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Full text of "Subversive involvement in disruption of 1968 Democratic Party National Convention. Hearings, Ninetieth Congress, second session"

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03 Uoc^-/ 



JUL 30 la69 






DECEMBER 2 AND 3, 1968 

Printed for the use of the 
Committee on Internal Security 

21-706 WASHINGTON : 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfiSce 
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United States House of Representatives 

(90th Congress, 2d Session) 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman 

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri DEL CLAWSON, California 
ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina 

Francis J. McNamara, Director 

Chester D. Smith, General Counsel 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 


United States House of Repeesentatives 

(91st Congress, 1st Session) 

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri, Chairman 



RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina 


Donald G. Sanders, Chief Counsel 

Glenn Davis, Editorial Director 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 



December 2, 1968: Testimony of — Page 

Thomas Emmett Hay den 2497 

Afternoon session: 

Thomas Emmett Hayden (resumed) 2527 

December 3, 1968: Testimony of — 

Thomas Emmett Hayden (resumed) 2561 

Afternoon session: 

Rennard Cordon Davis 2627 



The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing 
committee of the House of Eepresentatives, constituted as such by the 
rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the 
Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to deter- 
mines the rules of its proceedings. 


House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967, as amended April 3, 1968, by House 

Resolution 1099 


Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth 
Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganiza- 
tion Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of 
the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * * 


Rule X 


1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 

(s) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

***** * * 

Rule XI 



19. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, charac- 
ter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 

(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 

(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any 
necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of 
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to 
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the 
signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any mem- 
ber resignated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person desig- 
nated by any such chairman or member. 


28. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of 
the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that pur- 
pose, shall study aU pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the 
agencies in the execeutive branch of the Government. 




Part 2 


United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D.G. 
public hearings 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Kichard H. Ichord (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of 
Missouri, chairman ; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio ; and Albert W. Wat- 
son, of South Carolina.) 

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Ash- 

Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director ; Frank Con- 
ley, special comisel; Chester D. Smith, general comisel; Alfred M. 
Nittle, counsel ; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator. 

Mr. Ichord. There will be order in the hearing room. 

The committee will come to order. 

These hearings are a continuation of the hearings which began on 
October 1 and adjourned on October 4, until today, December 2. 

At the outset of the hearings, the Chair read into the record the reso- 
lution authorizing this investigation. There will be no need to repeat 
the same at this time. 

It is my understanding that there are several reporters covering 
this hearing who did not cover the first 3 days of the hearing. There- 
fore, for their benefit, we will aid them in reporting the hearings. 

I think I should briefly explain the purpose of the hearing and, 
also, the rules under which the hearings are conducted. 

The purpose of the hearing is to investigate and determine the 
nature and extent of Communist and subversive participation in the 
organization and the instigation of the disturbances that occurred 
during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the con- 
nections, if any, of certain leaders of the demonstration with foreign 

And, as I stated in the hearings, there are several collateral issues 
which might arise that are not the subject of the hearings. There have 
been charges that the police overreacted ; there have been charges that 



the police underreacted. Those charges are collateral to these hearings. 
There have also been charges that national TV did not accurately 
report what happened in Chicago, That is not the purpose of these 
hearings. The purposes are as stated. 

Now these are legislative hearings, a legislative investigation con- 
ducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which is 
one of the standing committees of Congress. These are not 'trial pro- 
ceedings. No one is on trial here. The committee seeks to punish no 
witness for conduct outside this hearing room. 

The rules governing these proceedings are obviously different than 
the procedures used in a court of law, because the purposes are dif- 
ferent, as I have stated. 

The rules governing the proceedings — the primary rule is Rule XI, 
section 26, subsection (k) , which reads as follows : 

Witnesses at investigative hearings may be accompanied by their own coun- 
sel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights. 

On October 18, 1966, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
the Honorable John McConnack, ruled that this privilege of be- 
ing represented by counsel, unlike advocacy in a court, does not as a 
matter of right entitle the attorney to present argument, make mo- 
tions, or make demands on the committee. 

Further rules governing the conduct of counsel and the witnesses 
are in the rules of the committee. Rule No. VII, ADVICE OF 

A — At every hearing, public or executive, every witness shall be accorded the 
privilege of having counsel of his own choosing. 

B — The participation of counsel during the course of any hearing and while 
the witness is testifying shall be limited to advising said witness as to his legal 
rights. Counsel shall not be permitted to engage in oral argument with the Com- 
mittee, but shall confine his activity to the area of legal advice to his client. 


Counsel for a witness shall conduct himself in a professional, ethical, and 
proper manner. His failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a 
majority of the Committee or Subcommittee before which the witness is appearing, 
subject such counsel to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, 
removal of counsel from the hearing room, or a recommendation of contempt 

Now, due to experiences in the past, it has been necessaiy to take 
certain security precautions. The experience of the past shows to us 
that there are certain persons who would seek admission to this room 
for the purpose of disturbing and disrupting the committee hearings. 
Therefore, the Chair has taken the responsibility of having the se- 
curity precautions being placed in effect. 

For those who are guests of the committee — and you are welcome — 
I feel that I must read section 6, if there are any who would seek to 
disrupt the committee hearings — section 6 of Public Law 90-108, 
which reads as follows : "It shall be unlawful for any person or group 
of persons — " 

[Subsection] (4) to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language, or to engage 
in any disorderly or disruptive conduct, at any place upon the United States 
Capitol Grounds or within any of the Capitol Buildings with intent to impede, 
disrupt, or disturb the orderly conduct of any session of the Congress or either 
House thereof, or the orderly conduct within any such building of any hearing 
before, or any deliberations of, any committee or subcommittee of the Congress 
or either House thereof ; 


The law goes on to proscribe such activity as a misdemeanor. 

I read these rules and the law not for the purposes of making any 
threats. I appeal to the sense of decorum of all of those j^resent in the 
room, I hope that the Chair does not have to invoke any of those rules 
or the statute, but there must be order maintained in the hearing room. 

During the last hearings, despite repeated admonitions of the Chair, 
there were disruptions, particularly from the audience. I hope that this 
does not occur again and I want to state that the failure of the Chair 
to invoke any of these rules or the statute does not mean acquiescence 
in the conduct. 

With that statement out of the way, Mr. Counsel — prior to recog- 
nizing you, however, I think I should read a communication into the 
record from the Honorable Edwin E. Willis, chairman of the full 
conunittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, dated 
November 25, 1968, reconstituting this subcommittee. It reads as 
follows : 

To: Mr. Francis J. McNamara, 

Director, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I hereby 
appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, consisting 
of Honorable Richard Ichord, as Chairman, and Honorable John M. Ashbrook 
and Honorable Albert W. Watson, as associate members, to conduct hearings in 
Washington, D.C., commencing on or about December 2, 1968, and/or at such 
other times thereafter and places as said subcommittee shall determine, as con- 
templated by the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 12th day of Sep- 
tember, 1968, authorizing hearings concerning Communist activities within the 
United States, with particular reference to the extent to which, and the manner 
in which the incidents and acts of force and ^-iolence which occurred in the City 
of Chicago, Illinois, during the week of August 25, 1968, were planned, instigated, 
incited, or supported by Communist and other subversive organizations and in- 
dividuals, and other matters under investigation by the Committee. 

Please make tliis action a matter of Committee record. 

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me. 

Given under my hand this 25th day of November, 1968. 

/s/ Edwin E. WiUis, 
Edwin E. Willis, 
Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Mr. Counsel, it was my understanding that the first witness to be 
called today was Mr. Abbie Hoffman. Is Mr. Abbie Hoffman present? 

Mr. Di Su\t:ro. Mr. Chairman, I have a communication 

Mr. IcHORD. Will you come forward, sir, and identify yourself? 

Mr. DI SuvERO. My name is di Suvero, and I am representing Thomas 
Hayden. I received a call last night from Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, who is 
representing Abbie Hoffman. He told me that he had been in com- 
munication, I believe, with Mr. McNamara and has advised Mr. Mc- 
Namara that Mr. Hoffman had taken ill last week, was under doctor's 
care. Mr. McNamara asked that a letter be forwarded, and the doctor 
is sending the letter today, and it will be in the hands of the committee. 

Mr. Ichord. Well, then, the subpena will be continued, with those 
facts in mind. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. DI StwERO. Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, call your next witness. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Mr. Thomas Hay- 

Mr. IcHORD. Is Mr. Hayden present in the room ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 


Mr. IcHORD. Will the witness please be sworn ? 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to g^ive be- 
fore this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Hayden. I do. 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce Mr. Hay- 
den's cocounsel, Leonard Weinglass, a member of the New Jersey bar. 

Mr. loHORD. How do you spell that name, sir ? 

Mr. Weinglass. W-e-i-n-g-1-a-s-s. 

Mr. loHORD. And the first name is Leonard ? 

Mr. Weinglass. Leonard. 

Mr. IcHORD. And what bar are you a member of, sir ? 

Mr. Weinglass. New Jersey. 

Mr. IcHORD. And Mr. di Suvero, you are of the New York bar ? 

Mr. DI SuvERO. And California. 

There was one matter that was left open by the committee chairman 
during the last hearings, and that was the matter under our point 11, 
which the committee chairman reserved decision on. 

Point 11 referred to the fact that Mr. Hayden was under pending 
State crimmal prosecutions in the State court of Illinois. What we 
asked at that time was that the committee not make inquiry, on the 
basis that such inquiry would violate Mr. Hayden's due process rights, 
as well as violate the separation of powers, insofar as J. Campbell has 
ordered an inquiry by the Federal grand jury. 

And I would like to know what the committee's decision has been 
on that ruling. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, could you explain to the Chair the 
nature of the prosecution ? 

Mr. DI SuvERO. Well, the State prosecutions are five counts. One is 
obstructing a police officer, two of disorderly conduct, and two of 
resisting arrest. The Federal prosecution, to which we have been 
advised Mr. Hayden is a target of that prosecution, is a prosecution 
under the Federal antiriot law. 

Mr. IcHORD. Has there been an indictment ? 

Mr. DI Sir\^R0. There has not been an indictment. 

Mr. IcHORD. If I may direct a question to the counsel of the com- 
mittee, Mr. Counsel, do you propose to ask this witness any questions 
concerning the charges pending against him in the city of Chicago? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, we do not contemplate any questions 
directed to his specific activities out of which these arrests apparently 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair is aware of Supreme Court decisions to the 
effect that if legislative hearings are conducted for the purpose 
of aiding the State in the prosecution of the case, Mr. Counsel, they 
would not be permissible, but this is not the purpose of these hearings. 

The purposes are as I stated in my opening statement. Therefore, 
the Chair will have to specifically overrule point 11 of the motion 
filed by the attorneys, and the Chair would specificallv instruct the 
counsel not to question this witness on any of the specifics contained 
in the charge of disorderly conduct and the other counts which the 
attorney has stated. 

Mr. DI SuvERo. And that direction, I take it, Mr. Chairman, does 
not extend to any subject matter which might be the inquiry of a 
Federal grand jury. 


Mr. IcHORD. Of course, the gentleman has not been indicted by the 
Federal grand jury. The Chair has been advised that the witness is 
in possession of certain facts which should be inquired into by this 
committee, and I would specifically rule that the pending grand 
jury proceedings would not prohibit this committee from examining 
the witness. 

Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, would you state your full name and 
address ? 

Mr. Hayden. My full name is Thomas Emmett Hayden, and my 
address is 6000 Broadway, Oakland, California. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And, Mr. Hayden, do you appear here today in re- 
sponse to a subpena that was served on you on or about the 23d day 
of September ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And was that subpena served by Mr. William Wheeler, 
an investigator for this committee ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, sir, it was. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, would you give 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Coimsel, can you bring the mike a little closer? I 
don't know whether you can be heard. I think people are having 
difficulty hearing you in the back of the room. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, would you give us a brief resume of your 
educational background, please ? 

Mr. Hayden. You mean the colleges I attended ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. High school and college, please. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes; I attended Royal Oak Dondero High School in 
Royal Oak, Michigan, from 1954 to 1957. I attended the University 
of Michigan, 1957 to 1961. I returned to the University of Michigan 
1962 through part of 1964 as a graduate student and as an instructor, 
and I taught political science at Rutgers University in 1967. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I don't believe you mentioned it. Did you get a degree 
from the University of Michigan ? 

Mr. Hayden. I did not complete my graduate studies. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you get a bachelor's ? 

Mr. Hayden. I got a bachelor's degree in 1961. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was this in English ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, since your completion of your edu- 
cation, what particular positions have you held, since you completed 
your education ? 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean by "positions" ? 

Mr. Conley. What jobs have you held, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, as I said — you mean, jobs in the sense of how 
I get money ? 

Mr. Conley. Well, let us start with that ; yes. 

Mr. Hayden. Or political positions, or what ? 

Mr. Conley. Let us start with the jobs that you held where you get 


Mr. Hayden. Well, I have done some teaching, as I said, at Eutgers 
University. I have been paid as an author and lecturer, published 
two books, one by New American Library-Signet, on North Viet- 
nam, and another on the conditions in Newark at the time of the re- 
bellion of July 1967, which was published by Random House. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Excuse me. Was this book Rebellion in Neioark ? 

Mr. Hayden. Right. And I remain under contract, writing another 
book on Vietnam for the same publishing house. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now have you, in connection with your book- 
writing, also written the preface to a book called Mission to Hanoi% 

Mr. Hayden. You mean the book by Communist Party theoretician 
Herbert Aptheker. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I traveled — I was a fellow traveler to Hanoi with 
Herbert Aptheker in 1965 and I did write an introduction to his book, 
before I proceeded to write a book giving my own political views. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now then, these are the jobs that you have 
held where you received pay, as I understand. 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I can recall. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now, what jobs have you held in the political 
area, as you define it ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I consider myself an organizer of a movement to 
put you and your committee out of power, because I think you repre- 
sent racist philosophy 

Mr. Conley. Well, what group is that, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. — that has no meaning any more in the :^Oth century. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, what group do you refer to that you 
represent ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I have worked for many groups. As you know, 
I worked very hard for several years for Students for a Democratic 
Society. I worked 

Mr. Conley. Were you president of that group from June of '62 to 

Mr. Hayden. I was president of SDS, yes, during the time that you 

Mr. Conley. And were you the author of 

Mr. Hayden. But before that I was an organizer of it, and after- 
ward I remained affiliated with it for some time. 

Mr. Conley. Were you the autlior of the Port Huron statement? 

Mr. Hayden. I wish that I was, but I was merely a drafter of the 
original document, and the author of the document was the convention 
itself that met in Port Hiiron. 

Mr. Conley. You assisted, then, in the preparation of the document 
which was adopted by the convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. I was probably the major author of the original draft. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Was it materially changed by the conven- 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. It had a better position on the American capital- 
ism. I was not too clear about the problems of American society, and 
the convention straightened me out bv deciding that tlie nrofit svstpni 
that you represent is a fundamental thing to be moved aside so that the 
country can move ahead. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, a minute ago, in con- 


nection with your books, you mentioned that you had written a 
book about Vietnam. Was this book The Other Side ? 

Mr. Hayden. Right. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Did you collaborate on this book with the traveler 
that went with you, Mr. Lynd? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And you coauthored this book together ? 

Mr. Hayden. Right. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And did I understand you correctly that this book 
came out subsequent to your preface to Mission to Han&i'^. 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I can recall, Herbert Aptheker's book came 
out rather quickly after the trip, and the book that I wrote with 
Staughton came out some time later. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, moving to another area, and that 
is the National Mobilization Committee, were you the coproject 
director with Mr. Davis for the National Mobilization Committee's 
efforts in Chicago ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I was. 

Mr. CoNLEY. When were you appointed to this position ? 

Mr. Hayden. When ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't recall the exact date. I suppose it was in the 
very early — in the early spring. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Could you be specific in terms of months, sir? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't think I could, but I would guess at March or 

Mr. CoNLEY. March or April. By whom were you appointed ? 

Mr. Hayden. By the Mobilization, which has a structure for making 
such appointments, consisting of an administrative committee and a 
steering committee and a set of officers. 

Mr. Conley. Were you a part of the steering committee or the offi- 
cers or the 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. In other words, you were appointed by this group. 
How many people are represented by this group ? 

Mr. Hayden. The Mobilization has representatives from nearly a 
hundred organizations, most of whom are active around particular 
subjects like the organization of the demonstration. 

Mr. Conley. Well, did 100 people meet to decide to appoint you ? 

Mr. Hayden. I can't really recall. If you will allow me 1 minute to go 
talk to Rennie Davis, who has more of an organizational mind than I 
do, I am sure I could straighten it all out, but the Mobilization, through 
its normal processes, appointed me in the spring of the year to be a 
project director with Rennie Davis, and I went to Chicago for that 

Mr. Conley. Did you receive this appointment in writing, or was 
it just verbal ? 

Mr. Hayden. Oh, no, that's not the way we work. 

Mr. Conley. Do you recall who actually told you that you had been 
appointed ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I just knew that I had been appointed. I presume 
it was, if anyone told me that I was appointed, it was Dave Dellinger, 
who as you know is the chairman of the Mobilization. 


Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, when did you go to Chi- 
cago and begin working full time for the committee ? 

Mr. Hayden. I went to Chicago at the beginning of the summer. 
Again, the exact date is something I would have to check, but it was 
late May or early Jmie. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. And did you work out of the 407 South Dear- 
bom Street address? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, at the time that you started to work for the com- 
mittee, were you paid any type of a salary ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. I didn't take a salary. I lived from my normal 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you, during any of the time that you worked with 
the National Mobilization Committee, receive any salary or compen- 
sation ? 

Mr. Hayden. Not that I know. I don't — I think they allocated some 
funds for the office staff, and those probably were in Rennie Davis' 
name. But I wasn't too close to that end of the organization, and my 
services were basically volunteer services. 

Again, there are ways, I think, if you — if Mr. Davis is here and he 
is listening to your questions, he can come before you with some more 
concrete answers to such questions. 

Mr. Conley. Then, sir, is it your testimony that you received no 
compensation, either by check or by cash, for your activities in 

Mr. Hayden. As best as I can recall, I lived from my own income, 
but you see, I would — the way we live, I mean, I give Rennie some 
money, and he might give it back to me. And in that sense, it may have 
gone through the Mobilization at one time or another, but basically, I 
always lived on my own income. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, sir, I can understand with cash that this might 
be true, but do you have any specific recollection of having received any 
checks in any way that were eannarked as moneys for you as com- 
pensation for working with the National Mobilization Committee? 

Mr. Hayden. There might have been some during the summer, but if 
there were they were a pittance. Maybe $200. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. I can check that in my bank account. I just don't have 
the information here. 

]VIr. Conley. All right, sir. You stated that you continued to live 
on your outside income. What was your outside income during the 
summer of 1968 ? 

Mr. Hayden. How much money did I carry around, or what ? 

Mr. Conley. No, sir, what was the source of your incOiUe ? 

Mr. Hayden. Source of it? Speaking, based on the notoriety that 
people like you and the mass media have given me. 

Mr. Conley. Your speaking appearances, th"\ were wliat you were 
able to derive your income from ? 

Mr. Hayden. And writing. 

Mr. Conley. What particular articles were you writing at that time ? 

Mr. Hayden. This summer? Well, as I said, I was at work on the 
contractual basis with Random House on a new book on Vietnam. 


Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, Mr. Davis worked with 
you in the Chicago office ; did he not ? 

Mr. Hayden. He primarily ran the office. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you consider him your boss ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. He was my brother. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. How many other full-time employees did 
you have in the Chicago office ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know, because we don't operate on that basis. 
As the convention approached, we had more and more people working 
out of the office on a multitude of problems. 

Mr. Conley. Starting in June, how many people did you have there 
in June ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Hayden. You see, because we have different views of the world, 
it sometimes may seem to you that I don't answer your questions, but 
that is primarily because I don't live in a world of jobs, money, and 
so forth. 

Mr. Conley. No, sir; you have answered my question very nicely. 
I am just asking you 

Mr. Hayden. There is a number, I mean, I don't know how many 
people worked in the Chicago office in June. Probably 10 or 15. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. And then in July, do you have any state- 
ment as to how large the staff had grown to at that time ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. A guesstimate ? 

Mr. Hayden. More. 

Mr. Conley. More than 

Mr. Hayden. Twenty, twenty-five. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir, and then during the first 2 weeks of 
August, what had the staff grown to ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't really know. It was larger, but see, it was 
organized not in terms of numbers; but we were organizing a legal 
l^anel to handle our suit against Mayor Daley, seeking to get permits 
for our demonstrations and rallies, and I don't know if you would con- 
sider those lawyers jjart of the Mobilization staff. 

We were organizing doctors to prepare first aid stations, because 
we expected that, what with the announcement that 20,000 troops 
would be brought into the city, some people were going to g;et hurt. 
And we didn't want Mayor Daley's hospitals to be the only thing that 
we could go to if people were hit over the head. But I don't know if 
you would consider those doctors part of the Mobilization staff. 

Mr. Conley. You considered them part of the Mobilization staff, 
didn't you ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, that is the doctors' group. We considered our re- 
sponsibility was to make sure that sympathetic public health students, 
medical students, and doctors would get themselves together and stay 
in touch with us about our programmatic needs, and the same with 
lawyers, so the question of staff involves a lot of blurred lines. That is 
all I am saying. 

Out of the central office, Eoom 315, 407 South Dearborn, as I say, 
there was always a nucleus of 10 to 30 people doing the normal cen- 
tral office work, answering the phone and sending out mailings and 
protecting the doors from people who might want to come in and shoot 


the place up. That sort of thing occupied most of the people in the 
oflSce. And as the convention approached, more and more people came 
to the office, at least to get some information about what was happen- 
ing and where to go in the city. So it got to be a very large office situ- 
ation by the time of the convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, you, then — do I understand it that it is your 
testimony you did not consider the lawyers, then, and the doctors, who 
were part of the overall plan, as a part of the Mobilization Committee ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, we don't think in those terms. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, you are the one that raised question that I might 
think in those terms, and I am asking you what you thought? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes ; they didn't have to accept the Mobilization struc- 
ture or follow its — I mean, they were not integral parts of it in the 
sense of groups that would abide by all the day-to-day decisions or 
general policy decisions. They were more cooperating groups, co- 
operating groups of doctors and cooperating groups of lawyers. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now after the convention was over, Mr. Hay- 
den, did you then leave the Chicago area and go to the West Coast? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And have you continued to remain on the West Coast, 
basically, since that time ? 

Mr. Hayden. Basically, since that time, yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. And did you consider — did you continue 
to receive in any way any compensation after the convention from the 
National Mobilization Committee ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. To your knowledge, you have not received any ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I haven't received it. 

Mr. Conley. Now when you initially went to the Oakland area, did 
you not in fact live with Robert Scheer ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. You did not stay at his residence ? 

Mr. Hayden. I stayed at several residences, including his. 

Mr. Conley. All right, you did stay at his residence at one time, 
then, since the convention and prior to this time ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. Now^, you are now living at what was it, 6000 ? 

Mr. Hayden. 6000 Broadway, in Oakland. 

Mr. Conley. In Oakland. All right. 

Mr. Hayden, in the early months of 1968 numerous items that your 
National Mobilization Committee put out referred to you and Rennie 
Davis as coproject directors of the Chicago organization. You are 
familiar with the articles that I am taking about ? 

Mr. Hayden. Right — no, I am not, but I am familiar with the titles. 

Mr. Conley. Well, your literature carried at the bottom of it you 
and Rennie Davis as coproject directors. 

Mr. Hayden. Right. 

Mr. Conley. Then a letter came out on August 10, 1968, on the 
stationery of the National Mobilization Committee and signed by 
Dave Dellinger, and it refers to Rennie Davis as project director and 
makes no mention of yourself. 

Were you no longer a coproject director as of August 10 ? 


Mr. Hayden. No, I don't know the letter you are referring to, but 
from all that I recall we were always the coproject directors. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This is the letter, sir. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. Hayden. Well, this only refers to Rennie Davis as project di- 
rector because Rennie would be — as I said, he was the managerial per- 
son in the office, and the section of the letter you refer to indicates that 
people should call the Chicago office and talk with Paul Potter, Vernon 
Grizzard, or Rennie Davis. And that makes sense to me because Rennie 
was the one who operated the office, but that doesn't imply that I was 
not a coproject director, even though I can understand how you might 
come to that conclusion. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I just wanted to clear it up. Okay ? 

Mr. Hayden. Is it clear ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. Now, Mr. Hayden, did you remain in Chi- 
cago from the time you arrived there in June until the Democratic 
Convention in August ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I did, basically. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you leave there on at least one occasion, though, 
and go overseas? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes ; I went to Paris to try to do some writing about 
the peace talks and to have discussions with Ambassador Harriman 
and with North Vietnamese officials. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now was this trip made in July of 1968 ? 

Mr. Hayden. To the best of my recollection. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And did you meet, when you were in Paris, with the 
North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and U.S. representatives, including 
Mr. Harriman? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes ; although I don't recall meeting with South Viet- 
namese representatives, or Viet Cong as you call them. I think 

Mr. Conley. Just 

Mr. Hayden. I passed them briefly at a reception. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, he answered "yes." You did meet with 
Mr. Harriman? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, of course. 

Mr. Conley. Now do you recall specifically when in July these visits 
occurred ? 

Mr. Hayden. It was the beginning of July. I remember because I 
was there on the Fourth of July, and we had a Fourth of July celebra- 
tion with all the Americans in Paris who wanted to come. We had a 
sort of a rally and a discussion with Vietnamese people and we showed 
films, and so on. 

Mr. Conley. Now when you had these contacts with the North Viet- 
namese in Paris, did you discuss with them a meeting between U.S. 
and Vietnamese youth to be held in Budapest, Hungary, in September 
of this year ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I did not. 

Mr. Conley. You had no discussion with them at all about that meet- 
ing in September ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. Prior to making this trip, did you consult with Robert 
Greenblatt ? Specifically with reference to this trip ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 


Mr. CoNLEY. You had no discussion with Mr. Greenblatt, then, prior 
to making the trip to Paris ? 

Mr. Hayden. Of course I have had discussions with Mr. Greenblatt. 

Mr. Gdnley. Sir, let me finish. 

Mr. Hayden. Prior to the trip. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, let me finish my question; I will try to let you 
finish your answer. 

You had no discussion with Mr. Greenblatt specifioally dealing with 
your making the trip to Paris or what you were going to do in Paris? 

Mr. Hayden. I probably did. It was not a veiy significant or impor- 
tant meeting, but since he was around the Mobilization office, he was 
aware that I w^ould be going on my way to Paris. And to the best of 
my recollection, I probably did not speak to Greenblatt because the 
trip to Paris was decided upon rather suddenly and I didn't stop in 
New York on my way out. 

I am just trying to indicate that I may have talked to Greenblatt at 
some point before the trip; and if you would ask something more 
specific, I might be able to answer more specifically. 

Mr. CoNLEY, All right; well, it is a fact, is it not, that Mr. Greenblatt 
and Dave Dellinger had been in Prague earlier this summer at a 
meeting with the Vietnamese representatives? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I believe that is true. 

Mr. Conley. All right ; now had you had any discussion with them 
with i"eference to this earlier meeting? 

Mr. Hayden. Wliat earlier meeting? Tlieir meeting? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Their meeting in Prague. 

Mr. Hayden. Not very extensive discussion, but I was aware that 
they had discussed in Prague a potential conference between Ameri- 
cans and Vietnamese, not unlike the conference that I had organized 
in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, in September of 1967. But I was work- 
ing on the Chicago project, and conferences with the Vietnamese in 
the fall were not particularly on my mind. That is all I am saying. 
My responsibility was to work on Chicago. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Would you say that you had made this trip 
to Paris as an emissary for David Dellinger, who had been in Europe 
earlier this summer ? Were you responsible for transmitting any mes- 
sages for Mr. Dellinger ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is not clear. Are you referring again to the Budapest 
business, or what ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. No; I am referring to your trip, sir. Your trip was to 

Mr. Hayden. Well, not an emissary of David Dellinger. He is the 
chairman of the Mobilization, and I am a close associate of his, and, 
but I didn't 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, sir, I will use your words. Did you make your 
trip as a "close associate" of Mr. Dellinger 

Mr. Hayden. Of course. 

Mr. Conley. — for the purpose of communication of messages from 
Mr. Dellinger to the group in Paris ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I think Mr. Dellinger was aware of what I was 
doing, and we sort of think alike, so I wasn't communicating his mes- 
sage to Paris so much as just communicating our own message. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Which would be both your messages, then, 
I take it, if you think alike. 


Mr. Hayden". I think that is a safe conclusion. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now Mr. Vernon Grizzard has stated 
that he attended the Budapest meeting. And did you, before you left 
for Paris, discuss with Grizzard, who was in charge of the marshals 
in Chicago, the possibility of his going to the Budapest meeting with 
the Viet Cong? 

Mr. Hayden. Not that I recall ; no. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You recall no conversations? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't think that Vernon was ever definite about 
whether he was going to Budapest or not. I think that that was a rather 
late decision, but you would have to call him and ask him. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now while you were in Paris in July, did 
you have occasion to meet with Colonel Ha Van Lau ? 

Mr. Hayden. I met him briefly at a reception. I know Colonel Lau 
from my trips to North Vietnam. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You had met with him previously; in '65, was it not? 

Mr. Hayden. I was there December of '65, January '66, and Oc- 
tober '67. And on those two occasions I had extensive discussions with 
Ha Van Lau, because he is a very important spokesman, as you know, 
for the North Vietnamese. He is, in addition to being a major member 
of their delegation in the Paris peace talks, he was the — he was a part 
of their delegation to Geneva in 1953-54. I believe that he was a mem- 
ber of the delegation in the 1962 settlement — in conference to settle the 
Laotian situation. 

He was the liaison between the North Vietnamese people's armed 
forces and the International Control Commission, which was set up 
by the Geneva agreements. He was the secretary-general of the North 
Vietnamese commission to investigate United States war crimes in 
Vietnam ^ and very instrumental in the [Bertrand Russell] tribunal ^ 
that found the United States guilty of genocide. 

Mr. Conley. What was his title in July of this year, when you met 
with him ? 

Mr. Hayden. He was probably still all of those things. I don't know. 
But he was basically functioning as a member of the North Vietnamese 

But don't misconstrue it. I didn't meet with him. I saw him by 
chance at a reception and shook his hand and didn't even exchange 
comments with him. 

Mr. Conley. Do you recall who else you might have met with from 
the North Vietnamese delegation there in Paris ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. I met with Vietnamese, again, whom I had 
known from North Vietnam. 

Mr. Conley. Yes ; their names, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. You want their names ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Nguyen Minh Vy and Xuan Oanh, which I am sure 
you racists will be able to pronounce. If you want the spelling, I can 
submit it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you have the spelling for the reporter? 

Mr. Hayden. I will write it down and pass it. 

Mr. Conley. Does this individual hold any official 

1 Democratic Republic of Vietnam Commission for Investigation on the American Im- 
perialist War Crimes in Vietnam. 

- International War Crimes Tribunal. 

21-706 O — 69— pt. 2 2 


Mr. Hayden. That is two people. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am sorry, sir. The first one. Let us go back to the 
first one. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, they are members of the North Vietnamese dele- 
gation in Paris. It is currently involved in discussions with the United 
States Government about ending the war. I don't know whether they 
have titles, as such, within the delegation. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now did you also just meet these people at a reception? 

Mr. Hayden. No; I had very extensive discussions with them, just 
as I did with Ambassador Harriman. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now did you in your discussions with them 
discuss the forthcoming Democratic Convention and the National 
Mobilization Committee's role in the Chicago convention ? 

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Hayden. I told them that what they were reading in the Amer- 
ican papers was true, that we were involved very heavily in planning 
for that, but that wasn't the purpose of my visits with them. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. What was their reaction when you told 
them that what they were reading in the American newspapers 
was true, that you were heavily involved in the planning for the 
convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, they hoped very much that the American public 
will be able to make its desire for the war in Vietnam to end; they 
hope that that public opinion would make itself felt on the Govern- 
ment of the United States; and, as you know, they certainly think 
that a peace movement is in the interests not only of the people of 
Vietnam, but the people of the United States. 

So they are always very interested in demonstrations or activities 
in the United States against the war, although they believe that the 
reason there is a peace movement is because the United States has been 
defeated in Vietnam. 

They would never say that they could utilize public opinion in the 
United States, as some people apparently believe, to bring the war to 
an end. They believe the war will only be brought to an end in Vietnam 
itself when the United States is stymied. 

Mr. Conley. Were they pleased at the focusing that your committee 
was having on the people in the United States ? Did they have any re- 
action to this, the methods being taken ? 

Mr. Hayden. They would never meddle in other people's affairs, con- 
trary to your theories of aggression in an infiltration, and so forth. 
They believe that the people 

Mr. Conley. Sir, I am not interested in what 

Mr. Hayden. People who have a problem- 

Mr. Conley. Just a minute, now. My question requires a yes or 
no answer. 

Mr. Hayden. I am 

Mr. Conley. My question requires a yes or a no, and then you can 
give your explanation. 

Mr. Weinglass. Mr. Chairman, at one pyoint 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us suspend for just a minute. 

Mr. Weinglass. At one point, comisel asked the witness to give him 
an opportunity to complete his question. I think that courtesy washes 
both ways, and the witness should be given an opportunity to complete 
his answer. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Let us p)roceed. There was a give-and-take here. 

Mr. Hayden. I will give better than a yes or no. I mean, I am not 
going to equivocate before this committee. 

Mr, IcHORD. Let the witness proceed. We are going along very well 

M. Hayden. If you want to state your question again, I will go at it 
more bluntly, or I will reduce it and make it simpler for you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was the North Vietnamese delegation pleased or did 
they have any reaction to the fact that your National Mobilization 
Committee was serving as a focal point for bringing this issue to the 
attention of the American people through the Democratic Convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, they are pleased at any kind of peace activity 
or any sign that people are beginning to come to their senses about 
Vietnam. So, of course, they are pleased about whatever the antiwar 
movement is trying to do in the United States — including demonstra- 
tions at the convention, including resistance to the draft, including 
traveling and speaking around the country on college campuses. Wliat- 
ever we do for peace in Vietnam that we think is in our interest is 
obviously in their interest, because they want peace in Vietnam. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, moving to another area and taking you 
back, if I may, to about February of this year, back to February 
11, 1968, actually, this is apparently when the first meeting of the 
National Mobilization Committee in relation to the Democratic Con- 
vention in Chicago was held, apparently this meeting was cochaired 
by Rennie Davis and Carlos Russell. 

Mr. Hayden. What was the date of that again ? 

Mr. Conley. February 11, 1968. 

Mr. Hayden. In Chicago ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes. It was held in Chicago on February 11, 1968. 

Mr. Hayden. At 407 South Dearborn ? 

Mr. Conley. Sir, I don't know the address. 

Mr. Hayden. Is that the meeting that I think this fellow here • 

Mr. Conley. If you will let me complete the question, I think you 
will know what meeting I mean. 

The meeting was cochaired by Rennie Davis and Carlos Russell 
and established an interim committee composed of yourself, Rennie 
Davis, Dave Dellinger, Robert Greenblatt, Earl Durham, Corky 
Gonzalez, Carolyn Black, Lincoln Lynch, Sue Munaker, and Carlos 
Russell, which was for the purpose of continuing the organization 
and planning of the project in Chicago. 

Now my question, sir, is. Did you attend that meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Conley. And the address is 407 South Dearborn ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Conley. Now do you recall who invited you to take part in 
that meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. Whether it was by a verbal invitation, by written 
notification ? You do not recall ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I wanted the meeting to happen and just as- 
sumed that I would be there. I was among the people who probably 
organized for the meeting, although I wasn't living in Chicago at 
the time. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Besides yourself, who else would have organized for 
the meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know. It was probably primarily myself and 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, was it prior to or sub- 
sequent to this meeting that you and Rennie Davis coauthored the 
YEAR OFFENSIVE," which was dated March 1968 and marked 
''Not for Publication''? [Hayden Exhibit No. 1. See pages 2562-2583.] 

Mr. Hayden. Is it before or after ? 

(Voice from the floor.) 

Mr. Hayden. I think that it was after. I think that we sort of took 
into account a lot of opinions expressed at that meeting, and then we 
wrote the document. To the best of my recollection, that is what I 
will testify to now. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. And Davis can correct me later if it turns out that I 
am being incorrect. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now, did you and Rennie Davis also 
prepare another document for the National Mobilization Committee 
CHALLENGE," and this document likewise was marked ''not for cir- 
culation or publication,'''' but was addressed to the Chicago organizers ? 
[Hayden Exhibit No. 2. See pages 2556-2559.] 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know. I don't remember such a document. If 
you will show it to me, I can easily tell you who wrote it. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. Hayden. Is this — this is it ? This ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. of course, we authored it. It says we did. I just 
didn't remember the title. See, it is not really a title. It just savs 
LENGE." I think that was kind of a warmup for the later paper. 

Mr. Conley. All right, now do you recall when this particular doc- 
ument was prepared ? 

Mr. Hayden. Oh, yes, it was — it was prepared sometime between 
January and February. 

Mr. Conley. In other words, was this document prepared prior to the 
February 11 meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. I think that it was, but again my recollection is kind 
of vague on that. 

Mr. Conley. All right, now I belicAe this document is marked to the 
"Chicago organizers." 

Mr. Hayden. No, I don't see that. Oh, yes. "National Mobilization," 
I can't read it. "To: National Mobilization Staff; Chicago organizers." 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. Now wlio were the Chicago organizers to 
whom this document was directed ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I don't think it was directed to Chicago orga- 
nizers any more than anybody else, so I don't know. You see, I didn't 
type this and I don't know what that particularly refers to. But it 
probably, when the term "Chicago organizers'' is used, tliat probably 
means that this document was circulated among active people through- 
out the citv who organized tenant unions, rent strikes against slum 


landlords, organize black people in the ghetto, organize draft resisters, 
organize students on campuses ; you know, organizers. 

Rennie was a Chicago organizer, as you know, for some time, work- 
ing with poorer working-class white people on the North Side of 
Chicago, and he probably means by this that this memorandum was 
sent out to other organizers around the city. 

That is a very revealing document in terms of what our intentions 
were. I hope that it is in your record, because it indicates that our in- 
tention was never to disrupt the convention or engage in violence. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is part of the record, is it not, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir, 

Mr. Hayden. And I hope that also part of the record is the fact that 
we had a vote, according to this document that you gave me, on what 
kind of demonstration we wanted to have. This was at this February 
meeting you are referring to, when we voted against the view of dis- 
ruption, which you have marked here, or someone has marked here, 
where it says : 

One view * ♦ * holds that the movement should prevent the Convention 
from assembly ing [sic]. * * * The movement should do everything possible 
to disrupt its deliberations in August. 

And as part of the record, we voted against that view, in favor of 
another view. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, going back to the meeting of Feb- 
ruary 11, you have stated that you were present at that meeting that 

Mr. Hayden. I must have been. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, did you hear Communist Party official Don- 
ald Hamerquist, and I quote as follows : 

What we must do is make concrete demands on the Convention which the Con- 
vention cannot respond to. * * * 

Mr. Hayden. Well, that would be a typical Communist Party posi- 
tion. Based on the idea that you have to organize people where they are 
at, and realize that your authorities will never give them even the 
smallest reward, so it wouldn't surprise me if Hamerquist said that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you recall him saying that, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I don't recall it. But it wouldn't surprise me in the 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Mr. Hayden. By that he would mean, if you organize to demand 
housing for everybody in America, they will find out that you people 
never give housing to everybody in America. 

Mr. Conley. All right, and then, Mr. Hayden, were you present 
when Communist Party member Jack Spiegel stated, "We can't call 

Mr. Hayden. By the way, I don't know if any of these people are 
members of the Communist Party. This is your committee and your 
tape recorders and you can go right ahead, but it is not my designations, 

Mr, Conley. Well, sir, I hand you back the "Convention Notes.'' 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. Hayden. Jack Spiegel is designated as a Communist Party 

Mr. Conley. I don't know what "CP" stands for, sir. 


Mr. Hayden. Chicago Peace Council, Jack Spiegel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Look at Hamerqiiist, please. 

Mr. Hayden. You didn't ask me about Hamerquist. When you said 
"Communist Party member Jack Spiegel," I interrupted you; when 
you said "Communist Party member Hamerquist," I didn't interrupt, 
because everybody knows he is a member of the Communist Party. 
It is listed. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Moving on to Mr. Spiegel, 

Mr. AsHBROoK. Mr. Counsel, is it listed on that book? 

Mr. Hayden. It just says, "CP." I assume that means "Communist 
Party." But Jack Spiegel is listed as Chicago Peace Council. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right; Mr. Spiegel's quote as follows: "We 

Mr. Hayden. What are you reading from? Some stolen notes, or 

Mr. Conley. From your February 11th, page 4, column 2. 

Mr. Hayden. Just give me the page, and you won't have to read it. 
Okay, what is it ? 

Mr. Conley. All right, the quote is : 

We can't call 200,000 i>eople to Chicago and then disassociate ourselves from 
violence. Disruption and violence will occur. It's going to happen and we'll have to 
deal with that fact. 

Now, were you present when this statement was made by Mr. Spiegel ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, you haven't read it, of course. But I was present 
during the meeting. I don't remember him saying it, but if you will read 
the whole statement, I think you will find it is very interesting. 

Mr. Spiegel does not mean that 

Mr. Conley. Now, sir, I am not interested in what 

Mr. Hayden. Just a minute. 

Mr. Conley. That isn't responsive to my question, siir. 

Mr. Hayden. I was present, but I think it is fair for you to read all 
of Mr. Spiegel's statement, and I will read it for you, if you won't 
read it. 

Mr. Conley. I am just asking you if Mr. Spiegel made this statement. 

Mr. Hayden. Then I have to say I don't know, but I will go further 
and say that you haven't read his entire statement. 

Mr. Conley. I am asking you, sir, though, did he make this statement? 

Mr. Hayden. You had better call him and ask him. 

Mr. Conley. I am asking you if you heard him make that statement. 

Mr. Hayden. I can't remember him saying it, but here it is in the 
notes, so I assume he said something like that. What is the big deal 
that you are uncovering by reading from a note? I mean obviously he 
said something like that, or it wouldn't be in the notes. But the main 
problem is you haven't read his entir-e statement, which tries to point 
out that we are going to have to organize an alternative to violence. 

Mr. IcHORD. The entire statement is a matter of record, is it not, 
Mr. Comisel ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Not for the press in this room, who are listening to 
your slander of Mr. Spiegel. 

Mr. Conley. It has been previously introduced as Grubisic Exhibit 
4 ^ at the earlier hearings. 

» See pt. 1, pp. 2293-2298, of Oct. 1, 1968, bearings. 


Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the witness. 

Let the Chair declare a 5-minute recess. 

(Brief recess.) 

( Subcommittee members present at the time of recess and when hear- 
ings resumed: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to page 4, 
column 1, of your "Convention Notes," the document prepared as 
a result of the February 11 meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. There appears there a statement, which apparently is 
attributed to you, beginning at the top of the page : 

As organization develops to challenge the Democratic Party, it must project 
a non-violent, legal face. We cannot call for violence, although violence is a 
major method of change in this society. * * * 

Did you make this statement, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. I made a statement to that effect. But again, you haven't 
read up my entire statement, which is typical of a witch hunt. 

Mr. Ichord. You wish the entire statement read ? 

Mr. Hayden. Either that, or if you would let me tell you why I 
think violence is a major tool of change, I would be glad to do that. 

Mr. Ichord. I think the question permits such an answer. Go ahead. 

Mr. Hayden. Fine. I believe that violence should never be ruled out 
as a method of change; especially, I believe that a country that is 
burning up Vietnam has no right to lecture people to be nonviolent. 
However, I believe also that — I always believed that Chicago was no 
place for a violent confrontation, because you have a disciplined, 
armed force of 20,000 men waiting for you there, and you have un- 
armed demonstrators straggling in, 19- and 20-year-old kids from 
all around the country, who don't know each other, and they would 
be wiped out. They almost were wiped out in Chicago, simply for 

So I wanted to make a distinction in that meeting between the fact 
that I believe that at some point there may be increased violence in 
American society on the one hand and/or, on the other hand, I didn't 
believe that violence should be part of the planning or preparation or 
conception of Chicago. 

I thought that what we were doing in Chicago was trying to sort 
of bring the kind of people who are the rank and file of the Demo- 
cratic Party — decent, middle-class Americans of all ages and classes 
and races who believe in peace and social justice — to come and protest 
the abandoning of those ideals by the Government of the United 

And I know very well that, for that kind of purpose, violence or 
the threat of violence only scares people away. And that is what I 
think Mayor Daley and President Johnson were engaged in by their 
buildup, military buildup; they were trying to scare people away 
from coming to the convention. 

So I make no secret of the fact that I am not nonviolent, but often 
people who are not nonviolent can be the most nonviolent, because 
they know w^hat they are doing and they want to make sure that the 
means suit the ends. And the means in this case for me was a mass 
mobilization of a peaceful kind. It became a violent situation because 


of the Chicago Police Department, of which this committee is, I 
believe, an extension. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, could I ask a question at that point? 

I think your statement regarding your preference that there not be 
a confrontation at that time would certainly be borne out by what 
you have said in the past. But isn't it also true that you probably, on 
the basis of your other statements, would prefer urban guerrilla type 
of activity, rather than a direct confrontation with 20,000 policemen ? 

I note from your interview in the National Guardian on July 1, 1967, 
page 4, where you say, I quote : 

Urban guerrillas are the only realistic alternative at this time to electoral 
politics or mass armed resistance. 

Mr. Haydex. I am glad you brought that up. I have been meaning 
to settle that score with the National Guardian for some time. What 
I said was that we have to function as "political guerrillas." I didn't 
say "urban guerrillas." 

A political guerrilla is a person who uses the political concepts of 
guerrilla warfare without the weapons or the guns. The political con- 
cept of guerrilla warfare is to make yourself at one with the people 
3'ou are trying to organize, be among them, go through their day-to- 
day existence, live on the same budget as they do, and organize them 
into a political force. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Sort of American Viet Cong? 

Mr. Haydex. It would not be an American Viet Cong, until the day 
we started taking your guns from your police stations and turning 
them on you, and as far as I know, that hasn't happened, so you are 
making an extremely mistaken generalization that is merely meant to 
kind of paint the antiwar movement, the movement which is for peace 
in Vietnam, as somehow being an aggressive, violent movement. It is a 
case of the criminal calling the victim the criminal. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. It is your position, when you said "urban guerrillas," 
you were not referring to urban guerrillas in the general context that 
most of us would think of urban guerrillas ? 

Mr. Hayden. I gave a speech saying that I believed that parlia- 
mentary means would be blocked in this society as we saw at the 
convention, the parliamentary efforts of Senators McGovern and 
McCarthy were blocked. And I felt that violent revolution was also 
not possible in the kind of society that we had ; that, therefore, we had 
to find some kind of alternative to the traditional concepts of social 
change, which on the one hand are overthrow the government, and on 
the other hand are elect yourself president. 

We have to find another way, and the way that I think is to organize 
a movement of people who are very strong minded and organized on 
local levels around their own grievances and are able to win more and 
more people to their side against the landlords and the tax collectors 
and the generals and the draft boards, who are sort of raping them. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Maybe I didn't make my question clear, but, spe- 
cifically, when you, or at least when the reference attributed to you to 
urban guerrillas was used, you were not referring to the RAM type of 
urban guerrilla, snipers, and so forth? 

Mr. Hayden. Oh, no; I was not referring to warfare in a military 
sense, and it was a misquote that I am sorry about, and have always 
had some problems of interpretation because of that statement. 


Mr. IcHORD. I think you said "political guerrillas" instead of "urban 
guerrillas" ? 

Mr. Hayden. I said a lot more than that, but I said "political guer- 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, since we have interrupted the continuity 
of counsel's questions, did I understand you earlier to say that you make 
no secret of the fact that you are nonviolent ? 

Mr. Hayden. I am not nonviolent is what I said. 

Mr. Watson. You are not nonviolent. Now am I to construe, then, you 
believe in violence ? 

Mr. Hayden. No more than you do. Probably less than you do. 

Mr. Watson. Is that right ? Now one further 

Mr. Hayden. Especially given your political background in South 
Carolina, I believe that to be the case. 

Mr. Watson. Well, fortunately, I believe the gentleman is not as 
well read about South Carolina activities as he may be about some' 
others, because we have been 

Mr. Hayden. I just read about all that disenfranchisement. 

Mr. Watson. — relatively free of that down there. Of course, we 
could debate that back and forth, and you are far less knowledgeable 
than othei^ around you. Wlien you stated earlier that you did 
not advocate violence in Chicago, your position was based upon the 
fact that there was an overwhelming force of some 20,000 policemen 
who would annihilate you, virtually, that's what you said. 

Mr. Hayden. No ; my basic reason was that I really wanted all along 
for the largest possible number of people to come, and that includes 
people with families, people bringing babies, and they would have to 
be guaranteed some safety coming to Chicago. 

They are afraid of Chicago because of what they have heard about 
Chicago, and so we fought, throughout the spring and summer, with 
Chicago officials to try to get permits so that this number of people 
could come into Chicago safe and sound, and go out. And my own inter- 
pretation of why the city refused us permits is because they didn't want 
all those people to come and they knew perfectly well that the average 
person, like yourself, with family, would not go somewhere if he is 
afraid that he might be locked up or get hit over the head, because 
people can't take those kind of chances. There were babies, and even so, 
in Grant Park, when the tear gas came. Tear gas can kill a baby. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, your position is that we have these 
things without the provocation by such groups as you represent? 

Mr. Hayden. I didn't understand that. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, your position is that we have such 
brutality as you alleged without the provo€ations by such groups as 
you represent ? 

ISIr. Hayden. Well, there is no question that we are a provocation to 
you. But why ? It is only because we exist. Since when is obscenity, for 
example, a reason for a policeman to hit you over the head? 

Mr. Watson. In other words, you as an individual Avould welcome 
anyone to use any obscene language, in cursing you, or anything else, 
and you would just stand back quietly and fold your hands and say, 
"Thank you"? 

Mr. Hayden. If I was a public servant engaged in protecting the 
law and order, I would not see obscenity as a threat to law and order. 


Mr. Watson. Oh, in other words, now we put you and the other 
citizens in a different category from a j^ublic official ? A public official, 
in your estimation, is to take all types of abuse, whereas you or I or 
others, who are not public officials, do not have to be so restrained. 
Is that your j)osition ? I guess basically it is. 

Mr. Hayden. What do we pay taxes to our Government for if it is 
not to have a professional government that is capable of having police 
force to 

Mr. Watson. To suffer all types of abuse and profanity and ob- 
scenity ? That is your basic position, isn't it ? You enjoy a safe position, 
whereas the policeman, by virtue of his office, should expect abuse from 
organizations and individuals such as you ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I pity the policemen, frankly. You haven't 
asked me enough 

Mr. Watson. I certainly do when confronted with individuals like 

Mr. Hayden, You haven't asked me enough about what I think to 
draw your conclusions. 

Mr. Watson. Let's reduce it to its simplest common denominator. 

Mr. Hayden. What is that, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. You expect the policeman to accept, by virtue of his 
position, all types of abuse against him, whereas you as an individual 
would not accept such abuse without retaliation ? 

Mr. Hayden. Why don't you ask me why policemen are sworn at 
sometimes? I mean you don't just get mad at a person like this fellow 
here. I have nothmg obscene to say to him, because he is not doing 
anything to me. His uniform doesn't disturb me any more than your 
suit disturbs me. Even the fact that he has a gun doesn't disturb me, 
if he has a gun. He hasn't done anything. I am not being obscene to 

Now why do you think somebody suddenly screams profanity at a 
policeman? Why do you think he does it? I would say it is because 
he has seen the policeman charge into a crowd and beat somebody. And 
especially when it is at the order of Mayor Daley. I mean, a 
lot of abuse has been heaped on the Chicago police, and it is 
not really their fault. They were obeying the orders of Mayor Daley 
and people higher up, because when we went to jail, they didn't beat 
us in jail; they didn't act like irrational monsters in jail. 

But what they did on the streets, they did in a liighly disciplined 
way. They charged into crowds, they hit people in a disciplined way, 
they were carrying out orders. And when people are doing that to you, 
then you — at the very least — have a right to think obscene thoughts 
about their behavior. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Hayden 

Mr. Hayden. Especially if Mayor Daley can say on television what 
he said to Abraham Ribicoff, which goes far beyond anything said 
to a |X)liceman, as you will find out, when it is revealed next week. 
He made an anti-Semitic remark; he used all the language to Ribicoff 
that he accused us of using. He is still the mayor of Chicago. He has 
not been called before you. He is not going to jail like we probably are. 
So let's put the cart before the horse, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. Now, getting back to the basic question I asked you, the 
policeman, in your judgment. 


Mr. Haydbn. We have handled that question. 

Mr. Watson. The policeman, in your judgment, is expected by vir- 
tue of his position to accept all of the verbal abuse, but you as an 
individual are not expected 

Mr. Hayden. Verbal abuse does not come out of thin air. Verbal 
abuse comes from an initial abuse, and abuse on the part of a police 
officer, which is very evident, which is evident in this enormous report, 
wliich I would, like to introduce into the evidence. I have it here, it has 
got 1,400 witnesses to police brutality in the city of Chicago, it is not 
going to be printed by any other Government agency, and so my 
lawyers plan to introduce it today, so that at least some Government 
agency will publish it with all of its obscene words and all the rest of 
it, and you can see for yourself who transgressed first. 

Mr. Watson. One final question. 

Mr. Hayden. The other major thing I want to say in answer to 
your question is simply again that I believe that even if someone 
verbally abuses a police officer, a good, solid professional police officer 
has no reason to act as jury, judge, and executioner towards the person 
who used profane language against him. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, he is to stand there and accept it, 
quietly fold his hands, even 

Mr. Hayden, If a person has violated the law. the duty of the police 
officer is to arrest the person, not to engage in profanity with the 
person, not to engage in brutality with the person, but simply to carry 
out the law, and these policemen know that. 

Mr. Watson. May I ask you one final question, then? 

Mr. Hayden. It is an insult to police to think that, you know, that 
they have to — that they somehow are incapable of controlling them- 
selves when abused. I think they are capable of it. I think that they 
were ordered into action by Mayor Daley. It was not the taunts of the 
demonstrators, it was not these bags of urine, it was nothing like that ; 
it was the fact that they were ordered by Mayor Daley to get these 
Yippies out of the streets, because a person like Mayor Daley does 
not believe that we have a right to exist. 

Tliat's our crime, that we exist ; we have long hair, we smoke dope, 
we are opposed to the war in Vietnam, and so we shouldn't exist. 

Mr. Watson. So the preparation of the bags of urine and other 
things, they were just in the normal routine ? 

Mr. Hayden. I didn't see the bags of urine. I said these supposed 
baofs of urine. 

Mr. Watson. Let me ask you one other thing. You say you have 
1,400 affidavits there? 

Mr. Hayden. Let's see the Nexo York Times, and I will tell you. It 
is the whole report which I am interested in. 

Mr. Watson. How many demonstrators do you estimate that you 
had out there ? 

Mr. Hayden. The police 

Mr. Watson. All told? 

Mr. Hayden. The police figure for Grant Park on August 28 was 
15,000. That was the largest official figure, or journalistic figure given, 
and everybody agrees that 

Mr. Watson. So you had a minimum of at least 15,000 demon- 
strators ? 


Mr. Hatden. Oh, no. The police said 15. Everybody 

Mr. Watson. How many do you think ? 

Mr. Hayden. Everybody agreed that that was the largest number, 
August 28. That was the largest number for that peaceful rally in 
Grant Park. Before that, I think it was far less. 

Mr. Watson. So you had 

Mr. Hayden. We were outnumbered by the forces of law and order, 
so to speak, by about 5 to 1, 1 would say. 

Mr. Watson. I see. If it had been equal, perhaps you really would 
have made a challenge at that time ? 
Mr. Hayden. Hardly. Hardly. 
Mr. Watson. One final thing. 

Mr. Hayden. Unless you think in man-to-man combat without 
weapons I can somehow handle this fellow officer here. I don't think 
I can. 

Mr. AVatson. But you have some 1,400 or 1,600 affidavits? 

Mr. Hayden. Not affidavits, just 

Mr. Watson. Statements. 

Mr. Hayden. There is a report that has been published that con- 
sists of testimony taken by an authorized task force of the National 
Commission to seek inquiry into the causes of violence,^ and I tliink 

they have something like 1,400 witnesses, and I hope that 

Mr. Ichord. Are these statements under oath, Mr. Hayden ? 
Mr. Hayden. I don't know. Wliy don't you call these witnesses in ? 
They will tell you about police brutality, under oath. 
Mr. Watson. Were they affidavits ? 

Mr. Hayden. I simply want to introduce it to you. Are you saying 
that this other Government Commission's study is invalid ? 

Mr. Watson. I am simply asking, Are these affidavits or are they 
just statements? 

Mr. Hayden. It is the report of the Commission, which is an author- 
ized Government task force, which made the preposterous number of 
interviews to come to the conclusion that anyone could come to by 
watching television. 

Mr. Watson. But you never intended to cause violence at all ? 

Mr. Hayden. Absolutely not. 

Mr. Watson. Absolutely not ; so all of the preparation, the training 

in the park 

Mr. Hayden. What preparation, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I assumed that you had to make a little prep- 
Mr. Hayden. What preparations ? 

Mr. Watson. Having these bags of urine and the sticks and the 
razor blades and the stones and the nails in the golf balls, and so forth. 
Mr. Hayden. That is quite a joke. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, your position is you deny that any of 
these things were there or used by the demonstrators ? 
Mr. Hayden. No, I do not deny that. 
Mr. Watson. Thank you. That's all. 
Mr. Hayden. But I deny that preparations were made. 
Mr. Watson. Do you allege that these things were used or prepai-ed 
by the police? Someone had to prepare them. 

1 Naticmal Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. 


Mr. Hatden. Oh, well, they use — you mean the tear gas and the 

Mr. Watson. Oh, no ; the bags of urine and golf balls. 

Mr. Haydbn. Woidd you rather be hit by a bag of urine or by 
Mace ? Let's get first things first. Even if there were bags of urine, and 
I didn't see any, Mr. Watson — I didn't see any — I would still rather 
be hit by a bag of urine than be hit by Mace. That may be because you 
have never been hit by Mace; you have never been hit by your own 
cattle prods in South Carolina. 

Mr. Watson. Frankly, the reference to cattle prods in my State is 
ridiculous and irrelevant, and I've never done anything to require 
Mace being used against me. But I will assure you of one thing 

Mr. Hayden. What would you do ? 

Mr. Watson. I would not sit by and quietly fold my hands and do 
nothing if bags of urine were thrown on me. 

Mr. Hayden. You would break the law ? 

Mr. Watson. Let me assure you 

Mr. Hayden. You would throw a bag of urine ? What would you do ? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I can assure you of one thing, that I would not 
sit back quietly and do nothing if the acts you committed against the 
police were done to me. 

Mr. Hayden. Would you swear? Would you swear at the person 
who did it to you ? Or you only do that at home ? 

Mr. Watson. You are bein^ interrogated, not I, and I have restated 
my position that were I a policeman. Congressman, or what have you, 
anyone who would throw a bag of urine on me would think twice 
before he did it again ! 

Mr. Hayden. Look, t-his is your hearing, not mine. I am not really 
interrogating you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen. 

Mr. Hayden. I would like to redirect the question back to Paris, 
though, because I think incomplete testimony was given there, and 
you tried to imply something about the meetings in Paris that I want 
to correct, and go back there and tell you what really was being done 
in Paris. So at some point, when you find it feasible, let's go back to 
that so that the record will be absolutely clear. 

Mr. IcHORD. We can get into that later on. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I think we will get back to Paris. Let's go back to 
February 11, 1968. 

The first meeting that was held in the national organizers, the 
National Mobilization Committee to organize for Chicago, Mr. Hay- 
den, were you aware at the time of your attendance at that meeting 
on February 11 that the following persons were in attendance at that 
meeting: who were identified as members of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. Identified by whom ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. By this committee, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't pay any attention to your committee. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Well 

Mr. Hayden. I would have no — I mean, you identify almost every- 
body in the United States as a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Kendra Alexander ? 

Mr. Hayden. Now what is the question? Was I aware she was there? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 


Mr. Hayden. Or was I aware that she was identified by your com- 
mittee as a Communist, or what ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question was : Were you aware that she was there 
and identified as a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You were not aware that she was there then ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I was aware she was there. 

Mr. Conley. Thank you, sir. 

Earl Durham ? 

Mr. Hayden. I was aware he was there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. You have these names underlined. What is that for? 

Mr. Conley. Don Hamerquist ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, he was there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Charlene Mitchell ? 

Mr. Hayden. She was there. 

