Studies Of An Imperialist

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

WORKS 8Y THE SAMS AUIUM*

PRACTICAL GEOMETRY AKI) KXGINEKIUNG imAWING

(Spon, 1874; and Edition, x8$4),

THE PRINCIPLES OF GRAPHIC STATICS (Stwn, xB 7 <>; 4iui
Edition, 1888). '

PLEVNA (1880, Royal Engineers' Institute)

FORTIFICATION, PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (John
Murray, 1800; and Edition,

THE LAST GREAT NAVAL WAR. By " A, Nrifton Swforlh M
(CasseU & Co,, 1891)*

IMPERIAL DEFENCE (1807, The Imperial Ltbiory).

THE NAVY AND THE NATION. By Sir George Svdonhani
Clarke and Mr. James R. Tliursftold (John Murray, 1897)

RUSSIA'S SEA POWER (John Murray, 1898),

KINGLAKE'S INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. Sludeat'n Edition
(Blackwood, 1899).

MY WORKING LIFE (Joan Murray, 1927).

STUDIES OF AN
IMPERIALIST

BY

LORD SYDENHAM OF COMBE

G.C.S.L, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.B.E., F.ILS,

COKXANDVR OF THE CROWN OF BELGIUM ; COLONEL (RETIRED) &.*. ; AND
BON. COLOHBL 6 3RD AUSTRALIAN XN&AHTRY

WITH A FOREWORD BY

FIELD-MARSHAL

SIR WILLIAM R. ROBERTSON, BART.
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O.

LONDON: MCMXXVIII

Made and Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

FOREWORD

As explained in the Preface, this collection of Essays is
divided into three sections War, India, and Socialism.
With respect to the first-named the only section to which
these observations are intended to apply the reader will
appreciate that it constitutes the work of a man who has
had a very wide experience in dealing with naval and
military affeirs. More than forty years have elapsed since
the writings of Lord Sydenham, then a comparatively
junior officer in the Royal Engineers, began to attract
public attention, and to be accepted as valuable studies
of the questions to which they referred. Incidentally,
they served, as I can personally testify, to stimulate and
to inspire with fresh ideas the rising generation of officers,
who were destined to direct and command our Armies
during the critical period of 1914-1918.

War is not a popular theme in these days, and I certainly
do not wish to imply that it should be. I may, however,
suggest that the last war might have ended far less satis-
factorily for us had the nation not had the benefit of Lord
Sydenham's services in the years that preceded it. For
example, he took a prominent part in the establishment
of efficient over-sea communications, naval bases, and
coast defences ; in the investigation of numerous strategi-
cal and administrative questions carried out by the newly
created Committee of Imperial Defence ; and in the re-
constitution of the War Office and the belated formation
of a General Staff. Had the recommendations of the
Harrington Commission, of which Lord Sydenham was
Secretary, been acted upon, the General Staff could have

vi FOREWORD

been formed some sixteen years earlier than it was, and
many of the shortcomings which characterized the war in
South Africa would thereby have been avoided.

Written in a non-technical manner, the Essays here
selected for re-publication present no difficulty to the
civilian reader, and, in the principles advocated as well
as in the lessons conveyed, they contain much that is
useful not only to Soldiers, Sailors, and Statesmen, but
to all and sundry who desire to understand some of the
more important naval and military factors by which the
security of the Empire is affected.

W. R. ROBERTSON, KM.
2 DECEMBER, 1927.

PREFACE

ALL "who teach old age after leading strenuous lives find
themselves inevitably drawn towards retrospection. The
earnest student of affairs must remain such to the end,
and the gathering shadows cannot obscure the exigencies
of the present or deny vision of the future* The craving
to be of use to one's country persists, though increasing
disabilities destroy all hope that it can be satisfied ; but
the younger generations, bred in circumstances which
tend to a new outlook, easily come to believe that the
conclusions which age has accumulated and the principles
of national policy and of conduct which once held the
field are no longer valid. For this reason the plain
lessons of history are frequently lost, and mankind has
to learn again from bitter and painful experiences much
that is written in letters of flame on the records of the
past.

To all who have studied deeply and written voluminously
with the aim of warning and of guiding thought in their
time, it is natural to look back with a critical eye upon
the quality of their efforts. I began, a few years after I
joined the Army, to write on technical and scientific sub-
jects, at a time when the apparent chance of my appoint-
ment on the Staff of the Indian Engineering College,
established at Cooper's Hill in 1871, provided leisure
and suggested this form of literary activity.

Before 1879, 1 had drifted away from civil to military
science, to which my later studies at Bermuda, Gibraltar,
Malta, in Egypt and the Sudan, on the Continent and in
North America, gave new scope. After 1882, it seemed

vii

Vlll

PREFACE

natural to devote my life not only to the Army, but to
the service of the Empire as a whole, which opened out
a wide range of subjects, and, among them, the Navy
in all its aspects, historical and technical, was prominent
for many years.

From 1885 to 1892, as Secretary to the Colonial Defence
Committee, I was learning daily about the outlying parts
of the Empire, and opportunities were given for trying
to apply some of the principles of Imperial defence at
which I had arrived. From 1894 to 1901, as head of the
Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich, I was plunged
deeply into Artillery questions of all kinds, and also able
to learn invaluable lessons in administration and the
management of men.

The scene abruptly changed, and, as Governor of
Victoria, I found myself in the best position to study the
working of democratic government in Australia, then far
more " advanced " than our own, and to understand the
difficulties of young countries and the psychology of their
citizens.

Again there was a transformation, and I was suddenly
recalled to London, at first to play a part in the reconstruc-
tion of the War Office and to help to realize some of the
principles of administration for which I had long and
earnestly pleaded, and later for three and a half years, as
Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to serve
directly under two Prime Ministers and to be brought into
dose contact with the mechanism of the government of an
empire. This period, during which I was permitted to
raise any question which seemed to be of Imperial import-
ance, present or future, and to act as remembrancer in
Naval, Military and cognate matters to the Head of the
Government, was an education of infinite value.

In 1907, for the fourth time, my life underwent a drastic
change, and I was flung into the fascinating Old Wotld of
India to face many difficulties and domestic tragedy, but

PREFACE ix

to add the East to my Imperial studies. There, for five
and a half years, I was learning every day, and a whole
new vista of thought opened out to my vision.

Anyone returning to England in 191 3 after a long period
of anxious and absorbing work could not fail to be alarmed
at the trend of political forces here and on the Continent,
when the world was heading straight for an unparalleled
catastrophe. Thence onwards my thoughts were mainly
directed, first to the tremendous drama of the War and
afterwards to political and economic questions, including
the ever-baffling problems of our Eastern Empire and its
involved implications.

In a period of fifty-five years, of which ten spent abroad
were barren of literary output, I produced eleven books ;
but the immensely greater part of the results of my labours
is scattered over many magazines and newspapers, our
own and foreign, or buried in Hansard* 1 A book has
the advantage that it passes into libraries, and being then
available for reference, becomes as nearly a permanent
record as a student can expect.

In the hope that some few of my thoughts may be
worthy of such record, this work has been compiled* It
has been most difficult to make selections from a huge
mass of publications and speeches ranging over many
years, and I have sought to include only those which
embody principles that seemed to me important, des-
cribe in convenient form conditions now forgotten, or

1 Thus I wrote for Tb* Times twenty- three articles on the Nile
Expedition of 1884-85, twenty-five on the China- Japan War of 1894-
95, and many more on the Burmese War of 1885, the Greco-Turkish
War of 1897, the Tirah campaign, and the Spanish-American War
of 1898 and the South African War. In addition I was a frequent
contributor to Tbt Times on general naval and military questions.
During the Great War, I wrote ninety articles and letters in The
Times > and over 130 in other newspapers. Since the Armistice more
than 1,000 articles and 300 letters of mine have appeared in the
Press, including more than thirty long articles in magazines.

x PREFACE

deal -with world movements, little understood and still
progressing* This has led to division into three sections
War, India, and Socialism all dealing with matters
which, directly or indirectly, bear upon the fortunes of
our Empire.

Part i by far the largest covers a great variety of
subjects naval and military, beginning with reviews of
the lives of Nelson and Moltke from which I have learned
many lessons. I have reproduced articles on the Bombard-
ment of the Forts of Alexandria (1882), which was full of
warning, and on the Suakin-Berber Railway, once a burning
question, together with my appreciation in 1885 of one
of the earliest submarines the germ from which sprang
the craft destined powerfully to influence the Great War
and to bring us within measurable distance of defeat,
Invisibility (1886) was my first effort to reduce to principles
the methods of camouflage which proved of vital import-
ance in the Great War and will never become obsolete.
In The Franco-German Frontier (1887) I tried to analyse
the geographical and military factors which led to the
conclusion that Germany would strike at France through
Belgium. The five articles dealing with the Army are
selected from many in which I pleaded for reforms. They
are faulty in some respects ; but they represent what at
the time seemed to be the main objects to aim at, and in
1904-6 some of my proposals were adopted, and certain
principles for which I long fought have entered into our
Army organization and administration. One speech out
of many on the question of the blockade of Germany may
help to avert oblivion of a ruling factor in the War with
which, for various reasons, we pkyed with too long at
terrible cost of life and treasure.

In Part n some of the results of five and a half years'
study of conditions in India are recalled. My speech
(6 August, 1918) on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was
the first attempt to explain in public the implications of that

PREFACE

XI

classic State paper. It is followed by my reflections, five
years later, on the practical effects on the life of India of
an exotic constitution which Miss Mayo has justly described
as " weedy, a stranger to the soil, forced forward beyond
its inherent strength by the heat of a generous and hasty
emotion." 1 Now that the governance of 320,000,000
souls is again to be overhauled, in conditions vastly more
difficult than those of 1918, the views and experience of
an old student and lover of the Indian peoples may not
be wholly inopportune. It will at least be recognized that
most of my misgivings have been abundantly justified.
I regard the future of India as by far the most important
internal question with which the Empire is confronted
to-day.

Part III deals with Socialism and kindred subjects, which
I studied on my return to England in 1913, when the
growth of Socialism appeared to be apart from the Ger-
man Peril the most ominous portent on the political
horizon. The War, as was certain to happen, added
hugely to the forces working consciously and uncon-
sciously for revolution, and after the capture of Russia
by Marxian Communists, a special attack was persistently
directed against the British Empire. To the organizations,
open and secret, working with this object, I have devoted
fourteen years of study, finding the subject infinitely com-
plex and always baffling. Only by carefully watching
events all over the world, for which our overworked
rulers and most of our younger men have no time, is it
possible roughly to analyse and to estimate the dark forces
arrayed against civilization and Christianity which well-
meaning Socialists, lacking knowledge, effectively support*
In the past fourteen years I have written copiously on these
subjects in their many aspects ; but the conclusions I
have reached are necessarily incomplete and much remains

1 Mother India, by Katharine Mayo (Jonathan Cape & Co.,
1927).

Xll

PREFACE

obscure. I have included only some reflections economic
and political, beginning with what was, I believe, the
first attempt to explain the meaning of the Labour pro-
gramme early in 1918. The Peril of Socialism was written
before I was aware that the " Labour " Report on Reconstruc-
tion was only a modified version brought up to date of
Mr. Sidney Webb's pamphlet Wanted a Programme secretly
circulated among "leading London Liberals" in 1888.
Most of the disastrous proposals, which I tried to expose
in this article, form the basis of Socialist policy to-day ;
but the Capital Levy formerly the sheet anchor of
" Labour " Finance has been temporarily abandoned in
favour of a crippling surtax on unearned incomes.

My speech on 22 July, 1920, on the League of Nations,
appears in Part HI, because the Press does not give full
reports of debates in the emasculated House of Lords,
and back-benchers cannot expect space. In the enthusiasm
of the time this speech naturally fell flat ; but any unpre-
judiced observer who has tried to follow the tangled pro-
ceedings at Geneva will before long admit that, while
there are, as I said, many tasks which the League can
and does accomplish with benefit to the nations, it tends
to become a danger to our Empire. Sir A. Chamberlain's
almost passionate outburst this year has a marked signifi-
cance. Meanwhile, intrigue is rampant during the Sessions
of the League especially and the Labour Bureau, per-
meated with Socialism and directed by a revolutionary
Socialist, attempts by its numerous Conventions to under-
mine the sovereignty of nations and, in co-operation with
internationalists of every hue, stealthily enfeebles national
patriotism*

The kst article, written before the conclusion by the
Coalition Government of the Trade Agreement with the
wreckers of Russia, feebly expresses my indignation at the
handling of relations with the most dangerous enemies we
have ever known. Not till this year, when the Bolsheviks

PREFACE xiii

had created a situation plainly intolerable, was the national
honour, dragged through the mire since the Prinkipo
proposals, partly vindicated. The story of the proceedings,
for which successive Governments are responsible, con-
stitutes in my opinion an indelible stain on the national
escutcheon, and incidentally illustrates the inversion of
traditional principles of right and wrong that we have
been condemned to watch since the Armistice.

If history is to render any service to mankind, a bare
chronicle will not suffice, and a chronicle, even if reason-
ably accurate, may distort all proportion in its presentation
of events. Of this there are shocking examples. The
main object of the honest historian must be to trace the
true connection between cause and effect, eliminating
personal bias while investing his narrative and comments
with literary charm. In the hands of the materialist school
now popular in some quarters the virtues and the
vices of nations and of men are hidden by the ascription
of all happenings to what may be called economic con-
ditions, and the moral law is ignored. History in this
form is more false than that which assigns periods to
individual rulers invested with exaggerated powers of
good and evil. The destinies of nations and of men are
shaped by a complexity of forces great and small, some
following inexorable natural laws still imperfectly under-
stood and beyond human control, others capable of being
directed to definite ends by the will power of individuals.
Failing the gift of intuition, which is often untrustworthy,
the sane direction of affairs, public and private, must
depend wholly on knowledge implemented by character.

For forty-five years the Empire has been my inspiration,
and to further its security and progress my one preoccupa-
tion. I regard the dangers psychological rather than
material which now confront the British people at home
and abroad as more menacing than at any previous period
in our long and chequered national life. I can only hope

xiv PREFACE

that this book, in spite of imperfections and necessary
limitations, may perhaps give some help to others who
will plough the fields in which I have long and strenuously
laboured.

LONDON, OCTOBER, 1927. S. OF C

Note. My best thanks are due to the Editors of The
Times, The Nineteenth Century and After., the Edinburgh,
Fortnightly and Empire Reviews, and the Financial Times \ for
permitting me to republish articles which have appeared
in their pages*

LIST OF ARTICLES AND SPEECHES IN THE
BOOK ARRANGED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

(Notes on the
"C/arfa, George

1883, September

1884, June

1885, October

1886, July

1887, February

1888, May
1891, October

December
1894, September
1897,

1898, August
1899,

1900, December

1901, February

[1904,
1913,

1915, December
1918,

1920,

1921, January

1923,

Articles and Speeches mil be found in the Index under
Sydenbam"}

The Lessons of the Bombardment of Alexandria.

The Suakin-Berber Railway.

The Nordenfelt Submarine Boat

Invisibility.

The Franco-German Frontier.

The Higher Policy of Defence.

Moltke.

The Administration of the War Office.

The War in the East.

Nelson.

Our Military Requirements.

The Spanish-American War.

The Limitations of Naval Force.

The Intercepted Correspondence of the French in

Egypt. t

Organization of the Army.
Training of the Army.
The Staff and the Army.
Report of Esher Committee.]
Warship Design.
Ifldian Nationalism.
The Blockade of Germany (Speech).
The Peril of Socialism.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (Speech).
Science and Labour Unrest (Speech).
The League of Nations (Speech),
Trade with Soviet Russia,
A Great Lesson of the Naval War.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in Theory and
Practice.

xv

CONTENTS

PAGE

FOREWORD BY FIELD-MARSHAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON * v
PREFACE vii

PART I
WAR

CHAP.

I NELSON 3

II THE INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH

IN EGYPT 24

HI .MOLTKE 44

IV THE LESSONS OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 71
V THE SUAKIN-BERBER RAILWAY 78

VI THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT , . .83

VII INVISIBILITY 94

VIII THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER . . . .109

IX THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE . . .120

X THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR OFFICE . .131

XI THE WAR IN THE EAST 143

XII OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS . . . -149

Xin THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR . . . . 162

XIV THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE . . .169

XV ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY . . . .183

XVI TRAINING OF THE ARMY i9z

XVII THE STAFF AJNTD THE ARMY . , * , .201

xvii

xviii CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

XVIII WARSHIP DESIGN 207

XIX THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY . . . .217

XX A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR . . , 227

PART II
INDIA

XXI INDIAN NATIONALISM 241

XXII THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT . . - 254

XXm THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS IN THEORY

AND PRACTICE 273

PART III
SOCIALISM

XXIV THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 29I

XXV SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST , . . .316

XXVI THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 330

XXVn TRADE vmu. SOVIET RUSSIA 33 <5

34X

PART I
WAR

I

NELSON

(" Nineteenth Century? June, 1897.)

As a master of the art of war at sea, as a great patriot and as a
sane Imperialist, Nelson always powerfully appealed to my imagina-
tion. I learned much from him, and I have written copiously with
the hope of enforcing the lessons which he bequeathed to the nation.
His Ltfe by my friend Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral) A, T,
Mahan, U.S.N., though excellent in many respects, did not wholly
satisfy me, and I wrote this article to point out some blemishes,
but also with the object of trying again to bring into relief the salient
features in the career and the character of our greatest seaman. In
these days, when the instruments of war on the sea have been
revolutionised, while the great principles remain unchanged and
unchangeable, there are plain signs that the teaching and the spirit
of Nelson our proud inheritance are in danger of being for-
gotten, and I recall them as the only sure guides to our national
security.

" ONE never knows," wrote Catherine II on 13 January,
1791, to Grimm, "if you are still alive in the midst of
the murders, carnage, and uproar of the cave of brigands
who have seised the reins of government in France and
will soon reduce it to the state of Gaul at the time of
Caesar, But Caesar put down the brigands in Gaul. When
will a Gesar arise in France ? Oh, come he will, you need
not doubt/'

These words were strikingly prophetic. Less than
five years later a young Corsican artillery officer of twenty-
six scattered the National Guards in the streets of Paris,
and, having restored the waning authority of the Con-
vention, was appointed second-in-command of the Atmy

4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of the Interior, In the following year (1796), as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, he defeated the
Austrians, reduced the King of Sardinia to vassalage,
occupied Milan, and shut up the veteran Wurmser in
Mantua. "Caesar" had come to rule the destinies of
France for eighteen years, to overturn the entire system
of Europe, and to prove himself the greatest master of
the art of land warfare that the world has known.

In 1793, a British post-captain of thirty-five sailed into
the Mediterranean in command of H.M.S. Agamemnon, to
enter upon a career of twelve years, which ended in the
hour of his most glorious victory, and won for him un-
dying fame as the most brilliant seaman whom the greatest
of maritime nations has ever produced.

As Napoleon was the highest incarnation of the power
of the land and of the military aptitude of the French
people, so was Nelson the supreme exponent of the power
of the sea and the embodiment of the naval genius of the
Anglo-Saxon race. Fate ordained that the careers of
these two should violently clash, and that the vast ambitions
of the one should be shattered by the untiring energy of
the other. The war which began in 1793 was in effect a
tremendous conflict between the forces of the land and
those of the sea, each directed by a master hand and each
fed by the resources of a great nation. The apparent
inequality of conditions was considerable at the outset,
and later overwhelming. Conquered or overawed by
the power of the land, the allies of England fell away,
becoming the instruments of Napoleon's policy, till the
small island State stood alone. There was no outpouring
of wild enthusiasm such as carried the armies of revolu-
tionary France from victory to victory ; but, instead, a
stem determination to uphold the cause of order and of
real liberty in the face of all odds, and in spite of much
real suffering. With the ultimate triumph, won upon the
sea, the name of Nelson will for ever be associated. It is

NELSON 5

his immortal honour not only to have stepped forth as
the champion of his country in the hour of dire need, but
to have bequeathed to her the knowledge in which lies
her only salvation.

Captain Mahan's Life of Nelson * is far more than the
story of an heroic career. It is a picture, drawn in firm
lines by a master hand, in which the significance of the
events chronicled stands out in true proportion. Nelson's
place in history, his mission as the great opponent of the
spirit of aggression, of which the French Revolution was
the inspiring force and Napoleon the mighty instrument,
and his final triumph, are traced with infinite skill and
inexorable analysis.

" At each of the momentous crises, so far removed in
time and place at the Nile, at Copenhagen, at Trafalgar
as the unfolding drama of the age reveals to the on-
looker the schemes of the arch-planner about to touch
success, over against Napoleon rises ever Nelson; and
as the latter in the hour of victory drops from the stage
where he has played so chief a part, his task is seen to be
accomplished, his triumph secured. In the very act of
dying he has dealt his foe a blow from which recovery is
impossible. Moscow and Waterloo are the inevitable
consequences of Trafalgar/*

In this passage the keynote of the book rings out clearly.
We knew that the author of The Influence of Sea Power
would place before us this aspect of Nelson's career as it
has never yet been presented, that no writer of the present
or the past was so competent to deal with Nelson's achieve-
ments and to portray him as a director of war. We did
not know whether the brilliant naval historian could
assume the difficult role of the biographer, and could

1 Ufe of Nelson, the TzmbocKment of the Sea "Power of Great Britain.
By Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral) A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D.,
U.S. Navy. London : Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1897.

6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

unveil a living image of the man of simple yet complex
nature, of impulse, yet of cold reason. In some respects,
at least, Captain Mahan's success in the more delicate
portion of his task is complete. He has shown the gradual
training of Nelson's mind in the school of experience.
He has placed beyond the reach of cavil the fact of Nelson's
genius, which a recent writer ventured to question, and
he has rightly claimed for that genius in its maturity a
wider range than the knowledge of the sea. Like his
great antagonist, Nelson was something more than a born
leader of fighting men, and both owed their success as
directors of war to the insight which, when associated
with self-reliance and readiness to accept responsibility,
is the essence of real statesmanship. Captain Mahan is,
however, not in the least carried away by an exaggerated
hero-worship. It is evident that he is profoundly im-
pressed by the personality of the man in whom sea power
found its greatest exponent ; but he can be coldly almost
harshly critical, and to the strain of human weakness,
which mingled with but did not mar the closing years of
Nelson's glorious career, he shows no excess of mercy.
The aim "has been to make Nelson describe himself
tell the story of his own inner life as well as of his external
actions," and, in the main, this course has been followed.
If here and there the running personal comment never
the historical ajoalysis seems a little fob, and leads to
unconscious repetitions, the book holds the reader from
beginning to end.

It is remarkable that Nelson, though almost continu-
ously afloat from 1770 till 1783, saw no naval action
during the great war of American Independence. In
this period, however, the foundations of his future great-
ness were laid. The opportunities were few, but none
were lost. As a post-captain of twenty-two he took in
1780 a leading part in the siege and capture of Fort San
Juan, near Lake Nicaragua, gaining experience to be

NELSON 7

turned to full account in after years on the coast of Corsica.
Of practical seamanship he became a master. He had
shown marked independence of judgment, together with
a certain restiveness under authority feebly or wrongfully
wielded. In 1785, defying popular opinion in the West
Indies, and disregarding the orders of the Rear-Admiral
(which relieved him of responsibility), he enforced the
Navigation Laws, and after much anxiety and vexation
was upheld by the Admiralty. " This struggle with Sit
Richard Hughes/* states Captain Mahan, " showed clearly
not only the loftiness of his motives, but the distinguishing
features which constituted the strength of his character
both civil and military." In 1788 Nelson returned to
England with his newly-married wife, and being out of
favour with the Court and the Admiralty for having openly
shown his friendship for the Duke of Clarence, then
attached to the party of the Prince of Wales, was unable
to obtain a ship. His fearless assumption of responsi-
bility in the West Indies, and the breadth of view which
he displayed, had impressed both Pitt and Mr. Rose, the
Secretary of the Treasury. Although, therefore, for the
moment under a cloud, his strong self-reliance had already
made its mark. " Even in the earlier stages of his pro-
fession," said Codrington, " his genius had soared higher,
and all his energies were turned to becoming a great com-
mander." Such men were sorely needed when, at the
end of 1792, Pitt realized that war with Revolutionary
France was inevitable, and on the 3oth of January, 1793,
Nelson was appointed to the sixty-four-gun ship Aga-
memnon. " The Admiralty," he wrote, " so smile upon me,
that really I am as much surprised as when they frowned."
The three years which followed form <e the period in
which expectation passed into fulfilment, when develop-
ment, being arrested, resumed its outward progress under
the benign influence of a favourable environment."
Nelson was fairly launched on his unparalleled career.

8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Nothing could be better than the author's treatment of
the wonderful chapter of history which now opened.
Here is no mere narrative of the actions of an individual,
but a luminous exposition of war in which the interaction
of the sea and land operations on a great scale is admirably
traced. We are enabled to see the gradual establish-
ment of order in a vast contest, which began with " no
sound ideas," no vestige of a clear policy. And we can
follow the rapid development of Nelson's genius maturing
through rich experience, his reason correcting his impulse,
and his powers as a director of war rising to meet the
ever-increasing demands which they were called upon to
meet. Fortune was now propitious. In Lord Hood,
Nelson found a commander-in-chief who recognized his
special capacity for "separate and responsible service."
Henceforth, till the battle of the Nile, his " life presents a
series of detached commands, independent as regarded
the local scene of operations," and exactly calculated to
furnish the scope and the opportunities for which he
craved.

The abandonment of Toulon due chiefly to the inter-
vention of Napoleon in December, 1793, left the Mediter-
ranean fleet without a harbour east of Gibraltar. Naval
warfare in sailing days demanded the use of harbours
quite as much as when coaling stations came to be a new
requirement. Corsica, held by a French garrison, appeared
to offer the necessary facilities, and on Nelson's advice, in
opposition to the opinion of General Dundas, the siege
of Bastia was undertaken. " If the Army will not take
it," he wrote, " we must, by some way or other," and he
both planned the siege and directed the operations to a
successful conclusion (May, 1794). At this juncture a
French squadron sailed from Toulon, and Vice-Admital
Hotham, commanding an equal force, fell back towards
Corsica, missing a great opportunity, as Nelson instantly
recognised. Hood, concentrating his fleet, was unable

NELSON 9

to bring the enemy to action, but effectually covered the
siege of Calvi, where Nelson lost the use of his right eye
when directing the fire of the batteries on shore, whose
construction he had advised. Corsica was now "un-
assailable" by the enemy, as Captain Mahan states, so
long as the sea was controlled by the British Navy ; but
Nelson had not as yet realized the impossibility of over-
sea operations in face of naval supremacy, and evinced
traces of the same anxiety which later he felt for Sicily.
In the memorable action of the Agamemnon and C^a Ira on
the i3th of March, 1795 his first sea fight Nelson un-
mistakably showed " the spirit which takes a man to the
front* not merely in battle but at all times." The difference
between his bold initiative on this day and the decision
instantly acted upon at St. Vincent was only one of degree.
So also when, on the following day, Hotham rested satis-
fied with a temporary advantage, Nelson pleaded for a
pursuit of the French fleet. There was risk, as the author
shows, but in the circumstances it was a risk which ought
to have been accepted. On the i3th of July, 'another
chance presented itself to Hotham, but the signal for a
general chase was delayed " pending certain drill-ground
manoeuvres," and the French lost only one ship.

This naval campaign, successful only in the sense that
captures were made, supplied object lessons which Nelson
took to heart. The French fleet was not crippled, and
Captain Mahan, who elsewhere seems to question the
deterrent effect of a fleet " in being," remarks : ec How
keep the fleet on the Italian coast, while the French fleet
remained in Toulon ? What a curb it was appeared again
in the next campaign, and even more clearly, because the
British were then commanded by Sir John Jervis, a man
not to be checked by ordinary obstacles." Controversy
has raged over this point, and unfortunately the disputants
will each be able to claim the author as an ally. The in-
consistency is perhaps more apparent than real, for the

io STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

records of naval war conclusively show that an effective
fleet a fleet at sea or ready to sail and handled by fighting
seamen is a most powerful deterrent to naval operations
and especially to the over-sea transport of military forces.

In the chapters dealing with Nelson's proceedings on
the Riviera in 1795 and 1796 Captain Mahan discusses
with much ability the possibilities of bringing sea power
to bear on the land campaign. Nelson's plan for landing
5,000 men at San Remo on the French line of communi-
cations with Nice was not justified under the existing
conditions. It was eminently characteristic of his marked
capacity for seising upon the decisive factor in a given
, situation ; but " his accurate instinct that war cannot be
made without running risks combined with his lack of
experience in the difficulties of land operations to mislead
his judgment in this particular instance." In 1796
Napoleon was launched on a full tide of victory ; Spain
declared war on us; Corsica rose against the English
garrison; and on the 25th of September, 1796, orders
were received by Jervis to quit the Mediterranean. By
Nelson this decision was bitterly resented. "I lament
our present orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable
to the dignity of England." His earlier view had changed,
and, realising all that the evacuation implied, his mind
dwelt upon the advantages of a bold offensive on the sea.
" The fleets of England are equal to meet the world in
arms." The defection of Rear-Admiral Man, who, against
the Admiralty's orders, had not joined Jervis but had re-
turned to England, left Jervis, however, in a position of
great numerical inferiority. The enemy fleet in being,
already a heavy " curb," now amounted, with the addi-
tion of the Spanish squadron, to thirty-four sail of the
line. It was natural that the British Government should
consider the odds too great.

To Nelson these three years were of the utmost impor-
tance. His mind, continually occupied in solving naval

NELSON 11

problems, in forecasting events, and in studying the
European situation, underwent rapid development. His
exploits on a minor stage had been remarkable, and, as
Captain Mahan justly points out, the brilliant achievements
which followed ought not to be permitted to obscure
" the long antecedent period of unswerving continuance
in strenuous action, allowing no flagging of earnestness
for a moment to appear, no chance for service, however
small or distant, to pass unimproved." It is the great
merit of the author to have thrown a strong light upon
this period, far less dramatic than that which followed,
but essential to a right understanding of the secret of
Nelson's transcendent success as a naval commander

Sent back into the Mediterranean in December, 1796,
with two frigates to evacuate Elba, Nelson accomplished
his task; and after fighting two actions, escaping his
pursuers by an act of splendid daring, and sailing through
a night in company with the Spanish fleet, he joined (13
February, 1797) Jervis the day before the battle of St.
Vincent. The well-known story is lucidly retold, and
the diagrams enable the unprofessional reader to grasp
the situation. The British fleet in single column was
tacking in succession to follow the Spanish main body,
when the great chance presented itself to the captains of
the rear ships to choose the chord instead of the arc, throw
over the formal movement, wear out of line, and head
off the enemy. 1 Nelson instantly seized this chance and
determined the course of the battle, arresting the Spanish
movement, and boarding the San Nicolas and San Josef.
There was risk of being overwhelmed before support
could arrive ; there was the further risk which attached
to an act undertaken without authority and in defiance of
an ordered evolution ; but Captain Mahan justly considers
that in any case Nelson would have been upheld by an

* This movement is prescribed in Clerk of Eldin's " Naval Tactics,"
which Nelson had probably studied.

12 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

admiral " who had just fought twenty-seven ships of the
line with fifteen because * a victory was essential to England
at that moment.* "

On this signal success quickly followed a ** sharp
reverse " in the failure of the attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe
(July, 1797). This was essentially a task in which military
forces ought to have been employed, as Nelson originally
proposed, and the lesson is important. The loss of his
right arm and the months of suffering which followed
brought temporary despondency, which disappeared when
at length the wound healed. On the loth of April, 1798,
Nelson sailed in the Vangtard to rejoin the fleet under
Jervis, now Lord St. Vincent, off Cadii, and to enter upon
what Captain Mahan regards as the second period of his
career. " Before him was now to open a field of possi-
bilities hitherto unexampled in naval warfare; and for
the appreciation of them was needed just those perceptions,
intuitive in origin, yet resting firmly on well-ordered,
rational processes which, on the intellectual side, distin-
guished him above all other British seamen,"

The political situation demanded the resumption of a
naval offensive in the Mediterranean, where a great French
expedition was known to be preparing. "If," wrote
Lord Spencer to St. Vincent, " by our appearance in the
Mediterranean, we can encourage Austria to come forward
again, it is in the highest degree probable that the other
powers will seise the opportunity of acting at the same
time." The measure was correctly conceived, and
Nelson was the instrument selected by the Cabinet to
carry it out. At last in sole command of a considerable
force, he entered the Mediterranean with a detachment
from St. Vincent's fleet.

With the greatest skill Captain Mahan re-tells the story
of the famous chase of Napoleon's fleet and transports
from the 7th of June to the memorable ist of August,
1798. We are made to share Nelson's anxieties and

NELSON 13

difficulties, to follow the workings of his mind, and to
realise the inflexible steadiness of purpose which at length
led him to his goal. Neither England nor Nelson himself
at first recognised the tremendous importance of the
battle of the Nile. French designs in Egypt and in the
Far East were checkmated; Minorca fell; the fate of
Malta was decided ; and a new alliance, joined by Russia
and Turkey, was arrayed against the forces of the Revo-
lution. Meanwhile Nelson, severely wounded and
suffering greatly, sailed for Naples, there to meet Lady
Hamilton, who from this period till the hour of his death
dominated his affections.

No biographer can ignore the influence which this
woman henceforth exercised over Nelson's private life.
The later breach with his wife, and the intimacy which he
publicly avowed, have rendered the discussion of this
phase of his career inevitable. The name of Lady Hamilton
must always be associated with that of Nelson.

It was, however, the manner and not the fact of his
liaison that imposes upon the biographer the duty of
referring to it in his pages. The lives of many other great
men lives grossly impure compared with that of Nelson
escape this form of investigation. We do not, in their
case, pause to inquire how far some woman's influence may
have swayed their actions, or seek to frame theories of
their moral deterioration. Captain Mahan appears to
forget that the special circumstances which invested
Nelson's human weakness with inevitable publicity con-
stitute a strong plea against exaggeration of treatment.
Nelson lived forty-seven years, into less than seven of
which Lady Hamilton enters. Yet throughout these two
large volumes we are continually bidden to remember
that a period of moral decline is impending, and the in-
woven strain of reflections is somewhat irritating. Until
Nelson sinned, we prefer to think of him as blameless*
In the years during which his whole nature is assumed to

I4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

have been warped, his most splendid services to his country
were rendered, and great victories won, and there is no
valid evidence that the influence of Lady Hamilton drew
him aside from his public duties. Captain Mahan does
not follow Admiral Jurien de la Gravi&re in ascribing the
execution of Carracciolo to that influence, but holds
that Nelson, in not delaying the execution, showed that
he was "saturated with the prevalent Court feeling against
the insurgents and the French/' To us, living a hundred
years after the reign of murder in France, it is not easy
to realise the feelings with which Revolutionists were
naturally regarded in 1799, and the crime for which
Carracciolo was justly condemned would have aroused
the strongest opprobrium in Nelson even if he had never
known Marie-Antoinette's sister, the Queen of Naples.
Motives are usually complex, and it is not necessary to
assume that his disobedience of the orders of Lord Keith
was prompted by reluctance to leave Lady Hamilton,
Nelson was not on good terms with his commander-in-
chief, whose judgment he distrusted, and whose instruc-
tions, addressed from a dull pupil to a master, he resented.
Moreover, it is certain that before he had seen Lady
Hamilton, as well as long after she had returned to England,
he, rightly or wrongly, attached special importance to
the security of the Two Sicilies* The disobedience cannot
be condoned; but unquestionably it did not prejudice
the interests of England, and the real moral is the un-
wisdom of subjecting genius to mediocrity in order to
comply with the dictates of petty routine. Nelson was
marked out for command in the Mediterranean in succes-
sion to St. Vincent, and in sending out Keith the Govern-
ment and the Admiralty made a grave mistake, from
which the national cause suffered. In the ten months of
temporary independence (August, 1799, to June, 1800)
which followed Keith's departure for England, Nelson
showed no sign whatever of diminished energy. His

NELSON 15

brief " administration of the station until Keith's return
was characterised by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic
tact that he had shown in earlier days." A second dis-
appointment the more bitterly felt since Keith, after
having lost touch with the French fleet, was sent back
and an Admiralty reprimand, which, though deserved,
caused Nelson much pain, sufficiently explain his " testi-
ness" at this time. Growing infatuation for Lady
Hamilton there may have been ; but if St. Vincent had
remained, or if Nelson had succeeded to the command,
it would have been unnoticed. When, after only four
months in England, Nelson sailed for the Baltic, his fiery
energy at once displayed itself, and we find no signs of
an inordinate craving to linger by the side of Lady Hamil-
ton. And when at last the brief peace came, Captain
Mahan assures us that, " like Great Britain herself during
this repose, he rested with his arms at his side, waiting for
a call." There is no proof that his duty to his country
and his king suffered from the one great passion, the one
great weakness of his life.

Captain Mahan is undoubtedly right in not investing
the hero's frailty with a halo of romance; but he has
perhaps tended towards the opposite extreme and sought
to depict a somewhat squalid amour. Nelson spent the
greater part of his life at sea and knew little of women.
He was capable of a devoted affection, which his wife at
no time inspired. There were signs of incompatibility of
temperament before another image engrossed his thoughts.
That image was doubtless unworthy, but can scarcely
have been so inadequate as it is represented in the spiteful
reminiscences of Mrs. St. George. Emma Hart was
what men had made her ; but to deny all moral sense to
the writer of the touching letters to Greville appears un-
just. Of her cleverness there is no question ; her beauty
is beyond dispute ; that she was incapable of returning
the deep affection she inspired is not certain. And

16 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Captain Mahan, in spite of his evidently opposite intention,
conveys a dim impression that the mistress was better
able to understand the heroic side of Nelson's character
than the blameless wife whose sad fate evokes our sym-
pathy. " Such things are/* as Nelson was wont to say
in regard to the anomalies of life, and such things un-
happily will be, so long as humanity retains its many im-
perfections.

The coalition formed after the battle of the Nile proved
short-lived. Napoleon, whose escape from Egypt Nelson
" sincerely regretted," landed in France in October, 1799,
and Austria, struck down by repeated blows, made peace
after Hohenlinden, Catherine II was dead, and the Tsar
Paul, easily cajoled by Napoleon, revived the armed
neutrality to which Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia at once
acceded. Great Britain stood almost alone. The new
combination was, as the author points out, the work of
Napoleon, who sought to employ the Northern navies to
his advantage, and at the same time " to exclude Great
Britain from her important commerce with the Continent,
which was carried on mainly by the ports of Prussia or
by those of North Germany/'

Again Nelson stands forth as the national champion,
" We have now arrived at that period," he wrote, " what
we have often heard of but must now execute that of
fighting for our dear country. ... I have only to say
. . . that the service of my country is the object nearest
my heart," The astounding blunder of giving the chief
command of the Baltic fleet to Sir Hyde Parker was, in the
opinion of Admiral Jurien de la Gravtere, due to a per-
ception of " the propriety of placing under the control of
some more temperate, docile, and matured mind, that
impetuous, daring, and brilliant courage whose caprices "
the Admiralty "had learned to dread," Captain Mahan
suggests, with greater probability, that the reason may be
sought in Parker's possession of " the information acquired

KELSON 17

during the last preparation for a Russian war." The
arrangement was one of which this country furnishes
many examples ; but in this case the national cause suffered
no injury* Denmark not Great Britain paid heavily
for the appointment of Sir Hyde Parker. "Nelson's
understanding of the situation/* states Captain Mahan,
"was, in truth, acute, profound, and decisive. In the
Northern combination . . . Paul was the trunk, Den-
mark and Sweden the branches. Could he get at the
trunk and hew it down, the branches fall with it ; but
should time and strength first be spent in lopping off
the branches, the trunk would remain, and c my power
must be weaker when its greatest strength is required/ "
To strike straight at the Russian squadron at Revel
clearly the right policy was a course which did not
commend itself to Parker ; and Nelson, perforce yielding
to his titular superior, addressed himself to the subsidiary
task of attacking the Danish fleet in the roads of Copen-
hagen. The plan which he proposed shows similarity
to that executed at the Nile, but with an important differ-
ence. In the earlier case, a general idea was given to all
the captains, to whom the details of the execution were
left. In the later, the instructions were singularly careful
and elaborate, aptly illustrating the completeness of
Nelson's genius. The battle of the and of April, 1801,
was an exhibition of seamanship finely conceived, as well
as of fighting power, and the share of the commander-in-
chief was practically limited to making a signal which
might have wrecked the whole scheme. Captain Mahan
shows that Nelson, in applying his telescope to the blind
eye, was not, as has been represented, acting a little
comedy. The frigates obeyed this " remarkable " signal,
and Rear-Admiral Graves, " not being able to distinguish
the Elephant* s * conduct," repeated it, but happily did not
haul down No. 16, signifying " Close action/' the order
1 Nelson's flagship.

18 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

given by Nelson. As the author pointedly remarks,
" The man who went into the Copenhagen fight with an
eye upon withdrawing from action would have been
beaten before he began/'

One branch of the Northern Alliance having been lopped
off, Nelson, who had brought on an illness by exposure
for six hours in an open boat when rejoining his flag-
ship, was intensely anxious to fight the Russians. The
assassination of the Tsar Paul had, however, changed the
situation, and when the fleet, under Nelson's command,
sailed for Revel the moment Sir Hyde Parker departed,
Russia could no longer be regarded as a belligerent. The
Baltic campaign had ended ; " there was nothing left to
do " ; and considering how Nelson's life had been passed
for eight years, the severe wounds he had received, and the
suffering caused by the keen air of the north, the longing
for rest which he evinced was, apart from the " unquench-
able passion for Lady Hamilton," surely natural. Landing
in England on the ist of July, he again hoisted his flag
on the z6th in command of a " Particular Service Squad-
ron," having previously drawn up what he called " a sea
plan of defence for the City of London."

Whatever may have been the reality of Napoleon's
preparations for the invasion of England in i8oj, those
of 1801 were undoubtedly undertaken with the object of
working upon the fears of the persons whom St. Vincent
accurately described as " the old women of both sexes/*
While, therefore, Nelson threw himself with characteristic
energy into the organisation of a defensive flotilla, his
opinion changed as soon as he had obtained an insight
into the situation. "Where is our invasion to come
from? The time is gone," he wrote on the izth of
August.

From October, 1801, to May, 1803, Nelson lived with
the Hamiltons at Merton, "resolute in braving" the
opinion of society ; but, according to the testimony of

NELSON 19

the daughter of the vicar, " setting such an example of
propriety and regularity that there are few who would
not be benefited by following it." His generosity to the
poor of the parish was unbounded, and he showed equal
solicitude for the welfare of the tenants on his Sicilian
estate. Nor did the alleged baneful influence of Lady
Hamilton destroy his interest in public matters, although
his representations on the questions of manning, desertion,
and prize-money appear to have received no consideration
from the Admiralty, then engrossed in economies, soon
to prove gravely injurious to the national cause.

The wonderful story of the Trafalgar campaign has
already been admirably told by Captain Mahan * ; but
this later version, in which the heroic personality of Nelson
dominates the drama, possesses an added interest. As
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, he sailed in
the Victory on the 2oth of May, 1805. " Government,"
he had written, " cannot be more anxious for my departure
than I am, if a war, to go." In this spirit Nelson entered
upon the crowning period of his career a period in
which the wide experience of the past was to bear rich
fruit, and the sterling qualities of the greatest of seamen
were to shine forth in full splendour. Through the long
and anxious cruising in the Mediterranean, the chase of
Villeneuve to and from the West Indies, and the brief
sojourn in England, down to the triumph at Trafalgar,
Captain Mahan leads the reader in pages whose luminous
analysis leaves nothing to be desired. The naval aspects
of each phase of the tremendous drama are grasped with a
firm hand. Nelson's steady concentration of purpose upon
the primary object the enemy's fleet his determination
to keep his own ships at sea, thus maintaining the officers
and crews in fullest fighting efficiency, and the wise ad-
ministration by which he won the love and confidence of

1 The Influence of Sea Power on the Wars of tbe French 'SLwolution and
Empire.

20 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

his command, supply lessons for all time. The causes of
the victory of Trafalgar lie deeper than either strategy or
tactics. They may be traced in the life of Nelson ; they
may be reproduced by following the example he has left.
From beginning to end the Trafalgar campaign abounds
in pregnant lessons which are only now beginning to be
understood. Assuming that the immense preparations
on the French coast were seriously intended for an in-
vasion, Napoleon's correct perception of the risks was
plainly shown. He might, as Captain Mahan intimates,
be willing to sacrifice an army to accomplish the occu-
pation of London. " What if the soldiers of the Grand
Army never returned from England ? There were still
in France men enough/* etc. He was not willing, how-
ever, to encounter the tremendous danger of being caught
in passage or in landing by the British Navy. His far-
reaching plans were directed to the concentration of a
superior force in the Channel, during a period which he
variously estimated at six hours, fifteen days, and two
months. He does not, however, appear to have realised
that this concentration could not have been effected
without hard fighting, which must inevitably have changed
the whole situation. Nor did he understand that his
harbour-trained ships were no match for their weather-
beaten opponents. Provided that the British blockading
squadrons would have quietly withdrawn into space
when threatened by superior numbers, the over-elaborate
scheme might have succeeded. But this is exactly what
could not reasonably be expected. On the arrival of
Villeneuve from the West Indies to relieve the blockaded
ships, the blockaders would have moved up Channel,
gathering strength, and being joined by the considerable
free force which is usually left out of account. There
would then have been a real " fleet in being " a fighting
fleet numerically not far inferior to that which Napoleon
vainly hoped to assemble, and in all other respects vastly

NELSON

superior. At best a victory could have been obtained
only at immense sacrifice, by which the French would
have been crippled, while a fresh British squadron under
Nelson must have been near at hand. Calder's action,
incomplete as it was, showed the moral ascendancy which
rendered it certain that the French would in any case be
attacked, and Nelson's words to his captains have a special
significance : " If we meet the enemy we shall find them
not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of the
line * ; do not be surprised if I should not fall on them
immediately we won't part without a battle/' The
idea, frequently put forward, that England narrowly
escaped invasion in 1805 has no foundation in reason or
in fact.

On the other hand, it is remarkable that neither the
British Government nor Nelson himself seems to have
realised that, if Napoleon was really bent upon crossing
the Channel, the movement of the Toulon squadron
must have been directly connected with the project.
Nelson did not live long enough to understand how deeply
the lesson of 1798 had been graven on the mind of his
antagonist, who, with a great object in view, was not in
the least likely to contemplate an eccentric operation of
any magnitude, such as a re-invasion of Egypt. In any
case, Nelson's conduct of the Trafalgar campaign was
based throughout upon sound principles of naval war,
and his success was amply deserved. Trafalgar did not,
as is frequently asserted, save England from invasion;
but the results were of vital importance. On the sea the
aims of Napoleon were finally shattered* Henceforth,
abandoning his hopes of invasion, he sought in vain to
conquer the sea by the land. The Peninsular War, Moscow,
Elba, Waterloo, and St. Helena marked the inexorable
series of events which sprang from Nelson's last victory.
To Great Britain Trafalgar implied the means of expansion,
1 Nelson had eleven sail of the line.

22 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the firm foundation of the present Colonial Empire, and
naval prestige which still endures. The complexity of
concurrent causes, by which, at a national crisis, the scale
was turned in favour of this country, baffles analysis ; but
to Nelson, above all his contemporaries, honour is due.

It is Captain Mahan's great merit to have shown clearly
that Nelson was far more than a fighting seaman. The
great principle, that the offensive role was essential to the
British Navy, dominated his actions. In 1795 he writes :
" I have no doubt but that, if we can get close to the
enemy, we shall defeat any plan of theirs ; but we ought
to have our ideas beyond mere defensive measures." He
fully understood that, in certain circumstances, the loss
of a, squadron would be justified if the enemy's project
could thereby be thwarted. When awaiting the incursion
of Bruix into the Mediterranean, by which the British
fleet would be placed in a position of great numerical in-
feriority, he thus writes to St. Vincent : " Your lordship
may depend that the squadron under my command shall
never fall into the hands of the enemy ; and, before we
are destroyed, I have little doubt but that the enemy will
have their wings so clipped that they may be easily over-
taken." No one ever more perfectly grasped the fact
that risks must be taken in war ; no one certainly was
ever more willing to take risks for a sufficient object.
Yet Nelson, when determined to fight, left nothing to
chance, never neglected details, willingly accepted counsel,
while never for a moment evading responsibility, and was
particularly careful in imparting his views to his captains.

A rare combination of qualities is thus implied. Captain
Mahan sums up these qualities as follows : " For success
in war, the indispensable complement of intellectual
grasp and insight is a moral power, which enables a man
to trust the inner light to have faith a power which
dominates hesitation and sustains action in the most tre-
mendous emergencies," These qualities rare in due

NELSON 23

combination met in Nelson, and "their coincidence
with the exceptional opportunities afforded him con-
stituted his good fortune and his greatness." One other
quality is, however, essential to a great commander the
power of winning the love of his subordinates and so of
obtaining their best services. This also Nelson possessed
in a marked degree. Restive under incompetent superiors,
he was always thoughtful of the welfare of his inferiors.
The man who, just before Trafalgar, recalled the mail by
signal because a petty officer of the Victory had omitted
to post a letter to his wife, and who refused to give to his
valued friend the command of a seventy-four because it
would rob a lieutenant of coming honour " No, Black-
wood, it is these men's birthright, and they shall have it "
could count upon the loyal support which never failed
him in the hour of battle.

Captain Mahan has given us incomparably the best life
of Nelson that has yet appeared. No other writer could
have paid so worthy a tribute to the greatest director of
naval war a tribute which gains in force because of its
evident spontaneity. To the British nation the value of
this book cannot be overrated. The principles which
guided Nelson to victory are eternal ; the qualities he dis-
played have now a far wider scope than in his day. For
rapidity and certainty of movement favour the offensive,
and, by conferring a vast increase of possibilities, distinctly
enhance the importance of the personal factor. Nelson
was the most brilliant exponent alike of a national policy
and a national spirit. If we cling to the one and keep
alive the other, the unknown future can be calmly awaited.

II

THE INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE FRENCH IN EGYPT

(United Semes Magazine, August, iSpp.)

I came across this litde-knowa correspondence by chance, and
it seemed to throw a strong light upon the direct and indirect results
of Nelson's great victory of the Nile. These letters are human
documents of real historical value. Some of them show true insight
into die future ; others reveal the inmost thoughts of the victims
of one of Napoleon's greatest blunders, due to his customary
ignorance of the laws of the sea. They illustrate French character
in certain pleasing aspects. Incidentally, their publication may be
regarded as an eady and a peculiarly futile example of Government
propaganda highly developed in our times. For these reasons, I
have resuscitated my article, more than twenty-eight years old,
as forming a fitting sequel to the story of Nelson's career.

THERE is no more accurate gauge of the condition or a
force engaged in military operations than private letters
conveying the daily impressions of the officers and men
and written solely for the information of wives and friends
at home. On such letters rather than on the despatches
of commanders will the historian prefer to rely j but they
are rarely available, and there is probably only a single
instance of a collected correspondence, the unconscious
testimony of many writers of varied rank and capacity,
covering a peculiarly interesting period.

When, after the battle of the Nile, Bonaparte's hapless
expedition was imprisoned at the far end of the Mediter-
ranean, a mass of correspondence intended for France
was captured by British and Turkish frigates* It seems

24

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 25

to have been decided by the Government of Pitt to
publish a selection from those papers, and they appeared,
with translations, in three successive parts during the
years 1798-1800. This decision, which appears utterly
indefensible, must have been regarded by the French as
a conclusive proof of the engrained perfidiousness of
Albion, but the result is a book intensely interesting to
the student of history and of men. From 1798 the
Egyptian aspirations of the French date. Here are their
unvarnished first impressions of the land of the Pharaohs.
In 1798 the Delta was overrun by a French army. To-day
it lies in the hollow of the hand of England, and is awaken-
ing to freedom and prosperity unknown in its long history.
The great changes wrought by the hand of time in less
than a century are powerfully emphasised by a study of
" The Intercepted Correspondence/*

An anonymous editor, whether official or otherwise is
not clear, was provided to supply the part of the Greek
chorus, to wail at frequent intervals over the depravity
of the French and to supply copious running comments
of a depreciatory nature which the text does not by any
means justify. " The correspondence," he tells us,
" would have remained a secret, had not the French, by
holding out, first, a false account of the motive of this
famous expedition, and then, by spreading the most absurd
and exaggerated accounts of its success, rendered it
necessary to undeceive Europe (still trembling at the tale)
by proving from their own statements that what began in
wickedness and fraud was likely to terminate in wretched-
ness and despair/* The "motive," we are given to
understand, arose out of " the difficulties of the Directory,"
who could not find the arrears of pay due to the army of
Italy, and who projected an invasion of Egypt "as an
excellent expedient for quieting the present clamour and
providing for 40,000 veteran troops inured to plunder and
impatient of control/* There is, however, no doubt that

26 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Bonaparte cherished vague dreams of founding an Eastern
Empire, and in any case he clearly recognised the future
importance of Egypt. Unfortunately for France, he did
not understand that, while the capture of Egypt would
be an easy task if the British fleet could be evaded, the
ultimate fate of the expedition must depend absolutely
upon the command of the sea which the French could not
hope to assert. The tragedy which followed is a lesson
for all time. How imperfectly it has been learned in
this country frequently appears in our handling of ques-
tions of national defence. The effect of the battle of the
Nile throughout Europe was electric, and any " absurd
and exaggerated accounts " of success sent by Bonaparte
for French consumption must have been effectually
annulled as soon as the news arrived. Altogether the
excuses for the publication put forward by the editor seem
remarkably feeble, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the Government hoped by this means to stir up
animosity against the French. Although the two nations
had been at war for five years, there was in this country a
considerable body of French sympathisers, and the editor
pointedly alludes to " the ignorant and malevolent,'* whom
he apparently sought to enlighten or convert, while he
heavily belabours the Morning Chronicle for protesting
against the publication.

The letters show extreme ignorance of Egypt. The
** savans " who, according to Berthier, " fought with the
greatest courage," were as devoid of all information as
die military chiefs. Bitter disappointment in regard to
the resources of the country constantly peep out. An
anonymous ** swan " writes :

* c Savary has deceived us all with respect to Egypt. It
is not the charming country of which he boasts so much,
nor that balsamic dew that is drawn in with the morning
air. It is the country of misery. Its inhabitants are

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 27

savages who have, in evey respect, incurred the disgrace
of nature."

Vivid pictures of the squalor and misery of the native
villages and even of Alexandria and Cairo abound. We
trace the painful disillusionment of an army which had
expected to find another Italy by the banks of the Nile.

" When we first got sight of Alexandria and the deserts
which surround it, both officers and men were struck with
consternation. Bonaparte has revived their spirits."
Jaubert to the Minister of Marine.

Allusions to the British fleet appear from time to time
before the catastrophe ; but there are few signs of any
realisation of the frightful peril which the expedition in-
curred. Louis Bonaparte, however, tells his brother
Joseph that Nelson's squadron was sighted by the Justice
after the enemy left Malta.

" Yet it had the awkwardness or the stupidity to miss
us 1 It required, I think, no common degree of courage
and good fortune to run through a numerous fleet, with
inferior forces . . . and to capture on our passage, partly
by force and partly by negociation, such an important
place as Malta."

The " good fortune " is evident since, if Nelson's frigates
had not returned to Gibraltar, Bonaparte would never
have seen Egypt ; but the successful evasion was danger-
ously delusive. The departure of the British fleet from
Alexandria before the arrival of the expedition gave rise
to further misapprehensions. On the izth July, 1798,
Vice-Admiral Brueys wrote to the Minister of Marine :

" I have heard nothing further of the English. They
are gone, perhaps, to look for us on the coast of Syria ;

28 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

or rather (and this is my private opinion) they have not so
many as 14 sail of the line, and finding themselves not
superior in numbers do not think it quite prudent to try
their strength with us."

How little did the French admiral know Nelson, who
at this very titne^ was writing to Lord St. Vincent : " If
they are above water, I will find them out and if possible
bring them to action." Later, after the fateful ist
August, Rear-Admiral Ganteaume admits, in a letter to
the Minister of Marine, that :

<e The conduct (of Nelson's fleet) which had not waited
for us before Alexandrk . . . unhappily confirmed us in
the opinion that it had no order to attack us and produced
a boundless and fatal sense of security/'

With the short march from Marabout to Alexandria the
troubles of the French troops began, and it is clear that
the expedition was lacking in all the requirements of
desert warfare. The capture of Alexandria dwindles into
a paltry aflair in the candid letter of Adjutant-General
Boyer who says that 22,000 men were employed in the
assault of a place defended by 500 " Janizaries, of whom
scarce a man knew how to level a musket." From Alex-
andria Bonaparte hastened on to Cairo and the corres-
pondence teems with accounts of the terrible sufferings
endured by the troops.

"We were many days without water, or bread, or
victuals of any kind, and even without the means of pro-
curing any. In five or six days, I speak without exag-
geration, we lost six or seven hundred men by thirst
alone. . . . We are exceedingly reduced in our numbers*
. . . We have had several soldiers who blew out their
brains in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief calling
out to him e Voifo ton owrage? " Captain Royls.

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 29

" I must now tell you that it is hardly possible to form
an idea of what we have gone through sufferings upon
sufferings, privations, mortifications, fatigues we have
exhausted them all. Three-fourths of the time we have
been dying of hunger." Colbert to Collasse.

The Battle of the Pyramids, upon which in Bonaparte's
magniloquent language forty centuries looked down, is
shorn of its glories and reduced to modest dimensions by
these artless narrators.

" Our entrance into Grand Cairo will doubtless excite
that sensation at home which every extraordinary event
is calculated to produce ; but when you come to know
the kind of enemy we had to combat, the little art they
employed against us and the perfect nullity of all their
measures, our expedition and our victories will appear to
you very ordinary things." Adjutant-General Boyer*

"We had an engagement the day we arrived in the
neighbourhood of Cairo. . . . We call it the Battle of
the Pyramids ; the enemy lost (to speak without exaggera-
tion) some seven or eight hundred men ; a great portion
perished in attempting to swim the Nile." Damas to

" We have had two battles and three or four skirmishes,
or rather we have had but two butcheries. The Mame-
lukes had nothing but bravery; we had discipline and
experience. They rushed on to dash themselves in pieces
against our squared battalions ; their unreflecting valout
precipitated them between two of these formidable masses,
where they found their graves." Adjutant-General Laeufo.

Of the Battle of the Nile there are interesting details,
and three eye-witnesses two at Rosetta and one at Alex-
andria narrate hour by hour what they saw of the fight.
Here is a vivid piece of description written by Frangois
to his wife. The letter was begun on the 3oth July, and
asks : " And the English will they keep the sea this

3 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

winter ? " Two days later, the blow falls and the writer
resumes his pen.

"Five o'clock. We discern the English fleet very
clearly with our glasses. It seems about to drop anchor
in Aboukir Bay for the purpose of attacking us.

" Half after five. The cannonade begins and about six
increases.

" Seven. It is now night and the fire still increases.

"Half after seven. The whole horizon seems in
flames ; this shows that a ship is on fire.

" Eight. The cannonade slackens a little.

" Nine. The flames augment.

" A little after nine. A vessel blows up. How tre-
mendously beautiful ! A sky covered with fire ! ...

" Noon (znd August). The express has arrived from
Aboukir. O fatal night 1 O fatal action for the honour
of France I The fleet is destroyed."

On the top of some old tower near Rosetta, another
careful observer notes each phase of the great battle with
wonderful accuracy, and returning to his post on the 3rd
August, presents * c an exact view of the whole scene as it
appeared to us, keeping the town of Aboukir to the left,
and directing our eyes along the horizon to the right/'

" The first vessel dismasted carries English colours.
" The second and third are in good condition ; colours
not to be distinguished. The fourth has lost a mast."

Proceeding thus the panorama of stricken ships is
completed*

Some few side lights on the causes of the disaster may
be gleaned. As early as the 8th July, Commissary Jaubert
tells us that it was the " general opinion " that the fleet
would sail for Corfu and be reinforced by ships from
Malta, Toulon and Ancona ; but adds : " The general
has decided otherwise/*

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 31

" We shall certainly see it (the English fleet) at last ;
but we are now disposed in such a manner as to bid de-
fiance to a force more than double our own."

On the i zth July, Vice-Admiral Brueys writes to the
Minister of Marine that he had been unable to find a
channel into the port of Alexandria for the ships of the
line, but still hoped to be successful in his search. Mean-
while, he had sent in the Venetian vessels and the light
craft, and had disposed his ships at Aboukir, " the leading
vessel being as close as possible to a shoal on the north-
west." In this, as we know, he was mistaken, and Captain
Foley in the Goliath followed by Zealous, Orion, Theseus
and Audacious passed across the bows of "the leading
vessel " the Guerrier between her and the shoal to which
Brueys trusted to save his van from being turned.

Bonaparte subsequently stated that up to July 24, he
believed that the French fleet had either sailed for Corfu
or entered the harbour of Alexandria ; but, on the zyth
July, he wrote to Brueys from Cairo :

"I hear from Alexandria that a channel, such as we
could wish, has been discovered, and by this time, I flatter
myself, you are already in port with all your fleet."

Rear-Admiral Ganteaume, however, in his report to
the Minister of Marine on the Battle of the Nile, says :

"It would have been the most prudent step perhaps
to have quitted the coast the moment the descent had been
effected ; but the Admiral l who waited for the orders of
the Commander-in-Chief, whose army naturally derived a
great measure of confidence from the presence of the
squadron, did not think himself justified in leaving the
coast."

1 Vice-Admiral Btueys, who was killed on board his flagship.

32 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Traces of a certain jealousy between the navy and army
are to be found, and one writer throws the whole blame
upon Brueys.

" This catastrophe . . . could not have taken place, if
the Admiral had been more anxious to execute his (Bona-
parte's) plans which were to carry all the ships into the
port of Alexandria."

In an appendix to his report, Ganteaume gives details
of the ships and crews which, being in the harbour of
Alexandria, escaped destruction. He enumerates ten ships
of the line and frigates x with 3,453 men, and fourteen
small craft with 1,495 men.

Writing on the i6th August, Bonaparte, with char-
acteristic energy of purpose and ignorance of naval matters,
was already planning impossible combinations. In a
letter to Villeneuve, he states :

" The two ships of the line, Le Causse and Le Dubois,
are manned and armed, as are the frigates Junon> Alceste 9
Meuiron 9 Carrere* and all the other Venetian frigates.
You will find at Malta two sail of the line and a frigate
and you will await the arrival of three Venetian sail of the
line and two frigates which are coming from Toulon.
. . . My plan is to unite the three vessels which we have
at Ancona, and that at Corfu with the two we have at the
port of Alexandria, so that we may be able, at all events,
to keep the Turkish squadrons in check, and thus to make
an attempt to form a junction with the seven vessels which
you will by this time have with you/*

All this reads very much like the complete plan of naval
campaign which ended in disaster at Trafalgar. Thus

1 The only ships of the line, so rated, wete the Venetian vessels
Causse and Dubois, which wete in bad condition.
3 Caszato in Ganteaume's list.

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 33

early in his career, Bonaparte seems to have vainly fancied
that he could effect naval combinations over great dis-
tances as easily as he could dispose troops for a great
battle. One solitary soldier seems to have been unper-
turbed by the tremendous catastrophe of the battle of
the Nile.

"The English, though victorious, are too much dis-
abled to keep the sea, and will for some time, I flatter
myself, leave our communications open/' Adjutant-
General Lacuee.

Other writers show that they fully comprehended the
magnitude of the disaster, and foresaw the ruin of the
expedition ; but, here and there, the high spirit of the
French nation asserts itself and belief in the power of
Bonaparte to save the situation is not wanting. The
army did not know that, as early as the 28th July, its
Commander-in-Chief had written to his brother Joseph :
" I think of being in France in two months/* It was not
realised that he was capable of deserting the troops whom
he had hopelessly compromised. Here are a few charac-
teristic echoes of the battle of the Nile :

" The defeat of our fleet in the dreadful action of the
ist inst. is a calamity which leaves us here as children
totally lost to the mother country. Nothing but peace
can restore us to her. But, gracious heavens ! how much
will this incomparable victory raise the pretensions of
the English ! we are all pierced to the soul by it ; but
courage and Bonaparte still remain." Le Ptre to his
mother.

"The action . . . would deprive the army of every
hope, if it was not acquainted with the genius of the
Commander-in-Chief. It is entirely on him that we rely
for the care of extricating us from the perilous step in
which we are engaged. May the measures he may take

34 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

bring us nearer to our country! This land is not made
for us." An anonymous " Savan"

** I set out to-morrow for Cairo to carry the news to
Bonaparte. It will shock him so much the more, as he
had not the least idea of its happening. ... A glimmer
of hope still remains ; may it not vanish like the rest 1 "
Tallien to Barras.

"If I must needs speak the truth, such as it really
appears to me, I then say that, after so dreadful a disaster,
I conceive nothing but a peace can consolidate the estab-
lishment of our new colony. May our Government
procure us a solid and honourable one I " Ganteaume to

[mister of Marine.

