SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968
DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION
PARTS
HAr.V,i^O COLLEGE LIBnAiri
DtPOSirtU b/ THE
UNITED STATES GOV-p"-c|vt
AUG J 1969
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETIETH CONGEESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 4 AND 5, 1968
(INCLUDING INDEX)
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
21-706 WASHINGTON : 1968
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 55 cents
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
United States House of Representatives
(90th Congress, 2d Session)
EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, Chairman
WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri DEL CLAWSON, California
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana
ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina
Francis J. McNamara, Director
Chester D. Smith, General Counsel
Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
United States House of Repbesentatives
(91st Congress, 1st Session)
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri, Chairman
CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
EDWIN W. EDWARDS, Louisiana RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana
RICHARDSON PREYER, North CaroUna ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio WILLIAM J. SCHERLE, Iowa
Donald G. Sanders, Chief Counsel
Glenn Davis, Editorial Director
Alfred M. Nittle, Counsel
CONTENTS
December 4, 1968 : Testimony of — Page
David Dellinger 2690
December 5, 1968 : Testimony of —
David Dellinger (resumed) 2746
Afternoon session :
David DeUinger (resumed) 2777
in
The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing
committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the
rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the
Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to deter-
mine the rules of its proceedings.
RULES ADOPTED BY THE 90TH CONGRESS
House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967, as amended April 3, 1968, by House
Resolution 1099
RESOLUTION
Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth
Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * *
*******
Rule X
STANDING COMMITTEES
1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,
*»•*♦*•
^(s) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.
*******
Rule XI
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES
i^ ***** *
19. Committee on Un-American Activities.
(a) Un-American activities.
(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, charac-
ter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any
necessary remedial legislation.
The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi-
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.
For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of
such witnesses and the production of such books, pai>ers, and documents, and to
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the
signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any mem-
ber designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person desig-
nated by any such chairman or member.
• ••»»*•
28. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary,
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of
the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee ; and, for that pur-
pose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the
agencies in the executive branch of the Government.
*******
IV
SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968
DE3I0CRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION
Part 3
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1968
United States House of Representatives,
Subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington^ D.C.
public hearings
The subcommittee of the Coimnittee on Un-American Activities met,
pursuant to recess, at 1 :40 p.m., in Room 311, Camion House Office
Building, Washington, D.C, Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of
Missouri, chairman ; Jolm M. Ashbrook, of Ohio ; and Albert W. Wat-
son, of South Carolina. )
Subcommittee members present : Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook,
and Watson.
Staff members present : Francis J. McNamara, director ; Frank Con-
ley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M.
Nittle, counsel ; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.
Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order, a quorum being
present.
At the last meeting of the connnittee yesterday, the committee was
recessed until 1 :30 p.m. today. We had just concluded hearing the
witness, Mr. Rennie Davis.
Mr. Counsel, a quorum being present, will you please call your next
witness ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, we would call David Dellinger.
Mr. Ichord. Mr. Dellinger, are you present?
Will you please come forward, sir ?
Will the witness first please be sworn.
Mr. Dellinger. I am soriy. I try to tell the truth on all occasions, so
I don't swear.
jNIr. Ichord. Well, of course, it is the practice of the committee that
all witnesses appearing before an investigative committee such as this,
Mr. Dellinger, would be sworii.
Will you raise your right hand, sir ? Do you solemnly
Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry. I will assure you
Mr. Ichord. Do you wish to affirm, sir ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I will affirm.
26S9
2690 DISRUPTION OF 19 6S DEMOCRATIC XATION-\L COXATXTIOX
Mr. IcHOKD. Do you solemnly affirm that the testunony you are
about to give before tliis committee "will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the tnith ?
Mr. Dellixger. I don't like formulas which imply that sometunes I
don't tell the truth.
'Siv. IcHC'RD. It is the understanding that the witness is affirming.
This is a practice before the committee.
Mr. DzLLixGER. Yes. without the ritual, I affirm.
Mr. IcHORD. The witness may be seated.
TESTIMONY OP DAVID DELLTNGEE. ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL,
JEEEMIAH S. GTJTMAN
Mr. GuT3iAX. First of all
]Mr, IcHORD. Just a minute, ^Ir. Counsel.
First of all, I would ask that the counsel identify himself for the
record.
;Mr. GrxMAX. Jeremiali. J-e-r-e-m-i-a-h S. G-u-t-m-a-n, 363 Sev-
enth Avenue, Xew York City.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Gutman. if you have something to say to the Chair,
would you please come forward I
ilr. GuTiiAX. Surely.
(Off the record.)
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair has just received a message from
!Mi\ Gutman relaying a request of ^Ir. Eubin to be permitted into the
hearing room. The Chair will announce that he has been informed
that Mr. Rubin is attired in a Santa Claus costimie. It is not the pur-
pose of the Chair to direct that Mr. Eubin attire himself in a certain
manner or take other actions in regard to his body, but it is a respon-
sibility of the Chair to mauitain order in these hearings. The Chair
has exercised its prerogative of excluding, and I have so instructed the
police to exclude, ^Ir. Rubin from the hearing room because it is the
determination of the Chair that such a dress could only add to the
possibilities of disorder. And in view of the antics of ^Ir. Rubin during
the past hearing, the Chair has no alternative except to exclude him.
First of all, Mr. Counsel, before you begin the questioning of the
witness, the Chair has been advised, ^Ir. Dellinger, that you have
recently undergone an operation. The Chair has been advised by the
director of the conmiittee that your doctor has informed him that you
would be able to testify*. I know tliat the operation is a ver\' recent
event. Perhaps the witness will tire. I would like to ask the witness. Do
you feel that you are physically able to testify at this time ?
Mr. Dellixger. Tliank you very much, sir. Yes, I am anxious to tell
the information and talk about the incidents in Chicago, and I expect
to be — I feel a little weak, but I expect to be able to proceed without
problems.
Mr. Ichord. Let me say this to the witness : that if you do tire, will
you please so advise the Chair and we can declare a recess for you to
rest somewhat.
^Ir. Dellixger. Thank you verv much, sir.
Mr. IcHOPJ). Or if you feel that you are not able to go on, why,
please advise the Chair of that. I know the operation has been very
recent.
DISRUPTIOX OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC XATIOXAL CO>r^*ENTIOX 2691
;Mr. Dellen'oee. Thank you.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel.
Mr. GuTMAX. ^Ir. Chairman, if I mav. I want to revert to the-
Mr. IcHORD. ;Mr. Gutman, you know the role of an attorney before
the committee. I have repeatedly advised counsel of the rules pre-
vailing in this committe and, as far as that is concerned, that prevail
in every legislative domain, and that is that the role of the attorney
is to advise the client of his constitutional rights. I think it is readily
■apparent why different rules prevail here, rather than in a court pro-
ceeding, because the functions of the bodies are completely different.
Xo one is on trial here and no one is sought to be punished.
I also appreciate the zeal of an attorney, as an attorney myself, in
representing the interests of his clients, but the Chair has no other
ulternative except to enforce the rules and carry out the responsibility
of the Chair in the way that he interprets. Perhaps we can work this
out. I am not asking the attorney to testify, but I would insist on the
rules.
(Off the record.)
Mr. IcHOED. Mr. Gutman, the attorney for Mr. Dellinger, has just
approached the Chair and asked that the record show an objection on
behalf of Mr. Rubin of the exclusion of ^Lc. Eubin from the hearing
room and, also, that the record show a renewal of the motions and the
objections which were previously filed on l^ehalf of Mr, Dellinger
with regard to Ms appearance here. The record will so show both
requests. And, Mr. Gutman, before ruling on the request, I have al-
ready ruled on the request of Mr. Rubin in my annoimcement of the
exclusion, but before ruling on the motions again, the renewal of the
motions, Sir. Dellinger has not been indicted ?
Mr. GuTiiAX. Xo, sir, but we understand from an announcement
made by the Federal grand jury in Chicago that within 2 weeks in-
dictments are expected of a gi'oup of people who have been described
as '"the leaders of the demonstration.""
Since Mr. Dellinger regards himself and the country regards him
as one of the leaders of the demonstration on behalf of Mobilization in
Chicago during the affected time, we believe it reasonable to assume
that there is a substantial likelihood that he may be indicted.
Mr. IcHORD. Then let the record show the Chair overrules the re-
quest for the reasons stated in the rulings on the motions when they
were originally filed.
Proceed, ^Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger. would you please state your full name
and address for the i-ecord i
Mr. Dellixger. My name is David DeUinger. ^ly office address is
5 Beekman Street, Manhattan, Xew York City.
Mr. CoxLET. Sir, do you have a home address ?
Mr. Dellixger. I have a home, but since I have received a number
of death threats and attacks, including receiving grenades and bombs
in the mail, which only by what the Army demolition experts called
a miracle did not kill my entire family, I prefer not to give my home
address publicly.
Mr. CoxLET. 'Very well, Mr. Dellinger.
Mr. Dellixger. For their safety and security.
Mr. CoxLEY. Yes, sir, I appreciate that.
Is it fair to sav that vour home address is also Xew York City ?
2692 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. At the present-
Mr. CoNLET. Without going into the street address?
Mr. Dellinger. At the present time, yes.
Mr. CoNLET. All right, sir, thank you.
And now for the record, you are represented by counsel, are you
not?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Mr. Gutman.
Mr. Conley. Now Mr. Dellinger, are you appearing here today in
response to a subpena served on you by United States [Deputy]
Marshal John Brophy on September 23, 1968, at 68 Charles Street,
New York City, which was mad© a continuing subpena from October
until this time ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I don't remember the name of the gentleman
who either signed it or gave it to me, whichever it was, but I did
receive a subpena and I considered not coming because I think that
one does not have to obey illegal and immoral orders. However, since
I am anxious to tell everything that I know involving myself, the
plans, the actions, and so forth, at Chicago, and since I consider the
conmiittee largely ineffective, I am perfectly happy to be here and to
discuss with you everything that I can about myself. So it is without
necessarily recognizing the validity of the subpena, the procedures
under which it was issued, I come in response and of my own volition.
Mr. IcHORD. At that point, Mr. Dellinger, I think you have ade-
quately expressed your contempt for the committee, and we will let
the record show that, and in order to expedite things
Mr. Dellinger. T don't know what your word "contempf-
Mr. IcHORD. — if you want to express contempt against anybody
else, go ahead.
Mr. Dellinger. I don't know where the word "contempt" is: I
certainly did not use it. I consider it undemocratic for a man to rep-
resent a congressional district in which 60 percent of the residents are
black, and by the last figures I saw only 6 percent of the black people
vote. That is the type of thing that I mean.
Mr. IcHORD. Of course, Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to argue with
you, but you said the immoral acts, referring to the subpena, and that
was an act of this committee, but if the record will show that, perhaps
we can get down to the meat of the matter and proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir.
Mr. Dellinger, in order to get some identification, where were you
born, sir, and when ?
Mr. Dellinger. I was born in Wakefield, Massachusetts, on Au-
gust 22, 1915.
Mr. Conley. And would you be kind enough to give us your edu-
cational background, formal education?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, roughly, I graduated from high school; I
graduated from Yale University in 1936: I studied for a year at
New College, Oxford, on a Henry Fellowship.
I returned to Yale where, while working for the University Chris-
tian Association, known as Dwight Hall, I took some courses at Yale
Divinity School.
I then went to Union Theological Seminary in New York City
for a year and had begun my second year when I declined my exemp-
tion from the draft and publicly refused to register and, therefore.
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2693
left the seminary to go to prison — where I got the best and most
thorough education of all, although I think that the combination was —
I am glad I had all the elements.
Mr. CoNLBY. When you mentioned prison, was this during the
Second World War, sir?
!Mr. Dellinger. It was before the Second World War. It was in
1940, when the first peacetime draft law was passed, and since I am a
pacifist, but since I did not want to hide behind a clerical exemption,
1 publicly refused to register.
Mr. C0NI.ET. Mr. Bellinger, what have been your major employ-
ments since 1953?
Mr. Bellinger. '53 — beginning before 1953, I worked and lived at
what is sometimes called an intentional community, somewhat in the
Utopian community tradition, where we had an
Mr. CoNLET. Well, Mr. Bellinger, can we get the date so we can
fix this? You say before '53?
Mr. Bellinger. I will have to warn you that particularly on things
that I don't have documents my memory may be faulty.
Mr. Ichord. The Chair would advise the witness we don't expect
you to recall all these dates.
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, but approximately 1946.
Mr. CoNLET. All right, sir.
]VIr. Bellinger. I would say I helped organize and was a part of
a producer's cooperative called the Libertarian Press, which both
wrote and edited and printed art work, political material, cultural
and intellectual. We did not write everything that we printed; we
were commercial printers, but we also participated in editing and
writing.
Mr. CoNLEY. Was this business based out of New York City, sir?
Mr, Bellinger. Not entirely, by any means. We did a certain amount
of local — no, it was located in New Jersey, in Glen Gardner, New
Jersey. And we did printing for people all over the country, in many
cases books and other publications, pamphlets.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir. And what particular title did you hold
with this venture at that time?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, in most circumstances, if I remember cor-
rectly, we listed myself and others as partners.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, have you worked for
Mr. Bellinger. There may have been occasions when I could have
been listed as director or something of that kind, but basically we
operated on an equal basis.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir.
Now coming forward from that venture, what was the next employ-
ment or business that you engaged in?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, in the winter of 1956 I was one of four or
five people, including A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Roy Finch,
and I think for a short jjeriod Charles Walker, who founded a maga-
zine called Liberation, and in the early years we printed the magazine
and did a great deal of the editing at the producer's cooperative.
Later I began to work for pay, you might say, as an editor, first for
2 days a week, and then perhaps about 2 or 3 years ago I became a
full-time editor.
2694 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, now the Liberation magazine to which you
are making reference now is still in existence, still publishes?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it is in its 12th year, I believe.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir, and has this been the source of your
employment since approximately 1956?
Mr. Delltnger. No.
Mr. CoNLEY. The publishing of this magazine?
Mr. Dellinger. No. It — I didn't draw any mcome from it until a
period approximately — this is why I am just not very good, but I
would say about 3 years ago.
Mr. Conley. Now my question wasn't, Was this your source of
income.
Mr. Dellinger. I beg your pardon.
Mr. CoNLEY, I wasn't asking about any income. I was asking you,.
Is this basically the employment that you have held since 1956 ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I really — my employment was directly with
the Libertarian Press.
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes.
Mr. Dellinger. And I was a voluntary editor for Liberation until
this more recent period.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now, Mr. Dellinger
Mr. Ichord. Now just a minute, Mr. Counsel, the witness wishes to>
confer with his counsel. Give him a chance to do so.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. If I may answer my counsel's question, I am not
employed by the National Mobilization Committee. I am an officer.
I am a chairman of the National Mobilization Committee.
Mr. CoNLEY. Sir, I don't believe I asked you that.
Mr. Dellinger. I don't know if it is all right for me to answer my
counsel, but just to be completely clear on where my employment is.
Mr. IcHORD. Feel completely free to confer with your counsel.
Mr. Dellinger. Thank you.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, now directing your attention to the
National Mobilization Committee and particularly to the events pre-
ceding and occurring in Chicago, you were in Chicago, were you not,
during the period of the Democratic Party Convention of August 26
to 29?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I was there prior to that, also.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Now were you not there in your capacity
as chairman of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War
in Vietnam, which was one of the prime organizers of the demon-
strations which took place in Chicago?
Mr. Dellinger. You say in my capacity as chairman ? Is that right ?
Mr. CoNi>F.Y. AVore you not there in your capacity as chairman of
the National Mobilization Committee?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, in part, but you see, my approach to jour-
nalism from way back when we started Libertarian Press has been
what is sometimes called an engaged jdurnalism. That is, to write on
many occasions about a movement or events in which the editors and
the other writers, but including myself, are actively involved. So when
I am active in the Mobilization, I am also active as an editor of
Liberation, which is the place where I draw my income.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well then, sir, would it be a fairer statement for me to
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2695
then say that you were in Chicago as chairman of National Mobiliza-
tion as an editor of Liberatio7i magazine?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it would.
Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, I think at that point that some of the peo-
ple in the back of the room are having difficulty hearing you.
Mr. Bellinger, would you pull the mike a little closer?
Mr. Bellinger. Sorry.
Mr. CoNLEY. You almost have to lean into it, sir.
Mr. Bellinger. Sorry. Well, leaning forward is what I am not
good at right now.
Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Bellinger, how long have you been chair-
man of the National Mobilization Committee, which I also understand
is referred to as Mob and possibly as Mo ?
Mr. Bellinger. I didn't hear the two distinctions.
Mr. CoNLEY. JNIob, M-o-b.
IVIr. Bellinger. Well
Mr. Conley. I have heard it abbreviated that way.
Mr. Bellinger. Some of the commercial press, I think, has called
it that. Sometimes it is called, for short, Mobe, but I would think that
would be spelled with an "e."
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. How long have you been chairman of Na-
tional Mobilization ?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, if I remember correctly, I was a cochairman,
no, not from its founding because I was not present when it was
founded. I was — for a healthy man, I have to say I was ill at the first
conference, at which I think it was founded, and then I was out of the
country during the first couple of months of its existence. But I would
say that either in Becember of '66 or early in the year of 1967 I be-
came a cochairman. Later, and this I would only be able to approxi-
mate, but perhaps July — in July of '67, sometune 1 to 3 — I will try
to be cautious — 1 to 4 months prior to the Pentagon demonstration,
I was elected chairman.
Mr. CoNLEY. Chairman by — you are sole chairman of the institu-
tion?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, we had a — I was made chairman, and there
were cochairmen. Our founding chairman, the Reverend A. J. Muste,
had died in February of 1968.
Mr. Ichord. Is chairman an elective position, Mr. Bellinger?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I was elected at a meeting of the administra-
tive committee. We are not a membership organization, but we have
an administrative committee which is roughly representative of the
various constituencies. And, to the best of my knowledge, all officers
and important staff posts have been elected or approved at a meeting
of the administrative committee.
IVIr. Conley. And I take it from your earlier answers just now that
you apparently were designated as chairman of the committee in the
summer of 1967 by the administrative committee ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Conley. Bo you recall who composed that committee, how large
it was at that time ?
Mr. Bellinger. Oh, the administrative committee consists of over
a hundred people, and the meetings vary greatly, but I would say we
rarely hold a meeting that is !under 50 or 60, and often the meetings —
■^696 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
we are very informal, and often the meetings grow to a hundred or —
well, 150 when something important is hapj)ening. And as I say, we
are very informal in the sense that people can come to meetings as
observers or something of that kind.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, how is your administrative committee
•selected? I use that word because I am not sure whether you nomi-
nate, elect, what you do. How do you select your administrative com-
mittee from which you make these various appointments?
;Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Well, the original administrative committee
was elected at a conference which was considered to be roughly repre-
sentative of the antiwar movement, many different types of attitudes.
^Ir. CoxLEY. I see.
Mr. Dellinger. And if I remember correctly, certain positions on
the administrative committee were filled at that time, and the com-
mittee or the officers were given the power to expand it in order to
bring in other constituencies who might not have been present.
Xow it has been revised on a number of occasions since then to try
to incorporate either new regional groups that have developed or new
organizations that have sprung (up, or to reflect the fact that perhaps
some organizations have become less active or possibly even ceased to
exist.
Mr. CoNLEY. I see. Now, prior to your election as chairman, I think
you have mentioned this, but did you not occupy a position with Na-
tinal Mobillization as either Adce chairman or cochairman?
I think you alluded to the fact that you were cochairman.
Mr. Dellinger. I said cochairman. but I do believe that at the very
beginning what are now called the cochairmen were called vice chair-
men. I think probably that was my original title. One of, you know,
a group of six or eight probably.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, now, Mr. Dellinger, is it a fair statement
to say that what is now known as National Mobilization Committee
came out of what was earlier known as the Spring Mobilization
Committee?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. As a matter of fact, when I spoke about the
earlier conferences and the setting up, the name was not strictly
-National Mobilization Committee.
In preparing for major action in New York and San Francisco on
April 15, 1967, it was called the Spring Mobilization Committee. It is
even possible that in preparing for actions in the previous December,
the period when I was out of the country, it may have even had a —
I'm sure it did have another name, other than Spring Mobilization,
because it was fall actions, but I can't remember, don't know what the
name was. But clearly there was an organic, but, as I say, somewhat
informal process which began approximately — began in the summer
of '66 and expanded through these actions, and the name changed
at various stages, but it was basically the same group, growing and
developing.
Mr. Conley. Well, carrying it back one step further, perhaps, sir,
was it not in fact known in '66 as the November 8 Mobilization
Committee ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, even when you refresh my memory, I literally
do not know. I was out of the country and I do not know.
Mr. Conley. All right.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2697
Mr. Dellinger, do you have any recollection as to how long you served
as vice chairman of what was known as the Spring Mobilization ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, if you put the two dates which I guessed at
earlier together, that would tell. Roughly from either December of '66
or January or February of '67, between then and whenever it was in the
late sprmg or summer of '67.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. A period of months, anyway.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Dellinger, if I may hand you a piece of literature — and I
must apologize to you for the reproduction of the copy — but if you
would examine that for me a moment, this purports to be a piece of
literature prepared by the National Mobilization Committee and, from
a reading of same, appears to have been distributed shortly before the
Chicago convention.
(Document handed to witness.)
Mr. Dellinger. The dates — is it blocked out? I don't know what
these black
Mr. CoNLEY. I think maybe at the conclusion of the letter, or in the
body of the letter itself, it indicates that it is a letter that Avas signed
by you and Mr. Greenblatt. And what I want to, if I may, particularly
direct your attention to is to the right margin of the letter, where the
officers and directors perhaps appear, in connection with the National
Mobilization Committee.
I want to ask you. if I may, sir, whether those people shown there
were in fact the officers at the time of that letter.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, it is entirely possible that there are some
inaccuracies, and I would have to — first, I haven't had time to read the
letter now; I will, if you wish, and there is no date. But sometimes
when we made minor changes in the officers, literature would go out on
the letterhead and not reflect, for example, the addition of a new
cochairman or the inactivity, perhaps, of somebody. I would have to —
I can read this and see the approximate date, if there is a point to it.
Mr. Conley. All right. Well, this is what I am getting to. If you will
also look at the letterhead, you will note that it gives a street address
for the National Mobilization Committee.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. 857 Broadway, New York City. There is also an
identical letter, and I think you can compare the two letters.
(Document handed to witness.)
Mr. CoNLEY. One is perhaps a somewhat better copy, and if you
would examine the signatures on the second page. Do they both appear
to be your signatures ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I can't tell whether they are my signature.
First of all, it is obviously scratched, and not very successfully, onto a
stencil and, secondly, I do often authorize my secretary or somebody
else by mail, if they read me something, to sign it. It is not my typical
writing, but I don't know whether it is because I was scratching on a
stencil, or not. If I am in fact, however, if I did authorize the letter,
I certainly wouldn't use this as a pretext for not taking the respon-
sibility for it.
Mr. CoNLEY. The only thing I am
2698 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. I still haven't had time to read it, so I won't say.
Mr. CoNLEY. I understand, sir. The only thing that I am raising
inquiry about, the letters do — I hope you will accept my word for it —
the two letters do read identically, the content of the two letters is
identical and the only exception that is noted is that one carries an
address 5 Beekman Place, and one carries an address 857 Broadway.
Would you be kind enough, if you did in fact maintain offices at
857 Broadway, to indicate when the change occurred?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, we have sometimes, we often have had more
than one office. Now again, I don't know if we are losing time by this,
but because there is no date apparently on either letter, I am a little
confused about whether at this time we did have two offices or not.
Obviously, I mean it is entirely possible, as I said. Sometimes letter-
heads were used which were not completely up to date, and it is not
;at all impossible that somebody would have made a mistake and put
out, you know, used the second address, at a time that we weren't
using it, but I am just trying — I apologize for being bad at this.
For all the times I have been there, there are two offices very close
together, one is of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee, of which
I am coordinator, and one was of the Mobilization Committee. They
are about half a block apart, and I think this was — this had to be
the Mobilization office.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir.
Mr. Dellinger. So it is quite likely that we had moved out of this
office at that time and tliat that was, you know, an administrative error,
to use that niunber, but hopefully replies were forwarded.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now let me ask you
Mr. Dellinger. It certainly wasn't an attempt to conceal our where-
abouts or locality.
Mr. CoNLEY. No, I imderstand. Now with reference to the letter
that carries No. 5 Beekman as the address on it, that is the last address
of National Mobilization in New York City ; is it not ?
Mr. Dellinger. It is the current address.
Mr. CoNLEY. That is what I mean. The last and present address
of National Mobilization.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, and perhaps if I could just clarify. I am not
sure it is of any importance, but, you see, I was chairman and my
office is in 5 Beekman Street. Also, we often held meetings there, and
it has kind of been a peace center, or center for peace organizations,
so it would not be amiss for us to use that address even at a time
when we might not have had our office equipment or personnel en-
tirely concentrated on the Mobilization, but in that address.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now is the No. 5 Beekman Place also •
Mr. Dellinger. Street.
Mr. CoNLEY. Street. I am sorry — also the address of Liberation
magazine?
ISIr. Dellinger. Yes, it is.
Mr. Conley. And do National Mobilization and Liberation actually
occupy the same office space ?
Mr. Dellinger. No. We have an arrangement, or have had until
recently — I think it is coming to an end — whereby the entire 10th
floor, with the exception, I believe, of one office, is leased. I mean there
is one lease, and then it is sublet to a number of organizations. The War
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2699
Resisters League, Liberation, and the National Mobilization are
amongst the people who have offices, so that actually Liberation^ the
specific rooms used by Liberation and used by the National Mobiliza-
tion Committee are contiguous, but they are separate.
Mr. CoNLEY. And under separate leases?
Mr. Dellengee. Although we share — no, I am saying it is one
lease and subleases.
Mr. CoNLEY. That is what I mean, which would be separate leases,
would they not ?
Mr. Dellinger. Not vis-a-vis the building owner, because Libera-
tion, if I could tell better from the office manager, but LAberation
collects the rent from Mobilization.
In other words, Liberation is responsible for at least half the floor
and collects the rent for the people that are there.
Mr. Conley. Well, let's get at it this way : Does Liberation actually
have the general lease with the building or the 10th floor, except one
office?
Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, the lease is actually
held by the War Eesisters League, not by Liberation, but I could
be wrong. It is one of the two, but I think the Vv'ay it is, that the lease
was signed by the War Resisters League; Liberation has taken the
responsibility for half of the floor, collects the rent and makes the
arrangements there, turns it over to the War Resisters League, who
then turns it over to the landlord. I think that is it, but I am not the
business manager and I am not positive.
Mr. Conley. Okay. Now I am sure there is a written lease between
either the War Resistance League and/or LJberation magazine and the
owner of the building.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes; as a matter of fact I remember that I think
I myself did sign some kind of a lease, so Liberation must be on there.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now do you know whether there are actually
in existence leases — subleases, I think we should call them — between
either War Resistance League and/or Liberation and these other
tenants ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry, you know, I have done my best to try
to tell you what I know, but there is a real danger that I will mislead
you because I am just — this isn't one of my points of concentration,
and I really don't know.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir. Now directing your attention back to
National Mobilization, if we may, do you receive a salary as chairman
of National Mobilization ?
]Mr. Dellinger. No, I do not.
Mr. CoNLEY. Have you in the past, at any time that you recall?
Mr. Dellinger. I have never received a salary from National Mo-
bilization Committee.
Mr. Conley. Or any type of compensation from National Mobili-
zation ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, it is my poor secretary — or associate's, reaUy
my partner in Liberation — it is her difficult task to try to figure out
from time to time which trips are, you know, were caused by Mobiliza-
tion work primarily or by Liberation, and to try, you know, if it is
clearly chargeable to Mobilization, to charge it to Mobilization, or if it
is clearly chargeable to Liberation, to charge it to Liberation, But
2700 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
basically, as I say, wherever I go, I am sort of both, and so it is very
difficult and, again, very informal.
Also, I raise money for both organizations and have often sug-
gested that people direct their money in one direction or the other,
according to which is the worst in debt at the moment.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well, sir, I take it from what you are saying that
actually the only thing then that you would receive from National
Mobilization might be your expenses ?
Mr. Dellinger. Expenses, right.
Mr. CoNLEY. You did not receive any type of compensation, profit to
you, in other words ?
Mr. Bellinger. I receive no salary.
Mr. IciiORD. Expenses on a reimbursable basis ?
Mr. Dellinger. I beg your pardon ?
Mr. IcHORD. Are the expenses paid to you on a reimbursable basis ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well
Mr. Iciiord. Do you have a fixed allowance for expenses, or is it a
reimbursable basis ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, no, if I — you know, if the Mobilization decides
to send me or we decide that I will go to some city to make a speech,
you know, fly in and out in one flight, and strictly for the Mobilization,
then the bill will be turned over to Mobilization, but it is not^ — it is
only, the limitation on it is our very poor finance. But there is no set
amount.
Mr. Conley, Mr. Dellinger, how many other persons are regularly
employed by the National Mobilization ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, remember that you — you say how many others
are regularly employed. I have made clear I am not employed.
Mr. Conley. I am sorry. How many other persons are employed ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, this is a very changing thing. And since I
have been out of conunission, in the hospital, beginning just about the
time of the elections, in which the Mobilization had an active organi-
zation, urging people not to vote for any of the prowar candidates, and
since I have not yet been back to the office, although I have done some
consulting on the phone, I literally do not know the size of the staff
now.
Mr. Conley. Well, let me ask you this, sir, if I may : Let's go back
and say, take January of this last year, the beginning of the year.
Mr. Dellinger. January ?
Mr. Conley. January 1968. Approximately how many employees
did you have at that time ?
Mr. Dellinger. Oh, very few because we were in a very transitional
period between the events at the Pentagon, when we had had a swollen
staff and uncertainty and planning, and so forth, as to what actions,
if any, we would have next.
You also should understand that we try to operate on a subsistence
basis and that we may — for example, I mean one figure that does come
to mind, which I think is relatively accurate, is that in September, or
possibly early October, we had a staff of about — what we called a
staff — of about 20 people.
Mr. Conley. You are referring to September or October ?
Mr. Dellinger. Of this year.
Mr. Conley. Of this year.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2701
Mr. Dellingee. And yet our total outlay for what might laugh-
ingly be called salaries or wages, well, we didn't pay it. We paid sub-
sistence, which meant that some people took $10 a week for which,
you know, maybe to eat sandwiches or what-have-you, or other
people — I think that the highest that was paid, well, 50 or perhaps
60 dollars, $60 to a woman who had a dependent or two.
Mr. CoNLET. Well, Mr. Dellinger
Mr. Dellingek. In other words, we pay according to need. We are
not a salaried organization.
Mr. Conley. All right. Then 20 possible people that were working
for you in September of this year, were they all based out of a New
York office, or were part of these numbers that you are mentioning in
the Chicago 407 Dearborn Street ^
Mr. Dellingee. No, the lease on the Chicago office expired almost
simultaneously with the end of the convention, and it was unfortunate
because it would have been better for us to have maintained an office
for at least a few weeks afterward, but we had no office in Chicago,
other than perhaps in a mail drop, and of course we had an active
office and committee members there, but no real Mobilization office in
Chicago in September.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right.
Now, Mr, Dellinger, with reference to the Chicago office and to the
convention, did Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis act as coproject di-
rectors for the National Mobilization Committee in connection with
the activities in Chicago ?
Mr. Dellingee, During the period prior to the convention
Mr, CoNLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dellingee. — they were coproject directors.
Might I just make a little statement at this point, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. IcHOED. To explain ?
Mr. Dellingee. It is just that I am willing and even anxious to tell
anytliing about myself or anything that I know. In view of the climate
of repression and the type of thing that happened to me with the
bombs that were sent to me and destruction of the press and the lino-
type at Libertarian Press that I referred to, along with the receipt of
a death threat at that time, it is not my intention to talk about other
people.
Also, I think that other people can basically speak best for them-
selves and express their views. However, within that approach, which
I believe is covered by the first amendment — but which I would take
anyway, whether it was or not — within that approach I would be
happy, you know, in obvious cases of this kind, people who are already
publicly identified, and so forth, to say yes.
Mr. IcHOED. Of course, we will have to rule on that when those ques-
tions arise, but certainly, if we abided by that request, it would cer-
tainly limit your testimony to what you merely wanted to testify about
because this could be construed quite broadly by you. But let's proceed,
and as those matters come up, the Chair will rule.
Mr. Dellingee. Yes ; well, obviously I think I could spend my time
better than going over details of wliich offices, and so forth. I mean,
there are many positive things I could be doing to try to stop the war
and to organize people. So it is not really limiting it to questions chosen
by me or the use of time that I would prefer.
21-706— 69— pt. 3 2
2702 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. IcHORD. These questions are pertinent. The background and op-
erations of your committee, of whicli you are chairman, and of your
own activity, these are pertinent.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I have been happy to cooperate, but I just want
to point this out about other individuals.
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will have to rule on those questions as they
arise.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with the National Mobi-
lization Committee, on the average, what are the total overhead and
salary costs of the National Mobilization Committee, say on a monthly
basis? Can you give us just an average?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have tried to explore, give you the best of
my recollection of the answers to questions or of information that you
have solicited that I am really not an expert on and that I am in danger
of misleading you. And I have to say that in this area I am really not
competent, and we do have a treasurer and we normally have a fine
committee who have this information, both in many cases in writing
in the books or are familiar with it. I have to say that whenever I write
an appeal letter, I buzz the office, if I am in Liberation^ and I say,
""V\Tiat is our weekly overhead now ?"
And they tell me, and I put it in the letter, and undoubtedly, since
many of our private letters are in your hands, you have some of tliose
letters which tell at that time what the budget was, but I am not in a
position to estimate. I would just mislead you if I tried to come up with
such a figure, but it is very variable, according to whether we are ap-
proaching a major action or not and/or according to whether it is a
period like January of '68 when we had almost no staff, I am sure.
Mr. IcHORD. Well, let the Chair advise you, Mr. Dellinger, that you
are not going to be required to testify as to matters beyond your recol-
lection. We don't expect you to recall each and every event or each and
every date and we realize that there are some activities outside of the
coimnittee, outside your knowledge, and just so advise the counsel in
your reply.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, it is outside of my knowledge. If I had known
ahead of time, I could have looked up and told you, but I didn't know
and I don't remember.
Mr, IcHORD. All right, Mr. Dellinger, what are National Mobiliza-
tion's basic or major sources of income?
In other words, where do you expect to get your income from and
where do you get it from ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, we get our income from different types of
sources. We ask participating organizations to contribute either di-
rectly or indirectly. There is rarely an administrative
Mr. CoNLEY. Now, sir, I don't mean to interrupt, but what do you
mean when you say "directly or indirectly" ?
Mr. Dellinger. I was just going to explain, but there is rarely an
administrative committee meeting at which I don't say, "We are this
much in debt. The phone is in danger of being shut off,'' or whatever
it is, "Which organizations can pledge some money?" And so forth.
That is the direct.
Indirectly, often if we prepare literature and an organization will
take copies of the literature and mail it out to its membersliip or its
lists — in other words, taking the cost of the stamps and perhaps of
the envelopes and the running them off — although it is apt to be volun-
DISRTJPTIOX OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2703
tary, on some occasions, when they can do it, we ask them to pay us
the cost of the leaflet, or whatever it is. If they can't, why, we don't.
That is the first source.
The second source is — second source comes from f undraising letters
or personal contacts.
The third source is occasional f undraising benefits that we hold. For
example, if somebody has just come back from a trip to North Vietnam,
helping in the release of prisoners, or from Pans, where they may
have talked with the American and the Vietnamese negotiators, we
will hold a little invitation event at which he makes a report, and
people are asked to contribute.
The fourth source or method is whenever possible at major events,
which range all the way from public meetings — although I mean, you
know, like speeches at a hall, although often they clear very little or
don't clear all the expenses — to wherever possible, collections or
pledges, at events such as the rally at the Lincoln Memorial in October,
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Mr. Bellinger, what are some of the organ-
izations? You mentioned that organizations contribute to National,
member organizations I believe is the way you described it. Wliat are
some of these organizations that you have reference to that do con-
tribute financially ?
]Mr, Dellinger. It would be very unfair of me, I think, to select out
anyone's, and again it would be hard for me to be sure that I was being
accurate. But if you look at the administrative committee list and the
list of the cooperating organizations, you can be sure that every one of
them has been dumied on many occasions and that some of them at least
have actually contributed money or have, most of them have mailed
out things, have contributed indirectly.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, on some of your letterheads, or notes of
your meetings, appears a list of people who attended the meetings. I
think you are familiar with what I am referring to. And they are
named by their name, their city, and the particular group that they
represent. I don't happen to have one of them in front of me at the
moment, but are these the type of groups that you are referring to, sir ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. Conley. All right.
Do you maintain lists of these groups that supply moneys to you ?
I mean, are they within the records of National Mobilization ?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. Well, we try. I am afraid we are not always as
efficient as we should be. But we try to keep a record of contributors,
both individual and organizational, and it may even occasionally be
in the minutes, that after a request from the chairman or from the
treasurer, that X organization agreed to send in a hundred dollars
within the next week. We try to keep records of this kind of a thing,
yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, would you be willing to supply those
records to this committee, showing the sources of income, the groups
that contributed?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I remember something that Averell Harri-
man said on TV the other night, that he had never turned down yet a
job that he hadn't been offered, and I think that if such a request was
made then I would have to deal with it, and I imagine — I mean, I have
to see the terms in which it was made, and so forth. I imagine that I
2704 DTSErmox of : y ? s doxocratic xatioxal coxvz^tion
-ini to La-re ^ oi 'i** a'iiaiiiisTadve coniniiriee lo .iis-
. - ;, "We TT-r " - ' ;i'!iL= and imowl^igp and. lieii we wo ili i
r =»3i:ie ki: : ii thai lime, coiiectiTelT. I myself a=
- - - :: know. I am imia.gnrir^
r kind of fomiai rti^uest.
- -\ - anse, as I say. I tMnk
- , - - who i!2?-"^ have sejii
mcKiey 111. : : - -ins^per-
h""-'^ zre ;zi _- :^.--. ...„_. ^ _;_._ :. ^is on oc-
This lypt of T-:_i-_:
-^-' ^[~ 7 ~^-, >: me isk yoTL mis: Do ycm nave in
-- - "i-fi in Washingtcn loday a list of che^e
cr^ ~ —iiiiXarionil Mobilization!
}h i i Ani ziiTue I XKiid laake a little -^x-
' ; .1^^ . T , : 7 : •:• iny . y c u kn'j^. ieginniare mq niry
ihii yc
TTe : As I iniios-ce-i eiriier. wie do n'X
have — -dip cards, and T'B'zpie and orsa-
7 r lo whi: 3 iTiviiy is being
-7 Firr-Tr: ::. are endiii-
hink more im-
. .- a e«istantlT
i - : . we do not <^)erate ba^callT by votes or by
: e. We operate om the basis of aoaut kind of
— " ^'"-^ ^ " ^oai <w cffliader an action, we
iat all intereaed in gtopping
^ -:i nz:~ " nz an organization or a
-s IT, i- i : . - among^ _
rr ' this is ~ ion to im -.
:.- i :i ..- -: r' -icons, saying. "Weh.
- 7 ' - ' ^ iati€«i cr :.- r-
Mr I :: - i . ieyoor ._ '.
li_ _ .- - - in yooT organizatifm?
Mr. Lm^ 1 es- yes, Jlight. :s somewhat from the
- — '- -- '' - r. as I say. oi :„- ^~i.:, .^hment or more tra-
_ n. I presume that
J'' : : yadonal MoblH-
za"
i:r National Mobili-
yir. T^niTs 7 ire if I tried to leD yon the name of
xb& ban - ^ — . _•- To l;*r - --' -^^rly honest. I know. I
€V€2i s _ OTH I — Xe^w Toik and. vou
DISErPTTOX OF 1968 DEMOCBATIC XATIOXAL COXTESTIOX 2705
know, there are people who kifcow. bar ii is mac the kzod of iciormation
that I carry aroimd in the top of mv head, and I am apt to give too.
rwo riamfts which actnalbr come from two diSerent banks. I am apt lo
TnaJrp the wrons oombinalioii.
3Ir. CoxLET. Do you have a treasurer that actually mainl:ai:L£ ~""=
bank accoimt f
^Lr. DixLixGEB. Tee. we do.
3Ir. Coxx-ET. Would you identify him. please- by name?