Mr. Conley. Jack Spiegel ? 

Mr. Hayden. And he was there. I mean, I don't exactly remember, 
but I assmne they were there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Were you aware that Charlene Mitchell, 
mentioned previously, was the presidential candidate for the Com- 
munist Party, U.S.A., during the 1968 campaign ? 

Mr. Hayden. That came as an interesting and pleasant surprise 
later. I think it is good that a black woman run for President of the 
United States. I think it is good that Communists are back entering 
American politics, even though I don't agree with their political pro- 
gram. But T doubt that even she knew tliat she would be a candidate 
for President of the United States at the time. And that was the first 
time that I had met her and I probably didn't even know her name. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now if I may, again, you said that you did not know 
that Kendra Alexander had been identified as a member of the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mr. H^VYDEN. I don't pay any attention to who you identify. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. ' 

Mr. HL^YDEN. If I had to read all your reports 

Mr. CoNLEY. Earl Durham ? 

Mr. Hayden. Earl Durham what? Was I aware that he had been 
identified by you ? No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Don Hamerquist ? 

Mr. Hayden. Same question ? 

Mr. Conley. Well, you can look at your own document, though. 

Mr. Hayden. Is he identified by your group as a member of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Conley. I will restate the question to Mr. Hayden. 

Mr. Hayden. What is it you want to know? Everyone knows thai 
there are 

Mr. IcHORD. The reporter is having difficulty following the exchange. 
It is very fast. Let's ask the question again. 

Mr. Conley. Let's go back and pick up the last question, and then 
move forward. Were you aware, from examining j-our own document, 
that Don Hamerquist was identified by your group as a member of the 
Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. You know, the Communist Party and anybody else 
opposed to the war in Vietnam can participa4» in the Mobilization. So 


what? I mean, I don't understand wh;^ you are continuing the tradi- 
tion of trying to point at these individuals, if you have pointed at 
them before. 

I would be only too happy to discuss a general question, but I don't 
understand what you are saying. 

Mr. CoNLEY. As I miderstand your answer to an earlier question, 
Charlene Mitchell's candidacj^ for President on the Communist Party 
was not known to you at that time ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. I didn't know anything about her. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You learned that sometime later ? 

Mr. Hayden. I learned from the papers. 

Mr. Conley. Do you recall when, approximately, you learned that ? 

Mr. Hayden. When it was announced in the papers. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you have any estimate as to when that was, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. I am sure you do. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Mr. Hayden, these ones that are not identi- 
fied by your document, which are identified by this committee 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. — do you have any knowledge yourself that they are 
members of the Communist Party. That would be 

Mr. Hayden. No, I don't. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Mr. Hayden. Except, of course, Mrs. Mitchell, from what I read 
in the papers. 

Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Hayden, referring back to your document, 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. Do you have a copy of that ? 

Mr. Conley. Did you describe this document as follows, quote : 

This paper proposes an election year campaign against a political system that 
has brought the United States into a crisis of war, racism, and social disintegra- 
tion. We outline a possible strategy for this campaign. * * * 

Mr. Hayden. I notice that your hand is shaking as you read those 
stated purposes. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is not being responsive to the question, Mr. 

Mr. Hayden. I think Rennie wrote that. It is on the first page. It is 
kind of a description of what is inside. 

Mr. Conley. You say that Mr. Davis wrote that particular 

Mr. Hayden. I think so. But, again, when he gets up here I am sure 
you can find out more clearly. 

Mr. Conley. All ri^ht. 

Mr. Hayden. This is just a little taste of what is to come, you know. 
It is just a cover. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, moving to page 15 of that 
document, did you make the following statements on that page, quote : 

Black Rebellions: In our view, summer organizers working in the white com- 
munity should discuss plans in each training school for support and parallel 
activity during black ghetto rebellions. * * * 

Mr. Hayden. I wrote that. 

Mr. Conley. "Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's offices" ? 

Mr. Hayden. I wrote that. 

Mr. Conley. "Organize medical and legal support"? 


Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "Pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the 

Mr. Hayden. Yes ; that even happened. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "To draw off police and find ways to focus public 
blame for what happens on the powerful white interests" ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes; you should talk to Rennie about this, also, be- 
cause he did just that with a lot of white people in Chicago in April. 
He organized demonstrations against the presence of National Guard 
in the city with a lot of other Chicago groups, and those people were 
bayoneted for carrying flowers, I believe, and gassed. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now, getting back to this particular state- 
ment, is what you meant by that statement that whenever a race riot 
broke out in a ghetto area that you were desirous that the white com- 
munity engage in simultaneous violent action in other parts of the 
community ? Is this what you meant ? 

Mr. Hayden, No; you see, it is because you don't understand revolu- 
tion. You can't start a revolution in your little suburb or on your cam- 
pus just because the blacks over here started one. You don't do some- 
thing because of something that is happening somewhere else. You 
don't do, you don't tiy to do the same thing. 

What this means is that, you see, we felt that white people who are 
sympathetic on these questions have been sort of paralyzed by the situ- 
ation in which there were these ghetto rebellions, the police could come 
in, and like in Newark, they killed 24 black people in 5 days, wounded 
hundreds, put a couple of thousand in jail ; and sympathetic whites 
could find no way to react except by feeling paralyzed, watching tele- 
vision, and so on. And we thought that the — this had to end and we 
had to show that not all white people favored the brutal suppression of 
justified rebellion, and so we wanted white people to conduct demon- 
strations in the suburbs and at the police stations and at the mayors' 
offices and, if necessary, place ourselves nonviolently in front of the 
National Guardsmen. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Simultaneously ? 

Mr. Hayden. Sure, at the time that it is happening. Like in Boston. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And in the same community ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, not necessarily. In Boston this spring there was the 
threat of an outbreak in the ghetto. It started one night, and the next 
day a local group there organized a l)ig rally of white people against 
bringing in troops to suppress those people, and 20,000 white people 
came, and there were speeches. And I think that had a small political 
effect in sort of cooling the situation and keeping the troops out. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, Mr. Hayden, in your statement you say to "pull 
together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off 
police." My question was : Did you mean in the same community ? You 
are not suggesting, sir, that if there were a black rebellion in Newark, 
New Jersey, that a white demonstration in IjOS Angeles would i)ull off 
any police, are you ? 

Mr. Hayden. That would be \evy good, even though it wouldn't i)ull 
off Newark police. I think a better place would be to go have a big 
demonstration at the temple where the landlords go to worship and 
another big demonstration at the Roman Catholic Church where the 
police go to worship, and raise questions about what they are doing in 


uniform, carrying the machine guns and automatic weapons down into 
the ghetto. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In Los Angeles or in Newark ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, right in the suburbs outside of Newark. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That's what I am trying to get at, sir. That's what we 
have been trying to get at, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Do you get it ? 

Mr. Conley. I think we are getting it. 

Mr. Hayden. Okay. 

Mr. Conley. Are all landlords Jewish ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. I misunderstood your statement. 

Mr, Hayden. But that's where most landlords tend to go, and most 
policemen tend to go to Roman Catholic Church, and that's where 
their conscience is, and that's where we should try to raise the question 
of how far they have strayed from their conscience. I certainly meant 
no ethnic slur. I meant there is a profound breakdown of religion in 
our country, as you know, in which people are not carrying out the 
basic teachings of morality or religion, unless those are carried out 
with tear gas and Mace. 

Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Hayden, getting back to the document again, 
in this document you describe a series or a wave of activities, which 
included the following, surrounding 

Mr. Hayden. Page, please? 

Mr. Conley. Page 18, sir — which included surrounding the Conrad 
Hilton, a Chicago hotel 

Mr. Hayden. I am sorry. Page what ? 

Yes, go ahead. 

Mr. Conley. Are you with me, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. — which included surrounding the Conrad Hilton, a 
downtown hotel. And this was in fact done during the convention, 
was it not ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. Where is that ? What line ? I don't see it. Page 

Mr. Conley. I am sorry, sir. I identified the wrong page. It starts 
on 17. 

Mr. Hayden. Give me the first line there. 

Mr. Conley. I am just generally paraphrasing, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. All right. Okay, but let's read it. I know what that 
is; it is beautiful, but I hope you read it into the record, and let the 
press hear what you are reading from, instead of distorting again, as 
you just did. 

Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead, read, Mr. Hayden. You have it before you. 
Read it. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, we are giving examples of how we wanted to 
bring the question of poverty to the surface, because we didn't think 
that poverty and hunger would be dealt witli by the Democratic Con- 
vention. And we were giving suggestions rather than instructions, as 
you can see from the use of the verb "might." We are trying to give 
suggestions of what might happen to dramatize what we wanted and 
we said : 

21-706 0—69 — pt. 2- 


To dramatize the demand and the urban condition, protests could focus on 
hundreds of the major institutions that irresponsibly contribute to urban break- 
down ; welfare oflSces, urban renewal departments, police stations, day-labor 
hiring halls, large slima landlords, schools and city hall. Different organizations 
would come to Chicago prepared to carry out a specific action program. The 
Mississippi Freedom Democrats might want to focus attention on their lack of 
representation or on the failure to deal with poverty across the coimtry. Or a 
coalition of "poverty rights" organizations in one region might surroimd the 
Conrad Hilton, a downtown Chicago hotel, on the morning of the 26th to greet 
the delegates with leaflets demanding $15 billion to end poverty and a breakfast 
menu totaling 15 cents, the amount allotted under welfare. At 10:00 a.m., the 
recipients might march from the Hilton to 318 West Adams to join with delega- 
tions coming from the other downtown hotels in a massive demonstration at the 
welfare oflice headquarters of Chicago. In the evening, the recipients might again 
return to the hotels to invite the delegates to spend the night with them in the 
ghetto rather than in luxurious hotels. * * * 

Mr. IcHORD. This is suggested strategy of demonstration? 

Mr. Hayden. This is something that we thought miglit be a good 
idea. It was a way to sort of clarify what we thought would be a good 
kind of protest. 

Mr. IcHORD. What was your question ? 

Mr. Hayden. The question was, Didn't we surround the Hilton ? In 
fact, obviously, we didn't, because the welfare mothers chose the road 
of going before the platform committee. And, in fact, the ones that 
I was in touch with felt it would be too dangerous to go stand in front 
of the Conrad Hilton, with all the police out there, so they confined 
their protest to speaking out forcefully before the platfonn committee, 
and they did not surround the Conrad Hilton and they did not invite 
the delegates to live in the ghetto, and so fortli. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it your testimony, then, that no group 
did in fact surround the Conrad Hilton ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "No," that is not vour testimony, or "No, no group 

Mr. Hayden. No one ever surrounded the Conrad Hilton, but obvi- 
ously people massed in front of it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. The police surrounded it. I am sorry. 

Mr. Conley. The word "surrounded," though, does appear in your 
treatise ; does it not ? 

Mr. Hayden. Treatise? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Advocating that the Conrad Hilton be surrounded ? 

Mr. Hayden. No; it is a matter of describing a scenario of what 
might be a good thing to happen. We thought it might be very good 
to think about welfare mothers standing all the way around, sur- 
rounding the Conrad Hilton. 

Mr. Conley. Well, you used the word "surround," is what I am 
getting at. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, but what is wrong with picketing and surrounding 
a building? 

Mr. Conley. Sir, I am not asking if there is anything wrong with it. 
I am just asking whether then, in fact, it did occur? 

Mr. Hayden. No, it didn't. 

Mr. Conley. All right. The only thing that did occur was a mobiliza- 
tion in front of the Conrad Hilton ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, no ; much more than that occurred in front of the 


Conrad Hilton, more brutality unleashed there than I have ever seen 
in one night in my life. I was almost killed there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now moving on with your document, did you not also 
suggest that actions could concentrate, or might concentrate, on dozens 
of war targets across the city ? 

Mr, Hayden. Yes, Chicago draft boards, the downtown induction 
centers, the Illinois Institute of Technology, which is the Nation's 
center for chemical biological warfare research, and major war cor- 
porations like Dow Chemical. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now were any of these things — was there any 
demonstration or any type of activities in connection with any of 
these particular suggestions? 

Mr. Hayden. There probably were a few, but I was not aware of 
them because of the pressing needs to survive the police. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Haj^den, did you not also suggest that a 
march be held on the International Amphitheatre immediately after 
the first ballot, the Amphitheatre being the site of the Democratic 
National Convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes ; August 28 would be the fifth anniversary of the 
march on Washington, which you will recall, for jobs and justice. 
1963. And since 

Mr. IcHORD, Are you referring to the march of unrepresented people, 
Mr. Hay den? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; the march sponsored by the late Reverend Martin 
Luther King and other figures, and they never got their jobs or jus- 
tice. We thought that it would be appropriate and symbolic on August 
28, 1968, 5 years later, with more unemployment in the country and 
the black community than ever, it might be good to, as we say, and I 
quote : 

[August 28] might begin with a massive "Democratic Assembly," perhaps in 
Grant Park, and climax in a "funeral march" on the International Amphitheater 
immediately after the first ballot. Such a march conld be led by retired generals, 
admirals and Vietnam veterans. The funeral procession might be organized by 
constituencies : blacks followed by clergy followed by women followed by farmers 
and faculty and workers and resisters and so on. This funeral would speak for 
those who say that the elections represent no choice and a complete breakdown 
of democracy, and those who pledge to use the fall election to expand the 
resistance into all sections of the American public : professors engaged in war 
research ; people who pay war taxes ; recipients who let themselves be pushed 
around * * * 

And so forth, and so forth, and so forth. [Continues reading :] 

While Johnson accepts the nomination — 

You see, we believed that Jolinson was still in there — 

a half-miinon people in the largest protest in the history of the country carry 
caskets^ — ■ 

Not filled with arms and weapons, like the Viet Cong did in Saigon — 

carry caskets symbolizing the Democratic Party into the Convention area and 
bury them in Chicago's stock yards beside the Amphitheater. 

That was certainly our hope, but this was a premature document. 
We didn't know what people would be for and we wrote it as a way 
of sort of suggesting what we thought would be a great protest. 

Mr. IcHORD. Wliat was your immediate objective, Mr. Hayden, to 
influence the choice of the Democratic Convention ? 


Mr. Hayden. No; we knew in advance that it would be a 1964 
deal all over again, where the people would be fooled into believing 
they had a choice and that Vietnam war would be brought to an end, 
but in fact you would get a duplication of 1964, where as soon as 
the elections were over the war would be escalated. So we calculated 
in advance that the Democratic Convention would be the perfect 
time to expose the hypocrisy and chicanery of your politicians, 
who always are engaged in promising peace to people, while killing 
their sons. 

And none of you Congressmen's sons are in Vietnam, but a lot 
of other people's sons are in Vietnam, and we thought that at the 
time of the 

Mr. IcHORD. One moment, Mr. Hayden. If you will examine the 

Mr. Hayden. We want to draw that out. 

Mr. IcHORD. — you will find that you are in error. There are 
Congressmen's sons in Vietnam. 

Mr. Hayden. I think there are two or three, possibly, and I stand 
corrected — out of 500. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, referring back to the earlier 
document that we talked about earlier, which is the "Democratic 
Convention Challenge," do you have a copy of this document there? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't believe so. The one you gave me before ? 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now referring your attention to the top of page 3, did 
you not say in this document : 

A massive confrontation with our government — the Democratic Party — as 
it holds its convention in Chicago this summer is being organized. * * * 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, that is no secret. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, you are the one that headed- 

Mr. Hayden. We organized it. He and I were project directors. We 
tried to organize a massive confrontation, but your confusion is the 
press's confusion in believing that confrontation can only be mili- 
tary. This document spells out a political confrontation in great 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir; I am just asking you if you made the state- 
ment, if it is properly attributable to you ? 

Mr. Hayden. To myself and Rennie. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Did you not further suggest that the Chi- 
cago demonstrations be used, and I quote you again — 

to dramatize to the world the large numbers of people who feel unrepresented, 
and in fact disgraced and used, by our govenunent's jxxlicies * ♦ *. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't see that, but that is certainly the way I feel 
about it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If that statement appears there, would it be attributable 
to you ? 

Mr. Hanley. Yes; I just don't know where it is, but I certainly take 
credit for that kind of viewpoint. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now turning to page 4 of that same docu- 
ment, sir, did you not also suggest that the local coordinating commit- 
tees develop a plan to attack the Democratic Convention and did you 
not further suggest that 


Mr. Hatden. Where is this word "attack"? And what context? 
Page 4? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Pages 3 and 4. 

Mr. Hayden. I will just read it until we come to it. I don't know — 

the summer should become a period of intense organizing, education and dem- 
onstration. As local coordinating committees develop to plan the attact [sic] — 

Oh, yes — 

the attact on the Democratic Convention, they should initiate recruiting and 
training programs for summer organizers — several thousand should be the objec- 
tive — who build high school draft resistance unions, organize challenges to cor- 
rupt delegates, talk with teachers, doctors, veterans and welfare recipients about 
confronting the Convention on a particular day, gather intelligence on delegates 
who will be continuously confronted and talked to during their entire stay in 
Chicago, speak to hundreds of local trade unions about the war and racism, 
build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party head- 
quarters, and hold local war crime tribunals to expose prominent Democrats 
who manufacture antipersonnel bombs, poison gases or other weapons banned 
by international agreement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, in the word "attack" — after you have read the 
j)aragraph, the word "attack" is your word. It is not mine, is it ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is your meaning. It is my word. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I haven't put any meaning on it, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Of course not. 

Mr. Conley. Now what did you mean in this statement, and I quote 
specifically, "build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Demo- 
cratic Party headquarters" ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, we don't — you see, this was at a time when we 
were having a dialogue with sections of the black movement who were 
interested in the Democratic Party and building an alternative politi- 
cal party independent of it. And we don't think that the Democratic 
Party has much of a right any longer to conduct the kind of campaigns 
that it has in the ghetto, so we thought that it shouldn't even have 
headquarters there. 

Mr. Conley. My question, sir, isn't what you thought. My question 
is : What did you mean by "build pressure in the ghetto" ? How did 
you propose to build this pressure ? 

Mr. Hayden. We didn't. We didn't ever propose how to do it and 
we didn't ever try to do it. 

Mr. Conley. What did you mean by it, then ? 

Mr. Hayden. What is "pressure" ? Pressure, you organize people to 
go to Democrats and say 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir ; I am asking you now for your interpretation ; 
don't let me put mine on it. 

Mr. Hayden. You organize pressure, pressure is people, people going 
to local political hacks and telling them to deliver or get out. What 
could be clearer ? 

Mr. Conley. You mean you are suggesting that the pressure you 
were talking about was for Negroes within the ghetto to go to the 
political hacks, as you describe them, and tell them to get out ? 

Mr. Hayden. Deliver or get out. Stop campaigning and not deliver- 
ing. Something like that. I mean, we never developed it programmati- 

Mr. Conley. Well, this statement doesn't give an alternative, sir. It 
merely says, "pressure in the ghetto." 


Mr. Hayden. You see, the statement does not say get them out. The 
statement says, "build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all 
Democratic Party headquarters." 

Mr. CoNLEY. It doesn't say, "If they don't deliver." It says, to re- 

Mr. Hayden. I was trying to interpret it further. But the main point 
is that very little of this happened, and I don't even have knowledge of 
whether it happened. So all of this is very suggestive, and we weren't 
committed to any of these strategies, like organizing high school 
unions. We didn't speak before hundreds of trade union locals and we 
didn't organize pressure in the ghetto to have Democratic Party head- 
quarters removed. 

Mr. Conley. Now directing your attention to page 4 and the first full 
paragraph on that page, did you not also suggest, Mr. Hayden, that — 

the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions and 
marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chi- 
cago * * *. 

Mr. Hayden [reads] . 

— clogging the streets of Chicago with people demanding peace, justice and partici- 
pation in government. This should be a period in which the movement projects a 
series of broad, but concrete demands — demands which the vast majority of people 
can identify with, but which the Democratic Party is shown to be unable to meet. 

The movement must not play into Johnson's hands by attempting to prevent 
the Convention from assembling, a position few Americans would accept or under- 
stand. Rather the action should build steadily through the Convention week, 
each day escalating the demands and the tactics, building for a massive confronta- 
tion at the time of Johnson's nomination. The initial challenges and activities 
might involve 50,000 to 100,000 people. The final funneral [sic] march on the Dem- 
ocratic Convention, beginning as the first ballot is taken, should bring a half mil- 
lion—people demanding a choice on the issues of peace and justice ; citizens who 
have come to "make the democratic process work" by pinning the delegates in the 
International Ampetheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to the American 

A well planned, educational build-up would preceed [sic] the final days of mil- 
itancy : for example, alternative platform committee hearings ; challenges inside 
the Convention as well as outside ; continuous "lobbying" with every delegate ; 
outdoor rallies ; daily press conferences — • 

And so on and so forth. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, what did you mean by the use of the word 
"militancy" ? 

Mr. Hayden. Oh, come on. I mean, I did not mean violence. I have 
put on the record, over and over, I did not mean that. And there are 
statements in this other document that you have read from which say 
that our protests should be nonviolent and legal. If you will give me the 
other document, I will read that to you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, let me ask you another question in that vein. 

Mr. Iciiord. Mr. Counsel, at that point, it is now 8 minutes after 12. 
I assume there are still many questions to propound to Mr. Hayden, 
Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock. 

Tlie committee will reconvene at 2 p.m. 

(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., Monday, December 2, 1968, the sub- 
committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.) 

(Subcommittee members present at the time of recess: Representa- 
tives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 


(The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, 
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.) 

(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Ash- 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order in the hearing room. 
A quorum again being present, the committee will resiune its hearings 
at the point we left off prior to recess. 

Mr. Counsel. 


Mr. CoNLET. Mr. Hayden, I think at the time of the recess you had 
been asked a question about a quote attributable to you which appeared 
in this publication, "DISCUSSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CON- 

I think the last question that we asked you was. Is there in fact a 
quotation in there, words to the effect, on page 4 in the first full para- 
graph, that — 

the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions and 
marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chi- 
cago * * *. 

Mr. Hayden. No, that would be a total erroneous understanding. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are those words in that ? 

Mr. Hayden. They're some of the words you have taken out of the 
sentence, out of the paragraph, and out of the document. You have 
done it in such a way as to totally alter the meaning. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I have not asked you what the meaning was. I have 
asked you if the words appear. 

Mr. Hayden. I was putting my point in your reference. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do the words, "demonstrations, disruptions and 
marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets 
of Chicago," do those words appear in that article ? 

Mr. Hayden. They appear, but not as a sentence. 

Mr. CoNLEY. They do appear? 

Mr. Hayden. They appear in the context of a sentence. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, sir, I will be pleased to hear your explanation. 

Mr. Hayden. I have already gone into that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Then we will move on if we may. On the 
same page does not the following statement appear, that one of your 
policies or plans was "pinning the delegates in the International 
Ampetheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to the American people" ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I read that to you before. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This does appear. 

Mr. Hayden. As part of the sentence. I read the entire sentence 

Mr. loHORD. The Chair has the paper before him. What page is 
that on ? 

Mr. Conley. Page 4, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hayden. The third full paragraph. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The third full paragraph on the page, I believe. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. This, I assume, is nonviolently and peacefully you 
would pin them in there. How is this done? 


Mr. Hayden. I don't want to bore you, but I think I read to you an 
extensive description of the funeral march on the Democratic Conven- 
tion before. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. You don't pin people in a funeral march, do you? 

Mr. Hayden. In effect, by coming down there to bury the coffins 
in the stockyard, the convention hall would be surrounded. Obviously, 
we would not be able to literally pin or literally prevent the conven- 
tion people from coming and going, because obviously they have ac- 
cess that the police can allow for them. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Do you think all the people who were there knew 

Mr. Hayden. In our permits, which we submitted in writing over 
and over again, which are public documents, we indicated what we 
meant by this. We indicated with maps and with descriptions where 
we wanted to go to the Amphitheatre, where we wanted our rally 
to be held. At no time did we submit plans or organize on the sort of 
preposterous basis of literally being able to pin or enclose people in 
a place. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then, sir, is not the use of the word "pin" a poor choice 
of words? 

Mr. Hayden. You may think so. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you. 

Mr. Hayden. I think that our meaning is conveyed in this document 
adequately. I will defend the use of this word or any other word. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, another question in the same area. This is 
the only paragraph that I read in this particular article that we have 
been reading from today where it is not couched in the terms "might" 
or a proposal. It is couched in a more specific, almost to the point of 
saying "shall." I don't know whether you actually used the word 
"shall" in there, but it is not suggested as a possibility, at least this 
particular paragraph does not read as a possibility, as some of the 
other paragraphs do. It reads as a position. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, it says at the beginning — you see, we divided into 
spring, summer, and convention time. We said that the summer should 
be capped by a week of demonstrations, et cetera. 

Wliat we were saying here is that we prefer this thing that we 
write about to come about. 

Mr. CoNLEY. But you didn't say the summer "might" be capped 
by, you said the summer "should" be capped by. 

Mr. Hayden. So what, 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Mr. Chairman, could he finish his answer? 

Mr. Hayden. I obviously said that. All I am saying is, that is exactly 
what you want me to say. It is what Mr. Davis and I proposed should 
happen, but I just want you to keep in mind that since this was 
written in Januai-y or February it was really meant to provoke discus- 
sion. Our own concept of what should be done and how it should be 
done changed over the next several months several times, depending 
on what the new situation was in the country. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Weren't these actions which you i^roposed, Mr. Hayden, 
actually planned to disrupt the convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was this the purpose ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. If you will let me give an extended answer, having 


said "no," I will be glad to try to clear that up. I don't want to go 
over past grounds, but I have said several times, and shown you in 
documents that you have in your possession, that our purpose was 

None of us thought that our purpose would be served by violence. 
We wanted the largest number of people to come to Chicago possible. 
We knew that the threat of violence would keep people away. Faced 
with what we considered to be the violence, the lack of permits, we 
decided we had to go to Chicago anyway and take our chances. 

But at no time did we want that to happen for a very serious political 
reason. I think that most people in this country respect the right of 
the Democratic Party or any other party to hold a convention and 
decide on its candidates and decide on its policies. We are not question- 
ing their right to do that. We are questioning their authority, their 
legitimacy, their status in our eyes, and, essentially, the morality of 
what they are doing. That is the point. If it was going to be disrupted, 
as I have said in speeches and in writing, in fact during convention 
week, I always believed that the disruption would occur by the military 
machinery turning against itself. 

You see, you had a situation where an agent from one agency was 
arresting another agent. I mean they were spying on each other, arrest- 
ing each other. I remember one day in Lincoln Park an officer from 
one agency arrested another fellow who was taking a picture, because 
he thought it Avas a demonstrator taking a picture of himself. It 
turned out there were just two people from different agencies spying 
on each other. 

As you saw that momentum build up, due to the presence of so 
many troops in the city not exactly knowing what they were there for, 
and you saw the methods practiced inside the convention hall, in 
which a substantial minority of the delegates felt — whether you agree 
with them or not, a substantial minority of the delegates felt that the 
entire operation w^as bein^ manipulated and controlled undemocrati- 
cally by the Johnson administration, there were times inside the con- 
vention, on the floor of the convention, that mass violence almost broke 
out as a result of what one television broadcaster called the thugs who 
seemed to be on the convention floor. There were times when the chair- 
man of the delegation moved that the convention stop and leave town. 
One U.S. Senator discussed from the podium, the gestapo tactics out- 
side and was attacked in obscene language by Mayor Daley. 

Mr. IcHORD. Were you inside the convention, Mr. Hay den ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are testifying from hearsay ? 

Mr. Hayden. I am testifying from what I saw on television. I 
thought there were points during that week in which the convention 
would simply fold up. I saw^ the Democratic Party eating itself, be- 
cause there is no security in this kind of military defense that the 
United States and that the convention had. You cannot secure your- 
self from people by building more and more barbed wire and getting 
miore spies and infiltrators and more sophisticated weapons. All you 
do is make yourself fundamentally insecure. That is how I thought the 
convention would disrupt itself. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden 

Mr. Hayden. And it almost did. It almost ended before it came to 
the nominations. 


Mr. CoNLET. In that vein I am sure you are familiar with the article 
which appeared in the December issue of Enquire dealing with you, 
Tom Hayden, "Will he overcome?'' or something to that effect.^ 

Mr. Hayden. You are probably far more familiar with it. 

Mr. CoNLET. There is a paragraph in it. I am not attributing this as 
a quote to you, but apparently it is an assessment of the reporters 
talking with you. It appears on the last page of this article. In the 
third column it says : 

This is the real point of Chicago. Hayden saw it as an ideal opportunity to 
provoke a confrontation with the police in full view of television cameras. 
Enough bloody heads and some people might get mad enough to cross over the 
line and put themselves in opposition, to become "radicalized." * * * 

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.) 

Mr. Hayden. I am sorry, did you have something further to ask, 
or what? 

Mr. CoNLEY, I am asking you, in view of your answer here that you 
were not intending to disrupt the convention, if this impression you 
created with this reporter at least would indicate othemvise. 

Mr. Hayden. I never talked to this reporter during or very far 
before the convention. His opinion about me is quite similar to yours. 
I can't help that, but I would like to read to you my own statement 
about the subject, which appeared in the RAT. 

The RAT is a publication 

Mr. CoNLEY. I don't mind your reading the statement if you will 
answer my original question. You say this is not a fair assessment. 

Mr. Hayden. Of course, it is not a fair assessment. It is contradictory 
to everything I have said to you all day. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden 

Mr. Hayden. Let me tell you my position. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Just a second. Let me ask you this. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair is not going to require the witness to com- 
ment on the assessment by the reporter. If he wishes to do so, I will 
recognize him for the purfK>se of doing so. 

Mr. Hayden. I would like to read a couple of things that I wrote, 
which were distributed in the closest thing to an official statement of 
what organizers of the demonstration were planning. In one article 
about the police preparations for the convention I said the following: 

The main thrust of their schemes revealed the mentality of the bully, attempt- 
ing to win by force what persuasion has failed to do : acceptance of a rigged 
political decision. The strategy is to frighten people into surrendering their 
right to dissent, to demonstrate, to take to the streets. [Bold face in original.] 

Jack Mabley of the Chicago American wrote July 25 that Chicago has estab- 
lished the reputation of being "an uptight city, with tough police." This has 
achieved a "sobering effect" [he said] on potential peace demonstrators "who 
are willing to risk a slight bump on the head or a twisted arm or a night in the 
cooler in New York or San Francisco but not a skull fracture in Chicago." * * * 

The purpose therefore, according to Mabley, of the police prepara- 
tion was — 

to develop a "strong movement ... to warn young hippies and yippies away 
from Chicago." 

1 Steven V. Roberts, "Will Tom Hayden Overcome?" Esquire, December 1968. 


Then I said the following : 

The sadistic and provocative element, of course, is represented by the Chicago 
police department. They are expected to use their clubs esi)ecially at night 
against small groups of peaceniks. The NMC [Mobilization Committee] has 
asked the Justice Department to investigate the existence of a rightv\dng con- 
spiracy within the Police Department to take advantage of the demonstrations 
to provoke violence. * * * 

The Justice Department has refused to make such an investigation. 

Then I go on to say : 

The strategic problems of the establishment are immense, conslstiiig of con- 
tradictions between the need for security and the need for political image. 
Security demands that they militarize Chicago and ring the Amphtheatre [sic] 
with troops. Too great a military presence threatens to alienate young people, 
McCarthy supporters, undermine confidence in the US govennrnfent every- 
where, and open the Administration to the ridicule of all its critics. Thus on the 
strategic level the govermnent already is working from a political disadvantage. 

Then I go on and on and on and I say : 

The Mobilization has asked for the withdrawal of all military forces from the 
vicinity of our demonstrations. They can carry on routine functions but the 
Mobilization wants none of their "protection" which inevitably means police 
provocation and brutality. 

However, if the authorities insist on ringing demonstrations everywhere with 
menacing troops, then they will be creating a full military occupation of Chicago. 
Thus, even peaceful and orderly demonstrations will be dramatic experiences 
and will show the widening gap between the i)eople with grievances and their 
supposed political representatives. When not demonstrating, we can laugh from 
beaches and turn to more serious topics while they protect their government and 
[private] property. 

In making Chicago safe for their "democracy," they will show others that 
this "democracy" is unsafe for human beings.* 

Again : 

We understand that if violence occurs, it will be because of the negligence 
and brutality of national and local authorities. They have called us "disrupters"; 
refused us marching permits; bluffed through shows-of-strength-; refused to 
clean out the vigilante-reactionaries operating within the police forces; and, 
above all, resisted all peaceful pressures for change. 

We do not welcome the beating or killing of even a single member of our 
movement. We do not reduce individuals to cannon-fodder as the warmakers 
do. We do not risk our people to "radicalize" others. But we know that serious 
struggle cannot begin without each individual preparing to accept jail or 
suffering as the price. We will not be intimidated into surrendering our rights 
to protest. We cannot allow an unjust law and order to be imposed by police 
methods.^ [Bold face in original.] 

Mr. IcHORD. This is the writing of yours, Mr. Hayden, which served 
as a basis of the reporter's assessment? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know the basis of his assessment. I am saying 
that what I have just read is from the convention document of the RAT. 
It was the closest thing to a semiofficial position by myself and other 
organizers. I tried to point out that the convention was in danger of 
disrupting itself because of its security preparations, not because of 
us. These preparations can't go hand in hand with a peaceful conven- 
tion. I tried to indicate that I don't really believe in this theory that the 
Esquire magazine article ascribes to me, that somehow you move people 
to the left or radicalize them by letting them get beat over the head by 

All through the year 

^ "the cops and the conTention." RAT convention special, p. 2. 



Mr. IcHORD. You don't feel that pinning the delegates in the Amphi- 
theatre would help to alleviate the undesirable conditions which you 
attribute to the convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. In our proposals which began in late spring and early 
summer in the city of Chicago, which I can bring out to you complete 
with maps, we can show how it was possible and how we proposed to 
the city how they could station whatever number of troops they wanted 
around the Amphitheatre, guarantee coming and going to all the dele- 
gates, and still allow a march to come to the Amphitheatre — which 
was the site of what we thought was a national tragedy — and have the 
marchers go around the Amphitheatre and have an enormous rally 
outside of it. 

It would be possible to both have a convention and have such a 
demonstration. In other words, the collision between the riots of the 
conventioners, you folks, and our riots, did not have to come off. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. If they played it your way ? 

Mr. Hayden. Right. Do you really think that the hippies and Yippies 
and people like myself are coming to Chicago, with the kind of com- 
position of our movement that we have, that we seriously planned to 
take on the police department, charge through the doors, and tear up 
the convention ? 

That is ridiculous. That is what I tried to say earlier about why I 
didn't think violence was meaningful in Chicago. I don't believe in this 
sort of throwing around the concept of violence loosely. And I did not 
believe, and I never believed, that it would be possible, quite apart from 
whether it was desirable — I didn't think it was desirable either — but 
I knew from the beginning it was not possible to carry through on some 
kind of concept of invading or disrupting the convention. 

What I wanted to know is why with all your police force, intelligence 
agencies, you weren't as smart as we were. I think you are as smart 
as we were so you turn the thing into a gigantic myth. Anybody knows 
that LSD in the water is not a real threat ; it cannot work. 

A little consultation with the doctor or scientist would straighten 
you out. With the Pentagon and State and local troops on the scene to 
figure things out for months in advance, I cannot understand why you 
thought it was possible, with minimum police protection, why it was 
possible for us to somehow enter and turn the convention upside down. 
I cannot understand it. Therefore, I think someone somewhere decided 
that it would be a good political thing to have all those troops in 

Mr. IcHORD. You are saying "you," Mr. Hayden. I think you have 
to remember that Mr. Ashbrook is a member of the Republican Party. 

Mr. Hayden. Right. I was trying to draw him out. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the next question. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in this same vein let me ask you about 
something which appeared in Granma^ the official organ of the cen- 
tral committee of the Communist Party of Ci^bii, in its issue of Sep- 
tember 8, 1968, page 12. [Hayden Exhil.'t No. 8. See page 2585.] 

Mr. Hayden. Do you have that ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. I will give it to you in just a moment. They pub- 
lished the text of an August 28 telephone interview with Michael 
Klonsky, national secretary of SDS. My first question would be, Do 
you know Michael Klonsky ? 


Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This interview was apparently held with Mr. Klonsky 
by telephone from Havana to Chicago during the course of the conven- 
tion. Mr. Klonsky was asked this question : "What can you tell us 
about the present situation in Chicago ?" 

Mr. Klonsky's answer was as follows : 

We have been fighting in the streets for four days. Many of our people have 
been beaten up, and many of them are in jail, but we are winning. We pushed the 
police out of Grant Park, and the people were still in the streets. They are going 
to be in the streets all night, and we are going to do anything we can to stop 
this farce (the Democratic National Convention) which is taking place in 
Chicago. The people are committed to carry on this fight not only in Chicago 
but throughout the United States. We are going to go back to the hotel (The 
Conrad Hilton) and down to the park again, and are going to carry on the 
fight all night until the Convention is over. The police have been very brutal, and 
a lot of people have been shot and a lot of people have been beaten up, but the 
young people have committed themselves to fight, and they are fighting very 

Now, Mr. Hayden- 

Mr. Hayden. What was the date of this ? When was this interview ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. The interview was on August 28. 

Mr. Hayden. How could that be ? I see it is on the 28th. Then there 
is something curious about the interview, because on that day the 
convention was virtually ended. 

Mr. IcHORD. The date of the convention was the 26th through the 
29th, was it not ? 

Mr. Hayden. The nominations and the real finish was the night 
of the 28th. There was no demonstration or activity on the 29th. 

Mr. Conley. This is in reference to the 28th. 

Mr. Hayden. All right. Wliat is your point ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question is, Did you have any conversations with 
Mr. Klonsky in Chicago at the time of this interview ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. You know nothing about what he told them ? 

Mr. Hayden. What he told the Cubans ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

Mr. Hayden. No. This is the first I knew about this. I knew that a 
very funny thing happened. A Cuban radio called up the Mobilization 
office in the middle of the convention and asked what was happening, 
and Dellinger picked up the phone. That is the only time I knew about 
it. I think somebody else called from some other foreign country. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This particular answer to the question would indicate 
that whoever Mr. Klonsky was speaking for had no intention of let- 
ting the Democratic Convention be completed. 

Don't you read it that way ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't quite read it that way. 

Mr, CoNLEY. "We have no intention of letting this convention finish" 
or "this farce'' ? I think he calls it "the farce." 

Mr. Hayden. "We are g:oing to do anything we can to stop this 
farce * * * which is taking place in Chicago." "Stop the farce," 
does that mean to you invasion of the convention ? What does it 
mean ? Certainly by that time it did not mean invasion of the conven- 
tion, August 28. 

Mr. CoNLEY. He says you "are going to do anything." 

Mr. Hayden. What does that mean ? 


Mr. CoNLEY. That gives you a lot of options. That is what I am ask- 
ing you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. a lot or none. We have the reports on what was done 
according to the Chicago Police Department. As far as I know a 
lot of things were not done, there were no weapons confiscated. There 
were one or two. There was a McCarthy card among the weapons, there 
was a bag of urine or some sticks. 

In terms of those realities I think this phrase, "We are going to do 
anything we can," should be judged in terms of the actual facts of 
the matter. You saw what they did. So I don't know what your point is. 

Mr. CoNLEY. My point is, sir, that he indicates in that interview 
that he was willing to do anything to stop the farce. 

Mr. Hayden. Did he ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I asked you if that is not what the interview said. 

Mr. Hayden. Obviously he must have decided there were things he 
should not do. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, was the witness present at the interview ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't even know if it is a correct interview. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking if that is what appears in the interview. 
That it all I am concerned with, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hayden". He certainly didn't indicate the convention would be 
stopped. He said we are going to carry on the fight all night until the 
convention is over, from the thing you have underlined. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, do you of your own knowledge know of 
anyone who was shot ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, killed. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In Chicago ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Who? 

Mr. Hayden. An American Indian from one of the Dakotas whose 
name appears in the document. I can't remember his name. He was 
described in the Chicago papers as a Yippie-clad person alleged to 
have — he was shot and killed about the 24th, 23d or 24th, something 
like that. Allegedly he had pulled a gun out of his bag and shot at 
pointblank range at the oiRcer, plainclothes officer, I believe, who had 
him ; that is like 2 feet away. 

Mr. IcHORD. Were you there ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. This is the report of the police. Somehow it missed 
this policeman. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was this at the convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. At the beginning; just when j^eople were coming to 
town. It threw extreme fear into people around the country. We had 
a lot of phone calls. The news went out around the country there had 
been the first clash between a hippie and policeman. 

This younger person, I can read to you from page 83. 

One incident which contributed to the week's uncertainty and the demon- 
strators' edginess was the August 22 Ivilling of a 17-year-old American Indian, 
Jerome Johnson. Johnson, from Sioux Falls, South Dakota, was shot to death by 
police at North Avenue and Wells Street, just a few blocks southwest of the park. 
Police detectives said they fired their guns when the fleeing youth, identified as 
a Yippie, fired a .32 caliber revolver at them. The shooting caused one of the 
marshal trainers to say : 

"We don't want to go overboard in ascribing malevolent intentions to the police, 
but obviously things are going to be getting very rough here. We've got to be 


That is the only per.son that I know of that was killed in connection 
with the Chicago convention. But I know a lot of shots were fired 
over people's heads and that the situation was one in which some people 
could have been killed very easily. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me direct your attention back to the right column, 
the top of the same page of the Havana interview, wherein Mr. Klon- 
sky apparently relates 

Mr. Hayden. He writes, "Some people were killed already several 
nights ago." I don't know whether Klonsky said that or whether the 
Cubans made it up. All I know is what it says here. It is reproduced 
and apparently was said on August 28. 

Again, I don't understand your point except that this statement 
of his is in error, whether it is a Cuban error or Klonsky error. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Or an SDS error ? 

Mr. Hayden. SDS error ? SDS does not make errors. We don't have 
such an organization. It is not capable of making any kind of decision. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, were you at a meeting held in Chicago 
by the National Mobilization Committee on August 4 of this year? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know. Explain the meeting, and I will try to 

Mr. CoNLEY. Maybe I can refresh your memory. Was it suggested 
at that meeting, if you were there 

Mr. Hayden. "Wliere was it and who was at it? 

Mr. Conley. 407 South Dearborn. It was suggested at that meeting 
by Rennie Davis, speaking for the steering committee of which you 
are a member, that on the day of the nomination, Wednesday, the 
28th of August, you would have a massive march to the Amphitheatre. 

Mr. Hayden. There was always the proposal of not simply Rennie 
Davis, but all the officers of the Mobilization, that we were going to 
march to the Amphitheatre. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis was speaking for the steering committee, 
was he not ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know whether he was speaking for the steering 
committee or .simply speaking for a project director. 

Mr. Conley. This did, in fact, occur then? 

Mr. Hayden. Let me see what you are reading from here. It will 
just take a second.^ 

All I see, sir, is the following : 

The discussion moved to the massive march proposal, analyzing the various 
routes to the Amphitheatre and the length of the different routes. Dave — 

That is Dellinger — 

pointed out that calling for an action not relating to the Amphitheatre on the 
28th was ignoring the natural magnetism of the place, that the media would 
be at the Amphitheatre, and that the necissity [sic] of having the military sur- 
round masses of people at a democratic convention would lend political content 
to the action. There was a discussion on the possibility of proceeding in the 
face of a curfew threat or denial of a permit. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Go ahead and read. That is all right. 
Mr. Hayden [continues reading]. 

1 "Summary of Administrative Meeting Held in Chicago on Aug. 4, Chaired by Dave 
Dellinger." See Grubisic Exhibit No. 25, pt. 1, pp. 2348-2352, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings. 


It was pointed out that the Mob[ilization] has rallied people before without a 
permit, and that insistence on fulfilling an announced aim made a strong bar- 
gaining position in negotiating a permit. * * * 

I am trying to find what you say Rennie said. I don't find that. I 
will read everything, but 

Mr. CoNLEY. If you are on page 2 this is all said by Mr. Davis. 

Mr. Hayden. That is what I can't understand. 


Mr. Hayden. That is absurd the way you are reading it. The 
"scenario," under where it says "proposed scenario," then the rest are 
notes from the meeting, from the discussion, made by whoever the 
secretary was. 

Here it is : 

The day of the nomination, Wednesday, the 28th, will see the massive march. 
At about 3 PM, marchers will gather north of the Loop, proceed through the 
central downtown business area to the Amphitheatre. In a specified one-mile area 
along Halstead neighboring to the Amphitheatre, the demonstrators can hold a 
vigil, picket, create theatre or rally for as long as the convention lasts; and 
when it concludes the marchers will leave as a unit to the Grant Park bandshell 
where they will disperse. This event, which will be aided by experienced mar- 
shals, will include a teach-in for the troops stressing our differences are not with 

That was the proposal. 

Mr. IcHORD. The proposal made after the application for the march 
to the Amphitheatre was applied for ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. This was in the course of our negotiations with 
the city, if you want to call them negotiations. I would say it was 
sort of a one-way monologue, with the city listening to us but not 
responding until a couple of days before the convention, 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, in connection with the paragraph that you were 
reading a while ago and directing your attention specifically to the top 
of page 4 

Mr. Hayden. What is the first word on 4, 1 don't have a number. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "Insistence." 

Mr. Hayden. I saw that wink in your eye. You want me to read 
down there? 

Mr. CoNLEY. No; I just want to know did there not occur the possi- 
bility that the city of Chicago would not permit a march against 
the Democratic Convention and was it not suggested by the persons in 
attendance that you would make this march on the Democratic Con- 
vention whether or not a permit was issued ? 

Mr. Hayden. It was always our position, stated over and over in 
the media — you don't need a House committee to investigate this 
question — that we thought that we were within our legal rights to 
march to the Amphitheatre ; that a parade permit was merely a tech- 
nical instrument that a city is supposed to use to allow people to con- 
duct legal activities, but this parade permit was being stalled and held 
back by the city authorities because they did not want people to come 
to Chicago. 

They never negotiated with us in good faith. Many people high in 
the Democratic Party know that. They were the losers. At the last 
moment they came through; after we had taken them to court they 


came through with some proposals which did not meet the substance 
of our request at all. 

A judge, who was Mayor Daley's law partner, Judge Lynch, very 
nicely named, denied our application and said that we could not have 
a permit. We said at that point that we would march, regardless, to 
the Ampliitheatre. We knew that it was in violation of this judge's 
ruling. We were prepared to accept whatever consequence came from 

We obviously knew that this would certainly not interrupt the 
Democratic Convention. In fact, we knew that we would not even get 
out of downtown without permit, and we didn't on the 28th. The 
police simply made it clear that they would block all arteries leading 
south to the Amphitheatre, and they did. We were bottled up in Grant 
Park for the whole day. We attempted to march, led by Dave Dellinger. 
We got to the police lines and stopped. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Specifically, was it not Mr. Robert Greenblatt who 
made the statement that if the curfew were imposed it should be 
disobeyed ? 

Mr. Hatden. It could very well have been Greenblatt. I don't recall 
exactly. Greenblatt is a responsible officer of the organization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will ask you to refer to the minutes. 

Mr. Hayden. The minutes do say Greenblatt. I will say it myself, 
Dellinger said it himself. Davis said it. Everybody agreed on that. 
As you read the notes you will see it was passed. 

Mr. Conley. Was it not at this meeting of August 4 that it was 
agreed Vernon Grizzard would be in charge of the marshals ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, we wanted Vernon to be in charge of the mar- 
shals. Yes, you are right ; in the minutes it was accepted. 

It is interesting that you don't mention the other names, because 
obviously you are interested in this Budapest conference that Vernon 
traveled to. I want to get back to this business in Paris with the Viet- 
namese, as soon as possible, to set the record straight about what our 
relations are with the Vietnamese and what Vernon was doing. 

Mr. Conley. Let us get back to something else first, Mr. Hayden, 
because you brought it up, RAT. You were reading from this a moment 
ago. Would you be kind enough to explain to the committee what 
RAT is? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, it is self-evident. It is an underground news- 
paper. It is published in New York and it is called the RAT. 

Mr. IcHORD. Published by whom, Mr. Hayden ? 

Mr. Hayden. The RAT staff. Editor, Jeffrey Shero; hero workers, 
Jeff Gerth, Marta Kusic; office guru, Sybil Dryden; maps, Michael 
Klare; graphics — hobo graphics. Rick Meyerwitz; advertising man- 
ager, Marvin Grafton. 

Mr. IcHORD. Is this the official publication of any organization ? 

Mr. Hayden. Published biweekly by R.A.T. Publication, Inc., 201 
East Fourth Street, New York, New York. 

Application for mail at second-class postage rates, et cetera, member 
of Liberation News Service and Underground Press Syndicate. 

Mr. Conley. Is RAT not in fact an organ of the SD$, Students for 
a Democratic Society? 

Mr. Hayden. No. SDS has an organ called New Left Notes. 

21-706 O — 69 — pt. 2 i 


Mr. CoNLEY. I am aware of that, but is not also RAT an organ of 
the same society ? 

Mr. Hayden. You will have to ask the society. As far as I know it 
never has been. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Since you had previously been an officer of that so- 
ciety, I thought you might be able to shed some light on the question. . 

Mr. Hayden. I have. Whether you like it or not that is the light that 
is shed. It is not connected to SDS. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, was this particular issue also known as 
the demonstrators' guidebook or handbook ? 

Mr. Hayden. It says "CONVENTION SPECIAL," "lyndon's 
BIRTHDAY FOLLIES," "iNSiDE : Maps & Muck." I will tell you about it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am not interested in it. 

Mr. Hayden. Rennie Davis and I wrote several articles explaining 
our political philosophy and information for people that we thought 
they should have if they were to come to demonstrate at Chicago. But 
it was not an official organ of SDS or the Mobilization or anyone else. 
That is what I said before, this is the closest thing to a sort of official 
recording of the views of myself and Rennie as project directors of 
the Mobilization. 

It includes maps of the Chicago Loop and different targets where 
you can demonstrate in the city of Chicago. The maps are introduced 
by the following statement : 

In order to avoid unnecessary violence and bloodshed it will be crucial to hold 
demonstrations at locations other than the International Amphitheatre where 
the concentration of police and national guard is very high. The following maps 
contain information about possible alternate demonstration sites throughout 
Chicago. Such information should enhance our mobility and assist in the forma- 
tion and execution of relatively safe demonstration strategies by different 

Then it has where all the rulers of America are located in the city, 
different buildings that they liave, banks, insurance companies, that 
sort of thing. And it has a map of the Amphitheatre area as well. It 
has an article on Mayor Daley, not very flattering. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was it stated at the meeting on August 4 that a hun- 
dred thousand copies of this special edition of RAT would be avail- 

Mr. Hayden. It mie:ht have been, but we decided on a smaller num- 
ber. I think it was 30,000. 

Mr. Conley. I will refer you to your notes again, on page 3. 

Mr. Hayden. Whatever the notes say I am sure you are reading 
them correctly, we came out with 30,000 instead of a hundred thousand. 

Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Hayden, if we may move on, in connection 
with the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Viet- 
nam, is it not a fact that the following people whom I am going to 
name were also invited to attend meetings of the administrative com- 
mittee or the steering committee of the National Mobilization Com- 

Mr. Hayden. Excuse me. Would it be possible for Mr. Davis to come 
up just to be a consultant to me on these questions of past meetings? 

Mr. Ichord. The Chair realizes, Mr. Hayden, that no one's memory 
is perfect. If you do not recall 

Mr. Hayden. As long as it is understood that I am not trying to hide 


anything under a bed, I will be glad to tell you when I can't remember 

Mr. CoNLEY. Okay. Did you want to have him come up ? 

Mr. Hayden. I would like him to come up. If the Chair thinks it is 

Mr. IcHORD. If he feels he wants to consult with him, I think Mr. 
Davis is close enough there. If you feel you have to consult with him, 
feel free to do so. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In order that I can make this as short as possible, you 
see the general tenor of my questions, sir. 

Other people invited to attend meetings of the planning committee 
of the National Mobilization Committee other than yourself: Mr. 
Herbert Bleich. 

Mr. Hayden. Are you reading from some list that I have also ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. It is from a composite list. 

Mr. Hayden, I don't know who Herbert Bleich is. 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness stated he did not know who Herbert Bleich 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I know, I don't know unless you are mispro- 
nomicing the name. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is why I am spelling it for you, sir, B-1-e-i-c-h. 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I know, I have never met such a person. 

Mr. CoNLEY, He has been identified by this committee as being affili- 
ated with the Progressive Labor Party, if that helps you in any way. 

Mr. Hayden. No, that does not clear up anything. 

Mr. Conley. The second name, Stokely Carmichael, black power 
advocate, who is now involved with the Black Panther organization. 

Mr. Hayden. "V^Hiat was the question, was he attending meetings? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was he invited to attend meetings and did he attend 
meetings ? 

Mr. Hayden. He may have been invited. He did not attend. 

Mr. Conley. Any of the meetings you attended ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. Conley. Kipp Dawson of the Socialist "Workers Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. He may have, but I don't know him. I don't know 
whether he was at a meeting. 

Mr. Conley. I have been told that Kipp Dawson is a female rather 
than a male. 

]VIr. Hayden. Well, that shows I don't know him. 

Mr. Conley. Abe Feinglass of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. Abe Feinglass of the Communist Party ? Is he listed 
as such ? I have heard the name. I think he is a trade unionist. "WTiether 
he is a member of the Communist Party, I don't know. I don't know if 
he attended any meetings. 

Mr. Conley. Paul Friedman, New York State youth director of the 
Communist Party. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know him. 

Mr. Conley. Jesse Gray. 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I know, Jesse Gray never attended meetings. 
I do know Jesse Gray somewhat. 

Mr. Conley. Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, Fred attended some meetings. I think he is an 
officer of the Mobilization anyway. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Lew Jones of the Young Socialist Alliance. 

Mr. HL^YDEN. He was present at some meetings. I forget which 
ones. You see, they didn't go for the action because they have a Trotsky- 
ist outlook. They don't believe the Democratic Party is legitimate at 
all, so they didn't want any demonstration whatsoever in the city of 
Chicago. So they did not participate very heavy in our planning. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Bettina Aptheker of the Comimunist Party. 

Mr. Hayden. I know Bettina just a little bit. I know her daddy bet- 
ter. I don't believe she was involved in the meetings. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Her daddy, I take it, is Herbert ? 

Mr. Hayden. You guessed it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sam Marcy, also known as Sam Ballan, Trotskyist 
Workers World Party. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know — my saying I don't know these people 
does not prove anything. They may be aromid my bed. They may have 
been at meetings. 

Mr. Conley. I understand. 

Jack O'Dell, also known as Hunter Pitts O'Dell, of the Communist 

Mr. Hayden. No idea. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Harry Ring of the Socialist Workers Party. 

Mr. Hayden. Harry Ring I met in Cuba once. He may have attended 
a Mobilization meeting. But as I said, these people, the Trotskyists, 
were against the action. So he couldn't have participated very heavy. 

Mr. IcHORD. Is the Trotskyite against 

Mr. Hayden. For the reason I said, they don't believe — you see, if 
you demonstrate outside the convention, they think this assumes you 
believe in the validity of the two-party system and they don't believe 
in its validity. So they didn't think there should be any demonstration 
there because it would be misleading the American people. I'm not a 
Trotskyist myself, but I may have done injustice to their position. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Jose Ristorucci. 

Mr. Hayden. No idea. 

Mr. Conley. Jack Spiegel. 

Mr. Hayden. Spiegel, yes ; Spiegel was in Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Arnold Johnson of the Commmiist Party. 

Mr. Hayden. Arnold Johnson I know slightly. He was at least at 
one meeting representing the Communist Party. Other than that I 
don't remember. I don't even know if he was in Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it not a fact that you have made trips 
to foreign comitries to meet with foreign Communist officials ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you not sign up as a delegate to attend the Soviet- 
controlled Communist World Youth Festival held in Helsinki, Fin- 
land, in 1962? 

Mr. Hayden. I'm glad you brought that up. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Remember, all I have asked you is did you sign up. 

Mr. Hayden. Just read it again. That is beautiful. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you sign up to make that trip ? 

Mr. Hayden. Say the whole question as you said it. 

Mr. Conley. Did you not sign up as a delegate to attend the Soviet- 
controlled Communist World Youth Festival held in Helsinki, Fin- 
land, in 1962? 


Mr. Hayden. This is an occasion where I was a dupe of the CIA, 
which controlled the National Student Association at the time. I was 
enticed by them to go to Helsinki as part of a little anti-Communist 
^roup that would try to make trouble for the Communists. I thought 
it would be a good trip, nice to have my way paid by whoever was 
paying it, probably the State Department or the CIA. Only at the 
last moment other problems here in this country prevented me from 
going. But I was going to carry Old Glory right into the heart of 
commmiism at that time. Now that can be proven by any number of 
CIA agents, former student leaders, organizers of the trip, or what 
have you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. My (question was, Did you originally sign up to go ? 

Mr. Hayden. I signed up not to go as a delegate, I don't think. I 
signed up to go as sort of a Radio Free America, or whatever we 
thought we were doing. We were going to go over there. I was a mem- 
ber of the group of Americans who were going to put out a little news- 
paper to tell the truth to all the Communists. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, although you did not go and you have 
offered us an explanation as to why you did not go, is it not a fact that 
you have since that time indicated that you wished you had had the 
opportunity to attend that festival ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I would have liked to have seen it, but I was 
accused of being a Communist here and had to fight that one out. That 
was when the parent organization of SDS threw SDS out back in 1962. 
That is in the history books. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in December of 1965 did you not travel to 
North Vietnam, together with Staughton Lynd and Herbert Aptheker, 
to attend meetings with such Communist officials as Premier Pham 
Van Dong? 

Mr. Hayden. Right. But the purpose was not to attend meetings 
with the Premier of North Vietnam in particular. The purpose 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question was "with such Communist officials." 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. I was trying to answer the question. The purpose 
was to try to understand the outlook on peace and war that the other 
side held. We wanted to interview a variety of people in North Viet- 

Mr. CoNLEY. On that trip in December 1965, did you meet with 
Colonel Ha Van Lau, who was mentioned here earlier this morning, 
who at that time, I believe, was liaison officer of the North Vietnamese 
on the International Control Commission ? 

Mr. Hayden. He was the liaison, I believe, between the North Viet- 
namese Army and the International Control Commission, which was 
established by the Geneva agreements. We heard from him a detailed 
analysis of their negotiating position and their view of the Geneva 
agreements, both in the past and in the future. We printed that inter- 
view in a book which we published, The Other Side^ in 1966. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, %vith regard to this trip were you not 
aware of the fact that Herbert Aptheker, a National Committee mem- 
ber of the Communist Party, U.S.A., received the original invitation 
from the North Vietnamese and was told to bring two persons with 

Mr. Hayden. That is the first time I have heard that version of it, 
but I am getting used to these kinds of doctored versions. I tell you 


what happened. Herbert Aptheker, whom I had not met before I 
took in a debate, attended a conference in Helsinki in the summer of 
1965 or early fall, which was one of the first conferences in Europe 
that I believe a North Vietnamese delegation came to since the be- 
ginning of the bombing in early 1965. 

They asked Aptheker if he would like to visit North Vietnam, which 
is a Communist country, he being a Communist Party official of the 
United States. He said he would be interested. They said they would 
like to also have acquaintance and contact with people in the emerging 
peace movement in the United States who were not in the Communist 
Party, who were not Communists. So he came back to do that. He 
contacted Professor Staughton Lynd, whom he knew slightly, but who 
at that time was one of the most widely acknowledged leaders of the 
protest against war. Professor Lynd thought it over and decided he 
would like to see North Vietnam and Professor Lynd asked if he 
could select a third person, and he selected myself. We had been 
friends in Atlanta and lived in the same community and have sort of 
been in contact for a couple of years. So we went with Dr. Aptheker, 
as you say, in December. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, it is not your understanding then that 
Mr. Aptheker in fact initially invited Carl Oglesby of the SDS, as 
well as leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 
to mJake this trip before he extended the in\dtation to Professor Lynd 
and yourself? 

Mr. Hayden. Not that I know of, but you can ask him. I'm sure 
that other people were considered, but I don't know who they were. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me ask you this : Do you recall having a conversa- 
tion with a reporter from the village Voice, a newspaper reporter by 
the name of Jack Newfield ? 

Mr. Hayden. I recall more than one conversation. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall a conversation with him where you 
indicated these were the facts, that Oglesby and somebody from SNCC 
were invited initially and they were not willing to go ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't remember who was invited. I was not par- 
ticularly involved in that. You will have to ask somebody else. Even 
if it were true I would be glad to acknowledge it. I just don't know 
whether it is true. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall in this conversation with Mr. Newfield 
that he advised you to contact the New York Times? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I don't recall. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you contact the i¥ei« York Times? 