The following does honour to the writer :

"What a calamity, my dear friend, has befallen our
fleet 1 It, is dreadful in the extreme ; but we must take
heart and rise superior to our misfortunes." Menou to
Kleber.

How heavily the sufferings of the march from Alexandria
to Cairo, the cruel disillusionment produced by personal
experience of the promised land of Egypt * and the fatal
news from Aboukir had told upon the army can be imagined
from the following extracts. It must not be forgotten
that most of the officers present were not novices in war
but tried soldiers of the Army of Italy. While the most
striking characteristics of these letters are despair and
deadly home-sickness, there are signs that the sense of duty
had not been lost, and it must be remembered that the
men who could thus write afterwards made the Syrian
campaign under the most painful conditions*

1 In his speech to the troops at Toulon before embarkation, Bona-
parte had promised " to lead them, in the name of his Goddess of
liberty, across mighty seas and into regions where native valour
might achieve such glory and wealth as could never be looked for
beneath the cold skies of the West.** (Editor of Correspondence.)

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 35

"If we have the happiness of returning speedily to
France, I will exert myself to the utmost to obtain my
discharge at any time whatever. I can no longer endure
this cursed business, always hazarding my life at every
hour of the day." Captain Gay to his parents.

" We are assured that in the course of a few months
reinforcements from France will arrive here and that we
shall then return home. . . . Sometimes, however, sad
thoughts, bitter regrets force themselves upon me. A
sign breaks forth, a tear trickles down my cheek and I
hasten to tear myself from my melancholy reverie. O
poor Charles ! How art thou passing thy youth 1 O
duty, why art thou so rigorous ! " Lasal/e to his mother.

" My situation becomes every day more and more irk-
some. . . . Nothing however shall induce me to betray
my friendship 1 and my duty. ... I can assure you
that if I ever have the happiness of placing my foot on
the soil of my native land, nothing shall induce me to quit
it again. Of the forty thousand Frenchmen who are here,
there are not four whose determination is not the same
as my own. . . . Adieu, my best Th6r6sia, my paper is
drenched with my tears." Tallien.

" The major part of the army is suffering from diarrhoea,
and although victorious, it will terminate its career by
perishing miserably if our Government persists in its
ambitious projects. Many officers are throwing up their
commissions ; and I fully confess to you that I should
throw up mine, if I had the least prospect of obtaining
anything in France." Pistre.

" There is a talk already of our ascending the Nile as
far as the cataracts an expectation that will make a
number of officers throw up their commissions. . . .
The cup of bitterness is poured out and I will drain it to
the dregs. I have on my side firmness, health and a spirit
which I trust will never flag ; with these I will persevere
to the end." Adjutant-General Boyer.

" I do not know, my dear mother, when I shall have
the pleasure of seeing you. I repent more and more of

x Foi Bonaparte.

56 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

our coining here ; but it is now too late. In a word, 1
resign myself to the Supreme Will/* Guillot.

Amid the sombre colours of such letters as these there
are occasional streaks of lighter tint* A brigadier-general
thus describes his somewhat embarrassing position in a
Cairo palace :

" Enfin, mon cher^foccupe aujourd'hui le plus beau s frail du
Caire, celui de la Sultane favorite d' Ibrahim 'Bey. ]'occupe son
palais enchantee et je respects > au milieu de ses nymphes, la
promesse quifaifaite & ma bonne amie d 9 Europe. Oui,je m
lui ai fait une infidelity etfespire qtte cela tiendra"

We must hope that this excellent resolution worthy
of a far earlier resident in Egypt was not broken. Other
writers were evidently less scrupulous than the gallant
brigadier.

The letters of Adjutant-General Boyer, which have
been previously quoted, are remarkable for their style
and candour. The following appreciation of the French
soldier, as he appeared to this able officer, must not be
omitted :

"I have seen enough to be convinced that it is not
with soldiers that colonies are founded, above all not
with soldiers such as ours. . . . They are terrible in
the field, terrible after victory, and without contradiction
the most intrepid troops in the world ; but they are not
formed for distant expeditions* A word dropped at
random will dishearten them. They are lasy, capricious,
and exceedingly turbulent and licentious in their conver-
sation. They have been heard to say as their officers
passed by, * Les voil&, les bourreaux des Fran9ais/ and a
thousand other words of this nature/'

Such, according to Adjutant-General Boyer, were the
soldiers of the First Republic. If, however, in common
with all troops and all individuals, they possessed the

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 37

defects of their qualities, they proved, under good leader-
ship, capable of some of the finest military achievements
that history records. Enthusiasm has always been neces-
sary to show the French soldier at his best, and of enthu-
siasm there could have been exceedingly little during
Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign.

The following has peculiar interest in the light of recent
events. The writer shows rare insight, and his words
were prophetic*

"In a word this country is nothing at present. It
merely offers magnificent recollections of the past and
vast but distant hopes of the future. It is not worth
conquering in its present condition; but if statesmen,
above all, if able administrators should undertake the
management of it for ten years ... it might become the
most valuable colony of Europe, and effect an important
change in the commerce of the world. . . . But where
are they these able administrators ? We have, indeed,
the man capable of giving the first strong impulse, but
not a soul equal to its administration. . . . Oh I how
many false reputations are acquired in Italy, and how
many pedestals will now rest without statues 1 Besides,
are the French whose impetuosity was well adapted to
the conquest of this country are they, I say, endued
with sufficient patience to wait for all this? Instantly
eager to pluck the fruit, will they let it ripen for ten years,
or will they not rather, like the savage of Montesquieu,
cut down the tree to have it the sooner? The first
measures which have been taken give me every reason to
fear this." Adjutant-General Lawte.

The official documents which figure in the" Intercepted
Correspondence" include the amazing proclamation
issued by Bonaparte on landing, in which he informed
Mamelukes, Bedouin, and Fellahin that " the French are
true Mussulmans." This must be so, because " not long
ago they marched to Rome and overthrew the throne of

3 8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the Pope who excited the Christians against the professors
of Islam. Afterwards they directed their course to Malta,
and drove out the unbelievers who imagined that they
were appointed by God to make war on the Mussulmans/*
Never did proclamation fall so absolutely or so deservedly
flat.

The clever, misleading and utterly disingenuous letter
to K16ber, in which Bonaparte announced his departure
and handed over the command, is well known. Less
remembered is the manly despatch from Kldber to the
Directory in which he unfolds die realities of the situation,
and justly criticises Bonaparte's academic fallacies. " The
General," he wrote, " further says that e Alexandria and
El Arish are the two keys of Egypt/ El Arish is a paltry
fort, four days' journey in the desert. The immense
difficulty of victualling it will not allow of its being
garrisoned by more than 250 men. Six hundred Mame-
lukes and Arabs might, whenever they pleased, cut off all
communication with Catiez ; and, as when Bonaparte left
us this garrison had but a fortnight's provisions in advance,
just that space of time and no more would be sufficient to
compel it to capitulate without firing a shot." To speak
of El Arish as one of the " keys " of Egypt was as pre-
posterous as the later application of the term to Merv in
regard to India. The allurements of a delusive phrase
frequently seem, however, to be irresistible.

Ganteaume summed up the situation in words which
should never be forgotten :

" I know all the importance of the possession of Egypt.
I used to say in Europe that this country was for France
the point d'apptti by means of which she might move at
will the commercial system of the world ; but to do this
effectually a powerful lever is required and that lever is a
navy. Ours has existed ! Since that period, everything
has changed, and peace is, in my opinion, the only ex-
pedient that holds out to us a means of fairly getting rid

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 39

of an enterprise no longer capable of attaining the object
for which it was undertaken/ 7

A letter from Damas, General of Division and Chief
of the Staff to the Minister of War, throws a strong light
upon the military position in October, 1799. About
42,000 men originally landed at Marabout

" The number of effective men on September 22, 1798,
was above 33,000; it is now reduced below 22,000.
From these must be deducted 2,000 sick and wounded,
who are absolutely incapable of any duty whatever, be-
sides 4,000 utterly unable to take the field or enter upon
any active service. . . . The 16,000 men, comprising
the forces of every description, who compose the army,
are dispersed over a tract of country comprised within a
triangle whose base extends from Marabout to El Arish
and whose apex is above the first cataract. ... It would
be impossible to collect a force of 7,000 men at any one
point to oppose the efforts of an enemy who menaces
us with an irruption on every side."

Reflections on the general political situation are naturally
rare in this correspondence ; but Poussielgue, the comp-
troller of the finances of the army, makes some shrewd
observations in which he contemplates future French
claims upon Egypt and anticipates the mutual jealousies
between Great Britain and Russia which have profoundly
influenced the history of the nineteenth century. Writing
to the Directory, he points out :

" Now, as the French Republic has nothing to appre-
hend from the English which is not trifling compared
with the losses she must sustain from the establishment
of the Russians in the Mediterranean ; as there is not a
chance of recovering from the English any part of what
they have taken from us but by an immediate treaty - . .
no present purpose would be answered and no incon-

40 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

venience would be sustained by adjourning our claims
(reclamations} to a happier period. ... I am persuaded
that the English cannot see without some uneasiness and
without a kind of secret jealousy the progress of the
Russians a progress mucn more dangerous for them
than our continental power now that our navy is destroyed
and we have lost our maritime conquests/*

The whole of this exceedingly able despatch is well
worth reading. It sets forth die miserable state of the
French army, and powerfully urges the need of an imme-
diate peace. At the same time, it reviews the international
situation with remarkable perspicuity considering that die
writer's knowledge must have been much restricted. He
rejects for example the then belief of " many politicians "
that the Ottoman Empire was already tottering to its fall
and he considers that " it will be eternally the interest of
France, England, and Prussia, and even the Empire to
oppose " the expected dismemberment.

No notice of the "Intercepted Correspondence "
would be complete without some samples of the quality
of the egregious editor. Two quotations from his abun-
dant comments must suffice. One of the "savans"
makes kindly mention of his horse "Milord" whose
privations he deplores. This pleasant little proof of the
humanity of the writer evokes the following explanatory
footnote : " His horse which from the name we suppose
to have been an English one. The joke of calling him
Milord is not a very refined one, it must be confessed ;
but savans have now and then odd notions of humour/*
The editor's sense of humour may be accurately gauged
from another characteristic effiision, A certain Girefc
writes from Cairo to tell his friend Ramay in France about
a " famous descent of the English upon the French coast.
. . . They landed with 10,000 men, of whom 4,500 were
taken prisoners, 1,500 killed and the rest put to flight/*
This is a delightful yarn of the camp, and one feels strongly

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 41

attracted towards Girez when he goes on to say : " These
islanders ought to be well beaten; they should have
stayed in their wooden houses. These animals descend,
I think, in a straight line from Moses, who taught them
the use of the sea. They ought to confine themselves to
it, for the instant they get on land, they prove themselves
to be a very stupid race." Biblical history may not have
been a strong point with Gires ; but the following por-
tentous comment is obviously superfluous : " If he will
look into the history of Moses on his return (for we fear
he will have no opportunity of doing so while he is in
Egypt) he will find that Moses has little pretensions to
the reputation of a teacher in navigation. His * descen-
dants in a straight line * too know almost as little of the
matter as himself; but so it ever is ; ignorance and pro-
faneness go hand in hand, and the sneer of the scoffer is
produced by the misconceptions of the fool."

We cannot, after the lapse of a century, estimate the
effect which the publication of these most interesting
letters may have produced upon the minds of our ancestors*
We can judge them only in the light of our day, and while
the publication was discreditable to the Government of
Pitt, it cannot now be a sore subject with our neighbours
across the Channel. Taken as a whole, these letters are
highly creditable to the heads and the hearts of the gallant
Frenchmen who suffered and died in Egypt and Syria.
A naval tragedy so complete, entailing military conditions
so infinitely depressing, has rarely befallen an expedition.
The absence of all vain glory and the modest estimates
of the military achievements are remarkable. The all-
pervading home-sickness was natural. It is impossible
not to sympathise warmly with the suffering and the hope-
less despondency which stand revealed. We are too
ready to judge French character from selected specimens
of Paris journalism. The student of human nature will
find in the letters a safer guide, and will perhaps be in-

42 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

dined to qualify the popular judgment. The ruin of the
expedition was due to the battle of the Nile, yet we trace
no signs of bitterness against the race which stood directly
between France and her ambitions. There is something
touching in the words of Tallien to Barras : " The English
themselves allow that all our ships fought well." The
rancour which pervades the volume is supplied entirely
by the editor.

One reputation alone is tarnished by the " Intercepted
Correspondence " that of Bonaparte, who without suffi-
cient knowledge committed the expedition to an enterprise
of the most hazardous nature and then abandoned to their
fate the troops who had blindly trusted him. " I would
never have believed," wrote General Dugua to Barras
" that Bonaparte would have abandoned us in the condi-
tion in which we were, without money, without powder,
without ball, and one part of our soldiers without arms."
The cold cynicism of the instructions to Kl6ber that
negptiations for peace might commence as soon as 1,500
troops had died of plague in addition to the daily losses
in the field, cannot easily be forgotten or forgiven. The
mendacity of Bonaparte's official despatches cannot possibly
be justified. Between the Egyptian and the Russian
campaigns there is a strong analbgy. Both were fool-
hardy ventures undertaken without adequate knowledge
of the country invaded. Both entailed terrible sufferings
on the troops employed. Both showed the unpleasant
spectacle of an army in direst need deserted by its Com-
mander-m-Chief. In both, that Commander-in-Chief in-
dulged freely in colossal falsehoods.

In the long history of naval war, the influence of sea
power has never been more directly or more decisively
asserted than at the battle of the Nile. Trafalgar, how-
ever important, was relatively less momentous, since
Napoleon's project of invading England had been pre-
viously abandoned. In defiance of a universal law, the

INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE 43

French expedition of 1798 was deliberately undertaken.
The fatal results are nowhere so plainly revealed as in the
"Intercepted Correspondence/* Here, told by its own
officers, is the whole painful story of the sufferings and
the gradual disappearance of an army stranded on a
foreign shore with its sea-communication hopelessly cut.
The lesson was evidently not learned by Bonaparte, who
six years later was apparently x planning another invasion
at a time when France did not possess and could not
reasonably hope to obtain the command of the sea, and
when the military resistance to be encountered after land-
ing was incomparably superior to that of the Mamelukes
and Bedouin to which Adjutant-General Boyer alludes in
terms of contempt. The needs of an army in the field
are now far more complex and more extensive than those
of 1798. Over-sea campaigns cannot be carried out
without secure communications and, if attempted in
defiance of the teaching of history, they must end in
disaster. Evasion may now, as in sailing days, but less
easily in the case of large fleets of transports, be success-
fully accomplished. As in 1798, however, the success
will prove dangerously delusive if the command of the
sea cannot be gained and maintained. This is the first
axiom of Imperial defence.

1 There is qf course evidence, based on Napoleon's own statements,
that the invasion project of 1805 was not seriously intended; but
the French people were at least led to entertain the opposite opinion.

m

MOLTKE

^Edinburgh Raww," October,

Moltke, as a soldier and as a man, always attracted me, and I carefully
studied his campaigns and his writings in which I found valuable
instruction. After his death, I wrote many reviews of his career
of which this article is the most complete. It began with a sketch
of Prussian history into which I tried to fit one of the greatest
organisers, and certainly one of the most exemplary characters that
Germany has produced* I have here included only my appreciation
of Moltke's Hfe and work from which, in long efforts to secure
military reforms, I drew help and inspiration,

THE potency of her army has at all times been the gauge
of the European position of Prussia, and the army has
drawn its inspiration from the throne, either directly as in
the days of Frederick the Great and his father, or indirectly
through advisers whom the monarch has selected* But
the efficiency of an army is bound up with the spirit of
the nation, on whose patriotism, intelligence, and self-
sacrifice its very existence depends. Thus the history of
the years which followed after Jena, die years which led
the Prussian army from utter disaster at the hands of
Napoleon to a single-handed overthrow of France in
1870-1, involves much more than a mere military revival.
The inhereriVqualities of the German race made possible
the far-reaching reforms of Stein and Scharnhorst The
people accorded ; more than acquiescence to the organic
law of 3rd September, 1814, by which the principle of
universal service was established, and there is something
admirable in the steady, quiet determination with which

44

MOLTKE 45

Prussia in the days of her humiliation set about the work
of military and national regeneration, which carried her
troops to Paris in 1814 and again in the following year.

For nearly fifty years after Waterloo the Prussian army
had no experience of real war ; and grave defects were
manifested in the mobilizations of 1850, 1854, and 1859,
which the keen insight of the military advisers of the
crown was quick to recognize. Prussia did not wait for
disaster before applying the remedies, and the year 1860
saw great changes and augmentations sternly carried out
in face of bitter opposition changes subsequently jus-
tified on the plains of Bohemia. Meanwhile, in 1857, the
Prince of Prussia, subsequently first German emperor, had
assumed the reins of government ; and at the same time
an appointment had been made which was destined to
exercise an enormous influence over the Prussian army.
On 29th October, 1857, Major-General von Moltke be-
came Chief of its General Staff.

Helmuth von Moltke like Bliicher, a Mecklenberger
was born in 1800, the year of Marengo, and as a child
of six witnessed the sacking of Liibeck by the French
troops after Jena. In 1811 his father moved to Copen-
hagen where, later, the boy was sent to the military
academy. Many years afterwards he still retained a
bitter memory of his young life in the Danish capital.

" Without friends or acquaintances (he wrote in 1866),
we passed a thoroughly joyless childhood. We were
treated with rigour, even with harshness. . . * The only
good I ever received from this treatment was that I be-
came well accustomed to every sort of privation."

Truly, he may be said to have " graduated in misery's
college." After a six years' course at the academy, he
headed the list in the examination of 1818, and in 1819
he was gazetted to an infantry regiment. Dissatisfied

46 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

with the career offered by the Danish army, and anxious
to give his services to his native land, Moltke, in 1822,
went to Berlin, where he seems to have lived a life of
quiet study. After a year spent as head of the cc some-
what disorderly military school" at Frankfort, he was
attached to the topographical department of the staff
under General von Muffling, From 1835 to 1839 his
services were lent to the Sultan, and he took part in the
disastrous campaign in Asia Minor against Ibrahim Pasha.
In 1841 his collected letters from the East were published,
as well as many maps, the results of surveys made in
Turkey. Four years later Major von Moltke became
adjutant to Prince Henry of Prussia, then an invalid living
in Rome. There he witnessed the enthusiasm attending
the accession of Pio Nono, and, returning shortly after-
wards, significantly remarked: "I saw how quickly the
enthusiasm had subsided as soon as the new Pope had
convinced himself that he would have to halt upon the
liberal paths he had chosen/* Two books were the
literary result of his life in Italy. For seven years, com-
mencing in 1848, he served at Magdeburg as chief of the
staff of the 4th Army Corps, then commanded by the
Crown Prince of Prussia. A lifelong friendship dates
from this period, of which the first public sign was the
appointment of Moltke as equerry to the Crown Prince
in attendance upon whom he visited St. Petersburg, Paris,
and London. In 1857, as already mentioned, he assumed
the direction of the General Staff, and his life entered
upon a far wider sphere. The reorganisation of the
army was completed in 1860, and in 1863 Moltke drew
up the plan of operations of his first campaign.

For a Prussian officer of this period, the career briefly
sketched above was most exceptionally varied. To a
keen observer, whom nothing seems to have escaped, the
opportunities thus presented were invaluable. Moltke
had been called upon to assist in a reorganisation of the

MOLTKE 47

Turkish army ; his practical experience of surveying in
wild countries had been great, and in Asia Minor he had
accompanied the hapless force of Hafiz Pasha to the ruin
which he foresaw, but was powerless to avert.

The whole story of the lost battle, in which some of
the experiences of Baker Pasha in 1877 were anticipated,
is vividly told in Moltke's Letters on the East. The keen-
eyed Prussian officer, instantly detecting a turning move-
ment on the part of Ibrahim's force, urged a general
attack, which, however, " was reduced to an insignificant
demonstration with our wretched cavalry/' The move-
ment successfully accomplished by the enemy, he at once
advised a retirement to Birardchik.

" This position had the great evil, according to European
principles, of being without a line of retreat ; after all
that I had seen, this circumstance appeared to my eyes its
greatest advantage. Everyone . . . would see that it
was necessary to hold on or perish." Hafiz, however,
" declared that it was a dishonour to retire ; he also feared
that Birardchik was too strong ; the enemy would not
dare to attack us/*

Moltke spoke his mind " in the most formal and frank
manner in the presence of the superior officers of the
army/' and the Pasha agreed to follow his advice. No
orders were issued, however, and an hour later he found
Hafis surrounded by his Mollahs. He had already
changed his mind.

" The cause of the Sultan was just : Allah would come
to his aid ... I reminded him that the next day, when
the sun again set behind these mountains, he would
probably be without an army ; all was in vain 1 "

At nightfall Moltke made a last fruitless appeal, and
then, resigning his appointment as adviser, he set himself

48 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

to post the troops for the coming fight. The rout of
the following day was complete.

" In a few minutes we had scarcely any battalions whose
courage had not been shaken by their losses." On the
left wing "almost all the battalions were at prayer,
with their hands above their heads a manoeuvre executed
under the orders of the commandant." The Pasha him-
self carried " the colours of a landwehr battalion ; but
the battalion did not follow him, . . . The infantry
fired into the air at immense ranges, the cavalry dispersed,
and soon all broke up."

Such were Moltke's first experiences of war* In a
striking passage General Lewal contrasts the slow pro-
motion, die unnoticed and unrewarded years of toil which
the great German uncomplainingly endured, with the
high rank and reputation easily won by French officers
of the period.

"While this major laboured in Berlin without great
recompense, hig;h-sounding reputations, prodigious pro-
motions were being won in Algeria. Men of the same age
were attaining the highest rank, and, later, fate will bring
these brilliant generals face to face with this persevering
old Prussian major, in one of those immense convulsions
in which the French army will go under." l

Moltke's ^^/-Algerian experiences were brief, and
brought him no honours ; but unquestionably they were
not thrown away on a mind capable of estimating them
at their true value. It was something to have taken part
in this rough and desultory warfare, to have led recon-
naissances, posted troops for battle, foreseen and striven
to avert defeat. " I perceived," he writes, " that in war,
spirit repkces much science." There is something almost

1 1* Martcbal dt Moltk* (Paris, 1891).

MOL1KE

49

grotesque in the picture of the future organiser of the
German army throwing himself with characteristic earnest-
ness into the siege of a Kurdish stronghold. cc When I
saw the imposing castle on a formidable height ... I
could not help thinking that forty resolute men would
here suffice for a very long resistance." Like Napoleon,
when the progress of his army was arrested by the little
mountain fort of Bard, Moltke instantly grasped the
situation. Guns must be taken to the top of an adjoining
rocky hill from which the castle was commanded. After
great labour this work was accomplished ; but the shoot-
ing proved to be indifferent, and Moltke undertook a
night reconnaissance, crawling on his hands and knees
over the rocks in order to choose a place to begin mining.
** As for the miner, you must picture an honest stone-
cutter, a poor rqyah, who was forced to exercise his peace-
ful trade for this warlike object." The description of
the whole affair is admirable. It is just sufficiently serious,
but shows all through that the writer exactly gauged the
military significance of the operations in which he took
an active part. A comparison between these letters and
the grandiloquent despatches which have been written
with regard to other operations of the same class involun-
tarily suggests itself.

" Algerian ** warfare has, however, a certain educational
value, provided that the sense of proportion is never lost
or blunted, and Moltke's experiences in Asia Minor were
unquestionably not without their effect on his subsequent
career. The estimate of him as a thinker rather than a
man of action, "un industriel militaire" rather than
a soldier, needs much qualification* As an expert sur-
veyor in a country as wild as Afghanistan, and as a staff
officer with a loose irregular force, he abundantly proved
his readiness of resource and genius for adventure.

No army in the world contains better fighting material
than that of Turkey. The nizam is a soldier to the manner

50 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

born brave, patient, hardy, and docile. At Kars and at
Plevna he not merely showed a tenacity almost unrivalled,
but here and there gave signs of the impetuosity and dash
which are associated with the best traditions of France.
The national conditions of Turkey, however, are fatal to
the efficiency of her army, and the Russian war of 1877-8
served to illustrate its weakness in every phrase. The
fates were not unpropitious ; Allah did not frown upon
the cause of the Orescent ; the enemy committed a series
of blunders which should have entailed disaster; but
unity of purpose even ordinary loyalty did not exist
among the Turkish commanders. The fleeting oppor-
tunities were lost, and the Russians, having won time to
bring up reinforcements and to learn the lessons of war,
irresistibly swept down to San Stefano.

In his admirable work on the Russo-Turkish war of
1828-9, Moltke showed how completely he had grasped
the inherent disabilities of the Turkish army. Sultan
Mahmud had none of the advantages with which William
I. of Prussia was surrounded.

" Among his own followers he found no one enlightened
man to aid him with counsel. . . . There was an utter
lack of intelligent native officers, and prejudice stood in
the way of the employment of foreigners. . . The
splendid appearance, the beautiful arms, the reckless
bravery of the former Moslem horde had disappeared ;
but yet this new army had one quality which placed it
above the numerous host which in earlier times the Porte
could summon to the field it obeyed/'

Nearly fifty years were to elapse before Russia and
Turkey would again engage in a single-handed contest.
One of the conditions which Moltke laid down as a certain
feature of the nest struggle " that the Russian fleet in
the Black Sea . . . will always be superior to the Turkish "
was not then fulfilled. He further pointed out that,

MOLTKE 51

taught by bitter experience, " the Russians in any future
war will probably advance into Bulgaria with much larger
forces/* But the Russian general staff in 1877 clearly
showed that they had never really studied the reasoned
criticism of the earlier campaign which came from the pen
of the " ancien major persvrant." With equal truth it
may be said that the plain teaching of this great work,
and the just estimate presented of the Russian soldiery,
were thrown away upon the British War Office in 1854.
The indefatigable German had even provided important
information as to the climate and military conditions of
the Crimea, which was translated by a British officer on
the eve of his departure to the East and forwarded to the
authorities who affected to conduct the war. " But they
would not be warned," he sadly wrote from the camp of
Balaclava after witnessing the terrible sufferings inflicted
upon the army by the ignorance and incapacity of its
administration.

The history of the Russo-Turkish war, with its admirable
lucidity, careful analysis and scrupulous attention to detail,
added considerably to Moltke's reputation. In Prussia
the truth of the saying of Don Quixote, that " the sword
hath never blunted the pen, nor the pen the sword," has
long been admitted. In style and arrangement the work
foreshadows the staff histories, now recognised models
of their kind, in which the deeds of the German army
have found an enduring monument. These histories*
containing a mine of wealth for the military student for
all time, unquestionably owe their inspiration to the great
Chief of the Staff, who guided, if he did not take a large
personal share in their preparation.

While the strategic genius of Moltke has been variously
estimated, there can be but one judgment as to his literary
faculty. His rare gifts as a military historian are beyond
question; as a letter writer, regarded in some aspects,
he has few equals. Moreover, the letters attest the man*

52 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Here is no pedant absorbed in a single science ; no hard,
narrow soul in which things non-military found no resting
place. His keen observation noted all which passed
before it. The toilettes of the ladies of the Russian court
are described in fullest detail and with evident accuracy,
as calculated to interest his wife. Yet, as M. Marchand
truly remarks, " Ces lettres t&noignent une fois de plus
des qualit& s&ieuses qui sont la force de nos ennemis." l
For in the midst of a vivid word-picture of the view from
his window, Moltke pauses to criticise the Fort of St.
Paul : " This fortress, being situated in the very middle
of the town, cannot contribute to the defence of St. Peters-
burg." The architecture and national customs of Russia
are made the subject of bright comment. Here, in few
words, is an admirable appreciation of the Russian soldier
of 1 8 5 6 : "It is with him as with the whole nation, without
his chiefs he would be in the most mortal difficulty. Who
would think for him? Who would lead him? Who
would punish him ? " He is a pacific animal, who knows
nothing of cock- or bull-fighting ; " but an order from
his superior suffices to make of the most peaceable Russian
against his tastes, it is true, and against his wishes a
soldier the most trustworthy, the most faithful to his duty."
And here speaks the cool observer of a great military
spectacle at Moscow : " I do not attach importance to the
deafening hurrahs which lasted several hours ; but it was
evident that these milks moustaches were pleased to see their
Czar."

General Lewal's imagination has pictured a nature hope-
lessly soured by an unhappy boyhood, absorbed in sombre
batted of France, cherishing inordinate ambition carefully
hidden, incapable of friendship or affection, dead to fancy,
lost to all sense of gentleness and beauty a calculating
machine rather than a man of flesh and blood.

"L'humanit semble n'avoir jamais eu accfes dans le
1 Preface to French translation of litters from Russia.

MOLTKE 53

cceur de ce grand silencieux/* In its place we are to find
only " cette haine qui a fait le fond de son caractre et Pa
laiss isol au milieu de la soci&/' We, -with these
many letters before us, derive an absolutely different
impression. There are touches of tenderness and glimpses
of quiet humour which lend the " charm of genius "
which Mr. O'Connor Morris finds wanting in the history
of the Russo-Turkish war. Can a critical history of war
really convey the sense of charm? "On this bank,"
writes the man of no imagination, "Medea plucked
enchanted herbs ; down in that broad valley, at the end
of which a stream glitters, camped the knights of the first
Crusade/* Below is a description of the first sight of
Constantinople :

" On the tenth morning after our departure from Rust-
chuk we saw the sun rise behind a distant mountain, at
the base of which lay a silver streak. This was Asia, the
cradle of nations ; there was snow-capped Olympus and
clear Propontis with its deep blue surface studded with
swan-like sails. Then arose, as it were from the sea, a
forest of minarets, masts, and cypress-trees. It was Con-
stantinople/'

" Coul en bronze, bronze il demeurera, conservant la
tnacit6 et I*inflexibilit6 du m&al, comme sa froideur et
son insensibility" Such is the verdict of General Lewal.
Inflexible on occasion he certainly was, as the unfortunate
De Wimpffen found at the Chateau Donchery ; yet there
was another and a different side to the character of the man.
Thirty years did not suffice to make him forget the old
tutor of his boyhood, to whom he forwarded a copy of
the Letters on the Eos , inscribed : " To my dear master
and friend, to whom I owe so much, I send this, my first
work, as a slight token of my esteem/*

t Do not envy us this campaign," he writes from Asia
Minor ; <c it is foil of horrors. More than 600 prisoners

54 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

have perished ; half were women and children. Women
have been wounded, children have been bayoneted."
And personally he tended and fed many of the sufferers.
Nearly thirty years later he thus feelingly writes of his
defeated adversary, Benedek :

"A vanquished commander! Ohl if outsiders had
but the faintest notion what that may mean ! The
Austrian headquarters on the night of K&niggratz I
cannot bear to think of it. A general, too, so deserving,
so brave, and so cautious."

Scattered throughout Moltke's writings there are many
such intensely human touches. Reserved and inexpansive
he doubtless was. His life was too completely given up
to labour to allow leisure for the cultivation of many
friendships; but that he was a mere cold, calculating
machine is obviously untrue. His quiet, studious habits
and intense dislike of all advertisement or semblance of
flattery combined to throw a veil over his personality
which has yet to be lifted. Meanwhile the statement of
Baron von Bunsen, " I believe that throughout his long
life on earth he never made an enemy," is, perhaps, the
most striking tribute which could be accorded to the
memory of one who has played so great a part in history.

The short historical sketch of Poland, first published in
1832, and rescued from oblivion nearly half a century later,
serves to throw additional light on the genius of Moltke.
It is a simple, clear statement of facts with few comments ;
but here and there are passages which attest the writer's
grasp of matters altogether outside of the pale of military
science. The economic condition of the agricultural
classes prior to the issue of the Prussian edict of i4th
September, 1811, is thus described :

" The fields lay waste, the dwellings were in ruins. No
peasant raised his hand to restore his hut, which threatened

MOLTKE 55

to fall in upon him, and in which he had no tight of
ownership. Though wood, straw, chalk and stones
abounded, and nature had provided materials in the fields
which surrounded the wretched villages, the peasant
never dreamed of using them, for he did not know if next
year he might not be forced to leave, without compen-
sation, what he had built to-day. . . . Bread, it should
be remembered, was a rarity for the peasant in the great
granary of Europe ; potatoes were his sole nourishment."

The terms of the edict were of a sufficiently sweeping
character, and their justification is thus stated :

" According to the general principles of public law and
political economy, the right of the State to ordinary and
extraordinary taxes and dues is paramount, and the dues
to the landlord are limited by the fact that he must leave
the peasants means to exist and to satisfy the State. Their
ability to do this can be taken for granted where the taxes
due to the landlord do not exceed one-third of the income
of an hereditary estate. The rights of the landlord could,
therefore, never have been greater, or, if they were, it was
illegal/*

The passages above quoted were written by an unknown
lieutenant of the Prussian staff, little over thirty years old,
then engaged on a survey of Silesia and the province of
Posen.

" Moltke seldom speaks in the Reichstag," writes Pro-
fessor Muller. " A whole session may pass without his
addressing the House, but when he does there is a death-
like silence amid the throng of eager listeners, anxious
that not a word should escape them. Most of his speeches
naturally bear upon military questions/' * The Nestor of
the German army possessed a nature which could not find
satisfaction in parliamentary life, and to the last he found

* Field-Marshal von Moltks* by Professor W, MOller.

56 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

other and mote congenial work to do. His habits and
experience did not tend to the formation of oratorical
powers, but it is easy to understand the earnestness with
which his rare utterances were followed, and the powerful
aid he was able to give to the military measures of the
Government. Speaking on the Bill introduced in Feb-
ruary, 1874, for fixing permanently the strength of the
peace standing army, he said :

" The first necessity for a State, in order to exist, is to
secure itself externally. Minor states can do this by
neutrality ; a Great Power must rely upon itself and on
its strength, being armed and determined to defend its
liberty and its rights. To leave a country defenceless
would be the greatest crime a Government could commit."

In memorable words he went on to state where the strength
of an army lies :

" It has been said that it is the schoolmaster who has won
our battles for us. Mere knowledge, however, does not
raise a man to the point at which he is willing to stake his
life for an idea for duty, honour, or fatherland. It
needs a whole training for this. It is not the school-
master, but the State which has won our battles the
State which, for sixty years past, has been, physically and
morally, arming and training the nation to punctuality
and order, to conscientious obedience, to love of country
and manliness/ 9

In an admirable chapter of his great work * Captain
Mahan has described the conditions essential to the exis-
tence of "Sea-Power." In the words above quoted,
Moltke kys down, as Scharnhorst had done, one of the
conditions on which the power of a modern army depends*
It is, in a sense, the fault of the State that the army of
Turkey is not one of the most formidable in Europe,

1 The Influent* of Sea-Power on History.

MOLTKE 57

even though the causes may be traced further and deeper.
Social and political conditions lie at the root of the weak-
ness of the British army.

Interesting from another point of view are the few words
spoken by Moltke in support of the laws proposed in 1878
for the suppression of Socialism. To him the struggle
for existence appeared to be not merely inevitable, but the
essential condition of progress.

"Want and privation are necessary conditions of
humanity which no form of government, no code of laws,
no human measures can ever set aside. And how could
the human race have attained to its present development
without the aid of these coercive elements in the divine
economy ? No, there will always be care and labour in
the future ; but a starving, freezing man does not think
of the future, but grasps at such means of relief as the
present holds out, and is driven by unbridled passion and
mortified hopes to acts of violence which his leaders are
least of all capable of hindering/*

Then, turning to the proceedings of the G>mmune in
Paris, he drew the following lesson :

" There was an opportunity of showing what democracy
could do towards an attempted realisation of its ideals.
Yet, though it destroyed much, it constructed nothing.
... On the path of overthrow the evil element soon
absorbs the good, and a moderate Liberal always has a
Radical at his back to goad htm on. And this has been
the chief error of so many in thinking it possible to level
down to their own standard, and to call 'Halt ! *, as if an
express train could be pulled up at a moment's notice with-
out destruction to all who are in it 1 "

In spite of the earnest attention which the speech obtained,
the Bill was thrown out by a majority of nearly five to one,
, dissolution followed shortly afterwards.

58 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Of the military genius of the man who for more than
thirty years was the directing brain of the army which he
organised and guided to victory in three campaigns, it is
not easy to form a just estimate. On the one hand, the
completeness of his successes and the unbounded con-
fidence which he inspired tend to dazzle the judgment ;
on the other hand, the campaigns which he conducted
were too few and too short to supply a sufficiency of com-
parison with those of Napoleon. More modern standards
are at present wanting. The change of conditions which
had arisen at the period when Moltke began to organise
war was greater and more wide-reaching than any which
preceded. The campaigns of Caesar admit of comparison
with those of Turenne. The handling of armies by
Turenne may be contrasted with that by Napoleon. But
at the period at which Moltke took office new forces had
come into play. The musket did not possess much
greater power than the yew bows of England, and the
field gun of Waterloo was not a much more formidable
weapon than that of Blenheim. In the development
which followed the invention of rifling, however, a leap
in advance was taken. Even more important in its in-
fluence upon the conduct of war were the immense improve-
ment of the road communications of Europe and the
introduction of railways. Most important of all was
the moral revolution, brought about by education and
the new requirements demanded of all ranks in the huge
national armies which were no longer capable of being
handled as a whole. La place of a cumbrous engine con-
trolled by a single will, an army had become a vast living
mass instinct with vivid life throughout its whole being,
an instrument of extreme complexity, flexible to the kst
degree, a loose aggregate of men or a weapon of terrific
power according to the perfection of its parts and the
spirit and intelligence of its thousands of subordinate
leaders. The nature of this change has been well expressed

MOLTKE 59

by Colonel Maurice in the introduction to his recent
work x :

"Under the conditions of the past, the general in
command of an army relied upon its perfection in drill
and in formal manoeuvres for enabling him to direct it
with success against the weak points of an adversary*
Now he must depend, instead, upon the perfection of its
organisation, and of a training adapted to make each man
ready when required to apply sound principles in any
emergency."

We, with the history of the campaigns of 1866 and
1870-1 before us, write and speak glibly of the principles
of organisation which modern conditions entail upon
armies ; but, with the clear insight of true genius, Moltke,
the student of war, untried in any great campaign, firmly
grasped those principles, and applied them throughout
tih.e whole vast fabric of the Prussian army. It is not
possible to apportion its precise relative weight to each
of the three determining factors the directing brain of
the Chief of the Staff, the complete trust reposed upon
him by William I, and the inherent characteristics of
the German race which have combined to make that
army the model of Europe. To admit the remarkable
coincidence of conditions favourable to military power,
is in no sense to detract from the genius of Moltke.

If in " the spirit of the age " are to be sought the causes
which lay at die root of the collapse of Prussia in 1806,
then assuredly in the national characteristics at a later
period lay the strength of the army of 1870. Although
the German race has always shown aptitude for a military
training, it cannot claim any special genius for adminis-
tration. No foreign nation has ever produced such an
administrative machine as the government of India. None
can show a private organisation to rival that of the North

i War, 1891.

60 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Western Railway. But Germany has, sternly and without
regard to class interests, applied the great principles of
administration to her army ; and we copying the letter
here and there with little intelligence, while neglecting
the spirit, continue to manifest in military matters every
phase of administrative incapacity. Moltke saw clearly
the needs of modem war and, following in the steps of
Scharnhorst and Clausewitz, with inimitable earnestness
set about the task of devising a system to meet those
needs. King William had the strong good sense to rely
on his Chief of the Staff; the nation learned to understand
and trust him implicitly. We, with a potential armed
strength of a million of men, are not at present able to
realise that " the responsible duty of preparing plans of
military operations, collecting and co-ordinating infor-
mation of all kinds, and generally tendering advice upon
all matters of organisation and the preparation of the
army for war," x requires ** a special department " for its
due discharge. A Moltke installed at Pall Mall would,
under existing circumstances, find his hand paralysed.
Genius, fettered by the trammels of a false system of
administration, is almost useless to a State. Mediocrity
under a sound system can at least turn out good work,
and the General Staff which Moltke reared will continue
to inspire the German army though the master has passed
away.

It was virtually a new organisation which his genius
created. Napoleon had no staff in the present sense. Pre-
paration for war, as Moltke taught it to Germany, had no
counterpart at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Enthusiasm, and the genius, personal prestige, and readi-
ness of resource of the commander, were the conditions
under which victory was wooed and won. No previous
campaign was prepared as was that of 1870. No military
concentration had ever been worked out to its last detail
1 Report of Lord Harrington's Commission.

MOLTKE 61

as was that which placed 370,000 men in the Palatinate
in fifteen days. Thus the two methods of war that of
Napoleon and Moltke differed essentially. The Napole-
onic method had its weak side, in that it rested too com-
pletely upon the individual genius of the commander,
left too much to the decision of the moment, and was not
well suited to the handling of large masses spread over
wide distances. The rare powers of Napoleon served to
veil this weak side, which, however, his lieutenants, less
gifted, frequently disclosed. It is impossible to believe
that even Napoleon would not have derived advantage
from a partial adoption of the later method, and he has
himself explained how he would have organised an army
if he had had time. In any case, the new conditions of
war demanded change. The mobilisation of an army in
which the greater part of the troops had to be recalled
from their homes, forwarded to their respective centres,
equipped, and then transported in large fighting units to
the place of concentration, would be painfully slow, if
not impossible, unless every requirement had been fore-
seen and provided for in advance. The full transporting
power supplied by railways could not be utilised unless
the most careful study had been devoted to the ways and
means.

The old order had changed and the old methods no
longer sufficed. It is the lasting distinction of Moltke
that he grasped the new requirements, and, with a patience
and earnestness above all praise, devoted himself to their
fulfilment. " Berthier," truly says General Lewal, " d'une
veritable modestie et d'une capacity militaire asses:
ordinaire, se contentait de la position de secretaire assidu,
vigilant, exact, d'un gdn&al incomparable, et ne prdten-
dait pas 6tre autre chose qu'un agent de transmission des
ordres et des rapports." What the Chief of the Staff
is to the commander of a German army, and how great
the services rendered by the General Staff to the whole

62 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

military system, readers of Captain Spenser Wilkinson's
excellent little work 1 will be able to judge. Lieut.-
General Brackenbury has summed up these services in
evidence given in 1887 before the House of Commons
Committee on army and navy estimates. The general
staff is stated to be " the keystone of the whole system of
German military organisation . . . the cause of the great
efficiency of the German army ... the powerful brain
of the military body, to the designs of which brain the
whole body is made to work." Even the " incomparable
general " of our day if he exists cannot afford to dis-
pense with the assistance of this living force. In no other
known way can a modem army be organised for war or a
great campaign adequately prepared. Every Great Power
in Europe has endeavoured to reproduce, according to its
ability, the system to the perfection of which Moltke
devoted half a lifetime. Great Britain alone has at present
no semblance of a General Staff, with the results dis-
closed in the official history of the Soudan expeditions.

As an organiser Moltke is admitted to have been
unrivalled. He "has 'organised victory* more thor-
oughly than has ever been seen," writes Mr. O'Connor
Morris. 2 Yet to the mind of General Lewal the very
refinement of his forethought and calculation seems almost
a degradation of the military art, dragging it down to the
level of the workshop.

^ " Depuis longtemps la conception de la guerre i venir
lui est apparue comme une affaire industrielle soumise aux
regies pr&ises de calcul. . . . Aprs s'&re usin6 lui-
m&ne, il va usiner Farm^e prussienne. . . . De Moltke
est un sp&ialiste Strange, ayant conduit la guerre sans
avoir jamais combattu ; c'est un industriel militaire, un

1 The Brain of an Army.

8 Great Commanders of Modern Times. By W* O'Connor Moms
(London, 1891).

MOLTKE 63

entrepreneur de combats, ayant pouss 1'usinage guerrier
& un degr inconnu jusqu'i lui. Cette prdvoyance, ce
calcul anticipd, ces dispositions r^glees d'avance d'une
manire presque irrevocable, constituent 6videmment un
ensemble remarquable et nouveau dans les annales de la
guerre ; c'est le triomphe de Fusinage et de 1'outillage et,
& ce titre, ils m&itent d'etre mis en Evidence/'

The questions arise, however, whether Moltke's campaigns
have not proved distinctly that this "usinage" is an
essential element of success in modern war, whether the
disdainful term is really apt, and whether organisation for
war in the new sense should not be placed in a much
higher category. It is at least clear that the process of
" usinage " did not convert the German army into a rigid
machine, but conferred upon it extreme flexibility in spite
of the great masses of men requiring to be handled.

The "complete project " which, as General Lewal
states, was supplied by Moltke to King William in the
spring of 1869 was a project of mobilisation and little
else. None knew better than " the great arithmetician "
the limits of calculation and prevision. "It is almost
impossible," he wrote, " during a campaign to remedy an
error in the primary concentration of the troops. . * . No
plan of operations can with any certainty reach beyond
the first encounter with the enemy/ 9 The " complete "
plan of campaign, which has appealed so strongly to some
imaginations, is defined in Moltke's masterly prfcis of the
operations of 1870-1 :

" In the plan of campaign, submitted by the Chief of
the Staff, and accepted by the King, that officer had his
eye fixed from the first upon the capture of the enemy's
capital, the possession of which is or more importance in
France than in other countries. On the way thither the
hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible
back from the fertile southern provinces into the narrower

64 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

tract on the north. But, above all, the plan was based
on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever
found, and keep the German troops so compact that a
superior force could be brought into the field/*

But in making arrangements to supply and reinforce the
army under all contingencies, and to use to the utmost the
transporting power of available railways, the plan was
worked out to the last detail.

"The orders for marching, and travelling by rail or
boat, were worked out for each division of the army,
together with the most minute directions as to their
different starting points, the duration of the journey, the
refreshment stations, and places of destination . . . and
thus, when war was declared, it needed only the royal
signature to set the entire machine in motion with un-
disturbed precision. There was nothing to be changed
in the directions previously given."

The distinction is important, as showing the limitations
of this " calcul anticip^ " the point at which " usinage "
must end. In war the period is quickly reached when
" our will clashes with the independent will of our oppo-
nent, upon which limits can be put by a well-timed and
determined initiative, but which can only be overcome by
actual combat." *

As a director of war, Moltke has been variously esti-
mated. To some of his countrymen he appears the

1 Moltke. In the recently published prfcis, this is still further
emphasised. " It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be
laid down for a long period and carried out in detail. The first
collision with the enemy's army changes the situation entirely, accord-
* ing to the result. Some things decided upon will become impracti-
cable ; others, which originally seemed impossible, become possible.
All that the leader of an army can do in a change of circumstances is
to decide for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his
purpose unflinchingly."

MOLTKE 65

Andrea del Sarto of strategists. In the judgment of
General Lewal he is an " ingenieur de combats plus que
g&i&al de rarme," and he will pass down to posterity
" d^pourvu du prestige et du nimbe glorieux qui font
resplendir le front des grands soldats." According to
Mr. O'Connor Morris, his operations " do not reveal one
grand strategic conception, and are characterised by
several grave errors. . . , He has not even approached
the height of Napoleon. We miss originality in his con-
ceptions of war/*

The latter verdict is wholly unjust, and the reason is,
perhaps, not difficult to seek. The great Chief of the
Staff had none of the dazzling personality of Napoleon.
For him there was no bridge of Arcola. No grandiloquent
manifestos, no invocations of glory, no appeals to avarice, 1
no allusions to " the sun of Austerlits " or the forty
centuries looking down from the worn summits of the
Pyramids, ever issued from him to infect an army with
the fever of battle. The theatrical element was utterly
foreign to a nature which knew not " 'Ercles* vein/*
Retiring to a fault, Moltke perfectly understood his func-
tions, and never sought to pass outside them. In the single
person of Napoleon centred the glory alike of the strategic
stroke and the well-ordered battle. It was Moltke's rtte
to move armies to battles which others would fight. He
was " a soldier fit to stand by Caesar and give directions,"
but no aspirant to Caesar's purple. Napoleon's military
career ended at the age of forty-six ; Moltke's first Euro-
pean campaign was fought when he was sixty-four. For
twenty-one years Napoleon was almost continuously at
war; Moltke's two great campaigns occupied less than
eleven months. There was no time for the one to attain

1 " Je veux vous conduke dans les plus fertiles plaines du monde.
De riches provinces, de grandes villes seront en votre pouvoir ; vous
y trouverez honneur, gloke et richesses." Proclamation in 1796 to
the Army of Italy.

66 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the personal prestige of the other, even if, yielding to the
tendency of the age, he had made self-advertisement the
first object of his life. Each created an empire the one
in the hopeless attempt to satisfy his personal ambition,
the other in single-hearted devotion to his King and his
country. The military genius of the two men cannot be
compared without first stripping Napoleon of half the
glamour the "nimbe glorieux" which has gathered
around his great name. For the real question is, whether
there is any reason to suppose that to the brilliant cam-
paigns of 1866 and 1870 Napoleon could have added
brilliancy. No such reason can be alleged; and it is
possible to believe that, just as Moltke did not possess the
magnetic qualities required to create and lead to conquest
the impressionable armies of the First Republic, so was
Napoleon wanting in the power of patient labour, by
means of which the hosts of Germany were quietly or-
ganised and then directed to victory.

In the diary of the late Emperor Frederick there are
stray notes which convey a vivid impression of the strength
and decision of Moltke's character. On August 20, 1870,
after the great battles round Metz, we read of " Moltke
quite cool and clear as ever; determined to march on
Paris ; Bismarck moderate and by no means sanguine."
November 23, by which date the activity of the French
army of the Loire was assuming great development, is
referred to as :

" a moment of exciting combinations. Moltke explains
the entire situation with the utmost clearness and modera-
tion; has always considered and calculated everything,
and constantly hits the right nail on the head ; but Roon's
shoulder-shrugs and spitting, and PodbielsH's Olympian
assurance often influence the King.**

On January 15, 1871, Von Werder having expressed a
wish to be allowed to raise the siege of Belfort, " Moltke

MOLTKE 67

read this out, and added with icy and imperturbable calm,
* Your Majesty will doubtless permit me to inform General
von Werder that he has simply to remain where he is and
beat -the enemy where he finds him?' . . Moltke
appears to me to be beyond all praise. Within a second
he had settled the whole affair." Such glimpses show
the great Chief of the Staff in an unmistakable light.

In the important appendix to his precis of the campaign
of 1870-1, Moltke disposes of several fictions. There was
no approach to panic at Versailles, as has been stated.
" Versailles was protected by four army corps ; to evacuate
the place never entered into anyone's head/' As for
councils of war at the German headquarters, " I can certify
that, neither in 1866 nor 1870-1 was a council of war ever
held." The working of the heart of the German system
of administration in the field is simply described.

" Except on marching and fighting days, a report was
regularly made to his Majesty at 10 a.m., when I, accom-
panied by the quartermaster-general, had to take over the
reports and news received, and to make new proposals
based upon them. The chief of the military cabinet and
the war minister were present, and at Versailles, while the
headquarters of the Third Army were there, the Crown
Prince also ; but only as listeners. The King occasionally
demanded from them information as to one matter or
another ; but I do not remember that he ever asked their
advice upon the operations, or my proposals relating to
them. The latter, which I had always discussed previously
with my officers, were subjected by his Majesty to a most
thorough personal investigation. He pointed out, with
military insight and always correct appreciation, all the
obstacles of the situation which might impede the
execution of the measures ; but, since in war every step
involves danger, the proposals in the end were invariably
adopted."

It is a picture of ideal simplicity of higher administration,

68 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

practicable only in the case of an army perfectly organised
for war and possessing a Chief of the Staff whose genius
demanded and obtained fullest confidence.

Moltke as a strategist will always suffer in comparison
with Napoleon, by reason of the far fewer opportunities
for the display of power which his career afforded. It
may be said that a single proof of genius should suffice to
fix the true place of a name in the roll of fame. Mankind
as a whole will, however, always be imposed upon by
magnitude, and achievements will inevitably impress in
proportion to their number. Gray made less mark than
poets who never approached the level of his Elegy.
Military history shows no more striking achievements
than Moltke's two campaigns* By these campaigns we
must judge him, and while it will be recognised that his
genius was not proved by adversity, that he was never
called upon to act under circumstances such as beset
Napoleon in 1813, the military critic of the future, equipped
with that sense of proportion which time alone can impart,
will claim for the " grand silencieux " a place by the side
of the greatest captains of war. For, it will be asked,
could Napoleon, or Turenne, who, said Napoleon, " was
the only one of us all who constantly improved in the
management of his campaigns as he advanced in years,"
have done better? Would either have done quite so
well?

The German army and nation owe to Moltke much
more than the successful conduct of campaigns. He
built up a great system of administration suited to the
needs of modern war. He raised organisation to a level
previously unapproached, and reduced its principles to a
science. To the student of military art in its broadest
aspects he has taught more than Napoleon, for he has
demonstrated the importance of that minute study of
detail which Napoleon had no time to undertake. The
armies which Moltke directed were by his own care and

MOLTKE 69

labour prepared for war in a sense which Napoleon had
not grasped ; and, it may fairly be added, the conditions
under which the former was called upon to take the field
involved a plunge into the unknown.

An army is a delicate organism. The spirit which
animates it is capable of assuming many forms, and that
spirit may be inspired by the life and example of few in-
dividuals. Personal ambition, flattery, greed of power
and of wealth, were the main motives supplied by Napoleon,
whose "marshals and generals, it is to be feared, set a
bad example to their subordinates. They grew rich at
the expense of the inhabitants of the lands they occupied,
and were often paid heavy sums for issuing orders against
plundering ... or for exempting towns from requisi-
tions or occupation/' Berthier with emoluments amount-
ing to about 55,000 a year, Davout with 37,000, serve
to illustrate the seamy side of a system which is justly
described as " resting on no secure moral basis." 1 In
strongest contrast is the simple, earnest life of the great
German Field-Marshal, in which personal aims, self-
assertion, and vanity found no place. " I have a hatred
of all fulsome praise," he wrote after returning from
victory in Bohemia. " It completely upsets me for the
whole day. . . * In this campaign I only did my duty ;
my comrades did theirs too."

"Duty, Honour, and the Fatherland" were the watch-
words of his long and laborious life. It is impossible to
over-estimate the effect of such an example upon an army,
which is quick to catch the tone of its leaders.

Moltke has left the memory of an unsullied life, in which
nothing small or mean found a resting-place, and to which
petty jealousy was unknown. Contented to labour for
long years without recompense or recognition, the most
darling successes took away none of the simplicity of his

1 " Intetio* Economy of Napoleon's Armies," by Captain E. S.
May, R,A*, United Service Magasym^ November, 1890,

70 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

character and aims. Duty, fulfilled with rare conscien-
tiousness, sufficed for his ambitions. He has left a great
example to soldiers for all time, and this perhaps is the
noblest of his claims to lasting distinction.

IV

THE LESSONS OF THE BOMBARDMENT
OF ALEXANDRIA

(" The Times? ij September, 1883.)

My mission to Egypt in 1882, with orders to report in detail on
the effects of the fire of our fleet on the defences of Alexandria, made
a profound impression on my mind, and gave definite objects at
which to aim in all subsequent writing on this and cognate subjects.
This article was an attempt to convey some general lessons in popular
form, as my exhaustive Report had been labelled "secret** and
remains unknown to this day. I am convinced that, if it had been
disinterred and studied before the Great War, the failure, loss and
suffering which were incurred at the Dardanelles would have been

WRITING in the Nineteenth Century for February 1882, Lord
Dunsany said :

" Dover, as against a modern fleet, is a very contemp-
tible defence ; the captain of a foreign ironclad might
simply have knocked it into a heap of rubbish from behind
his own armour without the loss of one life."

This was a serviceable argument against the Channel
Tunnel; but as a matter of fact the rifled armament of
Dover is heavier than that of Alexandria, and there is no
reasonable doubt that the guns of Dover, manned by
English artillerymen, would in an hour defeat, not a single
ironclad, but the great fleet engaged at Alexandria, with
singularly little difficulty. The town would certainly
suffer somewhat ; its defences would scarcely be scathed.

71

72 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

The opinion thus deliberately expressed by Lord Dun-
sany may either be ^iewed as an instance of the national
tendency to decry our own defences, or it may be held to
illustrate the exaggerated views of the power of modern
ironclads which obtained in some quarters. There was
nothing whatever to justify these views* Guns are bigger ;
the bursting charges of shells have been much increased,
but the difficulties under which ships labour in engaging
coast defences remain as they were at the time of the
American war. General Gillmore, in his report on the
siege of Charleston, said :

" The old maxims that forts cannot withstand a com-
petent land attack, but are able to resist and repel vessels
are maxims still. . * . They have indeed been amply
illustrated during the present war."

In spite of the success of our navy at Alexandria these
" old maxims " hold to-day, and will be fully vindicated
on the first occasion that a modern fleet is committed to
an attack on well-designed coast batteries fought by well-
trained gunners.

Military operations, viewed in the light of practical
experiments, can rarely be completely satisfactory. There
is almost always some erring factor which stands in the
way of absolute conclusion, and it is therefore necessary to
be particularly careful in generalizing. In the case of Alex-
andria, however, there are some deductions which at least
compel reflection. The works of the defenders were bad
in. most respects. The Egyptian gunnery was miserable.
The disproportion of armaments was extreme. The ships
had exceptionally calm water besides several other impor*
tant advantages. Yet it needed an expenditure of about
3,400 projectiles and some eight hours* firing, not to
destroy the works and dismount all the guns, but merely
to silence them.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 73

The case of Fort Meks is particularly instructive. Its
five rifled guns " commanded " nearly the whole of the
armour of the Monarch >, 'Penelope ', and Invincible at 1,000
yards. At ranges up to 2,000 yards European gunners
ought to have hulled the two broadside ships at every
round. Supposing that on account of losses and con-
sequent intermission of fire, the five guns of Fort Meks
could only be fired five times in the hour, they would still
have accomplished 87 shots before they were silenced,
and nearly every Palliser projectile which struck the ships
fairly should have penetrated their sides. We know how
many hits were required to disable the Huascar, and she was
fought with great gallantry. Under these circumstances
it seems fair to assume that had Fort Meks been properly
constructed and its guns properly handled, the inshore
squadron would have been disastrously defeated. The
three ships above named, together with the Temeraire,
which also engaged Fort Meks at long range, would not
perhaps constitute a powerful squadron in the Channel
or Mediterranean, but even France might find it difficult
to despatch such a force to the Cape of Good Hope, or
the Australian ports. Surely the case of Fort Meks
sufficiently studied affords some measure of the relative
power of ships and coast defences and supplies a healthy
corrective to rash assertions about the weakness of Dover.

Fort Meks had, however, one advantage. Its guns
were not protected by masses of stone and iron such as
we have erected on the banks of the Thames and Medway,
but by a rough-looking mound of sand scarcely distin-
guishable from the general coast line save for the high
buildings in rear. This advantage was shared by other
of the Egyptian works, and it goes a long way in explaining
the comparatively small number of effective hits our ships
were able to inflict. The tendency of fortification of
late years has been towards invulnerability. Assuming
that ships in action would achieve a degree of accuracy

74 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of fire never attained in practice, it has been sought to
clothe our defences in impenetrable armour. Some years
ago a distinguished admiral stated his opinion that it was
improbable that guns weighing more than 25 tons would
be mounted on board ship in his lifetime, except for special
or experimental purposes. We are now confronted with
loo-ton guns and the limit of weight is by no means
reached. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that the gallant
admiral will be spared for many years of usefulness. The
result of the race between guns and armour has been to
leave us a large number of very costly works, mostly
penetrable, difficult to strengthen, and admirably suited
for targets.

Alexandria may at least teach us the immense impor-
tance of the form and appearance of the target we offer to
an enemy's fire. Fortifications must not disdain to borrow
something of the art of the landscape gardener. But,
further, the great value of earth, and especially sand,
protection has been amply reaffirmed. This is no new
lesson. It was taught us in the Crimea ; it was strongly
attested in the American war ; but in the excitement of
the gun and shield competition it has been too much
forgotten. Modern guns, increasingly powerful against
armour, have gained relatively little against earth. The
large shells, flying with high velocities and low trajectories,
showed a marked tendency to turn up out of the sand
parapets of Alexandria, and even when they burst the
results were not very satisfactory. Nor is it easy to see
how this is to be remedied. If sensitive percussion fuses
are used, they burst the shells on impact and there is little
penetration. If a delay action fuse is adopted the effect
of a burst on graze very great when it occurs near the
inner crest of an open battery is altogether lost. Again,
it is very little use to fire Palliser projectiles against
earthworks, and an ironclad fitted out for general service
cannot carry a large supply of common shelL

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 75

The experiences of the American war seemed to prove
that it was possible for ships to run past shore batteries.
As to how far modern armaments have affected this
question Alexandria affords no evidence. The protected
portions of ironclads are now much stronger ; the un-
protected portions remain as they were; and both the
penetrative power and the destructive effect of shells have
been greatly increased. In range finding, concentration
of fire, and hitting power generally, coast defences have
made important advances. In passing shore batteries,
machine guns may or may not be destined to play an im-
portant part ; but it is not easy to see why, as sometimes
appears to be supposed, they will confer exclusive, or
even superior, advantages on the ship. On the whole,
therefore, it seems probable that, although ironclads may
submarine mines and locomotive torpedoes apart be
able to pass coast defences as formerly, and no dashing
naval officer would hesitate for an adequate object to
attempt the operation, the risks are now much increased,
and the possible damage to a ship is greater, so that the
achievements of Farragut may not be repeated.

But, while uncertainty on this point remains, Alex-
andria seems to make it clear that ironclads cannot hope
to silence earthworks by circling in front of them, or
passing and repassing them. At this game, the batteries,
if properly organized for defence, will unquestionably win,
and the ships will receive damage of more or less impor-
tance, according to luck and range, without inflicting any
corresponding injury on the works. It may be otherwise
in the case of stone and iron forts. They stand much
more nearly on a level with the ship. They are admirable
targets; their guns are even more crowded, and all damage
inflicted on them is cumulative. The issue between them
and the ironclads must turn on armaments, skill in
gunnery, and relative protection.

Regarding the power of England as organized for

76 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

defence rather than attack, the experiences of Alexandria
are decidedly encouraging. It is certain that we can, at
comparatively small cost, protect our distant harbours
and coaling stations with the weapons we now possess.
Finality in the construction of heavy guns is not by any
means reached; but, on the whole, it is probable that
progress will do more for the fort than for the ship. We
now know with tolerable exactness the worst that ironclads
of a certain class can accomplish under highly favourable
conditions, since it may safely be assumed that what the
English Navy failed to effect at Alexandria will not be
effected by the corresponding ships of any other Power in
the world. We do not know, however, the worst that
coast defences can accomplish, and there are, moreover,
some weapons as yet almost untried which ships may have
to face in the next engagement of the kind. Besides
fixed mines and locomotive torpedoes steered from the
shore, fast torpedo-boats in daring hands will prove very
awkward antagonists. Shrouded in her own smoke, and
hulled every other minute by shore guns, possibly
dispersed over a mile of coast, an ironclad will find some
difficulty in guarding against the attack of a zo-knot
torpedo-boat. Two or three of these craft would probably
have altered the entire aspect of the action at Alexandria.
On the other hand, it has been said that the ships were
not those best suited for such an attack and that specially
designed gunboats would have done the work better.
It is not easy to see why more or less unsteady gunboats
should make better shooting than the great ships, though
they would, of course, offer a less mark to the shore
guns. The wooden gunboats at Alexandria would, of
course, have been sunk had the guns of Marabout been
properly handled, and their armaments were too weak to
be effective; but the very trifling results obtained by their
fire may practically be due to unsteadiness of platform,
and, if so, the influence is not in favour of small vessels*

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 77

In any case, it would have required a vast fleet of gunboats
to carry an armament equal to that of the eight ironclads.
Under the special conditions which obtained at Alexandria,
it is believed that the best form of ship for the attack was
the ship which carried the greatest number of guns on
the broadside, and the opinion of an able American officer,
who carefully watched the action, that a few wooden
frigates would have silenced the works more quickly
and more cheaply, is not by any means a mere paradox.
The value of the experiences of Alexandria to England
can hardly be overrated. In the first place these experi-
ences carefully studied show us alike the strength and
the weakness of our defences. They teach us that the
power of a modern fleet has limits easily reached. They
prove conclusively that we can, if we choose, make our
distant harbours absolutely impregnable to a roving
squadron. In the second place, they indicate the lines
on which we should proceed in ordering our future
defences. Shields may be left for sites where there is no
room for anything else. Batteries of earth or sand (the
latter wherever possible) should be the mainstay of our
defences, and should be blended with the features of the
coast line as far as possible. Guns should be dispersed
and mounted on high sites wherever practicable. It will
probably be said that these principles were all perfectly
well known before. Their realization in some of our
existing coast defences has, however, been very successfully
veiled.

V
THE SUAKIN-BERBER RAILWAY

("Th TIMS," 18 J*u, 1884.}

As soon as it became evident that an expedition to Khartoum
could not be avoided, Sir Andrew Clarke, then Inspector of Fortifica-
tions, began to urge the construction of the Suakin-Berber Railway,
With his strenuous effort, which hopelessly failed, I was closely
associated, and this article was written at his suggestion to explain
the situation and the need of the railway. If the policy, which at
one time Lord Harrington seemed to favour, had been adopted, I
am convinced that Gordon might have been saved. The article
is prophetic, except that the expedition never reached Khartoum,
wmch, as I wrote, had to be occupied later. The railway was made
without difficulty and now enables us to mate effective our
responsibility for the Sudan, which I regarded in 1884 as ultimately
inevitable.

