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Full text of "Strategy and tactics of world communism"

DEPOSITORY f}p^. i>^A^O(. 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

THE COMMUNIST BATTLE PLAN 



HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 



OF THE 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-FOUPvTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 58 



APRIL 28, 1955 



PART 13 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
59886 WASHINGTON : 1955 



:^r^"r 



Boston Fub: ^j-y 

Cuperintendent of Documents 

OCT 13 1955 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia, Chairman 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

ESTES KEFADVER, Tennessee WILLIAM LANGER, Nortli Dakota 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, Soutli Carolina WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana 

THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Je., Missouri ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arlsansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois 

PRICE DANIEL, Texas HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 

JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secueitt 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JE., Missouri HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 

PRICE DANIEL, Texas JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

J. G. SouRWiNE, Chief Counsel 

Richard Arexs and Alva C. Carpenter, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 

II 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 



THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1955 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To lN\Ti:sTiGATE the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND other Internal Security Laws 

or the C031MITTEE ON THE Judiciary, 

Washingto?i, D. G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 135, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Hennings. 

Also present: Richard Arens, associate counsel; Frank Schroeder 
and Edward Duily, professional staff members. 

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. 

I would like the reporter to note that there is only one Senator in 
attendance at this subcommittee hearing, but a waiver is on file that 
one Senator can properly and legally conduct the hearing. 

General, will you be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to 
give to this task force of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the 
United States Senate will be the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

General Howley. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. FRANK L. HOWLEY 

Senator Jenner. General, will you give your full name for the 
record ? 

General Howley. My name is Frank Leo Howley. 

Senator Jenner. And where do you reside ? 

General Howley. I reside, sir — my home is in Madison, N. J. And 
my work is vice chancellor of New York University. My offices are 
in New York. 

Senator Jenner. You may proceed, Mr. Arens, with the question- 
ing of General Howley. 

Mr. Arens. General, for the purpose of this record will you give 
us just a brief resume of your professional background and the ex- 
perience you have had, with particular reference to the experience you 
have had and the studies you have made concerning the strategy and 
tactics of the Avorldwide Communist conspiracy? 

General Howley. Yes, sir. 

My introduction to this worldwide conspiracy took place in Europe, 
and really started at the end of the World War. I had been in com- 

1301 



1302 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

mand of civil affairs in Cherbourg, France, and then in Paris. Then 
I became what was popnhirly known as military governor of Berlin. 

"We observed the actions of international communism almost from 
the beginning in Cherbourg. I had landed somewhere along D-4 or 
5 — I will not dwell very long on France. I would like to say that in 
Paris, particularly, where I had the position that would correspond 
to military governor — it was called chief of civil affairs, because 
France was a liberated country rather than one that was conquered — 
we observed the various steps that took place there for the conquest 
and control of the French Government. 

I don't know whether you would like me to make rather long ex- 
planations or short ones. 

After Paris I was chosen by General Eisenhow^er's headquarters to 
be in charge of the American unit which was to go to Berlin when 
Berlin had been captured. I would be the commander of the Amer- 
ican part of the military government team which would control Berlin. 
It had been planned that Berlin was to be divided into first 3 and then 
4 parts, and that there would be a sort of military governor for each 
of the areas, then we commanders would coordinate and cooperate in 
order to control the German city. 

I was there 4i/2 years, and witnessed and did my best to implement 
the various American policies — which were never sharply defined, but 
which can be classified as first appeasement — that has become quite a 
nasty word — but it was a real effort on our part to win over the 
Soviets by means of friendship and concessions. And that failed 
miserably. 

Our second effort was what is generally known as coexistence today. 
It is a sort of good-neighbor policy, or "You run your part of Ger- 
many or your part of the -world ancl we will run ours, and we will tiy 
to get along." 

That led directly to the Soviets not only running their part of Ger- 
many but attemi^ting to seize our part. xVnd that resulted in Avhat 
is known as the hunger blockade of Berlin and the airlift which en- 
abled us to continue there. 

The third policy is that which was popularly known as contain- 
ment, simply because an article was written by a man who later be- 
came Ambassador to Russia, George Kennan. He wrote an article 
which described a type of containment — which simply means that 
we recognized that these people were aggressive and we were strong 
enough, and where they struck us we w^ould strike back so that they 
couldn't conquer us and they wouldn't continue to gain control over 
additional parts of the world and additional peoples. 

When I left and returned to the United States I gave a series of 
lectures, and wrote. When Korea struck us, I didn't think there was 
any use of continuing to talk, so I went to New York University as 
vice chancellor, and have been there ever since, concentrating on help- 
ing to educate as many as 60,000 students in 1 year. 

We have 14 colleges. More than 60 percent of the boys and girls 
there are working their way entirely through. Some of the gradu- 
ates have done great things for the world, including Dr. Salk, wlio 
worked out this vaccine wdiich is a blessing to all of us who have kids. 
He Mas graduated from our medical college. 

However, because of the problems, and because I had such an intro- 
duction, and because tragically I had been right since 1945 — I say 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COIVIMUNISM 1303 

"tragically" because I wish it were otherwise — because I have been 
pretty much right, and these things that I have prophesied did come 
true, I have continued my interest in this international conspiracy 
and have planned at least every year or two on contributing to public 
thinking in the areas. 

Therefore I have kept up by way of friends who were placed all 
over the world, really, ranging from my friend jSIajor General Hind, 
who is deputy commander fighting the ]\Iau ]\Iau in Kenya Colony, 
friends in Indochina, and elsewhere, and I have read and studied, and 
I managed to travel and go to these places every so often. 

My last trip — I just got back — was to Formosa and Hong Kong. 
Previously I had been down to Guatemala before the revolution there. 
I have been to Casablanca and Morocco, Africa, and, of course, have 
kept in pretty close touch with what is going on in Berlin, Germany, 
France, and so forth. 

Mr. Arens. May I suggest. General, if it is agreeable with the 
chairman, that we discuss in resume form each of these areas on the 
basis of your background and experience and information, so that 
3'^ou can apprise the subcommittee of your judgment on the strategy 
of the Soviet in each of these areas, and give your recommendations 
as to any counterstrategy which our Government should follow. 

First of all, with reference to Berlin and Germany, if you please, 
General. On the basis of your experience there as military governor 
of Berlin, did you reach any conclusions as to whether or not the 
Soviets could be trusted, whether they can be objects of negotiation 
or conference ? 

General Howlet. The Soviet Government, as distinguished from 
the Eussian people, cannot be trusted in anything. They are dedicated 
to the use of any means at their disposal to attain their ends. They 
will sometimes tell the truth, if it happens to serve their ends, but they 
will tell lies just as readily. 

There is no compromising with the Kremlin, if you want to have 
a sort of quick name for the government that now controls Russia, 
the Soviet Government of the Kremlin — there is no compromising 
with them. We have found no way of turning them away from their 
mission of destroying all of those things which we think are im- 
portant in life, the concepts of God, freedom of the individual, em- 
phasis upon a man's having various rights, and so forth, all of these 
things which we take for granted in the United States, they are 
against. 

