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DtPOSirtU b/ THE 

AUG J 1969 






DECEMBER 4 AND 5, 1968 

Printed for the use of the 
Committee on Internal Security 

21-706 WASHINGTON : 1968 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 55 cents 


United States House of Representatives 

(90th Congress, 2d Session) 

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman 

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri DEL CLAWSON, California 
ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina 

Francis J. McNamara, Director 

Chester D. Smith, General Counsel 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 


United States House of Repbesentatives 
(91st Congress, 1st Session) 
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri, Chairman 




Donald G. Sanders, Chief Counsel 

Glenn Davis, Editorial Director 

Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel 


December 4, 1968 : Testimony of — Page 

David Dellinger 2690 

December 5, 1968 : Testimony of — 

David Dellinger (resumed) 2746 

Afternoon session : 

David DeUinger (resumed) 2777 


The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing 
committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the 
rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the 
Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to deter- 
mine the rules of its proceedings. 


House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967, as amended April 3, 1968, by House 

Resolution 1099 


Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth 
Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganiza- 
tion Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of 
the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * * 


Rule X 


1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 

^(s) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 


Rule XI 

i^ ***** * 

19. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Un-American activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, 
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, charac- 
ter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 

(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks 
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 

(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any 
necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of 
such witnesses and the production of such books, pai>ers, and documents, and to 
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the 
signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any mem- 
ber designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person desig- 
nated by any such chairman or member. 

• ••»»*• 

28. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of 
the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject 
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that pur- 
pose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the 
agencies in the executive branch of the Government. 




Part 3 


United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D.C. 
public hearings 

The subcommittee of the Coimnittee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to recess, at 1 :40 p.m., in Room 311, Camion House Office 
Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of 
Missouri, chairman ; Jolm M. Ashbrook, of Ohio ; and Albert W. Wat- 
son, of South Carolina. ) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, 
and Watson. 

Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director ; Frank Con- 
ley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. 
Nittle, counsel ; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator. 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order, a quorum being 

At the last meeting of the connnittee yesterday, the committee was 
recessed until 1 :30 p.m. today. We had just concluded hearing the 
witness, Mr. Rennie Davis. 

Mr. Counsel, a quorum being present, will you please call your next 
witness ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, we would call David Dellinger. 

Mr. Ichord. Mr. Dellinger, are you present? 

Will you please come forward, sir ? 

Will the witness first please be sworn. 

Mr. Dellinger. I am soriy. I try to tell the truth on all occasions, so 
I don't swear. 

jNIr. Ichord. Well, of course, it is the practice of the committee that 
all witnesses appearing before an investigative committee such as this, 
Mr. Dellinger, would be sworii. 

Will you raise your right hand, sir ? Do you solemnly 

Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry. I will assure you 

Mr. Ichord. Do you wish to affirm, sir ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I will affirm. 



Mr. IcHOKD. Do you solemnly affirm that the testunony you are 
about to give before tliis committee "will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the tnith ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I don't like formulas which imply that sometunes I 
don't tell the truth. 

'Siv. IcHC'RD. It is the understanding that the witness is affirming. 
This is a practice before the committee. 

Mr. DzLLixGER. Yes. without the ritual, I affirm. 

Mr. IcHORD. The witness may be seated. 


Mr. GuT3iAX. First of all 

]Mr, IcHORD. Just a minute, ^Ir. Counsel. 

First of all, I would ask that the counsel identify himself for the 

;Mr. GrxMAX. Jeremiali. J-e-r-e-m-i-a-h S. G-u-t-m-a-n, 363 Sev- 
enth Avenue, Xew York City. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Gutman. if you have something to say to the Chair, 
would you please come forward I 

ilr. GuTiiAX. Surely. 

(Off the record.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair has just received a message from 
!Mi\ Gutman relaying a request of ^Ir. Eubin to be permitted into the 
hearing room. The Chair will announce that he has been informed 
that Mr. Rubin is attired in a Santa Claus costimie. It is not the pur- 
pose of the Chair to direct that Mr. Eubin attire himself in a certain 
manner or take other actions in regard to his body, but it is a respon- 
sibility of the Chair to mauitain order in these hearings. The Chair 
has exercised its prerogative of excluding, and I have so instructed the 
police to exclude, ^Ir. Rubin from the hearing room because it is the 
determination of the Chair that such a dress could only add to the 
possibilities of disorder. And in view of the antics of ^Ir. Rubin during 
the past hearing, the Chair has no alternative except to exclude him. 

First of all, Mr. Counsel, before you begin the questioning of the 
witness, the Chair has been advised, ^Ir. Dellinger, that you have 
recently undergone an operation. The Chair has been advised by the 
director of the conmiittee that your doctor has informed him that you 
would be able to testify*. I know tliat the operation is a ver\' recent 
event. Perhaps the witness will tire. I would like to ask the witness. Do 
you feel that you are physically able to testify at this time ? 

Mr. Dellixger. Tliank you very much, sir. Yes, I am anxious to tell 
the information and talk about the incidents in Chicago, and I expect 
to be — I feel a little weak, but I expect to be able to proceed without 

Mr. Ichord. Let me say this to the witness : that if you do tire, will 
you please so advise the Chair and we can declare a recess for you to 
rest somewhat. 

^Ir. Dellixger. Thank you verv much, sir. 

Mr. IcHOPJ). Or if you feel that you are not able to go on, why, 
please advise the Chair of that. I know the operation has been very 


;Mr. Dellen'oee. Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. GuTMAX. ^Ir. Chairman, if I mav. I want to revert to the- 

Mr. IcHORD. ;Mr. Gutman, you know the role of an attorney before 
the committee. I have repeatedly advised counsel of the rules pre- 
vailing in this committe and, as far as that is concerned, that prevail 
in every legislative domain, and that is that the role of the attorney 
is to advise the client of his constitutional rights. I think it is readily 
■apparent why different rules prevail here, rather than in a court pro- 
ceeding, because the functions of the bodies are completely different. 
Xo one is on trial here and no one is sought to be punished. 

I also appreciate the zeal of an attorney, as an attorney myself, in 
representing the interests of his clients, but the Chair has no other 
ulternative except to enforce the rules and carry out the responsibility 
of the Chair in the way that he interprets. Perhaps we can work this 
out. I am not asking the attorney to testify, but I would insist on the 

(Off the record.) 

Mr. IcHOED. Mr. Gutman, the attorney for Mr. Dellinger, has just 
approached the Chair and asked that the record show an objection on 
behalf of Mr. Rubin of the exclusion of ^Lc. Eubin from the hearing 
room and, also, that the record show a renewal of the motions and the 
objections which were previously filed on l^ehalf of Mr, Dellinger 
with regard to Ms appearance here. The record will so show both 
requests. And, Mr. Gutman, before ruling on the request, I have al- 
ready ruled on the request of Mr. Rubin in my annoimcement of the 
exclusion, but before ruling on the motions again, the renewal of the 
motions, Sir. Dellinger has not been indicted ? 

Mr. GuTiiAX. Xo, sir, but we understand from an announcement 
made by the Federal grand jury in Chicago that within 2 weeks in- 
dictments are expected of a gi'oup of people who have been described 
as '"the leaders of the demonstration."" 

Since Mr. Dellinger regards himself and the country regards him 
as one of the leaders of the demonstration on behalf of Mobilization in 
Chicago during the affected time, we believe it reasonable to assume 
that there is a substantial likelihood that he may be indicted. 

Mr. IcHORD. Then let the record show the Chair overrules the re- 
quest for the reasons stated in the rulings on the motions when they 
were originally filed. 

Proceed, ^Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger. would you please state your full name 
and address for the i-ecord i 

Mr. Dellixger. My name is David DeUinger. ^ly office address is 
5 Beekman Street, Manhattan, Xew York City. 

Mr. CoxLET. Sir, do you have a home address ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I have a home, but since I have received a number 
of death threats and attacks, including receiving grenades and bombs 
in the mail, which only by what the Army demolition experts called 
a miracle did not kill my entire family, I prefer not to give my home 
address publicly. 

Mr. CoxLET. 'Very well, Mr. Dellinger. 

Mr. Dellixger. For their safety and security. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Yes, sir, I appreciate that. 

Is it fair to sav that vour home address is also Xew York City ? 

Mr. Dellinger. At the present- 

Mr. CoNLET. Without going into the street address? 

Mr. Dellinger. At the present time, yes. 

Mr. CoNLET. All right, sir, thank you. 

And now for the record, you are represented by counsel, are you 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Mr. Gutman. 

Mr. Conley. Now Mr. Dellinger, are you appearing here today in 
response to a subpena served on you by United States [Deputy] 
Marshal John Brophy on September 23, 1968, at 68 Charles Street, 
New York City, which was mad© a continuing subpena from October 
until this time ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I don't remember the name of the gentleman 
who either signed it or gave it to me, whichever it was, but I did 
receive a subpena and I considered not coming because I think that 
one does not have to obey illegal and immoral orders. However, since 
I am anxious to tell everything that I know involving myself, the 
plans, the actions, and so forth, at Chicago, and since I consider the 
conmiittee largely ineffective, I am perfectly happy to be here and to 
discuss with you everything that I can about myself. So it is without 
necessarily recognizing the validity of the subpena, the procedures 
under which it was issued, I come in response and of my own volition. 

Mr. IcHORD. At that point, Mr. Dellinger, I think you have ade- 
quately expressed your contempt for the committee, and we will let 
the record show that, and in order to expedite things 

Mr. Dellinger. T don't know what your word "contempf- 

Mr. IcHORD. — if you want to express contempt against anybody 
else, go ahead. 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't know where the word "contempt" is: I 
certainly did not use it. I consider it undemocratic for a man to rep- 
resent a congressional district in which 60 percent of the residents are 
black, and by the last figures I saw only 6 percent of the black people 
vote. That is the type of thing that I mean. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course, Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to argue with 
you, but you said the immoral acts, referring to the subpena, and that 
was an act of this committee, but if the record will show that, perhaps 
we can get down to the meat of the matter and proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger, in order to get some identification, where were you 
born, sir, and when ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I was born in Wakefield, Massachusetts, on Au- 
gust 22, 1915. 

Mr. Conley. And would you be kind enough to give us your edu- 
cational background, formal education? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, roughly, I graduated from high school; I 
graduated from Yale University in 1936: I studied for a year at 
New College, Oxford, on a Henry Fellowship. 

I returned to Yale where, while working for the University Chris- 
tian Association, known as Dwight Hall, I took some courses at Yale 
Divinity School. 

I then went to Union Theological Seminary in New York City 
for a year and had begun my second year when I declined my exemp- 
tion from the draft and publicly refused to register and, therefore. 


left the seminary to go to prison — where I got the best and most 
thorough education of all, although I think that the combination was — 
I am glad I had all the elements. 

Mr. CoNLBY. When you mentioned prison, was this during the 
Second World War, sir? 

!Mr. Dellinger. It was before the Second World War. It was in 
1940, when the first peacetime draft law was passed, and since I am a 
pacifist, but since I did not want to hide behind a clerical exemption, 

1 publicly refused to register. 

Mr. C0NI.ET. Mr. Bellinger, what have been your major employ- 
ments since 1953? 

Mr. Bellinger. '53 — beginning before 1953, I worked and lived at 
what is sometimes called an intentional community, somewhat in the 
Utopian community tradition, where we had an 

Mr. CoNLET. Well, Mr. Bellinger, can we get the date so we can 
fix this? You say before '53? 

Mr. Bellinger. I will have to warn you that particularly on things 
that I don't have documents my memory may be faulty. 

Mr. Ichord. The Chair would advise the witness we don't expect 
you to recall all these dates. 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, but approximately 1946. 

Mr. CoNLET. All right, sir. 

]VIr. Bellinger. I would say I helped organize and was a part of 
a producer's cooperative called the Libertarian Press, which both 
wrote and edited and printed art work, political material, cultural 
and intellectual. We did not write everything that we printed; we 
were commercial printers, but we also participated in editing and 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was this business based out of New York City, sir? 

Mr, Bellinger. Not entirely, by any means. We did a certain amount 
of local — no, it was located in New Jersey, in Glen Gardner, New 
Jersey. And we did printing for people all over the country, in many 
cases books and other publications, pamphlets. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. And what particular title did you hold 
with this venture at that time? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, in most circumstances, if I remember cor- 
rectly, we listed myself and others as partners. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, have you worked for 

Mr. Bellinger. There may have been occasions when I could have 
been listed as director or something of that kind, but basically we 
operated on an equal basis. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Now coming forward from that venture, what was the next employ- 
ment or business that you engaged in? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, in the winter of 1956 I was one of four or 
five people, including A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Roy Finch, 
and I think for a short jjeriod Charles Walker, who founded a maga- 
zine called Liberation, and in the early years we printed the magazine 
and did a great deal of the editing at the producer's cooperative. 

Later I began to work for pay, you might say, as an editor, first for 

2 days a week, and then perhaps about 2 or 3 years ago I became a 
full-time editor. 


Mr. CoNLEY. All right, now the Liberation magazine to which you 
are making reference now is still in existence, still publishes? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it is in its 12th year, I believe. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir, and has this been the source of your 
employment since approximately 1956? 

Mr. Delltnger. No. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The publishing of this magazine? 

Mr. Dellinger. No. It — I didn't draw any mcome from it until a 
period approximately — this is why I am just not very good, but I 
would say about 3 years ago. 

Mr. Conley. Now my question wasn't, Was this your source of 

Mr. Dellinger. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. CoNLEY, I wasn't asking about any income. I was asking you,. 
Is this basically the employment that you have held since 1956 ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I really — my employment was directly with 
the Libertarian Press. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. 

Mr. Dellinger. And I was a voluntary editor for Liberation until 
this more recent period. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now, Mr. Dellinger 

Mr. Ichord. Now just a minute, Mr. Counsel, the witness wishes to> 
confer with his counsel. Give him a chance to do so. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. If I may answer my counsel's question, I am not 
employed by the National Mobilization Committee. I am an officer. 
I am a chairman of the National Mobilization Committee. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I don't believe I asked you that. 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't know if it is all right for me to answer my 
counsel, but just to be completely clear on where my employment is. 

Mr. IcHORD. Feel completely free to confer with your counsel. 

Mr. Dellinger. Thank you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, now directing your attention to the 
National Mobilization Committee and particularly to the events pre- 
ceding and occurring in Chicago, you were in Chicago, were you not, 
during the period of the Democratic Party Convention of August 26 
to 29? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I was there prior to that, also. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Now were you not there in your capacity 
as chairman of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War 
in Vietnam, which was one of the prime organizers of the demon- 
strations which took place in Chicago? 

Mr. Dellinger. You say in my capacity as chairman ? Is that right ? 

Mr. CoNi>F.Y. AVore you not there in your capacity as chairman of 
the National Mobilization Committee? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, in part, but you see, my approach to jour- 
nalism from way back when we started Libertarian Press has been 
what is sometimes called an engaged jdurnalism. That is, to write on 
many occasions about a movement or events in which the editors and 
the other writers, but including myself, are actively involved. So when 
I am active in the Mobilization, I am also active as an editor of 
Liberation, which is the place where I draw my income. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well then, sir, would it be a fairer statement for me to 


then say that you were in Chicago as chairman of National Mobiliza- 
tion as an editor of Liberatio7i magazine? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it would. 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, I think at that point that some of the peo- 
ple in the back of the room are having difficulty hearing you. 

Mr. Bellinger, would you pull the mike a little closer? 

Mr. Bellinger. Sorry. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You almost have to lean into it, sir. 

Mr. Bellinger. Sorry. Well, leaning forward is what I am not 
good at right now. 

Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Bellinger, how long have you been chair- 
man of the National Mobilization Committee, which I also understand 
is referred to as Mob and possibly as Mo ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I didn't hear the two distinctions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. JNIob, M-o-b. 

IVIr. Bellinger. Well 

Mr. Conley. I have heard it abbreviated that way. 

Mr. Bellinger. Some of the commercial press, I think, has called 
it that. Sometimes it is called, for short, Mobe, but I would think that 
would be spelled with an "e." 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. How long have you been chairman of Na- 
tional Mobilization ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, if I remember correctly, I was a cochairman, 
no, not from its founding because I was not present when it was 
founded. I was — for a healthy man, I have to say I was ill at the first 
conference, at which I think it was founded, and then I was out of the 
country during the first couple of months of its existence. But I would 
say that either in Becember of '66 or early in the year of 1967 I be- 
came a cochairman. Later, and this I would only be able to approxi- 
mate, but perhaps July — in July of '67, sometune 1 to 3 — I will try 
to be cautious — 1 to 4 months prior to the Pentagon demonstration, 
I was elected chairman. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Chairman by — you are sole chairman of the institu- 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, we had a — I was made chairman, and there 
were cochairmen. Our founding chairman, the Reverend A. J. Muste, 
had died in February of 1968. 

Mr. Ichord. Is chairman an elective position, Mr. Bellinger? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I was elected at a meeting of the administra- 
tive committee. We are not a membership organization, but we have 
an administrative committee which is roughly representative of the 
various constituencies. And, to the best of my knowledge, all officers 
and important staff posts have been elected or approved at a meeting 
of the administrative committee. 

IVIr. Conley. And I take it from your earlier answers just now that 
you apparently were designated as chairman of the committee in the 
summer of 1967 by the administrative committee ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. Bo you recall who composed that committee, how large 
it was at that time ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Oh, the administrative committee consists of over 
a hundred people, and the meetings vary greatly, but I would say we 
rarely hold a meeting that is !under 50 or 60, and often the meetings — 


we are very informal, and often the meetings grow to a hundred or — 
well, 150 when something important is hapj)ening. And as I say, we 
are very informal in the sense that people can come to meetings as 
observers or something of that kind. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, how is your administrative committee 
•selected? I use that word because I am not sure whether you nomi- 
nate, elect, what you do. How do you select your administrative com- 
mittee from which you make these various appointments? 

;Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Well, the original administrative committee 
was elected at a conference which was considered to be roughly repre- 
sentative of the antiwar movement, many different types of attitudes. 

^Ir. CoxLEY. I see. 

Mr. Dellinger. And if I remember correctly, certain positions on 
the administrative committee were filled at that time, and the com- 
mittee or the officers were given the power to expand it in order to 
bring in other constituencies who might not have been present. 

Xow it has been revised on a number of occasions since then to try 
to incorporate either new regional groups that have developed or new 
organizations that have sprung (up, or to reflect the fact that perhaps 
some organizations have become less active or possibly even ceased to 

Mr. CoNLEY. I see. Now, prior to your election as chairman, I think 
you have mentioned this, but did you not occupy a position with Na- 
tinal Mobillization as either Adce chairman or cochairman? 

I think you alluded to the fact that you were cochairman. 

Mr. Dellinger. I said cochairman. but I do believe that at the very 
beginning what are now called the cochairmen were called vice chair- 
men. I think probably that was my original title. One of, you know, 
a group of six or eight probably. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, now, Mr. Dellinger, is it a fair statement 
to say that what is now known as National Mobilization Committee 
came out of what was earlier known as the Spring Mobilization 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. As a matter of fact, when I spoke about the 
earlier conferences and the setting up, the name was not strictly 
-National Mobilization Committee. 

In preparing for major action in New York and San Francisco on 
April 15, 1967, it was called the Spring Mobilization Committee. It is 
even possible that in preparing for actions in the previous December, 
the period when I was out of the country, it may have even had a — 
I'm sure it did have another name, other than Spring Mobilization, 
because it was fall actions, but I can't remember, don't know what the 
name was. But clearly there was an organic, but, as I say, somewhat 
informal process which began approximately — began in the summer 
of '66 and expanded through these actions, and the name changed 
at various stages, but it was basically the same group, growing and 

Mr. Conley. Well, carrying it back one step further, perhaps, sir, 
was it not in fact known in '66 as the November 8 Mobilization 
Committee ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, even when you refresh my memory, I literally 
do not know. I was out of the country and I do not know. 

Mr. Conley. All right. 


Mr. Dellinger, do you have any recollection as to how long you served 
as vice chairman of what was known as the Spring Mobilization ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, if you put the two dates which I guessed at 
earlier together, that would tell. Roughly from either December of '66 
or January or February of '67, between then and whenever it was in the 
late sprmg or summer of '67. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. A period of months, anyway. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Thank you. 

Now, Mr. Dellinger, if I may hand you a piece of literature — and I 
must apologize to you for the reproduction of the copy — but if you 
would examine that for me a moment, this purports to be a piece of 
literature prepared by the National Mobilization Committee and, from 
a reading of same, appears to have been distributed shortly before the 
Chicago convention. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. Dellinger. The dates — is it blocked out? I don't know what 
these black 

Mr. CoNLEY. I think maybe at the conclusion of the letter, or in the 
body of the letter itself, it indicates that it is a letter that Avas signed 
by you and Mr. Greenblatt. And what I want to, if I may, particularly 
direct your attention to is to the right margin of the letter, where the 
officers and directors perhaps appear, in connection with the National 
Mobilization Committee. 

I want to ask you. if I may, sir, whether those people shown there 
were in fact the officers at the time of that letter. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, it is entirely possible that there are some 
inaccuracies, and I would have to — first, I haven't had time to read the 
letter now; I will, if you wish, and there is no date. But sometimes 
when we made minor changes in the officers, literature would go out on 
the letterhead and not reflect, for example, the addition of a new 
cochairman or the inactivity, perhaps, of somebody. I would have to — 
I can read this and see the approximate date, if there is a point to it. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Well, this is what I am getting to. If you will 
also look at the letterhead, you will note that it gives a street address 
for the National Mobilization Committee. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. 857 Broadway, New York City. There is also an 
identical letter, and I think you can compare the two letters. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. One is perhaps a somewhat better copy, and if you 
would examine the signatures on the second page. Do they both appear 
to be your signatures ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I can't tell whether they are my signature. 
First of all, it is obviously scratched, and not very successfully, onto a 
stencil and, secondly, I do often authorize my secretary or somebody 
else by mail, if they read me something, to sign it. It is not my typical 
writing, but I don't know whether it is because I was scratching on a 
stencil, or not. If I am in fact, however, if I did authorize the letter, 
I certainly wouldn't use this as a pretext for not taking the respon- 
sibility for it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The only thing I am 


Mr. Dellinger. I still haven't had time to read it, so I won't say. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I understand, sir. The only thing that I am raising 
inquiry about, the letters do — I hope you will accept my word for it — 
the two letters do read identically, the content of the two letters is 
identical and the only exception that is noted is that one carries an 
address 5 Beekman Place, and one carries an address 857 Broadway. 

Would you be kind enough, if you did in fact maintain offices at 
857 Broadway, to indicate when the change occurred? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, we have sometimes, we often have had more 
than one office. Now again, I don't know if we are losing time by this, 
but because there is no date apparently on either letter, I am a little 
confused about whether at this time we did have two offices or not. 
Obviously, I mean it is entirely possible, as I said. Sometimes letter- 
heads were used which were not completely up to date, and it is not 
;at all impossible that somebody would have made a mistake and put 
out, you know, used the second address, at a time that we weren't 
using it, but I am just trying — I apologize for being bad at this. 

For all the times I have been there, there are two offices very close 
together, one is of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee, of which 
I am coordinator, and one was of the Mobilization Committee. They 
are about half a block apart, and I think this was — this had to be 
the Mobilization office. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger. So it is quite likely that we had moved out of this 
office at that time and tliat that was, you know, an administrative error, 
to use that niunber, but hopefully replies were forwarded. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now let me ask you 

Mr. Dellinger. It certainly wasn't an attempt to conceal our where- 
abouts or locality. 

Mr. CoNLEY. No, I imderstand. Now with reference to the letter 
that carries No. 5 Beekman as the address on it, that is the last address 
of National Mobilization in New York City ; is it not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is the current address. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is what I mean. The last and present address 
of National Mobilization. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, and perhaps if I could just clarify. I am not 
sure it is of any importance, but, you see, I was chairman and my 
office is in 5 Beekman Street. Also, we often held meetings there, and 
it has kind of been a peace center, or center for peace organizations, 
so it would not be amiss for us to use that address even at a time 
when we might not have had our office equipment or personnel en- 
tirely concentrated on the Mobilization, but in that address. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now is the No. 5 Beekman Place also • 

Mr. Dellinger. Street. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Street. I am sorry — also the address of Liberation 

ISIr. Dellinger. Yes, it is. 

Mr. Conley. And do National Mobilization and Liberation actually 
occupy the same office space ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No. We have an arrangement, or have had until 
recently — I think it is coming to an end — whereby the entire 10th 
floor, with the exception, I believe, of one office, is leased. I mean there 
is one lease, and then it is sublet to a number of organizations. The War 


Resisters League, Liberation, and the National Mobilization are 
amongst the people who have offices, so that actually Liberation^ the 
specific rooms used by Liberation and used by the National Mobiliza- 
tion Committee are contiguous, but they are separate. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And under separate leases? 

Mr. Dellengee. Although we share — no, I am saying it is one 
lease and subleases. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That is what I mean, which would be separate leases, 
would they not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Not vis-a-vis the building owner, because Libera- 
tion, if I could tell better from the office manager, but LAberation 
collects the rent from Mobilization. 

In other words, Liberation is responsible for at least half the floor 
and collects the rent for the people that are there. 

Mr. Conley. Well, let's get at it this way : Does Liberation actually 
have the general lease with the building or the 10th floor, except one 

Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, the lease is actually 
held by the War Eesisters League, not by Liberation, but I could 
be wrong. It is one of the two, but I think the Vv'ay it is, that the lease 
was signed by the War Resisters League; Liberation has taken the 
responsibility for half of the floor, collects the rent and makes the 
arrangements there, turns it over to the War Resisters League, who 
then turns it over to the landlord. I think that is it, but I am not the 
business manager and I am not positive. 

Mr. Conley. Okay. Now I am sure there is a written lease between 
either the War Resistance League and/or LJberation magazine and the 
owner of the building. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes; as a matter of fact I remember that I think 
I myself did sign some kind of a lease, so Liberation must be on there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now do you know whether there are actually 
in existence leases — subleases, I think we should call them — between 
either War Resistance League and/or Liberation and these other 
tenants ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry, you know, I have done my best to try 
to tell you what I know, but there is a real danger that I will mislead 
you because I am just — this isn't one of my points of concentration, 
and I really don't know. 

Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Now directing your attention back to 
National Mobilization, if we may, do you receive a salary as chairman 
of National Mobilization ? 

]Mr. Dellinger. No, I do not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Have you in the past, at any time that you recall? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have never received a salary from National Mo- 
bilization Committee. 

Mr. Conley. Or any type of compensation from National Mobili- 
zation ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, it is my poor secretary — or associate's, reaUy 
my partner in Liberation — it is her difficult task to try to figure out 
from time to time which trips are, you know, were caused by Mobiliza- 
tion work primarily or by Liberation, and to try, you know, if it is 
clearly chargeable to Mobilization, to charge it to Mobilization, or if it 
is clearly chargeable to Liberation, to charge it to Liberation, But 


basically, as I say, wherever I go, I am sort of both, and so it is very 
difficult and, again, very informal. 

Also, I raise money for both organizations and have often sug- 
gested that people direct their money in one direction or the other, 
according to which is the worst in debt at the moment. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, sir, I take it from what you are saying that 
actually the only thing then that you would receive from National 
Mobilization might be your expenses ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Expenses, right. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You did not receive any type of compensation, profit to 
you, in other words ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I receive no salary. 

Mr. IciiORD. Expenses on a reimbursable basis ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I beg your pardon ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Are the expenses paid to you on a reimbursable basis ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well 

Mr. Iciiord. Do you have a fixed allowance for expenses, or is it a 
reimbursable basis ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, no, if I — you know, if the Mobilization decides 
to send me or we decide that I will go to some city to make a speech, 
you know, fly in and out in one flight, and strictly for the Mobilization, 
then the bill will be turned over to Mobilization, but it is not^ — it is 
only, the limitation on it is our very poor finance. But there is no set 

Mr. Conley, Mr. Dellinger, how many other persons are regularly 
employed by the National Mobilization ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, remember that you — you say how many others 
are regularly employed. I have made clear I am not employed. 

Mr. Conley. I am sorry. How many other persons are employed ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, this is a very changing thing. And since I 
have been out of conunission, in the hospital, beginning just about the 
time of the elections, in which the Mobilization had an active organi- 
zation, urging people not to vote for any of the prowar candidates, and 
since I have not yet been back to the office, although I have done some 
consulting on the phone, I literally do not know the size of the staff 

Mr. Conley. Well, let me ask you this, sir, if I may : Let's go back 
and say, take January of this last year, the beginning of the year. 

Mr. Dellinger. January ? 

Mr. Conley. January 1968. Approximately how many employees 
did you have at that time ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Oh, very few because we were in a very transitional 
period between the events at the Pentagon, when we had had a swollen 
staff and uncertainty and planning, and so forth, as to what actions, 
if any, we would have next. 

You also should understand that we try to operate on a subsistence 
basis and that we may — for example, I mean one figure that does come 
to mind, which I think is relatively accurate, is that in September, or 
possibly early October, we had a staff of about — what we called a 
staff — of about 20 people. 

Mr. Conley. You are referring to September or October ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Of this year. 

Mr. Conley. Of this year. 


Mr. Dellingee. And yet our total outlay for what might laugh- 
ingly be called salaries or wages, well, we didn't pay it. We paid sub- 
sistence, which meant that some people took $10 a week for which, 
you know, maybe to eat sandwiches or what-have-you, or other 
people — I think that the highest that was paid, well, 50 or perhaps 
60 dollars, $60 to a woman who had a dependent or two. 

Mr. CoNLET. Well, Mr. Dellinger 

Mr. Dellingek. In other words, we pay according to need. We are 
not a salaried organization. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Then 20 possible people that were working 
for you in September of this year, were they all based out of a New 
York office, or were part of these numbers that you are mentioning in 
the Chicago 407 Dearborn Street ^ 

Mr. Dellingee. No, the lease on the Chicago office expired almost 
simultaneously with the end of the convention, and it was unfortunate 
because it would have been better for us to have maintained an office 
for at least a few weeks afterward, but we had no office in Chicago, 
other than perhaps in a mail drop, and of course we had an active 
office and committee members there, but no real Mobilization office in 
Chicago in September. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Now, Mr, Dellinger, with reference to the Chicago office and to the 
convention, did Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis act as coproject di- 
rectors for the National Mobilization Committee in connection with 
the activities in Chicago ? 

Mr. Dellingee, During the period prior to the convention 

Mr, CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dellingee. — they were coproject directors. 

Might I just make a little statement at this point, Mr. Chairman ? 

Mr. IcHOED. To explain ? 

Mr. Dellingee. It is just that I am willing and even anxious to tell 
anytliing about myself or anything that I know. In view of the climate 
of repression and the type of thing that happened to me with the 
bombs that were sent to me and destruction of the press and the lino- 
type at Libertarian Press that I referred to, along with the receipt of 
a death threat at that time, it is not my intention to talk about other 

Also, I think that other people can basically speak best for them- 
selves and express their views. However, within that approach, which 
I believe is covered by the first amendment — but which I would take 
anyway, whether it was or not — within that approach I would be 
happy, you know, in obvious cases of this kind, people who are already 
publicly identified, and so forth, to say yes. 

Mr. IcHOED. Of course, we will have to rule on that when those ques- 
tions arise, but certainly, if we abided by that request, it would cer- 
tainly limit your testimony to what you merely wanted to testify about 
because this could be construed quite broadly by you. But let's proceed, 
and as those matters come up, the Chair will rule. 

Mr. Dellingee. Yes ; well, obviously I think I could spend my time 
better than going over details of wliich offices, and so forth. I mean, 
there are many positive things I could be doing to try to stop the war 
and to organize people. So it is not really limiting it to questions chosen 
by me or the use of time that I would prefer. 

21-706— 69— pt. 3 2 


Mr. IcHORD. These questions are pertinent. The background and op- 
erations of your committee, of whicli you are chairman, and of your 
own activity, these are pertinent. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I have been happy to cooperate, but I just want 
to point this out about other individuals. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will have to rule on those questions as they 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with the National Mobi- 
lization Committee, on the average, what are the total overhead and 
salary costs of the National Mobilization Committee, say on a monthly 
basis? Can you give us just an average? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have tried to explore, give you the best of 
my recollection of the answers to questions or of information that you 
have solicited that I am really not an expert on and that I am in danger 
of misleading you. And I have to say that in this area I am really not 
competent, and we do have a treasurer and we normally have a fine 
committee who have this information, both in many cases in writing 
in the books or are familiar with it. I have to say that whenever I write 
an appeal letter, I buzz the office, if I am in Liberation^ and I say, 
""V\Tiat is our weekly overhead now ?" 

And they tell me, and I put it in the letter, and undoubtedly, since 
many of our private letters are in your hands, you have some of tliose 
letters which tell at that time what the budget was, but I am not in a 
position to estimate. I would just mislead you if I tried to come up with 
such a figure, but it is very variable, according to whether we are ap- 
proaching a major action or not and/or according to whether it is a 
period like January of '68 when we had almost no staff, I am sure. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, let the Chair advise you, Mr. Dellinger, that you 
are not going to be required to testify as to matters beyond your recol- 
lection. We don't expect you to recall each and every event or each and 
every date and we realize that there are some activities outside of the 
coimnittee, outside your knowledge, and just so advise the counsel in 
your reply. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it is outside of my knowledge. If I had known 
ahead of time, I could have looked up and told you, but I didn't know 
and I don't remember. 

Mr, IcHORD. All right, Mr. Dellinger, what are National Mobiliza- 
tion's basic or major sources of income? 

In other words, where do you expect to get your income from and 
where do you get it from ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, we get our income from different types of 
sources. We ask participating organizations to contribute either di- 
rectly or indirectly. There is rarely an administrative 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, sir, I don't mean to interrupt, but what do you 
mean when you say "directly or indirectly" ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I was just going to explain, but there is rarely an 
administrative committee meeting at which I don't say, "We are this 
much in debt. The phone is in danger of being shut off,'' or whatever 
it is, "Which organizations can pledge some money?" And so forth. 
That is the direct. 

Indirectly, often if we prepare literature and an organization will 
take copies of the literature and mail it out to its membersliip or its 
lists — in other words, taking the cost of the stamps and perhaps of 
the envelopes and the running them off — although it is apt to be volun- 


tary, on some occasions, when they can do it, we ask them to pay us 
the cost of the leaflet, or whatever it is. If they can't, why, we don't. 
That is the first source. 

The second source is — second source comes from f undraising letters 
or personal contacts. 

The third source is occasional f undraising benefits that we hold. For 
example, if somebody has just come back from a trip to North Vietnam, 
helping in the release of prisoners, or from Pans, where they may 
have talked with the American and the Vietnamese negotiators, we 
will hold a little invitation event at which he makes a report, and 
people are asked to contribute. 

The fourth source or method is whenever possible at major events, 
which range all the way from public meetings — although I mean, you 
know, like speeches at a hall, although often they clear very little or 
don't clear all the expenses — to wherever possible, collections or 
pledges, at events such as the rally at the Lincoln Memorial in October, 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Mr. Bellinger, what are some of the organ- 
izations? You mentioned that organizations contribute to National, 
member organizations I believe is the way you described it. Wliat are 
some of these organizations that you have reference to that do con- 
tribute financially ? 

]Mr, Dellinger. It would be very unfair of me, I think, to select out 
anyone's, and again it would be hard for me to be sure that I was being 
accurate. But if you look at the administrative committee list and the 
list of the cooperating organizations, you can be sure that every one of 
them has been dumied on many occasions and that some of them at least 
have actually contributed money or have, most of them have mailed 
out things, have contributed indirectly. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, on some of your letterheads, or notes of 
your meetings, appears a list of people who attended the meetings. I 
think you are familiar with what I am referring to. And they are 
named by their name, their city, and the particular group that they 
represent. I don't happen to have one of them in front of me at the 
moment, but are these the type of groups that you are referring to, sir ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. All right. 

Do you maintain lists of these groups that supply moneys to you ? 
I mean, are they within the records of National Mobilization ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, we try. I am afraid we are not always as 
efficient as we should be. But we try to keep a record of contributors, 
both individual and organizational, and it may even occasionally be 
in the minutes, that after a request from the chairman or from the 
treasurer, that X organization agreed to send in a hundred dollars 
within the next week. We try to keep records of this kind of a thing, 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, would you be willing to supply those 
records to this committee, showing the sources of income, the groups 
that contributed? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I remember something that Averell Harri- 
man said on TV the other night, that he had never turned down yet a 
job that he hadn't been offered, and I think that if such a request was 
made then I would have to deal with it, and I imagine — I mean, I have 
to see the terms in which it was made, and so forth. I imagine that I 

2704 DTSErmox of : y ? s doxocratic xatioxal coxvz^tion 

-ini to La-re ^ oi 'i** a'iiaiiiisTadve coniniiriee lo .iis- 

. - ;, "We TT-r " - ' ;i'!iL= and imo wl^igp and. lieii we wo ili i 

r =»3i:ie ki: : ii thai lime, coiiectiTelT. I myself a= 

- - - :: know. I am imia.gnrir^ 

r kind of fomiai rti^uest. 

- -\ - anse, as I say. I tMnk 

- , - - who i!2?-"^ have sejii 

mcKiey 111. : : - -ins^per- 

h""-'^ zre ;zi _- :^.--. ...„_. ^ _;_._ :. ^is on oc- 

This lypt of T-:_i-_: 

-^-' ^[~ 7 ~^-, >: me isk yoTL mis: Do ycm nave in 

-- - "i-fi in Washingtcn loday a list of che^e 

cr^ ~ —iiiiXarionil Mobilization! 

}h i i Ani ziiTue I XKiid laake a little -^x- 

' ; .1^^ . T , : 7 : •:• iny . y c u kn'j^. ieginniare mq niry 

ihii yc 

TTe : As I iniios-ce-i eiriier. wie do n'X 

have — -dip cards, and T'B'zpie and orsa- 

7 r lo whi: 3 iTiviiy is being 

-7 Firr-Tr: ::. are endiii- 

hink more im- 

. .- a e«istantlT 

i - : . we do not <^)erate ba^callT by votes or by 

: e. We operate om the basis of aoaut kind of 

— " ^'"-^ ^ " ^oai <w cffliader an action, we 

iat all intereaed in gtopping 

^ -:i nz:~ " nz an organization or a 

-s IT, i- i : . - among^ _ 

rr ' this is ~ ion to im -. 

:.- i :i ..- -: r' -icons, saying. "Weh. 

- 7 ' - ' ^ iati€«i cr :.- r- 

Mr I :: - i . ieyoor ._ '. 

li_ _ .- - - in yooT organizatifm? 

Mr. Lm^ 1 es- yes, Jlight. :s somewhat from the 

- — '- -- '' - r. as I say. oi :„- ^~i.:, .^hment or more tra- 

_ n. I presume that 

J'' : : yadonal MoblH- 


i:r National Mobili- 

yir. T^ni Ts 7 ire if I tried to leD yon the name of 

xb& ban - ^ — . _•- To l;*r - --' -^^rly honest. I know. I 

€V€2i s _ OTH I — Xe^w Toik and. vou 


know, there are people who kifcow. bar ii is mac the kzod of iciormation 
that I carry aroimd in the top of mv head, and I am apt to give too. 
rwo riamft s which actnalbr come from two diSerent banks. I am apt lo 
TnaJr p the wrons oombinalioii. 

3Ir. CoxLET. Do you have a treasurer that actually mainl:ai:L£ ~""= 
bank accoimt f 

^Lr. DixLixGEB. Tee. we do. 

3Ir. Coxx-ET. Would you identify him. please- by name? 

!Mr. Deujxgze. WelL sinoe his xiam^ is on the leCTerbead. whiA is 
information whi'jh I am sure you already have 

Air. CoxixY. That is what I have ref-~^^~ '--'". 

Mr. Deu-Ixgee. — or should, any-^ _ - - : ' r :^-iz_z~. -HS 

nanie i? Eric Weinberger- 
Mr. CoxLET. It does appear on the correspondence that yon hive 
in front of you. I believe, doesn't it ! 

Air. DziiixGEE. WeE. it is not along vi^ side here, bat some of our 
letterheads do have it. I still haven't read this letter. It may veiy 
-rrell refer to him. It is no aecret. 

]Mr. CoxLET- All right, now in that conneeficm is Mr. Wenlia^ger — 
Weinberg ! 

Mr. DnxixGZE. Weinberger. 

3»Ir. CoxLET. All right, sir. is he authorized to draw diecis on this 
acx-oimt and to make dejxjsits in the account ! 

3Ir. Delixs-gee. WelL we have a deposit procedure whidh. bsacallr 
he oversees, but actually we generally iiave sorcsebody in the office wiib 
does the sometimes tedious w^^rk — bec-ause we get many anaU diecfe 
instead of large ones — of. you know, opening the mail and anting <iat 
the deposits. I am not even sure he sees every depoax. He oversees 
the b«x)k5 very carefully and scrupuloa^. and aH chcdB> hfswever. 
must be agned by at ieaac two r>e«?ple. 

Mr. CoxiXT. Xow is he 

Mr. Deloxger. And iic is cue ?i the <M3!es who is andwriaed to 
sign them. 

Again, the list of ihe signees has varied, or signers has varied, you 
know, from period to p«er::'>d. b:ii iie is. ~o the wst of my koowfedge, 
he has been treasurer from very eariy in the existence, and has always 
been one of the signers. I have, for a long rime, been a x>signer. but 
there are others- 
Mr. CoxLET. All right, if I understand wh^r you are saying, to 
make it clear here, he does nor ne.^sisariiy have to sign a eoeck. You 
and somebody else who has -:he>:k authority comd sisn a check. 

Mr. Deleixgek. WelL if yon want to know the rmiii. wie keep the 
checkbook locked in a safe, to which Eric Weinberger is the only 
person who has the key. so it is extremely dimciut f'-"«" anybody else 
ro cet hold of a check and to find two signers without his knowledge. 

Mr. CoNXET. All right. 


Air. Deixixger. That's our normal procedtire, anyway. 

Mr. CoxLET. Xow. is this bank ac»x»unt maintained in the name of 
Xational Mobilization Committee ! I mean, is that the way it is ! 

Mr. Deixixger. To the best of my knowledge- yes. 

Mr. CoxLET. Do you maintain baink aceotmts in any other banks 
in the Xew York ai«a nor Xationai Mobilizaticai Commiiree! 


Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, no, but you know 
for one thing, as I say, I have been out of touch for over a month. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now 

Mr. Dellinger. And, you know, I am not sworn to be — to know. Or 
to remember. 

Mr. CoNLET. Did you all have a bank account operational in Chi- 
cago, a separate account from the New York account, in connection 
with the activities that occurred in Chicago ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, there was a bank account in Chicago also 
during that period. 

Mr. CoNLEY. During the period that you maintained an office? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

JNIr. Conley. Now, were you authorized to draw on that bank 
account ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I was not in Chicago, except as an occasional 
visitor, and to the best of my — ^you know, actually I signed checks 
for a nmnber of organizations, although it is largely formal and 
I rarely do it, but I am practically certain that I never signed a 
form — you know, you sign these little things giving you the right to, 
and I don't believe I ever signed a form in connection with the Chi- 
cago bank account and I certainly do not remember ever having signed 
a clieck on that account. 

Mr. Conley. Now, either Mr. Hayden or Mr. Davis — and I must 
apologize for not recalling which one that said this — indicated that 
Mr. Weinberger was authorized to sign on the Chicago account as 
well and that one or the other of them — and again I don't recall which 
one it was — was authorized to sign on that account. Is that your 
understanding of the way the Chicago bank account was handled? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, 1 know that Mr. Weinberger, who has done 
a very good job, not only for the Mobilization but also for the [Fifth 
Avenue Vietnam Peace] Parade Committee in terms of supervising 
the finances and the books, met with the person in charge of the 
Chicago office to go over bookkeeping procedures to try to be sure that 
they were informative and accurate and kept up to date, and so forth, 
so I know that he supervised. 