THE Suakin-Berber railway has formed the subject of
many letters in many papers, but it is more than doubtful
whether the real significance of this important project
has been sufficiently appreciated. It is precisely one of
those questions in relation to which the educating power
of the Press is peculiarly valuable.

The present position of this country in regard to the
Sudan may be stated in a few words. An expedition to
relieve Khartoum in the autumn is inevitable so much
the Government have practically admitted unless mean-
while Gordon escapes southward, having made terms for
the remaining Egyptian garrisons, or succeeds in inflicting
a defeat on the Mahdi's forces and restores order by his
own unassisted genius, There appears to be only one

78

THE SUAKIN-BERBER RAILWAY 79

other alternative, and that is the sacrifice of the hero
himself and of the remaining garrisons.

If none of these three things happens by September, a
relief expedition must be sent has, indeed, been virtually
promised. But will the country decide on the total
abandonment of the Sudan even in the event of one of
these occurrences taking place prior to the starting of an
expedition ? The first would lead to the establishment of
a strong militant Mohammedan power which would con-
stitute a standing menace to Lower Egypt, and would
with certainty ultimately entail military operations on a
large scale. The second would commit England to com-
plete responsibility for the future of the Sudan and the
consolidation of a Government under Gordon or someone
else, who must in any case be a protege of this country.
The third would leave us in the same position as the first,
except that there would probably be an outcry for ven-
geance which no Government could resist. To acquiesce
calmly in the defeat and slaughter of one of its Governor-
Generals is impossible to a Great Power. If the question
of the Sudan is fairly faced it will be generally admitted
that, whether an expedition starts next autumn or no,
some sort of hold on the Sudan must be maintained by
England.

It is comparatively seldom that political, military, and
commercial considerations can be satisfied by the same
course of action. The Abyssinian expedition was carried
out for a political purpose ; the Afghan war was created
avowedly for a political, really for a purely military end.
The Quetta railway, when it is made, will practically confer
a military advantage only. On the other hand the Indian
railway systems, actually political and commercial in
their aspects, are potentially military. The objects to be
attained by a railway from Suakin to the Nile Valley are
actually military and political, potentially commercial/
English expeditions are for the most part costly and

8o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

particularly unremunerative aflairs, and this affords an
easy explanation of their unpopularity. Of the latter
there can be little doubt, in spite of the eager excitement
naturally aroused during the course of the military opera-
tions, however insignificant. And there is a terrible want
of finality about these expeditions of ours ; it is so seldom
that they achieve a permanent result or a result which
bears any decent proportion to the expenditure. The
Sudan expedition may produce permanent political and
military effects, may be turned to permanent commercial
advantage, may serve a constructive instead of a blankly
destructive purpose. But in order that this may be the
case and that the forthcoming expedition may not be as
fruitless of real advantage as most of those which have
preceded it, the Suakin-Berber railway must be made.

The present dread of becoming involved in the affairs
of the Eastern Sudan is due solely to the vast distances.
When the railway is made, Berber will be within twelve
hours of English ships and will be as easy of access as
Cairo. England will have a permanent hold on Khartoum,
the heart of the Sudan, without the smallest necessity for
the permanent establishment of a European garrison there.
The mere accessibility of Khartoum will give the Governor
of the Sudan, whoever he may be, a power which Mehemet
All never wielded. The opening of the country to com-
merce is the one means by which tranquillity can be secured,
and when once the Upper Nile is accessible to the markets
of the world, large tracts of the interior of Africa will be
opened up, and the stream of commerce will flow to and
from the Red Sea.

Why does not Manchester support a scheme which
would be immensely to its advantage ? Much has been
said and written about the Congo Treaty; yet it must
be years before the Congo can compete as a trade route
with the Nile. An expenditure of 1,250,000 is all that is
needed to connect the latter with the Red Sea by a metre

THE SUAKIN-BERBER RAILWAY 81

gauge railway and to open up the heart of Eastern Africa
to British commerce. If, then, we elect to abandon the
Sudan altogether, it is to be expected that the International
Association will transfer its operations at once to the Nile,
and the latter will fall ultimately under the sway of France.
But behind commercial England there lies humanitarian
England, which has been shocked at the horrors of the
slave trade and is more tharl half inclined to advocate an
English Protectorate in order to suppress the slave trade
alone. Make this railway and the slave trade will die a
natural death. Finally, there is the present military ques-
tion, daily becoming more urgent. If every preparation
at home and on the spot were made at once, the actual
advance of troops would be immensely facilitated by the
construction of this railway. In any case, the return of
the expedition would become a matter of hours instead of
weeks, and even the retention for a time of a force at
Berber or Khartoum would not be much more serious
than the present occupation of Cairo.

At the present moment it is impossible for any private
company to construct this railway. The military and
engineering difficulties are so closely bound together that
the work can be carried through only by Government,
and India alone can find highly trained military and civil
engineers to supervise it. When the line is completed
and tranquillity restored to the Eastern Sudan, it can be
made over to die trading company which has already been
partially formed. The whole cost of the railway would be
little more than that of the camels required to transport
a force of 7,000 men, and when the military operations
are ended the country will recoup itself. Locomotives do
not die like camels. If England declares at once, in
unmistakable language, that this railway will be made and
that the Sudan will not be given back to the Egyptians,
the bitter opposition of the native tribes will cease and
the military difficulties will practically disappear. More-

82 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

over, the railway will achieve the commercial success
predicted by every competent authority on the subject.

To sum up : the requirements of the present and of
the future can be satisfied only by the construction of this
railway. When it is made, an English Protectorate of the
Eastern Sudan will be a responsibility scarcely greater
than that which we have already incurred on the shores
of the Red Sea ; or if a Rajah Brooke can be found to
undertake the country, his task will be rendered com-
paratively easy. In a word, the existence of this railway
will leave us masters of the situation, able to protect if
we choose, or if we " Sarawak " the country under an
Englishman or some clean-handed Zebehr able to assert
our authority at any moment.

Another policy may be followed, and its results may be
foretold with tolerable certainty. We shall have a costly
expedition, relieve Khartoum, hold the lines of communica-
tion till the garrison has been withdrawn, and retire,
having done absolutely nothing towards the final solution
of the question of the Sudan. The Mahdi, or some
other religious adventurer, will form a Mohammedan
state, Egypt will be in a state of chronic ferment and will
ultimately be invaded. Military operations which may
again require us to go to Khartoum will then be inevitable.

VI
THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT

(" The Times," I October, 1885.}

This article was perhaps the earliest attempt to forecast the future
potency of tibe Submarine Boat, then in embryo. The forecast is
faulty is some respects ; but it gave warning of the new possibilities.
If the possible action of the U-boats and the means of attacking
them had been carefully studied before the Great War, we should
not have been brought near to starvation ; but unfortunately the
Admiralty had been mainly occupied in developing not in defeat-
ingthe submarine. At Landskrona, I suggested the periscope to
Mr. Nordenfelt, but the idea would, of course, have occurred later
to many minds.

THE interest excited by the recent trials of the Nordenfelt
submarine boat is sufficiently shown by the presence at
Landskrona of thirty-nine officers representing every
European Power, as well as Brazil and Japan. Such a
boat, if successful, will exercise a powerful influence both
on naval warfare and on coast defence. Its possible uses
are manifold, its moral effects are unquestionable, and
against its operations no system of defence at present
suggested seems adequate.

The torpedo boat has been met, actively by the machine
gun, capable of delivering an extremely rapid fire of small
shell at ranges beyond the useful limit of the Whitehead,
and passively by the steel wire netting with which it is pro-
posed to surround ships. Again, the torpedo boat can be
met and fought on the sea by similar boats, faster, better
handled, or better armed. On the other hand, a boat which
can maintain a fair speed under water for several hours,

84 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

which need only rise to the surface for brief periods, and
can sink at will if discovered, which can lit perdu and direct
a steered torpedo, or run up to close quarters and fire the
Whitehead at 10 feet below the surface, is undoubtedly an
exceptionally dangerous antagonist. If the problem of
producing such a boat can be solved, the largest ship would
be secure only when in rapid motion, no port could be
satisfactorily defended, and no system of submarine mines
could be regarded as safe.

It is no new problem. Submarine boats were employed

in the American war, where some successes were claimed

for them, and considering the enormous advantages to

be obtained, it is not surprising that at least one European

Power has devoted both time and money to experiment.

But there has been a natural tendency to preserve secrecy

on the subject since to create the vague suspicion of the

possession of a submarine boat would be a more desirable

object than to proclaim the existence of one with known

imperfections and limitations. Besides, the past record

of the performances of these boats has not been free from

disaster. Several have sunk with their crews to rise no

more; others have remained fixed and helpless at the

bottom for long periods, to be saved only by exceptional

coolness and exertion on the part of the crews. It would

be clearly unwise to create an antecedent impression of

the exceptional danger involved in their service at a time

when such danger might be due chiefly to structural

imperfection and want of knowledge. For the problem

is no easy one, when its conditions come to be realized.

Power to sink and rise rapidly at will, fair speed under

water, horizontal and vertical steering power under full

control, endurance of motive force, and air supply for the

crew, are only some of the many requirements on the

fulfilment of which success is dependent.

The Nordenfelt boat, the first of its class, was built at
Stockholm about two years ago. The boat is cigar-shaped,

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT 85

with a coffin-like projection on the top amidships, formed
by vertical combings supporting a glass dome or conning
tower, i foot high, which enables the commander to see
his way. The dome, with its iron protecting cover, stands
on a horizontal lid, which can be swung aside to allow
the crew of three men to get in or out without difficulty.
The length of the hull is 64 feet and the central diameter
9 feet. It is built of Swedish mild steel plates inch
thick at the centre tapered to f inch at the ends, supported,
on angle-iron framing, 3 inches by 3 inches by f inch.
The arrangements for sinking the boat are of a special
nature, for which the inventor claims important advantages.
Practically, such a boat can be sunk in three ways, singly
or taken in combination. It may be forced down by
power applied from within, weighted down by taking in
sea water sufficient to destroy the buoyancy, or it may be
steered down by the application of its ordinary motive
power modified by a horizontal rudder. Mr. Nordenfelt
has adopted the former arrangement, placing sponsons on
each side of the boat amidships in which are wells for the
vertical propellers capable of working the boat up or
down. In order to prepare for action, enough sea water is
taken in to reduce the buoyancy to i cwt., which suffices
to keep the conning tower well above the surface. In
order to sink the boat further the vertical propellers are
set in motion and, by their action, it is held at the required
depth. Thus, to come to the surface again, it is merely
necessary to stop the vertical propellers, in which case
the reserve of buoyancy at once comes into play. This
principle is rightly regarded as important, even if not
essential, in a safe submarine boat. A breakdown in the
engines does not entail danger, since the reserve of buoy-
ancy is never lost for a moment. As a still further safe-
guard, however, Mr, Nordenfelt has provided an automatic
check on the downward motion. A lever, with a weight
which can be adjusted so as to counterbalance any desired

86 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

head of water, is connected with a throttle valve supplying
steam to the engine working the vertical propellers. Thus,
directly the desired depth is exceeded, the increased head
of outside water overcomes the weight, and the vertical
propellers are stopped.

The motive power is steam alone, generated in a boiler
of the ordinary marine type with a forced draught. So
long as the boat runs on the surface, this boiler can be
stoked and a constant head of steam maintained. The
smoke is driven out through two channels which pass
partly round the hull and point aft. For submarine work,
no stoking is, of course, possible, and the firebox has to
be sealed. It is therefore necessary to store the requisite
power beforehand, and this is done by heating the water
in two tanks placed fore and aft and connected by circulating
tubes with the boiler, till a pressure of about 150 Ib. per
square inch is attained. With about this initial pressure,
it is stated that the boat has been driven for 16 miles at a
speed of three knots. The greatest surface speed attained
is a little over eight knots, and the boat has been run for
150 miles without re-coaling. There are three sets of
engines, one of which drives the propeller, an ordinary
four-bladed screw 5 feet in diameter, with a pitch of 7 feet
6 inches. The other engines drive the blower and the
horizontal propellers respectively.

One of the principal difficulties of submarine navigation
is to preserve an even keel when under water. Should a
boat turn downwards when in motion below the surface,
it might easily strike the bottom or reach a depth at which
it must collapse before its course could be arrested. On
the other hand, if the bow took an upward turn under
the same circumstances, the boat would rapidly come to
the surface and be exposed to view and to projectiles.
It is evidently, therefore, of the utmost importance to
provide ample steering power in a vertical direction. la.
the Nordenfdt boat, two horizontal rudders are placed

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT 87

one on each side near the bows, and are acted upon by a
pendulum inside the hull. This pendulum, coming into
play the instant the boat takes a cant in either direction,
actuates the horizontal rudders and causes her immediately
to return to an even keel. By this means it is claimed that
the boat is automatically kept with her axis horizontal,
while since the bow rudders are entirely beyond the control
of the crew there is no danger of accident due to neglect
or loss of nerve. In the event of a breakdown of the
above arrangement, it is necessary at once to stop the boat
and let her return to the surface. No compressed air is
carried, and the crew depend, therefore, for existence on
the amount of air sealed up in the hulL With this amount
of air only, four men have remained for a period of six
hours without any especial inconvenience. The above are
the main features of the invention which Mr. Nordenfelt
has just made public, and which has received the careful
consideration of experts of many nations.

The general principles embodied in the Nordenfelt
boat have been described ; it remains to discuss its per-
formances and future possibilities. The public trials took
place off Landskrona, a small harbour on the south coast
of Sweden, the representatives of the various Powers
being taken on board the Swedish gunboat Edda> which
had been courteously placed at their disposal by the
Minister of Marine. The first trial took place on the 22nd
September, in presence of the King and Queen of Den-
mark, the Empress of Russia, and the Prince and Princess
of Wales, who arrived from Copenhagen in the Osborn$.
The submarine boat was towed out about 2 miles from
Landskrona by a steam launch, and in casting loose her
bow rudders were unfortunately fouled by the tow rope.
A boat was lowered from the Edda and one of the Swedish
bluejackets mounted on the back of the Nordenfelt and
running out to the bows cleared the rope with gteat
smartness. The rudders had, however, received a strain,

88 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

which it was stated crippled her vertical steering power
and rendered movement below the surface undesirable
until repairs were effected. On this day, the experiments
were confined to demonstrating the movement of the boat
on the surface, and her power of being submerged partially
and entirely. Moving at a rather slow speed, probably
never exceeding five knots, the boat was manoeuvred round
the Edda, and showed good steering qualities. She was
repeatedly submerged to a depth of about 5 feet, dis-
appearing below the surface in about half a minute, but
only remaining below for very short periods. On the
second day, the boat steamed out about 10 miles from
Landskrona in the direction of Helsingor, but remained
always at light draught. On the third day, in a very calm
sea, she for the first time exhibited her power of moving
under water, disappearing for periods never exceeding
four and a half minutes, and moving for distances appar-
ently of about 300 yards.

Riding light on a grey and almost motionless sea, the
hull of the torpedo boat was scarcely visible at 1,000 yards.
In spite of her light grey colour, however, the vertical
combings supporting the cupola showed out dark on
account of the abrupt change in the angle of reflection.
Thus, viewed broadside on, the appearance was that of
a short dark log lying on the surface of the water. In this
position, and in a calm sea, the wash of the screw was
visible, and in broad daylight could hardly fail to attract
attention. It was generally felt, however, that such a boat
advancing end on at speed would offer a particularly
unsatisfactory mark to fire at, even with machine guns ;
while in a bad light it would be almost impossible to shoot
with any chance of effect. Compared with an ordinary
torpedo boat for example, the chances of hitting would be
inconsiderable, and a boat of this build, if a speed of
twenty knots could be attained, might probably approach to
WMtehead range without excessive risk, even if she did not

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT 89

possess the power of disappearing below the surface.
There was no smoke or escaping steam to proclaim her
presence at a distance of many miles, and up to 1,500 yards
range at least she could probably advance with absolute
impunity. The process of sealing up and sinking to deep
draught occupied about twenty minutes, and in this position
the top of the combings was just awash, and only the
cupola was visible above the surface. Thus trimmed the
available target becomes insignificant and the possibility
of hitting it extremely remote. Submerged to a depth of
5 feet in a calm sea, the boat was visible as a shadow on
the surface of the water, and from the tops of the Edda
she could be distinctly made out at a distance of about
600 yards. The observers, however, knew exactly the
spot at which she had sunk, and, failing this advantage,
would probably have been quite unable to detect her
position. While moving under water no trace of the
boat was visible, and it was impossible to foresee the
position at which she would rise. The impression pro-
duced on the mind by seeing the boat thus disappear was
decidedly uncomfortable, and it was generally acknow-
ledged that the sense of insecurity which the mere presence
of such a boat would cause on board ship, would be no
small factor in war. In a slight sea the Nordenfelt proved
remarkably steady at light draught, riding level, while the
launch in company was moving considerably, and an
ordinary torpedo boat would probably have been affected
to some extent. The wash over the bows and against the
front of the combings served, however, to render the boat
more conspicuous.

Summing up, it may be said to have been demonstrated
that the Nordenfelt boat can be rapidly submerged at will,
and can move under water, at all events for short distances,
when the firebox has been sealed. The speed attained
below the surface is unquestionably slow, and, as has been
Already stated, the inventor only claims three knots for

90 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

this particular boat. There appears to be no reason why
/the boat should not maintain this speed for considerable
distances when submerged ; but, whether for prudential
reasons or otherwise, its power to do so was not shown
at Landskrona. Certain defects are obvious. The speed
is insufficient ; the period of twelve hours required to get
up pressure is too long ; the vertical combings must be
abolished ; there is no means of getting in or out of the
boat when it is submerged ; the perfecting of the vertical
steering arrangements is perhaps doubtful. These first
public trials of a submarine boat will, however, undoubtedly
produce results far beyond a mere criticism of the existing
craft. Many shrewd heads have been set thinking, and
the great possibilities of this mode of attack have been
brought home with a force which no mere description,
however graphic, could have excited. It is one thing to
read of vaguely described exploits in the American war,
or indefinite rumours of Russian experiments. It is quite
another matter to be brought face to face with a boat which
disappears before one's eyes to reappear in an unexpected
position.

The present boat is admittedly imperfect, but its per-
formances have served to show clearly the possibilities
which lie before us. Some of the difficulties which beset
the construction of a submarine boat have been overcome
more or less completely. The rest appear to be scarcely
insurmountable, and it may be taken as certain that the
perfection of this most dangerous weapon of attack is
only a matter of time and brains. Even without the
power of complete submersion a boat of this type, given
speed, would prove a most formidable antagonist. Pro-
tected to a degree impossible in the case of an ordinary
torpedo boat, it might in the hands of one or two daring
men safely reach ranges at which the Whitehead would
be deadly. The chances of a torpedo boat in broad
daylight depend entirely on smoke and the comparative

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT 91

confusion and inevitable excitement which must prevail
during an action. Favoured by these conditions, it may
be possible for such a boat to reach striking distance un-
harmed ; but modern machine guns in cool hands would
unquestionably render the operation excessively risky, and
the attack of a single boat, under ordinary circumstances,
would offer small chance of success. A boat of the
Nordenfelt type could, however, run up to at least 1,500
yards with trifling danger, and, if it could then be sub-
merged and continue its course for another 1,000 yards,
would be an awkward assailant for the ironclad. Such
a boat affords, perhaps, the one really practicable mode
of isolated torpedo attack in broad daylight. Off chances
apart, the ordinary torpedo boat would have to trust
mainly to numbers, by which it might be hoped to distract
attention, create a general nervous demoralisation, and
so enable one or more boats to reach close quarters. A
single submarine boat might, however, if all requirements
can be complied with, prove to be the equivalent of a
fleet of ordinary torpedo boats.

Cardinal importance has naturally been attached to the
power of complete submersion; but it is evident that,
under many circumstances, this power need be resorted
to only when it is necessary for self-defensive purposes.
In attacking, the boat might remain on the surface as
long as possible and dive only when the machine guns
have opened upon it and begun to find its range. The
power which would be conferred by the possession of a
good submarine boat can scarcely be exaggerated. When
Colonel Chesney, in the Battle of Dorking, summarily
disposed of the British Navy, the mode adopted was the
subject of some criticism. It will be remembered that
the invaders, whose nationality is so distinctly indicated,
possessed a peculiarly fatal torpedo, which we in England
knew little or nothing about, and by means of which
our available fleet was eliminated from the scene. It was

92 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

necessary, for the purposes of the tale, to get rid of that
fleet; but it was generally considered that the modus
operand* savoured somewhat of Jules Verne. The con-
struction of a submarine boat, already foreshadowed by
that ingenious writer, is, however, by no means beyond
the powers of modern science, and it will be generally
admitted that, given the possession of such boats by one
of two belligerents, the navy of the other might in very
truth be either destroyed or neutralized.

It seems difficult, indeed, to set limits to their possible
sphere of action. On the one hand, there appears to be
no special reason why a submarine boat dropped off a
port by a fast cruiser should not calmly navigate the
harbour and proceed either to torpedo the shipping
sheltered there or destroy the mine defences. It is true
that nettings stretched across the channels of approach
promise substantial protection, but they would be an
intolerable obstruction to the use of the port. On the
other hand, for purposes of defence, such boats could
on the approach of a fleet take up their stations near the
position from which bombardment was practicable and
await the enemy in placid security. Open and otherwise
almost indefensible towns, such as Brighton, would possess
, means of defence ready to their hand. Submarine boats
could be launched on any coast, and their mere presence
would probably suffice to deter the approach of hostile
ships.

The r6Ie of the submarine boat in purely naval warfare
is less easily laid down. Their probable want of speed
would to a certain extent limit their action, but their
moral effect would be great, and they would confer a
new value on speed and manoeuvring power in ships.
If they were to end the day of the great ironclads, few
would perhaps be found to regret the change; and it
would be a strange instance of the irony of progress if
these costly monsters became obsolete before they had

THE NORDENFELT SUBMARINE BOAT 93

ever really justified their existence. On the whole, small
and non-aggressive Powers would perhaps gain most by
this new and, comparatively, cheap weapon. Coast defence,
already very formidable, would be rendered less expensive
and its sphere would be extended* Every change in the
art of war has raised people who loudly proclaim it as
fatal to the supremacy of England ; but there will be
some who will take a different view, and will argue that
it implies increased strength to a Power which has much
to defend, and seeks no territorial aggrandizement at the
expense of its rivals a Power, moreover, to which con-
scious defensive strength means wealth and prosperity,

It is certain that the Nordenfelt boat as at present existing
will effect no revolution ; but it seems to be equally clear
that we shall shortly have to face possibilities which we
have been hitherto able to neglect. Scientific experi-
ment, in other words money judiciously applied, will
enable us to hold our own in any future development of
submarine warfare, and to omit to employ every effort
to be first in a race in which the start is even would be to
court disaster.

VII
INVISIBILITY

("&yal Engineers Corps Papers,*' July, 1886.)

The crucial importance of Invisibility was first brought home to
me by my studies at Alexandria in 1882 and by the difficulties of
vision explained to me by Naval officers who took part in the action.
Later, there came opportunities of examining our defence works at
home and at Malta, and I determined to try to reduce " Invisibility "
to a science by laying down certain principles of general application,
In the Great War, camouflage instantly became of first-class importance
and was applied even to ships. In 1886 there was no idea that protec-
tion from aerial observation would be essential, and the late Mr*
Solomon J. Solomon, R.A., developed with great ability and marked
success the principles which I had laid down some thirty years earlier.

THE defences of Alexandria possessed only two advantages :
they were constructed mainly of sand, which turned up
the heavy projectiles of the attacking ships, and many of
them were comparatively invisible. This latter charac-
teristic was pointed out in the report on the results of the
bombardment, where invisibility was contended for as
one of the most important conditions to which the coast
defences of the future should conform. It may now be
useful to discuss the subject more fully, and to seek to
show how far this condition can be fulfilled under different
drcumstances.

At starting, it is fully granted that at short range, where
the details of a work and the position of shore guns can
be dearly made out, such invisibility as can usually be
attained matters but little. Captain Lewis, R.E., in the
Appendix to his able Lectures, reiterated his opinion that

94

INVISIBILITY 9J

"ships attacking a properly built and manned fortress
will fight at short ranges." It is not easy to see why,
when worthily opposed, ships should adopt tactics for
which they have shown no preference in attacking weak
and badly manned defences ; and it is certain that mines, of
which ships are not indisposed to take account, will in many
cases prevent close quarters. Accepting Captain Lewis's
dictum, however, as the rule of the future, exceptions will
unquestionably occur in which the advantages claimed for
invisibility will have full scope. All naval commanders
are not equally daring. Lightly armoured vessels may
have to engage coast defences. Injuries inflicted, say
in an attempt to force an entrance into Port Philip, Victoria,
9,600 miles from Toulon and 5 ,000 miles from Vladivostock,
would not be lightly risked. Mines and difficulties of
navigation may combine to prevent an enemy from follow-
ing 'the obsolete and now utterly erroneous maxim of
" reserving his fire till he can see our eyes." Coast defence
batteries will certainly not defer their fire till the ship is at
close quarters, and the ship herself may possibly be tempted
do reply. Under these circumstances, it is still worth
while to consider how far we may protect our works,
present and future the more so as this sort of protection,
at least, costs little.

The object in view is so to disguise coast defences that
their design may not be patent to the most casual observa-
tion ; and secondly, to render the individualising of the
guns of the defence as difficult as possible. Granted that
the plans of our defences and the positions of our guns
will be known to all the world ; still the practical advan-
tages of invisibility will be none the less marked. There
may be a perfect map of Malta in the Captain's cabin ;
but if this has to be translated to individual members at
the ship's guns, in the heat, smoke, and confusion of an
action, its value will be heavily discounted.

Another important fact, re-attested by the action at

96 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Alexandria, is that in order permanently to silence coast
defence guns it is necessary to hit them. Every gun
disabled by the fleet was fairly hit ; and of all the guns
mounted in accordance with other than mediaeval ideas,
there was but one case of independent injury to carriage
or platform, sufficient to cause permanent disablement.
In the case referred to, the gun never in action was
taken in reverse, as might reasonably have been expected
from its position. It may, perhaps, be laid down as an
axiom, therefore, that guns mounted in good earthworks
must be individually hit in order to place them hors de
combat. The cases of guns mounted close under high
buildings, such as the Pharos Tower at Alexandria, the
Europa Lighthouse at Gibraltar, or half a dozen well-
known instances at Malta, obviously do not fall into the
above category. Such guns may be seriously disabled by
projectiles which ought to be recorded as " 5,000 yards
over/* In other words, the vulnerable target need be
little larger than the breech section of the gun. Theory
will doubtless prescribe that in attacking barbette guns,
ships should invariably cross-fire, so as to obtain a
broadside target ; but human nature is sometimes
opposed to theory, and there may be expected to be a
considerable tendency on board the ship to fire at the
particular guns which are hulling her, rather than to
leave them to the chance ministrations of a distant con-
sort, who is only too likely to be imbued with a similar
prejudice.

The clear moral of it all is that anything which can be
done to render laying on a particular shore gun less easy
must be a definite gain to the defence. Study the appear-
ance of various works, as viewed from the sea, and the
difference will be found to be enormous. Given suitable
conditions, the guns will be barely distinguishable with a
field glass on a clear day at 2,000 yards ; seen en silhouette
against the sky, or a contrasted background, they will be

INVISIBILITY 97

clearly visible to the naked eye for 6 miles. The great
Krupp gun in the Dardanelles frankly announces its
presence by appearing as a black bulls-eye on a bright white
ground. The loo-ton gun in Cambridge Battery, Malta,
requires a practised eye to find it, and might be made
almost invisible. The 38-ton gun in Harding's Fort,
Gibraltar, is pointed out with eager pride by every tourist
on board a P. & O. steamer. Its fellows at Hatherwood
Battery, Isle of Wight, are in certain lights altogether
invisible. The difference would apparently exercise a
marked effect on an action.

The difficulty of maintaining a complete general direc-
tion over the fire of a ship more especially if in motion
is very great. A highly trained officer, with nerves of iron,
may, perhaps, be spared to lay each turret ; but the majority
of the guns on board an ironclad must be laid by gunners,
who will not always adopt a severely scientific view of the
object of their fire, and who will frequently as at Alex-
andria show a weakness for a good upstanding target,
independently of the probable advantages to be gained
by hitting it. If, to such, you can say, "fire at that
particular gun only," it is a clear gain. If you must amplify
your directions " fire a little to the right of that brownish
bush ; not the bush nearly on a line with that low tree,
but the one which is almost directly above that triangular
piece of bare grass ; there is a heavy gun there, and you
will see the flash in about two minutes " there are evident
elements of error. Suppose the ship to be under way,
and the relative positions of things changing every minute ;
try to imagine the disturbing influences of an action;
remember the natural tendency of the average No. i,
when his gun is loaded, to let it off without waiting for a
nice discrimination of particular bushes, trees, or other
objects ; finally, reflect that the officer cannot be always
at hand to see where the shot goes, and it will be granted
that this translation of the field-glass observation of the

98 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

gunnery lieutenant to the gunner's unaided eye may not
invariably secure literal obedience.

It is proposed to consider under several heads the
conditions by which comparative invisibility may be
obtained in coast defences present and future.

BACKGROUND

A hill rising gradually in rear is always advantageous.
Such a background will not serve to record errors of
excess in range, but will materially aid in disguising works
of defence. If, on the other hand, it is barren and rocky,
and the parapet of the work is a bright band of well-
trimmed turf, as in some existing cases, the gain will be
minimized. The object should be to assimilate the work
to the background. If the latter is rough, let the former
be rough ; if the hill in rear is bush-grown, plant the
parapets similarly, and leave them to nature.

Guns should never show against the sky. Failing a
hill background, therefore, plant trees or tall bushes,
building a bank, if necessary, for them to stand on. If no
vegetation will flourish, a rough wall, high enough to
appear just above the guns at moderate ranges, and not
too near so as to give back dangerous splinters, may
be employed. Such a wall can be washed with any
suitable colour. Mere canvas screens or wooden hoarding,
coloured at discretion, might be temporarily used for the
same purpose. There can rarely be any excuse for turning
a gun into a beacon ; and to provide (as at Inchkeith and
elsewhere) a white concrete ground on which to place a
black gun is to concede an unnecessary advantage to the
attack.

FORM

The form adopted in the design of a work will exercise
a determining influence on its visibility. Rectilinear con-
tours and mo.dels have been the curse of coast fortification.

INVISIBILITY 99

If a design is made with straight line contours and sharp
angles, the tendency in execution will be towards extreme
fidelity. Profiles will duly be erected, and the result will
be a structure like Fort Madalena, Malta, or South Hook,
Pembroke, plainly labelled " This is a Fort/' Curved
contours are now being employed, and it is generally
recognized that great latitude must be granted to the
constructor. Let him avail himself of it to the fullest
extent, remembering that his contractor is almost certain
to exhibit a preference for straight lines and angles. The
measure of excellence in a model will usually be its neatness.
Hence the model too often shows all the characteristics
which a coast work should not possess. Ideas once formed
are difficult to uproot, and die same species of mental
demoralisation which results from a continued contempla-
tion of obsolete guns, may be engendered by a model in
itself a work of art.

As a general rule, therefore, interfere with the near
foreground of the guns as little as possible. Sink batteries
in preference to building them up. The presence of a
gun at Buena Vista Site, Gibraltar, is advertised by the
artificial mass built up on the top of natural rock. By
leaving nature unimproved this gun might indeed have
been invisible.

Abrupt changes of slope are invariably conspicuous,
especially in sunshine. Since nature abhors straight lines,
avoid a long straight crest above all things ; it is never
necessary since a level row of guns, except in a saluting
battery, is a thing of the past and it frequently adds to
the cost of a work by entailing unnecessary earth-move-
ment. All geometrical forms are objectionable, as, for
example, the carefully shaped cones, frequently formed
with misplaced accuracy in front of salient guns. By
omitting grading, and by planting, all such obviously
artificial forms can be broken up and visibility avoided.

The flanks of a coast battery also require special treat*

too STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

ment. The exterior slope, seen in profile, frequently pro-
claims a fort for miles. Its outline can be broken without
any difficulty whatever. Traverses rising above a parapet,
with their side slopes showing sharp in profile, are always
to be avoided. At Fort Madalena, Malta, there is a
solitary traverse of this description on the long sea face,
conspicuous enough for the leading mark of a ship channel.
There is no real inconsistency in maintaining the interior
of a coast battery as neat as an artillery store, and leaving
the exterior to nature. An exterior slope cannot be used
as a tennis ground, and by abandoning the lawn ideal
which is still upheld in some cases, invisibility will be
promoted.

COLOUR

The colouring of the guns is a highly important point.
Black will usually be the worst colour that can be adopted ;
especially if, as is generally the case, it gives off bright
reflections. A dull mat colour is always desirable, but
the tint should be varied to suit individual conditions.
The dull white applied to the loo-ton guns at Malta is
remarkably successful against the uniform whiteness of the
background. It might be supposed that Malta offers
conditions unfavourable to invisibility. The very reverse
is the case. At Gibraltar, however, the background and
surroundings of the loo-ton guns are brilliantly green in
spring, and a greenish brown in the late summer and
winter. These guns should be painted a greenish brown;,
the tint, in every case, should be rather lighter than the
average depth of colour of the setting. Uniform flat
washes are in nature only to be found in skies and English
lawns, scarcely even in calm coast waters, which are gener-
ally heavily loaded with reflections. Guns should be
spattered, therefore, rather than treated with a flat tint*
However untidy their appearance may thus become, they
can be kept equally serviceable, and will shoot none the

INVISIBILITY 101

worse. The glitter on a bayonet is no evidence of its
temper, and, when fixed to a rifle, it proclaims the bearer
for miles.

Cement concrete has, from the present point of view,
been the bane of the Engineer. A wall built of the stone
of the country soon loses its visibility, weathering down to
a mellow hue, and, where it is not expensively pointed at
intervals, clothing itself with a rich garment of lichen.
Hard rendered surfaces of cement concrete weather little,
look like nothing in nature, and proclaim in terms not
to be mistaken that the Engineer has been at work. Even
at Malta, an island of white stone, concrete powerfully
asserts itself, and insists on being seen.

In another case, a recent cartridge store with clean
concrete surfaces stands out from a background of dark
rugged rock, and can be seen for miles. This is as it
should be, in the case, say, of a monument ; but does not
fulfil all the requirements of a magazine of explosives
turned towards, and within 2,000 yards of an enemy's
possible position.

Devil's Gap Battery, Gibraltar, again, is a white concrete
wart on the grey-green western slopes of the Rock. In
this special position, it is hardly too much to say that a
regulation blanket would be a better protection than this
advertisement in concrete.

Bonnettes of stone or concrete are rarely satisfactory
from any point of view. When, as at Fort Leonardo,
Malta, they have vertical faces rising eight feet above the crest
over which the guns fire, they stand condemned as being
simply an artificial mode of increasing at considerable cost
the dangerous target offered to a ship's fire; while in
most cases they add materially to the visibility of the guns
whose detachments they are designed to protect. At
Victoria emplacement, Gibraltar, on either flank of the
loo-ton gun there is a trapezium of glaring white concrete
slope, set in a luxuriant growth of vegetation. If the great

102 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

gun could be tendered absolutely invisible by any process
of enchantment, these slopes would serve to show an
enemy's No. i exactly where to aim. To bisect the distance
between two closely adjacent, sharply outlined symmetrical
targets, is an even easier process than laying the sight
directly on an object less well defined. If these objection-
able slopes had any protective value, their presence would
be partially excused. As it is, they are shams mere
screens a few feet thick with no mass behind them. Earth
would have been positively less dangerous to the gun,
apart from the fact that invisibility would have been secured
by its employment.

Concrete can be darkened by an admixture of soot;
which, however, if introduced in sufficient quantities to
produce much result, would materially diminish its strength.
It can be tarred and sprinkled with earth or sand, much
of which would soon wash out in a rainy climate, and
leave a surface which would gleam in the sun like a looking
glass or a slate roof. If painted, the oils sink in and
leave a nearly indelible stain. But here also flat tints are
inadmissible. Blotching with a large brush is required,
which will not merely lower the tone to any desired pitch,
but will break up the flatness of the surface, obviate
uniform reflection, and secure assimilation to any sur-
roundings. Concrete not rendered weathers to some
extent, and soon becomes less glaring.

Granting for the purposes of the present argument
only that it is necessary to carry up the concrete mass
covering a gun emplacement to the plane of the superior
slope, the effect is usually a glittering white line, directly
under the muzzle of the gun, broadening in proportion
both to the depression provided, and also within limits
to the range from which it is viewed. Here again, artificial
colouring can be resorted to with excellent results, although,
as will be noticed hereafter, vegetation may in some cases
be even more effective.

INVISIBILITY 103

FOREGROUND

The railway embankment treatment of parapets has
been already pointed out as undesirable; it remains to
deal with the question of the foreground in advance of
the so-called " exterior slope " a term which might with
advantage lose its literal accuracy in connection with most
defence works.

The ditch constitutes, in some cases, an effectual adver-
tisement of a fort or battery. There will be another
straight defined line drawn parallel to and under the crest.
Perhaps the top of the scarp exhibits a broad band. At
the Needles battery the ditch is visible for miles. At
Newhaven even the flanking arrangements are frankly
exposed, and there is a caponier generously posing as a
target. At Rinella Battery, Malta, the ditch helps to tell
the tale. As Colonel Schaw has lately pointed out, the
divorcing of the ditch from a too rigid alliance with the
parapet is no new proposal ; but Choumara has at present
found few apostles in England, where we have perhaps
been unnecessarily generous in the matter of excavation.
We have ditches with virtual precipices a short distance in
advance of them; others, again, closely following the
edges of cliffs. Carlisle Fort, Cork Harbour, has a ditch of
monumental proportions, which is said to have been the
grave of the fortunes of successive contractors. A part
of this ditch serves to enclose a narrow ridge at the top
of a natural cliff, and gives rise to the probably unique
phenomenon of a piece of infantry parapet facing the sea
suddenly changing into one facing the other way, without
any alteration of alignment. Some ditches seem to be
built up much on the Hibernian plan of casting a gun
" you take a hole and pour molten iron round it." No. 2
battery, Inchkeith, has a land front ditch, duly flanked ;
but there is nothing to prevent a whole ship's company
walking up the natural slopes in front of the work. Brean-

104 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

down, Severn defences, has a well-flanked gorge ditch;
but almost any old woman could walk into the work from
the front. Fort Langton, Bermuda, a little bit of a work,
has six flanking chambers, and only just escaped having
twelve. A commanding officer, not desiring to have two-
thirds of his little garrison permanently quartered in the
ditch when danger threatened, would be likely to block
up the entrance galleries tightly, and leave the ditch for
the enemy to get into if he liked.

In advance of the ditch, we have perhaps a long graded
glacis, sometimes but not always a legacy of the days
of the "percussion musket," or flint-lock. All these
things make for visibility. Progress, the breech-loader,
and the machine gun, will simplify the task of the designer
aiming at concealment. Accept the necessity for a ditch,
even if unflanked, and the glacis beyond may be left to
nature. Where guns are on a steep bluff, a little scarping
here and there not a regularly traced line combined
with iron fraises or palisades not necessarily continuous
will frequently be considered amply sufficient protection
against a boat party, which after all is composed neither
of Alpine climbers nor monkys, and which, even if it
succeeded in reaching the parapet, would nowadays be
easier victims than the gallant Spaniards who escaladed
the back of the Rock of Gibraltar. If the Russians on
Mount Nicholas, in the Shipka Pass, without ditches,
flanked or otherwise, could repulse, latterly with stones, the
brilliant attacks of the Turkish infantry, we with machine
guns may count on equal success against an enemy's
bluejackets.

Thus the problem of invisibility will be simplified.
Parapets may in many cases be effectively masked by trees.
At Oscar Friedricksborg Fort, the main defence of the
channel of approach to Stockholm, this plan has been
adopted with wonderful success* There is a high barbette
battery commanding the water approach. Tall pine trees,

INVISIBILITY 105

1 standing on what might have been termed the glacis, and
spoiled accordingly, rise to the level of the muales.
Viewed from the sea coast side, it is almost absolutely
impossible to identify a single gun. Yet the fire is not in
the least masked, and in the worse case the shells of the
defence would easily tear their way through the light
branches. It is true that there is a venerable legend to the
effect that a projectile was, " once upon a time/' turned
up by blades of grass : but rabbits are not infrequently
shot through grass, and even swede-tops, so that there is
hope for modern shells opposed by pine-needles. All the
minor defences of the Oscar Friedricksborg position are
equally well concealed. There are several other batteries
among the trees which defy detection. Under the ordinary
conventional treatment, they would have been magnani-
mously proclaimed from afar.

PROMINENT OBJECTS

High chimneys, flagstaffs, or other well defined and
prominent objects in the neighbourhood of guns, are to
be avoided. Within limits, indirect laying on board ship
is just as easy as any other mode of aiming, and such
objects greatly facilitate it. At Alexandria the positions
of the magazines were usually indicated by tall lightning
rods, which, being in many cases innocent of any proper
earth connection, were doubly objectionable.

DISAPPEARING GUNS

The disappearing mountings, which it is hoped will be
provided for some of the new B.L. guns will enormously
facilitate disguise. Under most circumstances, there
appears to be no reason why the positions of guns thus
mounted should ever be identified, except by the flash,
which is not an easy thing to lay upon. But much will
evidently depend upon the design and construction of the
works in which they are to be placed. At Flatholtne,

xo6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Severn defences, the pits for the y-inch Moncrieff counter-
weight guns are exceedingly well masked.

Similar concealment has not always been accorded to
disappearing guns. In the middle of the Corradino Lines,
Malta, there are two counterweight pits, built up high
above the level of the crest line, and the most conspicuous
objects in the neighbourhood. It seems hardly fair to
buildup zpit, as we have done at Popton and Hubberstone,
and as the Egyptians probably intended to do, when
they mounted their 9-inch counterweight gun on the open
sea-shore. The Corradino Lines have the compensating
advantage, however, of hundreds of yards of infantry
parapet, 32 feet thick! At Newhaven Fort one of the
9-inch counterweights is placed in what is virtually a
circular stone tower of vertical cylindrical form.

The dummy disappearing gun, employed in the Portland
experiments last year, raised itself out of a stretch of natural
down land. When this dummy was in the loading position,
there was nothing whatever to indicate the site of what
was thus a veritable^;/; which partly accounts, no doubt,
for the fact that the effect of the fire of the attacking ship
was practically nil. Nevertheless, the conditions at Port-
land were not ideal ; since, when in the firing position,
the gun showed against the sky, while there were no
scattered bushes which might be mistaken for it. The
flag on the top of the splinter-proof sheltering the range
party was officially reported, however, to be so remarkably
like the dummy, that it was liable to be fired at.

EXISTING WORKS

Very much may be done, at small cost, to diminish the
visibility of existing works. The armour belt of Spitbank
Fort has been painted in black and white chequers with
admirable results. The ports which used to be bulls-eyes
are now indistinguishable, and the prominent mass of the
fort is reduced in tone. This treatment appears suitable

INVISIBILITY 107

to all such continuous armoured casemates, the colour
of the chequers being varied, however, tp suit the prevailing
tint of the coast line. It has been suggested that by a
little vigorous scene painting, a casemated battery can be
assimilated to a rocky coast. Fort Delimara, Malta, would
be a good sub j ect for this treatment. It is a shielded battery
with massive concrete merlons between the ports. Standing
above and by the side of a naturally weathered cliff, the
Delimara guns offer as good a target as the captain of a
gun's crew could desire to lay upon. The judicious
application of a big flatting brush would change all this.
The casemates at Camden and Carlisle lend themselves to
similar treatment.

Where trees and vegetation flourish, very much can be
done by well-considered planting, both in front and in
rear of the guns ; while the painting of the latter in accord-
ance with the principles advocated will materially aid in
disguisement. The guns in Kinghorn battery, for ex-
ample, could thus be almost obliterated.

Concrete slopes can be painted, or a rough rubble wall
can be built in front of them, and vegetation fostered.
This, in the case of Devil's Gap Battery, above alluded to,
as well as in that of several other works at Gibraltar,
would promote invisibility to an unexpected degree.
Screens of cork bark in front of guns have been suggested,
and appear to be worth a trial. Creepers deserve every
encouragement, and ivy is invaluable. These are but a
few ways in which the prominence of our defences can
be diminished, and a study of individual works from the
point of view of the attack not from plans will not fail
to suggest others.

Invisibility will possibly produce a loss of moral effect;
" Frowning batteries," will cease to be a term dear to poets
and newspaper correspondents ; but, if it is the case that
the mere appearance of his target is a matter of serious
importance to the Wimbledon prizeman, the relative visi-

108 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

bility of shore guns may be expected to exert a determining
influence in an action. It would be better, perhaps, if
some defences did not " frown " quite so much.

All experience goes to prove that the appearance of the
target proffered to the ship does actually exert an enormous
effect on the accuracy of her fire. Concealment is thus a
very real protection, none the less valuable because it is
not to be measured in feet and inches.

There is nothing new under the sun, and no originality
whatever is claimed for the views here advocated. It is
occasionally desirable to re-state an ancient case.

VIII
THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER

(" The Times," 18 February, 1887.}

In 1887 anxiety for the peace of Europe was widely felt. There
had been scabbard-rattling in Germany and another Franco-German
War seemed not improbable. In these circumstances, I was asked
to make a study of the frontier and of the military position generally.
I was forced to the conclusion that, if France were again invaded, the
line of advance would be through Belgium, and I outlined a plan
closely resembling that of Von Sddieffen which was adopted in
1914. Three years kter, in 1890, I was ordered to examine the
Belgian defences then under construction at Li&ge, Namur, and at
Antwerp. I reported giving detailed reasons to show that the defences
of the Meuse and at Antwerp, in the absence of a strong field army,
could not offer any serious resistance. And again I expressed the
view that an invasion would take this route. Unfortunately, the
French General Staff believed to the last that the main attack would
come from the east* The wonderfully accurate forecast of General
Michel in 1911 was ignored. "Plan XVH," which the " offensive
school " had elaborated, was put in force and proved quite unsuited
to the conditions in which the Great War began.

" THE Rhine/' states a French writer, " is the veritable
military frontier of Germany, her most serious line of
defence, the natural barrier interposed between the Latin
and the German races, which, in the interests of the peace
of the world, they ought always to have respected.
But," he candidly adds, "it has never been so/' Few
subjects of study are more fascinating than that of the
successive changes of the frontier lines of Europe, but no
writer has yet given it to the world. Which of the natural
frontiers has shown the greatest stability amid the many

109

no STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

changes of the map ? How far have ethnical boundaries
followed those of nature? To what extent have the
great wars of the past been the result of waves of races
seeking a natural barrier ? In what way has military pro-
gress, and especially the creation of the vast system of
continental railways, changed the conditions of the past,
and how will the new order affect the maps of the future ?
These are some of the many questions which await adequate
handling. Meanwhile, present interest centres on the
short strip of frontier across which France and Germany
watch each other to-day a frontier barely sixteen years
old.

After Waterloo France shrank back nearly to the frontier
of 1789, her command of the left bank of the Rhine ceasing
however at the Lauter. This was the frontier through
which three German armies broke in August, 1870, and
the battles which ended the dream of French invasion
were fought on the routes crossing the Vosges to the valley
of the Moselle. The frontier of to-day, as laid down by
the Treaty of Versailles, differs materially, and the difference
would exercise much influence, over the early stages at
least, of a new war. No Rhine frontier remains to France,
who now faces Germany on a line, from Luxemburg to
Switzerland, about 140 miles long as the crow flies, with a
single marked salient extending to within 30 miles of
Strassburg.

The present German frontier, after skirting Belgium
and Luxemburg behind the line of the lower Meuse, enters
the deep valley of the Our, which it follows down to the
Moselle a short distance above Trier, passes up the Moselle,
and making a detour to include Thionville and Mets,
crosses the river, and bending to the south-east reaches
the summit of the Donon in the southern Vosges due west
of Strassburg. Thence it follows the summit ridge of the
Vosges, and crosses the great gap in front of Belfort. In

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER in

rea of this frontier line lie on the north the rich plains of
Crefeld and Koln, between the Rhine and the Meuse.
Further south is the Eifel region, mountainous and sparsely
inhabited, sloping steeply on the south-eastern side to the
valley of the Moselle, whose left affluents have cut deep
ravines, forming serious obstacles to military movements.
Portions of this district are densely wooded, and the whole
is poorly cultivated, has few roads, and would be quite
unable to support any large body of troops. For military
operations on a large scale the Eifel region is altogether
unsuited, and, though no impassable barrier, it can cer-
tainly be regarded as a naturally strong portion of the
German frontier. To the west of the Eifel district and
beyond the frontier lies the Ardennes region, largely
covered with forest and marsh, with few inhabitants or
roads, and generally regarded as specially unhealthy.
From the south-east bank of the Moselle rises the high
and somewhat rugged plateau of the Hiinsruck, prolonged
across the Rhine in the Taunus range* The Hiinsruck
also is a difficult country for military operations, and,
though fair roads follow the general line of its summit to
the Rhine, it constitutes a formidable obstacle to cross-
communication from the Moselle valley to that of the
Nahe, which is nearly parallel. From Mains to the Swiss
frontier the Vosges range runs parallel to the course of
the Rhine at an average distance of about 18 miles. The
northern portion, known as the Harott, offers a consider-
able obstacle to the free movement of troops, and is
divided from the southern Vosges by the depression of
Zabern, over which the army of the Crown Prince marched
in eight columns to the Saar, masking the small fortresses
which lay in its path. South of the depression of Zabern
the Vosges form a strongly-marked chain, falling steeply
on the eastern side to the broad valley of the Rhine, and
ending at the gap of Belfort. West of the Vosges the
region between the Saar and the Moselle is less accen-

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

tuated, well cultivated, and possesses numerous good
toads. In rear of all flows the Rhine, a great natural
retrenchment or second line of defence, which the French
could not now hope to pass in a single campaign.

Roughly speaking, therefore, the German territory
between the Rhine and the French frontier divides itself
into three mountainous districts the Eifel, Htinsruck,
and the Vosges, all more or less difficult for military opera-
tions on a large scale and an advanced region between
the Saar and the Moselle, over which great armies can be
manoeuvred with ease. The natural lines of approach to
this advanced place of arms are the valley of the Moselle
and the depression of Zabern. The main line of the
German defences is that of the Rhine. Wesel, Koln, Cob-
lenz, Mainz, and Strassburg are now first-class fortresses,
covering important railway bridges and able to contain
large forces Strassburg, for example, requiring a war
garrison of nearly 40,000 men. The minor defended
points are Rheinhausen, Dusseldorf, Germersheim, Rastadt
and Neu Brisach. In advance of this great fortress line
stands Metz, a huge entrenched camp, the citadel of the
region between the Saar and Moselle, with Thionville,
about 1 8 miles to the north, forming a species of strategic
outwork and guarding an important railway centre. Be-
tween these two frontier fortresses and the Rhine are
Saarlouis and the naturally strong position of Bitsche,
barring the railway lines, Trier-Saarbriick and Metz-
Haguenau respectively. The Germans have not greatly
sought to multiply fortresses ; but have diligently laboured
to increase the cross-communications of the Rhine, while
largely developing their railway system. From Wesel to
Basle there are twelve railway bridges as well as about
twenty boat bridges and several steam ferries.

The scheme of fortifications adopted unmistakably
implies a bold offensive policy. The line of the Rhine
has been made so strong that enormous forces would be

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER

needed to besiege or mask its fortresses, while to ignore
and penetrate between them in face of a gun-boat flotilla
is practically impossible. But the object has been mainly
to facilitate invasion on a given line by destroying the
possibility of a retaliatory advance into Cis-Rhine territory.
Not the least of the functions of the Rhine fortresses is
that of serving as depots of supply to armies operating
beyond the frontier. Metz, the advanced place of arms,
has an offensive far more than a defensive significance.
If a victorious French army, operating from Nancy and
Lu&Sville, could strike Saarbriick and the line of the Saar,
Metis might be isolated, and would then, as in 1870, be-
come strategically important only in proportion to the
number of men required to girdle it and to the urgency of
the need of through railway communication. On the
other hand, Metz, as a great intrenched camp and military
depot within 170 miles of Paris, would afford powerful
aid to the rapid development of an offensive campaign.
Turning to the railways, the preference given by the
Germans to a bold offensive policy appears equally apparent.
They evidently attach the greatest importance to the
powers of strategic combinations which railways confer,
and rely with confidence on the ability of their military
leaders to wield those powers with effect. Neglecting the
frontier territory north of Koln, two main lines of railway,
one on each bank, closely follow the Rhine up to Mainz.
There they quit the actual banks; but still follow the
course of the river at varying distances up to Basle. A
perfect network of cross lines unite them, providing a,
power of movement from one bank to the other and of
concentration against the flank or communications of an
invader which has changed all the conditions of the older
wars. Between Mainz and Koln the river has been many
times crossed by invading armies from the east and west ;
but the great game of hide and seek, which the German
railways, supported by the great fortresses, have now

ii4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

tendered possible to the strategist, has yet to be played.
Numerous short branches lead towards the French frontier,
especially between the Zabern depression and the gap of
Belfort, and all along the Rhine valley troops can be moved
with ease and massed with marvellous rapidity. The
possession of this vast system, developed with so keen an
eye to military requirements, confers on the German
Empire an advantage of the first order. To possess such
a system, and to know how to use it, is to hold many
points in the game of modern war.

The Treaty of Versailles practically left France without
any naturally strong line of defence against Germany.
The line of French frontier fortresses begins on the left
with M&ire$ on the Meuse, followed by Verdun, a great
intrenched camp directly opposite to, and about 38 miles
from, Mete. Between Verdun and Toul on the Upper
Moselle there is a series efforts d'arrfc Troyon, Giron-
ville, Lionville, and Camp des Remains. From Toul to
Epinal there are no permanent works, but the left bank of
the Moselle offers good natural positions which could be
rapidly strengthened. Further south the high ground on
the left bank of the Upper Moselle is guarded by a chain
of defences on the extreme right of which stands the
fortress of Belfort Supposing that France at the outset
of war deliberately adopted a purely defensive policy, or
was compelled to this course by the more rapid strategic
deployment of the Germans, this is the line which would
be held. In advance of it there are only the minor for-
tresses of Longwy and Montm&ly respectively batting
the railways from Luxembourg and Thionville.

1 It will be seen therefore that, apart from all questions
of the relative available strength of the French and German
armies of to-day, the initial conditions of war have
materially changed since 1870. The strategic frontier of

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 115

Germany is now good in every respect. The chain of
strong fortresses on the Rhine is unbroken. The railway
system has been enormously developed. The advanced
base has been pushed forward to Met2, 90 miles from the
Rhine. The balance of natural advantages of frontier
thus rests with Germany, and the strategic deployment
which in 1870 took place between Memg and Landau
can now be carried out as easily on the line of the Moselle.

The conditions under which the last great war were
begun are worth recalling at the present time. On the
i4th of July, 1870, the Garde Mobile was called to arms
and volunteers were enlisted to serve for " the duration
of the war." On the i8th and i9th war credits for more
than 500 millions of francs were voted and Marshal
Lebceuf announced that France was archi-prete. Yet when,
on the latter day, war was declared, no one complete army
corps was ready to take the field, though the nominal
strength numbered 393,000 men, with reserves amounting
to 173,000. Of this total number about 230,000 men
were employed as garrison troops, in depots, or quartered
in Algeria. The nominal available strength was, there-
fore, about 340,000, with 900 field guns. The intention
of the Emperor and his advisers was to mass 150,000 men
at Metz, 100,000 at Strassburg, and 50,000 in second line
at Chalons. The Metis army was then to move towards
the Strassburg force, and both were to cross the Rhine and
endeavour to detach Prussia from the South German
States. The neutralization of the latter was thus antici-
pated, and the early successes of the French arms would,
it was hoped, lead to alliances with Austria and Italy.
The calculated time for mobilisation was twelve days
from the i4th of July, and on the 28th the Emperor arrived
at Mete to assume supreme command. On the 2nd of
August the campaign was begun by a strong reconnais-
sance on Saarbriick.

On the German side the mobilization began on the

ii6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

night of the i5th of July, and Wiirtemberg, Baden,
Darmstadt and Bavaria speedily announced their intention
to take their stand with the Prussian army. On the i9th
the Parliament of the North German Confederation voted
a war credit of 450 million marks. Although the German
peace establishment was only 385,000 men, the army in
the field early in August numbered about 520,000, with
1,500 field guns, exclusive of 364,000 men and 460 guns
left behind in the garrisons and depots. On the 3rd of
August the deployment was complete, and the army com-
manders were able to report their troops ready to com-
mence operations. During the period from the i6th of
July to the 2nd of August the railways of Northern Germany
transported about 280,000 men, and the South German
lines 80,000. On the 4th of August a portion of the
Third Army defeated General Douay at Weissenburg,
and on the 6th the Crown Prince advanced from the
Lauter to the Saar and defeated Marshal MacMahon at
Woerth; while on the same day Frossard's Corps was
beaten at Forbach by troops of the First and Second
Armies. The French plan of campaign had utterly
collapsed, and the three German armies were free to advance
to the Moselle.

Up to this point, therefore, the fortresses had played
no direct part. The French plan of campaign was that
of invasion, trusting to certain political contingencies ;
but all possibility of the preliminary dispositions which
invasion involved was destroyed in a few days by the
unexpectedly rapid concentration of the German forces
and the prompt advance which followed.

The after-course of the war was, however, in a great
measure ruled by the French fortresses. Metfc blocked a
mam line of railway, necessitating five weeks of labour in
the construction of 23 miles of new line ; while the in-
vestment detained 230,000 Germans till the 2yth of
October. Toul barred the line through Commercy to

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 117

Chalons till the 24th of September. Sedan a position
which the first Napoleon had absolutely condemned
decoyed a French army to destruction. Strassburg held a
German force nearly 60,000 strong till the z8th of Sep-
tember, while its possession by the French entailed the
partial demolition of an important railway bridge across
the Rhine* Finally Paris endured a siege of four and a
half months, entailing considerable strain on the German
resources. These results were certainly of a negative kind ;
but in order that a country should be able to reap real
benefit from its fortresses it is necessary that they should
be of modern type, fully equipped, amply garrisoned by
field troops, and, above all, that there should be a large
field force able to manoeuvre between and around them.

Not one of these conditions was fulfilled in France in
1870. Most of the fortresses had long been obsolete.
The defences of Paris and Mete were incomplete, and their
equipment was utterly deficient. At the outbreak of the
war Thionville had forty trained soldiers in garrison,
besides Gardes Mobiles and recruits ! After the surrender
at Sedan no free field army remained to France, and the
hastily organized levies were no match for the solid German
battalions.

The conditions of to-day are in all respects different.
A German army advancing on Paris from the Moselle
must pass through or break a chain of modern fortresses
which bar all the railway lines running to the capital. It
must be assumed that the equipment of these fortresses is
complete; while the French dispose of an enormous
personnel for their garrisons as well as for field armies.
Adequately held, and supported by the presence of large
field armies, the fortresses cannot be effectively masked
without absorbing a heavy proportion of the invaders*
strength. Certain German writers have argued in favour
of attempting to storm fortresses at the outset of war,
trusting to the defences being incomplete and the garrisons

n8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

unprepared. Thete is no modem experience to show
that such a course is feasible, and it -would in any case
entail vast sacrifices. To maintain an army before Paris,
however, through railways are a first necessity, and till
the frontier fortresses of France are taken no line is avail-
able; but siege operations against these fortresses are
undoubtedly facilitated to a great extent by the German
railway system and the great military depots on the Rhine.

Assuming then that the French are now in a position to
reap the benefits of their fortress system, the task of in-
vasion from the line of the Moselle is one of grave difficulty,
and, in the absence of any false step on their part, it is not
easy to see how the Germans could begin a campaign with
the brilliant successes which marked that of 1 870. Imagine
the battles of the 4th and 6th of August eliminated ; con-
ceive that the three German armies had arrived before a
Mete perfectly equipped, suitably garrisoned, and pro-
vided with provisions for nine months ; that a French
army 250,000 strong had held the line of the Meuse, with
a reserve of 100,000 at Chalons ; finally, suppose that
Paris had been a complete fortress in every respect : all
these things might have been, and who shall, in that case,
lay down the course of the campaign ? Yet, with certain
reservations, these suppositions do not inaptly represent
what might be the conditions of a new campaign ; while
the numerically greater personnel of the French army to-
day, and the less distances to be traversed in concentration,
should compensate for the slower mobilization which a
system not strictly territorial entails.

Under all the circumstances, the temptations to turn
the main defences of France and strike at Paris from the
north would be very strong. Maintaining a strict defensive
in Elsass and Lothringen if necessary permitting the
French to reach the left bank of the Upper Rhine the
mass of the German army could be hurled upon the Oise
by making free use of the Belgian railway system. The

THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER 119

Ardennes and Eifel districts would afford considerable
protection to the flank of the line of communications till
the frontier was fairly crossed. The northern frontier
fortresses are of little account. The distance from Valen-
ciennes to Paris is only about no miles as the crow flies,
and from Charleroi 130 miles. The line of invasion would,
in this case, be that of 181 5, and the weight of the French
resistance would probably be developed in the triangle La
F&tre, Laon, Soissons.

Such a plan of campaign presents many attractions, and,
provided that a convention could be arranged with or
forced upon Belgium, the military difficulties appear dis-
tinctly less than those of an advance from the Moselle.
Belgium has, however, none of the race antipathy which
assisted in determining the action of Roumania in 1877 ;
while the German fleet would be unable to protect the
trade of Antwerp and at the same time fulfil its proper
functions. Hence it is highly doubtful whether the
necessary arrangement could be concluded without com-
pulsion or a high bribe. In any case the effect of a
victory would be to leave Germany with a permanent
protectorate over the kingdom.

These contingencies are no mere dreams. In the giant
struggle which a single false step on the part of either of
two small groups of men may precipitate, it is at least
certain that all considerations will yield to military exped-
iency. The initiative would be seised by Germany,
whose preparations have been long perfected and whose
plan of campaign is already decided. Events would hardly
accommodate themselves to the speed of thought and
action usual in the Foreign Office, and it is necessary for
British statesmen to decide in advance as to the course
which the interests of this Empire demand.

IX
THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE

("Tb Tims: 9 25 My, 1888.)

I select this article from among many written at a time when the
great effort to restore the strength of the Navy, which led to the
Naval Defence Act of 1889, was in progress. It summarises briefly
some of the first principles of Imperial Defence, which I have striven
during many years to make clear to the nation. Two years kter
Captain Mahan's first gieat work, The Influence of Sea Power on History*
made its appearance, powerfully emphasising some of those principles
by copious historical evidence*

ADMIRAL COLOMB'S able paper recently read and discussed
at the Royal United Service Institute deserves to be "widely
studied. A much-neglected branch of the great subject
of national defence could not have been dealt with at a
more opportune moment or dealt with by an abler hand.
Panic of any sort develops unreason, and unreason means
waste for expenditure producing disproportionate results
is simply waste, the inevitable Nemesis of reaction.
Given a panic, skilfully manipulated, you can get almost
anything you demand ; but in the long run mistakes are
usually found out, and the discovery once made invariably
produces a dissatisfaction which shows itself in reluctance
to accept even necessary expenditure.

On all grounds, therefore, it is desirable to place the
demands put forward in relation to the defences of the
Empire on a fair and intelligible basis. No amount of
ingenuity in matters of detail can ever atone for the defects
of a scheme of which the fundamental conception is wrong.

120

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE 121

No tactical skill can avert the evils resulting from a plan
of campaign which is strategically faulty. We have on
many occasions shown a tendency to approach questions,
both large and small, from the wrong end, and it is not
difficult to ascertain the cause.

Master minds are necessarily rare. Able and zealous
experts, capable of holding a brief with much show of
force, abound. The balance is supposed to be held by a
civilian Minister who of necessity knows nothing about
the matter. The qualities which lead a statesman to
Cabinet rank in this country are tending less and less in
the direction which the right government of a great
Empire demands. Good debating power, mastery of the
details of local government or of finance, capacity for work
all these things are not only compatible with a total
inability to understand the broad aspects of great military
problems, but they may be associated with complete
incompetence in the mere administrative work of a War
Office or Admiralty. And it is possible to arrive at the
head of either even without the possession of one of the
attributes enumerated. Pitt could grasp and direct a vast
military scheme. Palmerston was naturally gifted with
something of a soldier's genius. But, of the public men
of recent times, how many have arrived at the elementary
proposition that the richest Empire in the world must
needs be strong or perish, and that to weld the scattered
members into one great whole capable of acting as such
against a common enemy is a problem worth the labour
of a life? Political distinction being obtainable at an
infinitely cheaper rate, involving no slightest study of the
relative strength of the Great Powers, no thought of the
solution of the complex problem of Imperial defence, the
result is not to be wondered at.