!Mr. Deujxgze. WelL sinoe his xiam^ is on the leCTerbead. whiA is
information whi'jh I am sure you already have
Air. CoxixY. That is what I have ref-~^^~ '--'".
Mr. Deu-Ixgee. — or should, any-^ _ - - : ' r :^-iz_z~. -HS
nanie i? Eric Weinberger-
Mr. CoxLET. It does appear on the correspondence that yon hive
in front of you. I believe, doesn't it !
Air. DziiixGEE. WeE. it is not along vi^ side here, bat some of our
letterheads do have it. I still haven't read this letter. It may veiy
-rrell refer to him. It is no aecret.
]Mr. CoxLET- All right, now in that conneeficm is Mr. Wenlia^ger —
Weinberg !
Mr. DnxixGZE. Weinberger.
3»Ir. CoxLET. All right, sir. is he authorized to draw diecis on this
acx-oimt and to make dejxjsits in the account !
3Ir. Delixs-gee. WelL we have a deposit procedure whidh. bsacallr
he oversees, but actually we generally iiave sorcsebody in the office wiib
does the sometimes tedious w^^rk — bec-ause we get many anaU diecfe
instead of large ones — of. you know, opening the mail and anting <iat
the deposits. I am not even sure tr.at he sees every depoax. He oversees
the b«x)k5 very carefully and scrupuloa^. and aH chcdB> hfswever.
must be agned by at ieaac two r>e«?ple.
Mr. CoxiXT. Xow is he
Mr. Deloxger. And iic is cue ?i the <M3!es who is andwriaed to
sign them.
Again, the list of ihe signees has varied, or signers has varied, you
know, from period to p«er::'>d. b:ii iie is. ~o the wst of my koowfedge,
he has been treasurer from very eariy in the existence, and has always
been one of the signers. I have, for a long rime, been a x>signer. but
there are others-
Mr. CoxLET. All right, if I understand wh^r you are saying, to
make it clear here, he does nor ne.^sisariiy have to sign a eoeck. You
and somebody else who has -:he>:k authority comd sisn a check.
Mr. Deleixgek. WelL if yon want to know the rmiii. wie keep the
checkbook locked in a safe, to which Eric Weinberger is the only
person who has the key. so it is extremely dimciut f'-"«" anybody else
ro cet hold of a check and to find two signers without his knowledge.
Mr. CoNXET. All right.
^OW
Air. Deixixger. That's our normal procedtire, anyway.
Mr. CoxLET. Xow. is this bank ac»x»unt maintained in the name of
Xational Mobilization Committee ! I mean, is that the way it is !
Mr. Deixixger. To the best of my knowledge- yes.
Mr. CoxLET. Do you maintain baink aceotmts in any other banks
in the Xew York ai«a nor Xationai Mobilizaticai Commiiree!
2706 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, no, but you know
for one thing, as I say, I have been out of touch for over a month.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now
Mr. Dellinger. And, you know, I am not sworn to be — to know. Or
to remember.
Mr. CoNLET. Did you all have a bank account operational in Chi-
cago, a separate account from the New York account, in connection
with the activities that occurred in Chicago ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, there was a bank account in Chicago also
during that period.
Mr. CoNLEY. During the period that you maintained an office?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
JNIr. Conley. Now, were you authorized to draw on that bank
account ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I was not in Chicago, except as an occasional
visitor, and to the best of my — ^you know, actually I signed checks
for a nmnber of organizations, although it is largely formal and
I rarely do it, but I am practically certain that I never signed a
form — you know, you sign these little things giving you the right to,
and I don't believe I ever signed a form in connection with the Chi-
cago bank account and I certainly do not remember ever having signed
a clieck on that account.
Mr. Conley. Now, either Mr. Hayden or Mr. Davis — and I must
apologize for not recalling which one that said this — indicated that
Mr. Weinberger was authorized to sign on the Chicago account as
well and that one or the other of them — and again I don't recall which
one it was — was authorized to sign on that account. Is that your
understanding of the way the Chicago bank account was handled?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, 1 know that Mr. Weinberger, who has done
a very good job, not only for the Mobilization but also for the [Fifth
Avenue Vietnam Peace] Parade Committee in terms of supervising
the finances and the books, met with the person in charge of the
Chicago office to go over bookkeeping procedures to try to be sure that
they were informative and accurate and kept up to date, and so forth,
so I know that he supervised.
In fact, I myself made the arrangements for that meeting. I know
that he had some kind of general supervisory relationship to the Chi-
cago account, although you must remember that he was, like myself,
only periodically in Chicago.
_ I am sorry, but I literally do not know whether this included the
right for him to sign checks or not.
Mr. Conley. All right, Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the bank
accounts in New York, you indicated that you were hesitant because
you weren't sure that you wouldn't get two names backward.
Mr. Dellinger. I might give you half the Liberation bank and
half the Mobilization.
Mr. Conley, All right, sir, would you be willing, if an investigator
from this committee contacted you next week, to supply to that man
the name of the bank ?
jNIr. Dellinger. The name of the bank ?
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dellinger. I believe I would.
Mr. GuTMAN. I will save you the trouble. I will write a letter to,
the committee and inform them.
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2707
Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, Mr. Gutman.
Now, Mr. Bellinger, in connection with the project undertaken by
National Mobilization in Chicago, do you have an approximate cost as
to what this ran into, in terms of dollars and cents, to
Mr. Bellinger. In Chicago ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. An estimate on your part, if you have one.
Mr. Bellinger. You laiow, I am sorry, but first of all, you see, the
complicated nature of our financing — we try to decentralize the ex-
penses as much as possible, and I already mentioned, for an example,
to get organizations to mail out our literature and to take the costs
themselves. Also, for example, when we hold an administrative meet-
ing, most people come in, they either pay for the travel out of their own
expenses or in a nmnber of cases they get the money from the
organization which they represent.
So, first of all, if we knew how much money went through the
National Mobilization Committee bank accounts in New York and
Chicago, that would not tell us the whole picture.
Secondly, I will have to plead ignorance again and to say that
there are competent people within the Mobilization. It is not an evasion
on my part, but particularly after having been out of touch for a
month, but even a month ago I might not have been able to
Mr. CoNLEY. Perhaps I read the wrong thing into what you just
said, sir, but you indicated that if you knew how much money had
come into the account and how much had gone out, that would not tell
the whole story.
Mr. Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. Bo I imply or infer from that, that there must be a
deficit, as a result of what occurred in Chicago, at the present time?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, I wasn't making any reference either to a
deficit or a surplus. I was saying that we try to decentralize everj^thing.
Mr. CoNLEY. Let me ask you, sir
Mr. Bellinger. Including the expenses and, therefore, other orga-
nizations incurred expenses in connection with recruiting people for
Chicago, going there themselves, or expenses in Chicago.
Mr. CoNLEY. Bo you have a deficit as a result of the Chicago project ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I am afraid we have a considerable deficit.
Mr. CoNLEY. Bo you have any estimate as to the size of that deficit ?'
Understanding that we don't intend to hold you to the dollars and cents.
Mr. Bellinger. No, I understand, but I just — I wouldn't dare
estimate at this point. I plead delinquency, but due to the fact that I
have been away for a month — I literally, I don't remember what it was
and I don't know what it is now.
Mr. CoNLEY. Would it be in terms of a thousand, or in terms of
thousands ?
Mr. Bellinger. No, it would be, I am sure that it is at least several
thousand.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right.
Mr. IcHORD. At that point we have been testifying for an hour and
15 minut-es. Would you gentlemen like a brief break?
Mr. Bellinger. I really feel fine.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed. Let there be order in the hearing room.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, in some of the earlier literature and
2708 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
newspaper accounts dealing with the movement of the National Mobil-
ization Committee to Chicago, there were statements by many that
there would be thousands of people who would converge on Chicago as
a result of the efforts of National Mobilization.
In fact, some of the statements may have been huindreds of thousands.
I think I recall one press account that said National Mobilization was
hoping that they would mass perhaps 500,000 in Chicago during the
week of the convention.
I wanted to hand you
Mr. Bellinger. We should get rid of whoever said that.
Mr. CoNLET. I want to hand to you
Mr. IcHORD. Just a minute.
Officer, will you inform the people outside that there is too much
disorder or noise in the hall? They are making it more difficult for
the Chair to hear the questions and the answers.
Mr. CoxLEY. I want to hand a letter, Mr. Dellinger, dated August 10,
[1968], which purports to carry your signature and in which you pared
down your estimates, or at least your estimates were as follows, and I
refer you specifically, if I may, sir, to the second page. It has been
nnderlined near the middle of the paragraph at the top of the page.
Quote :
We expect and need thousands of persons to be in Chicago from August 2.3rd and
24th on. We expect and need tens of thousands on August 28th and 29th. * * *
Mr. Dellinger, my question to you is this : To the best of your knowl-
edge, approximately liow many persons actually went to Chicago as a
recuU of the urging, the agitation, the propagandizing, the informa-
tion that was disseminated from National Mobilization? Do you have
an estimate as to how many were there ?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. Well, let me say two things about that: First of all,
one of the things I have learned in the last 3 years of being involved in
mass mobilizations of one kind or another is that there is never any
agreement on the numbers. And it is my general impression that all
mass events, whether of the left, the right, or the center, tend to be
overestimated in terms of the numbers.
Wliere we have tried to make a count, it generally has turned out
somewhat less than we thought were there. But, on the other hand,
other events that I have attended, and when I compare tlie numbers
with other events, whether it is even the crowd leaving a football sta-
dium or a baseball stadium, I find they are also overestimated. So I
find that, in other words, the science of counting crowds is very
inaccurate.
In the Chicago situation it was particularly difficult because many
people were there in many different capacities. They might, during
part of the time, be on the convention floor and, during part,, in the
Hilton or one of the other hotels and, during part of the time, they
might \)e. in Lincoln Park or ( rrant Park.
Also, because of the nature of the police assaults upon the demon-
strators, it was dangerous to be involved in either extreme, either to be
isolated, where you could be attacked and beaten, or in very large
crowds, which might also provoke an attack. So the result was that
from this and another factor which I should mention, namely, the di-
versity of the people there and the diversity of their interests, and the
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2709
decentralized nature of the program, even of the Mobilization, which
was not the sole group there — that is, we organized movement centers
for workshops and for, out of which individual decentralized actions
would be planned. As a result, the crowd that was there was scattered
throughout the city a great deal of the time, and, finally, as to this
business about how manj^ we might have brought, again it is hard
to say.
Mr. CoNLET. I don't want to say that you brought, but that you
directly, through National Mobilization, were able to say that you
would attribute their being there to the efforts of National Mobiliza-
tion.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would be too hazardous to say whether a
20-year-old kid or a 50-year-old housewife who came, to what extent
did she come because she wanted to hear the rock bands promised by
the Yippies, she wanted to march to the convention hall to call for an
end to the war, or because she was hoping to lobby one of the delegates.
There were just such a variety of motives and a crossover in actions
amongst many of the people, anyway.
The Mobilization just is not in a position — we seek, we have no
desire to claim credit for everybody that was there. For us, you see, it
is credit, not discredit, but I just would have to leave it open that way.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well
Mr. Dellinger. We did our best to bring as many people as we
could.
Mr. IcHORD, The Chair will state that being there in Cliicago, I a^ree
with the witness: it would be an almost impossible task to est' late
how many people were there.
Mr. Dellinger. This particular letter was written in the hopes that
we would get more people there than at that time appeared to be pre-
pared to come.
Incidentally, on the estimates, I never, to the best of my memory,
have ever estimated there would be X number of thousands at an
event. Because, as I say, even after it, you can't tell whether it was right
or not, and I have tried to indicate the massive nature of what we
expected by saying thousands or tens of thousands, but I have never
myself either made or condoned an estimate on specifics like saying a
hundred thousand or five hundred thousand.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move to something else, on
August 15 of this year, August 15, 1968, just before the opening of the
Democratic Party's Convention in Chicago, Havana radio broadcast
in mixed English and Spanish what it claimed was a telephone inter-
view with you.
I will read excerpts from this interview and ask whether the broad-
cast is an accurate recording of your words at that time.
Mr. Dellinger. Are you going to translate tlie Spanish, or read it
in Spanish?
Mr. CoNLEY. It has been translated for me. I can't give it to you
in Spanish, sir.
According to the broadcast, you were asked this by the interWewer :
Your organization has announced a protest demonstration to be held in Chicago
during the Democratic Party's national convention. Could you tell us the aims of
such action and what the action will consist of?
2710 DISRUPTIOX OF 19 6S DEMOCRATIC XATIOX-\L COX^-EXTION
XovT. TOur answer in part was as follows, and I read this as-
^Ir. Dellixger. Do tou have that written out so I will be able to
look at it afterwards without taking notes ?
^Ir. IcHOKD. Yes. the document will be handed to the witness.
;Mr. GuTMAX. Will you hare another copy of it ? It would make it
so much easier if we had a copy to follow as you read.
(Document handed to witness.)
Mr. CoNXET. All right. Quote: "the demonstration will take place
during some 6 days"
Mr. Dellixger. Excuse me. Where is this: it is not at the beginning.
I just want to find it.
Mr. CoNTJET. Could you show him where it is ?
'Mr. GuTMAX. Wliat page is it ? Oh. I see it.
Mr. CoxLET. Third paragraph. I believe, sir. on the first page.
!Mr. GiTTMAX. In the middle of the second line, right ? Leaving out
part of it ? Okay.
!Mr. CoxLET. Yes. Quote —
the demonstration will take place during some 6 days — from 24 to 29 August.
Through it. we wiU try to show the i)eople of the United States and the Demo-
cratic Party that there cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States
while the government's ctirrent foreign policy continues * * *.
And the transmission does go on. but this is the particular part that
I wish to ask you about. Are those words an accurate reflection of
wh'ir you said in that particular interview ?
^Ir. Deixix'Gek. Well, do you mind if I just finish the sentence?
[Continues reading :]
that regardless of who the candidate is or what his platform is. we will keep up
our active resistance in the streets until all U.S. soldiers return from Vietnam
and the current policy of repression against the Xegro community is halted.
I certainly endorse those statements, those sentiments. That was my
attitude on August 15. It is my attitude today. I can't vouch, of course,
for the words, you know, if it was translated into Spanish and then
back again, but that is an accurate representation of my aims and views.
]Mr. CoxLET. All riarht. We were going to get to the remainder of it.
I didn't want you to think we weren't.
Mr. Dellixger. Eight.
Mr. CoxLET. I was breaking it down into two parts, if I might.
With reference to that first part, which concludes with "the govern-
ment's current foreign policy continues.'' I want to ask you specifically
what you meant by the words, "we will try to show * * * that there
cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States while * * *"?
Mr. Dellixger. Yes. Well, maybe even somewhere later in this
transcript — I haven't read it — ^but first of all let me say that I, to
the best of my
Mr. IcHOPj). Do you wish to have the opportunity to read it before
commenting ?
Air. Dellixger. Xo, it is not necessary yet. Thank you.
But to the best of my ability, I give basically the same interview
or express the same sentiments. I may change the language a little,
whether it is an educated or, you know, yoimg or an old audience,
hut I express the same sentiments to any press and during this period I,
for example, expressed similar sentiments to the press at least from
DISRrPTIOX OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2711
England, France. Belgium, Holland, West Germany, Canada, United
States, as well as Havana.
Xow, what I have tried to do during that period, and it is some-
thing that I still believe very deeply, is that we in the United Stat^
because we are a little smoother and more, quote, '•civilized"* on the
surface than Xazi Germany, we must not be able to continue business
as usual, making it possible for the American people to napalm people
and to uproot people and conmiit genocide in Vietnam, or in the black
community at home, which is referred to in this section, or in Latin
America or throughout the world.
We must not be able to do this and people think, "Well, everything
is smooth and tranquil here." and. you know, really there are fanatics
who are worried about it. But, you know, it is no more real to the
American people than the death camps were to the German people.
So although I am, by conviction and politics and philosophy and
religion, a pacifist and myself only take part in and advocate non-
violent actions, I believe that within the non\"iolent framework, and
also, of course, within others who in one way or another do not share
all of that philosophy, that it is tremendously important that we con-
front the American people. Xot just the political figures who might be
deemed by some to be responsible, but I believe the responsibility goes
to us all. We confront them with the reality of the situation and make
it impossible for us to gorge ourselves on our high standard of living
and our consumer culture and to dismiss this death of American boys
and Vietnamese men. women, and children which is going on daily as
long as the war continues. And it is my intention, it was my intention
then and it is my intention today, to do everything I can to assure the —
to make it impossible for the American people to sink back into that
kind of apathy and acquiescence.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger
Mr. Dellixger. And that is what I mean by no peace and
tranquillity.
Mr. IcHORD. ;Mr. Dellinger, the Chair last night read an editorial
in which it was stated that we often forget the activities of terrorist
Viet Cong, who, since the beginning of 196S. have killed 12.000 South
Vietnamese civilians and abducted about 25 a day.
My question is : In these interviews, do you speak out against those
kinds of atrocities, too '.
Mr. Dellixger. Well, I try very hard not to fall into the trap of
equating the violence of the Viet Cong or the Xational Liberation
Pront and the vast majority of the Vietnamese people, try not to equate
that with the aggressive violence of the invader. I myself
!Mr. IcHORD. Is terrorist activity not aggressive?
Mr. Dellixger. I beg your pardon ?
Mr. Ichord. Is terrorist activity directed against South Vietnamese
civilians not aggressive \
Mr. Dellixger. Well, you see. I make a comparison between the
Vietnamese people who feel that there is no other way to defend the
independence and the sanctity of their homeland than by the use of
A-iolence. I compare them to the American patriots imder George
Washington and of the time of the American Revolution, who also
used violence — and the word "terror"* is a tough one. you know, what
constitutes "terror," but who applied methods similar to those of the
2712 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
NLF against the British and also, bj^ the way, against American
Tories.
Although I myself advocate nonviolence, I do not feel that I as an
American have the right to trj- to be self-righteous, or could be self-
righteous, about the methods employed by the Vietnamese who are
certainly fighting for the freedom and independence of the Vietna-
mese people.
Mr, IcHORD. I take it as a pacifist, then, you do justify violence
under certain circumstances?
Mr. Dellixger. "Well, as a pacifist I understand people, including
the American patriots, including the Vietnamese patriots, including
the Cuban patriots, including the black patriots, our internal colony,
people who feel that it is necessary to resort to violence in order ro
throw off an oppressive force. And I do make a distinction between,
as I say, an imperialist country like the United States, which has its
tentacles all over the world and has the liighest standard of living in
the world, based upon the fact that it bleeds those countries and keei)s
them underdeveloped and is now, as I see it, fighting a war of example
in Vietnam. They can afford to lose the resources of Vietnam, l)Ut
they feel that they can't afford to have the underdeveloped and under-
privileged people of the world get it into their head that they can
win their freedom and independence.
Mr. IcHORD. Do I understand you to say that you believe such
terrorist activity to be justified under the circumstances I
Mr. Dellinger. Well, as I say, I draw a distinction. I did not
condemn my brother, who during World War II went overseas. WolL
actuall}' he was in the medical battalion, but as part of the war. But I
myself, partly because of — despite the fact that I had been very active
in the anti-Xazi movement as a kid and not that good at it, or any-
thing, I myself, partly because of the method and partly because of the
imperialist system which was backing the American war effort, I my-
self did not bear arms.
As I say, I went to jail rather than hide behind the clerical exemp-
tion, but I do not criticize my brother.
I think these are individual decisions that people have to make, and
particularly when faced with a menace like Hitlerism in the thirties
or like the American imperialist aggression throughout the world to-
day. I have a great deal of sympathy for people who resort to violence
in order to overthrow this kind of thing, but it is not my position, and
when I was in Hanoi I had no difficulties of a certain kind of under-
standing with the Vietnamese. But I pointed out to them that Norman
Morrison, who was a national hero in Vietnam because he had Inirned
himself in front of the Pentagon in order to bring home to the Ameri-
can people what they were doing to Vietnamese men, women, and
children, that Norman Morrison was ready to give up his own life that
way, but that he would not even shoot down a plane that was coming
overhead.
And I pointed out that I, that Staughton Lynd and A. J. Muste.
whom the Vietnamese all knew, that none of us would engage in violent
activity, but I did not feel that in my heart or in my politics to con-
demn or criticize them for their use of violence.
Mr. IcHORD. I had the experience, Mr. Dellinger, the other day, of
meeting a woman who had two sons, one of whom had volunteered for
the Army and volunteered for Vietnam to fight for what he thought
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2713
was right, and the other son, she said, was a pacifist and had stated that
he was going to violate the draft laws.
It is rather difficult to give a mother advice, 'Wliat kind of advice
conld you have given her ?
I apologize for interrupting the counsel.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, but Tt is very helpful. It helps because the
point is, I hold strong convictions, and from a lecture platform or in
an article or in a general way I will always present those positions as
forcefully as I can, but I do not believe in indoctrinating people or
giving them advice and I did not — for example, my brother was a little
3'ounger than I, and when I came out of jail the first time he came to
me a little bit in anguish because he also was suspicious of the Ameri-
can economic and political system which had supported Hitler earlier
and had not helped the Jews, would not let them in, and now was going
into this holy war. But on the other hand, he felt that it was necessary
and if he in a sense came to me for advice, and I wouldn't give it to
him because I think that things that people wrestle with in their own
conscience, and I hope to be part of what they wrestle with by what
I write and demonstrate and act, but I never advise anybody to regis-
ter or not to register, to go into the Army or leave the Army, to bear
arms or not to bear arms.
Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead with your questions. Counsel.
Mr. AsHBROOK. I have one question on that point.
I was listening very intently and of course I can respect your views
and your principles, but I note in talking about nazism and talking
about what you termed American aggressive imperialism that you did
not say anything in condemnation of Communist aggressive imperial-
ism. Was this an oversight or do you in fact think that there is not a
problem of Communist aggressive imperialism ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I was a little distressed that when we were at
Chicago, and it was immediately following the period and during the
period in which the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia
Mr. AsHBROOK. This was to stabilize the situation, though.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, but let me finish because it answers your ques-
tion. I was a little distressed that, although I made a number of public
statements to the press and in other places condemning the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in as strong terms as I could, that normally
this was not picked up. I am not saying that this was, you know, indi-
rect censorship or anything, but it would have been helpful, I think, if
at that time it could have been made clear what our attitude was, be-
cause I think that in the cold war atmosphere, and certainly in the
past this atmosphere has been encouraged and developed by this
committee — and that's one of my deep reasons for deep opposition to
this committee — people think automatically, or some people think that
automatically that people like myself are one-sided about this. I don't
believe that the situation
Mr. AsHBROOK. You still haven't said whether you think there is a
threat or whether you have the same condemnation of Communist
aggressive imperialism as that you have charged the United States
with.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I thought I indicated that I condemned, and
I have signed public statements as well as made public speeches con-
demning, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I think that it has not
ended up at the present stage in the kind of genocide that has been
2714 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
going on for years in Vietnam, but I think that this relates to the-
peculiar conditions there.
Mr. AsHBRooK. Genocide? You mean the white races and others
weren't suffering from genocide ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, this seems a little silly to me because I am
indicating that I oppose aggression, including Soviet aggression, and
somehow or other you seem unwilling to give up the idea that I don't.
Mr. AsHBROOK. No, you have now stated, but at first I didn't think
you had stated.
Mr. Dellinger. Now, it so happens that I do not, however, believe
that the — well, in most cases the opinions that come out in the press
are a little superficial, and I think that much as I condemn the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, I do not think that the Americans should
wash their hands of the responsibility they play in the situation because
of the fact that the CIA and other Government agencies are organiz-
ing subversion and the overthrow of government and direct and indi-
rect invasion and aggression in all of these countries. And although I
do not believe that this justifies the Soviet invasion — as I say, I oppose
it — nonetheless, the ri^htwing in this country and the liberal center
wing, which has been m the administration, actually makes it easier
for the Soviet people, Soviet Government to fool its people because
they can say, "Look, the CIA has overthrown this government and
that government."
I mean such as the bloodbath in Indonesia, as an example, and they
can therefore more easily persuade their people that the CIA and the
United States and West Germany, which has never been thoroughly
denazified, that these countries are about to invade Czechoslovakia.
But still, my solidarity is with people like Mrs. Daniel and the others
who protested in Moscow, and one of the organizations to which I
belong actually sent people to Moscow and Prague and Warsaw where
they protested against the Soviet invasion and were arrested and in
some cases beaten up for it.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, may I ask you a question in that
regard? If apparently you do condemn the aggresive Communist
activities equally with the so-called American imperialistic activities,
I wonder why you do not spend at least a part of your time in articu-
lating that condemnation ?
Apparently this is the first time that I have heard of it right here.
I wonder why you don't give at least a little time during your lec-
tures and your Libertarian Press, and so forth? I wonder why you
wouldn't devote just a little column on one of the pages to a condem-
nation of that ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, you see-
Mr. Watson. Or perhaps you have, and if so-
Mr. Dellinger. I think that in part that is an indication of how
out of touch your committee and its staff, its research staff is.
Mr. Watson. Maybe you can put it in touch with it. Have you done
that?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I indicated that I, first of all, I made state-
ments in Chicago and helped organize
Mr. IcHORD. Have those been reported in the press ?
Mr. Dellinger. I complained that they had not been adequately
reported. Even I helped organize and signed a statement endorsing
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2715
a protest action at the — if I remember, it was the Polish, or the
only available Communist country office in Chicago, where the protest
took place.
Mr. Watson. I am not
Mr. Dellinger. I have written, we have articles in Liberation
magazine condemning it. I, as a member of the War Crimes Tribunal,
which I believe rightly found the United States guilty of war crimes^
contrary to the Nuremburg charter and contrary to humanity, in
Vietnam, I, as a member of that tribunal, was one of an overwhelming
majority of the tribunal who signed the public statement condemning
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Watson. I personally would find it interesting if you could
supply the committee with some of your public pronouncements con-
demning Soviet aggressiveness in your various publications.
And one final question in this regard : Did I understand you cor-
rectly to say that it is not your business to give advice to people ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I tried to make that very clear. I said that
I give a certain type of advice all the time, that is, 1 will speak gen-
erally. I myself, for example, think that American soldiers should
refuse to commit war crimes in Vietnam.
Mr. Watson. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Dellinger. And I will say that publicly. I think that young
men should refuse to go into the Armed Forces and I will say that
publicly.
Mr. Watson. And you urge them to do that ?
Mr. Dellinger. But I never to an individual, even when I am
sought out by an individual, and the;^ say "Should I do this or that?"
I never say, because first of all the price they pay, you know, whatever
they do, they have to accept themselves and, also, if people take
actions without having come to what I will call spirtually and psycho-
logically and mentally, intellectually, to an understanding of why they
do it, or at least why it becomes very difficult for them. I saw men
crack in prison because they were there on a more shallow emotion
than was able to sustain them. And so I never advise anybody and
say, "You drop out of the Army," or, "You refuse to register for
the draft," or, "You lay down your arms," but obviously that's my
general position, and I try to shout that from the housetops.
Mr. Watson. But you advise everybody to do that. You advise
everyone to do that, but to understand you correctly, you do not give
individuals that advice?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. Are you trying to
Mr. Watson. Is that a fair statement ?
Mr. Dellinger. It seems to me you are trying to — excuse me, I
don't mean to impute evil motives, but you seem to be obscuring what
I am saying. I make very clear that I do not advise individuals. I
Mr. Watson. But you advise everyone generally ?
Mr. Dellinger. I extol the virtues of this position because I believe
that if the United States does not bring a halt to its aggression and if it
does not do this through methods of power, which means denying the
military-industrial complex the methods, the means, the manpower,
money and manpower, to build a war machine and to use it in Santo
Domingo and use it in Bolivia and use it in Paraguay and use it in
2716 DISRUPTION OF 196S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Vietnam — unless we do that, why I see a very terrible future. There is
ali"eady a terrible present.
So I make that very clear; but if you come to me and say, "Now
I am wondering," I might be tempted to suggest you resign from the
House I^n-American Activities Committee, but I would rather call
for its abolition ; but if you come to me and say, "Shall I or shall I not
go into the Army?" there comes a point when I have to say, "You
have to wrestle with your own conscience; you have to decide what
you are prepared to do, what you believe is effective and right."
Mr. Watson. Of course, it wouldn't be difficult for you to suggest
that I resign from this committee ; would it ?
Mr. Dellinger. I say that might be a temptation, but I think even
that, I
Mr. Watson. I believe I would agree with you, it would be a
temptation.
Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Dellinger. But what I would rather do, you see, is to have
South Carolina turned into a democracy, which would elect peopie
with all the citizens' votes. [Applause.]
Mr. IcHORD. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the audience, the Chair
will have to admonish you that you are guests of the committee. The
business of this committee is the people's business and you are cer-
tainly welcome. But the Chair has the duty of maintaining order, and
outbursts, applause, or any kind of disturbing activity just can't be
permitted. So I would appeal to your sense of propriety and ask that
you abide by the rules, not only of the House, but of this committee.
Proceed.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I might make just one statement
in reference to the outburst, apparently against my State and me
personally, down home we have an old saying whereby people are
judged not only by their friends but by their enemies, and it is a
compliment down my way to be opposed by certain individuals, so
I take no personal offense to the outciy against me.
Mr. IcHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question in this same line,
if I may. I notice that you indicated that you were a pacifist during
the Second World War, or, specifically, with reference to Germany.
And you indicate, as I understand it, and I certainly do not wish to
put words in your mouth, that you still maintain a posture of being a
pacifist. Is this a fair statement today ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I advocate and practice nonviolent methods,
and even during World War II, or before World War II when I was
put in jail, I used often to object to the word "pacifist" or "conscien-
tious objector." I am not theological by nature and I don't like things
being set up in a way that people who have peculiar beliefs are paci-
fists and oppose war, and others. I believe that the adoption of non-
violence is a necessity for the world and for the American people,
and so when I, for example, went to prison during World War II, I
refused to call myself — or before World War II — a conscientious ob-
jector because that seemed to make it some special thing or special
people. I called myself a war objector.
Having made 'that little modification, my views are essentially
basically the same today as they were then. I believe I am opposed to
the use of military methods in an attempt to solve problems.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2717
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. My question then is a very simple one,
sir : You maintain that you are opposed to war, do you not ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, and I am also opposed to imperialism.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you, sir, is this:
If you are opposed to war, you make no judgment in the World War
II matter, other than to say you were opposed to war ?
Mr. Dellinger. I did make a judgment. I was actively anti-Xazi. I
picketed to try to have the United States lower — picketed and other
public demonstrations to have the United States lower its immigra-
tion barriers and allow Jews to come in, in order to save their lives.
But the United States would not do that, and I always, before it was
popular to do so in this country or in England, where I spent a year
in 1936 to '37, I condemned Hitler and Hitlerism. But on the other
hand, I myself was unwilling to adopt the methods which culminated
in the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Mr. CoNLEY. My question has nothing to do with whether you
were willing to adopt or not. My question has to do with, you did
not, from the background material — let me finish my question.
Mr. Bellinger. I am sorry. I beg your pardon.
Mr. CoNLEY. From the background material which has been made
available to me, I do not find you speaking out with quite the fervor in
the World War II situation that you have adopted in the present
Vietnam situation. What I am putting to you, sir, is that you did not,
with the same fervor, make a judgment as to who was right and who
was wrong in World War II as you have now.
i\Ir. Bellinger. Witli the same fervor, I drew a moral distinction
between the Fascist forces and particularly the popular forces, such as
the resistance forces, in France and Italy and Yugoslavia and other
places, who were fighting against fascism. My endorsement of the
United States Government was less enthusiastic because I felt that I
could not trust how a government elected and run in a largely undemo-
cratic way dominated by large corporations and military-industrial
interests, I did not feel confident to wliat outcome and to what purpose
they would fight a war which seemingly was against fascism. And
although I found that a very difficult matter, as I say, I never con-
demned anybody who bore arms and I was in some ways ambivalent
about it.
Nonetheless, I think that much of my point was justified or verified
when the United States first, for example, burned half a million people
alive in Tokyo with fire bombs and then dropped — unnecessarily
dropped — the atom bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in order to
improve their power position after World War II and also prepared
the climate which led to the McCarthy period and the foundation of
committees like this, the repression of democracies in the — or the
partial repression of democracies in the United States.
I believe that the self-righteous unity of the American people in
World War II, even behind a good cause, namely, antifascism, helped
produce the assault upon the people of Korea and helped i^roduce the
war in Vietnam.
Mr. Conley. All right. If I may move you back to the Havana
broadcast, the transcript of which you have in front of you
!Mr. Bellinger. We got a long way from it ; yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. The next question that you were asked, Mr. Bellinger,
21-706 — 69— pt. 3 3
2718 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
in this broadcast was about the National Mobilization Comniittee's
view of the peace talks which were presently under way in Paris. I am
referring to the interview that you had with a Havana radio on
about August 15, and your answer, and I quote —
the U.S. delegation is trying to carry out a fraud. * ♦ * in reality, the U.S.
Government is escalating the conflict. * * *
Mr. Dellinger. Just a second, because you skipped so much ; I have
to find where you skipped to.
Mr. GuTMAN. Where is this ?
Mr. Bellinger. I see the part about ''the U.S. delegation is trying
to carry out a fraud."
Mr. GuTMAX. Then he jumps down to the middle of the next
paragraph.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well, I want to give you all of these clauses, sir,
and I assure you, you can offer any exi:)lanation. I think it will make it
much quicker for us if we do :
in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * * We think that in
reality the United States
Mr. GuTiMAN. Where are you now ?
Mr. Dellixger. I am sorry. I am trying to follow j^ou.
Mr. GuTMAX. You skipped the rest of that paragraph and you are
down in the following paragraph. Where? Where? How many lines
into the next paragraph ?
Mr. CoNLEY. The beginning of the next paragraph.
Mr. Dellixger. The next is number what ?
Mr. GuTMAX. You know, Mr. Romerstein, if you have a marked
copy — Okay.
Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness examine the document.
Mr. Gttimax. You see, Mr. Chairman
Mr. Dellixger [reads].
But in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * *
Mr. GuTMAx^. Then he skips three or four sentences and he goes
down
Mr. Dellixger. What comes next?
Mr. CoxLEY [reads].
We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war * * *.
Mr. Dellixger. I say next :
There are more soldiers in Vietnam now than when President Johnson made his
speech on the eve of "April Fool" —
And then they have added —
a North American festivity similar to the "Day of the Innocents." Every week
the North American planes drop more tons of bombs on the Vietnamese people.
* * * more and more bombing missions. * * *
Mr. IcHORD. Is the whole document already in the record? Mr.
Counsel ?
Mr. Cox^LEY. No, but we intend to offer it into the record.
Mr. IcHORD. The entire document will be made a part of the record.
(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 1" and retained in
committee files.)
Mr. Dellixger [reads].
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2719
We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war and it is using
the Paris talks as a pretext to make one believe that it has not escalated the
war and that it wants peace.
I subscribe to those sentiments.
Mr. CoNLET. Just a minute, and there is one more, "One of the
motives"
Mr. GuTMAN. Where are you reading now ? Next page ?
Mr. Dellinger. I mentioned that Johnson's speech of March 31
coincided with a proposal made by Herman Kahn, who was willing
to have
Mr. CoNLET. Third full prirruininh
INIr. Dellinger. — to have 200 or 300 million people die in a nuclear
war, that he made the Johnson program — he made it as a propo-al
under the title 2 of the program for victory in Vietnam — that it
would be possible to concentrate on the bombing on the narrow pan-
handle, supported with shelling from ships like the Jersey^ and pre-
tend or convince the American people and some of world opinion that
this was a peace move, whereas actually from a military point of
view it would help the United States.
Yes, I subscribe to that statement.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, the next one is the third paragraph
on the following page:
One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the
hypocrisy
Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment. Let's see what you skipped before
we get to that.
Mr. IcHORD. The entire document will be in the record,
Mr. CoNLEY. I will certainly let you go back and make any com-
ment that you want about what I skipped.
The third paragraph down.
Mr. Dellinger. All right. Yes.
Mr. Conley [reads].
One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the hypocrisy
and fraud of the Democratic Party's political machinery, which talks of peace
while escalating the war.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Conley. Now these three quotations which are lifted from
different portions of this interview, are these all accurate? As best
you recall?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I subscribe to the general sentiments ex-
pressed, yes — absolutely. I would like to stress that.
IVIr. CoNLEY. All right. All right, sir.
Now, if I may move you to the next question, which is as follows :
Next Sunday marks the third anniversary of the Negro rebellion in the city
of Watts. Mr. Dellinger, what can you tell us in this respect?
Do you find the question, sir ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. And the answer, both.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now I would like to read to you this portion
of your answer.
(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)
Mr. CoNLEY. And then you certainly may supply anjrthing that
j'ou wish to add to it :
2720 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Right now there is intensive repression of U.S. Negro leaders
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading].
This month, there has been a well-planned * * * —
And a word is indistinct, I believe, there
]Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading],
to liquidate Negro leaders, the leaders who are capable of heading the struggle
for Negro liberation, but this is nothing new. We all know what happened to
Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he became a threat to the established
system * * * —
And again there is an indication that some more words are
indistinct. [Continues reading:]
that the federal government and the state governments are carrying out a
joint effort to eliminate many other youthful leaders who are less well known,
leaders who get more and more i>opular support and who are actively organizing
popular resistance. To cite an example, there is now a trial in progress against
Huey Newton in Oakland, California, and the authorities are determined to
wii>e out the leaders. Ho too, another leader Eldridge Cleaver, is threatened
with being sentenced to a long prison term. Newton is in jail and is fighting
for his life in the trial.
Now my question, Mr. Dellinger, is this an accurate reporting of
what you said in this particular interview ?
Mr, Dellinger, Well, I am not sure about one or two words, in
view of the fact that this apparently was translated back from the
Spanish to the English, and I am not sure whether I used the word,
for example, "liquidate," "to liquidate Negro leaders." However, I
think that I subscribe to the general statements, including the fact
that there is an attempt to eliminate the Black Panthers and many
youthful leaders, and this came, this statement was made shortly after
the police in Oakland, I believe it was, attacked a group of Black
Panthers who were in a house, came out without arms and with their
hands up, and actually did shoot and kill an 18-year-old Black Panther
by the name of Bobby Hutton and did wound Eldridge Cleaver, and
because of that
Mr, IcHORD. Did wound whom ?
Mr. Dellinger. Eldridge Cleaver ; and because of his having been
attacked in this way by the police, his parole was revoked. Mean-
while, Huey Newton that I refer to, as I say, was in jail and was
fighting for his life in a trial, and it was clear to me — I won't pre-
tend to be in the position of the Supreme Court at that point, but
it seemed, I have not read everything, but it seemed to come through
pretty clearly that there was not clearcut evidence to convict Huey
Newton of what he was charged, and that the jury realized this, but
so they gave some other charge of manslaughter, or some finding of
manslaughter, which was completely irrelevant; either he attacked
the jDolice or he didn't. It wasn't a case of manslaughter. And he is
now m jail.
And so I support this general thinking and I think it is similarly
about Malcolm X. The CIA has been assassinating people throughout
the world for too many years novv^, and it is my belief that vre can't
maintain the geographical boundaries indefinitely and that a govern-
ment that thinks it is morally and politically sound to assassinate o])-
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2721
position political leaders abroad, whether it is the Dominican Republic
or Cuba or Bolivia or South Vietnam or where, that that government
and some of those agencies will not hesitate to assassniate political
leaders in this country, .
And I think that it would be very useful if we had a real mquiry,
for example, into the actual events surrounding the assassination of
President Kennedy, who was no radical, but obviously was killed
under circumstances far different from those implied or stated by the
"Warren Commission report.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well, Mr. Bellinger, you make reference m here to
Malcolm X, and I do want to talk with you a moment about that, if I
may. The expression that is used here is :
We all know what happened to Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he be-
came a threat to the established system. * * * that the federal government and
the state governments are carrying out a joint effort to eliminate many other
youthful leaders * * *.
Now, Mr. Dellinger
Mr. Dellixger. You skipped a little, I think, but words are
indistinct.
Mr. CoNLEY. There were some indistinct words.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, sir.
]Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you is this : At the
time that you made that statement or a statement similar to that, Mr.
Dellinger,' did you or were you or are you aware of the fact tliat two
of the three assassins of Malcolm X were members of an organization
he had formerly been a leader of, the Black Muslims ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, first of all, I don't believe that that is neces-
sarily true.
Secondly, it is not beyond the CIA or the New York Police Depart-
ment to use such people, or, I am soriy, I don't mean to impugn tlie
New York Police Department as a totality, but elements within it or
within some other agencies, to use former members of such an
association.
