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DEPOSITORY  f}p^.  i>^A^O(. 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 

THE  COMMUNIST  BATTLE  PLAN 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE 

ADMINISTEATION  OF  THE  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

ACT  AND  OTHER  INTERNAL  SECURITY  LAWS 


OF  THE 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-FOUPvTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Res.  58 


APRIL  28,  1955 


PART  13 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
59886  WASHINGTON  :  1955 


:^r^"r 


Boston  Fub:  ^j-y 

Cuperintendent  of  Documents 

OCT  13  1955 


COMMITTEE  ON  THE  JUDICIARY 

HARLEY  M.  KILGORE,  West  Virginia,  Chairman 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi  ALEXANDER  WILEY,  Wisconsin 

ESTES  KEFADVER,  Tennessee  WILLIAM  LANGER,  Nortli  Dakota 

OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  Soutli  Carolina  WILLIAM  B.  JENNER,  Indiana 

THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  Je.,  Missouri  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 

JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arlsansas  EVERETT  McKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois 

PRICE  DANIEL,  Texas  HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho 

JOSEPH  C.  O'MAHONEY,  Wyoming  JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland 


Subcommittee  To  Investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Secueitt 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws 

JAMES  O.  EASTLAND,  Mississippi,  Chairman 

OLIN  D.  JOHNSTON,  South  Carolina  WILLIAM  E.  JENNER,  Indiana 

JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  Utah 

THOMAS  C.  HENNINGS,  JE.,  Missouri  HERMAN  WELKER,  Idaho 

PRICE  DANIEL,  Texas  JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland 

J.  G.  SouRWiNE,  Chief  Counsel 

Richard  Arexs  and  Alva  C.  Carpenter,  Associate  Counsel 

Benjamin  Mandel,  Director  of  Research 

II 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS  OF  WORLD  COMMUNISM 


THURSDAY,  APRIL  28,   1955 

United  States  Senate, 
Subcommittee  To  lN\Ti:sTiGATE  the 
Administration  of  the  Internal  Security  Act 

AND  other  Internal  Security  Laws 

or  the  C031MITTEE  ON  THE  Judiciary, 

Washingto?i,  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  in  room  135, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  William  E.  Jenner  presiding. 

Present :  Senators  Jenner  and  Hennings. 

Also  present:  Richard  Arens,  associate  counsel;  Frank  Schroeder 
and  Edward  Duily,  professional  staff  members. 

Senator  Jenner.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

I  would  like  the  reporter  to  note  that  there  is  only  one  Senator  in 
attendance  at  this  subcommittee  hearing,  but  a  waiver  is  on  file  that 
one  Senator  can  properly  and  legally  conduct  the  hearing. 

General,  will  you  be  sworn. 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  that  you  are  about  to 
give  to  this  task  force  of  the  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  of  the 
United  States  Senate  will  be  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

General  Howley.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  BRIG.  GEN.  FRANK  L.  HOWLEY 

Senator  Jenner.  General,  will  you  give  your  full  name  for  the 
record  ? 

General  Howley.  My  name  is  Frank  Leo  Howley. 

Senator  Jenner.  And  where  do  you  reside  ? 

General  Howley.  I  reside,  sir — my  home  is  in  Madison,  N.  J.  And 
my  work  is  vice  chancellor  of  New  York  University.  My  offices  are 
in  New  York. 

Senator  Jenner.  You  may  proceed,  Mr.  Arens,  with  the  question- 
ing of  General  Howley. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  for  the  purpose  of  this  record  will  you  give 
us  just  a  brief  resume  of  your  professional  background  and  the  ex- 
perience you  have  had,  with  particular  reference  to  the  experience  you 
have  had  and  the  studies  you  have  made  concerning  the  strategy  and 
tactics  of  the  Avorldwide  Communist  conspiracy? 

General  Howley.  Yes,  sir. 

My  introduction  to  this  worldwide  conspiracy  took  place  in  Europe, 
and  really  started  at  the  end  of  the  World  War.     I  had  been  in  com- 

1301 


1302  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

mand  of  civil  affairs  in  Cherbourg,  France,  and  then  in  Paris.     Then 
I  became  what  was  popnhirly  known  as  military  governor  of  Berlin. 

"We  observed  the  actions  of  international  communism  almost  from 
the  beginning  in  Cherbourg.  I  had  landed  somewhere  along  D-4  or 
5 — I  will  not  dwell  very  long  on  France.  I  would  like  to  say  that  in 
Paris,  particularly,  where  I  had  the  position  that  would  correspond 
to  military  governor — it  was  called  chief  of  civil  affairs,  because 
France  was  a  liberated  country  rather  than  one  that  was  conquered — 
we  observed  the  various  steps  that  took  place  there  for  the  conquest 
and  control  of  the  French  Government. 

I  don't  know  whether  you  would  like  me  to  make  rather  long  ex- 
planations or  short  ones. 

After  Paris  I  was  chosen  by  General  Eisenhow^er's  headquarters  to 
be  in  charge  of  the  American  unit  which  was  to  go  to  Berlin  when 
Berlin  had  been  captured.  I  would  be  the  commander  of  the  Amer- 
ican part  of  the  military  government  team  which  would  control  Berlin. 
It  had  been  planned  that  Berlin  was  to  be  divided  into  first  3  and  then 
4  parts,  and  that  there  would  be  a  sort  of  military  governor  for  each 
of  the  areas,  then  we  commanders  would  coordinate  and  cooperate  in 
order  to  control  the  German  city. 

I  was  there  4i/2  years,  and  witnessed  and  did  my  best  to  implement 
the  various  American  policies — which  were  never  sharply  defined,  but 
which  can  be  classified  as  first  appeasement — that  has  become  quite  a 
nasty  word — but  it  was  a  real  effort  on  our  part  to  win  over  the 
Soviets  by  means  of  friendship  and  concessions.  And  that  failed 
miserably. 

Our  second  effort  was  what  is  generally  known  as  coexistence  today. 
It  is  a  sort  of  good-neighbor  policy,  or  "You  run  your  part  of  Ger- 
many or  your  part  of  the  -world  ancl  we  will  run  ours,  and  we  will  tiy 
to  get  along." 

That  led  directly  to  the  Soviets  not  only  running  their  part  of  Ger- 
many but  attemi^ting  to  seize  our  part.  xVnd  that  resulted  in  Avhat 
is  known  as  the  hunger  blockade  of  Berlin  and  the  airlift  which  en- 
abled us  to  continue  there. 

The  third  policy  is  that  which  was  popularly  known  as  contain- 
ment, simply  because  an  article  was  written  by  a  man  who  later  be- 
came Ambassador  to  Russia,  George  Kennan.  He  wrote  an  article 
which  described  a  type  of  containment — which  simply  means  that 
we  recognized  that  these  people  were  aggressive  and  we  were  strong 
enough,  and  where  they  struck  us  we  w^ould  strike  back  so  that  they 
couldn't  conquer  us  and  they  wouldn't  continue  to  gain  control  over 
additional  parts  of  the  world  and  additional  peoples. 

When  I  left  and  returned  to  the  United  States  I  gave  a  series  of 
lectures,  and  wrote.  When  Korea  struck  us,  I  didn't  think  there  was 
any  use  of  continuing  to  talk,  so  I  went  to  New  York  University  as 
vice  chancellor,  and  have  been  there  ever  since,  concentrating  on  help- 
ing to  educate  as  many  as  60,000  students  in  1  year. 

We  have  14  colleges.  More  than  60  percent  of  the  boys  and  girls 
there  are  working  their  way  entirely  through.  Some  of  the  gradu- 
ates have  done  great  things  for  the  world,  including  Dr.  Salk,  wlio 
worked  out  this  vaccine  wdiich  is  a  blessing  to  all  of  us  who  have  kids. 
He  Mas  graduated  from  our  medical  college. 

However,  because  of  the  problems,  and  because  I  had  such  an  intro- 
duction, and  because  tragically  I  had  been  right  since  1945 — I  say 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COIVIMUNISM  1303 

"tragically"  because  I  wish  it  were  otherwise — because  I  have  been 
pretty  much  right,  and  these  things  that  I  have  prophesied  did  come 
true,  I  have  continued  my  interest  in  this  international  conspiracy 
and  have  planned  at  least  every  year  or  two  on  contributing  to  public 
thinking  in  the  areas. 

Therefore  I  have  kept  up  by  way  of  friends  who  were  placed  all 
over  the  world,  really,  ranging  from  my  friend  jSIajor  General  Hind, 
who  is  deputy  commander  fighting  the  ]\Iau  ]\Iau  in  Kenya  Colony, 
friends  in  Indochina,  and  elsewhere,  and  I  have  read  and  studied,  and 
I  managed  to  travel  and  go  to  these  places  every  so  often. 

My  last  trip — I  just  got  back — was  to  Formosa  and  Hong  Kong. 
Previously  I  had  been  down  to  Guatemala  before  the  revolution  there. 
I  have  been  to  Casablanca  and  Morocco,  Africa,  and,  of  course,  have 
kept  in  pretty  close  touch  with  what  is  going  on  in  Berlin,  Germany, 
France,  and  so  forth. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  suggest.  General,  if  it  is  agreeable  with  the 
chairman,  that  we  discuss  in  resume  form  each  of  these  areas  on  the 
basis  of  your  background  and  experience  and  information,  so  that 
3'^ou  can  apprise  the  subcommittee  of  your  judgment  on  the  strategy 
of  the  Soviet  in  each  of  these  areas,  and  give  your  recommendations 
as  to  any  counterstrategy  which  our  Government  should  follow. 

First  of  all,  with  reference  to  Berlin  and  Germany,  if  you  please, 
General.  On  the  basis  of  your  experience  there  as  military  governor 
of  Berlin,  did  you  reach  any  conclusions  as  to  whether  or  not  the 
Soviets  could  be  trusted,  whether  they  can  be  objects  of  negotiation 
or  conference  ? 

General  Howlet.  The  Soviet  Government,  as  distinguished  from 
the  Eussian  people,  cannot  be  trusted  in  anything.  They  are  dedicated 
to  the  use  of  any  means  at  their  disposal  to  attain  their  ends.  They 
will  sometimes  tell  the  truth,  if  it  happens  to  serve  their  ends,  but  they 
will  tell  lies  just  as  readily. 