As near as we have ever had a government which is completely bad, 
theirs is it. I mean, if you look hard enough, you can find something 
good about Mussolini, though I would have trouble doing it. And 
I suppose somebody could find something good about Hitler, although 
I wouldn't be able to do it. But I don't believe anybody who is honest 
can find anything good about the Government of the Soviet Union, 

Mr. Arens. How potent is the Soviet conspiracy as a threat to the 
world, in your judgment; an overall appraisal ? 

General Howley. The threat is very great. It is a world plan. 
It took us quite a while to reach the point where we would recognize 
that a Communist move in Guatemala had a relation to the Kremlin 
and a relation to Mao Tse-tung on the Communist mainland in the 
government of China. I think we accept that now. 



1304 STKATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

The lines run directly out of the Kremlin; they are all working 
together, and they all follow the same detail, even as to how they 
murder innocent people or how they murder prisoners. There were 
many of the Korean civilians who were killed and thrown in pits; 
there were many of our soldiers who were taken in Korea on these 
death marches. And even the knot that was used to tie them was 
the same knot which the Communists used in Paris in 1945, or 1944-45, 
to murder people and throw them in the Seine. 

You see, the hard core of the resistance movement in France was 
Communist, the free forces of the interior. There was a hard core 
there of dedicated Communists, and they fought very effectively when 
the signal was out to fight effectively against the Germans there. 

But when Paris was liberated and France was liberated, the normal 
people who were in the resistance movement went back to work. One 
of them, named Pierre Fisson — he went with me as interpreter to 
Berlin — he wrote a story of it, Voyage to the Horizons. Most of these 
people went back into normal life, but the hard core of the Communists 
went on to step No. 2. 

On this point of similar techniques, we found in one part of the 
Seine the bodies of, I think it was 27 persons who had been murdered 
and shot in the back of the head. We found that out of the 20 mayors 
of the little townhalls, around 20 of the arrondissement boroughs, 18 
of the mayors were known Communists — let's assume that the others 
were, too. They were holding mock courts and trying people; they 
gave them very fine phrases, "collaborators" and "menace to the people" 
and so on. 

But they were carrying on a great injustice and actually extorting 
money and murdering people. And, as I say, even the technique of 
how they were tied — you see, they studied the same books published by 
the Kremlin. 

Mr. Arens. What are the objectives of the Soviets, first of all in 
Berlin and Germany ? 

General Howley. The objective there as elsewhere is complete 
control of the world. You can say it is economic control and political 
control and military control and control of your very soul, though they 
don't think you have a soul. But it is absolute dictatorship carried 
to an extreme we have never known before. 

Mr. Arens. What are the objectives of the Soviets in calling for a 
United Germany? 

General Howlet. Any conference — you see, you must first start off 
by recognizing that the Soviet Union is making war against us for 
complete, overall control of the world, but it is more comprehensive 
than past wars. 

Mr. Arens. In other words, you think the Soviets are at war with 
us now ? 

General Howlet. Oh, yes. And, of course, all these things I am 
implying are outlined in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Stalin, 
while he was making statements — you see, all this is written up and 
planned, and if we look at it we see that their intention^ and their 
planning has been continuous. 

Lenin, particularly about 1909, wrote some very effective explana- 
tions of his plan, much better than Hitler in Mein Kampf, indicating 
what he was going to do. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1305 

For US not to understand what the Soviet Union intends to do — I 
just can't understand that, you have to be rather blind not to under- 
stand it. There is no compromising with them, and they are abso- 
lutely sure that they are going to conquer. 

You see, I have had thousands of hours of negotiations with them, 
and I have gone out with them on a friendly basis — I have gone wild- 
pig hunting with the Russian Communists and others, and have seen 
them drinking great quantities of vodka, and listened to their singing, 
all through these various phases for 4i/^ years in Berlin. 

I always asked them various questions to find out what sort of made 
them tick. 

I said to General Kotikikov one time — he was the commander gen- 
eral in Berlin — I said, "Look, let's get these darn streetcars running 
and stop talking about the class problem." The streetcars were not 
running. I said, "The class struggle will go on forever." And I 
mentioned these class struggles which we have under encouraging con- 
ditions in the United States with poor immigrant boys, Italians or 
Irish or Negroes, they move on up through a process of land of fighting 
their way on. 

I said, "We won't live to see the end of the class struggle." 

He said, "I don't know about you. General Howley, but I will live 
to see the end of it." 

They are sure of conquering us. 

That is one of their great weaknesses in battle. They have no plan, 
providing they don't succeed. 

Of course, we should make use of that knowledge ; we should make 
them adjust themselves to us rather than letting them carry on the plan 
that they have to follow. They have to follow plans whether it is in 
diplomacy or in the battlefield, because their system of education or 
their system of government can't train low-level men to think. 

Wliere they have a plan to take a hill, it has to be a very simple 
plan. In America, with the type of men we have, we have many a 
corporal that is as smart as one of their generals, because he has 
thought as a free man and has grown up with the ability to make 
decisions. 

Therefore, for us to adopt the mass methods of a crude army is to 
waste the greatest asset we have. 

And so it is with diplomacy. For us to adopt this crude, brutal, 
artless policy, which is pushed on the world by the Kremlin, is a 
tragedy for the whole world. It ends up with our talking all the 
time about these barbarians instead of, let us say, about French 
subjects. 

I am getting a little off the subject, I am afraid. 

Mr. Arens. "WTiat is your appraisal of the objective of the Soviet 
in Germany in calling for a united Germany ? 

General Howlet. I am sorry I didn't answer that originally. 

You see, a conference is part of their technique. It is one part of 
the war they are fighting against us. It is made up of economic 
warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and if necessary, 
military or forced warfare, which they emphasize in any part of the 
world at any time, depending on which method the Kremlin thinks 
will work best. 

So it will take different forms in different areas of the world. For 
example, in Morocco, now — I might say that the mission is economic — 



1306 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

the purpose of economic warfare is to destroy the economy of a 
country, you see, and make the people desperate, make them poor, make 
them suffer, make them want change. The purpose of psychological 
warfare, where they use it, is to confuse their opponents so that they 
are like a bird I saw one time watching a snake ; it couldn't move — - 
I kicked the snake away — I assume it was hypnotized — and so the 
opponent is confused, they don't know, and, of course, that helps. 
That is the purpose of the psychological warfare. 

The j)urpose of political warfare is to get control of the govern- 
ment, as they did in Czechoslovakia. The military is used as one of 
the instruments ; it is simply an extension of the other. 

Now, we separate those parts, but they don't. It is all one; they 
combine them. They are all doing the same thing. 

I am giving this background because it has a bearing on why they 
call a conference. You see, in Morocco they are in phase one, which 
is to destroy the economy of the country. And so when they light 
cork fires, as they did when I was there, they call them the terrorists, 
the line goes back to the Kremlin through Tunisia and Egypt — the 
terrorists light cork fires. Cork is one of the big exports of the area, 
only phosphates and wheat are ahead of it. 

But if you light a fire on the dock, a ship won't take the cork out, 
because cork can revive and burn up the ship. So there is a lot of 
cork that has nowhere to go. 

Wlien you perpetrate a number of murders, which are even politi- 
cally trivial, the tourist trade stops. 

All of this is a series of economic things combined with the psycho- 
logical, where they get the natives to talk about the French and 
colonialism, whereas in many instances colonialism bears a resem- 
blance to our point 4 program, whether it is good or bad, you have to 
say this is bad colonialism or this is good colonialism, whether it is 
good or bad, you have to say so. 

