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SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

PARTS 

HAr.V,i^O   COLLEGE  LIBnAiri 

DtPOSirtU  b/  THE 
UNITED  STATES  GOV-p"-c|vt 

AUG    J   1969 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

NINETIETH  CONGEESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


DECEMBER  4  AND  5,  1968 
(INCLUDING  INDEX) 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Committee  on  Internal  Security 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
21-706  WASHINGTON  :   1968 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402  -  Price  55  cents 


COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 

United  States  House  of  Representatives 

(90th  Congress,  2d  Session) 

EDWIN  E.  WILLIS,  Louisiana,  Chairman 

WILLIAM  M.  TUCK,  Virginia  JOHN  M.  ASHBROOK,  Ohio 
RICHARD  H.  ICHORD,  Missouri  DEL  CLAWSON,  California 
JOHN  C.  CULVER,  Iowa  RICHARD  L.  ROUDEBUSH,  Indiana 
ALBERT  W.  WATSON,  South  Carolina 

Francis  J.  McNamara,  Director 

Chester  D.  Smith,  General  Counsel 

Alfred  M.  Nittle,  Counsel 


COMMITTEE  ON  INTERNAL  SECURITY 

United  States  House  of  Repbesentatives 
(91st  Congress,  1st  Session) 
RICHARD  H.  ICHORD,  Missouri,  Chairman 
CLAUDE  PEPPER,  Florida  JOHN  M.  ASHBROOK,  Ohio 

EDWIN  W.  EDWARDS,  Louisiana  RICHARD  L.  ROUDEBUSH,  Indiana 

RICHARDSON  PREYER,  North  CaroUna  ALBERT  W.  WATSON,  South  Carolina 

LOUIS  STOKES,  Ohio  WILLIAM  J.  SCHERLE,  Iowa 

Donald  G.  Sanders,  Chief  Counsel 

Glenn  Davis,  Editorial  Director 

Alfred  M.  Nittle,  Counsel 


CONTENTS 


December  4, 1968 :  Testimony  of —  Page 

David  Dellinger 2690 

December  5, 1968 :  Testimony  of — 

David  Dellinger    (resumed) 2746 

Afternoon  session : 

David  DeUinger    (resumed) 2777 

in 


The  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  is  a  standing 
committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  constituted  as  such  by  the 
rules  of  the  House,  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  I,  section  5,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  authorizes  the  House  to  deter- 
mine the  rules  of  its  proceedings. 

RULES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  90TH  CONGRESS 

House  Resolution  7,  January  10,  1967,  as  amended  April  3,  1968,  by  House 

Resolution  1099 

RESOLUTION 

Resolved,  That  the  Rules  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Eighty-ninth 
Congress,  together  with  all  applicable  provisions  of  the  Legislative  Reorganiza- 
tion Act  of  1946,  as  amended,  be,  and  they  are  hereby,  adopted  as  the  Rules  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Ninetieth  Congress  *  *  * 

******* 

Rule  X 

STANDING   COMMITTEES 

1.  There  shall  be  elected  by  the  House,  at  the  commencement  of  each  Congress, 

*»•*♦*• 
^(s)   Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Members. 

******* 

Rule  XI 

POWERS    AND   DUTIES    OF    COMMITTEES 
i^  *****  * 

19.  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(a)  Un-American  activities. 

(b)  The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  whole  or  by  subcommittee, 
is  authorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (1)  the  extent,  charac- 
ter, and  objects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United  States, 

(2)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  subversive  and  un-American  propa- 
ganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and  attacks 
the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution,  and 

(3)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress  in  any 
necessary  remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  times 
and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting,  has 
recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  hold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance  of 
such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  pai>ers,  and  documents,  and  to 
take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary.  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under  the 
signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any  mem- 
ber designated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person  desig- 
nated by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

•  ••»»*• 

28.  To  assist  the  House  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws  and  in 
developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  it  may  deem  necessary, 
each  standing  committee  of  the  House  shall  exercise  continuous  watchfulness  of 
the  execution  by  the  administrative  agencies  concerned  of  any  laws,  the  subject 
matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  committee ;  and,  for  that  pur- 
pose, shall  study  all  pertinent  reports  and  data  submitted  to  the  House  by  the 
agencies  in  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government. 

******* 

IV 


SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DE3I0CRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Part  3 


WEDNESDAY,  DECEMBER  4,  1968 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

Subcommittee  of  the 
Committee  on  Un-American  Activities, 

Washington^  D.C. 
public  hearings 

The  subcommittee  of  the  Coimnittee  on  Un-American  Activities  met, 
pursuant  to  recess,  at  1 :40  p.m.,  in  Room  311,  Camion  House  Office 
Building,  Washington,  D.C,  Hon.  Richard  H.  Ichord  (chairman  of 
the  subcommittee)  presiding. 

(Subcommittee  members:  Representatives  Richard  H.  Ichord,  of 
Missouri,  chairman ;  Jolm  M.  Ashbrook,  of  Ohio ;  and  Albert  W.  Wat- 
son, of  South  Carolina. ) 

Subcommittee  members  present :  Representatives  Ichord,  Ashbrook, 
and  Watson. 

Staff  members  present :  Francis  J.  McNamara,  director ;  Frank  Con- 
ley,  special  counsel;  Chester  D.  Smith,  general  counsel;  Alfred  M. 
Nittle,  counsel ;  and  Herbert  Romerstein,  investigator. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order,  a  quorum  being 
present. 

At  the  last  meeting  of  the  connnittee  yesterday,  the  committee  was 
recessed  until  1 :30  p.m.  today.  We  had  just  concluded  hearing  the 
witness,  Mr.  Rennie  Davis. 

Mr.  Counsel,  a  quorum  being  present,  will  you  please  call  your  next 
witness  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  would  call  David  Dellinger. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Mr.  Dellinger,  are  you  present? 

Will  you  please  come  forward,  sir  ? 

Will  the  witness  first  please  be  sworn. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  soriy.  I  try  to  tell  the  truth  on  all  occasions,  so 
I  don't  swear. 

jNIr.  Ichord.  Well,  of  course,  it  is  the  practice  of  the  committee  that 
all  witnesses  appearing  before  an  investigative  committee  such  as  this, 
Mr.  Dellinger,  would  be  sworii. 

Will  you  raise  your  right  hand,  sir  ?  Do  you  solemnly 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  sorry.  I  will  assure  you 

Mr.  Ichord.  Do  you  wish  to  affirm,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  will  affirm. 

26S9 


2690  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6S  DEMOCRATIC  XATION-\L  COXATXTIOX 

Mr.  IcHOKD.  Do  you  solemnly  affirm  that  the  testunony  you  are 
about  to  give  before  tliis  committee  "will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth, 
and  nothing  but  the  tnith  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  don't  like  formulas  which  imply  that  sometunes  I 
don't  tell  the  truth. 

'Siv.  IcHC'RD.  It  is  the  understanding  that  the  witness  is  affirming. 
This  is  a  practice  before  the  committee. 

Mr.  DzLLixGER.  Yes.  without  the  ritual,  I  affirm. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  witness  may  be  seated. 

TESTIMONY  OP  DAVID  DELLTNGEE.  ACCOMPANIED  BY  COUNSEL, 
JEEEMIAH  S.  GTJTMAN 

Mr.  GuT3iAX.  First  of  all 

]Mr,  IcHORD.  Just  a  minute,  ^Ir.  Counsel. 

First  of  all,  I  would  ask  that  the  counsel  identify  himself  for  the 
record. 

;Mr.  GrxMAX.  Jeremiali.  J-e-r-e-m-i-a-h  S.  G-u-t-m-a-n,  363  Sev- 
enth Avenue,  Xew  York  City. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Gutman.  if  you  have  something  to  say  to  the  Chair, 
would  you  please  come  forward  I 

ilr.  GuTiiAX.  Surely. 

(Off  the  record.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  the  Chair  has  just  received  a  message  from 
!Mi\  Gutman  relaying  a  request  of  ^Ir.  Eubin  to  be  permitted  into  the 
hearing  room.  The  Chair  will  announce  that  he  has  been  informed 
that  Mr.  Rubin  is  attired  in  a  Santa  Claus  costimie.  It  is  not  the  pur- 
pose of  the  Chair  to  direct  that  Mr.  Eubin  attire  himself  in  a  certain 
manner  or  take  other  actions  in  regard  to  his  body,  but  it  is  a  respon- 
sibility of  the  Chair  to  mauitain  order  in  these  hearings.  The  Chair 
has  exercised  its  prerogative  of  excluding,  and  I  have  so  instructed  the 
police  to  exclude,  ^Ir.  Rubin  from  the  hearing  room  because  it  is  the 
determination  of  the  Chair  that  such  a  dress  could  only  add  to  the 
possibilities  of  disorder.  And  in  view  of  the  antics  of  ^Ir.  Rubin  during 
the  past  hearing,  the  Chair  has  no  alternative  except  to  exclude  him. 

First  of  all,  Mr.  Counsel,  before  you  begin  the  questioning  of  the 
witness,  the  Chair  has  been  advised,  ^Ir.  Dellinger,  that  you  have 
recently  undergone  an  operation.  The  Chair  has  been  advised  by  the 
director  of  the  conmiittee  that  your  doctor  has  informed  him  that  you 
would  be  able  to  testify*.  I  know  tliat  the  operation  is  a  ver\'  recent 
event.  Perhaps  the  witness  will  tire.  I  would  like  to  ask  the  witness.  Do 
you  feel  that  you  are  physically  able  to  testify  at  this  time  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Tliank  you  very  much,  sir.  Yes,  I  am  anxious  to  tell 
the  information  and  talk  about  the  incidents  in  Chicago,  and  I  expect 
to  be — I  feel  a  little  weak,  but  I  expect  to  be  able  to  proceed  without 
problems. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Let  me  say  this  to  the  witness :  that  if  you  do  tire,  will 
you  please  so  advise  the  Chair  and  we  can  declare  a  recess  for  you  to 
rest  somewhat. 

^Ir.  Dellixger.  Thank  you  verv  much,  sir. 

Mr.  IcHOPJ).  Or  if  you  feel  that  you  are  not  able  to  go  on,  why, 
please  advise  the  Chair  of  that.  I  know  the  operation  has  been  very 
recent. 


DISRUPTIOX  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  XATIOXAL  CO>r^*ENTIOX  2691 

;Mr.  Dellen'oee.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  GuTMAX.  ^Ir.  Chairman,  if  I  mav.  I  want  to  revert  to  the- 


Mr.  IcHORD.  ;Mr.  Gutman,  you  know  the  role  of  an  attorney  before 
the  committee.  I  have  repeatedly  advised  counsel  of  the  rules  pre- 
vailing in  this  committe  and,  as  far  as  that  is  concerned,  that  prevail 
in  every  legislative  domain,  and  that  is  that  the  role  of  the  attorney 
is  to  advise  the  client  of  his  constitutional  rights.  I  think  it  is  readily 
■apparent  why  different  rules  prevail  here,  rather  than  in  a  court  pro- 
ceeding, because  the  functions  of  the  bodies  are  completely  different. 
Xo  one  is  on  trial  here  and  no  one  is  sought  to  be  punished. 

I  also  appreciate  the  zeal  of  an  attorney,  as  an  attorney  myself,  in 
representing  the  interests  of  his  clients,  but  the  Chair  has  no  other 
ulternative  except  to  enforce  the  rules  and  carry  out  the  responsibility 
of  the  Chair  in  the  way  that  he  interprets.  Perhaps  we  can  work  this 
out.  I  am  not  asking  the  attorney  to  testify,  but  I  would  insist  on  the 
rules. 

(Off  the  record.) 

Mr.  IcHOED.  Mr.  Gutman,  the  attorney  for  Mr.  Dellinger,  has  just 
approached  the  Chair  and  asked  that  the  record  show  an  objection  on 
behalf  of  Mr.  Rubin  of  the  exclusion  of  ^Lc.  Eubin  from  the  hearing 
room  and,  also,  that  the  record  show  a  renewal  of  the  motions  and  the 
objections  which  were  previously  filed  on  l^ehalf  of  Mr,  Dellinger 
with  regard  to  Ms  appearance  here.  The  record  will  so  show  both 
requests.  And,  Mr.  Gutman,  before  ruling  on  the  request,  I  have  al- 
ready ruled  on  the  request  of  Mr.  Rubin  in  my  annoimcement  of  the 
exclusion,  but  before  ruling  on  the  motions  again,  the  renewal  of  the 
motions,  Sir.  Dellinger  has  not  been  indicted  ? 

Mr.  GuTiiAX.  Xo,  sir,  but  we  understand  from  an  announcement 
made  by  the  Federal  grand  jury  in  Chicago  that  within  2  weeks  in- 
dictments are  expected  of  a  gi'oup  of  people  who  have  been  described 
as  '"the  leaders  of  the  demonstration."" 

Since  Mr.  Dellinger  regards  himself  and  the  country  regards  him 
as  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  demonstration  on  behalf  of  Mobilization  in 
Chicago  during  the  affected  time,  we  believe  it  reasonable  to  assume 
that  there  is  a  substantial  likelihood  that  he  may  be  indicted. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Then  let  the  record  show  the  Chair  overrules  the  re- 
quest for  the  reasons  stated  in  the  rulings  on  the  motions  when  they 
were  originally  filed. 

Proceed,  ^Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger.  would  you  please  state  your  full  name 
and  address  for  the  i-ecord  i 

Mr.  Dellixger.  My  name  is  David  DeUinger.  ^ly  office  address  is 
5  Beekman  Street,  Manhattan,  Xew  York  City. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  Sir,  do  you  have  a  home  address  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  have  a  home,  but  since  I  have  received  a  number 
of  death  threats  and  attacks,  including  receiving  grenades  and  bombs 
in  the  mail,  which  only  by  what  the  Army  demolition  experts  called 
a  miracle  did  not  kill  my  entire  family,  I  prefer  not  to  give  my  home 
address  publicly. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  'Very  well,  Mr.  Dellinger. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  For  their  safety  and  security. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Yes,  sir,  I  appreciate  that. 

Is  it  fair  to  sav  that  vour  home  address  is  also  Xew  York  City  ? 


2692  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 
Mr.  Dellinger.  At  the  present- 


Mr.  CoNLET.  Without  going  into  the  street  address? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  At  the  present  time,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  All  right,  sir,  thank  you. 

And  now  for  the  record,  you  are  represented  by  counsel,  are  you 
not? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  Mr.  Gutman. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  Mr.  Dellinger,  are  you  appearing  here  today  in 
response  to  a  subpena  served  on  you  by  United  States  [Deputy] 
Marshal  John  Brophy  on  September  23,  1968,  at  68  Charles  Street, 
New  York  City,  which  was  mad©  a  continuing  subpena  from  October 
until  this  time  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  don't  remember  the  name  of  the  gentleman 
who  either  signed  it  or  gave  it  to  me,  whichever  it  was,  but  I  did 
receive  a  subpena  and  I  considered  not  coming  because  I  think  that 
one  does  not  have  to  obey  illegal  and  immoral  orders.  However,  since 
I  am  anxious  to  tell  everything  that  I  know  involving  myself,  the 
plans,  the  actions,  and  so  forth,  at  Chicago,  and  since  I  consider  the 
conmiittee  largely  ineffective,  I  am  perfectly  happy  to  be  here  and  to 
discuss  with  you  everything  that  I  can  about  myself.  So  it  is  without 
necessarily  recognizing  the  validity  of  the  subpena,  the  procedures 
under  which  it  was  issued,  I  come  in  response  and  of  my  own  volition. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  At  that  point,  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  think  you  have  ade- 
quately expressed  your  contempt  for  the  committee,  and  we  will  let 
the  record  show  that,  and  in  order  to  expedite  things 

Mr.  Dellinger.  T  don't  know  what  your  word  "contempf- 


Mr.  IcHORD.  — if  you  want  to  express  contempt  against  anybody 
else,  go  ahead. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  know  where  the  word  "contempt"  is:  I 
certainly  did  not  use  it.  I  consider  it  undemocratic  for  a  man  to  rep- 
resent a  congressional  district  in  which  60  percent  of  the  residents  are 
black,  and  by  the  last  figures  I  saw  only  6  percent  of  the  black  people 
vote.  That  is  the  type  of  thing  that  I  mean. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course,  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  don't  want  to  argue  with 
you,  but  you  said  the  immoral  acts,  referring  to  the  subpena,  and  that 
was  an  act  of  this  committee,  but  if  the  record  will  show  that,  perhaps 
we  can  get  down  to  the  meat  of  the  matter  and  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger,  in  order  to  get  some  identification,  where  were  you 
born,  sir,  and  when  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  was  born  in  Wakefield,  Massachusetts,  on  Au- 
gust 22,  1915. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  would  you  be  kind  enough  to  give  us  your  edu- 
cational background,  formal  education? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  roughly,  I  graduated  from  high  school;  I 
graduated  from  Yale  University  in  1936:  I  studied  for  a  year  at 
New  College,  Oxford,  on  a  Henry  Fellowship. 

I  returned  to  Yale  where,  while  working  for  the  University  Chris- 
tian Association,  known  as  Dwight  Hall,  I  took  some  courses  at  Yale 
Divinity  School. 

I  then  went  to  Union  Theological  Seminary  in  New  York  City 
for  a  year  and  had  begun  my  second  year  when  I  declined  my  exemp- 
tion from  the  draft  and  publicly  refused  to  register  and,  therefore. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2693 

left  the  seminary  to  go  to  prison — where  I  got  the  best  and  most 
thorough  education  of  all,  although  I  think  that  the  combination  was — 
I  am  glad  I  had  all  the  elements. 

Mr.  CoNLBY.  When  you  mentioned  prison,  was  this  during  the 
Second  World  War,  sir? 

!Mr.  Dellinger.  It  was  before  the  Second  World  War.  It  was  in 
1940,  when  the  first  peacetime  draft  law  was  passed,  and  since  I  am  a 
pacifist,  but  since  I  did  not  want  to  hide  behind  a  clerical  exemption, 

1  publicly  refused  to  register. 

Mr.  C0NI.ET.  Mr.  Bellinger,  what  have  been  your  major  employ- 
ments since  1953? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  '53 — beginning  before  1953,  I  worked  and  lived  at 
what  is  sometimes  called  an  intentional  community,  somewhat  in  the 
Utopian  community  tradition,  where  we  had  an 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Well,  Mr.  Bellinger,  can  we  get  the  date  so  we  can 
fix  this?  You  say  before  '53? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  will  have  to  warn  you  that  particularly  on  things 
that  I  don't  have  documents  my  memory  may  be  faulty. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  Chair  would  advise  the  witness  we  don't  expect 
you  to  recall  all  these  dates. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  but  approximately  1946. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  All  right,  sir. 

]VIr.  Bellinger.  I  would  say  I  helped  organize  and  was  a  part  of 
a  producer's  cooperative  called  the  Libertarian  Press,  which  both 
wrote  and  edited  and  printed  art  work,  political  material,  cultural 
and  intellectual.  We  did  not  write  everything  that  we  printed;  we 
were  commercial  printers,  but  we  also  participated  in  editing  and 
writing. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  this  business  based  out  of  New  York  City,  sir? 

Mr,  Bellinger.  Not  entirely,  by  any  means.  We  did  a  certain  amount 
of  local — no,  it  was  located  in  New  Jersey,  in  Glen  Gardner,  New 
Jersey.  And  we  did  printing  for  people  all  over  the  country,  in  many 
cases  books  and  other  publications,  pamphlets. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  And  what  particular  title  did  you  hold 
with  this  venture  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  in  most  circumstances,  if  I  remember  cor- 
rectly, we  listed  myself  and  others  as  partners. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  have  you  worked  for 

Mr.  Bellinger.  There  may  have  been  occasions  when  I  could  have 
been  listed  as  director  or  something  of  that  kind,  but  basically  we 
operated  on  an  equal  basis. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Now  coming  forward  from  that  venture,  what  was  the  next  employ- 
ment or  business  that  you  engaged  in? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  in  the  winter  of  1956  I  was  one  of  four  or 
five  people,  including  A.  J.  Muste,  Bayard  Rustin,  and  Roy  Finch, 
and  I  think  for  a  short  jjeriod  Charles  Walker,  who  founded  a  maga- 
zine called  Liberation,  and  in  the  early  years  we  printed  the  magazine 
and  did  a  great  deal  of  the  editing  at  the  producer's  cooperative. 

Later  I  began  to  work  for  pay,  you  might  say,  as  an  editor,  first  for 

2  days  a  week,  and  then  perhaps  about  2  or  3  years  ago  I  became  a 
full-time  editor. 


2694  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  now  the  Liberation  magazine  to  which  you 
are  making  reference  now  is  still  in  existence,  still  publishes? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  it  is  in  its  12th  year,  I  believe. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir,  and  has  this  been  the  source  of  your 
employment  since  approximately  1956? 

Mr.  Delltnger.  No. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  publishing  of  this  magazine? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  It — I  didn't  draw  any  mcome  from  it  until  a 
period  approximately — this  is  why  I  am  just  not  very  good,  but  I 
would  say  about  3  years  ago. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  my  question  wasn't,  Was  this  your  source  of 
income. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  beg  your  pardon. 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  I  wasn't  asking  about  any  income.  I  was  asking  you,. 
Is  this  basically  the  employment  that  you  have  held  since  1956  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  really — my  employment  was  directly  with 
the  Libertarian  Press. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And  I  was  a  voluntary  editor  for  Liberation  until 
this  more  recent  period. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now,  Mr.  Dellinger 

Mr.  Ichord.  Now  just  a  minute,  Mr.  Counsel,  the  witness  wishes  to> 
confer  with  his  counsel.  Give  him  a  chance  to  do  so. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  If  I  may  answer  my  counsel's  question,  I  am  not 
employed  by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee.  I  am  an  officer. 
I  am  a  chairman  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  don't  believe  I  asked  you  that. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  know  if  it  is  all  right  for  me  to  answer  my 
counsel,  but  just  to  be  completely  clear  on  where  my  employment  is. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Feel  completely  free  to  confer  with  your  counsel. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  now  directing  your  attention  to  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee  and  particularly  to  the  events  pre- 
ceding and  occurring  in  Chicago,  you  were  in  Chicago,  were  you  not, 
during  the  period  of  the  Democratic  Party  Convention  of  August  26 
to  29? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  was  there  prior  to  that,  also. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  Now  were  you  not  there  in  your  capacity 
as  chairman  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War 
in  Vietnam,  which  was  one  of  the  prime  organizers  of  the  demon- 
strations which  took  place  in  Chicago? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  You  say  in  my  capacity  as  chairman  ?  Is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  CoNi>F.Y.  AVore  you  not  there  in  your  capacity  as  chairman  of 
the  National  Mobilization  Committee? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  in  part,  but  you  see,  my  approach  to  jour- 
nalism from  way  back  when  we  started  Libertarian  Press  has  been 
what  is  sometimes  called  an  engaged  jdurnalism.  That  is,  to  write  on 
many  occasions  about  a  movement  or  events  in  which  the  editors  and 
the  other  writers,  but  including  myself,  are  actively  involved.  So  when 
I  am  active  in  the  Mobilization,  I  am  also  active  as  an  editor  of 
Liberation,  which  is  the  place  where  I  draw  my  income. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well  then,  sir,  would  it  be  a  fairer  statement  for  me  to 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2695 

then  say  that  you  were  in  Chicago  as  chairman  of  National  Mobiliza- 
tion as  an  editor  of  Liberatio7i  magazine? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  it  would. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen,  I  think  at  that  point  that  some  of  the  peo- 
ple in  the  back  of  the  room  are  having  difficulty  hearing  you. 

Mr.  Bellinger,  would  you  pull  the  mike  a  little  closer? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Sorry. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  almost  have  to  lean  into  it,  sir. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Sorry.  Well,  leaning  forward  is  what  I  am  not 
good  at  right  now. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  Mr.  Bellinger,  how  long  have  you  been  chair- 
man of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee,  which  I  also  understand 
is  referred  to  as  Mob  and  possibly  as  Mo  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  didn't  hear  the  two  distinctions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  JNIob,  M-o-b. 

IVIr.  Bellinger.  Well 

Mr.  Conley.  I  have  heard  it  abbreviated  that  way. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Some  of  the  commercial  press,  I  think,  has  called 
it  that.  Sometimes  it  is  called,  for  short,  Mobe,  but  I  would  think  that 
would  be  spelled  with  an  "e." 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  How  long  have  you  been  chairman  of  Na- 
tional Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  if  I  remember  correctly,  I  was  a  cochairman, 
no,  not  from  its  founding  because  I  was  not  present  when  it  was 
founded.  I  was — for  a  healthy  man,  I  have  to  say  I  was  ill  at  the  first 
conference,  at  which  I  think  it  was  founded,  and  then  I  was  out  of  the 
country  during  the  first  couple  of  months  of  its  existence.  But  I  would 
say  that  either  in  Becember  of  '66  or  early  in  the  year  of  1967  I  be- 
came a  cochairman.  Later,  and  this  I  would  only  be  able  to  approxi- 
mate, but  perhaps  July — in  July  of  '67,  sometune  1  to  3 — I  will  try 
to  be  cautious — 1  to  4  months  prior  to  the  Pentagon  demonstration, 
I  was  elected  chairman. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Chairman  by — you  are  sole  chairman  of  the  institu- 
tion? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  we  had  a — I  was  made  chairman,  and  there 
were  cochairmen.  Our  founding  chairman,  the  Reverend  A.  J.  Muste, 
had  died  in  February  of  1968. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Is  chairman  an  elective  position,  Mr.  Bellinger? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  I  was  elected  at  a  meeting  of  the  administra- 
tive committee.  We  are  not  a  membership  organization,  but  we  have 
an  administrative  committee  which  is  roughly  representative  of  the 
various  constituencies.  And,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  all  officers 
and  important  staff  posts  have  been  elected  or  approved  at  a  meeting 
of  the  administrative  committee. 

IVIr.  Conley.  And  I  take  it  from  your  earlier  answers  just  now  that 
you  apparently  were  designated  as  chairman  of  the  committee  in  the 
summer  of  1967  by  the  administrative  committee  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  Bo  you  recall  who  composed  that  committee,  how  large 
it  was  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Oh,  the  administrative  committee  consists  of  over 
a  hundred  people,  and  the  meetings  vary  greatly,  but  I  would  say  we 
rarely  hold  a  meeting  that  is  !under  50  or  60,  and  often  the  meetings — 


■^696  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

we  are  very  informal,  and  often  the  meetings  grow  to  a  hundred  or — 
well,  150  when  something  important  is  hapj)ening.  And  as  I  say,  we 
are  very  informal  in  the  sense  that  people  can  come  to  meetings  as 
observers  or  something  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  how  is  your  administrative  committee 
•selected?  I  use  that  word  because  I  am  not  sure  whether  you  nomi- 
nate, elect,  what  you  do.  How  do  you  select  your  administrative  com- 
mittee from  which  you  make  these  various  appointments? 

;Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  Well,  the  original  administrative  committee 
was  elected  at  a  conference  which  was  considered  to  be  roughly  repre- 
sentative of  the  antiwar  movement,  many  different  types  of  attitudes. 

^Ir.  CoxLEY.  I  see. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And  if  I  remember  correctly,  certain  positions  on 
the  administrative  committee  were  filled  at  that  time,  and  the  com- 
mittee or  the  officers  were  given  the  power  to  expand  it  in  order  to 
bring  in  other  constituencies  who  might  not  have  been  present. 

Xow  it  has  been  revised  on  a  number  of  occasions  since  then  to  try 
to  incorporate  either  new  regional  groups  that  have  developed  or  new 
organizations  that  have  sprung  (up,  or  to  reflect  the  fact  that  perhaps 
some  organizations  have  become  less  active  or  possibly  even  ceased  to 
exist. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  see.  Now,  prior  to  your  election  as  chairman,  I  think 
you  have  mentioned  this,  but  did  you  not  occupy  a  position  with  Na- 
tinal  Mobillization  as  either  Adce  chairman  or  cochairman? 

I  think  you  alluded  to  the  fact  that  you  were  cochairman. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  said  cochairman.  but  I  do  believe  that  at  the  very 
beginning  what  are  now  called  the  cochairmen  were  called  vice  chair- 
men. I  think  probably  that  was  my  original  title.  One  of,  you  know, 
a  group  of  six  or  eight  probably. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  now,  Mr.  Dellinger,  is  it  a  fair  statement 
to  say  that  what  is  now  known  as  National  Mobilization  Committee 
came  out  of  what  was  earlier  known  as  the  Spring  Mobilization 
Committee? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  when  I  spoke  about  the 
earlier  conferences  and  the  setting  up,  the  name  was  not  strictly 
-National  Mobilization  Committee. 

In  preparing  for  major  action  in  New  York  and  San  Francisco  on 
April  15,  1967,  it  was  called  the  Spring  Mobilization  Committee.  It  is 
even  possible  that  in  preparing  for  actions  in  the  previous  December, 
the  period  when  I  was  out  of  the  country,  it  may  have  even  had  a — 
I'm  sure  it  did  have  another  name,  other  than  Spring  Mobilization, 
because  it  was  fall  actions,  but  I  can't  remember,  don't  know  what  the 
name  was.  But  clearly  there  was  an  organic,  but,  as  I  say,  somewhat 
informal  process  which  began  approximately — began  in  the  summer 
of  '66  and  expanded  through  these  actions,  and  the  name  changed 
at  various  stages,  but  it  was  basically  the  same  group,  growing  and 
developing. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  carrying  it  back  one  step  further,  perhaps,  sir, 
was  it  not  in  fact  known  in  '66  as  the  November  8  Mobilization 
Committee  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  even  when  you  refresh  my  memory,  I  literally 
do  not  know.  I  was  out  of  the  country  and  I  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2697 

Mr.  Dellinger,  do  you  have  any  recollection  as  to  how  long  you  served 
as  vice  chairman  of  what  was  known  as  the  Spring  Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  if  you  put  the  two  dates  which  I  guessed  at 
earlier  together,  that  would  tell.  Roughly  from  either  December  of  '66 
or  January  or  February  of  '67,  between  then  and  whenever  it  was  in  the 
late  sprmg  or  summer  of  '67. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  A  period  of  months,  anyway. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Thank  you. 

Now,  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may  hand  you  a  piece  of  literature — and  I 
must  apologize  to  you  for  the  reproduction  of  the  copy — but  if  you 
would  examine  that  for  me  a  moment,  this  purports  to  be  a  piece  of 
literature  prepared  by  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  and,  from 
a  reading  of  same,  appears  to  have  been  distributed  shortly  before  the 
Chicago  convention. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  dates — is  it  blocked  out?  I  don't  know  what 
these  black 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  think  maybe  at  the  conclusion  of  the  letter,  or  in  the 
body  of  the  letter  itself,  it  indicates  that  it  is  a  letter  that  Avas  signed 
by  you  and  Mr.  Greenblatt.  And  what  I  want  to,  if  I  may,  particularly 
direct  your  attention  to  is  to  the  right  margin  of  the  letter,  where  the 
officers  and  directors  perhaps  appear,  in  connection  with  the  National 
Mobilization  Committee. 

I  want  to  ask  you.  if  I  may,  sir,  whether  those  people  shown  there 
were  in  fact  the  officers  at  the  time  of  that  letter. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  there  are  some 
inaccuracies,  and  I  would  have  to — first,  I  haven't  had  time  to  read  the 
letter  now;  I  will,  if  you  wish,  and  there  is  no  date.  But  sometimes 
when  we  made  minor  changes  in  the  officers,  literature  would  go  out  on 
the  letterhead  and  not  reflect,  for  example,  the  addition  of  a  new 
cochairman  or  the  inactivity,  perhaps,  of  somebody.  I  would  have  to — 
I  can  read  this  and  see  the  approximate  date,  if  there  is  a  point  to  it. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Well,  this  is  what  I  am  getting  to.  If  you  will 
also  look  at  the  letterhead,  you  will  note  that  it  gives  a  street  address 
for  the  National  Mobilization  Committee. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  857  Broadway,  New  York  City.  There  is  also  an 
identical  letter,  and  I  think  you  can  compare  the  two  letters. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  One  is  perhaps  a  somewhat  better  copy,  and  if  you 
would  examine  the  signatures  on  the  second  page.  Do  they  both  appear 
to  be  your  signatures  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  can't  tell  whether  they  are  my  signature. 
First  of  all,  it  is  obviously  scratched,  and  not  very  successfully,  onto  a 
stencil  and,  secondly,  I  do  often  authorize  my  secretary  or  somebody 
else  by  mail,  if  they  read  me  something,  to  sign  it.  It  is  not  my  typical 
writing,  but  I  don't  know  whether  it  is  because  I  was  scratching  on  a 
stencil,  or  not.  If  I  am  in  fact,  however,  if  I  did  authorize  the  letter, 
I  certainly  wouldn't  use  this  as  a  pretext  for  not  taking  the  respon- 
sibility for  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  only  thing  I  am 


2698  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  still  haven't  had  time  to  read  it,  so  I  won't  say. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  understand,  sir.  The  only  thing  that  I  am  raising 
inquiry  about,  the  letters  do — I  hope  you  will  accept  my  word  for  it — 
the  two  letters  do  read  identically,  the  content  of  the  two  letters  is 
identical  and  the  only  exception  that  is  noted  is  that  one  carries  an 
address  5  Beekman  Place,  and  one  carries  an  address  857  Broadway. 

Would  you  be  kind  enough,  if  you  did  in  fact  maintain  offices  at 
857  Broadway,  to  indicate  when  the  change  occurred? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  we  have  sometimes,  we  often  have  had  more 
than  one  office.  Now  again,  I  don't  know  if  we  are  losing  time  by  this, 
but  because  there  is  no  date  apparently  on  either  letter,  I  am  a  little 
confused  about  whether  at  this  time  we  did  have  two  offices  or  not. 
Obviously,  I  mean  it  is  entirely  possible,  as  I  said.  Sometimes  letter- 
heads were  used  which  were  not  completely  up  to  date,  and  it  is  not 
;at  all  impossible  that  somebody  would  have  made  a  mistake  and  put 
out,  you  know,  used  the  second  address,  at  a  time  that  we  weren't 
using  it,  but  I  am  just  trying — I  apologize  for  being  bad  at  this. 

For  all  the  times  I  have  been  there,  there  are  two  offices  very  close 
together,  one  is  of  the  Fifth  Avenue  Parade  Committee,  of  which 
I  am  coordinator,  and  one  was  of  the  Mobilization  Committee.  They 
are  about  half  a  block  apart,  and  I  think  this  was — this  had  to  be 
the  Mobilization  office. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  So  it  is  quite  likely  that  we  had  moved  out  of  this 
office  at  that  time  and  tliat  that  was,  you  know,  an  administrative  error, 
to  use  that  niunber,  but  hopefully  replies  were  forwarded. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  let  me  ask  you 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  certainly  wasn't  an  attempt  to  conceal  our  where- 
abouts or  locality. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No,  I  imderstand.  Now  with  reference  to  the  letter 
that  carries  No.  5  Beekman  as  the  address  on  it,  that  is  the  last  address 
of  National  Mobilization  in  New  York  City ;  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  the  current  address. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  what  I  mean.  The  last  and  present  address 
of  National  Mobilization. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  and  perhaps  if  I  could  just  clarify.  I  am  not 
sure  it  is  of  any  importance,  but,  you  see,  I  was  chairman  and  my 
office  is  in  5  Beekman  Street.  Also,  we  often  held  meetings  there,  and 
it  has  kind  of  been  a  peace  center,  or  center  for  peace  organizations, 
so  it  would  not  be  amiss  for  us  to  use  that  address  even  at  a  time 
when  we  might  not  have  had  our  office  equipment  or  personnel  en- 
tirely concentrated  on  the  Mobilization,  but  in  that  address. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now  is  the  No.  5  Beekman  Place  also • 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Street. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Street.  I  am  sorry — also  the  address  of  Liberation 
magazine? 

ISIr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  it  is. 

Mr.  Conley.  And  do  National  Mobilization  and  Liberation  actually 
occupy  the  same  office  space  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  We  have  an  arrangement,  or  have  had  until 
recently — I  think  it  is  coming  to  an  end — whereby  the  entire  10th 
floor,  with  the  exception,  I  believe,  of  one  office,  is  leased.  I  mean  there 
is  one  lease,  and  then  it  is  sublet  to  a  number  of  organizations.  The  War 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2699 

Resisters  League,  Liberation,  and  the  National  Mobilization  are 
amongst  the  people  who  have  offices,  so  that  actually  Liberation^  the 
specific  rooms  used  by  Liberation  and  used  by  the  National  Mobiliza- 
tion Committee  are  contiguous,  but  they  are  separate. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  under  separate  leases? 

Mr.  Dellengee.  Although  we  share — no,  I  am  saying  it  is  one 
lease  and  subleases. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  is  what  I  mean,  which  would  be  separate  leases, 
would  they  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Not  vis-a-vis  the  building  owner,  because  Libera- 
tion, if  I  could  tell  better  from  the  office  manager,  but  LAberation 
collects  the  rent  from  Mobilization. 

In  other  words,  Liberation  is  responsible  for  at  least  half  the  floor 
and  collects  the  rent  for  the  people  that  are  there. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  let's  get  at  it  this  way :  Does  Liberation  actually 
have  the  general  lease  with  the  building  or  the  10th  floor,  except  one 
office? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  the  lease  is  actually 
held  by  the  War  Eesisters  League,  not  by  Liberation,  but  I  could 
be  wrong.  It  is  one  of  the  two,  but  I  think  the  Vv'ay  it  is,  that  the  lease 
was  signed  by  the  War  Resisters  League;  Liberation  has  taken  the 
responsibility  for  half  of  the  floor,  collects  the  rent  and  makes  the 
arrangements  there,  turns  it  over  to  the  War  Resisters  League,  who 
then  turns  it  over  to  the  landlord.  I  think  that  is  it,  but  I  am  not  the 
business  manager  and  I  am  not  positive. 

Mr.  Conley.  Okay.  Now  I  am  sure  there  is  a  written  lease  between 
either  the  War  Resistance  League  and/or  LJberation  magazine  and  the 
owner  of  the  building. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes;  as  a  matter  of  fact  I  remember  that  I  think 
I  myself  did  sign  some  kind  of  a  lease,  so  Liberation  must  be  on  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  do  you  know  whether  there  are  actually 
in  existence  leases — subleases,  I  think  we  should  call  them — between 
either  War  Resistance  League  and/or  Liberation  and  these  other 
tenants  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  sorry,  you  know,  I  have  done  my  best  to  try 
to  tell  you  what  I  know,  but  there  is  a  real  danger  that  I  will  mislead 
you  because  I  am  just — this  isn't  one  of  my  points  of  concentration, 
and  I  really  don't  know. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  Now  directing  your  attention  back  to 
National  Mobilization,  if  we  may,  do  you  receive  a  salary  as  chairman 
of  National  Mobilization  ? 

]Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  do  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Have  you  in  the  past,  at  any  time  that  you  recall? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  never  received  a  salary  from  National  Mo- 
bilization Committee. 

Mr.  Conley.  Or  any  type  of  compensation  from  National  Mobili- 
zation ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  it  is  my  poor  secretary — or  associate's,  reaUy 
my  partner  in  Liberation — it  is  her  difficult  task  to  try  to  figure  out 
from  time  to  time  which  trips  are,  you  know,  were  caused  by  Mobiliza- 
tion work  primarily  or  by  Liberation,  and  to  try,  you  know,  if  it  is 
clearly  chargeable  to  Mobilization,  to  charge  it  to  Mobilization,  or  if  it 
is  clearly  chargeable  to  Liberation,  to  charge  it  to  Liberation,  But 


2700  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

basically,  as  I  say,  wherever  I  go,  I  am  sort  of  both,  and  so  it  is  very 
difficult  and,  again,  very  informal. 

Also,  I  raise  money  for  both  organizations  and  have  often  sug- 
gested that  people  direct  their  money  in  one  direction  or  the  other, 
according  to  which  is  the  worst  in  debt  at  the  moment. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  sir,  I  take  it  from  what  you  are  saying  that 
actually  the  only  thing  then  that  you  would  receive  from  National 
Mobilization  might  be  your  expenses  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Expenses,  right. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  did  not  receive  any  type  of  compensation,  profit  to 
you,  in  other  words  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  receive  no  salary. 

Mr.  IciiORD.  Expenses  on  a  reimbursable  basis  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  beg  your  pardon  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Are  the  expenses  paid  to  you  on  a  reimbursable  basis  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well 

Mr.  Iciiord.  Do  you  have  a  fixed  allowance  for  expenses,  or  is  it  a 
reimbursable  basis  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  no,  if  I — you  know,  if  the  Mobilization  decides 
to  send  me  or  we  decide  that  I  will  go  to  some  city  to  make  a  speech, 
you  know,  fly  in  and  out  in  one  flight,  and  strictly  for  the  Mobilization, 
then  the  bill  will  be  turned  over  to  Mobilization,  but  it  is  not^ — it  is 
only,  the  limitation  on  it  is  our  very  poor  finance.  But  there  is  no  set 
amount. 

Mr.  Conley,  Mr.  Dellinger,  how  many  other  persons  are  regularly 
employed  by  the  National  Mobilization  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  remember  that  you — you  say  how  many  others 
are  regularly  employed.  I  have  made  clear  I  am  not  employed. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  am  sorry.  How  many  other  persons  are  employed  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  this  is  a  very  changing  thing.  And  since  I 
have  been  out  of  conunission,  in  the  hospital,  beginning  just  about  the 
time  of  the  elections,  in  which  the  Mobilization  had  an  active  organi- 
zation, urging  people  not  to  vote  for  any  of  the  prowar  candidates,  and 
since  I  have  not  yet  been  back  to  the  office,  although  I  have  done  some 
consulting  on  the  phone,  I  literally  do  not  know  the  size  of  the  staff 
now. 

Mr.  Conley.  Well,  let  me  ask  you  this,  sir,  if  I  may :  Let's  go  back 
and  say,  take  January  of  this  last  year,  the  beginning  of  the  year. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  January  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  January  1968.  Approximately  how  many  employees 
did  you  have  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Oh,  very  few  because  we  were  in  a  very  transitional 
period  between  the  events  at  the  Pentagon,  when  we  had  had  a  swollen 
staff  and  uncertainty  and  planning,  and  so  forth,  as  to  what  actions, 
if  any,  we  would  have  next. 

You  also  should  understand  that  we  try  to  operate  on  a  subsistence 
basis  and  that  we  may — for  example,  I  mean  one  figure  that  does  come 
to  mind,  which  I  think  is  relatively  accurate,  is  that  in  September,  or 
possibly  early  October,  we  had  a  staff  of  about — what  we  called  a 
staff — of  about  20  people. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  are  referring  to  September  or  October  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Of  this  year. 

Mr.  Conley.  Of  this  year. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2701 

Mr.  Dellingee.  And  yet  our  total  outlay  for  what  might  laugh- 
ingly be  called  salaries  or  wages,  well,  we  didn't  pay  it.  We  paid  sub- 
sistence, which  meant  that  some  people  took  $10  a  week  for  which, 
you  know,  maybe  to  eat  sandwiches  or  what-have-you,  or  other 
people — I  think  that  the  highest  that  was  paid,  well,  50  or  perhaps 
60  dollars,  $60  to  a  woman  who  had  a  dependent  or  two. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Well,  Mr.  Dellinger 

Mr.  Dellingek.  In  other  words,  we  pay  according  to  need.  We  are 
not  a  salaried  organization. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Then  20  possible  people  that  were  working 
for  you  in  September  of  this  year,  were  they  all  based  out  of  a  New 
York  office,  or  were  part  of  these  numbers  that  you  are  mentioning  in 
the  Chicago  407  Dearborn  Street  ^ 

Mr.  Dellingee.  No,  the  lease  on  the  Chicago  office  expired  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  end  of  the  convention,  and  it  was  unfortunate 
because  it  would  have  been  better  for  us  to  have  maintained  an  office 
for  at  least  a  few  weeks  afterward,  but  we  had  no  office  in  Chicago, 
other  than  perhaps  in  a  mail  drop,  and  of  course  we  had  an  active 
office  and  committee  members  there,  but  no  real  Mobilization  office  in 
Chicago  in  September. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Now,  Mr,  Dellinger,  with  reference  to  the  Chicago  office  and  to  the 
convention,  did  Tom  Hayden  and  Rennie  Davis  act  as  coproject  di- 
rectors for  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  in  connection  with 
the  activities  in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Dellingee,  During  the  period  prior  to  the  convention 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellingee.  — they  were  coproject  directors. 

Might  I  just  make  a  little  statement  at  this  point,  Mr.  Chairman  ? 

Mr.  IcHOED.  To  explain  ? 

Mr.  Dellingee.  It  is  just  that  I  am  willing  and  even  anxious  to  tell 
anytliing  about  myself  or  anything  that  I  know.  In  view  of  the  climate 
of  repression  and  the  type  of  thing  that  happened  to  me  with  the 
bombs  that  were  sent  to  me  and  destruction  of  the  press  and  the  lino- 
type at  Libertarian  Press  that  I  referred  to,  along  with  the  receipt  of 
a  death  threat  at  that  time,  it  is  not  my  intention  to  talk  about  other 
people. 

Also,  I  think  that  other  people  can  basically  speak  best  for  them- 
selves and  express  their  views.  However,  within  that  approach,  which 
I  believe  is  covered  by  the  first  amendment — but  which  I  would  take 
anyway,  whether  it  was  or  not — within  that  approach  I  would  be 
happy,  you  know,  in  obvious  cases  of  this  kind,  people  who  are  already 
publicly  identified,  and  so  forth,  to  say  yes. 

Mr.  IcHOED.  Of  course,  we  will  have  to  rule  on  that  when  those  ques- 
tions arise,  but  certainly,  if  we  abided  by  that  request,  it  would  cer- 
tainly limit  your  testimony  to  what  you  merely  wanted  to  testify  about 
because  this  could  be  construed  quite  broadly  by  you.  But  let's  proceed, 
and  as  those  matters  come  up,  the  Chair  will  rule. 

Mr.  Dellingee.  Yes ;  well,  obviously  I  think  I  could  spend  my  time 
better  than  going  over  details  of  wliich  offices,  and  so  forth.  I  mean, 
there  are  many  positive  things  I  could  be  doing  to  try  to  stop  the  war 
and  to  organize  people.  So  it  is  not  really  limiting  it  to  questions  chosen 
by  me  or  the  use  of  time  that  I  would  prefer. 

21-706— 69— pt.  3 2 


2702  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  IcHORD.  These  questions  are  pertinent.  The  background  and  op- 
erations of  your  committee,  of  whicli  you  are  chairman,  and  of  your 
own  activity,  these  are  pertinent. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  have  been  happy  to  cooperate,  but  I  just  want 
to  point  this  out  about  other  individuals. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  have  to  rule  on  those  questions  as  they 
arise. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  again  dealing  with  the  National  Mobi- 
lization Committee,  on  the  average,  what  are  the  total  overhead  and 
salary  costs  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee,  say  on  a  monthly 
basis?  Can  you  give  us  just  an  average? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  have  tried  to  explore,  give  you  the  best  of 
my  recollection  of  the  answers  to  questions  or  of  information  that  you 
have  solicited  that  I  am  really  not  an  expert  on  and  that  I  am  in  danger 
of  misleading  you.  And  I  have  to  say  that  in  this  area  I  am  really  not 
competent,  and  we  do  have  a  treasurer  and  we  normally  have  a  fine 
committee  who  have  this  information,  both  in  many  cases  in  writing 
in  the  books  or  are  familiar  with  it.  I  have  to  say  that  whenever  I  write 
an  appeal  letter,  I  buzz  the  office,  if  I  am  in  Liberation^  and  I  say, 
""V\Tiat  is  our  weekly  overhead  now  ?" 

And  they  tell  me,  and  I  put  it  in  the  letter,  and  undoubtedly,  since 
many  of  our  private  letters  are  in  your  hands,  you  have  some  of  tliose 
letters  which  tell  at  that  time  what  the  budget  was,  but  I  am  not  in  a 
position  to  estimate.  I  would  just  mislead  you  if  I  tried  to  come  up  with 
such  a  figure,  but  it  is  very  variable,  according  to  whether  we  are  ap- 
proaching a  major  action  or  not  and/or  according  to  whether  it  is  a 
period  like  January  of  '68  when  we  had  almost  no  staff,  I  am  sure. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Well,  let  the  Chair  advise  you,  Mr.  Dellinger,  that  you 
are  not  going  to  be  required  to  testify  as  to  matters  beyond  your  recol- 
lection. We  don't  expect  you  to  recall  each  and  every  event  or  each  and 
every  date  and  we  realize  that  there  are  some  activities  outside  of  the 
coimnittee,  outside  your  knowledge,  and  just  so  advise  the  counsel  in 
your  reply. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  it  is  outside  of  my  knowledge.  If  I  had  known 
ahead  of  time,  I  could  have  looked  up  and  told  you,  but  I  didn't  know 
and  I  don't  remember. 

Mr,  IcHORD.  All  right,  Mr.  Dellinger,  what  are  National  Mobiliza- 
tion's basic  or  major  sources  of  income? 

In  other  words,  where  do  you  expect  to  get  your  income  from  and 
where  do  you  get  it  from  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  we  get  our  income  from  different  types  of 
sources.  We  ask  participating  organizations  to  contribute  either  di- 
rectly or  indirectly.  There  is  rarely  an  administrative 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  sir,  I  don't  mean  to  interrupt,  but  what  do  you 
mean  when  you  say  "directly  or  indirectly"  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  was  just  going  to  explain,  but  there  is  rarely  an 
administrative  committee  meeting  at  which  I  don't  say,  "We  are  this 
much  in  debt.  The  phone  is  in  danger  of  being  shut  off,''  or  whatever 
it  is,  "Which  organizations  can  pledge  some  money?"  And  so  forth. 
That  is  the  direct. 

Indirectly,  often  if  we  prepare  literature  and  an  organization  will 
take  copies  of  the  literature  and  mail  it  out  to  its  membersliip  or  its 
lists — in  other  words,  taking  the  cost  of  the  stamps  and  perhaps  of 
the  envelopes  and  the  running  them  off — although  it  is  apt  to  be  volun- 


DISRTJPTIOX  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2703 

tary,  on  some  occasions,  when  they  can  do  it,  we  ask  them  to  pay  us 
the  cost  of  the  leaflet,  or  whatever  it  is.  If  they  can't,  why,  we  don't. 
That  is  the  first  source. 

The  second  source  is — second  source  comes  from  f undraising  letters 
or  personal  contacts. 

The  third  source  is  occasional  f  undraising  benefits  that  we  hold.  For 
example,  if  somebody  has  just  come  back  from  a  trip  to  North  Vietnam, 
helping  in  the  release  of  prisoners,  or  from  Pans,  where  they  may 
have  talked  with  the  American  and  the  Vietnamese  negotiators,  we 
will  hold  a  little  invitation  event  at  which  he  makes  a  report,  and 
people  are  asked  to  contribute. 

The  fourth  source  or  method  is  whenever  possible  at  major  events, 
which  range  all  the  way  from  public  meetings — although  I  mean,  you 
know,  like  speeches  at  a  hall,  although  often  they  clear  very  little  or 
don't  clear  all  the  expenses — to  wherever  possible,  collections  or 
pledges,  at  events  such  as  the  rally  at  the  Lincoln  Memorial  in  October, 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Mr.  Bellinger,  what  are  some  of  the  organ- 
izations? You  mentioned  that  organizations  contribute  to  National, 
member  organizations  I  believe  is  the  way  you  described  it.  Wliat  are 
some  of  these  organizations  that  you  have  reference  to  that  do  con- 
tribute financially  ? 

]Mr,  Dellinger.  It  would  be  very  unfair  of  me,  I  think,  to  select  out 
anyone's,  and  again  it  would  be  hard  for  me  to  be  sure  that  I  was  being 
accurate.  But  if  you  look  at  the  administrative  committee  list  and  the 
list  of  the  cooperating  organizations,  you  can  be  sure  that  every  one  of 
them  has  been  dumied  on  many  occasions  and  that  some  of  them  at  least 
have  actually  contributed  money  or  have,  most  of  them  have  mailed 
out  things,  have  contributed  indirectly. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  on  some  of  your  letterheads,  or  notes  of 
your  meetings,  appears  a  list  of  people  who  attended  the  meetings.  I 
think  you  are  familiar  with  what  I  am  referring  to.  And  they  are 
named  by  their  name,  their  city,  and  the  particular  group  that  they 
represent.  I  don't  happen  to  have  one  of  them  in  front  of  me  at  the 
moment,  but  are  these  the  type  of  groups  that  you  are  referring  to,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right. 

Do  you  maintain  lists  of  these  groups  that  supply  moneys  to  you  ? 
I  mean,  are  they  within  the  records  of  National  Mobilization  ? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  we  try.  I  am  afraid  we  are  not  always  as 
efficient  as  we  should  be.  But  we  try  to  keep  a  record  of  contributors, 
both  individual  and  organizational,  and  it  may  even  occasionally  be 
in  the  minutes,  that  after  a  request  from  the  chairman  or  from  the 
treasurer,  that  X  organization  agreed  to  send  in  a  hundred  dollars 
within  the  next  week.  We  try  to  keep  records  of  this  kind  of  a  thing, 
yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  would  you  be  willing  to  supply  those 
records  to  this  committee,  showing  the  sources  of  income,  the  groups 
that  contributed? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  remember  something  that  Averell  Harri- 
man  said  on  TV  the  other  night,  that  he  had  never  turned  down  yet  a 
job  that  he  hadn't  been  offered,  and  I  think  that  if  such  a  request  was 
made  then  I  would  have  to  deal  with  it,  and  I  imagine — I  mean,  I  have 
to  see  the  terms  in  which  it  was  made,  and  so  forth.  I  imagine  that  I 


2704  DTSErmox  of  :  y  ?  s  doxocratic  xatioxal  coxvz^tion 

-ini  to  La-re  ^  oi  'i**  a'iiaiiiisTadve  coniniiriee  lo  .iis- 

.  -       ;,  "We  TT-r "  - '  ;i'!iL=  and  imowl^igp  and.  lieii  we  wo ili  i 

r       =»3i:ie  ki:        :  ii  thai  lime,  coiiectiTelT.  I  myself  a= 

-     -    -  ::  know.  I  am  imia.gnrir^ 

r  kind  of  fomiai  rti^uest. 

-      -\  -  anse,  as  I  say.  I  tMnk 

-     ,  -                                -  who  i!2?-"^  have  sejii 

mcKiey  111. : :  -                                          -ins^per- 

h""-'^   zre  ;zi  _-  :^.--.        ...„_. ^ _;_._  :.  ^is  on  oc- 

This  lypt  of  T-:_i-_: 

-^-'  ^[~    7  ~^-,  >:  me  isk  yoTL  mis:  Do  ycm  nave  in 

--  -  "i-fi  in  Washingtcn  loday  a  list  of  che^e 

cr^                                   ~  —iiiiXarionil  Mobilization! 

}h    i                             i  Ani  ziiTue  I  XKiid  laake  a  little  -^x- 

'  ;      .1^^  .    T  ,        :  7  :  •:•  iny .  y c  u  kn'j^.  ieginniare  mq niry 

ihii  yc 

TTe  :  As  I  iniios-ce-i  eiriier.  wie  do  n'X 

have —  -dip  cards,  and  T'B'zpie  and  orsa- 

7       r  lo  whi:  3  iTiviiy  is  being 

-7  Firr-Tr:  ::.  are  endiii- 

hink  more  im- 

.     .-  a  e«istantlT 

i  - : .  we  do  not  <^)erate  ba^callT  by  votes  or  by 

:  e.  We  operate  om  the  basis  of  aoaut  kind  of 

— "  ^'"-^     ^  "  ^oai  <w  cffliader  an  action,  we 

iat  all  intereaed  in  gtopping 

^  -:i   nz:~  "  nz  an  organization  or  a 

-s  IT,  i- i    :  .  -  among^  _ 

rr  '  this  is       ~  ion  to  im  -. 

:.- i  :i    ..-        -:  r'  -icons,  saying.  "Weh. 

-  7    '  -  '    ^  iati€«i  cr :.-  r- 


Mr  I  ::     -     i  .  ieyoor    ._  '. 

li_    _   .-  - -  in  yooT  organizatifm? 

Mr.  Lm^  1  es-  yes,  Jlight.  :s  somewhat  from  the 

- — '-  --  ''  -     r.  as  I  say.  oi  :„-  ^~i.:,  .^hment  or  more  tra- 

_  n.  I  presume  that 

J''  :  :  yadonal  MoblH- 

za" 

i:r  National  Mobili- 

yir.  T^niTs  7  ire  if  I  tried  to  leD  yon  the  name  of 

xb&  ban  -   ^  —  .  _•-  To  l;*r  -    --'  -^^rly  honest.  I  know.  I 

€V€2i  s  _  OTH  I —  Xe^w  Toik  and.  vou 


DISErPTTOX  OF  1968  DEMOCBATIC  XATIOXAL  COXTESTIOX  2705 

know,  there  are  people  who  kifcow.  bar  ii  is  mac  the  kzod  of  iciormation 
that  I  carry  aroimd  in  the  top  of  mv  head,  and  I  am  apt  to  give  too. 
rwo  riamfts  which  actnalbr  come  from  two  diSerent  banks.  I  am  apt  lo 
TnaJrp  the  wrons  oombinalioii. 

3Ir.  CoxLET.  Do  you  have  a  treasurer  that  actually  mainl:ai:L£  ~""= 
bank  accoimt  f 

^Lr.  DixLixGEB.  Tee.  we  do. 

3Ir.  Coxx-ET.  Would  you  identify  him.  please-  by  name? 

!Mr.  Deujxgze.  WelL  sinoe  his  xiam^  is  on  the  leCTerbead.  whiA  is 
information  whi'jh  I  am  sure  you  already  have 

Air.  CoxixY.  That  is  what  I  have ref-~^^~  '--'". 

Mr.  Deu-Ixgee.  — or  should,  any-^  _  -      -     :  '   r  :^-iz_z~.  -HS 

nanie  i?  Eric  Weinberger- 
Mr.  CoxLET.  It  does  appear  on  the  correspondence  that  yon  hive 
in  front  of  you.  I  believe,  doesn't  it ! 

Air.  DziiixGEE.  WeE.  it  is  not  along  vi^  side  here,  bat  some  of  our 
letterheads  do  have  it.  I  still  haven't  read  this  letter.  It  may  veiy 
-rrell  refer  to  him.  It  is  no  aecret. 

]Mr.  CoxLET-  All  right,  now  in  that  conneeficm  is  Mr.  Wenlia^ger — 
Weinberg ! 

Mr.  DnxixGZE.  Weinberger. 

3»Ir.  CoxLET.  All  right,  sir.  is  he  authorized  to  draw  diecis  on  this 
acx-oimt  and  to  make  dejxjsits  in  the  account ! 

3Ir.  Delixs-gee.  WelL  we  have  a  deposit  procedure  whidh.  bsacallr 
he  oversees,  but  actually  we  generally  iiave  sorcsebody  in  the  office  wiib 
does  the  sometimes  tedious  w^^rk — bec-ause  we  get  many  anaU  diecfe 
instead  of  large  ones — of.  you  know,  opening  the  mail  and  anting  <iat 
the  deposits.  I  am  not  even  sure  tr.at  he  sees  every  depoax.  He  oversees 
the  b«x)k5  very  carefully  and  scrupuloa^.  and  aH  chcdB>  hfswever. 
must  be  agned  by  at  ieaac  two  r>e«?ple. 

Mr.  CoxiXT.  Xow  is  he 

Mr.  Deloxger.  And  iic  is  cue  ?i  the  <M3!es  who  is  andwriaed  to 
sign  them. 

Again,  the  list  of  ihe  signees  has  varied,  or  signers  has  varied,  you 
know,  from  period  to  p«er::'>d.  b:ii  iie  is.  ~o  the  wst  of  my  koowfedge, 
he  has  been  treasurer  from  very  eariy  in  the  existence,  and  has  always 
been  one  of  the  signers.  I  have,  for  a  long  rime,  been  a  x>signer.  but 
there  are  others- 
Mr.  CoxLET.  All  right,  if  I  understand  wh^r  you  are  saying,  to 
make  it  clear  here,  he  does  nor  ne.^sisariiy  have  to  sign  a  eoeck.  You 
and  somebody  else  who  has  -:he>:k  authority  comd  sisn  a  check. 

Mr.  Deleixgek.  WelL  if  yon  want  to  know  the  rmiii.  wie  keep  the 
checkbook  locked  in  a  safe,  to  which  Eric  Weinberger  is  the  only 
person  who  has  the  key.  so  it  is  extremely  dimciut  f'-"«"  anybody  else 
ro  cet  hold  of  a  check  and  to  find  two  signers  without  his  knowledge. 

Mr.  CoNXET.  All  right. 

^OW 

Air.  Deixixger.  That's  our  normal  procedtire,  anyway. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  Xow.  is  this  bank  ac»x»unt  maintained  in  the  name  of 
Xational  Mobilization  Committee !  I  mean,  is  that  the  way  it  is ! 

Mr.  Deixixger.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge-  yes. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  Do  you  maintain  baink  aceotmts  in  any  other  banks 
in  the  Xew  York  ai«a  nor  Xationai  Mobilizaticai  Commiiree! 