There  is  no  compromising  with  the  Kremlin,  if  you  want  to  have 
a  sort  of  quick  name  for  the  government  that  now  controls  Russia, 
the  Soviet  Government  of  the  Kremlin — there  is  no  compromising 
with  them.  We  have  found  no  way  of  turning  them  away  from  their 
mission  of  destroying  all  of  those  things  which  we  think  are  im- 
portant in  life,  the  concepts  of  God,  freedom  of  the  individual,  em- 
phasis upon  a  man's  having  various  rights,  and  so  forth,  all  of  these 
things  which  we  take  for  granted  in  the  United  States,  they  are 
against. 

As  near  as  we  have  ever  had  a  government  which  is  completely  bad, 
theirs  is  it.  I  mean,  if  you  look  hard  enough,  you  can  find  something 
good  about  Mussolini,  though  I  would  have  trouble  doing  it.  And 
I  suppose  somebody  could  find  something  good  about  Hitler,  although 
I  wouldn't  be  able  to  do  it.  But  I  don't  believe  anybody  who  is  honest 
can  find  anything  good  about  the  Government  of  the  Soviet  Union, 

Mr.  Arens.  How  potent  is  the  Soviet  conspiracy  as  a  threat  to  the 
world,  in  your  judgment;  an  overall  appraisal  ? 

General  Howley.  The  threat  is  very  great.  It  is  a  world  plan. 
It  took  us  quite  a  while  to  reach  the  point  where  we  would  recognize 
that  a  Communist  move  in  Guatemala  had  a  relation  to  the  Kremlin 
and  a  relation  to  Mao  Tse-tung  on  the  Communist  mainland  in  the 
government  of  China.    I  think  we  accept  that  now. 


1304  STKATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

The  lines  run  directly  out  of  the  Kremlin;  they  are  all  working 
together,  and  they  all  follow  the  same  detail,  even  as  to  how  they 
murder  innocent  people  or  how  they  murder  prisoners.  There  were 
many  of  the  Korean  civilians  who  were  killed  and  thrown  in  pits; 
there  were  many  of  our  soldiers  who  were  taken  in  Korea  on  these 
death  marches.  And  even  the  knot  that  was  used  to  tie  them  was 
the  same  knot  which  the  Communists  used  in  Paris  in  1945,  or  1944-45, 
to  murder  people  and  throw  them  in  the  Seine. 

You  see,  the  hard  core  of  the  resistance  movement  in  France  was 
Communist,  the  free  forces  of  the  interior.  There  was  a  hard  core 
there  of  dedicated  Communists,  and  they  fought  very  effectively  when 
the  signal  was  out  to  fight  effectively  against  the  Germans  there. 

But  when  Paris  was  liberated  and  France  was  liberated,  the  normal 
people  who  were  in  the  resistance  movement  went  back  to  work.  One 
of  them,  named  Pierre  Fisson — he  went  with  me  as  interpreter  to 
Berlin — he  wrote  a  story  of  it,  Voyage  to  the  Horizons.  Most  of  these 
people  went  back  into  normal  life,  but  the  hard  core  of  the  Communists 
went  on  to  step  No.  2. 

On  this  point  of  similar  techniques,  we  found  in  one  part  of  the 
Seine  the  bodies  of,  I  think  it  was  27  persons  who  had  been  murdered 
and  shot  in  the  back  of  the  head.  We  found  that  out  of  the  20  mayors 
of  the  little  townhalls,  around  20  of  the  arrondissement  boroughs,  18 
of  the  mayors  were  known  Communists — let's  assume  that  the  others 
were,  too.  They  were  holding  mock  courts  and  trying  people;  they 
gave  them  very  fine  phrases,  "collaborators"  and  "menace  to  the  people" 
and  so  on. 

But  they  were  carrying  on  a  great  injustice  and  actually  extorting 
money  and  murdering  people.  And,  as  I  say,  even  the  technique  of 
how  they  were  tied — you  see,  they  studied  the  same  books  published  by 
the  Kremlin. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  are  the  objectives  of  the  Soviets,  first  of  all  in 
Berlin  and  Germany  ? 

General  Howley.  The  objective  there  as  elsewhere  is  complete 
control  of  the  world.  You  can  say  it  is  economic  control  and  political 
control  and  military  control  and  control  of  your  very  soul,  though  they 
don't  think  you  have  a  soul.  But  it  is  absolute  dictatorship  carried 
to  an  extreme  we  have  never  known  before. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  are  the  objectives  of  the  Soviets  in  calling  for  a 
United  Germany? 

General  Howlet.  Any  conference — you  see,  you  must  first  start  off 
by  recognizing  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  making  war  against  us  for 
complete,  overall  control  of  the  world,  but  it  is  more  comprehensive 
than  past  wars. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  other  words,  you  think  the  Soviets  are  at  war  with 
us  now  ? 

General  Howlet.  Oh,  yes.  And,  of  course,  all  these  things  I  am 
implying  are  outlined  in  the  writings  of  Lenin  and  Stalin.  Stalin, 
while  he  was  making  statements — you  see,  all  this  is  written  up  and 
planned,  and  if  we  look  at  it  we  see  that  their  intention^  and  their 
planning  has  been  continuous. 

Lenin,  particularly  about  1909,  wrote  some  very  effective  explana- 
tions of  his  plan,  much  better  than  Hitler  in  Mein  Kampf,  indicating 
what  he  was  going  to  do. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1305 

For  US  not  to  understand  what  the  Soviet  Union  intends  to  do — I 
just  can't  understand  that,  you  have  to  be  rather  blind  not  to  under- 
stand it.  There  is  no  compromising  with  them,  and  they  are  abso- 
lutely sure  that  they  are  going  to  conquer. 

You  see,  I  have  had  thousands  of  hours  of  negotiations  with  them, 
and  I  have  gone  out  with  them  on  a  friendly  basis — I  have  gone  wild- 
pig  hunting  with  the  Russian  Communists  and  others,  and  have  seen 
them  drinking  great  quantities  of  vodka,  and  listened  to  their  singing, 
all  through  these  various  phases  for  4i/^  years  in  Berlin. 

I  always  asked  them  various  questions  to  find  out  what  sort  of  made 
them  tick. 

I  said  to  General  Kotikikov  one  time — he  was  the  commander  gen- 
eral in  Berlin — I  said,  "Look,  let's  get  these  darn  streetcars  running 
and  stop  talking  about  the  class  problem."  The  streetcars  were  not 
running.  I  said,  "The  class  struggle  will  go  on  forever."  And  I 
mentioned  these  class  struggles  which  we  have  under  encouraging  con- 
ditions in  the  United  States  with  poor  immigrant  boys,  Italians  or 
Irish  or  Negroes,  they  move  on  up  through  a  process  of  land  of  fighting 
their  way  on. 

I  said,  "We  won't  live  to  see  the  end  of  the  class  struggle." 

He  said,  "I  don't  know  about  you.  General  Howley,  but  I  will  live 
to  see  the  end  of  it." 

They  are  sure  of  conquering  us. 

That  is  one  of  their  great  weaknesses  in  battle.  They  have  no  plan, 
providing  they  don't  succeed. 

Of  course,  we  should  make  use  of  that  knowledge ;  we  should  make 
them  adjust  themselves  to  us  rather  than  letting  them  carry  on  the  plan 
that  they  have  to  follow.  They  have  to  follow  plans  whether  it  is  in 
diplomacy  or  in  the  battlefield,  because  their  system  of  education  or 
their  system  of  government  can't  train  low-level  men  to  think. 

Wliere  they  have  a  plan  to  take  a  hill,  it  has  to  be  a  very  simple 
plan.  In  America,  with  the  type  of  men  we  have,  we  have  many  a 
corporal  that  is  as  smart  as  one  of  their  generals,  because  he  has 
thought  as  a  free  man  and  has  grown  up  with  the  ability  to  make 
decisions. 

Therefore,  for  us  to  adopt  the  mass  methods  of  a  crude  army  is  to 
waste  the  greatest  asset  we  have. 

And  so  it  is  with  diplomacy.  For  us  to  adopt  this  crude,  brutal, 
artless  policy,  which  is  pushed  on  the  world  by  the  Kremlin,  is  a 
tragedy  for  the  whole  world.  It  ends  up  with  our  talking  all  the 
time  about  these  barbarians  instead  of,  let  us  say,  about  French 
subjects. 

I  am  getting  a  little  off  the  subject,  I  am  afraid. 

Mr.  Arens.  "WTiat  is  your  appraisal  of  the  objective  of  the  Soviet 
in  Germany  in  calling  for  a  united  Germany  ? 

General  Howlet.  I  am  sorry  I  didn't  answer  that  originally. 

You  see,  a  conference  is  part  of  their  technique.  It  is  one  part  of 
the  war  they  are  fighting  against  us.  It  is  made  up  of  economic 
warfare,  psychological  warfare,  political  warfare,  and  if  necessary, 
military  or  forced  warfare,  which  they  emphasize  in  any  part  of  the 
world  at  any  time,  depending  on  which  method  the  Kremlin  thinks 
will  work  best. 

So  it  will  take  different  forms  in  different  areas  of  the  world.  For 
example,  in  Morocco,  now — I  might  say  that  the  mission  is  economic — 


1306  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

the  purpose  of  economic  warfare  is  to  destroy  the  economy  of  a 
country,  you  see,  and  make  the  people  desperate,  make  them  poor,  make 
them  suffer,  make  them  want  change.  The  purpose  of  psychological 
warfare,  where  they  use  it,  is  to  confuse  their  opponents  so  that  they 
are  like  a  bird  I  saw  one  time  watching  a  snake ;  it  couldn't  move — - 
I  kicked  the  snake  away — I  assume  it  was  hypnotized — and  so  the 
opponent  is  confused,  they  don't  know,  and,  of  course,  that  helps. 
That  is  the  purpose  of  the  psychological  warfare. 

The  j)urpose  of  political  warfare  is  to  get  control  of  the  govern- 
ment, as  they  did  in  Czechoslovakia.  The  military  is  used  as  one  of 
the  instruments ;  it  is  simply  an  extension  of  the  other. 

Now,  we  separate  those  parts,  but  they  don't.  It  is  all  one;  they 
combine  them.     They  are  all  doing  the  same  thing. 

I  am  giving  this  background  because  it  has  a  bearing  on  why  they 
call  a  conference.  You  see,  in  Morocco  they  are  in  phase  one,  which 
is  to  destroy  the  economy  of  the  country.  And  so  when  they  light 
cork  fires,  as  they  did  when  I  was  there,  they  call  them  the  terrorists, 
the  line  goes  back  to  the  Kremlin  through  Tunisia  and  Egypt — the 
terrorists  light  cork  fires.  Cork  is  one  of  the  big  exports  of  the  area, 
only  phosphates  and  wheat  are  ahead  of  it. 