All these things are working in different places one way or the 
other, but always together. Together with the groups which the 
jiolitical people are indoctrinating, the Communists set up cells. 
With every bit of ground taken in China by Mao Tse-tung, goes back- 
ing by political organizations. But it is all one. 

But why do they go to a conference? The conference is a device 
for getting their way. For us a conference is a place where j^ou go 
and iron out differences. To them a conference is a very powerful 
weapon against reasonable people. 

So anticipate real trouble when a conference is called. 

You could do it this way. Let's assume that here we are and here 
the Soviets are. I will include in the Soviets all of these Communist 
leaders, whether they have the eyes of the man from China or whether 
they have the features of the man from Africa, or the features of the 
man from Central America, their principles are the same. 

Here they are. They go to a conference. They know where they 
are going. They are moving along in their effort to gain control of the 
world. And they never change from that purpose, and haven't for 
many years. They never stop. "VYlien they go to a conference they 
will all talk in the hope that they will get a concession that will ad- 
vance them, you see. They never go back, even though Lenin did 
describe a process for going backward; I think he called it, "1 step 
back, 2 forward." 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1307 

They never stop while they confer. They are moving forward 

always. 

When we go to a conference — sometimes we don't know where we 
are going anyway — our policy isn't set. That is understandable, be- 
cause we Americans don't want anything. We are not hungry; we 
don't need more food or automobiles; we have got them. We don't 
want anybody's land. So we start out with not being very positive. 

But they know what they want when they go to a conference. Let's 
assume that we are going on here with a certain policy. We stop, for 
fear — and as one of mj^ critics used the expression about me, he said 
that my periodic statements "tended to tear asunder the delicate fab- 
ric of international negotiations," or some such nonsense. 

There is nothing delicate in dealing with the Soviets. You can't 
insult them. 

So we stop and they continue on. 

Let's take Dienbienphu last fall. A conference was called, and we 
agreed — a conference with these people with a hideous philosophy, 
these enemies of everything good, these seekers of control of a great 
nation of good people ; and they have been more cruel to the Russian 
people than anybody else — we agreed to a conference at Geneva. So 
we stopped. In the meantime there was fighting at Dienbienphu. 
They were going right ahead. And while we stopped they stepped up 
their artillery fire, and so on and so forth, to make this lowland posi- 
tion at Dienbienphu completely untenable. 

To show you how completely they stopped us, the French called for 
help. But you heard the statement coming from our allies and some 
of our people, "Let's do nothing to upset the negotiations." So, while 
we did nothing to upset the negotiations, they captured Dienbienphu, 
gave the French a tremendous blow to their prestige, killed a lot of 
people fighting for their government, and advanced their cause of 
communism by quite a jump. 

So if Chou En-lai says he wants to have a conference I think it is 
an insult to start with that this man is willing to recognize us. He has 
turned it around. We started off by saying that we won't recognize 
his government ; it isn't the real government ; it doesn't represent the 
Chinese people at all. Yet apparently some people were delighted 
when the Communist Chou En-lai said, "Now we are willing to sit 
down and talk to you." It is an insult to start with. You can be 
sure he has got something up his sleeve. Either he is not willing 
to make an attack or can't make an attack, or they are planning some- 
thing and want us to stop or want us to talk. 

That is a rather long-winded answer. 

Mr. Arexs. We are glad to have your response. 

General, in the light of your background and experience as a 
student of world communism, how late is it on the Soviet timetable for 
world domination? 

General Howley. I don't believe anybody knows. You never know 
completely the other fellow's intention or his timetable. The aggres- 
sor always, however, has the advantage with a timetable, because, 
just from the military point of view, that is an asset. And I want 
to emphasize again that is only a part of their war against us. On 
the military, if you are planning an aggressive act, you can say, "We 
will be completely ready for it, we can have these planes in produc- 
tion, we can have these tanks in production, we can have that satellite 

59886— 55— pt. 13 2 



1308 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

government softened," and so forth, and we will be ready on a certain 
date. But I don't know what that date is. The only thing is, I am 
sure they have one. 

And so we have to judge it from our point of view : when will we 
be ready. Well, the United States, as long as we have the sort of 
philosophy which we do — and God willing, we will always be able to 
have it — as long as we have the luxury of such a time philosophy, we 
will have no plans for aggression. And, therefore, we always compro- 
mise by putting plans into production or putting in plans something 
new, based on what the other fellow will do. 

Mr. Arens. Can we solve this thing around the conference table? 

General Howley. I will give you a time element. Here is the time 
element which I consider vital today. Of course, the mission of every- 
body is to put an end to wars as such. We are quite willing to fight 
their psychological and governmental wars. It is this element of 
f oice that we can't take. We had an opportunity to end all war for the- 
foreseeable future in 1945^8. We could have used forces in keep- 
ing with principles already agreed on. United Nations' principles 
and others ; we could have forced a termination of wholesale aggression 
at least. And if our efforts to force the Soviet Union to live up to 
agreements had resulted in war, it would have been a very simple war. 
And it probably would not have resulted in war. If we had been 
strong and insisted on some plan such as Baruch's plan, including 
these safeguards of inspection, we could, I believe, have compelled the 
Soviet Union, whether they wanted it or not, to accept limitations 
which would have protected us against attacks which may come im 
the future. We lost that opportunity, partially because, I think, we 
are good people, and we wanted to believe the best of them ; partially 
because we lacked determination, and partially because we were un- 
willing to suffer a little bit, and we would rather postpone some of 
these strong unpleasant things in the hope that they would solve 
themselves. 

Now, the time is running out. There isn't any question of the 
Kremlin's willingness to use any weapon which will attain their ends. 
As one Russian general said to me — I said, "What was the sense, in 
the commune of 1870 in Paris, of the Communists running around and 
putting chorus girls on the Notre Dame altar and pulling down the old 
statue at the Place Vendome and destroying things ?" 

Then he said : "Sometimes you must destroy everything to rebuild it 
properly." And therefore Communists — and that includes Mao Tse- 
tung — will not hesitate to destroy everything, if they cannot control 
it. 

To get back to our time element, right now they are not in a posi- 
tion to use force to attain their ends, because they know we will fight^ 
and because we do have superiority. It isn't a matter of 5 days 
of fighting. The United States has superiority of everything except 
superiority of evil. We have superiority of philosophy, I believe, of 
arms, of planes, of missiles, of planning, of the thinking power of 
the individual, and of all these factors that enter into modern warfare. 

But the Soviet Union, up until they obtained the means of making 
the hydrogen bomb or the atomic bomb on a big scale, did not have 
the means of offsetting all our superiorities. They knew that they 
could not fight us in tlie old-fasliioned way. They could not use 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM 1309 

force against the United States based on the type of fighting used 
in the last war, because no nation in the \Yorld, except the United 
States, could fight that kind of a war, wdiich requires a tremendous 
steel output, over a hundred million tons a year, tremendous in- 
genuity of women who can go in plants and put gadgets together, 
and all of these things that the United States has and in which we 
are vastly superior. 

