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03  Uoc^-/ 

SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

PART  2 

HARVARD  COUEGE  LIBRAfir 
DEPOSITED  er  THE 
UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT 
JUL  30  la69 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETIETH  CONGEESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


DECEMBER  2  AND  3,  1968 
(INCLUDING  INDEX) 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Committee  on  Internal  Security 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
21-706  0  WASHINGTON    :  1968 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  OfiSce 
Washington,  D.C.  20402  -  Price  75  cents 


GOMMITTBB  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 

United  States  House  of  Representatives 

(90th  Congress,  2d  Session) 

EDWIN  E.  WILLIS,  Louisiana,  Chairman 

WILLIAM  M.  TUCK,  Virginia  JOHN  M.  ASHBROOK,  Oliio 
RICHARD  H.  ICHORD,  Missouri  DEL  CLAWSON,  California 
JOHN  C.  CULVER,  Iowa  RICHARD  L.  ROUDEBUSH,  Indiana 
ALBERT  W.  WATSON,  South  Carolina 

Francis  J.  McNamara,  Director 

Chester  D.  Smith,  General  Counsel 

Alfred  M.  Nittle,   Counsel 


COMMITTEE  ON  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

United  States  House  of  Repeesentatives 

(91st  Congress,  1st  Session) 

RICHARD  H.  ICHORD,  Missouri,  Chairman 

CLAUDE  PEPPER,  Florida  JOHN  M.  ASHBROOK,  Ohio 

EDWIN  W.  EDWARDS,  Louisiana  RICHARD  L.  ROUDEBUSH,  Indiana 

RICHARDSON  PREYER,  North  Carolina  ALBERT  W.  WATSON,  South  Carolina 

LOUIS  STOKES,  Ohio  WILLIAM  J.  SCHERLE,  Iowa 

Donald  G.  Sanders,  Chief  Counsel 

Glenn  Davis,  Editorial  Director 

Alfred  M.  Nittle,  Counsel 

II 


CONTENTS 


December  2,  1968:  Testimony  of —  Page 

Thomas  Emmett  Hay  den 2497 

Afternoon  session: 

Thomas  Emmett  Hayden  (resumed) 2527 

December  3,  1968:  Testimony  of — 

Thomas  Emmett  Hayden  (resumed) 2561 

Afternoon  session: 

Rennard  Cordon  Davis 2627 

Index 

III 


The  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  is  a  standing 
committee  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives,  constituted  as  such  by  the 
rules  of  the  House,  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  I,  section  5,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  authorizes  the  House  to  deter- 
mines the  rules  of  its   proceedings. 

RULES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  90TH  CONGRESS 

House  Resolution  7,  January  10, 1967,  as  amended  April  3, 1968,  by  House 

Resolution  1099 

RESOLUTION 

Resolved,  That  the  Rules  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Eighty-ninth 
Congress,  together  with  all  applicable  provisions  of  the  Legislative  Reorganiza- 
tion Act  of  1946,  as  amended,  be,  and  they  are  hereby,  adopted  as  the  Rules  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Ninetieth  Congress  *  *  * 

******* 

Rule  X 

STANDING    COMMITTEES 

1.  There  shall  be  elected  by  the  House,  at  the  commencement  of  each  Congress, 

******* 
(s)   Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Members. 

*****  *  * 

Rule  XI 

POWERS   AND   DUTIES   OF   COMMITTEES 

******* 

19.  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(a)  Un-American  activities. 

(b)  The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  whole  or  by  subcommittee, 
is  authorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (1)  the  extent,  charac- 
ter, and  objects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United   States, 

(2)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  subversive  and  un-American  propa- 
ganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and  attacks 
the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution,  and 

(3)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress  in  any 
necessary  remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  times 
and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting,  has 
recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  hold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance  of 
such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  and  to 
take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary.  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under  the 
signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any  mem- 
ber resignated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person  desig- 
nated by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

******* 

28.  To  assist  the  House  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws  and  in 
developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  it  may  deem  necessary, 
each  standing  committee  of  the  House  shall  exercise  continuous  watchfulness  of 
the  execution  by  the  administrative  agencies  concerned  of  any  laws,  the  subject 
matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  committee ;  and,  for  that  pur- 
pose, shall  study  aU  pertinent  reports  and  data  submitted  to  the  House  by  the 
agencies  in  the  execeutive  branch  of  the  Government. 

******* 

IV 


SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Part  2 


MONDAY,  DECEMBER  2,  1968 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

Subcommittee  of  the 
Committee  on  Un-American  Activities, 

Washington^  D.G. 
public  hearings 

A  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  met, 
pursuant  to  notice,  at  10:10  a.m.,  in  Room  311,  Cannon  House  Office 
Building,  Washington,  D.C.,  Hon.  Kichard  H.  Ichord  (chairman  of 
the  subcommittee)  presiding. 

(Subcommittee  members:  Representatives  Richard  H.  Ichord,  of 
Missouri,  chairman ;  John  M.  Ashbrook,  of  Ohio ;  and  Albert  W.  Wat- 
son, of  South  Carolina.) 

Subcommittee  members  present:  Representatives  Ichord  and  Ash- 
brook. 

Staff  members  present :  Francis  J.  McNamara,  director ;  Frank  Con- 
ley,  special  comisel;  Chester  D.  Smith,  general  comisel;  Alfred  M. 
Nittle,  counsel ;  and  Herbert  Romerstein,  investigator. 

Mr.  Ichord.  There  will  be  order  in  the  hearing  room. 

The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

These  hearings  are  a  continuation  of  the  hearings  which  began  on 
October  1  and  adjourned  on  October  4,  until  today,  December  2. 

At  the  outset  of  the  hearings,  the  Chair  read  into  the  record  the  reso- 
lution authorizing  this  investigation.  There  will  be  no  need  to  repeat 
the  same  at  this  time. 

It  is  my  understanding  that  there  are  several  reporters  covering 
this  hearing  who  did  not  cover  the  first  3  days  of  the  hearing.  There- 
fore, for  their  benefit,  we  will  aid  them  in  reporting  the  hearings. 

I  think  I  should  briefly  explain  the  purpose  of  the  hearing  and, 
also,  the  rules  under  which  the  hearings  are  conducted. 

The  purpose  of  the  hearing  is  to  investigate  and  determine  the 
nature  and  extent  of  Communist  and  subversive  participation  in  the 
organization  and  the  instigation  of  the  disturbances  that  occurred 
during  the  Democratic  National  Convention  in  Chicago  and  the  con- 
nections, if  any,  of  certain  leaders  of  the  demonstration  with  foreign 
powers. 

And,  as  I  stated  in  the  hearings,  there  are  several  collateral  issues 
which  might  arise  that  are  not  the  subject  of  the  hearings.  There  have 
been  charges  that  the  police  overreacted ;  there  have  been  charges  that 

2493 


2494  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

the  police  underreacted.  Those  charges  are  collateral  to  these  hearings. 
There  have  also  been  charges  that  national  TV  did  not  accurately 
report  what  happened  in  Chicago,  That  is  not  the  purpose  of  these 
hearings.  The  purposes  are  as  stated. 

Now  these  are  legislative  hearings,  a  legislative  investigation  con- 
ducted by  the  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  which  is 
one  of  the  standing  committees  of  Congress.  These  are  not  'trial  pro- 
ceedings. No  one  is  on  trial  here.  The  committee  seeks  to  punish  no 
witness  for  conduct  outside  this  hearing  room. 

The  rules  governing  these  proceedings  are  obviously  different  than 
the  procedures  used  in  a  court  of  law,  because  the  purposes  are  dif- 
ferent, as  I  have  stated. 

The  rules  governing  the  proceedings — the  primary  rule  is  Rule  XI, 
section  26,  subsection  (k) ,  which  reads  as  follows : 

Witnesses  at  investigative  hearings  may  be  accompanied  by  their  own  coun- 
sel for  the  purpose  of  advising  them  concerning  their  constitutional  rights. 

On  October  18,  1966,  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
the  Honorable  John  McConnack,  ruled  that  this  privilege  of  be- 
ing represented  by  counsel,  unlike  advocacy  in  a  court,  does  not  as  a 
matter  of  right  entitle  the  attorney  to  present  argument,  make  mo- 
tions, or  make  demands  on  the  committee. 

Further  rules  governing  the  conduct  of  counsel  and  the  witnesses 
are  in  the  rules  of  the  committee.  Rule  No.  VII,  ADVICE  OF 
COUNSEL: 

A — At  every  hearing,  public  or  executive,  every  witness  shall  be  accorded  the 
privilege  of  having  counsel  of  his  own  choosing. 

B — The  participation  of  counsel  during  the  course  of  any  hearing  and  while 
the  witness  is  testifying  shall  be  limited  to  advising  said  witness  as  to  his  legal 
rights.  Counsel  shall  not  be  permitted  to  engage  in  oral  argument  with  the  Com- 
mittee, but  shall  confine  his  activity  to  the  area  of  legal  advice  to  his  client. 

Rule  VIII— CONDUCrr  OF  COUNSEL: 

Counsel  for  a  witness  shall  conduct  himself  in  a  professional,  ethical,  and 
proper  manner.  His  failure  to  do  so  shall,  upon  a  finding  to  that  effect  by  a 
majority  of  the  Committee  or  Subcommittee  before  which  the  witness  is  appearing, 
subject  such  counsel  to  disciplinary  action  which  may  include  warning,  censure, 
removal  of  counsel  from  the  hearing  room,  or  a  recommendation  of  contempt 
proceedings. 

Now,  due  to  experiences  in  the  past,  it  has  been  necessaiy  to  take 
certain  security  precautions.  The  experience  of  the  past  shows  to  us 
that  there  are  certain  persons  who  would  seek  admission  to  this  room 
for  the  purpose  of  disturbing  and  disrupting  the  committee  hearings. 
Therefore,  the  Chair  has  taken  the  responsibility  of  having  the  se- 
curity precautions  being  placed  in  effect. 

For  those  who  are  guests  of  the  committee — and  you  are  welcome — 
I  feel  that  I  must  read  section  6,  if  there  are  any  who  would  seek  to 
disrupt  the  committee  hearings — section  6  of  Public  Law  90-108, 
which  reads  as  follows :  "It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  or  group 
of  persons — " 

[Subsection]  (4)  to  utter  loud,  threatening,  or  abusive  language,  or  to  engage 
in  any  disorderly  or  disruptive  conduct,  at  any  place  upon  the  United  States 
Capitol  Grounds  or  within  any  of  the  Capitol  Buildings  with  intent  to  impede, 
disrupt,  or  disturb  the  orderly  conduct  of  any  session  of  the  Congress  or  either 
House  thereof,  or  the  orderly  conduct  within  any  such  building  of  any  hearing 
before,  or  any  deliberations  of,  any  committee  or  subcommittee  of  the  Congress 
or  either  House  thereof ; 


DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2495 

The  law  goes  on  to  proscribe  such  activity  as  a  misdemeanor. 

I  read  these  rules  and  the  law  not  for  the  purposes  of  making  any 
threats.  I  appeal  to  the  sense  of  decorum  of  all  of  those  j^resent  in  the 
room,  I  hope  that  the  Chair  does  not  have  to  invoke  any  of  those  rules 
or  the  statute,  but  there  must  be  order  maintained  in  the  hearing  room. 

During  the  last  hearings,  despite  repeated  admonitions  of  the  Chair, 
there  were  disruptions,  particularly  from  the  audience.  I  hope  that  this 
does  not  occur  again  and  I  want  to  state  that  the  failure  of  the  Chair 
to  invoke  any  of  these  rules  or  the  statute  does  not  mean  acquiescence 
in  the  conduct. 

With  that  statement  out  of  the  way,  Mr.  Counsel — prior  to  recog- 
nizing you,  however,  I  think  I  should  read  a  communication  into  the 
record  from  the  Honorable  Edwin  E.  Willis,  chairman  of  the  full 
conunittee  of  the  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  dated 
November  25,  1968,  reconstituting  this  subcommittee.  It  reads  as 
follows : 

To:  Mr.  Francis  J.  McNamara, 

Director,  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  the  Rules  of  this  Committee,  I  hereby 
appoint  a  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  consisting 
of  Honorable  Richard  Ichord,  as  Chairman,  and  Honorable  John  M.  Ashbrook 
and  Honorable  Albert  W.  Watson,  as  associate  members,  to  conduct  hearings  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  commencing  on  or  about  December  2,  1968,  and/or  at  such 
other  times  thereafter  and  places  as  said  subcommittee  shall  determine,  as  con- 
templated by  the  resolution  adopted  by  the  Committee  on  the  12th  day  of  Sep- 
tember, 1968,  authorizing  hearings  concerning  Communist  activities  within  the 
United  States,  with  particular  reference  to  the  extent  to  which,  and  the  manner 
in  which  the  incidents  and  acts  of  force  and  ^-iolence  which  occurred  in  the  City 
of  Chicago,  Illinois,  during  the  week  of  August  25,  1968,  were  planned,  instigated, 
incited,  or  supported  by  Communist  and  other  subversive  organizations  and  in- 
dividuals, and  other  matters  under  investigation  by  the  Committee. 

Please  make  tliis  action  a  matter  of  Committee  record. 

If  any  member  indicates  his  inability  to  serve,  please  notify  me. 

Given  under  my  hand  this  25th  day  of  November,  1968. 

/s/  Edwin  E.  WiUis, 
Edwin  E.  Willis, 
Chairman,  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

Mr.  Counsel,  it  was  my  understanding  that  the  first  witness  to  be 
called  today  was  Mr.  Abbie  Hoffman.  Is  Mr.  Abbie  Hoffman  present? 

Mr.  Di  Su\t:ro.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  communication 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Will  you  come  forward,  sir,  and  identify  yourself? 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  My  name  is  di  Suvero,  and  I  am  representing  Thomas 
Hayden.  I  received  a  call  last  night  from  Mr.  Gerald  Lefcourt,  who  is 
representing  Abbie  Hoffman.  He  told  me  that  he  had  been  in  com- 
munication, I  believe,  with  Mr.  McNamara  and  has  advised  Mr.  Mc- 
Namara that  Mr.  Hoffman  had  taken  ill  last  week,  was  under  doctor's 
care.  Mr.  McNamara  asked  that  a  letter  be  forwarded,  and  the  doctor 
is  sending  the  letter  today,  and  it  will  be  in  the  hands  of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Well,  then,  the  subpena  will  be  continued,  with  those 
facts  in  mind. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  DI  StwERO.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  call  your  next  witness. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  call  Mr.  Thomas  Hay- 
den. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  Mr.  Hayden  present  in  the  room  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 


2496  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Will  the  witness  please  be  sworn  ? 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  g^ive  be- 
fore this  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  do. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  introduce  Mr.  Hay- 
den's  cocounsel,  Leonard  Weinglass,  a  member  of  the  New  Jersey  bar. 

Mr.  loHORD.  How  do  you  spell  that  name,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Weinglass.  W-e-i-n-g-1-a-s-s. 

Mr.  loHORD.  And  the  first  name  is  Leonard  ? 

Mr.  Weinglass.  Leonard. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  And  what  bar  are  you  a  member  of,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Weinglass.  New  Jersey. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  And  Mr.  di  Suvero,  you  are  of  the  New  York  bar  ? 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  And  California. 

There  was  one  matter  that  was  left  open  by  the  committee  chairman 
during  the  last  hearings,  and  that  was  the  matter  under  our  point  11, 
which  the  committee  chairman  reserved  decision  on. 

Point  11  referred  to  the  fact  that  Mr.  Hayden  was  under  pending 
State  crimmal  prosecutions  in  the  State  court  of  Illinois.  What  we 
asked  at  that  time  was  that  the  committee  not  make  inquiry,  on  the 
basis  that  such  inquiry  would  violate  Mr.  Hayden's  due  process  rights, 
as  well  as  violate  the  separation  of  powers,  insofar  as  J.  Campbell  has 
ordered  an  inquiry  by  the  Federal  grand  jury. 

And  I  would  like  to  know  what  the  committee's  decision  has  been 
on  that  ruling. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  could  you  explain  to  the  Chair  the 
nature  of  the  prosecution  ? 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  Well,  the  State  prosecutions  are  five  counts.  One  is 
obstructing  a  police  officer,  two  of  disorderly  conduct,  and  two  of 
resisting  arrest.  The  Federal  prosecution,  to  which  we  have  been 
advised  Mr.  Hayden  is  a  target  of  that  prosecution,  is  a  prosecution 
under  the  Federal  antiriot  law. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Has  there  been  an  indictment  ? 

Mr.  DI  Sir\^R0.  There  has  not  been  an  indictment. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  If  I  may  direct  a  question  to  the  counsel  of  the  com- 
mittee, Mr.  Counsel,  do  you  propose  to  ask  this  witness  any  questions 
concerning  the  charges  pending  against  him  in  the  city  of  Chicago? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  do  not  contemplate  any  questions 
directed  to  his  specific  activities  out  of  which  these  arrests  apparently 
arose. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  is  aware  of  Supreme  Court  decisions  to  the 
effect  that  if  legislative  hearings  are  conducted  for  the  purpose 
of  aiding  the  State  in  the  prosecution  of  the  case,  Mr.  Counsel,  they 
would  not  be  permissible,  but  this  is  not  the  purpose  of  these  hearings. 

The  purposes  are  as  I  stated  in  my  opening  statement.  Therefore, 
the  Chair  will  have  to  specifically  overrule  point  11  of  the  motion 
filed  by  the  attorneys,  and  the  Chair  would  specificallv  instruct  the 
counsel  not  to  question  this  witness  on  any  of  the  specifics  contained 
in  the  charge  of  disorderly  conduct  and  the  other  counts  which  the 
attorney  has  stated. 

Mr.  DI  SuvERo.  And  that  direction,  I  take  it,  Mr.  Chairman,  does 
not  extend  to  any  subject  matter  which  might  be  the  inquiry  of  a 
Federal  grand  jury. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2497 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course,  the  gentleman  has  not  been  indicted  by  the 
Federal  grand  jury.  The  Chair  has  been  advised  that  the  witness  is 
in  possession  of  certain  facts  which  should  be  inquired  into  by  this 
committee,  and  I  would  specifically  rule  that  the  pending  grand 
jury  proceedings  would  not  prohibit  this  committee  from  examining 
the  witness. 

Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

TESTIMONY   OF  THOMAS   EMMETT  HAYDEN,   ACCOMPANIED  BY 
COUNSEL,  LEONARD  WEINGLASS  AND  HENRY  M.  DI  SUVERO 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  would  you  state  your  full  name  and 
address  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  My  full  name  is  Thomas  Emmett  Hayden,  and  my 
address  is  6000  Broadway,  Oakland,  California. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And,  Mr.  Hayden,  do  you  appear  here  today  in  re- 
sponse to  a  subpena  that  was  served  on  you  on  or  about  the  23d  day 
of  September  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  sir,  I  do. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  was  that  subpena  served  by  Mr.  William  Wheeler, 
an  investigator  for  this  committee  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  sir,  it  was. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  would  you  give 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Coimsel,  can  you  bring  the  mike  a  little  closer?  I 
don't  know  whether  you  can  be  heard.  I  think  people  are  having 
difficulty  hearing  you  in  the  back  of  the  room. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  would  you  give  us  a  brief  resume  of  your 
educational  background,  please  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  mean  the  colleges  I  attended  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  High  school  and  college,  please. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes;  I  attended  Royal  Oak  Dondero  High  School  in 
Royal  Oak,  Michigan,  from  1954  to  1957.  I  attended  the  University 
of  Michigan,  1957  to  1961.  I  returned  to  the  University  of  Michigan 
1962  through  part  of  1964  as  a  graduate  student  and  as  an  instructor, 
and  I  taught  political  science  at  Rutgers  University  in  1967. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  don't  believe  you  mentioned  it.  Did  you  get  a  degree 
from  the  University  of  Michigan  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  did  not  complete  my  graduate  studies. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  get  a  bachelor's  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  got  a  bachelor's  degree  in  1961. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  this  in  English  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  since  your  completion  of  your  edu- 
cation, what  particular  positions  have  you  held,  since  you  completed 
your  education  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean  by  "positions"  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  What  jobs  have  you  held,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  as  I  said — you  mean,  jobs  in  the  sense  of  how 
I  get  money  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  let  us  start  with  that ;  yes. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Or  political  positions,  or  what  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Let  us  start  with  the  jobs  that  you  held  where  you  get 
money. 


2498  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  have  done  some  teaching,  as  I  said,  at  Eutgers 
University.  I  have  been  paid  as  an  author  and  lecturer,  published 
two  books,  one  by  New  American  Library-Signet,  on  North  Viet- 
nam, and  another  on  the  conditions  in  Newark  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
bellion of  July  1967,  which  was  published  by  Random  House. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Excuse  me.  Was  this  book  Rebellion  in  Neioark  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right.  And  I  remain  under  contract,  writing  another 
book  on  Vietnam  for  the  same  publishing  house. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  have  you,  in  connection  with  your  book- 
writing,  also  written  the  preface  to  a  book  called  Mission  to  Hanoi% 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  mean  the  book  by  Communist  Party  theoretician 
Herbert  Aptheker. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  traveled — I  was  a  fellow  traveler  to  Hanoi  with 
Herbert  Aptheker  in  1965  and  I  did  write  an  introduction  to  his  book, 
before  I  proceeded  to  write  a  book  giving  my  own  political  views. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  then,  these  are  the  jobs  that  you  have 
held  where  you  received  pay,  as  I  understand. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  can  recall. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now,  what  jobs  have  you  held  in  the  political 
area,  as  you  define  it  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  consider  myself  an  organizer  of  a  movement  to 
put  you  and  your  committee  out  of  power,  because  I  think  you  repre- 
sent racist  philosophy 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  what  group  is  that,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  — that  has  no  meaning  any  more  in  the  :^Oth  century. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  what  group  do  you  refer  to  that  you 
represent  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  have  worked  for  many  groups.  As  you  know, 
I  worked  very  hard  for  several  years  for  Students  for  a  Democratic 
Society.  I  worked 

Mr.  Conley.  Were  you  president  of  that  group  from  June  of  '62  to 
'63? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  president  of  SDS,  yes,  during  the  time  that  you 
designate. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  were  you  the  author  of 

Mr.  Hayden.  But  before  that  I  was  an  organizer  of  it,  and  after- 
ward I  remained  affiliated  with  it  for  some  time. 

Mr.  Conley.  Were  you  the  autlior  of  the  Port  Huron  statement? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  wish  that  I  was,  but  I  was  merely  a  drafter  of  the 
original  document,  and  the  author  of  the  document  was  the  convention 
itself  that  met  in  Port  Hiiron. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  assisted,  then,  in  the  preparation  of  the  document 
which  was  adopted  by  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  probably  the  major  author  of  the  original  draft. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Was  it  materially  changed  by  the  conven- 
tion? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  It  had  a  better  position  on  the  American  capital- 
ism. I  was  not  too  clear  about  the  problems  of  American  society,  and 
the  convention  straightened  me  out  bv  deciding  that  tlie  nrofit  svstpni 
that  you  represent  is  a  fundamental  thing  to  be  moved  aside  so  that  the 
country  can  move  ahead. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  a  minute  ago,  in  con- 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2499 

nection  with  your  books,  you  mentioned  that  you  had  written  a 
book  about  Vietnam.  Was  this  book  The  Other  Side  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Did  you  collaborate  on  this  book  with  the  traveler 
that  went  with  you,  Mr.  Lynd? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  did. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  you  coauthored  this  book  together  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  did  I  understand  you  correctly  that  this  book 
came  out  subsequent  to  your  preface  to  Mission  to  Han&i'^. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  can  recall,  Herbert  Aptheker's  book  came 
out  rather  quickly  after  the  trip,  and  the  book  that  I  wrote  with 
Staughton  came  out  some  time  later. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  moving  to  another  area,  and  that 
is  the  National  Mobilization  Committee,  were  you  the  coproject 
director  with  Mr.  Davis  for  the  National  Mobilization  Committee's 
efforts  in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  When  were  you  appointed  to  this  position  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  When  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  recall  the  exact  date.  I  suppose  it  was  in  the 
very  early — in  the  early  spring. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Could  you  be  specific  in  terms  of  months,  sir? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  think  I  could,  but  I  would  guess  at  March  or 
April. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  March  or  April.  By  whom  were  you  appointed  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  By  the  Mobilization,  which  has  a  structure  for  making 
such  appointments,  consisting  of  an  administrative  committee  and  a 
steering  committee  and  a  set  of  officers. 

Mr.  Conley.  Were  you  a  part  of  the  steering  committee  or  the  offi- 
cers or  the 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  In  other  words,  you  were  appointed  by  this  group. 
How  many  people  are  represented  by  this  group  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  Mobilization  has  representatives  from  nearly  a 
hundred  organizations,  most  of  whom  are  active  around  particular 
subjects  like  the  organization  of  the  demonstration. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  did  100  people  meet  to  decide  to  appoint  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  can't  really  recall.  If  you  will  allow  me  1  minute  to  go 
talk  to  Rennie  Davis,  who  has  more  of  an  organizational  mind  than  I 
do,  I  am  sure  I  could  straighten  it  all  out,  but  the  Mobilization,  through 
its  normal  processes,  appointed  me  in  the  spring  of  the  year  to  be  a 
project  director  with  Rennie  Davis,  and  I  went  to  Chicago  for  that 
purpose. 

Mr.  Conley.  Did  you  receive  this  appointment  in  writing,  or  was 
it  just  verbal  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Oh,  no,  that's  not  the  way  we  work. 

Mr.  Conley.  Do  you  recall  who  actually  told  you  that  you  had  been 
appointed  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  just  knew  that  I  had  been  appointed.  I  presume 
it  was,  if  anyone  told  me  that  I  was  appointed,  it  was  Dave  Dellinger, 
who  as  you  know  is  the  chairman  of  the  Mobilization. 


2500  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  when  did  you  go  to  Chi- 
cago and  begin  working  full  time  for  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  went  to  Chicago  at  the  beginning  of  the  summer. 
Again,  the  exact  date  is  something  I  would  have  to  check,  but  it  was 
late  May  or  early  Jmie. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  And  did  you  work  out  of  the  407  South  Dear- 
bom  Street  address? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  did. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  at  the  time  that  you  started  to  work  for  the  com- 
mittee, were  you  paid  any  type  of  a  salary  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  didn't  take  a  salary.  I  lived  from  my  normal 
income. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you,  during  any  of  the  time  that  you  worked  with 
the  National  Mobilization  Committee,  receive  any  salary  or  compen- 
sation ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  that  I  know.  I  don't — I  think  they  allocated  some 
funds  for  the  office  staff,  and  those  probably  were  in  Rennie  Davis' 
name.  But  I  wasn't  too  close  to  that  end  of  the  organization,  and  my 
services  were  basically  volunteer  services. 

Again,  there  are  ways,  I  think,  if  you — if  Mr.  Davis  is  here  and  he 
is  listening  to  your  questions,  he  can  come  before  you  with  some  more 
concrete  answers  to  such  questions. 

Mr.  Conley.  Then,  sir,  is  it  your  testimony  that  you  received  no 
compensation,  either  by  check  or  by  cash,  for  your  activities  in 
Chicago? 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  best  as  I  can  recall,  I  lived  from  my  own  income, 
but  you  see,  I  would — the  way  we  live,  I  mean,  I  give  Rennie  some 
money,  and  he  might  give  it  back  to  me.  And  in  that  sense,  it  may  have 
gone  through  the  Mobilization  at  one  time  or  another,  but  basically,  I 
always  lived  on  my  own  income. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  sir,  I  can  understand  with  cash  that  this  might 
be  true,  but  do  you  have  any  specific  recollection  of  having  received  any 
checks  in  any  way  that  were  eannarked  as  moneys  for  you  as  com- 
pensation for  working  with  the  National  Mobilization  Committee? 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  might  have  been  some  during  the  summer,  but  if 
there  were  they  were  a  pittance.  Maybe  $200. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  can  check  that  in  my  bank  account.  I  just  don't  have 
the  information  here. 

]VIr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  You  stated  that  you  continued  to  live 
on  your  outside  income.  What  was  your  outside  income  during  the 
summer  of  1968  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  How  much  money  did  I  carry  around,  or  what  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  No,  sir,  what  was  the  source  of  your  incOiUe  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Source  of  it?  Speaking,  based  on  the  notoriety  that 
people  like  you  and  the  mass  media  have  given  me. 

Mr.  Conley.  Your  speaking  appearances,  th"\  were  wliat  you  were 
able  to  derive  your  income  from  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  writing. 

Mr.  Conley.  What  particular  articles  were  you  writing  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  This  summer?  Well,  as  I  said,  I  was  at  work  on  the 
contractual  basis  with  Random  House  on  a  new  book  on  Vietnam. 


DISRUPTION  OF   1968   DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2501 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  Mr.  Davis  worked  with 
you  in  the  Chicago  office ;  did  he  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  primarily  ran  the  office. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  consider  him  your  boss  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  He  was  my  brother. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  How  many  other  full-time  employees  did 
you  have  in  the  Chicago  office  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know,  because  we  don't  operate  on  that  basis. 
As  the  convention  approached,  we  had  more  and  more  people  working 
out  of  the  office  on  a  multitude  of  problems. 

Mr.  Conley.  Starting  in  June,  how  many  people  did  you  have  there 
in  June  ? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  see,  because  we  have  different  views  of  the  world, 
it  sometimes  may  seem  to  you  that  I  don't  answer  your  questions,  but 
that  is  primarily  because  I  don't  live  in  a  world  of  jobs,  money,  and 
so  forth. 

Mr.  Conley.  No,  sir;  you  have  answered  my  question  very  nicely. 
I  am  just  asking  you 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  is  a  number,  I  mean,  I  don't  know  how  many 
people  worked  in  the  Chicago  office  in  June.  Probably  10  or  15. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  And  then  in  July,  do  you  have  any  state- 
ment as  to  how  large  the  staff  had  grown  to  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  A  guesstimate  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  More. 

Mr.  Conley.  More  than 

Mr.  Hayden.  Twenty,  twenty-five. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir,  and  then  during  the  first  2  weeks  of 
August,  what  had  the  staff  grown  to  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  really  know.  It  was  larger,  but  see,  it  was 
organized  not  in  terms  of  numbers;  but  we  were  organizing  a  legal 
l^anel  to  handle  our  suit  against  Mayor  Daley,  seeking  to  get  permits 
for  our  demonstrations  and  rallies,  and  I  don't  know  if  you  would  con- 
sider those  lawyers  jjart  of  the  Mobilization  staff. 

We  were  organizing  doctors  to  prepare  first  aid  stations,  because 
we  expected  that,  what  with  the  announcement  that  20,000  troops 
would  be  brought  into  the  city,  some  people  were  going  to  g;et  hurt. 
And  we  didn't  want  Mayor  Daley's  hospitals  to  be  the  only  thing  that 
we  could  go  to  if  people  were  hit  over  the  head.  But  I  don't  know  if 
you  would  consider  those  doctors  part  of  the  Mobilization  staff. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  considered  them  part  of  the  Mobilization  staff, 
didn't  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  that  is  the  doctors'  group.  We  considered  our  re- 
sponsibility was  to  make  sure  that  sympathetic  public  health  students, 
medical  students,  and  doctors  would  get  themselves  together  and  stay 
in  touch  with  us  about  our  programmatic  needs,  and  the  same  with 
lawyers,  so  the  question  of  staff  involves  a  lot  of  blurred  lines.  That  is 
all  I  am  saying. 

Out  of  the  central  office,  Eoom  315,  407  South  Dearborn,  as  I  say, 
there  was  always  a  nucleus  of  10  to  30  people  doing  the  normal  cen- 
tral office  work,  answering  the  phone  and  sending  out  mailings  and 
protecting  the  doors  from  people  who  might  want  to  come  in  and  shoot 


2502  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

the  place  up.  That  sort  of  thing  occupied  most  of  the  people  in  the 
oflSce.  And  as  the  convention  approached,  more  and  more  people  came 
to  the  office,  at  least  to  get  some  information  about  what  was  happen- 
ing and  where  to  go  in  the  city.  So  it  got  to  be  a  very  large  office  situ- 
ation by  the  time  of  the  convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  you,  then — do  I  understand  it  that  it  is  your 
testimony  you  did  not  consider  the  lawyers,  then,  and  the  doctors,  who 
were  part  of  the  overall  plan,  as  a  part  of  the  Mobilization  Committee  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  we  don't  think  in  those  terms. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  you  are  the  one  that  raised  question  that  I  might 
think  in  those  terms,  and  I  am  asking  you  what  you  thought? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes ;  they  didn't  have  to  accept  the  Mobilization  struc- 
ture or  follow  its — I  mean,  they  were  not  integral  parts  of  it  in  the 
sense  of  groups  that  would  abide  by  all  the  day-to-day  decisions  or 
general  policy  decisions.  They  were  more  cooperating  groups,  co- 
operating groups  of  doctors  and  cooperating  groups  of  lawyers. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  after  the  convention  was  over,  Mr.  Hay- 
den, did  you  then  leave  the  Chicago  area  and  go  to  the  West  Coast? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  have  you  continued  to  remain  on  the  West  Coast, 
basically,  since  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Basically,  since  that  time,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  And  did  you  consider — did  you  continue 
to  receive  in  any  way  any  compensation  after  the  convention  from  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  To  your  knowledge,  you  have  not  received  any  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  haven't  received  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  when  you  initially  went  to  the  Oakland  area,  did 
you  not  in  fact  live  with  Robert  Scheer  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  did  not  stay  at  his  residence  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  stayed  at  several  residences,  including  his. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  you  did  stay  at  his  residence  at  one  time, 
then,  since  the  convention  and  prior  to  this  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now^,  you  are  now  living  at  what  was  it,  6000  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  6000  Broadway,  in  Oakland. 

Mr.  Conley.  In  Oakland.  All  right. 

Mr.  Hayden,  in  the  early  months  of  1968  numerous  items  that  your 
National  Mobilization  Committee  put  out  referred  to  you  and  Rennie 
Davis  as  coproject  directors  of  the  Chicago  organization.  You  are 
familiar  with  the  articles  that  I  am  taking  about  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right — no,  I  am  not,  but  I  am  familiar  with  the  titles. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  your  literature  carried  at  the  bottom  of  it  you 
and  Rennie  Davis  as  coproject  directors. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right. 

Mr.  Conley.  Then  a  letter  came  out  on  August  10,  1968,  on  the 
stationery  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  and  signed  by 
Dave  Dellinger,  and  it  refers  to  Rennie  Davis  as  project  director  and 
makes  no  mention  of  yourself. 

Were  you  no  longer  a  coproject  director  as  of  August  10  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2503 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  don't  know  the  letter  you  are  referring  to,  but 
from  all  that  I  recall  we  were  always  the  coproject  directors. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  is  the  letter,  sir. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  this  only  refers  to  Rennie  Davis  as  project  di- 
rector because  Rennie  would  be — as  I  said,  he  was  the  managerial  per- 
son in  the  office,  and  the  section  of  the  letter  you  refer  to  indicates  that 
people  should  call  the  Chicago  office  and  talk  with  Paul  Potter,  Vernon 
Grizzard,  or  Rennie  Davis.  And  that  makes  sense  to  me  because  Rennie 
was  the  one  who  operated  the  office,  but  that  doesn't  imply  that  I  was 
not  a  coproject  director,  even  though  I  can  understand  how  you  might 
come  to  that  conclusion. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  just  wanted  to  clear  it  up.  Okay  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  it  clear  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  did  you  remain  in  Chi- 
cago from  the  time  you  arrived  there  in  June  until  the  Democratic 
Convention  in  August  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  did,  basically. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  leave  there  on  at  least  one  occasion,  though, 
and  go  overseas? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes ;  I  went  to  Paris  to  try  to  do  some  writing  about 
the  peace  talks  and  to  have  discussions  with  Ambassador  Harriman 
and  with  North  Vietnamese  officials. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  was  this  trip  made  in  July  of  1968  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  did  you  meet,  when  you  were  in  Paris,  with  the 
North  Vietnamese,  Viet  Cong,  and  U.S.  representatives,  including 
Mr.  Harriman? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes ;  although  I  don't  recall  meeting  with  South  Viet- 
namese representatives,  or  Viet  Cong  as  you  call  them.  I  think 

Mr.  Conley.  Just 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  passed  them  briefly  at  a  reception. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Mr.  Counsel,  he  answered  "yes."  You  did  meet  with 
Mr.  Harriman? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  of  course. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  do  you  recall  specifically  when  in  July  these  visits 
occurred  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  was  the  beginning  of  July.  I  remember  because  I 
was  there  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  and  we  had  a  Fourth  of  July  celebra- 
tion with  all  the  Americans  in  Paris  who  wanted  to  come.  We  had  a 
sort  of  a  rally  and  a  discussion  with  Vietnamese  people  and  we  showed 
films,  and  so  on. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  when  you  had  these  contacts  with  the  North  Viet- 
namese in  Paris,  did  you  discuss  with  them  a  meeting  between  U.S. 
and  Vietnamese  youth  to  be  held  in  Budapest,  Hungary,  in  September 
of  this  year  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  had  no  discussion  with  them  at  all  about  that  meet- 
ing in  September  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  Prior  to  making  this  trip,  did  you  consult  with  Robert 
Greenblatt  ?  Specifically  with  reference  to  this  trip  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 


2504  DISRUPTION  OF  19 68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  had  no  discussion  with  Mr.  Greenblatt,  then,  prior 
to  making  the  trip  to  Paris  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course  I  have  had  discussions  with  Mr.  Greenblatt. 

Mr.  Gdnley.  Sir,  let  me  finish. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Prior  to  the  trip. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  let  me  finish  my  question;  I  will  try  to  let  you 
finish  your  answer. 

You  had  no  discussion  with  Mr.  Greenblatt  specifioally  dealing  with 
your  making  the  trip  to  Paris  or  what  you  were  going  to  do  in  Paris? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  probably  did.  It  was  not  a  veiy  significant  or  impor- 
tant meeting,  but  since  he  was  around  the  Mobilization  office,  he  was 
aware  that  I  w^ould  be  going  on  my  way  to  Paris.  And  to  the  best  of 
my  recollection,  I  probably  did  not  speak  to  Greenblatt  because  the 
trip  to  Paris  was  decided  upon  rather  suddenly  and  I  didn't  stop  in 
New  York  on  my  way  out. 

I  am  just  trying  to  indicate  that  I  may  have  talked  to  Greenblatt  at 
some  point  before  the  trip;  and  if  you  would  ask  something  more 
specific,  I  might  be  able  to  answer  more  specifically. 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  All  right;  well,  it  is  a  fact,  is  it  not,  that  Mr.  Greenblatt 
and  Dave  Dellinger  had  been  in  Prague  earlier  this  summer  at  a 
meeting  with  the  Vietnamese  representatives? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  believe  that  is  true. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right ;  now  had  you  had  any  discussion  with  them 
with  i"eference  to  this  earlier  meeting? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Wliat  earlier  meeting?  Tlieir  meeting? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Their  meeting  in  Prague. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  very  extensive  discussion,  but  I  was  aware  that 
they  had  discussed  in  Prague  a  potential  conference  between  Ameri- 
cans and  Vietnamese,  not  unlike  the  conference  that  I  had  organized 
in  Bratislava,  Czechoslovakia,  in  September  of  1967.  But  I  was  work- 
ing on  the  Chicago  project,  and  conferences  with  the  Vietnamese  in 
the  fall  were  not  particularly  on  my  mind.  That  is  all  I  am  saying. 
My  responsibility  was  to  work  on  Chicago. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Would  you  say  that  you  had  made  this  trip 
to  Paris  as  an  emissary  for  David  Dellinger,  who  had  been  in  Europe 
earlier  this  summer  ?  Were  you  responsible  for  transmitting  any  mes- 
sages for  Mr.  Dellinger  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  not  clear.  Are  you  referring  again  to  the  Budapest 
business,  or  what  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No;  I  am  referring  to  your  trip,  sir.  Your  trip  was  to 
Paris. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  not  an  emissary  of  David  Dellinger.  He  is  the 
chairman  of  the  Mobilization,  and  I  am  a  close  associate  of  his,  and, 
but  I  didn't 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  sir,  I  will  use  your  words.  Did  you  make  your 
trip  as  a  "close  associate"  of  Mr.  Dellinger 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course. 

Mr.  Conley.  — for  the  purpose  of  communication  of  messages  from 
Mr.  Dellinger  to  the  group  in  Paris  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  think  Mr.  Dellinger  was  aware  of  what  I  was 
doing,  and  we  sort  of  think  alike,  so  I  wasn't  communicating  his  mes- 
sage to  Paris  so  much  as  just  communicating  our  own  message. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Which  would  be  both  your  messages,  then, 
I  take  it,  if  you  think  alike. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2505 

Mr.  Hayden".  I  think  that  is  a  safe  conclusion. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now  Mr.  Vernon  Grizzard  has  stated 
that  he  attended  the  Budapest  meeting.  And  did  you,  before  you  left 
for  Paris,  discuss  with  Grizzard,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  marshals 
in  Chicago,  the  possibility  of  his  going  to  the  Budapest  meeting  with 
the  Viet  Cong? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  that  I  recall ;  no. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  recall  no  conversations? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  think  that  Vernon  was  ever  definite  about 
whether  he  was  going  to  Budapest  or  not.  I  think  that  that  was  a  rather 
late  decision,  but  you  would  have  to  call  him  and  ask  him. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now  while  you  were  in  Paris  in  July,  did 
you  have  occasion  to  meet  with  Colonel  Ha  Van  Lau  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  met  him  briefly  at  a  reception.  I  know  Colonel  Lau 
from  my  trips  to  North  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  had  met  with  him  previously;  in  '65,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  there  December  of  '65,  January  '66,  and  Oc- 
tober '67.  And  on  those  two  occasions  I  had  extensive  discussions  with 
Ha  Van  Lau,  because  he  is  a  very  important  spokesman,  as  you  know, 
for  the  North  Vietnamese.  He  is,  in  addition  to  being  a  major  member 
of  their  delegation  in  the  Paris  peace  talks,  he  was  the — he  was  a  part 
of  their  delegation  to  Geneva  in  1953-54.  I  believe  that  he  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  delegation  in  the  1962  settlement — in  conference  to  settle  the 
Laotian  situation. 

He  was  the  liaison  between  the  North  Vietnamese  people's  armed 
forces  and  the  International  Control  Commission,  which  was  set  up 
by  the  Geneva  agreements.  He  was  the  secretary-general  of  the  North 
Vietnamese  commission  to  investigate  United  States  war  crimes  in 
Vietnam  ^  and  very  instrumental  in  the  [Bertrand  Russell]  tribunal  ^ 
that  found  the  United  States  guilty  of  genocide. 

Mr.  Conley.  What  was  his  title  in  July  of  this  year,  when  you  met 
with  him  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  was  probably  still  all  of  those  things.  I  don't  know. 
But  he  was  basically  functioning  as  a  member  of  the  North  Vietnamese 
delegation. 

But  don't  misconstrue  it.  I  didn't  meet  with  him.  I  saw  him  by 
chance  at  a  reception  and  shook  his  hand  and  didn't  even  exchange 
comments  with  him. 

Mr.  Conley.  Do  you  recall  who  else  you  might  have  met  with  from 
the  North  Vietnamese  delegation  there  in  Paris  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  I  met  with  Vietnamese,  again,  whom  I  had 
known  from  North  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes ;  their  names,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  want  their  names  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Nguyen  Minh  Vy  and  Xuan  Oanh,  which  I  am  sure 
you  racists  will  be  able  to  pronounce.  If  you  want  the  spelling,  I  can 
submit  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  have  the  spelling  for  the  reporter? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  write  it  down  and  pass  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  Does  this  individual  hold  any  official 

1  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam  Commission  for  Investigation  on  the  American  Im- 
perialist War  Crimes  in  Vietnam. 

-  International  War  Crimes  Tribunal. 

21-706  O — 69— pt.  2 2 


2506  DISRUPTION  OF  1 9 68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  two  people. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  sorry,  sir.  The  first  one.  Let  us  go  back  to  the 
first  one. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  they  are  members  of  the  North  Vietnamese  dele- 
gation in  Paris.  It  is  currently  involved  in  discussions  with  the  United 
States  Government  about  ending  the  war.  I  don't  know  whether  they 
have  titles,  as  such,  within  the  delegation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  did  you  also  just  meet  these  people  at  a  reception? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No;  I  had  very  extensive  discussions  with  them,  just 
as  I  did  with  Ambassador  Harriman. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now  did  you  in  your  discussions  with  them 
discuss  the  forthcoming  Democratic  Convention  and  the  National 
Mobilization  Committee's  role  in  the  Chicago  convention  ? 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Watson  entered  the  hearing  room.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  told  them  that  what  they  were  reading  in  the  Amer- 
ican papers  was  true,  that  we  were  involved  very  heavily  in  planning 
for  that,  but  that  wasn't  the  purpose  of  my  visits  with  them. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  What  was  their  reaction  when  you  told 
them  that  what  they  were  reading  in  the  American  newspapers 
was  true,  that  you  were  heavily  involved  in  the  planning  for  the 
convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  they  hoped  very  much  that  the  American  public 
will  be  able  to  make  its  desire  for  the  war  in  Vietnam  to  end;  they 
hope  that  that  public  opinion  would  make  itself  felt  on  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States;  and,  as  you  know,  they  certainly  think 
that  a  peace  movement  is  in  the  interests  not  only  of  the  people  of 
Vietnam,  but  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

So  they  are  always  very  interested  in  demonstrations  or  activities 
in  the  United  States  against  the  war,  although  they  believe  that  the 
reason  there  is  a  peace  movement  is  because  the  United  States  has  been 
defeated  in  Vietnam. 

They  would  never  say  that  they  could  utilize  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States,  as  some  people  apparently  believe,  to  bring  the  war  to 
an  end.  They  believe  the  war  will  only  be  brought  to  an  end  in  Vietnam 
itself  when  the  United  States  is  stymied. 

Mr.  Conley.  Were  they  pleased  at  the  focusing  that  your  committee 
was  having  on  the  people  in  the  United  States  ?  Did  they  have  any  re- 
action to  this,  the  methods  being  taken  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  They  would  never  meddle  in  other  people's  affairs,  con- 
trary to  your  theories  of  aggression  in  an  infiltration,  and  so  forth. 
They  believe  that  the  people 

Mr.  Conley.  Sir,  I  am  not  interested  in  what 

Mr.  Hayden.  People  who  have  a  problem- 


Mr.  Conley.  Just  a  minute,  now.  My  question  requires  a  yes  or 
no  answer. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am 

Mr.  Conley.  My  question  requires  a  yes  or  a  no,  and  then  you  can 
give  your  explanation. 

Mr.  Weinglass.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  one  pyoint 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  suspend  for  just  a  minute. 

Mr.  Weinglass.  At  one  point,  comisel  asked  the  witness  to  give  him 
an  opportunity  to  complete  his  question.  I  think  that  courtesy  washes 
both  ways,  and  the  witness  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  complete 
his  answer. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2507 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  us  p)roceed.  There  was  a  give-and-take  here. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  give  better  than  a  yes  or  no.  I  mean,  I  am  not 
going  to  equivocate  before  this  committee. 

Mr,  IcHORD.  Let  the  witness  proceed.  We  are  going  along  very  well 
here. 

M.  Hayden.  If  you  want  to  state  your  question  again,  I  will  go  at  it 
more  bluntly,  or  I  will  reduce  it  and  make  it  simpler  for  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  the  North  Vietnamese  delegation  pleased  or  did 
they  have  any  reaction  to  the  fact  that  your  National  Mobilization 
Committee  was  serving  as  a  focal  point  for  bringing  this  issue  to  the 
attention  of  the  American  people  through  the  Democratic  Convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  they  are  pleased  at  any  kind  of  peace  activity 
or  any  sign  that  people  are  beginning  to  come  to  their  senses  about 
Vietnam.  So,  of  course,  they  are  pleased  about  whatever  the  antiwar 
movement  is  trying  to  do  in  the  United  States — including  demonstra- 
tions at  the  convention,  including  resistance  to  the  draft,  including 
traveling  and  speaking  around  the  country  on  college  campuses.  Wliat- 
ever  we  do  for  peace  in  Vietnam  that  we  think  is  in  our  interest  is 
obviously  in  their  interest,  because  they  want  peace  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  moving  to  another  area  and  taking  you 
back,  if  I  may,  to  about  February  of  this  year,  back  to  February 
11,  1968,  actually,  this  is  apparently  when  the  first  meeting  of  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee  in  relation  to  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention in  Chicago  was  held,  apparently  this  meeting  was  cochaired 
by  Rennie  Davis  and  Carlos  Russell. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  was  the  date  of  that  again  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  February  11, 1968. 

Mr.  Hayden.  In  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes.  It  was  held  in  Chicago  on  February  11, 1968. 

Mr.  Hayden.  At  407  South  Dearborn  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Sir,  I  don't  know  the  address. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  that  the  meeting  that  I  think  this  fellow  here • 

Mr.  Conley.  If  you  will  let  me  complete  the  question,  I  think  you 
will  know  what  meeting  I  mean. 

The  meeting  was  cochaired  by  Rennie  Davis  and  Carlos  Russell 
and  established  an  interim  committee  composed  of  yourself,  Rennie 
Davis,  Dave  Dellinger,  Robert  Greenblatt,  Earl  Durham,  Corky 
Gonzalez,  Carolyn  Black,  Lincoln  Lynch,  Sue  Munaker,  and  Carlos 
Russell,  which  was  for  the  purpose  of  continuing  the  organization 
and  planning  of  the  project  in  Chicago. 

Now  my  question,  sir,  is.  Did  you  attend  that  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  did. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  the  address  is  407  South  Dearborn  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  do  you  recall  who  invited  you  to  take  part  in 
that  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  Whether  it  was  by  a  verbal  invitation,  by  written 
notification  ?  You  do  not  recall  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  wanted  the  meeting  to  happen  and  just  as- 
sumed that  I  would  be  there.  I  was  among  the  people  who  probably 
organized  for  the  meeting,  although  I  wasn't  living  in  Chicago  at 
the  time. 


2508  DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Besides  yourself,  who  else  would  have  organized  for 
the  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know.  It  was  probably  primarily  myself  and 
Rennie. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  was  it  prior  to  or  sub- 
sequent to  this  meeting  that  you  and  Rennie  Davis  coauthored  the 
document,  "MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  1968:  AN  ELECTION 
YEAR  OFFENSIVE,"  which  was  dated  March  1968  and  marked 
''Not  for  Publication''?  [Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1.  See  pages  2562-2583.] 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  it  before  or  after  ? 

(Voice  from  the  floor.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  that  it  was  after.  I  think  that  we  sort  of  took 
into  account  a  lot  of  opinions  expressed  at  that  meeting,  and  then  we 
wrote  the  document.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  that  is  what  I 
will  testify  to  now. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  Davis  can  correct  me  later  if  it  turns  out  that  I 
am  being  incorrect. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now,  did  you  and  Rennie  Davis  also 
prepare  another  document  for  the  National  Mobilization  Committee 
entitled  "DISCUSSION  ON  THE  DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION 
CHALLENGE,"  and  this  document  likewise  was  marked  ''not  for  cir- 
culation or  publication,''''  but  was  addressed  to  the  Chicago  organizers  ? 
[Hayden  Exhibit  No.  2.  See  pages  2556-2559.] 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know.  I  don't  remember  such  a  document.  If 
you  will  show  it  to  me,  I  can  easily  tell  you  who  wrote  it. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  this — this  is  it  ?  This  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  of  course,  we  authored  it.  It  says  we  did.  I  just 
didn't  remember  the  title.  See,  it  is  not  really  a  title.  It  just  savs 
"DISCUSSION  ON  THE  DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION  CHAL- 
LENGE." I  think  that  was  kind  of  a  warmup  for  the  later  paper. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  now  do  you  recall  when  this  particular  doc- 
ument was  prepared  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Oh,  yes,  it  was — it  was  prepared  sometime  between 
January  and  February. 

Mr.  Conley.  In  other  words,  was  this  document  prepared  prior  to  the 
February  11  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  that  it  was,  but  again  my  recollection  is  kind 
of  vague  on  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  now  I  belicAe  this  document  is  marked  to  the 
"Chicago  organizers." 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  don't  see  that.  Oh,  yes.  "National  Mobilization," 
I  can't  read  it.  "To:  National  Mobilization  Staff;  Chicago  organizers." 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir.  Now  wlio  were  the  Chicago  organizers  to 
whom  this  document  was  directed  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  don't  think  it  was  directed  to  Chicago  orga- 
nizers any  more  than  anybody  else,  so  I  don't  know.  You  see,  I  didn't 
type  this  and  I  don't  know  what  that  particularly  refers  to.  But  it 
probably,  when  the  term  "Chicago  organizers''  is  used,  tliat  probably 
means  that  this  document  was  circulated  among  active  people  through- 
out the  citv  who  organized  tenant  unions,  rent  strikes  against  slum 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2509 

landlords,  organize  black  people  in  the  ghetto,  organize  draft  resisters, 
organize  students  on  campuses ;  you  know,  organizers. 

Rennie  was  a  Chicago  organizer,  as  you  know,  for  some  time,  work- 
ing with  poorer  working-class  white  people  on  the  North  Side  of 
Chicago,  and  he  probably  means  by  this  that  this  memorandum  was 
sent  out  to  other  organizers  around  the  city. 

That  is  a  very  revealing  document  in  terms  of  what  our  intentions 
were.  I  hope  that  it  is  in  your  record,  because  it  indicates  that  our  in- 
tention was  never  to  disrupt  the  convention  or  engage  in  violence. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  That  is  part  of  the  record,  is  it  not,  Mr.  Counsel  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir, 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  I  hope  that  also  part  of  the  record  is  the  fact  that 
we  had  a  vote,  according  to  this  document  that  you  gave  me,  on  what 
kind  of  demonstration  we  wanted  to  have.  This  was  at  this  February 
meeting  you  are  referring  to,  when  we  voted  against  the  view  of  dis- 
ruption, which  you  have  marked  here,  or  someone  has  marked  here, 
where  it  says : 

One  view  *  ♦  *  holds  that  the  movement  should  prevent  the  Convention 
from  assembly ing  [sic].  *  *  *  The  movement  should  do  everything  possible 
to  disrupt  its  deliberations  in  August. 

And  as  part  of  the  record,  we  voted  against  that  view,  in  favor  of 
another  view. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  going  back  to  the  meeting  of  Feb- 
ruary 11,  you  have  stated  that  you  were  present  at  that  meeting  that 
occurred. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  must  have  been. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  did  you  hear  Communist  Party  official  Don- 
ald Hamerquist,  and  I  quote  as  follows : 

What  we  must  do  is  make  concrete  demands  on  the  Convention  which  the  Con- 
vention cannot  respond  to.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  that  would  be  a  typical  Communist  Party  posi- 
tion. Based  on  the  idea  that  you  have  to  organize  people  where  they  are 
at,  and  realize  that  your  authorities  will  never  give  them  even  the 
smallest  reward,  so  it  wouldn't  surprise  me  if  Hamerquist  said  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  recall  him  saying  that,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  don't  recall  it.  But  it  wouldn't  surprise  me  in  the 
least. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Mr.  Hayden.  By  that  he  would  mean,  if  you  organize  to  demand 
housing  for  everybody  in  America,  they  will  find  out  that  you  people 
never  give  housing  to  everybody  in  America. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  and  then,  Mr.  Hayden,  were  you  present 
when  Communist  Party  member  Jack  Spiegel  stated,  "We  can't  call 
to" 

Mr.  Hayden.  By  the  way,  I  don't  know  if  any  of  these  people  are 
members  of  the  Communist  Party.  This  is  your  committee  and  your 
tape  recorders  and  you  can  go  right  ahead,  but  it  is  not  my  designations, 

Mr,  Conley.  Well,  sir,  I  hand  you  back  the  "Convention  Notes.'' 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  Jack  Spiegel  is  designated  as  a  Communist  Party 
member? 

Mr.  Conley.  I  don't  know  what  "CP"  stands  for,  sir. 


2510  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  Chicago  Peace  Council,  Jack  Spiegel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Look  at  Hamerqiiist,  please. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  didn't  ask  me  about  Hamerquist.  When  you  said 
"Communist  Party  member  Jack  Spiegel,"  I  interrupted  you;  when 
you  said  "Communist  Party  member  Hamerquist,"  I  didn't  interrupt, 
because  everybody  knows  he  is  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 
It  is  listed. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Moving  on  to  Mr.  Spiegel, 

Mr.  AsHBROoK.  Mr.  Counsel,  is  it  listed  on  that  book? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  just  says,  "CP."  I  assume  that  means  "Communist 
Party."  But  Jack  Spiegel  is  listed  as  Chicago  Peace  Council. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right;  Mr.  Spiegel's  quote  as  follows:  "We 
can't" 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  are  you  reading  from?  Some  stolen  notes,  or 
what? 

Mr.  Conley.  From  your  February  11th,  page  4,  column  2. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Just  give  me  the  page,  and  you  won't  have  to  read  it. 
Okay,  what  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  the  quote  is : 

We  can't  call  200,000  i>eople  to  Chicago  and  then  disassociate  ourselves  from 
violence.  Disruption  and  violence  will  occur.  It's  going  to  happen  and  we'll  have  to 
deal  with  that  fact. 

Now,  were  you  present  when  this  statement  was  made  by  Mr.  Spiegel  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  you  haven't  read  it,  of  course.  But  I  was  present 
during  the  meeting.  I  don't  remember  him  saying  it,  but  if  you  will  read 
the  whole  statement,  I  think  you  will  find  it  is  very  interesting. 

Mr.  Spiegel  does  not  mean  that 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  sir,  I  am  not  interested  in  what 

Mr.  Hayden.  Just  a  minute. 

Mr.  Conley.  That  isn't  responsive  to  my  question,  siir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  present,  but  I  think  it  is  fair  for  you  to  read  all 
of  Mr.  Spiegel's  statement,  and  I  will  read  it  for  you,  if  you  won't 
read  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  just  asking  you  if  Mr.  Spiegel  made  this  statement. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Then  I  have  to  say  I  don't  know,  but  I  will  go  further 
and  say  that  you  haven't  read  his  entire  statement. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  asking  you,  sir,  though,  did  he  make  this  statement? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  had  better  call  him  and  ask  him. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  asking  you  if  you  heard  him  make  that  statement. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  can't  remember  him  saying  it,  but  here  it  is  in  the 
notes,  so  I  assume  he  said  something  like  that.  What  is  the  big  deal 
that  you  are  uncovering  by  reading  from  a  note?  I  mean  obviously  he 
said  something  like  that,  or  it  wouldn't  be  in  the  notes.  But  the  main 
problem  is  you  haven't  read  his  entir-e  statement,  which  tries  to  point 
out  that  we  are  going  to  have  to  organize  an  alternative  to  violence. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  entire  statement  is  a  matter  of  record,  is  it  not, 
Mr.  Comisel  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  for  the  press  in  this  room,  who  are  listening  to 
your  slander  of  Mr.  Spiegel. 

Mr.  Conley.  It  has  been  previously  introduced  as  Grubisic  Exhibit 
4  ^  at  the  earlier  hearings. 

»  See  pt.  1,  pp.  2293-2298,  of  Oct.  1,  1968,  bearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  251 1 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  the  witness. 

Let  the  Chair  declare  a  5-minute  recess. 

(Brief  recess.) 

( Subcommittee  members  present  at  the  time  of  recess  and  when  hear- 
ings resumed:  Representatives  Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  directing  your  attention  to  page  4, 
column  1,  of  your  "Convention  Notes,"  the  document  prepared  as 
a  result  of  the  February  11  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  There  appears  there  a  statement,  which  apparently  is 
attributed  to  you,  beginning  at  the  top  of  the  page : 

As  organization  develops  to  challenge  the  Democratic  Party,  it  must  project 
a  non-violent,  legal  face.  We  cannot  call  for  violence,  although  violence  is  a 
major  method  of  change  in  this  society.  *  *  * 

Did  you  make  this  statement,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  made  a  statement  to  that  effect.  But  again,  you  haven't 
read  up  my  entire  statement,  which  is  typical  of  a  witch  hunt. 

Mr.  Ichord.  You  wish  the  entire  statement  read  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Either  that,  or  if  you  would  let  me  tell  you  why  I 
think  violence  is  a  major  tool  of  change,  I  would  be  glad  to  do  that. 

Mr.  Ichord.  I  think  the  question  permits  such  an  answer.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Fine.  I  believe  that  violence  should  never  be  ruled  out 
as  a  method  of  change;  especially,  I  believe  that  a  country  that  is 
burning  up  Vietnam  has  no  right  to  lecture  people  to  be  nonviolent. 
However,  I  believe  also  that — I  always  believed  that  Chicago  was  no 
place  for  a  violent  confrontation,  because  you  have  a  disciplined, 
armed  force  of  20,000  men  waiting  for  you  there,  and  you  have  un- 
armed demonstrators  straggling  in,  19-  and  20-year-old  kids  from 
all  around  the  country,  who  don't  know  each  other,  and  they  would 
be  wiped  out.  They  almost  were  wiped  out  in  Chicago,  simply  for 
existing. 

So  I  wanted  to  make  a  distinction  in  that  meeting  between  the  fact 
that  I  believe  that  at  some  point  there  may  be  increased  violence  in 
American  society  on  the  one  hand  and/or,  on  the  other  hand,  I  didn't 
believe  that  violence  should  be  part  of  the  planning  or  preparation  or 
conception  of  Chicago. 

I  thought  that  what  we  were  doing  in  Chicago  was  trying  to  sort 
of  bring  the  kind  of  people  who  are  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Demo- 
cratic Party — decent,  middle-class  Americans  of  all  ages  and  classes 
and  races  who  believe  in  peace  and  social  justice — to  come  and  protest 
the  abandoning  of  those  ideals  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States. 

And  I  know  very  well  that,  for  that  kind  of  purpose,  violence  or 
the  threat  of  violence  only  scares  people  away.  And  that  is  what  I 
think  Mayor  Daley  and  President  Johnson  were  engaged  in  by  their 
buildup,  military  buildup;  they  were  trying  to  scare  people  away 
from  coming  to  the  convention. 

So  I  make  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  I  am  not  nonviolent,  but  often 
people  who  are  not  nonviolent  can  be  the  most  nonviolent,  because 
they  know  w^hat  they  are  doing  and  they  want  to  make  sure  that  the 
means  suit  the  ends.  And  the  means  in  this  case  for  me  was  a  mass 
mobilization  of  a  peaceful  kind.  It  became  a  violent  situation  because 


2512  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

of  the  Chicago  Police  Department,  of  which  this  committee  is,  I 
believe,  an  extension. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Mr.  Counsel,  could  I  ask  a  question  at  that  point? 

I  think  your  statement  regarding  your  preference  that  there  not  be 
a  confrontation  at  that  time  would  certainly  be  borne  out  by  what 
you  have  said  in  the  past.  But  isn't  it  also  true  that  you  probably,  on 
the  basis  of  your  other  statements,  would  prefer  urban  guerrilla  type 
of  activity,  rather  than  a  direct  confrontation  with  20,000  policemen  ? 

I  note  from  your  interview  in  the  National  Guardian  on  July  1, 1967, 
page  4,  where  you  say,  I  quote : 

Urban  guerrillas  are  the  only  realistic  alternative  at  this  time  to  electoral 
politics  or  mass  armed  resistance. 

Mr.  Haydex.  I  am  glad  you  brought  that  up.  I  have  been  meaning 
to  settle  that  score  with  the  National  Guardian  for  some  time.  What 
I  said  was  that  we  have  to  function  as  "political  guerrillas."  I  didn't 
say  "urban  guerrillas." 

A  political  guerrilla  is  a  person  who  uses  the  political  concepts  of 
guerrilla  warfare  without  the  weapons  or  the  guns.  The  political  con- 
cept of  guerrilla  warfare  is  to  make  yourself  at  one  with  the  people 
3'ou  are  trying  to  organize,  be  among  them,  go  through  their  day-to- 
day existence,  live  on  the  same  budget  as  they  do,  and  organize  them 
into  a  political  force. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Sort  of  American  Viet  Cong? 

Mr.  Haydex.  It  would  not  be  an  American  Viet  Cong,  until  the  day 
we  started  taking  your  guns  from  your  police  stations  and  turning 
them  on  you,  and  as  far  as  I  know,  that  hasn't  happened,  so  you  are 
making  an  extremely  mistaken  generalization  that  is  merely  meant  to 
kind  of  paint  the  antiwar  movement,  the  movement  which  is  for  peace 
in  Vietnam,  as  somehow  being  an  aggressive,  violent  movement.  It  is  a 
case  of  the  criminal  calling  the  victim  the  criminal. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  It  is  your  position,  when  you  said  "urban  guerrillas," 
you  were  not  referring  to  urban  guerrillas  in  the  general  context  that 
most  of  us  would  think  of  urban  guerrillas  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  gave  a  speech  saying  that  I  believed  that  parlia- 
mentary means  would  be  blocked  in  this  society  as  we  saw  at  the 
convention,  the  parliamentary  efforts  of  Senators  McGovern  and 
McCarthy  were  blocked.  And  I  felt  that  violent  revolution  was  also 
not  possible  in  the  kind  of  society  that  we  had ;  that,  therefore,  we  had 
to  find  some  kind  of  alternative  to  the  traditional  concepts  of  social 
change,  which  on  the  one  hand  are  overthrow  the  government,  and  on 
the  other  hand  are  elect  yourself  president. 

We  have  to  find  another  way,  and  the  way  that  I  think  is  to  organize 
a  movement  of  people  who  are  very  strong  minded  and  organized  on 
local  levels  around  their  own  grievances  and  are  able  to  win  more  and 
more  people  to  their  side  against  the  landlords  and  the  tax  collectors 
and  the  generals  and  the  draft  boards,  who  are  sort  of  raping  them. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Maybe  I  didn't  make  my  question  clear,  but,  spe- 
cifically, when  you,  or  at  least  when  the  reference  attributed  to  you  to 
urban  guerrillas  was  used,  you  were  not  referring  to  the  RAM  type  of 
urban  guerrilla,  snipers,  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Oh,  no;  I  was  not  referring  to  warfare  in  a  military 
sense,  and  it  was  a  misquote  that  I  am  sorry  about,  and  have  always 
had  some  problems  of  interpretation  because  of  that  statement. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68   DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2513 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  you  said  "political  guerrillas"  instead  of  "urban 
guerrillas"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  said  a  lot  more  than  that,  but  I  said  "political  guer- 
rillas." 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  since  we  have  interrupted  the  continuity 
of  counsel's  questions,  did  I  understand  you  earlier  to  say  that  you  make 
no  secret  of  the  fact  that  you  are  nonviolent  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  not  nonviolent  is  what  I  said. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  not  nonviolent.  Now  am  I  to  construe,  then,  you 
believe  in  violence  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  more  than  you  do.  Probably  less  than  you  do. 

Mr.  Watson.  Is  that  right  ?  Now  one  further 

Mr.  Hayden.  Especially  given  your  political  background  in  South 
Carolina,  I  believe  that  to  be  the  case. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  fortunately,  I  believe  the  gentleman  is  not  as 
well  read  about  South  Carolina  activities  as  he  may  be  about  some' 
others,  because  we  have  been 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  just  read  about  all  that  disenfranchisement. 

Mr.  Watson.  — relatively  free  of  that  down  there.  Of  course,  we 
could  debate  that  back  and  forth,  and  you  are  far  less  knowledgeable 
than  othei^  around  you.  Wlien  you  stated  earlier  that  you  did 
not  advocate  violence  in  Chicago,  your  position  was  based  upon  the 
fact  that  there  was  an  overwhelming  force  of  some  20,000  policemen 
who  would  annihilate  you,  virtually,  that's  what  you  said. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  my  basic  reason  was  that  I  really  wanted  all  along 
for  the  largest  possible  number  of  people  to  come,  and  that  includes 
people  with  families,  people  bringing  babies,  and  they  would  have  to 
be  guaranteed  some  safety  coming  to  Chicago. 

They  are  afraid  of  Chicago  because  of  what  they  have  heard  about 
Chicago,  and  so  we  fought,  throughout  the  spring  and  summer,  with 
Chicago  officials  to  try  to  get  permits  so  that  this  number  of  people 
could  come  into  Chicago  safe  and  sound,  and  go  out.  And  my  own  inter- 
pretation of  why  the  city  refused  us  permits  is  because  they  didn't  want 
all  those  people  to  come  and  they  knew  perfectly  well  that  the  average 
person,  like  yourself,  with  family,  would  not  go  somewhere  if  he  is 
afraid  that  he  might  be  locked  up  or  get  hit  over  the  head,  because 
people  can't  take  those  kind  of  chances.  There  were  babies,  and  even  so, 
in  Grant  Park,  when  the  tear  gas  came.  Tear  gas  can  kill  a  baby. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  your  position  is  that  we  have  these 
things  without  the  provocation  by  such  groups  as  you  represent? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  didn't  understand  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  your  position  is  that  we  have  such 
brutality  as  you  alleged  without  the  provo€ations  by  such  groups  as 
you  represent  ? 

ISIr.  Hayden.  Well,  there  is  no  question  that  we  are  a  provocation  to 
you.  But  why  ?  It  is  only  because  we  exist.  Since  when  is  obscenity,  for 
example,  a  reason  for  a  policeman  to  hit  you  over  the  head? 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  you  as  an  individual  Avould  welcome 
anyone  to  use  any  obscene  language,  in  cursing  you,  or  anything  else, 
and  you  would  just  stand  back  quietly  and  fold  your  hands  and  say, 
"Thank  you"? 

Mr.  Hayden.  If  I  was  a  public  servant  engaged  in  protecting  the 
law  and  order,  I  would  not  see  obscenity  as  a  threat  to  law  and  order. 


2514  DISRUPTION  OF   1'9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  in  other  words,  now  we  put  you  and  the  other 
citizens  in  a  different  category  from  a  j^ublic  official  ?  A  public  official, 
in  your  estimation,  is  to  take  all  types  of  abuse,  whereas  you  or  I  or 
others,  who  are  not  public  officials,  do  not  have  to  be  so  restrained. 
Is  that  your  j)osition  ?  I  guess  basically  it  is. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  we  pay  taxes  to  our  Government  for  if  it  is 
not  to  have  a  professional  government  that  is  capable  of  having  police 
force  to 

Mr.  Watson.  To  suffer  all  types  of  abuse  and  profanity  and  ob- 
scenity ?  That  is  your  basic  position,  isn't  it  ?  You  enjoy  a  safe  position, 
whereas  the  policeman,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  should  expect  abuse  from 
organizations  and  individuals  such  as  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  pity  the  policemen,  frankly.  You  haven't 
asked  me  enough 

Mr.  Watson.  I  certainly  do  when  confronted  with  individuals  like 
you. 

Mr.  Hayden,  You  haven't  asked  me  enough  about  what  I  think  to 
draw  your  conclusions. 

Mr.  Watson.  Let's  reduce  it  to  its  simplest  common  denominator. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  that,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  You  expect  the  policeman  to  accept,  by  virtue  of  his 
position,  all  types  of  abuse  against  him,  whereas  you  as  an  individual 
would  not  accept  such  abuse  without  retaliation  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Why  don't  you  ask  me  why  policemen  are  sworn  at 
sometimes?  I  mean  you  don't  just  get  mad  at  a  person  like  this  fellow 
here.  I  have  nothmg  obscene  to  say  to  him,  because  he  is  not  doing 
anything  to  me.  His  uniform  doesn't  disturb  me  any  more  than  your 
suit  disturbs  me.  Even  the  fact  that  he  has  a  gun  doesn't  disturb  me, 
if  he  has  a  gun.  He  hasn't  done  anything.  I  am  not  being  obscene  to 
him. 

Now  why  do  you  think  somebody  suddenly  screams  profanity  at  a 
policeman?  Why  do  you  think  he  does  it?  I  would  say  it  is  because 
he  has  seen  the  policeman  charge  into  a  crowd  and  beat  somebody.  And 
especially  when  it  is  at  the  order  of  Mayor  Daley.  I  mean,  a 
lot  of  abuse  has  been  heaped  on  the  Chicago  police,  and  it  is 
not  really  their  fault.  They  were  obeying  the  orders  of  Mayor  Daley 
and  people  higher  up,  because  when  we  went  to  jail,  they  didn't  beat 
us  in  jail;  they  didn't  act  like  irrational  monsters  in  jail. 

But  what  they  did  on  the  streets,  they  did  in  a  liighly  disciplined 
way.  They  charged  into  crowds,  they  hit  people  in  a  disciplined  way, 
they  were  carrying  out  orders.  And  when  people  are  doing  that  to  you, 
then  you — at  the  very  least — have  a  right  to  think  obscene  thoughts 
about  their  behavior. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Hayden 

Mr.  Hayden.  Especially  if  Mayor  Daley  can  say  on  television  what 
he  said  to  Abraham  Ribicoff,  which  goes  far  beyond  anything  said 
to  a  |X)liceman,  as  you  will  find  out,  when  it  is  revealed  next  week. 
He  made  an  anti-Semitic  remark;  he  used  all  the  language  to  Ribicoff 
that  he  accused  us  of  using.  He  is  still  the  mayor  of  Chicago.  He  has 
not  been  called  before  you.  He  is  not  going  to  jail  like  we  probably  are. 
So  let's  put  the  cart  before  the  horse,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  Now,  getting  back  to  the  basic  question  I  asked  you,  the 
policeman,  in  your  judgment. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2515 

Mr.  Haydbn.  We  have  handled  that  question. 

Mr.  Watson.  The  policeman,  in  your  judgment,  is  expected  by  vir- 
tue of  his  position  to  accept  all  of  the  verbal  abuse,  but  you  as  an 
individual  are  not  expected 

Mr.  Hayden.  Verbal  abuse  does  not  come  out  of  thin  air.  Verbal 
abuse  comes  from  an  initial  abuse,  and  abuse  on  the  part  of  a  police 
officer,  which  is  very  evident,  which  is  evident  in  this  enormous  report, 
wliich  I  would,  like  to  introduce  into  the  evidence.  I  have  it  here,  it  has 
got  1,400  witnesses  to  police  brutality  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  it  is  not 
going  to  be  printed  by  any  other  Government  agency,  and  so  my 
lawyers  plan  to  introduce  it  today,  so  that  at  least  some  Government 
agency  will  publish  it  with  all  of  its  obscene  words  and  all  the  rest  of 
it,  and  you  can  see  for  yourself  who  transgressed  first. 

Mr.  Watson.  One  final  question. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  other  major  thing  I  want  to  say  in  answer  to 
your  question  is  simply  again  that  I  believe  that  even  if  someone 
verbally  abuses  a  police  officer,  a  good,  solid  professional  police  officer 
has  no  reason  to  act  as  jury,  judge,  and  executioner  towards  the  person 
who  used  profane  language  against  him. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  he  is  to  stand  there  and  accept  it, 
quietly  fold  his  hands,  even 

Mr.  Hayden,  If  a  person  has  violated  the  law.  the  duty  of  the  police 
officer  is  to  arrest  the  person,  not  to  engage  in  profanity  with  the 
person,  not  to  engage  in  brutality  with  the  person,  but  simply  to  carry 
out  the  law,  and  these  policemen  know  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  May  I  ask  you  one  final  question,  then? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  an  insult  to  police  to  think  that,  you  know,  that 
they  have  to — that  they  somehow  are  incapable  of  controlling  them- 
selves when  abused.  I  think  they  are  capable  of  it.  I  think  that  they 
were  ordered  into  action  by  Mayor  Daley.  It  was  not  the  taunts  of  the 
demonstrators,  it  was  not  these  bags  of  urine,  it  was  nothing  like  that ; 
it  was  the  fact  that  they  were  ordered  by  Mayor  Daley  to  get  these 
Yippies  out  of  the  streets,  because  a  person  like  Mayor  Daley  does 
not  believe  that  we  have  a  right  to  exist. 

Tliat's  our  crime,  that  we  exist ;  we  have  long  hair,  we  smoke  dope, 
we  are  opposed  to  the  war  in  Vietnam,  and  so  we  shouldn't  exist. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  the  preparation  of  the  bags  of  urine  and  other 
things,  they  were  just  in  the  normal  routine  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  didn't  see  the  bags  of  urine.  I  said  these  supposed 
baofs  of  urine. 

Mr.  Watson.  Let  me  ask  you  one  other  thing.  You  say  you  have 
1,400  affidavits  there? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Let's  see  the  Nexo  York  Times,  and  I  will  tell  you.  It 
is  the  whole  report  which  I  am  interested  in. 

Mr.  Watson.  How  many  demonstrators  do  you  estimate  that  you 
had  out  there  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  police 

Mr.  Watson.  All  told? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  police  figure  for  Grant  Park  on  August  28  was 
15,000.  That  was  the  largest  official  figure,  or  journalistic  figure  given, 
and  everybody  agrees  that 

Mr.  Watson.  So  you  had  a  minimum  of  at  least  15,000  demon- 
strators ? 


2516  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hatden.  Oh,  no.  The  police  said  15.  Everybody 

Mr.  Watson.  How  many  do  you  think  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Everybody  agreed  that  that  was  the  largest  number, 
August  28.  That  was  the  largest  number  for  that  peaceful  rally  in 
Grant  Park.  Before  that,  I  think  it  was  far  less. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  you  had 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  were  outnumbered  by  the  forces  of  law  and  order, 
so  to  speak,  by  about  5  to  1, 1  would  say. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  see.  If  it  had  been  equal,  perhaps  you  really  would 
have  made  a  challenge  at  that  time  ? 
Mr.  Hayden.  Hardly.  Hardly. 
Mr.  Watson.  One  final  thing. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Unless  you  think  in  man-to-man  combat  without 
weapons  I  can  somehow  handle  this  fellow  officer  here.  I  don't  think 
I  can. 

Mr.  AVatson.  But  you  have  some  1,400  or  1,600  affidavits? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  affidavits,  just 

Mr.  Watson.  Statements. 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  is  a  report  that  has  been  published  that  con- 
sists of  testimony  taken  by  an  authorized  task  force  of  the  National 
Commission  to  seek  inquiry  into  the  causes  of  violence,^  and  I  tliink 

they  have  something  like  1,400  witnesses,  and  I  hope  that 

Mr.  Ichord.  Are  these  statements  under  oath,  Mr.  Hayden  ? 
Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know.  Wliy  don't  you  call  these  witnesses  in  ? 
They  will  tell  you  about  police  brutality,  under  oath. 
Mr.  Watson.  Were  they  affidavits  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  simply  want  to  introduce  it  to  you.  Are  you  saying 
that  this  other  Government  Commission's  study  is  invalid  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  simply  asking,  Are  these  affidavits  or  are  they 
just  statements? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  the  report  of  the  Commission,  which  is  an  author- 
ized Government  task  force,  which  made  the  preposterous  number  of 
interviews  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  anyone  could  come  to  by 
watching  television. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you  never  intended  to  cause  violence  at  all  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Absolutely  not. 

Mr.  Watson.  Absolutely  not ;  so  all  of  the  preparation,  the  training 

in  the  park 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  preparation,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  I  assumed  that  you  had  to  make  a  little  prep- 
aration. 
Mr.  Hayden.  What  preparations  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Having  these  bags  of  urine  and  the  sticks  and  the 
razor  blades  and  the  stones  and  the  nails  in  the  golf  balls,  and  so  forth. 
Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  quite  a  joke. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  your  position  is  you  deny  that  any  of 
these  things  were  there  or  used  by  the  demonstrators  ? 
Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  do  not  deny  that. 
Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you.  That's  all. 
Mr.  Hayden.  But  I  deny  that  preparations  were  made. 
Mr.  Watson.  Do  you  allege  that  these  things  were  used  or  prepai-ed 
by  the  police?  Someone  had  to  prepare  them. 


1  Naticmal  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2517 

Mr.  Hatden.  Oh,  well,  they  use — you  mean  the  tear  gas  and  the 
Mace? 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  no ;  the  bags  of  urine  and  golf  balls. 

Mr.  Haydbn.  Woidd  you  rather  be  hit  by  a  bag  of  urine  or  by 
Mace  ?  Let's  get  first  things  first.  Even  if  there  were  bags  of  urine,  and 
I  didn't  see  any,  Mr.  Watson — I  didn't  see  any — I  would  still  rather 
be  hit  by  a  bag  of  urine  than  be  hit  by  Mace.  That  may  be  because  you 
have  never  been  hit  by  Mace;  you  have  never  been  hit  by  your  own 
cattle  prods  in  South  Carolina. 

Mr.  Watson.  Frankly,  the  reference  to  cattle  prods  in  my  State  is 
ridiculous  and  irrelevant,  and  I've  never  done  anything  to  require 
Mace  being  used  against  me.  But  I  will  assure  you  of  one  thing 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  would  you  do  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  would  not  sit  by  and  quietly  fold  my  hands  and  do 
nothing  if  bags  of  urine  were  thrown  on  me. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  would  break  the  law  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Let  me  assure  you 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  would  throw  a  bag  of  urine  ?  What  would  you  do  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  I  can  assure  you  of  one  thing,  that  I  would  not 
sit  back  quietly  and  do  nothing  if  the  acts  you  committed  against  the 
police  were  done  to  me. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Would  you  swear?  Would  you  swear  at  the  person 
who  did  it  to  you  ?  Or  you  only  do  that  at  home  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  bein^  interrogated,  not  I,  and  I  have  restated 
my  position  that  were  I  a  policeman.  Congressman,  or  what  have  you, 
anyone  who  would  throw  a  bag  of  urine  on  me  would  think  twice 
before  he  did  it  again ! 

Mr.  Hayden.  Look,  t-his  is  your  hearing,  not  mine.  I  am  not  really 
interrogating  you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  like  to  redirect  the  question  back  to  Paris, 
though,  because  I  think  incomplete  testimony  was  given  there,  and 
you  tried  to  imply  something  about  the  meetings  in  Paris  that  I  want 
to  correct,  and  go  back  there  and  tell  you  what  really  was  being  done 
in  Paris.  So  at  some  point,  when  you  find  it  feasible,  let's  go  back  to 
that  so  that  the  record  will  be  absolutely  clear. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  can  get  into  that  later  on. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  think  we  will  get  back  to  Paris.  Let's  go  back  to 
February  11, 1968. 

The  first  meeting  that  was  held  in  the  national  organizers,  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee  to  organize  for  Chicago,  Mr.  Hay- 
den, were  you  aware  at  the  time  of  your  attendance  at  that  meeting 
on  February  11  that  the  following  persons  were  in  attendance  at  that 
meeting:  who  were  identified  as  members  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Identified  by  whom  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  By  this  committee,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  pay  any  attention  to  your  committee. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Well 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  have  no — I  mean,  you  identify  almost  every- 
body in  the  United  States  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Kendra  Alexander  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Now  what  is  the  question?  Was  I  aware  she  was  there? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 


2518  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  Or  was  I  aware  that  she  was  identified  by  your  com- 
mittee as  a  Communist,  or  what  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  was :  Were  you  aware  that  she  was  there 
and  identified  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  were  not  aware  that  she  was  there  then  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  was  aware  she  was  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Earl  Durham  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  aware  he  was  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  have  these  names  underlined.  What  is  that  for? 