Under such conditions it is inevitable that what may
well be termed the higher policy of defence has palpably
been forgotten. Admiral Colomb's valuable essay has

122 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

prepared the way for discussion on the only true lines
by bringing sober history to bear upon the airy generalities
which have been plentifully scattered around The policy
which has been successful in the past, which has brought
the Empire not safety alone, but conquest, may apparently
be our guide to-day. We are here on firm ground at
last, and, starting from such a basis, it becomes possible
to lay down the outlines of the higher policy above
referred to*

The most cursory study of the various papers put for-
ward from time to time, or of the reports of Commissions
on questions of national defence, shows clearly the need
for the substantial basis which Admiral Colomb supplies.
He is naturally severe upon the Royal Commission of
1860, which he characterizes as a body " very badly con-
stituted for pronouncing on the general principles of
defence/* Questions of higher policy were practically
excluded from the charter of this Commission which had
a huge system of fortification flung at its head, and was
called upon to pronounce an opinion upon a mass of
details. We had, in fact, begun at the wrong end. The
question of higher policy was left practically untouched.
Here was the greatest naval power of the age centred in
a sea-girt isle possessing the proudest naval traditions.
Clearly, in approaching any scheme of national defence,
the primary datum> the basis of everything, should have
been the part which the national navy might, judging
from the past, be able to play in the future. The forti-
fications were needed only to supplement the action of
the national navy. It was surely necessary to arrive at a
definite idea as to what the action of that navy would be,
before attempting to fix the standard of coast defence,
still less to go down to details of batteries, forts, and guns.

There is no evidence that the Commission made any
such effort, and it is certain that they were not officially
required to do so. As Admiral Colomb points out, their

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE 123

summary of the case gives no hint that the matter ever
presented itself to their minds. That summary ran as
follows :

" Should any such catastrophe (defeat or dispersion by
storm) occur, or should the fleet from whatever cause be
unable to keep the command of the Channel, it appears to
your Commissioners that the insular position of the king-
dom, so far from being an advantage, might prove a dis-
advantage for defensive purposes, inasmuch as it would
enable any superior naval Power or Powers to concentrate
a larger body of troops on any part of our coasts and move
more rapidly and secretly than could be done against any
neighbouring country having only a land frontier ; and an
army so placed could maintain its base and be reinforced
and supplied with more facility than if dependent on land

communications/*

It is scarcely to be wondered that Admiral Colomb takes
exception to these remarkable dicta. If all this is true,
what is the use of being a Great Naval Power ? One can
conceive a Russian commission committing itself to these
sentiments ; but for Great Britain, with her great and
costly Navy and its glorious past, to accept them is in-
credible. It is even difficult to believe that they are seri-
ously put forward. Put the French Navy away altogether
and sever France from Germany by a stormy sea ; would
the Commission really have contended that the Germans
in 1870 would have been " supplied with more facility than
if dependent on land communications " i.e. on through
railways bringing every resource of the invader into the
heart of the invaded country.

Consider the vagueness of the speculations on which
these Commissioners based a plea for 12 millions* worth
of fortification " should any such catastrophe occur, ot
should the fleet, from whatever cause/* lose command of
the Channel. What is the use of pretending to be a Great

124 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Naval Power any longer if we place no faith whatever in
our Navy, and by what right do we assume defeat ? It is
probabilities, not indefinite possibilities, with which we
have to deal. With almost equal justice advocates on
the other side might say, " Should your forts be unfor-
tunately blown up at a critical moment by careless people
dropping matches in the magazines, or should these forts
prove to be quite unfit for purposes of fighting * from
whatever cause/ it appears to your Commissioners that
in the last resort you have only the Navy to fall back
upon/'

The fact is simply that the Commission in question
assumed the position of an advocate, not that of a judge,
and the result of this mistaken identity was not unimportant.
The report was drawn up in contradiction to a mass of
the evidence. The whole cut-and-dried scheme of forti-
fication was practically adopted ; the standard of defence
was wrongly adjusted, and the evil has hardly yet dis-
appeared, although it is now widely admitted that the
grandiose scale of land defence adopted at Portsmouth
and Plymouth was not in the least suited to the real require-
ments of the country. No better evidence could be
found of the fatal result of approaching a great question
at the wrong end.

The Royal Commission of 1881-2 was directed to in-
quire into the protection of commerce generally, and was
constrained, therefore, to touch upon the naval aspects of
the question. This Commission reported :

a We have called attention to some of the various duties
which in time of war will be required of Your Majesty's
fleet, in order to protect the interests of the Colonial
dependencies of the Empire and to afford reasonable hope
that the commerce of England would still be carried on
under the British flag. How far the Navy is equal to the
discharge of their duties is a grave and pressing question,
which can only be answered by a careful inquiry into the

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE 125

relative strength of our Navy as compared with the navies
of other powers. . . . We are deeply impressed by the
returns furnished by the Admiralty, and to these, as well
as to the other evidence, we invite the particular atten-
tion of Your Majesty's Government, feeling bound to
express our opinion that, looking to the action of other
countries, the strength of the Navy should be increased
with as little delay as possible."

The Commissioners were not called upon to consider
the defence of these islands or the functions of the Navy
in relation thereto, but the words above quoted are sig-
nificant of their views. Alas for the fate which crosses
our procedure in such matters ! The able report of the
Commission was not published till last year. The plain
words above quoted appear to have escaped notice, and
action was taken only on the coaling station defences,
with which alone the labours of Lord Carnarvon and his
colleagues came to be popularly associated.

Again, take up almost any of the papers dealing with
questions of defence or pleading for the fortification of
London at any imaginable cost. Everywhere will be
found vague phrases showing that Admiral Colomb's
points have never been grappled with. "The com-
mand of the sea may be lost/* " The fleet may be de-
coyed away or dispersed." Some undefined catastrophe
may overtake it. " The fleet " is generally the term pre-
ferred, not the Navy of the Empire, existing and potential.
Nothing is less clearly understood than what is meant by
" command of the sea." In a sense the words are mean-
ingless. Had the Northern States the command of the
sea while the Alabama and her sisters could work their
sweet will upon Federal commerce ? Had England the
command of the sea at a time when the capture of her
merchant ships almost in sight of her shores was a matter
of daily occurrence ? Definition is essential or the issue
becomes confused.

126 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

The command of the sea has no teal significance apart
from the question of time. If England has in home waters
or in the Mediterranean a strength so great that no fleet
which a hostile Power can assemble could engage with
hope of victory then, in those seas, England holds
command at the moment, but conditionally, on the power
of movement within a certain time. Were the British
strength to be wedded to Spithead or Malta the command
would be gone. Thus, the only definition must run
somewhat as follows : The command in certain waters
exists when, within those waters, no hostile fleet can
count on the time requisite for a serious enterprise without
a strong probability of having a superior force to deal
with.

Admiral Fremantle in last year's manoeuvres got clear
away up Channel and ran into a trap. The papers
announced the " Capture of the Nore," whatever that
might mean. Had he, then, the command of the Channel ?
Assuredly not, for he did what no enemy dare dream of
doing. He placed himself in a position in which he was
certain, within a fixed and limited period, to have a stronger
force down upon his rear ; he was even at a place whence
he could not retire at all tides. But would he have sunk
captured ships and fortified himself at Thames Haven ?
Most certainly not, for no British ship of any kind would
have been ready to his hand. He dare hardly engage the
defences of Sheerness, for he might get roughly handled,
and, besides, he knew that he had Admiral Hewett behind
him coming up at speed with full magazines.

" The fleet then being out of the way . . . destroyed,
defeated, and driven off to shelter and refit, or decoyed
away " ; this is the major premiss of Sir C. Nugent's paper,
read and discussed at the Royal United Service Institution
last February. Starting therefrom, he draws a sufficiently
gloomy picture of our prospects of defence. The military
ports " have been completed, with the exception of the

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE 127

armament for seven years ; and on the land side well,
you can walk round the land fronts and see for yourselves,
as I daresay every foreign Military Attache has done over
and over again." The garrisons ? " My firm belief is
that if you beat to quarters at this moment you could not
open fire over the whole sea-front of Portsmouth : I
doubt if you could in six days I was nearly writing six
weeks/* Even the Martello towers, sad to say, have ce in
many places . * . decayed away, partly destroyed by the
sea and partly in consequence of the supineness of the
authorities."

This, then, is the practical outcome of the fortifications
of the Commissioners of 1860. The defences could not
offer any resistance in Sir C Nugent's view and the
reiterated argument of the economical advantage of coast
works apparently breaks down altogether. If the Com-
missioners* millions had been put into ships they would
at least have been able to fight, even if only to be " de-
feated and driven off " ; they must have been seaworthy
or they could not be "decoyed away/* Starting from
such a basis as this, there is but one logical deduction,
which, however, most of our teachers shirk conscription
and a home standing army of at least 300,000 men. The
sense of the country, however, is sound in the main, and
there are some who cherish a belief in the power of the
Navy still. It may be defeated if you have fixed its
standard too low. That is your own fault and you must
rectify it at once. Even at its present strength it will
surely be able to account for most of the ships of any
single Power. The decoy theory has grown into a parrot
cry, so often repeated as to be half believed in, and Admiral
Colomb did good service in exposing the fallacy of the
stock instance. Nelson was never decoyed to the West
Indies, but simply followed his enemy there and back.
The place of the British ironclads in the event of war is
in face of the enemy*s ironclads, wherever they may be.

128 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

That place the British ironclads will take, and they are no
more likely to be decoyed away, when invasion impends,
than was the whole French army to be massed on the
Italian frontier in June, 1870.

Fiction is sometimes more logical than serious writing.
General Chesney, for the purposes of the "Battle of
Dorking/* recognised that the British Navy stood directly
in his path and provided a peculiarly fatal torpedo for its
destruction. A novel-writer wishing to dispose of im-
pregnable fortifications would similarly invent a dirigible
balloon discharging tons of milinite^ and would reach a
logical conclusion thereby. On the other hand, the
author of Plus d* Angleterre^ also feeling the British Navy
to be in the way, defeats it in the decisive battle of
Abervrac'h. Four ironclads only remain to England;
" the rest were either sunk or disabled." As the French
have another ironclad squadron in reserve at Brest, the
command of the Channel passes into their hands until
Great Britain can build more ships or repair damages,
and the landing at Hastings, followed by the advance on
London, proceeds merrily. If the naval disaster of
Abervrac'h were worth serious consideration, the deduc-
tion must evidently be neither the necessity for conscrip-
tion, nor the conversion of Hastings into a fortress, nor
the resuscitation of the useless Martello towers ; but
simply that the Royal Navy had been allowed to fall below
the standard of its necessary and indisputable requirements.

By ignoring the Navy altogether, accepting wild possi-
bilities, and forgetting probabilities, the case for a defence
of London on the Antwerp scale can be readily made out.
One great authority holds that England can be brought to
her knees by landing 100,000 men. Sir C. Nugent recently
stated that " no ruler in his senses would think of in-
vading this country with less than 200,000 men/* In'
the face of such diversity of opinion, what is the lay mind
to think ? Surely some closer approximation of views

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE 129

can be arrived at if the matter is properly thought out. We
know, at least, that Napoleon considered 178,000 men to
be required, and that they did not arrive. Experts can
calculate the tons of shipping required for a fully equipped
force of 200,000 men. We learn from the Report of the
Royal Commission of 1882 that the total number of
French merchant steamers of 1,500 tons and upwards was
ninety, a number which would not have conveyed the
Egyptian expeditionary force of that year. At the same
time the corresponding number of British steamers was,
on the same authority, 1,039, " not including Great
Eastern"

We know from the history of war the risks which will
and will not be run in placing an army on shore in a hostile
country. There are here data enough for a worthy dis-
cussion of the question; but in any such discussion
Admiral Colomb's points cannot be shirked. He says in
effect : " You have no right to leave the Navy out of the
matter as you seem to do. Study what the Navy did for
the defence of the country in the past and the principles
on which it acted. Those principles are eternal. They
are as applicable to-day as they were when Lord Howe
and Lord St. Vincent applied them. If you do not know
what the Navy can do for the defence of your shores we
can tell you ; but you have no more right to spirit away
our ships than we have to assume the incapacity for fight-
ing of your forts."

The higher policy of defence may be summed up in a
few words. Decide first of all what Power or combination
of Powers the Empire must be defended against. Respon-
sible statesmen can alone say whether we are to prepare
to fight two or more Powers, or whether we cannot as
reasonably count on an effective alliance as any of our
possible enemies. When this point is settled, and not
till then, can the naval experts lay down ship by ship the
strength of the Navy such that the command of the sea,

i 3 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

in the sense above defined, shall never be lost. However
rigid the system of blockade may be, however complete
the command of the sea, some of an enemy's fast ships
will get away, and within the limits of their speed and
coal supply they will be able to inflict injury. Here,
therefore, fortification steps in and selected points must
be defended, but defended merely against the only prob-
able form of attack. If an enemy's ironclad squadron
goes to the Cape, an English squadron can follow and will
move with far greater ease. Home ports also, in which
serious national injury can be inflicted in a few hours by
an adventurous raider willing to accept risk, claim defence
on a similar scale. This is no question of " fortifying the
coast in order to set free the Navy " set free the Navy
to do what ? merely to act against the only force which
can seriously threaten that coast but of supplementing
the defence which the Navy can and will give by providing
against the swift raids which no command of the sea will
entirely prevent. The corsairs of the sea must be fairly
hunted down by our own cruisers based on the coaling
stations, and for one privateer fitted out from an enemy's
port Great Britain must and easily can fit out six.

The changed conditions of naval warfare are all in favour
of the Power which holds half the points of vantage of the
world, and which can build iron ships at a rate which the
foreigner cannot approach. For many years the national
policy has been enfeebled by the want of that intelligible
basis which Admiral Colomb now suggests. The time has
surely come to consider questions of Imperial defence from
the higher standpoint.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR
OFFICE

(" The Times" 10 December > 1891.)

This is the last of the six " Letters of Vetus," which made some
stir at the time and may have helped to draw public attention to the
chaotic conditions afterwaxds revealed by Lord Elgin's Commission
on die conduct of the South African War. The preceding letters were
devoted to a full explanation of the confusion of administration then
reigning at the War Office. The last was an attempt to replace this
confusion by an ordered system based upon certain principles. It
was faulty in some respects, mainly because I dared not in 1891
propose the abolition of the Office of Commander-in-Chief, which
Mr. Balfour's Government decided upon in 1903. It may be pointed
out, however, that many of the features of these proposals were
adopted by the Esher Committee of 1903-4 Lord Esher, Sir John
(afterwards Lord) Fisher and myself. They have since governed
the higher administration of the Army, and they held the field during
the Great War ; for example, the executive command of the Army
was finally taken out of the War Office, and a ** Council (Committee)
of Imperial Defence," a War Office " Council," and a Chief of the Staff
came into existence thirteen years after this article was written and
became established features in our Army Administration, though
little use was made of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1914-18.
Some other of my proposals in 1891 have also been adopted

AIL efficient systems of administration conform to ascer-
tainable principles. Such principles are independent alike
of forms of government, of the nature of undertakings,
and of the extent of the monetary transactions involved
They are eternal ; their violation inevitably entails dis-
organization, inefficiency, and waste.
The responsibility and power of individuals must be

131

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

defined ; neither must ever be dissociated from adequate
knowledge and experience, or permitted to be degraded
into mere formality. This entails grouping of business
into departments, each under a responsible head, such
grouping being based upon the co-relation of services,
and limited by the amount of work which one man can
efficiently supervise. Sub-groupings the drawing of hori-
zontal lines across the diagram necessarily follow, in
order to allow the focusing of business at earlier stages
and to relieve the head of the department of everything
with which a responsible subordinate can deal. In this
way only is it possible to create a real chain of responsibility,
and to conduct business with efficiency and despatch.
The War Office method of forcing questions through a
succession of officials of increasing rank, and, perhaps,
decreasing knowledge of the matter, leads directly to
mistakes and delays. No official, unless formally charged
with duties in relation to a given subject, should be per-
mitted to intervene. Responsibility can thus be appor-
tioned to individuals policy to heads, details to subordi-
nates. Nothing should be done at the central office which
can be better dealt with locally ; delegation and decentral-
ization of power are paramount objects. Correspondence
should follow fixed and unchanging lines, should be reduced
to a minimum^ and should never supplant personal confer-
ence. Decisions should be recorded in the, name of the
official responsible for making them. The working of
the system should be tested by efficient inspection. These
things are among the axioms of sound administration ;
all appear to be neglected at the War Office.

The London and North-Western Railway may be taken
as an example of an excellent administrative machine,
manipulating in each year a revenue of io millions sterling,
and dealing with more than 55,000 men, whom it trains
successfully for difficult and important duties. "The
secret of organizing the .management of a great service,

ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR OFFICE 133

such as this," writes Mr. Findlay, " is nothing mote than
a carefully-arranged system of devolution, combined with
watchful supervision." Decentralization begins at the
head, where the whole mass of business is divided up
amongst six committees of the Board. The executive
management is vested in three officials the General
Manager, Chief Goods Manager, and Superintendent. Ad-
ministration is carried out by dividing the line into ten
sections, each under the control of a district superintendent.
Monthly conferences of the principal officers are held,
under the General Manager and the Chief Goods Manager
respectively, at which all matters relating to these two
great departments are discussed, and recommendations are
framed and printed for the approval of the Board. The
system of inspection is complete; "nothing is left to chance
or to the possible carelessness of subordinates, but a jealous
watchfulness is constantly exercised to ensure that all the
necessary precautions that experience has 'dictated and
authority has laid down are thoroughly and effectually
observed."

Such, in brief, are the principles upon which one of the
most successful undertakings of the age is based. This
great railway system annually conveys 57 million passen-
gers and 36 million tons of goods. If it were admin-
istered on the lines of the War Office, where correspon-
dence is indiscriminate, devolution unknown, centralisa-
tion supreme, and inspection a farce, the certain results
would be a holocaust of passengers and swift bank-
ruptcy.

Following the analogy of the administrations of all Great
Powers, of India, and of private corporations, I have
sought to frame a system which embodies great principles,
conforms to the ordinary methods of business, and which,
if carried out, would in time remedy the ills under which
the British Army helplessly labours. The accompanying
diagram will explain the general features of such a system :

134

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

General Officer Commanding in Great Britain ' j r
General Officer Commanding in Ireland - 1
General Officers Commanding in Colonial Stations'

Inspector-General of Cavalry

Inspector-General of Field Artillery

Director-General of Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers

Director-General of Recruiting

First Appointments and Promotions
Records

"I*-

5

/ Ordn

coittee-

Army Facto

Experiments and Inventions -

Ordnance Store Department
ntSmall-Anni

nrttee-

Director-General of Fortifications -

Inspector-General Coast and Garrison Artillery

Army Service Corps, Transport, and Supplies

Vetennery Service

Remounts

Barracks

Clothing-

Army Medical Department
Director of Contracts
Estimates and Finance

~ / General Staff of Army
jj| Intelligence Department-
pi < Colonial Section

V Military Education

^** t Clerical Staff and Correspondence -

l^j

3 I Chaplains

t Army Pay Department
Accountant-General-

Estimates and Fix

^ Non-EffcctJTe Vote

-

si

r

ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR OFFICE 155

The Secretary of State is responsible to the Crown,
through the Cabinet, and to Parliament for the efficiency
of the Army, and of that he is the responsible adminis-
trator. All high patronage, all military honours are dis-
pensed by the Crown on his recommendation. There is
no communication between the Army and the Crown
except through him.

To advise the Secretary of State in an individual and in
a collective capacity, five heads in the War Office are
provided three military and two civil. These high posts
are filled by selection, on the responsibility of the Cabinet,
which now appoints judges, bishops, and commanders of
armies in the field. The chance of ill-advised or of
interested selection will certainly be no greater in the one
case than in the other. No Cabinet will dare to appoint,
no Secretary of State for War will dare to nominate,
incompetent officers for positions which carry great and
direct responsibility officers who will be the sole advisers
in matters relating to their respective spheres.

The five members of the War Office Council are co-equal.
Of the three military members, the General Officer Com-
manding-in-Chief and the Chief of the Staff of the Army
are appointed for five years, with a possible extension of
two years as a maximum. The Master-General has a five
years' appointment, renewable for a similar term. All
these posts carry the acting rank of general, and there is
nothing to prevent their being held by officers of lower
grade, if specially fitted for the duties. Thus the tendency
to estimate genius in proportion to military rank that
curse of all armies in which selection is inoperative would
be averted* Neither military rank nor success in the field
necessarily implies administrative capacity.

The five heads in the War Office are directly responsible
to the Secretary of State for the administration of their
offices, in which every new subordinate is appointed on
their recommendation. They are the sole responsible

136 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

advisers of the Secretary of State on all questions relating
to their departments, and they alone have direct access to
him. In grouping duties under the five heads, I have
followed well-established precedents. In the armies of all
Great Powers, and in India, supply is kept entirely separate
from matters of personnel. This essential distinction was
preserved at the War Office until the recent disastrous
innovations. Again, every Great Power in Europe has a
Chief of the General Staff, whose special functions are to
watch over the organisation and the preparation of the
army for war. This officer was regarded as necessary by
the great majority of Lord Harrington's Commission.

The five departments stand as follows :

i. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chiej is solely re-
sponsible to the Secretary of State for the personnel and
discipline of the whole of the combatant branches of the
Army. The recent absurd attempt, which the Duke of
Wellington would have opposed with all his strength, to
mix up questions of finance and estimates with these duties
is swept into deserved oblivion, as also is the monstrous
system, strongly condemned by the Royal Commission, of
vesting in the War Office the executive command of the
troops in Great Britain. The command of these troops
is conferred upon a general officer. All general officers
commanding at home and abroad report to the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, through the Adjutant-
General ; but increased powers are conferred upon them,
and they catty out, on their own responsibility, everything
on which a reference to head-quarters is not absolutely
necessary. The General Officer Commanding-in-ChidF
will inspect the forces, not only in Great Britain and in
Ireland, but also in the Mediterranean. High officials of
the head-quarters staff will no longer take the field on every
opportunity. In the event of a great war, the General
commanding in Great Britain, being originally selected

ADMINISlttATION OF THE WAR OFFICE 137

with that object, would assume command ; his experience,
gained by actually handling troops at manoeuvres, will
enable him to feel and to inspire confidence. The com-
mand of minor expeditions would naturally fall to the
General Officer at Aldershot. The Chief of the Staff of
the Army and a portion of his officers would serve in
larger expeditions, a portion only of his staff in smaller
wars. No other officer would leave the duties of his
appointment, and not only would dislocation of adminis-
tration be prevented, but the promiscuous descent of
unfamiliar officers upon a field army would cease.

In accordance with the German organization, Inspecting-
Generals of Cavalry and of Field Artillery are appointed,
who report direct to the General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief. All appointments and selections up to regimental
commands are made on the recommendation of that
officer, who, conjointly with the Chief of the Staff, recom-
mends the selection of general officers.

2. The Master-General of Ordnance is responsible to the
Secretary of State for manufacture, supply of all kinds,
and for transport. He is responsible for the preparation
of his estimate, which is separately presented to Parliament.
Portions of his great and important duties are grouped
under the Director-General of Artillery. The Master-
General might be provided with a naval assistant, to
facilitate communication with the Admiralty, watch over
naval interests, and avert the misunderstandings which
correspondence frequently creates. The Quartermaster-
General, among other duties, supervises the Army
Service Corps, which will then again take its proper
position in relation to the Army the position allotted
to analogous bodies in every civilised military force, as
well as in our own till the dangerous change recently
introduced. For the same reasons the Army Medical
Department a purely civil body has been transferred
to the department of the Master-General. A permanent

i 5 8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Small Aims Committee, necessary in all respects, is added,
as in Germany.

3* The Chief of the Staff of the Army is responsible for
the " thinking " branch of the administration, to employ
the apt phrase used by General Brackenbury in his evidence
before the Select Committee of the House of Commons.
All reforms in organisation would be considered, if not
initiated, by him. He is further responsible for advice as
to the general standard of defence of all ports, at home
and abroad, and for plans of mobilization. There is a
special section in his department, whose duty lies in
watching over the requirements of the Colonial troops, a
body growing in numbers and efficiency. Their im-
portance seems at present to be under-estimated at the
War Office, where the Intelligence Branch alone appears
to acknowledge their existence. The education of the
Army and the Intelligence Department are under the
Chief of the Staff, and he administers the General Staff.

4. The Permanent Under-Secretary, as the chief of the
bureau of the Secretary of State, is responsible for the
administration of the clerical staff of the office and of the
Chaplains* sub-department. The regulation, distribution
and central registry of correspondence rest with him, and
letters to and from all other State offices pass through his
hands.

5. The Financial Secretary retains his existing duties,
except that the Ordnance Factories and the Director of
Contracts are naturally transferred to the Master-General,
and that the Army Pay Department a purely civil branch,
however it may be recruited is administered by him.
He is responsible for financial order within the War Office,
for audit and account, and for the framing of all .estimates,
except those of the Master-General.

These five principal officers, forming the Secretary of
State's council of advice, will be able to support even a

ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR OFFICE 139

newly-appointed Minister, collectively as regards military
policy, individually by expert knowledge of the needs of
their respective departments. All proceedings and deci-
sions of this council are to be recorded in print. A
decision having been taken and approved by the Secretary
of State, the whole responsibility for carrying it out rests
upon the heads of the departments concerned. The three
military heads each address annual reports to the Secretary
of State, which, if called for, will be presented to Parlia-
ment.

Great questions of Imperial policy arise from time to
time ; many such now require settlement. To meet this
requirement a Council of Imperial Defence, under the
Prime Minister, is provided, with four associated repre-
sentatives of the Admiralty and War Office. Such repre-
sentatives have no vote, no power, and no responsibility
except for advice given. They are added to the Council
in order to bring the Cabinet face to face with professional
opinion. Had such a Council existed in 1884, General
Gordon might have been saved.

The same four officers form a permanent inter-depart-
mental committee, for dealing with minor questions jointly
affecting the Navy and Army. By this means, and by
communication between the Chief of the Staff and the
First Naval Lord, as proposed by Lord Harrington's Com-
mission, ample facilities are provided for the exchange of
opinion between the administrations of the two Services,
Much has been written as to the necessity for planning
" combined operations " between the Navy and Army.
The term has an attractive sound, but, on examination,
proves to have little meaning. In the case of a nation so
circumstanced as ours, little or nothing of value can be
done in this direction. If the Navy and the Army are
alike ready for war, the Imperial needs will be readily met,
and " combined operations," when they become necessary
and possible, can be effectively organised.

i 4 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Correspondence between the five departments of the
War Office is rigidly restricted. Personal conference
replaces futile discussions on paper, which lead only to
verbal misunderstandings, obstruction of business, and
inflation of establishments. All decisions taken by the
Secretary of State are, however, transmitted in writing or
by printed minutes to the head of the department concerned,
thus conferring authority upon him, and distinguishing
that authority from the powers he wields in his own
department. The importance of correspondence, duly
regularised, cannot be overrated, and in order to convert
the War Office into a State administration, capable of
efficiently conducting business, a complete revision of the
existing system is imperatively demanded.

One other vital point remains to be noticed. The
general outlines of the reformed administration, the powers,
responsibilities, and position of the heads of departments,
and the main grouping of business should be laid down by
Act of Parliament. In the future it must be rendered
impossible for a Secretary of State, however w r ell-inten-
tioned, to rear, on his own authority, without the previous
knowledge of Parliament or the country, such a crazy
edifice as that shown in the diagram attached to my letter
of the 1 9th of November. Changes outraging great
principles must not be within the power of a single Minister,
acting on casual and irresponsible advice. On Pfl.t1jfl.tn.ftpt
alone, which contains members perfectly capable of under-
standing matters involving no military technicalities, should
rest the responsibility for organic alterations in War Office
administration.

The outlines of my proposals have now been given.
When the distribution of business and the responsibility
of the heads of departments are fixed, the details can be
filled in by anyone with a grasp of administrative methods.
It will scarcely be asserted that these proposals are not
sufficiently definite, or that they do not constitute a real

ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR OFFICE 141

attempt to remove the intolerable evils which I have
previously described. A tremendous responsibility rests
upon the Secretary of State for War in regard to duties
which, under present ckcumstances, he is impotent to
discharge. I have shown how he can be provided with
advisers, to whom direct responsibility for advice and for
administration can be brought home. At the same time,
the independence of the Minister is made as complete in
practice as Lord Harrington's Committee states that it is
in Constitutional law. Following the general lines laid
down by a Royal Commission, whose report nestles peace-
fully in its pigeon-hole, I have gone further than the
report in the direction of definition of duties, yet not so
far in that of innovation. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman need
not fear that such a Chief of the Staff as is now proposed
can become that War God which his imagination has
pictured.

I am aware of the criticism with which these proposals
will be met. It will be said that the establishment of
co-equal heads of departments would conduce to friction,
thereby implying that officers of the British Army are
incapable of the loyalty to an administration shown by
the Naval Lords of the Admiralty, by civilians of every
degree, and by the military officials of other Powers. It
will be argued that responsibility cannot be dissociated
from complete command of the purse, as if large and small
sums were not alike capable of being well administered.
To the many who proclaim that the Army requires only
more and ever more money, the reply is obvious " First,
produce an efficient army, however small, in return for the
vast sums annually entrusted to you. Then, if it is proved
necessary, and you are proved worthy, the country will
willingly entrust you with more/* The hopeless class of
persons who affect to trace the ills of the Army entirely
to our system of Parliamentary government are beyond
the reach of reason* Must we assume that they prefer a

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

constitution like that of France, which at least has created
an army beyond the wildest dreams of the Second Empire ?

My task is accomplished. Advisedly I have refrained
from touching upon questions of organization or supply
of men. The latter is a question of the labour market,
and when the aggregate yearly waste, the superfluous staffs
and superior officers, and the abuses of the good service
pension list have been abolished, funds will be available
for increase of pay to such portion of the rank and file
as it may be desirable to retain, to leaven the mass of
generally young soldiers. I do not for a moment pretend
that the adoption of the administrative reforms which I
urge would at once provide the nation with a well organized
army, trained and equipped for war. A species of moral
regeneration must first be accomplished. Present habits of
thought and present prejudices must be submerged in a
widespread patriotism, which places the national good
above every personal consideration. It is this sentiment
which lies at the root of the military greatness of Germany.
I do assert, however, in the strongest terms, that no such
regeneration, no efficient and trained army, no economy
of the national resources are possible until the administra-
tion of the War Office has been placed on a sound basis.
Till this work is accomplished no addition to Army Votes
will amend palpable evils, and none should be permitted.

I regret that I have been compelled, as the result of
my investigations, to touch many susceptibilities and arouse
many resentments. This was inevitable. There are times
when patriotism demands that truths, however unpleasant,
shall not be shirked. Effective War Office reform will
never arise from within, and the only lever available is
that of educated public opinion, to which I therefore appeal.

XI
THE WAR IN THE EAST

(" The Speaker," 22 September,

This is one of many articles, of which twenty-five appeared in
1h Tims, in which I dealt with the Sine- Japanese War. In some
quarters, there was a disposition at die time to believe thatthe strategy of
the Japanese was rash, and that the " steam roller," of which we were to
hear twenty years later, would eventually come into operation for their
destruction. I had carefully studied the organization of the Japanese
Navy and Army, and I could not take this view. The War of 1894
is important in its revelation of what an Eastern nation, adopting
the best of the naval and military methods of the West, could
accomplish. It marks the emergence of Japan as a Great Power.
Incidentally, some of the lessons which I attempted to extract from
the War were not learned in this country by 1914.

MODERN civilization has not changed the conditions of
the past or modified the esteem in which physical force is
held. Now, as in the times of the Romans, a nation, to
be accounted great, must prove its capacity for waging
successful war. Italy in 1866, the Second French Empire
in 1854, are recent instances of this law ; and it is to the
credit of reconstructed France that she has so far remained
content with the sense of power. Japan, the one really
progressive Asiatic nation, has taken this lesson of Europe
to heart, and whatever may have been the immediate
causes of the present conflict, the knowledge that the
rights and the sanctions of an independent Power are
conceded only when fighting capacity has been vividly
demonstrated undoubtedly prompted the invasion of Korea.
The demonstration,, in this case has been startling.

143

144 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Neither United Italy in 1866, nor the France of Louis
Napoleon in 1854, was able to give proofs comparably
impressive. Asiatic races have always supplied splendid
raw material. In the simplicity of his wants, in marching
power, and in endurance of physical fatigue, the soldier of
the East is a far superior animal to the best average product
of Germany. In personal gallantry he is at least the equal
of the Western. His military instincts are inherent ; with
us they are largely the result of an education elaborately
calculated to attain its object. A Pathan, a Ghurka, or
a Sudanese Arab has senses which we, with all our
training, cannot evoke in a London-bred youth, still less
in a Dorsetshire ploughboy. Yet, with supreme advan-
tages, the qualities which organized fighting forces require
have generally been wanting in Asiatic armies. Had it
been otherwise, we should not now hold India. With the
swift advance of scientific invention, revolutionizing fight-
ing weapons, the disabilities of the Eastern seemed to be
relatively increased. The whole of the modern science of
war appeared to be beyond his reach. He might provide
himself with European armaments ; but his ideas of army
administration and the manipulation of large bodies of
men in the field must, it has been imagined, remain nearly
as they were in the times of Alexander. An army is, after
all, the reflex of a nation, and, as Von Moltke pointed out,
it is the qualities of Germany as a State which have made
her army the most formidable fighting force which has
yet been created. The whole constitution of Asiatic
peoples, their forms of government, and even their social
conditions, have militated against their naval or military
strength in the modern sense. If, however, an Eastern
State should be able to organize itself on European models,
and, availing itself of the splendid raw material, ready to
hand, to create fighting forces as flexible yet as solid, as
divisible yet as capable of combined action, as responsive
to supreme direction yet as self-contained in its units as

THE WAR IN THE EAST 145

a European national force, a new and formidable factor
would evidently arise.

This is what Japan seems to have accomplished ; herein
lies the lesson of the Battles of Ping-Yang and the Yalu.
Even those who have had special opportunities for watching
the development of the new army and navy of this pheno-
menal nation must feel surprise at the consummate skill
with which the Korean campaign has, so far, been con-
ducted. There were ample opportunities for blunders
just the kind of opportunities which an Eastern people
might have been expected to take. Nevertheless, the bold-
ness and the prudence, the strategic plan of campaign and
the tactical execution, are alike admirable.

Realizing, as most Englishmen fail to do, the meaning
of the command of the sea, the Japanese have employed
their navy with absolute wisdom. Instead of uselessly
knocking their heads against Captain Von Hannecken's
coast defences, they have contrived to keep every Chinese
port in a state of alarm, and to promote the building of
more fortifications which will be of no value whatever.
When at last a Chinese squadron came out of port, they
attacked it without hesitation.

Meanwhile, with perfect correctness, they recognised
that to strike a crushing blow in Korea itself was the first
great object, and, availing themselves of the effective menace
of their navy, they quietly poured troops into the peninsula.
Imagination pictured innumerable Chinese forces sweeping
down from Manchuria with a view to overwhelm the
defenders of a position in front of Seoul. Victory after
victory was duly reported at Pekin as each small outpost
affair occurred. The immense difficulties of movement
which confronted the Chinese leaders were insufficiently
realized. The latter, probably finding onward progress
impracticable, occupied and fortified the position of Ping-
Yang, hoping for reinforcements, and perhaps counting
on a front attack. Upon Ping-Yang, therefore, three Jap-

i 4 6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

anese columns quietly converged. Greatly superior forces,
and the extreme probability that the Chinamen would
merely await attack, reduced the risks of the operation.
About the i3th September, communication must have been
established with the columns which had moved across
the mountains from Gensan, the other two forces being
comparatively close. The process of distributing the
forces could then be undertaken; and on the i5th the
Chinese were engaged in front, in order to draw off their
attention. Before dawn on the i6th all was ready, and
the combined attack was delivered by which the Chinese
were taken in flank and rear and utterly routed. The
Japanese appear to have instantly launched a force along
the route to Manchuria to overtake any escaped Chinese,
to disperse any fresh forces on their way to Ping-Yang,
and (so it is stated) to seize the northern passes, though a
fresh Chinese advance this year appears out of the question.
The whole operations could not have been better done ;
and the fact that the actual victory was an easy one in no
way detracts from the merits of the Japanese leaders, their
staff arrangements, or the gallantry of the troops. Com-
pared with Ping- Yang, Tel-el-Kebir was an unscientific
operation.

Details of the great naval action off the mouth of the
Yalu river are still wanting, and some of the bare facts
remain in dispute. Here, again, however, we are directly
confronted with the new phenomenon. The navies of
both China and Japan have been mainly built and armed
in Europe. British officers have played an important part
in their training. Their armaments contain guns of the
ktest type one of the Japanese cruisers being, in this
respect, in advance of any other vessel in the world. That
the sailors of both nations would fight magnificently under
favourable conditions was certain ; that they the Japanese
especially would prove capable of handling their com-
plicated weapons was confidently believed. That either

THE WAR IN THE EAST 147

would have shown a complete grasp of the principles of
naval war might, however, have been doubted. An
Asiatic, it might be imagined, will provide himself with
the best modern weapons ; but his want of organization,
and of discipline in the higher sense, will always pre-
vent bitn from employing them to the best advantage.

It has not so proved. The Chinese, indeed, with a
considerably superior fleet, containing four powerful
armour-clads, utterly failed to use it when the demonstra-
tion of its power would have been decisive. Remaining
within their fortified ports, they permitted the Japanese to
pour troops at will into Korea. Goaded at length into
action, the Chinese naval commanders conceived nothing
better than to attempt to convoy troops to the extreme
north-west angle of the peninsula, thus making a mere
indirect use of their superior force. Not so the Japanese.
Though busied with the transport and supply of the large
force in Korea, they seem to have been perfectly alive to
the possibility of this movement. Collecting all their
available ships, they seem to have struck straight at the
Chinese squadron, catching it off a lee shore before the
disembarkation was complete, ignoring the boasted armour-
clads, and compelling it to fight. Again, nothing could
possibly have been better. It is too soon fully to estimate
the results of this first great encounter of modern ships ;
but it is at least certain that four Chinese vessels have been
sunk or burned, and the prestige seems unquestionably to
remain with the Japanese, who will be able quickly to
repair damages, and are certain to attack again if their
enemy allows them the opportunity. The sea-fight will
teach many lessons when its details come to be known ;
for, under such circumstances, the fierce fighting instincts
of the Asiatic would be aroused, and he would endure
unflinchingly a trial which might prove too severe for the
more delicate nerves of Western nations.

What would have seemed wholly impossible fifty years

148 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

ago has thus been accomplished. An Asiatic nation has
shown the power of organizing a navy and an army on
the most approved models, of equipping it with the best
weapons, of framing and consistently pursuing an excellent
strategical plan, and, finally, of securing well-deserved
success.

An island people of whom this can be said, who can
handle and fight a fleet as well as an army, and who occupy
one of the most important strategical points of the
world, may go far, if some strain of Oriental weakness
does not betray itself if, that is to say, the structure of
the nation is firmly wrought. The European Powers will
have to take Japan very seriously, and the Treaties which
seemed merely somewhat out of date last week now appear
supremely ridiculous. It is extremely satisfactory that the
important step taken by Lord Kimberley preceded the
demonstration of the fighting capacity of Japan.

XII
OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

(" Fortnightly Review" I November,

The military expeditions of 1882, 1884 and 1885, of which I
saw something from the inside, brought home to me the total unfitness
of our military system to provide for its most probable needs, in
spite of the large nominal total of troops maintained at great expense.
Out of more than 530,000 armed men at home, we could not, in 1882,
provide 32,000 without makeshifts of all kinds, disorganizing the
system. Lord Wolselev and other high authorities drew attention
to this outstanding disability. We were not organized even for small
wars. This article was one of a number of efforts at this period to
lay down definite objects to which organization could be directed.
If the field forces here suggested had been in being in 1899, the
course of the South African War might have been different. In
the Memorandum of 31 January, 1906, which I laid before Mr.
Haldane, I proposed that the Expeditionary Force held ready for
embarkation should consist of six enlarged divisions, the com*
position of which was detailed, and three Cavalry Brigades, This
provision had happily been made before August, 1914.

THE military problem which confronted Prussia after Jena
was simple in its essence. To train the maximum number
of men in the shortest time and with the least expense ;
to organize masses with a view to their being rapidly
placed on a war footing, becoming at once a fully equipped
and effective field army ; to provide the means of reinforc-
ing units in the field and also of forming reserve units to
be brought forward if the occasion demanded such were
the conditions of the problem. It was ultimately solved
by sternly applying the following principles throughout
the fabric of die German nation :

149

1 50 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

1. Universal service, 1

2. Short colour service, followed by a period on leave
with annual training, and a further period in a great
territorial militia.

3. Territorial recruitment and organization.

4. A completely decentralized administration.

With modifications in detail the above are the character-
istic features of the modern European system, which
provides Germany with a standing army of about 590,000
men, capable of being brought up to a war strength con-
siderably exceeding 3,000,000 trained and organized troops.
Such a system enables a small and poor state like Switzer-
land to place in the field at short notice an effective militia
army of more than 200,000 men, backed by an available
levy of 250,000 men, who could in a short time take their
places in the ranks. Such a system fulfils the military
requirements of the European Powers, each of which in
war may be invaded, or must invade, across its land frontier.
To all alike territorial security at home is the first essential.
France alone is compelled to maintain a considerable force
over-sea, and to contemplate the possibility of attack upon
her outlying possessions. 2

If the principles of the German system above defined
are examined, it will be evident that a constant supply of
men physically fit is assured by the first ; that the second
ensures a complete initial training supplemented by
periodical exercises which prevent the soldier from losing
his military efficiency ; anid that the third and fourth are
essential to rapid and orderly mobilization. Whether a
force composed of troops who have had little over two
years of colour training will prove to be as solid as the

1 This is frequently confounded with " conscription," which ex-
presses a somewhat different idea.

2 The African adventures of Italy are not likely to become a per-
manent element of her policy, and the loss of over-sea possessions
would entail no real disadvantage upon Germany.

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 151

old armies of Europe may be doubted* There were, even
on the German side, in the war of 1870-71, some ugly
symptoms. On the other hand, this possible lack of
solidarity is now common to most armies, and at least
the Continental system brings into the ranks the pick of
the physical and intellectual vigour of a nation by which
its shortcomings may be mitigated.

The guiding spirit of the organic changes introduced
into the British Army in 1872 was undoubtedly caught
from Germany. Short service had proved capable of
turning out masses of trained and highly organized men.
In a modified form it must surely suit our requirements !
In following a principle crowned with startling successes
we could not be wrong. The training of the German
army was carried out by the service units* By revolution-
izing the old regimental system, and linking together
battalions, each half unit could supply the other half when
serving abroad. By tracing recruiting areas, and building
depdt centres, a ^^/-territorial organization could be
created to which the old constitutional force of Militia
and the new force of Volunteers might be affiliated. The
German Army Corps had proved a convenient subdivision
of a huge field force ; it might be naturalized in this
country. These were, perhaps, the leading ideas in the
minds of the framers of the new military system which
was inaugurated by a chorus of praise and of blame, alike
discordant and indiscriminating.

In the twenty-five years which have since ekpsed the
Army has made marked progress in all directions ; but
this progress is largely independent of the system, which
possesses inherent defects quickly realized and increasingly
serious. Neither in 1 872, nor since, was there any attempt
, to define the requirements of the Empire. The system
had thus no sure foundation, and was the result of a
mistaken analogy. The military needs of the European

i 5 2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Powers differ radically from our own, and the merits of
the Continental organization arise from conditions which
we have not adopted and cannot adopt. It was not short
service which gave pre-eminence to the German arms, but
a far-reaching machinery which actuated the whole social
structure of the nation. Out of the four principles above
defined we have selected for adoption only a portion of
the second. We have not established universal service ;
we do not train our reservists or pass them into a militia ;
our Army has not been, and cannot be, rendered territorial
in the German sense; decentralisation remains to be
achieved. We have, in fact, taken a small portion of the
German machine, and, having surrounded it with an
incongruous assemblage of working parts, we vainly expect
smooth and effective action.

The practical results of what Sir H. Havelock-Allan
styles our " fatal system " x may be briefly described. It
maintains with growing difficulty a force of 73,200 men
in India, and 37,500 men in the Colonies and Egypt.
The 110,700 troops thus provided are probably as efficient
as any equal force in the world; but the garrisons of
most of our colonial stations are necessarily deprived of
all except formal training. Whether the quality of the
drafts annually sent to India is such that the men at once
take their places as effective soldiers, and whether the
present method of supply is economical, the military
authorities in that country are well able to decide. In
any case the system broke down absolutely from the
moment that the number of infantry battalions abroad
began to exceed those at home, and makeshift arrangements
were thenceforth necessary. It may be said that the system
was based upon the theory that equality between the
battalions at home and abroad would always be preserved,
and that by raising new battalions the machinery could
again be made to move. This, however, presumes that
l F0rfntg6tty Revtw, July, 1897.

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 153

the establishment strength of the Atmy is to depend upon
the exigencies of the system a view which will certainly
not receive general acceptance. Since the inauguration
of the changes of 1872 about 2,600,000 square miles of
the earth's surface have been brought under the flag. 1
Great Britain has become responsible for order in Egypt,
and will soon have vast territories in the Sudan virtually
under her protectorate. By what right was it assumed
that the strength of the forces required to be maintained
abroad was fixed and unvarying ? Was it supposed that
the expansion of the Empire had ended, or that the national
policy would henceforth be made subservient to the new
military system?

If, however, by arresting imperial progress or by creating
new units whenever fresh responsibilities were accepted,
the equality between the home and foreign battalions had
been maintained, the military position of Great Britain
would have been none the less deplorable. It is the very
essence of the <c fatal system " that the home army a should
be converted into a huge depot for the forces abroad.
The linked battalion at home, recruited from immature
boys, and annually depleted of its grown and trained men,
ceased to be a fighting unit. "The line battalion in
England which has a linked battalion abroad is unfit in
every way to go into the field," and resembles " a lemon
when all the juice is squeezed out of it/' " Not a single
infantry battalion at home is effective." " If we had to
send a force on service now we could not send any regi-
ments of the First Army Corps. We have never been
able " to do so, " and I do not think we ever shall."
These are the deliberate opinions of the most experienced
officers of the Army given with a full sense of responsi-
bility, and based upon unrivalled knowledge. Even,
therefore, if at great cost, a temporary equilibrium between

1 Lord Rosebery, at Edinburgh, 9th October, 1896.

2 With the exception, until this year (1897), of the Brigade of Guards.

154 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

battalions at home and abroad should be established
" an equilibrium which . . . can never be depended upon,
because it is always liable to be disturbed by the never-
ceasing contingencies occurring in our colonies and pro-
tectorates " * the country would remain without any field
army ready for embarkation. Such being the results of a
system established without any regard to national require-
ments, the all-prevailing disquietude which led to the
unanimous protest of the service members of the House
of Commons is abundantly justified.

On the other hand, that system has created a body of
reservists who have served three, seven, or eight years
with the colours, and this may fairly be regarded as a
definite gain. These reservists are, however, not periodic-
ally trained, do not, as in Germany, keep touch with their
regiments, and may be called upon to serve with any unit
of their special arm. This is not a Reserve in the German
or in any real sense ; but, as the Commander-in-Chief has
most justly stated, it is " as regards efficiency . . . some-
thing of a sham."

And further, the Continental reservist knows that he
will be called to the ranks only in case of great national
emergency, failing which and subject to such time as he
must give to refresh his military knowledge, his position
in civil life is secure. If the sham reservist is liable to be
called up for small wars, his means of gaining a living
are imperilled, and even without this disability men who
quit the Army at twenty-five frequently find the struggle
for existence sufficiently distressing. The creation of our
Army Reserve is thus a gain which requires to be heavily
discounted. It does not satisfy our most probable military
requirement ; it is not suited to the economic conditions
of the country. The normal service exacted from the
soldier is too short or too long too short to attract him

^Military Qrgamsytion. Field-Marshal Sk lintorn
G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 155

to the Army as a profession, too long to permit httn easily
to regain his place among civil workers.

Even if additional battalions are created in order to
restore the number of units at home and abroad to tem-
porary equality, every line infantry unit at home will still
be " unfit in every way to go into the field/* It follows,
therefore, that there can never be a force at home ready
for the needs which may any day arise, and that, for the
purposes of a small war, battalions must be hastily filled
up by drafts from others which will then practically cease
to exist, 1 or the Reserves must be called up. Either
process violates every principle of sound organisation.
The one is destructive of regimental efficiency and of the
territorial element ; the other involves the employment of
the Reserve for purposes for which it was not intended,
and tends to make the Army unpopular. Moreover, since
the home battalions, contain on an average only about
300 privates above twenty years of age, and with more
than one year's service, 2 each would, in order to take the
field, require 600 men from the Reserves men who, unlike
the Germans, would, to a great extent, have lost touch of
their regiment, and who would not readily fall under the
control of young and unfamiliar non-commissioned officers.

For the Egyptian expedition of 1 882 the following forces
were embarked : 3

From England 14,5*0

Reserves . . . 4*362
Mediterranean . . . .7,558
India 5*863

Total . . . 32,303

1 As Sir H. Havelock-AUan has pointed out, 189 men and 272
horses had to be obtained from other units to render 3 field batteries
effective for service in South Africa. If the process had been carried
further, the force of field artillery at home would have been tempor-
arily destroyed. 2 Military Orgamsytfion.

8 Parliamentary Ejeturns, loth March, 1883, called for by the late Sit
W. Barttelot.

156 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Both processes were, therefore, employed on this
occasion, and in order to enable only 18,882 men to be
despatched from England, 11,649 reservists were called
out and 10,593 actually joined the colours. The only
complete units were, therefore, sent into the field from the
Mediterranean and India, and those from the former station
could have received no real tactical training. The strain
upon the system entailed by the provision, without any
real hurry, of an expeditionary force of 18,882 men from
Great Britain cannot be regarded as excessive; but it
could only be met by a large call upon Reserves created
for the purpose of a great war.

While there are in this country more than 5 30,000 armed
and drilled men a total never before equalled in time of
peace we have no available Field Army ; since, for the
reasons stated, the Reserves might bring up the depleted
battalions at home to their proper strength of able-bodied
combatants, but could not, as in Germany, immediately
amalgamate with the young soldiers so as to form a fully
effective fighting unit. The mobilized battalions would
be swamped by men who had, to a great extent, lost touch
of the Aimy, and time would be needed for the process
of consolidation.

The neglect to recognize the vital necessity for the
provision of a field force always ready for instant embarka-
tion may be traced to several causes. The decadence of
the Army after 1815 created a belief that a purely defensive
policy had become inevitable. The Duke of Wellington,
in his memorable letter of 9 January, 1847, to Sir John
Burgoyne, seems to have regarded security at home as
the only military object which he could then hope to attain.
The Royal Commission of 1859, by laying down the
astonishing proposition that an island State was more
liable to invasion than one blessed with land frontiers,
succeeded in diverting attention from the proper duties of
the Army the duties which throughout our long history

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 157

the Army has invariably discharged and sought to impose
on our military forces functions which have always belonged
to the Navy. Meanwhile, science offered in rich profusion
the weapons of passive defence costly luxuries of fourth-
rate importance to the British Empire, but attractive by
reason of their technical perfections. It naturally resulted
that offensive power, the real military requirement, dropped
out of consideration, and that what Mr. Kipling finely
calls " our far-flung battle-line " was ignored. Absorbed
in fortifying ourselves on a scale which is not required if
the Navy is adequate, and will prove absolutely delusive
if the command of the sea is lost, we forgot to prepare to
strike. Thus the growth of sedentary forces and of
expenditure upon the multifarious demands of passive
defence has been a marked feature in recent years, and has
directly tended towards the dangerous enfeeblement of our
mobile Army. 1

Nevertheless, with strange inconsistency, we have ac-
cepted the dictates of a forward policy in matters Imperial.
New responsibilities are being incurred in various parts of
the world which may at any time make heavy demands
upon our military strength. Such demands will without
doubt take the form of mobile forces, not sedentary troops
or fortifications. On these grounds, as on all others, the
present system stands condemned as inadequate and un-
suitable. The most pressing military requirement is the
provision of a field force ready at all times for embarkation.

The great difficulty which has beset our military reforms
in the past, which still baffles the many earnest thinkers of
the Army, and which confers unreality upon our too copious
discussions and controversies, can be directly traced to the
fact that the national requirements have never been defined
by authority. We vainly beat the air. Having no ascer-

1 While this year (1897) adding about 3,000 men to our deficient
infantry force and a solitary battery to our scanty field artillery, we
have increased the garrison artillery by no less than 3,600 men.

i 5 8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

tained object at which to aim, we attack the problem in
piece-meal fashion, argue in vicious circles, and uselessly
criticize or formulate vague demands in accordance with
our individual predilections. The process is alike futile
and undignified.

To frame an organisation suited to the national needs
is no easy task ; but it is at least possible to define these
needs with tolerable accuracy. Here in brief are the
objects which might be placed before our many military
reformers :

i. The maintenance in India and the Colonies of a force
consisting, as at present, of

Cavalry ..... 12 regiments,

Infantry ..... 73 battalions.

2. The maintenance at home in immediate readiness for
embarkation of a field force of about 40,000 men, includ-
ing

Cavalry ..... 3 regiments,
Artillery ..... 20 batteries,
Infantry ..... 30 battalions ;

with a due proportion of Engineers and departmental
corps. Considering that there are at home *

Cavalry . . *9 regiments,

Artillery . . -59 batteries,

Infantry . . -75 battalions,

Engineers . . - 45 troops and companies,

the above provision appears sufficiently moderate.

3. The provision of a field force to reinforce the army
abroad and for home defence, capable of being fully

1 Or will be when the recent augmentations are completed.

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 159

mobilised in a week and consisting of twelve divisions,
and four cavalry brigades.

Of existing establishments there remain, after providing
for i and 2

Regular troops .

'Cavalry . .16 regiments.
Artillery . -39 batteries.
Infantry . . 45 battalions.

Reserves . . 78,000 men.
Yeomanry ..... 11,800
Militia Infantry .... 112,300

The only arm deficient is field artillery, which could be
made up by militia batteries.

4. The provision of sedentary garrisons for naval ports
and fortified harbours. For this service there are 9,300
regular (garrison) artillery, 18,500 militia artillery, 47,724
volunteer artillery, and 198,000 volunteer infantry. There
is, therefore, an available force enormously exceeding the
requirements of the sedentary garrisons and capable, after
two months* training, of supplementing the field army.

In the above rough sketch the armed forces of Great
Britain are grouped under four heads, corresponding to
the initial requirements on the outbreak of war. In addi-
tion to the troops abroad a strong field force is provided,
complete with commanders and staff, ready at all times
for embarkation, and capable of acting over-sea in the
event of a great war, fulfilling the demands of a small war,
or of supplying a temporary increase to the foreign
garrisons. Behind this there would be a considerable
field army composed of regulars and militia, capable of
being rapidly mobilised by divisions each in its military
district. A divisional organization is preferred as begin
far less cumbrous and better suited to our requirements
than the Army corps, which, in the German sense, never
has existed and never will exist in this country. The
sedentary force would be supplied mainly by militia and

160 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

volunteer artillery, and by volunteer infantry, who might
be strictly localized. Provided that a few guns at each
defended port are always held ready for action, the bulk
of the armaments can with economy and advantage be
manned by local militia trained each year and on the spot
to their use. The greatest of our alarmists will hardly
assert that, with our present naval strength in home waters,
the ports of the United Kingdom can be attacked by a
battle-ship squadron at the outset of war.

The above fairly represents a basis on which a military
system might be framed. It may be faulty, in which case
let some other statement be presented. In one respect
only is it beyond cavil. There are at least four parts of
the world to any one of which it may be vitally necessary
to despatch an effective expeditionary force at short notice. 1
The knowledge that such a force stood ready at all times
would exert a powerful influence in favour of peace, and
would create throughout the country a feeling of confidence,
now lacking, in our military preparations. At the same
time the requirements of any small war would be fully
met. It is the greatest of the many defects of the present
system that, out of 110,000 regular troops at home, not a
single effective artillery or line infantry unit is forthcoming
in normal circumstances. Any examination of our nominal
numerical strength and of the number of our cadres serves
to reveal an astonishing disproportion between apparent
military resources and the forces available to meet our
war requirements. This can only be due to the fact that
those requirements were not ascertained as the indispensable
preliminary to the creation of a " system."

I do not admit, with Sk H. Havelock-Allan, that we are
" deficient " in " brains to organise " the large military
force at our disposal. There is plenty of available brain-
power in the Army, which vainly expends itself in attempt-

1 This was written before the outbreak on the Indian frontier,
which supplies a warning of possible demands.

OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 161

ing to solve an indeterminate equation. I do not for a
moment underrate the difficulties ; but I assert that it is
possible to create an organization which will satisfy our
requirements as soon as these requirements have been
defined by authority. The cause of the present deplorable
unreadiness for war is to be sought not in the House of
Commons, which freely grants funds shown to be needed ;
not in the Treasury, which exercises no real control over
gross estimates ; not in the Army, which is keenly anxious
to attain full efficiency; but in the fact that successive
Governments have failed to supply the data essential to
the framing of any system of military organization.

M

XIII
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

(" Ik Tims," 15 Augtst, 1898.)

This, the last of a series of articles, was intended as a brief sketch
of the events and general lessons of one of the shortest of wars in
which the naval factor was dominant. Between the manifold short-
comings of the American War Department in 1898 and the wonderful
achievement of 1917, the contrast is startling. I was asked by
the Naval Institute at Annapolis to write a review of the naval aspects
of this War, which, as a soldier, I esteemed a high honour. In
the Proceedings of the Institute, and in Brassey's Naval Annual
(1899), I tried to treat the subject in full detail, which was not possible
m a

WHEN, on 2ist April, war between the United States and
Spain was declared, few persons were so sanguine as to
believe that it would be brought to a conclusion in less
than four months. The task with which the Americans
were confronted to enforce the evacuation of Cuba-
appeared to be encompassed by difficulties. The climate,
the want of internal communications in the island, the
Spanish garrison of about 110,000 regular troops, and the
unreadiness of the United States to undertake military
operations oversea, were formidable facts which seemed
to point to the probability of a long resistance. It was
absolutely certain that the enormous resources of the
United States must ultimately crush their antagonist, but
a year was not regarded as an excessive estimate of the
time required to bring those resources to bear upon the
operations of war.

162

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 163

That the war has been speedily brought to an end is
due primarily to a single cause the naval collapse of
Spain. Sea power has again triumphantly asserted its
dominant influence. On paper the Spanish navy was a
fine force. Though relatively weak in battleships, it was
strong in modern armoured cruisers, from which much
was expected. The glamour of these cruisers lasted for
a few weeks. It sufficed to create great uneasiness on the
Eastern seaboard of the United States and to lead to
measures which, as was pointed out, were superfluous if
not ridiculous.

After a few weeks of war, the hopeless defects of the
Spanish navy became plainly visible. The squadron in
the Far East was not a serious fighting force, and the only
redeeming feature on the Spanish side in the action of
Manila was the gallantry of the personnel. The ships were
utterly unfitted to oppose a modern squadron, and even
if the state of the fleet in home waters had permitted an
effective reinforcement to be sent to the Philippines, it
was too late. The Cape Verde squadron, of which much
was expected, proved to be deficient in every essential
respect. It was unprepared for war; its engine-room
staffs were incompetent; financial and other consider-
ations rendered an adequate coal supply impossible. With
difficulty Admiral Cervera crossed the Atlantic to meet
with greater difficulties, and, after being credited in some
quarters with a profound strategic purpose which never
existed, he sought shelter and at the same time courted
destruction at Santiago.

The naval game was then played out, and a new objective
presented itself to the United States. The capture of
Havana was a task, for the moment, quite beyond their
powers. To take Santiago was a far easier operation. If
successful, it would evidently demonstrate to the Govern-
ment of Madrid that naval action in the West Indies was
at an end, while the moral effect of the capture of a large

164 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Spanish garrison would necessarily be considerable.
Whether Admiral Cervera decided to remain in harbour
and assist in the defence, following the precedent of the
Russian fleet at Sebastopol, or to make a dash for freedom,
the issue was predetermined. Only speed and a place
of refuge at a moderate distance could have saved the
squadron ; neither existed. The sea speed of the Spanish
cruisers did not approach that which they professed ; in
the cramped harbour of Puerto Rico Admiral Cervera
would have been less secure than at Santiago.

In the Far East, the naval situation was cleared by the
wholesale destruction of Admiral Montojo's force; in
the West Indies, as soon as Admiral Cervera permitted
himself to be blockaded at Santiago, the command of the
sea ceased to be in doubt. In both cases, therefore, the
way was open to the employment of military force. The
United States navy had accomplished its task, not by
futile bombardments of indifferently fortified coast towns,
but by the assertion of its supremacy on its own element.
At San Francisco and at Tampa, therefore, military expe-
ditions embarked to undertake operations of precisely the
same nature as those carried out by the Romans against
Carthage or Syracuse. The vigour shown by the United
States naval authorities, and the high qualities of the
naval officers qualities inherited from the mother State
sufficed to counteract the effects of unreadiness. The
strain thrown upon the American navy was not serious ;
but the way in which large numbers of warships and
auxiliaries were rapidly equipped and manned, together
with the conspicuous ability with which a great naval
force, largely extemporized, was handled and supplied, is
extremely significant. The inherited aptitude of the
American people for maritime operations has been
strikingly asserted.

Of the military measures it is not possible to speak in
the same terms. The task of the Washington authorities

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 165

was difficult and quite unfamiliar ; but organising power
in abundance is possessed by the American people, and
money was poured out like water. There was, however,
previous evidence that the War Department was badly
constituted, largely monopolized by civilians, and ruled
on political principles. The causes of its failure to rise
to the emergency are not yet fully known and it will be
interesting to see whether the American people demand
an investigation. The fact remains that the expedition to
Santiago was ill-equipped, ill-provided with transport and
artillery, and lamentably deficient in essential require-
ments. The parallel of our own expedition to the Crimea
irresistibly suggested itself. Before Santiago, as before
Sebastopol, unnecessary sufferings and hardships were
inflicted upon the troops, and in both cases disaster was
averted by the gallantry of the regimental officers and of
the rank and file.

It is perhaps too soon to attempt to deduce the lessons
of the war. Those lessons are not and could not be
what was generally expected. From each new experience
some surprise is looked for ; yet, except in matters of pure
detail, the invariable result of successive modern wars is
to reaffirm the old lessons of the past. The modern ship
and the modern armaments have revolutionised nothing.
Now, as in the days of Queen Elizabeth, the gun is the
decisive weapon in naval war and superior gunnery confers
now, as then, unquestionable advantages. Accuracy and
speed of fire are the main factors. The limitations of the
modern warship are, on the whole, greater than those of
her sailing prototype, as the proceedings of Admiral
Cervera's hapless squadron show. Efficiency of pro-
pulsion is now, as ever, important ; but it now depends
upon engine-room complements. Naval bombardments
of coast defences are probably less effective than in Nelson's
days. That they have been recently attempted on a con-
siderable scale is probably due rather to the desirability of

166 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

giving the American seamen gunners practice, than to any
special predilection on the part of American naval officers.
On the other hand, it is clear that the command of the sea
is now more than ever important, because it can be far
more quickly turned to account. If, after Admiral Dewey's
action in Manila Bay, sailing transports only had been
available to convey troops to the Philippines, many months
would have passed before military force could have been
brought to bear. Naval victories can now, therefore, be
followed up with a promptitude formerly impossible,
provided that military preparations are organized in
advance. The ancient lesson of the fatal results of un-
readiness for war has been demonstrated afresh by the
collapse of Spain, and the close connection between the
political and moral conditions of a nation and its naval
and military efficiency has been strikingly reaffirmed. The
technical deficiencies of the Spanish navy have not been
more marked than the incapacity of the Government for
the conduct of naval war. The numerous writers who
reckon the fighting capacity of navies by counting up the
number of ships, and who estimate the powers of ships
by their legend qualifications may perhaps be led to see
that other considerations of much importance are involved
in sea-power.

Turning to details, there are some points in Admiral
Sampson's report published last week which are worth
noticing. The New York, we learn, "received the un-
divided fire from the forts in passing the harbour entrance."
These forts were said to have been destroyed on several
previous occasions. The Cristobal Colon, with her nom-
inal 19*5 knot speed at natural draught, secured a six-mile
start of her pursuers ; but in spite of her watertube boilers
" her spurt " was quickly " finished." " It was evident
from the bridge that all the American ships " Brooklyn,
Oregon, Texas, Vixen, and New York "were gradually
overhauling die chase/' The fact that the Oregon ulti-

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 167

mately showed better speed than the other American
battleships was doubtless due to her long voyage from
the Pacific, which had provided a thorough training for
her engine-room staff. Sea training thus proved its in-
trinsic value. To save the Colon from sinking in deep
water she was pushed on shore by the New York, this
somewhat delicate operation being performed with " ad-
mirable judgment " by Captain Chadwick, the well-known
late Naval Attach^ of the United States Embassy in
London. The Maria Teresa and Oquendo seem to have
been set on fire in fifteen minutes, and the experience of
the action of the Yalu was thus fully confirmed. It is
clear that easily combustible materials must be removed
from warships. The American ships used common shell
almost exclusively, and the destruction on board the
Spanish vessels was mainly due to the medium and
smaller projectiles. Whether by reason of their relatively
slower rate of fire, or from some other cause, the heavy
guns of the battleships disappointed expectation. This
is a repetition of the experience of the battle of the Yalu.
The Spanish gunnery afloat, as on shore, was most in-
different, and, as Admiral Sampson intimates, his ships
obtained the mastery from the beginning of the action.
This rather than their armour protection conferred upon
them relative immunity, and Admiral Farragut's opinion
that effective fire is the best form of defence received fresh
confirmation. Modern armaments enable an overpower-
ing fire to be delivered, and by superior skill and coolness
it is possible in a few minutes so to demoralise an opponent
that the advantage once gained may prove decisive. This
also is a venerable lesson ; but in this country and else-
where the spurious prestige attaching to the torpedo has
perhaps tended to induce neglect of naval gunnery.