In fact, I myself made the arrangements for that meeting. I know 
that he had some kind of general supervisory relationship to the Chi- 
cago account, although you must remember that he was, like myself, 
only periodically in Chicago. 

_ I am sorry, but I literally do not know whether this included the 
right for him to sign checks or not. 

Mr. Conley. All right, Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the bank 
accounts in New York, you indicated that you were hesitant because 
you weren't sure that you wouldn't get two names backward. 

Mr. Dellinger. I might give you half the Liberation bank and 
half the Mobilization. 

Mr. Conley, All right, sir, would you be willing, if an investigator 
from this committee contacted you next week, to supply to that man 
the name of the bank ? 

jNIr. Dellinger. The name of the bank ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger. I believe I would. 

Mr. GuTMAN. I will save you the trouble. I will write a letter to, 
the committee and inform them. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Gutman. 

Now, Mr. Bellinger, in connection with the project undertaken by 
National Mobilization in Chicago, do you have an approximate cost as 
to what this ran into, in terms of dollars and cents, to 

Mr. Bellinger. In Chicago ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. An estimate on your part, if you have one. 

Mr. Bellinger. You laiow, I am sorry, but first of all, you see, the 
complicated nature of our financing — we try to decentralize the ex- 
penses as much as possible, and I already mentioned, for an example, 
to get organizations to mail out our literature and to take the costs 
themselves. Also, for example, when we hold an administrative meet- 
ing, most people come in, they either pay for the travel out of their own 
expenses or in a nmnber of cases they get the money from the 
organization which they represent. 

So, first of all, if we knew how much money went through the 
National Mobilization Committee bank accounts in New York and 
Chicago, that would not tell us the whole picture. 

Secondly, I will have to plead ignorance again and to say that 
there are competent people within the Mobilization. It is not an evasion 
on my part, but particularly after having been out of touch for a 
month, but even a month ago I might not have been able to 

Mr. CoNLEY. Perhaps I read the wrong thing into what you just 
said, sir, but you indicated that if you knew how much money had 
come into the account and how much had gone out, that would not tell 
the whole story. 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Bo I imply or infer from that, that there must be a 
deficit, as a result of what occurred in Chicago, at the present time? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, I wasn't making any reference either to a 
deficit or a surplus. I was saying that we try to decentralize everj^thing. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let me ask you, sir 

Mr. Bellinger. Including the expenses and, therefore, other orga- 
nizations incurred expenses in connection with recruiting people for 
Chicago, going there themselves, or expenses in Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Bo you have a deficit as a result of the Chicago project ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I am afraid we have a considerable deficit. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Bo you have any estimate as to the size of that deficit ?' 
Understanding that we don't intend to hold you to the dollars and cents. 

Mr. Bellinger. No, I understand, but I just — I wouldn't dare 
estimate at this point. I plead delinquency, but due to the fact that I 
have been away for a month — I literally, I don't remember what it was 
and I don't know what it is now. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would it be in terms of a thousand, or in terms of 
thousands ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No, it would be, I am sure that it is at least several 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Mr. IcHORD. At that point we have been testifying for an hour and 
15 minut-es. Would you gentlemen like a brief break? 

Mr. Bellinger. I really feel fine. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed. Let there be order in the hearing room. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, in some of the earlier literature and 


newspaper accounts dealing with the movement of the National Mobil- 
ization Committee to Chicago, there were statements by many that 
there would be thousands of people who would converge on Chicago as 
a result of the efforts of National Mobilization. 

In fact, some of the statements may have been huindreds of thousands. 
I think I recall one press account that said National Mobilization was 
hoping that they would mass perhaps 500,000 in Chicago during the 
week of the convention. 

I wanted to hand you 

Mr. Bellinger. We should get rid of whoever said that. 

Mr. CoNLET. I want to hand to you 

Mr. IcHORD. Just a minute. 

Officer, will you inform the people outside that there is too much 
disorder or noise in the hall? They are making it more difficult for 
the Chair to hear the questions and the answers. 

Mr. CoxLEY. I want to hand a letter, Mr. Dellinger, dated August 10, 
[1968], which purports to carry your signature and in which you pared 
down your estimates, or at least your estimates were as follows, and I 
refer you specifically, if I may, sir, to the second page. It has been 
nnderlined near the middle of the paragraph at the top of the page. 
Quote : 

We expect and need thousands of persons to be in Chicago from August 2.3rd and 
24th on. We expect and need tens of thousands on August 28th and 29th. * * * 

Mr. Dellinger, my question to you is this : To the best of your knowl- 
edge, approximately liow many persons actually went to Chicago as a 
recuU of the urging, the agitation, the propagandizing, the informa- 
tion that was disseminated from National Mobilization? Do you have 
an estimate as to how many were there ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, let me say two things about that: First of all, 
one of the things I have learned in the last 3 years of being involved in 
mass mobilizations of one kind or another is that there is never any 
agreement on the numbers. And it is my general impression that all 
mass events, whether of the left, the right, or the center, tend to be 
overestimated in terms of the numbers. 

Wliere we have tried to make a count, it generally has turned out 
somewhat less than we thought were there. But, on the other hand, 
other events that I have attended, and when I compare tlie numbers 
with other events, whether it is even the crowd leaving a football sta- 
dium or a baseball stadium, I find they are also overestimated. So I 
find that, in other words, the science of counting crowds is very 

In the Chicago situation it was particularly difficult because many 
people were there in many different capacities. They might, during 
part of the time, be on the convention floor and, during part,, in the 
Hilton or one of the other hotels and, during part of the time, they 
might \)e. in Lincoln Park or ( rrant Park. 

Also, because of the nature of the police assaults upon the demon- 
strators, it was dangerous to be involved in either extreme, either to be 
isolated, where you could be attacked and beaten, or in very large 
crowds, which might also provoke an attack. So the result was that 
from this and another factor which I should mention, namely, the di- 
versity of the people there and the diversity of their interests, and the 


decentralized nature of the program, even of the Mobilization, which 
was not the sole group there — that is, we organized movement centers 
for workshops and for, out of which individual decentralized actions 
would be planned. As a result, the crowd that was there was scattered 
throughout the city a great deal of the time, and, finally, as to this 
business about how manj^ we might have brought, again it is hard 
to say. 

Mr. CoNLET. I don't want to say that you brought, but that you 
directly, through National Mobilization, were able to say that you 
would attribute their being there to the efforts of National Mobiliza- 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would be too hazardous to say whether a 
20-year-old kid or a 50-year-old housewife who came, to what extent 
did she come because she wanted to hear the rock bands promised by 
the Yippies, she wanted to march to the convention hall to call for an 
end to the war, or because she was hoping to lobby one of the delegates. 
There were just such a variety of motives and a crossover in actions 
amongst many of the people, anyway. 

The Mobilization just is not in a position — we seek, we have no 
desire to claim credit for everybody that was there. For us, you see, it 
is credit, not discredit, but I just would have to leave it open that way. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well 

Mr. Dellinger. We did our best to bring as many people as we 

Mr. IcHORD, The Chair will state that being there in Cliicago, I a^ree 
with the witness: it would be an almost impossible task to est' late 
how many people were there. 

Mr. Dellinger. This particular letter was written in the hopes that 
we would get more people there than at that time appeared to be pre- 
pared to come. 

Incidentally, on the estimates, I never, to the best of my memory, 
have ever estimated there would be X number of thousands at an 
event. Because, as I say, even after it, you can't tell whether it was right 
or not, and I have tried to indicate the massive nature of what we 
expected by saying thousands or tens of thousands, but I have never 
myself either made or condoned an estimate on specifics like saying a 
hundred thousand or five hundred thousand. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move to something else, on 
August 15 of this year, August 15, 1968, just before the opening of the 
Democratic Party's Convention in Chicago, Havana radio broadcast 
in mixed English and Spanish what it claimed was a telephone inter- 
view with you. 

I will read excerpts from this interview and ask whether the broad- 
cast is an accurate recording of your words at that time. 

Mr. Dellinger. Are you going to translate tlie Spanish, or read it 
in Spanish? 

Mr. CoNLEY. It has been translated for me. I can't give it to you 
in Spanish, sir. 

According to the broadcast, you were asked this by the interWewer : 

Your organization has announced a protest demonstration to be held in Chicago 
during the Democratic Party's national convention. Could you tell us the aims of 
such action and what the action will consist of? 


XovT. TOur answer in part was as follows, and I read this as- 

^Ir. Dellixger. Do tou have that written out so I will be able to 
look at it afterwards without taking notes ? 

^Ir. IcHOKD. Yes. the document will be handed to the witness. 

;Mr. GuTMAX. Will you hare another copy of it ? It would make it 
so much easier if we had a copy to follow as you read. 

(Document handed to witness.) 

Mr. CoNXET. All right. Quote: "the demonstration will take place 
during some 6 days" 

Mr. Dellixger. Excuse me. Where is this: it is not at the beginning. 
I just want to find it. 

Mr. CoNTJET. Could you show him where it is ? 

'Mr. GuTMAX. Wliat page is it ? Oh. I see it. 

Mr. CoxLET. Third paragraph. I believe, sir. on the first page. 

!Mr. GiTTMAX. In the middle of the second line, right ? Leaving out 
part of it ? Okay. 

!Mr. CoxLET. Yes. Quote — 

the demonstration will take place during some 6 days — from 24 to 29 August. 
Through it. we wiU try to show the i)eople of the United States and the Demo- 
cratic Party that there cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States 
while the government's ctirrent foreign policy continues * * *. 

And the transmission does go on. but this is the particular part that 
I wish to ask you about. Are those words an accurate reflection of 
wh'ir you said in that particular interview ? 

^Ir. Deixix'Gek. Well, do you mind if I just finish the sentence? 
[Continues reading :] 

that regardless of who the candidate is or what his platform is. we will keep up 
our active resistance in the streets until all U.S. soldiers return from Vietnam 
and the current policy of repression against the Xegro community is halted. 

I certainly endorse those statements, those sentiments. That was my 
attitude on August 15. It is my attitude today. I can't vouch, of course, 
for the words, you know, if it was translated into Spanish and then 
back again, but that is an accurate representation of my aims and views. 

]Mr. CoxLET. All riarht. We were going to get to the remainder of it. 
I didn't want you to think we weren't. 

Mr. Dellixger. Eight. 

Mr. CoxLET. I was breaking it down into two parts, if I might. 

With reference to that first part, which concludes with "the govern- 
ment's current foreign policy continues.'' I want to ask you specifically 
what you meant by the words, "we will try to show * * * that there 
cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States while * * *"? 

Mr. Dellixger. Yes. Well, maybe even somewhere later in this 
transcript — I haven't read it — ^but first of all let me say that I, to 
the best of my 

Mr. IcHOPj). Do you wish to have the opportunity to read it before 
commenting ? 

Air. Dellixger. Xo, it is not necessary yet. Thank you. 

But to the best of my ability, I give basically the same interview 
or express the same sentiments. I may change the language a little, 
whether it is an educated or, you know, yoimg or an old audience, 
hut I express the same sentiments to any press and during this period I, 
for example, expressed similar sentiments to the press at least from 


England, France. Belgium, Holland, West Germany, Canada, United 

States, as well as Havana. 

Xow, what I have tried to do during that period, and it is some- 
thing that I still believe very deeply, is that we in the United Stat^ 
because we are a little smoother and more, quote, '•civilized"* on the 
surface than Xazi Germany, we must not be able to continue business 
as usual, making it possible for the American people to napalm people 
and to uproot people and conmiit genocide in Vietnam, or in the black 
community at home, which is referred to in this section, or in Latin 
America or throughout the world. 

We must not be able to do this and people think, "Well, everything 
is smooth and tranquil here." and. you know, really there are fanatics 
who are worried about it. But, you know, it is no more real to the 
American people than the death camps were to the German people. 

So although I am, by conviction and politics and philosophy and 
religion, a pacifist and myself only take part in and advocate non- 
violent actions, I believe that within the non\"iolent framework, and 
also, of course, within others who in one way or another do not share 
all of that philosophy, that it is tremendously important that we con- 
front the American people. Xot just the political figures who might be 
deemed by some to be responsible, but I believe the responsibility goes 
to us all. We confront them with the reality of the situation and make 
it impossible for us to gorge ourselves on our high standard of living 
and our consumer culture and to dismiss this death of American boys 
and Vietnamese men. women, and children which is going on daily as 
long as the war continues. And it is my intention, it was my intention 
then and it is my intention today, to do everything I can to assure the — 
to make it impossible for the American people to sink back into that 
kind of apathy and acquiescence. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger 

Mr. Dellixger. And that is what I mean by no peace and 

Mr. IcHORD. ;Mr. Dellinger, the Chair last night read an editorial 
in which it was stated that we often forget the activities of terrorist 
Viet Cong, who, since the beginning of 196S. have killed 12.000 South 
Vietnamese civilians and abducted about 25 a day. 

My question is : In these interviews, do you speak out against those 
kinds of atrocities, too '. 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, I try very hard not to fall into the trap of 
equating the violence of the Viet Cong or the Xational Liberation 
Pront and the vast majority of the Vietnamese people, try not to equate 
that with the aggressive violence of the invader. I myself 

!Mr. IcHORD. Is terrorist activity not aggressive? 

Mr. Dellixger. I beg your pardon ? 

Mr. Ichord. Is terrorist activity directed against South Vietnamese 
civilians not aggressive \ 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, you see. I make a comparison between the 
Vietnamese people who feel that there is no other way to defend the 
independence and the sanctity of their homeland than by the use of 
A-iolence. I compare them to the American patriots imder George 
Washington and of the time of the American Revolution, who also 
used violence — and the word "terror"* is a tough one. you know, what 
constitutes "terror," but who applied methods similar to those of the 


NLF against the British and also, bj^ the way, against American 

Although I myself advocate nonviolence, I do not feel that I as an 
American have the right to trj- to be self-righteous, or could be self- 
righteous, about the methods employed by the Vietnamese who are 
certainly fighting for the freedom and independence of the Vietna- 
mese people. 

Mr, IcHORD. I take it as a pacifist, then, you do justify violence 
under certain circumstances? 

Mr. Dellixger. "Well, as a pacifist I understand people, including 
the American patriots, including the Vietnamese patriots, including 
the Cuban patriots, including the black patriots, our internal colony, 
people who feel that it is necessary to resort to violence in order ro 
throw off an oppressive force. And I do make a distinction between, 
as I say, an imperialist country like the United States, which has its 
tentacles all over the world and has the liighest standard of living in 
the world, based upon the fact that it bleeds those countries and keei)s 
them underdeveloped and is now, as I see it, fighting a war of example 
in Vietnam. They can afford to lose the resources of Vietnam, l)Ut 
they feel that they can't afford to have the underdeveloped and under- 
privileged people of the world get it into their head that they can 
win their freedom and independence. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do I understand you to say that you believe such 
terrorist activity to be justified under the circumstances I 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, as I say, I draw a distinction. I did not 
condemn my brother, who during World War II went overseas. WolL 
actuall}' he was in the medical battalion, but as part of the war. But I 
myself, partly because of — despite the fact that I had been very active 
in the anti-Xazi movement as a kid and not that good at it, or any- 
thing, I myself, partly because of the method and partly because of the 
imperialist system which was backing the American war effort, I my- 
self did not bear arms. 

As I say, I went to jail rather than hide behind the clerical exemp- 
tion, but I do not criticize my brother. 

I think these are individual decisions that people have to make, and 
particularly when faced with a menace like Hitlerism in the thirties 
or like the American imperialist aggression throughout the world to- 
day. I have a great deal of sympathy for people who resort to violence 
in order to overthrow this kind of thing, but it is not my position, and 
when I was in Hanoi I had no difficulties of a certain kind of under- 
standing with the Vietnamese. But I pointed out to them that Norman 
Morrison, who was a national hero in Vietnam because he had Inirned 
himself in front of the Pentagon in order to bring home to the Ameri- 
can people what they were doing to Vietnamese men, women, and 
children, that Norman Morrison was ready to give up his own life that 
way, but that he would not even shoot down a plane that was coming 

And I pointed out that I, that Staughton Lynd and A. J. Muste. 
whom the Vietnamese all knew, that none of us would engage in violent 
activity, but I did not feel that in my heart or in my politics to con- 
demn or criticize them for their use of violence. 

Mr. IcHORD. I had the experience, Mr. Dellinger, the other day, of 
meeting a woman who had two sons, one of whom had volunteered for 
the Army and volunteered for Vietnam to fight for what he thought 


was right, and the other son, she said, was a pacifist and had stated that 
he was going to violate the draft laws. 

It is rather difficult to give a mother advice, 'Wliat kind of advice 
conld you have given her ? 

I apologize for interrupting the counsel. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, but Tt is very helpful. It helps because the 
point is, I hold strong convictions, and from a lecture platform or in 
an article or in a general way I will always present those positions as 
forcefully as I can, but I do not believe in indoctrinating people or 
giving them advice and I did not — for example, my brother was a little 
3'ounger than I, and when I came out of jail the first time he came to 
me a little bit in anguish because he also was suspicious of the Ameri- 
can economic and political system which had supported Hitler earlier 
and had not helped the Jews, would not let them in, and now was going 
into this holy war. But on the other hand, he felt that it was necessary 
and if he in a sense came to me for advice, and I wouldn't give it to 
him because I think that things that people wrestle with in their own 
conscience, and I hope to be part of what they wrestle with by what 
I write and demonstrate and act, but I never advise anybody to regis- 
ter or not to register, to go into the Army or leave the Army, to bear 
arms or not to bear arms. 

Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead with your questions. Counsel. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. I have one question on that point. 

I was listening very intently and of course I can respect your views 
and your principles, but I note in talking about nazism and talking 
about what you termed American aggressive imperialism that you did 
not say anything in condemnation of Communist aggressive imperial- 
ism. Was this an oversight or do you in fact think that there is not a 
problem of Communist aggressive imperialism ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I was a little distressed that when we were at 
Chicago, and it was immediately following the period and during the 
period in which the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia 

Mr. AsHBROOK. This was to stabilize the situation, though. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, but let me finish because it answers your ques- 
tion. I was a little distressed that, although I made a number of public 
statements to the press and in other places condemning the Soviet in- 
vasion of Czechoslovakia in as strong terms as I could, that normally 
this was not picked up. I am not saying that this was, you know, indi- 
rect censorship or anything, but it would have been helpful, I think, if 
at that time it could have been made clear what our attitude was, be- 
cause I think that in the cold war atmosphere, and certainly in the 
past this atmosphere has been encouraged and developed by this 
committee — and that's one of my deep reasons for deep opposition to 
this committee — people think automatically, or some people think that 
automatically that people like myself are one-sided about this. I don't 
believe that the situation 

Mr. AsHBROOK. You still haven't said whether you think there is a 
threat or whether you have the same condemnation of Communist 
aggressive imperialism as that you have charged the United States 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I thought I indicated that I condemned, and 
I have signed public statements as well as made public speeches con- 
demning, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I think that it has not 
ended up at the present stage in the kind of genocide that has been 


going on for years in Vietnam, but I think that this relates to the- 
peculiar conditions there. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. Genocide? You mean the white races and others 
weren't suffering from genocide ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, this seems a little silly to me because I am 
indicating that I oppose aggression, including Soviet aggression, and 
somehow or other you seem unwilling to give up the idea that I don't. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. No, you have now stated, but at first I didn't think 
you had stated. 

Mr. Dellinger. Now, it so happens that I do not, however, believe 
that the — well, in most cases the opinions that come out in the press 
are a little superficial, and I think that much as I condemn the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, I do not think that the Americans should 
wash their hands of the responsibility they play in the situation because 
of the fact that the CIA and other Government agencies are organiz- 
ing subversion and the overthrow of government and direct and indi- 
rect invasion and aggression in all of these countries. And although I 
do not believe that this justifies the Soviet invasion — as I say, I oppose 
it — nonetheless, the ri^htwing in this country and the liberal center 
wing, which has been m the administration, actually makes it easier 
for the Soviet people, Soviet Government to fool its people because 
they can say, "Look, the CIA has overthrown this government and 
that government." 

I mean such as the bloodbath in Indonesia, as an example, and they 
can therefore more easily persuade their people that the CIA and the 
United States and West Germany, which has never been thoroughly 
denazified, that these countries are about to invade Czechoslovakia. 
But still, my solidarity is with people like Mrs. Daniel and the others 
who protested in Moscow, and one of the organizations to which I 
belong actually sent people to Moscow and Prague and Warsaw where 
they protested against the Soviet invasion and were arrested and in 
some cases beaten up for it. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, may I ask you a question in that 
regard? If apparently you do condemn the aggresive Communist 
activities equally with the so-called American imperialistic activities, 
I wonder why you do not spend at least a part of your time in articu- 
lating that condemnation ? 

Apparently this is the first time that I have heard of it right here. 
I wonder why you don't give at least a little time during your lec- 
tures and your Libertarian Press, and so forth? I wonder why you 
wouldn't devote just a little column on one of the pages to a condem- 
nation of that ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, you see- 

Mr. Watson. Or perhaps you have, and if so- 

Mr. Dellinger. I think that in part that is an indication of how 
out of touch your committee and its staff, its research staff is. 

Mr. Watson. Maybe you can put it in touch with it. Have you done 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I indicated that I, first of all, I made state- 
ments in Chicago and helped organize 

Mr. IcHORD. Have those been reported in the press ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I complained that they had not been adequately 
reported. Even I helped organize and signed a statement endorsing 


a protest action at the — if I remember, it was the Polish, or the 
only available Communist country office in Chicago, where the protest 
took place. 

Mr. Watson. I am not 

Mr. Dellinger. I have written, we have articles in Liberation 
magazine condemning it. I, as a member of the War Crimes Tribunal, 
which I believe rightly found the United States guilty of war crimes^ 
contrary to the Nuremburg charter and contrary to humanity, in 
Vietnam, I, as a member of that tribunal, was one of an overwhelming 
majority of the tribunal who signed the public statement condemning 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 

Mr. Watson. I personally would find it interesting if you could 
supply the committee with some of your public pronouncements con- 
demning Soviet aggressiveness in your various publications. 

And one final question in this regard : Did I understand you cor- 
rectly to say that it is not your business to give advice to people ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I tried to make that very clear. I said that 
I give a certain type of advice all the time, that is, 1 will speak gen- 
erally. I myself, for example, think that American soldiers should 
refuse to commit war crimes in Vietnam. 

Mr. Watson. Oh, certainly. 

Mr. Dellinger. And I will say that publicly. I think that young 
men should refuse to go into the Armed Forces and I will say that 

Mr. Watson. And you urge them to do that ? 

Mr. Dellinger. But I never to an individual, even when I am 
sought out by an individual, and the;^ say "Should I do this or that?" 
I never say, because first of all the price they pay, you know, whatever 
they do, they have to accept themselves and, also, if people take 
actions without having come to what I will call spirtually and psycho- 
logically and mentally, intellectually, to an understanding of why they 
do it, or at least why it becomes very difficult for them. I saw men 
crack in prison because they were there on a more shallow emotion 
than was able to sustain them. And so I never advise anybody and 
say, "You drop out of the Army," or, "You refuse to register for 
the draft," or, "You lay down your arms," but obviously that's my 
general position, and I try to shout that from the housetops. 

Mr. Watson. But you advise everybody to do that. You advise 
everyone to do that, but to understand you correctly, you do not give 
individuals that advice? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. Are you trying to 

Mr. Watson. Is that a fair statement ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It seems to me you are trying to — excuse me, I 
don't mean to impute evil motives, but you seem to be obscuring what 
I am saying. I make very clear that I do not advise individuals. I 

Mr. Watson. But you advise everyone generally ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I extol the virtues of this position because I believe 
that if the United States does not bring a halt to its aggression and if it 
does not do this through methods of power, which means denying the 
military-industrial complex the methods, the means, the manpower, 
money and manpower, to build a war machine and to use it in Santo 
Domingo and use it in Bolivia and use it in Paraguay and use it in 


Vietnam — unless we do that, why I see a very terrible future. There is 
ali"eady a terrible present. 

So I make that very clear; but if you come to me and say, "Now 
I am wondering," I might be tempted to suggest you resign from the 
House I^n-American Activities Committee, but I would rather call 
for its abolition ; but if you come to me and say, "Shall I or shall I not 
go into the Army?" there comes a point when I have to say, "You 
have to wrestle with your own conscience; you have to decide what 
you are prepared to do, what you believe is effective and right." 

Mr. Watson. Of course, it wouldn't be difficult for you to suggest 
that I resign from this committee ; would it ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I say that might be a temptation, but I think even 
that, I 

Mr. Watson. I believe I would agree with you, it would be a 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Dellinger. But what I would rather do, you see, is to have 
South Carolina turned into a democracy, which would elect peopie 
with all the citizens' votes. [Applause.] 

Mr. IcHORD. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the audience, the Chair 
will have to admonish you that you are guests of the committee. The 
business of this committee is the people's business and you are cer- 
tainly welcome. But the Chair has the duty of maintaining order, and 
outbursts, applause, or any kind of disturbing activity just can't be 
permitted. So I would appeal to your sense of propriety and ask that 
you abide by the rules, not only of the House, but of this committee. 


Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I might make just one statement 
in reference to the outburst, apparently against my State and me 
personally, down home we have an old saying whereby people are 
judged not only by their friends but by their enemies, and it is a 
compliment down my way to be opposed by certain individuals, so 
I take no personal offense to the outciy against me. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question in this same line, 
if I may. I notice that you indicated that you were a pacifist during 
the Second World War, or, specifically, with reference to Germany. 
And you indicate, as I understand it, and I certainly do not wish to 
put words in your mouth, that you still maintain a posture of being a 
pacifist. Is this a fair statement today ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I advocate and practice nonviolent methods, 
and even during World War II, or before World War II when I was 
put in jail, I used often to object to the word "pacifist" or "conscien- 
tious objector." I am not theological by nature and I don't like things 
being set up in a way that people who have peculiar beliefs are paci- 
fists and oppose war, and others. I believe that the adoption of non- 
violence is a necessity for the world and for the American people, 
and so when I, for example, went to prison during World War II, I 
refused to call myself — or before World War II — a conscientious ob- 
jector because that seemed to make it some special thing or special 
people. I called myself a war objector. 

Having made 'that little modification, my views are essentially 
basically the same today as they were then. I believe I am opposed to 
the use of military methods in an attempt to solve problems. 


Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. My question then is a very simple one, 
sir : You maintain that you are opposed to war, do you not ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, and I am also opposed to imperialism. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you, sir, is this: 
If you are opposed to war, you make no judgment in the World War 
II matter, other than to say you were opposed to war ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I did make a judgment. I was actively anti-Xazi. I 
picketed to try to have the United States lower — picketed and other 
public demonstrations to have the United States lower its immigra- 
tion barriers and allow Jews to come in, in order to save their lives. 
But the United States would not do that, and I always, before it was 
popular to do so in this country or in England, where I spent a year 
in 1936 to '37, I condemned Hitler and Hitlerism. But on the other 
hand, I myself was unwilling to adopt the methods which culminated 
in the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question has nothing to do with whether you 
were willing to adopt or not. My question has to do with, you did 
not, from the background material — let me finish my question. 

Mr. Bellinger. I am sorry. I beg your pardon. 

Mr. CoNLEY. From the background material which has been made 
available to me, I do not find you speaking out with quite the fervor in 
the World War II situation that you have adopted in the present 
Vietnam situation. What I am putting to you, sir, is that you did not, 
with the same fervor, make a judgment as to who was right and who 
was wrong in World War II as you have now. 

i\Ir. Bellinger. Witli the same fervor, I drew a moral distinction 
between the Fascist forces and particularly the popular forces, such as 
the resistance forces, in France and Italy and Yugoslavia and other 
places, who were fighting against fascism. My endorsement of the 
United States Government was less enthusiastic because I felt that I 
could not trust how a government elected and run in a largely undemo- 
cratic way dominated by large corporations and military-industrial 
interests, I did not feel confident to wliat outcome and to what purpose 
they would fight a war which seemingly was against fascism. And 
although I found that a very difficult matter, as I say, I never con- 
demned anybody who bore arms and I was in some ways ambivalent 
about it. 

Nonetheless, I think that much of my point was justified or verified 
when the United States first, for example, burned half a million people 
alive in Tokyo with fire bombs and then dropped — unnecessarily 
dropped — the atom bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in order to 
improve their power position after World War II and also prepared 
the climate which led to the McCarthy period and the foundation of 
committees like this, the repression of democracies in the — or the 
partial repression of democracies in the United States. 

I believe that the self-righteous unity of the American people in 
World War II, even behind a good cause, namely, antifascism, helped 
produce the assault upon the people of Korea and helped i^roduce the 
war in Vietnam. 

Mr. Conley. All right. If I may move you back to the Havana 
broadcast, the transcript of which you have in front of you 

!Mr. Bellinger. We got a long way from it ; yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The next question that you were asked, Mr. Bellinger, 

21-706 — 69— pt. 3 3 


in this broadcast was about the National Mobilization Comniittee's 
view of the peace talks which were presently under way in Paris. I am 
referring to the interview that you had with a Havana radio on 
about August 15, and your answer, and I quote — 

the U.S. delegation is trying to carry out a fraud. * ♦ * in reality, the U.S. 
Government is escalating the conflict. * * * 

Mr. Dellinger. Just a second, because you skipped so much ; I have 
to find where you skipped to. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Where is this ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I see the part about ''the U.S. delegation is trying 
to carry out a fraud." 

Mr. GuTMAX. Then he jumps down to the middle of the next 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, I want to give you all of these clauses, sir, 
and I assure you, you can offer any exi:)lanation. I think it will make it 
much quicker for us if we do : 

in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * * We think that in 
reality the United States 

Mr. GuTiMAN. Where are you now ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I am sorry. I am trying to follow j^ou. 

Mr. GuTMAX. You skipped the rest of that paragraph and you are 
down in the following paragraph. Where? Where? How many lines 
into the next paragraph ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. The beginning of the next paragraph. 

Mr. Dellixger. The next is number what ? 

Mr. GuTMAX. You know, Mr. Romerstein, if you have a marked 
copy — Okay. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness examine the document. 

Mr. Gttimax. You see, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Dellixger [reads]. 

But in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * * 

Mr. GuTMAx^. Then he skips three or four sentences and he goes 


Mr. Dellixger. What comes next? 
Mr. CoxLEY [reads]. 

We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war * * *. 

Mr. Dellixger. I say next : 

There are more soldiers in Vietnam now than when President Johnson made his 
speech on the eve of "April Fool" — 

And then they have added — 

a North American festivity similar to the "Day of the Innocents." Every week 
the North American planes drop more tons of bombs on the Vietnamese people. 
* * * more and more bombing missions. * * * 

Mr. IcHORD. Is the whole document already in the record? Mr. 
Counsel ? 

Mr. Cox^LEY. No, but we intend to offer it into the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. The entire document will be made a part of the record. 

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 1" and retained in 
committee files.) 

Mr. Dellixger [reads]. 


We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war and it is using 
the Paris talks as a pretext to make one believe that it has not escalated the 
war and that it wants peace. 

I subscribe to those sentiments. 

Mr. CoNLET. Just a minute, and there is one more, "One of the 

Mr. GuTMAN. Where are you reading now ? Next page ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I mentioned that Johnson's speech of March 31 
coincided with a proposal made by Herman Kahn, who was willing 
to have 

Mr. CoNLET. Third full prirruininh 

INIr. Dellinger. — to have 200 or 300 million people die in a nuclear 
war, that he made the Johnson program — he made it as a propo-al 
under the title 2 of the program for victory in Vietnam — that it 
would be possible to concentrate on the bombing on the narrow pan- 
handle, supported with shelling from ships like the Jersey^ and pre- 
tend or convince the American people and some of world opinion that 
this was a peace move, whereas actually from a military point of 
view it would help the United States. 

Yes, I subscribe to that statement. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, the next one is the third paragraph 
on the following page: 

One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the 

Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment. Let's see what you skipped before 
we get to that. 

Mr. IcHORD. The entire document will be in the record, 

Mr. CoNLEY. I will certainly let you go back and make any com- 
ment that you want about what I skipped. 

The third paragraph down. 

Mr. Dellinger. All right. Yes. 

Mr. Conley [reads]. 

One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the hypocrisy 
and fraud of the Democratic Party's political machinery, which talks of peace 
while escalating the war. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. Conley. Now these three quotations which are lifted from 
different portions of this interview, are these all accurate? As best 
you recall? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I subscribe to the general sentiments ex- 
pressed, yes — absolutely. I would like to stress that. 

IVIr. CoNLEY. All right. All right, sir. 

Now, if I may move you to the next question, which is as follows : 

Next Sunday marks the third anniversary of the Negro rebellion in the city 
of Watts. Mr. Dellinger, what can you tell us in this respect? 

Do you find the question, sir ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. And the answer, both. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now I would like to read to you this portion 
of your answer. 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. And then you certainly may supply anjrthing that 
j'ou wish to add to it : 


Right now there is intensive repression of U.S. Negro leaders 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading]. 

This month, there has been a well-planned * * * — 

And a word is indistinct, I believe, there 

]Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading], 

to liquidate Negro leaders, the leaders who are capable of heading the struggle 
for Negro liberation, but this is nothing new. We all know what happened to 
Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he became a threat to the established 
system * * * — 

And again there is an indication that some more words are 
indistinct. [Continues reading:] 

that the federal government and the state governments are carrying out a 
joint effort to eliminate many other youthful leaders who are less well known, 
leaders who get more and more i>opular support and who are actively organizing 
popular resistance. To cite an example, there is now a trial in progress against 
Huey Newton in Oakland, California, and the authorities are determined to 
wii>e out the leaders. Ho too, another leader Eldridge Cleaver, is threatened 
with being sentenced to a long prison term. Newton is in jail and is fighting 
for his life in the trial. 

Now my question, Mr. Dellinger, is this an accurate reporting of 
what you said in this particular interview ? 

Mr, Dellinger, Well, I am not sure about one or two words, in 
view of the fact that this apparently was translated back from the 
Spanish to the English, and I am not sure whether I used the word, 
for example, "liquidate," "to liquidate Negro leaders." However, I 
think that I subscribe to the general statements, including the fact 
that there is an attempt to eliminate the Black Panthers and many 
youthful leaders, and this came, this statement was made shortly after 
the police in Oakland, I believe it was, attacked a group of Black 
Panthers who were in a house, came out without arms and with their 
hands up, and actually did shoot and kill an 18-year-old Black Panther 
by the name of Bobby Hutton and did wound Eldridge Cleaver, and 
because of that 

Mr, IcHORD. Did wound whom ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Eldridge Cleaver ; and because of his having been 
attacked in this way by the police, his parole was revoked. Mean- 
while, Huey Newton that I refer to, as I say, was in jail and was 
fighting for his life in a trial, and it was clear to me — I won't pre- 
tend to be in the position of the Supreme Court at that point, but 
it seemed, I have not read everything, but it seemed to come through 
pretty clearly that there was not clearcut evidence to convict Huey 
Newton of what he was charged, and that the jury realized this, but 
so they gave some other charge of manslaughter, or some finding of 
manslaughter, which was completely irrelevant; either he attacked 
the jDolice or he didn't. It wasn't a case of manslaughter. And he is 
now m jail. 

And so I support this general thinking and I think it is similarly 
about Malcolm X. The CIA has been assassinating people throughout 
the world for too many years novv^, and it is my belief that vre can't 
maintain the geographical boundaries indefinitely and that a govern- 
ment that thinks it is morally and politically sound to assassinate o])- 


position political leaders abroad, whether it is the Dominican Republic 
or Cuba or Bolivia or South Vietnam or where, that that government 
and some of those agencies will not hesitate to assassniate political 
leaders in this country, . 

And I think that it would be very useful if we had a real mquiry, 
for example, into the actual events surrounding the assassination of 
President Kennedy, who was no radical, but obviously was killed 
under circumstances far different from those implied or stated by the 
"Warren Commission report. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, Mr. Bellinger, you make reference m here to 
Malcolm X, and I do want to talk with you a moment about that, if I 
may. The expression that is used here is : 

We all know what happened to Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he be- 
came a threat to the established system. * * * that the federal government and 
the state governments are carrying out a joint effort to eliminate many other 
youthful leaders * * *. 

Now, Mr. Dellinger 

Mr. Dellixger. You skipped a little, I think, but words are 

Mr. CoNLEY. There were some indistinct words. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you is this : At the 
time that you made that statement or a statement similar to that, Mr. 
Dellinger,' did you or were you or are you aware of the fact tliat two 
of the three assassins of Malcolm X were members of an organization 
he had formerly been a leader of, the Black Muslims ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, first of all, I don't believe that that is neces- 
sarily true. 

Secondly, it is not beyond the CIA or the New York Police Depart- 
ment to use such people, or, I am soriy, I don't mean to impugn tlie 
New York Police Department as a totality, but elements within it or 
within some other agencies, to use former members of such an 

The fact is that Malcolm X was exerting a tremendous influence 
upon the black community. 

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.) 

Mr. Dellinger. He had traveled abroad and had come back after 
his experiences in Algeria, saying that he supported revolutionists, 
whatever their color. He was obviously a very charismatic and grow- 
ing person, a person of great political insight and leadership and he 
vras causing tremendous embarrassment to the United States in the 
U.N. and elsewhere. And, obviously, I am not going to — I am not in 
a position to name the killers, and the reason I raise the question about 
the word "liquidate," which may very well not have been the original 
text, was that I never try to go beyond what I know, you Imow, in 
imputing actual physical assassination or guilt to groups that I do 
not know. And that's why I made it clear that the time will come — 
whether it has come yet or not. we don't know — when the CIA, which 
assassinates all over the world — this has been even revealed in the 
Senate by Senator Young of Ohio in relation to Vietnam, where he 
speaks of assassination teams which pose as Viet Cong and commit 
acts of murder, arson, and rape 


'SLv. AsiiBRcoK. TTait a second. He rejected that. That doesn't stand 
as a st-atement of Senator Young. 

]Mr. Dellixger. He asked me to supply you with some things, and I 
\\ ouki be happy to supply. 

Mr. AsiTBrv:MiK. Senator Young did reject that. 

]Mr. Dellixger. I thought that after the pressure was on he spoke 
rather cautiously, but never retracted the statement. Anyway, it is a 
known fact, whetlier Senator Young can be cited as an authority or 

Mr. IcHORD. Are you saying that Senator Young is the type of man 
that can be pressured < 

Mr. Dellixger. What I tried to say was that my memory was that he 
resisted the pressure, but, anyway. I could cite Donald Duncan, who 
helped organize such assassination teams and who has testified so. 

So, anyway, what I said was that we can't do that abroad without 
sooner or later doing it at home. I am not about to say that the CIA 
assassinated President Kennedy, because I don't know whether it did 
or not. But it is a question which all American people ought to ask 
themselves, and so the least they can do is to bring the CIA, for ex- 
ample, under control. So the same way when it comes to Malcolm. 

Mr. CoxLEY. I^t's start, though, with first things first. You jtimped 
to the assumption that the CIA 

Mr. Dellixger. I do not jump to it. I say it is a question I want to 
ask you and the American people. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Xo, sir, it is a part of a two-part question, and let's 
get the first part of it out of the way first and then move on to whether 
they were CIA. 

Mr. Dellixger. I don't know whether they were CIA or not. I know 
that the CIA does that kind of thing. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. The pomt is that just as valid a question, if you 
raise the question, a Cuban Communist might have killed President 
Kennedy. It is just as valid a question. 

Mr. Dellixger. One can ask all of tliose questions, but all of the 
evidence that I have read, if we are speaking about President Ken- 

]\Ir. AsHBROOK. Yes. 

Mr. Dellixger. — goes in the other direction. 

]Mr. IcHORD. You repudiate the finding of Chief Justice "Warren 
and his tribunal ? 

Mr. Dellixger. Yes. I do. absolutely. I consider that a snow job 
to tr\' to pacify the American people. And I think it is a shame that 
a man like Chief Justice Warren, who in many ways seems to be a fine 
man. although I don't agree with his politics, I think it is a shame that 
he apparently lent himself to that kind of a job. 

Mr. Watsox. Mr, Dellinger, offhand could you think of any possible 
activity being engaged in by a Communist in the United States that 
might be illegal or wrong ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I am sorry. I didn't hear it all and I really want to. 

Mr. Watsox. Since apparently you assign all of these things to 
the CIA and to the establishment, and so forth, I was just wondering 
if possibly you might think of anything that a Communist might be 
doing in this country that you might consider illegal or immoral? 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, it took place in Mexico, but I believe that the 
government of Josef Stalin 


Mr. Watson. You mean the assassination of President Kennedy? 

Mr. Dellinger. Oh, the assassination of President Kennedy ? 

Mr. Watson. I notice you never see anything wrong 

Mr. Dellinger. I was going to say that one of the reasons that I 
could never be a member of tlie Communist Party, for example, is that 
in their past history, at least, and, well, in their past history they have 
used acts of this kind, including the assassination of Leon Trotsky in 

Mr. AVatson. Yes. 

Mr. Dellinger. And undoubtedly others that I am not aware of. 
To the best of my reading, the Soviet Union did not stand to profit 
from the assassination of President Kennedy. There were other people 
in this country who very obviously profited with it, and they should be 
examined and thought about. 

Mr. Watson. My question is a simple one as to whether or not you 
could think of anything which a Communist j)ossibly could have done 
in this country which was illegal or immoral, since apparenth* you 
have suspicioned that President Kennedy may have been killed by the 
CIA, or Malcolm X — it was some matter with the CIA. I am just 
asking you whether you possibl}'^ could think of anything that they may 
have done wrong in this coimtry. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, if I couldn't think of anything that they 
had done wrong, I would have joined the Communist Party, and 
obviously I never have and never wanted to. 

Mr. Watson. I just noticed you never cast any suspicion on them; 
it is always on the Government. 

Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, it would be nice to communicate. I 
know it is hard because I am very critical, for example, of your election 
and of other things, and we have serious political diiferences, but I 

Mr. Watson. Obviously you have political differences with Republi- 
cans, Democrats, and eveiybody. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, with the Republican and Democratic estab- 
lishment, yes. 

Mr. Watson. You think everything is wrong except what you are 

Mr. Dellinger. Xo, not except what I am doing. Xot^ 

Mr. Watson. You were against the Democrats and the Republicans, 
weren't you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am against the program and the presidential 
candidates of both the Republicans and the Democrats, yes. I believe 
there are many obvious reasons for that, but I would like you to 
know that the Xational Mobilization Committee, when it is at its 
fullest, has over a hundred different groups, many of whom have 
different political and other views. It is a very heterogeneous group. 
But they are united on wanting an end to American aggression in 

Mr. Watson. Yes; and of course you would agree with the state- 
ment that Mr. Hayden earlier made, that he welcomed tlie support of 
anyone. Communist or anybody else, if they agreed with his objectives ? 

iilr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, if you would come out on our next 
demonstration, I would be happy to walk side by side with you, pro- 
testing the war and calling for withdrawal of the American troops. 

Mr. Watson. So the answer to my question 


Mr. Dellinger. But you might get hit with a club. 

Mr. Watson. You mean to tell me your people might hit me with 
a club? 

Mr. Dellinger. No; our people don't carry clubs. 