Now, for the first time in the history of the world, there are two 
very dangerous weapons in existence by which a handful of evil men 
can destro}' a whole nation of good, powerful men. And of course 
the two weapons — one of them is one you would think of, that is, 
the gi-eat bombs, the hydrogen l^omb particularly. Enough of them 
with the means of delivering them to the American cities can para- 
lyze us, can very well, if we wait long enough, destroy us and make 
it impossible for us to really retaliate if we accept the first punch. 
It is entirely possible, although that is an area where nobody is 
certain. 

The second great element that makes world dictatorship possible 
now^ is one you wouldn't usually think of, communications. It is pos- 
sible now for the first time in the history of the world for one man to 
impose his will on all the people of the world, technically it is pos- 
sible, by means of television, radio, the press, and so forth. Of 
course, at this point here are many parts of the world, in Africa, 
and so forth, where they don't have a radio and they don't have these 
things that can influence your mind and sway you. But the me- 
chanical means exist today for the Kremlin not only to quickly get 
control of areas, but by a process of indoctrination and twisting of 
minds to timi the populations of the world so the world doesn't know 
right from wrong and which way is up or down. 

And that is a second great threat. 

I will dwell more on that. We all have that communications 
threat. The answer to it, of course, is the thing that we have in 
America and we try to develop in colleges. It is a critical sense, that 
an individual should insist on being an individual and ask, "Wlio 
says so ? Is it true ? " 

Mr. Arens. ^\^iat distinction do the Soviets make between the cold 
war and the hot war ? 

General Howlet. There isn't any distinction at all. They are just 
popular words. They don't even make a distinction between the 
effort to destroy the economy of a country by starting a strike move- 
ment, for instance, and ruining one small plant — it is all part of one 
plan to them. 

Terms such as "hot war" and "cold war" — I doubt if the Russian 
people ever heard of the terms — but they are terms that grow out of 
our desire to work out names for things ; they don't mean anything ; 
it is all part of one great plan. 

Mr. Arens. General, may we proceed with an analysis and appraisal 
of the Communist penetration and threat in specific areas of the world 
in which you have made a special study ? I would suggest that you 
pick the area of the world that you would like to discuss first and go 
ahead, if you please, sir. 

General Howlet. I would like to start with Guatemala because that 
threat is terminated and it is a rather encouraging situation. 



1310 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

There is an awfully good lesson there which we ouijht to remember. 
The lesson is that we should not be fooled into thinking that the 
people of any country are behind the Communist government. 

I say that because when I was in Guatemala before the revolution, 
if you judged by what was in the newspapers or what you heard over 
the radio, or what you saw on streamers all over the city, and what 
you heard these Communists say, and these Communist-led "setups" — 
if you listened to them, all the people were in back of this wonderful 
thing, and they were speaking for the people. The fact was that 
when this government was challenged in the way in which it was chal- 
lenged, by force — and it was a government which was maintained by 
force — when the government was challenged by force, there was prac- 
tically nobody in back of the Communist government. On the physical 
side of the war you could literally say that there were only a handful 
that had taken control. 

The army was in the barracks. And you wouldn't be exaggerating 
if you said that 3 men in 3 hired planes did it. You might say one 
of the chaps did it. They did drop bombs on those ammunition 
dumps and 1 was hit and about 180 killed. At that time the Presi- 
dent — he called himself President, though he had really seized that 
control — be called on the army to rally and repel this little force that 
was sitting down there in the jungle. 

The army said "No." Then he called on the trade unions. The 
trade unions were not really trade unions; they were set up by Com- 
munists and controlled by Communists. So he called on the trade 
unions, and I think that nobody but 2 or 3 Communist leaders re- 
sponded. He called on the people to rise up and defend their govern- 
ment. But they knew that they weren't defending their government, 
and they weren't going to waste any time in defending these Com- 
munists. 

And so the President ran and hid in the cellar of an embassy where, 
according to South American custom, he was safe. He is now a citizen 
of Switzerland. 

Mr. Arens. That, then, was not the usual Communist conspiracy? 

General Howley. Yes. Let's not be fooled or confused by these 
Communists. Any man with a printing plant and someone to help 
him can cover the city with placards. Let's not be confused by that. 
That is the first lesson. 

I have mentioned Morocco. Phase 1 is that of destroying author- 
ity. Obviously, you must get authority destroyed or you can't get 
things stirred up so that you can seize control because anyone in his 
right mind would not vote the Communists into control of anything. 

Their system is very poor ; it is brutal ; it is slave labor ; and they 
still can't produce goods. They make you give up God and golf and 
you still can't get shoes. 

Wlien they go into Morocco— obviously it is not ready for any- 
body's troops to go in there — their object is to destroy the authority. 
If the authority is the French Government, destroy that. If the 
government is a political party, discredit that, as they tried to do in 
Berlin. If the authority is the church, destroy that. Get it out; it 
doesn't matter what church it is. If religion is a form of holding 
people together, destroy it. 

In Morocco and north Africa there is much to be said as to the 
good work that has been done there by the French. Much of their 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1311 

colonialism has been really quite magnificent. But if you read some 
writers who have gone over there — one in particular who capitalized 
upon his position to indicate objectively and then produced a pam- 
phlet — if you read those you would think there was a dreadful 
situation there, and that it is all due to the French Government. 

Mr. Aeens. May I suggest that we proceed to your appraisal of the 
situation in the Far East with particular reference to Formosa and 
Eed China? 

General Howley. Yes. There is a similarity out there, of course, 
to many other spots in the world. There is a similarity to Germany. 
They are working around the world now, and dividing it. 

If a war is going to come, if you assume a war becomes inevitable, 
it will certainly be an awful one, the longer we wait, because we are 
teaching everybody how to shoot each other now. And I would rather, 
years ago — and even now — I would rather force issues and get rid 
of this constant threat of war, even if it meant fighting. But we 
always go into these wars and fight a war to end wars, and then quit 
and come home and let a few enemies stir it all up again. 

Well, my recent visit to Formosa and Hong Kong 

Mr. Arens. "When was that, by the way ? 

General Howley. I believe I have been back about 6 weeks. It 
was at the turn of the year. I was gone about a total of 6 weeks. 

In think of the Orient — and I refuse to get myself all involved in 
not being able to talk because somebody objects to calling him an 
oriental — it has been my observation that the only people who object 
to an English word which is well meant are enemies, so they say, 
"You can't use the word 'oriental'^ — that means you don't understand 
the oriental people." Most of that is bunk. 

In the first place, when you say it in Chinese it doesn't even sound 
the way it does in English. In dealing with the orientals, we are all 
ignorant. And that has caused us to be misled by a small number of 
people who claim to be experts. 

Now, whether these experts misled us because they are ignorant or 
because they are in the pay of the Soviet Union I wouldn't attempt 
to pass judgment. I don't know. I can't tell what goes on in a man's 
mind or why he is doing something. But we have been grossly 
misinformed. 

And because the Orient has been so far away from us and there have 
been so few schoolteachers and kids and professors and others from 
our universities going back and forth and businessmen from the Mid- 
dle West going out there, we haven't known. We haven't had the 
feeling which people get from the way we now travel in Europe. It 
would help us a great deal in dealing with the Orient in the future 
if we had more of our people going out there. 

Wlien I was graduated from college I saved some money and I 
went to France. I went to the Sorbonne and studied there, and in 
Germany. 