The fact is that Malcolm X was exerting a tremendous influence
upon the black community.
(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.)
Mr. Dellinger. He had traveled abroad and had come back after
his experiences in Algeria, saying that he supported revolutionists,
whatever their color. He was obviously a very charismatic and grow-
ing person, a person of great political insight and leadership and he
vras causing tremendous embarrassment to the United States in the
U.N. and elsewhere. And, obviously, I am not going to — I am not in
a position to name the killers, and the reason I raise the question about
the word "liquidate," which may very well not have been the original
text, was that I never try to go beyond what I know, you Imow, in
imputing actual physical assassination or guilt to groups that I do
not know. And that's why I made it clear that the time will come —
whether it has come yet or not. we don't know — when the CIA, which
assassinates all over the world — this has been even revealed in the
Senate by Senator Young of Ohio in relation to Vietnam, where he
speaks of assassination teams which pose as Viet Cong and commit
acts of murder, arson, and rape
2722 DISRUPTIOX OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
'SLv. AsiiBRcoK. TTait a second. He rejected that. That doesn't stand
as a st-atement of Senator Young.
]Mr. Dellixger. He asked me to supply you with some things, and I
\\ ouki be happy to supply.
Mr. AsiTBrv:MiK. Senator Young did reject that.
]Mr. Dellixger. I thought that after the pressure was on he spoke
rather cautiously, but never retracted the statement. Anyway, it is a
known fact, whetlier Senator Young can be cited as an authority or
not.
Mr. IcHORD. Are you saying that Senator Young is the type of man
that can be pressured <
Mr. Dellixger. What I tried to say was that my memory was that he
resisted the pressure, but, anyway. I could cite Donald Duncan, who
helped organize such assassination teams and who has testified so.
So, anyway, what I said was that we can't do that abroad without
sooner or later doing it at home. I am not about to say that the CIA
assassinated President Kennedy, because I don't know whether it did
or not. But it is a question which all American people ought to ask
themselves, and so the least they can do is to bring the CIA, for ex-
ample, under control. So the same way when it comes to Malcolm.
Mr. CoxLEY. I^t's start, though, with first things first. You jtimped
to the assumption that the CIA
Mr. Dellixger. I do not jump to it. I say it is a question I want to
ask you and the American people.
Mr. CoxLEY. Xo, sir, it is a part of a two-part question, and let's
get the first part of it out of the way first and then move on to whether
they were CIA.
Mr. Dellixger. I don't know whether they were CIA or not. I know
that the CIA does that kind of thing.
Mr. AsHBRooK. The pomt is that just as valid a question, if you
raise the question, a Cuban Communist might have killed President
Kennedy. It is just as valid a question.
Mr. Dellixger. One can ask all of tliose questions, but all of the
evidence that I have read, if we are speaking about President Ken-
nedy
]\Ir. AsHBROOK. Yes.
Mr. Dellixger. — goes in the other direction.
]Mr. IcHORD. You repudiate the finding of Chief Justice "Warren
and his tribunal ?
Mr. Dellixger. Yes. I do. absolutely. I consider that a snow job
to tr\' to pacify the American people. And I think it is a shame that
a man like Chief Justice Warren, who in many ways seems to be a fine
man. although I don't agree with his politics, I think it is a shame that
he apparently lent himself to that kind of a job.
Mr. Watsox. Mr, Dellinger, offhand could you think of any possible
activity being engaged in by a Communist in the United States that
might be illegal or wrong ?
Mr. Dellixger. I am sorry. I didn't hear it all and I really want to.
Mr. Watsox. Since apparently you assign all of these things to
the CIA and to the establishment, and so forth, I was just wondering
if possibly you might think of anything that a Communist might be
doing in this country that you might consider illegal or immoral?
Mr. Dellixger. Well, it took place in Mexico, but I believe that the
government of Josef Stalin
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2723
Mr. Watson. You mean the assassination of President Kennedy?
Mr. Dellinger. Oh, the assassination of President Kennedy ?
Mr. Watson. I notice you never see anything wrong
Mr. Dellinger. I was going to say that one of the reasons that I
could never be a member of tlie Communist Party, for example, is that
in their past history, at least, and, well, in their past history they have
used acts of this kind, including the assassination of Leon Trotsky in
Mexico.
Mr. AVatson. Yes.
Mr. Dellinger. And undoubtedly others that I am not aware of.
To the best of my reading, the Soviet Union did not stand to profit
from the assassination of President Kennedy. There were other people
in this country who very obviously profited with it, and they should be
examined and thought about.
Mr. Watson. My question is a simple one as to whether or not you
could think of anything which a Communist j)ossibly could have done
in this country which was illegal or immoral, since apparenth* you
have suspicioned that President Kennedy may have been killed by the
CIA, or Malcolm X — it was some matter with the CIA. I am just
asking you whether you possibl}'^ could think of anything that they may
have done wrong in this coimtry.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, if I couldn't think of anything that they
had done wrong, I would have joined the Communist Party, and
obviously I never have and never wanted to.
Mr. Watson. I just noticed you never cast any suspicion on them;
it is always on the Government.
Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, it would be nice to communicate. I
know it is hard because I am very critical, for example, of your election
and of other things, and we have serious political diiferences, but I
Mr. Watson. Obviously you have political differences with Republi-
cans, Democrats, and eveiybody.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, with the Republican and Democratic estab-
lishment, yes.
Mr. Watson. You think everything is wrong except what you are
doing.
Mr. Dellinger. Xo, not except what I am doing. Xot^
Mr. Watson. You were against the Democrats and the Republicans,
weren't you ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am against the program and the presidential
candidates of both the Republicans and the Democrats, yes. I believe
there are many obvious reasons for that, but I would like you to
know that the Xational Mobilization Committee, when it is at its
fullest, has over a hundred different groups, many of whom have
different political and other views. It is a very heterogeneous group.
But they are united on wanting an end to American aggression in
Vietnam.
Mr. Watson. Yes; and of course you would agree with the state-
ment that Mr. Hayden earlier made, that he welcomed tlie support of
anyone. Communist or anybody else, if they agreed with his objectives ?
iilr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, if you would come out on our next
demonstration, I would be happy to walk side by side with you, pro-
testing the war and calling for withdrawal of the American troops.
Mr. Watson. So the answer to my question
2724 DISRUPTION OF 19 6S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. But you might get hit with a club.
Mr. Watson. You mean to tell me your people might hit me with
a club?
Mr. Dellinger. No; our people don't carry clubs.
Mr. Watson. Oh, they don't? I see. So the answer to m^^ question
is you do welcome the support, active and otherwise, financial, of the
Communists ?
Mr. Bellinger. I will work with anybody who I think will help
bring the war to an end. Now, at the points where I differ from him
I will not AYork. I made a trip to Paris in which I talked for hours
with Averell Harriman, more briefly with Cyrus Vance, and also for
hours with the North Vietnamese negotiators. I Avill talk with anybody
across the board if I think it will help save the lives of the — what
shall we guess^ — the 150 to 250 American boys who will be killed next
week in Vietnam and the several thousand Vietnamese who will be
killed. I will work together with anybody for that objective, but with-
out pretending, for example, to adopt the views of Averell Harrimar
on our corporate structure, or the views of the Communist Party peoj)le
on the Soviet Union.
Mr. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, getting back to Malcolm X, if I may^
I would like to go back to the first part of your answer and my first
question to you on this subject, which was : Are you aware of the fact
that two of the three assassins charged and convicted of killing Mal-
colm X were foi-mer members or members of an organization he had
formerly operated ?
Now let's forget about whether they were hired by CIA to do it.
Are you aware of the fact that two of the three people who were tried
and convicted were members of the Black Muslims?
]Mr. Dellinger. I have read that fact, seen
Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you.
!Mr. Dellinger. May I complete my answer? I have seen it stated
in the press. I have also read a study by Eric Norden, a journalist in
New York who has done work for Liberation. He did a study called
"American Atrocities in Vietnam."" He made an exhaustive research
into the circumstances of the assassination of Malcolm X. It was pub-
lished in The Realist magazine. I can't give you the date. But I think
anybody who reads that and tries to be open to its message comes out
of there with a very strong suspicion that some quasi-governmental or
governmental agencies had something to do with the assassination
of Malcolm.
Mr. Conley. All right. Now, Mr. Dellinger, in that same vein, you
have also indicated that Malcolm X was, as I took your words, a rather
knowledgeable individual. Is that a fair appraisal of your appraisal
of him?
]Mr. Dellinger. I don't remember using the word. He was a man
with whom I did not totally agree. I knew him personally and I had
some differences with him, particularly in his earlier days, but he was
a man who had gone through the worst, almost, of what our society
imposes upon black people growing up in the ghetto. Like Eldridge
Cleaver, he had been in prison and had all kinds of experiences and
had himself, you know
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2725
Mr. CoNLEY. Do you feel that he knew what his movement was
about ?
Mr. Dellinger. I believe that he was a person who had tremendous
insight and, unlike so man}^ political people, was able to grow as he
discovered new truths and new insights.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now my question, sir, is this: Are you
aware of the fact that before Malcolm X's death he wrote in his own
autobiography that the Black Muslims had placed a death sentence
on his head?
Are you aware of that fact?
Mr. Dellinger. I have seen that stated.
Mr. CoNLEY. And are you aware of the fact that Malcolm X him-
self employed bodyguards to protect himself and, for instance, when
I visited Chicago on one occasion, there were newspaper accounts of
the city of Chicago assigning a tremendous number of police officers
to protect him from the possibility of an assassination?
Now, Mr.
Mr. Dellinger. Let me
Mr. Conley. Just a minute, Mr Dellinger.
Mr. Dellinger. Sorry. Finish ; you asked two questions.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now my question, though, on this is this : You have
indicated that there is a possibility that some nefarious influence, the
CIA or somebody in some form of government, had something to do
with this assassination. If, sir, you have any information or evidence
of that type, have you taken it to any agency and made it available
to them?
I will ask you : Do you have any direct evidence ?
Mr. Dellinger. Now, since I think you did ask about three ques-
tions, let me try to start at the beginning as best I can.
First of all, I have heard the statements — well, first of all, let me
say I did not come down here bringing my resource materials on the
assassination of Malcolm X. I am therefore trying to give a sort of
a general attitude in which I say that there should be deep suspicions
on this score and I tried to put it into context.
Let me say that although I have seen statements attributed to Mal-
colm X where he said he feared assassination by the Muslims, there
is also evidence that the day before Malcolm's assassination he told
people that he was frightened of the New York Police Department,
tliat they were not providing him protection, and that he feared that
they intended to assassinate him.
Now, as I say, I really don't want to go too far into this material
because I can supply to yOu, if you want — I have already given you
the reference — one of the many articles on this subject. I doivt want
to make these things appear more simple than they are, and that has
been my slight quarrel with Congressman Watson because I think
there are very basic questions that the American people ought to
ask themselves and ou.<rht to investigate. I am not prepared to supply
the answers or think I am in a position to supply the answer, either
on the assassination of President Kennedy or on the assassination of
Malcolm X. But there are very disturbing aspects to both of these
<luestions, which I believe the Govermnent has basically tried to sweep
under the rug, and I think thev ought to be brousfht out into the open.
Mr. Ichord. Well, Mr. Dellinger, after making those statements.
2726 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
1 am very disappointed that ydu don't have some evidence to offer thi«r
committee. Let me assure you that this is one Member of Congress
that doesn't fear the CIA or any other organization in this country,,
and I think it should be your duty to give this to the Government.
Mr. Dellingek. Well, I have a suggestion. I appreciate your inter-
est and, as a matter of fact, I think a lot of people, you know, are not
aware of these things and are shielded from them.
Mr. IcHORD. Well, I certainly am not aware of them. I would like
to have the evidence.
Mr. Bellinger. Yes; I would like to suggest, Congressman Ichord^
that I mail to you, registered, some of the material on the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy and on the assassination of Malcolm X;
and on the assassination of Malcolm X, I will specifically send the
article by Eric Xorden from The Iieallst that I mentioned and I
would like to ask you, in turn, to insert these into the Congressional
Record.
Mr. IcHORD. Let's take a brief recess.
(A brief recess was taken from 3 :50 to 3 :58 p.m.)
Mr. IcHORD. The committee will come to order.
The photographers will please retire.
At the time of the recess, Mr. Dellinger, we were talking about an
alleged assassination of certain Negro leaders by the CIA, and yoiu
had asked me to put certain evidence that you might provide i]i the
Record. Let me advise you that I have some of my closest friends to
request me to put things in the Record that I often turn down. I would
have to look at the material. But if you do, again, if you do have any
evidence, I would appreciate your giving it to this conunittee at this
time.
IMr. Dellinger. Yes ; I want it made very clear that I did not allege
that the CIA committed these assassinations. I said the circumstances
were very suspicious, CIA does commit assassinations all over the
world, and that sooner or later, and perhaps already, this method will
be used in the United States as well. And I said that I thought that
you and the American people, everybody who is concerned for the wel-
fare and future of this countrj^ and the world, should ask themselves
this c^uestion and should read a great deal of the material.
I did offer to send to you Eric Norden's article on the assassination
of Malcolm X and I did hope that, when you read it, you would feel
moved to insert it in the Oongressional Record so that it could receive a
wider audience and people could read it and take it from there.
Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questioning, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. Dellinger. And excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt, but
cotdd I ask that this article be put in the record of this hearing, since
we have made many references to it ?
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement, and you
can forward the article to the Chair.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, the testimony
here, to me, would at least indicate that you have certainly, or perhaps,
some suspicions about how Malcolm X met his death, but apparently
you have no defhiite evidence, other than suspicions.
Perhaps other people have suspicions the other way, and the thing
that concerns me at this point is why would you make these statements,
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 6 S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2727
which have been attributed to you, to Havana radio with no more
basis in fact than you have apparently indicated.
Was it done with the intention of inflaming those people in Cuba ?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, I think it is clear that I have gone into m^ich
greater detail and have been much more specific here in this country
than I was in that broadcast. So it is not something peculiar to going
to the Havana radio.
As I indicated earlier, I don't have any double standard of what
I say. I say the same thing basically to you, to the American press, to
the foreign press, Avhether within the Communist countries or not.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you ever say some things you wish you hadn't said ?
Mr. Dellixger. Well, I often don't say things clearly enough or
well enough or I change my mind, my opinion, later.
One thmg in that respect that occurred to me in connection with
Congressman Watson's Cjuestion al)0ut Communist imperialism, which
I think I didn't make clear right now, so I would like to make it
clearer.
If you stop to think of it, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
involved two Communist countries, so it is a little artificial, if this was
meant to be implied, and certainly some people think of it that way —
it is certainly a little artificial to identify this as an example of Com-
munist aggression because it was also an example of a Communist
victim.
And I think one has to be a little more careful than to attribute every
wrongful act that takes place in a Communist country', and of course
there are many and ha^'e been many historically as well, to attribute
that somehow to all Communists, all Communist countries, or all
periods of communism.
Mr. IcnoRo. You are not saying that you would justify aggression
by one Commnnist against another Communist ?
' Mr. Dellixger. No; I am just saying that it is really, in this case,
not a question of Communist aggression. It is in part, but it is also a
question, to complete the picture, of a Communist victim, so this has
something to do with the nature of the politics and internal problems
of the Soviet Union.
And one of the faults of the United States in relation to Vietnam has
been that it has tried to build up an artificial picture of communism in
tenns of the worst period of Stalinism and without reference to the
fact that even during that period the Soviet Union had been attacked
by the TTnit^d States and other countries.
And to take it out of context and say, "This is tlie nature of the beast ;
this is the way all Communist countries are," and so when an underde-
veloped country like Vietnam begins to introduce land refonn and
cooperatives and literacy and medicine and to introduce what I prefer
to call economic democracy, a certain form of communism within
Vietnam, people hold it up and say this is — they will act and they are
like it — Mke Stalin in his worst day.
Mr. Watsox. Now, am I to understand, since you brought the ques-
tion back UP, that you are now modifying your condemnation of the
Communist aggression against Czechoslovakia?
Mr. Dellixger. It is really hard for me not to be unkind, but I will
try not to be.
Mr. Watsox. Well, von are cond^Muning
2728 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellingek. Is that the best you could get out of what I said?
Mr. Watsox. Are you condemning it or are you not ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am condemning the Soviet, the invasion of Soviet
Kussia.
Mr. Watson. But you
Mr. Dellinger. A Communist country.
ISIr. Watsox. Against another Communist country.
Mr. Dellinger. Against Czechoslovakia, another Communist
country.
Mr. Watsox. Oh, so your condemnation, then, is because the aggres-
sion was against another Communist country ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry.
Mr. Watson. That's an unfair question.
Mr. Dellinger. I am sorry. I didn't hear what you said at the end.
Mr. Watsox. Well, if you want to confer with counsel, I think coun-
sel might know what I am going to ask nest.
Go ahead.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. We have finished.
JMr. GuTMAN. Let me guess.
You are right, Congressman, it was a nonsensical question.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you have a question you wish to ask?
Mr. Watsox. In other words, your condemnation of the Soviet's
activities in Czechoslovakia, then, would in no way be affected by the
fact that Czechoslovakia was a Communist country and the aggres-
sion was against a Communist country?
Mr. Dellixger. I would have been opposed to that, whatever the
nature of the Czechoslovakian Government.
I certainly in no way, however, condemn the handful. I guess, up
until now, the handful of Czechoslovakian people who fell victim to
the Soviet guns, which weren't used veiw much because of the nature
of the situation, or would in no way condemn the Czechoslovakian
people who fell victim to the suppression of freedom.
Mr. Watson. Of course, you recall this came up in the context of our
discussion of whether or not you had been active in condemning
aggressive communism.
You had been very vocal in condemning imperialistic Americanism,
and so that's when the question came up. and so if you can — and, really,
in some of the publications that I have seen from your Ijibertarian
Press, I have failed to see very much defense, or criticism, rather, of
the communism — and so if you could sup])ly us with some of the issues
in which you have condemned aggressive communism, either against
Czechoslovakia or Hungary or any place else, it might be helpful, and
then I could say that really this man might have a little modicum of
objectivity in his writing.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. When the Soviet Union was invading Hun-
gary, I helped organize and spoke at a mass protest rally, and although
I think that very often the attacks upon the Soviet Union from this
country are prejudicial and do not reflect the facts accurately, none-
theless, whenever the Soviet Union or any other Communist country
employs totalitarian methods or invades another counti-y, I speak up
against it.
I have signed petitions and sent them to Moscow and I have spoken
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2729
in Moscow itself against the imprisonment, for example, of the Soviet
jntellectuals.
Mr. AsHBROOK. Judging fi'om vrhat you said, then, wouldn't one
exception be, at least what I figure, with the aggression from North
Korea and South Korea ?
I notice you specifically exempted tliat when you were talking
earlier.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellixger. I don't know how far you want to go into Koreii,
but let me say-
Mr. AsHBROOK. No, I just uote you specifically used that
Mr, Dellinger. I consider that the American people, suid I sup-
pose in a sense it begins with historians, but should delve back into
the history of the Korean war.
I think that that war took place at a time when the American people
were subjecting — were suffering from the brainwashing and the politi-
cal fears and fanaticism associated with the McCartliy period and the
cold war, and I think that they assumed, all too readily and without
sufficient evidence, tliat North Korea was the aggressor and that the
United States was somehow not fighting in Korea the kind of war
that most people noAv know it has been fighting in Vietnam.
I think that there were some differences between the war in Korea
and the war in Vietnam, but basically they represent the same phe-
nomenon, the attempt of American imperialism to control the lives
and societies of Asia and to control them for the profits and for the
sincere self-righteousness and fanatical missionary purposes of the
American people.
To try to say all that in a summary form, but I think that the as-
sumption that North Korea invaded ignores such things as the visits
of Secretary of State Dulles to Seoul immediately before the inva-
sion ; it ignores a whole lot of evidence. And in this case, amongst other
things, I would recommend that you read I. F. Stone's book on the
history of Korea, which was published in 1952 — I forget the title —
by Monthly Review Press, and I would be happy to send you a copy
if you would read it.
Mr. IcHORD. Am I to understand, Mr. Dellinger, that you feel that
if North Korea were to invade South Korea, the United States would
have no right to intervene in behalf of South Korea ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, we are getting "iffy," again, but I am opposed
to military invasions of one country by another. I think I have made
that clear. I think, however, that I have also made clear that I do not
think it behooves me, as a member of the privileged imperialist society
of the United States, to stand in judgment of the methods that the
victims used to try to throw off that imperialism.
I think the United States has driven a wedge through two countries
in Asia, besides infiltrating and overthrowing governments and assas-
sinating, and so forth, that I talked about in other countries. But in
Vietnam and in Korea it has taken a country and driven a line across
it, the same as if the Soviet Union or China or anybody else would
draw a line right across the United States and say, "Half of it we are
going to control because our system is better and because we have the
best interests, and the other half you can control."
And I think that in that kind of a situation I understand why the
2730 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
people of Korea want to tlirow off the corrupt dictatorship of Park,
hist like they wanted to throw off the corrupt dictatorship of Syngman
ilhee. I understand why they want to have the American military and
industrial interests withdraw so that they can run their own country in
their own way, and I am not — althou<2:h I will speak, as I said, in a
general way for nonviolence and in certain circumstances I will dis-
cuss it with people from Korea or Vietnam, if I am talking with
them — ^I don't feel that I have the moral or the political right to tell
them in their conditions what methods they should use to try to get rid
of American imperialism.
Mr. IcHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, a moment ago you made a statement
that you speak both in the American press as well as in the foreign
press on these various and sundry subjects.
I put to you the question, sir : Have you at any time over Havana
radio, which we have established you do communicate with, have you
at any time ever delivered a statement over the Havana radio, or an
interview, in opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia '?
j\Ir. Dellinger. Yes, I did.
Mr. CoNLEY. And would you give me the date, sir ?
Mr. Delt.tnger. Well, I can't give 3^ou the date. You apparently
have better records than I do, or keep them, but when I was in Chicago,
in the midst of the police riot, I ducked into the office at 407 South
Dearborn Street, was intending to be there about 15 minutes to take
care of some business or other and go out into action again, and some-
body said, '""^hero is a long distance call for j^ou." And T picked it up,
and it was Havana radio and they asked me some questions, and I
can't give you the exact words — you undoubtedly already have them,
or at feast in a version that went from English to Spanish to English
and was picked up, accurately or inaccurately, by somebody, but any-
*vay, in the course of that speech, whatever you want to call it, that in-
terview with Havana radio, I mentioned the fact that Chicago had
become the Prague of the United States, or the Prague of the Mid-
west, and I don't remember what else, but I clearly indicated mj^ op-
position to the Soviet, or implied — I don't want to exaggerate ; I think
I made it quite clear that I was opposed to the Soviet mtervention in
Czechoslovakia and that we were comparing the actions of Daley,
Daley and Humphrey's and Johnson's and Bailey's police, with the
actions of the Soviet troops.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention to this broad-
cast further, you were also asked the following question.
IVfr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir?
Mr. Dellixger. This is the same one.
Mr. Gttfmax. Back to the same one. I am sorry.
]\[r. CoNLEY. At the bottom of the page :
Mr. Dellinger, How do you view the possibility of a united struggle by militant
black and white elements on common nasesV
And, again, according to the broadcast, you replied in part as fol-
lows, and I am extracting from your reply certain paragraphs — and
you certainly are at liberty to add, if you wish to, but I do want
to establish these particular paragraphs — the first paragraph being
the last full paragraph on the bottom of the page :
I entirely favor the creation of a common front, a common goal, and unified
action. * * *
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2731
Then turning to the next page, sir.
Mr. Dellinger. In this case, I would have to ask that the next
sentence be read, because it is part of it :
But it is encouraging to see the black people developing their own strength, their
own sense of dignity, and confidence in their own strength.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right. Now, on the next page, starting at the be-
ginning, the first paragraph :
Because they suffer more directly and openly than the whites, the black popu-
lation is more advanced and nearer a revolutionary position. This is why they
have made themselves the natural leaders of the people —
And if I may move on to the last paragraph
Mr. Dellinger, I would like to add the part, "and this is deepening
both the blacks' " — excuse me —
"deepening both the blacks' and vrhites' political awareness
Mr. CoNLEY [continues reading].
.although there is some holding back in white communities.
As a white citizen, I think our immediate responsibility is to raise the white
segment's political awareness, thereby making ourselves better comrades of the
black community. * * *
And finishing up the paragraph —
and try to be better qualified to serve as comrades and allies with the black
•community.
Now^, Mr. Dellinger, I will ask you if those three particular para-
graphs which I have read to you from the transmission are substan-
tially statements which you did make on August 15.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, the words don't seem to be mine all the way.
I am not accustomed to using the word "comrade."' I might, you know,
to my lawyer or somebody in a certain very informal sense, but politi-
^-ally the term has been, you know, it was overused and misused and a
lot of things, and I just don't ordinarily speak in those terms.
This could have been entirely innocent, either in going from English
to Spanish or back, or in the hearing on the shortwave. I don't know.
But the general essence of the statements, I subscribe to, yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir. I have no concern with the particular
use of the word "comrade." Wliat I am wishing to ask you about is
this : What did you mean when you stated in these paragraphs that the
black population, being nearer a revolutionary position is, quote, to
use your words, "more advanced" ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have tried to make clear, publicly and
privately, at least since I spent 3 years in the Federal prison, that I
believe we need a revolutionary change in this country and I consider
myself a nonviolent revolutionist.
Now, leaving aside for the moment the question of nonviolence, I
"believe that the United States gave great hope to the world with
documents and aspirations such as those expressed in the Declaration
of Independence in 1776, but there were two fatal flaws. One of them
was that this document did not apply to the natives of the country, the
Indians, and it did not apply to the black people who were being
brought over here as slaves.
But there was also a flaw in that we introduced the highest form of
political democracy known in the 18th century, but we did not intro-
duce economic democracy. In fact, far the opposite.
2732 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
We introduced a very complex document which Adam Smith,
amongst others, enunciated mainly, and he was a very religious man.
He thought that that was— you know, he was sincere about it. He said,
•'If everybody works basically for his own selfish interests, through
economic and other competition, the invisible hand of God will make
thino-s turn out best for the community and the society as a whole."
I believe that this was totally, a hundred percent wrong, and I
believe that our failure to introduce economic democracy, together
with our failure to extend political democracy to all people, Avith or
without property, with white skins, black skins, red skins, or what—
our failure to do that has corrupted and led our society and our
system astray.
It doesn't mean that there don't remain to this day many good
aspects and many good impulses and many sincere aspirations and
many people who, even soldiers, who have gone to Vietnam and
dropped napalm, thinking they were doing it for a better society—
although I think they were tragically wrong — but I believe that our
society, particularly now, there has been the industrial revolution, the
electronic revolution ; we have the giant corporations. We have the —
how many million dollars was it that Nixon and Humphrey had to
spend to run for President ? We have all of the economic aristrocracy
and economic concentration of power which makes democracy an
illusion and a failure in this country.
And so I am for revolutionary change and I think that the black
people who have suffered from the w^orst aspects of our failure to be
genuinely democratic are therefore more sensitive to some of the
hypocrisy or some of the illusions involved in our system, and, there-
fore, they are more apt to adopt a genuinely revolutionary position
than most of us. And I use the term "revolutionary" in the sense of
drastic or basic. I do not use it in the sense of meaning that I should
go out and kill you, or you should go out and kill me. In fact, one of
the things that I am opposed to is a seizure of power.
I believe that what we need to do is to decentralize and democratize
power, both politically and in terms of the economic institutions of
the country.
So I am a revolutionist in that sense, and in that and in other senses,
because there is no monolithic approach to these things.
The black people, in fact, in ways that I and others can learn from,
have revolutionary instincts and instincts for justice and for freedom
that we are not so apt to have. So I look for some kind of united
struggle between those who feel in general as I do, those who are
upset over the failure of our system, the failure of us, for instance, to
be able to hold a democratic presidential election. We haven't voted
on the issues; we voted on personalities who have avoided the issues.
So people who are upset over that, or upset over the persistence of
poverty, people who feel as I do, that the war in Vietnam was not the
accident of a bad man in office, but feel that it grew out of these begin-
nings even in American history in which we have advanced steadily
across the continent, picking up parts of Mexico and islands that don't
belong to us, like Cuba and Puerto Rico and the Philipj^ines and
PInAvaii, and then have gotten to Vietnam.
The ]:)eople who are a little bit, at least, aware of that are horrified
by the napalm.
DISRUPTION OF 19 6S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CON'\XNTION 2733
I hate to put it just on the atrocities, but still it makes it more real in
terms of human flesh, but also by the spiritual indignity imposed upon
the Vietnamese people.
Even now, flying recomiaissance planes over their country -s\ hen -we
sav we are, you know, moving toward peace.
The people who feel that way, I Ijelieve, have a right and a responsi-
bility and obligation to unite with black people who have suffered the
things that the black people have suffered and to try, together, to
work to make the original promise of America and the aspiration
which many hold to this day. to make it a reality, to have a genuine
societv in which all men and women and children are equal and have
freedom and the kind of economic security and well-l>emg which cer-
tainly our technology' makes possible.
Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving your attention, if I may. to
another radio broadcast with Havana, Cuba, directing your attention
specifically to August 29. the day after the convention ended — —
Mr. Dellixger." That is the date on which I spoke about the Soviet
invasion.
Mr. CoxLEY. All right. Havana radio summarized another tele-
phone interx-iew it said it had with you, and this is not a literal trans-
lation, as I understand it, of your words. It is a smnmar\' by Havana
radio, which they broadcast, which we picked up and which has been
retranslated again, and if I may read this to you and then ask you if
it substantially states what you said at that time :
U.S. PACIFIST LEADER DAVID DELLINGER declared in Chicago that the
heroic fight of the Cuban people today serves as an inspiration to those who fight
in the United States to put an end to the criminal hand of the GoTemment of
Washington. Dellinger granted RADIO HABANA a telephonic interview in
connection with the demonstrations in Chicago that aim at halting the U.S.
aggression in Vietnam.
He added that the demonstrators had been brutally treated by tens of thous-
ands of polic-emen and soldiers mobilized in Chicago. The U.S. leader also said
that millions of his fellow-citizens had lost their faith in the so-called U.S.
democratic system and that they have decided to fight to end the war and to do
away with jwverty. exploitation, and racism in their home country.
Dellinger who is president of the National Committee of Mobilization against
The War in Vietnam and publisher of the magazine "LIBERATION" said that
the official position of the Yankee Government in the Paris talks is false and
hypocritical. You cannot ask the victim and the aggressor to reduce their military
operations at the same time, said David Dellinger, and he added : the one side
is fighting for its home coimtry and for its liberation and the other side is trying
to curb the aspirations of that people.
After pointing out that people in the United States are becoming aware of what
is really hapi)ening in Cuba, the prominent U.S. pacifist stated : If one appreciates
both the heroism and the dynamism of the peoples of Vietnam and Cuba, one
draws from two sources of enormous capacity.
David Dellinger concluded his statements made by phone to RADIO HABANA
CUBA with these words : We, Americans, are determined to liberate our country
in the same way ; may we also assure you of our solidarity.
Is this a fair account of what you said to Radio Havana, which was
transmitted back by them, and I am sure editorialized upon by them,
or whatever way tliey wrote their story, and then was retranslated
in this country (
Mr. Dellixger. "Well, first of all, I think you have very fairly
indicated, you know, the process that took place, and obviously, you
know, there are some phrases, again, which are not my phrases.
I have accused the United States of war crimes m Vietnam, con-
21-706 — 69— pt. 3 i
2734 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
trary to the Xuremberjj; nnd other judi>-ments. But I don't ordinarily
speak of the criminal hands.
It is not important. I think the Walker Commission, as well as the
evidence at the time, has clearly demonstrated, made clear, that the
demonstrators were brutally treated.
It is true that millions have lost faith in, I don't remember the exact
phrase, but in the way our "democracy," in quotes, is now operating.
I think it is clear that, Avell, according- to some estimates, perhaps
as many as 5 million people who normally in the past would have voted,
did not vote in the past election or, in the case of a minority of those
four or five million, voted for other candidates, selectively, but not
for President.
I wouldn't use the phrase "Yankee Government," but that is no abuse
on their part. That is simply, you know, semantics.
I do have here at this time stated that I think that one side in Viet-
nam is trying to fight for its homeland and its independence and its
own self-determination, and the other side, the United States side, is
trying to suppress their aspirations even though, as I have stated,
many people who, particularly in the early days, did this, did it quite
sincerely, out of illusions, I do believe — and these sound almost like
my exact words — that Cuba and Vietnam have provided a heroic and
dynamic
Mr. CoNLEY. "Heroism" and "dynamism."
Mr. Bellinger. Heroism and dynamism which has been an inspira-
tion to many Americans in this country because, although it is easy
for people to be disillusioned with our commercialism and our facade of
democracy, which doesn't really extend deep enough into everyday life,
it is very hard for people to get the energy and to have the dynamics
to fight for something better or even to dare hope that there might be
something better. And although there are thnigs in both of those
societies which are not of the best and although I think every people,
including the American people, must solve their own problems and
develop their own indigenous institutions and not import from any
foreign country, nonetheless, the attempt, the heroic and dynamic at-
tempt of the Vietnamese and Cuban people to build a world of brotlier-
hood and a world of human equality, I think that that offers some in-
spiration and also offers us some concrete examples of methods to look
into.
So I certainly — and I hope that the American people will liberate
themselves in a way similar. That is, I hope that the American people
will work out ways of getting rid of the undemocratic influence of
institutions like the United Fruit Company, which, for example, pre-
vented democracy in Cuba and prevents it now in most of Latin
America. I think we should free ourselves from the tyrannical and
antidemocratic power of corporations of that kind.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well, then, am I correct, Mr. Dellinger, that you, that
the statement, and particularly I am reading, "We, Americans, are
determined to liberate our country in the same way ; may we also assure
you of our solidarity." Is that a fair statement of what you said ?
Mr. I^ELLiXGER. Not — I am sure that this M'as undoubtedly innocent
on their part, or maybe it is not even necessary to say that because you
nmst put that in the context that thej^ continually referred to me as a
pacifist.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2735
So, obviously, when I said whatever they summarized that way, I
was not suggesting that we should go into the Grand Canyon or the
Rockies and organize a guerrilla force which would attempt to over-
throw the United States Government. It is contrary to my beliefs.
It is contrary to the practical possibilities for anybody who might even
be willing if they thought it would work.
So, clearly, as a pacifist leader, and this, I think, makes quite clear
that in Cuba, as in Vietnam, I have always identified myself as a
pacifist, and in that context, yes, I believe that the American people
should liberate themselves from the evils of corporations and of an
inadequate democracy which gives the illusion that people have con-
trol over their lives, which they don't really have.
Mr. CoNLEY. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Coimsel, in that regard, Mr. Dellinger, obviously
this broadcast is in error in one part, that it omitted your earlier al-
leged condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I saw
no reference to that, so it is in error that they omitted that.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes; and as a matter of fact, when I talk next
to my Cuban friends, who will not necessarily be Radio Havana, but
I will certainly, as a matter of interest, ask if they have a transcript of
what exactly was broadcast because I realize there are two possibilities
here: one, that whoever picked it up on the shortwave either missed
that, missed that, either intentionally or unintentionally. I mean, it
could have been broadcast and not added on in this.
The other possibility is that somebody in Radio Havana who dis-
agreed with my views left that out.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you ever have any of your statements edited ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. It happens in this comitry. It happens
elsewhere.
Mr. IcHORD. I have had that happen.
Mr. AsHBROOK. We wouldn't say Cuba is the only one that does that.
Mr. Dellinger. But obviously it is interesting to me because I never
heard the broadcast. And I wouldn't make it a major effort, but I will
inquire and see if I can find out how it happened, or what happened.
Mr. IciiORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention specifically to
August 26, Chicago, Illinois, early in the morning of August 26 in
Chicago, the police, according to reports, cleared out of Lincoln Park
some 1,000 people who had determined that they would spend the night
in the park, even though they had been denied a permit which was
in violation of the city ordinances, and there apparently was some free-
for-all there in the park and there was fighting and there were in-
juries sustained.
Mr. Dellinger. This is the morning ?
]Mr. CoNLEY. Yes. Early morning hours, actually, of August 26.
Mr. Dellinger. Oh, maybe like after midnight, 12 to 1, or
something.
Mr. CoNLEY. jSTow, were you aware, to begin with, that this ordi-
nance which denies a person the right to remain in the park was not an
ordinance of recent vintage in the city of Chicago, that this ordinance
had been in effect in Chicago, as it is in many other cities in the United
States, for a number of years, that closes parks at a particular time
in the evening ?
2736 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Bellinger. I was aware that this ordinance was, I believe, ad-
ministrative. Anyway, somebody had the power to suspend it because
on a number of occasions, ranging from the National Guard to, if I re-
member correctly, the Shriners — if not the Shriners, some group of
that kind — had had the ordinance sus^^ended and had been able to use
the park after 11 o'clock.
So I was aware that this really was in the discretion of the city ad-
ministration and I continually took the position and I was never able
to get to see Mayor Daley himself. But to his assistant and to a cor-
poration counsel and other people, I continually said that a city that in
the midst of a cruel war that was killing off hundreds of Americans
and thousands of Vietnamese every week, a city who invited the war
party, the administration which was conducting that war, to hold its
political convention, had to assume that along with that convention
would come thousands of protesters, and that just like the city had
a responsibility to provide traffic policemen and, oh, sanitary facilities,
if necessary, and first aid to accommodate a major football game or
a World Series or something of that kind, so, when it invited in a con-
vention and, automatically, protesters, it had a responsibility to pro-
vide the facilities for sleeping, for first aid, for all of the various
things that would both make it possible for those people to express
their democratic rights meaningfully and also protect whatever
citizens of Chicago or convention delegates or other people who were
in the city at that time.
Now, I was a little nervous about people pleeping in the p^rk. T
didn't think it was my riglit ro tell anybody whether they should slee]:)
there or not, but the Mobilization made a very serious attempt to
rent from the city Soldier Field or, we said, if that was unavailable,
any comparable facility.
We even offered — and at that time, I can tell you, we were in debt I
would guess at least $10,000 — but we offered to rent Soldier Field and
to pay $1,500 a night for it so people could have a place where they
could sleep and meet and gather and eat sandwiches or what have you
and not either be an interference with the other convention delegates
and other facilities or run into some of the exaggerated risks which
the city of Chicago was claiming would follow from the demonstra-
tors being there.
Mr. IcHORD. ISIr. Bellinger, at that point Mr. Hay den, I belicA-e. in
response to one of my questions, indicated that he entertained a con-
stitutional view that the first amendment right of freedom of assembly
was absolute and not subject to restrictions.
You indicated some concern about the existing ordinance and
whether it was effective or not.
I am wondering if you entertain the same view as to the first amend-
ment right of freedom of assembly.
Mr. Bellinger. Well
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Ichord. There is no trick to the question.
Mr. Bellinger. No, that's all right. I am not worried.
Naturally, I have not read the transcript, or anyway I have not
had an opportunity to read the transcript of wliat Mr. iflayden said.
Mr. Ichord. I understand.
Mr. Bellinger. So I would like to make mv own statement, witliout
reference to what he may or may not have said.
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2737
First of all, I thiiik that the right of people to assembly and to
protest for redress of grievances is extremely strong under the Con-
stitution. But anyway, at a time when, as I keep saying, people are
being killed, people are being oppressed, people are being drafted, all
this kind of thing, there is a tremendous urgency, which, as I indicated
earlier, means that I think we should set aside business as usual and
that there must be some inconvenience and some problems.
Now, within that, in other words, I am not interested in the move-
ment which has the token right to dissent, the token right to express
a differing opinion than that of the administration, but allows the
war to go on and these people to be killed and maimed and all the rest.
I am interested in a movement which will stop the war and which
v,'ill liberate the American people, as well as allow the Vietnamese
people to be liberated. And I think that one has a tremendous moral
and political obligation to act, to be effective, and to be successful, and
not just to express dissent.
Now, again within that framework, it has been my view that the
kind of liberation that I am talking about, and that in general the
movement stands for, is a humanist liberation.
I don't want to punish Congressman Watson. I want to give him an
opportunity to live a better life, a life in which you can enjoy, and
I hate — I don't mean to sound patronizing; I am afraid maybe it
does — but anyway, for all people.