2706  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellinger.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  no,  but  you  know 
for  one  thing,  as  I  say,  I  have  been  out  of  touch  for  over  a  month. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And,  you  know,  I  am  not  sworn  to  be — to  know.  Or 
to  remember. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Did  you  all  have  a  bank  account  operational  in  Chi- 
cago, a  separate  account  from  the  New  York  account,  in  connection 
with  the  activities  that  occurred  in  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  there  was  a  bank  account  in  Chicago  also 
during  that  period. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  During  the  period  that  you  maintained  an  office? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

JNIr.  Conley.  Now,  were  you  authorized  to  draw  on  that  bank 
account  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  was  not  in  Chicago,  except  as  an  occasional 
visitor,  and  to  the  best  of  my — ^you  know,  actually  I  signed  checks 
for  a  nmnber  of  organizations,  although  it  is  largely  formal  and 
I  rarely  do  it,  but  I  am  practically  certain  that  I  never  signed  a 
form — you  know,  you  sign  these  little  things  giving  you  the  right  to, 
and  I  don't  believe  I  ever  signed  a  form  in  connection  with  the  Chi- 
cago bank  account  and  I  certainly  do  not  remember  ever  having  signed 
a  clieck  on  that  account. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  either  Mr.  Hayden  or  Mr.  Davis — and  I  must 
apologize  for  not  recalling  which  one  that  said  this — indicated  that 
Mr.  Weinberger  was  authorized  to  sign  on  the  Chicago  account  as 
well  and  that  one  or  the  other  of  them — and  again  I  don't  recall  which 
one  it  was — was  authorized  to  sign  on  that  account.  Is  that  your 
understanding  of  the  way  the  Chicago  bank  account  was  handled? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  1  know  that  Mr.  Weinberger,  who  has  done 
a  very  good  job,  not  only  for  the  Mobilization  but  also  for  the  [Fifth 
Avenue  Vietnam  Peace]  Parade  Committee  in  terms  of  supervising 
the  finances  and  the  books,  met  with  the  person  in  charge  of  the 
Chicago  office  to  go  over  bookkeeping  procedures  to  try  to  be  sure  that 
they  were  informative  and  accurate  and  kept  up  to  date,  and  so  forth, 
so  I  know  that  he  supervised. 

In  fact,  I  myself  made  the  arrangements  for  that  meeting.  I  know 
that  he  had  some  kind  of  general  supervisory  relationship  to  the  Chi- 
cago account,  although  you  must  remember  that  he  was,  like  myself, 
only  periodically  in  Chicago. 

_  I  am  sorry,  but  I  literally  do  not  know  whether  this  included  the 
right  for  him  to  sign  checks  or  not. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  connection  with  the  bank 
accounts  in  New  York,  you  indicated  that  you  were  hesitant  because 
you  weren't  sure  that  you  wouldn't  get  two  names  backward. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  might  give  you  half  the  Liberation  bank  and 
half  the  Mobilization. 

Mr.  Conley,  All  right,  sir,  would  you  be  willing,  if  an  investigator 
from  this  committee  contacted  you  next  week,  to  supply  to  that  man 
the  name  of  the  bank  ? 

jNIr.  Dellinger.  The  name  of  the  bank  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  believe  I  would. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  will  save  you  the  trouble.  I  will  write  a  letter  to, 
the  committee  and  inform  them. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2707 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Gutman. 

Now,  Mr.  Bellinger,  in  connection  with  the  project  undertaken  by 
National  Mobilization  in  Chicago,  do  you  have  an  approximate  cost  as 
to  what  this  ran  into,  in  terms  of  dollars  and  cents,  to 

Mr.  Bellinger.  In  Chicago  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir.  An  estimate  on  your  part,  if  you  have  one. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  You  laiow,  I  am  sorry,  but  first  of  all,  you  see,  the 
complicated  nature  of  our  financing — we  try  to  decentralize  the  ex- 
penses as  much  as  possible,  and  I  already  mentioned,  for  an  example, 
to  get  organizations  to  mail  out  our  literature  and  to  take  the  costs 
themselves.  Also,  for  example,  when  we  hold  an  administrative  meet- 
ing, most  people  come  in,  they  either  pay  for  the  travel  out  of  their  own 
expenses  or  in  a  nmnber  of  cases  they  get  the  money  from  the 
organization  which  they  represent. 

So,  first  of  all,  if  we  knew  how  much  money  went  through  the 
National  Mobilization  Committee  bank  accounts  in  New  York  and 
Chicago,  that  would  not  tell  us  the  whole  picture. 

Secondly,  I  will  have  to  plead  ignorance  again  and  to  say  that 
there  are  competent  people  within  the  Mobilization.  It  is  not  an  evasion 
on  my  part,  but  particularly  after  having  been  out  of  touch  for  a 
month,  but  even  a  month  ago  I  might  not  have  been  able  to 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Perhaps  I  read  the  wrong  thing  into  what  you  just 
said,  sir,  but  you  indicated  that  if  you  knew  how  much  money  had 
come  into  the  account  and  how  much  had  gone  out,  that  would  not  tell 
the  whole  story. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Bo  I  imply  or  infer  from  that,  that  there  must  be  a 
deficit,  as  a  result  of  what  occurred  in  Chicago,  at  the  present  time? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  I  wasn't  making  any  reference  either  to  a 
deficit  or  a  surplus.  I  was  saying  that  we  try  to  decentralize  everj^thing. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  me  ask  you,  sir 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Including  the  expenses  and,  therefore,  other  orga- 
nizations incurred  expenses  in  connection  with  recruiting  people  for 
Chicago,  going  there  themselves,  or  expenses  in  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Bo  you  have  a  deficit  as  a  result  of  the  Chicago  project  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  I  am  afraid  we  have  a  considerable  deficit. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Bo  you  have  any  estimate  as  to  the  size  of  that  deficit  ?' 
Understanding  that  we  don't  intend  to  hold  you  to  the  dollars  and  cents. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  I  understand,  but  I  just — I  wouldn't  dare 
estimate  at  this  point.  I  plead  delinquency,  but  due  to  the  fact  that  I 
have  been  away  for  a  month — I  literally,  I  don't  remember  what  it  was 
and  I  don't  know  what  it  is  now. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  it  be  in  terms  of  a  thousand,  or  in  terms  of 
thousands  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  it  would  be,  I  am  sure  that  it  is  at  least  several 
thousand. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  At  that  point  we  have  been  testifying  for  an  hour  and 
15  minut-es.  Would  you  gentlemen  like  a  brief  break? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  really  feel  fine. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  proceed.  Let  there  be  order  in  the  hearing  room. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  in  some  of  the  earlier  literature  and 


2708  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

newspaper  accounts  dealing  with  the  movement  of  the  National  Mobil- 
ization Committee  to  Chicago,  there  were  statements  by  many  that 
there  would  be  thousands  of  people  who  would  converge  on  Chicago  as 
a  result  of  the  efforts  of  National  Mobilization. 

In  fact,  some  of  the  statements  may  have  been  huindreds  of  thousands. 
I  think  I  recall  one  press  account  that  said  National  Mobilization  was 
hoping  that  they  would  mass  perhaps  500,000  in  Chicago  during  the 
week  of  the  convention. 

I  wanted  to  hand  you 

Mr.  Bellinger.  We  should  get  rid  of  whoever  said  that. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  I  want  to  hand  to  you 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Just  a  minute. 

Officer,  will  you  inform  the  people  outside  that  there  is  too  much 
disorder  or  noise  in  the  hall?  They  are  making  it  more  difficult  for 
the  Chair  to  hear  the  questions  and  the  answers. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  I  want  to  hand  a  letter,  Mr.  Dellinger,  dated  August  10, 
[1968],  which  purports  to  carry  your  signature  and  in  which  you  pared 
down  your  estimates,  or  at  least  your  estimates  were  as  follows,  and  I 
refer  you  specifically,  if  I  may,  sir,  to  the  second  page.  It  has  been 
nnderlined  near  the  middle  of  the  paragraph  at  the  top  of  the  page. 
Quote : 

We  expect  and  need  thousands  of  persons  to  be  in  Chicago  from  August  2.3rd  and 
24th  on.  We  expect  and  need  tens  of  thousands  on  August  28th  and  29th.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Dellinger,  my  question  to  you  is  this :  To  the  best  of  your  knowl- 
edge, approximately  liow  many  persons  actually  went  to  Chicago  as  a 
recuU  of  the  urging,  the  agitation,  the  propagandizing,  the  informa- 
tion that  was  disseminated  from  National  Mobilization?  Do  you  have 
an  estimate  as  to  how  many  were  there  ? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  let  me  say  two  things  about  that:  First  of  all, 
one  of  the  things  I  have  learned  in  the  last  3  years  of  being  involved  in 
mass  mobilizations  of  one  kind  or  another  is  that  there  is  never  any 
agreement  on  the  numbers.  And  it  is  my  general  impression  that  all 
mass  events,  whether  of  the  left,  the  right,  or  the  center,  tend  to  be 
overestimated  in  terms  of  the  numbers. 

Wliere  we  have  tried  to  make  a  count,  it  generally  has  turned  out 
somewhat  less  than  we  thought  were  there.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
other  events  that  I  have  attended,  and  when  I  compare  tlie  numbers 
with  other  events,  whether  it  is  even  the  crowd  leaving  a  football  sta- 
dium or  a  baseball  stadium,  I  find  they  are  also  overestimated.  So  I 
find  that,  in  other  words,  the  science  of  counting  crowds  is  very 
inaccurate. 

In  the  Chicago  situation  it  was  particularly  difficult  because  many 
people  were  there  in  many  different  capacities.  They  might,  during 
part  of  the  time,  be  on  the  convention  floor  and,  during  part,,  in  the 
Hilton  or  one  of  the  other  hotels  and,  during  part  of  the  time,  they 
might  \)e.  in  Lincoln  Park  or  ( rrant  Park. 

Also,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  police  assaults  upon  the  demon- 
strators, it  was  dangerous  to  be  involved  in  either  extreme,  either  to  be 
isolated,  where  you  could  be  attacked  and  beaten,  or  in  very  large 
crowds,  which  might  also  provoke  an  attack.  So  the  result  was  that 
from  this  and  another  factor  which  I  should  mention,  namely,  the  di- 
versity of  the  people  there  and  the  diversity  of  their  interests,  and  the 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2709 

decentralized  nature  of  the  program,  even  of  the  Mobilization,  which 
was  not  the  sole  group  there — that  is,  we  organized  movement  centers 
for  workshops  and  for,  out  of  which  individual  decentralized  actions 
would  be  planned.  As  a  result,  the  crowd  that  was  there  was  scattered 
throughout  the  city  a  great  deal  of  the  time,  and,  finally,  as  to  this 
business  about  how  manj^  we  might  have  brought,  again  it  is  hard 
to  say. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  I  don't  want  to  say  that  you  brought,  but  that  you 
directly,  through  National  Mobilization,  were  able  to  say  that  you 
would  attribute  their  being  there  to  the  efforts  of  National  Mobiliza- 
tion. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  it  would  be  too  hazardous  to  say  whether  a 
20-year-old  kid  or  a  50-year-old  housewife  who  came,  to  what  extent 
did  she  come  because  she  wanted  to  hear  the  rock  bands  promised  by 
the  Yippies,  she  wanted  to  march  to  the  convention  hall  to  call  for  an 
end  to  the  war,  or  because  she  was  hoping  to  lobby  one  of  the  delegates. 
There  were  just  such  a  variety  of  motives  and  a  crossover  in  actions 
amongst  many  of  the  people,  anyway. 

The  Mobilization  just  is  not  in  a  position — we  seek,  we  have  no 
desire  to  claim  credit  for  everybody  that  was  there.  For  us,  you  see,  it 
is  credit,  not  discredit,  but  I  just  would  have  to  leave  it  open  that  way. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well 

Mr.  Dellinger.  We  did  our  best  to  bring  as  many  people  as  we 
could. 

Mr.  IcHORD,  The  Chair  will  state  that  being  there  in  Cliicago,  I  a^ree 
with  the  witness:  it  would  be  an  almost  impossible  task  to  est'  late 
how  many  people  were  there. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  This  particular  letter  was  written  in  the  hopes  that 
we  would  get  more  people  there  than  at  that  time  appeared  to  be  pre- 
pared to  come. 

Incidentally,  on  the  estimates,  I  never,  to  the  best  of  my  memory, 
have  ever  estimated  there  would  be  X  number  of  thousands  at  an 
event.  Because,  as  I  say,  even  after  it,  you  can't  tell  whether  it  was  right 
or  not,  and  I  have  tried  to  indicate  the  massive  nature  of  what  we 
expected  by  saying  thousands  or  tens  of  thousands,  but  I  have  never 
myself  either  made  or  condoned  an  estimate  on  specifics  like  saying  a 
hundred  thousand  or  five  hundred  thousand. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may  move  to  something  else,  on 
August  15  of  this  year,  August  15, 1968,  just  before  the  opening  of  the 
Democratic  Party's  Convention  in  Chicago,  Havana  radio  broadcast 
in  mixed  English  and  Spanish  what  it  claimed  was  a  telephone  inter- 
view with  you. 

I  will  read  excerpts  from  this  interview  and  ask  whether  the  broad- 
cast is  an  accurate  recording  of  your  words  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Are  you  going  to  translate  tlie  Spanish,  or  read  it 
in  Spanish? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  has  been  translated  for  me.  I  can't  give  it  to  you 
in  Spanish,  sir. 

According  to  the  broadcast,  you  were  asked  this  by  the  interWewer  : 

Your  organization  has  announced  a  protest  demonstration  to  be  held  in  Chicago 
during  the  Democratic  Party's  national  convention.  Could  you  tell  us  the  aims  of 
such  action  and  what  the  action  will  consist  of? 


2710  DISRUPTIOX  OF  19  6S  DEMOCRATIC  XATIOX-\L  COX^-EXTION 

XovT.  TOur  answer  in  part  was  as  follows,  and  I  read  this  as- 


^Ir.  Dellixger.  Do  tou  have  that  written  out  so  I  will  be  able  to 
look  at  it  afterwards  without  taking  notes  ? 

^Ir.  IcHOKD.  Yes.  the  document  will  be  handed  to  the  witness. 

;Mr.  GuTMAX.  Will  you  hare  another  copy  of  it  ?  It  would  make  it 
so  much  easier  if  we  had  a  copy  to  follow  as  you  read. 

(Document  handed  to  witness.) 

Mr.  CoNXET.  All  right.  Quote:  "the  demonstration  will  take  place 
during  some  6  days" 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Excuse  me.  Where  is  this:  it  is  not  at  the  beginning. 
I  just  want  to  find  it. 

Mr.  CoNTJET.  Could  you  show  him  where  it  is  ? 

'Mr.  GuTMAX.  Wliat  page  is  it  ?  Oh.  I  see  it. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  Third  paragraph.  I  believe,  sir.  on  the  first  page. 

!Mr.  GiTTMAX.  In  the  middle  of  the  second  line,  right  ?  Leaving  out 
part  of  it  ?  Okay. 

!Mr.  CoxLET.  Yes.  Quote — 

the  demonstration  will  take  place  during  some  6  days — from  24  to  29  August. 
Through  it.  we  wiU  try  to  show  the  i)eople  of  the  United  States  and  the  Demo- 
cratic Party  that  there  cannot  be  peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  United  States 
while  the  government's  ctirrent  foreign  policy  continues  *  *  *. 

And  the  transmission  does  go  on.  but  this  is  the  particular  part  that 
I  wish  to  ask  you  about.  Are  those  words  an  accurate  reflection  of 
wh'ir  you  said  in  that  particular  interview  ? 

^Ir.  Deixix'Gek.  Well,  do  you  mind  if  I  just  finish  the  sentence? 
[Continues  reading :] 

that  regardless  of  who  the  candidate  is  or  what  his  platform  is.  we  will  keep  up 
our  active  resistance  in  the  streets  until  all  U.S.  soldiers  return  from  Vietnam 
and  the  current  policy  of  repression  against  the  Xegro  community  is  halted. 

I  certainly  endorse  those  statements,  those  sentiments.  That  was  my 
attitude  on  August  15.  It  is  my  attitude  today.  I  can't  vouch,  of  course, 
for  the  words,  you  know,  if  it  was  translated  into  Spanish  and  then 
back  again,  but  that  is  an  accurate  representation  of  my  aims  and  views. 

]Mr.  CoxLET.  All  riarht.  We  were  going  to  get  to  the  remainder  of  it. 
I  didn't  want  you  to  think  we  weren't. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Eight. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  I  was  breaking  it  down  into  two  parts,  if  I  might. 

With  reference  to  that  first  part,  which  concludes  with  "the  govern- 
ment's current  foreign  policy  continues.''  I  want  to  ask  you  specifically 
what  you  meant  by  the  words,  "we  will  try  to  show  *  *  *  that  there 
cannot  be  peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  United  States  while  *  *  *"? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Yes.  Well,  maybe  even  somewhere  later  in  this 
transcript — I  haven't  read  it — ^but  first  of  all  let  me  say  that  I,  to 
the  best  of  my 

Mr.  IcHOPj).  Do  you  wish  to  have  the  opportunity  to  read  it  before 
commenting  ? 

Air.  Dellixger.  Xo,  it  is  not  necessary  yet.  Thank  you. 

But  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  I  give  basically  the  same  interview 
or  express  the  same  sentiments.  I  may  change  the  language  a  little, 
whether  it  is  an  educated  or,  you  know,  yoimg  or  an  old  audience, 
hut  I  express  the  same  sentiments  to  any  press  and  during  this  period  I, 
for  example,  expressed  similar  sentiments  to  the  press  at  least  from 


DISRrPTIOX  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2711 

England,  France.  Belgium,  Holland,  West  Germany,  Canada,  United 

States,  as  well  as  Havana. 

Xow,  what  I  have  tried  to  do  during  that  period,  and  it  is  some- 
thing that  I  still  believe  very  deeply,  is  that  we  in  the  United  Stat^ 
because  we  are  a  little  smoother  and  more,  quote,  '•civilized"*  on  the 
surface  than  Xazi  Germany,  we  must  not  be  able  to  continue  business 
as  usual,  making  it  possible  for  the  American  people  to  napalm  people 
and  to  uproot  people  and  conmiit  genocide  in  Vietnam,  or  in  the  black 
community  at  home,  which  is  referred  to  in  this  section,  or  in  Latin 
America  or  throughout  the  world. 

We  must  not  be  able  to  do  this  and  people  think,  "Well,  everything 
is  smooth  and  tranquil  here."  and.  you  know,  really  there  are  fanatics 
who  are  worried  about  it.  But,  you  know,  it  is  no  more  real  to  the 
American  people  than  the  death  camps  were  to  the  German  people. 

So  although  I  am,  by  conviction  and  politics  and  philosophy  and 
religion,  a  pacifist  and  myself  only  take  part  in  and  advocate  non- 
violent actions,  I  believe  that  within  the  non\"iolent  framework,  and 
also,  of  course,  within  others  who  in  one  way  or  another  do  not  share 
all  of  that  philosophy,  that  it  is  tremendously  important  that  we  con- 
front the  American  people.  Xot  just  the  political  figures  who  might  be 
deemed  by  some  to  be  responsible,  but  I  believe  the  responsibility  goes 
to  us  all.  We  confront  them  with  the  reality  of  the  situation  and  make 
it  impossible  for  us  to  gorge  ourselves  on  our  high  standard  of  living 
and  our  consumer  culture  and  to  dismiss  this  death  of  American  boys 
and  Vietnamese  men.  women,  and  children  which  is  going  on  daily  as 
long  as  the  war  continues.  And  it  is  my  intention,  it  was  my  intention 
then  and  it  is  my  intention  today,  to  do  everything  I  can  to  assure  the — 
to  make  it  impossible  for  the  American  people  to  sink  back  into  that 
kind  of  apathy  and  acquiescence. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Dellinger 

Mr.  Dellixger.  And  that  is  what  I  mean  by  no  peace  and 
tranquillity. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  ;Mr.  Dellinger,  the  Chair  last  night  read  an  editorial 
in  which  it  was  stated  that  we  often  forget  the  activities  of  terrorist 
Viet  Cong,  who,  since  the  beginning  of  196S.  have  killed  12.000  South 
Vietnamese  civilians  and  abducted  about  25  a  day. 

My  question  is :  In  these  interviews,  do  you  speak  out  against  those 
kinds  of  atrocities,  too  '. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  I  try  very  hard  not  to  fall  into  the  trap  of 
equating  the  violence  of  the  Viet  Cong  or  the  Xational  Liberation 
Pront  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  Vietnamese  people,  try  not  to  equate 
that  with  the  aggressive  violence  of  the  invader.  I  myself 

!Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  terrorist  activity  not  aggressive? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  beg  your  pardon  ? 

Mr.  Ichord.  Is  terrorist  activity  directed  against  South  Vietnamese 
civilians  not  aggressive  \ 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  you  see.  I  make  a  comparison  between  the 
Vietnamese  people  who  feel  that  there  is  no  other  way  to  defend  the 
independence  and  the  sanctity  of  their  homeland  than  by  the  use  of 
A-iolence.  I  compare  them  to  the  American  patriots  imder  George 
Washington  and  of  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution,  who  also 
used  violence — and  the  word  "terror"*  is  a  tough  one.  you  know,  what 
constitutes  "terror,"  but  who  applied  methods  similar  to  those  of  the 


2712  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

NLF  against  the  British  and  also,  bj^  the  way,  against  American 
Tories. 

Although  I  myself  advocate  nonviolence,  I  do  not  feel  that  I  as  an 
American  have  the  right  to  trj-  to  be  self-righteous,  or  could  be  self- 
righteous,  about  the  methods  employed  by  the  Vietnamese  who  are 
certainly  fighting  for  the  freedom  and  independence  of  the  Vietna- 
mese people. 

Mr,  IcHORD.  I  take  it  as  a  pacifist,  then,  you  do  justify  violence 
under  certain  circumstances? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  "Well,  as  a  pacifist  I  understand  people,  including 
the  American  patriots,  including  the  Vietnamese  patriots,  including 
the  Cuban  patriots,  including  the  black  patriots,  our  internal  colony, 
people  who  feel  that  it  is  necessary  to  resort  to  violence  in  order  ro 
throw  off  an  oppressive  force.  And  I  do  make  a  distinction  between, 
as  I  say,  an  imperialist  country  like  the  United  States,  which  has  its 
tentacles  all  over  the  world  and  has  the  liighest  standard  of  living  in 
the  world,  based  upon  the  fact  that  it  bleeds  those  countries  and  keei)s 
them  underdeveloped  and  is  now,  as  I  see  it,  fighting  a  war  of  example 
in  Vietnam.  They  can  afford  to  lose  the  resources  of  Vietnam,  l)Ut 
they  feel  that  they  can't  afford  to  have  the  underdeveloped  and  under- 
privileged people  of  the  world  get  it  into  their  head  that  they  can 
win  their  freedom  and  independence. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  I  understand  you  to  say  that  you  believe  such 
terrorist  activity  to  be  justified  under  the  circumstances  I 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  as  I  say,  I  draw  a  distinction.  I  did  not 
condemn  my  brother,  who  during  World  War  II  went  overseas.  WolL 
actuall}'  he  was  in  the  medical  battalion,  but  as  part  of  the  war.  But  I 
myself,  partly  because  of — despite  the  fact  that  I  had  been  very  active 
in  the  anti-Xazi  movement  as  a  kid  and  not  that  good  at  it,  or  any- 
thing, I  myself,  partly  because  of  the  method  and  partly  because  of  the 
imperialist  system  which  was  backing  the  American  war  effort,  I  my- 
self did  not  bear  arms. 

As  I  say,  I  went  to  jail  rather  than  hide  behind  the  clerical  exemp- 
tion, but  I  do  not  criticize  my  brother. 

I  think  these  are  individual  decisions  that  people  have  to  make,  and 
particularly  when  faced  with  a  menace  like  Hitlerism  in  the  thirties 
or  like  the  American  imperialist  aggression  throughout  the  world  to- 
day. I  have  a  great  deal  of  sympathy  for  people  who  resort  to  violence 
in  order  to  overthrow  this  kind  of  thing,  but  it  is  not  my  position,  and 
when  I  was  in  Hanoi  I  had  no  difficulties  of  a  certain  kind  of  under- 
standing with  the  Vietnamese.  But  I  pointed  out  to  them  that  Norman 
Morrison,  who  was  a  national  hero  in  Vietnam  because  he  had  Inirned 
himself  in  front  of  the  Pentagon  in  order  to  bring  home  to  the  Ameri- 
can people  what  they  were  doing  to  Vietnamese  men,  women,  and 
children,  that  Norman  Morrison  was  ready  to  give  up  his  own  life  that 
way,  but  that  he  would  not  even  shoot  down  a  plane  that  was  coming 
overhead. 

And  I  pointed  out  that  I,  that  Staughton  Lynd  and  A.  J.  Muste. 
whom  the  Vietnamese  all  knew,  that  none  of  us  would  engage  in  violent 
activity,  but  I  did  not  feel  that  in  my  heart  or  in  my  politics  to  con- 
demn or  criticize  them  for  their  use  of  violence. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  had  the  experience,  Mr.  Dellinger,  the  other  day,  of 
meeting  a  woman  who  had  two  sons,  one  of  whom  had  volunteered  for 
the  Army  and  volunteered  for  Vietnam  to  fight  for  what  he  thought 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2713 

was  right,  and  the  other  son,  she  said,  was  a  pacifist  and  had  stated  that 
he  was  going  to  violate  the  draft  laws. 

It  is  rather  difficult  to  give  a  mother  advice,  'Wliat  kind  of  advice 
conld  you  have  given  her  ? 

I  apologize  for  interrupting  the  counsel. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  but  Tt  is  very  helpful.  It  helps  because  the 
point  is,  I  hold  strong  convictions,  and  from  a  lecture  platform  or  in 
an  article  or  in  a  general  way  I  will  always  present  those  positions  as 
forcefully  as  I  can,  but  I  do  not  believe  in  indoctrinating  people  or 
giving  them  advice  and  I  did  not — for  example,  my  brother  was  a  little 
3'ounger  than  I,  and  when  I  came  out  of  jail  the  first  time  he  came  to 
me  a  little  bit  in  anguish  because  he  also  was  suspicious  of  the  Ameri- 
can economic  and  political  system  which  had  supported  Hitler  earlier 
and  had  not  helped  the  Jews,  would  not  let  them  in,  and  now  was  going 
into  this  holy  war.  But  on  the  other  hand,  he  felt  that  it  was  necessary 
and  if  he  in  a  sense  came  to  me  for  advice,  and  I  wouldn't  give  it  to 
him  because  I  think  that  things  that  people  wrestle  with  in  their  own 
conscience,  and  I  hope  to  be  part  of  what  they  wrestle  with  by  what 
I  write  and  demonstrate  and  act,  but  I  never  advise  anybody  to  regis- 
ter or  not  to  register,  to  go  into  the  Army  or  leave  the  Army,  to  bear 
arms  or  not  to  bear  arms. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Go  ahead  with  your  questions.  Counsel. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  I  have  one  question  on  that  point. 

I  was  listening  very  intently  and  of  course  I  can  respect  your  views 
and  your  principles,  but  I  note  in  talking  about  nazism  and  talking 
about  what  you  termed  American  aggressive  imperialism  that  you  did 
not  say  anything  in  condemnation  of  Communist  aggressive  imperial- 
ism. Was  this  an  oversight  or  do  you  in  fact  think  that  there  is  not  a 
problem  of  Communist  aggressive  imperialism  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  was  a  little  distressed  that  when  we  were  at 
Chicago,  and  it  was  immediately  following  the  period  and  during  the 
period  in  which  the  Soviet  Union  invaded  Czechoslovakia 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  This  was  to  stabilize  the  situation,  though. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  but  let  me  finish  because  it  answers  your  ques- 
tion. I  was  a  little  distressed  that,  although  I  made  a  number  of  public 
statements  to  the  press  and  in  other  places  condemning  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Czechoslovakia  in  as  strong  terms  as  I  could,  that  normally 
this  was  not  picked  up.  I  am  not  saying  that  this  was,  you  know,  indi- 
rect censorship  or  anything,  but  it  would  have  been  helpful,  I  think,  if 
at  that  time  it  could  have  been  made  clear  what  our  attitude  was,  be- 
cause I  think  that  in  the  cold  war  atmosphere,  and  certainly  in  the 
past  this  atmosphere  has  been  encouraged  and  developed  by  this 
committee — and  that's  one  of  my  deep  reasons  for  deep  opposition  to 
this  committee — people  think  automatically,  or  some  people  think  that 
automatically  that  people  like  myself  are  one-sided  about  this.  I  don't 
believe  that  the  situation 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  You  still  haven't  said  whether  you  think  there  is  a 
threat  or  whether  you  have  the  same  condemnation  of  Communist 
aggressive  imperialism  as  that  you  have  charged  the  United  States 
with. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  thought  I  indicated  that  I  condemned,  and 
I  have  signed  public  statements  as  well  as  made  public  speeches  con- 
demning, the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia.  I  think  that  it  has  not 
ended  up  at  the  present  stage  in  the  kind  of  genocide  that  has  been 


2714  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

going  on  for  years  in  Vietnam,  but  I  think  that  this  relates  to  the- 
peculiar  conditions  there. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  Genocide?  You  mean  the  white  races  and  others 
weren't  suffering  from  genocide  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  this  seems  a  little  silly  to  me  because  I  am 
indicating  that  I  oppose  aggression,  including  Soviet  aggression,  and 
somehow  or  other  you  seem  unwilling  to  give  up  the  idea  that  I  don't. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  No,  you  have  now  stated,  but  at  first  I  didn't  think 
you  had  stated. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Now,  it  so  happens  that  I  do  not,  however,  believe 
that  the — well,  in  most  cases  the  opinions  that  come  out  in  the  press 
are  a  little  superficial,  and  I  think  that  much  as  I  condemn  the  Soviet 
invasion  of  Czechoslovakia,  I  do  not  think  that  the  Americans  should 
wash  their  hands  of  the  responsibility  they  play  in  the  situation  because 
of  the  fact  that  the  CIA  and  other  Government  agencies  are  organiz- 
ing subversion  and  the  overthrow  of  government  and  direct  and  indi- 
rect invasion  and  aggression  in  all  of  these  countries.  And  although  I 
do  not  believe  that  this  justifies  the  Soviet  invasion — as  I  say,  I  oppose 
it — nonetheless,  the  ri^htwing  in  this  country  and  the  liberal  center 
wing,  which  has  been  m  the  administration,  actually  makes  it  easier 
for  the  Soviet  people,  Soviet  Government  to  fool  its  people  because 
they  can  say,  "Look,  the  CIA  has  overthrown  this  government  and 
that  government." 

I  mean  such  as  the  bloodbath  in  Indonesia,  as  an  example,  and  they 
can  therefore  more  easily  persuade  their  people  that  the  CIA  and  the 
United  States  and  West  Germany,  which  has  never  been  thoroughly 
denazified,  that  these  countries  are  about  to  invade  Czechoslovakia. 
But  still,  my  solidarity  is  with  people  like  Mrs.  Daniel  and  the  others 
who  protested  in  Moscow,  and  one  of  the  organizations  to  which  I 
belong  actually  sent  people  to  Moscow  and  Prague  and  Warsaw  where 
they  protested  against  the  Soviet  invasion  and  were  arrested  and  in 
some  cases  beaten  up  for  it. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  may  I  ask  you  a  question  in  that 
regard?  If  apparently  you  do  condemn  the  aggresive  Communist 
activities  equally  with  the  so-called  American  imperialistic  activities, 
I  wonder  why  you  do  not  spend  at  least  a  part  of  your  time  in  articu- 
lating that  condemnation  ? 

Apparently  this  is  the  first  time  that  I  have  heard  of  it  right  here. 
I  wonder  why  you  don't  give  at  least  a  little  time  during  your  lec- 
tures and  your  Libertarian  Press,  and  so  forth?  I  wonder  why  you 
wouldn't  devote  just  a  little  column  on  one  of  the  pages  to  a  condem- 
nation of  that  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  you  see- 


Mr.  Watson.  Or  perhaps  you  have,  and  if  so- 


Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  that  in  part  that  is  an  indication  of  how 
out  of  touch  your  committee  and  its  staff,  its  research  staff  is. 

Mr.  Watson.  Maybe  you  can  put  it  in  touch  with  it.  Have  you  done 
that? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  indicated  that  I,  first  of  all,  I  made  state- 
ments in  Chicago  and  helped  organize 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Have  those  been  reported  in  the  press  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  complained  that  they  had  not  been  adequately 
reported.  Even  I  helped  organize  and  signed  a  statement  endorsing 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2715 

a  protest  action  at  the — if  I  remember,  it  was  the  Polish,  or  the 
only  available  Communist  country  office  in  Chicago,  where  the  protest 
took  place. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  not 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  written,  we  have  articles  in  Liberation 
magazine  condemning  it.  I,  as  a  member  of  the  War  Crimes  Tribunal, 
which  I  believe  rightly  found  the  United  States  guilty  of  war  crimes^ 
contrary  to  the  Nuremburg  charter  and  contrary  to  humanity,  in 
Vietnam,  I,  as  a  member  of  that  tribunal,  was  one  of  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  tribunal  who  signed  the  public  statement  condemning 
the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  personally  would  find  it  interesting  if  you  could 
supply  the  committee  with  some  of  your  public  pronouncements  con- 
demning Soviet  aggressiveness  in  your  various  publications. 

And  one  final  question  in  this  regard :  Did  I  understand  you  cor- 
rectly to  say  that  it  is  not  your  business  to  give  advice  to  people  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  tried  to  make  that  very  clear.  I  said  that 
I  give  a  certain  type  of  advice  all  the  time,  that  is,  1  will  speak  gen- 
erally. I  myself,  for  example,  think  that  American  soldiers  should 
refuse  to  commit  war  crimes  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  certainly. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And  I  will  say  that  publicly.  I  think  that  young 
men  should  refuse  to  go  into  the  Armed  Forces  and  I  will  say  that 
publicly. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  you  urge  them  to  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  I  never  to  an  individual,  even  when  I  am 
sought  out  by  an  individual,  and  the;^  say  "Should  I  do  this  or  that?" 
I  never  say,  because  first  of  all  the  price  they  pay,  you  know,  whatever 
they  do,  they  have  to  accept  themselves  and,  also,  if  people  take 
actions  without  having  come  to  what  I  will  call  spirtually  and  psycho- 
logically and  mentally,  intellectually,  to  an  understanding  of  why  they 
do  it,  or  at  least  why  it  becomes  very  difficult  for  them.  I  saw  men 
crack  in  prison  because  they  were  there  on  a  more  shallow  emotion 
than  was  able  to  sustain  them.  And  so  I  never  advise  anybody  and 
say,  "You  drop  out  of  the  Army,"  or,  "You  refuse  to  register  for 
the  draft,"  or,  "You  lay  down  your  arms,"  but  obviously  that's  my 
general  position,  and  I  try  to  shout  that  from  the  housetops. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you  advise  everybody  to  do  that.  You  advise 
everyone  to  do  that,  but  to  understand  you  correctly,  you  do  not  give 
individuals  that  advice? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Are  you  trying  to 

Mr.  Watson.  Is  that  a  fair  statement  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  seems  to  me  you  are  trying  to — excuse  me,  I 
don't  mean  to  impute  evil  motives,  but  you  seem  to  be  obscuring  what 
I  am  saying.  I  make  very  clear  that  I  do  not  advise  individuals.  I 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you  advise  everyone  generally  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  extol  the  virtues  of  this  position  because  I  believe 
that  if  the  United  States  does  not  bring  a  halt  to  its  aggression  and  if  it 
does  not  do  this  through  methods  of  power,  which  means  denying  the 
military-industrial  complex  the  methods,  the  means,  the  manpower, 
money  and  manpower,  to  build  a  war  machine  and  to  use  it  in  Santo 
Domingo  and  use  it  in  Bolivia  and  use  it  in  Paraguay  and  use  it  in 


2716  DISRUPTION  OF  196S  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Vietnam — unless  we  do  that,  why  I  see  a  very  terrible  future.  There  is 
ali"eady  a  terrible  present. 

So  I  make  that  very  clear;  but  if  you  come  to  me  and  say,  "Now 
I  am  wondering,"  I  might  be  tempted  to  suggest  you  resign  from  the 
House  I^n-American  Activities  Committee,  but  I  would  rather  call 
for  its  abolition ;  but  if  you  come  to  me  and  say,  "Shall  I  or  shall  I  not 
go  into  the  Army?"  there  comes  a  point  when  I  have  to  say,  "You 
have  to  wrestle  with  your  own  conscience;  you  have  to  decide  what 
you  are  prepared  to  do,  what  you  believe  is  effective  and  right." 

Mr.  Watson.  Of  course,  it  wouldn't  be  difficult  for  you  to  suggest 
that  I  resign  from  this  committee ;  would  it  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  say  that  might  be  a  temptation,  but  I  think  even 
that,  I 

Mr.  Watson.  I  believe  I  would  agree  with  you,  it  would  be  a 
temptation. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  what  I  would  rather  do,  you  see,  is  to  have 
South  Carolina  turned  into  a  democracy,  which  would  elect  peopie 
with  all  the  citizens'  votes.  [Applause.] 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Now,  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  the  audience,  the  Chair 
will  have  to  admonish  you  that  you  are  guests  of  the  committee.  The 
business  of  this  committee  is  the  people's  business  and  you  are  cer- 
tainly welcome.  But  the  Chair  has  the  duty  of  maintaining  order,  and 
outbursts,  applause,  or  any  kind  of  disturbing  activity  just  can't  be 
permitted.  So  I  would  appeal  to  your  sense  of  propriety  and  ask  that 
you  abide  by  the  rules,  not  only  of  the  House,  but  of  this  committee. 

Proceed. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  might  make  just  one  statement 
in  reference  to  the  outburst,  apparently  against  my  State  and  me 
personally,  down  home  we  have  an  old  saying  whereby  people  are 
judged  not  only  by  their  friends  but  by  their  enemies,  and  it  is  a 
compliment  down  my  way  to  be  opposed  by  certain  individuals,  so 
I  take  no  personal  offense  to  the  outciy  against  me. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  one  other  question  in  this  same  line, 
if  I  may.  I  notice  that  you  indicated  that  you  were  a  pacifist  during 
the  Second  World  War,  or,  specifically,  with  reference  to  Germany. 
And  you  indicate,  as  I  understand  it,  and  I  certainly  do  not  wish  to 
put  words  in  your  mouth,  that  you  still  maintain  a  posture  of  being  a 
pacifist.  Is  this  a  fair  statement  today  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  advocate  and  practice  nonviolent  methods, 
and  even  during  World  War  II,  or  before  World  War  II  when  I  was 
put  in  jail,  I  used  often  to  object  to  the  word  "pacifist"  or  "conscien- 
tious objector."  I  am  not  theological  by  nature  and  I  don't  like  things 
being  set  up  in  a  way  that  people  who  have  peculiar  beliefs  are  paci- 
fists and  oppose  war,  and  others.  I  believe  that  the  adoption  of  non- 
violence is  a  necessity  for  the  world  and  for  the  American  people, 
and  so  when  I,  for  example,  went  to  prison  during  World  War  II,  I 
refused  to  call  myself — or  before  World  War  II — a  conscientious  ob- 
jector because  that  seemed  to  make  it  some  special  thing  or  special 
people.  I  called  myself  a  war  objector. 

Having  made  'that  little  modification,  my  views  are  essentially 
basically  the  same  today  as  they  were  then.  I  believe  I  am  opposed  to 
the  use  of  military  methods  in  an  attempt  to  solve  problems. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2717 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  My  question  then  is  a  very  simple  one, 
sir :  You  maintain  that  you  are  opposed  to  war,  do  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  and  I  am  also  opposed  to  imperialism. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now  my  question  to  you,  sir,  is  this: 
If  you  are  opposed  to  war,  you  make  no  judgment  in  the  World  War 
II  matter,  other  than  to  say  you  were  opposed  to  war  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  did  make  a  judgment.  I  was  actively  anti-Xazi.  I 
picketed  to  try  to  have  the  United  States  lower — picketed  and  other 
public  demonstrations  to  have  the  United  States  lower  its  immigra- 
tion barriers  and  allow  Jews  to  come  in,  in  order  to  save  their  lives. 
But  the  United  States  would  not  do  that,  and  I  always,  before  it  was 
popular  to  do  so  in  this  country  or  in  England,  where  I  spent  a  year 
in  1936  to  '37,  I  condemned  Hitler  and  Hitlerism.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  I  myself  was  unwilling  to  adopt  the  methods  which  culminated 
in  the  atom  bombing  of  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  has  nothing  to  do  with  whether  you 
were  willing  to  adopt  or  not.  My  question  has  to  do  with,  you  did 
not,  from  the  background  material — let  me  finish  my  question. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  am  sorry.  I  beg  your  pardon. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  From  the  background  material  which  has  been  made 
available  to  me,  I  do  not  find  you  speaking  out  with  quite  the  fervor  in 
the  World  War  II  situation  that  you  have  adopted  in  the  present 
Vietnam  situation.  What  I  am  putting  to  you,  sir,  is  that  you  did  not, 
with  the  same  fervor,  make  a  judgment  as  to  who  was  right  and  who 
was  wrong  in  World  War  II  as  you  have  now. 

i\Ir.  Bellinger.  Witli  the  same  fervor,  I  drew  a  moral  distinction 
between  the  Fascist  forces  and  particularly  the  popular  forces,  such  as 
the  resistance  forces,  in  France  and  Italy  and  Yugoslavia  and  other 
places,  who  were  fighting  against  fascism.  My  endorsement  of  the 
United  States  Government  was  less  enthusiastic  because  I  felt  that  I 
could  not  trust  how  a  government  elected  and  run  in  a  largely  undemo- 
cratic way  dominated  by  large  corporations  and  military-industrial 
interests,  I  did  not  feel  confident  to  wliat  outcome  and  to  what  purpose 
they  would  fight  a  war  which  seemingly  was  against  fascism.  And 
although  I  found  that  a  very  difficult  matter,  as  I  say,  I  never  con- 
demned anybody  who  bore  arms  and  I  was  in  some  ways  ambivalent 
about  it. 

Nonetheless,  I  think  that  much  of  my  point  was  justified  or  verified 
when  the  United  States  first,  for  example,  burned  half  a  million  people 
alive  in  Tokyo  with  fire  bombs  and  then  dropped — unnecessarily 
dropped — the  atom  bomb  in  Nagasaki  and  Hiroshima  in  order  to 
improve  their  power  position  after  World  War  II  and  also  prepared 
the  climate  which  led  to  the  McCarthy  period  and  the  foundation  of 
committees  like  this,  the  repression  of  democracies  in  the — or  the 
partial  repression  of  democracies  in  the  United  States. 

I  believe  that  the  self-righteous  unity  of  the  American  people  in 
World  War  II,  even  behind  a  good  cause,  namely,  antifascism,  helped 
produce  the  assault  upon  the  people  of  Korea  and  helped  i^roduce  the 
war  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  If  I  may  move  you  back  to  the  Havana 
broadcast,  the  transcript  of  which  you  have  in  front  of  you 

!Mr.  Bellinger.  We  got  a  long  way  from  it ;  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  next  question  that  you  were  asked,  Mr.  Bellinger, 

21-706 — 69— pt.  3 3 


2718  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

in  this  broadcast  was  about  the  National  Mobilization  Comniittee's 
view  of  the  peace  talks  which  were  presently  under  way  in  Paris.  I  am 
referring  to  the  interview  that  you  had  with  a  Havana  radio  on 
about  August  15,  and  your  answer,  and  I  quote — 

the  U.S.  delegation  is  trying  to  carry  out  a  fraud.  *  ♦  *  in  reality,  the  U.S. 
Government  is  escalating  the  conflict.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Just  a  second,  because  you  skipped  so  much ;  I  have 
to  find  where  you  skipped  to. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Where  is  this  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  see  the  part  about  ''the  U.S.  delegation  is  trying 
to  carry  out  a  fraud." 

Mr.  GuTMAX.  Then  he  jumps  down  to  the  middle  of  the  next 
paragraph. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  I  want  to  give  you  all  of  these  clauses,  sir, 
and  I  assure  you,  you  can  offer  any  exi:)lanation.  I  think  it  will  make  it 
much  quicker  for  us  if  we  do : 

in  reality,  the  U.S.  Government  is  escalating  the  conflict.  *  *  *  We  think  that  in 
reality  the  United  States 

Mr.  GuTiMAN.  Where  are  you  now  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  am  sorry.  I  am  trying  to  follow  j^ou. 

Mr.  GuTMAX.  You  skipped  the  rest  of  that  paragraph  and  you  are 
down  in  the  following  paragraph.  Where?  Where?  How  many  lines 
into  the  next  paragraph  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  beginning  of  the  next  paragraph. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  The  next  is  number  what  ? 

Mr.  GuTMAX.  You  know,  Mr.  Romerstein,  if  you  have  a  marked 
copy — Okay. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  witness  examine  the  document. 

Mr.  Gttimax.  You  see,  Mr.  Chairman 

Mr.  Dellixger  [reads]. 

But  in  reality,  the  U.S.  Government  is  escalating  the  conflict.  *  *  * 

Mr.  GuTMAx^.  Then  he  skips  three  or  four  sentences  and  he  goes 

down 

Mr.  Dellixger.  What  comes  next? 
Mr.  CoxLEY  [reads]. 

We  think  that  in  reality  the  United  States  has  escalated  the  war  *  *  *. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  say  next : 

There  are  more  soldiers  in  Vietnam  now  than  when  President  Johnson  made  his 
speech  on  the  eve  of  "April  Fool" — 

And  then  they  have  added — 

a  North  American  festivity  similar  to  the  "Day  of  the  Innocents."  Every  week 
the  North  American  planes  drop  more  tons  of  bombs  on  the  Vietnamese  people. 
*  *  *  more  and  more  bombing  missions.  *  *  * 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Is  the  whole  document  already  in  the  record?  Mr. 
Counsel  ? 

Mr.  Cox^LEY.  No,  but  we  intend  to  offer  it  into  the  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  entire  document  will  be  made  a  part  of  the  record. 

(Document  marked  "Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  1"  and  retained  in 
committee  files.) 

Mr.  Dellixger  [reads]. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2719 

We  think  that  in  reality  the  United  States  has  escalated  the  war  and  it  is  using 
the  Paris  talks  as  a  pretext  to  make  one  believe  that  it  has  not  escalated  the 
war  and  that  it  wants  peace. 

I  subscribe  to  those  sentiments. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Just  a  minute,  and  there  is  one  more,  "One  of  the 
motives" 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Where  are  you  reading  now  ?  Next  page  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  mentioned  that  Johnson's  speech  of  March  31 
coincided  with  a  proposal  made  by  Herman  Kahn,  who  was  willing 
to  have 

Mr.  CoNLET.  Third  full  prirruininh 

INIr.  Dellinger. — to  have  200  or  300  million  people  die  in  a  nuclear 
war,  that  he  made  the  Johnson  program — he  made  it  as  a  propo-al 
under  the  title  2  of  the  program  for  victory  in  Vietnam — that  it 
would  be  possible  to  concentrate  on  the  bombing  on  the  narrow  pan- 
handle, supported  with  shelling  from  ships  like  the  Jersey^  and  pre- 
tend or  convince  the  American  people  and  some  of  world  opinion  that 
this  was  a  peace  move,  whereas  actually  from  a  military  point  of 
view  it  would  help  the  United  States. 

Yes,  I  subscribe  to  that  statement. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  the  next  one  is  the  third  paragraph 
on  the  following  page: 

One  of  the  motives  for  the  demonstration  in  Chicago  is  to  lay  bare  the 
hypocrisy 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Just  a  moment.  Let's  see  what  you  skipped  before 
we  get  to  that. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  entire  document  will  be  in  the  record, 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  will  certainly  let  you  go  back  and  make  any  com- 
ment that  you  want  about  what  I  skipped. 

The  third  paragraph  down. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  All  right.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley  [reads]. 

One  of  the  motives  for  the  demonstration  in  Chicago  is  to  lay  bare  the  hypocrisy 
and  fraud  of  the  Democratic  Party's  political  machinery,  which  talks  of  peace 
while  escalating  the  war. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  absolutely. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now  these  three  quotations  which  are  lifted  from 
different  portions  of  this  interview,  are  these  all  accurate?  As  best 
you  recall? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  subscribe  to  the  general  sentiments  ex- 
pressed, yes — absolutely.  I  would  like  to  stress  that. 

IVIr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  All  right,  sir. 

Now,  if  I  may  move  you  to  the  next  question,  which  is  as  follows : 

Next  Sunday  marks  the  third  anniversary  of  the  Negro  rebellion  in  the  city 
of  Watts.  Mr.  Dellinger,  what  can  you  tell  us  in  this  respect? 

Do  you  find  the  question,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  And  the  answer,  both. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  I  would  like  to  read  to  you  this  portion 
of  your  answer. 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Ashbrook  left  the  hearing  room.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  then  you  certainly  may  supply  anjrthing  that 
j'ou  wish  to  add  to  it : 


2720  DISRUPTION  OF   1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Right  now  there  is  intensive  repression  of  U.S.  Negro  leaders 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY  [continues  reading]. 

This  month,  there  has  been  a  well-planned  *  *  * — 

And  a  word  is  indistinct,  I  believe,  there 

]Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY  [continues  reading], 

to  liquidate  Negro  leaders,  the  leaders  who  are  capable  of  heading  the  struggle 
for  Negro  liberation,  but  this  is  nothing  new.  We  all  know  what  happened  to 
Malcolm  X,  who  was  assassinated  when  he  became  a  threat  to  the  established 
system  *  *  * — 

And  again  there  is  an  indication  that  some  more  words  are 
indistinct.  [Continues  reading:] 

that  the  federal  government  and  the  state  governments  are  carrying  out  a 
joint  effort  to  eliminate  many  other  youthful  leaders  who  are  less  well  known, 
leaders  who  get  more  and  more  i>opular  support  and  who  are  actively  organizing 
popular  resistance.  To  cite  an  example,  there  is  now  a  trial  in  progress  against 
Huey  Newton  in  Oakland,  California,  and  the  authorities  are  determined  to 
wii>e  out  the  leaders.  Ho  too,  another  leader  Eldridge  Cleaver,  is  threatened 
with  being  sentenced  to  a  long  prison  term.  Newton  is  in  jail  and  is  fighting 
for  his  life  in  the  trial. 

Now  my  question,  Mr.  Dellinger,  is  this  an  accurate  reporting  of 
what  you  said  in  this  particular  interview  ? 

Mr,  Dellinger,  Well,  I  am  not  sure  about  one  or  two  words,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  this  apparently  was  translated  back  from  the 
Spanish  to  the  English,  and  I  am  not  sure  whether  I  used  the  word, 
for  example,  "liquidate,"  "to  liquidate  Negro  leaders."  However,  I 
think  that  I  subscribe  to  the  general  statements,  including  the  fact 
that  there  is  an  attempt  to  eliminate  the  Black  Panthers  and  many 
youthful  leaders,  and  this  came,  this  statement  was  made  shortly  after 
the  police  in  Oakland,  I  believe  it  was,  attacked  a  group  of  Black 
Panthers  who  were  in  a  house,  came  out  without  arms  and  with  their 
hands  up,  and  actually  did  shoot  and  kill  an  18-year-old  Black  Panther 
by  the  name  of  Bobby  Hutton  and  did  wound  Eldridge  Cleaver,  and 
because  of  that 

Mr,  IcHORD.  Did  wound  whom  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Eldridge  Cleaver ;  and  because  of  his  having  been 
attacked  in  this  way  by  the  police,  his  parole  was  revoked.  Mean- 
while, Huey  Newton  that  I  refer  to,  as  I  say,  was  in  jail  and  was 
fighting  for  his  life  in  a  trial,  and  it  was  clear  to  me — I  won't  pre- 
tend to  be  in  the  position  of  the  Supreme  Court  at  that  point,  but 
it  seemed,  I  have  not  read  everything,  but  it  seemed  to  come  through 
pretty  clearly  that  there  was  not  clearcut  evidence  to  convict  Huey 
Newton  of  what  he  was  charged,  and  that  the  jury  realized  this,  but 
so  they  gave  some  other  charge  of  manslaughter,  or  some  finding  of 
manslaughter,  which  was  completely  irrelevant;  either  he  attacked 
the  jDolice  or  he  didn't.  It  wasn't  a  case  of  manslaughter.  And  he  is 
now  m  jail. 

And  so  I  support  this  general  thinking  and  I  think  it  is  similarly 
about  Malcolm  X.  The  CIA  has  been  assassinating  people  throughout 
the  world  for  too  many  years  novv^,  and  it  is  my  belief  that  vre  can't 
maintain  the  geographical  boundaries  indefinitely  and  that  a  govern- 
ment that  thinks  it  is  morally  and  politically  sound  to  assassinate  o])- 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2721 

position  political  leaders  abroad,  whether  it  is  the  Dominican  Republic 
or  Cuba  or  Bolivia  or  South  Vietnam  or  where,  that  that  government 
and  some  of  those  agencies  will  not  hesitate  to  assassniate  political 
leaders  in  this  country,  . 

And  I  think  that  it  would  be  very  useful  if  we  had  a  real  mquiry, 
for  example,  into  the  actual  events  surrounding  the  assassination  of 
President  Kennedy,  who  was  no  radical,  but  obviously  was  killed 
under  circumstances  far  different  from  those  implied  or  stated  by  the 
"Warren  Commission  report. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  Mr.  Bellinger,  you  make  reference  m  here  to 
Malcolm  X,  and  I  do  want  to  talk  with  you  a  moment  about  that,  if  I 
may.  The  expression  that  is  used  here  is : 

We  all  know  what  happened  to  Malcolm  X,  who  was  assassinated  when  he  be- 
came a  threat  to  the  established  system.  *  *  *  that  the  federal  government  and 
the  state  governments  are  carrying  out  a  joint  effort  to  eliminate  many  other 
youthful  leaders  *  *  *. 

Now,  Mr.  Dellinger 

Mr.  Dellixger.  You  skipped  a  little,  I  think,  but  words  are 
indistinct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  There  were  some  indistinct  words. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  sir. 

]Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  Now  my  question  to  you  is  this :  At  the 
time  that  you  made  that  statement  or  a  statement  similar  to  that,  Mr. 
Dellinger,'  did  you  or  were  you  or  are  you  aware  of  the  fact  tliat  two 
of  the  three  assassins  of  Malcolm  X  were  members  of  an  organization 
he  had  formerly  been  a  leader  of,  the  Black  Muslims  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  first  of  all,  I  don't  believe  that  that  is  neces- 
sarily true. 

Secondly,  it  is  not  beyond  the  CIA  or  the  New  York  Police  Depart- 
ment to  use  such  people,  or,  I  am  soriy,  I  don't  mean  to  impugn  tlie 
New  York  Police  Department  as  a  totality,  but  elements  within  it  or 
within  some  other  agencies,  to  use  former  members  of  such  an 
association. 

The  fact  is  that  Malcolm  X  was  exerting  a  tremendous  influence 
upon  the  black  community. 

(At  this  point  Mr.  Ashbrook  returned  to  the  hearing  room.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  He  had  traveled  abroad  and  had  come  back  after 
his  experiences  in  Algeria,  saying  that  he  supported  revolutionists, 
whatever  their  color.  He  was  obviously  a  very  charismatic  and  grow- 
ing person,  a  person  of  great  political  insight  and  leadership  and  he 
vras  causing  tremendous  embarrassment  to  the  United  States  in  the 
U.N.  and  elsewhere.  And,  obviously,  I  am  not  going  to — I  am  not  in 
a  position  to  name  the  killers,  and  the  reason  I  raise  the  question  about 
the  word  "liquidate,"  which  may  very  well  not  have  been  the  original 
text,  was  that  I  never  try  to  go  beyond  what  I  know,  you  Imow,  in 
imputing  actual  physical  assassination  or  guilt  to  groups  that  I  do 
not  know.  And  that's  why  I  made  it  clear  that  the  time  will  come — 
whether  it  has  come  yet  or  not.  we  don't  know — when  the  CIA,  which 
assassinates  all  over  the  world — this  has  been  even  revealed  in  the 
Senate  by  Senator  Young  of  Ohio  in  relation  to  Vietnam,  where  he 
speaks  of  assassination  teams  which  pose  as  Viet  Cong  and  commit 
acts  of  murder,  arson,  and  rape 


2722  DISRUPTIOX  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

'SLv.  AsiiBRcoK.  TTait  a  second.  He  rejected  that.  That  doesn't  stand 
as  a  st-atement  of  Senator  Young. 

]Mr.  Dellixger.  He  asked  me  to  supply  you  with  some  things,  and  I 
\\  ouki  be  happy  to  supply. 

Mr.  AsiTBrv:MiK.  Senator  Young  did  reject  that. 

]Mr.  Dellixger.  I  thought  that  after  the  pressure  was  on  he  spoke 
rather  cautiously,  but  never  retracted  the  statement.  Anyway,  it  is  a 
known  fact,  whetlier  Senator  Young  can  be  cited  as  an  authority  or 
not. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Are  you  saying  that  Senator  Young  is  the  type  of  man 
that  can  be  pressured  < 

Mr.  Dellixger.  What  I  tried  to  say  was  that  my  memory  was  that  he 
resisted  the  pressure,  but,  anyway.  I  could  cite  Donald  Duncan,  who 
helped  organize  such  assassination  teams  and  who  has  testified  so. 

So,  anyway,  what  I  said  was  that  we  can't  do  that  abroad  without 
sooner  or  later  doing  it  at  home.  I  am  not  about  to  say  that  the  CIA 
assassinated  President  Kennedy,  because  I  don't  know  whether  it  did 
or  not.  But  it  is  a  question  which  all  American  people  ought  to  ask 
themselves,  and  so  the  least  they  can  do  is  to  bring  the  CIA,  for  ex- 
ample, under  control.  So  the  same  way  when  it  comes  to  Malcolm. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  I^t's  start,  though,  with  first  things  first.  You  jtimped 
to  the  assumption  that  the  CIA 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  do  not  jump  to  it.  I  say  it  is  a  question  I  want  to 
ask  you  and  the  American  people. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Xo,  sir,  it  is  a  part  of  a  two-part  question,  and  let's 
get  the  first  part  of  it  out  of  the  way  first  and  then  move  on  to  whether 
they  were  CIA. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  don't  know  whether  they  were  CIA  or  not.  I  know 
that  the  CIA  does  that  kind  of  thing. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  The  pomt  is  that  just  as  valid  a  question,  if  you 
raise  the  question,  a  Cuban  Communist  might  have  killed  President 
Kennedy.  It  is  just  as  valid  a  question. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  One  can  ask  all  of  tliose  questions,  but  all  of  the 
evidence  that  I  have  read,  if  we  are  speaking  about  President  Ken- 
nedy  

]\Ir.  AsHBROOK.  Yes. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  — goes  in  the  other  direction. 

]Mr.  IcHORD.  You  repudiate  the  finding  of  Chief  Justice  "Warren 
and  his  tribunal  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Yes.  I  do.  absolutely.  I  consider  that  a  snow  job 
to  tr\'  to  pacify  the  American  people.  And  I  think  it  is  a  shame  that 
a  man  like  Chief  Justice  Warren,  who  in  many  ways  seems  to  be  a  fine 
man.  although  I  don't  agree  with  his  politics,  I  think  it  is  a  shame  that 
he  apparently  lent  himself  to  that  kind  of  a  job. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Mr,  Dellinger,  offhand  could  you  think  of  any  possible 
activity  being  engaged  in  by  a  Communist  in  the  United  States  that 
might  be  illegal  or  wrong  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  am  sorry.  I  didn't  hear  it  all  and  I  really  want  to. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Since  apparently  you  assign  all  of  these  things  to 
the  CIA  and  to  the  establishment,  and  so  forth,  I  was  just  wondering 
if  possibly  you  might  think  of  anything  that  a  Communist  might  be 
doing  in  this  country  that  you  might  consider  illegal  or  immoral? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  it  took  place  in  Mexico,  but  I  believe  that  the 
government  of  Josef  Stalin 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2723 

Mr.  Watson.  You  mean  the  assassination  of  President  Kennedy? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Oh,  the  assassination  of  President  Kennedy  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  I  notice  you  never  see  anything  wrong 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  was  going  to  say  that  one  of  the  reasons  that  I 
could  never  be  a  member  of  tlie  Communist  Party,  for  example,  is  that 
in  their  past  history,  at  least,  and,  well,  in  their  past  history  they  have 
used  acts  of  this  kind,  including  the  assassination  of  Leon  Trotsky  in 
Mexico. 

Mr.  AVatson.  Yes. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And  undoubtedly  others  that  I  am  not  aware  of. 
To  the  best  of  my  reading,  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  stand  to  profit 
from  the  assassination  of  President  Kennedy.  There  were  other  people 
in  this  country  who  very  obviously  profited  with  it,  and  they  should  be 
examined  and  thought  about. 

Mr.  Watson.  My  question  is  a  simple  one  as  to  whether  or  not  you 
could  think  of  anything  which  a  Communist  j)ossibly  could  have  done 
in  this  country  which  was  illegal  or  immoral,  since  apparenth*  you 
have  suspicioned  that  President  Kennedy  may  have  been  killed  by  the 
CIA,  or  Malcolm  X — it  was  some  matter  with  the  CIA.  I  am  just 
asking  you  whether  you  possibl}'^  could  think  of  anything  that  they  may 
have  done  wrong  in  this  coimtry. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  if  I  couldn't  think  of  anything  that  they 
had  done  wrong,  I  would  have  joined  the  Communist  Party,  and 
obviously  I  never  have  and  never  wanted  to. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  just  noticed  you  never  cast  any  suspicion  on  them; 
it  is  always  on  the  Government. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Mr.  Watson,  it  would  be  nice  to  communicate.  I 
know  it  is  hard  because  I  am  very  critical,  for  example,  of  your  election 
and  of  other  things,  and  we  have  serious  political  diiferences,  but  I 

Mr.  Watson.  Obviously  you  have  political  differences  with  Republi- 
cans, Democrats,  and  eveiybody. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  with  the  Republican  and  Democratic  estab- 
lishment, yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  think  everything  is  wrong  except  what  you  are 
doing. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Xo,  not  except  what  I  am  doing.  Xot^ 

Mr.  Watson.  You  were  against  the  Democrats  and  the  Republicans, 
weren't  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  against  the  program  and  the  presidential 
candidates  of  both  the  Republicans  and  the  Democrats,  yes.  I  believe 
there  are  many  obvious  reasons  for  that,  but  I  would  like  you  to 
know  that  the  Xational  Mobilization  Committee,  when  it  is  at  its 
fullest,  has  over  a  hundred  different  groups,  many  of  whom  have 
different  political  and  other  views.  It  is  a  very  heterogeneous  group. 
But  they  are  united  on  wanting  an  end  to  American  aggression  in 
Vietnam. 