Today I would recommend that many of our students go to the 
Orient for their postgraduate work. I recommended that to my oldest 
boy, who is a freshman in New York University now. 

We are prone to misjudge the Orient because there haven't been 
enough people who know what the country looks like out there, be- 
cause it is a very big country and there are a lot of people. 



1312 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

Most of the information that I started off with, particularly about 
the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist Government, the 
legitimate government of China — mostly the information I started 
with, I found to be false. The type of thing I had heard was that 
they had an old man's army, kind of limping around out on Formosa, 
and if we were counting on them to do any fighting in support of 
anything it was a mistake. That is completely false. I -went out on 
maneuvers with them. I had a little camera, and I took many pic- 
tures — but my finger covered the camera and they didn't come out so 
well. But I made a point of taking a great number of pictures of 
this kind of army. 

The average age of the army is 28, which is not an old army at all. 
I don't know how it works out that they have got an old man's army. 
That army is dedicated to going back and liberating China. And 
that army is a young man's army, and they are being taught, and learn- 
ing very fast, how to fight western style, which is in a cooperative 
manner, using modern weapons rather than the primitive style that 
is still used by Mao Tse-tung. 

Wlien you have an army trained in western style, numbers don't 
mean very much. So to say, "This little army won't have a chance 
against this vast army of 2% million." Well, how many millions have 
we got in our Army? You can write anything on a piece of paper. 
But in the final analysis the number you can put on a battlefield is 
how many you can arm properly and train properly and transport 
properly. 

And Mao Tse-tung's announcement that he has this 2% million 
doesn't rpean anything. Nor do numbers mean anything against a 
well-equipped and organized force. 

So the force on Formosa is much better than I had expected. 

Just incidentally, the average age of 28 is quite young. Where you 
really need young fellows is in flying jets. Yet the average age of 
our jet aces in Korea was just over 28, around 29. And the average 
age of all our flyers there, including jets and the rest of them, was, 
I think, 33. 

And this chap that set the record from California to New York 
was 35 years old. 

So let's not go overboard on the fallacy that this army on Formosa 
is an old man's army. 

Another fallacy was that this was a corrupt government of Chiang 
Kai-shek, that the government was bad. I don't know what they did 
on the mainland. I do know why they didn't put into effect reforms, 
and it makes sense to me. China started having reforms to modernize 
the country a bit and still not lose their wonderful traditions and their 
wonderful family life with Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek was one 
of his followers. When the group that the Soviets are behind, the 
group represented by Mao Tse-tung's Communists, attempted to seize 
control, they couldn't get control of this revolution. Mind you, the 
Communists have never produced a general revolution ; like a Cuckoo 
bird they would rather move in on something, as they moved in on 
the Russian Revolution, which started off as a people's revolution, 
and seized control. Mao Tse-tung's group tried to get control in 
China, and they fought what is now the Nationalist government for 
years. Then the Japanese occupied China all during the war years. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1313 

SO how could reforms be put into effect ? On the island of Formosa 
there is a modern renaissance of a real China, a renaissance which is 
bringing about needed modernizations without the sacrificing of the 
principles which make the Chinese people great. 

Even in the matter of the redistribution of land — in Formosa — of 
those tenant farmers in the past, over 40 percent of them are now 
owners of their own land. The land was made available both from 
the state-owned land which had been held by the Japanese when they 
were there — because the Japanese were in control of Formosa, you 
know, for 50 years — those lands were distributed, and certain big 
estates were also distributed. Yet the men who owned the biggest 
estates were given genuine compensation, which is the difference 
between distributing land under a system of justice and distributing 
land under a Communist system. 

Senator Jenner. Let the record show that Senator Hennings is 
now in attendance. 

Senator Hennixgs. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to come and hear the 
general long before this, but I had another meeting. 

General Howlet. Senator, I had indicated that it was all part of 
the same conspiracy, and our problem was pretty much the same in 
all these areas. And it is quite possible that the solutions may come 
all at one time. 

But the observations in Formosa and the observations in Hong 
Kong, they fit right in with those observations which you. Senator, 
and others have seen in Germany, in Berlin. 

Mr. Arens. Will Chiang Kai-shek fight to the death to defend 
Formosa ? 

General Ho^vlet. "Well, he doesn't even think in terms of defense. 
Neither do I. I have very little respect for defense. You can't even 
get a girl that way, you have to take the offensive if you want to 
marry her. A fellow with a drugstore never thinks in terms of holding 
what business he has, he thinks in terms of getting more. 

A defense policy would destroy American spirit if vou. really carried 
it out. There are nations that think in terms of tlie status quo, or 
as things are. But America never has. So I can't think of the Orient 
or of anywhere else in terms of defending things; it is almost 
impossible. 

In modern warfare you can't defend, except as a very temporary 
measure ; you always lose. It is impossible to have a perfect defense 
if the other fellow has a very good offense. 

So Chiang Kai-shek is with us on that. He never thinks in terms 
of defending Formosa. Formosa is easy to defend as an island. 
There are a hundred miles of rough water between it and the main- 
land. Assuming that we want to help and gain control of the situation 
either by way of the water or by way of the air, Formosa couldn't 
possibly be taken. 

There isn't any point in talking about Formosa or whether we can 
defend Formosa. 

Mr. Arens, Do you have any observation to make with reference to 
any lessons which we should learn from the situation in Korea in try- 
ing to formulate a policy of this Govermnent to meet the worldwide 
Communist threat ? 

General Howlet. Yes, sir. The lessons — we get all of these lessons, 
and then we seem to go off and forget them. That is a disappointing 



1314 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

thing to SO many of us. All of the lessons that were learned were 
learned in Berlin. I wrote my first book, Berlin Command, and I 
have written others, about it. 

Senator Hennings. General Hand and others in Berlin told me that 
is one of the best books that has ever been written on the subject, your 
book. 

General Howley. Even their techniques at the conference table, 
even the smile techniques are the same. I noticed in the paper today, 
if it is accurate — and I have great confidence in these newspaper re- 
ports. I know a lot of these press chaps, and they have been doing an 
awful good job for the American people — that Zhukov wrote Eisen- 
hower along the line of "We are soldier boys; let's release this kid 
and let him go back to his parents" — they often did that with me in 
Berlin. That has no significance ; that is off to the side. 

Wliether Zhukov likes Eisenhower personally has no bearing on the 
subject. It would with us. If you make a friend of an English gen- 
eral or statesman and then you go to the conference table the next day, 
he may do what his government orders, even if he doesn't like it, but he 
will let you know that it isn't personal. The Soviet representative has 
no freedom of choice at all, and whether he likes you or not doesn't 
matter. Actually the Soviets I dealt with all liked me ; I am sure of it 
from what they said, but that wouldn't hinder them from killing me 
the next day if it entered into their plans. 

I have been out in the evening with them and have had a grand 
time drinking vodka — and they drink until they break the glasses on 
the wall — and the next day at the conference table there would be no 
difference at all — the same old line. 

And those representatives who begin to soften a little bit and not 
hate us, they get removed from contact. That was the case of those 
who contacted me who were a little bit inclined to think that maybe 
we didn't have horns ; they were immediately yanked out and taken out 
of contact and reindoctrinated. 

Mr. Arens. General, on the basis of your background and extensive 
experience, what overall strategy and technique do you recommend 
for the Government of the United States to use in meeting the world- 
wide Communist threat ? 