But  if  you  light  a  fire  on  the  dock,  a  ship  won't  take  the  cork  out, 
because  cork  can  revive  and  burn  up  the  ship.  So  there  is  a  lot  of 
cork  that  has  nowhere  to  go. 

Wlien  you  perpetrate  a  number  of  murders,  which  are  even  politi- 
cally trivial,  the  tourist  trade  stops. 

All  of  this  is  a  series  of  economic  things  combined  with  the  psycho- 
logical, where  they  get  the  natives  to  talk  about  the  French  and 
colonialism,  whereas  in  many  instances  colonialism  bears  a  resem- 
blance to  our  point  4  program,  whether  it  is  good  or  bad,  you  have  to 
say  this  is  bad  colonialism  or  this  is  good  colonialism,  whether  it  is 
good  or  bad,  you  have  to  say  so. 

All  these  things  are  working  in  different  places  one  way  or  the 
other,  but  always  together.  Together  with  the  groups  which  the 
jiolitical  people  are  indoctrinating,  the  Communists  set  up  cells. 
With  every  bit  of  ground  taken  in  China  by  Mao  Tse-tung,  goes  back- 
ing by  political  organizations.     But  it  is  all  one. 

But  why  do  they  go  to  a  conference?  The  conference  is  a  device 
for  getting  their  way.  For  us  a  conference  is  a  place  where  j^ou  go 
and  iron  out  differences.  To  them  a  conference  is  a  very  powerful 
weapon  against  reasonable  people. 

So  anticipate  real  trouble  when  a  conference  is  called. 

You  could  do  it  this  way.  Let's  assume  that  here  we  are  and  here 
the  Soviets  are.  I  will  include  in  the  Soviets  all  of  these  Communist 
leaders,  whether  they  have  the  eyes  of  the  man  from  China  or  whether 
they  have  the  features  of  the  man  from  Africa,  or  the  features  of  the 
man  from  Central  America,  their  principles  are  the  same. 

Here  they  are.  They  go  to  a  conference.  They  know  where  they 
are  going.  They  are  moving  along  in  their  effort  to  gain  control  of  the 
world.  And  they  never  change  from  that  purpose,  and  haven't  for 
many  years.  They  never  stop.  "VYlien  they  go  to  a  conference  they 
will  all  talk  in  the  hope  that  they  will  get  a  concession  that  will  ad- 
vance them,  you  see.  They  never  go  back,  even  though  Lenin  did 
describe  a  process  for  going  backward;  I  think  he  called  it,  "1  step 
back,  2  forward." 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1307 

They  never  stop  while  they  confer.   They   are  moving  forward 

always. 

When  we  go  to  a  conference — sometimes  we  don't  know  where  we 
are  going  anyway — our  policy  isn't  set.  That  is  understandable,  be- 
cause we  Americans  don't  want  anything.  We  are  not  hungry;  we 
don't  need  more  food  or  automobiles;  we  have  got  them.  We  don't 
want  anybody's  land.    So  we  start  out  with  not  being  very  positive. 

But  they  know  what  they  want  when  they  go  to  a  conference.  Let's 
assume  that  we  are  going  on  here  with  a  certain  policy.  We  stop,  for 
fear — and  as  one  of  mj^  critics  used  the  expression  about  me,  he  said 
that  my  periodic  statements  "tended  to  tear  asunder  the  delicate  fab- 
ric of  international  negotiations,"  or  some  such  nonsense. 

There  is  nothing  delicate  in  dealing  with  the  Soviets.  You  can't 
insult  them. 

So  we  stop  and  they  continue  on. 

Let's  take  Dienbienphu  last  fall.  A  conference  was  called,  and  we 
agreed — a  conference  with  these  people  with  a  hideous  philosophy, 
these  enemies  of  everything  good,  these  seekers  of  control  of  a  great 
nation  of  good  people ;  and  they  have  been  more  cruel  to  the  Russian 
people  than  anybody  else — we  agreed  to  a  conference  at  Geneva.  So 
we  stopped.  In  the  meantime  there  was  fighting  at  Dienbienphu. 
They  were  going  right  ahead.  And  while  we  stopped  they  stepped  up 
their  artillery  fire,  and  so  on  and  so  forth,  to  make  this  lowland  posi- 
tion at  Dienbienphu  completely  untenable. 

To  show  you  how  completely  they  stopped  us,  the  French  called  for 
help.  But  you  heard  the  statement  coming  from  our  allies  and  some 
of  our  people,  "Let's  do  nothing  to  upset  the  negotiations."  So,  while 
we  did  nothing  to  upset  the  negotiations,  they  captured  Dienbienphu, 
gave  the  French  a  tremendous  blow  to  their  prestige,  killed  a  lot  of 
people  fighting  for  their  government,  and  advanced  their  cause  of 
communism  by  quite  a  jump. 

So  if  Chou  En-lai  says  he  wants  to  have  a  conference  I  think  it  is 
an  insult  to  start  with  that  this  man  is  willing  to  recognize  us.  He  has 
turned  it  around.  We  started  off  by  saying  that  we  won't  recognize 
his  government ;  it  isn't  the  real  government ;  it  doesn't  represent  the 
Chinese  people  at  all.  Yet  apparently  some  people  were  delighted 
when  the  Communist  Chou  En-lai  said,  "Now  we  are  willing  to  sit 
down  and  talk  to  you."  It  is  an  insult  to  start  with.  You  can  be 
sure  he  has  got  something  up  his  sleeve.  Either  he  is  not  willing 
to  make  an  attack  or  can't  make  an  attack,  or  they  are  planning  some- 
thing and  want  us  to  stop  or  want  us  to  talk. 

That  is  a  rather  long-winded  answer. 

Mr.  Arexs.  We  are  glad  to  have  your  response. 

General,  in  the  light  of  your  background  and  experience  as  a 
student  of  world  communism,  how  late  is  it  on  the  Soviet  timetable  for 
world  domination? 

General  Howley.  I  don't  believe  anybody  knows.  You  never  know 
completely  the  other  fellow's  intention  or  his  timetable.  The  aggres- 
sor always,  however,  has  the  advantage  with  a  timetable,  because, 
just  from  the  military  point  of  view,  that  is  an  asset.  And  I  want 
to  emphasize  again  that  is  only  a  part  of  their  war  against  us.  On 
the  military,  if  you  are  planning  an  aggressive  act,  you  can  say,  "We 
will  be  completely  ready  for  it,  we  can  have  these  planes  in  produc- 
tion, we  can  have  these  tanks  in  production,  we  can  have  that  satellite 

59886— 55— pt.  13 2 


1308  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

government  softened,"  and  so  forth,  and  we  will  be  ready  on  a  certain 
date.  But  I  don't  know  what  that  date  is.  The  only  thing  is,  I  am 
sure  they  have  one. 

And  so  we  have  to  judge  it  from  our  point  of  view :  when  will  we 
be  ready.  Well,  the  United  States,  as  long  as  we  have  the  sort  of 
philosophy  which  we  do — and  God  willing,  we  will  always  be  able  to 
have  it — as  long  as  we  have  the  luxury  of  such  a  time  philosophy,  we 
will  have  no  plans  for  aggression.  And,  therefore,  we  always  compro- 
mise by  putting  plans  into  production  or  putting  in  plans  something 
new,  based  on  what  the  other  fellow  will  do. 

Mr.  Arens.  Can  we  solve  this  thing  around  the  conference  table? 

General  Howley.  I  will  give  you  a  time  element.  Here  is  the  time 
element  which  I  consider  vital  today.  Of  course,  the  mission  of  every- 
body is  to  put  an  end  to  wars  as  such.  We  are  quite  willing  to  fight 
their  psychological  and  governmental  wars.  It  is  this  element  of 
f oice  that  we  can't  take.  We  had  an  opportunity  to  end  all  war  for  the- 
foreseeable  future  in  1945^8.  We  could  have  used  forces  in  keep- 
ing with  principles  already  agreed  on.  United  Nations'  principles 
and  others ;  we  could  have  forced  a  termination  of  wholesale  aggression 
at  least.  And  if  our  efforts  to  force  the  Soviet  Union  to  live  up  to 
agreements  had  resulted  in  war,  it  would  have  been  a  very  simple  war. 
And  it  probably  would  not  have  resulted  in  war.  If  we  had  been 
strong  and  insisted  on  some  plan  such  as  Baruch's  plan,  including 
these  safeguards  of  inspection,  we  could,  I  believe,  have  compelled  the 
Soviet  Union,  whether  they  wanted  it  or  not,  to  accept  limitations 
which  would  have  protected  us  against  attacks  which  may  come  im 
the  future.  We  lost  that  opportunity,  partially  because,  I  think,  we 
are  good  people,  and  we  wanted  to  believe  the  best  of  them ;  partially 
because  we  lacked  determination,  and  partially  because  we  were  un- 
willing to  suffer  a  little  bit,  and  we  would  rather  postpone  some  of 
these  strong  unpleasant  things  in  the  hope  that  they  would  solve 
themselves. 

Now,  the  time  is  running  out.  There  isn't  any  question  of  the 
Kremlin's  willingness  to  use  any  weapon  which  will  attain  their  ends. 
As  one  Russian  general  said  to  me — I  said,  "What  was  the  sense,  in 
the  commune  of  1870  in  Paris,  of  the  Communists  running  around  and 
putting  chorus  girls  on  the  Notre  Dame  altar  and  pulling  down  the  old 
statue  at  the  Place  Vendome  and  destroying  things  ?" 

Then  he  said :  "Sometimes  you  must  destroy  everything  to  rebuild  it 
properly."  And  therefore  Communists — and  that  includes  Mao  Tse- 
tung — will  not  hesitate  to  destroy  everything,  if  they  cannot  control 
it. 

To  get  back  to  our  time  element,  right  now  they  are  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  use  force  to  attain  their  ends,  because  they  know  we  will  fight^ 
and  because  we  do  have  superiority.  It  isn't  a  matter  of  5  days 
of  fighting.  The  United  States  has  superiority  of  everything  except 
superiority  of  evil.  We  have  superiority  of  philosophy,  I  believe,  of 
arms,  of  planes,  of  missiles,  of  planning,  of  the  thinking  power  of 
the  individual,  and  of  all  these  factors  that  enter  into  modern  warfare. 