Mr.  Watson.  Yes;  and  of  course  you  would  agree  with  the  state- 
ment that  Mr.  Hayden  earlier  made,  that  he  welcomed  tlie  support  of 
anyone.  Communist  or  anybody  else,  if  they  agreed  with  his  objectives  ? 

iilr.  Dellinger.  Mr.  Watson,  if  you  would  come  out  on  our  next 
demonstration,  I  would  be  happy  to  walk  side  by  side  with  you,  pro- 
testing the  war  and  calling  for  withdrawal  of  the  American  troops. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  the  answer  to  my  question 


2724  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6S  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  you  might  get  hit  with  a  club. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  mean  to  tell  me  your  people  might  hit  me  with 
a  club? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No;  our  people  don't  carry  clubs. 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  they  don't?  I  see.  So  the  answer  to  m^^  question 
is  you  do  welcome  the  support,  active  and  otherwise,  financial,  of  the 
Communists  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  will  work  with  anybody  who  I  think  will  help 
bring  the  war  to  an  end.  Now,  at  the  points  where  I  differ  from  him 
I  will  not  AYork.  I  made  a  trip  to  Paris  in  which  I  talked  for  hours 
with  Averell  Harriman,  more  briefly  with  Cyrus  Vance,  and  also  for 
hours  with  the  North  Vietnamese  negotiators.  I  Avill  talk  with  anybody 
across  the  board  if  I  think  it  will  help  save  the  lives  of  the — what 
shall  we  guess^ — the  150  to  250  American  boys  who  will  be  killed  next 
week  in  Vietnam  and  the  several  thousand  Vietnamese  who  will  be 
killed.  I  will  work  together  with  anybody  for  that  objective,  but  with- 
out pretending,  for  example,  to  adopt  the  views  of  Averell  Harrimar 
on  our  corporate  structure,  or  the  views  of  the  Communist  Party  peoj)le 
on  the  Soviet  Union. 

Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  the  questions,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  getting  back  to  Malcolm  X,  if  I  may^ 
I  would  like  to  go  back  to  the  first  part  of  your  answer  and  my  first 
question  to  you  on  this  subject,  which  was :  Are  you  aware  of  the  fact 
that  two  of  the  three  assassins  charged  and  convicted  of  killing  Mal- 
colm X  were  foi-mer  members  or  members  of  an  organization  he  had 
formerly  operated  ? 

Now  let's  forget  about  whether  they  were  hired  by  CIA  to  do  it. 
Are  you  aware  of  the  fact  that  two  of  the  three  people  who  were  tried 
and  convicted  were  members  of  the  Black  Muslims? 

]Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  read  that  fact,  seen 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you. 

!Mr.  Dellinger.  May  I  complete  my  answer?  I  have  seen  it  stated 
in  the  press.  I  have  also  read  a  study  by  Eric  Norden,  a  journalist  in 
New  York  who  has  done  work  for  Liberation.  He  did  a  study  called 
"American  Atrocities  in  Vietnam.""  He  made  an  exhaustive  research 
into  the  circumstances  of  the  assassination  of  Malcolm  X.  It  was  pub- 
lished in  The  Realist  magazine.  I  can't  give  you  the  date.  But  I  think 
anybody  who  reads  that  and  tries  to  be  open  to  its  message  comes  out 
of  there  with  a  very  strong  suspicion  that  some  quasi-governmental  or 
governmental  agencies  had  something  to  do  with  the  assassination 
of  Malcolm. 

Mr.  Conley.  All  right.  Now,  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  that  same  vein,  you 
have  also  indicated  that  Malcolm  X  was,  as  I  took  your  words,  a  rather 
knowledgeable  individual.  Is  that  a  fair  appraisal  of  your  appraisal 
of  him? 

]Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  remember  using  the  word.  He  was  a  man 
with  whom  I  did  not  totally  agree.  I  knew  him  personally  and  I  had 
some  differences  with  him,  particularly  in  his  earlier  days,  but  he  was 
a  man  who  had  gone  through  the  worst,  almost,  of  what  our  society 
imposes  upon  black  people  growing  up  in  the  ghetto.  Like  Eldridge 
Cleaver,  he  had  been  in  prison  and  had  all  kinds  of  experiences  and 
had  himself,  you  know 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2725 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  you  feel  that  he  knew  what  his  movement  was 
about  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  believe  that  he  was  a  person  who  had  tremendous 
insight  and,  unlike  so  man}^  political  people,  was  able  to  grow  as  he 
discovered  new  truths  and  new  insights. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now  my  question,  sir,  is  this:  Are  you 
aware  of  the  fact  that  before  Malcolm  X's  death  he  wrote  in  his  own 
autobiography  that  the  Black  Muslims  had  placed  a  death  sentence 
on  his  head? 

Are  you  aware  of  that  fact? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  seen  that  stated. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  are  you  aware  of  the  fact  that  Malcolm  X  him- 
self employed  bodyguards  to  protect  himself  and,  for  instance,  when 
I  visited  Chicago  on  one  occasion,  there  were  newspaper  accounts  of 
the  city  of  Chicago  assigning  a  tremendous  number  of  police  officers 
to  protect  him  from  the  possibility  of  an  assassination? 

Now,  Mr. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Let  me 

Mr.  Conley.  Just  a  minute,  Mr  Dellinger. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Sorry.  Finish ;  you  asked  two  questions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  my  question,  though,  on  this  is  this :  You  have 
indicated  that  there  is  a  possibility  that  some  nefarious  influence,  the 
CIA  or  somebody  in  some  form  of  government,  had  something  to  do 
with  this  assassination.  If,  sir,  you  have  any  information  or  evidence 
of  that  type,  have  you  taken  it  to  any  agency  and  made  it  available 
to  them? 

I  will  ask  you :  Do  you  have  any  direct  evidence  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Now,  since  I  think  you  did  ask  about  three  ques- 
tions, let  me  try  to  start  at  the  beginning  as  best  I  can. 

First  of  all,  I  have  heard  the  statements — well,  first  of  all,  let  me 
say  I  did  not  come  down  here  bringing  my  resource  materials  on  the 
assassination  of  Malcolm  X.  I  am  therefore  trying  to  give  a  sort  of 
a  general  attitude  in  which  I  say  that  there  should  be  deep  suspicions 
on  this  score  and  I  tried  to  put  it  into  context. 

Let  me  say  that  although  I  have  seen  statements  attributed  to  Mal- 
colm X  where  he  said  he  feared  assassination  by  the  Muslims,  there 
is  also  evidence  that  the  day  before  Malcolm's  assassination  he  told 
people  that  he  was  frightened  of  the  New  York  Police  Department, 
tliat  they  were  not  providing  him  protection,  and  that  he  feared  that 
they  intended  to  assassinate  him. 

Now,  as  I  say,  I  really  don't  want  to  go  too  far  into  this  material 
because  I  can  supply  to  yOu,  if  you  want — I  have  already  given  you 
the  reference — one  of  the  many  articles  on  this  subject.  I  doivt  want 
to  make  these  things  appear  more  simple  than  they  are,  and  that  has 
been  my  slight  quarrel  with  Congressman  Watson  because  I  think 
there  are  very  basic  questions  that  the  American  people  ought  to 
ask  themselves  and  ou.<rht  to  investigate.  I  am  not  prepared  to  supply 
the  answers  or  think  I  am  in  a  position  to  supply  the  answer,  either 
on  the  assassination  of  President  Kennedy  or  on  the  assassination  of 
Malcolm  X.  But  there  are  very  disturbing  aspects  to  both  of  these 
<luestions,  which  I  believe  the  Govermnent  has  basically  tried  to  sweep 
under  the  rug,  and  I  think  thev  ought  to  be  brousfht  out  into  the  open. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Well,  Mr.  Dellinger,  after  making  those  statements. 


2726  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8   DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

1  am  very  disappointed  that  ydu  don't  have  some  evidence  to  offer  thi«r 
committee.  Let  me  assure  you  that  this  is  one  Member  of  Congress 
that  doesn't  fear  the  CIA  or  any  other  organization  in  this  country,, 
and  I  think  it  should  be  your  duty  to  give  this  to  the  Government. 

Mr.  Dellingek.  Well,  I  have  a  suggestion.  I  appreciate  your  inter- 
est and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  think  a  lot  of  people,  you  know,  are  not 
aware  of  these  things  and  are  shielded  from  them. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Well,  I  certainly  am  not  aware  of  them.  I  would  like 
to  have  the  evidence. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes;  I  would  like  to  suggest,  Congressman  Ichord^ 
that  I  mail  to  you,  registered,  some  of  the  material  on  the  assassina- 
tion of  President  Kennedy  and  on  the  assassination  of  Malcolm  X; 
and  on  the  assassination  of  Malcolm  X,  I  will  specifically  send  the 
article  by  Eric  Xorden  from  The  Iieallst  that  I  mentioned  and  I 
would  like  to  ask  you,  in  turn,  to  insert  these  into  the  Congressional 
Record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let's  take  a  brief  recess. 

(A  brief  recess  was  taken  from  3  :50  to  3 :58  p.m.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

The  photographers  will  please  retire. 

At  the  time  of  the  recess,  Mr.  Dellinger,  we  were  talking  about  an 
alleged  assassination  of  certain  Negro  leaders  by  the  CIA,  and  yoiu 
had  asked  me  to  put  certain  evidence  that  you  might  provide  i]i  the 
Record.  Let  me  advise  you  that  I  have  some  of  my  closest  friends  to 
request  me  to  put  things  in  the  Record  that  I  often  turn  down.  I  would 
have  to  look  at  the  material.  But  if  you  do,  again,  if  you  do  have  any 
evidence,  I  would  appreciate  your  giving  it  to  this  conunittee  at  this 
time. 

IMr.  Dellinger.  Yes ;  I  want  it  made  very  clear  that  I  did  not  allege 
that  the  CIA  committed  these  assassinations.  I  said  the  circumstances 
were  very  suspicious,  CIA  does  commit  assassinations  all  over  the 
world,  and  that  sooner  or  later,  and  perhaps  already,  this  method  will 
be  used  in  the  United  States  as  well.  And  I  said  that  I  thought  that 
you  and  the  American  people,  everybody  who  is  concerned  for  the  wel- 
fare and  future  of  this  countrj^  and  the  world,  should  ask  themselves 
this  c^uestion  and  should  read  a  great  deal  of  the  material. 

I  did  offer  to  send  to  you  Eric  Norden's  article  on  the  assassination 
of  Malcolm  X  and  I  did  hope  that,  when  you  read  it,  you  would  feel 
moved  to  insert  it  in  the  Oongressional  Record  so  that  it  could  receive  a 
wider  audience  and  people  could  read  it  and  take  it  from  there. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  the  questioning,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And  excuse  me,  I  didn't  mean  to  interrupt,  but 
cotdd  I  ask  that  this  article  be  put  in  the  record  of  this  hearing,  since 
we  have  made  many  references  to  it  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  take  that  under  advisement,  and  you 
can  forward  the  article  to  the  Chair. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  this  same  connection,  the  testimony 
here,  to  me,  would  at  least  indicate  that  you  have  certainly,  or  perhaps, 
some  suspicions  about  how  Malcolm  X  met  his  death,  but  apparently 
you  have  no  defhiite  evidence,  other  than  suspicions. 

Perhaps  other  people  have  suspicions  the  other  way,  and  the  thing 
that  concerns  me  at  this  point  is  why  would  you  make  these  statements, 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  6  S  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2727 

which  have  been  attributed  to  you,  to  Havana  radio  with  no  more 
basis  in  fact  than  you  have  apparently  indicated. 

Was  it  done  with  the  intention  of  inflaming  those  people  in  Cuba  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  I  think  it  is  clear  that  I  have  gone  into  m^ich 
greater  detail  and  have  been  much  more  specific  here  in  this  country 
than  I  was  in  that  broadcast.  So  it  is  not  something  peculiar  to  going 
to  the  Havana  radio. 

As  I  indicated  earlier,  I  don't  have  any  double  standard  of  what 
I  say.  I  say  the  same  thing  basically  to  you,  to  the  American  press,  to 
the  foreign  press,  Avhether  within  the  Communist  countries  or  not. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  ever  say  some  things  you  wish  you  hadn't  said  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  I  often  don't  say  things  clearly  enough  or 
well  enough  or  I  change  my  mind,  my  opinion,  later. 

One  thmg  in  that  respect  that  occurred  to  me  in  connection  with 
Congressman  Watson's  Cjuestion  al)0ut  Communist  imperialism,  which 
I  think  I  didn't  make  clear  right  now,  so  I  would  like  to  make  it 
clearer. 

If  you  stop  to  think  of  it,  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 
involved  two  Communist  countries,  so  it  is  a  little  artificial,  if  this  was 
meant  to  be  implied,  and  certainly  some  people  think  of  it  that  way — 
it  is  certainly  a  little  artificial  to  identify  this  as  an  example  of  Com- 
munist aggression  because  it  was  also  an  example  of  a  Communist 
victim. 

And  I  think  one  has  to  be  a  little  more  careful  than  to  attribute  every 
wrongful  act  that  takes  place  in  a  Communist  country',  and  of  course 
there  are  many  and  ha^'e  been  many  historically  as  well,  to  attribute 
that  somehow  to  all  Communists,  all  Communist  countries,  or  all 
periods  of  communism. 

Mr.  IcnoRo.  You  are  not  saying  that  you  would  justify  aggression 
by  one  Commnnist  against  another  Communist  ? 

'  Mr.  Dellixger.  No;  I  am  just  saying  that  it  is  really,  in  this  case, 
not  a  question  of  Communist  aggression.  It  is  in  part,  but  it  is  also  a 
question,  to  complete  the  picture,  of  a  Communist  victim,  so  this  has 
something  to  do  with  the  nature  of  the  politics  and  internal  problems 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

And  one  of  the  faults  of  the  United  States  in  relation  to  Vietnam  has 
been  that  it  has  tried  to  build  up  an  artificial  picture  of  communism  in 
tenns  of  the  worst  period  of  Stalinism  and  without  reference  to  the 
fact  that  even  during  that  period  the  Soviet  Union  had  been  attacked 
by  the  TTnit^d  States  and  other  countries. 

And  to  take  it  out  of  context  and  say,  "This  is  tlie  nature  of  the  beast ; 
this  is  the  way  all  Communist  countries  are,"  and  so  when  an  underde- 
veloped country  like  Vietnam  begins  to  introduce  land  refonn  and 
cooperatives  and  literacy  and  medicine  and  to  introduce  what  I  prefer 
to  call  economic  democracy,  a  certain  form  of  communism  within 
Vietnam,  people  hold  it  up  and  say  this  is — they  will  act  and  they  are 
like  it — Mke  Stalin  in  his  worst  day. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Now,  am  I  to  understand,  since  you  brought  the  ques- 
tion back  UP,  that  you  are  now  modifying  your  condemnation  of  the 
Communist  aggression  against  Czechoslovakia? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  It  is  really  hard  for  me  not  to  be  unkind,  but  I  will 
try  not  to  be. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Well,  von  are  cond^Muning 


2728  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellingek.  Is  that  the  best  you  could  get  out  of  what  I  said? 

Mr.  Watsox.  Are  you  condemning  it  or  are  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  condemning  the  Soviet,  the  invasion  of  Soviet 
Kussia. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you 

Mr.  Dellinger.  A  Communist  country. 

ISIr.  Watsox.  Against  another  Communist  country. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Against  Czechoslovakia,  another  Communist 
country. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Oh,  so  your  condemnation,  then,  is  because  the  aggres- 
sion was  against  another  Communist  country  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  sorry. 

Mr.  Watson.  That's  an  unfair  question. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  sorry.  I  didn't  hear  what  you  said  at  the  end. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Well,  if  you  want  to  confer  with  counsel,  I  think  coun- 
sel might  know  what  I  am  going  to  ask  nest. 

Go  ahead. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  We  have  finished. 

JMr.  GuTMAN.  Let  me  guess. 

You  are  right,  Congressman,  it  was  a  nonsensical  question. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  have  a  question  you  wish  to  ask? 

Mr.  Watsox.  In  other  words,  your  condemnation  of  the  Soviet's 
activities  in  Czechoslovakia,  then,  would  in  no  way  be  affected  by  the 
fact  that  Czechoslovakia  was  a  Communist  country  and  the  aggres- 
sion was  against  a  Communist  country? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  would  have  been  opposed  to  that,  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  Czechoslovakian  Government. 

I  certainly  in  no  way,  however,  condemn  the  handful.  I  guess,  up 
until  now,  the  handful  of  Czechoslovakian  people  who  fell  victim  to 
the  Soviet  guns,  which  weren't  used  veiw  much  because  of  the  nature 
of  the  situation,  or  would  in  no  way  condemn  the  Czechoslovakian 
people  who  fell  victim  to  the  suppression  of  freedom. 

Mr.  Watson.  Of  course,  you  recall  this  came  up  in  the  context  of  our 
discussion  of  whether  or  not  you  had  been  active  in  condemning 
aggressive  communism. 

You  had  been  very  vocal  in  condemning  imperialistic  Americanism, 
and  so  that's  when  the  question  came  up.  and  so  if  you  can — and,  really, 
in  some  of  the  publications  that  I  have  seen  from  your  Ijibertarian 
Press,  I  have  failed  to  see  very  much  defense,  or  criticism,  rather,  of 
the  communism — and  so  if  you  could  sup])ly  us  with  some  of  the  issues 
in  which  you  have  condemned  aggressive  communism,  either  against 
Czechoslovakia  or  Hungary  or  any  place  else,  it  might  be  helpful,  and 
then  I  could  say  that  really  this  man  might  have  a  little  modicum  of 
objectivity  in  his  writing. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  When  the  Soviet  Union  was  invading  Hun- 
gary, I  helped  organize  and  spoke  at  a  mass  protest  rally,  and  although 
I  think  that  very  often  the  attacks  upon  the  Soviet  Union  from  this 
country  are  prejudicial  and  do  not  reflect  the  facts  accurately,  none- 
theless, whenever  the  Soviet  Union  or  any  other  Communist  country 
employs  totalitarian  methods  or  invades  another  counti-y,  I  speak  up 
against  it. 

I  have  signed  petitions  and  sent  them  to  Moscow  and  I  have  spoken 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2729 

in  Moscow  itself  against  the  imprisonment,  for  example,  of  the  Soviet 
jntellectuals. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Judging  fi'om  vrhat  you  said,  then,  wouldn't  one 
exception  be,  at  least  what  I  figure,  with  the  aggression  from  North 
Korea  and  South  Korea  ? 

I  notice  you  specifically  exempted  tliat  when  you  were  talking 
earlier. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  don't  know  how  far  you  want  to  go  into  Koreii, 
but  let  me  say- 


Mr.  AsHBROOK.  No,  I  just  uote  you  specifically  used  that 

Mr,  Dellinger.  I  consider  that  the  American  people,  suid  I  sup- 
pose in  a  sense  it  begins  with  historians,  but  should  delve  back  into 
the  history  of  the  Korean  war. 

I  think  that  that  war  took  place  at  a  time  when  the  American  people 
were  subjecting — were  suffering  from  the  brainwashing  and  the  politi- 
cal fears  and  fanaticism  associated  with  the  McCartliy  period  and  the 
cold  war,  and  I  think  that  they  assumed,  all  too  readily  and  without 
sufficient  evidence,  tliat  North  Korea  was  the  aggressor  and  that  the 
United  States  was  somehow  not  fighting  in  Korea  the  kind  of  war 
that  most  people  noAv  know  it  has  been  fighting  in  Vietnam. 

I  think  that  there  were  some  differences  between  the  war  in  Korea 
and  the  war  in  Vietnam,  but  basically  they  represent  the  same  phe- 
nomenon, the  attempt  of  American  imperialism  to  control  the  lives 
and  societies  of  Asia  and  to  control  them  for  the  profits  and  for  the 
sincere  self-righteousness  and  fanatical  missionary  purposes  of  the 
American  people. 

To  try  to  say  all  that  in  a  summary  form,  but  I  think  that  the  as- 
sumption that  North  Korea  invaded  ignores  such  things  as  the  visits 
of  Secretary  of  State  Dulles  to  Seoul  immediately  before  the  inva- 
sion ;  it  ignores  a  whole  lot  of  evidence.  And  in  this  case,  amongst  other 
things,  I  would  recommend  that  you  read  I.  F.  Stone's  book  on  the 
history  of  Korea,  which  was  published  in  1952 — I  forget  the  title — 
by  Monthly  Review  Press,  and  I  would  be  happy  to  send  you  a  copy 
if  you  would  read  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Am  I  to  understand,  Mr.  Dellinger,  that  you  feel  that 
if  North  Korea  were  to  invade  South  Korea,  the  United  States  would 
have  no  right  to  intervene  in  behalf  of  South  Korea  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  we  are  getting  "iffy,"  again,  but  I  am  opposed 
to  military  invasions  of  one  country  by  another.  I  think  I  have  made 
that  clear.  I  think,  however,  that  I  have  also  made  clear  that  I  do  not 
think  it  behooves  me,  as  a  member  of  the  privileged  imperialist  society 
of  the  United  States,  to  stand  in  judgment  of  the  methods  that  the 
victims  used  to  try  to  throw  off  that  imperialism. 

I  think  the  United  States  has  driven  a  wedge  through  two  countries 
in  Asia,  besides  infiltrating  and  overthrowing  governments  and  assas- 
sinating, and  so  forth,  that  I  talked  about  in  other  countries.  But  in 
Vietnam  and  in  Korea  it  has  taken  a  country  and  driven  a  line  across 
it,  the  same  as  if  the  Soviet  Union  or  China  or  anybody  else  would 
draw  a  line  right  across  the  United  States  and  say,  "Half  of  it  we  are 
going  to  control  because  our  system  is  better  and  because  we  have  the 
best  interests,  and  the  other  half  you  can  control." 

And  I  think  that  in  that  kind  of  a  situation  I  understand  why  the 


2730  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

people  of  Korea  want  to  tlirow  off  the  corrupt  dictatorship  of  Park, 
hist  like  they  wanted  to  throw  off  the  corrupt  dictatorship  of  Syngman 
ilhee.  I  understand  why  they  want  to  have  the  American  military  and 
industrial  interests  withdraw  so  that  they  can  run  their  own  country  in 
their  own  way,  and  I  am  not — althou<2:h  I  will  speak,  as  I  said,  in  a 
general  way  for  nonviolence  and  in  certain  circumstances  I  will  dis- 
cuss it  with  people  from  Korea  or  Vietnam,  if  I  am  talking  with 
them — ^I  don't  feel  that  I  have  the  moral  or  the  political  right  to  tell 
them  in  their  conditions  what  methods  they  should  use  to  try  to  get  rid 
of  American  imperialism. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed  with  the  questions,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  a  moment  ago  you  made  a  statement 
that  you  speak  both  in  the  American  press  as  well  as  in  the  foreign 
press  on  these  various  and  sundry  subjects. 

I  put  to  you  the  question,  sir :  Have  you  at  any  time  over  Havana 
radio,  which  we  have  established  you  do  communicate  with,  have  you 
at  any  time  ever  delivered  a  statement  over  the  Havana  radio,  or  an 
interview,  in  opposition  to  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia '? 

j\Ir.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  did. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  And  would  you  give  me  the  date,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Delt.tnger.  Well,  I  can't  give  3^ou  the  date.  You  apparently 
have  better  records  than  I  do,  or  keep  them,  but  when  I  was  in  Chicago, 
in  the  midst  of  the  police  riot,  I  ducked  into  the  office  at  407  South 
Dearborn  Street,  was  intending  to  be  there  about  15  minutes  to  take 
care  of  some  business  or  other  and  go  out  into  action  again,  and  some- 
body said,  '""^hero  is  a  long  distance  call  for  j^ou."  And  T  picked  it  up, 
and  it  was  Havana  radio  and  they  asked  me  some  questions,  and  I 
can't  give  you  the  exact  words — you  undoubtedly  already  have  them, 
or  at  feast  in  a  version  that  went  from  English  to  Spanish  to  English 
and  was  picked  up,  accurately  or  inaccurately,  by  somebody,  but  any- 
*vay,  in  the  course  of  that  speech,  whatever  you  want  to  call  it,  that  in- 
terview with  Havana  radio,  I  mentioned  the  fact  that  Chicago  had 
become  the  Prague  of  the  United  States,  or  the  Prague  of  the  Mid- 
west, and  I  don't  remember  what  else,  but  I  clearly  indicated  mj^  op- 
position to  the  Soviet,  or  implied — I  don't  want  to  exaggerate ;  I  think 
I  made  it  quite  clear  that  I  was  opposed  to  the  Soviet  mtervention  in 
Czechoslovakia  and  that  we  were  comparing  the  actions  of  Daley, 
Daley  and  Humphrey's  and  Johnson's  and  Bailey's  police,  with  the 
actions  of  the  Soviet  troops. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  directing  your  attention  to  this  broad- 
cast further,  you  were  also  asked  the  following  question. 

IVfr.  GuTMAN.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that,  sir? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  This  is  the  same  one. 

Mr.  Gttfmax.  Back  to  the  same  one.  I  am  sorry. 

]\[r.  CoNLEY.  At  the  bottom  of  the  page : 

Mr.  Dellinger,  How  do  you  view  the  possibility  of  a  united  struggle  by  militant 
black  and  white  elements  on  common  nasesV 

And,  again,  according  to  the  broadcast,  you  replied  in  part  as  fol- 
lows, and  I  am  extracting  from  your  reply  certain  paragraphs — and 
you  certainly  are  at  liberty  to  add,  if  you  wish  to,  but  I  do  want 
to  establish  these  particular  paragraphs — the  first  paragraph  being 
the  last  full  paragraph  on  the  bottom  of  the  page : 

I  entirely  favor  the  creation  of  a  common  front,  a  common  goal,  and  unified 
action.  *  *  * 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2731 

Then  turning  to  the  next  page,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  In  this  case,  I  would  have  to  ask  that  the  next 
sentence  be  read,  because  it  is  part  of  it : 

But  it  is  encouraging  to  see  the  black  people  developing  their  own  strength,  their 
own  sense  of  dignity,  and  confidence  in  their  own  strength. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right.  Now,  on  the  next  page,  starting  at  the  be- 
ginning, the  first  paragraph : 

Because  they  suffer  more  directly  and  openly  than  the  whites,  the  black  popu- 
lation is  more  advanced  and  nearer  a  revolutionary  position.  This  is  why  they 
have  made  themselves  the  natural  leaders  of  the  people — 

And  if  I  may  move  on  to  the  last  paragraph 

Mr.  Dellinger,  I  would  like  to  add  the  part,  "and  this  is  deepening 
both  the  blacks'  " — excuse  me — 
"deepening  both  the  blacks'  and  vrhites'  political  awareness 

Mr.  CoNLEY  [continues  reading]. 

.although  there  is  some  holding  back  in  white  communities. 

As  a  white  citizen,  I  think  our  immediate  responsibility  is  to  raise  the  white 
segment's  political  awareness,  thereby  making  ourselves  better  comrades  of  the 
black  community.  *  *  * 

And  finishing  up  the  paragraph — 

and  try  to  be  better  qualified  to  serve  as  comrades  and  allies  with  the  black 
•community. 

Now^,  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  will  ask  you  if  those  three  particular  para- 
graphs which  I  have  read  to  you  from  the  transmission  are  substan- 
tially statements  which  you  did  make  on  August  15. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  the  words  don't  seem  to  be  mine  all  the  way. 
I  am  not  accustomed  to  using  the  word  "comrade."'  I  might,  you  know, 
to  my  lawyer  or  somebody  in  a  certain  very  informal  sense,  but  politi- 
^-ally  the  term  has  been,  you  know,  it  was  overused  and  misused  and  a 
lot  of  things,  and  I  just  don't  ordinarily  speak  in  those  terms. 

This  could  have  been  entirely  innocent,  either  in  going  from  English 
to  Spanish  or  back,  or  in  the  hearing  on  the  shortwave.  I  don't  know. 
But  the  general  essence  of  the  statements,  I  subscribe  to,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir.  I  have  no  concern  with  the  particular 
use  of  the  word  "comrade."  Wliat  I  am  wishing  to  ask  you  about  is 
this :  What  did  you  mean  when  you  stated  in  these  paragraphs  that  the 
black  population,  being  nearer  a  revolutionary  position  is,  quote,  to 
use  your  words,  "more  advanced"  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  have  tried  to  make  clear,  publicly  and 
privately,  at  least  since  I  spent  3  years  in  the  Federal  prison,  that  I 
believe  we  need  a  revolutionary  change  in  this  country  and  I  consider 
myself  a  nonviolent  revolutionist. 

Now,  leaving  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  nonviolence,  I 
"believe  that  the  United  States  gave  great  hope  to  the  world  with 
documents  and  aspirations  such  as  those  expressed  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  in  1776,  but  there  were  two  fatal  flaws.  One  of  them 
was  that  this  document  did  not  apply  to  the  natives  of  the  country,  the 
Indians,  and  it  did  not  apply  to  the  black  people  who  were  being 
brought  over  here  as  slaves. 

But  there  was  also  a  flaw  in  that  we  introduced  the  highest  form  of 
political  democracy  known  in  the  18th  century,  but  we  did  not  intro- 
duce economic  democracy.  In  fact,  far  the  opposite. 


2732  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

We  introduced  a  very  complex  document  which  Adam  Smith, 
amongst  others,  enunciated  mainly,  and  he  was  a  very  religious  man. 
He  thought  that  that  was— you  know,  he  was  sincere  about  it.  He  said, 
•'If  everybody  works  basically  for  his  own  selfish  interests,  through 
economic  and  other  competition,  the  invisible  hand  of  God  will  make 
thino-s  turn  out  best  for  the  community  and  the  society  as  a  whole." 
I  believe  that  this  was  totally,  a  hundred  percent  wrong,  and  I 
believe  that  our  failure  to  introduce  economic  democracy,  together 
with  our  failure  to  extend  political  democracy  to  all  people,  Avith  or 
without  property,  with  white  skins,  black  skins,  red  skins,  or  what— 
our  failure  to  do  that  has  corrupted  and  led  our  society  and  our 
system  astray. 

It  doesn't  mean  that  there  don't  remain  to  this  day  many  good 
aspects  and  many  good  impulses  and  many  sincere  aspirations  and 
many  people  who,  even  soldiers,  who  have  gone  to  Vietnam  and 
dropped  napalm,  thinking  they  were  doing  it  for  a  better  society— 
although  I  think  they  were  tragically  wrong — but  I  believe  that  our 
society,  particularly  now,  there  has  been  the  industrial  revolution,  the 
electronic  revolution ;  we  have  the  giant  corporations.  We  have  the — 
how  many  million  dollars  was  it  that  Nixon  and  Humphrey  had  to 
spend  to  run  for  President  ?  We  have  all  of  the  economic  aristrocracy 
and  economic  concentration  of  power  which  makes  democracy  an 
illusion  and  a  failure  in  this  country. 

And  so  I  am  for  revolutionary  change  and  I  think  that  the  black 
people  who  have  suffered  from  the  w^orst  aspects  of  our  failure  to  be 
genuinely  democratic  are  therefore  more  sensitive  to  some  of  the 
hypocrisy  or  some  of  the  illusions  involved  in  our  system,  and,  there- 
fore, they  are  more  apt  to  adopt  a  genuinely  revolutionary  position 
than  most  of  us.  And  I  use  the  term  "revolutionary"  in  the  sense  of 
drastic  or  basic.  I  do  not  use  it  in  the  sense  of  meaning  that  I  should 
go  out  and  kill  you,  or  you  should  go  out  and  kill  me.  In  fact,  one  of 
the  things  that  I  am  opposed  to  is  a  seizure  of  power. 

I  believe  that  what  we  need  to  do  is  to  decentralize  and  democratize 
power,  both  politically  and  in  terms  of  the  economic  institutions  of 
the  country. 

So  I  am  a  revolutionist  in  that  sense,  and  in  that  and  in  other  senses, 
because  there  is  no  monolithic  approach  to  these  things. 

The  black  people,  in  fact,  in  ways  that  I  and  others  can  learn  from, 
have  revolutionary  instincts  and  instincts  for  justice  and  for  freedom 
that  we  are  not  so  apt  to  have.  So  I  look  for  some  kind  of  united 
struggle  between  those  who  feel  in  general  as  I  do,  those  who  are 
upset  over  the  failure  of  our  system,  the  failure  of  us,  for  instance,  to 
be  able  to  hold  a  democratic  presidential  election.  We  haven't  voted 
on  the  issues;  we  voted  on  personalities  who  have  avoided  the  issues. 
So  people  who  are  upset  over  that,  or  upset  over  the  persistence  of 
poverty,  people  who  feel  as  I  do,  that  the  war  in  Vietnam  was  not  the 
accident  of  a  bad  man  in  office,  but  feel  that  it  grew  out  of  these  begin- 
nings even  in  American  history  in  which  we  have  advanced  steadily 
across  the  continent,  picking  up  parts  of  Mexico  and  islands  that  don't 
belong  to  us,  like  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  and  the  Philipj^ines  and 
PInAvaii,  and  then  have  gotten  to  Vietnam. 

The  ]:)eople  who  are  a  little  bit,  at  least,  aware  of  that  are  horrified 
by  the  napalm. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6S  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CON'\XNTION  2733 

I  hate  to  put  it  just  on  the  atrocities,  but  still  it  makes  it  more  real  in 
terms  of  human  flesh,  but  also  by  the  spiritual  indignity  imposed  upon 
the  Vietnamese  people. 

Even  now,  flying  recomiaissance  planes  over  their  country  -s\  hen  -we 
sav  we  are,  you  know,  moving  toward  peace. 

The  people  who  feel  that  way,  I  Ijelieve,  have  a  right  and  a  responsi- 
bility and  obligation  to  unite  with  black  people  who  have  suffered  the 
things  that  the  black  people  have  suffered  and  to  try,  together,  to 
work  to  make  the  original  promise  of  America  and  the  aspiration 
which  many  hold  to  this  day.  to  make  it  a  reality,  to  have  a  genuine 
societv  in  which  all  men  and  women  and  children  are  equal  and  have 
freedom  and  the  kind  of  economic  security  and  well-l>emg  which  cer- 
tainly our  technology'  makes  possible. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  moving  your  attention,  if  I  may.  to 
another  radio  broadcast  with  Havana,  Cuba,  directing  your  attention 
specifically  to  August  29.  the  day  after  the  convention  ended — — 

Mr.  Dellixger."  That  is  the  date  on  which  I  spoke  about  the  Soviet 
invasion. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  All  right.  Havana  radio  summarized  another  tele- 
phone interx-iew  it  said  it  had  with  you,  and  this  is  not  a  literal  trans- 
lation, as  I  understand  it,  of  your  words.  It  is  a  smnmar\'  by  Havana 
radio,  which  they  broadcast,  which  we  picked  up  and  which  has  been 
retranslated  again,  and  if  I  may  read  this  to  you  and  then  ask  you  if 
it  substantially  states  what  you  said  at  that  time : 

U.S.  PACIFIST  LEADER  DAVID  DELLINGER  declared  in  Chicago  that  the 
heroic  fight  of  the  Cuban  people  today  serves  as  an  inspiration  to  those  who  fight 
in  the  United  States  to  put  an  end  to  the  criminal  hand  of  the  GoTemment  of 
Washington.  Dellinger  granted  RADIO  HABANA  a  telephonic  interview  in 
connection  with  the  demonstrations  in  Chicago  that  aim  at  halting  the  U.S. 
aggression  in  Vietnam. 

He  added  that  the  demonstrators  had  been  brutally  treated  by  tens  of  thous- 
ands of  polic-emen  and  soldiers  mobilized  in  Chicago.  The  U.S.  leader  also  said 
that  millions  of  his  fellow-citizens  had  lost  their  faith  in  the  so-called  U.S. 
democratic  system  and  that  they  have  decided  to  fight  to  end  the  war  and  to  do 
away  with  jwverty.  exploitation,  and  racism  in  their  home  country. 

Dellinger  who  is  president  of  the  National  Committee  of  Mobilization  against 
The  War  in  Vietnam  and  publisher  of  the  magazine  "LIBERATION"  said  that 
the  official  position  of  the  Yankee  Government  in  the  Paris  talks  is  false  and 
hypocritical.  You  cannot  ask  the  victim  and  the  aggressor  to  reduce  their  military 
operations  at  the  same  time,  said  David  Dellinger,  and  he  added  :  the  one  side 
is  fighting  for  its  home  coimtry  and  for  its  liberation  and  the  other  side  is  trying 
to  curb  the  aspirations  of  that  people. 

After  pointing  out  that  people  in  the  United  States  are  becoming  aware  of  what 
is  really  hapi)ening  in  Cuba,  the  prominent  U.S.  pacifist  stated  :  If  one  appreciates 
both  the  heroism  and  the  dynamism  of  the  peoples  of  Vietnam  and  Cuba,  one 
draws  from  two  sources  of  enormous  capacity. 

David  Dellinger  concluded  his  statements  made  by  phone  to  RADIO  HABANA 
CUBA  with  these  words :  We,  Americans,  are  determined  to  liberate  our  country 
in  the  same  way  ;  may  we  also  assure  you  of  our  solidarity. 

Is  this  a  fair  account  of  what  you  said  to  Radio  Havana,  which  was 
transmitted  back  by  them,  and  I  am  sure  editorialized  upon  by  them, 
or  whatever  way  tliey  wrote  their  story,  and  then  was  retranslated 
in  this  country  ( 

Mr.  Dellixger.  "Well,  first  of  all,  I  think  you  have  very  fairly 
indicated,  you  know,  the  process  that  took  place,  and  obviously,  you 
know,  there  are  some  phrases,  again,  which  are  not  my  phrases. 

I  have  accused  the  United  States  of  war  crimes  m  Vietnam,  con- 

21-706 — 69— pt.  3 i 


2734  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

trary  to  the  Xuremberjj;  nnd  other  judi>-ments.  But  I  don't  ordinarily 
speak  of  the  criminal  hands. 

It  is  not  important.  I  think  the  Walker  Commission,  as  well  as  the 
evidence  at  the  time,  has  clearly  demonstrated,  made  clear,  that  the 
demonstrators  were  brutally  treated. 

It  is  true  that  millions  have  lost  faith  in,  I  don't  remember  the  exact 
phrase,  but  in  the  way  our  "democracy,"  in  quotes,  is  now  operating. 

I  think  it  is  clear  that,  Avell,  according-  to  some  estimates,  perhaps 
as  many  as  5  million  people  who  normally  in  the  past  would  have  voted, 
did  not  vote  in  the  past  election  or,  in  the  case  of  a  minority  of  those 
four  or  five  million,  voted  for  other  candidates,  selectively,  but  not 
for  President. 

I  wouldn't  use  the  phrase  "Yankee  Government,"  but  that  is  no  abuse 
on  their  part.  That  is  simply,  you  know,  semantics. 

I  do  have  here  at  this  time  stated  that  I  think  that  one  side  in  Viet- 
nam is  trying  to  fight  for  its  homeland  and  its  independence  and  its 
own  self-determination,  and  the  other  side,  the  United  States  side,  is 
trying  to  suppress  their  aspirations  even  though,  as  I  have  stated, 
many  people  who,  particularly  in  the  early  days,  did  this,  did  it  quite 
sincerely,  out  of  illusions,  I  do  believe — and  these  sound  almost  like 
my  exact  words — that  Cuba  and  Vietnam  have  provided  a  heroic  and 
dynamic 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "Heroism"  and  "dynamism." 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Heroism  and  dynamism  which  has  been  an  inspira- 
tion to  many  Americans  in  this  country  because,  although  it  is  easy 
for  people  to  be  disillusioned  with  our  commercialism  and  our  facade  of 
democracy,  which  doesn't  really  extend  deep  enough  into  everyday  life, 
it  is  very  hard  for  people  to  get  the  energy  and  to  have  the  dynamics 
to  fight  for  something  better  or  even  to  dare  hope  that  there  might  be 
something  better.  And  although  there  are  thnigs  in  both  of  those 
societies  which  are  not  of  the  best  and  although  I  think  every  people, 
including  the  American  people,  must  solve  their  own  problems  and 
develop  their  own  indigenous  institutions  and  not  import  from  any 
foreign  country,  nonetheless,  the  attempt,  the  heroic  and  dynamic  at- 
tempt of  the  Vietnamese  and  Cuban  people  to  build  a  world  of  brotlier- 
hood  and  a  world  of  human  equality,  I  think  that  that  offers  some  in- 
spiration and  also  offers  us  some  concrete  examples  of  methods  to  look 
into. 

So  I  certainly — and  I  hope  that  the  American  people  will  liberate 
themselves  in  a  way  similar.  That  is,  I  hope  that  the  American  people 
will  work  out  ways  of  getting  rid  of  the  undemocratic  influence  of 
institutions  like  the  United  Fruit  Company,  which,  for  example,  pre- 
vented democracy  in  Cuba  and  prevents  it  now  in  most  of  Latin 
America.  I  think  we  should  free  ourselves  from  the  tyrannical  and 
antidemocratic  power  of  corporations  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  then,  am  I  correct,  Mr.  Dellinger,  that  you,  that 
the  statement,  and  particularly  I  am  reading,  "We,  Americans,  are 
determined  to  liberate  our  country  in  the  same  way ;  may  we  also  assure 
you  of  our  solidarity."  Is  that  a  fair  statement  of  what  you  said  ? 

Mr.  I^ELLiXGER.  Not — I  am  sure  that  this  M'as  undoubtedly  innocent 
on  their  part,  or  maybe  it  is  not  even  necessary  to  say  that  because  you 
nmst  put  that  in  the  context  that  thej^  continually  referred  to  me  as  a 
pacifist. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2735 

So,  obviously,  when  I  said  whatever  they  summarized  that  way,  I 
was  not  suggesting  that  we  should  go  into  the  Grand  Canyon  or  the 
Rockies  and  organize  a  guerrilla  force  which  would  attempt  to  over- 
throw the  United  States  Government.  It  is  contrary  to  my  beliefs. 
It  is  contrary  to  the  practical  possibilities  for  anybody  who  might  even 
be  willing  if  they  thought  it  would  work. 

So,  clearly,  as  a  pacifist  leader,  and  this,  I  think,  makes  quite  clear 
that  in  Cuba,  as  in  Vietnam,  I  have  always  identified  myself  as  a 
pacifist,  and  in  that  context,  yes,  I  believe  that  the  American  people 
should  liberate  themselves  from  the  evils  of  corporations  and  of  an 
inadequate  democracy  which  gives  the  illusion  that  people  have  con- 
trol over  their  lives,  which  they  don't  really  have. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Coimsel,  in  that  regard,  Mr.  Dellinger,  obviously 
this  broadcast  is  in  error  in  one  part,  that  it  omitted  your  earlier  al- 
leged condemnation  of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia.  I  saw 
no  reference  to  that,  so  it  is  in  error  that  they  omitted  that. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  when  I  talk  next 
to  my  Cuban  friends,  who  will  not  necessarily  be  Radio  Havana,  but 
I  will  certainly,  as  a  matter  of  interest,  ask  if  they  have  a  transcript  of 
what  exactly  was  broadcast  because  I  realize  there  are  two  possibilities 
here:  one,  that  whoever  picked  it  up  on  the  shortwave  either  missed 
that,  missed  that,  either  intentionally  or  unintentionally.  I  mean,  it 
could  have  been  broadcast  and  not  added  on  in  this. 

The  other  possibility  is  that  somebody  in  Radio  Havana  who  dis- 
agreed with  my  views  left  that  out. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  ever  have  any  of  your  statements  edited  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  It  happens  in  this  comitry.  It  happens 
elsewhere. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  have  had  that  happen. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  We  wouldn't  say  Cuba  is  the  only  one  that  does  that. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  obviously  it  is  interesting  to  me  because  I  never 
heard  the  broadcast.  And  I  wouldn't  make  it  a  major  effort,  but  I  will 
inquire  and  see  if  I  can  find  out  how  it  happened,  or  what  happened. 

Mr.  IciiORD.  Proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  directing  your  attention  specifically  to 
August  26,  Chicago,  Illinois,  early  in  the  morning  of  August  26  in 
Chicago,  the  police,  according  to  reports,  cleared  out  of  Lincoln  Park 
some  1,000  people  who  had  determined  that  they  would  spend  the  night 
in  the  park,  even  though  they  had  been  denied  a  permit  which  was 
in  violation  of  the  city  ordinances,  and  there  apparently  was  some  free- 
for-all  there  in  the  park  and  there  was  fighting  and  there  were  in- 
juries sustained. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  This  is  the  morning  ? 

]Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes.  Early  morning  hours,  actually,  of  August  26. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Oh,  maybe  like  after  midnight,  12  to  1,  or 
something. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  jSTow,  were  you  aware,  to  begin  with,  that  this  ordi- 
nance which  denies  a  person  the  right  to  remain  in  the  park  was  not  an 
ordinance  of  recent  vintage  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  that  this  ordinance 
had  been  in  effect  in  Chicago,  as  it  is  in  many  other  cities  in  the  United 
States,  for  a  number  of  years,  that  closes  parks  at  a  particular  time 
in  the  evening  ? 


2736  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  was  aware  that  this  ordinance  was,  I  believe,  ad- 
ministrative. Anyway,  somebody  had  the  power  to  suspend  it  because 
on  a  number  of  occasions,  ranging  from  the  National  Guard  to,  if  I  re- 
member correctly,  the  Shriners — if  not  the  Shriners,  some  group  of 
that  kind — had  had  the  ordinance  sus^^ended  and  had  been  able  to  use 
the  park  after  11  o'clock. 

So  I  was  aware  that  this  really  was  in  the  discretion  of  the  city  ad- 
ministration and  I  continually  took  the  position  and  I  was  never  able 
to  get  to  see  Mayor  Daley  himself.  But  to  his  assistant  and  to  a  cor- 
poration counsel  and  other  people,  I  continually  said  that  a  city  that  in 
the  midst  of  a  cruel  war  that  was  killing  off  hundreds  of  Americans 
and  thousands  of  Vietnamese  every  week,  a  city  who  invited  the  war 
party,  the  administration  which  was  conducting  that  war,  to  hold  its 
political  convention,  had  to  assume  that  along  with  that  convention 
would  come  thousands  of  protesters,  and  that  just  like  the  city  had 
a  responsibility  to  provide  traffic  policemen  and,  oh,  sanitary  facilities, 
if  necessary,  and  first  aid  to  accommodate  a  major  football  game  or 
a  World  Series  or  something  of  that  kind,  so,  when  it  invited  in  a  con- 
vention and,  automatically,  protesters,  it  had  a  responsibility  to  pro- 
vide the  facilities  for  sleeping,  for  first  aid,  for  all  of  the  various 
things  that  would  both  make  it  possible  for  those  people  to  express 
their  democratic  rights  meaningfully  and  also  protect  whatever 
citizens  of  Chicago  or  convention  delegates  or  other  people  who  were 
in  the  city  at  that  time. 

Now,  I  was  a  little  nervous  about  people  pleeping  in  the  p^rk.  T 
didn't  think  it  was  my  riglit  ro  tell  anybody  whether  they  should  slee]:) 
there  or  not,  but  the  Mobilization  made  a  very  serious  attempt  to 
rent  from  the  city  Soldier  Field  or,  we  said,  if  that  was  unavailable, 
any  comparable  facility. 

We  even  offered — and  at  that  time,  I  can  tell  you,  we  were  in  debt  I 
would  guess  at  least  $10,000 — but  we  offered  to  rent  Soldier  Field  and 
to  pay  $1,500  a  night  for  it  so  people  could  have  a  place  where  they 
could  sleep  and  meet  and  gather  and  eat  sandwiches  or  what  have  you 
and  not  either  be  an  interference  with  the  other  convention  delegates 
and  other  facilities  or  run  into  some  of  the  exaggerated  risks  which 
the  city  of  Chicago  was  claiming  would  follow  from  the  demonstra- 
tors being  there. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  ISIr.  Bellinger,  at  that  point  Mr.  Hay  den,  I  belicA-e.  in 
response  to  one  of  my  questions,  indicated  that  he  entertained  a  con- 
stitutional view  that  the  first  amendment  right  of  freedom  of  assembly 
was  absolute  and  not  subject  to  restrictions. 

You  indicated  some  concern  about  the  existing  ordinance  and 
whether  it  was  effective  or  not. 

I  am  wondering  if  you  entertain  the  same  view  as  to  the  first  amend- 
ment right  of  freedom  of  assembly. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Ichord.  There  is  no  trick  to  the  question. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  that's  all  right.  I  am  not  worried. 

Naturally,  I  have  not  read  the  transcript,  or  anyway  I  have  not 
had  an  opportunity  to  read  the  transcript  of  wliat  Mr.  iflayden  said. 

Mr.  Ichord.  I  understand. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  So  I  would  like  to  make  mv  own  statement,  witliout 
reference  to  what  he  may  or  may  not  have  said. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2737 

First  of  all,  I  thiiik  that  the  right  of  people  to  assembly  and  to 
protest  for  redress  of  grievances  is  extremely  strong  under  the  Con- 
stitution. But  anyway,  at  a  time  when,  as  I  keep  saying,  people  are 
being  killed,  people  are  being  oppressed,  people  are  being  drafted,  all 
this  kind  of  thing,  there  is  a  tremendous  urgency,  which,  as  I  indicated 
earlier,  means  that  I  think  we  should  set  aside  business  as  usual  and 
that  there  must  be  some  inconvenience  and  some  problems. 

Now,  within  that,  in  other  words,  I  am  not  interested  in  the  move- 
ment which  has  the  token  right  to  dissent,  the  token  right  to  express 
a  differing  opinion  than  that  of  the  administration,  but  allows  the 
war  to  go  on  and  these  people  to  be  killed  and  maimed  and  all  the  rest. 

I  am  interested  in  a  movement  which  will  stop  the  war  and  which 
v,'ill  liberate  the  American  people,  as  well  as  allow  the  Vietnamese 
people  to  be  liberated.  And  I  think  that  one  has  a  tremendous  moral 
and  political  obligation  to  act,  to  be  effective,  and  to  be  successful,  and 
not  just  to  express  dissent. 

Now,  again  within  that  framework,  it  has  been  my  view  that  the 
kind  of  liberation  that  I  am  talking  about,  and  that  in  general  the 
movement  stands  for,  is  a  humanist  liberation. 

I  don't  want  to  punish  Congressman  Watson.  I  want  to  give  him  an 
opportunity  to  live  a  better  life,  a  life  in  which  you  can  enjoy,  and 
I  hate — I  don't  mean  to  sound  patronizing;  I  am  afraid  maybe  it 
does — but  anyway,  for  all  people. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  can  punish 

Mr.  Dellinger.  A  life  in  which  people  can  find  the  joys  and  the 
satisfactions  of  brotherhood  and  peace,  and  not  of  boasting  that  they 
have  the  highest  consumer  standard  of  living  in  the  world,  but  of 
boasting  that  they  are  the  most  honest  and  just  and  egalitarian 
country  in  the  world. 

Now,  within  this  framework,  it  applies  to  a  lot  of  little  things, 
because  I  think  big  things  grow  out  of  little  things,  and  it  was  not 
my  desire  in  Chicago  or  anywhere  else,  for  example,  artificially  and 
unnecessarily  to  interfere  with  the  rights  and  the  liberties  and  the 
normal  lives  of  other  people.  I  wanted  to  challenge  them;  I  wanted  to 
bring  everything  out  into  the  open  and  have  them  have  to  face  up  to  it 
one  way  or  another.  But  both  in  that  interest  and  in  the  interests  of  the 
Tippies,  who  were  the  most  interested  in  sleeping  in  Lincoln  Park,  but 
also  a  lot  of  other  young  people,  I  thought  it  would  be  better  to  let 
them  sleep  in  Soldier  Field  or  somewhere  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  you  and  an  earlier  witness  have  equated 
your  request  to  use  this  part  with  that  of  the  Shriners. 

I  don't  happen  to  be  a  Shriner,  but  I  applaud  their  effort  and  I  be- 
lieve that  any  objective  person  would  conclude  that  their  objectives 
and  their  activities  are  180  degrees  from  that  of  your  organization. 

But  to  get  specifically  to  the  point,  do  you  know  of  any  occasion 
when  a  Shrine  group  has  either  requested  or  been  granted  permission 
to  sleep  in  Grant  Park  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  first  of  all,  let  me  say  I  am  not  very  familiar 
with  the  Shriners. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Well,  you  mean  you  make  the  accusation,  you  and 
others.  Do  3'ou  know  of  any  time  where  they  have  either  requested  or 
been  granted  permission  to  sleep  in  Grant  Park  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Mr.  Watson,  I  don't  like  you  to 

Mr.  Watson.  To  ask  these  rather  interesting  questions  ? 


2738  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellingek.  No.  I  am  glad  for  the  question.  But  I  don't  like 
you  to  attribute  views  to  me,  or  statements,  that  I  didn't  make. 

I  don't  think  I  accuse<^l  the  Shriners  of  anything.  I  am  not  very  fami- 
liar with  the  Shriners. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  you  made  a  reference  earlier. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Wliat  I  said  was  that  the  city  of  Chicago  had  sus- 
pended the  ordinance  and  had  allowed  groups,  including  the  National 
Guard  and  including  either  the  Shriners  or  some  groups  similar  to 
that,  to  use  the  park  after  the  closing  hours. 

Now,  I  do  not  remember  the  full  details,  as  I  say.  It  could  have  been 
somebody  else,  but  I  believe  the  Shriners.  But  this  information  was 
even  volunteered  to  us,  or  I  was  going  to  say  by  the  assistant  mayor  of 
Chicago.  It  is  possible  that  it  was  first  brought  out  by  one  of  our  law- 
yers who  did  some  researcli,  and  then  assented  to  or,  in  other  words, 
the  deputy  mayor  agi^eed  that  this  had  happened.  But  I  was  not  making 
any  accusations  and  I  was  trying  to  be  very  precise. 

I  do  not  know  whether  they  stayed  there  all  night  or  what,  but  even 
if  nobody  had  done  it  before,  we  liave  never  had  a  war  before  which 
had  t]\e.  majority  of  the  population  as  aroused  against  it  as  this  one. 
And  tliere  is  an  obligation  of  the  city  to  provide  facilities  and  make  it 
}X)Ssible  for  the  protesters,  who  are  an  inevitable  accompaniment  of 
the  convention,  to  make  it  possible  for  them  to  be  there  without  being 
subjected  to  beating,  gassing,  and  other  attacks,  whether  sporadic  or 
organized. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Well,  I  think  your  point  is,  then,  Mr.  Bellinger,  you  had 
heard  that  it  was  used  by  the  Shriners  and  you  thought  that  it  should 
also  be  used  by  your  organization. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  thought  it  should  be  used  by  us,  by  those  demon- 
strators who  wanted  to  use  it,  before  I  heard  that  it  had  been  used  by 
some  other  group. 

But  in  response  to  the  question,  it  was  clear  that  this  ordinance  was 
not  absolute,  that  it  was  within  the  discretion  of  the  city  to  suspend 
that. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  care  whether  the  ordinance  was  absolute  or  not^ 
but  if  there  were  no  provisions  in  the  ordinance  for  suspension,  though 
I  happen  to  be  a  Shriner,  I  will  say  they  should  be  enforced  against  the 
Shriners  just  as  much  as  they  should  be  enforced  against  any  other 
group. 

But  go  ahead.  I  don't  think  this  is  too  relevant  to  our  inquiry. 

Let's  proceed. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Just  one  summary  sentence. 

It  seems  to  me  that  such  an  ordinance  would  yield  to  making  the  first 
amendment  rights  effective  in  that  situation. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may,  in  connection  with  what  we 
started  out  here  about  the  incidents  in  Lincoln  Park,  and  I  think  per- 
haps we  will  now  get  to  the  quotation  that  you  had  reference  to,  about 
the  Prague  of  the  Middle  West,  later  that  morning  you  purportedly 
held  a  press  conference,  that  is,  the  morning  of  August  26  you  held 
this  press  conference  in  Chicago,  and  it  was  reported  in  the  Chicago 
newspapers.  Now,  whether  this  was  also  reported  in  Havana,  Cuba,  I 
have  no  way  of  knowing.  But  this  is  what  you  said,  quote : 

We  have  achieved  a  tragic  victory.  We  have  forced  the  city  of  Chicago  and 
Mayor  (Richard  J.)  Daley  to  bring  out  into  the  open  the  machinery  of  repres- 
sions which  makes  this  city  the  Prague  of  the  Middle  West. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2739 

Xow,  I  liave  no  information  that  indicates  that  Radio  Havana  ever 
broadcast  this.  This  statement  was  made,  and  it  was  made  in  the  United 
States  to  American  reporters  and  was  reported  in  the  American  press. 
Mr.  Dellinger.  That  is,  as  near  as  I  can  tell,  an  accurate  presenta- 
tion and  that  is  substantially  what  I  said  at  the  relevant  point  in  the 
interview  with  Havana,  also. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Well,  my  question,  anyway,  is  that,  in  view  of  this 
statement,  this  quotation  from  you  to  the  reporters  in  Chicago,  and  in. 
view  of  your  statements  which  you  had  made  to  Radio  Havana,  which 
we  have  talked  about  earlier  here,  those  made  earlier,  that  it  was  your 
intent  in  Chicago  to  organize,  to  foment,  and  bring  about  violations  of 
the  law  and  refusals  of  demonstrators  to  obey  lawful  orders  of  the 
police,  thereby  compelling  the  police  to  use  physical  force  to  imple- 
ment the  law 

Mr.  Dellingee.  You  are  reading  that  from  something  ? 
I  don't  quite — I  lost  it. 

Mr.  CoNLET.  My  question,  sir — I  will  repeat  it  to  you. 
Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  please.  I  am  sorry. 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  want  to  read  it  to  you  specifically. 
Mr.  Dellinger,  In  other  words,  you  have  moved  from  my  statement 
now  to  a  written  question  ?  Right  ? 
Thank  you. 
Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir. 

In  light  of  this  statement  which  you  made  to  the  newspapers  in 
Chicago,  in  light  of  your  earlier  statements  to  Radio  Havana,  isn't 
it  a  fact  that  it  was  your  intent  in  Chicago  to  organize,  to  foment,  and 
to  bring  about  violations  of  the  law  and  refusal  of  demonstrators  to 
obey  lawful  orders  of  the  police,  thereby  compelling  the  police  to  use 
physical  force  to  implement  the  law  ? 
Mr.  Dellinger.  May  I  use  an  analogy  ? 

If  you  asked  me,  in  view  of  what  you  tried  to  explain  earlier  about 
being  a  nonviolent  revolutionist,  "Am  I  to  conclude  that  you  support 
the  suppression  by  Stalin  of  political  opposition  during  the  1920's 
and  the  1930's,"  I  would  have  to  say  you  are  off  in  another  field. 

That's  not  my  language.  I  don't  speak  about  fomenting.  I  don't 
believe  people  can  foment.  I  think  that  is  an  illusion,  and  one  of  the 
problems  that  a  committee  like  this  has  to  think  about. 

That  I  could  decide  that,  you  know,  if  I  were  that  kind  of  a  person, 
that  I  was  going  to  foment  all  kinds  of  things,  but  if  the  people  didn't 
have  grievances  and  the  people  didn't  believe  that  they  had  something 
to  be  gained  by  going  on  strike,  or  whatever  it  would  be,  nobody 
would  listen  to  me. 

And  many,  many,  many  years  ago,  starting,  I  guess,  with  the  fact 
that  I  didn't  want  anybody  to,  quote,  "foment"  me,  that  is,  for  any- 
body to  tell  me  what  to  do,'  and  so  forth,  I  never  wanted  to  tell  any- 
body else  what  to  do. 

Where  people  don't  know  the  facts  about  the  war  in  Vietnam,  I 
will  try  to  bring  them  to  their  attention.  Where  they  have  opposition 
and  want  to  figure  out  ways  of  opposing,  I  will  sit  down  with  them 
and  try  to  plan  and  join  and  work  together  Avith  them. 

But  I  never  in  my  life  tried  to  foment  anything.  This  word,  to  me, 
implies  artificial  introduction  of  unreal  grievances  and  unreal  prob- 
lems in  order  to  get  people  in  trouble,  and  I  am  not  interested  in  that. 


2740  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY,  Mr.  Dellinger,  we  are  off  the  subject,  tliat- 


Mr.  Dellixger.  That's  your  question.  The  answer  is,  "No,"  to  tlie 
question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No,  no,  that's  not  my  question,  I  don't  think. 

I  will  put  the  question  to  you  a  different  way,  if  I  may. 

We  are  not  talking  about  the  war  in  Vietnam  right  now.  We  are 
talking  about  a  simple  question :  Did  the  people  who  had  been  denied 
a  permit  to  be  in  Lincoln  Park  that  night  have  the  right  to  go  into  that 
park,  and  in  violation  of  the  ordinance  ? 

Now,  that's  the  basic  question.  Did  they? 

That  hasn't  got  anything  to  do  with  the  war  in  Vietnam. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  you  see  that's 

Mr.  GuTMAX.  Can  we  confer  just  a  moment? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  All  right.  So  first  of  all,  I  have  to  respectfully  dis- 
agree, that  I  think  the  war  in  Vietnam  has  everything  to  do  with  it. 
And  I  am  sorry  that  even  in  the  Walker  Commission  Report,  which, 
you  laiow,  points  out  some  of  the  realities  which,  as  I  say,  people 
were  attempting  to  sweep  under  the  rug — I  am  sorry  that  it  exists — 
almost  in  abstraction  from  the  war  in  Vietnam. 

I  shouldn't  say  that  about  the  whole  report.  I  haven't  read  it  all, 
but  the  sections  that  I  have,  excerpted  from  the  discussion  in  the 
pa])er,  because  I  don't  want  to  go  to  Chicago,  nobody  wanted  to  go  to 
Chicago  in  order  to  i^rove  that  in  the  American  democracy  you  could 
•demonstrate  without  being  beaten  and  gassed  and  assaulted.  We  wanted 
to  go  there  to  create  pressures  to  stop  the  war  in  Vietnam  and  to  put 
an  end  to  black  oppression,  put  an  end  to  the  murder  of  people  like 
Bobby  Hutton,  the  Black  Panther  I  referred  to. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  that's  not  what  you  said. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  except  within  that  context,  you  can't  under- 
stand why  people  wanted  to  march  down  the  street  or  why  they  wanted 
to  sleep  in  Lincoln  Park  or  anything  else,  and  on  the  legal  question 
about  their  right  to  stay  in  the  park  or  not,  I  have  already  said  that 
I  think — first  of  all,  I  am  not  a  lawyer  and  I  will  defer  that  to  some- 
body else,  except  to  say  tliat  I  think  such  ordinances  are  subsidiary  to 
the  first  amendment  rights,  j^articularly  in  a  time  of  national  emer- 
gency, such  as  this  war,  which  is  today  still  being  fought  in  Vietnam. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Sir,  you  make  the  statement,  though,  "We  have 
achieved  a  tragic  victory,"  alluding  back  to  what  occurred  in  Lincoln 
Park. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  "We  have  forced" — "forced" 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Now,  are  you  quoting  me  now,  or  are  you  quoting 
yourself? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir,  I  am  quotinii-you. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  All  right,  go  aliead,  including  it  all. 