General Howley. Assuming that we are all agreed that this threat 
does exist — and there will always be a small percentage that you can't 
change for one reason or another, and there are even people who live 
in a cave somewhere, so we will never have 100 percent of the American 
people agree on things — I think all of our leaders and all of our think- 
ing people, after all these murders and deaths and all of these lies have 
been perpetrated, I think today, the vast majority of Americans recog- 
nize this whole Communist system for what it is, that tliis interna- 
tional conspiracy is bad, and it is very bad for us. And I think that 
the people recognize that there is no real compromise with them. 
There may be little temporary things, but there is no real settling of 
this problem. 

There are two ways, therefore, that you can operate. One is to 
take positive action to see that these Communist governments are 
destroyed. That doesn't mean rolling the drum necessarily, one, two, 
one, two across some place for military liberation. But certainly 
there is a pattern of thought that you must — I don't know what word 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMIVIUNISM 1315 

you use, you can call it liberation, maybe, if you want, but that isn't a 
good word— but we must take positive steps and plan everything to 
see that these Communist governments fall, whether it is in Guatemala 
or somewhere else. And they fall with surprising ease. 

Now, the other way is the way— call it what you want, you can call 
it delay or postponement or coexistence or "let's do nothing" or "let's 
do anything to avoid dying" — of course, even though we are all gomg 
to die— I can tell you a good story about a Buddhist's comment on 
that. He said, "You people talk about the hereafter but run your 
affairs as if there weren't any hereafter." He said, "I am a Buddhist ; 
I know little about the hereafter— but there are three phases : birth, 
life, and death. Each has a place. You believe in the concept of 
afterlife, but you don't allow it to control what you do in life." 

Anyhow you have two general plans of action as I see it. One is 
coexistence,"^ defense, decline. And the other is positive actions in 
order to destroy these governments which are dedicated to our destruc- 
tion. 

In 1945 or 1946 I came to the conclusion that we must see these 
governments fall, and we must use everything, we must use moral 
means, psychological warfare, economic blockade, and even the risk 
of war — because there will never be a war with any Communist gov- 
ernment unless that Communist government wants a war anyhow. In 
the case of the present Government of Russia, they fought a major 
war with the Japanese on that Hill 286 in Manchuria. I talked with 
the Russian general who commanded the troops. They used their 
artillery, troops, and everything for a major fight; they didn't declare 
war, so if there was a mere killing of hundreds of Communists, if it 
did not suit the Communist purpose, they would do nothing about it. 

In one sense it is very easy to deal with Communist governments, 
because they will not do emotional things. The British Empire was 
built on emotion. And I do hope that we never lose our emotions, 
because there are so many things tied up with them. A cold, rational, 
bleak world, I have very little use for. I agree with the Greeks that 
the mind should be the servant of the heart. 

But they will only use war as an instrument when it suits them. 
Therefore, if they have a schedule and it suits them, and we do some- 
thing, they might fight, or they might even without excuse. They 
might just fight if it suited them to fight. But our action would have 
little to do with it, because if they wanted a fight they would simply 
produce an incident, or they would get stooges to give them the 
excuses. 

They have used, since the end of the last World War, a very good 
knowledge of the way we think. And they have had some of our top 
people advise them on how we think. They have used a threat of war 
as a means of getting concessions. If they can get us to say that 
nothing matters but peace ; if they can get us to that point of view, 
they have got the world. Of course, this is mere nonsense. There 
are a lot of things that are a lot more important than peace. If you 
accepted that there would be no struggle and no progress in any di- 
rection. For that they have threatened. And in the early days at 
conferences they always had the god of war standing back of the 
Russian representative. There was always that threat, whether it 
was Europe or somewhere else. If we didn't give them the conces- 



1316 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

sions, if we didn't sit down and negotiate, there would be war. We 
thought that giving in was better than war, you see, because that is 
the way we think ; anything is better than war. If they can get us 
convinced that peace is all that matters, they have got what they want. 
So they have always threatened us. 

Senator Hennings. Right at that point may I inquire, you don't 
think that is the way we as a people generally think, do you ? 

General Howley. No. 

Senator Hennings. We don't think anything is better than war? 
Do you think we as a people, I say, the generality, the majority of the 
American people, take the loss of our freedom, take slavery, totali- 
tarian government, all of the things that are inherent in communism — 
we don't prefer that to war, do we ? 

General Howley. No, sir. And of course we fought one of the- 

Senator Hennings. I understood you to say that is the way we are 
thinking now. 

General Howley. It was rephrased. Senator, and I didn't quite fol- 
low — no, of course. We fought really one of the most awful wars of 
history over slavery to free the colored man in the Civil War. 

Senator Hennings. They didn't call it that ; they called it the war 
to save the Union, that was the rallying force Mr. Lincoln used so 
successfully. He wanted to stay away from the war to free the 
slaves. 

General How^ley. I concede your point. But that was a point they 
used in getting the boys to march out and fight each other. That was 
one factor, but another factor was certainly economic in the Civil 
War. So if you took all the factors, including the right of the state 
to determine its own destiny, they Avere things that w^ere more valuable 
to the people at the time of the Civil War than peace. I agree with 
you now, and I apologize if I picked out just one part of our incentives. 
That just comes out of my grandfather's side of that particular strug- 
gle, that was his motivating force, though there were many different 
ones. 

Therefore we have two patterns. One in favor of holding on while 
keeping strong so that we do not precipitate a war. In favor of that 
is the fact — there are a lot of things in favor of it. The Soviet will 
have trouble with their system. They do have a very poor system. 
They promise the people if they give up all these things like their 
church, and all of their old customs, they will get more material goods. 
Of course, it sounds like the Devil tempting Christ, and of course it 
is, it is a promise of material things if you give up the spiritual. 

One of their great tragedies is that wherever the Soviets are in 
control, they produce less goods. I don't want to get into the psy- 
chology of why that is, but it is a fact that they go through the various 
stages that lead directly to slavery. And then they become unpopular. 
I could tell you stories of my visit to Poland cluring the blockade, 
when I saw these poor people running from one truck to another; 
they were going to their second 8-hour day. 

Marx said an 8-hour day, but that doesn't mean a 40-hour week. 
They were running to their second 8-hour day. Even then, they were 
producing less goods. 

Wlien production lags, they put in regulations forcing the people 
to work harder. They tried to have heroes to set records, and finally 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1317 

they force them into slave labor. Even then, they can't produce as 
many goods as free countries. 

On this side of holding on, of staying strong and staying on the 
defensive, is the fact that communism is a very poor system. And 
wherever it is, the people hate it. I won't break down by causes the 
hate in China, but there is real hate there against this government of 
Mao Tse-tung. 

On the other hand, there is a terrible, dreadful risk to this Ameri- 
can delaying policy. The dreadful risk is that the Soviet Union will 
confuse us and destroy our moral fabric because we permit certain 
things to go on, and then we can't teach our kids the right things. 

Then, too, there is the fact that the Russians are obtaining these 
mass means of destruction and the means of delivering them. We will 
reach a day when we do not have our present superiority — or, we 
may have superiorities, but they won't count, because an aggressor can 
offset those by his evil, and he has enough bombs and things of that 
sort to harm us. 