Mr. Hayden. Before going to Hanoi ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Before or after you got back. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you make a proposal to them to give them an 
exclusive story on your trip to Hanoi on the condition they play up 
the role of Staughton Lynd and down the role of Communist Party 
official Herbert Aptheker? 

Mr. Hayden. That is a joke. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking the question. 

Mr. Hayden. I answered it. Do you think the New York Times 
would agree to such a bargain ? 


Mr. C0N1.EY, That is not the question, sir, whether they agreed to it. 
The question is, Did you propose it ? 

Mr. Hayden. There never was such a proposal. We would not be 
insane enough to think that the Neio York Times was, you know, 
capable of that kind of reasoning. I think we had the following prob- 
lem. There was going to be a critical problem of publicity. We were 
aware that a story might break at any time, especially when we were 
away from the United States, and we would not be able to talk to the 
press. We would be in China or Vietnam or somewhere out of contact 
with the American press. So we decided to leave behind separate 
statements, each of us. And after much debp.te we decided that we 
would agree on the strategy of telling the reporter from the New 
York Times essentially what was happening, with the understanding 
that if the story was about to break he could break it. He just wrote 
whatever he wanted to write. The idea that they were boosting Staugh- 
ton Lynd and downplaying Herbert Aptheker I cannot understand. 

Mr. CoNLET. My question was not. Did the Tiifnes do this ; my ques- 
tion was, Did you propose this to the Times ? 

Mr. Hayden. Of course not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have no knowledge of any of the other two people 
who made the trip making such a proposal ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, who paid for your trip to North Vietnam 
in December 1965 ? 

Mr. Hayden. Most of the financing outside of our free world was 
by the North Vietnamese over much protest, because we would have 
liked to have answered the question by saying we paid for our own 
way because we know the very deeply felt value that you should always 
pay your own way, and if somebody pays for you then you are not 
an independent judge. 

I think I can be an independent judge no matter who pays for me. 
I have taken your money to fly here to talk to you, and so forth. But 
there is another factor. The North Vietnamese insisted that since they 
are in a state of war, and they were a different nation, if they were 
going to bring Americans into North Vietnam they would come in as 
guests of the government and not have to pay for the use of facilities 
that the government had or had access to. So, after we ^ot through to 
Czechoslovakia we did not have to pay the rest of the trip and did not 
liave to pay the food and lodging expenses in Hanoi. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you pay personally for the trip 

Mr. Hayden. I paid a round trip to Czechoslovakia. 

Mr. Conley. From the United States ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Out of your own personal funds, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, or whatever I raised from friends. It was my 
money. I can check it for you and write a letter or something. The 
second trip to North Vietnam, by the way, I paid for altogether out 
of my own funds. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then the North Vietnamese, as I understand you, from 
Czechoslovakia to North Vietnam paid your round-trip fare; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't believe they paid, because they do not believe 
in money exactly the same way. The United States paid my way back. 

Mr. Conley. The North Vietnamese Government either paid or took 


care of your transportation from Czechoslovakia to North Vietnam 
and back to Czechoslovakia ? 

Mr. Hayden. Maybe back to Moscow. I think we came back from 
Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, New York, or something like that. This is all 
recorded elsewhere, sir. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In connection with your stay in North Vietnam, were 
you a guest of the Vietnam Peace Committee? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I would say they were sort of our hosts. They 
were responsible for our welfare and safety because of the American 
bombing. They provided us with interpreters. 

Mr. IcHORD. Talking of the last visit, Mr. Hayden ? 

Mr. Hayden, On both visits, as a matter of fact. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you know whether the Vietnam Peace Com- 
mittee has any official standing in the North Vietnamese Government ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I'm not sure exactly how they are funded. I'm 
sure it is some kind of government funding. I'm not sure. I think if 
you read our book we have some explanation of it, but I can't recall 
the nature of the organization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, I have asked you earlier whether you 
met Colonel Lau on this trip to North Vietnam in December 1965, 
and you have indicated you did. Have you had occasion since that time 
to maintain contact with Colonel Lau ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I saw Colonel Lau the second time I went to 
North Vietnam in October of last year. As I said before, I saw Colonel 
Lau momentarily in Paris when I was carrying out that mission that I 
want to explain to you and discuss. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, I want to show you a letter 

Mr. Hayden. I know this letter. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Dated June 4, 1968. It bears the signature of Tom 
Hayden, does it not? [Hayden Exhibit No. 4. See page 2586.] 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. Is that your signature ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. This whole letter I will take complete credit for. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In other words, this letter which has been previously 
offered as an exhibit 

Mr. Hayden. It is a stolen letter. You collaborated with police 
agencies to take this out of somebody's briefcase. It is not a secret 
letter, although I object to the method by which you obtained it. 

Mr. Conley. You indicate that this letter, which has been previously 
offered as an exhibit in these hearings,^ is in fact a letter which you 
prepared the original of, and of which I have handed you a photocopy ? 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I know. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you give the original copy of this letter to Mr. 
Robert Greenblatt ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall the day you give it to him ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. I think that he was going to somewhere in Europe 
to some kind of conference. He was expecting to be able to stop on 
the way back through Paris, because we wanted to understand what 
the situation was in the peace talks that were going on. I gave him 
an introductory note to Colonel Lau, which I will be glad to read 
to you. 

1 See pt. 1, p. 2476, Oct. 4, 1968, heariags. Letter read in full, but not made an exhibit. 


Mr. CoNLEY. No. I think the letter has already been read into the 
record, Mr. Hayden. You did give this letter to Mr. Greenblattt then 
at his request ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't remember whether it was Greenblatt's re- 
quest. I may have just proposed that he should stop in Paris and try 
to get some information on what the state of the talks was. 

Mr. CoNLEY. May I have the letter back ? 

Mr. Hayden. I would like to write some things from it, since I never 
expected to see it again. 

Mr. IcHORD. We will prepare a copy for you. 

Mr. Hayden. I will just scribble one thing. That this should be 
taken at the Canadian border under a false search and seizure process 
should be known to the press in this room. 

Mr. IcHORD. I guess that has already been brought out by other 

Mr. Hayden. I just wanted to repeat that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in order that I understand your last 
answer completely, Mr. Greenblatt may have asked you for this 
letter or you may have been aware of the fact he was going to Paris ? 

Mr. Hayden. 1 don't know where he was going. He may have been 
going to Europe. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I wondered what prompted you to write a letter to 
Colonel Lau. 

Mr. Hayden. Colonel Lau is one of the people that I know in the 
North Vietnamese delegation. I thought that it would be possible for 
Greenblatt to have a discussion with him and required an introductory 
note. At that time I was very enthusiastic about the situation. I was 
under the illusion temporarily that the war might be ending. But w'e- 
wanted to know very much what the Paris talks were accomplishing, 
and several of us were in Paris on several occasions talking to both 
State Department officials. North Vietnamese officials, trying to get 
a picture. 

I have written my own picture of what was going on in Paris in 
Rampai'ts magazine. Anyone these days who is going to Paris from 
the peace movement I will be glad to give a letter to so that they can 
go try to see the North Vietnamese, who don't trust Americans for 
some reason. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Do they trust you ? 

Mr. Hayden. They trust me enough to have a conversation. I doubt, 
Mr. Ashbrook, that they would see you. 

Mr. Ashbrook. I doubt that I would want to see them. 

Mr. Hayden. You would not want to see them? You would not want 
to talk to them? 

Mr. Ashbrook. I have no reason to. 

Mr. Hayden. I didn't think you would. That is quite a peaceful 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention specifically to 
this letter, it is addressed to Colonel Lau; is it not? It is written to 
Colonel Lau ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is an introductory note for Greenblatt. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I specifically read to you from the next to the last 
paragraph which savs, "We hope that the current Paris discussions 
go well for you." This is implying, as I read the note, that you are 


hoping they go well for Colonel Lau, or for the North Vietnamese 
people. Is that not correct ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, it is correct. It is literally correct. I was very 
hopeful that at last the thing was winding up and, after the agony 
of 25 years of war which involved many fruitless attempts at negotia- 
tion, that this finally was it, people were getting together at the table 
and that it would be possible for the bombing to be ended and the 
American troops to be withdrawn from South Vietnam. 

Mr. CoNLEY. As I read this particular sentence, it is not wishing the 
Vietnamese people, it is wishing a particular group within Vietnam. 

Mr. Hayden. My views are well known on that. In a war you can only 
decide one side is right and the other side is wrong. My Government, 
which I don't think represents me, is wrong in Vietnam. There is only 
one other group to say it is right and that is the people of Vietnam, and 
the National Liberation Front in the South and the North Vietnamese 
Government. They are right in wanting the United States out of 
Vietnam. We have no business in Vietnam. They're right in wanting 
the bombing to end, and so forth. I have always said that. 

Mr. Conley. Are you saying that you support the North Vietnamese, 
then, in their efforts ? 

Mr. Hayden. I support their position. Their position is that the 
United States should get out of Vietnam. That is also the position of 
Communists, non-Communists, anti-Communists, the world over. Do 
you support the proposition the United States should stay in ? There 
are only two things you can stand for on this, out or in. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You are the witness, I am the counsel. 

Mr. Hayden. Okay. 

Mr. CoNLEY. It also says here, "The news from South Vietnam seems 
very good indeed." 

Mr. Hayden. It looked like the war was winding up. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What about the second Tet offensive which was in the 
process of occurring at that time? Is that what you had reference to? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; the entire situation in the country was improved 
immensely, I thought, because of the beginning of the Paris talks, and 
the news from Vietnam was just good. 

Mr. Conley. The news from South Vietnam at that particular time 
was the second Tet offensive. 

Mr. Hayden. That was 2 months before the letter was written. The 
second Tet offensive was early May. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This was early June. I say the Tet offensive was just 
winding up. 

Mr. Hayden. No, it was not just winding up. Actually, it never 
stopped if you want to get into the reality of the defeat, the tragic 
defeat of the United States troops there. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, you conclude the letter with the closing, 
"Good fortune ! Victory !" 

Mr. Hayden. Right. 

Mr. Conley. What do you mean by the words "good fortune" ? 

Mr. Hayden. I hope it is all over, I hope peace can be restored at 
last. This country has been massacred by so many countries for so many 
years that it just made me terribly happy to think that at last the 
possibility of ])eace in Vietnam was being a real possibility. I wished 
them every luck in the world. I think we owe them tremendous respect 


for the struggle tliey have endured at the hands of politicians in 
Washington, particularly President Johnson, and that is the meaning 
of the statement, I hope they win their independence and hope they 
keep it. I think they should be an independent country. Whether Com- 
munist or not it is their business, not Rusk's or President Johnson's. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You did not send it to the Vietnamese people. You sent 
it to a particular officer within a particular segment of the country of 

Mr. Hayden. To me the Vietnamese people, insofar as they are or- 
ganized, are organized in the united way against the United States. 
The other Vietnamese are fictional characters invented to make us 
believe at home that we are somehow supporting the government there. 
But we are not supporting the government there. It would fall in a min- 
ute of its own corruption if it were not for the United States military. 
It is like saying the American Revolution, the American people were 
the American Revolutionaries. Surely there were some Americans 
working for the British, just as there were Vietnamese working for 
the French and now work for the Americans. But when you said the 
Americans versus the British, there was no question you were talk- 
ing about the American Revolutionaries. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying the North Vietnamese are the only 
government you recognize yourself as existing in Vietnam ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. The North Vietnamese Government by virtue of the 
fact that the Geneva agreements were never implemented is a de 
facto government of the I7th parallel. South of the I7th parallel the 
de facto government, in my opinion as an objective observer as much 
as I can be, the only real government in South Vietnam is the National 
Liberation Front. The Americans admit that when they say that their 
whole zone of South Vietnam has been under Viet Cong control for the 
last 20 years. 

We forget that the Vietnamese succeeded in liberating all of the 
Vietnam from the French in 1945. Ho Chi Minh's administration 
stretched to the south down to the Ca Mau Peninsula. The attempt by 
the French, and now the Americans ever since, has been to kind of 
roll back that revolutionary victory, roll back that nationalist revo- 
lution. It still remains in South Vietnam. The Viet Minh, who now 
are the Viet Cong, are still there and they function, they collect taxes, 
they have an army, they have schools, they have hospitals, they have 
all of the things which you and I would saj governments have. 

Mr. Watson. May I ask. Counsel, at this point in order to establish 
your objectivity, have you visited South Vietnam ? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; I would like to very much, but I am sure I would 
be killed. 

Mr. Watson. Have you visited South Vietnam ? 

Mr. Hayden. I cannot because it is too dangerous, with the Amer- 
icans there, to visit if you. have been in Hanoi. 

Mr. Watson. I could appreciate that fact, but I just wanted 

Mr. Hayden. I am sure you could. 

Mr. Watson. I was trying to ascertain your objectivity in assessing 
the various governments. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, one other question : The letter concludes 
with the word "Victory !" Am I to imply from that that you are 
wishing victory to Colonel Lau and his people ? 


Mr. Hayden. No. When I say "victory" I mean that the end of the 
war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of the American troops woukl be 
the greatest victory possible for the people of this country and for the 
people of Vietnam, including Colonel Lau, a victory over the people 
like Rusk and Jolmson and other old men who have been dominating 
foreign policy with whacko conceptions of communism the last 20 
years, a victory over the draft boards in the United States, whose 
average age is 58 years old. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Particularly over the American servicemen there? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; we are the closest friends the American servicemen 
have, I think. We want them out of Vietnam. We are not the reason 
that they are being killed. We are finding that it is more and more 
possible to organize within the Armed Forces and around Army 
bases. We believe that the GIs in Vietnam are increasuigly against 
the war and think that they are merely cannon fodder for Washing- 
ton, while elections are settled and prestige is traded around. 

Mr. Watson. In fact, Mr. Hayden, you are encouraging direct action 
on the part of militaiy men of America to go AWOL and refuse to 
serve in Vietnam. 

Mr. Hayden. What is your evidence for that, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. So far as your special publication of SDS and other 
newspapers direct ed at servicemen. 

Mr. Hayden. I am not connected with any of those newspapers. My 
position on servicemen is that they should be 

Mr. Watson. You are aware of that activity, aren't you? 

Mr. Hayden. I'm aware of the activity. 

Mr. Watson. That is all I want to know, thank you. 

Mr. Hayden. What does that have to do with what I think should 
be done? I would like to explain to you what I think of servicemen. 
I respect those who have deserted. I think it is a very brave thing. I 
think it would be better, if possible, to sta)' in the Armed Forces, not 
shoot any Vietnamese, and come home alive. I think a lot of them will. 
I think the revolt is going on clearly by soldiers in South Vietnam 
against their commanding officers and especially against Johnson. 

Mr. IcHORD. On what do you base that ? 

Mr. Hayden. Riots in the prison camps, widespread interviews pub- 
lished in various magazines, letters I have seen from GIs who are 
fed up with this way. They don't like peaceniks because they think 
we are not fighters and we are taking an easy way out. That is their 
business, that is their opinion, but I identif}^ with them. I think young 
men like myself are over there and I think there has to be good rela- 
tions in the future betweeji those young American men who fought in 
Vietnam and those young American men who oppose the war in Viet- 
nam, and that is what we are working towards. 

I think that the reason, the very fundamental reason, if you in- 
quire in your committees and in your secret investigations, the rea- 
son the war is getting harder and liarder to fight is that the American 
GIs cannot be pushed out there to continue fighting it because they 
don't think it is worth it. That is a factor that a general has to take 
into account. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Do you think you are talking for 500,000 servicemen ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is just becoming clear that servicemen over there 
don't want to fight this war. 


Mr. AsHBROOK, What numbers indicate that ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know what numbers. Wliat numbers do you 
think, Mr. Ashbrook ? 

Mr. Ashbrook. I don't agree with you. It is your allegation. You 
say increasing numbers of servicemen, and pretty soon you are talking 
about all servicemen. Koughly there are 500,000 servicemen there. How 
many do you think will identify with what you are saying is the 
new wave among servicemen ? 

Mr. Hayden. I think most servicemen would not identify with me 
or my position, but would identify with the idea that this war stinks 
and that they should be home and if Johnson wants to go to Vietnam 
or you want to go to Vietnam, you Congressmen, to fight, that is all 
well and good, but that is not the place for young Americans. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Hayden, T was in South Vietnam in June 196Y and 
talked to well over a thousand enlisted men individually. 

Mr. Hayden. Talked to a thousand enlisted, individually ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Talked to a thousand enlisted men individually. My 
impression was that their morale was surprisingly high. 

Mr. Hayden. I'm afraid you were brainwashed. 

Mr. IcHORD. By the enlisted men ? 

Mr. Hayden. By the people who organized your trip. Probably the 
generals that Governor Romney spoke about. 

Mr. IcHORD. I will state to you that the enlisted men whom I inter- 
viewed on an individual basis and in groups of 50 or 60 were not picked 
by anybody. I picked them myself. But that is a matter of assessment. 
You haven't been there 

Mr. Hayden. Did you talk to veterans of Khe Sanh ? 

Mr. IcHORD. As a matter of fact, I was in Khe Sanh. 

Mr. Hayden. While it was the chief thing that we had to hold for- 
ever, or while it was something we had to evacuate ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course the siege of Khe Sanh had not occurred. That 
occurred subsequent to June 1967. But we have gone far afield here. 

Mr, Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I may say one further word. 

Mr. Hayden is correct, although earlier he didn't seem to know too 
much about this publication directed toward the military urging 
them to desert ; apparently now you do recall something about it. But 
they run periodically some letters in this publication, most of them 
anonymous letters, allegedly from veterans of Vietnam, or people in 
Vietnam who are againsit war. 

Mr. Hayden. I have letters. 

Mr. Watson. No doubt he has some letters. 

Mr. Hayden. I would like to discuss what I did in Paris. It is curious 
to me I haven't been asked. 

Mr. IcHORD. We are going to get to Paris. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We will get to Paris. 

Mr. Hayden, I cannot help but note that you have again, for the 
fourth time as I count it, given a different meaning to the word 
"victory" as you have with the words "guerrilla," "militant," and 
"attack." Perhaps it is just a question of semantics between you and me 
that we are unable to define these words or give the same meaning 
to them. 

Mr. Hayden, What about deeds? Let's try deeds. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I don't recall your using the word "deeds." 

Mr. Hayden. If you can't understand my words, I would like to 


know what it is about my actions that you have in mind. What have I 
attacked ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I said there were three words that we have had trouble 
with today, the word "guerrilla," the word "militant," and the word 
"attack." Periliaps you did not hear what I said. 

Mr. Hayden. Wliat was the trouble? I explained what I meant by 
the words. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes; and your explanation would not, I think, be the 
common sensible explanation for the meaning of those particular 
words any more than your explanation for the word "victory," mean- 
ing by victory "bringing the soldiers home." 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Could we go on, Mr. Chairman, because I think the 
counsel is being argumentative. 

Mr. IcHORD. Just a minute. We are following the rules pretty well 
thus far. We are dealing in semantics here. 

Mr. Hayden. We are also dealing with things I have written in 
dozens of places. It is unnecessary to go over them here as far as I 
can see. 

Mr. Ighord. Certainly, Mr. Hayden, I would say these words that 
you have written will have a different meaning to many people. It ap- 
parently has a different meaning tx) you than the ordinary connota- 
tion that I would accept. That is one of the reasons for the question. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Not only that, but also the word "pinned." I think 
everybody has some common understanding of what is meant when 
you are going to "pin" delegates in a convention. The other is, "any- 
thing to stop this farce," and of course to him "anything" would not 
mean what it would normally mean to others. The words "guerrilla," 
"attack," and "victory" 

Mr. Hayden. Before the joking goes further, aren't you embarrassed 
and discomfited by the existence of this gigantic report, which goes 
over in much greater detail than you could, because you don't have the 
funds, thank God, or the staff to do it — evervthing, I mean meetings, 
all the things that you have been asking about are listed in here. These 
investigators didn't have too much difficulty understanding what our 
position was, what we were planning to do, what our applications for 
permits meant, what liappened in meetings. 

Maybe because you don't have the staff or the machinery to collect 
the information that these people collected, but they have not raised 
the questions that you are raising about whether 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Maybe this is why we are raising them. 

Mr. Hayden. So you are not embarrassed by this, but you sort of 
disagree with its conclusions or analysis. 

Mr. Conley. I think we need to make it clear that that document to 
which you refer carries neither the approval or disapproval of that 
particular Commission, but is merely one of three task force reports. 

Mr. Hayden. Beautiful. That is what I said, though. 

Mr. IcHORD. We should make it clear it is a staff report. 

Mr. Hayden. I said it was done by an authorized task force three or 
four times earlier today. 

Mr. AsiiBRooK. Which has neither been accepted or rejected by the 
Commission ? 

Mr. Hayden. Is that your last refuge ? Obviously, it is not going to 
be accepted by the committee, IVIilton Eisenhower and those people. 


But they have been done in by their own staff. Their own staff went out 
and looked at the situation and could not come to any conclusions than 
the ones they came to. 

Mr. IcHORD. The committee will have the opportunity to read the 
staff report. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hay den, if I may belabor vou one moment fur- 
ther on this particular letter that you wrote for Mr. Greenblatt, I 
notice in here the last sentence in the first paragraph, "He works closely 
with myself and Dave Dellinger, and has just returned from Hanoi." 

You don't need the letter ? 

Mr. Hayden. I heard your statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What was the significance of mentioning that Mr. 
Greenblatt works closely with yourself and with Dave Dellinger ? 

Mr. Hayden. We wanted to identify this person as a person who is 
active in the Mobilization and the way to do that would be to identify 
him with two people, myself and Dave Dellinger, who visited North 
Vietnam and who are known to the North Vietnamese. 

Mr. Conley. Both you and Mr. Dellinger had previously met with 
Colonel Lau, had you not ? 

Mr. Hayden. You mean together ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Not together, out you have both met Colonel Lau ; have 
you not? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. I said I have met him, and Dave Dellinger is a 
member of the tribunal that found the United States guilty of geno- 
cide. Colonel Lau was the North Vietnamese person in charge of mar- 
shaling the evidence for the North Vietnamese case. So he would know 
Colonal Lau through the examination of mutilated and napalmed 
Vietnamese bodies. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If we may move back to one other question that came 
up earlier, you were asked, I believe, whether you were aware of the 
fact whether RAT was or was not a publication of SDS. 

Mr. Hayden. I said it was not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I do call to your attention the fact that in the publica- 
tion vocations for social change — are you aware of this publication? 

Mr. Hayden. Hay ward, California ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. The October 1968 issue advises people who 
want a job with RAT to apply as follows. 

Mr. Hayden. "THE RAT c/o SDS, 131 Prince Street, New York, 
New York." 

It gives the phone number; "Contact Jeff Shero." That could mean 
anything, but what it does not mean is that the RAT is an SDS publi- 
cation. SDS, 131 Prince Street could be a New York chapter of SDS. 
I don't know what it is. It may be a temporary office of the RAT, it 
may not. But it is not an official SDS publication. 

The SDS publication is Neiv Left Notes. But Jeffrey Shero is a 
former officer of some kind of SDS, I mean some kind in SDS, and 
he is the editor and founder of the RAT. A lot of SDS people active 
in New York City just as there are other movement groups in New 
York City and they all identify very closely with the RAT. But the 
RAT is an independent publication published by these five or six 
people, as far as I know. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in September 1967 did you attend a meet- 
ing in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, with representatives of the Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese ? 


Mr. Hatden. Yes. That is another thing that is available. 
Mr. CoNLET, Mr. Hayden, in a document sent out under the signa- 
ture of Dave Dellinger appears the following quotation : 

The Prague conference is intended to create solidarity and mutual understand- 
ing between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their American supporters who 
are trying to change the United States. * * * 

Mr. Hayden, my question to you, sir, would be, Did you receive a 
copy of this particular document? Have you seen it before today? 

Mr. Hayden. I must have seen it. I had a hand in preparing this 
document. I was one of the people who helped to write the agenda and 
work out an agenda for the conference. 

Wliat you read from is a true statement of one of the purposes of 
the conference. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, let me ask you this question, if I may, sir, 
with reference to that statement : Are you, sir, one of the American 
supporters of the "revolutionaries" mentioned there in Vietnam? 

Mr. Hayden. I have already said I am. 

Mr. Conley. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Very few people in the world are not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayclen, while you were in Czechoslovakia at this 
conference in September of 1967, were you asked by the Viet Cong 
representatives to go to the capital of Cambodia to receive three Amer- 
ican, war prisoners ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, this is a very delicate area. I'm glad to get into 
it, but I will have to listen to your questions very carefully. So if you 
will restate that. 

Mr. Conley. I will read it again to you. 

While you were in Czechoslovakia did the Viet Cong representatives 
ask you to ^o to the capital of Cambodia to take custody of three 
American prisoners of war ? 

Mr. Hayden. Not exactly. I, as you know, have been involved in 
the release of American prisoners on three occasions — well, several 
occasions — and totaling altogether three American prisoners from 
South Vietnam and six American pilots from North Vietnam, all of 
whom are here in the United States now. 

The way in which these releases were effected is very complicated 
and delicate. I will be very happy to speak as frankly as I can about it, 
but I want us to be very careful because the implication that you are 
making, that somehow the link-up between the peace movement, peo- 
ple like myself, and Hanoi, is bad, is the kind of thing that is going to 
go out around the world as an item of news. And it is going to appear, 
whether you like it or not, it is going to appear as sort of an official 
United States Government committee condemning these operations 
which have resulted in the release of prisoners. And I am very con- 
cerned about the welfare of those prisoners, not that I think the Viet- 
namese would do anything to them, but tlie possibility of any American 
being released is always useful, helpful, and basically good. So we have 
to discuss it in a way that respects the situation. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, I think you read more malice in my ques- 
tion than I intended. 

Mr. Hayden. I was trying to set the groundwork. 

Mr. Conley. My question was simple. Were you asked to go to the 


capital of Cambodia ? I am not asking you to go into a detailed explana- 
tion of anything. 

Mr. Hayden. The literal answer to your literal question is no. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Now, then, in connection with that same general proposition, did you 
not in fact in November 1967 go to Hanoi and from there to the capital 
of Cambodia, where you took custody of three United States sergeants 
who had been held as prisoners of war ? 

Mr. Hayden. Incorrect again. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you like to explain? 

Mr. Hayden. I would prefer not to explain more than I have ex- 
plained in many publications and statements. I was involved in the re- 
lease of these prisoners. It did not quite exactly happen according to 
the geographic route you described. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you quarreling with going from Hanoi to Cam- 
bodia ? Is that it ? 

Mr. Hayden. That and going from Czechoslovakia to Cambodia, and 
so forth. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I never suggested you went from Czechoslovakia to 

Mr. Hayden. I thought the first question was, did I go from that 
conference to Cambodia. 

Mr. Conley. No, sir. My question was. Were you approached at the 
conference in Czechoslovakia and asked if you would go, to the capital 
of Cambodia ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. May I change that question, because as I recall his 
answer he said literally that was not correct. Was the conference at 
Czechoslovakia the place at which you learned that you could take 
custody of these servicemen if you were to be in Cambodia ? 

Mr. Hayden. Not exactly. There had been discussions ever since our 
first trip to Vietnam about the worries that American families have 
about prisoners there. We had always stressed that while we did not 
feel that the North Vietnamese had any legal or other kind of 
responsibility to release the prisoners, we thought it would be a highly 
liumane and important act that could contribute to making peace 
easier to negotiate. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Not for propaganda purposes? 

Mr. Hayden. Propaganda works both ways. Every time the Viet- 
namese have released prisoners, the United States releases prisoners 
and announces it although the actions are not reciprocal. Neither side 
recognizes that the other has done it, and so forth. 

It was at this conference in Bratislava during the discussions with 
the Vietnamese about the state of American prisoners that some Viet- 
namese approached myself and said that they were contemplating the 
possible release of some prisoners from South Vietnam. They were 
not sure how to do it technically. They had a lot of problems. Contrary 
to public opinion, people do not run up and down from North to South 
Vietnam on the Ho Chi Minh trail. These prisoners were deep in South 

A way had to be found for them to bs released without the National 
Liberation Front having to hand them directly over to the Americans 
because they did not recognize each other. The problem was never 

21-706 O — 69 — pt. 2 5 


solved in the first discussions, but I said that I was ready at any point 
to participate in such a release if I could be of value and service. Some 
time later, not too much later, I think a month or month and a half, 
the word did come that such a thing was possible. I happened to be in 
Paris at the time and at that time I went to Cambodia to work out 
the arrangements. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You did not then go to Hanoi and from there to Cam- 

Mr. Hatden. I went to Hanoi, but not particularly related to pris- 
oners. I went to Hanoi to see what 2 years of bombing had done in 
the way of destruction. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you go to Hanoi prior to going to Cambodia ? 

Mr. Hayden. I went to Cambodia and to Hanoi and back to Cam- 
bodia because that is the way you go, and then to France and back 
to Cambodia and back to New York. It was not all related. 

Mr. Conley. Had you been to Hanoi before you went to Cambodia 
and took custody of these three prisoners ? 

Mr. Hayden. I had been to Hanoi twice by then. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden 

Mr. Hayden. The prisoners were from South Vietnam, not related 
to North Vietnam. 

Mr. IcHORD. Were they held by North Vietnamese ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, NLF. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to January of 
this year, did you make a trip to Havana, Cuba ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. To take part in the International Cultural Congress, 
which was a gathering of Communists and other revolutionaries whose 
aim is to destroy the non-Communist governments of the world ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't remember those aims being enunciated in quite 
that way. But then there are no more people like yourself in Cuba. 
It was essentially a meeting of intellectuals, who are not strong enough 
to pick up a gun and were film-makers, painters, but these intellectuals 

Mr. Conley. Do I have the title right, the "International Cultural 
Congress" ? 

Mr. Hayden. It was a cultural congress in Havana. I don't know 
if it was called the International Cultural Congress. 

Mr. Conley. This was held during January of this year? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Counsel, the witness is not implying that there 
are not some intellectuals who are fighting for this country ? You are 
not implying that, are you ? 

Mr. Hayden. Oh, no. 

Mr. Watson. You said earlier that they were not strong enough to 
lift a gun. 

Mr. Hayden. I was replying to the suggestion that this was a meet- 
ing of armed revolutionaries, which was implied although not exactly 
stated by the question. I wanted to indicate that it was a meeting of 

Mr. Watson. Do you consider yourself an intellectual ? 

Mr. Hayden. I never thought about it. 

Mr. Watson, Thank you. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, how long were you in Cuba attending this 
conference ? 

Mr. Hayden. About 10 days to 15 days. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you leave and return to the United States ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you describe briefly, if you can, exactly what 
you did at the conference ? 

Mr. Hayden. Nothing. 

Mr. Conley. I did not mean you as an individual. I mean what was 
done at the conference ? Was it a discussion ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Discussion group. 

Mr. IcHORD. Would you say it was not a very productive conference? 

Mr. Hayden. I got a lot of things I wanted to get. I talked to a lot 
of people. I wanted to see what Cuba was like. But I went as a jour- 
nalist through a strange deal with the Department of State, who would 
not allow me a passport to go as a delegate. So I didn't participate, I 
didn't have any official status in the conference, I did not speak, I did 
not operate as a delegate. 

Around the site of the conference I was able to meet and talk with 
people from Latin America, the Middle East, Western Europe. There 
were Vietnamese people there. I just took advantage of the occasion 
to talk to as many people as I could. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it a fair statement to say that the 
congress closed with an appeal to the intellectuals to boycott United 
States academic and cultural programs? 

Mr. Hayden. There was such an appeal. It had more to it than that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You participated 

Mr. Hayden. I did not participate in the drafting of the appeal, 
although I agree with the appeal. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What particular publication did you represent at this 
conference ? 

Mr. Hayden. I just went as a writer. I didn't have to represent a 

Mr. CoNLEY. I thought you indicated that you did, though, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Perhaps I misunderstood you. 

Mr. Hayden. No. I can check it in my documents, but I think I just 
agreed not to go as a delegate. 

Mr. Conley. You did not represent any particular newspaper or 
magazine then. 

Mr. Hayden. I think I may have gone as an editor or associate 
editor of Liberation^ which is a pacifist magazine edited by Dave 
Dellinger with which I had ties for a while, but I haven't been active 
with them for some time. But I went in the cajDacity of 

Mr. CoNLEY. When was the last time you were active with Liberation 
magazine ? 

Mr. Hayden. I never was very active. That is why I decided to not 
have my name on the masthead. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was any of the material related to the Havana con- 
ference published in the Liberation magazine? 

Mr. Hayden. It was published by Dellinger. 

Mr. Conley. Written by you, sir? 


Mr. Hayden. No. I certainly had talks with Dellinger relating to 
the article he finally wrote. 

Mr. IcHORD. Counsel has advised me that there would be no oppor- 
tunity to conclude the questioning of Mr. Hayden by 5 o'clock. Give- 
and-take has been quite active. I think we could very well at this 
point adjourn the hearings until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 4 :05 p.m., Monday, December 2, 1968, the subcom- 
mittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968.) 

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives 
Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 

Hayden Exhibit No. 2 

To : National Mobilization Staff : Chicago organizers 

not for circulation or publication. 
From : Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden. 


The Purpose 

American society is being destroyed by its unrepresentative government. The 
politicians who control the White House and Congress do not respond to glaring 
social needs or to the outcries of millions of i)eople. Democracy is reduced to 
the sorry event of people trooping to the polls every four years tto [sic] vote 
for candidates who offer no serious choice. 

Our taxes, blood and national honor are being poured out in the hopeless 
Vietnam war, while the violence in our cities exposes the real depth of our 
unsolved problems at home. Faced with a world wide cry for human rights, 
from Vietnam to our nation's slums, top American politicians seem able to reply 
only with negative and self-defeating violence. But the violence of suppression 
solves nothing. The problems cannot be avoided or bombed away. 

In 1960 and especially in 1964, the American voters supported peace in 
Vietnam and social reform at home. Since then leading scholars, religious 
figures, artists, even certain generals and businessmen have protested the war ; 
the Senate leadership of both parties has criticised the President ; opinion 
surveys show a large minority opposed to the fighting; nearly all of America's 
allies have registered their opposition ; world public opinion condemns the US 
as the aggressor in Vietnam. Yet the warmakers continue to escalate. Their 
domination of policy grows. 

For a century American society has endorsed racial equality. But in 1968 a 
virtual race war is in the making. Since open rebellions broke out nearly four 
years ago, no social and economic answer has been put forward. The basic 
response of the government has been to violently suppress the rebellions then 
let evil conditions go on as before. Rotten housing, schools and jobs are the 
continuous lot of black Americans. Neither hard work in the cotton fields, nor 
politics, nor labor organizations, nor nonviolent demonstrations have made the 
American promise become a reality. 

The problems of Vietnam and racism affect all Americans. Our country's 
future peace and honor depend on a successful resolution of these two problems. 
Hatreds and divisions are being created which will take generations to end. 
America is becoming an ugly and insecure place to live. The country lacks the 
commitment to deal with racism, and cannot afford to anyway because of its 
preoccunation with Vietnam. Because our social imagination is blighted by 
these investments in violence, our life as a whole is degraded in countless ways. 
Cities are unlivable. Television is a wasteland. Medical needs are not met. 
Mental problems go unattended. 

The political parties, especially the governing Democratic Party, fail com- 
pletely to perform their function of solving social problems peacefully. The Demo- 
cratic Party is bound to the demands of Southern racists who control key com- 
mittee position.s through seniority gained by generations of Negro disenfranchise- 
ment. These politicians are not only racist.s. They are old and out of touch with 
changes in our country and the world. They are believers in the use of force to 
maintain the status quo. The northern Democrats, though traditionally seeming 
more liberal and flexible than their southern allies, now are exposed to be fully 


as corrupt. Their power rests on urban machines which have failed to solve the 
problems of their largely Negro and working class constituencies. Elections in the 
North tend to be personality contests, or battles between competing ethnic groups, 
or competitions in which candidates out-promise each other. Nothing changes but 
the faces. 

Above and behind this useless structure of petty politics have arisen hugh [sic] 
bureaucracies with enormous power over the life and death of America's people. 
These include the military which commands three-fourths of the taxpayer's 
money and an equal percentage of all research and development ; and large cor- 
porations which make their fortunes in the midst of urban squalor and world 
poverty. Where these giants cannot influence politicians, they simply buy them, 
and where they cannot buy them, they threaten to withdraw supix)rt of all kinds. 

Against these conditions there is mounting resistance and revolt. The summer 
of 1968 will see the greatest outpouring of dissent ever witnessed in this country. 
Anger with police and rats, Vietnam and the draft is now massive and cannot be 
quieted with "better police methods." This summer will bring a more determined 
and powerful movement for change. At the same time established solutions to the 
foreign and domestic crisis will harden and the democratic process will visibly 
close itself to any viable alternative. The axis of the Democratic Party — the 
blacks, the workers, the intellectuals — will experience a new consciousness of 
unrepresentation. Nixon, not Rockefeller, will be the Presidential candidate of the 
Republican convention. And Johnson, not McCarthy or Kennedy, will become the 
"alternative" for the liberals. To the average Democrat who wants a say on the 
widening war, high taxes, and urban squalor the "choice" will appear desperate. 
Many, for the first time, will wake up to the fact that in the wheeling and deal- 
ing of the democratic process the average person does not count. He is expected 
to participate in politics in about the same way that he goes to the movies. His 
choices are limited to which of the stars he least dislikes. This summer, millions 
of anxious Democrats will ask, what now? 

The strategy of the anti-war and black movements in this period may help to 
answer this question. We may either take the initiative in laying the foundation 
for a new political force in the United States or be driven into isolation from 
average Americans. What we do now, how we prepare the country for the 
Democratic Convention, and how we respond to that Convention may well 
determine whether we bury the Democratic Party or set the conditions for John- 
son to bury the movement. 

A Proposal 

A massive confrontation with our government — the Democratic Party — as it 
holds its convention in Chicago this summer is being organized. Given the right 
strategic perspective, this challenge could help transform the ix)litics of the coim- 
try. Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party's electoral strength has de- 
pended upon the support of the politically conscious people in trade unions, black 
communities and the professions. Now major sections of this base are in opposi- 
tion to the policies of the Democratic Party. At the same time, the country's oflS- 
cial leadership is determined to hold to the status quo. Every political sign 
points towards this conflict of interest coming to hammer blows at the Augusit 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Our task must be to prepare the 
country to meet this political crisis by supporting and strengthening a i>eople's 
movement and a people's force which the politicians cannot avoid or resist. 

This proposal suggests several ways to build for a massive action in Chicago 
over a period of months ; to use the Chicago demonstration to dramatize to the 
world the large numbers of i>eople who feel unrepresented, and in fact disgraced 
and used, by our government's policies on the crisis of Vietnam and racism and 
the mockery that democracy has become ; and to unfold the Democratic Conven- 
tion challenge in such a way that all of America and the world can look on and 
judge whether Lyndon Johnson or the demonstrators are better representatives 
of America's tradition of democracy and social justice. 

Specifically, the proposal is that events unfold in three major periods of 

First, from April 21 to April 30, the spring days of resistance. Where possible, 
the anti-war and black movements should focus on the Democratic Party. The 
undemocratic method of choosing delegates — through money and "pull" — should 
be exposed and opposed. The names of Democratic contributors who profit from 
war and racism should be revealed and their private comfort disturbed. Mayors 
who head local Democratic Parties should become the recipients of draft cards. 
State chairman should be burned in efl5gy for their support to Johnson, to the 


war and repression. The movement's demands on the Democratic National Con- 
vention should be widely distributed and interpreted. Where appropriate, the 
positions of Dodd, Jaclfson and Symington should be protested. Englehard's tie 
to Johnson should be attacted [sic]. The Texas construction companies which 
profit off Vietnam should be exposed, etc. 

Second, the summer should become a period of intense organizing, education and 
demonstration. As local coordinating committees develop to plan the attact [sic] 
on the Democratic Convention, they should initiate recruiting and training pro- 
grams for summer organizers — several thousand should be the objective — who 
build high school draft resistance unions, organize challenges to corrupt dele- 
gates, talk with teachers, doctors, veterans and welfare recipients about con- 
fronting the Convention on a particular day, gather intelligence on delegates 
who will be continuously confronted and talked to during their entire stay in 
Chicago, speak to hundreds of local trade unions about the war and racism, build 
pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party headquarters, 
and hold local war crime tribunals to expose prominent Democrats who manu- 
facture anti-personnel bombs, poison gases or other weapons banned by inter- 
national agreement. 

Third, the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions 
and marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of 
Chicago with people demanding peace, justice and participation in government. 
This should be a period in which the movement projects a series of broad, but 
concrete demands — demands which the vast majority of people can identify 
with, but which the Democratic Party is shown to be unable to meet. 

The movement must not play into Johnson's hands by attempting to prevent 
the Convention from assembling, a position few Americans would accept or 
understand. Rather the action should build steadily through the Convention 
week, each day escalating the demands and the tactics, building for a massive 
confrontation at the time of Johnson's nomination. The initial challenges and 
activities might involve 50,000 to 100,000 people. The final funneral [sic] march 
on the Democratic Convention, beginning as the first ballot is taken, should bring 
a half million — people demanding a choice on the issues of i^eace and justice ; 
citizens who have come to "make the democratic process work" by pinning the 
delegates in the International Ampetheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to 
the American people. 

A well planned, educational build-up would preceed [sic] the final days of mili- 
tancy ; for example, alternative platform committee hearings ; challenges inside 
the Convention as well as outside ; continuous "lobbying" with every delegate ; 
outdoor rallies ; daily press conferences of our own making ; and actions which 
project a series of concrete demands and grievances. A people's platform hearing 
might be highlighted by Garrison testifying on the Kennedy assassination. Satre 
[sic] on US war crimes in Vietnam and Carmaichael [sic] on the causes of riots. 
For the mass media, our hearings should be able to compete with the Democratic 
Convention platform hearings. 

Daily demonstrations should be organized so they do not become a massive 
blending of movement forces competing for TV coverage. Machinery is needed 
that permits demonstrations to clarify demands, not confuse the public. Perhaps 
each day of the Convention could be matched with each of the major demands 
of the anti-war and black movements. A schedule of demonstrations could be 
projected : one day for education ; one for poverty ; one for the draft ; etc. Each 
day would be utilized to dramatize a single demand. Each day, actions all across 
Chicago would share a common issue focus. 

For example, on August 26, a coalition of poverty rights organizations might 
surround the Conrad Hilton Hotel to wake the delegates with the demand for 
$20 billion to end poverty. Throughout the day, press conferences, disruptions 
and pickets would dramatize this demand. In the evening, poor whites, Spanish 
and black Chicagoans could march on the troops protecting the Convention to 
invite the delegates to spend the night with them in the ghetto instead of the 
Conrad Hilton and Palmer House. While the world looks on, the invitation is 
greeted with police clubs, brutality and arrests since the President's injunction 
against all demonstrations at the Convention has just been violated. The follow- 
ing day, August 27, actions might focus on the draft, organized by a radical 
student coalition. The actions would be slightly more militant than the preceed- 
ing [sic] day with young people pinning draft cards on soldier's bayonets or 
burning them on Mayor Daley's lawn which is in the community beside the In- 
ternational Ampetheatre [sic]. 


A day by day focus on national grievances not only can clarify movement 
demands for the general public but allow for diversity in forms of protest, 
militancy and rhetoric. Such diversity is possible, indeed desirable, if there is 
agreement on the general strategic framework : to allow people who presently 
represent forces within the Democratic Party to clarify for themselves the 
limits of the present two party system ; and to offer an alternative perspective 
and program to those millions who agree that a Johnson-Nixon contest is no 
contest at all. The objective of the movement should be to compete with the Dem- 
ocratic Party for people's allegiance, by undermining its ideological and organi- 
zational base during this crisis period. 

The Tasks 

In addition to creating immediate discussions among movement organizations 
and activists across the country about the Convention confrontation, machinery 
must be built now to prepare for the spring, summer and August activities. For 
the February 24 National Mobilization conference in Chicago, drafts of alterna- 
tive demands should be prepared. A pamphlet on "What Is the Democratic 
Party" which implies clear tarkets [sic] for the spring actions should be written 
and distributed. A black and white staff should be organized in Chicago. State 
by state, groups should form to research local Democratic Party corruption and 
develop delegate lists which can be forwarded to the National Mobilization 
oflSce in Chicago. Regional coordinating committees that launch summer organiz- 
ing projects and assume organizational responsibility for different days of dem- 
onstrations should be created. A lawyers conference must be schedules [sic] to 
build the legal defense and support. Preparations for medical stations attended 
by doctors should begin. Housing for 50,000 people must be found in Chicago. 
Fifteen large meeting halls are also needed. Educational and interpretative ma- 
terials should be written. Research and organization for an alternative platform 
committee hearing must be started. A national press service should be estab- 
lished. A speakers program on the Democratic Party should be launched. And 
finally, funds are needed to supiwrt this program and the countless, creative activ- 
ities that will develop as we approach the time when the President finds it 
necessary to employ troops from Vietnam or the ghetto to secuire [sic] his nom- 
ination and the breakdown of representative and meaningful government in 
American [sic] becomes an historic admission to all. 


Part 2 


United States House of Representatives, 

subc0]mmittee of the 
Committee ox Un-American AcnvnrES, 

Washington^ D.G. 


A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to recess, at 10 :10 a.m., in Eoom 311, Cannon House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subconmiittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of 
Missouri, chairman; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. 
Watson, of South Carolina.) 

Subconmiittee members present : Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, 
and Watson. 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank Con- 
ley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. 
Nittle, counsel; and Herbert Romerstem, investigator. 

Mr. Ichord. The connnittee will come to order. 

The photographers will please retire. 

At the close of the hearings yesterday, the witness, Mr. Hayden, was 
continuing his testimony. 

]SIr. di Suvero, Mr. Weinglass is not with you today ? 

Mr. DI Su\'ERo. He is not going to be here today. 

Mr. Ichord. The counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness. 
The witness, of course, will again be reminded that he is under oath. 


Mr. CoNLET. At this time, Mr. Chairman, we would like to request 
the following documents to be entered into the record. xVs Exhibit 1, 
the brochure, '"MO^^MEXT CAMPAIGN 1968 : AN ELECTION 
YEAR OFFENSIVE." This was the subject of some testimony 

As Exhibit 2, the document entitled 

Mr. Ichord. Let the brochure, read at length, in part by you and by 
Mr. Hayden, written by Mr. Hayden, be inserted. There being no ob- 
jection from the members of the'^committee, it will be incorporated in 
the record. 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 1." See pages 2562-2583.) 



Hayden Exhibit No. 1 

Rennie DaVis 

Tom Hayden 

This paper proposes :\n election year 
campaiga against r political systein 
that has bxouglit the United States into 
a crisis of war, racism, and social 
disintegration. We outline a possible .. 
strategy for ihi ■ campaign. For pur- "' 
poses of di.Ecurrion, we have made' 

, our proposals concrete. But we will -^ 
fail it you consider them final. The " . 
.suggestions are merely our own, in- ' ■ 
tended only, to provoke discussion. , --^ 

\ The decisions and planning for ah elec- < 
tiotk yeajT program must'be made by the t, 

< tlifferent brjganizations whose yftal in-- 

i te^estA are at stake. ^ 

., Not fof- Publication 
SlaVcb,' 196^'., '^ 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

r ntrocuctlon 

Election year 1968 will be a fateful one for American democrscy. Millions of Americans 
want an end to the ViBtnam war, liberation from racism, and hew steps toward a more humane 
society. But the last several years of war, racism and social decay have raised the ques- 
tion of whether the U.S. government has the capacity to find meaningful solutions to prob- 
lems facing people. The crisis, on the surface, is the credibility gap between words and 
daeds: between the talk of "peace" and "equality" and the reality of burning villages and 
rnd-bltten babies. But the deeper crisis is the failure of deoiocratic and representative 
government to work./ The Democratic Party is not "the party of the people. " It is an inatTBH 
■ent for the use ot corporation executives and their lawyers, the military brass, sisgrega- 'j, 
'.tlonists, machine politicians, and the old narrow-minded preservers, of an "American Way ot/-^^ 

;^fe."| The 1968 elections will represent a sad culmination of the failure of our political':} 
- , , ' — ^ "' ^ ' ■ " . '"■?■'*■ 

Inc'.ltutioia. People are being asked to spend their taxes and blood supporting a BovcriaiBitft "^ 

'yln.vhich. It becomes clearer day by day, tbegr have little voice. The supreme Insult, «ill'%*^j 

.t;tie "choice" between two candidates supporting identical policies whicli are destroying our. ' \- 

vcountry's potential for .decpnc;'. The fraudulence of this choice exposed and opposed ^ 

^tty e norement of -people deb^nainedf-to see their needs attended and their voices heard; V )i^» 

•^ 'it-, .; , .\ , - ^'- ^ : .: ._•: -^? -r -»■■■'>•:: iij^. 

... ,.^^^ ',/■ .' .-. •-■ • ■'■■■■ "^'■■■- ii^f^: 

;■■ 'We are proposing a Movement Campaign— an election year program of organlzlog and pref" -^ - 

^.;- • ■ . . .-..- 

-• test against the failure of the government, particularly the failure of the governing Deno- * 
- cratie Faritjr* We see'the creation of a loose national coalition to carry out a program In . 
otagos: ,■ 

V— a spring In which various local protest movements consolidate regionally to become a 
political force confronting and attacking the politics of both parties, 

• — a sunner of stepped-up resistance, community organiaaiion and independent electoral 
politics in which local groups expand their visibility and base of support, 

•^ — a series of massive demonstrations at the Democratic Convention to dramatize the 
nocial noeds which are unmet and the large numbers of people uiu*epresented by the Party and 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

J 2 

•t-a campaign of exposure and opposition through the November elections which offers , 

concrete independent political activity and organization as an alternative to Johnson-Nixon 

The general purpose of this program is to provide opportunities for eocpression to the / 
people who feel th^ have no choice and no voice in 1968. The protest should focus on the 



failure of the government to deal vrith the racial and Vietnam crises, and the nockery of a T 
democratic process which the Democratic Convention represents. J ^ 

AjCampaign Against Undemocratic Power 

A movement election year campaign should reflect the growing understanding tbat both ^ 

racisB and US policies in Vietnam flow from the sane corrupt power structure at hone. The a 

j[ conUnuation of these policies makes an even greater mockery of detnocracy In the 0S« . The > 4 

■^govemment becomes more repressive. Policy already is dominated by a "national iseeurllgr ' "^ 

-vconplex" whose decisions are subject to only the most feeble deoiocratic review.:' The war y-- ''. 

.^-atmosphere permits their domination to become enlarged; it Also requires an Increaalng .dl8« : ' 
i■^ ■ ^. 

...tortion of democratic processes. Deliberate lying about events in Vietnam, Oscal4tion'ttf , '^^r* 

■the droft, intimidation and repression of dissent are only the clearest trends flowing fron 

^:this tightening control. A declaration of war, now a real poBslbllity, would give qualita- ; 

r' . ■ , . . , - . . ..>;.•- 

' tivaly greater powers to these decisionHoakers. 

> This consolldatlpn of undemocratic power is accompanied by the abandoning of any at- 
tempt to provide political and economic answers to social problems. Riot control is the 
main domestic priority of the government. Ghetto poverty, air and water pollution, glutted 
cities and highviays, inadequate health programs, all are inevitable in a commercial system 
using military means to keep an unjust peace. Private interests nin rampant— even in 
Johnson's cabinet — ^vjhlle social needs are left unattended. 

A Campaign for Self -Determination 

'.'e should base our campaign on the right of people to knov the truth, to control their 

oun government, to use politics to solve their problems. We should demand self-deterraina- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


tion in Vietnam, the ghettos, and in the boring, insecure life of the ordinary whiite citizen 

vjho pays taxes and blood to a political system that shuts him out of meaningful partici- 
pation. Our campaign is against the system of repressive authority which gives rise to the 
crises of racism and war in the first place. 

A Campaign to Reach Average Democrats 

These two political patterns — repression and neglect — open the opportunity to organize 
and reach new people whose dissatisfaction is rising. / V'e can hasten the death of the tradi- 
tional Democratic coalition by working among the constituencies with past loyalties to the 
Party: black people, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, the young, suburban liberals, trade unionists, 
the students and intellectuals. J As Johnson abandons welfare and "great society" programs. 

, _T«e prepared to organize among people who increasingly feel the bite of the war 

lr<'' r^ — 

•yipto domestic priorities. I This will mean hard work among people with deep consarvative ten-' 

■': '"'■' ^*— . ■ '"f jL 

«\dencles, especially in lower-middle and working class sections, but we are convinced that '•;■■.; 

■:Jj •■ •^. ^ - ■ ■ -"V 

'•: -real opportunities exist because of taxes, inflation, the draft and the pervasive sense of-. 

^:- ' -^ ' --i . ■ :'^' '■ ■'■ 'J 

y.confiislon about the state of society.! Our hope is that 1968 ■vri.ll find many" people develop*v;-< 
>-• ■■ ' I "'-"•» 

t,Aing a critical and independent political sense, expressed throu^ a variety of forms. ' ,:-'AT 
t.ij^-'- ' ■ . . ■'■.*'.■ 

'^:^'- . ■ .: . :.:^ 

. "A Campaign Against Repression - ;>"'■■ ..:'''*'/'' 

I V.'e Most recognize that thousands of people, especially black ndlitants and draft ro^ 

sisters, will be struggling for survival against an increasingly repressive government ' 

machinery. I While our' campaign should seek to be far broader than these militant movements. 


we must work in solidarity and coordination with those facing police violence, intimidation 
■ aftcf .^alU'"' **% must help give political expression to their demands: the right of individu- 
als to refuse to fi^t in unjust wars, the right of black people to control their own^,com- 
pwnttles, the right of rebellion against oppression. Our campaign should build the ttidest 
possible understanding and support for these demands. We are convinced this is the most 

effective deterrent to, the repression which incvitabljr./is growing. | The tendency to Inten- 
sify militancy without organizing wide political support is self-defeating. But so is the 
tendency to draw away from militancy into milder and more conventional forms of protest.! 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

(The pi-oblea is to build the bx'oadest coalition uhich can give political support and interpre- 
tation to the militancy. ) As the government rcakes it clear that its only response to revolu- 
tion abroad and resistance at home is violence and suppression, the moveiient must either 
reach out for new support or be eroded away. 

On Disruption in Chicago 

The campaign should not plan violence and disruption against the Democratic National 
Convention. It should be non-violent and legal. The right to rebellion is hardly exercised 
in an eCfective vjay by assembling 300,000 people to charge into 30,000 paratroopers. In • 
fact, apy plan of deliberate disruption Td.ll drive away people who are worried about arreats' 
or violence, and thus sharply dindnish the size and political effect of the mobiUzation. ■"! 
Idttla would be ser^-ed, except perhaps the political hopes of Johnson, Nixon and Wallace, by- 
a Chicago action that would be seen (as H.tx I.erner sees it in his fantasy alrea<fy) a6^a .'-^ 
gathering of "every crackpot g*X3up, jirotest group, every disruptive, violent force in Aaar^-r 
can society that thinks it lias the pipeline to absolute truth." \-!e must demonstrate the ' .v' 
opposite, that the government is the real source of crackpot thinking and violence. We hava^ 
no ill«j8ions about the distortions which are inevitable frara Time magazine and the' rest of- .-; 
the mass media. Hjwever, we believe the country is bo divided that even within the mass me- 
dia there are possibilitiea for reporting based on a degree of respect and objectivity. f V/e -, 
must make an absolutely clear commitment to nonviolent tactics, develop a simple and clear 
political message that large nuirbers of Auericans can understand, carry out effective local 
organizirg which can interpret the national program and, finally, mobilize an assembly of 


people too large to be considered the lunatic fringe.! The planning for this program should 
begin now, while there is enough time to develop a sophisticated nationwide staff with ex- 
perience in both local organizing and demonstrations. This staff v.'ould be not only the nu- 
cleus of local activities, but the key to carrying out an orderly, hi^ily-coordinated series 
of actions at the convention. We believe the demonstrations can be orderly and directed. 
Certainly, there will be police crackdowns and various incidents of violence, but they need 
not change the overall character of the convention protest. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


• Ii cnedirte impact of th ' CaiT- vxTJ^'ii 

. On the V/ar; Au.jji'o^diiitu effect or .■ucK a cp.ypulfjP ^cnlo" tn to. irjoi-eaop the preSEure 
on tb(3 US govt\:iOT,3nt to end the wai in Vietnam. DK-^vei-nmerrt vdll be forced from Its 
Vietnam cominitment when the costs of that commitmeiit become, too greit, when the cotiimitmeat 
becomes untenable. Tt.c costs are many: billions of dollars, inflatr'on and rising taxes, 
thousands of casualties, a vjorsening US image abroad, shortage of resou;xes to deal vjith 
other crises, and disco iteni'. and disilliisionneut a'v hone, \le can increase pressure against 
the main po^jers nenied to p'oseca^d ohe war; the power j to mobilize an army, to tax, and to ' 
rer.iain in political offico.j V/c r.ust continuaJJly sl-iow that the an'^.i-war movement is increas- 
ing in militancy and n'.Lrbers. VJe can shovi the establishmait that deeper social conflict at 
, hoir.Q will result from the Vietnani crisis. Vie can accelerate the breakdovin of confidence In 
'' thf government and militrry by stressing that the decisions which led to ths Vietnam war ... 
'•:'\vete rigged in th? same way and by the same people vlio are rigging the convention and eleo--';- 
*.-"-tiOH3 in r'.?68.i The probable use of troops to protect Ms ovn nomination willftu^ar expz^d.^ 
V t--> outiiorltarlen character of Johnson's govsmnient. ; ...>■>'! ^ .,■ 

W -' ■■■ -■ : ■- ' ■•',: 

*'•-■" On Racism ; A second intnedi^te erfeot should be on the racial conflict.-, Va can expect' 

... ,liiaJor voi-er revulsion in the black coontunities vdth the traditional Democratic machines. .;'•' 

)«, " .-i. ' ' ' -^ 

v-Cuts In-anti-poverty, education and welfare funds, in addition to the ruthless police treat- 

>. nent of ■ rebelllcr.s, should guarantee that this revulsion wilJ. bo, at ?. new hi^ during the 

STUsnar and fall, lit is time for whites to stop being shocked spectators or vicarious par- 
t-Tlpr.nts in blsclc raJjeDlicas and begin to find activities which can be of direct value to 
the black power rjiove-pcrt. One obvious need in an election ye?.r is for white." to attack 
politically city halls and the feder?! goverrjient for oppressive policies. Whether this is 
done throu3^ angry telegrams, sit-ins, or forTpatlonr of coKiiittees to supply financial, legal 
and medical aid to f^hotto residents,, the effect is to create divisicne between "hawks" and 
"doves" in the establishment J As in the case of Vietnam, the existence of tiiese divisions ■•■• 
gives certain legitimacy to protest, and slows or dilutes repressive te.odenclta. The pre- 
sence of hwdredg of thousrnds of Wiiltes filling the streets of Chicago is a way to demon- 
strate the government's inability to completely unite the majority and the futility of its 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

attempt to be policemen oveiywhere. l/fhatever the form of black participation in tha_chal- 
lenge -and that viill b© decided by black organizations — it will constitute a significant and 
dramatic r-.-nent coming at the end of the summer and on the fifth anniversary of the 1963 
March on V/ashing^ton for Jobs and Justice. 

On In t ernational Polations ; The challenge also can be Important in increasing interna- <. 
tional- pressure on the United States. The global operations of the US partially depend on 
confidence, good vdll and cooperation from many governments. Alreacfy, most governments even 
in the West oppose the Vietnam war, and many peoples are worried about racio::i, tha Kenrody ■ ■ 
assassination and the imperial thrust of the US into their own econosdes. We anist intorna-' 
tionallze our battle, encouraging further opposition to US policies in these countries. The 
' protest of the 1968 elections will sound a worldwide alarm and increase opposition to the '' 

American power structure. (The 1968 campaign will be televised by satellite in Eui\,pe. ) 
I Cur gpaH should be to brand the US an orxt^itw power in the international coimaocity as Iciig es^ 
it c-jritittico its racist and imperialist pollsies.J „ ' . 

:. \ '.,-,. -.-i 

What Kind of Coalition? "' „: ■ 

We must buiU a real coalition, one involving connsctions bet'.;ecr. the i "'^•irgj,..'. Tcrskj ''.' 
jf acn>sa the countty. This roqttlres respect for different positions and outloolcs. Political*- 
' disagz'aements and dlscussiona should be carried onintensely, but within an understanding ' ' .' 
that the caallticn generally represents the forces lAlch, however divided at the nomsnt, 
must be d^relopsd inunity to achiere radical social change. People should be ablo to main- 
tain their own viev;s without advancing them in a sectarian way thi.t forces others to drop 
out. The goal is to v'J.te and radicalise a movenent, not to pirge it of its "rlcht" or 
"left" wings. 