But  the  Soviet  Union,  up  until  they  obtained  the  means  of  making 
the  hydrogen  bomb  or  the  atomic  bomb  on  a  big  scale,  did  not  have 
the  means  of  offsetting  all  our  superiorities.  They  knew  that  they 
could  not  fight  us  in  tlie  old-fasliioned  way.     They  could  not  use 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMIVIUNISM  1309 

force  against  the  United  States  based  on  the  type  of  fighting  used 
in  the  last  war,  because  no  nation  in  the  \Yorld,  except  the  United 
States,  could  fight  that  kind  of  a  war,  wdiich  requires  a  tremendous 
steel  output,  over  a  hundred  million  tons  a  year,  tremendous  in- 
genuity of  women  who  can  go  in  plants  and  put  gadgets  together, 
and  all  of  these  things  that  the  United  States  has  and  in  which  we 
are  vastly  superior. 

Now,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  world,  there  are  two 
very  dangerous  weapons  in  existence  by  which  a  handful  of  evil  men 
can  destro}'  a  whole  nation  of  good,  powerful  men.  And  of  course 
the  two  weapons — one  of  them  is  one  you  would  think  of,  that  is, 
the  gi-eat  bombs,  the  hydrogen  l^omb  particularly.  Enough  of  them 
with  the  means  of  delivering  them  to  the  American  cities  can  para- 
lyze us,  can  very  well,  if  we  wait  long  enough,  destroy  us  and  make 
it  impossible  for  us  to  really  retaliate  if  we  accept  the  first  punch. 
It  is  entirely  possible,  although  that  is  an  area  where  nobody  is 
certain. 

The  second  great  element  that  makes  world  dictatorship  possible 
now^  is  one  you  wouldn't  usually  think  of,  communications.  It  is  pos- 
sible now  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  world  for  one  man  to 
impose  his  will  on  all  the  people  of  the  world,  technically  it  is  pos- 
sible, by  means  of  television,  radio,  the  press,  and  so  forth.  Of 
course,  at  this  point  here  are  many  parts  of  the  world,  in  Africa, 
and  so  forth,  where  they  don't  have  a  radio  and  they  don't  have  these 
things  that  can  influence  your  mind  and  sway  you.  But  the  me- 
chanical means  exist  today  for  the  Kremlin  not  only  to  quickly  get 
control  of  areas,  but  by  a  process  of  indoctrination  and  twisting  of 
minds  to  timi  the  populations  of  the  world  so  the  world  doesn't  know 
right  from  wrong  and  which  way  is  up  or  down. 

And  that  is  a  second  great  threat. 

I  will  dwell  more  on  that.  We  all  have  that  communications 
threat.  The  answer  to  it,  of  course,  is  the  thing  that  we  have  in 
America  and  we  try  to  develop  in  colleges.  It  is  a  critical  sense,  that 
an  individual  should  insist  on  being  an  individual  and  ask,  "Wlio 
says  so  ?     Is  it  true  ? " 

Mr.  Arens.  ^\^iat  distinction  do  the  Soviets  make  between  the  cold 
war  and  the  hot  war  ? 

General  Howlet.  There  isn't  any  distinction  at  all.  They  are  just 
popular  words.  They  don't  even  make  a  distinction  between  the 
effort  to  destroy  the  economy  of  a  country  by  starting  a  strike  move- 
ment, for  instance,  and  ruining  one  small  plant — it  is  all  part  of  one 
plan  to  them. 

Terms  such  as  "hot  war"  and  "cold  war" — I  doubt  if  the  Russian 
people  ever  heard  of  the  terms — but  they  are  terms  that  grow  out  of 
our  desire  to  work  out  names  for  things ;  they  don't  mean  anything ; 
it  is  all  part  of  one  great  plan. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  may  we  proceed  with  an  analysis  and  appraisal 
of  the  Communist  penetration  and  threat  in  specific  areas  of  the  world 
in  which  you  have  made  a  special  study  ?  I  would  suggest  that  you 
pick  the  area  of  the  world  that  you  would  like  to  discuss  first  and  go 
ahead,  if  you  please,  sir. 

General  Howlet.  I  would  like  to  start  with  Guatemala  because  that 
threat  is  terminated  and  it  is  a  rather  encouraging  situation. 


1310  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

There  is  an  awfully  good  lesson  there  which  we  ouijht  to  remember. 
The  lesson  is  that  we  should  not  be  fooled  into  thinking  that  the 
people  of  any  country  are  behind  the  Communist  government. 

I  say  that  because  when  I  was  in  Guatemala  before  the  revolution, 
if  you  judged  by  what  was  in  the  newspapers  or  what  you  heard  over 
the  radio,  or  what  you  saw  on  streamers  all  over  the  city,  and  what 
you  heard  these  Communists  say,  and  these  Communist-led  "setups" — 
if  you  listened  to  them,  all  the  people  were  in  back  of  this  wonderful 
thing,  and  they  were  speaking  for  the  people.  The  fact  was  that 
when  this  government  was  challenged  in  the  way  in  which  it  was  chal- 
lenged, by  force — and  it  was  a  government  which  was  maintained  by 
force — when  the  government  was  challenged  by  force,  there  was  prac- 
tically nobody  in  back  of  the  Communist  government.  On  the  physical 
side  of  the  war  you  could  literally  say  that  there  were  only  a  handful 
that  had  taken  control. 

The  army  was  in  the  barracks.  And  you  wouldn't  be  exaggerating 
if  you  said  that  3  men  in  3  hired  planes  did  it.  You  might  say  one 
of  the  chaps  did  it.  They  did  drop  bombs  on  those  ammunition 
dumps  and  1  was  hit  and  about  180  killed.  At  that  time  the  Presi- 
dent— he  called  himself  President,  though  he  had  really  seized  that 
control — be  called  on  the  army  to  rally  and  repel  this  little  force  that 
was  sitting  down  there  in  the  jungle. 

The  army  said  "No."  Then  he  called  on  the  trade  unions.  The 
trade  unions  were  not  really  trade  unions;  they  were  set  up  by  Com- 
munists and  controlled  by  Communists.  So  he  called  on  the  trade 
unions,  and  I  think  that  nobody  but  2  or  3  Communist  leaders  re- 
sponded. He  called  on  the  people  to  rise  up  and  defend  their  govern- 
ment. But  they  knew  that  they  weren't  defending  their  government, 
and  they  weren't  going  to  waste  any  time  in  defending  these  Com- 
munists. 

And  so  the  President  ran  and  hid  in  the  cellar  of  an  embassy  where, 
according  to  South  American  custom,  he  was  safe.  He  is  now  a  citizen 
of  Switzerland. 

Mr.  Arens.  That,  then,  was  not  the  usual  Communist  conspiracy? 

General  Howley.  Yes.  Let's  not  be  fooled  or  confused  by  these 
Communists.  Any  man  with  a  printing  plant  and  someone  to  help 
him  can  cover  the  city  with  placards.  Let's  not  be  confused  by  that. 
That  is  the  first  lesson. 

I  have  mentioned  Morocco.  Phase  1  is  that  of  destroying  author- 
ity. Obviously,  you  must  get  authority  destroyed  or  you  can't  get 
things  stirred  up  so  that  you  can  seize  control  because  anyone  in  his 
right  mind  would  not  vote  the  Communists  into  control  of  anything. 

Their  system  is  very  poor ;  it  is  brutal ;  it  is  slave  labor ;  and  they 
still  can't  produce  goods.  They  make  you  give  up  God  and  golf  and 
you  still  can't  get  shoes. 

Wlien  they  go  into  Morocco— obviously  it  is  not  ready  for  any- 
body's troops  to  go  in  there — their  object  is  to  destroy  the  authority. 
If  the  authority  is  the  French  Government,  destroy  that.  If  the 
government  is  a  political  party,  discredit  that,  as  they  tried  to  do  in 
Berlin.  If  the  authority  is  the  church,  destroy  that.  Get  it  out;  it 
doesn't  matter  what  church  it  is.  If  religion  is  a  form  of  holding 
people  together,  destroy  it. 

In  Morocco  and  north  Africa  there  is  much  to  be  said  as  to  the 
good  work  that  has  been  done  there  by  the  French.    Much  of  their 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1311 

colonialism  has  been  really  quite  magnificent.  But  if  you  read  some 
writers  who  have  gone  over  there — one  in  particular  who  capitalized 
upon  his  position  to  indicate  objectively  and  then  produced  a  pam- 
phlet— if  you  read  those  you  would  think  there  was  a  dreadful 
situation  there,  and  that  it  is  all  due  to  the  French  Government. 

Mr.  Aeens.  May  I  suggest  that  we  proceed  to  your  appraisal  of  the 
situation  in  the  Far  East  with  particular  reference  to  Formosa  and 
Eed  China? 

General  Howley.  Yes.  There  is  a  similarity  out  there,  of  course, 
to  many  other  spots  in  the  world.  There  is  a  similarity  to  Germany. 
They  are  working  around  the  world  now,  and  dividing  it. 

If  a  war  is  going  to  come,  if  you  assume  a  war  becomes  inevitable, 
it  will  certainly  be  an  awful  one,  the  longer  we  wait,  because  we  are 
teaching  everybody  how  to  shoot  each  other  now.  And  I  would  rather, 
years  ago — and  even  now — I  would  rather  force  issues  and  get  rid 
of  this  constant  threat  of  war,  even  if  it  meant  fighting.  But  we 
always  go  into  these  wars  and  fight  a  war  to  end  wars,  and  then  quit 
and  come  home  and  let  a  few  enemies  stir  it  all  up  again. 

Well,  my  recent  visit  to  Formosa  and  Hong  Kong 

Mr.  Arens.  "When  was  that,  by  the  way  ? 

General  Howley.  I  believe  I  have  been  back  about  6  weeks.  It 
was  at  the  turn  of  the  year.    I  was  gone  about  a  total  of  6  weeks. 

In  think  of  the  Orient — and  I  refuse  to  get  myself  all  involved  in 
not  being  able  to  talk  because  somebody  objects  to  calling  him  an 
oriental — it  has  been  my  observation  that  the  only  people  who  object 
to  an  English  word  which  is  well  meant  are  enemies,  so  they  say, 
"You  can't  use  the  word  'oriental'^ — that  means  you  don't  understand 
the  oriental  people."   Most  of  that  is  bunk. 

In  the  first  place,  when  you  say  it  in  Chinese  it  doesn't  even  sound 
the  way  it  does  in  English.  In  dealing  with  the  orientals,  we  are  all 
ignorant.  And  that  has  caused  us  to  be  misled  by  a  small  number  of 
people  who  claim  to  be  experts. 

Now,  whether  these  experts  misled  us  because  they  are  ignorant  or 
because  they  are  in  the  pay  of  the  Soviet  Union  I  wouldn't  attempt 
to  pass  judgment.  I  don't  know.  I  can't  tell  what  goes  on  in  a  man's 
mind  or  why  he  is  doing  something.  But  we  have  been  grossly 
misinformed. 