If the brief war now ended has produced no startling
developments, its results will be necessarily far-reaching.
The greatly overrated power of Spain was shattered by

i68 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the English Navy at the end of the sixteenth century and
the way to English expansion was opened out. Three
hundred years later the last remnants of the Spanish
Empire have been obliterated by the great offshoot of
the Anglo-Saxon race established in the New World.
The oversea expansion of the United States has now
begun, and the significance of the new departure in
American politics is as yet only dimly perceived. On the
other hand it is widely recognized that the attitude of the
mother country at a critical period has been supremely
advantageous to the American cause, and, ^although
political memories are proverbially short, this important
fact cannot be altogether forgotten.

XIV
THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE

(" Nineteenth Centwy" Augut, 1899.)

The strength of the Navy had been allowed to decline to a dangerous
extent when Lord Salisbury's Government, after a prolonged cam-
paign in the Press in which I took part, decided by the Naval Defence
Act of 1889 to restore the situation. The result was a sudden revival
of war shipbuilding, unprecedented in peace time. This and
Captain (Afterwards Rear-Admiral) A, T. Mahan's admirable books,
which quickly followed, gave a general impetus to naval competition
leading to developments which, in some cases, seemed ill-conceived.
In this article, I attempted briefly to trace the evolution of sea power
and to show that it had become subject to certain limitations. How
far this analysis was justified or discredited by the experience of the
Great War, the reader will judge. Some of the anticipations of the
general advantages to be derived from naval strength, which were
cherished between 1889 and 1899, could only lead to disappointment
and wasteful expenditure, as has happened.

THE strength of the navy of England has at all times been
the gauge of her territorial security and of her position
among nations. Every great war at once made heavy
demands upon the navy, and success turned upon the
measure of sea power which Great Britain was able to
exert Nevertheless, the plain lesson that the maintenance
of a sufficient fleet in time of peace was a primary duty of
Parliament and the only effective guarantee against
national disaster, came to be forgotten. The great navy
which won and held the dominion of the seas during the
long struggle ending in 1815 was permitted to dwindle
to a peace strength which left no adequate margin* The
concentration of public interest upon the military oper-

i 7 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

ations in the Crimea, and the failure of the Baltic fleet to
accomplish tasks which do not belong to navies, served
effectually to promote illusion.

In the general naval reconstruction which followed
the Russian War no attempt was made to fix a reasonable
standard of strength adjusted to national requirements.
While. British interests upon and across the seas were
increasing yearly by leaps and bounds, the territorial
defence of these islands by fortifications and auxiliary forces
came to be regarded as a primary object. Lavish expen-
diture upon passive defence naturally produced neglect
alike of the navy and the field army. Even the war scare
of 1878 produced as its principal result a fresh instalment
of passive defence, and the grave warning sounded by the
kte Lord Carnarvon's Commission was forgotten in the
discussion of new projects of fortification. Thus during
many years the Empire practically existed on sufferance,
courting enormous losses and perhaps irretrievable dis-
aster. The strenuous efforts of a few writers, whose
appeals to history and to common sense were afterwards
powerfully reinforced by Captain Mahan's admirable books,
effected a veritable revolution. It was quickly discovered
that naval expenditure was popular, and successive
Governments vied in increasing the fleet. A rough
standard of naval strength was authoritatively laid down,
and shipbuilding programmes were pressed forward with
unwonted energy. Since Colbert, in 1662, set about the
reconstruction of the wasted navy of France, there has
never been, in time of peace, a naval revival so thoroughly
undertaken or so technically successful as that which
Great Britain has accomplished in the last ten years. As
remarkable has been the uprising of a strong Imperial
sentiment, of which the regenerated fleet is alike an exciting
cause and a fitting symbol.

This sudden national awakening, however, has had
results which were not wholly anticipated. The European

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE 171

Chancelleries began to recall with uneasiness the days in
which Great Britain, with a population of eighteen millions
and with colonies able to bring little except " opportunity
of ports " to aid the national cause, faced the Continent in
arms. We are never weary of laying stress upon our
peculiarly unaggressive national character while steadily
adding to our territorial possessions ; but foreigners who
study history may well be incredulous. It was inevitable
that our great naval revival should appear in the guise of
a portent, and that we should thus have supplied a powerful
incentive to naval competition. If Great Britain had
preserved any continuity of naval policy, that competi-
tion would perhaps never have attained its present dimen-
sions. The suddenness of our resolve endowed it with
special significance.

Six Powers are now busily engaged in adding to their
fleets, and while one of them Italy already feels the
strain severely, there seems no present prospect of
any relaxation of effort. The question arises whether
these numerous fleets can fully justify the expectations
which it must be assumed have been formed of their
potentiality. In other words, has naval force no limi-
tations ?

In early days, when nations were unorganised, the
peoples who learned to use the sea had the coast lines of
the Old World practically at their mercy. The Greeks
could stud the shores of the Mediterranean with their
colonies, occupying every spot which promised com-
mercial advantages or means of comfortable existence.
The detached communities thus formed became little
centres of sea power, secure so long as their fleets were
not overmatched. The Romans, with more deliberate
purpose and less of the trading instinct, used the naval
supremacy won in the wars with Carthage to plant military
colonies along the seaboard, and thence to extend inland
their territorial possessions. The Norsemen, at fitst

i 7 2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

simple raiders of the coasts of England only, finding no
organized resistance, widely extended their sphere of
operations and formed fortified inland settlements on the
Rhine, the Seine, the Rhone, and the Loire. The stress
thus thrown upon Western Europe gave a strong impetus
to military art and helped to develop the feudal system
on the Continent. Sea power, as wielded by the Norse-
men, was crude and unorganised ; but it was based on
the natural aptitudes of a fighting race, and its great in-
fluence on history has not been adequately recognized.
By England under Alfred the Great it was successfully
opposed at sea ; by the Prankish and Teutonic peoples it
was at length stemmed, mainly by cavalry.

As the European States acquired consolidation and
their military forces assumed an organized form, their
seaboards more than ever important began to experi-
ence comparative immunity from aggression. It was no
longer possible for a people who happened to be superior at
sea to plant and maintain settlements on any neighbouring
coast-line. Reciprocal raids on the shores of the Channel
continued, but changed character. While the proceedings
of John de Vienne in the reign of Richard the Second
resembled those of the Norsemen, attacks on the coast-
line of organized States tended more and more to take
the form of considerable expeditions, such as those
directed against St. Malo and Cherbourg in 175 8. During
the wars of the French Revolution and Empire, although
the extent and influence of the sea power of Great Britain
attained dimensions previously unapproached, purely
coastal attacks on the mainland territory of her enemies
practically ceased, and expeditions for the capture of
places deemed important took their place. In recent
years, the great instance is that of 1854-55, when
four Powers combined in an attack on Sebastopol
which monopolized the efforts and decided the issue of a
great war. Here, however, the comparative isolation of

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE 173

the Crimea and the immense difficulties of the Russian
line of communication were factors of the first importance.

The direct operations of sea power being thus gradually
restricted in certain aspects by the growth of organized
European States, the maritime Powers began to move
further afield. Following precisely the proceedings of
the ancient Greeks and as easily Spain, Portugal, and
Holland established trading settlements on the shores of
America, Africa, and Asia. Spain, with ambitions equal-
ling those of Rome, but with infinitely less strength of
purpose, sought to extend her settlements into an empire
of the New World. While isolated and drawing little
support from their hinterlands, such settlements evidently
lay at the mercy of sea power, and Great Britain, at first
contented with raiding them in the Norse fashion, pro-
ceeded later to conquest and occupation. Such conquest
was in some cases child's play, like the capture of San Luis
d'Apra by the United States last year. In other cases, and
notably in the struggle between France and England for
the dominion of India, immense efforts and long wars
were entailed. The measure of resistance was that of the
available local resources, and sea power, while essential
to success and in this sense always decisive, no longer
sufficed. It is an obvious truth that without naval suprem-
acy the expansion of England would have been impos-
sible, and both Canada and India would have passed into
other hands. It is equally true that naval strength
alone would not have saved either. A nation unable to
produce troops of the best quality, great military leaders
and capable administrators, must inevitably have lost both.

Viewing history in its broadest aspects, there appear
to be grounds for the belief that the influence of sea power
has undergone modifications, which ought not to be dis-
regarded. The days when the Norsemen could row up
the Seine and establish themselves strongly above Rouen
cannot offer exact parallels with our own. Highly

i 7 4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

specialised naval forces cannot act precisely in the same
manner as mere fighting men navigating light craft pro-
pelled mainly by oars. When the sailing art had attained
perfection, fleets enjoyed a freedom of movement now
limited by their absolute dependence upon coal. There
is here a great gain in speed and certainty of navigation ;
but there is also a certain loss. Coast defence has changed
its whole character since the times when the raider could
draw up his ships on any convenient beach and proceed
to plunder, certain of being opposed only by the few
armed inhabitants who could be hastily collected from
neighbouring villages. Now, important harbours can be
easily and quite inexpensively protected against purely
naval attack. As early as 1794 it was shown that two
i8-pounder guns mounted on a tower could repulse two
British ships of the line with heavy loss, and when the
miserable work known as the Telegraph Battery succeeded
at Sebastopol in putting several line-of-battle ships out of
action, it must have become evident that the attack of
coast defences was not the business of navies. Further
scientific advance has added to the inequality of conditions
between the ship and the coast battery, and the attack of
defended harbours is now more than ever a purely military
operation, in which a fleet acts as a covering force.

Seaborne trade has increased enormously in importance
and volume, gaining steadily in speed and safety of transit ;
but land communications have received an incomparably
greater development. The distribution of trade is now
largely a matter of railways, which are exerting a powerful
influence upon the commercial systems of the world, and
changing what may be called their strategic centres.
Directly and indirectly, railways threaten the sphere of
influence of sea power. The attack on the coastwise
trade of an enemy once a formidable weapon in the
hands of a naval Power has lost some of its efficacy.
Such an attack may entail only inconvenience now that

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE I75

land communications, formerly non-existent, can tem-
porarily replace sea-transit for distributing purposes*
And in the wider sense the vast railway systems of Europe
unquestionably tend to reduce the pressure which sea
power was able to exert at the beginning of the century.
The elasticity of arrangements which is one of the most
striking characteristics of modern commerce will invest
neutral harbours with new importance during a great war.
The difficulties of the commercial blockade of a long
coast-line are perhaps greater than ever, and at the same
time the neutral port, thanks to railway communication,
can do for a belligerent what was formerly impossible.

Sea power cannot seal a land frontier, and in proportion
to the ease and cheapness of land communications will
the trade of a belligerent be assisted. So great is the
complexity of interests of modern commerce that, in a
war with a European Power, British capital, attracted by
high prices, would almost certainly be employed in supply-
ing the needs of the enemy.

These reflections and many others point to certain
general principles which have not been sufficiently recog-
nized. The functions of navies are practically limited in
war to the attack and defence of sea communications,
implying a vigorous and sustained offensive against an
enemy's armed ships. The Power which is able to hold
those communications can not only count on territorial
security for such of its possessions as are liable to
oversea attack alone, but is free to employ military
force against an enemy's territory. The IJutnits of such
offensive action are determined by the strength of the
field forces available and by the measure of resistance
which can be concentrated at the point selected for
attack. Here evidently local considerations and questions
of land communication enter. Isolated settlements which
have no independent resources must fall an easy prey to
the Power which commands the sea. Highly organized

176 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

States, such as ate Canada and India, sudhl as Federated
Australia will become, such as we may hope South
Africa will one day be, can offer a measure of resistance
to oversea attack which would demand of the invader
great efforts and a huge provision of transports. In
1854 a railway -even a first-class road connecting
Sevastopol with the military centres of Russia would either
have caused the project of invading the Crimea to be
abandoned or would have brought disaster upon the
invaders. If land communications in Cuba had not
been almost non-existent, General Shafter's force must
either have been trebled or would have been driven into
the sea. A railway between Havana and Santiago would
have altered the aspects of the campaign, even though the
ultimate result would not have been doubtful. Sea
power thus secured evident advantage because the land
communications and the natural resources of Cuba had
been hopelessly neglected.

Great Britain, dependent upon seaborne trade for the
food supply and for the purchasing power of a crowded
population, and ruling a vast Empire held together by
maritime communications alone, must be prepared to
assert supremacy at sea or perish. Supremacy at sea
demands that the navy should take the offensive at the out-
break of war, and should concentrate its energies upon an
enemy's warships. The greater task includes the less
and, if the ocean communications of the Empire are held,
oversea invasion of its territory at home and abroad is
impossible. For the exercise of sea power in this sense,
the conditions have never been so supremely favourable
as now and, while the immense growth of British sea-
borne trade may seem to involve an increase of vulner-
ability, that trade steam propelled can be more easily
protected than in sailing days. The story of the depre-
dations of the Alabama and her consorts has been widely
misread.

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE 177

While sea power has gained in what may be termed its
defensive aspects, the offensive character imparted to it
by Great Britain in the old wars has undergone limita-
tions. The military operations which since navies became
specialized bodies have always been the corollary of naval
supremacy can be more than ever effectively covered;
but they have become more serious in scope, and in some
cases they are no longer possible. During the senseless
war of 1812-14 with the United States, a British expedi-
tionary force occupied Washington. No measure of
naval supremacy would now render such an operation
possible. A second Crimean campaign is practically out
of the question. Ten years ago Vladivostok might have
been taken at the cost of great efforts. Within a short
period Port Arthur may be made absolutely unassailable
by any force which Great Britain could employ. In the
Far East, railways must compete directly with sea power,
and rivalry between Great Britain and Russia will then
assume a purely military character. The idea that the
conversion of Wei-Hai-Wei into a " secondary " or any
other species of naval base will enable a fleet to check
Russian projects is illusory. Unless Russia could be over-
powered on land there would be no trade in the Gulf of
Pe-chi-li for our navy to protect. Again, during the old
wars the most important of the undeveloped colonies of
other Powers fell into the hands of Great Britain. Sur-
veying the map of the world to-day, we find no possessions
of foreign nations that we have any real reason to desire.
We have not now, as at the beginning of the contest with
France, an empire to gain. It is our present task to hold
and to develop. By proceeding to further oversea
conquests we should neither secure advantage to our-
selves nor inflict material injury upon an enemy. Finally,
attack on commerce is for Great Britain a less formid-
able weapon than it was a century ago. We cannot now
expect to impose arbitrary restrictions upon neutrals.

N

178 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

There is little commerce afloat that we could attack without
injuring British interests.

The conclusion seems inevitable that our sea power,
relatively and absolutely more potent for the defence of
the Empire, is distinctly less capable of exerting decisive
pressure upon an enemy, and therefore of bringing a great
war to a conclusion. By maritime conquests our Empire
was won, and trade thus directly followed the flag. As Mr.
Ellis Ashley has pointed out, it is now more correct to
say that " trade is the flag." In peace time, it is clear that
navies cannot directly promote trade, although the growth
of trade provides, as in Germany, 1 a strong plea for the
increase of a navy. It is even possible that the con-
struction of great fleets, by its demands on the industries
of a country, may check profitable production. The
promotion of national commerce is, as the Continental
Powers have begun to discover, a question for Foreign
Offices rather than for Ministers of Marine.

The conditions of the European Powers differ so widely
from our own that there can be no true analogy of naval
requirements. The one purely Continental war of this
century in which sea power proved decisive was that
waged by the German Confederation against Denmark in
1848-9. The Danish navy, in full command of the sea
and operating from an insular base, was able to give such
substantial aid to the military operations that the siege of
Fredericia ended disastrously and the Germans withdrew
from Schleswig. The part played by the Russian navy
in 1828-9 had an extremely important influence on the
campaigns both in Europe and in Asia ; but in the then
exhausted condition of Turkey the issue was predetermined;
and in 1878, when the naval situation was reversed, the
Russian army camped before Constantinople. The diffi-
culties and the losses of the campaign, followed by the

1 See my " Germany as a Naval Power/' Nineteenth Century > May,
1899.

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE 179

threat of British intervention, supplied Russia -with a
powerful incentive for the creation of a strong fleet in
the Black Sea. In the war of 1866, the foolish attack on
Lissa and the naval action which followed conformed
strictly to ancient law, but the issue had already been
determined on land and the incident had no practical
importance. In 1859, and in 1870-1, navies played no
part. A Franco-German war, a Russo-German war, or
a contest between the Triple and Dual Alliances must
mainly be decided by military success or failure. German
trade in the Baltic and North Sea would suffer inter-
ruption in a war with France; but at a time when
the whole effective manhood of both nations was drawn
to the colours their industries must in any case suffer
temporary restrictions*

In 1870-1, Germany could give her trade no protection,
and by blocking her ports with mines in fear of the attack
of a French fleet which could not approach them, she in-
curred unnecessary losses. Nevertheless, from 1871 on-
wards German commerce has prospered exceedingly. The
geographical position of Germany is such that no reason-
able increase to the navy would enable her to despatch
expeditionary forces to attack the colonies of France. On
the other hand, France has no inducement to attempt the
conquest of German colonies, even if troops could be
spared for the task. Concentration of effort upon the
land campaigns by which the issue must be decided would
be the necessary policy of both Powers. In a war with
Russia, the fleet of Germany would neutralize that of her
opponent in the Baltic. German communications with
the Far East would be rendered precarious and Kiao-chau
would have to take care of itself; but here, again, the
inducement to either Power to expend energy upon sub-
sidiary operations could not be great, since the ultimate
decision must lie with the land campaign in Europe, what-
ever occurred elsewhere. It is difficult to conceive the

i8o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Austrian navy as a really important factor in any great
war. The fleet of Italy may, as has often been pointed
out, be intended as a coast defence force to prevent France
from supplementing an advance across the frontier by an
oversea attack. It is not, however, well constituted for
such a task ; it is a heavy drain upon a poor country and,
except in alliance with that of a great naval Power, it cannot
look for any considerable achievement. Japan, with a
growing trade, is building up a great navy, which, from
the geographical position of its bases, must exercise a
dominating influence in Far Eastern waters. Japan in
alliance with a great naval Power will be able to secure
the command of the Northern China Seas, and her for-
midable army would then be available for operations on
land. In a Russo-Japanese war, sea and land communi-
cations would compete for victory, and the haste with
which Russia is seeking to consolidate her position in
Manchuria is easily explained.

At opposite ends of the world, therefore, two island
nations, one purely from motives of self-protection and
the other with dawning ambitions, are unwillingly supply-
ing arguments for the expansion of navies. If Russia had
been disposed to accept Mr. Goschen's offer and call a
halt, the growing power of Japan a far more uncertain
factor than Great Britain might have inspired other
counsels. We have not perhaps sufficiently realized the
power of Japan, with her great and highly organized
army within short striking distance of the latest territorial
acquisition of Russia.

I we could regard eagerness to secure material prosperity
by means of trade as the only cause likely to disturb the
peace of nations, there would be hopes of a better mutual
understanding. France has nothing to gain by adding to
her ill-digested possessions. The rapid progress of the
trade of Germany should satisfy her aspirations, and that
progress owes practically nothing to so-called colonies.

THE LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE 181

A good commercial treaty with Great Britain, such as
M. de Witte probably desires, coupled 'with steady develop-
ment of her immense territory, would do more for the
prosperity of Russia than any further ventures in China.
The trade prospects of the United States are magnificent,
and they have Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines on
their hands awaiting just administration and internal
development* We cannot, however, regard trade rivalry
as the only probable cause of war so long as such incidents
as that of Fashoda can occur ; and even if China were
peaceably partitioned, nations may fight on real or
supposed points of honour. National pride does not
easily admit a mistake, however flagrant, and in the mis-
takes of individuals the honour of a nation may unfor-
tunately become involved. The new Court of Arbitration
should in time be regarded as a means of appeasing honour
without resort to war ; but meanwhile we must be pre-
pared to meet all reasonable probabilities. Our standard
of naval preparations must continue to be based on those
of other Powers to whom naval supremacy is not an
imperious necessity. Human nature being what it is, we
cannot perhaps expect these Powers to recognize the
facts that the competition is for us inevitable, that we
desire nothing at their expense, and that a strong British
navy is one of the most effective guarantees of the peace
of the world.

On our side there must be no illusions. The navy is,
from the Imperial point of view, a defensive force, more
powerful than ever in that role, less powerful in some
aspects than formerly as the final arbiter of wax. To
strike is the function of the field army. It is trade which
enables us to maintain our present navy, and, if that trade
does not keep pace with our growing population, naval
supremacy cannot be assured. If, therefore, foreign
Powers can pass us in the race for commerce, they will
compass the downfall of the Empire without any need for

1 82 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

an inordinate increase of their fleets* Increase of territory
does not, as is sometimes assumed, necessarily carry with
it increase of trade. If this were so, French commerce
would show an extraordinary advance. The basis of
trade lies in the reciprocal needs of large populations of
producers.

Lastly, the industries by which markets are supplied
and the communications, land or sea, by which these
markets are reached have, since 1815, come to depend
more and more upon coal. The twentieth century will
see a marked increase in the price of the coal of the United
Kingdom. India, Australia, and South Africa will come
to the aid of the Empire ; but the United States may
become the centre of the world's coal supply, to be, in
the far future, perhaps supplanted by China. How these
changes will affect the relative sea power of nations it
would be rash to attempt to predict.

XV
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

(" The Times," 7 December, 1900.)

This article is one of many in which I tried to draw public attention
to the outstanding defects in our Army Organization. It was inspired
mainly by the grave defects which the War in South Africa laid bare.
My main objects, then and always, were (i) to provide a field force
kept in readiness for immediate embarkation, and (2) to reorganize
the old Militia force as a " real second line to die Army." In 1905-6
I was at length able to play a part in Army Reorganization, and an
expeditionary force, which I had advocated long before, came into
existence, mercifully before August, 1914 ; but Mr. Haldane against
my advice decided upon the fa facto destruction of the Militia, our
oldest armed Force.

THE organization of the Army has been frequently, and
for the most part vainly, criticized during the past twenty-
five years. Its state has been the subject of many inquiries,
and volumes of evidence have been taken, of which con-
demnation, direct or implied, has been the ruling char-
acteristic. From the late Commander-in-Chief and from
minor spokesmen of the military hierarchy, there has been
a combined stream of testimony tending to show that
great evils existed, and foreshadowing much that is now
painfully apparent.

When urgent necessity arose for reinforcing the troops
in South Africa, instant demands had to be made upon
the garrisons of India and of the colonial stations demands
which in less favourable circumstances could not have
been fulfilled. The force thus collected was inadequate
and was an aggregate of units in no sense organized for

183

184 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

war. If out military preparations had corresponded with
our national requirements, the course of the war would
have been different. The mobilisation of the first army
corps, a cavalry division, and some additional infaatry
battalions was at length tardily begun, and, as ample time
was available for maturing every arrangement, the work
was easily accomplished. It became quickly evident, as
had been foreseen by every serious critic, that the army
corps was not what was wanted. As such it never existed
for a day ; but its constitution on paper dictated an order
of embarkation of units which did not conform to the
needs of the military situation. An immense Staff was
suddenly created, of which the members were strange to
each other and to the troops, and were, in some cases,
quite unfamiliar with their duties. Arrived in South
Africa, the army corps and the cavalry division, as such,
disappeared and no trace of their paper organization
remains. If, however, the theories of the War Office
organizers had been realized, and if a British army corps
had been placed in line with and opposed by the solid
organizations produced by the territorial systems of the
Continent, how painful would have been its disabilities !
The process of mobilization slowly proceeded, and an
eighth division began to assume concrete form on 22nd
January, 1900. Thus the mobilization of an army corps,
a cavalry division, four additional infantry divisions, a
cavalry brigade, and some details was spread over more
than three months, and it is impossible to regard this
achievement as a triumph of our Army system.

Disasters and bitter humiliation having brought home
to the country and to the military authorities the magnitude
of the task lightly undertaken, improvization on a large
scale was inaugurated. The wholesale volunteering of
Militia battalions for active service helped to relieve the
pressure for men, but these battalions, neglected in peace
time and despoiled by the Army, were short of men and

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 185

of officers, and were but indifferently trained. No other
whole units with a semblance of an organisation existed in
this country, in spite of the large number of men nominally
available. A so-called Imperial Yeomanry was hastily
brought together by calling for Volunteers of all kinds
and trusting largely to the efforts of individuals, thus
reverting to the practice of days when permanent military
organizations were rudimentary or non-existent. Through
the agency of the Lord Mayor of London a body of
** Qty Imperial Volunteers " was brought into existence
by skimming many regiments. Other Volunteers, irregu-
larly obtained, were collected in companies to join their
territorial battalions. The innate military spirit of the
British people facilitated these promiscuous measures.
The numerical weakness of the Boers and the great dis-
abilities inherent in their loose organization came power-
fully to our assistance. <c The majority of us," said the
officer commanding the Gty Imperial Volunteers, " had
no less than two months on the line of communications
to learn those special duties which pertain to service at the
front." Time was thus in our favour to repair, at great
cost, the grave defects in our military system. On loth
January, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener began in
South Africa and in face of the enemy to organize a
field army.

A military force depends for its fighting efficiency upon
the solidarity of its units regiments of cavalry, batteries
of artillery, and battalions of infantry. The mobilized
strengths of these units are about 670, 175, and 1,100 men
respectively. So many young soldiers present with the
colours were unfit for service abroad that in some cases
considerably more than half the requisite quota of these
units was made up from the so-called Reserve, and not
half the nominal effectives of the Home Army could be
placed in the field. By a wholesale use of that Reserve
aad of the miscalled Militia Reserve the deficiency was

186 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

made up, these two Reserves being thus practically ex-
pended in replacing immature lads maintained at great
expense in the ranks, but unable when required to render
soldier service. The South African war inevitably created
a heavy demand for mounted infantry, and under our
system a number of men belonging to infantry battalions
had been trained for this purpose. As on previous
occasions, but now on a far larger scale, these men were
withdrawn from their units and grouped into new organiza-
tions. In some cases, therefore, battalions lost the pick
of their officers and men before entering upon the cam-
paign, and there was a further drain upon them for
signallers and various staff duties. A battalion might
thus come to be composed of (a) young soldiers little over
20 ; (#) so-called Reservists fresh from their homes and
undrilled for two or three years ; (i) Militia Reservists
partially trained ; and (d) a company of Volunteers repre-
senting several corps. Its wastage might be made good
by drafts of young soldiers who, in some cases, had never
been through a course of musketry, and who were con-
sidered to be just physically fit to be sent to the front ;
while even this provision could not be made without
stopping the flow of drafts urgently required for India.

Such conditions imply the absolute negation of every
principle upon which a sound military organisation should
be based. If they are adequately realized, it becomes easy
to understand the difficulties under which our Army in
the field has laboured, and an explanation of some unfor-
tunate incidents is supplied. That the fighting power of
our troops has been so brilliantly displayed is a striking
tribute to the high qualities of our officers and men thus
heavily handicapped by a vicious system. The wholesale
splitting up of higher units, the frequent changes of
commanders and staff officers, the new groupings con-
stantly arising, the great variety of the local and other
colonial contingents, the losses, and the influx of inferior

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 187

material have combined to confer almost an irregular
character upon our forces in South Africa. They now
consist, for the most part, of men hardened and trained
by experience in the rough school of war, but they bear
no resemblance to the paper organisations prescribed for
the British Army. It may fairly be doubted whether any
other troops than our own would have stood the trials
which an exceedingly difficult campaign and a hopelessly
defective system have entailed without showing symptoms
of disintegration.

The lessons of the war in regard to the principles of our
military organization are unmistakable. There is no need
for any revolution, but drastic changes are essential.
" We are fond of shams in this country/' as Lord Wolseley
has well said ; it is necessary that these shams should be
summarily ended. Delusive figures must no longer be
paraded for the deception of the public ; the only true
test of a military system is the number of trained, equipped,
and organized men, prepared at all points for war, which
it can produce. Dealing with our miscellaneous forces
in turn, the following is an outline of the principal reforms
now required :

A. The Regular Army. The army corps organisation,
which has never existed except on paper, but has neverthe-
less worked sufficient evil, should be abandoned. The
infantry and field artillery at home should be organized in
divisions, the cavalry and horse artillery in brigades. The
periods of enlistment can remain as at present, but should
begin to reckon only from the age of 20, or from the
date at which the soldier is certified to be fit for active
service abroad. The rates of pay should be adjusted so as
to attract grown men and to be progressive. Cubicles in
barracks and other improvements in the conditions of life
of the soldier, together with a diminution of useless and
repulsive routine duties, would do much to heighten the

1 88 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

attractions of the service. Men under 20, or physically
unable to render soldier service, to be paid at present rates.
Re-engagement at increased pay to carry pensions, or
Government employment prior to pension, to be open to
at least 25 per cent, of the rank and file, as proposed by
Lod Airey's Committee. Re-engagement for shorter
periods to be permitted, and soldiers quitting the colours
to be allowed six months before finally deciding whether
or not they will extend their service. Re-engaged men
serving at home to be allowed to live out of barracks,
receiving a messing allowance. A real Army Reserve to
be formed by giving a retaining fee to men under 40
who have completed their term of engagement. The
result of the above proposals will be to increase consider-
ably the pay of effective soldiers, but to diminish the
present enormous expenditure upon rickety boys of whom
a large proportion never give a day's soldier service to the
State. The establishment of the Army in all arms to be
revised with a view to fulfil the following conditions :

(1) To provide a field force at home consisting of not
less than three divisions and two cavalry brigades always
ready for immediate embarkation, and at least ten divisions
and three cavalry brigades capable of being mobilised
within a week by recalling men from furlough. The
composition of a British division will require revision,
which must include an increase of field artillery and possibly
the addition of properly organized battalions of mounted
infantry or cyclists. Similarly the cavalry brigade should
be provided with horse artillery.

(2) To maintain in full efficiency the forces in India and
in the garrisons abroad.

(3) To provide sedentary troops, garrison artillery and
engineers, for the fortified harbours at home, a portion
of the armaments only to be manned in peace, the rest to
be taken over in the event of a great war by local Militia
trained to their service.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 189

Reforms carried out on these lipes would result in a
reduction of present nominal strength and a considerable
increase of effective soldiers. It may be objected that it
is advisable to keep boys who in course of time will become
soldiers, and who meanwhile are learning discipline. If
the country is willing to pay for cadets, the present practice
can be continued, provided that such cadets are not included
in the roll of effective soldiers.

B. The Militia to be reorganized as a real second line
to the Army. Transfers to the colours to be permitted
but not encouraged, and efficiency of units to be the sole
criterion of the merits of commanding officers. The pay
to be raised in order to enable the necessary establishment
of grown men to be maintained. Officers retiring from
the Army to be liable to service in the Militia up to the
age of 50. The practice of counting subalterns, who
join in order to qualify for commissions in the Army, as
part of the Militia strength, to cease. The so-called Militia
Reserve to be abolished and a real reserve formed by giving
a retaining fee to men under 40 who have completed
their Militia engagement. The Militia establishment to be
thoroughly revised, the object being

(1) To provide a field army of not less than twelve com-
pletely equipped divisions for home defence, or to reinforce
the army in the field in a great war.

(2) To provide the garrison artillery companies required
to complete the manning of coast defence armaments.

(?) To provide infantry battalions for the garrisons of
fortified ports, such battalions to be distinct from the
Militia field army and to be localked as close as possible
to their allotted stations.

This will involve an increase to the present establishment
of Militia, which, in recent years, has never been approxi-
mately attained, the creation of a Militia field artillery, and
a great improvement in the training which can easily be
attained by proper administrative arrangements.

190 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

C The Yeomanry to be converted into and trained only
as mounted infantry, which Lord Wolseley has already
advocated. The establishment to be revised on the basis
of providing an adequate mounted force for the require-
ments of the home field army. The pay to be sufficient
to enable the establishment to be maintained, and retired
Regular officers to be liable for service in the Yeomanry
up to the age of 50.

D. The Volunteers to be frankly recogmzed as a paid
force for home defence only, and to be reduced to an
establishment, say, not exceeding 120,000. A good
physical standard to be insisted upon, and adequate induce-
ments for ensuring proficiency with the rifle to be provided.
The Volunteers to supply only infantry, position artillery,
field engineers, provided with transport by a system of
registration, and properly constituted cyclist corps, and to
be organised in brigades specially composed. Their r61e
to be that of a field force equipped with heavy mobile
artillery and capable of rapidly taking up field positions
previously studied to arrest the advance of an invader
who had not been opposed at the coast line. Cadet corps
or rifle clubs may be encouraged as feeders to the Volunteer
organization, but should not receive money grants or be
counted as effectives.

The above proposals indicate the general lines which
the organization of our military forces must follow if it is
to be brought into harmony with principles instead of
being based as now upon accidental influences, the theories
of individuals, or pure caprice. The adoption of these
proposals would secure to the nation : (a) a considerable
field force always ready for war without drawing a man
from civil life ; () a large field force on mobilisation with
a reserve behind it ; (c) a great territorial field army (Militia)
also provided with a reserve, and fully capable of alleviating
the fears of " the old women of both sexes " at home if

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY 191

the whole of the Regular field forces were serving abroad,
and ready, as soon as those fears had subsided, to reinforce
the army oversea ; (cT) a second line field force (Volunteers)
for home defence alone ; and (e) a large number of men
capable of being drawn into the above categories in the
event of emergency. The main object has been to prepare
for offensive war and at the same time to make concessions
to the apparently considerable class which is incapable of
realising what naval defence implies. It has also been
sought to allot definite duties to our manifold forces, and
to provide clear aims as a basis for training.

The protracted operations in South Africa have neces-
sarily disorganized our whole military system. Because
we have successfully opposed one of the most loosely-knit
military bodies in the world, it already appears to be con-
sidered in some quarters that the era of the amateur soldier
has arrived. The lessons of the war, properly understood,
are of a diametrically opposite nature, and this dangerous
delusion requires to be sternly combated. We have learned
by bitter humiliations that our forces are not organized
and trained for war. We have also seen that we possess
fighting material unsurpassed in quality, and that adequate
brain power properly applied is alone required to produce
a perfectly efficient Army. It is necessary to remedy
obvious defects before we are threatened with national
disaster.

XVI
TRAINING OF THE ARMY

(" The limes," 28 February, ipoi.)

Lord Wolseley and other authorities in the nineties of kst century
bad pointedly drawn attention to the lack of training of our Army
for War. There seemed to be certain reasons, which I tried to
explain, why pur training was deficient, and the revelations which
the South African War disclosed inspired the writing of this article.

TRAINING, using the term in the widest sense, is a vital
part in the preparation of an army for war. It ranges
from the handling of large bodies of troops down to the
instruction of the private soldier. It covers the whole
field of military science in every branch. It embraces alike
the intellectual process necessitated by the study of strategy
and of tactics, the physical development of the body, and
that education of hand and eye by prolonged practice
which is essential to effective rifle shooting. Its only
assured foundation is the habit of intelligent obedience,
which is expressed in the word discipline. Thus from the -
private soldier to the Commander-in-Chief of an army a
finely graduated scale of knowledge and of personal
capacity is demanded.

As long as armies fought in crowded masses over which
control could be maintained by superior authority, formal
movements mechanically executed sufficed for the require-
ments of the battlefield. The army of Frederick the Great
was a perfect machine, responding with precision to the
demands of the directing head. The drill of the parade
ground and the manoeuvres required in the field were

192

TTLAJNING OF THE ARMY 193

practically one and the same. The soldier and the sub-
ordinate officer were forced by an iron discipline to become
masters of formal evolutions sedulously practised. Neither
was called upon to think for himself, and a stolid, unin-
telligent obedience satisfied the military conditions of the
time. The system had its weak side, the full disclosure
of which the generally sluggish movements of the Austrian
opponents of the King tended to prevent. After the
death of Frederick, the system was maintained in spite of
his plain intimation that it would need change. The com-
manders whom he instructed had grown old and had
become wedded to tradition. The younger officers, with-
out war experience, had failed to grasp the nature or
significance of his warning. Thus one of the best-drilled
armies the world has seen was shattered at Jena and
Auerstadt before the new methods of Napoleon.

It was a peace-trained Prussian army which fought the
campaign of 1866, when superior generalship, better
organization, and breech-loading small arms combined to
secure a striking success ; but tactical shortcomings on the
side of the victors were manifest, and the handling both
of cavalry and of artillery was plainly defective. The
lessons of 1866 were taken to heart and rigorously applied
to the North German armies, with the startling results
seen in 1870-1.

The British Army during many years prior to the out-
break of the Boer War had been almost continuously
engaged in warlike operations of a varied character in
many parts of the world. No other army had so great
an accumulated experience of campaigning; but, for
several reasons, the practical training thus acquired did not
altogether conduce to sound preparation for war. Our
opponents when possessing fighting qualities of a high
class, like the Sudanese and the fanatics of the North-West
Frontier, were for the most part ill-armed, and when well
equipped, like the Egyptian army in 1882, were incapably

i 9 4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

commanded* Military reputations and rapid promotion
were thus in some cases easily won, and, as little discrimina-
tion was exercised in the distribution of rewards, capacity
in troop leading was not made the necessary stepping-stone
to high positions in the Army, Inducements to the earnest
study of war were thus wanting, and mere presence in a
minor campaign sufficed to secure the fulfilment of the
objects of military ambition. The small wax came to be
regarded as an exciting form of sport carrying with it,the
probability of great rewards without entailing the need
for any special intellectual effort. It followed inevitably
that high rank could be attained without the possession of
the necessary qualifications, that the Army did not possess
an adequate number of competent instructors in the higher
branches of military science, and that peace manoeuvres
were frequently farcical. It is true that the small war
provided useful experience as regards transport questions ;
but the improvisation which might succeed on a small
scale was dangerous when applied to such a campaign as
that in South Africa. The idea that any promiscuous
group of officers who will work in tolerable harmony can
form a staff is opposed to the whole teaching of modem
war.

There can be no doubt that any European force con-
fronted with the difficult task which has fallen to us in
South Africa would have exhibited defects in training, but
it must be admitted that many of the mistakes which have
led to loss of life and to national chagrin can be directly
traced to a faulty system and might have been avoided.
Neglect of the all-important duty of reconnaissance led
to several disasters, and the late Adjutant-General of the
Army, when actually in the field, was impelled to express
a hope " that our officers will at length learn the necessity
for good scouting." Nevertheless, the unfortunate battle
of Colenso was fought without any clear idea as to the
position of the enemy and under a complete misapprehen-

TRAINING OF THE ARMY 195

sion as to the level of the Tugek. How far the too
numerous surrenders were due to want of recognition
of the defensive power of the modern rifle and to the false
teaching imparted at manoeuvres we cannot know* Troops
accustomed to be ordered by ill-qualified umpires to lay
down their arms because they were assumed to have been
" annihilated " by a fire which would have inflicted trivial
loss upon men well covered, might be expected to repeat
their lessons in war. In the art of taking up a good
defensive position and strengthening it, our forces in South
Africa have, on some occasions, proved plainly deficient,
and this may fairly be attributed to a faulty peace-training.
To the handling of artillery in the field some generals
were clearly quite unaccustomed, and the results were
serious. The individual instruction was palpably inade-
quate, and skill in taking cover, which can be inculcated
under a good system of training, had to be acquired at a
heavy sacrifice. Staff duties were often indifferently per-
formed, and for various reasons a trained staff can hardly
be said to have existed. This also must be ascribed to
our system, which does not, in peace time, test the capacity
of staff officers. Men accustomed to spend most of their
time in offices and able to build up a reputation by pro-
ficiency in dealing with papers cannot, even if equipped
with an academic familiarity with the details of the Franco-
German campaign acquired at Sandhurst, be expected to
rise to the exacting requirements of war. Moreover, a
large proportion of the miscellaneous staff officers employed
in South Africa had no previous acquaintance with their
duties and were dependent upon their unaided natural
instincts. There were not only staff officers who did not
know their work, but generals who did not know how to
use their staffs. Education is an art not studied to much
effect in this country, where our civil experiments in this
direction have been only moderately successful* The
education of an army is only a special branch of a great

196 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

subject for which we have not at present shown any marked
national aptitude.

An army cannot train itself. In such matters as prepara-
tion for war it is absolutely in the hands of the central
military authority, and it is impossible to ascribe failure
in the education of the Army to the peculiarities of the
British Constitution. If the civil Minister obtains from
Parliament, which is always willing to grant anything
required to ensure military efficiency, the money necessary
for manoeuvres, the entire responsibility for turning those
manoeuvres to the best account rests with the military
hierarchy at the War Office. There is scarcely a defect
manifested in South Africa which has not been previously
pointed out in The Times, and this fact may be taken to
prove that foresight has not been wanting, and that the
Army contains thoughtful students of war whose warnings,
frequently expressed, have failed to produce practical
results.

The changes which are urgently needed to fit our
military forces for the work which may at any time devolve
upon them cannot be brought about by unaided regulations.
The Army is already swatted in complex bonds of regula-
tions of every description. Regulations already provide
in theory against many of the ills from which we have
suffered in South Africa. It is a moral and an intellectual
regeneration which is now demanded. " The letter killeth ;
but the spirit giveth life," and " Back from the Veldt "
has lately shown what adherence to the letter may imply
in the instruction of an army. The " Laputan methods "
which waste the time and duU the intelligence of the soldier
must be abandoned. If we have " stupid officers " and
" infinitely stupider private soldiers," which in the literal
sense has not been proved, they are the results of a system
which tends to destroy the initiative and the individuality
that all sound methods of education must seek to promote.
In place of prescribing formulae which, according to the

HIAINING OF THE ARMY 197

egregious orders not long ago published at the Curragh,
" are to be known by heart by all ranks who have passed
their drills/' it is essential to cultivate individual intelligence
by every possible means. The days when mechanical
obedience to accustomed words of command sufficed for
the needs of an army have ended for ever. In military as
in commercial competition, the modern condition of
success must mainly be sought in an adequate and a suitable
educational equipment. The officers of the British Army
are not more stupid than those of Germany, but they are
vastly more ignorant, since the German system renders
want of actual knowledge in the various ranks impossible.
Similarly, pure want of acquirable knowledge handicaps
our commercial enterprise.

The need of the Army is competent instructors of every
degree, and, so long as the study of military science is not
rewarded, such instructors will not be forthcoming. The
present examination tests imposed upon officers are futile.
Such questions as " How do you fell a tree with an axe ? "
or " Draw a sketch of a bowline knot," which have appeared
in very recent years, can only show whether a candidate
has learned his text-book by rote. A brief period of
cramming and an average memory suffice to secure a pass,
except when the caprice of some ill-chosen examiner leads
him to propound questions which a Von Moltke wquld
find it difficult to answer within the time limits.

The only true test is aptitude in handling troops, by
which the results of study are practically demonstrated.
The officer in each successive grade must be made to show
that he is fully qualified to instruct the troops under his
command. The necessary study will be automatically
secured if it is once understood that military proficiency
in all ranks is the sole road to military advancement. If
no command were ever bestowed except upon officers
who had proved their capacity for its duties, a new spirit
would arise in the Army, " the spirit that giveth life/*

198 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Inspection, made into a reality and applied to proficiency
in field duties and not to routine evolutions, would effectu-
ally stimulate military study in preparation for war.

Manoeuvres on a large or on a small scale, carried on
under service conditions and treated with enforced serious-
ness by all ranks, would enable incompetence to be detected.
When the superior officer is visibly bored and only anxious
for a field day to terminate, the junior officer and the private
cannot be expected to take an intelligent interest in the
proceedings. The late Commander-in-Chief has stated that,
" To work our men during manoeuvres as is often done
abroad would necessitate a far greater pressure upon our
young soldiers than those responsible for the recruiting
of our Army can venture to impose, during peace, upon
the rank and file." These are grave words. Taken
literally they imply that the regular forces of the Empire
cannot be properly trained for war. Fortunately this view
need not be implicitly accepted. The necessity for filling
the ranks with boys physically unfit for field manoeuvres
has not yet been proved, and there is no reason to believe
that such manoeuvres, intelligently executed, could not be
much more attractive to the soldier than the drudgery
which they ought to supplant. Nor need it be feared
that arrangements cannot be made to render training
grounds available for our forces. It is the long " nights
out of bed " spent in dreary and useless sentry duties,
rather than manoeuvres, that " seriously affect the recruiting
of a voluntary army." The soldier unquestionably resents
the pecuniary loss entailed upon him by the wear and tear
of clothing during manoeuvres, and our present clothing
regulations are so devised as to put a premium upon the
evasion of military duties ; but this is a matter for minor
administrative reform easily accomplished when military
considerations receive due weight at the War Office.

In the initial training of the soldier there is some necessary
drudgery which can be mitigated under a better system.

TRAINING OF THE ARMY 199

At large depots, such as those at Caterham and Walmer,
selected instructors, proper teaching appliances, and a
well-considered curriculum can be provided, by which the
preliminary instruction of the recruit can alike be shortened
and rendered less repellent than it now appears. As soon
as the instruction at such large depots is passed, the
higher training of troops can be made interesting to all
ranks. It is the idea of being uselessly marched about,
as now frequently happens, that damps the military
seal of officers and men- Field days and progressive
manoeuvres, intelligently devised and conducted, can be
made actually attractive.

Lastly, as The Times has frequently pointed out, there is
vital need of a central department capable of studying in
advance the requirements of " inevitable " and other wars,
and relieved of all executive duties. The Intelligence t
Branch is only one section of an office which should be at '
once the central advising department in matters of military
policy and a school of instruction in the higher duties of
the General Staff.

The new spirit, the spirit which alone will regenerate
the training of the Army, cannot be implanted by regula-
tions. Draconian edicts imposing new obligations upon
officers will not suffice. Existing regulations contain much
that is excellent, but is uniformly ignored. The new
spirit must be inspired by the military chiefs, who have
now a unique opportunity. The cleansing fires of war
have revealed some incompetence, but also much real
merit. The Army has received a practical training which
is possessed by no other military force in the world; the
most exacting of all tests has been applied, and it can no
longer be said that selection offers difficulties. Let the
coming rewards be bestowed in every case solely and
simply on grounds of proved military aptitude, and let
appointments of every kind be made in future on these
grounds alone. Thus, and thus only, can the training of

200 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the Army be placed upon a sure basis. Ability has not
hitherto received a fair field, although when assisted by
accidental circumstances and, perhaps, by war corres-
pondents, it has occasionally been able to assert itself.
In a well-ordered army, as in other professions, ability
can be discerned and encouraged. The British Army
contains a due proportion of ability ; the stupid officer and
the stupid private exist in all armies. The ignorant officer
and the ill-trained soldier can only be the results of a vicious
and an ill-conceived system.

XVII
THE STAFF AND THE ARMY

(" Tb Times," 15 October, 1901.)

As Secretary of the Harrington Commission (1888-90), I bad
vainly hoped that the establishment of a General Staff would be
strongly recommended ; but Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman was hostile
and this all-important reform was shelved. I pleaded often and
earnestly in The Times for the reconstruction of out confused Staff
system, and in the sixth " Letter of Vetus " (see p. 131) I proposed
a complete reorganization of the War Office. In 1904, the Esher
Committee laid down a Staff system in full detail, which with small
modification proved successful in the Great War and has held the
field till this year, when an innovation has been made which our
most experienced officers regard as dangerous.

IN examination before a Select Committee of the House of
Commons in May, 1887, Major-General (now General
Sir H.) Brackenbury described the Great General Staff of
the German Army as " the keystone of the whole system
of German military organization ... the cause of the
great efficiency of the German army . . . acting as the
powerful brain of the military body, to the designs of
which brain the whole body is made to work," He
added significantly : '* I cannot but feel that to the want
of any such great central thinking department is due that
want of economy and efficiency which to a certain extent
exists in our Army."

These words were no mere figures of speech ; they
embody truths amply and strikingly demonstrated alike
in war and in peace. The Great General Staff founded by
Von Moltke has in the phrase applied with less justice to

201

202 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Camot directly "organised victory" in the past; it
remains the "powerfiil brain " of the German army,
securing efficiency and readiness for war, and guiding
military policy as a whole upon consistent and reasoned
lines by which alone wise economy can be exercised.
Books have been written to explain the functions of the
German staff, and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in particular has
endeavoured to make clear its vital importance as the
directing " brain of an army."

During many years before the outbreak of the unfortu-
nate war in South Africa The Times has frequently striven
to point out the palpable evils and the scandalous waste
which have necessarily resulted from our persistent neglect
to provide what General Brackenbury aptly termed a
" central thinking department." It would be easy to fill
a substantial volume with instances of the inevitable
effects of this inexplicable neglect. The bombardment of
the forts of Alexandria before an adequate landing force
was at hand, the surrender of Heligoland to Germany
for a totally inadequate consideration, the ridiculous
project for pretending to fortify London, the amasing
proceedings which led to the adoption of the Nile route
to Khartum in 1884 and consequently to failure, the
successive costly schemes of coast fortification hatched in
hole-and-corner fashion and defying first principles, the
wildly conflicting statements of Cabinet Ministers in regard
to important questions of national defence, the painful
groping for a military policy in the absence of adequate
knowledge these and many more ills for which the nation
has paid heavily are all due to the want of an organised
Great General Staff.

The plain warnings of The Times were ignored, and
when the war in South Africa broke out the military
situation was totally misunderstood, with the gravest
results. The Intelligence branch had collected a mass of
information which proved wonderfully accurate; but

THE STAFF AND THE ARMY 203

there was no one to study the facts and figures with a view
to ascertain their practical significance. Thus the Com-
mander-in-Chief professed surprise at the numbers and
the armaments of the Boers, although details as to both
were at his disposal, and the Cabinet was led to trust
irresponsible advisers, who represented views prevalent in
Johannesburg, but knew nothing of the character and
intentions of the Boers, and were totally ignorant of Dutch
history. A conscientious perusal of Motley's works or
of our own Dutch wars might have provided enlighten-
ment ; but Ministers have no time for studies of this nature.
Thus, as the general public is now beginning to realise,
arose a whole series of mistakes and illusions from the
effects of which the nation has suffered, and is still suffering,
in gallant lives which cannot be replaced and in resources
not easily restored.

The most vital lesson of the war, and that which is
least likely to be understood, is the want of a Great General
Staff. The Army contains plenty of ability, but it has no
organized brain power. Ministers have been known to
complain bitterly of the military advice tendered to them,
and that advice has frequently been misleading or inco-
herent. The reason is evident. It is futile to expect a
G>mmander-in-Chief, an Adjutant-General, or a Quarter-
master-General, absorbed in the multifarious duties of
administration, impossibly commingled with executive
functions, to study the varied needs of " inevitable " and
other wars, to work out the complex problems of such an
Empire as ours, to foresee and to reduce to a logical form
the requirements which any turn in the European kaleido-
scope may call forth, to be ready with carefully reasoned
advice whenever it is wanted. The hasty surmises of
flurried officials, or the random suggestions of uninformed
committees promiscuously collected are no substitutes for
the deliberate conclusions of trained minds accustomed to
specialized study. It is by means of organized brain power

204 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

scientifically applied that Germany succeeds in beating us
in too many fields of activity. A modem army which is
unprovided with a " central thinking department " is at
the mercy of chance and of the caprice of individuals. In
peace it must be ill-organized and unready ; in war it will
be indifferently handled.

The functions of a Great General Staff are twofold. In
the first place, it collects and co-ordinates information
which it applies to the unravelling of military problems of
all kinds so as to be able to place before the statesman the
military aspect of any question of national importance.
In the second place, it trains men for special duties in peace
and in war. The interesting work of General von Verdy
du Vernois gives a lifelike picture of the work of the
German General Staff at Headquarters during a great war.
Other writers have described at length the functions of
the staff officer acting as the expert assistant of the general
commanding in the field. We are thus able to understand
how the system operates throughout the whole structure
of the German army, guiding, inspiring, foreseeing, and
thus, in General Brackenbury's words, "acting as the
powerful brain of the military body." The result, in war,
we have seen ; while we know that in peace the fabric
of the German army is sedulously watched and tended,
that reforms are constantly and consistently applied on
reasoned lines, that individual caprices are duly checked,
that military talent is discovered, and that all that is
implied in organization for war is maintained at a standard
worthy of a great nation. We know that, in Germany,
contingencies of many kinds have been folly studied in
advance, that the elementary principles of national defence
are not matters of public discussion, that military policy is
framed in conformity with real requirements, and that
efficiency is combined with rigid economy. Our military
problems are more complex than those of Germany, and
our Army is a peculiarly intricate structure. We need

THE STAFF AND THE ARMY 205

organized brain power far more than any of our rivals,
yet we disdain the common-sense methods by which they
achieve marked success, and we cherish the baseless belief
that our inherent capabilities are so great as to enable us to
dispense with the business-like procedure necessary in the
case of less gifted peoples.

In administration, civil or military, the grouping of
definite duties in trained hands is of vital importance. At
the War Office, as a recent committee seems to have
rediscovered, the definition of duties and of responsibilities
is radically defective. The duties of a Great General Staff
are, however, not allotted to or discharged by anyone.
The notorious telegram "Unmounted men preferred,"
addressed to the finest nursery of mounted men in the
world, was only a casual indication of the total absence of
any "central thinking department" in the office which
undertakes to prepare for and to conduct operations of
war. The 'absence of organized brain power at the head
is naturally extended to the whole military body. We
maintain a relatively enormous number of staff officers, to
whose numbers we make immense promiscuous additions
whenever we go to war. Nevertheless, we not only fail
to provide the means for carrying out the duties of a
Great General Staff in peace or in war, but our system is
such as actually to prevent the discharge of those duties.

It is not too much to say that the failure to provide
trained general staff officers with functions properly
defined has been one of the most fruitful sources - of
disaster in South Africa. Instances could be multiplied,
but the loss of a valuable convoy at the commencement of
the turning movement by which Kimberley was relieved is
perhaps the most striking. Although the facts have never
been made public, it is dear that faulty staff arrangements
were mainly responsible for a loss which led to most
serious results. On numerous other occasions there have
been mistakes, such as the neglect strongly to occupy the

206 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

waterworks at Bloemfontein, or omissions, such as the total
failure to recognize the crucial importance of Hlangwani
Hill before the hopeless battle of Colenso, which, com-
bitied with badly-worded orders, have directly caused
unnecessary losses and have hampered the progress of the
campaign.

So conspicuous have been the fiascoes thus arising that
special stupidity on the part of our officers has been
inferred. This explanation is not by any means just, and
it is not required to account for the facts. The real
causes of our too frequent blunders are the entire absence
of anything approximating to an organized Great General
Staff and the confusion of duties which has been deliberately
introduced into our military system.

XVIH
WARSHIP DESIGN

(" The Ttmes" 8 and 15 October, 1913.)

I had for many years closely followed the evolution of Warships
and, on returning from India in 1913, 1 returned to this question, and
The Tims permitted me to contribute three critical articles in which
it was suggested that the great vacillations in building policy were
partly due to insufficient study of War, and that, as before the passing
of the Naval Defence Act of 1889, a Committee on design should
be assembled to supply guidance. I had unsuccessfully opposed
the construction of die Dreadnought in which some features were
reactionary, while the stimulus to competition which our sudden
increase of tonnage induced favoured the policy of von Titpitz,
added hugely to our expenditure, and decreased our relative strength
on tie day of battle. Nine months after these articles appeared we were
at wax, and some of my forecasts proved accurate ; but I was wrong
in discounting the naval value of airships. The Zeppelins did render
some little service to the German fleet.

SINCE 1889 the problems involved in shipbuilding policy
have become vastly more complex ; doubts and uncer-
tainties have multiplied, while the cost of ships of all
classes has enormously increased, and the consequence of
mistakes is, therefore, far more serious. There has never
been a time when the application of scientific methods to
the elucidation of naval questions was so imperatively
demanded as the present day. Science has been brought
to bear with bewildering effect upon the development of
naval matiml in all its various aspects. The absence of
the scientific spirit in dealing with the many and sometimes
conflicting claims of the several elements upon which
naval strength depends has long been painfully apparent to

207

208 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

every close student of the lessons of war. The inevitable
results can be traced in mistakes which could be veiled
only in peace conditions, in decisions at which no com-
petent advisory body supplied with adequate materials for
free and full discussion could have arrived, and in a large
aggregate waste of public funds. In place of orderly
evolution guided by reason there have been spasmodic
new departures, followed by reversion to type, but again
repeated as if past experience was of no value.

In recent years the tendency to plunge into extremes
has been marked. Tremendous changes have been intro-
duced changes far too great to rest on the unsupported
opinions of a single Board of Admiralty and subsequent
attempts to justify them by misleading phrases invented
post hoc serve only to create the impression that they were
never properly discussed or considered. The most cursory
study of the erratic forms which shipbuilding policy has
assumed since the introduction of steam and steel reveals
with startling clearness a total absence of guiding principles
and a lamentable readiness to accept theories based on pure
speculation and opposed to facts known or easily ascer-
tained. The hopeless breakdown of such theories when
brought to the test of war has not had the effect of inculcat-
ing caution, and even, when obviously discredited, they
have been resuscitated and claimed as new discoveries.

Turning to the broad principles which should govern
shipbuilding policy, the teaching of war for centuries is
curiously consistent. The great advances in propulsion,
in ship construction, in weapons, and in means of protec-
tion have not produced the results too confidently expected.
On the contrary, fighting in the new material conditions
has powerfully reaffirmed the lessons derived from the
experience of the old wooden sailing navies. The battle
of Tsushima was won by the same means which gave
victory at Trafalgar, and the strategic characteristics of the
campaigns which culminated in these two decisive naval

WARSHIP DESIGN 209

actions present essential points of similarity. Weapons
govern tactics and modify methods, but the dominating
tactical object to-day is precisely the same as that which
Nelson strove to attain. " Changes in the motive power
only affect the time required to move from one position
to another. They do not influence the tactical formations
to be adopted, which must be those best suited to the
effective use of the particular weapon employed."

From the days of the Armada to those of Tsushima, the
gun has proved to be the only weapon by which decisive
naval victories can be won. There is no reason to suppose
that this condition will be changed in the near future.
We may, therefore, safely lay down as a law of naval war
that tactics must now, as always, be directed to bringing
the greatest number of effective guns to bear upon an
enemy at effective ranges in the shortest time. The three-
decker, with a broadside of fifty-two guns, represented, in
Nelson's day, the closest approach to this ideal. As
effective ranges increased the fulfilment of the law could
best be attained by other means than the concentration of
guns in three tiers on a single ship. The later development
of a high speed of fire from individual guns still forther
facilitated dispersion, which has obvious advantages. In
land warfare we have seen precisely the same evolution
arising from precisely the same causes ; but the great
extension of the battle line between the days of Waterloo
and those of Mukden introduced difficulties of its own.
An army ranged on a front of 45 miles cannot quickly
reinforce by movement from a flank a unit threatened
with destruction. In the case of a fleet, this difficulty is
far less serious.

Another lesson enforced by the unbroken experience of
naval war and worthy to be regarded as an immutable law
is that victories can be won only by the offensive tactical
and strategical and that defensive ideals are futile and
dangerous. Improvements in armour and the development

210 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of shell power have in no way affected the truth firmly
grasped by Nelson and forcibly stated by Farragut. " The
best protection against an enemy's fire," he wrote, " is a
well directed fire from our own guns." This dictum, in
the words of Rear-Admiral A. T. Mahan, embodies " one
of the profoundest of all military truths, easily confessed,
but with difficulty lived up to, and which in these days of
armour protection needs to be diligently recalled as a
qualifying consideration/*

How far have these laws of war been applied, or violated,
in the recent progress of our shipbuilding policy ?

The advent of the latest Dreadnoughts and Invincibles
effected a violent change in naval ideals, in warship design,
and in national policy. The change seems to have been
based upon a political forecast which has been disastrously
falsified. Instead of humanity being staggered, as was
expected, the result has been to give a powerful stimulus
to foreign competition and at the same time to depreciate
our own Fleet in our own eyes, with the necessary conse-
quence of heavily inflated public expenditure. The changes
consisted in :

1. A sudden large increase of speed.

2. The substitution of ten 1 2-inch guns for four in the
battleship and eight i2-inch for four 9-2-inch in cruisers.

3. The abolition of the secondary armament ; and

4. A new distribution of armour.

Speaking broadly, the pendulum had swung back to the
all-big-gun Inflexible^ immensely exaggerated. Sir William
White shortly before his death explained the nature of the
change. In forty-two years, from the Warrior to the Ktng
Edward VII, the increase of length in battleships had been
45 feet, and of deep load displacement 8,300 tons. At one
step length was suddenly increased by 65 feet and displace-
ment by 4,700 tons. It is most improbable that any com-
mittee composed of Admirals with large sea experience
and students of their profession would have accepted the

WARSHIP DESIGN 211

new designs. , It is equally improbable that any Cabinet
which had seriously considered the question would have
committed itself to the political miscalculation which has
gravely affected the national finances.

The disposition of guns in the Dreadnought was one long
adopted in the French Navy and wisely abandoned. The
return to a discredited arrangement was officially explained
by the statement that " it lies in the power of an enemy to
force an opponent, who is anxious to engage, to fight an
end-on action." Similarly, the sudden increase of speed
was explained by the allegation that " it gives the power of
choosing the range." These are tactical propositions of
a highly disputable character, and nothing except a series
of careful trials, easy to carry out, could justify their
acceptance.

If it could be assumed that the Dreadnought was the result
of careful study and not the unhappy product of megalo-
mania, and if we had, therefore, at last reached sound
principles, then, obviously, succeeding ships would have
shown continuity of design. This was not the case. The
later vessels were entitled " super-Dreadnoughts " in order
that they might create a terrifying impression ; but they
quickly began to show violent departures from the type
which was to render all preceding battleships " obsoles-
cent." The speed of 2 1 knots was retained. The arrange-
ment of gun positions, for the revival of which special
advantages were claimed, was changed to the &fo/0# plan
also previously discredited in the Neptunes, and was
again changed in the Orions, reverting to the centre line,
to which fixe British Navy had long been accustomed.
The abolished secondary armament which the Germans,
who, following the Dreadnought policy, had jumped up
from 13,200 to 18,200 tons, wisely retained was restored.

The vagaries of armour in j&0j-/-Dreadnoughts are
remarkable. The great length of unprotected waterline in
the Inflexible and the Admiral ckss had been the subject

212 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of much criticism. The " soft ends " of some pre-Dread-
noughts had been condemned, and the King Edward VII
and Lord Nelson classes were provided with complete
belts* In the design of the Dreadnought special credit
was claimed for the bow and stern protection adopted.
This was continued and even heightened at the bow in
the Neptunes, and then dropped in the Orions. Internal
armour was sparingly applied in the Dreadnought, was
then extensively used, and was afterwards almost wholly
abandoned. It is not here contended that one of these
systems was right and the others wrong, but that the
amazing instability of opinion even since the Dreadnought
was designed proves that now, as formerly, no principles
which war experience could support have ever been arrived
at. One other change must be noticed. In the Dread-
noughts the i2-inch gun was retained, and its power has
been recently increased. The Orions carry 13^-inch guns,
and a further jump to the 15 -inch gun is apparently con-
templated. No war experience justifies this return to the
large calibres which were tried and deliberately abandoned.
No fresh improvement of armour has taken place to render
it plausible. No careful inquiry would lead to the accep-
tance of the greatly increased cost, the reduction of the life
of the gun, and the complications involved.

The history of the development of British cruisers
supplies abundant evidence of fluctuations of policy plainly
due to the lack of clear ideas as to the work required to be
done. A Scout class suddenly appeared which was quickly
discovered to be totally unfit for scouting and had to be
provided with some other employment. Armoured and
protected cruisers had fallen into separate classes, which
culminated respectively in the Minotaur and the Challenger.
The building of protected cruisers was abruptly stopped,
and the sudden scrapping of vessels of this class before
their period of usefulness had e^psed led to a serious
deficiency of craft of which Great Britain would have real

WARSHIP DESIGN 215

need in war. The pendulum has again swung, and the
deficiency will doubtless be made good.

In the armoured class it is difficult to assign any course
other than unreasoning megalomania for the jump from
the Minotaur of 14,600 tons and about 23 knots speed
to an Invincible of 17,250 tons and 26 knots, and the still
greater jump to a Lion of 27,000 tons and over 28 knots.
The tactical employment of these huge ships cannot have
been considered ; and when it was pointed out that they
were costly battleships of excessive speed with inferior
protection, they were entitled " battle cruisers " ; but their
use was not explained. Clearly, if they are to lie in the
line they, or the battleships, must be wrongly designed.
In any case, the great sacrifices made to obtain exaggerated
speed needs justification on rational grounds which has
not yet been forthcoming. It is now probable that the
type will be dropped.