The need for a coordinated effort does not imply that the groupe involved conform to a 

spec^^fic or narrow program. Oixc political point is that many diverse groupe are sufferl:;g 
from tho government's policies. Clack people, school teachers, social workers, hippleaj 
draf w resirtcrs, soldiers and veterans, and ordinary tax-paying people with gripes should 
have thn opp0rtv.rJ.t7 to express their particular concerns in thoir own ways. The overall 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

. or;-auir,aLion uljJT not spoa'; Tor everyone Kccept in i-liu moot j3(;iieni GcnL:e; it:; basic task is 
> '' 
not to "rcprooi nt. cvoiyone, but to structure opportuniticr; i'or communication ond coordination. 

I'e are finding tliat neither the methods of "liiorarcliy" (in which committeca of leaders meet 
continually but v.rith no real relation to what vjill actually happen at the demonstration), 
nor the nxore ^spontaneous method of "doing your ovm thing" are satisfactory organizational 
concepts. \!e seek a new organizational form based on both coordination and spontaneous ac- 
tion, effective leadership and active participation. J The problem is to create a staff and 
structure rooted in local areas, skiDied in demonstrations and community organizing, avjare 
of the nature of the party systen conscious of the layout of Chicago, experienced in viork- 
ing together, and able to have the confidence of the people coming for one or tvro days of 
demonstrations at the convention. | Such a staff would sexTre a genuine coalition structure, 
built in stages, allowing for full and equal participation by groups entering at different 
tines, and providing a connection between the wide variety of movements involved in the pro- 

This kind of broad coalition should include insurgent Democrats while, of course, mak- 
ing it clear that our strategy lis to build political organizations of our own rather than to 
"reform" the Democratic Party/. Insurgencies within the Danocratic Party should be seen as 
related to tha overall movement campaign, however. For instance, challenges to the creden- 
tials of state party machines — especially when made by black organizations or anti-war 
groups — help to expo'^e the top-down way in which decisions are made in the Party. Criticism 
of Party policy or structure before the Platform Committee can be equally valuable as a 
mians of e;:posurs. The "dump Johnson," pre-McCai-tiy or pre-Kennedy Democrats also are im- 
portant objectively because of the issues they sharpen. V/e should keep our organizational 
ranks open so sorro of these dissidents can join vath us in the streets or in independent or- 
ganizations when their hojies are blocked at the convention. 

At the same tine, wo must be arguing that the Democratic Party and the linits of the 
electoral system itself .ire wl^at wo oppose. TUe focus of our hopes is not a McCarthy (or 
K'.-nrieay) candidnr.y. Tlicsc condidaoos are not alternatives to the powei- structure, they are 
only alternatives within it. V/c bcXicvc Uml the p^rtj system cannot be reformed, as 

21-706 O— 69— pt. 2- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

K'-Mii<"-.y •'•: ■ y>;C;i?7thy -^o, boViSuHP it contains. intrannigr-nt oK.~pnts comnittod to tnaintni"' 
t-.ia slntun quo at ,nn c<ysts. A vote is nt best an organizing tool; it i>ecurc8 nothing hy 
^''""It. What we want to create is a greater consciouBnens that organizations of protest, 
ro:' '-s'^.^ucc , and in<lepeDdeat politics, underthe control of the actual people with grlevan- 
rcs. ore more important than casting a vote or<«orking for the "better" of two conventional 
canili ■ ■ '". 

l,oc.-.^ '-/tnl-ing -'ersua National DcmonstratlonB 

Within tbc enti-war and black liberation movements, there have been two broad organiz- 
er^ cnifhiccs. One aims at dramatizing massive popular dissent against established policii^ 
by "□oblli::irig"pcople for a single day of protest and demonetration. The other seeks to 
build ''permanent" bases of independent power by organising locally around people's felt 
gr .'3'-ccs. Which organizing approach ia "crrrect" has been an issue of considerable di':- 
p-.I'^^ within the movement. 

?3r ttis problem, we propose a solution that will differ from previous national ■r'-'.'- 
zations s^ainst the war. This eacpaign is aimed at deepening the roots of local organizs- 
ti3::3. We are r:ot envisioning a one-shot, two-day affair in which thousands of dollars are 
spent c'^'Z srerry evaporated with little effect on the local level. For previous mobiliri- 
tions, IccaT oomittees spent ouch of their energy in advartiaing the awnt and arranging 
the b'-.ces. T!:e events were often without any relation to local activities, the dates were 
eriitrsr.'ly chosen, and so on. 

\le propose an Organizational experiment thay nay fail, but one that we believs should 
be c' Uirpted. I A national coalition should be organized which is dominated by people with n 
-ccal oT^a-rz^ii^ perspective, people responsible to local constituencies. Any national dc- 
monstrr •,icn in Ct' '"ago "'>•>•• lo "■".r.eout of a program that has atrensed local organizing dur. 
in,"^ '.'.2 evrirg and summer and can support coouunity base-building in the fall. 

Jz rcc^irnize that in some parts of the country there vill be tension between local or- 
(^nrr 7s end tbin campaign. But, in general, this program could be of great value in 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


donloping lasting orgahizatlons on the local level. We view the election year as opening 

\it> an imncnso diance for expansion of the numbers of people interested in a new political 
novenent. Also, opportunities to build regional coalitions will increase aa a variety of 
groups see a mutual interest in attacking a common enenQr: the entrenched and repressive 
political establishment. In numerous ways, there will exist the opportunity for organizers 
to come together in a region for a common purpose: the Peace and Freedom Party in Califor- 
nia is one exa<:!pQ.e of what vte mean; the union of white organisers in Chicago is another. 

In addition to the comnon enei^y, this movement campaign creates another useful (dynamic: 

- a 6£use of Ui'genqy because of the timetable. Of course, timetables, especially those vhich 

, pro set by the TJ^ government, can force a local movement to stress superficial mst-bods to 

, ^ quick results rather, than other organizing methods which might in the long ruq yield 

•'Btiwngor , grass-roots activity. But in this case, the timetable forces people to both con-, - 
Sfe, . ■ ' ^ 

<8olldate and cxptind, p^oritics which are of immediate importance to most Insurgent greapd.-' 

racing posclble repression^ on tb9 one hand and tremendous organizing opportnnltie» among -- 

' newly-<lls«ontented groups on the other, local organizing has to accelerate evexT^d^ere or bs'- 

'lost. *;■'•':;-... "o ., . ['" ,,'/;' \ ■ ' ■_ _ ■..";•■;•■''.'); 

V , I^ ^1^9 caRpad^ coalition, particularly at the regional level, is dominated by people 

f - ' : s. ■ ..:,■•.-•.■ ; ..;■,•,■. ■ V 

With a commitment to local organizing vork, then the resources and nomentum t^at q national 
challenge of this kind can generate can be used in a new way. For example, organizer- 
training schools could be supported by the national coalition rather 'than New York Tines 
adverti::nr.onts. Such schools could focus not only on the mechanics of the Democratic Con- 
vention challenfre, but on organizing methods, the immediate issues of the draft, or on the 
prcmoticn of permanont organizing projects among white workers. 

*!•".-» * * * * » * ■n « 

Finally, we should not become so trapped in debates about the abstract merits or prob- 
l^wis of this p-oject that we miss its historical and dramatic potential. There ia a grow- , 
ing renoe e-zeiywhore that the country ia cracking up, and this feeling la sure to deepen the Eunmsr rebellions and the next escalation in Vietnam. There is an interest in 
njw ancviere, a distrust of the established ones. There is a sense that Johnson has brou^t 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

Araerio<in politics :to an awful and total bankruptcy, reflecting a deep sickness ±i\ the 

wliole society. ■There is a feeling that this sickness must somehov; be stopped. I Certainly, 
we cannot stop Johnsorf or'the government at the Convention, nor can we do it on any single 
similar occasion. But there are times, or turning points, when dying ideas can be de- 
clared dead and new ideas announced in their place. VJe can accomplish that at the Conven- 
tion by exposing and defying the nauseating emptiness of our political leaders, and we can 
use this ■ election year to create and- advance nary centers of local power which contain the 
seels for a nevi order. 

. V We propose a trogram that would unfold in three phases: the spring, the summer, md 
; late August at the Democratic National Convention. A second paper will follow this one, 
dlccuBSing possible activities aod program daring the fall election. period. 

The Spring (April,-June) 
*f'' J, These spring months should bring wide public attention to a serious challenge against - • 

the Deracratlc Party in cities and towns across the country. The objectives of thp spring 
' Jnonths wauld be: fl^ t he formation of local coordinating structures composed of various 
v5.*ovement organizations in 12 to 1$ regions of the country. These regional committpes woi^Ld- 
-^provide the poUt^-cai direction for the movement election year campaign in local tf^&a;^^^ 
■j a public call by ijocal coalition committees for a specific summer organizing program rela- 
_< ted to the Democratic Party challenge; (3) immediate activity which tends to put the Demo- 
." cratic Party on the defensive or publicly embarrasses or exposes Party officialdom. 


A nunibar of beginning projects could be suggested which move toward this initial ob- 
jective, -for example t 
' ^\^ P.OJearch and Exposure : Organizers need hard information and intelligence on the 
, people-wlu) hold power locally. A research center, based on a campus or in an organization, 
with no more than several people, can help fill this. need while gathering intelligence for 
the local moverignt campaign. The undenwcratic method of choosing delegates — through mon^ 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

•and "pull" — should be exposed and fought. The names of Democratic Party contributors who 

profit, from. P^tagon contracts should be revealed. I The political, business and personal 

biographies of the ten most powerful people in each state mi^t be circulated on a "most 

wanted" l ist. \ For research suggestions, Lee Webb has written a useful paper entitled "How 

to Bypore and Sight the Democratic Party in Your Conmunity;" it is availablis by writing to" """ 

. h07 South Dearborn, ^eou /31?i Clticago. Other articles and documents on the Democrats and 

- elactoral pollttos are b«ing prepar^ed"for publication in major jnagazinea. ; " " ■*" 

Yf Ee^Lj-, Regional cornmit-feeea-mtght interest local lawyers in prepartug iBgai" ch"Slleng6B - 

to the crsde.itials of national delegates. In all states that" elect dclef;atea behind th e 

closed doors of state conventions, legal challenges should ^e organized. " Any ^ irregulari- ' ;; 

ti(9s in thesel f ^st i lnn tv Tnlrini; i n I iiiii m f ni '^ft1 i °f ^»''" e3 should be documented . Hopeful ly, - 

f ^'nunerous challenges t o the credentials of state delegates can face tho c.pfldent ■^a^H' rnlntll^t- ,-.. 

' ' tea "at the opening of the convention. At the same time or earlier, we would hope for a ''" 

■'•.'■'■■ ■,.■.■■-'■' 'i' ''' 

<:rederal court rult seeking to enjoin the convention from assesillng on tha grounds that itr« 

.Lawyers who work on credentials challenges are also need^J' 

• ed in the legal defense of those »dio may be arrested in Chicago at the time of the.conven-'> 

» *■- ' . , . ■ ' . - - > ■ !■•■■,: t-.- •'>, - ;.- 

fls tlon. . ' *•■ .— 

.*. ^/"-^ : ■'-... - 

• TrU National Teaeh-In ; For many disgusted Democrats, the ldea~ of . exposing the. Democratic • ., 
*. , , ' -.- ..--■'■_. - . ', ■'■.'-■••< 

^' Party and bulldihg local independent organization will not be immediately afaparent. A ,' ':,•"■'! 
*« ■ - ■ . ..,■"'■."' 

,' national -teach-in ^n litt; Democratic Party, modeled along the lines of the Vietnaur teach-ins ^. 
u ' ._-■•■• 

, and piped into hundredf_ of colleges and organizations could help create a popular focus on ' • 

the Democratic Pafty. A national teach-in. might cover: (l) the historic failure of the - 
Democratic P.^rty and the New Deal; (2) who really controls the Democratic Party and the 
govemraentj (3) the failure of policy from the Democratic Party; and (li) the need to organ- 
ize political forces Independent of the two major political parties. . - 

T'l Direct Action ; The spring months should Sds a broader nevj expression of opposition to 
the draft because of Johnson's selective service orders. Coming from rather convention^ 
backgrounds, the new recruits to the anti-draft movement will tend to seek a political ob- 
ject of protefet. They may be joined by more and more respectable members of the academic 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

cpinrcunity, includinc college administrations. By April 3> the next national day pf resis- 
tance, wi3 may find a mvch greater outbreak of anti-draft action. After the counter-com- 
mencements' planned th:.3 spriilfe -to protest the war and the draft and to reject the degree 
ag a ticket into American vsociety, these people might become a greater nucleus of draft 
resistance- organizers. The government and Democratic Party night become the felt enemies 
of this broadened -resistance. One organization on Chicago's Northside recently submitted 
draft cards to the Democratic Party office ■which they regarded as the local representatives 
of the war. 

During t}^e .SDS "Tsn Days, of Itesistance" (April 2lT30),-attentiou might be given to ,. 
DeraocraticParty^targfets, ., Picket?; at Party fund-raising affairs, actions at state Den»cra-.-,; 
tia_£Otwentions vb-ere delegates are- chosen beliind closed doors^ local Democratic Party 
teiach~iD3 ■i>n the- cainpuses^.ar* examples* In Chicago^ ths-April .Ian Days mil begimrtth 
Beveral.jcampusesjiolding teach-ins-on 1;he Democratic. Party -and~the- War. On April.. 24»-^9tii- 

>■■-•■• • ■ • . . - r.;, 

»-^«tertfcs- acEoas-tbe .city wiJJL.denoostrate at HI, the -univflrsity vhich- conducts the. largest; 
**reoe8aTfa-pragram -^ «arf ara jeseard>- iii-ibo-coontry .. . Qo- April *5> .^ • ' 
' Ja*n»oa_la- sclieduled- to speak at aJ3efi»crat±« Party fund "ra±sing-.affair,- which the- tnoT»-- j; 
-•Btont.-will.dl^rupt«,.p;i.Apiril26,^soo» camposes vill.^partic±pa*e iu stcdent-.»trite-to-" ' • •' '^ 
- iJnjtest^-the-var-j-^vall^by tba-StudcntHobiliswiion. On-Apcil 27, 2$y000j)GiTpl&,scre~expoo-' \ 
~t«iJta,jaarciiuoT^ city-hall 4etnanciing that Mayor- Dal^y^-hostto -the-l'emocratic.Jt3on»ention». 4:i - 
-TSupport-a-programjEor- peace.. -...•.= " 


*^' f rima ryl^ampai p^s : McCarthy ovganiaaticns will -be supporti-ng-^hcir candidate _d£le- 
.^5ate& tcr-tbe.flational-ooTiventicn.-- The decision whetherj how ani.on what- t.enns-to give 
"wippDrt-io-such campaigns -should bo Icft-np to th-a .local coalition organizationsV Ib wcTar, 
"•contact -oX-^ some kirj?, should be arranged -with a view to-niard_brinipLng-£ome. oT. the_McCaTthy 
" snpportero- into ths. overall campaign againi;t thenonven-tion and -elaction-xhoice -— At' the- 
sajne-tdme^ jaore--ratlical^organ.l2atlons.-with. electoral programs- Tnight-tK»-i!Drmingi_.^uch- as- ' 
the -Calif^nia. Peao«-~and Freedom Party. These independent^ .aiitr-war-and~antiwaci3t_jalec- • 
toraj^ campaigns ar.i_bullding^ a. consciousness- critical^of traditional jxirty .politics. -- It- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


ley may even want 

use the coalition machinery to promote similar parties in other states. 

sboulrt be natTbral for them vo find allies in the overall coalition. They may even want to 

3^ People's Platform Hearing ; During the spring, the platform coDBnlttea of the Denocra- 
tlc Party is expected to receive testioor;/ for its 1968 platform in several cities. Peop- 
le's p^Latform hearings could be anzuunced i^ thjeae cities at. the same time,>Alch can pub- 
licly focus on the Democratic Party's id^tewash of the double crisis of the cities aqd 
foreign policy. People's hearings would receive testimony from returning Vietnam veterans, 
welfare recipients, lawyers and workers. Hearings would continue throu^ "the summer ^ as a 
way of directing attention in dozens of communities on the nation's real difficulties. 
The h6fu:lng3 would conclude in Chicago when a final report from a panel of prestigioifs 
Americtos would indict the Deoocratlc Party and the government for their failure to 9eek . 

•■■ serious answers to the nation's crisis. 

}'' ' ' . 

v,\-i . Planning Slimmer Program : Finally, an important task of each regional- campaign commit-. 

'tee will be to develop a coherent, relevant sunner program that can help expand and stren~-; 

tuen the existing base of the movement in the- local area. The iro gram for summer work , 

■ - •. ^' 

:■>:'■ should: be widely-circulated. . If possible, a training school Cor orientation oi^ summor 

'^^ ■' . ; ^ > •, vf. '', • ' ', .'; 

- volunteers -iWDuld .'tje developed. * :/. - : : v j »• .: -, . :-•.],' .> ? .. ' .^'^ 

^' ■ " f ' * ' ' . 

^ The Summer (June-August) , 

F^r the reiasons that hundi'eda of thousands will come to Chicago in late August to ex- 
press tbeir disgust ..and anger about the election alternatives, maoy more Americans will 
willingly work in communities this sunner if offered concrete things to do. The obj^tlves 
of the noTement cui^ign during the sunmer period would include: (l) a massive orgaqizing 
drive affecting hundreds of local areas— towns, couotiea and cities — and involving ttpu- 
sands pf new people in independent movement actiTilgr; (2) a national training program for 
STMmer and full-time volunteers organized by regions, which could provide meaningful orl- 
entatipn and establish specific work for the organizers; (3) local preparations for ^, 
Chicago demonstration in late August, with organizations planning their own actions^' ■ 
"Denucratic Assemblies" for people to formulate demands and develop tactics for the 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

Convention, the training of cadres in den»nstration tactics, and the education of local 
connnunities, particularly Chicago, about the purpose of the demonatration. 

3 '^ local Organizing: The nmvement campaign 1968 should center around the work of local 
organisers this summer — several thousand should be the objective — who build high school 
draft resistance groups; organize anti-war committees among teachers, doctors, veterans 
and clrrgy; speak to every trade union in a city about the war, tax and high prices; reach 
women isolated in the suburbs; support peace and freedom party campaigns or move intq white 
working class communities in Cincinnati, Richmond or Lexington to live and stay for the 
long ha'Jl. The national program should find support for those organizers who see thqir .':; 

task to be slow, patient political work in one section of one community, reqidring several ' f;. 
ysari <x) establish an independent political base,and those resistors *4io organize a qummsr > !^ 
'- caraivan to travel across the country, reaching hundreds and hundreds of young people on th&,. .- 

' ■ "'■5! 

.;^^ issues of the war and the draft, ^ Local coordinating committees associated with the nation- Jy 

■■-'.- tf 
' " al navpmcnt campaign would define^and organize their own summer program. It is not the • ■ ' 
,A ' , ; .. ; ■ .'i 

< ir:t.ent of this campaign to pUsh any single organizational approach, though it is expected ,:..,: 

'- that cacia region might develop its own specific political emphasis.. Nationally, several - ■' 

■ " org?uil2atlonal forms, 'such as training schools, might be stressed. 
". ' ; , ■ " f* 

l^ 1'ra?-' lng Schools ; Sumner "projects" frequently fail to achleive their expected pirpcio . 
hor-.-ise short-term objectives are not carefully defined and consminlcated to the sunmer pai- 
ticf^auts. There is now considerable organizing experience in a variety of communities 
tha* can be draim upon in developing and guiding a summer program. We believe this ^xperi-'.': 
ence ^ould be summarized and analyzed in a series of materials that are circulated ^mong ■ /•, 
all pirticipatinj regional campaign committees and presented in a systematic fashion at the , 
'.)'■ ■■•'.n:in3 of the summer to volunteers. Perhaps two weeks of "training" would be sufficient,- 
perhaps more. Some formal orientation to the summer work, in whatever, form. Is essential, 
however. Furthermore, there will be a need for continuing organisers* workshops to make v 
preparation for the challenges at the convention. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

"be workshops could cover a variety of areas: (l) Information on demonstration tactisfl 
from experience in this country and abroad; (2) b ackground on the Democratic Party—who oxma 
and nuks it, hoH.doe8,.it work, the mechanics of its Convention, the failures of its promiae 
and policies; (3) discussion of our movement, ite history, its problems, and Its directlonj 
(U_considerati'on of various philosophies and techniques of community organizing. "Tech- 
oiquea" of community organizing will vary of course, depending on the political emphasis of 
the regional campaign committee. In California, organizing for the Peace and Preedoia Party 
would probably represent the important training focus. In Boston, community -based draft 
resistance could be emphasized. In Chicago, white working class organizing might be nost 
' linportant. . 

St' "Qetnocratic A38entolies" t Organizers working with people coming to Chicago In Au^t 
^. pl^t qpnsider "open forums" to discuss and develop demands on the Convention or plan/spe- ' 
* clfio tactics for Chicago. Where possible, people coming td OMcago should be famlll^ 
: vlth ttie overall strategy of the Convention challenge and be pa:%pared to implement thalr 
-, own plans of action. Broad representational assetA>lles or eoaller constituency meetings in 
^' ifiTjmn of coimuniiles befoi>e August should be one aim of the summer. 

[should (Useuss plans In each training school for support and parallel activity during ,4)la:k 
^etto rebellions. Whites ahoold sit-in at DeoDbratie_M^rpr's. offices, ofcg^^d i^edleal 
and legal support, p a l l together diversionary demonstrations outside the ^etto to dr^w off 
police ^ind find ways to focus public blame for iriiat happens on the powerful white interests. 

i [^ Chicaeo Demonstration Leadership; One goal of the sunaer should be to develop groups 

of peof^e who can piravide street leadership during the Chicago action. The specific iae- 

- thgy 

tics for Chicago should be developed and implemented by these groups sbould/oome to Chicago 

during the sunner to familiarise themselves with streets and targets and the denonstr^tion , 

coamunication system. From each summer organizing program, cadres should develop who take 

responsibility for specific parts of the Chicago demonstration. Doctors and laiqrcrs' should 

also be organized to observe, report and aid at the time of the demonstrations. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


National Convention Mobilization (Au(?jst 214-28) 

The summer would be capped by three days of sustained, organized protests at the Deno- 
cratlc National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago vrtth people demanding peace, 
Justice and self-determination for all people. The Chicago challenge must convey a broad ' 
but concrete critique of the Democratic Party and its failure to meet the crisis of our 
cities and the war. It must say to the world that Johnson represents the wealth, the mill- 
taxy and the politically corrupt of America, not ordinary people. It must attempt to de- 
legitimate the Democratic Party while building support for an Independent people's movement • 
during, the 1968 elections. 

_ We propose a general outline of a demons tration strategy for Chicago, as a way of sug- 
gesting what Is possible during this period. The outline is divided into four perio48t _ T 
(l) prp-Convention publicity, education and legal offensives; This would include a chal-: '^' 
lenge \o the Oonstitutionallty of the Convention, challenges to several state delegat(lons , 
and a citizen's indictment of the Democratic Party and the governraentj (2) an Inltia^ Con- ^ 
ventlop challenge related to the crisis of poveirty and the cities, with emi^iasls on the ,.— 
conditions of black Americans; (3) a second wave of . detnonstrationa and protects related to ,\ 
the crjsis.of the war and America's foreign ipllcy; (U) a final,' ^8aive^]jlrote8t.agaiIl8t-..' 
the Institution of the Democrati c Par^ a«^, its fraudulent, undetaqctatlc Convention.' '' ;." 

Pre-Convention Actlvlt/ (August 2U-2$) t) After a summer of gathering testlnoiy from 
hundreds of citizens' on direct eocperiences with the conditions of racism, urban neglept. 
Democratic Party, corruption, and the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Thallapd, the "People's 
Platform Hearings" wguld receive summary testiraoiv in Chicaga as the Democratic Party was 
holilng its own platform hearings. The People's Platfor m Hearings ml^t be hi^ilighljed by 
tee tlmony on the conditions of Mississippi, on America's welfare system, on th e Kennec^ y 
assassinat ion, on V S war crimes in Vietn am and on the causes of riots . Following the pub- 
lic people's hearings, a fipal report viould be announced and released for the opening day 
of the Convention. Prominent Americans with moral and political authority would present a 
citizen's iixiictment of the government and the Democratic Party and demand that the Demo- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

^, . cratic National Convention suspend all rules and all 

buaine^s to take up the challenges of the indictment. The citizen's indictment would be 

made politically serious if the full power of the demonstration was then put behind this 


In addition, numerous legal challenges to the credentials of delegates or entire state 

delegations vjould be made during this early Convention period. A federal court suit would 

seek to enjoin the Convention from assembling until the method of delegate selection fol- 

„lowed the one man-one vote principle. The citizen's indictment would be presented at .the 

same time that the Democratic credentials committee was publicly derying several dozap , , . 

charge^ of undemocratic rules and fraudulent procedures. • ^ .^ ' , 

*»^- ... ....■ '■ '' . \ 

'"'^'■%l First Wave; Poverty and the Citie/(August 26) ;j Following the demand that the Coit- j'l. 
»,*^ v«itlon take up the dja^enge of the citizen's indictment, pfr+he'liSrsf day 6r, the Conren- 'Jj, 

■;%■•• '.■['■■•'-■"' ._ ^- "■' • ■ ■-■"-' ■ ■ ■ - V ;.- -V.:v,;" ?•■-■■■ ■ ■'^;^: 

'^. ,tion, act4.ons pti^t demaipi,,that the panocratia- Party deal with the crisl» of thascltiea and/? 

? *"^novorte. To dramatize the deftMid and the urban condition, protests could focus on hundreds ■ 

V*, /■ • ■_ -l-'r-^rrr-r- ^— , — > > ^ i — ' ~; 

'"•" of the major institutions that irresponsibly cofttribute to urban breakdown; welfare offi- -j 

^' ces. .U3?ban renewal departments, police stations, dav-ln hnr hiring halia. larga aluw lAnd-^ ^ ;.; 

"• '..■•-: ',"'''• '^"''■" 

^ -' lords, schools and city hall. Different brganlsations would come to Chicago prepaid -to \^ ;*i 
if ■ •■• ■ ..I . ■ .,■, ^ .-■,...•-■ ■ ■' ;. •. \ "■ ■■.,,■ 

t.^oanyout a speciXic. action program.- The Mississippi Freedom Demoicra,t^ nl^t want, to -focus,;' 

attention on their lack of representation or on the failure to deal with poverty across the ■>" 
country. Or a coalition of "poverty ri^ts" organizations in one region mi^t surround the 
Conrad Hilton, a downtown Chicago hotels on the ■ mornihg of the 26th to greet the delegates 
,. with leaflets demanding $15 billion to end poverty ahd a breakfast menu totaling 15#, the 
amount alloted under welfare. At lOcOO a.m., the recipients mi^t march from iha Hilton 
to 318 Weet Adams to join with delegations coming from the other downtown hotels in a mas- 
sive demonstration at the welfare office headquarters of Chicago. In the evening, th^ re- 
cipients might again return to the hotels < to invito the delegates to spend the night with 
them in the ghetto rather than in luxurious hotels. Hopefully, many organizations woBld 
come to Chicago vrlth specific plans of action that together cover many issues, many tar- 
gets, but dramatize a common theme. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 —Continued 

^O (Second Uawe:3be Ha^ (August ?7j ! The indictment dramatized on the aecond day viould 
regard the~nfiperiallst role of the United States in the world. Actions would concentr ate 
on doBens of war targets across the city; Chicago draft boards, the downtovm induction 
center, Il linois Institute of Tgchnolopy (the nation's center for chemica l-biological war- 
fare research) ^ fflj pajrir hot- iprprifrlltipns like Dovj Chemical. The second day mi^t see a 

me morial servicq fnr ^""-"irV p^-'p"'" ''•S"\i\?'^ In Tin tnam and the ghett os, h eld in one of Qhi - 
cago's large parks, with services conducted by America's most prominent black ministers. 

August 27 might be declared a national day of resistance, with draft cards' turned in to the 
Convention and a serious teach-in for soldiers protecting Johnson's convention. This array, 
of protests would stand in stark contrast to the silence of the Convention regarding the ■i'.' 
Vietnam war. , . . , jj;-'. 

,2' I XjJinal Wave;/ A Funeral March on the Democratic Party; A major call for Americans \A''\ 

f;- register their oppdeltion to" the Democratic Party should be Issued for August 28, the day.. ,' 

«ii' '^ I , ' . . ■ " . .- . ■• .- , ... • ' ..-,.>'. 

*• -r of the PresidentiaX nomination and the fifth anniversary of the Mirch on Washington tot • -^ ^ 

■'..■■ - " ■■ ... ■ ■ - -■■ .. . - K .... : '■ .' '<M 

^ '. Jobs ajid Justice. ' August 28 mleht f iwirin iHtVi a iiioqg4\ro nnomnoT-at,-^ ^ Asgemblv'." perhaps li^ '^ 

■\v' ,• '-■'-■ . .' ,i ' "• . . ^ .■.■■- '■ 'W; 

^ Grant Park, and climax in a "fa neral march" on the InterHationlil Amphitheater immediatel y %.., 

4» after the first ballot.'" Such a march could be led by retired generals, admirals and 7 1^- 

■^ . . ^ r ,-. ; ;■>>-• 

r*, nam veterans . The funeral jik'ocession ndght be organized by constituencies: blacks fol- ;' 
f lAwed ^'clergy followed by women followed by faxTners and faculty and workers and resistera 
f-' "and so on. This funeral would Speak for those who say that the elections represent no 

choice and a complete breakdown of democracy, and those who pledge to use the fall election 
to expend the resistance into all sections of the American public: professors engaged ia s"' 
war research; people who pay war taxes j recipients who let themselves be pushed az*ouDd by 
caseworkers; workers v;ho "go along" with their unions on racism aijd the war; college gradu- . 
ates faced with the draft; suburban women conditioned to "Stay in their place"; etc. j WM.I9 , 
Johnson accepts the nomination, a half -million people in the largest protest In the history ' 
of ttle country carry caskets symbolizing the Democratic Party Into the Convention area and 
bury them in Chicago's stock yards beside the Amphitheater. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


Th"? Or Ranlzatlon of the Caiffjlen t 

The porogram suggested Is broad, demanding and difficult to implement. Already, time 
is short. Organization must be created at many levelo, in many sections of the country. 
People, community organizations and coalitions must define their relation to the program 
according to their own intirest and needs and in their' ovm time. The national coalition , 
organisation' isust be representative of. many interests.-and cpnstituencies, yet be able to 
move fprward and accomplish tasks. Support can only come in stages, yet; where, ^p^pport 
exists, work must proceed if anything is to happen. Understandably .""thFISHti -war and black 
liberation movccicnts id.ll stress different emphases. Organization must allow for separate 
approaphes while remaining^o^n to cooperation. '5Tfr-ip']Ti^"T7;T'"~ .^ 

t Thsrefore, we sxigg^t that the national coali'tloh'6rgaid.zatidn~Be set up in stages and ^ 

jbcp bjpen to new groupings that' idsh to, participate until %he«hd oTllugt^ i)ecl,diona and A 

'. ' ' '.'"'■ •''■: ■ ■ '• ■ '-'-'. .'.;■' 1 ' 

' fTogran development should be- decentralised as much as. possible tp-i:egional coalltio^ com-. 

, (» . "" " '■'"- ''" ■ "...:■''■ V" -i ■ ■*'■'< 

nlttees. The black liberation and anti-war moTements should consider parallel organizatiein a^ 

■ .—__- -T r^— ^ — — *-T^r-^rv 

, that «n <w t^^x rnmr"^'' '"'*•''"' •"vl f;f>opf>rat.-i .on where political Interftsta neree. And ah ad-^ h^ 

... . ■.- - ■: . ■_ ■ . . , „ '—^-- . ■ ' ■- "^..-'V ■• .',4 

^>-Klnlstratlve comndttee should be created that Is rasponktbl'tf t>o the ooalitioa organisation. « 

Iv. • • f _ • ■ " 7 " I ■ ■ ,• ' ■ ■, -1 I ■■;,i-vi •- ■ ■ , ■;-'•■ ■ , , -"• .■,•5'-^.■ . ,j . -■ 

■ ■ , ■ . • '' ■' ,,■'■■'■-■,.,-'«;■*■'. 

K;^/->. caH allow ncKLbiUty and •fTiciency In directing staff.- The organisation for JUte ■\.-^< 
-r^-^ -(";•"■ " "If.:.-.-.: v^'- ^,^ .,.;■' .-,.:;.' -v^ •''.>:■'■;:. i.■ix^ ;':*•' '■^;. 

.-t/jveai^nt campaign mi^t proceed in this wasr: - ...» . ' . ^.t' 

^'fX'' ^^'V^^^^'^'o^^^^^ ''^0^ ^or Harch-;22-2U, inciting some 250 repree«n-v 

tatlvee fxx>n 'different anti-war itH black organizations across the nation, a tentative '<;.. 

.^.^ructiire could be established. ' The conference participants ndght elect two coalition ,' 
boarn?) representing different 'interests in the anti-war .and black movements. These two . 
boards', in our opinion, should be empowered to add meid>er3h4p> jbs new constltuenclee ;decide 
they wish to participate in the challenge coalition. The boards would be responsiblo for 
the br.:ad policy and direction of the two parallel coalitions. 

Tjie elected bosvds would then select administrative committees to direct. 'the st^fff.,.,. 
The adpdnlstratlve committees would include two representatives froR^ the East, JSouth^' Mid-r 
West aM West regions. The two administrative committees ml^t meet together op matters of 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

concern conmon to the anti-war and black coalitions. The committees would hire separate 
staff. The staffs would then begin to develop programs in white and black comimmitiea. 
The structure mi^t look like this: 



rl i. 


Ilarch 22-2U Conferences 

National Board 

National Board 

Wrainistrative Committee Administrative Committee 

Regional Groupings 

Regional Groupings 


Vftiite Community 

Black Community 

"^ -. ^PJnaUy, the coalition boards might consider including a representative of<«ach major 

project} developing around the Conv^tlon challenge. Maiior projects idU be organissed on a^,' 

i: ^- ••■•■' ;.. ■,■,.-■• ■ --■■■' -■■'-. ' - . - - ■ ' ..;>,-r t* 

C^ndejiendent or eend-independent basis, t^.ihe coalition organization^ but najr \ ' ''vant,to=. ^ 

'A-r ' '•■»■■-'.' ', I.'- "-■.' " ■ * ■ ■• -■-" -i ■■ '''^ V ■; -/-. ■• V, 

;-; participate in the coalition. Such pro jecta might include: , "" />? "^^ , - \S:'- J.: 
••-'''■■" t "■■">"'•■. 1- -« ' -• — ■ 

^-."f, Legal — Offense and Defensa t-' Organization of lawyers is needed to pttSepBire challepgeo ^^ 
' ;fci j,th(^«redentials of delegates and the Constitutionality of .the Oonvetitioa. Injunctions^ J^ 
'^fal^b|(ils, and vague Dulti-state and municipal charges need legal opposition. And tbosa^ ^ 

V. t 

i arrested In Chicago, Jor whatever reason, require legal defense. .j 

People's Platform Hearings ; A panel of prominent people to receive testinoiy and de- 
velop a report on America must be assembled. Research must be gathered, witnesses vl^ 
pertinent information found, hearings organized, etc. Preparations for Chicago facilities 
for the final hearings should begin soon. 

_ Research and Education ; A stream of papers and educational materials exposing the 
Democratic Party should pour out of the coalition organization. A list of research priori- 
ties should be developed nationally and locally and support from people with research- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


skills I'li-oups that, gather sj.>cciric intelligence on national delegates should be or- 
ganised locally. Papers that can assist summer organizing, spring teach-in and other edu- 
cational work should be circulated. 

Regional Training Schools : The curriculum of each school will vary, reflecting the 
political emphasis of the Ipcal campaign coalition. Nevertheless, it could be helpful if 
a national training project" were established to assist regional schools in developing ma- 
terials, recruiting, fund-raising, etc. 

National Teach-in : Considerable preparation is required to develop background materi- 
als and speakers for the national teach-in on the Democratic Party. The technical arrange- 
ments are considerable. While preparations have begun in California for such a project, 
they will need national support. 

Convention Papier : A newspaper that circulates in Chicago during the demonstrations 
and informs participants of inside and outside activities is an essential project. 

National Press Service ; Attention should be given to Informing the media about the 
specific objectives of the challenge and keeping the press informed as events in Chicago 
unfold. ^f 

Yippee Festival ; A large-scale convocation of hippies, rock bands, etc., will occur 
in Chicago at the same time as the Convention, seeking to contrast the cel*ration of life 
with the death-producing rituals of the politicians. 

International Protest : A group should be formed to approach delegations at the United 
Nations about increasing pressures on the United States. We should call for demonstrations 
in man/ countries and send representatives to speak and organize in. those countries. We 
should invite international representatives to join our "people's platform hearings" and 
march v;ith us on the- Convention. 


Mr. CoNLEY. As Exhibit 2, the document entitled "DISCUSSION" 
by Rennie Davis and Tom Hay den, also the subject of some testimony 

Mr. IcHORD. Is there any objection? Members? 

If not, the document will be incorporated into the record. 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 2." See pages 2556-2559.) 

Mr. CoNLET. As Exhibit 3, the clipping from the Cuban Commu- 
nist paper entitled Gromfnm^ dated September 8, 1968, specifically page 
12, entitled "Michael Klonsky denounces police brutality during Chi- 
cago incidents." 

Mr. IcHORD. I thought, Mr. Counsel, that was already in as part of 
the record. 

Mr. CoNLEfT. I don't believe so. 

Mr. IcHORD. If there be no objection, that will be incorporated. 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 3." See page 2585.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. As Exhibit 4, a letter dated June 4, 1968, addressed 
"Dear Col. Lao" ^ and signed "Tom Hayden" and also the subject of 
some testimony yesterday. 

Mr. IcHORD. This has been read into the record. 

Mr. CoNLEY. But not f onnally offered, I don't believe. 

Mr. IcHORD. No objection, so admitted. 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 4." See page 2586.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Counsel is recognized to proceed. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, I believe when we concluded the hearings 
yesterday, we were talking about the trip that you took to Cuba in De- 
cember — or January 1968. And you were asked in what capacity you 
went, I believe, to summarize and get us back where we were, and you 
indicated that you went as a journalist for Liberation magazine. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, can you pull the mike just a little closer 
to you? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is this not substantially where we were yesterday ? 

All right, I would ask you, sir, and directing your attention specifi- 
cally to a news item which appeared in the National Guardian of De- 
cember 30, 1967, under the byline of Lionel Martin, and I am reading 
specifically from the fourth paragraph, which I will be glad to hand 
you in just a moment, which reads as follows : 

Those who to date have expressed their intention to participate in the congress 
from the U.S. are anti-war activist Dave Bellinger; Tom Hayden, community 
organizer in Newark, N.J. ; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, professor of humanities 
at New York University. Many others are expected to attend from the U.S. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, my question to you would be this, sir: 
This article would indicate that you were attending as a participant. 
In fact, I believe it uses that word. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Hayden. I am sorry. Did you ask a question ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. I thought you just made a statement, 

Mr. IcHORD, Repeat the question. 

Mr, CoNLEY. My question was, sir, that the article says that you 
attended as a participant. Is this correct ? 

1 Correct spelling "Lau." 


Hayden Exhibit No. 3 


Michael Klonsky 
denounces peBice brutality 
during Chicago incidents 

y^^ "^V~I ICHAEL Klomky, National Stcretan of SDS (Students /or a Dtmoeratie 

f y Society), wot interviewed by t'lepSon* by Radio Havanc Cuba on Au- 

MS 1 ffust 88 during the incidents in Chicago. 

Considerable attention has already been called to the fact that the police 
used the butts of their rifles, tear gas and MACE in their attacki on tHc 
thousands of persons protecting the Yankee war of aggreseton in Vietnam 
at the very moment toHen Hubert Humphrey was being Mominatmt pre*- 

idential candidate at the Democratic Convention. 

Klonsky spoke of these incidents in hi* telephone interthew which we present here 

in full: 

What. can yoa tall ui about the present tituatitta 
in CUcacor 

We have been fitting in the street* for four days. 
Manv of our people have been beaten up, and many 
of them are in jail, but we are winning. We 
puihed the police out of Grant Park, and the peo- 

Ele were sull in the streets. They are going to be 
t the streets all night, and we are going \o do 
anythine we can to stop this farce (the Democratic 
National Convention) which is taking place in 
Chicago. The people are committed to carry on 
this fight not onlv m Chicago but throughout the 
United States We are going to go back to the 
hotel (The Conrad Hilton) and down to the park 
•gain, ond are going to carry on the fi^ht all night 
until the Convention is over. The pobce have been 
very brutal, and a lot of people have been shot 
and a lot of people have been beaten up, but the 
young people have committed them«elves to fight. 
and they are fighting very bravely 

The pioUce and the National Guard have been 
very brutal. They have beaten pieople up at 
random; they have been tear-gassing us. I think 
ttiere are at least 300 hurt tonight (Wednesday); 
ik lot of policemen have been hurt, too. We have 
Mt up medical units, and I think we are winning. 
They have the guns and the gas and the clubs. 
We have been outmaneuvering and outfighting 
them. We have nothing but sticks and stones. Ail 
I can say is that the people have fought very well 
and have been very brave. It's just that they out- 
number us so badly, and they have much better 
.weapons. We are just putting up the best fight 
we can. 

The Yankee news agencies say that the police 
osed MACE, and you know that the Department 
of Health, Edncation and Welfare of the U& Gov- 
ernment — a scientific committee of the depart- 
ment — aaid recently that MACE could be very 
dangeroua to the «yes and cause temporary bUnd- 

That is correct. Many people have been MACEd 
in the eyes, and many people have been shot with 
shotguns. Some people were killed already Mveral 
nights ago. People were MACEd tsnight; we wer* 
all tear-ganed, all gassed, and many people were 
beaten up. 

(The meaaage from the delefades of 808 la 
Cuba in which they urge their eetnrades t* con- 
tinue the stragfle and create twe, three, many 
Chicatoe la the Vaited State* It reai to Kloiuky 
and be te asked te give his opinloa on it) 

That's >>eautifuL That's very beautiful. That 
cticourkgai us. What can I tay but that we ara 
all very excited and ready to go back to the atiaata 

What la your ovlaioa on the ptatfotai ayyrarad 
by the Damocratic CoMveatioaf 

We tiunk it is irrelevant. It is not important It 
u only important because a lot of the youag peo- 
ple who were supporting McCarthy have iww 
come to understand that the Democratic Conven* 
tion was rigged, was phony, and are now joining 
us in the streets. Many, many McC^iarthy people 
are coming over because of the platform today. 

Wti knew what was happening all along, and wa 
knew that the people who control the Convan- 
lion would not allow a peace platfonn to win Id 
the Convention. It went just as wa expected, and 
we are very enthusiastic about the reaponM of tha 
young people in Chicago. We think that the young 
people in America are going to tarn the power 
structure upside down. 

Michael, what aie year laasedlata alaaa B««r7 

To go back to the atraets. That's what we ara 
going to do. 

mmumaoi vmim 

21-706 O — 69— pt. 2- 


Hayden Exhibit No. 4 

June 4 1968 

Dear Col. Lao; * * ' . 

This note Is to Introduce to you Mr. Robert Greenblatt, the 
coordinator of the National Kobillzationto End the War in 
Vietnam. He works closely with myself , and Dave Dellinger, and 
has Just returned from Hanoi. 

If there are any pressing questions you wish to discuss, Mr* 
Greenblatt will be in Paris for a few days. 

We hope that the current Paris discussions go well for you. 
The news from South Vietnam see::::s very good indeed. 

We hope to. see you this summer in Paris or at a later time. 

Good fortune! 

Tom Hayden / 

Mr. Hayden. Well, you didn't even read the article, then. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am reading to you the paragraph that deals 
specifically with you, going to that conference. 

Mr. Hayden. But your own testimony here, sir, is that I went to 
the congress in January, and the article is dated December 30. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This article was obviously written prior to the — read 
the paragraph that I have reference to, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, it is an article that says what you read, but 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, instead of asking the witness about what 
the article says, ask him 

Mr. Hayden. Are you saying that it does say that ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Ask him whether or not he was a participant. 

Mr. Hayden. We already testified that. 

Mr. Conley. This article, Mr. Hayden, was written prior to the 

Mr. Hayden. So what ? 

Mr. Conley. Is Mr. Martin mistaken, or did he make a false state- 
ment in that article, to say that you were going to be a participant ? 

Mr. Di Suvero. He doesn't say that. 

Mr. Hayden. That is between you and Mr. Martin. 

Mr. DI SuvERO. Would the counsel point out where that is stated? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us have order. The witness is saying that he testi- 
fied that he was not a participant ? 

Mr. Hayden. I testified — in fact, you know what I testified. 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, you have testified that you did not participate ? 

Mr. Hayden. Of course. 

Mr. Conley. But this article, let me read it again to you, sir. 

Mr Hayden. You didn't read it. 

Mr. Conley. "Those who to date have expressed their intention to 
participate in the congress from the U.S. are" as follows. 


Mr. Hayden". So what? 

Mr. CoisTLEY. All right. Now the word "participate," perhaps we are 
getting hung up again on what words mean. 

Mr. Hayden. Perhaps you are, my friend, but I don't believe every- 
thing I read in the newspapers. It is a matter of record that I did 
not participate as a delegate in that congress. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then, sir, my question 

Mr. Hayden. It is a matter of record, as I said yesterday, that I 
went in my capacity as an editor of Liberation magazine, but the main 
problem is I don't understand what you are uptight about. 

Mr. IcHORD. The record will stand as made, Mr. Counsel. 

Proceed with the next question, 

Mr. Conley. The next question is 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't always agree with or believe what I read in 
the newspapers. 

Mr. Conley. The next question, then, is that Mr. Martin is 
mistaken ? 

Mr. Hayden. That is between you and Mr. Martin. You have my 

Mr. Conley. I am asking you, sir, is this article correct as far as 
it pertains 

Mr. Hayden. You have my testimony. 

Mr. IcHORD. We have his testimony, Mr. Counsel. Proceed to the 
next question. 

Mr. Hayden. It is ridiculous. 

Mr. Conley. All right, now directing your attention to another 
article in the National Guardian^ dated January 27, 1968, and written 
again by Mr. Lionel Martin, Guardian staff correspondent, bylined 
Havana, "Participants" — and I am reading from the paragraph. The 
first paragraph to introduce the article says : 

The International Cultural Congress closed here with an appeal to intellectuals 
to boycott U.S. academic and cultural programs. 

Moving down in the article, there is a subheadline which says, "Par- 
ticipants from U.S." : 

The congress was attended by some 500 delegates and observers from 70 coun- 
tries, and more than 100 journalists. Participating from the U.S. were antiwar 
leader Dave Bellinger, community organizer Tom Hayden, moviemakers Dick 
Moore and Saul Landau, writer Jose Iglesias, cartoonist Jules Feiffer 

And on and on and on. 

A^ain, the editor or the reporter, after the conference, says that you 
participated in the conference. 

Mr. Hayden. So what? I have testified that I did not. 

Mr. Conley. And I am asking you, sir, I put to you the question 

Mr. Hayden. Put it. 

Mr. Conley. — Is this reporter in error when he says that you 
participated ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, he is in error. 

Mr. Conley, Thank you, sir. And he is a reporter for the National 

Mr. Hayden. Tliat is the first time I ever heard you fellows believe 
the National Guardian. I can even give you my press badge for one of 


your exhibits. Tliat was made in Cuba, and it might not be valid to 
bring it into the United States. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to another sub- 
ject, some time ago Captain Charles Kinney of the Newark Police 
Department testified before this committee. 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you like to say something else ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, no, go ahead. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Testified before this committee in connec- 
tion with the riots which occurred in Newark in the suimuer of 1967, 
and during the testimony of Captain Kinney, with reference to these 
particular riots, he quoted from an article which appeared in the New 
York Times^ under date of December 17, 1967, in which you are quoted 
as follows : "a case can be made for violence in the peace movement," 

It's not as if violence in the slums and in Vietnam appeared in a vaccuum [sic]. 
It came only after the failure of democratic methods. When I participate in 
violence it was out of that failure — not as an expression of psychological self- 

Mr. Hayden, would you please advise us as to what circumstances 
you are willing to participate in violence ? 

Mr. Hayden. Advise you ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I have already testified about that question as 
it pertains to the subject of these hearings, and I went on at considera- 
ble length trying to educate you yesterday as to my beliefs in that 
area, and I think it would be redundant to go over them. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I am reading particularly again from this 
account, which is attributed to you : "When I participate in violence it 
was out of that failure^ — not as an expression of psychological self- 

Now, when I read that quotation, and perhaps I am putting the 
wrong emphasis on it, you are implying that you have participated in 
violence, and I am asking you under what conditions do you partici- 
pate in violence ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, I think perhaps you should lay the proper 
foundation and first ask the witness whether he made that statement 
or not. 

Mr. Hayden. What is the quotation from ? 

Mr. Ichord. If that is a correct quotation 

Mr. Hayden. Every quotation that you gave me yesterday you read 
out of context, so I would like to have the full quotation that you are 
now reading. 

Mr. IcHORD. Show the witness the quotation 

Mr. Hayden. "Where is the 

Mr. IcHORD. — Mr. Counsel, and then ask him if that is a correct 
quote of his statement. 

Mr. Hayden. Where is the full statement ? 

Wliat is the date of it ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. December 17. 1 don't have the clipping here. 

Mr. Hayden. Of what year ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. 1967. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I certainly would answer at a later time, but 


given your way of handling quotations yesterday, when I had a 
chance to look at the full quotation, and given the fact that I had to 
read into the record extensively the context of statements that you 
had lifted, I would not now want to comment on something that you 
attribute to me, because I am sure that in part it is taken out of 

Furthermore, I have discussed violence ad nauseam before this 
committee in reference to almost every subject that you are supposedly 
considering under your very vague mandate. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, gentlemen, the record will stand as made. The 
question will be in the record. 

If you read the full statement, Mr. Hayden, that will also be in the 

I think, Mr. Counsel, first of all, you should ask the witness if he 
made such a statement, to lay the proper foundation. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I believe we have asked that question, 
and he said he would have to see the article. I do not have the article 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, did you make — was that a correct quotation, Mr. 
Hayden ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, not as far as I know. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you remember making a statement to that particular 
reporter ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't remember making a statement to the Neio York 
Times in December of 1967, though it is conceivable that I did. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, moving on to another subject, and one 
with which I am sure you are quite familiar, your book. Rebellion in 
Newark^ are you familiar with that book, sir ? 

Mr. Hayden. More familiar than you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am sure that you are, sir, and I want to direct your 
attention specifically to pages 70-71 of that book. 

Mr. Hayden. Could I have a copy of the book ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. Wherein appears the following, starting on 
page 70 : 

The role of organized violence is now being carefully considered. During a riot, 
for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away from the 
path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in new areas 
the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all the people, to white 
neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If necessary, he can successfully 
shoot to kill. 

And the quotation continues. That is not the end of the quotation. 

Now, sir, I will ask you whether that quotation appears in your 
book. Rebellion in Newark^ on j)ages 70-71 ? 

Mr. Hayden. On page 70. 

Mr. Di SuvERo. I think the best evidence as to whether it appears is 
the book itself. I don't think the witness needs to testify to that. 

Mr. IcHORD. You have the book there. Proceed and rephrase your 
question, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, with reference to that 
particular quotation that appears in that book, is that not similar to 
the recommendations that you made in your position papers before 
the Chicago demonstrations, urging that white revolutionaries organ- 


ize diversionary activities to pull the police out of the black areas 
during the rioting, looting, and burning? 
Do you recall the testimony yesterday, sir ? 
Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now is this not a similar position ? 
Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you explain the difference, please? 
Mr. HLayden. Yes; the difference is that I am discussing here on 
page 70 what possibly is being considered, or possibly might be carried 
out, by black people in the ghettos. 

In the quotation that you spoke about yesterday, I was not referring 
particularly to black people. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is this the only distinction that you make as between 
the fact that, in one instance, it involves black peoj^le ^oing from the 
ghettx) to the white neighborhoods and, in the other situation, white 
people rising up in the white neighborhoods ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, if you imply that from the statement that you 
read yesterday — that that statement implies that people are going to 
pull police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores, 
that is unlikely, since I talked about the suburbs, which are nowhere 
near these stores. Creating disorder in new areas, carrying the torch, 
shooting to kill. I tried to make clear yesterday what I meant by diver- 
sionary demonstrations, and it is quite different from what I say here. 

In fact, what is said here is 

Mr. AsHBROOK. What do you say here ? 

Mr. Haydejst. What do I say here ? 

Mr. AsHBROOK, You have a different meaning for everything that is 

Mr. Hayden. Well, you are struggling because you can't get any- 
thing on me and you keep hoping that there is something, a sinister 
meaning, but the words only mean one thing. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Hayden, at that point, what we are trying to do 

Mr. Hayden [reads]. "The role of organized violence is now being 
carefully considered." Clear? 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Clear. 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't understand 

Mr. Hayden. Wliat ambiguous meaning is there, then ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let there be order. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. I was waiting for your 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, let us get back on the track. I don't quite 
understand, Mr. Hayden, your explanation. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, read it. 

Mr. Ichord. You say you are not advocating shoot to kill, but you 
set this up as a possibility of a solution? Is that your distinction ? 

Mr. Hayden. Sir. 

Mr. Ichord. Those are your words. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, there is a kind of a brainless way of analyzing 
going on here, or there is an attempt to fuid something that is not 
there. Tliis is a book that analyzes Avhat will follow from the series of 
rebellions in ghettos that occurred from 1964 to 1968, and if necessary 
I will read into the record the entire last chapter. 

Mr. Ichord. We can have the entire chapter placed in the record. 


Mr. Hayden. All right, then please place it there. In the meantime, 
I would like to read to you the full last two pages. 

(The chapter was received for the record and marked "Hay den 
Exhibit No. 5." See pages 2592-2601.) 

Mr. Hayden [reads]. 

The roll of organized violence is now being carefully considered. During a 
riot, for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away 
from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in 
new areas the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all 
the people, to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If neces- 
sary, he can successfully shoot to kill. 

The guerrilla can employ violence effectively during times of apparent "peace," 
too. He can attack, in the suburbs or slums, with paint or bullets, symbols of 
racial oppression. He can get away with it. If he can force the oppressive power 
to be passive and defensive at the point where it is administered — by the case- 
worker, landlord, storeowner, or policeman — he can build people's confidence in 
their ability to demand change. Persistent, accurately-aimed attacks which need 
not be on human life to be effective, might disrupt the administration of the 
ghetto to a crisis point where a new system would have to be considered. 

These tactics of disorder will be defined by the authorities as criminal 
anarchy. But it may be that disruption will create possibilities of meaningful 
change. This depends on whether the leaders of ghetto struggles can be more 
successful in building strong organization than they have been so far. Violence 
can contribute to shattering the status quo, but only politics and organization 
can transform it. The ghetto still needs the power to decide its destiny on such 
matters as urban renewal and housing, social services, policing, and taxation. 
Tenants still need concrete rights against landlords in public and private 
housing, or a new system of tenant-controlled living conditions. Welfare clients 
still need a livable income. Consumers still need to control the quality of 
merchandise and service in the stores where they shop. Citizens still need effec- 
tive control over those who police their community. Political structures belong- 
ing to the community are needed to bargain for, and maintain control over, 
funds from government or private sources. In order to build a more decent 
community while resisting racist power, more than violence is required. People 
need to create self-government. We are at a point where democracy — the idea 
and practise of people controlling their lives — is a revolutionary issue in the 
United States. 

Now I think that that is a clear statement. It is my own view, as 
much today as it was when I wrote the book. I think that what has 
happened in American ghettos since the book was written indicates 
that the book was accurate in predicting what would happen. If you 
look at any daily paper, you see that violence is I^reaking out in the 
urban areas, wherever people have no organized opportunities for 
democratic participation in resolving their problems, period. 

And I think that under those conditions, violence is ofttimes 

That is absolutely separate, as I have said many times, here and 
other places, from the situation in Chicago. Chicago demonstrators 
were from out of town. They were not living in oppressive ghetto 
situation. They were coming into town for 2, 3, or perhaps 4 days to 
conduct a demonstration, and the purpose of that demonstration was 
to be political. 

The attempt to link the statements made in a book on ghetto rebel- 
lions with what happened in Chicago misses an awful lot of the differ- 
ences between a demonstration and a rebellion by people living in 
their own community — differences between the situation of black 
people in the United States and the situation of white students, and 
so on and so forth. 


Hayden Exhibit No. 5 
[Rebellion in Newark by Tom Hayden] 

From Riot to Revolution? 

I HIS I OUNTRY is experiencing its fourth year of urban 
revolt, yet the message from Newark is that America 
has learned almost nothing since Watts. 

Of primary importance is the fact that no national 
program exists to deal with the social and economic 
questions black people are raising. Despite exhaustive 
hearings over the last five years on problems of man- 
power and unemployment, anti-poverty programs and 
the urban crisis, there is no apparent commitment 
from national power centers to do something con- 

During the height of the rioting in Newark and 
Detroit, Congress discussed gun-control laws, voted 
down with chuckles a bill for rat extermination, and 
President Johnson set up a commission to do more 
investigating of the crisis. The main emphasis of gov- 
ernmental remedial programs seems likely to be on 




Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

Rebellion in Newaric 

ending the riots rather than dealing with the racial 
and economic problem. President Johnson made this 
clear in his televised July 28 address on the "deeper 
questions" about the riots: 

Explanations may be offered, but nothing can ex- 
cuse what [the rioters] have done. There will be 
attempts to interpret the events of the past few 
days, but when violence strikes, then those in 
public responsibility have an immediate and a very 
different job: not to analyse but to end disorder. 

When it moves past riot-control to discussion of 
social programs, Congress is likely to lament the fail- 
ure of past civil rights, welfare, and anti-poverty pro- 
grams, rather than focus on the need for new ones. 
As with foreign aid, white politicians (and their vot- 
ers) tend to view aid to Negroes as a form of "char- 
ity" to be trimmed wherever possible, or as a means 
of eliminating surplus food, or a way to enlarge urban 
patronage roles. Negroes more than likely will be in- 
structed to "help themselves." 

But unlike the Italians, Irish, and Jews, black 
Americans have always faced a shrinking structure of 
economic opportunity in which to "help themselves." 
If sheer effort were the answer, the black people 
who chopped cotton from dawn to sunset would today 
be millionaire suburban homeowners. Self-help does 
not build housing, hospitals, and schools. The cost of 
making cities livable and institutions responsive is 
greater than any sum this country has ever been wiQ- 
ing to spend on domestic reform. In addition, the very 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

From Riot to Revolution 

act of spending such money would disrupt much of 
the status quo. Private interests, from the real estate 
lobby and the construction unions to the social work 
profesiion, would be threatened. Urban political ma- 
chines would have to make space for black political 
power. Good intentions tend to collapse when faced 
with the necessity for massive spending and struc- 
tural <^nge. 

Th« political bankruptcy leads directly to the use 
o{ military force. When citizens have no political way 
t<' deal with revolution, they become counter-revolu- 
f«iftary. The race issue becomes defined exclusively 
a* one of maintaining white society. Holding this view 
forces the white community to adopt the "jungle atti- 
tudes" I hat they fear the Negroes hold. "Go kill them 
niggers. ' white crowds shouted to Guardsmen at 7 
o'clock Friday morning as they rode into Newark. 
During the riot, a New York Times reporter was 
stopped at 2:30 a.m. in Mayor Addonizio's west side 
neighborhood by a pipe-smoking gentleman carrying 
(illegaUy) a shotgun. He explained that a protection 
society was formed in case "they" should come into 
the neighborhood. Rifle stores in white neighborhoods 
all over the east coast are selling out. In such way, the 
society becomes militarized. 

A police "takeover" of local government is not 
necessary to declare war on Negroes. All that is nec- 
essary is to instill in the white citizens the idea that 
only military force stands between them and black 
savages. The civilians merely turn over the problem 
to the troops, who define the problem in terms of 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

Rebdlion in Newark 

using arms to maintain the racial status quo. A typical 
military attitude in the wake of the riots was offered 
in the July 29th Times by the commander of the New 
York State National Guard, who said that a greater 
commitment of force might have prevented rioting 
around the country. He recommended the use of 
heavy weapons including hand grenades, recoilless 
rifles and bazookas. He blamed indecisive civilian 
authority for making National Guard units operate 
"with one hand behind their backs" in riot areas. 

This military orientation means that outright kill- 
ing of people is condoned where those people cannot 
accept law and order as defined by the majority. The 
country is not moved by the deaths of twenty-five 
Negro "rioters." 