Mr. Watson. Oh, they don't? I see. So the answer to m^^ question 
is you do welcome the support, active and otherwise, financial, of the 
Communists ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I will work with anybody who I think will help 
bring the war to an end. Now, at the points where I differ from him 
I will not AYork. I made a trip to Paris in which I talked for hours 
with Averell Harriman, more briefly with Cyrus Vance, and also for 
hours with the North Vietnamese negotiators. I Avill talk with anybody 
across the board if I think it will help save the lives of the — what 
shall we guess^ — the 150 to 250 American boys who will be killed next 
week in Vietnam and the several thousand Vietnamese who will be 
killed. I will work together with anybody for that objective, but with- 
out pretending, for example, to adopt the views of Averell Harrimar 
on our corporate structure, or the views of the Communist Party peoj)le 
on the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, getting back to Malcolm X, if I may^ 
I would like to go back to the first part of your answer and my first 
question to you on this subject, which was : Are you aware of the fact 
that two of the three assassins charged and convicted of killing Mal- 
colm X were foi-mer members or members of an organization he had 
formerly operated ? 

Now let's forget about whether they were hired by CIA to do it. 
Are you aware of the fact that two of the three people who were tried 
and convicted were members of the Black Muslims? 

]Mr. Dellinger. I have read that fact, seen 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you. 

!Mr. Dellinger. May I complete my answer? I have seen it stated 
in the press. I have also read a study by Eric Norden, a journalist in 
New York who has done work for Liberation. He did a study called 
"American Atrocities in Vietnam."" He made an exhaustive research 
into the circumstances of the assassination of Malcolm X. It was pub- 
lished in The Realist magazine. I can't give you the date. But I think 
anybody who reads that and tries to be open to its message comes out 
of there with a very strong suspicion that some quasi-governmental or 
governmental agencies had something to do with the assassination 
of Malcolm. 

Mr. Conley. All right. Now, Mr. Dellinger, in that same vein, you 
have also indicated that Malcolm X was, as I took your words, a rather 
knowledgeable individual. Is that a fair appraisal of your appraisal 
of him? 

]Mr. Dellinger. I don't remember using the word. He was a man 
with whom I did not totally agree. I knew him personally and I had 
some differences with him, particularly in his earlier days, but he was 
a man who had gone through the worst, almost, of what our society 
imposes upon black people growing up in the ghetto. Like Eldridge 
Cleaver, he had been in prison and had all kinds of experiences and 
had himself, you know 


Mr. CoNLEY. Do you feel that he knew what his movement was 
about ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I believe that he was a person who had tremendous 
insight and, unlike so man}^ political people, was able to grow as he 
discovered new truths and new insights. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now my question, sir, is this: Are you 
aware of the fact that before Malcolm X's death he wrote in his own 
autobiography that the Black Muslims had placed a death sentence 
on his head? 

Are you aware of that fact? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have seen that stated. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And are you aware of the fact that Malcolm X him- 
self employed bodyguards to protect himself and, for instance, when 
I visited Chicago on one occasion, there were newspaper accounts of 
the city of Chicago assigning a tremendous number of police officers 
to protect him from the possibility of an assassination? 

Now, Mr. 

Mr. Dellinger. Let me 

Mr. Conley. Just a minute, Mr Dellinger. 

Mr. Dellinger. Sorry. Finish ; you asked two questions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now my question, though, on this is this : You have 
indicated that there is a possibility that some nefarious influence, the 
CIA or somebody in some form of government, had something to do 
with this assassination. If, sir, you have any information or evidence 
of that type, have you taken it to any agency and made it available 
to them? 

I will ask you : Do you have any direct evidence ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Now, since I think you did ask about three ques- 
tions, let me try to start at the beginning as best I can. 

First of all, I have heard the statements — well, first of all, let me 
say I did not come down here bringing my resource materials on the 
assassination of Malcolm X. I am therefore trying to give a sort of 
a general attitude in which I say that there should be deep suspicions 
on this score and I tried to put it into context. 

Let me say that although I have seen statements attributed to Mal- 
colm X where he said he feared assassination by the Muslims, there 
is also evidence that the day before Malcolm's assassination he told 
people that he was frightened of the New York Police Department, 
tliat they were not providing him protection, and that he feared that 
they intended to assassinate him. 

Now, as I say, I really don't want to go too far into this material 
because I can supply to yOu, if you want — I have already given you 
the reference — one of the many articles on this subject. I doivt want 
to make these things appear more simple than they are, and that has 
been my slight quarrel with Congressman Watson because I think 
there are very basic questions that the American people ought to 
ask themselves and ou.<rht to investigate. I am not prepared to supply 
the answers or think I am in a position to supply the answer, either 
on the assassination of President Kennedy or on the assassination of 
Malcolm X. But there are very disturbing aspects to both of these 
<luestions, which I believe the Govermnent has basically tried to sweep 
under the rug, and I think thev ought to be brousfht out into the open. 

Mr. Ichord. Well, Mr. Dellinger, after making those statements. 


1 am very disappointed that ydu don't have some evidence to offer thi«r 
committee. Let me assure you that this is one Member of Congress 
that doesn't fear the CIA or any other organization in this country,, 
and I think it should be your duty to give this to the Government. 

Mr. Dellingek. Well, I have a suggestion. I appreciate your inter- 
est and, as a matter of fact, I think a lot of people, you know, are not 
aware of these things and are shielded from them. 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, I certainly am not aware of them. I would like 
to have the evidence. 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes; I would like to suggest, Congressman Ichord^ 
that I mail to you, registered, some of the material on the assassina- 
tion of President Kennedy and on the assassination of Malcolm X; 
and on the assassination of Malcolm X, I will specifically send the 
article by Eric Xorden from The Iieallst that I mentioned and I 
would like to ask you, in turn, to insert these into the Congressional 

Mr. IcHORD. Let's take a brief recess. 

(A brief recess was taken from 3 :50 to 3 :58 p.m.) 

Mr. IcHORD. The committee will come to order. 

The photographers will please retire. 

At the time of the recess, Mr. Dellinger, we were talking about an 
alleged assassination of certain Negro leaders by the CIA, and yoiu 
had asked me to put certain evidence that you might provide i]i the 
Record. Let me advise you that I have some of my closest friends to 
request me to put things in the Record that I often turn down. I would 
have to look at the material. But if you do, again, if you do have any 
evidence, I would appreciate your giving it to this conunittee at this 

IMr. Dellinger. Yes ; I want it made very clear that I did not allege 
that the CIA committed these assassinations. I said the circumstances 
were very suspicious, CIA does commit assassinations all over the 
world, and that sooner or later, and perhaps already, this method will 
be used in the United States as well. And I said that I thought that 
you and the American people, everybody who is concerned for the wel- 
fare and future of this countrj^ and the world, should ask themselves 
this c^uestion and should read a great deal of the material. 

I did offer to send to you Eric Norden's article on the assassination 
of Malcolm X and I did hope that, when you read it, you would feel 
moved to insert it in the Oongressional Record so that it could receive a 
wider audience and people could read it and take it from there. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questioning, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Dellinger. And excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt, but 
cotdd I ask that this article be put in the record of this hearing, since 
we have made many references to it ? 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement, and you 
can forward the article to the Chair. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, the testimony 
here, to me, would at least indicate that you have certainly, or perhaps, 
some suspicions about how Malcolm X met his death, but apparently 
you have no defhiite evidence, other than suspicions. 

Perhaps other people have suspicions the other way, and the thing 
that concerns me at this point is why would you make these statements, 


which have been attributed to you, to Havana radio with no more 
basis in fact than you have apparently indicated. 

Was it done with the intention of inflaming those people in Cuba ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, I think it is clear that I have gone into m^ich 
greater detail and have been much more specific here in this country 
than I was in that broadcast. So it is not something peculiar to going 
to the Havana radio. 

As I indicated earlier, I don't have any double standard of what 
I say. I say the same thing basically to you, to the American press, to 
the foreign press, Avhether within the Communist countries or not. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you ever say some things you wish you hadn't said ? 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, I often don't say things clearly enough or 
well enough or I change my mind, my opinion, later. 

One thmg in that respect that occurred to me in connection with 
Congressman Watson's Cjuestion al)0ut Communist imperialism, which 
I think I didn't make clear right now, so I would like to make it 

If you stop to think of it, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
involved two Communist countries, so it is a little artificial, if this was 
meant to be implied, and certainly some people think of it that way — 
it is certainly a little artificial to identify this as an example of Com- 
munist aggression because it was also an example of a Communist 

And I think one has to be a little more careful than to attribute every 
wrongful act that takes place in a Communist country', and of course 
there are many and ha^'e been many historically as well, to attribute 
that somehow to all Communists, all Communist countries, or all 
periods of communism. 

Mr. IcnoRo. You are not saying that you would justify aggression 
by one Commnnist against another Communist ? 

' Mr. Dellixger. No; I am just saying that it is really, in this case, 
not a question of Communist aggression. It is in part, but it is also a 
question, to complete the picture, of a Communist victim, so this has 
something to do with the nature of the politics and internal problems 
of the Soviet Union. 

And one of the faults of the United States in relation to Vietnam has 
been that it has tried to build up an artificial picture of communism in 
tenns of the worst period of Stalinism and without reference to the 
fact that even during that period the Soviet Union had been attacked 
by the TTnit^d States and other countries. 

And to take it out of context and say, "This is tlie nature of the beast ; 
this is the way all Communist countries are," and so when an underde- 
veloped country like Vietnam begins to introduce land refonn and 
cooperatives and literacy and medicine and to introduce what I prefer 
to call economic democracy, a certain form of communism within 
Vietnam, people hold it up and say this is — they will act and they are 
like it — Mke Stalin in his worst day. 

Mr. Watsox. Now, am I to understand, since you brought the ques- 
tion back UP, that you are now modifying your condemnation of the 
Communist aggression against Czechoslovakia? 

Mr. Dellixger. It is really hard for me not to be unkind, but I will 
try not to be. 

Mr. Watsox. Well, von are cond^Muning 


Mr. Dellingek. Is that the best you could get out of what I said? 

Mr. Watsox. Are you condemning it or are you not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am condemning the Soviet, the invasion of Soviet 

Mr. Watson. But you 

Mr. Dellinger. A Communist country. 

ISIr. Watsox. Against another Communist country. 

Mr. Dellinger. Against Czechoslovakia, another Communist 

Mr. Watsox. Oh, so your condemnation, then, is because the aggres- 
sion was against another Communist country ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry. 

Mr. Watson. That's an unfair question. 

Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry. I didn't hear what you said at the end. 

Mr. Watsox. Well, if you want to confer with counsel, I think coun- 
sel might know what I am going to ask nest. 

Go ahead. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. We have finished. 

JMr. GuTMAN. Let me guess. 

You are right, Congressman, it was a nonsensical question. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you have a question you wish to ask? 

Mr. Watsox. In other words, your condemnation of the Soviet's 
activities in Czechoslovakia, then, would in no way be affected by the 
fact that Czechoslovakia was a Communist country and the aggres- 
sion was against a Communist country? 

Mr. Dellixger. I would have been opposed to that, whatever the 
nature of the Czechoslovakian Government. 

I certainly in no way, however, condemn the handful. I guess, up 
until now, the handful of Czechoslovakian people who fell victim to 
the Soviet guns, which weren't used veiw much because of the nature 
of the situation, or would in no way condemn the Czechoslovakian 
people who fell victim to the suppression of freedom. 

Mr. Watson. Of course, you recall this came up in the context of our 
discussion of whether or not you had been active in condemning 
aggressive communism. 

You had been very vocal in condemning imperialistic Americanism, 
and so that's when the question came up. and so if you can — and, really, 
in some of the publications that I have seen from your Ijibertarian 
Press, I have failed to see very much defense, or criticism, rather, of 
the communism — and so if you could sup])ly us with some of the issues 
in which you have condemned aggressive communism, either against 
Czechoslovakia or Hungary or any place else, it might be helpful, and 
then I could say that really this man might have a little modicum of 
objectivity in his writing. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. When the Soviet Union was invading Hun- 
gary, I helped organize and spoke at a mass protest rally, and although 
I think that very often the attacks upon the Soviet Union from this 
country are prejudicial and do not reflect the facts accurately, none- 
theless, whenever the Soviet Union or any other Communist country 
employs totalitarian methods or invades another counti-y, I speak up 
against it. 

I have signed petitions and sent them to Moscow and I have spoken 


in Moscow itself against the imprisonment, for example, of the Soviet 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Judging fi'om vrhat you said, then, wouldn't one 
exception be, at least what I figure, with the aggression from North 
Korea and South Korea ? 

I notice you specifically exempted tliat when you were talking 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellixger. I don't know how far you want to go into Koreii, 
but let me say- 

Mr. AsHBROOK. No, I just uote you specifically used that 

Mr, Dellinger. I consider that the American people, suid I sup- 
pose in a sense it begins with historians, but should delve back into 
the history of the Korean war. 

I think that that war took place at a time when the American people 
were subjecting — were suffering from the brainwashing and the politi- 
cal fears and fanaticism associated with the McCartliy period and the 
cold war, and I think that they assumed, all too readily and without 
sufficient evidence, tliat North Korea was the aggressor and that the 
United States was somehow not fighting in Korea the kind of war 
that most people noAv know it has been fighting in Vietnam. 

I think that there were some differences between the war in Korea 
and the war in Vietnam, but basically they represent the same phe- 
nomenon, the attempt of American imperialism to control the lives 
and societies of Asia and to control them for the profits and for the 
sincere self-righteousness and fanatical missionary purposes of the 
American people. 

To try to say all that in a summary form, but I think that the as- 
sumption that North Korea invaded ignores such things as the visits 
of Secretary of State Dulles to Seoul immediately before the inva- 
sion ; it ignores a whole lot of evidence. And in this case, amongst other 
things, I would recommend that you read I. F. Stone's book on the 
history of Korea, which was published in 1952 — I forget the title — 
by Monthly Review Press, and I would be happy to send you a copy 
if you would read it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Am I to understand, Mr. Dellinger, that you feel that 
if North Korea were to invade South Korea, the United States would 
have no right to intervene in behalf of South Korea ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, we are getting "iffy," again, but I am opposed 
to military invasions of one country by another. I think I have made 
that clear. I think, however, that I have also made clear that I do not 
think it behooves me, as a member of the privileged imperialist society 
of the United States, to stand in judgment of the methods that the 
victims used to try to throw off that imperialism. 

I think the United States has driven a wedge through two countries 
in Asia, besides infiltrating and overthrowing governments and assas- 
sinating, and so forth, that I talked about in other countries. But in 
Vietnam and in Korea it has taken a country and driven a line across 
it, the same as if the Soviet Union or China or anybody else would 
draw a line right across the United States and say, "Half of it we are 
going to control because our system is better and because we have the 
best interests, and the other half you can control." 

And I think that in that kind of a situation I understand why the 


people of Korea want to tlirow off the corrupt dictatorship of Park, 
hist like they wanted to throw off the corrupt dictatorship of Syngman 
ilhee. I understand why they want to have the American military and 
industrial interests withdraw so that they can run their own country in 
their own way, and I am not — althou<2:h I will speak, as I said, in a 
general way for nonviolence and in certain circumstances I will dis- 
cuss it with people from Korea or Vietnam, if I am talking with 
them — ^I don't feel that I have the moral or the political right to tell 
them in their conditions what methods they should use to try to get rid 
of American imperialism. 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, a moment ago you made a statement 
that you speak both in the American press as well as in the foreign 
press on these various and sundry subjects. 

I put to you the question, sir : Have you at any time over Havana 
radio, which we have established you do communicate with, have you 
at any time ever delivered a statement over the Havana radio, or an 
interview, in opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia '? 

j\Ir. Dellinger. Yes, I did. 

Mr. CoNLEY. And would you give me the date, sir ? 

Mr. Delt.tnger. Well, I can't give 3^ou the date. You apparently 
have better records than I do, or keep them, but when I was in Chicago, 
in the midst of the police riot, I ducked into the office at 407 South 
Dearborn Street, was intending to be there about 15 minutes to take 
care of some business or other and go out into action again, and some- 
body said, '""^hero is a long distance call for j^ou." And T picked it up, 
and it was Havana radio and they asked me some questions, and I 
can't give you the exact words — you undoubtedly already have them, 
or at feast in a version that went from English to Spanish to English 
and was picked up, accurately or inaccurately, by somebody, but any- 
*vay, in the course of that speech, whatever you want to call it, that in- 
terview with Havana radio, I mentioned the fact that Chicago had 
become the Prague of the United States, or the Prague of the Mid- 
west, and I don't remember what else, but I clearly indicated mj^ op- 
position to the Soviet, or implied — I don't want to exaggerate ; I think 
I made it quite clear that I was opposed to the Soviet mtervention in 
Czechoslovakia and that we were comparing the actions of Daley, 
Daley and Humphrey's and Johnson's and Bailey's police, with the 
actions of the Soviet troops. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention to this broad- 
cast further, you were also asked the following question. 

IVfr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir? 

Mr. Dellixger. This is the same one. 

Mr. Gttfmax. Back to the same one. I am sorry. 

]\[r. CoNLEY. At the bottom of the page : 

Mr. Dellinger, How do you view the possibility of a united struggle by militant 
black and white elements on common nasesV 

And, again, according to the broadcast, you replied in part as fol- 
lows, and I am extracting from your reply certain paragraphs — and 
you certainly are at liberty to add, if you wish to, but I do want 
to establish these particular paragraphs — the first paragraph being 
the last full paragraph on the bottom of the page : 

I entirely favor the creation of a common front, a common goal, and unified 
action. * * * 


Then turning to the next page, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger. In this case, I would have to ask that the next 
sentence be read, because it is part of it : 

But it is encouraging to see the black people developing their own strength, their 
own sense of dignity, and confidence in their own strength. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, on the next page, starting at the be- 
ginning, the first paragraph : 

Because they suffer more directly and openly than the whites, the black popu- 
lation is more advanced and nearer a revolutionary position. This is why they 
have made themselves the natural leaders of the people — 

And if I may move on to the last paragraph 

Mr. Dellinger, I would like to add the part, "and this is deepening 
both the blacks' " — excuse me — 
"deepening both the blacks' and vrhites' political awareness 

Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading]. 

.although there is some holding back in white communities. 

As a white citizen, I think our immediate responsibility is to raise the white 
segment's political awareness, thereby making ourselves better comrades of the 
black community. * * * 

And finishing up the paragraph — 

and try to be better qualified to serve as comrades and allies with the black 

Now^, Mr. Dellinger, I will ask you if those three particular para- 
graphs which I have read to you from the transmission are substan- 
tially statements which you did make on August 15. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, the words don't seem to be mine all the way. 
I am not accustomed to using the word "comrade."' I might, you know, 
to my lawyer or somebody in a certain very informal sense, but politi- 
^-ally the term has been, you know, it was overused and misused and a 
lot of things, and I just don't ordinarily speak in those terms. 

This could have been entirely innocent, either in going from English 
to Spanish or back, or in the hearing on the shortwave. I don't know. 
But the general essence of the statements, I subscribe to, yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. I have no concern with the particular 
use of the word "comrade." Wliat I am wishing to ask you about is 
this : What did you mean when you stated in these paragraphs that the 
black population, being nearer a revolutionary position is, quote, to 
use your words, "more advanced" ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have tried to make clear, publicly and 
privately, at least since I spent 3 years in the Federal prison, that I 
believe we need a revolutionary change in this country and I consider 
myself a nonviolent revolutionist. 

Now, leaving aside for the moment the question of nonviolence, I 
"believe that the United States gave great hope to the world with 
documents and aspirations such as those expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence in 1776, but there were two fatal flaws. One of them 
was that this document did not apply to the natives of the country, the 
Indians, and it did not apply to the black people who were being 
brought over here as slaves. 

But there was also a flaw in that we introduced the highest form of 
political democracy known in the 18th century, but we did not intro- 
duce economic democracy. In fact, far the opposite. 


We introduced a very complex document which Adam Smith, 
amongst others, enunciated mainly, and he was a very religious man. 
He thought that that was— you know, he was sincere about it. He said, 
•'If everybody works basically for his own selfish interests, through 
economic and other competition, the invisible hand of God will make 
thino-s turn out best for the community and the society as a whole." 
I believe that this was totally, a hundred percent wrong, and I 
believe that our failure to introduce economic democracy, together 
with our failure to extend political democracy to all people, Avith or 
without property, with white skins, black skins, red skins, or what— 
our failure to do that has corrupted and led our society and our 
system astray. 

It doesn't mean that there don't remain to this day many good 
aspects and many good impulses and many sincere aspirations and 
many people who, even soldiers, who have gone to Vietnam and 
dropped napalm, thinking they were doing it for a better society— 
although I think they were tragically wrong — but I believe that our 
society, particularly now, there has been the industrial revolution, the 
electronic revolution ; we have the giant corporations. We have the — 
how many million dollars was it that Nixon and Humphrey had to 
spend to run for President ? We have all of the economic aristrocracy 
and economic concentration of power which makes democracy an 
illusion and a failure in this country. 

And so I am for revolutionary change and I think that the black 
people who have suffered from the w^orst aspects of our failure to be 
genuinely democratic are therefore more sensitive to some of the 
hypocrisy or some of the illusions involved in our system, and, there- 
fore, they are more apt to adopt a genuinely revolutionary position 
than most of us. And I use the term "revolutionary" in the sense of 
drastic or basic. I do not use it in the sense of meaning that I should 
go out and kill you, or you should go out and kill me. In fact, one of 
the things that I am opposed to is a seizure of power. 

I believe that what we need to do is to decentralize and democratize 
power, both politically and in terms of the economic institutions of 
the country. 

So I am a revolutionist in that sense, and in that and in other senses, 
because there is no monolithic approach to these things. 

The black people, in fact, in ways that I and others can learn from, 
have revolutionary instincts and instincts for justice and for freedom 
that we are not so apt to have. So I look for some kind of united 
struggle between those who feel in general as I do, those who are 
upset over the failure of our system, the failure of us, for instance, to 
be able to hold a democratic presidential election. We haven't voted 
on the issues; we voted on personalities who have avoided the issues. 
So people who are upset over that, or upset over the persistence of 
poverty, people who feel as I do, that the war in Vietnam was not the 
accident of a bad man in office, but feel that it grew out of these begin- 
nings even in American history in which we have advanced steadily 
across the continent, picking up parts of Mexico and islands that don't 
belong to us, like Cuba and Puerto Rico and the Philipj^ines and 
PInAvaii, and then have gotten to Vietnam. 

The ]:)eople who are a little bit, at least, aware of that are horrified 
by the napalm. 


I hate to put it just on the atrocities, but still it makes it more real in 
terms of human flesh, but also by the spiritual indignity imposed upon 
the Vietnamese people. 

Even now, flying recomiaissance planes over their country -s\ hen -we 
sav we are, you know, moving toward peace. 

The people who feel that way, I Ijelieve, have a right and a responsi- 
bility and obligation to unite with black people who have suffered the 
things that the black people have suffered and to try, together, to 
work to make the original promise of America and the aspiration 
which many hold to this day. to make it a reality, to have a genuine 
societv in which all men and women and children are equal and have 
freedom and the kind of economic security and well-l>emg which cer- 
tainly our technology' makes possible. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving your attention, if I may. to 
another radio broadcast with Havana, Cuba, directing your attention 
specifically to August 29. the day after the convention ended — — 

Mr. Dellixger." That is the date on which I spoke about the Soviet 

Mr. CoxLEY. All right. Havana radio summarized another tele- 
phone interx-iew it said it had with you, and this is not a literal trans- 
lation, as I understand it, of your words. It is a smnmar\' by Havana 
radio, which they broadcast, which we picked up and which has been 
retranslated again, and if I may read this to you and then ask you if 
it substantially states what you said at that time : 

U.S. PACIFIST LEADER DAVID DELLINGER declared in Chicago that the 
heroic fight of the Cuban people today serves as an inspiration to those who fight 
in the United States to put an end to the criminal hand of the GoTemment of 
Washington. Dellinger granted RADIO HABANA a telephonic interview in 
connection with the demonstrations in Chicago that aim at halting the U.S. 
aggression in Vietnam. 

He added that the demonstrators had been brutally treated by tens of thous- 
ands of polic-emen and soldiers mobilized in Chicago. The U.S. leader also said 
that millions of his fellow-citizens had lost their faith in the so-called U.S. 
democratic system and that they have decided to fight to end the war and to do 
away with jwverty. exploitation, and racism in their home country. 

Dellinger who is president of the National Committee of Mobilization against 
The War in Vietnam and publisher of the magazine "LIBERATION" said that 
the official position of the Yankee Government in the Paris talks is false and 
hypocritical. You cannot ask the victim and the aggressor to reduce their military 
operations at the same time, said David Dellinger, and he added : the one side 
is fighting for its home coimtry and for its liberation and the other side is trying 
to curb the aspirations of that people. 

After pointing out that people in the United States are becoming aware of what 
is really hapi)ening in Cuba, the prominent U.S. pacifist stated : If one appreciates 
both the heroism and the dynamism of the peoples of Vietnam and Cuba, one 
draws from two sources of enormous capacity. 

David Dellinger concluded his statements made by phone to RADIO HABANA 
CUBA with these words : We, Americans, are determined to liberate our country 
in the same way ; may we also assure you of our solidarity. 

Is this a fair account of what you said to Radio Havana, which was 
transmitted back by them, and I am sure editorialized upon by them, 
or whatever way tliey wrote their story, and then was retranslated 
in this country ( 

Mr. Dellixger. "Well, first of all, I think you have very fairly 
indicated, you know, the process that took place, and obviously, you 
know, there are some phrases, again, which are not my phrases. 

I have accused the United States of war crimes m Vietnam, con- 

21-706 — 69— pt. 3 i 


trary to the Xuremberjj; nnd other judi>-ments. But I don't ordinarily 
speak of the criminal hands. 

It is not important. I think the Walker Commission, as well as the 
evidence at the time, has clearly demonstrated, made clear, that the 
demonstrators were brutally treated. 

It is true that millions have lost faith in, I don't remember the exact 
phrase, but in the way our "democracy," in quotes, is now operating. 

I think it is clear that, Avell, according- to some estimates, perhaps 
as many as 5 million people who normally in the past would have voted, 
did not vote in the past election or, in the case of a minority of those 
four or five million, voted for other candidates, selectively, but not 
for President. 

I wouldn't use the phrase "Yankee Government," but that is no abuse 
on their part. That is simply, you know, semantics. 

I do have here at this time stated that I think that one side in Viet- 
nam is trying to fight for its homeland and its independence and its 
own self-determination, and the other side, the United States side, is 
trying to suppress their aspirations even though, as I have stated, 
many people who, particularly in the early days, did this, did it quite 
sincerely, out of illusions, I do believe — and these sound almost like 
my exact words — that Cuba and Vietnam have provided a heroic and 

Mr. CoNLEY. "Heroism" and "dynamism." 

Mr. Bellinger. Heroism and dynamism which has been an inspira- 
tion to many Americans in this country because, although it is easy 
for people to be disillusioned with our commercialism and our facade of 
democracy, which doesn't really extend deep enough into everyday life, 
it is very hard for people to get the energy and to have the dynamics 
to fight for something better or even to dare hope that there might be 
something better. And although there are thnigs in both of those 
societies which are not of the best and although I think every people, 
including the American people, must solve their own problems and 
develop their own indigenous institutions and not import from any 
foreign country, nonetheless, the attempt, the heroic and dynamic at- 
tempt of the Vietnamese and Cuban people to build a world of brotlier- 
hood and a world of human equality, I think that that offers some in- 
spiration and also offers us some concrete examples of methods to look 

So I certainly — and I hope that the American people will liberate 
themselves in a way similar. That is, I hope that the American people 
will work out ways of getting rid of the undemocratic influence of 
institutions like the United Fruit Company, which, for example, pre- 
vented democracy in Cuba and prevents it now in most of Latin 
America. I think we should free ourselves from the tyrannical and 
antidemocratic power of corporations of that kind. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, then, am I correct, Mr. Dellinger, that you, that 
the statement, and particularly I am reading, "We, Americans, are 
determined to liberate our country in the same way ; may we also assure 
you of our solidarity." Is that a fair statement of what you said ? 

Mr. I^ELLiXGER. Not — I am sure that this M'as undoubtedly innocent 
on their part, or maybe it is not even necessary to say that because you 
nmst put that in the context that thej^ continually referred to me as a 


So, obviously, when I said whatever they summarized that way, I 
was not suggesting that we should go into the Grand Canyon or the 
Rockies and organize a guerrilla force which would attempt to over- 
throw the United States Government. It is contrary to my beliefs. 
It is contrary to the practical possibilities for anybody who might even 
be willing if they thought it would work. 

So, clearly, as a pacifist leader, and this, I think, makes quite clear 
that in Cuba, as in Vietnam, I have always identified myself as a 
pacifist, and in that context, yes, I believe that the American people 
should liberate themselves from the evils of corporations and of an 
inadequate democracy which gives the illusion that people have con- 
trol over their lives, which they don't really have. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Coimsel, in that regard, Mr. Dellinger, obviously 
this broadcast is in error in one part, that it omitted your earlier al- 
leged condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I saw 
no reference to that, so it is in error that they omitted that. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes; and as a matter of fact, when I talk next 
to my Cuban friends, who will not necessarily be Radio Havana, but 
I will certainly, as a matter of interest, ask if they have a transcript of 
what exactly was broadcast because I realize there are two possibilities 
here: one, that whoever picked it up on the shortwave either missed 
that, missed that, either intentionally or unintentionally. I mean, it 
could have been broadcast and not added on in this. 

The other possibility is that somebody in Radio Havana who dis- 
agreed with my views left that out. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you ever have any of your statements edited ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. It happens in this comitry. It happens 

Mr. IcHORD. I have had that happen. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. We wouldn't say Cuba is the only one that does that. 

Mr. Dellinger. But obviously it is interesting to me because I never 
heard the broadcast. And I wouldn't make it a major effort, but I will 
inquire and see if I can find out how it happened, or what happened. 

Mr. IciiORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention specifically to 
August 26, Chicago, Illinois, early in the morning of August 26 in 
Chicago, the police, according to reports, cleared out of Lincoln Park 
some 1,000 people who had determined that they would spend the night 
in the park, even though they had been denied a permit which was 
in violation of the city ordinances, and there apparently was some free- 
for-all there in the park and there was fighting and there were in- 
juries sustained. 

Mr. Dellinger. This is the morning ? 

]Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. Early morning hours, actually, of August 26. 

Mr. Dellinger. Oh, maybe like after midnight, 12 to 1, or 

Mr. CoNLEY. jSTow, were you aware, to begin with, that this ordi- 
nance which denies a person the right to remain in the park was not an 
ordinance of recent vintage in the city of Chicago, that this ordinance 
had been in effect in Chicago, as it is in many other cities in the United 
States, for a number of years, that closes parks at a particular time 
in the evening ? 


Mr. Bellinger. I was aware that this ordinance was, I believe, ad- 
ministrative. Anyway, somebody had the power to suspend it because 
on a number of occasions, ranging from the National Guard to, if I re- 
member correctly, the Shriners — if not the Shriners, some group of 
that kind — had had the ordinance sus^^ended and had been able to use 
the park after 11 o'clock. 

So I was aware that this really was in the discretion of the city ad- 
ministration and I continually took the position and I was never able 
to get to see Mayor Daley himself. But to his assistant and to a cor- 
poration counsel and other people, I continually said that a city that in 
the midst of a cruel war that was killing off hundreds of Americans 
and thousands of Vietnamese every week, a city who invited the war 
party, the administration which was conducting that war, to hold its 
political convention, had to assume that along with that convention 
would come thousands of protesters, and that just like the city had 
a responsibility to provide traffic policemen and, oh, sanitary facilities, 
if necessary, and first aid to accommodate a major football game or 
a World Series or something of that kind, so, when it invited in a con- 
vention and, automatically, protesters, it had a responsibility to pro- 
vide the facilities for sleeping, for first aid, for all of the various 
things that would both make it possible for those people to express 
their democratic rights meaningfully and also protect whatever 
citizens of Chicago or convention delegates or other people who were 
in the city at that time. 

Now, I was a little nervous about people pleeping in the p^rk. T 
didn't think it was my riglit ro tell anybody whether they should slee]:) 
there or not, but the Mobilization made a very serious attempt to 
rent from the city Soldier Field or, we said, if that was unavailable, 
any comparable facility. 

We even offered — and at that time, I can tell you, we were in debt I 
would guess at least $10,000 — but we offered to rent Soldier Field and 
to pay $1,500 a night for it so people could have a place where they 
could sleep and meet and gather and eat sandwiches or what have you 
and not either be an interference with the other convention delegates 
and other facilities or run into some of the exaggerated risks which 
the city of Chicago was claiming would follow from the demonstra- 
tors being there. 

Mr. IcHORD. ISIr. Bellinger, at that point Mr. Hay den, I belicA-e. in 
response to one of my questions, indicated that he entertained a con- 
stitutional view that the first amendment right of freedom of assembly 
was absolute and not subject to restrictions. 

You indicated some concern about the existing ordinance and 
whether it was effective or not. 

I am wondering if you entertain the same view as to the first amend- 
ment right of freedom of assembly. 

Mr. Bellinger. Well 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Ichord. There is no trick to the question. 

Mr. Bellinger. No, that's all right. I am not worried. 

Naturally, I have not read the transcript, or anyway I have not 
had an opportunity to read the transcript of wliat Mr. iflayden said. 

Mr. Ichord. I understand. 

Mr. Bellinger. So I would like to make mv own statement, witliout 
reference to what he may or may not have said. 


First of all, I thiiik that the right of people to assembly and to 
protest for redress of grievances is extremely strong under the Con- 
stitution. But anyway, at a time when, as I keep saying, people are 
being killed, people are being oppressed, people are being drafted, all 
this kind of thing, there is a tremendous urgency, which, as I indicated 
earlier, means that I think we should set aside business as usual and 
that there must be some inconvenience and some problems. 

Now, within that, in other words, I am not interested in the move- 
ment which has the token right to dissent, the token right to express 
a differing opinion than that of the administration, but allows the 
war to go on and these people to be killed and maimed and all the rest. 

I am interested in a movement which will stop the war and which 
v,'ill liberate the American people, as well as allow the Vietnamese 
people to be liberated. And I think that one has a tremendous moral 
and political obligation to act, to be effective, and to be successful, and 
not just to express dissent. 

Now, again within that framework, it has been my view that the 
kind of liberation that I am talking about, and that in general the 
movement stands for, is a humanist liberation. 

I don't want to punish Congressman Watson. I want to give him an 
opportunity to live a better life, a life in which you can enjoy, and 
I hate — I don't mean to sound patronizing; I am afraid maybe it 
does — but anyway, for all people. 

Mr. Watson. You can punish 

Mr. Dellinger. A life in which people can find the joys and the 
satisfactions of brotherhood and peace, and not of boasting that they 
have the highest consumer standard of living in the world, but of 
boasting that they are the most honest and just and egalitarian 
country in the world. 

Now, within this framework, it applies to a lot of little things, 
because I think big things grow out of little things, and it was not 
my desire in Chicago or anywhere else, for example, artificially and 
unnecessarily to interfere with the rights and the liberties and the 
normal lives of other people. I wanted to challenge them; I wanted to 
bring everything out into the open and have them have to face up to it 
one way or another. But both in that interest and in the interests of the 
Tippies, who were the most interested in sleeping in Lincoln Park, but 
also a lot of other young people, I thought it would be better to let 
them sleep in Soldier Field or somewhere of that kind. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, you and an earlier witness have equated 
your request to use this part with that of the Shriners. 

I don't happen to be a Shriner, but I applaud their effort and I be- 
lieve that any objective person would conclude that their objectives 
and their activities are 180 degrees from that of your organization. 

But to get specifically to the point, do you know of any occasion 
when a Shrine group has either requested or been granted permission 
to sleep in Grant Park ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, first of all, let me say I am not very familiar 
with the Shriners. 

Mr. Watsox. Well, you mean you make the accusation, you and 
others. Do 3'ou know of any time where they have either requested or 
been granted permission to sleep in Grant Park ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, I don't like you to 

Mr. Watson. To ask these rather interesting questions ? 


Mr. Dellingek. No. I am glad for the question. But I don't like 
you to attribute views to me, or statements, that I didn't make. 

I don't think I accuse<^l the Shriners of anything. I am not very fami- 
liar with the Shriners. 

Mr. Watson. Well, you made a reference earlier. 

Mr. Dellinger. Wliat I said was that the city of Chicago had sus- 
pended the ordinance and had allowed groups, including the National 
Guard and including either the Shriners or some groups similar to 
that, to use the park after the closing hours. 

Now, I do not remember the full details, as I say. It could have been 
somebody else, but I believe the Shriners. But this information was 
even volunteered to us, or I was going to say by the assistant mayor of 
Chicago. It is possible that it was first brought out by one of our law- 
yers who did some researcli, and then assented to or, in other words, 
the deputy mayor agi^eed that this had happened. But I was not making 
any accusations and I was trying to be very precise. 

I do not know whether they stayed there all night or what, but even 
if nobody had done it before, we liave never had a war before which 
had t]\e. majority of the population as aroused against it as this one. 
And tliere is an obligation of the city to provide facilities and make it 
}X)Ssible for the protesters, who are an inevitable accompaniment of 
the convention, to make it possible for them to be there without being 
subjected to beating, gassing, and other attacks, whether sporadic or 

Mr. IcHORD. Well, I think your point is, then, Mr. Bellinger, you had 
heard that it was used by the Shriners and you thought that it should 
also be used by your organization. 

Mr. Dellinger. I thought it should be used by us, by those demon- 
strators who wanted to use it, before I heard that it had been used by 
some other group. 

But in response to the question, it was clear that this ordinance was 
not absolute, that it was within the discretion of the city to suspend 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't care whether the ordinance was absolute or not^ 
but if there were no provisions in the ordinance for suspension, though 
I happen to be a Shriner, I will say they should be enforced against the 
Shriners just as much as they should be enforced against any other 

But go ahead. I don't think this is too relevant to our inquiry. 

Let's proceed. 

Mr. Dellinger. Just one summary sentence. 

It seems to me that such an ordinance would yield to making the first 
amendment rights effective in that situation. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, in connection with what we 
started out here about the incidents in Lincoln Park, and I think per- 
haps we will now get to the quotation that you had reference to, about 
the Prague of the Middle West, later that morning you purportedly 
held a press conference, that is, the morning of August 26 you held 
this press conference in Chicago, and it was reported in the Chicago 
newspapers. Now, whether this was also reported in Havana, Cuba, I 
have no way of knowing. But this is what you said, quote : 

We have achieved a tragic victory. We have forced the city of Chicago and 
Mayor (Richard J.) Daley to bring out into the open the machinery of repres- 
sions which makes this city the Prague of the Middle West. 


Xow, I liave no information that indicates that Radio Havana ever 
broadcast this. This statement was made, and it was made in the United 
States to American reporters and was reported in the American press. 
Mr. Dellinger. That is, as near as I can tell, an accurate presenta- 
tion and that is substantially what I said at the relevant point in the 
interview with Havana, also. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Well, my question, anyway, is that, in view of this 
statement, this quotation from you to the reporters in Chicago, and in. 
view of your statements which you had made to Radio Havana, which 
we have talked about earlier here, those made earlier, that it was your 
intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and bring about violations of 
the law and refusals of demonstrators to obey lawful orders of the 
police, thereby compelling the police to use physical force to imple- 
ment the law 

Mr. Dellingee. You are reading that from something ? 
I don't quite — I lost it. 

Mr. CoNLET. My question, sir — I will repeat it to you. 
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, please. I am sorry. 
Mr. CoNLEY. I want to read it to you specifically. 
Mr. Dellinger, In other words, you have moved from my statement 
now to a written question ? Right ? 
Thank you. 
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. 

In light of this statement which you made to the newspapers in 
Chicago, in light of your earlier statements to Radio Havana, isn't 
it a fact that it was your intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and 
to bring about violations of the law and refusal of demonstrators to 
obey lawful orders of the police, thereby compelling the police to use 
physical force to implement the law ? 
Mr. Dellinger. May I use an analogy ? 

If you asked me, in view of what you tried to explain earlier about 
being a nonviolent revolutionist, "Am I to conclude that you support 
the suppression by Stalin of political opposition during the 1920's 
and the 1930's," I would have to say you are off in another field. 

That's not my language. I don't speak about fomenting. I don't 
believe people can foment. I think that is an illusion, and one of the 
problems that a committee like this has to think about. 

That I could decide that, you know, if I were that kind of a person, 
that I was going to foment all kinds of things, but if the people didn't 
have grievances and the people didn't believe that they had something 
to be gained by going on strike, or whatever it would be, nobody 
would listen to me. 

And many, many, many years ago, starting, I guess, with the fact 
that I didn't want anybody to, quote, "foment" me, that is, for any- 
body to tell me what to do,' and so forth, I never wanted to tell any- 
body else what to do. 

Where people don't know the facts about the war in Vietnam, I 
will try to bring them to their attention. Where they have opposition 
and want to figure out ways of opposing, I will sit down with them 
and try to plan and join and work together Avith them. 

But I never in my life tried to foment anything. This word, to me, 
implies artificial introduction of unreal grievances and unreal prob- 
lems in order to get people in trouble, and I am not interested in that. 


Mr. CoNLEY, Mr. Dellinger, we are off the subject, tliat- 

Mr. Dellixger. That's your question. The answer is, "No," to tlie 

Mr. CoNLEY. No, no, that's not my question, I don't think. 

I will put the question to you a different way, if I may. 

We are not talking about the war in Vietnam right now. We are 
talking about a simple question : Did the people who had been denied 
a permit to be in Lincoln Park that night have the right to go into that 
park, and in violation of the ordinance ? 

Now, that's the basic question. Did they? 

That hasn't got anything to do with the war in Vietnam. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. No, you see that's 

Mr. GuTMAX. Can we confer just a moment? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. All right. So first of all, I have to respectfully dis- 
agree, that I think the war in Vietnam has everything to do with it. 
And I am sorry that even in the Walker Commission Report, which, 
you laiow, points out some of the realities which, as I say, people 
were attempting to sweep under the rug — I am sorry that it exists — 
almost in abstraction from the war in Vietnam. 

I shouldn't say that about the whole report. I haven't read it all, 
but the sections that I have, excerpted from the discussion in the 
pa])er, because I don't want to go to Chicago, nobody wanted to go to 
Chicago in order to i^rove that in the American democracy you could 
•demonstrate without being beaten and gassed and assaulted. We wanted 
to go there to create pressures to stop the war in Vietnam and to put 
an end to black oppression, put an end to the murder of people like 
Bobby Hutton, the Black Panther I referred to. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, that's not what you said. 

Mr. Dellinger. But except within that context, you can't under- 
stand why people wanted to march down the street or why they wanted 
to sleep in Lincoln Park or anything else, and on the legal question 
about their right to stay in the park or not, I have already said that 
I think — first of all, I am not a lawyer and I will defer that to some- 
body else, except to say tliat I think such ordinances are subsidiary to 
the first amendment rights, j^articularly in a time of national emer- 
gency, such as this war, which is today still being fought in Vietnam. 

Mr, CoNLEY. Sir, you make the statement, though, "We have 
achieved a tragic victory," alluding back to what occurred in Lincoln 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. "We have forced" — "forced" 

Mr. Dellinger. Now, are you quoting me now, or are you quoting 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, I am quotinii-you. 

Mr. Dellinger. All right, go aliead, including it all. 

Mr. Cx)nley [reads]. 

We have forced the city of Chicago and Mayor (Richard .7.) Daley to bring out 
into the open the machinery of repressions which makes this city the Prague of 
the Middle West. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Tret's see the whole statement. 

Mr. AsHBRooK. He had previously acknowledged it. 


That was the point I make. 