Mr.  Conley.  Don  Hamerquist  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  he  was  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Charlene  Mitchell  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  She  was  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  Jack  Spiegel  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  he  was  there.  I  mean,  I  don't  exactly  remember, 
but  I  assmne  they  were  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Were  you  aware  that  Charlene  Mitchell, 
mentioned  previously,  was  the  presidential  candidate  for  the  Com- 
munist Party,  U.S.A.,  during  the  1968  campaign  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  came  as  an  interesting  and  pleasant  surprise 
later.  I  think  it  is  good  that  a  black  woman  run  for  President  of  the 
United  States.  I  think  it  is  good  that  Communists  are  back  entering 
American  politics,  even  though  I  don't  agree  with  their  political  pro- 
gram. But  T  doubt  that  even  she  knew  tliat  she  would  be  a  candidate 
for  President  of  the  United  States  at  the  time.  And  that  was  the  first 
time  that  I  had  met  her  and  I  probably  didn't  even  know  her  name. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  if  I  may,  again,  you  said  that  you  did  not  know 
that  Kendra  Alexander  had  been  identified  as  a  member  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  ? 

Mr.  H^VYDEN.  I  don't  pay  any  attention  to  who  you  identify. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. ' 

Mr.  HL^YDEN.  If  I  had  to  read  all  your  reports 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Earl  Durham  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Earl  Durham  what?  Was  I  aware  that  he  had  been 
identified  by  you  ?  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Don  Hamerquist  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Same  question  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  you  can  look  at  your  own  document,  though. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  he  identified  by  your  group  as  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  I  will  restate  the  question  to  Mr.  Hayden. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  it  you  want  to  know?  Everyone  knows  thai 
there  are 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  reporter  is  having  difficulty  following  the  exchange. 
It  is  very  fast.  Let's  ask  the  question  again. 

Mr.  Conley.  Let's  go  back  and  pick  up  the  last  question,  and  then 
move  forward.  Were  you  aware,  from  examining  j-our  own  document, 
that  Don  Hamerquist  was  identified  by  your  group  as  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  know,  the  Communist  Party  and  anybody  else 
opposed  to  the  war  in  Vietnam  can  participa4»  in  the  Mobilization.  So 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2519 

what?  I  mean,  I  don't  understand  wh;^  you  are  continuing  the  tradi- 
tion of  trying  to  point  at  these  individuals,  if  you  have  pointed  at 
them  before. 

I  would  be  only  too  happy  to  discuss  a  general  question,  but  I  don't 
understand  what  you  are  saying. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  I  miderstand  your  answer  to  an  earlier  question, 
Charlene  Mitchell's  candidacj^  for  President  on  the  Communist  Party 
was  not  known  to  you  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  didn't  know  anything  about  her. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  learned  that  sometime  later  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  learned  from  the  papers. 

Mr.  Conley.  Do  you  recall  when,  approximately,  you  learned  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  When  it  was  announced  in  the  papers. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  have  any  estimate  as  to  when  that  was,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  am  sure  you  do. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Mr.  Hayden,  these  ones  that  are  not  identi- 
fied by  your  document,  which  are  identified  by  this  committee 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  — do  you  have  any  knowledge  yourself  that  they  are 
members  of  the  Communist  Party.  That  would  be 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  don't. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Except,  of  course,  Mrs.  Mitchell,  from  what  I  read 
in  the  papers. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  referring  back  to  your  document, 
"MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  1968— AN  ELECTION  YEAR  OF- 
FENSIVE." 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Did  you  describe  this  document  as  follows,  quote : 

This  paper  proposes  an  election  year  campaign  against  a  political  system  that 
has  brought  the  United  States  into  a  crisis  of  war,  racism,  and  social  disintegra- 
tion. We  outline  a  possible  strategy  for  this  campaign.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  notice  that  your  hand  is  shaking  as  you  read  those 
stated  purposes. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  That  is  not  being  responsive  to  the  question,  Mr. 
Hayden. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  Rennie  wrote  that.  It  is  on  the  first  page.  It  is 
kind  of  a  description  of  what  is  inside. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  say  that  Mr.  Davis  wrote  that  particular 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  so.  But,  again,  when  he  gets  up  here  I  am  sure 
you  can  find  out  more  clearly. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  ri^ht. 

Mr.  Hayden.  This  is  just  a  little  taste  of  what  is  to  come,  you  know. 
It  is  just  a  cover. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  moving  to  page  15  of  that 
document,  did  you  make  the  following  statements  on  that  page,  quote : 

Black  Rebellions:  In  our  view,  summer  organizers  working  in  the  white  com- 
munity should  discuss  plans  in  each  training  school  for  support  and  parallel 
activity  during  black  ghetto  rebellions.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  wrote  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  "Whites  should  sit-in  at  Democratic  Mayor's  offices"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  wrote  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  "Organize  medical  and  legal  support"? 


2520  DISRUPTION  OF  19 68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "Pull  together  diversionary  demonstrations  outside  the 
ghetto"? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes ;  that  even  happened. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "To  draw  off  police  and  find  ways  to  focus  public 
blame  for  what  happens  on  the  powerful  white  interests"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes;  you  should  talk  to  Rennie  about  this,  also,  be- 
cause he  did  just  that  with  a  lot  of  white  people  in  Chicago  in  April. 
He  organized  demonstrations  against  the  presence  of  National  Guard 
in  the  city  with  a  lot  of  other  Chicago  groups,  and  those  people  were 
bayoneted  for  carrying  flowers,  I  believe,  and  gassed. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now,  getting  back  to  this  particular  state- 
ment, is  what  you  meant  by  that  statement  that  whenever  a  race  riot 
broke  out  in  a  ghetto  area  that  you  were  desirous  that  the  white  com- 
munity engage  in  simultaneous  violent  action  in  other  parts  of  the 
community  ?  Is  this  what  you  meant  ? 

Mr.  Hayden,  No;  you  see,  it  is  because  you  don't  understand  revolu- 
tion. You  can't  start  a  revolution  in  your  little  suburb  or  on  your  cam- 
pus just  because  the  blacks  over  here  started  one.  You  don't  do  some- 
thing because  of  something  that  is  happening  somewhere  else.  You 
don't  do,  you  don't  tiy  to  do  the  same  thing. 

What  this  means  is  that,  you  see,  we  felt  that  white  people  who  are 
sympathetic  on  these  questions  have  been  sort  of  paralyzed  by  the  situ- 
ation in  which  there  were  these  ghetto  rebellions,  the  police  could  come 
in,  and  like  in  Newark,  they  killed  24  black  people  in  5  days,  wounded 
hundreds,  put  a  couple  of  thousand  in  jail ;  and  sympathetic  whites 
could  find  no  way  to  react  except  by  feeling  paralyzed,  watching  tele- 
vision, and  so  on.  And  we  thought  that  the — this  had  to  end  and  we 
had  to  show  that  not  all  white  people  favored  the  brutal  suppression  of 
justified  rebellion,  and  so  we  wanted  white  people  to  conduct  demon- 
strations in  the  suburbs  and  at  the  police  stations  and  at  the  mayors' 
offices  and,  if  necessary,  place  ourselves  nonviolently  in  front  of  the 
National  Guardsmen. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Simultaneously  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Sure,  at  the  time  that  it  is  happening.  Like  in  Boston. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  in  the  same  community  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  not  necessarily.  In  Boston  this  spring  there  was  the 
threat  of  an  outbreak  in  the  ghetto.  It  started  one  night,  and  the  next 
day  a  local  group  there  organized  a  l)ig  rally  of  white  people  against 
bringing  in  troops  to  suppress  those  people,  and  20,000  white  people 
came,  and  there  were  speeches.  And  I  think  that  had  a  small  political 
effect  in  sort  of  cooling  the  situation  and  keeping  the  troops  out. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  Mr.  Hayden,  in  your  statement  you  say  to  "pull 
together  diversionary  demonstrations  outside  the  ghetto  to  draw  off 
police."  My  question  was :  Did  you  mean  in  the  same  community  ?  You 
are  not  suggesting,  sir,  that  if  there  were  a  black  rebellion  in  Newark, 
New  Jersey,  that  a  white  demonstration  in  IjOS  Angeles  would  i)ull  off 
any  police,  are  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  would  be  \evy  good,  even  though  it  wouldn't  i)ull 
off  Newark  police.  I  think  a  better  place  would  be  to  go  have  a  big 
demonstration  at  the  temple  where  the  landlords  go  to  worship  and 
another  big  demonstration  at  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  where  the 
police  go  to  worship,  and  raise  questions  about  what  they  are  doing  in 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2521 

uniform,  carrying  the  machine  guns  and  automatic  weapons  down  into 
the  ghetto. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  Los  Angeles  or  in  Newark  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  right  in  the  suburbs  outside  of  Newark. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That's  what  I  am  trying  to  get  at,  sir.  That's  what  we 
have  been  trying  to  get  at,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Do  you  get  it  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  I  think  we  are  getting  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Okay. 

Mr.  Conley.  Are  all  landlords  Jewish  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  misunderstood  your  statement. 

Mr,  Hayden.  But  that's  where  most  landlords  tend  to  go,  and  most 
policemen  tend  to  go  to  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  that's  where 
their  conscience  is,  and  that's  where  we  should  try  to  raise  the  question 
of  how  far  they  have  strayed  from  their  conscience.  I  certainly  meant 
no  ethnic  slur.  I  meant  there  is  a  profound  breakdown  of  religion  in 
our  country,  as  you  know,  in  which  people  are  not  carrying  out  the 
basic  teachings  of  morality  or  religion,  unless  those  are  carried  out 
with  tear  gas  and  Mace. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  getting  back  to  the  document  again, 
in  this  document  you  describe  a  series  or  a  wave  of  activities,  which 
included  the  following,  surrounding 

Mr.  Hayden.  Page,  please? 

Mr.  Conley.  Page  18,  sir — which  included  surrounding  the  Conrad 
Hilton,  a  Chicago  hotel 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  sorry.  Page  what  ? 

Yes,  go  ahead. 

Mr.  Conley.  Are  you  with  me,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley. — which  included  surrounding  the  Conrad  Hilton,  a 
downtown  hotel.  And  this  was  in  fact  done  during  the  convention, 
was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  Where  is  that  ?  What  line  ?  I  don't  see  it.  Page 
18? 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  sorry,  sir.  I  identified  the  wrong  page.  It  starts 
on  17. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Give  me  the  first  line  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  just  generally  paraphrasing,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  All  right.  Okay,  but  let's  read  it.  I  know  what  that 
is;  it  is  beautiful,  but  I  hope  you  read  it  into  the  record,  and  let  the 
press  hear  what  you  are  reading  from,  instead  of  distorting  again,  as 
you  just  did. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Go  ahead,  read,  Mr.  Hayden.  You  have  it  before  you. 
Read  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  we  are  giving  examples  of  how  we  wanted  to 
bring  the  question  of  poverty  to  the  surface,  because  we  didn't  think 
that  poverty  and  hunger  would  be  dealt  witli  by  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention. And  we  were  giving  suggestions  rather  than  instructions,  as 
you  can  see  from  the  use  of  the  verb  "might."  We  are  trying  to  give 
suggestions  of  what  might  happen  to  dramatize  what  we  wanted  and 
we  said : 


21-706  0—69 — pt.  2- 


2522  DISRUPTION  OF  1'96  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

To  dramatize  the  demand  and  the  urban  condition,  protests  could  focus  on 
hundreds  of  the  major  institutions  that  irresponsibly  contribute  to  urban  break- 
down ;  welfare  oflSces,  urban  renewal  departments,  police  stations,  day-labor 
hiring  halls,  large  slima  landlords,  schools  and  city  hall.  Different  organizations 
would  come  to  Chicago  prepared  to  carry  out  a  specific  action  program.  The 
Mississippi  Freedom  Democrats  might  want  to  focus  attention  on  their  lack  of 
representation  or  on  the  failure  to  deal  with  poverty  across  the  coimtry.  Or  a 
coalition  of  "poverty  rights"  organizations  in  one  region  might  surroimd  the 
Conrad  Hilton,  a  downtown  Chicago  hotel,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  to  greet 
the  delegates  with  leaflets  demanding  $15  billion  to  end  poverty  and  a  breakfast 
menu  totaling  15  cents,  the  amount  allotted  under  welfare.  At  10:00  a.m.,  the 
recipients  might  march  from  the  Hilton  to  318  West  Adams  to  join  with  delega- 
tions coming  from  the  other  downtown  hotels  in  a  massive  demonstration  at  the 
welfare  oflice  headquarters  of  Chicago.  In  the  evening,  the  recipients  might  again 
return  to  the  hotels  to  invite  the  delegates  to  spend  the  night  with  them  in  the 
ghetto  rather  than  in  luxurious  hotels.  *  *  * 

Mr.  IcHORD.  This  is  suggested  strategy  of  demonstration? 

Mr.  Hayden.  This  is  something  that  we  thought  miglit  be  a  good 
idea.  It  was  a  way  to  sort  of  clarify  what  we  thought  would  be  a  good 
kind  of  protest. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  What  was  your  question  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  question  was,  Didn't  we  surround  the  Hilton  ?  In 
fact,  obviously,  we  didn't,  because  the  welfare  mothers  chose  the  road 
of  going  before  the  platform  committee.  And,  in  fact,  the  ones  that 
I  was  in  touch  with  felt  it  would  be  too  dangerous  to  go  stand  in  front 
of  the  Conrad  Hilton,  with  all  the  police  out  there,  so  they  confined 
their  protest  to  speaking  out  forcefully  before  the  platfonn  committee, 
and  they  did  not  surround  the  Conrad  Hilton  and  they  did  not  invite 
the  delegates  to  live  in  the  ghetto,  and  so  fortli. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  your  testimony,  then,  that  no  group 
did  in  fact  surround  the  Conrad  Hilton  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "No,"  that  is  not  vour  testimony,  or  "No,  no  group 
did"? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  one  ever  surrounded  the  Conrad  Hilton,  but  obvi- 
ously people  massed  in  front  of  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  police  surrounded  it.  I  am  sorry. 

Mr.  Conley.  The  word  "surrounded,"  though,  does  appear  in  your 
treatise ;  does  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Treatise? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Advocating  that  the  Conrad  Hilton  be  surrounded  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No;  it  is  a  matter  of  describing  a  scenario  of  what 
might  be  a  good  thing  to  happen.  We  thought  it  might  be  very  good 
to  think  about  welfare  mothers  standing  all  the  way  around,  sur- 
rounding the  Conrad  Hilton. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  you  used  the  word  "surround,"  is  what  I  am 
getting  at. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  but  what  is  wrong  with  picketing  and  surrounding 
a  building? 

Mr.  Conley.  Sir,  I  am  not  asking  if  there  is  anything  wrong  with  it. 
I  am  just  asking  whether  then,  in  fact,  it  did  occur? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  it  didn't. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  The  only  thing  that  did  occur  was  a  mobiliza- 
tion in  front  of  the  Conrad  Hilton  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  no ;  much  more  than  that  occurred  in  front  of  the 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2523 

Conrad  Hilton,  more  brutality  unleashed  there  than  I  have  ever  seen 
in  one  night  in  my  life.  I  was  almost  killed  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  moving  on  with  your  document,  did  you  not  also 
suggest  that  actions  could  concentrate,  or  might  concentrate,  on  dozens 
of  war  targets  across  the  city  ? 

Mr,  Hayden.  Yes,  Chicago  draft  boards,  the  downtown  induction 
centers,  the  Illinois  Institute  of  Technology,  which  is  the  Nation's 
center  for  chemical  biological  warfare  research,  and  major  war  cor- 
porations like  Dow  Chemical. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  were  any  of  these  things — was  there  any 
demonstration  or  any  type  of  activities  in  connection  with  any  of 
these  particular  suggestions? 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  probably  were  a  few,  but  I  was  not  aware  of 
them  because  of  the  pressing  needs  to  survive  the  police. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Haj^den,  did  you  not  also  suggest  that  a 
march  be  held  on  the  International  Amphitheatre  immediately  after 
the  first  ballot,  the  Amphitheatre  being  the  site  of  the  Democratic 
National  Convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes ;  August  28  would  be  the  fifth  anniversary  of  the 
march  on  Washington,  which  you  will  recall,  for  jobs  and  justice. 
1963.  And  since 

Mr.  IcHORD,  Are  you  referring  to  the  march  of  unrepresented  people, 
Mr.  Hay  den? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  the  march  sponsored  by  the  late  Reverend  Martin 
Luther  King  and  other  figures,  and  they  never  got  their  jobs  or  jus- 
tice. We  thought  that  it  would  be  appropriate  and  symbolic  on  August 
28,  1968,  5  years  later,  with  more  unemployment  in  the  country  and 
the  black  community  than  ever,  it  might  be  good  to,  as  we  say,  and  I 
quote : 

[August  28]  might  begin  with  a  massive  "Democratic  Assembly,"  perhaps  in 
Grant  Park,  and  climax  in  a  "funeral  march"  on  the  International  Amphitheater 
immediately  after  the  first  ballot.  Such  a  march  conld  be  led  by  retired  generals, 
admirals  and  Vietnam  veterans.  The  funeral  procession  might  be  organized  by 
constituencies  :  blacks  followed  by  clergy  followed  by  women  followed  by  farmers 
and  faculty  and  workers  and  resisters  and  so  on.  This  funeral  would  speak  for 
those  who  say  that  the  elections  represent  no  choice  and  a  complete  breakdown 
of  democracy,  and  those  who  pledge  to  use  the  fall  election  to  expand  the 
resistance  into  all  sections  of  the  American  public :  professors  engaged  in  war 
research ;  people  who  pay  war  taxes ;  recipients  who  let  themselves  be  pushed 
around  *  *  * 

And  so  forth,  and  so  forth,  and  so  forth.  [Continues  reading :] 

While  Johnson  accepts  the  nomination — 

You  see,  we  believed  that  Jolinson  was  still  in  there — 

a  half-miinon  people  in  the  largest  protest  in  the  history  of  the  country  carry 
caskets^ — ■ 

Not  filled  with  arms  and  weapons,  like  the  Viet  Cong  did  in  Saigon — 

carry  caskets  symbolizing  the  Democratic  Party  into  the  Convention  area  and 
bury  them  in  Chicago's  stock  yards  beside  the  Amphitheater. 

That  was  certainly  our  hope,  but  this  was  a  premature  document. 
We  didn't  know  what  people  would  be  for  and  we  wrote  it  as  a  way 
of  sort  of  suggesting  what  we  thought  would  be  a  great  protest. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Wliat  was  your  immediate  objective,  Mr.  Hayden,  to 
influence  the  choice  of  the  Democratic  Convention  ? 


2524  DISRUPTION  OF  1'9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  No;  we  knew  in  advance  that  it  would  be  a  1964 
deal  all  over  again,  where  the  people  would  be  fooled  into  believing 
they  had  a  choice  and  that  Vietnam  war  would  be  brought  to  an  end, 
but  in  fact  you  would  get  a  duplication  of  1964,  where  as  soon  as 
the  elections  were  over  the  war  would  be  escalated.  So  we  calculated 
in  advance  that  the  Democratic  Convention  would  be  the  perfect 
time  to  expose  the  hypocrisy  and  chicanery  of  your  politicians, 
who  always  are  engaged  in  promising  peace  to  people,  while  killing 
their  sons. 

And  none  of  you  Congressmen's  sons  are  in  Vietnam,  but  a  lot 
of  other  people's  sons  are  in  Vietnam,  and  we  thought  that  at  the 
time  of  the 

Mr.  IcHORD.  One  moment,  Mr.  Hayden.  If  you  will  examine  the 
record 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  want  to  draw  that  out. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  — you  will  find  that  you  are  in  error.  There  are 
Congressmen's  sons  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  there  are  two  or  three,  possibly,  and  I  stand 
corrected — out  of  500. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  referring  back  to  the  earlier 
document  that  we  talked  about  earlier,  which  is  the  "Democratic 
Convention  Challenge,"  do  you  have  a  copy  of  this  document  there? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  believe  so.  The  one  you  gave  me  before  ? 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  referring  your  attention  to  the  top  of  page  3,  did 
you  not  say  in  this  document : 

A  massive  confrontation  with  our  government — the  Democratic  Party — as 
it  holds  its  convention  in  Chicago  this  summer  is  being  organized.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  that  is  no  secret. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  you  are  the  one  that  headed- 


Mr.  Hayden.  We  organized  it.  He  and  I  were  project  directors.  We 
tried  to  organize  a  massive  confrontation,  but  your  confusion  is  the 
press's  confusion  in  believing  that  confrontation  can  only  be  mili- 
tary. This  document  spells  out  a  political  confrontation  in  great 
detail. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir;  I  am  just  asking  you  if  you  made  the  state- 
ment, if  it  is  properly  attributable  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  To  myself  and  Rennie. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Did  you  not  further  suggest  that  the  Chi- 
cago demonstrations  be  used,  and  I  quote  you  again — 

to  dramatize  to  the  world  the  large  numbers  of  people  who  feel  unrepresented, 
and  in  fact  disgraced  and  used,  by  our  govenunent's  jxxlicies  *  ♦  *. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  see  that,  but  that  is  certainly  the  way  I  feel 
about  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  that  statement  appears  there,  would  it  be  attributable 
to  you  ? 

Mr.  Hanley.  Yes;  I  just  don't  know  where  it  is,  but  I  certainly  take 
credit  for  that  kind  of  viewpoint. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  turning  to  page  4  of  that  same  docu- 
ment, sir,  did  you  not  also  suggest  that  the  local  coordinating  commit- 
tees develop  a  plan  to  attack  the  Democratic  Convention  and  did  you 
not  further  suggest  that 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2525 

Mr.  Hatden.  Where  is  this  word  "attack"?  And  what  context? 
Page  4? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Pages  3  and  4. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  just  read  it  until  we  come  to  it.  I  don't  know — 

the  summer  should  become  a  period  of  intense  organizing,  education  and  dem- 
onstration. As  local  coordinating  committees  develop  to  plan  the  attact  [sic] — 

Oh,  yes — 

the  attact  on  the  Democratic  Convention,  they  should  initiate  recruiting  and 
training  programs  for  summer  organizers — several  thousand  should  be  the  objec- 
tive— who  build  high  school  draft  resistance  unions,  organize  challenges  to  cor- 
rupt delegates,  talk  with  teachers,  doctors,  veterans  and  welfare  recipients  about 
confronting  the  Convention  on  a  particular  day,  gather  intelligence  on  delegates 
who  will  be  continuously  confronted  and  talked  to  during  their  entire  stay  in 
Chicago,  speak  to  hundreds  of  local  trade  unions  about  the  war  and  racism, 
build  pressure  in  the  ghetto  for  the  removal  of  all  Democratic  Party  head- 
quarters, and  hold  local  war  crime  tribunals  to  expose  prominent  Democrats 
who  manufacture  antipersonnel  bombs,  poison  gases  or  other  weapons  banned 
by  international  agreement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  in  the  word  "attack" — after  you  have  read  the 
j)aragraph,  the  word  "attack"  is  your  word.  It  is  not  mine,  is  it  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  your  meaning.  It  is  my  word. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  haven't  put  any  meaning  on  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course  not. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  what  did  you  mean  in  this  statement,  and  I  quote 
specifically,  "build  pressure  in  the  ghetto  for  the  removal  of  all  Demo- 
cratic Party  headquarters"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  we  don't — you  see,  this  was  at  a  time  when  we 
were  having  a  dialogue  with  sections  of  the  black  movement  who  were 
interested  in  the  Democratic  Party  and  building  an  alternative  politi- 
cal party  independent  of  it.  And  we  don't  think  that  the  Democratic 
Party  has  much  of  a  right  any  longer  to  conduct  the  kind  of  campaigns 
that  it  has  in  the  ghetto,  so  we  thought  that  it  shouldn't  even  have 
headquarters  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  My  question,  sir,  isn't  what  you  thought.  My  question 
is :  What  did  you  mean  by  "build  pressure  in  the  ghetto"  ?  How  did 
you  propose  to  build  this  pressure  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  didn't.  We  didn't  ever  propose  how  to  do  it  and 
we  didn't  ever  try  to  do  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  What  did  you  mean  by  it,  then  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  "pressure"  ?  Pressure,  you  organize  people  to 
go  to  Democrats  and  say 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir ;  I  am  asking  you  now  for  your  interpretation ; 
don't  let  me  put  mine  on  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  organize  pressure,  pressure  is  people,  people  going 
to  local  political  hacks  and  telling  them  to  deliver  or  get  out.  What 
could  be  clearer  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  You  mean  you  are  suggesting  that  the  pressure  you 
were  talking  about  was  for  Negroes  within  the  ghetto  to  go  to  the 
political  hacks,  as  you  describe  them,  and  tell  them  to  get  out  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Deliver  or  get  out.  Stop  campaigning  and  not  deliver- 
ing. Something  like  that.  I  mean,  we  never  developed  it  programmati- 
cally. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  this  statement  doesn't  give  an  alternative,  sir.  It 
merely  says,  "pressure  in  the  ghetto." 


2526  DISRUPTION  OF  1'9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  see,  the  statement  does  not  say  get  them  out.  The 
statement  says,  "build  pressure  in  the  ghetto  for  the  removal  of  all 
Democratic  Party  headquarters." 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  doesn't  say,  "If  they  don't  deliver."  It  says,  to  re- 
move  

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  trying  to  interpret  it  further.  But  the  main  point 
is  that  very  little  of  this  happened,  and  I  don't  even  have  knowledge  of 
whether  it  happened.  So  all  of  this  is  very  suggestive,  and  we  weren't 
committed  to  any  of  these  strategies,  like  organizing  high  school 
unions.  We  didn't  speak  before  hundreds  of  trade  union  locals  and  we 
didn't  organize  pressure  in  the  ghetto  to  have  Democratic  Party  head- 
quarters removed. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  directing  your  attention  to  page  4  and  the  first  full 
paragraph  on  that  page,  did  you  not  also  suggest,  Mr.  Hayden,  that — 

the  summer  should  be  capped  by  a  week  of  demonstrations,  disruptions  and 
marches  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention,  clogging  the  streets  of  Chi- 
cago *  *  *. 

Mr.  Hayden  [reads] . 

— clogging  the  streets  of  Chicago  with  people  demanding  peace,  justice  and  partici- 
pation in  government.  This  should  be  a  period  in  which  the  movement  projects  a 
series  of  broad,  but  concrete  demands — demands  which  the  vast  majority  of  people 
can  identify  with,  but  which  the  Democratic  Party  is  shown  to  be  unable  to  meet. 

The  movement  must  not  play  into  Johnson's  hands  by  attempting  to  prevent 
the  Convention  from  assembling,  a  position  few  Americans  would  accept  or  under- 
stand. Rather  the  action  should  build  steadily  through  the  Convention  week, 
each  day  escalating  the  demands  and  the  tactics,  building  for  a  massive  confronta- 
tion at  the  time  of  Johnson's  nomination.  The  initial  challenges  and  activities 
might  involve  50,000  to  100,000  people.  The  final  funneral  [sic]  march  on  the  Dem- 
ocratic Convention,  beginning  as  the  first  ballot  is  taken,  should  bring  a  half  mil- 
lion—people demanding  a  choice  on  the  issues  of  peace  and  justice ;  citizens  who 
have  come  to  "make  the  democratic  process  work"  by  pinning  the  delegates  in  the 
International  Ampetheatre  [sic]  until  a  choice  is  presented  to  the  American 
people. 

A  well  planned,  educational  build-up  would  preceed  [sic]  the  final  days  of  mil- 
itancy :  for  example,  alternative  platform  committee  hearings ;  challenges  inside 
the  Convention  as  well  as  outside ;  continuous  "lobbying"  with  every  delegate ; 
outdoor  rallies  ;  daily  press  conferences — • 

And  so  on  and  so  forth. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  what  did  you  mean  by  the  use  of  the  word 
"militancy"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Oh,  come  on.  I  mean,  I  did  not  mean  violence.  I  have 
put  on  the  record,  over  and  over,  I  did  not  mean  that.  And  there  are 
statements  in  this  other  document  that  you  have  read  from  which  say 
that  our  protests  should  be  nonviolent  and  legal.  If  you  will  give  me  the 
other  document,  I  will  read  that  to  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  let  me  ask  you  another  question  in  that  vein. 

Mr.  Iciiord.  Mr.  Counsel,  at  that  point,  it  is  now  8  minutes  after  12. 
I  assume  there  are  still  many  questions  to  propound  to  Mr.  Hayden, 
Perhaps  it  would  be  convenient  to  adjourn  at  this  time  until  2  o'clock. 

Tlie  committee  will  reconvene  at  2  p.m. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:03  p.m.,  Monday,  December  2,  1968,  the  sub- 
committee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  2  p.m.  the  same  day.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present  at  the  time  of  recess:  Representa- 
tives Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2527 
AFTERNOON  SESSION— MONDAY,  DECEMBER  2,  1968 

(The  subcommittee  reconvened  at  2  p.m.,  Hon.  Richard  H.  Ichord, 
chairman  of  the  subcommittee,  presiding.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present:  Representatives  Ichord  and  Ash- 
brook.) 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order  in  the  hearing  room. 
A  quorum  again  being  present,  the  committee  will  resiune  its  hearings 
at  the  point  we  left  off  prior  to  recess. 

Mr.  Counsel. 

TESTIMONY  OF  THOMAS  EMMETT  HAYDEN— Resumed 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  think  at  the  time  of  the  recess  you  had 
been  asked  a  question  about  a  quote  attributable  to  you  which  appeared 
in  this  publication,  "DISCUSSION  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  CON- 
VENTION CHALLENGE." 

I  think  the  last  question  that  we  asked  you  was.  Is  there  in  fact  a 
quotation  in  there,  words  to  the  effect,  on  page  4  in  the  first  full  para- 
graph, that — 

the  summer  should  be  capped  by  a  week  of  demonstrations,  disruptions  and 
marches  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention,  clogging  the  streets  of  Chi- 
cago *  *  *. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  that  would  be  a  total  erroneous  understanding. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  those  words  in  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  They're  some  of  the  words  you  have  taken  out  of  the 
sentence,  out  of  the  paragraph,  and  out  of  the  document.  You  have 
done  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  totally  alter  the  meaning. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  have  not  asked  you  what  the  meaning  was.  I  have 
asked  you  if  the  words  appear. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  putting  my  point  in  your  reference. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  the  words,  "demonstrations,  disruptions  and 
marches  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention,  clogging  the  streets 
of  Chicago,"  do  those  words  appear  in  that  article  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  They  appear,  but  not  as  a  sentence. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  They  do  appear? 

Mr.  Hayden.  They  appear  in  the  context  of  a  sentence. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  sir,  I  will  be  pleased  to  hear  your  explanation. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have  already  gone  into  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Then  we  will  move  on  if  we  may.  On  the 
same  page  does  not  the  following  statement  appear,  that  one  of  your 
policies  or  plans  was  "pinning  the  delegates  in  the  International 
Ampetheatre  [sic]  until  a  choice  is  presented  to  the  American  people"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  read  that  to  you  before. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  does  appear. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  part  of  the  sentence.  I  read  the  entire  sentence 
l)efore. 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  Chair  has  the  paper  before  him.  What  page  is 
that  on  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Page  4,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  third  full  paragraph. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  third  full  paragraph  on  the  page,  I  believe. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  This,  I  assume,  is  nonviolently  and  peacefully  you 
would  pin  them  in  there.  How  is  this  done? 


2528  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  want  to  bore  you,  but  I  think  I  read  to  you  an 
extensive  description  of  the  funeral  march  on  the  Democratic  Conven- 
tion before. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  You  don't  pin  people  in  a  funeral  march,  do  you? 

Mr.  Hayden.  In  effect,  by  coming  down  there  to  bury  the  coffins 
in  the  stockyard,  the  convention  hall  would  be  surrounded.  Obviously, 
we  would  not  be  able  to  literally  pin  or  literally  prevent  the  conven- 
tion people  from  coming  and  going,  because  obviously  they  have  ac- 
cess that  the  police  can  allow  for  them. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Do  you  think  all  the  people  who  were  there  knew 
that? 

Mr.  Hayden.  In  our  permits,  which  we  submitted  in  writing  over 
and  over  again,  which  are  public  documents,  we  indicated  what  we 
meant  by  this.  We  indicated  with  maps  and  with  descriptions  where 
we  wanted  to  go  to  the  Amphitheatre,  where  we  wanted  our  rally 
to  be  held.  At  no  time  did  we  submit  plans  or  organize  on  the  sort  of 
preposterous  basis  of  literally  being  able  to  pin  or  enclose  people  in 
a  place. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then,  sir,  is  not  the  use  of  the  word  "pin"  a  poor  choice 
of  words? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  may  think  so. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  you. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  that  our  meaning  is  conveyed  in  this  document 
adequately.  I  will  defend  the  use  of  this  word  or  any  other  word. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  another  question  in  the  same  area.  This  is 
the  only  paragraph  that  I  read  in  this  particular  article  that  we  have 
been  reading  from  today  where  it  is  not  couched  in  the  terms  "might" 
or  a  proposal.  It  is  couched  in  a  more  specific,  almost  to  the  point  of 
saying  "shall."  I  don't  know  whether  you  actually  used  the  word 
"shall"  in  there,  but  it  is  not  suggested  as  a  possibility,  at  least  this 
particular  paragraph  does  not  read  as  a  possibility,  as  some  of  the 
other  paragraphs  do.  It  reads  as  a  position. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  it  says  at  the  beginning — you  see,  we  divided  into 
spring,  summer,  and  convention  time.  We  said  that  the  summer  should 
be  capped  by  a  week  of  demonstrations,  et  cetera. 

Wliat  we  were  saying  here  is  that  we  prefer  this  thing  that  we 
write  about  to  come  about. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  But  you  didn't  say  the  summer  "might"  be  capped 
by,  you  said  the  summer  "should"  be  capped  by. 

Mr.  Hayden.  So  what, 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  he  finish  his  answer? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  obviously  said  that.  All  I  am  saying  is,  that  is  exactly 
what  you  want  me  to  say.  It  is  what  Mr.  Davis  and  I  proposed  should 
happen,  but  I  just  want  you  to  keep  in  mind  that  since  this  was 
written  in  Januai-y  or  February  it  was  really  meant  to  provoke  discus- 
sion. Our  own  concept  of  what  should  be  done  and  how  it  should  be 
done  changed  over  the  next  several  months  several  times,  depending 
on  what  the  new  situation  was  in  the  country. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Weren't  these  actions  which  you  i^roposed,  Mr.  Hayden, 
actually  planned  to  disrupt  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  this  the  purpose  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  If  you  will  let  me  give  an  extended  answer,  having 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2529 

said  "no,"  I  will  be  glad  to  try  to  clear  that  up.  I  don't  want  to  go 
over  past  grounds,  but  I  have  said  several  times,  and  shown  you  in 
documents  that  you  have  in  your  possession,  that  our  purpose  was 
political. 

None  of  us  thought  that  our  purpose  would  be  served  by  violence. 
We  wanted  the  largest  number  of  people  to  come  to  Chicago  possible. 
We  knew  that  the  threat  of  violence  would  keep  people  away.  Faced 
with  what  we  considered  to  be  the  violence,  the  lack  of  permits,  we 
decided  we  had  to  go  to  Chicago  anyway  and  take  our  chances. 

But  at  no  time  did  we  want  that  to  happen  for  a  very  serious  political 
reason.  I  think  that  most  people  in  this  country  respect  the  right  of 
the  Democratic  Party  or  any  other  party  to  hold  a  convention  and 
decide  on  its  candidates  and  decide  on  its  policies.  We  are  not  question- 
ing their  right  to  do  that.  We  are  questioning  their  authority,  their 
legitimacy,  their  status  in  our  eyes,  and,  essentially,  the  morality  of 
what  they  are  doing.  That  is  the  point.  If  it  was  going  to  be  disrupted, 
as  I  have  said  in  speeches  and  in  writing,  in  fact  during  convention 
week,  I  always  believed  that  the  disruption  would  occur  by  the  military 
machinery  turning  against  itself. 

You  see,  you  had  a  situation  where  an  agent  from  one  agency  was 
arresting  another  agent.  I  mean  they  were  spying  on  each  other,  arrest- 
ing each  other.  I  remember  one  day  in  Lincoln  Park  an  officer  from 
one  agency  arrested  another  fellow  who  was  taking  a  picture,  because 
he  thought  it  Avas  a  demonstrator  taking  a  picture  of  himself.  It 
turned  out  there  were  just  two  people  from  different  agencies  spying 
on  each  other. 

As  you  saw  that  momentum  build  up,  due  to  the  presence  of  so 
many  troops  in  the  city  not  exactly  knowing  what  they  were  there  for, 
and  you  saw  the  methods  practiced  inside  the  convention  hall,  in 
which  a  substantial  minority  of  the  delegates  felt — whether  you  agree 
with  them  or  not,  a  substantial  minority  of  the  delegates  felt  that  the 
entire  operation  w^as  bein^  manipulated  and  controlled  undemocrati- 
cally  by  the  Johnson  administration,  there  were  times  inside  the  con- 
vention, on  the  floor  of  the  convention,  that  mass  violence  almost  broke 
out  as  a  result  of  what  one  television  broadcaster  called  the  thugs  who 
seemed  to  be  on  the  convention  floor.  There  were  times  when  the  chair- 
man of  the  delegation  moved  that  the  convention  stop  and  leave  town. 
One  U.S.  Senator  discussed  from  the  podium,  the  gestapo  tactics  out- 
side and  was  attacked  in  obscene  language  by  Mayor  Daley. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Were  you  inside  the  convention,  Mr.  Hay  den  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  are  testifying  from  hearsay  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  testifying  from  what  I  saw  on  television.  I 
thought  there  were  points  during  that  week  in  which  the  convention 
would  simply  fold  up.  I  saw^  the  Democratic  Party  eating  itself,  be- 
cause there  is  no  security  in  this  kind  of  military  defense  that  the 
United  States  and  that  the  convention  had.  You  cannot  secure  your- 
self from  people  by  building  more  and  more  barbed  wire  and  getting 
miore  spies  and  infiltrators  and  more  sophisticated  weapons.  All  you 
do  is  make  yourself  fundamentally  insecure.  That  is  how  I  thought  the 
convention  would  disrupt  itself. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  it  almost  did.  It  almost  ended  before  it  came  to 
the  nominations. 


2530  DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLET.  In  that  vein  I  am  sure  you  are  familiar  with  the  article 
which  appeared  in  the  December  issue  of  Enquire  dealing  with  you, 
Tom  Hayden,  "Will  he  overcome?''  or  something  to  that  effect.^ 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  are  probably  far  more  familiar  with  it. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  There  is  a  paragraph  in  it.  I  am  not  attributing  this  as 
a  quote  to  you,  but  apparently  it  is  an  assessment  of  the  reporters 
talking  with  you.  It  appears  on  the  last  page  of  this  article.  In  the 
third  column  it  says : 

This  is  the  real  point  of  Chicago.  Hayden  saw  it  as  an  ideal  opportunity  to 
provoke  a  confrontation  with  the  police  in  full  view  of  television  cameras. 
Enough  bloody  heads  and  some  people  might  get  mad  enough  to  cross  over  the 
line  and  put  themselves  in  opposition,  to  become  "radicalized."  *  *  * 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Watson  entered  the  hearing  room.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  sorry,  did  you  have  something  further  to  ask, 
or  what? 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  I  am  asking  you,  in  view  of  your  answer  here  that  you 
were  not  intending  to  disrupt  the  convention,  if  this  impression  you 
created  with  this  reporter  at  least  would  indicate  othemvise. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  never  talked  to  this  reporter  during  or  very  far 
before  the  convention.  His  opinion  about  me  is  quite  similar  to  yours. 
I  can't  help  that,  but  I  would  like  to  read  to  you  my  own  statement 
about  the  subject,  which  appeared  in  the  RAT. 

The  RAT  is  a  publication 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  don't  mind  your  reading  the  statement  if  you  will 
answer  my  original  question.  You  say  this  is  not  a  fair  assessment. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course,  it  is  not  a  fair  assessment.  It  is  contradictory 
to  everything  I  have  said  to  you  all  day. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden 

Mr.  Hayden.  Let  me  tell  you  my  position. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Just  a  second.  Let  me  ask  you  this. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  is  not  going  to  require  the  witness  to  com- 
ment on  the  assessment  by  the  reporter.  If  he  wishes  to  do  so,  I  will 
recognize  him  for  the  purfK>se  of  doing  so. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  like  to  read  a  couple  of  things  that  I  wrote, 
which  were  distributed  in  the  closest  thing  to  an  official  statement  of 
what  organizers  of  the  demonstration  were  planning.  In  one  article 
about  the  police  preparations  for  the  convention  I  said  the  following: 

The  main  thrust  of  their  schemes  revealed  the  mentality  of  the  bully,  attempt- 
ing to  win  by  force  what  persuasion  has  failed  to  do :  acceptance  of  a  rigged 
political  decision.  The  strategy  is  to  frighten  people  into  surrendering  their 
right  to  dissent,  to  demonstrate,  to  take  to  the  streets.  [Bold  face  in  original.] 

Jack  Mabley  of  the  Chicago  American  wrote  July  25  that  Chicago  has  estab- 
lished the  reputation  of  being  "an  uptight  city,  with  tough  police."  This  has 
achieved  a  "sobering  effect"  [he  said]  on  potential  peace  demonstrators  "who 
are  willing  to  risk  a  slight  bump  on  the  head  or  a  twisted  arm  or  a  night  in  the 
cooler  in  New  York  or  San  Francisco  but  not  a  skull  fracture  in  Chicago."  *  *  * 

The  purpose  therefore,  according  to  Mabley,  of  the  police  prepara- 
tion was — 

to  develop  a  "strong  movement  ...  to  warn  young  hippies  and  yippies  away 
from  Chicago." 


1  Steven  V.  Roberts,  "Will  Tom  Hayden  Overcome?"  Esquire,  December  1968. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2531 

Then  I  said  the  following : 

The  sadistic  and  provocative  element,  of  course,  is  represented  by  the  Chicago 
police  department.  They  are  expected  to  use  their  clubs  esi)ecially  at  night 
against  small  groups  of  peaceniks.  The  NMC  [Mobilization  Committee]  has 
asked  the  Justice  Department  to  investigate  the  existence  of  a  rightv\dng  con- 
spiracy within  the  Police  Department  to  take  advantage  of  the  demonstrations 
to  provoke  violence.  *  *  * 

The  Justice  Department  has  refused  to  make  such  an  investigation. 

Then  I  go  on  to  say : 

The  strategic  problems  of  the  establishment  are  immense,  conslstiiig  of  con- 
tradictions between  the  need  for  security  and  the  need  for  political  image. 
Security  demands  that  they  militarize  Chicago  and  ring  the  Amphtheatre  [sic] 
with  troops.  Too  great  a  military  presence  threatens  to  alienate  young  people, 
McCarthy  supporters,  undermine  confidence  in  the  US  govennrnfent  every- 
where, and  open  the  Administration  to  the  ridicule  of  all  its  critics.  Thus  on  the 
strategic  level  the  govermnent  already  is  working  from  a  political  disadvantage. 

Then  I  go  on  and  on  and  on  and  I  say : 

The  Mobilization  has  asked  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  military  forces  from  the 
vicinity  of  our  demonstrations.  They  can  carry  on  routine  functions  but  the 
Mobilization  wants  none  of  their  "protection"  which  inevitably  means  police 
provocation  and  brutality. 

However,  if  the  authorities  insist  on  ringing  demonstrations  everywhere  with 
menacing  troops,  then  they  will  be  creating  a  full  military  occupation  of  Chicago. 
Thus,  even  peaceful  and  orderly  demonstrations  will  be  dramatic  experiences 
and  will  show  the  widening  gap  between  the  i)eople  with  grievances  and  their 
supposed  political  representatives.  When  not  demonstrating,  we  can  laugh  from 
beaches  and  turn  to  more  serious  topics  while  they  protect  their  government  and 
[private]  property. 

In  making  Chicago  safe  for  their  "democracy,"  they  will  show  others  that 
this  "democracy"  is  unsafe  for  human  beings.* 

Again : 

We  understand  that  if  violence  occurs,  it  will  be  because  of  the  negligence 
and  brutality  of  national  and  local  authorities.  They  have  called  us  "disrupters"; 
refused  us  marching  permits;  bluffed  through  shows-of-strength-;  refused  to 
clean  out  the  vigilante-reactionaries  operating  within  the  police  forces;  and, 
above  all,  resisted  all  peaceful  pressures  for  change. 

We  do  not  welcome  the  beating  or  killing  of  even  a  single  member  of  our 
movement.  We  do  not  reduce  individuals  to  cannon-fodder  as  the  warmakers 
do.  We  do  not  risk  our  people  to  "radicalize"  others.  But  we  know  that  serious 
struggle  cannot  begin  without  each  individual  preparing  to  accept  jail  or 
suffering  as  the  price.  We  will  not  be  intimidated  into  surrendering  our  rights 
to  protest.  We  cannot  allow  an  unjust  law  and  order  to  be  imposed  by  police 
methods.^  [Bold  face  in  original.] 

Mr.  IcHORD.  This  is  the  writing  of  yours,  Mr.  Hayden,  which  served 
as  a  basis  of  the  reporter's  assessment? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know  the  basis  of  his  assessment.  I  am  saying 
that  what  I  have  just  read  is  from  the  convention  document  of  the  RAT. 
It  was  the  closest  thing  to  a  semiofficial  position  by  myself  and  other 
organizers.  I  tried  to  point  out  that  the  convention  was  in  danger  of 
disrupting  itself  because  of  its  security  preparations,  not  because  of 
us.  These  preparations  can't  go  hand  in  hand  with  a  peaceful  conven- 
tion. I  tried  to  indicate  that  I  don't  really  believe  in  this  theory  that  the 
Esquire  magazine  article  ascribes  to  me,  that  somehow  you  move  people 
to  the  left  or  radicalize  them  by  letting  them  get  beat  over  the  head  by 
policemen. 

All  through  the  year 

^  "the  cops  and  the  conTention."  RAT  convention  special,  p.  2. 

2  "DEMOCRACY   IS    .    .    .    IN   THE   STREETS,"  RAT   CONVENTION  SPECIAL,  p.  5. 


2532  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  don't  feel  that  pinning  the  delegates  in  the  Amphi- 
theatre would  help  to  alleviate  the  undesirable  conditions  which  you 
attribute  to  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  In  our  proposals  which  began  in  late  spring  and  early 
summer  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  which  I  can  bring  out  to  you  complete 
with  maps,  we  can  show  how  it  was  possible  and  how  we  proposed  to 
the  city  how  they  could  station  whatever  number  of  troops  they  wanted 
around  the  Amphitheatre,  guarantee  coming  and  going  to  all  the  dele- 
gates, and  still  allow  a  march  to  come  to  the  Amphitheatre — which 
was  the  site  of  what  we  thought  was  a  national  tragedy — and  have  the 
marchers  go  around  the  Amphitheatre  and  have  an  enormous  rally 
outside  of  it. 

It  would  be  possible  to  both  have  a  convention  and  have  such  a 
demonstration.  In  other  words,  the  collision  between  the  riots  of  the 
conventioners,  you  folks,  and  our  riots,  did  not  have  to  come  off. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  If  they  played  it  your  way  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right.  Do  you  really  think  that  the  hippies  and  Yippies 
and  people  like  myself  are  coming  to  Chicago,  with  the  kind  of  com- 
position of  our  movement  that  we  have,  that  we  seriously  planned  to 
take  on  the  police  department,  charge  through  the  doors,  and  tear  up 
the  convention  ? 

That  is  ridiculous.  That  is  what  I  tried  to  say  earlier  about  why  I 
didn't  think  violence  was  meaningful  in  Chicago.  I  don't  believe  in  this 
sort  of  throwing  around  the  concept  of  violence  loosely.  And  I  did  not 
believe,  and  I  never  believed,  that  it  would  be  possible,  quite  apart  from 
whether  it  was  desirable — I  didn't  think  it  was  desirable  either — but 
I  knew  from  the  beginning  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  through  on  some 
kind  of  concept  of  invading  or  disrupting  the  convention. 

What  I  wanted  to  know  is  why  with  all  your  police  force,  intelligence 
agencies,  you  weren't  as  smart  as  we  were.  I  think  you  are  as  smart 
as  we  were  so  you  turn  the  thing  into  a  gigantic  myth.  Anybody  knows 
that  LSD  in  the  water  is  not  a  real  threat ;  it  cannot  work. 

A  little  consultation  with  the  doctor  or  scientist  would  straighten 
you  out.  With  the  Pentagon  and  State  and  local  troops  on  the  scene  to 
figure  things  out  for  months  in  advance,  I  cannot  understand  why  you 
thought  it  was  possible,  with  minimum  police  protection,  why  it  was 
possible  for  us  to  somehow  enter  and  turn  the  convention  upside  down. 
I  cannot  understand  it.  Therefore,  I  think  someone  somewhere  decided 
that  it  would  be  a  good  political  thing  to  have  all  those  troops  in 
Chicago. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  are  saying  "you,"  Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  you  have 
to  remember  that  Mr.  Ashbrook  is  a  member  of  the  Republican  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right.  I  was  trying  to  draw  him  out. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  the  next  question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  this  same  vein  let  me  ask  you  about 
something  which  appeared  in  Granma^  the  official  organ  of  the  cen- 
tral committee  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Ci^bii,  in  its  issue  of  Sep- 
tember 8,  1968,  page  12.  [Hayden  Exhil.'t  No.  8.  See  page  2585.] 

Mr.  Hayden.  Do  you  have  that  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes.  I  will  give  it  to  you  in  just  a  moment.  They  pub- 
lished the  text  of  an  August  28  telephone  interview  with  Michael 
Klonsky,  national  secretary  of  SDS.  My  first  question  would  be,  Do 
you  know  Michael  Klonsky  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONTENTION  2533 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  interview  was  apparently  held  with  Mr.  Klonsky 
by  telephone  from  Havana  to  Chicago  during  the  course  of  the  conven- 
tion. Mr.  Klonsky  was  asked  this  question :  "What  can  you  tell  us 
about  the  present  situation  in  Chicago  ?" 

Mr.  Klonsky's  answer  was  as  follows : 

We  have  been  fighting  in  the  streets  for  four  days.  Many  of  our  people  have 
been  beaten  up,  and  many  of  them  are  in  jail,  but  we  are  winning.  We  pushed  the 
police  out  of  Grant  Park,  and  the  people  were  still  in  the  streets.  They  are  going 
to  be  in  the  streets  all  night,  and  we  are  going  to  do  anything  we  can  to  stop 
this  farce  (the  Democratic  National  Convention)  which  is  taking  place  in 
Chicago.  The  people  are  committed  to  carry  on  this  fight  not  only  in  Chicago 
but  throughout  the  United  States.  We  are  going  to  go  back  to  the  hotel  (The 
Conrad  Hilton)  and  down  to  the  park  again,  and  are  going  to  carry  on  the 
fight  all  night  until  the  Convention  is  over.  The  police  have  been  very  brutal,  and 
a  lot  of  people  have  been  shot  and  a  lot  of  people  have  been  beaten  up,  but  the 
young  people  have  committed  themselves  to  fight,  and  they  are  fighting  very 
bravely. 

Now,  Mr.  Hayden- 


Mr.  Hayden.  What  was  the  date  of  this  ?  When  was  this  interview  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  interview  was  on  August  28. 

Mr.  Hayden.  How  could  that  be  ?  I  see  it  is  on  the  28th.  Then  there 
is  something  curious  about  the  interview,  because  on  that  day  the 
convention  was  virtually  ended. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  date  of  the  convention  was  the  26th  through  the 
29th,  was  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  nominations  and  the  real  finish  was  the  night 
of  the  28th.  There  was  no  demonstration  or  activity  on  the  29th. 

Mr.  Conley.  This  is  in  reference  to  the  28th. 

Mr.  Hayden.  All  right.  Wliat  is  your  point  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  is,  Did  you  have  any  conversations  with 
Mr.  Klonsky  in  Chicago  at  the  time  of  this  interview  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  know  nothing  about  what  he  told  them  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  he  told  the  Cubans  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  This  is  the  first  I  knew  about  this.  I  knew  that  a 
very  funny  thing  happened.  A  Cuban  radio  called  up  the  Mobilization 
office  in  the  middle  of  the  convention  and  asked  what  was  happening, 
and  Dellinger  picked  up  the  phone.  That  is  the  only  time  I  knew  about 
it.  I  think  somebody  else  called  from  some  other  foreign  country. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  particular  answer  to  the  question  would  indicate 
that  whoever  Mr.  Klonsky  was  speaking  for  had  no  intention  of  let- 
ting the  Democratic  Convention  be  completed. 

Don't  you  read  it  that  way  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  quite  read  it  that  way. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  "We  have  no  intention  of  letting  this  convention  finish" 
or  "this  farce''  ?  I  think  he  calls  it  "the  farce." 

Mr.  Hayden.  "We  are  g:oing  to  do  anything  we  can  to  stop  this 
farce  *  *  *  which  is  taking  place  in  Chicago."  "Stop  the  farce," 
does  that  mean  to  you  invasion  of  the  convention  ?  What  does  it 
mean  ?  Certainly  by  that  time  it  did  not  mean  invasion  of  the  conven- 
tion, August  28. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  He  says  you  "are  going  to  do  anything." 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  does  that  mean  ? 


2534  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  gives  you  a  lot  of  options.  That  is  what  I  am  ask- 
ing you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  a  lot  or  none.  We  have  the  reports  on  what  was  done 
according  to  the  Chicago  Police  Department.  As  far  as  I  know  a 
lot  of  things  were  not  done,  there  were  no  weapons  confiscated.  There 
were  one  or  two.  There  was  a  McCarthy  card  among  the  weapons,  there 
was  a  bag  of  urine  or  some  sticks. 

In  terms  of  those  realities  I  think  this  phrase,  "We  are  going  to  do 
anything  we  can,"  should  be  judged  in  terms  of  the  actual  facts  of 
the  matter.  You  saw  what  they  did.  So  I  don't  know  what  your  point  is. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  point  is,  sir,  that  he  indicates  in  that  interview 
that  he  was  willing  to  do  anything  to  stop  the  farce. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Did  he  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  asked  you  if  that  is  not  what  the  interview  said. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Obviously  he  must  have  decided  there  were  things  he 
should  not  do. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  was  the  witness  present  at  the  interview  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  even  know  if  it  is  a  correct  interview. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  if  that  is  what  appears  in  the  interview. 
That  it  all  I  am  concerned  with,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Hayden".  He  certainly  didn't  indicate  the  convention  would  be 
stopped.  He  said  we  are  going  to  carry  on  the  fight  all  night  until  the 
convention  is  over,  from  the  thing  you  have  underlined. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  do  you  of  your  own  knowledge  know  of 
anyone  who  was  shot  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  killed. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Who? 

Mr.  Hayden.  An  American  Indian  from  one  of  the  Dakotas  whose 
name  appears  in  the  document.  I  can't  remember  his  name.  He  was 
described  in  the  Chicago  papers  as  a  Yippie-clad  person  alleged  to 
have — he  was  shot  and  killed  about  the  24th,  23d  or  24th,  something 
like  that.  Allegedly  he  had  pulled  a  gun  out  of  his  bag  and  shot  at 
pointblank  range  at  the  oiRcer,  plainclothes  officer,  I  believe,  who  had 
him ;  that  is  like  2  feet  away. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Were  you  there  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  This  is  the  report  of  the  police.  Somehow  it  missed 
this  policeman. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  this  at  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  At  the  beginning;  just  when  j^eople  were  coming  to 
town.  It  threw  extreme  fear  into  people  around  the  country.  We  had 
a  lot  of  phone  calls.  The  news  went  out  around  the  country  there  had 
been  the  first  clash  between  a  hippie  and  policeman. 

This  younger  person,  I  can  read  to  you  from  page  83. 

One  incident  which  contributed  to  the  week's  uncertainty  and  the  demon- 
strators' edginess  was  the  August  22  Ivilling  of  a  17-year-old  American  Indian, 
Jerome  Johnson.  Johnson,  from  Sioux  Falls,  South  Dakota,  was  shot  to  death  by 
police  at  North  Avenue  and  Wells  Street,  just  a  few  blocks  southwest  of  the  park. 
Police  detectives  said  they  fired  their  guns  when  the  fleeing  youth,  identified  as 
a  Yippie,  fired  a  .32  caliber  revolver  at  them.  The  shooting  caused  one  of  the 
marshal  trainers  to  say  : 

"We  don't  want  to  go  overboard  in  ascribing  malevolent  intentions  to  the  police, 
but  obviously  things  are  going  to  be  getting  very  rough  here.  We've  got  to  be 
prepared." 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2535 

That  is  the  only  per.son  that  I  know  of  that  was  killed  in  connection 
with  the  Chicago  convention.  But  I  know  a  lot  of  shots  were  fired 
over  people's  heads  and  that  the  situation  was  one  in  which  some  people 
could  have  been  killed  very  easily. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  direct  your  attention  back  to  the  right  column, 
the  top  of  the  same  page  of  the  Havana  interview,  wherein  Mr.  Klon- 
sky  apparently  relates 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  writes,  "Some  people  were  killed  already  several 
nights  ago."  I  don't  know  whether  Klonsky  said  that  or  whether  the 
Cubans  made  it  up.  All  I  know  is  what  it  says  here.  It  is  reproduced 
and  apparently  was  said  on  August  28. 

Again,  I  don't  understand  your  point  except  that  this  statement 
of  his  is  in  error,  whether  it  is  a  Cuban  error  or  Klonsky  error. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Or  an  SDS  error  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  SDS  error  ?  SDS  does  not  make  errors.  We  don't  have 
such  an  organization.  It  is  not  capable  of  making  any  kind  of  decision. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  were  you  at  a  meeting  held  in  Chicago 
by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  on  August  4  of  this  year? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know.  Explain  the  meeting,  and  I  will  try  to 
answer. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Maybe  I  can  refresh  your  memory.  Was  it  suggested 
at  that  meeting,  if  you  were  there 

Mr.  Hayden.  "Wliere  was  it  and  who  was  at  it? 

Mr.  Conley.  407  South  Dearborn.  It  was  suggested  at  that  meeting 
by  Rennie  Davis,  speaking  for  the  steering  committee  of  which  you 
are  a  member,  that  on  the  day  of  the  nomination,  Wednesday,  the 
28th  of  August,  you  would  have  a  massive  march  to  the  Amphitheatre. 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  was  always  the  proposal  of  not  simply  Rennie 
Davis,  but  all  the  officers  of  the  Mobilization,  that  we  were  going  to 
march  to  the  Amphitheatre. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis  was  speaking  for  the  steering  committee, 
was  he  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know  whether  he  was  speaking  for  the  steering 
committee  or  .simply  speaking  for  a  project  director. 

Mr.  Conley.  This  did,  in  fact,  occur  then? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Let  me  see  what  you  are  reading  from  here.  It  will 
just  take  a  second.^ 

All  I  see,  sir,  is  the  following : 

The  discussion  moved  to  the  massive  march  proposal,  analyzing  the  various 
routes  to  the  Amphitheatre  and  the  length  of  the  different  routes.  Dave — 

That  is  Dellinger — 

pointed  out  that  calling  for  an  action  not  relating  to  the  Amphitheatre  on  the 
28th  was  ignoring  the  natural  magnetism  of  the  place,  that  the  media  would 
be  at  the  Amphitheatre,  and  that  the  necissity  [sic]  of  having  the  military  sur- 
round masses  of  people  at  a  democratic  convention  would  lend  political  content 
to  the  action.  There  was  a  discussion  on  the  possibility  of  proceeding  in  the 
face  of  a  curfew  threat  or  denial  of  a  permit. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Go  ahead  and  read.  That  is  all  right. 
Mr.  Hayden  [continues  reading]. 


1  "Summary  of  Administrative  Meeting  Held   in   Chicago   on  Aug.   4,   Chaired  by  Dave 
Dellinger."  See  Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  25,  pt.   1,  pp.  2348-2352,  of  Oct.  1,   1968,  hearings. 


2536  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

It  was  pointed  out  that  the  Mob[ilization]  has  rallied  people  before  without  a 
permit,  and  that  insistence  on  fulfilling  an  announced  aim  made  a  strong  bar- 
gaining position  in  negotiating  a  permit.  *  *  * 

I  am  trying  to  find  what  you  say  Rennie  said.  I  don't  find  that.  I 
will  read  everything,  but 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  you  are  on  page  2  this  is  all  said  by  Mr.  Davis. 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  what  I  can't  understand. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mine  says,  "PROPOSED  SCENARIO  AS  RECOM- 
MENDED BY  THE  STEERING  COMMITTEE,  PRESENTED 
BY  RENNIE  DAVIS." 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  absurd  the  way  you  are  reading  it.  The 
"scenario,"  under  where  it  says  "proposed  scenario,"  then  the  rest  are 
notes  from  the  meeting,  from  the  discussion,  made  by  whoever  the 
secretary  was. 

Here  it  is : 

The  day  of  the  nomination,  Wednesday,  the  28th,  will  see  the  massive  march. 
At  about  3  PM,  marchers  will  gather  north  of  the  Loop,  proceed  through  the 
central  downtown  business  area  to  the  Amphitheatre.  In  a  specified  one-mile  area 
along  Halstead  neighboring  to  the  Amphitheatre,  the  demonstrators  can  hold  a 
vigil,  picket,  create  theatre  or  rally  for  as  long  as  the  convention  lasts;  and 
when  it  concludes  the  marchers  will  leave  as  a  unit  to  the  Grant  Park  bandshell 
where  they  will  disperse.  This  event,  which  will  be  aided  by  experienced  mar- 
shals, will  include  a  teach-in  for  the  troops  stressing  our  differences  are  not  with 
them. 

That  was  the  proposal. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  proposal  made  after  the  application  for  the  march 
to  the  Amphitheatre  was  applied  for  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  This  was  in  the  course  of  our  negotiations  with 
the  city,  if  you  want  to  call  them  negotiations.  I  would  say  it  was 
sort  of  a  one-way  monologue,  with  the  city  listening  to  us  but  not 
responding  until  a  couple  of  days  before  the  convention, 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  in  connection  with  the  paragraph  that  you  were 
reading  a  while  ago  and  directing  your  attention  specifically  to  the  top 
of  page  4 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  the  first  word  on  4, 1  don't  have  a  number. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "Insistence." 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  saw  that  wink  in  your  eye.  You  want  me  to  read 
down  there? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No;  I  just  want  to  know  did  there  not  occur  the  possi- 
bility that  the  city  of  Chicago  would  not  permit  a  march  against 
the  Democratic  Convention  and  was  it  not  suggested  by  the  persons  in 
attendance  that  you  would  make  this  march  on  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention whether  or  not  a  permit  was  issued  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  was  always  our  position,  stated  over  and  over  in 
the  media — you  don't  need  a  House  committee  to  investigate  this 
question — that  we  thought  that  we  were  within  our  legal  rights  to 
march  to  the  Amphitheatre ;  that  a  parade  permit  was  merely  a  tech- 
nical instrument  that  a  city  is  supposed  to  use  to  allow  people  to  con- 
duct legal  activities,  but  this  parade  permit  was  being  stalled  and  held 
back  by  the  city  authorities  because  they  did  not  want  people  to  come 
to  Chicago. 

They  never  negotiated  with  us  in  good  faith.  Many  people  high  in 
the  Democratic  Party  know  that.  They  were  the  losers.  At  the  last 
moment  they  came  through;  after  we  had  taken  them  to  court  they 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2537 

came  through  with  some  proposals  which  did  not  meet  the  substance 
of  our  request  at  all. 

A  judge,  who  was  Mayor  Daley's  law  partner,  Judge  Lynch,  very 
nicely  named,  denied  our  application  and  said  that  we  could  not  have 
a  permit.  We  said  at  that  point  that  we  would  march,  regardless,  to 
the  Ampliitheatre.  We  knew  that  it  was  in  violation  of  this  judge's 
ruling.  We  were  prepared  to  accept  whatever  consequence  came  from 
that. 

We  obviously  knew  that  this  would  certainly  not  interrupt  the 
Democratic  Convention.  In  fact,  we  knew  that  we  would  not  even  get 
out  of  downtown  without  permit,  and  we  didn't  on  the  28th.  The 
police  simply  made  it  clear  that  they  would  block  all  arteries  leading 
south  to  the  Amphitheatre,  and  they  did.  We  were  bottled  up  in  Grant 
Park  for  the  whole  day.  We  attempted  to  march,  led  by  Dave  Dellinger. 
We  got  to  the  police  lines  and  stopped. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Specifically,  was  it  not  Mr.  Robert  Greenblatt  who 
made  the  statement  that  if  the  curfew  were  imposed  it  should  be 
disobeyed  ? 

Mr.  Hatden.  It  could  very  well  have  been  Greenblatt.  I  don't  recall 
exactly.  Greenblatt  is  a  responsible  officer  of  the  organization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  ask  you  to  refer  to  the  minutes. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  minutes  do  say  Greenblatt.  I  will  say  it  myself, 
Dellinger  said  it  himself.  Davis  said  it.  Everybody  agreed  on  that. 
As  you  read  the  notes  you  will  see  it  was  passed. 

Mr.  Conley.  Was  it  not  at  this  meeting  of  August  4  that  it  was 
agreed  Vernon  Grizzard  would  be  in  charge  of  the  marshals  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  we  wanted  Vernon  to  be  in  charge  of  the  mar- 
shals. Yes,  you  are  right ;  in  the  minutes  it  was  accepted. 

It  is  interesting  that  you  don't  mention  the  other  names,  because 
obviously  you  are  interested  in  this  Budapest  conference  that  Vernon 
traveled  to.  I  want  to  get  back  to  this  business  in  Paris  with  the  Viet- 
namese, as  soon  as  possible,  to  set  the  record  straight  about  what  our 
relations  are  with  the  Vietnamese  and  what  Vernon  was  doing. 

Mr.  Conley.  Let  us  get  back  to  something  else  first,  Mr.  Hayden, 
because  you  brought  it  up,  RAT.  You  were  reading  from  this  a  moment 
ago.  Would  you  be  kind  enough  to  explain  to  the  committee  what 
RAT  is? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  it  is  self-evident.  It  is  an  underground  news- 
paper. It  is  published  in  New  York  and  it  is  called  the  RAT. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Published  by  whom,  Mr.  Hayden  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  RAT  staff.  Editor,  Jeffrey  Shero;  hero  workers, 
Jeff  Gerth,  Marta  Kusic;  office  guru,  Sybil  Dryden;  maps,  Michael 
Klare;  graphics — hobo  graphics.  Rick  Meyerwitz;  advertising  man- 
ager, Marvin  Grafton. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  this  the  official  publication  of  any  organization  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Published  biweekly  by  R.A.T.  Publication,  Inc.,  201 
East  Fourth  Street,  New  York,  New  York. 

Application  for  mail  at  second-class  postage  rates,  et  cetera,  member 
of  Liberation  News  Service  and  Underground  Press  Syndicate. 

Mr.  Conley.  Is  RAT  not  in  fact  an  organ  of  the  SD$,  Students  for 
a  Democratic  Society? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  SDS  has  an  organ  called  New  Left  Notes. 

21-706  O — 69 — pt.  2 i 


2538  DISRUPTION  OF  rO  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  aware  of  that,  but  is  not  also  RAT  an  organ  of 
the  same  society  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  will  have  to  ask  the  society.  As  far  as  I  know  it 
never  has  been. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Since  you  had  previously  been  an  officer  of  that  so- 
ciety, I  thought  you  might  be  able  to  shed  some  light  on  the  question.  . 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have.  Whether  you  like  it  or  not  that  is  the  light  that 
is  shed.  It  is  not  connected  to  SDS. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  was  this  particular  issue  also  known  as 
the  demonstrators'  guidebook  or  handbook  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  says  "CONVENTION  SPECIAL,"  "lyndon's 
BIRTHDAY  FOLLIES,"  "iNSiDE :  Maps  &  Muck."  I  will  tell  you  about  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  not  interested  in  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Rennie  Davis  and  I  wrote  several  articles  explaining 
our  political  philosophy  and  information  for  people  that  we  thought 
they  should  have  if  they  were  to  come  to  demonstrate  at  Chicago.  But 
it  was  not  an  official  organ  of  SDS  or  the  Mobilization  or  anyone  else. 
That  is  what  I  said  before,  this  is  the  closest  thing  to  a  sort  of  official 
recording  of  the  views  of  myself  and  Rennie  as  project  directors  of 
the  Mobilization. 

It  includes  maps  of  the  Chicago  Loop  and  different  targets  where 
you  can  demonstrate  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  The  maps  are  introduced 
by  the  following  statement : 

In  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  violence  and  bloodshed  it  will  be  crucial  to  hold 
demonstrations  at  locations  other  than  the  International  Amphitheatre  where 
the  concentration  of  police  and  national  guard  is  very  high.  The  following  maps 
contain  information  about  possible  alternate  demonstration  sites  throughout 
Chicago.  Such  information  should  enhance  our  mobility  and  assist  in  the  forma- 
tion and  execution  of  relatively  safe  demonstration  strategies  by  different 
groups. 

Then  it  has  where  all  the  rulers  of  America  are  located  in  the  city, 
different  buildings  that  they  liave,  banks,  insurance  companies,  that 
sort  of  thing.  And  it  has  a  map  of  the  Amphitheatre  area  as  well.  It 
has  an  article  on  Mayor  Daley,  not  very  flattering. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  it  stated  at  the  meeting  on  August  4  that  a  hun- 
dred thousand  copies  of  this  special  edition  of  RAT  would  be  avail- 
able? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  mie:ht  have  been,  but  we  decided  on  a  smaller  num- 
ber. I  think  it  was  30,000. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  will  refer  you  to  your  notes  again,  on  page  3. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Whatever  the  notes  say  I  am  sure  you  are  reading 
them  correctly,  we  came  out  with  30,000  instead  of  a  hundred  thousand. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  if  we  may  move  on,  in  connection 
with  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Viet- 
nam, is  it  not  a  fact  that  the  following  people  whom  I  am  going  to 
name  were  also  invited  to  attend  meetings  of  the  administrative  com- 
mittee or  the  steering  committee  of  the  National  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee  

Mr.  Hayden.  Excuse  me.  Would  it  be  possible  for  Mr.  Davis  to  come 
up  just  to  be  a  consultant  to  me  on  these  questions  of  past  meetings? 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  Chair  realizes,  Mr.  Hayden,  that  no  one's  memory 
is  perfect.  If  you  do  not  recall 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  long  as  it  is  understood  that  I  am  not  trying  to  hide 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2539 

anything  under  a  bed,  I  will  be  glad  to  tell  you  when  I  can't  remember 
things. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Okay.  Did  you  want  to  have  him  come  up  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  like  him  to  come  up.  If  the  Chair  thinks  it  is 
unnecessary 

Mr.  IcHORD.  If  he  feels  he  wants  to  consult  with  him,  I  think  Mr. 
Davis  is  close  enough  there.  If  you  feel  you  have  to  consult  with  him, 
feel  free  to  do  so. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  order  that  I  can  make  this  as  short  as  possible,  you 
see  the  general  tenor  of  my  questions,  sir. 

Other  people  invited  to  attend  meetings  of  the  planning  committee 
of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  other  than  yourself:  Mr. 
Herbert  Bleich. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Are  you  reading  from  some  list  that  I  have  also  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  is  from  a  composite  list. 

Mr.  Hayden,  I  don't  know  who  Herbert  Bleich  is. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness  stated  he  did  not  know  who  Herbert  Bleich 
is. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  know,  I  don't  know  unless  you  are  mispro- 
nomicing  the  name. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  why  I  am  spelling  it  for  you,  sir,  B-1-e-i-c-h. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  know,  I  have  never  met  such  a  person. 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  He  has  been  identified  by  this  committee  as  being  affili- 
ated with  the  Progressive  Labor  Party,  if  that  helps  you  in  any  way. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  that  does  not  clear  up  anything. 

Mr.  Conley.  The  second  name,  Stokely  Carmichael,  black  power 
advocate,  who  is  now  involved  with  the  Black  Panther  organization. 

Mr.  Hayden.  "V^Hiat  was  the  question,  was  he  attending  meetings? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  he  invited  to  attend  meetings  and  did  he  attend 
meetings  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  may  have  been  invited.  He  did  not  attend. 

Mr.  Conley.  Any  of  the  meetings  you  attended  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  Conley.  Kipp  Dawson  of  the  Socialist  "Workers  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  may  have,  but  I  don't  know  him.  I  don't  know 
whether  he  was  at  a  meeting. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  have  been  told  that  Kipp  Dawson  is  a  female  rather 
than  a  male. 

]VIr.  Hayden.  Well,  that  shows  I  don't  know  him. 

Mr.  Conley.  Abe  Feinglass  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Abe  Feinglass  of  the  Communist  Party  ?  Is  he  listed 
as  such  ?  I  have  heard  the  name.  I  think  he  is  a  trade  unionist.  "WTiether 
he  is  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  I  don't  know.  I  don't  know  if 
he  attended  any  meetings. 

Mr.  Conley.  Paul  Friedman,  New  York  State  youth  director  of  the 
Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know  him. 

Mr.  Conley.  Jesse  Gray. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  know,  Jesse  Gray  never  attended  meetings. 
I  do  know  Jesse  Gray  somewhat. 

Mr.  Conley.  Fred  Halstead  of  the  Socialist  Workers  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  Fred  attended  some  meetings.  I  think  he  is  an 
officer  of  the  Mobilization  anyway. 


2540  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Lew  Jones  of  the  Young  Socialist  Alliance. 

Mr.  HL^YDEN.  He  was  present  at  some  meetings.  I  forget  which 
ones.  You  see,  they  didn't  go  for  the  action  because  they  have  a  Trotsky- 
ist  outlook.  They  don't  believe  the  Democratic  Party  is  legitimate  at 
all,  so  they  didn't  want  any  demonstration  whatsoever  in  the  city  of 
Chicago.  So  they  did  not  participate  very  heavy  in  our  planning. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Bettina  Aptheker  of  the  Comimunist  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  know  Bettina  just  a  little  bit.  I  know  her  daddy  bet- 
ter. I  don't  believe  she  was  involved  in  the  meetings. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Her  daddy,  I  take  it,  is  Herbert  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  guessed  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sam  Marcy,  also  known  as  Sam  Ballan,  Trotskyist 
Workers  World  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know — my  saying  I  don't  know  these  people 
does  not  prove  anything.  They  may  be  aromid  my  bed.  They  may  have 
been  at  meetings. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  understand. 

Jack  O'Dell,  also  known  as  Hunter  Pitts  O'Dell,  of  the  Communist 
Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  idea. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Harry  Ring  of  the  Socialist  Workers  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Harry  Ring  I  met  in  Cuba  once.  He  may  have  attended 
a  Mobilization  meeting.  But  as  I  said,  these  people,  the  Trotskyists, 
were  against  the  action.  So  he  couldn't  have  participated  very  heavy. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  the  Trotskyite  against 

Mr.  Hayden.  For  the  reason  I  said,  they  don't  believe — you  see,  if 
you  demonstrate  outside  the  convention,  they  think  this  assumes  you 
believe  in  the  validity  of  the  two-party  system  and  they  don't  believe 
in  its  validity.  So  they  didn't  think  there  should  be  any  demonstration 
there  because  it  would  be  misleading  the  American  people.  I'm  not  a 
Trotskyist  myself,  but  I  may  have  done  injustice  to  their  position. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Jose  Ristorucci. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  idea. 

Mr.  Conley.  Jack  Spiegel. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Spiegel,  yes ;  Spiegel  was  in  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Arnold  Johnson  of  the  Commmiist  Party. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Arnold  Johnson  I  know  slightly.  He  was  at  least  at 
one  meeting  representing  the  Communist  Party.  Other  than  that  I 
don't  remember.  I  don't  even  know  if  he  was  in  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  not  a  fact  that  you  have  made  trips 
to  foreign  comitries  to  meet  with  foreign  Communist  officials  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  not  sign  up  as  a  delegate  to  attend  the  Soviet- 
controlled  Communist  World  Youth  Festival  held  in  Helsinki,  Fin- 
land, in  1962? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I'm  glad  you  brought  that  up. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Remember,  all  I  have  asked  you  is  did  you  sign  up. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Just  read  it  again.  That  is  beautiful. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  sign  up  to  make  that  trip  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Say  the  whole  question  as  you  said  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  Did  you  not  sign  up  as  a  delegate  to  attend  the  Soviet- 
controlled  Communist  World  Youth  Festival  held  in  Helsinki,  Fin- 
land, in  1962? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2541 

Mr.  Hayden.  This  is  an  occasion  where  I  was  a  dupe  of  the  CIA, 
which  controlled  the  National  Student  Association  at  the  time.  I  was 
enticed  by  them  to  go  to  Helsinki  as  part  of  a  little  anti-Communist 
^roup  that  would  try  to  make  trouble  for  the  Communists.  I  thought 
it  would  be  a  good  trip,  nice  to  have  my  way  paid  by  whoever  was 
paying  it,  probably  the  State  Department  or  the  CIA.  Only  at  the 
last  moment  other  problems  here  in  this  country  prevented  me  from 
going.  But  I  was  going  to  carry  Old  Glory  right  into  the  heart  of 
commmiism  at  that  time.  Now  that  can  be  proven  by  any  number  of 
CIA  agents,  former  student  leaders,  organizers  of  the  trip,  or  what 
have  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  (question  was,  Did  you  originally  sign  up  to  go  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  signed  up  not  to  go  as  a  delegate,  I  don't  think.  I 
signed  up  to  go  as  sort  of  a  Radio  Free  America,  or  whatever  we 
thought  we  were  doing.  We  were  going  to  go  over  there.  I  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  group  of  Americans  who  were  going  to  put  out  a  little  news- 
paper to  tell  the  truth  to  all  the  Communists. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  although  you  did  not  go  and  you  have 
offered  us  an  explanation  as  to  why  you  did  not  go,  is  it  not  a  fact  that 
you  have  since  that  time  indicated  that  you  wished  you  had  had  the 
opportunity  to  attend  that  festival  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  would  have  liked  to  have  seen  it,  but  I  was 
accused  of  being  a  Communist  here  and  had  to  fight  that  one  out.  That 
was  when  the  parent  organization  of  SDS  threw  SDS  out  back  in  1962. 
That  is  in  the  history  books. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  December  of  1965  did  you  not  travel  to 
North  Vietnam,  together  with  Staughton  Lynd  and  Herbert  Aptheker, 
to  attend  meetings  with  such  Communist  officials  as  Premier  Pham 
Van  Dong? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right.  But  the  purpose  was  not  to  attend  meetings 
with  the  Premier  of  North  Vietnam  in  particular.  The  purpose 
was 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  was  "with  such  Communist  officials." 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  I  was  trying  to  answer  the  question.  The  purpose 
was  to  try  to  understand  the  outlook  on  peace  and  war  that  the  other 
side  held.  We  wanted  to  interview  a  variety  of  people  in  North  Viet- 
nam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  On  that  trip  in  December  1965,  did  you  meet  with 
Colonel  Ha  Van  Lau,  who  was  mentioned  here  earlier  this  morning, 
who  at  that  time,  I  believe,  was  liaison  officer  of  the  North  Vietnamese 
on  the  International  Control  Commission  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  He  was  the  liaison,  I  believe,  between  the  North  Viet- 
namese Army  and  the  International  Control  Commission,  which  was 
established  by  the  Geneva  agreements.  We  heard  from  him  a  detailed 
analysis  of  their  negotiating  position  and  their  view  of  the  Geneva 
agreements,  both  in  the  past  and  in  the  future.  We  printed  that  inter- 
view in  a  book  which  we  published,  The  Other  Side^  in  1966. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  %vith  regard  to  this  trip  were  you  not 
aware  of  the  fact  that  Herbert  Aptheker,  a  National  Committee  mem- 
ber of  the  Communist  Party,  U.S.A.,  received  the  original  invitation 
from  the  North  Vietnamese  and  was  told  to  bring  two  persons  with 
him? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  the  first  time  I  have  heard  that  version  of  it, 
but  I  am  getting  used  to  these  kinds  of  doctored  versions.  I  tell  you 


2542  DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

what  happened.  Herbert  Aptheker,  whom  I  had  not  met  before  I 
took  in  a  debate,  attended  a  conference  in  Helsinki  in  the  summer  of 
1965  or  early  fall,  which  was  one  of  the  first  conferences  in  Europe 
that  I  believe  a  North  Vietnamese  delegation  came  to  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  bombing  in  early  1965. 