Mr. Watson. You can punish
Mr. Dellinger. A life in which people can find the joys and the
satisfactions of brotherhood and peace, and not of boasting that they
have the highest consumer standard of living in the world, but of
boasting that they are the most honest and just and egalitarian
country in the world.
Now, within this framework, it applies to a lot of little things,
because I think big things grow out of little things, and it was not
my desire in Chicago or anywhere else, for example, artificially and
unnecessarily to interfere with the rights and the liberties and the
normal lives of other people. I wanted to challenge them; I wanted to
bring everything out into the open and have them have to face up to it
one way or another. But both in that interest and in the interests of the
Tippies, who were the most interested in sleeping in Lincoln Park, but
also a lot of other young people, I thought it would be better to let
them sleep in Soldier Field or somewhere of that kind.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, you and an earlier witness have equated
your request to use this part with that of the Shriners.
I don't happen to be a Shriner, but I applaud their effort and I be-
lieve that any objective person would conclude that their objectives
and their activities are 180 degrees from that of your organization.
But to get specifically to the point, do you know of any occasion
when a Shrine group has either requested or been granted permission
to sleep in Grant Park ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, first of all, let me say I am not very familiar
with the Shriners.
Mr. Watsox. Well, you mean you make the accusation, you and
others. Do 3'ou know of any time where they have either requested or
been granted permission to sleep in Grant Park ?
Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, I don't like you to
Mr. Watson. To ask these rather interesting questions ?
2738 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellingek. No. I am glad for the question. But I don't like
you to attribute views to me, or statements, that I didn't make.
I don't think I accuse<^l the Shriners of anything. I am not very fami-
liar with the Shriners.
Mr. Watson. Well, you made a reference earlier.
Mr. Dellinger. Wliat I said was that the city of Chicago had sus-
pended the ordinance and had allowed groups, including the National
Guard and including either the Shriners or some groups similar to
that, to use the park after the closing hours.
Now, I do not remember the full details, as I say. It could have been
somebody else, but I believe the Shriners. But this information was
even volunteered to us, or I was going to say by the assistant mayor of
Chicago. It is possible that it was first brought out by one of our law-
yers who did some researcli, and then assented to or, in other words,
the deputy mayor agi^eed that this had happened. But I was not making
any accusations and I was trying to be very precise.
I do not know whether they stayed there all night or what, but even
if nobody had done it before, we liave never had a war before which
had t]\e. majority of the population as aroused against it as this one.
And tliere is an obligation of the city to provide facilities and make it
}X)Ssible for the protesters, who are an inevitable accompaniment of
the convention, to make it possible for them to be there without being
subjected to beating, gassing, and other attacks, whether sporadic or
organized.
Mr. IcHORD. Well, I think your point is, then, Mr. Bellinger, you had
heard that it was used by the Shriners and you thought that it should
also be used by your organization.
Mr. Dellinger. I thought it should be used by us, by those demon-
strators who wanted to use it, before I heard that it had been used by
some other group.
But in response to the question, it was clear that this ordinance was
not absolute, that it was within the discretion of the city to suspend
that.
Mr. IcHORD. I don't care whether the ordinance was absolute or not^
but if there were no provisions in the ordinance for suspension, though
I happen to be a Shriner, I will say they should be enforced against the
Shriners just as much as they should be enforced against any other
group.
But go ahead. I don't think this is too relevant to our inquiry.
Let's proceed.
Mr. Dellinger. Just one summary sentence.
It seems to me that such an ordinance would yield to making the first
amendment rights effective in that situation.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, in connection with what we
started out here about the incidents in Lincoln Park, and I think per-
haps we will now get to the quotation that you had reference to, about
the Prague of the Middle West, later that morning you purportedly
held a press conference, that is, the morning of August 26 you held
this press conference in Chicago, and it was reported in the Chicago
newspapers. Now, whether this was also reported in Havana, Cuba, I
have no way of knowing. But this is what you said, quote :
We have achieved a tragic victory. We have forced the city of Chicago and
Mayor (Richard J.) Daley to bring out into the open the machinery of repres-
sions which makes this city the Prague of the Middle West.
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2739
Xow, I liave no information that indicates that Radio Havana ever
broadcast this. This statement was made, and it was made in the United
States to American reporters and was reported in the American press.
Mr. Dellinger. That is, as near as I can tell, an accurate presenta-
tion and that is substantially what I said at the relevant point in the
interview with Havana, also.
Mr. CoNLEY. Well, my question, anyway, is that, in view of this
statement, this quotation from you to the reporters in Chicago, and in.
view of your statements which you had made to Radio Havana, which
we have talked about earlier here, those made earlier, that it was your
intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and bring about violations of
the law and refusals of demonstrators to obey lawful orders of the
police, thereby compelling the police to use physical force to imple-
ment the law
Mr. Dellingee. You are reading that from something ?
I don't quite — I lost it.
Mr. CoNLET. My question, sir — I will repeat it to you.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, please. I am sorry.
Mr. CoNLEY. I want to read it to you specifically.
Mr. Dellinger, In other words, you have moved from my statement
now to a written question ? Right ?
Thank you.
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir.
In light of this statement which you made to the newspapers in
Chicago, in light of your earlier statements to Radio Havana, isn't
it a fact that it was your intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and
to bring about violations of the law and refusal of demonstrators to
obey lawful orders of the police, thereby compelling the police to use
physical force to implement the law ?
Mr. Dellinger. May I use an analogy ?
If you asked me, in view of what you tried to explain earlier about
being a nonviolent revolutionist, "Am I to conclude that you support
the suppression by Stalin of political opposition during the 1920's
and the 1930's," I would have to say you are off in another field.
That's not my language. I don't speak about fomenting. I don't
believe people can foment. I think that is an illusion, and one of the
problems that a committee like this has to think about.
That I could decide that, you know, if I were that kind of a person,
that I was going to foment all kinds of things, but if the people didn't
have grievances and the people didn't believe that they had something
to be gained by going on strike, or whatever it would be, nobody
would listen to me.
And many, many, many years ago, starting, I guess, with the fact
that I didn't want anybody to, quote, "foment" me, that is, for any-
body to tell me what to do,' and so forth, I never wanted to tell any-
body else what to do.
Where people don't know the facts about the war in Vietnam, I
will try to bring them to their attention. Where they have opposition
and want to figure out ways of opposing, I will sit down with them
and try to plan and join and work together Avith them.
But I never in my life tried to foment anything. This word, to me,
implies artificial introduction of unreal grievances and unreal prob-
lems in order to get people in trouble, and I am not interested in that.
2740 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY, Mr. Dellinger, we are off the subject, tliat-
Mr. Dellixger. That's your question. The answer is, "No," to tlie
question.
Mr. CoNLEY. No, no, that's not my question, I don't think.
I will put the question to you a different way, if I may.
We are not talking about the war in Vietnam right now. We are
talking about a simple question : Did the people who had been denied
a permit to be in Lincoln Park that night have the right to go into that
park, and in violation of the ordinance ?
Now, that's the basic question. Did they?
That hasn't got anything to do with the war in Vietnam.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. No, you see that's
Mr. GuTMAX. Can we confer just a moment?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. All right. So first of all, I have to respectfully dis-
agree, that I think the war in Vietnam has everything to do with it.
And I am sorry that even in the Walker Commission Report, which,
you laiow, points out some of the realities which, as I say, people
were attempting to sweep under the rug — I am sorry that it exists —
almost in abstraction from the war in Vietnam.
I shouldn't say that about the whole report. I haven't read it all,
but the sections that I have, excerpted from the discussion in the
pa])er, because I don't want to go to Chicago, nobody wanted to go to
Chicago in order to i^rove that in the American democracy you could
•demonstrate without being beaten and gassed and assaulted. We wanted
to go there to create pressures to stop the war in Vietnam and to put
an end to black oppression, put an end to the murder of people like
Bobby Hutton, the Black Panther I referred to.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, that's not what you said.
Mr. Dellinger. But except within that context, you can't under-
stand why people wanted to march down the street or why they wanted
to sleep in Lincoln Park or anything else, and on the legal question
about their right to stay in the park or not, I have already said that
I think — first of all, I am not a lawyer and I will defer that to some-
body else, except to say tliat I think such ordinances are subsidiary to
the first amendment rights, j^articularly in a time of national emer-
gency, such as this war, which is today still being fought in Vietnam.
Mr, CoNLEY. Sir, you make the statement, though, "We have
achieved a tragic victory," alluding back to what occurred in Lincoln
Park.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. "We have forced" — "forced"
Mr. Dellinger. Now, are you quoting me now, or are you quoting
yourself?
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, I am quotinii-you.
Mr. Dellinger. All right, go aliead, including it all.
Mr. Cx)nley [reads].
We have forced the city of Chicago and Mayor (Richard .7.) Daley to bring out
into the open the machinery of repressions which makes this city the Prague of
the Middle West.
Mr. GuTMAN. Tret's see the whole statement.
Mr. AsHBRooK. He had previously acknowledged it.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2741
That was the point I make.
Mr. Dellingee. It is from the press. Eight ?
Mr. CoNLEY. It is from the Baltimore Sun^^ if you want to make an
identification of where it is from.
Mr. Dellinger. Right.
Mr. AsHBROoK. It was in his preceding question before this one, his
acknowledgement.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, now, first of all, I believe that this is quite
accurate, and I may have indicated this before, quite accurate, quota-
tion. Certamly I would not fault it.
I would like, since you are interested in, you know, investigating
these events, to perhaps explain it a little bit and to put it into context.
That is, if I thought that our going to Chicago caused the United States
to develop methods of repression of democracy, I would think that I
would be sorry about this. I would be disappointed.
And even Avithin this context, I called it a tragic victory. That is, it
is my conviction that this repressive machinery already existed, is
being used far more severely and with far less pretense, in Vietnam
against the Vietnamese people, is used in the black communities of this
country, and since this repressive machinery exists and is used in emer-
gencies, I thought that there was a certain healthy educational effect
that at least I hoped we could draw from it.
I would have preferred — and I fought in every way I could with
the city authorities and talked with the Justice Department officials
and everybody else — I would have preferred for us to have the rights
to march peacefully down those streets.
I did not want myself or anybody else to have his head bashed in or
poisoned — well, not poison gas, I beg your pardon ; there are poisonous
aspects to it — anyway, the kind of gasses they used, tear gas and other
chemicals used. I didn't want any of that to happen.
We pleaded with the city. I said it Avas an emergency and asked that
this kind of tiling be avoided. But since they brought it out, then
there was a certain tragic educational value in knowing, in white
middle-class Americans knowing that this is what black people face.
this is what Vietnamese people face, this is what noncollege poor
people face, if they try to assert their rights and try to act as equals in
this country or with Americans in Vietnam.
Mr. CoNLEY. Is this what you are saying, then, that tlie tragic vic-
tory is for these kids to get beaten, and so forth, to demonstrate to the
remainder of the American people that which is wrong ?
Mr. Delltnger. No. It is like, vou know, people say, "Well, vou
staged these things for television, didn't you ?" So people would think,
you know, see them, and the implication being that they get some false
opinion.
The fact is, I would neA^er stage anything of that kind. I told you,
explained to you, my life has been devoted to opposition to violence,
even violence on the side of causes that I agree with and support, so
obA'iously I would not want any unnecessary violence to take place.
In fact, in one confrontation — more than one, but I tliink one par-
tipularly in the worst afternoon — we appealed to the policemen, some-
thins: that some people think is, you know, romantic, but we appealed
to them to understand that we were not trying to provolce violence or
1 "Police Boosting Response To Protesters In Chicago," Aug. 27, 1968, issue.
2742 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
to cause violence and that we wanted simply to assert our democratic
rights and that we wanted an end to the war in Vietnam, that tliey
were not our enemies. So obviously, I would not want to provoke
Mr. AsHBROOK. What about an appeal to the followers, Mr.
Dellinger ^
Mr. Dellinger. And, of course, appeals to followers.
"When the police brutally and viciously attacked the crowd in Lin-
coln Park, you know, it is not easy to know how you do, because also
there is an element of self-respect and solidarity with one's fellows
who are being attacked, and so in many people's minds there was a
question: Should the demonstrators counterattack the police or not?
Now, it was my judgment and mj' conviction that they should not,
and from the platform— I was chairing the meeting — I appealed to
people. And it was for that reason that we had organized marshals,
to handle situations of that kind. And our marshals, again told from
the platform of what was happening and using their own loud speak-
ers, a line of marshals went and got between the police and the demon-
strators in order to minimize or stop the violence, in order to stand as
a protective shield between the ])olice and the demonstrators, and also
to be sure that if, as happened in a number of occasions in Chicago,
police agents tried to get our people to attack in what I considered
would have been a suicidal mission and a mission which would have
confused and interfered with the presentation of what we stood for,
would have made everybody forget about the war in Vietnam, if police
agents tried to get that to happen, our marshals were in between.
So to our own followers and to the police, my position consistently
has been to avoid violence and to avoid provocation.
Mr. AsHBROOK. Let me say, maybe
Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, I think at this point it would be a convenient
place to stop.
]Mr. AsHBROOK. I would like to ask one more question.
I guess the point we can't seem to get together on, it would seem to
me a fairminded, rational person reading or hearing your statement,
"We have forced the city of Chicago" to do, et cetera, et cetera, would
be led to believe, as I truly am led to believe, that you in fact did fol-
low a course of action, the end result of which brought about what
happened, to your satisfaction.
You say, "We have forced" them to do something. I don't think it
is unreasonable to take the point of view : we followed this course of
action ; this course of action succeeded because it forced the police to do
this, which resulted in a tragic victory. And I think that's what
Mr. Dellixger. I can understand
Mr. AsHBROOK. This certainly isn't an unreasonable interpretation.
I think that's what the average citizen would think when you say,
"We have forced the city of Chicago" to do these things.
Mr. Dellixger. Well, I can understand that confusion, or, you know,
as to just what I had in mind.
I would like, maybe, to give an examjile.
It is as if you have a lily-white community — and we know there are
many of them in this country — where, by a number of intimidatory
methods, black people are discouraged from ever moving in and living
in the neighborhood. And for years nothing is ever done about it and
people congratulate themselves in this lily-white neighborhood, or
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2743
often it is — in the past and still in the present — it has been an all-
Christian neighborhood which excludes Jews.
People have congratulated themselves on living in a democracy and
a society of human brotherhood, and so forth ; but de facto, black peo-
ple or Jews or both, or sometimes Catholics, can't live in this kind of
community.
Now, if somebody decides, however, to go to that community — a
black person, a Jew, a Catholic — and to buy a house or to rent or to
live with his friends, and the community comes out and takes action
against it, I consider that tragic. And that is what I meant by tragic,
there, but I also consider it the beginning of education and the begin-
ning of a process which may correct that situation because j)eople
have been made aware that in effect black people, Jews, or Catholics,
or whatever it is, are excluded from that commmiity.
Now, I apply that to the situation in Chicago. I think Mayor
Daley — and Mayor Daley is not untypical of how most of our big cities
are run — I think he runs that city with a police force which, on many,
many, many occasions, just as a daily fact, does not hesitate to suppress
the rights of black people, suppress the rights of people who may look
poorly dressed or have long hair or what have you, or people that
they think are Communists or what have you. There is a lot of club-
bing that goes on. There is a lot of suppression of rights.
In addition, in the context of the war in Vietnam, where, after all,
many of the people used in times of civil disturbances of this country
are people who have been trained, and they get either sent to Vietnam
or they get sent to Detroit, in the black community, for example, or
they come back from Vietnam and go there, so there is also this ever-
present threat, as well as daily practice of repression.
Now, to bring that out in the open so that people can see what the
cancer is and to begin to deal with it and face up to it — it is tragic
that the cancer exists, but it is also necessary, sometimes, to bring it
out in the open.
Mr. AsHBROOK. But it would seem to me that, of course, you are
talking on a high plane ; you are talking on a very high plane
Mr. Dellingbe. It is the plane on which I try to operate.
Mr. AsiiBROOK. We are not — you are at least addressing yourself
on what I vrould consider a very high plane, but, also, the facts indi-
cate that the confrontation was brought about to some extent by those
who cursed, shouted obscenities, threw things, did things which I am
sure you don't condone. And what you are saying, in effect, is you did
not follow a course of action, the obscenities, the stone-throwing, et
cetera, to bring this about, and yet that is one of the factors that
helpecl bring it about.
That isn't what you mean when you say, "We forced the police."
Mr. Dellinger. Not forced them by any of those methods.
Mr. AsHBROOK, Bv using your own group, whatever you meant
by it?
Mr. Dellinger. No, by the fact
Mr. AsHBRooK. You have to admit that was a part of it.
Mr. Dellinger. By the fact that at last, you got — not entirely, be-
cause there were more whites, because there were more black people
there than is sometimes noted, but at last you got the students and
some of the white middle class, middle-aged community so opposed
to the war and so insistent that it be stopped that they were no longer
2744 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
content to play this role of meaningless dissent that I referred to, or
relatively meaningless dissent, but actually wanted to stop the war,
actually wanted to save the lives of the American soldiers and Viet-
namese people.
This was an accomplishment.
Now, when any movement gets serious about changing the existing
social structure, as not all of our movements, but large elements are
becoming increasingly serious about it, then they face the danger of
the kind of repression which ordinarily falls, and still falls heaviest
on black people, poor people, and various others.
Could I make — I know I would like to say one thing to clear up a
misunderstanding.
I have tried, as I said, to speak for myself and to be verj^ clear about
my own attitudes, convictions, and so forth.
I would not want to give the impression — it would not be fair to-
them — that our movement is, for example, the Mobilization is a pacifist
organization. It is not. It is a coalition of many different types. I
already said that.
Almost, well, in most occasions, a leading role is played by veter-
ans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean war, veterans
of the war in Vietnam. Obviously, many of those people do not share-
my views, whether it is about World War II or even Korea, so I have
tried to be clear about myself. But I am not trying to give a picture
that our movement is a universally pacifist movement.
Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, we can resume the testimony tomorrow
morning.
The Chair at this time will declare an adjournment until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., Wednesday, December 4, 1968, the subcom-
mittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968.)
(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives
Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)
SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968
DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION
Part 3
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1968
United States House of Representatives,
Subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activtites,
Washington^ D.G.
public hearings
The subconmiittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met,
pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Build-
ing, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of
Missouri, chairman ; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio ; and Albert W. Wat-
son, of South Carolina.)
Subcommittee members present : Representatives Ichord and Wat-
son.
Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank
Conley, special counsel ; Chester D. Smith, general counsel ; Alfred M.
Nittle, counsel ; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.
Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order, a quorum being
present.
At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday, we were in the midst of
taking the testimony from the witness in the chair, Mr. David Del-
linger.
The witness will be reminded that the affirmation continues. Now,
the Chair will again admonish — I do not mean this for all the mem-
bers of the audience, but there may be some who might be intent on
causing distraction or attempting to disrupt the hearing. The Chair
cannot tolerate any disturbances, such as boisterous conduct or any
activity that would distract the committee and the witnesses and the
counsel involved in these hearings. The Chair will admonish the audi-
ence that he will require strict adherence to the rules and that order be
maintained. Otherwise, the Chair will have to use his authority of ask-
ing that you leave the room. If you do not comply with the request,
then the officers will have to be directed to escort you from the room.
With that admonition, Mr. Counsel, will you resume questioning of
the witness.
2745
2746 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
TESTIMONY OF DAVID DELLINGER, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL.
JEREMIAH S. GUTMAN— Resumed
Mr. GuTMAN, Mr. Chairman, I want to put on the record we continue
with the same objections with which we prefaced our testimony yes-
terday. I also would like to repeat on the record the request I made
of counsel yesterday, which I think got on the record, and that is that
we be provided with copies of all documents from which readings have
been made, whether or not they have been intioduced in the record.
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair thought, perhaps in connection with another
witness, that he did state that the transcript would be printed as
quickly as possible, and, of course, the transcript will be available
to you.
Mr. GuTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What I had reference to was the document from which the counsel
was reading yesterday wliile he questioned the witness and from which
extracts were read into tlie record.
Mr. IcHORD. Of course, the counsel, I am sure, prepares his own
notes, Mr. Gutman. Some of them would be his own notes.
Mr. Gutman. I don't expect to receive his notes. But he was reading
from a transcript of a Havana radio broadcast. Two separate broad-
casts. He was reading from news articles, from letters allegedly signed
by Mr. Dellinger. I would like to liave copies of all tliose documents.
Some of them I saw and were taken away from me. Some I have not
even seen.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, will you come forward, please, both
counsel.
(Chairman and counsel confer.)
Mr. IcHORD. Let the record show that the request made by the
attorney for furnishing copies of all of the documents which the
attorney might use is denied for the reason tliat it does constitute, in
the Chair's opinion, an undue burden on the statf of the committee.
Mr. Gutman. If I can borrow them for 10 miinites, I can Xerox
them and give them back.
Mr. IcHORD. Let us have order, Mr. Counsel.
These documents, the Chair has been informed, are newspaper ac-
counts and also refer to transcripts from Radio Havana. I am sure
they are available to counsel by other means. The Chair considers the
lequest unreasonable and will deny it, and Ave will let the record show
that.
Proceed, gentlemen.
Mr. Bellinger. May I ask a question ? When the documents are used
and parts are read, will the entire document appear in the transcript?
I would like to have the whole evidence in.
Mr. IcHORD. Those documents that have been admitted in the record
will appear in the transcript.
Mr. Gutman. The documents I liave reference to have not been
marked in evidence, so far as I know. I request that they be marked
in evidence so that they can appear.
Mr. IcHORD. The counsel refers to the documents. The record will
stand as made. Let us proceed, Counsel.
^W. Gftman. T most respectfully except.
Mr. IciioRD. The record will show the request is denied. Let us abide
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2747
by the rules. We got along very well yesterday. Let us see if we cannot
do the same today.
Mr. GuTMAN. We will get along fine as long as I don't assert my
constitutional rights.
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will admonish the attorney that _we are
functioning under the rules of the House and the rules of this com-
mittee. The Chair will point out that the rights of the counsel, con-
stitutional rights, are not being infringed upon.
Mr. GuTMAN. Of the witness, sir.
Mr. IcHORD. And of the witness and of the counsel. The Chair has
read many times the rules governing this procedure. I point out, I did
not think it was necessary, but I shall point out again ^
Mr. GuTMAN. I waive the reading of that, sir. I am familiar with
the rule.
Mr. IcHORD. I think it is necessary in view of what has proceeded
here. It has been read to the counsel many times.
This is not a criminal proceeding. This is a proceeding to gather
facts. We have gotten along very well. The witness is not on trial;
he is not sought to be punished. The Chair does not intend to use this
committee, and I will state that the Chair does not even have the
authority to punish the witness for any activity of his outside of this
hearing room, and it is not the intent of the Chair, and I shall never
use this committee or any other committee which I might be chair-
man of for that purpose.
Now, the rules have been read. I think they have been very clear.
The rules of court procedure do not prevail in this body and for good
reason. The purposes, the objectives, are completel}^ different. Now,
let us proceed, Mr. Counsel, and let us have order.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may direct your attention back to
about June 29 of last year, and basing the present questions on certain
articles which appeared in the W a.shington Post of June 30, the articles
in the Post of June 30 indicate that a press conference was held by you
and other members of the National Mobilization Committee in New
York City on June 29, and at that time you revealed some of your
plans and goals in connection with the Democratic Party Convention
in Chicago.
First of all, let me ask you. Do you remember this particular press
conference back on the 29th of June ?
Mr. Dellinger. Not as yet. I don't remember the date or the occa-
sion. We sought to make our views publicly known as often and as
much as possible, but I don't remember that specific date.
Mr. CoxLEY. Perhaps if I give you a specific quote from that con-
ference it will recall it to your mind.
At that particular conference, according to the report published in
the Washington Post under date of June 30, 1968, you stated as fol-
lows: That your activities in Chicago would consist of, and I use the
quotes from the article, a "period of several days of escalating actions
climaxed by a massive mobilization at the time of the nomination."
Do you recall this particular statement ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. Did you also state at that time that the tactics to be
used, and I again quote from the article, "will be fixed as events
unfold" and that "massive direct action" would be one of them.
2748 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. GuTMAN. Are you reading from an article, sir? Do you have
a copy of that ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. GunviAN. May we keep this copy ?
Mr. CoNLEY. No, sir. That is the only copy I have, sir.
(Document handed to witness and counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. In reading this I find it incorporates the correction
that I was going to make. If I understand you, and I hope the record
will show this, you said that "events would include massive direct
action."
What it says is that " 'massive direct action' could include picket
lines, sit-ins, roving sound trucks and street performances by theater
und rock music groups."
Obviously, a very small part of this is in direct quotes, and it is not
a direct statement by me. But in general it describes the kind of action
which we envision, with the emphasis upon the fact that tactics will be
fixed as events unfold. That is my general approach, that we are not
doctrinary and we are not stereotyped and that we interact with other
people who are present and with events.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now, the first part of it, of course, dealt with the
"period of several days of escalating actions climaxed by a massive
mobilization at the time of the nomination."
Do you iind that? It is a little earlier in the same article.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I find that. I would like to see activities to
stop the war escalate from now until the war is stopped. Ceitainly
those are my sentiments and they were my sentiments at that time. I
advocated then, and I advocate now, massive actions and small actions,
too, and escalating as much as possible until the war is stopped and the
lives of the Americans and Vietnamese who are being needlessly
killed are saved, until every American soldier is brought home.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this in connection with
those two remarks which you have indicated were made and placed
jour own interpretation on them : Isn't it a fact that as early as June
1968, at this particular press conference in New York City, you cer-
tainly, at least in the back of your mind, considered as a possibility
that violence would occur as a result of these proceedings which were
going to occur in Chicago ; did you not ?
Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment.
Mr. Conley. Sir
Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness confer with his attorney.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. Of course, you have made a complete non sequitur
there because I called for escalating actions to stop the war in Vietnam
and to end oppression of the black community.
You have made some connection that I expected or wanted violence.
The fact is that I called for this kind of action long before June.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, my question did not say you were calling
for violence. My question was, and I will repeat it : Didn't you at least
consider that there was a possibility that tliere would be violence stem-
ming from these demonstrations in Chicago? I don't think you need
to read more into the question than what I ha^-e asked you.
iSIr. Dellinger. It was more than a possibility that the I''^nited
States Government would commit violence against people trj'ing to
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2749
assert their democratic rights, whether in this country or in Vietnam,
because they were already imposing that violence upon the people of
Vietnam, upon the black community.
They had imposed it upon me and other objectors before. So I would
be a fool to think that we could assert our democratic rights in this
country and we could work against war and for peace and justice with-
out running the risk of the kind of police riot which the Humphrey-
Johnson-Bailey-Daley forces unleashed at Chicago,
This is one of the risks of the game, but w^e are unwilling to be silent
and to protect ourselves while Americans and Vietnamese and black
people are suffering,
Mr, CoNLEY. You have admitted the fact that you, then, consid-
ered the possibility that there would be governmental violence, if I
may use a broad term. Don't you also admit that there was also a pos-
sibility that some of the people involved in your movement might be
involved in violence themselves?
Mr, Dellinger, Well, our movement does not plan or provoke or
organize violence,
Mr. CoNLEY. I appreciate that your movement does not. My ques-
tion, though, is : Did you not anticipate or foresee the possibility that
some of the people participating in your movement would or could
engage in violence in comiection with the Chicago demonstrations?
Mr. Dellinger. My concern about violence at Chicago was that the
police and the Federal authorities would employ violence. That was
the major danger and the major cause.
Mr. CoNLEY. You never considered the possibility that some group
affiliated with you in this effort or some individual affiliated with you
in this effort might not himself, or themselves, engage in acts of
violence ?
Mr. Dellinger. In any action there is always the possibility that
somebody will engage in acts of violence. But I have had enough ex-
l)erience with our movement, and particularly coming up to Chicago,
to know that historically and in terms of probability the threat of
violence comes from the authorities and not from the demonstrators.
Mr. CoNLEY. History tells you this, that it comes from the authori-
ties and not from the demonstrators ?
Mr. Dellinger. The history of my participation in the antiwar
movement has been that when we seek to assert our rights, when we
seek to try to stop injustice or war or violence, that the authorities
on many occasions, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, use
violence.
Mr. CoNLEY. We have spent much time here now on these questions
answering that the authorities used violence. There are a number
of reports that would indicate that the police did over or under, or
whatever they did, react. We are not askmg you about this.
I am asking you about the people that you felt — I hesitate to use
the word — responsible for. Did you consider that some of these people
w^ould use violence ? It is a very simple question.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I think you should hesitate to use the word
"responsible" because ours is not the kind of movement in which some
individual or small group controls the others. We created a frame-
work and we issued a call and we did our best to organize and invite
people to come. But we do not exercise a strong talk-down leadership.
21-706 O — 69 — pt. 3 5
2750 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY. Still, as a person very definitely committed to this
movement, did you as an individual or as part of the steering com-
mittee consider the possibilities that people from within your move-
ment or affiliated with your movement would engage in acts of violence
in Chicago?
Mr. Dellinger. But whenever we come up to an action of any kind,
naturally, in my own thoughts and sometimes in discussions with
others, I try to consider all of the possibilities.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying, sir, then, that you did consider this
as a possibility ?
Mr. Dellinger. I will say — I haven't said yet — but as we ap-
proached Chicago and as I considered all of the possibilities, the thing
that weighed heaviest on my mind and the thing that I was most
concerned about in the area of violence was that the Chicago police
would act as they did and that the political authorities would not have
the courage to stop this, as they could have stopped it in advance.
In fact, the political authorities, going all the way to the White
House and the State Department, might very well wished to have this
kind of violence, either in order to seize the initiative on the law and
order issue from the opposition or in order to intimidate the growing
antiwar sentiment by picking on what I wnll call the more militant
and more active group at Chicago, indicate to other people that even
though they might not like the war they had better not speak up too
much and they had better not stick their necks out too much.
I think this organized and intended political violence on the part of
the Government could very well be a complement or supplement to
such political trials as the Spock-Coffin-Raskin-Goodman trial in
Boston.
Obviously this was a veiy unpopular war. People were becoming
disillusioned with American foreign policy. Obviously people were
unwnlling to have their sons killed in Vietnam, and obviously the
Government was making a determined effort in a variety of ways
to intimidate people and to prevent them or discourage them from
exercising their conscientious and democratic obligations.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, in this same area, if I may take you
back to March 26 of this same year, the New Ym^k T'nnfH published
a rather lengthy accomit of a press conference held by you and other
planners of the Chicago convention.
You held it at a camp near Chicago on March 28 and 24. Do you
recall the meeting to which I refer?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I do.
Mr- CoNLEY. You apparently held a i)ress conference, or it was at
least reported by the Times on the 26th of March, i)age 28
Mr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir.
Particularly, I want to direct your attention to a statement — it is
not in quotes — in the article. It is apparently the judgment of the
Times reporter, based upon what you said :
Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demon-
stration tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.
Now% did you make a statement of that type to a reporter from the
New York Times?
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2751
Mr. Bellinger. First, may I call your attention — since you called
attention to the interpretation of the reporter — to the two headlines.
The main headline is "PEACEFUL PEOTEST IN CHICAGO
VOWED,'- which is a strong word. Secondly, the "Group Says It
Doesn't Plan to Disrupt Convention."
However, if you remember, Mayor Daley and the authorities con-
tinually used the claim that we had announced we were going to
disrupt the convention as a basis for denying us ordinary permits,
for threatening all kinds of violent action against people w^ho came
to Chicago.
Mr. CoNLEY. Let us go down those specific
Mr. Dellinger. Now, when it comes to your quote, not a quote
Mr. GuTMAN. About 20 paragraphs down the article.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. Perhaps I should just glance briefly at the
rest of it —
they attacked Mayor Richard J. Daley, charging him with planning uncon-
stitutional repression * * *.
This was as early as March 26, and yet the Federal Government-
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, I don't object to your going ahead and
explaining your answer. Let us answer the question first.
Mr. IcHORD. Let us have order. Let us start over again. Put the
question.
Mr. CoNLEY. The question is. Did you make a statement similar to
the one I have read :
Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration
tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.
Let us get to that and then to yours.
Mr. Dellinger. Since I had a lengthy meeting with a reporter, which
was then summarized here, I think that it is important to try to estab-
lish the context and the overall impact of what I was trying to say.
I have already indicated that the headline and the early sections
make clear our emphasis upon a peaceful protest and our attempt to
warn the Federal authorities and the American people of the repression
planned by Mayor Daley. I certainly will answer your question about
this paragraph, but I would like to put it in context. It is at least 6 or 7
or 8 inches down the story.
I do object somewhat to your taking it out of context. I will skip
over things I could comment on in between 8 inches. I will point out
early we warned against the dangers of oppression. The Federal au-
thorities took no overt action. Mayor Daley, who certainly is not
independent — he is interrelated with the whole Democratic Party and
the whole administration — certainly did not proceed entirely on his
own.
I want to bring this out because it is very important in terms of the
Walker Commission Report wliich has come out now. As someone
ix)ints out, the worse things get in the United States, the better the
reports in the post factum analyses get.
I think it is very important that the American people be not deceived
in thinking that this problem of protection of constitutional rights
and resistance to unlawful exercise of police authority has been taken
care of by the fact that first they had the evil and then afterwards there
is a report which seeks to tell at least some of the truth about it.
2752 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Now, when it comes to this — well, just one final comment on the
preceding thing. Our prediction was that, basically, if there was
violence and if there was repression, it would come from the authorities
and not from the movement.
Now when it gets down here it says :
Mr. Bellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration
tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.
Well, that is part of my very strong and our very strong democratic
conception, namely, that we do not own the movement. We do not
dictate the tactics which other people employ. Perhaps when we select
a date, as we selected the date of October 21 and 22, 1967, to protest
at the Pentagon, we controlled most, if not all, of the conditions —
well, most of the conditions would be a fairer way — and we exercised
more control, or tried to exercise more control over the nature of
what takes place.
But in a national event such as a Democratic Convention, the con-
vention of the ruling war party, it would be presumptuous of any-
body to say we have staked off this event in this city and we are
going to control everything that happens there.
We could not control the McCarthy delegates, the Humphrey dele-
gates, the Ted Kennedy people who were working in conjunction
with Mayor Daley to try to get a draft for him. We could not control
any other people who might be coming to Chicago.
We simply indicated that if some other group was carrying out
whatever form of activity that it believed in and wanted to par-
ticipate in, whether inside the convention, such as some of the groups
I have mentioned, or in one of the hotels or in the streets or any-
where else, it was not our responsibility or our concern or our
right to dictate to them what they should do.
Mr. CoNLEY. So this, then, is a fair and attributable statement to
you, then ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think the statement I have just made is a fair
and attributable statement. That is an expression of my views. The
other is an expression of a reporter's attempt to summarize in one
sentence something that I have explained more fully. And I would
like what I have said to stand as my views, rather than what the re-
porter said.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, at that point you have stated, as I
understood you, that you did have control of the Pentagon demon-
stration. Do you mean by that, that the Mobilization Committee
was the only group that participated in the Pentagon demonstra-
tion ?
Mr. Dellinger. No ; what I said was that when we select a target
and date and call for a demonstration, obviously we take on more
responsibility than in an event such as the Chicago Democratic
Convention.
However, even there, the Pentagon and the ground surround-
ing it are public property, and we do not have either the right or
the power to control everybody who decides to come at that time.
In that case, because we did select the date and issued the call,
if we heard of other people who were planning to participate, I
mean planning to come, we made a determined effort to contact
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2753
them to find out what their plans were and to attempt to coordinate
our activities.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, with your explanation of this statement
in this article, I will put to you this question, which I think is answer-
able with a rather specific answer. Did you, at the time you made
this statement which you have elaborated on for our benefit here this
morning, have any particular groups in mind, which were a part of
the coalition or who would become a part of the coalition, who might
possibly be motivated towards acts of violence ?
Mr. Dellinger. No. In my elaboration of the reporter's statement,
I have referred to the McCarthy people, the Ted Kennedy people.
Obviously there were other groups, many of whom we would not even
know.
To the best of my recollection, remembering that this was, what,
last March, and this is a reporter's summary of, of a meeting with him,
I certainly have no recollection of any particular groups of the kind
you are talking about.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are you saying that you suspected that possibly the
Kennedy or the McCarthy people might be prone to violence ?
Mr. Dellinger. As a matter of fact, most of them do believe in
violence. They enforce the American Armed Forces, and Senator Mc-
Carthy has said that he thinks our commitment to Taiwan is very
important. And he supports NATO and has criticized the President,
not for having maintained NATO, but for having not handled the
situation in a way that would make it possible for France to stay in.
Of course, the people running for .the Presidency of the Unil^ed
States on the major tickets are all endorsers of the imperialist vio-
lence that the United States does impose on the world. In terms of
my concern with violence, and, as I said, this is the major violence
that our society has to face
Mr. Conley. Let us relate the violence to Chicago, not the world
situation.
Mr. Dellinger. Chicago was taking place in context. We were going
to Chicago because we liked to march up and down the street even
without getting beaten over the head. That is the main issue, the
fact that the U.S. Government is promoting violence and practicing
violence all over the world. That is what brought us to Chicago and
also in the ghetto.
Mr. CoNLEY. We are concerned with what, if any, violence occurred
in Chicago. I would like for us to be using the term in that sense.
Mr. Dellinger, I just want you to put it in this context because
that is the important violence. This is the case of — what is it from
the Bible — of looking at the moat in the other fellow's eye and not
observing the beam in your own eye.
For the U.S. Government to be upset over the fact that some people
might be so opposed to the war or so horrified about it that they might,
in self-defense or some other way, engage in some act that they might
consider violence, is perhaps one of the greatest obscenities of our age.
I am sure that future historians will consider this a subject for
satire and tragic humor.
Mr. Conley. Besides the McCarthy and Kennedy people, whom
you have identified as groups you thought possibly could engage in
acts of violence, what other groups do you have reference to?
2754 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Bellinger. I try to be very precise about these things because
there are a lot of subtleties^ and I did not talk about the McCarthy
and Kennedy groups engaging in violence in Chicago. I talked about
their endorsing violence abroad.
Now, as it happened, I think that in some cases they either endorsed
or acquiesced in the violence of the Chicago police against us. Cer-
tainly, even Senator McCarthy did not speak out until after 3 or 4 days
of brutality. It was not until the end of the convention, and his own
headquai-ters had been invaded and his own supporters bloodied, that
he made some mild statement against it.
Certainly one of the disappointments of the time was that a man
who wanted to be an idealistic leader of youth, or at least w^as described
as such, had nothing to say during the violence. I didn't say I expected
them to take part directly in the violence themselves.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are there any other groups that you did anticipate,
foresee, suspect, or contemplate might engage in acts of violence, other
than those groups that you have already identified ?
Mr. Dellinger. Like the National Guard and the U.S. Army and
the police and the undercover agents.
Mr. CoNLEY. Groups who would be there generally with the same
purposes as your group or as part of your coalition ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I really don't have any particular memory of
such groups.
Mr. CoNLEY. Why would you make a statement, or a statement gen-
erally attributable to you, like this, that you would not try to impose
peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups ? There must have been
feX)mething brought to your mind.
Mr. Dellinger. I just spent about 5 minutes explaining the nature
of the occasion and the nature of our approach to it and why we did
not seek to dictate to other groups — this wide spectrum of people
who might be in Chicago — dictate how they would act. This whole
business, I simply refuse to speculate about the possible motives and
the possible methods and actions of the wide spectrum of American
people.
Mr. Conley. You did speculate in this statement that has been
attributable to you. You did speculate?
Mr. Dellinger. You are really going a long way on the basis of one
sentence by a reporter, which is not even a direct quote.
Mr. Conley. If we may move on, sir, to August 4, 1968. This is
administrative meeting of the National Mobilization Committee held
in the city of Chicago. The document I am about to read from is a
document which has been previously testified to in these hearings by
Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department.
Mr. GuTMAN. May we have a copy of it, please ?
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, just as soon as I get through with it.
This document, I believe, has been made a part of the exhibits of this
hearing.^ I particularly direct your attention to page 3, the last para-
graph : "The discussion moved to the massive march"
Mr. GuTMAN. Hold it ; let us see what it is.
This is a summary of administrative meeting held
Mr. IcHORD. Let us abide by the rules.
1 Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 25." See pt. 1, pp. 2348-2352, of Oct. 1, 19ft8,
hearings.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2755
Give the attorney and his client the opportunity to examine the
document.
(Witness and counsel examine document.)
Mr. Dellinger. It was quite long, but I have finished it.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now, sir, to get us back where we were a moment ago,
as I say, this document has been previously offered and received by
the committee. The entire document is in evidence and is part of the
transcript, I believe.