Mr. Dellingee. It is from the press. Eight ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. It is from the Baltimore Sun^^ if you want to make an 
identification of where it is from. 

Mr. Dellinger. Right. 

Mr. AsHBROoK. It was in his preceding question before this one, his 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, now, first of all, I believe that this is quite 
accurate, and I may have indicated this before, quite accurate, quota- 
tion. Certamly I would not fault it. 

I would like, since you are interested in, you know, investigating 
these events, to perhaps explain it a little bit and to put it into context. 
That is, if I thought that our going to Chicago caused the United States 
to develop methods of repression of democracy, I would think that I 
would be sorry about this. I would be disappointed. 

And even Avithin this context, I called it a tragic victory. That is, it 
is my conviction that this repressive machinery already existed, is 
being used far more severely and with far less pretense, in Vietnam 
against the Vietnamese people, is used in the black communities of this 
country, and since this repressive machinery exists and is used in emer- 
gencies, I thought that there was a certain healthy educational effect 
that at least I hoped we could draw from it. 

I would have preferred — and I fought in every way I could with 
the city authorities and talked with the Justice Department officials 
and everybody else — I would have preferred for us to have the rights 
to march peacefully down those streets. 

I did not want myself or anybody else to have his head bashed in or 
poisoned — well, not poison gas, I beg your pardon ; there are poisonous 
aspects to it — anyway, the kind of gasses they used, tear gas and other 
chemicals used. I didn't want any of that to happen. 

We pleaded with the city. I said it Avas an emergency and asked that 
this kind of tiling be avoided. But since they brought it out, then 
there was a certain tragic educational value in knowing, in white 
middle-class Americans knowing that this is what black people face. 
this is what Vietnamese people face, this is what noncollege poor 
people face, if they try to assert their rights and try to act as equals in 
this country or with Americans in Vietnam. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is this what you are saying, then, that tlie tragic vic- 
tory is for these kids to get beaten, and so forth, to demonstrate to the 
remainder of the American people that which is wrong ? 

Mr. Delltnger. No. It is like, vou know, people say, "Well, vou 
staged these things for television, didn't you ?" So people would think, 
you know, see them, and the implication being that they get some false 

The fact is, I would neA^er stage anything of that kind. I told you, 
explained to you, my life has been devoted to opposition to violence, 
even violence on the side of causes that I agree with and support, so 
obA'iously I would not want any unnecessary violence to take place. 

In fact, in one confrontation — more than one, but I tliink one par- 
tipularly in the worst afternoon — we appealed to the policemen, some- 
thins: that some people think is, you know, romantic, but we appealed 
to them to understand that we were not trying to provolce violence or 

1 "Police Boosting Response To Protesters In Chicago," Aug. 27, 1968, issue. 


to cause violence and that we wanted simply to assert our democratic 
rights and that we wanted an end to the war in Vietnam, that tliey 
were not our enemies. So obviously, I would not want to provoke 

Mr. AsHBROOK. What about an appeal to the followers, Mr. 
Dellinger ^ 

Mr. Dellinger. And, of course, appeals to followers. 

"When the police brutally and viciously attacked the crowd in Lin- 
coln Park, you know, it is not easy to know how you do, because also 
there is an element of self-respect and solidarity with one's fellows 
who are being attacked, and so in many people's minds there was a 
question: Should the demonstrators counterattack the police or not? 

Now, it was my judgment and mj' conviction that they should not, 
and from the platform— I was chairing the meeting — I appealed to 
people. And it was for that reason that we had organized marshals, 
to handle situations of that kind. And our marshals, again told from 
the platform of what was happening and using their own loud speak- 
ers, a line of marshals went and got between the police and the demon- 
strators in order to minimize or stop the violence, in order to stand as 
a protective shield between the ])olice and the demonstrators, and also 
to be sure that if, as happened in a number of occasions in Chicago, 
police agents tried to get our people to attack in what I considered 
would have been a suicidal mission and a mission which would have 
confused and interfered with the presentation of what we stood for, 
would have made everybody forget about the war in Vietnam, if police 
agents tried to get that to happen, our marshals were in between. 

So to our own followers and to the police, my position consistently 
has been to avoid violence and to avoid provocation. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. Let me say, maybe 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, I think at this point it would be a convenient 
place to stop. 

]Mr. AsHBROOK. I would like to ask one more question. 

I guess the point we can't seem to get together on, it would seem to 
me a fairminded, rational person reading or hearing your statement, 
"We have forced the city of Chicago" to do, et cetera, et cetera, would 
be led to believe, as I truly am led to believe, that you in fact did fol- 
low a course of action, the end result of which brought about what 
happened, to your satisfaction. 

You say, "We have forced" them to do something. I don't think it 
is unreasonable to take the point of view : we followed this course of 
action ; this course of action succeeded because it forced the police to do 
this, which resulted in a tragic victory. And I think that's what 

Mr. Dellixger. I can understand 

Mr. AsHBROOK. This certainly isn't an unreasonable interpretation. 

I think that's what the average citizen would think when you say, 
"We have forced the city of Chicago" to do these things. 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, I can understand that confusion, or, you know, 
as to just what I had in mind. 

I would like, maybe, to give an examjile. 

It is as if you have a lily-white community — and we know there are 
many of them in this country — where, by a number of intimidatory 
methods, black people are discouraged from ever moving in and living 
in the neighborhood. And for years nothing is ever done about it and 
people congratulate themselves in this lily-white neighborhood, or 


often it is — in the past and still in the present — it has been an all- 
Christian neighborhood which excludes Jews. 

People have congratulated themselves on living in a democracy and 
a society of human brotherhood, and so forth ; but de facto, black peo- 
ple or Jews or both, or sometimes Catholics, can't live in this kind of 

Now, if somebody decides, however, to go to that community — a 
black person, a Jew, a Catholic — and to buy a house or to rent or to 
live with his friends, and the community comes out and takes action 
against it, I consider that tragic. And that is what I meant by tragic, 
there, but I also consider it the beginning of education and the begin- 
ning of a process which may correct that situation because j)eople 
have been made aware that in effect black people, Jews, or Catholics, 
or whatever it is, are excluded from that commmiity. 

Now, I apply that to the situation in Chicago. I think Mayor 
Daley — and Mayor Daley is not untypical of how most of our big cities 
are run — I think he runs that city with a police force which, on many, 
many, many occasions, just as a daily fact, does not hesitate to suppress 
the rights of black people, suppress the rights of people who may look 
poorly dressed or have long hair or what have you, or people that 
they think are Communists or what have you. There is a lot of club- 
bing that goes on. There is a lot of suppression of rights. 

In addition, in the context of the war in Vietnam, where, after all, 
many of the people used in times of civil disturbances of this country 
are people who have been trained, and they get either sent to Vietnam 
or they get sent to Detroit, in the black community, for example, or 
they come back from Vietnam and go there, so there is also this ever- 
present threat, as well as daily practice of repression. 

Now, to bring that out in the open so that people can see what the 
cancer is and to begin to deal with it and face up to it — it is tragic 
that the cancer exists, but it is also necessary, sometimes, to bring it 
out in the open. 

Mr. AsHBROOK. But it would seem to me that, of course, you are 
talking on a high plane ; you are talking on a very high plane 

Mr. Dellingbe. It is the plane on which I try to operate. 

Mr. AsiiBROOK. We are not — you are at least addressing yourself 
on what I vrould consider a very high plane, but, also, the facts indi- 
cate that the confrontation was brought about to some extent by those 
who cursed, shouted obscenities, threw things, did things which I am 
sure you don't condone. And what you are saying, in effect, is you did 
not follow a course of action, the obscenities, the stone-throwing, et 
cetera, to bring this about, and yet that is one of the factors that 
helpecl bring it about. 

That isn't what you mean when you say, "We forced the police." 

Mr. Dellinger. Not forced them by any of those methods. 

Mr. AsHBROOK, Bv using your own group, whatever you meant 
by it? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, by the fact 

Mr. AsHBRooK. You have to admit that was a part of it. 

Mr. Dellinger. By the fact that at last, you got — not entirely, be- 
cause there were more whites, because there were more black people 
there than is sometimes noted, but at last you got the students and 
some of the white middle class, middle-aged community so opposed 
to the war and so insistent that it be stopped that they were no longer 


content to play this role of meaningless dissent that I referred to, or 
relatively meaningless dissent, but actually wanted to stop the war, 
actually wanted to save the lives of the American soldiers and Viet- 
namese people. 

This was an accomplishment. 

Now, when any movement gets serious about changing the existing 
social structure, as not all of our movements, but large elements are 
becoming increasingly serious about it, then they face the danger of 
the kind of repression which ordinarily falls, and still falls heaviest 
on black people, poor people, and various others. 

Could I make — I know I would like to say one thing to clear up a 

I have tried, as I said, to speak for myself and to be verj^ clear about 
my own attitudes, convictions, and so forth. 

I would not want to give the impression — it would not be fair to- 
them — that our movement is, for example, the Mobilization is a pacifist 
organization. It is not. It is a coalition of many different types. I 
already said that. 

Almost, well, in most occasions, a leading role is played by veter- 
ans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean war, veterans 
of the war in Vietnam. Obviously, many of those people do not share- 
my views, whether it is about World War II or even Korea, so I have 
tried to be clear about myself. But I am not trying to give a picture 
that our movement is a universally pacifist movement. 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, we can resume the testimony tomorrow 

The Chair at this time will declare an adjournment until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning. 

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., Wednesday, December 4, 1968, the subcom- 
mittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968.) 

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives 
Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.) 


Part 3 


United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activtites, 

Washington^ D.G. 
public hearings 

The subconmiittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Build- 
ing, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of 
Missouri, chairman ; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio ; and Albert W. Wat- 
son, of South Carolina.) 

Subcommittee members present : Representatives Ichord and Wat- 

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank 
Conley, special counsel ; Chester D. Smith, general counsel ; Alfred M. 
Nittle, counsel ; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator. 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order, a quorum being 

At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday, we were in the midst of 
taking the testimony from the witness in the chair, Mr. David Del- 

The witness will be reminded that the affirmation continues. Now, 
the Chair will again admonish — I do not mean this for all the mem- 
bers of the audience, but there may be some who might be intent on 
causing distraction or attempting to disrupt the hearing. The Chair 
cannot tolerate any disturbances, such as boisterous conduct or any 
activity that would distract the committee and the witnesses and the 
counsel involved in these hearings. The Chair will admonish the audi- 
ence that he will require strict adherence to the rules and that order be 
maintained. Otherwise, the Chair will have to use his authority of ask- 
ing that you leave the room. If you do not comply with the request, 
then the officers will have to be directed to escort you from the room. 

With that admonition, Mr. Counsel, will you resume questioning of 
the witness. 




Mr. GuTMAN, Mr. Chairman, I want to put on the record we continue 
with the same objections with which we prefaced our testimony yes- 
terday. I also would like to repeat on the record the request I made 
of counsel yesterday, which I think got on the record, and that is that 
we be provided with copies of all documents from which readings have 
been made, whether or not they have been intioduced in the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair thought, perhaps in connection with another 
witness, that he did state that the transcript would be printed as 
quickly as possible, and, of course, the transcript will be available 
to you. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What I had reference to was the document from which the counsel 
was reading yesterday wliile he questioned the witness and from which 
extracts were read into tlie record. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course, the counsel, I am sure, prepares his own 
notes, Mr. Gutman. Some of them would be his own notes. 

Mr. Gutman. I don't expect to receive his notes. But he was reading 
from a transcript of a Havana radio broadcast. Two separate broad- 
casts. He was reading from news articles, from letters allegedly signed 
by Mr. Dellinger. I would like to liave copies of all tliose documents. 
Some of them I saw and were taken away from me. Some I have not 
even seen. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, will you come forward, please, both 

(Chairman and counsel confer.) 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the record show that the request made by the 
attorney for furnishing copies of all of the documents which the 
attorney might use is denied for the reason tliat it does constitute, in 
the Chair's opinion, an undue burden on the statf of the committee. 

Mr. Gutman. If I can borrow them for 10 miinites, I can Xerox 
them and give them back. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us have order, Mr. Counsel. 

These documents, the Chair has been informed, are newspaper ac- 
counts and also refer to transcripts from Radio Havana. I am sure 
they are available to counsel by other means. The Chair considers the 
lequest unreasonable and will deny it, and Ave will let the record show 

Proceed, gentlemen. 

Mr. Bellinger. May I ask a question ? When the documents are used 
and parts are read, will the entire document appear in the transcript? 
I would like to have the whole evidence in. 

Mr. IcHORD. Those documents that have been admitted in the record 
will appear in the transcript. 

Mr. Gutman. The documents I liave reference to have not been 
marked in evidence, so far as I know. I request that they be marked 
in evidence so that they can appear. 

Mr. IcHORD. The counsel refers to the documents. The record will 
stand as made. Let us proceed, Counsel. 

^W. Gftman. T most respectfully except. 

Mr. IciioRD. The record will show the request is denied. Let us abide 


by the rules. We got along very well yesterday. Let us see if we cannot 
do the same today. 

Mr. GuTMAN. We will get along fine as long as I don't assert my 
constitutional rights. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will admonish the attorney that _we are 
functioning under the rules of the House and the rules of this com- 
mittee. The Chair will point out that the rights of the counsel, con- 
stitutional rights, are not being infringed upon. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Of the witness, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. And of the witness and of the counsel. The Chair has 
read many times the rules governing this procedure. I point out, I did 
not think it was necessary, but I shall point out again ^ 

Mr. GuTMAN. I waive the reading of that, sir. I am familiar with 
the rule. 

Mr. IcHORD. I think it is necessary in view of what has proceeded 
here. It has been read to the counsel many times. 

This is not a criminal proceeding. This is a proceeding to gather 
facts. We have gotten along very well. The witness is not on trial; 
he is not sought to be punished. The Chair does not intend to use this 
committee, and I will state that the Chair does not even have the 
authority to punish the witness for any activity of his outside of this 
hearing room, and it is not the intent of the Chair, and I shall never 
use this committee or any other committee which I might be chair- 
man of for that purpose. 

Now, the rules have been read. I think they have been very clear. 
The rules of court procedure do not prevail in this body and for good 
reason. The purposes, the objectives, are completel}^ different. Now, 
let us proceed, Mr. Counsel, and let us have order. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may direct your attention back to 
about June 29 of last year, and basing the present questions on certain 
articles which appeared in the W a.shington Post of June 30, the articles 
in the Post of June 30 indicate that a press conference was held by you 
and other members of the National Mobilization Committee in New 
York City on June 29, and at that time you revealed some of your 
plans and goals in connection with the Democratic Party Convention 
in Chicago. 

First of all, let me ask you. Do you remember this particular press 
conference back on the 29th of June ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Not as yet. I don't remember the date or the occa- 
sion. We sought to make our views publicly known as often and as 
much as possible, but I don't remember that specific date. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Perhaps if I give you a specific quote from that con- 
ference it will recall it to your mind. 

At that particular conference, according to the report published in 
the Washington Post under date of June 30, 1968, you stated as fol- 
lows: That your activities in Chicago would consist of, and I use the 
quotes from the article, a "period of several days of escalating actions 
climaxed by a massive mobilization at the time of the nomination." 
Do you recall this particular statement ? 
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you also state at that time that the tactics to be 
used, and I again quote from the article, "will be fixed as events 
unfold" and that "massive direct action" would be one of them. 


Mr. GuTMAN. Are you reading from an article, sir? Do you have 
a copy of that ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GunviAN. May we keep this copy ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. No, sir. That is the only copy I have, sir. 

(Document handed to witness and counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. In reading this I find it incorporates the correction 
that I was going to make. If I understand you, and I hope the record 
will show this, you said that "events would include massive direct 

What it says is that " 'massive direct action' could include picket 
lines, sit-ins, roving sound trucks and street performances by theater 
und rock music groups." 

Obviously, a very small part of this is in direct quotes, and it is not 
a direct statement by me. But in general it describes the kind of action 
which we envision, with the emphasis upon the fact that tactics will be 
fixed as events unfold. That is my general approach, that we are not 
doctrinary and we are not stereotyped and that we interact with other 
people who are present and with events. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, the first part of it, of course, dealt with the 
"period of several days of escalating actions climaxed by a massive 
mobilization at the time of the nomination." 

Do you iind that? It is a little earlier in the same article. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I find that. I would like to see activities to 
stop the war escalate from now until the war is stopped. Ceitainly 
those are my sentiments and they were my sentiments at that time. I 
advocated then, and I advocate now, massive actions and small actions, 
too, and escalating as much as possible until the war is stopped and the 
lives of the Americans and Vietnamese who are being needlessly 
killed are saved, until every American soldier is brought home. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this in connection with 
those two remarks which you have indicated were made and placed 
jour own interpretation on them : Isn't it a fact that as early as June 
1968, at this particular press conference in New York City, you cer- 
tainly, at least in the back of your mind, considered as a possibility 
that violence would occur as a result of these proceedings which were 
going to occur in Chicago ; did you not ? 

Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment. 

Mr. Conley. Sir 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness confer with his attorney. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. Of course, you have made a complete non sequitur 
there because I called for escalating actions to stop the war in Vietnam 
and to end oppression of the black community. 

You have made some connection that I expected or wanted violence. 
The fact is that I called for this kind of action long before June. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, my question did not say you were calling 
for violence. My question was, and I will repeat it : Didn't you at least 
consider that there was a possibility that tliere would be violence stem- 
ming from these demonstrations in Chicago? I don't think you need 
to read more into the question than what I ha^-e asked you. 

iSIr. Dellinger. It was more than a possibility that the I''^nited 
States Government would commit violence against people trj'ing to 


assert their democratic rights, whether in this country or in Vietnam, 
because they were already imposing that violence upon the people of 
Vietnam, upon the black community. 

They had imposed it upon me and other objectors before. So I would 
be a fool to think that we could assert our democratic rights in this 
country and we could work against war and for peace and justice with- 
out running the risk of the kind of police riot which the Humphrey- 
Johnson-Bailey-Daley forces unleashed at Chicago, 

This is one of the risks of the game, but w^e are unwilling to be silent 
and to protect ourselves while Americans and Vietnamese and black 
people are suffering, 

Mr, CoNLEY. You have admitted the fact that you, then, consid- 
ered the possibility that there would be governmental violence, if I 
may use a broad term. Don't you also admit that there was also a pos- 
sibility that some of the people involved in your movement might be 
involved in violence themselves? 

Mr, Dellinger, Well, our movement does not plan or provoke or 
organize violence, 

Mr. CoNLEY. I appreciate that your movement does not. My ques- 
tion, though, is : Did you not anticipate or foresee the possibility that 
some of the people participating in your movement would or could 
engage in violence in comiection with the Chicago demonstrations? 

Mr. Dellinger. My concern about violence at Chicago was that the 
police and the Federal authorities would employ violence. That was 
the major danger and the major cause. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You never considered the possibility that some group 
affiliated with you in this effort or some individual affiliated with you 
in this effort might not himself, or themselves, engage in acts of 
violence ? 

Mr. Dellinger. In any action there is always the possibility that 
somebody will engage in acts of violence. But I have had enough ex- 
l)erience with our movement, and particularly coming up to Chicago, 
to know that historically and in terms of probability the threat of 
violence comes from the authorities and not from the demonstrators. 

Mr. CoNLEY. History tells you this, that it comes from the authori- 
ties and not from the demonstrators ? 

Mr. Dellinger. The history of my participation in the antiwar 
movement has been that when we seek to assert our rights, when we 
seek to try to stop injustice or war or violence, that the authorities 
on many occasions, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, use 

Mr. CoNLEY. We have spent much time here now on these questions 
answering that the authorities used violence. There are a number 
of reports that would indicate that the police did over or under, or 
whatever they did, react. We are not askmg you about this. 

I am asking you about the people that you felt — I hesitate to use 
the word — responsible for. Did you consider that some of these people 
w^ould use violence ? It is a very simple question. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I think you should hesitate to use the word 
"responsible" because ours is not the kind of movement in which some 
individual or small group controls the others. We created a frame- 
work and we issued a call and we did our best to organize and invite 
people to come. But we do not exercise a strong talk-down leadership. 

21-706 O — 69 — pt. 3 5 


Mr. CoNLEY. Still, as a person very definitely committed to this 
movement, did you as an individual or as part of the steering com- 
mittee consider the possibilities that people from within your move- 
ment or affiliated with your movement would engage in acts of violence 
in Chicago? 

Mr. Dellinger. But whenever we come up to an action of any kind, 
naturally, in my own thoughts and sometimes in discussions with 
others, I try to consider all of the possibilities. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying, sir, then, that you did consider this 
as a possibility ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I will say — I haven't said yet — but as we ap- 
proached Chicago and as I considered all of the possibilities, the thing 
that weighed heaviest on my mind and the thing that I was most 
concerned about in the area of violence was that the Chicago police 
would act as they did and that the political authorities would not have 
the courage to stop this, as they could have stopped it in advance. 

In fact, the political authorities, going all the way to the White 
House and the State Department, might very well wished to have this 
kind of violence, either in order to seize the initiative on the law and 
order issue from the opposition or in order to intimidate the growing 
antiwar sentiment by picking on what I wnll call the more militant 
and more active group at Chicago, indicate to other people that even 
though they might not like the war they had better not speak up too 
much and they had better not stick their necks out too much. 

I think this organized and intended political violence on the part of 
the Government could very well be a complement or supplement to 
such political trials as the Spock-Coffin-Raskin-Goodman trial in 

Obviously this was a veiy unpopular war. People were becoming 
disillusioned with American foreign policy. Obviously people were 
unwnlling to have their sons killed in Vietnam, and obviously the 
Government was making a determined effort in a variety of ways 
to intimidate people and to prevent them or discourage them from 
exercising their conscientious and democratic obligations. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, in this same area, if I may take you 
back to March 26 of this same year, the New Ym^k T'nnfH published 
a rather lengthy accomit of a press conference held by you and other 
planners of the Chicago convention. 

You held it at a camp near Chicago on March 28 and 24. Do you 
recall the meeting to which I refer? 
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I do. 

Mr- CoNLEY. You apparently held a i)ress conference, or it was at 
least reported by the Times on the 26th of March, i)age 28 

Mr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Particularly, I want to direct your attention to a statement — it is 
not in quotes — in the article. It is apparently the judgment of the 
Times reporter, based upon what you said : 

Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demon- 
stration tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention. 

Now% did you make a statement of that type to a reporter from the 
New York Times? 


Mr. Bellinger. First, may I call your attention — since you called 
attention to the interpretation of the reporter — to the two headlines. 
The main headline is "PEACEFUL PEOTEST IN CHICAGO 
VOWED,'- which is a strong word. Secondly, the "Group Says It 
Doesn't Plan to Disrupt Convention." 

However, if you remember, Mayor Daley and the authorities con- 
tinually used the claim that we had announced we were going to 
disrupt the convention as a basis for denying us ordinary permits, 
for threatening all kinds of violent action against people w^ho came 
to Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Let us go down those specific 

Mr. Dellinger. Now, when it comes to your quote, not a quote 

Mr. GuTMAN. About 20 paragraphs down the article. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Perhaps I should just glance briefly at the 
rest of it — 

they attacked Mayor Richard J. Daley, charging him with planning uncon- 
stitutional repression * * *. 

This was as early as March 26, and yet the Federal Government- 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, I don't object to your going ahead and 
explaining your answer. Let us answer the question first. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us have order. Let us start over again. Put the 

Mr. CoNLEY. The question is. Did you make a statement similar to 
the one I have read : 

Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration 
tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention. 

Let us get to that and then to yours. 

Mr. Dellinger. Since I had a lengthy meeting with a reporter, which 
was then summarized here, I think that it is important to try to estab- 
lish the context and the overall impact of what I was trying to say. 

I have already indicated that the headline and the early sections 
make clear our emphasis upon a peaceful protest and our attempt to 
warn the Federal authorities and the American people of the repression 
planned by Mayor Daley. I certainly will answer your question about 
this paragraph, but I would like to put it in context. It is at least 6 or 7 
or 8 inches down the story. 

I do object somewhat to your taking it out of context. I will skip 
over things I could comment on in between 8 inches. I will point out 
early we warned against the dangers of oppression. The Federal au- 
thorities took no overt action. Mayor Daley, who certainly is not 
independent — he is interrelated with the whole Democratic Party and 
the whole administration — certainly did not proceed entirely on his 

I want to bring this out because it is very important in terms of the 
Walker Commission Report wliich has come out now. As someone 
ix)ints out, the worse things get in the United States, the better the 
reports in the post factum analyses get. 

I think it is very important that the American people be not deceived 
in thinking that this problem of protection of constitutional rights 
and resistance to unlawful exercise of police authority has been taken 
care of by the fact that first they had the evil and then afterwards there 
is a report which seeks to tell at least some of the truth about it. 


Now, when it comes to this — well, just one final comment on the 
preceding thing. Our prediction was that, basically, if there was 
violence and if there was repression, it would come from the authorities 
and not from the movement. 

Now when it gets down here it says : 

Mr. Bellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration 
tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention. 

Well, that is part of my very strong and our very strong democratic 
conception, namely, that we do not own the movement. We do not 
dictate the tactics which other people employ. Perhaps when we select 
a date, as we selected the date of October 21 and 22, 1967, to protest 
at the Pentagon, we controlled most, if not all, of the conditions — 
well, most of the conditions would be a fairer way — and we exercised 
more control, or tried to exercise more control over the nature of 
what takes place. 

But in a national event such as a Democratic Convention, the con- 
vention of the ruling war party, it would be presumptuous of any- 
body to say we have staked off this event in this city and we are 
going to control everything that happens there. 

We could not control the McCarthy delegates, the Humphrey dele- 
gates, the Ted Kennedy people who were working in conjunction 
with Mayor Daley to try to get a draft for him. We could not control 
any other people who might be coming to Chicago. 

We simply indicated that if some other group was carrying out 
whatever form of activity that it believed in and wanted to par- 
ticipate in, whether inside the convention, such as some of the groups 
I have mentioned, or in one of the hotels or in the streets or any- 
where else, it was not our responsibility or our concern or our 
right to dictate to them what they should do. 

Mr. CoNLEY. So this, then, is a fair and attributable statement to 
you, then ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think the statement I have just made is a fair 
and attributable statement. That is an expression of my views. The 
other is an expression of a reporter's attempt to summarize in one 
sentence something that I have explained more fully. And I would 
like what I have said to stand as my views, rather than what the re- 
porter said. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, at that point you have stated, as I 
understood you, that you did have control of the Pentagon demon- 
stration. Do you mean by that, that the Mobilization Committee 
was the only group that participated in the Pentagon demonstra- 
tion ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No ; what I said was that when we select a target 
and date and call for a demonstration, obviously we take on more 
responsibility than in an event such as the Chicago Democratic 

However, even there, the Pentagon and the ground surround- 
ing it are public property, and we do not have either the right or 
the power to control everybody who decides to come at that time. 
In that case, because we did select the date and issued the call, 
if we heard of other people who were planning to participate, I 
mean planning to come, we made a determined effort to contact 


them to find out what their plans were and to attempt to coordinate 
our activities. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, with your explanation of this statement 
in this article, I will put to you this question, which I think is answer- 
able with a rather specific answer. Did you, at the time you made 
this statement which you have elaborated on for our benefit here this 
morning, have any particular groups in mind, which were a part of 
the coalition or who would become a part of the coalition, who might 
possibly be motivated towards acts of violence ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No. In my elaboration of the reporter's statement, 
I have referred to the McCarthy people, the Ted Kennedy people. 
Obviously there were other groups, many of whom we would not even 

To the best of my recollection, remembering that this was, what, 
last March, and this is a reporter's summary of, of a meeting with him, 
I certainly have no recollection of any particular groups of the kind 
you are talking about. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying that you suspected that possibly the 
Kennedy or the McCarthy people might be prone to violence ? 

Mr. Dellinger. As a matter of fact, most of them do believe in 
violence. They enforce the American Armed Forces, and Senator Mc- 
Carthy has said that he thinks our commitment to Taiwan is very 
important. And he supports NATO and has criticized the President, 
not for having maintained NATO, but for having not handled the 
situation in a way that would make it possible for France to stay in. 

Of course, the people running for .the Presidency of the Unil^ed 
States on the major tickets are all endorsers of the imperialist vio- 
lence that the United States does impose on the world. In terms of 
my concern with violence, and, as I said, this is the major violence 
that our society has to face 

Mr. Conley. Let us relate the violence to Chicago, not the world 

Mr. Dellinger. Chicago was taking place in context. We were going 
to Chicago because we liked to march up and down the street even 
without getting beaten over the head. That is the main issue, the 
fact that the U.S. Government is promoting violence and practicing 
violence all over the world. That is what brought us to Chicago and 
also in the ghetto. 

Mr. CoNLEY. We are concerned with what, if any, violence occurred 
in Chicago. I would like for us to be using the term in that sense. 

Mr. Dellinger, I just want you to put it in this context because 
that is the important violence. This is the case of — what is it from 
the Bible — of looking at the moat in the other fellow's eye and not 
observing the beam in your own eye. 

For the U.S. Government to be upset over the fact that some people 
might be so opposed to the war or so horrified about it that they might, 
in self-defense or some other way, engage in some act that they might 
consider violence, is perhaps one of the greatest obscenities of our age. 

I am sure that future historians will consider this a subject for 
satire and tragic humor. 

Mr. Conley. Besides the McCarthy and Kennedy people, whom 
you have identified as groups you thought possibly could engage in 
acts of violence, what other groups do you have reference to? 


Mr. Bellinger. I try to be very precise about these things because 
there are a lot of subtleties^ and I did not talk about the McCarthy 
and Kennedy groups engaging in violence in Chicago. I talked about 
their endorsing violence abroad. 

Now, as it happened, I think that in some cases they either endorsed 
or acquiesced in the violence of the Chicago police against us. Cer- 
tainly, even Senator McCarthy did not speak out until after 3 or 4 days 
of brutality. It was not until the end of the convention, and his own 
headquai-ters had been invaded and his own supporters bloodied, that 
he made some mild statement against it. 

Certainly one of the disappointments of the time was that a man 
who wanted to be an idealistic leader of youth, or at least w^as described 
as such, had nothing to say during the violence. I didn't say I expected 
them to take part directly in the violence themselves. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are there any other groups that you did anticipate, 
foresee, suspect, or contemplate might engage in acts of violence, other 
than those groups that you have already identified ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Like the National Guard and the U.S. Army and 
the police and the undercover agents. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Groups who would be there generally with the same 
purposes as your group or as part of your coalition ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I really don't have any particular memory of 
such groups. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Why would you make a statement, or a statement gen- 
erally attributable to you, like this, that you would not try to impose 
peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups ? There must have been 
feX)mething brought to your mind. 

Mr. Dellinger. I just spent about 5 minutes explaining the nature 
of the occasion and the nature of our approach to it and why we did 
not seek to dictate to other groups — this wide spectrum of people 
who might be in Chicago — dictate how they would act. This whole 
business, I simply refuse to speculate about the possible motives and 
the possible methods and actions of the wide spectrum of American 

Mr. Conley. You did speculate in this statement that has been 
attributable to you. You did speculate? 

Mr. Dellinger. You are really going a long way on the basis of one 
sentence by a reporter, which is not even a direct quote. 

Mr. Conley. If we may move on, sir, to August 4, 1968. This is 
administrative meeting of the National Mobilization Committee held 
in the city of Chicago. The document I am about to read from is a 
document which has been previously testified to in these hearings by 
Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department. 

Mr. GuTMAN. May we have a copy of it, please ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, just as soon as I get through with it. 

This document, I believe, has been made a part of the exhibits of this 
hearing.^ I particularly direct your attention to page 3, the last para- 
graph : "The discussion moved to the massive march" 

Mr. GuTMAN. Hold it ; let us see what it is. 

This is a summary of administrative meeting held 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us abide by the rules. 

1 Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 25." See pt. 1, pp. 2348-2352, of Oct. 1, 19ft8, 


Give the attorney and his client the opportunity to examine the 

(Witness and counsel examine document.) 

Mr. Dellinger. It was quite long, but I have finished it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, sir, to get us back where we were a moment ago, 
as I say, this document has been previously offered and received by 
the committee. The entire document is in evidence and is part of the 
transcript, I believe. 

It is a document that was testified to earlier in these proceedings by 
Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department. I want, if I may, 
to direct your attention specifically to the last paragraph, beginning 
on page 3, which reads as follows: 

The discussion moved to the massive march proposal, analyzing the various 
routes to the Amphitheatre and the length of the different routes. Dave pointed 
out that calling for an action not relating to the Amphitheatre on the 28th was 
ignoring the natural magnetism of the place, that the media would would [sic] 
be at the Amphitheatre, and that the necissity [sic] of having the military sur- 
round masses of i^eople at a democratic convention would lend political con- 
tent to the action. There was a discussion on the possibility of proceeding in the 
face of a curfew threat or denial of a permit. It was pointed out that Mob has 
rallied people before without a permit, and that insistence on fulfilling an an- 
nounced aim made a strong bargaining position in negotiating a permit. A curfew 
according to Bob Greenbatt, would be clearly an oppressive measure to be dis- 
obeyed. If a curfew is imposed. Otto Lilj'enstolpe suggested volunteers be urged 
to disobey in order to force the city into the predicament of mass arrests. 

Now, sir, my question, after reading to you that quotation, is : Are 
you the Dave mentioned in that paragraph ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I assume that I am. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Does the paragraph accurately summarize one of the 
discussions at the meeting, indicating, as it does, that you apparently 
strongly urged that there be a march on the Amphitheatre? 

Mr. Dellinger. I certainlj;, before that time, at that time, and after 
that time, strongly urged that there be a massive march to the Amphi- 
theatre. I changed your word "on" to "to.'' 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, quoting from the same document, directing your 
attention to the paragraph on the top of page 5 of the same document : 

When the nonviolent line was questioned, Dave explained that Mob included 
groups whose beliefs ranged from pacifism to militant self defense. While our 
aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence. Mob 
has never repudiated the actions of its constituents. It will be stressed, in addi- 
tion, that it is well known that Chicago police are responsible for violence. * * * 

Now, does that quotation, Mr. Dellinger, also accurately reflect a 
discussion at the meeting and your role in that particular discussion ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Obviously it is a very pithy summary of the dis- 
cussion which, if I remember correctly, took at least or about half an 
hour. I think that what is clear there — well, even in this report, which 
I am glad I took an opportunity to resvd earlier, there is a specific 
reference to the very great violence employed by tlie Chicago police 
on April 27, the peace march in Chicago, which was under the spon- 
sorship of the Chicago Peace Council and the National Mobilization 

So there was nothing artificial. This plus reports that we had of 
many oppressive police actions against the black residents of Chicago, 
against hippies and other groups. So the reference to the violence of 
the Chicago police was not abstract. It was in this kind of context. I 


pointed out yesterday, after making clear my adherence to the total 
nonviolence, that I pointed out that the movement as a whole includes 
many diverse groups and, as a matter of fact, the activities are often 
led by veterans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean 
war, and even veterans of the war in Vietnam. 

So this is the kind of thing I was pointing out in this diverse group, 
that although for tactical reasons and practical reasons of where we 
were operating and how, the entire group advocated nonviolence, none- 
theless, our constituency included people like veterans and many others 
who do believe in militant self-defense. 

Militant self-defense was, on some occasions, employed on the actual 
scene in Chicago, and true to this statement — and I think quite prop- 
erly — neither I nor any other pacifist I know of has repudiated acts 
of self-defense, even though we ourselves might not have participated 
in them. 

Mr. IcHORD. Even you as a pacifist believe in the right of self- 
defense ? 

Mr. Dellinger. There are various forms of self-defense. 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't want to get into the discussion of various juris- 
dictions on laws of self-defense. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have been attacked by police and others 
without striking back. I believe it is possible to maintain a militant 
and noncooperative posture in such a situation without choosing the 
method of combat adopted by the police. This happens to be the view 
of probably a minority wnthin our movement, but this is the distinction 
which was being made here because there were, for example, I remem- 
ber some Quakers and pacifists who had come from some distance to 
this meeting who do not adopt methods of physical self-defense when 
attacked, as I do not. 

And there were others who feel that the more manly and success- 
ful and militant thing to do, if you are attacked by the police, is to 
resist physically. 

We were trying to show that our movement comprised both groups, 
and it was not — and that neither need repudiate the other and that, 
given the practical situation in Chicago, we could all work together 
for a united impact. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, moving back in this article and, again, 
like that earlier article that we had the small quote from, reading spe- 
cifically from the interior of this article : 

While our aim is 

Mr. loHORD. The article, Mr. Counsel, or the minutes ? 
Mr. CoNLEY. The minutes, I am sorry, page 5 : 

While our aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence, 
Mob has never repudiated the actions of its constituents. 

This is a sentence drawn from within this larger statement. The 
statement starts out saying you do not advocate violence, as I under- 
stand it, but it says you do not repudiate the actions of your 
constituents ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I made clear yesterday that I do not repudiate 
the actions of the Vietnamese or the Cubans in fighting for the lib- 
erty and advancement of their country, and in the same way I do not 
repudiate, in fact I try to support in a variety of ways the Black Pan- 


thers, who, in their dilemma and the injustices they suffer, do not take 
a pacifist position. And in the same way in Chicago, although I myself 
would not and did not throw stones, for example, against charging 
police, I can understand and I have a great deal of sympathy with 
some of my colleagues who feel that when the police viciously attack 
a crowd of people and are advancing that way, that the moral position 
is to resist them, including by physical means. 

This kind of self-defense — as I say, the Mobilization includes both 
approaches to that, and sometimes it leads to some tensions or prob- 
lems that have to be worked out. But we have never repudiated either 
the pacifists, who, in the face of a charging police, will perhaps lie 
down or sit down or do something else, Jbut not try to fight them off, 
or the other group, who may on occasion try to defend themselves with 
their fists or whatever other instruments are handy. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, does this not mean really, then, that you 
do not condone violence on the part of persons participating with you 
in a demonstration ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Do not condone it ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Do not condone or do condone. Which do you choose, 

Mr. Dellinger. I choose what really runs all the way throug;h this. 
I think you are straining at one point here which for one thing — I 
stand by this statement that you are excerpting, but all the way through 
the emphasis is on planning and organizing and conducting nonviolent 

That was our plan. There were people there who think there is a 
time when nonviolence is inadequate, but who felt, in the situation at 
Chicago, for tactical reasons it was necessary to be nonviolent because, 
otherwise, people would be unnecessarily brutalized and the issues 
would be obscured and we would not focus on what we were there for. 

I won't give all of their reasons. 

Mr. Conley. You do, then, condone violence on the part of people 
participating with you, do you not ? You do not repudiate it. 

Mr. Dellinger. Is it better that my views be expressed in my words 
or yours ? I have expressed them at great length, I think. I am a little 
embarrassed to keep repeating my sentiments. I would rather not have 
my views put in one sentence by you with your choice of words. I find 
these matters very complicated. 

Mr. IcHORD. We are dealing, Mr. Dellinger, with very subtle 

Mr. Dellinger. Right. 

Mr. IcHORD. As I understood, for example, on desertions by the mili- 
tary, you stated that you did not advocate desertion by the military. 
I don't know what your words were, but you approved desertion or you 
condoned desertion. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. If I had the opjjortunity tonight at a public 
meeting, I would say that I think American soldiers should not com- 
mit war crimes and that I will support anybody who decides either to 
refuse orders to go to Vietnam or decides to turn in his uniform or 
decides to take political asylum in Sweden or Canada or anywhere else, 
in the reversal of the process by which our country began, to come here 
to get asylum from militarism. I will support that. 

What I made clear was that I will not say to any individual that 
you ought to do this or you ought to do that. 


Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinsfer 

Mr. Dellixger. Incidentally, I will be very happy if my statement 
on desertion, for example, were published b}" the press because I think 
this is the kind of thing that the American people have open and part of 
the alternatives which are presented to them, part of the challenge 
presented to them. 

Mr. CoxLEY. I would like to mo^^e you to another event occurring 
on August 28, the rally which was held, under a permit granted by 
the city of Chicago, in Grant Park. I want to hand you what purports 
to be a flyer, which is captioned, ''"Let the People Speak,"* and it con- 
cludes with "Let the People Be Heard, National ^Mobilization 

I will ask you, sir, if this is a flyer or document published by your 
organization and distributed, urging attendance at this particular 

Mr. IcHORD. Give the witness time to examine the document. 

(Witness and counsel examine document.) 

Mr. Dellix'ger. Yes; this was issued bj' the National Mobilization 
Committee. I would like to respectfully request that it be entered 
into the record so that people who read the record may know what 
our views were. I could read it out loud, but it is not necessary. 

Mr. IcHORD. There being no objection from Mr. Watson, the docu- 
ment will be admitted and printed in the record. 

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 2" follows:) 

Dellinger Exhibit No. 2 

Let the 
People Speak 

Demonstrate Your Opposition to the Vietnam War 

Grant Park 

Wednesday August 28th 

1 P.M. to 4 P.M. 

The majority of the American people want the United States to stop the 
bombing and get out of Vietnam. The politicians are in Chicago threatening to con- 
tinue the war and to suppress opposition. This is the only demonstration for which 
the city has issued a permit despite repeated requests by many groups. 

The political bosses at the Democratic Convention, and the political boss of 
Chicago, Richard J. Daley, are obviously afraid to hear what the people want. They 
have turned Chicago into an armed camp and have tried to scuttle free speech so that 
they wouldn't have to listen to the innumerable Americans WHO WANT THE UNITED 

The people of this country have been grossly deceived and misrepresented by 
the Johnson-Humphrey-Daley team. These are the men who promised peace in 1 964, 
then escalated the war to the point where 200,000 American boys (and countless 
Vietnamese) have been killed or wounded. These are the men who evidently believe 
that the American people have no rights, that only government bureaucrats can decide 
whether we live or die. 

This totalitarian mentality, which goes hand in hand with the illegal war in 
Vietnam, must not go unchallenged. If we would reassert our right to be free citizens, 
we must show our determination to stop the slaughter in Vietnam. 

We urge all Chicagoans to join with the thousands coming from across the 
country in a massive antiwar demonstration at Grant Park, Wednesday from 
1 p.m. to 4 p.m. 

Let the 

People Be Heard 

National Mobilization Committa* 
Room 315, 407 S. Daartwm 939-2666 


Mr. CoNLEY. In connection with this rally to which this flyer speaks 
there was a rally held in Grant Park and there was a permit issued 
by the city of Chicago for that purpose, was there not? 

Mr. Dellinger. It was never clear whether we had a permit or not 
because we received assurances — well, I don't want to be wrong about 
the time, but at least 24 hours, probably 48 or 72 hours beforehand, 
perhaps on the Monday before Wednesday — we were told that a per- 
mit would be granted. 

However, at approximately 5 :30 in the afternoon, Tuesday, before 
the rally planned for Wednesday noon, I received a letter from the 
city of Chicago — I forget whether it was the mayor's office; I think 
it was the mayor's office — the letter saying that we would be permitted 
to rally, but that we would not be allowed to distribute any literature, 
that we must have an insurance policy of from $300,000 to $500,000 
indemnity, I guess is the word, and that we must promise or under- 
take to pay all the costs incurred by the city of Chicago because of 
the holding of the rally. 

Obviously, we could not and would not accept these terms, and it 
was, from all points of view, impossible at 5 :30 on Tuesday after- 
noon, for example, to secure that kind of insurance if we had been 
willing to. 

Therefore, it was never clear whether w^e really had a permit or not 
or whether this was another method of intimidation; whether if we 
attempted, as we did attempt to assert our constitutional rights and 
our moral obligations by going there, whether we would be declared 
illegal and subject to abuse. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, if you contend it is not clear as to 
whether or not you had a permit — you, as you have always contended, 
a man who always speaks the truth — why did you put in this doc- 
ument the statement, "This is the only demonstration for which 
the city has issued a permit * * *"? 