They  asked  Aptheker  if  he  would  like  to  visit  North  Vietnam,  which 
is  a  Communist  country,  he  being  a  Communist  Party  official  of  the 
United  States.  He  said  he  would  be  interested.  They  said  they  would 
like  to  also  have  acquaintance  and  contact  with  people  in  the  emerging 
peace  movement  in  the  United  States  who  were  not  in  the  Communist 
Party,  who  were  not  Communists.  So  he  came  back  to  do  that.  He 
contacted  Professor  Staughton  Lynd,  whom  he  knew  slightly,  but  who 
at  that  time  was  one  of  the  most  widely  acknowledged  leaders  of  the 
protest  against  war.  Professor  Lynd  thought  it  over  and  decided  he 
would  like  to  see  North  Vietnam  and  Professor  Lynd  asked  if  he 
could  select  a  third  person,  and  he  selected  myself.  We  had  been 
friends  in  Atlanta  and  lived  in  the  same  community  and  have  sort  of 
been  in  contact  for  a  couple  of  years.  So  we  went  with  Dr.  Aptheker, 
as  you  say,  in  December. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  it  is  not  your  understanding  then  that 
Mr.  Aptheker  in  fact  initially  invited  Carl  Oglesby  of  the  SDS,  as 
well  as  leaders  of  the  Student  Nonviolent  Coordinating  Committee, 
to  mJake  this  trip  before  he  extended  the  in\dtation  to  Professor  Lynd 
and  yourself? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  that  I  know  of,  but  you  can  ask  him.  I'm  sure 
that  other  people  were  considered,  but  I  don't  know  who  they  were. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  ask  you  this :  Do  you  recall  having  a  conversa- 
tion with  a  reporter  from  the  village  Voice,  a  newspaper  reporter  by 
the  name  of  Jack  Newfield  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  recall  more  than  one  conversation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  a  conversation  with  him  where  you 
indicated  these  were  the  facts,  that  Oglesby  and  somebody  from  SNCC 
were  invited  initially  and  they  were  not  willing  to  go  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  remember  who  was  invited.  I  was  not  par- 
ticularly involved  in  that.  You  will  have  to  ask  somebody  else.  Even 
if  it  were  true  I  would  be  glad  to  acknowledge  it.  I  just  don't  know 
whether  it  is  true. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  in  this  conversation  with  Mr.  Newfield 
that  he  advised  you  to  contact  the  New  York  Times? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  contact  the  i¥ei«  York  Times? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Before  going  to  Hanoi  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Before  or  after  you  got  back. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  make  a  proposal  to  them  to  give  them  an 
exclusive  story  on  your  trip  to  Hanoi  on  the  condition  they  play  up 
the  role  of  Staughton  Lynd  and  down  the  role  of  Communist  Party 
official  Herbert  Aptheker? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  a  joke. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  the  question. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  answered  it.  Do  you  think  the  New  York  Times 
would  agree  to  such  a  bargain  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2543 

Mr.  C0N1.EY,  That  is  not  the  question,  sir,  whether  they  agreed  to  it. 
The  question  is,  Did  you  propose  it  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  never  was  such  a  proposal.  We  would  not  be 
insane  enough  to  think  that  the  Neio  York  Times  was,  you  know, 
capable  of  that  kind  of  reasoning.  I  think  we  had  the  following  prob- 
lem. There  was  going  to  be  a  critical  problem  of  publicity.  We  were 
aware  that  a  story  might  break  at  any  time,  especially  when  we  were 
away  from  the  United  States,  and  we  would  not  be  able  to  talk  to  the 
press.  We  would  be  in  China  or  Vietnam  or  somewhere  out  of  contact 
with  the  American  press.  So  we  decided  to  leave  behind  separate 
statements,  each  of  us.  And  after  much  debp.te  we  decided  that  we 
would  agree  on  the  strategy  of  telling  the  reporter  from  the  New 
York  Times  essentially  what  was  happening,  with  the  understanding 
that  if  the  story  was  about  to  break  he  could  break  it.  He  just  wrote 
whatever  he  wanted  to  write.  The  idea  that  they  were  boosting  Staugh- 
ton  Lynd  and  downplaying  Herbert  Aptheker  I  cannot  understand. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  My  question  was  not.  Did  the  Tiifnes  do  this ;  my  ques- 
tion was,  Did  you  propose  this  to  the  Times  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  no  knowledge  of  any  of  the  other  two  people 
who  made  the  trip  making  such  a  proposal  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  who  paid  for  your  trip  to  North  Vietnam 
in  December  1965  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Most  of  the  financing  outside  of  our  free  world  was 
by  the  North  Vietnamese  over  much  protest,  because  we  would  have 
liked  to  have  answered  the  question  by  saying  we  paid  for  our  own 
way  because  we  know  the  very  deeply  felt  value  that  you  should  always 
pay  your  own  way,  and  if  somebody  pays  for  you  then  you  are  not 
an  independent  judge. 

I  think  I  can  be  an  independent  judge  no  matter  who  pays  for  me. 
I  have  taken  your  money  to  fly  here  to  talk  to  you,  and  so  forth.  But 
there  is  another  factor.  The  North  Vietnamese  insisted  that  since  they 
are  in  a  state  of  war,  and  they  were  a  different  nation,  if  they  were 
going  to  bring  Americans  into  North  Vietnam  they  would  come  in  as 
guests  of  the  government  and  not  have  to  pay  for  the  use  of  facilities 
that  the  government  had  or  had  access  to.  So,  after  we  ^ot  through  to 
Czechoslovakia  we  did  not  have  to  pay  the  rest  of  the  trip  and  did  not 
liave  to  pay  the  food  and  lodging  expenses  in  Hanoi. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  pay  personally  for  the  trip 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  paid  a  round  trip  to  Czechoslovakia. 

Mr.  Conley.  From  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Out  of  your  own  personal  funds,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  or  whatever  I  raised  from  friends.  It  was  my 
money.  I  can  check  it  for  you  and  write  a  letter  or  something.  The 
second  trip  to  North  Vietnam,  by  the  way,  I  paid  for  altogether  out 
of  my  own  funds. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then  the  North  Vietnamese,  as  I  understand  you,  from 
Czechoslovakia  to  North  Vietnam  paid  your  round-trip  fare;  is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  believe  they  paid,  because  they  do  not  believe 
in  money  exactly  the  same  way.  The  United  States  paid  my  way  back. 

Mr.  Conley.  The  North  Vietnamese  Government  either  paid  or  took 


2544  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

care  of  your  transportation  from  Czechoslovakia  to  North  Vietnam 
and  back  to  Czechoslovakia  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Maybe  back  to  Moscow.  I  think  we  came  back  from 
Hanoi,  Peking,  Moscow,  New  York,  or  something  like  that.  This  is  all 
recorded  elsewhere,  sir. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  connection  with  your  stay  in  North  Vietnam,  were 
you  a  guest  of  the  Vietnam  Peace  Committee? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  would  say  they  were  sort  of  our  hosts.  They 
were  responsible  for  our  welfare  and  safety  because  of  the  American 
bombing.  They  provided  us  with  interpreters. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Talking  of  the  last  visit,  Mr.  Hayden  ? 

Mr.  Hayden,  On  both  visits,  as  a  matter  of  fact. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  know  whether  the  Vietnam  Peace  Com- 
mittee has  any  official  standing  in  the  North  Vietnamese  Government  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I'm  not  sure  exactly  how  they  are  funded.  I'm 
sure  it  is  some  kind  of  government  funding.  I'm  not  sure.  I  think  if 
you  read  our  book  we  have  some  explanation  of  it,  but  I  can't  recall 
the  nature  of  the  organization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  have  asked  you  earlier  whether  you 
met  Colonel  Lau  on  this  trip  to  North  Vietnam  in  December  1965, 
and  you  have  indicated  you  did.  Have  you  had  occasion  since  that  time 
to  maintain  contact  with  Colonel  Lau  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  saw  Colonel  Lau  the  second  time  I  went  to 
North  Vietnam  in  October  of  last  year.  As  I  said  before,  I  saw  Colonel 
Lau  momentarily  in  Paris  when  I  was  carrying  out  that  mission  that  I 
want  to  explain  to  you  and  discuss. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  I  want  to  show  you  a  letter 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  know  this  letter. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Dated  June  4,  1968.  It  bears  the  signature  of  Tom 
Hayden,  does  it  not?  [Hayden  Exhibit  No.  4.  See  page  2586.] 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  Is  that  your  signature  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  This  whole  letter  I  will  take  complete  credit  for. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  other  words,  this  letter  which  has  been  previously 
offered  as  an  exhibit 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  a  stolen  letter.  You  collaborated  with  police 
agencies  to  take  this  out  of  somebody's  briefcase.  It  is  not  a  secret 
letter,  although  I  object  to  the  method  by  which  you  obtained  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  indicate  that  this  letter,  which  has  been  previously 
offered  as  an  exhibit  in  these  hearings,^  is  in  fact  a  letter  which  you 
prepared  the  original  of,  and  of  which  I  have  handed  you  a  photocopy  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  know. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  give  the  original  copy  of  this  letter  to  Mr. 
Robert  Greenblatt  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  the  day  you  give  it  to  him  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  think  that  he  was  going  to  somewhere  in  Europe 
to  some  kind  of  conference.  He  was  expecting  to  be  able  to  stop  on 
the  way  back  through  Paris,  because  we  wanted  to  understand  what 
the  situation  was  in  the  peace  talks  that  were  going  on.  I  gave  him 
an  introductory  note  to  Colonel  Lau,  which  I  will  be  glad  to  read 
to  you. 


1  See  pt.  1,  p.  2476,  Oct.  4,  1968,  heariags.  Letter  read  in  full,  but  not  made  an  exhibit. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2545 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No.  I  think  the  letter  has  already  been  read  into  the 
record,  Mr.  Hayden.  You  did  give  this  letter  to  Mr.  Greenblattt  then 
at  his  request  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  remember  whether  it  was  Greenblatt's  re- 
quest. I  may  have  just  proposed  that  he  should  stop  in  Paris  and  try 
to  get  some  information  on  what  the  state  of  the  talks  was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  May  I  have  the  letter  back  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  like  to  write  some  things  from  it,  since  I  never 
expected  to  see  it  again. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  will  prepare  a  copy  for  you. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  just  scribble  one  thing.  That  this  should  be 
taken  at  the  Canadian  border  under  a  false  search  and  seizure  process 
should  be  known  to  the  press  in  this  room. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  guess  that  has  already  been  brought  out  by  other 
witnesses. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  just  wanted  to  repeat  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  order  that  I  understand  your  last 
answer  completely,  Mr.  Greenblatt  may  have  asked  you  for  this 
letter  or  you  may  have  been  aware  of  the  fact  he  was  going  to  Paris  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  1  don't  know  where  he  was  going.  He  may  have  been 
going  to  Europe. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  wondered  what  prompted  you  to  write  a  letter  to 
Colonel  Lau. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Colonel  Lau  is  one  of  the  people  that  I  know  in  the 
North  Vietnamese  delegation.  I  thought  that  it  would  be  possible  for 
Greenblatt  to  have  a  discussion  with  him  and  required  an  introductory 
note.  At  that  time  I  was  very  enthusiastic  about  the  situation.  I  was 
under  the  illusion  temporarily  that  the  war  might  be  ending.  But  w'e- 
wanted  to  know  very  much  what  the  Paris  talks  were  accomplishing, 
and  several  of  us  were  in  Paris  on  several  occasions  talking  to  both 
State  Department  officials.  North  Vietnamese  officials,  trying  to  get 
a  picture. 

I  have  written  my  own  picture  of  what  was  going  on  in  Paris  in 
Rampai'ts  magazine.  Anyone  these  days  who  is  going  to  Paris  from 
the  peace  movement  I  will  be  glad  to  give  a  letter  to  so  that  they  can 
go  try  to  see  the  North  Vietnamese,  who  don't  trust  Americans  for 
some  reason. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Do  they  trust  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  They  trust  me  enough  to  have  a  conversation.  I  doubt, 
Mr.  Ashbrook,  that  they  would  see  you. 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  I  doubt  that  I  would  want  to  see  them. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  would  not  want  to  see  them?  You  would  not  want 
to  talk  to  them? 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  I  have  no  reason  to. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  didn't  think  you  would.  That  is  quite  a  peaceful 
attitude. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  directing  your  attention  specifically  to 
this  letter,  it  is  addressed  to  Colonel  Lau;  is  it  not?  It  is  written  to 
Colonel  Lau  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  an  introductory  note  for  Greenblatt. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  specifically  read  to  you  from  the  next  to  the  last 
paragraph  which  savs,  "We  hope  that  the  current  Paris  discussions 
go  well  for  you."  This  is  implying,  as  I  read  the  note,  that  you  are 


2546  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

hoping  they  go  well  for  Colonel  Lau,  or  for  the  North  Vietnamese 
people.  Is  that  not  correct  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  it  is  correct.  It  is  literally  correct.  I  was  very 
hopeful  that  at  last  the  thing  was  winding  up  and,  after  the  agony 
of  25  years  of  war  which  involved  many  fruitless  attempts  at  negotia- 
tion, that  this  finally  was  it,  people  were  getting  together  at  the  table 
and  that  it  would  be  possible  for  the  bombing  to  be  ended  and  the 
American  troops  to  be  withdrawn  from  South  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  I  read  this  particular  sentence,  it  is  not  wishing  the 
Vietnamese  people,  it  is  wishing  a  particular  group  within  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Hayden.  My  views  are  well  known  on  that.  In  a  war  you  can  only 
decide  one  side  is  right  and  the  other  side  is  wrong.  My  Government, 
which  I  don't  think  represents  me,  is  wrong  in  Vietnam.  There  is  only 
one  other  group  to  say  it  is  right  and  that  is  the  people  of  Vietnam,  and 
the  National  Liberation  Front  in  the  South  and  the  North  Vietnamese 
Government.  They  are  right  in  wanting  the  United  States  out  of 
Vietnam.  We  have  no  business  in  Vietnam.  They're  right  in  wanting 
the  bombing  to  end,  and  so  forth.  I  have  always  said  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  Are  you  saying  that  you  support  the  North  Vietnamese, 
then,  in  their  efforts  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  support  their  position.  Their  position  is  that  the 
United  States  should  get  out  of  Vietnam.  That  is  also  the  position  of 
Communists,  non-Communists,  anti-Communists,  the  world  over.  Do 
you  support  the  proposition  the  United  States  should  stay  in  ?  There 
are  only  two  things  you  can  stand  for  on  this,  out  or  in. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  are  the  witness,  I  am  the  counsel. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Okay. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  also  says  here,  "The  news  from  South  Vietnam  seems 
very  good  indeed." 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  looked  like  the  war  was  winding  up. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  about  the  second  Tet  offensive  which  was  in  the 
process  of  occurring  at  that  time?  Is  that  what  you  had  reference  to? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  the  entire  situation  in  the  country  was  improved 
immensely,  I  thought,  because  of  the  beginning  of  the  Paris  talks,  and 
the  news  from  Vietnam  was  just  good. 

Mr.  Conley.  The  news  from  South  Vietnam  at  that  particular  time 
was  the  second  Tet  offensive. 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  was  2  months  before  the  letter  was  written.  The 
second  Tet  offensive  was  early  May. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  was  early  June.  I  say  the  Tet  offensive  was  just 
winding  up. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  it  was  not  just  winding  up.  Actually,  it  never 
stopped  if  you  want  to  get  into  the  reality  of  the  defeat,  the  tragic 
defeat  of  the  United  States  troops  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  you  conclude  the  letter  with  the  closing, 
"Good  fortune !  Victory !" 

Mr.  Hayden.  Right. 

Mr.  Conley.  What  do  you  mean  by  the  words  "good  fortune"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  hope  it  is  all  over,  I  hope  peace  can  be  restored  at 
last.  This  country  has  been  massacred  by  so  many  countries  for  so  many 
years  that  it  just  made  me  terribly  happy  to  think  that  at  last  the 
possibility  of  ])eace  in  Vietnam  was  being  a  real  possibility.  I  wished 
them  every  luck  in  the  world.  I  think  we  owe  them  tremendous  respect 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2547 

for  the  struggle  tliey  have  endured  at  the  hands  of  politicians  in 
Washington,  particularly  President  Johnson,  and  that  is  the  meaning 
of  the  statement,  I  hope  they  win  their  independence  and  hope  they 
keep  it.  I  think  they  should  be  an  independent  country.  Whether  Com- 
munist or  not  it  is  their  business,  not  Rusk's  or  President  Johnson's. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  did  not  send  it  to  the  Vietnamese  people.  You  sent 
it  to  a  particular  officer  within  a  particular  segment  of  the  country  of 
Vietnam. 

Mr.  Hayden.  To  me  the  Vietnamese  people,  insofar  as  they  are  or- 
ganized, are  organized  in  the  united  way  against  the  United  States. 
The  other  Vietnamese  are  fictional  characters  invented  to  make  us 
believe  at  home  that  we  are  somehow  supporting  the  government  there. 
But  we  are  not  supporting  the  government  there.  It  would  fall  in  a  min- 
ute of  its  own  corruption  if  it  were  not  for  the  United  States  military. 
It  is  like  saying  the  American  Revolution,  the  American  people  were 
the  American  Revolutionaries.  Surely  there  were  some  Americans 
working  for  the  British,  just  as  there  were  Vietnamese  working  for 
the  French  and  now  work  for  the  Americans.  But  when  you  said  the 
Americans  versus  the  British,  there  was  no  question  you  were  talk- 
ing about  the  American  Revolutionaries. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  saying  the  North  Vietnamese  are  the  only 
government  you  recognize  yourself  as  existing  in  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  The  North  Vietnamese  Government  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  the  Geneva  agreements  were  never  implemented  is  a  de 
facto  government  of  the  I7th  parallel.  South  of  the  I7th  parallel  the 
de  facto  government,  in  my  opinion  as  an  objective  observer  as  much 
as  I  can  be,  the  only  real  government  in  South  Vietnam  is  the  National 
Liberation  Front.  The  Americans  admit  that  when  they  say  that  their 
whole  zone  of  South  Vietnam  has  been  under  Viet  Cong  control  for  the 
last  20  years. 

We  forget  that  the  Vietnamese  succeeded  in  liberating  all  of  the 
Vietnam  from  the  French  in  1945.  Ho  Chi  Minh's  administration 
stretched  to  the  south  down  to  the  Ca  Mau  Peninsula.  The  attempt  by 
the  French,  and  now  the  Americans  ever  since,  has  been  to  kind  of 
roll  back  that  revolutionary  victory,  roll  back  that  nationalist  revo- 
lution. It  still  remains  in  South  Vietnam.  The  Viet  Minh,  who  now 
are  the  Viet  Cong,  are  still  there  and  they  function,  they  collect  taxes, 
they  have  an  army,  they  have  schools,  they  have  hospitals,  they  have 
all  of  the  things  which  you  and  I  would  saj  governments  have. 

Mr.  Watson.  May  I  ask.  Counsel,  at  this  point  in  order  to  establish 
your  objectivity,  have  you  visited  South  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  I  would  like  to  very  much,  but  I  am  sure  I  would 
be  killed. 

Mr.  Watson.  Have  you  visited  South  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  cannot  because  it  is  too  dangerous,  with  the  Amer- 
icans there,  to  visit  if  you.  have  been  in  Hanoi. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  could  appreciate  that  fact,  but  I  just  wanted 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  sure  you  could. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  was  trying  to  ascertain  your  objectivity  in  assessing 
the  various  governments. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  one  other  question :  The  letter  concludes 
with  the  word  "Victory !"  Am  I  to  imply  from  that  that  you  are 
wishing  victory  to  Colonel  Lau  and  his  people  ? 


2548  DISRUPTION  OF  1'9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  When  I  say  "victory"  I  mean  that  the  end  of  the 
war  in  Vietnam  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  American  troops  woukl  be 
the  greatest  victory  possible  for  the  people  of  this  country  and  for  the 
people  of  Vietnam,  including  Colonel  Lau,  a  victory  over  the  people 
like  Rusk  and  Jolmson  and  other  old  men  who  have  been  dominating 
foreign  policy  with  whacko  conceptions  of  communism  the  last  20 
years,  a  victory  over  the  draft  boards  in  the  United  States,  whose 
average  age  is  58  years  old. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Particularly  over  the  American  servicemen  there? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  we  are  the  closest  friends  the  American  servicemen 
have,  I  think.  We  want  them  out  of  Vietnam.  We  are  not  the  reason 
that  they  are  being  killed.  We  are  finding  that  it  is  more  and  more 
possible  to  organize  within  the  Armed  Forces  and  around  Army 
bases.  We  believe  that  the  GIs  in  Vietnam  are  increasuigly  against 
the  war  and  think  that  they  are  merely  cannon  fodder  for  Washing- 
ton, while  elections  are  settled  and  prestige  is  traded  around. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  fact,  Mr.  Hayden,  you  are  encouraging  direct  action 
on  the  part  of  militaiy  men  of  America  to  go  AWOL  and  refuse  to 
serve  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  your  evidence  for  that,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  So  far  as  your  special  publication  of  SDS  and  other 
newspapers  direct  ed  at  servicemen. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  not  connected  with  any  of  those  newspapers.  My 
position  on  servicemen  is  that  they  should  be 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  aware  of  that  activity,  aren't  you? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I'm  aware  of  the  activity. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  all  I  want  to  know,  thank  you. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  does  that  have  to  do  with  what  I  think  should 
be  done?  I  would  like  to  explain  to  you  what  I  think  of  servicemen. 
I  respect  those  who  have  deserted.  I  think  it  is  a  very  brave  thing.  I 
think  it  would  be  better,  if  possible,  to  sta)'  in  the  Armed  Forces,  not 
shoot  any  Vietnamese,  and  come  home  alive.  I  think  a  lot  of  them  will. 
I  think  the  revolt  is  going  on  clearly  by  soldiers  in  South  Vietnam 
against  their  commanding  officers  and  especially  against  Johnson. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  On  what  do  you  base  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Riots  in  the  prison  camps,  widespread  interviews  pub- 
lished in  various  magazines,  letters  I  have  seen  from  GIs  who  are 
fed  up  with  this  way.  They  don't  like  peaceniks  because  they  think 
we  are  not  fighters  and  we  are  taking  an  easy  way  out.  That  is  their 
business,  that  is  their  opinion,  but  I  identif}^  with  them.  I  think  young 
men  like  myself  are  over  there  and  I  think  there  has  to  be  good  rela- 
tions in  the  future  betweeji  those  young  American  men  who  fought  in 
Vietnam  and  those  young  American  men  who  oppose  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam, and  that  is  what  we  are  working  towards. 

I  think  that  the  reason,  the  very  fundamental  reason,  if  you  in- 
quire in  your  committees  and  in  your  secret  investigations,  the  rea- 
son the  war  is  getting  harder  and  liarder  to  fight  is  that  the  American 
GIs  cannot  be  pushed  out  there  to  continue  fighting  it  because  they 
don't  think  it  is  worth  it.  That  is  a  factor  that  a  general  has  to  take 
into  account. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Do  you  think  you  are  talking  for  500,000  servicemen  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  just  becoming  clear  that  servicemen  over  there 
don't  want  to  fight  this  war. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2549 

Mr.  AsHBROOK,  What  numbers  indicate  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know  what  numbers.  Wliat  numbers  do  you 
think,  Mr.  Ashbrook  ? 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  I  don't  agree  with  you.  It  is  your  allegation.  You 
say  increasing  numbers  of  servicemen,  and  pretty  soon  you  are  talking 
about  all  servicemen.  Koughly  there  are  500,000  servicemen  there.  How 
many  do  you  think  will  identify  with  what  you  are  saying  is  the 
new  wave  among  servicemen  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  most  servicemen  would  not  identify  with  me 
or  my  position,  but  would  identify  with  the  idea  that  this  war  stinks 
and  that  they  should  be  home  and  if  Johnson  wants  to  go  to  Vietnam 
or  you  want  to  go  to  Vietnam,  you  Congressmen,  to  fight,  that  is  all 
well  and  good,  but  that  is  not  the  place  for  young  Americans. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Hayden,  T  was  in  South  Vietnam  in  June  196Y  and 
talked  to  well  over  a  thousand  enlisted  men  individually. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Talked  to  a  thousand  enlisted,  individually  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Talked  to  a  thousand  enlisted  men  individually.  My 
impression  was  that  their  morale  was  surprisingly  high. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I'm  afraid  you  were  brainwashed. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  By  the  enlisted  men  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  By  the  people  who  organized  your  trip.  Probably  the 
generals  that  Governor  Romney  spoke  about. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  will  state  to  you  that  the  enlisted  men  whom  I  inter- 
viewed on  an  individual  basis  and  in  groups  of  50  or  60  were  not  picked 
by  anybody.  I  picked  them  myself.  But  that  is  a  matter  of  assessment. 
You  haven't  been  there 

Mr.  Hayden.  Did  you  talk  to  veterans  of  Khe  Sanh  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  was  in  Khe  Sanh. 

Mr.  Hayden.  While  it  was  the  chief  thing  that  we  had  to  hold  for- 
ever, or  while  it  was  something  we  had  to  evacuate  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course  the  siege  of  Khe  Sanh  had  not  occurred.  That 
occurred  subsequent  to  June  1967.  But  we  have  gone  far  afield  here. 

Mr,  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  say  one  further  word. 

Mr.  Hayden  is  correct,  although  earlier  he  didn't  seem  to  know  too 
much  about  this  publication  directed  toward  the  military  urging 
them  to  desert ;  apparently  now  you  do  recall  something  about  it.  But 
they  run  periodically  some  letters  in  this  publication,  most  of  them 
anonymous  letters,  allegedly  from  veterans  of  Vietnam,  or  people  in 
Vietnam  who  are  againsit  war. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have  letters. 

Mr.  Watson.  No  doubt  he  has  some  letters. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  like  to  discuss  what  I  did  in  Paris.  It  is  curious 
to  me  I  haven't  been  asked. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  are  going  to  get  to  Paris. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  will  get  to  Paris. 

Mr.  Hayden,  I  cannot  help  but  note  that  you  have  again,  for  the 
fourth  time  as  I  count  it,  given  a  different  meaning  to  the  word 
"victory"  as  you  have  with  the  words  "guerrilla,"  "militant,"  and 
"attack."  Perhaps  it  is  just  a  question  of  semantics  between  you  and  me 
that  we  are  unable  to  define  these  words  or  give  the  same  meaning 
to  them. 

Mr.  Hayden,  What  about  deeds?  Let's  try  deeds. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  don't  recall  your  using  the  word  "deeds." 

Mr.  Hayden.  If  you  can't  understand  my  words,  I  would  like  to 


2550  DISRUPTION  OF  1'968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

know  what  it  is  about  my  actions  that  you  have  in  mind.  What  have  I 
attacked  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  said  there  were  three  words  that  we  have  had  trouble 
with  today,  the  word  "guerrilla,"  the  word  "militant,"  and  the  word 
"attack."  Periliaps  you  did  not  hear  what  I  said. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Wliat  was  the  trouble?  I  explained  what  I  meant  by 
the  words. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes;  and  your  explanation  would  not,  I  think,  be  the 
common  sensible  explanation  for  the  meaning  of  those  particular 
words  any  more  than  your  explanation  for  the  word  "victory,"  mean- 
ing by  victory  "bringing  the  soldiers  home." 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Could  we  go  on,  Mr.  Chairman,  because  I  think  the 
counsel  is  being  argumentative. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Just  a  minute.  We  are  following  the  rules  pretty  well 
thus  far.  We  are  dealing  in  semantics  here. 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  are  also  dealing  with  things  I  have  written  in 
dozens  of  places.  It  is  unnecessary  to  go  over  them  here  as  far  as  I 
can  see. 

Mr.  Ighord.  Certainly,  Mr.  Hayden,  I  would  say  these  words  that 
you  have  written  will  have  a  different  meaning  to  many  people.  It  ap- 
parently has  a  different  meaning  tx)  you  than  the  ordinary  connota- 
tion that  I  would  accept.  That  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  question. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Not  only  that,  but  also  the  word  "pinned."  I  think 
everybody  has  some  common  understanding  of  what  is  meant  when 
you  are  going  to  "pin"  delegates  in  a  convention.  The  other  is,  "any- 
thing to  stop  this  farce,"  and  of  course  to  him  "anything"  would  not 
mean  what  it  would  normally  mean  to  others.  The  words  "guerrilla," 
"attack,"  and  "victory" 

Mr.  Hayden.  Before  the  joking  goes  further,  aren't  you  embarrassed 
and  discomfited  by  the  existence  of  this  gigantic  report,  which  goes 
over  in  much  greater  detail  than  you  could,  because  you  don't  have  the 
funds,  thank  God,  or  the  staff  to  do  it — evervthing,  I  mean  meetings, 
all  the  things  that  you  have  been  asking  about  are  listed  in  here.  These 
investigators  didn't  have  too  much  difficulty  understanding  what  our 
position  was,  what  we  were  planning  to  do,  what  our  applications  for 
permits  meant,  what  liappened  in  meetings. 

Maybe  because  you  don't  have  the  staff  or  the  machinery  to  collect 
the  information  that  these  people  collected,  but  they  have  not  raised 
the  questions  that  you  are  raising  about  whether 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Maybe  this  is  why  we  are  raising  them. 

Mr.  Hayden.  So  you  are  not  embarrassed  by  this,  but  you  sort  of 
disagree  with  its  conclusions  or  analysis. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  think  we  need  to  make  it  clear  that  that  document  to 
which  you  refer  carries  neither  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  that 
particular  Commission,  but  is  merely  one  of  three  task  force  reports. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Beautiful.  That  is  what  I  said,  though. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  should  make  it  clear  it  is  a  staff  report. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  said  it  was  done  by  an  authorized  task  force  three  or 
four  times  earlier  today. 

Mr.  AsiiBRooK.  Which  has  neither  been  accepted  or  rejected  by  the 
Commission  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Is  that  your  last  refuge  ?  Obviously,  it  is  not  going  to 
be  accepted  by  the  committee,  IVIilton  Eisenhower  and  those  people. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2551 

But  they  have  been  done  in  by  their  own  staff.  Their  own  staff  went  out 
and  looked  at  the  situation  and  could  not  come  to  any  conclusions  than 
the  ones  they  came  to. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  committee  will  have  the  opportunity  to  read  the 
staff  report. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hay  den,  if  I  may  belabor  vou  one  moment  fur- 
ther on  this  particular  letter  that  you  wrote  for  Mr.  Greenblatt,  I 
notice  in  here  the  last  sentence  in  the  first  paragraph,  "He  works  closely 
with  myself  and  Dave  Dellinger,  and  has  just  returned  from  Hanoi." 

You  don't  need  the  letter  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  heard  your  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  was  the  significance  of  mentioning  that  Mr. 
Greenblatt  works  closely  with  yourself  and  with  Dave  Dellinger  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  wanted  to  identify  this  person  as  a  person  who  is 
active  in  the  Mobilization  and  the  way  to  do  that  would  be  to  identify 
him  with  two  people,  myself  and  Dave  Dellinger,  who  visited  North 
Vietnam  and  who  are  known  to  the  North  Vietnamese. 

Mr.  Conley.  Both  you  and  Mr.  Dellinger  had  previously  met  with 
Colonel  Lau,  had  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  mean  together  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Not  together,  out  you  have  both  met  Colonel  Lau ;  have 
you  not? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  I  said  I  have  met  him,  and  Dave  Dellinger  is  a 
member  of  the  tribunal  that  found  the  United  States  guilty  of  geno- 
cide. Colonel  Lau  was  the  North  Vietnamese  person  in  charge  of  mar- 
shaling the  evidence  for  the  North  Vietnamese  case.  So  he  would  know 
Colonal  Lau  through  the  examination  of  mutilated  and  napalmed 
Vietnamese  bodies. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  we  may  move  back  to  one  other  question  that  came 
up  earlier,  you  were  asked,  I  believe,  whether  you  were  aware  of  the 
fact  whether  RAT  was  or  was  not  a  publication  of  SDS. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  said  it  was  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  do  call  to  your  attention  the  fact  that  in  the  publica- 
tion vocations  for  social  change — are  you  aware  of  this  publication? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Hay  ward,  California  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir.  The  October  1968  issue  advises  people  who 
want  a  job  with  RAT  to  apply  as  follows. 

Mr.  Hayden.  "THE  RAT  c/o  SDS,  131  Prince  Street,  New  York, 
New  York." 

It  gives  the  phone  number;  "Contact  Jeff  Shero."  That  could  mean 
anything,  but  what  it  does  not  mean  is  that  the  RAT  is  an  SDS  publi- 
cation. SDS,  131  Prince  Street  could  be  a  New  York  chapter  of  SDS. 
I  don't  know  what  it  is.  It  may  be  a  temporary  office  of  the  RAT,  it 
may  not.  But  it  is  not  an  official  SDS  publication. 

The  SDS  publication  is  Neiv  Left  Notes.  But  Jeffrey  Shero  is  a 
former  officer  of  some  kind  of  SDS,  I  mean  some  kind  in  SDS,  and 
he  is  the  editor  and  founder  of  the  RAT.  A  lot  of  SDS  people  active 
in  New  York  City  just  as  there  are  other  movement  groups  in  New 
York  City  and  they  all  identify  very  closely  with  the  RAT.  But  the 
RAT  is  an  independent  publication  published  by  these  five  or  six 
people,  as  far  as  I  know. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  September  1967  did  you  attend  a  meet- 
ing in  Bratislava,  Czechoslovakia,  with  representatives  of  the  Viet 
Cong  and  North  Vietnamese  ? 


2552  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hatden.  Yes.  That  is  another  thing  that  is  available. 
Mr.  CoNLET,  Mr.  Hayden,  in  a  document  sent  out  under  the  signa- 
ture of  Dave  Dellinger  appears  the  following  quotation : 

The  Prague  conference  is  intended  to  create  solidarity  and  mutual  understand- 
ing between  revolutionaries  from  Vietnam  and  their  American  supporters  who 
are  trying  to  change  the  United  States.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Hayden,  my  question  to  you,  sir,  would  be,  Did  you  receive  a 
copy  of  this  particular  document?  Have  you  seen  it  before  today? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  must  have  seen  it.  I  had  a  hand  in  preparing  this 
document.  I  was  one  of  the  people  who  helped  to  write  the  agenda  and 
work  out  an  agenda  for  the  conference. 

Wliat  you  read  from  is  a  true  statement  of  one  of  the  purposes  of 
the  conference. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  let  me  ask  you  this  question,  if  I  may,  sir, 
with  reference  to  that  statement :  Are  you,  sir,  one  of  the  American 
supporters  of  the  "revolutionaries"  mentioned  there  in  Vietnam? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have  already  said  I  am. 

Mr.  Conley.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Very  few  people  in  the  world  are  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayclen,  while  you  were  in  Czechoslovakia  at  this 
conference  in  September  of  1967,  were  you  asked  by  the  Viet  Cong 
representatives  to  go  to  the  capital  of  Cambodia  to  receive  three  Amer- 
ican, war  prisoners  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  this  is  a  very  delicate  area.  I'm  glad  to  get  into 
it,  but  I  will  have  to  listen  to  your  questions  very  carefully.  So  if  you 
will  restate  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  will  read  it  again  to  you. 

While  you  were  in  Czechoslovakia  did  the  Viet  Cong  representatives 
ask  you  to  ^o  to  the  capital  of  Cambodia  to  take  custody  of  three 
American  prisoners  of  war  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  exactly.  I,  as  you  know,  have  been  involved  in 
the  release  of  American  prisoners  on  three  occasions — well,  several 
occasions — and  totaling  altogether  three  American  prisoners  from 
South  Vietnam  and  six  American  pilots  from  North  Vietnam,  all  of 
whom  are  here  in  the  United  States  now. 

The  way  in  which  these  releases  were  effected  is  very  complicated 
and  delicate.  I  will  be  very  happy  to  speak  as  frankly  as  I  can  about  it, 
but  I  want  us  to  be  very  careful  because  the  implication  that  you  are 
making,  that  somehow  the  link-up  between  the  peace  movement,  peo- 
ple like  myself,  and  Hanoi,  is  bad,  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  is  going  to 
go  out  around  the  world  as  an  item  of  news.  And  it  is  going  to  appear, 
whether  you  like  it  or  not,  it  is  going  to  appear  as  sort  of  an  official 
United  States  Government  committee  condemning  these  operations 
which  have  resulted  in  the  release  of  prisoners.  And  I  am  very  con- 
cerned about  the  welfare  of  those  prisoners,  not  that  I  think  the  Viet- 
namese would  do  anything  to  them,  but  tlie  possibility  of  any  American 
being  released  is  always  useful,  helpful,  and  basically  good.  So  we  have 
to  discuss  it  in  a  way  that  respects  the  situation. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  think  you  read  more  malice  in  my  ques- 
tion than  I  intended. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  trying  to  set  the  groundwork. 

Mr.  Conley.  My  question  was  simple.  Were  you  asked  to  go  to  the 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2553 

capital  of  Cambodia  ?  I  am  not  asking  you  to  go  into  a  detailed  explana- 
tion of  anything. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  literal  answer  to  your  literal  question  is  no. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Now,  then,  in  connection  with  that  same  general  proposition,  did  you 
not  in  fact  in  November  1967  go  to  Hanoi  and  from  there  to  the  capital 
of  Cambodia,  where  you  took  custody  of  three  United  States  sergeants 
who  had  been  held  as  prisoners  of  war  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Incorrect  again. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  like  to  explain? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  prefer  not  to  explain  more  than  I  have  ex- 
plained in  many  publications  and  statements.  I  was  involved  in  the  re- 
lease of  these  prisoners.  It  did  not  quite  exactly  happen  according  to 
the  geographic  route  you  described. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  quarreling  with  going  from  Hanoi  to  Cam- 
bodia ?  Is  that  it  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  and  going  from  Czechoslovakia  to  Cambodia,  and 
so  forth. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  never  suggested  you  went  from  Czechoslovakia  to 
Cambodia. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  thought  the  first  question  was,  did  I  go  from  that 
conference  to  Cambodia. 

Mr.  Conley.  No,  sir.  My  question  was.  Were  you  approached  at  the 
conference  in  Czechoslovakia  and  asked  if  you  would  go,  to  the  capital 
of  Cambodia  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  May  I  change  that  question,  because  as  I  recall  his 
answer  he  said  literally  that  was  not  correct.  Was  the  conference  at 
Czechoslovakia  the  place  at  which  you  learned  that  you  could  take 
custody  of  these  servicemen  if  you  were  to  be  in  Cambodia  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  exactly.  There  had  been  discussions  ever  since  our 
first  trip  to  Vietnam  about  the  worries  that  American  families  have 
about  prisoners  there.  We  had  always  stressed  that  while  we  did  not 
feel  that  the  North  Vietnamese  had  any  legal  or  other  kind  of 
responsibility  to  release  the  prisoners,  we  thought  it  would  be  a  highly 
liumane  and  important  act  that  could  contribute  to  making  peace 
easier  to  negotiate. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Not  for  propaganda  purposes? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Propaganda  works  both  ways.  Every  time  the  Viet- 
namese have  released  prisoners,  the  United  States  releases  prisoners 
and  announces  it  although  the  actions  are  not  reciprocal.  Neither  side 
recognizes  that  the  other  has  done  it,  and  so  forth. 

It  was  at  this  conference  in  Bratislava  during  the  discussions  with 
the  Vietnamese  about  the  state  of  American  prisoners  that  some  Viet- 
namese approached  myself  and  said  that  they  were  contemplating  the 
possible  release  of  some  prisoners  from  South  Vietnam.  They  were 
not  sure  how  to  do  it  technically.  They  had  a  lot  of  problems.  Contrary 
to  public  opinion,  people  do  not  run  up  and  down  from  North  to  South 
Vietnam  on  the  Ho  Chi  Minh  trail.  These  prisoners  were  deep  in  South 
Vietnam. 

A  way  had  to  be  found  for  them  to  bs  released  without  the  National 
Liberation  Front  having  to  hand  them  directly  over  to  the  Americans 
because  they  did  not  recognize  each  other.  The  problem  was  never 

21-706  O — 69 — pt.  2 5 


2554  DISRXJPTION  OF  1'9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

solved  in  the  first  discussions,  but  I  said  that  I  was  ready  at  any  point 
to  participate  in  such  a  release  if  I  could  be  of  value  and  service.  Some 
time  later,  not  too  much  later,  I  think  a  month  or  month  and  a  half, 
the  word  did  come  that  such  a  thing  was  possible.  I  happened  to  be  in 
Paris  at  the  time  and  at  that  time  I  went  to  Cambodia  to  work  out 
the  arrangements. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  did  not  then  go  to  Hanoi  and  from  there  to  Cam- 
bodia? 

Mr.  Hatden.  I  went  to  Hanoi,  but  not  particularly  related  to  pris- 
oners. I  went  to  Hanoi  to  see  what  2  years  of  bombing  had  done  in 
the  way  of  destruction. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  go  to  Hanoi  prior  to  going  to  Cambodia  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  went  to  Cambodia  and  to  Hanoi  and  back  to  Cam- 
bodia because  that  is  the  way  you  go,  and  then  to  France  and  back 
to  Cambodia  and  back  to  New  York.  It  was  not  all  related. 

Mr.  Conley.  Had  you  been  to  Hanoi  before  you  went  to  Cambodia 
and  took  custody  of  these  three  prisoners  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  had  been  to  Hanoi  twice  by  then. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  prisoners  were  from  South  Vietnam,  not  related 
to  North  Vietnam. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Were  they  held  by  North  Vietnamese  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  NLF. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  directing  your  attention  to  January  of 
this  year,  did  you  make  a  trip  to  Havana,  Cuba  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  To  take  part  in  the  International  Cultural  Congress, 
which  was  a  gathering  of  Communists  and  other  revolutionaries  whose 
aim  is  to  destroy  the  non-Communist  governments  of  the  world  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  remember  those  aims  being  enunciated  in  quite 
that  way.  But  then  there  are  no  more  people  like  yourself  in  Cuba. 
It  was  essentially  a  meeting  of  intellectuals,  who  are  not  strong  enough 
to  pick  up  a  gun  and  were  film-makers,  painters,  but  these  intellectuals 
supported 

Mr.  Conley.  Do  I  have  the  title  right,  the  "International  Cultural 
Congress"  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  was  a  cultural  congress  in  Havana.  I  don't  know 
if  it  was  called  the  International  Cultural  Congress. 

Mr.  Conley.  This  was  held  during  January  of  this  year? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Counsel,  the  witness  is  not  implying  that  there 
are  not  some  intellectuals  who  are  fighting  for  this  country  ?  You  are 
not  implying  that,  are  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Oh,  no. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  said  earlier  that  they  were  not  strong  enough  to 
lift  a  gun. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  replying  to  the  suggestion  that  this  was  a  meet- 
ing of  armed  revolutionaries,  which  was  implied  although  not  exactly 
stated  by  the  question.  I  wanted  to  indicate  that  it  was  a  meeting  of 
intellectuals. 

Mr.  Watson.  Do  you  consider  yourself  an  intellectual  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  never  thought  about  it. 

Mr.  Watson,  Thank  you.  Excuse  me,  Mr.  Counsel. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2555 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  how  long  were  you  in  Cuba  attending  this 
conference  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  About  10  days  to  15  days. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  leave  and  return  to  the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  describe  briefly,  if  you  can,  exactly  what 
you  did  at  the  conference  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Nothing. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  did  not  mean  you  as  an  individual.  I  mean  what  was 
done  at  the  conference  ?  Was  it  a  discussion  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Discussion  group. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Would  you  say  it  was  not  a  very  productive  conference? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  got  a  lot  of  things  I  wanted  to  get.  I  talked  to  a  lot 
of  people.  I  wanted  to  see  what  Cuba  was  like.  But  I  went  as  a  jour- 
nalist through  a  strange  deal  with  the  Department  of  State,  who  would 
not  allow  me  a  passport  to  go  as  a  delegate.  So  I  didn't  participate,  I 
didn't  have  any  official  status  in  the  conference,  I  did  not  speak,  I  did 
not  operate  as  a  delegate. 

Around  the  site  of  the  conference  I  was  able  to  meet  and  talk  with 
people  from  Latin  America,  the  Middle  East,  Western  Europe.  There 
were  Vietnamese  people  there.  I  just  took  advantage  of  the  occasion 
to  talk  to  as  many  people  as  I  could. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  a  fair  statement  to  say  that  the 
congress  closed  with  an  appeal  to  the  intellectuals  to  boycott  United 
States  academic  and  cultural  programs? 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  was  such  an  appeal.  It  had  more  to  it  than  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  participated 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  did  not  participate  in  the  drafting  of  the  appeal, 
although  I  agree  with  the  appeal. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  particular  publication  did  you  represent  at  this 
conference  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  just  went  as  a  writer.  I  didn't  have  to  represent  a 
publication. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  thought  you  indicated  that  you  did,  though,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Perhaps  I  misunderstood  you. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  can  check  it  in  my  documents,  but  I  think  I  just 
agreed  not  to  go  as  a  delegate. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  did  not  represent  any  particular  newspaper  or 
magazine  then. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  I  may  have  gone  as  an  editor  or  associate 
editor  of  Liberation^  which  is  a  pacifist  magazine  edited  by  Dave 
Dellinger  with  which  I  had  ties  for  a  while,  but  I  haven't  been  active 
with  them  for  some  time.  But  I  went  in  the  cajDacity  of 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  When  was  the  last  time  you  were  active  with  Liberation 
magazine  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  never  was  very  active.  That  is  why  I  decided  to  not 
have  my  name  on  the  masthead. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  any  of  the  material  related  to  the  Havana  con- 
ference published  in  the  Liberation  magazine? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  was  published  by  Dellinger. 

Mr.  Conley.  Written  by  you,  sir? 


2556  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  certainly  had  talks  with  Dellinger  relating  to 
the  article  he  finally  wrote. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Counsel  has  advised  me  that  there  would  be  no  oppor- 
tunity to  conclude  the  questioning  of  Mr.  Hayden  by  5  o'clock.  Give- 
and-take  has  been  quite  active.  I  think  we  could  very  well  at  this 
point  adjourn  the  hearings  until  10  o'clock  tomorrow  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  4 :05  p.m.,  Monday,  December  2,  1968,  the  subcom- 
mittee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  10  a.m.,  Tuesday,  December  3,  1968.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present  at  time  of  recess:  Representatives 
Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 

Hayden  Exhibit  No.  2 

To :  National  Mobilization  Staff :  Chicago  organizers 

not  for  circulation  or  publication. 
From  :  Rennie  Davis,  Tom  Hayden. 

DISCUSSION  ON  THE  DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION   CHALLENGE 

The  Purpose 

American  society  is  being  destroyed  by  its  unrepresentative  government.  The 
politicians  who  control  the  White  House  and  Congress  do  not  respond  to  glaring 
social  needs  or  to  the  outcries  of  millions  of  i)eople.  Democracy  is  reduced  to 
the  sorry  event  of  people  trooping  to  the  polls  every  four  years  tto  [sic]  vote 
for  candidates  who  offer  no  serious  choice. 

Our  taxes,  blood  and  national  honor  are  being  poured  out  in  the  hopeless 
Vietnam  war,  while  the  violence  in  our  cities  exposes  the  real  depth  of  our 
unsolved  problems  at  home.  Faced  with  a  world  wide  cry  for  human  rights, 
from  Vietnam  to  our  nation's  slums,  top  American  politicians  seem  able  to  reply 
only  with  negative  and  self-defeating  violence.  But  the  violence  of  suppression 
solves  nothing.  The  problems  cannot  be  avoided  or  bombed  away. 

In  1960  and  especially  in  1964,  the  American  voters  supported  peace  in 
Vietnam  and  social  reform  at  home.  Since  then  leading  scholars,  religious 
figures,  artists,  even  certain  generals  and  businessmen  have  protested  the  war ; 
the  Senate  leadership  of  both  parties  has  criticised  the  President ;  opinion 
surveys  show  a  large  minority  opposed  to  the  fighting;  nearly  all  of  America's 
allies  have  registered  their  opposition ;  world  public  opinion  condemns  the  US 
as  the  aggressor  in  Vietnam.  Yet  the  warmakers  continue  to  escalate.  Their 
domination  of  policy  grows. 

For  a  century  American  society  has  endorsed  racial  equality.  But  in  1968  a 
virtual  race  war  is  in  the  making.  Since  open  rebellions  broke  out  nearly  four 
years  ago,  no  social  and  economic  answer  has  been  put  forward.  The  basic 
response  of  the  government  has  been  to  violently  suppress  the  rebellions  then 
let  evil  conditions  go  on  as  before.  Rotten  housing,  schools  and  jobs  are  the 
continuous  lot  of  black  Americans.  Neither  hard  work  in  the  cotton  fields,  nor 
politics,  nor  labor  organizations,  nor  nonviolent  demonstrations  have  made  the 
American  promise  become  a  reality. 

The  problems  of  Vietnam  and  racism  affect  all  Americans.  Our  country's 
future  peace  and  honor  depend  on  a  successful  resolution  of  these  two  problems. 
Hatreds  and  divisions  are  being  created  which  will  take  generations  to  end. 
America  is  becoming  an  ugly  and  insecure  place  to  live.  The  country  lacks  the 
commitment  to  deal  with  racism,  and  cannot  afford  to  anyway  because  of  its 
preoccunation  with  Vietnam.  Because  our  social  imagination  is  blighted  by 
these  investments  in  violence,  our  life  as  a  whole  is  degraded  in  countless  ways. 
Cities  are  unlivable.  Television  is  a  wasteland.  Medical  needs  are  not  met. 
Mental  problems  go  unattended. 

The  political  parties,  especially  the  governing  Democratic  Party,  fail  com- 
pletely to  perform  their  function  of  solving  social  problems  peacefully.  The  Demo- 
cratic Party  is  bound  to  the  demands  of  Southern  racists  who  control  key  com- 
mittee position.s  through  seniority  gained  by  generations  of  Negro  disenfranchise- 
ment.  These  politicians  are  not  only  racist.s.  They  are  old  and  out  of  touch  with 
changes  in  our  country  and  the  world.  They  are  believers  in  the  use  of  force  to 
maintain  the  status  quo.  The  northern  Democrats,  though  traditionally  seeming 
more  liberal  and  flexible  than  their  southern  allies,  now  are  exposed  to  be  fully 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2557 

as  corrupt.  Their  power  rests  on  urban  machines  which  have  failed  to  solve  the 
problems  of  their  largely  Negro  and  working  class  constituencies.  Elections  in  the 
North  tend  to  be  personality  contests,  or  battles  between  competing  ethnic  groups, 
or  competitions  in  which  candidates  out-promise  each  other.  Nothing  changes  but 
the  faces. 

Above  and  behind  this  useless  structure  of  petty  politics  have  arisen  hugh  [sic] 
bureaucracies  with  enormous  power  over  the  life  and  death  of  America's  people. 
These  include  the  military  which  commands  three-fourths  of  the  taxpayer's 
money  and  an  equal  percentage  of  all  research  and  development ;  and  large  cor- 
porations which  make  their  fortunes  in  the  midst  of  urban  squalor  and  world 
poverty.  Where  these  giants  cannot  influence  politicians,  they  simply  buy  them, 
and  where  they  cannot  buy  them,  they  threaten  to  withdraw  supix)rt  of  all  kinds. 

Against  these  conditions  there  is  mounting  resistance  and  revolt.  The  summer 
of  1968  will  see  the  greatest  outpouring  of  dissent  ever  witnessed  in  this  country. 
Anger  with  police  and  rats,  Vietnam  and  the  draft  is  now  massive  and  cannot  be 
quieted  with  "better  police  methods."  This  summer  will  bring  a  more  determined 
and  powerful  movement  for  change.  At  the  same  time  established  solutions  to  the 
foreign  and  domestic  crisis  will  harden  and  the  democratic  process  will  visibly 
close  itself  to  any  viable  alternative.  The  axis  of  the  Democratic  Party — the 
blacks,  the  workers,  the  intellectuals — will  experience  a  new  consciousness  of 
unrepresentation.  Nixon,  not  Rockefeller,  will  be  the  Presidential  candidate  of  the 
Republican  convention.  And  Johnson,  not  McCarthy  or  Kennedy,  will  become  the 
"alternative"  for  the  liberals.  To  the  average  Democrat  who  wants  a  say  on  the 
widening  war,  high  taxes,  and  urban  squalor  the  "choice"  will  appear  desperate. 
Many,  for  the  first  time,  will  wake  up  to  the  fact  that  in  the  wheeling  and  deal- 
ing of  the  democratic  process  the  average  person  does  not  count.  He  is  expected 
to  participate  in  politics  in  about  the  same  way  that  he  goes  to  the  movies.  His 
choices  are  limited  to  which  of  the  stars  he  least  dislikes.  This  summer,  millions 
of  anxious  Democrats  will  ask,  what  now? 

The  strategy  of  the  anti-war  and  black  movements  in  this  period  may  help  to 
answer  this  question.  We  may  either  take  the  initiative  in  laying  the  foundation 
for  a  new  political  force  in  the  United  States  or  be  driven  into  isolation  from 
average  Americans.  What  we  do  now,  how  we  prepare  the  country  for  the 
Democratic  Convention,  and  how  we  respond  to  that  Convention  may  well 
determine  whether  we  bury  the  Democratic  Party  or  set  the  conditions  for  John- 
son to  bury  the  movement. 

A  Proposal 

A  massive  confrontation  with  our  government — the  Democratic  Party — as  it 
holds  its  convention  in  Chicago  this  summer  is  being  organized.  Given  the  right 
strategic  perspective,  this  challenge  could  help  transform  the  ix)litics  of  the  coim- 
try.  Since  the  New  Deal,  the  Democratic  Party's  electoral  strength  has  de- 
pended upon  the  support  of  the  politically  conscious  people  in  trade  unions,  black 
communities  and  the  professions.  Now  major  sections  of  this  base  are  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  policies  of  the  Democratic  Party.  At  the  same  time,  the  country's  oflS- 
cial  leadership  is  determined  to  hold  to  the  status  quo.  Every  political  sign 
points  towards  this  conflict  of  interest  coming  to  hammer  blows  at  the  Augusit 
Democratic  National  Convention  in  Chicago.  Our  task  must  be  to  prepare  the 
country  to  meet  this  political  crisis  by  supporting  and  strengthening  a  i>eople's 
movement  and  a  people's  force  which  the  politicians  cannot  avoid  or  resist. 

This  proposal  suggests  several  ways  to  build  for  a  massive  action  in  Chicago 
over  a  period  of  months ;  to  use  the  Chicago  demonstration  to  dramatize  to  the 
world  the  large  numbers  of  i>eople  who  feel  unrepresented,  and  in  fact  disgraced 
and  used,  by  our  government's  policies  on  the  crisis  of  Vietnam  and  racism  and 
the  mockery  that  democracy  has  become ;  and  to  unfold  the  Democratic  Conven- 
tion challenge  in  such  a  way  that  all  of  America  and  the  world  can  look  on  and 
judge  whether  Lyndon  Johnson  or  the  demonstrators  are  better  representatives 
of  America's  tradition  of  democracy  and  social  justice. 

Specifically,  the  proposal  is  that  events  unfold  in  three  major  periods  of 
activity. 

First,  from  April  21  to  April  30,  the  spring  days  of  resistance.  Where  possible, 
the  anti-war  and  black  movements  should  focus  on  the  Democratic  Party.  The 
undemocratic  method  of  choosing  delegates — through  money  and  "pull" — should 
be  exposed  and  opposed.  The  names  of  Democratic  contributors  who  profit  from 
war  and  racism  should  be  revealed  and  their  private  comfort  disturbed.  Mayors 
who  head  local  Democratic  Parties  should  become  the  recipients  of  draft  cards. 
State  chairman  should  be  burned  in  efl5gy  for  their  support  to  Johnson,  to  the 


2558  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

war  and  repression.  The  movement's  demands  on  the  Democratic  National  Con- 
vention should  be  widely  distributed  and  interpreted.  Where  appropriate,  the 
positions  of  Dodd,  Jaclfson  and  Symington  should  be  protested.  Englehard's  tie 
to  Johnson  should  be  attacted  [sic].  The  Texas  construction  companies  which 
profit  off  Vietnam  should  be  exposed,  etc. 

Second,  the  summer  should  become  a  period  of  intense  organizing,  education  and 
demonstration.  As  local  coordinating  committees  develop  to  plan  the  attact  [sic] 
on  the  Democratic  Convention,  they  should  initiate  recruiting  and  training  pro- 
grams for  summer  organizers — several  thousand  should  be  the  objective — who 
build  high  school  draft  resistance  unions,  organize  challenges  to  corrupt  dele- 
gates, talk  with  teachers,  doctors,  veterans  and  welfare  recipients  about  con- 
fronting the  Convention  on  a  particular  day,  gather  intelligence  on  delegates 
who  will  be  continuously  confronted  and  talked  to  during  their  entire  stay  in 
Chicago,  speak  to  hundreds  of  local  trade  unions  about  the  war  and  racism,  build 
pressure  in  the  ghetto  for  the  removal  of  all  Democratic  Party  headquarters, 
and  hold  local  war  crime  tribunals  to  expose  prominent  Democrats  who  manu- 
facture anti-personnel  bombs,  poison  gases  or  other  weapons  banned  by  inter- 
national agreement. 

Third,  the  summer  should  be  capped  by  a  week  of  demonstrations,  disruptions 
and  marches  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention,  clogging  the  streets  of 
Chicago  with  people  demanding  peace,  justice  and  participation  in  government. 
This  should  be  a  period  in  which  the  movement  projects  a  series  of  broad,  but 
concrete  demands — demands  which  the  vast  majority  of  people  can  identify 
with,  but  which  the  Democratic  Party  is  shown  to  be  unable  to  meet. 

The  movement  must  not  play  into  Johnson's  hands  by  attempting  to  prevent 
the  Convention  from  assembling,  a  position  few  Americans  would  accept  or 
understand.  Rather  the  action  should  build  steadily  through  the  Convention 
week,  each  day  escalating  the  demands  and  the  tactics,  building  for  a  massive 
confrontation  at  the  time  of  Johnson's  nomination.  The  initial  challenges  and 
activities  might  involve  50,000  to  100,000  people.  The  final  funneral  [sic]  march 
on  the  Democratic  Convention,  beginning  as  the  first  ballot  is  taken,  should  bring 
a  half  million — people  demanding  a  choice  on  the  issues  of  i^eace  and  justice ; 
citizens  who  have  come  to  "make  the  democratic  process  work"  by  pinning  the 
delegates  in  the  International  Ampetheatre  [sic]  until  a  choice  is  presented  to 
the  American  people. 

A  well  planned,  educational  build-up  would  preceed  [sic]  the  final  days  of  mili- 
tancy ;  for  example,  alternative  platform  committee  hearings ;  challenges  inside 
the  Convention  as  well  as  outside ;  continuous  "lobbying"  with  every  delegate ; 
outdoor  rallies ;  daily  press  conferences  of  our  own  making ;  and  actions  which 
project  a  series  of  concrete  demands  and  grievances.  A  people's  platform  hearing 
might  be  highlighted  by  Garrison  testifying  on  the  Kennedy  assassination.  Satre 
[sic]  on  US  war  crimes  in  Vietnam  and  Carmaichael  [sic]  on  the  causes  of  riots. 
For  the  mass  media,  our  hearings  should  be  able  to  compete  with  the  Democratic 
Convention  platform  hearings. 

Daily  demonstrations  should  be  organized  so  they  do  not  become  a  massive 
blending  of  movement  forces  competing  for  TV  coverage.  Machinery  is  needed 
that  permits  demonstrations  to  clarify  demands,  not  confuse  the  public.  Perhaps 
each  day  of  the  Convention  could  be  matched  with  each  of  the  major  demands 
of  the  anti-war  and  black  movements.  A  schedule  of  demonstrations  could  be 
projected :  one  day  for  education ;  one  for  poverty ;  one  for  the  draft ;  etc.  Each 
day  would  be  utilized  to  dramatize  a  single  demand.  Each  day,  actions  all  across 
Chicago  would  share  a  common  issue  focus. 

For  example,  on  August  26,  a  coalition  of  poverty  rights  organizations  might 
surround  the  Conrad  Hilton  Hotel  to  wake  the  delegates  with  the  demand  for 
$20  billion  to  end  poverty.  Throughout  the  day,  press  conferences,  disruptions 
and  pickets  would  dramatize  this  demand.  In  the  evening,  poor  whites,  Spanish 
and  black  Chicagoans  could  march  on  the  troops  protecting  the  Convention  to 
invite  the  delegates  to  spend  the  night  with  them  in  the  ghetto  instead  of  the 
Conrad  Hilton  and  Palmer  House.  While  the  world  looks  on,  the  invitation  is 
greeted  with  police  clubs,  brutality  and  arrests  since  the  President's  injunction 
against  all  demonstrations  at  the  Convention  has  just  been  violated.  The  follow- 
ing day,  August  27,  actions  might  focus  on  the  draft,  organized  by  a  radical 
student  coalition.  The  actions  would  be  slightly  more  militant  than  the  preceed- 
ing  [sic]  day  with  young  people  pinning  draft  cards  on  soldier's  bayonets  or 
burning  them  on  Mayor  Daley's  lawn  which  is  in  the  community  beside  the  In- 
ternational Ampetheatre  [sic]. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2559 

A  day  by  day  focus  on  national  grievances  not  only  can  clarify  movement 
demands  for  the  general  public  but  allow  for  diversity  in  forms  of  protest, 
militancy  and  rhetoric.  Such  diversity  is  possible,  indeed  desirable,  if  there  is 
agreement  on  the  general  strategic  framework :  to  allow  people  who  presently 
represent  forces  within  the  Democratic  Party  to  clarify  for  themselves  the 
limits  of  the  present  two  party  system ;  and  to  offer  an  alternative  perspective 
and  program  to  those  millions  who  agree  that  a  Johnson-Nixon  contest  is  no 
contest  at  all.  The  objective  of  the  movement  should  be  to  compete  with  the  Dem- 
ocratic Party  for  people's  allegiance,  by  undermining  its  ideological  and  organi- 
zational base  during  this  crisis  period. 

The  Tasks 

In  addition  to  creating  immediate  discussions  among  movement  organizations 
and  activists  across  the  country  about  the  Convention  confrontation,  machinery 
must  be  built  now  to  prepare  for  the  spring,  summer  and  August  activities.  For 
the  February  24  National  Mobilization  conference  in  Chicago,  drafts  of  alterna- 
tive demands  should  be  prepared.  A  pamphlet  on  "What  Is  the  Democratic 
Party"  which  implies  clear  tarkets  [sic]  for  the  spring  actions  should  be  written 
and  distributed.  A  black  and  white  staff  should  be  organized  in  Chicago.  State 
by  state,  groups  should  form  to  research  local  Democratic  Party  corruption  and 
develop  delegate  lists  which  can  be  forwarded  to  the  National  Mobilization 
oflSce  in  Chicago.  Regional  coordinating  committees  that  launch  summer  organiz- 
ing projects  and  assume  organizational  responsibility  for  different  days  of  dem- 
onstrations should  be  created.  A  lawyers  conference  must  be  schedules  [sic]  to 
build  the  legal  defense  and  support.  Preparations  for  medical  stations  attended 
by  doctors  should  begin.  Housing  for  50,000  people  must  be  found  in  Chicago. 
Fifteen  large  meeting  halls  are  also  needed.  Educational  and  interpretative  ma- 
terials should  be  written.  Research  and  organization  for  an  alternative  platform 
committee  hearing  must  be  started.  A  national  press  service  should  be  estab- 
lished. A  speakers  program  on  the  Democratic  Party  should  be  launched.  And 
finally,  funds  are  needed  to  supiwrt  this  program  and  the  countless,  creative  activ- 
ities that  will  develop  as  we  approach  the  time  when  the  President  finds  it 
necessary  to  employ  troops  from  Vietnam  or  the  ghetto  to  secuire  [sic]  his  nom- 
ination and  the  breakdown  of  representative  and  meaningful  government  in 
American  [sic]  becomes  an  historic  admission  to  all. 


SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DE3I0CRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Part  2 


TUESDAY,  DECEMBER  3,  1968 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

subc0]mmittee  of  the 
Committee  ox  Un-American  AcnvnrES, 

Washington^  D.G. 

PUBLIC   HEARINGS 

A  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  met, 
pursuant  to  recess,  at  10 :10  a.m.,  in  Eoom  311,  Cannon  House  Office 
Building,  Washington,  D.C.,  Hon.  Richard  H.  Ichord  (chairman  of 
the  subcommittee)  presiding. 

(Subconmiittee  members:  Representatives  Richard  H.  Ichord,  of 
Missouri,  chairman;  John  M.  Ashbrook,  of  Ohio;  and  Albert  W. 
Watson,  of  South  Carolina.) 

Subconmiittee  members  present :  Representatives  Ichord,  Ashbrook, 
and  Watson. 

Staff  members  present:  Francis  J.  McNamara,  director;  Frank  Con- 
ley,  special  counsel;  Chester  D.  Smith,  general  counsel;  Alfred  M. 
Nittle,  counsel;  and  Herbert  Romerstem,  investigator. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  connnittee  will  come  to  order. 

The  photographers  will  please  retire. 

At  the  close  of  the  hearings  yesterday,  the  witness,  Mr.  Hayden,  was 
continuing  his  testimony. 

]SIr.  di  Suvero,  Mr.  Weinglass  is  not  with  you  today  ? 

Mr.  DI  Su\'ERo.  He  is  not  going  to  be  here  today. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  counsel  will  resume  the  interrogation  of  the  witness. 
The  witness,  of  course,  will  again  be  reminded  that  he  is  under  oath. 

TESTIMONY  OF  THOMAS  EMMETT  HAYDEN,  ACCOMPANIED  BY 
COUNSEL,  HENRY  M.  DI  STJVERO— Resumed 

Mr.  CoNLET.  At  this  time,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  would  like  to  request 
the  following  documents  to  be  entered  into  the  record.  xVs  Exhibit  1, 
the  brochure,  '"MO^^MEXT  CAMPAIGN  1968 :  AN  ELECTION 
YEAR  OFFENSIVE."  This  was  the  subject  of  some  testimony 
yesterday. 

As  Exhibit  2,  the  document  entitled 

Mr.  Ichord.  Let  the  brochure,  read  at  length,  in  part  by  you  and  by 
Mr.  Hayden,  written  by  Mr.  Hayden,  be  inserted.  There  being  no  ob- 
jection from  the  members  of  the'^committee,  it  will  be  incorporated  in 
the  record. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1."  See  pages  2562-2583.) 

2561 


2562  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 
MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  1968>     AN  ELECTION  YEAR  OFFENSIVE 


Rennie  DaVis 


Tom  Hayden 


This  paper  proposes  :\n  election  year 
campaiga  against  r  political  systein 
that  has  bxouglit  the  United  States  into 
a  crisis  of  war,    racism,   and  social 
disintegration.     We  outline  a  possible    .. 
strategy  for  ihi  ■  campaign.     For  pur-    "' 
poses  of  di.Ecurrion,   we  have  made' 

,  our  proposals  concrete.  But  we  will  -^ 
fail  it  you  consider  them  final.  The  "  . 
.suggestions  are  merely  our  own,  in-  '  ■ 
tended  only,  to  provoke  discussion.     ,       --^ 

\  The  decisions  and  planning  for  ah  elec-  < 
tiotk  yeajT  program  must'be  made  by  the  t, 

<  tlifferent  brjganizations  whose  yftal  in-- 

i  te^estA  are  at  stake. ^ 


.,  Not  fof- Publication 
SlaVcb,'  196^'.,   '^ 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2563 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

rntrocuctlon 

Election  year  1968  will  be  a  fateful  one  for  American  democrscy.     Millions  of  Americans 
want  an  end  to  the  ViBtnam  war,  liberation  from  racism,  and  hew  steps  toward  a  more  humane 
society.     But  the  last  several  years  of  war,  racism  and  social  decay  have  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  whether  the  U.S.  government  has  the  capacity  to  find  meaningful  solutions  to  prob- 
lems facing  people.     The  crisis,  on  the  surface,  is  the  credibility  gap  between  words  and 
daeds:     between  the  talk  of  "peace"  and  "equality"  and  the  reality  of  burning  villages  and 
rnd-bltten  babies.     But  the  deeper  crisis  is  the  failure  of  deoiocratic  and  representative 
government  to  work./  The  Democratic  Party  is  not  "the  party  of  the  people. "     It  is  an  inatTBH 
■ent  for  the  use  ot  corporation  executives  and  their  lawyers,  the  military  brass,  sisgrega-    'j, 
'.tlonists,  machine  politicians,  and  the  old  narrow-minded  preservers,  of  an  "American  Way  ot/-^^ 

;^fe."|  The  1968  elections  will  represent  a  sad  culmination  of  the  failure  of  our  political':} 
- , , '     — ^  "'        ^     '     ■     "  .     '"■?■'*■ 

Inc'.ltutioia.     People  are  being  asked  to  spend  their  taxes  and  blood  supporting  a  BovcriaiBitft  "^ 

'yln.vhich.  It  becomes  clearer  day  by  day,  tbegr  have  little  voice.     The  supreme  Insult, «ill'%*^j 

.t;tie  "choice"  between  two  candidates  supporting  identical  policies  whicli  are  destroying  our.    '  \- 

vcountry's  potential  for  .decpnc;'.    The  fraudulence  of  this  choice  must.be  exposed  and  opposed  ^ 

^tty  e  norement  of -people  deb^nainedf-to  see  their  needs  attended  and  their  voices  heard;     V  )i^» 

•^     'it-,   .;  ,  .\  ,  -  ^'- ^      : .:   ._•:      -^? -r -»■■■'>•::  iij^. 

...     ,.^^^  ',/■  .'    .-.   •-■  •    ■'■■■■  "^'■■■-       ii^f^: 

;■■  'We  are  proposing  a  Movement  Campaign— an  election  year  program  of  organlzlog  and  pref"    -^  - 

^.;- •  ■  .  .  .-..- 

-•  test  against  the  failure  of  the  government,  particularly  the  failure  of  the  governing  Deno-   * 
-  cratie  Faritjr*  We  see'the  creation  of  a  loose  national  coalition  to  carry  out  a  program  In  . 
otagos:  ,■ 

V— a  spring  In  which  various  local  protest  movements  consolidate  regionally  to  become  a 
political  force  confronting  and  attacking  the  politics  of  both  parties, 

• — a  sunner  of  stepped-up  resistance,  community  organiaaiion  and  independent  electoral 
politics  in  which  local  groups  expand  their  visibility  and  base  of  support, 

•^  — a  series  of  massive  demonstrations  at  the  Democratic  Convention  to  dramatize  the 
nocial  noeds  which  are  unmet  and  the  large  numbers  of  people  uiu*epresented  by  the  Party  and 
Ad.ninlstratlon, 


2564  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

J  2 

•t-a  campaign  of  exposure  and  opposition  through  the  November  elections  which  offers       , 

concrete  independent  political  activity  and  organization  as  an  alternative  to  Johnson-Nixon 
electioneering. 

The  general  purpose  of  this  program  is  to  provide  opportunities  for  eocpression  to  the  / 
people  who  feel  th^  have  no  choice  and  no  voice  in  1968.     The  protest  should  focus  on  the 


r 


L' 


failure  of  the  government  to  deal  vrith  the  racial  and  Vietnam  crises,  and  the  nockery  of  a    T 
democratic  process  which  the  Democratic  Convention  represents.  J ^ 


AjCampaign  Against  Undemocratic  Power 

A  movement  election  year  campaign  should  reflect  the  growing  understanding  tbat  both     ^ 

racisB  and  US  policies  in  Vietnam  flow  from  the  sane  corrupt  power  structure  at  hone.     The  a 

j[  conUnuation  of  these  policies  makes  an  even  greater  mockery  of  detnocracy  In  the  0S«  .  The  >  4 

■^govemment  becomes  more  repressive.     Policy  already  is  dominated  by  a  "national  iseeurllgr  '  "^ 

-vconplex"  whose  decisions  are  subject  to  only  the  most  feeble  deoiocratic  review.:'    The  war    y-- ''. 

.^-atmosphere  permits  their  domination  to  become  enlarged;  it  Also  requires  an  Increaalng .dl8« : ' 
i■^  ■  ^. 

...tortion  of  democratic  processes.     Deliberate  lying  about  events  in  Vietnam,  Oscal4tion'ttf , '^^r* 

■the  droft,  intimidation  and  repression  of  dissent  are  only  the  clearest  trends  flowing  fron 

^:this  tightening  control.     A  declaration  of  war,  now  a  real  poBslbllity,  would  give  qualita-  ; 

r'  .  ■    ,  .  .  ,     -    .     .  ..>;.•- 

'   tivaly  greater  powers  to  these  decisionHoakers. 

>    This  consolldatlpn  of  undemocratic  power  is  accompanied  by  the  abandoning  of  any  at- 
tempt to  provide  political  and  economic  answers  to  social  problems.     Riot  control  is  the 
main  domestic  priority  of  the  government.     Ghetto  poverty,  air  and  water  pollution,  glutted 
cities  and  highviays,  inadequate  health  programs,  all  are  inevitable  in  a  commercial  system 
using  military  means  to  keep  an  unjust  peace.     Private  interests  nin  rampant— even  in 
Johnson's  cabinet — ^vjhlle  social  needs  are  left  unattended. 

A  Campaign  for  Self -Determination 

'.'e  should  base  our  campaign  on  the  right  of  people  to  knov  the  truth,  to  control  their 

oun  government,   to  use  politics  to  solve  their  problems.     We  should  demand  self-deterraina- 
> 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2565 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

3 

tion  in  Vietnam,  the  ghettos,  and  in  the  boring,  insecure  life  of  the  ordinary  whiite  citizen 

vjho  pays  taxes  and  blood  to  a  political  system  that  shuts  him  out  of     meaningful  partici- 
pation. Our  campaign  is  against  the  system  of  repressive  authority  which  gives  rise  to  the 
crises  of  racism  and  war  in  the  first  place. 

A  Campaign  to  Reach  Average  Democrats 

These  two  political  patterns — repression  and  neglect — open  the  opportunity  to  organize 
and  reach  new  people  whose  dissatisfaction  is  rising.  /  V'e  can  hasten  the  death  of  the  tradi- 
tional Democratic  coalition  by  working  among  the  constituencies  with  past  loyalties  to  the 
Party:  black  people,  Mexicans,  Puerto  Ricans,  the  young,  suburban  liberals,  trade  unionists, 
the  students  and  intellectuals. J  As  Johnson  abandons  welfare  and  "great  society"  programs. 


,  _T«e  should.be  prepared  to  organize  among  people  who  increasingly  feel  the  bite  of  the  war 

lr<''  r^ — 

•yipto  domestic  priorities.  I  This  will  mean  hard  work  among  people  with  deep  consarvative  ten-' 

■':  '"'■'  ^*—  .  ■  '"f  jL 

«\dencles,  especially  in  lower-middle  and  working  class  sections,  but  we  are  convinced  that  '•;■■.; 

■:Jj  •■  •^.  ^       -     ■  ■  -"V 

'•:  -real  opportunities  exist  because  of  taxes,  inflation,  the  draft  and  the  pervasive  sense  of-. 

^:-  '    -^  '  --i   .     ■  :'^' '■  ■'■    'J 

y.confiislon  about  the  state  of  society.!   Our  hope  is  that  1968  ■vri.ll  find  many"  people  develop*v;-< 
>-•  ■■ '  I  "'-"•» 

t,Aing  a  critical  and  independent  political  sense,   expressed  throu^  a  variety  of  forms.  '     ,:-'AT 
t.ij^-'-  '  ■  .  .  ■'■.*'.■ 

'^:^'-  .  ■  .:      .  :.:^ 

.  "A  Campaign  Against  Repression   -  ;>"'■■  ..:'''*'/'' 

I  V.'e  Most  recognize  that  thousands  of  people,  especially  black  ndlitants  and  draft  ro^ 

sisters,  will  be  struggling  for  survival  against  an  increasingly  repressive  government     ' 

machinery. I  While  our' campaign  should  seek  to  be  far  broader  than  these  militant  movements. 


^ 


we  must  work  in  solidarity  and  coordination  with  those  facing  police  violence,  intimidation 
■  aftcf  .^alU'"' **%  must  help  give  political  expression  to  their  demands:     the  right  of  individu- 
als to  refuse  to  fi^t  in  unjust  wars,  the  right  of  black  people  to  control  their  own^,com- 
pwnttles,   the  right  of  rebellion  against  oppression.     Our  campaign  should  build  the  ttidest 
possible  understanding  and  support  for  these  demands.     We  are  convinced  this  is  the  most 


effective  deterrent  to,  the  repression  which  incvitabljr./is  growing.  |  The  tendency  to  Inten- 
sify  militancy  without  organizing  wide  political  support  is  self-defeating.  But  so  is  the 
tendency  to  draw  away  from  militancy  into  milder  and  more  conventional  forms  of  protest.! 


2566  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 


(The  pi-oblea  is  to  build  the  bx'oadest  coalition  uhich  can  give  political  support  and  interpre- 
tation to  the  militancy.  )  As  the  government  rcakes  it  clear  that  its  only  response  to  revolu- 
tion abroad  and  resistance  at  home  is  violence  and  suppression,   the  moveiient  must  either 
reach  out  for  new  support  or  be  eroded  away. 

On  Disruption  in  Chicago 

The  campaign  should  not  plan  violence  and  disruption  against  the  Democratic  National 
Convention.     It  should  be  non-violent  and  legal.     The  right  to  rebellion  is  hardly  exercised 
in  an  eCfective  vjay  by  assembling  300,000  people  to  charge  into  30,000  paratroopers.     In  • 
fact,  apy  plan  of  deliberate  disruption  Td.ll  drive  away  people  who  are  worried  about  arreats' 
or  violence,  and  thus  sharply  dindnish  the  size  and  political  effect  of  the  mobiUzation.     ■"! 
Idttla  would  be  ser^-ed,   except  perhaps  the  political  hopes  of  Johnson,  Nixon  and  Wallace,  by- 
a  Chicago  action  that  would  be  seen  (as  H.tx  I.erner  sees  it  in  his  fantasy  alrea<fy)  a6^a        .'-^ 
gathering  of  "every  crackpot  g*X3up,  jirotest  group,  every  disruptive,  violent  force  in  Aaar^-r 
can  society  that  thinks  it  lias  the  pipeline  to  absolute  truth."    \-!e  must  demonstrate  the  '  .v' 
opposite,  that  the  government  is  the  real  source  of  crackpot  thinking  and  violence.    We  hava^ 
no  ill«j8ions  about  the  distortions  which  are  inevitable  frara  Time  magazine  and  the'  rest  of-  .-; 
the  mass  media.     Hjwever,  we  believe  the  country  is  bo  divided  that  even  within  the  mass  me- 
dia there  are  possibilitiea  for  reporting  based  on  a  degree  of  respect  and  objectivity. f  V/e  -, 
must  make  an  absolutely  clear  commitment  to  nonviolent  tactics,  develop  a  simple  and  clear 
political  message  that  large  nuirbers  of  Auericans  can  understand,  carry  out  effective  local 
organizirg  which  can  interpret  the  national  program  and,  finally,  mobilize  an  assembly  of 


'inge.j 


people  too  large  to  be  considered  the  lunatic  fringe.!    The  planning  for  this  program  should 
begin  now,  while  there  is  enough  time  to  develop  a  sophisticated  nationwide  staff  with  ex- 
perience in  both  local  organizing  and  demonstrations.     This  staff  v.'ould  be  not  only  the  nu- 
cleus of  local  activities,  but  the  key  to  carrying  out  an  orderly,  hi^ily-coordinated  series 
of  actions  at  the  convention.     We  believe  the  demonstrations  can  be  orderly  and  directed. 
Certainly,  there  will  be  police  crackdowns  and  various  incidents  of  violence,  but  they  need 
not  change  the  overall  character  of  the  convention  protest. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2567 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 

5 

•  Iicnedirte  impact  of  th  '  CaiT-vxTJ^'ii 

.    On  the  V/ar;     Au.jji'o^diiitu  effect  or  .■ucK  a  cp.ypulfjP  ^cnlo"  tn  to.  irjoi-eaop  the  preSEure 
on  tb(3  US  govt\:iOT,3nt  to  end  the  wai   in  Vietnam.     DK-^vei-nmerrt  vdll  be  forced  from  Its 
Vietnam  cominitment  when  the  costs  of  that  commitmeiit  become,  too  greit,  when  the  cotiimitmeat 
becomes  untenable.     Tt.c  costs  are  many:     billions  of  dollars,   inflatr'on  and  rising  taxes, 
thousands  of  casualties,   a  vjorsening  US  image  abroad,   shortage  of  resou;xes  to  deal  vjith 
other  crises,  and  disco  iteni'.  and  disilliisionneut  a'v  hone,     \le  can  increase  pressure  against 
the  main  po^jers  nenied  to  p'oseca^d  ohe  war;     the  power j  to  mobilize  an  army,   to  tax,  and  to    ' 
rer.iain  in  political  offico.j  V/c  r.ust  continuaJJly  sl-iow  that  the  an'^.i-war  movement  is  increas- 
ing in  militancy  and  n'.Lrbers.     VJe  can  shovi  the  establishmait  that  deeper  social  conflict  at 
,  hoir.Q  will  result  from  the  Vietnani  crisis.    Vie  can  accelerate  the  breakdovin  of  confidence  In 
''  thf  government  and  militrry  by  stressing  that  the  decisions  which  led  to  ths  Vietnam  war      ... 
'•:'\vete  rigged  in  th?  same  way  and  by  the  same  people  vlio  are  rigging  the  convention  and  eleo--';- 
*.-"-tiOH3  in  r'.?68.i  The  probable  use  of  troops  to  protect  Ms  ovn  nomination  willftu^ar  expz^d.^ 
V     t-->  outiiorltarlen  character  of  Johnson's  govsmnient.  ;  ...>■>'!  ^  .,■ 

W  -'    ■■■  -■  :   ■-  '    ■•',: 

*'•-■"       On  Racism;     A  second  intnedi^te  erfeot  should  be  on  the  racial  conflict.-,  Va  can  expect' 


...  ,liiaJor  voi-er  revulsion  in  the  black  coontunities  vdth  the  traditional  Democratic  machines.       .;'•' 

)«,  "         .-i.  '  '  '  -^ 

v-Cuts  In-anti-poverty,  education  and  welfare  funds,  in  addition  to  the  ruthless  police  treat- 

>. nent  of ■  rebelllcr.s,  should  guarantee  that  this  revulsion  wilJ.  bo, at  ?.  new  hi^  during  the 


STUsnar  and  fall,  lit  is  time  for  whites  to  stop  being  shocked  spectators  or  vicarious  par- 
t-Tlpr.nts  in  blsclc  raJjeDlicas  and  begin  to  find  activities  which  can  be  of  direct  value  to 
the  black  power  rjiove-pcrt.     One  obvious  need  in  an  election  ye?.r  is  for  white."  to  attack 
politically  city  halls  and  the  feder?!  goverrjient  for  oppressive  policies.     Whether  this  is 
done  throu3^  angry  telegrams,   sit-ins,  or  forTpatlonr  of  coKiiittees  to  supply  financial,  legal 
and  medical  aid  to  f^hotto  residents,,  the  effect  is  to  create  divisicne  between  "hawks"  and 
"doves"  in  the  establishment  J  As  in  the  case  of  Vietnam,   the  existence  of  tiiese  divisions  ■•■• 
gives  certain  legitimacy  to  protest,   and  slows  or  dilutes  repressive  te.odenclta.     The  pre- 
sence of  hwdredg  of  thousrnds  of  Wiiltes  filling  the  streets  of  Chicago  is  a  way  to  demon- 
strate the  government's  inability  to  completely  unite  the  majority  and  the  futility  of  its 


2568  DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

attempt  to  be  policemen  oveiywhere.     l/fhatever  the  form  of  black  participation  in  tha_chal- 
lenge    -and  that  viill  b©  decided  by  black  organizations — it  will  constitute  a  significant  and 
dramatic       r-.-nent  coming  at  the  end  of  the  summer  and  on  the  fifth  anniversary  of  the  1963 
March  on  V/ashing^ton  for  Jobs  and  Justice. 