News of a Negro's death is received at most as a 
tragedy, the inevitable result of looting and lawless- 
ness. When a picture appears of a policeman over a 
fallen victim, the typical reaction is framed in the 
terms set by the majority: the dead man is a sniper, a 
looter, a burner, a criminal. If history is any guide, it 
is a foregone conclusion that no white policeman will 
be punished for murder in Newark. 

Even many white sympathizers with the Negro 
cause, and Negro leaders themselves, believe that 
disorder must be stopped so that, in Roy Wilkins' 
words, "society can proceed." The question they do 
not ask is: whose society? They say that Negro riot- 
ing will create a backlash suppressing the liberties 
needed to organize for change. 3ut this accurate 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

From Riot to Revolution 

prediction overlooks the fact that those very civil 
liberties have meant little protection for civil rights 
workers and ordinary black people in the South, and 
nearly a& little for people in the ghettoes of the North. 
T\\t freedoms that middle-class people correctly feel 
are real to themselves have very little day-to-day 
meaning in the ghetto, which is more like a concen- 
tration camp than an open society for a large number 
trf its residents. But in order to protect these liberties, 
many civil rights leaders take part in condemning the 
ghetto to brutal occupation. Even where "excessive 
force" is deplored, as Roy Wilkins deplored it in 
Newark, the assumption still remains that there is a 
■proper" degree of force that should be used to main- 
tain the status quo. Top officials welcome this liberal 
support, and agree that any "excessive" force is re- 
grettable and will be investigated. Thus most of the 
society becomes involved in organizing and protect- 
ing murder. 

However, the use of force can do nothing but 
create a demand for greater force. The Newark riot 
shows that troops cannot make a people surrender. 
The police had several advantages over the com- 
munity, particularly in firepower and mechanical 
mobility. Their pent-up racism gave them a certain 
amount of energy and morale as well. But as events 
m the riot showed, the troops could not apply their 
methods to urban conditions. The problem of pre- 
cision shooting — for example, at a sniper in a build- 
ing with forty windows and escape routes through 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

RebeUJon in Newut 

rooftop, alley, and doorway — is nearly as difficult in 
the urban jungle as precision bombing is in Vietnam. 
There is a lack of safe cover. There is no front line 
and no rear, no way to cordon an area completely. 
A block that is quiet when the troops are present can 
be the scene of an outbreak the moment the troops 

At the same time, the morale fueled by racism 
soon turns into anxiety. Because of racism, the troops 
are unfamiliar with both the people and structure of 
the ghetto. Patrol duty after dark becomes a fright-, 
ening and exhausting experience, especially for men 
who want to return alive to their families and homes. 
A psychology of desperation leads to careless and 
indiscriminate violence toward the community, in- 
cluding reprisal killing, which inflames the people 
whom the troops were sent to pacify. 

The situation thus contains certain built-in advan- 
tages for black people. The community is theirs. 
They know faces, corners, rooms, alleys. They know 
whom to trust and whom not to trust. They can 
switch in. seconds from a fighting to a passive pos- 
ture. It is impressive that state and local officials 
could not get takers for their offer of money and 
clemency to anyone turning in a sniper. 

This is not a time for radical illusions about "revo- 
lution." Stagnancy and conservatism arc essential 
facts of ghetto life. It undoubtedly is true that most 
Negroes desire the comforts and security that white 
people possess. There is little revolutionary con- 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5— Continued 

From Riot to Revolution 

sciousness or commitment to violence per se in the 
ghetto. Most people in the Newark riot were afraid, 
unorganiied, and helpless when directly facing the 
automatic weapons. But the actions of white America 
toward the ghetto are showing black people, espe- 
cially the young, that they must prepare to fight back. 

The conditions slowly are being created for an 
American form of guerrilla warfare based in the 
slums The riot represents a signal of this funda- 
menui change. 

lo the conservative mind the riot is essentially 
revt>4ution against civilization. To the liberal mind 
it if. an expression of helpless frustration. While the 
conicrvative is hostile and the liberal generous toward 
those who riot, both assume that the riot is a form 
of lawless, mob behavior. The liberal will turn con- 
servative if polite methods fail to stem disorder. 
Against these two fundamentally similar concepts, a 
third one must be asserted, the concept that a riot 
represents people making history. 

The riot is certainly an awkward, even primitive, 
form of history-making. But if people are barred 
from using the sophisticated instruments of the es- 
tablished order for their ends, they will find another 
way. Rocks and bottles are only a beginning, but 
they cause more attention than all the reports in 
Washington. To the people involved, the riot is far 
less lawless and far more representative than the 
system of arbitrary rules and prescribed channels 
which they confront every day. The riot is not a 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

Rebellion in Newark 

beautiful and romantic experience, but neither is the 
day-to-day slum life from which the riot springs. 
Riots will not go away if ignored, and will not be 
cordoned off. They will only disappear when their 
energy is absorbed into a more decisive and effective 
form of history-making. 

Men are now appearing in the ghettoes who might 
turn the energy of the riot to a more organized and 
continuous revolutionary direction. Middle-class Ne- 
gro intellectuals (esi>ecially students) and Negroes 
of the ghetto are joining forces. They have found 
channels closed, the rules of the game stacked, and' 
American democracy a system that excludes them. 
They understand that the institutions of the white 
community are unreliable in the absence of black 
community power. They recognize that national civil- 
rights leaders will not secure the kind of change that 
is needed. They assume that disobedience, disorder, 
and even violence must be risked as the only alterna- 
tive to continuing slavery. 

The role of organized violence is now being care- 
fully considered. During a riot, for instance, a con- 
scious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away 
from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. 
He can create disorder in new areas the police think 
are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all the 
people, to white neighborhoods and downtown busi- 
ness districts. If necessary, he can successfully shoot 
to kill. 

The guerrilla can employ violence effectively dur- 



Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

From Riot to Rr»ofution 

ing times of apparent "peace," too. He can attack, in 
the suburbs or slums, with paint or bullets, symbols 
of racial oppression. He can get away with it. If he 
can force the oppressive power to be passive and de- 
fensive at the point where it is administered — by the 
caseworker, landlord, storeowner, or policeman — he 
can build people's confidence in their ability to de- 
mand change. Persistent, accurately-aimed attacks, 
which need not be on human life to be effective, 
might disrupt the administration of the ghetto to 
a crisis point where a new system would have to be 

These tactics of disorder will be defined by the 
authorities as criminal anarchy. But it may be that 
disruption will create possibilities of meaningful 
change. This depends on whether the leaders of 
ghetto struggles can be more successful in building 
strong organization than they have been so far. Vio- 
lence can contribute to shattering the status quo, but 
only politics and organization can transform it. The 
ghetto still needs the power to decide its destiny on 
such matters as urban renewal and housing, social 
services, policing, and taxation. Tenants still need 
concrete rights against landlords in public and private 
housing, or a new system of tenant-controlled living 
conditions. Welfare clients still need a livable income. 
Consumers still need to control the quality of mer- 
chandise and service in the stores where they shop. 
Citizens still need effective control over those who 
police their conmiunity. Political structures belonging 


Hayden Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 

Rebellion in Newark 

to the community are needed to bargain for, and 
maintain control over, funds from government or 
private sources. In order to build a more decent com- 
munity while resisting racist power, more than 
violence is required. People need to create self- 
government. We are at a point where democracy— 
the idea and practise of people controlling their lives 
— ^is a revolutionary issue in the United States. 

Now what is there left to say ? I will be glad to repeat again what 
I just said. I think I said it yesterday. I am on public record as having 
said it other times and other places. And again I feel that the dis- 
cussion is becoming redundant. 

Mr. IcHORD. The record will stand as made. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Mr. Hayden, my specific question is — now that you have the book in 
front of you and the particular paragraph on page 70, 1 hand you back 
what has previously been marked as an exhibit before this committee, 
which is your "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968." 

I invite your attention to page 15, under the subtitle ''^Black Re- 
hellions^'' and my question is still what it was some minutes ago: Is 
there not a striking similarity between what is expressed in the book on 
page 70 and what is expressed on page 15 of that particular handbook 
for the convention ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, there is not, again 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you be kind enough 

Mr. Hayden. I believe increasingly that it is impossible to educate 
you or to speak with you, and this will be the last time, and then we 
svill move to another kind of discussion. This will be the last time. 

I said yesterday, both in general and through examples, what was 
meant by this statement and I will say it now m another way. 

After the outbreak of rebellions in more than 100 cities after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King this spring, I helped to organize 
a meeting in Washington of white people from around the country 
who are mcreasingly concerned with how to work within the white 
community directly against racism. These are people from Detroit, 
from Boston, from New Jersey, places where rebellions had occurred 
either the previous year or that year, and we discussed the varieJty 
of things that could b© done, and the main tilings that we felt could 
be done were essentially political things. 

For example, when the Roxbuiy riots seemed to be precipitated this 
spring, the Boston people organized in a group called People Against 

21-706 O— 69 — pt. 2 8 


Racism, organized a rally in downtown Boston, prior to the eruption 
and expanding, in which they called for no troops being brought in. 
And there were 20,000 people attended the rally^ and I believe that 
being able to bring that number of white people into downtown area 
of the city got them out of their usual fear which keeeps them at home 
when they think there is going to be racial trouble. It had a political 
impact on the mayor of the city, whose observers were there, and I 
think he himself attended and I think that it had an ofl'ect in cooling 
that situation. 

And I gave a number of other examples, but at no time did I advo- 
cate or carry into practice the shooting or disruptions or whatever 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, I haven't asked you that question. I think 
you are belaboring the issue. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I know you better than you know you, then, be- 
cause I know what you are after. I am just trying to get it out on the 
table, and as long as you haven't asked me it, then we can put it off 
the table, but then don't imply it. Don't bring it up ; I don't want to 
hear anything about it ; it is out of order. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let us answer the question. The question is 

Mr. Hayden. No, they are not similar. 

Mr, CoNLEY. Could you be kind enough 

Mr. Hayden. I will not be kind enough to tell you why they are not 
similar; no. 

Mr, CoNLEY. In other words, you would prefer to make a speech. 

Mr. Hayden. I would prefer to forget any attempt to be civil, or 
have a dialogue with you, at this point. Because I have been here for 6, 
7, 8 hours. No witness in the history of your siUy committee has ever 
granted you a fuller statement of his philosophy or his views or al- 
lowed himself to be subjected to more insane questioning without tak- 
ing offense to it, without complaining about it, and now I am going to 
begin, because I am tired of you 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the questions be put. 

Mr. Hayden. — pulling out of your folder 

Mr. loHORD. The Chair will decide on whether the questions shall be 

Mr. Hayden. — ^newspapers published, asking me if what is said in 
those newspapers is true 

Mr. IcHORD. Let there be order here. 

Mr. Hayden. There is no order. That is what I am getting at, Mr. 

Mr. Ichord. The Chair will decide whether the question is or is not 
to be answered. 

Proceed with another point. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Could I ask a question at this point ? 

Mr. IcHORD, Yes. 

Mr, AsHBROOK. So long as we are straightening up the record and 
you say, "I never urged that," is the committee also to understand 
that U.S. News <& World Report of September 9, 1968, is wrong? 

Mr. HL\YDEN. You know it is wrong, 

Mr. AsHBROOK. No, I don't know it is wrong ; I am asking you, in 
your statement that you said in addressing a rally in Grant Park, and 
I quote: 


If they want blood to flow from our heads, the blood will flow from a lot of 
other heads around this city and around the country. We must take to the 
streets, for the streets belong to the people. ... It may well be that the era — 

Mr. Hayden. Sir, I have already stated, over and over, what I 
feel about that. 
Mr. AsHBROOK. Now wait a minute. Let me finish. 
Mr. IcHORD. I don't think the question has been asked. 
Mr. AsHBROOK [continues reading] . 

It may well be that the era of organized, peaceful and orderly demonstrations 
is coming to an end and that other methods will be needed. 

This is attributed to you. I say "attributed," as a direct quote, in a 
U.S. News c& World Report of September 9. Now following up on 
your statement which you just made, that you never at any time urged 
that, this type of action, did you say this, or is the U.jS. News (& World 
Report story wrong? 

As I say, it indicates that you addressed a rally in Grant Park. 

Mr. Hayden. You see, there is a kind of a — there is, maybe there is 
a brainlessness here. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. I don't have any trouble understanding it. 

Mr. Hayden. You do have trouble. You do have trouble under- 
standing it. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. I have no trouble 

Mr. IcHORD. I think the question is very pertinent. Is this a mis- 
quotation of your statement ? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; it is what I have been virtually saying in exactly 
the same words for 2 days before you. That if you are attacked by 
somebody and your head is split, that I believe that it is within your 
legislative rights to, at least moral rights, to hit back. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. That is a very 

Mr. Hayden. That is very different from what we have just got done 
reading, because out there in the suburbs, when a rebellion is going on 
over here, you are standing there, you are not being aggressed upon, no 
one is attacking you, you are not being shot at, you are not being tear 
gassed. And it is further true, as Chicago demonstrates, that we are 
now in a situation where the possibility of having a peaceful demon- 
stration is continually jeopardized, and the era of peaceful demonstra- 
tions symbolized b}^ 1961 to 1968 may very well be at an end. But that 
you can get from picking up the morning paper and looking at Ocean 
Hill-Brownsville; you don't have to have me here to point that out to 

Mr. IcHORD. There is still an unanswered element, Mr. Hayden. 

We don't know whether the statements are correctly — that they are 
correct quotes of your statement, and that was the question directed 
to you. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Yes ; I brought up this point because my recollection 
of what he said was that he had never said anything of that type, and 

now, of course, under this circumstance 

Mr. Hayden. Those are not things of the same type. There is a 
difference. Oh, forget it. 

Mr. Ichord. Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in line with this same inquiry, if I may 
direct your attention to your appearance before the President's Com- 


mission, in which I had a copy of a task force report, particularly want 
to direct your attention to pages 1777, 1778, and 1779. 

Page 1777 you and Mr. Jaworski, I believe, engaged in some dia- 
logue about who was responsible for violence in draft board affairs. 
That is the background of the particular questions that I wish to ask 
you, sir. 

Then, starting on page 1778, appears the following question by Mr. 
Jaworski : "This is not in line with this policy, your movement, these 
acts of violence ? " 

Mr. Hayden's answer : "No." 

And I take it that this is your answer, is it not, at that time ? 

Mr. Hayden. Ask your question, and give me the transcript. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me go on and read the remainder of these questions. 

Mr. IcHORD. And then hand him the transcript. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then Mr. Jaworski asked : 

You don't approve of any of them yourself, do you ? 

Mr. Hayden. I will say this, I would not morally condemn a person who en- 
gages in such sabotage because I understand the way he feels, I think that a lot 
of people understand the way he feels. I think it is a counter-productive tactic. If 
he was involved in killing the poor secretaries who work in draft boards, then, I 
would morally object and try to find ways to intervene. But so long as the damage 
is to private property, I would not mortally condemn it while I do not think it is 
a useful tactic, although it has become fairly useful for the labor movement. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. I ask you if that is an accurate transcript of what 
occurred between you and Mr. Jaworski. 

Mr. Hayden. I had the same problem with Jaworski that I am hav- 
ing with you. We went over this and over this. 

Now what you have just read seems to me perfectly clear, and it 
seems to me I have already testified over and over. 

Mr. CoNHEY. Sir, I haven't asked you what it meant. Wliat I have 
asked you is. Is this an accurate copy of the testimony ? 

Mr. Hayden-. This is an accurate copy of the transcript. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. In which I say that I do not believe that acts of 
sabotage or terror are effective or meaningful in this particular time. 
But if such acts are carried out, for instance, the napalming of the 
records of 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, I hate to interrupt, but I haven't asked 
you that. I have just asked you if this was an accurate transcript. 
Please, Mr. Chairman, I think he has answered that question. 

Mr. IcHORD. He has answered the question of whether it was an 
accurate transcript. Proceed. 

Mr. Conley. Now, if I may have the transcript again, I want to 
ask you one or two other questions, and then if you want to make any 
explanation, you certainly may. 

Moving on down to the bottom of page 1778, Mr. Jaworski put this 
question to you : 

Do you either espouse or condone those practices? 

And your answer : 

I thought I answered that. I will not object to that practice of destruction of 
private property on moral grounds. I do not prescribe it or advocate it. and I 
know of no organization that does prescribe or advocate it. 


And Mr. Jaworski said : 

You are in sympathy with it, that is what you are trying to say to us? 

And then you answered : 

I am in sympathy with Senators who stand on the floor and denounce the war 
in Vietnam, 

Mr. Jaworski. I am not talking about the war in Vietnam. 

Mr. BUyden. I am in sympathy with anybody who is opposed to the war. 

Mr. Jaworski. We are talking about destruction. These acts that you have 
described to us, are you in sympathy with them ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I morally sympathize with people who feel that way. I don't 
think it is tactically or strategically effective. 

Mr. Jaworski. That is all. 

I will ask you again, sir, if that is an accurate 

Mr. Hayden. That is true. 

Mr. CoNLEY. — if that is an accurate transcript of your testimony 
before the President's Commission ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is relatively accurate. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, are there any errors in the transcript? 

Mr. Hayden. I haven't gone over the transcript. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you be kind enough to ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't object to anything that you have read, being, 
you know, credited to me. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. And sir, let me ask you this, and now 
this ^ives you your opportunity for your explanation, if you care: 
Is this your conviction with reference to violence as you have set it 
forth here in the report ? 

Mr. Hayden. Of course. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank youj sir. 

Mr. Hayden, in connection with the testimony of Captain Kinney 
this past spring in the Newark riots, he mentioned that a number of 
persons were associated with you in the Newark area prior to these 
particular riots, and among the people that he mentioned were a Carol 
Grlassman, a Constance Brown, and a Corinna Fales. Were these peo- 
ple not also with you during the demonstrations which occurred in 
Chicago ? 

Mr. Hayden. Depends what you mean by with me. They were in 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. They were not with me. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And, Mr. Hayden, is it not also a fact that the com- 
munication center for the National Mobilization in Chicago during 
the demonstrations and disturbances was manned by Carol Glassman ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Miss Glassman was not 

Mr. Hayden. She was one of a good number of people who worked 
in the communications center. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. And she is also the same Carol Glass- 
man that attended the conference with you at Bratislava, Czech- 
slovakia ; is she not ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. Now, Mr. Hayden, is it not also true 
that two of your other associates, Constance Brown and Corinna Fales, 
were in Chicago and charged with pouring some type of acid on the 
lobby of a hotel there in Chicago ? 


(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. HIatden. They were so arrested. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. As far as I know. I mean, I wasn't able to be around 
at the time. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I have not asked you if you saw the act occur. I 
asked you if you were aware of the fact that they were 

Mr. Hayden. I wasn't even able to be anywhere in the city of 
Chicago because of the police. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, at the time of her arrest 
on this particular charge of dispensing acid, or whatever it was, on 
the floor of the hotel, Connie Brown had in her possession a paper con- 
taining the following words, quote : 

hunting slingshot, ball bearings — buy at sports shop. Jacks w[ith] points on 
all sides, cans of lighter fluid, cans of spray paint, pieces of garden hose, cherry 
bombs, fire crackers 

Mr. Hayden, I hand you a photocopy of that particular document 
and ask you if you have ever seen that before ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I never have. 

Mr. Conley. Do you recognize the handwritmg on the document, 

Mr. Hayden. It is possible that I do, but I would not want to try 
to identify the handwriting. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is the handwriting similar to the handwriting of 
Constance Brown ? 

Mr. Hayden. It could be. Why don't you ask her ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, was this type of information which is 
contained in this document in any way given to the people who par- 
ticipated in the demonstrations in Chicago by you or any other mem- 
bers of the steering committee of the National Mobilization Committee ? 

Mr, Hayden. I told you that I didn't even know about this so-called 
document. It sounds like something Mayor Daley wrote, because it 
lists the kind of weapons that he said the demonstrators carried. I have 
already said that, or at least I guess in general I have already said 
that no such things were advocated officially or unofficially by any- 
one connected with the Mobilization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question to you 

Mr. Hayden. But what is your meaning ? 

Mr. Conley. My question to you, and I will repeat the question, 
because I think again you are reading more into my questions than I 
intend for you to read 

Mr. Hayden. I am just trying to speed the hearing up. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If you will speed it up but listening to the question. 
The question again was. To your knowledge did any member of Na- 
tional Mobilization Steering Committee or National Mobilization's 
staff put out information of this type ? 

Mr. Hayden. Didn't I just answer that? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I didn't ask you if you put out this document. 

Mr. Hayden. No, the answer is no. 

Mr. CoNLEY, All right, sir; to your knowledge did you hear any 
member of National Mobilization Committee advocating the purchase 
of or procuring of these type objects ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. 


Mr. CoNLET. Thank you, sir. Mr. Hayden, the Chicago Tribune on 
May 22d of 1968 featured 

Mr. Hayden. I am sorry. The date, please ? 

Mr. CoNLEY, May 22, 1968, in an interview with you by their report- 
er, Michael Kilian — and this interview occurred in the offices of the 
National Mobilization Committee, 407 South Dearborn, Chicago — Mr. 
Kilian quoted you as saying to him, quote, "What we are seeking is 

And he stated that he overheard you taking a telephone call from 
New Jersey, in which you were overheard to say, quote : "Fine, send 
them on out. We'll start the revolution now. Do they want to fight?" 

Mr. Hayden, are these quotations correct ? 

Mr. Hayden. Not that I know of, sir. Kilian, I believe, is an agent 
of the Chicago Police Department, 

Mr. Ichord. You are saying you are not correctly quoted, Mr. 
Hayden ? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't believe that I said that. But I will tell you what 
the conversation was about. And again it is an example of your ex- 
traordinary inability to think. 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't see anything extraordinary about it at all, Mr. 
Hayden. It is very pertinent. 

Mr. Hayden. I will be glad to explain to you why I was seeking 

Mr. Kilian dropped by, and we talked, had a little interview for 
5 or 10 minutes, in which Mr. Kilian asked me my views about universi- 
ties and whether they would shut down in the fall. And I said that I 
thought that there was a tremendous showdown coming on college 
campuses, for example, in California, between regents and business- 
men and State legislatures on the one hand, and students and, increas- 
ingly, faculty on the other hand, and that this would lead to a crisis 
for the administration of the universities, to force them to side either 
with the tradition of the university or side with the State and business 
interests that control universities. 

So you would have a situation in w^hich one university administra- 
tor after another would either be fired or be retired, and I think that 
that is highly desirable. Until the university situation straightens 
itself out, and that certainly is happening today at San Fran State ; it 
has happened at the University of California ; it has happened at other 
universities. University administrators, university presidents, are be- 
ing forced to choose what kind of university they want. One that 
serves business, or one that serves the traditions of academic freedom. 

And this instability of university administrations is a very im- 
portant sign that times are changing. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden 

Mr. Hayden. And I would like to further point out, since I recall 
the conversation from memory, that the article again is an example of 
your extraordinary manipulation of information. 

You choose the word "instability." "What we are seeking is in- 
stability," in the context of a 14- or 15-inch article, which states 
pretty much exactly what I just said. But you didn't say that it re- 
ferred to college presidents, that it referred to college campuses, that 
it referred to anything but instability, as if instability was an end in 


Mr. CoNLEY. Well, Mr. Hayden, we didn't ever infer that it re- 
ferred to the Democratic Convention, did we ? 

Mr. Hayden. Not yet. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Mr. Di SuvEEO. May we have this marked in evidence? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 6." See page 2609.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let us go back. 

You say that the quotes are not accurate ; that Mr. Kilian has not 
properly quoted you or not properly related what occurred, so the 
quotation, then, "What we are seeking is instability," taken, as you 
put it, from a larger contention, that is not an accurate quote ? 

Mr. Hayden. It is not an accurate quote, but the context is right 
there in the story. It is not Kilian's fault, it is your fault. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, what about the second quotations which 
have been attributed to you ? 

Mr. Hayden. Those are an unbelievable joke. 

Mr. Conley. Are you saying that Mr. Kilian, representing the 
Ohicago Tribune^ has misquoted you specifically 

Mr. Hayden. Would you think that I would say in front of a 
Chicago Tribune reporter what was ascribed to me, unless it was said 
with a sense of humor right in front of his face, which could have 
been possible ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying that you could have said this, then? 

Mr. Hayden. I certainly could have said it, but my question to you 
is what you think I meant by it. 

Mr. IcHORD. The question is being put to you, Mr. Hayden. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The question is a very simple one. Did you or did you 
not say it ? 

Mr. Hayden. To the best of my knowledge, I did not, but I could 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, and if you could have, which means you 
really don't know whether you did or didn't ? 

Mr. Hayden. To the best of my knowledge I did not, but I could 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Mr. Hayden, in executive session, the 
1st of October of this year, this committee received testimony from 
an individual identified as J. Herbert Rees. 

Mr. di Suvero. How do you spell that ? 

Mr. Conley. The last name ? 

Mr. DI Suvero. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. R-e-e-s. 

Mr. DI Suvero. That was what date? 

Mr. Conley. October 2d. 

* * * * * * *i 

Mr. DI Suvero. Mr. Chairman, may I have a moment? 

Mr. IcHORD. Just a moment. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

(Witness' counsel confers with chairman and then with liis client.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Tliere is some question as to whether the question, Mr. 
Counsel, is admissible. The connnittee will be in recess. I want to be 
completely fair with the witness, whether the question is admissible 

1 Question stricken from r^cooxl by order of chairman. See p. 2610. 

Hayden Exhibit No. 6 

2 - SecUun IJ^ 




Leader Threatens to| 
Close Universities | 

BY m;chael kilian ! 

The goal of the recent student I 
rebellions la to' make the, 
administCations of all colleges 
and universities subordinate to 
the student body and (acuity, a 
new left student leader ~ de- 
clared yesterday. 

In an. Interview.' Thomas 
Hayden, 28, a founder of the 
militant Students for a Demo- 
cratic Society, said that, rather 
than ending the war in Viet 
Nam or furthering civil rights, 
the tr^e aim of the rebellions 
ha.s been student control ol 
universities. Hayden, an anti- 
war activist, is now operating 
in the Chicago area but he still 
has no permanent address 

toclades AH CoUegef 

"The universities are domi- 
nated by the conservative and 
middle class ctUblishment, and 
do not serve the intellectual 
worjt of the students." he 

He extended this allegation to 
all educational institutions, in- 
' eluding several-tiberal univer- 
sities in the east. 

He said if college adminis- 
tratorj'do not make themselves 
subordlncte to students, *'we 
will close them Ltbe colleges] 
all dftwn." 

Hayden, who was a partici- 
pant in Ihe recent seige at Co- 


lumbia university, said univer- 
sities will in effect "close them- 
selves down" by resisting stu- 
dent protest. 

Tells Goal: 'InsUbiUty'*^ 

'They will be caiigbt in the 
middle," he said. "Between the 
students and the establishment. 
More and more administrators 
will resign. What we are 
seeking is instability." 

In public statements earlier 
this week, Hayden s^id . it 
wouldn't matter much if uni- 
versities are shut down because 
"the students viio go tliere are 
not learning very much any- 

He claimed that repressive 
measures against rebellious 
students will only furtlier tfll 
student cause. 

"If you want to' bring the 
system down," he said, "then 
start locking aD of us up. If 
they send police, then you 
become revolutionaries." > 

Plan U. S. O.'s for Peace 

Hayden is working out of an 
office at 407 S. Dearbtmi St., 
where youth groups are trying 
to organize U. S. O.'s for Peace, 
a system of coffee shops 
outside army bases where 
soldiers are invited to attend 
free folk music shows, hear 
anti-war lectures, and use 

libraries where peace hteraturA' 
is available. 

The interview was conducted 
in a room off the main 
Dearborn st. office. Curtailing 
the interview after a ■ few 
minutes, Hayden went into the 
next room to take a phone call 
from New Jersey. 

He was overheard by this 
reporter to say: . "Fine, send 
them on out. We'll start the 
revolution sow. Do they want to 

Recaft Newark Testimony 
Appearing before the House 
CO mmittee on un-Americaa 
activities in April, Capt. 
Charles E. Kinnly of the 
Newark police department de- 
scribed Hayden's group as 
"honeycombed with subver- 
sives aod commui^st char- 
acters'' who moved into New- 
ark irl964 and exploited every 
possible aitualion they could 
encounter. ■, 

Hayden retnmed to Chicago 
last week from Newark, where 
he had been doing research on 
the July, 1987. riou. 

His passport was ordered 
revoked by the state depart- 
ment in 1966 after he accpm- 
paoied StaugbtOD Lynd, a hi»- 
lory p r olesaor. now lo Ch>cago. 
OS an onautbonied trip to 
North Viet Nam. 

Chrft RlfkU Ftfbter 
Bom tn Royal Oak. Mich, io 
IMO. Haydeo graduated from 
the UatvertUy of .Michigan^ia 

1961. where be was editor ofthe 
MJchigan Daily. 

An early orgftnuer of the 

Student NoD-viol\nt Coordinat- 
ing committee, wmch now ha» 
b^ ta^en over by black power 
militants, Hayden traveled with 
his wife, Casey, thniout tlie 
country on behalf of civil rights 
causes. He Iselped in* the 
formation of the S. D. S. in 

1962. and with SUughton Lynd, 
authored the book "The Other 
Side." following their travels to 
North Viet Nam. 

Hayden and his wife have 
since separated. 


under the rules, and the committee will be in recess for a few minutes 
while the Chair examines the rules. 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Thank you. 

(A brief recess was taken from 11 to 11 :04 a.m. Subcommittee 
members present at time of recess and when hearings resumed : Rep- 
resentatives Ichord, Aslibrook, and Watson.) 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order. 

This, Mr. Counsel, is a very close question under the rules, and the 
Chair, as a member of the Congress and having the responsibility as 
chairman of this subcommittee, is bound by the rules. Rule 26 (m) reads 
as follows: 

If the committee determines that evidence or testimony at an investigative 
hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall — 

( 1 ) receive such evidence or testimony in executive session ; 

(2) afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness ; and 

(3) receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpena additional 

The answer to the question would possibly incriminate the mdi- 
vidual. The counsel for the witness has come forward and raised that 
as an objection. 

The Chair will rule under rule 26 (m) that the question is out of 

Proceed with the next question. 

Mr. DI SuvERO. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to set the record 
straight that I did not make the objection on the basis that the state- 
ment would incriminate the witness, and that was not the basis. 

I do appreciate the Chair's ruling, however, and its respect for its 
own rules. And I therefore request that the full question be stricken 
from the record as bemg improperly advanced by counsel. 

Mr. Ichord. Tliere may be a proper way of asking tlie question, but 
the counsel has not chosen that way at this time. The Chair will strike 
the question from the record. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, I will ask you if you are familiar with a 
publication known as ChuUenge. 

Mr. Hayden. Somewhat familiar, yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. On page IB of the September 1968 Challenge^ appears 
the following quote, attributed to you, sir. 

Hayden said in Grant Park on Wednesday, "This city and the military ma- 
chinery it has aimed at us won't permit us to protest in an organized fashion. 
Therefore we must move out of this park in groups throughout the city and 
turn this overheated military machine against itself. Let us make sure that if 
blood flows, it flows all over this city ; if they use gas against us, let's make 
sure they use gas against their own citizens." 

Mr. Hayden, my question is, Did you make that statement on 
August 28 in Grant Park, at the bandshell, at approximately 2 p.m.? 

Mr. Hayden. I made a statement similar to that, somewhat longer, at 
approximately that time, just after the police brought down the Ameri- 
can flag, charged the crowd, and split Rennie Davis' scalp and sur- 
rounded the demonstrators who were trying to nonviolently begin to 
march to the Amphitheatre, led by David Dellinger. 

At that time with National Guardsmen standing on the roof of the 
museum, with gas coming down all over the park, with women and 
children trying to flee, I thought that we were in a cul de sac, sur- 
rounded by police. And my advice to the crowd was that it would be 


probably futile to expect to be able to march even as far as the Con- 
rad Hilton, and so people should separp^s into groups of their fTiends, 
keep track of each other, because it was a very dangerous situation, and 
get out of the bandshell area and go back to the area of the Conrad 
Hilton and the Loop, where we had been demonstrating for the pre- 
vious 3 or 4 days. 

And about the overheated military machinery and the blood and 
the gas, I think I spoke at great length about that yesterday. My feel- 
ing all along was that the excessive military preparations would lead to 
a state of insecurity for the city itself and perhaps close the 

The convention would disrupt itself, not that we would invade it, but 
it would disrupt itself. And the thing that I did not want to happen on 
August 28 was for all of these demonstrators to be trapped down by 
the bandshell and wiped out by the police. 

If they were going to be wiped out, if the convention was going to 
end with mass arrests or with mass gassing or with mass bloodshed, my 
feeling was that it should take place in front of the Conrad Hilton or 
in the Loop. And I hoped that if I was going to pass out from the gas 
that it would waft its way into the 15th floor suite of Hubert Humph- 
rey as well J which it did, and make him get the real sweet smell of 
democracy in Chicago, himself. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, if I may move back to something that we 
touched on earlier, and that is the article which appeared in the Chi- 
cago Tribune under date of May 22, as I reread this article, you men- 
tioned that you would be a fool to have made such a statement as was 
attributed to you in that article in the presence of a reporter for the 

As I read that article 

Mr. Hayden. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Looking back through it, it appears that perhaps you 
left the room and went to another room, and that the reporter over- 
heard your telephone conversation. Is that not what you read in that 
article ? 

Mr. Hayden. Listen, we are the most open organization you will 
ever investigate. That is why you can't catch us. We allowed any 
reporter or any spy from your committee or anywhere else to 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Hayden, let me explain to you. We are not trying to 
trap you, we are trying to find out the facts. You are not called before 
this coimnittee to be punished or to be tried for any crime. 

Mr. Hayden, That is a matter of interpretation. 

Mr. IcHORD, Well, proceed, sir, 

Mr, AsHBROOK, Just a minute. On the matter of interpretation, I 
have listened very carefully to your very articulate defense of what 
you said or what you believe. Up to now you have talked about vio- 
lence in the sense that, to use your words, I believe, it might be defen- 
sible ; in other cases, it might be the type of thing you would acquiesce 
in. But now, to be quite honest and frank, don't these words sound a 
little bit more like exhortations to violence than mere defensibility 
of violence or acquiescence in violence ? 

Mr, Hayden, No, sir; you have to have been there to understand 
what I was talking about, I was speaking while people, including 
myself, were gagging on tear gas, people were being carried off on 
stretchers, mobile hospitals were being set up before our eyes, police 


were being moved in in columns, and the violence was already around 

It was hardly exhortation, except exhortation to move this whole 
situation over to the Hilton and try to escape for as long as possible 
the obvious attack that was accelerating against us right before our 

This is on film. I am sure my speech is tape recorded. You don't 
have to go into executive session to listen to it. And that is the kind of 
exhortation that it was, and I stand by it. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Thank you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hay den, moving to another subject, did you attend 
a meeting in Washington, D.C, on September 14 of this year, where 
further plans were made by the National Mobilization Committee in 
connection with the upcoming elections? Did you attend such a 
meeting ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes, I went to such a meeting. I naturally don't remem- 
ber the exact date, but it was in Washington, about that time. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Keading from the minutes of that meet- 
ing, and I will, if you do not have a copy, supply them to you as soon 
as I finish reading them 

Mr. Hayden. Please. 

Mr. CoNLEY. It says, paragraph : 

Tom Hayden explained that the removal of Johnson to silence the anti-war 
sentiment underscores the strategic relationship of the war to the election 
and the candidates. He felt the ouitlined Davis proposal would successfully 
surface anti-war, anti-racist sentiment, would allow moderates to participate in 
the rallies and permit more militant action for the youth. He explained that 
working classes wouldn't be changed by "cooling it" or by educational state- 
ments, but that the work with the armed forces during GI week would pre- 
pare new ground. He argued against the conservative tone being injected into 
the meeting. 

Mr. Hayden, this is the copy of those notes. I will ask you if that is 
substantially what you said at that time. 

(Document handed to witness.) ^ 

Mr. Hayden. That is a fairly — substantially my position at that 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now, isn't it a fact that at that particular 
meeting three individuals, whom we will identify as pacifists, sug- 
gested that a nonviolent stance be assumed by the Mobilization Com- 
mittee, and isn't it also true that you stood up and disagreed wih this 
particular position ? And I refer you specifically to your words in that, 
which are a "more militant action for the youth." 

Mr. Hayden. No, that doesn't mean that. That doesn't mean more 
militant in a sense, higher degree of militance, but continuing mili- 
tance. More militant. It provides another, a further militant action 
for youth as a f olio wth rough from Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. To me, sir, the better choice of words would have been 
"continuing militance." 

Mr. Hayden. Well, you weren't the secretary ; and we didn't expect 
HUAC, with its double and triple meanings, to examine the notes. 
But I would be glad to explain at great length, right now, everything 
that is meant by each and every word. 

^ Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 26." See pt. 1, pp. 2358-2365, of Oct. 1, 1968, 


Mr. Watson. Mr. Counsel, at this point — when you advocate more 
militancy, granted, I am not of such a nature as to construe that in 
other than its simplest terms, and that means, to me, "more militant." 

The question I would like to know, since you are giving different 
interpretations now to such terms that you have used as "carry the 
torch," "shoot to kill," "more militancy," did you explain at that time 
what you meant by these terms ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. That they were not to be construed in the usual sense 
of their meaning ? 

Mr. Hayde'N. Well, that is a joke, the way you put the question. 

Mr. Watson. Well, you are giving them different meanings now, 
and all I am asking you is whether or not you explained, at that time, 
to those that you were urging to carry out these particular activities, 
that you did not mean them to be literally taken, as an average person 
would construe them. That is 

Mr. Hayden. I think that people at the meeting could understand 
my terms. I argued that the elections should not be disrupted ; that 
there should not be violence around polling places ; that there should 
be demonstrations everywhere in the country against the fraudulent 
choice put forward to the voters, of Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace ; 
that those people who don't feel represented — either because they can't 
agree with any of these three law-and-order candidates, or because they 
do not have the right to vote, which is true of most young people — 
should vote with their feet in the streets, should vote by ha"vHing edu- 
cational rallies on their campuses, and should try to again show the 
incoming President that he will be in the same hot water that Lyndon 
Johnson could only get out of by retiring from office, unless the Viet- 
nam war is ended forthwith, period. 

Mr. Watson. Now I Avill try one more time to ask you the question 
and see whether or not I can get an answer. 

Mr. Hayden. I just answered your question. 

Mr. Watson. Did you, at the time that you made the statement ad- 
vocating more militancy on the part of youth, explain to those, who 
were listening to you that you did not mean for those words to be 
taken literally, but you had an intellectual interpretation ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I can't answer your question, because it is a loaded 
question. I said to those people 

Mr. Watson. Yes, because I am trying to get the truth. 

Mr. Hayden. I said to those people — the truth is what I just said, 
is what I said to those people. 

Mr. Watson. You did not explain to them. 

Mr. Hayden. I just explained very clearly 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. 

Mr. Hayden. — what the meaning of "militancy" was. That this kind 
cf action was the only way that you could get moderate people, people 
with families and jobs, together with the younger, more militant peo- 
ple, and it was a way to i^rovide opportunities for more militant action 
of the kind that had been developing throughout the year, period. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, in addition to yourself at that meeting 
and Mr. Bellinger and Mr. Davis — and I am referring to the meeting 
in September in this city — was not also Mr. Harry Ring of the Socialist 
Workers Party present ? 


Mr. Hatden. I believe he was. He came back. He was in disagree- 
ment. He is the Trotskyist I was telling you about. He came back to 
see what we were goin^ to do next. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, and was Mr. Lew Jones, of the Young 
Socialist Alliance? 

Mr. Hayden. I believe that he was. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And Mr. Arnold Johnson, of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Hayden. I believe that he was. And the other people who were 
there, according to your list, were: Gerald Schwinn, Tim McCarthy, 
Richard Ochs, Rod Robinson, Ken Katz, Irving Beinin, Emily Sack, 
Lenny Brody, Karl Baker, Tom Hayden, Alan Gross, Bob Kowollik, 
Judith Simmons, Dave Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Betty Hellman, 
Harry Ring, Lew Jones, Susan La Mont, Mike Maggi, Larry Seigle, 
Pat Grogan, John Tillman, Walter Reeves, John Wilson, Willy Lou- 
vallen, Irwin Gladstone, Josh Brown, Marcia Kallen, Abe Bloom, 
John Benson, Lei and Sommers, Thomas L. Hayes, Gabrielle Edgcomb, 
Walter Schneir, Arnold Johnson, Marc Bedner, Richie Lesnik, Eric 
Weinberger, Bill Ayers, Teri-y Robbins, Joan Campbell, Marilyn 
Lerch, Barbara Demmg, Sidney Lens, Bradford Lyttle, Louis Kampf , 
Allan Brick, Trudi Schutz, Ron Young, Marty Teitel, Josie Teitel, 
Sandy Lutz, Arthur Waskow, Donna Gripe, Lee Webb, Jim Estes, 
Bernice Smith, Barbara Bick, Tibi Texler, Nona Stanton, Greg San- 
dow, Terry Gross, Ted Yarow, Helen Gurewitz, Richard M. Gold, and 
Edward Henderson. 

Now what is the meaning of your selecting those three individuals ? 
Why didn't you ask whether the members of the Fellowship of Recon- 
ciliation were there or members from the Institutes for Policy Studies 
there or representatives of the clergy ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Now, to the question, the witness is not being responsive. 
What is your question ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. He has answered my question, Mr. Chairman. It is his 

Mr. IcHORD. It will be handed to the reporter, then. 

Mr. CoNLEY. He has identified who I wanted him to identify-. 

Mr. Hayden, my next question to you is. Did you attend a meeting 
of the National Lawyers Guild, 5 Beekman Street, New York City, on 
January 26, 1968? 

Mr. Hayden. I attended a meeting in their offices. I am not sure 
there was a guild meeting and I don't know if that was exactly the 
date, but your informer who wrote up the crazy notes would probably 
at least be accurate about the date. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Now directing your attention to the 
minutes of that meeting, which I will be glad to supply to you 

Mr. Hayden. Minutes? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, the minutes that were taken at that meeting. The 
minutes of a meeting to discuss setting up a legal committee for Chi- 
cago, January 26, 7:30 p.m.. National Lawyers Guild Office, New 
York City. 

My question, sir, is that the minutes taken at that meeting and distrib- 
uted to the persons in attendance indicate that you said the following, 


should have people organized who can fight the police, people who are willing to 
get arrested. No question that there will be a lot of arrests. My thinking is not to 
leave the initiative to the police. * * * ^ 

Sir, did you make that statement? 

Mr. Di SuvERO. May we see? 

Mr. Hayden. That statement, I did not make, although I will elabo- 
rate the meaning of the statement, because I made one that was strik- 
ingly similar, in your terms. And since it appeared today in LIFE 
magazine, also, I have to set the record that your informer has created 
straight. And I want to point out that this statement was made by an 
informer and is not part of minutes. 

Now, the meaning of this statement that I made at the time was 
that we had t-o have^ legal and medical committees far in advance. We 
could not take, if we were responsible organizers of the Chicago action, 
we could not assume — or we could not avoid the problem of possible 
mass arrests and possible police brutality and possible injunctions to 
keep us out of the city even before the convention started. And so it 
seemed necessary that we begin early in the year organizing at least 
lawyers and doctors, and I did not say that we should organize people 
to fight the police. We did not organize people to fight the police. I have 
always said that if you are attacked by a police officer, however, it is 
certainly your right, whether it is a legal right or not, to try to get 
away from him, to protect yourself, to exercise self-defense. But I 
have said that at least 10 times. 

Mr. IcHORD. You mean, even if a person is violating the law and a 
policeman is enforcing the law ? 

Mr. Hayden. If a policeman is enforcing the law, he did not do it 
with a billy club. If a policeman is making an arrest, as is his respon- 
sibility, that is responsible exercise of his function — unless it is a 
false arrest, of course — but what happened in Chicago was that there 
were more beatings than arrests. 

There was a policy, in my opinion, to emphasize the beatings, 
rather than get bogged down by huge mass arrests, filling the jails, 
having to feed everybody, having to set up all the special courts, and 
the rest of it. And in that kind of situation the policeman becomes the 
prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner on the spot ; and in that case 
crime in the streets is being carried on by the policeman. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, back to the original statement, did you or 
did you not make words to that effect ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. No, your informer missed. 

Mr. Watson. Now he did say that he made a statement strikingly 
similar to that. 

Mr. Hayden. I was preempting what you would believe. 

Mr. Watson. Well, did you make a statement strikingly similar? 

Mr. Hayden. I made a statement almost exactly of the nature that I 
just got through making. It 

Mr. Watson. I see. 

Mr. Hayden. It is for you to judge whether that is strikingly 

Mr. Watson. I see. Well, perhaps you did use the terminology 
"strikingly similar." I ask you again; at that time did you explain 

1 Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 3." See pt. 1, pp. 2284-2291 of Oct. 1, 1968, 


to those that you vrere urging to take such action against the police 
that you didn't literally mean them to do that ? 

Mr. Hayden. No ; I said to them 

Mr. Watson". Since you are giving moral interpretations ? 

Mr. Hayden. I said to them roughly what I just said. 

Mr, Watson. But did you explain to them that you didn't literally 
mean them to do that ? 

Mr. Hayden. No, I didn't explain anything as paternalistic and 
panderingly ridiculous and childish as that to grownup organizers, 
lawyers, and activists. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, you knew that they would not accept 
your words in the common understanding ? 

Mr. Hayden. You don't even know what you are talking about, 
Mr. Watson, because I didn't use the words 

Mr. Watson. Well, I will agree with you that if most of them are 
like you, they will be speaking in foreign tongues and the interpreta- 
tions indeed would be other than what a normal person would make 
under the circumstances. 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Is the Congressman testifying now ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us proceed with the next question. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, in the Esquire magazine, December 
1968 edition, appears an article, "Will Tom Hayden Overcome?" 
Referring you specifically 

Mr. Hayden. It is a good question. 

Mr. Conley. Referring you specifically to the first page and to 
the second coluimi and approximately one-half of the way down on 
that column, the following quotation, attributed to you, appears, 
quote : 

"It would be terrible," be said with an unerring sense of his own vincibility, 
"if the revolution actually started and I was driving across the country." 

Now, first of all, I will ask you if the quotation is accurate. 

Mr. Hayden. I don't know^, but again you haven't read the entire 
thing, which he is trying to demonstrate what a great sense of humor 
I have, I gather. And he uses this, which didn't exactly tickle your 
sensibility, I noticed, so I guess I don't have a very good sense of 
humor. And since I don't remember oifhand hilarious comments that 
I make from time to time, I don't know whether I said that or whether 
it is an invention of Esquire. 

Mr. Ichord. The witness has answered the question. Go ahead, 
Mr. Counsel. Next question. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, the national council of SDS, of 
which you were formerly president, held a meeting at Boulder, Colo- 
rado, on October 10th through the 12th of this year. A report of the 
major developments of that meeting was published in the SDS news- 
paper, New Left Notes., issue of October 18. And I quote to you from 
page 3 of that particular newspaper : 

Much of the plenary discussion focused on the National Mobilization Commit- 
tee, and our relations to that group. Many persons felt that we should avoid 
any alliances with the MOB (GI Week is a Mobilization proposal, and some of 
the regional demonstrations would be planned in conjunction with them) espe- 
cially in light of the disastrous leadership provided by the Mobilization in 
Chicago. In addition to discussing the Mob's politics, people also pointed out that 
marching to Washington would be just another march which would accomplish 
nothing. * * * 


Now, Mr. Hayden, I ask you whether or not this was a slap at the 
leadership provided to National Mobilization by Mr. Bellinger, Mr. 
Davis, and yourself, by the SDS organization ? 

Mr. Hayden. I was not at the meeting, but I am sure it was — it 
somids like the Progressive Labor line. But I am sure that one of your 
experts on the varieties of leftism in America could supply you with 
a report about factional difficulties within SDS, within the Mobiliza- 
tion, and so forth. I was not at the meeting. This is the first time that 
this statement was brought to my attention. 

Mr. IcHORD. Are you still active in SDS, Mr. Hayden? 

Mr. Hayden. I am not an officer of SDS. I remain in, and I speak 
on campuses often before SDS chapters and I go perhaps to a meet- 
ing a year, or a meeting every 2 years, and I remain in somewhat 
frequent contact with their national office. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, you have previously testified that you 
wrote the preface to a book. Mission to Hanoi^ which was publishecl by 
Herbert Aptheker, a member of the Communist Party, and is it also 
not a fact that in 1966 you served as an initial sponsor of the campaign 
committee for the same Herbert Aptheker to run for Congress as a 
Communist in the 12th Congressional District, Brooklyn? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. I thought that it was important. I didn't even 
support Aptheker. But I thought it was important that he be put on 
the ballot. I think it would be a good thing if members of the Com- 
munist Party or any other party could legally participate in the 
American electoral system. It would then be less of a fraud. 

Mr. Ichord. You acted as his manager to get him on the ticket and 
then didn't support him ? 

Mr. Hayden. I supported the idea that he should be on the ticket 
and allowed to run, but I didn't support him for Congress, because I 
am not personally that attracted to electoral politics, as you probably 
know from any previous testimony. 

Mr. Watson. No wonder he lost, if his manager didn't support him. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is one of the difficult things I have in under- 
standing you. How do you propose to elect a President, Mr. Hayden, by 
working out demonstrations to that effect ? 

Mr. Hayden. I never proposed to elect a President. Never proposed 
to elect a President. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, were you not also a speaker at May Day 
Rally, 1968, Los Angeles, California, sponsored by the Youth Section 
of the Communist Party, U.S.A. ? 

Mr. Hayden. I agreed to speak, but then I did not. I did not go to 
California at that time. 

Mr. Conley. And in addition to these other groups that I have 
indicated, have you not also worked with the Movement for the 
Independence of Puerto Rico, a violence-oriented Castroite group 
active in Puerto Rico and New York City ? 

Mr. di Sttvero. Is the counsel testifying at the moment ? 

Mr. Ichord. What was the question, Mr. Counsel ? Read the question. 

Mr. Conley. Has he worked with the Movement for the Inde- 
pendence of Puerto Rico. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is the question. 

Mr. Hayden. I have been in Puerto Rico once, at their invitation, 
and appeared, but did not speak, at a rally given by their leader, Juan 
Mari Bras, and though I am not that closely — I don't know that much 

21-706 O— 69— pt. 2 9 


in detail about the politics of the Puerto Eican Independence Move- 
ment, I would be proud to say that I supported the struggle of the 
people in Puerto Rico against the draft, against the Vietnam war, and 
for the development of Puerto Rico as an independent country. And I 
support organizations that work for that end, and as far as I know 
the Movement for Puerto Rican Independence is the leading organi- 
zation of that kind. 

It is not clear to me that it was a violent or violence-oriented organi- 
zation, as you put it, but obviously they are sympathetic to the Cuban 
revolution, and obviously I am sympathetic to the Cuban revolution. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This trip that you made to Puerto Rico was in April 
of 1967, was it not? 

Mr. Hayden. I don't remember the exact date, but it was in the 
spring, 1967, for about a week or 5 days. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it your present aim to seek the de- 
struction of the present American democratic system ? 

Mr. Hayden. That is a joke. 

Mr. Conley. I am asking you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I don't believe the present American democratic 
system exists. That is why we can't get together to straighten things 
out. I mean, I believe that you have destroyed the American democratic 
system by the existence of a committee of this kind. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, let us use the word "system," then. Let us take 
the words "American" and "democratic" out of it and let us just call 
it the system. Is it your aim to destroy the present system ? 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean by "destroy" ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. To overturn it. 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean by "overturn it" ? 

Mr. Conley. To do away with it. 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean by "do away with it"? By what 
means ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. No, you asked me whether it was my aim. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you if that is your aim, sir. 

Mr. Hayden. The question is too ambiguous. 

Mr. IcHORD. We are getting into the field of political philosophy. 
The witness has testified at length as to his philosophy, Mr. Counsel. 
But it would be very dilRcult for the Chair to direct an answer to the 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Hayden, I have one final question for you. 

Ambrose Bierce, in his DeviVs Dictionary^ defines a conspirator as 
someone who finds it necessary to write doAvn everything for his 
enemy to find. 

Mr. Hayden, you were clever enough not to be carrying ixny names 
or addresses on your person, or any slips of paper, at the time of the 
events in Chicago. However, in the purse of Miss Constance Brown 
was a complete list of names and addresses which were purportedly 
prepared by you. 

And I would ask you, sir, don't you think that the 3'oung people 
who follow you in these various movements should take a second look 
at you before they place their lives and their responsibilities in the 
hands of you ? 

Mr. Hayden. . 


Mr. IcHORD. The wtness will please be seated. 

Mr. HL^YDEN. I thought that was the final question. 

Mr. IcHORD, The Chair directs the witness to be seated. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, may I make this point ? 

I know there are advocates of free speech, and the witness is one of 
them, but I happen to be one who will not tolerate any such language 
as that. We have ladies in this room, and I shall not tolerate it, and 
if it is necessary for me to ask the police to arrest a man for such dis- 
orderly language as that, I shall do so. I am not going to tolerate lan- 
guage such as that in the presence of ladies. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, will you tolerate 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness 

Mr. Hayden. — ^tolerate a question of the indecent kind that was just 
made by your own counsel ? 

Mr. IcHOED. Let us continue with the hearings, and the committee 
will let stand the record and take that under advisement at the proper 

Let the witness be admonished that this is a committee of Congress, 
consisting of duly elected members, that this committee is a legisla- 
tive arm of Congress, and there are ways of enforcing proper order be- 
fore the committee. 

There is such a thing, as I have stated to the witness before and to 
his attorney, as contempt. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us proceed with the questioning again. We have 
gotten along very well thus far. The witness has testified, relatively 
freely, compared to other witnesses appearing before the committee. 

Eephrase your question, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, that completes our questioning. 

Mr. Di SuvERo. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to move 
that the question be stricken as being irrelevant to any inquiry under 
the mandate the chairman has initially stated. I think it asks for an 
opinion, and not for testimony. I think it has no relevance to anything 
that has been developed. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement. 

Are there any further questions of the witness ? 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Yes, I have several, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Ashbrook. 

Mr. Ashbrook. Mr. Hayden, I have listened very intently to your 
description of the events in Chicago, your opinions on that, and I 
would admit one area is not completely clear. 

Sometimes I get the impression that you indicate what happened 
in Chicago was unfortunate, a travesty, and so forth. Other times, I 
get the indication you believe — at least it comes through in what you 
say — that Chicago was valuable, in that it demonstrated certain things, 
brought to the surface what you consider to be unfair treatment, some 
of the wrongs of the political processes. 

There is somewhat of a dilemma here. I would like to have for the 
record whether you think now, looking back to the Chicago convention, 
what happened was good, bad, or helpful to your movement. 

You have talked kind of from both sides. I would like to know 
which is your honest point of view. 

Mr. Hayden. I have talked both sides, because we are going to win 
either way, Mr. Ashbrook. We would have won if it would have been 


safe and secure for 200,000 rank-and-file people, ordinary people, to 
come to Chicago and protest. That would have had a profoundly dis- 
crediting effect on the Democratic Party as it ratified the war in Viet- 
nam and nominated Hubert Humphrey, and would have defeated the 
Democratic Party by the alienation of its grassroots base. 

Since that was not allowed because of the failure of the city to 
grant permits, since that was not allowed because there was too much 
jeopardy facing anybody with a family or job, and since they didn't 
come to Chicago, we won in a different w^ay, by exposing the brute na- 
ture that underlies the supposedly democratic two-party system. 

I w^ould have preferred to win the first way, but the second way 
was a tremendous victory of a kind for the young people in this coun- 
try, people who are not voters, people who are never polled by Gallup 
or Harris, but people who watch on television and do not identify with 
youn^ people like the young Nixon girls and David Eisenhower, but 
identify with the young people who are in the streets of Chicago, and 
watch very carefully. 

If you think that you have had militant people before you in these 
hearings, you have yet to see what the 7- and 8-year-olds are going to 
bring you over the next 5 or 10 years. 

You have taught them very well to have no respect for your author- 
ity by what has happened in the city of Chicago. And that is a victory 
in the sense that committees like yourselves are now through. You 
exist only formally ; you exist officially, but you have lost all authority. 
And when a group of people who have power lose their authority, then 
they have lost. You have lost, period. 

That is why I have been quiet. That is why these hearings aren't 
disrupted, that is why no one comes to these hearings to picket any 
more, because the job has been done against HUAC and the job has 
virtually been done against politicians. 

Mr. IcHORD. And you say you are eventually going to do the job 
against the w^hole United States ? 

Mr. Hayden. Politicians of the kind like Dean Rusk, Lyndon John- 
son, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, these people are in a sense 
already finished, because they can't exercise any authority ; they have 
no respect from wide sections of the American people. 

Richard Nixon does not even believe that Beatles' albums should be 
played. He believes that drugs are the curse of American youth. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course, Mr. Hayden, you are very fortunate to have 
the protection of the first amendment rights. Do you think that if you 
had performed the acts that you have performed and said such things 
that you have said in North Vietnam, in behalf of America, that you 
wouldn't be shot on the spot? Do you think you would be given the 
same amount of liberty, guarantees of first amendment rights, which 
you have been given ? 

Mr. Hayden. Mr. Ichord, I don't consider that I have that much 
freedom. Is it freedom to sit here and, under penalty of going to jail 
if I don't talk to you and express my opinions over and over in a 
committee chamber of this sort, knowing full well that the opinions 
are hot air, they have no effect on your ears, they will not change a 
thing? If that is freedom, that is a very inadequate definition of 


Mr. IcHORD. You have indeed a very strange philosophy, sir. You 
say that you don't care about electing a President. You don't care about 
a President at all. What kind of government do you want? 

Mr. Hayden. I want a democratic government. My views on that 
are spelled out in the — ^not so ver}^ well, perhaps, certainly not in my 
opinion, but they are spelled out in exhaustive detail in all kinds of 
things that I have written, which I would be glad to submit to you, but 
I think that the question at this point would be a little bit redundant. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Ashbrook, continue. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. If I could possibly crystallize what you have said, 
and going back to the original question, it would be, as I understand it 
from your point of view, that you would have preferred to have 
another approach in Chicago. And from your point of view, this was 
pushed upon you but, once it happened, it did pinpoint some of your 
criticisans of the democratic process and, as such, probably helped 
in the overall situation. I gather this is what you are saying. 

But from what you are saying about the democratic processes, you 
are reasonably clear, from what you say — at least it comes through to 
me — ^that this was not good for the democratic processes in this coun- 
try, at least from your point of view, but would be good from the 
point of view of those who think the democratic processes are in an 
establishment, white majority, et cetera, and won't work. 

Would that be a reasonable summation of what you have said? 
Trying to differentiate between your point of view and our point of 
view. What happened in Chicago did not help the democratic process 
in this country ? 

Mr. Hayden. From your point of view. 

Mr. Ashbrook. From our point of view. 

Mr. Hayden. From my point of view, it did. 

Mr. Ashbrook. Well, then, maybe that is why I have a hard time 
understanding your statement, which is made in the New York Times, 
on September 1, 1968, from Downers Grove, Illinois, where it quoted 
you directly as saying, by John Kifner, their reporter, "We're going 
to create little Chicagos everywhere the candidates appear." 

If what happened in Chicago was bad — and, of course, some of what 
you have said indicates that it was bad — it should be avoided ; it was 
unfortimate ; and, once happening, you had to derive some benefit 
for those who want change. Now you are in a position of saying that, 
nevertheless, you want little Chicagos, 200, 300 Chicagos throughout 
the country. Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Hayden. Yes. I wanted, and many of us wanted, the energy and 
momentum of the Chicago demonstration to be carried back to the com- 
munities where the demonstrators came from, and the criticism of the 
Democratic Party, criticism of the false choices in the elections, criti- 
cism of the fact that there was no way to vote for peace in the 1968 
elections, to be made very clear in these local communities. And I 
wanted the people to go back from Chicago and interpret what hap- 
pened in Chicago to students in high schools and colleges and their 
neighbors, and I wanted demonstrations to occur whenever candidates 
came to speak, and there were some demonstrations around the country 
when candidates came to speak, and we wanted election-day demon- 
strations, and there were some election-day demonstrations. 

Mr. Ashbrook. Well, then I would be wrong in assuming, when you 


say you wanted to create little Chicagos in the country, you are talk- 
ing from the standpoint of demonstration, where I guess I was think- 
ing you meant that you wanted the police to be hitting people on the 
head, and that kind of thing. 

Mr. Hatden. Well, it takes two to do that. It takes an initiator, 
and I think that police learned from Chicago to temporarily pull back, 
in some local situations, because they wanted to get Hubert Humphrey 
elected President. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. The police wanted to? 