Most unfortunately the country was committed to the
Dreadnought policy before the decisive battle of Tsushima
had been fought. It may fairly be said that the lessons
of the Russo-Japanese war, which are of immense practical
value, conflict with this policy in most important respects.
In the careful and illuminating studies of the naval cam-
paign which Admiral distance has made will be found
teaching of supreme importance to the British Navy.

The present Board of Admiralty has succeeded to an
inheritance full of difficulties for which it is not responsible.
The problems and the uncertainties confronting it are
many. Airships are not likely to become an element of
naval strength; but their capabilities must be carefully
studied. Hydroplanes, on the other hand, promise to
be a valuable aid to offensive naval war and will doubtless
undergo continuous development. The question of oil is
complex and vastly important. It may be expected that
the Royal Commission now sitting will produce an ex-
haustive report, and materials for judgment will then be

214 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

available. The advantages to the warships of oil fuel are
undoubted ; but we possess at the heart of the Empire
an abundant supply of the best steam coal in the world
and the Imperial sources of oil are at present limited and
undeveloped. Before committing our battle fleet to a
change which is structurally irrevocable, it must be proved
that an abundant annual supply can be absolutely guaran-
teed, that an immense reserve for war can be built up and
always maintained, and that the advantages will justify
the heavily increased charges involved.

Meanwhile, the great growth of naval expenditure in
part at least due to our own impolicy renders it vital that
mistakes involving loss of fighting power should be reduced
to the minimum that reason and foresight can guarantee.
As three distinguished Admirals declared in 1888, it is
by the Navy that we " must stand or fall " ; and, having
regard to the magnitude of the burden which the nation is
now forced to bear, no care in the direction of naval
progress can be too great. Past experience plainly shows
that changing Admiralty Boards, in which the civil element
may be dominant, cannot unassisted be trusted to bring
every fresh step to the test of ascertained facts, to check
the baneful influence of unsupported theories, to clear up
tactical problems, and to subordinate the attractions of
defensive methods to the supreme necessity of preparing
to wage offensive war. So much cannot be expected from
officials overtaxed by the exacting claims of daily business
always increasing in amount.

So far as can be judged, we are now drifting without
guidance in a direction which will soon give us battleships
of 40,000 tons, costing over 4,000,000. At the same time,
there have been indications that, in view of the develop-
ment of the submarine, these monsters might not be trusted
to navigate the North Sea. If the submarine can accom-
plish a fraction of what is claimed for it, the policy of
building exaggerated battleships cannot be maintained. In

WARSHIP DESIGN 215

Nelson's view, " only numbers can annihilate/* and the
long ranges of the present day permit dispersion of arma-
ment in ships of moderate size, the loss of one or two of
which would not entail such a serious diminution of fleet
strength as that of hyper-super-Dreadnoughts. Here is a
point which needs careful study by experienced naval
officers, who can give undivided attention to it.

As the submarine apparently cannot fight the submarine,
we must seek to attack it as we ultimately did the now
obsolete torpedo-boat. It is possible that the aeroplane
and the light cruiser or improved destroyer may prove
effective rejoinders. Here, again, study is urgently needed
in order that the inevitable limitations of the submarine
may be fully grasped ; and, since the submarine obtains
safety only by accepting a great increase in the difficulty
of using her only weapon, limitations on the high seas
especially must exist.

The question of armour needs careful investigation in
the light of the war experience available. " The received
doctrine tends to arm ships with a small number of guns
ever increasing in size and to the use of armour ever
increasing in thickness and weight." Is this " doctrine " in
accordance with the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, or is
it not ? A direct answer is evidently possible. The advan-
tage of speed in a fleet action lends itself perfectly to determi-
nation by well-devised trials, and the degree of superiority
required to confer advantage can be accurately ascertained.

A scientific analysis of the relative power of two such
different ships as the Dreadnought and the King "Edward VII,
taking into account the greater target presented by the
former, can be made on the basis of battle practice, and an
idea of the relative number of hits in a given time can be
arrived at with due regard to the greatly inferior stability
of the gun platform provided by the later ship. Present
ideas of the fighting power of warships are evidently
nebulous, and the importance of intensity of fire ^strikingly

216 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

illustrated at Tsushima has been ignored. Nevertheless,
it must be clear that, at ranges at which all the guns of
two ships can do effective damage, the ship that makes
the greatest number of initial hits will inevitably reduce
her antagonist's fire, and will, therefore, not only protect
herself in the most effectual way but will rapidly establish
decisive superiority.

Perhaps the most important point of all is that the
discussion of such questions as have been touched upon
should be associated with definite tactical ideas by which the
ram and the " single-blow theory " could have been killed
at birth. If these questions were referred to a strong
committee of well-chosen naval officers, with a statesman
of experience as chairman, for investigation on the basis
of reason and known facts, it is impossible not to believe
that the Admiralty would gain welcome and needed
support, and that new light would shine where fog now
prevails. Evidence taken by and information supplied
to such a committee would naturally be confidential ; but
a general statement of results such as that arrived at in
connection with the Naval Defence Act would give con-
fidence to the public and strength to the Admiralty.

Lastly, it is to be remembered that the present tendency
is towards over-concentration of thought upon the techni-
calities of materiel. Our system of training is producing
specialists of all kinds ; but it does not lead the best
brains of our young officers to the study of such matters
as have been dealt with in these articles. Definite tactical
ideas which can be acquired only by experience at sea are
of vital importance, since technical superiority cannot save
a badly-handled fleet from disastrous defeat. The great
lessons of war have not changed with the advance of
mechanical science ; and from them alone can be drawn
the inspiration which will command victory when the
naval forces of the Empire are brought face to face with
the supreme ordeal.

XIX
THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY

(The speech republished below was delivered in the House of Lords on 20
December, 1915, in a debate on the Motion of the Earl of Portsmouth^ " That
an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to a
reported Treaty or Arrangement with Great Britain whereby articles exported
from Great Britain can be re-exported from Denmark to other countries")

Commodities vital to the prolongation of the War poured into
Germany during the early months under the disastrous provisions
of the Declaration of London, as Mr. Asquith admitted on 2oth July,
1915. There was subsequently a tightening of the blockade ; but
many leaks remained until America declared war in April, 1917.
The paralysing of our sea power when it was most needed and when
our Navy was perfectly able to exercise it, weighed heavily on me,
and over and over again I tried to draw attention in the House of
Lords to the relative failure of the blockade. This speech, which
the kte Lord Portsmouth urged me to make on his motion, deals
largely with the forgotten " Danish Agreement " made with a body
which contained astute Germans. Hie Government refused infor-
mation as to the terms of a unique instrument. Of its effects I have
no knowledge, but I was able to show kter that important commo-
dities were freely reaching Germany, and the shocking revelations
which Rear~Admiral Consett patriotically revealed, give some idea of
what was in progress. The losses of life and treasure, due to out
neglect to use our most potent weapon, will always remain a
harrowing reflection.

MY LORDS, the real question which is raised by this Danish
Agreement is this, Are we using our splendid Navy in
the best possible way to bring this war to an end ? That
is a very grave question ; it is one which ought to be
folly discussed, and it can only be so discussed in present
circumstances in your Lordships* House, Nearly half a

217

2x8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

century ago Mr. Gladstone wrote these remarkable and
most prophetic words :

"It is hard to say whether or when our countrymen
will be folly alive to the vast advantages they derive from
consummate means of naval defence. . . . Our lot
would, perhaps, be too much favoured if we possessed,
together with such advantages, a full sense of what they
are. Where the Almighty grants exceptional and peculiar
benefits He sometimes permits by counterpoise an insen-
sibility to their value/'

Those words have a deep significance for us in the crisis
in which we are placed to-day.

We began this war under many disabilities, but with
one enormous advantage. Relatively and absolutely our
Fleet was far stronger than it had ever been at the com-
mencement of any of the great naval wars of the past,
and within a few months the Navy handed over to His
Majesty's Government the gift of the sea. That was
an achievement which was impossible in sailing days,
and which surprised even many close students of naval
warfare. What use did we make of it ? That is a ques-
tion which will have to be examined with care by the
future historian of this war. Meanwhile we know what
we did not do with it. A short conference with men who
understood the question would have made clear the fact
that cotton was a vital commodity in modern war, and
that it had practically replaced sulphur and saltpetre which
were vital in the wars of the past. His Majesty's Govern-
ment must have trusted some adviser with that half-
knowledge which is proverbially dangerous, and it was
slowly that the truth dawned. But at last, on zoth July,
the Prime Minister used these words :

" I am not myself satisfied with the existing state of
affairs. I believe that a great deal of this material, which

THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY 219

is a necessary ingredient in some kinds of ammunition,
teaches the enemy which ought not to teach the enemy."

All this liad been pointed out more than six months before
by Sir William Ramsay, one of out greatest chemists.
But it was not until August, after the war had been going
on a year, that cotton was made contraband.

We know fairly well what happened in the meantime.
The imports of cotton into Holland and the Scandinavian
countries in the eight months from 3ist August of last
year to 3oth April of this year increased from 57,800 bales
in the corresponding period of 1913-14 to 1,322,100 bales
in this period of eight months an excess considerably
over one-and-a-quarter million bales. Probably the whole
of this vast excess did not go into Germany, but a great
part of it must have done; and Germany also drew
cotton from several other sources- Early in the period
of the war the German Government itself undertook
measures for shipping part of the American crop of 1914.
That was, I believe, told to our late Government, who
were at the same time offered an option on so much of
that crop as would have secured the ready acquiescence
of the Southern cotton interests in making cotton con-
traband at that time. More than that, the price was so
low that it would fyave been an excellent investment.
But nothing was done.

Take one other case. A little inquiry would have
shown that oil is one of the most impottant elements in
food-stuffs, and also that it can be used fot the manufac-
ture of nitro-glycerine, which the Germans employ to a
considetable extent in their ptopellants. It has been
stated publicly that as much as 33,440 tons of linseed and
othet oils wete imported into Holland in excess of the
normal requirements in the eleven months which ended
in November. Sir William Ramsay tells us that this
would make 18,000 tons of heavy gun ammunition. If

220 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

ever full investigation is made into this question, I am
afraid that some scandals will be revealed. I could quote
a great many more figures, but I will not weary your
Lordships with statistics. It is sufficient to say that other
commodities of extreme importance to Germany have
gone and are still going into adjacent neutral countries
largely in excess of the normal amounts imported by those
countries. My Lords, facts of this kind have made a
painful impression in the country. It is certain that had
Germany not received indispensable commodities of many
kinds the war would have ended before this ; and it is
absolutely certain that our Navy could have prevented
these excess imports from going into Germany. Is it to
be wondered at that there is a widespread belief that the
"insensibility" which Mr. Gladstone realized has pre-
vailed in our councils ?

After seven months of war our policy seemed at last
to have settled down upon definite and clear lines. On
ist March the Prime Minister made this very important
announcement to which both the noble Lord and the
noble Earl referred that our Fleet henceforth was to
take steps to prevent " commodities of any kind " from
entering or leaving Germany ; and, further than that, all
" juridical niceties " were to be swept aside. When the
Order in Council was issued ten days after that announce-
ment, it seemed that at last the gift of the sea was to be
turned to the fullest account. It is curious that the policy
of the Prime Minister, announced in those words, is
exactly identical with the policy of Germany which was
most lucidly stated by Count Caprivi in the Reichstag in
1892. Count Caprivi said:

" I am of opinion that the cutting off of hostile commerce
in a naval war will remain an essential means,' an ultima
ratio, because nothing else remains. Whoever wages war
wants to reach the goal of war, and if he is energetic he
attains that by the application of all means, and to this

THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY 221

goal belongs in naval war the cutting off of hostile trade.
No one can renounce that."

That was the policy which, doubtless, Germany feared that
we would adopt. By means of her submarines, which she
used in the most ruthless fashion, she attempted to apply
that policy to the very end to ourselves, and after i8th
February she proceeded to violate every law of sea war-
fare, so that now there is hardly a neutral which has not
had a ship sunk and some of its citizens murdered by the
German Navy.

When war broke out, it was open to us to follow the
course which was taken by the Northern States in the
great Qvil War. They treated supplies of all kinds for
the Southern States as absolute contraband, including
even such articles as chloroform and surgical instruments,
which we should certainly not so include. They also
applied the doctrine of continuous voyage most rigorously,
and they set up a blockade which we recognized, though
we need not have done so because for a long time it was
thoroughly ineffective. If to this policy we had added a
recognition of the right of neutrals to receive their normal
imports, and if, in certain special cases, we had purchased
stocks of raw materials, the war would have been brought
to a comparatively speedy end. But because we have
carried on the war without any definite and consistent
naval policy, tens of thousands of gallant lives will still
have to fall. We know that the difficulties of dealing with
neutrals are very great ; but I think that any clear and con-
sistent plan would have aroused less irritation among
neutrals than arrangements constantly varying which left the
neutral in doubt as to what he could do and what he could
not do. In the United States I believe that a display of
firmness and stability of purpose would have been wel-
comed in the best quarters because many Americans know
full well that it is our Fleet that stands between them and

222 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

German aggression. One can imagine what the tone of
the Notes from Wilhelmstrasse would have been had it
not been for our Grand Fleet in the North Sea. For
seven months of the war we acted upon a modified version
of the disastrous Declaration of London, and the enemy
secured thereby many advantages. Subsequently the
action of the Navy was regulated by an Order in Council
of nth March, tempered by an unknown number of secret
Agreements. All that we know is that very large quan-
tities of commodities have passed to the enemy since the
Prime Minister's important statement of policy on ist
March, and that the influx of those commodities has
enabled the enemy to prolong the war.

My Lords, it is because of what has happened in the
past that the country looks with natural suspicion upon
this Danish Agreement. A Danish correspondent, writing
to the Morning Post the other day from Copenhagen, drew
attention to the fact that the Chambers with which nego-
tiations were made contained many German Danes ; and
he went on to point out that :

" There is no doubt whatever that Denmark has* been
doMg an enormous trade with Germany and Austria
during the last seventeen months, and the prosperity of
all here is too apparent, and that Denmark has received
far, far more of everything than was necessary for her own
use. You have helped in this, and your new Agreement
will help much more than ever for Germany to be fed,
the war prolonged, and your blockade made a joke. This
Agreement is very wrong and should be cancelled, and
you should wake up and stir up your officials or dismiss
them."

I believe that that is not an inaccurate view of the matter.

There are only two certainties in this Agreement. One

is that large quantities of most useful commodities will

pass into Germany ; the other is that many people will

THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY 223

make very large sums of money. But the uncertainties
are many and most disturbing. I will not quote the
Agreement, because I believe that would not be proper.
But I must point out that the commodities which are to
enter Germany are those of which Germany has great
need. Unless the whole of the Agreement were most
carefully examined by expert chemists and by expert manu-
facturers it is quite impossible to ascertain what can be
made out of these commodities ; and, if they were even
partially manufactured, they would then be able to go into
Germany apparently in unlimited quantities under new
names. I do not wish to criticize the Foreign Office
officials for a moment, but I do say this that the spectacle
of Foreign Office officials negotiating with persons whose
Teutonic names the noble Earl (Lord Portsmouth) read
out the other day is most pathetic. In this as in many
other matters we have pitted amateurs against professionals,
and we know quite well to what that leads. Until this
Agreement has been carefully examined by experts on this
side it is absolutely impossible for the Government to
know exactly what it involves. It is for that reason that
I am very sorry that the Government will not take the
people into their confidence and make the Agreement
public.

The terms of this Agreement are known to the German
Government, and the details which have come from
German sources have been purposely altered in order to
mislead us. The terms are also known to many Danish
and German firms, to Swedes, and to Americans. I even
believe the Agreement itself can be bought at a price. In
these circumstances surely there is no possibility of con-
cealment except from the people who ought to know the
details. One great objection to this Agreement is this.
The Foreign Office has negotiated, not with the Danish
Government, but with representatives of a large number of
private firms. Some of those firms may be purely German ;

224 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of the rest there must be quite a large number of a " pre-
dominantly enemy character,'* to borrow a phrase from
Lord Halsbury's Bill. I am not quite certain, therefore,
that the Foreign Office has not brought itself within 1 the
scope of our laws prohibiting dealing with enemy aliens.
In his interesting speech last Thursday the noble Mar-
quess (Lord Lansdowne) said that " we have endeavoured
to arrive at an understanding" that when the normal
amount of commodities required by neutrals for their own
consumption is exceeded, enemy destination is implied.
If only that rule had been strictly enforced, many of our
difficulties would have been avoided. But the noble
Marquess went on to say :

"Look what happens. You hold up ships carrying
cargo which you suspect is going to the enemy. You
may find that you have let through an amount of a par-
ticular cargo representing the full limit to which the
neutral country is entitled for its own consumption. But
if, as time goes on, you find more cargoes coming in and
the papers of the ships which carry them are in order and
there is no proof of enemy destination, you are absolutely
helpless, and you have really to acquiesce and see all these
supplies passing through, in spite of your precautions/*

But, my Lords, we are fighting for our existence as a
nation, and if we had enforced the rule that excess imports
implied enemy destination, then these difficulties would
have disappeared and further excess cargoes would not
continue to arrive.

What is happening at the present time is this. Our
officers board a ship bound for a Dutch port ; they find
her full of iron ore, and the captain says that it is all per-
fectly correct and his papers are in order. They put a
prise crew on board and take the ship to a Scottish port,
and the captain, finding himself captured, admits that
the whole of the ore is for Krupps and says that there are

THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY 125

other consignments of the same article coming on behind.
All this is duly reported. But after a few days a telegram
is received ordering the release of the ship. My Lords, this
is heartbreaking for our gallant officers and seamen, who
often have to risk their lives in boarding these ships in bad
weather. It has been said in another place that the Admir-
alty approved of this Agreement. The term " Admiralty "
is sometimes very loosely used ; and it is quite impossible
to believe that the Board of Admiralty, sitting as a Board,
could ever have approved of this Danish Agreement. The
noble Marquess pointed out, most justly, that the geo-
graphical position of Denmark exposes her very much to
pressure from Germany, and he rather indicated that we
ought to allow Denmark to obtain and export important
commodities to Germany in order to relieve that pressure.
I hardly think that we are bound to act in this way. It has
suited Germany exceedingly well that Denmark and Holland
should remain neutral. Otherwise both would have been
treated like Belgium, or forced into belligerency some time
ago. If Germany were to win the war, the independence
of these two small countries would be gone for ever, even
if their territories were not annexed, as would certainly
happen to a strip of Holland. So that the real interest of
these neutrals and of all neutrals all over the world is that
the war should end quickly and that the Allies should win.
The noble Marquess said most truly that

" There are large profits to be made. There is cor-
ruption on every side."

That is a great danger, because Agreements such as this
build up powerful vested interests in the prolongation of
the war.

I will touch on only one other point. This Agreement
and some others are negotiated by the Foreign Office, not
with the Governments of foreign Powers, but with the

226 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

representatives of private traders. But the High Contract-
ing Parties on our side are -not the Foreign Office or the
Government. They are the people of this country, the
people of the Dominions and of our Colonies, the people of
India, and the Allied nations. Surely that is a strong reason
for careful expert examination of this Agreement and for
the abandonment of secrecy in regard to it. The effect of
the pressure which the Navy has been permitted tardily and
still most imperfectly to exercise is beginning to be felt.
The difference in tone between the German Chancellor's
recent speech and that of August last tells its tale. I believe
that the most humane course in the interests of the civilized
world is that our Sea Power should be used to the utmost
extent. Among the many grave mistakes which have
marked the conduct of this war I regard the neglect to use
outmost potent weapon tothe best effect as the most serious,
because it has reacted upon our operations all over the many
theatres of war. The Navy has splendidly upheld its finest
traditions. Its resourcefulness in dealing with the sub-
marine menace is above all praise. The skill and daring of
our young submarine officers have been brilliant. But we
have erred grievously, either because of the " insensibility "
of which Mr. Gkdstone wrote, or in consequence of that
amazing tenderness towards German interests of which we
have had too many signs since this war began. If we are to
bring the war to a victorious end and save our Empire
from destruction we must translate the words of the Prime
Minister into deeds, and we must put an end to all secret
Agreements.

XX
A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR

^ Nineteenth Century and After" June, 1921.)

The special conditions which alone enabled the Grand Fleet in
the Norm Sea to be held at all times in readiness for action seemed
to be inadequately realized. A battle fleet, in the days of submarines
and aircraft, requires the attendant support of a host of auxiliary
craft. Frequent dockings and repairs are essential. Following my
study in 1899 of The Limitations of Naval Force (p. 169) I, therefore,
attempted to explain the added " Limitations " which now restrict
the field of action of battle fleets. Judging from some recently
expressed opinions, I am doubtful whether, either here or in America,
the specially favourable conditions existing in 1914-18 are fully
recognized.

NEITHER in the confused controversy in regard to the future
of the battleship, nor in the wholly inadequate debate in the
House of Commons, can any clear indication of one of the
greatest lessons of the Naval War be discerned, The geo-
graphical and strategic conditions of the mighty conflict
were special and peculiar. No one can say that they will
never repeat themselves ; but, for the present at least, this
cannot be.

The Austrian Navy, controlled by the Italian fleet with
French and British assistance, exercised little influence upon
the situation. It followed that, until the intervention of
America, the contest devolved mainly upon two great Naval
Powers, each possessing powerful battle fleets based upon
its home ports and operating in its home waters, and these
waters the North Sea and die Channel were common to
both in the sense that they were within short striking
distance.

227

228 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

The strategic conditions, so far as the battle fleets are con-
cerned, were, therefore, these. Germany, with the weaker
force, could keep her ships secure and ready to emerge from
their harbours at any time which she might select. The ad-
vantage of the Kiel Canal, in providing her with a double
egress into the North Sea, did not materialize, as was ex-
pected; but this important waterway had the effect of
coupling up her ports to serve in keeping her fleet in
readiness for an excursion by way of the Heligoland
Bight.

On the other hand, the Grand Fleet had to be held at all
times prepared to meet the High Seas Fleet, with the dis-
advantage of not knowing precisely when the occasion
would arise. Such were briefly the conditions with which
the British Navy was forced to contend. Its vital function
was to maintain command of the North Sea, which entailed
the necessity of seeking a fleet action whenever it was
challenged. So long as it was in a position to fight in
superior force whenever required, the command of the
North Sea could not be wrested from it. Until it was
decisively defeated, that command could not pass to the
enemy, and incidentally no invasion of this country was
possible. Such a position, as I have often pointed out, did
not exclude swift naval raids upon the coast-line, which
the Germans attempted, and which, in spite of their good
luck, proved obviously futile. If this general statement is
correct, Mr. Churchill's amazing pronouncements that ** our
silent attack on the vital interests of the enemy " sufficed for
our needs, that " no obligation of war obliges us to go
further," and that there was " no strategic cause " impelling
us to fight off the Danish coast, contrast painfully with
the principles of naval policy which our greatest seamen
have bequeathed for our guidance. They, however, had
not to consider the special dangers which submarine and
mine warfare has introduced, and which imposed inexorable
limitations upon our Grand Fleet.

A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR 229

What was the nature of those limitations ? In the first
place, secure ports where the crews could obtain rest were
essential, and these ports could not be far apart, otherwise
the fleet would not be able to combine in time to meet the
enemy and would be liable to be defeated in detail. The
battleships which fought at Jutland came from three ports.
At each port, facilities for fuelling and for receiving the
various supplies which a fleet requires must either be
forthcoming as at Rosyth, or be capable of being con-
tinuously and securely forwarded by sea as at Scapa.
Otherwise, the fleet could not be kept in readiness to
meet the enemy at all times. Then means of docking x
and repairing great ships must evidently be close at
hand, more especially in the case of a war of long dura-
tion.

So much for the vital needs of the battle fleet ; but they
are only part of the requirements of a great naval force in
the present day. The battleships, when they go to sea in
an enemy's home waters, must be accompanied by large
numbers of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine-
sweepers, mine-layers, seaplane carriers and other craft.
All these auxiliaries have the same general requirements as
the battleships. They must have secure ports where their
crews can obtain rest, and these ports must be so situated
that every unit forming part of the fleet can join the flag at
short notice and can be kept in readiness to do so. They
also require constant coaling or oiling, if this condition is
to be fulfilled, apart from ammunition, provisions and mis-
cellaneous supplies. They will the destroyers especially
need constant repairs, and means of docking them must
be within easy distance. Light-draught vessels will of

1 During the war 194 dry-dockings of battleships and 60 of cruisers
were required. There is at present no British dock outside the
United Kingdom which will receive the Hood ; but three large floating
docks were handed over by the Germans, and may be sent to distant
stations.

2 3 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

course have a greater choice of ports than the heavy ships ;
but their requirements, though less in degree, are in
proportion to tonnage greater in kind.

Clearly naval war, under steam, entailed the fulfilment
of some of these requirements in such conditions two
opposing battle fleets in the same home waters before the
advent of the submarine and mine, which have introduced
new needs of great importance. And evidently the oppor-
tunities for the employment of the submarine and the mine
are greatest in the home waters of a belligerent if he elects
to make use of them. In the war, the Germans, when they
decided to make a piratical attack on commerce a main
object, were forced to employ a considerable number of
their submarines beyond the North Sea and the Channel.
The menace to the Grand Fleet was, therefore, less than it
might have been, and considerably less than it may be in the
future if a belligerent restricted his submarine activities
to the defence of near waters. Yet that menace helped to
force upon the Grand Fleet the conditions which I have
attempted to describe.

The sea mine, moored in deep waters, operating by
contact and laid in accordance with objects, temporary or
permanent, arising in the course of naval hostilities, was
first employed in die Russo-Japanese War. The Germans
appear to have noted the possibilities of this weapon and
made careful preparations to turn it to account. We
were caught with no effective type of sea mine, and the
loss of the Audacious was an unpleasant warning. Great
efforts were made to make good the deficiency, and
ultimately the number of such mines laid by the British
and American Navies in the North Sea was very large,
while the invention of the paravane gave some measure
of protection to our warships. Here again, the advan-
tages accruing to a belligerent in his own waters where
mine-layers can go to and fro between their bases and the
areas selected for minefields are undoubted, although

A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR 231

mines in small numbers can, as was proved in the war,
be laid at long distances from home ports.

That the difficult conditions which existed in the North
Sea were combated and that, when the chance of a great
battle presented itself, the Grand Fleet, with its host of
necessary concomitants, was ready to act, not only in-
volved a huge organization, but immense resources near
at hand. I maintain that the essential requirements of
such a fleet could not have been met except in its home
waters. The whole distance from Scapa Flow to the
mouth of the Elbe is only about 500 miles and to Rosyth
less than 200 miles. Along the British coast for 750 miles,
from Moray Firth to Plymouth, there are numerous ports,
some of them capable of receiving the largest ships. And
behind these ports were the whole of the resources of
Britain with those of America which could be drawn upon.
These resources, available by reason of geographical
position, enabled the Grand Fleet to discharge its difficult
functions. But for their existence, that fleet could not
have been maintained, and nowhere else in the Empire
could a naval force of half its strength, confronted by an
enemy battle fleet, be kept in being for more than a short
time. Similarly, behind the High Seas Fleet lay the whole
resources of Germany, and only in the North Sea, the
Baltic, or the Channel could this fleet have operated.
While the proximity of our Northern ports permitted some
division of the fleet without endangering the power of
rapid combination, the naval force of Germany could be
kept concentrated.

Unless these views can be controverted, some vastly
important conclusions necessarily follow. The effects,
direct and indirect, of the development of the submarine
and mine are to add to the power of an inferior battle fleet
operating in its home waters, and to place sharp limitations
upon a fleet acting at a long distance from its home bases.
Assuming no submarines or minefields to have existed in

2)2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

1914, and that the opposing fleets were in other respects
the same, the difficulties with which our Navy had to deal
would have been greatly simplified. In other words, the
submarine and the mine increased the power of the smaller
fleet acting on the defensive in its home waters. Admiral
Sir Percy Scott has modified the opinions he advanced in
1914, and, in common with the midshipman whom he
repeatedly quotes, he now proclaims the uselessness of
the battleship. If Germany had possessed no battle fleet,
we could have dispensed with ours ; but, as the event
clearly proved, the existence of the High Seas Fleet was
the most potent factor in the naval war, and our Grand
Fleet was the solid basis upon which all our operations
rested. Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty has emphasised
the great value of the battleships to Germany in preventing
measures which would have gone far to minimize the
submarine activities from which von Tirpite hoped for
and was not far from attaining victory.

While other Powers continue to build battleships, we
must do the same ; but it is vital to remember their limit-
ations in the present day. To some Americans the menace
of the Japanese fleet evidently appeals ; because they have
failed to grasp a great lesson of the war. From Yokohama
to San Francisco the distance is 4,750 miles and behind the
Pacific ports of Washington, Oregon and California, dis-
tributed along a coast-line of 1,100 miles, are the vast
resources of America. Assuming even that the Japanese
captured Hawaii and made it into a temporary base, they
would still be 2,093 miles from San Francisco, the nearest
American port. Surely it must be perfectly dear to
everyone who has attempted to study the situation in the
North Sea during the war that no large Japanese battle
fleet could ever be maintained on the Pacific Coast of
America in complete readiness to meet a smaller American
fleet resting upon its home ports. Conversely no American
fleet could be maintained in the Western Pacific capable of

A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR 233

dealing with a smaller Japanese fleet as we dealt with the
High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. The American advanced
base, Hawaii, to which everything would have to be
brought by sea, is about 3,400 miles from Yokohama, and
Manila is about 2,300 miles from Nagasaki. No American
fleet, based on the Philippines, 1 could be in a position to
meet the Japanese fleet based on its home ports, with all
the resources of Japan at its back, and the possibility of
drawing upon China, Siberia, and even Europe. The
same conditions would present themselves to a British
battle fleet in the N.W. Pacific and China Sea in view of
the distance of Hong-Kong from Nagasaki.

War between America and Britain is inconceivable, and
it is, therefore, unnecessary to point out that we could not
maintain a large battle fleet in the Western Atlantic
based upon Halifax, Bermuda and the West Indian Islands.
The naval strength of America in her adjacent home
waters is already amply sufficient, and the battleship pro-
gramme of Mr. Josephus Daniels has no reasoned jus-
tification.

It may be that the capital ship of the future will be less
vulnerable to torpedo attack than those of pre-Jutland
types. The Germans secured some measure of protection
by building capital ships unfitted for any theatre of war
except the North Sea and the Baltic ; but other limitations,
when battleships are employed at long distances from
their home ports, will remain, and the principles which
I have sought to lay down will be little affected. In the

*A recent American writer, commenting on the allocation of
territories under the mandatory system, significantly remarks that
" the islands which Japan takes form a gigantic quarter-circle off the
Eastern coasts of the Philippines, a barrier between the Philippines
and America/*" Progress of the World," North American Review,
January 1941. The dangers of attack by far-ranging submarine
craft on supply ships employed to feed temporary or inadequate bases
cannot be disregarded.

234 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

recent rambling controversy, stress was laid upon air
attack as an argument against the retention of the battle-
ship, and it would be most unwise to ignore the increasing
potentiality of aircraft. The risks to ships in motion may
continue to be moderate, because anti-aircraft armaments
will improve ; but battle fleets in harbour will provide
good targets. It must, however, be evident that ships
lying in their home ports can be far more effectively pro-
tected than in distant or temporary harbours. Further,
aircraft attack must be most intense and most dangerous
when it is based upon home air stations at comparatively
short distances from its objectives and with the resources
of a Great Power behind them, and will be relatively weak
when carried on thousands of miles away from those
resources and from bases which may have to be extem-
porized or from aeroplane carriers. On the Western sea-
board of America, for example, the Japanese could not
make use of aircraft on a scale comparable to that which
the Americans could easily develop and 'maintain. It
follows that the air argument against the battleships may
prove to be invalid, and that one result of air force is to
increase the potency of a battle fleet in its own waters
against an enemy coming from a long distance.

The main problem to be solved in a war between two
naval Powers remains the same as in the days of Drake
and of Nelson. The enemy's battle fleet must be brought
to action and decisively defeated, as at Trafalgar and
Tsushima, or effectively controlled, as in the North Sea.
If either of these conditions is fulfilled, overseas operations
will be denied to the weaker belligerent, who will also be
sharply restricted in carrying on a cruiser attack on com-
merce. On the other hand, the stronger of two Naval
Powers will find it impossible to fulfil either condition if
it is operating at a great distance from its home ports
against a well-prepared though weaker enemy having his
resources dose at hand. In this case, the weaker belli-

A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR 235

gerent may secure considerable freedom when operating
in adjacent waters.

The destruction inflicted by German submarines on our
mercantile marine has perhaps blinded us to what might
have been accomplished by cruisers, but for the control
resting upon the Grand Fleet. The performances of the
Eatdet?, Karlsruhe, Moewe, and other vessels should, how-
ever, provide some enlightenment. The submarine attack,
as Earl Beatty has pointed out, was facilitated by the fact
that the German High Seas Fleet remained concentrated
as a menace, and could not be forced to action and des-
troyed* This attack was at length defeated by offensive
measures tardily organized and capable of being rendered
more effective in the future. But for the presence in the
North Sea of the Grand Fleet in constant readiness for
action, German cruiser operations in distant waters might
have attained larger proportions, and the naval war would
have assumed different aspects.

Whatever developments of the submarine may be
expected, its menace must be greatest in waters adjacent
to the territorial bases of the Power which relies upon it.
Japanese submarines, for example, could be employed
with far greater effect in the N.W. Pacific than off the
American coast. I come back, therefore, to the general
proposition that, from the strategic point of view, the
effect of the submarine and mine is to add to the power
of a battle fleet in its home waters, and to impose limit-
ations on a belligerent operating at a long distance from
his territorial bases and resources. In other words, the
effective transference of sea power to a great distance in
order to bring it to bear on a strong naval belligerent is
far more difficult than it was in the past and in circum-
stances easily imagined might be impossible. This con-
clusion must, however, be modified when the Power
operating from a distance has a strong ally possessing
ports and resources adjacent to the territorial waters of its

236 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

opponent. Thus, in the Great War, the American naval
forces acting in the North Sea and East Atlantic gained
this advantage, which was fully reaped because of the rare
spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding which
animated our two Navies. Similarly the Allied Powers
had command of many ports in the Mediterranean where
Japanese destroyers could be effectively employed.

When the territories of naval belligerents are not far
apart, conditions resembling those in the North Sea will
again rise. Such conditions would exist in a war between
Japan and China, assuming the latter to have re-created a
fleet, or between two adjacent South American Republics.
In European waters, pending a period of national re-
construction, a great naval war need not be contemplated.
Austria as a Naval Power has vanished. France and
Italy could have no motive for competitive warship
building, which inexorable economic stringency would in
any case forbid. It is impossible for us to base our stan-
dard of naval force upon any probable European con-
tingency. No one would dare to assume that Germany
and Russia may not again be in a position to become
strong Naval Powers ; but that cannot happen for many
years, and the wrecking of Russia by her Bolshevik rulers
has been so complete that half a century would be a
moderate estimate of the time needed for her full recuper-
ation. She will have to breed millions of men to replace
those massacred or starved, and to rebuild the educated
classes specially selected for destruction. German ex-
ploitation, however strenuous, must be a slow process*

Of all Great Powers, Britain has by far the greatest
facilities for employing naval force in distant ports. Such
a harbour as that of Sydney, with its narrow though shallow
entrance, is almost unique in the accommodation it oflers,
and there are other fine ports in Australia, little known,
but long distances apart. Singapore occupies an im-
portant strategic position flanking the sea route between

A GREAT LESSON OF THE NAVAL WAR 237

Australia and Japan. In many parts of the world there
are numerous minor ports available as temporary fuelling
bases, and as shelters for submarines and light craft. For
the naval defence of territories so provided this is a great
advantage, which, however, accrues to any naval belli-
gerent attacked by a Power whose bases are far distant,
and especially if that Power is forced to employ a battle
fleet. In laying down the standard of British naval
strength in capital ships, therefore, the criterion is not
necessarily the number of such ships possessed by any
other Power, but that which it would be possible to
employ in such contingencies as it is reasonable to provide
against. To proclaim a one-Power standard, as the
Admiralty has done, can only mean that our battleship
force must be of any strength which may commend itself
to American opinion. This would be an indefensible
policy, certain to be eventually discarded, and perhaps
leading to a reaction which might imperil our national
safety. It is worse than useless to build ships which could
not be employed.

There are two considerations which can enable us to
find a sound basis for our standard of naval strength :

i* The strength necessary to deal with action which we
should be impelled by the dictates of national safety or
bound in honour to oppose.

z. The strength which any Naval Power that can be
reasonably regarded as a probable enemy could bring to
bear upon any territorial portion of the Empire or upon
Imperial commerce at sea.

The time element the period required to make addi-
tions to naval force exceeding those now in progress
must be duly regarded. Fortunately the number of
problems thus arising is limited in present circumstances,
and* as the greater includes the less, the standard required
for major operations will amply suffice for the minor tasks
which may fall upon the Navy.

238 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Instead of seeking for formulae necessarily misleading,
it is most desirable that the Naval General Staff, which is
at length being properly organked, should work out
estimates on the lines I suggest. One result might well
be modifications of the existing types of battleship, while
the various elements which now make up sea-power
would receive full consideration by being adjusted to fulfil
definite purposes studied in advance.

I do not for a moment ignore the possibilities of a purely
air attack, or the fact that the means of orrying out such
an attack can be provided in a far shorter time than that
required for ship-building ; but an air attack from the
home territory of one belligerent upon that of another
must be met in the air, and I have confined myself to
certain aspects of the naval warfare of the future.

British sea-power will always depend upon adequate
and suitable matkntl> effective direction in war, and, per-
haps most important of all, the qualities of our seamen of
all ranks, including the mercantile marine. There have
been periods in our history when the first condition was
not fulfilled at the outset of hostilities. The second was
not entirely fulfilled during the Great War for reasons
which I cannot here discuss. The third never shone more
brilliantly than when we triumphed over forces far greater
than those which Napoleon wielded. The future security
of the Empire demands that we should turn to the fullest
account all the many and varied lessons of the war before
they are either blurred or forgotten.

PART II
INDIA

XXI
INDIAN NATIONALISM

(" The Times" 22 and 23 December, 1913.)

This is composed of two out of four long articles which The Times
then not committed to any policy permitted me to contribute.
They were intended to convey my fresh impressions, on returning
to England, of a complex situation and to explain the falsity of the
claims of the Indian Nationalists which seemed to appeal to con-
vinced democrats in this country kcking all knowledge of the basic
conditions of the Indian peoples. My object was to give an early
warning that India was still wholly unfit for democratic institutions,
and that concessions to the clamour of a small and privileged class
could only shake the foundations of order and prejudice the greatest
interests of the masses, the responsibility for whose welfare we
could neither surrender nor devolve upon an Indian oligarchy.
Five years later these and other plain warnings were thrown to the
winds ; but all who have sought to follow events since Mr. Montagu's
disastrous policy came into force, will surely realize that my words,
inspired by deep affection for India and her peoples, have proved
true to the letter.

IN his admirable study of Indian Unrest Sir Valentine Chirol
carefully examined the influence of Brahmanism, which
he regards as one of the " only two forces that aspire to
substitute themselves for British rule, or at least to make
the continuance of that rule subservient to their own
ascendency." The other force he defines as that " gener-
ated by Western education, which operates to some
extent over the whole of India, but only upon an infinit-
esimal fraction of the population recruited among a few
privileged castes." Neither of these forces had, in his
opinion, " in itself sufficient substance to be dangerous " ;

241 E

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

but lie clearly saw that " the most rebellious elements in
both have effected a temporary and unnatural alliance on
the basis of an illusory e Nationalism * which appeals to
nothing in Indian history, but is calculated and meant to
appeal with dangerous force to Western sentiment and
ignorance/'

This diagnosis of the situation a few years ago was
profoundly true, but recent developments indicate the
need of some qualification. The " temporary and un-
natural alliance " has been strengthened for evil, and other
than " the most rebellious elements " are, consciously or
unconsciously, playing a part in the alienation of the
masses. Between the Western thought imperfectly assim-
ilated in the schools and colleges of India and Brahmanism
there may appear to be an almost impassable intellectual
gulf, but the imported " Nationalist " theories have been
absorbed by Brahmans whose ambitions blind them to
the hopeless incongruity of ideals and who are quick to
see the political uses of religions in which they may have
ceased to believe. And so-called Hindu "Moderates/*
or Mohammedans, when they engage in a movement for
the establishment of what is described as " self-govern-
ment" in India, cannot be expected to exercise a nice
discrimination as to methods. In India we have to
recognise the fact that apparently antagonistic elements
can unite in swelling the propaganda directed against
British rule, and whether perpetual misrepresentations or
incitements to active hostility suit the predilections of
individuals, the effect upon the vast unthinking masses is
to instil dislike differing only in degree. Such "tem-
porary and unnatural " alliances may continue effective
until irreparable injury has been inflicted upon India, and
their existence can be represented as a proof of the cathol-
icity and the solidarity of the " national " spirit.

It is perhaps inevitable that the growth of this spirit
should be welcomed and encouraged by well-meaning

INDIAN NATIONALISM 243

persons at home who fail to understand its relation to the
helpless millions absolutely dependent upon British rule
to save them from anarchy. The Nationalist idea is a by-
product of a shallow education in which the merits of
democratic institutions resulting from centuries of political
evolution were casually imbibed without the counterpoise
of knowledge. The uprising and the naval and military
triumphs of Japan suggested nebulous possibilities of pan-
Asiatic dominion. The paper Constitutions nominally
adopted in Persia and China stimulated vague notions of
self-government. It was discovered not in the pages of
history that India had a golden past in which all other
nations learned at her feet and her peoples were immune
from all the ills of modern existence. This and more
could be regained if the " demon " of British rule were
driven out.

The political uses which this theory can be made to
serve are manifold. It may well appeal to the nobler
instincts of the Indian peoples. It ought so to appeal
if it bore the least resemblance to truth. In the painful
story of Siri Ram, Revolutionist the saddest and the
truest picture of some aspects of the Nationalist propa-
ganda that has yet been painted the Swami skilfully
plays upon the imagination of the young Indian student :

<C A dragon is sucking the life-blood of our Bharat
Mata. She is weeping. Shall we sit at our meals amid
laughter and merry-making without care ? Or shall we
not rather give up our pleasures and smear our bodies
with ashes every day until we have rescued her and
trampled the demon under our foot ? . . . Our country
was the crown of all countries and was called the
Golden Land. Her hour has come again. Drums are
beating. Heroes and martyrs are preceding. See to
Sivaji, Napoleon Buonaparte, and other heroes of Ger-
many and France. See to Japan. Take only a life for
a life"

244 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

This is no invented harangue. It is simply a paraphrase
of the teaching which is being daily distilled into the
impressionable youth of India, and the Nationalist sym-
pathizers at home are assisting the process.

Who are the teachers and where lies the strength of
the movement which threatens the peace of India ? Among
the 1,670,000 persons classed as "literate in English"
there are men of whom any country might be proud
real Indian philanthropists and patriots, students of affairs,
captains of commerce and industry, some scholars, true
reformers, loyal friends willing to help the Government
with disinterested advice and perfectly cognisant of the
fact that on the stability of British rule every hope for the
future of India absolutely depends. Such men fear and
deplore the tendencies which they plainly see ; but their
numbers do not increase, and they are sensitive to the
attacks to which they are subjected. Their influence is
diminishing in India and is not felt in England, where
determined efforts are made to capture public opinion for
Nationalist purposes. The large number of students in
colleges and secondary schools who may be classed as
literati for Census objects have too often been used for
political purposes, but they can hardly be regarded as
politicians fit to lead or to represent opinion. There are
more than 365,000 Christian literates in English. Pro-
bably not more than 500,000 adults remain, and these
would include many thousands of persons who have
failed in their examinations, who are not educated in any
real sense, and who cherish grievances against the. Govern-
ment, which they regard as the cause of their want of
success. Lastly, there are large numbers of Indian
Government servants who are true to their salt. All such
estimates must be conjectural ; but the adult classes who
constitute the plastic "material" upon which, as Sir
Valentine Chirol has pointed out, " the leaders of unrest
have most successfully worked" cannot greatly exceed

INDIAN NATIONALISM 245

300,000, and may be less in number, out of a population
of 315 millions.

As will be seen from the figures already given, the
literates in English tend to increase in a higher ratio than
the general literates, many of whom are barely able to
read and write a vernacular language. The literati have
picked up the shibboleths of democracy, and some of
them can glibly use its formulae, but of the existence of
any real democratic spirit it is difficult to find a trace
among them. A body less representative of India cannot
be imagined. India remains and will remain for many
generations an essentially aristocratic country in a sense
of which the British people at home and in the Dominions
have long lost the knowledge. Some of our mistakes in
India have been due to our lack of this knowledge, and
for want of it we may and do at times unconsciously
offend the deep-rooted feelings of an ancient people.
Were we to abdicate in favour of the " Nationalists "
there would be no materials from which to form and no
democrats to administer a democracy. The success of
the present political movement would entail an attempt to
govern by the narrowest of oligarchies, which, external
aggression apart, would instantly crumble to pieces.
Such a Government, were it conceivable, would violate
every principle cherished by the politicians at home who
are giving support to the growing disaffection, and would
violently conflict with the inherited traditions of old India.
When the Indian Nationalist speaks attractively of " repre-
sentative " institutions, it is necessary to remember that
he is thinking in terms of a handful of persons whose
interests often conflict with those of the millions of India,
and who show no real sympathy with their needs. He
contemplates the attainment of power for himself and his
dass, and any addition of Indians in the higher posts of
the Administration which the Public Services Commission
may recommend cannot have the smallest

246 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

effect. It would provide only for a pitiful fraction of
the literate malcontents, leaving all the rest unbenefited.
Like the generous and important reforms of 1909, it
would utterly fail to satisfy the aspirations fomented and
proclaimed.

Unfortunately for India, circumstances which the
Government could not control have powerfully assisted
the Nationalist movement. The Tripoli and Balkan wars
naturally produce excitement among the Moslems of
India. There were sober and loyal Mohammedans who
strove to restrain it ; but the Nationalists duly exploited
the alleged impotence and ill-will of the British Govern-
ment in the interests of swaraj, and the Moslem extremists,
to the temporary satisfaction of their astute Hindu allies,
have risen to power in the councils of the community.
The consequences appeared at Cawnpore where a ques-
tion which had excited no local interest was, suddenly
and by outside influences, made the occasion of an out-
break of fanaticism. The usual deplorable results followed,
and the incendiaries on whom the whole responsibility
rests escaped scot-free. The settlement would be Gil-
bertian but for the preceding tragedy, since the sanctity
of the dalan, which had formed the sole justification of
the riot, was readily abandoned.

The grievances of the Indians in South Africa, which
most naturally and rightly appeal to all classes and religions,
are an even greater source of danger. The matter is
infinitely complicated and entangled with Union politics
and with the relations which must exist between the
Home Government and the Dominions. The facts that
the British people in South Africa support the reasonable
demands of the Indians, that the Indian Governments are
in fullest sympathy with those demands, that Englishmen
freely subscribe to the funds which are being raised to
help sufferers, that the obnoxious 3 licence tax is doomed
even if it is not proved illegal, as an English lawyer main-

INDIAN NATIONALISM 247

tains, and that methods of administration easily changed
are as much responsible for the hardships complained
of as legislation, cannot be jmade clear to the sensitive
masses of India. It is distressing to note that inflam-
matory reports were at once spread over India, and strong
language was instantly forthcoming without waiting for
ascertained facts. Whatever might be the result of an
inquiry, harm which cannot be remedied has already
been done, and the general result must be to strengthen
the forces of disaffection.

Incidents of party strife at home, the preparations in
Ulster, strikes which lead to violence, even die outrages
of the suffragettes, can be turned to account for political
purposes and can be used to supply points for the propa-
ganda. Thus in India we can plainly see the creation of
an atmosphere in which the best efforts of Government
and the wonderful progress already achieved are viewed
as in a distorting medium where all sense of proportion is
lost and truth is effectually obscured.

Since the Nationalist Party began to aim, not at building
up Indian nationhood but at supplanting British rule,
the injury inflicted upon India has spread and deepened.
The diversion of energy and funds from the cause of the
real people of India has visibly checked the progress of
social reforms which would have helped to uplift the
masses and to instil the spirit of brotherhood. Signs of
a real and a healthy awakening, due to Western influences,
can be discerned. Some of the best and most patriotic
of Indians are earnestly endeavouring to work on truly
national lines, and several movements have been started
in recent years to develop practical philanthropy, to
stimulate self-help, and to undertake the many tasks to
which Government agency is not suited. Such efforts
are overshadowed and stunted by the perversion of ideals
preached by the small body of lawyers, doctors, jour-
nalists, and schoolmasters who claim the leadership of

248 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the classes which have acquired a superficial Western
education and who are seeking, through these classes, to
overthrow all authority in India. A train of misfortunes
has naturally followed. Murder, crime, and general law-
lessness increase in many places, and the loss of innocent
lives in riots artificially fomented may well give rise to
anxiety for the future. How many other rising storms
have been quieted by the tact and the soothing influence of
British officials is not guessed in England.

Even the recent bank failures, which have brought
suffering to many poor people, are directly due to the
propaganda. The swadeshi boycott movement, started in
Bengal and endorsed by the Indian National Congress,
naturally led to the establishment of fraudulent institu-
tions, which made appeals to a spurious patriotism. As
an Indian banker has recently pointed out, "company
promoting became the hobby of all true patriotic Indians.
Now, my good countrymen lost sight of the point that
plans matured in such an atmosphere and such a temper
were bound to be attended by grave dangers." There
have been great bankers in India. The Seths of dive's
time must have possessed remarkable capacity. India
to-day can boast of men who show sterling business
aptitudes combined with untarnished integrity; but too
many of the promoters of the swadeshi institutions which
have lately collapsed with ruinous results can lay no
claims to either. It is to be hoped that public investi-
gations and such legislation as is possible for the protec-
tion of the people will follow ; but the Nationalist move-
ment in this aspect has already had the effect of setting
back the investing habit, and we cannot be sure that some
ignorant victims will not be induced to throw the blame
on the Government.

Many other examples of the effects of political agitation
in Indk might be adduced. Enough has been said to
give some idea of a situation which is becoming more

INDIAN NATIONALISM 249

and more distressing to all who love India and her warm-
hearted peoples, who realise the sacred nature of our
obligations towards them, and who are striving to pro-
mote the good will that is essential to the building up of
Indian nationhood. A small section of the population is
working, strenuously and successfully, to bring about the
alienation of the vast unwieldy masses. That is "the
Indian Peril," and if it is not understood in time there will
be a rude awakening.

Let the conscientious democrat at home reflect upon the
tumultuous forces latent in 315 millions of people wholly
uneducated and inheriting, in part at least, strong fighting
instincts, split not only vertically into discordant elements
deeply permeated by traditional enmity but horizontally
into thousands of castes, and quickly roused to violent
fanaticism. Let him ask himself what power is to preserve
this stupendous mob from blood-stained anarchy if British
rule is weakened or removed. Let him consider who is
to hold back the armed warrior tribes of the North-West
Frontier with Afghan hordes behind them, the Nepalese
on the north, the Chinese on the north-east, from the
rich plains and cities of India. Let him admit that the
peace and order in India which he may have seen or read
of are the direct results of British rule with the forces
behind it, and that if these forces fail the reaction will be
catastrophic. Let him realize that, if that day comes,
the literati whose familiarity with the phrases of demo-
cracy attracts his sympathy will be instantly submerged,
and the elemental instincts of the untutored millions will
ruthlessly assert themselves until some other Western
Power restores order by the sword. Then perhaps he
may come to doubt whether the so-called Nationalist
agitation merits his encouragement.

Out of the grave perplexities and complexities of the
situation in India some few general principles plainly
fprtb as guides to policy. The welfare of the

25 o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

millions of helpless and inarticulate people, not the momen-
tary gratification of a handful of literates, must be the
first object, as its furtherance is the first duty, of Govern-
ment. If they are allowed to be alienated, India will
become ungovernable, and nothing is so certain as that
any visible weakening of the British Raj will bring about
alienation on a large scale. In the East the masses in-
stinctively follow what they believe to be the rising star
and quickly abandon what may seem to be a losing cause.
Something of this nature seems to be occurring in Bengal,
where the number of British officials is utterly inadequate.
We must gradually educate these millions, remembering
that the vast majority of them will always remain culti-
vators and seeking to fit them for the tasks of their lives.
We should also endeavour to build up the village com-
munity, where this is possible, and thus to inculcate
citizenship.

Our Government must concern itself less with politics
and more with economics. There is ample scope for work
which will benefit and uplift the toiling millions, but will
never be pressed and may be strongly opposed by the
lawyer-politicians who pose as friends of the people. We
must show inflexible justice in dealing with conflicting
interests, never forgetting that the Government is the only
force under which nationhood can grow up out of the
jarring elements of India. It is necessary to reverse the
old Latin adage and unite to govern. In proportion to
our success in uniting the Government with the governed
and in securing co-operation between all classes will be
the progress of India towards self-government in the
distant fixture. We must unflinchingly enforce law and
order, realizing that misplaced leniency may be cruel in
the long run by encouraging outbreaks in the suppression
of which the lives of harmless persons will inevitably be
sacrificed. There are parts of India in which the primary
duty of guarding life and property is not now adequately

INDIAN NATIONALISM 251

discharged, and some Native States can show a higher
standard of security than certain British districts.

Improvement of our educational system in the higher
branches should be fearlessly undertaken in the truest
interests of the people. Technical education needs to be
built up, and the preposterous misuse of English literature,
which the experienced author of SH EMM has effectively
exposed, requires to be eliminated. Other defects are
patent, and thek inevitable results have been frequently
pointed out. No country stands in greater need of
soundly educated men and women than India ; but, for
various reasons, the products of the universities are
deplorably inadequate to the growing requirements. The
judicial system urgently needs to be overhauled. Estab-
lished with the best of intentions, it operates in certain
respects with real hardship upon a naturally litigious
people easily exploited by the superfluity of pleaders, and
it too often fails to secure justice. " Inexplicable acquit-
tals," wrote our most acute foreign critic, "encourage
crime and ruin the prestige of the dominant race."

If, as is now the case, a small band of political mal-
contents has come to wield an influence which threatens
to alienate the toiling millions from our rule, there are
elements sincerely loyal by conviction, by personal affi-
nities, or by knowledge. Reverence and affection for the
Sovereign are deeply engrained in the mind of the peoples
of India. This strong sentiment, the inheritance of many
centuries, is a power for good which the agitators are
seeking to undermine. The Princes and Chiefs, who
have already been threatened by the propagandists, realize
the dangers of a " Vakil Raj," and they would not for a
moment tolerate in their States an agitation directed against
themselves. The fine old gentry of India wonder whether
the flowing tide is with the Government, and what will
be their position if it is not. The native officers are
beginning to ask whether the Sircar is afraid, and it is

2 5 2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

most undesirable that an Asiatic army should think it
scents fear in its rulers. Indians trained in practical
business perfectly understand the basis of British credit
upon which the whole increasing structure of Indian
commerce and industry rests. The Government in
normal times cannot depend upon all these elements for
active support ; but it can show regard for its friends,
seek their counsels, and avoid arousing their distrust by
making concessions to agitation concessions which" can
never lead to the least political advantage and will in-
variably be taken as the starting-point for fresh demands.

Strange as it may seem to some minds at home, it is
strength in Government which alone attracts support in
the East. And Government can be more educative by
frankly explaining its objects and issuing authoritative
statements of facts which could not be entirely ignored.
Party organs have at least the advantage that both sides
of a question or of a policy may be presented ; but in
India there is no effective antidote to die streams of mis-
representation and detraction which now find their way
even to the simple villagers, who can be as easily reached
by the administrative machinery. Firm administration
of the Press laws is essential in the truest interests of the
masses, who are the real sufferers from incendiary publi-
cations, as experience has sadly proved. These laws
cannot absolutely prevent incendiary writing artfully
veiled ; but they can mitigate the danger and help to raise
the standard of journalism. It is the bounden duty of
every Briton in India to give out sympathy unstinted when
it is deserved; but he must never flinch from frankly
condemning what is unworthy and reactionary. That is
the true way to show real friendship to India and to build
up the best qualities of her peoples.

If, however, the Government and its officials adopted
every measure best calculated to avert the coming danger,
influences emanating from England might go far to thwart

INDIAN NATIONALISM 253

their aims. Can it be too much to ask that politicians
and publicists at home shall take reasonable care to
ascertain the truth, and shall assume that Britons in India
have as keen a sense of justice and of duty and as much
sympathy as are given to Britons elsewhere ? And may
they not seriously consider whether the aspirations which
they encourage really represent a burning zeal to make
" the bounds of freedom wider yet," or a growing desire
for power to be wielded by a small section of malcontents
who have imperfectly assimilated some Western ideas?
The great question to be resolved is : Can a democracy
govern a vast Eastern Empire? Upon the answer,
which must be forthcoming within a few years, the ruin
or the sustained and quickened progress of India depends.

XXII
THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT

(The speech repubhsbed Mow was delivered in the House of Lords on
6th August, 19 18, in support of a Motion of mine, drawing attention to the
Rtport of the Viceroy (Lord Cbelmsford) and the Secretary of State for
Ini&a (the late Mr. Edwin Montagfi) on Indian "&&forms y and moving for the
production of Papers ffving the opinions of Local Governments on the
question of reforms, of a selection of Addresses to the Viceroy and Secretary
of State, ffving both sides of opinion on that question, and of the Export of
Mr. Justice Rtwlatfs Committee on Sedition in India.)

This speech was the first in which it was attempted to analyse the
proposals of the amassing Report to which the India Office and the
Government of India were committed after Mr. Montagu's trip to
India in the cold weather of 1917-18, I tried to explain the prepos-
terous device of dyarchy which, as such, has proved unworkable ;
but my main object was to point out that the interests of the masses
of India whose " contentment " Mr, Montagu proposed " deliber-
ately" to disturb were ignored. In the draft Bill which followed,
some features in the Report did not appear ; but the general effect
of this Bill was dangerously to weaken British authority in India
and to put nothing in its place. The Bill, as it emerged from the
Joint Select Committee, went further than the draft in crippling the
Supreme Government More than nine years have passed since
this speech was delivered, and I believe that it will be admitted that
my forecasts have been abundantly justified by events. Many stal-
wart supporters of the Montagu-Chelmsford policy seem now to
have abandoned their theories and to be filled with misgivings.

MY LORDS, I believe that there are many of your Lord-
ships who feel, now that a remarkable Report has been
issued for public discussion, that if this Report is not
considered in your Lordships' House it might seem as if
the vital interests of the Indian people were not being

254

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 255

regarded. In the second place, there has been an attempt
on a considerable scale, which began even before the
Report was issued, to create what is generally called an
" atmosphere " favourable to the Report. That, I think,
makes it all the more necessary that some discussion should
take place before the recess. I venture to think that the
handling of the questions of Indian reform have been
somewhat irregular and generally unfortunate. It bears
a close resemblance to the handling of the Irish question,
and it is leading, I believe, to curiously similar results.

On zoth August last the Secretary of State made an
important declaration with which I do not for a moment
quarrel, but I should like to point that the aims which
he then announced are not really new. I believe that
every one who has had the honour of holding office in
India has always thought that it was his first duty to do
everything in his power -to advance Indian nationhood
in order that self-government could come as soon as that
nationhood existed. I know that this was my first object
during my five and a half years in India. I paid special
interest to all questions of education and to all Indian
enterprises during my time. But it was most unfortunate
that before the Secretary of State assumed office he had
made some caustic and not very well-informed criticisms
of our rule in India, and the result was that his official
declaration was, quite naturally, coupled with his unofficial
previous utterances, and this aroused most exaggerated
expectations throughout India.

Again, I cannot help thinking that the visit of the
Secretary of State to India at a time when this country
was fighting for its life was a real misfortune. It had the
effect of stimulating a very dangerous agitation throughout
India, and incidentally it also had the effect of lowering
the high office of Viceroy in the eyes of the Indian poli-
ticians. And lastly, my Lords, I cannot help regarding
the manner of the presentation of this Report as being

2 5 6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

somewhat irregular. In the past the Government of
India drew up schemes of reform ; they were discussed
by the Secretary of State and his Council ; they were then
considered by the Cabinet, and were finally submitted to
the judgment of Parliament. Instead, in this case, the
Viceroy and the Secretary of State have signed one of the
most controversial documents ever issued, and then the
public is asked to discuss it. Imagine the First Lord of
the Admiralty putting forward a most elaborate naval
programme over his signature for public discussion and
a member of the Board of Admiralty getting up publicly
to express his approval of it, and all that being done before
the Board of Admiralty or the Cabinet had had an oppor-
tunity of officially considering it. I cannot help thinking
that the procedure was distinctly irregular.

My Lords, I warmly welcome some parts of this Report.
The reconstruction of the India Office, I believe, has
been long overdue. That is now, we are told, to be
done by a Committee. The Provinces of India are to
have in future charge of their own domestic affairs. That
was the main feature in the Delhi Durbar Despatch of 191 1 .
The immediate effect will be to give much greater influence
to Indian opinion on all Provincial Councils, which I
believe to be a very good step. The future effect of that
measure will be to give a kind of Federal form to the
Government of India which I think is essential to ultimate
self-government. That is to be arranged by another
Committee. Beyond that, the extension of Indian influence
in the sphere of self-government is, I believe, a wise and
necessary measure which might have been taken some
time ago. The rearrangement of electorates under the
Morley-Minto scheme, and the reconsideration of the
franchise in certain cases, are also most necessary steps
which should be taken. But that is to be arranged by a
Committee which is to tour India under a chairman who
knows nothing of the country. The process must take

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 257

several months, and it must lead to further controversy
of a bitter kind throughout India. I cannot think that
that process is necessary. I believe that the Government
of India and the Local Governments can perfectly well
prepare schemes under some general instructions, and
there is ample knowledge here to enable those schemes to
be reviewed when they come home.

Now I turn to the Report, which reflects the great-
est credit on its draftsmen, but is in parts exceedingly
difficult reading, and I am afraid that few people in these
very strenuous times will be able to master some of its
intricacies. That, I think, is one of its dangers. It comes
to us without any pifoes justificatives* We are not told
the opinion of the Local Governments, though those
Local Governments are to be turned upside down. The
Report ignores the great volume of non-Brahman and
non-lawyer opinion expressed often most passionately by
politicians in memorials or in resolutions passed in public
meetings. I will quote only three of those protests out
of a very large number. The Namasudras of Bengal, who
are an important lower class of the working classes,
numbering^ I think, something like 10,000,000 men, passed
this resolution in a conference at Calcutta :

"This conference emphatically protests against the
gross misrepresentations of facts that are being made by
some so-called high-caste leaders in the self-conceived
character of representatives with regard to the real wishes
of the people about Home Rule or self-government."

My Lords, I think that that protest has been justified.
The South Indian Islamic League, in an address to the
Secretary of State, say :

"Nothing should be done which will weaken British
authority in any manner whatsoever, and hand over the
destinies of the Moslem community to a class which has

2 5 8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

no regard for their interests and no respect for their

sentiments."

Lastly, the Madras Dravidian Hindu Association, which
represents classes that are now giving almost the whole
of the recruits which have been provided from the Madras
Presidency, in an address to the Viceroy and the Secretary
of State, say this :

" We shall fight, to the last drop of our blood, any
attempt to transfer the seat of authority in this country
from British hands to so-called high-caste Hindus, who
have ill-treated us in the past and will do so again but for
the protection of British laws/'

I earnestly hope that your Lordships will read the little
selection of these protests which have been published by
the Indo-Btitish Association, and which I think have been
sent to your Lordships. Considering the little time there
was for organization, the Home Rule movement was well
supported by funds from well-known sources and it
exercised intimidation on a large scale. I feel that these
protests and warnings deserve consideration, and must be
regarded by us all as most significant.

Surely the Report might have devoted one paragraph
to the opinions of the working-classes in India, who, after
all, represent the real mass of the people. The authors
of the Report base their proposals " on the faith that is in
us." My Lords, it is a faith which will certainly be called
upon to remove mountains of difficulty and of danger*
We are told that they "discovered infallible signs that
indicate the growth of character/' They do not say in
what period that " growth of character " has occurred.
Has it been in the past century or during the war, or during
the visit of the Secretary of State ? That is one of the
few touches of humour in an otherwise grave State Paper*
The Viceroy had been about a year and a half in India

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 259

when the Secretary of State arrived, and he must have
been deeply engrossed in all the various affairs connected
with the work of the war. The Secretary of State and
his colleagues made a cold-weather tour through some of
the great towns. Now, can it be believed that a tour of
five or six of the European capitals would enable the
tourists to declare that they saw " infallible signs of the
growth of character " in Europe ? And the peoples of
India are much more diverse than the people of Europe.
A Finn is much more like an Italian than a Pathan is like
a Tamil!