And  because  the  Orient  has  been  so  far  away  from  us  and  there  have 
been  so  few  schoolteachers  and  kids  and  professors  and  others  from 
our  universities  going  back  and  forth  and  businessmen  from  the  Mid- 
dle West  going  out  there,  we  haven't  known.  We  haven't  had  the 
feeling  which  people  get  from  the  way  we  now  travel  in  Europe.  It 
would  help  us  a  great  deal  in  dealing  with  the  Orient  in  the  future 
if  we  had  more  of  our  people  going  out  there. 

Wlien  I  was  graduated  from  college  I  saved  some  money  and  I 
went  to  France.  I  went  to  the  Sorbonne  and  studied  there,  and  in 
Germany. 

Today  I  would  recommend  that  many  of  our  students  go  to  the 
Orient  for  their  postgraduate  work.  I  recommended  that  to  my  oldest 
boy,  who  is  a  freshman  in  New  York  University  now. 

We  are  prone  to  misjudge  the  Orient  because  there  haven't  been 
enough  people  who  know  what  the  country  looks  like  out  there,  be- 
cause it  is  a  very  big  country  and  there  are  a  lot  of  people. 


1312  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

Most  of  the  information  that  I  started  off  with,  particularly  about 
the  government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek,  the  Nationalist  Government,  the 
legitimate  government  of  China — mostly  the  information  I  started 
with,  I  found  to  be  false.  The  type  of  thing  I  had  heard  was  that 
they  had  an  old  man's  army,  kind  of  limping  around  out  on  Formosa, 
and  if  we  were  counting  on  them  to  do  any  fighting  in  support  of 
anything  it  was  a  mistake.  That  is  completely  false.  I  -went  out  on 
maneuvers  with  them.  I  had  a  little  camera,  and  I  took  many  pic- 
tures— but  my  finger  covered  the  camera  and  they  didn't  come  out  so 
well.  But  I  made  a  point  of  taking  a  great  number  of  pictures  of 
this  kind  of  army. 

The  average  age  of  the  army  is  28,  which  is  not  an  old  army  at  all. 
I  don't  know  how  it  works  out  that  they  have  got  an  old  man's  army. 
That  army  is  dedicated  to  going  back  and  liberating  China.  And 
that  army  is  a  young  man's  army,  and  they  are  being  taught,  and  learn- 
ing very  fast,  how  to  fight  western  style,  which  is  in  a  cooperative 
manner,  using  modern  weapons  rather  than  the  primitive  style  that 
is  still  used  by  Mao  Tse-tung. 

Wlien  you  have  an  army  trained  in  western  style,  numbers  don't 
mean  very  much.  So  to  say,  "This  little  army  won't  have  a  chance 
against  this  vast  army  of  2%  million."  Well,  how  many  millions  have 
we  got  in  our  Army?  You  can  write  anything  on  a  piece  of  paper. 
But  in  the  final  analysis  the  number  you  can  put  on  a  battlefield  is 
how  many  you  can  arm  properly  and  train  properly  and  transport 
properly. 

And  Mao  Tse-tung's  announcement  that  he  has  this  2%  million 
doesn't  rpean  anything.  Nor  do  numbers  mean  anything  against  a 
well-equipped  and  organized  force. 

So  the  force  on  Formosa  is  much  better  than  I  had  expected. 

Just  incidentally,  the  average  age  of  28  is  quite  young.  Where  you 
really  need  young  fellows  is  in  flying  jets.  Yet  the  average  age  of 
our  jet  aces  in  Korea  was  just  over  28,  around  29.  And  the  average 
age  of  all  our  flyers  there,  including  jets  and  the  rest  of  them,  was, 
I  think,  33. 

And  this  chap  that  set  the  record  from  California  to  New  York 
was  35  years  old. 

So  let's  not  go  overboard  on  the  fallacy  that  this  army  on  Formosa 
is  an  old  man's  army. 

Another  fallacy  was  that  this  was  a  corrupt  government  of  Chiang 
Kai-shek,  that  the  government  was  bad.  I  don't  know  what  they  did 
on  the  mainland.  I  do  know  why  they  didn't  put  into  effect  reforms, 
and  it  makes  sense  to  me.  China  started  having  reforms  to  modernize 
the  country  a  bit  and  still  not  lose  their  wonderful  traditions  and  their 
wonderful  family  life  with  Sun  Yat-sen.  Chiang  Kai-shek  was  one 
of  his  followers.  When  the  group  that  the  Soviets  are  behind,  the 
group  represented  by  Mao  Tse-tung's  Communists,  attempted  to  seize 
control,  they  couldn't  get  control  of  this  revolution.  Mind  you,  the 
Communists  have  never  produced  a  general  revolution ;  like  a  Cuckoo 
bird  they  would  rather  move  in  on  something,  as  they  moved  in  on 
the  Russian  Revolution,  which  started  off  as  a  people's  revolution, 
and  seized  control.  Mao  Tse-tung's  group  tried  to  get  control  in 
China,  and  they  fought  what  is  now  the  Nationalist  government  for 
years.    Then  the  Japanese  occupied  China  all  during  the  war  years. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1313 

SO  how  could  reforms  be  put  into  effect  ?  On  the  island  of  Formosa 
there  is  a  modern  renaissance  of  a  real  China,  a  renaissance  which  is 
bringing  about  needed  modernizations  without  the  sacrificing  of  the 
principles  which  make  the  Chinese  people  great. 

Even  in  the  matter  of  the  redistribution  of  land — in  Formosa — of 
those  tenant  farmers  in  the  past,  over  40  percent  of  them  are  now 
owners  of  their  own  land.  The  land  was  made  available  both  from 
the  state-owned  land  which  had  been  held  by  the  Japanese  when  they 
were  there — because  the  Japanese  were  in  control  of  Formosa,  you 
know,  for  50  years — those  lands  were  distributed,  and  certain  big 
estates  were  also  distributed.  Yet  the  men  who  owned  the  biggest 
estates  were  given  genuine  compensation,  which  is  the  difference 
between  distributing  land  under  a  system  of  justice  and  distributing 
land  under  a  Communist  system. 

Senator  Jenner.  Let  the  record  show  that  Senator  Hennings  is 
now  in  attendance. 

Senator  Hennixgs.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  wanted  to  come  and  hear  the 
general  long  before  this,  but  I  had  another  meeting. 

General  Howlet.  Senator,  I  had  indicated  that  it  was  all  part  of 
the  same  conspiracy,  and  our  problem  was  pretty  much  the  same  in 
all  these  areas.  And  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  solutions  may  come 
all  at  one  time. 

But  the  observations  in  Formosa  and  the  observations  in  Hong 
Kong,  they  fit  right  in  with  those  observations  which  you.  Senator, 
and  others  have  seen  in  Germany,  in  Berlin. 

Mr.  Arens.  Will  Chiang  Kai-shek  fight  to  the  death  to  defend 
Formosa  ? 

General  Ho^vlet.  "Well,  he  doesn't  even  think  in  terms  of  defense. 
Neither  do  I.  I  have  very  little  respect  for  defense.  You  can't  even 
get  a  girl  that  way,  you  have  to  take  the  offensive  if  you  want  to 
marry  her.  A  fellow  with  a  drugstore  never  thinks  in  terms  of  holding 
what  business  he  has,  he  thinks  in  terms  of  getting  more. 

A  defense  policy  would  destroy  American  spirit  if  vou.  really  carried 
it  out.  There  are  nations  that  think  in  terms  of  tlie  status  quo,  or 
as  things  are.  But  America  never  has.  So  I  can't  think  of  the  Orient 
or  of  anywhere  else  in  terms  of  defending  things;  it  is  almost 
impossible. 

In  modern  warfare  you  can't  defend,  except  as  a  very  temporary 
measure ;  you  always  lose.  It  is  impossible  to  have  a  perfect  defense 
if  the  other  fellow  has  a  very  good  offense. 

So  Chiang  Kai-shek  is  with  us  on  that.  He  never  thinks  in  terms 
of  defending  Formosa.  Formosa  is  easy  to  defend  as  an  island. 
There  are  a  hundred  miles  of  rough  water  between  it  and  the  main- 
land. Assuming  that  we  want  to  help  and  gain  control  of  the  situation 
either  by  way  of  the  water  or  by  way  of  the  air,  Formosa  couldn't 
possibly  be  taken. 

There  isn't  any  point  in  talking  about  Formosa  or  whether  we  can 
defend  Formosa. 

Mr.  Arens,  Do  you  have  any  observation  to  make  with  reference  to 
any  lessons  which  we  should  learn  from  the  situation  in  Korea  in  try- 
ing to  formulate  a  policy  of  this  Govermnent  to  meet  the  worldwide 
Communist  threat  ? 

General  Howlet.  Yes,  sir.  The  lessons  — we  get  all  of  these  lessons, 
and  then  we  seem  to  go  off  and  forget  them.     That  is  a  disappointing 


1314  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

thing  to  SO  many  of  us.  All  of  the  lessons  that  were  learned  were 
learned  in  Berlin.  I  wrote  my  first  book,  Berlin  Command,  and  I 
have  written  others,  about  it. 

Senator  Hennings.  General  Hand  and  others  in  Berlin  told  me  that 
is  one  of  the  best  books  that  has  ever  been  written  on  the  subject,  your 
book. 

General  Howley.  Even  their  techniques  at  the  conference  table, 
even  the  smile  techniques  are  the  same.  I  noticed  in  the  paper  today, 
if  it  is  accurate — and  I  have  great  confidence  in  these  newspaper  re- 
ports. I  know  a  lot  of  these  press  chaps,  and  they  have  been  doing  an 
awful  good  job  for  the  American  people — that  Zhukov  wrote  Eisen- 
hower along  the  line  of  "We  are  soldier  boys;  let's  release  this  kid 
and  let  him  go  back  to  his  parents" — they  often  did  that  with  me  in 
Berlin.    That  has  no  significance ;  that  is  off  to  the  side. 

Wliether  Zhukov  likes  Eisenhower  personally  has  no  bearing  on  the 
subject.  It  would  with  us.  If  you  make  a  friend  of  an  English  gen- 
eral or  statesman  and  then  you  go  to  the  conference  table  the  next  day, 
he  may  do  what  his  government  orders,  even  if  he  doesn't  like  it,  but  he 
will  let  you  know  that  it  isn't  personal.  The  Soviet  representative  has 
no  freedom  of  choice  at  all,  and  whether  he  likes  you  or  not  doesn't 
matter.  Actually  the  Soviets  I  dealt  with  all  liked  me ;  I  am  sure  of  it 
from  what  they  said,  but  that  wouldn't  hinder  them  from  killing  me 
the  next  day  if  it  entered  into  their  plans. 