Mr. Hayden. No, not the police, but the people who order the j)olice. 
Certainly the police didn't want Hubert Humphrey elected President. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. On one other point, I think it is very important, be- 
cause we are looking at all the statements in the context of what you 
have said, what your meaning is to what you have said, and I think 
you pointed out very articulately that you do have some different mean- 
ing than what many of us might thiiik would come from that ; that is 
a good example there. But from your own words — and I know quite 
often you have been misquoted; I can understand that, everybody is 
misquoted — but from your own words, on June 15, 1968, issue of 
Ramparts^ pa^ge 40, where it says, "Two, Three, Many Columbias," that 
is the heading, it says, "By Tom Hayden," you state the following — 
you are going to say I take it out of context. I will suggest the whole 
article be placed in the record. But you say : 

Columbia opened a new tactical stage in the resistance movement which began 
last fall : from the overnight occupation of buildings to permanent occupation ; 
from mill-ins to the creation of revolutionary committees ; from symbolic civil 
disobedience to barricaded resistance. Not only are these tactics already being 
duplicated on other campuses, but they are sure to be surpassed by even more 
militant tactics. In the future it is conceivable that students will threaten 
destruction of buildings as a last deterrent to police attacks. Many of the tac- 
tics learned can also be applied in smaller hit-and-run operations between strikes : 
raids on the offices of professors doing weapons research could win substantial 
support among students while making the university more blatantly repressive. 

End of your direct quote. 

I would have to say, when I obseiwe this and other statements you 
have made, most of the tenor that I get out of them is a call to more 
militant action. I know you have defined what you mean by "militant." 

Here you are talking about taking over buildings ; you are talking 
-about hit-and-rmi operations between strikes, raids on offices, maybe 
we get back to the old semantic argument we had yesterday, of what 
"attack" means, of what "pinning delegates in the convention" means, 
what the statement "anything to stop this farce" means, of what 
"guerrillas" means, but it seems to me that this sets the stage or sets 
the atmosphere for the confrontations with the police, a confrontation 
Avith the authority everywhere, which many of us feel might have hap- 
pened in Chicago and might have been one of the causes. 

Now I hand you the whole article. I assure you I didn't take it out 
of context, because I have read it three or four times, and those words 
that you state, isn't it fair for any reasonable person, possibly even a 
Member of Congress, to feel that you are advocating more militant 
action, up to and including illegal action ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, we would disagree on whether it is illegal 

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 7." See page 2623.) 

Mr. AsHBROOK. To take over a building ? 


Hayden Exhibit No. 7 
[Ramparts, June 15. 1968] 



"Two,Three, Many Columbias" 

By Tom Hayden 

walls was "Ovate two, three, 
many Columbiai"; it meant ex- 
pand the strike so that the U.S. must 
either change or send its troops to oc- 
cupy American campuses. 

At this point the goal seems realistic; 
an explosive mix is present on dozens of 
campuses where demands for attention 
to student views are being disregarded 
by university administiators. 

The American student movemoit has 
continued to swell for nearly a decade : 
during the semi-peace of the early '60s 
as well as during Vietnam; during the 
token liberalism of John Keimedy as 
well as during the bankrupt racism of 
Lyndon Johnson. Students have re- 
sponded most directly to the black move- 
ment of the '60s: from Mississippi Sum- 
mer to the Free Speech Movement ; from 
"Black Power" to "Student Power"; 
from the seizure of Howard University 
to the seizure of Hamilton Hall. As the 
racial crisis deepens so will the campus 
crisis. But the student protest is not just 
an offshoot of the black protest— it is 
based on authentic opposition to the 
middle-class world of manipulation, 
channeling and careerism. The students 
are in oiqxMition to the fundamental in- 
stitutions of society. 

The students' protest constantly es- 
calates by building on its achievements 
and legends. The issues being considered 
by seventeen-year-old freshmen at Co- 
lumbia University would not have been 
within the imagination of most "vet- 
eran" student activists five years ago. 

Columbia opened a new tactical stage 
in the resistance movement which began 
last fall: from the overnight occupation 
of buildings to permanent occupation; 
from mill-ins to the creation of revolu- 
tionary committees; from symbolic civil 
disobedience to barricaded resistance. 
Not only are these tactics already being 
duplicated on other campuses, but they 
are sure to be surpassed by even more 

militam taclici. lo the fiiturc it is con- 
ceivahle that students will threaten de- 
struction of buildings as a last deterrent 
to police attacks. Many of the tactics 
learned can also be applied in smaller 
hit-and-run operations between strikes: 
raids on the oflkes of professors doing 
weapons research could win substantial 
support among students while making 
the university more blatantly repressive. 

In the buildings occupied at Colum- 
bia, the students created what they called 
a "new society" or "liberated area" or 
"commune," a society in which decent 
values would be lived out even though 
university officials might cut short the 
communes through use of police. The 
students had fim, they sang and danced 
and wisecracked, but there was continual 
tension. There was no question of their 
constant awareness of the seriousness of 
their acts. Though there were a few 
violent arguments about tactics, the dis- 
course was more in the form of endless 
meetings convened to explore the outside 
political situation, defense tactics, main- 
tenance and morale problems within the 
group. Debating and then determining 
what leaders should do were attematives 
to the remote and authoritarian decision- 
making of Columbia's trustees. 

The Columbia strike represented more 
than a new tactical movement, however. 
There was a political message as well. 
The striking students were not holding 
onto a narrow conception of students as 
a privileged class asking for inclusion in 
the university as it now exists. This kind 
of demand could easily be met by ad- 
ministrators by opening minor oppor- 
tunities for "student rights" while crack- 
ing down on campus radicals. Tne 
Columbia students were instead taking 
an internationalist and revolutionary 
view of themselves in opposition to the 
imperialism of the very institutions in 
which they have been groomed and edu- 
cated. They did not even want to be in- 
cluded in the decision-making circles of 

the miUtary-industrial complex that runs 
Columbia : Ihey want to bt included only 
if Iheir inclusion u a step toward trans- 
jbrming the university. They want a new 
and independent university standing 
against the mainstream of American 
society, or they want no imiversity at all. 
They are, in Fidel Castro's words, "guer- 
rillas in the field of culture." 

How many other schools can be con- 
sidered ripe for such confrontations? 
The question is hard to answer, but it is 
clear that the demands of black students 
for cukura! recognition rather than 
paternalistic tolerance, and radical white 
students' awareness of the sinister para- 
military activities carried on in secret by 
the faculty on many campuses, are haidly 
conflaed loCokrabia Columbia's prob- 
lem is the American problem in minia- 
ture—the inability to provide answers to 
widespread social needs and the use of 
the military to protect the authorities 
against the people. This process can only 
lead to greater unity in the movement. 

Support from outside the university 
communities can be counted on in inany 
large cities. A crisis is foreseeable that 
would be too massive for poUce to han- 
dle. It can happen ; whether or not it will 
be necessary is a question which only 
time will answer. What is certain is that 
we are moving toward power— the 
power to stop the machine if it cannot be 
made to serve humane ends. 

American educators are fond of telling 
their students that barricades are pert of 
the romantic past, that social change 
today can only come about through the 
processes of negotiation. But the stu- 
dents at Columbia discovered that barri- 
cades are only the begiiming of what 
they call "bringing the war hoit)e." 

Mr. Hayden, a founder of SDS, wrote 
Rebellion in Newark and Is co-amhor 
with Staughton Lynd of The Other Side. 
He spent four days in Mathematics Hall 
at Columbia with the sit-in. 


Mr. BL^YDEN. I think it is unconstitutional for the Columbia board 
of trustees to be appointed for life. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. But not to prevent students from going to class? 

Mr. Hayden. I think it is illegal and unconstitutional for scientists 
to make weapons which are banned by Geneva agreements and other 
international treaties and to make them on university campuses. 

I think that, in the whole area of student riots and welfare, students 
are threatened in a way that gives them less actual legal civil rights 
than convicts in a j>enitentiary have. 

My views on this are extremely thoroughly written down, I don't 
believe that there is a democratic machinery on the campus; I don't 
believe the draft represents democratic machinery. And as long as there 
is no democratic machinery, then young people will either have to ca- 
pitulate in the status quo, or have to find ways to resist it, and I don't 
really advise that people find illegal ways to resist it l^ecause I think 
that the authorities are going to start putting people away. 

Most of my friends are on their way to jail, for one thing or another. 
Most of the young leaders in this country in the movements — many 
of them unknown to you, many of them miknown to me — are facing 
prison sentences already, so I beg to differ with the idea that I advocate 
illegal action. But I do advocate action that could bring a university 
to a halt, as the actions of the students and faculty at San Fran State 
have brought that university to a halt, to try to straighten the miiver- 
sity out. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Hayden, maybe we would disagree on the term, 
but it seemed to me from what you have said that that comes very close 
to anarchy. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, we are living in a state of anarchy when a young 
man is faced by a draft board — the average age of its members is 58, 
one-fifth of those members are 73 years old — there is no mechanism 
for that young person to avoid intolerable choices, either of fighting in 
a war that he doesn't want to fight in, or copping out and letting some 
Puerto Rican or young black person or poor working-class person 
fight for him, then isn't that a state of anarchy facing that individual, 
rather than a state of law? He has no recourse; he has no machinery. 
And that is the situation facing all young people in this country, and 
it is a situation that I could describe in great detail in other spheres 
besides the draft. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Thank you. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. IcHORD. Any questions, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Hayden, I believe you stated in sununation that 
we are going to lose, referring to the present generation, the 

Mr. Hayden. No, I just meant HUAC has lost its authority. That 
is why no one pickets here any more. 

Mr. Watson. I see. Of coui"se, perhaps some of us may assign other 
reasons as to why they no longer picket, but 

Mr. Hayden. I hope you don't think it is the police. 

Mr. Watson. Oh, of course not. You have demonstrated that you 
have no fear or respect for police authority. But did I not under- 

Mr. Hayden. Not when it is used in the way that you are using it 
to protect your so-called democracj-. 


Mr. Watson. Did I understand you to say that the system, or what- 
ever it is, this generation, we are goin^ to lose ? 

Mr, Hayden. I think that politicians like Dean Rusk, Lyndon 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humi^hrey, and anybody else I might 
have listed before and now forgotten have lost their authority with 
wide sections of the American people. I said that. I said that HIT AC 
has lost its authority. 

Mr. Watson. And that you 

Mr. Hatben. And that you can't retain it by having a younger 
chairman or being more reasonable, because that doesn't deal with the 
fundamental questions. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Hayden, some of the newspaper colimuiists have 
stated that you and your group were very instrmnental in the election 
of Richard Nixon. Doesn't that somewhat f iiistrate you, with your feel- 
ing toward Richard Nixon, if those columnists are accurate in their 
assessment ? 

Mr. Hayden. No. I tliink that the election of Richard Nixon, in a 
sense, is — shows that the comitr}^ will continue to run down mitil people 
decide to straighten it out. You know, it doesn't really matter to me 
whether Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon is President of the 
United States. 

Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. You didn't say earlier that you and those of your 
thinking were going to ultimately win ? 

Mr. Hayden. Well, I think we will at least outlive you. [Laughter.] 
Probably much of our time will be spent in penitentiaries. I think that 
we are more than an existential or romantic movement, however. I 
think we are a calculating movement, a political movement, and we are 
trying to make this country a better country and we expect that — we 
have every reason to believe that we have some chance to be successful 
in that effort. 

Mr. Watson. So your ultimate objective is to make this country a 
better country. You made that statement. 

Mr. Hayden. Well, yes ; I just made that statement. 

Mr. Watson. And you have, I believe, a lot of, or several comments 
in support of the so-called Walker Report. 

Mr. Hayden. Not quite. I don't quite agree with the Walker Report- 
Mr. Watson. You don't quite. But some parts of it, you do. As I 
recall earlier, you said that it condemned this 

Mr. Hayden. It has a lot of evidence of what happened in Chicago 
between the police and demonstrators that I think is accurate evidence, 
solid evidence. 

Mr. Watson. Well, from this report, on page 49, 1 would like to read 
a paragraph. The report says it is a typical Yippie flyer, and it reads as 
follows, quote : 

. . . Who says that rich white Americans can tell the Chinese what is best? 
How dare you tell the poor that their poverty is deserved? nuns — 

And you know what I mean. 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean, Mr. Watson ? 
]\Ir. Watson [continues reading] : 

laugh at professors 

Mr. Hayden. What do you mean, Mr. Watson ? 


Mr. Watson. I will give you credit for being intelligent enough to 
arrive at an interpretation yourself. [Continues reading :] 

disobey your parents : bum your money : you know life is a dream and all of 
our institutions are man-made illusions effective because YOU take the dream 
for reality. . . . Break down the family, church, nation, city, economy : turn life 
into an art form, a theatre of the soul and a theatre of the future ; the revolu- 
tionary is the only artist. . . . What's needed is a generation of people who are 
freaky, crazy, irrational, sexy, angry, irreligious, childish and mad : people who 
burn draft cards, burn high school and college degrees : people who say : "To hell 
with your goals !" ; people who lure the youth with music, pot and acid : people 
who re-define the normal ; people who break with the status-role-title-consumer 
game ; people who have nothing material to lose but their flesh. . . . 

And finally : 

The white youth of America have more in common with Indians plundered, than 
they do with their own parents. Burn their houses down, and you will be free. 

End quote. 

That is a typical Yippie flyer. Those associated with you in this 
movement in Chicago and this, in your judgment, is the way to have a 
better America ? 

Mr. Hayden. I think that beautiful sentiments are expressed in 
that statement, and I wish that you could understand them, Mr. 

Mr. Watson. Fine, that wraps it up real well. Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD. The gentlemen of the committee will have a special 
meeting of the committee in regard to other business immediately 
upon the recess of the committee. 

The committee will be in recess. 

Mr. Di SuvERO. Mr. Chainnan, could we have copies of all the 
exliibits ? 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement. 

Mr. DI SuvERO. Is there any reason why the Chair would depart 
from its previous ruling ? 

Mr. loHORD. The Chair is taking it under advisement. There is no 
reason that the Chair knows at this time, but this is within the preroga- 
tives of the Chair, and I exercise that prerogative. 

Tlie meeting will be in recess until 1 :30, gentlemen, until 1 :30 p.m., 
at which time the counsel will call the next witness. 

Mr. DI SuvERo. Is the witness excused ? 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness is excused. 

Mr. DI Su^^RO. Thank you. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 :55 a.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968, the sub- 
committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 :30 p.m. the same day.) 

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives 
Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 


(The subcommittee reconvened at 1 :30 p.m., Hon. Richard H. 
Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.) 

(Subcommittee membei's present: Representatives Ichord and 

Mr, IciioRD. The committee will come to order. A quorum is present. 
Tlie hearings will resume. 


Mr. Counsel, do you wish to come forward? Who is your next 
witness, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Rennie Davis. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Davis, would you please come forward? 

Will the photographers please retire? 

Raise your hand, please, and be sworn, sir. 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Davis. I do. 


Mr. IcHOED. Mr. Counsel, your name is Michael Kennedy; is that 
not correct ? 

Mr. Kennedy. That is correct. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of the New York bar ? 

Mr. Kennedy. I am a member of the California bar. 

Mr. IcHORD. Would the witness please be seated ? 

Mr. Kennedy. May I take up one brief thing, please ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you wish to come forward ? 

Mr. KJENNEDY. It is merely to request a daily transcript of the pre- 
vious testimony on behalf of the witness and myself, as counsel. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will advise the attorney that it is a tremen- 
dous burden upon the staff to reproduce these documents. Actually, 
there are provisions for reproducing them and sending them out 

Mr. KJENNEDY. I am more concerned about the transcript. 

Mr. IcHORD. I think you can buy the transcrij)t. As soon as the 
transcript is prepared, you can have it. 

Mr. Kennedy. Can we have it on a daily basis? It is understood 
it will be at our expense, 

Mr. Ichord. The staff has difficulty in reproducing the documents, 
but the transcript can be readily reproduced. 

Mr. Kjennedy. May I assume that in time we will have copies of 
the documents ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Yes, the Chair has instructed the staff members to get 
the hearing records printed promptly, and they will be included in 
the hearing record and will be available to everyone.^ 

Mr. Counsel, you are recognized and may proceed. 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Ichord, I begin with a very brief statement. 

Mr. IcHORD. It has always been the custom of the committee to per- 
mit a statement, and I would advise the witness that, under this pro- 
cedure, you are recognized for the purpose of making objections to 
the jurisdiction of the committee, the validity of the subpenas, compli- 
ance with the rules, and the subject of the hearing. The Chair will not 
permit, as has been done in the past, harassment or abuse of the mem- 
bers of the committee or committees of the Congress, and you are rec- 
ognized for that purpose at this time. 

Mr. DA\r[s. I would like to give the customary background and 
information on myself essentially. I think it will speed up things. 

1 All documents used in the hearings are not reproduced. However, those not repro- 
duced are available in committee files. 


Mr. IcHOED. I tliink it would be better if that could be done on the 
record, and you can elaborate on it. We want to have those questions 
in the record, of your residence, your employment. After we get those 
in the record, if you want to elaborate on your background you may 
do so, but I think we can proceed better if we proceed this way. 

Go ahead and ask the usual identification questions, Mr, Counsel, 
and then you will be recognized for that purpose if you want to 

Mr. CoNUBY. Mr. Davis, would you state your full name and address 
for the record. 

Mr. Davis. My full name is Rennard Cordon Davis. 

Mr. CoNLET. Spell the first name. 

Mr. Davis. R-e-n-n-a-r-d. My friends call me Rennie. Police and 
peof)le who are upset by what I represent call me Mr. Davis or simply 

My address that I would suggest that you use is 5 Beekman Street, 
New York, New York. I am in the process of possibly moving to 
Washington in response to President-elect Nixon's call to come to the 
inauguration and I may take up residence here in Washington, D.C. 
But for the time being I can receive all mail at 5 Beekman Street in 
New York City. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, are you represented here by counsel today ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, I am. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is it Mr. Kennedy who earlier identified himself ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, are you appearing here today in response 
to a subpena served on you by United States deputy marshal John 
Brophy on September 26, 1968, at 25 East 26th Street, New York, 
New York ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember the exact time that I was subpenaed, 
but that is certainly the only reason that I would appear before a 
committee such as this. 

Mr. CoNXEY. Mr. Davis, where were you born, please ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I was born in Lansing, Michigan. 

Mr. CoNiiEY. The date ? 

Mr. Davis. May 23, 1940. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you be kind enough to give the committee a 
brief resume of your education, high school and college ? 

Mr. Davis. I grew up in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. I 
am a southerner. I feel that I am. I went to a small niral school just 
outside — about 65 miles southwest of Washington, called Clarke 
County High School. It borders right on the property of Senator 
Harry Byrd, who owns the largest singly owned apple orchard in the 
country. I attended Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio, and received a 
B.A. degree. I did graduate work 

Mr. CoNiiEY. May I interrupt you ? 

Mr. Davis. Of course. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was that degree in 1962 ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In political science ? 

Mr. Davis. Right again. 

Mr. CoNXJBY. All right. Go ahead. 

Mr. Davis. I went to graduate schools at the University of Illinois, 


the University of Michigan, and the University of Chicago after grad- 
uating from Oberlin College. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you attend these schools in 1964, 1965, and 1966, 
respectively ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoNXEY. Have you received any advanced degrees as a result 
of this graduate work ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I can't seem to finish any of my degrees. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, what is your employment background since 
high school ? What type of employment have you held ? 

Mr. Davis. Essentially I have been employed by what we have been 
calling loosely this morning the movement since early 1960. And I 
thing it is misleading to talk about my formal education as being the 
important education. My education came from having a cigarette 
ground out in the back of my neck in the South, trying to get a ham- 
burger with a black man. My education came with working with people 
from Kentucky, West Virginia, Alabama, and South Carolina who 
moved to Chicago thinking they could get a better deal there, onlj'- to 
find they were confronted with railroads who wanted to steal rents and 
fix up apartments in no way at all or caseworkers who live in the 
suburbs and made literally life-and-death decisions over their lives, and 
they had no recourse in making those decisions. 

You know my background, and essentially my work has been in 
neighborhoods, in communities in this country, trying to work around 
those kinds of grievances. That has been the basic employment of the 
past, and I hope for the future. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, to be specific, if I may for a moment, in the 
years 1964-1965, were you director of SDS Economic Research and 
Action Project? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. Let me run through the whole list. 

In 1964 Students for a Democratic Society established a community 
organizing program that was aimed at trying to brin^ people into 
black and poor white communities, to develop new political centers 
of power that could allow individuals who are victims of police 
brutality or welfare bureaucracy or slum landlords or loan sharks to 
have an organization that they could use for their own rights and their 
own grievances. 

We established some 10 organizing projects in 1964, That was the 
same year that some 800 students went to Mississippi to work in that 
State against racism. 

Then in 1965 I moved to Chicago, Illinois, where I became a member 
of an organization called JOIN Community Union. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is J-O-I-N ? 

Mr. Da\t[s. That is correct. The purpose of JOIN was to attempt to 
see if the kinds of people that Mr. Watson claims to represent and 
that Wallace claimed to speak for could, in fact, if organized around 
their own grievances and their own problems, begin to understand 
that they have a relationship to the black community and the problems 
of the black community and that, in fact, it is the movement that has 
begun in the black community that makes the most sense as an ultimate 
solution, power solution to the problems of poor whites in this country. 

I had the privilege to work for nearly 3 years with residents of 
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky in this organization. 


In 1967, 1 believe it was, I became director of a research project that 
was aimed at supplying intelligence and information to various com- 
munity groups across Chicago that would be useful in making their 
challenge to an incredibly corrupt from top down political machine 
represented publicly by Mayor Daley. Through information that 
would assist them in their local community activity — the name of this 
organization was called the Center for Radical Research. 

In late 1967 

Mr. IcHORD. Is that with headquarters in Chicago ? 

Mr. Daves. That is right. In late 1967 I was invited to a conference 
in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, along with 40 other people who rep- 
resented the black movement, people who represented the clergy, the 
lawyers, reporters, women, and others who shared at least in common 
a desire to end the bloodshed and slaughter in Vietnam. 

At that conference, invitation was extended to me to see firsthand 
what had been talked about at Bratislava through a trip to North Viet- 
nam. I went essentially at that time, October 1967, to North Vietnam 
to try to document, if I could, the widespread use of antipersonnel 
weapons or cluster bomb units in that country. 

As you know, in 1967 the United States Air Force was claiming it 
was hitting only steel and concrete in North Vietnam. What I dis- 
covered in cities like Nam Dinh or Son Tay or Hanoi, in the populated 
civilian areas, was the use of a weapon that sprays small steel pellets in 
every direction, splintering the bodies, splintering the bones, creating 
deep rips within the internal organs, and most people facing a death 
that amounts to a slow, painful bleeding to death. 

If such a bomb were to explode in tins room, I think you — everyone 
here would die. But as quickly as the bodies could be removed from 
this room, we could have another session of Un-American Activities. 

Mr. IcHORD. Are you an expert on bombs, Mr. Davis ? 

Mr. Davis. I have studied this particular weapon in great detail, 
because in 1967 one out of every two bombs dropped in North Vietnam 
was a cluster bomb unit. So, I attempted to go to study bomb damage 
and the type of experimental weapons used in Hanoi to bring that in- 
formation back to the United States, since the United States military — 
and through the press — was patently lying about whait was happen- 
ing in that country. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Mr. Davis, on that point, have you yourself physi- 
cally examined one of these bombs ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, just outside of Nam Dinh, 
about 65 miles south of Saigon, it was a city that was reduced to about 
30,000 from 65,000. An early morning raid of F-105's came across and 
dropped CBU's on this city. Immediately after the plane left, we 
iraLmediately went into the city. One of the bomblets— there are bomb- 
lets inside the cluster bomb unit that contain the pellets, and when they 
hit, they then explode some 300 steel pellets in the air — an old-fashioned 
hand grenade has about 80 pieces of shrapnel. One of the bomblets 
did not detonate, did not explode, and it was deactivated. And a 
peasant woman who had just lost two of her own children that morning 
presented me with this bomblet and asked that I take it back to Amer- 
ica, where it belongs. 

She was standing in front of a schoolhouse at the time, and the whole 
wall was just splintered with these pellets, and it stuck in the wall or 
chipped the wall. 


Mr. AsHBROOK. You don't know that the bomb could have been 
planted and used for propaganda? 

Mr, Davis. If the bomb was planted, then the North Vietnamese are 
spending perhaps a million man-hours a month putting little pellets 
in doors in Hanoi and hospitals and schools, and everywhere you go 
this camouflage of propaganda has been created over what I traveled, 
literally hundreds of miles, particularly for essentially rural area, 
what amounts to the industrial or city or populated areas. 

So, I would judge that that was not the case, though there are Amer- 
icans who would believe that the Vietnamese are so vicious they would 
go to any extreme to create that impression. 

Coming back from Hanoi, and I would like to talk much more about 
the use of experimental weapons of our military in that country and 
my purposes in going there, if you are interested in my connections 
with the Vietnamese, as I am sure you are. 
Mr. IcHORD. We are getting far afield from the identification. 
Mr. Davis. I am sorry. I will try to speed up. 

I was essentially a traveler and speaker about the war until the mid 
part of — the spring of 1968. At that time I became quite involved in 

the organization of soldiers 

Mr. CoNLET. Mr. Davis, I don't mean to interrupt you or cut you 
off, but if we do get some other information we have already gone into, 
we could get to that. 

Mr. Davis. I thought I would talk about Summer Support, which 
I was formerly involved in, and it was the project that helped to set up 
antiwar coffeehouses around the country. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We will get that, but if we can take it in a little differ- 
ent order 

Mr. DA^^[s. Fine — any way you want. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In connection with your jobs, as I understand it, you 
were director of SDS Economic Research and Action Project, the 
director of the JOIN Commimity Union. 

Mr. Davis. No, I was never director of JOIN. 
Mr. CoNLEY. You were just a part of that. 
Mr. Davis. Yes, I worked for the organization. 
Mr. CoNLEY. Were you the director of the Center for Radical Re- 
search ? Did I misunderstand you on that? 
Mr. Davis. No, that is correct. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In connection with those three particular employments 
or jobs that you held, did you receive any compensation? 
Mr. Davis. Do you mean from those organizations ? 
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis. No, don't be silly. They have no money. 
Mr. CoxLEY. In other words, you were not paid in any way for your 
work with SDS or with the other two organizations, JOIN or the 
Center for Radical Research ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I never received a paycheck from any of those 
organizations, to the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. CoNLBY. In connection with your work with the Center for 
Radical Research, did not this group undertake to investigate the Chi- 
cago Police Department for the purpose of identifying the plain- 
c^otjies officers that worked within that department this past year? 
Mr. Davis. I don't remember the time that we worked on that proj- 


ect; but, as you know through your association with this committee, 
many of the organizations that are trying to change this coimtry are 
contmuously infiltrated and undermined by Federal and local police 

One of the concerns of people who are trying to build a democratic 
society in this country is how to operate democratically when your 
m.eetings are infiltrated and reports are written that distort your pur- 
poses and then used against you. It seemed to us that the first step in 
dealing with this problem was to identify who those agents might be. 

My recollection is that we did have some young people connected 
with the research center who tried to develop that information for 
Chicago community groups. 

Mr. CoNLET. Mr. Davis, moving to your involvement with the 
National Mobilization Committee, I would ask you if you were not 
in Chicago during the Democratic Convention in August of this year. 

Mr. Davis. I have a big scar on my head to demonstrate that I was in 
Chicago at that time. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you not, in fact, ser\^e as codirector with Tom 
Hay den for the Mobilization Committee's activities in Chicago? 

Mr. Da\t[s. Yes. I wonder if I could speed it up by saying I associ- 
ate myself with every statement that Mr. Hayden made in the last 
day and a half. 

I find the substance of that statement to be essentially correct, and 
all questions that were put to him, I would respond to essentially in 
the same way. I think that he demonstrated that beautifully, what 
he means by being a political guerrilla. I think he attacked you — 
he pinned you against the wall. I think his testimony was the best 
kind of example 

Mr. IcHORD. What is your definition ? 

Mr, Davis. I would take as an example and a definition Mr. Hay- 
den's — Tom's — testimony because I think that essentially it made this 
committee what it is, which is irrelevant to our movement. 

Mr. IcHORD. I think we could speed up, Mr. Davis, if we would let 
the record show that you have the same contempt for the committee and 
the other institutions of Congress and our Government 

Mr. Davis. No, let the record not show that. That would distort 
my position. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed with the questioning, then. 

Mr. Davis. What I was going to suggest, because I am very anxious 
to get out of here as soon as I can, as I am sure you are, that Mr. Hay- 
den's testimony stand is my testimony as well, and maybe we could 
now zero in on the questions which remain, such as how we get our 
money, how we organize ourselves, whatever you like. 

Mr. IcHORD. May I ask that you answer the questions counsel asks. 
It might prove helpful to know that you do agree with the statements 
made by Mr. Hayden, but we will have to wait until the questions are 
put, and the Chair will rule. 

Mr. Davis. All right ; I thought that would help. 

Mr. CoNXEY. I do have to ask you these questions, because, as I recall 
Mr. Hayden's questions, he said you were in a better position to answer 
these next few questions than he was. The last question was, Did you 
serve as a coproject director ? Is your answer "yes" to that ? 


Mr. Davis. Mr. Hayden said I was. That is what I was trying to 
get to. We could cut through the things he already said. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Wlien were you appointed to this position, Mr. Davis ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, appointments don't come in some kind of mechan- 
ical way in our movement. I was interested in a demonstration at the 
Democratic Convention as early as October of 1967 and began to go 
to various meetings to raise that possibility as early as December of 
1967. I think it was largely because of my interest in focusing on the 
Democratic Convention, which at the beginning, at least, appeared 
almost certain to renominate Lyndon Johnson for another 4 years of 
slaughter in Vietnam. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, was it in January, February ? Was it along 
in there when the letterhead first began using your name? I cer- 
tainly don't intend to lead you, but I think we are getting far afield 

Mr. Davis. I would say in the spring of 1968 I became coproject 
director of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War 
in Vietnam. 

Mr. CoNLEY. When did you first go to Chicago to work full time 
in the office setup on South Dearborn ? 

Mr. Davis. I lived in Chicago all the time, so I never went there; 
I was always there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall when the office was opened? I am re- 
ferring to Room 315, 407 South Dearborn. 

Mr. Da\t;s. The office was opened in late January or early February. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you start working out of the office at that time? 

Mr. DA^^s. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was that office being operated at that time as a part 
of National Mobilization ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I don't think that would be essentially correct. The 
Mobilization was one of the organizations that was discussing the 
possibilities of a demonstration in Chicago. The Chicago office was a 
group of people in Chicago who were attempting to relate to a 
variety of organizations, not all of whom were represented by the 
National Mobilization coalition. 

It was only in May, I would guess, of 1968 that the office in some 
sense became formally connected with the National Mobilization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with your duties as codi- 
rector or coproject director, whatever you choose to call it, did you 
receive any type of compensation, salary, any type of remuneration 
for your duties? 

Mr. DA^^s. I recall that there was a period in which the Mobilization 
did pay me a subsistence salary that I generally gave away. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was this by check or by cash ? 

Mr. Da\t:s. It would always have been by check if such money was 

Mr. CoNLEY. May I ask you, sir, who was authorized to write checks 
and deliver checks to you ? 

Mr. Davis. From the National Mobilization ? 

Mr. CoNEEY. Yes. 

Mr. Davis. Eric Weinberger is our treasurer. 

Mr. CoNEEY. Spell his last. name. 

Mr. Davis. W-e-i-n-b-e-r-g-e-r. 

21-706 O — 69— pt. 2 10 


Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall on what banks these checks were drawn? 

Mr. Davis. No, I don't. 

Mr. CoNXEY. Was it a Chicago bank or out-of-city bank? 

Mr. Davis. The Mobilization account is in New York City. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, in some of Mr. Hayden's testimony here 
yesterday, I believe, he indicated that you actually were the principal 
administrator of the Chicago office of the National Mobilization Com- 
mittee; that you more or less had the overall responsibility for the 
office. Is this a fair statement ? I hope I am not misquoting the impres- 
sion that he gave to me, which was that you were the one who basically 
made the decisions in the Chicago office, how many people were needed 
and what were they going to do. Is this a fair statement ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes; but again it does not do justice to the way people 
work. People don't work in a kind of — one person gives the directions 
and the other people carry them out. We generally sit down and talk 
about what the problems are — how do we get housing for maybe 5,000 
people and who is best at working up a letter to explain our pur- 
poses or getting some students to go out and talk about that, 
and whoever is the best at that or figures they can do it — you know, 
they just say, "Okay, I will do that." It is not like I figure there has to 
be housing for this number of people and then make an assignment. If 
you did that, you would be immediately — people would not work with 
you if you worked that way. 

How do you explain the fact that people work for no money and 
live on peanut butter sandwiches and take orders ? It just does not work 
out that way. We just got together, divided it up, and I was there like 
everybody else. 

Mr. CoNiiEY. At the time you started running this office as a National 
Mobilization office, which I understand was in approximately May of 
1968, about how many people did you have employed there full time? 

Mr. Davis. What do you mean by "employed" ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. "Employed" to me would mean people you were pay- 
ing. If you had none, I presume your answer would be none. 

Mr. Davis. When somebody needed some money we would try to go 
out and get someone to give some money so they could get through the 
next week, but I don't believe that anybody actually received a formal 
salary, so I guess the answer to your question would be none. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me ask you if actually, to your knowledge, if no 
one did receive a salary, how many people were working in the office in 
May, on a voluntary basis, on up to the time of the convention ? 

Mr. Davis. The people worked 12 to 16 hours a day. In May I would 
guess maybe 12 to 15. By late Jul;^ I would guess we had 20 to 25. 
Through the week of the convention our staff numbered approxi- 
mately 200. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, during the period that you took over — I 
will withdraw the use of the words "took over" — during the time you 
were affiliated with the National Mobilization at 407 South Dearborn, 
you did have occasion to attend meetings prior to the Democratic Con- 
vention, did you not, that dealt with the specific problems, what were 
you going to do at the convention and in connection with the 
convention ? 

Mr. Davis. I think that is self-evident. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, did you and Mr. Hayden prepare two 
documents prior to the Democratic Convention, one entitled "MOVE- 
another one which is a "DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONVENTION CHALLENGE," also marked "not for pubHca- 
tion" ? [Hayden Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. See pages 2562-2583 and 2556- 

Mr. Davis. I cant recall whether they had those limitations on 
them, but those documents were prepared as Tom said earlier. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention specifically to the 
paper entitled "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968," was this docu- 
ment not described by you and Mr. Hayden on the preface: 

This paper proposes an election year campaign against a political system that 
has brought the United States into a crisis of war, racism, and social dis^ 

Tliat is not the end of the prelude, I do not believe, but it is a part of 
what appears on the first page of that document, is it not ? 

Mr. Davis. You should read on because it is important. It says: 

For purpose of discussion, we have made our proposals concrete. But we wiU 
fail if you consider them final. The suggestions are merely our own, intended 
only to provoke discussion. * * * 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, this particular document has been received 
by the committee in its entirety. 

Mr. Davis. How did you get this document ? 

Mr. IcHORD. It is part of the record, is it not ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir, it was offered this morning. 

Mr. Davis. What was the procedure of how this document was 
obtained ? 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness is out of order. 

Mr. Da\t:s. I would think the Chair would be very interested in 
how the document was secured. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you know ? 

Mr. DA^^s. No, I am asking you. I wondered if it was secured by 
one of your midercover agents. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are out of order. Proceed with the questioning, 

Mr. CoNLEY. May I have the document back for a moment for the 
next question? 

Mr. Davis, directing your attention to what has been marked as page 
15 and the paragraph which has been bracketed, does not the language 
read: '"''Black Rebellions : In our view, summer organizers working m 
the white commmiity should discuss plans * * *." 

This has previously been read. Do you see where I am referring to ? 

Mr. Da\t:s. Where it has been marked in red and outlined and 

Mr. CoNLEY. It starts with '■'•Black Rehellions: In our view, sum- 
mer oganizers working in the white community * * *." 

Do you see where I have reference ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, I do see. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I ask you : Do you mean by this statement 
that you hoped that white young people would engage in violent 
actions ? 

Mr. Da\t:s. Let me read the statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Tlie statement is 


Mr. Davis. I agree. I don't know why you asked it. As I said, Tom 
answered this question perhaps 2 hours totally of his testimony. And 
as I have already said, I associate myself with all he said. If you would 
like me to repeat what he said. 

Mr. IcHORD. Tliis is no procedure to incorporate Mr. Hayden's 
answers to the questions. You are the person who is now being ques- 
tioned. Go ahead and elaborate. 

Mr. Davis. I think it speaks for itself. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will put my question to you again, sir, if I may : Did 
you mean by that statement that you hoped or desired that young 
wliite people would engage in violent reactions or actions ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; the statement reads : 

In our view, suromer organizers worliing in the wtiite community should discuss 
plans in each training school for support and parallel activity during black 
ghetto rebellions. AVhites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's oflSces, organize 
medical and legal support, pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the 
ghetto to draw off police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on 
the powerful white interests. 

I did not mean that we should organize violence in white com- 
munities at the time of black rebellions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I said : Did you mean that you hoped that young white 
people would engage in violent actions? I did not put the question to 
you, sir, that you intended to organize anyone to do anything. Was 
it your hope that the young white people would engage in certain 
violent actions? 

Mr. Davis. No, that was not my hope. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What did you mean by the statement : 

Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's oflSces, organize medical and legal 
support, pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off 
police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on the powerful 
white interests. 

What did you mean for the whites to do then ? 

Mr. Davis. As you know, our movement in the early 1960's was born 
out of the idea of nonviolent sit-ins, first at restaurants that discrimi- 
nated against black people. We thought there were absolutely no 
channels through which one could redress the grievances of racism; 
that a nonviolent sit-in tactic was a way of raising the moral issue into 
public consciousness. 

I think that we are veiy familiar in the country now with people 
going into public offices or private institutions that are undemocratic 
or racist or represent forces that really do not operate through any 
kind of democratic channels to try to find or bring about the under- 
standing that new channels have to be created. I think that "sit-in" 
is almost synonymous with "nonviolence." Organized medical and 
legal support speaks for itself. That is, in a black rebellion police come 
in, as they did in Chicago, and shoot black people down ; many of them 
innocent people in the streets. 

Mayor Daley suggested people who were engaged in what he called 
arson or looting be shot to kill, or "we shoot to kill." The police carry 
out that kind of order. When you have a public official suggesting that 
black people be shot down in the streets of their own community, ob- 
viously, citizens have to organize medical help for the victims of 
police brutality. 


Similarly, wholesale pickups occur during rebellions. Police move 
in and pick up everybody right or wrong, whatever is happening, and 
the crimes that go on in the courtrooms and the jailhouses of this 
country, particularly during black rebellions, are enough to turn any- 
body's stomach. 

It seems to me the least white people can do in that kind of situa- 
tion is bring the legal resources they are in contact with in that 
situation to help it along. I think the statement speaks for itself. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, at the risk of lifting out of context, I read 
purposely the entire portion there dealing with whites, but the part 
that concerns me is the part that says, "pull together diversionary dem- 
onstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police." 

I will grant you, you could probably have a very peaceable demon- 
stration somewhere outside the ghetto, but I wonder if that would 
accomplish what this is apparently desirous of doing, which is to pull 
the police out. Are you not in fact suggesting as an alternative, or pos- 
sibility, that this demonstration might become violent ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, I guess if the questions are going to be speeches, 
then I should make speeches, too. I prefer not to. 

Tom gave the example in the spring of 1968 after the tragic assas- 
sination of Dr. King of some 20,000 whites holding a rally in down- 
town Boston as a way of essentially dramatizing attention, focusing 
attention on the conditions that had sparked the black revolts that 
were being triggered across the country at that time, and demonstrat- 
ing solidarity with black people who face day to day extremely op- 
pressive conditions. 

I think that he explained very eloquently the political thinking 
behind that particular demonstration, and that kind of demonstration 
is precisely what we meant when we talked about white people having 
diversionary demonstrations at the time of black rebellions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. But you did not view these, as I understand it, as 
possibly of a violent nature. 

Mr. Davis. It might be that National Guard troops or police would 
come into such a demonstration and crush heads or use Mace, as they 
did in such a demonstration in Chicago. There was a white demonstra- 
tion, more or less, at the time of the Boston demonstration, sprmg 
1968, which attempted to pass out leaflets to National Guard troops 
explaining that they were going through a very difficult situation. 
They were confronted with orders that no man should have to be 
confronted with, that we sympathized with their situation, but we 
urged them not to shoot down black people in Chicago's black 

We went armed with leaflets and flowers, and the Chicago police 
moved into the Armory and annomiced that 5,000 people were storm- 
ing the Armory and that the National Guard troops should get ready 
with bayonets out, and sidewalks were cleared and women were 
clubbed and tear gas was popped off, and there was police violence. 

We were very sorry that happened — very sorry — it was not at all 
the situation that was called for, but it was a situation that was created 
by police. I felt that it was a very important demonstration, neverthe- 
less, and focusing attention at that time on the fact that there were 
white people who were very sympathetic with the terrible police situa- 
tion that black people were confronting at that time, in the spring of 
1968 in Chicago. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with that same paragraph, 
this is a document, to keep it in perspective, is it not, that was written 
prior to the convention by you and Mr. Hayden, and this particular 
section deals with black rebellion. 

Mr. Davis. This has nothing to do with the Democratic Conven- 
tion. This is a whole program that talks about a program from the 
spring into the summer and into the fall. One aspect of this is to focus 
on the Democratic Convention. What you are referring to here is 
activity we had in mind during the spring and summer and had no 
relationship at all to activity around the Democratic Convention. So 
that is quite incorrect to suggest that the particular section on page 15 
that you are reading from has any relationship to our proposals, 
specifically proposals for the Democratic Convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I didn't say that, you did. 

Mr. Davis. I thought you suggested that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I said this was written prior to the Democratic Con- 
vention. It has in the statement in here under this particular para- 
graph, ''and parallel activity" — I am lifting out of context, but I don't 
think it is necessary to read the whole thing to get at it — "and parallel 
activity during black ghetto rebellions." 

Isn't this an assumption on your part that there will be, in fact, 
these rebellions ? 

Mr. Davis. I think that is a fairly safe presumption as long as we 
continue to elect to high office candidates like Mayor Daley and 
President-elect Nixon. 

Mr. IcHORD. I take it your view is that authorities have no authority 
to restrict demonstrations and require permits to be issued for dem- 
onstrations before they can be held. 

Mr. Davis. A city administration has no right to use its administra- 
tive control over permits to destroy first amendment rights ; that the 
administrative power that is granted has to do with problems of traffic 
control and other things that are essentially technical. In Chicago at 
least, the control over permits is continuously used in a political way. 
That is, the Shriners can march down Michigan Avenue 50,000 strong, 
but 5,000 peace demonstrators cannot march down Michigan Avenue. 
That is what we oibject to. We consider that totally unconstitutional, 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you believe the freedom of assembly, of the first 
amendment constitutional right, is absolute and is not subject to 
restriction ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, that is my position, Mr. Ichord 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, in this same connection — and now perhaps 
I am moving into the area you were challenging a moment ago — was 
it your assumption that there would be "black ghetto rebellions," to 
use your words, please, during or prior to the Democratic Convention 
in Chicago ? 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room, ) 

Mr. Davis. My assumption is as long as slum landlords go un- 
checked, as long as loan sharks continue to be the major banks for 
black communities, as long as welfare bureaucracies continue to strad- 
dle black pe-ople, black people will object to oppressive conditions; 
and imtil this country deals with the race joroblems that exist in every 
community in the United States, then we will see more black rebellions, 

Mr. CoNLEY, The fact that the Democratic Convention was going 


to be held in Chicago was going to be grounds for trying everything — 
what you referred to as a black ghetto rebellion ? 

Mr. Da\^s. No, I never assumed that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In this same document, do you not also advocate a 
march on the convention hall, the International Amphitheatre? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Kennedy. Do you want to tell us what page it is on? 

Mr. CoNLEY. If you give me the document, I will. 

Mr. Davis. It does not matter what we propose. It is a matter 
of public record. We proposed an assembly on the east side of the 
International Amphitheatre, Halsted Street from 39th in the north 
to 47th on the south, that was to constitute a gigantic citizens' or public 
hearing at the time of the Democratic nomination. 

Our hope was that we would bring to that hearing Vietnam veterans, 
welfare recipients, university people, yoimg people facing the draft, 
and others who in some sense represented the victims of the Johnson 
policies and that, while Johnson or Humphrey were being nominated 
inside, tens of thousands of people on the outside would conduct this 
gigantic citizens' hearing. 

At the same time they were to symbolically bury the coffins that 
stood for death of the Democratic Party. That was essentially our idea, 
in one f onn or another, from the beginning. 

Now, in order to have that citizens' assembly on the outside of 
course required that we move people to the Amphitheatre. It was for 
that reason that we requested from the city of Chicago permits to hold 
a march or parade from the downtown Chicago area to the Interna- 
tional Amphitheatre at 43d and Halsted. 

Mr. Watson. Basically, Mr. Davis, it is your contention that you 
and those who subscribe to your thinking should have or do have the 
right to assemble anywhere you wish on the outside of the Amphi- 
theatre ^vithout interference from the authorities, but yet you would 
not grant that same right to the delegates who were assembling on the 
in^de. Is that your basic position ? 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Watson, I think you know that is not my basic 

Mr. Watson. That is what you are advocating. 

Mr. Da%t:s. "When did I advocate that? 

Mr. Watson. You wanted to have a mass demonstration against the 
convention. You wanted, according to all of your preliminary publicity, 
to disrupt the whole convention. So you feel you should have the right 
to move unimpeded, but the convention does not have the right to 

Tliat is your basic presumption ? 

Mr. Davis. I wonder if we could take a 2-hour recess so Mr. Watson 
could read our literature, because none of our literature calls for the 
projection he thinks we called for, and the contrary. 

Mr. Watson. You never advocated disrupting the convention? 

Mr. Davis, We said before television, to reporters, in meetings, in the 
infamous Room 315, and all over the country that we were not coming 
to Chicago to disrupt the convention or confront the International 
Amphitheatre. We were not coming to Chicago to fight police or 
National Guard troops. Our confrontation was a political confronta- 
tion. We did not seek violence. We did not seek disruption of the con- 
vention proceedings in any way whatsoever. 


Mr. Watson". In other words, the preconvention publicity by the 
Yippie spokesmen and various publications relative to "turning the 
city upside down" 

Mr. Davis. ^Yhat does that mean, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. I guess you could give us a definition. 

Mr. Davis. You mean you take a city and do that ? 

Mr. Watson. I guess that is exactly what you meant by that. 

Mr. Davis. How would one go about doing that ? 

Mr. Watson. You suggest various ways 

Mr. IcHORD. Just a minute, Mr. Watson 

Mr. Davis. It was proposed that the Pentagon be levitated by cer- 
tain spokesmen- 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair would admonish the audience that you are 
guests of the committee. One outbreak might call for another one, so 
let's remain in order. 

Mr, Watson. If you would like to know specific places in which you 
enumerated the ways in which you planned to "turn the city upside 
down," some of them I refer to are on page 49 of the so-called Walker 

Mr. Davis. That is the Walker Report. 

Mr. Watson. "Dynamite," "hallucinating drugs," and so on, "slip 
into the convention hall"; "to stage a mass stall-in of old jalopies," 
and on and on. 

Mr. Da^^s. Does that mean that you are endorsing this report by 
using it as one of your sources ? 

Mr. Watson. I asked you the question whether or not there were 
statements by Yippie leaders and statements made in many of the pub- 
lications of the so-called New Left or Mobilization Committee aiming 
at such disruption as that. 

Mr. Davis. If you want to find out what the Yippie leaders — and 
that is your term, not mine, or theirs — said, then you have the power 
to bring them here to ask them yourself. The National Mobilization 
Committee, the coalition for which I was coproject director, never 
issued any official document that called for the disruption of the Demo- 
cratic National Convention, nor in any public statement that I ever 
made, to the best of my knowledge, did I ever call for the disruption, 
the physical disruption of the Democratic National Convention. 

Mr. Watson. Perhaps the evidence a little later on would shed 
some light. 

Mr. Davis. I would hope you would bring it out. 

Mr. CoNLBY. THE MOVEMENT, issue of February 1968, pages 4 
and 11, featured an interview with you and, according to the text, of 
this interview you were asked the following question : "Wliat do you 
see happening at the Democratic Convention ?" 

There is a rather long answer — we are intending to offer this entire 
document for reception by the committee, but the part of the answer 
that I think is significant is this part — you are answering what }^ou 
think will happen at the Democratic National Convention, and I pick 
up — in lifting out of context again, if you please, sir, "turning the 
delegates back into the amphitheater as they attempt to leave, de- 
manding that the American people be given a choice, demanding that 
they reconsider a decision not in the national interest," and then it 
goes on down after going through some of this about the funeral, and 
so forth, "and [a] giant showdown in Washington to prevent the 


inauguration next January." But the part I particularly call your 
attention to is, "turning the delegates back into the amphitheater as 
they attempt to leave." ^. x i 

Sir, you indicated you did not plan to disrupt the convention, i ask 
you, first of all, is this an accurate quote from you ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Davis. The statement in its entirety says— this is a qu^tion: 
"Wliat do you see happening at the Democratic Convention?" Under- 
stand, this was written in February 1968 and many events changed. 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 1." See pages 2642-1648.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you accept this as an accurate quotation from you? 
If you don't accept it, there is no point in reading it all. 

Mr. Davis. I believe it is essentially correct. I don't recall whether 
I used the exact expression "turning the delegates back into the amphi- 
theater," but I think when you read the whole context it is quite clear 
that the emphasis here is on the funeral march, the emphasis is on the 
fact that the Democratic Convention is going to essentially produce an 
undemocratic choice. And what we are trying to do in our actions is 
to focus on the unrepresentative nature of the Democratic Convention. 
It does not, in my opinion, imply disruption. It certainly does not mean 
disruption, physical disruption 

Mr. CoNLEY. "Turning the delegates back into the * * * [conven- 
tion] " does not imply something physical ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I think the idea we had at this stage, before the shoot- 
to-kill order of Mayor Daley, before the announcement that demon- 
strators would be placed in underground caverns by Sheriff Woods, 
before the announcement that the 12,000-man police force wiis going 
to be mobilized in 12-hour shifts against us, before the special issuance 
of 8,000 cannisters of Mace to be u^ against the demonstrators, before 
the announcement that 6,000 Guard troops were going to be brought 
in to be used against demonstrators, before the announcement that 
soldiers at Fort Hood were being trained in the use of nauseating gas to 
be used against demonstrators — before all of that environment was 
created by the political officials in Chicago with the support of the 
Democratic Party, we hoped there would be a massive walkout of the 
delegates at the time of the Democratic Convention. 

The symbol we used was a funeral march to go to the Amphitheatre 
and there essentially to say the decisions that were made inside that 
Amphitheatre did not represent the rank and file of that party and 
ordinary Americans. 

I mean I think that the record, Mr. Conley, and the things that we 
had said again and again before the press, out of our meetings, to pub- 
lic officials in Chicago, made it absolutely clear that the organizations 
represented by the National Mobilization Committee never sought a 
physical confrontation of the Democratic National Convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. After you said all that, my question is. How did you 
propose to turn back the delegates into the Amphitheatre, as is stated 
there. It is a very simple question. 

Mr. Davis. I never proposed to keep the delegates physically jailed 
in the International Amphitheatre. But I think it is quite easy to man- 
age a hundred thousand people at the International Amphitheatre 
essentially rejecting the decision of the delegates and by their demand- 
ing that the Democratic decision or change on the war essentially be 


Davis Exhibit No. 1 



Rennie Davis, one of the founders of SDS, was in the Bay 
Area last month. The Movement rook that opportunity to 
talk to him about the new mood in the country and the 
direction of the movement in the coming year. Davis was 
once the director of ERAP and an organizer for JOIN until 
late in 1966. Since then he has been the director for the 
Center for Radical Research. He recently returned from 
a trip to North Vietnam. 

THE MOVEMENT: What do you think the major concerns of the movement are? Where 
do you see the movement going? There seems to be a "new mood" In 
the white movement. How do you see that? 
DAVIS: A "new moo<f' In the country and tfje movement is evident, extending in 
my opinion, signlficaittly beyond Oakland, Madison and WHiite hall, beyond the mobile, 
half-organized, hatf-spontaneous white demonstrators who in the last four months have 
tnade it plain to anyone who reads a paper that some at least are getting damn serious. 
Behind the people who may be comprising a kind of front Une, a more general mood 
•xlscs, fed by the deep public insecurity about ttie war and the cities. It's mostly young, 
mostly Immature politically, mostly rep- 
resenting, in my view, a mass surfacing 

of radical instincts. I've met recently Now you ask about the major concerns 

some of its representatives — in Iowa; and direction of the movement. My con- 

Champaign, Illinois; Williamsburg, Vir- ceni is bow does the conscious, organ- 

ginia — and have several impressions. izcd pert of our movement, the people 

Johnson, not us, is the organizer and to wl» for tbe past four years have become 

a considerable extent the political edu- c wn fc icta ble in e language alien to most 

cator of these people. And the relation- AtDCiiceas, the people who have con- 

ship of the organized movement to the solklMed radical organizations, developed 

human beings who shape the "new mood" 
is both tenuous and limited. We plug in 
with them at national peace rumbles like 
the OctobM' mobilization, then we unplug. 

tkmlr "'itntm*', and engaged themselves 
seriously in detfete about the relative 
radlcalDess of organizing around the draft 
versus organizing around welfare or coo- 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

fronting centers of imperialism versus 
centers of induction, how do these 
radicals now open themselves to the 
potential of the "new mood". 

I believe this question should help guide 
our direction as a movement. 
THE MOVF.MENT: Could you be more 
specific about the 
direction you see? 
DAVIS: Among radicals, there have been 
two major emphases of activity — that which 
supports and works for massive demon- 
strations and confrontations of the Es- 
tablishment; and that which supports and 
works for the creation of permanent, 
radical organization, organization built on 
a day-to-day basis, generally around peo- 
ple's self interest issues, generally from 
the bottom-up. The argument about which 
emphasis one should make is of great 
importance and must and will be con- 
sidered again and again. But this polarity 
of tendencies has tended to Umit close 
cooperation between organizations and 
people acting out the two emphasis and 
thereby limit the possibility of a coopera- 
tive strategy, which I believe we must 
have If the movement is to provide direc- 
tion to those hundreds of thousands who 
are getting their liberal philosophies 
nibbed raw by Johnson's open applica- 
tion of thatphllosophy's darker principals, 
I believe it would be helpful to define 
specific national objectives and a national 
strategy of work for the movement for 
given periods of time — a perspective that 
represents the composite programs of the 
significant left organizations and includes 
national calls for both local organizing 
and national confrontations, a national 
program that could be more widely com- 
municated than any single communica- 
tions network could now manage. It would 
require a new willingness to push each 
other's thlr^ and a new openness among 
people with different emphases of work. 

Until tK« inauguration 

The dozen months from now until the 
PresldeMlal loMigtiration Is one such 
per|o4^^|lNK -couAd be fined in vrtth a 
luctcnit ^^iJNigr«n. The shape <h- outline 

of such a program is already begin- 
ning to form, I think. TTiere will be 
several evaluatative conferences and plan- 
ning meetings in the anti-war move- 
ment at the beginning of the year. These 
gatherings might begin by comptcmiseon 
a specific period of days for the "inter- 
national days of resistence, 10 days to 
shake the Empire", etc. The spring re- 
sistence will be followed by several calls 
for local organizing drives in the early 
Summer. The summer organizing activity, 
for many people, will be capped by the 
Chicago Democratic Convention demon- 
stration — the most massive confrontation 
of the war-makers yet. The fall will see 
a new wave of local organizing— in anti- 
Johnson, anti -Nixon campaigns, around 
local war crimes tribunals, in working 
class black and white communities, on the 
campus foi^ the resistence etc. If the two 
candidates get through the campaign and 
the election is actuaHy held, I feel cer- 
tain that the movement will greet the new 
President in Washington with a special 
Inaugural message of our own, 

.\s I say, these five or six events 
or programs represent onlv .-i shadowy 
outline of what can be seen coming. What 
1 consider to be our task is the sharpen- 
ing of such an outline, making it as 
specific as possible, making it absolutely 
clear how one participates, and finding 
new means of communicating its content 
to the young people of this country. It 
requires that we define ways that the or- 
ganizers of mass confrontations can assist 
in the recruitment of people who will join 
local organizing projects. It demands that 
we develop a political relationship among 
people .^ctive at the two levels of work, so 
as to make possible a new interpretation 
to Americans of the road we are follow- 
ing in the next period, a strategy specific 
enough that "uninvolved radicals" might 
see ways to get on that road and stay on 
that road. 
Organizing More Relevant 

Now between the two emphases of the 
movement, I have always seen local 
organizing as the more relevant. The most 
difficult work, though in my view the most 
Important, is the organization- of specific 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

constituencies that can offer a community 
radical political education, power to com- 
bat effectively certain self-interest is- 
sues, a forum for people seeking new 
definitions for their lives and their work, 
and a method for relating the specific 
constituency to other parts of the move- 
ment. I have tended to regard national 
demonstrations as relatively insignificant 
in comparison to the task of creating 
permanent local organization, I see us 
moving from strong local projects to 
regional structures to some kind of func- 
tional equivalent to a radical national 
party. That scenario is a whole interview 
in itself. 

Those of us who have held this view 
and made this emphasis in our work, 
however, should recognize that demon- 
strations, especially in the past four to 
five months, have exhibited In several 
instances a new power for radicaiizlng 
those involved .,:md £«Tor^fakg (hose 
against whom the power is directed. Both 
the militancy and the new tactics make 
the acts tremendously important to Viet- 
nam and other people's movements around 
the world, useful in changing the image of 
blacks toward white students, important 
for the education and consciousness of the 
participants, and appealing to certain — not 
all — segments of the American population. 
This last by-product — who we appeal to and 
whom we alienate — is important and, as 
I suggested before, should give direction 
to our strategy. It should guide our think- 
ing, for example, at the Democratic Con- 
vention this August. 

Democratic Convention 

THE MOVEMENT: What do you see hap- 
pening at the Demo- 
cratic Convention? 
DAVIS: For this particular action, I believe 
we will be guided in part by Establish- 
ment events and political factors not yet 
known. There Is every indication today that 
Nixon, the Republican frontrunner, will 
keep his lead and sail through the Re- 
publican Convention. McCarthy's can- 
didacy has little chance of catching fire. 

And Kennedy seemingly has no primary 
strategy at all. We shall see. If the Re- 
publicans give Americans no "choice" 
on the issue of the war, and the Demo- 
crats, whose convention follows the Re- 
publican's, go to Chicago with Johnson 
fully in control, millions of people are 
going to feel doors closing on their high 
school conception of American democracy, 
millions are going to be asking, what 
now? The question of v^at the movement 
says to such people at this time should 
guide our planning for the confrontation, 
in my view. 

I think we can do better than attempting 
to prevent the convention from taking 
place, as some have suggested by closing 
down the city on the first day of fwe- 
conventiwi activity. The delegates should 
be allowed to come to Chicago, so long 
as they give their support to a policy 
of ending racism and the war. I favor 
letting the delegates meet in the Inter- 
national Amphitheater and making our 
demands and the actions behind those 
demands escalate in militancy as the Con- 
vention proceeds and as the TV's drum 
into everyone's home that we're moving 
towards a Johnson-Nixon "choice". I 
would like to see us be able to carry our 
incredible, imaginative actions ever, 
against Chicago's blanket injunction th^^i 
will prohibit all demonstrations. Pven 
against the two I .S .\rmy regiments that 
will be "protecting" the convention, I 
would like to see the delegates confronte.i 
by masses of people each day, organized 
perhaps by that constituency which leadji 
a particular struggle — one day for eJ j- 
cation, one for welfare, one for w.>men. 
one for black people, and so on. 