On  International  Polations;  The  challenge  also  can  be  Important  in  increasing  interna-  <. 
tional- pressure  on  the  United  States.  The  global  operations  of  the  US  partially  depend  on 
confidence,  good  vdll  and  cooperation  from  many  governments.  Alreacfy,  most  governments  even 
in  the  West  oppose  the  Vietnam  war,  and  many  peoples  are  worried  about  racio::i,  tha  Kenrody  ■  ■ 
assassination  and  the  imperial  thrust  of  the  US  into  their  own  econosdes.  We  anist  intorna-' 
tionallze  our  battle,  encouraging  further  opposition  to  US  policies  in  these  countries.  The 
'    protest  of  the  1968  elections  will  sound  a  worldwide  alarm  and  increase  opposition  to  the    '' 

American  power  structure.     (The  1968  campaign  will  be  televised  by  satellite  in  Eui\,pe. ) 
I  Cur  gpaH  should  be  to  brand  the  US  an  orxt^itw  power  in  the  international  coimaocity  as  Iciig  es^ 
it  c-jritittico  its  racist  and  imperialist  pollsies.J  „  '    . 

:.  \  '.,-,.       -.-i 

What  Kind  of  Coalition?  "'  „:      ■ 

We  must  buiU  a  real  coalition,  one  involving  connsctions  bet'.;ecr.  the  i "'^•irgj,..'.  Tcrskj  ''.' 
jf  acn>sa  the  countty.     This  roqttlres  respect  for  different  positions  and  outloolcs.     Political*- 
'   disagz'aements  and  dlscussiona  should  be  carried  onintensely,  but  within  an  understanding    '  ' .' 
that  the  caallticn  generally  represents  the  forces  lAlch,  however  divided  at  the  nomsnt, 
must  be  d^relopsd  inunity  to  achiere  radical  social  change.     People  should  be  ablo  to  main- 
tain their  own  viev;s  without  advancing  them  in  a  sectarian  way  thi.t  forces  others  to  drop 
out.     The  goal  is  to  v'J.te  and  radicalise  a  movenent,  not  to  pirge  it  of  its  "rlcht"  or 
"left"  wings. 

The  need  for  a  coordinated  effort  does  not  imply  that  the  groupe  involved  conform  to  a 

spec^^fic  or  narrow  program.     Oixc  political  point  is  that  many  diverse  groupe  are  sufferl:;g 
from  tho  government's  policies.     Clack  people,  school  teachers,   social  workers,  hippleaj 
draf w  resirtcrs,  soldiers  and  veterans,  and  ordinary  tax-paying  people  with  gripes  should 
have  thn  opp0rtv.rJ.t7  to  express  their  particular  concerns  in  thoir  own  ways.     The  overall 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2569 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

7 
.  or;-auir,aLion  uljJT  not   spoa';  Tor  everyone  Kccept  in  i-liu  moot  j3(;iieni  GcnL:e;    it:;  basic  task  is 
>  '' 
not  to  "rcprooi  nt.  cvoiyone,   but  to  structure  opportuniticr;   i'or  communication  ond  coordination. 

I'e  are  finding  tliat  neither  the  methods  of   "liiorarcliy"    (in  which  committeca  of   leaders  meet 
continually  but  v.rith  no  real  relation  to  what  vjill  actually  happen  at  the  demonstration), 
nor  the  nxore  ^spontaneous  method  of  "doing  your  ovm  thing"  are  satisfactory  organizational 
concepts.     \!e  seek  a  new  organizational  form  based  on  both  coordination  and  spontaneous  ac- 
tion,  effective  leadership  and  active  participation.  J  The  problem  is  to  create  a  staff  and 
structure  rooted  in  local  areas,   skiDied  in  demonstrations  and  community  organizing,   avjare 
of  the  nature  of  the  party  systen     conscious  of  the  layout  of  Chicago,   experienced  in  viork- 
ing  together,  and  able  to  have  the  confidence  of  the  people  coming  for  one  or  tvro  days  of 
demonstrations  at  the  convention.  |  Such  a  staff  would  sexTre  a  genuine  coalition  structure, 
built  in  stages,  allowing  for  full  and  equal  participation  by  groups  entering  at  different 
tines,  and  providing  a  connection  between  the  wide  variety  of  movements  involved  in  the  pro- 
test. 

This  kind  of  broad  coalition  should  include  insurgent  Democrats  while,  of  course,  mak- 
ing it  clear  that  our  strategy  lis  to  build  political  organizations  of  our  own  rather  than  to 
"reform"  the  Democratic  Party/.     Insurgencies  within  the  Danocratic  Party  should  be  seen  as 
related  to  tha  overall  movement  campaign,  however.     For  instance,   challenges  to  the  creden- 
tials of  state  party  machines — especially  when  made  by  black  organizations  or  anti-war 
groups — help  to  expo'^e  the  top-down  way  in  which  decisions  are  made  in  the  Party.     Criticism 
of  Party  policy  or  structure  before  the  Platform  Committee  can  be  equally  valuable  as  a 
mians  of  e;:posurs.     The  "dump  Johnson,"  pre-McCai-tiy  or  pre-Kennedy  Democrats  also  are  im- 
portant objectively  because  of  the  issues  they  sharpen.     V/e  should  keep  our  organizational 
ranks  open  so  sorro  of  these  dissidents  can  join  vath  us  in  the  streets  or  in  independent  or- 
ganizations when  their  hojies  are  blocked  at  the  convention. 

At  the  same  tine,   wo  must  be  arguing  that  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  linits  of  the 
electoral  system  itself  .ire  wl^at  wo  oppose.     TUe  focus  of  our  hopes  is   not  a  McCarthy   (or 
K'.-nrieay)   candidnr.y.     Tlicsc  condidaoos  are  not  alternatives  to  the  powei-  structure,   they  are 
only  alternatives  within  it.     V/c  bcXicvc  Uml  the  p^rtj   system  cannot  be  reformed,   as 


21-706  O— 69— pt.  2- 


2570  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8   DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

K'-Mii<"-.y   •'•:  ■   y>;C;i?7thy   -^o,   boViSuHP    it    contains. intrannigr-nt   oK.~pnts    comnittod   to  tnaintni"' 
t-.ia    slntun    quo    at  ,nn    c<ysts.      A   vote    is   nt   best    an    organizing   tool;    it    i>ecurc8   nothing   hy 
^''""It.      What   we   want   to   create    is   a  greater    consciouBnens   that   organizations   of   protest, 
ro:' '-s'^.^ucc ,    and   in<lepeDdeat   politics,     underthe    control   of   the   actual   people   with  grlevan- 
rcs.    ore   more    important    than    casting  a   vote   or<«orking   for   the   "better"    of  two   conventional 
canili  ■    ■  '". 

l,oc.-.^    '-/tnl-ing  -'ersua  National  DcmonstratlonB 

Within   tbc   enti-war  and  black  liberation  movements,   there  have  been  two  broad  organiz- 
er^ cnifhiccs.     One   aims  at  dramatizing  massive   popular  dissent  against  established  policii^ 
by  "□oblli::irig"pcople   for  a  single  day  of  protest  and  demonetration.     The   other   seeks  to 
build  ''permanent"  bases  of  independent  power  by  organising  locally  around  people's  felt 
gr      .'3'-ccs.     Which  organizing  approach  ia  "crrrect"  has  been  an  issue  of  considerable  di':- 
p-.I'^^  within  the  movement. 

?3r  ttis  problem,  we  propose  a  solution  that  will  differ  from  previous  national  ■r'-'.'- 
zations  s^ainst  the  war.  This  eacpaign  is  aimed  at  deepening  the  roots  of  local  organizs- 
ti3::3.  We  are  r:ot  envisioning  a  one-shot,  two-day  affair  in  which  thousands  of  dollars  are 
spent  c'^'Z  srerry  evaporated  with  little  effect  on  the  local  level.  For  previous  mobiliri- 
tions,  IccaT  oomittees  spent  ouch  of  their  energy  in  advartiaing  the  awnt  and  arranging 
the  b'-.ces.  T!:e  events  were  often  without  any  relation  to  local  activities,  the  dates  were 
eriitrsr.'ly  chosen,   and  so  on. 

\le  propose  an  Organizational  experiment  thay  nay  fail,  but  one  that  we  believs  should 
be   c' Uirpted.  I  A  national   coalition  should  be  organized  which  is  dominated  by  people  with  n 
-ccal  oT^a-rz^ii^  perspective,   people  responsible  to   local   constituencies.      Any  national  dc- 
monstrr  •,icn  in    Ct' '"ago  "'>•>••  lo  "■".r.eout  of  a  program  that  has  atrensed   local  organizing  dur. 
in,"^   '.'.2   evrirg  and  summer   and  can  support   coouunity  base-building  in  the   fall. 


Jz  rcc^irnize    that    in   some   parts   of   the  country  there   vill  be   tension  between   local   or- 
(^nrr    7s   end   tbin    campaign.      But, in   general,    this   program   could  be   of  great   value    in 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2571 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

9 

donloping  lasting  orgahizatlons  on  the  local  level.     We  view  the  election  year  as  opening 

\it>  an  imncnso  diance  for  expansion  of  the  numbers  of  people  interested  in  a  new  political 
novenent.     Also,  opportunities  to  build  regional  coalitions  will  increase  aa  a  variety  of 
groups  see  a  mutual  interest  in  attacking  a  common  enenQr:     the  entrenched  and  repressive 
political  establishment.     In  numerous  ways,  there  will  exist  the  opportunity  for  organizers 
to  come  together  in  a  region  for  a  common  purpose:     the  Peace  and  Freedom  Party  in  Califor- 
nia is  one  exa<:!pQ.e  of  what  vte  mean;  the  union  of  white  organisers  in  Chicago  is  another. 

In  addition  to  the  comnon  enei^y,  this  movement  campaign  creates  another  useful  (dynamic: 

-  a  6£use  of  Ui'genqy  because  of  the  timetable.     Of  course,  timetables,   especially  those  vhich 

,  pro  set  by  the  TJ^  government,  can  force  a  local  movement  to  stress  superficial  mst-bods  to 

,  ^  quick  results  rather,  than  other  organizing  methods  which  might  in  the  long  ruq  yield 

•'Btiwngor ,  grass-roots  activity.     But  in  this  case,  the  timetable  forces  people  to  both  con-,  - 
Sfe,  .     ■  '  ^ 

<8olldate  and  cxptind, p^oritics  which  are  of  immediate  importance  to  most  Insurgent  greapd.-' 

racing  posclble  repression^  on  tb9  one  hand  and  tremendous  organizing  opportnnltie»  among  -- 

'  newly-<lls«ontented  groups  on  the  other,  local  organizing  has  to  accelerate  evexT^d^ere  or  bs'- 

'lost.  *;■'•':;-...  "o  .,      .  ['"     ,,'/;' \   ■    '    ■_  _       ■..";•■;•■''.'); 

V  ,  I^  ^1^9  caRpad^  coalition,  particularly  at  the  regional  level,  is  dominated  by  people 

f    -       '  :        s.  ■  ..:,■•.-•.■      ;  ..;■,•,■.  ■  V 

With  a  commitment  to  local  organizing  vork,  then  the  resources  and  nomentum  t^at  q  national 
challenge  of  this  kind  can  generate  can  be  used  in  a  new  way.     For  example,  organizer- 
training  schools  could  be  supported  by  the  national  coalition  rather  'than  New  York  Tines 
adverti::nr.onts.     Such  schools  could  focus  not  only  on  the  mechanics  of  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention challenfre,  but  on  organizing  methods,  the  immediate  issues  of  the  draft,  or  on  the 
prcmoticn  of  permanont  organizing  projects  among  white  workers. 

*!•".-»  *  *  *  *  »  *  ■n  « 

Finally,  we  should  not  become  so  trapped  in  debates  about  the  abstract  merits  or  prob- 
l^wis  of  this  p-oject  that  we  miss  its  historical  and  dramatic  potential.     There  ia  a  grow-    , 
ing  renoe  e-zeiywhore  that  the  country  ia  cracking  up,  and  this  feeling  la  sure  to  deepen 
vri.th  the  Eunmsr  rebellions  and  the  next  escalation  in  Vietnam.     There  is  an  interest  in 
njw  ancviere,  a  distrust  of  the  established  ones.     There  is  a  sense  that  Johnson  has  brou^t 


2572  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

10 
Araerio<in  politics  :to  an  awful  and  total  bankruptcy,   reflecting  a  deep  sickness  ±i\  the 


wliole  society.  ■There  is  a  feeling  that  this  sickness  must  somehov;  be  stopped.  I  Certainly, 
we  cannot  stop  Johnsorf  or'the  government  at  the  Convention,  nor  can  we  do  it  on  any  single 
similar  occasion.  But  there  are  times,  or  turning  points,  when  dying  ideas  can  be  de- 
clared dead  and  new  ideas  announced  in  their  place.  VJe  can  accomplish  that  at  the  Conven- 
tion by  exposing  and  defying  the  nauseating  emptiness  of  our  political  leaders,  and  we  can 
use  this ■  election  year  to  create  and- advance  nary  centers  of  local  power  which  contain  the 
seels  for  a  nevi  order. 


.   V       We  propose  a  trogram  that  would  unfold  in  three  phases:    the  spring,  the  summer,  md 
;  late  August  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention.     A  second  paper  will  follow  this  one, 
dlccuBSing  possible  activities  aod  program  daring  the  fall  election. period. 


The  Spring  (April,-June) 
*f''  J,      These  spring  months  should  bring  wide  public  attention  to  a  serious  challenge  against  -  • 

the  Deracratlc  Party  in  cities  and  towns  across  the  country.    The  objectives  of  thp  spring 
'  Jnonths  wauld  be:     fl^  the  formation  of  local  coordinating  structures  composed  of  various 
v5.*ovement  organizations  in  12  to  1$  regions  of  the  country.     These  regional  committpes  woi^Ld- 
-^provide  the  poUt^-cai  direction  for  the  movement  election  year  campaign  in  local  tf^&a;^^^ 
■j  a  public  call  by  ijocal  coalition  committees  for  a  specific  summer  organizing  program  rela- 
_<  ted  to  the  Democratic  Party  challenge;   (3)  immediate  activity  which  tends  to  put  the  Demo- 
."  cratic  Party  on  the  defensive  or  publicly  embarrasses  or  exposes  Party  officialdom. 

*i 

A  nunibar  of  beginning  projects  could  be  suggested  which  move  toward  this  initial  ob- 
jective,   -for  example  t 
'  ^\^  P.OJearch  and  Exposure:     Organizers  need  hard  information  and  intelligence  on  the 
,    people-wlu)  hold  power  locally.     A  research  center,  based  on  a  campus  or  in  an  organization, 
with  no  more  than  several  people,   can  help  fill  this. need  while  gathering  intelligence  for 
the  local  moverignt  campaign.     The  undenwcratic  method  of  choosing  delegates — through  mon^ 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2573 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

11 
•and  "pull" — should  be  exposed  and  fought.     The  names  of  Democratic  Party  contributors  who 

profit,  from.  P^tagon  contracts  should  be  revealed.  I  The  political,  business  and  personal 

biographies  of  the  ten  most  powerful  people  in  each  state  mi^t  be  circulated  on  a  "most 

wanted"  list.   \For  research  suggestions,  Lee  Webb  has  written  a  useful  paper  entitled  "How 

to  Bypore  and  Sight  the  Democratic  Party  in  Your  Conmunity;"  it  is  availablis  by  writing  to"""" 

.  h07  South  Dearborn,  ^eou /31?i  Clticago.     Other  articles  and  documents  on  the  Democrats  and 

-  elactoral  pollttos  are  b«ing  prepar^ed"for  publication  in  major  jnagazinea.  ; "  "  ■*" 

Yf       Ee^Lj-,  Regional  cornmit-feeea-mtght  interest  local  lawyers  in  prepartug  iBgai"  ch"Slleng6B - 

to  the  crsde.itials  of  national  delegates.     In  all  states  that"  elect  dclef;atea  behind  the 

closed  doors  of  state  conventions,  legal  challenges  should  ^e  organized.  "  Any^irregulari-   ' ;; 

ti(9s  in  theself^stilnn  tv  Tnlrini;  in Iiiiiim  fni    '^ft1i°f^»''"e3  should  be  documented.     Hopefully,    - 

f  ^'nunerous  challenges  to  the  credentials  of  state  delegates  can  face  tho  c.pfldent■^a^H'  rnlntll^t-  ,-.. 

'  'tea  "at  the  opening  of  the  convention.     At  the  same  time  or  earlier,  we  would  hope  for  a       ''" 

■'•.'■'■■  ■,.■.■■-'■'  'i' ''' 

<:rederal  court  rult  seeking  to  enjoin  the  convention  from  assesillng  on  tha  grounds  that  itr« 

.Lawyers  who  work  on  credentials  challenges  are  also  need^J' 


•  ed  in  the  legal  defense  of  those  »dio  may  be  arrested  in  Chicago  at  the  time  of  the.conven-'> 

»  *■-  '  .        ,      .  ■  '         .  -    -  >  ■       !■•■■,:  t-.-  •'>,  -      ;.- 

fls  tlon.        .  '  *•■  .— 

.*.  ^/"-^    :   ■'-...  - 

•  TrU     National  Teaeh-In;     For  many  disgusted  Democrats,  the  ldea~  of . exposing  the.  Democratic  •  ., 
*.  ,     , '  -.-  ..--■'■_.  -      .  ',   ■'■.'-■••< 

^'  Party  and  bulldihg  local  independent  organization  will  not  be  immediately  afaparent.     A  ,'  ':,•"■'! 
*«  ■  -  ■  .  ..,■"'■."' 

,'   national -teach-in  ^n  litt;  Democratic  Party,  modeled  along  the  lines  of  the  Vietnaur  teach-ins    ^. 
u  '  ._-■•■• 

,    and  piped  into  hundredf_  of  colleges  and  organizations  could  help  create  a  popular  focus  on    '  • 

the  Democratic  Pafty.     A  national  teach-in.  might  cover:     (l)  the  historic  failure  of  the         - 
Democratic  P.^rty  and  the  New  Deal;   (2)  who  really  controls  the  Democratic  Party  and  the 
govemraentj   (3)  the  failure  of  policy  from  the  Democratic  Party;  and  (li)  the  need  to  organ- 
ize political  forces  Independent  of  the  two  major  political  parties.  .     - 

T'l     Direct  Action;     The  spring  months  should  Sds  a  broader  nevj  expression  of  opposition  to 
the  draft  because  of  Johnson's  selective  service  orders.     Coming  from  rather  convention^ 
backgrounds,  the  new  recruits  to  the  anti-draft  movement  will  tend  to  seek  a  political  ob- 
ject of  protefet.     They  may  be  joined  by  more  and  more  respectable  members  of  the  academic 


2574  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

12 
cpinrcunity,   includinc  college  administrations.     By  April  3>   the  next  national  day  pf  resis- 
tance, wi3  may  find  a  mvch  greater  outbreak  of  anti-draft  action.     After  the  counter-com- 
mencements'planned  th:.3  spriilfe -to  protest  the  war  and  the  draft  and  to  reject  the  degree 
ag  a  ticket  into  American  vsociety,   these  people  might  become  a  greater  nucleus  of  draft 
resistance- organizers.     The  government  and  Democratic  Party  night  become  the  felt  enemies 
of  this  broadened -resistance.     One  organization  on  Chicago's  Northside  recently  submitted 
draft  cards  to  the  Democratic  Party  office  ■which  they  regarded  as  the  local  representatives 
of  the  war. 


During  t}^e  .SDS  "Tsn  Days,  of  Itesistance"  (April  2lT30),-attentiou might  be  given  to  ,. 
DeraocraticParty^targfets,  .,  Picket?;  at  Party  fund-raising  affairs,  actions  at  state  Den»cra-.-,; 
tia_£Otwentions  vb-ere  delegates  are- chosen  beliind  closed  doors^  local  Democratic  Party 
teiach~iD3  ■i>n  the-  cainpuses^.ar*  examples*    In  Chicago^  ths-April .Ian  Days  mil  begimrtth 
Beveral.jcampusesjiolding  teach-ins-on  1;he  Democratic. Party -and~the- War.    On  April.. 24»-^9tii- 

>■■-•■•  •  ■     •  .  .  -      r.;, 

»-^«tertfcs- acEoas-tbe  .city  wiJJL.denoostrate  at  HI,  the -univflrsity  vhich- conducts  the. largest; 
**reoe8aTfa-pragram  -^m-cheiai.cal-iiiologLial  «arf ara  jeseard>-  iii-ibo-coontry .. .  Qo-  April  *5>  .^      • ' 
'  Ja*n»oa_la- sclieduled- to  speak  at  aJ3efi»crat±«  Party  fund  "ra±sing-.affair,- which  the- tnoT»--  j; 
-•Btont.-will.dl^rupt«,.p;i.Apiril26,^soo»  camposes  vill.^partic±pa*e  iu      stcdent-.»trite-to-" ' •  •' '^ 
-  iJnjtest^-the-var-j-^vall^by  tba-StudcntHobiliswiion.    On-Apcil  27,  2$y000j)GiTpl&,scre~expoo-'  \ 
~t«iJta,jaarciiuoT^  city-hall  4etnanciing  that  Mayor-  Dal^y^-hostto  -the-l'emocratic.Jt3on»ention».  4:i  - 
-TSupport-a-programjEor- peace..  -...•.=    " 


^:1 


*^'        frimaryl^ampai p^s :     McCarthy  ovganiaaticns  will -be  supporti-ng-^hcir  candidate _d£le- 
.^5ate&  tcr-tbe.flational-ooTiventicn.--  The  decision  whetherj  how  ani.on  what-  t.enns-to  give 
"wippDrt-io-such  campaigns -should  bo  Icft-np  to  th-a  .local  coalition  organizationsV    IbwcTar, 
"•contact -oX-^ some  kirj?,  should  be  arranged  -with  a  view  to-niard_brinipLng-£ome.  oT.  the_McCaTthy 
"  snpportero-  into  ths.  overall  campaign  againi;t  thenonven-tion  and  -elaction-xhoice -— At' the- 
sajne-tdme^  jaore--ratlical^organ.l2atlons.-with.  electoral  programs-  Tnight-tK»-i!Drmingi_.^uch- as- ' 
the -Calif^nia.  Peao«-~and  Freedom  Party.    These  independent^  .aiitr-war-and~antiwaci3t_jalec-  • 
toraj^ campaigns  ar.i_bullding^  a. consciousness-  critical^of  traditional  jxirty  .politics. -- It- 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2575 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

13 

ley  may  even  want 

use  the  coalition  machinery  to  promote  similar  parties  in  other  states. 


sboulrt  be  natTbral  for  them  vo  find  allies  in  the  overall  coalition.     They  may  even  want  to 


3^      People's  Platform  Hearing;     During  the  spring,  the  platform  coDBnlttea  of  the  Denocra- 
tlc  Party  is  expected  to  receive  testioor;/  for  its  1968  platform  in  several  cities.    Peop- 
le's p^Latform  hearings  could  be  anzuunced  i^  thjeae  cities  at.  the  same  time,>Alch  can  pub- 
licly focus  on  the  Democratic  Party's  id^tewash  of  the  double  crisis  of  the  cities  aqd 
foreign  policy.    People's  hearings  would  receive  testimony  from  returning  Vietnam  veterans, 
welfare  recipients,  lawyers  and  workers.     Hearings  would  continue  throu^  "the  summer ^  as  a 
way  of  directing  attention  in  dozens  of  communities  on  the  nation's  real  difficulties. 
The  h6fu:lng3  would  conclude  in  Chicago  when  a  final  report  from  a  panel  of  prestigioifs 
Americtos  would  indict  the  Deoocratlc  Party  and  the  government  for  their  failure  to  9eek    . 

•■■    serious  answers  to  the  nation's  crisis. 

}''  '    '  . 

v,\-i   .     Planning  Slimmer  Program:     Finally,  an  important  task  of  each  regional- campaign  commit-. 

'tee  will  be  to  develop  a  coherent,  relevant  sunner  program  that  can  help  expand  and  stren~-; 

tuen  the  existing  base  of  the  movement  in  the- local  area.    The  iro gram  for  summer  work         , 

■  -  •.  ^' 

:■>:'■  should: be  widely-circulated.  .  If  possible,  a  training  school  Cor  orientation  oi^  summor 

'^^  ■'      .  ;      ^  >  •,  vf.     '',    •      ' ', .'; 

-    volunteers -iWDuld .'tje  developed. * :/.      -   :   :  v    j         »•  .:         -,    .      :-•.],'   .>  ? ..  '  .^'^ 

^'  ■  "  f  '  *        '    '      . 

^  The  Summer  (June-August)     , 

F^r  the  reiasons  that  hundi'eda  of  thousands  will  come  to  Chicago  in  late  August  to  ex- 
press tbeir  disgust  ..and  anger  about  the  election  alternatives,  maoy  more  Americans  will 
willingly  work  in  communities  this  sunner  if  offered  concrete  things  to  do.     The  obj^tlves 
of  the  noTement  cui^ign  during  the  sunmer  period  would  include:     (l)  a  massive  orgaqizing 
drive  affecting  hundreds  of  local  areas— towns,  couotiea  and  cities — and  involving  ttpu- 
sands  pf  new  people  in  independent  movement  actiTilgr;  (2)  a  national  training  program  for 
STMmer  and  full-time  volunteers  organized  by  regions,  which  could  provide  meaningful  orl- 
entatipn  and  establish  specific  work  for  the  organizers;   (3)  local  preparations  for  ^, 
Chicago  demonstration  in  late  August,  with  organizations  planning  their  own  actions^'    ■ 
"Denucratic  Assemblies"  for  people  to  formulate  demands  and  develop  tactics  for  the 


2576  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

Convention,  the  training  of  cadres  in  den»nstration  tactics,  and  the  education  of  local 
connnunities,  particularly  Chicago,  about  the  purpose  of  the  demonatration. 

3  '^  local  Organizing:     The  nmvement  campaign  1968  should  center  around  the  work  of  local 
organisers  this  summer — several  thousand  should  be  the  objective — who  build  high  school 
draft  resistance  groups;  organize  anti-war  committees  among  teachers,  doctors,  veterans 
and  clrrgy;  speak  to  every  trade  union  in  a  city  about  the  war,  tax  and  high  prices;  reach 
women  isolated  in  the  suburbs;  support  peace  and  freedom  party  campaigns  or  move  intq  white 
working  class  communities  in  Cincinnati,  Richmond  or  Lexington  to  live  and  stay  for  the 
long  ha'Jl.     The  national  program  should  find  support  for  those  organizers  who  see  thqir  .':; 

task  to  be  slow,   patient  political  work  in  one  section  of  one  community,  reqidring  several  '  f;. 
ysari  <x)  establish  an  independent  political  base,and  those  resistors  *4io  organize  a  qummsr  >  !^ 
'-  caraivan  to  travel  across  the  country,  reaching  hundreds  and  hundreds  of  young  people  on  th&,.  .- 

'  ■  "'■5! 

.;^^    issues  of  the  war  and  the  draft,  ^  Local  coordinating  committees  associated  with  the  nation- Jy 

■■-'.-  tf 
'  "  al  navpmcnt  campaign  would  define^and  organize  their  own  summer  program.  It  is  not  the  •  ■  ' 
,A  '  , ;  ..       ;    ■  .'i 

<     ir:t.ent  of  this  campaign  to  pUsh  any  single  organizational  approach,  though  it  is  expected    ,:..,: 

'-    that  cacia  region  might  develop  its  own  specific  political  emphasis..    Nationally,  several      -    ■' 

■ "  org?uil2atlonal  forms, 'such  as  training  schools,  might  be  stressed. 
".  '         ;       ,    ■  "  f* 

l^      1'ra?-'lng  Schools;     Sumner  "projects"  frequently  fail  to  achleive  their  expected  pirpcio  . 
hor-.-ise  short-term  objectives  are  not  carefully  defined  and  consminlcated  to  the  sunmer  pai- 
ticf^auts.     There  is  now  considerable  organizing  experience  in  a  variety  of  communities 
tha*  can  be  draim  upon  in  developing  and  guiding  a  summer  program.     We  believe  this  ^xperi-'.': 
ence  ^ould  be  summarized  and  analyzed  in  a  series  of  materials  that  are  circulated  ^mong  ■  /•, 
all  pirticipatinj  regional  campaign  committees  and  presented  in  a  systematic  fashion  at  the  , 
'.)'■  ■■•'.n:in3  of  the  summer  to  volunteers.     Perhaps  two  weeks  of  "training"  would  be  sufficient,- 
perhaps  more.     Some  formal  orientation  to  the  summer  work,  in  whatever,  form.  Is  essential, 
however.     Furthermore,   there  will  be  a  need  for  continuing  organisers*  workshops  to  make        v 
preparation  for  the  challenges  at  the  convention. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2577 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

"be  workshops  could  cover  a  variety  of  areas:     (l)  Information  on  demonstration  tactisfl 
from  experience  in  this  country  and  abroad;   (2)  background  on  the  Democratic  Party—who  oxma 
and  nuks  it,  hoH.doe8,.it  work,  the  mechanics  of  its  Convention,  the  failures  of  its  promiae 
and  policies;   (3)  discussion  of  our  movement,  ite  history,  its  problems,  and  Its  directlonj 
(U_considerati'on  of  various  philosophies  and  techniques  of  community  organizing.     "Tech- 
oiquea"  of  community  organizing  will  vary  of  course,  depending  on  the  political  emphasis  of 
the  regional  campaign  committee.     In  California,  organizing  for  the  Peace  and  Preedoia  Party 
would  probably  represent  the  important  training  focus.     In  Boston,  community -based  draft 
resistance  could  be  emphasized.     In  Chicago,  white  working  class  organizing  might  be  nost 
'  linportant.  . 

St'  "Qetnocratic  A38entolies"t    Organizers  working  with  people  coming  to  Chicago  In  Au^t 
^.    pl^t  qpnsider  "open  forums"  to  discuss  and  develop  demands  on  the  Convention  or  plan/spe-  ' 
*    clfio  tactics  for  Chicago.    Where  possible,  people  coming  td  OMcago  should  be  famlll^ 
:    vlth  ttie  overall  strategy  of  the  Convention  challenge  and  be  pa:%pared  to  implement  thalr 
-,   own  plans  of  action.     Broad  representational  assetA>lles  or  eoaller  constituency  meetings  in 
^'   ifiTjmn  of  coimuniiles  befoi>e  August  should  be  one  aim  of  the  summer. 


[should  (Useuss  plans  In  each  training  school  for  support  and  parallel  activity  during ,4)la:k 
^etto  rebellions.    Whites  ahoold  sit-in  at  DeoDbratie_M^rpr's. offices,  ofcg^^d  i^edleal 
and  legal  support,  pall  together  diversionary  demonstrations  outside  the  ^etto  to  dr^w  off 
police  ^ind  find  ways  to  focus  public  blame  for  iriiat  happens  on  the  powerful  white  interests. 

i  [^    Chicaeo  Demonstration  Leadership;     One  goal  of  the  sunaer  should  be  to  develop  groups 

of  peof^e  who  can  piravide  street  leadership  during  the  Chicago  action.     The  specific  iae- 

-  thgy 

tics  for  Chicago  should  be  developed  and  implemented  by  these  groups  sbould/oome  to  Chicago 

during  the  sunner  to  familiarise  themselves  with  streets  and  targets  and  the  denonstr^tion    , 

coamunication  system.     From  each  summer  organizing  program,  cadres  should  develop  who  take 

responsibility  for  specific  parts  of  the  Chicago  demonstration.     Doctors  and  laiqrcrs'  should 

also  be  organized  to  observe,  report  and  aid  at  the  time  of  the  demonstrations. 


2578  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

16 

National  Convention  Mobilization  (Au(?jst  214-28) 

The  summer  would  be  capped  by  three  days  of  sustained,  organized  protests  at  the  Deno- 
cratlc  National  Convention,   clogging  the  streets  of  Chicago  vrtth  people  demanding  peace, 
Justice  and  self-determination  for  all  people.     The  Chicago  challenge  must  convey  a  broad  ' 
but  concrete  critique  of  the  Democratic  Party  and  its  failure  to  meet  the  crisis  of  our 
cities  and  the  war.     It  must  say  to  the  world  that  Johnson  represents  the  wealth,  the  mill- 
taxy  and  the  politically  corrupt  of  America,  not  ordinary  people.     It  must  attempt  to  de- 
legitimate  the  Democratic  Party  while  building  support  for  an  Independent  people's  movement  • 
during,  the  1968  elections. 

_  We  propose  a  general  outline  of  a  demonstration  strategy  for  Chicago,  as  a  way  of  sug- 
gesting what  Is  possible  during  this  period.  The  outline  is  divided  into  four  perio48t  _  T 
(l)  prp-Convention  publicity,  education  and  legal  offensives;  This  would  include  a  chal-:  '^' 
lenge  \o  the  Oonstitutionallty  of  the  Convention,  challenges  to  several  state  delegat(lons  , 
and  a  citizen's  indictment  of  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  governraentj  (2)  an  Inltia^  Con-  ^ 
ventlop  challenge  related  to  the  crisis  of  poveirty  and  the  cities,  with  emi^iasls  on  the  ,.— 
conditions  of  black  Americans;  (3)  a  second  wave  of . detnonstrationa  and  protects  related  to  ,\ 
the  crjsis.of  the  war  and  America's  foreign  ipllcy;  (U)  a  final,' ^8aive^]jlrote8t.agaiIl8t-..' 
the  Institution  of  the  Democratic  Par^  a«^, its  fraudulent,  undetaqctatlc  Convention.'  ''  ;." 

Pre-Convention  Actlvlt/  (August  2U-2$)  t)  After  a  summer  of  gathering  testlnoiy  from 
hundreds  of  citizens'  on  direct  eocperiences  with  the  conditions  of  racism,  urban  neglept. 
Democratic  Party, corruption,  and  the  wars  in  Vietnam,  Laos  and  Thallapd,  the  "People's 
Platform  Hearings"  wguld  receive  summary  testiraoiv  in  Chicaga  as  the  Democratic  Party  was 
holilng  its  own  platform  hearings.     The  People's  Platform  Hearings  ml^t  be  hi^ilighljed  by 
teetlmony  on  the  conditions  of  Mississippi,  on  America's  welfare  system,  on  the  Kennec^y 
assassination,  on  VS  war  crimes  in  Vietnam  and  on  the  causes  of  riots.     Following  the  pub- 
lic people's  hearings,  a  fipal  report  viould  be  announced  and  released  for  the  opening  day 
of  the  Convention.     Prominent  Americans  with  moral  and  political  authority  would  present  a 
citizen's  iixiictment  of  the  government  and  the  Democratic  Party  and  demand  that  the  Demo- 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2579 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

^,       .  cratic  National  Convention  suspend  all  rules  and  all 

buaine^s  to  take  up  the  challenges  of  the  indictment.     The  citizen's  indictment  would  be 

made  politically  serious  if  the  full  power  of  the  demonstration  was  then  put  behind  this 

demand, 

In  addition,  numerous  legal  challenges  to  the  credentials  of  delegates  or  entire  state 

delegations  vjould  be  made  during  this  early  Convention  period.     A  federal  court  suit  would 

seek  to  enjoin  the  Convention  from  assembling  until  the  method  of  delegate  selection  fol- 

„lowed  the  one  man-one  vote  principle.     The  citizen's  indictment  would  be  presented  at .the 

same  time  that  the  Democratic  credentials  committee  was  publicly  derying  several  dozap   ,    ,  . 

charge^  of  undemocratic  rules  and  fraudulent  procedures.  •  ^    .^      '    , 

*»^-       ...    ....■  '■  ''      .   \ 

'"'^'■%l    First  Wave;     Poverty  and  the  Citie/(August  26) ;j  Following  the  demand  that  the  Coit-    j'l. 
»,*^  v«itlon  take  up  the  dja^enge  of  the  citizen's  indictment,  pfr+he'liSrsf  day  6r, the  Conren-  'Jj, 

■;%■••       '.■['■■•'-■"'        ._    ^-    "■'  •         ■     ■-■"-'  ■  ■     ■  -    V  ;.-    -V.:v,;"  ?•■-■■■    ■  ■'^;^: 

'^.  ,tion,  act4.ons  pti^t  demaipi,,that  the  panocratia- Party  deal  with  the  crisl»  of  thascltiea  and/? 

?  *"^novorte.    To  dramatize  the  deftMid  and  the  urban  condition,  protests  could  focus  on  hundreds  ■ 

V*,   /■  •  ■_ -l-'r-^rrr-r- ^— , — > > ^ i — ' ~; 

'"•"of  the  major  institutions  that  irresponsibly  cofttribute  to  urban  breakdown;  welfare  offi-   -j 

^'ces.  .U3?ban  renewal  departments,  police  stations,  dav-lnhnr  hiring  halia.  larga  aluw  lAnd-^  ^ ;.; 

"•  '..■•-:    ',"'''•  '^"''■" 

^-'  lords,  schools  and  city  hall.  Different  brganlsations  would  come  to  Chicago  prepaid -to  \^  ;*i 
if  ■    •■•  ■  ..I       .  ■  .,■,  ^  .-■,...•-■  ■    ■'  ;.  •.  \    "■  ■■.,,■ 

t.^oanyout  a  speciXic.  action  program.-  The  Mississippi  Freedom  Demoicra,t^  nl^t  want,  to -focus,;' 

attention  on  their  lack  of  representation  or  on  the  failure  to  deal  with  poverty  across  the  ■>" 
country.  Or  a  coalition  of  "poverty  ri^ts"  organizations  in  one  region  mi^t  surround  the 
Conrad  Hilton,  a  downtown  Chicago  hotels  on  the ■ mornihg  of  the  26th  to  greet  the  delegates 
,.  with  leaflets  demanding  $15  billion  to  end  poverty  ahd  a  breakfast  menu  totaling  15#,  the 
amount  alloted  under  welfare.  At  lOcOO  a.m.,  the  recipients  mi^t  march  from  iha  Hilton 
to  318  Weet  Adams  to  join  with  delegations  coming  from  the  other  downtown  hotels  in  a  mas- 
sive demonstration  at  the  welfare  office  headquarters  of  Chicago.  In  the  evening,  th^  re- 
cipients might  again  return  to  the  hotels < to  invito  the  delegates  to  spend  the  night  with 
them  in  the  ghetto  rather  than  in  luxurious  hotels.  Hopefully,  many  organizations  woBld 
come  to  Chicago  vrlth  specific  plans  of  action  that  together  cover  many  issues,  many  tar- 
gets, but  dramatize  a  common  theme. 


2580  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 —Continued 

^O      (Second  Uawe:3be  Ha^  (August  ?7j!     The  indictment  dramatized  on  the  aecond  day  viould 
regard  the~nfiperiallst  role  of  the  United  States  in  the  world.     Actions  would  concentrate 
on  doBens  of  war  targets  across  the  city;     Chicago  draft  boards,   the  downtovm  induction 
center,   Illinois  Institute  of  Tgchnolopy  (the  nation's  center  for  chemical-biological  war- 
fare  research) ^   fflj  pajrir  hot-  iprprifrlltipns  like  Dovj  Chemical.     The  second  day  mi^t  see  a 


memorial  servicq  fnr  ^""-"irV  p^-'p"'"  ''•S"\i\?'^  In Tintnam  and  the  ghettos,  held  in  one  of  Qhi- 
cago's  large  parks,  with  services  conducted  by  America's  most  prominent  black  ministers. 


August  27  might  be  declared  a  national  day  of  resistance,  with  draft  cards'  turned  in  to  the 
Convention  and  a  serious  teach-in  for  soldiers  protecting  Johnson's  convention.     This  array, 
of  protests  would  stand  in  stark  contrast  to  the  silence  of  the  Convention  regarding  the  ■i'.' 
Vietnam  war.  ,  .  .        ,  jj;-'. 

,2' I    XjJinal  Wave;/  A  Funeral  March  on  the  Democratic  Party;     A  major  call  for  Americans  \A''\ 

f;-  register  their  oppdeltion  to"  the  Democratic  Party  should  be  Issued  for  August  28,  the  day..  ,' 

«ii'    '^     I  , '  .  .  ■  "  .  .-  .      ■•  .-  ,  ...  •     '        ..-,.>'. 

*•  -r  of  the  PresidentiaX  nomination  and  the  fifth  anniversary  of  the  Mirch  on  Washington  tot  •  -^  ^ 

■'..■■        -     "  ■■    ...    ■  ■  -    -■■  ..  .    -  K  ....       :  '■  .'  '<M 

^  '.  Jobs  ajid  Justice.'   August  28  mlehtf  iwirin  iHtVi  a  iiioqg4\ro  nnomnoT-at,-^ ^  Asgemblv'."  perhaps  li^    '^ 

■\v'       ,•      '-■'-■    .       .'  ,i        '      "•  .  .      ^       .■.■■-  '■       'W; 

^    Grant  Park,  and  climax  in  a  "faneral  march"  on  the  InterHationlil  Amphitheater  immediately %.., 

4»    after  the  first  ballot.'"  Such  a  march  could  be  led  by  retired  generals,  admirals  and  71^- 

■^      .     .  ^       r  ,-.  ;   ;■>>-• 

r*,   nam  veterans .  The  funeral  jik'ocession  ndght  be  organized  by  constituencies:  blacks  fol-   ;' 
f   lAwed  ^'clergy  followed  by  women  followed  by  faxTners  and  faculty  and  workers  and  resistera 
f-'  "and  so  on.  This  funeral  would  Speak  for  those  who  say  that  the  elections  represent  no 

choice  and  a  complete  breakdown  of  democracy,  and  those  who  pledge  to  use  the  fall  election 
to  expend  the  resistance  into  all  sections  of  the  American  public:  professors  engaged  ia  s"' 
war  research;  people  who  pay  war  taxes j  recipients  who  let  themselves  be  pushed  az*ouDd  by 
caseworkers;  workers  v;ho  "go  along"  with  their  unions  on  racism  aijd  the  war;  college  gradu-  . 
ates  faced  with  the  draft;  suburban  women  conditioned  to  "Stay  in  their  place";  etc.  j  WM.I9  , 
Johnson  accepts  the  nomination,  a  half -million  people  in  the  largest  protest  In  the  history  ' 
of  ttle  country  carry  caskets  symbolizing  the  Democratic  Party  Into  the  Convention  area  and 
bury  them  in  Chicago's  stock  yards  beside  the  Amphitheater. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2581 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

19 

Th"?  OrRanlzatlon  of  the  Caiffjlent 

The  porogram  suggested  Is  broad,  demanding  and  difficult  to  implement.     Already,  time 
is  short.     Organization  must  be  created  at  many  levelo,  in  many  sections  of  the  country. 
People,  community  organizations  and  coalitions  must  define  their  relation  to  the  program 
according  to  their  own  intirest  and  needs  and  in  their' ovm  time.     The  national  coalition  , 
organisation' isust  be  representative  of.  many  interests.-and  cpnstituencies,  yet  be  able  to 
move  fprward  and  accomplish  tasks.     Support  can  only  come  in  stages,  yet; where, ^p^pport 
exists,  work  must  proceed  if  anything  is  to  happen.     Understandably .""thFISHti -war  and  black 
liberation  movccicnts  id.ll  stress  different  emphases.     Organization  must  allow  for  separate 
approaphes  while  remaining^o^n  to  cooperation.  '5Tfr-ip']Ti^"T7;T'"~  .^ 

t  Thsrefore,  we  sxigg^t  that  the  national  coali'tloh'6rgaid.zatidn~Be  set  up  in  stages  and  ^ 

jbcp  bjpen  to  new  groupings  that' idsh  to,  participate  until  %he«hd  oTllugt^        i)ecl,diona  and   A 

'.    '  '  '.'"'■    •''■:  ■    ■  '•       ■  '-'-'.  .'.;■'  1 ' 

'  fTogran  development  should  be- decentralised  as  much  as.  possible  tp-i:egional  coalltio^  com-. 

,  (»  .      ""    "      '■'"-    ''"  ■  "...:■''■  V"  -i  ■  ■*'■'< 

nlttees.  The  black  liberation  and  anti-war  moTements  should  consider  parallel  organizatieina^ 

■      .—__-  -T  r^— ^ — —       *-T^r-^rv 

,  that  «n<w  t^^x  rnmr"^'' '"'*•''"'  •"vl  f;f>opf>rat.-i.on  where  political  Interftsta  neree.     And  ah  ad-^  h^ 

...  .  ■.-     -         ■:       .      ■_     ■       .  .  ,  „  '—^--     .      ■     '    ■-  "^..-'V         ■•  .',4 

^>-Klnlstratlve  comndttee  should  be  created  that  Is  rasponktbl'tf  t>o  the  ooalitioa  organisation. « 

Iv.  •  •  f  _    •  ■  " 7         "   I  ■  ■  ,•  '       ■      ■,     -1  I  ■■;,i-vi  •-  ■  ■  ,  ■;-'•■  ■  , ,   -"•  .■,•5'-^.■  .  ,j  .  -■ 

■    ■  ,  ■         .  •  ''      ■'       ,,■'■■'■-■,.,-'«;■*■'. 

K;^/->.  caH  allow  ncKLbiUty  and  •fTiciency  In  directing  staff.-   The  organisation  for  JUte     ■\.-^< 
-r^-^    -(";•"■      "        "If.:.-.-.:  v^'-    ^,^  .,.;■'  .-,.:;.' -v^  •''.>:■'■;:.  i.■ix^ ;':*•'    '■^;. 

.-t/jveai^nt  campaign  mi^t  proceed  in  this  wasr:    -  ...»       .  '     .    ^.t' 

^'fX'' ^^'V^^^^'^'o^^^^^  ''^0^  ^or  Harch-;22-2U,  inciting  some  250  repree«n-v 

tatlvee  fxx>n 'different  anti-war  itH  black  organizations  across  the  nation,  a  tentative     '<;.. 

.^.^ructiire  could  be  established.  '  The  conference  participants  ndght  elect  two  coalition     ,' 
boarn?)  representing  different 'interests  in  the  anti-war  .and  black  movements.     These  two  . 
boards',  in  our  opinion,  should  be  empowered  to  add  meid>er3h4p>  jbs  new  constltuenclee  ;decide 
they  wish  to  participate  in  the  challenge  coalition.     The  boards  would  be  responsiblo  for 
the  br.:ad    policy  and  direction  of  the  two  parallel  coalitions. 

Tjie  elected  bosvds  would  then  select  administrative  committees  to  direct. 'the  st^fff.,.,. 
The  adpdnlstratlve  committees  would  include  two  representatives  froR^  the  East,  JSouth^' Mid-r 
West  aM  West  regions.     The  two  administrative  committees  ml^t  meet  together  op  matters  of 


2582  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

concern  conmon  to  the  anti-war  and  black  coalitions.     The  committees  would  hire  separate 
staff.     The  staffs  would  then  begin  to  develop  programs  in  white  and  black  comimmitiea. 
The  structure  mi^t  look  like  this: 


20 


•S' 


rl  i. 
ft 


40 


Ilarch  22-2U  Conferences 


National  Board 
Anti-War 


National  Board 
Black 


Wrainistrative  Committee     Administrative  Committee 


Regional  Groupings 
Anti4-/ar 


Regional  Groupings 
Black 


Staff 


Vftiite  Community 


Black  Community 


"^  -.  ^PJnaUy,  the  coalition  boards  might  consider  including  a  representative  of<«ach  major 

project}  developing  around  the  Conv^tlon  challenge.    Maiior  projects  idU  be  organissed  on  a^,' 

i:  ^- ••■•■'      ;..    ■,■,.-■•      ■      --■■■'  -■■'-.       '  -      .    -    -  ■   '    ..;>,-r    t* 

C^ndejiendent  or  eend-independent  basis,  t^.ihe  coalition  organization^  but  najr  \ '  ''vant,to=.  ^ 

'A-r  '    '•■»■■-'.'  ',  I.'-    "-■.'      "    ■  *  ■  ■•    -■-"    -i    ■■    '''^  V  ■;    -/-.     ■•  V, 

;-;  participate  in  the  coalition.     Such  pro  jecta  might  include:       ,      ""     />?  "^^        ,    -    \S:'-     J.: 
••-'''■■"  t  "■■">"'•■.        1-  -«        '    -•        — ■ 

^-."f,  Legal — Offense  and  Defensat-' Organization  of  lawyers  is  needed  to  pttSepBire  challepgeo  ^^ 
'  ;fci  j,th(^«redentials  of  delegates  and  the  Constitutionality  of  .the  Oonvetitioa.  Injunctions^  J^ 
'^fal^b|(ils,  and  vague  Dulti-state  and  municipal  charges  need  legal  opposition.     And  tbosa^    ^ 

V.  t 

i  arrested  In  Chicago,  Jor  whatever  reason,  require  legal  defense.  .j 

People's  Platform  Hearings;  A  panel  of  prominent  people  to  receive  testinoiy  and  de- 
velop a  report  on  America  must  be  assembled.  Research  must  be  gathered,  witnesses  vl^ 
pertinent  information  found,  hearings  organized,  etc.  Preparations  for  Chicago  facilities 
for  the  final  hearings  should  begin  soon. 


_  Research  and  Education;  A  stream  of  papers  and  educational  materials  exposing  the 
Democratic  Party  should  pour  out  of  the  coalition  organization.  A  list  of  research  priori- 
ties should  be  developed  nationally  and  locally  and  support  from  people  with  research- 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2583 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  1 — Continued 

21 

skills  four.il.     I'li-oups  that,  gather  sj.>cciric  intelligence  on  national  delegates  should  be  or- 
ganised locally.     Papers  that   can  assist  summer  organizing,   spring  teach-in  and  other  edu- 
cational work  should  be  circulated. 

Regional  Training  Schools:     The  curriculum  of  each  school  will  vary,   reflecting  the 
political  emphasis  of  the  Ipcal  campaign  coalition.     Nevertheless,   it  could  be  helpful  if 
a  national  training  project"  were  established  to  assist  regional  schools  in  developing  ma- 
terials,  recruiting,   fund-raising,   etc. 

National  Teach-in:     Considerable  preparation  is  required  to  develop  background  materi- 
als and  speakers  for  the  national  teach-in  on  the  Democratic  Party.     The  technical  arrange- 
ments are  considerable.     While  preparations  have  begun  in  California  for  such  a  project, 
they  will  need  national  support. 

Convention  Papier:  A  newspaper  that  circulates  in  Chicago  during  the  demonstrations 
and  informs  participants  of  inside  and  outside  activities  is  an  essential  project. 

National  Press  Service;  Attention  should  be  given  to  Informing  the  media  about  the 
specific  objectives  of  the  challenge  and  keeping  the  press  informed  as  events  in  Chicago 
unfold.  ^f 

Yippee  Festival;     A  large-scale  convocation  of  hippies,  rock  bands,   etc.,  will  occur 
in  Chicago  at  the  same  time  as  the  Convention,   seeking  to  contrast  the  cel*ration  of  life 
with  the  death-producing  rituals  of  the  politicians. 

International  Protest:     A  group  should  be  formed  to  approach  delegations  at  the  United 
Nations  about  increasing  pressures  on  the  United  States.     We  should  call  for  demonstrations 
in  man/  countries  and  send  representatives  to  speak  and  organize  in. those  countries.     We 
should  invite  international  representatives  to   join  our   "people's   platform  hearings"  and 
march  v;ith  us  on  the-  Convention. 


2584  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  Exhibit  2,  the  document  entitled  "DISCUSSION" 
ON  THE  DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION  CHALLENGE,"  signed 
by  Rennie  Davis  and  Tom  Hay  den,  also  the  subject  of  some  testimony 
yesterday. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  there  any  objection?  Members? 

If  not,  the  document  will  be  incorporated  into  the  record. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  2."  See  pages  2556-2559.) 

Mr.  CoNLET.  As  Exhibit  3,  the  clipping  from  the  Cuban  Commu- 
nist paper  entitled  Gromfnm^  dated  September  8, 1968,  specifically  page 
12,  entitled  "Michael  Klonsky  denounces  police  brutality  during  Chi- 
cago incidents." 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  thought,  Mr.  Counsel,  that  was  already  in  as  part  of 
the  record. 

Mr.  CoNLEfT.  I  don't  believe  so. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  If  there  be  no  objection,  that  will  be  incorporated. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  3."  See  page  2585.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  Exhibit  4,  a  letter  dated  June  4,  1968,  addressed 
"Dear  Col.  Lao"  ^  and  signed  "Tom  Hayden"  and  also  the  subject  of 
some  testimony  yesterday. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  This  has  been  read  into  the  record. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  But  not  f onnally  offered,  I  don't  believe. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  No  objection,  so  admitted. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  4."  See  page  2586.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Counsel  is  recognized  to  proceed. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  believe  when  we  concluded  the  hearings 
yesterday,  we  were  talking  about  the  trip  that  you  took  to  Cuba  in  De- 
cember— or  January  1968.  And  you  were  asked  in  what  capacity  you 
went,  I  believe,  to  summarize  and  get  us  back  where  we  were,  and  you 
indicated  that  you  went  as  a  journalist  for  Liberation  magazine. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  can  you  pull  the  mike  just  a  little  closer 
to  you? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  this  not  substantially  where  we  were  yesterday  ? 

All  right,  I  would  ask  you,  sir,  and  directing  your  attention  specifi- 
cally to  a  news  item  which  appeared  in  the  National  Guardian  of  De- 
cember 30, 1967,  under  the  byline  of  Lionel  Martin,  and  I  am  reading 
specifically  from  the  fourth  paragraph,  which  I  will  be  glad  to  hand 
you  in  just  a  moment,  which  reads  as  follows : 

Those  who  to  date  have  expressed  their  intention  to  participate  in  the  congress 
from  the  U.S.  are  anti-war  activist  Dave  Bellinger;  Tom  Hayden,  community 
organizer  in  Newark,  N.J. ;  and  Conor  Cruise  O'Brien,  professor  of  humanities 
at  New  York  University.  Many  others  are  expected  to  attend  from  the  U.S. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  my  question  to  you  would  be  this,  sir: 
This  article  would  indicate  that  you  were  attending  as  a  participant. 
In  fact,  I  believe  it  uses  that  word. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  sorry.  Did  you  ask  a  question  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  thought  you  just  made  a  statement, 

Mr.  IcHORD,  Repeat  the  question. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  My  question  was,  sir,  that  the  article  says  that  you 
attended  as  a  participant.  Is  this  correct  ? 

1  Correct  spelling  "Lau." 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2585 

Hayden  Exhibit  No.  3 


nUPHONi  INTIKVIIW  _  '  ^ 

Michael  Klonsky 
denounces  peBice  brutality 
during  Chicago  incidents 


y^^    "^V~I  ICHAEL  Klomky,  National  Stcretan  of  SDS  (Students  /or  a  Dtmoeratie 

f  y    Society),  wot  interviewed  by  t'lepSon*  by  Radio  Havanc  Cuba  on  Au- 

MS       1  ffust  88  during  the  incidents  in  Chicago. 

Considerable  attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  fact  that  the  police 
used  the  butts  of  their  rifles,  tear  gas  and  MACE  in  their  attacki  on  tHc 
thousands  of  persons  protecting  the  Yankee  war  of  aggreseton  in  Vietnam 
at  the  very  moment  toHen  Hubert  Humphrey  was  being  Mominatmt  pre*- 

idential    candidate  at    the   Democratic    Convention. 

Klonsky  spoke  of  these  incidents  in  hi*  telephone   interthew   which  we  present   here 

in  full: 


What. can  yoa  tall  ui  about  the  present  tituatitta 
in  CUcacor 

We  have  been  fitting  in  the  street*  for  four  days. 
Manv  of  our  people  have  been  beaten  up,  and  many 
of  them  are  in  jail,  but  we  are  winning.  We 
puihed  the  police  out  of  Grant  Park,  and  the  peo- 

Ele  were  sull  in  the  streets.  They  are  going  to  be 
t  the  streets  all  night,  and  we  are  going  \o  do 
anythine  we  can  to  stop  this  farce  (the  Democratic 
National  Convention)  which  is  taking  place  in 
Chicago.  The  people  are  committed  to  carry  on 
this  fight  not  onlv  m  Chicago  but  throughout  the 
United  States  We  are  going  to  go  back  to  the 
hotel  (The  Conrad  Hilton)  and  down  to  the  park 
•gain,  ond  are  going  to  carry  on  the  fi^ht  all  night 
until  the  Convention  is  over.  The  pobce  have  been 
very  brutal,  and  a  lot  of  people  have  been  shot 
and  a  lot  of  people  have  been  beaten  up,  but  the 
young  people  have  committed  them«elves  to  fight. 
and  they  are  fighting  very  bravely 

The  pioUce  and  the  National  Guard  have  been 
very  brutal.  They  have  beaten  pieople  up  at 
random;  they  have  been  tear-gassing  us.  I  think 
ttiere  are  at  least  300  hurt  tonight  (Wednesday); 
ik  lot  of  policemen  have  been  hurt,  too.  We  have 
Mt  up  medical  units,  and  I  think  we  are  winning. 
They  have  the  guns  and  the  gas  and  the  clubs. 
We  have  been  outmaneuvering  and  outfighting 
them.  We  have  nothing  but  sticks  and  stones.  Ail 
I  can  say  is  that  the  people  have  fought  very  well 
and  have  been  very  brave.  It's  just  that  they  out- 
number us  so  badly,  and  they  have  much  better 
.weapons.  We  are  just  putting  up  the  best  fight 
we  can. 

The  Yankee  news  agencies  say  that  the  police 
osed  MACE,  and  you  know  that  the  Department 
of  Health,  Edncation  and  Welfare  of  the  U&  Gov- 
ernment —  a  scientific  committee  of  the  depart- 
ment  —  aaid  recently  that  MACE  could  be  very 
dangeroua  to  the  «yes  and  cause  temporary  bUnd- 


That  is  correct.  Many  people  have  been  MACEd 
in  the  eyes,  and  many  people  have  been  shot  with 
shotguns.  Some  people  were  killed  already  Mveral 
nights  ago.  People  were  MACEd  tsnight;  we  wer* 
all  tear-ganed,  all  gassed,  and  many  people  were 
beaten  up. 

(The  meaaage  from  the  delefades  of  808  la 
Cuba  in  which  they  urge  their  eetnrades  t*  con- 
tinue the  stragfle  and  create  twe,  three,  many 
Chicatoe  la  the  Vaited  State*  It  reai  to  Kloiuky 
and  be  te  asked  te  give  his  opinloa  on  it) 

That's  >>eautifuL  That's  very  beautiful.  That 
cticourkgai  us.  What  can  I  tay  but  that  we  ara 
all  very  excited  and  ready  to  go  back  to  the  atiaata 
again. 

What  la  your  ovlaioa  on  the  ptatfotai  ayyrarad 
by  the  Damocratic  CoMveatioaf 

We  tiunk  it  is  irrelevant.  It  is  not  important  It 
u  only  important  because  a  lot  of  the  youag  peo- 
ple who  were  supporting  McCarthy  have  iww 
come  to  understand  that  the  Democratic  Conven* 
tion  was  rigged,  was  phony,  and  are  now  joining 
us  in  the  streets.  Many,  many  McC^iarthy  people 
are  coming  over  because  of  the  platform  today. 

Wti  knew  what  was  happening  all  along,  and  wa 
knew  that  the  people  who  control  the  Convan- 
lion  would  not  allow  a  peace  platfonn  to  win  Id 
the  Convention.  It  went  just  as  wa  expected,  and 
we  are  very  enthusiastic  about  the  reaponM  of  tha 
young  people  in  Chicago.  We  think  that  the  young 
people  in  America  are  going  to  tarn  the  power 
structure  upside  down. 

Michael,   what  aie  year  laasedlata  alaaa  B««r7 

To  go  back  to  the  atraets.  That's  what  we  ara 
going  to  do. 


mmumaoi  vmim 


21-706  O — 69— pt.  2- 


2586  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Hayden  Exhibit  No.  4 

June  4  1968 

Dear  Col.  Lao;  *  *    '      . 

This  note  Is  to  Introduce  to  you  Mr.  Robert  Greenblatt,  the 
coordinator  of  the  National  Kobillzationto  End  the  War  in 
Vietnam.  He  works  closely  with  myself , and  Dave  Dellinger,  and 
has  Just  returned  from  Hanoi. 

If  there  are  any  pressing  questions  you  wish  to  discuss,  Mr* 
Greenblatt  will  be  in  Paris  for  a  few  days. 

We  hope  that  the  current  Paris  discussions  go  well  for  you. 
The  news  from  South  Vietnam  see::::s  very  good  indeed. 

We  hope  to.  see  you  this  summer  in  Paris  or  at  a  later  time. 

Good  fortune! 
Victory! 

Tom  Hayden  / 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  you  didn't  even  read  the  article,  then. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  reading  to  you  the  paragraph  that  deals 
specifically  with  you,  going  to  that  conference. 

Mr.  Hayden.  But  your  own  testimony  here,  sir,  is  that  I  went  to 
the  congress  in  January,  and  the  article  is  dated  December  30. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  article  was  obviously  written  prior  to  the — read 
the  paragraph  that  I  have  reference  to,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  it  is  an  article  that  says  what  you  read,  but 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  instead  of  asking  the  witness  about  what 
the  article  says,  ask  him 

Mr.  Hayden.  Are  you  saying  that  it  does  say  that  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Ask  him  whether  or  not  he  was  a  participant. 

Mr.  Hayden.  We  already  testified  that. 

Mr.  Conley.  This  article,  Mr.  Hayden,  was  written  prior  to  the 
conference. 

Mr.  Hayden.  So  what  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Is  Mr.  Martin  mistaken,  or  did  he  make  a  false  state- 
ment in  that  article,  to  say  that  you  were  going  to  be  a  participant  ? 

Mr.  Di  Suvero.  He  doesn't  say  that. 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  between  you  and  Mr.  Martin. 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  Would  the  counsel  point  out  where  that  is  stated? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  have  order.  The  witness  is  saying  that  he  testi- 
fied that  he  was  not  a  participant  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  testified — in  fact,  you  know  what  I  testified. 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir,  you  have  testified  that  you  did  not  participate  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course. 

Mr.  Conley.  But  this  article,  let  me  read  it  again  to  you,  sir. 

Mr  Hayden.  You  didn't  read  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  "Those  who  to  date  have  expressed  their  intention  to 
participate  in  the  congress  from  the  U.S.  are"  as  follows. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2587 

Mr.  Hayden".  So  what? 

Mr.  CoisTLEY.  All  right.  Now  the  word  "participate,"  perhaps  we  are 
getting  hung  up  again  on  what  words  mean. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Perhaps  you  are,  my  friend,  but  I  don't  believe  every- 
thing I  read  in  the  newspapers.  It  is  a  matter  of  record  that  I  did 
not  participate  as  a  delegate  in  that  congress. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then,  sir,  my  question 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  a  matter  of  record,  as  I  said  yesterday,  that  I 
went  in  my  capacity  as  an  editor  of  Liberation  magazine,  but  the  main 
problem  is  I  don't  understand  what  you  are  uptight  about. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  record  will  stand  as  made,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Proceed  with  the  next  question, 

Mr.  Conley.  The  next  question  is 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  always  agree  with  or  believe  what  I  read  in 
the  newspapers. 

Mr.  Conley.  The  next  question,  then,  is  that  Mr.  Martin  is 
mistaken  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  between  you  and  Mr.  Martin.  You  have  my 
testimony, 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  asking  you,  sir,  is  this  article  correct  as  far  as 
it  pertains 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  have  my  testimony. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  have  his  testimony,  Mr.  Counsel.  Proceed  to  the 
next  question. 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  ridiculous. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  now  directing  your  attention  to  another 
article  in  the  National  Guardian^  dated  January  27, 1968,  and  written 
again  by  Mr.  Lionel  Martin,  Guardian  staff  correspondent,  bylined 
Havana,  "Participants" — and  I  am  reading  from  the  paragraph.  The 
first  paragraph  to  introduce  the  article  says : 

The  International  Cultural  Congress  closed  here  with  an  appeal  to  intellectuals 
to  boycott  U.S.  academic  and  cultural  programs. 

Moving  down  in  the  article,  there  is  a  subheadline  which  says,  "Par- 
ticipants from  U.S." : 

The  congress  was  attended  by  some  500  delegates  and  observers  from  70  coun- 
tries, and  more  than  100  journalists.  Participating  from  the  U.S.  were  antiwar 
leader  Dave  Bellinger,  community  organizer  Tom  Hayden,  moviemakers  Dick 
Moore    and    Saul    Landau,    writer    Jose    Iglesias,    cartoonist    Jules    Feiffer 

And  on  and  on  and  on. 

A^ain,  the  editor  or  the  reporter,  after  the  conference,  says  that  you 
participated  in  the  conference. 

Mr.  Hayden.  So  what?  I  have  testified  that  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  I  am  asking  you,  sir,  I  put  to  you  the  question 
now 

Mr.  Hayden.  Put  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  — Is  this  reporter  in  error  when  he  says  that  you 
participated  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  he  is  in  error. 

Mr.  Conley,  Thank  you,  sir.  And  he  is  a  reporter  for  the  National 
Guardian? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Tliat  is  the  first  time  I  ever  heard  you  fellows  believe 
the  National  Guardian.  I  can  even  give  you  my  press  badge  for  one  of 


2588  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

your  exhibits.  Tliat  was  made  in  Cuba,  and  it  might  not  be  valid  to 
bring  it  into  the  United  States. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  directing  your  attention  to  another  sub- 
ject, some  time  ago  Captain  Charles  Kinney  of  the  Newark  Police 
Department  testified  before  this  committee. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  like  to  say  something  else  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  no,  go  ahead. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Testified  before  this  committee  in  connec- 
tion with  the  riots  which  occurred  in  Newark  in  the  suimuer  of  1967, 
and  during  the  testimony  of  Captain  Kinney,  with  reference  to  these 
particular  riots,  he  quoted  from  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  New 
York  Times^  under  date  of  December  17, 1967,  in  which  you  are  quoted 
as  follows :  "a  case  can  be  made  for  violence  in  the  peace  movement," 
and: 

It's  not  as  if  violence  in  the  slums  and  in  Vietnam  appeared  in  a  vaccuum  [sic]. 
It  came  only  after  the  failure  of  democratic  methods.  When  I  participate  in 
violence  it  was  out  of  that  failure — not  as  an  expression  of  psychological  self- 
hatred. 

Mr.  Hayden,  would  you  please  advise  us  as  to  what  circumstances 
you  are  willing  to  participate  in  violence  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Advise  you  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  have  already  testified  about  that  question  as 
it  pertains  to  the  subject  of  these  hearings,  and  I  went  on  at  considera- 
ble length  trying  to  educate  you  yesterday  as  to  my  beliefs  in  that 
area,  and  I  think  it  would  be  redundant  to  go  over  them. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  am  reading  particularly  again  from  this 
account,  which  is  attributed  to  you :  "When  I  participate  in  violence  it 
was  out  of  that  failure^ — not  as  an  expression  of  psychological  self- 
hatred." 

Now,  when  I  read  that  quotation,  and  perhaps  I  am  putting  the 
wrong  emphasis  on  it,  you  are  implying  that  you  have  participated  in 
violence,  and  I  am  asking  you  under  what  conditions  do  you  partici- 
pate in  violence  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  I  think  perhaps  you  should  lay  the  proper 
foundation  and  first  ask  the  witness  whether  he  made  that  statement 
or  not. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  is  the  quotation  from  ? 

Mr.  Ichord.  If  that  is  a  correct  quotation 

Mr.  Hayden.  Every  quotation  that  you  gave  me  yesterday  you  read 
out  of  context,  so  I  would  like  to  have  the  full  quotation  that  you  are 
now  reading. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Show  the  witness  the  quotation 

Mr.  Hayden.  "Where  is  the 

Mr.  IcHORD. — Mr.  Counsel,  and  then  ask  him  if  that  is  a  correct 
quote  of  his  statement. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Where  is  the  full  statement  ? 

Wliat  is  the  date  of  it  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  December  17. 1  don't  have  the  clipping  here. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  what  year  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  1967. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  certainly  would  answer  at  a  later  time,  but 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2589 

given  your  way  of  handling  quotations  yesterday,  when  I  had  a 
chance  to  look  at  the  full  quotation,  and  given  the  fact  that  I  had  to 
read  into  the  record  extensively  the  context  of  statements  that  you 
had  lifted,  I  would  not  now  want  to  comment  on  something  that  you 
attribute  to  me,  because  I  am  sure  that  in  part  it  is  taken  out  of 
context. 

Furthermore,  I  have  discussed  violence  ad  nauseam  before  this 
committee  in  reference  to  almost  every  subject  that  you  are  supposedly 
considering  under  your  very  vague  mandate. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Well,  gentlemen,  the  record  will  stand  as  made.  The 
question  will  be  in  the  record. 

If  you  read  the  full  statement,  Mr.  Hayden,  that  will  also  be  in  the 
record. 

I  think,  Mr.  Counsel,  first  of  all,  you  should  ask  the  witness  if  he 
made  such  a  statement,  to  lay  the  proper  foundation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  we  have  asked  that  question, 
and  he  said  he  would  have  to  see  the  article.  I  do  not  have  the  article 
here. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Well,  did  you  make — was  that  a  correct  quotation,  Mr. 
Hayden  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  not  as  far  as  I  know. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  remember  making  a  statement  to  that  particular 
reporter  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  remember  making  a  statement  to  the  Neio  York 
Times  in  December  of  1967,  though  it  is  conceivable  that  I  did. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  moving  on  to  another  subject,  and  one 
with  which  I  am  sure  you  are  quite  familiar,  your  book.  Rebellion  in 
Newark^  are  you  familiar  with  that  book,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  More  familiar  than  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  sure  that  you  are,  sir,  and  I  want  to  direct  your 
attention  specifically  to  pages  70-71  of  that  book. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Could  I  have  a  copy  of  the  book  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir.  Wherein  appears  the  following,  starting  on 
page  70 : 

The  role  of  organized  violence  is  now  being  carefully  considered.  During  a  riot, 
for  instance,  a  conscious  guerrilla  can  participate  in  pulling  police  away  from  the 
path  of  people  engaged  in  attacking  stores.  He  can  create  disorder  in  new  areas 
the  police  think  are  secure.  He  can  carry  the  torch,  if  not  all  the  people,  to  white 
neighborhoods  and  downtown  business  districts.  If  necessary,  he  can  successfully 
shoot  to  kill. 

And  the  quotation  continues.  That  is  not  the  end  of  the  quotation. 

Now,  sir,  I  will  ask  you  whether  that  quotation  appears  in  your 
book.  Rebellion  in  Newark^  on  j)ages  70-71  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  On  page  70. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERo.  I  think  the  best  evidence  as  to  whether  it  appears  is 
the  book  itself.  I  don't  think  the  witness  needs  to  testify  to  that. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  have  the  book  there.  Proceed  and  rephrase  your 
question,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  with  reference  to  that 
particular  quotation  that  appears  in  that  book,  is  that  not  similar  to 
the  recommendations  that  you  made  in  your  position  papers  before 
the  Chicago  demonstrations,  urging  that  white  revolutionaries  organ- 


2590  DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

ize  diversionary  activities  to  pull  the  police  out  of  the  black  areas 
during  the  rioting,  looting,  and  burning? 
Do  you  recall  the  testimony  yesterday,  sir  ? 
Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  is  this  not  a  similar  position  ? 
Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  explain  the  difference,  please? 
Mr.  HLayden.  Yes;  the  difference  is  that  I  am  discussing  here  on 
page  70  what  possibly  is  being  considered,  or  possibly  might  be  carried 
out,  by  black  people  in  the  ghettos. 

In  the  quotation  that  you  spoke  about  yesterday,  I  was  not  referring 
particularly  to  black  people. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  this  the  only  distinction  that  you  make  as  between 
the  fact  that,  in  one  instance,  it  involves  black  peoj^le  ^oing  from  the 
ghettx)  to  the  white  neighborhoods  and,  in  the  other  situation,  white 
people  rising  up  in  the  white  neighborhoods  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  if  you  imply  that  from  the  statement  that  you 
read  yesterday — that  that  statement  implies  that  people  are  going  to 
pull  police  away  from  the  path  of  people  engaged  in  attacking  stores, 
that  is  unlikely,  since  I  talked  about  the  suburbs,  which  are  nowhere 
near  these  stores.  Creating  disorder  in  new  areas,  carrying  the  torch, 
shooting  to  kill.  I  tried  to  make  clear  yesterday  what  I  meant  by  diver- 
sionary demonstrations,  and  it  is  quite  different  from  what  I  say  here. 

In  fact,  what  is  said  here  is 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  What  do  you  say  here  ? 

Mr.  Haydejst.  What  do  I  say  here  ? 

Mr.  AsHBROOK,  You  have  a  different  meaning  for  everything  that  is 
said. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  you  are  struggling  because  you  can't  get  any- 
thing on  me  and  you  keep  hoping  that  there  is  something,  a  sinister 
meaning,  but  the  words  only  mean  one  thing. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Hayden,  at  that  point,  what  we  are  trying  to  do 
is 

Mr.  Hayden  [reads].  "The  role  of  organized  violence  is  now  being 
carefully  considered."  Clear? 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Clear. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  understand 

Mr.  Hayden.  Wliat  ambiguous  meaning  is  there,  then  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  there  be  order. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  I  was  waiting  for  your 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen,  let  us  get  back  on  the  track.  I  don't  quite 
understand,  Mr.  Hayden,  your  explanation. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  read  it. 

Mr.  Ichord.  You  say  you  are  not  advocating  shoot  to  kill,  but  you 
set  this  up  as  a  possibility  of  a  solution?  Is  that  your  distinction ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Sir. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Those  are  your  words. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  there  is  a  kind  of  a  brainless  way  of  analyzing 
going  on  here,  or  there  is  an  attempt  to  fuid  something  that  is  not 
there.  Tliis  is  a  book  that  analyzes  Avhat  will  follow  from  the  series  of 
rebellions  in  ghettos  that  occurred  from  1964  to  1968,  and  if  necessary 
I  will  read  into  the  record  the  entire  last  chapter. 

Mr.  Ichord.  We  can  have  the  entire  chapter  placed  in  the  record. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2591 

Mr.  Hayden.  All  right,  then  please  place  it  there.  In  the  meantime, 
I  would  like  to  read  to  you  the  full  last  two  pages. 

(The  chapter  was  received  for  the  record  and  marked  "Hay den 
Exhibit  No.  5."  See  pages  2592-2601.) 

Mr.  Hayden  [reads]. 

The  roll  of  organized  violence  is  now  being  carefully  considered.  During  a 
riot,  for  instance,  a  conscious  guerrilla  can  participate  in  pulling  police  away 
from  the  path  of  people  engaged  in  attacking  stores.  He  can  create  disorder  in 
new  areas  the  police  think  are  secure.  He  can  carry  the  torch,  if  not  all 
the  people,  to  white  neighborhoods  and  downtown  business  districts.  If  neces- 
sary, he  can  successfully  shoot  to  kill. 

The  guerrilla  can  employ  violence  effectively  during  times  of  apparent  "peace," 
too.  He  can  attack,  in  the  suburbs  or  slums,  with  paint  or  bullets,  symbols  of 
racial  oppression.  He  can  get  away  with  it.  If  he  can  force  the  oppressive  power 
to  be  passive  and  defensive  at  the  point  where  it  is  administered — by  the  case- 
worker, landlord,  storeowner,  or  policeman — he  can  build  people's  confidence  in 
their  ability  to  demand  change.  Persistent,  accurately-aimed  attacks  which  need 
not  be  on  human  life  to  be  effective,  might  disrupt  the  administration  of  the 
ghetto  to  a  crisis  point  where  a  new  system  would  have  to  be  considered. 

These  tactics  of  disorder  will  be  defined  by  the  authorities  as  criminal 
anarchy.  But  it  may  be  that  disruption  will  create  possibilities  of  meaningful 
change.  This  depends  on  whether  the  leaders  of  ghetto  struggles  can  be  more 
successful  in  building  strong  organization  than  they  have  been  so  far.  Violence 
can  contribute  to  shattering  the  status  quo,  but  only  politics  and  organization 
can  transform  it.  The  ghetto  still  needs  the  power  to  decide  its  destiny  on  such 
matters  as  urban  renewal  and  housing,  social  services,  policing,  and  taxation. 
Tenants  still  need  concrete  rights  against  landlords  in  public  and  private 
housing,  or  a  new  system  of  tenant-controlled  living  conditions.  Welfare  clients 
still  need  a  livable  income.  Consumers  still  need  to  control  the  quality  of 
merchandise  and  service  in  the  stores  where  they  shop.  Citizens  still  need  effec- 
tive control  over  those  who  police  their  community.  Political  structures  belong- 
ing to  the  community  are  needed  to  bargain  for,  and  maintain  control  over, 
funds  from  government  or  private  sources.  In  order  to  build  a  more  decent 
community  while  resisting  racist  power,  more  than  violence  is  required.  People 
need  to  create  self-government.  We  are  at  a  point  where  democracy — the  idea 
and  practise  of  people  controlling  their  lives — is  a  revolutionary  issue  in  the 
United  States. 

Now  I  think  that  that  is  a  clear  statement.  It  is  my  own  view,  as 
much  today  as  it  was  when  I  wrote  the  book.  I  think  that  what  has 
happened  in  American  ghettos  since  the  book  was  written  indicates 
that  the  book  was  accurate  in  predicting  what  would  happen.  If  you 
look  at  any  daily  paper,  you  see  that  violence  is  I^reaking  out  in  the 
urban  areas,  wherever  people  have  no  organized  opportunities  for 
democratic  participation  in  resolving  their  problems,  period. 

And  I  think  that  under  those  conditions,  violence  is  ofttimes 
defensible. 

That  is  absolutely  separate,  as  I  have  said  many  times,  here  and 
other  places,  from  the  situation  in  Chicago.  Chicago  demonstrators 
were  from  out  of  town.  They  were  not  living  in  oppressive  ghetto 
situation.  They  were  coming  into  town  for  2,  3,  or  perhaps  4  days  to 
conduct  a  demonstration,  and  the  purpose  of  that  demonstration  was 
to  be  political. 

The  attempt  to  link  the  statements  made  in  a  book  on  ghetto  rebel- 
lions with  what  happened  in  Chicago  misses  an  awful  lot  of  the  differ- 
ences between  a  demonstration  and  a  rebellion  by  people  living  in 
their  own  community — differences  between  the  situation  of  black 
people  in  the  United  States  and  the  situation  of  white  students,  and 
so  on  and  so  forth. 


2592  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5 
[Rebellion  in  Newark  by  Tom  Hayden] 


From  Riot  to  Revolution? 


I  HIS  I  OUNTRY  is  experiencing  its  fourth  year  of  urban 
revolt,  yet  the  message  from  Newark  is  that  America 
has  learned  almost  nothing  since  Watts. 

Of  primary  importance  is  the  fact  that  no  national 
program  exists  to  deal  with  the  social  and  economic 
questions  black  people  are  raising.  Despite  exhaustive 
hearings  over  the  last  five  years  on  problems  of  man- 
power and  unemployment,  anti-poverty  programs  and 
the  urban  crisis,  there  is  no  apparent  commitment 
from  national  power  centers  to  do  something  con- 
structive. 

During  the  height  of  the  rioting  in  Newark  and 
Detroit,  Congress  discussed  gun-control  laws,  voted 
down  with  chuckles  a  bill  for  rat  extermination,  and 
President  Johnson  set  up  a  commission  to  do  more 
investigating  of  the  crisis.  The  main  emphasis  of  gov- 
ernmental remedial  programs  seems  likely  to  be  on 

63 


I 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2593 

Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 

Rebellion  in  Newaric 

ending  the  riots  rather  than  dealing  with  the  racial 
and  economic  problem.  President  Johnson  made  this 
clear  in  his  televised  July  28  address  on  the  "deeper 
questions"  about  the  riots: 

Explanations  may  be  offered,  but  nothing  can  ex- 
cuse what  [the  rioters]  have  done.  There  will  be 
attempts  to  interpret  the  events  of  the  past  few 
days,  but  when  violence  strikes,  then  those  in 
public  responsibility  have  an  immediate  and  a  very 
different  job:  not  to  analyse  but  to  end  disorder. 

When  it  moves  past  riot-control  to  discussion  of 
social  programs,  Congress  is  likely  to  lament  the  fail- 
ure of  past  civil  rights,  welfare,  and  anti-poverty  pro- 
grams, rather  than  focus  on  the  need  for  new  ones. 
As  with  foreign  aid,  white  politicians  (and  their  vot- 
ers) tend  to  view  aid  to  Negroes  as  a  form  of  "char- 
ity" to  be  trimmed  wherever  possible,  or  as  a  means 
of  eliminating  surplus  food,  or  a  way  to  enlarge  urban 
patronage  roles.  Negroes  more  than  likely  will  be  in- 
structed to  "help  themselves." 

But  unlike  the  Italians,  Irish,  and  Jews,  black 
Americans  have  always  faced  a  shrinking  structure  of 
economic  opportunity  in  which  to  "help  themselves." 
If  sheer  effort  were  the  answer,  the  black  people 
who  chopped  cotton  from  dawn  to  sunset  would  today 
be  millionaire  suburban  homeowners.  Self-help  does 
not  build  housing,  hospitals,  and  schools.  The  cost  of 
making  cities  livable  and  institutions  responsive  is 
greater  than  any  sum  this  country  has  ever  been  wiQ- 
ing  to  spend  on  domestic  reform.  In  addition,  the  very 

64 


2594  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 


From  Riot  to  Revolution 

act  of  spending  such  money  would  disrupt  much  of 
the  status  quo.  Private  interests,  from  the  real  estate 
lobby  and  the  construction  unions  to  the  social  work 
profesiion,  would  be  threatened.  Urban  political  ma- 
chines would  have  to  make  space  for  black  political 
power.  Good  intentions  tend  to  collapse  when  faced 
with  the  necessity  for  massive  spending  and  struc- 
tural <^nge. 

Th«  political  bankruptcy  leads  directly  to  the  use 
o{  military  force.  When  citizens  have  no  political  way 
t<'  deal  with  revolution,  they  become  counter-revolu- 
f«iftary.  The  race  issue  becomes  defined  exclusively 
a*  one  of  maintaining  white  society.  Holding  this  view 
forces  the  white  community  to  adopt  the  "jungle  atti- 
tudes" I  hat  they  fear  the  Negroes  hold.  "Go  kill  them 
niggers. '  white  crowds  shouted  to  Guardsmen  at  7 
o'clock  Friday  morning  as  they  rode  into  Newark. 
During  the  riot,  a  New  York  Times  reporter  was 
stopped  at  2:30  a.m.  in  Mayor  Addonizio's  west  side 
neighborhood  by  a  pipe-smoking  gentleman  carrying 
(illegaUy)  a  shotgun.  He  explained  that  a  protection 
society  was  formed  in  case  "they"  should  come  into 
the  neighborhood.  Rifle  stores  in  white  neighborhoods 
all  over  the  east  coast  are  selling  out.  In  such  way,  the 
society  becomes  militarized. 