Mr.  Cx)nley  [reads]. 

We  have  forced  the  city  of  Chicago  and  Mayor  (Richard  .7.)  Daley  to  bring  out 
into  the  open  the  machinery  of  repressions  which  makes  this  city  the  Prague  of 
the  Middle  West. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Tret's  see  the  whole  statement. 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  He  had  previously  acknowledged  it. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19 68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2741 

That  was  the  point  I  make. 

Mr.  Dellingee.  It  is  from  the  press.  Eight  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  It  is  from  the  Baltimore  Sun^^  if  you  want  to  make  an 
identification  of  where  it  is  from. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Right. 

Mr.  AsHBROoK.  It  was  in  his  preceding  question  before  this  one,  his 
acknowledgement. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  now,  first  of  all,  I  believe  that  this  is  quite 
accurate,  and  I  may  have  indicated  this  before,  quite  accurate,  quota- 
tion. Certamly  I  would  not  fault  it. 

I  would  like,  since  you  are  interested  in,  you  know,  investigating 
these  events,  to  perhaps  explain  it  a  little  bit  and  to  put  it  into  context. 
That  is,  if  I  thought  that  our  going  to  Chicago  caused  the  United  States 
to  develop  methods  of  repression  of  democracy,  I  would  think  that  I 
would  be  sorry  about  this.  I  would  be  disappointed. 

And  even  Avithin  this  context,  I  called  it  a  tragic  victory.  That  is,  it 
is  my  conviction  that  this  repressive  machinery  already  existed,  is 
being  used  far  more  severely  and  with  far  less  pretense,  in  Vietnam 
against  the  Vietnamese  people,  is  used  in  the  black  communities  of  this 
country,  and  since  this  repressive  machinery  exists  and  is  used  in  emer- 
gencies, I  thought  that  there  was  a  certain  healthy  educational  effect 
that  at  least  I  hoped  we  could  draw  from  it. 

I  would  have  preferred — and  I  fought  in  every  way  I  could  with 
the  city  authorities  and  talked  with  the  Justice  Department  officials 
and  everybody  else — I  would  have  preferred  for  us  to  have  the  rights 
to  march  peacefully  down  those  streets. 

I  did  not  want  myself  or  anybody  else  to  have  his  head  bashed  in  or 
poisoned — well,  not  poison  gas,  I  beg  your  pardon ;  there  are  poisonous 
aspects  to  it — anyway,  the  kind  of  gasses  they  used,  tear  gas  and  other 
chemicals  used.  I  didn't  want  any  of  that  to  happen. 

We  pleaded  with  the  city.  I  said  it  Avas  an  emergency  and  asked  that 
this  kind  of  tiling  be  avoided.  But  since  they  brought  it  out,  then 
there  was  a  certain  tragic  educational  value  in  knowing,  in  white 
middle-class  Americans  knowing  that  this  is  what  black  people  face. 
this  is  what  Vietnamese  people  face,  this  is  what  noncollege  poor 
people  face,  if  they  try  to  assert  their  rights  and  try  to  act  as  equals  in 
this  country  or  with  Americans  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  this  what  you  are  saying,  then,  that  tlie  tragic  vic- 
tory is  for  these  kids  to  get  beaten,  and  so  forth,  to  demonstrate  to  the 
remainder  of  the  American  people  that  which  is  wrong  ? 

Mr.  Delltnger.  No.  It  is  like,  vou  know,  people  say,  "Well,  vou 
staged  these  things  for  television,  didn't  you  ?"  So  people  would  think, 
you  know,  see  them,  and  the  implication  being  that  they  get  some  false 
opinion. 

The  fact  is,  I  would  neA^er  stage  anything  of  that  kind.  I  told  you, 
explained  to  you,  my  life  has  been  devoted  to  opposition  to  violence, 
even  violence  on  the  side  of  causes  that  I  agree  with  and  support,  so 
obA'iously  I  would  not  want  any  unnecessary  violence  to  take  place. 

In  fact,  in  one  confrontation — more  than  one,  but  I  tliink  one  par- 
tipularly  in  the  worst  afternoon — we  appealed  to  the  policemen,  some- 
thins:  that  some  people  think  is,  you  know,  romantic,  but  we  appealed 
to  them  to  understand  that  we  were  not  trying  to  provolce  violence  or 


1  "Police  Boosting  Response  To  Protesters  In  Chicago,"  Aug.  27, 1968,  issue. 


2742  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

to  cause  violence  and  that  we  wanted  simply  to  assert  our  democratic 
rights  and  that  we  wanted  an  end  to  the  war  in  Vietnam,  that  tliey 
were  not  our  enemies.  So  obviously,  I  would  not  want  to  provoke 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  What  about  an  appeal  to  the  followers,  Mr. 
Dellinger  ^ 

Mr.  Dellinger.  And,  of  course,  appeals  to  followers. 

"When  the  police  brutally  and  viciously  attacked  the  crowd  in  Lin- 
coln Park,  you  know,  it  is  not  easy  to  know  how  you  do,  because  also 
there  is  an  element  of  self-respect  and  solidarity  with  one's  fellows 
who  are  being  attacked,  and  so  in  many  people's  minds  there  was  a 
question:  Should  the  demonstrators  counterattack  the  police  or  not? 

Now,  it  was  my  judgment  and  mj'  conviction  that  they  should  not, 
and  from  the  platform— I  was  chairing  the  meeting — I  appealed  to 
people.  And  it  was  for  that  reason  that  we  had  organized  marshals, 
to  handle  situations  of  that  kind.  And  our  marshals,  again  told  from 
the  platform  of  what  was  happening  and  using  their  own  loud  speak- 
ers, a  line  of  marshals  went  and  got  between  the  police  and  the  demon- 
strators in  order  to  minimize  or  stop  the  violence,  in  order  to  stand  as 
a  protective  shield  between  the  ])olice  and  the  demonstrators,  and  also 
to  be  sure  that  if,  as  happened  in  a  number  of  occasions  in  Chicago, 
police  agents  tried  to  get  our  people  to  attack  in  what  I  considered 
would  have  been  a  suicidal  mission  and  a  mission  which  would  have 
confused  and  interfered  with  the  presentation  of  what  we  stood  for, 
would  have  made  everybody  forget  about  the  war  in  Vietnam,  if  police 
agents  tried  to  get  that  to  happen,  our  marshals  were  in  between. 

So  to  our  own  followers  and  to  the  police,  my  position  consistently 
has  been  to  avoid  violence  and  to  avoid  provocation. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  Let  me  say,  maybe 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen,  I  think  at  this  point  it  would  be  a  convenient 
place  to  stop. 

]Mr.  AsHBROOK.  I  would  like  to  ask  one  more  question. 

I  guess  the  point  we  can't  seem  to  get  together  on,  it  would  seem  to 
me  a  fairminded,  rational  person  reading  or  hearing  your  statement, 
"We  have  forced  the  city  of  Chicago"  to  do,  et  cetera,  et  cetera,  would 
be  led  to  believe,  as  I  truly  am  led  to  believe,  that  you  in  fact  did  fol- 
low a  course  of  action,  the  end  result  of  which  brought  about  what 
happened,  to  your  satisfaction. 

You  say,  "We  have  forced"  them  to  do  something.  I  don't  think  it 
is  unreasonable  to  take  the  point  of  view :  we  followed  this  course  of 
action ;  this  course  of  action  succeeded  because  it  forced  the  police  to  do 
this,  which  resulted  in  a  tragic  victory.  And  I  think  that's  what 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  can  understand 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  This  certainly  isn't  an  unreasonable  interpretation. 

I  think  that's  what  the  average  citizen  would  think  when  you  say, 
"We  have  forced  the  city  of  Chicago"  to  do  these  things. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  I  can  understand  that  confusion,  or,  you  know, 
as  to  just  what  I  had  in  mind. 

I  would  like,  maybe,  to  give  an  examjile. 

It  is  as  if  you  have  a  lily-white  community — and  we  know  there  are 
many  of  them  in  this  country — where,  by  a  number  of  intimidatory 
methods,  black  people  are  discouraged  from  ever  moving  in  and  living 
in  the  neighborhood.  And  for  years  nothing  is  ever  done  about  it  and 
people  congratulate  themselves  in  this  lily-white  neighborhood,  or 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2743 

often  it  is — in  the  past  and  still  in  the  present — it  has  been  an  all- 
Christian  neighborhood  which  excludes  Jews. 

People  have  congratulated  themselves  on  living  in  a  democracy  and 
a  society  of  human  brotherhood,  and  so  forth ;  but  de  facto,  black  peo- 
ple or  Jews  or  both,  or  sometimes  Catholics,  can't  live  in  this  kind  of 
community. 

Now,  if  somebody  decides,  however,  to  go  to  that  community — a 
black  person,  a  Jew,  a  Catholic — and  to  buy  a  house  or  to  rent  or  to 
live  with  his  friends,  and  the  community  comes  out  and  takes  action 
against  it,  I  consider  that  tragic.  And  that  is  what  I  meant  by  tragic, 
there,  but  I  also  consider  it  the  beginning  of  education  and  the  begin- 
ning of  a  process  which  may  correct  that  situation  because  j)eople 
have  been  made  aware  that  in  effect  black  people,  Jews,  or  Catholics, 
or  whatever  it  is,  are  excluded  from  that  commmiity. 

Now,  I  apply  that  to  the  situation  in  Chicago.  I  think  Mayor 
Daley — and  Mayor  Daley  is  not  untypical  of  how  most  of  our  big  cities 
are  run — I  think  he  runs  that  city  with  a  police  force  which,  on  many, 
many,  many  occasions,  just  as  a  daily  fact,  does  not  hesitate  to  suppress 
the  rights  of  black  people,  suppress  the  rights  of  people  who  may  look 
poorly  dressed  or  have  long  hair  or  what  have  you,  or  people  that 
they  think  are  Communists  or  what  have  you.  There  is  a  lot  of  club- 
bing that  goes  on.  There  is  a  lot  of  suppression  of  rights. 

In  addition,  in  the  context  of  the  war  in  Vietnam,  where,  after  all, 
many  of  the  people  used  in  times  of  civil  disturbances  of  this  country 
are  people  who  have  been  trained,  and  they  get  either  sent  to  Vietnam 
or  they  get  sent  to  Detroit,  in  the  black  community,  for  example,  or 
they  come  back  from  Vietnam  and  go  there,  so  there  is  also  this  ever- 
present  threat,  as  well  as  daily  practice  of  repression. 

Now,  to  bring  that  out  in  the  open  so  that  people  can  see  what  the 
cancer  is  and  to  begin  to  deal  with  it  and  face  up  to  it — it  is  tragic 
that  the  cancer  exists,  but  it  is  also  necessary,  sometimes,  to  bring  it 
out  in  the  open. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK.  But  it  would  seem  to  me  that,  of  course,  you  are 
talking  on  a  high  plane ;  you  are  talking  on  a  very  high  plane 

Mr.  Dellingbe.  It  is  the  plane  on  which  I  try  to  operate. 

Mr.  AsiiBROOK.  We  are  not — you  are  at  least  addressing  yourself 
on  what  I  vrould  consider  a  very  high  plane,  but,  also,  the  facts  indi- 
cate that  the  confrontation  was  brought  about  to  some  extent  by  those 
who  cursed,  shouted  obscenities,  threw  things,  did  things  which  I  am 
sure  you  don't  condone.  And  what  you  are  saying,  in  effect,  is  you  did 
not  follow  a  course  of  action,  the  obscenities,  the  stone-throwing,  et 
cetera,  to  bring  this  about,  and  yet  that  is  one  of  the  factors  that 
helpecl  bring  it  about. 

That  isn't  what  you  mean  when  you  say,  "We  forced  the  police." 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Not  forced  them  by  any  of  those  methods. 

Mr.  AsHBROOK,  Bv  using  your  own  group,  whatever  you  meant 
by  it? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  by  the  fact 

Mr.  AsHBRooK.  You  have  to  admit  that  was  a  part  of  it. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  By  the  fact  that  at  last,  you  got — not  entirely,  be- 
cause there  were  more  whites,  because  there  were  more  black  people 
there  than  is  sometimes  noted,  but  at  last  you  got  the  students  and 
some  of  the  white  middle  class,  middle-aged  community  so  opposed 
to  the  war  and  so  insistent  that  it  be  stopped  that  they  were  no  longer 


2744  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

content  to  play  this  role  of  meaningless  dissent  that  I  referred  to,  or 
relatively  meaningless  dissent,  but  actually  wanted  to  stop  the  war, 
actually  wanted  to  save  the  lives  of  the  American  soldiers  and  Viet- 
namese people. 

This  was  an  accomplishment. 

Now,  when  any  movement  gets  serious  about  changing  the  existing 
social  structure,  as  not  all  of  our  movements,  but  large  elements  are 
becoming  increasingly  serious  about  it,  then  they  face  the  danger  of 
the  kind  of  repression  which  ordinarily  falls,  and  still  falls  heaviest 
on  black  people,  poor  people,  and  various  others. 

Could  I  make — I  know  I  would  like  to  say  one  thing  to  clear  up  a 
misunderstanding. 

I  have  tried,  as  I  said,  to  speak  for  myself  and  to  be  verj^  clear  about 
my  own  attitudes,  convictions,  and  so  forth. 

I  would  not  want  to  give  the  impression — it  would  not  be  fair  to- 
them — that  our  movement  is,  for  example,  the  Mobilization  is  a  pacifist 
organization.  It  is  not.  It  is  a  coalition  of  many  different  types.  I 
already  said  that. 

Almost,  well,  in  most  occasions,  a  leading  role  is  played  by  veter- 
ans, veterans  of  World  War  II,  veterans  of  the  Korean  war,  veterans 
of  the  war  in  Vietnam.  Obviously,  many  of  those  people  do  not  share- 
my  views,  whether  it  is  about  World  War  II  or  even  Korea,  so  I  have 
tried  to  be  clear  about  myself.  But  I  am  not  trying  to  give  a  picture 
that  our  movement  is  a  universally  pacifist  movement. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen,  we  can  resume  the  testimony  tomorrow 
morning. 

The  Chair  at  this  time  will  declare  an  adjournment  until  10  o'clock 
tomorrow  morning. 

(Whereupon,  at  5  p.m.,  Wednesday,  December  4,  1968,  the  subcom- 
mittee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  10  a.m.,  Thursday,  December  5, 1968.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present  at  time  of  recess:  Representatives 
Ichord,  Ashbrook,  and  Watson.) 


SUBVERSIVE  INVOLVEMENT  IN  DISRUPTION  OF  1968 
DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Part  3 


THURSDAY,  DECEMBER  5,  1968 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

Subcommittee  of  the 
Committee  on  Un-American  Activtites, 

Washington^  D.G. 
public  hearings 

The  subconmiittee  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  met, 
pursuant  to  recess,  at  10  a.m.,  in  Room  311,  Cannon  House  Office  Build- 
ing, Washington,  D.C.,  Hon.  Richard  H.  Ichord  (chairman  of  the 
subcommittee)  presiding. 

(Subcommittee  members:  Representatives  Richard  H.  Ichord,  of 
Missouri,  chairman ;  John  M.  Ashbrook,  of  Ohio ;  and  Albert  W.  Wat- 
son, of  South  Carolina.) 

Subcommittee  members  present :  Representatives  Ichord  and  Wat- 
son. 

Staff  members  present:  Francis  J.  McNamara,  director;  Frank 
Conley,  special  counsel ;  Chester  D.  Smith,  general  counsel ;  Alfred  M. 
Nittle,  counsel ;  and  Herbert  Romerstein,  investigator. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order,  a  quorum  being 
present. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing  yesterday,  we  were  in  the  midst  of 
taking  the  testimony  from  the  witness  in  the  chair,  Mr.  David  Del- 
linger. 

The  witness  will  be  reminded  that  the  affirmation  continues.  Now, 
the  Chair  will  again  admonish — I  do  not  mean  this  for  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  audience,  but  there  may  be  some  who  might  be  intent  on 
causing  distraction  or  attempting  to  disrupt  the  hearing.  The  Chair 
cannot  tolerate  any  disturbances,  such  as  boisterous  conduct  or  any 
activity  that  would  distract  the  committee  and  the  witnesses  and  the 
counsel  involved  in  these  hearings.  The  Chair  will  admonish  the  audi- 
ence that  he  will  require  strict  adherence  to  the  rules  and  that  order  be 
maintained.  Otherwise,  the  Chair  will  have  to  use  his  authority  of  ask- 
ing that  you  leave  the  room.  If  you  do  not  comply  with  the  request, 
then  the  officers  will  have  to  be  directed  to  escort  you  from  the  room. 

With  that  admonition,  Mr.  Counsel,  will  you  resume  questioning  of 
the  witness. 

2745 


2746  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

TESTIMONY  OF  DAVID  DELLINGER,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  COUNSEL. 
JEREMIAH  S.  GUTMAN— Resumed 

Mr.  GuTMAN,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  want  to  put  on  the  record  we  continue 
with  the  same  objections  with  which  we  prefaced  our  testimony  yes- 
terday. I  also  would  like  to  repeat  on  the  record  the  request  I  made 
of  counsel  yesterday,  which  I  think  got  on  the  record,  and  that  is  that 
we  be  provided  with  copies  of  all  documents  from  which  readings  have 
been  made,  whether  or  not  they  have  been  intioduced  in  the  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  thought,  perhaps  in  connection  with  another 
witness,  that  he  did  state  that  the  transcript  would  be  printed  as 
quickly  as  possible,  and,  of  course,  the  transcript  will  be  available 
to  you. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

What  I  had  reference  to  was  the  document  from  which  the  counsel 
was  reading  yesterday  wliile  he  questioned  the  witness  and  from  which 
extracts  were  read  into  tlie  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course,  the  counsel,  I  am  sure,  prepares  his  own 
notes,  Mr.  Gutman.  Some  of  them  would  be  his  own  notes. 

Mr.  Gutman.  I  don't  expect  to  receive  his  notes.  But  he  was  reading 
from  a  transcript  of  a  Havana  radio  broadcast.  Two  separate  broad- 
casts. He  was  reading  from  news  articles,  from  letters  allegedly  signed 
by  Mr.  Dellinger.  I  would  like  to  liave  copies  of  all  tliose  documents. 
Some  of  them  I  saw  and  were  taken  away  from  me.  Some  I  have  not 
even  seen. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  will  you  come  forward,  please,  both 
counsel. 

(Chairman  and  counsel  confer.) 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  record  show  that  the  request  made  by  the 
attorney  for  furnishing  copies  of  all  of  the  documents  which  the 
attorney  might  use  is  denied  for  the  reason  tliat  it  does  constitute,  in 
the  Chair's  opinion,  an  undue  burden  on  the  statf  of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Gutman.  If  I  can  borrow  them  for  10  miinites,  I  can  Xerox 
them  and  give  them  back. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  have  order,  Mr.  Counsel. 

These  documents,  the  Chair  has  been  informed,  are  newspaper  ac- 
counts and  also  refer  to  transcripts  from  Radio  Havana.  I  am  sure 
they  are  available  to  counsel  by  other  means.  The  Chair  considers  the 
lequest  unreasonable  and  will  deny  it,  and  Ave  will  let  the  record  show 
that. 

Proceed,  gentlemen. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  May  I  ask  a  question  ?  When  the  documents  are  used 
and  parts  are  read,  will  the  entire  document  appear  in  the  transcript? 
I  would  like  to  have  the  whole  evidence  in. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Those  documents  that  have  been  admitted  in  the  record 
will  appear  in  the  transcript. 

Mr.  Gutman.  The  documents  I  liave  reference  to  have  not  been 
marked  in  evidence,  so  far  as  I  know.  I  request  that  they  be  marked 
in  evidence  so  that  they  can  appear. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  counsel  refers  to  the  documents.  The  record  will 
stand  as  made.  Let  us  proceed,  Counsel. 

^W.  Gftman.  T  most  respectfully  except. 

Mr.  IciioRD.  The  record  will  show  the  request  is  denied.  Let  us  abide 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2747 

by  the  rules.  We  got  along  very  well  yesterday.  Let  us  see  if  we  cannot 
do  the  same  today. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  We  will  get  along  fine  as  long  as  I  don't  assert  my 
constitutional  rights. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  admonish  the  attorney  that  _we  are 
functioning  under  the  rules  of  the  House  and  the  rules  of  this  com- 
mittee. The  Chair  will  point  out  that  the  rights  of  the  counsel,  con- 
stitutional rights,  are  not  being  infringed  upon. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Of  the  witness,  sir. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  And  of  the  witness  and  of  the  counsel.  The  Chair  has 
read  many  times  the  rules  governing  this  procedure.  I  point  out,  I  did 
not  think  it  was  necessary,  but  I  shall  point  out  again ^ 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  waive  the  reading  of  that,  sir.  I  am  familiar  with 
the  rule. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  it  is  necessary  in  view  of  what  has  proceeded 
here.  It  has  been  read  to  the  counsel  many  times. 

This  is  not  a  criminal  proceeding.  This  is  a  proceeding  to  gather 
facts.  We  have  gotten  along  very  well.  The  witness  is  not  on  trial; 
he  is  not  sought  to  be  punished.  The  Chair  does  not  intend  to  use  this 
committee,  and  I  will  state  that  the  Chair  does  not  even  have  the 
authority  to  punish  the  witness  for  any  activity  of  his  outside  of  this 
hearing  room,  and  it  is  not  the  intent  of  the  Chair,  and  I  shall  never 
use  this  committee  or  any  other  committee  which  I  might  be  chair- 
man of  for  that  purpose. 

Now,  the  rules  have  been  read.  I  think  they  have  been  very  clear. 
The  rules  of  court  procedure  do  not  prevail  in  this  body  and  for  good 
reason.  The  purposes,  the  objectives,  are  completel}^  different.  Now, 
let  us  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel,  and  let  us  have  order. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may  direct  your  attention  back  to 
about  June  29  of  last  year,  and  basing  the  present  questions  on  certain 
articles  which  appeared  in  the  W a.shington  Post  of  June  30,  the  articles 
in  the  Post  of  June  30  indicate  that  a  press  conference  was  held  by  you 
and  other  members  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  in  New 
York  City  on  June  29,  and  at  that  time  you  revealed  some  of  your 
plans  and  goals  in  connection  with  the  Democratic  Party  Convention 
in  Chicago. 

First  of  all,  let  me  ask  you.  Do  you  remember  this  particular  press 
conference  back  on  the  29th  of  June  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Not  as  yet.  I  don't  remember  the  date  or  the  occa- 
sion. We  sought  to  make  our  views  publicly  known  as  often  and  as 
much  as  possible,  but  I  don't  remember  that  specific  date. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Perhaps  if  I  give  you  a  specific  quote  from  that  con- 
ference it  will  recall  it  to  your  mind. 

At  that  particular  conference,  according  to  the  report  published  in 
the  Washington  Post  under  date  of  June  30,  1968,  you  stated  as  fol- 
lows: That  your  activities  in  Chicago  would  consist  of,  and  I  use  the 
quotes  from  the  article,  a  "period  of  several  days  of  escalating  actions 
climaxed  by  a  massive  mobilization  at  the  time  of  the  nomination." 
Do  you  recall  this  particular  statement  ? 
Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  also  state  at  that  time  that  the  tactics  to  be 
used,  and  I  again  quote  from  the  article,  "will  be  fixed  as  events 
unfold"  and  that  "massive  direct  action"  would  be  one  of  them. 


2748  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Are  you  reading  from  an  article,  sir?  Do  you  have 
a  copy  of  that  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  GunviAN.  May  we  keep  this  copy  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  No,  sir.  That  is  the  only  copy  I  have,  sir. 

(Document  handed  to  witness  and  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  In  reading  this  I  find  it  incorporates  the  correction 
that  I  was  going  to  make.  If  I  understand  you,  and  I  hope  the  record 
will  show  this,  you  said  that  "events  would  include  massive  direct 
action." 

What  it  says  is  that  "  'massive  direct  action'  could  include  picket 
lines,  sit-ins,  roving  sound  trucks  and  street  performances  by  theater 
und  rock  music  groups." 

Obviously,  a  very  small  part  of  this  is  in  direct  quotes,  and  it  is  not 
a  direct  statement  by  me.  But  in  general  it  describes  the  kind  of  action 
which  we  envision,  with  the  emphasis  upon  the  fact  that  tactics  will  be 
fixed  as  events  unfold.  That  is  my  general  approach,  that  we  are  not 
doctrinary  and  we  are  not  stereotyped  and  that  we  interact  with  other 
people  who  are  present  and  with  events. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  the  first  part  of  it,  of  course,  dealt  with  the 
"period  of  several  days  of  escalating  actions  climaxed  by  a  massive 
mobilization  at  the  time  of  the  nomination." 

Do  you  iind  that?  It  is  a  little  earlier  in  the  same  article. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  find  that.  I  would  like  to  see  activities  to 
stop  the  war  escalate  from  now  until  the  war  is  stopped.  Ceitainly 
those  are  my  sentiments  and  they  were  my  sentiments  at  that  time.  I 
advocated  then,  and  I  advocate  now,  massive  actions  and  small  actions, 
too,  and  escalating  as  much  as  possible  until  the  war  is  stopped  and  the 
lives  of  the  Americans  and  Vietnamese  who  are  being  needlessly 
killed  are  saved,  until  every  American  soldier  is  brought  home. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  let  me  ask  you  this  in  connection  with 
those  two  remarks  which  you  have  indicated  were  made  and  placed 
jour  own  interpretation  on  them :  Isn't  it  a  fact  that  as  early  as  June 
1968,  at  this  particular  press  conference  in  New  York  City,  you  cer- 
tainly, at  least  in  the  back  of  your  mind,  considered  as  a  possibility 
that  violence  would  occur  as  a  result  of  these  proceedings  which  were 
going  to  occur  in  Chicago ;  did  you  not  ? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Just  a  moment. 

Mr.  Conley.  Sir 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  witness  confer  with  his  attorney. 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Of  course,  you  have  made  a  complete  non  sequitur 
there  because  I  called  for  escalating  actions  to  stop  the  war  in  Vietnam 
and  to  end  oppression  of  the  black  community. 

You  have  made  some  connection  that  I  expected  or  wanted  violence. 
The  fact  is  that  I  called  for  this  kind  of  action  long  before  June. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  my  question  did  not  say  you  were  calling 
for  violence.  My  question  was,  and  I  will  repeat  it :  Didn't  you  at  least 
consider  that  there  was  a  possibility  that  tliere  would  be  violence  stem- 
ming from  these  demonstrations  in  Chicago?  I  don't  think  you  need 
to  read  more  into  the  question  than  what  I  ha^-e  asked  you. 

iSIr.  Dellinger.  It  was  more  than  a  possibility  that  the  I''^nited 
States  Government  would  commit  violence  against  people  trj'ing  to 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2749 

assert  their  democratic  rights,  whether  in  this  country  or  in  Vietnam, 
because  they  were  already  imposing  that  violence  upon  the  people  of 
Vietnam,  upon  the  black  community. 

They  had  imposed  it  upon  me  and  other  objectors  before.  So  I  would 
be  a  fool  to  think  that  we  could  assert  our  democratic  rights  in  this 
country  and  we  could  work  against  war  and  for  peace  and  justice  with- 
out running  the  risk  of  the  kind  of  police  riot  which  the  Humphrey- 
Johnson-Bailey-Daley  forces  unleashed  at  Chicago, 

This  is  one  of  the  risks  of  the  game,  but  w^e  are  unwilling  to  be  silent 
and  to  protect  ourselves  while  Americans  and  Vietnamese  and  black 
people  are  suffering, 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  You  have  admitted  the  fact  that  you,  then,  consid- 
ered the  possibility  that  there  would  be  governmental  violence,  if  I 
may  use  a  broad  term.  Don't  you  also  admit  that  there  was  also  a  pos- 
sibility that  some  of  the  people  involved  in  your  movement  might  be 
involved  in  violence  themselves? 

Mr,  Dellinger,  Well,  our  movement  does  not  plan  or  provoke  or 
organize  violence, 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  appreciate  that  your  movement  does  not.  My  ques- 
tion, though,  is :  Did  you  not  anticipate  or  foresee  the  possibility  that 
some  of  the  people  participating  in  your  movement  would  or  could 
engage  in  violence  in  comiection  with  the  Chicago  demonstrations? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  My  concern  about  violence  at  Chicago  was  that  the 
police  and  the  Federal  authorities  would  employ  violence.  That  was 
the  major  danger  and  the  major  cause. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  never  considered  the  possibility  that  some  group 
affiliated  with  you  in  this  effort  or  some  individual  affiliated  with  you 
in  this  effort  might  not  himself,  or  themselves,  engage  in  acts  of 
violence  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  In  any  action  there  is  always  the  possibility  that 
somebody  will  engage  in  acts  of  violence.  But  I  have  had  enough  ex- 
l)erience  with  our  movement,  and  particularly  coming  up  to  Chicago, 
to  know  that  historically  and  in  terms  of  probability  the  threat  of 
violence  comes  from  the  authorities  and  not  from  the  demonstrators. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  History  tells  you  this,  that  it  comes  from  the  authori- 
ties and  not  from  the  demonstrators  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  history  of  my  participation  in  the  antiwar 
movement  has  been  that  when  we  seek  to  assert  our  rights,  when  we 
seek  to  try  to  stop  injustice  or  war  or  violence,  that  the  authorities 
on  many  occasions,  in  one  way  or  another,  directly  or  indirectly,  use 
violence. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  have  spent  much  time  here  now  on  these  questions 
answering  that  the  authorities  used  violence.  There  are  a  number 
of  reports  that  would  indicate  that  the  police  did  over  or  under,  or 
whatever  they  did,  react.  We  are  not  askmg  you  about  this. 

I  am  asking  you  about  the  people  that  you  felt — I  hesitate  to  use 
the  word — responsible  for.  Did  you  consider  that  some  of  these  people 
w^ould  use  violence  ?  It  is  a  very  simple  question. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  think  you  should  hesitate  to  use  the  word 
"responsible"  because  ours  is  not  the  kind  of  movement  in  which  some 
individual  or  small  group  controls  the  others.  We  created  a  frame- 
work and  we  issued  a  call  and  we  did  our  best  to  organize  and  invite 
people  to  come.  But  we  do  not  exercise  a  strong  talk-down  leadership. 

21-706  O — 69 — pt.  3 5 


2750  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Still,  as  a  person  very  definitely  committed  to  this 
movement,  did  you  as  an  individual  or  as  part  of  the  steering  com- 
mittee consider  the  possibilities  that  people  from  within  your  move- 
ment or  affiliated  with  your  movement  would  engage  in  acts  of  violence 
in  Chicago? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  But  whenever  we  come  up  to  an  action  of  any  kind, 
naturally,  in  my  own  thoughts  and  sometimes  in  discussions  with 
others,  I  try  to  consider  all  of  the  possibilities. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  saying,  sir,  then,  that  you  did  consider  this 
as  a  possibility  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  will  say — I  haven't  said  yet — but  as  we  ap- 
proached Chicago  and  as  I  considered  all  of  the  possibilities,  the  thing 
that  weighed  heaviest  on  my  mind  and  the  thing  that  I  was  most 
concerned  about  in  the  area  of  violence  was  that  the  Chicago  police 
would  act  as  they  did  and  that  the  political  authorities  would  not  have 
the  courage  to  stop  this,  as  they  could  have  stopped  it  in  advance. 

In  fact,  the  political  authorities,  going  all  the  way  to  the  White 
House  and  the  State  Department,  might  very  well  wished  to  have  this 
kind  of  violence,  either  in  order  to  seize  the  initiative  on  the  law  and 
order  issue  from  the  opposition  or  in  order  to  intimidate  the  growing 
antiwar  sentiment  by  picking  on  what  I  wnll  call  the  more  militant 
and  more  active  group  at  Chicago,  indicate  to  other  people  that  even 
though  they  might  not  like  the  war  they  had  better  not  speak  up  too 
much  and  they  had  better  not  stick  their  necks  out  too  much. 

I  think  this  organized  and  intended  political  violence  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  could  very  well  be  a  complement  or  supplement  to 
such  political  trials  as  the  Spock-Coffin-Raskin-Goodman  trial  in 
Boston. 

Obviously  this  was  a  veiy  unpopular  war.  People  were  becoming 
disillusioned  with  American  foreign  policy.  Obviously  people  were 
unwnlling  to  have  their  sons  killed  in  Vietnam,  and  obviously  the 
Government  was  making  a  determined  effort  in  a  variety  of  ways 
to  intimidate  people  and  to  prevent  them  or  discourage  them  from 
exercising  their  conscientious  and  democratic  obligations. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  this  same  area,  if  I  may  take  you 
back  to  March  26  of  this  same  year,  the  New  Ym^k  T'nnfH  published 
a  rather  lengthy  accomit  of  a  press  conference  held  by  you  and  other 
planners  of  the  Chicago  convention. 

You  held  it  at  a  camp  near  Chicago  on  March  28  and  24.  Do  you 
recall  the  meeting  to  which  I  refer? 
Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  do. 

Mr-  CoNLEY.  You  apparently  held  a  i)ress  conference,  or  it  was  at 
least  reported  by  the  Times  on  the  26th  of  March,  i)age  28 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that,  sir? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Particularly,  I  want  to  direct  your  attention  to  a  statement — it  is 
not  in  quotes — in  the  article.  It  is  apparently  the  judgment  of  the 
Times  reporter,  based  upon  what  you  said  : 

Mr.  Dellinger  said  the  coalition  would  not  try  to  impose  peaceful  demon- 
stration tactics  on  other  groups  demonstrating  at  the  convention. 

Now%  did  you  make  a  statement  of  that  type  to  a  reporter  from  the 
New  York  Times? 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2751 

Mr.  Bellinger.  First,  may  I  call  your  attention — since  you  called 
attention  to  the  interpretation  of  the  reporter — to  the  two  headlines. 
The  main  headline  is  "PEACEFUL  PEOTEST  IN  CHICAGO 
VOWED,'-  which  is  a  strong  word.  Secondly,  the  "Group  Says  It 
Doesn't  Plan  to  Disrupt  Convention." 

However,  if  you  remember,  Mayor  Daley  and  the  authorities  con- 
tinually used  the  claim  that  we  had  announced  we  were  going  to 
disrupt  the  convention  as  a  basis  for  denying  us  ordinary  permits, 
for  threatening  all  kinds  of  violent  action  against  people  w^ho  came 
to  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Let  us  go  down  those  specific 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Now,  when  it  comes  to  your  quote,  not  a  quote 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  About  20  paragraphs  down  the  article. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  Perhaps  I  should  just  glance  briefly  at  the 
rest  of  it — 

they  attacked  Mayor  Richard  J.   Daley,  charging  him  with  planning  uncon- 
stitutional repression  *  *  *. 

This  was  as  early  as  March  26,  and  yet  the  Federal  Government- 


Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  don't  object  to  your  going  ahead  and 
explaining  your  answer.  Let  us  answer  the  question  first. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  have  order.  Let  us  start  over  again.  Put  the 
question. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  question  is.  Did  you  make  a  statement  similar  to 
the  one  I  have  read : 

Mr.  Dellinger  said  the  coalition  would  not  try  to  impose  peaceful  demonstration 
tactics  on  other  groups  demonstrating  at  the  convention. 

Let  us  get  to  that  and  then  to  yours. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Since  I  had  a  lengthy  meeting  with  a  reporter,  which 
was  then  summarized  here,  I  think  that  it  is  important  to  try  to  estab- 
lish the  context  and  the  overall  impact  of  what  I  was  trying  to  say. 

I  have  already  indicated  that  the  headline  and  the  early  sections 
make  clear  our  emphasis  upon  a  peaceful  protest  and  our  attempt  to 
warn  the  Federal  authorities  and  the  American  people  of  the  repression 
planned  by  Mayor  Daley.  I  certainly  will  answer  your  question  about 
this  paragraph,  but  I  would  like  to  put  it  in  context.  It  is  at  least  6  or  7 
or  8  inches  down  the  story. 

I  do  object  somewhat  to  your  taking  it  out  of  context.  I  will  skip 
over  things  I  could  comment  on  in  between  8  inches.  I  will  point  out 
early  we  warned  against  the  dangers  of  oppression.  The  Federal  au- 
thorities took  no  overt  action.  Mayor  Daley,  who  certainly  is  not 
independent — he  is  interrelated  with  the  whole  Democratic  Party  and 
the  whole  administration — certainly  did  not  proceed  entirely  on  his 
own. 

I  want  to  bring  this  out  because  it  is  very  important  in  terms  of  the 
Walker  Commission  Report  wliich  has  come  out  now.  As  someone 
ix)ints  out,  the  worse  things  get  in  the  United  States,  the  better  the 
reports  in  the  post  factum  analyses  get. 

I  think  it  is  very  important  that  the  American  people  be  not  deceived 
in  thinking  that  this  problem  of  protection  of  constitutional  rights 
and  resistance  to  unlawful  exercise  of  police  authority  has  been  taken 
care  of  by  the  fact  that  first  they  had  the  evil  and  then  afterwards  there 
is  a  report  which  seeks  to  tell  at  least  some  of  the  truth  about  it. 


2752  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Now,  when  it  comes  to  this — well,  just  one  final  comment  on  the 
preceding  thing.  Our  prediction  was  that,  basically,  if  there  was 
violence  and  if  there  was  repression,  it  would  come  from  the  authorities 
and  not  from  the  movement. 

Now  when  it  gets  down  here  it  says : 

Mr.  Bellinger  said  the  coalition  would  not  try  to  impose  peaceful  demonstration 
tactics  on  other  groups  demonstrating  at  the  convention. 

Well,  that  is  part  of  my  very  strong  and  our  very  strong  democratic 
conception,  namely,  that  we  do  not  own  the  movement.  We  do  not 
dictate  the  tactics  which  other  people  employ.  Perhaps  when  we  select 
a  date,  as  we  selected  the  date  of  October  21  and  22,  1967,  to  protest 
at  the  Pentagon,  we  controlled  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  conditions — 
well,  most  of  the  conditions  would  be  a  fairer  way — and  we  exercised 
more  control,  or  tried  to  exercise  more  control  over  the  nature  of 
what  takes  place. 

But  in  a  national  event  such  as  a  Democratic  Convention,  the  con- 
vention of  the  ruling  war  party,  it  would  be  presumptuous  of  any- 
body to  say  we  have  staked  off  this  event  in  this  city  and  we  are 
going  to  control  everything  that  happens  there. 

We  could  not  control  the  McCarthy  delegates,  the  Humphrey  dele- 
gates, the  Ted  Kennedy  people  who  were  working  in  conjunction 
with  Mayor  Daley  to  try  to  get  a  draft  for  him.  We  could  not  control 
any  other  people  who  might  be  coming  to  Chicago. 

We  simply  indicated  that  if  some  other  group  was  carrying  out 
whatever  form  of  activity  that  it  believed  in  and  wanted  to  par- 
ticipate in,  whether  inside  the  convention,  such  as  some  of  the  groups 
I  have  mentioned,  or  in  one  of  the  hotels  or  in  the  streets  or  any- 
where else,  it  was  not  our  responsibility  or  our  concern  or  our 
right  to  dictate  to  them  what  they  should  do. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  So  this,  then,  is  a  fair  and  attributable  statement  to 
you,  then  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  the  statement  I  have  just  made  is  a  fair 
and  attributable  statement.  That  is  an  expression  of  my  views.  The 
other  is  an  expression  of  a  reporter's  attempt  to  summarize  in  one 
sentence  something  that  I  have  explained  more  fully.  And  I  would 
like  what  I  have  said  to  stand  as  my  views,  rather  than  what  the  re- 
porter said. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Dellinger,  at  that  point  you  have  stated,  as  I 
understood  you,  that  you  did  have  control  of  the  Pentagon  demon- 
stration. Do  you  mean  by  that,  that  the  Mobilization  Committee 
was  the  only  group  that  participated  in  the  Pentagon  demonstra- 
tion ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No  ;  what  I  said  was  that  when  we  select  a  target 
and  date  and  call  for  a  demonstration,  obviously  we  take  on  more 
responsibility  than  in  an  event  such  as  the  Chicago  Democratic 
Convention. 

However,  even  there,  the  Pentagon  and  the  ground  surround- 
ing it  are  public  property,  and  we  do  not  have  either  the  right  or 
the  power  to  control  everybody  who  decides  to  come  at  that  time. 
In  that  case,  because  we  did  select  the  date  and  issued  the  call, 
if  we  heard  of  other  people  who  were  planning  to  participate,  I 
mean  planning  to  come,  we  made  a  determined  effort  to  contact 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2753 

them  to  find  out  what  their  plans  were  and  to  attempt  to  coordinate 
our  activities. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  with  your  explanation  of  this  statement 
in  this  article,  I  will  put  to  you  this  question,  which  I  think  is  answer- 
able with  a  rather  specific  answer.  Did  you,  at  the  time  you  made 
this  statement  which  you  have  elaborated  on  for  our  benefit  here  this 
morning,  have  any  particular  groups  in  mind,  which  were  a  part  of 
the  coalition  or  who  would  become  a  part  of  the  coalition,  who  might 
possibly  be  motivated  towards  acts  of  violence  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  In  my  elaboration  of  the  reporter's  statement, 
I  have  referred  to  the  McCarthy  people,  the  Ted  Kennedy  people. 
Obviously  there  were  other  groups,  many  of  whom  we  would  not  even 
know. 

To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  remembering  that  this  was,  what, 
last  March,  and  this  is  a  reporter's  summary  of,  of  a  meeting  with  him, 
I  certainly  have  no  recollection  of  any  particular  groups  of  the  kind 
you  are  talking  about. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  saying  that  you  suspected  that  possibly  the 
Kennedy  or  the  McCarthy  people  might  be  prone  to  violence  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  most  of  them  do  believe  in 
violence.  They  enforce  the  American  Armed  Forces,  and  Senator  Mc- 
Carthy has  said  that  he  thinks  our  commitment  to  Taiwan  is  very 
important.  And  he  supports  NATO  and  has  criticized  the  President, 
not  for  having  maintained  NATO,  but  for  having  not  handled  the 
situation  in  a  way  that  would  make  it  possible  for  France  to  stay  in. 

Of  course,  the  people  running  for  .the  Presidency  of  the  Unil^ed 
States  on  the  major  tickets  are  all  endorsers  of  the  imperialist  vio- 
lence that  the  United  States  does  impose  on  the  world.  In  terms  of 
my  concern  with  violence,  and,  as  I  said,  this  is  the  major  violence 
that  our  society  has  to  face 

Mr.  Conley.  Let  us  relate  the  violence  to  Chicago,  not  the  world 
situation. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Chicago  was  taking  place  in  context.  We  were  going 
to  Chicago  because  we  liked  to  march  up  and  down  the  street  even 
without  getting  beaten  over  the  head.  That  is  the  main  issue,  the 
fact  that  the  U.S.  Government  is  promoting  violence  and  practicing 
violence  all  over  the  world.  That  is  what  brought  us  to  Chicago  and 
also  in  the  ghetto. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  are  concerned  with  what,  if  any,  violence  occurred 
in  Chicago.  I  would  like  for  us  to  be  using  the  term  in  that  sense. 

Mr.  Dellinger,  I  just  want  you  to  put  it  in  this  context  because 
that  is  the  important  violence.  This  is  the  case  of — what  is  it  from 
the  Bible — of  looking  at  the  moat  in  the  other  fellow's  eye  and  not 
observing  the  beam  in  your  own  eye. 

For  the  U.S.  Government  to  be  upset  over  the  fact  that  some  people 
might  be  so  opposed  to  the  war  or  so  horrified  about  it  that  they  might, 
in  self-defense  or  some  other  way,  engage  in  some  act  that  they  might 
consider  violence,  is  perhaps  one  of  the  greatest  obscenities  of  our  age. 

I  am  sure  that  future  historians  will  consider  this  a  subject  for 
satire  and  tragic  humor. 

Mr.  Conley.  Besides  the  McCarthy  and  Kennedy  people,  whom 
you  have  identified  as  groups  you  thought  possibly  could  engage  in 
acts  of  violence,  what  other  groups  do  you  have  reference  to? 


2754  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  try  to  be  very  precise  about  these  things  because 
there  are  a  lot  of  subtleties^  and  I  did  not  talk  about  the  McCarthy 
and  Kennedy  groups  engaging  in  violence  in  Chicago.  I  talked  about 
their  endorsing  violence  abroad. 

Now,  as  it  happened,  I  think  that  in  some  cases  they  either  endorsed 
or  acquiesced  in  the  violence  of  the  Chicago  police  against  us.  Cer- 
tainly, even  Senator  McCarthy  did  not  speak  out  until  after  3  or  4  days 
of  brutality.  It  was  not  until  the  end  of  the  convention,  and  his  own 
headquai-ters  had  been  invaded  and  his  own  supporters  bloodied,  that 
he  made  some  mild  statement  against  it. 

Certainly  one  of  the  disappointments  of  the  time  was  that  a  man 
who  wanted  to  be  an  idealistic  leader  of  youth,  or  at  least  w^as  described 
as  such,  had  nothing  to  say  during  the  violence.  I  didn't  say  I  expected 
them  to  take  part  directly  in  the  violence  themselves. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  there  any  other  groups  that  you  did  anticipate, 
foresee,  suspect,  or  contemplate  might  engage  in  acts  of  violence,  other 
than  those  groups  that  you  have  already  identified  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Like  the  National  Guard  and  the  U.S.  Army  and 
the  police  and  the  undercover  agents. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Groups  who  would  be  there  generally  with  the  same 
purposes  as  your  group  or  as  part  of  your  coalition  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  really  don't  have  any  particular  memory  of 
such  groups. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Why  would  you  make  a  statement,  or  a  statement  gen- 
erally attributable  to  you,  like  this,  that  you  would  not  try  to  impose 
peaceful  demonstration  tactics  on  other  groups  ?  There  must  have  been 
feX)mething  brought  to  your  mind. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  just  spent  about  5  minutes  explaining  the  nature 
of  the  occasion  and  the  nature  of  our  approach  to  it  and  why  we  did 
not  seek  to  dictate  to  other  groups — this  wide  spectrum  of  people 
who  might  be  in  Chicago — dictate  how  they  would  act.  This  whole 
business,  I  simply  refuse  to  speculate  about  the  possible  motives  and 
the  possible  methods  and  actions  of  the  wide  spectrum  of  American 
people. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  did  speculate  in  this  statement  that  has  been 
attributable  to  you.  You  did  speculate? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  You  are  really  going  a  long  way  on  the  basis  of  one 
sentence  by  a  reporter,  which  is  not  even  a  direct  quote. 

Mr.  Conley.  If  we  may  move  on,  sir,  to  August  4,  1968.  This  is 
administrative  meeting  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee  held 
in  the  city  of  Chicago.  The  document  I  am  about  to  read  from  is  a 
document  which  has  been  previously  testified  to  in  these  hearings  by 
Lieutenant  Healy  of  the  Chicago  Police  Department. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  May  we  have  a  copy  of  it,  please  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir,  just  as  soon  as  I  get  through  with  it. 

This  document,  I  believe,  has  been  made  a  part  of  the  exhibits  of  this 
hearing.^  I  particularly  direct  your  attention  to  page  3,  the  last  para- 
graph :  "The  discussion  moved  to  the  massive  march" 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Hold  it ;  let  us  see  what  it  is. 

This  is  a  summary  of  administrative  meeting  held 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  abide  by  the  rules. 

1  Previously  marked  "Grubisic  Exhibit  No.  25."  See  pt.  1,  pp.  2348-2352,  of  Oct.  1,  19ft8, 
hearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2755 

Give  the  attorney  and  his  client  the  opportunity  to  examine  the 
document. 

(Witness  and  counsel  examine  document.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  was  quite  long,  but  I  have  finished  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  sir,  to  get  us  back  where  we  were  a  moment  ago, 
as  I  say,  this  document  has  been  previously  offered  and  received  by 
the  committee.  The  entire  document  is  in  evidence  and  is  part  of  the 
transcript,  I  believe. 

It  is  a  document  that  was  testified  to  earlier  in  these  proceedings  by 
Lieutenant  Healy  of  the  Chicago  Police  Department.  I  want,  if  I  may, 
to  direct  your  attention  specifically  to  the  last  paragraph,  beginning 
on  page  3,  which  reads  as  follows: 

The  discussion  moved  to  the  massive  march  proposal,  analyzing  the  various 
routes  to  the  Amphitheatre  and  the  length  of  the  different  routes.  Dave  pointed 
out  that  calling  for  an  action  not  relating  to  the  Amphitheatre  on  the  28th  was 
ignoring  the  natural  magnetism  of  the  place,  that  the  media  would  would  [sic] 
be  at  the  Amphitheatre,  and  that  the  necissity  [sic]  of  having  the  military  sur- 
round masses  of  i^eople  at  a  democratic  convention  would  lend  political  con- 
tent to  the  action.  There  was  a  discussion  on  the  possibility  of  proceeding  in  the 
face  of  a  curfew  threat  or  denial  of  a  permit.  It  was  pointed  out  that  Mob  has 
rallied  people  before  without  a  permit,  and  that  insistence  on  fulfilling  an  an- 
nounced aim  made  a  strong  bargaining  position  in  negotiating  a  permit.  A  curfew 
according  to  Bob  Greenbatt,  would  be  clearly  an  oppressive  measure  to  be  dis- 
obeyed. If  a  curfew  is  imposed.  Otto  Lilj'enstolpe  suggested  volunteers  be  urged 
to  disobey  in  order  to  force  the  city  into  the  predicament  of  mass  arrests. 

Now,  sir,  my  question,  after  reading  to  you  that  quotation,  is :  Are 
you  the  Dave  mentioned  in  that  paragraph  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  assume  that  I  am. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Does  the  paragraph  accurately  summarize  one  of  the 
discussions  at  the  meeting,  indicating,  as  it  does,  that  you  apparently 
strongly  urged  that  there  be  a  march  on  the  Amphitheatre? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  certainlj;,  before  that  time,  at  that  time,  and  after 
that  time,  strongly  urged  that  there  be  a  massive  march  to  the  Amphi- 
theatre. I  changed  your  word  "on"  to  "to.'' 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  quoting  from  the  same  document,  directing  your 
attention  to  the  paragraph  on  the  top  of  page  5  of  the  same  document : 

When  the  nonviolent  line  was  questioned,  Dave  explained  that  Mob  included 
groups  whose  beliefs  ranged  from  pacifism  to  militant  self  defense.  While  our 
aim  is  not  to  physically  disrupt  the  convention  nor  to  advocate  violence.  Mob 
has  never  repudiated  the  actions  of  its  constituents.  It  will  be  stressed,  in  addi- 
tion, that  it  is  well  known  that  Chicago  police  are  responsible  for  violence.  *  *  * 

Now,  does  that  quotation,  Mr.  Dellinger,  also  accurately  reflect  a 
discussion  at  the  meeting  and  your  role  in  that  particular  discussion  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Obviously  it  is  a  very  pithy  summary  of  the  dis- 
cussion which,  if  I  remember  correctly,  took  at  least  or  about  half  an 
hour.  I  think  that  what  is  clear  there — well,  even  in  this  report,  which 
I  am  glad  I  took  an  opportunity  to  resvd  earlier,  there  is  a  specific 
reference  to  the  very  great  violence  employed  by  tlie  Chicago  police 
on  April  27,  the  peace  march  in  Chicago,  which  was  under  the  spon- 
sorship of  the  Chicago  Peace  Council  and  the  National  Mobilization 
Committee. 

So  there  was  nothing  artificial.  This  plus  reports  that  we  had  of 
many  oppressive  police  actions  against  the  black  residents  of  Chicago, 
against  hippies  and  other  groups.  So  the  reference  to  the  violence  of 
the  Chicago  police  was  not  abstract.  It  was  in  this  kind  of  context.  I 


2756  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

pointed  out  yesterday,  after  making  clear  my  adherence  to  the  total 
nonviolence,  that  I  pointed  out  that  the  movement  as  a  whole  includes 
many  diverse  groups  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  activities  are  often 
led  by  veterans,  veterans  of  World  War  II,  veterans  of  the  Korean 
war,  and  even  veterans  of  the  war  in  Vietnam. 

So  this  is  the  kind  of  thing  I  was  pointing  out  in  this  diverse  group, 
that  although  for  tactical  reasons  and  practical  reasons  of  where  we 
were  operating  and  how,  the  entire  group  advocated  nonviolence,  none- 
theless, our  constituency  included  people  like  veterans  and  many  others 
who  do  believe  in  militant  self-defense. 

Militant  self-defense  was,  on  some  occasions,  employed  on  the  actual 
scene  in  Chicago,  and  true  to  this  statement — and  I  think  quite  prop- 
erly— neither  I  nor  any  other  pacifist  I  know  of  has  repudiated  acts 
of  self-defense,  even  though  we  ourselves  might  not  have  participated 
in  them. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Even  you  as  a  pacifist  believe  in  the  right  of  self- 
defense  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  There  are  various  forms  of  self-defense. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  the  discussion  of  various  juris- 
dictions on  laws  of  self-defense. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  have  been  attacked  by  police  and  others 
without  striking  back.  I  believe  it  is  possible  to  maintain  a  militant 
and  noncooperative  posture  in  such  a  situation  without  choosing  the 
method  of  combat  adopted  by  the  police.  This  happens  to  be  the  view 
of  probably  a  minority  wnthin  our  movement,  but  this  is  the  distinction 
which  was  being  made  here  because  there  were,  for  example,  I  remem- 
ber some  Quakers  and  pacifists  who  had  come  from  some  distance  to 
this  meeting  who  do  not  adopt  methods  of  physical  self-defense  when 
attacked,  as  I  do  not. 

And  there  were  others  who  feel  that  the  more  manly  and  success- 
ful and  militant  thing  to  do,  if  you  are  attacked  by  the  police,  is  to 
resist  physically. 

We  were  trying  to  show  that  our  movement  comprised  both  groups, 
and  it  was  not — and  that  neither  need  repudiate  the  other  and  that, 
given  the  practical  situation  in  Chicago,  we  could  all  work  together 
for  a  united  impact. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr,  Dellinger,  moving  back  in  this  article  and,  again, 
like  that  earlier  article  that  we  had  the  small  quote  from,  reading  spe- 
cifically from  the  interior  of  this  article : 

While  our  aim  is 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  article,  Mr.  Counsel,  or  the  minutes  ? 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  minutes,  I  am  sorry,  page  5 : 

While  our  aim  is  not  to  physically  disrupt  the  convention  nor  to  advocate  violence, 
Mob  has  never  repudiated  the  actions  of  its  constituents. 

This  is  a  sentence  drawn  from  within  this  larger  statement.  The 
statement  starts  out  saying  you  do  not  advocate  violence,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  but  it  says  you  do  not  repudiate  the  actions  of  your 
constituents  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  made  clear  yesterday  that  I  do  not  repudiate 
the  actions  of  the  Vietnamese  or  the  Cubans  in  fighting  for  the  lib- 
erty and  advancement  of  their  country,  and  in  the  same  way  I  do  not 
repudiate,  in  fact  I  try  to  support  in  a  variety  of  ways  the  Black  Pan- 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2757 

thers,  who,  in  their  dilemma  and  the  injustices  they  suffer,  do  not  take 
a  pacifist  position.  And  in  the  same  way  in  Chicago,  although  I  myself 
would  not  and  did  not  throw  stones,  for  example,  against  charging 
police,  I  can  understand  and  I  have  a  great  deal  of  sympathy  with 
some  of  my  colleagues  who  feel  that  when  the  police  viciously  attack 
a  crowd  of  people  and  are  advancing  that  way,  that  the  moral  position 
is  to  resist  them,  including  by  physical  means. 

This  kind  of  self-defense — as  I  say,  the  Mobilization  includes  both 
approaches  to  that,  and  sometimes  it  leads  to  some  tensions  or  prob- 
lems that  have  to  be  worked  out.  But  we  have  never  repudiated  either 
the  pacifists,  who,  in  the  face  of  a  charging  police,  will  perhaps  lie 
down  or  sit  down  or  do  something  else,  Jbut  not  try  to  fight  them  off, 
or  the  other  group,  who  may  on  occasion  try  to  defend  themselves  with 
their  fists  or  whatever  other  instruments  are  handy. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  does  this  not  mean  really,  then,  that  you 
do  not  condone  violence  on  the  part  of  persons  participating  with  you 
in  a  demonstration  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Do  not  condone  it  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Do  not  condone  or  do  condone.  Which  do  you  choose, 
sir? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  choose  what  really  runs  all  the  way  throug;h  this. 
I  think  you  are  straining  at  one  point  here  which  for  one  thing — I 
stand  by  this  statement  that  you  are  excerpting,  but  all  the  way  through 
the  emphasis  is  on  planning  and  organizing  and  conducting  nonviolent 
actions. 

That  was  our  plan.  There  were  people  there  who  think  there  is  a 
time  when  nonviolence  is  inadequate,  but  who  felt,  in  the  situation  at 
Chicago,  for  tactical  reasons  it  was  necessary  to  be  nonviolent  because, 
otherwise,  people  would  be  unnecessarily  brutalized  and  the  issues 
would  be  obscured  and  we  would  not  focus  on  what  we  were  there  for. 

I  won't  give  all  of  their  reasons. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  do,  then,  condone  violence  on  the  part  of  people 
participating  with  you,  do  you  not  ?  You  do  not  repudiate  it. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Is  it  better  that  my  views  be  expressed  in  my  words 
or  yours  ?  I  have  expressed  them  at  great  length,  I  think.  I  am  a  little 
embarrassed  to  keep  repeating  my  sentiments.  I  would  rather  not  have 
my  views  put  in  one  sentence  by  you  with  your  choice  of  words.  I  find 
these  matters  very  complicated. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  We  are  dealing,  Mr.  Dellinger,  with  very  subtle 
distinctions. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Right. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  As  I  understood,  for  example,  on  desertions  by  the  mili- 
tary, you  stated  that  you  did  not  advocate  desertion  by  the  military. 
I  don't  know  what  your  words  were,  but  you  approved  desertion  or  you 
condoned  desertion. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  If  I  had  the  opjjortunity  tonight  at  a  public 
meeting,  I  would  say  that  I  think  American  soldiers  should  not  com- 
mit war  crimes  and  that  I  will  support  anybody  who  decides  either  to 
refuse  orders  to  go  to  Vietnam  or  decides  to  turn  in  his  uniform  or 
decides  to  take  political  asylum  in  Sweden  or  Canada  or  anywhere  else, 
in  the  reversal  of  the  process  by  which  our  country  began,  to  come  here 
to  get  asylum  from  militarism.  I  will  support  that. 

What  I  made  clear  was  that  I  will  not  say  to  any  individual  that 
you  ought  to  do  this  or  you  ought  to  do  that. 


2758  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Mr.  Dellinsfer 


Mr.  Dellixger.  Incidentally,  I  will  be  very  happy  if  my  statement 
on  desertion,  for  example,  were  published  b}"  the  press  because  I  think 
this  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  the  American  people  have  open  and  part  of 
the  alternatives  which  are  presented  to  them,  part  of  the  challenge 
presented  to  them. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  I  would  like  to  mo^^e  you  to  another  event  occurring 
on  August  28,  the  rally  which  was  held,  under  a  permit  granted  by 
the  city  of  Chicago,  in  Grant  Park.  I  want  to  hand  you  what  purports 
to  be  a  flyer,  which  is  captioned,  ''"Let  the  People  Speak,"*  and  it  con- 
cludes with  "Let  the  People  Be  Heard,  National  ^Mobilization 
Committee.'* 

I  will  ask  you,  sir,  if  this  is  a  flyer  or  document  published  by  your 
organization  and  distributed,  urging  attendance  at  this  particular 
rally. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Give  the  witness  time  to  examine  the  document. 

(Witness  and  counsel  examine  document.) 

Mr.  Dellix'ger.  Yes;  this  was  issued  bj'  the  National  Mobilization 
Committee.  I  would  like  to  respectfully  request  that  it  be  entered 
into  the  record  so  that  people  who  read  the  record  may  know  what 
our  views  were.  I  could  read  it  out  loud,  but  it  is  not  necessary. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  There  being  no  objection  from  Mr.  Watson,  the  docu- 
ment will  be  admitted  and  printed  in  the  record. 

(Document  marked  "Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  2"  follows:) 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2759 
Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  2 


Let  the 
People  Speak 

Demonstrate  Your  Opposition  to  the  Vietnam  War 


Grant  Park 

Wednesday  August  28th 

1  P.M.  to  4  P.M. 


The  majority  of  the  American  people  want  the  United  States  to  stop  the 
bombing  and  get  out  of  Vietnam.  The  politicians  are  in  Chicago  threatening  to  con- 
tinue the  war  and  to  suppress  opposition.  This  is  the  only  demonstration  for  which 
the  city  has  issued  a  permit  despite  repeated  requests  by  many  groups. 

The  political  bosses  at  the  Democratic  Convention,  and  the  political  boss  of 
Chicago,  Richard  J.  Daley,  are  obviously  afraid  to  hear  what  the  people  want.  They 
have  turned  Chicago  into  an  armed  camp  and  have  tried  to  scuttle  free  speech  so  that 
they  wouldn't  have  to  listen  to  the  innumerable  Americans  WHO  WANT  THE  UNITED 
STATES  TO  GET  OUT  OF  VIETNAM. 

The  people  of  this  country  have  been  grossly  deceived  and  misrepresented  by 
the  Johnson-Humphrey-Daley  team.  These  are  the  men  who  promised  peace  in  1 964, 
then  escalated  the  war  to  the  point  where  200,000  American  boys  (and  countless 
Vietnamese)  have  been  killed  or  wounded.  These  are  the  men  who  evidently  believe 
that  the  American  people  have  no  rights,  that  only  government  bureaucrats  can  decide 
whether  we  live  or  die. 

This  totalitarian   mentality,   which   goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  illegal  war  in 
Vietnam,  must  not  go  unchallenged.  If  we  would  reassert  our  right  to  be  free  citizens, 
we  must  show  our  determination  to  stop  the  slaughter  in  Vietnam. 