Therefore, that is the risk. All of us who believe, "Let us go on ; 
let us keep trying; let us do anything to avoid trouble," they have 
something on their side. But the risk is dreadful. 

I have never been able to take that risk. Those who think more or 
less in their own ways along this same idea probably have some of 
these same considerations. Some day — it might be 2, 3, or 5 years — 
when the Soviets have these massive means of what we call retalia- 
tion or destruction, when they are in a position to attack us first, and 
our allies, and really destroy great chunks of the world, if they can't 
control the world any other way, they will use that force. 

And they will not worry about it any more than my friend. Gen- 
eral Kotikikov, who said, "Sometimes you have to destroy everything 
in order to rebuild properly." 

We have, therefore, a period of grace during which we have supe- 
riority in retaliatory power. We have enormous bombs which can 
destroy the Soviet Union. We have the means of delivering them. 

And their defenses are not particularly good. They therefore would 
not dare today to attack our major cities for any reason, because they 
couldn't succeed, and we would succeed in winning against these 
people. 

These people are dialetic materialists; they don't do things emo- 
tionally, therefore, while we have superiority they will not attack our 
major cities. 

Meanwhile we have an opportunity on the positive side. We can 
hold our superiority of mass retaliation in order to guarantee to the 
civilized world that these barbarians will not attack our women and 
children in our cities, for the same reason that Hitler didn't use 
poison gas — because he would have lost. We had more poison gas than 
he had, and we were ready. Therefore poison gas was not used, and 
other methods of fighting were. 

We can use tactical weapons, we can use these small weapons which 
are suitable for the battlefield, atomic weapons fired from cannon just 
as you fire high explosives, small atomic weapons that can be dropped 
by planes which are a tremendous force but which can be limited 
to the battlefield so that only those who want to fight will get hurt. 

We can, I believe, start the fall of the Soviet conspiracy, and we 
can start it right across the Formosan Straits at an appropriate time. 



1318 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

We should use economic, political, and psychological weapons against 
them now, even at the risk of the Soviets emphasising war against us, 

This government of Mao Tse-tung is a weak government. The 
people on the mainland now see that they have nothing to hope for 
from this government. I can spell out in detail why, but we haven't 
time to do it. 

They have, for example, seen what happened when they were 
promised the land. They were promised the land, but now they don't 
have the land, and they are under worse slavery now than they ever 
were under war lords. They have found, for example, that all of 
the products of their land must be turned over to the state, and they 
get a receipt for them ; they can't even get food to eat. That receipt 
must go in the local Communist-controlled bank. So they can save 
so much money in the bank, but they can't take out a bit of it unless 
the head of the local Communist government says it is for a worthy 
cause. 

So now all they are doing is working for the government, and under 
much more cruel conditions than under the war lords. 

Mr. Arens. What policy must be pursued by our Government in 
Formosa and in the Far East, in your judgment ? 

General Howley. We should use our massive retaliatory material to 
protect our cities and our allies against the Soviets attempting to at- 
tack our cities with weapons and they can't do so now, although how 
long this superiority of ours will exist I don't know. But it does 
exist now. 

Where the Soviets are using force we can use force against them. 
We can supply to our allies — I don't see supplying ground troops to 
our powerful allies on the flank of China ; I don't see supplying ground 
troops to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek; he has 
plenty of ground troops. 

In this great fight around the world each country should contribute 
its share, and what they have most of is what they ought to con- 
tribute. Our speciality isn't troops ; our specialty is young men and 
women who can do triclcy things with radar, and gadgets, aiq^lanes, 
big guns, and things like that. Some countries have infantry, and 
that should be their contribution to the common fight. 

Senator Jenner. What do you think about negotiation at this time? 

General Howley. Negotiation only confuses us. That fits into the 
Soviet pattern of psychological warfare that confuses us. Senator. 
Any time we sit down to negotiate with them we have not only con- 
fused our allies but we have confused the American people. How 
can the mother or uncle or cousin or friend who has a relative in a 
dungeon out there which the Soviets are holding — how can they under- 
stand a friendly letter between the enemy and us, or a conference 
where we sit down and talk with these people ? 

How can I teach my kids what is right or wrong if we don't make 
a distinction? And, in the final analysis, whether we recognize a 
government or not should not be based on Stimson's Nine Points as to 
whether they meet their obligations, for example. Recognition 
should be a matter of principle. 

You cannot keep such things secret. You cannot have one moral 
in Timbuktu and another in north Africa, or someplace else. There 
are too many newspapermen around. You can't employ Machiavellian 
tactics of deceit today without destroying your own people. 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1319 

Therefore our national policy, I think, has to be based on principle, 
and certainly a principle is that you do not sit down with a murderer 
and discuss business or anything else with him. 

Senator Jenner. "N^liat do you think about severance of diplomatic 
relations with Russia at this time? Would that help in the psycho- 
logical attack? Would it encourage the people who are in slavery, 
the fact that this great Nation would no longer recognize a country 
like that and just have nothing to do with it ? 

General Howlet. I think so. I think so, for the sake of our own 
people, Senator. One of the great dangers we are having today is 
that these compromises, these negotiations, with men who are strictly 
bad men, is confusing our own people. We are in danger of national 
cynicism. And once the Nation arrives at a point where the in- 
dividual says, "Wliat is in it for me? Wliy should I go out and 
fight for that rag?" — and the flag becomes a rag — you don't have a 
great nation. And it is the one thing that can't be rebuilt. 

The Egyptians lost something about 2,000 years ago, and it isn't 
nice to say, but their chances of coming back and amounting to 
sometliing are very slim now. And some of our friends, people we 
love, they are suffering from national cynicism. In other words, the 
emphasis upon the fellow doing what he wants for what he gets out 
of it — when you have that emphasis then you don't have a great 
nation. 

I think these negotiations and these conferences and these exchanges 
over champagne glasses do great harm to the American people. We 
forget what it is all about. We forget these people who were killed in 
Korea. We forget that the same people, in the case of Korea by out- 
right aggression, caused the death of over 30,000 Americans, and oyer 
125,000 casualties, and so forth. So, before we even talk of recognition 
or continuing recognition, we must do what we did in Germany, in the 
case of Korea. 

We must submit a list of those men who are criminals, who break 
agreements — not just the Geneva Agreement; they didn't sign it — 
but they have broken every principle of decency ; they have murdered 
people; they have killed prisoners; they did that and other things, 
and we know their names. 

We should have a list of them. Always before we negotiate or 
talk any business with this present Chinese Communist Government, 
they should have to meet a lot of terms. One, I think they should 
have to contribute, with their Russian backers, to the rehabilitation 
of South Korea. 

Senator Jenner. Damages, in other words ? 

General Howley. Damages. The same thing that we demanded in 
Germany. If we sit down and negotiate with these people and forget 
what they have done, we forget the American principle that, if crime 
isn't punished, there will be more crime. 

We should take account of the war crimes just as we did at the 
end of our last war with Germany. 

Senator Hennings. We know, of course, they will never pay any 
damages. 

General Howley. They have never paid any damages, and they 
have never given anything back, but we can keep the record straight, 
and when the day comes, they can be punished. 



1320 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 

]Mi\ Arens. Do you have any observations to make with respect to 
the substitution of a new leader for Malenkov ? 