A  police  "takeover"  of  local  government  is  not 
necessary  to  declare  war  on  Negroes.  All  that  is  nec- 
essary is  to  instill  in  the  white  citizens  the  idea  that 
only  military  force  stands  between  them  and  black 
savages.  The  civilians  merely  turn  over  the  problem 
to  the  troops,  who  define  the  problem  in  terms  of 

65 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2595 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 

Rebdlion  in  Newark 

using  arms  to  maintain  the  racial  status  quo.  A  typical 
military  attitude  in  the  wake  of  the  riots  was  offered 
in  the  July  29th  Times  by  the  commander  of  the  New 
York  State  National  Guard,  who  said  that  a  greater 
commitment  of  force  might  have  prevented  rioting 
around  the  country.  He  recommended  the  use  of 
heavy  weapons  including  hand  grenades,  recoilless 
rifles  and  bazookas.  He  blamed  indecisive  civilian 
authority  for  making  National  Guard  units  operate 
"with  one  hand  behind  their  backs"  in  riot  areas. 

This  military  orientation  means  that  outright  kill- 
ing of  people  is  condoned  where  those  people  cannot 
accept  law  and  order  as  defined  by  the  majority.  The 
country  is  not  moved  by  the  deaths  of  twenty-five 
Negro  "rioters." 

News  of  a  Negro's  death  is  received  at  most  as  a 
tragedy,  the  inevitable  result  of  looting  and  lawless- 
ness. When  a  picture  appears  of  a  policeman  over  a 
fallen  victim,  the  typical  reaction  is  framed  in  the 
terms  set  by  the  majority:  the  dead  man  is  a  sniper,  a 
looter,  a  burner,  a  criminal.  If  history  is  any  guide,  it 
is  a  foregone  conclusion  that  no  white  policeman  will 
be  punished  for  murder  in  Newark. 

Even  many  white  sympathizers  with  the  Negro 
cause,  and  Negro  leaders  themselves,  believe  that 
disorder  must  be  stopped  so  that,  in  Roy  Wilkins' 
words,  "society  can  proceed."  The  question  they  do 
not  ask  is:  whose  society?  They  say  that  Negro  riot- 
ing will  create  a  backlash  suppressing  the  liberties 
needed  to  organize  for  change.  3ut  this  accurate 

66 


2596  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 


From  Riot  to  Revolution 

prediction  overlooks  the  fact  that  those  very  civil 
liberties  have  meant  little  protection  for  civil  rights 
workers  and  ordinary  black  people  in  the  South,  and 
nearly  a&  little  for  people  in  the  ghettoes  of  the  North. 
T\\t  freedoms  that  middle-class  people  correctly  feel 
are  real  to  themselves  have  very  little  day-to-day 
meaning  in  the  ghetto,  which  is  more  like  a  concen- 
tration camp  than  an  open  society  for  a  large  number 
trf  its  residents.  But  in  order  to  protect  these  liberties, 
many  civil  rights  leaders  take  part  in  condemning  the 
ghetto  to  brutal  occupation.  Even  where  "excessive 
force"  is  deplored,  as  Roy  Wilkins  deplored  it  in 
Newark,  the  assumption  still  remains  that  there  is  a 
■proper"  degree  of  force  that  should  be  used  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo.  Top  officials  welcome  this  liberal 
support,  and  agree  that  any  "excessive"  force  is  re- 
grettable and  will  be  investigated.  Thus  most  of  the 
society  becomes  involved  in  organizing  and  protect- 
ing murder. 

However,  the  use  of  force  can  do  nothing  but 
create  a  demand  for  greater  force.  The  Newark  riot 
shows  that  troops  cannot  make  a  people  surrender. 
The  police  had  several  advantages  over  the  com- 
munity, particularly  in  firepower  and  mechanical 
mobility.  Their  pent-up  racism  gave  them  a  certain 
amount  of  energy  and  morale  as  well.  But  as  events 
m  the  riot  showed,  the  troops  could  not  apply  their 
methods  to  urban  conditions.  The  problem  of  pre- 
cision shooting — for  example,  at  a  sniper  in  a  build- 
ing with  forty  windows  and  escape  routes  through 

67 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2597 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 


RebeUJon  in  Newut 

rooftop,  alley,  and  doorway — is  nearly  as  difficult  in 
the  urban  jungle  as  precision  bombing  is  in  Vietnam. 
There  is  a  lack  of  safe  cover.  There  is  no  front  line 
and  no  rear,  no  way  to  cordon  an  area  completely. 
A  block  that  is  quiet  when  the  troops  are  present  can 
be  the  scene  of  an  outbreak  the  moment  the  troops 
leave. 

At  the  same  time,  the  morale  fueled  by  racism 
soon  turns  into  anxiety.  Because  of  racism,  the  troops 
are  unfamiliar  with  both  the  people  and  structure  of 
the  ghetto.  Patrol  duty  after  dark  becomes  a  fright-, 
ening  and  exhausting  experience,  especially  for  men 
who  want  to  return  alive  to  their  families  and  homes. 
A  psychology  of  desperation  leads  to  careless  and 
indiscriminate  violence  toward  the  community,  in- 
cluding reprisal  killing,  which  inflames  the  people 
whom  the  troops  were  sent  to  pacify. 

The  situation  thus  contains  certain  built-in  advan- 
tages for  black  people.  The  community  is  theirs. 
They  know  faces,  corners,  rooms,  alleys.  They  know 
whom  to  trust  and  whom  not  to  trust.  They  can 
switch  in. seconds  from  a  fighting  to  a  passive  pos- 
ture. It  is  impressive  that  state  and  local  officials 
could  not  get  takers  for  their  offer  of  money  and 
clemency  to  anyone  turning  in  a  sniper. 

This  is  not  a  time  for  radical  illusions  about  "revo- 
lution." Stagnancy  and  conservatism  arc  essential 
facts  of  ghetto  life.  It  undoubtedly  is  true  that  most 
Negroes  desire  the  comforts  and  security  that  white 
people  possess.   There   is   little  revolutionary  con- 

68 


2598  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5— Continued 


From  Riot  to  Revolution 

sciousness  or  commitment  to  violence  per  se  in  the 
ghetto.  Most  people  in  the  Newark  riot  were  afraid, 
unorganiied,  and  helpless  when  directly  facing  the 
automatic  weapons.  But  the  actions  of  white  America 
toward  the  ghetto  are  showing  black  people,  espe- 
cially the  young,  that  they  must  prepare  to  fight  back. 

The  conditions  slowly  are  being  created  for  an 
American  form  of  guerrilla  warfare  based  in  the 
slums  The  riot  represents  a  signal  of  this  funda- 
menui  change. 

lo  the  conservative  mind  the  riot  is  essentially 
revt>4ution  against  civilization.  To  the  liberal  mind 
it  if.  an  expression  of  helpless  frustration.  While  the 
conicrvative  is  hostile  and  the  liberal  generous  toward 
those  who  riot,  both  assume  that  the  riot  is  a  form 
of  lawless,  mob  behavior.  The  liberal  will  turn  con- 
servative if  polite  methods  fail  to  stem  disorder. 
Against  these  two  fundamentally  similar  concepts,  a 
third  one  must  be  asserted,  the  concept  that  a  riot 
represents  people  making  history. 

The  riot  is  certainly  an  awkward,  even  primitive, 
form  of  history-making.  But  if  people  are  barred 
from  using  the  sophisticated  instruments  of  the  es- 
tablished order  for  their  ends,  they  will  find  another 
way.  Rocks  and  bottles  are  only  a  beginning,  but 
they  cause  more  attention  than  all  the  reports  in 
Washington.  To  the  people  involved,  the  riot  is  far 
less  lawless  and  far  more  representative  than  the 
system  of  arbitrary  rules  and  prescribed  channels 
which  they  confront  every  day.  The  riot  is  not  a 

69 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2599 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 


Rebellion  in  Newark 

beautiful  and  romantic  experience,  but  neither  is  the 
day-to-day  slum  life  from  which  the  riot  springs. 
Riots  will  not  go  away  if  ignored,  and  will  not  be 
cordoned  off.  They  will  only  disappear  when  their 
energy  is  absorbed  into  a  more  decisive  and  effective 
form  of  history-making. 

Men  are  now  appearing  in  the  ghettoes  who  might 
turn  the  energy  of  the  riot  to  a  more  organized  and 
continuous  revolutionary  direction.  Middle-class  Ne- 
gro intellectuals  (esi>ecially  students)  and  Negroes 
of  the  ghetto  are  joining  forces.  They  have  found 
channels  closed,  the  rules  of  the  game  stacked,  and' 
American  democracy  a  system  that  excludes  them. 
They  understand  that  the  institutions  of  the  white 
community  are  unreliable  in  the  absence  of  black 
community  power.  They  recognize  that  national  civil- 
rights  leaders  will  not  secure  the  kind  of  change  that 
is  needed.  They  assume  that  disobedience,  disorder, 
and  even  violence  must  be  risked  as  the  only  alterna- 
tive to  continuing  slavery. 

The  role  of  organized  violence  is  now  being  care- 
fully considered.  During  a  riot,  for  instance,  a  con- 
scious guerrilla  can  participate  in  pulling  police  away 
from  the  path  of  people  engaged  in  attacking  stores. 
He  can  create  disorder  in  new  areas  the  police  think 
are  secure.  He  can  carry  the  torch,  if  not  all  the 
people,  to  white  neighborhoods  and  downtown  busi- 
ness districts.  If  necessary,  he  can  successfully  shoot 
to  kill. 

The  guerrilla  can  employ  violence  effectively  dur- 

70 


2600  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 

From  Riot  to  Rr»ofution 

ing  times  of  apparent  "peace,"  too.  He  can  attack,  in 
the  suburbs  or  slums,  with  paint  or  bullets,  symbols 
of  racial  oppression.  He  can  get  away  with  it.  If  he 
can  force  the  oppressive  power  to  be  passive  and  de- 
fensive at  the  point  where  it  is  administered — by  the 
caseworker,  landlord,  storeowner,  or  policeman — he 
can  build  people's  confidence  in  their  ability  to  de- 
mand change.  Persistent,  accurately-aimed  attacks, 
which  need  not  be  on  human  life  to  be  effective, 
might  disrupt  the  administration  of  the  ghetto  to 
a  crisis  point  where  a  new  system  would  have  to  be 
considered. 

These  tactics  of  disorder  will  be  defined  by  the 
authorities  as  criminal  anarchy.  But  it  may  be  that 
disruption  will  create  possibilities  of  meaningful 
change.  This  depends  on  whether  the  leaders  of 
ghetto  struggles  can  be  more  successful  in  building 
strong  organization  than  they  have  been  so  far.  Vio- 
lence can  contribute  to  shattering  the  status  quo,  but 
only  politics  and  organization  can  transform  it.  The 
ghetto  still  needs  the  power  to  decide  its  destiny  on 
such  matters  as  urban  renewal  and  housing,  social 
services,  policing,  and  taxation.  Tenants  still  need 
concrete  rights  against  landlords  in  public  and  private 
housing,  or  a  new  system  of  tenant-controlled  living 
conditions.  Welfare  clients  still  need  a  livable  income. 
Consumers  still  need  to  control  the  quality  of  mer- 
chandise and  service  in  the  stores  where  they  shop. 
Citizens  still  need  effective  control  over  those  who 
police  their  conmiunity.  Political  structures  belonging 

71 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2601 
Hayden  Exhibit  No.  5  — Continued 

Rebellion  in  Newark 

to  the  community  are  needed  to  bargain  for,  and 
maintain  control  over,  funds  from  government  or 
private  sources.  In  order  to  build  a  more  decent  com- 
munity while  resisting  racist  power,  more  than 
violence  is  required.  People  need  to  create  self- 
government.  We  are  at  a  point  where  democracy— 
the  idea  and  practise  of  people  controlling  their  lives 
— ^is  a  revolutionary  issue  in  the  United  States. 


Now  what  is  there  left  to  say  ?  I  will  be  glad  to  repeat  again  what 
I  just  said.  I  think  I  said  it  yesterday.  I  am  on  public  record  as  having 
said  it  other  times  and  other  places.  And  again  I  feel  that  the  dis- 
cussion is  becoming  redundant. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  record  will  stand  as  made. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Mr.  Hayden,  my  specific  question  is — now  that  you  have  the  book  in 
front  of  you  and  the  particular  paragraph  on  page  70, 1  hand  you  back 
what  has  previously  been  marked  as  an  exhibit  before  this  committee, 
which  is  your  "MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  1968." 

I  invite  your  attention  to  page  15,  under  the  subtitle  ''^Black  Re- 
hellions^''  and  my  question  is  still  what  it  was  some  minutes  ago:  Is 
there  not  a  striking  similarity  between  what  is  expressed  in  the  book  on 
page  70  and  what  is  expressed  on  page  15  of  that  particular  handbook 
for  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  there  is  not,  again 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  be  kind  enough 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  believe  increasingly  that  it  is  impossible  to  educate 
you  or  to  speak  with  you,  and  this  will  be  the  last  time,  and  then  we 
svill  move  to  another  kind  of  discussion.  This  will  be  the  last  time. 

I  said  yesterday,  both  in  general  and  through  examples,  what  was 
meant  by  this  statement  and  I  will  say  it  now  m  another  way. 

After  the  outbreak  of  rebellions  in  more  than  100  cities  after  the 
assassination  of  Martin  Luther  King  this  spring,  I  helped  to  organize 
a  meeting  in  Washington  of  white  people  from  around  the  country 
who  are  mcreasingly  concerned  with  how  to  work  within  the  white 
community  directly  against  racism.  These  are  people  from  Detroit, 
from  Boston,  from  New  Jersey,  places  where  rebellions  had  occurred 
either  the  previous  year  or  that  year,  and  we  discussed  the  varieJty 
of  things  that  could  b©  done,  and  the  main  tilings  that  we  felt  could 
be  done  were  essentially  political  things. 

For  example,  when  the  Roxbuiy  riots  seemed  to  be  precipitated  this 
spring,  the  Boston  people  organized  in  a  group  called  People  Against 

21-706  O— 69 — pt.  2 8 


2602  DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  (CONVENTION 

Racism,  organized  a  rally  in  downtown  Boston,  prior  to  the  eruption 
and  expanding,  in  which  they  called  for  no  troops  being  brought  in. 
And  there  were  20,000  people  attended  the  rally^  and  I  believe  that 
being  able  to  bring  that  number  of  white  people  into  downtown  area 
of  the  city  got  them  out  of  their  usual  fear  which  keeeps  them  at  home 
when  they  think  there  is  going  to  be  racial  trouble.  It  had  a  political 
impact  on  the  mayor  of  the  city,  whose  observers  were  there,  and  I 
think  he  himself  attended  and  I  think  that  it  had  an  ofl'ect  in  cooling 
that  situation. 

And  I  gave  a  number  of  other  examples,  but  at  no  time  did  I  advo- 
cate or  carry  into  practice  the  shooting  or  disruptions  or  whatever 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  haven't  asked  you  that  question.  I  think 
you  are  belaboring  the  issue. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  know  you  better  than  you  know  you,  then,  be- 
cause I  know  what  you  are  after.  I  am  just  trying  to  get  it  out  on  the 
table,  and  as  long  as  you  haven't  asked  me  it,  then  we  can  put  it  off 
the  table,  but  then  don't  imply  it.  Don't  bring  it  up ;  I  don't  want  to 
hear  anything  about  it ;  it  is  out  of  order. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  us  answer  the  question.  The  question  is 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  they  are  not  similar. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Could  you  be  kind  enough 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  not  be  kind  enough  to  tell  you  why  they  are  not 
similar;  no. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  In  other  words,  you  would  prefer  to  make  a  speech. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  would  prefer  to  forget  any  attempt  to  be  civil,  or 
have  a  dialogue  with  you,  at  this  point.  Because  I  have  been  here  for  6, 
7,  8  hours.  No  witness  in  the  history  of  your  siUy  committee  has  ever 
granted  you  a  fuller  statement  of  his  philosophy  or  his  views  or  al- 
lowed himself  to  be  subjected  to  more  insane  questioning  without  tak- 
ing offense  to  it,  without  complaining  about  it,  and  now  I  am  going  to 
begin,  because  I  am  tired  of  you 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  questions  be  put. 

Mr.  Hayden.  — pulling  out  of  your  folder 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  Chair  will  decide  on  whether  the  questions  shall  be 
admissible. 

Mr.  Hayden.  — ^newspapers  published,  asking  me  if  what  is  said  in 
those  newspapers  is  true 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  there  be  order  here. 

Mr.  Hayden.  There  is  no  order.  That  is  what  I  am  getting  at,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  Chair  will  decide  whether  the  question  is  or  is  not 
to  be  answered. 

Proceed  with  another  point. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Could  I  ask  a  question  at  this  point  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD,  Yes. 

Mr,  AsHBROOK.  So  long  as  we  are  straightening  up  the  record  and 
you  say,  "I  never  urged  that,"  is  the  committee  also  to  understand 
that  U.S.  News  <&  World  Report  of  September  9, 1968,  is  wrong? 

Mr.  HL\YDEN.  You  know  it  is  wrong, 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  No,  I  don't  know  it  is  wrong ;  I  am  asking  you,  in 
your  statement  that  you  said  in  addressing  a  rally  in  Grant  Park,  and 
I  quote: 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2603 

If  they  want  blood  to  flow  from  our  heads,  the  blood  will  flow  from  a  lot  of 
other  heads  around  this  city  and  around  the  country.  We  must  take  to  the 
streets,  for  the  streets  belong  to  the  people.  ...  It  may  well  be  that  the  era — 

Mr.  Hayden.  Sir,  I  have  already  stated,  over  and  over,  what  I 
feel  about  that. 
Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Now  wait  a  minute.  Let  me  finish. 
Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  think  the  question  has  been  asked. 
Mr.  AsHBROOK  [continues  reading] . 

It  may  well  be  that  the  era  of  organized,  peaceful  and  orderly  demonstrations 
is  coming  to  an  end  and  that  other  methods  will  be  needed. 

This  is  attributed  to  you.  I  say  "attributed,"  as  a  direct  quote,  in  a 
U.S.  News  c&  World  Report  of  September  9.  Now  following  up  on 
your  statement  which  you  just  made,  that  you  never  at  any  time  urged 
that,  this  type  of  action,  did  you  say  this,  or  is  the  U.jS.  News  (&  World 
Report  story  wrong? 

As  I  say,  it  indicates  that  you  addressed  a  rally  in  Grant  Park. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  see,  there  is  a  kind  of  a — there  is,  maybe  there  is 
a  brainlessness  here. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  I  don't  have  any  trouble  understanding  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  do  have  trouble.  You  do  have  trouble  under- 
standing it. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  I  have  no  trouble 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  the  question  is  very  pertinent.  Is  this  a  mis- 
quotation of  your  statement  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  it  is  what  I  have  been  virtually  saying  in  exactly 
the  same  words  for  2  days  before  you.  That  if  you  are  attacked  by 
somebody  and  your  head  is  split,  that  I  believe  that  it  is  within  your 
legislative  rights  to,  at  least  moral  rights,  to  hit  back. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  That  is  a  very 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  very  different  from  what  we  have  just  got  done 
reading,  because  out  there  in  the  suburbs,  when  a  rebellion  is  going  on 
over  here,  you  are  standing  there,  you  are  not  being  aggressed  upon,  no 
one  is  attacking  you,  you  are  not  being  shot  at,  you  are  not  being  tear 
gassed.  And  it  is  further  true,  as  Chicago  demonstrates,  that  we  are 
now  in  a  situation  where  the  possibility  of  having  a  peaceful  demon- 
stration is  continually  jeopardized,  and  the  era  of  peaceful  demonstra- 
tions symbolized  b}^  1961  to  1968  may  very  well  be  at  an  end.  But  that 
you  can  get  from  picking  up  the  morning  paper  and  looking  at  Ocean 
Hill-Brownsville;  you  don't  have  to  have  me  here  to  point  that  out  to 
you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  There  is  still  an  unanswered  element,  Mr.  Hayden. 

We  don't  know  whether  the  statements  are  correctly — that  they  are 
correct  quotes  of  your  statement,  and  that  was  the  question  directed 
to  you. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Yes ;  I  brought  up  this  point  because  my  recollection 
of  what  he  said  was  that  he  had  never  said  anything  of  that  type,  and 

now,  of  course,  under  this  circumstance 

Mr.  Hayden.  Those  are  not  things  of  the  same  type.  There  is  a 
difference.  Oh,  forget  it. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  line  with  this  same  inquiry,  if  I  may 
direct  your  attention  to  your  appearance  before  the  President's  Com- 


2604  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

mission,  in  which  I  had  a  copy  of  a  task  force  report,  particularly  want 
to  direct  your  attention  to  pages  1777, 1778,  and  1779. 

Page  1777  you  and  Mr.  Jaworski,  I  believe,  engaged  in  some  dia- 
logue about  who  was  responsible  for  violence  in  draft  board  affairs. 
That  is  the  background  of  the  particular  questions  that  I  wish  to  ask 
you,  sir. 

Then,  starting  on  page  1778,  appears  the  following  question  by  Mr. 
Jaworski :  "This  is  not  in  line  with  this  policy,  your  movement,  these 
acts  of  violence  ? " 

Mr.  Hayden's  answer :  "No." 

And  I  take  it  that  this  is  your  answer,  is  it  not,  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Ask  your  question,  and  give  me  the  transcript. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  go  on  and  read  the  remainder  of  these  questions. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  And  then  hand  him  the  transcript. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then  Mr.  Jaworski  asked : 

You  don't  approve  of  any  of  them  yourself,  do  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  say  this,  I  would  not  morally  condemn  a  person  who  en- 
gages in  such  sabotage  because  I  understand  the  way  he  feels,  I  think  that  a  lot 
of  people  understand  the  way  he  feels.  I  think  it  is  a  counter-productive  tactic.  If 
he  was  involved  in  killing  the  poor  secretaries  who  work  in  draft  boards,  then,  I 
would  morally  object  and  try  to  find  ways  to  intervene.  But  so  long  as  the  damage 
is  to  private  property,  I  would  not  mortally  condemn  it  while  I  do  not  think  it  is 
a  useful  tactic,  although  it  has  become  fairly  useful  for  the  labor  movement. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  ask  you  if  that  is  an  accurate  transcript  of  what 
occurred  between  you  and  Mr.  Jaworski. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  had  the  same  problem  with  Jaworski  that  I  am  hav- 
ing with  you.  We  went  over  this  and  over  this. 

Now  what  you  have  just  read  seems  to  me  perfectly  clear,  and  it 
seems  to  me  I  have  already  testified  over  and  over. 

Mr.  CoNHEY.  Sir,  I  haven't  asked  you  what  it  meant.  Wliat  I  have 
asked  you  is.  Is  this  an  accurate  copy  of  the  testimony  ? 

Mr.  Hayden-.  This  is  an  accurate  copy  of  the  transcript. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  In  which  I  say  that  I  do  not  believe  that  acts  of 
sabotage  or  terror  are  effective  or  meaningful  in  this  particular  time. 
But  if  such  acts  are  carried  out,  for  instance,  the  napalming  of  the 
records  of 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  hate  to  interrupt,  but  I  haven't  asked 
you  that.  I  have  just  asked  you  if  this  was  an  accurate  transcript. 
Please,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  he  has  answered  that  question. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  He  has  answered  the  question  of  whether  it  was  an 
accurate  transcript.  Proceed. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  if  I  may  have  the  transcript  again,  I  want  to 
ask  you  one  or  two  other  questions,  and  then  if  you  want  to  make  any 
explanation,  you  certainly  may. 

Moving  on  down  to  the  bottom  of  page  1778,  Mr.  Jaworski  put  this 
question  to  you : 

Do  you  either  espouse  or  condone  those  practices? 

And  your  answer : 

I  thought  I  answered  that.  I  will  not  object  to  that  practice  of  destruction  of 
private  property  on  moral  grounds.  I  do  not  prescribe  it  or  advocate  it.  and  I 
know  of  no  organization  that  does  prescribe  or  advocate  it. 


DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2605 

And  Mr.  Jaworski  said : 

You  are  in  sympathy  with  it,  that  is  what  you  are  trying  to  say  to  us? 

And  then  you  answered : 

I  am  in  sympathy  with  Senators  who  stand  on  the  floor  and  denounce  the  war 
in  Vietnam, 

Mr.  Jaworski.  I  am  not  talking  about  the  war  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  BUyden.  I  am  in  sympathy  with  anybody  who  is  opposed  to  the  war. 

Mr.  Jaworski.  We  are  talking  about  destruction.  These  acts  that  you  have 
described  to  us,  are  you  in  sympathy  with  them  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  morally  sympathize  with  people  who  feel  that  way.  I  don't 
think  it  is  tactically  or  strategically  effective. 

Mr.  Jaworski.  That  is  all. 


I  will  ask  you  again,  sir,  if  that  is  an  accurate 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  true. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  — if  that  is  an  accurate  transcript  of  your  testimony 
before  the  President's  Commission  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  relatively  accurate. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  are  there  any  errors  in  the  transcript? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  haven't  gone  over  the  transcript. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  be  kind  enough  to  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  object  to  anything  that  you  have  read,  being, 
you  know,  credited  to  me. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  And  sir,  let  me  ask  you  this,  and  now 
this  ^ives  you  your  opportunity  for  your  explanation,  if  you  care: 
Is  this  your  conviction  with  reference  to  violence  as  you  have  set  it 
forth  here  in  the  report  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Of  course. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  youj  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden,  in  connection  with  the  testimony  of  Captain  Kinney 
this  past  spring  in  the  Newark  riots,  he  mentioned  that  a  number  of 
persons  were  associated  with  you  in  the  Newark  area  prior  to  these 
particular  riots,  and  among  the  people  that  he  mentioned  were  a  Carol 
Grlassman,  a  Constance  Brown,  and  a  Corinna  Fales.  Were  these  peo- 
ple not  also  with  you  during  the  demonstrations  which  occurred  in 
Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Depends  what  you  mean  by  with  me.  They  were  in 
Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  They  were  not  with  me. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And,  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  not  also  a  fact  that  the  com- 
munication center  for  the  National  Mobilization  in  Chicago  during 
the  demonstrations  and  disturbances  was  manned  by  Carol  Glassman  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Miss  Glassman  was  not 

Mr.  Hayden.  She  was  one  of  a  good  number  of  people  who  worked 
in  the  communications  center. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir.  And  she  is  also  the  same  Carol  Glass- 
man  that  attended  the  conference  with  you  at  Bratislava,  Czech- 
slovakia ;  is  she  not  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  not  also  true 
that  two  of  your  other  associates,  Constance  Brown  and  Corinna  Fales, 
were  in  Chicago  and  charged  with  pouring  some  type  of  acid  on  the 
lobby  of  a  hotel  there  in  Chicago  ? 


2606  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  HIatden.  They  were  so  arrested. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  As  far  as  I  know.  I  mean,  I  wasn't  able  to  be  around 
at  the  time. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  have  not  asked  you  if  you  saw  the  act  occur.  I 
asked  you  if  you  were  aware  of  the  fact  that  they  were 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  wasn't  even  able  to  be  anywhere  in  the  city  of 
Chicago  because  of  the  police. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  at  the  time  of  her  arrest 
on  this  particular  charge  of  dispensing  acid,  or  whatever  it  was,  on 
the  floor  of  the  hotel,  Connie  Brown  had  in  her  possession  a  paper  con- 
taining the  following  words,  quote : 

hunting  slingshot,  ball  bearings — buy  at  sports  shop.  Jacks  w[ith]  points  on 
all  sides,  cans  of  lighter  fluid,  cans  of  spray  paint,  pieces  of  garden  hose,  cherry 
bombs,  fire  crackers 

Mr.  Hayden,  I  hand  you  a  photocopy  of  that  particular  document 
and  ask  you  if  you  have  ever  seen  that  before  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  never  have. 

Mr.  Conley.  Do  you  recognize  the  handwritmg  on  the  document, 
sir? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  possible  that  I  do,  but  I  would  not  want  to  try 
to  identify  the  handwriting. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  the  handwriting  similar  to  the  handwriting  of 
Constance  Brown  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  could  be.  Why  don't  you  ask  her  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  was  this  type  of  information  which  is 
contained  in  this  document  in  any  way  given  to  the  people  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  demonstrations  in  Chicago  by  you  or  any  other  mem- 
bers of  the  steering  committee  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  ? 

Mr,  Hayden.  I  told  you  that  I  didn't  even  know  about  this  so-called 
document.  It  sounds  like  something  Mayor  Daley  wrote,  because  it 
lists  the  kind  of  weapons  that  he  said  the  demonstrators  carried.  I  have 
already  said  that,  or  at  least  I  guess  in  general  I  have  already  said 
that  no  such  things  were  advocated  officially  or  unofficially  by  any- 
one connected  with  the  Mobilization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  to  you 

Mr.  Hayden.  But  what  is  your  meaning  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  My  question  to  you,  and  I  will  repeat  the  question, 
because  I  think  again  you  are  reading  more  into  my  questions  than  I 
intend  for  you  to  read 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  just  trying  to  speed  the  hearing  up. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  you  will  speed  it  up  but  listening  to  the  question. 
The  question  again  was.  To  your  knowledge  did  any  member  of  Na- 
tional Mobilization  Steering  Committee  or  National  Mobilization's 
staff  put  out  information  of  this  type  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Didn't  I  just  answer  that? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  didn't  ask  you  if  you  put  out  this  document. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  the  answer  is  no. 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  All  right,  sir;  to  your  knowledge  did  you  hear  any 
member  of  National  Mobilization  Committee  advocating  the  purchase 
of  or  procuring  of  these  type  objects  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2607 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Thank  you,  sir.  Mr.  Hayden,  the  Chicago  Tribune  on 
May  22d  of  1968  featured 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  sorry.  The  date,  please  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  May  22, 1968,  in  an  interview  with  you  by  their  report- 
er, Michael  Kilian — and  this  interview  occurred  in  the  offices  of  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee,  407  South  Dearborn,  Chicago — Mr. 
Kilian  quoted  you  as  saying  to  him,  quote,  "What  we  are  seeking  is 
instability." 

And  he  stated  that  he  overheard  you  taking  a  telephone  call  from 
New  Jersey,  in  which  you  were  overheard  to  say,  quote :  "Fine,  send 
them  on  out.  We'll  start  the  revolution  now.  Do  they  want  to  fight?" 

Mr.  Hayden,  are  these  quotations  correct  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  that  I  know  of,  sir.  Kilian,  I  believe,  is  an  agent 
of  the  Chicago  Police  Department, 

Mr.  Ichord.  You  are  saying  you  are  not  correctly  quoted,  Mr. 
Hayden  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  believe  that  I  said  that.  But  I  will  tell  you  what 
the  conversation  was  about.  And  again  it  is  an  example  of  your  ex- 
traordinary inability  to  think. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  see  anything  extraordinary  about  it  at  all,  Mr. 
Hayden.  It  is  very  pertinent. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  will  be  glad  to  explain  to  you  why  I  was  seeking 
instability. 

Mr.  Kilian  dropped  by,  and  we  talked,  had  a  little  interview  for 
5  or  10  minutes,  in  which  Mr.  Kilian  asked  me  my  views  about  universi- 
ties and  whether  they  would  shut  down  in  the  fall.  And  I  said  that  I 
thought  that  there  was  a  tremendous  showdown  coming  on  college 
campuses,  for  example,  in  California,  between  regents  and  business- 
men and  State  legislatures  on  the  one  hand,  and  students  and,  increas- 
ingly, faculty  on  the  other  hand,  and  that  this  would  lead  to  a  crisis 
for  the  administration  of  the  universities,  to  force  them  to  side  either 
with  the  tradition  of  the  university  or  side  with  the  State  and  business 
interests  that  control  universities. 

So  you  would  have  a  situation  in  w^hich  one  university  administra- 
tor after  another  would  either  be  fired  or  be  retired,  and  I  think  that 
that  is  highly  desirable.  Until  the  university  situation  straightens 
itself  out,  and  that  certainly  is  happening  today  at  San  Fran  State ;  it 
has  happened  at  the  University  of  California ;  it  has  happened  at  other 
universities.  University  administrators,  university  presidents,  are  be- 
ing forced  to  choose  what  kind  of  university  they  want.  One  that 
serves  business,  or  one  that  serves  the  traditions  of  academic  freedom. 

And  this  instability  of  university  administrations  is  a  very  im- 
portant sign  that  times  are  changing. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden 

Mr.  Hayden.  And  I  would  like  to  further  point  out,  since  I  recall 
the  conversation  from  memory,  that  the  article  again  is  an  example  of 
your  extraordinary  manipulation  of  information. 

You  choose  the  word  "instability."  "What  we  are  seeking  is  in- 
stability," in  the  context  of  a  14-  or  15-inch  article,  which  states 
pretty  much  exactly  what  I  just  said.  But  you  didn't  say  that  it  re- 
ferred to  college  presidents,  that  it  referred  to  college  campuses,  that 
it  referred  to  anything  but  instability,  as  if  instability  was  an  end  in 
itself. 


2608  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  Mr.  Hayden,  we  didn't  ever  infer  that  it  re- 
ferred to  the  Democratic  Convention,  did  we  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  yet. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Di  SuvEEO.  May  we  have  this  marked  in  evidence? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  6."  See  page  2609.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  us  go  back. 

You  say  that  the  quotes  are  not  accurate ;  that  Mr.  Kilian  has  not 
properly  quoted  you  or  not  properly  related  what  occurred,  so  the 
quotation,  then,  "What  we  are  seeking  is  instability,"  taken,  as  you 
put  it,  from  a  larger  contention,  that  is  not  an  accurate  quote  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  not  an  accurate  quote,  but  the  context  is  right 
there  in  the  story.  It  is  not  Kilian's  fault,  it  is  your  fault. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  what  about  the  second  quotations  which 
have  been  attributed  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Those  are  an  unbelievable  joke. 

Mr.  Conley.  Are  you  saying  that  Mr.  Kilian,  representing  the 
Ohicago  Tribune^  has  misquoted  you  specifically 

Mr.  Hayden.  Would  you  think  that  I  would  say  in  front  of  a 
Chicago  Tribune  reporter  what  was  ascribed  to  me,  unless  it  was  said 
with  a  sense  of  humor  right  in  front  of  his  face,  which  could  have 
been  possible  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  saying  that  you  could  have  said  this,  then? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  certainly  could  have  said  it,  but  my  question  to  you 
is  what  you  think  I  meant  by  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  question  is  being  put  to  you,  Mr.  Hayden. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  question  is  a  very  simple  one.  Did  you  or  did  you 
not  say  it  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  did  not,  but  I  could 
have. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  and  if  you  could  have,  which  means  you 
really  don't  know  whether  you  did  or  didn't  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  I  did  not,  but  I  could 
have. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  executive  session,  the 
1st  of  October  of  this  year,  this  committee  received  testimony  from 
an  individual  identified  as  J.  Herbert  Rees. 

Mr.  di  Suvero.  How  do  you  spell  that  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  The  last  name  ? 

Mr.  DI  Suvero.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  R-e-e-s. 

Mr.  DI  Suvero.  That  was  what  date? 

Mr.  Conley.  October  2d. 

*  *  *  *  *  *  *i 

Mr.  DI  Suvero.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  have  a  moment? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Just  a  moment. 

(Discussion  off  the  record.) 

(Witness'  counsel  confers  with  chairman  and  then  with  liis  client.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Tliere  is  some  question  as  to  whether  the  question,  Mr. 
Counsel,  is  admissible.  The  connnittee  will  be  in  recess.  I  want  to  be 
completely  fair  with  the  witness,  whether  the  question  is  admissible 

1  Question  stricken  from  r^cooxl  by  order  of  chairman.  See  p.  2610. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2609 
Hayden  Exhibit  No.  6 


2  -    SecUun  IJ^ 


iiv 


CHICAtiO  TRIBUNE,  WEDNESDAY,  MAY  22,  1968 


TELLS  COLLEGE 
REBELS'  GOAL: 
FULL  CONTROL| 

Leader  Threatens  to| 
Close  Universities  | 

BY  m;chael  kilian      ! 

The  goal  of  the  recent  student  I 
rebellions  la  to'  make  the, 
administCations  of  all  colleges 
and  universities  subordinate  to 
the  student  body  and  (acuity,  a 
new  left  student  leader  ~  de- 
clared yesterday. 

In  an.  Interview.'  Thomas 
Hayden,  28,  a  founder  of  the 
militant  Students  for  a  Demo- 
cratic Society,  said  that,  rather 
than  ending  the  war  in  Viet 
Nam  or  furthering  civil  rights, 
the  tr^e  aim  of  the  rebellions 
ha.s  been  student  control  ol 
universities.  Hayden,  an  anti- 
war activist,  is  now  operating 
in  the  Chicago  area  but  he  still 
has  no  permanent  address 
here. 

toclades  AH  CoUegef 

"The  universities  are  domi- 
nated by  the  conservative  and 
middle  class  ctUblishment,  and 
do  not  serve  the  intellectual 
worjt  of  the  students."  he 
charged. 

He  extended  this  allegation  to 
all  educational  institutions,  in- 
'  eluding  several-tiberal  univer- 
sities  in  the  east. 

He  said  if  college  adminis- 
tratorj'do  not  make  themselves 
subordlncte  to  students,  *'we 
will  close  them  Ltbe  colleges] 
all  dftwn." 

Hayden,  who  was  a  partici- 
pant in  Ihe  recent  seige  at  Co- 


1_^ 


lumbia  university,  said  univer- 
sities will  in  effect  "close  them- 
selves down"  by  resisting  stu- 
dent protest. 

Tells  Goal:  'InsUbiUty'*^ 

'They  will  be  caiigbt  in  the 
middle,"  he  said.  "Between  the 
students  and  the  establishment. 
More  and  more  administrators 
will  resign.  What  we  are 
seeking  is  instability." 

In  public  statements  earlier 
this  week,  Hayden  s^id  .  it 
wouldn't  matter  much  if  uni- 
versities are  shut  down  because 
"the  students  viio  go  tliere  are 
not  learning  very  much  any- 
way." 

He  claimed  that  repressive 
measures  against  rebellious 
students  will  only  furtlier  tfll 
student  cause. 

"If  you  want  to'  bring  the 
system  down,"  he  said,  "then 
start  locking  aD  of  us  up.  If 
they  send  police,  then  you 
become  revolutionaries."  > 

Plan  U.  S.  O.'s  for  Peace 

Hayden  is  working  out  of  an 
office  at  407  S.  Dearbtmi  St., 
where  youth  groups  are  trying 
to  organize  U.  S.  O.'s  for  Peace, 
a  system  of  coffee  shops 
outside  army  bases  where 
soldiers  are  invited  to  attend 
free  folk  music  shows,  hear 
anti-war     lectures,     and    use 


libraries  where  peace  hteraturA' 
is  available. 

The  interview  was  conducted 
in  a  room  off  the  main 
Dearborn  st.  office.  Curtailing 
the  interview  after  a  ■  few 
minutes,  Hayden  went  into  the 
next  room  to  take  a  phone  call 
from  New  Jersey. 

He  was  overheard  by  this 
reporter  to  say: .  "Fine,  send 
them  on  out.  We'll  start  the 
revolution  sow.  Do  they  want  to 
fight?" 

Recaft  Newark  Testimony 
Appearing  before  the  House 
CO mmittee  on  un-Americaa 
activities  in  April,  Capt. 
Charles  E.  Kinnly  of  the 
Newark  police  department  de- 
scribed Hayden's  group  as 
"honeycombed  with  subver- 
sives aod  commui^st  char- 
acters'' who  moved  into  New- 
ark irl964  and  exploited  every 
possible  aitualion  they  could 
encounter.  ■, 

Hayden  retnmed  to  Chicago 
last  week  from  Newark,  where 
he  had  been  doing  research  on 
the  July,  1987.  riou. 

His  passport  was  ordered 
revoked  by  the  state  depart- 
ment in  1966  after  he  accpm- 
paoied  StaugbtOD  Lynd,  a  hi»- 
lory  prolesaor.  now  lo  Ch>cago. 
OS  an  onautbonied  trip  to 
North  Viet  Nam. 

Chrft  RlfkU  Ftfbter 
Bom  tn  Royal  Oak.  Mich,  io 
IMO.   Haydeo  graduated   from 
the  UatvertUy  of  .Michigan^ia 

1961.  where  be  was  editor  ofthe 
MJchigan  Daily. 

An   early    orgftnuer   of   the 

Student  NoD-viol\nt  Coordinat- 
ing committee,  wmch  now  ha» 
b^  ta^en  over  by  black  power 
militants,  Hayden  traveled  with 
his  wife,  Casey,  thniout  tlie 
country  on  behalf  of  civil  rights 
causes.  He  Iselped  in*  the 
formation    of    the    S.  D.  S.    in 

1962.  and  with  SUughton  Lynd, 
authored  the  book  "The  Other 
Side."  following  their  travels  to 
North  Viet  Nam. 

Hayden  and  his  wife  have 
since  separated. 


2610  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

under  the  rules,  and  the  committee  will  be  in  recess  for  a  few  minutes 
while  the  Chair  examines  the  rules. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Thank  you. 

(A  brief  recess  was  taken  from  11  to  11 :04  a.m.  Subcommittee 
members  present  at  time  of  recess  and  when  hearings  resumed :  Rep- 
resentatives Ichord,  Aslibrook,  and  Watson.) 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

This,  Mr.  Counsel,  is  a  very  close  question  under  the  rules,  and  the 
Chair,  as  a  member  of  the  Congress  and  having  the  responsibility  as 
chairman  of  this  subcommittee,  is  bound  by  the  rules.  Rule  26  (m)  reads 
as  follows: 

If  the  committee  determines  that  evidence  or  testimony  at  an  investigative 
hearing  may  tend  to  defame,  degrade,  or  incriminate  any  person,  it  shall — 

( 1 )  receive  such  evidence  or  testimony  in  executive  session ; 

(2)  afford  such  person  an  opportunity  voluntarily  to  appear  as  a  witness ;  and 

(3)  receive  and  dispose  of  requests  from  such  person  to  subpena  additional 
vdtnesses. 

The  answer  to  the  question  would  possibly  incriminate  the  mdi- 
vidual.  The  counsel  for  the  witness  has  come  forward  and  raised  that 
as  an  objection. 

The  Chair  will  rule  under  rule  26  (m)  that  the  question  is  out  of 
order. 

Proceed  with  the  next  question. 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  just  like  to  set  the  record 
straight  that  I  did  not  make  the  objection  on  the  basis  that  the  state- 
ment would  incriminate  the  witness,  and  that  was  not  the  basis. 

I  do  appreciate  the  Chair's  ruling,  however,  and  its  respect  for  its 
own  rules.  And  I  therefore  request  that  the  full  question  be  stricken 
from  the  record  as  bemg  improperly  advanced  by  counsel. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Tliere  may  be  a  proper  way  of  asking  tlie  question,  but 
the  counsel  has  not  chosen  that  way  at  this  time.  The  Chair  will  strike 
the  question  from  the  record. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  will  ask  you  if  you  are  familiar  with  a 
publication  known  as  ChuUenge. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Somewhat  familiar,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  On  page  IB  of  the  September  1968  Challenge^  appears 
the  following  quote,  attributed  to  you,  sir. 

Hayden  said  in  Grant  Park  on  Wednesday,  "This  city  and  the  military  ma- 
chinery it  has  aimed  at  us  won't  permit  us  to  protest  in  an  organized  fashion. 
Therefore  we  must  move  out  of  this  park  in  groups  throughout  the  city  and 
turn  this  overheated  military  machine  against  itself.  Let  us  make  sure  that  if 
blood  flows,  it  flows  all  over  this  city ;  if  they  use  gas  against  us,  let's  make 
sure  they  use  gas  against  their  own  citizens." 

Mr.  Hayden,  my  question  is,  Did  you  make  that  statement  on 
August  28  in  Grant  Park,  at  the  bandshell,  at  approximately  2  p.m.? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  made  a  statement  similar  to  that,  somewhat  longer,  at 
approximately  that  time,  just  after  the  police  brought  down  the  Ameri- 
can flag,  charged  the  crowd,  and  split  Rennie  Davis'  scalp  and  sur- 
rounded the  demonstrators  who  were  trying  to  nonviolently  begin  to 
march  to  the  Amphitheatre,  led  by  David  Dellinger. 

At  that  time  with  National  Guardsmen  standing  on  the  roof  of  the 
museum,  with  gas  coming  down  all  over  the  park,  with  women  and 
children  trying  to  flee,  I  thought  that  we  were  in  a  cul  de  sac,  sur- 
rounded by  police.  And  my  advice  to  the  crowd  was  that  it  would  be 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2611 

probably  futile  to  expect  to  be  able  to  march  even  as  far  as  the  Con- 
rad Hilton,  and  so  people  should  separp^s  into  groups  of  their  fTiends, 
keep  track  of  each  other,  because  it  was  a  very  dangerous  situation,  and 
get  out  of  the  bandshell  area  and  go  back  to  the  area  of  the  Conrad 
Hilton  and  the  Loop,  where  we  had  been  demonstrating  for  the  pre- 
vious 3  or  4  days. 

And  about  the  overheated  military  machinery  and  the  blood  and 
the  gas,  I  think  I  spoke  at  great  length  about  that  yesterday.  My  feel- 
ing all  along  was  that  the  excessive  military  preparations  would  lead  to 
a  state  of  insecurity  for  the  city  itself  and  perhaps  close  the 
convention. 

The  convention  would  disrupt  itself,  not  that  we  would  invade  it,  but 
it  would  disrupt  itself.  And  the  thing  that  I  did  not  want  to  happen  on 
August  28  was  for  all  of  these  demonstrators  to  be  trapped  down  by 
the  bandshell  and  wiped  out  by  the  police. 

If  they  were  going  to  be  wiped  out,  if  the  convention  was  going  to 
end  with  mass  arrests  or  with  mass  gassing  or  with  mass  bloodshed,  my 
feeling  was  that  it  should  take  place  in  front  of  the  Conrad  Hilton  or 
in  the  Loop.  And  I  hoped  that  if  I  was  going  to  pass  out  from  the  gas 
that  it  would  waft  its  way  into  the  15th  floor  suite  of  Hubert  Humph- 
rey as  well  J  which  it  did,  and  make  him  get  the  real  sweet  smell  of 
democracy  in  Chicago,  himself. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  if  I  may  move  back  to  something  that  we 
touched  on  earlier,  and  that  is  the  article  which  appeared  in  the  Chi- 
cago Tribune  under  date  of  May  22,  as  I  reread  this  article,  you  men- 
tioned that  you  would  be  a  fool  to  have  made  such  a  statement  as  was 
attributed  to  you  in  that  article  in  the  presence  of  a  reporter  for  the 
Tribune. 

As  I  read  that  article 

Mr.  Hayden.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Looking  back  through  it,  it  appears  that  perhaps  you 
left  the  room  and  went  to  another  room,  and  that  the  reporter  over- 
heard your  telephone  conversation.  Is  that  not  what  you  read  in  that 
article  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Listen,  we  are  the  most  open  organization  you  will 
ever  investigate.  That  is  why  you  can't  catch  us.  We  allowed  any 
reporter  or  any  spy  from  your  committee  or  anywhere  else  to 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Hayden,  let  me  explain  to  you.  We  are  not  trying  to 
trap  you,  we  are  trying  to  find  out  the  facts.  You  are  not  called  before 
this  coimnittee  to  be  punished  or  to  be  tried  for  any  crime. 

Mr.  Hayden,  That  is  a  matter  of  interpretation. 

Mr.  IcHORD,  Well,  proceed,  sir, 

Mr,  AsHBROOK,  Just  a  minute.  On  the  matter  of  interpretation,  I 
have  listened  very  carefully  to  your  very  articulate  defense  of  what 
you  said  or  what  you  believe.  Up  to  now  you  have  talked  about  vio- 
lence in  the  sense  that,  to  use  your  words,  I  believe,  it  might  be  defen- 
sible ;  in  other  cases,  it  might  be  the  type  of  thing  you  would  acquiesce 
in.  But  now,  to  be  quite  honest  and  frank,  don't  these  words  sound  a 
little  bit  more  like  exhortations  to  violence  than  mere  defensibility 
of  violence  or  acquiescence  in  violence  ? 

Mr,  Hayden,  No,  sir;  you  have  to  have  been  there  to  understand 
what  I  was  talking  about,  I  was  speaking  while  people,  including 
myself,  were  gagging  on  tear  gas,  people  were  being  carried  off  on 
stretchers,  mobile  hospitals  were  being  set  up  before  our  eyes,  police 


2612  DISRUPTION  OP  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

were  being  moved  in  in  columns,  and  the  violence  was  already  around 
us. 

It  was  hardly  exhortation,  except  exhortation  to  move  this  whole 
situation  over  to  the  Hilton  and  try  to  escape  for  as  long  as  possible 
the  obvious  attack  that  was  accelerating  against  us  right  before  our 
eyes. 

This  is  on  film.  I  am  sure  my  speech  is  tape  recorded.  You  don't 
have  to  go  into  executive  session  to  listen  to  it.  And  that  is  the  kind  of 
exhortation  that  it  was,  and  I  stand  by  it. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hay  den,  moving  to  another  subject,  did  you  attend 
a  meeting  in  Washington,  D.C,  on  September  14  of  this  year,  where 
further  plans  were  made  by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  in 
connection  with  the  upcoming  elections?  Did  you  attend  such  a 
meeting  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes,  I  went  to  such  a  meeting.  I  naturally  don't  remem- 
ber the  exact  date,  but  it  was  in  Washington,  about  that  time. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Keading  from  the  minutes  of  that  meet- 
ing, and  I  will,  if  you  do  not  have  a  copy,  supply  them  to  you  as  soon 
as  I  finish  reading  them 

Mr.  Hayden.  Please. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  says,  paragraph : 

Tom  Hayden  explained  that  the  removal  of  Johnson  to  silence  the  anti-war 
sentiment  underscores  the  strategic  relationship  of  the  war  to  the  election 
and  the  candidates.  He  felt  the  ouitlined  Davis  proposal  would  successfully 
surface  anti-war,  anti-racist  sentiment,  would  allow  moderates  to  participate  in 
the  rallies  and  permit  more  militant  action  for  the  youth.  He  explained  that 
working  classes  wouldn't  be  changed  by  "cooling  it"  or  by  educational  state- 
ments, but  that  the  work  with  the  armed  forces  during  GI  week  would  pre- 
pare new  ground.  He  argued  against  the  conservative  tone  being  injected  into 
the  meeting. 

Mr.  Hayden,  this  is  the  copy  of  those  notes.  I  will  ask  you  if  that  is 
substantially  what  you  said  at  that  time. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.)  ^ 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  a  fairly — substantially  my  position  at  that 
time. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now,  isn't  it  a  fact  that  at  that  particular 
meeting  three  individuals,  whom  we  will  identify  as  pacifists,  sug- 
gested that  a  nonviolent  stance  be  assumed  by  the  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee, and  isn't  it  also  true  that  you  stood  up  and  disagreed  wih  this 
particular  position  ?  And  I  refer  you  specifically  to  your  words  in  that, 
which  are  a  "more  militant  action  for  the  youth." 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  that  doesn't  mean  that.  That  doesn't  mean  more 
militant  in  a  sense,  higher  degree  of  militance,  but  continuing  mili- 
tance.  More  militant.  It  provides  another,  a  further  militant  action 
for  youth  as  a  f olio wth  rough  from  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  To  me,  sir,  the  better  choice  of  words  would  have  been 
"continuing  militance." 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  you  weren't  the  secretary ;  and  we  didn't  expect 
HUAC,  with  its  double  and  triple  meanings,  to  examine  the  notes. 
But  I  would  be  glad  to  explain  at  great  length,  right  now,  everything 
that  is  meant  by  each  and  every  word. 

^  Previously  marked  "Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  26."  See  pt.  1,  pp.  2358-2365,  of  Oct.  1,  1968, 
hearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2613 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Counsel,  at  this  point — when  you  advocate  more 
militancy,  granted,  I  am  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  construe  that  in 
other  than  its  simplest  terms,  and  that  means,  to  me,  "more  militant." 

The  question  I  would  like  to  know,  since  you  are  giving  different 
interpretations  now  to  such  terms  that  you  have  used  as  "carry  the 
torch,"  "shoot  to  kill,"  "more  militancy,"  did  you  explain  at  that  time 
what  you  meant  by  these  terms  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  they  were  not  to  be  construed  in  the  usual  sense 
of  their  meaning  ? 

Mr.  Hayde'N.  Well,  that  is  a  joke,  the  way  you  put  the  question. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  you  are  giving  them  different  meanings  now, 
and  all  I  am  asking  you  is  whether  or  not  you  explained,  at  that  time, 
to  those  that  you  were  urging  to  carry  out  these  particular  activities, 
that  you  did  not  mean  them  to  be  literally  taken,  as  an  average  person 
would  construe  them.  That  is 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  that  people  at  the  meeting  could  understand 
my  terms.  I  argued  that  the  elections  should  not  be  disrupted ;  that 
there  should  not  be  violence  around  polling  places ;  that  there  should 
be  demonstrations  everywhere  in  the  country  against  the  fraudulent 
choice  put  forward  to  the  voters,  of  Nixon,  Humphrey,  and  Wallace ; 
that  those  people  who  don't  feel  represented — either  because  they  can't 
agree  with  any  of  these  three  law-and-order  candidates,  or  because  they 
do  not  have  the  right  to  vote,  which  is  true  of  most  young  people — 
should  vote  with  their  feet  in  the  streets,  should  vote  by  ha"vHing  edu- 
cational rallies  on  their  campuses,  and  should  try  to  again  show  the 
incoming  President  that  he  will  be  in  the  same  hot  water  that  Lyndon 
Johnson  could  only  get  out  of  by  retiring  from  office,  unless  the  Viet- 
nam war  is  ended  forthwith,  period. 

Mr.  Watson.  Now  I  Avill  try  one  more  time  to  ask  you  the  question 
and  see  whether  or  not  I  can  get  an  answer. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  just  answered  your  question. 

Mr.  Watson.  Did  you,  at  the  time  that  you  made  the  statement  ad- 
vocating more  militancy  on  the  part  of  youth,  explain  to  those,  who 
were  listening  to  you  that  you  did  not  mean  for  those  words  to  be 
taken  literally,  but  you  had  an  intellectual  interpretation  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  can't  answer  your  question,  because  it  is  a  loaded 
question.  I  said  to  those  people 

Mr.  Watson.  Yes,  because  I  am  trying  to  get  the  truth. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  said  to  those  people — the  truth  is  what  I  just  said, 
is  what  I  said  to  those  people. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  did  not  explain  to  them. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  just  explained  very  clearly 

Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Hayden. — what  the  meaning  of  "militancy"  was.  That  this  kind 
cf  action  was  the  only  way  that  you  could  get  moderate  people,  people 
with  families  and  jobs,  together  with  the  younger,  more  militant  peo- 
ple, and  it  was  a  way  to  i^rovide  opportunities  for  more  militant  action 
of  the  kind  that  had  been  developing  throughout  the  year,  period. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  addition  to  yourself  at  that  meeting 
and  Mr.  Bellinger  and  Mr.  Davis — and  I  am  referring  to  the  meeting 
in  September  in  this  city — was  not  also  Mr.  Harry  Ring  of  the  Socialist 
Workers  Party  present  ? 


2614  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Hatden.  I  believe  he  was.  He  came  back.  He  was  in  disagree- 
ment. He  is  the  Trotskyist  I  was  telling  you  about.  He  came  back  to 
see  what  we  were  goin^  to  do  next. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  and  was  Mr.  Lew  Jones,  of  the  Young 
Socialist  Alliance? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  believe  that  he  was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  Mr.  Arnold  Johnson,  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  believe  that  he  was.  And  the  other  people  who  were 
there,  according  to  your  list,  were:  Gerald  Schwinn,  Tim  McCarthy, 
Richard  Ochs,  Rod  Robinson,  Ken  Katz,  Irving  Beinin,  Emily  Sack, 
Lenny  Brody,  Karl  Baker,  Tom  Hayden,  Alan  Gross,  Bob  Kowollik, 
Judith  Simmons,  Dave  Dellinger,  Rennie  Davis,  Betty  Hellman, 
Harry  Ring,  Lew  Jones,  Susan  La  Mont,  Mike  Maggi,  Larry  Seigle, 
Pat  Grogan,  John  Tillman,  Walter  Reeves,  John  Wilson,  Willy  Lou- 
vallen,  Irwin  Gladstone,  Josh  Brown,  Marcia  Kallen,  Abe  Bloom, 
John  Benson,  Lei  and  Sommers,  Thomas  L.  Hayes,  Gabrielle  Edgcomb, 
Walter  Schneir,  Arnold  Johnson,  Marc  Bedner,  Richie  Lesnik,  Eric 
Weinberger,  Bill  Ayers,  Teri-y  Robbins,  Joan  Campbell,  Marilyn 
Lerch,  Barbara  Demmg,  Sidney  Lens,  Bradford  Lyttle,  Louis  Kampf , 
Allan  Brick,  Trudi  Schutz,  Ron  Young,  Marty  Teitel,  Josie  Teitel, 
Sandy  Lutz,  Arthur  Waskow,  Donna  Gripe,  Lee  Webb,  Jim  Estes, 
Bernice  Smith,  Barbara  Bick,  Tibi  Texler,  Nona  Stanton,  Greg  San- 
dow,  Terry  Gross,  Ted  Yarow,  Helen  Gurewitz,  Richard  M.  Gold,  and 
Edward  Henderson. 

Now  what  is  the  meaning  of  your  selecting  those  three  individuals  ? 
Why  didn't  you  ask  whether  the  members  of  the  Fellowship  of  Recon- 
ciliation were  there  or  members  from  the  Institutes  for  Policy  Studies 
there  or  representatives  of  the  clergy  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Now,  to  the  question,  the  witness  is  not  being  responsive. 
What  is  your  question  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  He  has  answered  my  question,  Mr.  Chairman.  It  is  his 
dialogue. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  will  be  handed  to  the  reporter,  then. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  He  has  identified  who  I  wanted  him  to  identify-. 

Mr.  Hayden,  my  next  question  to  you  is.  Did  you  attend  a  meeting 
of  the  National  Lawyers  Guild,  5  Beekman  Street,  New  York  City,  on 
January  26,  1968? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  attended  a  meeting  in  their  offices.  I  am  not  sure 
there  was  a  guild  meeting  and  I  don't  know  if  that  was  exactly  the 
date,  but  your  informer  who  wrote  up  the  crazy  notes  would  probably 
at  least  be  accurate  about  the  date. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  Now  directing  your  attention  to  the 
minutes  of  that  meeting,  which  I  will  be  glad  to  supply  to  you 

Mr.  Hayden.  Minutes? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  the  minutes  that  were  taken  at  that  meeting.  The 
minutes  of  a  meeting  to  discuss  setting  up  a  legal  committee  for  Chi- 
cago, January  26,  7:30  p.m..  National  Lawyers  Guild  Office,  New 
York  City. 

My  question,  sir,  is  that  the  minutes  taken  at  that  meeting  and  distrib- 
uted to  the  persons  in  attendance  indicate  that  you  said  the  following, 
quote— 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2615 

should  have  people  organized  who  can  fight  the  police,  people  who  are  willing  to 
get  arrested.  No  question  that  there  will  be  a  lot  of  arrests.  My  thinking  is  not  to 
leave  the  initiative  to  the  police.  *  *  *  ^ 

Sir,  did  you  make  that  statement? 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  May  we  see? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  statement,  I  did  not  make,  although  I  will  elabo- 
rate the  meaning  of  the  statement,  because  I  made  one  that  was  strik- 
ingly similar,  in  your  terms.  And  since  it  appeared  today  in  LIFE 
magazine,  also,  I  have  to  set  the  record  that  your  informer  has  created 
straight.  And  I  want  to  point  out  that  this  statement  was  made  by  an 
informer  and  is  not  part  of  minutes. 

Now,  the  meaning  of  this  statement  that  I  made  at  the  time  was 
that  we  had  t-o  have^ legal  and  medical  committees  far  in  advance.  We 
could  not  take,  if  we  were  responsible  organizers  of  the  Chicago  action, 
we  could  not  assume — or  we  could  not  avoid  the  problem  of  possible 
mass  arrests  and  possible  police  brutality  and  possible  injunctions  to 
keep  us  out  of  the  city  even  before  the  convention  started.  And  so  it 
seemed  necessary  that  we  begin  early  in  the  year  organizing  at  least 
lawyers  and  doctors,  and  I  did  not  say  that  we  should  organize  people 
to  fight  the  police.  We  did  not  organize  people  to  fight  the  police.  I  have 
always  said  that  if  you  are  attacked  by  a  police  officer,  however,  it  is 
certainly  your  right,  whether  it  is  a  legal  right  or  not,  to  try  to  get 
away  from  him,  to  protect  yourself,  to  exercise  self-defense.  But  I 
have  said  that  at  least  10  times. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  mean,  even  if  a  person  is  violating  the  law  and  a 
policeman  is  enforcing  the  law  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  If  a  policeman  is  enforcing  the  law,  he  did  not  do  it 
with  a  billy  club.  If  a  policeman  is  making  an  arrest,  as  is  his  respon- 
sibility, that  is  responsible  exercise  of  his  function — unless  it  is  a 
false  arrest,  of  course — but  what  happened  in  Chicago  was  that  there 
were  more  beatings  than  arrests. 

There  was  a  policy,  in  my  opinion,  to  emphasize  the  beatings, 
rather  than  get  bogged  down  by  huge  mass  arrests,  filling  the  jails, 
having  to  feed  everybody,  having  to  set  up  all  the  special  courts,  and 
the  rest  of  it.  And  in  that  kind  of  situation  the  policeman  becomes  the 
prosecutor,  judge,  jury,  and  executioner  on  the  spot ;  and  in  that  case 
crime  in  the  streets  is  being  carried  on  by  the  policeman. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  back  to  the  original  statement,  did  you  or 
did  you  not  make  words  to  that  effect  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  No,  your  informer  missed. 

Mr.  Watson.  Now  he  did  say  that  he  made  a  statement  strikingly 
similar  to  that. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  preempting  what  you  would  believe. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  did  you  make  a  statement  strikingly  similar? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  made  a  statement  almost  exactly  of  the  nature  that  I 
just  got  through  making.     It 

Mr.  Watson.  I  see. 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  for  you  to  judge  whether  that  is  strikingly 
similar. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  see.  Well,  perhaps  you  did  use  the  terminology 
"strikingly  similar."  I  ask  you  again;  at  that  time  did  you  explain 

1  Previously  marked  "Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  3."  See  pt.  1,  pp.  2284-2291  of  Oct.  1,  1968, 
hearings. 


2616  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

to  those  that  you  vrere  urging  to  take  such  action  against  the  police 
that  you  didn't  literally  mean  them  to  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No  ;  I  said  to  them 

Mr.  Watson".  Since  you  are  giving  moral  interpretations  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  said  to  them  roughly  what  I  just  said. 

Mr,  Watson.  But  did  you  explain  to  them  that  you  didn't  literally 
mean  them  to  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  didn't  explain  anything  as  paternalistic  and 
panderingly  ridiculous  and  childish  as  that  to  grownup  organizers, 
lawyers,  and  activists. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  you  knew  that  they  would  not  accept 
your  words  in  the  common  understanding  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  You  don't  even  know  what  you  are  talking  about, 
Mr.  Watson,  because  I  didn't  use  the  words 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  I  will  agree  with  you  that  if  most  of  them  are 
like  you,  they  will  be  speaking  in  foreign  tongues  and  the  interpreta- 
tions indeed  would  be  other  than  what  a  normal  person  would  make 
under  the  circumstances. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Is  the  Congressman  testifying  now  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  proceed  with  the  next  question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  in  the  Esquire  magazine,  December 
1968  edition,  appears  an  article,  "Will  Tom  Hayden  Overcome?" 
Referring  you  specifically 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  is  a  good  question. 

Mr.  Conley.  Referring  you  specifically  to  the  first  page  and  to 
the  second  coluimi  and  approximately  one-half  of  the  way  down  on 
that  column,  the  following  quotation,  attributed  to  you,  appears, 
quote : 

"It  would  be  terrible,"  be  said  with  an  unerring  sense  of  his  own  vincibility, 
"if  the  revolution  actually  started  and  I  was  driving  across  the  country." 

Now,  first  of  all,  I  will  ask  you  if  the  quotation  is  accurate. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  know^,  but  again  you  haven't  read  the  entire 
thing,  which  he  is  trying  to  demonstrate  what  a  great  sense  of  humor 
I  have,  I  gather.  And  he  uses  this,  which  didn't  exactly  tickle  your 
sensibility,  I  noticed,  so  I  guess  I  don't  have  a  very  good  sense  of 
humor.  And  since  I  don't  remember  oifhand  hilarious  comments  that 
I  make  from  time  to  time,  I  don't  know  whether  I  said  that  or  whether 
it  is  an  invention  of  Esquire. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  witness  has  answered  the  question.  Go  ahead, 
Mr.  Counsel.  Next  question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  the  national  council  of  SDS,  of 
which  you  were  formerly  president,  held  a  meeting  at  Boulder,  Colo- 
rado, on  October  10th  through  the  12th  of  this  year.  A  report  of  the 
major  developments  of  that  meeting  was  published  in  the  SDS  news- 
paper, New  Left  Notes.,  issue  of  October  18.  And  I  quote  to  you  from 
page  3  of  that  particular  newspaper  : 

Much  of  the  plenary  discussion  focused  on  the  National  Mobilization  Commit- 
tee, and  our  relations  to  that  group.  Many  persons  felt  that  we  should  avoid 
any  alliances  with  the  MOB  (GI  Week  is  a  Mobilization  proposal,  and  some  of 
the  regional  demonstrations  would  be  planned  in  conjunction  with  them)  espe- 
cially in  light  of  the  disastrous  leadership  provided  by  the  Mobilization  in 
Chicago.  In  addition  to  discussing  the  Mob's  politics,  people  also  pointed  out  that 
marching  to  Washington  would  be  just  another  march  which  would  accomplish 
nothing.  *  *  * 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2617 

Now,  Mr.  Hayden,  I  ask  you  whether  or  not  this  was  a  slap  at  the 
leadership  provided  to  National  Mobilization  by  Mr.  Bellinger,  Mr. 
Davis,  and  yourself,  by  the  SDS  organization  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  was  not  at  the  meeting,  but  I  am  sure  it  was — it 
somids  like  the  Progressive  Labor  line.  But  I  am  sure  that  one  of  your 
experts  on  the  varieties  of  leftism  in  America  could  supply  you  with 
a  report  about  factional  difficulties  within  SDS,  within  the  Mobiliza- 
tion, and  so  forth.  I  was  not  at  the  meeting.  This  is  the  first  time  that 
this  statement  was  brought  to  my  attention. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Are  you  still  active  in  SDS,  Mr.  Hayden? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  am  not  an  officer  of  SDS.  I  remain  in,  and  I  speak 
on  campuses  often  before  SDS  chapters  and  I  go  perhaps  to  a  meet- 
ing a  year,  or  a  meeting  every  2  years,  and  I  remain  in  somewhat 
frequent  contact  with  their  national  office. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  you  have  previously  testified  that  you 
wrote  the  preface  to  a  book.  Mission  to  Hanoi^  which  was  publishecl  by 
Herbert  Aptheker,  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  and  is  it  also 
not  a  fact  that  in  1966  you  served  as  an  initial  sponsor  of  the  campaign 
committee  for  the  same  Herbert  Aptheker  to  run  for  Congress  as  a 
Communist  in  the  12th  Congressional  District,  Brooklyn? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  I  thought  that  it  was  important.  I  didn't  even 
support  Aptheker.  But  I  thought  it  was  important  that  he  be  put  on 
the  ballot.  I  think  it  would  be  a  good  thing  if  members  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  or  any  other  party  could  legally  participate  in  the 
American  electoral  system.  It  would  then  be  less  of  a  fraud. 

Mr.  Ichord.  You  acted  as  his  manager  to  get  him  on  the  ticket  and 
then  didn't  support  him  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  supported  the  idea  that  he  should  be  on  the  ticket 
and  allowed  to  run,  but  I  didn't  support  him  for  Congress,  because  I 
am  not  personally  that  attracted  to  electoral  politics,  as  you  probably 
know  from  any  previous  testimony. 

Mr.  Watson.  No  wonder  he  lost,  if  his  manager  didn't  support  him. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  That  is  one  of  the  difficult  things  I  have  in  under- 
standing you.  How  do  you  propose  to  elect  a  President,  Mr.  Hayden,  by 
working  out  demonstrations  to  that  effect  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  never  proposed  to  elect  a  President.  Never  proposed 
to  elect  a  President. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  were  you  not  also  a  speaker  at  May  Day 
Rally,  1968,  Los  Angeles,  California,  sponsored  by  the  Youth  Section 
of  the  Communist  Party,  U.S.A.  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  agreed  to  speak,  but  then  I  did  not.  I  did  not  go  to 
California  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  in  addition  to  these  other  groups  that  I  have 
indicated,  have  you  not  also  worked  with  the  Movement  for  the 
Independence  of  Puerto  Rico,  a  violence-oriented  Castroite  group 
active  in  Puerto  Rico  and  New  York  City  ? 

Mr.  di  Sttvero.  Is  the  counsel  testifying  at  the  moment  ? 

Mr.  Ichord.  What  was  the  question,  Mr.  Counsel  ?  Read  the  question. 

Mr.  Conley.  Has  he  worked  with  the  Movement  for  the  Inde- 
pendence of  Puerto  Rico. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  That  is  the  question. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have  been  in  Puerto  Rico  once,  at  their  invitation, 
and  appeared,  but  did  not  speak,  at  a  rally  given  by  their  leader,  Juan 
Mari  Bras,  and  though  I  am  not  that  closely — I  don't  know  that  much 

21-706  O— 69— pt.  2 9 


2618  DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

in  detail  about  the  politics  of  the  Puerto  Eican  Independence  Move- 
ment, I  would  be  proud  to  say  that  I  supported  the  struggle  of  the 
people  in  Puerto  Rico  against  the  draft,  against  the  Vietnam  war,  and 
for  the  development  of  Puerto  Rico  as  an  independent  country.  And  I 
support  organizations  that  work  for  that  end,  and  as  far  as  I  know 
the  Movement  for  Puerto  Rican  Independence  is  the  leading  organi- 
zation of  that  kind. 

It  is  not  clear  to  me  that  it  was  a  violent  or  violence-oriented  organi- 
zation, as  you  put  it,  but  obviously  they  are  sympathetic  to  the  Cuban 
revolution,  and  obviously  I  am  sympathetic  to  the  Cuban  revolution. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  trip  that  you  made  to  Puerto  Rico  was  in  April 
of  1967,  was  it  not? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  don't  remember  the  exact  date,  but  it  was  in  the 
spring,  1967,  for  about  a  week  or  5  days. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Hayden,  is  it  your  present  aim  to  seek  the  de- 
struction of  the  present  American  democratic  system  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  That  is  a  joke. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  asking  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  don't  believe  the  present  American  democratic 
system  exists.  That  is  why  we  can't  get  together  to  straighten  things 
out.  I  mean,  I  believe  that  you  have  destroyed  the  American  democratic 
system  by  the  existence  of  a  committee  of  this  kind. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  let  us  use  the  word  "system,"  then.  Let  us  take 
the  words  "American"  and  "democratic"  out  of  it  and  let  us  just  call 
it  the  system.  Is  it  your  aim  to  destroy  the  present  system  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean  by  "destroy"  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  To  overturn  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean  by  "overturn  it"  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  To  do  away  with  it. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean  by  "do  away  with  it"?  By  what 
means  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  you  asked  me  whether  it  was  my  aim. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  you  if  that  is  your  aim,  sir. 

Mr.  Hayden.  The  question  is  too  ambiguous. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  are  getting  into  the  field  of  political  philosophy. 
The  witness  has  testified  at  length  as  to  his  philosophy,  Mr.  Counsel. 
But  it  would  be  very  dilRcult  for  the  Chair  to  direct  an  answer  to  the 
question. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  have  one  final  question  for  you. 

Ambrose  Bierce,  in  his  DeviVs  Dictionary^  defines  a  conspirator  as 
someone  who  finds  it  necessary  to  write  doAvn  everything  for  his 
enemy  to  find. 

Mr.  Hayden,  you  were  clever  enough  not  to  be  carrying  ixny  names 
or  addresses  on  your  person,  or  any  slips  of  paper,  at  the  time  of  the 
events  in  Chicago.  However,  in  the  purse  of  Miss  Constance  Brown 
was  a  complete  list  of  names  and  addresses  which  were  purportedly 
prepared  by  you. 

And  I  would  ask  you,  sir,  don't  you  think  that  the  3'oung  people 
who  follow  you  in  these  various  movements  should  take  a  second  look 
at  you  before  they  place  their  lives  and  their  responsibilities  in  the 
hands  of  you  ? 

Mr.  Hayden. . 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2619 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  wtness  will  please  be  seated. 

Mr.  HL^YDEN.  I  thought  that  was  the  final  question. 

Mr.  IcHORD,  The  Chair  directs  the  witness  to  be  seated. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  make  this  point  ? 

I  know  there  are  advocates  of  free  speech,  and  the  witness  is  one  of 
them,  but  I  happen  to  be  one  who  will  not  tolerate  any  such  language 
as  that.  We  have  ladies  in  this  room,  and  I  shall  not  tolerate  it,  and 
if  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  ask  the  police  to  arrest  a  man  for  such  dis- 
orderly language  as  that,  I  shall  do  so.  I  am  not  going  to  tolerate  lan- 
guage such  as  that  in  the  presence  of  ladies. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  will  you  tolerate 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness 

Mr.  Hayden.  — ^tolerate  a  question  of  the  indecent  kind  that  was  just 
made  by  your  own  counsel  ? 

Mr.  IcHOED.  Let  us  continue  with  the  hearings,  and  the  committee 
will  let  stand  the  record  and  take  that  under  advisement  at  the  proper 
time. 

Let  the  witness  be  admonished  that  this  is  a  committee  of  Congress, 
consisting  of  duly  elected  members,  that  this  committee  is  a  legisla- 
tive arm  of  Congress,  and  there  are  ways  of  enforcing  proper  order  be- 
fore the  committee. 

There  is  such  a  thing,  as  I  have  stated  to  the  witness  before  and  to 
his  attorney,  as  contempt. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  proceed  with  the  questioning  again.  We  have 
gotten  along  very  well  thus  far.  The  witness  has  testified,  relatively 
freely,  compared  to  other  witnesses  appearing  before  the  committee. 

Eephrase  your  question,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  that  completes  our  questioning. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERo.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  time  I  would  like  to  move 
that  the  question  be  stricken  as  being  irrelevant  to  any  inquiry  under 
the  mandate  the  chairman  has  initially  stated.  I  think  it  asks  for  an 
opinion,  and  not  for  testimony.  I  think  it  has  no  relevance  to  anything 
that  has  been  developed. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  take  that  under  advisement. 

Are  there  any  further  questions  of  the  witness  ? 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Yes,  I  have  several,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Ashbrook. 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  have  listened  very  intently  to  your 
description  of  the  events  in  Chicago,  your  opinions  on  that,  and  I 
would  admit  one  area  is  not  completely  clear. 

Sometimes  I  get  the  impression  that  you  indicate  what  happened 
in  Chicago  was  unfortunate,  a  travesty,  and  so  forth.  Other  times,  I 
get  the  indication  you  believe — at  least  it  comes  through  in  what  you 
say — that  Chicago  was  valuable,  in  that  it  demonstrated  certain  things, 
brought  to  the  surface  what  you  consider  to  be  unfair  treatment,  some 
of  the  wrongs  of  the  political  processes. 

There  is  somewhat  of  a  dilemma  here.  I  would  like  to  have  for  the 
record  whether  you  think  now,  looking  back  to  the  Chicago  convention, 
what  happened  was  good,  bad,  or  helpful  to  your  movement. 

You  have  talked  kind  of  from  both  sides.  I  would  like  to  know 
which  is  your  honest  point  of  view. 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  have  talked  both  sides,  because  we  are  going  to  win 
either  way,  Mr.  Ashbrook.  We  would  have  won  if  it  would  have  been 


2620  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

safe  and  secure  for  200,000  rank-and-file  people,  ordinary  people,  to 
come  to  Chicago  and  protest.  That  would  have  had  a  profoundly  dis- 
crediting effect  on  the  Democratic  Party  as  it  ratified  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam and  nominated  Hubert  Humphrey,  and  would  have  defeated  the 
Democratic  Party  by  the  alienation  of  its  grassroots  base. 

Since  that  was  not  allowed  because  of  the  failure  of  the  city  to 
grant  permits,  since  that  was  not  allowed  because  there  was  too  much 
jeopardy  facing  anybody  with  a  family  or  job,  and  since  they  didn't 
come  to  Chicago,  we  won  in  a  different  w^ay,  by  exposing  the  brute  na- 
ture that  underlies  the  supposedly  democratic  two-party  system. 

I  w^ould  have  preferred  to  win  the  first  way,  but  the  second  way 
was  a  tremendous  victory  of  a  kind  for  the  young  people  in  this  coun- 
try, people  who  are  not  voters,  people  who  are  never  polled  by  Gallup 
or  Harris,  but  people  who  watch  on  television  and  do  not  identify  with 
youn^  people  like  the  young  Nixon  girls  and  David  Eisenhower,  but 
identify  with  the  young  people  who  are  in  the  streets  of  Chicago,  and 
watch  very  carefully. 

If  you  think  that  you  have  had  militant  people  before  you  in  these 
hearings,  you  have  yet  to  see  what  the  7-  and  8-year-olds  are  going  to 
bring  you  over  the  next  5  or  10  years. 

You  have  taught  them  very  well  to  have  no  respect  for  your  author- 
ity by  what  has  happened  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  And  that  is  a  victory 
in  the  sense  that  committees  like  yourselves  are  now  through.  You 
exist  only  formally ;  you  exist  officially,  but  you  have  lost  all  authority. 
And  when  a  group  of  people  who  have  power  lose  their  authority,  then 
they  have  lost.  You  have  lost,  period. 

That  is  why  I  have  been  quiet.  That  is  why  these  hearings  aren't 
disrupted,  that  is  why  no  one  comes  to  these  hearings  to  picket  any 
more,  because  the  job  has  been  done  against  HUAC  and  the  job  has 
virtually  been  done  against  politicians. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  And  you  say  you  are  eventually  going  to  do  the  job 
against  the  w^hole  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Politicians  of  the  kind  like  Dean  Rusk,  Lyndon  John- 
son, Richard  Nixon,  Hubert  Humphrey,  these  people  are  in  a  sense 
already  finished,  because  they  can't  exercise  any  authority ;  they  have 
no  respect  from  wide  sections  of  the  American  people. 

Richard  Nixon  does  not  even  believe  that  Beatles'  albums  should  be 
played.  He  believes  that  drugs  are  the  curse  of  American  youth. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course,  Mr.  Hayden,  you  are  very  fortunate  to  have 
the  protection  of  the  first  amendment  rights.  Do  you  think  that  if  you 
had  performed  the  acts  that  you  have  performed  and  said  such  things 
that  you  have  said  in  North  Vietnam,  in  behalf  of  America,  that  you 
wouldn't  be  shot  on  the  spot?  Do  you  think  you  would  be  given  the 
same  amount  of  liberty,  guarantees  of  first  amendment  rights,  which 
you  have  been  given  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Mr.  Ichord,  I  don't  consider  that  I  have  that  much 
freedom.  Is  it  freedom  to  sit  here  and,  under  penalty  of  going  to  jail 
if  I  don't  talk  to  you  and  express  my  opinions  over  and  over  in  a 
committee  chamber  of  this  sort,  knowing  full  well  that  the  opinions 
are  hot  air,  they  have  no  effect  on  your  ears,  they  will  not  change  a 
thing?  If  that  is  freedom,  that  is  a  very  inadequate  definition  of 
freedom. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2621 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  have  indeed  a  very  strange  philosophy,  sir.  You 
say  that  you  don't  care  about  electing  a  President.  You  don't  care  about 
a  President  at  all.  What  kind  of  government  do  you  want? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  want  a  democratic  government.  My  views  on  that 
are  spelled  out  in  the — ^not  so  ver}^  well,  perhaps,  certainly  not  in  my 
opinion,  but  they  are  spelled  out  in  exhaustive  detail  in  all  kinds  of 
things  that  I  have  written,  which  I  would  be  glad  to  submit  to  you,  but 
I  think  that  the  question  at  this  point  would  be  a  little  bit  redundant. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Ashbrook,  continue. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  If  I  could  possibly  crystallize  what  you  have  said, 
and  going  back  to  the  original  question,  it  would  be,  as  I  understand  it 
from  your  point  of  view,  that  you  would  have  preferred  to  have 
another  approach  in  Chicago.  And  from  your  point  of  view,  this  was 
pushed  upon  you  but,  once  it  happened,  it  did  pinpoint  some  of  your 
criticisans  of  the  democratic  process  and,  as  such,  probably  helped 
in  the  overall  situation.  I  gather  this  is  what  you  are  saying. 

But  from  what  you  are  saying  about  the  democratic  processes,  you 
are  reasonably  clear,  from  what  you  say — at  least  it  comes  through  to 
me — ^that  this  was  not  good  for  the  democratic  processes  in  this  coun- 
try, at  least  from  your  point  of  view,  but  would  be  good  from  the 
point  of  view  of  those  who  think  the  democratic  processes  are  in  an 
establishment,  white  majority,  et  cetera,  and  won't  work. 

Would  that  be  a  reasonable  summation  of  what  you  have  said? 
Trying  to  differentiate  between  your  point  of  view  and  our  point  of 
view.  What  happened  in  Chicago  did  not  help  the  democratic  process 
in  this  country  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  From  your  point  of  view. 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  From  our  point  of  view. 

Mr.  Hayden.  From  my  point  of  view,  it  did. 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  Well,  then,  maybe  that  is  why  I  have  a  hard  time 
understanding  your  statement,  which  is  made  in  the  New  York  Times, 
on  September  1,  1968,  from  Downers  Grove,  Illinois,  where  it  quoted 
you  directly  as  saying,  by  John  Kifner,  their  reporter,  "We're  going 
to  create  little  Chicagos  everywhere  the  candidates  appear." 