We  urge  all  Chicagoans  to  join  with  the  thousands  coming  from  across  the 
country  in  a  massive  antiwar  demonstration  at  Grant  Park,  Wednesday  from 
1  p.m.  to  4  p.m. 

Let  the 

People  Be  Heard 

National  Mobilization  Committa* 
Room  315,  407  S.  Daartwm  939-2666 


2760  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  connection  with  this  rally  to  which  this  flyer  speaks 
there  was  a  rally  held  in  Grant  Park  and  there  was  a  permit  issued 
by  the  city  of  Chicago  for  that  purpose,  was  there  not? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  was  never  clear  whether  we  had  a  permit  or  not 
because  we  received  assurances — well,  I  don't  want  to  be  wrong  about 
the  time,  but  at  least  24  hours,  probably  48  or  72  hours  beforehand, 
perhaps  on  the  Monday  before  Wednesday — we  were  told  that  a  per- 
mit would  be  granted. 

However,  at  approximately  5 :30  in  the  afternoon,  Tuesday,  before 
the  rally  planned  for  Wednesday  noon,  I  received  a  letter  from  the 
city  of  Chicago — I  forget  whether  it  was  the  mayor's  office;  I  think 
it  was  the  mayor's  office — the  letter  saying  that  we  would  be  permitted 
to  rally,  but  that  we  would  not  be  allowed  to  distribute  any  literature, 
that  we  must  have  an  insurance  policy  of  from  $300,000  to  $500,000 
indemnity,  I  guess  is  the  word,  and  that  we  must  promise  or  under- 
take to  pay  all  the  costs  incurred  by  the  city  of  Chicago  because  of 
the  holding  of  the  rally. 

Obviously,  we  could  not  and  would  not  accept  these  terms,  and  it 
was,  from  all  points  of  view,  impossible  at  5 :30  on  Tuesday  after- 
noon, for  example,  to  secure  that  kind  of  insurance  if  we  had  been 
willing  to. 

Therefore,  it  was  never  clear  whether  w^e  really  had  a  permit  or  not 
or  whether  this  was  another  method  of  intimidation;  whether  if  we 
attempted,  as  we  did  attempt  to  assert  our  constitutional  rights  and 
our  moral  obligations  by  going  there,  whether  we  would  be  declared 
illegal  and  subject  to  abuse. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  you  contend  it  is  not  clear  as  to 
whether  or  not  you  had  a  permit — you,  as  you  have  always  contended, 
a  man  who  always  speaks  the  truth — why  did  you  put  in  this  doc- 
ument the  statement,  "This  is  the  only  demonstration  for  which 
the  city  has  issued  a  permit  *  *  *"? 

It  does  not  ring  true  to  me  that  you  would  put  that  in  one  of  these 
documents.  You  would  accuse  us  of  dishonesty,  but  not  yourself? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  do  not  remember  accusing  you  of  dishonesty.  I 
have  accused  you  of  many  political  crimes,  but  I  don't  remember  ac- 
cusing you  of  personal  dishonesty.  I  certainly  don't  want  you  to  have 
that  impression.  I  have  no  basis  for  thinking  such. 

However,  I  think  I  just  pointed  out  tliat  the  city  had  told  us  that 
the  rally  would  be  permitted.  Ordinarily,  under  those  circumstances, 
I  take  people  to  be  men  of  their  words,  and  that  if  the  deputy  mayor 
says  this  be  permitted — or  the  assistant  corporation  counsel,  whoever 
it  was,  I  think  it  was  both — we  assumed  that  it  is  permitted.  Since  the 
city  of  Chicago  was  obviously  trying  to  keep  people  away  from  the 
assertion  of  their  democratic  rights  and  of  their  moral  obligation  to 
oppose  the  war,  first  of  all  by  a  series  of  threats,  all  the  way  from 
Mayor  Daley's  shoot  to  kill  and  shoot  to  maim  statement  of  April  or 
May  to  a  variety  of  other  things  I  won't  go  into  now,  and  also  by  de- 
laying permits  so  that  people  who  did  want  to  face  arrest  or 
brutalization  would  not  have  time  to  get  to  the  city. 

As  soon  as  we  were  told  by  the  deputy  mayor  and  the  assistant  cor- 
poration counsel  that  we  did  have  the  permit  and  that  it  would  be 
legally  granted,  we  informed  people  as  rapidly  as  we  could. 

However,  this  was  limited  to  distribution  in  the  Chicago  area.  There 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2761 

was  not  time  to  reach  people  in  outlying  districts  except  by  a  few 
selective  phone  calls, 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Wliat  was  the  procedure  used  in  issuing  permits?  Does 
the  city  of  Chicago  follow  the  practice  of  issuing  written  permits, 
which  are  given  to  the  permittee  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  As  far  as  I  know — and  I  think  I  remember  this 
accurately — on  the  occasion  of  the  April  27  peace  march,  which  was, 
however,  brutally  assaulted,  they  had  delivered  a  written  permit.  So 
it  was  our  belief  that  this  would  happen. 

However,  it  was  clear  that  after  we  had  been  told — and  I  believe 
that  the  meeting  was  on  Monday  before  the  Wednesday  of  the  rally- 
after  we  had  been  told  that  the  permit  would  be  granted,  we  didn't 
expect  to  sit  in  the  office  and  have  it  all  written  out  and  handed  to  us 
at  that  time.  In  fact,  the  deputy  mayor  explained  that  he  had  to  con- 
tact various  authorities,  the  park  authorities,  and  so  forth. 

Mr.  Watson.  Really  it  made  no  difference  whether  you  had  the  per- 
mit. You  would  have  held  the  rally  anyway.  You  did  not  recognize 
that  authority  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No.  I  am  in  favor,  as  it  came  out  in  the  other  docu- 
ment. In  the  document  we  said  that  we  would  and  should  march  and 
rally  with  or  without  the  permit,  that  we  had  done  this  before. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  the  permit  was  inconsequential  after  all  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  not  inconsequential  because  it  is  in  violation 
of  constitutional  rights  when  the  authorities  refuse  to  give  a  permit. 

Mr.  Watson.  The  point  is  that  you  would  have  had  the  demonstra- 
tion with  or  without  a  pennit  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  At  the  time  of  the  Chicago  convention,  in  the  nature 
of  two  or  three  hundred  Americans  and  many  thousands  of  Vietnamese 
were  being  killed  every  week.  And  if  the  mayor  of  the  city  of  Chicago, 
in  his  totalitarian  method,  was  to  say  to  us,  "You  are  not  allowed  to 
protest  against  the  war  by  holding  a  peaceful  march  and  rally,"  I  was 
not  about  to  say,  "Well,  I  am  sorry,  my  brothers  in  Vietnam,  of  both 
nationalities,  all  nationalities.  I  am'^ sorry  I  cannot  do  anything  for  you 
because  the  mayor  of  Chicago  will  not  pennit  it." 

Mr.  Watson.  So  the  permit  was  of  no  consequence  at  all. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  you  did  hold  the  rally,  did  you  not? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  We  held  a  very  hectic  and  very  often  interrupted 
rally  by  attacks  by  the  police. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  rally  in  Grant  Park  ^ 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  referring  to  in  Grant  Park  at  the  bandshell. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir.  In  that  comiection  I  hand  you  what  purports 
to  be  a  flyer  published  by  the  Chicago  Police  Department,  which  was 
distributed,  according  to  earlier  testimony,  in  Grant  Park  on  August  28 
by  that  police  department. 

Are  you  familiar  with  that  document? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  This  was  handed  to  me  on  the  platform  when 
I  was  chairing  the  meeting. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  will  ask  leave  at  this  time  to  read 
this  particular  document  into  the  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Go  ahead. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  document  is  captioned  "please  cooperate," 
"28  August  1968" : 


2762  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

PLEASE  COOPERATE  WITH  THE  POLICE  DEPARTMENT 

In  the  interests  of  free  speech  and  assembly,  this  portion  of  Grant  Park  has 
been  set  aside  for  a  rally.  You  are  permitted  to  conduct  this  assembly  and  rally 
anid  will  be  protected. 

In  order  to  aid  traflSc  control  efforts  and  assist  in  maintaining  the  -security  of 
the  Democratic  National  Convention,  no  rally  or  assembly  will  be  permitted  at 
or  near  the  International  Amphitheatre. 

No  authorization  for  a  parade,  march  or  procession  has  been  issued.  Any 
attempts  to  conduct  or  participate  ini  a  parade  or  march  will  subject  each  and 
every  participant  to  arrest.  We  earnestly  request  your  cooperation  so  that  the 
rights  of  dissent  and  protest  will  be  properly  safeguarded  as  well  as  the  rights 
of  all  others  including  those  delegates  at  the  Democratic  National  Convention. 

CHICAGO   POLICE   DEPARTMENT, 

James  B.  Oonlisk,  Jr., 
Superintendent  of  Police. 

Now  you  were  familiar,  were  you  not,  Mr.  Dellinger,  with  the 
contents  of  this  document,  which  I  have  just  read,  on  August  28  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  were  also  aware  prior  to  August  28,  were  you  not, 
that  your  organization,  that  is  Mobe,  had  been  denied  a  permit  to 
march  on  the  International  Amphitheatre  or  to  hold  any  rally  near  it  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  might  point  out  in  that  connection  that  we 
were  also  denied  a  permit  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  city  of 
Washington,  to  hold  a  legal  and  constitutional  and  politically  neces- 
sary rally  at  Lincoln  Memorial  on  the  march  to  the  Pentagon. 

For  some  time  we  were  informed  absolutely  that  we  would  not  get 
this  permit,  but  we  decided — we  knew  that  we  did  not  want  to  see  a 
police  state  created  by  default.  We  knew  that  already  too  many  of  our 
liberties  and  rights  and  powers  had  been  taken  away  from  us,  so  we 
decided  to  assert  these  rights  at  whatever  cost. 

After  ha\dng  made  this  decision  and  made  clear  that  there  would  be 
thousands  of  people  here,  then  we  received  a  permit.  We  hoped — and 
I  continually  said  to  the  press  and  in  many  other  ways — we  hoped  that 
the  city  of  Chicago,  which  was  attempting  to  suppress  our  rights  just 
as  the  Federal  authori'ties  attempted  to  suppress  our  rights  and  to 
impede  the  development  of  an  effective  antiwar  movement  in  October, 
we  hoped  that  the  city  of  Chicago  would  come  to  its  senses  and  would 
reverse  its  position.  We  held  this  hope  right  up  until  the  very  last 
moment. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  connection  with  the  rally  held  in 
Grant  Park  at  the  bandshell,  is  it  not  true,  sir,  as  has  been  reported  in 
numerous  newspaper  accounts — and  I  have  before  me  si^ecifically  the 
Baltimore  Sun  of  August  29,  directing  your  attention  to  page  10 — 
that  you,  at  this  rally,  in  view  of  the  massive  show  of  police  strength 
which  did  appear  as  your  rally  ended  about  5  or  5  :80  p.m.,  advised  tlie 
crowd  to  do  one  of  the  following  things:  One,  to  form  in  lines  eight 
abreast  for  a  march  towards  the  Ampnitheatre  that  was  sure  to  end 
in  arrest. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Excuse  me.  That  would  be  inaccurate  because  I 
never  say  anything  is  sure.  I  say  you  must  be  prepared  to  be  arrested. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Two,  to  filter  out  of  the  park  into  the  street  so  as  to  tie  up  motor 
and  pedestrian  traffic  in  the  Loop  area,  advising  clergymen  and  those 
with  children  particularly  to  follow  this  procedure. 

And  three,  to  remain  sitting  in  the  park. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2763 

Now,  this  is  the  Baltimore  Sun  account  of  the  reporter  who  was 
there  and  who  has  indicated  that  these  were  the  three  alternatives 
proposed  by  you  to  those  meeting  in  the  bandshell. 

Are  these  fair  statements  of  what  you  did  in  fact  propose? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Give  the  witness  time  to  examine  the  three  alternatives. 

(Witness  and  counsel  examine  document.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  would  like  to  respond.  Firet  of  all,  as  usual  by 
putting  it  into  context  and  saying  it  was  a  very  hectic  situation  and  an 
atmosphere  of  police  intimidation  and  violence,  and  therefore  I  do 
not  blame  the  reporter  for  what  I  would  consider  some  inaccuracies  in 
my  position. 

It  speaks  here  of :  "Thousands  of  Chicago  police  and  Illinois  Na- 
tional Guardsmen  chased  and  clubbed  thousands  of  youthful  anti-war 
demonstrators  *  *  *  smell  of  tear  gas  hung  in  the  air  *  *  *. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  they  inaccurate  on  that  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  they  are  not.  I  am  explaining  the  context,  both 
in  which  I  made  the  statement  and  in  which  the  reporter  unwittingly 
did  not  get  them  completely  accurate.  "Scores  of  youths  were  arrested 
and  scores  more  were  beaten  on  the  head,  chest  and  shoulders  *  *  *." 

Mr.  Conley.  Was  the  reporter  inaccurate  on  that? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  He  mi^ht  have  underestimated  the  number,  but 
the  general  picture  is  certainly  accurate.  "Mayor  Richard  J.  Daley  and 
the  city's  police  force  behaved  tonight  very  much  like  the  'fascist,  im- 
perialist' force  that  the  mobilization  leaders  have  charged  them  with 
being  all  along." 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  the  Baltimore  Sun  reporter  inaccurate  on  that? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  believe  he  was  accurate.  He  goes  on  to  say  that 
this  "vindicated  the  radicals'  arguments."  Then  he  speaks  of  the  tense 
atmosphere. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  he  accurate  on  that  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  He  was  accurate  in  all  of  this. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  He  only,  then,  as  I  understand  it,  is  inaccurate  on  the 
part  that  is  attributable  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  he  didn't  do  a  bad  job  there.  I  presented 
three  alternatives.  Given  the  tenseness  of  the  situation,  which  these 
quotations  have  indicated,  and  given  the  confusion  on  the  platform 
and  the  attempts  we  were  making  to  get  people  taken  to  the  hospital 
and  this  kind  of  thing,  I  think  he  did  a  relatively  good  job  of  it. 

But  the  three  alternatives  that  I  presented  were,  the  first  one,  as  he 
says,  to  form  in  lines  eight  abreast  for  the  march,  which  I  indicated 
they  should  be  prepared  to  face  arrest  if  they  chose  that  alternative. 

I  also  said  that  this  was  to  be  a  strictly  nonviolent  march  and  any- 
body who  felt  he  could  not  react  to  police  attack  nonviolently  should 
do  something  else,  should  not  take  part  in  this  march.  This  led  to  the 
second  alternative. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  rejjorter  was  inaccurate  in  not  including  that  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  it  would  have  been  a  fuller  and  more  accurate 
report  if  he  had  mentioned  that  because  this  was  clearly  emphasized 
and  clearly  followed,  that  as  we  started  the  march,  through  the  port- 
able loudspeaker  I  kept  repeating  that  and  saying  it  was  not  a  matter 
of,  you  know,  the  superiority  of  one  group  over  another  or  anything 
of  that  kind,  but  there  was  a  division  of  labor.  We  only  wanted  peo- 
ple there  who  could  clearly  respond  to  police  violence  by  nonviolence 
and  not  by  using  militant  self-defense. 


2764  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  asked  those  who  either  felt  they  could  not  respond 
in  a  crisis  nonviolently  or  who  did  not  think  that  a  march  was  at  this 
point  called  for,  to  take  one  of  two  other  alternatives. 

One  was  to  simply  stay  in  the  park  and  to  wait  until  the  atmosphere 
was  clear  as  possible  since,  given  the  attitude  of  the  Chicago  police 
and  the  practice  of  the  last  few  days,  women  and  children  and  others 
who  did  not  face  brutality  could  not  feel  safe  in  leaving  at  this  time. 

Then  for  others  who  wished  to  protest  in  other  places  or  in  other 
ways  and  did  not  want  to  take  part  in  the  nonviolent  march,  that  they 
should  leave  in  small  groups  and  carry  out  their  own  activities. 

Now  it  is  entirely  possible  that  somebody  referred  to  pedestrians, 
and  so  forth,  going  into  the  Loop  area.  I  have  no  recollection  of  saying 
that  myself.  1  think  the  reference  to  tying  up  pedestrians  and  motor 
traffic  was  not  that  we  should  go  out  to  do  it,  but  that  if  the  Chicago 
police  were  going  to  attack  us — this  was  the  second  alternative — peo- 
ple should  be  in  the  streets  or  near  the  Hilton  or  somewhere  where 
their  violence  would  be  partially  restrained  and  where  it  would  be 
visible  for  the  whole  world  to  see. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  then,  as  I  take  it,  it  is  a  generally  fair 
and  accurate  statement  that  we  can  attribute  to  the  reporter  from  the 
Baltimore  Sun^  with  those  corrections  which  you  have  made? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  It  is  obviously  an  attempt,  and  fairly  success- 
ful attempt,  to  write  a  fair  report  of  what  happened. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Subsequent  to  making  these  proposals,  did  you  not,  in 
fact,  lead  people  out  of  the  park  eight  abreast  ^ 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  advancing  what  I  would  i^resume  would  be  your 
position  one,  to  form  in  lines  eight  abreast  for  a  march  toward  the 
Amphitheatre  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Right. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now,  Mr.  Dellinger,  when  you  started  this  march  eight 
abreast,  you  were  aware  of  the  fact  that  you  did  not  have  any  permit 
for  a  parade  or  a  procession.  So  you  were  doing  this  in  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  violate  the  law? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Not  in  a  deliberate  attempt  to  violate  the  law.  We 
were  doing  it  in  a  deliberate  attempt  to  get  to  the  Amphitheatre  and 
to  hold  a  rally  at  which  Vietnam  veterans  and  others  could  speak 
against  the  war  and  could  urge  the  American  people  to  resist  the  war. 
That  was  what  we  were  attempting  to  do. 

The  Chicago  police  were  attempting  to  prevent  us  from  doing  that. 
Therefore,  we  knew  that  we  had  to  face  the  possibility  of  brutal 
attack  or  arrest.  We  were  not  interested  in  demonstrating  either  peace- 
fully or  with  violent  attack  for  its  own  sake.  We  were  interested  in 
trying  to  move  beyond  the  stage  of  token  dissent  to  a  position  where 
the  antiwar  movement  could  have  enough  power  and  enough  numbers 
to  stop  the  war. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  But  you  were  making  a  deliberate  violation  of  the 
law,  were  you  not,  sir?  Whether  you  agreed  with  the  law  or  not,  it 
was  a  deliberate  violation  of  the  law? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  happens  that  I  agreed  with  the  Constitution, 
which  said  I  had  the  right  and  other  people  had  the  right  to  make 
this  march. 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2765 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  But  you  were  also  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  city  of 
Chicago  had  a  law 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  also  aware  of  the  fact  that  Federal,  State, 
and  local  authorities  often  violate  the  rights  of  our  citizens,  contrary 
to  the  Constitution  and  contrary  to  any  sound  ethical  and  political 
practice,  and  that  if  people  do  not  resist  this,  willing  to  take  the 
consequences  upon  themselves 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  — of  violating  the  law.  You  have  to  violate  the  law 
to  take  the  consequence. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Are  you  making  the  statement,  or  am  I? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  asking  you,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  I  have  made  clear  that  if  the  authorities, 
in  this  case  Mayor  Daley,  are  violating  the  Constitution  and  probably 
violating  the  laws  of  Illinois  as  well,  then  I  am  not  going  to  obey 
his  illegal  orders.  It  is  of  little  consequence  to  me  whether  he  decides, 
whether  what  he  thinks  I  do  is  illegal  or  not. 

I  am  not  opposed  to  breaking  laws  in  order  to  try  to  bring  about 
a  more  just  and  humane  society  and  to  bring  about  an  end  to  the 
war.  I  have  many  times  violated  laws.  I  expect  to  have  to  do  so  in 
the  future.  Otherwise,  one  reduces  himself  to  the  position  of  token 
dissent. 

Mr.  Conley.  One  question  here — and  it  has  been  a  very  simple  ques- 
tion— was:  Did  you  violate  a  law  by  marching  in  this  demonstration? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Mayor  Daley  violated  the  law  by  sending  out  his 
police,  and  the  National  Guard  violated  the  law  by  sending  out  their 
machine  guns  and  tanks — well,  tanks  I  am  not  sure  of,  I  will  with- 
draw that — their  machine  guns  and  their  various  devices  to  prevent 
us  from  exercising  our  constitutional  rights. 

They  violated  the  law,  and  we,  to  the  best  of  our  feeble  ability,  re- 
sisted their  illegal  act. 

Mr.  Conley.  This  law  I  am  talking  about,  which  requires  a  parade 
permit  or  a  processional  permit,  this  was  not  a  law  that  was  enacted  to 
keep  you  from  making  a  march  that  day,  was  it,  to  your  knowledge  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Repression  is  not  a  new  thing  in  this  country.  There 
have  been  illegal  laws  and  suppression  of  democratic  rights  throughout 
our  history  and  a  constant  struggle  by  the  people  to  overcome  these 
illegal  and  unconstitutional  and  antidemocratic  acts. 

I  would  not  be  so  presumptuous  as  to  think  all  the  repressive  legisla- 
tion in  the  U.S.  was  enacted  in  order  to  prevent  the  Mobilization  from 
exercising  its  functions.  In  some  cases  new  laws  have  been  passed  in 
relation  to  our  activities,  but  basically  these  laws  have  existed  in  the 
past. 

Mr.  Conley.  With  reference  to  this  particular  law,  to  your  knowl- 
edge it  was  not  passed  for  the  purpose  of  harassing  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  was  not  even  a  law.  There  is  no  law  that  I  know 
of  in  Chicago  that  says  that  people  cannot  assert  their  constitutional 
rights.  This  was  a  ruling  by  a  tyrannical  mayor  who  is  one  of  the  top 
officials,  not  only  the  mayor  of  the  second  or  third  largest  city  in  the 
country,  but  also  a  leading  figure  in  the  Democratic  administration. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  as  I  understand  it,  you  believe  that  the 
constitutional  right  which  you  had  to  move  out  eight  abreast  super- 
seded any  so-called  municipal  ordinance  or  anything  else? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  That  is  a  clear  statement  of  my  views. 

Mr.  Watson.  Let  me  ask  you  about  this.  Since  you  have  that  consti- 

21-706  O — 69 — pt.  3 6 


2766  DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  6  S  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

tutional  right  and  no  one  can  deny  you  or  your  group  that  right, 
what  is  your  position  on  the  right  of  people  to  traverse  the  streets  and 
sidewalks  of  Cliicago  in  a  normal  fashion?  How  do  you  relate  your 
right  to  their  rights,  or  do  they  have  any  rights  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  they  do.  I  have  written  and  spoke  publicly 
on  this  and  I  have  also  acted. 

Mr.  Watson.  They  can't  traverse  the  streets  when  you  are  marching 
eight  abreast.  AVhat  do  they  do  ?  Do  they  lose  their  rights  or  do  they 
run  over  you  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  My  dear  Mr.  Watson,  when  the  Chicago  Bears  hold 
a  football  game,  I  myself  have  been  held  up  from  being  able  to  cross 
the  streets  or  held  up  in  a  traffic  jam  because  of  this.  Obviously,  we  live 
in  a  complicated  society  in  which  the  rights  of  people  impinge  upon 
the  rights  of  other  people,  and  there  have  to  be  many  interactions.  I  do 
not  believe  that  at  a  time,  to  use  my  repeated  phrase,  when  hundreds  of 
Americans  and  thousiinds  of  Vietnamese  are  being  killed  evei'j'  week 
and  when  the  black  people  of  this  country  are  being  oppressed  and 
subjected  to  bitter  violence  and  economic  provocations,  that  at  such  a 
time  it  is  a  proper  sense  of  proportion  to  allow  streets  to  be  tied  up  for 
Shriners'  parades,  for  prowar  parades,  for  football  games,  for  World 
Series,  for  the  arrival  of  a  movie  star,  all  kinds  of  things  which  are 
inevitable,  but  to  allow  that  kind  of  thing  to  interfere  with  the  normal 
movement  of  people  through  the  street,  but  to  say  to  people  who  want 
to  bring  an  end  to  the  war  and  oppression,  "You  can't  use  the  streets 
bec-ause  if  you  do  this  particular  street  will  be  tied  up  or  somebody 
may  be  delayed  on  his  way  home." 

My  position  is,  however,  that  we  should  attempt  to  minimize  impos- 
ing penalties  upon  people  who  do  not  agree  with  us,  who  are  not  in  our 
march.  It  is  for  that  reason — that  was  one  of  the  reasons  we  went  to  the 
mayor's  office  and  tried  to  get  a  permit  and  offered,  in  the  course  of  our 
discussions  on  many  occasions,  to  adjust  the  route  so  that  it  would  not 
interfere  with  the  rights  of  other  people. 

We  could  never  get  to  the  point  where  we  could  have  that  kind  of 
discussion.  What  we  would  not  accept  is  being  moved  so  far  away  from 
the  Amphitlieatre  or  so  far  away  fi-om  where  people  are  that  our 
march  would  be  taking  place  in  isolation. 

We  were  perfectly  willing  to  try  to  work  out  the  ground  rules  so 
that  the  rights  of  other  people  would  not  be  violated  or  imposed  upon. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  you  wanted  to  exercise  your  rights  in 
close  proximity  to  others  who  were  trying  to  exercise  their  rights  so 
as  to  disrupt  the  othei-s  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  That  is  the  opposite  of  what  I  said. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  is? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  did  not  understand  you  correctly.  I  thought  you  said 
you  did  not  want  your  demonstration  to  be  in  isolation,  but  you 
wanted  to  move  to  wliere  the  action  was. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  You  see,  in  real  life  there  are  always  many  factors 
that  one  has  to  weigh  and  adjust,  and  so  forth.  In  real  life  in  Chicago, 
as  in  New  York,  as  in  Washington,  what  we  were  attempting  to  do 
was  to  prevent  the  authorities  from  putting  us  so  far  away  that  we 
could  not  be  seen  and  that  the  people  would  have  the  sense  of  marching 
through  a  wasteland. 

That  was  one  of  the  factors. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2767 

Another  factor  was  to  attempt  not  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
other  people  who  were  in  the  city  for  other  reasons  or  who  lived  there. 
It  was  a  matter  of  trying  to  weigh  these. 

AVe  offered  to  try  to  work  out  this  problem  with  the  Chicago  authori- 
ties, but  they  refused  to  recognize  our  right  even  to  discuss  the  problem. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Finally,  sir,  will  you  not  agree  that  we  would  actually 
have  a  confused,  if  not  a  chaotic,  condition  if  any  group  at  its  own 
wish  were  able  to  move  out  and  march  up  and  down  the  streets 
without  some  coordination  or  clearance  or  control  by  the  municipal 
authorities  ? 

I  recognize  the  fact  that  you  generally  do  not  recognize  civil  au- 
thority. But  would  you  not  agree  that  it  would  be  a  rather  confused 
and  chaotic  condition  if  your  principle  were  followed? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  think  we  would  have  worse  than  a  confused  and 
chaotic  condition  because  of  the  conditions  imposed  upon  black  people, 
because  of  the  draft  of  American  youth  to  be  slaughtered  and  to  com- 
mit war  crimes  in  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Watsox.  You  know  you  have  spoken  of  veterans  in  the  lead  of 
this  movement.  You  are  not  a  veteran  are  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  am  not. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  don't  believe  Mr.  Hayden  was  or  Mr.  Davis. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Do  you  want  us  to  swap  war  stories.  Congressman, 
to  show  some  wounds  and  medals?  They  are  on  many  veterans,  in- 
cluding myself,  who  have  honorably  served,  been  wounded,  been  deco- 
rated in  combat,  who  think  we  are  committing  war  crimes  in  Viet- 
nam. 

Mr.  Watsox'.  I  am  sure  I  am  aware  of  counsel's  position. 

I  am  just  making  the  observation.  I  have  heard  repeated  statements 
that  in  this  group  are  veterans  of  World  War  II  and  Korea  and  Viet- 
nam, and  so  forth.  As  of  yet  I  have  not  seen  many  of  them 

Mr.  GuTMAX'.  I  am.  Here  is  one  right  in  front  of  you,  Congressman 
Watson. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Did  I  understand  you  to  sav  you  are  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  march  and  demonstration  in  Chicago  f 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  No. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Gentlemen,  let  us  be  in  order. 

Counsel  has  not  been  called  to  testify.  Just  wait  a  minute  and  then 
we  will  have  a  question. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  am  prepared  to  swap  war  stories  with  the  Congress- 
man. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Proceed,  Counsel. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  want  to  say  that  the  Congressman  is  way  off  the 
point  because  the  antiwar  movement,  as  I  have  indicated,  includes  a 
tremendous  spread  of  occupations,  ages,  political  attitude,  religious 
attitude,  and  also  of  personal  histories  and  experiences  in  relation 
to  war. 

I  have  expounded  as  clearly  as  I  could  my  own  belief  in  nonviolence, 
which  extends  even  to  wars  in  which  I  think  one  side  is  clearly  more 
right  than  the  other.  But  it  would  be  wrong  for  you  to  think  that  in 
this  particular  respect  I  am  typical  of  the  movement  because  I  am  sure 
a  vast  majority  of  our  members  either  have  served  in  past  wars  or 
would  have  if  they  had  been  of  the  proper  age  and  sex. 

Mr.  Watsox'.  Of  course,  my  last  question  is  whether  or  not  we  would 
have  a  confused,  at  least,  if  not  a  chaotic,  condition  if  any  group  could 


2768  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

move  as  it  wished  throughout  any  city  in  America  without  having  some 
coordination  by  the  municipal  authorities. 

Would  you  not  agree  that  is  the  proper  situation  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  myself  tried  to  coordinate  and  to  work  out 
such  arrangements  to  minimize  confusion.  Howe.ver,  I  have  full  sym- 
pathy with  those  who  on  occasion — and  there  could  very  well  be 
occasion  myself  when  I  would  feel  that  the  disruption  to  ordinary 
civilian  life  and  the  confusion  that  would  result,  for  example,  from 
sitting  down  in  a  public  place  or  tying  up  a  street — that  this  disrup- 
tion would  be  justified  in  terms  of  the  necessity  of  bringing  home  to 
the  American  people  the  genocide  that  they  are  committing. 

So  I  am  not  making  an  absolute  statement  against  that  type  of 
activity  in  this  type  of  mass  mobilization  which  the  Mobilization 
Conunittee  has  organized — April  15  in  New  York  and  San  Fran,  Octo- 
ber 21  and  22  here,  the  attempted  demonstrations  at  Chicago. 

We  felt  that  on  these  occasions  it  was  important  to  coordinate  our 
activities  with  the  authorities  to  try  to  avoid  this  kind  of  unnecessary 
confusion  and  conflict  of  rights. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  that  connection,  when  you  started 
out  with  this  group  eight  abreast,  you  certainly  had  no  hopes  that  you 
were  going  to  alter  or  change,  had  you  been  able  to  reach  the  Inter- 
national Amphitheatre,  the  convictions  or  the  voting  of  the  delegates 
or  their  choice  for  President,  did  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Again,  let  me  say  that  the  Mobilization  is  a  coali- 
tion, and  there  were  people  who  wanted  to  march  to  the  Amphi- 
theatre who  undoubtedly  harbored  the  hope  that  this  would  change 
the  votes  of  the  delegates. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  My  question  is  directed  to  you. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  myself,  no,  because  I  did  not  expect  that  any 
outcome  of  the  Democratic  Nominating  Convention  would  be  the 
major  influence  to  determine  whether  we  went  to  war  or  not. 

I  myself  believed  that  it  was  to  arouse  the  concern  of  the  American 
people  expressed  by  a  variety  of  other  methods,  including  active  re- 
sistance, draft  resistance,  the  resistance  against  military  operations, 
the  kind  of  thing  which  a  number  of  Catholic  clergymen  have  done 
when  they  have  taken  draft  card  files  and  destroyed  them  saying  there 
is  some  kind  of  property,  such  as  draft  card  files  for  Vietnam  and 
crematorium  in  Nazi  Germany,  which  have  no  right  to  exist. 

i  have  more  faith  in  this  kind  of  thing  and,  although  I  am  very 
happy  w^hen  any  public  figure  or  politician  speaks  out  against  the 
war. 

I  have  found  that  the  program  of  all  of  the  candidates  for  the 
Democratic  nomination  was  inadequate  and  unsatisfactory  to  me,  and 
it  did  not  matter  that  much  to  me  which  one  was  selected, 

Mr.  IcHORD.  At  that  point,  if  I  may  intervene,  Mr.  Counsel,  have 
you  been  active  in  Mr.  Davis'  coffeehouse,  what  do  you  call  it,  coffee- 
house operation  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  supported  that  program,  endorsed  it,  worked 
with  it  some.  I  have  only  made  one  brief  visit  to  the  coffeehouse,  but 
I  do  everything  I  can  to — which  I  believe  was  in  Congressman  Wat- 
son's district  in  Columbia,  South  Carolina.  I  think  they  are  doing 
very  fine  work. 

I  think  it  is  very  important  that  the  people  who  are  drafted  into 
the  Army  not  be  completely  brainwashed  and  intimidated  by  the 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2769 

military  mind  and  the  military  interpretation  of  events,  and  at  the 
very  least  they  have  this  kind  of  place  where  they  can  go  for  a  much 
more  mature  and  self-creative  type  of  activity. 

Also,  of  course,  as  I  want  to  make  very  clear,  I  believe  that  one  of 
the  evils  in  the  United  States  is  that  after  people  are  drafted  it  has 
been  assumed  that  the^  lose  their  constitutional  rights,  not  only  in 
terms  of  some  of  the  trials  and  imposition  of  penalties,  but  in  terms 
of  access  to  free  speech,  free  assembly,  and  so  forth. 

I  have  always  felt  that  it  is  very  important  that  the  soldiers  who 
are  being  asked  to  go  to  Vietnam  and  to  commit  war  crimes  and  to 
risk  their  lives  and  limbs,  that  they  be  enabled  to  hear  the  full  story 
against  the  war  and  be  given  all  of  the  information  on  both  sides, 
which  will  make  it  possible  to  make  up  their  own  minds  as  to  what 
course  of  action  they  should  take. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Then,  sir,  as  I  understand  it,  you  did  not  hope,  your- 
self, when  you  led  this  march  toward  the  Amphitheatre,  to  alter  the 
conduct  of  either  the  delegates  or  their  selection  for  President? 

Mr.  Dellingek.  No,  I  did  not.  I  wanted  to  appeal  to  the  American 
people.  We  wanted  to  contrast  the  statement  by  the  Vietnam  war 
veterans  outside  the  Amphitheatre  with  the  ludicrous  statements  in 
the  Democratic  platform  and  the  programs  and  statements  of  the 
nominees  or  the  prospective  nominees. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr,  Bellinger,  moving  to  another  area,  when  Lieuten- 
ant Healy  was  here  in  October  from  the  Chicago  Police  Department,  he 
testified  concerning  certain  events  which  occurred  in  Lincoln  Park, 
which  was  the  practicing  of  the  so-called  Japanese  snake  dance. 

He  also  produced  photographs,  which  I  believe  were  received  by 
tlie  committee,  of  individuals  practicing  this  particular  form  of 
athletic  endeavor. 

Mr.  Dellinger,  I  put  to  you,  sir,  the  question :  Were  you  aware  of 
these  practice  sessions  which  were  going  on  in  the  Lincoln  Park 
during  the  days  leading  up  to  August  28  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  was  aware  of  them.  Although  I  knew  of  our 
general  plans,  I  first  read  of  them  in  the  newspaper  when  I  was  on 
a  plane  on  the  way  to  Chicago.  I  later  visited  Lincoln  Park  and  wit- 
nessed at  least  one  or  two  of  these  sessions. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  let  me  ask  you  this:  Did  you  at  any 
time  object  to  or  take  any  concrete  position  indicating  that  you  felt 
this  wasn't  a  desirable  thing  for  the  p«)ple  involved  to  do? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  had  some  discussions  with  my  fellow  committee 
members  in  order  to  find  out  more  about  the  nature  and  purpose  of 
this  and  was  convinced  that  this,  on  the  whole,  was  a  legitimate  prepa- 
ration for  self-defense  on  the  part  of  those  who  felt  it  important  to 
react  to  police  brutality  by  defending  themselves  collectively  as  well 
as  individually. 

I  did  feel  that,  on  the  whole,  the  amount  of  training  possible  in 
such  a  situation  would  not  make  a  great  deal  of  difference.  It  mainly 
gave  the  people  some  sense  of  morale.  In  my  verj  first  discussion  with 
the  marshals  and  the  others  who  were  working  on  this,  it  was  made 
clear  that  the  Japanese  snake  dance  as  such  was  not  intended  to  be 
used.  It  was  something  which  required  a  great  deal  of  training,  much 
longer  than  was  available  to  our  people;  closely  coordinated  group, 
and  for  one  thing  our  group  was  not  even  that  united  in  using  it  as  a 
tactic.  I  want  to  make  very  clear  that  my  discussions  along  this  line 


2770  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

were  not  in  the  nature  of  objections,  but  a  simple  attempt  to  clarify 
and  discuss  and  evaluate. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  in  that  connection,  almost  anybody  who 
has  any  familiarity  at  all  with  the  Japanese  snake  dance  knows  his- 
torically where  it  comes  from  and  knows  the  purpose  for  which  it 
is  used,  which  is  to  break  through  police  lines. 

Is  that  not  a  fair  statement  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  think,  if  I  understand  it  correctly,  first  of  all  it 
has  emerged  as  a  form  of  resistance  to  U.S.  attempts  to  rearm  and 
remilitarize  Japan,  including  the  sending  of — the  gross  obscenity  of 
sending  nuclear  submarines  to  the  area,  besides  using  the  former  Japa- 
nese territory  of  Okinawa  as  a  base  from  which  to  attack  first  Korea 
and  now  Vietnam. 

Now,  I  really  am  not  an  expert ;  although  I  have  visited  Japan  and 
met  with  various  members  of  the  Japanese  antiwar  movement,  I  really 
am  not  an  expert.  I  have  never  seen  it  used,  and  all  of  my  informa- 
tion is  secondhand. 

I  have  the  impression  that  it  is  used  for  two  things.  The  one  you 
mentioned,  to  break  through  restraining  police  lines,  similar  to  the 
policy  of  Mayor  Baley's  people  being  kept  away  from  places  where 
they  feel  they  have  a  right  to  be.  And  secondly,  to  protect  themselves, 
as  they  march  down  the  street,  from  being  attacked  or  from  the  results 
of  being  attacked  or  assaulted. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  when  you  got  to  Chicago  it  was  not 
the  first  time  that  you  had  some  indication  or  awareness  of  the  fact 
that  the  Japanese  snake  dance  was  being  considered  as  a  possibility, 
is  it? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  have  heard  of  the  Japanese  snake  dance  for  many 
years. 

Mr.  Conley.  I  mean  with  specific  reference  to  Chicago,  to  its  use  or 
its  contemplated  use  in  the  city  of  Chicago. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  The  witness  already  answered.  He  said  he  read  about 
it  on  the  plane  to  Chicago. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  give  the  counsel  time  to  advise  with  the 
witness. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  It  is  not  impossible  that  on  the  teleplione  or  in  some 
prior  conversation  it  had  been  mentioned  that  some  people  were  in- 
terested in  this.  I  really  cannot  recollect.  It  was  not  a  big  deal  either 
way. 

I  remember  in  my  conscious  memory  that  the  thing  came  to  my 
attention  particularly  when  I  read  an  article  in  the  newspaper.  I  am 
not  sure  it  was  on  my  last  trip  to  Chicago  before  the  convention  or  per- 
haps the  week  earlier.  At  any  rate,  en  route  to  Chicago. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Ivet  me  refer  to  the  Liberation  magazine,  November 
1967,  "Gandhi  and  Guerrilla"  by  Arthur  Waskow.  Reading  from  this : 
"Can  we  do  better  at  the  Bemocratic  National  Convention  in  Chi- 
cago? What  if  we  use  snake  dances  'I  And  so  on.  Points  to  remember" — 
and  it  goes  on  into  some  other  things. 

In  other  words,  in  that  magazine  published  by  you  or  your  group, 
you  are  talking  about  the  Japanese  snake  dance,  as  early  as  the  No- 
vember edition  1967,  to  be  used  specifically  at  the  Bemocratic  Con- 
vention in  the  following  August. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  wouldn't  be  surprised,  if  we  search  through  the  12 
years  of  Liberation^  if  we  could  find  prior  references  to  the  Japanese 
snake  dance.  I  indicated  I  had  been  aware  of  it  for  several  years. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2771 

This  particular  article  was  published  in  a  month  when  we  had  not 
decided  yet  even  whether  we  were  going  to  go  to  Chicago.  Immediately 
following  the  activity  at  the  Pentagon,  we  began  to  discuss  together — 
many  different  groups  and  people — both  informally  and  formally, 
about  where  did  the  movement  go  from  here,  how  could  we  be  the 
most  effective  in  stopping  the  war. 

We  raised  questions  probably  before  the  Pentagon  on  the  possibility 
of  going  to  the  Democratic  Convention.  Would  it  be  valid  or  not; 
would  it  be  effective  or  not.  This  particular  article  was  written — I  am 
simply  trying  to  be  accurate — was  written  before  we  had  decided 
whether  we  would  go  or  not. 

The  author,  if  I  remember  the  article,  was  speculating  as  part  of  his 
general  exploration  and  discussion. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Dellinger,  the  Chair  has  never  seen  a  Japanese 
snake  dance,  but  as  it  has  been  described  to  me  I  cannot  understand 
how  it  is  a  defensive  tactic.  It  appears  to  me  that  it  can  only  be  an 
offensive  or  counteroffensive  tactic, 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  not  an  expert  on  it.  But  when  I  described  my 
understanding  of  it,  I  think  I  said  that  I  believe  that  on  occasion  in 
Japan  it  is  used  as  a  method  of  breaking  through  police  lines,  or  an  at- 
tempted method  to  break  through  police  lines,  when  people  are  being 
kept  from  places  where  they  thmk  they  have  a  right  to  be. 

There  are  a  lot  of  very  perplexing  and  difficult  problems  that  any- 
body who,  as  I  say,  wants  to  move  beyond  token  dissent  to  actual  ac- 
complishment of  ending  the  war  and  some  of  the  injustice,  problems 
that  he  has  to  wrestle  with. 

If  one  limits  himself  first  of  all  to  matters  which  the  authorities  de- 
clare are  legal,  obviously  he  will  end  up  in  a  form  of  token  dissent,  or 
the  movement  is  limited  to  those.  Similarly,  to  the  extent  that  the  police 
interfere  with  our  right  to  protest  effectively,  it  is  only  natural,  and 
I  support  exploration  and  analysis  and  thought  about  proper  methods 
of  not  allowing  ourselves  to  be  boxed  in  and  protest  made  ineffective. 

I  think  the  discussion  of  the  snake  dance  is  a  perfectly  proper  dis- 
cussion in  a  serious  movement,  even  though  my  own  initial  instinction 
and  analysis  would  lead  me  not  to  favor  it,  and  I  have  never  taken 
part  in  it  or  encouraged  it.  But  I  think  within  the  scope  of  our  move- 
ment it  is  a  legitimate  method,  at  least  worthy  of  consideration. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  ask  leave,  since  I  did  not  want 
to  read  this  out  of  context,  to  read  this  entire  paragraph  from  which 
these  remarks  were  taken,  which  were  the  subject  of  the  last  questions. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Has  that  document  been  made  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  particular  document,  no,  sir. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  wish  it  to  be  made  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  We  wish  to  offer  this  part  of  the  document  dealing  on 
this  particular  point. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Why  not  put  the  entire  document  in  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Very  well,  we  will  offer  it. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  have  any  objection,  Mr.  Watson  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  No. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Hearing  none,  the  document  will  be  incorporated  into 
the  record.  That  is  from  the  publication  Liberation^  as  I  understood  it. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  It  is  the  first  page  of  the  Waskow  article,  right? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

(Document  marked  "Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  3"  follows:) 


2772  DISRUPTION  OF   1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Bellinger  Exhibit  No.  3 

Gandhi  and  Guerrilla 


ARTHUR  WASKOW 


The  Penlagiin  fiepe  can  ln'  treated  as  a  tacticai  event  to 
be  analyzed  and  criticized  as  one  possible  model  for  future 
physical  confrontations.  This  is  a  necessary  process:  there 
will  be  more  occasions  for  pinsicai  confrontations  and  they 
oupht  to  be  much  better  plarineil  than  the  Pentagon  was. 
Oaii  we  do  better  at  the  IJenciratic  National  Convention  in 
Chicago?  What  if  we  n-,  -n,l^e  dances?  And  so  on.  I'oinl- 
to  remember: 

(1)   Tactically  rather  than  puliticallv  speakin<;.  the   Ten- 
lagon   was  a   bad  choice   for   resistance — if  bv   that   we 


mean  events  like  the  sie^c.  ■ 

The   Pentagon   is  a   fort,   the   l>„ 
settings  should  be  more  vulnerab 

-implv  s\mboli(  arrest- 
iloinac  its  nioal.  1  rba 
le. 

i2)    Simple    logistical    prcparali 
etc. — would  have  helped. 

..n      blanket.s.    ,  antccn^ 

(3)    .So  would  knowledge  of  sin 
the   ilcspondcncv    characteristic    < 
dawn,  and  how  to  combat  it. 

•ss  ps\iliolop)  -such  a 
,1   the   last    hour    bcb.r 

(t)  Although  physical  confrontations  may  have  to  bi' 
commanded  at  the  last  moment  In  a  previously  selected 
''college  of  generals,"  this  ought  not  to  push  the  .Move- 
ment toward  letting  a  small  elite  lake  over  decision- 
making before  or  after  the  coufronlatiim  itself.  If  not 
guarded  against,  this  could  happen  fairlv  easilv — espe- 
cially if  physical  confrontations  pla\  a  larger  and  larger 
role  in  the  life  of  the  movcmenl. 


But   the  siege   can  also   be   seen 
polilical  situation:  and  this  sernis 


■A>   a    microcosm   of   the 
UK  h  iiiorc  iniportant  to 


The  siege  was  a  crude,  unplamicd  mixture  of  llaiidhi  and 
guerrilla.  That  mixture  is  what  made  it  a  ^ucccvs.  Neither 
the  Gandhiism  la  la  Dave  Dellinger's  lea' hin  and  early 
arrest!  nor  the  guerrilla-style  hostility  la  i.i  the  efforts  of 
the  Revolutionarv  Contingent  to  charge  the  lio<ip~i  worked 
or  could  have  worked  cither  morallv  or  politicallv  -if 
used  alone  by  one  or  another  group  of  the  dcmon-trators. 
We  now  ought  to  examine  the  rough  guerrilla-Gainlhi  mix- 
ture and  try  to  develop  a  true  svnthesis  of  the  two  ap- 
proaches. (I  don't  know  myself,  yel.  what  that  means:  but 
I  feel  a  need  for  not  throwing  away  either  side  of  what  we 
did  on  the  Mall.) 

What  I  mean  by  the  mixture:  people  half  walked  through, 
half  charged  through  the  outer  troop  lines  and  frequentiv 
went  around  them — through  the  bushes.  They  did  not  wait 
to  convert  or  convince  or  use  soul-force  upon  those  troops. 

26 


Vet  once  they  reached  the  Mall  they  established  their  i m- 
pathy  with  the  troops,  made  clear  they  saw  The  Enemv  .i~ 
generals  and  presidents  rather  than  soldiers,  and  set  a  <  row.! 
discipline  that  prevented  the  use  of  violence  even  win  14 
•U.S.  marshals  beat  demonstrators  in  full  sight  of  llie  <  rowd. 
I  One  group  of  sit-dowiiers  even  refused  to  move  to  ,1  lui  li- 
( all)  more  useful  spot  because  they  said  the)  hail  cslab 
lished  a  warm  emotional  connection  with  "their''  soldiers, 
and  would  not  leave  them.  I  And  since  it  became  pos^d'lt  to 
express  and  use  the  Gandhian  connuitmeni  eftectivelv  ..niv 
once  people  had  got  up  to  the  Mall.  1  am  saying  thai  "ri 
Saturda)  evening  the  guerrilla  approach  was  ibc  <uiii-il 
fulhllment  of  Gandhian  intentions. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  think  il  was  a  mistake  i>n  .'^iiinl.iv 
morning  to  follow  guerrilla  modes  of  thought  with  the  -hoc 
rigidity  as  the  majoritv  did  when  it  decided  to  have  lin 
Mall  at  6  o'clock.  The  decision  was  urged  and  juslilied  li\ 
some  of  the  S.D.S.  leadership  as  returning  the  initiativi  to 
the  Movement  rather  than  the  Pentagon  and  exemplifv  ui^' 
the  guerrilla  tactic  of  strike-retreat-and-strike-again.  But  the 
results  were  that  six  hundred  to  a  thousand  |>eople.  who 
probably  could  have  been  kept  together  till  the  sunrise  re- 
stored their  morale,  were  instead  encouraged  to  retreat 
I  though  in  fairly  good  order)  and  that  the  S.U.S.  national 
leadership  did  not  go  to  jail,  which  in  this  particular  case — 
given  that  jail  meant  two  to  five  davs  rather  than  twu  to 
five  )cars — was  a  political  as  well  as  moral  error.  Staving 
out  of  jail  separated  the  leaders  from  some  of  the  Move- 
ment during  days  when  they  could  have  carried  on  inipor 
tant  political  education  and  re-established  moral  si.jidariu. 
Furthermore,  the  country  was  not  forced  to  aildn  ss  the 
meaning  of  a  really  massive  two-day  occupation  of  the  Mall, 
followed  by  large-scale  arrests  and  perhaps  a  jail-no-bail 
movement.  In  short.  I  am  sa^-ing  that  on  Sunday  morning 
the  Gandhian  approach  would  have  been  the  wisest  guer- 
rilla tactic  to  use.  for  those  who  thought  in  political  guer- 
rilla terms,  as  well  as  the  morallv  correct  one  for  those  who 
thought  in  essentially  religious  terms. 

.More  generally,  I  would  argue  that  in  the  present  state  of 
the  Movement  and  the  countrv,  precisely  because  large  parts 
of  our  movement  are  moving  to  resistance,  with  il-  guer- 
rilla overtones,  it  is  important  for  us  not  to  forget  the  cen 
Iral  meaning  of  the  Gandhian  approach:  that  those  we  must 
oppose  are  not  The  Enemy.  Certainly  this  is  true  as  regards 
the  "great  center"  of  American  society,  whether  or  iimI  il 
is  true  of  the  "power  elite."  If  it  is  these  large  numbers  o( 
the  miconvinced  whom  we  must  transform  if  we  are  to  end 

Liberation 


[Nov.  1967] 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2773 


Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  3 — Continued 


. . .  fhose  we  must  oppose  are  not  The 
Enemy.  .  .  .  It  is  the  unconvinced 
whom  we  must  transform  .  . .  remake 
their  ideas  of  what  legitimate  be- 
havior is.  .  .  . 

the  war  and  make  any  more  such  «ars  impo!-sil)le,  (hen  we 
cannot  treat  them  as  our  enemies.  We  must  get  through  to 
them  what  we  mean;  we  must  be  able  to  remake  their  ideas 
of  what  lef'tiniate  behavior  is  so  that  what  we  do-^not  what 
the  police  niid  the  I're-iident  do — is  felt  to  be  legitimate. 

1  emphasize  this  because  I  have  talked  with  some  people 
who  took  part  in  the  Pentagon  siege  who  bitterly  reacted  to 
the  press  distortions  of  the  siege.  They  felt  that  if  efforts 
to  build  community  with  the  soldiers  could  be  described  as 
"taunts"  and  if  the  demonstrators'  fantastic  restraint  in  the 
face  of  police  violence  could  be  described  as  initiating  vio- 
lence, then  there  was  no  point  to  Irving  so  hard — that 
"America"  would  define  what  we  do  as  illegitimate  regard- 
less of  what  it  is  we  do.  I  do  not  agree  with  this.  I  think 
that  if  we  stay  inside  trulv  legitimate  bounds  (based  on  our 
own  moral  sense),  we  will  be  able  to  bring  the  press  and 
the  country  to  join  us.  Not  in  one  go-round,  of  course; 
naturalU  the  press  would  define  as  "violence"  the  most 
direrl  challenge  Americans  ha\e  made  to  the  legitimacy  of 
their  own  government  since  South  (Carolina  fired  on  Ft. 
Suinlcr.  even  though  we  were  not  tiring  on  the  Pentagon. 
But  just  a-  those  who  once  condemned  mass  marches  for 
witlidrawal  as  "irresponsible"  now  applaud  them  as  "mod- 
erate, -o  those  who  now  are  Imrrifieil  by  resistance  will 
come  to  iHidcrstand  it. 

What  is  Legitimate? 

The  real  problem  is,  what  do  ive  feel  is  legitimate?  And 
here  we  falter.  There  are  a  few  of  u-^  who  feel  .July  6,  177.5, 
has  already  arrived  and  a  "Declaration  of  the  Causes  and 
No  essitv  of  Taking  Up  Arms"  well  justified.  .\  few  of  us 
feel  that  Julv  6  can  never  arrive  in  that  sense,  because  the 
taking  up  of  arjns  is  never  wholly  justified  (though  perhap> 
defensible  I.  And  niore  of  us  are  not  certain  what  to  think: 
but  we  are  acting  as  if  violence  were  not  legitimate. 

(If  one  rereads  the  declarations  both  <if  177.5  and  1776 
with  these  moral  and  political  dilenunas  on  one's  mind, 
they  come  alive  in  some  new  ways.  People  who  have  strug- 
gled with  whether  to  "support  the  National  Liberation 
front"  and  what  that  means,  can  understand  why  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence  specifies  that  the  colonies  may 
make  alHance?  with  foreign  powers;  imagine  the  emotional 
strain  on  Englishmen  born  and  bred  of  deciding  whether  to 
commit  treason  in  the  company  of  the  hereditary  enemy, 
France!  And  it  is  important  to  see  that  even  in  the  moment 
of  rebellion,  the  colonists  did  not  treat  all  Britain  as  The 
Enemy  nr  dismiss  the  possibility  of  making  themselves  seem 
legitimate  to  their  opponents.  Instead  they  specified  the 
King  as  enemy,  and  carefully  wrote  the  Declaration  to  ex- 
plain and  justify  their  acts  and  to  claim  legitimacy  for 
tliemsekes.  I 

V^  hat  might  we  put  in  a  Declaration  on  the  Causes  and 
Necessity  of  Resistance?  1  would  idenlifv  three  levels  of 
resistance:  withdrawal,  challenge  and  coercion,  and  I  would 
endorse  the  first  two  while  rejecting  the  third.  Here  is  why: 


^-it' 


JfW^ 


Aofemfcer  1967 


27 


2774  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Df.i  LiNGF.R  I^xiiiHiT  No.  3 — Continued 


"...  fhe  majority  .  .  .  will  decide  that 
if  killing  Vietnamese  requires  beat- 
ing and  arresting  Americans,  the 
killing  of  Vietnamese  should  end." 

Oil  uilfulraual:  simply,  it  is  a  criiiii'  tn  fi^lu  in  the 
Aimriian  war  against  Vietnam;  therefore  it  is  no  crime  to 
refuse  the  Hrafl.  It  is  a  erime  tn  pay  for  that  war;  therefore 
it  <  amiot  lie  a  erime  to  refuse  taxes. 

On  rliallcnpc:  when  we  attempt  to  block  the  Pentagon 
with  otir  liodies.  or  interfere  witii  an  induction  center  or  a 
na|>alm  plant  or  a  campus  recruiting  booth,  we  arc  saying 
soniethinp  very  s()ecial — so  long  as  we  do  not  initiate  vio- 
Icnie  in  the  process.  We  are  saying:  "We  will  not  literally 
force  you  to  stop  (he  Penlapon,  but  we  will  force  you  to  use 
violence  on  us  in  order  to  keep  the  Pentagon  going — just  as 
you  use  violence  on  the  Vietnamese.  We  believe  that,  con- 
fronted with  such  a  direct  challenge  from  ever-growing 
numbers  (though  a  minority)  of  Americans,  the  majority 
will  decide  to  stop:  will  decide  that  if  killing  Vietnamese 
requires  beating  and  arresting  Americans,  the  killing  of 
Vietnamese  should  end."  It  should  be  noted  that  even  if 
these  challenges  are  carried  on  with  the  greatest  toughness 
and  energy — like  the  Pentagon  siege,  and  more — they  are 
still  basically  a  tactic  of  persuasion.  They  are  built  on  the 
assiiniption  that  it  is  legitimate  to  be  arrested  if  one  vio- 
lates what  seems  to  be  the  law,  though  of  course  the  validity 
of  the  law  should  then  Iw  challenged  in  court. 

Another  Chance 

h'inalU.  what  about  coercion?  Here  I  would  draw  the 
lin<^  not  ntvessarily  forever,  but  for  now.  Given  a  clear 
and  delilierate  de<i»ion  by  the  majorilv  of  the  American 
people  to  commit  major  crimes  against  another  people  (or 
pari  of  its  own  |>eopie),  it  might  become  legitimate  for  a 
niinoritv  to  try  to  prevent  such  crimes  from  taking  place. 
Rut  that  is  not  our  ca.se.  On  the  last  occasion  the  American 
|M'oplr  had  a  chance  to  decide  on  war  or  peace — in  1961 — 
the*  decided  for  |>eace.  If  they  get  a  chance  to  make  that 
dc(  ision  again,  in  1968,  and  decide  to  support  war  crimi- 
nals; or  if  thev  dwide  to  end  war  crimes  but  their  decision 
is  ignored  as  their  last  one  was;  or  if  they  are  denied,  and 
cannot  create,  a  way  to  make  a  decision  on  those  issues — 
then  this  last  issue  will  have  to  be  rethought.  (Why  give  the 
s\stem  another  chance?  Because  any  body  |K)litic  is  liable 
to  be  tricked  and  defrauded  ome;  if  it  allows  this  to  happen 
twice,  it  has  abandoned  the  efTorl  to  restore  democracy.  If 
it  deliberately  chooses  war  crimes,  iheii  its  democratic-ness 
is  ii relevant.) 

Bui  there  is  every  evidence  that  the  American  people, 
confronted  with  the  overwhelming  fads  that  their  govern- 
ment is  perpetrating  war  crimes  and  that  a  rising  propor- 
tion of  their  compatriots  are  prepared  to  resist  those  crimes, 
are  now  trying  to  reinvent  the  dcmwratic  process.  They  are 
patriots,  and  it  hel^>s  to  know  that  the  resisters  are  patriots 
too.  And  if  our  conunitnient  to  our  country  sometimes  be- 
comes unclear  to  them,  it  is  our  job  to  illuminate  it — as  we 
did  instinctively  on  the  Pentagon  Mall  when  we  Mng 
"Americ*  the  Beautiful." 

This   determined    effort    to    restore    representative   democ- 


racy and  get  it  to  end  the  war  is  being  honorably  expressed 
(though  some  of  us  may  think  its  premises  short-sighted 
and  its  means  ineffectual)  in  the  various  "dunip-Johnnon" 
organizations.  It  seems  very  likely  that  the  liberals  who  have 
in  two  Mobilizations  inarched  alongside  those  conimiMed 
to  resistance  will  now  be  moving  out  of  the  "protest-man  h" 
syndrome  into  political  action,  lit  is  not  only  the  ri-sistaiice 
people  who  have  concluded  that  protest  is  not  enough,) 
Our  attitude  toward  these  people  will  lie  important— to 
them  and  to  us.  It  is  almost  certainly  a  mistake  to  try  to 
keep  an  organized  coalition  with  them;  indeed,  the  worst 
errors  of  the  direct-action  part  of  the  Mobilization  were 
probably  a  result  of  the  agonizing  negotiations  over  a 
period  of  months  between  [leople  who  wanted  direct  action 
and  people  who  didn't.  The  hauling  and  shoving  prevented 
a  careful  and  detailed  working-out  of  how  to  make  the 
direct  action  fully  effective.  Now  that  both  wings  of  the 
Mobilization  are  clearly  moving  forward  in  different  direc- 
tions (both  politics  and  resistance  are  "forward"  from  pro- 
test I,  the  old  coalition  will  be  even  more  difficult  and  even 
less  relevant.  But  a  warm  and  o}H!n-ended  communication 
is  much  more  important  than  ever. 

We  may  find  that  we  meet  each  other  again  in  Chicago — 
not  at  a  New  Politics  convention  this  time,  but  at  the  Demo- 
cratic National  Convention,  because  the  tactical  situation 
will  be  good  and  the  Convention  is  a  crucial  point  in  the 
process  by  which  Johnson  might  again  take  (xiwer.  (The 
black  moventent  may  join  us  too.)  What  .should  the  terms 
of  this  meeting  be?  If  there  are  1(X),(XX)  people  on  the 
strtH-ts,  prepared  to  do  civil  disobedience,  what  should  their 
demands  be?  To  most  antiwar  Americans,  the  l)enio«'ratic 
Party  probably  does  not  seem  to  be  intrinsically  evil,  like 
the  Pentagon;  so  an  unconditonal  effort  simply  to  block  it 
would  seem  unreasonable.  But  what  about  a  demand  that 
the  Convention  adjourn  in  favor  of  an  emergency  national 
primary  to  nominate  the  Democratic  candidates  and  vote 
for  or  against  a  iieace  platform?  (The  demand  will  seem 
esp«Mially  reasonable  if  Johnson  has  lost  a  number  of  pri- 
maries but  is  about  to  be  nominated  by  the  machine  any- 
way. I  What  about  a  demand  that  delegations  from  each 
state  have  a  proportion  of  black  people  equal  to  the  pro- 
portion of  the  Democratic  vote  cast  by  blacks  in  those 
states?  These  notions  are  only  initial  speculations;  the 
point  is  that  some  way  should  be  sought  to  keep  the  hope* 
and  demands  of  the  resistance  and  the  political  movements 
reasonably  complementary  to  each  other. 