It was necessary for the purposes of the Report to insist
that the Morley-Minto reforms, which were barely nine
years old, were totally inadequate, and quite out of date ;
but incidentally the Report shows that these reforms
gave immense influence to Indian opinion. We are told
that

" Whenever the Government has met with anything
approaching solid opposition on the part of Indian
Members, it has, except on matters touching the peace
and security of the country, generally preferred to give
way."

Could there be a more striking tribute to the efficacy of
those reforms? But those reforms had two defects.
Firstly, decentralization was not made at the same time,
which, as I have said, would have immensely increased
the influence of Indian opinion and the Provincial Councils ;
secondly, some of the electorates were fax too small ; and
communal representation, which is the only possible means
of giving any influence in affairs to the real working-classes
in India, was accepted by Lord Morley and Lord Minto
only in the case of Mohammedans. The most striking
feature of this Report, as it appears to me, is that it seems
mainly directed to finding means of placating the little
Home Rule Party, and that it ignores the conditions of

260 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

India during the war, and also the interests of the great
working-classes of the country.

The Report asks this vital question, What ratio of the
people really ask for greater power ? And it goes on to
say, most justly, that this question cannot be answered
with any degree of certainty. But it then proceeds to add :

" There is a core of earnest men who believe sincerely
and strive for political progress ; around them a ring of
less educated people to whom a phrase or a sentiment
appeals ; and an outside fringe of those who have been
described as attracted by curiosity to this new thing, or
who find diversions in attacking a big and very solemn
Government as urchins might take a perilous joy at casting
toy darts at an elephant."

The President of the Home Rule League informed the
Secretary of State that the membership of that League
throughout all India numbered 52,000 persons. Now, if
we assume that the earnest core, the ring, and the outside
fringe of urchins, number altogether 250,000, that would
be a most exaggerated estimate ; and of that 250,000 a
large number would not be able to give the slightest
account of what self-government or Home Rule meant.
But if we accept that figure, it means that the 250,000 wish
to rule the 244,000,000 people in British India. Is that
" democracy " in any form ? If this " core of earnest
men " includes the leaders of this movement, then some
of its leaders have frankly stated quite openly that it is
their object to destroy British rule altogether. Others
tried to boycott recruiting for the Indian Defence Force ;
others, again, at the Delhi Conference tried to bargain on
the basis of "No Home Rule, no man-power." The
Report says that the war has immeasurably accelerated
the demand for Home Rule. That is perfectly true. The
little band of Home Rulers saw their opportunity, and so
also did the Germans, who have done all they could to

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 261

raise trouble for us in India. The war has also accelerated
the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland again with German
assistance. It is very difficult for people in this country
to follow events in India during the war. News is meagre,
and the censorship is always energetic.

I will try briefly to indicate what has happened, because
I think it should be widely known. German intrigues
have been prevalent everywhere, and have been operating
in many ways in different parts of India. The greatest
conspiracy since the Mutiny was most happily discovered in
time and ably handled by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who has
been publicly rebuked for speaking the truth. I am glad,
however, to know that he had the loyal co-operation of
the police in the Punjab and also of many of the people in
the Punjab, who assisted him to get at the details of that
conspiracy. The ramifications of that conspiracy included
Vancouver, Japan, Berlin, and many other places. Several
Indian regiments have shown mutinous symptoms, due to
corruption by secret agents who have not been discovered.
As you will remember, the outbreak at Singapore was
particularly dangerous and serious. In Bengal anarchy
and murder have prevailed for some time in many parts ;
and there is a dangerous revolutionary movement, sup-
ported by the educated classes, which Lord Ronaldshay
in December last described in what I can only call very
grave language. In October there occurred in Behar one
of the most violent Hindu attacks on Mohammedans
ever known in India ; it was well organized in advance ;
it covered 1,000 square miles of territory, and it was
accompanied by murder, outrage and robbery. Ultimately
it was put down by British troops. That was at a time
when Hindu politicians and members of the little Moslem
League were discussing Home Rule schemes at Calcutta.
Besides that, during this period of war there has been a
most vicious outburst of slanders against British rule in
the press of India, to which the Viceroy on one occasion

262 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

drew serious attention. There ate some other symptoms
than these which are not generally known in this country,
as I feel sure that they ought to be known. The moral
seems to me to be this that, owing largely to weakness
of government in India in recent years, the margin of
safety is now very small. There never was a time when
it was so necessary to scrutinize as carefully as possible any
proposed changes in the system of our government in
India.

I turn now to the details of the Report, which does not
proceed, I think, on lines of evolution, but on lines of
revolution. Speaking broadly, there are two ways by
which a greater share of the Administration can be conferred
upon Indians. The first I may call the geographical plan
by which defined areas can be handed over to Indian rule,
those areas being carefully increased until ultimately the
whole Province falls under Indian rule in the future.
Another plan is to allocate certain services to Indian
Executives, and to go on increasing those services till all
have been handed over.

The Report adopts the second plan, and, if your Lord-
ships will bear with me, I will try to explain the result.
Every Province is to have two Executives, which I will
call A and B. Executive A is to consist of the Governor,
one European, and one Indian, all appointed by the Crown.
That is the present system, except that one European is
taken away, which I think would be a great disadvantage
to a Governor coming fresh from this country. That
system has worked well in the past, and I believe will
always work well, unless a permanent anti-Government
majority is set up in the Legislative Council, which is
exactly what the Home Rule Party is aiming at. Executive
B is to consist of two, and eventually more, Ministers,
selected by the Governor from the elected members of
the Legislative Council, and responsible to the elected
members of that body. It is wisely ordained that these

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT z6 3

Ministers can only be removable by General Election;
otherwise the changes in those offices would, I think, be
very frequent. Two advisers may be added without port-
folio, with no status, no special salary, no authority, and
no vote.

Executive A has control of the reserved services.
Executive B controls all the transferred services, which
are to be settled by another Committee, and the transferred
services are to be increased until Executive A has dis-
appeared altogether. When this remarkable Cabinet meets
there will be three bodies, each serving in totally different
capacities, with the Governor as the sole link between
them. Executive A cannot deal with transferred services ;
B cannot deal with the reserved services ; but A is wholly
responsible for the maintenance of order, and B has no
responsibility whatever of that kind. The advisers can
speak in the Cabinet if asked, and if they choose, but have no
powers of any kind. I think it is a menagerie and not a
Cabinet. The Report says the decisions of the " Ministers "
will be subject to the Governor's advice and control. He
may advise, but it will be quite impossible for him to control
Ministers who depend upon elected majorities ; and all of
your Lordships who have served in the Dominions as well
as in India know that such a proposition is out of the
question.

Legislative Councils are to have a " substantial " elected
majority, and certain of their official members may speak
and not vote. Bills will apparently be in two categories,
differently handled. If Executive B introduces a Bill
dealing with transferred services and it is passed by the
Council, then it may remain subject to the veto of the
Governor, the Governor-General, and of the Secretary of
State ; but in some circumstances it might be difficult to
exercise the power of veto. But if Executive A brings
in a Bill which is opposed, as it frequently would be, by
an elected majority in the Legislative Council, the Governor

264 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

may certify that it is essential to the discharge of his
responsibility. The majority of the Council can then
appeal to the Governor-General in Council, who is to
decide " whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved
subject/* If the Governor-General in Council supports
the certificate, then he^ and probably the Governor, will
be subject to violent attacks, but if the Governor's deliber-
ate judgment in a matter on which he must know better
than the Governor-General, is upset, I really think the
position of the Governor will become impossible.

If the Government of India support the certificate, then
the procedure is as follows. The Bill is discussed by the
Legislative Council, and referred to an elected Grand
Committee, consisting of 40 to 50 per cent, of the Council
" reproducing as nearly as possible the various elements
in the larger body." That condition will be exceedingly
difficult to fulfil by any form of election which I can
conceive. The Governor is permitted to nominate a bare
majority on that Committee, which presumably will be a
majority of one. The Grand Committee, after discussing
the Bill, may refer it to a Select Committee. After being
discussed by the Select Committee the Bill returns at once
to the Grand Committee for further debate, and is reported
back to the Legislative Council as a whole, and they may
debate it again, subject to a time limit which the Governor
may prescribe. The Bill then passes automatically, but
the elected majority may send up their objections and may
possibly succeed in stopping the ultimate sanction of the
Bill. It is difficult to conceive anything more complicated,
cumbrous, and unsuited to Indian conditions. It must
have the effect of destroying all appearance of authority
of every Provincial Government. It would put a premium
on intrigue, in tohich, as we all know, the Eastern genius
excels.

Two most serious results must follow directly from this
amaabg system. In the first place, proceedings taken by

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 265

Executive B might quite conceivably give rise to trouble ;
but whatever B may do, A must support B, by force of
arms if necessary. This little difficulty is recognised by
Mr. Curtis, the inventor of the " dyarchy " which the
Report has adopted. He says quite frankly that we may
have to look on while helpless people are being injured
by their own electorates. That is what I think we can
never do while we remain in India; and it is exactly
what is expected by some of the memorialists, of whose
warnings the Report takes no account. I think every one
who has served in India knows that it is one of the pre-
occupations of British officials to prevent Indians from
oppressing Indians, and the paucity of British officials in
some departments is so marked that we all sadly know
that this oppression goes on without our being able to
stop it.

The second serious objection is that services, whether
reserved or transferred, must continue to be administered
by district officers and commissioners, who, therefore, will
have to serve two masters one subject to the control of
the Governor and ultimately of Parliament and the other
practically uncontrolled, except by the elected majority
in the Legislative Council. This must give rise to acute
irritation and difficulty, and taken in conjunction .with
some of the other proposals in the Report, will have the
effect of destroying the present high standard of the Indian
Civil Service. No wise man will go to India under the
proposed conditions, and if the Indian Civil Service
deteriorates I do not see what we have left to keep our
hold upon the affections and respect of the masses of
India.

Policy will always depend largely upon finance, and
every Budget must be a source of acute controversy
between Executive A and Executive B. The " Ministers "
will .naturally clamour for money for the transferred
services. The Executive Council may want it for the

266 . STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

reserved services, and for the maintenance of law and order.
Executive A is certain to be defeated in the Legislative
Council. The Governor may certify necessity, and then
he is sure to be attacked by the majority of the Council
and by all the organs which they control I really believe
the position of the Governor in these circumstances will
become quite intolerable, and, as after a period of years
a roving Commission is to go out to examine into every-
thing and see if he has done his duty, I am convinced
that no man who understands the situation and cherishes
any self-respect could accept the office of Governor.

I will now turn to the Supreme Government. At
present the Viceroy's Council has a Government majority,
which Lord Morley rightly thought was absolutely essential.
That is all changed, and two Chambers are now to be
set up. The Upper Chamber, or Council of State, is to
consist of twenty-one elected and twenty-nine nominated
members, of whom four must be non-officials. The
Lower Chamber, or Legislative Assembly, is to consist
of about 100 members, of whom two-thirds are to be
elected, and of the remaining one-third not less than
one-third must be non-official.

Government measures are ordinarily to be introduced
in the Lower Chamber and passed on to the Upper House.
If the Houses disagree, as they frequently will, then
unless the Governor-General certifies the necessity of the
Amendment of the Upper House and considers it essential
for the discharge of his responsibilities, the two Houses
sit together, which might have the effect of defeating the
Government of India, If leave to introduce a Bill is refused
by the Lower House, or if the Bill is rejected by the Lower
House, then the Governor-General may certify it and send
it to die other House which must pass it and report it
only to the Lower House. This seems to me to be govern-
ment by certification and veto, I cannot conceive any
government more likely to be unpopular than that form

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 267

of government in India or any other place. The general
effect of this very complicated scheme must be long delays
of public business, frequent conflicts between the two
Houses, and, I believe, a weakening of the high position
of the Viceroy.

Here, again, there are enormous opportunities opened
out to political intrigue. The general effect of the adoption
of this Report would, in my opinion, be to weaken the
authority of the British Government all over India at a
time when that authority is more than ever needed. Dual
authority will be established in all the Provinces and will
permeate down to quite humble officials. The Govern-
ment will only in part be British any longer, and there will
be an Indian majority in every Provincial Cabinet. Every
one who knows the powerful forces of reaction which
are latent in India will understand that we should risk a
most serious setback to civilization and progress. I really
believe that, if these proposals were adopted as they stand,
the result would be to postpone the ultimate self-govern-
ment which we all desire as soon as there is an Indian
nation to which we can hand over our responsibilities.
Your Lordships will see that these proposals introduce a
new principle into India, and it is a principle which Lord
Morley said he would never accept. That principle is
the transference of executive power to Ministers responsible
to elected Members, themselves responsible to electorates
which, in the Western sense, cannot exist for some years.
That principle is absolutely opposed to the traditions,
customs, and inherited characteristics of the Indian peoples.
There never was such a case of putting heady new wine
into very ancient bottles. There is not a Chief in India
who, as I said the other day, would not die rather than
accept that principle in the ruling of his State, and we
must remember that the Chiefs govern one-third of the
area of India and one-quarter of its population.

Have we any right to force upon India a form of demo-

268 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

cracy which the greatest democracy in the world would
not tolerate for a moment ? It was the main object of
the founders of the United States to get rid of this form.
Is it certain that this form of government will for ever
endure with us ? Has it really shown to advantage either
in peace or in war ? May I quote the words of an English
non-official resident in India who knows the country and
its people well. He writes :

" I do not much heed the outcry from the small minority
of iconoclasts and speculative jetty-builders. I listen
rather for a voice that cannot yet be heard, the voice of
the peoples of India. Can we guess now what they will
say when the gift of political speech is theirs ? Positively,
we cannot say ; negatively, we may be confident that it
will not be for any self-governing system of the West
that they will clamour. For the- India of that far-off day
will wish its institutions to conform to the genius of the
Indian peoples, not to the borrowed notions of a de-
nationalized intelligentsia, denationalized, alas ! by the
errors of British policy in the past."

I believe those words express a profound truth, which
was borne in upon me during my styy in India.

The main fault which I find with the Report is that it
wholly ignores the genius of the Indian peoples and is
mainly concerned with concessions to a denationalized
intelligentsia. These proposals will not placate the little
class of Brahmans and lawyers who have raised a ferment
in British India, and British India only, during the war.
The political leaders are already vehemently protesting
against these proposals. Mr. Tilak said of this reform
scheme :

" It is entirely unacceptable and will not satisfy anybody.
It is only a miserable cheese-paring measure proposed in
the interests of the bureaucracy, whose vested interests
must always remain adverse to our aspirations. We

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 269

must now take out case to England and appeal to the
British democracy."

Appeal to the British democracy to establish the narrow-
est oligarchy in the world 1 It was my painful duty in
1908 to order the arrest and trial of Mr. Tilak for articles
in which it was plainly represented that the bomb, then
newly introduced into India, was a charm calculated to
work for the benefit of the people. The miserable assassin
of Mr. Jackson, a most valuable Indian Civil Servant who
was beloved by the Indians who knew him, stated at his
trial:

" I read of many instances of oppression in the Kesari,
the Kal and the Kashtramat. I think that by killing sahibs
we people can get justice. I never got injustice myself,
nor did any one I know. I now regret killing Mr.
Jackson. I killed a good man causelessly."

Could there be a greater tragedy than is expressed in those
few words ? Those three papers were all conducted by
Mr. Tilak, who now proposes to come home to appeal
to the British democracy.

While the principal leaders of what the Report calls
the " earnest core " will not accept these reforms, they
will be abhorrent to the gallant soldiers who have fought
and suffered for the Empire during this war, if they ever
come to understand them. Yet it is on the achievements
of these fighting men that the politicians base their claims
to rule them. The intelligentsia could not rule the
fighting classes of India for a week. I firmly believe that
the effect of these proposals, if they are adopted as they
stand, would be first to lead to administrative, and then
to political, chaos. And may I quote the words of
Zemindar Telaprole to a large gathering of the non-
Brahmans of Southern India. These are significant
words:

270 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

" Britain must understand that we are not cattle to be
sold by one master to the other, with the further humilia-
tion of having the first master standing by with a bludgeon
in case we object to be sold."

That is exactly the view which is taken by some of the
memorialists who are ignored in this Report, and I believe
it expresses the opinions of tens of millions of people in
India who would not understand one word of this Report
and would strongly object to be handed over to the tender
mercies of their hereditary oppressors.

The Report contains some most admirable sentiments
which may divert attention from some of the dangers
that I have tried to point out. We are told that the first
duty of every party in the State is to unteach partisanship.
Have we learned that great truth ourselves ? Excellent
advice is given in the Report to every class in India. The
pity is that it will never reach them. The Report says :

" We can at least appeal to Hindu and Moslem, Brahman
and non-Brahman, to cultivate a community of interests
in the greatest welfare of the whole."

The authors cannot have realized the chasm which at
present separates Hindus and Moslems, Brahmans and
non-Brahmans, a chasm which was formed hundreds of
years ago, which is still deep, and which it will take years
to bridge over. The authors of the Report believe that
representative institutions will help to soften the rigidity
of the caste system, and that is a system which dates back
thousands of years. It is a system which has actually
been intensified in our own day. Then they believe what
to my mind is still more extraordinary. They believe
that in " deliberately disturbing the placid, pathetic con-
tentment of the masses " they are working for the highest
good of India. It has not hitherto been regarded as the
duty of the Viceroy and Secretary of State to disturb the

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT 271.

content of India. The catastrophic possibilities of dis-
content among 315,000,000 of people do not seem to hare
occurred to the authors of this Report.

Russia is now giving a most appalling object lesson of
the results of the breaking up of centralized authority
in a country where there are at least 80 per cent, illiterates.
The effect of the weakening, or destruction, of British
rule in India must be more disastrous, because there the
antagonisms, social, religious, and racial, are far deeper,
and far more bitter and complex, than those which exist
in Russia. It is only the paramount authority of British
rule which now stands between the Indian people and the
blood-stained welter which followed the collapse 'of the
Mogul Empire. We have made mistakes in the past, but
still there is nothing in history to compare with our gigantic
work in maintaining order and promoting the prosperity
of the people of India. The difference between Persia
and India to-day is British rule ; nothing else. Our work
is not finished, and our heavy responsibility still remains.
It is the greatest trust that has ever fallen upon any nation ;
we must fearlessly accept it, and do only what we think
right and safe for the best interests of the Indian people.
We desire to associate with us in the administration as
many as possible of the best minds in India, and not only
the little intelligentsia which is represented by a group of
agitators.

We have still before us a great work in India in gradually
educating the masses, and it is a work which we alone can
control and direct. The noble Earl [Earl Curson of
Kedleston], who made a fine effort to rescue higher educa-
tion work in India from the morass into which it had
fallen, knows well how everything really depends on the
direction which we give, and that if our influence and our
power are taken away there will be an instant and a quick
relapse. There are ways by which we can accomplish
out great task, I believe, in safety, and there are alternative

272 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

proposals which I am prepared to make on geographical
lines which, I believe, real Indian moderates would
accept. Meanwhile, I hope the Government will refer
this Report to some competent examining body which will
be able to take and record evidence. I have given my
reasons for believing that some of these proposals are
dangerous and in doing so I have only one object in view,
and that is the welfare of the masses in India. I have
ventured to raise this question in your Lordships* House
to-day, only because I cherish a real affection for India and
her simple, kindly peoples.

xxm

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

(" Empire &eviw," May, 1923)

The Government of India Act had been in operation more than
four years, and I thought it desirable to examine the divergence
between the theories accepted in 1918-19 and the practical results
obtained in India. Since 1923, this divergence has become more
marked and, at the present time, the outstanding features are com-
munal civil war which has entailed a hecatomb of Indian victims
and, as I predicted in 1918 and later, growing alarm for the future
on the part of the Princes and Chiefs. Now that the Government
of 320 millions of the human race is again to be thrown into the
melting pot, I venture to think that this article, written in the interests
of the vast masses to whom forms of government convey nothing,
is worth consideration,

THE circumstances which led to the subjection of the sub-
continent of India, with a population of about 320,000,000,
to what ML Montagu describes as "a very dangerous
experiment," afe already forgotten. The clamour of a
few individuals, steadily increasing in volume and violence,
brought about an unexampled series of concessions cul-
minating in the Government of India Act of 1919, which
pleased no one except its authors, and is now creating a
situation fraught with grave anxiety.

The year 1915 ended in bitter disappointment to the
Allied Powers. The spring offensive on the western front
had failed. The great joint attack in September in Cham-
pagne and on the Arras-La Bass6e sector had entailed
many losses with no adequate results, because it proved

273 T

274 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

impossible to dominate the German artillery. The Italian
operations against the Trentino and in the Isonzo region
yielded little gain after great sacrifices. In the East, the
Russians had suffered severe reverses ; Bulgaria had joined
the Central Powers, who thus gained free communication
with Asia Minor, and one great Pan-German object was
temporarily attained. The first submarine campaign had
added to our difficulties, and was to be renewed later with
tremendous effect. The year closed with two British
disasters the abandonment of Gallipoli and the failure
of the mad attempt to reach Baghdad, which entailed
terrible suffering to our forces in Mesopotamia, the fall
of Kut, and a heavy blow to British prestige in Persia
and throughout the East.

This was the time selected by Mrs. Besant to launch her
Home Rule movement, and to secure the return of the
Indian extremists to the National Congress, 1 which hence-
forth became an increasingly effective instrument for pro-
moting disaffection and the race-hatred which her paper
New India actively promoted. The All-India Moslem
League inspired by the Ali brothers, subjects of a native
state, subsequently joined forces with the Congress, and
within a year a small band of agitators grew into a large
organization, demanding absolute political independence
for India. In June, 1917, as the result of the scathing
Report of the Royal Commission on the administration of
the medical services in Mesopotamia, Mr. Chamberlain,
whose actions were not involved, resigned, and Mr.
Montagu was appointed Secretary of State for India.
Mr. Montagu had distinguished himself previously by
uninformed criticisms on British Government in India,
and his selection at this critical juncture naturally aroused

1 The extremists, led by Tikk, had been expelled from the Congress
at Surat in 1907, after violent scenes, and had conducted an indepen-
dent agitation until he was arrested in January, 1908, His return
with Mrs. Besant's assistance had a disastrous effect on this body.

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 275

expectations which he proceeded to justify. On aoth
August, in reply to a casual question in Parliament, he
made a declaration of policy so worded as to be capable
of interpretation which might even propitiate Mrs. Besant
and her political friends, and at the same time he announced
his intention of visiting India to receive " the suggestions
of representative bodies and others/* From this time
onwards, two tendencies became painfully visible and led
to disorders on a great scale. On the one hand, Mr.
Montagu engaged in the creation of atmospheres favourable
to the projects which he was incubating. On the other
hand, the Indian agitators were quick to realize that the
fears of the new Secretary of State could be exploited, and
they proceeded to organize a campaign of intimidation
intended to influence opinion in England and to raise an
anti-British ferment which could be turned to account as
occasion required.

Two results, on which a volume might be written, quickly
followed. The British Government in India began to be
afflicted by creeping paralysis, which weakened the adminis-
tration of the law and assisted the objects of the extremists.
A long series of outrages commenced, of which the
dangerous rebellion in the Punjab (1919) and the murderous
Moplah rising in Malabar (1921) were the outstanding
examples. Till the end of the Great War, the followers of
the National Congress and the Moslem League continued
to harass the Government to the utmost of their power,
while the Princes and Chiefs and the fighting classes of
India rallied nobly to the cause of the Empire. Mr.
Montagu's atmosphere helped to inspire a widespread
belief, which was duly encouraged and became a mob
slogan, that the British Raj was passing away. In such
conditions, the Indian Constitution took form and came
into force transferring power into the hands of the disloyal
elements*

In November, 1917, the Secretary of State, with the

276 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Viceroy and. some minor officials, began his tour of a
few of the great cities of India, during which he received
numerous deputations and interviewed leading politicians
and Mrs- Besant. No attempt was made to get in touch
with the agriculturists, whose representations were ig-
nored. 1 On 5th June, 1919, Mr. Montagu stated that
the conclusions on which his Bill was based were the
result of protracted discussion for two years, and that
general agreement in India and in England had been
attained. No measure of such transcendent importance
was ever so little discussed and all idea of agreement was
rudely dispelled by the Indian politicians themselves as
soon as the details of the measure became known.

In July, 1918, when the military situation in France
was still grave, and the Germans were able to report the
capture of 2,476 guns and 15,024 machine guns since
2ist March, the Montagu-Chdmsford Report, the most
amazing State paper ever issued, was made public. Previ-
ously, however, our many reverses in France had suggested
to the extremists the desirabilty of starting agitation in
England, and selected emissaries, including Tilak and
Bepin Chandra Pal, were accordingly despatched. In the
absence of Mr. Montagu, the Government ordered the
return of these delegates.

The first five chapters in this Report, which very few
people in this country ever studied, are occupied with
political history prior to the advent of Mr. Montagu, and
with a disquisition on the Morley-Minto Reforms not then
seven years old which is inadequate and far from accurate.
The authors state their conviction that "even from the
beginning, political institutions must be devised with due
regard to die conditions under which they will be worked "
a copy-book maxim embodying an impregnable truth,

*A selection of these interesting and pathetic documents was
published by the Indo-British Association. Otherwise they would
never have seen the light.

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 277

which they subsequently forgot. Chapter VI, The Condi-
tions of the Problem, evidently written by a Civil Servant
with a facile pen and local knowledge, gives a true but
incomplete account of the state of the ancient people upon
whom Mr. Montagu proposed to confer the blessings of
democracy. This is by far the most interesting and
accurate section in a Report of 300 pages and, if it was
passed by the authors without editing, they are to be
congratulated. A few passages will give some idea of
the illuminating character of this chapter, which clearly
ought to have been placed in the forefront of the Report.
Unfortunately, it is marred here and there by futile admoni-
tions, which could never reach, or affect in the slightest
degree the ingrained habits and customs of the masses
to whom they are apparently addressed, and which may
have been interpolations by the sanguine constitution-
mongers. Thus the 320 millions of India, composed of
many races, having the most diverse qualities, and speaking
fifty languages, are gravely told that :

" The (democratic ?) system presupposes in those who
work it such a perception of, and loyalty to, the common
interests as enables the decision of the majority to be
peaceably accepted. This means that majorities must
practise toleration and minorities patience. There must,
m fact, be a certain capacity for business, but, which is
more important, a real perception of the public welfare
as something apart from, and with superior claims to,
the individual good."

Excellent advice if given to the great political parties
here ; but consider the conditions of the heterogeneous
peoples for whom it appears to be intended I

** The immense masses of the people are poor, ignorant
and helpless, far beyond the standards of Europe. . . .
There runs through Indian Society a series of cleavages

278 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of religion, race and caste which constantly threaten
its solidarity."

These pregnant statements can convey no real meaning
to anyone who has not lived in and studied the life of India.

" British India has two and a half times the population
of the United States.

" We may say that 226 out of 244 millions of people
live a rural life, and the proportion of those who ever
give a thought to matters beyond the horizon of their
villages is very small.

** They are not concerned with district boards or muni-
cipal boards. , . . Of Parliament, and even of the
Legislative Councils, they have never heard.

" In British India, 6 per cent, of the population . . .
were able at the last census (1511) to comply with the
test of literacy which consisted in reading and writing a
letter in their own script."

Such a test of " literacy " is futile, and in the case of a
large number of these literates, the power of writing and
reading is quickly lost after leaving school.

" The knowledge of English is confined to less than
two million people, a fractional percentage of the entire
population."

Not one million have a working "knowledge of
English."

Of the interests " of the ryot " it is correctly explained
that:

" A simple, cheap and certain system of law is one of
his greatest needs.

" One of his constant needs is protection against the
exaction of petty official oppressors.

"He has never exercised a vote on public occasions.

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 279

. , . These facts make it an imperative duty to protect
him while he is learning to shoulder political responsi-
bilities.

" The rural classes have the greatest stake in the country,
because they contribute most to its resources."

In the course of a cold-weather tour of a few cities,
Mr. Montagu was able to discern "the infallible signs
that indicate the growth of character," and he thus arrived
at the momentous conclusion :

" That the placid, pathetic, contentment of the masses is not
the soil on which such nationhood [nationhood within the Em-
pire} mil grow, and that, in deliberately disturbing it, we are
working for her highest good"

I have given only a few of the more important, because
accurate, passages in Chapter VI. Anyone, knowing
India, who will carefully compare them with the Constitu-
tion outlined in the succeeding chapters, cannot fail to
note a complete contradiction. Nothing that the 226
millions of cultivators in British India are said to need
or to desire is provided for. Pious aspirations, which
cannot be fulfilled, are substituted for practical statesman-
ship, and Mr. Montagu's " very dangerous experiment "
is being tried because of " the faith that is in us."

At what period the disastrous Mr. Lionel Curtis super-
vened is not certain; but in 1917 he went to India to
advertise the great principles of dyarchy and to evolve
one of the most crazy Constitutions ever concocted by an
ingenious doctrinaire who knew nothing of the country,
or the people selected for experiment. Mr. Montagu and
the Viceroy rejected the scheme as a whole, but adopted
the unheard-of dyarchical device. Their Constitution
imposed a complete Parliamentary system, to which Lord
Morley said he would never agree, upon India. Large

280 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

Councils dominate the Provinces. A "National As-
sembly " and a " State Council " in which the executive
is supposed to have a majority, take charge of India as a
whole. The electorates, subsequently arranged, though
only 2 per cent, of the population, are numerically large
and very complicated, but they deprive the 226 millions,
who " live a rural life " and contribute most of the revenue,
of any effective political influence.

So far the Constitution follows generally the lines of
the democratic institutions which work with more or less
success in countries where the population is fairly homo-
geneous and has not 94 per cent, of illiterates. It is in
die construction of the executives that the inspiration of
Mr. Lionel Curtis appears. The dyarchical principle
entails a dual Council consisting of (i) the Governor and
a mixed body of experienced Civil Servants and selected
Indians, and (2) Indian " Ministers/' chosen for their
assumed influence as elected members of the Legislative
Councils. The business of the administration is divided
into "reserved" and "transferred subjects/* distributed
respectively among executives (i) and (2), the preservation
of law and order, which affects all "subjects/* being
nominally entrusted to the former. There are elaborate
suggestions as to the way of working this impossible
system, which devolve upon the unfortunate Governor.
So far as can be gathered, Mr. Montagu and the Viceroy
believed that " Ministers " would introduce and defend
their own measures in the Councils and would resign in
case of rejections, thus carrying out the theory of an
executive responsible to an elective body, which, except
in the United States, is the approved democratic principle.
If executive No. (i) disagreed with No. (2), the Governor
was to use his efforts to secure harmony ! In administering
their " subjects," " Ministers " were to be subject to the
advice and control of the Governor, who obviously could
not prevent decisions supported by a large majority in his

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 281

Legislative Council. The supreme Government was revo-
lutionized by the institution of a bi-cameral Parliament.

The Indian Civil Service, as a whole, is unlearned in
political systems ; but Mr. Montagu succeeded in attaching
to himself a small group of individuals who were liberally
rewarded. The Heads of Provinces took strong objection
to the dyarchical plan, and made alternative proposals
which the Secretary of State ignored. The reception of
the Report by the Indian extremists and Mrs. Besant was
exactly as might have been expected. Tilak spoke of it
as "a miserable cheese-paring measure," and another
leader called it " the monster foundling of Round Table
politicians " in compliment to Mr. Lionel Curtis. The
Home Rule League demanded its instant rejection, and
Mrs. Besant declared that it was " leading to a line beyond
which its authors cannot go perpetual slavery, which
can only be broken by revolution." Gandhi, whose
ominous star was beginning to rise above the Indian
horizon, was hopeful that the Congress might still attain
its objects " by sheer obstructive and destructive agitation,"
which he proceeded to organize,

In India, therefore, Mr. Montagu had failed to placate
what he described as the "limited intelligentsia," had
created a lurid atmosphere, and was forced to plan further
concessions, while the British people at the greatest crisis
in their history, when their fate was still undecided, were
uninformed, and inevitably apathetic to the complex
problems of India. The Government of India Bill was at
length referred to a carefully arranged Joint Select Com-
mittee, to which Mr. Montagu, whose policy was to be
reviewed, appointed himself and his Undersecretary of
State, Lord Sinha. Political deputations, in which Mrs.
Besant was prominent, arrived in London, and quickly got
into touch with the "Labour" Party, which, interpreting
democracy here as government by the manual workers,
was aj&sfious to transfer all po^er in India to a little minority

282 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of English-speaking politicians, 1 whose main object was

to get power over the 226 million helpless people who

" live a rural life " and contribute most of the revenue.

Masses of evidence, mostly futile as representing Indian

opinion, were taken. The Committee declined to hear

the opinion of any non-English-speaking Indian, thus

excluding some of the shrewdest brains in India. Nor

would they hear any representatives of the fighting classes

who suffered and died for the Empire in most theatres

of war. 2 With the able assistance of Sir James (now

Lord) Meston at his elbow, Mr. Montagu was able to

secure some at least of the further concessions which the

various self-appointed deputies urged upon him in the

Committee room and behind the scenes. The Bill thus

emerged in a form which rendered the Government of

India far weaker, especially in regard to finance, than the

Report appeared to contemplate, and all the conditions

which Lord Curzon had laid down were flagrantly violated.

Special urgency now supervened, and the most momentous

Bill, from the Imperial point of view, ever presented was

rushed through Parliament, many amendments not being

discussed, while all were rejected. This indecent haste

was doubtless due to Mr. Montagu's belief that the

erection of his Constitution would at once bring peace to

India.

The elections at the end of 1920 were in some cases
farcical, and the new Councils quickly began to impede
the re-establishment of order. The year 1921 was marked
by a succession of riots, political strikes and outrages,
culminating in the Moplah rebellion, which severely

1 The spectacle of the Brahman politician, belonging to the most
privileged class in the world, and of the parasitic lawyer in dose
alliance with Labour Members would have been irresistibly comic,
but for the tragedy in the background

a l pleaded in vain for the admission of the evidence of these two

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 283

taxed the resources of the Government. Until the Govern-
ment of India was induced or forced to arrest Gandhi,
there was no lull, and the visits of the Duke of Connaught
and H.R.K the Prince of Wales were deliberately marred
by disorders, which, in some places, were of a serious
character. Mr. Montagu had succeeded in paralysing the
operation of law and emasculating the local authorities,
while his frequent amnesties and the favour shown to
the enemies of Britain alienated our natural allies. As a
loyal and distinguished Indian soldier wrote in 1921 :

/thing in these days is carried by the extremist
wind-bags and by their subsidized papers. All the well-
wishers of the Government have been boycotted. Almost
every extremist has been selected as Minister throughout
the country. The party which brought about chaos in
the Punjab has got ne\v facilities to predominate. . . .
Thanks to the high officials, there exists no Government
of its name in India. Government has already lost its
respect and prestige."

Such were the natural results of Mr. Montagu's policy,
which was based upon concession to organized clamour
and ignored the vital necessity of maintaining order the
primary duty of civilized governments. He placated no
one and he built up a whole host of new enemies, ready
to become facile dupes of the Bolshevik propaganda
skilfully adapted to Indian conditions which has been
stealthily developed. His Constitution remains, and its
leading features can be briefly indicated.

British power to guide and to restrain has been limited
to vctos and certifications which can rarely be exercised,
and to the personal qualities of the members of the rapidly
dwindling British services. Authority has passed to a
small oligarchy which has no basis on representation of the
people. Of a nominal 900,000 voters for the Legislative
Assembly in a population of 250,000,000, the number

284 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

who went to the polls was 1 80,000, or i in 1,400 of the total.
For the eight Provincial Councils about 5^ millions were
qualified to vote, and about ij millions registered their
preferences. Of these voters, many had no idea of the
meaning of their electoral privilege, and ridiculous ex-
pedients were devised to secure their support. 1 If we
imagine the House of Commons to be elected by about
28,000 voters, membership being confined to persons
literate in French, it becomes possible to form a rough
idea of democracy as applied to India. India is to be
ruled by what Mr. Montagu accurately described as a
" limited intelligentsia/* and the persons who loudly
demand a "dictatorship of the proletariat" the class
which breeds appkuded his scheme.

One curious result follows. By the vast masses of simple
agriculturists, whose existence Mr. Montagu recognized
in Chapter VI of the Report, and then proceeded to ignore,
the Raj, in spite of what the professional agitators assert,
is still regarded as in being, and will be held responsible
for everything that they resent. The doubling of the
salt tax will be felt by the humblest of " the immense
masses," whom Mr. Montagu correctly described as * poor,
ignorant and helpless, far beyond the standards of Europe,"
though providing most of the revenue. The Assembly
has thrown out this measure, because the chosen of the
people would not agree to the taxation of income from
land, to succession duties, or even to a more rigorous collec-
tion of income tax, which many rich Indians scandalously
evade. The increased salt tax, certified by the Viceroy,
may be bitterly resented, and the agitators with Bolshevik
assistance will ascribe it to British oppression. Our

1 In Burma the application of the Constitution was delayed and
opposed even by the Government of India. A local agitation having
been engineered, Mr. Montagu prevailed, and at the elections last
year a little more than 5 per cent, of the voters returned the candidates
for the Assembly.

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 285

responsibility to the Indian peoples remains, while our
power to discharge it has been destroyed.

Another, and a peculiarly dangerous, process has begun.
The great British public services are literally withering
away, and the " steel frame," which Mr. Lloyd George
discovered after the departure of Mr, Montagu, is cracking
from top to bottom. As Lord Peel explained on ist March,
the total number of applications for premature retirement
is 227, including fifty (already sanctioned) from the Civil
Service, eighty-one from the Police, and thirty-three from
the Public Works Department. Anyone who knows what
these services have done in keeping the peace and in
securing the wonderful progress of India under British
Government will understand what this wastage of experi-
enced officers must entail. The clearest warning of what
Mr. Montagu's headstrong policy would inflict upon the
public services was given more than four years ago. A
new commission is now to inquire whether the disaster
can be retrieved.

The working of the Constitution must be judged by
what has happened in more than two years, remembering
that in 1920 the Councils were supposed to be boycotted
by the advanced politicians, who are now considering
whether they will stand in the coming elections. The
Constitution has, of course, not operated as its authors
expected, and some of its provisions have proved a dead
letter. The dyarchy practically disappeared, and the
various executives appear to act as unified bodies. " Minis-
ters" never resign if their measures are rejected; but
they often fail to support the executive even on important
occasions. The "moderate" Councils have made a
pastime of defeating their Governments, and have shown
a marked tendency to cut down expenditure on security
services, and to reduce the British elements in the adminis-
tration. The bureaucracies have been swollen, in accord-
ance with the invariable practice of democracy, and the

286 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

transaction of business has been delayed and complicated.
The cost of what was the cheapest of governments has
grown considerably, and will largely increase in the future.
The special powers vested in the Viceroy and the Pro-
vincial Governors are proving illusory, and the executives,
that of the Supreme Government especially, appear to be
cowed by the elected bodies. The Assembly in 1921
repealed the Press Acts, operating as a merciful check on
revolutionary organizations, which, it was asserted, had
ceased to exist; the Moplah rebellion, an artificial out-
break, quickly followed. This august chamber rejected
the Princes Protection Bill on first reading, though it was
a measure promised to the Council of Princes as some
safeguard against imported revolution in their States and
the outrageous blackmailing which has long been pre-
valent. In this case, the Viceroy was prevailed upon to
use his power of certification, and in consequence the
measure was made the subject of a most mischievous
debate in the House of Commons. The Assembly has
also distinguished itself by passing embarrassing resolutions
directed to upset the Constitution with a view to immediate
Home Rule. The Upper Chamber has shown its teeth
by passing a resolution in defiance of the Government,
demanding the appointment of Indians to high posts
irrespective of fitness, after an anti-British speech from
Mr. Srinavasa Sastti, a much favoured " moderate." The
Parliament of India has also succeeded in securing action
by the Colonial Office in Kenya, which has brought the
British builders of the colony very near to rebellion.

Speaking broadly, the Constitution has provided effective
machinery for developing and demonstrating racial antago-
nism. It is noteworthy that, in its first year of power, the
Council of the Central Provinces rejected a resolution to
allow the lower castes access to water supplies provided
from public funds.

It must be presumed that the framers of the Constitution

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS 287

intended to benefit the peoples of India, but everything
that they claimed for it has been falsified by events. Only
a little minority has gained by the power conferred upon
it, which has been used to exploit the ignorant and excitable
masses for political purposes, and is now to be employed
to exploit them economically by high tariffs. And this
minority, far from being satisfied by Mr. Montagu's
largesse, has been rendered more than ever hostile. His
regime has been marked by financial confusion, not all
due to the war which brought great wealth to India. A
sadder result of his theories has been the loss of more
Indian lives in internal disorders than occurred during
the whole period since the Great Mutiny. In these
apathetic days, some outstanding outrage is required to
draw public attention to the condition of India, which is
now assumed to be tranquil. Lawlessness is, however,
steadily increasing, and the number of dacoities has become
alarming, while corruption flourishes. This naturally
follows the lapse of authority, and it will grow with the
crumbling of the British services.

PART III
SOCIALISM

289 U

XXIV
THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM

(" Nineteenth Century and After" March, 1918.)

On my return to England in 1913, after more than five and a
half years* absence, the growth of organised Socialism appeared
to be the most ominous change, and I regarded the "Report on ^con-
struction prepared for the Labour confeience at Nottingham (January,
1918) as a portent which could not be disregarded. When attribut-
ing the authorship to "Fabian doctrinaires," I did not know of
the existence of Wanted a Programme ; an Appeal to the Liberal Party,
published just thirty years earlier by Mr. Sidney Webb, then an
official at the Colonial Office, and " printed for private circulation
among leading London Liberals*" This remarkable effusion closely
and curiously resembles the Report on Reconstruction. Thus Mr.
Webb, while a salaried public servant, demanded :

" Revision of Taxation. Object complete shifting of burden
from the workers, of whatever grade, to the recipients of rent and
interest, with a view to the ultimate and gradual extinction of the
latter class/'

Mr. Webb's political programme, aiming at "the most accurate
representation and expression of the desires of the majority of the
people at every moment " was briefly :

1. Adult suffrage, " Parliamentary and Municipal."

2. "Annual Parliaments.'*

3. '* Payment of all public representatives, Parliamentary, County,
or Municipal."

4. " Abolition or painless extinction of the House of Lords."
Whether this purely revolutionary scheme attracted any of the

" leading London Liberals " to whom it was secretly circulated, I
do not know ; but that the gist of it should have reappeared in 1918
as the suggested platform of the then powerful " Labour " organi-
zations is distinctly interesting.

The childishly absurd theories which I strove to expose in this
article are still widely cherished and employed to deceive the more
ignorant of the electorate ; but, when I wrote, the war was entering on
a most critical stage and public attention could not be effectively

291

STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

drawn to this new attempt to plot the ruin of our country* There
have been modifications of the Report, because the Intelligentsia
which directs " Labour " in these matters has discovered practical
difficulties in the ** Capital Levy " and now tends to prefer an annual
impost of 100,000,000 a year or more drawn from the class of " re-
cipients of rent and interest " which Mr. Webb proposed to extinguish.
His crasy and disastrous theories have still to be fought, and my warn-
ings and detailed criticisms are not obsolete. The ruin which these
theories, put in practice in a self-supporting country, have wrought
in Russia has been explained in the revealing books of Mr. Lancelot
Lawton, and Professors Anton Karlgren and Sarolea ; but they were
nevertheless endorsed by the recent " Labour " Conference at Black-
pool, and they must now be regarded as the basis of the policy of
the Opposition.

THE war has made plain the evils and the weaknesses of
our political, social and industrial systems. Defects,
clearly seen by the few, are now glaringly apparent to the
many. The commingling of the efforts of all classes in
war work of every kind on many stricken fields and in
hospitals, offices and workshops has brought about a
new and sympathetic understanding of grievances that
are preventable and of needs that must be fulfilled in the
future* The mind of the nation is set upon a reconstruc-
tion which shall be the starting-point of a purer, healthier
and happier life that every honest worker with hand or
brain may share. This ideal is not impracticable; but
it can be attained only on conditions which are inex-
orable.

When the war ends, we shall be faced with a heavy
burden of accumulated public debt and also with new
demands that can be met only out of revenue. Past
experience, which is the only safe guide, tends to show
that the burden should not prove intolerable. The public
debt, which stood at 664,263 after the Revolution of
1688, had mounted to 7919817,339 in 1846, owing to
the long wars of the French Revolution and Empire, and
the charges had risen to 28,121,622. Public expenditure
in 1846 stood at 58,437,891. We may now have to

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 293

bear a debt of more than 6,000 millions; but we are
already raising a revenue of about 573^ millions, 1 and
the increase in the ratio of the national wealth to the
public debt since 1846 has been so great as to justify the
belief that the economic situation following the war should
not be unmanageable.

The vital condition of national solvency is an increase
of production, which the vast resources of the Empire,
still undeveloped, render possible with the assistance of the
skill acquired and the immense extension of new machinery
that have become available during the war. The problem
of national reconstruction, with all that it involves to the
future of the State and of the Empire, can be solved only
by the application of science in the widest sense to the
economics of commerce and industry, by hard work of
hand and brain, and by the mutual confidence and co-
operation of Labour and Capital, under the guidance of a
wise and far-seeing Government.

But more than this is needed. Our commerce and
industry form the most intensely complex fabric ever built
up> and it rests mainly upon resources external to the United
Kingdom. Russia, self-supporting in food and with
huge undeveloped possibilities, can in time recover from
any financial disaster, if a stable Government, capable
of maintaining law and order, is established. For us, not
only dependent upon oversea trade for the necessaries of
life and of manufacture, but subject to sharp competition
in the markets of the world, there could be no such recupera-
tion. Our rivals in production would quickly supplant
us, and we should be reduced to hopeless national bank-
ruptcy. Organic changes in our industrial system when
peace returns would, therefore, bring about irretrievable
disaster, and only a smooth transition from war to peace
conditions can enable us to hold the place which we have
won and to secure such an expansion as will enable the

*Year 1916-1917*

294 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

debt charges to be borne and the amelioration of the
conditions of the national life, which we all desire, to be
accomplished.

Reconstruction is already occupying many minds.
Boards and committees are engaged in examining the
economics of production from various points of view,
in scientific research on a large scale, and in seeking to
promote harmonious relations between Labour and Capital.
Employers' federations and associations, as well as bodies
appointed by Government, are studying industrial prob-
lems, elaborating plans of profit-sharing, and showing an
earnest wish to remove all the legitimate grievances of
which labour complains. The Whitley Report marks a
great advance in the direction of bringing employers and
employed into closer touch, of giving the latter a voice
in arranging labour conditions, and of enabling differences
to be adjusted before they become acute. The proposals
have been well received, and steps are being taken to put
them into effect in certain trades. A great measure of public
education has been introduced, which is intended to extend
and improve the instruction of the people and to afford
them fuller opportunities of advancement and a wider
outlook on life and affairs. New enterprises of many
kinds, which can provide employment on a large scale,
are being studied, and schemes for dealing with public
health, housing, the prevention of undeserved poverty and
the care of infant life are being prepared. There has never
been such an awakening to national needs, or such a
strong determination to fulfil them, as that which the war
has created.

Meanwhile, out of the tremendous evils, the cruel losses
and the shared sorrows and sufferings which Prussian
ambitions have inflicted upon the world, there has arisen
a truer sense of brotherhood. The splendid gallantry and
the uncomplaining endurance of our sailors, soldiers and
the seafaring population have powerfully appealed to our

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 295

imagination. We realize that to them we owe a debt that
can never be repaid. They and their as gallant comrades
from the Dominions and India saved the Old Country at
a time of mortal peril and have drawn closer the bonds of
Empire. Wherever the flag flies, there has been a breaking-
down of the artificial barriers which separate classes and
interests. Devoted personal service has been forthcoming
to an extent formerly unknown, and money has flowed
lavishly into channels directed to relieve distress and to
help in softening the asperities inseparable from war. In
this growth of what can best be described as general
kindliness, there is hope for the accomplishment of the
difficult tasks that lie before the nation.

While, however, one set of minds is thus employed in
seeking to abolish remediable ills, and to repair the ravages
of war in accordance with the principles which civilized
societies in all ages have hitherto accepted, another set
is busily engaged in propagating theories entailing the
destruction of freedom, the negation of all the lessons
of the war, the rendering vain of the sacrifices of our
best manhood, and the ruin of the nation. The Report
on ^construction prepared for submission to the Labour
Conference at Nottingham, in order that it may be
discussed before the " Party Conference " to be held in
June, should be carefully studied by all who are follow-
ing events in Russia. It has evidently been written by
Fabian doctrinaires and perhaps touched up here and
there by a Labour leader in order to adapt it to the
manual workers* point of view. The theories pro-
pounded were largely made in Germany, and the
Germans may be trusted to make the most strenuous
efforts to secure their adoption in all the Allied countries.
The text is taken from a statement attributed to the
Japanese statesman, Count Okuma, that " the civiliza-
tion of all Europe is even now receiving its death-blow,"
and

2 9 6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

" we of the Labour Party . . . recognize in the present
world catastrophe, if not the death, in Europe, of civili-
zation itself, at any rate the culmination and collapse of a
distinctive industrial civilization which the workers will
not seek to reconstruct/*

There are, therefore, to be a new heaven and a new earth
in which all the experience of the ages is to be ignored,
and it is sufficient for the propagandists to paint the crudest
picture of an ideal State, without attempting to prove
how this end can be attained. All this was foreshadowed
twenty-three centuries ago by Plato, who, however, evaded
industrial difficulties by excluding "artisans and mer-
chants " from his Republic. The new civilization which
the theorists who advise the Labour Party propose to build
up brick by brick is to rest

"not on an enforced dominion over subject nations,
subject races, subject colonies, subject classes, or a subject
sex, but, in industry as well as in government, on that
equal freedom, that general consciousness of consent, and
that widest possible participation in power, both economic
and political, which is characteristic of Democracy."

This, like much else in an amazing composition, may be
an attractive arrangement of words ; but it is nothing
more. The dominant note is false, and the plan would
lead to anarchy not democracy. These ideals are pro-
fessed by the Bolsheviks, whose conception of "equal
freedom " and of the " general consciousness of consent "
is interpreted by the use of machine guns against persons
who do not agree with them. At the same time, con-
sistently with their views of " the widest possible participa-
tion in power," they elect as director of a great Technical
Institute ranking as a University its door-keeper, while
the woman who officiates as Minister of Education under

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 297

the auspices of Lenin appoints a housemaid as head-mistress
of a famous girls' high school. 1

The spirit in which the great problems of reconstruction
are approached by the Fabian theorists is illustrated by
the following passage :

" The individualist system of capitalist production, based
on the private ownership and competitive administration
of land and capital, with its reckless c profiteering * and
wage-slavery ; with its glorification of the unhampered
struggle for the means of life and its hypocritical pretence
of the * survival of the fittest ' ; with the monstrous in-
equality of circumstances which it produces and the
degradation and brutalization, both moral and spiritual,
resulting therefrom, may, we hope, indeed have received
its death-blow. With it must go the political system and
ideas in which it naturally found expression/*

There are many grave blots on our social system, which
all humane men and women are keenly anxious to remove ;
but progress, in recent years, has taken on accelerated
speed. There is no comparison between the position of
the industrious and sober workman now and half a century
ago. What is miscalled * wzge-stavery " may still linger ;
but it tends to disappear, and to apply the term to the
organized trades, with the insinuation that the class they
represent is being degraded and brutalized, is a flagrant
perversion of the truth. These trades dominate the market
and have been able to dictate their own terms with little
regard for the consequences to unprivileged labour. There
may be bad employers who show no sympathy with their
employees, as there are bad workers, who, on syndicalist
principles, dishonestly stint their efforts; but the great
majority of employers are sincerely desirous to be fair and
just, while among our employees are the best artisans in
the world. " Inequality of circumstances," by which in-

1 Petrograd correspondent of the Morning Post, 25th January,

298 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

equality of worldly goods is apparently meant, has existed
in all communities since the world was inhabited, and will
continue in some measure to the end of time. On the
other hand, one of the most significant features of the
" individualist system of capitalist production " is the fact
that the majority of large fortunes are now made by men
of the manual workers class. Mr. Schwab, President of
the United States Steel Corporation, stated not long ago
that, at a gathering of forty successful men at which he
was present, only two had been at college. All the rest
had started life as poor boys and worked their way up
from the bottom of the ladder with no advantages other
than industry and exceptional aptitudes. With us, the
same rise to wealth is almost as easy and as conspicuous.
The only possible inference is that the possession of special
qualities will always command wealth in free countries.

The most painful aspect of the turgid passage quoted
and of the Report as a whole is the evident object of stirring
up class war by the use of catchwords calculated to deceive
because never defined. If the hand belongs to the Fabian
Society, the voice is that of Karl Marx.

"Reckless profiteering" plays an important rdle in
literature of this kind, and is part of the stock-in-trade of
the " pacifist " who confines his belligerency to his fellow-
countrymen and regards with mild disapproval the
unparalleled atrocities of " our German friends.' 3 That
deliberate attempts to make pecuniary gains out of the
distress of the nation should arouse strong resentment is
just and right. That it should receive more prominence
in Socialist lucubrations than the appalling crimes recorded
by Lord Bryce's Committee, or by the author of Murder
Most Foul, is inexplicable. That it should apparently have
the effect, in many minds, of weakening the determination
to save the world from the Prussian yoke, indicates a
childish petulance which defies comprehension.
Increased profits in war-time may accrue from (i) a

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 299

deliberate attempt to exploit the situation, (2) the creation
of new or the extension of old businesses to meet the
exceptional demands, and (3) the astonishing financial
arrangements made by uncontrolled Government Depart-
ments. Of these, (2) may be automatic and can be blamed
only if the producer passes on to the consumer charges
disproportionate to the increased prices which he has to
pay. This process is subject to check in the case of certain
commodities, and Mr. Clynes, at Nottingham, effectually
disposed of some of the false statements which have been
circulated among the manual workers. Moreover, excess
profits pay 80 per cent, to the State, and no one would
suggest that the manual worker whose wages have been
raised by war conditions from 2 to 10 a week should
be similarly taxed. Operations such as (i), especially if
they are concerned with the food of the people, are
peculiarly odious. They undoubtedly occur; but they
are not numerous, and the law might be strengthened
to deal with them. The charge of war profiteering is a
dangerous weapon of the boomerang type in the hands of
organized labour, which forms the only class that, as
several of its leaders have frankly admitted, 1 has profited
qttd class, by the war. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir F. Hall,
M.P., has pointed out that advances in wages

" mostly granted within the last year or eighteen months,
total well up to 200,000,000 a year. Add to that any-
thing from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 in the shape of
increases given by various arbitrations and concessions,
and you get an additional expenditure of something in
the neighbourhood of 250,000,000 to 300,000,000." a

The manual workers are perf ectly entitled to wages covering

i Mr* Barnes was attacked at Nottingham for a statement of this
nature, and unfortunately did not make the defence which was ready
to his hand*

* The Sunday Times, zoth January, 1918.

3 oo STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

the advance of the cost of living, and no one who realizes
the strain entailed in some departments of war work
would for a moment grudge them something more than
that. Remembering, however, the strikes and threats of
strikes appeased by successive increases of wages, the
accusation of war profiteering does not come well from
classes which ignore the real stress thrown upon many
thousands of persons who have no means of increasing
their incomes at the public expense, and who keenly feel
the burden of high taxation and high food prices. Privi-
leged labour equally forgets the large number of households
some of them of modest dimensions which have from
the first rigidly adhered to the scale of rations laid down.
If all classes had been as scrupulous, the present food
stringency would have been greatly mitigated.

" The difficulty [writes Mr. Clynes] is this : the workers
are under the impression that food troubles are not due
to real shortage!?, but to inequitable distribution and to
the power which money has been able to wield over the
claims of ordinary men. It is not too much now to say
that that is an absolutely wrong impression." 1

By impressions great masses of men are moved, and
in false impressions, spread with design and not effectively
countered, danger lies. There are doubtless millions who
believe that strict rationing would at once transfer food
from the well-to-do cksses to themselves, and there will
be bitter disillusionment when it is discovered that relief
from this source cannot be forthcoming. 8
The "pillars " of the new civilization are catch-words ;

1 The Sunday Herald, 20th January, 1918.

2 The imposition of sharp restrictions on consumption in the great
restaurants should have been the first measure of food control. It
could have made no sensible difference in the national supplies ; but
it would have prevented the growth of impressions of inequality,
sure to be bitterly resented.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 301

the foundations rest upon wild assumptions. It is easy
to brush away every practical objection by the statement
that " to-day no man dares to say that anything is imprac-
ticable " ; but the one thing which has proved " imprac-
ticable " in all ages is to change human nature, and such
a change is the first postulate of Socialism. The authors
of this " Report " have not taken the trouble to disguise
the spirit of envy that has fostered injustice since the days
of Cain, and over their confused picture runs the red streak
of ckss war. " The Universal Enforcement of the National
Minimum; the Democratic Control of Industry; the
Revolution in National Finance ; the Surplus Wealth for
the Common Good " what are these but phrases veiling
economic ruin ? Now, as always, only " righteousness "
implying thrift, industry, sobriety, self-control and common
sacrifices " exalteth a nation/' To raise the standard of
life, health and happiness among the poorer classes of the
community should be the first object of every true
citizen * ; but it cannot be attained by methods which
would entail universal poverty, tempered by corruption
on a vast scale.
The first " brick " in the new edifice is :

<c The National Ownership and Administration of the
Railways and Canals, and their union along with the
Harbours and Roads and the Ports and Telegraphs not
to say also the great lines of steamers which could at once
be owned, if not immediately directly managed in detail,
by the Government in a united national service of
communication and transport : to be worked, unhampered
by capitalist, private, or purely local interests (and with a
steadily increasing participation of the organised workers

1 The progress already made in the prolongation of life, the in-
crease of small savings, and the decline in pauperism are full of hope,
and show conclusively that the resources of the present rivilmtion
are not exhausted.

3 o2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

in the management, both central and local) exclusively
for the common good/*

It is not difficult for those who have followed the business
transactions of governments during the war to imagine
what this stupendous " united national service " would be
like, when every valid safeguard for economy in adminis-
tration had been removed and the management passed into
the hands of elected and paid politicians of all classes. The
" extraction of coal and iron " is similarly to be " worked
as a public service," while " the retail distribution of house-
hold coal " is to be carried on " as a local public service
by the elected Municipal or County Councils." By such
steps, we are to reach the goal of the " Common Ownership
of the Means of Production," and meanwhile there is to
be a * c rigid filing for standardized products of maximum
prices at the factory, at the warehouse of the wholesale
trader, and in the retail shop." l Every incentive to trade
being thus destroyed, that convenient and illusive entity
known as " the State " would step in, and every worker
by brain or hand would become a salaried servant whose
career would depend upon a gigantic bureaucracy super-
vised by elected amateurs mainly anxious to secure votes.
We are not told whether all private property in the
"nationalized" concerns is to be confiscated. This
essential feature in the new civilization is discreetly veiled ;
but there are significant hints of the real objects. Thus
we are told that the Labour Party " will offer ... the
most strenuous opposition " to any proposal to " hand
the railways back to the shareholders,* 5 and will " decline

x The fixing of prices has helped to produce scarcity except when
associated as in tie case of bread and potatoes with heavy public
expenditure, which would not be possible in peace time. The French
Revolutionists tried the expedient by the ** Law of the Maximum "
of September, 1793, which could not be enforced even by the death
penalty, was found to aggravate distress, and was soon abolished.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 303

to be dependent on usury-exacting financiers/' The
authors of these expressions of opinion appear to be
unaware that the railways have not been taken away from
the shareholders. All that has happened is that their
managers act under the orders of Government as
regards traffic rendered necessary by the War, and that
Government indemnifies the shareholders for the loss, if
any, thus arising. The trustees of the great Trade Union
funds * doubtless fulfil their duty to their clients, and these
funds are presumably placed in interest-bearing securities.
Are the trustees, therefore, " usury-exacting financiers " ?
Through the "Report" unavowed, but implied runs
the infamous doctrine of Proudhon, "All property is
theft," which the Bolsheviks are consistently carrying into
effect to the accompaniment of murder.

The " Revolution in National Finance," which is
sketched with a light hand, is incompatible with or
unnecessary to the rest of the programme. When the
nationalization of all activities has been accomplished
there will be nothing to tax. Meanwhile, there is to be a

" capital levy chargeable like the Death Duties on all
property . . . with exemption of the smallest savings and
tor the rest at rates very steeply graduated*"

To this is added a regraduation and a great increase of the
present death duties so that the Exchequer will become
" normally . . . the heir to all private riches in excess of
a quite moderate amount by way of family provision," 2
while cc the present unduly low minimum income " assess-
able to income tax is to be raised, and a graduated tax
rising "up to sixteen or even nineteen shillings in the
pound is to be imposed." The " Capital Levy " is peculi-
arly attractive to the Socialist because it is regarded as

1 These funds exceeded 5,500,000, in 1911.

2 By this method alone, all private capital would, after a term of
years, tend to disappear.

3o 4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

a means of ridding the world of the hated " Capitalist/'
the " Capitalist system/* " Capitalist Government " and
"Capitalist wars" at one stroke. The extraordinary
difficulties of raising a levy on property with any approach
to justice and of ensuring that the State shall obtain the
new money it requires have been frequently explained.
The trade of the burglar needs the assistance of the
receiver who is able to market his acquisitions, and where,
as in the majority of cases, a man's whole property consists
of (i) his house, freehold or on lease, and his furniture,

(2) his brains which give him an income, and perhaps

(3) some invested savings and a life insurance policy, the
difficulty must be obvious. The State would be unable
to realize (i), cannot take (z), and might find the stock
representing (3) unsaleable. And while the State could
not manage an Exchange and Mart for houses, furniture,
pictures, or little scraps of land scattered over the country,
the owner may be unable to raise cash even by the method
of mortgage, which in the circumstances might be imprac-
ticable. In the case of large capitalists, the same difficul-
ties must arise where money is locked] up in securities.
Enforced sales would cause a heavy fall in the markets the
effects of which would be far-reaching, as the rich Trade
Unions would quickly discover, and as the great majority
of our capitalists are persons of small means, the losses
due to depreciation would fall upon many humble homes.
The great Joint-Stock Companies, Banks and Insurance
Corporations could meet the levy only by gravely weaken-
ing their position, with consequent injury to the interests
of very krge numbers of persons already struggling with
their own difficulties in raising cash. On the other hand,
where large bank balances awaiting investment existed,
the methods of Lenin could be adopted. The levy would
work smoothly where War Loan scrip, which many
persons have bought by stinting themselves as a patriotic
duty, could be handed over.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 305

The net result of the " conscription of wealth " would
be a general dislocation of business, the destruction of
credit, the transference of capital to other countries and a
burning sense of injustice and inequality, while the cash
gained by the State would be miserably disappointing, 1
and permanent sources of revenue would be irretrievably
lost. Mr. Bonar Law has <tf not given consideration " to
the " academically interesting " subject of the capital levy ;
but, as he reminded the House of Commons, Mr. Snowden
had

" shown before the War how, if that sort of thing was
to be done ... it could be done, quite as effectively
and far more easily, by using the income tax and the super-
tax, not for the raising of revenue, but as a means of
confiscation." 2

The Socialists propose to use all these methods and
having effectually exterminated the capitalists, they still
count upon " the steeply graduated Taxation of Private
Income and Riches " in combination with " Nationalization
and Municipalization " to balance their huge budgets. It
must be evident that nationalization and municipalization
of production will yield no increase of income unless the
property so treated is stolen from the owners. If the
latter are bought out by the means of State or Municipal
loans, which ex hypothesi could not be raised, or if the
State or Municipality takes over the shares and pays the
normal dividends, there will be no increased revenue, and
in either case, as the administration charges will rapidly
mount, there will soon be a deficit.

There is not the smallest attempt to show how the
" Revolution in National Finance " can provide either the

1 The German levy, enforced to assist in perfecting war prepar-
ations, was recognized as a failure.

2 House of Commons, 29th January, 1918.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 307

vulgar and provocative ostentation, just as there is a
minority of idle and intemperate manual workers, and no
place for either class can be found in any scheme of national
reconstruction. " Senseless luxury " apart, it would be
found, if analysis were possible, that these large incomes
are either expended in ways which create employment or
are partly saved and applied to enterprises which extend
the range of employment. Among the super-tax payers
are men who can create new and develop old industries
and expand commerce when peace returns, while at the
same time contributing heavily to the public revenue.
The Fabian reconstructors say that the classes who pay
direct taxation will not " willingly forgo the relative im-
munity that they have hitherto enjoyed," and others warn
their pupils that " every possible effort will be made to
juggle with the taxes " in order to place " an unfair share "
of the national burdens upon " the shoulders of the mass
of labouring folk and the struggling households of the
professional men." Gladstonian finance contemplated a
rough equality between direct and indirect taxation. The
proportion is now 82 to 18 per cent., and the suggestion
of probable juggling is as ungenerous as it is false to recent
experience. But for the income-tax payers, the War could
not have been carried on, and the country would have
been at the mercy of the Germans. After the War they
must bear higher taxation, and they will do so cheerfully,
leading simpler lives, practising more thrift and working
harder* Under a wise system of taxation, inequalities of
wealth will diminish * ; but the first object must be to avoid
the destruction of enterprise by which alone national welfare
can be restored and increased. If the incentive to saving
is obliterated by the confiscations and the destructive

1 Sit Thomas Whittaker, M.P., effectively exposes the falsity of
the assertion that the rich are growing richer and die poor are growing
poorer in this country, Ownership^ Tenure and Taxation of Land
(]Vfacmillan and Co.).