It does not ring true to me that you would put that in one of these 
documents. You would accuse us of dishonesty, but not yourself? 

Mr. Dellinger. I do not remember accusing you of dishonesty. I 
have accused you of many political crimes, but I don't remember ac- 
cusing you of personal dishonesty. I certainly don't want you to have 
that impression. I have no basis for thinking such. 

However, I think I just pointed out tliat the city had told us that 
the rally would be permitted. Ordinarily, under those circumstances, 
I take people to be men of their words, and that if the deputy mayor 
says this be permitted — or the assistant corporation counsel, whoever 
it was, I think it was both — we assumed that it is permitted. Since the 
city of Chicago was obviously trying to keep people away from the 
assertion of their democratic rights and of their moral obligation to 
oppose the war, first of all by a series of threats, all the way from 
Mayor Daley's shoot to kill and shoot to maim statement of April or 
May to a variety of other things I won't go into now, and also by de- 
laying permits so that people who did want to face arrest or 
brutalization would not have time to get to the city. 

As soon as we were told by the deputy mayor and the assistant cor- 
poration counsel that we did have the permit and that it would be 
legally granted, we informed people as rapidly as we could. 

However, this was limited to distribution in the Chicago area. There 


was not time to reach people in outlying districts except by a few 
selective phone calls, 

Mr. IcHORD. Wliat was the procedure used in issuing permits? Does 
the city of Chicago follow the practice of issuing written permits, 
which are given to the permittee ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. As far as I know — and I think I remember this 
accurately — on the occasion of the April 27 peace march, which was, 
however, brutally assaulted, they had delivered a written permit. So 
it was our belief that this would happen. 

However, it was clear that after we had been told — and I believe 
that the meeting was on Monday before the Wednesday of the rally- 
after we had been told that the permit would be granted, we didn't 
expect to sit in the office and have it all written out and handed to us 
at that time. In fact, the deputy mayor explained that he had to con- 
tact various authorities, the park authorities, and so forth. 

Mr. Watson. Really it made no difference whether you had the per- 
mit. You would have held the rally anyway. You did not recognize 
that authority ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No. I am in favor, as it came out in the other docu- 
ment. In the document we said that we would and should march and 
rally with or without the permit, that we had done this before. 

Mr. Watson. So the permit was inconsequential after all ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is not inconsequential because it is in violation 
of constitutional rights when the authorities refuse to give a permit. 

Mr. Watson. The point is that you would have had the demonstra- 
tion with or without a pennit ? 

Mr. Dellinger. At the time of the Chicago convention, in the nature 
of two or three hundred Americans and many thousands of Vietnamese 
were being killed every week. And if the mayor of the city of Chicago, 
in his totalitarian method, was to say to us, "You are not allowed to 
protest against the war by holding a peaceful march and rally," I was 
not about to say, "Well, I am sorry, my brothers in Vietnam, of both 
nationalities, all nationalities. I am'^ sorry I cannot do anything for you 
because the mayor of Chicago will not pennit it." 

Mr. Watson. So the permit was of no consequence at all. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, you did hold the rally, did you not? 

Mr. Dellinger. We held a very hectic and very often interrupted 
rally by attacks by the police. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The rally in Grant Park ^ 

Mr. Dellinger. I am referring to in Grant Park at the bandshell. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. In that comiection I hand you what purports 
to be a flyer published by the Chicago Police Department, which was 
distributed, according to earlier testimony, in Grant Park on August 28 
by that police department. 

Are you familiar with that document? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. This was handed to me on the platform when 
I was chairing the meeting. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Chairman, I will ask leave at this time to read 
this particular document into the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The document is captioned "please cooperate," 
"28 August 1968" : 



In the interests of free speech and assembly, this portion of Grant Park has 
been set aside for a rally. You are permitted to conduct this assembly and rally 
anid will be protected. 

In order to aid traflSc control efforts and assist in maintaining the -security of 
the Democratic National Convention, no rally or assembly will be permitted at 
or near the International Amphitheatre. 

No authorization for a parade, march or procession has been issued. Any 
attempts to conduct or participate ini a parade or march will subject each and 
every participant to arrest. We earnestly request your cooperation so that the 
rights of dissent and protest will be properly safeguarded as well as the rights 
of all others including those delegates at the Democratic National Convention. 


James B. Oonlisk, Jr., 
Superintendent of Police. 

Now you were familiar, were you not, Mr. Dellinger, with the 
contents of this document, which I have just read, on August 28 ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You were also aware prior to August 28, were you not, 
that your organization, that is Mobe, had been denied a permit to 
march on the International Amphitheatre or to hold any rally near it ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I might point out in that connection that we 
were also denied a permit in the District of Columbia, the city of 
Washington, to hold a legal and constitutional and politically neces- 
sary rally at Lincoln Memorial on the march to the Pentagon. 

For some time we were informed absolutely that we would not get 
this permit, but we decided — we knew that we did not want to see a 
police state created by default. We knew that already too many of our 
liberties and rights and powers had been taken away from us, so we 
decided to assert these rights at whatever cost. 

After ha\dng made this decision and made clear that there would be 
thousands of people here, then we received a permit. We hoped — and 
I continually said to the press and in many other ways — we hoped that 
the city of Chicago, which was attempting to suppress our rights just 
as the Federal authori'ties attempted to suppress our rights and to 
impede the development of an effective antiwar movement in October, 
we hoped that the city of Chicago would come to its senses and would 
reverse its position. We held this hope right up until the very last 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the rally held in 
Grant Park at the bandshell, is it not true, sir, as has been reported in 
numerous newspaper accounts — and I have before me si^ecifically the 
Baltimore Sun of August 29, directing your attention to page 10 — 
that you, at this rally, in view of the massive show of police strength 
which did appear as your rally ended about 5 or 5 :80 p.m., advised tlie 
crowd to do one of the following things: One, to form in lines eight 
abreast for a march towards the Ampnitheatre that was sure to end 
in arrest. 

Mr. Dellinger. Excuse me. That would be inaccurate because I 
never say anything is sure. I say you must be prepared to be arrested. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. 

Two, to filter out of the park into the street so as to tie up motor 
and pedestrian traffic in the Loop area, advising clergymen and those 
with children particularly to follow this procedure. 

And three, to remain sitting in the park. 


Now, this is the Baltimore Sun account of the reporter who was 
there and who has indicated that these were the three alternatives 
proposed by you to those meeting in the bandshell. 

Are these fair statements of what you did in fact propose? 

Mr. IcHORD. Give the witness time to examine the three alternatives. 

(Witness and counsel examine document.) 

Mr. Dellinger. I would like to respond. Firet of all, as usual by 
putting it into context and saying it was a very hectic situation and an 
atmosphere of police intimidation and violence, and therefore I do 
not blame the reporter for what I would consider some inaccuracies in 
my position. 

It speaks here of : "Thousands of Chicago police and Illinois Na- 
tional Guardsmen chased and clubbed thousands of youthful anti-war 
demonstrators * * * smell of tear gas hung in the air * * *. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are they inaccurate on that ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, they are not. I am explaining the context, both 
in which I made the statement and in which the reporter unwittingly 
did not get them completely accurate. "Scores of youths were arrested 
and scores more were beaten on the head, chest and shoulders * * *." 

Mr. Conley. Was the reporter inaccurate on that? 

Mr. Dellinger. He mi^ht have underestimated the number, but 
the general picture is certainly accurate. "Mayor Richard J. Daley and 
the city's police force behaved tonight very much like the 'fascist, im- 
perialist' force that the mobilization leaders have charged them with 
being all along." 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was the Baltimore Sun reporter inaccurate on that? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I believe he was accurate. He goes on to say that 
this "vindicated the radicals' arguments." Then he speaks of the tense 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was he accurate on that ? 

Mr. Dellinger. He was accurate in all of this. 

Mr. CoNLEY. He only, then, as I understand it, is inaccurate on the 
part that is attributable to you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think he didn't do a bad job there. I presented 
three alternatives. Given the tenseness of the situation, which these 
quotations have indicated, and given the confusion on the platform 
and the attempts we were making to get people taken to the hospital 
and this kind of thing, I think he did a relatively good job of it. 

But the three alternatives that I presented were, the first one, as he 
says, to form in lines eight abreast for the march, which I indicated 
they should be prepared to face arrest if they chose that alternative. 

I also said that this was to be a strictly nonviolent march and any- 
body who felt he could not react to police attack nonviolently should 
do something else, should not take part in this march. This led to the 
second alternative. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The rejjorter was inaccurate in not including that ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would have been a fuller and more accurate 
report if he had mentioned that because this was clearly emphasized 
and clearly followed, that as we started the march, through the port- 
able loudspeaker I kept repeating that and saying it was not a matter 
of, you know, the superiority of one group over another or anything 
of that kind, but there was a division of labor. We only wanted peo- 
ple there who could clearly respond to police violence by nonviolence 
and not by using militant self-defense. 


Mr. CoNLEY. All right. 

Mr. Dellinger. I asked those who either felt they could not respond 
in a crisis nonviolently or who did not think that a march was at this 
point called for, to take one of two other alternatives. 

One was to simply stay in the park and to wait until the atmosphere 
was clear as possible since, given the attitude of the Chicago police 
and the practice of the last few days, women and children and others 
who did not face brutality could not feel safe in leaving at this time. 

Then for others who wished to protest in other places or in other 
ways and did not want to take part in the nonviolent march, that they 
should leave in small groups and carry out their own activities. 

Now it is entirely possible that somebody referred to pedestrians, 
and so forth, going into the Loop area. I have no recollection of saying 
that myself. 1 think the reference to tying up pedestrians and motor 
traffic was not that we should go out to do it, but that if the Chicago 
police were going to attack us — this was the second alternative — peo- 
ple should be in the streets or near the Hilton or somewhere where 
their violence would be partially restrained and where it would be 
visible for the whole world to see. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, then, as I take it, it is a generally fair 
and accurate statement that we can attribute to the reporter from the 
Baltimore Sun^ with those corrections which you have made? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. It is obviously an attempt, and fairly success- 
ful attempt, to write a fair report of what happened. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Subsequent to making these proposals, did you not, in 
fact, lead people out of the park eight abreast ^ 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. In advancing what I would i^resume would be your 
position one, to form in lines eight abreast for a march toward the 
Amphitheatre ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Right. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Dellinger, when you started this march eight 
abreast, you were aware of the fact that you did not have any permit 
for a parade or a procession. So you were doing this in a deliberate 
attempt to violate the law? 

Mr. Dellinger. Not in a deliberate attempt to violate the law. We 
were doing it in a deliberate attempt to get to the Amphitheatre and 
to hold a rally at which Vietnam veterans and others could speak 
against the war and could urge the American people to resist the war. 
That was what we were attempting to do. 

The Chicago police were attempting to prevent us from doing that. 
Therefore, we knew that we had to face the possibility of brutal 
attack or arrest. We were not interested in demonstrating either peace- 
fully or with violent attack for its own sake. We were interested in 
trying to move beyond the stage of token dissent to a position where 
the antiwar movement could have enough power and enough numbers 
to stop the war. 

Mr. CoNLEY. But you were making a deliberate violation of the 
law, were you not, sir? Whether you agreed with the law or not, it 
was a deliberate violation of the law? 

Mr. Dellinger. It happens that I agreed with the Constitution, 
which said I had the right and other people had the right to make 
this march. 


Mr. CoNLEY. But you were also aware of the fact that the city of 
Chicago had a law 

Mr. Dellinger. I am also aware of the fact that Federal, State, 
and local authorities often violate the rights of our citizens, contrary 
to the Constitution and contrary to any sound ethical and political 
practice, and that if people do not resist this, willing to take the 
consequences upon themselves 

Mr. CoNLEY. — of violating the law. You have to violate the law 
to take the consequence. 

Mr. Dellinger. Are you making the statement, or am I? 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger. I think I have made clear that if the authorities, 
in this case Mayor Daley, are violating the Constitution and probably 
violating the laws of Illinois as well, then I am not going to obey 
his illegal orders. It is of little consequence to me whether he decides, 
whether what he thinks I do is illegal or not. 

I am not opposed to breaking laws in order to try to bring about 
a more just and humane society and to bring about an end to the 
war. I have many times violated laws. I expect to have to do so in 
the future. Otherwise, one reduces himself to the position of token 

Mr. Conley. One question here — and it has been a very simple ques- 
tion — was: Did you violate a law by marching in this demonstration? 

Mr. Dellinger. Mayor Daley violated the law by sending out his 
police, and the National Guard violated the law by sending out their 
machine guns and tanks — well, tanks I am not sure of, I will with- 
draw that — their machine guns and their various devices to prevent 
us from exercising our constitutional rights. 

They violated the law, and we, to the best of our feeble ability, re- 
sisted their illegal act. 

Mr. Conley. This law I am talking about, which requires a parade 
permit or a processional permit, this was not a law that was enacted to 
keep you from making a march that day, was it, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Repression is not a new thing in this country. There 
have been illegal laws and suppression of democratic rights throughout 
our history and a constant struggle by the people to overcome these 
illegal and unconstitutional and antidemocratic acts. 

I would not be so presumptuous as to think all the repressive legisla- 
tion in the U.S. was enacted in order to prevent the Mobilization from 
exercising its functions. In some cases new laws have been passed in 
relation to our activities, but basically these laws have existed in the 

Mr. Conley. With reference to this particular law, to your knowl- 
edge it was not passed for the purpose of harassing you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It was not even a law. There is no law that I know 
of in Chicago that says that people cannot assert their constitutional 
rights. This was a ruling by a tyrannical mayor who is one of the top 
officials, not only the mayor of the second or third largest city in the 
country, but also a leading figure in the Democratic administration. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, as I understand it, you believe that the 
constitutional right which you had to move out eight abreast super- 
seded any so-called municipal ordinance or anything else? 

Mr. Dellinger. That is a clear statement of my views. 

Mr. Watson. Let me ask you about this. Since you have that consti- 

21-706 O — 69 — pt. 3 6 


tutional right and no one can deny you or your group that right, 
what is your position on the right of people to traverse the streets and 
sidewalks of Cliicago in a normal fashion? How do you relate your 
right to their rights, or do they have any rights ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think they do. I have written and spoke publicly 
on this and I have also acted. 

Mr. Watson. They can't traverse the streets when you are marching 
eight abreast. AVhat do they do ? Do they lose their rights or do they 
run over you ? 

Mr. Bellinger. My dear Mr. Watson, when the Chicago Bears hold 
a football game, I myself have been held up from being able to cross 
the streets or held up in a traffic jam because of this. Obviously, we live 
in a complicated society in which the rights of people impinge upon 
the rights of other people, and there have to be many interactions. I do 
not believe that at a time, to use my repeated phrase, when hundreds of 
Americans and thousiinds of Vietnamese are being killed evei'j' week 
and when the black people of this country are being oppressed and 
subjected to bitter violence and economic provocations, that at such a 
time it is a proper sense of proportion to allow streets to be tied up for 
Shriners' parades, for prowar parades, for football games, for World 
Series, for the arrival of a movie star, all kinds of things which are 
inevitable, but to allow that kind of thing to interfere with the normal 
movement of people through the street, but to say to people who want 
to bring an end to the war and oppression, "You can't use the streets 
bec-ause if you do this particular street will be tied up or somebody 
may be delayed on his way home." 

My position is, however, that we should attempt to minimize impos- 
ing penalties upon people who do not agree with us, who are not in our 
march. It is for that reason — that was one of the reasons we went to the 
mayor's office and tried to get a permit and offered, in the course of our 
discussions on many occasions, to adjust the route so that it would not 
interfere with the rights of other people. 

We could never get to the point where we could have that kind of 
discussion. What we would not accept is being moved so far away from 
the Amphitlieatre or so far away fi-om where people are that our 
march would be taking place in isolation. 

We were perfectly willing to try to work out the ground rules so 
that the rights of other people would not be violated or imposed upon. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, you wanted to exercise your rights in 
close proximity to others who were trying to exercise their rights so 
as to disrupt the othei-s ? 

Mr. Bellinger. That is the opposite of what I said. 

Mr. Watson. It is? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Watson. I did not understand you correctly. I thought you said 
you did not want your demonstration to be in isolation, but you 
wanted to move to wliere the action was. 

Mr. Bellinger. You see, in real life there are always many factors 
that one has to weigh and adjust, and so forth. In real life in Chicago, 
as in New York, as in Washington, what we were attempting to do 
was to prevent the authorities from putting us so far away that we 
could not be seen and that the people would have the sense of marching 
through a wasteland. 

That was one of the factors. 


Another factor was to attempt not to interfere with the rights of 
other people who were in the city for other reasons or who lived there. 
It was a matter of trying to weigh these. 

AVe offered to try to work out this problem with the Chicago authori- 
ties, but they refused to recognize our right even to discuss the problem. 

Mr. Watsox. Finally, sir, will you not agree that we would actually 
have a confused, if not a chaotic, condition if any group at its own 
wish were able to move out and march up and down the streets 
without some coordination or clearance or control by the municipal 
authorities ? 

I recognize the fact that you generally do not recognize civil au- 
thority. But would you not agree that it would be a rather confused 
and chaotic condition if your principle were followed? 

Mr. Bellinger. I think we would have worse than a confused and 
chaotic condition because of the conditions imposed upon black people, 
because of the draft of American youth to be slaughtered and to com- 
mit war crimes in Vietnam. 

Mr. Watsox. You know you have spoken of veterans in the lead of 
this movement. You are not a veteran are you ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I am not. 

Mr. Watson. I don't believe Mr. Hayden was or Mr. Davis. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Do you want us to swap war stories. Congressman, 
to show some wounds and medals? They are on many veterans, in- 
cluding myself, who have honorably served, been wounded, been deco- 
rated in combat, who think we are committing war crimes in Viet- 

Mr. Watsox'. I am sure I am aware of counsel's position. 

I am just making the observation. I have heard repeated statements 
that in this group are veterans of World War II and Korea and Viet- 
nam, and so forth. As of yet I have not seen many of them 

Mr. GuTMAX'. I am. Here is one right in front of you, Congressman 

Mr. Watsox. Did I understand you to sav you are one of the leaders 
of the march and demonstration in Chicago f 

Mr. GuTMAN. No. 

Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, let us be in order. 

Counsel has not been called to testify. Just wait a minute and then 
we will have a question. 

Mr. GuTMAN. I am prepared to swap war stories with the Congress- 

Mr. IcHORD. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Dellixger. I want to say that the Congressman is way off the 
point because the antiwar movement, as I have indicated, includes a 
tremendous spread of occupations, ages, political attitude, religious 
attitude, and also of personal histories and experiences in relation 
to war. 

I have expounded as clearly as I could my own belief in nonviolence, 
which extends even to wars in which I think one side is clearly more 
right than the other. But it would be wrong for you to think that in 
this particular respect I am typical of the movement because I am sure 
a vast majority of our members either have served in past wars or 
would have if they had been of the proper age and sex. 

Mr. Watsox'. Of course, my last question is whether or not we would 
have a confused, at least, if not a chaotic, condition if any group could 


move as it wished throughout any city in America without having some 
coordination by the municipal authorities. 

Would you not agree that is the proper situation ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I myself tried to coordinate and to work out 
such arrangements to minimize confusion. Howe.ver, I have full sym- 
pathy with those who on occasion — and there could very well be 
occasion myself when I would feel that the disruption to ordinary 
civilian life and the confusion that would result, for example, from 
sitting down in a public place or tying up a street — that this disrup- 
tion would be justified in terms of the necessity of bringing home to 
the American people the genocide that they are committing. 

So I am not making an absolute statement against that type of 
activity in this type of mass mobilization which the Mobilization 
Conunittee has organized — April 15 in New York and San Fran, Octo- 
ber 21 and 22 here, the attempted demonstrations at Chicago. 

We felt that on these occasions it was important to coordinate our 
activities with the authorities to try to avoid this kind of unnecessary 
confusion and conflict of rights. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in that connection, when you started 
out with this group eight abreast, you certainly had no hopes that you 
were going to alter or change, had you been able to reach the Inter- 
national Amphitheatre, the convictions or the voting of the delegates 
or their choice for President, did you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Again, let me say that the Mobilization is a coali- 
tion, and there were people who wanted to march to the Amphi- 
theatre who undoubtedly harbored the hope that this would change 
the votes of the delegates. 

Mr. CoNLEY. My question is directed to you. 

Mr. Dellinger. I myself, no, because I did not expect that any 
outcome of the Democratic Nominating Convention would be the 
major influence to determine whether we went to war or not. 

I myself believed that it was to arouse the concern of the American 
people expressed by a variety of other methods, including active re- 
sistance, draft resistance, the resistance against military operations, 
the kind of thing which a number of Catholic clergymen have done 
when they have taken draft card files and destroyed them saying there 
is some kind of property, such as draft card files for Vietnam and 
crematorium in Nazi Germany, which have no right to exist. 

i have more faith in this kind of thing and, although I am very 
happy w^hen any public figure or politician speaks out against the 

I have found that the program of all of the candidates for the 
Democratic nomination was inadequate and unsatisfactory to me, and 
it did not matter that much to me which one was selected, 

Mr. IcHORD. At that point, if I may intervene, Mr. Counsel, have 
you been active in Mr. Davis' coffeehouse, what do you call it, coffee- 
house operation ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have supported that program, endorsed it, worked 
with it some. I have only made one brief visit to the coffeehouse, but 
I do everything I can to — which I believe was in Congressman Wat- 
son's district in Columbia, South Carolina. I think they are doing 
very fine work. 

I think it is very important that the people who are drafted into 
the Army not be completely brainwashed and intimidated by the 


military mind and the military interpretation of events, and at the 
very least they have this kind of place where they can go for a much 
more mature and self-creative type of activity. 

Also, of course, as I want to make very clear, I believe that one of 
the evils in the United States is that after people are drafted it has 
been assumed that the^ lose their constitutional rights, not only in 
terms of some of the trials and imposition of penalties, but in terms 
of access to free speech, free assembly, and so forth. 

I have always felt that it is very important that the soldiers who 
are being asked to go to Vietnam and to commit war crimes and to 
risk their lives and limbs, that they be enabled to hear the full story 
against the war and be given all of the information on both sides, 
which will make it possible to make up their own minds as to what 
course of action they should take. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Then, sir, as I understand it, you did not hope, your- 
self, when you led this march toward the Amphitheatre, to alter the 
conduct of either the delegates or their selection for President? 

Mr. Dellingek. No, I did not. I wanted to appeal to the American 
people. We wanted to contrast the statement by the Vietnam war 
veterans outside the Amphitheatre with the ludicrous statements in 
the Democratic platform and the programs and statements of the 
nominees or the prospective nominees. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Bellinger, moving to another area, when Lieuten- 
ant Healy was here in October from the Chicago Police Department, he 
testified concerning certain events which occurred in Lincoln Park, 
which was the practicing of the so-called Japanese snake dance. 

He also produced photographs, which I believe were received by 
tlie committee, of individuals practicing this particular form of 
athletic endeavor. 

Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir, the question : Were you aware of 
these practice sessions which were going on in the Lincoln Park 
during the days leading up to August 28 ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I was aware of them. Although I knew of our 
general plans, I first read of them in the newspaper when I was on 
a plane on the way to Chicago. I later visited Lincoln Park and wit- 
nessed at least one or two of these sessions. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this: Did you at any 
time object to or take any concrete position indicating that you felt 
this wasn't a desirable thing for the p«)ple involved to do? 

Mr. Dellinger. I had some discussions with my fellow committee 
members in order to find out more about the nature and purpose of 
this and was convinced that this, on the whole, was a legitimate prepa- 
ration for self-defense on the part of those who felt it important to 
react to police brutality by defending themselves collectively as well 
as individually. 

I did feel that, on the whole, the amount of training possible in 
such a situation would not make a great deal of difference. It mainly 
gave the people some sense of morale. In my verj first discussion with 
the marshals and the others who were working on this, it was made 
clear that the Japanese snake dance as such was not intended to be 
used. It was something which required a great deal of training, much 
longer than was available to our people; closely coordinated group, 
and for one thing our group was not even that united in using it as a 
tactic. I want to make very clear that my discussions along this line 


were not in the nature of objections, but a simple attempt to clarify 
and discuss and evaluate. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, in that connection, almost anybody who 
has any familiarity at all with the Japanese snake dance knows his- 
torically where it comes from and knows the purpose for which it 
is used, which is to break through police lines. 

Is that not a fair statement ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I think, if I understand it correctly, first of all it 
has emerged as a form of resistance to U.S. attempts to rearm and 
remilitarize Japan, including the sending of — the gross obscenity of 
sending nuclear submarines to the area, besides using the former Japa- 
nese territory of Okinawa as a base from which to attack first Korea 
and now Vietnam. 

Now, I really am not an expert ; although I have visited Japan and 
met with various members of the Japanese antiwar movement, I really 
am not an expert. I have never seen it used, and all of my informa- 
tion is secondhand. 

I have the impression that it is used for two things. The one you 
mentioned, to break through restraining police lines, similar to the 
policy of Mayor Baley's people being kept away from places where 
they feel they have a right to be. And secondly, to protect themselves, 
as they march down the street, from being attacked or from the results 
of being attacked or assaulted. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, when you got to Chicago it was not 
the first time that you had some indication or awareness of the fact 
that the Japanese snake dance was being considered as a possibility, 
is it? 

Mr. Bellinger. I have heard of the Japanese snake dance for many 

Mr. Conley. I mean with specific reference to Chicago, to its use or 
its contemplated use in the city of Chicago. 

Mr. GuTMAN. The witness already answered. He said he read about 
it on the plane to Chicago. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will give the counsel time to advise with the 

Mr. Bellinger. It is not impossible that on the teleplione or in some 
prior conversation it had been mentioned that some people were in- 
terested in this. I really cannot recollect. It was not a big deal either 

I remember in my conscious memory that the thing came to my 
attention particularly when I read an article in the newspaper. I am 
not sure it was on my last trip to Chicago before the convention or per- 
haps the week earlier. At any rate, en route to Chicago. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Ivet me refer to the Liberation magazine, November 
1967, "Gandhi and Guerrilla" by Arthur Waskow. Reading from this : 
"Can we do better at the Bemocratic National Convention in Chi- 
cago? What if we use snake dances 'I And so on. Points to remember" — 
and it goes on into some other things. 

In other words, in that magazine published by you or your group, 
you are talking about the Japanese snake dance, as early as the No- 
vember edition 1967, to be used specifically at the Bemocratic Con- 
vention in the following August. 

Mr. Bellinger. I wouldn't be surprised, if we search through the 12 
years of Liberation^ if we could find prior references to the Japanese 
snake dance. I indicated I had been aware of it for several years. 


This particular article was published in a month when we had not 
decided yet even whether we were going to go to Chicago. Immediately 
following the activity at the Pentagon, we began to discuss together — 
many different groups and people — both informally and formally, 
about where did the movement go from here, how could we be the 
most effective in stopping the war. 

We raised questions probably before the Pentagon on the possibility 
of going to the Democratic Convention. Would it be valid or not; 
would it be effective or not. This particular article was written — I am 
simply trying to be accurate — was written before we had decided 
whether we would go or not. 

The author, if I remember the article, was speculating as part of his 
general exploration and discussion. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, the Chair has never seen a Japanese 
snake dance, but as it has been described to me I cannot understand 
how it is a defensive tactic. It appears to me that it can only be an 
offensive or counteroffensive tactic, 

Mr. Dellinger. I am not an expert on it. But when I described my 
understanding of it, I think I said that I believe that on occasion in 
Japan it is used as a method of breaking through police lines, or an at- 
tempted method to break through police lines, when people are being 
kept from places where they thmk they have a right to be. 

There are a lot of very perplexing and difficult problems that any- 
body who, as I say, wants to move beyond token dissent to actual ac- 
complishment of ending the war and some of the injustice, problems 
that he has to wrestle with. 

If one limits himself first of all to matters which the authorities de- 
clare are legal, obviously he will end up in a form of token dissent, or 
the movement is limited to those. Similarly, to the extent that the police 
interfere with our right to protest effectively, it is only natural, and 
I support exploration and analysis and thought about proper methods 
of not allowing ourselves to be boxed in and protest made ineffective. 

I think the discussion of the snake dance is a perfectly proper dis- 
cussion in a serious movement, even though my own initial instinction 
and analysis would lead me not to favor it, and I have never taken 
part in it or encouraged it. But I think within the scope of our move- 
ment it is a legitimate method, at least worthy of consideration. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave, since I did not want 
to read this out of context, to read this entire paragraph from which 
these remarks were taken, which were the subject of the last questions. 

Mr. IcHORD. Has that document been made part of the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. This particular document, no, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. You wish it to be made part of the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. We wish to offer this part of the document dealing on 
this particular point. 

Mr. IcHORD. Why not put the entire document in the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Very well, we will offer it. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you have any objection, Mr. Watson ? 

Mr. Watson. No. 

Mr. IcHORD. Hearing none, the document will be incorporated into 
the record. That is from the publication Liberation^ as I understood it. 

Mr. GuTMAN. It is the first page of the Waskow article, right? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 3" follows:) 


Bellinger Exhibit No. 3 

Gandhi and Guerrilla 


The Penlagiin fiepe can ln' treated as a tacticai event to 
be analyzed and criticized as one possible model for future 
physical confrontations. This is a necessary process: there 
will be more occasions for pinsicai confrontations and they 
oupht to be much better plarineil than the Pentagon was. 
Oaii we do better at the IJenciratic National Convention in 
Chicago? What if we n-, -n,l^e dances? And so on. I'oinl- 
to remember: 

(1) Tactically rather than puliticallv speakin<;. the Ten- 
lagon was a bad choice for resistance — if bv that we 

mean events like the sie^c. ■ 

The Pentagon is a fort, the l>„ 
settings should be more vulnerab 

-implv s\mboli( arrest- 
iloinac its nioal. 1 rba 

i2) Simple logistical prcparali 
etc. — would have helped. 

..n blanket.s. , antccn^ 

(3) .So would knowledge of sin 
the ilcspondcncv characteristic < 
dawn, and how to combat it. 

•ss ps\iliolop) -such a 
,1 the last hour bcb.r 

(t) Although physical confrontations may have to bi' 
commanded at the last moment In a previously selected 
''college of generals," this ought not to push the .Move- 
ment toward letting a small elite lake over decision- 
making before or after the coufronlatiim itself. If not 
guarded against, this could happen fairlv easilv — espe- 
cially if physical confrontations pla\ a larger and larger 
role in the life of the movcmenl. 

But the siege can also be seen 
polilical situation: and this sernis 

■A> a microcosm of the 
UK h iiiorc iniportant to 

The siege was a crude, unplamicd mixture of llaiidhi and 
guerrilla. That mixture is what made it a ^ucccvs. Neither 
the Gandhiism la la Dave Dellinger's lea' hin and early 
arrest! nor the guerrilla-style hostility la i.i the efforts of 
the Revolutionarv Contingent to charge the lio<ip~i worked 
or could have worked cither morallv or politicallv -if 
used alone by one or another group of the dcmon-trators. 
We now ought to examine the rough guerrilla-Gainlhi mix- 
ture and try to develop a true svnthesis of the two ap- 
proaches. (I don't know myself, yel. what that means: but 
I feel a need for not throwing away either side of what we 
did on the Mall.) 

What I mean by the mixture: people half walked through, 
half charged through the outer troop lines and frequentiv 
went around them — through the bushes. They did not wait 
to convert or convince or use soul-force upon those troops. 


Vet once they reached the Mall they established their i m- 
pathy with the troops, made clear they saw The Enemv .i~ 
generals and presidents rather than soldiers, and set a < row.! 
discipline that prevented the use of violence even win 14 
•U.S. marshals beat demonstrators in full sight of llie < rowd. 
I One group of sit-dowiiers even refused to move to ,1 lui li- 
( all) more useful spot because they said the) hail cslab 
lished a warm emotional connection with "their'' soldiers, 
and would not leave them. I And since it became pos^d'lt to 
express and use the Gandhian connuitmeni eftectivelv ..niv 
once people had got up to the Mall. 1 am saying thai "ri 
Saturda) evening the guerrilla approach was ibc <uiii-il 
fulhllment of Gandhian intentions. 

On the other hand, I think il was a mistake i>n .'^iiinl.iv 
morning to follow guerrilla modes of thought with the -hoc 
rigidity as the majoritv did when it decided to have lin 
Mall at 6 o'clock. The decision was urged and juslilied li\ 
some of the S.D.S. leadership as returning the initiativi to 
the Movement rather than the Pentagon and exemplifv ui^' 
the guerrilla tactic of strike-retreat-and-strike-again. But the 
results were that six hundred to a thousand |>eople. who 
probably could have been kept together till the sunrise re- 
stored their morale, were instead encouraged to retreat 
I though in fairly good order) and that the S.U.S. national 
leadership did not go to jail, which in this particular case — 
given that jail meant two to five davs rather than twu to 
five )cars — was a political as well as moral error. Staving 
out of jail separated the leaders from some of the Move- 
ment during days when they could have carried on inipor 
tant political education and re-established moral si.jidariu. 
Furthermore, the country was not forced to aildn ss the 
meaning of a really massive two-day occupation of the Mall, 
followed by large-scale arrests and perhaps a jail-no-bail 
movement. In short. I am sa^-ing that on Sunday morning 
the Gandhian approach would have been the wisest guer- 
rilla tactic to use. for those who thought in political guer- 
rilla terms, as well as the morallv correct one for those who 
thought in essentially religious terms. 

.More generally, I would argue that in the present state of 
the Movement and the countrv, precisely because large parts 
of our movement are moving to resistance, with il- guer- 
rilla overtones, it is important for us not to forget the cen 
Iral meaning of the Gandhian approach: that those we must 
oppose are not The Enemy. Certainly this is true as regards 
the "great center" of American society, whether or iimI il 
is true of the "power elite." If it is these large numbers o( 
the miconvinced whom we must transform if we are to end 


[Nov. 1967] 


Dellinger Exhibit No. 3 — Continued 

. . . fhose we must oppose are not The 
Enemy. . . . It is the unconvinced 
whom we must transform . . . remake 
their ideas of what legitimate be- 
havior is. . . . 

the war and make any more such «ars impo!-sil)le, (hen we 
cannot treat them as our enemies. We must get through to 
them what we mean; we must be able to remake their ideas 
of what lef'tiniate behavior is so that what we do-^not what 
the police niid the I're-iident do — is felt to be legitimate. 

1 emphasize this because I have talked with some people 
who took part in the Pentagon siege who bitterly reacted to 
the press distortions of the siege. They felt that if efforts 
to build community with the soldiers could be described as 
"taunts" and if the demonstrators' fantastic restraint in the 
face of police violence could be described as initiating vio- 
lence, then there was no point to Irving so hard — that 
"America" would define what we do as illegitimate regard- 
less of what it is we do. I do not agree with this. I think 
that if we stay inside trulv legitimate bounds (based on our 
own moral sense), we will be able to bring the press and 
the country to join us. Not in one go-round, of course; 
naturalU the press would define as "violence" the most 
direrl challenge Americans ha\e made to the legitimacy of 
their own government since South (Carolina fired on Ft. 
Suinlcr. even though we were not tiring on the Pentagon. 
But just a- those who once condemned mass marches for 
witlidrawal as "irresponsible" now applaud them as "mod- 
erate, -o those who now are Imrrifieil by resistance will 
come to iHidcrstand it. 

What is Legitimate? 

The real problem is, what do ive feel is legitimate? And 
here we falter. There are a few of u-^ who feel .July 6, 177.5, 
has already arrived and a "Declaration of the Causes and 
No essitv of Taking Up Arms" well justified. .\ few of us 
feel that Julv 6 can never arrive in that sense, because the 
taking up of arjns is never wholly justified (though perhap> 
defensible I. And niore of us are not certain what to think: 
but we are acting as if violence were not legitimate. 

(If one rereads the declarations both <if 177.5 and 1776 
with these moral and political dilenunas on one's mind, 
they come alive in some new ways. People who have strug- 
gled with whether to "support the National Liberation 
front" and what that means, can understand why the Dec- 
laration of Independence specifies that the colonies may 
make alHance? with foreign powers; imagine the emotional 
strain on Englishmen born and bred of deciding whether to 
commit treason in the company of the hereditary enemy, 
France! And it is important to see that even in the moment 
of rebellion, the colonists did not treat all Britain as The 
Enemy nr dismiss the possibility of making themselves seem 
legitimate to their opponents. Instead they specified the 
King as enemy, and carefully wrote the Declaration to ex- 
plain and justify their acts and to claim legitimacy for 
tliemsekes. I 

V^ hat might we put in a Declaration on the Causes and 
Necessity of Resistance? 1 would idenlifv three levels of 
resistance: withdrawal, challenge and coercion, and I would 
endorse the first two while rejecting the third. Here is why: 



Aofemfcer 1967 



Df.i LiNGF.R I^xiiiHiT No. 3 — Continued 

"... fhe majority . . . will decide that 
if killing Vietnamese requires beat- 
ing and arresting Americans, the 
killing of Vietnamese should end." 

Oil uilfulraual: simply, it is a criiiii' tn fi^lu in the 
Aimriian war against Vietnam; therefore it is no crime to 
refuse the Hrafl. It is a erime tn pay for that war; therefore 
it < amiot lie a erime to refuse taxes. 

On rliallcnpc: when we attempt to block the Pentagon 
with otir liodies. or interfere witii an induction center or a 
na|>alm plant or a campus recruiting booth, we arc saying 
soniethinp very s()ecial — so long as we do not initiate vio- 
Icnie in the process. We are saying: "We will not literally 
force you to stop (he Penlapon, but we will force you to use 
violence on us in order to keep the Pentagon going — just as 
you use violence on the Vietnamese. We believe that, con- 
fronted with such a direct challenge from ever-growing 
numbers (though a minority) of Americans, the majority 
will decide to stop: will decide that if killing Vietnamese 
requires beating and arresting Americans, the killing of 
Vietnamese should end." It should be noted that even if 
these challenges are carried on with the greatest toughness 
and energy — like the Pentagon siege, and more — they are 
still basically a tactic of persuasion. They are built on the 
assiiniption that it is legitimate to be arrested if one vio- 
lates what seems to be the law, though of course the validity 
of the law should then Iw challenged in court. 

Another Chance 

h'inalU. what about coercion? Here I would draw the 
lin<^ not ntvessarily forever, but for now. Given a clear 
and delilierate de<i»ion by the majorilv of the American 
people to commit major crimes against another people (or 
pari of its own |>eopie), it might become legitimate for a 
niinoritv to try to prevent such crimes from taking place. 
Rut that is not our On the last occasion the American 
|M'oplr had a chance to decide on war or peace — in 1961 — 
the* decided for |>eace. If they get a chance to make that 
dc( ision again, in 1968, and decide to support war crimi- 
nals; or if thev dwide to end war crimes but their decision 
is ignored as their last one was; or if they are denied, and 
cannot create, a way to make a decision on those issues — 
then this last issue will have to be rethought. (Why give the 
s\stem another chance? Because any body |K)litic is liable 
to be tricked and defrauded ome; if it allows this to happen 
twice, it has abandoned the efTorl to restore democracy. If 
it deliberately chooses war crimes, iheii its democratic-ness 
is ii relevant.) 

Bui there is every evidence that the American people, 
confronted with the overwhelming fads that their govern- 
ment is perpetrating war crimes and that a rising propor- 
tion of their compatriots are prepared to resist those crimes, 
are now trying to reinvent the dcmwratic process. They are 
patriots, and it hel^>s to know that the resisters are patriots 
too. And if our conunitnient to our country sometimes be- 
comes unclear to them, it is our job to illuminate it — as we 
did instinctively on the Pentagon Mall when we Mng 
"Americ* the Beautiful." 

This determined effort to restore representative democ- 

racy and get it to end the war is being honorably expressed 
(though some of us may think its premises short-sighted 
and its means ineffectual) in the various "dunip-Johnnon" 
organizations. It seems very likely that the liberals who have 
in two Mobilizations inarched alongside those conimiMed 
to resistance will now be moving out of the "protest-man h" 
syndrome into political action, lit is not only the ri-sistaiice 
people who have concluded that protest is not enough,) 
Our attitude toward these people will lie important— to 
them and to us. It is almost certainly a mistake to try to 
keep an organized coalition with them; indeed, the worst 
errors of the direct-action part of the Mobilization were 
probably a result of the agonizing negotiations over a 
period of months between [leople who wanted direct action 
and people who didn't. The hauling and shoving prevented 
a careful and detailed working-out of how to make the 
direct action fully effective. Now that both wings of the 
Mobilization are clearly moving forward in different direc- 
tions (both politics and resistance are "forward" from pro- 
test I, the old coalition will be even more difficult and even 
less relevant. But a warm and o}H!n-ended communication 
is much more important than ever. 

We may find that we meet each other again in Chicago — 
not at a New Politics convention this time, but at the Demo- 
cratic National Convention, because the tactical situation 
will be good and the Convention is a crucial point in the 
process by which Johnson might again take (xiwer. (The 
black moventent may join us too.) What .should the terms 
of this meeting be? If there are 1(X),(XX) people on the 
strtH-ts, prepared to do civil disobedience, what should their 
demands be? To most antiwar Americans, the l)enio«'ratic 
Party probably does not seem to be intrinsically evil, like 
the Pentagon; so an unconditonal effort simply to block it 
would seem unreasonable. But what about a demand that 
the Convention adjourn in favor of an emergency national 
primary to nominate the Democratic candidates and vote 
for or against a iieace platform? (The demand will seem 
esp«Mially reasonable if Johnson has lost a number of pri- 
maries but is about to be nominated by the machine any- 
way. I What about a demand that delegations from each 
state have a proportion of black people equal to the pro- 
portion of the Democratic vote cast by blacks in those 
states? These notions are only initial speculations; the 
point is that some way should be sought to keep the hope* 
and demands of the resistance and the political movements 
reasonably complementary to each other. 

To this point I have assumed that the resistance move- 
ment will stay mostly on the campus. But there might be 
conditions under which the liberal middle class would join 
it. The chief of these is the possibility of a major escala- 
tion of the war — the use of nuclear weapons, a land inva- 
sion of the North or an attack on China. The Consultation 
on the Church and Society held in Detroit October 2.'i-26. 
for example, proposed that the National Council of Churches 
call a national general strike if any of those three escala- 
tions occur (and start preparing now for the possibility i . 
If the nriddle class does move toward resistance, it will 
probably be in nonphysical ways: tax refusal, phone-ins li> 
the New York Slock Exchange or the White House, rti- 
That likelihood makes even shar^>er the necessity of viewins 
the Pentagon siege as a political, not merely a tactical, 
model from which to learn and advance. 




Mr. CoNLEY. The paragraph I have specific reference to, sir, is : 

The Pentagon seige can be treated as a tactical event to be analyzed and critic- 
ized as one possible model for future physical confrontations. This is a neces- 
sary process : there will be more occasions for physical confrontations and they 
ought to be much better planned than the Pentagon was. Can we do better at the 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago? What if we use snake dances? And 
so on. * ♦ * 

Now, in connection with the reference made, Mr. Dellinger, to the 
Pentagon demonstration, and still on this particular subject of the 
snake dances, I want to read to you and then ask you to examine, if 
you will, a document dated Washington, D.C, October 21. This was a 
document published in connection with the Pentagon demonstrations. 

It is captioned "Another demonstration" : 

Up until now the peace movement has been operating within the rules of the 
system, oooi>erating with establishment restrictions and predictable, controllable 
demonstrations, i>aying lip service to the myth that these mass protests will 
change U.S. policies. 