To  this  point  I  have  assumed  that  the  resistance  move- 
ment will  stay  mostly  on  the  campus.  But  there  might  be 
conditions  under  which  the  liberal  middle  class  would  join 
it.  The  chief  of  these  is  the  possibility  of  a  major  escala- 
tion of  the  war — the  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  a  land  inva- 
sion of  the  North  or  an  attack  on  China.  The  Consultation 
on  the  Church  and  Society  held  in  Detroit  October  2.'i-26. 
for  example,  proposed  that  the  National  Council  of  Churches 
call  a  national  general  strike  if  any  of  those  three  escala- 
tions occur  (and  start  preparing  now  for  the  possibility  i . 
If  the  nriddle  class  does  move  toward  resistance,  it  will 
probably  be  in  nonphysical  ways:  tax  refusal,  phone-ins  li> 
the  New  York  Slock  Exchange  or  the  White  House,  rti- 
That  likelihood  makes  even  shar^>er  the  necessity  of  viewins 
the  Pentagon  siege  as  a  political,  not  merely  a  tactical, 
model  from  which  to  learn  and  advance. 


28 


Liberation 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2775 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  paragraph  I  have  specific  reference  to,  sir,  is : 

The  Pentagon  seige  can  be  treated  as  a  tactical  event  to  be  analyzed  and  critic- 
ized as  one  possible  model  for  future  physical  confrontations.  This  is  a  neces- 
sary process :  there  will  be  more  occasions  for  physical  confrontations  and  they 
ought  to  be  much  better  planned  than  the  Pentagon  was.  Can  we  do  better  at  the 
Democratic  National  Convention  in  Chicago?  What  if  we  use  snake  dances?  And 
so  on.  *  ♦  * 

Now,  in  connection  with  the  reference  made,  Mr.  Dellinger,  to  the 
Pentagon  demonstration,  and  still  on  this  particular  subject  of  the 
snake  dances,  I  want  to  read  to  you  and  then  ask  you  to  examine,  if 
you  will,  a  document  dated  Washington,  D.C,  October  21.  This  was  a 
document  published  in  connection  with  the  Pentagon  demonstrations. 

It  is  captioned  "Another  demonstration" : 

Up  until  now  the  peace  movement  has  been  operating  within  the  rules  of  the 
system,  oooi>erating  with  establishment  restrictions  and  predictable,  controllable 
demonstrations,  i>aying  lip  service  to  the  myth  that  these  mass  protests  will 
change  U.S.  policies. 

The  mounting  frustration  in  the  peace  movement  is  caused  not  only  by  the 
fact  that  the  war  has  not  been  stopped,  but  also  by  the  growing  identification 
with  liberation  struggles  in  the  world  today. 

A  radical  new  form  of  protest  is  needed  as  a  next  step  in  the  U.S.  peace 
movement.  One  example  of  this  type  of  protest  is  the  Snake  Dance,  used  in 
.Japan  by  the  Zengakuren  (student  organization),  which  enables  the  protesters 
to  take  over  the  .streets  and  control  their  own  demonstration. 

The  Snake  Dance  is  made  up  of  successive  rows  of  about  fifteen  people  abreast, 
with  arms  linked.  Once  in  action  it  weaves  and  sways,  maintaining  a  running 
pace.  It  is  an  easily  learned  formation  which  is  <liflBcult  to  break  up  because  of 
its  speed  and  tightness,  and  because  the  Snake  Dance  can  change  direction  .spon- 
taneously and  immediately.  It  was  this  kind  of  demonstration  which  was  used  in 
preventing  President  Eisenhower  from  visiting  Japan  in  1960. 

All  indei>endents  and  groups  interested  in  a  militant  form  of  protest  will 
gather  at  the  Reflecting  Pool,  by  the  Lincoln  Memorial,  under  the  follow- 
ing symbol : 

And  there  is  a  symbol  which  I  take  to  be  the  snake. 

Mr.  Dellinger,  reading  from  that  particular  release — I  believe  that 
was  released  by  the  Revolutionary  Contingent  based  out  of  New  York 
City,  and  it  was  released  in  connection  with  the  October  21  demonstra- 
tions a  year  ago — they  make  mention  that  this  type  of  formation  was 
used  to  prevent  someone  from  coming  somewhere.  This  does  not  appear 
to  me,  sir,  to  be  a  defensive  tactic. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  First  of  all,  there  are  a  number  of  points  I  would 
like  to  make. 

First  of  all,  I  consider  it  preposterous  that  a  representative  of  the 
U.S.  Government,  which  is  wedded  to  violence  and  is  imposing  violence 
on  people  throughout  the  world,  should  be  so  morally  offended  by 
people  who  are  trying  to  s-top  the  war  contemplating  or  using  a  method 
such  as  the  snake  dance,  which  apparently  had  the  terrible  effect  when 
used  by  the  Japanese,  for  whom  obviously  I  take  no  responsibility, 
but  of  making  President  P^isenhower— if  I  remember  correctly,  it  says 
it  prevented  him  from  visiting  Japan,  making  him  decide  he  would 
stay  away. 

I  think  it  would  be  much  better  if  the  United  States  would  stop 
interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of  such  nations.  The  poor  Japanese 
people  passed  a  constitution,  actually  encouraged  by  MacArthur,  re- 
nouncing war,  and  ever  since  the  U.S.  has  been  involving  them  in  the 
cold  war  and  trying  to  remilitarize  them. 


2776  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Secondly,  I  am  curious  about  how  you  know  so  well  who  put  this 
out.  I  am  only  interested  in  making  clear,  first  of  all,  it  is  unsigned, 
it  is  not  a  Mobilization  document,  I  have  never  seen  it  before. 

Mr.  CoNXJEY.  Sir,  I  have  not  attributed  it  to  you. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  You  have  attributed  it  to  somebody  else. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  was  very  careful  to  keep  it  away  from  your  organiza- 
tion ;  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  up  to  you  or  them  to  protest  or  to  inquire. 
Maybe  they  don't  want  to  protest. 

Since  it  is  unsigned,  I  am  curious  about  how  you  identified  it  with 
a  particular  group.  But  I  am  willing  to  pass  over  that. 

Now  I  want  to  say  further  in  this  context,  though,  that  the  title 
of  the  Waskow  article  in  which  you  have  introduced  the  subject,  if  I 
remember  correctly,  "Gandhi  and  Guerrilla,"  and  I  myself  believe 
that  the  traditional  nonviolent  movement  has  been  much  too  passive 
and  much  too  ineflPective  and  I  am  not  interested  in  the  purity  of  the 
movement.  I  am  interested  in  social  effectiveness  from  back  in  World 
War  II,  when  I  had  much  more  sympathy  with  the  resistance  move- 
ment of  Europe  in  their  fight  against  Hitler  and  Hitlerism  than  I  did 
with  the  U.S.  Government,  which  is  distrusted  and,  I  think,  with 
reasons  that  have  been  proven  somewhat  accurate.  But  from  those 
days  I  myself  have  always  contemplated  and  tried  in  various  ways 
to  experiment  with  some  kind  of  new  development  which  might  be  a 
synthesis  of  Gandhi  and  guerrilla  or  synthesis  of  the  partisan  and  re- 
sistance-type activity. 

I  think  this  is  fascinating.  I  am  quite  willing  to  discuss  my  views, 
including  things  that  are  unclear  to  me.  But  I  also  would  like  to  say 
it  is  a  very  strange  concern  of  the  U.S.  Government  to  go  into  such 
detail  over  my  views  on  these  subjects.  I  am  not  sure  what  legislative 
purpose  it  has. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  this  same  connection,  regardless  of 
its  purpose,  and  I  now  hand  you  what  has  previously  been  marked 
Exhibit  15  ^  before  this  committee  in  connection  with  earlier  testi- 
mony, which  is  a  closeup  of  some  of  these  people  practicing  the  Japa- 
nese snake  dance  in  the  Lincoln  Park,  and  I  ask  you,  sir,  if  they  are  not 
holding  some  object,  a  group  of  them,  across  the  front  row  there? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  They  seem  to  be  grasping  a  pole. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  have  occasion  when  you  were  watching  them 
practicing  the  Japanese  snake  dance  to  see  tliem  holding  onto  a  pole 
such  as  this  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  To  the  best  of  m^^  memory,  I  didn't. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  at  any  time  see  any  such  poles  with  these 
groups  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  When  I  was  in  Lincoln  Park  there  were  a  num- 
ber of  groups  practicing  in  different  places  and  practicing  different 
methods.  I,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  never  saw  any  physical 
objects  such  as  poles  being  used.  That  is  not  to  say  there  could  not 
have  been.  WHiat  I  am  very  clear  about  is  that  during  the  entire  time 
of  the  protest  and  of  convention  week  that  I  never  saw  any  pole  of 
that  kind  in  anybody's  hands. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may  move  you  to  something  else 

Mr.  Icho.rd.  At  this  pomt,  Mr.  Counsel,  if  you  are  moving  to  an- 


1  Previously  marked  "Grubisic  Exhibit  No.   15-B."  See  pt.   1,  p.  2323,   of  Oct.   1,   1968, 
hearings. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2777 

other  subject,  it  is  now  7  minutes  after  12.  I  think  this  would  be  a 
convenient  place  to  declare  an  adjournment. 

The  Chair  will  declare  that  the  committee  is  in  adjournment  until 
1 :30  p.m. 

(Whereupon,  at  12:07  p.m.,  Thursday,  December  5,  1968,  the  sub- 
committee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  1 :30  p.m.  the  same  day.  Subcom- 
mittee members  present  at  time  of  recess :  Representatives  Ichord  and 
Watson.) 

AFTERNOON  SESSION— THURSDAY,  DECEMBER  5,  1968 

(The  subcommittee  reconvened  at  1 :45  p.m.,  Hon.  Richard  H. 
Ichord,  chairman  of  the  subcommittee,  presiding.) 

(Subcommittee  members  present:  Representatives  Ichord  and 
Watson.) 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  Let  there  be  order 
in  the  hearing  room. 

I  mentioned  yesterday,  Mr.  Bellinger,  of  the  Chair's  knowledge  of 
the  fact  that  you  recently  had  an  operation.  How  are  you  feeling  to- 
day ?  Do  you  think  we  are  going  to  be  able  to  finish  the  hearings? 

Mr,  Dellinger.  Oh,  yes.  I  feel  better  today  than  yesterday.  I  am 
sorry  to  be  late  getting  back.  My  slowness  had  something  to  do  with 
that.  I  do  move  slowly. 

Mr.  loHORD.  The  examination  of  Mr.  Dellinger  will  continue  with 
the  observation  that  the  affirmation  continues. 

Proceed. 

TESTIMONY  OF  DAVID  DELLINGER— Resumed 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may,  I  would  like  to  direct  your 
attention  to  Havana,  Cuba,  this  year.  Did  you  have  occasion  in  Janu- 
ary of  1968  to  attend  the  International  Cultural  Congress  which  was 
held  in  Havana,  Cuba  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes;  I  have  made  two  trips  to  Havana,  Cuba,  this 
year.  One  of  them  was  in  January  when  I  went — although  I  consid- 
ered the  State  Department  in  violation  of  the  Constitution,  again  I 
nonetheless  asked  and  received  State  Department  validation  as  a  jour- 
nalist. I  only  regret  that  a  number  of  intellectuals,  American  intel- 
lectuals, who  had  also  been  invited  were  unable  to  attend  because  they 
were  not  full-time  practicing  journalists. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  detected  that  you  indicated  you  had 
been  in  Cuba  twice  this  year. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  When  was  the  other  occasion  you  were  in  Cuba  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  went  to  Havana  on  November  1st. 

Mr.  Conley.  How  long  did  you  remain  there  at  that  time  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  had  my  operation  in  Cuba  and  I  have  just  re- 
turned. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Now  in  connection  with  your  trip  to  Cuba  of  1968,  the 
first  trip  this  year,  while  you  were  in  Havana,  did  you  have  occasion 
to  grant  an  interview  to  the  Cuban  newspaper  jB'/  Mundo? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Quite  probably,  yes.  I  remember  speaking  with  a 
journalist  who  I  think  was  identified  as  a  freelance  journalist,  but  who 
quite  likely  may  have — I  never  saw  the  interview,  but  quite  likely 


2778  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

might  have  placed  it  in  El  Mundo  since  in  Havana  itself  there  are  just 
two  dailies. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  I  may,  I  would  like  to  read  you  some  excerpts  from 
a  Havana  radio  broadcast  of  February  5,  1968,  this  radio  broadcast 
dealing  with  your  El  Mundo  interview.  Understanding  that  these  are 
not  purporting  to  be  your  words — it  is  the  radio  station  engaging  in 
whatever  editorializing  they  might  do,  I  am  sure — if  I  may,  I  would 
like  to  read  you  some  excerpts  and  then  ask  you  some  questions. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Do  you  have  a  copy  that  you  could  put  in  front  of  us? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  witness  have  a  copy. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Reading  from  the  broadcast : 

Among  the  guests  at  the  Havana  Cultural  Congress,  the  North  American  David 
Bellinger  represents  the  curious  paradox  of  being  a  fighter  for  nonviolence  who 
favors  violence.  Bellinger  does  not  object  to  the  just  violence  of  the  Cuban 
revolution  against  imi)erialism  or  the  violence  of  the  Vietnamese  against  the 
same  evil ;  he  reasons  that  "Vietnam  and  Cuba  are  very  important  for  the  devel- 
opment of  a  new  movement  in  the  United  States  which  will  gradually  turn  into 
an  anti-imi)erialist  movement." 

Mr.  Dellinger,  is  this  substantially  in  accordance  with  what  you  told 
the  reporter  for  El  Mundof 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  you  can  be  sure  that  since  probably  between 
this  date  and  January  and  now — well,  I  don't  know,  but  I  might  even 
have  had  more  than  a  hundred  or  several  hundred  press  interviews  or 
conversations  of  this  kind.  I  cannot  remember  what  I  said  to  him.  This 
was  in  the  lobby  of  the  Havana  Libre  Hotel,  when  I  was  on  my  way  to 
somewhere  else,  and  I  spoke  to  him  briefly. 

However,  I  think  I  made  very  clear,  to  the  best  of  my  ability  I  have 
made  clear  in  the  last  2  days  my  attitude  toward  the  relationship  be- 
tween violence  and  nonviolence.  Although  this  is  a  very  elliptical  ver- 
sion and  it  goes  on  in  very  short  order  to  combine  two  rather  separate 
ideas,  I  certainly  can  see  where  he  may  have  drawn  this.  Aiid  as  you 
indicated  it  went  all  the  way  from  the  newspaper  to  Havana  radio,  so 
there  were  two  stages  or  three  stages  involved. 

I  think,  as  I  said  earlier  about  the  Baltimore  Sun  article,  I  would 
consider  this  an  example  of  honest  journalism.  But  I  wouldn't  want 
at  this  point  to  have  those  two  sentences,  particularly  as  juxtaposed, 
to  be  fully  representative  of  my  views. 

Just  to  be  perfectly  clear,  it  goes  on  from  the  discussion  of  violence 
and  nonviolence — I  beg  your  pardon — no,  it  is  two  sentences.  Anyway, 
it  goes  on  from  that  to  talk  about  the  importance  of  Cuba  and  Vietnam 
to  the  development  of  new  movements  in  the  Ignited  States.  These  are 
separate  ideas  I  hold.  I  favor  nonviolence.  I  advocate  nonviolence.  I 
jDractice  nonviolence,  but  I  do  not  repudiate  or  oppose  what  I  some- 
times call  the  violence  of  the  victims,  which  in  this  case  includes  Viet- 
nam and  Cuba,  as  well  as  the  black  people  in  this  country. 

Then,  as  a  completely  separate  idea,  I  believe  that  the  Cuban  and 
Vietnamese  movements  for  independence  and  to  do  away  with  really 
what  amounts  to  the  imperialist  stranglehold  on  their  country,  control 
of  their  country  by  foreignere  who  build  up  the  highest  standard  of 
living  at  home  and  promote  illiteracy  and  lack  of  medicine  and  pov- 
erty in  Vietnam  and  Ouba,  that  the  struggle  of  these  two  peoples  has 
certainly  been  an  inspiration  to  me.  And  I  think  it  has  been  a  chal- 
lenge to  many  Americans;  it  helps  speed  up  the  process  of  evaluation 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2779 

that  goes  on  in  this  country.  However,  I  do  not  consider  from  my  own 
point  of  view  that  the  inspiration  and  the  value  is  inevitably  a  product 
of  the  violence. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  I  may  move  on  to  the  third  paragraph : 

The  pacifist  David  Bellinger  understands  that  it  is  impossible  to  coexist  with 
the  great  enemy,  and  he  combats  it.  He  has  been  to  Cuba  three  times,  first  in  1960, 
then  in  1964,  and  now  for  the  Cultural  Congress. 

Do  you  recall  whether  you  did  or  did  not  make  that  statement  to  the 
reporter  for  El  Mundo  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  By  the  way,  there  is  even  the  fourth  stage  of  this 
meeting  with  the  reporter  in  the  lobby  of  the  Havana  Libre  Hotel : 
in  English,  he  to  his  newspaper ;  the  newspaper  to  the  radio ;  and  the 
second  stage  of  that  from  English  to  Spanish ;  and  then  finally  back 
from  Spanish  to  English.  So  I  am  quite  prepared  to  talk  about  all  of 
my  views  here,  including  my  very  vigorous  and  determined  opposition 
to  American  imi^erialism,  which  he  may  be  referring  to  as  the  enemy, 
but  this  is  not  a  good  way  to  find  out  my  views. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  May  I  inquire  at  this  time,  Mr.  Bellinger,  as  to  whether 
all  of  these  interviews  that  you  had  in  Cuba  with  Havana  radio  or 
representatives  of  Havana  radio  were  in  English? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  was  always  speaking  in  English.  The  other  inter- 
views earlier  were  on  the  telephone,  where  I  was  one  time  in  New 
York  and  one  time  in  Chicago.  In  all  the  cases  I  spoke  in  English. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Bo  you  speak  Spanish  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes ;  my  last  trip  was  a  great  asset  that  way.  The 
last  trip  I  was  there,  I  spoke  only  Spanish  and  was  interviewed  in 
Spanish. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  think,  Mr.  Bellinger,  this  is  the  reason  for  our  ask- 
ing you  specifically  about  these,  to  ask  you  whether  they  are  a  fair 
quote.  If  they  are  not,  I  think  you  should  indicate  they  are  not. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  As  I  said  about  the  Baltimore  Sun  article,  this  gives 
me  the  general  impression  of  being  an  honest  journalistic  attempt. 
I  don't  think  it  is  completely  accurate,  as  in  a  couple  of  points  the 
Baltimore  Sun  article  was  not.  I  think  I  indicated  why,  because  it 
went  through  four  processes,  including  condensation.  It  does  not  mean 
a  lot  to  me,  this  particular  sentence  you  quoted.  I  would  be  very  happy 
to  discuss  who  I  think  the  great  enemy  is,  although  I  think  there  are 
many  enemies.  It  is  hardly  a  way  of  discovering  my  views. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  All  right,  sir,  if  I  may  ask  you  what  the  great  enemy 
is,  as  the  interpretation  you  would  put  on  those  words. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  cannot,  out  of  context  here,  know  for  sure  w4iom 
they  were  referring  to.  I  would  be  happy  to  tell  you  who  I  think  the 
enemies  of  the  American  people  are,  the  enemies  of  world  peace.  They 
range  all  the  way  from  the  military-industrial  complex  to  the  system 
in  which  property  is  considered  to  be  of  more  value  than  human  beings, 
in  which  people  are  encouraged  to  work  for  private  profit  instead  of 
for  social  well-being  and  the  good  of  the  community. 

I  also  consider  any  reliance  on  violence,  even  by  people  I  associate 
with  and  am  willing  to  work  with  in  certain  ways,  I  consider  this 
reliance  on  violence  to  be  an  enemy  and  I  try  to  work  away  from  this 
as  much  as  I  can. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  a  moment  ago  I  think  you  used  as  an 
illustration  of  a  great  enemy,  and  I  thought  perhaps  this  is  what 


2780  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

you  were  alluding  to  since  it  does  appear  in  the  first  paragraph,  that 
perhaps  imperialism,  in  itself  was  the  enemy. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  consider  imperialism — except  I  don't  like  to  turn 
chese  things  into  stereotypes  and  slogans,  but  I  think  the  system  of 
private  ownership  and  control  and  profitmaking,  basically  known  as 
the  capitalist  system  in  the  United  States,  I  think  is  a  violation  of 
economic  democracy  and  the  brotherhood  of  man.  I  think  as  it  reaches 
out  and  spreads  its  tentacles  into  Latin  America,  Asia,  and  Africa, 
and  so  forth,  and  in  that  sense  at  least  I  always  think  of  imperialism 
as  being  the  foreign  expression  of  this  selfish,  competitive  profitseek- 
ing,  nonhumanist,  antiJiuman  form  of  economics,  I  always  identify 
the  foreign  expression  as  being  imperialism.  I  certainly  consider  that 
to  be  the  major  enemy  in  terms  of  anybody  who  is  concerned  with 
economic  equality,  economic  brotherhood,  freedom,  bringing,  as  I  say, 
making  it  possible  for  people  like  the  Vietnamese  and  the  Cubans  to 
have  hospitals,  free  medical  care,  wipe  out  illiteracy,  narrow  the  gap 
between  the  very  rich  and  the  very  poor,  raise  the  level  of  the  standard 
of  living  of  the  people — I  consider  imperialism  to  have  proven  itself 
unfortunately  to  be  the  major  enemy,  though  I  don't  think  that  most 
American  people  realize  this.  I  think  there  is  a  great  gap ;  people  quite 
sincerely  think  somehow  or  other  they  are  helping  these  foreign  coun- 
tries and  bringing  them  freedom  or  democracy,  but  I  am  convinced 
that  the  history  of  the  American  influence  in  Dominican  Republic, 
Cuba,  Puerto  Rico,  in  entire  Latin  America  and  Asia  has  not  been 
one  to  bring  freedom  and  justice. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may  move  you  now  to  the  fourth 
paragraph  of  this  same  article,  and  I  quote  as  follows : 

Dellinger  says  that  "Cuba  is  the  only  country  in  the  world  where  this  con- 
gress— 

and  I  presume  this  means  the  Cultural  Congress — 

where  this  congress  could  be  held,  with  such  diversity  of  delegates  having  differ- 
ent views — all  united  by  a  basic  sympathy  for  Cuba  and  antipathy  toward  im- 
perialism. The  only  other  country  would  have  been  Vietnam,  except  for  the 
inconvenience  of  the  bombings."  He  notes  that  the  word  "inconvenience"  should 
be  in  quotes ;  the  bombings  are  more  than  that ;  they  are  a  crime.  He  says  that 
in  Cuba,  "intellectuals  could  avoid  the  vices  and  sectarianism  and  excessive  in- 
dividualism ruining  past  meetings  of  this  nature." 

This,  concluding  with  the  words,  "except  for  the  inconvenience  of 
the  bombings" — is  this  basically  in  accord  with  what  you  said  to  the 
reporter  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  As  I  said,  not  only  do  I  really  not  remember  at  all 
what  I  said  to  him  on  this  occasion,  but  it  went  tlirough  four  stages. 
At  the  beginning  of  it,  it  certainly  is  a  germ  of  an  idea  that  I  believe 
in  and  would  be  happy  to  express  to  you  or  maybe  explain  to  yoiL 
That  is,  that  this  particular  congress,  due  to  the  prestige  of  Vietnam 
and  the  prestige  of  Cuba  amongst  the  world  intellectuals  and  among 
humanitarians  of  many  varieties,  it  was  possible  to  bring  together 
delegates  from  countries  and  from  political  groups  which  are  in  very 
serious  opposition  to  each  other. 

Of  course,  the  Soviet's  Czechoslovakia  invasion  had  not  taken  place 
at  that  time.  That  is  an  example.  There  were  delegates  from  Czechoslo- 
vakia and  from  the  Soviet  Union.  But  there  were  also  delegations 
from  the  traditional  Communist  parties,  which,  by  the  way,  the 
Cubans  are  very  much  in  conflict  with.  There  were  delegates  from 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2781 

liberal  and  anti-Communist  groups.  There  were  delegates  from  Franco 
Spain.  It  was  a  situation  in  which  there  were  several  occasions  on 
which  the  congress  could  have  broken  down  with  some  kind  of  violent 
antipathy. 

When  it  came  close  to  reaching  this  point,  when,  for  example, 
delegates  from  several  countries  attacked  the  Soviet  Union  very 
strongly  for  being  bureaucratic  for  having  taken  on  the  nature  of 
some  imperialist  aspects,  and  when  obviously  delegates  from  the 
Soviet  Union  and  from  the  traditional  Communist  Party  very  much 
resented  this.  However,  as  I  say,  not  entirely  but  to  a  great  extent 
through  the  leadership  and  the  moral  authority  of  the  Cubans  and 
the  Vietnamese,  the  people  were  able  to  express  these  differences  and 
still  not  fly  off  into  many  splinters.  The  other  factor  is  that  a  number 
of  the  people  who  were  attending  that  conference,  I  know^  from  my 
own  personal  experience,  had  been  denied  visas  to  enter  the  United 
States. 

I  think  particularly  of  Jean-Pierre  Vigier,  who  is  a  military  expert, 
in  France  who  had  testified  before  the  War  Crimes  Tribunal  on  the 
type  of  weaponry  being  employed  by  the  United  States  in  Vietnam. 
As  to  the  pattern  of  the  attacks,  for  example,  he  had,  through  very 
elaborate  and  conscientious  studies,  established  that  the  United  States 
had  concentrated  its  bombing  on  Catholic  villages  in  Vietnam  because 
it  assumed  apparently  that  the  Catholics  would  be  the  first  to  revolt 
and  therefore  they  should  be  hit  the  hardest,  and  this  would  under- 
mine the  morale  and  unity  of  Vietnam. 

TVTien  I  heard  him  and  noticed  his  very  objective  and  scientific 
approach  to  these  things,  the  devastating  nature  of  his  research  and 
findings,  I  became  interested  in  having  him  appear  on  an  American 
television  program  so  that  the  American  people  could  hear  these 
things  and  thought  that  it  would  be  appropriate  for  him  to  testify 
or  appear  on  television  and  have  somebody  from  the  Pentagon  or 
whoever  disagreed  with  him,  and  who  supposedly  had  information,  to 
answer  him.  And  in  that  w^ay  the  American  people  could  hear  both 
sides  and  decide.  However,  neither  did  the  Pentagon  nor  the  State 
Department  answer.  He  was  unable  to  obtain  a  visa  to  enter  this 
country.  However,  he  did  get  a  visa  to  go  to  Cuba. 

As  I  say,  there  were  a  number  of  factors  that  would  be  behind  the 
germ  of  the  idea  that  is  summarized  here. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Maybe  I  look  at  things  wnth  too  much  simplicity,  but 
the  germ  of  the  idea  I  see  here  is  simply  that  Cuba  or  Vietnam, 
"except  for  the  inconvenience  of  the  bombings,"  are  the  two  coun- 
tries geographically — I  think  of  it  more  geographically  than  politi- 
cally— that  could  hold  this  type  of  conference. 

Have  I  reduced  it  to  too  much  simplicity  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  I  think  you  have.  And  again — sometimes  I 
wonder  if  I  take  too  long  in  my  answers,  but  I  answered  at  some 
length  what  I  would  have  in  mind.- 1  somewhat  disassociate  myself 
from  this  article  because  of  the  number  of  stages  it  went  through.  I 
would  rather,  again,  have  my  own  words  stand  rather  than  yours. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  connection  with  this  conference 
which  was  held  in  Havana,  was  a  man  by  the  name  of  David  Siqueiros 
a  delegate  to  this  conference? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  He  was  not  only  a  delegate.  If  you  don't  mind, 
I  would  like  to  give  him  as  an  example  of  what  I  was  indicating  before. 

21-706  O— 69— pt.  3 7 


2782  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Because  at  the  conference  there  were  other  people,  not  only  artists  like 
himself,  but  in  some  cases  nonartists,  who  were  very  hostile  to  David 
Siqueiros  on  the  belief  that  he  was  involved  in  the  execution  of  Leon 
Trotsky.  So  there  was  very  great  personal  tension  and  political  ten- 
sion between  Siqueiros  and  a  number  of  people,  and  it  threatened  to 
lead  to  all  kinds  of  situations. 

As  I  say,  basically  the  Cubans,  with  an  assist  from  Vietnam,  man- 
aged to  put  on  a  conference  in  which  people  like  Siqueiros  and  people 
who  hate  Siqueiros  were  able  to  take  part. 

It  is  fascinating  to  me  also  because  the  State  Department  denied  a 
number  of  people  who  had  come  to  mind,  Robert  Lowell,  the  poet,  a 
number  of  people  like  that,  Dwight  Macdonald,  I  believe,  the  critic, 
a  number  of  people  who  had  been  active  in  the  Congress  for  Cultural 
Freedom,  had  been  very  anti-Communist — and  to  mis  day,  so  far  as 
I  know,  tend  to  be  that  way — a  number  of  those  people  had  been  in- 
vited to  the  congress,  applied  to  the  State  Department  to  go,  but  wei-e 
told  that  this  was  a  monolithic  political  show  and  therefore  it  was  not 
a  legitimate  cultural  congress  for  them  to  go  to. 

When  I  got  there,  I  discovered  this  kind  of  differentiation  and 
difference  and  heterogeneity. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Was  David  Siqueiros  a  delegate  from  the  Soviet  LTnion? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  he  was  a  delegate  from  Mexico.  I  don't  pre- 
sume to  know  all  of  his  history  or  enough  to  say  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Some  of  his  history  is  that  he  is  supposed  to  have  been 
involved  in  an  attempt  to  murder  Leon  Trotsky. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  believe  that  is  right.  He  is  considered  to  have  been 
a  Stalinist  who  supported  or  took  part  in  some  of  the  violence  of  the 
Communists  of  that  period.  He  was  very  much  resented  and  even 
hated  by  a  number  of  the  other  delegates.  There  was  an  occasion  when 
it  almost  came  to  blows. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  He  was  never  prosecuted  for  attempted  assassination  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  a  little  vague  in  my  memory  as  to  exactly  what 
he  did  or  didn't  do. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  before  we  leave  this  Havana  radio 
broadcast  of  February  5,  earlier  you  made  a  number  of  comments  about 
our  inability  to  communicate  with  one  another.  Do  you  find  it  rather 
disconcerting  that  your  friend  down  in  Havana,  Cuba,  made  this 
statement,  that  you  represent  "the  curious  paradox  of  being  a  fighter 
for  nonviolence  who  favors  violence"? 

Would  you  find  it  rather  disconcerting  that  even  your  friends  down 
in  Cuba  would  find  you  equally  paradoxical,  as  perhaps  some  mem- 
bers of  this  committee  would  find  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  think  there  is  a  paradox  involved. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  fact,  everyone,  even  your  friends,  finds  it  very  diffi- 
cult to  understand  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  didn't  say  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  does  not  disturb  you  that  he  referred  to  you  as  a 
curious  paradox? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  don't  feel  disturbed  about  this.  If  I  had  been 
there  at  the  time,  I  would  have  tried  to  expatiate  on  it.  As  I  say,  I 
think  it  is  a  difficult  thing  about  people  who  believe  in  nonviolence, 
who  believe  that  violence  tends  to  become  corrupting  and  self-defeat- 
ing and  yet  are  unwilling  to  be  assigned  to  a  token  position  of 


DISRUPTION  OF   1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2783 

dissent  and  are  struggling  for  some  method  in  which  the  humanist 
and  other  values  of  nonviolence  can  be  preserved  and  yet  can  be 
politically  effective. 

I  spoke  about  my  own  interest  in  the  possibility  of  some  kind  of 
combination  of  what  Arthur  Waskow  called  Gandhi  and  Guerrilla, 
what  I  thought  earlier  of  traditional  pacifism  and  resistance  activities 
of  World  War  II.  I  don't  know  what  the  exact  answer  is.  I  am  ex- 
perimenting. A  lot  of  other  people  are.  It  is  not  surprising  to  me, 
particularly  since  we  have  no  clear-cut  doctrinaire  position  on  it;  it 
confuses  a  number  of  people. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  the  major  thrust  of  my  question  was  that  since  the 
journalist  in  Cuba,  whom  you  described  as  making  an  honest  effort 
at  journalism,  describes  you  as  a  curious  paradox — in  other  words, 
he  found  you  at  least  difficult  to  understand  so  far  as  being  non- 
violent but  favoring  violence — you  must  conclude  that  it  would  be 
difficult  for  some  of  us  to  understand  how  you  can  be  both  for  and 
against  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time.  That  is  the  only  point  I  am 
trying  to  make,  if  you  will  perhaps  make  that  concession,  which  I  am 
sure  you  will  not.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Let  the  record  show  that  the  Congressman  is  correct, 
the  concession  is  not  made. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  be  in  order. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  I  don't  object  to  the  fact  that  this  is  a  difficult 
idea  to  understand.  I  am  quite  ready  to  concede  that  to  you  or  any- 
body else,  including  many  people  I  work  with.  I  would  not  want  to 
include  in  that  some  of  the  other  things  that  we  have  discussed,  that 
is  all. 

Mr.  Watson.  May  I  ask  you  one  other  question  ? 

I  asked  it  of  the  other  gentleman.  Wlien  you  make  these  statements, 
which  obviously  now  you  do  not  mean  to  be  taken  in  their  normal  and 
literal  meaning  and  interpretation,  do  you  explain  to  those  to  whom 
you  articulate  these  positions  that  you  really  don't  mean  for  them 
to  be  taken  and  accepted  in  the  normal  manner? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  quite  confused  by  what  you  mean  by  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  wanted  to  confuse  the  question  purposely  with  the 
thought  it  might  get  through  to  ^ou.  I  have  been  making  my  questions 
simple,  and  you  accused  me  of  simplicity.  I  wanted  to  make  the  ques- 
tion complicated. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  know  what  statements  you  are  referring  to. 
I  want  to  make  clear  that  I  do  not  have  a  double  standard  of  what  I 
say  or  where.  My  views  I  try  to  say  as  openly  whether  it  is  you  or  Ave- 
rell  Harriman  or  somebody  from  the  Soviet  Union  or  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Proceed  with  the  questioning. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Directing  your  attention  to  June  1968,  were  you  in 
Prague,  Czechoslovakia,  on  June  16, 1968  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Approximately  that  time  I  had  a  very  brief  stop- 
over in  Prague,  yes,  on  a  trip  to  Prague.  I  don't  know  if  that  is  the 
exact  date. 

Mr.  Conley.  Did  you  at  that  time  meet  with  Tran  Van  Anh  and 
Phan  Van  Chuong,  the  Viet  Cong  representatives  in  Prague?  Please 
excuse  my  pronunciation,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  With  that  reservation,  yes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  What  other  Americans  were  present  at  that  meeting? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  As  I  said  earlier,  I  really  don't  care  to  discuss  the 


2784  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

activities  of  other  people.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  am  just  thinking  about 
this  out  loud,  but  since  I  know  you  already  know  who  was  there:  in 
fact  as  I  think  it  was  testified  before  this  conunittee 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  That  was  going  to  be  my  next  question,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  don't  think  I  am  involving  anybody  in  a  public 
wuy  that  might  lead  to  attack  and  danger  that  he  is  not  already  sub- 
ject to. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Mr.  Robeit  Greenblatt  ( 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Yes.  Mr.  Greenblatt. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  All  right,  sir. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Xow  maybe  before  you  proceed  with  this  line  of 
questioning,  if  I  could  just  make  a  little  statement. 

I  have  had  intimate  contacts  with  both  the  XLF  and  representatives 
from  North  Vietnam,  including  both  Xuan  Thuy,  who  is  head  of  the 
DRV  delegation  in  Paris,  and  ^ladam  Binh.  who  is  head  of  the  XLF 
delegation.  Xow  the  sole  purpose  of  these  has  not  been,  I  will  try  to 
say  that  right,  the  sole  purpose  has  not  been  to  secure  the  release  of 
American  prisoners,  but  this  has  been  a  very  important  aspect  of  my 
contacts  with  these  people.  It  is  a  very  touchy  and  delicate  area,  as  I 
am  sure  you  i^eoognize.  And  we  have  been  successful  in  playing  a  part 
at  least  in  the  release.  I  would  have  to  stop  to  comit  them  up,  but  in 
at  least,  well,  a  number  of  prisoners,  some  by  the  XLF  and  some  by  the 
Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam. 

In  addition  to  my  reservations  I  said  about  involving  other  people 
who  can  better  speak  for  themselves,  in  this  particular  area  I  am  very 
anxious  not  to  do  anythmg  which  might  conceivably  jeopardize  future 
releases  and  complicate  those  relations. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  thmk  the  questions  will  be  connected  with  the  Chi- 
cago demonstration. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  I  think  jou  are  anticipating  again  malice  m  my 
heart. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  wanted  to  remind  you  of  the  delicacy  of  this. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  "Were  there  any  other  Americans  besides  you  and  Rob- 
ert Greenblatt.  bearmg  in  mind  I  have  not  asked  you  to  identify  those 
persons  (  I  simply  ask  you,  "Were  there  other  Americans  present  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  To  the  best  of  my  memory,  no. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  You  were  the  only  two  Americans  present  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  don't  want  to  give  a  wrong  answer.  I  can't  remem- 
ber anybody  else  present.  I  am  trying  to  thmk  if  there  could  have 
been,  smce  you  are  asking. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  At  this  meeting  did  you  discuss  with  the  Viet  Cong  the 
meeting  which  was  to  be  held  in  Septeml>er  1968  in  Budapest  between 
American,  Viet  Cong,  and  Xorth  Vietnamese  activities? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Yes:  I  always  favor  face-to-face  contacts,  as  I  say, 
whether  it  is  Averell  Harriman  or  Vietnamese,  although  I  place  more 
faith  and  hope  in  the  contacts  between  the  American  antiwar  move- 
ment and  the  Vietnamese.  I  have  always  attempted  to  encourage  first- 
hand contact  and  firsthand  mformation. 

On  this  occasion  we  discussed  the  possibility  of  some  kind  of  meeting 
between  Americans  and  the  Xational  Liberation  Front  and  representa- 
tives from  Xoith  Vietnam. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Xow.  bearing  in  mind  that  we  are  still  talking  about 
June  16  or  thereabouts  in  Prague.  Czechoslovakia,  at  this  meeting  did 
not  the  Viet  Cong  recommend  only,  and  using  the  exact  quotes,  if  I 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2785 

may,  "those  politically  most  advanced"  should  be  invited  from  the 
United  States  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Well,  it  is  interesting  to  me  about  direct  quotes.  I 
happen  to  know  that  the  U.S.  Government  illegally  seized  Mr.  Green- 
blatt's  jjapers,  and  undoubtedly  there  are  notes  of  his  which  can  be 
given  as  direct  (j[uote3.  The  fact  is  that  in  these  kinds  of  conversations, 
you  know,  one  jots  down  a  suggestion  to  remember  something.  How- 
ever, I  have  no  objection  to  describing  exactly  how  I  interpret  what 
that  note  meant  and  what  the  facts  were.  I  helfjed  to  arrange 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  don't  want  to  mislead  you  into  believ- 
ing that  this  quote  is  based  upon  a  note  that  was  seized  from  some 
person.  I  don't  want  to  lead  you  down  that  primrose  path.  But  you  go 
ahead  and  answer. 

Mr,  Dellinger.  "Well,  the  devious  methods  of  the  police  state  in 
which  telephone  conversations,  private  meetings,  are  bugged  and 
recorded  and  Avhich  undercover  agents  who  pose  as  something  which 
they  are  not  and  f»ry  into  the  private  affairs  and  guaranteed  political 
associations  of  the  American  people,  as  well  as  all  over  the  world — 
these  methods  elude  me.  However,  I  consider  it  extremeh"  unlikely 
that  at  this  particular  time  somebody  in  the  meeting  could  give  you  a 
direct  quote.  Perhaps  30U  have  been  violating  the  internal  democracy 
of  Czechoslovakia,  along  with  that  of  the  United  States,  and  perhaps 
the  room  in  which  we  met  was  bugged.  I  know  about  these  methods, 
in  general,  and  I  am  certainly  willing  to  deal  with  the  question,  al- 
though I  must  say  I  have  scorn  for  these  methods  and  consider  them 
to  be  self-defeating. 

Mr,  CoxLET.  May  we  get  back  to  the  question,  which  was  "Tihose 
politically  most  advanced."  Did  they  not,  in  fact,  indicate  to  you  or 
reconmaend  that  these  are  the  persons  that  should  be  invited  from 
the  United  States  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  Let  me  tell  you  what  did  happen  in  our  conversa- 
tions. I  am  not  tr^nng  to  pin  down  the  exact  month,  but  earlier,  begin- 
ing  in  Hanoi,  where  I  had  proposed  that  they  should,  within  the  limits 
possible  under  the  very  hea\-y  bombing  that  Vietnam  was  suffering, 
they  should  give  visas  t>o  American  reporters  and  teleWsion  people  and 
to  many  others  so  as  to  have  face-to-face  contact  and  accurate  informa- 
tion, beginning  then  and  through  a  series  of  conversations  we  arranged 
a  meeting  which  took  place  in  Bratislava  approximately  1  year  earlier, 
and  at  that  meeting 

Mr.  CoxLET.  Let  us  not  go  into  Bratislava. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  It  is  the  contrast  that  is  involved. 

Mr.  CoxLET.  We  are  going  to  get  to  Bratislava  in  a  little  while. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  In  this  context  it  would  be  better  if  I  set  up  the 
contrast.  What  we  decided  was  that  this  was  a  conference  in  Bratislava 
at  which  it  would  l^e  valuable  to  have  a  wide  range  of  j^eople  of  a 
variety  of  political  \*iew5  and  attitudes,  including  some  people  who 
might  not  even  be  sure  that  they  were  against  war,  but  who  were 
tending  in  that  direction.  It  would  be  a  healthy  thing  to  have  a  face- 
to-face  contact  in  conference  among  people  of  this  kind. 

In  Budapest  a  year  later  we  felt,  partly  because  this  other  conference 
had  taken  place,  but  partly  also  because  of  the  growth  in  numbers 
and  intensity  of  the  antiwar  movement,  that  it  would  be  more  useful  to 
have  people  who  were  clearly  part  of  the  active  movement  to  have 


2786  DISRUPTION  OF   19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

this  experience  of  meeting  face  to  face  and  holding  protracted  dis- 
cussions with  the  Vietnamese.  That  is  wliat  was  meant  by  whatever 
the  phrase  that  came  from,  or  at  least  my  understanding  of  what 
might  have  been  meant  by  the  phrase  "politically  most  advanced,"  or 
whatever  you  said. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Is  not  another  way  to  put  that,  and  again  I  am  engaged 
in  being  simple,  "to  leave  the  dupes  at  home"  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  really  don't  think  in  terms  of  "dupes."  I  never 
have.  It  is  public  knowledge  tiiat  some  of  tlie  types  of  people  we  in- 
vited to  Bratislava  were  not  actively  involved  in  the  antiwar  m^ove- 
ment,  but  just  as  I  encouraged  Hanoi  to  invite  people  from  the  mass 
media  to  come  and  see  the  bombing  and  report  to  the  American  people, 
similarly  it  would  be  useful  to  have  people  who  had  suspicions  or 
hostilities,  even,  to  the  NLF  who  had  been  brainwashed,  if  I  could 
put  it  that  way,  by  a  diet  of  American  propaganda  about  terrorists, 
and  so  forth,  I  thought  there  would  be  some  benefits  from  having  them 
sit  down  together  with  the  NLF. 

At  that  meeting  many  people,  including  myself,  tried  to  ask  search- 
ing questions  of  them  and  to  express  our  own  view^point.  There  was 
no  question  of  dupes  or  nondupes. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  I  may,  was  not  another  item  on  the 
proposed  agenda  discussions  that  were  had  between  the  Viet  Cong 
w^ho  were  experienced  in  attempting  to  cause  disaffection  among  U.S. 
soldiers  and  Americans  who  were  engaging  in  the  same  type  activity  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  First  of  all,  I  just  prefer  to  call  them  the  National 
Liberation  Front.  Viet  Cong  is  a  little  bit  like  the  term  "nigger"  or 
"Polack"  or  something  of  that  kind.  Now,  what  was  planned  and  envi- 
sioned was  that  there  would  be  a  discussion  of  all  forms  of  antiwar 
activity.  Now,  these  would  include,  for  example — in  fact,  at  our  earlier 
meeting  the  first  item  of  the  report  from  the  NLF  was  a  report  on  the 
military  situation.  HoAvever,  this  was  not  interpreted  and  did  not 
mean  that  the  Americans  would  go  home  and  organize  a  military 
campaign  against  the  American  Government. 

In  much  the  same  kind  of  context,  it  is  quite  possible,  although  I 
don't  remember  specifically,  that  there  would  Ivdve  been  planned — I 
did  not  attend  this  meeting  by  the  way  because  I  thought  other  people 
should  have  the  opportunity — but  it  is  quite  possible  amongst  the 
Vietnamese  reports,  besides  reports  of  the  military  situation,  would 
be  reports  on  disaffection  within  the  Armed  Forces  because  this  is 
something  which  has  always  interested  me.  There  are  rumors  about 
groups  of  soldiers  in  Vietnam  who  refused  to  go  into  battle  or  who 
desert  and  hide  out  in  Saigon.  Even  I  read  some  things  about  people 
going  over  to  the  other  side.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  very  sharp 
and  strong  military  censorship  which  often  even  denies  things  after 
they  have  been  made  public  and  are  known  basically  to  be  true. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Of  course,  that  works  on  both  sides.  There  are  a  num- 
ber of  Viet  Cong  or  NLF  or  Nortli  Vietnamese  who  come  over  to  the 
American  and  South  Vietnamese  side,  too. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  That  is  correct.  In  any  event,  I  myself  certainly 
have  interest  in  any  information  that  anybody,  whether  Vietnamese 
from  the  South— I  asked  questions  of  this'  kincl  when  I  was  in  Saigon 
on  an  early  visit — Vietnamese  from  the  South  or  Vietnamese  from 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2787 

the  National  Liberation  Front,  what  have  you,  any  information  they 
might  have  about  this  would  certainly  be  of  interest  to  me. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Being  specific  in  this  area,  did  not  the  Viet  Cong,  the 
National  Liberation  Front,  or  the  North  Vietnamese  specifically  ask 
for,  and  I  quote,  sir,  "competent  people  to  discuss  work  among  soldiers 
since  a  major  item  is  exchange  of  experience  and  coordination  of 
activities"  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  That  does  not  sound  quite  kosher  to  me.  I  did  not 
have  the  benefit  of  a  tape  recorder,  and  I  have  had  many,  many  con- 
versations before  and  since  with  the  Vietnamese  and  others.  It  does  not 
sound  quite  like  the  way  they  talk  or  the  way  I  talk  when  I  am  with 
them.  I  volunteered  here,  as  I  will  anywhere,  my  great  interest  in  the 
coffeehouse  program,  my  great  interest  in  bringing  the  facts  about  the 
war  to  American  soldiers,  my  support  in  general  of  desertion,  of  re- 
fusal to  commit  war  crimes,  of  any  acts  which  will  bring  the  war  to 
an  end  and  save  the  lives  of  Vietnamese  and  Americans. 

I  certainly,  in  talking  to  the  Vietnamese  tomorrow,  would  tell  them 
that  one  of  the  things  we  are  doing  is  carrying  out  this  coffeehouse 
program.  How^ever,  I  have  always  made  clear  and  specifically  at  the 
earlier  conference  when  I  made  an  opening  speech — if  I  remember  cor- 
rectly, it  was  an  opening  speech — a  great  deal  of  my  emphasis  was  on 
the  fact  that,  as  the  Vietnamese  seemed  to  themselves  emphasize,  every 
people  had  to  work  out  their  own  problems  and  develop  their  own 
indigenous  movement  and,  in  my  view,  a  whole  generation  of  idealists 
had  been  led  astray  because  they  had,  perhaps  for  understandable 
reasons,  been  subservient  to  a  foreign  power,  namely,  Moscow,  and  that 
the  present  movement  in  the  United  States  was  not  that  kind  of 
movement. 

I  wanted  to  make  it  very  clear  to  the  Vietnamese  that  we  were 
indigenous  and  patriotic  Americans  who  were  opposed  to  imperialism 
and  certain  other  forms  of  our  society;  that  they  must  understand 
from  the  beginning  we  would  have  differences  from  them  as  well  as 
agreements  with  them.  It  is  in  this  context  we  have  always  operated. 
Therefore  the  words  you  read  to  me  don't  sound  quite  correct. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  don't  think  they  wanted  competent  people? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  trying  not  to  make  a  game  of  it.  It  sounds  like 
you  are. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  am  trying  not  to. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Obviously  they  want  competent  people. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  To  discuss  work  among  soldiers  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  What  I  have  tried  to  indicate  is  that  I  think  they 
want  competent  people,  including  people  who  work  in  draft  resistance, 
teach-ins,  anything  else;  they  would  like  to  have  some  sense  of  what 
is  going  on  here,  although  it  is  quite  clear  to  me  that  they  realize  the 
issue  will  be  resolved  on  the  battlefield  and  not  basically  by  the  Ameri- 
can movement. 

Mr.  Ichord.  In  that  connection,  Mr.  Dellinger,  do  you  consider  prop- 
aganda distributed  on  the  battlefield  to  American  soldiers  in  South 
Vietnam,  such  as  one  document  that  I  picked  up  when  I  was  last  in 
South  Vietnam,  saying,  "Yankee,  go  home,"  to  be  not  part  of  the  war 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  Viet  Cong  or  the  North  Vietnamese  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  it  is.  My  understanding  is  that  in  almost 
all  wars  both  sides,  one  way  or  another,  try  to  communicate,  nowadays 


2788  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

broadcast,  to  the  other  side  pointing  out  that  their  side  is  unjust  and 
they  should  lay  down  their  arms. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  This  paper  said,  "Yankee,  go  home,  do  not  die  here.'" 
You  would  have  to  niterpret  that  as  trying  to  destroy  the  morale  of 
the  soldiers. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  know  they  have  broadcast,  and  similarly  the 
United  States  drops  leaflets  on  the  other  side.  I  consider  this  a  very 
difficult  area.  For  myself,  although  I  made  very  clear  I  hope  that 
every  American  boy  will  refuse  to  go  to  Vietnam  and  refuse  to  take 
part  in  other  imperialist  ventures,  I  have  some  simple  reservations  in 
terms  of  when  a  person  is  actually  on  the  scene.  It  is  not  that  I  don't 
want  him  to  be  able  responsibly  and  in  the  proper  way,  my  idea  of  the 
proper  way  or  his,  to  be  able  to  leave,  but  I  would  be  very  slow  to  say 
something  to  somebody  as  he  was  going  into  battle,  you  know,  at  that 
very  moment,  because  obviously  it  can  lead  to  all  kinds  of  difficulties 
and  problems  for  him.  So,  I  myself,  as  it  happens,  have  never  engaged 
in  this  kind  of  activity,  although  I  do  my  best  to  encourage  everybody 
to  refuse  to  serve  in  the  Armed  Forces. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  encourage  everybody  to  refuse  to  serve  in  the 
Armed  Forces  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes ;  particularly  at  the  present  time. 

Mr.  Watson.  Does  that  extend  to  encouragement  or  at  least  being 
delighted  with  those  who  would  desert  the  military  forces? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  I  think  I  indicated  on  several  occasions  I  sup- 
port those  who  have  taken  political  asylum  in  Sweden,  France,  Hol- 
land, and  so  forth.  I  am  fascinated  by  the  fact  that  originally  we  pro- 
vided asylum  in  the  United  States  to  people  who  opposed  militarism 
and  aggression. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  is  evident  from  your  earlier  statement  that  you  do 
everything  that  you  can  to  assist  or  carry  out  your  beliefs. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  it  would  be  interesting  to  look  back.  Did  I  say 
"to  assist"  ?  I  think  I  said  "to  encourage." 

Mr.  Watson.  You  agreed  that  you  would  do  everything  you  can  to 
carry  out  your  beliefs  and  your  desires  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  trying  to  be  very  candid  because  I  believe  in 
my  beliefs  and  I  believe  in  my  actions. 

Mr.  Watson.  Try  it  on  this  one,  yes  or  no. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  way  you  phrased  it,  I  think  I  have  to  exercise 
some  reservations  because  there  are  things  that  some  people  might 
think  might  assist  in  this  case  which  I  wouldn't  undertake  for  a 
variety  of  reasons.  Without  really  going  into  it  very  well,  I  have 
explained,  that  I  consider  it  a  complex  problem.  If  a  group  of  soldiers 
is  going  back  in  battle,  I  would  be  very  slow  to  do  something  at  that 
moment  to  demoralize  them  or  to  make  them  feel  spirtually  ill  at  ease 
when  they  went  out.  This  is  a  very  difficult  question  that  I  don't  have 
to  face  because  I  am  not  ordinarily  in  that  situation. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  not  concerned  about  any  spiritual  aspects  of 
the  matter,  are  you,  Mr.  Dellinger  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  know  where  you  draw  that  conclusion.  I  just 
used  the  word. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  just  used  the  word. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  was  not  playing  a  game  when  I  used  it. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  not  really  concerned  about  that,  are  you  ?  Do 
you,  in  your  youth  movement,  encourage  people  to  attend  church? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2789 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Unfortunately  it  is  my  own  view,  although  I  did 
study  for  the  Christian  ministry.  And  again  I  am  not  sure,  I  am 
ahvays  happy  to  expound  my  views,  but  this  seems  quite  remote; 
unfortunately  I  believe,  speaking  generally  of  the  organized  church, 
it  is  not  a  force  that  has  opposed  war,  stood  for  justice,  or  really  been 
for  the  greatest  spiritual  advancement  of  tlie  people.  I  would  like  to 
distinguish  that  there  are  obviously  great  numbers  of  individual  clergy- 
men, individual  Christians,  individual  Jews,  adherents  of  various 
religions,  who  are  very  sincere  and  try  to  carry  through  this  way. 

In  my  own  life  and  my  own  belief,  I  believe  the  institutions,  in  gen- 
eral, tend  to  interfere  with  the  very  goals  that  they  purport  to  serve. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  any  instance,  anything  which  tends  to  restrict  the 
individualism  of  a  person 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Again  I  haven't  said  such  a  thing  because  I  do 
believe  in  a  combination  of  what  might  be  called  individualism  and 
social  solidarity.  I  have  indicated  that  in  a  number  of  areas.  I  am  op- 
posed to  the  form  of  individualism  which  is  expressed  under  capitalism, 
where  people  work  for  their  own  selfish  economic  interest  instead  of 
w^orking  for  the  common  good. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  are  against  the  profit  motive  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  I  am. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  don't  want  again  to  get  you  in  a  paradox  here,  but 
you  are  against  the  Government.  Of  course,  we  understand  that. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  don't  know  if  I  got  into  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  you  are.  That  is  a  fair  assumption?  You  don't 
like  the  established  Government,  do  you  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  do  not. 

Mr.  Watson.  If  you  are  against  profit  and  the  people  running  the 
business,  you  would  have  to  turn  it  over  to  the  Government.  You  are 
against  the  Government  who  would  run  it.  Would  you  be  satisfied  if 
you  and  the  Mobilization  Committee  ran  it  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Again,  I  find  it  difficult  to  accept  your  summary  of 
my  views.  I  generally  don't  make  blanket  indictments  of  quite  that 
kind.  I  happen  to  advocate  some  kind  of  combination  of  political 
democracy  and  economic  democracy,  some  kind  of  communal  solidarity 
and  equality,  with  maximum  possible  decentralization  and  individual 
responsibility. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  used  the  word  "communal."  Am  I  to  interpret  that 
in  the  usual  meaning,  or  do  you  have  a  different  interpretation? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  don't  know.  I  used  the  word  "communal" 

Mr.  Watson.  Everybody  is  to  live 

Mr.  Bellinger.  In  my  own  life  and  interest,  my  first  major  interest 
in  this  was  at  the  time  that  I  was  an  active  church  member,  when  I 
was  very  impressed  by  the  early  disciples  of  Jesus,  Avho  abandoned 
all  private  ownership  and,  as  it  says  in  the  Bible,  there  was  neither 
rich  nor  poor  among  them. 

Mr.  Watson.  The  Bible  says  that  you  shall  always  have  the  poor 
with  you.  I  am  concerned  with  this  aspect  because  I  have  a  relation 
to  it,  I  have  a  twin  brother  who  is  a  minister.  We  won't  pursue  it 
further.  Obviously  he  is  of  the  category  you  condemn,  he  is  of  the 
established  church. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  would  not  want  to  condemn  sight  unseen.  I  have 
a  great  deal  of  respect  for  the  established  church,  both  clergy  and  laity. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  proceed  with  the  questioning. 


2790  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Mr,  Dellinger,  if  I  may — again  reminding  you  that  we 
are  talking  about  your  visit  to  Prague,  Czechoslovakia,  in  June  1968 — 
put  to  you,  sir,  was  not  a  code  worked  out  for  telegrams  to  be  sent  be- 
tween you  and  the  Viet  Cong  office  in  Prague  so  that,  for  example, 
the  word  "Harry"  in  a  telegram  would  be  "Hungary"  and  the  word 
"Peter"  would  mean  "Poland"  ?  Was  such  a  code  worked  out  by  you 
and  the  representatives  of  the  North  Vietnam  Government? 

Mr.  Dellinger,  xlbsolutely.  I  do  everything  I  can — although  I  my- 
self am  public  about  just  about  everything  I  do  and  believe,  in 
preparing  for  something  of  that  kind,  I  would  certainly  attempt  to 
maintain  the  privacy  of  communication,  which  I  think  is  our  right 
and  which  I  think  the  Government  constantly  violates.  Now  this  is  a 
very  unimportant  matter.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  wouldn't  have  had 
enough  interest  to  do  this,  but  I  am  quite  willing  to  use  this  kind  of 
very  simple  code,  as  I  think  all  businesses  do — I  mean  businesses  even 
use  that  code  if  they  are  going  to  announce  a  new  model  or  new  price. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Who  did  propose  the  idea  of  the  code  then  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  emerged  from  our  discussions  of  four  people. 

Mr.  Conley.  You  and  Mr.  Greenblatt  and  two  others? 

Mr,  Dellinger.  The  two  others  you  mentioned,  Tran  Van  Aiih  and 
Phan  Van  Chuong. 

Mr,  Conley.  We  may  assume  from  your  remarks  it  was  not  your 
idea,  but  one  of  the  other  three  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger,  Not  necessarily.  You  see,  it  is  the  same  as  going  to 
Bratislava,  We  did  not  hold  any  press  conference  or  make  any  press 
announcement  beforehand  because  we  wanted  to  be  able  to  meet  with- 
out being  harassed  by  CIA  agents  and  reporters.  It  was  difficult  enough 
bringing  together  people  from  these  three  different  groups,  that  is, 
the  two  Vietnamese  and  the  American,  and  we  didn't  want  to  be  meet- 
ing in  a  goldfish  bowl.  Although  we  made  no  elaborate  attempts  to 
keep  it  secret,  nonetheless  we  were  relatively  quiet  about  it.  As  soon  as 
the  meeting  was  over,  we  were  quite  prepared  to  give  all  and  any  in- 
formation. The  same  way  here.  There  was  also  another  factor.  For 
example,  a  captain  in  the  Army,  who  served  in  Vietnam  and  is  opposed 
to  the  war,  was  part  of  a  group  which  we  were  having  go  to  Sweden 
to  visit  deserters  to  find  out  what  the  reason  for  their  desertion  was, 
to  give  factual  rejDorts  to  the  American  people. 

This  was  not  kept  secret  because  we  did  not  use  the  code.  Because 
one  of  your  informers  discovered  the  information,  he  was  denied  a 
l^assport  by  the  State  Department  and  was  unable  to  make  the  trip. 
So,  you  know,  there  are  certain  practical  considerations  which  would 
motivate  me.  So  although,  in  general,  I  don't  bother  with  such  things, 
I  could  very  well  have  been  the  one  to  suggest  it  just  to  keep  it  quiet 
a  little  bit  and  to  prevent  the  State  Department  from  denying  pass- 
ports or  visas  to  some  of  the  people  who  were  going,  that  we  keep  it  a 
little  bit  quiet,  also,  so  they  miglit  not  bug  the  room  in  Hungary,  as 
they  may  have  well  bugged  the  room  in  Prague. 

Mr.  Conley.  Were  there  others  at  the  meeting — Mr.  Greenblatt — 
during  this  trip  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes;  Mr.  Greenblatt  accompanied  me  on  at  least 
two  visits  to  Averell  Harriman  and  one  to  Cyrus  Vance  and  on  per- 
haps three  visits,  two  or  three  visits,  with  the  North  Vietnamese  dele- 
gation, including  Xuan  Thuy,  the  head  of  the  delegation,  and  Colonel 
Ha  Van  Lau  and  a  number  of  others. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2791 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Greenblatt  also  met  with  Ambassador  Harriman, 
did  he  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  he  did- 


Mr.  CoNLEY.  Were  you  aware 

Mr.  Dellinger. — to  the  best  of  my  memory. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Were  you  aware,  sir,  that  a  Mr.  Wilfred  Burchett 
briefed  Robert  Greenblatt  before  his  meeting  with  Harriman  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  occasion  you  are  referring  to  is  probably  one 
in  which  I  called  up  Wilfred  Burchett,  whom  I  originally  met  in  his 
home  in  Phnom  Penh,  Cambodia,  some  years  ago.  I  knew  he  was  in 
Paris.  He  is  a  journalist  and  a  correspondent,  and  I  consider  him  to 
be  a  very  honest  journalist  and  very  helpful.  I  don't  remember  that 
Mr.  Greenblatt  knew  him  before.  The  way  I  remember  it  is  that  I 
called  Wilfred  and  suggested  that  we  meet  and  have  a  drink  and  talk 
about  things  and  that  Mr.  Greenblatt  and  I  met  with  Mr.  Burchett  on 
not  one,  but  at  least  two,  occasions. 

I  don't  look  at  this  as  briefing.  I  look  at  this  as  exchange  of  ideas 
and  information  since  none  of  us  follow  party  lines  or  receive  orders 
from  anybody. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  This  is  the  same  Wilfred  Burchett,  is  it  not,  who  was 
a  participant  in  the  Communist  brainwashing  campaign  against  Amer- 
ican prisoners  of  war  during  the  Korean  war  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Do  you  expect  me  to  consider  that  a  serious  ques- 
tion and  answer  it  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir,  I  do. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Repeat  it,  please,  and  I  will  do  my  best. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Were  you  not  aware  that  Wilfred  Burchett  was  a 
participant  in  the  Communist  brainwashing  campaign  against  Ameri- 
can prisoners  of  war  in  Korea  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  have  no  knowledge  of  that.  In  fact,  I  am  not 
an  expert  on  that  phase  of  the  Korean  war.  You  know,  as  a  layman 
and  from  a  distance,  there  were  some  things  about  the  whole  treat- 
ment of  the  prisoners,  on  both  sides,  by  the  way,  which  made  me  a  little 
uneasy.  As  I  say,  I  was  not  in  a  position,  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  to 
really  explore  this  very  thoroughly. 