Sophisticated Movement 

There should be elbow room in Chicago 
for a national youth festival, a women's 
army marching on the US troops, several 
thousand people who call "their" dele- 
gate promptly at 7:00 am and midnight to 
ask to meet him to discuss the issues of 
war and race, doctors who march on the 
troops demanding to speak to the dele- 
gates about the children of Vietnam, etc.. 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

etc. I would like, in other words, for us 
to create a more sophisticated movement 
machinery for this late August meeting 
than we have previously had and which 
we need as we enter this new period. 
I would hope that this machinery would 
be used by the widest possible political 
forces opposed to the war, that it would 
be used to appeal broadly to the Ameri- 
can people, not just to ourselves, but 
that it be used in the end to release the 
real power of our many forces in a new 
and significant way at the time that John- 

son is nominated, turning the delegates 
back into the amprfiitheater as they at- 
tempt to leave, demanding that the Amer- 
ican people be given a choice, demand- 
ing that thev reconsider a .decision not 
in the national interest, a decision that 
can only lead to the funeral of the demo- 
cratic policies that support racism and 
the war, should carry not only us, but 
thousands of Americans into an active 
boycott of the elections and giant show- 
down in Washington to prevent the in-' 
augur ation next January. 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 


TOE MOVEMENT: Do you feel that na- 
tional confrontations 
such as you envision 
for the . Democratic 
Convention <tetract 
from your own priOTity 
of organizing locally? 
DAVIS: Yes, In part. The Democratic 
Convention will have mixed results for 
local building. Since most people in the 
movement are not organizers, it is said 
that a national action allows non-organ- 
izers to find a role. I believe it also 
reinforces the idea that one's role is to 
go to demonstrations rather than build 
radical organizations day-to-day. And 
pressure mounts among the actual day- 
to-day organizers to respond to the call 
and fit their local needs into |he national 
strategy of the moment. 
THE MOVEMENT: V-Tiy then do you ac- 
tively support building 
the machinery you 
called for in prep- 
aration for the Demo- 
cratic Convention con- 
frontation ? 
DAVIS: The confrontation will have mixed 
results for local organizing and highly 
important consequences in other ways. I 
believe it Is important for what we can say 
to Americans at this time. 1 believe it is 
very Important to Vietnam. .\nd frankly 
I see it as a possible turning point for the 
country And the movemeiut. 

If the Convention confrontation can be 
placed In a broader strategy, it can 
perhaps Induce many people to take up 
organizing positions. Can the Democratic 
Convention focus have a relationship to 
an over -all white organizing drive be- 
glnnli^ in the summer? Can SD6, the Stu- 
dent Moblllzatioa, the Resistance, the 
Young Christian MoveiiiMit provide the 
netwwk for recruitment and the resources 
for training and direction to make possible 
new white projects In dozens of com- 
munities leading up to the Democratic 
Convention and then continuing beyond it. 
Can the anti-war movement, identified 
publicly as people who organize national 
days of resistance, or Washington marches 

or bank accounts for NY Times adver- 
tisements, become associated more 
directly with efforts to build power 

Vm Interested personally In working 
for the Democratic Convention challenge 
because it's being held in Chicago — a 
really arrogant thing for Daley to do — 
and because I want to work more directly 
with the anti-war movement as an or- 
ganizer, and this offers me a way to do 
just that. One of the challenges to or- 
ganizers is how the enormous energy 
and numbers of people who are opposed 
to the Vietnam war can be directed to- 
wards building organization which has 
permanency, power and radical posture long 
after Vietnam. 

Beyond Vietnam 

THE MOVEMENT: How does the Viet- 
nam issue become the 
issue of imperialism 
r and how should the 

anti-war movement 
organize to outlast the 
Vietnam war? 
DAVIS: SNCC, SDS and the people who 
make up the Resistance have been fairly 
successful. Perhaps they offer approaches 
to the problem, I would add, as a way 
to expand into the constituencies which 
perhaps these people are not reaching, 
the idea of "localizing the anti-war 
movement." Since returning from North 
Vietnam, and speaking to more diverse 
groups than I am accustomed, I have 
been struck by the militancy of suburban 
groups, newly organized student com- 
mittees and clergy peace associations 
on the issue of the war. People are will- 
ing to work as organizers, as well as 
support the Resistance, etc., if they believe 
it will help build pressure to rnd the war. 
These same groups become angry, bored 
or generally turned off if they are bom- 
barded with words like imperialism, neo- 
colonialism, or tightly drawn analysis too 
thick with Marxist or left slogans. 

Not everyone who comes in the front 
door of the JOIN office m Chicago is 
opposed to the Democratic Parry, tlie 
machine and the war in Vietnam. It may 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

only be the policeman who beat their 
head or the case-worker who is threaten- 
ing to cut off support which provides the 
will to consider a political act. For the 
organizer the problem is to search with 
Chat Individual for the process which Is 
the most liberating and radicalizing, as 
die immediate political act is thought 
through and carried out, a process which 
can connect that Individual to a larger 
organization and more radical program. 
If the radicals in the movwnent are to 
give leadership to the anti-war movement 
in its broadest sense, it will not be be- 
cause we joined the National- Mobiliza- 
tion to fight for "our politics" or de- 
manded a focus on "imperialist targets". 
We will have to suggest programs and 
organize work which allow people new to 
the movement to learn from experience 
who holds power, how decisions are 
made, the relationship of the war effort 
to corporations which operate in every 
major city. There are numerous examples 
of such an approach. Let me suggest 
only one. 

Discovering the War Makers 

In those regions of the country where 
the movement is strong in the ghettoes, I 
would like to see organizers develop pro- 
grams that recruit people basically con- 
cerned about the napalming children or 
the use of indiscriminate US fire power 
against the civilian population of Vietnam 
— the people regarded by some in the 
movement as too apolitical or too human- 
itarian to work with. The program might 
begin by helping people learn about the 
experimental weapons being used In Viet- 
nam: the Shrike guided missile, the elec- 
tron bomb, the cluster bombs, the cylinder 
fragmentation bomb and the long line of 
Inclndary weapons, toxic chemicals and 
poison gases. Then research could begin 
on wtio makes these weapons In the local 
community — what corporations are in- 
volved, who sits on the board, where do 
they live, what positions of influence In 
the community do they hold? The pro- 
gram would urge people to look into the 
kinds of weapons that are actually being 

used in Vietnam only to learn that the peo- 
ple who manufacture tbese weapons that 

have been banned by international agree- 
ment are the very people who sit on the 
Board of Education and the Mayor's Com- 
mittees in their own cities. This process, 
1 susp>ect, would radically expand people's 
consciousness and the scope of possible 
activity. Suddenly the war makers be- 
come real people, the same j>eople, if the 
ghetto movement is strong, who are being 
attacked by the blacks or poor whites 
because of rotten schools or urban re- 
newal. War crime tribunals that put these 
individuals on public trial for complicity 
in US war crimes might represent still 
another dimension of a process that be- 
gins with simple moral concerns but al- 
lows "nice" people to grow politically 
through their own work and experience. 
I believe anti-war activity of this sort — 
and there are many other examples — be- 
gins to suggest 10 various moventent con- 
stituencies in a city new kinds of political 
relationships we have not seen signif- 
icantly at a local leveL 


THE MOVEMENT* We've been reading 
reports coming into 
our office of people 
supoened, arrested or 
Investigated all over 
the country. Icapp>ears 
there is a coordinated 
effort to Intimidate and ' 
infiltrate every pro- 
test organization. In 
fact, it appears that 
the Administration is 
extremely afraid for 
it's convention next 
summer and will be 
making moves to re- 
press those involved 
in the ^convention 
strategy. How should 
the movement respond 
to these events? 
DAVIS: While the movement ts still small 
and generally overly preoccupied with 
talking to itself, these limttadons every 

Davis Exhibit No. 1 — Continued 

day are breaking down, as new people, 
fed up and disgusted, turn to us for 
direction and work, or ignore us and 
create exciting political communities of 
their own, U seems to me that there is 
every reason to believe that conditions 
are with those who want the movement 
to be vastly broadened. 

The Viet Cong believe that the Itokec 
States has been militarily defeated ii 
South Vietnam and that the question ol 
NLF victory Is a question of time. John- 
son—or for that matter all public can- 
didates for President— appear unpreparec 
to accept a military defeat, at least t<x 
some time. So, as sickening a« It is, 
every sign points to a long war anc 
greater and greater loss of Americac 
lives. Thus far, the only response o^ the 
Administration to the black ghetto revolts 
has been to improve police tactics, train- 
ing ami manpower. So, every sign points 
towards more intense black-poUce war- 
fare in our cities. And finally the reports 
from the inner circles of international 
finance capitalism point with horror to the 
softening of currency, the new protective 
tariffs in the US and the rising US price 
level, signs which even conservative econ- 
omists now claim point toward economic 
slump or worse in this country. It seems 
the very conditions we deplore harbor the 
potential for a vast swelling of our move- 
ment and our power, as the war, riots 

and recession converge on ordinary peo- 

Need Positive View 

This reading of conditions makes it im- 
perative, I believe, that wedevel<^*frMfii 
and positive view of the role we may play 
in tills country and the world. W« are not 
the Communist Party bi the middle pert 
of this century. We nuist not face re- 
pression by taking the defensive, by send- 
ing large numbers of people underj^oupd 
or seekii^ to {cooectouraeihreS'lif 4iny*| 
log what we stand for at our l^^ille Qc^)** 
i believe we must tioia every trtal Ipco ! 
a trial ol tite system, ttm fm'l^ltm^pt^ 
oB paranoia as tmnA «• po«lfi)le «»re» 
pression comes an4 <Swt we irtiould Mek 
the widest si^pport f<nr oUr actleiis end for 
our right to hold and ejqpress our con- 
victions. I'm calling not olijy ffflr a polit- 
ical strategy of op^iness. txit aunong 
ourselves for a psychological frame-work 
that allows us to turn outward rather 
th&n Inward as the going getr rough. The 
escalation of the war la Vietnam has 
only strengthened the Vietnamese struggle 
as they turn each stage of the escalation 
into a new response to their own people. 
The escalation of the war of rejwesslon 
in the United States might be seen as that 
kind of organizing possibility for us. 


I don't think that the presence of those numbers or the symbol of a 
funeral march at all suggests disruption. If it suggests disruption to 
you, let me make it quite clear to you that we did not plan disruption 
at the Democratic Convention. It did not call for disruption; and 
everything we did — including the training of our marshals, how _we 
organized, how we recruited — led toward a nonviolent demonstration 
at the time of the nomination on August 28. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I find a striking similarity between this 
expression and the expression, "pinning the delegates in the Amphi- 

Mr. Davis. Yes, we went through that this morning. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yesterday afternoon. 

Mr. Davis. Whenever it was, and it was mixed together. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We have the same basic understanding 

Mr. Davis. Do you understand what I said ? That is the only ques- 
tion before this committee and this country. 

Mr. IcHORD. If you are going to be turning back the delegates, 
though, Mr. Witness, you are going to be restricting their liberty ; are 
you not? Perhaps some of the delegates would want to leave the Amphi- 
theatre. You would be restricting their liberty. 

Mr. Davis. I think it is quite possible to go down to a meeting of 
the city council that is about to pass a $2 million project that intends to 
disrupt the entire community of poor people with the destruction of 
their homes and with replacement of homes that only the upper- or 
middle-income can afford. And imagine a situation where that com- 
munity would come down and say this decision does not represent us 
and we demand that you stay here and make a decision that does repre- 
sent us. 

Then there might be quite an exchange in which it would be clear 
that the local city council was hopelessly tied to the intrenched political 
and business interests of the downtown community, and the like, to the 
suburbs, and hopelessly unwilling to deal with the problems of the 
black community. And there could be a political confrontation, but 
that is different. I mean, I could imagme myself running around the 
community recruiting and saying, "We are going to hold those people 
in there until they make it right," and going around and nobody would 
think by that that we are going to hold a gim at a city councilman's 
head or physically shut the building down until everybody came out 
right, but the people would go down there and have a political con- 
frontation, a confrontation on life-and-death decisions that affect 

Mr. IcHORD. This is where your right to demonstrate ru'bs up against 
the rights of other people. 

Mr. Davis. If you plan a demonstration thai disrupts a public 
meeting, that creates physical harm to local officials, whatever, I 
agree that such people would be arrested in this country, but to caU 
for a massive demonstration at the International Amphitheatre, de- 
manding that the people make a decision that is consistent with 80 per- 
cent of the electorate voters who voted in Democratic primaries, which 
is for new direction and new leadership in 1968, and to say in all of 
your publications that you are not coming to Chicago to disrupt the 

21-706 O— 69— pt. 2 11 


convention, but to raise a serious political issue that faces this coun- 
try, I just think that that is crystal clear what you have in mind. I 
hope that it is clear. 

Mr. Watson. And you said that the activities of the Democratic 
Convention were undemocratic ? Is that your statement ? I have heard 
that repeatedly, that the activities of the Democratic Convention were 

Mr. Davis. Isn't that terrible. 

Mr. Watson. Did you make that statement ? 

Mr. Davis. I believe I made that statement ; and if I did not, I make 
it now. 

Mr. Watson. So your interpretation of what is true democratic 
action is, when duly elected delegates to a convention do not do what 
you or your associates believe that the real democratic way to do it is, 
for you to get out and force the duly elected delegates to adhere to 
your belief. That is the real democratic process. 

Mr. Davis. Do you mean duly elected like you, Mr. Watson, like a 
racist out of a congressional district which has been cited by the 1965 
civil rig'hts law 

Mr. Watson. Bear this in mind, and you made reference to the 
State of South Carolina earlier. How long have you lived in South 
Carolina, Mr. Davis ? 

Mr. Davis. I never lived there. I visited there ; I know many people 
from South Carolina. We have a little coffeehouse that is supporting 
soldiers at Fort Jackson in Columbia, South Carolina, and I have — 
know something about the kinds of people who come from South 
Carolina, Wliat distresses me is the politicians that come from South 

Mr. Watson. I am sure of that. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair again admonishes the audience we must 
have order in the hearing. You are guests of the committee. You are 
entitled to be here if you keep in order ; otherwise the Chair will have 
to ask you to leave. 

Mr. Davis. Let me just say on the substance of your question, Mr. 
Watson, that 80 percent of the people voting in Democratic primaries 
in 1968 voted against the Johnson-Humphrey policies and 20 percent 
voted for those policies, and yet at the Democratic National Conven- 
tion where at the time public opinion j^olls and j^rimaries and every 
conceivable measure that we have around the issue of the war in Viet- 
nam was overturned by the people in control of that convention. That 
convention, I think by anybody's standards, was fraudulent and un- 

Mr. IcHORD. I think you are making a misstatement of the polls 
there. My memory, as I recall, showed Humphrey far ahead of 
McCarthy, if that is what you are referring to, prior to the convention, 

Mr. Davis. I'm talking about the electorate that voted in the pri- 
maries and the general feeling going into the convention about the 
need to get out of Vietnam. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask him again, first let me 
make one general statement in reference to your comments concerning 
the State that I am honored to represent. I have been living there 46 
years; and if you will come down and live in South Carolina just, 
say a tenth of that time, then perhaps you will be in a position to 


discuss the situation in South Carolina in a reasonably intelligent 

Let me get back to one basic question : If the convention at Chicago 
had adopted your platform in reference to Vietnam^ in your judgment 
it would have been a democratic process ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I think the Democratic Party is essentially con- 
trolled by Southern conservatives, reactionary trade union fat 

Mr. Watson. I ask you one simple statement 

Mr. Daves. — big city machines like Chicago. 

Mr. Watson. If they adopted your principle, would it have been a 
democratic process ? 

Mr, Davis. I think the Democratic Party is hopelessly tied to the 
interests of the military and the bankers and the Southern racists like 

Mr. IcHORD. We will take a 5 -minute recess. 

(Brief recess.) 

Mr. IcHORD. The committee will again come to order. 

The witness will resume the chair. 

Mr. Watson. So that we might wrap that dialogue up that we started 
a moment ago, let me just conclude by saying apparently nothing could 
have been done at the Democratic Convention which would have met 
the qualifications of the witness' term of "democratically conceived" 
or "democratically passed." 

Mr. Davis. No, Mr. Watson. I think it would have been a verv good 
thing for this country had there been a resolution passed at the iDemo- 
cratic Convention that recognized that we have no business directing 
the affairs of another country 10,000 miles away. 

Had the Democratic Party supported a peace plank, had the Demo- 
cratic Convention seen it necessarily consistent with American inter- 
ests to withdraw American forces from that country, I, and I think 
millions of other Americans, would have applauded that decision. I 
would have continued to work to try to make this a more democratic 
country, to try to find a way in your own district to get black people 
represented in that district. I would have continued to try to find a 
way to get welfare recipients and people who live in slum apartment 
buildings and students and others who essentially have no effective 
way to influence the decisions that operate in the day-to-day way in 
their own lives so that there would be the beginnings of more demo- 
cratic channels in this country. 

That is the essence of this movement, but I certainly would have ap- 
plauded and supported any decision that moved us closer to peace in 
Vietnam coming from the Democratic Convention in August. 

Mr. Watson. If your statement relative to the black people of my 
district is for political purposes, to adversely effect my reelection, the 
election is over, and I suggest you make those statements before the 
next election. 

Mr. Davis. The reason you were elected again is because those black 
people didn't have a chance. If we can get those people a vote, you 
will not be back here again, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. We w^on't pursue it, but no less authority than the 
president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People made the statement several years ago at a State convention of 


that organization in Charleston, South Carolina, that they had no 
problem in that regard in my State. And we have never had any 
difficulty, and I believe that he is a better authority, so far as the rights 
and so far as the opportunities given those people, than is the gentle- 
man now speaking, or the witness now in the chair, so let's proceed. 

Mr. IcHORD. We have gotten somewhat afield from the inquiry. 

Let's proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you on or about November 20, 1967, make a state- 
ment substantially to this effect : that if President Johnson was nomi- 
nated for reelection at the convention in Chicago, anyone who voted 
to nominate him would not be allowed to leave the convention hall ? 

Mr. Davis. Could you ^ive me the document you are using ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you if you made such a statement on No- 
vember 20, 1967, or thereabouts. 

Mr. Daves. I can't recall making any such statement, but if you could 
refer to when it was made and the context of it, perhaps I could talk 
further to it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will ask you further: On March 6, 1967, in con- 
nection with the question of urban renewal, if you made the following 
statement and words to this effect, "If you can't stop urban renewal, 
you may have to bum the buildings down." 

Mr. Davis. Wliat was the context in which this alleged statement 
was made? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I believe it was made by you at the meeting of the 
Englewood Action Committee. 

Mr. Kennedy. You have the the document before you. Why don't 
you show it to him, if you are interested in showing the truth ? 

Mr. Conley. These are simply notes I have here. 

I am asking you, sir, if you made that statement. If you don't recall 
it, just say you don't recall it. 

Mr. Davis. It is not that. It would be inconsistent with my position, 
that j>eople should bum down the buildings they live in. People should 
do all that they can to stop the demolition of their communities in the 
interest of business and real estate forces that want to change that 
community into middle- or upper-income and destroy the commimity 
of the poor. 

I havt) worked a long time along those linas. I think that one of the 
clearest examples of the issue of democracy in America is the way in 
which the administrative programs that were launched out of the New 
Deal 1930's philosophy, programs and visions that had, as their basis 
at least, the rendering of justice to i^eople who were unemployed and 
lived in slum communities, and instead created the administrative 
operations that came increasingly under the control of forces that were 
not in tune with the interests of poor people of the United States. 
Welfare is one example, schools is another example, and urban renewal 
is a classic example. 

The movement is attempting to find new channels so that people 
who are victims of an administrative operation or bureaucracy can 
begin to have control over those administrative operations. 

You can't vote in that kind of change, as we see it, that is, you can't 
vote in a changed urban renewal program. You have to get the resi- 
dents in a community to begin to exercise power over their urban re- 
newal program, directly, and welfare recipients and students in schools, 
and so on. 


In that context, I don't believe I would advocate as a tactic for creat- 
ing a new political base for more democratic urban renewal programs 
burning down buildings. 

I don -it believe I would ever do that, so I am sorry to take long, but I 
wanted to say what my context would be, and then go on to say I don't 
recall being at the Englewood Action Committee on November — what- 
ever it was, 1967, of having made that statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In March. Mr. Davis, taking you back again to the 
newspaper, THE MOVEMENT, and the February edition you had 
a moment ago, in the same coliunn where the question appears from 
the reporter, "What do you see happening at the Democratic Conven- 
tion?" And I quote your reply as follows : 

I think we can do better than attempting to prevent the convention from tak- 
ing place, as some have suggested by closing down the city on the flirst day of 
preconvention activity. The delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago, so 
long as they give their support to a policy of ending racism and the war. * * * 

Did you make that statement, and has MOVEMENT adequately 
quoted the statement which I just read to you ? 

Mr. Davis. It might be helpful to read into the record the entire 
statement again. My position was that we should not disrupt the con- 
vention or prevent the convention from carrying out its business. 

Our political business in Chicago was to have a political confronta- 
tion on the issues of the war and racism in America. 

It seems to me that perhaps if you read the whole statement, or even 
if you don't, it is implied there that what I am suggesting 

Mr. IcHORD. The statement has been made a part of the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. It will be shown in the record. 

Mr. Davis. Our purpose was not to prevent the convention, or to 
prevent people from entering the International Amphitheatre during 
convention week. Our purpose was to, as dramatically as we could to 
double the agenda facing the Govermnent and the Nation at this time, 
the war in Vietnam and racism in our communities, coast to coast. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I still come back to the specific sentence : 

The delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago, so long as they give their 
support to a policy of ending racism and the war. 

That particular sentence troubles me, sir. 

Mr. Da\t:s. Do you mean if they don't end it, then they should be 
prevented ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. You seem to place an option. All may come, if they 
subscribe to these two philosophies. 

I am not arguing the merit of the philosophy. I am asking if this 
does not attach a condition to a delegate coming to the convention, 
reading tliat sentence. 

Mr. I)a\t:s. I don't think it does. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "The delegates should be allowed to come, so long as 
they give their support." What does that mean to you? 

Mr. Davis. What I just said that it meant, that is, that we do not 
seek to prevent the delegates from coming to Chicago or to the Demo- 
cratic Convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Why didn't you say that? 

Mr. DA\^s. Give me the whole statement again, and I will find for 
you a sentence that says that clearly. 


Mr. IcHORD. Hand him the statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. \Miy didn't you just say the delegates should be al- 
lowed to come to Chicago? 

Mr. Davis. I have said that in hundreds of places and I am sure you 
have it before you. 

The Febiiiary 11 meeting that you brought up with Mr. Hay den, in 
wliich we put into our minutes our position against disruption of the 
Democratic Convention, not because it was an issue that was live and 
bubbling among young people and others who were planning to come 
to Chicago, but because the media had essentially created this issue 
from the beginning, and we wanted to be on record publicly and with 
ourselves that Ave were not seeking a confrontation or a physical dis- 
ruption of the convention. 

I don't know how many times it was said publicly to the press and 
in our minutes, and it seems to me it is said here, as well. 

You know, you may be able to, in the millions of words that were 
said about the Democratic Convention, find three that to you repre- 
sent what you already believe. But I think if you will study the context 
of any statement that is made and if you will basically absorb the 
message that came out of the Mobilization at every level, it will be 
crystal clear that we came to Chicago not to confront or disrupt, but 
to raise the issues before this Government and the American people. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I submit to you, had somebody in Chicago 
put to your group a proposal you will be permitted to come to Chicago 
so long as you remain peaceable and quiet, sitting on the sidewalk and 
causing no demonstration, no parades whatsoever, that you would not 
have found that acceptable. You would have considered that as a 
blackjack over your head, wouldn't you ? 

Mr. Davis. I say in this vei*y article : 

I favor letting the delegates meet in the International Amphitheater and making 
our demands and the actions behind those demands escalate in militancy 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let's stop there. We both know what "escalate" means, 
don't we ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Because that is what we have been talking about for 
the last 4 or 5 years. What is the next word ? 

Mr. Daa^s. That very bad word, "militancy." 

Mr. CoNLEY. What does that word "militancy" mean to you ? 

Mr. Daais. It means when people feel the democratic process has 
broken down, when they have no choice between law and order and 
procandidates — in eveiy conceivable way they have been working to 
try to end this terrible war in Vietnam — that they have to do what 
they can to undercut, to prevent this authority from continuing in the 
way that it has. 

Essentially, the movement of the last 8 years has been a movement 
that tries to bring about a change in consciousness of both the people 
who run this country and the general population. I think that we have 
demonstrated our moralism and nonviolence and our willingness to go 
to jail for our convictions, our refusal to go into the draft, our non- 
violent sit-ins, where we subject ourselves to all kinds of abuse in an 
effort to try to make this country face up to what it is doing, not only 
in the black and poor communities of the Nation, but all over the 


I think that militancy is an appropriate term for a movement that 
is angry, that wants cliange, that is trying to reach more and more 
people to understand what we are doing to human lives all over the 
world. I think militancy is a word that is appropriate to young people 
and black people and concerned Americans facing the kinds of oppo- 
sition, the kinds of oppression, and the kinds of war policies that this 
Government stands for. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I tliink we both recognize that militant, or militancy, 
whatever you choose to call it, means exactly the same thing to both 
of us. It means a very firm position. 

Mr. Davis. That is right. 

Mr. CoNLEY. It means, if necessary, the use of force. 

Mr. Davis. Well, what kind of force? That is the kind, you see. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will not belabor with you on that one. 

Mr. Davis. That is the key issue. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will let you cop out to that. 

Mr. Davis. Every time we use "militancy," we mean "get our guns" 
or "pin the delegates in" or "don't let them out." And what I am 
saying is that our statements, public and private, throughout the 
events leading up to Chicago were absolutely clear that we wanted a 
nonviolent peace demonstration at the time of the Democratic 

Mr. CoNLEY. I go back on the word "militant" or "militancy" to the 
word "militia." I think they spring from the same area. 

Mr. Davis. I think they do. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's get away from semantics. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I ask you if the first organizational meeting 
for the demonstrations in Chicago was not in fact held on February 
11, 1968, at 407 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, and that you and 
Mr. Carlos Russell chaired that meeting. 

Mr. Davis. The first organizational meeting for what ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. For the demonstrations in Chicago, or the events 
which occurred in Chicago, however you choose to put it, took place 
on February 11. 

Mr. Davis. No ; there were many meetings before the February 11 
meeting to discuss the convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was there a meeting on February 11 ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, there was. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was it chaired by you and Mr. Carlos Russell ? 

Mr. DA^^s. Yes, it was. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now I will ask you if, in fact, did not the question of 
necessity for violence come up for discussion in that meeting on 
February 11 ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes ; in preparing an agenda for that meeting, the press 
particularly was speculating publicly at that time that the convention 
would be disrupted. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We are wandering. You are talking about the press. 
I am asking, Did the question of violence come up ? Not what the press 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Da\t:s. The reason in large part it came up was because I wanted 
very explicitly to have a discussion of whether or not the convention 
should be disrupted, precisely so we could clarify publicly the position 


of the overwhelming numbers of groups, I thiiik all the groups who 
were affiliated with the National Mobilization, and were thinking or 
discussing at least the idea of an antiwar demonstration at the time of 
the convention. 

In other words, the position of disruption was one of four posi- 
tions that was put forward so that we could make crystal clear to 
everyone that this position had been advanced, since it was being 
talked about in the press, and had been rejected by this meeting, as it 

Mr. CoNLEY. Specifically, Mr. Davis, didn't Jack Spiegel make a 
statement there at this particular meeting that dealt with the question 
of violence ? 

Mr. Davis. A number of people raised the question of whether there 
would be violence 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did Mr. Spiegel make the following statement, or 
words to this effect : 

We can't call 200,000 people to Chicago) and then disassociate ourselves from 
violence. Disruption and violence will occur. It's going to happen and we'll 
have to deal with that fact.* 

Wasn't a statement of this type made ? 

Mr. Davis. It may or may not have been made. It turned out to be 
a quite accurate statement, that is, that police violence, or what the 
Walker Report calls a police riot, did develop, and Mr. Spiegel was 
quite accurate in saying we would have to deal with that problem. And 
the way we dealt with it, or tried to get ready for it, was doing all we 
could to secure permits and demand that the Justice Department in- 
vestigate the possibility of police violence during the Democratic Con- 
vention, and to make public statements that announced the military 
buildup in the city of Chicago and to organize marshals who could 
implement a nonviolent demonstration if we were ever allowed to have 
one, which we were not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you hear a Lincoln Lynch make the following 
statement : 

How are we going to discredit Daley and show him to be a liar? How will we 
present challenges to the Convention? 

Was this statement made by Mr. Lynch ? 

Mr. Kennedy. It is a question, not a statement. 

Mr. Davis. I think Lincoln might have said something along those 
lines. It seems to me a question he might have said, but I can't recall 
that he said that exactly. 

Does that statement mean anything to you, Mr. Conley ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Davis, I show you a copy of a letter, or the 
letterhead of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War 
in Vietnam, which was mailed during August of 1968. This letter 
identifies you and Tom Hayden as coproject directors and states that 
you were greatly aided by the Chicago Peace Council.^ 

Is that true ? 

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Davis. This appears to be a stolen letter signed by Dave Del- 
linger and Bob Greenblatt that I think is essentially correct. 

1 See Grubisic Exhibit No. 4. pt. 1, pp. 2293-2298. of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings. 

2 Document introduced as Grubisic Exhibit No. 6 and retained in committee files. See 
pt. 1, p. 2305, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings. 


The Chicago Peace Council did have staff in Chicago that assisted 
us with le^al nelp and getting housing for people. One of their officers 
worked with us closely in trying to secure permits from the city of 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, did you issue a press release on March 25, 
1968, in which you described a meeting that was held March 22-24 at 
a camp outside of Chicago to make plans for disrupting the Demo- 
cratic Convention, and did you state that an interim committee was 
established to carry out those plans, which consisted of yourself, Dave 
Dellinger, and Vernon Grizzard? 

Mr. Davis. No, that would be absolutely incorrect. As I said, I never 
publicly called for disruption of the Democratic National Convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, did you have an interim committee consisting of 
yourself, Dellinger, and Grizzard ? 

Mr. Davis. Let's start and end with that. 

It is this constant reading into the record this word of "disruption" 
that I am objecting to. 

Yes, there was a committee that was set up to essentially consult 
with people around the country about a possible action at the time of 
the Democratic National Convention. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have as much trouble with the word "disrupt" as I 
do with the word "militant," don't you ? 

Mr. Da\is. "Militant" and "disrupt" are both perfectly clear to me, 
and apparently not so clear to you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you examine this particular document that we 
are referring to, the press release of March 25, and I will ask you if in 
fact that was the release that was made on that date. 

(Witness examines document.) 

Mr. Davis. Yes, that appears to be the press release that was issued. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the committee receive 
this particular document as Davis Exhibit No. 2. 

Mr. IcHORD. Without objection from members of the committee, the 
document will be received and incorporated in the record. 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 2." See pages 2658 and 

Mr. Davis. What is this "attachment 8A" ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Written in the yellow crayon ? 

Mr. Davis. You have No. 8 in red or yellow, here 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is to key it to my question to you, sir. 

Mr. Da\t;s. Why is my name underlined in red ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's get back to the issue at hand. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you prefer yellow ? 

Mr. Davis, on August 18, 1968, did you attend a meeting of the 
Chicago Peace Council at which you were one of the featured speakers 
and at that time did you introduce other speakers ? 

Mr. Davis. What was the date ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. August 18, 1968, approximately 6 or 7 days before the 

Mr. Davis. Why don't you go ahead ? I really don't recall. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall whether a Sylvia Kushner was present 
at that particular meeting, collecting money at the door from persons 
entering the meeting ? Do you know a Sylvia Kushner ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, I do. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you aware of the fact that Sylvia Kushner is the 
wife of a long-time Communist Party member, Sam Kushner? 


Davis Exhibit No. 2 

for Immediate release . 
March 25, 1968 10:00 am 

contact: Rennie Davis 

407 S. Dearborn, Chicago 

■'•;■', . ,,; .. t"^ 

A i^Jor, representative conference of anti-war, student and black liberation 
forces across the United State sxneeting outside Chicago has called for an 
' ^'election year organizing, campaign throughout the country" and affirmed its ' 
> >>-lntention to hold demonstrations at the time of the Democratic National Convention. 
" 'The. Conference,, meeting at camp Ravenswood, was united in its conviction . -^ ' .^, 
■vthat neither,;die Democratic or Repttblican parties cotald solve, the basic ''';'^ . . 
, V.j^irbb'lems that this iconntry home or abroad.«"'The strategy developed -, 
'i^*/bytUe Conference wlii be to tinderscore through Jk^lon organization' the r^al " 
,"!^'iBsues this country; must face. Thdse issues are the Immediate withdrawal of • w:. 

1^-^^ i-' ^■.:"' ' '■ .-■'■' ■'"^■" : ■"- '^- - ■ - %■". .- '■ ■' ■■■' - 'V: :' ■ '"'• v^. >■ A^•■X,^v. 

-|-Alnericdn troops from Vietnam, the right of the .Vietnamese people to national ^n""^ 

^ti X ' ■'' ■•' ^ . . ^ . • ^ ,. ,. ■• ' ■ ••^■. ' •, 

''.^independence and self-determination,, the en^ of American attempts to control ■_ _[' "'. 

v-and direct the future of the underdeveloped aresiv of tlie world for its own - ! 

i|^>.e£ononiic and poUtictiL Interests, an inmi^diate end to the draft and the virtual', w'-t 

>^: military occupation «oi, Black Comznunities and the recognition of the right '_ '_^' . 
of Black People to control their own lives and determine their own future in 

'^ this country. 

A national campaign committee is being established by the 250 representatives 
at the weekend conference. This campaign is committed to an extensive program 
of support to local organizing activity against the draft, the war, the undeniocratic 

a Interests in the Stspot Republican and Democratic parties, racism and poverty. 

\ Several thousand volufiteers are expected to Join this campaign during the ■ ' 

Davis Exhibit No. 2— Continued 

The conference selected a three man interim conrunittee to function during '''"''^ 
the next few weeks ^i^hile national and regional student and xmti-war organizations 
are selecting representatives to the national campaign committee. Members 
of the interim commjLttee are Hennie DavlBf C ^qja fgj _P ^yg P-g^-^^S^'' ^^^ 
York) and Vernon Grizzard, Boston. 

Mr. Davis. I think that is completely irrelevant, who she marries. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am just asking you. Are you aware of the fact? 

Mr. Davis. No ; but whoever she married is quite beautiful. 

Mr. IcHORD. You are not acquainted with her husband ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I have not had the good fortune to meet her hus- 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, just prior to the convention, several days, 
did you have a conversation with one Abbie Hoffman, and Mr. Hoff- 
man stated to you he had stolen a book from NBC, and this book con- 
tained a floor plan of all of the hotels in which the Democratic dele- 
gates would be staying, as well as a detailed floor plan of the Amphi- 
theatre, and this convention floor plan was printed in only 50 copies ? 

Mr. Davis. He is known by the name Abbie, and we talked on several 
occasions before and during the convention, but frankly, I can't recall 
this particular conversation, but since he has been subpenaed by this 
committee, I would recommend that you ask him the question. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have no recollection of having any such discussion 
with him ? 

Mr. Davis. I can't recall, but it is possible. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will ask you whether at the time, or at some other time 
in the general neighborhood, you told Hoffman that you had located 
the frequency of the secret police radio so you could monitor their 
signals ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I can't ever remember saying that to Abbie. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You are quite sure you never made such a statement 
to him or to anyone else ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I can't ever recall making such a statement. 

Mr. CoNUEY. Is the fact, then, untrue, the question I put to you, 

(Witness confers with counsel. ) 

Mr. Davis. My recollection is that there were a lot of radios 
around Chicago that picked up continuously the police calls. It is one 
of the ways that we have to document the fact that police orders con- 
tinuously were issued and violated by the men in the field. But I don't 
recall ever discussing with people that information or those radios, 
how they got the radios or who they were or what their involvement 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question was not what they had gotten. My ques- 
tion was, Did you make the statement to Hoffman or to some other 
person that you had located the frequency of the secret police radio 
so that you could monitor their signals ? 


Mr. Davis. No ; I am sure I had not made such a statement since I 
had not located such a secret police frequency. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then this statement would be false ? 

Mr. Davis. Unless I just made it up, it would be false. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you just make it up ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't believe I would. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I want to direct your attention to a meet- 
ing that occurred on August 21 in Lincoln Park, which you as well as 
Mr. Hoffman attended. 

Was there not in fact a demonstration given on crowd control and 
also training on how to attack the police? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember August 21 in Lincoln Park, but I 
could explain to you that we tried to organize in Chicago some 200 
marshals in nonviolent demonstration techniques that were of two 

One was a fairly traditional monitoring operation, in the hope 
that at the 11th hour the mayor would come to his senses and ^ant us 
a permit to go from Lincoln Park to the International Amphitheatre. 

A part of our training with marshals was designed to organize a 
committee of people that could provide communication to a large 
parade and direction that would seek to end in a people's assembly 
outside the International Amphitheatre. 

The other part of our training essentially was designed to assist peo- 
ple in the eventuality of police attacks or police brutality. 

At that time, August 21, we had not been granted permits. The 
military preparations were well known publicly, and the police and 
other secret security and military forces were in or on their way to 
the city. It did appear that demonstrators might be attacked by police, 
as was the case. 

So we tried to also acquaint our marshals with what to do in the 
eventuality of tear gas or Mace or broken limbs or bleeding heads. 
We also tried to get marshals to understand ways in which they could 
move large numbers of people out of a situation in the eventuality 
of police confrontation or police attack. 

So, those were the two focuses in our training of marshals, one for 
nonviolent demonstration and the other for self-defense of crowds 
in the eventuality of police attack. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Wasn't there some training, sir, at this particular 
meeting I am talking about, involving the use of the snake dance ? 

Mr. Davis. A part of the 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is just a simple question. 

Mr. Davis. It is not a simple question. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was there training on the use of the snake dance? 

Mr. Davis. There was training that tried to bring people together 
that could allow people in a crowd situation to quickly organize and 
move out of the situation. Some of the newsmen and others called this 
a snake dance. 

Snake dance demonstrations, which has been used widely in Ja- 

Mr. CoNLEY. It isn't used in Japan to move a crowd out quickly. 

Mr. Davis. That is why it is not a simple question at all, and I 
wouldn't let you imply what you are now describing as a snake dance 
in any way was used in Chicago for offensive purposes, or in any way 


that our training program was used for offensive or confrontation 

I think anyone who is involved in that training, or any of the news- 
men with whom we spoke who were there at the time of the training, 
will testify that we made it very clear that we were extremely con- 
cerned at that time about crowds being attacked. And we were trying 
to see if there was a way in which people could be organized to move 
out of an area very rapidly without trampling each other, and it 
seemed this might possibly be a demonstration technique that could 
be used in eventuality. It was never used, as you know, in Chicago. 

Mr, CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, why don't you describe to us how a snake 
dance works to show how we get rid of people real quick ? 

Mr. Davis. Do you want me to stand up 5 

Mr. CoNLEY, You can described it in words. 

Mr, Davis. Essentially, it is a way of organizing a group by linking 
arms and moving out of an area in formation. That is the simplest way 
to describe it, 

Mr, CoNLEY. Can you move more quickly ? 

Mr. Davis, You can move at a very fast pace, yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Faster than you can move by yourself ? 

Mr. Davis. The advantage is that it keeps you from stampeding over 
your friends. It allows people to move together, instead of trampling 
each other. 

It is a terrible thing we have to discuss what to do in a demonstra- 
tion that has called for a peace march and citizens' assembly at the 
International Ampihitheatre. The fact that young people have to dis- 
cuss how to defend themselves against public officials when they have 
asked for a legal permit is a dreadful indictment of what this coun- 
try is coming to. 

Mr, CoNLEY, On August 23 of this year, did you in the company of 
Mr. David Dellinger and Mr. Sidney Peck wait to see Mayor Daley, 
and did you not after half an hour see the mayor's assistant, Mr. David 

Mr, Davis. Wliat was the date, again ? 

Mr. CoNLEY, August 23. 

Mr. Davis. I can't recall if that is the exact date, but I believe a 
meeting around that time did take place. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are these facts substantially correct, that you waited 
half an hour to see Mayor Daley, could not see him, and requested to 
see Mr. Stahl, and could not see him ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. We finally wound up seeing their secre- 
tary, who explained neither man would be available to us at the very 
time when permits were desperately needed. The mayor closed his 
door to the officials of the National Mobilization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is it not a fact that at that time Mr. Stahl's secretary 
indicated to you he would see representatives of your group on August 
26? Did that occur, that they indicated that they would see you on 
I guess 2 or 3 days later ? 

Mr. Davis. We had been meeting with David Stahl for 7 weeks, at 
that point, and we had made every possible effort to try to meet with 
somebody in that government who could give us the straight story on 
whether or not constitutional rights would be protected during the 
Democratic National Convention, and David Stahl, like Judge Lynch, 
was appropriately named. 


We only got the stall, and we felt that on the 23d that it was essen- 
tial to meet with the mayor himself or with Jolin Bailey, the chair- 
man of the Democratic National Committee, 

I believe, following the meeting with Mr. Stahl's secretary, that I 
did talk briefly with John Bailey and I pleaded with him to appeal 
to the mayor of the city of Chicago to meet with us and issue permits 
to prevent a police riot in the city of Chicago. We felt one more 
meeting on August 26 with essentially a staff person, rather than with 
the person who really made the decisions, was ludicrous. 

Mr. IcHORD. There were permits issued for demonstrations at certain 
places, were there not ? 

Mr. Davis. There was a permit issued on the afternoon of August 28 
for the use of the bandshell, but the essential j^ermit for a citizens' 
assembly outside the International Amphitheatre was not granted, 
and the essential right to use the park, which would have prevented 
the skull fractures and the bloodshed that we saw on television, were 
never granted. The use of Soldier Field that would have prevented 
what happened in Chicago was never availed. 

Mr. IcHORD. Was the permit to which you referred the only permit 
issued ? 

Mr. Davis. That is right, for any group that was granted. 

Mr. CoNLEY. After you were told you could not see Mr. Stahl until 
August 26, were you present when Mr. Dellinger made the following 
statement: If Mayor Daley would not see him now, he — implying 
Mayor Daley — would be responsible for any bloodshed that took 
place in Chicago. 

Were you present when that statement was made, or words to that 

Mr. Davis. I don't believe I overheard that exact statement, but that 
certainly is a statement that I believe that all of us felt very strongly 
at that time, and if Dave Dellinger had not made it, I think I would 

Mr. CoNLEY. Whose blood did you plan to shed in Chicago ? 

Mr. Davis. We didn't plan to shed anybody's blood. The plan was 
announced months ago, and we were seeking permits so we could have 
a legal, peaceful assembly, and that right to assemble was being crushed 
by the officials of Chicago. 

We felt that this kind of blatant disregard of the Constitution and 
the military buildup that was occurring in Chicago could only mean 
that Chicago officials were interested in a jxvlice riot and the destruc- 
tion of any possibility or opportunity to have a peaceful assembly. 
As we know, that is exactly what happened. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, besides yourself, Mr. Dellinger, and Mr. 
Peck, were not Linda Morse, Stanley Bass, Irving Beinin, and James 
O'Brien of Ramparts magazine present at this meeting we have been 
talking about, if you recall ? 

Mr. DA\^s. I recall some of them being present, but not all of them. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yesterday Mr. Hayden was asked about what the word 
"victory" meant to him, and a number of things. 

I put to you this question, sir: Would you like to see the North 
Vietnamese victorious in this war that is occurring in Southeast Asia? 

Mr. Davis. The victory for me would be for American military pres- 
ence in Vietnam to withdraw. That would be an enormous victory for 
the American people, and that is the victory I seek. 


Mr. CoNLEY. In other words, you do not subscribe to Mr. Hayden's 
statement as of yesterday. You do not wish to adopt what he said on 
that particular point ? 

Mr. Davis. I think it is irrelevant, you see, to say that as an Ameri- 
can I want to figure out or dictate the ways in which Vietnam will be 
governed. The only thing that is relevant to me, as an American, is al- 
lowing Vietnam to determine its own affairs. 

It is quite clear to me that the forces in the struggle in Vietnam 
are essentially forces that are organized around the DRV and the 
National Liberation Front. It is clear to me that it is those forces that 
have essentially united the nationalist interests in Vietnam. 

But my political position, as an American, is simply to insist that 
this country come to its senses and withdraw its troops. It has always 
been my position, and it will continue to be my position. 

Mr. CoNLET. In this connection, Mr. Davis, we are moving into 
the area of the military, now, I suppose. You at least bear the credit 
for it, if not the responsibility, for having been a part of an organiza- 
tion which has called itself the Summer of Support. 

Would you be kind enough to tell us what the purpose of this orga- 
nization, "Summer of Support," are, and I have given you a big, 
broad field to talk in now. 

Mr. Davis. As a young person myself, I feel a particular sympathy 
for those Americans who have been drafted into the Armed Forces and 
given orders to fight and die in a war that, in the interests of this coun- 
try, cannot be tolerated or supported. I happen to believe that as some- 
one who is very committed to peace in that country that I represent a 
major ally of the average GI. I thiiik that our own movement, however, 
based largely on 

Mr. CoNLEY. May I interrupt you a moment? I am not sure I fol- 
lowed what you meant by that last remark. Would you elaborate on 
what you meant by "ally" ? 

Mr. Davis. I think the best thing we can do to support our American 
soldiers is to work to bring them home, to return them safely to their 

Mr. CoNLEY. Who is the ally you are mentioning — ^the age group 
you are representing ? 

Mr. Davis. Young people and others in this country who have or- 
ganized and worked and raised the issue of the war in public arenas 
from coast to coast. In other words, the peace movement, it seems to 
me, not the Congressmen who sit here, who are for the war, represent 
the major supporters of American fighting men, and Summer Sup- 
port was essentially a program to dramatize and focus in a very specific 
way the support of the peace movement for American soldiers. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let's stay on this one point for just a minute. How old 
are you ? 

Mr. Davis. I am 28. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You are 28 years old. How old is the average service- 

Mr. Davis. The average serviceman is 20. 

Mr. CoNLEY. So there is some 8 years between you and him, is there 

Mr. Davis. That is right, although a lot of people who work in 
Summer Support are 18, 19, 20. As a matter of fact, some of the people 


that are supporting soldiers are 50 and 60. I don't think it is strictly 
the case that people who support soldiers have to be old, bigoted, re- 
pressive, sick, patriotic in the worst sense, rather than the best sense. 

I think the symbols of patriotism have been stolen by the right, and 
they have to be regained by those people who are working to make 
freedom and peace in this country consistent with American interests. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me ask you if this Summer of Support actually 
has as one of its objectives to encourage disaffection and desertion from 
the Army ? 

Mr. Davis. You may use those words. We know exactly what they 
are, in law. We do not urge any young soldier to take any action 
that would put him in legal jeopardy with the United States military, 
nor do we in any of our coffeehouses counsel young men to desert. Our 
purpose is to try to provide a place for the young man who has given 
his body to Uncle Sam so that he does not have to give his mind. Our 
place is to provide rest and relaxation for basic trainees who around 
the 5th week of their basic training learn to kill. He has something 
to escape to, other than the whore houses and saloons that make up 
these small towns, like in Waynesville or Queens, Texas, where there 
are people who generally care about him and are not trying to ex- 
tract or steal his body for prostitution purposes. There are people 
who want to keep his mind alive, and not be totally sold out to the 
military machine. There are people there who essentially say, "I am 
from the peace movement because I care about the hell you are going 

That is the essential idea of the coffeehouse — pretty good. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I want to be specific about this, though. You do encour- 
age the people between themselves — I use "among soldiers" not be- 
tween the peace movement and the soldiers; I use the term "among 
soldiers." I do see a distinction. Do you ? 

Mr. Davis. I see your distinction. If GIs decide to organize them- 
selves to do whatever they feel they want to do, we may counsel them 
very strongly about the legal problems they may face if they take 
certain actions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And you use the coffeehouse, perhaps, as a catalyst for 
them or focusing point 

Mr. Davis. No, the coffeehouse is a place where they can somehow 
keep their sanity, sort of offering an antidote to the spirit of the bay- 
onet, which is what the Government represents. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am familiar with at least one of your coffeehouses, 
because it is from part of the country I represent. And you do have 
posters in the coffeehouses, do you not ? 

Mr. Davis. We have all kmds of posters, posters of pretty girls, 
posters of Stokely Carmichael 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have posters there which indicate that the war 
in Vietnam is immoral, or however you choose to put it; do you not? 

Mr. Davis. One poster in Mad Anthony's is a big kind of picture of 
a cruiser plane of a 

Mr. CoNLEY. Of a what ? 

Mr. Davis. Of a huge plane going off in the distance, and it says, 
"This summer spend your vacation in beautiful Vietnam." That is a 
kind of an antiwar poster, I guess. I don't know. GIs really like it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Did you not close down Mad Anthony's ? 


Mr. Davis. We hope very much to open at Fort Leonard Wood, but 
the combination of the official and unofficial harassment, including the 
breaking of windows and other terror that came from the military and 
the police, forced that particular coffeehouse to temporarily close. It 
was too bad, but the GIs on the whole were very supportive of it 
and liked it, but the officers don't think too well of it. 

Mr. IcHORD. How many coffeehouses do you have throughout the 
United States? 

Mr. Daves. I think the first thing to say about your question is we 
feel the coffeehouses do not somehow belong to us. They somehow be- 
long to American soldiers, but the number of coffeehouses near mili- 
lary bases that I am acquainted with at least I think number six. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am going to show you a letter dated April 30, 1968, 
signed by "Rennie," addressed to "Dear Bob," concerning the opera- 
tion of the coffeehouses. The following statement is made in this cover 
letter : 

Enclosed is a recruiting letter to be shown to trustworthy people who are 
seriously interested in working in one of the army base coffee houses this 

Since security is a problem, please be careful to whom this letter is shown. 

I will ask you, sir, if you did not in fact prepare the original of that 
letter, if the "Rennie" referred to is not you and the "Bob" referred 
to there is not Robert Greenblatt ? 

Mr. Davis. How was this letter stolen, Mr. Oonley? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I didn't know that it was stolen. 

Mr. Davis. The handwriting is not mine, so I really can't identify 
this letter. Why don't you go into it, and we will see? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will ask you, sir, if you prepared a letter of that 
type on or about April 30, 1968, containing that language. 

Mr. Davis. I really, honestly, don't know. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You don't have any recollection? 

Mr. Davis. At that time we were very actively engaged in recruit- 
ing for a new project. 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 3" and retained in commit- 
tee files.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you know of anyone else involved in the Summer 
of Support Army coffeehouse movement whose name perliaps is 

Mr. Davis. No; that is the only person who has that name. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Attached to that letter is a rather voluminous piece 
of material 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the record show that counsel has handed the mate- 
rial to the witness. 

Mr. Davis [reads]. 

The coffee houses represent * * * a new way of reaching soldiers without 
haranguing them. 
The coffee-houses come on as strictly commercial ventures 

Mr. CoNLEY. I don't think it is necessary to read the letter. 
I ask you if you recognize the letter. Do you recognize the letter, Mr. 
Davis ? 

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.) 
Mr. Davis. The first part of this letter, Mr. Conley 

21-706 O — 69— pt. 2 12 


Mr. CoNLEY. Are you describing by that the first and second pages ? 

Mr. Davis. The first two pages, that is correct. 

Mr. Kennedy, The other stujff is secret, and they want it back. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We didn't mark it secret. 

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Oonley, are you going to put all of this in the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. No, sir; we are only interested in the first two pages 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 4." See pages 2667 and 

Mr. Davis. I am very interested in the other five pages. It has a lot 
of useful information about the attitude of many young men in the 

Mr. CoNLEY. Have you ever seen that document before 

Mr. Davis. — who feel that this war is very unjust. 

Mr. IcHORD. The question is, Have you ever seen the document? 

Mr. Davis. No, I haven't. 

Mr, CoNLEY. It is moot 

Mr. Kennedy. I don't think it is moot. You yourself have indi- 

Mr. IcHQRD. Let's be in order. Mr. Counsel, I remind you of the rules. 

Mr. Kennedy, This is evidence from your own committee. All you 
want to see is a stinking letter. 

Mr. IcHORD. I remind the counsel again that he is in violation of the 

Mr. Davis. It is useful ; it says on February 21 and 22 many GIs re- 
fused to jump out of helicopters. U.S. commanders — it goes on for five 
pages with information about that. 

Mr. IcHORD, The witness said he does not reco^ize it, 

Mr. Davis. Anyway, the first two pages are mine, Mr. Conley. 

Mr, IcHORD. Mr. Davis, do you state you have never seen this docu- 
ment before ? 

Mr. Davis. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I have never 
seen it before. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with your next question. 

Mr. Conley. I take it you cannot identify either document ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; the first two pages I recognize as a document that I 
was involved in writing. I don't think the full teid; of that letter is mine, 
but parts of it are. 

M!r. AsHBROOK, He said he didn't recognize it, 

Mr, IcHORD, He said he recognized the first letter. Is that not right? 

Mr. Conley. Let's make it real clear. The short letter dated April 

Mr. Davis, I don't recognize that letter. 

Mr, Conley, You have no recollection of ever having written that 

Mr, Davis. That is right. 

Mr. Conley. But the second letter, which deals with the coffeehouses, 
specifically two pages in length, you do recognize,- although you main- 
tain it is not a complete 

Mr, Davis. I will take credit for that letter, 

Mr, Conley. Mr. Davis, in this same connection, dealing with the 
question of the Summer of Support, is it not a fact that, as far back as 
November 1967, you organized an operation to make tape recordings 

Davis Exhibit No. 4 

..-■ ^ia letter is to be sho^-m only to those trustworthy individualc: 
■ vho -have expressed interest in staffing one of the coffee-houses 
.J' in amy base parasite tcv/na. , /■ 

, The coffee houses represent an to work out a new way of 
/, reaching soldiers without haranguing thes. y 

The coffee-houses cor>.a on as. strictly cor-'jnercial ventures ' / 

' ' 'psychedelic* painting- on . tho windaii?3, peroonality posters oh / 

• •' the x.'alls, flashing colored lights, folk singorG, or a hi-fi 

• playing with Judy Collins, The Mothers, etc., and outlandich . 
prices for a cup of coffee in v/hich any explicit pronMytirir.g' 

• by-r.ovcTT^ent people who \.'or/;ocl there v/oul'd ba inappropriate cind^- 
even threatening to the coffee-houses* continued .^existence. 

The coffee-houses are not designed to organise soldiers; they 
ore designed to provide coldicro v/ith a resource institution 
through v/hich they can organise tlier.solves, when they are ready. 

• TTie q'jalities needed in coffee house staff are not those of a 
:-- political activist? they are these of friend and soda-jorh. 

i ; VJamth, friendliness, openness, and a willingness to listen are 
'the qualities" needed to nahe soldiers feel at hone and unthroatened 
' in the coffee house. The coffee houses give r.ovcnont people an. 

• 'opportunity to naKe their rhetoric of fraternity real — but 
'•■nothing more. . 

;^ X The first step in any i>olitical process is to try to find that 
."•.-fraction who are-rinost ready to move. A coffee house in an iV^rr.'y 
I .town, amidst the bars, v/horehouccs, loansharhs and sterile 
■• sorviccrr.en's clubs, worhs as a selective nagnet to attract this 
.J cro'.v'd. Because of the cultural and class basis of our niover.ent 
;. v/ith which v/e are already familiar, those soldiers most likely 
•■; to be turned off the army are also those laost likely to be - 
. . turned off the bars and whorehouses; r.ost likely to w^lcorr.e 
;' a coffee house; This ten percent of the amy are those guys who, 
y' before the coffee houses, stayed in their barracks and left their 
v.'cskend passes unused. 

- The coffee houses, therefore, by their very existence, offer col- 
-:. diers an opportunity; to draw support frcra each other simply by uceting 
'each other in a friendly, non-nilitary atrruDcphera, with open 

young people around who are synipathctic and vrilling to nako an car 
;. ; available to those v;ho v;ant to bend it. On the base, these soldiers 
'-'''.S.ZQ usually isolated frora one anotl-jor, lost 30,000 other man, 
■••• probably unaware of each other's c:cistenco. Just by learning 
'. that there are people of s5.nilar scns.lbilities, they begin to . 
CGa problems as cc:r.:";on \.'.:ich they had previously perceived as 
individual. Thoy gain Eupi:ort for acts they have been contera- 
platingj and, more important, begin to explore possibilities of 
cor^aon action. 

Davis Exhibit No. 4— Continued 

This is all to say that we have undertaken a very limited, tech- 
nical job that hasn't involved urging anyone to oppose the" war 
in Vietnam. Soldiers don't have to be urged; they are the first 
group (for very obvious reasons) to oppose the war in their hearts. 
But expecting soldiers to take the enormous risks of doing something 
about it is unrealistic at this jDoint; for us to ask soldiers 
to risk defection is, to put it kindly, arrogant. r, 

This will be even more true, come June, when there will be a ' 
high percentage of college grads in basic training. These guys 
will not need to be proselytized to an anti-war position; v.-c'va 
been doing that for three years now and most likely, quite a bit 
has sunk in. What these soldiers will need, however, is a hviraane 
and familiar environment in vtiich they can meet like jninded guyo 
and talk in a non-military atmosphere. 

Let me sum uj> by quoting from the letter written by the originator 
'of these coffee-houses, a former GI himself: 

As movement people begin to distinguish between the 
unhappy conscript and the marine sgt who actually digs 
burning dc/m huts vrith his ^ippo lighter, a sympathy will 
probably inform their attitude toward American soldiers 
in training. It nay alco become c-lear that the mover,-!cnt 
has long made strident and impossible demands on soldiers: 
Go to jail; Go into exile; Risk lifelong ostracism and 
unemployment; etc. Movement people may even begin to sec 
GIs as a .likely constituency. They're the same age-, after 
all, speak the sane language, like the same music."- 
Soldiers have imaediate problems that can be eased and, 
someday solved. They form the segment of our society 
that pays most heavily for the iron-heel foreign policy. 
...Finally, soldiers aren't powerless, and can change 
the situation if a eignificant fraction become articulate 
and willing to act on their anti-war outlook. 

...Expecting mass refunals to fight in Vietnam would be 
like thinking American workers could have forced through 
the Wagner Act in 1870. Only after soldiers have found it 
possible, on some level, to change their situation, might 
they think of pressing demands which now seem outlandish, 
such as the right to decline assignment to a given duty 
station (i.e., refuse to fight in Bolivia). The immediate 
changes they could fight for might include the removal of 
particularly sadistic KCOs from positions of authority; 
or doctors might demand a guaranteed 8 hours sleep for 
tra'inees at posts where meningitis is endemic... 

We in the movement will not organize these things. But we can begin 
to provide a service institution for soldiers who are beginning 
to cove on their own. Viithout the ectablishment and preservation 
■of this institution, the movement may not be possible. 


which could be broadcast to GIs, with the objective of breaking down 
morale and causing disaffection among U.S. Army personnel ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I never organized such an operation. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Were you ever involved in such an operation, as a par- 
ticipant, not as an organizer, bearing in mind the distinction ? 

Mr. Davis. Do you mean did I make tapes to encourage disaffection 
among the troops ? 

Mr, CoNLEY. To make tape recordings which could be broadcast to 

Mr. Daves. I would certainly make tapes, if they could be broadcast 
to GIs, which would express my point of view. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you make any tapes ? 

Mr. Davis. I make a lot of speeches that are taped that may have 
been used on radio, or even may have been made available to GIs. 
If that happened, that is good. But I never participated in any or- 
ganized way for that purpose. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, I ask you : Why, then — you said you would 
make tapes for the GIs; for what purpose would you make them? 

Mr. Daves. To explain my point of view, that I support them, that 
I am upset by what they have to go through, while the politicians hag- 
gle over how to save face, and they fight and die in that senseless war. 

We are doing all we can to try to end that war. We very much want 
to involve them, when they return from Vietnam, in campus activities. 
There are some 400,000 Vietnam veterans on the campus today, and 
we think they have the best account of what happened over there and 
we would like them to share their experience in this war with other 

I mean I have a whole range of feelings about soldiers that essen- 
tially line up to be, one, that we want to do all that we can as a move- 
ment to underscore our support for American fighting men and their 
right to come home, and, two, encourage them to hang on to their 
minds during this incredible 2-year experience. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, let me ask you this : The committee has in- 
formation that you did have such a plan, that is, the making of tapes 
for the GI 

Mr. Daves. Bring it out. 

Mr. CoNLEY. — which you had when you returned after your trip 
to Hanoi in November of 1967. 

Did you discuss this plan with any North Vietnamese civil or army 
officials ? 

Mr. Kennedy. Before we proceed, if we are going to encounter ques- 
tions with respect to information taken in executive session, and I am 
not aware that such information was taken, then the chairman should 
be aware of his own procedures here. 

Mr. loHORD. The Chair will have to rule that counsel has informed 
the Chair that it was not taken in executive session. 

Perhaps, Mr. Reporter, you could read the question back to Mr. 

( The question referred to was read by the reporter. ) 

Mr. IcHORD. I think the question is proper, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. Davis. I am very anxious to talk about soldiers. 

I am not at all sure what the relevance is to Chicago or your legis- 
lative purposes, but I welcome this opportunity. 


To the best of my knowledge, I never discussed with North Viet- 
namese officials the making of tapes to be broadcast to troops to en- 
courage disaffection. 