It is a document that was testified to earlier in these proceedings by
Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department. I want, if I may,
to direct your attention specifically to the last paragraph, beginning
on page 3, which reads as follows:
The discussion moved to the massive march proposal, analyzing the various
routes to the Amphitheatre and the length of the different routes. Dave pointed
out that calling for an action not relating to the Amphitheatre on the 28th was
ignoring the natural magnetism of the place, that the media would would [sic]
be at the Amphitheatre, and that the necissity [sic] of having the military sur-
round masses of i^eople at a democratic convention would lend political con-
tent to the action. There was a discussion on the possibility of proceeding in the
face of a curfew threat or denial of a permit. It was pointed out that Mob has
rallied people before without a permit, and that insistence on fulfilling an an-
nounced aim made a strong bargaining position in negotiating a permit. A curfew
according to Bob Greenbatt, would be clearly an oppressive measure to be dis-
obeyed. If a curfew is imposed. Otto Lilj'enstolpe suggested volunteers be urged
to disobey in order to force the city into the predicament of mass arrests.
Now, sir, my question, after reading to you that quotation, is : Are
you the Dave mentioned in that paragraph ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I assume that I am.
Mr. CoNLEY. Does the paragraph accurately summarize one of the
discussions at the meeting, indicating, as it does, that you apparently
strongly urged that there be a march on the Amphitheatre?
Mr. Dellinger. I certainlj;, before that time, at that time, and after
that time, strongly urged that there be a massive march to the Amphi-
theatre. I changed your word "on" to "to.''
Mr. CoNLEY. Now, quoting from the same document, directing your
attention to the paragraph on the top of page 5 of the same document :
When the nonviolent line was questioned, Dave explained that Mob included
groups whose beliefs ranged from pacifism to militant self defense. While our
aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence. Mob
has never repudiated the actions of its constituents. It will be stressed, in addi-
tion, that it is well known that Chicago police are responsible for violence. * * *
Now, does that quotation, Mr. Dellinger, also accurately reflect a
discussion at the meeting and your role in that particular discussion ?
Mr. Dellinger. Obviously it is a very pithy summary of the dis-
cussion which, if I remember correctly, took at least or about half an
hour. I think that what is clear there — well, even in this report, which
I am glad I took an opportunity to resvd earlier, there is a specific
reference to the very great violence employed by tlie Chicago police
on April 27, the peace march in Chicago, which was under the spon-
sorship of the Chicago Peace Council and the National Mobilization
Committee.
So there was nothing artificial. This plus reports that we had of
many oppressive police actions against the black residents of Chicago,
against hippies and other groups. So the reference to the violence of
the Chicago police was not abstract. It was in this kind of context. I
2756 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
pointed out yesterday, after making clear my adherence to the total
nonviolence, that I pointed out that the movement as a whole includes
many diverse groups and, as a matter of fact, the activities are often
led by veterans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean
war, and even veterans of the war in Vietnam.
So this is the kind of thing I was pointing out in this diverse group,
that although for tactical reasons and practical reasons of where we
were operating and how, the entire group advocated nonviolence, none-
theless, our constituency included people like veterans and many others
who do believe in militant self-defense.
Militant self-defense was, on some occasions, employed on the actual
scene in Chicago, and true to this statement — and I think quite prop-
erly— neither I nor any other pacifist I know of has repudiated acts
of self-defense, even though we ourselves might not have participated
in them.
Mr. IcHORD. Even you as a pacifist believe in the right of self-
defense ?
Mr. Dellinger. There are various forms of self-defense.
Mr. IcHORD. I don't want to get into the discussion of various juris-
dictions on laws of self-defense.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I have been attacked by police and others
without striking back. I believe it is possible to maintain a militant
and noncooperative posture in such a situation without choosing the
method of combat adopted by the police. This happens to be the view
of probably a minority wnthin our movement, but this is the distinction
which was being made here because there were, for example, I remem-
ber some Quakers and pacifists who had come from some distance to
this meeting who do not adopt methods of physical self-defense when
attacked, as I do not.
And there were others who feel that the more manly and success-
ful and militant thing to do, if you are attacked by the police, is to
resist physically.
We were trying to show that our movement comprised both groups,
and it was not — and that neither need repudiate the other and that,
given the practical situation in Chicago, we could all work together
for a united impact.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, moving back in this article and, again,
like that earlier article that we had the small quote from, reading spe-
cifically from the interior of this article :
While our aim is
Mr. loHORD. The article, Mr. Counsel, or the minutes ?
Mr. CoNLEY. The minutes, I am sorry, page 5 :
While our aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence,
Mob has never repudiated the actions of its constituents.
This is a sentence drawn from within this larger statement. The
statement starts out saying you do not advocate violence, as I under-
stand it, but it says you do not repudiate the actions of your
constituents ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I made clear yesterday that I do not repudiate
the actions of the Vietnamese or the Cubans in fighting for the lib-
erty and advancement of their country, and in the same way I do not
repudiate, in fact I try to support in a variety of ways the Black Pan-
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2757
thers, who, in their dilemma and the injustices they suffer, do not take
a pacifist position. And in the same way in Chicago, although I myself
would not and did not throw stones, for example, against charging
police, I can understand and I have a great deal of sympathy with
some of my colleagues who feel that when the police viciously attack
a crowd of people and are advancing that way, that the moral position
is to resist them, including by physical means.
This kind of self-defense — as I say, the Mobilization includes both
approaches to that, and sometimes it leads to some tensions or prob-
lems that have to be worked out. But we have never repudiated either
the pacifists, who, in the face of a charging police, will perhaps lie
down or sit down or do something else, Jbut not try to fight them off,
or the other group, who may on occasion try to defend themselves with
their fists or whatever other instruments are handy.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, does this not mean really, then, that you
do not condone violence on the part of persons participating with you
in a demonstration ?
Mr. Dellinger. Do not condone it ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Do not condone or do condone. Which do you choose,
sir?
Mr. Dellinger. I choose what really runs all the way throug;h this.
I think you are straining at one point here which for one thing — I
stand by this statement that you are excerpting, but all the way through
the emphasis is on planning and organizing and conducting nonviolent
actions.
That was our plan. There were people there who think there is a
time when nonviolence is inadequate, but who felt, in the situation at
Chicago, for tactical reasons it was necessary to be nonviolent because,
otherwise, people would be unnecessarily brutalized and the issues
would be obscured and we would not focus on what we were there for.
I won't give all of their reasons.
Mr. Conley. You do, then, condone violence on the part of people
participating with you, do you not ? You do not repudiate it.
Mr. Dellinger. Is it better that my views be expressed in my words
or yours ? I have expressed them at great length, I think. I am a little
embarrassed to keep repeating my sentiments. I would rather not have
my views put in one sentence by you with your choice of words. I find
these matters very complicated.
Mr. IcHORD. We are dealing, Mr. Dellinger, with very subtle
distinctions.
Mr. Dellinger. Right.
Mr. IcHORD. As I understood, for example, on desertions by the mili-
tary, you stated that you did not advocate desertion by the military.
I don't know what your words were, but you approved desertion or you
condoned desertion.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. If I had the opjjortunity tonight at a public
meeting, I would say that I think American soldiers should not com-
mit war crimes and that I will support anybody who decides either to
refuse orders to go to Vietnam or decides to turn in his uniform or
decides to take political asylum in Sweden or Canada or anywhere else,
in the reversal of the process by which our country began, to come here
to get asylum from militarism. I will support that.
What I made clear was that I will not say to any individual that
you ought to do this or you ought to do that.
2758 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinsfer
Mr. Dellixger. Incidentally, I will be very happy if my statement
on desertion, for example, were published b}" the press because I think
this is the kind of thing that the American people have open and part of
the alternatives which are presented to them, part of the challenge
presented to them.
Mr. CoxLEY. I would like to mo^^e you to another event occurring
on August 28, the rally which was held, under a permit granted by
the city of Chicago, in Grant Park. I want to hand you what purports
to be a flyer, which is captioned, ''"Let the People Speak,"* and it con-
cludes with "Let the People Be Heard, National ^Mobilization
Committee.'*
I will ask you, sir, if this is a flyer or document published by your
organization and distributed, urging attendance at this particular
rally.
Mr. IcHORD. Give the witness time to examine the document.
(Witness and counsel examine document.)
Mr. Dellix'ger. Yes; this was issued bj' the National Mobilization
Committee. I would like to respectfully request that it be entered
into the record so that people who read the record may know what
our views were. I could read it out loud, but it is not necessary.
Mr. IcHORD. There being no objection from Mr. Watson, the docu-
ment will be admitted and printed in the record.
(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 2" follows:)
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2759
Dellinger Exhibit No. 2
Let the
People Speak
Demonstrate Your Opposition to the Vietnam War
Grant Park
Wednesday August 28th
1 P.M. to 4 P.M.
The majority of the American people want the United States to stop the
bombing and get out of Vietnam. The politicians are in Chicago threatening to con-
tinue the war and to suppress opposition. This is the only demonstration for which
the city has issued a permit despite repeated requests by many groups.
The political bosses at the Democratic Convention, and the political boss of
Chicago, Richard J. Daley, are obviously afraid to hear what the people want. They
have turned Chicago into an armed camp and have tried to scuttle free speech so that
they wouldn't have to listen to the innumerable Americans WHO WANT THE UNITED
STATES TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM.
The people of this country have been grossly deceived and misrepresented by
the Johnson-Humphrey-Daley team. These are the men who promised peace in 1 964,
then escalated the war to the point where 200,000 American boys (and countless
Vietnamese) have been killed or wounded. These are the men who evidently believe
that the American people have no rights, that only government bureaucrats can decide
whether we live or die.
This totalitarian mentality, which goes hand in hand with the illegal war in
Vietnam, must not go unchallenged. If we would reassert our right to be free citizens,
we must show our determination to stop the slaughter in Vietnam.
We urge all Chicagoans to join with the thousands coming from across the
country in a massive antiwar demonstration at Grant Park, Wednesday from
1 p.m. to 4 p.m.
Let the
People Be Heard
National Mobilization Committa*
Room 315, 407 S. Daartwm 939-2666
2760 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY. In connection with this rally to which this flyer speaks
there was a rally held in Grant Park and there was a permit issued
by the city of Chicago for that purpose, was there not?
Mr. Dellinger. It was never clear whether we had a permit or not
because we received assurances — well, I don't want to be wrong about
the time, but at least 24 hours, probably 48 or 72 hours beforehand,
perhaps on the Monday before Wednesday — we were told that a per-
mit would be granted.
However, at approximately 5 :30 in the afternoon, Tuesday, before
the rally planned for Wednesday noon, I received a letter from the
city of Chicago — I forget whether it was the mayor's office; I think
it was the mayor's office — the letter saying that we would be permitted
to rally, but that we would not be allowed to distribute any literature,
that we must have an insurance policy of from $300,000 to $500,000
indemnity, I guess is the word, and that we must promise or under-
take to pay all the costs incurred by the city of Chicago because of
the holding of the rally.
Obviously, we could not and would not accept these terms, and it
was, from all points of view, impossible at 5 :30 on Tuesday after-
noon, for example, to secure that kind of insurance if we had been
willing to.
Therefore, it was never clear whether w^e really had a permit or not
or whether this was another method of intimidation; whether if we
attempted, as we did attempt to assert our constitutional rights and
our moral obligations by going there, whether we would be declared
illegal and subject to abuse.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, if you contend it is not clear as to
whether or not you had a permit — you, as you have always contended,
a man who always speaks the truth — why did you put in this doc-
ument the statement, "This is the only demonstration for which
the city has issued a permit * * *"?
It does not ring true to me that you would put that in one of these
documents. You would accuse us of dishonesty, but not yourself?
Mr. Dellinger. I do not remember accusing you of dishonesty. I
have accused you of many political crimes, but I don't remember ac-
cusing you of personal dishonesty. I certainly don't want you to have
that impression. I have no basis for thinking such.
However, I think I just pointed out tliat the city had told us that
the rally would be permitted. Ordinarily, under those circumstances,
I take people to be men of their words, and that if the deputy mayor
says this be permitted — or the assistant corporation counsel, whoever
it was, I think it was both — we assumed that it is permitted. Since the
city of Chicago was obviously trying to keep people away from the
assertion of their democratic rights and of their moral obligation to
oppose the war, first of all by a series of threats, all the way from
Mayor Daley's shoot to kill and shoot to maim statement of April or
May to a variety of other things I won't go into now, and also by de-
laying permits so that people who did want to face arrest or
brutalization would not have time to get to the city.
As soon as we were told by the deputy mayor and the assistant cor-
poration counsel that we did have the permit and that it would be
legally granted, we informed people as rapidly as we could.
However, this was limited to distribution in the Chicago area. There
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2761
was not time to reach people in outlying districts except by a few
selective phone calls,
Mr. IcHORD. Wliat was the procedure used in issuing permits? Does
the city of Chicago follow the practice of issuing written permits,
which are given to the permittee ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. As far as I know — and I think I remember this
accurately — on the occasion of the April 27 peace march, which was,
however, brutally assaulted, they had delivered a written permit. So
it was our belief that this would happen.
However, it was clear that after we had been told — and I believe
that the meeting was on Monday before the Wednesday of the rally-
after we had been told that the permit would be granted, we didn't
expect to sit in the office and have it all written out and handed to us
at that time. In fact, the deputy mayor explained that he had to con-
tact various authorities, the park authorities, and so forth.
Mr. Watson. Really it made no difference whether you had the per-
mit. You would have held the rally anyway. You did not recognize
that authority ?
Mr. Bellinger. No. I am in favor, as it came out in the other docu-
ment. In the document we said that we would and should march and
rally with or without the permit, that we had done this before.
Mr. Watson. So the permit was inconsequential after all ?
Mr. Dellinger. It is not inconsequential because it is in violation
of constitutional rights when the authorities refuse to give a permit.
Mr. Watson. The point is that you would have had the demonstra-
tion with or without a pennit ?
Mr. Dellinger. At the time of the Chicago convention, in the nature
of two or three hundred Americans and many thousands of Vietnamese
were being killed every week. And if the mayor of the city of Chicago,
in his totalitarian method, was to say to us, "You are not allowed to
protest against the war by holding a peaceful march and rally," I was
not about to say, "Well, I am sorry, my brothers in Vietnam, of both
nationalities, all nationalities. I am'^ sorry I cannot do anything for you
because the mayor of Chicago will not pennit it."
Mr. Watson. So the permit was of no consequence at all.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, you did hold the rally, did you not?
Mr. Dellinger. We held a very hectic and very often interrupted
rally by attacks by the police.
Mr. CoNLEY. The rally in Grant Park ^
Mr. Dellinger. I am referring to in Grant Park at the bandshell.
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir. In that comiection I hand you what purports
to be a flyer published by the Chicago Police Department, which was
distributed, according to earlier testimony, in Grant Park on August 28
by that police department.
Are you familiar with that document?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. This was handed to me on the platform when
I was chairing the meeting.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Chairman, I will ask leave at this time to read
this particular document into the record.
Mr. IcHORD. Go ahead.
Mr. CoNLEY. The document is captioned "please cooperate,"
"28 August 1968" :
2762 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
PLEASE COOPERATE WITH THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
In the interests of free speech and assembly, this portion of Grant Park has
been set aside for a rally. You are permitted to conduct this assembly and rally
anid will be protected.
In order to aid traflSc control efforts and assist in maintaining the -security of
the Democratic National Convention, no rally or assembly will be permitted at
or near the International Amphitheatre.
No authorization for a parade, march or procession has been issued. Any
attempts to conduct or participate ini a parade or march will subject each and
every participant to arrest. We earnestly request your cooperation so that the
rights of dissent and protest will be properly safeguarded as well as the rights
of all others including those delegates at the Democratic National Convention.
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
James B. Oonlisk, Jr.,
Superintendent of Police.
Now you were familiar, were you not, Mr. Dellinger, with the
contents of this document, which I have just read, on August 28 ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. You were also aware prior to August 28, were you not,
that your organization, that is Mobe, had been denied a permit to
march on the International Amphitheatre or to hold any rally near it ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I might point out in that connection that we
were also denied a permit in the District of Columbia, the city of
Washington, to hold a legal and constitutional and politically neces-
sary rally at Lincoln Memorial on the march to the Pentagon.
For some time we were informed absolutely that we would not get
this permit, but we decided — we knew that we did not want to see a
police state created by default. We knew that already too many of our
liberties and rights and powers had been taken away from us, so we
decided to assert these rights at whatever cost.
After ha\dng made this decision and made clear that there would be
thousands of people here, then we received a permit. We hoped — and
I continually said to the press and in many other ways — we hoped that
the city of Chicago, which was attempting to suppress our rights just
as the Federal authori'ties attempted to suppress our rights and to
impede the development of an effective antiwar movement in October,
we hoped that the city of Chicago would come to its senses and would
reverse its position. We held this hope right up until the very last
moment.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the rally held in
Grant Park at the bandshell, is it not true, sir, as has been reported in
numerous newspaper accounts — and I have before me si^ecifically the
Baltimore Sun of August 29, directing your attention to page 10 —
that you, at this rally, in view of the massive show of police strength
which did appear as your rally ended about 5 or 5 :80 p.m., advised tlie
crowd to do one of the following things: One, to form in lines eight
abreast for a march towards the Ampnitheatre that was sure to end
in arrest.
Mr. Dellinger. Excuse me. That would be inaccurate because I
never say anything is sure. I say you must be prepared to be arrested.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir.
Two, to filter out of the park into the street so as to tie up motor
and pedestrian traffic in the Loop area, advising clergymen and those
with children particularly to follow this procedure.
And three, to remain sitting in the park.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2763
Now, this is the Baltimore Sun account of the reporter who was
there and who has indicated that these were the three alternatives
proposed by you to those meeting in the bandshell.
Are these fair statements of what you did in fact propose?
Mr. IcHORD. Give the witness time to examine the three alternatives.
(Witness and counsel examine document.)
Mr. Dellinger. I would like to respond. Firet of all, as usual by
putting it into context and saying it was a very hectic situation and an
atmosphere of police intimidation and violence, and therefore I do
not blame the reporter for what I would consider some inaccuracies in
my position.
It speaks here of : "Thousands of Chicago police and Illinois Na-
tional Guardsmen chased and clubbed thousands of youthful anti-war
demonstrators * * * smell of tear gas hung in the air * * *.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are they inaccurate on that ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, they are not. I am explaining the context, both
in which I made the statement and in which the reporter unwittingly
did not get them completely accurate. "Scores of youths were arrested
and scores more were beaten on the head, chest and shoulders * * *."
Mr. Conley. Was the reporter inaccurate on that?
Mr. Dellinger. He mi^ht have underestimated the number, but
the general picture is certainly accurate. "Mayor Richard J. Daley and
the city's police force behaved tonight very much like the 'fascist, im-
perialist' force that the mobilization leaders have charged them with
being all along."
Mr. CoNLEY. Was the Baltimore Sun reporter inaccurate on that?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I believe he was accurate. He goes on to say that
this "vindicated the radicals' arguments." Then he speaks of the tense
atmosphere.
Mr. CoNLEY. Was he accurate on that ?
Mr. Dellinger. He was accurate in all of this.
Mr. CoNLEY. He only, then, as I understand it, is inaccurate on the
part that is attributable to you ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think he didn't do a bad job there. I presented
three alternatives. Given the tenseness of the situation, which these
quotations have indicated, and given the confusion on the platform
and the attempts we were making to get people taken to the hospital
and this kind of thing, I think he did a relatively good job of it.
But the three alternatives that I presented were, the first one, as he
says, to form in lines eight abreast for the march, which I indicated
they should be prepared to face arrest if they chose that alternative.
I also said that this was to be a strictly nonviolent march and any-
body who felt he could not react to police attack nonviolently should
do something else, should not take part in this march. This led to the
second alternative.
Mr. CoNLEY. The rejjorter was inaccurate in not including that ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would have been a fuller and more accurate
report if he had mentioned that because this was clearly emphasized
and clearly followed, that as we started the march, through the port-
able loudspeaker I kept repeating that and saying it was not a matter
of, you know, the superiority of one group over another or anything
of that kind, but there was a division of labor. We only wanted peo-
ple there who could clearly respond to police violence by nonviolence
and not by using militant self-defense.
2764 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY. All right.
Mr. Dellinger. I asked those who either felt they could not respond
in a crisis nonviolently or who did not think that a march was at this
point called for, to take one of two other alternatives.
One was to simply stay in the park and to wait until the atmosphere
was clear as possible since, given the attitude of the Chicago police
and the practice of the last few days, women and children and others
who did not face brutality could not feel safe in leaving at this time.
Then for others who wished to protest in other places or in other
ways and did not want to take part in the nonviolent march, that they
should leave in small groups and carry out their own activities.
Now it is entirely possible that somebody referred to pedestrians,
and so forth, going into the Loop area. I have no recollection of saying
that myself. 1 think the reference to tying up pedestrians and motor
traffic was not that we should go out to do it, but that if the Chicago
police were going to attack us — this was the second alternative — peo-
ple should be in the streets or near the Hilton or somewhere where
their violence would be partially restrained and where it would be
visible for the whole world to see.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, then, as I take it, it is a generally fair
and accurate statement that we can attribute to the reporter from the
Baltimore Sun^ with those corrections which you have made?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. It is obviously an attempt, and fairly success-
ful attempt, to write a fair report of what happened.
Mr. CoNLEY. Subsequent to making these proposals, did you not, in
fact, lead people out of the park eight abreast ^
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. In advancing what I would i^resume would be your
position one, to form in lines eight abreast for a march toward the
Amphitheatre ?
Mr. Dellinger. Right.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now, Mr. Dellinger, when you started this march eight
abreast, you were aware of the fact that you did not have any permit
for a parade or a procession. So you were doing this in a deliberate
attempt to violate the law?
Mr. Dellinger. Not in a deliberate attempt to violate the law. We
were doing it in a deliberate attempt to get to the Amphitheatre and
to hold a rally at which Vietnam veterans and others could speak
against the war and could urge the American people to resist the war.
That was what we were attempting to do.
The Chicago police were attempting to prevent us from doing that.
Therefore, we knew that we had to face the possibility of brutal
attack or arrest. We were not interested in demonstrating either peace-
fully or with violent attack for its own sake. We were interested in
trying to move beyond the stage of token dissent to a position where
the antiwar movement could have enough power and enough numbers
to stop the war.
Mr. CoNLEY. But you were making a deliberate violation of the
law, were you not, sir? Whether you agreed with the law or not, it
was a deliberate violation of the law?
Mr. Dellinger. It happens that I agreed with the Constitution,
which said I had the right and other people had the right to make
this march.
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2765
Mr. CoNLEY. But you were also aware of the fact that the city of
Chicago had a law
Mr. Dellinger. I am also aware of the fact that Federal, State,
and local authorities often violate the rights of our citizens, contrary
to the Constitution and contrary to any sound ethical and political
practice, and that if people do not resist this, willing to take the
consequences upon themselves
Mr. CoNLEY. — of violating the law. You have to violate the law
to take the consequence.
Mr. Dellinger. Are you making the statement, or am I?
Mr. CoNLEY. I am asking you, sir.
Mr. Dellinger. I think I have made clear that if the authorities,
in this case Mayor Daley, are violating the Constitution and probably
violating the laws of Illinois as well, then I am not going to obey
his illegal orders. It is of little consequence to me whether he decides,
whether what he thinks I do is illegal or not.
I am not opposed to breaking laws in order to try to bring about
a more just and humane society and to bring about an end to the
war. I have many times violated laws. I expect to have to do so in
the future. Otherwise, one reduces himself to the position of token
dissent.
Mr. Conley. One question here — and it has been a very simple ques-
tion— was: Did you violate a law by marching in this demonstration?
Mr. Dellinger. Mayor Daley violated the law by sending out his
police, and the National Guard violated the law by sending out their
machine guns and tanks — well, tanks I am not sure of, I will with-
draw that — their machine guns and their various devices to prevent
us from exercising our constitutional rights.
They violated the law, and we, to the best of our feeble ability, re-
sisted their illegal act.
Mr. Conley. This law I am talking about, which requires a parade
permit or a processional permit, this was not a law that was enacted to
keep you from making a march that day, was it, to your knowledge ?
Mr. Dellinger. Repression is not a new thing in this country. There
have been illegal laws and suppression of democratic rights throughout
our history and a constant struggle by the people to overcome these
illegal and unconstitutional and antidemocratic acts.
I would not be so presumptuous as to think all the repressive legisla-
tion in the U.S. was enacted in order to prevent the Mobilization from
exercising its functions. In some cases new laws have been passed in
relation to our activities, but basically these laws have existed in the
past.
Mr. Conley. With reference to this particular law, to your knowl-
edge it was not passed for the purpose of harassing you ?
Mr. Dellinger. It was not even a law. There is no law that I know
of in Chicago that says that people cannot assert their constitutional
rights. This was a ruling by a tyrannical mayor who is one of the top
officials, not only the mayor of the second or third largest city in the
country, but also a leading figure in the Democratic administration.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, as I understand it, you believe that the
constitutional right which you had to move out eight abreast super-
seded any so-called municipal ordinance or anything else?
Mr. Dellinger. That is a clear statement of my views.
Mr. Watson. Let me ask you about this. Since you have that consti-
21-706 O — 69 — pt. 3 6
2766 DISRUPTION OF 1 9 6 S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
tutional right and no one can deny you or your group that right,
what is your position on the right of people to traverse the streets and
sidewalks of Cliicago in a normal fashion? How do you relate your
right to their rights, or do they have any rights ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think they do. I have written and spoke publicly
on this and I have also acted.
Mr. Watson. They can't traverse the streets when you are marching
eight abreast. AVhat do they do ? Do they lose their rights or do they
run over you ?
Mr. Bellinger. My dear Mr. Watson, when the Chicago Bears hold
a football game, I myself have been held up from being able to cross
the streets or held up in a traffic jam because of this. Obviously, we live
in a complicated society in which the rights of people impinge upon
the rights of other people, and there have to be many interactions. I do
not believe that at a time, to use my repeated phrase, when hundreds of
Americans and thousiinds of Vietnamese are being killed evei'j' week
and when the black people of this country are being oppressed and
subjected to bitter violence and economic provocations, that at such a
time it is a proper sense of proportion to allow streets to be tied up for
Shriners' parades, for prowar parades, for football games, for World
Series, for the arrival of a movie star, all kinds of things which are
inevitable, but to allow that kind of thing to interfere with the normal
movement of people through the street, but to say to people who want
to bring an end to the war and oppression, "You can't use the streets
bec-ause if you do this particular street will be tied up or somebody
may be delayed on his way home."
My position is, however, that we should attempt to minimize impos-
ing penalties upon people who do not agree with us, who are not in our
march. It is for that reason — that was one of the reasons we went to the
mayor's office and tried to get a permit and offered, in the course of our
discussions on many occasions, to adjust the route so that it would not
interfere with the rights of other people.
We could never get to the point where we could have that kind of
discussion. What we would not accept is being moved so far away from
the Amphitlieatre or so far away fi-om where people are that our
march would be taking place in isolation.
We were perfectly willing to try to work out the ground rules so
that the rights of other people would not be violated or imposed upon.
Mr. Watson. In other words, you wanted to exercise your rights in
close proximity to others who were trying to exercise their rights so
as to disrupt the othei-s ?
Mr. Bellinger. That is the opposite of what I said.
Mr. Watson. It is?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Watson. I did not understand you correctly. I thought you said
you did not want your demonstration to be in isolation, but you
wanted to move to wliere the action was.
Mr. Bellinger. You see, in real life there are always many factors
that one has to weigh and adjust, and so forth. In real life in Chicago,
as in New York, as in Washington, what we were attempting to do
was to prevent the authorities from putting us so far away that we
could not be seen and that the people would have the sense of marching
through a wasteland.
That was one of the factors.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2767
Another factor was to attempt not to interfere with the rights of
other people who were in the city for other reasons or who lived there.
It was a matter of trying to weigh these.
AVe offered to try to work out this problem with the Chicago authori-
ties, but they refused to recognize our right even to discuss the problem.
Mr. Watsox. Finally, sir, will you not agree that we would actually
have a confused, if not a chaotic, condition if any group at its own
wish were able to move out and march up and down the streets
without some coordination or clearance or control by the municipal
authorities ?
I recognize the fact that you generally do not recognize civil au-
thority. But would you not agree that it would be a rather confused
and chaotic condition if your principle were followed?
Mr. Bellinger. I think we would have worse than a confused and
chaotic condition because of the conditions imposed upon black people,
because of the draft of American youth to be slaughtered and to com-
mit war crimes in Vietnam.
Mr. Watsox. You know you have spoken of veterans in the lead of
this movement. You are not a veteran are you ?
Mr. Dellixger. I am not.
Mr. Watson. I don't believe Mr. Hayden was or Mr. Davis.
Mr. GuTMAN. Do you want us to swap war stories. Congressman,
to show some wounds and medals? They are on many veterans, in-
cluding myself, who have honorably served, been wounded, been deco-
rated in combat, who think we are committing war crimes in Viet-
nam.
Mr. Watsox'. I am sure I am aware of counsel's position.
I am just making the observation. I have heard repeated statements
that in this group are veterans of World War II and Korea and Viet-
nam, and so forth. As of yet I have not seen many of them
Mr. GuTMAX'. I am. Here is one right in front of you, Congressman
Watson.
Mr. Watsox. Did I understand you to sav you are one of the leaders
of the march and demonstration in Chicago f
Mr. GuTMAN. No.
Mr. IcHORD. Gentlemen, let us be in order.
Counsel has not been called to testify. Just wait a minute and then
we will have a question.
Mr. GuTMAN. I am prepared to swap war stories with the Congress-
man.
Mr. IcHORD. Proceed, Counsel.
Mr. Dellixger. I want to say that the Congressman is way off the
point because the antiwar movement, as I have indicated, includes a
tremendous spread of occupations, ages, political attitude, religious
attitude, and also of personal histories and experiences in relation
to war.
I have expounded as clearly as I could my own belief in nonviolence,
which extends even to wars in which I think one side is clearly more
right than the other. But it would be wrong for you to think that in
this particular respect I am typical of the movement because I am sure
a vast majority of our members either have served in past wars or
would have if they had been of the proper age and sex.
Mr. Watsox'. Of course, my last question is whether or not we would
have a confused, at least, if not a chaotic, condition if any group could
2768 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
move as it wished throughout any city in America without having some
coordination by the municipal authorities.
Would you not agree that is the proper situation ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I myself tried to coordinate and to work out
such arrangements to minimize confusion. Howe.ver, I have full sym-
pathy with those who on occasion — and there could very well be
occasion myself when I would feel that the disruption to ordinary
civilian life and the confusion that would result, for example, from
sitting down in a public place or tying up a street — that this disrup-
tion would be justified in terms of the necessity of bringing home to
the American people the genocide that they are committing.
So I am not making an absolute statement against that type of
activity in this type of mass mobilization which the Mobilization
Conunittee has organized — April 15 in New York and San Fran, Octo-
ber 21 and 22 here, the attempted demonstrations at Chicago.
We felt that on these occasions it was important to coordinate our
activities with the authorities to try to avoid this kind of unnecessary
confusion and conflict of rights.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in that connection, when you started
out with this group eight abreast, you certainly had no hopes that you
were going to alter or change, had you been able to reach the Inter-
national Amphitheatre, the convictions or the voting of the delegates
or their choice for President, did you ?
Mr. Dellinger. Again, let me say that the Mobilization is a coali-
tion, and there were people who wanted to march to the Amphi-
theatre who undoubtedly harbored the hope that this would change
the votes of the delegates.
Mr. CoNLEY. My question is directed to you.
Mr. Dellinger. I myself, no, because I did not expect that any
outcome of the Democratic Nominating Convention would be the
major influence to determine whether we went to war or not.
I myself believed that it was to arouse the concern of the American
people expressed by a variety of other methods, including active re-
sistance, draft resistance, the resistance against military operations,
the kind of thing which a number of Catholic clergymen have done
when they have taken draft card files and destroyed them saying there
is some kind of property, such as draft card files for Vietnam and
crematorium in Nazi Germany, which have no right to exist.
i have more faith in this kind of thing and, although I am very
happy w^hen any public figure or politician speaks out against the
war.
I have found that the program of all of the candidates for the
Democratic nomination was inadequate and unsatisfactory to me, and
it did not matter that much to me which one was selected,
Mr. IcHORD. At that point, if I may intervene, Mr. Counsel, have
you been active in Mr. Davis' coffeehouse, what do you call it, coffee-
house operation ?
Mr. Dellinger. I have supported that program, endorsed it, worked
with it some. I have only made one brief visit to the coffeehouse, but
I do everything I can to — which I believe was in Congressman Wat-
son's district in Columbia, South Carolina. I think they are doing
very fine work.
I think it is very important that the people who are drafted into
the Army not be completely brainwashed and intimidated by the
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2769
military mind and the military interpretation of events, and at the
very least they have this kind of place where they can go for a much
more mature and self-creative type of activity.
Also, of course, as I want to make very clear, I believe that one of
the evils in the United States is that after people are drafted it has
been assumed that the^ lose their constitutional rights, not only in
terms of some of the trials and imposition of penalties, but in terms
of access to free speech, free assembly, and so forth.
I have always felt that it is very important that the soldiers who
are being asked to go to Vietnam and to commit war crimes and to
risk their lives and limbs, that they be enabled to hear the full story
against the war and be given all of the information on both sides,
which will make it possible to make up their own minds as to what
course of action they should take.
Mr. CoNLEY. Then, sir, as I understand it, you did not hope, your-
self, when you led this march toward the Amphitheatre, to alter the
conduct of either the delegates or their selection for President?
Mr. Dellingek. No, I did not. I wanted to appeal to the American
people. We wanted to contrast the statement by the Vietnam war
veterans outside the Amphitheatre with the ludicrous statements in
the Democratic platform and the programs and statements of the
nominees or the prospective nominees.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Bellinger, moving to another area, when Lieuten-
ant Healy was here in October from the Chicago Police Department, he
testified concerning certain events which occurred in Lincoln Park,
which was the practicing of the so-called Japanese snake dance.
He also produced photographs, which I believe were received by
tlie committee, of individuals practicing this particular form of
athletic endeavor.
Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir, the question : Were you aware of
these practice sessions which were going on in the Lincoln Park
during the days leading up to August 28 ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, I was aware of them. Although I knew of our
general plans, I first read of them in the newspaper when I was on
a plane on the way to Chicago. I later visited Lincoln Park and wit-
nessed at least one or two of these sessions.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this: Did you at any
time object to or take any concrete position indicating that you felt
this wasn't a desirable thing for the p«)ple involved to do?
Mr. Dellinger. I had some discussions with my fellow committee
members in order to find out more about the nature and purpose of
this and was convinced that this, on the whole, was a legitimate prepa-
ration for self-defense on the part of those who felt it important to
react to police brutality by defending themselves collectively as well
as individually.
I did feel that, on the whole, the amount of training possible in
such a situation would not make a great deal of difference. It mainly
gave the people some sense of morale. In my verj first discussion with
the marshals and the others who were working on this, it was made
clear that the Japanese snake dance as such was not intended to be
used. It was something which required a great deal of training, much
longer than was available to our people; closely coordinated group,
and for one thing our group was not even that united in using it as a
tactic. I want to make very clear that my discussions along this line
2770 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
were not in the nature of objections, but a simple attempt to clarify
and discuss and evaluate.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, in that connection, almost anybody who
has any familiarity at all with the Japanese snake dance knows his-
torically where it comes from and knows the purpose for which it
is used, which is to break through police lines.
Is that not a fair statement ?
Mr. Bellinger. I think, if I understand it correctly, first of all it
has emerged as a form of resistance to U.S. attempts to rearm and
remilitarize Japan, including the sending of — the gross obscenity of
sending nuclear submarines to the area, besides using the former Japa-
nese territory of Okinawa as a base from which to attack first Korea
and now Vietnam.
Now, I really am not an expert ; although I have visited Japan and
met with various members of the Japanese antiwar movement, I really
am not an expert. I have never seen it used, and all of my informa-
tion is secondhand.
I have the impression that it is used for two things. The one you
mentioned, to break through restraining police lines, similar to the
policy of Mayor Baley's people being kept away from places where
they feel they have a right to be. And secondly, to protect themselves,
as they march down the street, from being attacked or from the results
of being attacked or assaulted.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, when you got to Chicago it was not
the first time that you had some indication or awareness of the fact
that the Japanese snake dance was being considered as a possibility,
is it?
Mr. Bellinger. I have heard of the Japanese snake dance for many
years.
Mr. Conley. I mean with specific reference to Chicago, to its use or
its contemplated use in the city of Chicago.
Mr. GuTMAN. The witness already answered. He said he read about
it on the plane to Chicago.
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will give the counsel time to advise with the
witness.
Mr. Bellinger. It is not impossible that on the teleplione or in some
prior conversation it had been mentioned that some people were in-
terested in this. I really cannot recollect. It was not a big deal either
way.
I remember in my conscious memory that the thing came to my
attention particularly when I read an article in the newspaper. I am
not sure it was on my last trip to Chicago before the convention or per-
haps the week earlier. At any rate, en route to Chicago.
Mr. CoNLEY. Ivet me refer to the Liberation magazine, November
1967, "Gandhi and Guerrilla" by Arthur Waskow. Reading from this :
"Can we do better at the Bemocratic National Convention in Chi-
cago? What if we use snake dances 'I And so on. Points to remember" —
and it goes on into some other things.
In other words, in that magazine published by you or your group,
you are talking about the Japanese snake dance, as early as the No-
vember edition 1967, to be used specifically at the Bemocratic Con-
vention in the following August.
Mr. Bellinger. I wouldn't be surprised, if we search through the 12
years of Liberation^ if we could find prior references to the Japanese
snake dance. I indicated I had been aware of it for several years.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2771
This particular article was published in a month when we had not
decided yet even whether we were going to go to Chicago. Immediately
following the activity at the Pentagon, we began to discuss together —
many different groups and people — both informally and formally,
about where did the movement go from here, how could we be the
most effective in stopping the war.
We raised questions probably before the Pentagon on the possibility
of going to the Democratic Convention. Would it be valid or not;
would it be effective or not. This particular article was written — I am
simply trying to be accurate — was written before we had decided
whether we would go or not.
The author, if I remember the article, was speculating as part of his
general exploration and discussion.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, the Chair has never seen a Japanese
snake dance, but as it has been described to me I cannot understand
how it is a defensive tactic. It appears to me that it can only be an
offensive or counteroffensive tactic,
Mr. Dellinger. I am not an expert on it. But when I described my
understanding of it, I think I said that I believe that on occasion in
Japan it is used as a method of breaking through police lines, or an at-
tempted method to break through police lines, when people are being
kept from places where they thmk they have a right to be.
There are a lot of very perplexing and difficult problems that any-
body who, as I say, wants to move beyond token dissent to actual ac-
complishment of ending the war and some of the injustice, problems
that he has to wrestle with.
If one limits himself first of all to matters which the authorities de-
clare are legal, obviously he will end up in a form of token dissent, or
the movement is limited to those. Similarly, to the extent that the police
interfere with our right to protest effectively, it is only natural, and
I support exploration and analysis and thought about proper methods
of not allowing ourselves to be boxed in and protest made ineffective.
I think the discussion of the snake dance is a perfectly proper dis-
cussion in a serious movement, even though my own initial instinction
and analysis would lead me not to favor it, and I have never taken
part in it or encouraged it. But I think within the scope of our move-
ment it is a legitimate method, at least worthy of consideration.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave, since I did not want
to read this out of context, to read this entire paragraph from which
these remarks were taken, which were the subject of the last questions.
Mr. IcHORD. Has that document been made part of the record ?
Mr. CoNLEY. This particular document, no, sir.
Mr. IcHORD. You wish it to be made part of the record ?
Mr. CoNLEY. We wish to offer this part of the document dealing on
this particular point.
Mr. IcHORD. Why not put the entire document in the record ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Very well, we will offer it.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you have any objection, Mr. Watson ?
Mr. Watson. No.
Mr. IcHORD. Hearing none, the document will be incorporated into
the record. That is from the publication Liberation^ as I understood it.
Mr. GuTMAN. It is the first page of the Waskow article, right?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir.
(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 3" follows:)
2772 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Bellinger Exhibit No. 3
Gandhi and Guerrilla
ARTHUR WASKOW
The Penlagiin fiepe can ln' treated as a tacticai event to
be analyzed and criticized as one possible model for future
physical confrontations. This is a necessary process: there
will be more occasions for pinsicai confrontations and they
oupht to be much better plarineil than the Pentagon was.