My  chief  concern,  since  I  have  been  in  Vietnam,  was  to  try  to  in- 
vestigate whether  the  Vietnamese  were  doing  the  kind  of  brainwash- 
ing, which  I  don't  know  whether  the  Koreans  did  or  not,  but  of  which 
they  were  accused,  but  I  did  investigate  that  and  felt  convinced  that 
they  were  not  brainwashing  anybody. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  found  out  that  one  of  the  bars  to  the  release 
of  more  American  prisoners  is  that  when  arrangements  have  been 
made  and  the  prisoners  are  on  their  way  home,  the  Army,  the  State 
Department — and  on  one  occasion  the  prisoners  were  told  the  word 
came  right  from  the  White  House — put  pressure  on  the  released  pris- 
oners to  go  to  the  base  in  Thailand  from  which  Vietnam  was  being 
bombed  and  there  to  "debrief  them  before  they  were  allowed  to  speak 
to  the  press. 

In  other  words,  I  think  there  is  at  least  some  suspicion  of  brain- 
washing on  the  American  authorities'  part.  I  am  against  brainwashing, 
whoever  does  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  have  in  my  hand  here  an  extract  from 
the  Subcommittee  on  the  Korean  War  Atrocities  of  the  Permanent 


2792  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the  Committee  on  Government 
Operations,  U.S.  Senate,  83d  Congress,  December  4,  1953,  wherein 
appears  the  sworn  testimony  of  former  prisoner  of  war  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Robert  Abbott  of  the  United  States  Infantry,  wherein  he 
identifies  this  Wilfred  Burchett  as  a  person  who  visited  prisoner-of- 
war  camps  in  an  effort  to  sway  the  prisoners  and  to  get  statements  from 
them  and  to  create  unrest. 

Now,  gir,  in  the  light  of  that  testimony  which  is  in  our  possession, 
do  you  still  say  that  you  were  not  aware  that  Mr,  Burchett  had  previ- 
ously participated  in  the  Communist  brainwashing  campaign  against 
American  prisoners  of  war  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  First  of  all,  I  never  saw  that  statement  before. 
Secondly,  I  would  have  to  consider  it  quite  likely  it  could  be  as  un- 
reliable as  some  of  the  statements  made  by  the  committee,  the  present 
committee,  particularly  in  its  October  sessions,  when  the  staff  and 
"^ritnesses  told  a  number  of  fanciful  and  untrue  things. 

Mr,  CoNLEY.  Sir,  I  have  to  assume,  as  I  do  with  you,  sir,  that  a  man 
who  takes  the  oath  intends  to  tell  the  truth. 

Mr.  Dellinger,  Well,  you  can  assume  that,  and  I  don't  know  any 
of  the  people  involved.  I  am  not  going  to  challenge  their  veracity,  but 
I  don't  automatically  believe  it  because  you  have  read  it  to  me  from 
that  committee,  I  will  tell  you  very  frankly  that  when  I  went  to 
Phnom  Penh,  Cambodia,  in  1966,  I  had  some  suspicions  about  the 
accuracy  of  Wilfred  Burchett  as  a  correspondent.  I  myself  am  quite 
aware  of  how  partisans  on  both  sides  of  a  controversy  tend  to  distort 
the  truth. 

I  think  the  record  of  Communist  journalists  during  the  twenties 
and  thirties  and  later  includes  many,  many  instances  of  distortion 
and  propaganda  which  later  was  exposed  not  to  be  true. 

Mr,  IcHORD,  Do  you  think  the  record  is  pretty  good  today  ?  You  only 
mentioned  the  thirties  and  twenties. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  I  was  thinking  this  was  the  period  of  the  slave  labor 
camps  and  the  executions,  and  so  on.  I  think  there  has  been  a  modifica- 
tion in  a  healthy  direction.  There  has  been  some  liberalization  process 
which  has  taken  place,  but  the  record  is  not  one  that  I  consider  satis- 
factory today. 

The  journalistic  covering  of  the  Soviet-Czechoslovakian  invasion  is 
an  example.  Anyway  I  did  not  know  Wilfred  Burchett.  Because  he 
had  access  to  information  and  also  had  insights  which  many  other 
people  did  not,  he  is  occasionally  quoted  in  the  American  press.  Be- 
cause of  the  kind  of  pressures  that  exist  in  this  society,  I  never  saw 
him  quoted  without  being  referred  to  in  some  invidious  way.  To  the 
very  least,  as  the  Australian  Communist  journalist,  which  is  a  way, 
you  know,  of  discrediting  him,  I  had  no  idea  whether  he  would  turn 
out  to  be  an  honest  journalist  or  dishonest  journalist, 

I  will  say  I  spent  considerable  time  with  him  in  Cambodia  on  both 
occasions  before  I  visited  North  Vietnam,  I  talked  with  him  at  length 
about  what  he  had  seen  and  what  the  realities  were.  I  had  far  more 
opportunity  to  check  these  things  out  during  my  visit  than  he,  I  am 
sure,  anticipated  because  it  involved  the  kind  of  traveling  under  in- 
tense bombardment  which  nobody  else  had  been  permitted  to  do  during 
that  time,  with  the  exception  of  himself. 

I  found  out  that  he  was  utterly  reliable.  There  might  be  something 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2793 

that  I  would  interpret  differently,  but  I  found  as  a  journalist  he  was 
utterly  reliable  and  honest.  I  have  a  great  deal  of  respect  for  him.  If  I 
wanted  to  find  out  facts  about  something,  I  would  certainly  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  opportmiity  of  meeting  with  him  in  Paris  so  as  to  have 
whatever  up-to-date  knowledge  I  could  before  meeting  either  with 
the  Vietnamese  or  the  Americans. 

Mr.  Watsox.  Mr.  Bellinger,  you  made  the  statement  that  you  under- 
stood that  partisans  on  both  sides  would  tend  to  distort  the  truth. 

Mr.  Dellikger.  Often  do ;  not  all  times. 

Mr.  Watson.  Of  course,  you  are  partisan.  Would  that  apply  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  try  not  to,  but  obviously  I  have  my  own  biases  and 
beliefs.  I  think  nobody  is  a  completely  objective  observer.  But  I  have 
learned  through  the  years  that  to  exaggerate  or  distort — first  of  all  that 
one  may  do  it  unconsciously.  And  that  is  bad  enough.  But  to  stretch 
the  truth  a  little  bit  or  the  facts  in  order  to  gain  a  temporary  advantage 
is  self-defeating  and  corrupting,  and  I  try  to  avoid  it. 

Mr.  Watson.  If  a  report  were  to  reach  you  that  could  be  construed 
as  pro-  or  anti-American,  your  first  inclination  would  be  to  construe 
it  anti-American  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  first  of  all 

Mr.  Watson.  In  reference  to  the  war  in  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No.  I  think  there  is  a  glorious  American  tradition  of 
belief  in  self-determination  and  of  struggling  and  striving  for  democ- 
racy even  though  that  has  been  greatly  frustrated.  Therefore,  to  me  I 
think  it  is  the  most  pro- American  thing  I  know  and  the  greatest  hope 
in  the  country  that  so  many  people,  particularly  young  people,  are 
speaking  up  for  the  truth  as  they  see  it  and  are  able  to  get  away  from 
the  very  stupid  and  wrong  concept  of  ''my  country,  right  or  wrong" 
or  "Whatever  my  country  does  is  right.'' 

If  a  Communist  country  adopts  that  position,  I  oppose  it.  If  a 
capitalist  country  adopts  that  position,  I  oppose  it.  My  own  country  or 
somebody  else's  country,  I  don't  believe  in  it. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  you  do  believe  that  might  be  pro- 
American  in  reference  to  our  position  in  Vietnam  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  did  not  say  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  Then  the  answer  to  my  earlier  question  is  simply,  if 
you  heard  a  report  which  could  either  be  construed  pro-  or  anti- 
American  in  reference  to  Vietnam,  your  construction  would  be  anti- 
American  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No  ;  I,  for  example,  heard  a  report 

Mr.  Watson.  Tell  us  something  good  that  America  has  done. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  This  is  not  good,  but  let  me  give  you  an  example. 

Mr.  Watson.  Tell  me  one  good  thing  that  we  have  done  over  there. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  That  is  pretty  hard.  You  are  asking  a  difficult  ques- 
tion. I  think  many  sincere  people  have  thought  they  were  doing  some- 
thing good  when  they  tried  to,  well 

Mr.  Watson.  You  can  think  offhand  of  nothing  good,  not  one  single 
good  thing? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  didn't  say  that.  I  think  many  people  have  gone 
over  there,  for  example,  to  bring  medical  aid.  I  know  people  personally 
who  have  done  educational  and  other  constructive  work  in  Vietnam. 
However,  as  in  the  well-known  case  of,  I  forget  his  name — anyway  a 
number  of  the  leading  people,  also  unknpwn  people,  have  gone  over 


2794  DISRUPTION  OF  196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

there  and  have  worked  for  a  few  months  and  a  few  years  in  the  Amer- 
ican aid  program  and  on  the  constructive  side  have  felt  in  the  end 
that  the  purpose  of  this  and  the  success  of  this  was  completely  defeated 
by  the,  first  of  all,  by  the  American  militarism  which  was  going  on  at 
the  same  time  and,  secondly,  because  of  the  fact  that  when  a  country  is 
trying  to  impose  its  will  upon  another  country,  then  even  the  good 
things  that  that  country  does  turn  to  ashes  in  the  people's  mouths. 

I  would  certainly  give  eveiy  credit  to  many,  many  individuals,  some 
of  whom  I  know  and  some  of  whom  I  don't,  who  have  gone  over  to 
Vietnam  with  that  kind  of  aim.  I  would  like  to  withdraw  all  Amer- 
ican troops  and  end  American  attempts  to  dominate  Vietnamese  life 
so  that  this  kind  of  constructive  relationship  could  take  place  between 
American  people  and  Vietnamese  people,  which  I  very  much  believe  in. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Del  linger,  are  you  not  the  author  of  the  introduc- 
tion to  Mr.  Burchett's  forthcoming  book  on  Vietna^  ? 

Mr.  Dbllinger.  Yes.  I  was  going  to  mention  that  earlier. 

Mr.  CoNiLEY.  Are  you  also  not  planning  to  address  a  rally  tonight, 
the  Guardian  rally  in  New  York  City,  with  Mr.  Burchett? 

Mr.  Delilinger.  Not  that  I  know  of.  I  was  earlier  asked  if  I  could 
come,  but  because  of  my  operation  I  indicated  that  I  did  not  expect 
to  be  able  to  come  there. 

I  did  expect  to  speak  with  Mr.  Burchett  at  a  conference  in  Montreal 
last  weekend.  I  also  had  to  cancel  out  on  that.  I  will  be  happy  to  appear 
on  any  platform  anywhere  with  Mr.  Burchett,  even  though  we  might 
have  differences  of  interpretation. 

Mr.  Conley.  May  I  suggest,  on  your  next  occasion  of  visiting  with 
him,  you  make  inquiry  about  the  question  I  put  to  you  about  the  Com- 
munist brainwashing  campaign  in  Korea  several  years  ago. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes. 

I  think  I  should  come  to  his  defense  a  little  bit  on  that,  because  I 
discussed  with  him  the  question  of  possible  Vietnamese  brainwash- 
ing of  Americans.  Firet  of  all,  I  became  assured,  insofar  as  it  was 
possible,  that  this  is  not  taking  place.  Also  that  the  prisoners  released 
have  made  this  pretty  clear — the  first  release  of  NLF  prisoners,  the  men 
were  whisked  away  to  Okinawa  and  kept  incommunicado  for  months 
and  had  not  been  released  until  they  had  been  threatened  and  in- 
timidated so  that  they  did  not  speak. 

From  these  conversations  with  Mr.  Burchett,  I  feel  convinced  that 
he  is  opposed  to  brainwashing  and  would  neither  support  it  nor  take 
part  in  it,  even  though  I  have  to  plead  ignorance  of  the  history  or 
the  information  that  has  been  adduced  on  both  sides  in  the  Korean 
war. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  moving  to  another  area,  the  participa- 
tion by  you  in  the  Bratishiva  conference,  I  wish  to  hand  to  you  at 
this  time  a  copy  of  a  letter.  It  is  addressed,  "Dear  friend."  It  is  dated 
August  22,  1967,  which  solicits  participation  in  a  conference  then 
scheduled  for  Prague. 

I  ask  you  to  advise  the  committee  as  to  the  identity  of  tlvose 
l^eople  to  whom  this  letter  was  sent. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  We  sent  out  a  number  of  communications.  Ap- 
parently this  went,  as  near  as  I  can  tell  from  the  way  it  reads  m 
the  context,  it  went  to  peoj^le  wlio  were  part  of  the  delegation.  I 
think  most  of  their  names  have  appeared.  Most  of  them  wrote  re- 


DISRUPTION  OF   19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2795 

ports  of  the  visit  when  they  came  back,  and  others  were  mentioned, 
I  remember,  in  Newstoeek  and  Time. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Would  you  identify  those  that  you  recall  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  really  can't  go  through  the  business  of,  because 
I  am  sure  it  would  be  incomplete  and,  as  I  have  indicated,  spotty. 
That  is  not  the  main  reason.  As  I  indicated  earlier,  I  myself  have 
received  deadly  bombs  and  grenades  through  the  mail,  which  only 
by  a  miracle  failed  to  kill  my  children,  who  got  the  mail. 

According  to  the  post  office  inspectors,  on  at  least  two  previous 
occasions,  bombs  which  were  intended  for  me  blew  up  in  the  post 
office  when  they  were  being  handled. 

It  is  that  delicate.  Yet  my  children  at  that  time  normally  picked  up 
the  mail  and  walked  a  mile  with  it  to  my  country  home.  It  was  by 
accident  I  picked  it  up  in  the  car,  and  it  is  a  miracle  when  I  opened 
it,  it  did  not  explode,  because  I  was  a  little  suspicious  and  opened  it 
cautiously. 

Under  those  circumstances,  I  refuse.  I  think  it  is  unwise  for  me  at 
this  point  to  name  people  who  met  with  the  NLF  and  the  Demo- 
cratic Republic  of  Vietnam  in  Bratislava.  To  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge, they  have  all  themselves  written  and  talked  about  this.  But  in 
case  there  is  anybody  who,  because  of  his  home  situation,  felt  that 
he  did  not  want  this  made  public  because  of  the  safety  of  his  family, 
I  certainly  don't  want  to  be  in  a  position  to  make  this  public. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  May  I  see  the  letter,  Mr.  Counsel  ? 

Are  you  going  to  have  other  questions  about  the  meeting  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  see  that  letter  for  one  moment? 

Before  we  leave  this  letter,  I  believe  you  did  acknowledge  that  you 
had  sent  this  letter  out,  but  you  would  not  divulge  the  names  of  the 
persons  to  whom  it  was  sent.  This  is  your  letter  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  photostat  runs  off  the  page.  I  think  my  name  is 
near  the  bottom,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Watson.  Yes ;  but  you  did  acknowledge  the  letter. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  looks  like  a  letter  that  I  sent  out,  I  certainly  send 
many  letters  of  that  kind. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  notice  item  5  in  this  letter  states  that  there  would  be 
a  limitation  of  44  pounds  for  luggage:  "however,  please  only  pack 
39  pounds,  saving  5  pounds  for  literature  to  take  to  the  Vietnamese." 

What  was  the  form  of  that  literature  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  would  vary;  but  naturally,  I  being  editor  of 
Liberation,  what  would  first  come  to  mind  would  be  that  we  would 
send  over  issues  of  Liberation. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  would  be  anti-American  literature? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  consider  Liberation  to  be  ant i- American.  I 
consider  the  House  Un-American  Activity  to  be  anti-American. 

There  are  two  Americas,  you  know.  I  think  I  speak  for  the  best 
interests  of  the  best  America. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Let  us  describe  the  type  of  literature  which  you  an- 
ticipated being  taken. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  type  ? 

Mr.  Ichord.  Yes. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  As  I  said.  Liberation  is  the  first  thing  that  comes 


2796  DISRUPTION  OF   1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

to  mind,  but  just  a  scattering  of  materials  of  various  kinds  that  could 
be  books  and  magazines,  weekly  publications. 

Yes,  I  would  bring  back  copies  of  the  Vietnam.  Courier;  and  I  would 
take  to  them  copies  of  Liberation^  Guardian,  who  knows,  maybe  an 
interesting  magazine  section  of  the  New  York  Times.  Anything  which 
would 

Mr.  Watson.  Anything  which  would  be  of  encouragement  to  the 
North  Vietnamese  would  be  included  in  that  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Not  necessarily,  because  I  don't  believe  in  encour- 
aging contrary  to  the  facts.  For  instance,  on  my  first  trip  to  Vietnam, 
I  have  been  so  brainwashed  by  the  American  press  that  I  thought  the 
Vietnamese  were  overemphasizing  the  value  to  them  of  the  demonstra- 
tions in  this  country.  One  of  the  things  I  had  in  mind  was  to  say  to 
them,  "Listen,  the  antiwar  movement  is  not  that  strong,  the  demon- 
strators are  not  all  that  big,  and  we  are  not  powerful  enough  to  stop 
the  war  in  the  United  States.  Don't  think  that  we  are." 

But  that  was  independent  of  whether  it  would  encourage  or  dis- 
courage. That  was  to  simply  tell  them  the  truth.  When  I  got  over 
there,  I  found  out  that  the  press  had  a  false  idea  of  the  emphasis. 

Since  that  time,  the  antiwar  sentiment  has  grown.  Now  it  is  the 
most  unpopular  war  in  American  history. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  this  suggests  to  me  that  of  this  reserve 
5  pounds  for  literature,  you  would  want  this  committee  to  believe  that 
a  j)art  was  to  be  some  proper  American  literature. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  truthful  literature,  which  I  consider  to  be  the 
most  proper  American  literature,  to  the  best  interest  of  America,  the 
proper  American  of  the  antiwar  movement,  who  does  not  want  our 
country  to  be  dragged  into  the  mud  and  to  be  a  war  criminal  and 
does  not  want  his  children  slaughtered. 

Mr.  Watson.  Basically,  it  would  be  that  type  literature  which 
would  be  of  encouragement  or  help  to  the  North  Vietnamese  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Well,  you  can  put  your  own  interpretation  on  it. 
As  I  say,  I  am  sure  we  included  Liberation.  I  am  sure  we  included  the 
Guardian.  I  am  sure  we  included  some  things  from  the  Neiv  York 
Times  i\\?it  might  be  of  interest  to  them. 

Mr.  Ichord.  Continue. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  believe  in  the  free  dissemination  of  ideas  and 
literature  everywhere,  including  ideas  that  I  disagree  with.  Nothing 
would  have  stopped  me  from  bringing  things  that  I  disagreed  with. 

Mr.  Watson.  At  your  meetings  do  you  distribute  proper  American 
positions  on  Vietnam?  Bo  you  distribute  leaflets 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  have  already  indicated  that  I  think  Mobilization 
represents  the  proper  American  position  on  Vietnam. 

Mr.  Watson.  Bo  you  distribute  literature  of  the  position  opposite 
to  yours? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  myself  take  the  position  that  if  somebody  comes 
up  and  distributes  anti-American  literature,  in  other  words,  literature 
supporting  the  war  in  Vietnam,  I  would  be  perfectly  happy  to  have 
them  do  that.  I  always  am  happy  for  people  to  hear  both  sides. 

On  a  number  of  occasions,  when  I  was  scheduled  to  debate  with 
representatives  of  the  State  Bepartment  or  of  the  Pentagon  or  various 
governmental  agencies,  they  pulled  out  when  they  learned  I  was  to 
be  the  opponent,  because  they  knew  I  had  been  to  Vietnam  and  had 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2797 

perhaps  more  facts  than  that  particular  individual  felt  competent 
to  deal  with.  On  other  occasions,  I  have  debated  such  people.  I  have 
always  believed  in  fair  preseiitation  on  both  sides,  including  sides 
whose  ideas  I  disagree  with. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  yourself  have  never  made  any  distribution  or 
you  yourself  have  never  articulated  the  position  opposite  to  that 
which  you  now  describe  as  "proper  American"  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  My  position  is  constantly  developing.  There  is  a 
certain  core  of  constancy  to  it,  but  it  is  constantly  developing. 

Mr.  Watson.  Hardening,  or  developing? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  think  it  is  becoming  more  militantly  anti-imperial- 
ist through  the  years,  but  I  don't  think  it  is  hardening ;  it  is  developing. 

Mr.  Watson.  Is  your  meaning  of  the  term  "more  militant"  the  same 
as  we  have  heard  described  by  some  of  the  other  witnesses,  or  should 
we  construe  that  in  the  normal  interpretation  of  more  militant  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  not  heard  the  other  witnesses.  I  have  tried  to 
make  my  own  position  clear.  I  have  tried  to  summarize  it  by  saying  a 
position  which  would  go  beyond  token  dissent  to  effective  changing  of 
policy. 

Mr.  Watson.  Militant  is  generally  described  as  the  opposite  of 
peaceful,  is  it  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Not  in  my  vocabulary.  I  certainly  do  not  mean  it 
that  way. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  do  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  I  am  a  nonviolent  militant. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  guess  that  is  just  like  being  a  Catholic-Jew. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  can  be  verbally  aggressive,  just  as  I  am  now  to  you. 
Congressman. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  let  us  abide  by  the  rules.  You  have  not 
been  called  to  testify.  We  have  gotten  along  very  well  today.  Let  us 
proceed  with  the  questioning. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  hand  you  now  what  is  captioned  "Pur- 
poses and  Proposed  Agenda  of  the  Prague  Conference,"  and  ask  you 
if  you  recognize  this  and  whether  you  did,  in  fact,  prepare  it. 

\  Witness  and  counsel  examine  document. ) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  read  this. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  The  question  was:  Did  you  prepare  it  and  do  you 
recognize  it  as  something  you  prepared  ? 

Mr,  Dellinger.  Yes,  I  imagine  I  did.  Some  of  the  wording  seems 
like  mine.  I  literally  cannot  remember  whether  I  worked  on  it  jointly 
with  somebody  else.  There  is  nothing  in  here  that  I  want  to  repudiate, 
but  I  don't  remember  whether  it  is  all  mine  or  not. 

You  only  have  one  copy  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir.  I  would  like  to  use  it  for  a  moment,  if  I  may. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  All  right.  Maybe  you  can  give  it  back  to  me  for  my 
response. 

Mr.  Conley.  Yes,  sir,  I  will  be  glad  to. 

In  this  particular  document,  Mr.  Dellinger,  appears  a  "POSSIBLE 
AGENDA."  I  read  from  that  agenda  the  proposed  topics : 

A.  The  Anti-War  Movement 

B.  The  Student  Movement 

C.  The  Civil  Rights  and  Black  Power  Movement 

D.  The  Labor  Movement 

21-706  O— 69— pt.  3 8 


2798  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

E.  American  Politics:  1968 

F.  Business  and  the  War 

G.  America's  Global  Situation. 

Are  these  basically  the  topics  which  were  the  proposed  or  possible 
agenda  for  that  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  it  makes  clear  in  here  that  the  Vietnamese 
were  preparing  a  proposed  agenda,  and  we  were  jjreparing  a  proposed 
agenda,  and  then  a  smaller  committee  would  meet  before  the  conference 
and  work  this  out  so  that  the  conference  would  hopefully  be  mutually 
satisfactory. 

This  was  a  proposed  agenda  which  I,  perhaps  working  with  others, 
drew  up,  first  of  all  for  the  reactions  of  the  American  delegates,  and 
after  those  were  taken  and  absorbed,  leading  to  whatever  changes  then 
would  be  presented  to  the  Vietnamese. 

I  can  assure  you  that,  unfortunately,  we  did  not  cover  adequately 
all  of  these  subjects.  The  time  was  too  short. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  you  acquainted  with  an  individual  by  the  name  of 
Steven  S.  Schwarzschild  ? 
Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Conley.  Now,  Mr.  Schwarzschild  has  apparently  done  some 
writing,  Mr.  Dellinger,  in  a  magazine  referred  to  as  DISSENT,  I 
believe,  and  has  indicated  in  this  magazine  that  he  attended  this  par- 
ticular conference. 

I  say  that  to  you  in  order  that  you  will  not  feel  like,  in  connection 
with  my  next  question,  that  you  are  identifying  someone  who  has  not 
been  already  publicly  identified. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Just  a  moment.  I  have  a  word  for  my  client. 
Mr,  IcHORD.  Give  the  counsel  time  to  confer  with  his  witness. 
(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  my  next  question  is:  Was  Steven 
Schwarzschild,  in  fact,  at  this  conference  held  in  Bratislava  between 
September  6  and  12, 1967  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  He  was  at  part  of  it.  He  was  in  very  great  personal 
conflict,  I  think,  over  this.  I  myself  had  luncheon  with  him  and  his 
family,  discussing  the  advisability  of  his  going.  He  was  under  a  lot  of 
pressure  from  some  members  of  his  family  about  going.  In  addition 
to  the  usual  concerns  that  families  might  have  about  that,  if  he  went, 
he  might  be  called  before  the  House  Un-American  Activities  Commit- 
tee or  otherwise  persecuted. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  think  you  have  been  persecuted  ? 
Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  you  have  been  very  fair  in  the  manner  of 
this.  I  think  a  lot  of  the  questions  have  no  legislative  purpose. 

Mr.  Ichord.  The  Chair  will  be  the  judge  of  those  questions,  if  and 
when  that  question  arises. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  it  is  clear  the  history  of  the  committee  is  that 
it  has  not  been  one  which  I  consider  honorable. 

I  think  one  realizes  that,  in  a  sense,  one  is  persecuted  just  by  being 
here,  because  it  takes  one  away  from  his  work  and  because  he  constantly 
runs  the  danger  of  being  cited  for  contempt  if  he  makes  any  slight 

wrong  step,  or  witnesses  whose  honesty  is  not  necessarily- 

Mr.  IciiORD.  The  Chair  will  assume  that  you  will  abide  by  your 
affirmation,  Mr.  Dellinger. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Anyway,  in  addition,  Steven  Schwarzschild  is  a 
rabbi,  and  this  was  shortly  after  the  death  of  an  American  in  Czecho- 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2799 

Slovakia  by  the  name  of  Jordan,  if  I  remember  correctly,  in  which  there 
were  overtones  of  anti-Semitism.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  emotion, 
both  Jewish  and  other  concerns,  over  this  whole  incident.  Steven 
Schwarzschild  was  very  much  torn  about  whether  he  should  go  or  not. 

I  encouraged  him  to  go,  on  the  line  I  have  always  taken  and  ex- 
pressed here.  I  thought  this  would  give  him  the  opportunity  to  express 
his  concerns,  including  about  Czechoslovakia  and  anti-Semitism,  and 
to  investigate. 

Anyway,  as  a  result  of  the  internal  conflict,  and  perhaps  due  to  the 
fact  he  was  trying  to  do  some  of  these  things,  I  think  Steven  Schwarz- 
schild attended  less  of  the  conference  than  anybody  else.  In  one  sense 
he  might  be  said  to  have  never  quite  participated ;  he  was  around  the 
edges  of  it. 

The  conference  did  not  take  place  in  Prague,  as  you  remember,  but 
in  Bratislava.  During  at  least  part  of  the  conference,  he  was  in  Prague 
instead  of  in  Bratislava. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  You  will  concede  with  me,  then,  that  he  was  at  least 
there  physically,  whether  he  participated  or  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  He  was  a  delegate  and  he  was  there  during  part  of 
it  and  he  participated  in  part  of  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Bearing  this  in  mind  and  referring  specifically  to  this 
magazine,  DISSENT,  the  January-February  1968  issue,  I  read  to 
you,  sir,  a  portion  of  an  article,  the  introduction  to  an  article  which 
he  wrote,  entitled  "The  New  Left  Meets  The  Real  Thing."  It  goes  as 
follows : 

During  their  visits  to  hanoi  David  Dellinger  (editor  of  Liberation),  Tom 
Hayden,  and  Nick  Egleston  (recent  chairman  of  SDS)  were  invited  to  gather  a 
group  of  about  40  American  radicals  in  order  to  arrange  a  meeting  with  a  group 
of  Vietnamese.  The  Americans  were  exi)ected  not  only  to  oppose  the  war  in  Viet- 
nam but  also  to  favor,  on  balance,  an  NLF  victory.  Such  a  group  did  in  fact  meet 
with  their  Vietnamese  counteri>arts  last  September  in  Bratislava,  Czechoslovakia. 
Their  hosts  were  the  Czechoslovak  and  Slovak  Peace  Committees  *  *  *. 

It  goes  on  into  who  defrayed  their  expenses,  and  so  forth. 

Sir,  is  this  a  fair  statement  by  Mr.  Schwarzschild,  that  "The 
Americans  were  expected  not  only  to  oppose  the  war  in  Vietnam 
but  also  to  favor,  on  balance,  an  NLF  victory"? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Without  meaning  to  reflect  on  Rabbi  Schwarz- 
schild's  honesty,  because  I  do  believe  he  is  an  honest  person,  I  would 
have  to  say  that  I  consider  this  to  be  an  inaccurate  summary. 

First  of  all,  Tom  Hayden  was  not  involved  in  meetings  in  Hanoi, 
which  originated  the  idea  or  made  plans  for  this  conference,  and 
his  error  at  this  point  is  indicative,  perhaps,  of  other  errors.  Sec- 
ondly, I  cannot  remember  or  recognize  discussion  at  any  point  that 
the  delegation  would  be  expected,  on  balance,  to  favor  an  NLF 
victory. 

If  you  look  at  the  agenda  we  drew  up  and  if  you  remember  my 
earlier  remarks  about  the  nature  of  this  group,  this  just  wasn't  in 
our  minds. 

The  very  presence  of  Rabbi  Schwarzschild,  who  was  not.  in  my 
mind,  for  all  my  respect  for  him,  I  would  not  consider  him  a  radical, 
and  for  a  number  of  the  other  people  I  should  indicate  that  fact. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  May  I  have  our  other  document  back? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes.  By  the  way,  in  there,  since  you  have  it,  I  won't 


2800  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

read  it  exactly,  but  it  stresses  about  we  expect  to  have  a  variety  of 
viewpoints  amongst  the  Americans,  a  variety  of  attitudes. 

I  would  like  it,  if  it  is  used,  Mr.  Chairman,  if  possible,  that  the 
entire  document  be  put  in  the  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Has  the  document  been  admitted  as  part  of  the  record  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  which  document  are  you  referring  to? 

We  will  offer  the  proposed  agenda. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  There  being  no  objection,  it  will  be  placed  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  simply  refer  the  reader  to  the  section  on  variety. 
It  was  expected  of  the  American  delegation. 

(Document  marked  "Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  4"  follows:) 

Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  4 
Purposes  and  Proposed  Agenda  of  the  Prague  Conference 

I.  The  Prague  Conference  is  intended  to  create  solidarity  and  mutual  under- 
standing between  revolutionaries  from  Vietnam  and  their  American  supporters 
who  are  trying  to  change  the  United  States.  The  Vietnamese  hoi>e  not  only  to 
create  this  climate  of  mutual  confidence,  but  to  take  back  a  clear  understand- 
ing of  the  United  States  based  on  i>ersonal  contact  with  radical  American  ac- 
tivists. The  American  organizers  of  the  conference  hoi^e  that  the  U.S.  delegates 
take  back  an  understanding  of  Vietnam  which  will  stimulate  the  guide  their 
work.  This  is  not  contemplated  as  a  meeting  where  good  wishes  are  expressed 
in  ritual  terms,  resolutions  are  passed,  debates  carried  on  over  the  current  line, 
etc.  The  significance  of  the  event  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  delegates  are  chosen 
not  on  the  basis  of  their  political  affiliations  with  a  particular  radical  organiza- 
tion, but  on  the  basis  of  their  proven  effectiveness  in  radical  activity.  We  are 
trying  to  create  an  internationai  solidarity  which  cuts  across  organizational  lines 
to  base  itself  on  contact  and  dialogue  among  many  active  people. 

II.  Each  American  delegate  must  have  considerable  basic  knowledge  about 
the  Vietnamese  revolution  and  American  reaction.  This  means  a  concrete  famil- 
iarity with :  a  history  of  the  nationalist,  religious  and  left-wing  movements  in 
Vietnam,  the  role  and  legacy  of  the  French,  dynamics  of  the  first  independence 
war,  the  Geneva  Agreements,  land  reform,  education  and  government  in  the 
North,  the  rise  of  insurgency  and  the  NLF  in  the  South,  the  stages  of  American 
involvement  since  1949,  the  state  of  the  war  (bombing,  ground  fighting,  "pa- 
cification," South  Vietnamese  political  crises),  and  the  solutions  proposed  by 
various  parties.  While  the  conference  is  not  intended  for  academic  experts,  it 
should  not  be  bogged  down  in  discussing  subjects  the  Americans  can  inform  them- 
selves of  at  home.  When  you  arrive  im  New  York  September  3,  you  will  receive 
bound  volumes  of  Vkt-Rcport  and  several  copies  of  a  Hanoi  publication.  Viet- 
namese Studies.  In  the  meantime  you  should  read :  Kahin  and  Lewis,  The  United 
States  in  Vietnam;  Burchett,  Vietnam  North  ;  Hayden  and  Lynd,  The  Other  Side. 

III.  Problems  of  people  relating  well  at  the  conference  are  crucial.  Tliere  will 
be  an  information  gap,  a  language  barrier,  and  a  profound  difference  in  experi- 
ences between  the  Americans  and  Vietnamese.  Achieving  communication  will  be 
a  major  task.  It  will  be  possible  only  if  the  American  delegation  itself  is  alert, 
informed,  and  sensitive.  Among  the  Americans  there  may  be  pressures,  disagree- 
ments, tensions.  Since  there  will  be  no  "official  spokesmen",  no  imposed  con- 
formity to  a  single  line,  the  Americans  will  have  to  discipline  themselves.  Every 
effort  must  be  made  to  struggle  through  this  experience  staying  together,  re- 
solving and  harmonizing  different  feelings  so  that  a  variety  of  ideas  are  set  forth 
to  the  Vietnamese  with  a  minimum  of  difficulty. 

IV.  All  these  problems  quite  clearly  arise  when  the  problem  of  an  agenda 
is  considered.  When  Dave,  Nick  and  the  Vietnamese  first  discussed  this  con- 
ference, the  exact  Agenda  was  left  open.  Since  that  time  word  was  received  from 
Hanoi  that  the  Vietnamese  are  preparing  with  great  interest,  but  we  have  no 
word  of  their  hopes  for  the  agenda.  It  can  be  assumed  that  they  will  arrive 
with  definite  ideas,  experts  on  a  variety  of  subjects,  and  probably  even  some 
working  papers.  If  at  all  possible  we  will  arrange  a  pre-conference  meeting  in 
I'rague  to  work  out  a  mutually  satisfactory  agenda.  In  the  meantime,  the 
American  delegation's  business  is  to  think  concretely  about  what  would  be  the 
most  useful  way  to  spend  the  week  in  Prague.  The  following  are  some  simply- 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2801 

written  notes  on  a  possible  agenda  to  be  thought  over  by  the  people  who  are 
considering  going.  Responses  are  requested  by  mail  or  phone,  and  probably  a 
discussion  of  the  agenda  can  be  held  at  our  get-together  September  3-^. 

POSSIBLE  AGENDA 

I.  Reports  and  Discussions:  Part  of  the  conference  time  will  be  spent  in  panel- 
style  or  individual  reports  to  the  whole  body,  part  of  the  time  in  smaller  work- 
shops. In  either  form,  the  subjects  of  discussion  will  be  the  same  or  very  similar, 
the  likely  difference  being  that  the  statements  to  the  whole  group  may  seem 
authoritative  and  general  while  the  smaller  discussions  will  produce  insights  into 
important  details.  The  American  delegation  will  have  a  first  responsibility  to 
report  in  depth  on  the  state  of  American  society  in  the  context  of  the  Vietnam  war. 
This  will  mean  written  or  carefully-prepared  oral  reports  on  something  like 
the  following : 

A.  The  Anti-War  Movement:  the  strands  of  draft  resistance,  civil  dis- 
obedience and  protest  marches,  electoral  action  for  peace,  community  organi- 
zation and  education  campaigns.  The  degree  and  kind  of  anti-war  activity 
among  different  social  groups  :  the  intellectuals  and  students,  the  Negro  com- 
munity, the  churches,  labor,  iwlitical  parties.  The  differences  in  approach 
among  different  movements :  the  relative  importance  of  disobedience,  educa- 
tion and  politics  in  achieving  change,  which  groups  use  "withdrawal,"  "nego- 
tiations now"  or  other  demands ;  the  role  of  moderate  opinion,  whether  the 
anti-war  issue  should  be  related  to  other  domestic  and  foreign  policy  ques- 
tions. A  careful  analysis  of  existing  organizations  or  groupings  and  their 
role  in  the  anti-war  movement. 

B.  The  Student  Movement:  in  addition  to  the  role  played  by  students  in 
the  anti-war  movement  itself,  a  thorough  analysis  should  be  presented  on 
students  as  a  social  force  in  America.  The  origins  and  developments  of  the 
student  movement  since  1959-60.  The  role  of  students  in  civil  rights,  edu- 
cational reform  and  other  issues.  The  numbers  of  students  actually  in- 
volved in  protest  activity.  Their  real  and  potential  significance  as  a  critical 
group  in  the  society. 

C.  The  Civil  Rights  and  Black  Power  Movement:  as  in  the  case  of  the 
student  movement,  this  subject  should  be  treated  not  only  as  part  of  the 
Vietnam  protest  but  as  an  independent  force  for  social  change  which  can 
be  examined  and  measured.  An  in-depth  analysis  of  the  rise  of  the.  civil  rights 
movement  in  1956,  the  involvement  of  students  in  direct  action  in  the  South, 
the  beginning  of  voter  registration  and  community  organization,  political 
experiments  in  Mississippi,  Alabama  and  Georgia,  nationalism  in  the  ghetto, 
rebellions  and  violence  from  1964-67.  employment  of  urban  guerrilla  war- 
fare, reaction  of  white  community,  government,  business.  How  does  this 
struggle  affect  the  U.S.  ability  to  fight  in  Vietnam? 

D.  The  Labor  Movement:  Not  because  it  is  involved  in  anti-war  protest, 
and  not  because  it  represents  a  positive  force  such  as  the  students  and 
Negroes,  but  because  of  its  importance  and  potential  in  our  view  and 
especially  in  the  view  of  the  Vietnamese,  the  labor  movement  should  be 
analysed  in  depth.  The  state  of  the  industrial  unions,  differences  between 
the  Reuther  and  Meany  wings  of  the  movement,  pres.sures  caused  by  in- 
flation, war  economy  and  Negro  revolt.  Must  there  be  organized  working 
class  protest  for  the  Vietnam  war  to  end?  What  are  the  real  prospects  for 
this  protest? 

E.  American  Politics:  1968:  an  analysis  of  the  spectrum  of  political  posi- 
tions being  staked  out  as  the  1968  elections  approach.  Explanation  of  the  dif- 
ferent economic,  ethnic  and  regional  factions  in  the  Democratic  and  Re- 
publican parties.  Identification  of  the  iK)sitions  and  prospects  for  Johnson, 
Romney,  Kennedy,  Reagan,  Nixon,  Rockefeller,  Percy,  other  Senate  "doves." 
How  meaningful  are  elections  as  guides  to  power  and  opinion  in  America? 
Does  it  matter  for  Vietnam  who  is  elected  Pre.sident  in  1968? 

F.  Business  and  the  War:  analysis  of  the  divisions  appearing  between 
different  sectors  of  the  business  community  over  the  war.  How  are  the  dif- 
ferent economic  judgements  expressed  in  national  politics?  Whose  economic 
interests  are  primarily  served  by  the  war?  Is  the  war  "healthy"  for  American 
business?  or  is  it  causing  deterioration  and  worsening  for  business  elites? 

G.  America's  Global  Situation:  What  are  the  military  and  para-militairy 
policies  of  the  U.S.  in  other  parts  of  the  world?  What  are  the  limits  on 
America's  ability  to  wage  counter-revolution  by  force?  Can  the  U.S.  meet 


2802  DISRUPTION  OF   196  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

the  challenge  of  "more  Vietnams  in  Latin  America?"  Can  the  U.S.  indef- 
initely expand  the  war  throughout  Southeast  Asia  and  into  China?  Is  the 
U.S.  suffering  on  diplomatic  fronts  in  Europe,  the  United  Nations,  the  Third 
World? 

II.  The  Americans  will  probably  want  to  hear  similar  reports  in  depth  about 
the  situation  as  the  Vietnamese  see  it.  Subjects  on  which  the  Vietnamese  are  most 
expert  would  include : 

A.  The  military  situation  in  the  South  and  North 

B.  Economic  and  social  situation 

C.  U.S.  war  crimes 

D.  Estimate  of  U.S.  military^iplomatic  intentions 
B.  Possible  scenarios  for  ending  the  war 

F.  Role  of  People's  Revolutionary  Party  (Communist)  in  NLF,  role  of 
other  groups 

G.  Position  on  interim  (coalition)  government,  elections  in  the  South,  irela- 
tions  with  the  North,  relations  with  other  "camps,"  relations  with  U.S. 
protest  movement  "after  the  war" 

H.  Analysis  of  world  situation,  revolutionary  strategies :  guerrilla  war, 
armed  propaganda,  self-defense,  labor  and  political  organization 

III.  Other  joint  activities  should  be  included  besides  discussions  and  reports. 
These  might  include  Vietnamese- Axnerican  speaking  appearances  before  Czech 
audiences  or  meetings  with  Czech,  East  European,  Russian,  Chinese  or  other 
groups  located  in  Prague.  Evenings  of  entertainment,  perhaps  sponsored  by  the 
Czechs,  would  also  be  useful.  The  showing  and  exchange  of  Vietnamese  and 
American  protest  films  could  be  done  as  well.  Tours  of  Prague  and  other  parts  of 
Czechoslovakia  might  be  included. 

IV.  Preparation  of  materials  beforehand  by  the  American  delegation  should 
be  i^equired.  Because  of  the  shortage  of  time,  it  probably  is  impossible  to 
prepare  adequate  working  papers  on  any  of  the  above  subjects  before  leaving. 
But  it  is  possible  to  pull  together  a  number  of  relevant  articles  and  books  which 
have  been  produced  in  the  last  several  months,  and  make  sure  these  get  into 
Vietnamese  hands.  It  also  is  possible  to  bring  films,  photographs  and  other 
paraphenalia  [sic]  from  America  in  which  the  Vietnamese  are  interested. 

These  are  some  of  the  proposed  ingredients  for  making  a  successful  conference. 
Detailed  arrangements  will  have  to  be  worked  out  on  the  six)t.  But  if  you  have 
any  general  comments  or  amendments  about  this  agenda-formula,  please  make 
them  right  away. 

SEE   YOU    ON    SEPTEMBER    3RD,    1967. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  For  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  believe  it  is  most 
important  that  this  be  in  the  record. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  It  has  already  been  admitted. 

Mr.  GuTMAN,  No.  This  is  another  point.  Rabbi  Steven  Schwarz- 
schild  is  a  client  of  mine  in  other  connections.  I  wish  the  record  to 
reflect  it  at  this  point. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  don't  know  what  materiality  it  has. 

Mr.  Watson.  So  far  as  you  know,  he  is  an  honorable,  honest  man? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  have  always  felt  so  and  would  continue  to  feel  so. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  Avould  not  deliberately  make  a  false  statement 
about  anyone  or  any  event  ? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  So  far  as  I  know.  Congressman  Watson,  neither  would 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Bellinger,  moving  on,  in  this  article  prepared  by 
Rabbi  Schwarzschild  appears  the  following,  which  I  would  like  to 
read  you  and  then  ask  a  question,  if  I  may  : 

Yet  out  of  these  quasi-official  reiwrts  no  "hard  news"  whatever  emerged. 
Even  someone  like  myself  who  knows  nothing  about  Vietnam  but  what  he 
reads  in  the  newspapers  and  in  a  few  supplementary  sources  heard  nothing 
that  I  had  not  known  beforehand.  It  was.  furthermore,  absolutely  impo.ssible, 
even  in  private  conversation,  to  break  through  the  oflicial  propaganda  line  to 
which  all  of  the  Vietnamese  rigorously  adhered.  This  was  esi)ecially  annoying 
since  the  Americans  had,  after  all,  been  selected  because  they  supported  the  cause 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2803 

of  their  Vietnamese  counterparts — and  yet  tliey  were  addressed  as  if  they  had  to 
be  indoctrinated  from  scratch  with  the  cnidesit  tools  of  persuasion.  *  *  * 

Mr.  Dellinger,  I  put  to  you,  sir :  Is  Rabbi  Schwarzschild's  observation 
as  to  the  way  the  group  was  treated  by  the  Vietnamese  an  accurate  one  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  I  Avould  not  consider  that  an  accurate  descrip- 
tion at  all. 

I  would  say  Mr.  Schwarzschild,  who  did  not  come  to  Bratislava  until 
late  and  who,  as  I  say,  was  somewhat  on  the  fringes  of  the  conference 
and  also  was,  I  would  feel,  internally  torn  and  under  great  pressure 
from  his  anti-Communist  associates,  was  probably  not  able  to  be  an 
objective  judge  at  that  point,  and  perhaps  himself  set  up  some  of  the 
barriers  that  existed  between  him  and  the  Vietnamese. 

I  have  found  that  with  all  political  groups  that  is  a  problem,  of  a 
tendency  toward  doctrinaire  positions.  I  found  that  the  Vietnamese, 
who  are  intensely  involved  in  the  defense  of  their  homeland  and  have 
suffered  incalculable  casualties,  have,  on  a  number  of  occasions  when 
I  have  been  present,  tended  to  start  off  with  a  rather,  what  should  I 
say,  a  rather  formal  presentation  of  the  official  Vietnamese  point  of 
view,  which  I,  on  a  number  of  occasions,  have  not  found  extremely 
helpful.  I  have  discussed  this  with  them  and  certainly  on  every  occasion 
when  I  have  been  present  I  try  to  get  beyond  this  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  considering  the  suspicions  which  they  are  almost  bound  to  have  of 
Americans,  considering  the  ability  of  committees  like  yours  and  the 
CIA  and  others  to  infiltrate  all  of  these  groups,  considering  the  very 
loose  procedures  that  we  had  for  incorporating  this  group,  I  can  see 
where  they  were  perhaps  a  little  standoffish  at  first. 

If  I  remember  correctly,  the  first  reports,  although  of  value,  were  a 
little  more  stereotyped  and  a  little  less  valuable  than  I  had  hoped.  But 
this  very  quickly  broke  down,  and  we  ate  in  the  same  dining  room  to- 
gether at  tables  that  sat  four,  most  of  them,  and  I  think  the  experience 
of  all  the  Americans  was  that  these  conversations  were  very  frank  and 
informal,  and  not  doctrinaire  and  not  propaganda. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  again  dealing  with  this  same  article 
and  again  dealing  with  this  conference  held  in  Czechoslovakia,  Rabbi 
Schwarzschild,  toward  the  end  of  this  article,  deals  with  what  he  de- 
scribed as  the  propaganda  films  on  guerrilla  tactics  exhibited  to  the 
Americans  by  an  NLF  military  expert. 

Apparently,  from  reading  the  article,  I  deduce  there  were  some  mo- 
tion picture  films  shown  of  guerrilla  tactics.  He  wrote  the  following, 
and  I  quote : 

The  most  one  can  say  of  these  methods  is  that  they  possibly  may  be  necessary,  if 
not  desirable,  in  defense  against  at  least  equally  brutal  and  politically  even  less 
justified  foreign  invaders.  One  might  even  be  prepared  to  go  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  Vietnamese  who  had  to  practice  them  might,  in  order  to  be  able  to  live 
with  themselves,  have  to  get  some  kind  of  personal  satisfaction  out  of  these 
tactics.  While  some  of  these  blood-curdling  tactics  were  being  described,  I  made 
it  my  busine.ss  not  to  look  at  the  siieaker  but  to  study  the  American  listeners.  I 
am  sorry  to  have  to  say  that,  with  the  exception  of  some  of  the  members  of 
pacifist,  especially  Quaker,  organizations  who  maintained  .straight  faces,  there 
was  nothing  but  approval  to  be  seen  in  any  facial  expressions,  and  there  were 
even  a  few  audible  chuckles.  So  far  as  I  know,  not  a  word  was  ever  said  about 
this  afterwards. 

Mr.   Dellinger,    were   you    present   at   these   events   which    Rabbi 

Schwarzschilcl  is  describing,  the  description  of  the  guerrilla  tactics? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  want  to  be  very  clear  about  this.  Obviously,  the 


2804  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

NLF  is  engaged  in  guerrilla  warfare  so,  obviously,  it  is  possible  that 
such  a  session  took  place.  But  as  you  read  this  my  jaw  dropped,  and 
I  have  been  searching  my  mind  and  my  memory  to  try  to  remember 
what  it  could  be  that  he  is  referring  to.  I  literally  cannot  remember 
any  such  occasion.  I  remember  reports  of  battles — as  I  say,  it  was  a 
military  report,  and  I  think  this  was  one  of  the  first  times  that  the 
Vietnamese  began  to  say  that  they  were  winning  the  war  or  had  won 
the  war  or  were  about  to  win  the  war.  I  don't  remember  any  such 
session.  I  do  remember  there  were  movies. 

As  I  remember  the  Vietnamese  movies,  they  showed  bombs  drop- 
ping; they  showed  peasants  being  rounded  up;  they  showed  peasants 
being  tortured,  kicked,  hit  wdth  guns,  dragged  behind  tanks,  American 
tanks,  this  kind  of  thing. 

Forgive  me  if  I  am  wrong. 

There  are  two  possibilities :  either  that  it  took  place  when  I  wasn't 
there,  or  that  it  didn't  take  place  and  this  is  a  somewhat  liberal  inter- 
pretation of  his  of  one  of  these  movies  or  of  the  descriptions  of 
battles. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  In  other  words,  you  are  saying  that  either  you  were 
not  there,  or  Rabbi  Schwarzschild  could  be  mistaken  in  what  he 
thought  he  saw  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  I  was  present  at  the 
entire  conference. 

There  w^ere  some  times  when  we  met  in  small  groups.  Perhaps  there 
was  one  small  group  he  attended  from  which  he  has  written  this 
description,  but  nothing  in  that  coincides  w4th  anything  of  my  own 
experience  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  going  to  offer  as  a  pait  of  the 
record  an  article  ["The  New  Left  Meets  the  Real  Thing"]  from  the 
magazine  DISSENT^  dated  January-February  1968. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  That  is  the  document  I  thought  I  had  a  while  ago, 
instead  of  the  agenda  document. 

There  being  no  objection,  it  will  be  admitted. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  May  I  make  a  comment  ? 

I  think  this  article  indicates  that  we  did,  in  fact,  have  a  variety 
of  people  there.  There  were  many  different  interpretations,  most  of 
them  quite  friendly,  believing  the  conference  was  very  valuable,  but 
sev^eral  of  them  registering  criticisms  of  dissatisfaction. 

It  is  the  opposite  of  the  hard-line  plot  approach. 

(Document  marked  "Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  5"  follows :) 


DISRUPTION  OF  1 9  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2805 

Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  5 
[.Dj£££«£— January-February  1968,  pp.  78-81] 

NOTEBOOK 


Stephen  S.  Schwarzschlld 

The  New  Left  Meets 
The  Real  Thing 


DURING  THEIR  visrrs  TO  HANOI  David  Del- 
linger  (editor  of  Liberation),  Tom  Hay- 
den,  and  Nick  Egleston  (recent  chairman  of 
SDS)  were  invited  to  gather  a  group  of  ribout 
40  American  radicals  in  order  to  arrange  a 
meeting  with  a  group  of  Vietnamese.  The 
Americans  were  expected  not  only  to  oppose 
the  war  in  Vietnam  but  also  to  favor,  on  bal- 
ance, an  NLF  victory.  Such  a  group  did  in 
fact  meet  with  their  Vietnamese  counterparts 
last  September  in  Bratislava,  Czechoslovakia. 
Their  hosts  were  the  Czechoslovak  and  Slovak 
Peace  Committees — though  it  should  be  made 
clear  that  the  American  participants  defrayed 
all  other  expenses  out  of  their  own  pockets 
or  through  their  respective  organizations  at 
home. 

Extremely  little,  if  anything,  that  is  new  or 
significant  emerged  from  the  meeting.  My  own 
opposition  to  the  American  war  in  Vietnam 
continues  to  be  as  complete  as  it  had  been 
before — 1  still  see  no  viable  alternative  to  a 
victory  of  the  Vietnamese  Communists  (all 
other  possible  alternatives  having  been  polarized 
out  of  existence  by  the  ruthless  American  war) 
and^refer  it  immeasurably  to  the  brutal  Ameri- 
can policy  now  being  pursued.  Ail  this,  how- 
ever, not  because  of  what  1  witnessed  in  Bra- 
tislava but  despite  it 

Apart  from  the  original  organizers,  the 
American  contingent  consisted  in  about  equal 
measure  of  a  few  religious  radicals  from  the 
American  Friends'  Service  Committee  (AFSC), 
other  Quakers,  the  Fellowship  of  RecoiKilia- 
tion  (FOR),  and  one  or  two  off-beat  clergy- 
men; young  academicians;  representatives  of 
the  Black  Power  movement;  young  community 
organizers  and  student  organizers  of  the  New 
Left;  a  few  writers,  most  of  them  associated 
with  Left  periodicals.  This  group,  in  which 
there  were  very  few  trained  political  technicians 
or  Vietnam  experts,  was  confronted  by  two 
Vietnamese  delegations  who  had  brought  along 
their  own  experts  in  all  areas  under  discussion 
and  their  own  translators.  It  soon  became  clear 
thal^  the  Vietnamese  were  from  very  high 
echelons.  At  least  one  of  them  mentioned  in 
passing  that  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  Viet- 
namese delegation  to  the  Geneva  Convention 
in  1954;  all  spoke  with  governmental  authority. 
They  were  highly  disciplined  and  in  their  way 
very  competent. 


The  contrast  between  the  two  groups  was 
striking.  The  Americans  represented  small  fac- 
tions— in  some  respects  at  odds  with  one  an- 
other— of  a  movement  on  the  outermost  peri- 
phery of  American  society — whereas  the  Viet- 
namese were  representatives  of  an  effective 
government  in  one  area  and  of  a  para-govern- 
ment in  another. 

The  first  day  of  the  conference  was  set  aside 
for  reports  from  the  Americans  about  the  strug- 
gle against  the  war  and  the  conditions  for  so- 
cial revolution  in  this  coimtry;  the  second  day 
for  reports  from  South  Vietnam;  the  third  for 
North  Vietnam;  the  remaining  time  for  smaller 
group  discussions  about  special  aspects  of  the 
Vietnam  situation.  The  American  reports  were 
multitudinous,  relatively  brief,  mostly  extem- 
poraneous, quite  subjective,  and  sometimes  in 
conflict  with  one  another.  The  Vietnamese  re- 
ports were  well-prepared.  Each  subject  was  as- 
signed to  a  single  expert.  These  reports  were 
often  written  out  and  mimeographed  before- 
hand and  extremely  lengthy.  (Madame  Binh, 
head  of  the  South  Vietnamese  delegation,  took 
all  of  one  afternoon  and  most  of  the  next 
morning  for  her  opening  statement.)  They  were 
clearly  formulated  as  quasi-official,  diplomatic 
documents. 

Yet  out  of  these  quasi-official  reports  no 
"hard  news"  whatever  emerged.  Even  some- 
one like  myself  who  knows  nothing  about  Viet- 
nam but  what  he  reads  in  the  newspapers  and 
in  a  few  supplementary  sources  heard  nothing 
that  I  had  not  known  beforehand.  It  was,  fur- 
thermore, absolutely  impossible,  even  in  private 
conversation,  to  break  through  the  official  pro- 
paganda line  to  which  all  of  the  Vietnamese 
rigorously  adhered.  This  was  especially  an- 
noying since  the  Americans  had,  after  all, 
been  selected  because  they  supported  the  cause 
of  their  Vietnamese  counterparts — and  yet  they 
were  addressed  as  if  they  had  to  be  indoctri- 
nated from  scratch  with  the  crudest  tools  of 
persuasion.  Two  evenings,  for  example,  were 
set  aside  for  a  series  of  North  and  South  Viet- 
namese propaganda  films  that  might  be  effec- 
tive with  Asian  or  African  peasants  but  sure- 
ly could  not  be  expected  to  be  persuasive  with 
an  even  slightly  sophisticated  group. 

Along  with  some  AFSC  and  FOR  people,  I 


2806  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 


Bellinger  Exhibit  No.  5 — Continued 

NOTEBOOK 


spent  a  long  afternoon  with  the  official  Bud- 
dhist representative  of  the  NLF.  We  pUed  him 
with  questions  about  reUgious  and  cultural 
trends  in  his  country,  "third  force"  personalities 
known  to  us,  and  the  facts  concerning  religious 
groups  In  his  organization.  It  was,  however, 
entirely  impossible  to  come  to  grips  with  such 
problems:  he  insisted,  first,  on  giving  us  what 
was  in  effect  a  two-hour  filibuster,  reviewing 
rudimentary  knowledge  and  views  obviously 
perfectly  familiar  to  us.  Anything  that  did  not 
fit  into  his  picture  was  either  disregarded,  con- 
demned as  treason  and  called  untypical  of  the 
Vietnamese  people,  or  treated  as  still  an  open 
question  that  could  be  answered  only  after  the 
Front  had  niled  upon  it. 

In  a  private  conversation,  1  probed  the  at- 
titude of  this  gentleman  and  that  of  the  head 
of  the  North  Vietnamese  lawyers'  guild  toward 
the  Roman  Catholic  church.  It  b  perfectly  ob- 
vious that  the  church  ii  virtually  identified  with 
the  American  cause  in  Vietnam.  To  admit  this, 
however,  would  be  tantamount  to  a  contradic- 
tion of  the  official  propaganda  line  that  "all 
of  the  Vietnamese  people"  are  arraigned  with 
the  NLF  and  that  theirs  is  a  "neutral,  popular 
front."  1  could  not,  therefore,  extract  an  anti- 
Roman-Catholic  opinion  from  either  of  them. 
Indeed,  the  Buddhist  representative  insisted 
that  a  Roman  Catholic  priest,  whom  he  named, 
was  a  member  of  the  NLF  Central  Committee. 
"Is  he  recognized  by  Rome?"  "Yes,  he  has 
been  ordained  by  a  bishop  and  officiates  at 
a  church."  "Is  he  still  recognized  by  Rome?" 
"Yes,  he  still  says  mass."  "Is  his  saying  of 
mass  still  recognized  by  official  Roman  Cath- 
olic authorities  as  licit?"  "Well" — this  after 
half-an-hour's  involved,  translated  give-and- 
take — "the  priest  is  right  now  temporarily  not 
recognized  by  the  Vatican." 

Several  sessions  were  devoted  to  explore  pos- 
sibilities of  dissuading  Americans  from  par- 
ticipating in  the  war.  The  prominent  role  of 
blbck  men  in  the  army  was  discussed.  One  of 
the  American  blacks  asked  the  relevant  ques- 
tion: how  many  black  soldiers  had  defected  to 
the  NLF?  It  took  a  long  time  to  explain  that 
question.  Finally,  the  answer  came  forth  that 
all  the  Vietnamese  present  were  from  the  North 
and  that  they,  therefore,  did  not  have  such 
information.  "Could  we  ask  some  people  from 
the  NLF?"  "Yea,  they'll  come  in  the  after- 


noon. 

In  the  afternoon  a^ain  much  time  was  spent 
in  making  the  question  clear.  Ultimately,  of 
course,  it  had  to  be  conceded  that  there  was  no 
record  of  Amencan  defections,  black  or  white. 
(On  the  other  hand,  the  numbers  of  South 
Vietnamese  defectors  are,  of  course,  vast — 
to  the  point  where  the  NLF  people  claim, 
with  considerable  credibility,  that  they  train 
some  of  their  officers  by  letting  them  be  in- 
ducted into  Ky's  army  and  having  them  in- 
structed under  U.S.  auspices.) 

As  FOR  Czechoslovakia,  the  situation  in  that 
country,  even  as  revealed  during  such  a  visit 
of  little  more  than  a  week,  struck  me  as  much 
more  oppressive  and  frightening  than  the  de- 
scriptions we  have  been  getting  in  the  press. 
At  the  very  beginning  i  had  heard  a  few  of 
(he  Americans  express  relief  at  finally  being  in 
a  "socialist"  country  and  no  volunteered  criti- 
cal observations.  1  feared,  therefore,  that  this 
representation  of  the  New  Left  was  buying  the 
Czech  party  line  completely.  As  the  week  drew 
on,  however,  my  initial  fear  turned  out  to  be 
unjustified.  With  no  exception  that  1  know  of, 
the  Americans  became  aware  of  the  mindless 
and  repressive  society  in  which  we  found  our- 
selves. At  least  within  the  confines  of  the 
American  caucus,  phrases  such  as  "fascist," 
"paranoiac,"  "get  out  of  here  with  my  life," 
"totalitarian,"  etc.  became  quite  frequent.  Yet, 
to  my  knowledge  at  least,  no  one  but  myself 
confronted  any  Czech  with  articulated  critic- 
ism. 