If  what  happened  in  Chicago  was  bad — and,  of  course,  some  of  what 
you  have  said  indicates  that  it  was  bad — it  should  be  avoided ;  it  was 
unfortimate ;  and,  once  happening,  you  had  to  derive  some  benefit 
for  those  who  want  change.  Now  you  are  in  a  position  of  saying  that, 
nevertheless,  you  want  little  Chicagos,  200,  300  Chicagos  throughout 
the  country.  Is  that  a  fair  statement  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Yes.  I  wanted,  and  many  of  us  wanted,  the  energy  and 
momentum  of  the  Chicago  demonstration  to  be  carried  back  to  the  com- 
munities where  the  demonstrators  came  from,  and  the  criticism  of  the 
Democratic  Party,  criticism  of  the  false  choices  in  the  elections,  criti- 
cism of  the  fact  that  there  was  no  way  to  vote  for  peace  in  the  1968 
elections,  to  be  made  very  clear  in  these  local  communities.  And  I 
wanted  the  people  to  go  back  from  Chicago  and  interpret  what  hap- 
pened in  Chicago  to  students  in  high  schools  and  colleges  and  their 
neighbors,  and  I  wanted  demonstrations  to  occur  whenever  candidates 
came  to  speak,  and  there  were  some  demonstrations  around  the  country 
when  candidates  came  to  speak,  and  we  wanted  election-day  demon- 
strations, and  there  were  some  election-day  demonstrations. 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  Well,  then  I  would  be  wrong  in  assuming,  when  you 


2622  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

say  you  wanted  to  create  little  Chicagos  in  the  country,  you  are  talk- 
ing from  the  standpoint  of  demonstration,  where  I  guess  I  was  think- 
ing you  meant  that  you  wanted  the  police  to  be  hitting  people  on  the 
head,  and  that  kind  of  thing. 

Mr.  Hatden.  Well,  it  takes  two  to  do  that.  It  takes  an  initiator, 
and  I  think  that  police  learned  from  Chicago  to  temporarily  pull  back, 
in  some  local  situations,  because  they  wanted  to  get  Hubert  Humphrey 
elected  President. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  The  police  wanted  to? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  not  the  police,  but  the  people  who  order  the  j)olice. 
Certainly  the  police  didn't  want  Hubert  Humphrey  elected  President. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  On  one  other  point,  I  think  it  is  very  important,  be- 
cause we  are  looking  at  all  the  statements  in  the  context  of  what  you 
have  said,  what  your  meaning  is  to  what  you  have  said,  and  I  think 
you  pointed  out  very  articulately  that  you  do  have  some  different  mean- 
ing than  what  many  of  us  might  thiiik  would  come  from  that ;  that  is 
a  good  example  there.  But  from  your  own  words — and  I  know  quite 
often  you  have  been  misquoted;  I  can  understand  that,  everybody  is 
misquoted — but  from  your  own  words,  on  June  15,  1968,  issue  of 
Ramparts^  pa^ge  40,  where  it  says,  "Two,  Three,  Many  Columbias,"  that 
is  the  heading,  it  says,  "By  Tom  Hayden,"  you  state  the  following — 
you  are  going  to  say  I  take  it  out  of  context.  I  will  suggest  the  whole 
article  be  placed  in  the  record.  But  you  say : 

Columbia  opened  a  new  tactical  stage  in  the  resistance  movement  which  began 
last  fall :  from  the  overnight  occupation  of  buildings  to  permanent  occupation ; 
from  mill-ins  to  the  creation  of  revolutionary  committees ;  from  symbolic  civil 
disobedience  to  barricaded  resistance.  Not  only  are  these  tactics  already  being 
duplicated  on  other  campuses,  but  they  are  sure  to  be  surpassed  by  even  more 
militant  tactics.  In  the  future  it  is  conceivable  that  students  will  threaten 
destruction  of  buildings  as  a  last  deterrent  to  police  attacks.  Many  of  the  tac- 
tics learned  can  also  be  applied  in  smaller  hit-and-run  operations  between  strikes  : 
raids  on  the  offices  of  professors  doing  weapons  research  could  win  substantial 
support  among  students  while  making  the  university  more  blatantly  repressive. 

End  of  your  direct  quote. 

I  would  have  to  say,  when  I  obseiwe  this  and  other  statements  you 
have  made,  most  of  the  tenor  that  I  get  out  of  them  is  a  call  to  more 
militant  action.  I  know  you  have  defined  what  you  mean  by  "militant." 

Here  you  are  talking  about  taking  over  buildings ;  you  are  talking 
-about  hit-and-rmi  operations  between  strikes,  raids  on  offices,  maybe 
we  get  back  to  the  old  semantic  argument  we  had  yesterday,  of  what 
"attack"  means,  of  what  "pinning  delegates  in  the  convention"  means, 
what  the  statement  "anything  to  stop  this  farce"  means,  of  what 
"guerrillas"  means,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  this  sets  the  stage  or  sets 
the  atmosphere  for  the  confrontations  with  the  police,  a  confrontation 
Avith  the  authority  everywhere,  which  many  of  us  feel  might  have  hap- 
pened in  Chicago  and  might  have  been  one  of  the  causes. 

Now  I  hand  you  the  whole  article.  I  assure  you  I  didn't  take  it  out 
of  context,  because  I  have  read  it  three  or  four  times,  and  those  words 
that  you  state,  isn't  it  fair  for  any  reasonable  person,  possibly  even  a 
Member  of  Congress,  to  feel  that  you  are  advocating  more  militant 
action,  up  to  and  including  illegal  action  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  we  would  disagree  on  whether  it  is  illegal 
action. 

(Document  marked  "Hayden  Exhibit  No.  7."  See  page  2623.) 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  To  take  over  a  building  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2623 

Hayden  Exhibit  No.  7 
[Ramparts,  June  15.  1968] 


-[Politics]- 


TF'*=*= 


"Two,Three,  Many  Columbias" 

By  Tom  Hayden 


THBOOALwrarTENontbeunivasity 
walls  was  "Ovate  two,  three, 
many  Columbiai";  it  meant  ex- 
pand the  strike  so  that  the  U.S.  must 
either  change  or  send  its  troops  to  oc- 
cupy American  campuses. 

At  this  point  the  goal  seems  realistic; 
an  explosive  mix  is  present  on  dozens  of 
campuses  where  demands  for  attention 
to  student  views  are  being  disregarded 
by  university  administiators. 

The  American  student  movemoit  has 
continued  to  swell  for  nearly  a  decade : 
during  the  semi-peace  of  the  early  '60s 
as  well  as  during  Vietnam;  during  the 
token  liberalism  of  John  Keimedy  as 
well  as  during  the  bankrupt  racism  of 
Lyndon  Johnson.  Students  have  re- 
sponded most  directly  to  the  black  move- 
ment of  the  '60s:  from  Mississippi  Sum- 
mer to  the  Free  Speech  Movement ;  from 
"Black  Power"  to  "Student  Power"; 
from  the  seizure  of  Howard  University 
to  the  seizure  of  Hamilton  Hall.  As  the 
racial  crisis  deepens  so  will  the  campus 
crisis.  But  the  student  protest  is  not  just 
an  offshoot  of  the  black  protest— it  is 
based  on  authentic  opposition  to  the 
middle-class  world  of  manipulation, 
channeling  and  careerism.  The  students 
are  in  oiqxMition  to  the  fundamental  in- 
stitutions of  society. 

The  students'  protest  constantly  es- 
calates by  building  on  its  achievements 
and  legends.  The  issues  being  considered 
by  seventeen-year-old  freshmen  at  Co- 
lumbia University  would  not  have  been 
within  the  imagination  of  most  "vet- 
eran" student  activists  five  years  ago. 

Columbia  opened  a  new  tactical  stage 
in  the  resistance  movement  which  began 
last  fall:  from  the  overnight  occupation 
of  buildings  to  permanent  occupation; 
from  mill-ins  to  the  creation  of  revolu- 
tionary committees;  from  symbolic  civil 
disobedience  to  barricaded  resistance. 
Not  only  are  these  tactics  already  being 
duplicated  on  other  campuses,  but  they 
are  sure  to  be  surpassed  by  even  more 


militam  taclici.  lo  the  fiiturc  it  is  con- 
ceivahle  that  students  will  threaten  de- 
struction of  buildings  as  a  last  deterrent 
to  police  attacks.  Many  of  the  tactics 
learned  can  also  be  applied  in  smaller 
hit-and-run  operations  between  strikes: 
raids  on  the  oflkes  of  professors  doing 
weapons  research  could  win  substantial 
support  among  students  while  making 
the  university  more  blatantly  repressive. 

In  the  buildings  occupied  at  Colum- 
bia, the  students  created  what  they  called 
a  "new  society"  or  "liberated  area"  or 
"commune,"  a  society  in  which  decent 
values  would  be  lived  out  even  though 
university  officials  might  cut  short  the 
communes  through  use  of  police.  The 
students  had  fim,  they  sang  and  danced 
and  wisecracked,  but  there  was  continual 
tension.  There  was  no  question  of  their 
constant  awareness  of  the  seriousness  of 
their  acts.  Though  there  were  a  few 
violent  arguments  about  tactics,  the  dis- 
course was  more  in  the  form  of  endless 
meetings  convened  to  explore  the  outside 
political  situation,  defense  tactics,  main- 
tenance and  morale  problems  within  the 
group.  Debating  and  then  determining 
what  leaders  should  do  were  attematives 
to  the  remote  and  authoritarian  decision- 
making of  Columbia's  trustees. 

The  Columbia  strike  represented  more 
than  a  new  tactical  movement,  however. 
There  was  a  political  message  as  well. 
The  striking  students  were  not  holding 
onto  a  narrow  conception  of  students  as 
a  privileged  class  asking  for  inclusion  in 
the  university  as  it  now  exists.  This  kind 
of  demand  could  easily  be  met  by  ad- 
ministrators by  opening  minor  oppor- 
tunities for  "student  rights"  while  crack- 
ing down  on  campus  radicals.  Tne 
Columbia  students  were  instead  taking 
an  internationalist  and  revolutionary 
view  of  themselves  in  opposition  to  the 
imperialism  of  the  very  institutions  in 
which  they  have  been  groomed  and  edu- 
cated. They  did  not  even  want  to  be  in- 
cluded in  the  decision-making  circles  of 


the  miUtary-industrial  complex  that  runs 
Columbia :  Ihey  want  to  bt  included  only 
if  Iheir  inclusion  u  a  step  toward  trans- 
jbrming  the  university.  They  want  a  new 
and  independent  university  standing 
against  the  mainstream  of  American 
society,  or  they  want  no  imiversity  at  all. 
They  are,  in  Fidel  Castro's  words,  "guer- 
rillas in  the  field  of  culture." 

How  many  other  schools  can  be  con- 
sidered ripe  for  such  confrontations? 
The  question  is  hard  to  answer,  but  it  is 
clear  that  the  demands  of  black  students 
for  cukura!  recognition  rather  than 
paternalistic  tolerance,  and  radical  white 
students'  awareness  of  the  sinister  para- 
military activities  carried  on  in  secret  by 
the  faculty  on  many  campuses,  are  haidly 
conflaed  loCokrabia  Columbia's  prob- 
lem is  the  American  problem  in  minia- 
ture—the inability  to  provide  answers  to 
widespread  social  needs  and  the  use  of 
the  military  to  protect  the  authorities 
against  the  people.  This  process  can  only 
lead  to  greater  unity  in  the  movement. 

Support  from  outside  the  university 
communities  can  be  counted  on  in  inany 
large  cities.  A  crisis  is  foreseeable  that 
would  be  too  massive  for  poUce  to  han- 
dle. It  can  happen ;  whether  or  not  it  will 
be  necessary  is  a  question  which  only 
time  will  answer.  What  is  certain  is  that 
we  are  moving  toward  power— the 
power  to  stop  the  machine  if  it  cannot  be 
made  to  serve  humane  ends. 

American  educators  are  fond  of  telling 
their  students  that  barricades  are  pert  of 
the  romantic  past,  that  social  change 
today  can  only  come  about  through  the 
processes  of  negotiation.  But  the  stu- 
dents at  Columbia  discovered  that  barri- 
cades are  only  the  begiiming  of  what 
they  call  "bringing  the  war  hoit)e." 

Mr.  Hayden,  a  founder  of  SDS,  wrote 
Rebellion  in  Newark  and  Is  co-amhor 
with  Staughton  Lynd  of  The  Other  Side. 
He  spent  four  days  in  Mathematics  Hall 
at  Columbia  with  the  sit-in. 


2624  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  BL^YDEN.  I  think  it  is  unconstitutional  for  the  Columbia  board 
of  trustees  to  be  appointed  for  life. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  But  not  to  prevent  students  from  going  to  class? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  it  is  illegal  and  unconstitutional  for  scientists 
to  make  weapons  which  are  banned  by  Geneva  agreements  and  other 
international  treaties  and  to  make  them  on  university  campuses. 

I  think  that,  in  the  whole  area  of  student  riots  and  welfare,  students 
are  threatened  in  a  way  that  gives  them  less  actual  legal  civil  rights 
than  convicts  in  a  j>enitentiary  have. 

My  views  on  this  are  extremely  thoroughly  written  down,  I  don't 
believe  that  there  is  a  democratic  machinery  on  the  campus;  I  don't 
believe  the  draft  represents  democratic  machinery.  And  as  long  as  there 
is  no  democratic  machinery,  then  young  people  will  either  have  to  ca- 
pitulate in  the  status  quo,  or  have  to  find  ways  to  resist  it,  and  I  don't 
really  advise  that  people  find  illegal  ways  to  resist  it  l^ecause  I  think 
that  the  authorities  are  going  to  start  putting  people  away. 

Most  of  my  friends  are  on  their  way  to  jail,  for  one  thing  or  another. 
Most  of  the  young  leaders  in  this  country  in  the  movements — many 
of  them  unknown  to  you,  many  of  them  miknown  to  me — are  facing 
prison  sentences  already,  so  I  beg  to  differ  with  the  idea  that  I  advocate 
illegal  action.  But  I  do  advocate  action  that  could  bring  a  university 
to  a  halt,  as  the  actions  of  the  students  and  faculty  at  San  Fran  State 
have  brought  that  university  to  a  halt,  to  try  to  straighten  the  miiver- 
sity  out. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Mr.  Hayden,  maybe  we  would  disagree  on  the  term, 
but  it  seemed  to  me  from  what  you  have  said  that  that  comes  very  close 
to  anarchy. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  we  are  living  in  a  state  of  anarchy  when  a  young 
man  is  faced  by  a  draft  board — the  average  age  of  its  members  is  58, 
one-fifth  of  those  members  are  73  years  old — there  is  no  mechanism 
for  that  young  person  to  avoid  intolerable  choices,  either  of  fighting  in 
a  war  that  he  doesn't  want  to  fight  in,  or  copping  out  and  letting  some 
Puerto  Rican  or  young  black  person  or  poor  working-class  person 
fight  for  him,  then  isn't  that  a  state  of  anarchy  facing  that  individual, 
rather  than  a  state  of  law?  He  has  no  recourse;  he  has  no  machinery. 
And  that  is  the  situation  facing  all  young  people  in  this  country,  and 
it  is  a  situation  that  I  could  describe  in  great  detail  in  other  spheres 
besides  the  draft. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Thank  you. 

That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Any  questions,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Hayden,  I  believe  you  stated  in  sununation  that 
we  are  going  to  lose,  referring  to  the  present  generation,  the 
establishment. 

Mr.  Hayden.  No,  I  just  meant  HUAC  has  lost  its  authority.  That 
is  why  no  one  pickets  here  any  more. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  see.  Of  coui"se,  perhaps  some  of  us  may  assign  other 
reasons  as  to  why  they  no  longer  picket,  but 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  hope  you  don't  think  it  is  the  police. 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  of  course  not.  You  have  demonstrated  that  you 
have  no  fear  or  respect  for  police  authority.  But  did  I  not  under- 
stand  

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  when  it  is  used  in  the  way  that  you  are  using  it 
to  protect  your  so-called  democracj-. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2625 

Mr.  Watson.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  that  the  system,  or  what- 
ever it  is,  this  generation,  we  are  goin^  to  lose  ? 

Mr,  Hayden.  I  think  that  politicians  like  Dean  Rusk,  Lyndon 
Johnson,  Richard  Nixon,  Hubert  Humi^hrey,  and  anybody  else  I  might 
have  listed  before  and  now  forgotten  have  lost  their  authority  with 
wide  sections  of  the  American  people.  I  said  that.  I  said  that  HIT  AC 
has  lost  its  authority. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  that  you 

Mr.  Hatben.  And  that  you  can't  retain  it  by  having  a  younger 
chairman  or  being  more  reasonable,  because  that  doesn't  deal  with  the 
fundamental  questions. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Hayden,  some  of  the  newspaper  colimuiists  have 
stated  that  you  and  your  group  were  very  instrmnental  in  the  election 
of  Richard  Nixon.  Doesn't  that  somewhat  f iiistrate  you,  with  your  feel- 
ing toward  Richard  Nixon,  if  those  columnists  are  accurate  in  their 
assessment  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  No.  I  tliink  that  the  election  of  Richard  Nixon,  in  a 
sense,  is — shows  that  the  comitr}^  will  continue  to  run  down  mitil  people 
decide  to  straighten  it  out.  You  know,  it  doesn't  really  matter  to  me 
whether  Hubert  Humphrey  or  Richard  Nixon  is  President  of  the 
United  States. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Go  ahead,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  didn't  say  earlier  that  you  and  those  of  your 
thinking  were  going  to  ultimately  win  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  I  think  we  will  at  least  outlive  you.  [Laughter.] 
Probably  much  of  our  time  will  be  spent  in  penitentiaries.  I  think  that 
we  are  more  than  an  existential  or  romantic  movement,  however.  I 
think  we  are  a  calculating  movement,  a  political  movement,  and  we  are 
trying  to  make  this  country  a  better  country  and  we  expect  that — we 
have  every  reason  to  believe  that  we  have  some  chance  to  be  successful 
in  that  effort. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  your  ultimate  objective  is  to  make  this  country  a 
better  country.  You  made  that  statement. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Well,  yes ;  I  just  made  that  statement. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  you  have,  I  believe,  a  lot  of,  or  several  comments 
in  support  of  the  so-called  Walker  Report. 

Mr.  Hayden.  Not  quite.  I  don't  quite  agree  with  the  Walker  Report- 
Mr.  Watson.  You  don't  quite.  But  some  parts  of  it,  you  do.  As  I 
recall  earlier,  you  said  that  it  condemned  this 

Mr.  Hayden.  It  has  a  lot  of  evidence  of  what  happened  in  Chicago 
between  the  police  and  demonstrators  that  I  think  is  accurate  evidence, 
solid  evidence. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  from  this  report,  on  page  49, 1  would  like  to  read 
a  paragraph.  The  report  says  it  is  a  typical  Yippie  flyer,  and  it  reads  as 
follows,  quote : 

.  .  .  Who  says  that  rich  white  Americans  can  tell  the  Chinese  what  is  best? 
How  dare  you  tell  the  poor  that  their  poverty  is  deserved? nuns — 

And  you  know  what  I  mean. 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean,  Mr.  Watson  ? 
]\Ir.  Watson  [continues  reading]  : 

laugh  at  professors 

Mr.  Hayden.  What  do  you  mean,  Mr.  Watson  ? 


2626  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Watson.  I  will  give  you  credit  for  being  intelligent  enough  to 
arrive  at  an  interpretation  yourself.  [Continues  reading :] 

disobey  your  parents :  bum  your  money :  you  know  life  is  a  dream  and  all  of 
our  institutions  are  man-made  illusions  effective  because  YOU  take  the  dream 
for  reality.  .  .  .  Break  down  the  family,  church,  nation,  city,  economy :  turn  life 
into  an  art  form,  a  theatre  of  the  soul  and  a  theatre  of  the  future ;  the  revolu- 
tionary is  the  only  artist.  .  .  .  What's  needed  is  a  generation  of  people  who  are 
freaky,  crazy,  irrational,  sexy,  angry,  irreligious,  childish  and  mad :  people  who 
burn  draft  cards,  burn  high  school  and  college  degrees  :  people  who  say  :  "To  hell 
with  your  goals !" ;  people  who  lure  the  youth  with  music,  pot  and  acid :  people 
who  re-define  the  normal ;  people  who  break  with  the  status-role-title-consumer 
game ;  people  who  have  nothing  material  to  lose  but  their  flesh.  .  .  . 

And  finally : 

The  white  youth  of  America  have  more  in  common  with  Indians  plundered,  than 
they  do  with  their  own  parents.  Burn  their  houses  down,  and  you  will  be  free. 

End  quote. 

That  is  a  typical  Yippie  flyer.  Those  associated  with  you  in  this 
movement  in  Chicago  and  this,  in  your  judgment,  is  the  way  to  have  a 
better  America  ? 

Mr.  Hayden.  I  think  that  beautiful  sentiments  are  expressed  in 
that  statement,  and  I  wish  that  you  could  understand  them,  Mr. 
Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  Fine,  that  wraps  it  up  real  well.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  gentlemen  of  the  committee  will  have  a  special 
meeting  of  the  committee  in  regard  to  other  business  immediately 
upon  the  recess  of  the  committee. 

The  committee  will  be  in  recess. 

Mr.  Di  SuvERO.  Mr.  Chainnan,  could  we  have  copies  of  all  the 
exliibits  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  take  that  under  advisement. 

Mr.  DI  SuvERO.  Is  there  any  reason  why  the  Chair  would  depart 
from  its  previous  ruling  ? 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  Chair  is  taking  it  under  advisement.  There  is  no 
reason  that  the  Chair  knows  at  this  time,  but  this  is  within  the  preroga- 
tives of  the  Chair,  and  I  exercise  that  prerogative. 

Tlie  meeting  will  be  in  recess  until  1 :30,  gentlemen,  until  1 :30  p.m., 
at  which  time  the  counsel  will  call  the  next  witness. 

Mr.  DI  SuvERo.  Is  the  witness  excused  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness  is  excused. 

Mr.  DI  Su^^RO.  Thank  you. 

(Wliereupon,  at  11 :55  a.m.,  Tuesday,  December  3,  1968,  the  sub- 
committee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  1 :30  p.m.  the  same  day.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present  at  time  of  recess:  Representatives 
Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 

AFTERNOON  SESSION— TIIESDAY,  DECEMBER  3,  1968 

(The  subcommittee  reconvened  at  1 :30  p.m.,  Hon.  Richard  H. 
Ichord,  chairman  of  the  subcommittee,  presiding.) 

(Subcommittee  membei's  present:  Representatives  Ichord  and 
Watson.) 

Mr,  IciioRD.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  A  quorum  is  present. 
Tlie  hearings  will  resume. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2627 

Mr.  Counsel,  do  you  wish  to  come  forward?  Who  is  your  next 
witness,  Mr.  Counsel  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Rennie  Davis. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Davis,  would  you  please  come  forward? 

Will  the  photographers  please  retire? 

Raise  your  hand,  please,  and  be  sworn,  sir. 

Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give  before 
this  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but 
the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  RENNARD  CORDON  DAVIS,  ACCOMPANIED  BY 
COUNSEL,  MICHAEL  KENNEDY 

Mr.  IcHOED.  Mr.  Counsel,  your  name  is  Michael  Kennedy;  is  that 
not  correct  ? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  the  New  York  bar  ? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  I  am  a  member  of  the  California  bar. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Would  the  witness  please  be  seated  ? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  May  I  take  up  one  brief  thing,  please  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  wish  to  come  forward  ? 

Mr.  KJENNEDY.  It  is  merely  to  request  a  daily  transcript  of  the  pre- 
vious testimony  on  behalf  of  the  witness  and  myself,  as  counsel. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  advise  the  attorney  that  it  is  a  tremen- 
dous burden  upon  the  staff  to  reproduce  these  documents.  Actually, 
there  are  provisions  for  reproducing  them  and  sending  them  out 

Mr.  KJENNEDY.  I  am  more  concerned  about  the  transcript. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  you  can  buy  the  transcrij)t.  As  soon  as  the 
transcript  is  prepared,  you  can  have  it. 

Mr.  Kennedy.  Can  we  have  it  on  a  daily  basis?  It  is  understood 
it  will  be  at  our  expense, 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  staff  has  difficulty  in  reproducing  the  documents, 
but  the  transcript  can  be  readily  reproduced. 

Mr.  Kjennedy.  May  I  assume  that  in  time  we  will  have  copies  of 
the  documents  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Yes,  the  Chair  has  instructed  the  staff  members  to  get 
the  hearing  records  printed  promptly,  and  they  will  be  included  in 
the  hearing  record  and  will  be  available  to  everyone.^ 

Mr.  Counsel,  you  are  recognized  and  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Ichord,  I  begin  with  a  very  brief  statement. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  has  always  been  the  custom  of  the  committee  to  per- 
mit a  statement,  and  I  would  advise  the  witness  that,  under  this  pro- 
cedure, you  are  recognized  for  the  purpose  of  making  objections  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee,  the  validity  of  the  subpenas,  compli- 
ance with  the  rules,  and  the  subject  of  the  hearing.  The  Chair  will  not 
permit,  as  has  been  done  in  the  past,  harassment  or  abuse  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  committee  or  committees  of  the  Congress,  and  you  are  rec- 
ognized for  that  purpose  at  this  time. 

Mr.  DA\r[s.  I  would  like  to  give  the  customary  background  and 
information  on  myself  essentially.  I  think  it  will  speed  up  things. 

1  All  documents  used  in  the  hearings  are  not  reproduced.  However,  those  not  repro- 
duced are  available  in  committee  files. 


2628  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  IcHOED.  I  tliink  it  would  be  better  if  that  could  be  done  on  the 
record,  and  you  can  elaborate  on  it.  We  want  to  have  those  questions 
in  the  record,  of  your  residence,  your  employment.  After  we  get  those 
in  the  record,  if  you  want  to  elaborate  on  your  background  you  may 
do  so,  but  I  think  we  can  proceed  better  if  we  proceed  this  way. 

Go  ahead  and  ask  the  usual  identification  questions,  Mr,  Counsel, 
and  then  you  will  be  recognized  for  that  purpose  if  you  want  to 
elaborate. 

Mr.  CoNUBY.  Mr.  Davis,  would  you  state  your  full  name  and  address 
for  the  record. 

Mr.  Davis.  My  full  name  is  Rennard  Cordon  Davis. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Spell  the  first  name. 

Mr.  Davis.  R-e-n-n-a-r-d.  My  friends  call  me  Rennie.  Police  and 
peof)le  who  are  upset  by  what  I  represent  call  me  Mr.  Davis  or  simply 
Davis. 

My  address  that  I  would  suggest  that  you  use  is  5  Beekman  Street, 
New  York,  New  York.  I  am  in  the  process  of  possibly  moving  to 
Washington  in  response  to  President-elect  Nixon's  call  to  come  to  the 
inauguration  and  I  may  take  up  residence  here  in  Washington,  D.C. 
But  for  the  time  being  I  can  receive  all  mail  at  5  Beekman  Street  in 
New  York  City. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  are  you  represented  here  by  counsel  today  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  I  am. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  it  Mr.  Kennedy  who  earlier  identified  himself  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  are  you  appearing  here  today  in  response 
to  a  subpena  served  on  you  by  United  States  deputy  marshal  John 
Brophy  on  September  26,  1968,  at  25  East  26th  Street,  New  York, 
New  York  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  the  exact  time  that  I  was  subpenaed, 
but  that  is  certainly  the  only  reason  that  I  would  appear  before  a 
committee  such  as  this. 

Mr.  CoNXEY.  Mr.  Davis,  where  were  you  born,  please  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  was  born  in  Lansing,  Michigan. 

Mr.  CoNiiEY.  The  date  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  May  23, 1940. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  be  kind  enough  to  give  the  committee  a 
brief  resume  of  your  education,  high  school  and  college  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  grew  up  in  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains  of  Virginia.  I 
am  a  southerner.  I  feel  that  I  am.  I  went  to  a  small  niral  school  just 
outside — about  65  miles  southwest  of  Washington,  called  Clarke 
County  High  School.  It  borders  right  on  the  property  of  Senator 
Harry  Byrd,  who  owns  the  largest  singly  owned  apple  orchard  in  the 
country.  I  attended  Oberlin  College  in  Oberlin,  Ohio,  and  received  a 
B.A.  degree.  I  did  graduate  work 

Mr.  CoNiiEY.  May  I  interrupt  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Of  course. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  that  degree  in  1962  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  political  science  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Right  again. 

Mr.  CoNXJBY.  All  right.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  went  to  graduate  schools  at  the  University  of  Illinois, 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2629 

the  University  of  Michigan,  and  the  University  of  Chicago  after  grad- 
uating from  Oberlin  College. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  attend  these  schools  in  1964,  1965,  and  1966, 
respectively  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  CoNXEY.  Have  you  received  any  advanced  degrees  as  a  result 
of  this  graduate  work  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  can't  seem  to  finish  any  of  my  degrees. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  what  is  your  employment  background  since 
high  school  ?  What  type  of  employment  have  you  held  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Essentially  I  have  been  employed  by  what  we  have  been 
calling  loosely  this  morning  the  movement  since  early  1960.  And  I 
thing  it  is  misleading  to  talk  about  my  formal  education  as  being  the 
important  education.  My  education  came  from  having  a  cigarette 
ground  out  in  the  back  of  my  neck  in  the  South,  trying  to  get  a  ham- 
burger with  a  black  man.  My  education  came  with  working  with  people 
from  Kentucky,  West  Virginia,  Alabama,  and  South  Carolina  who 
moved  to  Chicago  thinking  they  could  get  a  better  deal  there,  onlj'-  to 
find  they  were  confronted  with  railroads  who  wanted  to  steal  rents  and 
fix  up  apartments  in  no  way  at  all  or  caseworkers  who  live  in  the 
suburbs  and  made  literally  life-and-death  decisions  over  their  lives,  and 
they  had  no  recourse  in  making  those  decisions. 

You  know  my  background,  and  essentially  my  work  has  been  in 
neighborhoods,  in  communities  in  this  country,  trying  to  work  around 
those  kinds  of  grievances.  That  has  been  the  basic  employment  of  the 
past,  and  I  hope  for  the  future. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  to  be  specific,  if  I  may  for  a  moment,  in  the 
years  1964-1965,  were  you  director  of  SDS  Economic  Research  and 
Action  Project? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes.  Let  me  run  through  the  whole  list. 

In  1964  Students  for  a  Democratic  Society  established  a  community 
organizing  program  that  was  aimed  at  trying  to  brin^  people  into 
black  and  poor  white  communities,  to  develop  new  political  centers 
of  power  that  could  allow  individuals  who  are  victims  of  police 
brutality  or  welfare  bureaucracy  or  slum  landlords  or  loan  sharks  to 
have  an  organization  that  they  could  use  for  their  own  rights  and  their 
own  grievances. 

We  established  some  10  organizing  projects  in  1964,  That  was  the 
same  year  that  some  800  students  went  to  Mississippi  to  work  in  that 
State  against  racism. 

Then  in  1965  I  moved  to  Chicago,  Illinois,  where  I  became  a  member 
of  an  organization  called  JOIN  Community  Union. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  J-O-I-N  ? 

Mr.  Da\t[s.  That  is  correct.  The  purpose  of  JOIN  was  to  attempt  to 
see  if  the  kinds  of  people  that  Mr.  Watson  claims  to  represent  and 
that  Wallace  claimed  to  speak  for  could,  in  fact,  if  organized  around 
their  own  grievances  and  their  own  problems,  begin  to  understand 
that  they  have  a  relationship  to  the  black  community  and  the  problems 
of  the  black  community  and  that,  in  fact,  it  is  the  movement  that  has 
begun  in  the  black  community  that  makes  the  most  sense  as  an  ultimate 
solution,  power  solution  to  the  problems  of  poor  whites  in  this  country. 

I  had  the  privilege  to  work  for  nearly  3  years  with  residents  of 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  and  Kentucky  in  this  organization. 


2630  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

In  1967, 1  believe  it  was,  I  became  director  of  a  research  project  that 
was  aimed  at  supplying  intelligence  and  information  to  various  com- 
munity groups  across  Chicago  that  would  be  useful  in  making  their 
challenge  to  an  incredibly  corrupt  from  top  down  political  machine 
represented  publicly  by  Mayor  Daley.  Through  information  that 
would  assist  them  in  their  local  community  activity — the  name  of  this 
organization  was  called  the  Center  for  Radical  Research. 

In  late  1967 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  that  with  headquarters  in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Daves.  That  is  right.  In  late  1967  I  was  invited  to  a  conference 
in  Bratislava,  Czechoslovakia,  along  with  40  other  people  who  rep- 
resented the  black  movement,  people  who  represented  the  clergy,  the 
lawyers,  reporters,  women,  and  others  who  shared  at  least  in  common 
a  desire  to  end  the  bloodshed  and  slaughter  in  Vietnam. 

At  that  conference,  invitation  was  extended  to  me  to  see  firsthand 
what  had  been  talked  about  at  Bratislava  through  a  trip  to  North  Viet- 
nam. I  went  essentially  at  that  time,  October  1967,  to  North  Vietnam 
to  try  to  document,  if  I  could,  the  widespread  use  of  antipersonnel 
weapons  or  cluster  bomb  units  in  that  country. 

As  you  know,  in  1967  the  United  States  Air  Force  was  claiming  it 
was  hitting  only  steel  and  concrete  in  North  Vietnam.  What  I  dis- 
covered in  cities  like  Nam  Dinh  or  Son  Tay  or  Hanoi,  in  the  populated 
civilian  areas,  was  the  use  of  a  weapon  that  sprays  small  steel  pellets  in 
every  direction,  splintering  the  bodies,  splintering  the  bones,  creating 
deep  rips  within  the  internal  organs,  and  most  people  facing  a  death 
that  amounts  to  a  slow,  painful  bleeding  to  death. 

If  such  a  bomb  were  to  explode  in  tins  room,  I  think  you —  everyone 
here  would  die.  But  as  quickly  as  the  bodies  could  be  removed  from 
this  room,  we  could  have  another  session  of  Un-American  Activities. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Are  you  an  expert  on  bombs,  Mr.  Davis  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  studied  this  particular  weapon  in  great  detail, 
because  in  1967  one  out  of  every  two  bombs  dropped  in  North  Vietnam 
was  a  cluster  bomb  unit.  So,  I  attempted  to  go  to  study  bomb  damage 
and  the  type  of  experimental  weapons  used  in  Hanoi  to  bring  that  in- 
formation back  to  the  United  States,  since  the  United  States  military — 
and  through  the  press — was  patently  lying  about  whait  was  happen- 
ing in  that  country. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Mr.  Davis,  on  that  point,  have  you  yourself  physi- 
cally examined  one  of  these  bombs  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  just  outside  of  Nam  Dinh, 
about  65  miles  south  of  Saigon,  it  was  a  city  that  was  reduced  to  about 
30,000  from  65,000.  An  early  morning  raid  of  F-105's  came  across  and 
dropped  CBU's  on  this  city.  Immediately  after  the  plane  left,  we 
iraLmediately  went  into  the  city.  One  of  the  bomblets— there  are  bomb- 
lets  inside  the  cluster  bomb  unit  that  contain  the  pellets,  and  when  they 
hit,  they  then  explode  some  300  steel  pellets  in  the  air — an  old-fashioned 
hand  grenade  has  about  80  pieces  of  shrapnel.  One  of  the  bomblets 
did  not  detonate,  did  not  explode,  and  it  was  deactivated.  And  a 
peasant  woman  who  had  just  lost  two  of  her  own  children  that  morning 
presented  me  with  this  bomblet  and  asked  that  I  take  it  back  to  Amer- 
ica, where  it  belongs. 

She  was  standing  in  front  of  a  schoolhouse  at  the  time,  and  the  whole 
wall  was  just  splintered  with  these  pellets,  and  it  stuck  in  the  wall  or 
chipped  the  wall. 


DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2631 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  You  don't  know  that  the  bomb  could  have  been 
planted  and  used  for  propaganda? 

Mr,  Davis.  If  the  bomb  was  planted,  then  the  North  Vietnamese  are 
spending  perhaps  a  million  man-hours  a  month  putting  little  pellets 
in  doors  in  Hanoi  and  hospitals  and  schools,  and  everywhere  you  go 
this  camouflage  of  propaganda  has  been  created  over  what  I  traveled, 
literally  hundreds  of  miles,  particularly  for  essentially  rural  area, 
what  amounts  to  the  industrial  or  city  or  populated  areas. 

So,  I  would  judge  that  that  was  not  the  case,  though  there  are  Amer- 
icans who  would  believe  that  the  Vietnamese  are  so  vicious  they  would 
go  to  any  extreme  to  create  that  impression. 

Coming  back  from  Hanoi,  and  I  would  like  to  talk  much  more  about 
the  use  of  experimental  weapons  of  our  military  in  that  country  and 
my  purposes  in  going  there,  if  you  are  interested  in  my  connections 
with  the  Vietnamese,  as  I  am  sure  you  are. 
Mr.  IcHORD.  We  are  getting  far  afield  from  the  identification. 
Mr.  Davis.  I  am  sorry.  I  will  try  to  speed  up. 

I  was  essentially  a  traveler  and  speaker  about  the  war  until  the  mid 
part  of — the  spring  of  1968.  At  that  time  I  became  quite  involved  in 

the  organization  of  soldiers 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Mr.  Davis,  I  don't  mean  to  interrupt  you  or  cut  you 
off,  but  if  we  do  get  some  other  information  we  have  already  gone  into, 
we  could  get  to  that. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  thought  I  would  talk  about  Summer  Support,  which 
I  was  formerly  involved  in,  and  it  was  the  project  that  helped  to  set  up 
antiwar  coffeehouses  around  the  country. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  will  get  that,  but  if  we  can  take  it  in  a  little  differ- 
ent order 

Mr.  DA^^[s.  Fine — any  way  you  want. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  connection  with  your  jobs,  as  I  understand  it,  you 
were  director  of  SDS  Economic  Research  and  Action  Project,  the 
director  of  the  JOIN  Commimity  Union. 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  was  never  director  of  JOIN. 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  were  just  a  part  of  that. 
Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  I  worked  for  the  organization. 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  Were  you  the  director  of  the  Center  for  Radical  Re- 
search ?  Did  I  misunderstand  you  on  that? 
Mr.  Davis.  No,  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  connection  with  those  three  particular  employments 
or  jobs  that  you  held,  did  you  receive  any  compensation? 
Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  mean  from  those  organizations  ? 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  don't  be  silly.  They  have  no  money. 
Mr.  CoxLEY.  In  other  words,  you  were  not  paid  in  any  way  for  your 
work  with  SDS  or  with  the  other  two  organizations,  JOIN  or  the 
Center  for  Radical  Research  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  never  received  a  paycheck  from  any  of  those 
organizations,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge. 

Mr.  CoNLBY.  In  connection  with  your  work  with  the  Center  for 
Radical  Research,  did  not  this  group  undertake  to  investigate  the  Chi- 
cago Police  Department  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  the  plain- 
c^otjies  officers  that  worked  within  that  department  this  past  year? 
Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  the  time  that  we  worked  on  that  proj- 


2632  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

ect;  but,  as  you  know  through  your  association  with  this  committee, 
many  of  the  organizations  that  are  trying  to  change  this  coimtry  are 
contmuously  infiltrated  and  undermined  by  Federal  and  local  police 
agents. 

One  of  the  concerns  of  people  who  are  trying  to  build  a  democratic 
society  in  this  country  is  how  to  operate  democratically  when  your 
m.eetings  are  infiltrated  and  reports  are  written  that  distort  your  pur- 
poses and  then  used  against  you.  It  seemed  to  us  that  the  first  step  in 
dealing  with  this  problem  was  to  identify  who  those  agents  might  be. 

My  recollection  is  that  we  did  have  some  young  people  connected 
with  the  research  center  who  tried  to  develop  that  information  for 
Chicago  community  groups. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Mr.  Davis,  moving  to  your  involvement  with  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee,  I  would  ask  you  if  you  were  not 
in  Chicago  during  the  Democratic  Convention  in  August  of  this  year. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  a  big  scar  on  my  head  to  demonstrate  that  I  was  in 
Chicago  at  that  time. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  not,  in  fact,  ser\^e  as  codirector  with  Tom 
Hay  den  for  the  Mobilization  Committee's  activities  in  Chicago? 

Mr.  Da\t[s.  Yes.  I  wonder  if  I  could  speed  it  up  by  saying  I  associ- 
ate myself  with  every  statement  that  Mr.  Hayden  made  in  the  last 
day  and  a  half. 

I  find  the  substance  of  that  statement  to  be  essentially  correct,  and 
all  questions  that  were  put  to  him,  I  would  respond  to  essentially  in 
the  same  way.  I  think  that  he  demonstrated  that  beautifully,  what 
he  means  by  being  a  political  guerrilla.  I  think  he  attacked  you — 
he  pinned  you  against  the  wall.  I  think  his  testimony  was  the  best 
kind  of  example 

Mr.  IcHORD.  What  is  your  definition  ? 

Mr,  Davis.  I  would  take  as  an  example  and  a  definition  Mr.  Hay- 
den's — Tom's — testimony  because  I  think  that  essentially  it  made  this 
committee  what  it  is,  which  is  irrelevant  to  our  movement. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  we  could  speed  up,  Mr.  Davis,  if  we  would  let 
the  record  show  that  you  have  the  same  contempt  for  the  committee  and 
the  other  institutions  of  Congress  and  our  Government 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  let  the  record  not  show  that.  That  would  distort 
my  position. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  proceed  with  the  questioning,  then. 

Mr.  Davis.  What  I  was  going  to  suggest,  because  I  am  very  anxious 
to  get  out  of  here  as  soon  as  I  can,  as  I  am  sure  you  are,  that  Mr.  Hay- 
den's  testimony  stand  is  my  testimony  as  well,  and  maybe  we  could 
now  zero  in  on  the  questions  which  remain,  such  as  how  we  get  our 
money,  how  we  organize  ourselves,  whatever  you  like. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  May  I  ask  that  you  answer  the  questions  counsel  asks. 
It  might  prove  helpful  to  know  that  you  do  agree  with  the  statements 
made  by  Mr.  Hayden,  but  we  will  have  to  wait  until  the  questions  are 
put,  and  the  Chair  will  rule. 

Mr.  Davis.  All  right ;  I  thought  that  would  help. 

Mr.  CoNXEY.  I  do  have  to  ask  you  these  questions,  because,  as  I  recall 
Mr.  Hayden's  questions,  he  said  you  were  in  a  better  position  to  answer 
these  next  few  questions  than  he  was.  The  last  question  was,  Did  you 
serve  as  a  coproject  director  ?  Is  your  answer  "yes"  to  that  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2633 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Hayden  said  I  was.  That  is  what  I  was  trying  to 
get  to.  We  could  cut  through  the  things  he  already  said. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Wlien  were  you  appointed  to  this  position,  Mr.  Davis  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  appointments  don't  come  in  some  kind  of  mechan- 
ical way  in  our  movement.  I  was  interested  in  a  demonstration  at  the 
Democratic  Convention  as  early  as  October  of  1967  and  began  to  go 
to  various  meetings  to  raise  that  possibility  as  early  as  December  of 
1967.  I  think  it  was  largely  because  of  my  interest  in  focusing  on  the 
Democratic  Convention,  which  at  the  beginning,  at  least,  appeared 
almost  certain  to  renominate  Lyndon  Johnson  for  another  4  years  of 
slaughter  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  was  it  in  January,  February  ?  Was  it  along 
in  there  when  the  letterhead  first  began  using  your  name?  I  cer- 
tainly don't  intend  to  lead  you,  but  I  think  we  are  getting  far  afield 
again. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  would  say  in  the  spring  of  1968  I  became  coproject 
director  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War 
in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  When  did  you  first  go  to  Chicago  to  work  full  time 
in  the  office  setup  on  South  Dearborn  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  lived  in  Chicago  all  the  time,  so  I  never  went  there; 
I  was  always  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  when  the  office  was  opened?  I  am  re- 
ferring to  Room  315, 407  South  Dearborn. 

Mr.  Da\t;s.  The  office  was  opened  in  late  January  or  early  February. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  start  working  out  of  the  office  at  that  time? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  that  office  being  operated  at  that  time  as  a  part 
of  National  Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  don't  think  that  would  be  essentially  correct.  The 
Mobilization  was  one  of  the  organizations  that  was  discussing  the 
possibilities  of  a  demonstration  in  Chicago.  The  Chicago  office  was  a 
group  of  people  in  Chicago  who  were  attempting  to  relate  to  a 
variety  of  organizations,  not  all  of  whom  were  represented  by  the 
National  Mobilization  coalition. 

It  was  only  in  May,  I  would  guess,  of  1968  that  the  office  in  some 
sense  became  formally  connected  with  the  National  Mobilization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  in  connection  with  your  duties  as  codi- 
rector  or  coproject  director,  whatever  you  choose  to  call  it,  did  you 
receive  any  type  of  compensation,  salary,  any  type  of  remuneration 
for  your  duties? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  I  recall  that  there  was  a  period  in  which  the  Mobilization 
did  pay  me  a  subsistence  salary  that  I  generally  gave  away. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  this  by  check  or  by  cash  ? 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  It  would  always  have  been  by  check  if  such  money  was 
given. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  May  I  ask  you,  sir,  who  was  authorized  to  write  checks 
and  deliver  checks  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.    From  the  National  Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  CoNEEY.  Yes. 

Mr.  Davis.  Eric  Weinberger  is  our  treasurer. 

Mr.  CoNEEY.  Spell  his  last.  name. 

Mr.  Davis.  W-e-i-n-b-e-r-g-e-r. 

21-706  O — 69— pt.  2 10 


2634  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  on  what  banks  these  checks  were  drawn? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  don't. 

Mr.  CoNXEY.  Was  it  a  Chicago  bank  or  out-of-city  bank? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  Mobilization  account  is  in  New  York  City. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  in  some  of  Mr.  Hayden's  testimony  here 
yesterday,  I  believe,  he  indicated  that  you  actually  were  the  principal 
administrator  of  the  Chicago  office  of  the  National  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee; that  you  more  or  less  had  the  overall  responsibility  for  the 
office.  Is  this  a  fair  statement  ?  I  hope  I  am  not  misquoting  the  impres- 
sion that  he  gave  to  me,  which  was  that  you  were  the  one  who  basically 
made  the  decisions  in  the  Chicago  office,  how  many  people  were  needed 
and  what  were  they  going  to  do.  Is  this  a  fair  statement  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes;  but  again  it  does  not  do  justice  to  the  way  people 
work.  People  don't  work  in  a  kind  of — one  person  gives  the  directions 
and  the  other  people  carry  them  out.  We  generally  sit  down  and  talk 
about  what  the  problems  are — how  do  we  get  housing  for  maybe  5,000 
people  and  who  is  best  at  working  up  a  letter  to  explain  our  pur- 
poses or  getting  some  students  to  go  out  and  talk  about  that, 
and  whoever  is  the  best  at  that  or  figures  they  can  do  it — you  know, 
they  just  say,  "Okay,  I  will  do  that."  It  is  not  like  I  figure  there  has  to 
be  housing  for  this  number  of  people  and  then  make  an  assignment.  If 
you  did  that,  you  would  be  immediately — people  would  not  work  with 
you  if  you  worked  that  way. 

How  do  you  explain  the  fact  that  people  work  for  no  money  and 
live  on  peanut  butter  sandwiches  and  take  orders  ?  It  just  does  not  work 
out  that  way.  We  just  got  together,  divided  it  up,  and  I  was  there  like 
everybody  else. 

Mr.  CoNiiEY.  At  the  time  you  started  running  this  office  as  a  National 
Mobilization  office,  which  I  understand  was  in  approximately  May  of 
1968,  about  how  many  people  did  you  have  employed  there  full  time? 

Mr.  Davis.  What  do  you  mean  by  "employed"  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "Employed"  to  me  would  mean  people  you  were  pay- 
ing. If  you  had  none,  I  presume  your  answer  would  be  none. 

Mr.  Davis.  When  somebody  needed  some  money  we  would  try  to  go 
out  and  get  someone  to  give  some  money  so  they  could  get  through  the 
next  week,  but  I  don't  believe  that  anybody  actually  received  a  formal 
salary,  so  I  guess  the  answer  to  your  question  would  be  none. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  ask  you  if  actually,  to  your  knowledge,  if  no 
one  did  receive  a  salary,  how  many  people  were  working  in  the  office  in 
May,  on  a  voluntary  basis,  on  up  to  the  time  of  the  convention  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  people  worked  12  to  16  hours  a  day.  In  May  I  would 
guess  maybe  12  to  15.  By  late  Jul;^  I  would  guess  we  had  20  to  25. 
Through  the  week  of  the  convention  our  staff  numbered  approxi- 
mately 200. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  during  the  period  that  you  took  over — I 
will  withdraw  the  use  of  the  words  "took  over" — during  the  time  you 
were  affiliated  with  the  National  Mobilization  at  407  South  Dearborn, 
you  did  have  occasion  to  attend  meetings  prior  to  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention, did  you  not,  that  dealt  with  the  specific  problems,  what  were 
you  going  to  do  at  the  convention  and  in  connection  with  the 
convention  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  that  is  self-evident. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2635 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  did  you  and  Mr.  Hayden  prepare  two 
documents  prior  to  the  Democratic  Convention,  one  entitled  "MOVE- 
MENT CAMPAIGN  1968 :  AN  ELECTION  YEAR  OFFENSIVE," 
another  one  which  is  a  "DISCUSSION  ON  THE  DEMOCRATIC 
CONVENTION  CHALLENGE,"  also  marked  "not  for  pubHca- 
tion"  ?  [Hayden  Exhibits  Nos.  1  and  2.  See  pages  2562-2583  and  2556- 
2559.] 

Mr.  Davis.  I  cant  recall  whether  they  had  those  limitations  on 
them,  but  those  documents  were  prepared  as  Tom  said  earlier. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  directing  your  attention  specifically  to  the 
paper  entitled  "MOVEMENT  CAMPAIGN  1968,"  was  this  docu- 
ment not  described  by  you  and  Mr.  Hayden  on  the  preface: 

This  paper  proposes  an  election  year  campaign  against  a  political  system  that 
has  brought  the  United  States  into  a  crisis  of  war,  racism,  and  social  dis^ 
integration. 

Tliat  is  not  the  end  of  the  prelude,  I  do  not  believe,  but  it  is  a  part  of 
what  appears  on  the  first  page  of  that  document,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  should  read  on  because  it  is  important.  It  says: 

For  purpose  of  discussion,  we  have  made  our  proposals  concrete.  But  we  wiU 
fail  if  you  consider  them  final.  The  suggestions  are  merely  our  own,  intended 
only  to  provoke  discussion.  *  *  * 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  this  particular  document  has  been  received 
by  the  committee  in  its  entirety. 

Mr.  Davis.  How  did  you  get  this  document  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  is  part  of  the  record,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir,  it  was  offered  this  morning. 

Mr.  Davis.  What  was  the  procedure  of  how  this  document  was 
obtained  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness  is  out  of  order. 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  I  would  think  the  Chair  would  be  very  interested  in 
how  the  document  was  secured. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  know  ? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  No,  I  am  asking  you.  I  wondered  if  it  was  secured  by 
one  of  your  midercover  agents. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  are  out  of  order.  Proceed  with  the  questioning, 
Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  May  I  have  the  document  back  for  a  moment  for  the 
next  question? 

Mr.  Davis,  directing  your  attention  to  what  has  been  marked  as  page 
15  and  the  paragraph  which  has  been  bracketed,  does  not  the  language 
read:  '"''Black  Rebellions :  In  our  view,  summer  organizers  working  m 
the  white  commmiity  should  discuss  plans  *  *  *." 

This  has  previously  been  read.  Do  you  see  where  I  am  referring  to  ? 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  Where  it  has  been  marked  in  red  and  outlined  and 
underlined. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  starts  with  '■'•Black  Rehellions:  In  our  view,  sum- 
mer oganizers  working  in  the  white  community  *  *  *." 

Do  you  see  where  I  have  reference  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  I  do  see. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  ask  you :  Do  you  mean  by  this  statement 
that  you  hoped  that  white  young  people  would  engage  in  violent 
actions  ? 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  Let  me  read  the  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Tlie  statement  is 


2636  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Davis.  I  agree.  I  don't  know  why  you  asked  it.  As  I  said,  Tom 
answered  this  question  perhaps  2  hours  totally  of  his  testimony.  And 
as  I  have  already  said,  I  associate  myself  with  all  he  said.  If  you  would 
like  me  to  repeat  what  he  said. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Tliis  is  no  procedure  to  incorporate  Mr.  Hayden's 
answers  to  the  questions.  You  are  the  person  who  is  now  being  ques- 
tioned. Go  ahead  and  elaborate. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  it  speaks  for  itself. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  put  my  question  to  you  again,  sir,  if  I  may :  Did 
you  mean  by  that  statement  that  you  hoped  or  desired  that  young 
wliite  people  would  engage  in  violent  reactions  or  actions  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  the  statement  reads : 

In  our  view,  suromer  organizers  worliing  in  the  wtiite  community  should  discuss 
plans  in  each  training  school  for  support  and  parallel  activity  during  black 
ghetto  rebellions.  AVhites  should  sit-in  at  Democratic  Mayor's  oflSces,  organize 
medical  and  legal  support,  pull  together  diversionary  demonstrations  outside  the 
ghetto  to  draw  off  police  and  find  ways  to  focus  public  blame  for  what  happens  on 
the  powerful  white  interests. 

I  did  not  mean  that  we  should  organize  violence  in  white  com- 
munities at  the  time  of  black  rebellions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  said :  Did  you  mean  that  you  hoped  that  young  white 
people  would  engage  in  violent  actions?  I  did  not  put  the  question  to 
you,  sir,  that  you  intended  to  organize  anyone  to  do  anything.  Was 
it  your  hope  that  the  young  white  people  would  engage  in  certain 
violent  actions? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  that  was  not  my  hope. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  did  you  mean  by  the  statement : 

Whites  should  sit-in  at  Democratic  Mayor's  oflSces,  organize  medical  and  legal 
support,  pull  together  diversionary  demonstrations  outside  the  ghetto  to  draw  off 
police  and  find  ways  to  focus  public  blame  for  what  happens  on  the  powerful 
white  interests. 

What  did  you  mean  for  the  whites  to  do  then  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  As  you  know,  our  movement  in  the  early  1960's  was  born 
out  of  the  idea  of  nonviolent  sit-ins,  first  at  restaurants  that  discrimi- 
nated against  black  people.  We  thought  there  were  absolutely  no 
channels  through  which  one  could  redress  the  grievances  of  racism; 
that  a  nonviolent  sit-in  tactic  was  a  way  of  raising  the  moral  issue  into 
public  consciousness. 

I  think  that  we  are  veiy  familiar  in  the  country  now  with  people 
going  into  public  offices  or  private  institutions  that  are  undemocratic 
or  racist  or  represent  forces  that  really  do  not  operate  through  any 
kind  of  democratic  channels  to  try  to  find  or  bring  about  the  under- 
standing that  new  channels  have  to  be  created.  I  think  that  "sit-in" 
is  almost  synonymous  with  "nonviolence."  Organized  medical  and 
legal  support  speaks  for  itself.  That  is,  in  a  black  rebellion  police  come 
in,  as  they  did  in  Chicago,  and  shoot  black  people  down ;  many  of  them 
innocent  people  in  the  streets. 

Mayor  Daley  suggested  people  who  were  engaged  in  what  he  called 
arson  or  looting  be  shot  to  kill,  or  "we  shoot  to  kill."  The  police  carry 
out  that  kind  of  order.  When  you  have  a  public  official  suggesting  that 
black  people  be  shot  down  in  the  streets  of  their  own  community,  ob- 
viously, citizens  have  to  organize  medical  help  for  the  victims  of 
police  brutality. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2637 

Similarly,  wholesale  pickups  occur  during  rebellions.  Police  move 
in  and  pick  up  everybody  right  or  wrong,  whatever  is  happening,  and 
the  crimes  that  go  on  in  the  courtrooms  and  the  jailhouses  of  this 
country,  particularly  during  black  rebellions,  are  enough  to  turn  any- 
body's stomach. 

It  seems  to  me  the  least  white  people  can  do  in  that  kind  of  situa- 
tion is  bring  the  legal  resources  they  are  in  contact  with  in  that 
situation  to  help  it  along.  I  think  the  statement  speaks  for  itself. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  at  the  risk  of  lifting  out  of  context,  I  read 
purposely  the  entire  portion  there  dealing  with  whites,  but  the  part 
that  concerns  me  is  the  part  that  says,  "pull  together  diversionary  dem- 
onstrations outside  the  ghetto  to  draw  off  police." 

I  will  grant  you,  you  could  probably  have  a  very  peaceable  demon- 
stration somewhere  outside  the  ghetto,  but  I  wonder  if  that  would 
accomplish  what  this  is  apparently  desirous  of  doing,  which  is  to  pull 
the  police  out.  Are  you  not  in  fact  suggesting  as  an  alternative,  or  pos- 
sibility, that  this  demonstration  might  become  violent  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  guess  if  the  questions  are  going  to  be  speeches, 
then  I  should  make  speeches,  too.  I  prefer  not  to. 

Tom  gave  the  example  in  the  spring  of  1968  after  the  tragic  assas- 
sination of  Dr.  King  of  some  20,000  whites  holding  a  rally  in  down- 
town Boston  as  a  way  of  essentially  dramatizing  attention,  focusing 
attention  on  the  conditions  that  had  sparked  the  black  revolts  that 
were  being  triggered  across  the  country  at  that  time,  and  demonstrat- 
ing solidarity  with  black  people  who  face  day  to  day  extremely  op- 
pressive conditions. 

I  think  that  he  explained  very  eloquently  the  political  thinking 
behind  that  particular  demonstration,  and  that  kind  of  demonstration 
is  precisely  what  we  meant  when  we  talked  about  white  people  having 
diversionary  demonstrations  at  the  time  of  black  rebellions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  But  you  did  not  view  these,  as  I  understand  it,  as 
possibly  of  a  violent  nature. 

Mr.  Davis.  It  might  be  that  National  Guard  troops  or  police  would 
come  into  such  a  demonstration  and  crush  heads  or  use  Mace,  as  they 
did  in  such  a  demonstration  in  Chicago.  There  was  a  white  demonstra- 
tion, more  or  less,  at  the  time  of  the  Boston  demonstration,  sprmg 
1968,  which  attempted  to  pass  out  leaflets  to  National  Guard  troops 
explaining  that  they  were  going  through  a  very  difficult  situation. 
They  were  confronted  with  orders  that  no  man  should  have  to  be 
confronted  with,  that  we  sympathized  with  their  situation,  but  we 
urged  them  not  to  shoot  down  black  people  in  Chicago's  black 
community. 

We  went  armed  with  leaflets  and  flowers,  and  the  Chicago  police 
moved  into  the  Armory  and  annomiced  that  5,000  people  were  storm- 
ing the  Armory  and  that  the  National  Guard  troops  should  get  ready 
with  bayonets  out,  and  sidewalks  were  cleared  and  women  were 
clubbed  and  tear  gas  was  popped  off,  and  there  was  police  violence. 

We  were  very  sorry  that  happened — very  sorry — it  was  not  at  all 
the  situation  that  was  called  for,  but  it  was  a  situation  that  was  created 
by  police.  I  felt  that  it  was  a  very  important  demonstration,  neverthe- 
less, and  focusing  attention  at  that  time  on  the  fact  that  there  were 
white  people  who  were  very  sympathetic  with  the  terrible  police  situa- 
tion that  black  people  were  confronting  at  that  time,  in  the  spring  of 
1968  in  Chicago. 


2638  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  in  connection  with  that  same  paragraph, 
this  is  a  document,  to  keep  it  in  perspective,  is  it  not,  that  was  written 
prior  to  the  convention  by  you  and  Mr.  Hayden,  and  this  particular 
section  deals  with  black  rebellion. 

Mr.  Davis.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Democratic  Conven- 
tion. This  is  a  whole  program  that  talks  about  a  program  from  the 
spring  into  the  summer  and  into  the  fall.  One  aspect  of  this  is  to  focus 
on  the  Democratic  Convention.  What  you  are  referring  to  here  is 
activity  we  had  in  mind  during  the  spring  and  summer  and  had  no 
relationship  at  all  to  activity  around  the  Democratic  Convention.  So 
that  is  quite  incorrect  to  suggest  that  the  particular  section  on  page  15 
that  you  are  reading  from  has  any  relationship  to  our  proposals, 
specifically  proposals  for  the  Democratic  Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  didn't  say  that,  you  did. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  thought  you  suggested  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  said  this  was  written  prior  to  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention. It  has  in  the  statement  in  here  under  this  particular  para- 
graph, ''and  parallel  activity" — I  am  lifting  out  of  context,  but  I  don't 
think  it  is  necessary  to  read  the  whole  thing  to  get  at  it — "and  parallel 
activity  during  black  ghetto  rebellions." 

Isn't  this  an  assumption  on  your  part  that  there  will  be,  in  fact, 
these  rebellions  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  that  is  a  fairly  safe  presumption  as  long  as  we 
continue  to  elect  to  high  office  candidates  like  Mayor  Daley  and 
President-elect  Nixon. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  take  it  your  view  is  that  authorities  have  no  authority 
to  restrict  demonstrations  and  require  permits  to  be  issued  for  dem- 
onstrations before  they  can  be  held. 

Mr.  Davis.  A  city  administration  has  no  right  to  use  its  administra- 
tive control  over  permits  to  destroy  first  amendment  rights ;  that  the 
administrative  power  that  is  granted  has  to  do  with  problems  of  traffic 
control  and  other  things  that  are  essentially  technical.  In  Chicago  at 
least,  the  control  over  permits  is  continuously  used  in  a  political  way. 
That  is,  the  Shriners  can  march  down  Michigan  Avenue  50,000  strong, 
but  5,000  peace  demonstrators  cannot  march  down  Michigan  Avenue. 
That  is  what  we  oibject  to.  We  consider  that  totally  unconstitutional, 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  believe  the  freedom  of  assembly,  of  the  first 
amendment  constitutional  right,  is  absolute  and  is  not  subject  to 
restriction  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  that  is  my  position,  Mr.  Ichord 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  in  this  same  connection — and  now  perhaps 
I  am  moving  into  the  area  you  were  challenging  a  moment  ago — was 
it  your  assumption  that  there  would  be  "black  ghetto  rebellions,"  to 
use  your  words,  please,  during  or  prior  to  the  Democratic  Convention 
in  Chicago  ? 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Ashbrook  left  the  hearing  room, ) 

Mr.  Davis.  My  assumption  is  as  long  as  slum  landlords  go  un- 
checked, as  long  as  loan  sharks  continue  to  be  the  major  banks  for 
black  communities,  as  long  as  welfare  bureaucracies  continue  to  strad- 
dle black  pe-ople,  black  people  will  object  to  oppressive  conditions; 
and  imtil  this  country  deals  with  the  race  joroblems  that  exist  in  every 
community  in  the  United  States,  then  we  will  see  more  black  rebellions, 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  The  fact  that  the  Democratic  Convention  was  going 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2639 

to  be  held  in  Chicago  was  going  to  be  grounds  for  trying  everything — 
what  you  referred  to  as  a  black  ghetto  rebellion  ? 

Mr.  Da\^s.  No,  I  never  assumed  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  this  same  document,  do  you  not  also  advocate  a 
march  on  the  convention  hall,  the  International  Amphitheatre? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Kennedy.  Do  you  want  to  tell  us  what  page  it  is  on? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  you  give  me  the  document,  I  will. 

Mr.  Davis.  It  does  not  matter  what  we  propose.  It  is  a  matter 
of  public  record.  We  proposed  an  assembly  on  the  east  side  of  the 
International  Amphitheatre,  Halsted  Street  from  39th  in  the  north 
to  47th  on  the  south,  that  was  to  constitute  a  gigantic  citizens'  or  public 
hearing  at  the  time  of  the  Democratic  nomination. 

Our  hope  was  that  we  would  bring  to  that  hearing  Vietnam  veterans, 
welfare  recipients,  university  people,  yoimg  people  facing  the  draft, 
and  others  who  in  some  sense  represented  the  victims  of  the  Johnson 
policies  and  that,  while  Johnson  or  Humphrey  were  being  nominated 
inside,  tens  of  thousands  of  people  on  the  outside  would  conduct  this 
gigantic  citizens'  hearing. 

At  the  same  time  they  were  to  symbolically  bury  the  coffins  that 
stood  for  death  of  the  Democratic  Party.  That  was  essentially  our  idea, 
in  one  f  onn  or  another,  from  the  beginning. 

Now,  in  order  to  have  that  citizens'  assembly  on  the  outside  of 
course  required  that  we  move  people  to  the  Amphitheatre.  It  was  for 
that  reason  that  we  requested  from  the  city  of  Chicago  permits  to  hold 
a  march  or  parade  from  the  downtown  Chicago  area  to  the  Interna- 
tional Amphitheatre  at  43d  and  Halsted. 

Mr.  Watson.  Basically,  Mr.  Davis,  it  is  your  contention  that  you 
and  those  who  subscribe  to  your  thinking  should  have  or  do  have  the 
right  to  assemble  anywhere  you  wish  on  the  outside  of  the  Amphi- 
theatre ^vithout  interference  from  the  authorities,  but  yet  you  would 
not  grant  that  same  right  to  the  delegates  who  were  assembling  on  the 
in^de.  Is  that  your  basic  position  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Watson,  I  think  you  know  that  is  not  my  basic 
position. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  what  you  are  advocating. 

Mr.  Da%t:s.  "When  did  I  advocate  that? 

Mr.  Watson.  You  wanted  to  have  a  mass  demonstration  against  the 
convention.  You  wanted,  according  to  all  of  your  preliminary  publicity, 
to  disrupt  the  whole  convention.  So  you  feel  you  should  have  the  right 
to  move  unimpeded,  but  the  convention  does  not  have  the  right  to 
proceed. 

Tliat  is  your  basic  presumption  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  wonder  if  we  could  take  a  2-hour  recess  so  Mr.  Watson 
could  read  our  literature,  because  none  of  our  literature  calls  for  the 
projection  he  thinks  we  called  for,  and  the  contrary. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  never  advocated  disrupting  the  convention? 

Mr.  Davis,  We  said  before  television,  to  reporters,  in  meetings,  in  the 
infamous  Room  315,  and  all  over  the  country  that  we  were  not  coming 
to  Chicago  to  disrupt  the  convention  or  confront  the  International 
Amphitheatre.  We  were  not  coming  to  Chicago  to  fight  police  or 
National  Guard  troops.  Our  confrontation  was  a  political  confronta- 
tion. We  did  not  seek  violence.  We  did  not  seek  disruption  of  the  con- 
vention proceedings  in  any  way  whatsoever. 


2640  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Watson".  In  other  words,  the  preconvention  publicity  by  the 
Yippie  spokesmen  and  various  publications  relative  to  "turning  the 
city  upside  down" 

Mr.  Davis.  ^Yhat  does  that  mean,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  guess  you  could  give  us  a  definition. 

Mr.  Davis.  You  mean  you  take  a  city  and  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  guess  that  is  exactly  what  you  meant  by  that. 

Mr.  Davis.  How  would  one  go  about  doing  that  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  You  suggest  various  ways 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Just  a  minute,  Mr.  Watson 

Mr.  Davis.  It  was  proposed  that  the  Pentagon  be  levitated  by  cer- 
tain spokesmen- 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  would  admonish  the  audience  that  you  are 
guests  of  the  committee.  One  outbreak  might  call  for  another  one,  so 
let's  remain  in  order. 

Mr,  Watson.  If  you  would  like  to  know  specific  places  in  which  you 
enumerated  the  ways  in  which  you  planned  to  "turn  the  city  upside 
down,"  some  of  them  I  refer  to  are  on  page  49  of  the  so-called  Walker 
Report 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  the  Walker  Report. 

Mr.  Watson.  "Dynamite,"  "hallucinating  drugs,"  and  so  on,  "slip 
into  the  convention  hall";  "to  stage  a  mass  stall-in  of  old  jalopies," 
and  on  and  on. 

Mr.  Da^^s.  Does  that  mean  that  you  are  endorsing  this  report  by 
using  it  as  one  of  your  sources  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  asked  you  the  question  whether  or  not  there  were 
statements  by  Yippie  leaders  and  statements  made  in  many  of  the  pub- 
lications of  the  so-called  New  Left  or  Mobilization  Committee  aiming 
at  such  disruption  as  that. 

Mr.  Davis.  If  you  want  to  find  out  what  the  Yippie  leaders — and 
that  is  your  term,  not  mine,  or  theirs — said,  then  you  have  the  power 
to  bring  them  here  to  ask  them  yourself.  The  National  Mobilization 
Committee,  the  coalition  for  which  I  was  coproject  director,  never 
issued  any  official  document  that  called  for  the  disruption  of  the  Demo- 
cratic National  Convention,  nor  in  any  public  statement  that  I  ever 
made,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  did  I  ever  call  for  the  disruption, 
the  physical  disruption  of  the  Democratic  National  Convention. 

Mr.  Watson.  Perhaps  the  evidence  a  little  later  on  would  shed 
some  light. 

Mr.  Davis.    I  would  hope  you  would  bring  it  out. 

Mr.  CoNLBY.  THE  MOVEMENT,  issue  of  February  1968,  pages  4 
and  11,  featured  an  interview  with  you  and,  according  to  the  text,  of 
this  interview  you  were  asked  the  following  question :  "Wliat  do  you 
see  happening  at  the  Democratic  Convention  ?" 

There  is  a  rather  long  answer — we  are  intending  to  offer  this  entire 
document  for  reception  by  the  committee,  but  the  part  of  the  answer 
that  I  think  is  significant  is  this  part — you  are  answering  what  }^ou 
think  will  happen  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention,  and  I  pick 
up — in  lifting  out  of  context  again,  if  you  please,  sir,  "turning  the 
delegates  back  into  the  amphitheater  as  they  attempt  to  leave,  de- 
manding that  the  American  people  be  given  a  choice,  demanding  that 
they  reconsider  a  decision  not  in  the  national  interest,"  and  then  it 
goes  on  down  after  going  through  some  of  this  about  the  funeral,  and 
so  forth,  "and  [a]  giant  showdown  in  Washington  to  prevent  the 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2641 

inauguration  next  January."  But  the  part  I  particularly  call  your 
attention  to  is,  "turning  the  delegates  back  into  the  amphitheater  as 
they  attempt  to  leave."  ^.       x     i 

Sir,  you  indicated  you  did  not  plan  to  disrupt  the  convention,  i  ask 
you,  first  of  all,  is  this  an  accurate  quote  from  you  ? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Davis.  The  statement  in  its  entirety  says— this  is  a  qu^tion: 
"Wliat  do  you  see  happening  at  the  Democratic  Convention?"  Under- 
stand, this  was  written  in  February  1968  and  many  events  changed. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  1."  See  pages  2642-1648.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  accept  this  as  an  accurate  quotation  from  you? 
If  you  don't  accept  it,  there  is  no  point  in  reading  it  all. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  believe  it  is  essentially  correct.  I  don't  recall  whether 
I  used  the  exact  expression  "turning  the  delegates  back  into  the  amphi- 
theater," but  I  think  when  you  read  the  whole  context  it  is  quite  clear 
that  the  emphasis  here  is  on  the  funeral  march,  the  emphasis  is  on  the 
fact  that  the  Democratic  Convention  is  going  to  essentially  produce  an 
undemocratic  choice.  And  what  we  are  trying  to  do  in  our  actions  is 
to  focus  on  the  unrepresentative  nature  of  the  Democratic  Convention. 
It  does  not,  in  my  opinion,  imply  disruption.  It  certainly  does  not  mean 
disruption,  physical  disruption 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "Turning  the  delegates  back  into  the  *  *  *  [conven- 
tion] "  does  not  imply  something  physical  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  think  the  idea  we  had  at  this  stage,  before  the  shoot- 
to-kill  order  of  Mayor  Daley,  before  the  announcement  that  demon- 
strators would  be  placed  in  underground  caverns  by  Sheriff  Woods, 
before  the  announcement  that  the  12,000-man  police  force  wiis  going 
to  be  mobilized  in  12-hour  shifts  against  us,  before  the  special  issuance 
of  8,000  cannisters  of  Mace  to  be  u^  against  the  demonstrators,  before 
the  announcement  that  6,000  Guard  troops  were  going  to  be  brought 
in  to  be  used  against  demonstrators,  before  the  announcement  that 
soldiers  at  Fort  Hood  were  being  trained  in  the  use  of  nauseating  gas  to 
be  used  against  demonstrators — before  all  of  that  environment  was 
created  by  the  political  officials  in  Chicago  with  the  support  of  the 
Democratic  Party,  we  hoped  there  would  be  a  massive  walkout  of  the 
delegates  at  the  time  of  the  Democratic  Convention. 

The  symbol  we  used  was  a  funeral  march  to  go  to  the  Amphitheatre 
and  there  essentially  to  say  the  decisions  that  were  made  inside  that 
Amphitheatre  did  not  represent  the  rank  and  file  of  that  party  and 
ordinary  Americans. 

I  mean  I  think  that  the  record,  Mr.  Conley,  and  the  things  that  we 
had  said  again  and  again  before  the  press,  out  of  our  meetings,  to  pub- 
lic officials  in  Chicago,  made  it  absolutely  clear  that  the  organizations 
represented  by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  never  sought  a 
physical  confrontation  of  the  Democratic  National  Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  After  you  said  all  that,  my  question  is.  How  did  you 
propose  to  turn  back  the  delegates  into  the  Amphitheatre,  as  is  stated 
there.  It  is  a  very  simple  question. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  never  proposed  to  keep  the  delegates  physically  jailed 
in  the  International  Amphitheatre.  But  I  think  it  is  quite  easy  to  man- 
age a  hundred  thousand  people  at  the  International  Amphitheatre 
essentially  rejecting  the  decision  of  the  delegates  and  by  their  demand- 
ing that  the  Democratic  decision  or  change  on  the  war  essentially  be 
made. 


2642  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Davis  Exhibit  No.  1 

JHi  DiMOCRATK  COHVINTION 

A    CHALLENGE    TO 
ORGANIZERS 


Rennie  Davis,  one  of  the  founders  of  SDS,  was  in  the  Bay 
Area  last  month.  The  Movement  rook  that  opportunity  to 
talk  to  him  about  the  new  mood  in  the  country  and  the 
direction  of  the  movement  in  the  coming  year.  Davis  was 
once  the  director  of  ERAP  and  an  organizer  for  JOIN  until 
late  in  1966.  Since  then  he  has  been  the  director  for  the 
Center  for  Radical  Research.  He  recently  returned  from 
a  trip  to  North  Vietnam. 

THE  MOVEMENT:  What  do  you  think  the  major  concerns  of  the  movement  are?  Where 
do  you  see  the  movement  going?  There  seems  to  be  a  "new  mood"  In 
the  white  movement.  How  do  you  see  that? 
DAVIS:  A  "new  moo<f'  In  the  country  and  tfje  movement  is  evident,  extending  in 
my  opinion,  signlficaittly  beyond  Oakland,  Madison  and  WHiite  hall,  beyond  the  mobile, 
half-organized,  hatf-spontaneous  white  demonstrators  who  in  the  last  four  months  have 
tnade  it  plain  to  anyone  who  reads  a  paper  that  some  at  least  are  getting  damn  serious. 
Behind  the  people  who  may  be  comprising  a  kind  of  front  Une,  a  more  general  mood 
•xlscs,  fed  by  the  deep  public  insecurity  about  ttie  war  and  the  cities.  It's  mostly  young, 
mostly  Immature  politically,  mostly  rep- 
resenting, in  my  view,  a  mass  surfacing 

of    radical   instincts.    I've   met   recently  Now  you  ask  about  the  major  concerns 

some    of    its    representatives — in    Iowa;  and  direction  of  the  movement.  My  con- 

Champaign,    Illinois;  Williamsburg,  Vir-  ceni   is  bow  does  the  conscious,  organ- 

ginia — and    have     several    impressions.  izcd  pert   of  our   movement,  the  people 

Johnson,  not  us,  is  the  organizer  and  to  wl»  for  tbe  past  four  years  have  become 

a   considerable   extent  the  political  edu-  cwnfcicta ble  in  e  language  alien  to  most 

cator  of  these  people.  And  the  relation-  AtDCiiceas,    the    people  who   have   con- 

ship  of  the   organized   movement  to  the  solklMed  radical  organizations,  developed 


human  beings  who  shape  the  "new  mood" 
is  both  tenuous  and  limited.  We  plug  in 
with  them  at  national  peace  rumbles  like 
the  OctobM'  mobilization,  then  we  unplug. 


tkmlr  "'itntm*',  and  engaged  themselves 
seriously  in  detfete  about  the  relative 
radlcalDess  of  organizing  around  the  draft 
versus  organizing  around  welfare  or  coo- 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2643 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


fronting  centers  of  imperialism  versus 
centers  of  induction,  how  do  these 
radicals  now  open  themselves  to  the 
potential  of  the  "new  mood". 

I  believe  this  question  should  help  guide 
our  direction  as  a  movement. 
THE  MOVF.MENT:  Could  you  be  more 
specific  about  the 
direction  you  see? 
DAVIS:  Among  radicals,  there  have  been 
two  major  emphases  of  activity — that  which 
supports  and  works  for  massive  demon- 
strations and  confrontations  of  the  Es- 
tablishment; and  that  which  supports  and 
works  for  the  creation  of  permanent, 
radical  organization,  organization  built  on 
a  day-to-day  basis,  generally  around  peo- 
ple's self  interest  issues,  generally  from 
the  bottom-up.  The  argument  about  which 
emphasis  one  should  make  is  of  great 
importance  and  must  and  will  be  con- 
sidered again  and  again.  But  this  polarity 
of  tendencies  has  tended  to  Umit  close 
cooperation  between  organizations  and 
people  acting  out  the  two  emphasis  and 
thereby  limit  the  possibility  of  a  coopera- 
tive strategy,  which  I  believe  we  must 
have  If  the  movement  is  to  provide  direc- 
tion to  those  hundreds  of  thousands  who 
are  getting  their  liberal  philosophies 
nibbed  raw  by  Johnson's  open  applica- 
tion of  thatphllosophy's  darker  principals, 
I  believe  it  would  be  helpful  to  define 
specific  national  objectives  and  a  national 
strategy  of  work  for  the  movement  for 
given  periods  of  time — a  perspective  that 
represents  the  composite  programs  of  the 
significant  left  organizations  and  includes 
national  calls  for  both  local  organizing 
and  national  confrontations,  a  national 
program  that  could  be  more  widely  com- 
municated than  any  single  communica- 
tions network  could  now  manage.  It  would 
require  a  new  willingness  to  push  each 
other's  thlr^  and  a  new  openness  among 
people  with  different  emphases  of  work. 

Until  tK«  inauguration 

The  dozen  months  from  now  until  the 
PresldeMlal  loMigtiration  Is  one  such 
per|o4^^|lNK -couAd  be  fined  in  vrtth  a 
luctcnit  ^^iJNigr«n.  The  shape  <h-  outline 


of  such  a  program  is  already  begin- 
ning to  form,  I  think.  TTiere  will  be 
several  evaluatative  conferences  and  plan- 
ning meetings  in  the  anti-war  move- 
ment at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  These 
gatherings  might  begin  by  comptcmiseon 
a  specific  period  of  days  for  the  "inter- 
national days  of  resistence,  10  days  to 
shake  the  Empire",  etc.  The  spring  re- 
sistence will  be  followed  by  several  calls 
for  local  organizing  drives  in  the  early 
Summer.  The  summer  organizing  activity, 
for  many  people,  will  be  capped  by  the 
Chicago  Democratic  Convention  demon- 
stration— the  most  massive  confrontation 
of  the  war-makers  yet.  The  fall  will  see 
a  new  wave  of  local  organizing— in  anti- 
Johnson,  anti -Nixon  campaigns,  around 
local  war  crimes  tribunals,  in  working 
class  black  and  white  communities,  on  the 
campus  foi^  the  resistence  etc.  If  the  two 
candidates  get  through  the  campaign  and 
the  election  is  actuaHy  held,  I  feel  cer- 
tain that  the  movement  will  greet  the  new 
President  in  Washington  with  a  special 
Inaugural  message  of  our  own, 

.\s  I  say,  these  five  or  six  events 
or  programs  represent  onlv  .-i  shadowy 
outline  of  what  can  be  seen  coming.  What 
1  consider  to  be  our  task  is  the  sharpen- 
ing of  such  an  outline,  making  it  as 
specific  as  possible,  making  it  absolutely 
clear  how  one  participates,  and  finding 
new  means  of  communicating  its  content 
to  the  young  people  of  this  country.  It 
requires  that  we  define  ways  that  the  or- 
ganizers of  mass  confrontations  can  assist 
in  the  recruitment  of  people  who  will  join 
local  organizing  projects.  It  demands  that 
we  develop  a  political  relationship  among 
people  .^ctive  at  the  two  levels  of  work,  so 
as  to  make  possible  a  new  interpretation 
to  Americans  of  the  road  we  are  follow- 
ing in  the  next  period,  a  strategy  specific 
enough  that  "uninvolved  radicals"  might 
see  ways  to  get  on  that  road  and  stay  on 
that  road. 
Organizing  More  Relevant 

Now  between  the  two  emphases  of  the 
movement,  I  have  always  seen  local 
organizing  as  the  more  relevant.  The  most 
difficult  work,  though  in  my  view  the  most 
Important,  is  the  organization- of  specific 


2644  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


constituencies  that  can  offer  a  community 
radical  political  education,  power  to  com- 
bat effectively  certain  self-interest  is- 
sues, a  forum  for  people  seeking  new 
definitions  for  their  lives  and  their  work, 
and  a  method  for  relating  the  specific 
constituency  to  other  parts  of  the  move- 
ment. I  have  tended  to  regard  national 
demonstrations  as  relatively  insignificant 
in  comparison  to  the  task  of  creating 
permanent  local  organization,  I  see  us 
moving  from  strong  local  projects  to 
regional  structures  to  some  kind  of  func- 
tional equivalent  to  a  radical  national 
party.  That  scenario  is  a  whole  interview 
in  itself. 

Those  of  us  who  have  held  this  view 
and  made  this  emphasis  in  our  work, 
however,  should  recognize  that  demon- 
strations, especially  in  the  past  four  to 
five  months,  have  exhibited  In  several 
instances  a  new  power  for  radicaiizlng 
those  involved  .,:md  £«Tor^fakg  (hose 
against  whom  the  power  is  directed.  Both 
the  militancy  and  the  new  tactics  make 
the  acts  tremendously  important  to  Viet- 
nam and  other  people's  movements  around 
the  world,  useful  in  changing  the  image  of 
blacks  toward  white  students,  important 
for  the  education  and  consciousness  of  the 
participants,  and  appealing  to  certain — not 
all — segments  of  the  American  population. 
This  last  by-product — who  we  appeal  to  and 
whom  we  alienate — is  important  and,  as 
I  suggested  before,  should  give  direction 
to  our  strategy.  It  should  guide  our  think- 
ing, for  example,  at  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention this  August. 

Democratic  Convention 

THE  MOVEMENT:  What  do  you  see  hap- 
pening at  the  Demo- 
cratic Convention? 
DAVIS:  For  this  particular  action,  I  believe 
we  will  be  guided  in  part  by  Establish- 
ment events  and  political  factors  not  yet 
known.  There  Is  every  indication  today  that 
Nixon,  the  Republican  frontrunner,  will 
keep  his  lead  and  sail  through  the  Re- 
publican Convention.  McCarthy's  can- 
didacy has   little  chance  of  catching  fire. 