Oaii we do better at the IJenciratic National Convention in
Chicago? What if we n-, -n,l^e dances? And so on. I'oinl-
to remember:
(1) Tactically rather than puliticallv speakin<;. the Ten-
lagon was a bad choice for resistance — if bv that we
mean events like the sie^c. ■
The Pentagon is a fort, the l>„
settings should be more vulnerab
-implv s\mboli( arrest-
iloinac its nioal. 1 rba
le.
i2) Simple logistical prcparali
etc. — would have helped.
..n blanket.s. , antccn^
(3) .So would knowledge of sin
the ilcspondcncv characteristic <
dawn, and how to combat it.
•ss ps\iliolop) -such a
,1 the last hour bcb.r
(t) Although physical confrontations may have to bi'
commanded at the last moment In a previously selected
''college of generals," this ought not to push the .Move-
ment toward letting a small elite lake over decision-
making before or after the coufronlatiim itself. If not
guarded against, this could happen fairlv easilv — espe-
cially if physical confrontations pla\ a larger and larger
role in the life of the movcmenl.
But the siege can also be seen
polilical situation: and this sernis
■A> a microcosm of the
UK h iiiorc iniportant to
The siege was a crude, unplamicd mixture of llaiidhi and
guerrilla. That mixture is what made it a ^ucccvs. Neither
the Gandhiism la la Dave Dellinger's lea' hin and early
arrest! nor the guerrilla-style hostility la i.i the efforts of
the Revolutionarv Contingent to charge the lio<ip~i worked
or could have worked cither morallv or politicallv -if
used alone by one or another group of the dcmon-trators.
We now ought to examine the rough guerrilla-Gainlhi mix-
ture and try to develop a true svnthesis of the two ap-
proaches. (I don't know myself, yel. what that means: but
I feel a need for not throwing away either side of what we
did on the Mall.)
What I mean by the mixture: people half walked through,
half charged through the outer troop lines and frequentiv
went around them — through the bushes. They did not wait
to convert or convince or use soul-force upon those troops.
26
Vet once they reached the Mall they established their i m-
pathy with the troops, made clear they saw The Enemv .i~
generals and presidents rather than soldiers, and set a < row.!
discipline that prevented the use of violence even win 14
•U.S. marshals beat demonstrators in full sight of llie < rowd.
I One group of sit-dowiiers even refused to move to ,1 lui li-
( all) more useful spot because they said the) hail cslab
lished a warm emotional connection with "their'' soldiers,
and would not leave them. I And since it became pos^d'lt to
express and use the Gandhian connuitmeni eftectivelv ..niv
once people had got up to the Mall. 1 am saying thai "ri
Saturda) evening the guerrilla approach was ibc <uiii-il
fulhllment of Gandhian intentions.
On the other hand, I think il was a mistake i>n .'^iiinl.iv
morning to follow guerrilla modes of thought with the -hoc
rigidity as the majoritv did when it decided to have lin
Mall at 6 o'clock. The decision was urged and juslilied li\
some of the S.D.S. leadership as returning the initiativi to
the Movement rather than the Pentagon and exemplifv ui^'
the guerrilla tactic of strike-retreat-and-strike-again. But the
results were that six hundred to a thousand |>eople. who
probably could have been kept together till the sunrise re-
stored their morale, were instead encouraged to retreat
I though in fairly good order) and that the S.U.S. national
leadership did not go to jail, which in this particular case —
given that jail meant two to five davs rather than twu to
five )cars — was a political as well as moral error. Staving
out of jail separated the leaders from some of the Move-
ment during days when they could have carried on inipor
tant political education and re-established moral si.jidariu.
Furthermore, the country was not forced to aildn ss the
meaning of a really massive two-day occupation of the Mall,
followed by large-scale arrests and perhaps a jail-no-bail
movement. In short. I am sa^-ing that on Sunday morning
the Gandhian approach would have been the wisest guer-
rilla tactic to use. for those who thought in political guer-
rilla terms, as well as the morallv correct one for those who
thought in essentially religious terms.
.More generally, I would argue that in the present state of
the Movement and the countrv, precisely because large parts
of our movement are moving to resistance, with il- guer-
rilla overtones, it is important for us not to forget the cen
Iral meaning of the Gandhian approach: that those we must
oppose are not The Enemy. Certainly this is true as regards
the "great center" of American society, whether or iimI il
is true of the "power elite." If it is these large numbers o(
the miconvinced whom we must transform if we are to end
Liberation
[Nov. 1967]
DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2773
Dellinger Exhibit No. 3 — Continued
. . . fhose we must oppose are not The
Enemy. . . . It is the unconvinced
whom we must transform . . . remake
their ideas of what legitimate be-
havior is. . . .
the war and make any more such «ars impo!-sil)le, (hen we
cannot treat them as our enemies. We must get through to
them what we mean; we must be able to remake their ideas
of what lef'tiniate behavior is so that what we do-^not what
the police niid the I're-iident do — is felt to be legitimate.
1 emphasize this because I have talked with some people
who took part in the Pentagon siege who bitterly reacted to
the press distortions of the siege. They felt that if efforts
to build community with the soldiers could be described as
"taunts" and if the demonstrators' fantastic restraint in the
face of police violence could be described as initiating vio-
lence, then there was no point to Irving so hard — that
"America" would define what we do as illegitimate regard-
less of what it is we do. I do not agree with this. I think
that if we stay inside trulv legitimate bounds (based on our
own moral sense), we will be able to bring the press and
the country to join us. Not in one go-round, of course;
naturalU the press would define as "violence" the most
direrl challenge Americans ha\e made to the legitimacy of
their own government since South (Carolina fired on Ft.
Suinlcr. even though we were not tiring on the Pentagon.
But just a- those who once condemned mass marches for
witlidrawal as "irresponsible" now applaud them as "mod-
erate, -o those who now are Imrrifieil by resistance will
come to iHidcrstand it.
What is Legitimate?
The real problem is, what do ive feel is legitimate? And
here we falter. There are a few of u-^ who feel .July 6, 177.5,
has already arrived and a "Declaration of the Causes and
No essitv of Taking Up Arms" well justified. .\ few of us
feel that Julv 6 can never arrive in that sense, because the
taking up of arjns is never wholly justified (though perhap>
defensible I. And niore of us are not certain what to think:
but we are acting as if violence were not legitimate.
(If one rereads the declarations both <if 177.5 and 1776
with these moral and political dilenunas on one's mind,
they come alive in some new ways. People who have strug-
gled with whether to "support the National Liberation
front" and what that means, can understand why the Dec-
laration of Independence specifies that the colonies may
make alHance? with foreign powers; imagine the emotional
strain on Englishmen born and bred of deciding whether to
commit treason in the company of the hereditary enemy,
France! And it is important to see that even in the moment
of rebellion, the colonists did not treat all Britain as The
Enemy nr dismiss the possibility of making themselves seem
legitimate to their opponents. Instead they specified the
King as enemy, and carefully wrote the Declaration to ex-
plain and justify their acts and to claim legitimacy for
tliemsekes. I
V^ hat might we put in a Declaration on the Causes and
Necessity of Resistance? 1 would idenlifv three levels of
resistance: withdrawal, challenge and coercion, and I would
endorse the first two while rejecting the third. Here is why:
^-it'
JfW^
Aofemfcer 1967
27
2774 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Df.i LiNGF.R I^xiiiHiT No. 3 — Continued
"... fhe majority . . . will decide that
if killing Vietnamese requires beat-
ing and arresting Americans, the
killing of Vietnamese should end."
Oil uilfulraual: simply, it is a criiiii' tn fi^lu in the
Aimriian war against Vietnam; therefore it is no crime to
refuse the Hrafl. It is a erime tn pay for that war; therefore
it < amiot lie a erime to refuse taxes.
On rliallcnpc: when we attempt to block the Pentagon
with otir liodies. or interfere witii an induction center or a
na|>alm plant or a campus recruiting booth, we arc saying
soniethinp very s()ecial — so long as we do not initiate vio-
Icnie in the process. We are saying: "We will not literally
force you to stop (he Penlapon, but we will force you to use
violence on us in order to keep the Pentagon going — just as
you use violence on the Vietnamese. We believe that, con-
fronted with such a direct challenge from ever-growing
numbers (though a minority) of Americans, the majority
will decide to stop: will decide that if killing Vietnamese
requires beating and arresting Americans, the killing of
Vietnamese should end." It should be noted that even if
these challenges are carried on with the greatest toughness
and energy — like the Pentagon siege, and more — they are
still basically a tactic of persuasion. They are built on the
assiiniption that it is legitimate to be arrested if one vio-
lates what seems to be the law, though of course the validity
of the law should then Iw challenged in court.
Another Chance
h'inalU. what about coercion? Here I would draw the
lin<^ not ntvessarily forever, but for now. Given a clear
and delilierate de<i»ion by the majorilv of the American
people to commit major crimes against another people (or
pari of its own |>eopie), it might become legitimate for a
niinoritv to try to prevent such crimes from taking place.
Rut that is not our ca.se. On the last occasion the American
|M'oplr had a chance to decide on war or peace — in 1961 —
the* decided for |>eace. If they get a chance to make that
dc( ision again, in 1968, and decide to support war crimi-
nals; or if thev dwide to end war crimes but their decision
is ignored as their last one was; or if they are denied, and
cannot create, a way to make a decision on those issues —
then this last issue will have to be rethought. (Why give the
s\stem another chance? Because any body |K)litic is liable
to be tricked and defrauded ome; if it allows this to happen
twice, it has abandoned the efTorl to restore democracy. If
it deliberately chooses war crimes, iheii its democratic-ness
is ii relevant.)
Bui there is every evidence that the American people,
confronted with the overwhelming fads that their govern-
ment is perpetrating war crimes and that a rising propor-
tion of their compatriots are prepared to resist those crimes,
are now trying to reinvent the dcmwratic process. They are
patriots, and it hel^>s to know that the resisters are patriots
too. And if our conunitnient to our country sometimes be-
comes unclear to them, it is our job to illuminate it — as we
did instinctively on the Pentagon Mall when we Mng
"Americ* the Beautiful."
This determined effort to restore representative democ-
racy and get it to end the war is being honorably expressed
(though some of us may think its premises short-sighted
and its means ineffectual) in the various "dunip-Johnnon"
organizations. It seems very likely that the liberals who have
in two Mobilizations inarched alongside those conimiMed
to resistance will now be moving out of the "protest-man h"
syndrome into political action, lit is not only the ri-sistaiice
people who have concluded that protest is not enough,)
Our attitude toward these people will lie important— to
them and to us. It is almost certainly a mistake to try to
keep an organized coalition with them; indeed, the worst
errors of the direct-action part of the Mobilization were
probably a result of the agonizing negotiations over a
period of months between [leople who wanted direct action
and people who didn't. The hauling and shoving prevented
a careful and detailed working-out of how to make the
direct action fully effective. Now that both wings of the
Mobilization are clearly moving forward in different direc-
tions (both politics and resistance are "forward" from pro-
test I, the old coalition will be even more difficult and even
less relevant. But a warm and o}H!n-ended communication
is much more important than ever.
We may find that we meet each other again in Chicago —
not at a New Politics convention this time, but at the Demo-
cratic National Convention, because the tactical situation
will be good and the Convention is a crucial point in the
process by which Johnson might again take (xiwer. (The
black moventent may join us too.) What .should the terms
of this meeting be? If there are 1(X),(XX) people on the
strtH-ts, prepared to do civil disobedience, what should their
demands be? To most antiwar Americans, the l)enio«'ratic
Party probably does not seem to be intrinsically evil, like
the Pentagon; so an unconditonal effort simply to block it
would seem unreasonable. But what about a demand that
the Convention adjourn in favor of an emergency national
primary to nominate the Democratic candidates and vote
for or against a iieace platform? (The demand will seem
esp«Mially reasonable if Johnson has lost a number of pri-
maries but is about to be nominated by the machine any-
way. I What about a demand that delegations from each
state have a proportion of black people equal to the pro-
portion of the Democratic vote cast by blacks in those
states? These notions are only initial speculations; the
point is that some way should be sought to keep the hope*
and demands of the resistance and the political movements
reasonably complementary to each other.
To this point I have assumed that the resistance move-
ment will stay mostly on the campus. But there might be
conditions under which the liberal middle class would join
it. The chief of these is the possibility of a major escala-
tion of the war — the use of nuclear weapons, a land inva-
sion of the North or an attack on China. The Consultation
on the Church and Society held in Detroit October 2.'i-26.
for example, proposed that the National Council of Churches
call a national general strike if any of those three escala-
tions occur (and start preparing now for the possibility i .
If the nriddle class does move toward resistance, it will
probably be in nonphysical ways: tax refusal, phone-ins li>
the New York Slock Exchange or the White House, rti-
That likelihood makes even shar^>er the necessity of viewins
the Pentagon siege as a political, not merely a tactical,
model from which to learn and advance.
28
Liberation
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2775
Mr. CoNLEY. The paragraph I have specific reference to, sir, is :
The Pentagon seige can be treated as a tactical event to be analyzed and critic-
ized as one possible model for future physical confrontations. This is a neces-
sary process : there will be more occasions for physical confrontations and they
ought to be much better planned than the Pentagon was. Can we do better at the
Democratic National Convention in Chicago? What if we use snake dances? And
so on. * ♦ *
Now, in connection with the reference made, Mr. Dellinger, to the
Pentagon demonstration, and still on this particular subject of the
snake dances, I want to read to you and then ask you to examine, if
you will, a document dated Washington, D.C, October 21. This was a
document published in connection with the Pentagon demonstrations.
It is captioned "Another demonstration" :
Up until now the peace movement has been operating within the rules of the
system, oooi>erating with establishment restrictions and predictable, controllable
demonstrations, i>aying lip service to the myth that these mass protests will
change U.S. policies.
The mounting frustration in the peace movement is caused not only by the
fact that the war has not been stopped, but also by the growing identification
with liberation struggles in the world today.
A radical new form of protest is needed as a next step in the U.S. peace
movement. One example of this type of protest is the Snake Dance, used in
.Japan by the Zengakuren (student organization), which enables the protesters
to take over the .streets and control their own demonstration.
The Snake Dance is made up of successive rows of about fifteen people abreast,
with arms linked. Once in action it weaves and sways, maintaining a running
pace. It is an easily learned formation which is <liflBcult to break up because of
its speed and tightness, and because the Snake Dance can change direction .spon-
taneously and immediately. It was this kind of demonstration which was used in
preventing President Eisenhower from visiting Japan in 1960.
All indei>endents and groups interested in a militant form of protest will
gather at the Reflecting Pool, by the Lincoln Memorial, under the follow-
ing symbol :
And there is a symbol which I take to be the snake.
Mr. Dellinger, reading from that particular release — I believe that
was released by the Revolutionary Contingent based out of New York
City, and it was released in connection with the October 21 demonstra-
tions a year ago — they make mention that this type of formation was
used to prevent someone from coming somewhere. This does not appear
to me, sir, to be a defensive tactic.
Mr. Dellinger. First of all, there are a number of points I would
like to make.
First of all, I consider it preposterous that a representative of the
U.S. Government, which is wedded to violence and is imposing violence
on people throughout the world, should be so morally offended by
people who are trying to s-top the war contemplating or using a method
such as the snake dance, which apparently had the terrible effect when
used by the Japanese, for whom obviously I take no responsibility,
but of making President P^isenhower— if I remember correctly, it says
it prevented him from visiting Japan, making him decide he would
stay away.
I think it would be much better if the United States would stop
interfering in the internal affairs of such nations. The poor Japanese
people passed a constitution, actually encouraged by MacArthur, re-
nouncing war, and ever since the U.S. has been involving them in the
cold war and trying to remilitarize them.
2776 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Secondly, I am curious about how you know so well who put this
out. I am only interested in making clear, first of all, it is unsigned,
it is not a Mobilization document, I have never seen it before.
Mr. CoNXJEY. Sir, I have not attributed it to you.
Mr. Dellinger. You have attributed it to somebody else.
Mr. CoNLEY. I was very careful to keep it away from your organiza-
tion ; that is correct.
Mr. Dellinger. It is up to you or them to protest or to inquire.
Maybe they don't want to protest.
Since it is unsigned, I am curious about how you identified it with
a particular group. But I am willing to pass over that.
Now I want to say further in this context, though, that the title
of the Waskow article in which you have introduced the subject, if I
remember correctly, "Gandhi and Guerrilla," and I myself believe
that the traditional nonviolent movement has been much too passive
and much too ineflPective and I am not interested in the purity of the
movement. I am interested in social effectiveness from back in World
War II, when I had much more sympathy with the resistance move-
ment of Europe in their fight against Hitler and Hitlerism than I did
with the U.S. Government, which is distrusted and, I think, with
reasons that have been proven somewhat accurate. But from those
days I myself have always contemplated and tried in various ways
to experiment with some kind of new development which might be a
synthesis of Gandhi and guerrilla or synthesis of the partisan and re-
sistance-type activity.
I think this is fascinating. I am quite willing to discuss my views,
including things that are unclear to me. But I also would like to say
it is a very strange concern of the U.S. Government to go into such
detail over my views on these subjects. I am not sure what legislative
purpose it has.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, regardless of
its purpose, and I now hand you what has previously been marked
Exhibit 15 ^ before this committee in connection with earlier testi-
mony, which is a closeup of some of these people practicing the Japa-
nese snake dance in the Lincoln Park, and I ask you, sir, if they are not
holding some object, a group of them, across the front row there?
Mr. Dellinger. They seem to be grasping a pole.
Mr. CoNLEY. Did you have occasion when you were watching them
practicing the Japanese snake dance to see tliem holding onto a pole
such as this ?
Mr. Dellinger. To the best of m^^ memory, I didn't.
Mr. CoNLEY. Did you at any time see any such poles with these
groups ?
Mr. Dellinger. No. When I was in Lincoln Park there were a num-
ber of groups practicing in different places and practicing different
methods. I, to the best of my knowledge, I never saw any physical
objects such as poles being used. That is not to say there could not
have been. WHiat I am very clear about is that during the entire time
of the protest and of convention week that I never saw any pole of
that kind in anybody's hands.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you to something else
Mr. Icho.rd. At this pomt, Mr. Counsel, if you are moving to an-
1 Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 15-B." See pt. 1, p. 2323, of Oct. 1, 1968,
hearings.
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2777
other subject, it is now 7 minutes after 12. I think this would be a
convenient place to declare an adjournment.
The Chair will declare that the committee is in adjournment until
1 :30 p.m.
(Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the sub-
committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 :30 p.m. the same day. Subcom-
mittee members present at time of recess : Representatives Ichord and
Watson.)
AFTERNOON SESSION— THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1968
(The subcommittee reconvened at 1 :45 p.m., Hon. Richard H.
Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)
(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and
Watson.)
Mr. Ichord. The committee will come to order. Let there be order
in the hearing room.
I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Bellinger, of the Chair's knowledge of
the fact that you recently had an operation. How are you feeling to-
day ? Do you think we are going to be able to finish the hearings?
Mr, Dellinger. Oh, yes. I feel better today than yesterday. I am
sorry to be late getting back. My slowness had something to do with
that. I do move slowly.
Mr. loHORD. The examination of Mr. Dellinger will continue with
the observation that the affirmation continues.
Proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID DELLINGER— Resumed
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, I would like to direct your
attention to Havana, Cuba, this year. Did you have occasion in Janu-
ary of 1968 to attend the International Cultural Congress which was
held in Havana, Cuba ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes; I have made two trips to Havana, Cuba, this
year. One of them was in January when I went — although I consid-
ered the State Department in violation of the Constitution, again I
nonetheless asked and received State Department validation as a jour-
nalist. I only regret that a number of intellectuals, American intel-
lectuals, who had also been invited were unable to attend because they
were not full-time practicing journalists.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I detected that you indicated you had
been in Cuba twice this year.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. When was the other occasion you were in Cuba ?
Mr. Dellinger. I went to Havana on November 1st.
Mr. Conley. How long did you remain there at that time ?
Mr. Dellinger. I had my operation in Cuba and I have just re-
turned.
Mr. CoNLEY. Now in connection with your trip to Cuba of 1968, the
first trip this year, while you were in Havana, did you have occasion
to grant an interview to the Cuban newspaper jB'/ Mundo?
Mr. Dellinger. Quite probably, yes. I remember speaking with a
journalist who I think was identified as a freelance journalist, but who
quite likely may have — I never saw the interview, but quite likely
2778 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
might have placed it in El Mundo since in Havana itself there are just
two dailies.
Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, I would like to read you some excerpts from
a Havana radio broadcast of February 5, 1968, this radio broadcast
dealing with your El Mundo interview. Understanding that these are
not purporting to be your words — it is the radio station engaging in
whatever editorializing they might do, I am sure — if I may, I would
like to read you some excerpts and then ask you some questions.
Mr. GuTMAN. Do you have a copy that you could put in front of us?
Mr. IcHORD. Let the witness have a copy.
Mr. GuTMAN. Thank you.
Mr. CoNLEY. Reading from the broadcast :
Among the guests at the Havana Cultural Congress, the North American David
Bellinger represents the curious paradox of being a fighter for nonviolence who
favors violence. Bellinger does not object to the just violence of the Cuban
revolution against imi)erialism or the violence of the Vietnamese against the
same evil ; he reasons that "Vietnam and Cuba are very important for the devel-
opment of a new movement in the United States which will gradually turn into
an anti-imi)erialist movement."
Mr. Dellinger, is this substantially in accordance with what you told
the reporter for El Mundof
Mr. Bellinger. Well, you can be sure that since probably between
this date and January and now — well, I don't know, but I might even
have had more than a hundred or several hundred press interviews or
conversations of this kind. I cannot remember what I said to him. This
was in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel, when I was on my way to
somewhere else, and I spoke to him briefly.
However, I think I made very clear, to the best of my ability I have
made clear in the last 2 days my attitude toward the relationship be-
tween violence and nonviolence. Although this is a very elliptical ver-
sion and it goes on in very short order to combine two rather separate
ideas, I certainly can see where he may have drawn this. Aiid as you
indicated it went all the way from the newspaper to Havana radio, so
there were two stages or three stages involved.
I think, as I said earlier about the Baltimore Sun article, I would
consider this an example of honest journalism. But I wouldn't want
at this point to have those two sentences, particularly as juxtaposed,
to be fully representative of my views.
Just to be perfectly clear, it goes on from the discussion of violence
and nonviolence — I beg your pardon — no, it is two sentences. Anyway,
it goes on from that to talk about the importance of Cuba and Vietnam
to the development of new movements in the Ignited States. These are
separate ideas I hold. I favor nonviolence. I advocate nonviolence. I
jDractice nonviolence, but I do not repudiate or oppose what I some-
times call the violence of the victims, which in this case includes Viet-
nam and Cuba, as well as the black people in this country.
Then, as a completely separate idea, I believe that the Cuban and
Vietnamese movements for independence and to do away with really
what amounts to the imperialist stranglehold on their country, control
of their country by foreignere who build up the highest standard of
living at home and promote illiteracy and lack of medicine and pov-
erty in Vietnam and Ouba, that the struggle of these two peoples has
certainly been an inspiration to me. And I think it has been a chal-
lenge to many Americans; it helps speed up the process of evaluation
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2779
that goes on in this country. However, I do not consider from my own
point of view that the inspiration and the value is inevitably a product
of the violence.
Mr. CoNLEY. If I may move on to the third paragraph :
The pacifist David Bellinger understands that it is impossible to coexist with
the great enemy, and he combats it. He has been to Cuba three times, first in 1960,
then in 1964, and now for the Cultural Congress.
Do you recall whether you did or did not make that statement to the
reporter for El Mundo ?
Mr. Bellinger. By the way, there is even the fourth stage of this
meeting with the reporter in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel :
in English, he to his newspaper ; the newspaper to the radio ; and the
second stage of that from English to Spanish ; and then finally back
from Spanish to English. So I am quite prepared to talk about all of
my views here, including my very vigorous and determined opposition
to American imi^erialism, which he may be referring to as the enemy,
but this is not a good way to find out my views.
Mr. IcHORD. May I inquire at this time, Mr. Bellinger, as to whether
all of these interviews that you had in Cuba with Havana radio or
representatives of Havana radio were in English?
Mr. Bellinger. I was always speaking in English. The other inter-
views earlier were on the telephone, where I was one time in New
York and one time in Chicago. In all the cases I spoke in English.
Mr. IcHORD. Bo you speak Spanish ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes ; my last trip was a great asset that way. The
last trip I was there, I spoke only Spanish and was interviewed in
Spanish.
Mr. CoNLEY. I think, Mr. Bellinger, this is the reason for our ask-
ing you specifically about these, to ask you whether they are a fair
quote. If they are not, I think you should indicate they are not.
Mr. Bellinger. As I said about the Baltimore Sun article, this gives
me the general impression of being an honest journalistic attempt.
I don't think it is completely accurate, as in a couple of points the
Baltimore Sun article was not. I think I indicated why, because it
went through four processes, including condensation. It does not mean
a lot to me, this particular sentence you quoted. I would be very happy
to discuss who I think the great enemy is, although I think there are
many enemies. It is hardly a way of discovering my views.
Mr. CoNLEY. All right, sir, if I may ask you what the great enemy
is, as the interpretation you would put on those words.
Mr. Bellinger. I cannot, out of context here, know for sure w4iom
they were referring to. I would be happy to tell you who I think the
enemies of the American people are, the enemies of world peace. They
range all the way from the military-industrial complex to the system
in which property is considered to be of more value than human beings,
in which people are encouraged to work for private profit instead of
for social well-being and the good of the community.
I also consider any reliance on violence, even by people I associate
with and am willing to work with in certain ways, I consider this
reliance on violence to be an enemy and I try to work away from this
as much as I can.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, a moment ago I think you used as an
illustration of a great enemy, and I thought perhaps this is what
2780 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
you were alluding to since it does appear in the first paragraph, that
perhaps imperialism, in itself was the enemy.
Mr. Dellinger. I consider imperialism — except I don't like to turn
chese things into stereotypes and slogans, but I think the system of
private ownership and control and profitmaking, basically known as
the capitalist system in the United States, I think is a violation of
economic democracy and the brotherhood of man. I think as it reaches
out and spreads its tentacles into Latin America, Asia, and Africa,
and so forth, and in that sense at least I always think of imperialism
as being the foreign expression of this selfish, competitive profitseek-
ing, nonhumanist, antiJiuman form of economics, I always identify
the foreign expression as being imperialism. I certainly consider that
to be the major enemy in terms of anybody who is concerned with
economic equality, economic brotherhood, freedom, bringing, as I say,
making it possible for people like the Vietnamese and the Cubans to
have hospitals, free medical care, wipe out illiteracy, narrow the gap
between the very rich and the very poor, raise the level of the standard
of living of the people — I consider imperialism to have proven itself
unfortunately to be the major enemy, though I don't think that most
American people realize this. I think there is a great gap ; people quite
sincerely think somehow or other they are helping these foreign coun-
tries and bringing them freedom or democracy, but I am convinced
that the history of the American influence in Dominican Republic,
Cuba, Puerto Rico, in entire Latin America and Asia has not been
one to bring freedom and justice.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you now to the fourth
paragraph of this same article, and I quote as follows :
Dellinger says that "Cuba is the only country in the world where this con-
gress—
and I presume this means the Cultural Congress —
where this congress could be held, with such diversity of delegates having differ-
ent views — all united by a basic sympathy for Cuba and antipathy toward im-
perialism. The only other country would have been Vietnam, except for the
inconvenience of the bombings." He notes that the word "inconvenience" should
be in quotes ; the bombings are more than that ; they are a crime. He says that
in Cuba, "intellectuals could avoid the vices and sectarianism and excessive in-
dividualism ruining past meetings of this nature."
This, concluding with the words, "except for the inconvenience of
the bombings" — is this basically in accord with what you said to the
reporter ?
Mr. Dellinger. As I said, not only do I really not remember at all
what I said to him on this occasion, but it went tlirough four stages.
At the beginning of it, it certainly is a germ of an idea that I believe
in and would be happy to express to you or maybe explain to yoiL
That is, that this particular congress, due to the prestige of Vietnam
and the prestige of Cuba amongst the world intellectuals and among
humanitarians of many varieties, it was possible to bring together
delegates from countries and from political groups which are in very
serious opposition to each other.
Of course, the Soviet's Czechoslovakia invasion had not taken place
at that time. That is an example. There were delegates from Czechoslo-
vakia and from the Soviet Union. But there were also delegations
from the traditional Communist parties, which, by the way, the
Cubans are very much in conflict with. There were delegates from
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2781
liberal and anti-Communist groups. There were delegates from Franco
Spain. It was a situation in which there were several occasions on
which the congress could have broken down with some kind of violent
antipathy.
When it came close to reaching this point, when, for example,
delegates from several countries attacked the Soviet Union very
strongly for being bureaucratic for having taken on the nature of
some imperialist aspects, and when obviously delegates from the
Soviet Union and from the traditional Communist Party very much
resented this. However, as I say, not entirely but to a great extent
through the leadership and the moral authority of the Cubans and
the Vietnamese, the people were able to express these differences and
still not fly off into many splinters. The other factor is that a number
of the people who were attending that conference, I know^ from my
own personal experience, had been denied visas to enter the United
States.
I think particularly of Jean-Pierre Vigier, who is a military expert,
in France who had testified before the War Crimes Tribunal on the
type of weaponry being employed by the United States in Vietnam.
As to the pattern of the attacks, for example, he had, through very
elaborate and conscientious studies, established that the United States
had concentrated its bombing on Catholic villages in Vietnam because
it assumed apparently that the Catholics would be the first to revolt
and therefore they should be hit the hardest, and this would under-
mine the morale and unity of Vietnam.
TVTien I heard him and noticed his very objective and scientific
approach to these things, the devastating nature of his research and
findings, I became interested in having him appear on an American
television program so that the American people could hear these
things and thought that it would be appropriate for him to testify
or appear on television and have somebody from the Pentagon or
whoever disagreed with him, and who supposedly had information, to
answer him. And in that w^ay the American people could hear both
sides and decide. However, neither did the Pentagon nor the State
Department answer. He was unable to obtain a visa to enter this
country. However, he did get a visa to go to Cuba.
As I say, there were a number of factors that would be behind the
germ of the idea that is summarized here.
Mr. CoNLEY. Maybe I look at things wnth too much simplicity, but
the germ of the idea I see here is simply that Cuba or Vietnam,
"except for the inconvenience of the bombings," are the two coun-
tries geographically — I think of it more geographically than politi-
cally— that could hold this type of conference.
Have I reduced it to too much simplicity ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I think you have. And again — sometimes I
wonder if I take too long in my answers, but I answered at some
length what I would have in mind.- 1 somewhat disassociate myself
from this article because of the number of stages it went through. I
would rather, again, have my own words stand rather than yours.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with this conference
which was held in Havana, was a man by the name of David Siqueiros
a delegate to this conference?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. He was not only a delegate. If you don't mind,
I would like to give him as an example of what I was indicating before.
21-706 O— 69— pt. 3 7
2782 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Because at the conference there were other people, not only artists like
himself, but in some cases nonartists, who were very hostile to David
Siqueiros on the belief that he was involved in the execution of Leon
Trotsky. So there was very great personal tension and political ten-
sion between Siqueiros and a number of people, and it threatened to
lead to all kinds of situations.
As I say, basically the Cubans, with an assist from Vietnam, man-
aged to put on a conference in which people like Siqueiros and people
who hate Siqueiros were able to take part.
It is fascinating to me also because the State Department denied a
number of people who had come to mind, Robert Lowell, the poet, a
number of people like that, Dwight Macdonald, I believe, the critic,
a number of people who had been active in the Congress for Cultural
Freedom, had been very anti-Communist — and to mis day, so far as
I know, tend to be that way — a number of those people had been in-
vited to the congress, applied to the State Department to go, but wei-e
told that this was a monolithic political show and therefore it was not
a legitimate cultural congress for them to go to.
When I got there, I discovered this kind of differentiation and
difference and heterogeneity.
Mr. IcHORD. Was David Siqueiros a delegate from the Soviet LTnion?
Mr. Dellinger. No, he was a delegate from Mexico. I don't pre-
sume to know all of his history or enough to say it.
Mr. CoNLEY. Some of his history is that he is supposed to have been
involved in an attempt to murder Leon Trotsky.
Mr. Dellinger. I believe that is right. He is considered to have been
a Stalinist who supported or took part in some of the violence of the
Communists of that period. He was very much resented and even
hated by a number of the other delegates. There was an occasion when
it almost came to blows.
Mr. IcHORD. He was never prosecuted for attempted assassination ?
Mr. Dellinger. It is a little vague in my memory as to exactly what
he did or didn't do.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, before we leave this Havana radio
broadcast of February 5, earlier you made a number of comments about
our inability to communicate with one another. Do you find it rather
disconcerting that your friend down in Havana, Cuba, made this
statement, that you represent "the curious paradox of being a fighter
for nonviolence who favors violence"?
Would you find it rather disconcerting that even your friends down
in Cuba would find you equally paradoxical, as perhaps some mem-
bers of this committee would find you ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I think there is a paradox involved.
Mr. Watson. In fact, everyone, even your friends, finds it very diffi-
cult to understand you ?
Mr. Dellinger. I didn't say that.
Mr. Watson. It does not disturb you that he referred to you as a
curious paradox?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I don't feel disturbed about this. If I had been
there at the time, I would have tried to expatiate on it. As I say, I
think it is a difficult thing about people who believe in nonviolence,
who believe that violence tends to become corrupting and self-defeat-
ing and yet are unwilling to be assigned to a token position of
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2783
dissent and are struggling for some method in which the humanist
and other values of nonviolence can be preserved and yet can be
politically effective.
I spoke about my own interest in the possibility of some kind of
combination of what Arthur Waskow called Gandhi and Guerrilla,
what I thought earlier of traditional pacifism and resistance activities
of World War II. I don't know what the exact answer is. I am ex-
perimenting. A lot of other people are. It is not surprising to me,
particularly since we have no clear-cut doctrinaire position on it; it
confuses a number of people.
Mr. Watson. So the major thrust of my question was that since the
journalist in Cuba, whom you described as making an honest effort
at journalism, describes you as a curious paradox — in other words,
he found you at least difficult to understand so far as being non-
violent but favoring violence — you must conclude that it would be
difficult for some of us to understand how you can be both for and
against the same thing at the same time. That is the only point I am
trying to make, if you will perhaps make that concession, which I am
sure you will not. Thank you.
Mr. GuTMAN. Let the record show that the Congressman is correct,
the concession is not made.
Mr. IcHORD. Let us be in order.
Mr. Bellinger. No, I don't object to the fact that this is a difficult
idea to understand. I am quite ready to concede that to you or any-
body else, including many people I work with. I would not want to
include in that some of the other things that we have discussed, that
is all.
Mr. Watson. May I ask you one other question ?
I asked it of the other gentleman. Wlien you make these statements,
which obviously now you do not mean to be taken in their normal and
literal meaning and interpretation, do you explain to those to whom
you articulate these positions that you really don't mean for them
to be taken and accepted in the normal manner?
Mr. Dellinger. I am quite confused by what you mean by that.
Mr. Watson. I wanted to confuse the question purposely with the
thought it might get through to ^ou. I have been making my questions
simple, and you accused me of simplicity. I wanted to make the ques-
tion complicated.
Mr. Dellinger. I don't know what statements you are referring to.
I want to make clear that I do not have a double standard of what I
say or where. My views I try to say as openly whether it is you or Ave-
rell Harriman or somebody from the Soviet Union or Vietnam.
Mr. Ichord. Proceed with the questioning.
Mr. CoNLEY. Directing your attention to June 1968, were you in
Prague, Czechoslovakia, on June 16, 1968 ?
Mr. Dellinger. Approximately that time I had a very brief stop-
over in Prague, yes, on a trip to Prague. I don't know if that is the
exact date.
Mr. Conley. Did you at that time meet with Tran Van Anh and
Phan Van Chuong, the Viet Cong representatives in Prague? Please
excuse my pronunciation, sir.
Mr. Dellinger. With that reservation, yes.
Mr. CoNLEY. What other Americans were present at that meeting?
Mr. Dellinger. As I said earlier, I really don't care to discuss the
2784 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
activities of other people. As a matter of fact, I am just thinking about
this out loud, but since I know you already know who was there: in
fact as I think it was testified before this conunittee
Mr. CoxLEY. That was going to be my next question, sir.
Mr. Dellixger. I don't think I am involving anybody in a public
wuy that might lead to attack and danger that he is not already sub-
ject to.
Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Robeit Greenblatt (
Mr. Dellixger. Yes. Mr. Greenblatt.
Mr. CoxLEY. All right, sir.
Mr. Dellixger. Xow maybe before you proceed with this line of
questioning, if I could just make a little statement.
I have had intimate contacts with both the XLF and representatives
from North Vietnam, including both Xuan Thuy, who is head of the
DRV delegation in Paris, and ^ladam Binh. who is head of the XLF
delegation. Xow the sole purpose of these has not been, I will try to
say that right, the sole purpose has not been to secure the release of
American prisoners, but this has been a very important aspect of my
contacts with these people. It is a very touchy and delicate area, as I
am sure you i^eoognize. And we have been successful in playing a part
at least in the release. I would have to stop to comit them up, but in
at least, well, a number of prisoners, some by the XLF and some by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
In addition to my reservations I said about involving other people
who can better speak for themselves, in this particular area I am very
anxious not to do anythmg which might conceivably jeopardize future
releases and complicate those relations.
Mr. IcHORD. I thmk the questions will be connected with the Chi-
cago demonstration.
Mr. CoxLEY. I think jou are anticipating again malice m my
heart.
Mr. Dellixger. I wanted to remind you of the delicacy of this.
Mr. CoxLEY. "Were there any other Americans besides you and Rob-
ert Greenblatt. bearmg in mind I have not asked you to identify those
persons ( I simply ask you, "Were there other Americans present ?
Mr. Dellixger. To the best of my memory, no.
Mr. CoxLEY. You were the only two Americans present ?
Mr. Dellixger. I don't want to give a wrong answer. I can't remem-
ber anybody else present. I am trying to thmk if there could have
been, smce you are asking.
Mr. CoxLEY. At this meeting did you discuss with the Viet Cong the
meeting which was to be held in Septeml>er 1968 in Budapest between
American, Viet Cong, and Xorth Vietnamese activities?
Mr. Dellixger. Yes: I always favor face-to-face contacts, as I say,
whether it is Averell Harriman or Vietnamese, although I place more
faith and hope in the contacts between the American antiwar move-
ment and the Vietnamese. I have always attempted to encourage first-
hand contact and firsthand mformation.
On this occasion we discussed the possibility of some kind of meeting
between Americans and the Xational Liberation Front and representa-
tives from Xoith Vietnam.
Mr. CoxLEY. Xow. bearing in mind that we are still talking about
June 16 or thereabouts in Prague. Czechoslovakia, at this meeting did
not the Viet Cong recommend only, and using the exact quotes, if I
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2785
may, "those politically most advanced" should be invited from the
United States ?
Mr. Dellixger. Well, it is interesting to me about direct quotes. I
happen to know that the U.S. Government illegally seized Mr. Green-
blatt's jjapers, and undoubtedly there are notes of his which can be
given as direct (j[uote3. The fact is that in these kinds of conversations,
you know, one jots down a suggestion to remember something. How-
ever, I have no objection to describing exactly how I interpret what
that note meant and what the facts were. I helfjed to arrange
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to mislead you into believ-
ing that this quote is based upon a note that was seized from some
person. I don't want to lead you down that primrose path. But you go
ahead and answer.
Mr, Dellinger. "Well, the devious methods of the police state in
which telephone conversations, private meetings, are bugged and
recorded and Avhich undercover agents who pose as something which
they are not and f»ry into the private affairs and guaranteed political
associations of the American people, as well as all over the world —
these methods elude me. However, I consider it extremeh" unlikely
that at this particular time somebody in the meeting could give you a
direct quote. Perhaps 30U have been violating the internal democracy
of Czechoslovakia, along with that of the United States, and perhaps
the room in which we met was bugged. I know about these methods,
in general, and I am certainly willing to deal with the question, al-
though I must say I have scorn for these methods and consider them
to be self-defeating.
Mr, CoxLET. May we get back to the question, which was "Tihose
politically most advanced." Did they not, in fact, indicate to you or
reconmaend that these are the persons that should be invited from
the United States ?