I  have  been  out  in  the  evening  with  them  and  have  had  a  grand 
time  drinking  vodka — and  they  drink  until  they  break  the  glasses  on 
the  wall — and  the  next  day  at  the  conference  table  there  would  be  no 
difference  at  all — the  same  old  line. 

And  those  representatives  who  begin  to  soften  a  little  bit  and  not 
hate  us,  they  get  removed  from  contact.  That  was  the  case  of  those 
who  contacted  me  who  were  a  little  bit  inclined  to  think  that  maybe 
we  didn't  have  horns ;  they  were  immediately  yanked  out  and  taken  out 
of  contact  and  reindoctrinated. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  on  the  basis  of  your  background  and  extensive 
experience,  what  overall  strategy  and  technique  do  you  recommend 
for  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  use  in  meeting  the  world- 
wide Communist  threat  ? 

General  Howley.  Assuming  that  we  are  all  agreed  that  this  threat 
does  exist — and  there  will  always  be  a  small  percentage  that  you  can't 
change  for  one  reason  or  another,  and  there  are  even  people  who  live 
in  a  cave  somewhere,  so  we  will  never  have  100  percent  of  the  American 
people  agree  on  things — I  think  all  of  our  leaders  and  all  of  our  think- 
ing people,  after  all  these  murders  and  deaths  and  all  of  these  lies  have 
been  perpetrated,  I  think  today,  the  vast  majority  of  Americans  recog- 
nize this  whole  Communist  system  for  what  it  is,  that  tliis  interna- 
tional conspiracy  is  bad,  and  it  is  very  bad  for  us.  And  I  think  that 
the  people  recognize  that  there  is  no  real  compromise  with  them. 
There  may  be  little  temporary  things,  but  there  is  no  real  settling  of 
this  problem. 

There  are  two  ways,  therefore,  that  you  can  operate.  One  is  to 
take  positive  action  to  see  that  these  Communist  governments  are 
destroyed.  That  doesn't  mean  rolling  the  drum  necessarily,  one,  two, 
one,  two  across  some  place  for  military  liberation.  But  certainly 
there  is  a  pattern  of  thought  that  you  must — I  don't  know  what  word 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF   WORLD    COMIVIUNISM  1315 

you  use,  you  can  call  it  liberation,  maybe,  if  you  want,  but  that  isn't  a 
good  word— but  we  must  take  positive  steps  and  plan  everything  to 
see  that  these  Communist  governments  fall,  whether  it  is  in  Guatemala 
or  somewhere  else.    And  they  fall  with  surprising  ease. 

Now,  the  other  way  is  the  way— call  it  what  you  want,  you  can  call 
it  delay  or  postponement  or  coexistence  or  "let's  do  nothing"  or  "let's 
do  anything  to  avoid  dying" — of  course,  even  though  we  are  all  gomg 
to  die— I  can  tell  you  a  good  story  about  a  Buddhist's  comment  on 
that.  He  said,  "You  people  talk  about  the  hereafter  but  run  your 
affairs  as  if  there  weren't  any  hereafter."  He  said,  "I  am  a  Buddhist ; 
I  know  little  about  the  hereafter— but  there  are  three  phases :  birth, 
life,  and  death.  Each  has  a  place.  You  believe  in  the  concept  of 
afterlife,  but  you  don't  allow  it  to  control  what  you  do  in  life." 

Anyhow  you  have  two  general  plans  of  action  as  I  see  it.  One  is 
coexistence,"^  defense,  decline.  And  the  other  is  positive  actions  in 
order  to  destroy  these  governments  which  are  dedicated  to  our  destruc- 
tion. 

In  1945  or  1946  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  we  must  see  these 
governments  fall,  and  we  must  use  everything,  we  must  use  moral 
means,  psychological  warfare,  economic  blockade,  and  even  the  risk 
of  war — because  there  will  never  be  a  war  with  any  Communist  gov- 
ernment unless  that  Communist  government  wants  a  war  anyhow.  In 
the  case  of  the  present  Government  of  Russia,  they  fought  a  major 
war  with  the  Japanese  on  that  Hill  286  in  Manchuria.  I  talked  with 
the  Russian  general  who  commanded  the  troops.  They  used  their 
artillery,  troops,  and  everything  for  a  major  fight;  they  didn't  declare 
war,  so  if  there  was  a  mere  killing  of  hundreds  of  Communists,  if  it 
did  not  suit  the  Communist  purpose,  they  would  do  nothing  about  it. 

In  one  sense  it  is  very  easy  to  deal  with  Communist  governments, 
because  they  will  not  do  emotional  things.  The  British  Empire  was 
built  on  emotion.  And  I  do  hope  that  we  never  lose  our  emotions, 
because  there  are  so  many  things  tied  up  with  them.  A  cold,  rational, 
bleak  world,  I  have  very  little  use  for.  I  agree  with  the  Greeks  that 
the  mind  should  be  the  servant  of  the  heart. 

But  they  will  only  use  war  as  an  instrument  when  it  suits  them. 
Therefore,  if  they  have  a  schedule  and  it  suits  them,  and  we  do  some- 
thing, they  might  fight,  or  they  might  even  without  excuse.  They 
might  just  fight  if  it  suited  them  to  fight.  But  our  action  would  have 
little  to  do  with  it,  because  if  they  wanted  a  fight  they  would  simply 
produce  an  incident,  or  they  would  get  stooges  to  give  them  the 
excuses. 

They  have  used,  since  the  end  of  the  last  World  War,  a  very  good 
knowledge  of  the  way  we  think.  And  they  have  had  some  of  our  top 
people  advise  them  on  how  we  think.  They  have  used  a  threat  of  war 
as  a  means  of  getting  concessions.  If  they  can  get  us  to  say  that 
nothing  matters  but  peace ;  if  they  can  get  us  to  that  point  of  view, 
they  have  got  the  world.  Of  course,  this  is  mere  nonsense.  There 
are  a  lot  of  things  that  are  a  lot  more  important  than  peace.  If  you 
accepted  that  there  would  be  no  struggle  and  no  progress  in  any  di- 
rection. For  that  they  have  threatened.  And  in  the  early  days  at 
conferences  they  always  had  the  god  of  war  standing  back  of  the 
Russian  representative.  There  was  always  that  threat,  whether  it 
was  Europe  or  somewhere  else.     If  we  didn't  give  them  the  conces- 


1316  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

sions,  if  we  didn't  sit  down  and  negotiate,  there  would  be  war.  We 
thought  that  giving  in  was  better  than  war,  you  see,  because  that  is 
the  way  we  think ;  anything  is  better  than  war.  If  they  can  get  us 
convinced  that  peace  is  all  that  matters,  they  have  got  what  they  want. 
So  they  have  always  threatened  us. 

Senator  Hennings.  Right  at  that  point  may  I  inquire,  you  don't 
think  that  is  the  way  we  as  a  people  generally  think,  do  you  ? 

General  Howley.  No. 

Senator  Hennings.  We  don't  think  anything  is  better  than  war? 
Do  you  think  we  as  a  people,  I  say,  the  generality,  the  majority  of  the 
American  people,  take  the  loss  of  our  freedom,  take  slavery,  totali- 
tarian government,  all  of  the  things  that  are  inherent  in  communism — 
we  don't  prefer  that  to  war,  do  we  ? 

General  Howley.  No,  sir.     And  of  course  we  fought  one  of  the- 

Senator  Hennings.  I  understood  you  to  say  that  is  the  way  we  are 
thinking  now. 

General  Howley.  It  was  rephrased.  Senator,  and  I  didn't  quite  fol- 
low— no,  of  course.  We  fought  really  one  of  the  most  awful  wars  of 
history  over  slavery  to  free  the  colored  man  in  the  Civil  War. 

Senator  Hennings.  They  didn't  call  it  that ;  they  called  it  the  war 
to  save  the  Union,  that  was  the  rallying  force  Mr.  Lincoln  used  so 
successfully.  He  wanted  to  stay  away  from  the  war  to  free  the 
slaves. 

General  How^ley.  I  concede  your  point.  But  that  was  a  point  they 
used  in  getting  the  boys  to  march  out  and  fight  each  other.  That  was 
one  factor,  but  another  factor  was  certainly  economic  in  the  Civil 
War.  So  if  you  took  all  the  factors,  including  the  right  of  the  state 
to  determine  its  own  destiny,  they  Avere  things  that  w^ere  more  valuable 
to  the  people  at  the  time  of  the  Civil  War  than  peace.  I  agree  with 
you  now,  and  I  apologize  if  I  picked  out  just  one  part  of  our  incentives. 
That  just  comes  out  of  my  grandfather's  side  of  that  particular  strug- 
gle, that  was  his  motivating  force,  though  there  were  many  different 
ones. 

Therefore  we  have  two  patterns.  One  in  favor  of  holding  on  while 
keeping  strong  so  that  we  do  not  precipitate  a  war.  In  favor  of  that 
is  the  fact — there  are  a  lot  of  things  in  favor  of  it.  The  Soviet  will 
have  trouble  with  their  system.  They  do  have  a  very  poor  system. 
They  promise  the  people  if  they  give  up  all  these  things  like  their 
church,  and  all  of  their  old  customs,  they  will  get  more  material  goods. 
Of  course,  it  sounds  like  the  Devil  tempting  Christ,  and  of  course  it 
is,  it  is  a  promise  of  material  things  if  you  give  up  the  spiritual. 

One  of  their  great  tragedies  is  that  wherever  the  Soviets  are  in 
control,  they  produce  less  goods.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  the  psy- 
chology of  why  that  is,  but  it  is  a  fact  that  they  go  through  the  various 
stages  that  lead  directly  to  slavery.  And  then  they  become  unpopular. 
I  could  tell  you  stories  of  my  visit  to  Poland  cluring  the  blockade, 
when  I  saw  these  poor  people  running  from  one  truck  to  another; 
they  were  going  to  their  second  8-hour  day. 

Marx  said  an  8-hour  day,  but  that  doesn't  mean  a  40-hour  week. 
They  were  running  to  their  second  8-hour  day.  Even  then,  they  were 
producing  less  goods. 

Wlien  production  lags,  they  put  in  regulations  forcing  the  people 
to  work  harder.    They  tried  to  have  heroes  to  set  records,  and  finally 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1317 

they  force  them  into  slave  labor.    Even  then,  they  can't  produce  as 
many  goods  as  free  countries. 