The mounting frustration in the peace movement is caused not only by the 
fact that the war has not been stopped, but also by the growing identification 
with liberation struggles in the world today. 

A radical new form of protest is needed as a next step in the U.S. peace 
movement. One example of this type of protest is the Snake Dance, used in 
.Japan by the Zengakuren (student organization), which enables the protesters 
to take over the .streets and control their own demonstration. 

The Snake Dance is made up of successive rows of about fifteen people abreast, 
with arms linked. Once in action it weaves and sways, maintaining a running 
pace. It is an easily learned formation which is <liflBcult to break up because of 
its speed and tightness, and because the Snake Dance can change direction .spon- 
taneously and immediately. It was this kind of demonstration which was used in 
preventing President Eisenhower from visiting Japan in 1960. 

All indei>endents and groups interested in a militant form of protest will 
gather at the Reflecting Pool, by the Lincoln Memorial, under the follow- 
ing symbol : 

And there is a symbol which I take to be the snake. 

Mr. Dellinger, reading from that particular release — I believe that 
was released by the Revolutionary Contingent based out of New York 
City, and it was released in connection with the October 21 demonstra- 
tions a year ago — they make mention that this type of formation was 
used to prevent someone from coming somewhere. This does not appear 
to me, sir, to be a defensive tactic. 

Mr. Dellinger. First of all, there are a number of points I would 
like to make. 

First of all, I consider it preposterous that a representative of the 
U.S. Government, which is wedded to violence and is imposing violence 
on people throughout the world, should be so morally offended by 
people who are trying to s-top the war contemplating or using a method 
such as the snake dance, which apparently had the terrible effect when 
used by the Japanese, for whom obviously I take no responsibility, 
but of making President P^isenhower— if I remember correctly, it says 
it prevented him from visiting Japan, making him decide he would 
stay away. 

I think it would be much better if the United States would stop 
interfering in the internal affairs of such nations. The poor Japanese 
people passed a constitution, actually encouraged by MacArthur, re- 
nouncing war, and ever since the U.S. has been involving them in the 
cold war and trying to remilitarize them. 


Secondly, I am curious about how you know so well who put this 
out. I am only interested in making clear, first of all, it is unsigned, 
it is not a Mobilization document, I have never seen it before. 

Mr. CoNXJEY. Sir, I have not attributed it to you. 

Mr. Dellinger. You have attributed it to somebody else. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I was very careful to keep it away from your organiza- 
tion ; that is correct. 

Mr. Dellinger. It is up to you or them to protest or to inquire. 
Maybe they don't want to protest. 

Since it is unsigned, I am curious about how you identified it with 
a particular group. But I am willing to pass over that. 

Now I want to say further in this context, though, that the title 
of the Waskow article in which you have introduced the subject, if I 
remember correctly, "Gandhi and Guerrilla," and I myself believe 
that the traditional nonviolent movement has been much too passive 
and much too ineflPective and I am not interested in the purity of the 
movement. I am interested in social effectiveness from back in World 
War II, when I had much more sympathy with the resistance move- 
ment of Europe in their fight against Hitler and Hitlerism than I did 
with the U.S. Government, which is distrusted and, I think, with 
reasons that have been proven somewhat accurate. But from those 
days I myself have always contemplated and tried in various ways 
to experiment with some kind of new development which might be a 
synthesis of Gandhi and guerrilla or synthesis of the partisan and re- 
sistance-type activity. 

I think this is fascinating. I am quite willing to discuss my views, 
including things that are unclear to me. But I also would like to say 
it is a very strange concern of the U.S. Government to go into such 
detail over my views on these subjects. I am not sure what legislative 
purpose it has. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, regardless of 
its purpose, and I now hand you what has previously been marked 
Exhibit 15 ^ before this committee in connection with earlier testi- 
mony, which is a closeup of some of these people practicing the Japa- 
nese snake dance in the Lincoln Park, and I ask you, sir, if they are not 
holding some object, a group of them, across the front row there? 

Mr. Dellinger. They seem to be grasping a pole. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you have occasion when you were watching them 
practicing the Japanese snake dance to see tliem holding onto a pole 
such as this ? 

Mr. Dellinger. To the best of m^^ memory, I didn't. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did you at any time see any such poles with these 
groups ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No. When I was in Lincoln Park there were a num- 
ber of groups practicing in different places and practicing different 
methods. I, to the best of my knowledge, I never saw any physical 
objects such as poles being used. That is not to say there could not 
have been. WHiat I am very clear about is that during the entire time 
of the protest and of convention week that I never saw any pole of 
that kind in anybody's hands. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you to something else 

Mr. Icho.rd. At this pomt, Mr. Counsel, if you are moving to an- 

1 Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 15-B." See pt. 1, p. 2323, of Oct. 1, 1968, 


other subject, it is now 7 minutes after 12. I think this would be a 
convenient place to declare an adjournment. 

The Chair will declare that the committee is in adjournment until 
1 :30 p.m. 

(Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the sub- 
committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 :30 p.m. the same day. Subcom- 
mittee members present at time of recess : Representatives Ichord and 


(The subcommittee reconvened at 1 :45 p.m., Hon. Richard H. 
Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.) 

(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and 

Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order. Let there be order 
in the hearing room. 

I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Bellinger, of the Chair's knowledge of 
the fact that you recently had an operation. How are you feeling to- 
day ? Do you think we are going to be able to finish the hearings? 

Mr, Dellinger. Oh, yes. I feel better today than yesterday. I am 
sorry to be late getting back. My slowness had something to do with 
that. I do move slowly. 

Mr. loHORD. The examination of Mr. Dellinger will continue with 
the observation that the affirmation continues. 



Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, I would like to direct your 
attention to Havana, Cuba, this year. Did you have occasion in Janu- 
ary of 1968 to attend the International Cultural Congress which was 
held in Havana, Cuba ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes; I have made two trips to Havana, Cuba, this 
year. One of them was in January when I went — although I consid- 
ered the State Department in violation of the Constitution, again I 
nonetheless asked and received State Department validation as a jour- 
nalist. I only regret that a number of intellectuals, American intel- 
lectuals, who had also been invited were unable to attend because they 
were not full-time practicing journalists. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I detected that you indicated you had 
been in Cuba twice this year. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. When was the other occasion you were in Cuba ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I went to Havana on November 1st. 

Mr. Conley. How long did you remain there at that time ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I had my operation in Cuba and I have just re- 

Mr. CoNLEY. Now in connection with your trip to Cuba of 1968, the 
first trip this year, while you were in Havana, did you have occasion 
to grant an interview to the Cuban newspaper jB'/ Mundo? 

Mr. Dellinger. Quite probably, yes. I remember speaking with a 
journalist who I think was identified as a freelance journalist, but who 
quite likely may have — I never saw the interview, but quite likely 


might have placed it in El Mundo since in Havana itself there are just 
two dailies. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, I would like to read you some excerpts from 
a Havana radio broadcast of February 5, 1968, this radio broadcast 
dealing with your El Mundo interview. Understanding that these are 
not purporting to be your words — it is the radio station engaging in 
whatever editorializing they might do, I am sure — if I may, I would 
like to read you some excerpts and then ask you some questions. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy that you could put in front of us? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness have a copy. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Reading from the broadcast : 

Among the guests at the Havana Cultural Congress, the North American David 
Bellinger represents the curious paradox of being a fighter for nonviolence who 
favors violence. Bellinger does not object to the just violence of the Cuban 
revolution against imi)erialism or the violence of the Vietnamese against the 
same evil ; he reasons that "Vietnam and Cuba are very important for the devel- 
opment of a new movement in the United States which will gradually turn into 
an anti-imi)erialist movement." 

Mr. Dellinger, is this substantially in accordance with what you told 
the reporter for El Mundof 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, you can be sure that since probably between 
this date and January and now — well, I don't know, but I might even 
have had more than a hundred or several hundred press interviews or 
conversations of this kind. I cannot remember what I said to him. This 
was in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel, when I was on my way to 
somewhere else, and I spoke to him briefly. 

However, I think I made very clear, to the best of my ability I have 
made clear in the last 2 days my attitude toward the relationship be- 
tween violence and nonviolence. Although this is a very elliptical ver- 
sion and it goes on in very short order to combine two rather separate 
ideas, I certainly can see where he may have drawn this. Aiid as you 
indicated it went all the way from the newspaper to Havana radio, so 
there were two stages or three stages involved. 

I think, as I said earlier about the Baltimore Sun article, I would 
consider this an example of honest journalism. But I wouldn't want 
at this point to have those two sentences, particularly as juxtaposed, 
to be fully representative of my views. 

Just to be perfectly clear, it goes on from the discussion of violence 
and nonviolence — I beg your pardon — no, it is two sentences. Anyway, 
it goes on from that to talk about the importance of Cuba and Vietnam 
to the development of new movements in the Ignited States. These are 
separate ideas I hold. I favor nonviolence. I advocate nonviolence. I 
jDractice nonviolence, but I do not repudiate or oppose what I some- 
times call the violence of the victims, which in this case includes Viet- 
nam and Cuba, as well as the black people in this country. 

Then, as a completely separate idea, I believe that the Cuban and 
Vietnamese movements for independence and to do away with really 
what amounts to the imperialist stranglehold on their country, control 
of their country by foreignere who build up the highest standard of 
living at home and promote illiteracy and lack of medicine and pov- 
erty in Vietnam and Ouba, that the struggle of these two peoples has 
certainly been an inspiration to me. And I think it has been a chal- 
lenge to many Americans; it helps speed up the process of evaluation 


that goes on in this country. However, I do not consider from my own 
point of view that the inspiration and the value is inevitably a product 
of the violence. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If I may move on to the third paragraph : 

The pacifist David Bellinger understands that it is impossible to coexist with 
the great enemy, and he combats it. He has been to Cuba three times, first in 1960, 
then in 1964, and now for the Cultural Congress. 

Do you recall whether you did or did not make that statement to the 
reporter for El Mundo ? 

Mr. Bellinger. By the way, there is even the fourth stage of this 
meeting with the reporter in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel : 
in English, he to his newspaper ; the newspaper to the radio ; and the 
second stage of that from English to Spanish ; and then finally back 
from Spanish to English. So I am quite prepared to talk about all of 
my views here, including my very vigorous and determined opposition 
to American imi^erialism, which he may be referring to as the enemy, 
but this is not a good way to find out my views. 

Mr. IcHORD. May I inquire at this time, Mr. Bellinger, as to whether 
all of these interviews that you had in Cuba with Havana radio or 
representatives of Havana radio were in English? 

Mr. Bellinger. I was always speaking in English. The other inter- 
views earlier were on the telephone, where I was one time in New 
York and one time in Chicago. In all the cases I spoke in English. 

Mr. IcHORD. Bo you speak Spanish ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes ; my last trip was a great asset that way. The 
last trip I was there, I spoke only Spanish and was interviewed in 

Mr. CoNLEY. I think, Mr. Bellinger, this is the reason for our ask- 
ing you specifically about these, to ask you whether they are a fair 
quote. If they are not, I think you should indicate they are not. 

Mr. Bellinger. As I said about the Baltimore Sun article, this gives 
me the general impression of being an honest journalistic attempt. 
I don't think it is completely accurate, as in a couple of points the 
Baltimore Sun article was not. I think I indicated why, because it 
went through four processes, including condensation. It does not mean 
a lot to me, this particular sentence you quoted. I would be very happy 
to discuss who I think the great enemy is, although I think there are 
many enemies. It is hardly a way of discovering my views. 

Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir, if I may ask you what the great enemy 
is, as the interpretation you would put on those words. 

Mr. Bellinger. I cannot, out of context here, know for sure w4iom 
they were referring to. I would be happy to tell you who I think the 
enemies of the American people are, the enemies of world peace. They 
range all the way from the military-industrial complex to the system 
in which property is considered to be of more value than human beings, 
in which people are encouraged to work for private profit instead of 
for social well-being and the good of the community. 

I also consider any reliance on violence, even by people I associate 
with and am willing to work with in certain ways, I consider this 
reliance on violence to be an enemy and I try to work away from this 
as much as I can. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, a moment ago I think you used as an 
illustration of a great enemy, and I thought perhaps this is what 


you were alluding to since it does appear in the first paragraph, that 
perhaps imperialism, in itself was the enemy. 

Mr. Dellinger. I consider imperialism — except I don't like to turn 
chese things into stereotypes and slogans, but I think the system of 
private ownership and control and profitmaking, basically known as 
the capitalist system in the United States, I think is a violation of 
economic democracy and the brotherhood of man. I think as it reaches 
out and spreads its tentacles into Latin America, Asia, and Africa, 
and so forth, and in that sense at least I always think of imperialism 
as being the foreign expression of this selfish, competitive profitseek- 
ing, nonhumanist, antiJiuman form of economics, I always identify 
the foreign expression as being imperialism. I certainly consider that 
to be the major enemy in terms of anybody who is concerned with 
economic equality, economic brotherhood, freedom, bringing, as I say, 
making it possible for people like the Vietnamese and the Cubans to 
have hospitals, free medical care, wipe out illiteracy, narrow the gap 
between the very rich and the very poor, raise the level of the standard 
of living of the people — I consider imperialism to have proven itself 
unfortunately to be the major enemy, though I don't think that most 
American people realize this. I think there is a great gap ; people quite 
sincerely think somehow or other they are helping these foreign coun- 
tries and bringing them freedom or democracy, but I am convinced 
that the history of the American influence in Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, in entire Latin America and Asia has not been 
one to bring freedom and justice. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you now to the fourth 
paragraph of this same article, and I quote as follows : 

Dellinger says that "Cuba is the only country in the world where this con- 
gress — 

and I presume this means the Cultural Congress — 

where this congress could be held, with such diversity of delegates having differ- 
ent views — all united by a basic sympathy for Cuba and antipathy toward im- 
perialism. The only other country would have been Vietnam, except for the 
inconvenience of the bombings." He notes that the word "inconvenience" should 
be in quotes ; the bombings are more than that ; they are a crime. He says that 
in Cuba, "intellectuals could avoid the vices and sectarianism and excessive in- 
dividualism ruining past meetings of this nature." 

This, concluding with the words, "except for the inconvenience of 
the bombings" — is this basically in accord with what you said to the 
reporter ? 

Mr. Dellinger. As I said, not only do I really not remember at all 
what I said to him on this occasion, but it went tlirough four stages. 
At the beginning of it, it certainly is a germ of an idea that I believe 
in and would be happy to express to you or maybe explain to yoiL 
That is, that this particular congress, due to the prestige of Vietnam 
and the prestige of Cuba amongst the world intellectuals and among 
humanitarians of many varieties, it was possible to bring together 
delegates from countries and from political groups which are in very 
serious opposition to each other. 

Of course, the Soviet's Czechoslovakia invasion had not taken place 
at that time. That is an example. There were delegates from Czechoslo- 
vakia and from the Soviet Union. But there were also delegations 
from the traditional Communist parties, which, by the way, the 
Cubans are very much in conflict with. There were delegates from 


liberal and anti-Communist groups. There were delegates from Franco 
Spain. It was a situation in which there were several occasions on 
which the congress could have broken down with some kind of violent 

When it came close to reaching this point, when, for example, 
delegates from several countries attacked the Soviet Union very 
strongly for being bureaucratic for having taken on the nature of 
some imperialist aspects, and when obviously delegates from the 
Soviet Union and from the traditional Communist Party very much 
resented this. However, as I say, not entirely but to a great extent 
through the leadership and the moral authority of the Cubans and 
the Vietnamese, the people were able to express these differences and 
still not fly off into many splinters. The other factor is that a number 
of the people who were attending that conference, I know^ from my 
own personal experience, had been denied visas to enter the United 

I think particularly of Jean-Pierre Vigier, who is a military expert, 
in France who had testified before the War Crimes Tribunal on the 
type of weaponry being employed by the United States in Vietnam. 
As to the pattern of the attacks, for example, he had, through very 
elaborate and conscientious studies, established that the United States 
had concentrated its bombing on Catholic villages in Vietnam because 
it assumed apparently that the Catholics would be the first to revolt 
and therefore they should be hit the hardest, and this would under- 
mine the morale and unity of Vietnam. 

TVTien I heard him and noticed his very objective and scientific 
approach to these things, the devastating nature of his research and 
findings, I became interested in having him appear on an American 
television program so that the American people could hear these 
things and thought that it would be appropriate for him to testify 
or appear on television and have somebody from the Pentagon or 
whoever disagreed with him, and who supposedly had information, to 
answer him. And in that w^ay the American people could hear both 
sides and decide. However, neither did the Pentagon nor the State 
Department answer. He was unable to obtain a visa to enter this 
country. However, he did get a visa to go to Cuba. 

As I say, there were a number of factors that would be behind the 
germ of the idea that is summarized here. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Maybe I look at things wnth too much simplicity, but 
the germ of the idea I see here is simply that Cuba or Vietnam, 
"except for the inconvenience of the bombings," are the two coun- 
tries geographically — I think of it more geographically than politi- 
cally — that could hold this type of conference. 

Have I reduced it to too much simplicity ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I think you have. And again — sometimes I 
wonder if I take too long in my answers, but I answered at some 
length what I would have in mind.- 1 somewhat disassociate myself 
from this article because of the number of stages it went through. I 
would rather, again, have my own words stand rather than yours. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with this conference 
which was held in Havana, was a man by the name of David Siqueiros 
a delegate to this conference? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. He was not only a delegate. If you don't mind, 
I would like to give him as an example of what I was indicating before. 

21-706 O— 69— pt. 3 7 


Because at the conference there were other people, not only artists like 
himself, but in some cases nonartists, who were very hostile to David 
Siqueiros on the belief that he was involved in the execution of Leon 
Trotsky. So there was very great personal tension and political ten- 
sion between Siqueiros and a number of people, and it threatened to 
lead to all kinds of situations. 

As I say, basically the Cubans, with an assist from Vietnam, man- 
aged to put on a conference in which people like Siqueiros and people 
who hate Siqueiros were able to take part. 

It is fascinating to me also because the State Department denied a 
number of people who had come to mind, Robert Lowell, the poet, a 
number of people like that, Dwight Macdonald, I believe, the critic, 
a number of people who had been active in the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, had been very anti-Communist — and to mis day, so far as 
I know, tend to be that way — a number of those people had been in- 
vited to the congress, applied to the State Department to go, but wei-e 
told that this was a monolithic political show and therefore it was not 
a legitimate cultural congress for them to go to. 

When I got there, I discovered this kind of differentiation and 
difference and heterogeneity. 

Mr. IcHORD. Was David Siqueiros a delegate from the Soviet LTnion? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, he was a delegate from Mexico. I don't pre- 
sume to know all of his history or enough to say it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Some of his history is that he is supposed to have been 
involved in an attempt to murder Leon Trotsky. 

Mr. Dellinger. I believe that is right. He is considered to have been 
a Stalinist who supported or took part in some of the violence of the 
Communists of that period. He was very much resented and even 
hated by a number of the other delegates. There was an occasion when 
it almost came to blows. 

Mr. IcHORD. He was never prosecuted for attempted assassination ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is a little vague in my memory as to exactly what 
he did or didn't do. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, before we leave this Havana radio 
broadcast of February 5, earlier you made a number of comments about 
our inability to communicate with one another. Do you find it rather 
disconcerting that your friend down in Havana, Cuba, made this 
statement, that you represent "the curious paradox of being a fighter 
for nonviolence who favors violence"? 

Would you find it rather disconcerting that even your friends down 
in Cuba would find you equally paradoxical, as perhaps some mem- 
bers of this committee would find you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I think there is a paradox involved. 

Mr. Watson. In fact, everyone, even your friends, finds it very diffi- 
cult to understand you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I didn't say that. 

Mr. Watson. It does not disturb you that he referred to you as a 
curious paradox? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I don't feel disturbed about this. If I had been 
there at the time, I would have tried to expatiate on it. As I say, I 
think it is a difficult thing about people who believe in nonviolence, 
who believe that violence tends to become corrupting and self-defeat- 
ing and yet are unwilling to be assigned to a token position of 


dissent and are struggling for some method in which the humanist 
and other values of nonviolence can be preserved and yet can be 
politically effective. 

I spoke about my own interest in the possibility of some kind of 
combination of what Arthur Waskow called Gandhi and Guerrilla, 
what I thought earlier of traditional pacifism and resistance activities 
of World War II. I don't know what the exact answer is. I am ex- 
perimenting. A lot of other people are. It is not surprising to me, 
particularly since we have no clear-cut doctrinaire position on it; it 
confuses a number of people. 

Mr. Watson. So the major thrust of my question was that since the 
journalist in Cuba, whom you described as making an honest effort 
at journalism, describes you as a curious paradox — in other words, 
he found you at least difficult to understand so far as being non- 
violent but favoring violence — you must conclude that it would be 
difficult for some of us to understand how you can be both for and 
against the same thing at the same time. That is the only point I am 
trying to make, if you will perhaps make that concession, which I am 
sure you will not. Thank you. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Let the record show that the Congressman is correct, 
the concession is not made. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us be in order. 

Mr. Bellinger. No, I don't object to the fact that this is a difficult 
idea to understand. I am quite ready to concede that to you or any- 
body else, including many people I work with. I would not want to 
include in that some of the other things that we have discussed, that 
is all. 

Mr. Watson. May I ask you one other question ? 

I asked it of the other gentleman. Wlien you make these statements, 
which obviously now you do not mean to be taken in their normal and 
literal meaning and interpretation, do you explain to those to whom 
you articulate these positions that you really don't mean for them 
to be taken and accepted in the normal manner? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am quite confused by what you mean by that. 

Mr. Watson. I wanted to confuse the question purposely with the 
thought it might get through to ^ou. I have been making my questions 
simple, and you accused me of simplicity. I wanted to make the ques- 
tion complicated. 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't know what statements you are referring to. 
I want to make clear that I do not have a double standard of what I 
say or where. My views I try to say as openly whether it is you or Ave- 
rell Harriman or somebody from the Soviet Union or Vietnam. 

Mr. Ichord. Proceed with the questioning. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Directing your attention to June 1968, were you in 
Prague, Czechoslovakia, on June 16, 1968 ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Approximately that time I had a very brief stop- 
over in Prague, yes, on a trip to Prague. I don't know if that is the 
exact date. 

Mr. Conley. Did you at that time meet with Tran Van Anh and 
Phan Van Chuong, the Viet Cong representatives in Prague? Please 
excuse my pronunciation, sir. 

Mr. Dellinger. With that reservation, yes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. What other Americans were present at that meeting? 

Mr. Dellinger. As I said earlier, I really don't care to discuss the 


activities of other people. As a matter of fact, I am just thinking about 
this out loud, but since I know you already know who was there: in 
fact as I think it was testified before this conunittee 

Mr. CoxLEY. That was going to be my next question, sir. 

Mr. Dellixger. I don't think I am involving anybody in a public 
wuy that might lead to attack and danger that he is not already sub- 
ject to. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Robeit Greenblatt ( 

Mr. Dellixger. Yes. Mr. Greenblatt. 

Mr. CoxLEY. All right, sir. 

Mr. Dellixger. Xow maybe before you proceed with this line of 
questioning, if I could just make a little statement. 

I have had intimate contacts with both the XLF and representatives 
from North Vietnam, including both Xuan Thuy, who is head of the 
DRV delegation in Paris, and ^ladam Binh. who is head of the XLF 
delegation. Xow the sole purpose of these has not been, I will try to 
say that right, the sole purpose has not been to secure the release of 
American prisoners, but this has been a very important aspect of my 
contacts with these people. It is a very touchy and delicate area, as I 
am sure you i^eoognize. And we have been successful in playing a part 
at least in the release. I would have to stop to comit them up, but in 
at least, well, a number of prisoners, some by the XLF and some by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

In addition to my reservations I said about involving other people 
who can better speak for themselves, in this particular area I am very 
anxious not to do anythmg which might conceivably jeopardize future 
releases and complicate those relations. 

Mr. IcHORD. I thmk the questions will be connected with the Chi- 
cago demonstration. 

Mr. CoxLEY. I think jou are anticipating again malice m my 

Mr. Dellixger. I wanted to remind you of the delicacy of this. 

Mr. CoxLEY. "Were there any other Americans besides you and Rob- 
ert Greenblatt. bearmg in mind I have not asked you to identify those 
persons ( I simply ask you, "Were there other Americans present ? 

Mr. Dellixger. To the best of my memory, no. 

Mr. CoxLEY. You were the only two Americans present ? 

Mr. Dellixger. I don't want to give a wrong answer. I can't remem- 
ber anybody else present. I am trying to thmk if there could have 
been, smce you are asking. 

Mr. CoxLEY. At this meeting did you discuss with the Viet Cong the 
meeting which was to be held in Septeml>er 1968 in Budapest between 
American, Viet Cong, and Xorth Vietnamese activities? 

Mr. Dellixger. Yes: I always favor face-to-face contacts, as I say, 
whether it is Averell Harriman or Vietnamese, although I place more 
faith and hope in the contacts between the American antiwar move- 
ment and the Vietnamese. I have always attempted to encourage first- 
hand contact and firsthand mformation. 

On this occasion we discussed the possibility of some kind of meeting 
between Americans and the Xational Liberation Front and representa- 
tives from Xoith Vietnam. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Xow. bearing in mind that we are still talking about 
June 16 or thereabouts in Prague. Czechoslovakia, at this meeting did 
not the Viet Cong recommend only, and using the exact quotes, if I 


may, "those politically most advanced" should be invited from the 
United States ? 

Mr. Dellixger. Well, it is interesting to me about direct quotes. I 
happen to know that the U.S. Government illegally seized Mr. Green- 
blatt's jjapers, and undoubtedly there are notes of his which can be 
given as direct (j[uote3. The fact is that in these kinds of conversations, 
you know, one jots down a suggestion to remember something. How- 
ever, I have no objection to describing exactly how I interpret what 
that note meant and what the facts were. I helfjed to arrange 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to mislead you into believ- 
ing that this quote is based upon a note that was seized from some 
person. I don't want to lead you down that primrose path. But you go 
ahead and answer. 

Mr, Dellinger. "Well, the devious methods of the police state in 
which telephone conversations, private meetings, are bugged and 
recorded and Avhich undercover agents who pose as something which 
they are not and f»ry into the private affairs and guaranteed political 
associations of the American people, as well as all over the world — 
these methods elude me. However, I consider it extremeh" unlikely 
that at this particular time somebody in the meeting could give you a 
direct quote. Perhaps 30U have been violating the internal democracy 
of Czechoslovakia, along with that of the United States, and perhaps 
the room in which we met was bugged. I know about these methods, 
in general, and I am certainly willing to deal with the question, al- 
though I must say I have scorn for these methods and consider them 
to be self-defeating. 

Mr, CoxLET. May we get back to the question, which was "Tihose 
politically most advanced." Did they not, in fact, indicate to you or 
reconmaend that these are the persons that should be invited from 
the United States ? 

Mr. Dellixger. Let me tell you what did happen in our conversa- 
tions. I am not tr^nng to pin down the exact month, but earlier, begin- 
ing in Hanoi, where I had proposed that they should, within the limits 
possible under the very hea\-y bombing that Vietnam was suffering, 
they should give visas t>o American reporters and teleWsion people and 
to many others so as to have face-to-face contact and accurate informa- 
tion, beginning then and through a series of conversations we arranged 
a meeting which took place in Bratislava approximately 1 year earlier, 
and at that meeting 

Mr. CoxLET. Let us not go into Bratislava. 

Mr. Dellixger. It is the contrast that is involved. 

Mr. CoxLET. We are going to get to Bratislava in a little while. 

Mr. Dellixger. In this context it would be better if I set up the 
contrast. What we decided was that this was a conference in Bratislava 
at which it would l^e valuable to have a wide range of j^eople of a 
variety of political \*iew5 and attitudes, including some people who 
might not even be sure that they were against war, but who were 
tending in that direction. It would be a healthy thing to have a face- 
to-face contact in conference among people of this kind. 

In Budapest a year later we felt, partly because this other conference 
had taken place, but partly also because of the growth in numbers 
and intensity of the antiwar movement, that it would be more useful to 
have people who were clearly part of the active movement to have 


this experience of meeting face to face and holding protracted dis- 
cussions with the Vietnamese. That is wliat was meant by whatever 
the phrase that came from, or at least my understanding of what 
might have been meant by the phrase "politically most advanced," or 
whatever you said. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Is not another way to put that, and again I am engaged 
in being simple, "to leave the dupes at home" ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I really don't think in terms of "dupes." I never 
have. It is public knowledge tiiat some of tlie types of people we in- 
vited to Bratislava were not actively involved in the antiwar m^ove- 
ment, but just as I encouraged Hanoi to invite people from the mass 
media to come and see the bombing and report to the American people, 
similarly it would be useful to have people who had suspicions or 
hostilities, even, to the NLF who had been brainwashed, if I could 
put it that way, by a diet of American propaganda about terrorists, 
and so forth, I thought there would be some benefits from having them 
sit down together with the NLF. 

At that meeting many people, including myself, tried to ask search- 
ing questions of them and to express our own view^point. There was 
no question of dupes or nondupes. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, was not another item on the 
proposed agenda discussions that were had between the Viet Cong 
w^ho were experienced in attempting to cause disaffection among U.S. 
soldiers and Americans who were engaging in the same type activity ? 

Mr. Dellinger. First of all, I just prefer to call them the National 
Liberation Front. Viet Cong is a little bit like the term "nigger" or 
"Polack" or something of that kind. Now, what was planned and envi- 
sioned was that there would be a discussion of all forms of antiwar 
activity. Now, these would include, for example — in fact, at our earlier 
meeting the first item of the report from the NLF was a report on the 
military situation. HoAvever, this was not interpreted and did not 
mean that the Americans would go home and organize a military 
campaign against the American Government. 

In much the same kind of context, it is quite possible, although I 
don't remember specifically, that there would Ivdve been planned — I 
did not attend this meeting by the way because I thought other people 
should have the opportunity — but it is quite possible amongst the 
Vietnamese reports, besides reports of the military situation, would 
be reports on disaffection within the Armed Forces because this is 
something which has always interested me. There are rumors about 
groups of soldiers in Vietnam who refused to go into battle or who 
desert and hide out in Saigon. Even I read some things about people 
going over to the other side. On the other hand, there is a very sharp 
and strong military censorship which often even denies things after 
they have been made public and are known basically to be true. 

Mr. IcHORD. Of course, that works on both sides. There are a num- 
ber of Viet Cong or NLF or Nortli Vietnamese who come over to the 
American and South Vietnamese side, too. 

Mr. Dellinger. That is correct. In any event, I myself certainly 
have interest in any information that anybody, whether Vietnamese 
from the South— I asked questions of this' kincl when I was in Saigon 
on an early visit — Vietnamese from the South or Vietnamese from 


the National Liberation Front, what have you, any information they 
might have about this would certainly be of interest to me. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Being specific in this area, did not the Viet Cong, the 
National Liberation Front, or the North Vietnamese specifically ask 
for, and I quote, sir, "competent people to discuss work among soldiers 
since a major item is exchange of experience and coordination of 
activities" ? 

Mr. Bellinger. That does not sound quite kosher to me. I did not 
have the benefit of a tape recorder, and I have had many, many con- 
versations before and since with the Vietnamese and others. It does not 
sound quite like the way they talk or the way I talk when I am with 
them. I volunteered here, as I will anywhere, my great interest in the 
coffeehouse program, my great interest in bringing the facts about the 
war to American soldiers, my support in general of desertion, of re- 
fusal to commit war crimes, of any acts which will bring the war to 
an end and save the lives of Vietnamese and Americans. 

I certainly, in talking to the Vietnamese tomorrow, would tell them 
that one of the things we are doing is carrying out this coffeehouse 
program. How^ever, I have always made clear and specifically at the 
earlier conference when I made an opening speech — if I remember cor- 
rectly, it was an opening speech — a great deal of my emphasis was on 
the fact that, as the Vietnamese seemed to themselves emphasize, every 
people had to work out their own problems and develop their own 
indigenous movement and, in my view, a whole generation of idealists 
had been led astray because they had, perhaps for understandable 
reasons, been subservient to a foreign power, namely, Moscow, and that 
the present movement in the United States was not that kind of 

I wanted to make it very clear to the Vietnamese that we were 
indigenous and patriotic Americans who were opposed to imperialism 
and certain other forms of our society; that they must understand 
from the beginning we would have differences from them as well as 
agreements with them. It is in this context we have always operated. 
Therefore the words you read to me don't sound quite correct. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You don't think they wanted competent people? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am trying not to make a game of it. It sounds like 
you are. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I am trying not to. 

Mr. Dellinger. Obviously they want competent people. 

Mr. CoNLEY. To discuss work among soldiers ? 

Mr. Dellinger. What I have tried to indicate is that I think they 
want competent people, including people who work in draft resistance, 
teach-ins, anything else; they would like to have some sense of what 
is going on here, although it is quite clear to me that they realize the 
issue will be resolved on the battlefield and not basically by the Ameri- 
can movement. 

Mr. Ichord. In that connection, Mr. Dellinger, do you consider prop- 
aganda distributed on the battlefield to American soldiers in South 
Vietnam, such as one document that I picked up when I was last in 
South Vietnam, saying, "Yankee, go home," to be not part of the war 
effort on the part of the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think it is. My understanding is that in almost 
all wars both sides, one way or another, try to communicate, nowadays 


broadcast, to the other side pointing out that their side is unjust and 
they should lay down their arms. 

Mr. IcHORD. This paper said, "Yankee, go home, do not die here.'" 
You would have to niterpret that as trying to destroy the morale of 
the soldiers. 

Mr. Dellinger. I know they have broadcast, and similarly the 
United States drops leaflets on the other side. I consider this a very 
difficult area. For myself, although I made very clear I hope that 
every American boy will refuse to go to Vietnam and refuse to take 
part in other imperialist ventures, I have some simple reservations in 
terms of when a person is actually on the scene. It is not that I don't 
want him to be able responsibly and in the proper way, my idea of the 
proper way or his, to be able to leave, but I would be very slow to say 
something to somebody as he was going into battle, you know, at that 
very moment, because obviously it can lead to all kinds of difficulties 
and problems for him. So, I myself, as it happens, have never engaged 
in this kind of activity, although I do my best to encourage everybody 
to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces. 

Mr. Watson. You encourage everybody to refuse to serve in the 
Armed Forces ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; particularly at the present time. 

Mr. Watson. Does that extend to encouragement or at least being 
delighted with those who would desert the military forces? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I think I indicated on several occasions I sup- 
port those who have taken political asylum in Sweden, France, Hol- 
land, and so forth. I am fascinated by the fact that originally we pro- 
vided asylum in the United States to people who opposed militarism 
and aggression. 

Mr. Watson. It is evident from your earlier statement that you do 
everything that you can to assist or carry out your beliefs. 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would be interesting to look back. Did I say 
"to assist" ? I think I said "to encourage." 

Mr. Watson. You agreed that you would do everything you can to 
carry out your beliefs and your desires ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am trying to be very candid because I believe in 
my beliefs and I believe in my actions. 

Mr. Watson. Try it on this one, yes or no. 

Mr. Dellinger. The way you phrased it, I think I have to exercise 
some reservations because there are things that some people might 
think might assist in this case which I wouldn't undertake for a 
variety of reasons. Without really going into it very well, I have 
explained, that I consider it a complex problem. If a group of soldiers 
is going back in battle, I would be very slow to do something at that 
moment to demoralize them or to make them feel spirtually ill at ease 
when they went out. This is a very difficult question that I don't have 
to face because I am not ordinarily in that situation. 

Mr. Watson. You are not concerned about any spiritual aspects of 
the matter, are you, Mr. Dellinger ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't know where you draw that conclusion. I just 
used the word. 

Mr. Watson. You just used the word. 

Mr. Dellinger. I was not playing a game when I used it. 

Mr. Watson. You are not really concerned about that, are you ? Do 
you, in your youth movement, encourage people to attend church? 


Mr. Bellinger. Unfortunately it is my own view, although I did 
study for the Christian ministry. And again I am not sure, I am 
ahvays happy to expound my views, but this seems quite remote; 
unfortunately I believe, speaking generally of the organized church, 
it is not a force that has opposed war, stood for justice, or really been 
for the greatest spiritual advancement of tlie people. I would like to 
distinguish that there are obviously great numbers of individual clergy- 
men, individual Christians, individual Jews, adherents of various 
religions, who are very sincere and try to carry through this way. 

In my own life and my own belief, I believe the institutions, in gen- 
eral, tend to interfere with the very goals that they purport to serve. 

Mr. Watson. In any instance, anything which tends to restrict the 
individualism of a person 

Mr. Bellinger. Again I haven't said such a thing because I do 
believe in a combination of what might be called individualism and 
social solidarity. I have indicated that in a number of areas. I am op- 
posed to the form of individualism which is expressed under capitalism, 
where people work for their own selfish economic interest instead of 
w^orking for the common good. 

Mr. Watson. You are against the profit motive ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Watson. I don't want again to get you in a paradox here, but 
you are against the Government. Of course, we understand that. 

Mr. Bellinger. I don't know if I got into that. 

Mr. Watson. But you are. That is a fair assumption? You don't 
like the established Government, do you ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I do not. 

Mr. Watson. If you are against profit and the people running the 
business, you would have to turn it over to the Government. You are 
against the Government who would run it. Would you be satisfied if 
you and the Mobilization Committee ran it ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Again, I find it difficult to accept your summary of 
my views. I generally don't make blanket indictments of quite that 
kind. I happen to advocate some kind of combination of political 
democracy and economic democracy, some kind of communal solidarity 
and equality, with maximum possible decentralization and individual 

Mr. Watson. You used the word "communal." Am I to interpret that 
in the usual meaning, or do you have a different interpretation? 

Mr. Bellinger. I don't know. I used the word "communal" 

Mr. Watson. Everybody is to live 

Mr. Bellinger. In my own life and interest, my first major interest 
in this was at the time that I was an active church member, when I 
was very impressed by the early disciples of Jesus, Avho abandoned 
all private ownership and, as it says in the Bible, there was neither 
rich nor poor among them. 

Mr. Watson. The Bible says that you shall always have the poor 
with you. I am concerned with this aspect because I have a relation 
to it, I have a twin brother who is a minister. We won't pursue it 
further. Obviously he is of the category you condemn, he is of the 
established church. 

Mr. Bellinger. I would not want to condemn sight unseen. I have 
a great deal of respect for the established church, both clergy and laity. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us proceed with the questioning. 


Mr, CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, if I may — again reminding you that we 
are talking about your visit to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in June 1968 — 
put to you, sir, was not a code worked out for telegrams to be sent be- 
tween you and the Viet Cong office in Prague so that, for example, 
the word "Harry" in a telegram would be "Hungary" and the word 
"Peter" would mean "Poland" ? Was such a code worked out by you 
and the representatives of the North Vietnam Government? 

Mr. Dellinger, xlbsolutely. I do everything I can — although I my- 
self am public about just about everything I do and believe, in 
preparing for something of that kind, I would certainly attempt to 
maintain the privacy of communication, which I think is our right 
and which I think the Government constantly violates. Now this is a 
very unimportant matter. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't have had 
enough interest to do this, but I am quite willing to use this kind of 
very simple code, as I think all businesses do — I mean businesses even 
use that code if they are going to announce a new model or new price. 

Mr, CoNLEY. Who did propose the idea of the code then ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It emerged from our discussions of four people. 

Mr. Conley. You and Mr. Greenblatt and two others? 

Mr, Dellinger. The two others you mentioned, Tran Van Aiih and 
Phan Van Chuong. 

Mr, Conley. We may assume from your remarks it was not your 
idea, but one of the other three ? 

Mr. Dellinger, Not necessarily. You see, it is the same as going to 
Bratislava, We did not hold any press conference or make any press 
announcement beforehand because we wanted to be able to meet with- 
out being harassed by CIA agents and reporters. It was difficult enough 
bringing together people from these three different groups, that is, 
the two Vietnamese and the American, and we didn't want to be meet- 
ing in a goldfish bowl. Although we made no elaborate attempts to 
keep it secret, nonetheless we were relatively quiet about it. As soon as 
the meeting was over, we were quite prepared to give all and any in- 
formation. The same way here. There was also another factor. For 
example, a captain in the Army, who served in Vietnam and is opposed 
to the war, was part of a group which we were having go to Sweden 
to visit deserters to find out what the reason for their desertion was, 
to give factual rejDorts to the American people. 

This was not kept secret because we did not use the code. Because 
one of your informers discovered the information, he was denied a 
l^assport by the State Department and was unable to make the trip. 
So, you know, there are certain practical considerations which would 
motivate me. So although, in general, I don't bother with such things, 
I could very well have been the one to suggest it just to keep it quiet 
a little bit and to prevent the State Department from denying pass- 
ports or visas to some of the people who were going, that we keep it a 
little bit quiet, also, so they miglit not bug the room in Hungary, as 
they may have well bugged the room in Prague. 

Mr. Conley. Were there others at the meeting — Mr. Greenblatt — 
during this trip ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes; Mr. Greenblatt accompanied me on at least 
two visits to Averell Harriman and one to Cyrus Vance and on per- 
haps three visits, two or three visits, with the North Vietnamese dele- 
gation, including Xuan Thuy, the head of the delegation, and Colonel 
Ha Van Lau and a number of others. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Greenblatt also met with Ambassador Harriman, 
did he not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, he did- 

Mr. CoNLEY. Were you aware 

Mr. Dellinger. — to the best of my memory. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Were you aware, sir, that a Mr. Wilfred Burchett 
briefed Robert Greenblatt before his meeting with Harriman ? 

Mr. Dellinger. The occasion you are referring to is probably one 
in which I called up Wilfred Burchett, whom I originally met in his 
home in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, some years ago. I knew he was in 
Paris. He is a journalist and a correspondent, and I consider him to 
be a very honest journalist and very helpful. I don't remember that 
Mr. Greenblatt knew him before. The way I remember it is that I 
called Wilfred and suggested that we meet and have a drink and talk 
about things and that Mr. Greenblatt and I met with Mr. Burchett on 
not one, but at least two, occasions. 

I don't look at this as briefing. I look at this as exchange of ideas 
and information since none of us follow party lines or receive orders 
from anybody. 

Mr. CoNLEY. This is the same Wilfred Burchett, is it not, who was 
a participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against Amer- 
ican prisoners of war during the Korean war ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Do you expect me to consider that a serious ques- 
tion and answer it ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. Dellinger. Repeat it, please, and I will do my best. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Were you not aware that Wilfred Burchett was a 
participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against Ameri- 
can prisoners of war in Korea ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I have no knowledge of that. In fact, I am not 
an expert on that phase of the Korean war. You know, as a layman 
and from a distance, there were some things about the whole treat- 
ment of the prisoners, on both sides, by the way, which made me a little 
uneasy. As I say, I was not in a position, for a variety of reasons, to 
really explore this very thoroughly. 

My chief concern, since I have been in Vietnam, was to try to in- 
vestigate whether the Vietnamese were doing the kind of brainwash- 
ing, which I don't know whether the Koreans did or not, but of which 
they were accused, but I did investigate that and felt convinced that 
they were not brainwashing anybody. 

On the other hand, I found out that one of the bars to the release 
of more American prisoners is that when arrangements have been 
made and the prisoners are on their way home, the Army, the State 
Department — and on one occasion the prisoners were told the word 
came right from the White House — put pressure on the released pris- 
oners to go to the base in Thailand from which Vietnam was being 
bombed and there to "debrief them before they were allowed to speak 
to the press. 

