world 
outlook.  It  is  an  attempt  to  explain  how  the  world  began  and  how  it 
will  inevitably  end. 

As  Stalin  said  in  his  famous  chapter  4  of  the  History  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which,  if  I  may  use  that  word  in 
this  connection,  is  tlie  bible  of  the  Communists : 

Dialectical  materialism  is  the  world  outlook  of  the  Marxist-Leninist  Party. 

When  we  analyze  "dialectical  materialism,"  as  we  cannot  afford  the 
time  to  do  fully  today,  we  find  it  is  that  theory  which  is  determined  to 
prove  that  God  does  not  exist.  Not  merely  to  affirm  that  God  does  not 
exist,  which  it  does  in  its  assertion  that  all  reality  is  matter,  but  to 
prove  that  he  does  not  exist. 

This  proof  is  going  to  be  given  by  the  establishment  of  the  Com- 
munist society,  a  society  in  which  there  will  be  no  state,  no  law,  no 


320  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

compulsion,  no  family,  no  morality.  It  will  be  a  society,  as  Lenin 
says,  in  which  for  the  first  time  man  wnll  enjoy  genuine  freedom. 
That  is  Lenin's  statement  in  State  and  Revolution.  It  will  be  a  so- 
ciety, as  Marx  says,  where  each  will  give  according  to  his  ability  and 
receive  according  to  his  needs.  It  will  be  a  society  where  the  Commu- 
nists declare  there  will  no  longer  be  neurosis,  ill  health,  or  unhappi- 
ness.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  William  Z.  Foster,  in  his  Twilight  of 
World  Capitalism,  written  about  2  years  ago,  has  a  concluding  chap- 
ter. The  Advent  of  Socialist  Man,  in  which  he  declares  that  already 
in  Soviet  Russia  large  segments  of  the  population  no  longer  have 
any  neurosis,  other  segments  no  longer  have  any  ill  health,  and  some 
are  so  happy  they  sing  all  the  day  long.  That  is  a  strange  picture  to 
present  without  any  evidence,  because  he  gives  no  documents  or  au- 
thorities, and  we  know  of  the  15  million  peo])le  in  slave-labor  camps 
and  the  labor-passport  system,  the  Red  terror,  the  secret  police,  and 
the  other  indications  of  repression,  which  certainly  would  make  me 
neurotic,  and  I  am  sure  many  other  ])eople — not  to  mention  the  ill 
health  and  other  things  of  that  sort  which  we  know  exist  in  the  Soviet 
prisons,  from  the  accounts  by  some  of  those  people  who  have  escaped. 

This  is  essential.  Before  the  Communist  society  or  perfected  society 
for  the  animal  (man)  can  come  about  there  must  be  established  the 
world  Soviet  dictatorship  through  oceans  of  blood,  by  the  masses  led 
by  the  vanguard,  the  chosen  few  who  understand  Marxism-Leninism, 
who  understand  where  the  world  is  going.  This  world  Soviet  dicta- 
torship, they  contend,  is  absolutely  essential  if  you  are  going  to  get 
this  Communist  society. 

So  imbedded  is  this  in  Communist  thought  that  Dictator  Malenkov 
in  his  report — which  now  dominates  the  present  Communist  line  to 
a  large  extent,  along  with  Stalin's  statements — made  in  October  1952, 
entitled  the  report,  in  order  to  give  dynamism  to  the  Communists  of 
the  world.  On  the  Threshold  of  Communism — on  the  threshold  of 
this  earthly  paradise. 

It  is  true,  on  page  85  of  the  English  authorized  edition,  he  says  that 
the  transition  is  going  to  be  gradual  from  socialism,  the  first  stage, 
now  existing  in  Soviet  Russia,  to  communism,  when  this  dictatorship 
will  wither  away  and  the  society  of  unrestraint  will  come  into  exist- 
ence, but  he  concludes  with  this  battle  cry  which  he  must  always  use, 
"Under  the  banner  of  the  immortal  Lenin,  under  the  wise  leadership 
of  the  great  Stalin,  forward  to  the  victory  of  communism,"  or  this 
society  of  unrestraint  where  the  state  will  wither  away,  where  the 
dictatorship  will  wither  away,  but  which  cannot  be  achieved  until 
the  world  Soviet  dictatorship  is  established. 

You  can  see,  and  the  reason  I  have  emphasized  it,  the  fatalism  and 
fanaticism  involved  in  this  viewpoint. 

Mr.  Arens.  Isn't  there  a  paradox,  Mr.  Budenz,  that  God-fearing 
people  are  now  marching  to  the  tune  of  the  Communist  philosophy  ? 

]\Ir.  Budenz.  Not  so  much  the  Communist  philosophy. 

Mr.  Arens.  To  the  Communist  line. 

Mr.  Budenz.  As  the  Communist  line.  We  must  distinguish,  first, 
the  nature  of  communism  and  its  philosophy,  which  only  a  few  accept; 
second,  the  Communist  line,  which  is  accepted  by  many  because  it  is 
sent  through  a  prism,  sent  through  transmission  belts  which  are  non- 
Communist,  which  is  a  great  Communist  device;  and  third,  as  I  said, 
the  Conuuunist  attitude  on  reforms,  which  confuses  many  people. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  321 

Yes,  it  was  remarked  18  years  ago  by  Pius  XI  in  his  encyclical  on 
atheistic  communism,  that  many  people  who  did  not  agree  ^Yith  the 
philosophy  of  communism  nevertheless  went  along  forwarding — he 
didn't  call  it  specifically  the  "line,"  but  his  definition  of  it  was  the  line. 

What  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  that  when  this  is  appreciated,  this 
fanaticism  which  is  even  more  so  than  that  of  the  Moslems  when  they 
threatened  the  existence  of  Europe  hundreds  of  years  ago,  there  is  no 
way  you  can  accommodate  this  force,  there  is  no  way  you  can  come  to 
agreement  with  it,  there  is  no  way  you  can  negotiate,  because  it  is 
detennined  to  destroy  j-ou.  That  must  be  its  goal,  because  that  is  the 
only  way  it  is  going  to  get  this  Communist  society. 

Let  us  suppose  that  Dictator  IMalenkov  cynically  thought  maybe 
this  Comnninist  society  where  man  is  going  to  have  no  ill  health," no 
neurosis,  and  no  unhappiness — and  where,  incidentally,  the  forces  of 
nature  are  going  to  be  conquered,  too — cannot  be  achieved.  Neverthe- 
less he  nnist  raise  it  if  he  is  going  to  have  followers  throughout  the 
vrorld,  if  he  is  going  to  maintain  power,  if  he  is  going  to  be  able  to 
forward  the  Soviet  dictatorship.  He  must  do  it.  Consequently,  it  is 
the  thing  that  colors  and  drives  forward  all  that  the  Communists  do. 

We  wouldn't  have  to  have  any  experiences  from  Yalta  to  Geneva  to 
teach  us  if  we  understood  the  nature  of  Soviet  communism  that  the 
Kremlin  cannot  of  its  very  nature  be  satisfied  with  anything  less  than 
world  conquest. 

JMr.  Arens.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Budenz. 

Senator  Butler.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

^[r.  Budenz,  I  want  to  thank  you  again  for  coming  to  Washington 
and  appearing  before  this  subcommittee.  We  appreciate  very  much 
your  testimony. 

(Whereupon,  at  11:  45  a.  m.,  the  subcommittee  recessed.) 

X 


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