Mr. Dellixger. Let me tell you what did happen in our conversa-
tions. I am not tr^nng to pin down the exact month, but earlier, begin-
ing in Hanoi, where I had proposed that they should, within the limits
possible under the very hea\-y bombing that Vietnam was suffering,
they should give visas t>o American reporters and teleWsion people and
to many others so as to have face-to-face contact and accurate informa-
tion, beginning then and through a series of conversations we arranged
a meeting which took place in Bratislava approximately 1 year earlier,
and at that meeting
Mr. CoxLET. Let us not go into Bratislava.
Mr. Dellixger. It is the contrast that is involved.
Mr. CoxLET. We are going to get to Bratislava in a little while.
Mr. Dellixger. In this context it would be better if I set up the
contrast. What we decided was that this was a conference in Bratislava
at which it would l^e valuable to have a wide range of j^eople of a
variety of political \*iew5 and attitudes, including some people who
might not even be sure that they were against war, but who were
tending in that direction. It would be a healthy thing to have a face-
to-face contact in conference among people of this kind.
In Budapest a year later we felt, partly because this other conference
had taken place, but partly also because of the growth in numbers
and intensity of the antiwar movement, that it would be more useful to
have people who were clearly part of the active movement to have
2786 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
this experience of meeting face to face and holding protracted dis-
cussions with the Vietnamese. That is wliat was meant by whatever
the phrase that came from, or at least my understanding of what
might have been meant by the phrase "politically most advanced," or
whatever you said.
Mr. CoNLEY. Is not another way to put that, and again I am engaged
in being simple, "to leave the dupes at home" ?
Mr. Dellinger. I really don't think in terms of "dupes." I never
have. It is public knowledge tiiat some of tlie types of people we in-
vited to Bratislava were not actively involved in the antiwar m^ove-
ment, but just as I encouraged Hanoi to invite people from the mass
media to come and see the bombing and report to the American people,
similarly it would be useful to have people who had suspicions or
hostilities, even, to the NLF who had been brainwashed, if I could
put it that way, by a diet of American propaganda about terrorists,
and so forth, I thought there would be some benefits from having them
sit down together with the NLF.
At that meeting many people, including myself, tried to ask search-
ing questions of them and to express our own view^point. There was
no question of dupes or nondupes.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, was not another item on the
proposed agenda discussions that were had between the Viet Cong
w^ho were experienced in attempting to cause disaffection among U.S.
soldiers and Americans who were engaging in the same type activity ?
Mr. Dellinger. First of all, I just prefer to call them the National
Liberation Front. Viet Cong is a little bit like the term "nigger" or
"Polack" or something of that kind. Now, what was planned and envi-
sioned was that there would be a discussion of all forms of antiwar
activity. Now, these would include, for example — in fact, at our earlier
meeting the first item of the report from the NLF was a report on the
military situation. HoAvever, this was not interpreted and did not
mean that the Americans would go home and organize a military
campaign against the American Government.
In much the same kind of context, it is quite possible, although I
don't remember specifically, that there would Ivdve been planned — I
did not attend this meeting by the way because I thought other people
should have the opportunity — but it is quite possible amongst the
Vietnamese reports, besides reports of the military situation, would
be reports on disaffection within the Armed Forces because this is
something which has always interested me. There are rumors about
groups of soldiers in Vietnam who refused to go into battle or who
desert and hide out in Saigon. Even I read some things about people
going over to the other side. On the other hand, there is a very sharp
and strong military censorship which often even denies things after
they have been made public and are known basically to be true.
Mr. IcHORD. Of course, that works on both sides. There are a num-
ber of Viet Cong or NLF or Nortli Vietnamese who come over to the
American and South Vietnamese side, too.
Mr. Dellinger. That is correct. In any event, I myself certainly
have interest in any information that anybody, whether Vietnamese
from the South— I asked questions of this' kincl when I was in Saigon
on an early visit — Vietnamese from the South or Vietnamese from
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2787
the National Liberation Front, what have you, any information they
might have about this would certainly be of interest to me.
Mr. CoNLEY. Being specific in this area, did not the Viet Cong, the
National Liberation Front, or the North Vietnamese specifically ask
for, and I quote, sir, "competent people to discuss work among soldiers
since a major item is exchange of experience and coordination of
activities" ?
Mr. Bellinger. That does not sound quite kosher to me. I did not
have the benefit of a tape recorder, and I have had many, many con-
versations before and since with the Vietnamese and others. It does not
sound quite like the way they talk or the way I talk when I am with
them. I volunteered here, as I will anywhere, my great interest in the
coffeehouse program, my great interest in bringing the facts about the
war to American soldiers, my support in general of desertion, of re-
fusal to commit war crimes, of any acts which will bring the war to
an end and save the lives of Vietnamese and Americans.
I certainly, in talking to the Vietnamese tomorrow, would tell them
that one of the things we are doing is carrying out this coffeehouse
program. How^ever, I have always made clear and specifically at the
earlier conference when I made an opening speech — if I remember cor-
rectly, it was an opening speech — a great deal of my emphasis was on
the fact that, as the Vietnamese seemed to themselves emphasize, every
people had to work out their own problems and develop their own
indigenous movement and, in my view, a whole generation of idealists
had been led astray because they had, perhaps for understandable
reasons, been subservient to a foreign power, namely, Moscow, and that
the present movement in the United States was not that kind of
movement.
I wanted to make it very clear to the Vietnamese that we were
indigenous and patriotic Americans who were opposed to imperialism
and certain other forms of our society; that they must understand
from the beginning we would have differences from them as well as
agreements with them. It is in this context we have always operated.
Therefore the words you read to me don't sound quite correct.
Mr. CoNLEY. You don't think they wanted competent people?
Mr. Dellinger. I am trying not to make a game of it. It sounds like
you are.
Mr. CoNLEY. I am trying not to.
Mr. Dellinger. Obviously they want competent people.
Mr. CoNLEY. To discuss work among soldiers ?
Mr. Dellinger. What I have tried to indicate is that I think they
want competent people, including people who work in draft resistance,
teach-ins, anything else; they would like to have some sense of what
is going on here, although it is quite clear to me that they realize the
issue will be resolved on the battlefield and not basically by the Ameri-
can movement.
Mr. Ichord. In that connection, Mr. Dellinger, do you consider prop-
aganda distributed on the battlefield to American soldiers in South
Vietnam, such as one document that I picked up when I was last in
South Vietnam, saying, "Yankee, go home," to be not part of the war
effort on the part of the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think it is. My understanding is that in almost
all wars both sides, one way or another, try to communicate, nowadays
2788 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
broadcast, to the other side pointing out that their side is unjust and
they should lay down their arms.
Mr. IcHORD. This paper said, "Yankee, go home, do not die here.'"
You would have to niterpret that as trying to destroy the morale of
the soldiers.
Mr. Dellinger. I know they have broadcast, and similarly the
United States drops leaflets on the other side. I consider this a very
difficult area. For myself, although I made very clear I hope that
every American boy will refuse to go to Vietnam and refuse to take
part in other imperialist ventures, I have some simple reservations in
terms of when a person is actually on the scene. It is not that I don't
want him to be able responsibly and in the proper way, my idea of the
proper way or his, to be able to leave, but I would be very slow to say
something to somebody as he was going into battle, you know, at that
very moment, because obviously it can lead to all kinds of difficulties
and problems for him. So, I myself, as it happens, have never engaged
in this kind of activity, although I do my best to encourage everybody
to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces.
Mr. Watson. You encourage everybody to refuse to serve in the
Armed Forces ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; particularly at the present time.
Mr. Watson. Does that extend to encouragement or at least being
delighted with those who would desert the military forces?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. I think I indicated on several occasions I sup-
port those who have taken political asylum in Sweden, France, Hol-
land, and so forth. I am fascinated by the fact that originally we pro-
vided asylum in the United States to people who opposed militarism
and aggression.
Mr. Watson. It is evident from your earlier statement that you do
everything that you can to assist or carry out your beliefs.
Mr. Dellinger. Well, it would be interesting to look back. Did I say
"to assist" ? I think I said "to encourage."
Mr. Watson. You agreed that you would do everything you can to
carry out your beliefs and your desires ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am trying to be very candid because I believe in
my beliefs and I believe in my actions.
Mr. Watson. Try it on this one, yes or no.
Mr. Dellinger. The way you phrased it, I think I have to exercise
some reservations because there are things that some people might
think might assist in this case which I wouldn't undertake for a
variety of reasons. Without really going into it very well, I have
explained, that I consider it a complex problem. If a group of soldiers
is going back in battle, I would be very slow to do something at that
moment to demoralize them or to make them feel spirtually ill at ease
when they went out. This is a very difficult question that I don't have
to face because I am not ordinarily in that situation.
Mr. Watson. You are not concerned about any spiritual aspects of
the matter, are you, Mr. Dellinger ?
Mr. Dellinger. I don't know where you draw that conclusion. I just
used the word.
Mr. Watson. You just used the word.
Mr. Dellinger. I was not playing a game when I used it.
Mr. Watson. You are not really concerned about that, are you ? Do
you, in your youth movement, encourage people to attend church?
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2789
Mr. Bellinger. Unfortunately it is my own view, although I did
study for the Christian ministry. And again I am not sure, I am
ahvays happy to expound my views, but this seems quite remote;
unfortunately I believe, speaking generally of the organized church,
it is not a force that has opposed war, stood for justice, or really been
for the greatest spiritual advancement of tlie people. I would like to
distinguish that there are obviously great numbers of individual clergy-
men, individual Christians, individual Jews, adherents of various
religions, who are very sincere and try to carry through this way.
In my own life and my own belief, I believe the institutions, in gen-
eral, tend to interfere with the very goals that they purport to serve.
Mr. Watson. In any instance, anything which tends to restrict the
individualism of a person
Mr. Bellinger. Again I haven't said such a thing because I do
believe in a combination of what might be called individualism and
social solidarity. I have indicated that in a number of areas. I am op-
posed to the form of individualism which is expressed under capitalism,
where people work for their own selfish economic interest instead of
w^orking for the common good.
Mr. Watson. You are against the profit motive ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I am.
Mr. Watson. I don't want again to get you in a paradox here, but
you are against the Government. Of course, we understand that.
Mr. Bellinger. I don't know if I got into that.
Mr. Watson. But you are. That is a fair assumption? You don't
like the established Government, do you ?
Mr. Bellinger. I do not.
Mr. Watson. If you are against profit and the people running the
business, you would have to turn it over to the Government. You are
against the Government who would run it. Would you be satisfied if
you and the Mobilization Committee ran it ?
Mr. Bellinger. Again, I find it difficult to accept your summary of
my views. I generally don't make blanket indictments of quite that
kind. I happen to advocate some kind of combination of political
democracy and economic democracy, some kind of communal solidarity
and equality, with maximum possible decentralization and individual
responsibility.
Mr. Watson. You used the word "communal." Am I to interpret that
in the usual meaning, or do you have a different interpretation?
Mr. Bellinger. I don't know. I used the word "communal"
Mr. Watson. Everybody is to live
Mr. Bellinger. In my own life and interest, my first major interest
in this was at the time that I was an active church member, when I
was very impressed by the early disciples of Jesus, Avho abandoned
all private ownership and, as it says in the Bible, there was neither
rich nor poor among them.
Mr. Watson. The Bible says that you shall always have the poor
with you. I am concerned with this aspect because I have a relation
to it, I have a twin brother who is a minister. We won't pursue it
further. Obviously he is of the category you condemn, he is of the
established church.
Mr. Bellinger. I would not want to condemn sight unseen. I have
a great deal of respect for the established church, both clergy and laity.
Mr. IcHORD. Let us proceed with the questioning.
2790 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr, CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, if I may — again reminding you that we
are talking about your visit to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in June 1968 —
put to you, sir, was not a code worked out for telegrams to be sent be-
tween you and the Viet Cong office in Prague so that, for example,
the word "Harry" in a telegram would be "Hungary" and the word
"Peter" would mean "Poland" ? Was such a code worked out by you
and the representatives of the North Vietnam Government?
Mr. Dellinger, xlbsolutely. I do everything I can — although I my-
self am public about just about everything I do and believe, in
preparing for something of that kind, I would certainly attempt to
maintain the privacy of communication, which I think is our right
and which I think the Government constantly violates. Now this is a
very unimportant matter. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't have had
enough interest to do this, but I am quite willing to use this kind of
very simple code, as I think all businesses do — I mean businesses even
use that code if they are going to announce a new model or new price.
Mr, CoNLEY. Who did propose the idea of the code then ?
Mr. Dellinger. It emerged from our discussions of four people.
Mr. Conley. You and Mr. Greenblatt and two others?
Mr, Dellinger. The two others you mentioned, Tran Van Aiih and
Phan Van Chuong.
Mr, Conley. We may assume from your remarks it was not your
idea, but one of the other three ?
Mr. Dellinger, Not necessarily. You see, it is the same as going to
Bratislava, We did not hold any press conference or make any press
announcement beforehand because we wanted to be able to meet with-
out being harassed by CIA agents and reporters. It was difficult enough
bringing together people from these three different groups, that is,
the two Vietnamese and the American, and we didn't want to be meet-
ing in a goldfish bowl. Although we made no elaborate attempts to
keep it secret, nonetheless we were relatively quiet about it. As soon as
the meeting was over, we were quite prepared to give all and any in-
formation. The same way here. There was also another factor. For
example, a captain in the Army, who served in Vietnam and is opposed
to the war, was part of a group which we were having go to Sweden
to visit deserters to find out what the reason for their desertion was,
to give factual rejDorts to the American people.
This was not kept secret because we did not use the code. Because
one of your informers discovered the information, he was denied a
l^assport by the State Department and was unable to make the trip.
So, you know, there are certain practical considerations which would
motivate me. So although, in general, I don't bother with such things,
I could very well have been the one to suggest it just to keep it quiet
a little bit and to prevent the State Department from denying pass-
ports or visas to some of the people who were going, that we keep it a
little bit quiet, also, so they miglit not bug the room in Hungary, as
they may have well bugged the room in Prague.
Mr. Conley. Were there others at the meeting — Mr. Greenblatt —
during this trip ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes; Mr. Greenblatt accompanied me on at least
two visits to Averell Harriman and one to Cyrus Vance and on per-
haps three visits, two or three visits, with the North Vietnamese dele-
gation, including Xuan Thuy, the head of the delegation, and Colonel
Ha Van Lau and a number of others.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2791
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Greenblatt also met with Ambassador Harriman,
did he not ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, he did-
Mr. CoNLEY. Were you aware
Mr. Dellinger. — to the best of my memory.
Mr. CoNLEY. Were you aware, sir, that a Mr. Wilfred Burchett
briefed Robert Greenblatt before his meeting with Harriman ?
Mr. Dellinger. The occasion you are referring to is probably one
in which I called up Wilfred Burchett, whom I originally met in his
home in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, some years ago. I knew he was in
Paris. He is a journalist and a correspondent, and I consider him to
be a very honest journalist and very helpful. I don't remember that
Mr. Greenblatt knew him before. The way I remember it is that I
called Wilfred and suggested that we meet and have a drink and talk
about things and that Mr. Greenblatt and I met with Mr. Burchett on
not one, but at least two, occasions.
I don't look at this as briefing. I look at this as exchange of ideas
and information since none of us follow party lines or receive orders
from anybody.
Mr. CoNLEY. This is the same Wilfred Burchett, is it not, who was
a participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against Amer-
ican prisoners of war during the Korean war ?
Mr. Dellinger. Do you expect me to consider that a serious ques-
tion and answer it ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. Dellinger. Repeat it, please, and I will do my best.
Mr. CoNLEY. Were you not aware that Wilfred Burchett was a
participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against Ameri-
can prisoners of war in Korea ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I have no knowledge of that. In fact, I am not
an expert on that phase of the Korean war. You know, as a layman
and from a distance, there were some things about the whole treat-
ment of the prisoners, on both sides, by the way, which made me a little
uneasy. As I say, I was not in a position, for a variety of reasons, to
really explore this very thoroughly.
My chief concern, since I have been in Vietnam, was to try to in-
vestigate whether the Vietnamese were doing the kind of brainwash-
ing, which I don't know whether the Koreans did or not, but of which
they were accused, but I did investigate that and felt convinced that
they were not brainwashing anybody.
On the other hand, I found out that one of the bars to the release
of more American prisoners is that when arrangements have been
made and the prisoners are on their way home, the Army, the State
Department — and on one occasion the prisoners were told the word
came right from the White House — put pressure on the released pris-
oners to go to the base in Thailand from which Vietnam was being
bombed and there to "debrief them before they were allowed to speak
to the press.
In other words, I think there is at least some suspicion of brain-
washing on the American authorities' part. I am against brainwashing,
whoever does it.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I have in my hand here an extract from
the Subcommittee on the Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent
2792 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, December 4, 1953, wherein
appears the sworn testimony of former prisoner of war Lieutenant
Colonel Robert Abbott of the United States Infantry, wherein he
identifies this Wilfred Burchett as a person who visited prisoner-of-
war camps in an effort to sway the prisoners and to get statements from
them and to create unrest.
Now, gir, in the light of that testimony which is in our possession,
do you still say that you were not aware that Mr, Burchett had previ-
ously participated in the Communist brainwashing campaign against
American prisoners of war ?
Mr. Bellinger. First of all, I never saw that statement before.
Secondly, I would have to consider it quite likely it could be as un-
reliable as some of the statements made by the committee, the present
committee, particularly in its October sessions, when the staff and
"^ritnesses told a number of fanciful and untrue things.
Mr, CoNLEY. Sir, I have to assume, as I do with you, sir, that a man
who takes the oath intends to tell the truth.
Mr. Dellinger, Well, you can assume that, and I don't know any
of the people involved. I am not going to challenge their veracity, but
I don't automatically believe it because you have read it to me from
that committee, I will tell you very frankly that when I went to
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 1966, I had some suspicions about the
accuracy of Wilfred Burchett as a correspondent. I myself am quite
aware of how partisans on both sides of a controversy tend to distort
the truth.
I think the record of Communist journalists during the twenties
and thirties and later includes many, many instances of distortion
and propaganda which later was exposed not to be true.
Mr, IcHORD, Do you think the record is pretty good today ? You only
mentioned the thirties and twenties.
Mr. Dellixger. I was thinking this was the period of the slave labor
camps and the executions, and so on. I think there has been a modifica-
tion in a healthy direction. There has been some liberalization process
which has taken place, but the record is not one that I consider satis-
factory today.
The journalistic covering of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian invasion is
an example. Anyway I did not know Wilfred Burchett. Because he
had access to information and also had insights which many other
people did not, he is occasionally quoted in the American press. Be-
cause of the kind of pressures that exist in this society, I never saw
him quoted without being referred to in some invidious way. To the
very least, as the Australian Communist journalist, which is a way,
you know, of discrediting him, I had no idea whether he would turn
out to be an honest journalist or dishonest journalist,
I will say I spent considerable time with him in Cambodia on both
occasions before I visited North Vietnam, I talked with him at length
about what he had seen and what the realities were. I had far more
opportunity to check these things out during my visit than he, I am
sure, anticipated because it involved the kind of traveling under in-
tense bombardment which nobody else had been permitted to do during
that time, with the exception of himself.
I found out that he was utterly reliable. There might be something
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2793
that I would interpret differently, but I found as a journalist he was
utterly reliable and honest. I have a great deal of respect for him. If I
wanted to find out facts about something, I would certainly take ad-
vantage of the opportmiity of meeting with him in Paris so as to have
whatever up-to-date knowledge I could before meeting either with
the Vietnamese or the Americans.
Mr. Watsox. Mr. Bellinger, you made the statement that you under-
stood that partisans on both sides would tend to distort the truth.
Mr. Dellikger. Often do ; not all times.
Mr. Watson. Of course, you are partisan. Would that apply to you ?
Mr. Bellinger. I try not to, but obviously I have my own biases and
beliefs. I think nobody is a completely objective observer. But I have
learned through the years that to exaggerate or distort — first of all that
one may do it unconsciously. And that is bad enough. But to stretch
the truth a little bit or the facts in order to gain a temporary advantage
is self-defeating and corrupting, and I try to avoid it.
Mr. Watson. If a report were to reach you that could be construed
as pro- or anti-American, your first inclination would be to construe
it anti-American ?
Mr. Bellinger. No, first of all
Mr. Watson. In reference to the war in Vietnam ?
Mr. Bellinger. No. I think there is a glorious American tradition of
belief in self-determination and of struggling and striving for democ-
racy even though that has been greatly frustrated. Therefore, to me I
think it is the most pro- American thing I know and the greatest hope
in the country that so many people, particularly young people, are
speaking up for the truth as they see it and are able to get away from
the very stupid and wrong concept of ''my country, right or wrong"
or "Whatever my country does is right.''
If a Communist country adopts that position, I oppose it. If a
capitalist country adopts that position, I oppose it. My own country or
somebody else's country, I don't believe in it.
Mr. Watson. In other words, you do believe that might be pro-
American in reference to our position in Vietnam ?
Mr. Bellinger. I did not say that.
Mr. Watson. Then the answer to my earlier question is simply, if
you heard a report which could either be construed pro- or anti-
American in reference to Vietnam, your construction would be anti-
American ?
Mr. Bellinger. No ; I, for example, heard a report
Mr. Watson. Tell us something good that America has done.
Mr. Bellinger. This is not good, but let me give you an example.
Mr. Watson. Tell me one good thing that we have done over there.
Mr. Bellinger. That is pretty hard. You are asking a difficult ques-
tion. I think many sincere people have thought they were doing some-
thing good when they tried to, well
Mr. Watson. You can think offhand of nothing good, not one single
good thing?
Mr. Bellinger. I didn't say that. I think many people have gone
over there, for example, to bring medical aid. I know people personally
who have done educational and other constructive work in Vietnam.
However, as in the well-known case of, I forget his name — anyway a
number of the leading people, also unknpwn people, have gone over
2794 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
there and have worked for a few months and a few years in the Amer-
ican aid program and on the constructive side have felt in the end
that the purpose of this and the success of this was completely defeated
by the, first of all, by the American militarism which was going on at
the same time and, secondly, because of the fact that when a country is
trying to impose its will upon another country, then even the good
things that that country does turn to ashes in the people's mouths.
I would certainly give eveiy credit to many, many individuals, some
of whom I know and some of whom I don't, who have gone over to
Vietnam with that kind of aim. I would like to withdraw all Amer-
ican troops and end American attempts to dominate Vietnamese life
so that this kind of constructive relationship could take place between
American people and Vietnamese people, which I very much believe in.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Del linger, are you not the author of the introduc-
tion to Mr. Burchett's forthcoming book on Vietna^ ?
Mr. Dbllinger. Yes. I was going to mention that earlier.
Mr. CoNiLEY. Are you also not planning to address a rally tonight,
the Guardian rally in New York City, with Mr. Burchett?
Mr. Delilinger. Not that I know of. I was earlier asked if I could
come, but because of my operation I indicated that I did not expect
to be able to come there.
I did expect to speak with Mr. Burchett at a conference in Montreal
last weekend. I also had to cancel out on that. I will be happy to appear
on any platform anywhere with Mr. Burchett, even though we might
have differences of interpretation.
Mr. Conley. May I suggest, on your next occasion of visiting with
him, you make inquiry about the question I put to you about the Com-
munist brainwashing campaign in Korea several years ago.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes.
I think I should come to his defense a little bit on that, because I
discussed with him the question of possible Vietnamese brainwash-
ing of Americans. Firet of all, I became assured, insofar as it was
possible, that this is not taking place. Also that the prisoners released
have made this pretty clear — the first release of NLF prisoners, the men
were whisked away to Okinawa and kept incommunicado for months
and had not been released until they had been threatened and in-
timidated so that they did not speak.
From these conversations with Mr. Burchett, I feel convinced that
he is opposed to brainwashing and would neither support it nor take
part in it, even though I have to plead ignorance of the history or
the information that has been adduced on both sides in the Korean
war.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving to another area, the participa-
tion by you in the Bratishiva conference, I wish to hand to you at
this time a copy of a letter. It is addressed, "Dear friend." It is dated
August 22, 1967, which solicits participation in a conference then
scheduled for Prague.
I ask you to advise the committee as to the identity of tlvose
l^eople to whom this letter was sent.
Mr. Dellinger. We sent out a number of communications. Ap-
parently this went, as near as I can tell from the way it reads m
the context, it went to peoj^le wlio were part of the delegation. I
think most of their names have appeared. Most of them wrote re-
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2795
ports of the visit when they came back, and others were mentioned,
I remember, in Newstoeek and Time.
Mr. CoNLEY. Would you identify those that you recall ?
Mr. Dellinger. I really can't go through the business of, because
I am sure it would be incomplete and, as I have indicated, spotty.
That is not the main reason. As I indicated earlier, I myself have
received deadly bombs and grenades through the mail, which only
by a miracle failed to kill my children, who got the mail.
According to the post office inspectors, on at least two previous
occasions, bombs which were intended for me blew up in the post
office when they were being handled.
It is that delicate. Yet my children at that time normally picked up
the mail and walked a mile with it to my country home. It was by
accident I picked it up in the car, and it is a miracle when I opened
it, it did not explode, because I was a little suspicious and opened it
cautiously.
Under those circumstances, I refuse. I think it is unwise for me at
this point to name people who met with the NLF and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam in Bratislava. To the best of my knowl-
edge, they have all themselves written and talked about this. But in
case there is anybody who, because of his home situation, felt that
he did not want this made public because of the safety of his family,
I certainly don't want to be in a position to make this public.
Mr. IcHORD. May I see the letter, Mr. Counsel ?
Are you going to have other questions about the meeting ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, may I see that letter for one moment?
Before we leave this letter, I believe you did acknowledge that you
had sent this letter out, but you would not divulge the names of the
persons to whom it was sent. This is your letter ?
Mr. Dellinger. The photostat runs off the page. I think my name is
near the bottom, is it not ?
Mr. Watson. Yes ; but you did acknowledge the letter.
Mr. Dellinger. It looks like a letter that I sent out, I certainly send
many letters of that kind.
Mr. Watson. I notice item 5 in this letter states that there would be
a limitation of 44 pounds for luggage: "however, please only pack
39 pounds, saving 5 pounds for literature to take to the Vietnamese."
What was the form of that literature ?
Mr. Dellinger. It would vary; but naturally, I being editor of
Liberation, what would first come to mind would be that we would
send over issues of Liberation.
Mr. Watson. It would be anti-American literature?
Mr. Dellinger. I don't consider Liberation to be ant i- American. I
consider the House Un-American Activity to be anti-American.
There are two Americas, you know. I think I speak for the best
interests of the best America.
Mr. Ichord. Let us describe the type of literature which you an-
ticipated being taken.
Mr. Dellinger. The type ?
Mr. Ichord. Yes.
Mr. Dellinger. As I said. Liberation is the first thing that comes
2796 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
to mind, but just a scattering of materials of various kinds that could
be books and magazines, weekly publications.
Yes, I would bring back copies of the Vietnam. Courier; and I would
take to them copies of Liberation^ Guardian, who knows, maybe an
interesting magazine section of the New York Times. Anything which
would
Mr. Watson. Anything which would be of encouragement to the
North Vietnamese would be included in that ?
Mr. Bellinger. Not necessarily, because I don't believe in encour-
aging contrary to the facts. For instance, on my first trip to Vietnam,
I have been so brainwashed by the American press that I thought the
Vietnamese were overemphasizing the value to them of the demonstra-
tions in this country. One of the things I had in mind was to say to
them, "Listen, the antiwar movement is not that strong, the demon-
strators are not all that big, and we are not powerful enough to stop
the war in the United States. Don't think that we are."
But that was independent of whether it would encourage or dis-
courage. That was to simply tell them the truth. When I got over
there, I found out that the press had a false idea of the emphasis.
Since that time, the antiwar sentiment has grown. Now it is the
most unpopular war in American history.
Mr. Watson. In other words, this suggests to me that of this reserve
5 pounds for literature, you would want this committee to believe that
a j)art was to be some proper American literature.
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, truthful literature, which I consider to be the
most proper American literature, to the best interest of America, the
proper American of the antiwar movement, who does not want our
country to be dragged into the mud and to be a war criminal and
does not want his children slaughtered.
Mr. Watson. Basically, it would be that type literature which
would be of encouragement or help to the North Vietnamese ?
Mr. Bellinger. Well, you can put your own interpretation on it.
As I say, I am sure we included Liberation. I am sure we included the
Guardian. I am sure we included some things from the Neiv York
Times i\\?it might be of interest to them.
Mr. Ichord. Continue.
Mr. Bellinger. I believe in the free dissemination of ideas and
literature everywhere, including ideas that I disagree with. Nothing
would have stopped me from bringing things that I disagreed with.
Mr. Watson. At your meetings do you distribute proper American
positions on Vietnam? Bo you distribute leaflets
Mr. Bellinger. I have already indicated that I think Mobilization
represents the proper American position on Vietnam.
Mr. Watson. Bo you distribute literature of the position opposite
to yours?
Mr. Bellinger. I myself take the position that if somebody comes
up and distributes anti-American literature, in other words, literature
supporting the war in Vietnam, I would be perfectly happy to have
them do that. I always am happy for people to hear both sides.
On a number of occasions, when I was scheduled to debate with
representatives of the State Bepartment or of the Pentagon or various
governmental agencies, they pulled out when they learned I was to
be the opponent, because they knew I had been to Vietnam and had
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2797
perhaps more facts than that particular individual felt competent
to deal with. On other occasions, I have debated such people. I have
always believed in fair preseiitation on both sides, including sides
whose ideas I disagree with.
Mr. Watson. You yourself have never made any distribution or
you yourself have never articulated the position opposite to that
which you now describe as "proper American" ?
Mr. Dellinger. My position is constantly developing. There is a
certain core of constancy to it, but it is constantly developing.
Mr. Watson. Hardening, or developing?
Mr. Bellinger. I think it is becoming more militantly anti-imperial-
ist through the years, but I don't think it is hardening ; it is developing.
Mr. Watson. Is your meaning of the term "more militant" the same
as we have heard described by some of the other witnesses, or should
we construe that in the normal interpretation of more militant ?
Mr. Dellinger. I have not heard the other witnesses. I have tried to
make my own position clear. I have tried to summarize it by saying a
position which would go beyond token dissent to effective changing of
policy.
Mr. Watson. Militant is generally described as the opposite of
peaceful, is it not ?
Mr. Dellinger. Not in my vocabulary. I certainly do not mean it
that way.
Mr. Watson. You do not ?
Mr. Dellinger. No. I am a nonviolent militant.
Mr. Watson. I guess that is just like being a Catholic-Jew.
Mr. GuTMAN. I can be verbally aggressive, just as I am now to you.
Congressman.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, let us abide by the rules. You have not
been called to testify. We have gotten along very well today. Let us
proceed with the questioning.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Dellinger, I hand you now what is captioned "Pur-
poses and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference," and ask you
if you recognize this and whether you did, in fact, prepare it.
\ Witness and counsel examine document. )
Mr. Dellinger. I have read this.
Mr. CoNLEY. The question was: Did you prepare it and do you
recognize it as something you prepared ?
Mr, Dellinger. Yes, I imagine I did. Some of the wording seems
like mine. I literally cannot remember whether I worked on it jointly
with somebody else. There is nothing in here that I want to repudiate,
but I don't remember whether it is all mine or not.
You only have one copy ?
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir. I would like to use it for a moment, if I may.
Mr. Dellinger. All right. Maybe you can give it back to me for my
response.
Mr. Conley. Yes, sir, I will be glad to.
In this particular document, Mr. Dellinger, appears a "POSSIBLE
AGENDA." I read from that agenda the proposed topics :
A. The Anti-War Movement
B. The Student Movement
C. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement
D. The Labor Movement
21-706 O— 69— pt. 3 8
2798 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
E. American Politics: 1968
F. Business and the War
G. America's Global Situation.
Are these basically the topics which were the proposed or possible
agenda for that meeting ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think it makes clear in here that the Vietnamese
were preparing a proposed agenda, and we were jjreparing a proposed
agenda, and then a smaller committee would meet before the conference
and work this out so that the conference would hopefully be mutually
satisfactory.
This was a proposed agenda which I, perhaps working with others,
drew up, first of all for the reactions of the American delegates, and
after those were taken and absorbed, leading to whatever changes then
would be presented to the Vietnamese.
I can assure you that, unfortunately, we did not cover adequately
all of these subjects. The time was too short.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are you acquainted with an individual by the name of
Steven S. Schwarzschild ?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Conley. Now, Mr. Schwarzschild has apparently done some
writing, Mr. Dellinger, in a magazine referred to as DISSENT, I
believe, and has indicated in this magazine that he attended this par-
ticular conference.
I say that to you in order that you will not feel like, in connection
with my next question, that you are identifying someone who has not
been already publicly identified.
Mr. GuTMAN. Just a moment. I have a word for my client.
Mr, IcHORD. Give the counsel time to confer with his witness.
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my next question is: Was Steven
Schwarzschild, in fact, at this conference held in Bratislava between
September 6 and 12, 1967 ?
Mr. Dellixger. He was at part of it. He was in very great personal
conflict, I think, over this. I myself had luncheon with him and his
family, discussing the advisability of his going. He was under a lot of
pressure from some members of his family about going. In addition
to the usual concerns that families might have about that, if he went,
he might be called before the House Un-American Activities Commit-
tee or otherwise persecuted.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you think you have been persecuted ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think you have been very fair in the manner of
this. I think a lot of the questions have no legislative purpose.
Mr. Ichord. The Chair will be the judge of those questions, if and
when that question arises.
Mr. Dellinger. I think it is clear the history of the committee is that
it has not been one which I consider honorable.
I think one realizes that, in a sense, one is persecuted just by being
here, because it takes one away from his work and because he constantly
runs the danger of being cited for contempt if he makes any slight
wrong step, or witnesses whose honesty is not necessarily-
Mr. IciiORD. The Chair will assume that you will abide by your
affirmation, Mr. Dellinger.
Mr. Dellinger. Anyway, in addition, Steven Schwarzschild is a
rabbi, and this was shortly after the death of an American in Czecho-
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2799
Slovakia by the name of Jordan, if I remember correctly, in which there
were overtones of anti-Semitism. There was a great deal of emotion,
both Jewish and other concerns, over this whole incident. Steven
Schwarzschild was very much torn about whether he should go or not.
I encouraged him to go, on the line I have always taken and ex-
pressed here. I thought this would give him the opportunity to express
his concerns, including about Czechoslovakia and anti-Semitism, and
to investigate.
Anyway, as a result of the internal conflict, and perhaps due to the
fact he was trying to do some of these things, I think Steven Schwarz-
schild attended less of the conference than anybody else. In one sense
he might be said to have never quite participated ; he was around the
edges of it.
The conference did not take place in Prague, as you remember, but
in Bratislava. During at least part of the conference, he was in Prague
instead of in Bratislava.
Mr. CoNLEY. You will concede with me, then, that he was at least
there physically, whether he participated or not ?
Mr. Dellinger. He was a delegate and he was there during part of
it and he participated in part of it.
Mr. CoNLEY. Bearing this in mind and referring specifically to this
magazine, DISSENT, the January-February 1968 issue, I read to
you, sir, a portion of an article, the introduction to an article which
he wrote, entitled "The New Left Meets The Real Thing." It goes as
follows :
During their visits to hanoi David Dellinger (editor of Liberation), Tom
Hayden, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of SDS) were invited to gather a
group of about 40 American radicals in order to arrange a meeting with a group
of Vietnamese. The Americans were exi)ected not only to oppose the war in Viet-
nam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in fact meet
with their Vietnamese counteri>arts last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.
Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak Peace Committees * * *.
It goes on into who defrayed their expenses, and so forth.
Sir, is this a fair statement by Mr. Schwarzschild, that "The
Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam
but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory"?
Mr. Dellinger. Without meaning to reflect on Rabbi Schwarz-
schild's honesty, because I do believe he is an honest person, I would
have to say that I consider this to be an inaccurate summary.
First of all, Tom Hayden was not involved in meetings in Hanoi,
which originated the idea or made plans for this conference, and
his error at this point is indicative, perhaps, of other errors. Sec-
ondly, I cannot remember or recognize discussion at any point that
the delegation would be expected, on balance, to favor an NLF
victory.
If you look at the agenda we drew up and if you remember my
earlier remarks about the nature of this group, this just wasn't in
our minds.
The very presence of Rabbi Schwarzschild, who was not. in my
mind, for all my respect for him, I would not consider him a radical,
and for a number of the other people I should indicate that fact.
Mr. CoNLEY. May I have our other document back?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes. By the way, in there, since you have it, I won't
2800 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
read it exactly, but it stresses about we expect to have a variety of
viewpoints amongst the Americans, a variety of attitudes.
I would like it, if it is used, Mr. Chairman, if possible, that the
entire document be put in the record.
Mr. IcHORD. Has the document been admitted as part of the record ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, which document are you referring to?
We will offer the proposed agenda.
Mr. IcHORD. There being no objection, it will be placed in the record.
Mr. Dellinger. I simply refer the reader to the section on variety.
It was expected of the American delegation.
(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 4" follows:)
Dellinger Exhibit No. 4
Purposes and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference
I. The Prague Conference is intended to create solidarity and mutual under-
standing between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their American supporters
who are trying to change the United States. The Vietnamese hoi>e not only to
create this climate of mutual confidence, but to take back a clear understand-
ing of the United States based on i>ersonal contact with radical American ac-
tivists. The American organizers of the conference hoi^e that the U.S. delegates
take back an understanding of Vietnam which will stimulate the guide their
work. This is not contemplated as a meeting where good wishes are expressed
in ritual terms, resolutions are passed, debates carried on over the current line,
etc. The significance of the event lies in the fact that the delegates are chosen
not on the basis of their political affiliations with a particular radical organiza-
tion, but on the basis of their proven effectiveness in radical activity. We are
trying to create an internationai solidarity which cuts across organizational lines
to base itself on contact and dialogue among many active people.
II. Each American delegate must have considerable basic knowledge about
the Vietnamese revolution and American reaction. This means a concrete famil-
iarity with : a history of the nationalist, religious and left-wing movements in
Vietnam, the role and legacy of the French, dynamics of the first independence
war, the Geneva Agreements, land reform, education and government in the
North, the rise of insurgency and the NLF in the South, the stages of American
involvement since 1949, the state of the war (bombing, ground fighting, "pa-
cification," South Vietnamese political crises), and the solutions proposed by
various parties. While the conference is not intended for academic experts, it
should not be bogged down in discussing subjects the Americans can inform them-
selves of at home. When you arrive im New York September 3, you will receive
bound volumes of Vkt-Rcport and several copies of a Hanoi publication. Viet-
namese Studies. In the meantime you should read : Kahin and Lewis, The United
States in Vietnam; Burchett, Vietnam North ; Hayden and Lynd, The Other Side.
III. Problems of people relating well at the conference are crucial. Tliere will
be an information gap, a language barrier, and a profound difference in experi-
ences between the Americans and Vietnamese. Achieving communication will be
a major task. It will be possible only if the American delegation itself is alert,
informed, and sensitive. Among the Americans there may be pressures, disagree-
ments, tensions. Since there will be no "official spokesmen", no imposed con-
formity to a single line, the Americans will have to discipline themselves. Every
effort must be made to struggle through this experience staying together, re-
solving and harmonizing different feelings so that a variety of ideas are set forth
to the Vietnamese with a minimum of difficulty.
IV. All these problems quite clearly arise when the problem of an agenda
is considered. When Dave, Nick and the Vietnamese first discussed this con-
ference, the exact Agenda was left open. Since that time word was received from
Hanoi that the Vietnamese are preparing with great interest, but we have no
word of their hopes for the agenda. It can be assumed that they will arrive
with definite ideas, experts on a variety of subjects, and probably even some
working papers. If at all possible we will arrange a pre-conference meeting in
I'rague to work out a mutually satisfactory agenda. In the meantime, the
American delegation's business is to think concretely about what would be the
most useful way to spend the week in Prague. The following are some simply-
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2801
written notes on a possible agenda to be thought over by the people who are
considering going. Responses are requested by mail or phone, and probably a
discussion of the agenda can be held at our get-together September 3-^.
POSSIBLE AGENDA
I. Reports and Discussions: Part of the conference time will be spent in panel-
style or individual reports to the whole body, part of the time in smaller work-
shops. In either form, the subjects of discussion will be the same or very similar,
the likely difference being that the statements to the whole group may seem
authoritative and general while the smaller discussions will produce insights into
important details. The American delegation will have a first responsibility to
report in depth on the state of American society in the context of the Vietnam war.