General Howley. No, sir. Those things are insignificant. It is 
all part of the same thing. One gangster shoots another and gains 
control. They are still against us. And I think that is quite im- 
portant, because one will differ a little from the other. One fellow 
understands, for example, that if you smile at an American, you can 
do most anything to him. You can call him a bad name, and if you 
smile at him, you can get away with it. 

He understands that if you get rough with us, anything can happen. 
Stalin got to the point where he didn't care ; he was rough, and as a 
result we reacted and built up a powerful force against him. 

Whether it is Marshal Zhukov, or Marshal Sokolofsky — I call him 
"Wise Guy" Sokolofsky — because I sat in on conferences where he 
got these tremendous concessions from the United States — but he was 
a great one for holding champagne glasses and talking nice — and I 
had some of our own representatives, I wouldn't like to identify them, 
say that he is not a Communist. 

Guess where he is now? He is on the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. That man has been in the party since the revolu- 
tion. And for anybody to be misled, because he drinks a couple of 
cocktails and smiles, into thinking that he isn't a part of this vicious, 
corrupt system, is a great mistake. The same applies to Zhukov. 

So my advice is not to be misled by what these fellows say. We 
know what they are. Let's judge them by their actions. 

Mr. Arens. I have no further questions. 

Senator Jenner. Senator Hennings? 

Senator Hennings. General, don't you think that most of these 
speculations that, if there is a change, this fellow, or that, or the 
other fellow, will have his friend taken out and shot or sent to Siberia 
or otherwise liquidated, that doesn't make any difference, does it? 

General Howley. To us? 

Senator Hennings. We hear so much speculation. Now, we have 
good old Malenkov ; we have good old Beria, and we speculate, "They 
are going to be friendly. They like us." That is just nonsense, 
isn't it, just naive hope? 

General Howley. Yes; that is just nonsense. It is based on our 
belief, our whole code of civilization and education and ethics, that 
you as an individual are really more important than even an Army 
order. 

We recognize that even in the Army, where you must have absolute 
discipline. If there is an order against an officer's code of ethics, 
religion, or behavior, he can say, "No, I can't execute that order." 

Some of the German generals did obey orders, and they hung for it. 
And some of these things are important, because the individual is 
even more important than the elected officials. But not with the 
Commies. 

This is one pattern. The individual must obey orders in every- 
thing. He can't have personal reservations. 

Senator Hennings. He wouldn't exist as an instrumentality of the 
Soviet state if he wasn't thoroughly committed to the doctrine of 
world usurpation of power — world domination ? 

General Howley. That is right. 

Senator Hennings. And the Marxist thesis ? 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORLD COMMUNISM 1321 

General Howley. Yes. That is an easy way to judge and a correct 
one. If he is in authority, he is dedicated to our destruction. If he 
is a peasant in the Urals, he would probably like to love the American 
people — the Russian people are great. We must distinguish between 
the Russian people and the people who dominate them. 

Senator Hennings. A small percentage belong to the Communist 
Party, I understand. 'Wliat is that percentage ? 

General Howley. I don't believe that the percentage means very 
much. 

Senator Hennings. I don't either. But you hear people using 5 or 
10 million rather loosely. I don't know how they arrive at such a 
figure. We don't know, do we ? 

General Howley. I would think that in the Communist regime 
you could probably number the real Communists certainly not in the 
millions or in the hundreds of thousands. 

Many of the others have no choice in the matter. They have no 
choice. But we don't have to consider them. They have a very small, 
intensive minority. When you hear the Soviets talk, they talk about 
their October revolution. It was not a revolution. The number of 
men who seized control in their revolution, in a real old-fashioned 
coup d'etat — you could probably number 80 men who did it — they have 
never been elected in a real election ; they have simply taken control. 

Senator Hennings. General, as one member of this committee, I 
am most indebted to you for your very enlightening and interesting 
testimony today. 

General Howley. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Jenner. General, on behalf of the committee, I want to 
thank you. I think your testimony has been very beneficial and very 
helpful and very intelligible because it comes from firsthand expe- 
rience. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 



INDEX 



Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 

Page 

Africa 1303, 1306, 1310, 1318 

America 1313, 1319 

American 1317, 1320, 1321 

Baruch plan 1308 

Beria 1320 

Berlin command 1314 

Berlin 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1313 

British Empire 1315 

Casablanca 1303 

Central America 1306 

Cherbourg 1302 

Chiang Kai-shek 1312, 1313, 1318 

China 1303, 1306, 1312, 1313, 1317, 1318 

Chinese Nationalist Government 1312, 1318, 1319 

China, Red 1311 

Chou En-lai 1307 

Civil war 1316 

Communist Party, Central Committee of 1320 

Czechoslovakia 1306 

Dienbienphu 1307 

Egypt 1306, 1319 

Eisenhower 1302, 1314, 1320 

Far East 1311, 1318 

Fisson, Pierre 1304 

Formosa 1303, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1318 

Young Man's Army 1312 

Easy to defend 1318 

Chances on mainland 1313, 1318 

Formosan Straits 1317 

France 1303, 1304, 1311 

French 1306, 1307 

French Government 1310 

Geneva 1.307 

Geneva agreement 1319 

German generals 1320 

Germans 1304 

Germany 1302, 1304, 1311, 1313, 1319 

Germany, United 1304 

Greeks 1315 

Guatemala 1.303, 1.309, 1310, 1315 

Failure of revolution 1312 

Hand, General 1314 

Hind, General 1303 

Hitler 1,303, 1304 

Hong Kong 1303, 1311, 1313 

Howley, Brig. Gen. Frank L., biography 1301 

Japanese 1312, 1313, 1315 

Kennan, George 1,302 

Kenya Colony 1,303 

Kotikikov, General 1305, 1317 

I 



rr INDEX 

Page 

Korea 1302, 1304, 1312, 1313, 1319 

Kremlin 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1308 

Lenin 1304, 1306 

Malenkov 1320 

Manchuria 1315 

Mao Tse-tung 1303, 1306, 1308, 1312, 1317, 1318 

Marx 1316,1320 

Mau Mau 1303 

Mein Kampf 1304 

Morocco 1303, 1305, 1306, 1310 

Mussolini 1303 

New York University 1301, 1302, 1311 

Notre Dame 1308 

October Revolution 1321 

Orient 1311 

Paris 1302, 1304, 1308 

Poland 1316 

Russian Revolution 1312 

Seine 1304 

Siberia 1320 

South America 1310 

South Korea 1319 

Soviet Psychological Warfare 1318 

Soviet 

Can't be trusted 1303 

Objective 1804 

Techniques same everyvi^here 1304, 1314 

No plans for failure 1304 

Phases of total war 1305 

Conference as a weapon 1306 

Weaknesses 1305, 1307 

Use of communications 1309 

Defense against 1314, 1316 

Soviet Government 1303 

Soviet Union 1304, 1305, 1308, 1311, 1317 

Soviets 1304, 1306, 1307, 1318, 1321 

Stalin 1304 

Stimson's nine points 1318 

Sun Yat-sen 1312 

Tunisia 1306 

United Nations 1308 

United States 1305, 1308, 1309, 1314 

United States Policies 1302 

Urals 1321 

Voyage to the Horizon 1304 

World War II 1315 

Zhukov 1314, 1320 

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