And  Kennedy  seemingly  has  no  primary 
strategy  at  all.  We  shall  see.  If  the  Re- 
publicans give  Americans  no  "choice" 
on  the  issue  of  the  war,  and  the  Demo- 
crats, whose  convention  follows  the  Re- 
publican's, go  to  Chicago  with  Johnson 
fully  in  control,  millions  of  people  are 
going  to  feel  doors  closing  on  their  high 
school  conception  of  American  democracy, 
millions  are  going  to  be  asking,  what 
now?  The  question  of  v^at  the  movement 
says  to  such  people  at  this  time  should 
guide  our  planning  for  the  confrontation, 
in  my  view. 

I  think  we  can  do  better  than  attempting 
to  prevent  the  convention  from  taking 
place,  as  some  have  suggested  by  closing 
down  the  city  on  the  first  day  of  fwe- 
conventiwi  activity.  The  delegates  should 
be  allowed  to  come  to  Chicago,  so  long 
as  they  give  their  support  to  a  policy 
of  ending  racism  and  the  war.  I  favor 
letting  the  delegates  meet  in  the  Inter- 
national Amphitheater  and  making  our 
demands  and  the  actions  behind  those 
demands  escalate  in  militancy  as  the  Con- 
vention proceeds  and  as  the  TV's  drum 
into  everyone's  home  that  we're  moving 
towards  a  Johnson-Nixon  "choice".  I 
would  like  to  see  us  be  able  to  carry  our 
incredible,  imaginative  actions  ever, 
against  Chicago's  blanket  injunction  th^^i 
will  prohibit  all  demonstrations.  Pven 
against  the  two  I  .S  .\rmy  regiments  that 
will  be  "protecting"  the  convention,  I 
would  like  to  see  the  delegates  confronte.i 
by  masses  of  people  each  day,  organized 
perhaps  by  that  constituency  which  leadji 
a  particular  struggle — one  day  for  eJ  j- 
cation,  one  for  welfare,  one  for  w.>men. 
one  for  black  people,  and  so  on. 

Sophisticated  Movement 

There  should  be  elbow  room  in  Chicago 
for  a  national  youth  festival,  a  women's 
army  marching  on  the  US  troops,  several 
thousand  people  who  call  "their"  dele- 
gate promptly  at  7:00  am  and  midnight  to 
ask  to  meet  him  to  discuss  the  issues  of 
war  and  race,  doctors  who  march  on  the 
troops  demanding  to  speak  to  the  dele- 
gates about  the  children  of  Vietnam,  etc.. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2645 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


etc.  I  would  like,  in  other  words,  for  us 
to  create  a  more  sophisticated  movement 
machinery  for  this  late  August  meeting 
than  we  have  previously  had  and  which 
we  need  as  we  enter  this  new  period. 
I  would  hope  that  this  machinery  would 
be  used  by  the  widest  possible  political 
forces  opposed  to  the  war,  that  it  would 
be  used  to  appeal  broadly  to  the  Ameri- 
can people,  not  just  to  ourselves,  but 
that  it  be  used  in  the  end  to  release  the 
real  power  of  our  many  forces  in  a  new 
and  significant  way  at  the  time  that  John- 


son is  nominated,  turning  the  delegates 
back  into  the  amprfiitheater  as  they  at- 
tempt to  leave,  demanding  that  the  Amer- 
ican people  be  given  a  choice,  demand- 
ing that  thev  reconsider  a  .decision  not 
in  the  national  interest,  a  decision  that 
can  only  lead  to  the  funeral  of  the  demo- 
cratic policies  that  support  racism  and 
the  war,  should  carry  not  only  us,  but 
thousands  of  Americans  into  an  active 
boycott  of  the  elections  and  giant  show- 
down in  Washington  to  prevent  the  in-' 
augur ation  next  January. 


2646  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


Priorities 

TOE   MOVEMENT:  Do  you  feel  that  na- 
tional confrontations 
such  as  you  envision 
for     the .  Democratic 
Convention  <tetract 
from  your  own  priOTity 
of  organizing  locally? 
DAVIS:    Yes,    In   part.  The   Democratic 
Convention  will  have   mixed  results  for 
local  building.  Since  most  people  in  the 
movement  are  not  organizers,  it  is  said 
that  a  national  action  allows  non-organ- 
izers  to  find   a   role.    I  believe    it  also 
reinforces  the  idea  that  one's  role  is  to 
go   to   demonstrations   rather    than  build 
radical     organizations    day-to-day.    And 
pressure    mounts  among  the  actual  day- 
to-day  organizers  to  respond  to  the  call 
and  fit  their  local  needs  into  |he  national 
strategy  of  the  moment. 
THE  MOVEMENT:  V-Tiy  then  do  you  ac- 
tively support  building 
the     machinery     you 
called    for    in    prep- 
aration for  the  Demo- 
cratic Convention  con- 
frontation ? 
DAVIS:  The  confrontation  will  have  mixed 
results   for    local   organizing    and  highly 
important  consequences  in  other  ways.  I 
believe  it  Is  important  for  what  we  can  say 
to  Americans  at  this  time.  1  believe  it  is 
very   Important  to  Vietnam.  .\nd  frankly 
I  see  it  as  a  possible  turning  point  for  the 
country  And  the  movemeiut. 

If  the  Convention  confrontation  can  be 
placed  In  a  broader  strategy,  it  can 
perhaps  Induce  many  people  to  take  up 
organizing  positions.  Can  the  Democratic 
Convention  focus  have  a  relationship  to 
an  over -all  white  organizing  drive  be- 
glnnli^  in  the  summer?  Can  SD6,  the  Stu- 
dent Moblllzatioa,  the  Resistance,  the 
Young  Christian  MoveiiiMit  provide  the 
netwwk  for  recruitment  and  the  resources 
for  training  and  direction  to  make  possible 
new  white  projects  In  dozens  of  com- 
munities leading  up  to  the  Democratic 
Convention  and  then  continuing  beyond  it. 
Can  the  anti-war  movement,  identified 
publicly  as  people  who  organize  national 
days  of  resistance,  or  Washington  marches 


or  bank  accounts  for  NY  Times  adver- 
tisements, become  associated  more 
directly  with  efforts  to  build  power 
locally? 

Vm   Interested  personally   In   working 
for  the  Democratic  Convention  challenge 
because    it's    being   held   in   Chicago — a 
really   arrogant   thing  for  Daley  to  do — 
and  because  I  want  to  work  more  directly 
with   the    anti-war    movement   as  an  or- 
ganizer, and  this  offers  me  a  way  to  do 
just   that.  One   of  the  challenges  to  or- 
ganizers   is    how   the   enormous    energy 
and  numbers  of  people  who  are  opposed 
to   the  Vietnam  war  can  be  directed  to- 
wards   building    organization   which   has 
permanency,  power  and  radical  posture  long 
after  Vietnam. 

Beyond  Vietnam 

THE   MOVEMENT:  How  does  the  Viet- 
nam issue  become  the 
issue  of  imperialism 
r  and    how    should    the 

anti-war  movement 
organize  to  outlast  the 
Vietnam  war? 
DAVIS:  SNCC,  SDS  and  the  people  who 
make  up  the  Resistance  have  been  fairly 
successful.  Perhaps  they  offer  approaches 
to  the  problem,  I  would  add,  as  a  way 
to  expand  into  the  constituencies  which 
perhaps  these  people  are  not  reaching, 
the  idea  of  "localizing  the  anti-war 
movement."  Since  returning  from  North 
Vietnam,  and  speaking  to  more  diverse 
groups  than  I  am  accustomed,  I  have 
been  struck  by  the  militancy  of  suburban 
groups,  newly  organized  student  com- 
mittees and  clergy  peace  associations 
on  the  issue  of  the  war.  People  are  will- 
ing to  work  as  organizers,  as  well  as 
support  the  Resistance,  etc.,  if  they  believe 
it  will  help  build  pressure  to  rnd  the  war. 
These  same  groups  become  angry,  bored 
or  generally  turned  off  if  they  are  bom- 
barded with  words  like  imperialism,  neo- 
colonialism, or  tightly  drawn  analysis  too 
thick  with  Marxist  or  left  slogans. 

Not  everyone  who  comes  in  the  front 
door  of  the  JOIN  office  m  Chicago  is 
opposed  to  the  Democratic  Parry,  tlie 
machine  and  the  war  in  Vietnam.  It  may 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2647 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


only  be  the  policeman  who  beat  their 
head  or  the  case-worker  who  is  threaten- 
ing to  cut  off  support  which  provides  the 
will  to  consider  a  political  act.  For  the 
organizer  the  problem  is  to  search  with 
Chat  Individual  for  the  process  which  Is 
the  most  liberating  and  radicalizing,  as 
die  immediate  political  act  is  thought 
through  and  carried  out,  a  process  which 
can  connect  that  Individual  to  a  larger 
organization  and  more  radical  program. 
If  the  radicals  in  the  movwnent  are  to 
give  leadership  to  the  anti-war  movement 
in  its  broadest  sense,  it  will  not  be  be- 
cause we  joined  the  National- Mobiliza- 
tion to  fight  for  "our  politics"  or  de- 
manded a  focus  on  "imperialist  targets". 
We  will  have  to  suggest  programs  and 
organize  work  which  allow  people  new  to 
the  movement  to  learn  from  experience 
who  holds  power,  how  decisions  are 
made,  the  relationship  of  the  war  effort 
to  corporations  which  operate  in  every 
major  city.  There  are  numerous  examples 
of  such  an  approach.  Let  me  suggest 
only  one. 

Discovering  the  War  Makers 

In  those  regions  of  the  country  where 
the  movement  is  strong  in  the  ghettoes,  I 
would  like  to  see  organizers  develop  pro- 
grams that  recruit  people  basically  con- 
cerned about  the  napalming  children  or 
the  use  of  indiscriminate  US  fire  power 
against  the  civilian  population  of  Vietnam 
—  the  people  regarded  by  some  in  the 
movement  as  too  apolitical  or  too  human- 
itarian to  work  with.  The  program  might 
begin  by  helping  people  learn  about  the 
experimental  weapons  being  used  In  Viet- 
nam: the  Shrike  guided  missile,  the  elec- 
tron bomb,  the  cluster  bombs,  the  cylinder 
fragmentation  bomb  and  the  long  line  of 
Inclndary  weapons,  toxic  chemicals  and 
poison  gases.  Then  research  could  begin 
on  wtio  makes  these  weapons  In  the  local 
community — what  corporations  are  in- 
volved, who  sits  on  the  board,  where  do 
they  live,  what  positions  of  influence  In 
the  community  do  they  hold?  The  pro- 
gram would  urge  people  to  look  into  the 
kinds  of  weapons  that  are  actually  being 


used  in  Vietnam  only  to  learn  that  the  peo- 
ple who  manufacture  tbese  weapons  that 


have  been  banned  by  international  agree- 
ment are  the  very  people  who  sit  on  the 
Board  of  Education  and  the  Mayor's  Com- 
mittees in  their  own  cities.  This  process, 
1  susp>ect,  would  radically  expand  people's 
consciousness  and  the  scope  of  possible 
activity.  Suddenly  the  war  makers  be- 
come real  people,  the  same  j>eople,  if  the 
ghetto  movement  is  strong,  who  are  being 
attacked  by  the  blacks  or  poor  whites 
because  of  rotten  schools  or  urban  re- 
newal. War  crime  tribunals  that  put  these 
individuals  on  public  trial  for  complicity 
in  US  war  crimes  might  represent  still 
another  dimension  of  a  process  that  be- 
gins with  simple  moral  concerns  but  al- 
lows "nice"  people  to  grow  politically 
through  their  own  work  and  experience. 
I  believe  anti-war  activity  of  this  sort  — 
and  there  are  many  other  examples — be- 
gins to  suggest  10  various  moventent  con- 
stituencies in  a  city  new  kinds  of  political 
relationships  we  have  not  seen  signif- 
icantly at  a  local  leveL 

Repression 

THE  MOVEMENT*  We've  been  reading 
reports  coming  into 
our  office  of  people 
supoened,  arrested  or 
Investigated  all  over 
the  country.  Icapp>ears 
there  is  a  coordinated 
effort  to  Intimidate  and ' 
infiltrate  every  pro- 
test organization.  In 
fact,  it  appears  that 
the  Administration  is 
extremely  afraid  for 
it's  convention  next 
summer  and  will  be 
making  moves  to  re- 
press those  involved 
in  the  ^convention 
strategy.  How  should 
the  movement  respond 
to  these  events? 
DAVIS:  While  the  movement  ts  still  small 
and  generally  overly  preoccupied  with 
talking  to  itself,  these  limttadons  every 


2648  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  1  — Continued 


day  are  breaking  down,  as  new  people, 
fed  up  and  disgusted,  turn  to  us  for 
direction  and  work,  or  ignore  us  and 
create  exciting  political  communities  of 
their  own,  U  seems  to  me  that  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  conditions 
are  with  those  who  want  the  movement 
to  be  vastly  broadened. 

The  Viet  Cong  believe  that  the  Itokec 
States    has    been  militarily   defeated  ii 
South   Vietnam   and  that  the  question  ol 
NLF  victory  Is  a  question  of  time.  John- 
son—or for   that  matter  all  public  can- 
didates for  President— appear  unpreparec 
to  accept  a  military  defeat,  at  least  t<x 
some  time.   So,   as    sickening   a«    It   is, 
every    sign    points    to    a   long   war   anc 
greater    and  greater   loss   of  Americac 
lives.  Thus  far,  the  only  response  o^  the 
Administration  to  the  black  ghetto  revolts 
has  been  to  improve  police  tactics,  train- 
ing ami  manpower.  So,  every  sign  points 
towards  more  intense  black-poUce  war- 
fare in  our  cities.  And  finally  the  reports 
from  the    inner   circles   of  international 
finance  capitalism  point  with  horror  to  the 
softening  of  currency,  the  new  protective 
tariffs  in  the  US  and  the  rising  US  price 
level,  signs  which  even  conservative  econ- 
omists now  claim  point  toward  economic 
slump  or  worse  in  this  country.  It  seems 
the  very  conditions  we  deplore  harbor  the 
potential  for  a  vast  swelling  of  our  move- 
ment  and  our  power,  as  the  war,  riots 


and  recession  converge  on  ordinary  peo- 
ple. 

Need  Positive  View 

This  reading  of  conditions  makes  it  im- 
perative, I  believe,  that  wedevel<^*frMfii 
and  positive  view  of  the  role  we  may  play 
in  tills  country  and  the  world.  W«  are  not 
the  Communist  Party  bi  the  middle  pert 
of  this   century.    We   nuist   not  face  re- 
pression by  taking  the  defensive,  by  send- 
ing large  numbers  of  people  underj^oupd 
or  seekii^  to  {cooectouraeihreS'lif  4iny*| 
log  what  we  stand  for  at  our  l^^ille  Qc^)** 
i  believe  we  must  tioia  every  trtal  Ipco  ! 
a  trial  ol  tite  system,  ttm  fm'l^ltm^pt^ 
oB  paranoia  as  tmnA  «•  po«lfi)le  «»re» 
pression  comes  an4  <Swt  we  irtiould  Mek 
the  widest  si^pport  f<nr  oUr  actleiis  end  for 
our  right  to  hold  and  ejqpress  our  con- 
victions. I'm  calling  not  olijy  ffflr  a  polit- 
ical   strategy    of    op^iness.    txit  aunong 
ourselves  for  a  psychological  frame-work 
that    allows   us  to  turn  outward  rather 
th&n  Inward  as  the  going  getr  rough.  The 
escalation    of    the  war   la   Vietnam  has 
only  strengthened  the  Vietnamese  struggle 
as  they  turn  each  stage  of  the  escalation 
into  a  new  response  to  their  own  people. 
The  escalation  of  the  war  of  rejwesslon 
in  the  United  States  might  be  seen  as  that 
kind    of    organizing    possibility    for   us. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2649 

I  don't  think  that  the  presence  of  those  numbers  or  the  symbol  of  a 
funeral  march  at  all  suggests  disruption.  If  it  suggests  disruption  to 
you,  let  me  make  it  quite  clear  to  you  that  we  did  not  plan  disruption 
at  the  Democratic  Convention.  It  did  not  call  for  disruption;  and 
everything  we  did — including  the  training  of  our  marshals,  how  _we 
organized,  how  we  recruited — led  toward  a  nonviolent  demonstration 
at  the  time  of  the  nomination  on  August  28. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  find  a  striking  similarity  between  this 
expression  and  the  expression,  "pinning  the  delegates  in  the  Amphi- 
theatre." 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  we  went  through  that  this  morning. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yesterday  afternoon. 

Mr.  Davis.  Whenever  it  was,  and  it  was  mixed  together. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  have  the  same  basic  understanding 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  understand  what  I  said  ?  That  is  the  only  ques- 
tion before  this  committee  and  this  country. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  If  you  are  going  to  be  turning  back  the  delegates, 
though,  Mr.  Witness,  you  are  going  to  be  restricting  their  liberty ;  are 
you  not?  Perhaps  some  of  the  delegates  would  want  to  leave  the  Amphi- 
theatre. You  would  be  restricting  their  liberty. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  it  is  quite  possible  to  go  down  to  a  meeting  of 
the  city  council  that  is  about  to  pass  a  $2  million  project  that  intends  to 
disrupt  the  entire  community  of  poor  people  with  the  destruction  of 
their  homes  and  with  replacement  of  homes  that  only  the  upper-  or 
middle-income  can  afford.  And  imagine  a  situation  where  that  com- 
munity would  come  down  and  say  this  decision  does  not  represent  us 
and  we  demand  that  you  stay  here  and  make  a  decision  that  does  repre- 
sent us. 

Then  there  might  be  quite  an  exchange  in  which  it  would  be  clear 
that  the  local  city  council  was  hopelessly  tied  to  the  intrenched  political 
and  business  interests  of  the  downtown  community,  and  the  like,  to  the 
suburbs,  and  hopelessly  unwilling  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  the 
black  community.  And  there  could  be  a  political  confrontation,  but 
that  is  different.  I  mean,  I  could  imagme  myself  running  around  the 
community  recruiting  and  saying,  "We  are  going  to  hold  those  people 
in  there  until  they  make  it  right,"  and  going  around  and  nobody  would 
think  by  that  that  we  are  going  to  hold  a  gim  at  a  city  councilman's 
head  or  physically  shut  the  building  down  until  everybody  came  out 
right,  but  the  people  would  go  down  there  and  have  a  political  con- 
frontation, a  confrontation  on  life-and-death  decisions  that  affect 
them. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  This  is  where  your  right  to  demonstrate  ru'bs  up  against 
the  rights  of  other  people. 

Mr.  Davis.  If  you  plan  a  demonstration  thai  disrupts  a  public 
meeting,  that  creates  physical  harm  to  local  officials,  whatever,  I 
agree  that  such  people  would  be  arrested  in  this  country,  but  to  caU 
for  a  massive  demonstration  at  the  International  Amphitheatre,  de- 
manding that  the  people  make  a  decision  that  is  consistent  with  80  per- 
cent of  the  electorate  voters  who  voted  in  Democratic  primaries,  which 
is  for  new  direction  and  new  leadership  in  1968,  and  to  say  in  all  of 
your  publications  that  you  are  not  coming  to  Chicago  to  disrupt  the 


21-706  O— 69— pt.  2 11 


2650  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

convention,  but  to  raise  a  serious  political  issue  that  faces  this  coun- 
try, I  just  think  that  that  is  crystal  clear  what  you  have  in  mind.  I 
hope  that  it  is  clear. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  you  said  that  the  activities  of  the  Democratic 
Convention  were  undemocratic  ?  Is  that  your  statement  ?  I  have  heard 
that  repeatedly,  that  the  activities  of  the  Democratic  Convention  were 
undemocratic. 

Mr.  Davis.  Isn't  that  terrible. 

Mr.  Watson.  Did  you  make  that  statement  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  believe  I  made  that  statement ;  and  if  I  did  not,  I  make 
it  now. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  your  interpretation  of  what  is  true  democratic 
action  is,  when  duly  elected  delegates  to  a  convention  do  not  do  what 
you  or  your  associates  believe  that  the  real  democratic  way  to  do  it  is, 
for  you  to  get  out  and  force  the  duly  elected  delegates  to  adhere  to 
your  belief.  That  is  the  real  democratic  process. 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  mean  duly  elected  like  you,  Mr.  Watson,  like  a 
racist  out  of  a  congressional  district  which  has  been  cited  by  the  1965 
civil  rig'hts  law 

Mr.  Watson.  Bear  this  in  mind,  and  you  made  reference  to  the 
State  of  South  Carolina  earlier.  How  long  have  you  lived  in  South 
Carolina,  Mr.  Davis  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  never  lived  there.  I  visited  there ;  I  know  many  people 
from  South  Carolina.  We  have  a  little  coffeehouse  that  is  supporting 
soldiers  at  Fort  Jackson  in  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  and  I  have — 
know  something  about  the  kinds  of  people  who  come  from  South 
Carolina,  Wliat  distresses  me  is  the  politicians  that  come  from  South 
Carolina. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  sure  of  that. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  again  admonishes  the  audience  we  must 
have  order  in  the  hearing.  You  are  guests  of  the  committee.  You  are 
entitled  to  be  here  if  you  keep  in  order ;  otherwise  the  Chair  will  have 
to  ask  you  to  leave. 

Mr.  Davis.  Let  me  just  say  on  the  substance  of  your  question,  Mr. 
Watson,  that  80  percent  of  the  people  voting  in  Democratic  primaries 
in  1968  voted  against  the  Johnson-Humphrey  policies  and  20  percent 
voted  for  those  policies,  and  yet  at  the  Democratic  National  Conven- 
tion where  at  the  time  public  opinion  j^olls  and  j^rimaries  and  every 
conceivable  measure  that  we  have  around  the  issue  of  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam was  overturned  by  the  people  in  control  of  that  convention.  That 
convention,  I  think  by  anybody's  standards,  was  fraudulent  and  un- 
democratic. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  you  are  making  a  misstatement  of  the  polls 
there.  My  memory,  as  I  recall,  showed  Humphrey  far  ahead  of 
McCarthy,  if  that  is  what  you  are  referring  to,  prior  to  the  convention, 

Mr.  Davis.  I'm  talking  about  the  electorate  that  voted  in  the  pri- 
maries and  the  general  feeling  going  into  the  convention  about  the 
need  to  get  out  of  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  ask  him  again,  first  let  me 
make  one  general  statement  in  reference  to  your  comments  concerning 
the  State  that  I  am  honored  to  represent.  I  have  been  living  there  46 
years;  and  if  you  will  come  down  and  live  in  South  Carolina  just, 
say  a  tenth  of  that  time,  then  perhaps  you  will  be  in  a  position  to 


DISRUPTION  OF   1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2651 

discuss  the  situation  in  South  Carolina  in  a  reasonably  intelligent 
fashion. 

Let  me  get  back  to  one  basic  question :  If  the  convention  at  Chicago 
had  adopted  your  platform  in  reference  to  Vietnam^  in  your  judgment 
it  would  have  been  a  democratic  process  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  think  the  Democratic  Party  is  essentially  con- 
trolled by  Southern  conservatives,  reactionary  trade  union  fat 
men 


Mr.  Watson.  I  ask  you  one  simple  statement 

Mr.  Daves.  — big  city  machines  like  Chicago. 

Mr.  Watson.  If  they  adopted  your  principle,  would  it  have  been  a 
democratic  process  ? 

Mr,  Davis.  I  think  the  Democratic  Party  is  hopelessly  tied  to  the 
interests  of  the  military  and  the  bankers  and  the  Southern  racists  like 
yourself. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  will  take  a  5 -minute  recess. 

(Brief  recess.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  committee  will  again  come  to  order. 

The  witness  will  resume  the  chair. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  that  we  might  wrap  that  dialogue  up  that  we  started 
a  moment  ago,  let  me  just  conclude  by  saying  apparently  nothing  could 
have  been  done  at  the  Democratic  Convention  which  would  have  met 
the  qualifications  of  the  witness'  term  of  "democratically  conceived" 
or  "democratically  passed." 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  Mr.  Watson.  I  think  it  would  have  been  a  verv  good 
thing  for  this  country  had  there  been  a  resolution  passed  at  the  iDemo- 
cratic  Convention  that  recognized  that  we  have  no  business  directing 
the  affairs  of  another  country  10,000  miles  away. 

Had  the  Democratic  Party  supported  a  peace  plank,  had  the  Demo- 
cratic Convention  seen  it  necessarily  consistent  with  American  inter- 
ests to  withdraw  American  forces  from  that  country,  I,  and  I  think 
millions  of  other  Americans,  would  have  applauded  that  decision.  I 
would  have  continued  to  work  to  try  to  make  this  a  more  democratic 
country,  to  try  to  find  a  way  in  your  own  district  to  get  black  people 
represented  in  that  district.  I  would  have  continued  to  try  to  find  a 
way  to  get  welfare  recipients  and  people  who  live  in  slum  apartment 
buildings  and  students  and  others  who  essentially  have  no  effective 
way  to  influence  the  decisions  that  operate  in  the  day-to-day  way  in 
their  own  lives  so  that  there  would  be  the  beginnings  of  more  demo- 
cratic channels  in  this  country. 

That  is  the  essence  of  this  movement,  but  I  certainly  would  have  ap- 
plauded and  supported  any  decision  that  moved  us  closer  to  peace  in 
Vietnam  coming  from  the  Democratic  Convention  in  August. 

Mr.  Watson.  If  your  statement  relative  to  the  black  people  of  my 
district  is  for  political  purposes,  to  adversely  effect  my  reelection,  the 
election  is  over,  and  I  suggest  you  make  those  statements  before  the 
next  election. 

Mr.  Davis.  The  reason  you  were  elected  again  is  because  those  black 
people  didn't  have  a  chance.  If  we  can  get  those  people  a  vote,  you 
will  not  be  back  here  again,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  We  w^on't  pursue  it,  but  no  less  authority  than  the 
president  of  the  National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored 
People  made  the  statement  several  years  ago  at  a  State  convention  of 


2652  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

that  organization  in  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  that  they  had  no 
problem  in  that  regard  in  my  State.  And  we  have  never  had  any 
difficulty,  and  I  believe  that  he  is  a  better  authority,  so  far  as  the  rights 
and  so  far  as  the  opportunities  given  those  people,  than  is  the  gentle- 
man now  speaking,  or  the  witness  now  in  the  chair,  so  let's  proceed. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  have  gotten  somewhat  afield  from  the  inquiry. 

Let's  proceed,  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  on  or  about  November  20, 1967,  make  a  state- 
ment substantially  to  this  effect :  that  if  President  Johnson  was  nomi- 
nated for  reelection  at  the  convention  in  Chicago,  anyone  who  voted 
to  nominate  him  would  not  be  allowed  to  leave  the  convention  hall  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Could  you  ^ive  me  the  document  you  are  using  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  you  if  you  made  such  a  statement  on  No- 
vember 20, 1967,  or  thereabouts. 

Mr.  Daves.  I  can't  recall  making  any  such  statement,  but  if  you  could 
refer  to  when  it  was  made  and  the  context  of  it,  perhaps  I  could  talk 
further  to  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  ask  you  further:  On  March  6,  1967,  in  con- 
nection with  the  question  of  urban  renewal,  if  you  made  the  following 
statement  and  words  to  this  effect,  "If  you  can't  stop  urban  renewal, 
you  may  have  to  bum  the  buildings  down." 

Mr.  Davis.  Wliat  was  the  context  in  which  this  alleged  statement 
was  made? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  believe  it  was  made  by  you  at  the  meeting  of  the 
Englewood  Action  Committee. 

Mr.  Kennedy.  You  have  the  the  document  before  you.  Why  don't 
you  show  it  to  him,  if  you  are  interested  in  showing  the  truth  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  These  are  simply  notes  I  have  here. 

I  am  asking  you,  sir,  if  you  made  that  statement.  If  you  don't  recall 
it,  just  say  you  don't  recall  it. 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  not  that.  It  would  be  inconsistent  with  my  position, 
that  j>eople  should  bum  down  the  buildings  they  live  in.  People  should 
do  all  that  they  can  to  stop  the  demolition  of  their  communities  in  the 
interest  of  business  and  real  estate  forces  that  want  to  change  that 
community  into  middle-  or  upper-income  and  destroy  the  commimity 
of  the  poor. 

I  havt)  worked  a  long  time  along  those  linas.  I  think  that  one  of  the 
clearest  examples  of  the  issue  of  democracy  in  America  is  the  way  in 
which  the  administrative  programs  that  were  launched  out  of  the  New 
Deal  1930's  philosophy,  programs  and  visions  that  had,  as  their  basis 
at  least,  the  rendering  of  justice  to  i^eople  who  were  unemployed  and 
lived  in  slum  communities,  and  instead  created  the  administrative 
operations  that  came  increasingly  under  the  control  of  forces  that  were 
not  in  tune  with  the  interests  of  poor  people  of  the  United  States. 
Welfare  is  one  example,  schools  is  another  example,  and  urban  renewal 
is  a  classic  example. 

The  movement  is  attempting  to  find  new  channels  so  that  people 
who  are  victims  of  an  administrative  operation  or  bureaucracy  can 
begin  to  have  control  over  those  administrative  operations. 

You  can't  vote  in  that  kind  of  change,  as  we  see  it,  that  is,  you  can't 
vote  in  a  changed  urban  renewal  program.  You  have  to  get  the  resi- 
dents in  a  community  to  begin  to  exercise  power  over  their  urban  re- 
newal program,  directly,  and  welfare  recipients  and  students  in  schools, 
and  so  on. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2653 

In  that  context,  I  don't  believe  I  would  advocate  as  a  tactic  for  creat- 
ing a  new  political  base  for  more  democratic  urban  renewal  programs 
burning  down  buildings. 

I  don -it  believe  I  would  ever  do  that,  so  I  am  sorry  to  take  long,  but  I 
wanted  to  say  what  my  context  would  be,  and  then  go  on  to  say  I  don't 
recall  being  at  the  Englewood  Action  Committee  on  November — what- 
ever it  was,  1967,  of  having  made  that  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  March.  Mr.  Davis,  taking  you  back  again  to  the 
newspaper,  THE  MOVEMENT,  and  the  February  edition  you  had 
a  moment  ago,  in  the  same  coliunn  where  the  question  appears  from 
the  reporter,  "What  do  you  see  happening  at  the  Democratic  Conven- 
tion?" And  I  quote  your  reply  as  follows : 

I  think  we  can  do  better  than  attempting  to  prevent  the  convention  from  tak- 
ing place,  as  some  have  suggested  by  closing  down  the  city  on  the  flirst  day  of 
preconvention  activity.  The  delegates  should  be  allowed  to  come  to  Chicago,  so 
long  as  they  give  their  support  to  a  policy  of  ending  racism  and  the  war.  *  *  * 

Did  you  make  that  statement,  and  has  MOVEMENT  adequately 
quoted  the  statement  which  I  just  read  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  might  be  helpful  to  read  into  the  record  the  entire 
statement  again.  My  position  was  that  we  should  not  disrupt  the  con- 
vention or  prevent  the  convention  from  carrying  out  its  business. 

Our  political  business  in  Chicago  was  to  have  a  political  confronta- 
tion on  the  issues  of  the  war  and  racism  in  America. 

It  seems  to  me  that  perhaps  if  you  read  the  whole  statement,  or  even 
if  you  don't,  it  is  implied  there  that  what  I  am  suggesting 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  statement  has  been  made  a  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  will  be  shown  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Davis.  Our  purpose  was  not  to  prevent  the  convention,  or  to 
prevent  people  from  entering  the  International  Amphitheatre  during 
convention  week.  Our  purpose  was  to,  as  dramatically  as  we  could  to 
double  the  agenda  facing  the  Govermnent  and  the  Nation  at  this  time, 
the  war  in  Vietnam  and  racism  in  our  communities,  coast  to  coast. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  still  come  back  to  the  specific  sentence : 

The  delegates  should  be  allowed  to  come  to  Chicago,  so  long  as  they  give  their 
support  to  a  policy  of  ending  racism  and  the  war. 

That  particular  sentence  troubles  me,  sir. 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  Do  you  mean  if  they  don't  end  it,  then  they  should  be 
prevented  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  seem  to  place  an  option.  All  may  come,  if  they 
subscribe  to  these  two  philosophies. 

I  am  not  arguing  the  merit  of  the  philosophy.  I  am  asking  if  this 
does  not  attach  a  condition  to  a  delegate  coming  to  the  convention, 
reading  tliat  sentence. 

Mr.  I)a\t:s.  I  don't  think  it  does. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "The  delegates  should  be  allowed  to  come,  so  long  as 
they  give  their  support."  What  does  that  mean  to  you? 

Mr.  Davis.  What  I  just  said  that  it  meant,  that  is,  that  we  do  not 
seek  to  prevent  the  delegates  from  coming  to  Chicago  or  to  the  Demo- 
cratic Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Why  didn't  you  say  that? 

Mr.  DA\^s.  Give  me  the  whole  statement  again,  and  I  will  find  for 
you  a  sentence  that  says  that  clearly. 


2654  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Hand  him  the  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  \Miy  didn't  you  just  say  the  delegates  should  be  al- 
lowed to  come  to  Chicago? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  have  said  that  in  hundreds  of  places  and  I  am  sure  you 
have  it  before  you. 

The  Febiiiary  11  meeting  that  you  brought  up  with  Mr.  Hay  den,  in 
wliich  we  put  into  our  minutes  our  position  against  disruption  of  the 
Democratic  Convention,  not  because  it  was  an  issue  that  was  live  and 
bubbling  among  young  people  and  others  who  were  planning  to  come 
to  Chicago,  but  because  the  media  had  essentially  created  this  issue 
from  the  beginning,  and  we  wanted  to  be  on  record  publicly  and  with 
ourselves  that  Ave  were  not  seeking  a  confrontation  or  a  physical  dis- 
ruption of  the  convention. 

I  don't  know  how  many  times  it  was  said  publicly  to  the  press  and 
in  our  minutes,  and  it  seems  to  me  it  is  said  here,  as  well. 

You  know,  you  may  be  able  to,  in  the  millions  of  words  that  were 
said  about  the  Democratic  Convention,  find  three  that  to  you  repre- 
sent what  you  already  believe.  But  I  think  if  you  will  study  the  context 
of  any  statement  that  is  made  and  if  you  will  basically  absorb  the 
message  that  came  out  of  the  Mobilization  at  every  level,  it  will  be 
crystal  clear  that  we  came  to  Chicago  not  to  confront  or  disrupt,  but 
to  raise  the  issues  before  this  Government  and  the  American  people. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  submit  to  you,  had  somebody  in  Chicago 
put  to  your  group  a  proposal  you  will  be  permitted  to  come  to  Chicago 
so  long  as  you  remain  peaceable  and  quiet,  sitting  on  the  sidewalk  and 
causing  no  demonstration,  no  parades  whatsoever,  that  you  would  not 
have  found  that  acceptable.  You  would  have  considered  that  as  a 
blackjack  over  your  head,  wouldn't  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  say  in  this  vei*y  article : 

I  favor  letting  the  delegates  meet  in  the  International  Amphitheater  and  making 
our  demands  and  the  actions  behind  those  demands  escalate  in  militancy 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let's  stop  there.  We  both  know  what  "escalate"  means, 
don't  we  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Because  that  is  what  we  have  been  talking  about  for 
the  last  4  or  5  years.  What  is  the  next  word  ? 

Mr.  Daa^s.  That  very  bad  word,  "militancy." 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  does  that  word  "militancy"  mean  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Daais.  It  means  when  people  feel  the  democratic  process  has 
broken  down,  when  they  have  no  choice  between  law  and  order  and 
procandidates — in  eveiy  conceivable  way  they  have  been  working  to 
try  to  end  this  terrible  war  in  Vietnam — that  they  have  to  do  what 
they  can  to  undercut,  to  prevent  this  authority  from  continuing  in  the 
way  that  it  has. 

Essentially,  the  movement  of  the  last  8  years  has  been  a  movement 
that  tries  to  bring  about  a  change  in  consciousness  of  both  the  people 
who  run  this  country  and  the  general  population.  I  think  that  we  have 
demonstrated  our  moralism  and  nonviolence  and  our  willingness  to  go 
to  jail  for  our  convictions,  our  refusal  to  go  into  the  draft,  our  non- 
violent sit-ins,  where  we  subject  ourselves  to  all  kinds  of  abuse  in  an 
effort  to  try  to  make  this  country  face  up  to  what  it  is  doing,  not  only 
in  the  black  and  poor  communities  of  the  Nation,  but  all  over  the 
world. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2655 

I  think  that  militancy  is  an  appropriate  term  for  a  movement  that 
is  angry,  that  wants  cliange,  that  is  trying  to  reach  more  and  more 
people  to  understand  what  we  are  doing  to  human  lives  all  over  the 
world.  I  think  militancy  is  a  word  that  is  appropriate  to  young  people 
and  black  people  and  concerned  Americans  facing  the  kinds  of  oppo- 
sition, the  kinds  of  oppression,  and  the  kinds  of  war  policies  that  this 
Government  stands  for. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  tliink  we  both  recognize  that  militant,  or  militancy, 
whatever  you  choose  to  call  it,  means  exactly  the  same  thing  to  both 
of  us.  It  means  a  very  firm  position. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  means,  if  necessary,  the  use  of  force. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  what  kind  of  force?  That  is  the  kind,  you  see. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  not  belabor  with  you  on  that  one. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  the  key  issue. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  let  you  cop  out  to  that. 

Mr.  Davis.  Every  time  we  use  "militancy,"  we  mean  "get  our  guns" 
or  "pin  the  delegates  in"  or  "don't  let  them  out."  And  what  I  am 
saying  is  that  our  statements,  public  and  private,  throughout  the 
events  leading  up  to  Chicago  were  absolutely  clear  that  we  wanted  a 
nonviolent  peace  demonstration  at  the  time  of  the  Democratic 
Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  go  back  on  the  word  "militant"  or  "militancy"  to  the 
word  "militia."  I  think  they  spring  from  the  same  area. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  they  do. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  get  away  from  semantics. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  ask  you  if  the  first  organizational  meeting 
for  the  demonstrations  in  Chicago  was  not  in  fact  held  on  February 
11,  1968,  at  407  South  Dearborn  Street,  Chicago,  and  that  you  and 
Mr.  Carlos  Russell  chaired  that  meeting. 

Mr.  Davis.  The  first  organizational  meeting  for  what  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  For  the  demonstrations  in  Chicago,  or  the  events 
which  occurred  in  Chicago,  however  you  choose  to  put  it,  took  place 
on  February  11. 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  there  were  many  meetings  before  the  February  11 
meeting  to  discuss  the  convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  there  a  meeting  on  February  11  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  there  was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  it  chaired  by  you  and  Mr.  Carlos  Russell  ? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Yes,  it  was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  I  will  ask  you  if,  in  fact,  did  not  the  question  of 
necessity  for  violence  come  up  for  discussion  in  that  meeting  on 
February  11  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes ;  in  preparing  an  agenda  for  that  meeting,  the  press 
particularly  was  speculating  publicly  at  that  time  that  the  convention 
would  be  disrupted. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  are  wandering.  You  are  talking  about  the  press. 
I  am  asking,  Did  the  question  of  violence  come  up  ?  Not  what  the  press 
said. 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Ashbrook  returned  to  the  hearing  room.) 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  The  reason  in  large  part  it  came  up  was  because  I  wanted 
very  explicitly  to  have  a  discussion  of  whether  or  not  the  convention 
should  be  disrupted,  precisely  so  we  could  clarify  publicly  the  position 


2656  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

of  the  overwhelming  numbers  of  groups,  I  thiiik  all  the  groups  who 
were  affiliated  with  the  National  Mobilization,  and  were  thinking  or 
discussing  at  least  the  idea  of  an  antiwar  demonstration  at  the  time  of 
the  convention. 

In  other  words,  the  position  of  disruption  was  one  of  four  posi- 
tions that  was  put  forward  so  that  we  could  make  crystal  clear  to 
everyone  that  this  position  had  been  advanced,  since  it  was  being 
talked  about  in  the  press,  and  had  been  rejected  by  this  meeting,  as  it 
was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Specifically,  Mr.  Davis,  didn't  Jack  Spiegel  make  a 
statement  there  at  this  particular  meeting  that  dealt  with  the  question 
of  violence  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  A  number  of  people  raised  the  question  of  whether  there 
would  be  violence 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  Mr.  Spiegel  make  the  following  statement,  or 
words  to  this  effect : 

We  can't  call  200,000  people  to  Chicago)  and  then  disassociate  ourselves  from 
violence.  Disruption  and  violence  will  occur.  It's  going  to  happen  and  we'll 
have  to  deal  with  that  fact.* 

Wasn't  a  statement  of  this  type  made  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  may  or  may  not  have  been  made.  It  turned  out  to  be 
a  quite  accurate  statement,  that  is,  that  police  violence,  or  what  the 
Walker  Report  calls  a  police  riot,  did  develop,  and  Mr.  Spiegel  was 
quite  accurate  in  saying  we  would  have  to  deal  with  that  problem.  And 
the  way  we  dealt  with  it,  or  tried  to  get  ready  for  it,  was  doing  all  we 
could  to  secure  permits  and  demand  that  the  Justice  Department  in- 
vestigate the  possibility  of  police  violence  during  the  Democratic  Con- 
vention, and  to  make  public  statements  that  announced  the  military 
buildup  in  the  city  of  Chicago  and  to  organize  marshals  who  could 
implement  a  nonviolent  demonstration  if  we  were  ever  allowed  to  have 
one,  which  we  were  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  hear  a  Lincoln  Lynch  make  the  following 
statement : 

How  are  we  going  to  discredit  Daley  and  show  him  to  be  a  liar?  How  will  we 
present  challenges  to  the  Convention? 

Was  this  statement  made  by  Mr.  Lynch  ? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  It  is  a  question,  not  a  statement. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  Lincoln  might  have  said  something  along  those 
lines.  It  seems  to  me  a  question  he  might  have  said,  but  I  can't  recall 
that  he  said  that  exactly. 

Does  that  statement  mean  anything  to  you,  Mr.  Conley  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Davis,  I  show  you  a  copy  of  a  letter,  or  the 
letterhead  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War 
in  Vietnam,  which  was  mailed  during  August  of  1968.  This  letter 
identifies  you  and  Tom  Hayden  as  coproject  directors  and  states  that 
you  were  greatly  aided  by  the  Chicago  Peace  Council.^ 

Is  that  true  ? 

(Witness  examines  document  and  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Davis.  This  appears  to  be  a  stolen  letter  signed  by  Dave  Del- 
linger  and  Bob  Greenblatt  that  I  think  is  essentially  correct. 

1  See  Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  4.  pt.  1,  pp.  2293-2298.  of  Oct.  1,  1968,  hearings. 

2  Document  introduced  as  Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  6  and  retained  in  committee  files.  See 
pt.  1,  p.  2305,  of  Oct.  1,  1968,  hearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2657 

The  Chicago  Peace  Council  did  have  staff  in  Chicago  that  assisted 
us  with  le^al  nelp  and  getting  housing  for  people.  One  of  their  officers 
worked  with  us  closely  in  trying  to  secure  permits  from  the  city  of 
Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  did  you  issue  a  press  release  on  March  25, 
1968,  in  which  you  described  a  meeting  that  was  held  March  22-24  at 
a  camp  outside  of  Chicago  to  make  plans  for  disrupting  the  Demo- 
cratic Convention,  and  did  you  state  that  an  interim  committee  was 
established  to  carry  out  those  plans,  which  consisted  of  yourself,  Dave 
Dellinger,  and  Vernon  Grizzard? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  that  would  be  absolutely  incorrect.  As  I  said,  I  never 
publicly  called  for  disruption  of  the  Democratic  National  Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  did  you  have  an  interim  committee  consisting  of 
yourself,  Dellinger,  and  Grizzard  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Let's  start  and  end  with  that. 

It  is  this  constant  reading  into  the  record  this  word  of  "disruption" 
that  I  am  objecting  to. 

Yes,  there  was  a  committee  that  was  set  up  to  essentially  consult 
with  people  around  the  country  about  a  possible  action  at  the  time  of 
the  Democratic  National  Convention. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  as  much  trouble  with  the  word  "disrupt"  as  I 
do  with  the  word  "militant,"  don't  you  ? 

Mr.  Da\is.  "Militant"  and  "disrupt"  are  both  perfectly  clear  to  me, 
and  apparently  not  so  clear  to  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  examine  this  particular  document  that  we 
are  referring  to,  the  press  release  of  March  25,  and  I  will  ask  you  if  in 
fact  that  was  the  release  that  was  made  on  that  date. 

(Witness  examines  document.) 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  that  appears  to  be  the  press  release  that  was  issued. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  ask  that  the  committee  receive 
this  particular  document  as  Davis  Exhibit  No.  2. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Without  objection  from  members  of  the  committee,  the 
document  will  be  received  and  incorporated  in  the  record. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  2."  See  pages  2658  and 
2659.) 

Mr.  Davis.  What  is  this  "attachment  8A"  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Written  in  the  yellow  crayon  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  have  No.  8  in  red  or  yellow,  here 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  to  key  it  to  my  question  to  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Da\t;s.  Why  is  my  name  underlined  in  red  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  get  back  to  the  issue  at  hand. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  prefer  yellow  ? 

Mr.  Davis,  on  August  18,  1968,  did  you  attend  a  meeting  of  the 
Chicago  Peace  Council  at  which  you  were  one  of  the  featured  speakers 
and  at  that  time  did  you  introduce  other  speakers  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  What  was  the  date  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  August  18,  1968,  approximately  6  or  7  days  before  the 
convention. 

Mr.  Davis.  Why  don't  you  go  ahead  ?  I  really  don't  recall. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  whether  a  Sylvia  Kushner  was  present 
at  that  particular  meeting,  collecting  money  at  the  door  from  persons 
entering  the  meeting  ?  Do  you  know  a  Sylvia  Kushner  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  I  do. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  aware  of  the  fact  that  Sylvia  Kushner  is  the 
wife  of  a  long-time  Communist  Party  member,  Sam  Kushner? 


2658  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Davis  Exhibit  No.  2 

for  Immediate  release    . 
March  25,  1968    10:00  am 

contact:    Rennie  Davis 

407  S.  Dearborn,  Chicago 
939-2666 

■'•;■',    . ,,;  ..  t"^ 

A  i^Jor,  representative  conference  of  anti-war,   student  and  black  liberation 
forces  across  the  United  State sxneeting  outside  Chicago  has  called  for  an 
'    ^'election  year  organizing, campaign  throughout  the  country"  and  affirmed  its       ' 
>  >>-lntention  to  hold  demonstrations  at  the  time  of  the  Democratic  National  Convention. 
"  'The.  Conference,,  meeting  at  camp  Ravenswood,  was  united  in  its  conviction  .  -^  '     .^, 
■vthat  neither,;die  Democratic  or  Repttblican  parties  cotald  solve, the  basic        ''';'^  .  . 
,  V.j^irbb'lems  that  this  iconntry  faces.at  home  or  abroad.«"'The    strategy  developed  -, 
'i^*/bytUe  Conference  wlii  be  to  tinderscore  through  Jk^lon  organization' the  r^al  " 
,"!^'iBsues  this  country;  must  face.    Thdse  issues  are  the  Immediate  withdrawal  of  •  w:. 

1^-^^ i-'  ^■.:"' '  '■  .-■'■'  ■'"^■" :  ■"-  '^-  -  ■  -  %■". .-    '■  ■' ■■■' -  'V: :' ■  '"'•  v^.  >■   A^•■X,^v. 

-|-Alnericdn  troops  from  Vietnam, the  right  of  the  .Vietnamese  people  to  national  ^n""^ 

^ti      X    '  ■''  ■•'     ^    .        .   ^    .  •     ^  ,.  ,.  ■•      '        ■     ••^■. '  •, 

''.^independence  and  self-determination,,  the  en^ of  American  attempts  to  control  ■_  _['  "'. 

v-and  direct  the  future  of  the  underdeveloped  aresiv  of  tlie  world  for  its   own     -  ! 

i|^>.e£ononiic  and  poUtictiL  Interests,  an  inmi^diate  end  to  the  draft  and  the  virtual',    w'-t 

>^:  military  occupation «oi, Black  Comznunities  and  the  recognition  of  the  right       '_  '_^'   . 
of  Black  People  to  control  their  own  lives  and  determine  their  own  future  in 

'^  this  country. 

A  national  campaign  committee  is  being  established  by  the  250  representatives 
at  the  weekend  conference.     This  campaign  is  committed  to  an  extensive  program 
of  support  to  local  organizing  activity  against  the  draft,  the  war,  the  undeniocratic 

a  Interests  in  the  Stspot  Republican  and  Democratic  parties,  racism  and  poverty. 
:,/•■■•.■' 

\     Several  thousand  volufiteers  are  expected  to  Join  this  campaign  during  the  ■     ' 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2659 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  2— Continued 

-2- 
The  conference  selected  a  three  man  interim  conrunittee  to  function  during  '''"''^ 
the  next  few  weeks  ^i^hile  national  and  regional  student  and  xmti-war  organizations 
are  selecting  representatives  to  the  national  campaign  committee.    Members 
of  the  interim  commjLttee  are  Hennie  DavlBf  C^qjafgj_P^yg  P-g^-^^S^''  ^^^ 
York)  and  Vernon  Grizzard,  Boston. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  that  is  completely  irrelevant,  who  she  marries. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  just  asking  you.  Are  you  aware  of  the  fact? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  but  whoever  she  married  is  quite  beautiful. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  are  not  acquainted  with  her  husband  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  have  not  had  the  good  fortune  to  meet  her  hus- 
band. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  just  prior  to  the  convention,  several  days, 
did  you  have  a  conversation  with  one  Abbie  Hoffman,  and  Mr.  Hoff- 
man stated  to  you  he  had  stolen  a  book  from  NBC,  and  this  book  con- 
tained a  floor  plan  of  all  of  the  hotels  in  which  the  Democratic  dele- 
gates would  be  staying,  as  well  as  a  detailed  floor  plan  of  the  Amphi- 
theatre, and  this  convention  floor  plan  was  printed  in  only  50  copies  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  He  is  known  by  the  name  Abbie,  and  we  talked  on  several 
occasions  before  and  during  the  convention,  but  frankly,  I  can't  recall 
this  particular  conversation,  but  since  he  has  been  subpenaed  by  this 
committee,  I  would  recommend  that  you  ask  him  the  question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  no  recollection  of  having  any  such  discussion 
with  him  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  can't  recall,  but  it  is  possible. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  ask  you  whether  at  the  time,  or  at  some  other  time 
in  the  general  neighborhood,  you  told  Hoffman  that  you  had  located 
the  frequency  of  the  secret  police  radio  so  you  could  monitor  their 
signals  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  can't  ever  remember  saying  that  to  Abbie. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  are  quite  sure  you  never  made  such  a  statement 
to  him  or  to  anyone  else  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  can't  ever  recall  making  such  a  statement. 

Mr.  CoNUEY.  Is  the  fact,  then,  untrue,  the  question  I  put  to  you, 
sir? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel. ) 

Mr.  Davis.  My  recollection  is  that  there  were  a  lot  of  radios 
around  Chicago  that  picked  up  continuously  the  police  calls.  It  is  one 
of  the  ways  that  we  have  to  document  the  fact  that  police  orders  con- 
tinuously were  issued  and  violated  by  the  men  in  the  field.  But  I  don't 
recall  ever  discussing  with  people  that  information  or  those  radios, 
how  they  got  the  radios  or  who  they  were  or  what  their  involvement 
was. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  was  not  what  they  had  gotten.  My  ques- 
tion was,  Did  you  make  the  statement  to  Hoffman  or  to  some  other 
person  that  you  had  located  the  frequency  of  the  secret  police  radio 
so  that  you  could  monitor  their  signals  ? 


2660  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  am  sure  I  had  not  made  such  a  statement  since  I 
had  not  located  such  a  secret  police  frequency. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then  this  statement  would  be  false  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Unless  I  just  made  it  up,  it  would  be  false. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  just  make  it  up  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  believe  I  would. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  want  to  direct  your  attention  to  a  meet- 
ing that  occurred  on  August  21  in  Lincoln  Park,  which  you  as  well  as 
Mr.  Hoffman  attended. 

Was  there  not  in  fact  a  demonstration  given  on  crowd  control  and 
also  training  on  how  to  attack  the  police? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  August  21  in  Lincoln  Park,  but  I 
could  explain  to  you  that  we  tried  to  organize  in  Chicago  some  200 
marshals  in  nonviolent  demonstration  techniques  that  were  of  two 
kinds. 

One  was  a  fairly  traditional  monitoring  operation,  in  the  hope 
that  at  the  11th  hour  the  mayor  would  come  to  his  senses  and  ^ant  us 
a  permit  to  go  from  Lincoln  Park  to  the  International  Amphitheatre. 

A  part  of  our  training  with  marshals  was  designed  to  organize  a 
committee  of  people  that  could  provide  communication  to  a  large 
parade  and  direction  that  would  seek  to  end  in  a  people's  assembly 
outside  the  International  Amphitheatre. 

The  other  part  of  our  training  essentially  was  designed  to  assist  peo- 
ple in  the  eventuality  of  police  attacks  or  police  brutality. 

At  that  time,  August  21,  we  had  not  been  granted  permits.  The 
military  preparations  were  well  known  publicly,  and  the  police  and 
other  secret  security  and  military  forces  were  in  or  on  their  way  to 
the  city.  It  did  appear  that  demonstrators  might  be  attacked  by  police, 
as  was  the  case. 

So  we  tried  to  also  acquaint  our  marshals  with  what  to  do  in  the 
eventuality  of  tear  gas  or  Mace  or  broken  limbs  or  bleeding  heads. 
We  also  tried  to  get  marshals  to  understand  ways  in  which  they  could 
move  large  numbers  of  people  out  of  a  situation  in  the  eventuality 
of  police  confrontation  or  police  attack. 

So,  those  were  the  two  focuses  in  our  training  of  marshals,  one  for 
nonviolent  demonstration  and  the  other  for  self-defense  of  crowds 
in  the  eventuality  of  police  attack. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Wasn't  there  some  training,  sir,  at  this  particular 
meeting  I  am  talking  about,  involving  the  use  of  the  snake  dance  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  A  part  of  the 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  just  a  simple  question. 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  not  a  simple  question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  there  training  on  the  use  of  the  snake  dance? 

Mr.  Davis.  There  was  training  that  tried  to  bring  people  together 
that  could  allow  people  in  a  crowd  situation  to  quickly  organize  and 
move  out  of  the  situation.  Some  of  the  newsmen  and  others  called  this 
a  snake  dance. 

Snake  dance  demonstrations,  which  has  been  used  widely  in  Ja- 
pan  

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  isn't  used  in  Japan  to  move  a  crowd  out  quickly. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  why  it  is  not  a  simple  question  at  all,  and  I 
wouldn't  let  you  imply  what  you  are  now  describing  as  a  snake  dance 
in  any  way  was  used  in  Chicago  for  offensive  purposes,  or  in  any  way 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2661 

that  our  training  program  was  used  for  offensive  or  confrontation 
purposes. 

I  think  anyone  who  is  involved  in  that  training,  or  any  of  the  news- 
men with  whom  we  spoke  who  were  there  at  the  time  of  the  training, 
will  testify  that  we  made  it  very  clear  that  we  were  extremely  con- 
cerned at  that  time  about  crowds  being  attacked.  And  we  were  trying 
to  see  if  there  was  a  way  in  which  people  could  be  organized  to  move 
out  of  an  area  very  rapidly  without  trampling  each  other,  and  it 
seemed  this  might  possibly  be  a  demonstration  technique  that  could 
be  used  in  eventuality.  It  was  never  used,  as  you  know,  in  Chicago. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  why  don't  you  describe  to  us  how  a  snake 
dance  works  to  show  how  we  get  rid  of  people  real  quick  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  want  me  to  stand  up  5 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  You  can  described  it  in  words. 

Mr,  Davis.  Essentially,  it  is  a  way  of  organizing  a  group  by  linking 
arms  and  moving  out  of  an  area  in  formation.  That  is  the  simplest  way 
to  describe  it, 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Can  you  move  more  quickly  ? 

Mr.  Davis,  You  can  move  at  a  very  fast  pace,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Faster  than  you  can  move  by  yourself  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  advantage  is  that  it  keeps  you  from  stampeding  over 
your  friends.  It  allows  people  to  move  together,  instead  of  trampling 
each  other. 

It  is  a  terrible  thing  we  have  to  discuss  what  to  do  in  a  demonstra- 
tion that  has  called  for  a  peace  march  and  citizens'  assembly  at  the 
International  Ampihitheatre.  The  fact  that  young  people  have  to  dis- 
cuss how  to  defend  themselves  against  public  officials  when  they  have 
asked  for  a  legal  permit  is  a  dreadful  indictment  of  what  this  coun- 
try is  coming  to. 

Mr,  CoNLEY,  On  August  23  of  this  year,  did  you  in  the  company  of 
Mr.  David  Dellinger  and  Mr.  Sidney  Peck  wait  to  see  Mayor  Daley, 
and  did  you  not  after  half  an  hour  see  the  mayor's  assistant,  Mr.  David 
Stahl? 

Mr,  Davis.  Wliat  was  the  date,  again  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  August  23. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  can't  recall  if  that  is  the  exact  date,  but  I  believe  a 
meeting  around  that  time  did  take  place. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  these  facts  substantially  correct,  that  you  waited 
half  an  hour  to  see  Mayor  Daley,  could  not  see  him,  and  requested  to 
see  Mr.  Stahl,  and  could  not  see  him  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct.  We  finally  wound  up  seeing  their  secre- 
tary, who  explained  neither  man  would  be  available  to  us  at  the  very 
time  when  permits  were  desperately  needed.  The  mayor  closed  his 
door  to  the  officials  of  the  National  Mobilization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  at  that  time  Mr.  Stahl's  secretary 
indicated  to  you  he  would  see  representatives  of  your  group  on  August 
26?  Did  that  occur,  that  they  indicated  that  they  would  see  you  on 
I  guess  2  or  3  days  later  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  had  been  meeting  with  David  Stahl  for  7  weeks,  at 
that  point,  and  we  had  made  every  possible  effort  to  try  to  meet  with 
somebody  in  that  government  who  could  give  us  the  straight  story  on 
whether  or  not  constitutional  rights  would  be  protected  during  the 
Democratic  National  Convention,  and  David  Stahl,  like  Judge  Lynch, 
was  appropriately  named. 


2662  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

We  only  got  the  stall,  and  we  felt  that  on  the  23d  that  it  was  essen- 
tial to  meet  with  the  mayor  himself  or  with  Jolin  Bailey,  the  chair- 
man of  the  Democratic  National  Committee, 

I  believe,  following  the  meeting  with  Mr.  Stahl's  secretary,  that  I 
did  talk  briefly  with  John  Bailey  and  I  pleaded  with  him  to  appeal 
to  the  mayor  of  the  city  of  Chicago  to  meet  with  us  and  issue  permits 
to  prevent  a  police  riot  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  We  felt  one  more 
meeting  on  August  26  with  essentially  a  staff  person,  rather  than  with 
the  person  who  really  made  the  decisions,  was  ludicrous. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  There  were  permits  issued  for  demonstrations  at  certain 
places,  were  there  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  There  was  a  permit  issued  on  the  afternoon  of  August  28 
for  the  use  of  the  bandshell,  but  the  essential  j^ermit  for  a  citizens' 
assembly  outside  the  International  Amphitheatre  was  not  granted, 
and  the  essential  right  to  use  the  park,  which  would  have  prevented 
the  skull  fractures  and  the  bloodshed  that  we  saw  on  television,  were 
never  granted.  The  use  of  Soldier  Field  that  would  have  prevented 
what  happened  in  Chicago  was  never  availed. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Was  the  permit  to  which  you  referred  the  only  permit 
issued  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right,  for  any  group  that  was  granted. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  After  you  were  told  you  could  not  see  Mr.  Stahl  until 
August  26,  were  you  present  when  Mr.  Dellinger  made  the  following 
statement:  If  Mayor  Daley  would  not  see  him  now,  he — implying 
Mayor  Daley — would  be  responsible  for  any  bloodshed  that  took 
place  in  Chicago. 

Were  you  present  when  that  statement  was  made,  or  words  to  that 
effect? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  believe  I  overheard  that  exact  statement,  but  that 
certainly  is  a  statement  that  I  believe  that  all  of  us  felt  very  strongly 
at  that  time,  and  if  Dave  Dellinger  had  not  made  it,  I  think  I  would 
have. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Whose  blood  did  you  plan  to  shed  in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  didn't  plan  to  shed  anybody's  blood.  The  plan  was 
announced  months  ago,  and  we  were  seeking  permits  so  we  could  have 
a  legal,  peaceful  assembly,  and  that  right  to  assemble  was  being  crushed 
by  the  officials  of  Chicago. 

We  felt  that  this  kind  of  blatant  disregard  of  the  Constitution  and 
the  military  buildup  that  was  occurring  in  Chicago  could  only  mean 
that  Chicago  officials  were  interested  in  a  jxvlice  riot  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  any  possibility  or  opportunity  to  have  a  peaceful  assembly. 
As  we  know,  that  is  exactly  what  happened. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  besides  yourself,  Mr.  Dellinger,  and  Mr. 
Peck,  were  not  Linda  Morse,  Stanley  Bass,  Irving  Beinin,  and  James 
O'Brien  of  Ramparts  magazine  present  at  this  meeting  we  have  been 
talking  about,  if  you  recall  ? 

Mr.  DA\^s.  I  recall  some  of  them  being  present,  but  not  all  of  them. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yesterday  Mr.  Hayden  was  asked  about  what  the  word 
"victory"  meant  to  him,  and  a  number  of  things. 

I  put  to  you  this  question,  sir:  Would  you  like  to  see  the  North 
Vietnamese  victorious  in  this  war  that  is  occurring  in  Southeast  Asia? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  victory  for  me  would  be  for  American  military  pres- 
ence in  Vietnam  to  withdraw.  That  would  be  an  enormous  victory  for 
the  American  people,  and  that  is  the  victory  I  seek. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2663 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  other  words,  you  do  not  subscribe  to  Mr.  Hayden's 
statement  as  of  yesterday.  You  do  not  wish  to  adopt  what  he  said  on 
that  particular  point  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  it  is  irrelevant,  you  see,  to  say  that  as  an  Ameri- 
can I  want  to  figure  out  or  dictate  the  ways  in  which  Vietnam  will  be 
governed.  The  only  thing  that  is  relevant  to  me,  as  an  American,  is  al- 
lowing Vietnam  to  determine  its  own  affairs. 

It  is  quite  clear  to  me  that  the  forces  in  the  struggle  in  Vietnam 
are  essentially  forces  that  are  organized  around  the  DRV  and  the 
National  Liberation  Front.  It  is  clear  to  me  that  it  is  those  forces  that 
have  essentially  united  the  nationalist  interests  in  Vietnam. 

But  my  political  position,  as  an  American,  is  simply  to  insist  that 
this  country  come  to  its  senses  and  withdraw  its  troops.  It  has  always 
been  my  position,  and  it  will  continue  to  be  my  position. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  In  this  connection,  Mr.  Davis,  we  are  moving  into 
the  area  of  the  military,  now,  I  suppose.  You  at  least  bear  the  credit 
for  it,  if  not  the  responsibility,  for  having  been  a  part  of  an  organiza- 
tion which  has  called  itself  the  Summer  of  Support. 

Would  you  be  kind  enough  to  tell  us  what  the  purpose  of  this  orga- 
nization, "Summer  of  Support,"  are,  and  I  have  given  you  a  big, 
broad  field  to  talk  in  now. 

Mr.  Davis.  As  a  young  person  myself,  I  feel  a  particular  sympathy 
for  those  Americans  who  have  been  drafted  into  the  Armed  Forces  and 
given  orders  to  fight  and  die  in  a  war  that,  in  the  interests  of  this  coun- 
try, cannot  be  tolerated  or  supported.  I  happen  to  believe  that  as  some- 
one who  is  very  committed  to  peace  in  that  country  that  I  represent  a 
major  ally  of  the  average  GI.  I  thiiik  that  our  own  movement,  however, 
based  largely  on 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  May  I  interrupt  you  a  moment?  I  am  not  sure  I  fol- 
lowed what  you  meant  by  that  last  remark.  Would  you  elaborate  on 
what  you  meant  by  "ally"  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  the  best  thing  we  can  do  to  support  our  American 
soldiers  is  to  work  to  bring  them  home,  to  return  them  safely  to  their 
families. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Who  is  the  ally  you  are  mentioning — ^the  age  group 
you  are  representing  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Young  people  and  others  in  this  country  who  have  or- 
ganized and  worked  and  raised  the  issue  of  the  war  in  public  arenas 
from  coast  to  coast.  In  other  words,  the  peace  movement,  it  seems  to 
me,  not  the  Congressmen  who  sit  here,  who  are  for  the  war,  represent 
the  major  supporters  of  American  fighting  men,  and  Summer  Sup- 
port was  essentially  a  program  to  dramatize  and  focus  in  a  very  specific 
way  the  support  of  the  peace  movement  for  American  soldiers. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let's  stay  on  this  one  point  for  just  a  minute.  How  old 
are  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  28. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  are  28  years  old.  How  old  is  the  average  service- 
man? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  average  serviceman  is  20. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  So  there  is  some  8  years  between  you  and  him,  is  there 
not? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right,  although  a  lot  of  people  who  work  in 
Summer  Support  are  18, 19,  20.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  some  of  the  people 


2664  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

that  are  supporting  soldiers  are  50  and  60.  I  don't  think  it  is  strictly 
the  case  that  people  who  support  soldiers  have  to  be  old,  bigoted,  re- 
pressive, sick,  patriotic  in  the  worst  sense,  rather  than  the  best  sense. 

I  think  the  symbols  of  patriotism  have  been  stolen  by  the  right,  and 
they  have  to  be  regained  by  those  people  who  are  working  to  make 
freedom  and  peace  in  this  country  consistent  with  American  interests. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  ask  you  if  this  Summer  of  Support  actually 
has  as  one  of  its  objectives  to  encourage  disaffection  and  desertion  from 
the  Army  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  may  use  those  words.  We  know  exactly  what  they 
are,  in  law.  We  do  not  urge  any  young  soldier  to  take  any  action 
that  would  put  him  in  legal  jeopardy  with  the  United  States  military, 
nor  do  we  in  any  of  our  coffeehouses  counsel  young  men  to  desert.  Our 
purpose  is  to  try  to  provide  a  place  for  the  young  man  who  has  given 
his  body  to  Uncle  Sam  so  that  he  does  not  have  to  give  his  mind.  Our 
place  is  to  provide  rest  and  relaxation  for  basic  trainees  who  around 
the  5th  week  of  their  basic  training  learn  to  kill.  He  has  something 
to  escape  to,  other  than  the  whore  houses  and  saloons  that  make  up 
these  small  towns,  like  in  Waynesville  or  Queens,  Texas,  where  there 
are  people  who  generally  care  about  him  and  are  not  trying  to  ex- 
tract or  steal  his  body  for  prostitution  purposes.  There  are  people 
who  want  to  keep  his  mind  alive,  and  not  be  totally  sold  out  to  the 
military  machine.  There  are  people  there  who  essentially  say,  "I  am 
from  the  peace  movement  because  I  care  about  the  hell  you  are  going 
through." 

That  is  the  essential  idea  of  the  coffeehouse — pretty  good. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  want  to  be  specific  about  this,  though.  You  do  encour- 
age the  people  between  themselves — I  use  "among  soldiers"  not  be- 
tween the  peace  movement  and  the  soldiers;  I  use  the  term  "among 
soldiers."  I  do  see  a  distinction.  Do  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  see  your  distinction.  If  GIs  decide  to  organize  them- 
selves to  do  whatever  they  feel  they  want  to  do,  we  may  counsel  them 
very  strongly  about  the  legal  problems  they  may  face  if  they  take 
certain  actions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  you  use  the  coffeehouse,  perhaps,  as  a  catalyst  for 
them  or  focusing  point 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  the  coffeehouse  is  a  place  where  they  can  somehow 
keep  their  sanity,  sort  of  offering  an  antidote  to  the  spirit  of  the  bay- 
onet, which  is  what  the  Government  represents. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  familiar  with  at  least  one  of  your  coffeehouses, 
because  it  is  from  part  of  the  country  I  represent.  And  you  do  have 
posters  in  the  coffeehouses,  do  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  We  have  all  kmds  of  posters,  posters  of  pretty  girls, 
posters  of  Stokely  Carmichael 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  posters  there  which  indicate  that  the  war 
in  Vietnam  is  immoral,  or  however  you  choose  to  put  it;  do  you  not? 

Mr.  Davis.  One  poster  in  Mad  Anthony's  is  a  big  kind  of  picture  of 
a  cruiser  plane  of  a 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Of  a  what  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Of  a  huge  plane  going  off  in  the  distance,  and  it  says, 
"This  summer  spend  your  vacation  in  beautiful  Vietnam."  That  is  a 
kind  of  an  antiwar  poster,  I  guess.  I  don't  know.  GIs  really  like  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Did  you  not  close  down  Mad  Anthony's  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2665 

Mr.  Davis.  We  hope  very  much  to  open  at  Fort  Leonard  Wood,  but 
the  combination  of  the  official  and  unofficial  harassment,  including  the 
breaking  of  windows  and  other  terror  that  came  from  the  military  and 
the  police,  forced  that  particular  coffeehouse  to  temporarily  close.  It 
was  too  bad,  but  the  GIs  on  the  whole  were  very  supportive  of  it 
and  liked  it,  but  the  officers  don't  think  too  well  of  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  How  many  coffeehouses  do  you  have  throughout  the 
United  States? 

Mr.  Daves.  I  think  the  first  thing  to  say  about  your  question  is  we 
feel  the  coffeehouses  do  not  somehow  belong  to  us.  They  somehow  be- 
long to  American  soldiers,  but  the  number  of  coffeehouses  near  mili- 
lary  bases  that  I  am  acquainted  with  at  least  I  think  number  six. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  going  to  show  you  a  letter  dated  April  30,  1968, 
signed  by  "Rennie,"  addressed  to  "Dear  Bob,"  concerning  the  opera- 
tion of  the  coffeehouses.  The  following  statement  is  made  in  this  cover 
letter : 

Enclosed  is  a  recruiting  letter  to  be  shown  to  trustworthy  people  who  are 
seriously  interested  in  working  in  one  of  the  army  base  coffee  houses  this 
summer. 

Since  security  is  a  problem,  please  be  careful  to  whom  this  letter  is  shown. 

I  will  ask  you,  sir,  if  you  did  not  in  fact  prepare  the  original  of  that 
letter,  if  the  "Rennie"  referred  to  is  not  you  and  the  "Bob"  referred 
to  there  is  not  Robert  Greenblatt  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  How  was  this  letter  stolen,  Mr.  Oonley? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  didn't  know  that  it  was  stolen. 

Mr.  Davis.  The  handwriting  is  not  mine,  so  I  really  can't  identify 
this  letter.  Why  don't  you  go  into  it,  and  we  will  see? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  ask  you,  sir,  if  you  prepared  a  letter  of  that 
type  on  or  about  April  30,  1968,  containing  that  language. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  really,  honestly,  don't  know. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  don't  have  any  recollection? 

Mr.  Davis.  At  that  time  we  were  very  actively  engaged  in  recruit- 
ing for  a  new  project. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  3"  and  retained  in  commit- 
tee files.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  know  of  anyone  else  involved  in  the  Summer 
of  Support  Army  coffeehouse  movement  whose  name  perliaps  is 
Rennie? 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  that  is  the  only  person  who  has  that  name. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Attached  to  that  letter  is  a  rather  voluminous  piece 
of  material 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  record  show  that  counsel  has  handed  the  mate- 
rial to  the  witness. 

Mr.  Davis  [reads]. 

The  coffee  houses  represent  *  *  *  a  new  way  of  reaching  soldiers  without 
haranguing  them. 
The  coffee-houses  come  on  as  strictly  commercial  ventures 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  don't  think  it  is  necessary  to  read  the  letter. 
I  ask  you  if  you  recognize  the  letter.  Do  you  recognize  the  letter,  Mr. 
Davis  ? 

(Witness  examines  document  and  confers  with  counsel.) 
Mr.  Davis.  The  first  part  of  this  letter,  Mr.  Conley 

21-706  O — 69— pt.  2 12 


2666  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  describing  by  that  the  first  and  second  pages  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  first  two  pages,  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Kennedy,  The  other  stujff  is  secret,  and  they  want  it  back. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  didn't  mark  it  secret. 

(Witness  examines  document  and  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Oonley,  are  you  going  to  put  all  of  this  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No,  sir;  we  are  only  interested  in  the  first  two  pages 
there. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  4."  See  pages  2667  and 
2668.) 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  very  interested  in  the  other  five  pages.  It  has  a  lot 
of  useful  information  about  the  attitude  of  many  young  men  in  the 
Army- 


Mr.  CoNLEY.  Have  you  ever  seen  that  document  before 

Mr.  Davis.  — who  feel  that  this  war  is  very  unjust. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  question  is,  Have  you  ever  seen  the  document? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  haven't. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  It  is  moot 

Mr.  Kennedy.  I  don't  think  it  is  moot.  You  yourself  have  indi- 
cated  

Mr.  IcHQRD.  Let's  be  in  order.  Mr.  Counsel,  I  remind  you  of  the  rules. 

Mr.  Kennedy,  This  is  evidence  from  your  own  committee.  All  you 
want  to  see  is  a  stinking  letter. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  remind  the  counsel  again  that  he  is  in  violation  of  the 
rules. 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  useful ;  it  says  on  February  21  and  22  many  GIs  re- 
fused to  jump  out  of  helicopters.  U.S.  commanders — it  goes  on  for  five 
pages  with  information  about  that. 

Mr.  IcHORD,  The  witness  said  he  does  not  reco^ize  it, 

Mr.  Davis.  Anyway,  the  first  two  pages  are  mine,  Mr.  Conley. 

Mr,  IcHORD.  Mr.  Davis,  do  you  state  you  have  never  seen  this  docu- 
ment before  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  have  never 
seen  it  before. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  your  next  question. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  take  it  you  cannot  identify  either  document  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  the  first  two  pages  I  recognize  as  a  document  that  I 
was  involved  in  writing.  I  don't  think  the  full  teid;  of  that  letter  is  mine, 
but  parts  of  it  are. 

M!r.  AsHBROOK,  He  said  he  didn't  recognize  it, 

Mr,  IcHORD,  He  said  he  recognized  the  first  letter.  Is  that  not  right? 

Mr.  Conley.  Let's  make  it  real  clear.  The  short  letter  dated  April 
30 

Mr.  Davis,  I  don't  recognize  that  letter. 

Mr,  Conley,  You  have  no  recollection  of  ever  having  written  that 
letter? 

Mr,  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Conley.  But  the  second  letter,  which  deals  with  the  coffeehouses, 
specifically  two  pages  in  length,  you  do  recognize,- although  you  main- 
tain it  is  not  a  complete 

Mr,  Davis.  I  will  take  credit  for  that  letter, 

Mr,  Conley.  Mr.  Davis,  in  this  same  connection,  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  Summer  of  Support,  is  it  not  a  fact  that,  as  far  back  as 
November  1967,  you  organized  an  operation  to  make  tape  recordings 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2667 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  4 
Dear 

..-■  ^ia  letter  is  to   be  sho^-m  only  to  those  trustworthy  individualc: 
■  vho  -have  expressed  interest  in  staffing  one  of  the  coffee-houses 
.J'  in  amy  base  parasite  tcv/na.  ,  /■ 

,  The  coffee  houses  represent  an  atter.pt  to  work  out  a  new  way  of 
/,  reaching  soldiers  without  haranguing  thes.  y 

The  coffee-houses  cor>.a  on  as.  strictly  cor-'jnercial  ventures '  / 

'  '  'psychedelic*  painting- on .  tho  windaii?3,  peroonality  posters  oh  / 

•  •'  the  x.'alls,  flashing  colored  lights,  folk  singorG,  or  a  hi-fi 

•  playing  with  Judy  Collins,  The  Mothers,  etc.,  and  outlandich  . 
prices  for  a  cup  of  coffee in  v/hich  any  explicit  pronMytirir.g' 

•  by-r.ovcTT^ent  people  who  \.'or/;ocl  there  v/oul'd  ba  inappropriate  cind^- 
even  threatening  to  the  coffee-houses*  continued  .^existence. 

The  coffee-houses  are  not  designed  to  organise  soldiers;  they 
ore  designed  to  provide  coldicro  v/ith  a  resource  institution 
through  v/hich  they  can  organise  tlier.solves,  when  they  are  ready. 

•  TTie  q'jalities  needed  in  coffee  house  staff  are  not  those  of  a 
:-- political  activist?  they  are  these  of  friend  and  soda-jorh. 

i  ;  VJamth,  friendliness,  openness,  and  a  willingness  to  listen  are 
'the  qualities"  needed  to  nahe  soldiers  feel  at  hone  and  unthroatened 
'   in  the  coffee  house.   The  coffee  houses  give  r.ovcnont  people  an. 

•  'opportunity  to  naKe  their  rhetoric  of  fraternity  real  —  but 
'•■nothing  more.   . 

;^  X  The  first  step  in  any  i>olitical  process  is  to  try  to  find  that 
."•.-fraction  who  are-rinost  ready  to  move.  A  coffee  house  in  an  iV^rr.'y 
I  .town,  amidst  the  bars,  v/horehouccs,  loansharhs  and  sterile 
■•  sorviccrr.en's  clubs,  worhs  as  a  selective  nagnet  to  attract  this 
.J  cro'.v'd.   Because  of  the  cultural  and  class  basis  of  our  niover.ent 
;.  v/ith  which  v/e  are  already  familiar,  those  soldiers  most  likely 
•■;  to  be  turned  off  the  army  are  also  those  laost  likely  to  be   - 
.  .  turned  off  the  bars  and  whorehouses;  r.ost  likely  to  w^lcorr.e 
;'  a  coffee  house;   This  ten  percent  of  the  amy  are  those  guys  who, 
y'  before  the  coffee  houses,  stayed  in  their  barracks  and  left  their 
v.'cskend  passes  unused. 

-  The  coffee  houses,  therefore,  by  their  very  existence,  offer  col- 
-:.  diers  an  opportunity;  to  draw  support  frcra  each  other  simply  by  uceting 
'each  other  in  a  friendly,  non-nilitary  atrruDcphera,  with  open 

young  people  around  who  are  synipathctic  and  vrilling  to  nako  an  car 
;. ;  available  to  those  v;ho  v;ant  to  bend  it.   On  the  base,  these  soldiers 
'-'''.S.ZQ   usually  isolated  frora  one  anotl-jor,  lost  air.ong  30,000  other  man, 
■•••  probably  unaware  of  each  other's  c:cistenco.   Just  by  learning 
'.  that  there  are  people  of  s5.nilar  scns.lbilities,  they  begin  to  . 
CGa  problems  as  cc:r.:";on  \.'.:ich  they  had  previously  perceived  as 
individual.  Thoy  gain  Eupi:ort  for  acts  they  have  been  contera- 
platingj  and,  more  important,  begin  to  explore  possibilities  of 
cor^aon  action. 


2668  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 
Davis  Exhibit  No.  4— Continued 
-2- 


This  is  all  to  say  that  we  have  undertaken  a  very  limited,  tech- 
nical job  that  hasn't  involved  urging  anyone  to  oppose  the"  war 
in  Vietnam.   Soldiers  don't  have  to  be  urged;  they  are  the  first 
group  (for  very  obvious  reasons)  to  oppose  the  war  in  their  hearts. 
But  expecting  soldiers  to  take  the  enormous  risks  of  doing  something 
about  it  is  unrealistic  at  this  jDoint;  for  us  to  ask  soldiers 
to  risk  defection  is,  to  put  it  kindly,  arrogant.  r, 

/ 
This  will  be  even  more  true,  come  June,  when  there  will  be  a        ' 
high  percentage  of  college  grads  in  basic  training.   These  guys 
will  not  need  to  be  proselytized  to  an  anti-war  position;  v.-c'va 
been  doing  that  for  three  years  now  and  most  likely,  quite  a  bit 
has  sunk  in.   What  these  soldiers  will  need,  however,  is  a  hviraane 
and  familiar  environment  in  vtiich  they  can  meet  like  jninded  guyo 
and  talk  in  a  non-military  atmosphere. 

Let  me  sum  uj>  by  quoting  from  the  letter  written  by  the  originator 
'of  these  coffee-houses,  a  former  GI  himself: 

As  movement  people  begin  to  distinguish  between  the 
unhappy  conscript  and  the  marine  sgt  who  actually  digs 
burning  dc/m  huts  vrith  his  ^ippo  lighter,  a  sympathy  will 
probably  inform  their  attitude  toward  American  soldiers 
in  training.   It  nay  alco  become  c-lear  that  the  mover,-!cnt 
has  long  made  strident  and  impossible  demands  on  soldiers: 
Go  to  jail;  Go  into  exile;  Risk  lifelong  ostracism  and 
unemployment;  etc.   Movement  people  may  even  begin  to  sec 
GIs  as  a  .likely  constituency.   They're  the  same  age-,  after 
all,  speak  the  sane  language,  like  the  same  music."- 
Soldiers  have  imaediate  problems  that  can  be  eased  and, 
someday  solved.   They  form  the  segment  of  our  society 
that  pays  most  heavily  for  the  iron-heel  foreign  policy. 
...Finally,  soldiers  aren't  powerless,  and  can  change 
the  situation  if  a  eignificant  fraction  become  articulate 
and  willing  to  act  on  their  anti-war  outlook. 

...Expecting  mass  refunals  to  fight  in  Vietnam  would  be 
like  thinking  American  workers  could  have  forced  through 
the  Wagner  Act  in  1870.   Only  after  soldiers  have  found  it 
possible,  on  some  level,  to  change  their  situation,  might 
they  think  of  pressing  demands  which  now  seem  outlandish, 
such  as  the  right  to  decline  assignment  to  a  given  duty 
station  (i.e.,  refuse  to  fight  in  Bolivia).   The  immediate 
changes  they  could  fight  for  might  include  the  removal  of 
particularly  sadistic  KCOs  from  positions  of  authority; 
or  doctors  might  demand  a  guaranteed  8  hours  sleep  for 
tra'inees  at  posts  where  meningitis  is  endemic... 