In other words, I think there is at least some suspicion of brain- 
washing on the American authorities' part. I am against brainwashing, 
whoever does it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I have in my hand here an extract from 
the Subcommittee on the Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent 


Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government 
Operations, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, December 4, 1953, wherein 
appears the sworn testimony of former prisoner of war Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Abbott of the United States Infantry, wherein he 
identifies this Wilfred Burchett as a person who visited prisoner-of- 
war camps in an effort to sway the prisoners and to get statements from 
them and to create unrest. 

Now, gir, in the light of that testimony which is in our possession, 
do you still say that you were not aware that Mr, Burchett had previ- 
ously participated in the Communist brainwashing campaign against 
American prisoners of war ? 

Mr. Bellinger. First of all, I never saw that statement before. 
Secondly, I would have to consider it quite likely it could be as un- 
reliable as some of the statements made by the committee, the present 
committee, particularly in its October sessions, when the staff and 
"^ritnesses told a number of fanciful and untrue things. 

Mr, CoNLEY. Sir, I have to assume, as I do with you, sir, that a man 
who takes the oath intends to tell the truth. 

Mr. Dellinger, Well, you can assume that, and I don't know any 
of the people involved. I am not going to challenge their veracity, but 
I don't automatically believe it because you have read it to me from 
that committee, I will tell you very frankly that when I went to 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 1966, I had some suspicions about the 
accuracy of Wilfred Burchett as a correspondent. I myself am quite 
aware of how partisans on both sides of a controversy tend to distort 
the truth. 

I think the record of Communist journalists during the twenties 
and thirties and later includes many, many instances of distortion 
and propaganda which later was exposed not to be true. 

Mr, IcHORD, Do you think the record is pretty good today ? You only 
mentioned the thirties and twenties. 

Mr. Dellixger. I was thinking this was the period of the slave labor 
camps and the executions, and so on. I think there has been a modifica- 
tion in a healthy direction. There has been some liberalization process 
which has taken place, but the record is not one that I consider satis- 
factory today. 

The journalistic covering of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian invasion is 
an example. Anyway I did not know Wilfred Burchett. Because he 
had access to information and also had insights which many other 
people did not, he is occasionally quoted in the American press. Be- 
cause of the kind of pressures that exist in this society, I never saw 
him quoted without being referred to in some invidious way. To the 
very least, as the Australian Communist journalist, which is a way, 
you know, of discrediting him, I had no idea whether he would turn 
out to be an honest journalist or dishonest journalist, 

I will say I spent considerable time with him in Cambodia on both 
occasions before I visited North Vietnam, I talked with him at length 
about what he had seen and what the realities were. I had far more 
opportunity to check these things out during my visit than he, I am 
sure, anticipated because it involved the kind of traveling under in- 
tense bombardment which nobody else had been permitted to do during 
that time, with the exception of himself. 

I found out that he was utterly reliable. There might be something 


that I would interpret differently, but I found as a journalist he was 
utterly reliable and honest. I have a great deal of respect for him. If I 
wanted to find out facts about something, I would certainly take ad- 
vantage of the opportmiity of meeting with him in Paris so as to have 
whatever up-to-date knowledge I could before meeting either with 
the Vietnamese or the Americans. 

Mr. Watsox. Mr. Bellinger, you made the statement that you under- 
stood that partisans on both sides would tend to distort the truth. 

Mr. Dellikger. Often do ; not all times. 

Mr. Watson. Of course, you are partisan. Would that apply to you ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I try not to, but obviously I have my own biases and 
beliefs. I think nobody is a completely objective observer. But I have 
learned through the years that to exaggerate or distort — first of all that 
one may do it unconsciously. And that is bad enough. But to stretch 
the truth a little bit or the facts in order to gain a temporary advantage 
is self-defeating and corrupting, and I try to avoid it. 

Mr. Watson. If a report were to reach you that could be construed 
as pro- or anti-American, your first inclination would be to construe 
it anti-American ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No, first of all 

Mr. Watson. In reference to the war in Vietnam ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No. I think there is a glorious American tradition of 
belief in self-determination and of struggling and striving for democ- 
racy even though that has been greatly frustrated. Therefore, to me I 
think it is the most pro- American thing I know and the greatest hope 
in the country that so many people, particularly young people, are 
speaking up for the truth as they see it and are able to get away from 
the very stupid and wrong concept of ''my country, right or wrong" 
or "Whatever my country does is right.'' 

If a Communist country adopts that position, I oppose it. If a 
capitalist country adopts that position, I oppose it. My own country or 
somebody else's country, I don't believe in it. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, you do believe that might be pro- 
American in reference to our position in Vietnam ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I did not say that. 

Mr. Watson. Then the answer to my earlier question is simply, if 
you heard a report which could either be construed pro- or anti- 
American in reference to Vietnam, your construction would be anti- 
American ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No ; I, for example, heard a report 

Mr. Watson. Tell us something good that America has done. 

Mr. Bellinger. This is not good, but let me give you an example. 

Mr. Watson. Tell me one good thing that we have done over there. 

Mr. Bellinger. That is pretty hard. You are asking a difficult ques- 
tion. I think many sincere people have thought they were doing some- 
thing good when they tried to, well 

Mr. Watson. You can think offhand of nothing good, not one single 
good thing? 

Mr. Bellinger. I didn't say that. I think many people have gone 
over there, for example, to bring medical aid. I know people personally 
who have done educational and other constructive work in Vietnam. 
However, as in the well-known case of, I forget his name — anyway a 
number of the leading people, also unknpwn people, have gone over 


there and have worked for a few months and a few years in the Amer- 
ican aid program and on the constructive side have felt in the end 
that the purpose of this and the success of this was completely defeated 
by the, first of all, by the American militarism which was going on at 
the same time and, secondly, because of the fact that when a country is 
trying to impose its will upon another country, then even the good 
things that that country does turn to ashes in the people's mouths. 

I would certainly give eveiy credit to many, many individuals, some 
of whom I know and some of whom I don't, who have gone over to 
Vietnam with that kind of aim. I would like to withdraw all Amer- 
ican troops and end American attempts to dominate Vietnamese life 
so that this kind of constructive relationship could take place between 
American people and Vietnamese people, which I very much believe in. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Del linger, are you not the author of the introduc- 
tion to Mr. Burchett's forthcoming book on Vietna^ ? 

Mr. Dbllinger. Yes. I was going to mention that earlier. 

Mr. CoNiLEY. Are you also not planning to address a rally tonight, 
the Guardian rally in New York City, with Mr. Burchett? 

Mr. Delilinger. Not that I know of. I was earlier asked if I could 
come, but because of my operation I indicated that I did not expect 
to be able to come there. 

I did expect to speak with Mr. Burchett at a conference in Montreal 
last weekend. I also had to cancel out on that. I will be happy to appear 
on any platform anywhere with Mr. Burchett, even though we might 
have differences of interpretation. 

Mr. Conley. May I suggest, on your next occasion of visiting with 
him, you make inquiry about the question I put to you about the Com- 
munist brainwashing campaign in Korea several years ago. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. 

I think I should come to his defense a little bit on that, because I 
discussed with him the question of possible Vietnamese brainwash- 
ing of Americans. Firet of all, I became assured, insofar as it was 
possible, that this is not taking place. Also that the prisoners released 
have made this pretty clear — the first release of NLF prisoners, the men 
were whisked away to Okinawa and kept incommunicado for months 
and had not been released until they had been threatened and in- 
timidated so that they did not speak. 

From these conversations with Mr. Burchett, I feel convinced that 
he is opposed to brainwashing and would neither support it nor take 
part in it, even though I have to plead ignorance of the history or 
the information that has been adduced on both sides in the Korean 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving to another area, the participa- 
tion by you in the Bratishiva conference, I wish to hand to you at 
this time a copy of a letter. It is addressed, "Dear friend." It is dated 
August 22, 1967, which solicits participation in a conference then 
scheduled for Prague. 

I ask you to advise the committee as to the identity of tlvose 
l^eople to whom this letter was sent. 

Mr. Dellinger. We sent out a number of communications. Ap- 
parently this went, as near as I can tell from the way it reads m 
the context, it went to peoj^le wlio were part of the delegation. I 
think most of their names have appeared. Most of them wrote re- 


ports of the visit when they came back, and others were mentioned, 
I remember, in Newstoeek and Time. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Would you identify those that you recall ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I really can't go through the business of, because 
I am sure it would be incomplete and, as I have indicated, spotty. 
That is not the main reason. As I indicated earlier, I myself have 
received deadly bombs and grenades through the mail, which only 
by a miracle failed to kill my children, who got the mail. 

According to the post office inspectors, on at least two previous 
occasions, bombs which were intended for me blew up in the post 
office when they were being handled. 

It is that delicate. Yet my children at that time normally picked up 
the mail and walked a mile with it to my country home. It was by 
accident I picked it up in the car, and it is a miracle when I opened 
it, it did not explode, because I was a little suspicious and opened it 

Under those circumstances, I refuse. I think it is unwise for me at 
this point to name people who met with the NLF and the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam in Bratislava. To the best of my knowl- 
edge, they have all themselves written and talked about this. But in 
case there is anybody who, because of his home situation, felt that 
he did not want this made public because of the safety of his family, 
I certainly don't want to be in a position to make this public. 

Mr. IcHORD. May I see the letter, Mr. Counsel ? 

Are you going to have other questions about the meeting ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, may I see that letter for one moment? 

Before we leave this letter, I believe you did acknowledge that you 
had sent this letter out, but you would not divulge the names of the 
persons to whom it was sent. This is your letter ? 

Mr. Dellinger. The photostat runs off the page. I think my name is 
near the bottom, is it not ? 

Mr. Watson. Yes ; but you did acknowledge the letter. 

Mr. Dellinger. It looks like a letter that I sent out, I certainly send 
many letters of that kind. 

Mr. Watson. I notice item 5 in this letter states that there would be 
a limitation of 44 pounds for luggage: "however, please only pack 
39 pounds, saving 5 pounds for literature to take to the Vietnamese." 

What was the form of that literature ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It would vary; but naturally, I being editor of 
Liberation, what would first come to mind would be that we would 
send over issues of Liberation. 

Mr. Watson. It would be anti-American literature? 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't consider Liberation to be ant i- American. I 
consider the House Un-American Activity to be anti-American. 

There are two Americas, you know. I think I speak for the best 
interests of the best America. 

Mr. Ichord. Let us describe the type of literature which you an- 
ticipated being taken. 

Mr. Dellinger. The type ? 

Mr. Ichord. Yes. 

Mr. Dellinger. As I said. Liberation is the first thing that comes 


to mind, but just a scattering of materials of various kinds that could 
be books and magazines, weekly publications. 

Yes, I would bring back copies of the Vietnam. Courier; and I would 
take to them copies of Liberation^ Guardian, who knows, maybe an 
interesting magazine section of the New York Times. Anything which 

Mr. Watson. Anything which would be of encouragement to the 
North Vietnamese would be included in that ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Not necessarily, because I don't believe in encour- 
aging contrary to the facts. For instance, on my first trip to Vietnam, 
I have been so brainwashed by the American press that I thought the 
Vietnamese were overemphasizing the value to them of the demonstra- 
tions in this country. One of the things I had in mind was to say to 
them, "Listen, the antiwar movement is not that strong, the demon- 
strators are not all that big, and we are not powerful enough to stop 
the war in the United States. Don't think that we are." 

But that was independent of whether it would encourage or dis- 
courage. That was to simply tell them the truth. When I got over 
there, I found out that the press had a false idea of the emphasis. 

Since that time, the antiwar sentiment has grown. Now it is the 
most unpopular war in American history. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, this suggests to me that of this reserve 
5 pounds for literature, you would want this committee to believe that 
a j)art was to be some proper American literature. 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, truthful literature, which I consider to be the 
most proper American literature, to the best interest of America, the 
proper American of the antiwar movement, who does not want our 
country to be dragged into the mud and to be a war criminal and 
does not want his children slaughtered. 

Mr. Watson. Basically, it would be that type literature which 
would be of encouragement or help to the North Vietnamese ? 

Mr. Bellinger. Well, you can put your own interpretation on it. 
As I say, I am sure we included Liberation. I am sure we included the 
Guardian. I am sure we included some things from the Neiv York 
Times i\\?it might be of interest to them. 

Mr. Ichord. Continue. 

Mr. Bellinger. I believe in the free dissemination of ideas and 
literature everywhere, including ideas that I disagree with. Nothing 
would have stopped me from bringing things that I disagreed with. 

Mr. Watson. At your meetings do you distribute proper American 
positions on Vietnam? Bo you distribute leaflets 

Mr. Bellinger. I have already indicated that I think Mobilization 
represents the proper American position on Vietnam. 

Mr. Watson. Bo you distribute literature of the position opposite 
to yours? 

Mr. Bellinger. I myself take the position that if somebody comes 
up and distributes anti-American literature, in other words, literature 
supporting the war in Vietnam, I would be perfectly happy to have 
them do that. I always am happy for people to hear both sides. 

On a number of occasions, when I was scheduled to debate with 
representatives of the State Bepartment or of the Pentagon or various 
governmental agencies, they pulled out when they learned I was to 
be the opponent, because they knew I had been to Vietnam and had 


perhaps more facts than that particular individual felt competent 
to deal with. On other occasions, I have debated such people. I have 
always believed in fair preseiitation on both sides, including sides 
whose ideas I disagree with. 

Mr. Watson. You yourself have never made any distribution or 
you yourself have never articulated the position opposite to that 
which you now describe as "proper American" ? 

Mr. Dellinger. My position is constantly developing. There is a 
certain core of constancy to it, but it is constantly developing. 

Mr. Watson. Hardening, or developing? 

Mr. Bellinger. I think it is becoming more militantly anti-imperial- 
ist through the years, but I don't think it is hardening ; it is developing. 

Mr. Watson. Is your meaning of the term "more militant" the same 
as we have heard described by some of the other witnesses, or should 
we construe that in the normal interpretation of more militant ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have not heard the other witnesses. I have tried to 
make my own position clear. I have tried to summarize it by saying a 
position which would go beyond token dissent to effective changing of 

Mr. Watson. Militant is generally described as the opposite of 
peaceful, is it not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Not in my vocabulary. I certainly do not mean it 
that way. 

Mr. Watson. You do not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No. I am a nonviolent militant. 

Mr. Watson. I guess that is just like being a Catholic-Jew. 

Mr. GuTMAN. I can be verbally aggressive, just as I am now to you. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, let us abide by the rules. You have not 
been called to testify. We have gotten along very well today. Let us 
proceed with the questioning. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, I hand you now what is captioned "Pur- 
poses and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference," and ask you 
if you recognize this and whether you did, in fact, prepare it. 

\ Witness and counsel examine document. ) 

Mr. Dellinger. I have read this. 

Mr. CoNLEY. The question was: Did you prepare it and do you 
recognize it as something you prepared ? 

Mr, Dellinger. Yes, I imagine I did. Some of the wording seems 
like mine. I literally cannot remember whether I worked on it jointly 
with somebody else. There is nothing in here that I want to repudiate, 
but I don't remember whether it is all mine or not. 

You only have one copy ? 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. I would like to use it for a moment, if I may. 

Mr. Dellinger. All right. Maybe you can give it back to me for my 

Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, I will be glad to. 

In this particular document, Mr. Dellinger, appears a "POSSIBLE 
AGENDA." I read from that agenda the proposed topics : 

A. The Anti-War Movement 

B. The Student Movement 

C. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement 

D. The Labor Movement 

21-706 O— 69— pt. 3 8 


E. American Politics: 1968 

F. Business and the War 

G. America's Global Situation. 

Are these basically the topics which were the proposed or possible 
agenda for that meeting ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think it makes clear in here that the Vietnamese 
were preparing a proposed agenda, and we were jjreparing a proposed 
agenda, and then a smaller committee would meet before the conference 
and work this out so that the conference would hopefully be mutually 

This was a proposed agenda which I, perhaps working with others, 
drew up, first of all for the reactions of the American delegates, and 
after those were taken and absorbed, leading to whatever changes then 
would be presented to the Vietnamese. 

I can assure you that, unfortunately, we did not cover adequately 
all of these subjects. The time was too short. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are you acquainted with an individual by the name of 
Steven S. Schwarzschild ? 
Mr. Bellinger. Yes. 

Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Schwarzschild has apparently done some 
writing, Mr. Dellinger, in a magazine referred to as DISSENT, I 
believe, and has indicated in this magazine that he attended this par- 
ticular conference. 

I say that to you in order that you will not feel like, in connection 
with my next question, that you are identifying someone who has not 
been already publicly identified. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment. I have a word for my client. 
Mr, IcHORD. Give the counsel time to confer with his witness. 
(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my next question is: Was Steven 
Schwarzschild, in fact, at this conference held in Bratislava between 
September 6 and 12, 1967 ? 

Mr. Dellixger. He was at part of it. He was in very great personal 
conflict, I think, over this. I myself had luncheon with him and his 
family, discussing the advisability of his going. He was under a lot of 
pressure from some members of his family about going. In addition 
to the usual concerns that families might have about that, if he went, 
he might be called before the House Un-American Activities Commit- 
tee or otherwise persecuted. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you think you have been persecuted ? 
Mr. Dellinger. I think you have been very fair in the manner of 
this. I think a lot of the questions have no legislative purpose. 

Mr. Ichord. The Chair will be the judge of those questions, if and 
when that question arises. 

Mr. Dellinger. I think it is clear the history of the committee is that 
it has not been one which I consider honorable. 

I think one realizes that, in a sense, one is persecuted just by being 
here, because it takes one away from his work and because he constantly 
runs the danger of being cited for contempt if he makes any slight 

wrong step, or witnesses whose honesty is not necessarily- 

Mr. IciiORD. The Chair will assume that you will abide by your 
affirmation, Mr. Dellinger. 

Mr. Dellinger. Anyway, in addition, Steven Schwarzschild is a 
rabbi, and this was shortly after the death of an American in Czecho- 


Slovakia by the name of Jordan, if I remember correctly, in which there 
were overtones of anti-Semitism. There was a great deal of emotion, 
both Jewish and other concerns, over this whole incident. Steven 
Schwarzschild was very much torn about whether he should go or not. 

I encouraged him to go, on the line I have always taken and ex- 
pressed here. I thought this would give him the opportunity to express 
his concerns, including about Czechoslovakia and anti-Semitism, and 
to investigate. 

Anyway, as a result of the internal conflict, and perhaps due to the 
fact he was trying to do some of these things, I think Steven Schwarz- 
schild attended less of the conference than anybody else. In one sense 
he might be said to have never quite participated ; he was around the 
edges of it. 

The conference did not take place in Prague, as you remember, but 
in Bratislava. During at least part of the conference, he was in Prague 
instead of in Bratislava. 

Mr. CoNLEY. You will concede with me, then, that he was at least 
there physically, whether he participated or not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. He was a delegate and he was there during part of 
it and he participated in part of it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Bearing this in mind and referring specifically to this 
magazine, DISSENT, the January-February 1968 issue, I read to 
you, sir, a portion of an article, the introduction to an article which 
he wrote, entitled "The New Left Meets The Real Thing." It goes as 
follows : 

During their visits to hanoi David Dellinger (editor of Liberation), Tom 
Hayden, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of SDS) were invited to gather a 
group of about 40 American radicals in order to arrange a meeting with a group 
of Vietnamese. The Americans were exi)ected not only to oppose the war in Viet- 
nam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in fact meet 
with their Vietnamese counteri>arts last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. 
Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak Peace Committees * * *. 

It goes on into who defrayed their expenses, and so forth. 

Sir, is this a fair statement by Mr. Schwarzschild, that "The 
Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam 
but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory"? 

Mr. Dellinger. Without meaning to reflect on Rabbi Schwarz- 
schild's honesty, because I do believe he is an honest person, I would 
have to say that I consider this to be an inaccurate summary. 

First of all, Tom Hayden was not involved in meetings in Hanoi, 
which originated the idea or made plans for this conference, and 
his error at this point is indicative, perhaps, of other errors. Sec- 
ondly, I cannot remember or recognize discussion at any point that 
the delegation would be expected, on balance, to favor an NLF 

If you look at the agenda we drew up and if you remember my 
earlier remarks about the nature of this group, this just wasn't in 
our minds. 

The very presence of Rabbi Schwarzschild, who was not. in my 
mind, for all my respect for him, I would not consider him a radical, 
and for a number of the other people I should indicate that fact. 

Mr. CoNLEY. May I have our other document back? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes. By the way, in there, since you have it, I won't 


read it exactly, but it stresses about we expect to have a variety of 
viewpoints amongst the Americans, a variety of attitudes. 

I would like it, if it is used, Mr. Chairman, if possible, that the 
entire document be put in the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. Has the document been admitted as part of the record ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, which document are you referring to? 

We will offer the proposed agenda. 

Mr. IcHORD. There being no objection, it will be placed in the record. 

Mr. Dellinger. I simply refer the reader to the section on variety. 
It was expected of the American delegation. 

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 4" follows:) 

Dellinger Exhibit No. 4 
Purposes and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference 

I. The Prague Conference is intended to create solidarity and mutual under- 
standing between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their American supporters 
who are trying to change the United States. The Vietnamese hoi>e not only to 
create this climate of mutual confidence, but to take back a clear understand- 
ing of the United States based on i>ersonal contact with radical American ac- 
tivists. The American organizers of the conference hoi^e that the U.S. delegates 
take back an understanding of Vietnam which will stimulate the guide their 
work. This is not contemplated as a meeting where good wishes are expressed 
in ritual terms, resolutions are passed, debates carried on over the current line, 
etc. The significance of the event lies in the fact that the delegates are chosen 
not on the basis of their political affiliations with a particular radical organiza- 
tion, but on the basis of their proven effectiveness in radical activity. We are 
trying to create an internationai solidarity which cuts across organizational lines 
to base itself on contact and dialogue among many active people. 

II. Each American delegate must have considerable basic knowledge about 
the Vietnamese revolution and American reaction. This means a concrete famil- 
iarity with : a history of the nationalist, religious and left-wing movements in 
Vietnam, the role and legacy of the French, dynamics of the first independence 
war, the Geneva Agreements, land reform, education and government in the 
North, the rise of insurgency and the NLF in the South, the stages of American 
involvement since 1949, the state of the war (bombing, ground fighting, "pa- 
cification," South Vietnamese political crises), and the solutions proposed by 
various parties. While the conference is not intended for academic experts, it 
should not be bogged down in discussing subjects the Americans can inform them- 
selves of at home. When you arrive im New York September 3, you will receive 
bound volumes of Vkt-Rcport and several copies of a Hanoi publication. Viet- 
namese Studies. In the meantime you should read : Kahin and Lewis, The United 
States in Vietnam; Burchett, Vietnam North ; Hayden and Lynd, The Other Side. 

III. Problems of people relating well at the conference are crucial. Tliere will 
be an information gap, a language barrier, and a profound difference in experi- 
ences between the Americans and Vietnamese. Achieving communication will be 
a major task. It will be possible only if the American delegation itself is alert, 
informed, and sensitive. Among the Americans there may be pressures, disagree- 
ments, tensions. Since there will be no "official spokesmen", no imposed con- 
formity to a single line, the Americans will have to discipline themselves. Every 
effort must be made to struggle through this experience staying together, re- 
solving and harmonizing different feelings so that a variety of ideas are set forth 
to the Vietnamese with a minimum of difficulty. 

IV. All these problems quite clearly arise when the problem of an agenda 
is considered. When Dave, Nick and the Vietnamese first discussed this con- 
ference, the exact Agenda was left open. Since that time word was received from 
Hanoi that the Vietnamese are preparing with great interest, but we have no 
word of their hopes for the agenda. It can be assumed that they will arrive 
with definite ideas, experts on a variety of subjects, and probably even some 
working papers. If at all possible we will arrange a pre-conference meeting in 
I'rague to work out a mutually satisfactory agenda. In the meantime, the 
American delegation's business is to think concretely about what would be the 
most useful way to spend the week in Prague. The following are some simply- 


written notes on a possible agenda to be thought over by the people who are 
considering going. Responses are requested by mail or phone, and probably a 
discussion of the agenda can be held at our get-together September 3-^. 


I. Reports and Discussions: Part of the conference time will be spent in panel- 
style or individual reports to the whole body, part of the time in smaller work- 
shops. In either form, the subjects of discussion will be the same or very similar, 
the likely difference being that the statements to the whole group may seem 
authoritative and general while the smaller discussions will produce insights into 
important details. The American delegation will have a first responsibility to 
report in depth on the state of American society in the context of the Vietnam war. 
This will mean written or carefully-prepared oral reports on something like 
the following : 

A. The Anti-War Movement: the strands of draft resistance, civil dis- 
obedience and protest marches, electoral action for peace, community organi- 
zation and education campaigns. The degree and kind of anti-war activity 
among different social groups : the intellectuals and students, the Negro com- 
munity, the churches, labor, iwlitical parties. The differences in approach 
among different movements : the relative importance of disobedience, educa- 
tion and politics in achieving change, which groups use "withdrawal," "nego- 
tiations now" or other demands ; the role of moderate opinion, whether the 
anti-war issue should be related to other domestic and foreign policy ques- 
tions. A careful analysis of existing organizations or groupings and their 
role in the anti-war movement. 

B. The Student Movement: in addition to the role played by students in 
the anti-war movement itself, a thorough analysis should be presented on 
students as a social force in America. The origins and developments of the 
student movement since 1959-60. The role of students in civil rights, edu- 
cational reform and other issues. The numbers of students actually in- 
volved in protest activity. Their real and potential significance as a critical 
group in the society. 

C. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement: as in the case of the 
student movement, this subject should be treated not only as part of the 
Vietnam protest but as an independent force for social change which can 
be examined and measured. An in-depth analysis of the rise of the. civil rights 
movement in 1956, the involvement of students in direct action in the South, 
the beginning of voter registration and community organization, political 
experiments in Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, nationalism in the ghetto, 
rebellions and violence from 1964-67. employment of urban guerrilla war- 
fare, reaction of white community, government, business. How does this 
struggle affect the U.S. ability to fight in Vietnam? 

D. The Labor Movement: Not because it is involved in anti-war protest, 
and not because it represents a positive force such as the students and 
Negroes, but because of its importance and potential in our view and 
especially in the view of the Vietnamese, the labor movement should be 
analysed in depth. The state of the industrial unions, differences between 
the Reuther and Meany wings of the movement, pres.sures caused by in- 
flation, war economy and Negro revolt. Must there be organized working 
class protest for the Vietnam war to end? What are the real prospects for 
this protest? 

E. American Politics: 1968: an analysis of the spectrum of political posi- 
tions being staked out as the 1968 elections approach. Explanation of the dif- 
ferent economic, ethnic and regional factions in the Democratic and Re- 
publican parties. Identification of the iK)sitions and prospects for Johnson, 
Romney, Kennedy, Reagan, Nixon, Rockefeller, Percy, other Senate "doves." 
How meaningful are elections as guides to power and opinion in America? 
Does it matter for Vietnam who is elected Pre.sident in 1968? 

F. Business and the War: analysis of the divisions appearing between 
different sectors of the business community over the war. How are the dif- 
ferent economic judgements expressed in national politics? Whose economic 
interests are primarily served by the war? Is the war "healthy" for American 
business? or is it causing deterioration and worsening for business elites? 

G. America's Global Situation: What are the military and para-militairy 
policies of the U.S. in other parts of the world? What are the limits on 
America's ability to wage counter-revolution by force? Can the U.S. meet 


the challenge of "more Vietnams in Latin America?" Can the U.S. indef- 
initely expand the war throughout Southeast Asia and into China? Is the 
U.S. suffering on diplomatic fronts in Europe, the United Nations, the Third 

II. The Americans will probably want to hear similar reports in depth about 
the situation as the Vietnamese see it. Subjects on which the Vietnamese are most 
expert would include : 

A. The military situation in the South and North 

B. Economic and social situation 

C. U.S. war crimes 

D. Estimate of U.S. military^iplomatic intentions 
B. Possible scenarios for ending the war 

F. Role of People's Revolutionary Party (Communist) in NLF, role of 
other groups 

G. Position on interim (coalition) government, elections in the South, irela- 
tions with the North, relations with other "camps," relations with U.S. 
protest movement "after the war" 

H. Analysis of world situation, revolutionary strategies : guerrilla war, 
armed propaganda, self-defense, labor and political organization 

III. Other joint activities should be included besides discussions and reports. 
These might include Vietnamese- Axnerican speaking appearances before Czech 
audiences or meetings with Czech, East European, Russian, Chinese or other 
groups located in Prague. Evenings of entertainment, perhaps sponsored by the 
Czechs, would also be useful. The showing and exchange of Vietnamese and 
American protest films could be done as well. Tours of Prague and other parts of 
Czechoslovakia might be included. 

IV. Preparation of materials beforehand by the American delegation should 
be i^equired. Because of the shortage of time, it probably is impossible to 
prepare adequate working papers on any of the above subjects before leaving. 
But it is possible to pull together a number of relevant articles and books which 
have been produced in the last several months, and make sure these get into 
Vietnamese hands. It also is possible to bring films, photographs and other 
paraphenalia [sic] from America in which the Vietnamese are interested. 

These are some of the proposed ingredients for making a successful conference. 
Detailed arrangements will have to be worked out on the six)t. But if you have 
any general comments or amendments about this agenda-formula, please make 
them right away. 


Mr. GuTMAN. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is most 
important that this be in the record. 

Mr. IcHORD. It has already been admitted. 

Mr. GuTMAN, No. This is another point. Rabbi Steven Schwarz- 
schild is a client of mine in other connections. I wish the record to 
reflect it at this point. 

Mr. IcHORD. I don't know what materiality it has. 

Mr. Watson. So far as you know, he is an honorable, honest man? 

Mr. GuTMAN. I have always felt so and would continue to feel so. 

Mr. Watson. And Avould not deliberately make a false statement 
about anyone or any event ? 

Mr. GuTMAN. So far as I know. Congressman Watson, neither would 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, moving on, in this article prepared by 
Rabbi Schwarzschild appears the following, which I would like to 
read you and then ask a question, if I may : 

Yet out of these quasi-official reiwrts no "hard news" whatever emerged. 
Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he 
reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing 
that I had not known beforehand. It was. furthermore, absolutely impo.ssible, 
even in private conversation, to break through the oflicial propaganda line to 
which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was esi)ecially annoying 
since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause 


of their Vietnamese counterparts — and yet tliey were addressed as if they had to 
be indoctrinated from scratch with the cnidesit tools of persuasion. * * * 

Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir : Is Rabbi Schwarzschild's observation 
as to the way the group was treated by the Vietnamese an accurate one ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, I Avould not consider that an accurate descrip- 
tion at all. 

I would say Mr. Schwarzschild, who did not come to Bratislava until 
late and who, as I say, was somewhat on the fringes of the conference 
and also was, I would feel, internally torn and under great pressure 
from his anti-Communist associates, was probably not able to be an 
objective judge at that point, and perhaps himself set up some of the 
barriers that existed between him and the Vietnamese. 

I have found that with all political groups that is a problem, of a 
tendency toward doctrinaire positions. I found that the Vietnamese, 
who are intensely involved in the defense of their homeland and have 
suffered incalculable casualties, have, on a number of occasions when 
I have been present, tended to start off with a rather, what should I 
say, a rather formal presentation of the official Vietnamese point of 
view, which I, on a number of occasions, have not found extremely 
helpful. I have discussed this with them and certainly on every occasion 
when I have been present I try to get beyond this as soon as possible. 

In considering the suspicions which they are almost bound to have of 
Americans, considering the ability of committees like yours and the 
CIA and others to infiltrate all of these groups, considering the very 
loose procedures that we had for incorporating this group, I can see 
where they were perhaps a little standoffish at first. 

If I remember correctly, the first reports, although of value, were a 
little more stereotyped and a little less valuable than I had hoped. But 
this very quickly broke down, and we ate in the same dining room to- 
gether at tables that sat four, most of them, and I think the experience 
of all the Americans was that these conversations were very frank and 
informal, and not doctrinaire and not propaganda. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with this same article 
and again dealing with this conference held in Czechoslovakia, Rabbi 
Schwarzschild, toward the end of this article, deals with what he de- 
scribed as the propaganda films on guerrilla tactics exhibited to the 
Americans by an NLF military expert. 

Apparently, from reading the article, I deduce there were some mo- 
tion picture films shown of guerrilla tactics. He wrote the following, 
and I quote : 

The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if 
not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less 
justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say 
that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live 
with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these 
tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made 
it my not to look at the siieaker but to study the American listeners. I 
am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of 
pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained .straight faces, there 
was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were 
even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about 
this afterwards. 

Mr. Dellinger, were you present at these events which Rabbi 

Schwarzschilcl is describing, the description of the guerrilla tactics? 

Mr. Dellinger. I want to be very clear about this. Obviously, the 


NLF is engaged in guerrilla warfare so, obviously, it is possible that 
such a session took place. But as you read this my jaw dropped, and 
I have been searching my mind and my memory to try to remember 
what it could be that he is referring to. I literally cannot remember 
any such occasion. I remember reports of battles — as I say, it was a 
military report, and I think this was one of the first times that the 
Vietnamese began to say that they were winning the war or had won 
the war or were about to win the war. I don't remember any such 
session. I do remember there were movies. 

As I remember the Vietnamese movies, they showed bombs drop- 
ping; they showed peasants being rounded up; they showed peasants 
being tortured, kicked, hit wdth guns, dragged behind tanks, American 
tanks, this kind of thing. 

Forgive me if I am wrong. 

There are two possibilities : either that it took place when I wasn't 
there, or that it didn't take place and this is a somewhat liberal inter- 
pretation of his of one of these movies or of the descriptions of 

Mr. CoNLEY. In other words, you are saying that either you were 
not there, or Rabbi Schwarzschild could be mistaken in what he 
thought he saw ? 

Mr. Bellinger. To the best of my knowledge, I was present at the 
entire conference. 

There w^ere some times when we met in small groups. Perhaps there 
was one small group he attended from which he has written this 
description, but nothing in that coincides w4th anything of my own 
experience there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, we are going to offer as a pait of the 
record an article ["The New Left Meets the Real Thing"] from the 
magazine DISSENT^ dated January-February 1968. 

Mr. IcHORD. That is the document I thought I had a while ago, 
instead of the agenda document. 

There being no objection, it will be admitted. 

Mr. Dellinger. May I make a comment ? 

I think this article indicates that we did, in fact, have a variety 
of people there. There were many different interpretations, most of 
them quite friendly, believing the conference was very valuable, but 
sev^eral of them registering criticisms of dissatisfaction. 

It is the opposite of the hard-line plot approach. 

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 5" follows :) 


Dellinger Exhibit No. 5 
[.Dj£££«£— January-February 1968, pp. 78-81] 


Stephen S. Schwarzschlld 

The New Left Meets 
The Real Thing 

DURING THEIR visrrs TO HANOI David Del- 
linger (editor of Liberation), Tom Hay- 
den, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of 
SDS) were invited to gather a group of ribout 
40 American radicals in order to arrange a 
meeting with a group of Vietnamese. The 
Americans were expected not only to oppose 
the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on bal- 
ance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in 
fact meet with their Vietnamese counterparts 
last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. 
Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak 
Peace Committees — though it should be made 
clear that the American participants defrayed 
all other expenses out of their own pockets 
or through their respective organizations at 

Extremely little, if anything, that is new or 
significant emerged from the meeting. My own 
opposition to the American war in Vietnam 
continues to be as complete as it had been 
before — 1 still see no viable alternative to a 
victory of the Vietnamese Communists (all 
other possible alternatives having been polarized 
out of existence by the ruthless American war) 
and^refer it immeasurably to the brutal Ameri- 
can policy now being pursued. Ail this, how- 
ever, not because of what 1 witnessed in Bra- 
tislava but despite it 

Apart from the original organizers, the 
American contingent consisted in about equal 
measure of a few religious radicals from the 
American Friends' Service Committee (AFSC), 
other Quakers, the Fellowship of RecoiKilia- 
tion (FOR), and one or two off-beat clergy- 
men; young academicians; representatives of 
the Black Power movement; young community 
organizers and student organizers of the New 
Left; a few writers, most of them associated 
with Left periodicals. This group, in which 
there were very few trained political technicians 
or Vietnam experts, was confronted by two 
Vietnamese delegations who had brought along 
their own experts in all areas under discussion 
and their own translators. It soon became clear 
thal^ the Vietnamese were from very high 
echelons. At least one of them mentioned in 
passing that he had been a member of the Viet- 
namese delegation to the Geneva Convention 
in 1954; all spoke with governmental authority. 
They were highly disciplined and in their way 
very competent. 

The contrast between the two groups was 
striking. The Americans represented small fac- 
tions — in some respects at odds with one an- 
other — of a movement on the outermost peri- 
phery of American society — whereas the Viet- 
namese were representatives of an effective 
government in one area and of a para-govern- 
ment in another. 

The first day of the conference was set aside 
for reports from the Americans about the strug- 
gle against the war and the conditions for so- 
cial revolution in this coimtry; the second day 
for reports from South Vietnam; the third for 
North Vietnam; the remaining time for smaller 
group discussions about special aspects of the 
Vietnam situation. The American reports were 
multitudinous, relatively brief, mostly extem- 
poraneous, quite subjective, and sometimes in 
conflict with one another. The Vietnamese re- 
ports were well-prepared. Each subject was as- 
signed to a single expert. These reports were 
often written out and mimeographed before- 
hand and extremely lengthy. (Madame Binh, 
head of the South Vietnamese delegation, took 
all of one afternoon and most of the next 
morning for her opening statement.) They were 
clearly formulated as quasi-official, diplomatic 

Yet out of these quasi-official reports no 
"hard news" whatever emerged. Even some- 
one like myself who knows nothing about Viet- 
nam but what he reads in the newspapers and 
in a few supplementary sources heard nothing 
that I had not known beforehand. It was, fur- 
thermore, absolutely impossible, even in private 
conversation, to break through the official pro- 
paganda line to which all of the Vietnamese 
rigorously adhered. This was especially an- 
noying since the Americans had, after all, 
been selected because they supported the cause 
of their Vietnamese counterparts — and yet they 
were addressed as if they had to be indoctri- 
nated from scratch with the crudest tools of 
persuasion. Two evenings, for example, were 
set aside for a series of North and South Viet- 
namese propaganda films that might be effec- 
tive with Asian or African peasants but sure- 
ly could not be expected to be persuasive with 
an even slightly sophisticated group. 

Along with some AFSC and FOR people, I 


Bellinger Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 


spent a long afternoon with the official Bud- 
dhist representative of the NLF. We pUed him 
with questions about reUgious and cultural 
trends in his country, "third force" personalities 
known to us, and the facts concerning religious 
groups In his organization. It was, however, 
entirely impossible to come to grips with such 
problems: he insisted, first, on giving us what 
was in effect a two-hour filibuster, reviewing 
rudimentary knowledge and views obviously 
perfectly familiar to us. Anything that did not 
fit into his picture was either disregarded, con- 
demned as treason and called untypical of the 
Vietnamese people, or treated as still an open 
question that could be answered only after the 
Front had niled upon it. 

In a private conversation, 1 probed the at- 
titude of this gentleman and that of the head 
of the North Vietnamese lawyers' guild toward 
the Roman Catholic church. It b perfectly ob- 
vious that the church ii virtually identified with 
the American cause in Vietnam. To admit this, 
however, would be tantamount to a contradic- 
tion of the official propaganda line that "all 
of the Vietnamese people" are arraigned with 
the NLF and that theirs is a "neutral, popular 
front." 1 could not, therefore, extract an anti- 
Roman-Catholic opinion from either of them. 
Indeed, the Buddhist representative insisted 
that a Roman Catholic priest, whom he named, 
was a member of the NLF Central Committee. 
"Is he recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he has 
been ordained by a bishop and officiates at 
a church." "Is he still recognized by Rome?" 
"Yes, he still says mass." "Is his saying of 
mass still recognized by official Roman Cath- 
olic authorities as licit?" "Well" — this after 
half-an-hour's involved, translated give-and- 
take — "the priest is right now temporarily not 
recognized by the Vatican." 

Several sessions were devoted to explore pos- 
sibilities of dissuading Americans from par- 
ticipating in the war. The prominent role of 
blbck men in the army was discussed. One of 
the American blacks asked the relevant ques- 
tion: how many black soldiers had defected to 
the NLF? It took a long time to explain that 
question. Finally, the answer came forth that 
all the Vietnamese present were from the North 
and that they, therefore, did not have such 
information. "Could we ask some people from 
the NLF?" "Yea, they'll come in the after- 


In the afternoon a^ain much time was spent 
in making the question clear. Ultimately, of 
course, it had to be conceded that there was no 
record of Amencan defections, black or white. 
(On the other hand, the numbers of South 
Vietnamese defectors are, of course, vast — 
to the point where the NLF people claim, 
with considerable credibility, that they train 
some of their officers by letting them be in- 
ducted into Ky's army and having them in- 
structed under U.S. auspices.) 

As FOR Czechoslovakia, the situation in that 
country, even as revealed during such a visit 
of little more than a week, struck me as much 
more oppressive and frightening than the de- 
scriptions we have been getting in the press. 
At the very beginning i had heard a few of 
(he Americans express relief at finally being in 
a "socialist" country and no volunteered criti- 
cal observations. 1 feared, therefore, that this 
representation of the New Left was buying the 
Czech party line completely. As the week drew 
on, however, my initial fear turned out to be 
unjustified. With no exception that 1 know of, 
the Americans became aware of the mindless 
and repressive society in which we found our- 
selves. At least within the confines of the 
American caucus, phrases such as "fascist," 
"paranoiac," "get out of here with my life," 
"totalitarian," etc. became quite frequent. Yet, 
to my knowledge at least, no one but myself 
confronted any Czech with articulated critic- 

There was, however a considerable afneunt 
of nonverbal criticism. At first, the Czechs 
tried to keep us together in supervised places. 
But American, or New Left, anarchy soon took 
over. Many of us dispersed through Bratislava 
in so many directions at the same time that 
it would have been extremely difficult to keep 
track of all of us. A black man, a minister, 
and a student actually conducted a flower- 
power demonstration off the central square of 
the city. Still, in discussing possible future press 
relations, the Americans stressed that one 
should mute one's criticism of the Czechs in 
order to prevent imdesirable consequences for 
the Vietnamese and for future American-Viet- 
namese contacts — a rather eloquent expression 
of the stance of New Left people toward Com- 


Dellinger Exhibit No. 5 — Continued 


munis ts. 

This is precisely the main point about the 
encounter between the New Left and the icaJ 
Conununists in power. The question ybetber 
criticism of the Vietnamese should be muted 
never came up. It was apparently assumed 
that there was none. Certainly, none wa* ex- 
pressed. The unspoken premise was that the 
Vietnamese were effectively flffating America 
as it is — and "pas tennemies i la gauche com- 
baiiante." Newsweek quoted an anonymous 
reporter for Ramparts as having heard Tom 
Hayden exclaim: "Now we're all Vietcong." 
I did not hear such an announcement — but this 
certainly was the mood of the gathering. 