There  was,  however  a  considerable  afneunt 
of  nonverbal  criticism.  At  first,  the  Czechs 
tried  to  keep  us  together  in  supervised  places. 
But  American,  or  New  Left,  anarchy  soon  took 
over.  Many  of  us  dispersed  through  Bratislava 
in  so  many  directions  at  the  same  time  that 
it  would  have  been  extremely  difficult  to  keep 
track  of  all  of  us.  A  black  man,  a  minister, 
and  a  student  actually  conducted  a  flower- 
power  demonstration  off  the  central  square  of 
the  city.  Still,  in  discussing  possible  future  press 
relations,  the  Americans  stressed  that  one 
should  mute  one's  criticism  of  the  Czechs  in 
order  to  prevent  imdesirable  consequences  for 
the  Vietnamese  and  for  future  American-Viet- 
namese contacts — a  rather  eloquent  expression 
of  the  stance  of  New  Left  people  toward  Com- 


DISRUPTION  OF  1  9  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2807 


Dellinger  Exhibit  No.  5 — Continued 

NOTEBOOK 


munis  ts. 

This  is  precisely  the  main  point  about  the 
encounter  between  the  New  Left  and  the  icaJ 
Conununists  in  power.  The  question  ybetber 
criticism  of  the  Vietnamese  should  be  muted 
never  came  up.  It  was  apparently  assumed 
that  there  was  none.  Certainly,  none  wa*  ex- 
pressed. The  unspoken  premise  was  that  the 
Vietnamese  were  effectively  flffating  America 
as  it  is — and  "pas  tennemies  i  la  gauche  com- 
baiiante."  Newsweek  quoted  an  anonymous 
reporter  for  Ramparts  as  having  heard  Tom 
Hayden  exclaim:  "Now  we're  all  Vietcong." 
I  did  not  hear  such  an  announcement — but  this 
certainly  was  the  mood  of  the  gathering. 

There  were  some  nasty  manifestations  of  this 
total  identification  with  the  Vietnamese  Com- 
munists. The  NLF  military  expert  gave  a 
long  presentation  of  the  situation  in  the  field 
as  be  sasv  it  and  some  of  the  informal  and 
quite  brutal  guerrilla  tactics  that  had  to  be 
used  in  combating  the  American  aggressors. 
(This  had,  the  previous  evening,  been  illu- 
strated in  one  of  the  propaganda  films.)  The 
most  one  can  say  of  these  methods  is  that  they 
possibly  may  be  necessary,  if  not  desirable,  in 
defense  against  at  least  equally  brutal  and  poli- 
tically even  less  justified  foreign  invaders.  One 
might  even  be  prepared  to  go  so  far  as  to  say 
that  the  Vieuamese  who  had  to  practice  them 
might,  in  order  to  be  able  to  live  with  them- 
selves, have  to  get  some  lund  of  personal  satis- 
faction out  of  these  tactics.  While  some  of 
these  blood-curdling  tactics  were  being  de- 
scribed, I  made  it  my  business  not  to  look  at 
the  speaker  but  to  study  the  American  listeners. 
1  am  sorry  to  have  to  say  that,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  some  of  the  members  of  pacifist,  es- 
pecially Quaker,  organizations  who  maintained 
straight  faces,  there  was  nothing  but  approval 
to  be  seen  in  any  facial  expressions,  and  there 
were  even  a  few  audible  chuckles.  So  far  as  I 
know,  not  a  word  was  ever  said  about  this 
afterwards. 

The  American  reaction  to  the  Vietnamese 
ranged  all  the  way  from  calculated  political 
'^popular  frontism"  to  naive  to  wilfully  blind 
to  literally  sick  to  craven.  There  were,  no  doubt, 
some  who  actually  had  no  idea  of  what  a  Com- 
munist is.  There  were  surely  some  who  did 
not  want  to  know  and  regarded  every  enemy 
of  American  imperialism  as  a  comrade.  They 


inclined,  thus,  to  interpret  the  new  NLF 
program  as  if  it  were  an  "agrarian  reform"  do- 
cument. There  was  certainly  a  representation 
of  the  sick,  who  outraged  one  or  the  other 
Czech  puritan  Communist  by  talking,  mostly 
m  the  language  of  "shit,"  about  nonmarital  sex 
relations  and  the  abortions  of  girl  friends.  What 
most  of  the  Americans  had  in  common  was 
the  belief  that  anyone  who  batters  the  Ameri- 
can Establishment  effectively  makes  a  contribu- 
tion to  the  defeat  of  capitalist  imperialism  and 
he  may  not  be  criticized  in  any  way,  for  fear 
of  detracting  from  his  effectiveness. 

1,  for  one,  can  draw  only  one  ideological 
conclusion:  radicalism  at  this  point  can  consist 
only  of  a  radically  realistic  view  of  the  utterly 
hopeless  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves: 
American  capitalist  imperialism  is  flooding 
much  of  the  world  with  blood  and  vulgarity, 
while  neither  "coalition  politics,"  nor  "old-style 
socialism,"  nor  the  New  Left  have  any  rela- 
tionship to  the  real  world  or  hold  out  any  hope 
for  poliiical  effectiveness — and  "the  socialist 
blocs"  not  only  exhibit  no  significant  regaining 
of  humane  or  humanist  values  but  are,  in  fact, 
widening  the  destructive  circle.  Still,  because 
this  is  the  only  way  we  know  to  be  human,  we 
try  to  embody  and  to  advocate  radically  liber- 
tarian social  ideals. 


2808  DISRUPTION  OF  19  6  8  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  one  other  question  dealing  with  this 
particular  conference,  if  I  may. 

Did  you  have  occasion,  or  did  any  of  the  members  of  the  American 
delegation  have  occasion,  while  at  this  conference  to  be  presented  with 
a  ring  which  you  were  informed  had  been  made  from  a  part  of  an 
American  airplane  that  had  been  shot  down  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  consider  this  entirely  possible  because  the 
Vietnamese  make  combs  and  rings,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  from 
planes  that  have  been  shot  down. 

Mary  McCarthy  has  written  in  the  Ne\o  York  Revieio  of  Books 
about  being  tendered  such  a  ring  and  her  own  reluctance  to  wear  it. 
I  myself,  if  I  remember  correctly,  was  given  a  comb  and  a  ring  in 
Vietnam,  but  explained  that  I  was  not  interested  in  wearing  such  a 
ring. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  I  may,  sir,  I  have  another  article,  taken  from  WIN^ 
volume  III,  No.  17,  under  October  16,  1967,  captioned  "report  from 
BEATISLAVA,"  by  Eric  Weinberger,  which  would  indicate,  I  sup- 
pose, from  a  reading  of  it,  that  Mr.  Weinberger  was  also  at  this 
conference,  and  would  you  hesitate  to  identify  him? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  he  was  there. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  If  I  may,  sri',  put  to  you  this  question  from  this 
article.  In  this  article  Mr,  Weinberger  states  that,  prior  to  a  year  or 
two  before  his  article,  he  had  been  persuaded  and,  to  quote  him 
exactly,  "by  A.  J.  Muste  and  Dave  Dellinger,  to  come  off  it  on  the 
condemn- violence-on-both-sides-equally-bit." 

Do  you  recall  the  quotation  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  I  do  now,  and  that  is  my  position,  as  I 
indicated  yesterday,  that  the  violence  of  the  richest,  most  powerful 
nation  in  the  world  invading  a  little,  undeveloped  country  of  Asia 
should  not  be  compared  to  the  violence  used  in  self-defense  by  that 
country. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  As  I  understand  it,  sir,  Mr.  Weinberger,  up  until  you 
and  Mr.  Muste  were  able  to  prevail  on  him  to  come  off  of  it,  was 
taking  the  position  that  violence  was  wrong  on  both  sides,  or  was 
equally  wrong. 

As  I  understand  it,  is  it  your  position  as  a  pacifist  only  certain 
violence  is  wrong? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  We  have  discussed  this  at  great  length  here 
already.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  Vietnam,  the  traditional 
pacifist  tended  to  say,  "A  plague  on  both  your  houses,  we  are  against 
all  violence,  and  there  is  violence  being  used  on  both  sides." 

I  myself — just  as  I  believe  that  the  violence  of  George  Washington 
and  of  the  American  patriots  was  obviously  different  morally  and 
practically  from  the  violence  of  Adolf  Hitler  during  World  War  II — 
I  have  myself  made  distinctions  in  violence  without,  liowever,  advo- 
cating violence. 

It  was  not  hard  for  me,  I  guess — I  don't  remember  my  own  history 
in  relation  to  the  war  in  Vietnam,  but  it  was  not  hard  for  me  to  believe 
in  the  beginning  that  there  was  distinction  between  aggressive  violence 
of  the  United  States  and  the  violence  of  the  patriotic  forces  of  Viet- 
nam. I  certainly  wrote  this  and  said  tliis  on  many  occasions. 

Mr,  Conley,  In  connection  with  this  particular  conference,  I  want 
to  read  to  you  a  list  of  names,  and  will  rather  anticipate  your  answer, 
but  I  do  have  to  do  this,  sir,  for  the  record,  if  you  will  bear  with  me. 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2809 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Could  I  ask  you,  for  the  record,  if  you  might  con- 
sider whether  it  is  worth  reading  all  of  these  names,  in  case  there  are 
people  who  might  receive  the  kind  of  package  in  the  mail  that  I  have 
talked  about  i  Why  not  show  us  the  list  ? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Why  not  show  us  the  list,  and  then  ask  us  questions 
about  them  by  numbers  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  the  Chair  inquire.  Will  you  please  come  forward, 
Mr.  Counsel,  and  let  me  see  what  you  have  ? 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  my  question  is:  Were  the  following 
persons  present  at  this  conference  with  you:  Robert  L.  Allen,  Jr., 
Malcolm  Boyd,  Carol  D.  Brightman,  Reverend  John  Pairman  Brown, 
Bronson  Pettibone  Clark,  Robert  Merten  Cook,  Stoney  Cooks,  Ren- 
nard  Cordon  Davis,  David  Dellinger,  Elizabeth  P.  Dellinger,  Thorne 
Webb  Dreyer,  Nicholas  Egleson,  Richard  Flacks,  John  Ross  Flanagan, 
Norman  David  Fruchter,  Tom  Gardner,  Carol  Glassman,  Thomas 
Hayden,  Steven  E.  Halliwell,  Christopher  Jencks,  Walter  Russell 
Jolmson,  Carole  Yvonne  King,  Andrew  David  Kopkind,  Bob  Kramer, 
Carol  Cohen  McEldowney,  Leon  Morse,  Linda  Morse,  Raymond  A. 
Mungo,  Douglas  Craig  Norberg,  Vivian  Emma  Rothstein,  Steven  S. 
Schwarzschild,  Sol  Stern,  Dennis  Sweeney,  John  P.  Tillman,  Jr., 
Barbara  Webster,  Eric  Weinberger,  Henry  AVilliam  Werner,  John 
Augusta  Wilson,  Willie  T.  Wright,  and  Ron  Young? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  May  I  ask  the  legislative  purpose  of  this  question, 
Mr.  Chairman? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  wall  advise  the  counsel  that,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  this  was  a  meeting  with  the  North  Vietnamese  and  other 
allies,  friendly  nations  with  the  North  Vietnamese,  in  view  of  the 
purview  of  these  hearings  and  that  the  witness  w^as  a  leader  in  the 
Chicago  demonstration  and  he  has  so  testified,  that  it  is  a  pertinent 
question  and  within  the  subject  of  inquiry. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  I  fail  to  see  the  pertinency,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  These  are  individuals  who  attended  the  conference  with 
the  gentleman.  The  counsel  lias  advised  me  that  they  have  been  so 
identified  in  the  newspapers.  The  witness  was  there,  and  the  Chair  will 
have  to  rule  that  it  is  a  proper  question. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Mr.  Chairman,  since  you  have  just  stated^ 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  have  the  right  to  advise  with  your  witness  if  you 
desire,  but  you  haven't  been  called  to  testify,  Mr.  Gutman. 

Mr.  Gutman.  I  understand.  We  are  talking  on  the  question  of  rele- 
vancy. If  I  advise  him  on  the  question  what  to  say,  on  the  legal  point  of 
relevancy,  he  is  merely  going  to  have  to  parrot  what  I  suggest  to  him. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  think  we  will  have  to  abide  by  the  rules.  Go  ahead. 

You  will  be  given  time  to  confer  with  your  client. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  If  that  is  the  way  you  want  it. 

(Witness  confers  w^th  counsel.) 

Mr.  Dellinger.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  from  listening  care- 
fully to  the  list,  I  would  have  to  say  that,  no,  that  is  not  an  accurate 
list  of  the  people  who  attended  the  conference ;  definitely  not. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  the  people  named  attend  that  conference  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Some  of  the  people  named  did,  some  did  not.  Some 
of  the  names  appear  to  be  inaccurate  combinations. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Are  any  names  missing  who  attended  the  conference? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  not  any  idea.  As  you  read  off  those  names, 


2810  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

I  thought,  "Oh,  yes,  I  remember  him,  lie  was  there."  Other  names,  I 
thought,  "Who  is  he?  I  never  heard  of  him." 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  if  you  may  let  us  move  on  to  an  admin- 
istrative committee  meeting  of  the  National  Mobilization  Committee 
which  was  held  in  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  on  October  13  of  this 
year.  Was  there,  in  fact,  a  meeting  held  on  that  date  in  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts,  of  your  National  Mobilization  Committee? 

Mr,  Bellinger.  Is  that  a  Saturday  or  Sunday  ?  This  fall  there  was 
a  meeting  in  Cambridge.  That  is  undoubtedly  a  correct  date. 
Mr.  CoNLEY.  Did  you  attend  that  meeting  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  believe  I  attended  and  presided  at  that  meeting. 
Mr.  Conley.  All  right,  sir.  I  will  ask  you,  Mr.  Bellinger,  if  those 
attending  this  meeting  discussed  this  committee's  investigative  hear- 
ings, the  grand  jury  investigation  of  the  disturbances  in  Chicago,  and 
the  hearing  of  the  President's  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Preven- 
tion of  Violence  ? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes,  I  recollect  that  these  subjects  were  discussed 
there. 

I  would  like  to  point  out  that  one  of  the  concerns  expressed  was 
whether  or  not  some  of  the  people  present  would  be  indicted.  Since 
it  has  been  reported  in  the  newspapers  that  indictments  are  being 
prepared,  that  might  influence)  how  we  proceed  from  here,  because 
I  don't  want  to  say  anything  involving  people  indicted  or  about  to 
be  indicted. 

Mr.  Conley.  Again,  sir,  I  think  you  are  reading  more  into  the 
question  than  what  I  intended. 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  am  only  trying  to  communicate  and  establish  some 
understanding  here. 

Mr.  Conley.  Mr.  Bellinger,  was  it  decided  at  this  meeting  at  Cam- 
bridge that  in  view  of  these  activities,  that  is,  the  meeting  of  this 
committee,  the  grand  jury  investigation,  and  the  President's  Com- 
mission on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence,  that  the  persons 
involved  in  the  Chicago  disturbance,  the  demonstrators,  and  so  forth, 
should  be  urged  not  to  cooperate  with  any  request  received  for  an 
interview  by  the  FBI  or  any  other  investigative  agency  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  No,  this  was  not  the  decision.  There  were  a  number 
of  different  viewpoints  expressed.  Kennie  Bavis  and  I  reported  that 
we  had  already  had  an  interview  with  a  representative  of  the  sub- 
committee of  the  President's  Commission  on  Violence. 

Everybody  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  some  of  the  FBI  investiga- 
tion had  been  very  partial  and  unfair.  In  fact,  when  the  FBI  ap- 
proached me,  I  told  them  that  I  was  very  busy  and  asked  them  what 
the  purpose  was.  They  made  very  clear  to  me  that  the  purpose  of 
talking  to  me  was  to  find  out  if  I  knew  about  any  violations  of  law 
on  the  part  of  the  demonstrators,  but  it  was  clearly  demonstrated 
to  me  that  they  were  not  interested  in  any  violations  of  law  by  any- 
body other  than  demonstrators. 

I  reported  this  fact  at  the  meeting.  It  was  a  very  complicated  dis- 
cussion, in  which  there  were  probably  four  or  five  points  of  view,  as 
to  some  advocating  virtually  total  cooperation,  because  the  truth  was 
certainly  in  our  favor  and  we  had  nothing  to  hide;  some  people  advo- 
cating virtual  noncooperation,  because  whatever  we  said  might  be 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2811 

twisted  and  distorted  and  used  against  us  unfairly  or  used  to  involve 
other  people ;  and  there  were  a  variety  of  positions  in  between. 

If  my  memory  is  correct,  a  subcommittee,  of  which  I  was  a  member, 
was  instructed  to  work  with  the  legal  committee  and  to  get  out  a 
memorandum  discussing  the  various  dangers  and  difficulties,  but  not 
taking  a  hard  line  as  to  whether  people  should  speak  or  not. 

As  I  say,  we  are  not  a  talk-down  organization.  We  are  hetero- 
geneous and  under  no  circumstances  would  we  issue  too  hard  a  line 
anyway.  But  I  think  we  did  w^ant  people  to  be  aware  of  what  hap- 
pened in  a  number  of  FBI  interviews  and  also  to  be  aware  of  what 
their  rights  were ;  that  they  had  the  right  to  refuse  to  testify  if  they 
wanted  to. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Was  it  not  also  decided  at  this  meeting  in  Cambridge 
that  the  minutes  of  all  future  administrative  committee  meetings  would 
continue  to  list  those  in  attendance,  but  would  leave  out  home  addresses, 
and  while  they  would  summarize  issues  and  decisions,  they  would  not 
attribute  specific  remarks  to  specific  individuals? 

(Witness  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  think  it  is  very  important  for  me  to  point  out  here 
that  I  consider  this  to  be  an  example  of  the  kind  of  illegal  persecution 
that  I  have  referred  to,  that  unfortunately  has  too  often  characterized 
the  history  of  this  committee. 

This  was  a  private  meeting,  protected  under  the  first  and  fourth 
amendments  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  as  if  you  were  to  get  me  up  here 
and  to  say,  "Did  you  vote  for  so-and-so  in  your  secret  ballot?" 

I  think  that  would  be  an  obvious  intrusion. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Nobody  has  put  that  question  to  you. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  You  haA  e  asked  about  decisions  and  statements  of  a 
private  meeting,  which  is  protected  by  the  first  and  fourth  amend- 
ments. I  consider  this  a  violation  of  privacy. 

Now,  having  registered  that  objection  and  used  that  as  an  example 
of  the  type  of  thing  to  which  I  object  in  this  committee,  I  will  proceed 
to  answer  the  question,  or  at  least  in  a  way  that  will  not  involve  other 
people.  But  I  will  volunteer  the  information,  although  I  think  you 
don't  have  the  right  to  ask  it. 

Mr.  CoxLEY.  Mr.  Dellinger,  isn't  it  a  fact  that  you  yourself  actually 
gave  the  report  to  this  Cambridge  meeting  on  this  committee's  investi- 
gation ?  Are  you  not  the  one  that  actually  made  the  report  ? 

Mr.  Dellixger.  That  is  quite  possible.'lf  I  did,  I  am  sure  that  others 
supplemented  it.  It  was  not  a  very  flattering  report.  I  remember  using 
the  example  that  you  tried  to  connect  people  back  to  Lee  Harvey 
Oswald,  to  the  Rosenbergs,  to  people  out  of  the  1930's,  and  make  con- 
nections that  one  of  our  representatives  in  Chicago  had  an  office  which 
was  in  a  building  which  belonged  to  somebody  who  had  run  for  office 
as  a  Communist,  if  I  remember  correctly,  in  1941.  Maybe  it  was  1945. 

I  said  that  while  I  was  listening  to  this  in  the  audience  I  had  the 
feeling,  and  of  couree  my  name  was  brought  into  this,  that  I  was  being 
analyzed  to  see  if  I  was  I/32  J®w,  or  %4  Jew,  or  1/128  J^w. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Some  of  the  testimony  does  get  far  afield,  just  as  your 
testimony  making  Lee  Harvey  Oswald  a  pretty  good  guy,  as  well  as 
somebody  else. 

Mr.  Dellixger.  No.  I  say  there  was  testimony  attempting  to  link  us 
to  Lee  Harvey  Oswald,  that  someone  he  approached  to  be  an  attorney 


2812  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

had  also  been  an  attorney  for  somebody  in  the  movement.  If  one  took 
a  lawyer  and  followed  him  through  all  his  clients  and  tried  to  associate 
each  person  with  the  other  people  he  had  defended,  I  think  it  would 
be  as  ludicrous  as  this  example  I  am  giving  of  the  committee's  work 
in  October. 

If  I  remember  correctly,  I  reported  that  kind  of  thing  to  the  Mobili- 
zation administrative  committee.  If  I  didn't,  I  was  delinquent  in  my 
duty. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  call  to  your  attention  that  perhaps  your  memory 
does  not  serve  you  well.  Yesterday  it  was  you,  not  us,  that  brought  up 
the  name  Lee  Harvey  Oswald.  I  believe  it  w^as  you. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  possible  I  did,  in  this  connection. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  I  think  we  were  talking  about  Malcolm  X. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Let  us  get  back  on  the  subject  of  the  inquiry,  Mr. 
Counsel. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  you  brought  up  the 
question  of  the  assassination  of  Malcolm  X. 

Although  I  w^ondered  wdiat  the  pertinency  was  to  your  inquiry,  I 
certainly  did  express  my  opinion  on  some  of  the  assassinations,  in- 
cluding raising  some  questions  about  the  way  the  assassination  of  one 
of  our  Presidents  was  handled. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Sometimes  the  exchanges  have  been  quite  free,  Mr. 
Dellinger. 

Let  us  proceed,  Mr.  Counsel. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  Mr,  Dellinger,  I  put  to  you  this  question :  Since  the 
meeting  in  Cambridge  on  October  13,  isn't  it  true  that  the  Mobiliza- 
tion Committee  has  made  a  mailing  of  a  "Dear  Friend''  letter,  bring- 
ing attention  to  the  various  investigations  of  your  Chicago  demonstra- 
tion and  advising  that  any — I  use  the  quote  from  the  letter — "any 
further  cooperation,"  that  is,  wnth  investigating  agencies — 

runs  the  risk  of  lending  a  legitimacy  to  governmental  abuse  of  investigatory 
power  for  the  purpose  of  harrassing  [sic],  intimidating,  and  repressing  political 
opposition.  *  *  *  our  experience  has  shown  that  any  interview,  given  in  the 
best  of  faith  to  the  most  liberal  minded  body,  can  find  its  way  into  the  hands 
of  prosecuting  attorneys,  FBI  files  and  Huac  smear  campaigns. 

*  *  *  *  il!  If  t 

We  bring  this  matter  to  your  attention  as  a  matter  of  urgency.  *  *  *  hun- 
dreds of  people  have  already  been  asked  for  interviews  by  FBI  agents.  Since 
there  is  no  obligation  to  grant  any  interviews  or  give  any  testimony  unless  a 
subpoena  has  been  served,  most  people  refuse  these  requests.  We  support  those 
who  select  this  course  of  non-cooperation.  If  you  are  approached  b.v  any  in- 
vestigatory agency  please  keep  us  informed  and  feel  free  to  discuss  with  us  the 
manner  in  which  you  intend  to  resx)ond. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Is  that  the  entire  document  ? 

Mr.  Conley.  Is  that  a  fair  reading  of  those  portions  of  that  docu- 
ment ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Counsel,  the  Chair  can't  see  the  pertinency  of  that 
question.  Let  us  ofo  on  to  something  else. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Mr.  Chairman,  you  requested  we  close  at  4.  I  wonder 
if  we  are  going  to  make  it. 

Mr.  CoNLEY.  That  concludes  our  questions,  sir. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  thought  you  had  one  other  question  you  wanted  to  ask. 

Mr.  Watson,  do  you  have  any  questions  ? 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2813 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Does  the  missing  question  begin,  "Are  you  now,  or 
have  you  ever  been" 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Counsel  will  be  in  order. 

Mr.  Dellingek.  Mr.  Chairman,  while  he  is  thinking,  could  I  make 
a  comment  relevant  to  that  area  ? 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  mean  you  want  to  answer  the  question  when  I  ruled 
the  question  out  of  order  ? 

Mr.  Dellingee.  Well,  I  won't  go  into  the  document  because  that 
would  take  time  to  study  it,  and  I  am  not  sure,  it  did  not  appear  to  be 
signed 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  saw  no  purpose. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  want  to  tell  one  thing  from  my  own  experience, 
that  when  I  agreed  to  make  a  lengthy  tape  for  the  subcommittee  in- 
vestigating the  Chicago  disorder,  the  subcommission  of  the  President's 
Commission  on  Violence,  I  was  told  that  it  was — absolutely  none  of 
that  material  would  be  turned  over  to  the  grand  jury  or  to  any  other 
body,  including  HUAC. 

Now,  I  heard  on  television  last  night  an  interview  with  the  judge 
presiding  over  the  grand  jury  investigation  in  Illinois,  who  said  that 
he  was  anxious  to  see  the  material  on  which  the  report  was  based.  And 
the  impression  I  got  from  the  then  response  of  Chairman  Walker  was 
that  this  material  would  be  made  available  if  requested. 

Now,  I  give  this  as  an  example  of  the  kind  of  problem  that  people 
face. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  will  state  that  the  Chair  has  no  juris- 
diction whatsoever  over  the  Presidential  Riot  Commission  or  the 
grand  jury  proceedings  in  Chicago. 

As  I  stated  at  the  outset  of  the  hearing,  we  were  not  interested  in 
the  grand  jury  proceeding.  We  were  interested  in  proceeding  to  search 
out  the  facts,  look  into  the  charges  that  have  been  made  relative  to 
subversives  participating  in  the  organization,  in  the  planning,  of  the 
riots  and  what  connections  the  leaders  had  with  foreign  powers. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  Chair  to  keep  the  hearings  in  these  bounds.  That 
is  the  way  I  interpret  my  duty  as  chairman. 

I  have  no  jurisdiction  over  Mr.  Walker  or  the  judge  in  Chicago  or 
any  of  the  commissions.  They  are  separate,  distinct  arms  of  Govern- 
ment. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  simply  trying  to  indicate  any  additional  rea- 
son for  my  reluctance  to  mention  the  names  or  affairs  of  other  people 
who  might  then  proceed  on  to  some  other  body  which  might  use  them 
additionally  and  m  a  negative  way. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Mr.  Watson. 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Dellinger,  I  am  interested  in  the  article  that  was 
written  by  Rabbi  Schwarzschild,  a  friend  of  yours  and  a  friend  of 
your  good  counsel  there.  Obviously  the  article  or  the  author,  either 
or  both,  were  considered  reliable  enough  that  they  would  be  included 
in  the  publication  DISSENT,  which  I  assume  would  be  one  fairly 
recognized  by  the  left  movement. 

Is  that  not  a  correct  statement  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  First  of  all,  Rabbi  Schwarzschild  is  not  an  intimate 
friend  of  mine.  I  have  had  very  limited  contact  with  him,  but  I  indi- 
cated, you  know,  my  positive  response. 

Secondly,  there  are  many  variations  within  the  left,  and  I  think, 

21-70&— 69— pt.  3 9 


2814  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

if  you  want  my  own  opinion,  DISSENT  has  been  a  little  bit  sick  with 
anticommunism.  It  has  many  valuable  articles  in  it ;  but  a  lot  of  peo- 
ple are  intellectuals  who  I  think  have  been  victimized  by  the  cold  war 
and  perhaps  in  some  cases,  because  of  the  positions  that  they  hold  and 
the  respectability  that  they  covet — I  am  sorry  to  be  imputing  motiva- 
tion— but  for  a  variety  of  reasons  really  have  been  very  wrong  in  the 
things  they  write.  At  least  I  very  much  disagree  with  the  kind  of  viru- 
lent anticommunism  which  seeps  into  DISSENT  magazine  and  always 
the  lofty  and  patronizing  attitude  towards  young  people,  who  may 
not  be  able  to  write  as  well  as  some  of  the  editors  of  DISSENT^  but 
who  very  often  are  closer  to  the  struggle  for  social  justice  and  human 
liberation. 

Mr.  Watson.  We  still  get  back  to  the  basic  proposition,  as  you  stated 
earlier,  that  certainly  Rabbi  Schwarzschild  would  not  deliberately 
distort  the  truth. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes,  that  is  my  estimate. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  disagree  with  him  because  he  does  not  take  your 
exact  line,  and  naturally  you  would  be  in  disagreement,  but  in  his 
article  he  makes  the  statement,  on  page  80,  that  a  reporter  for  Ram- 
parts— again,  RaTuparts  is  not  necessarily  a  rightwmg  publication, 
is  it? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  not  a  right  wing  magazine. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  is  considered  a  left  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  not  part  of  the  Mobilization  Committee. 

Mr.  Watson.  But  it  would  be  considered  farther  left  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger,  I  really  dont  want  to  get  into  the  business  of  rank- 
ing the  various  magazines  and  expressing  my  areas  of  agreement 
and  disagreement  with  them,  although  I  did  partially  in  the  case  of 
DISSENT. 

Mr.  Watson.  This  statement  is  attributed  by  a  reporter  for  Ram- 
parts to  Tom  Hayden,  and  this  occurred  at  the  conference  in  Czecho- 
slovakia: "Now  we're  all  Vietcong."  The  rabbi  was  fair  enough  to. 
say,  "I  did  not  hear  such  an  announcement — but  this  certainly  was 
the  mood  of  the  gathering." 

Is  that  a  fair  statement  ?  And  j'ou  were  there. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No,  that  is  not  a  fair  statement.  That  is  a  single  sen- 
tence torn  out  of  context  and  not  giving  at  all  an  accurate  impression 
of  either  the  general  nature  of  the  conference  or  even  of  that  particu- 
lar scene. 

Mr.  Watson.  Here  is  another  article,  written  by  Ray  Mungo,  who 
I  understand  was  at  the  conference,  in  THE  east  village  OTHER 
magazine,  and  I  believe  this  is  headed  up  "LIBERATION  News 
Service."  I  believe  you  said  you  are  editor  of  that. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No.  I  am  editor  of  Liberation  magazine.  LIBERA- 
TION News  Service  is  an  independent  news-gathering  agency  with 
which  I  have  no  connection. 

Mr.  Watson.  Ray  Mungo  is  listed  as  the  writer  or  author  of  this 
article.  He  makes  this  statement : 

"Lyndon  Johnson  will  have  a  nightmare  when  he  hears  about  this  meeting," 
*  *  *.  "He  will  have  a  nightmare  because  he  has  sent  500,000  men  to  your  land 
to  find  the  Vietcong." 

"We  will  tell  him  he'd  better  leave  some  men  at  home.  Because,  like  Spartacus, 
whose  fellow  slaves  in  Rome  protected  his  hiding-place  by  each  claiming  to  be 
Spartacus  himself,  I  am  the  Vietcong.  We  are  everywhere!  We  are  all  the 
Vietcong !" 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2815 

Is  Mr.  Mungo  wrong  in  that  statement  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  That  still  is  incomplete,  but  it  is  a  much  more  ac- 
curate presentation  than  the  earlier  one,  because  it  gives  some  of  the 
context.  I  think  President  Johnson  did  have  a  nightmare  when  he 
thought  about  rumiing  for  the  Presidency  agam,  against  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  antiwar  movement. 

For  myself,  although  I  did  not  make  that  statement,  just  as  I  ap- 
preciate the  people  in  England  at  the  time  of  George  III  who  stood 
for  the  independence  of  the  American  Colonies  and  tried  to  pressure 
England  to  withdraw  its  colonial  aspirations  from  the  Colonies,  and 
there  is  a  certain  solidarity  between  them  and  the  forces  of  George 
Washington  in  the  same  way  there  is  an  obvious  solidarity  amongst 
some  of  the  people  opposed  to  the  war  and  the  people  who  were  fighting 
for  their  independence. 

It  was  in  that  direction  that  I  believe  the  incident  was  moving, 
although  Mr.  Hayden  is  perfectly  capable  of  speaking  for  himself. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  right. 

So  that  the  record  might  be  clear,  I  may  have  attributed  that  quota- 
tion to  Mun^o.  Mungo  was  the  author  or  the  writer,  and  he  was  sup- 
posedly quoting  Mr.  Hayden. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Right. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  agree  in  substance  that  that  was  correct  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Again,  it  is  a  summary  of  a  long  and  complex  state- 
ment of  Mr.  Hayden's.  It  tells  more  of  the  truth  than  the  earlier  arti- 
cle. If  you  are  really  interested  in  what  Mr.  Hayden's  views  are  on 
that,  I  guess  you  would  have  to  a^sk  him. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  brought  up  the  matter  of  the  Presidency.  Obvi- 
ously, President  Johnson  did  have  a  nightmare. 

Of  course,  I  am  a  Republican.  I  am  not  privy  to  the  motivations  of 
the  Democrats,  but  did  we  have  a  peace  candidate  in  this  past  elec- 
tion who  espoused  the  general  line  of  your  position  ?  Did  we  not  have 
one? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  important  thing 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  a  simple  question.  Did  we  have  one  or  not? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  did  not  vote  in  the  past  election. 

Mr.  Watson.  I  am  not  asking  you  whether  you  voted,  how  you  voted, 
or  anything  else. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  did  not  support  the  candidacy 

Mr.  Watson.  Did  we  not  have  a  peace  candidate  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  There  were  a  number  of  people  who  ran  on  their 
own  interpretation  of  a  peace  candidacy. 

Mr.  Watson.  They  certainly  espoused  your  philosophy  and  your 
position  completely,  did  they  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  am  not  able  to  answer  that  question  intelligently. 

Mr.  Watson.  You  know  Eldridge  Cleaver,  don't  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  There  were  a  number  of  people  running,  including 
Eldridge  Cleaver  and  Dick  Gregory,  at  least,  who  came  closer  to 
my  views  in  relation  to  the  war  in  Vietnam  than  other  candidates. 
But  I  never  conferred  with  any  of  them  about  their  platform;  I  never 
studied  their  platforms  at  length.  I  would  be  unable  to  say  in  what 
areas  I  disagreed  or  agreed  with  their  platform,  because  I  was  not 
interested  in  their  candidacy. 

Mr.  Watson.  Their  platform  and  their  position,  as  you  say,  were 
certainly  far  closer  to  your  position  than  any  other  candidate. 


2816  DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Than  that  of  George  Wallace,  Richard  Nixon,  or 
Hubert  Humphrey. 

Mr.  Watson.  Fine. 

In  one  of  the  flyers  that  your  National  Mobilization  Committee 
circulated  in  Chicago,  it  is  headed  up,  "Let  the  People  Speak,"  at 
the  bottom,  again,  "Let  the  People  Be  Heard." 

It  starts  out  in  bold  letters,  The  majority  of  the  American  people 
want  the  United  States  to  stop  the  bombing  and  get  out  of 
Vietnam.  *  *  *" 

That  is  your  contention. 

How  did  those  who  espoused  your  philosophy  fare  in  the  last 
-election  ? 

You  contended  there  that  the  majority  of  the  American  people 
•espoused  your  position.  How  did  your  candidates  fare  in  the  last 
election  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  First  of  all,  I  explained  that  I  had  no  candidate 
and  the  Mobilization  had  no  candidate. 

Mr.  Watson.  The  ones  who  came  closest  to  espousing  your  position, 
how  did  they  fare  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Mr.  Watson,  you  see,  if  we  are  running  a  foot  race 
and  you  are  holding  a  chess  contest,  and  you  ask  me  how  did  your 
candidates  make  out  in  the  chess  contest,  I  have  no  way  of  answering. 

Mr.  Watson.  This  is  a  political  contest. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes ;  and  in  my  conception  of  politics,  we  are  trying 
to  organize  the  American  people  and  encourage  them  to  take  grass- 
roots, democratic  action  to  develop  popular  forces  of  resistance  and 
popular  forces  which  will  incorporate  the  kind  of  ideas  and  attitudes 
that  we  favor  in  counterinstitutions  today. 

It  is  a  whole  program,  but  relying  on  the  people,  rather  than  relying 
on  the  present  kind  of  fraudulent  elections,  in  which  the  candidacies 
are  rigged,  the  conventions  are  rigged,  and  in  which  it  is  necessary  to 
be  a  millionaire  or  to  have  access  to  millions  of  dollars  in  order  to  get 
the  organization  and  the  coverage  on  TV  in  order  to  run.  I  consider 
the  last  election  to  have  been  a  denial  of  democracy.  The  American 
people  were  given  no  opportunity  to  vote  on  the  issues  or  to  have — 
well,  I  will  leave  it  at  that,  to  vote  on  the  issues. 

Mr.  Watson.  Since  you  contend  this  was  a  fraudulent  election, 
what,  under  your  standards,  would  be  a  so-called  democratic  election  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  The  first  thing  that  I  think  would  have  to  happen 
is  that  we  have  to  have 

Mr.  Watson.  Get  rid  of  people  like  me  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  No;  I  made  very  clear  that  I  would  be  happy  if 
there  was  some  kind  of  honorable  and  useful  work  which  you  could 
perform.  I  would  be  happy  for  you. 

Mr.  Watson.  At  least  you  give  us  credit  for  making  one  honorable 
attempt  by  giving  you  an  opportunity  to  articulate  your  position  be- 
fore this  committee.  Have  you  ever  thought  about  that?  But  go  ahead. 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think,  as  I  indicated  earlier,  that  political  democ- 
racy really  cannot  function  effectively  and  properly  in  a  society  which 
does  not  have  economic  democracy,  a  society  in  which  the  public  air- 
waves, for  instance,  are  owned  by  millionaire  corporations  and  are  sold 
at  exorbitant  prices — the  use  of  the  airwaves  sold  at  exorbitant  prices 


DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2817 

which  are  beyond  the  capacity  of  ordinary  poor  people,  black  people, 
and  other  minority  groups.  That  is  only  one  instance. 

I  don't  remember  exactly,  but  I  remember,  I  think,  the  acknowledged 
election  expenses  of  Mr.  Nixon  or  Mr.  Humphrey  was  $12  million. 

It  is  clear  that  some  method  has  to  be  found  whereby  the  people- 
have  a  chance  to  vote  without  the  outcome  being  determined  by,  in  the 
first  place,  political  conventions  similar  to  the  Democratic  Convention, 
which  went  against  the  votes  of  the  primaries,  secondly,  without  its 
requiring  millions  of  dollars  in  order  to  make  an  effective  campaign. 

Mr.  Watson.  Being  one  of  very  limited  means,  I  can  agree  with  you 
that  the  costs  of  an  election  are,  well,  astronomical,  to  say  the  least. 

One  final  thing.  It  has  caused  me  some  concern.  You  are  a  50-year- 
old  man.  You  have  spoken  here  at  length,  and  I  have  tried  not  to 
interrupt  too  much.  You  have  stated,  or  at  least  inferred,  that  you 
would  like  to  have  both  sides  of  the  question  presented  so  that  the 
people  can  make  the  decision  for  themselves. 

You  must  agree  that  primarily  you  are  dealing  in  your  movement 
with  young  people,  are  you  not,  the  bulk  of  them,  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  them  are  young  people,  even  teenagers? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  think  if  you  take  any  age  group  that  there  is 
obviously  a  higher  percentage  of  teenagers  than  of  any  other  age 
group.  I  think  it  would  be  fair  to  say  teenage  and  20's.  I  would  not 
be  sure. 

Mr.  Watson.  Most  of  them  are  young  ? 

Mr.  Delunger.  Who  are  actively  opposed  to  the  war  m  Vietnam. 
I  obviously  have  a  number  of  associations  with  people  who  are  in 
their  20's  or  30's  or  in  their  teens. 

Mr.  Watson.  Well,  before  the  Vietnam  war,  I  am  sure  you  have  not 
confined  your  activity  only  to  the  Vietnam  war.  You  have  been  critical 
of  the  American  institutions  all  along? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  have  been  critical  of  capitalism,  imperialism.  I 
have  been  critical  of  the  invasion  of  Puerto  Rico,  Cuba,  Dominican 
Republic,  Guatemala. 

Mr.  Watson.  And  if  the  Japanese  war  were  to  begin  today,  you 
would  still  be  critical  of  the  U.S.,  its  religious  institutions,  and  all  its 
institutions,  basically,  would  you  not  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  I  don't  want  to  leave  a  misimpression  on  the  earlier 
question.  It  probably  is  fair  to  say  that  at  least  half,  or  the  majority, 
of  my  own  time  and  work  is  with  people  closer  to  my  own  age, 
although  I  work  with  individuals  a  good  deal  younger. 

If  the  United  States  withdraws  from  Vietnam  and  the  war  ends, 
I  hope,  myself,  to  continue  fighting  against  American  imperialism. 
I  would  like  to  see  Puerto  Rico  a  free  and  independent  country,  rather 
than  to  have  to  suffer  culturally  and  cultural  genocide.  I  would  like  to 
see  the  Green  Berets  withdrawn  from  Bolivia,  Guatemala,  and  the 
other  Latin  American  countries.  I  would  like  to  see  the  American  air 
bases  withdrawn  from  Okinav/a  and  Okinawa  able  to  have  some  kind 
of  peaceful  and  democratic  society.  I  would  like  to  see  the  vast  power 
of  the  American  corporations  over  the  American  people  eliminated  so 
that  we  could  have  a  real  democracy  here.  I  would  like  to  see  the  black 
people  win  their  liberation  and  full  equality. 

Mr.  Watson.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  your  program  against  America 
will  continue? 


2818  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

Mr.  Dellinger.  My  program  for  America  will  continue,  and  for 
the  American  people. 

Mr.  Watson.  Did  it  ever  occur  to  you,  as  a  50-year-old  man,  that 
to  the  young  people  whom  you  rally  to  these  various  causes  you  might 
suggest  there  might  be  some  virtue  in  going  out  and  working  hard  in 
order  to  improve  their  lot  in  life?  Have  you  ever  urged  that  upon 
them? 

Have  you  ever  pointed  out  to  them  that  there  might  be  some  value  in 
attending  school  and  completing  their  education  in  order  that  their  lot 
might  be  improved  in  life  and  help  them  improve  the  lives  of  others? 
Have  you  ever  encouraged  that  line? 

Mr.  Deelinger.  I  believe  in  hard  work  and  self-discipline,  a  lot  of 
the  old-fashioned  virtues.  However,  I  do  not  belie A^e  in  people  improv- 
ing their  lot  at  the  expense  of  other  people.  I  am  opposed  to  the  kind 
of  atomized  and  individualistic  method  of  trying  to  move  to  the  top. 

^Ir.  Watson".  In  other  words,  everyone  must  be  absolutely  economi- 
calh^  equal  ?  That  is  your  philosophy  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  probably  believe  more  in 
economic  equality  than  a  Communist  country  like  the  Soviet  Union 
does,  where  they  have  greater  gaps  in  income,  more  difference  between 
rich  and  poor,  than  I  think  is  healthiest  and  best.  However,  I  do  not 
believe  in  a  monolithic,  sterile  society  in  which  everybody  is  the  same. 

Mr.  AVatson.  If  they  are  in  your  status,  how  could  it  be  otherwise 
than  sterile  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  In  the  richest  country  in  the  world,  we  have  an 
infant  mortality  rate  which,  if  I  remember  correctly,  is  ITtli  in  tlie 
world.  In  other  words,  there  are  16  countries  poorer  than  us  that  have 
a  better  infant  mortality  rate  than  we  do. 

I  do  not  consider  that  it  would  be  imposing  on  the  individuality  or 
the  full  creative  development  of  a  father  and  a  mother  or  a  child  if  we 
achieved  the  kind  of  availability  of  medical  resources  and  of  diet  and 
of  healthy  conditions,  freedom  from  rats,  freedom  from  slums,  freedom 
from  other  privations,  which  would  eliminate  that  kind  of  infant 
mortality. 

I  think  one  might  extend  this  into  many  other  areas,  I  think  for 
everybody,  for  example,  to  be  able  to  have  the  advantages  of  a  higher 
education,  but  not  a  higher  education  which  is  a  training  for  the  Ameri- 
can corporate  empire,  but  a  higher  education  which  is  a  training  to  be 
useful  and  to  be  equal.  For  everybody  to  have  that  would  not  impose 
on  their  individuality,  not  impose  a  dull  conformity. 

Mr.  Watson.  In  other  words,  we  would  have  individualism  of  total 
economic  equality.  Is  that  your  interpretation  of  true  freedom? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Again,  I  would  rather  let  my  words  stand  for  my 
opinion. 

Mr.  Watson.  One  final  thing.  Earlier,  you  stated  you  have  encour- 
aged yomig  people  to  go  out  and  work  hard,  to  stay  in  school 

Mv.  Bellinger.  No.  I  did  not  say  that. 

Mr.  Watson.  Oh,  you  have  not  urged  them  to  do  that  ? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  I  didn't  say  that,  either.  I  said  that  I  do  believe  in 
hard  work. 

Mr.  Watson.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  One  more  question,  before  the  meeting  is  adjourned. 


DISRUPTION  OF  19  68  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION  2819 

The  Chair  has  been  handed  a  copy  of  the  National  Guardian  of 
September  9,  1967.  On  page  5  there  is  an  article  by  Mary  Hamilton, 
entitled  "SNCC  leader  asks  for  guns." 

I  will  hand  the  article  to  you,  but  as  a  preface  for  my  question,  I  will 
read  to  you  the  opening  paragraph : 

Rap  brown's  message  to  white  radicals :  "Buy  us  some  guns  or  do  what  John 
Brown  did — pick  up  your  gun  and  go  out  and  shoot  our  enemy."  To  blacks  he 
•said  :  "Brother,  you  better  get  your  guns." 

At  the  bottom  of  the  same  column  this  is  written : 

Dave  Bellinger,  a  leader  of  the  Mobilization  Committee  and  a  pacifist,  told  his 
audience  that  "as  a  white  person  I  do  not  believe  it  is  up  to  me  to  tell  black  people 
what  method  to  use." 

Did  you  attend  that  meeting  on  August  29  in  New  York's  Village 
Theatre? 

Mr.  Bellinger.  Yes ;  I  was  chairman  and  one  of  the  speakers  at  that 
meeting  at  which  Rap  Brown  also  spoke. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Didn't  you  feel  constrained  to  advocate  your  position 
of  nonviolence  which  you  have  taken  in  the  anti-Vietnam  war  move- 
ment in  regard  to  this  problem  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes ;  part  of  what  I  said  that  night,  which  may  or 
may  not  be  reported  in  that  article,  did  include  an  advocacy  of  non- 
violence. But  a  statement  similar  to  one  I  made  many  times  here, 
about  a  certain  reluctance  on  my  part,  who  not  having  had  to  suffer 
what  the  North  Vietnamese  or  the  black  people  or  the  Puerto  Ricans 
suffered,  to  be  self-righteous  about  the  method  they  use.  That  does 
not  mean  that  I  do  not  enter  into  dialogue  with  Rap  Brown  or  others. 
I  happen  to  have  a  great  deal  of  respect  for  Rap  Brown,  who  I  think 
has  been  presented  very  inaccurately  in  the  American  press. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  You  don't  believe  that  the  problems  of  the  Negro  in 
the  ghettos  will  be  solved  hj  taking  up  guns,  do  you  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  discuss  that  with 
you  at  some  other  time,  or  with  Rap  Brown  or  others,  but  I  myself 
have  not  picked  up  a  gun.  I  am  not  about  to  stand  in  judgment  of  black 
IDeople  who  are  assaulted  and  attacked  and  who  feel  that  carrying  a 
gun  sometimes  will  save  their  lives  or  save  the  lives  of  their  children. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  There  being  no  other  questions,  the  Chair 

Mr.  Watson.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  make  one  more  statement. 

^I'ou  said  you  visited  the  coffeehouse  in  Columbia,  South  Carolina? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Yes :  I  did. 

Mr.  Watson.  That  is  my  home.  You  went  in  and  out  without  any 
difficulty  at  all,  and  no  one  tried  to  give  you  any  trouble.  Is  that 
correct  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  Well,  perhaps  I  should  say  that  I  arrived  after 
dark  one  evening  and  left  while  it  was  still  dark  and  that,  while  I  was 
there,  I  conferred  with  some  people  who  had  just  gotten  out  of  jail, 
had  been  picked  up  illegally,  and  there  were  a  number  of  different 
incidents.  Some  were  framed  on  marijuana  charges,  although  they 
did  not  smoke  or  possess  marijuana.  Others  were  picked  up  on 
technical  violations  of  going  through  red  lights. 

Mr.  Watson.  Of  course,  you  only  talked  with  them.  You  did  not 
talk  with  the  other  side  ? 

Mr.  Dellinger.  It  is  fair  for  you  to  bring  that  out. 


2820  DISRUPTION  OF  1968  DEMOCRATIC  NATIONAL  CONVENTION 

I  talked  with  people  who  told  me  that,  and  had  given  the  history 
of  some  of  the  persecution  of  radicals,  black  people,  hippies,  antiwar 
people,  in  your  State. 

I  don't  consider  it  impossible  that  this  may  have  happened,  but  I 
certainly  am  not  in  a  position  to  render  a  judgment  on  it,  or  state 
dogmatically  that  it  did. 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Mr.  Chairman,  before  you  drop  the  gavel,  if  I  may, 
assuming  that  we  are  finished  with  Mr.  Dellinger,  Mr.  Rubin  has  been 
directed  to  appear  tomorrow  morning  at  10  in  executive  session.  As 
you  know — I  think  you  have  a  copy — he  handed  out  a  release  here, 
and  I  will  hand  a  copy  in  and  ask  that  it  be  marked  in  the  record,  if  I 
may,  on  his  behalf,  because  it  sets  forth  his  position. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  Do  you  represent  Mr.  Rubin  ? 

Mr.  GuTMAN.  Yes. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  I  thought  Mr.  Kunstler  was  representing  him. 

Mr.  GuTMAisr.  I  am  associated  with  Mr.  Kunstler. 

Mr.  IcHORD.  The  Chair  will  take  this  under  advisement. 

The  Chair  will  declare  the  meeting  in  adjournment  until  10  o'clock 
tomorrow  morning,  at  which  time  the  subcommittee  will  meet  in 
executive  session. 

(Whereupon,  at  4:15  p.m.,  Thursday,  December  5,  1968,  the  sub- 
committee recessed,  to  reconvene  in  executive  session  at  10  a.m.,  Friday^ 
December  6,  1968.) 


INDEX 


Individuaxs 

A  Page 

Abbott,  Robert 2792 

Allen,   Robert   L.,    Jr 2909 

B 

Bailey,  John 2730,  2749 

Ballan,  Sam.  (See  Marcy,  Sam.) 

Binb 2754,  2805 

Boyd,  Malcolm 2809 

Brightman,  Carol  D 2809 

Brophy,   Jolin 2692 

Brown,  John  Pairman 2809 

Brown,  H.  Rap 2819 

Burchett,  Wilfred 2791, 2792,  2794,  2800 

C 

Clark,  Bronson  Pettibone 280& 

Cleaver,    Eldridge 2720.  2724.  2815 

Coffin  (William  Sloane,  Jr.) 2750 

Conlisk,  James  B.,  Jr 2762 

Cook,  Robert  Merten 2809 

Cooks,  Stoney 2809 

D 

Daley,  Richard  J 2730. 

2736,  2738,  2740,  2743,  2749,  2751,  2759,  2760,  2763,  2765.  2770 

Daniel  (Larissa) 2714 

Davis,  Rennard  Cordon    (Rennie) 2689,2701,2706,2767,2768,2809,2810 

Dellinger,   David 2689. 

2690-2745  (testimony),  2746-2820  (testimony),  2772,  2805 

Dellinger,  Elizabeth  P 2809 

Dreyer,  Thome  Webb 2809^ 

Dulles  (John  Foster) 2729 

Duncan,  Donald 2722 

E 

Egleson,  Nick 2799,"  2800,  280& 

Eisenhower  (Dwight  D.) 2775 

F 

Finch,  Roy 2693 

Flacks,  Richard 2809 

Flanagan,  John  Ross 2809 

Fruchter,  Norman  David 2809 

G 

Gandhi    (Mahatma) 2772,  2776.  2785 

Gardner,    Tom 2809 

Glassman,   Carol 2809 

Goodman    (Mitchell) 2750 

Greenblatt,   Bob    (Robert) 2690, 2755,  2784, 2785,  2790,  2791 

^  Incorrectly  spelled  "Egleston"  In  this  reference. 

i 


ti  INDEX 

Page 

Gregory,   Dick 2815 

Gutman,    Jeremiah    S 2690,  2691, 

2710,  2718  2719,  2728,  2740,  2746-2748,  2750,  2751,  2754,  2767,  2770, 
2771,  2778,  2783,  2797,  2798,  2802,  2809,  2812,  2813,  2820 

H 

Ha   Van  Lau 2790 

Halliewell,   Steven  E 2809 

Hamilton,    Mary 2819 

Harriman,   Averell 2703,  2724,  2783,  2784,2790,  2791 

Harden.    Thomas 2701,  2706,  2723,  2736,  2767, 12799,  2800,  2807,  2809,  2814,  2815 

Healy    (Joseph  J.) 2754,2755,2769 

Hitler.    Adolf 2776.  2808 

Humphrey.  Hubert  (Horatio) 2730,  2749,  2752,  2816,  2817 

Hutton,  Bobby 2720,  2740 

J 

Jencks,   Christopher 2809 

Johnson,  Lyndon  (Baines) 2718. 

2719,  2730,  2749,  2774,  2801,  2814,  2815 

Johnson,  Walter  Russell 2809 

Jordan   (Charles  H.) 2799 

K 

Kahin  (George  M.) 2800 

Kahn,  Herman 2719 

Kennedy.  Ted  (Edward  M.) 2752-2354 

Kennedy  (John  Fitzgerald)  2721-2723,2725,2726 

Kennedy  (Robert  F.) 2801 

Kine.  Carole  Yvonne 2809 

Kopkind,  Andrew  David 2809 

Kramer,  Robert   (Bob) 2809 

Kunstler  (William  M.) 2820 

Ky.  {See  Nguyen  Cao  Ky.) 

L 

Lewis    (John  W.) 2800 

Liljenstople,    Otto 2755 

Lowell,   Robert 2782 

Lynd,   Staughton 2712,  2800 

M 

MacArthur  (Douglas)   2775 

Macdonald.  Dwight 2782 

Malcolm   X 2720-2724,  2726,  2811 

^IcCarthy  (Eugene) 2752-2754 

McCarthy    (Joseph)    2718,2729 

McCarthv,  Mary 2808 

McEldowney,  Carol  Cohen 2809 

Meany   (George)   2801 

Morrison,  Norman 2712 

Morse,  Leon 2809 

Mungo.  Raymond  A.  (Ray) 2809,2814,2815 

Muste,  A.  J 2693,  2695,  2712,  2808 

N 

Newton,  Huey  (P.) 2720 

(Nguyen  Cao)  Ky 2806 

Nixon  (Richard  M.) 2732,2801,2816,2817 

Norberg,  Douglas  Craig 2809 

Norden,  Erie 2724,  2726 


INDEX  iii 

O 

Page 

Oswald,  Lee  Harvey 2811,  2812 

P 

Park  (Chung  Hee) 2730 

Percv  (Charles  H.) 2801 

Phan  Van  Chuoung 2783,  2790 

B 

Raskin  (Marcus) 2750 

Reagan  (Ronald) 2801 

Reuther  (Walter  P.) 2801 

Rockefeller   (Nelson) 2801 

Romnev  ( George) 2801 

Rosenberg  (Ethel) 2811 

Rosenberg   (Julius) 2811 

Rothstein,  Vivian  Emma 2809 

Rubin    ( Jerry ) 2690,  2691,  2820 

Rustin,  Bayard 2693 

S 

Schwarzschild,  Steven  Samuel 2798, 2799,  2802-2805, 2809,  2813,  2814 

Siqueiros,    David 2781,  2782 

Smith,  Adam 2732 

Spook    (Benjamin) 2750 

Stalin,   Josef 2722,  2727,  2739 

Stem,    Sol 2809 

Stone.   I.   F 2829 

Sweeney,   Dennis 2809 

Syngman  Rhee 2730 

T 

Tillman.  John  P.,  Jr 2809 

Tran  Van  Anh 2783,  2790 

Trotsky,  Leon 2723,  2782 

V 

Vance,  Cyrus 2724,  2790 

Vigier,  Jean-Pierre 2781 

W 

Walker.  Charles . 2693 

Walker    (Daniel) 2734,  2740,  2751,  2818 

W^allace,  George  (C.) 2816 

Warren  (Earl) 2722 

Waskow,  Arthur 2770,  2771,  2776,  2783 

Webster,  Barbara 2809 

Weinberger,    Eric 2705,  2706,  2808,  2809 

Werner,  Henry  William 2809 

Wilson,  John  Augusta 2809 

Wright,  Willie  T 2809 

X 
Xuan  Thuy 2784,  2790 

Y 

Young,  Ron 2809 

Young   (Stephen  M.) 2721,2722 


Iv  INDEX 

ORGANIZATIONS 
A 

AFSC.  (See  Religious  Society  of  Friends,  American  Friends  Service 
Committee. ) 

American  Friends  Service  Committee  (AFSC).  (See  entry  under  Re- 
ligious Society  of  Friends. )  Pag» 

Ancient  Arabic  Order  of  the  Nobles  of  the  Mystic  Shrine  (Shriners)  __  2736,  273.S 

B 

Black  Muslims.  (See  Nation  of  Islam. ) 

Black  Panthers.  (See  Black  Panther  Party.) 

Black  Panther  Party  (knovpn  variously  as  Black  Panthers,  Black  Panther 
Political  Party,  Black  Panther  Political  Party  for  Self  Defense,  and 
Black  Panther  Party  for  Self -Defense  (BPSD) ) 27.36 

C 

Chicago  Peace  Council 27.5.5 

Communist  Party  of  the  United  States  of  America  (CPUSA) 2723,2724- 

Congress  for  Cultural  Freedom 2782 

Czechoslovak  Peace  Committee 2799, 2805 

F 

Fellowship  of  Reconciliation   (FOR) 2805 

Fifth    Avenue   Parade    Committee.    {See   Fifth   Avenue   Vietnam   Peace 

Parade  Committee.) 
Fifth  Avenue  Vietnam  Peace  Parade  Committee 2698,2706 


Havana  Cultural  Congress.    (See  International  Cultural  Congress,  Jan- 
uary 1968,  Havana,  Cuba.) 

I 

International  Cultural  Congress,  January  1968,  Havana,  Cuba__  2777,  2778,  2780 

L 

Liberation  News   Service 2S14 

Libertarian  Press 2693,  2694,  2701,  2714 

M 

Monthly  Review  Press 2729 

N 

NATO.  (See  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.) 

NLF.  (See  National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  South  Vietnam.) 

Nation  of  Islam  (NOI)   (also  known  as  Black  Muslims) 2724,2725 

National  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence  (also 
referred  to  as  the  Walker  Commission  or  the  President's  Commission  on 

the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence) 2734.2810,2813 

National  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  South  Vietnam  (also  known  as  the 

National  Liberation  Front    (NLF)) 2711. 

2712,  2773,  2784,  2786,  2799,  2805.  2806 

Central  Committee 2806 

National  Liberation  Front  (NLF).  (-See  National  Front  for  the  Liberation 

of  South  Vietnam.) 
National  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam   (NMC) 
(formerly  known  as  Spring  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War  in 
Vietnam)    (see  also  November  8  Mobilization  Committee  for  Peace  in 

Vietnam,  for  Human  Rights,  and  for  Economic  Justice) 2694- 

2709,  2718,  2723,  27.33,  2736.  2744.  2747,  2752.  2754,  2755,  2757, 
2759,  2762,  2789,  2796,  2810,  2812,  2814,  2816,  2819 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO) 2753 

November  8  Mobilization  Committee.  (See  November  8  Mobilization  Com- 
mittee for  Peace  in  Vietnam,  for  Human  Rights,  and  for  Economic 
Justice.) 


INDEX 


November  8  Mobilization  Committee  for  Peace  in  Vietnam,  for  Human 
Rights,  and  for  Economic  Justice  (predecessor  to  Spring  Mobilization 
Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam)    (see  also  National  Mobiliza-     Page 
tioB  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam) 2696 


President's  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence.   {See 
National  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence. ) 

R 

Radio   Havana ., 2733,  2735,  2739,  2746 

Religious  Society  of  Friends  : 

American  Friends  Service  Committee  (AFSC) 2805 

Revolutionary  Contingent  (RC) 2772.2775 


:  SNCC.  ( See  Student  Nonviolent  Coordinating  Committee. ) 
Shriners.  (See  Ancient  Arabic  Order  of  the  Nobles  of  the  Mystic  Shrine.) 

Slovak  Peace  Committee 2799,  2805 

Spring  Mobilization  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam  (formerly 
known  as  November  8  Mobilization  Committee  for  Peace  in  Vietnam,  for 
Human  Rights,  and  for  Economic  Justice)   {see  also  National  Mobiliza- 

zation  Committee  To  End  the  War  in  Vietnam) 2696,2697 

rStudent  Nonviolent  Coordinating  Committee   (SNCC) 2819 

Students  for  a  Democratic  Society  (SDS) 2799 

U 

vUnion  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  Government  of 2714,  2818 

United  States  Government: 

Central  intelligence  Agency  (CIA) 2714 

Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI) 2810 

;University  Christian  Association   (also  known  as  Dwight  Hall) 2692 

W 

Walker  Commission.  (See  National  Commission  on  the  Causes  and  Pre- 
vention of  Violence.) 

War  Crimes  Tribunal 2715,  2781 

War  Resisters  League 2698 


YIP.  (See  Youth  International  Party.)  (also  known  as  Yippies) 

Yippies.  (/See  Youth  International  Party)  (YIP) 

Youth  International  Party  (YIP)    (also  known  as  Yippies) 2709 

Z 

Zengakuren   - — . 2775 

PUBLICATIONS 

D 
•Dissent  (magazine)   2799,  2804,  2813,  2814 

E 
iEl  Mundo  (newspaper) 2777-2779 

G 
.Guardian 2796 

L 
Liberation  2693-2715,  2724,  2733,  2770,  2795,  2799 

O 
Other  Side,  The  (book)  (Thomas  Hayden  and  Staughten  Lynd) 2800 


/ 


vi  INDEX 

R 

Ramparts  (magazine)   2S14 

Realist,   The    (magazine) 2724,2720 

U 

United   States  in  Vietnam,   The    (book)    (George   M.    Kahin   and    John 
W.  Lewis) 2S00 

V 

Vietnam  Courier 2796 

Vietnam  North    (book)    (Wilfred  Burchett) 2800 

Vietnamese   Studies  2800 

Viet-Report     2800 

W 

Walker  Commission  Report  (Report  to  the  National  Commission  on  the 

Causes  and  Prevention  of  Violence.) ^40,  2755 

o 


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