There have been many discussions that I have been involved in, in 
general ways, that we can try to communicate with soldiers. 

One meeting that I recall, for example, discussed the idea of trying 
to put together some programs that we would take to the United 
States Government and suggest that they broadcast over their own 
Saigon-controlled radio stations to troops, that would try to get the 
other side of this war out to American soldiers. 

To the best of my knowledge, those discussions never materialized 
into any specific activity or tape development. I wish that they had. 
I think it would be very good if more soldiers knew that the long- 
haired people and the short-haired people really ought to be getting 
together, because they are saying a lot of the same things. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Mr. Counsel, on that point, Mr. Davis, is it your 
testimony you never discussed making tapes for the purpose of en- 
couraging disaffection, or I guess it is your terminology. We will stop 
at this point. Did you discuss anything like that with the Vietnamese? 

You say you never discussed tapes of this nature. What about tapes 
in general, putting across your views ? 

Mr. Davis. I did visit the radio station Voice of Vietnam when I 
was in North Vietnam, as I visited numerous agencies and programs 
across that country, as a part of a general mission to try to learn about 
the enemy as it has been defined by the United States Government. 

At the Voice of Vietnam radio station, I indicated to them that I 
thought that much of their broadcasts were essentially irrelevant and 
unreal to American soldiers. I was critical of the message that they 
were trying to get across on that radio station. To the best of my 
knowledge, that was the only conversation about tapes in North 

Mr. AsHBROOK. It would be your testimony that the tapes, or any 
discussions, would be as to their broadcasts, and not as to any possible 
information or tapes that you would supply yourself ? 

Mr. Davis. That is right. 

Mr. Watson. You say you were critical of Hanoi broadcasts as di- 
rected at American soldiers and you thought they were very unreal? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. What do you mean by that, that they were not effective 
in bringing about disenchantment ? 

Mr. Davis. They are essentially as out of touch with young people as 
you are, Mr. Watson. They could not communicate at all. I said, "You 
are very much out of touch with the mentality of the young people in 

Mr. Watson. You were in the hopes that Hanoi's messages would 
be more in line with persuading the disenchantment on the part of the 
American GIs? 

Mr. Davis. No, I never said that, in Vietnam or elsewhere. 

Mr. Watson. Why would you say they were unreal ? 

Mr. Davis. It was just my feelings. They were out of touch with 
what GIs feel. 

Mr. Watson. You felt it should be so designed to be in touch ? 

Mr. Davis. I didn't propose anything. I just made that critical 
statement to them. 


Mr. Watson. Why were you critical to them ? 

Mr. Davis. I made comments all over North Vietnam — my reac- 
tions, that's all. 

Mr. Watson. Why \Yere you critical of their broadcasts — because, in 
your language, they were "unreal" ? 

Mr. Davis. Because it was, pure and simple. 

Mr. Watson. You would c-ertainly be hopeful that they would make 
their broadcasts more in tune with the thinking of the GI ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't think they are capable of that. I think their cul- 
ture and their understanding of American young people is like the 
culture and understanding of many old people who run this country — 
just as out of touch. I sort of write off any possibility of their being able 
to make tapes that would appeal to American soldiers. Besides that, 
I don't think that that is something that I want to address myself to. 

My concern, as an American, is how to demonstrate my support of 
American soldiers and to work with every muscle in me to try to get 
those soldiers home safe to their families. That is my only conQem. 

Mr. Watson. Since you were critical of these broadcasts for being 
unreal and out of touch, Mr. Davis, is it not correct that the Hanoi 
broadcasts aimed at the American soldiers are designed to bring about 
desertions and disenchantment of the American position in Vietnam ? 

Mr. Da\t:s. I don't know whether they take that position. I was 
critical of their playing music that was from the 1950's, like' Guy 

I think they get their programs from the USO. They don't play 
Judy Collins, they don't play the Fugs, Country Joe and the Fish, 
the music that is popular with today's young people. 

Mr. Watson. Are the Hanoi radio broadcasts aimed at American 
soldiers designed to encourage their loyalty to the American Army, or 
to encourage disloyalty ? 

That is a simple question. 

Mr. Davis. I would assume that they want the GIs to do everything 
possible to be disloyal to the policies of the United States military. 

Mr. Watson. Your assessment was they were not so composed as 
to be successful in their venture in doing that ? 

Mr. Daves. No, not that. They were not communicating with GIs, 
whatever their political purpose. That is all I am saying. I don't read 
into it more than that, because there is not any more than that. 

Mr. Watson. You made no suggestions at all as to how they might 
improve their programming ? 

Mr. Davis. I think I did suggest they get a Judy Collins record. I 
believe I did say that. 

Mr. Watson. As to how they might be more effective in bringing 
about their purpose as it relates to the American GI ? 

Mr- Davis. No, I didn't say that. You said that. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you want to provide them with better music, Mr. 

Mr. Davis. The music that comes out of the USO is so terrible ; if 
it comes out of North Vietnam, maybe it is better, and maybe the GI 
would dig that. 

The whole point is not to link me with the very bad propaganda of 
North Vietnam, because that is not, Mr. Watson, what I am about. 

Mr. Watson. I am sure if you were directing it, it would be far more 
successful. We will agree on that. 


Let's turn it around. Your criticism of the Hanoi broadcasts aimed aJt 
tlie American soldier was because the music was out of date ? 

Mr. Davis. I said that ; yes. 

Mr. Watson. That was exclusively your criticism ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. We are just getting into music now. 

Mr. Davis. You got it, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. The purpose of the Hanoi broadcast is strictly to give 
musical entertainment to the American GI, according to your inter- 

Mr. CoNLEY. I ask you if after your return from Hanoi you visited 
witli Dr. Quentin Young and discussed with him your trip to Vietnam. 

Mr. Davis. No ; I borrowed a thousand dollars from him, by phone. 
That was his crime. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am talking about in November of 1967. 1 am not talk- 
ing about the spring of 1968. 

Mr. Davis. I really can't recall the date. 

I know Quentin. I think he is both a marvelous doctor and a 
marvelous person, and he is active in many of the concerns I have in 

It is quite possible I met with him in November, because he is a 
friend, and we worked together on various activities in Chicago from 
time to time. It is possible, but I can't remember the exact date. 

Mr. CoNLEY. As you probably know, if you were here. Dr. Young 
did testify before this committee in October that he lent you $1,000 to 
help pay the rent for the National Mobilization Committee offices, 407 
South Dearborn, beginning April 1968. Was that testimony correct? 

Mr. Davis. Yes, he did loan me a thousand dollars — very generous. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you describe the circumstances of this loan? 
Did you call Dr. Young? Did you tell him of your need, if he would 
help you out ? How did you go about asking for the $1,000 ? 

Mr. Davis. My recollection is I got a frantic call from the staff at 
the Mobilization office in Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Weren't you at that office ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; I was in New York. 

The caller said the landlord expected his rent right away — like land- 
lords are apt to do. Being in New York at the time, and not being able 
to send immediately the money that was required, I tliought of various 
people who might on very short notice be able to advance that money, 
and we would try to raise it later and repay it. I called Quentin, and he 
said that he could do it if it could be repaid in several days. He did 
give the money for the rent. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did this check actually come to you, and I have refer- 
ence to what has been previously introduced as an exhibit here.^ Was 
this check sent to you ? Did you see this particular check ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; I was in New York. That was the whole point. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then I take it you did not see the check. 

Mr. Davis. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was Dr. Young the first individual whom you con- 
tacted for the purpose of this loan ? 

Mr. Davis. Do you mean for this specific loan ? I mean, I borrow 

' See Young Exhibit No. 1, pt. 1, p. 2430, of Oct. 3, 1968, hearings. 


money every day. I got money problems all over the place, just like 
every other American. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will again admonish the audience that you 
are guests of the committee, I am sorry, but since you are guests of 
the committee, we will have to have order, and that covers laughter and 
emotional outbursts or any other kind of disturbance. 

Let's proceed and try to finish up today, if we possibly can. 

Mr. Davis. Good. To the best of my knowledge, Quentin D. Young, 
trustee, was the only person I contacted for this loan. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Dr. Young testified here, first of all, when he was asked 
about this transaction, that his loan to you for $1,000 — reflected by that 
photocopy there — and to use his words, "promptly paid back in cash 
over a 2-day period." That was his testimony. He later said in his testi- 
mony that same day that he thought you paid him by check. 

How did you pay him back, by cash or check ? 

Mr. Davis. I can't recall. You can subpena our books and see whether 
or not a check was written to Quentin Young, or our full ac<x)unt will 
indicate whether it was in cash. But I can't remember whether it was 
cash or check. 

What relevance does it have to my activities in Chicago, or my 
connections with the Communist world and disruption, or whatever 
you are investigating ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Your financial transactions are pertinent. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You say your financial records will reflect that. Who 
keeps your records ? 

Mr. Davis, ^ric Weinberger of the National Mobilization Com- 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is he also the treasurer of that committee ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And the only person authorized to write checks for 
the committee? 

Mr. Davis. No. We had a special Chicago account for the project in 
Chicago. I was authorized to write and sign checks on this account. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This was the Chicago account ? 

Mr. Davis. It was a project of the National Mobilization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did it have a particular name ? 

Mr. Davis. I believe it was called National Mobilization. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This is separate and distinct from the other accounts 
of National Mobilization ? 

Mr. Davis. That is correct. 

Mr. CoNLEY. As I understood your earlier testimony. National 
Mobilization maintains a bank account in New York. 

Mr. Davis. Our organizational account is in New York. We set up 
a checking account in Chicago to write checks for that particular proj- 
ect, and then the records were sent to New York, so that committees 
like yours that wanted to see whether or not we get all our money from 
Cuba, Peking, and Moscow would find out in fact that most of it comes 
in nickels and dimes and small contributions from people all over the 
country ; that generally the funding of a national action of this kind 
comes out of the people who come to the action ; and that the lavish 
accounts you suspect we live on in fact turn out to be pitiful budgets 
of people trying to eke along day to day on peanut butter and jelly 


All of that is on the record, and I would be glad to bring all that 
down here and make that information clear. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What bank did you have your account with in Chicago 
at that time ? 

Mr. Davis. Mj^ recollection is that our account was with the Amal- 
gamated Trust and Savings, or something like that. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You indicated you had authority to di'^w on that ac- 
count. Did anyone else have authority to draw on that account ? 

Mr. Davis. I think during 

Mr. CoxLEY. I am speaking of the Chicago account now. 

Mr. Davis. Up until August 28 I think I was the only signer. 

ISIr. CoNLEY. After August 28 did anyone else take responsibility 
for signing checks on that account ^ 

Mr. DA^^s. Yes ; Donna Gripe, G-r-i-p-e. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you recall ever writing a check for $1,000 to Dr. 
Quentin Youn^? 

Mr. DA^^s. I Know I paid him back. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you have any recollection for ever having written 
a check for $1,000? 

Mr, Davis. I don't recall. 

Mr. CoxLEY. You pointed out $1,000 loans trouble us all and you 
have no recollection or having written a check ? 

Mr. Davis. No. I borrowed about $15,000 for Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you have any recollection of writing any checks 
for $1,000 in the month of April or May, regardless of whether it was 
to Dr. Quentin Young or not? 

Mr. Davis. I ciin't recall whether Quentin was paid in cash or 
check. I suspect — 

If you could throw some light on the subject, why don't you? 

Mr. IcHORD. "\Ve are asking }■ ou to, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. Davis. Well, I just can't remember. That is a long time ago. 
You can remember that. There is nothing hidden here. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did this $1,000 check or loan from Dr. Young cover 
the full cost of rent of this particular building, or this office ? 

Mr. Davis. I think we gave this poor landlord a little bit of money 
to hold it for a while, what they call a deposit, and then I believe the 
$1,000 paid our rent through the end of August. That is my recollec- 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do you recall whether there was not in fact an addi- 
tional $500 that was paid on rent on these particular offices ? 

Mr. Davis. There might have been, but that seems inconsistent with 
the way I generally work. I know that committees like this come 
traipsing around a landlord and ask, "Don't you know about the 
people in that building," and put a lot of pressure on him to throw us 
out, so I generally try to get the bills paid up far in advance, to stop 
that kind of harassment. 

I might have done it the other way, if we were short of the money. 

We get a lot of problems with FBI, police, and committees like this. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Let's not rely on a newspaper or FBI or this committee 
or police. There is a newspai>er account which apj>eared in The Shreve- 
poi-t Jounml of September 13 of this year, which is apparently a story 
prev^ared by the Chwago Tribune and syndicated 

Mr. Davis. That is a good paper. 



Mr. CoNLEY. The last paragraph of this story dealing with this 
rent on this building says : 

The remaining $500 due on the rent was paid by a near Northside financial sup- 
porter of black i>ower and other militant groups. * ♦ * 

Does this help you in any way to recall whether there was in fact 
a total rent of $1,500? 

Mr. Kennedy. Might we see that article? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

(Witness and counsel examine document.) 

Mr. Davis. Mr. ConJey, these questions are so iiTelevant, just like 
this connnittee. I can't understand what you are trying to do. But I 
am sori-y to say I cannot recall whether I got $500 from a support«.r 
of a black power or militant group. 

Mr. CoNLEY, Does the name Lucy Montgomery help you ? 

Mr. Davis. I know her. From time to time she has given money. She 
is a hard-working, upper middle-income woman who is committed to 
peace and freedom — peace and freedom, Mr. Conley. If she gave me 
the money, that is very nice. 

Mr. IcHORD. Did she give you the $500 ? 

Mr. Davis. I can't recall. 

Mr, IcHORD. You state that operations like the Mobilization Com- 
mittee operate — in your terms, as I recall them — "on peanuts." What do 
you mean by "peanuts" ? How much is "peanuts" ? 

The reason why I ask this question, here we have a $1,000 repay- 
ment not remembered, and $1,000 to me is a pretty good sum of money, 
so I would think you might have a higher figure in mind than nor- 
mally would be the connotation when you say "peanuts." 

Mr. Davis. Look at it this way : We had, from January until August, 
a full-time staff on an average of 15 people up until July and 25 peo- 
ple beyond that, and some 200 people for 3 weeks around the action 
itself. We are a coalition of organizations that number about 125 
groups. We distribute mailings in the tens of thousands. We had to 
pay, I think, $250 a month, or something like that, for rent for a large 
office for our staff. We had three phone lines with a terrible phone 
bill. The total of that kind of organization operating for that period 
of time came to roughly $15,000. That sounds like a lot of money to 
me, too, and I think it is a lot of money, but not for the enormous 
operation that was going on. 

As I say, most of that $15,000 was secured in loans going into the 
demonstration and then most of it was repaid by selling buttons to the 
people who would come to Chicago, for $1 each. 

Mr. IcHORD. You stated previously that you had borrowed $15,000 
to finance your operation. Was that the total cost of 3'our operation ? 
Did you borrow the entire sum ? 

Mr. Davis. I am not sure what proportion that breaks down to, but 
probably the largest amount was borrowed; yes. As I say, if I had 
known that you wanted all the specifics on the moneys, we could have 
brought our books or you could have subpenaed, because you would 
have to do that to get them. But we generally have to borrow a lot of 
money and then we try to repay it by selling buttons for 50 cents or a 
dollar when people come together. And getting that $1 out of some- 
one who does not have any income is a hard thing for them to do, 
but they recognize that we don't have big money supporters from 


aroimd the country ; that the money has to come out of the people who 
are commitited to ending the war and committed to trying to raise in 
America consciousness these issues which we feel are so vital to this 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention to another docu- 
ment, and it concerns a meeting held near Chicago March 22 to March 
24, 1 would ask you if you would examine that document, please [Davis 
Exhibit No. 5j. 

You will note that it carries a National Mobilization Committee 
heading and a date of March 7, 1968. Have you seen this document or 
a document similar to it in connection with that meeting ? 
(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Davis. This is signed by Father Daniel Berrigan, Carl David- 
son, Don Duncan, Al Evanoff, Richard Flacks, Vernon Grizzard, 
Steve Hollowell, Clark Kissinger, Sidney Lens, Marya Levenson, 
Linda Morse, Sidney Peck, William Pepper, Monsignor Charles Rice, 
Franz Shurmann, Cora Weiss, Dagmar Wilson, Dr. Quentin Young, 
Leni Zeiger, and Howard Zinn. 

Also the temporary administrative conunittee : Rennie Davis, Dave 
Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Bob Greenblatt, and Sue Munaker.^ 

I could read my whole address book right into the record if you 
want it. I have about 1,500 names. I think we put this letter out. I 
should stress, just for the record, that this meeting, as it says, was 
initiated by the National Mobilization Committee. It was not an official 
meeting of the National Mobilization Committee. 

Mr. CoNLEY. When you say we put this out, you mean National 
Mobilization put this letter out? 

Mr. Davis. No ; this meeting was initiated by the National Mobiliza- 
tion. The people responsible essentially for this meeting were the five 
people I mentioned, the temporary administrative people. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Wlio put the letter out ? 

Mr. Davis. The people who signed it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. They put out this letter ? 

Mr. Davis. They take the responsibility for the text of the letter. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And all of them take the responsibility for the text 
C'f the letter so far as you know ? 

Mr. Davis. I would hope so. Their names are on it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have not had anyone come to you and say, "I do 
not \yant my name to appear on this letter and I want you to repudiate 
that it is on there," 

Mr. Davis. No one has come to me about it, to the best of my 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with this letter there is a dis- 
tinction made between conference sponsoi-s and temporary administra- 
tive committee of which it lists Davis, Dellinger, Hayden, Greoiblatt, 
and Munaker. What is the distmction to be drawn from conference 
sponsors and temporary administrative committee? 

Mr. Davis. It is simple. One group, the conference sponsors, want 
to lend their name to the meeting to demonstrate the kinds of people 
and organizations that we hope to involve in the meeting. The second 
group IS a group that is responsible for putting the meeting together, 

' Spelled "Munacker" in this document. 



finding a phice, getting some money, circulating announcements about 
the meeting, doing the work. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In other words, the temporary administrative commit- 
tee is probably the one that put the letter out and used the names that 
appear above as the sponsors of the meeting. Is that a fair way of put- 
ting it ? The sponsors are people who are willing to lend their names — 

Mr. Davis. That is right. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I presume you contacted these people and they were 
agreeable to it? 

Mr. Davis. I hope so. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Davis, do you think I could prevail upon you to hand me back 
some of my exhibits? 

Mr. Kennedy. Yes, you can have them all back. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

I would like, if I may, to direct your attention to a statement that 
appears in the Guardian of September 7, 1968, issue, page 3. There 
are actually two paragraphs that I wish to call to your attention if I 
may. The first one is a statement by Mr. Dick Gregory, which is as 
follows: "Gregory said it is 'your duty to overthrow this govern- 
ment.' " 

Then there is a statement attributed to Rennie Davis, which is as 
follows : 

Rennie Davis called for the building of an NLF in the U.S., proposed that 
Humphrey and Nixon not be permitted to campaign, and announced plans for 
a national G.I. week this fall to let the troops know "we support your right to 
return to civilian life." 

Do you recall these statements? They were supposed to have been 
made on Thursday moniing, August 29, or thereabouts. 

( Document handed to witness. ) 

Mr. CoNLEY. The question 1 put to you at this time is. Did you in 
fact call for the formation of an NLF in the United States? 

Mr. Davis. Let me, if I may, describe to the best of my recollection 
what I did sa}^. This was Thursday, after the terrible police riot Wed- 
nesday night in front of the Conrad Hilton. Hubert Humphrey was 
the nominee of the Democratic National Convention. I said something 
to the effect that Hubert's notorious promise to export the great society 
to South Vietnam was turning this to its reverse ; Vietnam was coming 

We saw it in the barbed wire, bayonets, the troops that had been 
brought into Chicago to protect the Democratic Convention from its 
own citizens ; that Hubert Humphrey had been nominated in the Inter- 
national Amphitheatre, but outside the Conrad Hilton standing on a 
garbage can, which was our platform, we announced our own political 
campaign for the people who felt that there had been a total break- 
down of tlie democratic process, when Vietnam — which had been the 
central issue of tliis campaign, and perhaps the major issue, as im- 
portant as the issue of slavery for this country — had now^ been buried 
under the slogan, "law and order"; and that we announced at our 
platform, w^iich is appropriately a garbage can, that we intended to do 
all that we could in this campaign to focus on the central issue facing 
the American people in the election in 1968, which is how do we— 
suggested that in fact with Vietnam coming in America, what was 


perhaps needed more desperately before was a liberation movement 
in the United States; and that in this election what we had to do was 
vote and support American soldiers in their right to return to civilian 

I suggested we do it by holding love-ins at military bases around the 
country ; that we do it by leaflets and by word indicating our support 
for American soldiers; that those people who feel they are the real 
patriots in this country will stand up against the f raudulence of this 
country and help to bi"ing home the American boys in 1968. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then do I take it you have not said what is attributed 
to you ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; I think I mentioned I believed we needed a liberation 
movement in the United States. I don't know if I used "national libera- 
tion front" or not, but certainly the meaning that I intended was 
what I just described. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention to something else, 
back in January of this year at a meeting held in New York, the 
Lawyers Guild, were you at that meeting ? 

Mr. Davis. Is that the same meeting you talked to Tom about ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, I was at that meeting. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, apparently in connection with that meeting, you 
made some remarks about the manner of setting uj) law students— I 
believe your words were to the effect that Chicago operations should 
find subsistence for 50 law students, the guild should handle recruiting, 
and Chi(;ago should handle the research in Illinois law. 

Right after you made this statement. Ken Cloke — is that the way 
you pronounce the gentleman's name ? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. — made the statement: "Affirmative suits should be 
referred to Kunstler and Kinoy. Bail problems should be referred to 

Do you recall this statement having been made by Mr. Cloke ? 

Mr. Davis. It does not make any sense so I assume that he did not 
make it, since Ken generally makes sense. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Can you enlighten this committee as to why the state- 
ment was made, that it suggested that bail problems should be referred 
to Detroit? 

Mr. Davis. No, I don't think we made that statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You have never made a statement similar to that, 
where bail was a problem that you should contact Detroit ? 

Mr. Davis. Bail 

Mr. CoNLEY. I understand bail is a problem, but I am asking in 
connection with the city of Detroit. 

Mr. Davis. No ; that statement makes no sense at all to me. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You do not recall that statement, or one of similar 
import having been made ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; I think whoever took the minutes for you messed up. 

Mr. CoNLEY. These are not our minutes. 

Mr. Davis. They must be your minutes because they are wrong from 
beginning to end, everything you read. You brought that up with 
somebody else — Bob Greenblatt — about that meeting — not a very im- 
portant meeting, Mr. Conley, in the whole picture. 


Mr. IcHORD. What was the purpose of the meeting ? 

Mr. Davis. To discuss with lawyers who had assisted the Mobiliza- 
tion in other national actions, particularly on permit negotiations, ways 
we could handle whatever legal problems might be anticipated in 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I believe those are all the questions I 
desire to ask at this time. 

Mr. IcHORD. Thank you, Mr. Conley. 

Mr, Ashbrook, do you have any questions of Mr. Davis ? 

Mr. Ashbrook. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Watson. Inasmuch as we have one of the so-called coffeehouses 
in Columbia, my hometown, and since you acknowledge some recollec- 
tion of having written a letter similar to the first two pages of the so- 
called secret letter sent out to those prospective workers for the coffee- 
houses — do you remember that letter ? 

Mr. Davis. I don't remember it being so secret, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. But you say you sent it out, or are familiar with it? 

Mr. Davis. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. What is the purpose of the coffeehouse ? 

Mr. Davis. The purpose especially is to provide a kind of an oasis 
for soldiers who, in many cases, feel that they are involved, or are 
about to be involved, in a very unjust war, and where they can essen- 
tially come together to talk about whatever is on their mind, where we 
can hopefully bring good entertainment, and kind of provide an anti- 
dote to the virus of the USO, with its old ladies and scaggs and very 
bad music, and essentially let the GI 

Mr. Watson. Have you been in the service yourself ? 

Mr. Davis. No, I haven't been. 

Mr. Watson. So, in making such a categorical statement, which has 
been typical of the testimony, you would not be able to say they have 
not had some fine young ladies in the USO across this Nation of ours. 

Mr. Davis. They have had some young ladies in the USO. They 
have also had them in whore houses and prostitution halls in the Army 
towns. We would like to provide something better. 

Mr. Watson. Didn't you suggest your movement would suggest 
love-ins and 

Mr. Davis. Love is what is very much needed in the United States. 

Mr. Watson. What is a love-in ? You said you are against so-called 
prostitution, but you are going to suggest a national liberation pro- 
gram providing love-ins at military bases. 

Let's hear your explanation of a love-in. 

Mr. Davis. Love is the antidote to the spirit of the bayonet. 

Mr. Watson. Wliat is a love-in ? 

Mr. Da%t[s. That is where people can get together and relax and 
talk about whatever is on their mind and listen to good music and feel 
they are not going to be harassed or threatened by military officers, 
which represent the authority they get in the Army and out of the 

Love-in is a symbol of the youth culture that we are trying to create, 
that we hope some day will replace the sterile plastic culture that we 
think you represent, Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. 

And the purpose of the coffeehouse was not to bring about desertions, 
AWOLs, or any outward refusal on the part of a soldier, especially 


the recruits, since most of these are located in or are adjacent to re- 
cruiting bases or basic training stations — it was not to cause any 
AWOL or desertions or anything like that ? 

Mr. Davis. It is the first time in 2 days, Mr. Watson, that you have 
gotten something absolutely right. 

Mr. Watson. It was to encourage AWOLs ? 

Mr. Davis. You messed up again. I thought you had it, but you 
don't. And that is the problem with this committee 

Mr. Watson. That is the problem in talking to a gentleman like you. 
I thought if we had a meaning of the word 

Mr. Davis. We strained here this morning and the day before, I 
think, to try to attempt to understand each other, and I think it didn't 
work so well. But I think that young people, as you subpena them and 
bring them here, will continue to talk this way, more or less. You will 
not find the kind of format you had earlier. 

Mr. IcHORD. Remember, Mr. Davis, you are not so young any more ; 
you are 28. 

Mr. Watson. Now I ask you the question again. Was it not a purpose 
of the coffeehouse to cause AWOLs, desertions, among military per- 
sonnel, primarily basic trainees ? 

Mr. Davis. Hell no. 

Mr. Watson. You have made it very emphatic. 

Mr. Davis. That is right. 

Mr. Watson. It w as not ? 

Mr. Davis. That is right. 

Mr. Watson. In this two-page letter, which you agreed you had a 
part in its preparation, in the fourth paragraph, I read this sentence : 

Because of the cultural and class basis of our movement with which we are al- 
ready familiar, those soldiers most likely to be turned off the army are also 
those * * * most liliely to welcome a coffee house. 

What do you mean by the terminology "turned off" ? Does that mean 
to support the Army ? 

Mr. Davis. No; it is an expression that is very popular from 
barracks stateside to Vietnam. 

I would like to, at this time, quote that expression that almost every 
GI that I talked to, particularly those going through basic training 
or facing orders for Vietnamj immediately understands, that expres- 
sion is " it." And I thnik that it is that feeling that is sweep- 
ing young people who are in the military and outside the military 
across this Nation. And the reason that there is developing that attitude 
is because Congressmen like you are forcing us to feel more and more 
that the military of this country is something for which we cannot be 

Mr. Watson. Then what is the meaning of the words "turned off" ? 

Mr. Davis. Well, Mr. Watson, have you ever been turned on ? 

Mr. Watson. I have turned on a light and I have turned off a light. 

Mr. Davis. That is the problem. 

Mr. Watson. By the common terminology or interpretation, the 
interpretation of the language, or the understanding of the language, 
would be to cause someone to become disenchanted to the point of 
losing all interest in the Army, even to the point of AWOL or 
desertion, but that is not your meaning ? 


Mr. Davis. I think a lot of young men are losing interest in the Army 
and "turn off" is the opposite of "turn on." 

Mr. IcHORD. Is it synonymous with "cop out" ? 

Mr. Davis. You are getting close to it, Mr. Ichord. Let's see if we 
can understand it. I think, to begin, to feel that you do not have to give 
up your soul, your life, your beliefs because a sergeant yells at you to 
fall in or fall out, to carry a bayonet and learn the spirit, whicn is to 
kill, to understand that your body may be given to Uncle Sam, but not 
necessarily your mind ; that as an American citizen you have certain 
rights, even within the military, to express your point of view to say 
that this war is immoral and unjust, that you feel you have to somehow 
be heard on whether or not you will be forced to commit acts of geno- 
cide against another people, and to generally let it be known through 
your own deeds and through the actions of people in the military that 
there are vast segments of men in the Army today who want peace, 
who want out of Vietnam and want an end to the kmd of policies that 
the United States military policy carries out throughout the world. 

To feel that and express that is not automatically to go AWOL or 
desert. I happen to believe young men should go into the Army and 
organize in the Army to keep thoughts going, to increase this discus- 
sion, to make it possible for more and more young to let the American 
public know that there are bi^ segments of the Army that oppose this 
war, and to generally get the idea across that being against the Army 
is not unpatriotic ; that in this day and age it is one of the most patri- 
otic things you can do for this country and one of the most important 
things you can do for this country. 

Mr. Watson. I am sure we will never get a better interpretation of 
the meaning of the words "turned off," but I want to ask one final 
question with which you and I might agree. 

One thing, of course, you have nothing but contempt for this 
committee. That is fair, isn't it ? 

Mr. Davis. You men are interesting. I have not found this a 
complete drag. 

Mr. Watson. You have nothing but contempt for this committee, 
for the President, Secretary Rusk, and everything else ? 

Mr. Davis. No, not everything else. I don't have contempt for 

Mr. Watson. Love-ins 

Mr. Davis. I don't have contempt for American soldiers. I don't 
have contempt for black people, for poor people, for welfare mothers, 
for university people trying to open up democratic channels. I don't 
have contempt for people trying to earn a living. I don't have contempt 
for humanity and decency. People believe in democratic processes and 
want to bring the democratic values and processes into this society. 
There are many things, Mr. Watson, for which I do not have contempt. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, those things for which you and your 
organization stand for, you have no contempt for. I think we can be 
in accord with this : So far as what happened in Chicago, your part in 
it, you absolutely did nothing wrong, said nothing wrong, the whole 
blame is to be placed at the feet of Mayor Daley and the police 

Mr. DA\^s. The whole blame is to be placed on a society or a govern- 
ment that is increasingly out of touch with the young people in this 
country and with what the real interests of this country are. 

21-706 O — 69 — pt. 2 13 


Chicago is a kind of watershed event, I think. In August of 1963, 
you know — ^Tom mentioned this — some 250,000 people marched for 
jobs and justice in the city. Exactly 5 years later, another demonstra- 
tion that was trying to mount its concern about peace in Vietnam was 
clubbed and brutally suppressed by police in a general military 
environment that had been created by officials of Chicago. 

During those 5 years we dropped more bombs in Vietnam than we 
did in World War II. We spent three times as much in riot control 
as was spent on poverty. We saw scores of cities go up in smoke out of 
rebellion to the conditions in those communities. We saw thousands 
of young people face prison rather than fight in a war they considered 

I think Chicago really has to be seen in the context of a society 
or a government that increasingly resorts to military and police force 
rather than consensus for insuring its policies. 

Well, at the same time more and more American citizens are joining 
in a movement to create some kind of a new basis, just basis, humane 
basis on which this country can operate. 

Mr. IcHORD. If I may interrupt, Mr. Watson, at that point, do you 
feel they have a democratic society in North Vietnam? 

Mr. Davis. I was not in North Vietnam to say very much about 
them. Wliat I would say is that the American people are deluded if 
they believe there is a small group of people at the top that terrorize, 
a whole group of people at top to resist American aggression against 

My general impression was in the countryside and cities — the Viet- 
namese people are united in trying to stop the bombing and the aggres- 
sion of that country and that, in general, they feel that their own 
interests for freedom and independence and freedom is consistent with 
a struggle that has been going on for 25 years in that country and 
consistent with the positions of the recognized leaders of that country. 
But that to me is an irrelevant question, whether or not we have any 
business being there. We have no right deciding the fate and destinies 
of a country 25,000 miles away, and that is why I say American forces 
should be withdrawn from there. 

Mr. Watson. One final question : Earlier to establish the objectivity 
of Mr. Hayden, I asked him, in view of his visits to North Vietnam, as 
to how many visits he had made to South Vietnam. How many visits 
have you made to South Vietnam ? 

Mr, Davis. I have not had the opportunity to be in South Vietnam. 
I would like very much to go. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. I have one final question. I think it ties in what 
you said about North Vietnam. 

I would like to make this a part of the record. Hanoi radio broadcast 
of September 14, 1968, said, and I condense it : 

The South Vietnamese people's committee for solidarity with the American 
people has sent a letter to the national mobilization committee to end the war in 
Vietnam thanking the progressive American people of all strata for their seeth- 
ing, resolute, and courageous struggle conducted last month * * *. 

• **•••• 

we are daily and hourly following with great enthusiasm your persistent and 
valiant struggle. 

Your recent actions in Chicago, as well as throughout the United States, 
against the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam have strongly stimulated our 


people in South Vietnam who are conducting the powerful general offensive and 
widespread uprisings throughout South Vietnam with the resolve to wrest back 
at all costs our sacred right — 

et cetera. 

You were somewhat critical of broadcasts emanating from Vietnam. 
Would a broadcast of this type be the type that you could more identify 
yourself, consistent with what you just said ? 

Mr. Davis. I think it is totally within American interests to work in 
the way I am working for a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. And, 
secondly, the forces for independence in that country are clearly lined 
up against American penetration of that country. I don't consider the 
Vietnamese struggle to be at all inconsistent with the American inter- 
ests in getting our troops home safe to their families. 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 6." The complete text of 
the broadcast follows :) 

Davis Exhibit No. 6 

Participants in Chicago Struggle Thanked 

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0221 GMT 14 Sep 68 B 

[Text] Hanoi — The South Vietnamese people's committee for solidarity with 
the American people has sent a letter to the national mobilization committee 
to end the war in Vietnam thanking the progressive American people of all 
strata for their seething, resolute, and courageous struggle conducted last month 
when the convention of the Democratic Party was meeting to select a candidate 
to the presidency, according to liberation press agency. 

Despite the huge, barbarous repression machinery unleashed by Johnson, Hum- 
phrey, and their ilk, you have come down into the streets for demonstrations and 
shouted slogans demanding an end to the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, 
cessation of the bombing on the whole territory of the DRV, and withdrawal of 
troops of the United States and of its allied countries in the Vietnam war. By 
your activities you have raised the just voice of the United States, a country 
with a traditional love for freedom and justice. 

We express to you our deep sympathy and ask you to convey to the American 
people our heartfelt thanks for their participation in or support of the recent 
action in Chicago. We also voice the high indignation of our people at the news 
that, on orders from Johnson and Humphrey, policemen repelled the demonstra- 
tion by using tear gas and truncheons and firing at them, as a result of which 
hundreds of people were wounded and hundreds of others were arrested or jailed. 

You have shed your blood for the honor of the United States and for the sake 
of your loved ones, whom you do not want to die a useless death for the ravenous 
ambitions of the capitalists and gun dealers. You have shed your blood in defense 
of the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, which is being flouted by 
the American aggressors, and of the peace in Southeast Asia and in the world 
now being trampled underfoot by the U.S. warmongers. 

Terror and repression by the U.S. Government, however, cannot hamper youir 
activities. On the contrary, they will cause the antiwar movement to spread to 
the length and breadth of the United States. 

In this South Vietnam under fire and sword, though having to overcome great 
difliculties and hardships, we are daily and hourly following with great en- 
thusiasm your persistent and valiant struggle. 

Your recent actions in Chicago, as well as throughout the United States, against 
the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam have strongly stimulated our people in 
South Vietnam who are conducting the powerful general offensive and widespread 
uprisings throughout South Vietnam with the resolve to wrest back at all costs 
our sacred right to national independence. 

We wish you to convey our best vrishes to our American friends who were 
wounded or arrested during the recent demonstrations. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Talking about the North Vietnamese interests, I 
gather from this — and you can answer yes or no or not — I gather 
from this the North Vietnamese feel they gained great benefit 
from what transpired in Chicago, the efforts of the National Mobiliza- 


tion Committee, the response to the police, the general Chicago situa- 
tion. Would it be your impression that this Chicago fiasco, whoever is 
at fault, did help the Vietnamese? 

Mr. Davis. I think Chicago as well as other peace demonstrations 
help to convey to Vietnam, but to the people around the world, that 
there is a significant section of the American people who would like to 
see us return to some of the democratic ideals for which our Revolu- 
tion stood. To the extent that we project to the people of Vietnam or to 
the people of Asia or Latin America that there is in fact a movement 
of hope in this country and the country is not run as they see it as 
those who would impose; to give hope to other nations, I think, is 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Getting back to the GIs with whom you supposedly 
identify, the GI about whom you express great concern. Isn't it diffi- 
cult to get across to the GI that he is your friend, when the enemy he 
is fighting in Vietnam is gaining great heart and encouragement from 
your work in Chicago ? How can you identify with a GI or how are 
you going to get through the communication barrier when he hears 
broadcasts from Hanoi as to what great work, in effect, you are doing 
in Chicago ? 

Mr. Davis. I think the way that w^e get through to the GI is, our 
essential work is to rebuild this country, to make this country some- 
thing other than the people's policeman of the world. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Do we do it through a peaceful process ? 

Mr. Davis. It depends on you. This committee, this Congress, and 
this Government generally is so unresponsive to what people are saying 
in this country, particularly the young, that it becomes more and more 
difficult for us to find any channel through which we can operate. 

As I said, that demonstration in August of 1963 was ignored. We 
petitioned the Government, We met with President Kennedy, and 5 
years later the two Kennedys were assassinated. The spiritual leader 
of the civil rights movement. Dr. King, was assassinated, and the 
horrors at both abroad and home had been reaped on people by the 
Johnson administration. 

I think in some ways the best thing would be for you to get off of 
the committee and join us in the streets of this country trying to figure 
out the answer to this problem. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Thank you for your advice. 

Mr. Watson. One final question. You state the Government and the 
American people — the old fuddy-duddys as I and others — are unre- 
sponsive to the young. You made that statement. 

Mr. Davis. There are some young people that are growing up like 

Mr. Watson. Do you speak for all young Americans ? 

Mr. Davis. No ; I speak for myself. 

Mr. Watson. You speak for a small fraction of them. Most young 
Americans are responsible citizens. They want to help bring a better 
America and not help bring about an anarchy, as you and your asso- 
ciates wish. And the record should show you represent only a small 
fraction of America. 

Mr. Davis. Mr. Watson, you had better watch out. 

Mr. IcHORD. What are you going to do ? 

Mr. Davis. If you have children 


Mr. Watson. I have three children. I assure you I will teach them 
responsibility and not irresponsibility. 

Mr. Davis. And you keep that up, Mr. Watson, and right in your 
own house there will be trouble. Young people are not going to be whip- 
lashed into an unjust society. The hope that we have is that the young 
people at least have the advantage of opening their eyes and seeing 
what this country is doing. We do not claim to speak for or represent 
all young people in the United States, but we do say that there are 
many people who more and more understand that it is people like you 
that are destroying America and that the hope of America is in the 
people who will stand up to people like you and make it right. 

Mr. IcHORD. It is the understanding of the Chair that counsel has 
one document which he wishes to introduce. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I would request permission to introduce Davis Exhibit 
No. 5, which is a letter dated March 7. I would call the committee 
chairman's attention specifically to the fact that this is the letter 
repudiated by Dr. Quentin Young as to its authenticity at an earlier 
hearing. Mr. Davis said he prepared this. 

Mr. IcHORD. Without objection from the committee members, the 
document will be incorporated in the record. 

Mr. Davis. Beautiful. 

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 5." See pages 2686 and 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness will be excused and the committee will be 
adjourned until 1 :30 tomorrow afternoon. 

(Whereupon, at 4 :55 p.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968, the subcom- 
mittee recessed, to reconvene at 1 :30 p.m., Wednesday, December 4, 

( Subcommittee members present at time of recess : Representatives 
Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 


Davis Exhibit No. 5 

Room 315 "ovodw- 

U07 Sov-th Dearborn Avenue / *^» ,>. 

Chicago, Illinois 6o6o5 ix 

Phcne: 312 939-2666 
March 7^1968 

Dear Friend: 

Election year 1968 holds fateful signs: widening var and g^^^^^^^^^f^Shter for 
Vietnam: "improved" police techniques for the ghettoesj mure cu.bc.c^:, xn welfare 
and anti-povSrty measures; repression on a wider ==^?-«5^f'i^%>?°^^^""Nixcn 
Presidentiar-choice." Across the country, anti-war and bla-^k lj.borat..on organ- 
izations are soberly assessing the drift of the country rnd making plans for the 
next period. 

We beUeve a national gathering of movement activists is needed to ase-ss this 
period and consider strategies for the election year. V>- envision a working 
nieetlng of representatives from anti-war, studo-t, won-n, con.mnity, and in- 
dependent electoral organizations. Our purpose Is to \i^.ox end c.«v.-:..op plans ^ 
for an election year program, giving special attsnti^on to tl'.s Ecinocrat^c Mat- ^ 
ional Convention. . " 

Ifehave made arrangements for a meeting on March 22-214 in Chicago^_ 

This conference will climax several weeks of diPcu-Ti-n initiated by tbe Nat- 
ional Mobilization Committee to End the War Ln Vietna,:. After two meetings ... , 
among various anti-war, student and black power leaders, ^id after consultation - , 
«lth many other individuals, plans to call a March 22-2a couTn-cnca were mads. .. , 
A teii?)orary administrative committee, v*ose members :^'e listed balow, was 
established to organize the gathering. . \ 

loe two majorwirposss ^"^ *^s "^^*» conference are, firsi, to consider and 

adopt~gs^Erarp?oposils for an election year strat-gy, incD.oding possible ._ 

actions in Chicago at the time of the Democratic National Ccmen-icn^nd, f^ 

secOTd, to set up the administrative machinery which caxi cooperate vrj-th Ovher ^. 

organizations in carrying out the program, ^ 

The meeting will encourage an open discussion of a wide v-jriety of proposals. 
The goal will be to look for a common ground of n-tion whUe recognizing ^.liei-e ^ _ ^ ^ 
will be different levels of interest and approach. A^ccn r-'^^^gf ^^ ^:^"^ \vyyi:& - ■ <. -., q 
tion >^v.c^>^^J>^r^^^ -"^n?"?? ^ paraUel conference on Ila^-ch 22^,'-i^iLCnic|so ^rtt 
^r-^;n^^^;^r?rr^) with the goa3^of ^reati^i^^I^-?ll3l_^ rg3^^i^gn^_str^^^ • .; ,. 
j^n^^^j^^^^^^^j^Q^ggd^icg^llogle;^^ of sf-vvvata and . ^ .. ^. 

strength. . ? .: 

r*We encouraso local and regional maetinns to dis.^uss the different ideas about 
/ the August Democratic Convention, and we pnoou-ace worlcing papars detailing OiX- 
/ ferent concerns. Wa have opened an office at Foijn ZlS, ■■^7 So'itli Doarl^oiTl, 
^^ Chicago, telephone 939-2666. , 

The conference will be held in a quiet winter cf^rp ovc-looLing a large lake 
near Chicago. On Friday evening, March 22, shuttle 3ci-vicr froii. O^.Iarc?' Airport 


Davis Exhibit No. 5— Continued 

.02 it coatalno. intransigent •! oto coanlttt^ ! to r. -'...i 
J. .'• vote is at best an organizing tool; it eecres pii'iu 
■ ;- c ■^'■cioi'''n9 88 t^^.t pr^^ni".* " ■ " 
will be provided hourly from the United Airlines dnJ^)ma.ti^D.coimt^>' Fbr 
those arriving by bus, train or car and those rivingiJiChickgot&Vportation 

you,^ planjtq _attgnd_and_tfte^ppro xijnatrVune you%mr^^t^Chita S6r The"'^ 
•aiclosed card should be r^tOfned immecTiately. "" ~ ' 

We are convinced that a national election year program, though still undefined 
and problematic, could be of tremen^Jov.s -importance in deepening the challenge 
to the corrupt, racist and ijnperialif^c' politics of +tha„eEtaiilished^ order 
We hope you agree and that you^lljo-f,? h in'^iiago." ^"^ ' '^^ °''''^''' 

- .ii ,iug ii'"ssivo ^TDul'U" dierant ejainst GO'S . •'- 
-1j :* 7 of prctoct and demoastration. T-a i':'..^- 

'.tnt p-v/er 1 7 organizing Iccally are".~d r- -"-' 
--»• -VI is ".--..-ect" has boon an isc-i of •,_oir'i". 

Conference Sponsors: 

Father Daniel Berrigan 

Carl Davidson 

Don Duncan 

Al Evanoff 

Richard Flacks 

Vernon Grizzard 

Steve Ho Howe 11 

Clark Kissinger 

Sidney Lens . '. 

iiarya Levenson 

Linda Uorse 

Sidney Peck 

William Pepper 

Monseignor Charles Rice 

Franz Sburmann 

Cora Weiss 

Dagmar Wilson 

Dr. Quentin Young 

Leni Zeiger 

Howard Zinn 

^..~; z rolution t>..?t v.ill diffor from previo-is c"ti': 
■'.z --'■■:.:. -n is aiciod at deepening t!e rc-Sa c . 
• - >-i_ : t, t-.;3-d-.y affair in v;bich t'-:o-.'c-.a;!3 t/ .1 
r.iV-- little effect on the local level. For previe-'.s ; 
"^ -.— 'i. cf thoir en-jrey in advertising the -^vent r d '. 
■5 :ft>a viV -at euy relation to local activities, fas c '. 

Temporary Administrat 

Rennie Davis 

Dav3 Del linger 

Tom Eayden 

Bob Greenblatt 

Sue Ibinacker 

-1 vr.. .rir^snt t:.-y may fail, but c'O tb"t - 
ive CJiiit?e|-^'^" "^ or£3nlr.ed Vaich is dcmin-od -y F . - 
, i-.:?le to loc.-l coastit-.-rjsf.'s. /-.y n . 

■ r* B pi c^-3-n that has stre sed !":cf«l crgpaic'-j 
: c:.. ...--*• coi. -'prty basa-biildirs in tlia fell. 

•-. 4 

V there will bo teaslm \ Vien l—'il c. 

2 r rto -I to 

Iitj'a ^-.z-.Tal, this prograa could Is of i.'reel 





Addonizio (Hugh J.) 2594 

Alexander, Kendra (Claire) (nee Kendra Claire Harris; Mrs. Franklin 

Delano Alexander) 2517 

Aptheker, Bettina 2540 

Aptheker, Herbert 2498, 2499, 2540-2543, 2617 

Ayers, Bill 2614 


Bailey, John 2662 

Baker, Karl 2614 

Bass, Stanley 2662 

Bedner, Marc 2614 

Beinin, Irving (Irv) 2614,2662 

Benson, John 2614 

Berringan, Daniel 2676, 2687 

Bick, Barbara 2614 

Bierce, Ambrose 2618 

Black, Carolyn 2507 

Bleich, Herbert 2539 

Bloom, Abe 2614 

Bras, Juan Mari 2617 

Brick, Allan 2614 

Brody, Lenny 2614 

Brophy, John 2628 

Brown, Constance (Connie) 2605, 2606, 2618 

Brown, Josh 2614 

Byrd, Harry (F., Jr.) 2628 


Campbell, J 2496 

Campbell, Joan 2614 

Carmichael, Stokely 2539,2558,2664 

Castro, Fidel 2623 

Cloke, Kenneth (Ken) 2678 

Collins, Judy 2667, 2671 


Daley, Richard J 2501, 

25U, 2514, 2515, 2529, 2537, 2538, 2558, 2574, 2606, 2630, 2636, 2638, 
2&41, 2&46, 2656, 2661, 2662, 2681. 

Davidson, Carl 2676, 2687 

Davis, Rennard Cordon (Rennie) 2499- 

2503, 2507-2500, 2519, 2520, 2524, 2528, 2535-2539, 2556, 2562, 2584, 
2610, 2612^2614, 2617, 2627-2687 (testimony). 

Dawson, Kipp 2539 

Dellinger, David (Dave) — 2499, 

2502, 2504, 2507, 2533, 2535, 2537, 2551, 2552, 2555. 2584, 2587, 2610, 
2613, 2614, 2617, 2656, 2657, 2659, 2661, 2662, 2676, 2687. 

Deming, Barbara 2614 

di Suvero, Henry M 2495-2497, 

2528, 2550, 2561, 2586, 2589, 2608, 2610, 2615, 2616, 2619, 2626 




Dodd (Thomas J.) 2558 

Dryden, Sybil 2537 

Duncan, Don 2676,2687 

Durham, Earl 2507,2518 


Edgcombe, Gabrielle 2614 

Eisenhower, David 2620 

Eisenhower, Milton 2550 

Englehard 2558 

Estes, Jim 2614 

Evanoff, Al 2676, 2687 


Tales, Corinna 2605 

Feiffer, Jules 2587 

Feinglass, Abe 2539 

Flacks, Richard 2676, 2687 

Friedman, Paul 2539 


GaUup (George H.) 2620 

Garrison (Jim) 2558 

Gerth, Jeff 2537 

Gladstone, Irwin 2614 

Glassman, Carol 2605 

Gold, Richard M 2614 

Gonzalez, Corky 2507 

Grafton, Marvin 2537 

Gray, Jesse (Willard) 2530 

Greenblatt, Robert (Bob) 2503,2504,2507,2537,2544, 

2545, 2551, 2586, 2656, 2665, 2676, 2678, 2687 

Gregory, Dick 2677 

Gripe, Donna 2614, 2674 

Grizzard, Vernon 2503, 2505, 2537, 2657, 2659, 2676, 2687 

Grogan, Pat 2614 

Gross, Alan 2614 

Gross, Terry 2614 

Gurewlta, Helen 2614 


Ha Van Lau 2505, 2541, 2544-2548, 2551, 25M, 2586 

Halstead, Fred 2539 

Hamerquist, Donald (Don) 2509, 2510, 2518 

Harriman Averell 2503, 2506 

Eferris (Louis) 2620 

Hayden, Casey 2609 

Hayden, Thomas Enunett 2495, 2497-2626 (testimony), 2632-2638, 2654, 

2656, 2662, 2663, 2676, 2678, 2682, 2687 

Hayes, Thomas L 2614 

Hellmian, Betty 2614 

Henderson, Edward 2614 

Ho Chi Minh 2547 

HoflEmaJi, Abbie 2495, 2659, 2660 

Hollowell, Steve 2676 2687 

Humphrey, Hubert (H. ) __ 2585, 2611, 2613, 2620, 2622, 2625, 2639, 2650, 2677, 2683 

Iglesias, Jose — , 2587 

INDEX iii 



Jaxjkson (Henry M.) 2558 

Jaworski, Leon 2604, 2605 

Johnson, Arnold 2540, 2614 

Johnson, Jerome 2534 

Johnson, Lyndon (B.) 2511, 

2523, 2526, 2538, 2547-49, 2557-50, 2564-67, 2560, 2571-74, 2578, 
2580, 2502. 2593, 2612, 2613, 2620, 2623, 2625, 2633, 2630,, 2642-45, 
2648, 2650, 2652, 2681, 2683, 2684. 
Jones, Lew 2540, 2614 


Kallen, Marcia 2614 

Kampf, Louis 2614 

Katz, Ken 2614 

Kennedy, John (F.) 2558, 2623, 2644, 2684 

Kennedy, Michael (J.) 2627, 2652, 2660, 2677 

Kennedy, Robert (F.) 2557, 2569, 2570, 2684 

Kifner, John 2621 

KiUan, Michael 2607-2600 

King, Martin Luther 2523, 2601, 2637, 2684 

Kinney, Charles 2588, 2605, 2609 

Kinoy (Arthur) 2678 

Kissinger, Clark 2676, 2687 

Klare, Michael 2537 

Klonsky, Michael 2532, 2533, 2535, 2584, 2585 

Kowollik, Bob 2614 

Kunstler (William M.) 2678 

Kushner, Sam 2657 

Kushner, Sylvia 2657 

Kusic, Marta 2537 


La Mont, Susan 2614 

Landau, Saul 2587 

Lefcourt, Gerald 2495 

Lens, Sidney 2614, 2676, 2687 

Lerch, Marilyn 2614 

Lerner, Max 2566 

Lesnik, Richie 2614 

Levenson, Marya 2676, 2687 

Lombardo, Guy 2671 

Louvallen, WiUy 2614 

Lutz, Sandy 2614 

Lynch, Lincoln 2507, 2656 

Lynch (William J.) 2537,2661 

Lynd, Staughton 2499, 2541-2543, 2609, 2623 

Lyttle, Bradford 2614 


Mabley, Jack 2530 

Maggi, Mike 2614 

Marey, Sam (also known as Sam Ballan) 2540 

Martin, Lionel 2584, 2586, 2587 

McCarthy (Eugene J.) 2512, 2531, 2534, 2557, 2569, 2570, 2574, 2585, 2644, 2650 

McCarthy, Tim 2614 

McGovem (George) 2512 

Meyerwitz, Rick 2537 

MitcheU, Charlene 2518, 2519 

Montgomery, Lucy 2675 

Moore, Dick 2587 

Morse, Linda 2662, 2676, 2687 

Munaker, Sue 2507, 2676, 2687 ' 

' Incorrectly appears as "Sue Munacker" in this referepce. 




Newfield, Jack 2542 

Nixon (Julie) 2620 

Nixon (Patricia) 2620 

Nixon, Richard (M.) 2557,2559 2564,2566, 

2613, 2620, 2625, 2638, 2643, 2644, 2677 
Nguyen Minh Vy • 2505 


O'Brien, Conor Cruise 2584 

O'Brien, James 2662 

Ochs, Richard 2614 

O'Dell, Jack (also known as Hunter Pitts O'Dell) ' 2540 

Oglesby, Carl 2542 


Peck, Sidney (M.) 2661,2662,2676,2687 

Pepper, William 2676, 2687 

Pham Van Dong 2541 

Potter, Paul 2503 


Rees, J. Herbert 2608 

Reeves, Walter 2614 

Ribicoff, Abraham 2514 

Rice, Charles 2676, 2687 

Ring, Harry 2540. 2613,2614 

Ristorucci, Jose 2540 

Robbins, Terry 2614 

Roberts, Steven V 2530 

Robinson, Rod 2614 

Rockefeller (Nelson A.) 2557 

Romney (George) 2549 

Rusk, Dean 2547, 2548, 2620, 2625, 2681 

Russel, Bertrand 2505 

RusseU, Carlos 2507, 2655 


Sack, Emily 2614 

Sandow, Greg 2614 

Sartre (Jean Paul) 2558* 

Scheer, Robert 2502 

Schneir, Walter 2614 

Schultz, Trudi 2614 

Sehwinn, Gerald 2614 

Seigle, Larry 2614 

Shero, Jeffrey 2537, 2551 

Shurmann, Franz 2676, 2687 

Simmons, Judith 2614 

Smith, Bernice 2614 

Sommers, Leland 2614 

Spiegel, Jack 2509,2510,2518,2540,2656 

Stahl, David 2661,2662 

Stanton, Nona 2614 

Symington (Stuart) 2558 

1 Incornectlyi spelled "Satre" in this reference. 




Teitel, Josie 2614 

Teitel, Marty 2614 

Texler, Tibi 2614 

Tillman, John 2614 


Wallace, George (O.) 2566,2613,2629 

Waskow, Arthur 2614 

Webb, Lee 2573, 2614 

Weinberger, Eric 2614, 2633, 2673 

Weinglass, Leonard 2496, 2497, 2506, 2561 

Weiss, Cora 2676, 2687 

Wheeler, William 2497 

Wilkins, Roy 2595, 2596 

Wilson, Dagmar 2676, 2687 

Wilson, John 2614 

Woods 26il 

Xuan Oanh 2505 


Yarow, Ted 2614 

Young, Quentin David 2672-2674, 2676, 2685, 2687 

Young, Ron 2614 


Zinn, Howard 2676, 2687 

Zeigler, Leni 2676, 2687 



Black Panther Party (known variously as Black Panthers, Black Panther 
Political Party, Black Panther Political Party for Self Defense, and 
Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPSD) ) 2539 


Center for Radical Research 2630, 2631, 2642 

Chicago Peace Council 2510,2656,2657 

Communist Party of Cuba 2532 

Central Committee 2532 

Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 2498, 

2509, 2510, 2517-2519, 2539, 2541, 2542, 2614, 2617, 2657 
National Structure : 

Youth Section 2217 

Country Joe and the Fish 2671 


DRV. (See North Vietnam, Government of (Democratic Republic of 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). {See North Vietnam, Govern- 
ment of. ) 


ERAP. {See Students for a Democratic Society, Economic Research and 

Action Project.) 
Economic Research and Action Project. {See entry under Students for a 

Democratic Society.) 
Englewood Action Committee 2652 




FOR. (See Fellowship of Reconciliation.) 

Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 2614 

Free Speech Movement 2623 

Fugs 2671 


International Control Commission 2.541 

International Cultural Congress, January 1968, Havana, Cuba 2554 

International War Crimes Tribunal 2505 


JOIN Community Union 2629 

2631, 2&42, 2647 

Liberation News Service 2537 

Liberation Press Agency 2683 


Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) 2522 

Mississippi Summer 2623 

Mothers (of Invention), The 2667 

Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico 2617, 2618 


NLF. i{8ee National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. ) 

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 2651 

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 2516, 2603 

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) (also known 

as National Liberation Front) 2546, 2547, 2551, 2554, 2663. 2677 

National Lawyers Guild (NLG) 2614 

National Liberation Front. (See National Front for the Liberation of South 

Vietuam. ) 
National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (NMC) 
(formerly known as Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War 

in Vietnam) (also referred to as the Mobilization and Mob) 2499- 

2502, 2504, 2506-2508. 2517. 2518, 2531, 2533, 2535, 2536, 2538-2540, 
2556, 2559, 2586, 2605-2607, 2612, 2616, 2617, 2631. 2633, 2634, 2640, 
2041, 2648, 2656, 2661, 2672, 2673, 2675, 2676, 2679, 2683, 2686 

Steering Committee 2606 

National Student Association (NSA) 2541 

New American Library-Signet 2498 

North Vietnam, Government of (Democratic Republic of Vietnam — DRV) _ 2546, 

Peace and Freedom Party : 

California 2571, 2514, 2577 

People Against Racism '. 2601 

Progressive Labor Movement (PLM) (or Party (PLP) ) 2539, 2617 


RAM. (See Revolutionary Action Movement.) 

Random House 2498, 2500 

R. A. T. Publication, Inc 2537 

Resistance, Tlie 2&i7 

Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) 2512 

INDEX vii 


SDS. {See Students' for a Democratic Society) 

SNCC. {See Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.) Pago 

Socialist Workers Party (SWP) 2539,2540,2613 

Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) 2540, 2614 

South Vietnamese People's Committee for Solidarity 2682 

Student Mobilization To End the War in Vietnam 2647 

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 2542, 2609, 2647 

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 2498, 2532, 2535, 2537, 2538, 2551, 

2585, 2609, 2617, 2629, 2642, 2647 

Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) 2629, 2631, 2642 

National Council 2616 

Summer of Support 2664, 2666 


USO. {See United Service Organization.) 

Underground Press Syndicate 2537 

United Service Organization (USO) 2671,2679 

United States Government 2511, 2670 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2541 

Justice Department 2531 

State Department 2541, 2555 


Vietnam Peace Committee 2544 

Voice of Vietnam 2670 


Workers World Party (WWP) 2540 

World Youth Festivals: 

Eighth Youth Festival, 1962, Helsinki, Finland 2540 


Young Christian Movement 2647 

Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). {See entry under Socialist Workers 
Party. ) 


Discussion on the Democratic Convention Challenge. _ 2508, 2l527, 2584, 2585, 2635 

Esquire (magazine) 3531, 2616 

Gnanma (oflBcial organ of the Communist Party of Cuba) 2532, 2584 


Liberation (magazine) 2555, 2584, 2587 


Mission to Hanoi (book) (Herbert Aptheker) 2498,2617 

Movement Campaign 1968 : An Election Year Offensive 2508, 2561-2583, 

2601, 2635 
Movement, The 2640, 2642, 2653 


National Guardian 2512, 2^7 

New Left Notes 2537, 2551, 2616 

New York Times 2543 

viii INDEX 



Other Side, The (book) (Staughton Lynd and Thomas Hayden) 2499, 

2541,2609, 2623 

RAT (newspaper) 2531, 2537, 2551 

Rebellion in Newark (book) (Thomas Hayden) 2498, 2589, 2592, 2623 


vocations for social change 2551 


Walker Report (Report to the National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence.) 2625 



3 9999 05706 3032