On  this  side  of  holding  on,  of  staying  strong  and  staying  on  the 
defensive,  is  the  fact  that  communism  is  a  very  poor  system.  And 
wherever  it  is,  the  people  hate  it.  I  won't  break  down  by  causes  the 
hate  in  China,  but  there  is  real  hate  there  against  this  government  of 
Mao  Tse-tung. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  terrible,  dreadful  risk  to  this  Ameri- 
can delaying  policy.  The  dreadful  risk  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  will 
confuse  us  and  destroy  our  moral  fabric  because  we  permit  certain 
things  to  go  on,  and  then  we  can't  teach  our  kids  the  right  things. 

Then,  too,  there  is  the  fact  that  the  Russians  are  obtaining  these 
mass  means  of  destruction  and  the  means  of  delivering  them.  We  will 
reach  a  day  when  we  do  not  have  our  present  superiority — or,  we 
may  have  superiorities,  but  they  won't  count,  because  an  aggressor  can 
offset  those  by  his  evil,  and  he  has  enough  bombs  and  things  of  that 
sort  to  harm  us. 

Therefore,  that  is  the  risk.  All  of  us  who  believe,  "Let  us  go  on ; 
let  us  keep  trying;  let  us  do  anything  to  avoid  trouble,"  they  have 
something  on  their  side.    But  the  risk  is  dreadful. 

I  have  never  been  able  to  take  that  risk.  Those  who  think  more  or 
less  in  their  own  ways  along  this  same  idea  probably  have  some  of 
these  same  considerations.  Some  day — it  might  be  2,  3,  or  5  years — 
when  the  Soviets  have  these  massive  means  of  what  we  call  retalia- 
tion or  destruction,  when  they  are  in  a  position  to  attack  us  first,  and 
our  allies,  and  really  destroy  great  chunks  of  the  world,  if  they  can't 
control  the  world  any  other  way,  they  will  use  that  force. 

And  they  will  not  worry  about  it  any  more  than  my  friend.  Gen- 
eral Kotikikov,  who  said,  "Sometimes  you  have  to  destroy  everything 
in  order  to  rebuild  properly." 

We  have,  therefore,  a  period  of  grace  during  which  we  have  supe- 
riority in  retaliatory  power.  We  have  enormous  bombs  which  can 
destroy  the  Soviet  Union.    We  have  the  means  of  delivering  them. 

And  their  defenses  are  not  particularly  good.  They  therefore  would 
not  dare  today  to  attack  our  major  cities  for  any  reason,  because  they 
couldn't  succeed,  and  we  would  succeed  in  winning  against  these 
people. 

These  people  are  dialetic  materialists;  they  don't  do  things  emo- 
tionally, therefore,  while  we  have  superiority  they  will  not  attack  our 
major  cities. 

Meanwhile  we  have  an  opportunity  on  the  positive  side.  We  can 
hold  our  superiority  of  mass  retaliation  in  order  to  guarantee  to  the 
civilized  world  that  these  barbarians  will  not  attack  our  women  and 
children  in  our  cities,  for  the  same  reason  that  Hitler  didn't  use 
poison  gas — because  he  would  have  lost.  We  had  more  poison  gas  than 
he  had,  and  we  were  ready.  Therefore  poison  gas  was  not  used,  and 
other  methods  of  fighting  were. 

We  can  use  tactical  weapons,  we  can  use  these  small  weapons  which 
are  suitable  for  the  battlefield,  atomic  weapons  fired  from  cannon  just 
as  you  fire  high  explosives,  small  atomic  weapons  that  can  be  dropped 
by  planes  which  are  a  tremendous  force  but  which  can  be  limited 
to  the  battlefield  so  that  only  those  who  want  to  fight  will  get  hurt. 

We  can,  I  believe,  start  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  conspiracy,  and  we 
can  start  it  right  across  the  Formosan  Straits  at  an  appropriate  time. 


1318  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

We  should  use  economic,  political,  and  psychological  weapons  against 
them  now,  even  at  the  risk  of  the  Soviets  emphasising  war  against  us, 

This  government  of  Mao  Tse-tung  is  a  weak  government.  The 
people  on  the  mainland  now  see  that  they  have  nothing  to  hope  for 
from  this  government.  I  can  spell  out  in  detail  why,  but  we  haven't 
time  to  do  it. 

They  have,  for  example,  seen  what  happened  when  they  were 
promised  the  land.  They  were  promised  the  land,  but  now  they  don't 
have  the  land,  and  they  are  under  worse  slavery  now  than  they  ever 
were  under  war  lords.  They  have  found,  for  example,  that  all  of 
the  products  of  their  land  must  be  turned  over  to  the  state,  and  they 
get  a  receipt  for  them ;  they  can't  even  get  food  to  eat.  That  receipt 
must  go  in  the  local  Communist-controlled  bank.  So  they  can  save 
so  much  money  in  the  bank,  but  they  can't  take  out  a  bit  of  it  unless 
the  head  of  the  local  Communist  government  says  it  is  for  a  worthy 
cause. 

So  now  all  they  are  doing  is  working  for  the  government,  and  under 
much  more  cruel  conditions  than  under  the  war  lords. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  policy  must  be  pursued  by  our  Government  in 
Formosa  and  in  the  Far  East,  in  your  judgment  ? 

General  Howley.  We  should  use  our  massive  retaliatory  material  to 
protect  our  cities  and  our  allies  against  the  Soviets  attempting  to  at- 
tack our  cities  with  weapons  and  they  can't  do  so  now,  although  how 
long  this  superiority  of  ours  will  exist  I  don't  know.  But  it  does 
exist  now. 

Where  the  Soviets  are  using  force  we  can  use  force  against  them. 
We  can  supply  to  our  allies — I  don't  see  supplying  ground  troops  to 
our  powerful  allies  on  the  flank  of  China ;  I  don't  see  supplying  ground 
troops  to  the  Nationalist  Government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek;  he  has 
plenty  of  ground  troops. 

In  this  great  fight  around  the  world  each  country  should  contribute 
its  share,  and  what  they  have  most  of  is  what  they  ought  to  con- 
tribute. Our  speciality  isn't  troops ;  our  specialty  is  young  men  and 
women  who  can  do  triclcy  things  with  radar,  and  gadgets,  aiq^lanes, 
big  guns,  and  things  like  that.  Some  countries  have  infantry,  and 
that  should  be  their  contribution  to  the  common  fight. 

Senator  Jenner.  What  do  you  think  about  negotiation  at  this  time? 

General  Howley.  Negotiation  only  confuses  us.  That  fits  into  the 
Soviet  pattern  of  psychological  warfare  that  confuses  us.  Senator. 
Any  time  we  sit  down  to  negotiate  with  them  we  have  not  only  con- 
fused our  allies  but  we  have  confused  the  American  people.  How 
can  the  mother  or  uncle  or  cousin  or  friend  who  has  a  relative  in  a 
dungeon  out  there  which  the  Soviets  are  holding — how  can  they  under- 
stand a  friendly  letter  between  the  enemy  and  us,  or  a  conference 
where  we  sit  down  and  talk  with  these  people  ? 

How  can  I  teach  my  kids  what  is  right  or  wrong  if  we  don't  make 
a  distinction?  And,  in  the  final  analysis,  whether  we  recognize  a 
government  or  not  should  not  be  based  on  Stimson's  Nine  Points  as  to 
whether  they  meet  their  obligations,  for  example.  Recognition 
should  be  a  matter  of  principle. 

You  cannot  keep  such  things  secret.  You  cannot  have  one  moral 
in  Timbuktu  and  another  in  north  Africa,  or  someplace  else.  There 
are  too  many  newspapermen  around.  You  can't  employ  Machiavellian 
tactics  of  deceit  today  without  destroying  your  own  people. 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1319 

Therefore  our  national  policy,  I  think,  has  to  be  based  on  principle, 
and  certainly  a  principle  is  that  you  do  not  sit  down  with  a  murderer 
and  discuss  business  or  anything  else  with  him. 

Senator  Jenner.  "N^liat  do  you  think  about  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Russia  at  this  time?  Would  that  help  in  the  psycho- 
logical attack?  Would  it  encourage  the  people  who  are  in  slavery, 
the  fact  that  this  great  Nation  would  no  longer  recognize  a  country 
like  that  and  just  have  nothing  to  do  with  it  ? 

General  Howlet.  I  think  so.  I  think  so,  for  the  sake  of  our  own 
people,  Senator.  One  of  the  great  dangers  we  are  having  today  is 
that  these  compromises,  these  negotiations,  with  men  who  are  strictly 
bad  men,  is  confusing  our  own  people.  We  are  in  danger  of  national 
cynicism.  And  once  the  Nation  arrives  at  a  point  where  the  in- 
dividual says,  "Wliat  is  in  it  for  me?  Wliy  should  I  go  out  and 
fight  for  that  rag?" — and  the  flag  becomes  a  rag — you  don't  have  a 
great  nation.     And  it  is  the  one  thing  that  can't  be  rebuilt. 

The  Egyptians  lost  something  about  2,000  years  ago,  and  it  isn't 
nice  to  say,  but  their  chances  of  coming  back  and  amounting  to 
sometliing  are  very  slim  now.  And  some  of  our  friends,  people  we 
love,  they  are  suffering  from  national  cynicism.  In  other  words,  the 
emphasis  upon  the  fellow  doing  what  he  wants  for  what  he  gets  out 
of  it — when  you  have  that  emphasis  then  you  don't  have  a  great 
nation. 

I  think  these  negotiations  and  these  conferences  and  these  exchanges 
over  champagne  glasses  do  great  harm  to  the  American  people.  We 
forget  what  it  is  all  about.  We  forget  these  people  who  were  killed  in 
Korea.  We  forget  that  the  same  people,  in  the  case  of  Korea  by  out- 
right aggression,  caused  the  death  of  over  30,000  Americans,  and  oyer 
125,000  casualties,  and  so  forth.  So,  before  we  even  talk  of  recognition 
or  continuing  recognition,  we  must  do  what  we  did  in  Germany,  in  the 
case  of  Korea. 

We  must  submit  a  list  of  those  men  who  are  criminals,  who  break 
agreements — not  just  the  Geneva  Agreement;  they  didn't  sign  it — 
but  they  have  broken  every  principle  of  decency ;  they  have  murdered 
people;  they  have  killed  prisoners;  they  did  that  and  other  things, 
and  we  know  their  names. 

We  should  have  a  list  of  them.  Always  before  we  negotiate  or 
talk  any  business  with  this  present  Chinese  Communist  Government, 
they  should  have  to  meet  a  lot  of  terms.  One,  I  think  they  should 
have  to  contribute,  with  their  Russian  backers,  to  the  rehabilitation 
of  South  Korea. 