There were some nasty manifestations of this 
total identification with the Vietnamese Com- 
munists. The NLF military expert gave a 
long presentation of the situation in the field 
as be sasv it and some of the informal and 
quite brutal guerrilla tactics that had to be 
used in combating the American aggressors. 
(This had, the previous evening, been illu- 
strated in one of the propaganda films.) The 
most one can say of these methods is that they 
possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in 
defense against at least equally brutal and poli- 
tically even less justified foreign invaders. One 
might even be prepared to go so far as to say 
that the Vieuamese who had to practice them 
might, in order to be able to live with them- 
selves, have to get some lund of personal satis- 
faction out of these tactics. While some of 
these blood-curdling tactics were being de- 
scribed, I made it my business not to look at 
the speaker but to study the American listeners. 
1 am sorry to have to say that, with the excep- 
tion of some of the members of pacifist, es- 
pecially Quaker, organizations who maintained 
straight faces, there was nothing but approval 
to be seen in any facial expressions, and there 
were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I 
know, not a word was ever said about this 

The American reaction to the Vietnamese 
ranged all the way from calculated political 
'^popular frontism" to naive to wilfully blind 
to literally sick to craven. There were, no doubt, 
some who actually had no idea of what a Com- 
munist is. There were surely some who did 
not want to know and regarded every enemy 
of American imperialism as a comrade. They 

inclined, thus, to interpret the new NLF 
program as if it were an "agrarian reform" do- 
cument. There was certainly a representation 
of the sick, who outraged one or the other 
Czech puritan Communist by talking, mostly 
m the language of "shit," about nonmarital sex 
relations and the abortions of girl friends. What 
most of the Americans had in common was 
the belief that anyone who batters the Ameri- 
can Establishment effectively makes a contribu- 
tion to the defeat of capitalist imperialism and 
he may not be criticized in any way, for fear 
of detracting from his effectiveness. 

1, for one, can draw only one ideological 
conclusion: radicalism at this point can consist 
only of a radically realistic view of the utterly 
hopeless situation in which we find ourselves: 
American capitalist imperialism is flooding 
much of the world with blood and vulgarity, 
while neither "coalition politics," nor "old-style 
socialism," nor the New Left have any rela- 
tionship to the real world or hold out any hope 
for poliiical effectiveness — and "the socialist 
blocs" not only exhibit no significant regaining 
of humane or humanist values but are, in fact, 
widening the destructive circle. Still, because 
this is the only way we know to be human, we 
try to embody and to advocate radically liber- 
tarian social ideals. 


Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question dealing with this 
particular conference, if I may. 

Did you have occasion, or did any of the members of the American 
delegation have occasion, while at this conference to be presented with 
a ring which you were informed had been made from a part of an 
American airplane that had been shot down ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I consider this entirely possible because the 
Vietnamese make combs and rings, to the best of my knowledge, from 
planes that have been shot down. 

Mary McCarthy has written in the Ne\o York Revieio of Books 
about being tendered such a ring and her own reluctance to wear it. 
I myself, if I remember correctly, was given a comb and a ring in 
Vietnam, but explained that I was not interested in wearing such a 

Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, sir, I have another article, taken from WIN^ 
volume III, No. 17, under October 16, 1967, captioned "report from 
BEATISLAVA," by Eric Weinberger, which would indicate, I sup- 
pose, from a reading of it, that Mr. Weinberger was also at this 
conference, and would you hesitate to identify him? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, he was there. 

Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, sri', put to you this question from this 
article. In this article Mr, Weinberger states that, prior to a year or 
two before his article, he had been persuaded and, to quote him 
exactly, "by A. J. Muste and Dave Dellinger, to come off it on the 
condemn- violence-on-both-sides-equally-bit." 

Do you recall the quotation ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think I do now, and that is my position, as I 
indicated yesterday, that the violence of the richest, most powerful 
nation in the world invading a little, undeveloped country of Asia 
should not be compared to the violence used in self-defense by that 

Mr. CoNLEY. As I understand it, sir, Mr. Weinberger, up until you 
and Mr. Muste were able to prevail on him to come off of it, was 
taking the position that violence was wrong on both sides, or was 
equally wrong. 

As I understand it, is it your position as a pacifist only certain 
violence is wrong? 

Mr. Dellinger. No, We have discussed this at great length here 
already. At the beginning of the war in Vietnam, the traditional 
pacifist tended to say, "A plague on both your houses, we are against 
all violence, and there is violence being used on both sides." 

I myself — just as I believe that the violence of George Washington 
and of the American patriots was obviously different morally and 
practically from the violence of Adolf Hitler during World War II — 
I have myself made distinctions in violence without, liowever, advo- 
cating violence. 

It was not hard for me, I guess — I don't remember my own history 
in relation to the war in Vietnam, but it was not hard for me to believe 
in the beginning that there was distinction between aggressive violence 
of the United States and the violence of the patriotic forces of Viet- 
nam. I certainly wrote this and said tliis on many occasions. 

Mr, Conley, In connection with this particular conference, I want 
to read to you a list of names, and will rather anticipate your answer, 
but I do have to do this, sir, for the record, if you will bear with me. 


Mr. Dellinger. Could I ask you, for the record, if you might con- 
sider whether it is worth reading all of these names, in case there are 
people who might receive the kind of package in the mail that I have 
talked about i Why not show us the list ? 

Mr. GuTMAN. Why not show us the list, and then ask us questions 
about them by numbers ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Let the Chair inquire. Will you please come forward, 
Mr. Counsel, and let me see what you have ? 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my question is: Were the following 
persons present at this conference with you: Robert L. Allen, Jr., 
Malcolm Boyd, Carol D. Brightman, Reverend John Pairman Brown, 
Bronson Pettibone Clark, Robert Merten Cook, Stoney Cooks, Ren- 
nard Cordon Davis, David Dellinger, Elizabeth P. Dellinger, Thorne 
Webb Dreyer, Nicholas Egleson, Richard Flacks, John Ross Flanagan, 
Norman David Fruchter, Tom Gardner, Carol Glassman, Thomas 
Hayden, Steven E. Halliwell, Christopher Jencks, Walter Russell 
Jolmson, Carole Yvonne King, Andrew David Kopkind, Bob Kramer, 
Carol Cohen McEldowney, Leon Morse, Linda Morse, Raymond A. 
Mungo, Douglas Craig Norberg, Vivian Emma Rothstein, Steven S. 
Schwarzschild, Sol Stern, Dennis Sweeney, John P. Tillman, Jr., 
Barbara Webster, Eric Weinberger, Henry AVilliam Werner, John 
Augusta Wilson, Willie T. Wright, and Ron Young? 

Mr. GuTMAN. May I ask the legislative purpose of this question, 
Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair wall advise the counsel that, in view of the 
fact that this was a meeting with the North Vietnamese and other 
allies, friendly nations with the North Vietnamese, in view of the 
purview of these hearings and that the witness w^as a leader in the 
Chicago demonstration and he has so testified, that it is a pertinent 
question and within the subject of inquiry. 

Mr. GuTMAN. I fail to see the pertinency, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. IcHORD. These are individuals who attended the conference with 
the gentleman. The counsel lias advised me that they have been so 
identified in the newspapers. The witness was there, and the Chair will 
have to rule that it is a proper question. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, since you have just stated^ 

Mr. IcHORD. You have the right to advise with your witness if you 
desire, but you haven't been called to testify, Mr. Gutman. 

Mr. Gutman. I understand. We are talking on the question of rele- 
vancy. If I advise him on the question what to say, on the legal point of 
relevancy, he is merely going to have to parrot what I suggest to him. 

Mr. IcHORD. I think we will have to abide by the rules. Go ahead. 

You will be given time to confer with your client. 

Mr. Dellinger. If that is the way you want it. 

(Witness confers w^th counsel.) 

Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, from listening care- 
fully to the list, I would have to say that, no, that is not an accurate 
list of the people who attended the conference ; definitely not. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Did the people named attend that conference ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Some of the people named did, some did not. Some 
of the names appear to be inaccurate combinations. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Are any names missing who attended the conference? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have not any idea. As you read off those names, 


I thought, "Oh, yes, I remember him, lie was there." Other names, I 
thought, "Who is he? I never heard of him." 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if you may let us move on to an admin- 
istrative committee meeting of the National Mobilization Committee 
which was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on October 13 of this 
year. Was there, in fact, a meeting held on that date in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, of your National Mobilization Committee? 

Mr, Bellinger. Is that a Saturday or Sunday ? This fall there was 
a meeting in Cambridge. That is undoubtedly a correct date. 
Mr. CoNLEY. Did you attend that meeting ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I believe I attended and presided at that meeting. 
Mr. Conley. All right, sir. I will ask you, Mr. Bellinger, if those 
attending this meeting discussed this committee's investigative hear- 
ings, the grand jury investigation of the disturbances in Chicago, and 
the hearing of the President's Commission on the Causes and Preven- 
tion of Violence ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I recollect that these subjects were discussed 

I would like to point out that one of the concerns expressed was 
whether or not some of the people present would be indicted. Since 
it has been reported in the newspapers that indictments are being 
prepared, that might influence) how we proceed from here, because 
I don't want to say anything involving people indicted or about to 
be indicted. 

Mr. Conley. Again, sir, I think you are reading more into the 
question than what I intended. 

Mr. Bellinger. I am only trying to communicate and establish some 
understanding here. 

Mr. Conley. Mr. Bellinger, was it decided at this meeting at Cam- 
bridge that in view of these activities, that is, the meeting of this 
committee, the grand jury investigation, and the President's Com- 
mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, that the persons 
involved in the Chicago disturbance, the demonstrators, and so forth, 
should be urged not to cooperate with any request received for an 
interview by the FBI or any other investigative agency ? 

Mr. Bellinger. No, this was not the decision. There were a number 
of different viewpoints expressed. Kennie Bavis and I reported that 
we had already had an interview with a representative of the sub- 
committee of the President's Commission on Violence. 

Everybody was aware of the fact that some of the FBI investiga- 
tion had been very partial and unfair. In fact, when the FBI ap- 
proached me, I told them that I was very busy and asked them what 
the purpose was. They made very clear to me that the purpose of 
talking to me was to find out if I knew about any violations of law 
on the part of the demonstrators, but it was clearly demonstrated 
to me that they were not interested in any violations of law by any- 
body other than demonstrators. 

I reported this fact at the meeting. It was a very complicated dis- 
cussion, in which there were probably four or five points of view, as 
to some advocating virtually total cooperation, because the truth was 
certainly in our favor and we had nothing to hide; some people advo- 
cating virtual noncooperation, because whatever we said might be 


twisted and distorted and used against us unfairly or used to involve 
other people ; and there were a variety of positions in between. 

If my memory is correct, a subcommittee, of which I was a member, 
was instructed to work with the legal committee and to get out a 
memorandum discussing the various dangers and difficulties, but not 
taking a hard line as to whether people should speak or not. 

As I say, we are not a talk-down organization. We are hetero- 
geneous and under no circumstances would we issue too hard a line 
anyway. But I think we did w^ant people to be aware of what hap- 
pened in a number of FBI interviews and also to be aware of what 
their rights were ; that they had the right to refuse to testify if they 
wanted to. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Was it not also decided at this meeting in Cambridge 
that the minutes of all future administrative committee meetings would 
continue to list those in attendance, but would leave out home addresses, 
and while they would summarize issues and decisions, they would not 
attribute specific remarks to specific individuals? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Bellinger. I think it is very important for me to point out here 
that I consider this to be an example of the kind of illegal persecution 
that I have referred to, that unfortunately has too often characterized 
the history of this committee. 

This was a private meeting, protected under the first and fourth 
amendments of the Constitution. It is as if you were to get me up here 
and to say, "Did you vote for so-and-so in your secret ballot?" 

I think that would be an obvious intrusion. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Nobody has put that question to you. 

Mr. Dellinger. You haA e asked about decisions and statements of a 
private meeting, which is protected by the first and fourth amend- 
ments. I consider this a violation of privacy. 

Now, having registered that objection and used that as an example 
of the type of thing to which I object in this committee, I will proceed 
to answer the question, or at least in a way that will not involve other 
people. But I will volunteer the information, although I think you 
don't have the right to ask it. 

Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger, isn't it a fact that you yourself actually 
gave the report to this Cambridge meeting on this committee's investi- 
gation ? Are you not the one that actually made the report ? 

Mr. Dellixger. That is quite possible.'lf I did, I am sure that others 
supplemented it. It was not a very flattering report. I remember using 
the example that you tried to connect people back to Lee Harvey 
Oswald, to the Rosenbergs, to people out of the 1930's, and make con- 
nections that one of our representatives in Chicago had an office which 
was in a building which belonged to somebody who had run for office 
as a Communist, if I remember correctly, in 1941. Maybe it was 1945. 

I said that while I was listening to this in the audience I had the 
feeling, and of couree my name was brought into this, that I was being 
analyzed to see if I was I/32 J®w, or %4 Jew, or 1/128 J^w. 

Mr. IcHORD. Some of the testimony does get far afield, just as your 
testimony making Lee Harvey Oswald a pretty good guy, as well as 
somebody else. 

Mr. Dellixger. No. I say there was testimony attempting to link us 
to Lee Harvey Oswald, that someone he approached to be an attorney 


had also been an attorney for somebody in the movement. If one took 
a lawyer and followed him through all his clients and tried to associate 
each person with the other people he had defended, I think it would 
be as ludicrous as this example I am giving of the committee's work 
in October. 

If I remember correctly, I reported that kind of thing to the Mobili- 
zation administrative committee. If I didn't, I was delinquent in my 

Mr. CoNLEY. I call to your attention that perhaps your memory 
does not serve you well. Yesterday it was you, not us, that brought up 
the name Lee Harvey Oswald. I believe it w^as you. 

Mr. Dellinger. It is possible I did, in this connection. 

Mr. CoNLEY. I think we were talking about Malcolm X. 

Mr. IcHORD. Let us get back on the subject of the inquiry, Mr. 

Mr. Dellinger. I would like to point out that you brought up the 
question of the assassination of Malcolm X. 

Although I w^ondered wdiat the pertinency was to your inquiry, I 
certainly did express my opinion on some of the assassinations, in- 
cluding raising some questions about the way the assassination of one 
of our Presidents was handled. 

Mr. IcHORD. Sometimes the exchanges have been quite free, Mr. 

Let us proceed, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, I put to you this question : Since the 
meeting in Cambridge on October 13, isn't it true that the Mobiliza- 
tion Committee has made a mailing of a "Dear Friend'' letter, bring- 
ing attention to the various investigations of your Chicago demonstra- 
tion and advising that any — I use the quote from the letter — "any 
further cooperation," that is, wnth investigating agencies — 

runs the risk of lending a legitimacy to governmental abuse of investigatory 
power for the purpose of harrassing [sic], intimidating, and repressing political 
opposition. * * * our experience has shown that any interview, given in the 
best of faith to the most liberal minded body, can find its way into the hands 
of prosecuting attorneys, FBI files and Huac smear campaigns. 

* * * * il! If t 

We bring this matter to your attention as a matter of urgency. * * * hun- 
dreds of people have already been asked for interviews by FBI agents. Since 
there is no obligation to grant any interviews or give any testimony unless a 
subpoena has been served, most people refuse these requests. We support those 
who select this course of non-cooperation. If you are approached b.v any in- 
vestigatory agency please keep us informed and feel free to discuss with us the 
manner in which you intend to resx)ond. 

Mr. Dellinger. Is that the entire document ? 

Mr. Conley. Is that a fair reading of those portions of that docu- 
ment ? 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair can't see the pertinency of that 
question. Let us ofo on to something else. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, you requested we close at 4. I wonder 
if we are going to make it. 

Mr. CoNLEY. That concludes our questions, sir. 

Mr. IcHORD. I thought you had one other question you wanted to ask. 

Mr. Watson, do you have any questions ? 


Mr. GuTMAN. Does the missing question begin, "Are you now, or 
have you ever been" 

Mr. IcHORD. Counsel will be in order. 

Mr. Dellingek. Mr. Chairman, while he is thinking, could I make 
a comment relevant to that area ? 

Mr. IcHORD. You mean you want to answer the question when I ruled 
the question out of order ? 

Mr. Dellingee. Well, I won't go into the document because that 
would take time to study it, and I am not sure, it did not appear to be 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair saw no purpose. 

Mr. Dellinger. I want to tell one thing from my own experience, 
that when I agreed to make a lengthy tape for the subcommittee in- 
vestigating the Chicago disorder, the subcommission of the President's 
Commission on Violence, I was told that it was — absolutely none of 
that material would be turned over to the grand jury or to any other 
body, including HUAC. 

Now, I heard on television last night an interview with the judge 
presiding over the grand jury investigation in Illinois, who said that 
he was anxious to see the material on which the report was based. And 
the impression I got from the then response of Chairman Walker was 
that this material would be made available if requested. 

Now, I give this as an example of the kind of problem that people 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, I will state that the Chair has no juris- 
diction whatsoever over the Presidential Riot Commission or the 
grand jury proceedings in Chicago. 

As I stated at the outset of the hearing, we were not interested in 
the grand jury proceeding. We were interested in proceeding to search 
out the facts, look into the charges that have been made relative to 
subversives participating in the organization, in the planning, of the 
riots and what connections the leaders had with foreign powers. 

It is the duty of the Chair to keep the hearings in these bounds. That 
is the way I interpret my duty as chairman. 

I have no jurisdiction over Mr. Walker or the judge in Chicago or 
any of the commissions. They are separate, distinct arms of Govern- 

Mr. Dellinger. I am simply trying to indicate any additional rea- 
son for my reluctance to mention the names or affairs of other people 
who might then proceed on to some other body which might use them 
additionally and m a negative way. 

Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Watson. 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, I am interested in the article that was 
written by Rabbi Schwarzschild, a friend of yours and a friend of 
your good counsel there. Obviously the article or the author, either 
or both, were considered reliable enough that they would be included 
in the publication DISSENT, which I assume would be one fairly 
recognized by the left movement. 

Is that not a correct statement ? 

Mr. Dellinger. First of all, Rabbi Schwarzschild is not an intimate 
friend of mine. I have had very limited contact with him, but I indi- 
cated, you know, my positive response. 

Secondly, there are many variations within the left, and I think, 

21-70&— 69— pt. 3 9 


if you want my own opinion, DISSENT has been a little bit sick with 
anticommunism. It has many valuable articles in it ; but a lot of peo- 
ple are intellectuals who I think have been victimized by the cold war 
and perhaps in some cases, because of the positions that they hold and 
the respectability that they covet — I am sorry to be imputing motiva- 
tion — but for a variety of reasons really have been very wrong in the 
things they write. At least I very much disagree with the kind of viru- 
lent anticommunism which seeps into DISSENT magazine and always 
the lofty and patronizing attitude towards young people, who may 
not be able to write as well as some of the editors of DISSENT^ but 
who very often are closer to the struggle for social justice and human 

Mr. Watson. We still get back to the basic proposition, as you stated 
earlier, that certainly Rabbi Schwarzschild would not deliberately 
distort the truth. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes, that is my estimate. 

Mr. Watson. You disagree with him because he does not take your 
exact line, and naturally you would be in disagreement, but in his 
article he makes the statement, on page 80, that a reporter for Ram- 
parts — again, RaTuparts is not necessarily a rightwmg publication, 
is it? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is not a right wing magazine. 

Mr. Watson. It is considered a left ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is not part of the Mobilization Committee. 

Mr. Watson. But it would be considered farther left ? 

Mr. Dellinger, I really dont want to get into the business of rank- 
ing the various magazines and expressing my areas of agreement 
and disagreement with them, although I did partially in the case of 

Mr. Watson. This statement is attributed by a reporter for Ram- 
parts to Tom Hayden, and this occurred at the conference in Czecho- 
slovakia: "Now we're all Vietcong." The rabbi was fair enough to. 
say, "I did not hear such an announcement — but this certainly was 
the mood of the gathering." 

Is that a fair statement ? And j'ou were there. 

Mr. Dellinger. No, that is not a fair statement. That is a single sen- 
tence torn out of context and not giving at all an accurate impression 
of either the general nature of the conference or even of that particu- 
lar scene. 

Mr. Watson. Here is another article, written by Ray Mungo, who 
I understand was at the conference, in THE east village OTHER 
magazine, and I believe this is headed up "LIBERATION News 
Service." I believe you said you are editor of that. 

Mr. Dellinger. No. I am editor of Liberation magazine. LIBERA- 
TION News Service is an independent news-gathering agency with 
which I have no connection. 

Mr. Watson. Ray Mungo is listed as the writer or author of this 
article. He makes this statement : 

"Lyndon Johnson will have a nightmare when he hears about this meeting," 
* * *. "He will have a nightmare because he has sent 500,000 men to your land 
to find the Vietcong." 

"We will tell him he'd better leave some men at home. Because, like Spartacus, 
whose fellow slaves in Rome protected his hiding-place by each claiming to be 
Spartacus himself, I am the Vietcong. We are everywhere! We are all the 
Vietcong !" 


Is Mr. Mungo wrong in that statement ? 

Mr. Dellinger. That still is incomplete, but it is a much more ac- 
curate presentation than the earlier one, because it gives some of the 
context. I think President Johnson did have a nightmare when he 
thought about rumiing for the Presidency agam, against the opposi- 
tion of the antiwar movement. 

For myself, although I did not make that statement, just as I ap- 
preciate the people in England at the time of George III who stood 
for the independence of the American Colonies and tried to pressure 
England to withdraw its colonial aspirations from the Colonies, and 
there is a certain solidarity between them and the forces of George 
Washington in the same way there is an obvious solidarity amongst 
some of the people opposed to the war and the people who were fighting 
for their independence. 

It was in that direction that I believe the incident was moving, 
although Mr. Hayden is perfectly capable of speaking for himself. 

Mr. Watson. That is right. 

So that the record might be clear, I may have attributed that quota- 
tion to Mun^o. Mungo was the author or the writer, and he was sup- 
posedly quoting Mr. Hayden. 

Mr. Dellinger. Right. 

Mr. Watson. You agree in substance that that was correct ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Again, it is a summary of a long and complex state- 
ment of Mr. Hayden's. It tells more of the truth than the earlier arti- 
cle. If you are really interested in what Mr. Hayden's views are on 
that, I guess you would have to a^sk him. 

Mr. Watson. You brought up the matter of the Presidency. Obvi- 
ously, President Johnson did have a nightmare. 

Of course, I am a Republican. I am not privy to the motivations of 
the Democrats, but did we have a peace candidate in this past elec- 
tion who espoused the general line of your position ? Did we not have 

Mr. Dellinger. The important thing 

Mr. Watson. That is a simple question. Did we have one or not? 

Mr. Dellinger. I did not vote in the past election. 

Mr. Watson. I am not asking you whether you voted, how you voted, 
or anything else. 

Mr. Dellinger. I did not support the candidacy 

Mr. Watson. Did we not have a peace candidate ? 

Mr. Dellinger. There were a number of people who ran on their 
own interpretation of a peace candidacy. 

Mr. Watson. They certainly espoused your philosophy and your 
position completely, did they not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I am not able to answer that question intelligently. 

Mr. Watson. You know Eldridge Cleaver, don't you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. There were a number of people running, including 
Eldridge Cleaver and Dick Gregory, at least, who came closer to 
my views in relation to the war in Vietnam than other candidates. 
But I never conferred with any of them about their platform; I never 
studied their platforms at length. I would be unable to say in what 
areas I disagreed or agreed with their platform, because I was not 
interested in their candidacy. 

Mr. Watson. Their platform and their position, as you say, were 
certainly far closer to your position than any other candidate. 


Mr. Dellinger. Than that of George Wallace, Richard Nixon, or 
Hubert Humphrey. 

Mr. Watson. Fine. 

In one of the flyers that your National Mobilization Committee 
circulated in Chicago, it is headed up, "Let the People Speak," at 
the bottom, again, "Let the People Be Heard." 

It starts out in bold letters, The majority of the American people 
want the United States to stop the bombing and get out of 
Vietnam. * * *" 

That is your contention. 

How did those who espoused your philosophy fare in the last 
-election ? 

You contended there that the majority of the American people 
•espoused your position. How did your candidates fare in the last 
election ? 

Mr. Dellinger. First of all, I explained that I had no candidate 
and the Mobilization had no candidate. 

Mr. Watson. The ones who came closest to espousing your position, 
how did they fare ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, you see, if we are running a foot race 
and you are holding a chess contest, and you ask me how did your 
candidates make out in the chess contest, I have no way of answering. 

Mr. Watson. This is a political contest. 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; and in my conception of politics, we are trying 
to organize the American people and encourage them to take grass- 
roots, democratic action to develop popular forces of resistance and 
popular forces which will incorporate the kind of ideas and attitudes 
that we favor in counterinstitutions today. 

It is a whole program, but relying on the people, rather than relying 
on the present kind of fraudulent elections, in which the candidacies 
are rigged, the conventions are rigged, and in which it is necessary to 
be a millionaire or to have access to millions of dollars in order to get 
the organization and the coverage on TV in order to run. I consider 
the last election to have been a denial of democracy. The American 
people were given no opportunity to vote on the issues or to have — 
well, I will leave it at that, to vote on the issues. 

Mr. Watson. Since you contend this was a fraudulent election, 
what, under your standards, would be a so-called democratic election ? 

Mr. Dellinger. The first thing that I think would have to happen 
is that we have to have 

Mr. Watson. Get rid of people like me ? 

Mr. Dellinger. No; I made very clear that I would be happy if 
there was some kind of honorable and useful work which you could 
perform. I would be happy for you. 

Mr. Watson. At least you give us credit for making one honorable 
attempt by giving you an opportunity to articulate your position be- 
fore this committee. Have you ever thought about that? But go ahead. 

Mr. Dellinger. I think, as I indicated earlier, that political democ- 
racy really cannot function effectively and properly in a society which 
does not have economic democracy, a society in which the public air- 
waves, for instance, are owned by millionaire corporations and are sold 
at exorbitant prices — the use of the airwaves sold at exorbitant prices 


which are beyond the capacity of ordinary poor people, black people, 
and other minority groups. That is only one instance. 

I don't remember exactly, but I remember, I think, the acknowledged 
election expenses of Mr. Nixon or Mr. Humphrey was $12 million. 

It is clear that some method has to be found whereby the people- 
have a chance to vote without the outcome being determined by, in the 
first place, political conventions similar to the Democratic Convention, 
which went against the votes of the primaries, secondly, without its 
requiring millions of dollars in order to make an effective campaign. 

Mr. Watson. Being one of very limited means, I can agree with you 
that the costs of an election are, well, astronomical, to say the least. 

One final thing. It has caused me some concern. You are a 50-year- 
old man. You have spoken here at length, and I have tried not to 
interrupt too much. You have stated, or at least inferred, that you 
would like to have both sides of the question presented so that the 
people can make the decision for themselves. 

You must agree that primarily you are dealing in your movement 
with young people, are you not, the bulk of them, the overwhelming 
majority of them are young people, even teenagers? 

Mr. Dellinger. I think if you take any age group that there is 
obviously a higher percentage of teenagers than of any other age 
group. I think it would be fair to say teenage and 20's. I would not 
be sure. 

Mr. Watson. Most of them are young ? 

Mr. Delunger. Who are actively opposed to the war m Vietnam. 
I obviously have a number of associations with people who are in 
their 20's or 30's or in their teens. 

Mr. Watson. Well, before the Vietnam war, I am sure you have not 
confined your activity only to the Vietnam war. You have been critical 
of the American institutions all along? 

Mr. Dellinger. I have been critical of capitalism, imperialism. I 
have been critical of the invasion of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala. 

Mr. Watson. And if the Japanese war were to begin today, you 
would still be critical of the U.S., its religious institutions, and all its 
institutions, basically, would you not ? 

Mr. Dellinger. I don't want to leave a misimpression on the earlier 
question. It probably is fair to say that at least half, or the majority, 
of my own time and work is with people closer to my own age, 
although I work with individuals a good deal younger. 

If the United States withdraws from Vietnam and the war ends, 
I hope, myself, to continue fighting against American imperialism. 
I would like to see Puerto Rico a free and independent country, rather 
than to have to suffer culturally and cultural genocide. I would like to 
see the Green Berets withdrawn from Bolivia, Guatemala, and the 
other Latin American countries. I would like to see the American air 
bases withdrawn from Okinav/a and Okinawa able to have some kind 
of peaceful and democratic society. I would like to see the vast power 
of the American corporations over the American people eliminated so 
that we could have a real democracy here. I would like to see the black 
people win their liberation and full equality. 

Mr. Watson. It is fair to say that your program against America 
will continue? 


Mr. Dellinger. My program for America will continue, and for 
the American people. 

Mr. Watson. Did it ever occur to you, as a 50-year-old man, that 
to the young people whom you rally to these various causes you might 
suggest there might be some virtue in going out and working hard in 
order to improve their lot in life? Have you ever urged that upon 

Have you ever pointed out to them that there might be some value in 
attending school and completing their education in order that their lot 
might be improved in life and help them improve the lives of others? 
Have you ever encouraged that line? 

Mr. Deelinger. I believe in hard work and self-discipline, a lot of 
the old-fashioned virtues. However, I do not belie A^e in people improv- 
ing their lot at the expense of other people. I am opposed to the kind 
of atomized and individualistic method of trying to move to the top. 

^Ir. Watson". In other words, everyone must be absolutely economi- 
calh^ equal ? That is your philosophy ? 

Mr. Dellinger. As a matter of fact, I probably believe more in 
economic equality than a Communist country like the Soviet Union 
does, where they have greater gaps in income, more difference between 
rich and poor, than I think is healthiest and best. However, I do not 
believe in a monolithic, sterile society in which everybody is the same. 

Mr. AVatson. If they are in your status, how could it be otherwise 
than sterile ? 

Mr. Dellinger. In the richest country in the world, we have an 
infant mortality rate which, if I remember correctly, is ITtli in tlie 
world. In other words, there are 16 countries poorer than us that have 
a better infant mortality rate than we do. 

I do not consider that it would be imposing on the individuality or 
the full creative development of a father and a mother or a child if we 
achieved the kind of availability of medical resources and of diet and 
of healthy conditions, freedom from rats, freedom from slums, freedom 
from other privations, which would eliminate that kind of infant 

I think one might extend this into many other areas, I think for 
everybody, for example, to be able to have the advantages of a higher 
education, but not a higher education which is a training for the Ameri- 
can corporate empire, but a higher education which is a training to be 
useful and to be equal. For everybody to have that would not impose 
on their individuality, not impose a dull conformity. 

Mr. Watson. In other words, we would have individualism of total 
economic equality. Is that your interpretation of true freedom? 

Mr. Bellinger. Again, I would rather let my words stand for my 

Mr. Watson. One final thing. Earlier, you stated you have encour- 
aged yomig people to go out and work hard, to stay in school 

Mv. Bellinger. No. I did not say that. 

Mr. Watson. Oh, you have not urged them to do that ? 

Mr. Bellinger. I didn't say that, either. I said that I do believe in 
hard work. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you very much. 

Mr. IcHORD. One more question, before the meeting is adjourned. 


The Chair has been handed a copy of the National Guardian of 
September 9, 1967. On page 5 there is an article by Mary Hamilton, 
entitled "SNCC leader asks for guns." 

I will hand the article to you, but as a preface for my question, I will 
read to you the opening paragraph : 

Rap brown's message to white radicals : "Buy us some guns or do what John 
Brown did — pick up your gun and go out and shoot our enemy." To blacks he 
•said : "Brother, you better get your guns." 

At the bottom of the same column this is written : 

Dave Bellinger, a leader of the Mobilization Committee and a pacifist, told his 
audience that "as a white person I do not believe it is up to me to tell black people 
what method to use." 

Did you attend that meeting on August 29 in New York's Village 

Mr. Bellinger. Yes ; I was chairman and one of the speakers at that 
meeting at which Rap Brown also spoke. 

Mr. IcHORD. Didn't you feel constrained to advocate your position 
of nonviolence which you have taken in the anti-Vietnam war move- 
ment in regard to this problem ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; part of what I said that night, which may or 
may not be reported in that article, did include an advocacy of non- 
violence. But a statement similar to one I made many times here, 
about a certain reluctance on my part, who not having had to suffer 
what the North Vietnamese or the black people or the Puerto Ricans 
suffered, to be self-righteous about the method they use. That does 
not mean that I do not enter into dialogue with Rap Brown or others. 
I happen to have a great deal of respect for Rap Brown, who I think 
has been presented very inaccurately in the American press. 

Mr. IcHORD. You don't believe that the problems of the Negro in 
the ghettos will be solved hj taking up guns, do you ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, I am perfectly willing to discuss that with 
you at some other time, or with Rap Brown or others, but I myself 
have not picked up a gun. I am not about to stand in judgment of black 
IDeople who are assaulted and attacked and who feel that carrying a 
gun sometimes will save their lives or save the lives of their children. 

Mr. IcHORD. There being no other questions, the Chair 

Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I may make one more statement. 

^I'ou said you visited the coffeehouse in Columbia, South Carolina? 

Mr. Dellinger. Yes : I did. 

Mr. Watson. That is my home. You went in and out without any 
difficulty at all, and no one tried to give you any trouble. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Dellinger. Well, perhaps I should say that I arrived after 
dark one evening and left while it was still dark and that, while I was 
there, I conferred with some people who had just gotten out of jail, 
had been picked up illegally, and there were a number of different 
incidents. Some were framed on marijuana charges, although they 
did not smoke or possess marijuana. Others were picked up on 
technical violations of going through red lights. 

Mr. Watson. Of course, you only talked with them. You did not 
talk with the other side ? 

Mr. Dellinger. It is fair for you to bring that out. 


I talked with people who told me that, and had given the history 
of some of the persecution of radicals, black people, hippies, antiwar 
people, in your State. 

I don't consider it impossible that this may have happened, but I 
certainly am not in a position to render a judgment on it, or state 
dogmatically that it did. 

Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you drop the gavel, if I may, 
assuming that we are finished with Mr. Dellinger, Mr. Rubin has been 
directed to appear tomorrow morning at 10 in executive session. As 
you know — I think you have a copy — he handed out a release here, 
and I will hand a copy in and ask that it be marked in the record, if I 
may, on his behalf, because it sets forth his position. 

Mr. IcHORD. Do you represent Mr. Rubin ? 

Mr. GuTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. IcHORD. I thought Mr. Kunstler was representing him. 

Mr. GuTMAisr. I am associated with Mr. Kunstler. 

Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take this under advisement. 

The Chair will declare the meeting in adjournment until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning, at which time the subcommittee will meet in 
executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the sub- 
committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 10 a.m., Friday^ 
December 6, 1968.) 



A Page 

Abbott, Robert 2792 

Allen, Robert L., Jr 2909 


Bailey, John 2730, 2749 

Ballan, Sam. (See Marcy, Sam.) 

Binb 2754, 2805 

Boyd, Malcolm 2809 

Brightman, Carol D 2809 

Brophy, Jolin 2692 

Brown, John Pairman 2809 

Brown, H. Rap 2819 

Burchett, Wilfred 2791, 2792, 2794, 2800 


Clark, Bronson Pettibone 280& 

Cleaver, Eldridge 2720. 2724. 2815 

Coffin (William Sloane, Jr.) 2750 

Conlisk, James B., Jr 2762 

Cook, Robert Merten 2809 

Cooks, Stoney 2809 


Daley, Richard J 2730. 

2736, 2738, 2740, 2743, 2749, 2751, 2759, 2760, 2763, 2765. 2770 

Daniel (Larissa) 2714 

Davis, Rennard Cordon (Rennie) 2689,2701,2706,2767,2768,2809,2810 

Dellinger, David 2689. 

2690-2745 (testimony), 2746-2820 (testimony), 2772, 2805 

Dellinger, Elizabeth P 2809 

Dreyer, Thome Webb 2809^ 

Dulles (John Foster) 2729 

Duncan, Donald 2722 


Egleson, Nick 2799," 2800, 280& 

Eisenhower (Dwight D.) 2775 


Finch, Roy 2693 

Flacks, Richard 2809 

Flanagan, John Ross 2809 

Fruchter, Norman David 2809 


Gandhi (Mahatma) 2772, 2776. 2785 

Gardner, Tom 2809 

Glassman, Carol 2809 

Goodman (Mitchell) 2750 

Greenblatt, Bob (Robert) 2690, 2755, 2784, 2785, 2790, 2791 

^ Incorrectly spelled "Egleston" In this reference. 




Gregory, Dick 2815 

Gutman, Jeremiah S 2690, 2691, 

2710, 2718 2719, 2728, 2740, 2746-2748, 2750, 2751, 2754, 2767, 2770, 
2771, 2778, 2783, 2797, 2798, 2802, 2809, 2812, 2813, 2820 


Ha Van Lau 2790 

Halliewell, Steven E 2809 

Hamilton, Mary 2819 

Harriman, Averell 2703, 2724, 2783, 2784,2790, 2791 

Harden. Thomas 2701, 2706, 2723, 2736, 2767, 12799, 2800, 2807, 2809, 2814, 2815 

Healy (Joseph J.) 2754,2755,2769 

Hitler. Adolf 2776. 2808 

Humphrey. Hubert (Horatio) 2730, 2749, 2752, 2816, 2817 

Hutton, Bobby 2720, 2740 


Jencks, Christopher 2809 

Johnson, Lyndon (Baines) 2718. 

2719, 2730, 2749, 2774, 2801, 2814, 2815 

Johnson, Walter Russell 2809 

Jordan (Charles H.) 2799 


Kahin (George M.) 2800 

Kahn, Herman 2719 

Kennedy. Ted (Edward M.) 2752-2354 

Kennedy (John Fitzgerald) 2721-2723,2725,2726 

Kennedy (Robert F.) 2801 

Kine. Carole Yvonne 2809 

Kopkind, Andrew David 2809 

Kramer, Robert (Bob) 2809 

Kunstler (William M.) 2820 

Ky. {See Nguyen Cao Ky.) 


Lewis (John W.) 2800 

Liljenstople, Otto 2755 

Lowell, Robert 2782 

Lynd, Staughton 2712, 2800 


MacArthur (Douglas) 2775 

Macdonald. Dwight 2782 

Malcolm X 2720-2724, 2726, 2811 

^IcCarthy (Eugene) 2752-2754 

McCarthy (Joseph) 2718,2729 

McCarthv, Mary 2808 

McEldowney, Carol Cohen 2809 

Meany (George) 2801 

Morrison, Norman 2712 

Morse, Leon 2809 

Mungo. Raymond A. (Ray) 2809,2814,2815 

Muste, A. J 2693, 2695, 2712, 2808 


Newton, Huey (P.) 2720 

(Nguyen Cao) Ky 2806 

Nixon (Richard M.) 2732,2801,2816,2817 

Norberg, Douglas Craig 2809 

Norden, Erie 2724, 2726 

INDEX iii 



Oswald, Lee Harvey 2811, 2812 


Park (Chung Hee) 2730 

Percv (Charles H.) 2801 

Phan Van Chuoung 2783, 2790 


Raskin (Marcus) 2750 

Reagan (Ronald) 2801 

Reuther (Walter P.) 2801 

Rockefeller (Nelson) 2801 

Romnev ( George) 2801 

Rosenberg (Ethel) 2811 

Rosenberg (Julius) 2811 

Rothstein, Vivian Emma 2809 

Rubin ( Jerry ) 2690, 2691, 2820 

Rustin, Bayard 2693 


Schwarzschild, Steven Samuel 2798, 2799, 2802-2805, 2809, 2813, 2814 

Siqueiros, David 2781, 2782 

Smith, Adam 2732 

Spook (Benjamin) 2750 

Stalin, Josef 2722, 2727, 2739 

Stem, Sol 2809 

Stone. I. F 2829 

Sweeney, Dennis 2809 

Syngman Rhee 2730 


Tillman. John P., Jr 2809 

Tran Van Anh 2783, 2790 

Trotsky, Leon 2723, 2782 


Vance, Cyrus 2724, 2790 

Vigier, Jean-Pierre 2781 


Walker. Charles . 2693 

Walker (Daniel) 2734, 2740, 2751, 2818 

W^allace, George (C.) 2816 

Warren (Earl) 2722 

Waskow, Arthur 2770, 2771, 2776, 2783 

Webster, Barbara 2809 

Weinberger, Eric 2705, 2706, 2808, 2809 

Werner, Henry William 2809 

Wilson, John Augusta 2809 

Wright, Willie T 2809 

Xuan Thuy 2784, 2790 


Young, Ron 2809 

Young (Stephen M.) 2721,2722 



AFSC. (See Religious Society of Friends, American Friends Service 
Committee. ) 

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). (See entry under Re- 
ligious Society of Friends. ) Pag» 

Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine (Shriners) __ 2736, 273.S 


Black Muslims. (See Nation of Islam. ) 

Black Panthers. (See Black Panther Party.) 

Black Panther Party (knovpn variously as Black Panthers, Black Panther 
Political Party, Black Panther Political Party for Self Defense, and 
Black Panther Party for Self -Defense (BPSD) ) 27.36 


Chicago Peace Council 27.5.5 

Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 2723,2724- 

Congress for Cultural Freedom 2782 

Czechoslovak Peace Committee 2799, 2805 


Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 2805 

Fifth Avenue Parade Committee. {See Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace 

Parade Committee.) 
Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee 2698,2706 

Havana Cultural Congress. (See International Cultural Congress, Jan- 
uary 1968, Havana, Cuba.) 


International Cultural Congress, January 1968, Havana, Cuba__ 2777, 2778, 2780 


Liberation News Service 2S14 

Libertarian Press 2693, 2694, 2701, 2714 


Monthly Review Press 2729 


NATO. (See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.) 

NLF. (See National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.) 

Nation of Islam (NOI) (also known as Black Muslims) 2724,2725 

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (also 
referred to as the Walker Commission or the President's Commission on 

the Causes and Prevention of Violence) 2734.2810,2813 

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (also known as the 

National Liberation Front (NLF)) 2711. 

2712, 2773, 2784, 2786, 2799, 2805. 2806 

Central Committee 2806 

National Liberation Front (NLF). (-See National Front for the Liberation 

of South Vietnam.) 
National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (NMC) 
(formerly known as Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in 
Vietnam) (see also November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in 

Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic Justice) 2694- 

2709, 2718, 2723, 27.33, 2736. 2744. 2747, 2752. 2754, 2755, 2757, 
2759, 2762, 2789, 2796, 2810, 2812, 2814, 2816, 2819 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2753 

November 8 Mobilization Committee. (See November 8 Mobilization Com- 
mittee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic 


November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human 
Rights, and for Economic Justice (predecessor to Spring Mobilization 
Committee To End the War in Vietnam) (see also National Mobiliza- Page 
tioB Committee To End the War in Vietnam) 2696 

President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. {See 
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. ) 


Radio Havana ., 2733, 2735, 2739, 2746 

Religious Society of Friends : 

American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 2805 

Revolutionary Contingent (RC) 2772.2775 

: SNCC. ( See Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. ) 
Shriners. (See Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine.) 

Slovak Peace Committee 2799, 2805 

Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (formerly 
known as November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for 
Human Rights, and for Economic Justice) {see also National Mobiliza- 

zation Committee To End the War in Vietnam) 2696,2697 

rStudent Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 2819 

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 2799 


vUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of 2714, 2818 

United States Government: 

Central intelligence Agency (CIA) 2714 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2810 

;University Christian Association (also known as Dwight Hall) 2692 


Walker Commission. (See National Commission on the Causes and Pre- 
vention of Violence.) 

War Crimes Tribunal 2715, 2781 

War Resisters League 2698 

YIP. (See Youth International Party.) (also known as Yippies) 

Yippies. (/See Youth International Party) (YIP) 

Youth International Party (YIP) (also known as Yippies) 2709 


Zengakuren - — . 2775 


•Dissent (magazine) 2799, 2804, 2813, 2814 

iEl Mundo (newspaper) 2777-2779 

.Guardian 2796 

Liberation 2693-2715, 2724, 2733, 2770, 2795, 2799 

Other Side, The (book) (Thomas Hayden and Staughten Lynd) 2800 




Ramparts (magazine) 2S14 

Realist, The (magazine) 2724,2720 


United States in Vietnam, The (book) (George M. Kahin and John 
W. Lewis) 2S00 


Vietnam Courier 2796 

Vietnam North (book) (Wilfred Burchett) 2800 

Vietnamese Studies 2800 

Viet-Report 2800 


Walker Commission Report (Report to the National Commission on the 

Causes and Prevention of Violence.) ^40, 2755 




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