3 o8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

taxation which the Fabian visionaries propose, the means
of existence of the manual workers will tend to disappear,
and the schemes of amelioration which we all cherish will
become for ever impossible.

There is nothing new in the " Report " except that the
Fabian Society has now become "We of the Labour
Party." Every item in the programme has had a practical
trial, and the results have been inhuman tyranny, wholesale
murder, and anarchy. The creed of the Socialist is traced
in the blood of innocent citizens. The theorists, whether
dreamers or fanatics, have never been able to control or
direct the forces which they set in motion, though some
of them have found means of making money out of the
ruin of their fellow-men. Orlanistes, Girondins, and
Terrorists alike failed to ride the whirlwind of the French
Revolution, as completely as did Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin
and Louis Blanc that of 1848. The proposals of to-day
were made in 1789-97 ; but France was then little indus-
trialized, and the " nationalization of production " took
the form of State workshops, which reappeared in
1848 with effects economically disastrous and widely
demoralizing. From the Paris Commune, formed after
the fall of the Bastille to dominate France, to the present
Bolshevik regime, there is an unbroken record of the
sanguinary achievements of Socialism and of ruinous failure
to fulfil the promises of its high-priests. The " liberty,
equality and fraternity " held out in 1789, like the other
catch-words " peace and plenty," which raised Lenin to
power in 1917, translated themselves quickly into merciless
tyranny, civil war, unemployment and starvation.

The lull after Waterloo was followed by the rising of
1830 and the widespread Socialist insurrections of 1848,
which involved Paris, Berlin, Dresden, Vienna and Buda-
Pesth, with an echo in London. The Commune of 1871
faithftilly reproduced the terrible events of 1793, which
were again repeated in Spain in 1873-4 and in Russia in

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 309

1905, and are now being re-enacted. Always, after a
practical demonstration of the meaning of Socialism, the
minds of men have recoiled for a time from the atrocious
realities, and always the formulae have reasserted them-
selves, and the movement has again gathered strength.
In more than a century, there has been no real change in
Socialist doctrines ; but Karl Marx first impressed a strong
international character upon the movement, while Lassalle
in 1863 started the organization of German workers on
Socialist principles, which was copied by the Democratic
Federation in 1882 and later by the Independent Labour
Party. 1 Henry George, with his single-tax fallacy, gave
a fresh impetus to land nationalization, meaning com-
pulsory confiscation. 2 The major prophets of Socialism,
from Babeuf onwards, have been foreigners, and their
British disciples have only embroidered and spread their
doctrines.

The linking together of the Socialists of all countries
for the purpose of the class war, which Marx designed, is
now, after varying fortunes, giving rise to hopes of a
peace to be attained by conferences of manual workers.
After 1871, the German Socialist vote rapidly increased,
and there were signs of growing ferment before 1878,
when Bismarck applied repressive measures with temporary
success. Subsequently the Socialist vote again increased ;
but another process was at work which tended to check
the movement. Germany was being steadily tutored by
her Prussian rulers into the belief that Might is Right, that
world-dominion was her manifest destiny, and that un-
questioning trust in an all-powerful State was the first
duty of the citizen. As militarism progressed and megalo-

1 Other bodies followed, and while they disagree among them-
selves and sometimes intrigue against each other, tibey unite in bearing
aloft the Red Flag.

2 Progress and Poverty was published in 1881, and the Land National-
isation Society was founded in the following year.

5 io STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

mania developed, the strength of Socialism declined, and
the British Socialists who fondly imagined, even when
Germany was feverishly putting the last touches to her
vast armaments, that their " comrades " would be true to
their supposed creed, were quickly undeceived. The
International proved a broken reed, and only the failure
of the war-lords to achieve the expected triumphs and the
hajcdships which the German people have long borne could
have revived the hopes of a peace to be attained by Socialist
conferences. Unless Prussian militarism is finally broken,
the ckss war is unlikely to raise its head in Germany.
On the other hand, the German Government has with
conspicuous success endeavoured to set the Socialist
machinery in operation in the countries of the Allies. 1
Meanwhile, the Russian Fabians have been able to
wreck a great Empire, to rob the Allies of victory last
year, and thus to prolong the martyrdom of mankind.
The enthusiasm with which representatives of the wreckers
were received by a minority section at the Nottingham
Conference was a sinister portent.

How far the British manual workers have been led to
believe in the ruinous fallacies of Socialism will soon
become apparent. The propaganda has been as tireless as
mendacious, and the promises held out appeal to the most
universal of the elemental passions easy acquisition and
freedom from restraint. The appeal is thus formulated :

" Millions of you are now armed, trained, and discip-
lined. You have the power, if you have the will, to
sweep away your enslavers for ever. Then take fin^l
control of your country and all that it contains. Wealth
to-day may be made as plentiful as water if you will but
seize the enormous engines for creating goods now at

1 In uncivilised countries like Morocco, the German Government,
having no Socialist organizations to stimulate, has endeavoured to
incite the natives to massacre.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 311

the disposal of man in society. Wage-slavery, capitalism
and poverty will at once cease* The vast wealth created
by the labour of all will be distributed for the benefit of
every member of the community." x

The form of the appeal is varied to suit the classes
addressed; and in "the New Social Order/* which is
enjoined upon organized labour, this crudely anarchical
advice is wrapped up in plausible phrases. The objects
are the same, and while the amiable Socialist theorists follow
Louis Blanc in protesting that their objects are peaceful, all
experience shows whither their efforts must lead.

The British workman is by nature self-reliant and
individualistic. It is difficult to believe that he will swallow
the nostrums of the Socialists without attempting to inquire
into the validity of the reckless assumptions upon which
they rest. That the State can be turned into a wealth-
producer capable of making surpluses far exceeding those
at present available for the remuneration of labour is
refuted by the everyday experience of the war, and must
be dismissed as an impossibility by every one who reads
history or reflects upon facts. The State could at most
exercise a cursory supervision over the vast army of officials
to whom must fall the management of all business enter-
prises. The revolutionaries who proposed to govern
France by a loose aggregate of communes locally ruled,
at least recognized that a central administration of all
public and private business was not likely to succeed.
The conversion of " wage-slaves " into paid Government
servants would entail the end of the freedom of the
individual and the conscription of all labour under State
discipline. 2 Even the bad employer would be preferable
to the political " boss " who might take his place.

1 Extract from a leaflet Truths for the Workers which has been
widely distributed by the National Socialist Party.

'This aspect of Socialism was effectively depicted by the kte
Eugene Richter in Pictures of the Socialist Future (Allen & Unwin).

3 i2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

The means by which the Socialist millennium is to be
attained in Russia have recently been explained by Lenin :

" We stand for class violence against other classes, and
we are unperturbed by the wails of those who are dis-
concerted by the sight of this violence. . . . It is mere
prejudice to think that the simple workman and the simple
peasant cannot rule the country." 1

The French Socialists set about the extermination of the
people whose property they had seized. Their Russian
imitators have moved in the same direction. Nevertheless
the representatives of Leninism at Nottingham won
applause in jarring contrast with the note of true patriotism
sounded by the Chairman of the Conference. 2 According
to the Socialist theory, "the simple workman and the
simple peasant" are ruling Russia. In actual fact, a
small camarilla, 3 maintained in power by Red Guards
bribed with stolen money, is exercising the most shameful
tyranny over those who do not share its views and, having
rendered Russia defenceless against her only enemy, is
engaged in waging civil war. No " rule " exists in Russia,
and anarchy prevails from Petrograd to Vladivostok,
where the Japanese may find it necessary to intervene.
The Lenin tyranny is drawing to an end and may, according
to precedent, be succeeded by one of even greater violence,
which will last until a strong man with organized military
force behind him arises to restore peace and order and to
confer upon Russia the free institutions which, but fot
the Socialists, she might now be enjoying. The Bolsheviks
have already achieved a greater destruction of human life,

1 Speech at the Congress of Soviets, 25 January, 1918 :

2 "We owe it as a duty to those who have made the supreme
sacrifice and to those who have been disabled in the war to carry on
until a clean peace is secured, which will enable the peoples of the
world to live in security " : Mr. Purdy,

8 Largely of non-Russian or Jewish extraction.

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 313

and have dealt a more deadly blow to their country, than
the French Revolutionists. The appalling object-lesson
which they have given to the world is plain for all to see.
Is it possible that our manual workers will fail to draw the
obvious conclusions ? Will they not realize that the forces
of Revolution are incalculable, and that the only certainty
is that the extreme minority will seize power and proceed
to the most detestable forms of tyranny ?

Out of this stupendous world-convulsion, the gold and
the dross alike have been thrown up to the surface. Which
shall triumph in the clash of forces and ideas when the
time comes to heal the wounds of war and to rebuild
the shaken social and economic fabric of the nation on a
broader basis? The British people in all lands have
given the finest examples of patriotism that history records.
Our sailors and citizen-soldiers have displayed gallantry
and endurance unsurpassed in any naval and military annals*
Our civil sea-going population has shown devotion above
all praise and has faced danger in the spirit of true heroism.
The great majority of our manual workers, with many
thousand women, have given their best without stint to
save the world from Prussian domination and to guarantee
the freedom of mankind in the future. The patience of
the poor when food stringency appeared is a touching
proof of loyalty to the national cause. But since the war
began, there has been an increasing minority, which has
sought to draw advantage from the afflictions that all
have shared, to create class-hatred when the minds of men
and women were softened by common sorrows, and to
work consciously or unconsciously in the interests of the
enemies of mankind. And as disappointments and losses
multiplied, and the disaster entailed by the utter demoraliza-
tion of the greatest army that ever existed changed the
whole military situation and brought new anxieties and
heavier burdens upon the splendid men who uphold the
j&ational honour on sea and land, so this minority, drawing

3 i4 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

fresh inspiration from the ruin of Russia, extended the
sphere of its activities. Dangerous fallacies and alluring
promises have been spread broadcast among people who
have neither the time nor the knowledge required to
analyse them.

That is the peril of Socialism, which claims to have
found the cure of all human ills by methods that have
left the darkest stains upon history. Only by the
harmonious co-operation of the best brains of all classes,
working unselfishly for the common good, can our
problems of reconstruction be solved, and never was there
such an earnest desire to seek the solution in the spirit
of goodwill and mutual concession. This alone will not
suffice. Reconstruction must depend largely upon the
action of Government, which will have to undertake duties
hitherto neglected or inefficiently discharged. Changes in
the system of land tenure and in the law of inheritance will
be needed. Assistance in various forms will be required
in the development of the vast resources of the Empire.
Information will have to be collected, and research encour-
aged and systematized. Some measure of interference in
private undertakings will be necessary, and certain laxi-
ties in commercial law, which check honest enterprise,
must be removed. Interference of this kind will not be
resented, if it is intelligently applied and directed with a
single eye to national advantage. We have learned by the
bitter experience of war to distrust politicians and political
appointments with the Party caucuses behind them.
Purity in government, as in trade and commerce, will be
demanded. The bureaucracy must be trained on more
scientific lines, and strong but enlightened Treasury control
must be asserted to arrest the reckless waste which has
been permitted in recent years. Such in brief are some
of the reforms vital to reconstruction.

Democracy will be put to the proof in the immediate
future, and must stand or fall by what it can accomplish

THE PERIL OF SOCIALISM 315

in securing strength and rectitude in government, and in
subordinating rhetoric to statesmanship capable of raising
the moral and material standard of the national life.

Socialism, with its class-war, denial of freedom,
destruction of the inducements to individual effort, and
communistic principles which have always led to whole-
sale corruption and immorality, is the greatest enemy of
Democracy.

XXV
SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST

(Bthw is the Presidential Address delivered at the Goldsmiths 9 Hall on
17 June, 1919, to the British Science Guild.}

The British Science Guild was started by the late Sir Norman
Lockyer and, in its twenty-two years of existence, it has done much
useful work. As President, it devolved upon me to deliver three
annual addresses. In 1919, I chose as my subject the action and
interaction of scientific developments upon labour conditions and
mentality. The need of some of the warnings which I tried to give
eight years ago was strikingly illustrated by the economic disaster
of last year. After this ruinous example of the effects of " Labour
Untest " fomented by alien agency, it may be that the fundamental
principle that " The interests of all classes and sections of the body
politic are inextricably interwoven " is, at length, better realized.

IN one sense it may be said that the Labour Unrest which
now menaces industrial progress, and even civilization,
in many parts of the world, is due to the triumphs of
applied science. In another sense, it may be true that
Science using the word in its broadest sense can play
a leading part in providing remedies, and in securing the
industrial peace which alone can enable existing evils to
be overcome, and can help to place national prosperity
on a broad basis, so that it may be shared by all honest
workers by hand or brain.

Man has been well described as a tool-making animal,
and in devising tools, and in supplying power to drive
them, science has played a dominating part. On the
other hand, &&& can be no doubt that die revolution of
the conditions of Labour, which tools and power have

316

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 317

inevitably brought about, has led to wide-spread dis-
content, and accounts in some measure for the anarchical
doctrines now publicly advocated.

Primitive man had no need for lessons in political
economy* The dire struggle for existence forced upon
him certain inexorable laws. He was obliged to find
food for himself and his family, which he could do, in
the earliest stages, only by collecting wild products, by
killing wild animals, or by stealing either or both from his
fellow-tribesmen. Some Australian aborigines are prac-
tically in this stage of existence to-day, and in India such
conditions can be found at a short distance from great
railway systems. In the next stage, man took to cattle-
owning and cultivating, while the dawn of small industries
appeared, giving importance to skill in handicrafts, in-
volving exchange by barter or token, stimulating the
germs of scientific thought, and necessitating a rudimentary
social organization.

Out of these humble beginnings have developed the
vast and intensely complex systems of modem trade and
industry the systems against which some manual workers
appear to have set themselves in angry revolt. But this,
long evolution was relatively slow, until science began
to equip mankind with power. The invention of the
steam-engine was the starting-point of gigantic changes in
the social and political conditions of the Western world.
I can only indicate the magnitude of those changes in
barest outline. Coal and iron quickly assumed first-class
importance, and our possession of these valuable resources,
combined with immunity from the wreckage due to the
Napoleonic Wars, gave to this country, after the peace
of 1815, initial advantages which were turned to full
account, raising Great Britain, within seventy years, into
the position of the great workshop of the world. The
industrial life of the nation was revolutionized. The
economic employment of power necessitated a continuous

3x8 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

increase in the size of undertakings, which has not yet
reached a limit. Large factories, followed by groups of
factories, thus arose, bringing masses of people into the
industrial centres, and creating a host of new social
problems. At the same time, highly organized railway
systems and great shipping lines sprang up, both em-
ploying large numbers of men, with duties upon the
orderly and regular performance of which the interests of
the whole community became dependent. Without steam,
the population of London could not have reached its
present dimensions, and wherever great concentrations of
people grew up, the distribution of food, lighting, heat,
water supply, and drainage demanded highly-organised
services, upon the efficient continuity of which the life
and health of the city-dweller now rests. The failure of
some of these services during a small period of time
would entail disaster, while none could be long inter-
rupted without serious consequences.

The telegraph system covering the country, the cables
linking all countries, the telephone, even the typewriter
all these developments rendered possible a huge extension
of commercial activities, and, by the powers they con-
ferred, conduced to the building up of large businesses.
It followed that small undertakings diminished, and that,
as the capital required for great industrial and commercial
projects grew to vast dimensions, the private firm was
replaced by the Joint-Stock Company, and the direction
passed into the hands of Boards.

All these and other important developments were
directly due to the effects of applied science upon pro-
duction, failing which the present population of these
islands could not find the means of subsistence. Con-
versely, the rapid growth of population rendered the
home food supply totally inadequate to the needs of the
people, and Great Britain became dependent for food
upon the overseas trade, itself dependent upon the export

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 319

of manufactured goods and such taw material as coal.
At the same time, as our home resources were wholly in-
sufficient to maintain our vastly extended home industries,
they also became dependent on imported raw materials.
Speaking broadly, therefore, it may fairly be said that the
triumphs of applied science, which are still rapidly pro-
ceeding, have transformed the social, industrial, and
economic life of our country, have made the grouping of
business into large undertakings essential in many cases,
have tended to eliminate the private firm managed by one
or two individuals, and have created such an interlocking
of public interests that none can suffer without far-reaching
effects which must react upon the whole community.
Perhaps, however, the greatest of the triumphs of science
is that it has rendered possible an enormous increase of
economic production, which, bound up with the over-
seas trade, supplies the means of existence of our present
population. If our production, or that trade, falls away,
there must be universal poverty and destitution, and large
numbers of people will be forced to emigrate or perish.
How have the tremendous changes which I have roughly
sketched affected the manual worker ? I can only give a
bare indication of the complex ways in which the con-
ditions of Labour have been influenced. In the first place,
the employment of power, which has not nearly reached
its limit, has diminished, and will still further diminish
the total muscular exertion required in production, or
will further modify its application. Very large numbers
of workers arc now tenders of machines, which unerringly
perform even delicate operations, while making little
demand on the muscular system. Threshing by the flail,
which I am old enough to have seen, has been replaced
by the less strenuous and different work of feeding a
machine* The hard labour involved in cutting a field of
corn with the scythe is now replaced by duties entailing
little exertion. From the physical point of view, the

3 2o STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

change from hand work to the machine is extremely
important, although fatigue of another kind has super-
vened.

Operations being more and more performed by the
automatic power-driven machine, the manual skill re-
quired has decreased, but will never wholly disappear*
The craftsman to-day is not more skilled than those of
Greece and Rome. The Bombay mill hand is infinitely
less skilled than the Indian hand-loom weaver belonging
to an hereditary caste who, with a primitive machine,
produces amazing results. From the point of view of
large production, his position is hopeless ; but he can
still beat the power loom with some special products, and
while it is easy for him to learn the work of a mill, a man
of another caste could never acquire the manual skill
which he has inherited from a long line of ancestors.
Thus, modem industrial conditions, arising from the
progress of science, have rendered manual skill of less
importance in mass production than organization, expert
direction, and the scientific employment of large capital.
The experience gained during the war has clearly proved
that women unaccustomed to the workshop were quickly
able, in a short time and with complete success, to do
work formerly regarded as requiring long training. By
far the greater part of the manual work of to-day, whether
below or above ground, can be performed by uneducated
Indians, Chinese, or natives of South Africa. This
organic change from past conditions has evidently many
disadvantages ; but it is the inevitable result of the per-
fection of the power-driven machine, upon which the
means of subsistence of large populations have become
dependent.

Another grave drawback sprang from the wonderful
success of Great Britain in gaining initial industrial pre-
eminence. The process was rapid. Great undertakings,
industrial and commercial, arose and multiplied. Capital

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 321

increased on a large scale, and was applied to further
activities. Meanwhile, manual workers crowded into
manufacturing centres, and came to be regarded too
generally as pawns in the industrial game. As long
as they were forthcoming in sufficient numbers, and were
willing to work with regularity, their special needs were
not adequately considered. There have always been
good employers, who studied the comfort of their work-
men, and there are mining and industrial dwellings which
leave little or nothing to be desired ; but although much
has been done, with varying success, in the last fifty years
to improve the position of the working classes, slums and
dwellings unfit for human habitation were allowed to
accumulate. This great evil, with all its manifold and
deplorable results, could have been averted if taken in
hand before it grew to large dimensions. Now, we are
face to face with heavy arrears of rebuilding, aggravated
in recent years by the operation of the Budget of 1909,
by the rules of the Bricklayers* Union, and by the Great
War. The just claims of the workers are now realized
and admitted. We must, at huge expense, remedy evils
which, if vigorously tackled in good time, would not
have come into existence.

If the vital housing problem was neglected during
the years in which the present industrial system was being
built up, other matters affecting the life of the workers
were equally ignored, until the war turned a searchlight
upon them. I have pointed out that the intensity of
muscular exertion has been diminished; but industrial
fatigue in many aspects persists. The monotony of
tending a machine, though it may not cause physical
exhaustion, does entail nervous strain, and leads to psy-
chological effects of several kinds. Hours of work have
been generally too long and not well arranged. There
has been too much overtime, resulting in cumulative
industrial fatigue. These and other questions were

322 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

studied by Sir George Newman's Committee on the
Health of Munition Workers, and we now have valuable
information which, if wisely applied, can save the worker
from undue stress and provide him with time for whole-
some recreation. The study of the elimination of un-
necessary movements, and of enabling work to be carried
on with the least fatigue, was started in America, and is
certain to make way in this country. It is claimed that,
as a result of this study applied to mould-making, output
was increased 165 per cent, and wages 64 per cent., while
the reduction in cost was 54 per cent. In the purely
manual labour of unloading pig iron, the corresponding
percentages were 500, 69, and 66. There is here a new
branch of science, which can directly benefit the manual
worker, and at the same time increase production.

In the days when the employer worked by the side of
his men, or at least knew them all personally, community
of interests was evident. The employees acquired not
only a knowledge of their several duties, but of the con-
ditions of the business generally. Certain simple economic
laws were obvious to them. With the huge undertakings
of the present day all this was changed. Boards directing
businesses, sometimes with branches far apart, could not
be in direct touch with the workmen, whose interests, in
matters of detail affecting their comfort, fell into the hands
of foremen and managers largely drawn from their own
ckss. For the reasons which I have given, the necessity
for providing means of frequent consultation between
representatives of employees and the Company Boards
was forgotten. The former, therefore, came to regad
themselves as entangled in the cogs of a ruthless machine,
which determined their conditions of life, and the term
"wage-slavery" was invented to stimulate discontent.
Moreover, the extreme complexity of a great modern
industry was not understood by the workman, who had
never been taught elementary economic laws, and who

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 323

found the proceedings of the business in which he was
engaged wrapped in mystery. There has been far too
much secretiveness in these matters, and rarely was an
attempt made to enlighten the employees as to essential
economic facts. The Fabian Society was, therefore, able
to assert more than thirty years ago that the workman only
received one-third of the value of the results of his labour,
and this wild fallacy, which could easily have been refuted
by the publication of simple explanatory figures, found
ready acceptance.

Trade Unions were the outcome of the natural desire
of the working classes to protect their interests, and to
gain the means of collective bargaining. They have done
much good, and they might have proved an unmixed
benefit to the working classes and to the whole com-
munity. But, as they grew into powerful organizations,
instructed leadership became more rare, and grave mis-
takes of policy were made. The use of personal intimi-
dation and strike methods to force all workers into their
ranks was a deadly blow to liberty. The meticulous
regulations limiting the output of the individual worker,
coupled with a spy system and penalties for non-observance,
have proved economically disastrous. They have not only
kept down wages, but created unemployment. It was
shown during the war that boys from an Hementry School
could earn 4 ijs. per week, as compared with a man's
pre-war earning of 2 ios. 9 and that women, after a short
training, could earn 6 to 10 against 4 to 5 - 1 Morally,
the effects were even worse, because very large numbers of
men were taught that it was a duty to be dishonest. The
policy of some Unions has taken the form of a struggle
to prevent " unskilled men " (so-called) from doing work
which they are perfectly able to perform, and the result
has been to create a privileged aristocracy of labour, which
shows little regard for the classes below it.

* Sir Lynden Macassey, K.C, Edinburgh Review, April, 1019.

324 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

From the national point of view, the limitation of out-
put is ruinous, and if it is continued, our country can
never shoulder the burden of the war, and the amelioration
of the condition of the manual workers, which we all
desire, will be impossible. For the attitude which the
Unions have assumed the employing class are not free
from blame, I have already pointed out that, in the rapid
transformation of industries, the interests of the workers
were disregarded, and their share in profits has not always
been adequate ; but if the output of the workman had not
been restricted, pre-war wages would have been con-
siderably higher. The too general experience in this
country, contrary to that in America, is that a rise of
wages causes a reduction of output. The most recent
instance is the large increase of the wages of coal miners,
which has been forced upon the taxpayers, and which was
followed by a decrease of output, already disastrously low.

I have tried briefly to indicate some of the causes of
Labour unrest before 1914. The war caused an immense
rise of wages, estimated by Mr. Crammond at 900,000,000,
and a great rise of prices, which the working classes are
being taught to believe to be due to profiteering. War,
however, always raises the price of commodities, and
there are many contributing factors in this case, such as
actual shortage, the loss of about y millions of tonnage,
due to German piracy, heavy taxation, the foreign ex-
changes, the inflation of the currency, the great diversion
of labour to unprociuctive work, and, not least, high wages
paid by borrowed money. Profiteering wages apart
has played a relatively small part in the general rise of
prices. No one will defend, and everyone desires to
check, real profiteering as far as possible ; but much of it
is automatic in war conditions, or due to the methods of
government.

In an interesting article in the Edinburgh Review, Sk
Lynden Macassey describes some of the economic fallacies

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 325

which Labour has been induced to accept, and among them
ate the beliefs that wages have no effect on prices, that
the limitation of output is an advantage to the wage-earner,
and that all the demands of Labour can be liquidated out
of the profits of the employers. These are doubtless
honest misconceptions on the part of many workers;
but for some time strenuous attempts have been made to
exploit legitimate grievances and to spread falsehoods for
revolutionary purposes. Sir Lynden Macassey states
that in every other workshop on the Clyde the doctrines
of Karl Marx are quoted. The main tenets of this German
plagiarist of Babeuf are that all the proceeds of Labour
are the rightful property of the manual worker, and that
only by the Class War, enabling Labour to seize all the
means of production, can the prosperity of the workers
be secured. It is not their fault that they have no idea
of the amount of brain work of all kinds needed to start
and maintain any industry, and they vaguely imagine that
brain workers are superfluous. For years little children
in the Socialist Sunday Schools have been taught to sing
a hymn containing the lines :

Our own right arm will quickly show
Us all sufficient here.

That is the doctrine of Marx, which Lenin and Trotsky
have enforced with the bayonet and machine-gun wherever
their murderous tyranny has extended; but they have
been obliged to engage experts at large salaries, and to apply
conscription with cruel severity to labour. During the
war, the National Socialist Party widely distributed a
leaflet, with the following appeal :

"Millions of you are now armed, trained, and dis-
ciplined. You have the power, if you have the will, to
sweep away your enslavers for ever. Then take final
control of your country and all that it contains. Wealth
may be made as plentiful as water if you will but seke the

3*6 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

enormous engines for creating goods now at the disposal
of man in society."

This is exactly what the Bolsheviks have done, with
the results that we partly know.

Other Socialists demand the nationalization or State
ownership of all the means of production and distribution.
From the anarchical communist down to the promoter of
municipal enterprises there is a graduated range of opinions
agreeing only in the desire to abolish private capital,
and consequently the only certain incentive to industrial
and commercial progress which mankind has hitherto
possessed. Of the nationalization or State management
of industries there is a mass of unfavourable experience,
and at the time when our miners are pressing for the
nationalization of coal mines, a German Commission
reports its signal failure.

The present Labour unrest is thus partly due to real
grievances, partly to fallacies which would be ludicrous
if they were not fraught with tragedy to the working classes
and to the nation, and partly to a revolutionary propa-
ganda supported by Germans, Russians, and, to a minor
extent, by Indians. Before the war and since, it was a
great object of German policy to foment revolution in
the countries of the Allies, and the blood-stained dictators,
who have wrecked Russia for a time, well know that
their one chance of maintaining power is anarchy in
Europe similar to that which they have created.

Unfortunately, the Great War, by destroying the
economic basis of production, and by causing a huge
expenditure of borrowed money devoted to non-productive
purposes and involving an inflated currency with low
purchasing power, has had the effect of stereotyping some
of the gross fallacies which the manual workers have
swallowed.

With the end of Government borrowing, economic laws

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 327

will inexorably assert themselves, and unless pre-war
production can be increased, national ruin is ultimately
inevitable. The wealth and prosperity of a nation depend
absolutely upon an excess of production over consumption,
and everything which hampers production, or tends to
create wasteful consumption, must injure the vital interests
of the community as a whole. Inequalities in the distribu-
tion of wealth, which are already less marked than in former
times, may and will be further diminished ; but the des-
truction of capital, or in other words of savings, would
not only prevent the extension of industries, but would
ruin those that exist- The revolutionary Socialists lead
their dupes to believe that capital exists in tangible form,
available for confiscation and distribution. With the
exception of the cash held by Banks, and the insignificant
amount in private hands, the bulk of the national capital
rests upon credit. The value of all Government Securities,
which are now held by many millions of people, depends
upon the stability of government. All share capital
similarly depends upon the prospects of profitable enter-
prise. If the efforts of the revolutionary party in this
country were successful, almost the whole of the national
capital not invested abroad would instantly shrivel away.
In production lies our only hope of recovering from the
gigantic losses of the war, and of securing higher standards
of life and continuity of employment for our manual
workers. It is certain that these great objects can be
fulfilled on condition of industrial peace. It is as certain
that the present Labour unrest is not only causing un-
employment, but is gravely prejudicing the resumption of
peace activities, upon which the overseas trade, now
threatened with formidable competition, depends.

Happily, some circumstances are in our favour.
Government, during the war, has wisely assisted research
on a considerable scale, and has instituted investigations
which have thrown fresh light on the problems of

3 28 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

economic production. Our leaders of science have laid
the foundations of new industries, and have enabled us
to regain some that had been lost. It has been made
clear that, as compared with America, we are not making
sufficient use of power and machinery, and that this in
part accounts for the low production of the British worker.
In the economic use of power on a large scale, and in a
more scientific management of industries, lies the key to
the prosperity of the working classes and to the problems
of national reconstruction. Good wages, shorter working
hours, better housing, a voice in determining working
conditions, and an insight into the economics of industry
all these things and more are accessible to Labour, and
employers are anxious to meet their employees on terms
of goodwill.

Fair prospects lie before us ; but they can never be
realized unless the fallacies to which I have referred are
discarded and every manual worker honestly puts for-
ward bis full effort within the agreed hours of labour.
There is no idle class in this country ; but idlers exist in
all classes, and there can be no room for them in the
strenuous times which we must face. Knowledge we
now have in abundance. Our future existence as a nation
and an Empire depends upon whether we have wisdom
in all classes. Science, which has unconsciously caused
some of the evils which we must remove, can now point
the way to the restoration of national prosperity. Educa-
tion, which imperfectly assimilated and sometimes ill-
directed has contributed to the ferment of wild ideas
from which the world is now suffering, may in time be
able to implant an understanding of the fundamental laws
of national and industrial economics. It will at least
increase the flow from the ranks of manual labour to that
of brain work, which is now far more than ever important
to industrial and commercial progress.

Out of the intense complexity of 'modern life, one

SCIENCE AND LABOUR UNREST 329

central fact stands forth in the clearest light. The interests
of all classes and sections of the body politic are inextric-
ably interwoven. No horizontal lines can be drawn
across the social structure. No class can suffer, no class
can assert extravagant claims without affecting the whole
community. Labour and Capital have all their real in-
terests in common, arid must find the means of working
in harmony and mutual confidence. The right to strike
cannot be denied ; but, if exercised with reasonableness
and understanding, it will not, as too often in the past,
injure the workers, inflict hardships on the non-organized
classes, and confer advantage on our trade rivals.

Of the future no wise man would care to prophesy;
but one thing is certain. Our civilization has blemishes
which can be removed; but civilized mankind will not
permanently revert to autocratic tribal rule wielded by
self-constituted Soviets, composed of idealists and
scoundrels, who rob and murder at their will. The appal-
ling political object lesson, which martyre d Russia is giving
to the world s will not easily be forgotten.

XXVI
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(The speech here republished was delivered in the House of Lords on 22nd
9 ig20> in the course of a debate on LordParmor's Motion " to call
attention to the constitution of the Leajtpe of Nations and to the terms of the
Covenant and to ask to what extent the provisions of the Covenant have
become operative/')

So momentous an instrument as the Covenant of the League of
Nations was never evolved in so great a hurry or with so little thought,
and Parliament was committed to it without debate, I believed
that there is much useful work which a League of Nations could
accomplish ; but I disliked and distrusted the Covenant, and I pleaded
in this speech for changes which I still consider necessary if the League
is to benefit mankind. My main fear, however, was that the League
might become a source of danger to the Empire. Anyone who
has followed the proceedings of the costly International Labour Bureau
at Geneva must realize that Socialist exploitation is possible, and
that Resolutions passed by this Internationalist body can be used
to foster agitation.

The warning, which I vainly attempted to impress upon the House
of Lords in 1920, was perfectly justified seven years later when Sir A.
Chamberlain was forced, in September last, to remonstrate with
the Assembly in these significant words :

"Ladies and Gentlemen, you do not know what you ask us.
You are asking nothing less than the disruption of the British Empire,
I yield to no one in my devotion to this great League of Nations ;
but not even for this League of Nations, will I destroy that smaller
but older League of which my own country was the birthplace,
and of which it remains the Centre."

The League has done much good work, as I expected ; but, as
a Court of International Appeal protecting the rights of small nations,
it has not distinguished itself. In the crucial case of the destruction
of tie infant Republic of Georgia recognized as an independent
State by the League at the hands of the Red Army, no stern protest
against this crime was forthcoming at Geneva.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 331

MY LORBS, I do not propose to detain the House for more
than a few moments. I am sorry to introduce a jarring
note after the harmony of the three speeches [those of
Lords Parmoor, Bryce, and Haldane] to which we have
just listened. Notable speeches were made in the debates
in March and June of 1918,, and they are most interesting
reading at the present moment, if you will refer to them.
We have gone very far since those days. One of the
things we have is a Covenant which has never been dis-
cussed in Parliament, and some of the provisions of which
were pronounced by the principal speakers in those debates
as quite impossible. The genesis of the League of Nations
was not fortunate. By mixing it up with the Peace Treaty,
that Treaty was delayed for months, with results which
are already irreparable.

I only want to say very briefly how the question now
stands* We thought that the American people were
heart and soul with us in the League of Nations. We
now know that they were sharply divided. It is not for
us to say a word about their policy ; but we must face facts,
and that is what it seems to me so many of the advocates
of the League of Nations fail to do. To my mind it is
certain that America will never join the League of Nations
unless some modifications are introduced into the Covenant.
But it is certain that there can never be a valid League
of Nations unless America joins it wholeheartedly. In
the debates to which reference has been made, we had
distinct warnings against hurry, both from the noble
Earl who leads the House and from Lord Parker, whom
we sadly miss this afternoon. Those warnings were dis-
regarded*

Since 1918 there have been practically three main con-
siderations that have presented themselves fresh con-
siderations which we cannot ignore. In the first place,
there must be noted the extreme difficulties with which
the Supreme Council struggled. Negotiations were broken

33 2 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

off, which might have resulted in chaos. That chaos has
not happened is a tribute to the Prime Minister and his
colleagues, for their patience and earnest endeavour to
arrive at a settlement. But the moral is that if three or
four Great Powers, with force behind them, find it so
difficult to arrive at a settlement, what can a League of
Nations, composed of thirty or forty nations, do when a
difficult question comes before them ?

My noble and learned friend [Lord Parmoor] suggests
that the League of Nations should substitute itself for the
Supreme Council. I can only say that if this were done
I do not think any conclusions whatever would be
arrived at.

In the second place, we have been told that a very
large sum of money is required in this country to create
an atmosphere favourable to the League, and I imagine
that at least 10,000,000 would be required to create the
world atmosphere which seems to be necessary to produce
the success we should all like to see.

In the third place, only the other day a group of very
earnest people went as a deputation to the Prime Minister.
They are people who desire, as we all desire, to abolish
war. They went in a deputation to the Prime Minister,
begging him to set up an International Army without any
delay. In the debate in June, 1918, the noble Earl the
Leader of the House [Earl Curson of Kedleston], in my
opinion, knocked the bottom out of the idea of an
International Force, and, speaking as an old soldier who
has not quite forgotten all the principal studies of his life,
I must say he was absolutely and entirely right. You
can, of course, have a combination of force for specific
purposes, and it is most fortunate that we have such a
combination at the present moment; otherwise I think
that nothing would be done. But you can never have an
International Force organized, administered, and con-
trolled by a League of Nations. My noble and learned

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 33 3

friend [Lord Parmoor], when he introduced this question
in 1918, wanted a tribunal whose orders should be enforce-
able. I confess that I did not quite know what he meant,
but if he meant that he realized that force is necessary
behind all law, whether domestic or international, then I
entirely agree with him. Under the Covenant of the
League of Nations that body can always threaten, if it
can arrive at a completely unanimous opinion, which
must be a very rare occasion. But it would have no
means of backing its threats by force, and they will be
invalid threats merely idle threats. The noble Earl who
leads the House and the noble Marquess, Lord Lans-
downc, both pointed out the impossibility of limiting
armaments and of securing that any limitation set down
would be closely observed.

I ask your attention to Article 8 of the Covenant which,
for all practical purposes, I believe to be useless. At
least I do hope that this old sovereign State will never
submit to the humiliating inquisitions which Article 8 lays
down. Then there is Article 10, which the Americans,
I believe, will never accept, and I cannot understand how
anybody who realizes what it means can accept it. That
Article says that the Powers undertake to preserve against
external aggression the territorial integrity of all States,
which must include the new States which are now being
artificially constructed. When, for example, the Hun-
garians decide to throw off the yoke of Rumania, as they
certainly will do when the great national forces in Europe
begin to bestir themselves again, can the League of Nations
take up the cudgels against them? They will then be
confronted with the right of self-determination of a large
number of people, and how can you preserve the integrity
of a State by the use of mere threats ? But that is only
one ca$c out of a large number which may arise at any
time* The idea of preventing war is so attractive that
many supporters of the League seem to believe that it

334 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

has already been achieved, and they have not, I believe,
studied the terms of the Covenant. I commend to all
such persons the very careful, cold, and dispassionate
analysis of the terms of the Covenant made by the Swiss
Federal Council in its message to the Federal Assembly
of Switzerland. I believe that the League of Nations can,
at best, prevent only small wars, which can be averted in
other ways, but I do feel most seriously that it may lead
to wars.

We have already, as the noble Earl the Leader of the
House pointed out two years ago, the British Family of
Nations, which is now being assailed by an organized
conspiracy of very long standing. We have seen the
deadly effect of propaganda to which the noble and learned
Lord, Lord Sumner, referred in grave and earnest words
on Tuesday last. By means of such propaganda the
League might become a centre of dangerous intrigue
against the British Empire. We were told the other day
by the noble Lord, Lord Islington, that we ought to think
internationally. If that means that we ought always to
try and understand the point of view, and care for the
interests of other nations, then I most cordially agree
with him. But we have too many people already who
cannot think nationally ; there are very few among them
who can really think Imperially in the true and best sense
of that word ; and the only international thinking that is
likely to attract large numbers of people is that of the Red
Internationale which, I believe, the League of Nations
might be exploited to assist.

Lastly, I want to point out that in every State in the
world constitutional government is now at stake. While
that is the case can it be the right time to try and impose a
form of super-national government ? I envy the ideals
of my noble and learned friend, but I feel sometimes that
idealists are rather dangerous, and I think that, until
human nature can be changed very considerably, the

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 335

present Covenant, as it now stands, is premature, I
would not for a moment wish to abolish any of the
machinery that has already been constructed. I wish to
make purely constructive proposals, and they are these.
Let the Covenant be carefully revised in such a way as to
ensure the co-operation of America. That should be the
first step. Then, let it proceed on the lines, which were
laid down clearly by Lord Parker in this House, of restoring
and developing International Law, which has been shaken
to its very foundations during the war. Let it organise
a strong Court of Arbitration at The Hague, but let it
remember, as the noble Earl the Leader of the House
said three years ago, that a hard-and-fast juridical system
could only be attended with failure. Let it endeavour
to unite all the nations of the world by mutual treaties of
arbitration.

That is a work which would keep it going for a good
many years, and might lead to the most valuable results.
And there is much more work of an international character
which the League can quite safely carry on, notably work
connected with public health, and with social reforms of
all kinds. There is a great work which the League could
carry out in that way. But do let the League abandon
some of its more extravagant claims, and let it be patient,
and wait for a better time than the present. Unless it
reconsiders its position in some respects, I am very much
afraid that it may make itself ridiculous, as it very nearly
did over the question of Persia the other day. The noble
Earl the Leader of the House told us two years ago that
former Leagues had expired in ridicule and scorn. That
is exactly what all right-thkking men and women who
have learned the bitter lessons of this war hope, and must
do their utmost, to try to prevent.

XXVII
TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA

( Financial Ttms" 13 January, 1921.)

Lord Grey of Falloden has told us that " After the peace, more
especially in the last two years of Mr. Lloyd George's Government,
its proceedings and conduct of affairs stirred me with indignation
and despair such as I have never felt about any British Government."
No one could have felt this " indignation and despair " more keenly
than I, and the Trade Agreement with the Bolsheviks " stirred "
me in a special sense, because the honour of the nation appeared to
be deeply involved. In the House of Lords on many occasions I
tried to denounce this bargain with the forces of evil Perhaps for
this reason, I was pressed to write the article here reprinted. The
effects of the Agreement, which I described, became at length so
palpably intolerable that Mr. Baldwin's Government was forced to
break with the Soviet Government which proceeded by way of
retaliation to a fresh orgy of murder. We owe it to the Conservative
Party that the country has been released from a degrading connection,

THE negotiations ostensibly directed to the establishment
of ttade with Bolshevized Russia have already done incal-
culable harm. I trace their inspiration to the amazing
Pjtinkipo proposals, of which I wrote at the time :

"Imagine Pitt suggesting that Robespierre, Danton
and Marat should be taken into conference side by side
with representatives of the huge Royalist majority of the
French people which they had attempted to destroy by
massacre,"

The sources of this suggestion have never been cleared
up ; but the astute schemers at Moscow derived from it
the impression that there were influences in this countrf*

TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA 337

which could be effectively exploited. While, therefore,
France and America declined negotiation in any form,
and the Scandinavian countries quickly discovered that
they were being tricked, the Kameneff (Rosenfeld)
" mission " was permitted to establish itself in London.

The result was soon apparent. There can be no doubt
that the setting up of the Council of Action here was due
to this Bolshevik agency, and the effect was to inaugurate
what the Spectator has rightly described as an "Illegal
Government," provided with a Chancellerie which main-
tained communications with the Kremlin, and, like the
German Embassy at Washington during the war, could
carry on a continuous propaganda with objects of its own.

Rosenfeld was apparently too openly reckless, and the
Government was forced to repatriate him ; but under his
prompting the Council of Action was able to announce
that it had averted a war with Russia, which was never
within the region of possibility. To Rosenfeld succeeded
Krassin an Amurath to an Amurath and for months
" negotiations " have been proceeding, which have sub-
jected us to insult and humiliation.

Among the many suggestions emanating from this
new " Embassy," which incidentally was able to arrange
personally-conducted tours to enlighten labour leaders
and others as to the joys of the proletariat Heaven, was
the theory that unemployment would immediately cease
with the reopening of trade. This was a clever move,
because it had the effect of enlisting the sympathies of
the Trade Unions in the cause of peace with the small
band of conspirators which has murdered and enslaved
the Russian working classes. Recognition is all that
Lenin desired, as it would facilitate the starting of his
" heavy civil war " in this country and would enable him
to protract his bloodstained tyranny.

It has happened in China that one province could trade
amicably with Powers actively at war with other parts

338 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

of the Celestial Empire ; but no Western Power in modern
times has exhibited this elasticity of national sentiment
until our Government decided to receive the Kameneff
Mission. During the negotiations, of which from time
to time we have had glimpses revealing the amenities of
Soviet diplomacy, the Bolshevik autocracy has been at
open war with us in Persia, while in Ireland, India, Egypt
and Afghanistan it has done its utmost, with considerable
success, towards wrecking the British Empire, on the
maintenance of which the welfare of our working classes
depends. In addition, it has murdered, robbed and
shamefully ill-treated our countrymen and women who
were within its power. The heartrending reports of
the refugees who have escaped from the tender mercies of
Krassin's masters contrast painfully with the prolonged
conversations in comfortable London offices.

While the moral and political results of the negotia-
tions have been disastrous, the economic prospects, which
it must be assumed formed their basis, are evidently non-
existent. It is Sir Robert Home who tells us : c * The
real fact is that Russia has got no commodities to trade
with." Everyone who has taken the trouble to follow
the Bolshevik reports on the position of the industries
which they have ruined is aware that this is the simple
truth. On the other hand, we do not know precisely
what gold and other liquid assets Lenin has at disposal.
Cash, jewels and securities have been stolen from banks
and from private individuals, many of whom have been
tortured and murdered, and the large foreign loans of
Russia have been repudiated with cruel effect upon many
small French investors.

Mr. Urquhart, who has played a leading part in develop-
ing Russian resources with immense benefit to Russian
workers, has explained how the Soviet Authorities, with
inconceivable stupidity, have destroyed his undertakings
and inflicted heavy loss upon British subjects. In January

TRADE WITH SOVIET RUSSIA 339

of last year the Treasury permitted the encashment here
of Chinese bonds evidently stolen from a Russian bank,
and Lenin may have more securities of this class. Gold
reserves belonging to the Russian people have been
appropriated by the Moscow camarilla. Wedding rings
have been snatched from the fingers of widows, and
even the gold stopping of " bourgeois " teeth has not
been immune from the rapacity of their myrmidons.
Stolen precious stones have been sold in London, and
how far this process has been carried on we cannot tell.

A cargo of timber stolen from one British subject was
sold to another under Krassin's auspices, but happily a
British Court was able to intervene. This incident is
peculiarly instructive, because it indicates what is likely
to happen if we become the receivers of stolen goods
capable of identification. Had a trade agreement been
signed, it is probable that the plea that the adventurers
who seized all power in Russia constituted a recognized
Government privileged to steal from its terrorized sub-
jects would have been set up, and Mr. Justice Roche
might then have been forced to-deliver a different verdict.

As the numerous minor Soviet officials are busily
engaged in lining their pockets, commissars, for example,
claiming the personal belongings of the victims they order
to be shot, it may well be that the Central Authorities do
not obtain control of all the wealth they have " nation-
alized." But the systematic looting of a vast country
cannot have failed to produce substantial results, and
Lenin and his confederates may therefore be in a stronger
financial position than is generally supposed. The out-
goings must, however, be on a large scale. If millions of
Russians starve or die of the diseases which Soviet rule
has spread far and wide, the Red Army on which that
rule depends, the Chinese mercenaries employed to torture
and kill, and the huge bureaucracy which Communism
has created must be fed, clothed and paid enough to secure

2*

340 STUDIES OF AN IMPERIALIST

their allegiance. The employers of Kameneff and Krassin
cannot, apparently, make cash payments for British manu-
factures to an extent which would have any effect upon our
unemployment. For this reason the dictatorship of the
proletariat is now ready to give immense concessions to
foreign capitalists, and although the Vanderlip "deal"
is not likely to materialize, it proves what Mr. H. G. Wells
was not permitted to discover.

" Peace with Russia " is an attractive catch-phrase, the
origin of which is obvious ; but peace in Russia, entailing
the establishment of honest government and a return to
the usages of law and civilization, is the great need of the
world. As Mr. Urquhart has pointed out, you cannot
" trade with a country in which private trading is defined
as * speculation * and is punishable by death." Nor can
you touch pitch without being defiled. The only results
of the disastrous negotiations which the Government was
induced to undertake have been the encouragement of
Bolshevism here, the prolongation of the martyrdom of
Russia and the promotion of German aims.

Patriotic Russians who look forward to the New
Russia, which will one day arise from the ruin moral
and economic to which the red hand of Communism
has reduced a great people, will find it difficult to forget
the reception accorded to the emissaries of Lenin.

INDEX

(The dates m brackets are those of the articles or speeches repubhshed

in this book.)

AEROPLANE (1913), may "prove
effective rejoinder " to
submarine, 215

AIRCRAFT (1921), potentialities
in war of, 234, 238

ALEXANDRIA, capture of, by
Bonaparte, 28; defences
of in 1882, 73-4, 94, 96,
105-6 ; British bombard-
ment of, 71-7

ALFRED THE GREAT, 172

ARMY, BRITISH, 57, 60, 62, 131-
42, 149-61, 183-91, 192-

200, 201-6.

ASQUITH, the Rt. Hon. H. H.

ment of Gallipoli and
surrender of Kut, 274;
assists Tikk to return to
India, 274 (.); inter-
viewed in India by Mr.
Montagu, 276 ; on Mon-
tagu-Chelmsford Report,
281

BLOCKADES OF PORTS, difficulties
(1899) of enforcing, 175

BOLSHEVIKS, propaganda in India
by, 283 ; 296-7, 336-40

BRACKENBURY, General Sk
Henry, on German Gen-
eral Staff, 62, 201-2, 204
(afterwards ist Earl of BRAHMANS, 241-2, 270, 282 (.)
Oxford and Asquith) on BRITISH SCIENCE GUILD, 316
20 July, 191$, says he

CABINET MINISTERS, their in-
adequate qualifications
(1888) for dealing with
questions of Imperial
Defence, 121

CAMOUFLAGE, author's proposals
(1886) on, 94-108

CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN, Mr.
(afterwards Sir) Henry,
141

CAPITAL LEVY, proposed by
*' Labour" leaders, 292;
inevitable effects of, 304
341

"believes that a great
deal of this material [cot-
ton] , . * reaches the
enemy which ought not
to reach the enemy,"
218-19

BELGIUM, neutrality of, likely
(1887) to be violated by
Germany, 118-19

BESANT, Mrs. Annie, launches
Indian Home Rule Move-
ment soon after abandon-

342

INDEX

CATHERINE IE, prophecy in 1791
that a Gesar will arise in
France, 3 ; 16
CERVERA, Admiral, 163-5
CHADWICK, Captain, U.S.N., 167
CHAMBERLAIN, the Rt. Hon.
(afterwards Sir) Austen,

*74, 33
CHESNBY, Colonel (afterwards Sir

GO, 91-** Ii8

CHINESE MERCENARIES, employed
by Bolsheviks to torture
and murder, 339
CHIROL, Sir Valentine, 241, 244
CHURCHILL, the Rt Hon. Win-
ston S , his " amazing
pronouncements " on
naval strategy, 228
CLARKE, General Sir Andrew, 78
CLARKE, George Sydenham (after-
wards ist Baron Syden-
ham of Combe) :
2883. Explains in Tims
results of Bombardment
of Alexandria, which
" seem to make it clear
that ironclads cannot hope
to silence earthworks,"

7i-7;

1884. In Times of 18 June
urges that, as " an expedi-
tion to relieve Khartum
[and Gordon] in the
autumn " was " inevit-
able," a railway from
Suakin to Berber, which,
incidentally, would give
Great Britain a "per-
manent hold on Khar-
tum," should be con-
structed, 78-82 ;

1885. Describes in Times
Nordenfdt Submarine

Boat and, declaring that
"the perfection of this
most dangerous weapon
of attack " was " only a
matter of time and
brains," enlarges on the
uses to which it might be
put, 83-93 ;

1886. Under the title of
" Invisibility," contributes
to R.qyal Engineers Corps
Papers an article on tie
camouflaging of batteries
and guns, 94-108 ;

1887. Writes in Times on
the Franco-German fron-
tier and concludes (118-
19) that Germans were
likely to invade France
thiough Belgium, 109-
119;

1888. Argues in Times that
defence of British Isles
should be left to Navy,
defines " Command of the
Sea," and formulates rule
for deciding what should
be the strength of the
British Navy, 120-30 ;

1891. In Edinburgh Review,
besides outlining history
of Prussia, gives salient
features of Moltke's
career, comparing him
with Napoleon, 44-70 ;
and in Ttmes propounds
a scheme for reorganizing
administration of British
Army, suggesting (La.)
that Secretary of State
for War should act on
advice of a War Council,
and, also, that a General

Staff and a Council of
Impeiial Defence should
be created (see Diagram
on p. 134), 131-42;

1804, Commenting in
Speaker on Chino- Japan-
ese War, says that the
Japanese had " employed
their Navy with absolute
wisdom," that " compared
with Ping- Yang, Tel-el-
Kebir was an unscientific
operation,** and that " the
European Powers would
have to take Japan very
seriously,** 143-8 ;

j97. In Nineteenth Century
sketches the life of Nelson,
observing that " the quali-
ties he displayed have now
a far wider scope than in
his day,** 3-23 ; and in
Fortnightly Review recom-
mends reorganization of
our military forces and
the maintenance at home
of a " field force of about
40,000 men in imme-
diate readiness for em-
barkation,** 149-61 ;

1898. Sums up in Times
results of Spanish-Ameri-
can War, 162-8 ;

. In Nineteenth Century
discusses how far national
armies, international com-
merce, and railways had
diminished the functions
of navies, 169-82 ; and in
the United Service Magazine
throws fresh light on
Bonaparte*s Egyptian ex-
pedition, the failure of

INDEX 343

which illustrated " the in-
fluence of sea power,"

24-43 ;

Advocates in Times
a radical reorganization of
the Army, Militia, Yeo-
manry and Volunteers,
183-191 ;

Condemns in Times
British faulty methods of
training soldiers, protest-
ing against "paper** tests
and insisting that " the
only true test is aptitude
in handling troops," 192-
200 ; and in Times returns
to the question of the need
for creating a Great
General Staff, 201-6 ;

In Times surveys the
results of Lord Fisher's
naval policy and urges
that the problem of des-
troying submarines by
aeroplanes, etc., should
be studied, 207-16; also
in Times severely criticizes
the Indian Nationalists,
than whom a body less
representative of India
could not be imagined,

Mi-53;

1915. Speaks in House of
Lords on the Blockade
of Germany, protesting
against cotton and oil
being allowed to reach
her through neutral ports,
217-26 ;

1918. In Nineteenth Century
and After (March) exam-
ines at length Socialist
project for reconstructing

344

INDEX

society in the United
Kingdom prepared for
Labour Conference at
Nottingham, and pro-
nounces " Socialism, with
its class-war, denial of
freedom, destruction of
the inducements to in-
dividual effort, and com-
munistic principles which
have always led to whole-
sale corruption and im-
morality," to be the
" greatest enemy of
Democracy," 291-315 ;
and on 6 August in the
House of Lords hostilely
criticizes proposals in the
Montagu-Chelmsford Re-
port which, if adopted,
migjit lead to the state of
India becoming ultimately
chaotic, 254-72 ;
2-9x9. Delivers to British
Science Guild an address
on " Science and Labour
Unrest," 316-29;

1920. On 22 July in House
of Lords calls attention
to sinister aspects of the
League of Nations which
<c might become a centre
of dangerous intrigue
against the British
Empire," 330-5 ;

1921. In Financial Times of
13 January attacks Coali-
tion Cabinet's policy of
establishing trade with
Bolshevized Russia to
"the encouragement of
Bolshevism here, the pro-
longation of the martyr-

dom of Russia, and the
promotion of German
aims," 336-40; and in
Nineteenth Century and
After (June) draws certain
deductions from naval
operations in the Great
War militating against
the idea that a Japanese
fleet could successfully
wage war in American, or
an American fleet success-
fully wage war in Japanese
waters, 227-38 ;
1923. In the Empire Rwiew
explains the genesis of the
Montagu - Chelmsford
" Reforms " and shows
how those " Reforms "
had been disastrous, 273-

87
CLYNES, the Rt. Hon. J. R., 299,

300

COLENSO, Battle of, 194-5
COLOMB, Admiral, 120-3, 125,

127, 129, 130
COMMUNE, Paris, 308
CONSETT, Rear-Admiral, his

revelations on leakages

in Blockade of Germany,

217

COPENHAGEN, Battle of, 17, 18
CRIMEAN WAR, 53, 165, 172, 176
CUBA, 162
CURTIS, Mr. Lionel, 265, 279,

280-1
CURZON, ist Earl (afterwards

ist Marquess), 271, 282,

332-5

DARDANELLES, " great Krupp
gun " defending the (i 8 86),
97

INDEX

345

DECLARATION OF LONDON, 217,

222

DENMARK, Trade Agreement in

1915, 217, 222-26
DEWEY, Admiral, U.S.N., 166
DOVER, armament of (1885), 71

EDWARD VII, King, present when
Prince of Wales at test
of Nordenfelt submarine,

87

EGYPT, French under Bonaparte
in, 24-43 > British forces
embarked in 1882 for
expedition to, 155-6

ESHER COMMITTEE, 131

FABIAN SOCIETY, 323

FARRAGUT, Admiral, U.S.N., 75,
167, 210

FISHER, Sir John (afterwards ist
Baron), 131; "Dread*
nought " and general
policy at Admiralty criti-
cized, 210-16

FOREIGN OFFICE, peculiar con-
duct in negotiating with
neutrals during Great
War, 223-6

FRANCE, eastern frontier fort-
resses of (1887), 114;
northern frontier fort-
resses of (1887), 119

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR of 1 870-1,
main events of, 115-17

FREDERICK THE GREAT, 192-3

FRENCH REVOLUTIONS of 1789,
1830, and 1848, 308

GALLIPOLI EXPEDITION, 71
GANDHI, Mahatma, 281, 283
GEORGE, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd,
285

GEORGE, Henry, 309

GEORGIA, Republic of, destroyed
by Bolsheviks, 331 ;
League of Nations and,
ibid.

GERMAN ARMY, system of, 150

GERMANO - DANISH WAR OF
1848-9, 178

GERMANY, frontier of (1887),
1 10-14 ; may invade Bel-
gium, 118-19; develop-
ment of Navy (1899), 178 ;
intrigues in India and Ire-
land, 260-1 ; progress of
Socialism in, 309 ; milt,*
tansm in, 309-10

GIBRALTAR, defences of (1886),

9 6 -7> 99 i 00 - 1 * I0 7

GLADSTONE, W. E., 218

GORDON, General Charles, 78-9,
139

GREY OF FALLODEN, ist Vis-
count, 336

GUNS (1886), how they should be
painted, 100; "decisive
weapon" in naval war,
165, 209

HALDANE, the Rt. Hon* R. B,
(afterwards ist Viscount),
149, 183

HAMILTON, Lady, 13-16, 18, 19
HANNECKEN, Captain Von, 145
HAVELOCK-ALLAN, Sir H., 152,

155, 160
HORNE, the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert,

338
HUNGARY and League of Nations,

333

INDEPENDENT LABOUR PARTY, 309
INDIAN HOME RULE PARTY,
258-9, 260

346

INDEX

INDIAN MOSLEM LEAGUE, 261,

*74-5
INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, 248,

^74-5
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 317-19;

its effects in Great Britain,

319-24
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR BUREAU,

330

JAPAN, represented at trial of
Nordenfelt submarine
(1885), 83 ; war "with
China, 143-8 ; and Russia
(1899), 1 80; effect of
victories in Russo-
Japanese War on India,
243 (1913); and U.S.A.
(1921), 232-3

KAMENEFF (Rosenfeld), 337
KENYA COLONY, 286
KHARTUM, 78-82
KIAO-CHAU, 179
KITCHENER, istEarl, 185
KRASSIN, 337

LABOUR CONFERENCE AT NOT-
TINGHAM in January,
1918, 291, 295

"LABOUR" REPORT ON RECON-
STRUCTION, 291-2, 295-308
LANSDOWNE, 5th Marquess of,

224-5, 333

T.AggfT.T.T^ Ferdinand, 309
LAW, the Rt. Hon. A. Bonar, 305
LENIN, Nicolai, 312, 325, 337-40
LifeGE, author's report in 1890 on

defences of, 109
LISSA, Battle of, 179
LOCKXER, Sir Norman, 316
LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN
RAILWAY, 59, 60, 132-3

MACASSEY, Sir Lynden, K.C.,

3^3-5

MADRAS DRAVIDIAN HINDU
ASSOCIATION, 258

MAHAN, Captain (afterwards
Rear-Admiral) A. T.,
U.S.N., his "Life of Nel-
son " reviewed, 3-23 ; 1 20,
169, 210

MALTA, defences of (1886), 96-7,
99, joo-i, 103, 106-7

MANILA BAY, action in (1898),
163, 166

MARX, Karl, 298, 309, 325

MAURICE, Colonel (afterwards
Major - General Sir)
Frederick, 59

MESTON, Sir James (afterwards
ist Baron), 282

MINES (Sea) (1883), 75 ; sub-
marines and (1885), 92;
95 ; (1921), 230-2

MOLTKE, 44-70; on Socialism,

57; 144
MONTAGU, the Rt. Hon. Edwin,

254-6, 270-1, 274-7, 279,

280-5, 287
MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT,

cited, 258-60, 277-9
MOPLAH RISING, 275, 282
MORLEY, ist Viscount, 259, 267,

279
MOROCCO, German intrigues in,

310
MUKDEN, Battle of, 209

NAMASUDRAS OF BENGAL, 257
NAMUR, author's report in 1890

on defences of, 109
NAPOLEON I, 3-5, 8, 10, 12, 16,

20-1, 24, 26, 27-35, 37-8,

42-3, 58, 6o-x, 65-6, 68-9,

193

INDEX

347

NAVAL TACTICS, "must now
(1913) be directed to bring-
ing die greatest number
of effective guns to bear
upon an enemy at effective
ranges in the shortest
time," 209

NAVAL WARFARE, changed con-
ditions of (1921), 227-38

NAVY, BRITISH, state of between
1815 and 1889, 169-70;
(1888) functions of, 120-
30 ; (1899) limitations on
its uses in war, 177-8,
and its supremacy de-
pendent on our trade,
181-2; (1913) defective
system of training officers
in, 216; (1915) not pro-
perly employed to enforce
Blockade of Germany, 217

NELSON, 3-23, 24, 28, 127, 209,
215

NEUTRALS, treatment of by North
in North and South War,

221

NILE, Battle of the, 13 ; descrip-
tion of by French eye-
witnesses, 29, 30, 42
NKIB, Battle of, Moltke on, 47-8
NORTH AND SOUTH WAR, 72, 75,
84, 90, 125, 176, 221

O'DwYER, Sir Michael, and Pun-
jab Conspiracy, 261
OVERSEA CAMPAIGNS, 43

PAL, Bepin Chandra, 276
PALMERSTON, Lord, 121
PARMOOR, ist Baron, 330-3
PERISCOPE, invention of, sug-
gested by author to Mr,
Nordenfek, 83

PING-YANG, Battle of, 145-6
PITT, William, 7, 41, 3 3 6
PORT ARTHUR, 177
PRINKIPO, negotiations at, 336
PUNJAB, rebellion in, 275
PYRAMIDS, Battle of the, 29

RAMSAT, Sir William, his advice
to Asquith Government,
on importance of cotton
and oil in manufacture of
ammunition, 219

RED GUARDS, 312

ROBERTS, ist Earl, 185

ROSEBERY, Earl of, 153

RUSSIAN Revolution, 271, 292-3,
308-9,310,312-13,329

ST. VINCENT, Battle of, 11
SAMPSON, Admiral, U.S.N., 166-7
SANTIAGO, siege of, 163-5
SASTRI, Mr. Srinavasa, 286
SCHWAB, Mr. C. M. (President of

the United States Steel

Corporation), 298
SEBASTOPOL, siege of, 164-5
SIMMONS, Field-Marshal Sir Lin-

torn, 154

SINGAPORE, importance of, 236-7
SINHA, ist Baron, 281
SNOWDEN, the Rt. Hon. Philip,

305

SOCIALIST SUNDAY SCHOOLS, 325
SOLOMON, Solomon J., R.A., and

camouflage in Great Wai,

94
SOUTH INDIAN ISLAMIC LEAGUE,

SUBMARINES (1885), 83-935(1913),
215 ; (1915) how used by
Germans, 221 ; (1921), 227,
229, 230-2, 233 (*.), 235

SUDAN, the (1884), 78-82

INDEX

SYDENHAM OF COMBE, ist Baron
(see Clarke, George
Sydenham)

TILAK, Bal Gangadhar, 268-9,

274 (.), 276, 281
TIRPITS, Admiral von, 207, 232
TRAFALGAR, Battle of, 21-2 ;

208, 234

TROTSKY (Bronstein), 325
TSUSHIMA, Battle of, 208-9, 2I 3>

216, 234

URQUHART, Mr. Leslie, on trad-
ing with Bolshevik Russia,
338, 340

U.S.A., efficiency of Navy of
(1898), 164; defects in
War Department (1898),
162, 164-5 ; trade pros-
pects (1899), 181 ; effici-
ency of War Department
in 1917, 162 ; and League
of Nations, 331

VLADIVOSTOK, 177

WEBB, Mr. (afterwards the
Rt. Hon.) Sidney, when
official at Colonial Office
issues in 1888 for " private
circulation among leading
London Liberals ** a
" purely revolutionary
scheme/' among the ob-
jects of which was " the
ultimate and gradual ex-
tinction " of recipients
of rent and interest, 291 ;
his " crazy and disastrous
theories," 292

WEI-HAI-WEI, 177

WELLINGTON, Duke of, 156

WELLS, Mr. H. G., 340

WILKINSON, Mr. (afterwards
Professor) Spenser, 62,

202

WOLSELEY, Viscount, 149, 154,

187, 190

VILLENEUVE, Admiral, Nelson's
chase of, 19, 20

YALU, Battle of the, in 1894,
146-7, 167