Senator  Jenner.  Damages,  in  other  words  ? 

General  Howley.  Damages.  The  same  thing  that  we  demanded  in 
Germany.  If  we  sit  down  and  negotiate  with  these  people  and  forget 
what  they  have  done,  we  forget  the  American  principle  that,  if  crime 
isn't  punished,  there  will  be  more  crime. 

We  should  take  account  of  the  war  crimes  just  as  we  did  at  the 
end  of  our  last  war  with  Germany. 

Senator  Hennings.  We  know,  of  course,  they  will  never  pay  any 
damages. 

General  Howley.  They  have  never  paid  any  damages,  and  they 
have  never  given  anything  back,  but  we  can  keep  the  record  straight, 
and  when  the  day  comes,  they  can  be  punished. 


1320  STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM 

]Mi\  Arens.  Do  you  have  any  observations  to  make  with  respect  to 
the  substitution  of  a  new  leader  for  Malenkov  ? 

General  Howley.  No,  sir.  Those  things  are  insignificant.  It  is 
all  part  of  the  same  thing.  One  gangster  shoots  another  and  gains 
control.  They  are  still  against  us.  And  I  think  that  is  quite  im- 
portant, because  one  will  differ  a  little  from  the  other.  One  fellow 
understands,  for  example,  that  if  you  smile  at  an  American,  you  can 
do  most  anything  to  him.  You  can  call  him  a  bad  name,  and  if  you 
smile  at  him,  you  can  get  away  with  it. 

He  understands  that  if  you  get  rough  with  us,  anything  can  happen. 
Stalin  got  to  the  point  where  he  didn't  care ;  he  was  rough,  and  as  a 
result  we  reacted  and  built  up  a  powerful  force  against  him. 

Whether  it  is  Marshal  Zhukov,  or  Marshal  Sokolofsky — I  call  him 
"Wise  Guy"  Sokolofsky — because  I  sat  in  on  conferences  where  he 
got  these  tremendous  concessions  from  the  United  States —  but  he  was 
a  great  one  for  holding  champagne  glasses  and  talking  nice — and  I 
had  some  of  our  own  representatives,  I  wouldn't  like  to  identify  them, 
say  that  he  is  not  a  Communist. 

Guess  where  he  is  now?  He  is  on  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
Communist  Party.  That  man  has  been  in  the  party  since  the  revolu- 
tion. And  for  anybody  to  be  misled,  because  he  drinks  a  couple  of 
cocktails  and  smiles,  into  thinking  that  he  isn't  a  part  of  this  vicious, 
corrupt  system,  is  a  great  mistake.     The  same  applies  to  Zhukov. 

So  my  advice  is  not  to  be  misled  by  what  these  fellows  say.  We 
know  what  they  are.     Let's  judge  them  by  their  actions. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

Senator  Jenner.  Senator  Hennings? 

Senator  Hennings.  General,  don't  you  think  that  most  of  these 
speculations  that,  if  there  is  a  change,  this  fellow,  or  that,  or  the 
other  fellow,  will  have  his  friend  taken  out  and  shot  or  sent  to  Siberia 
or  otherwise  liquidated,  that  doesn't  make  any  difference,  does  it? 

General  Howley.  To  us? 

Senator  Hennings.  We  hear  so  much  speculation.  Now,  we  have 
good  old  Malenkov ;  we  have  good  old  Beria,  and  we  speculate,  "They 
are  going  to  be  friendly.  They  like  us."  That  is  just  nonsense, 
isn't  it,  just  naive  hope? 

General  Howley.  Yes;  that  is  just  nonsense.  It  is  based  on  our 
belief,  our  whole  code  of  civilization  and  education  and  ethics,  that 
you  as  an  individual  are  really  more  important  than  even  an  Army 
order. 

We  recognize  that  even  in  the  Army,  where  you  must  have  absolute 
discipline.  If  there  is  an  order  against  an  officer's  code  of  ethics, 
religion,  or  behavior,  he  can  say,  "No,  I  can't  execute  that  order." 

Some  of  the  German  generals  did  obey  orders,  and  they  hung  for  it. 
And  some  of  these  things  are  important,  because  the  individual  is 
even  more  important  than  the  elected  officials.  But  not  with  the 
Commies. 

This  is  one  pattern.  The  individual  must  obey  orders  in  every- 
thing.    He  can't  have  personal  reservations. 

Senator  Hennings.  He  wouldn't  exist  as  an  instrumentality  of  the 
Soviet  state  if  he  wasn't  thoroughly  committed  to  the  doctrine  of 
world  usurpation  of  power — world  domination  ? 

General  Howley.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Hennings.  And  the  Marxist  thesis  ? 


STRATEGY    AND    TACTICS    OF    WORLD    COMMUNISM  1321 

General  Howley.  Yes.  That  is  an  easy  way  to  judge  and  a  correct 
one.  If  he  is  in  authority,  he  is  dedicated  to  our  destruction.  If  he 
is  a  peasant  in  the  Urals,  he  would  probably  like  to  love  the  American 
people — the  Russian  people  are  great.  We  must  distinguish  between 
the  Russian  people  and  the  people  who  dominate  them. 

Senator  Hennings.  A  small  percentage  belong  to  the  Communist 
Party,  I  understand.     'Wliat  is  that  percentage  ? 

General  Howley.  I  don't  believe  that  the  percentage  means  very 
much. 

Senator  Hennings.  I  don't  either.  But  you  hear  people  using  5  or 
10  million  rather  loosely.  I  don't  know  how  they  arrive  at  such  a 
figure.     We  don't  know,  do  we  ? 

General  Howley.  I  would  think  that  in  the  Communist  regime 
you  could  probably  number  the  real  Communists  certainly  not  in  the 
millions  or  in  the  hundreds  of  thousands. 

Many  of  the  others  have  no  choice  in  the  matter.  They  have  no 
choice.  But  we  don't  have  to  consider  them.  They  have  a  very  small, 
intensive  minority.  When  you  hear  the  Soviets  talk,  they  talk  about 
their  October  revolution.  It  was  not  a  revolution.  The  number  of 
men  who  seized  control  in  their  revolution,  in  a  real  old-fashioned 
coup  d'etat — you  could  probably  number  80  men  who  did  it — they  have 
never  been  elected  in  a  real  election ;  they  have  simply  taken  control. 

Senator  Hennings.  General,  as  one  member  of  this  committee,  I 
am  most  indebted  to  you  for  your  very  enlightening  and  interesting 
testimony  today. 

General  Howley.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Senator  Jenner.  General,  on  behalf  of  the  committee,  I  want  to 
thank  you.  I  think  your  testimony  has  been  very  beneficial  and  very 
helpful  and  very  intelligible  because  it  comes  from  firsthand  expe- 
rience. 

(Wliereupon,  at  11 :  55  a.  m.,  the  subcommittee  adjourned.) 


INDEX 


Note. — The  Senate  Internal  Security  Subcommittee  attaches  no  significance  to 
the  mere  fact  of  the  appearance  of  the  name  of  an  individual  or  an  organization 
in  this  index. 

Page 

Africa 1303,  1306,  1310,  1318 

America 1313,  1319 

American 1317, 1320, 1321 

Baruch  plan 1308 

Beria  1320 

Berlin   command 1314 

Berlin 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1313 

British  Empire 1315 

Casablanca 1303 

Central   America 1306 

Cherbourg 1302 

Chiang  Kai-shek 1312, 1313, 1318 

China 1303,  1306, 1312, 1313,  1317,  1318 

Chinese  Nationalist  Government 1312,  1318,  1319 

China,    Red 1311 

Chou  En-lai 1307 

Civil  war 1316 

Communist  Party,  Central  Committee  of 1320 

Czechoslovakia 1306 

Dienbienphu 1307 

Egypt 1306,  1319 

Eisenhower 1302,  1314, 1320 

Far  East 1311,  1318 

Fisson,  Pierre 1304 

Formosa 1303,  1311,  1312,  1313,  1318 

Young  Man's  Army 1312 

Easy  to  defend 1318 

Chances  on  mainland 1313,  1318 

Formosan    Straits 1317 

France 1303,  1304,  1311 

French 1306,  1307 

French   Government 1310 

Geneva 1.307 

Geneva    agreement 1319 

German  generals 1320 

Germans 1304 

Germany 1302,  1304,  1311,  1313,  1319 

Germany,  United 1304 

Greeks 1315 

Guatemala 1.303,  1.309,  1310,  1315 

Failure  of  revolution 1312 

Hand,  General 1314 

Hind,  General 1303 

Hitler 1,303,  1304 

Hong  Kong 1303,  1311,  1313 

Howley,  Brig.  Gen.  Frank  L.,  biography 1301 

Japanese 1312,  1313,  1315 

Kennan,  George 1,302 

Kenya  Colony 1,303 

Kotikikov,  General 1305,  1317 

I 


rr  INDEX 

Page 

Korea 1302,  1304, 1312, 1313,  1319 

Kremlin 1303,  1304,  1305,  1306,  1308 

Lenin 1304,  1306 

Malenkov 1320 

Manchuria 1315 

Mao  Tse-tung 1303, 1306, 1308, 1312, 1317, 1318 

Marx 1316,1320 

Mau  Mau 1303 

Mein  Kampf 1304 

Morocco 1303,  1305, 1306, 1310 

Mussolini 1303 

New  York  University 1301,  1302,  1311 

Notre   Dame 1308 

October  Revolution 1321 

Orient 1311 

Paris 1302,  1304,  1308 

Poland 1316 

Russian   Revolution 1312 

Seine 1304 

Siberia 1320 

South  America 1310 

South  Korea 1319 

Soviet  Psychological  Warfare 1318 

Soviet 

Can't  be  trusted 1303 

Objective 1804 

Techniques  same  everyvi^here 1304,  1314 

No  plans  for  failure 1304 

Phases  of  total  war 1305 

Conference  as  a  weapon 1306 

Weaknesses 1305,    1307 

Use  of  communications 1309 

Defense  against 1314,  1316 

Soviet  Government 1303 

Soviet  Union 1304,  1305,  1308,  1311,  1317 

Soviets 1304,  1306,  1307,  1318,  1321 

Stalin 1304 

Stimson's  nine  points 1318 

Sun  Yat-sen 1312 

Tunisia 1306 

United   Nations 1308 

United  States 1305,  1308,  1309,  1314 

United  States  Policies 1302 

Urals 1321 

Voyage  to  the  Horizon 1304 

World  War  II 1315 

Zhukov 1314,  1320 

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