We  in  the  movement  will  not  organize  these  things.   But  we  can  begin 
to  provide  a  service  institution  for  soldiers  who  are  beginning 
to  cove  on  their  own.  Viithout  the  ectablishment  and  preservation 
■of  this  institution,  the  movement  may  not  be  possible. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2669 

which  could  be  broadcast  to  GIs,  with  the  objective  of  breaking  down 
morale  and  causing  disaffection  among  U.S.  Army  personnel  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  never  organized  such  an  operation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Were  you  ever  involved  in  such  an  operation,  as  a  par- 
ticipant, not  as  an  organizer,  bearing  in  mind  the  distinction  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  mean  did  I  make  tapes  to  encourage  disaffection 
among  the  troops  ? 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  To  make  tape  recordings  which  could  be  broadcast  to 
GIs? 

Mr.  Daves.  I  would  certainly  make  tapes,  if  they  could  be  broadcast 
to  GIs,  which  would  express  my  point  of  view. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  make  any  tapes  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  make  a  lot  of  speeches  that  are  taped  that  may  have 
been  used  on  radio,  or  even  may  have  been  made  available  to  GIs. 
If  that  happened,  that  is  good.  But  I  never  participated  in  any  or- 
ganized way  for  that  purpose. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  I  ask  you :  Why,  then — you  said  you  would 
make  tapes  for  the  GIs;  for  what  purpose  would  you  make  them? 

Mr.  Daves.  To  explain  my  point  of  view,  that  I  support  them,  that 
I  am  upset  by  what  they  have  to  go  through,  while  the  politicians  hag- 
gle over  how  to  save  face,  and  they  fight  and  die  in  that  senseless  war. 

We  are  doing  all  we  can  to  try  to  end  that  war.  We  very  much  want 
to  involve  them,  when  they  return  from  Vietnam,  in  campus  activities. 
There  are  some  400,000  Vietnam  veterans  on  the  campus  today,  and 
we  think  they  have  the  best  account  of  what  happened  over  there  and 
we  would  like  them  to  share  their  experience  in  this  war  with  other 
people. 

I  mean  I  have  a  whole  range  of  feelings  about  soldiers  that  essen- 
tially line  up  to  be,  one,  that  we  want  to  do  all  that  we  can  as  a  move- 
ment to  underscore  our  support  for  American  fighting  men  and  their 
right  to  come  home,  and,  two,  encourage  them  to  hang  on  to  their 
minds  during  this  incredible  2-year  experience. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  let  me  ask  you  this :  The  committee  has  in- 
formation that  you  did  have  such  a  plan,  that  is,  the  making  of  tapes 
for  the  GI 

Mr.  Daves.  Bring  it  out. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  — which  you  had  when  you  returned  after  your  trip 
to  Hanoi  in  November  of  1967. 

Did  you  discuss  this  plan  with  any  North  Vietnamese  civil  or  army 
officials  ? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  Before  we  proceed,  if  we  are  going  to  encounter  ques- 
tions with  respect  to  information  taken  in  executive  session,  and  I  am 
not  aware  that  such  information  was  taken,  then  the  chairman  should 
be  aware  of  his  own  procedures  here. 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  Chair  will  have  to  rule  that  counsel  has  informed 
the  Chair  that  it  was  not  taken  in  executive  session. 

Perhaps,  Mr.  Reporter,  you  could  read  the  question  back  to  Mr. 
Davis. 

( The  question  referred  to  was  read  by  the  reporter. ) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  the  question  is  proper,  Mr.  Davis. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  very  anxious  to  talk  about  soldiers. 

I  am  not  at  all  sure  what  the  relevance  is  to  Chicago  or  your  legis- 
lative purposes,  but  I  welcome  this  opportunity. 


2670  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  never  discussed  with  North  Viet- 
namese officials  the  making  of  tapes  to  be  broadcast  to  troops  to  en- 
courage disaffection. 

There  have  been  many  discussions  that  I  have  been  involved  in,  in 
general  ways,  that  we  can  try  to  communicate  with  soldiers. 

One  meeting  that  I  recall,  for  example,  discussed  the  idea  of  trying 
to  put  together  some  programs  that  we  would  take  to  the  United 
States  Government  and  suggest  that  they  broadcast  over  their  own 
Saigon-controlled  radio  stations  to  troops,  that  would  try  to  get  the 
other  side  of  this  war  out  to  American  soldiers. 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  those  discussions  never  materialized 
into  any  specific  activity  or  tape  development.  I  wish  that  they  had. 
I  think  it  would  be  very  good  if  more  soldiers  knew  that  the  long- 
haired people  and  the  short-haired  people  really  ought  to  be  getting 
together,  because  they  are  saying  a  lot  of  the  same  things. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Mr.  Counsel,  on  that  point,  Mr.  Davis,  is  it  your 
testimony  you  never  discussed  making  tapes  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
couraging disaffection,  or  I  guess  it  is  your  terminology.  We  will  stop 
at  this  point.  Did  you  discuss  anything  like  that  with  the  Vietnamese? 

You  say  you  never  discussed  tapes  of  this  nature.  What  about  tapes 
in  general,  putting  across  your  views  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  did  visit  the  radio  station  Voice  of  Vietnam  when  I 
was  in  North  Vietnam,  as  I  visited  numerous  agencies  and  programs 
across  that  country,  as  a  part  of  a  general  mission  to  try  to  learn  about 
the  enemy  as  it  has  been  defined  by  the  United  States  Government. 

At  the  Voice  of  Vietnam  radio  station,  I  indicated  to  them  that  I 
thought  that  much  of  their  broadcasts  were  essentially  irrelevant  and 
unreal  to  American  soldiers.  I  was  critical  of  the  message  that  they 
were  trying  to  get  across  on  that  radio  station.  To  the  best  of  my 
knowledge,  that  was  the  only  conversation  about  tapes  in  North 
Vietnam. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  It  would  be  your  testimony  that  the  tapes,  or  any 
discussions,  would  be  as  to  their  broadcasts,  and  not  as  to  any  possible 
information  or  tapes  that  you  would  supply  yourself  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  say  you  were  critical  of  Hanoi  broadcasts  as  di- 
rected at  American  soldiers  and  you  thought  they  were  very  unreal? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  What  do  you  mean  by  that,  that  they  were  not  effective 
in  bringing  about  disenchantment  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  They  are  essentially  as  out  of  touch  with  young  people  as 
you  are,  Mr.  Watson.  They  could  not  communicate  at  all.  I  said,  "You 
are  very  much  out  of  touch  with  the  mentality  of  the  young  people  in 
America." 

Mr.  Watson.  You  were  in  the  hopes  that  Hanoi's  messages  would 
be  more  in  line  with  persuading  the  disenchantment  on  the  part  of  the 
American  GIs? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  never  said  that,  in  Vietnam  or  elsewhere. 

Mr.  Watson.  Why  would  you  say  they  were  unreal  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  was  just  my  feelings.  They  were  out  of  touch  with 
what  GIs  feel. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  felt  it  should  be  so  designed  to  be  in  touch  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  didn't  propose  anything.  I  just  made  that  critical 
statement  to  them. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2671 

Mr.  Watson.  Why  were  you  critical  to  them  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  made  comments  all  over  North  Vietnam — my  reac- 
tions, that's  all. 

Mr.  Watson.  Why  \Yere  you  critical  of  their  broadcasts — because,  in 
your  language,  they  were  "unreal"  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Because  it  was,  pure  and  simple. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  would  c-ertainly  be  hopeful  that  they  would  make 
their  broadcasts  more  in  tune  with  the  thinking  of  the  GI  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  think  they  are  capable  of  that.  I  think  their  cul- 
ture and  their  understanding  of  American  young  people  is  like  the 
culture  and  understanding  of  many  old  people  who  run  this  country — 
just  as  out  of  touch.  I  sort  of  write  off  any  possibility  of  their  being  able 
to  make  tapes  that  would  appeal  to  American  soldiers.  Besides  that, 
I  don't  think  that  that  is  something  that  I  want  to  address  myself  to. 

My  concern,  as  an  American,  is  how  to  demonstrate  my  support  of 
American  soldiers  and  to  work  with  every  muscle  in  me  to  try  to  get 
those  soldiers  home  safe  to  their  families.  That  is  my  only  conQem. 

Mr.  Watson.  Since  you  were  critical  of  these  broadcasts  for  being 
unreal  and  out  of  touch,  Mr.  Davis,  is  it  not  correct  that  the  Hanoi 
broadcasts  aimed  at  the  American  soldiers  are  designed  to  bring  about 
desertions  and  disenchantment  of  the  American  position  in  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Da\t:s.  I  don't  know  whether  they  take  that  position.  I  was 
critical  of  their  playing  music  that  was  from  the  1950's,  like' Guy 
Lombardo. 

I  think  they  get  their  programs  from  the  USO.  They  don't  play 
Judy  Collins,  they  don't  play  the  Fugs,  Country  Joe  and  the  Fish, 
the  music  that  is  popular  with  today's  young  people. 

Mr.  Watson.  Are  the  Hanoi  radio  broadcasts  aimed  at  American 
soldiers  designed  to  encourage  their  loyalty  to  the  American  Army,  or 
to  encourage  disloyalty  ? 

That  is  a  simple  question. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  would  assume  that  they  want  the  GIs  to  do  everything 
possible  to  be  disloyal  to  the  policies  of  the  United  States  military. 

Mr.  Watson.  Your  assessment  was  they  were  not  so  composed  as 
to  be  successful  in  their  venture  in  doing  that  ? 

Mr.  Daves.  No,  not  that.  They  were  not  communicating  with  GIs, 
whatever  their  political  purpose.  That  is  all  I  am  saying.  I  don't  read 
into  it  more  than  that,  because  there  is  not  any  more  than  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  made  no  suggestions  at  all  as  to  how  they  might 
improve  their  programming  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  I  did  suggest  they  get  a  Judy  Collins  record.  I 
believe  I  did  say  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  As  to  how  they  might  be  more  effective  in  bringing 
about  their  purpose  as  it  relates  to  the  American  GI  ? 

Mr-  Davis.  No,  I  didn't  say  that.  You  said  that. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  want  to  provide  them  with  better  music,  Mr. 
Davis? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  music  that  comes  out  of  the  USO  is  so  terrible ;  if 
it  comes  out  of  North  Vietnam,  maybe  it  is  better,  and  maybe  the  GI 
would  dig  that. 

The  whole  point  is  not  to  link  me  with  the  very  bad  propaganda  of 
North  Vietnam,  because  that  is  not,  Mr.  Watson,  what  I  am  about. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  sure  if  you  were  directing  it,  it  would  be  far  more 
successful.  We  will  agree  on  that. 


2672  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Let's  turn  it  around.  Your  criticism  of  the  Hanoi  broadcasts  aimed  aJt 
tlie  American  soldier  was  because  the  music  was  out  of  date  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  said  that ;  yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  was  exclusively  your  criticism  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you.  We  are  just  getting  into  music  now. 

Mr.  Davis.  You  got  it,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  The  purpose  of  the  Hanoi  broadcast  is  strictly  to  give 
musical  entertainment  to  the  American  GI,  according  to  your  inter- 
pretation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  ask  you  if  after  your  return  from  Hanoi  you  visited 
witli  Dr.  Quentin  Young  and  discussed  with  him  your  trip  to  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Davis.  No ;  I  borrowed  a  thousand  dollars  from  him,  by  phone. 
That  was  his  crime. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  talking  about  in  November  of  1967. 1  am  not  talk- 
ing about  the  spring  of  1968. 

Mr.  Davis.  I  really  can't  recall  the  date. 

I  know  Quentin.  I  think  he  is  both  a  marvelous  doctor  and  a 
marvelous  person,  and  he  is  active  in  many  of  the  concerns  I  have  in 
Chicago. 

It  is  quite  possible  I  met  with  him  in  November,  because  he  is  a 
friend,  and  we  worked  together  on  various  activities  in  Chicago  from 
time  to  time.  It  is  possible,  but  I  can't  remember  the  exact  date. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  you  probably  know,  if  you  were  here.  Dr.  Young 
did  testify  before  this  committee  in  October  that  he  lent  you  $1,000  to 
help  pay  the  rent  for  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  offices,  407 
South  Dearborn,  beginning  April  1968.  Was  that  testimony  correct? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  he  did  loan  me  a  thousand  dollars — very  generous. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  describe  the  circumstances  of  this  loan? 
Did  you  call  Dr.  Young?  Did  you  tell  him  of  your  need,  if  he  would 
help  you  out  ?  How  did  you  go  about  asking  for  the  $1,000  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  My  recollection  is  I  got  a  frantic  call  from  the  staff  at 
the  Mobilization  office  in  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Weren't  you  at  that  office  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  was  in  New  York. 

The  caller  said  the  landlord  expected  his  rent  right  away — like  land- 
lords are  apt  to  do.  Being  in  New  York  at  the  time,  and  not  being  able 
to  send  immediately  the  money  that  was  required,  I  tliought  of  various 
people  who  might  on  very  short  notice  be  able  to  advance  that  money, 
and  we  would  try  to  raise  it  later  and  repay  it.  I  called  Quentin,  and  he 
said  that  he  could  do  it  if  it  could  be  repaid  in  several  days.  He  did 
give  the  money  for  the  rent. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  this  check  actually  come  to  you,  and  I  have  refer- 
ence to  what  has  been  previously  introduced  as  an  exhibit  here.^  Was 
this  check  sent  to  you  ?  Did  you  see  this  particular  check  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  was  in  New  York.  That  was  the  whole  point. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then  I  take  it  you  did  not  see  the  check. 

Mr.  Davis.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  Dr.  Young  the  first  individual  whom  you  con- 
tacted for  the  purpose  of  this  loan  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Do  you  mean  for  this  specific  loan  ?  I  mean,  I  borrow 

'  See  Young  Exhibit  No.  1,  pt.  1,  p.  2430,  of  Oct.  3,  1968,  hearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2673 

money  every  day.  I  got  money  problems  all  over  the  place,  just  like 
every  other  American. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  again  admonish  the  audience  that  you 
are  guests  of  the  committee,  I  am  sorry,  but  since  you  are  guests  of 
the  committee,  we  will  have  to  have  order,  and  that  covers  laughter  and 
emotional  outbursts  or  any  other  kind  of  disturbance. 

Let's  proceed  and  try  to  finish  up  today,  if  we  possibly  can. 

Mr.  Davis.  Good.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  Quentin  D.  Young, 
trustee,  was  the  only  person  I  contacted  for  this  loan. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Dr.  Young  testified  here,  first  of  all,  when  he  was  asked 
about  this  transaction,  that  his  loan  to  you  for  $1,000 — reflected  by  that 
photocopy  there — and  to  use  his  words,  "promptly  paid  back  in  cash 
over  a  2-day  period."  That  was  his  testimony.  He  later  said  in  his  testi- 
mony that  same  day  that  he  thought  you  paid  him  by  check. 

How  did  you  pay  him  back,  by  cash  or  check  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  can't  recall.  You  can  subpena  our  books  and  see  whether 
or  not  a  check  was  written  to  Quentin  Young,  or  our  full  ac<x)unt  will 
indicate  whether  it  was  in  cash.  But  I  can't  remember  whether  it  was 
cash  or  check. 

What  relevance  does  it  have  to  my  activities  in  Chicago,  or  my 
connections  with  the  Communist  world  and  disruption,  or  whatever 
you  are  investigating  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Your  financial  transactions  are  pertinent. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  say  your  financial  records  will  reflect  that.  Who 
keeps  your  records  ? 

Mr.  Davis,  ^ric  Weinberger  of  the  National  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  he  also  the  treasurer  of  that  committee  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  the  only  person  authorized  to  write  checks  for 
the  committee? 

Mr.  Davis.  No.  We  had  a  special  Chicago  account  for  the  project  in 
Chicago.  I  was  authorized  to  write  and  sign  checks  on  this  account. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  was  the  Chicago  account  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  was  a  project  of  the  National  Mobilization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  it  have  a  particular  name  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  believe  it  was  called  National  Mobilization. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  is  separate  and  distinct  from  the  other  accounts 
of  National  Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  I  understood  your  earlier  testimony.  National 
Mobilization  maintains  a  bank  account  in  New  York. 

Mr.  Davis.  Our  organizational  account  is  in  New  York.  We  set  up 
a  checking  account  in  Chicago  to  write  checks  for  that  particular  proj- 
ect, and  then  the  records  were  sent  to  New  York,  so  that  committees 
like  yours  that  wanted  to  see  whether  or  not  we  get  all  our  money  from 
Cuba,  Peking,  and  Moscow  would  find  out  in  fact  that  most  of  it  comes 
in  nickels  and  dimes  and  small  contributions  from  people  all  over  the 
country ;  that  generally  the  funding  of  a  national  action  of  this  kind 
comes  out  of  the  people  who  come  to  the  action ;  and  that  the  lavish 
accounts  you  suspect  we  live  on  in  fact  turn  out  to  be  pitiful  budgets 
of  people  trying  to  eke  along  day  to  day  on  peanut  butter  and  jelly 
sandwiches. 


2674  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CON\^ENTION 

All  of  that  is  on  the  record,  and  I  would  be  glad  to  bring  all  that 
down  here  and  make  that  information  clear. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  bank  did  you  have  your  account  with  in  Chicago 
at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Mj^  recollection  is  that  our  account  was  with  the  Amal- 
gamated Trust  and  Savings,  or  something  like  that. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  indicated  you  had  authority  to  di'^w  on  that  ac- 
count. Did  anyone  else  have  authority  to  draw  on  that  account  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  during 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  I  am  speaking  of  the  Chicago  account  now. 

Mr.  Davis.  Up  until  August  28  I  think  I  was  the  only  signer. 

ISIr.  CoNLEY.  After  August  28  did  anyone  else  take  responsibility 
for  signing  checks  on  that  account  ^ 

Mr.  DA^^s.  Yes ;  Donna  Gripe,  G-r-i-p-e. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  recall  ever  writing  a  check  for  $1,000  to  Dr. 
Quentin  Youn^? 

Mr.  DA^^s.  I  Know  I  paid  him  back. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  have  any  recollection  for  ever  having  written 
a  check  for  $1,000? 

Mr,  Davis.  I  don't  recall. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  You  pointed  out  $1,000  loans  trouble  us  all  and  you 
have  no  recollection  or  having  written  a  check  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No.  I  borrowed  about  $15,000  for  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  have  any  recollection  of  writing  any  checks 
for  $1,000  in  the  month  of  April  or  May,  regardless  of  whether  it  was 
to  Dr.  Quentin  Young  or  not? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  ciin't  recall  whether  Quentin  was  paid  in  cash  or 
check.  I  suspect — 

If  you  could  throw  some  light  on  the  subject,  why  don't  you? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  "\Ve  are  asking  }■  ou  to,  Mr.  Davis. 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  I  just  can't  remember.  That  is  a  long  time  ago. 
You  can  remember  that.  There  is  nothing  hidden  here. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  this  $1,000  check  or  loan  from  Dr.  Young  cover 
the  full  cost  of  rent  of  this  particular  building,  or  this  office  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  we  gave  this  poor  landlord  a  little  bit  of  money 
to  hold  it  for  a  while,  what  they  call  a  deposit,  and  then  I  believe  the 
$1,000  paid  our  rent  through  the  end  of  August.  That  is  my  recollec- 
tion. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  recall  whether  there  was  not  in  fact  an  addi- 
tional $500  that  was  paid  on  rent  on  these  particular  offices  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  There  might  have  been,  but  that  seems  inconsistent  with 
the  way  I  generally  work.  I  know  that  committees  like  this  come 
traipsing  around  a  landlord  and  ask,  "Don't  you  know  about  the 
people  in  that  building,"  and  put  a  lot  of  pressure  on  him  to  throw  us 
out,  so  I  generally  try  to  get  the  bills  paid  up  far  in  advance,  to  stop 
that  kind  of  harassment. 

I  might  have  done  it  the  other  way,  if  we  were  short  of  the  money. 

We  get  a  lot  of  problems  with  FBI,  police,  and  committees  like  this. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Let's  not  rely  on  a  newspaper  or  FBI  or  this  committee 
or  police.  There  is  a  newspai>er  account  which  apj>eared  in  The  Shreve- 
poi-t  Jounml  of  September  13  of  this  year,  which  is  apparently  a  story 
prev^ared  by  the  Chwago  Tribune  and  syndicated 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  a  good  paper. 


I 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2675 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  last  paragraph  of  this  story  dealing  with  this 
rent  on  this  building  says : 

The  remaining  $500  due  on  the  rent  was  paid  by  a  near  Northside  financial  sup- 
porter of  black  i>ower  and  other  militant  groups.  *  ♦  * 

Does  this  help  you  in  any  way  to  recall  whether  there  was  in  fact 
a  total  rent  of  $1,500? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  Might  we  see  that  article? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 

(Witness  and  counsel  examine  document.) 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  ConJey,  these  questions  are  so  iiTelevant,  just  like 
this  connnittee.  I  can't  understand  what  you  are  trying  to  do.  But  I 
am  sori-y  to  say  I  cannot  recall  whether  I  got  $500  from  a  support«.r 
of  a  black  power  or  militant  group. 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  Does  the  name  Lucy  Montgomery  help  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  know  her.  From  time  to  time  she  has  given  money.  She 
is  a  hard-working,  upper  middle-income  woman  who  is  committed  to 
peace  and  freedom — peace  and  freedom,  Mr.  Conley.  If  she  gave  me 
the  money,  that  is  very  nice. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Did  she  give  you  the  $500  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  can't  recall. 

Mr,  IcHORD.  You  state  that  operations  like  the  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee operate — in  your  terms,  as  I  recall  them — "on  peanuts."  What  do 
you  mean  by  "peanuts"  ?  How  much  is  "peanuts"  ? 

The  reason  why  I  ask  this  question,  here  we  have  a  $1,000  repay- 
ment not  remembered,  and  $1,000  to  me  is  a  pretty  good  sum  of  money, 
so  I  would  think  you  might  have  a  higher  figure  in  mind  than  nor- 
mally would  be  the  connotation  when  you  say  "peanuts." 

Mr.  Davis.  Look  at  it  this  way :  We  had,  from  January  until  August, 
a  full-time  staff  on  an  average  of  15  people  up  until  July  and  25  peo- 
ple beyond  that,  and  some  200  people  for  3  weeks  around  the  action 
itself.  We  are  a  coalition  of  organizations  that  number  about  125 
groups.  We  distribute  mailings  in  the  tens  of  thousands.  We  had  to 
pay,  I  think,  $250  a  month,  or  something  like  that,  for  rent  for  a  large 
office  for  our  staff.  We  had  three  phone  lines  with  a  terrible  phone 
bill.  The  total  of  that  kind  of  organization  operating  for  that  period 
of  time  came  to  roughly  $15,000.  That  sounds  like  a  lot  of  money  to 
me,  too,  and  I  think  it  is  a  lot  of  money,  but  not  for  the  enormous 
operation  that  was  going  on. 

As  I  say,  most  of  that  $15,000  was  secured  in  loans  going  into  the 
demonstration  and  then  most  of  it  was  repaid  by  selling  buttons  to  the 
people  who  would  come  to  Chicago,  for  $1  each. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  stated  previously  that  you  had  borrowed  $15,000 
to  finance  your  operation.  Was  that  the  total  cost  of  3'our  operation  ? 
Did  you  borrow  the  entire  sum  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  am  not  sure  what  proportion  that  breaks  down  to,  but 
probably  the  largest  amount  was  borrowed;  yes.  As  I  say,  if  I  had 
known  that  you  wanted  all  the  specifics  on  the  moneys,  we  could  have 
brought  our  books  or  you  could  have  subpenaed,  because  you  would 
have  to  do  that  to  get  them.  But  we  generally  have  to  borrow  a  lot  of 
money  and  then  we  try  to  repay  it  by  selling  buttons  for  50  cents  or  a 
dollar  when  people  come  together.  And  getting  that  $1  out  of  some- 
one who  does  not  have  any  income  is  a  hard  thing  for  them  to  do, 
but  they  recognize  that  we  don't  have  big  money  supporters  from 


2676  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

aroimd  the  country ;  that  the  money  has  to  come  out  of  the  people  who 
are  commitited  to  ending  the  war  and  committed  to  trying  to  raise  in 
America  consciousness  these  issues  which  we  feel  are  so  vital  to  this 
Nation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  directing  your  attention  to  another  docu- 
ment, and  it  concerns  a  meeting  held  near  Chicago  March  22  to  March 
24, 1  would  ask  you  if  you  would  examine  that  document,  please  [Davis 
Exhibit  No.  5j. 

You  will  note  that  it  carries  a  National  Mobilization  Committee 
heading  and  a  date  of  March  7,  1968.  Have  you  seen  this  document  or 
a  document  similar  to  it  in  connection  with  that  meeting  ? 
(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Davis.  This  is  signed  by  Father  Daniel  Berrigan,  Carl  David- 
son, Don  Duncan,  Al  Evanoff,  Richard  Flacks,  Vernon  Grizzard, 
Steve  Hollowell,  Clark  Kissinger,  Sidney  Lens,  Marya  Levenson, 
Linda  Morse,  Sidney  Peck,  William  Pepper,  Monsignor  Charles  Rice, 
Franz  Shurmann,  Cora  Weiss,  Dagmar  Wilson,  Dr.  Quentin  Young, 
Leni  Zeiger,  and  Howard  Zinn. 

Also  the  temporary  administrative  conunittee :  Rennie  Davis,  Dave 
Dellinger,  Tom  Hayden,  Bob  Greenblatt,  and  Sue  Munaker.^ 

I  could  read  my  whole  address  book  right  into  the  record  if  you 
want  it.  I  have  about  1,500  names.  I  think  we  put  this  letter  out.  I 
should  stress,  just  for  the  record,  that  this  meeting,  as  it  says,  was 
initiated  by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee.  It  was  not  an  official 
meeting  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  When  you  say  we  put  this  out,  you  mean  National 
Mobilization  put  this  letter  out? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  this  meeting  was  initiated  by  the  National  Mobiliza- 
tion. The  people  responsible  essentially  for  this  meeting  were  the  five 
people  I  mentioned,  the  temporary  administrative  people. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Wlio  put  the  letter  out  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  people  who  signed  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  They  put  out  this  letter  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  They  take  the  responsibility  for  the  text  of  the  letter. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  all  of  them  take  the  responsibility  for  the  text 
C'f  the  letter  so  far  as  you  know  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  would  hope  so.  Their  names  are  on  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  not  had  anyone  come  to  you  and  say,  "I  do 
not  \yant  my  name  to  appear  on  this  letter  and  I  want  you  to  repudiate 
that  it  is  on  there," 

Mr.  Davis.  No  one  has  come  to  me  about  it,  to  the  best  of  my 
recollection. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  in  connection  with  this  letter  there  is  a  dis- 
tinction made  between  conference  sponsoi-s  and  temporary  administra- 
tive committee  of  which  it  lists  Davis,  Dellinger,  Hayden,  Greoiblatt, 
and  Munaker.  What  is  the  distmction  to  be  drawn  from  conference 
sponsors  and  temporary  administrative  committee? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  simple.  One  group,  the  conference  sponsors,  want 
to  lend  their  name  to  the  meeting  to  demonstrate  the  kinds  of  people 
and  organizations  that  we  hope  to  involve  in  the  meeting.  The  second 
group  IS  a  group  that  is  responsible  for  putting  the  meeting  together, 

'  Spelled  "Munacker"  in  this  document. 


I 


•DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2677 

finding  a  phice,  getting  some  money,  circulating  announcements  about 
the  meeting,  doing  the  work. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  other  words,  the  temporary  administrative  commit- 
tee is  probably  the  one  that  put  the  letter  out  and  used  the  names  that 
appear  above  as  the  sponsors  of  the  meeting.  Is  that  a  fair  way  of  put- 
ting it  ?  The  sponsors  are  people  who  are  willing  to  lend  their  names — 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  presume  you  contacted  these  people  and  they  were 
agreeable  to  it? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  hope  so. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis,  do  you  think  I  could  prevail  upon  you  to  hand  me  back 
some  of  my  exhibits? 

Mr.  Kennedy.  Yes,  you  can  have  them  all  back. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

I  would  like,  if  I  may,  to  direct  your  attention  to  a  statement  that 
appears  in  the  Guardian  of  September  7,  1968,  issue,  page  3.  There 
are  actually  two  paragraphs  that  I  wish  to  call  to  your  attention  if  I 
may.  The  first  one  is  a  statement  by  Mr.  Dick  Gregory,  which  is  as 
follows:  "Gregory  said  it  is  'your  duty  to  overthrow  this  govern- 
ment.' " 

Then  there  is  a  statement  attributed  to  Rennie  Davis,  which  is  as 
follows : 

Rennie  Davis  called  for  the  building  of  an  NLF  in  the  U.S.,  proposed  that 
Humphrey  and  Nixon  not  be  permitted  to  campaign,  and  announced  plans  for 
a  national  G.I.  week  this  fall  to  let  the  troops  know  "we  support  your  right  to 
return  to  civilian  life." 

Do  you  recall  these  statements?  They  were  supposed  to  have  been 
made  on  Thursday  moniing,  August  29,  or  thereabouts. 

( Document  handed  to  witness. ) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  question  1  put  to  you  at  this  time  is.  Did  you  in 
fact  call  for  the  formation  of  an  NLF  in  the  United  States? 

Mr.  Davis.  Let  me,  if  I  may,  describe  to  the  best  of  my  recollection 
what  I  did  sa}^.  This  was  Thursday,  after  the  terrible  police  riot  Wed- 
nesday night  in  front  of  the  Conrad  Hilton.  Hubert  Humphrey  was 
the  nominee  of  the  Democratic  National  Convention.  I  said  something 
to  the  effect  that  Hubert's  notorious  promise  to  export  the  great  society 
to  South  Vietnam  was  turning  this  to  its  reverse ;  Vietnam  was  coming 
home. 

We  saw  it  in  the  barbed  wire,  bayonets,  the  troops  that  had  been 
brought  into  Chicago  to  protect  the  Democratic  Convention  from  its 
own  citizens ;  that  Hubert  Humphrey  had  been  nominated  in  the  Inter- 
national Amphitheatre,  but  outside  the  Conrad  Hilton  standing  on  a 
garbage  can,  which  was  our  platform,  we  announced  our  own  political 
campaign  for  the  people  who  felt  that  there  had  been  a  total  break- 
down of  tlie  democratic  process,  when  Vietnam — which  had  been  the 
central  issue  of  tliis  campaign,  and  perhaps  the  major  issue,  as  im- 
portant as  the  issue  of  slavery  for  this  country — had  now^  been  buried 
under  the  slogan,  "law  and  order";  and  that  we  announced  at  our 
platform,  w^iich  is  appropriately  a  garbage  can,  that  we  intended  to  do 
all  that  we  could  in  this  campaign  to  focus  on  the  central  issue  facing 
the  American  people  in  the  election  in  1968,  which  is  how  do  we— 
suggested  that  in  fact  with  Vietnam  coming  in  America,  what  was 


2678  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

perhaps  needed  more  desperately  before  was  a  liberation  movement 
in  the  United  States;  and  that  in  this  election  what  we  had  to  do  was 
vote  and  support  American  soldiers  in  their  right  to  return  to  civilian 
life. 

I  suggested  we  do  it  by  holding  love-ins  at  military  bases  around  the 
country ;  that  we  do  it  by  leaflets  and  by  word  indicating  our  support 
for  American  soldiers;  that  those  people  who  feel  they  are  the  real 
patriots  in  this  country  will  stand  up  against  the  f  raudulence  of  this 
country  and  help  to  bi"ing  home  the  American  boys  in  1968. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then  do  I  take  it  you  have  not  said  what  is  attributed 
to  you  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  think  I  mentioned  I  believed  we  needed  a  liberation 
movement  in  the  United  States.  I  don't  know  if  I  used  "national  libera- 
tion front"  or  not,  but  certainly  the  meaning  that  I  intended  was 
what  I  just  described. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Davis,  directing  your  attention  to  something  else, 
back  in  January  of  this  year  at  a  meeting  held  in  New  York,  the 
Lawyers  Guild,  were  you  at  that  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Is  that  the  same  meeting  you  talked  to  Tom  about  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes,  sir,  I  was  at  that  meeting. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  apparently  in  connection  with  that  meeting,  you 
made  some  remarks  about  the  manner  of  setting  uj)  law  students— I 
believe  your  words  were  to  the  effect  that  Chicago  operations  should 
find  subsistence  for  50  law  students,  the  guild  should  handle  recruiting, 
and  Chi(;ago  should  handle  the  research  in  Illinois  law. 

Right  after  you  made  this  statement.  Ken  Cloke — is  that  the  way 
you  pronounce  the  gentleman's  name  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  — made  the  statement:  "Affirmative  suits  should  be 
referred  to  Kunstler  and  Kinoy.  Bail  problems  should  be  referred  to 
Detroit.'' 

Do  you  recall  this  statement  having  been  made  by  Mr.  Cloke  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  does  not  make  any  sense  so  I  assume  that  he  did  not 
make  it,  since  Ken  generally  makes  sense. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Can  you  enlighten  this  committee  as  to  why  the  state- 
ment was  made,  that  it  suggested  that  bail  problems  should  be  referred 
to  Detroit? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  don't  think  we  made  that  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  have  never  made  a  statement  similar  to  that, 
where  bail  was  a  problem  that  you  should  contact  Detroit  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Bail 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  understand  bail  is  a  problem,  but  I  am  asking  in 
connection  with  the  city  of  Detroit. 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  that  statement  makes  no  sense  at  all  to  me. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  do  not  recall  that  statement,  or  one  of  similar 
import  having  been  made  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  think  whoever  took  the  minutes  for  you  messed  up. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  These  are  not  our  minutes. 

Mr.  Davis.  They  must  be  your  minutes  because  they  are  wrong  from 
beginning  to  end,  everything  you  read.  You  brought  that  up  with 
somebody  else — Bob  Greenblatt — about  that  meeting — not  a  very  im- 
portant meeting,  Mr.  Conley,  in  the  whole  picture. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2679 

Mr.  IcHORD.  What  was  the  purpose  of  the  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  To  discuss  with  lawyers  who  had  assisted  the  Mobiliza- 
tion in  other  national  actions,  particularly  on  permit  negotiations,  ways 
we  could  handle  whatever  legal  problems  might  be  anticipated  in 
Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  those  are  all  the  questions  I 
desire  to  ask  at  this  time. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Conley. 

Mr,  Ashbrook,  do  you  have  any  questions  of  Mr.  Davis  ? 

Mr.  Ashbrook.  I  have  no  questions,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Watson.  Inasmuch  as  we  have  one  of  the  so-called  coffeehouses 
in  Columbia,  my  hometown,  and  since  you  acknowledge  some  recollec- 
tion of  having  written  a  letter  similar  to  the  first  two  pages  of  the  so- 
called  secret  letter  sent  out  to  those  prospective  workers  for  the  coffee- 
houses— do  you  remember  that  letter  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  remember  it  being  so  secret,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you  say  you  sent  it  out,  or  are  familiar  with  it? 

Mr.  Davis.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  What  is  the  purpose  of  the  coffeehouse  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  The  purpose  especially  is  to  provide  a  kind  of  an  oasis 
for  soldiers  who,  in  many  cases,  feel  that  they  are  involved,  or  are 
about  to  be  involved,  in  a  very  unjust  war,  and  where  they  can  essen- 
tially come  together  to  talk  about  whatever  is  on  their  mind,  where  we 
can  hopefully  bring  good  entertainment,  and  kind  of  provide  an  anti- 
dote to  the  virus  of  the  USO,  with  its  old  ladies  and  scaggs  and  very 
bad  music,  and  essentially  let  the  GI 

Mr.  Watson.  Have  you  been  in  the  service  yourself  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  I  haven't  been. 

Mr.  Watson.  So,  in  making  such  a  categorical  statement,  which  has 
been  typical  of  the  testimony,  you  would  not  be  able  to  say  they  have 
not  had  some  fine  young  ladies  in  the  USO  across  this  Nation  of  ours. 

Mr.  Davis.  They  have  had  some  young  ladies  in  the  USO.  They 
have  also  had  them  in  whore  houses  and  prostitution  halls  in  the  Army 
towns.  We  would  like  to  provide  something  better. 

Mr.  Watson.  Didn't  you  suggest  your  movement  would  suggest 
love-ins  and 

Mr.  Davis.  Love  is  what  is  very  much  needed  in  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Watson.  What  is  a  love-in  ?  You  said  you  are  against  so-called 
prostitution,  but  you  are  going  to  suggest  a  national  liberation  pro- 
gram providing  love-ins  at  military  bases. 

Let's  hear  your  explanation  of  a  love-in. 

Mr.  Davis.  Love  is  the  antidote  to  the  spirit  of  the  bayonet. 

Mr.  Watson.  Wliat  is  a  love-in  ? 

Mr.  Da%t[s.  That  is  where  people  can  get  together  and  relax  and 
talk  about  whatever  is  on  their  mind  and  listen  to  good  music  and  feel 
they  are  not  going  to  be  harassed  or  threatened  by  military  officers, 
which  represent  the  authority  they  get  in  the  Army  and  out  of  the 
Army. 

Love-in  is  a  symbol  of  the  youth  culture  that  we  are  trying  to  create, 
that  we  hope  some  day  will  replace  the  sterile  plastic  culture  that  we 
think  you  represent,  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you. 

And  the  purpose  of  the  coffeehouse  was  not  to  bring  about  desertions, 
AWOLs,  or  any  outward  refusal  on  the  part  of  a  soldier,  especially 


2680  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

the  recruits,  since  most  of  these  are  located  in  or  are  adjacent  to  re- 
cruiting bases  or  basic  training  stations — it  was  not  to  cause  any 
AWOL  or  desertions  or  anything  like  that  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  is  the  first  time  in  2  days,  Mr.  Watson,  that  you  have 
gotten  something  absolutely  right. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  was  to  encourage  AWOLs  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  messed  up  again.  I  thought  you  had  it,  but  you 
don't.  And  that  is  the  problem  with  this  committee 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  the  problem  in  talking  to  a  gentleman  like  you. 
I  thought  if  we  had  a  meaning  of  the  word 

Mr.  Davis.  We  strained  here  this  morning  and  the  day  before,  I 
think,  to  try  to  attempt  to  understand  each  other,  and  I  think  it  didn't 
work  so  well.  But  I  think  that  young  people,  as  you  subpena  them  and 
bring  them  here,  will  continue  to  talk  this  way,  more  or  less.  You  will 
not  find  the  kind  of  format  you  had  earlier. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Remember,  Mr.  Davis,  you  are  not  so  young  any  more ; 
you  are  28. 

Mr.  Watson.  Now  I  ask  you  the  question  again.  Was  it  not  a  purpose 
of  the  coffeehouse  to  cause  AWOLs,  desertions,  among  military  per- 
sonnel, primarily  basic  trainees  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Hell  no. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  have  made  it  very  emphatic. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  w  as  not  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  this  two-page  letter,  which  you  agreed  you  had  a 
part  in  its  preparation,  in  the  fourth  paragraph,  I  read  this  sentence : 

Because  of  the  cultural  and  class  basis  of  our  movement  with  which  we  are  al- 
ready familiar,  those  soldiers  most  likely  to  be  turned  off  the  army  are  also 
those  *  *  *  most  liliely  to  welcome  a  coffee  house. 

What  do  you  mean  by  the  terminology  "turned  off"  ?  Does  that  mean 
to  support  the  Army  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No;  it  is  an  expression  that  is  very  popular  from 
barracks  stateside  to  Vietnam. 

I  would  like  to,  at  this  time,  quote  that  expression  that  almost  every 
GI  that  I  talked  to,  particularly  those  going  through  basic  training 
or  facing  orders  for  Vietnamj  immediately  understands,  that  expres- 
sion is  " it."  And  I  thnik  that  it  is  that  feeling  that  is  sweep- 
ing young  people  who  are  in  the  military  and  outside  the  military 
across  this  Nation.  And  the  reason  that  there  is  developing  that  attitude 
is  because  Congressmen  like  you  are  forcing  us  to  feel  more  and  more 
that  the  military  of  this  country  is  something  for  which  we  cannot  be 
proud. 

Mr.  Watson.  Then  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  words  "turned  off"  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  Well,  Mr.  Watson,  have  you  ever  been  turned  on  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  have  turned  on  a  light  and  I  have  turned  off  a  light. 

Mr.  Davis.  That  is  the  problem. 

Mr.  Watson.  By  the  common  terminology  or  interpretation,  the 
interpretation  of  the  language,  or  the  understanding  of  the  language, 
would  be  to  cause  someone  to  become  disenchanted  to  the  point  of 
losing  all  interest  in  the  Army,  even  to  the  point  of  AWOL  or 
desertion,  but  that  is  not  your  meaning  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2681 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  a  lot  of  young  men  are  losing  interest  in  the  Army 
and  "turn  off"  is  the  opposite  of  "turn  on." 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  it  synonymous  with  "cop  out"  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  are  getting  close  to  it,  Mr.  Ichord.  Let's  see  if  we 
can  understand  it.  I  think,  to  begin,  to  feel  that  you  do  not  have  to  give 
up  your  soul,  your  life,  your  beliefs  because  a  sergeant  yells  at  you  to 
fall  in  or  fall  out,  to  carry  a  bayonet  and  learn  the  spirit,  whicn  is  to 
kill,  to  understand  that  your  body  may  be  given  to  Uncle  Sam,  but  not 
necessarily  your  mind ;  that  as  an  American  citizen  you  have  certain 
rights,  even  within  the  military,  to  express  your  point  of  view  to  say 
that  this  war  is  immoral  and  unjust,  that  you  feel  you  have  to  somehow 
be  heard  on  whether  or  not  you  will  be  forced  to  commit  acts  of  geno- 
cide against  another  people,  and  to  generally  let  it  be  known  through 
your  own  deeds  and  through  the  actions  of  people  in  the  military  that 
there  are  vast  segments  of  men  in  the  Army  today  who  want  peace, 
who  want  out  of  Vietnam  and  want  an  end  to  the  kmd  of  policies  that 
the  United  States  military  policy  carries  out  throughout  the  world. 

To  feel  that  and  express  that  is  not  automatically  to  go  AWOL  or 
desert.  I  happen  to  believe  young  men  should  go  into  the  Army  and 
organize  in  the  Army  to  keep  thoughts  going,  to  increase  this  discus- 
sion, to  make  it  possible  for  more  and  more  young  to  let  the  American 
public  know  that  there  are  bi^  segments  of  the  Army  that  oppose  this 
war,  and  to  generally  get  the  idea  across  that  being  against  the  Army 
is  not  unpatriotic ;  that  in  this  day  and  age  it  is  one  of  the  most  patri- 
otic things  you  can  do  for  this  country  and  one  of  the  most  important 
things  you  can  do  for  this  country. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  sure  we  will  never  get  a  better  interpretation  of 
the  meaning  of  the  words  "turned  off,"  but  I  want  to  ask  one  final 
question  with  which  you  and  I  might  agree. 

One  thing,  of  course,  you  have  nothing  but  contempt  for  this 
committee.  That  is  fair,  isn't  it  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  You  men  are  interesting.  I  have  not  found  this  a 
complete  drag. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  have  nothing  but  contempt  for  this  committee, 
for  the  President,  Secretary  Rusk,  and  everything  else  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No,  not  everything  else.  I  don't  have  contempt  for 

Mr.  Watson.  Love-ins 

Mr.  Davis.  I  don't  have  contempt  for  American  soldiers.  I  don't 
have  contempt  for  black  people,  for  poor  people,  for  welfare  mothers, 
for  university  people  trying  to  open  up  democratic  channels.  I  don't 
have  contempt  for  people  trying  to  earn  a  living.  I  don't  have  contempt 
for  humanity  and  decency.  People  believe  in  democratic  processes  and 
want  to  bring  the  democratic  values  and  processes  into  this  society. 
There  are  many  things,  Mr.  Watson,  for  which  I  do  not  have  contempt. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  those  things  for  which  you  and  your 
organization  stand  for,  you  have  no  contempt  for.  I  think  we  can  be 
in  accord  with  this :  So  far  as  what  happened  in  Chicago,  your  part  in 
it,  you  absolutely  did  nothing  wrong,  said  nothing  wrong,  the  whole 
blame  is  to  be  placed  at  the  feet  of  Mayor  Daley  and  the  police 
department? 

Mr.  DA\^s.  The  whole  blame  is  to  be  placed  on  a  society  or  a  govern- 
ment that  is  increasingly  out  of  touch  with  the  young  people  in  this 
country  and  with  what  the  real  interests  of  this  country  are. 

21-706  O — 69 — pt.  2 13 


2682  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Chicago  is  a  kind  of  watershed  event,  I  think.  In  August  of  1963, 
you  know — ^Tom  mentioned  this — some  250,000  people  marched  for 
jobs  and  justice  in  the  city.  Exactly  5  years  later,  another  demonstra- 
tion that  was  trying  to  mount  its  concern  about  peace  in  Vietnam  was 
clubbed  and  brutally  suppressed  by  police  in  a  general  military 
environment  that  had  been  created  by  officials  of  Chicago. 

During  those  5  years  we  dropped  more  bombs  in  Vietnam  than  we 
did  in  World  War  II.  We  spent  three  times  as  much  in  riot  control 
as  was  spent  on  poverty.  We  saw  scores  of  cities  go  up  in  smoke  out  of 
rebellion  to  the  conditions  in  those  communities.  We  saw  thousands 
of  young  people  face  prison  rather  than  fight  in  a  war  they  considered 
unjust. 

I  think  Chicago  really  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  a  society 
or  a  government  that  increasingly  resorts  to  military  and  police  force 
rather  than  consensus  for  insuring  its  policies. 

Well,  at  the  same  time  more  and  more  American  citizens  are  joining 
in  a  movement  to  create  some  kind  of  a  new  basis,  just  basis,  humane 
basis  on  which  this  country  can  operate. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  If  I  may  interrupt,  Mr.  Watson,  at  that  point,  do  you 
feel  they  have  a  democratic  society  in  North  Vietnam? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  was  not  in  North  Vietnam  to  say  very  much  about 
them.  Wliat  I  would  say  is  that  the  American  people  are  deluded  if 
they  believe  there  is  a  small  group  of  people  at  the  top  that  terrorize, 
a  whole  group  of  people  at  top  to  resist  American  aggression  against 
them. 

My  general  impression  was  in  the  countryside  and  cities — the  Viet- 
namese people  are  united  in  trying  to  stop  the  bombing  and  the  aggres- 
sion of  that  country  and  that,  in  general,  they  feel  that  their  own 
interests  for  freedom  and  independence  and  freedom  is  consistent  with 
a  struggle  that  has  been  going  on  for  25  years  in  that  country  and 
consistent  with  the  positions  of  the  recognized  leaders  of  that  country. 
But  that  to  me  is  an  irrelevant  question,  whether  or  not  we  have  any 
business  being  there.  We  have  no  right  deciding  the  fate  and  destinies 
of  a  country  25,000  miles  away,  and  that  is  why  I  say  American  forces 
should  be  withdrawn  from  there. 

Mr.  Watson.  One  final  question :  Earlier  to  establish  the  objectivity 
of  Mr.  Hayden,  I  asked  him,  in  view  of  his  visits  to  North  Vietnam,  as 
to  how  many  visits  he  had  made  to  South  Vietnam.  How  many  visits 
have  you  made  to  South  Vietnam  ? 

Mr,  Davis.  I  have  not  had  the  opportunity  to  be  in  South  Vietnam. 
I  would  like  very  much  to  go. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  I  have  one  final  question.  I  think  it  ties  in  what 
you  said  about  North  Vietnam. 

I  would  like  to  make  this  a  part  of  the  record.  Hanoi  radio  broadcast 
of  September  14,  1968,  said,  and  I  condense  it : 

The  South  Vietnamese  people's  committee  for  solidarity  with  the  American 
people  has  sent  a  letter  to  the  national  mobilization  committee  to  end  the  war  in 
Vietnam  thanking  the  progressive  American  people  of  all  strata  for  their  seeth- 
ing, resolute,  and  courageous  struggle  conducted  last  month  *  *  *. 

•  **•••• 

we  are  daily  and  hourly  following  with  great  enthusiasm  your  persistent  and 
valiant  struggle. 

Your  recent  actions  in  Chicago,  as  well  as  throughout  the  United  States, 
against  the  U.S.  policy  of  aggression  in  Vietnam  have  strongly  stimulated  our 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2683 

people  in  South  Vietnam  who  are  conducting  the  powerful  general  offensive  and 
widespread  uprisings  throughout  South  Vietnam  with  the  resolve  to  wrest  back 
at  all  costs  our  sacred  right — 

et  cetera. 

You  were  somewhat  critical  of  broadcasts  emanating  from  Vietnam. 
Would  a  broadcast  of  this  type  be  the  type  that  you  could  more  identify 
yourself,  consistent  with  what  you  just  said  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  it  is  totally  within  American  interests  to  work  in 
the  way  I  am  working  for  a  withdrawal  of  troops  from  Vietnam.  And, 
secondly,  the  forces  for  independence  in  that  country  are  clearly  lined 
up  against  American  penetration  of  that  country.  I  don't  consider  the 
Vietnamese  struggle  to  be  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  American  inter- 
ests in  getting  our  troops  home  safe  to  their  families. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  6."  The  complete  text  of 
the  broadcast  follows :) 

Davis  Exhibit  No.  6 

Participants  in  Chicago  Struggle  Thanked 

Hanoi  VNA  International  Service  in  English  0221  GMT  14  Sep  68  B 

[Text]  Hanoi — The  South  Vietnamese  people's  committee  for  solidarity  with 
the  American  people  has  sent  a  letter  to  the  national  mobilization  committee 
to  end  the  war  in  Vietnam  thanking  the  progressive  American  people  of  all 
strata  for  their  seething,  resolute,  and  courageous  struggle  conducted  last  month 
when  the  convention  of  the  Democratic  Party  was  meeting  to  select  a  candidate 
to  the  presidency,  according  to  liberation  press  agency. 

Despite  the  huge,  barbarous  repression  machinery  unleashed  by  Johnson,  Hum- 
phrey, and  their  ilk,  you  have  come  down  into  the  streets  for  demonstrations  and 
shouted  slogans  demanding  an  end  to  the  U.S.  war  of  aggression  in  Vietnam, 
cessation  of  the  bombing  on  the  whole  territory  of  the  DRV,  and  withdrawal  of 
troops  of  the  United  States  and  of  its  allied  countries  in  the  Vietnam  war.  By 
your  activities  you  have  raised  the  just  voice  of  the  United  States,  a  country 
with  a  traditional  love  for  freedom  and  justice. 

We  express  to  you  our  deep  sympathy  and  ask  you  to  convey  to  the  American 
people  our  heartfelt  thanks  for  their  participation  in  or  support  of  the  recent 
action  in  Chicago.  We  also  voice  the  high  indignation  of  our  people  at  the  news 
that,  on  orders  from  Johnson  and  Humphrey,  policemen  repelled  the  demonstra- 
tion by  using  tear  gas  and  truncheons  and  firing  at  them,  as  a  result  of  which 
hundreds  of  people  were  wounded  and  hundreds  of  others  were  arrested  or  jailed. 

You  have  shed  your  blood  for  the  honor  of  the  United  States  and  for  the  sake 
of  your  loved  ones,  whom  you  do  not  want  to  die  a  useless  death  for  the  ravenous 
ambitions  of  the  capitalists  and  gun  dealers.  You  have  shed  your  blood  in  defense 
of  the  Vietnamese  people's  right  to  self-determination,  which  is  being  flouted  by 
the  American  aggressors,  and  of  the  peace  in  Southeast  Asia  and  in  the  world 
now  being  trampled  underfoot  by  the  U.S.  warmongers. 

Terror  and  repression  by  the  U.S.  Government,  however,  cannot  hamper  youir 
activities.  On  the  contrary,  they  will  cause  the  antiwar  movement  to  spread  to 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  United  States. 

In  this  South  Vietnam  under  fire  and  sword,  though  having  to  overcome  great 
difliculties  and  hardships,  we  are  daily  and  hourly  following  with  great  en- 
thusiasm your  persistent  and  valiant  struggle. 

Your  recent  actions  in  Chicago,  as  well  as  throughout  the  United  States,  against 
the  U.S.  policy  of  aggression  in  Vietnam  have  strongly  stimulated  our  people  in 
South  Vietnam  who  are  conducting  the  powerful  general  offensive  and  widespread 
uprisings  throughout  South  Vietnam  with  the  resolve  to  wrest  back  at  all  costs 
our  sacred  right  to  national  independence. 

We  wish  you  to  convey  our  best  vrishes  to  our  American  friends  who  were 
wounded  or  arrested  during  the  recent  demonstrations. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Talking  about  the  North  Vietnamese  interests,  I 
gather  from  this — and  you  can  answer  yes  or  no  or  not —  I  gather 
from  this  the  North  Vietnamese  feel  they  gained  great  benefit 
from  what  transpired  in  Chicago,  the  efforts  of  the  National  Mobiliza- 


2684  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

tion  Committee,  the  response  to  the  police,  the  general  Chicago  situa- 
tion. Would  it  be  your  impression  that  this  Chicago  fiasco,  whoever  is 
at  fault,  did  help  the  Vietnamese? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  Chicago  as  well  as  other  peace  demonstrations 
help  to  convey  to  Vietnam,  but  to  the  people  around  the  world,  that 
there  is  a  significant  section  of  the  American  people  who  would  like  to 
see  us  return  to  some  of  the  democratic  ideals  for  which  our  Revolu- 
tion stood.  To  the  extent  that  we  project  to  the  people  of  Vietnam  or  to 
the  people  of  Asia  or  Latin  America  that  there  is  in  fact  a  movement 
of  hope  in  this  country  and  the  country  is  not  run  as  they  see  it  as 
those  who  would  impose;  to  give  hope  to  other  nations,  I  think,  is 
beautiful. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Getting  back  to  the  GIs  with  whom  you  supposedly 
identify,  the  GI  about  whom  you  express  great  concern.  Isn't  it  diffi- 
cult to  get  across  to  the  GI  that  he  is  your  friend,  when  the  enemy  he 
is  fighting  in  Vietnam  is  gaining  great  heart  and  encouragement  from 
your  work  in  Chicago  ?  How  can  you  identify  with  a  GI  or  how  are 
you  going  to  get  through  the  communication  barrier  when  he  hears 
broadcasts  from  Hanoi  as  to  what  great  work,  in  effect,  you  are  doing 
in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  I  think  the  way  that  w^e  get  through  to  the  GI  is,  our 
essential  work  is  to  rebuild  this  country,  to  make  this  country  some- 
thing other  than  the  people's  policeman  of  the  world. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Do  we  do  it  through  a  peaceful  process  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  It  depends  on  you.  This  committee,  this  Congress,  and 
this  Government  generally  is  so  unresponsive  to  what  people  are  saying 
in  this  country,  particularly  the  young,  that  it  becomes  more  and  more 
difficult  for  us  to  find  any  channel  through  which  we  can  operate. 

As  I  said,  that  demonstration  in  August  of  1963  was  ignored.  We 
petitioned  the  Government,  We  met  with  President  Kennedy,  and  5 
years  later  the  two  Kennedys  were  assassinated.  The  spiritual  leader 
of  the  civil  rights  movement.  Dr.  King,  was  assassinated,  and  the 
horrors  at  both  abroad  and  home  had  been  reaped  on  people  by  the 
Johnson  administration. 

I  think  in  some  ways  the  best  thing  would  be  for  you  to  get  off  of 
the  committee  and  join  us  in  the  streets  of  this  country  trying  to  figure 
out  the  answer  to  this  problem. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Thank  you  for  your  advice. 

Mr.  Watson.  One  final  question.  You  state  the  Government  and  the 
American  people — the  old  fuddy-duddys  as  I  and  others — are  unre- 
sponsive to  the  young.  You  made  that  statement. 

Mr.  Davis.  There  are  some  young  people  that  are  growing  up  like 
you. 

Mr.  Watson.  Do  you  speak  for  all  young  Americans  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  No  ;  I  speak  for  myself. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  speak  for  a  small  fraction  of  them.  Most  young 
Americans  are  responsible  citizens.  They  want  to  help  bring  a  better 
America  and  not  help  bring  about  an  anarchy,  as  you  and  your  asso- 
ciates wish.  And  the  record  should  show  you  represent  only  a  small 
fraction  of  America. 

Mr.  Davis.  Mr.  Watson,  you  had  better  watch  out. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  What  are  you  going  to  do  ? 

Mr.  Davis.  If  you  have  children 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2685 

Mr.  Watson.  I  have  three  children.  I  assure  you  I  will  teach  them 
responsibility  and  not  irresponsibility. 

Mr.  Davis.  And  you  keep  that  up,  Mr.  Watson,  and  right  in  your 
own  house  there  will  be  trouble.  Young  people  are  not  going  to  be  whip- 
lashed  into  an  unjust  society.  The  hope  that  we  have  is  that  the  young 
people  at  least  have  the  advantage  of  opening  their  eyes  and  seeing 
what  this  country  is  doing.  We  do  not  claim  to  speak  for  or  represent 
all  young  people  in  the  United  States,  but  we  do  say  that  there  are 
many  people  who  more  and  more  understand  that  it  is  people  like  you 
that  are  destroying  America  and  that  the  hope  of  America  is  in  the 
people  who  will  stand  up  to  people  like  you  and  make  it  right. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  is  the  understanding  of  the  Chair  that  counsel  has 
one  document  which  he  wishes  to  introduce. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  would  request  permission  to  introduce  Davis  Exhibit 
No.  5,  which  is  a  letter  dated  March  7.  I  would  call  the  committee 
chairman's  attention  specifically  to  the  fact  that  this  is  the  letter 
repudiated  by  Dr.  Quentin  Young  as  to  its  authenticity  at  an  earlier 
hearing.  Mr.  Davis  said  he  prepared  this. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Without  objection  from  the  committee  members,  the 
document  will  be  incorporated  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Davis.  Beautiful. 

(Document  marked  "Davis  Exhibit  No.  5."  See  pages  2686  and 
2687.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness  will  be  excused  and  the  committee  will  be 
adjourned  until  1 :30  tomorrow  afternoon. 

(Whereupon,  at  4 :55  p.m.,  Tuesday,  December  3,  1968,  the  subcom- 
mittee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  1 :30  p.m.,  Wednesday,  December  4, 
1968.) 

( Subcommittee  members  present  at  time  of  recess :  Representatives 
Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 


2686  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Davis  Exhibit  No.  5 


Room  315  "ovodw- 

U07  Sov-th  Dearborn  Avenue  /  *^»  ,>. 

Chicago,  Illinois  6o6o5  ix 

Phcne:  312  939-2666 
March  7^1968 


Dear  Friend: 

Election  year  1968  holds  fateful  signs:  widening  var  and  g^^^^^^^^^f^Shter  for 
Vietnam:  "improved"  police  techniques  for  the  ghettoesj  mure  cu.bc.c^:,  xn  welfare 
and  anti-povSrty  measures;  repression  on  a  wider  ==^?-«5^f'i^%>?°^^^""Nixcn 
Presidentiar-choice."  Across  the  country,  anti-war  and  bla-^k  lj.borat..on  organ- 
izations are  soberly  assessing  the  drift  of  the  country  rnd  making  plans  for  the 
next  period. 

We  beUeve  a  national  gathering  of  movement  activists  is  needed  to  ase-ss  this 
period  and  consider  strategies  for  the  election  year.  V>-  envision  a  working 
nieetlng  of  representatives  from  anti-war,  studo-t,  won-n,  con.mnity,  and  in- 
dependent electoral  organizations.  Our  purpose  Is  to  \i^.ox   end  c.«v.-:..op  plans  ^ 
for  an  election  year  program,  giving  special  attsnti^on  to  tl'.s  Ecinocrat^c  Mat-  ^ 
ional  Convention.  .        " 


Ifehave  made  arrangements  for  a  meeting  on  March  22-214  in  Chicago^_ 


This  conference  will  climax  several  weeks  of  diPcu-Ti-n  initiated  by  tbe  Nat- 
ional Mobilization  Committee  to  End  the  War  Ln  Vietna,:.  After  two  meetings  ...   , 
among  various  anti-war,  student  and  black  power  leaders,  ^id  after  consultation  -   , 
«lth  many  other  individuals,  plans  to  call  a  March  22-2a  couTn-cnca  were  mads.  ..   , 
A  teii?)orary  administrative  committee,  v*ose  members  :^'e  listed  balow,  was 
established  to  organize  the  gathering.  .     \ 

loe  two  majorwirposss  ^"^  *^s  "^^*»  conference  are,  firsi,  to  consider  and 

adopt~gs^Erarp?oposils  for  an  election  year  strat-gy,  incD.oding  possible  ._ 

actions  in  Chicago  at  the  time  of  the  Democratic  National  Ccmen-icn^nd,  f^ 

secOTd,  to  set  up  the  administrative  machinery  which  caxi  cooperate  vrj-th  Ovher  ^. 

organizations  in  carrying  out  the  program,  ^ 

The  meeting  will  encourage  an  open  discussion  of  a  wide  v-jriety  of  proposals. 
The  goal  will  be  to  look  for  a  common  ground  of  n-tion  whUe  recognizing  ^.liei-e  ^  _  ^  ^ 
will  be  different  levels  of  interest  and  approach.  A^ccnr-'^^^gf  ^^  ^:^"^  \vyyi:&-    ■   <.  -.,  q 
tion  >^v.c^>^^J>^r^^^  -"^n?"??  ^  paraUel  conference  on  Ila^-ch  22^,'-i^iLCnic|so  ^rtt 
^r-^;n^^^;^r?rr^)  with  the  goa3^of^reati^i^^I^-?ll3l_^rg3^^i^gn^_str^^^     •  .;  ,. 
j^n^^^j^^^^^^^j^Q^ggd^icg^llogle;^^  of  sf-vvvata  and  egv.al  .       ^  ..  ^. 

strength.  .  ?  .: 

r*We  encouraso  local  and  regional  maetinns  to  dis.^uss  the  different  ideas  about 
/     the  August  Democratic  Convention,   and  we  pnoou-ace  worlcing  papars  detailing  OiX- 
/     ferent  concerns.     Wa  have  opened  an  office  at  Foijn  ZlS,  ■■^7  So'itli  Doarl^oiTl, 
^^ Chicago,  telephone  939-2666.  , 

The  conference  will  be  held  in  a  quiet  winter  cf^rp  ovc-looLing  a  large  lake 
near  Chicago.     On  Friday  evening,  March  22,   shuttle  3ci-vicr  froii.  O^.Iarc?' Airport 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2687 


Davis  Exhibit  No.  5— Continued 


.02   it   coatalno. intransigent  •!       oto   coanlttt^ !  to  r.  -'...i 
J.     .'•  vote   is  at  best  an  organizing  tool;    it   eecres  pii'iu 
■  ;-   c  ■^'■cioi'''n9  88  t^^.t  pr^^ni".* "  ■    " 
will  be  provided  hourly  from  the  United  Airlines  dnJ^)ma.ti^D.coimt^>'    Fbr 
those  arriving  by  bus,  train  or  car  and  those  rivingiJiChickgot&Vportation 

you,^ planjtq _attgnd_and_tfte^pproxijnatrVune  you%mr^^t^ChitaS6r   The"'^ 
•aiclosed  card  should  be  r^tOfned  immecTiately.     ""      ~         ' 

We  are  convinced  that  a  national  election  year  program,   though  still  undefined 
and  problematic,   could  be  of  tremen^Jov.s -importance  in  deepening  the  challenge 
to  the  corrupt,  racist  and  ijnperialif^c'  politics  of +tha„eEtaiilished^ order 
We  hope  you  agree  and  that  you^lljo-f,?  h  in'^iiago."  ^"^  '    '^^  °''''^''' 

-      .ii  ,iug  ii'"ssivo   ^TDul'U"  dierant  ejainst  GO'S  .  •'- 
-1j   :*  7  of  prctoct  and  demoastration.     T-a   i':'..^- 

'.tnt  p-v/er  1 7  organizing  Iccally  are".~d  r-   -"-' 
--»•     -VI  is  ".--..-ect"  has  boon  an  isc-i   of    •,_oir'i". 


Conference  Sponsors: 

Father  Daniel  Berrigan 

Carl  Davidson 

Don  Duncan 

Al  Evanoff 

Richard  Flacks 

Vernon  Grizzard 

Steve  Ho  Howe  11 

Clark  Kissinger 

Sidney  Lens  .      '. 

iiarya  Levenson 

Linda  Uorse 

Sidney  Peck 

William  Pepper 

Monseignor   Charles  Rice 

Franz  Sburmann 

Cora  Weiss 

Dagmar  Wilson 

Dr.  Quentin  Young 

Leni  Zeiger 

Howard  Zinn 


^..~;   z  rolution  t>..?t  v.ill  diffor   from  previo-is  c"ti': 
■'.z   --'■■:.:. -n  is  aiciod  at  deepening  t!e  rc-Sa  c    . 
•  -  >-i_  :    t,   t-.;3-d-.y  affair   in  v;bich  t'-:o-.'c-.a;!3  t/  .1 
r.iV--  little  effect  on  the   local   level.      For  previe-'.s  ; 
"^  -.— 'i.  cf  thoir  en-jrey  in  advertising  the   -^vent  r  d  '. 
■5    :ft>a  viV  -at  euy  relation  to  local  activities,   fas  c    '. 


Temporary  Administrat 

Rennie  Davis 

Dav3  Del linger 

Tom  Eayden 

Bob  Greenblatt 

Sue  Ibinacker 


-1  vr..  .rir^snt  t:.-y  may  fail,  but  c'O  tb"t  - 
ive   CJiiit?e|-^'^"  "^  or£3nlr.ed  Vaich  is  dcmin-od  -y  F  .  - 
,   i-.:?le  rcri.ar.gible  to   loc.-l   coastit-.-rjsf.'s.     /-.y  n  . 

■    r*  B  pi  c^-3-n  that  has  stre    sed  !":cf«l   crgpaic'-j 
:   c:..        ...--*•   coi. -'prty  basa-biildirs  in  tlia   fell. 


•-.  4 


V  there  will  bo  teaslm  \    Vien  l—'il  c. 


2   r  rto   -I  to 

Iitj'a  ^-.z-.Tal,   this  prograa  could  Is  of  i.'reel 


INDEX 

INDIVIDUALS 

A 

Page 

Addonizio  (Hugh  J.) 2594 

Alexander,  Kendra   (Claire)    (nee  Kendra  Claire  Harris;  Mrs.  Franklin 

Delano  Alexander) 2517 

Aptheker,  Bettina 2540 

Aptheker,    Herbert 2498,  2499,  2540-2543,  2617 

Ayers,  Bill 2614 

B 

Bailey,  John 2662 

Baker,  Karl 2614 

Bass,  Stanley 2662 

Bedner,  Marc 2614 

Beinin,  Irving  (Irv) 2614,2662 

Benson,  John 2614 

Berringan,  Daniel 2676,  2687 

Bick,  Barbara 2614 

Bierce,  Ambrose 2618 

Black,  Carolyn 2507 

Bleich,  Herbert 2539 

Bloom,  Abe 2614 

Bras,  Juan  Mari 2617 

Brick,  Allan 2614 

Brody,  Lenny 2614 

Brophy,  John 2628 

Brown,  Constance  (Connie) 2605,  2606,  2618 

Brown,  Josh 2614 

Byrd,  Harry  (F.,  Jr.) 2628 

O 

Campbell,  J 2496 

Campbell,  Joan 2614 

Carmichael,  Stokely 2539,2558,2664 

Castro,  Fidel 2623 

Cloke,  Kenneth  (Ken) 2678 

Collins,  Judy 2667,  2671 

D 

Daley,  Richard  J 2501, 

25U,  2514,  2515,  2529,  2537,  2538,  2558,  2574,  2606,  2630,  2636,  2638, 
2&41,  2&46,  2656,  2661,  2662,  2681. 

Davidson,  Carl 2676,  2687 

Davis,  Rennard  Cordon   (Rennie) 2499- 

2503,  2507-2500,  2519,  2520,  2524,  2528,  2535-2539,  2556,  2562,  2584, 
2610,  2612^2614,  2617,  2627-2687  (testimony). 

Dawson,  Kipp 2539 

Dellinger,  David  (Dave) —    2499, 

2502,  2504,  2507,  2533,  2535,  2537,  2551,  2552,  2555.  2584,  2587,  2610, 
2613,  2614,  2617,  2656,  2657,  2659,  2661,  2662,  2676,  2687. 

Deming,  Barbara 2614 

di  Suvero,  Henry  M 2495-2497, 

2528,  2550,  2561,  2586,  2589,  2608,  2610,  2615,  2616,  2619,  2626 

i 


ii  INDEX 

Page 

Dodd  (Thomas  J.) 2558 

Dryden,  Sybil 2537 

Duncan,  Don 2676,2687 

Durham,  Earl 2507,2518 

B 

Edgcombe,  Gabrielle 2614 

Eisenhower,  David 2620 

Eisenhower,  Milton 2550 

Englehard 2558 

Estes,  Jim 2614 

Evanoff,  Al 2676,  2687 

F 

Tales,   Corinna 2605 

Feiffer,  Jules 2587 

Feinglass,    Abe 2539 

Flacks,    Richard 2676,  2687 

Friedman,    Paul 2539 

G 

GaUup   (George  H.) 2620 

Garrison    (Jim) 2558 

Gerth,  Jeff 2537 

Gladstone,   Irwin 2614 

Glassman,    Carol 2605 

Gold,  Richard  M 2614 

Gonzalez,   Corky 2507 

Grafton,    Marvin 2537 

Gray,  Jesse  (Willard) 2530 

Greenblatt,  Robert    (Bob) 2503,2504,2507,2537,2544, 

2545,  2551,  2586,  2656,  2665,  2676,  2678,  2687 

Gregory,  Dick 2677 

Gripe,  Donna 2614,  2674 

Grizzard,  Vernon 2503, 2505,  2537, 2657,  2659,  2676,  2687 

Grogan,    Pat 2614 

Gross,  Alan 2614 

Gross,  Terry 2614 

Gurewlta,    Helen    2614 

H 

Ha  Van  Lau 2505,  2541,  2544-2548,  2551,  25M,  2586 

Halstead,  Fred 2539 

Hamerquist,  Donald  (Don) 2509,  2510,  2518 

Harriman  Averell 2503,  2506 

Eferris    (Louis)    2620 

Hayden,    Casey   2609 

Hayden,  Thomas  Enunett 2495,  2497-2626  (testimony),  2632-2638,  2654, 

2656,  2662,  2663,  2676,  2678,  2682,  2687 

Hayes,  Thomas  L 2614 

Hellmian,  Betty 2614 

Henderson,  Edward  2614 

Ho  Chi  Minh 2547 

HoflEmaJi,  Abbie 2495,  2659,  2660 

Hollowell,  Steve 2676  2687 

Humphrey,  Hubert  (H. )  __  2585,  2611,  2613,  2620,  2622,  2625,  2639,  2650,  2677,  2683 

I 
Iglesias,  Jose  — , 2587 


INDEX  iii 

J 

Page 

Jaxjkson   (Henry  M.) 2558 

Jaworski,   Leon   2604,   2605 

Johnson,  Arnold 2540,  2614 

Johnson,  Jerome 2534 

Johnson,  Lyndon  (B.) 2511, 

2523,  2526,  2538,  2547-49,  2557-50,  2564-67,  2560,  2571-74,  2578, 
2580,  2502.  2593,  2612,  2613,  2620,  2623,  2625,  2633,  2630,,  2642-45, 
2648,  2650,  2652,  2681,  2683,  2684. 
Jones,  Lew 2540,  2614 

K 

Kallen,  Marcia 2614 

Kampf,  Louis 2614 

Katz,   Ken 2614 

Kennedy,  John  (F.) 2558,  2623,  2644,  2684 

Kennedy,  Michael  (J.) 2627,  2652,  2660,  2677 

Kennedy,  Robert  (F.) 2557,  2569,  2570,  2684 

Kifner,  John 2621 

KiUan,  Michael 2607-2600 

King,  Martin  Luther 2523,  2601,  2637,  2684 

Kinney,  Charles 2588,  2605,  2609 

Kinoy  (Arthur) 2678 

Kissinger,  Clark 2676,  2687 

Klare,  Michael 2537 

Klonsky,  Michael 2532,  2533,  2535,  2584,  2585 

Kowollik,  Bob 2614 

Kunstler  (William  M.) 2678 

Kushner,  Sam 2657 

Kushner,  Sylvia 2657 

Kusic,   Marta 2537 

L 

La  Mont,  Susan 2614 

Landau,    Saul 2587 

Lefcourt,  Gerald 2495 

Lens,  Sidney 2614,  2676,  2687 

Lerch,  Marilyn 2614 

Lerner,  Max 2566 

Lesnik,   Richie 2614 

Levenson,  Marya 2676,  2687 

Lombardo,   Guy 2671 

Louvallen,  WiUy 2614 

Lutz,   Sandy 2614 

Lynch,  Lincoln 2507,  2656 

Lynch  (William  J.) 2537,2661 

Lynd,  Staughton 2499,  2541-2543,  2609,  2623 

Lyttle,  Bradford 2614 

M 

Mabley,  Jack 2530 

Maggi,  Mike 2614 

Marey,  Sam  (also  known  as  Sam  Ballan) 2540 

Martin,   Lionel 2584,  2586,  2587 

McCarthy  (Eugene  J.) 2512,  2531,  2534,  2557,  2569,  2570,  2574,  2585,  2644, 2650 

McCarthy,  Tim 2614 

McGovem   (George) 2512 

Meyerwitz,  Rick 2537 

MitcheU,  Charlene 2518,  2519 

Montgomery,   Lucy 2675 

Moore,  Dick 2587 

Morse,  Linda 2662,  2676,  2687 

Munaker,    Sue 2507,  2676,  2687 ' 

'  Incorrectly  appears  as  "Sue  Munacker"  in  this  referepce. 


iv  INDEX 

N 

Page 

Newfield,  Jack 2542 

Nixon    (Julie) 2620 

Nixon  (Patricia) 2620 

Nixon,    Richard    (M.) 2557,2559  2564,2566, 

2613,  2620,  2625,  2638,  2643,  2644,  2677 
Nguyen  Minh  Vy •   2505 

O 

O'Brien,  Conor  Cruise 2584 

O'Brien,    James 2662 

Ochs,    Richard 2614 

O'Dell,  Jack  (also  known  as  Hunter  Pitts  O'Dell) '  2540 

Oglesby,    Carl 2542 

P 

Peck,   Sidney    (M.) 2661,2662,2676,2687 

Pepper,  William 2676,  2687 

Pham  Van  Dong 2541 

Potter,    Paul 2503 

R 

Rees,  J.  Herbert 2608 

Reeves,  Walter 2614 

Ribicoff,  Abraham 2514 

Rice,  Charles 2676,  2687 

Ring,   Harry 2540.  2613,2614 

Ristorucci,  Jose 2540 

Robbins,  Terry 2614 

Roberts,  Steven  V 2530 

Robinson,  Rod 2614 

Rockefeller   (Nelson  A.) 2557 

Romney  (George) 2549 

Rusk,  Dean 2547, 2548,  2620, 2625,  2681 

Russel,  Bertrand 2505 

RusseU,  Carlos 2507,  2655 

S 

Sack,  Emily 2614 

Sandow,  Greg 2614 

Sartre  (Jean  Paul) 2558* 

Scheer,  Robert 2502 

Schneir,  Walter 2614 

Schultz,  Trudi 2614 

Sehwinn,   Gerald 2614 

Seigle,   Larry 2614 

Shero,  Jeffrey 2537,  2551 

Shurmann,   Franz 2676,  2687 

Simmons,  Judith 2614 

Smith,  Bernice 2614 

Sommers,  Leland 2614 

Spiegel,  Jack 2509,2510,2518,2540,2656 

Stahl,  David 2661,2662 

Stanton,  Nona 2614 

Symington  (Stuart) 2558 

1  Incornectlyi  spelled  "Satre"  in  this  reference. 


INDEX  V 

T 

Page 

Teitel,  Josie 2614 

Teitel,   Marty 2614 

Texler,  Tibi 2614 

Tillman,  John 2614 

W 

Wallace,  George  (O.) 2566,2613,2629 

Waskow,   Arthur 2614 

Webb,  Lee 2573,  2614 

Weinberger,  Eric 2614,  2633,  2673 

Weinglass,    Leonard 2496,  2497,  2506,  2561 

Weiss,  Cora 2676, 2687 

Wheeler,  William 2497 

Wilkins,    Roy 2595,  2596 

Wilson,    Dagmar 2676,  2687 

Wilson,  John 2614 

Woods 26il 

X 
Xuan  Oanh 2505 

Y 

Yarow,  Ted 2614 

Young,  Quentin  David 2672-2674,  2676,  2685,  2687 

Young,  Ron 2614 

Z 

Zinn,  Howard 2676,  2687 

Zeigler,  Leni 2676,  2687 

ORGANIZATIONS 

B 

Black  Panther  Party  (known  variously  as  Black  Panthers,  Black  Panther 
Political  Party,  Black  Panther  Political  Party  for  Self  Defense,  and 
Black  Panther  Party  for  Self-Defense  (BPSD) ) 2539 

C 

Center  for  Radical  Research 2630,  2631,  2642 

Chicago  Peace  Council 2510,2656,2657 

Communist  Party  of  Cuba 2532 

Central  Committee 2532 

Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  of  America  (CPUSA) 2498, 

2509,  2510,  2517-2519,  2539,  2541,  2542,  2614,  2617,  2657 
National  Structure : 

Youth  Section 2217 

Country  Joe  and  the  Fish 2671 

D 

DRV.  (See  North  Vietnam,  Government  of  (Democratic  Republic  of 
Vietnam).) 

Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam  (DRV).  {See  North  Vietnam,  Govern- 
ment of. ) 

E 

ERAP.  {See  Students  for  a  Democratic  Society,  Economic  Research  and 

Action  Project.) 
Economic  Research  and  Action  Project.  {See  entry  under  Students  for  a 

Democratic  Society.) 
Englewood  Action  Committee 2652 


vi  INDEX 

F 

Page 

FOR.  (See  Fellowship  of  Reconciliation.) 

Fellowship  of  Reconciliation   (FOR) 2614 

Free  Speech  Movement 2623 

Fugs   2671 

I 

International  Control  Commission 2.541 

International  Cultural  Congress,  January  1968,  Havana,  Cuba 2554 

International  War  Crimes  Tribunal 2505 

J 

JOIN  Community  Union 2629 

2631,  2&42,  2647 
L 

Liberation  News   Service 2537 

Liberation  Press  Agency 2683 

M 

Mississippi  Freedom  Democratic  Party  (MFDP) 2522 

Mississippi   Summer 2623 

Mothers   (of  Invention),  The 2667 

Movement  for  the  Independence  of  Puerto  Rico 2617,  2618 

N 

NLF.    i{8ee  National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  South  Vietnam. ) 

National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored  People  (NAACP) 2651 

National  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence 2516,  2603 

National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  South  Vietnam  (NLF)   (also  known 

as  National  Liberation  Front) 2546,  2547,  2551,  2554,  2663.  2677 

National  Lawyers  Guild   (NLG) 2614 

National  Liberation  Front.  (See  National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  South 

Vietuam. ) 
National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam    (NMC) 
(formerly  known  as  Spring  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War 

in  Vietnam)  (also  referred  to  as  the  Mobilization  and  Mob) 2499- 

2502,  2504,  2506-2508.  2517.  2518,  2531,  2533,  2535,  2536,  2538-2540, 
2556,  2559,  2586,  2605-2607,  2612,  2616,  2617,  2631.  2633,  2634,  2640, 
2041,  2648,  2656,  2661,  2672,  2673,  2675,  2676,  2679,  2683,  2686 

Steering   Committee 2606 

National  Student  Association  (NSA) 2541 

New  American  Library-Signet 2498 

North  Vietnam,  Government  of  (Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam — DRV)  _    2546, 

2663 
P 
Peace  and  Freedom  Party : 

California 2571,  2514,  2577 

People  Against  Racism '. 2601 

Progressive  Labor  Movement  (PLM)   (or  Party  (PLP) ) 2539,  2617 

R 

RAM.    (See  Revolutionary  Action  Movement.) 

Random  House 2498,  2500 

R.  A.  T.  Publication,  Inc 2537 

Resistance,   Tlie 2&i7 

Revolutionary  Action  Movement  (RAM) 2512 


INDEX  vii 

S 

SDS.  {See  Students'  for  a  Democratic  Society) 

SNCC.   {See  Student  Nonviolent  Coordinating  Committee.)  Pago 

Socialist  Workers  Party   (SWP) 2539,2540,2613 

Young  Socialist  Alliance  (YSA) 2540,  2614 

South  Vietnamese  People's  Committee  for  Solidarity 2682 

Student  Mobilization  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam 2647 

Student  Nonviolent  Coordinating  Committee  (SNCC) 2542,  2609,  2647 

Students  for  a  Democratic  Society  (SDS) 2498,  2532,  2535,  2537,  2538,  2551, 

2585,  2609,  2617,  2629,  2642,  2647 

Economic  Research  and  Action  Project  (ERAP) 2629,  2631,  2642 

National  Council 2616 

Summer  of  Support 2664,  2666 

U 

USO.  {See  United  Service  Organization.) 

Underground  Press  Syndicate 2537 

United  Service  Organization  (USO) 2671,2679 

United  States  Government 2511,  2670 

Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA) 2541 

Justice   Department 2531 

State  Department 2541,  2555 

V 

Vietnam  Peace  Committee 2544 

Voice  of  Vietnam 2670 

W 

Workers  World  Party   (WWP) 2540 

World  Youth  Festivals: 

Eighth  Youth  Festival,  1962,  Helsinki,  Finland 2540 

Y 

Young  Christian  Movement 2647 

Young   Socialist  Alliance    (YSA).    {See  entry   under  Socialist  Workers 
Party. ) 

PUBLICATIONS 

D 
Discussion  on  the  Democratic  Convention  Challenge.  _  2508,  2l527,  2584,  2585,  2635 

E 
Esquire  (magazine) 3531,  2616 

G 
Gnanma   (oflBcial  organ  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Cuba) 2532,  2584 

!L 

Liberation  (magazine)   2555,  2584,  2587 

M 

Mission  to  Hanoi  (book)  (Herbert  Aptheker) 2498,2617 

Movement  Campaign  1968 :  An  Election  Year  Offensive 2508,  2561-2583, 

2601,  2635 
Movement,  The   2640,  2642,   2653 

N 

National  Guardian 2512,  2^7 

New  Left  Notes 2537,  2551,  2616 

New  York  Times 2543 


viii  INDEX 

O 

Page 

Other  Side,  The  (book)  (Staughton  Lynd  and  Thomas  Hayden) 2499, 

2541,2609,  2623 
B 

RAT    (newspaper) 2531,  2537,  2551 

Rebellion  in  Newark  (book)   (Thomas  Hayden) 2498,  2589,  2592,  2623 

V 

vocations  for  social  change 2551 

W 

Walker  Report  (Report  to  the  National  Commission  on  the  Causes  and 
Prevention  of  Violence.) 2625 

o 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 


3  9999  05706  3032