This will mean written or carefully-prepared oral reports on something like
the following :
A. The Anti-War Movement: the strands of draft resistance, civil dis-
obedience and protest marches, electoral action for peace, community organi-
zation and education campaigns. The degree and kind of anti-war activity
among different social groups : the intellectuals and students, the Negro com-
munity, the churches, labor, iwlitical parties. The differences in approach
among different movements : the relative importance of disobedience, educa-
tion and politics in achieving change, which groups use "withdrawal," "nego-
tiations now" or other demands ; the role of moderate opinion, whether the
anti-war issue should be related to other domestic and foreign policy ques-
tions. A careful analysis of existing organizations or groupings and their
role in the anti-war movement.
B. The Student Movement: in addition to the role played by students in
the anti-war movement itself, a thorough analysis should be presented on
students as a social force in America. The origins and developments of the
student movement since 1959-60. The role of students in civil rights, edu-
cational reform and other issues. The numbers of students actually in-
volved in protest activity. Their real and potential significance as a critical
group in the society.
C. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement: as in the case of the
student movement, this subject should be treated not only as part of the
Vietnam protest but as an independent force for social change which can
be examined and measured. An in-depth analysis of the rise of the. civil rights
movement in 1956, the involvement of students in direct action in the South,
the beginning of voter registration and community organization, political
experiments in Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, nationalism in the ghetto,
rebellions and violence from 1964-67. employment of urban guerrilla war-
fare, reaction of white community, government, business. How does this
struggle affect the U.S. ability to fight in Vietnam?
D. The Labor Movement: Not because it is involved in anti-war protest,
and not because it represents a positive force such as the students and
Negroes, but because of its importance and potential in our view and
especially in the view of the Vietnamese, the labor movement should be
analysed in depth. The state of the industrial unions, differences between
the Reuther and Meany wings of the movement, pres.sures caused by in-
flation, war economy and Negro revolt. Must there be organized working
class protest for the Vietnam war to end? What are the real prospects for
this protest?
E. American Politics: 1968: an analysis of the spectrum of political posi-
tions being staked out as the 1968 elections approach. Explanation of the dif-
ferent economic, ethnic and regional factions in the Democratic and Re-
publican parties. Identification of the iK)sitions and prospects for Johnson,
Romney, Kennedy, Reagan, Nixon, Rockefeller, Percy, other Senate "doves."
How meaningful are elections as guides to power and opinion in America?
Does it matter for Vietnam who is elected Pre.sident in 1968?
F. Business and the War: analysis of the divisions appearing between
different sectors of the business community over the war. How are the dif-
ferent economic judgements expressed in national politics? Whose economic
interests are primarily served by the war? Is the war "healthy" for American
business? or is it causing deterioration and worsening for business elites?
G. America's Global Situation: What are the military and para-militairy
policies of the U.S. in other parts of the world? What are the limits on
America's ability to wage counter-revolution by force? Can the U.S. meet
2802 DISRUPTION OF 196 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
the challenge of "more Vietnams in Latin America?" Can the U.S. indef-
initely expand the war throughout Southeast Asia and into China? Is the
U.S. suffering on diplomatic fronts in Europe, the United Nations, the Third
World?
II. The Americans will probably want to hear similar reports in depth about
the situation as the Vietnamese see it. Subjects on which the Vietnamese are most
expert would include :
A. The military situation in the South and North
B. Economic and social situation
C. U.S. war crimes
D. Estimate of U.S. military^iplomatic intentions
B. Possible scenarios for ending the war
F. Role of People's Revolutionary Party (Communist) in NLF, role of
other groups
G. Position on interim (coalition) government, elections in the South, irela-
tions with the North, relations with other "camps," relations with U.S.
protest movement "after the war"
H. Analysis of world situation, revolutionary strategies : guerrilla war,
armed propaganda, self-defense, labor and political organization
III. Other joint activities should be included besides discussions and reports.
These might include Vietnamese- Axnerican speaking appearances before Czech
audiences or meetings with Czech, East European, Russian, Chinese or other
groups located in Prague. Evenings of entertainment, perhaps sponsored by the
Czechs, would also be useful. The showing and exchange of Vietnamese and
American protest films could be done as well. Tours of Prague and other parts of
Czechoslovakia might be included.
IV. Preparation of materials beforehand by the American delegation should
be i^equired. Because of the shortage of time, it probably is impossible to
prepare adequate working papers on any of the above subjects before leaving.
But it is possible to pull together a number of relevant articles and books which
have been produced in the last several months, and make sure these get into
Vietnamese hands. It also is possible to bring films, photographs and other
paraphenalia [sic] from America in which the Vietnamese are interested.
These are some of the proposed ingredients for making a successful conference.
Detailed arrangements will have to be worked out on the six)t. But if you have
any general comments or amendments about this agenda-formula, please make
them right away.
SEE YOU ON SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1967.
Mr. GuTMAN. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is most
important that this be in the record.
Mr. IcHORD. It has already been admitted.
Mr. GuTMAN, No. This is another point. Rabbi Steven Schwarz-
schild is a client of mine in other connections. I wish the record to
reflect it at this point.
Mr. IcHORD. I don't know what materiality it has.
Mr. Watson. So far as you know, he is an honorable, honest man?
Mr. GuTMAN. I have always felt so and would continue to feel so.
Mr. Watson. And Avould not deliberately make a false statement
about anyone or any event ?
Mr. GuTMAN. So far as I know. Congressman Watson, neither would
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Bellinger, moving on, in this article prepared by
Rabbi Schwarzschild appears the following, which I would like to
read you and then ask a question, if I may :
Yet out of these quasi-official reiwrts no "hard news" whatever emerged.
Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he
reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing
that I had not known beforehand. It was. furthermore, absolutely impo.ssible,
even in private conversation, to break through the oflicial propaganda line to
which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was esi)ecially annoying
since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2803
of their Vietnamese counterparts — and yet tliey were addressed as if they had to
be indoctrinated from scratch with the cnidesit tools of persuasion. * * *
Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir : Is Rabbi Schwarzschild's observation
as to the way the group was treated by the Vietnamese an accurate one ?
Mr. Dellinger. No, I Avould not consider that an accurate descrip-
tion at all.
I would say Mr. Schwarzschild, who did not come to Bratislava until
late and who, as I say, was somewhat on the fringes of the conference
and also was, I would feel, internally torn and under great pressure
from his anti-Communist associates, was probably not able to be an
objective judge at that point, and perhaps himself set up some of the
barriers that existed between him and the Vietnamese.
I have found that with all political groups that is a problem, of a
tendency toward doctrinaire positions. I found that the Vietnamese,
who are intensely involved in the defense of their homeland and have
suffered incalculable casualties, have, on a number of occasions when
I have been present, tended to start off with a rather, what should I
say, a rather formal presentation of the official Vietnamese point of
view, which I, on a number of occasions, have not found extremely
helpful. I have discussed this with them and certainly on every occasion
when I have been present I try to get beyond this as soon as possible.
In considering the suspicions which they are almost bound to have of
Americans, considering the ability of committees like yours and the
CIA and others to infiltrate all of these groups, considering the very
loose procedures that we had for incorporating this group, I can see
where they were perhaps a little standoffish at first.
If I remember correctly, the first reports, although of value, were a
little more stereotyped and a little less valuable than I had hoped. But
this very quickly broke down, and we ate in the same dining room to-
gether at tables that sat four, most of them, and I think the experience
of all the Americans was that these conversations were very frank and
informal, and not doctrinaire and not propaganda.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with this same article
and again dealing with this conference held in Czechoslovakia, Rabbi
Schwarzschild, toward the end of this article, deals with what he de-
scribed as the propaganda films on guerrilla tactics exhibited to the
Americans by an NLF military expert.
Apparently, from reading the article, I deduce there were some mo-
tion picture films shown of guerrilla tactics. He wrote the following,
and I quote :
The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if
not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less
justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say
that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live
with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these
tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made
it my busine.ss not to look at the siieaker but to study the American listeners. I
am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of
pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained .straight faces, there
was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were
even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about
this afterwards.
Mr. Dellinger, were you present at these events which Rabbi
Schwarzschilcl is describing, the description of the guerrilla tactics?
Mr. Dellinger. I want to be very clear about this. Obviously, the
2804 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
NLF is engaged in guerrilla warfare so, obviously, it is possible that
such a session took place. But as you read this my jaw dropped, and
I have been searching my mind and my memory to try to remember
what it could be that he is referring to. I literally cannot remember
any such occasion. I remember reports of battles — as I say, it was a
military report, and I think this was one of the first times that the
Vietnamese began to say that they were winning the war or had won
the war or were about to win the war. I don't remember any such
session. I do remember there were movies.
As I remember the Vietnamese movies, they showed bombs drop-
ping; they showed peasants being rounded up; they showed peasants
being tortured, kicked, hit wdth guns, dragged behind tanks, American
tanks, this kind of thing.
Forgive me if I am wrong.
There are two possibilities : either that it took place when I wasn't
there, or that it didn't take place and this is a somewhat liberal inter-
pretation of his of one of these movies or of the descriptions of
battles.
Mr. CoNLEY. In other words, you are saying that either you were
not there, or Rabbi Schwarzschild could be mistaken in what he
thought he saw ?
Mr. Bellinger. To the best of my knowledge, I was present at the
entire conference.
There w^ere some times when we met in small groups. Perhaps there
was one small group he attended from which he has written this
description, but nothing in that coincides w4th anything of my own
experience there.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Chairman, we are going to offer as a pait of the
record an article ["The New Left Meets the Real Thing"] from the
magazine DISSENT^ dated January-February 1968.
Mr. IcHORD. That is the document I thought I had a while ago,
instead of the agenda document.
There being no objection, it will be admitted.
Mr. Dellinger. May I make a comment ?
I think this article indicates that we did, in fact, have a variety
of people there. There were many different interpretations, most of
them quite friendly, believing the conference was very valuable, but
sev^eral of them registering criticisms of dissatisfaction.
It is the opposite of the hard-line plot approach.
(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 5" follows :)
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2805
Dellinger Exhibit No. 5
[.Dj£££«£— January-February 1968, pp. 78-81]
NOTEBOOK
Stephen S. Schwarzschlld
The New Left Meets
The Real Thing
DURING THEIR visrrs TO HANOI David Del-
linger (editor of Liberation), Tom Hay-
den, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of
SDS) were invited to gather a group of ribout
40 American radicals in order to arrange a
meeting with a group of Vietnamese. The
Americans were expected not only to oppose
the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on bal-
ance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in
fact meet with their Vietnamese counterparts
last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.
Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak
Peace Committees — though it should be made
clear that the American participants defrayed
all other expenses out of their own pockets
or through their respective organizations at
home.
Extremely little, if anything, that is new or
significant emerged from the meeting. My own
opposition to the American war in Vietnam
continues to be as complete as it had been
before — 1 still see no viable alternative to a
victory of the Vietnamese Communists (all
other possible alternatives having been polarized
out of existence by the ruthless American war)
and^refer it immeasurably to the brutal Ameri-
can policy now being pursued. Ail this, how-
ever, not because of what 1 witnessed in Bra-
tislava but despite it
Apart from the original organizers, the
American contingent consisted in about equal
measure of a few religious radicals from the
American Friends' Service Committee (AFSC),
other Quakers, the Fellowship of RecoiKilia-
tion (FOR), and one or two off-beat clergy-
men; young academicians; representatives of
the Black Power movement; young community
organizers and student organizers of the New
Left; a few writers, most of them associated
with Left periodicals. This group, in which
there were very few trained political technicians
or Vietnam experts, was confronted by two
Vietnamese delegations who had brought along
their own experts in all areas under discussion
and their own translators. It soon became clear
thal^ the Vietnamese were from very high
echelons. At least one of them mentioned in
passing that he had been a member of the Viet-
namese delegation to the Geneva Convention
in 1954; all spoke with governmental authority.
They were highly disciplined and in their way
very competent.
The contrast between the two groups was
striking. The Americans represented small fac-
tions— in some respects at odds with one an-
other— of a movement on the outermost peri-
phery of American society — whereas the Viet-
namese were representatives of an effective
government in one area and of a para-govern-
ment in another.
The first day of the conference was set aside
for reports from the Americans about the strug-
gle against the war and the conditions for so-
cial revolution in this coimtry; the second day
for reports from South Vietnam; the third for
North Vietnam; the remaining time for smaller
group discussions about special aspects of the
Vietnam situation. The American reports were
multitudinous, relatively brief, mostly extem-
poraneous, quite subjective, and sometimes in
conflict with one another. The Vietnamese re-
ports were well-prepared. Each subject was as-
signed to a single expert. These reports were
often written out and mimeographed before-
hand and extremely lengthy. (Madame Binh,
head of the South Vietnamese delegation, took
all of one afternoon and most of the next
morning for her opening statement.) They were
clearly formulated as quasi-official, diplomatic
documents.
Yet out of these quasi-official reports no
"hard news" whatever emerged. Even some-
one like myself who knows nothing about Viet-
nam but what he reads in the newspapers and
in a few supplementary sources heard nothing
that I had not known beforehand. It was, fur-
thermore, absolutely impossible, even in private
conversation, to break through the official pro-
paganda line to which all of the Vietnamese
rigorously adhered. This was especially an-
noying since the Americans had, after all,
been selected because they supported the cause
of their Vietnamese counterparts — and yet they
were addressed as if they had to be indoctri-
nated from scratch with the crudest tools of
persuasion. Two evenings, for example, were
set aside for a series of North and South Viet-
namese propaganda films that might be effec-
tive with Asian or African peasants but sure-
ly could not be expected to be persuasive with
an even slightly sophisticated group.
Along with some AFSC and FOR people, I
2806 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Bellinger Exhibit No. 5 — Continued
NOTEBOOK
spent a long afternoon with the official Bud-
dhist representative of the NLF. We pUed him
with questions about reUgious and cultural
trends in his country, "third force" personalities
known to us, and the facts concerning religious
groups In his organization. It was, however,
entirely impossible to come to grips with such
problems: he insisted, first, on giving us what
was in effect a two-hour filibuster, reviewing
rudimentary knowledge and views obviously
perfectly familiar to us. Anything that did not
fit into his picture was either disregarded, con-
demned as treason and called untypical of the
Vietnamese people, or treated as still an open
question that could be answered only after the
Front had niled upon it.
In a private conversation, 1 probed the at-
titude of this gentleman and that of the head
of the North Vietnamese lawyers' guild toward
the Roman Catholic church. It b perfectly ob-
vious that the church ii virtually identified with
the American cause in Vietnam. To admit this,
however, would be tantamount to a contradic-
tion of the official propaganda line that "all
of the Vietnamese people" are arraigned with
the NLF and that theirs is a "neutral, popular
front." 1 could not, therefore, extract an anti-
Roman-Catholic opinion from either of them.
Indeed, the Buddhist representative insisted
that a Roman Catholic priest, whom he named,
was a member of the NLF Central Committee.
"Is he recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he has
been ordained by a bishop and officiates at
a church." "Is he still recognized by Rome?"
"Yes, he still says mass." "Is his saying of
mass still recognized by official Roman Cath-
olic authorities as licit?" "Well" — this after
half-an-hour's involved, translated give-and-
take — "the priest is right now temporarily not
recognized by the Vatican."
Several sessions were devoted to explore pos-
sibilities of dissuading Americans from par-
ticipating in the war. The prominent role of
blbck men in the army was discussed. One of
the American blacks asked the relevant ques-
tion: how many black soldiers had defected to
the NLF? It took a long time to explain that
question. Finally, the answer came forth that
all the Vietnamese present were from the North
and that they, therefore, did not have such
information. "Could we ask some people from
the NLF?" "Yea, they'll come in the after-
noon.
In the afternoon a^ain much time was spent
in making the question clear. Ultimately, of
course, it had to be conceded that there was no
record of Amencan defections, black or white.
(On the other hand, the numbers of South
Vietnamese defectors are, of course, vast —
to the point where the NLF people claim,
with considerable credibility, that they train
some of their officers by letting them be in-
ducted into Ky's army and having them in-
structed under U.S. auspices.)
As FOR Czechoslovakia, the situation in that
country, even as revealed during such a visit
of little more than a week, struck me as much
more oppressive and frightening than the de-
scriptions we have been getting in the press.
At the very beginning i had heard a few of
(he Americans express relief at finally being in
a "socialist" country and no volunteered criti-
cal observations. 1 feared, therefore, that this
representation of the New Left was buying the
Czech party line completely. As the week drew
on, however, my initial fear turned out to be
unjustified. With no exception that 1 know of,
the Americans became aware of the mindless
and repressive society in which we found our-
selves. At least within the confines of the
American caucus, phrases such as "fascist,"
"paranoiac," "get out of here with my life,"
"totalitarian," etc. became quite frequent. Yet,
to my knowledge at least, no one but myself
confronted any Czech with articulated critic-
ism.
There was, however a considerable afneunt
of nonverbal criticism. At first, the Czechs
tried to keep us together in supervised places.
But American, or New Left, anarchy soon took
over. Many of us dispersed through Bratislava
in so many directions at the same time that
it would have been extremely difficult to keep
track of all of us. A black man, a minister,
and a student actually conducted a flower-
power demonstration off the central square of
the city. Still, in discussing possible future press
relations, the Americans stressed that one
should mute one's criticism of the Czechs in
order to prevent imdesirable consequences for
the Vietnamese and for future American-Viet-
namese contacts — a rather eloquent expression
of the stance of New Left people toward Com-
DISRUPTION OF 1 9 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2807
Dellinger Exhibit No. 5 — Continued
NOTEBOOK
munis ts.
This is precisely the main point about the
encounter between the New Left and the icaJ
Conununists in power. The question ybetber
criticism of the Vietnamese should be muted
never came up. It was apparently assumed
that there was none. Certainly, none wa* ex-
pressed. The unspoken premise was that the
Vietnamese were effectively flffating America
as it is — and "pas tennemies i la gauche com-
baiiante." Newsweek quoted an anonymous
reporter for Ramparts as having heard Tom
Hayden exclaim: "Now we're all Vietcong."
I did not hear such an announcement — but this
certainly was the mood of the gathering.
There were some nasty manifestations of this
total identification with the Vietnamese Com-
munists. The NLF military expert gave a
long presentation of the situation in the field
as be sasv it and some of the informal and
quite brutal guerrilla tactics that had to be
used in combating the American aggressors.
(This had, the previous evening, been illu-
strated in one of the propaganda films.) The
most one can say of these methods is that they
possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in
defense against at least equally brutal and poli-
tically even less justified foreign invaders. One
might even be prepared to go so far as to say
that the Vieuamese who had to practice them
might, in order to be able to live with them-
selves, have to get some lund of personal satis-
faction out of these tactics. While some of
these blood-curdling tactics were being de-
scribed, I made it my business not to look at
the speaker but to study the American listeners.
1 am sorry to have to say that, with the excep-
tion of some of the members of pacifist, es-
pecially Quaker, organizations who maintained
straight faces, there was nothing but approval
to be seen in any facial expressions, and there
were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I
know, not a word was ever said about this
afterwards.
The American reaction to the Vietnamese
ranged all the way from calculated political
'^popular frontism" to naive to wilfully blind
to literally sick to craven. There were, no doubt,
some who actually had no idea of what a Com-
munist is. There were surely some who did
not want to know and regarded every enemy
of American imperialism as a comrade. They
inclined, thus, to interpret the new NLF
program as if it were an "agrarian reform" do-
cument. There was certainly a representation
of the sick, who outraged one or the other
Czech puritan Communist by talking, mostly
m the language of "shit," about nonmarital sex
relations and the abortions of girl friends. What
most of the Americans had in common was
the belief that anyone who batters the Ameri-
can Establishment effectively makes a contribu-
tion to the defeat of capitalist imperialism and
he may not be criticized in any way, for fear
of detracting from his effectiveness.
1, for one, can draw only one ideological
conclusion: radicalism at this point can consist
only of a radically realistic view of the utterly
hopeless situation in which we find ourselves:
American capitalist imperialism is flooding
much of the world with blood and vulgarity,
while neither "coalition politics," nor "old-style
socialism," nor the New Left have any rela-
tionship to the real world or hold out any hope
for poliiical effectiveness — and "the socialist
blocs" not only exhibit no significant regaining
of humane or humanist values but are, in fact,
widening the destructive circle. Still, because
this is the only way we know to be human, we
try to embody and to advocate radically liber-
tarian social ideals.
2808 DISRUPTION OF 19 6 8 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question dealing with this
particular conference, if I may.
Did you have occasion, or did any of the members of the American
delegation have occasion, while at this conference to be presented with
a ring which you were informed had been made from a part of an
American airplane that had been shot down ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I consider this entirely possible because the
Vietnamese make combs and rings, to the best of my knowledge, from
planes that have been shot down.
Mary McCarthy has written in the Ne\o York Revieio of Books
about being tendered such a ring and her own reluctance to wear it.
I myself, if I remember correctly, was given a comb and a ring in
Vietnam, but explained that I was not interested in wearing such a
ring.
Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, sir, I have another article, taken from WIN^
volume III, No. 17, under October 16, 1967, captioned "report from
BEATISLAVA," by Eric Weinberger, which would indicate, I sup-
pose, from a reading of it, that Mr. Weinberger was also at this
conference, and would you hesitate to identify him?
Mr. Dellinger. No, he was there.
Mr. CoNLEY. If I may, sri', put to you this question from this
article. In this article Mr, Weinberger states that, prior to a year or
two before his article, he had been persuaded and, to quote him
exactly, "by A. J. Muste and Dave Dellinger, to come off it on the
condemn- violence-on-both-sides-equally-bit."
Do you recall the quotation ?
Mr. Dellinger. I think I do now, and that is my position, as I
indicated yesterday, that the violence of the richest, most powerful
nation in the world invading a little, undeveloped country of Asia
should not be compared to the violence used in self-defense by that
country.
Mr. CoNLEY. As I understand it, sir, Mr. Weinberger, up until you
and Mr. Muste were able to prevail on him to come off of it, was
taking the position that violence was wrong on both sides, or was
equally wrong.
As I understand it, is it your position as a pacifist only certain
violence is wrong?
Mr. Dellinger. No, We have discussed this at great length here
already. At the beginning of the war in Vietnam, the traditional
pacifist tended to say, "A plague on both your houses, we are against
all violence, and there is violence being used on both sides."
I myself — just as I believe that the violence of George Washington
and of the American patriots was obviously different morally and
practically from the violence of Adolf Hitler during World War II —
I have myself made distinctions in violence without, liowever, advo-
cating violence.
It was not hard for me, I guess — I don't remember my own history
in relation to the war in Vietnam, but it was not hard for me to believe
in the beginning that there was distinction between aggressive violence
of the United States and the violence of the patriotic forces of Viet-
nam. I certainly wrote this and said tliis on many occasions.
Mr, Conley, In connection with this particular conference, I want
to read to you a list of names, and will rather anticipate your answer,
but I do have to do this, sir, for the record, if you will bear with me.
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2809
Mr. Dellinger. Could I ask you, for the record, if you might con-
sider whether it is worth reading all of these names, in case there are
people who might receive the kind of package in the mail that I have
talked about i Why not show us the list ?
Mr. GuTMAN. Why not show us the list, and then ask us questions
about them by numbers ?
Mr. IcHORD. Let the Chair inquire. Will you please come forward,
Mr. Counsel, and let me see what you have ?
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my question is: Were the following
persons present at this conference with you: Robert L. Allen, Jr.,
Malcolm Boyd, Carol D. Brightman, Reverend John Pairman Brown,
Bronson Pettibone Clark, Robert Merten Cook, Stoney Cooks, Ren-
nard Cordon Davis, David Dellinger, Elizabeth P. Dellinger, Thorne
Webb Dreyer, Nicholas Egleson, Richard Flacks, John Ross Flanagan,
Norman David Fruchter, Tom Gardner, Carol Glassman, Thomas
Hayden, Steven E. Halliwell, Christopher Jencks, Walter Russell
Jolmson, Carole Yvonne King, Andrew David Kopkind, Bob Kramer,
Carol Cohen McEldowney, Leon Morse, Linda Morse, Raymond A.
Mungo, Douglas Craig Norberg, Vivian Emma Rothstein, Steven S.
Schwarzschild, Sol Stern, Dennis Sweeney, John P. Tillman, Jr.,
Barbara Webster, Eric Weinberger, Henry AVilliam Werner, John
Augusta Wilson, Willie T. Wright, and Ron Young?
Mr. GuTMAN. May I ask the legislative purpose of this question,
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair wall advise the counsel that, in view of the
fact that this was a meeting with the North Vietnamese and other
allies, friendly nations with the North Vietnamese, in view of the
purview of these hearings and that the witness w^as a leader in the
Chicago demonstration and he has so testified, that it is a pertinent
question and within the subject of inquiry.
Mr. GuTMAN. I fail to see the pertinency, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. IcHORD. These are individuals who attended the conference with
the gentleman. The counsel lias advised me that they have been so
identified in the newspapers. The witness was there, and the Chair will
have to rule that it is a proper question.
Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, since you have just stated^
Mr. IcHORD. You have the right to advise with your witness if you
desire, but you haven't been called to testify, Mr. Gutman.
Mr. Gutman. I understand. We are talking on the question of rele-
vancy. If I advise him on the question what to say, on the legal point of
relevancy, he is merely going to have to parrot what I suggest to him.
Mr. IcHORD. I think we will have to abide by the rules. Go ahead.
You will be given time to confer with your client.
Mr. Dellinger. If that is the way you want it.
(Witness confers w^th counsel.)
Mr. Dellinger. To the best of my knowledge, from listening care-
fully to the list, I would have to say that, no, that is not an accurate
list of the people who attended the conference ; definitely not.
Mr. CoNLEY. Did the people named attend that conference ?
Mr. Dellinger. Some of the people named did, some did not. Some
of the names appear to be inaccurate combinations.
Mr. CoNLEY. Are any names missing who attended the conference?
Mr. Dellinger. I have not any idea. As you read off those names,
2810 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
I thought, "Oh, yes, I remember him, lie was there." Other names, I
thought, "Who is he? I never heard of him."
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if you may let us move on to an admin-
istrative committee meeting of the National Mobilization Committee
which was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on October 13 of this
year. Was there, in fact, a meeting held on that date in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, of your National Mobilization Committee?
Mr, Bellinger. Is that a Saturday or Sunday ? This fall there was
a meeting in Cambridge. That is undoubtedly a correct date.
Mr. CoNLEY. Did you attend that meeting ?
Mr. Bellinger. I believe I attended and presided at that meeting.
Mr. Conley. All right, sir. I will ask you, Mr. Bellinger, if those
attending this meeting discussed this committee's investigative hear-
ings, the grand jury investigation of the disturbances in Chicago, and
the hearing of the President's Commission on the Causes and Preven-
tion of Violence ?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Bellinger. Yes, I recollect that these subjects were discussed
there.
I would like to point out that one of the concerns expressed was
whether or not some of the people present would be indicted. Since
it has been reported in the newspapers that indictments are being
prepared, that might influence) how we proceed from here, because
I don't want to say anything involving people indicted or about to
be indicted.
Mr. Conley. Again, sir, I think you are reading more into the
question than what I intended.
Mr. Bellinger. I am only trying to communicate and establish some
understanding here.
Mr. Conley. Mr. Bellinger, was it decided at this meeting at Cam-
bridge that in view of these activities, that is, the meeting of this
committee, the grand jury investigation, and the President's Com-
mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, that the persons
involved in the Chicago disturbance, the demonstrators, and so forth,
should be urged not to cooperate with any request received for an
interview by the FBI or any other investigative agency ?
Mr. Bellinger. No, this was not the decision. There were a number
of different viewpoints expressed. Kennie Bavis and I reported that
we had already had an interview with a representative of the sub-
committee of the President's Commission on Violence.
Everybody was aware of the fact that some of the FBI investiga-
tion had been very partial and unfair. In fact, when the FBI ap-
proached me, I told them that I was very busy and asked them what
the purpose was. They made very clear to me that the purpose of
talking to me was to find out if I knew about any violations of law
on the part of the demonstrators, but it was clearly demonstrated
to me that they were not interested in any violations of law by any-
body other than demonstrators.
I reported this fact at the meeting. It was a very complicated dis-
cussion, in which there were probably four or five points of view, as
to some advocating virtually total cooperation, because the truth was
certainly in our favor and we had nothing to hide; some people advo-
cating virtual noncooperation, because whatever we said might be
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2811
twisted and distorted and used against us unfairly or used to involve
other people ; and there were a variety of positions in between.
If my memory is correct, a subcommittee, of which I was a member,
was instructed to work with the legal committee and to get out a
memorandum discussing the various dangers and difficulties, but not
taking a hard line as to whether people should speak or not.
As I say, we are not a talk-down organization. We are hetero-
geneous and under no circumstances would we issue too hard a line
anyway. But I think we did w^ant people to be aware of what hap-
pened in a number of FBI interviews and also to be aware of what
their rights were ; that they had the right to refuse to testify if they
wanted to.
Mr. CoNLEY. Was it not also decided at this meeting in Cambridge
that the minutes of all future administrative committee meetings would
continue to list those in attendance, but would leave out home addresses,
and while they would summarize issues and decisions, they would not
attribute specific remarks to specific individuals?
(Witness confers with counsel.)
Mr. Bellinger. I think it is very important for me to point out here
that I consider this to be an example of the kind of illegal persecution
that I have referred to, that unfortunately has too often characterized
the history of this committee.
This was a private meeting, protected under the first and fourth
amendments of the Constitution. It is as if you were to get me up here
and to say, "Did you vote for so-and-so in your secret ballot?"
I think that would be an obvious intrusion.
Mr. CoxLEY. Nobody has put that question to you.
Mr. Dellinger. You haA e asked about decisions and statements of a
private meeting, which is protected by the first and fourth amend-
ments. I consider this a violation of privacy.
Now, having registered that objection and used that as an example
of the type of thing to which I object in this committee, I will proceed
to answer the question, or at least in a way that will not involve other
people. But I will volunteer the information, although I think you
don't have the right to ask it.
Mr. CoxLEY. Mr. Dellinger, isn't it a fact that you yourself actually
gave the report to this Cambridge meeting on this committee's investi-
gation ? Are you not the one that actually made the report ?
Mr. Dellixger. That is quite possible.'lf I did, I am sure that others
supplemented it. It was not a very flattering report. I remember using
the example that you tried to connect people back to Lee Harvey
Oswald, to the Rosenbergs, to people out of the 1930's, and make con-
nections that one of our representatives in Chicago had an office which
was in a building which belonged to somebody who had run for office
as a Communist, if I remember correctly, in 1941. Maybe it was 1945.
I said that while I was listening to this in the audience I had the
feeling, and of couree my name was brought into this, that I was being
analyzed to see if I was I/32 J®w, or %4 Jew, or 1/128 J^w.
Mr. IcHORD. Some of the testimony does get far afield, just as your
testimony making Lee Harvey Oswald a pretty good guy, as well as
somebody else.
Mr. Dellixger. No. I say there was testimony attempting to link us
to Lee Harvey Oswald, that someone he approached to be an attorney
2812 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
had also been an attorney for somebody in the movement. If one took
a lawyer and followed him through all his clients and tried to associate
each person with the other people he had defended, I think it would
be as ludicrous as this example I am giving of the committee's work
in October.
If I remember correctly, I reported that kind of thing to the Mobili-
zation administrative committee. If I didn't, I was delinquent in my
duty.
Mr. CoNLEY. I call to your attention that perhaps your memory
does not serve you well. Yesterday it was you, not us, that brought up
the name Lee Harvey Oswald. I believe it w^as you.
Mr. Dellinger. It is possible I did, in this connection.
Mr. CoNLEY. I think we were talking about Malcolm X.
Mr. IcHORD. Let us get back on the subject of the inquiry, Mr.
Counsel.
Mr. Dellinger. I would like to point out that you brought up the
question of the assassination of Malcolm X.
Although I w^ondered wdiat the pertinency was to your inquiry, I
certainly did express my opinion on some of the assassinations, in-
cluding raising some questions about the way the assassination of one
of our Presidents was handled.
Mr. IcHORD. Sometimes the exchanges have been quite free, Mr.
Dellinger.
Let us proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. CoNLEY. Mr, Dellinger, I put to you this question : Since the
meeting in Cambridge on October 13, isn't it true that the Mobiliza-
tion Committee has made a mailing of a "Dear Friend'' letter, bring-
ing attention to the various investigations of your Chicago demonstra-
tion and advising that any — I use the quote from the letter — "any
further cooperation," that is, wnth investigating agencies —
runs the risk of lending a legitimacy to governmental abuse of investigatory
power for the purpose of harrassing [sic], intimidating, and repressing political
opposition. * * * our experience has shown that any interview, given in the
best of faith to the most liberal minded body, can find its way into the hands
of prosecuting attorneys, FBI files and Huac smear campaigns.
* * * * il! If t
We bring this matter to your attention as a matter of urgency. * * * hun-
dreds of people have already been asked for interviews by FBI agents. Since
there is no obligation to grant any interviews or give any testimony unless a
subpoena has been served, most people refuse these requests. We support those
who select this course of non-cooperation. If you are approached b.v any in-
vestigatory agency please keep us informed and feel free to discuss with us the
manner in which you intend to resx)ond.
Mr. Dellinger. Is that the entire document ?
Mr. Conley. Is that a fair reading of those portions of that docu-
ment ?
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair can't see the pertinency of that
question. Let us ofo on to something else.
Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, you requested we close at 4. I wonder
if we are going to make it.
Mr. CoNLEY. That concludes our questions, sir.
Mr. IcHORD. I thought you had one other question you wanted to ask.
Mr. Watson, do you have any questions ?
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2813
Mr. GuTMAN. Does the missing question begin, "Are you now, or
have you ever been"
Mr. IcHORD. Counsel will be in order.
Mr. Dellingek. Mr. Chairman, while he is thinking, could I make
a comment relevant to that area ?
Mr. IcHORD. You mean you want to answer the question when I ruled
the question out of order ?
Mr. Dellingee. Well, I won't go into the document because that
would take time to study it, and I am not sure, it did not appear to be
signed
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair saw no purpose.
Mr. Dellinger. I want to tell one thing from my own experience,
that when I agreed to make a lengthy tape for the subcommittee in-
vestigating the Chicago disorder, the subcommission of the President's
Commission on Violence, I was told that it was — absolutely none of
that material would be turned over to the grand jury or to any other
body, including HUAC.
Now, I heard on television last night an interview with the judge
presiding over the grand jury investigation in Illinois, who said that
he was anxious to see the material on which the report was based. And
the impression I got from the then response of Chairman Walker was
that this material would be made available if requested.
Now, I give this as an example of the kind of problem that people
face.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Dellinger, I will state that the Chair has no juris-
diction whatsoever over the Presidential Riot Commission or the
grand jury proceedings in Chicago.
As I stated at the outset of the hearing, we were not interested in
the grand jury proceeding. We were interested in proceeding to search
out the facts, look into the charges that have been made relative to
subversives participating in the organization, in the planning, of the
riots and what connections the leaders had with foreign powers.
It is the duty of the Chair to keep the hearings in these bounds. That
is the way I interpret my duty as chairman.
I have no jurisdiction over Mr. Walker or the judge in Chicago or
any of the commissions. They are separate, distinct arms of Govern-
ment.
Mr. Dellinger. I am simply trying to indicate any additional rea-
son for my reluctance to mention the names or affairs of other people
who might then proceed on to some other body which might use them
additionally and m a negative way.
Mr. IcHORD. Mr. Watson.
Mr. Watson. Mr. Dellinger, I am interested in the article that was
written by Rabbi Schwarzschild, a friend of yours and a friend of
your good counsel there. Obviously the article or the author, either
or both, were considered reliable enough that they would be included
in the publication DISSENT, which I assume would be one fairly
recognized by the left movement.
Is that not a correct statement ?
Mr. Dellinger. First of all, Rabbi Schwarzschild is not an intimate
friend of mine. I have had very limited contact with him, but I indi-
cated, you know, my positive response.
Secondly, there are many variations within the left, and I think,
21-70&— 69— pt. 3 9
2814 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
if you want my own opinion, DISSENT has been a little bit sick with
anticommunism. It has many valuable articles in it ; but a lot of peo-
ple are intellectuals who I think have been victimized by the cold war
and perhaps in some cases, because of the positions that they hold and
the respectability that they covet — I am sorry to be imputing motiva-
tion— but for a variety of reasons really have been very wrong in the
things they write. At least I very much disagree with the kind of viru-
lent anticommunism which seeps into DISSENT magazine and always
the lofty and patronizing attitude towards young people, who may
not be able to write as well as some of the editors of DISSENT^ but
who very often are closer to the struggle for social justice and human
liberation.
Mr. Watson. We still get back to the basic proposition, as you stated
earlier, that certainly Rabbi Schwarzschild would not deliberately
distort the truth.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes, that is my estimate.
Mr. Watson. You disagree with him because he does not take your
exact line, and naturally you would be in disagreement, but in his
article he makes the statement, on page 80, that a reporter for Ram-
parts— again, RaTuparts is not necessarily a rightwmg publication,
is it?
Mr. Dellinger. It is not a right wing magazine.
Mr. Watson. It is considered a left ?
Mr. Dellinger. It is not part of the Mobilization Committee.
Mr. Watson. But it would be considered farther left ?
Mr. Dellinger, I really dont want to get into the business of rank-
ing the various magazines and expressing my areas of agreement
and disagreement with them, although I did partially in the case of
DISSENT.
Mr. Watson. This statement is attributed by a reporter for Ram-
parts to Tom Hayden, and this occurred at the conference in Czecho-
slovakia: "Now we're all Vietcong." The rabbi was fair enough to.
say, "I did not hear such an announcement — but this certainly was
the mood of the gathering."
Is that a fair statement ? And j'ou were there.
Mr. Dellinger. No, that is not a fair statement. That is a single sen-
tence torn out of context and not giving at all an accurate impression
of either the general nature of the conference or even of that particu-
lar scene.
Mr. Watson. Here is another article, written by Ray Mungo, who
I understand was at the conference, in THE east village OTHER
magazine, and I believe this is headed up "LIBERATION News
Service." I believe you said you are editor of that.
Mr. Dellinger. No. I am editor of Liberation magazine. LIBERA-
TION News Service is an independent news-gathering agency with
which I have no connection.
Mr. Watson. Ray Mungo is listed as the writer or author of this
article. He makes this statement :
"Lyndon Johnson will have a nightmare when he hears about this meeting,"
* * *. "He will have a nightmare because he has sent 500,000 men to your land
to find the Vietcong."
"We will tell him he'd better leave some men at home. Because, like Spartacus,
whose fellow slaves in Rome protected his hiding-place by each claiming to be
Spartacus himself, I am the Vietcong. We are everywhere! We are all the
Vietcong !"
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2815
Is Mr. Mungo wrong in that statement ?
Mr. Dellinger. That still is incomplete, but it is a much more ac-
curate presentation than the earlier one, because it gives some of the
context. I think President Johnson did have a nightmare when he
thought about rumiing for the Presidency agam, against the opposi-
tion of the antiwar movement.
For myself, although I did not make that statement, just as I ap-
preciate the people in England at the time of George III who stood
for the independence of the American Colonies and tried to pressure
England to withdraw its colonial aspirations from the Colonies, and
there is a certain solidarity between them and the forces of George
Washington in the same way there is an obvious solidarity amongst
some of the people opposed to the war and the people who were fighting
for their independence.
It was in that direction that I believe the incident was moving,
although Mr. Hayden is perfectly capable of speaking for himself.
Mr. Watson. That is right.
So that the record might be clear, I may have attributed that quota-
tion to Mun^o. Mungo was the author or the writer, and he was sup-
posedly quoting Mr. Hayden.
Mr. Dellinger. Right.
Mr. Watson. You agree in substance that that was correct ?
Mr. Dellinger. Again, it is a summary of a long and complex state-
ment of Mr. Hayden's. It tells more of the truth than the earlier arti-
cle. If you are really interested in what Mr. Hayden's views are on
that, I guess you would have to a^sk him.
Mr. Watson. You brought up the matter of the Presidency. Obvi-
ously, President Johnson did have a nightmare.
Of course, I am a Republican. I am not privy to the motivations of
the Democrats, but did we have a peace candidate in this past elec-
tion who espoused the general line of your position ? Did we not have
one?
Mr. Dellinger. The important thing
Mr. Watson. That is a simple question. Did we have one or not?
Mr. Dellinger. I did not vote in the past election.
Mr. Watson. I am not asking you whether you voted, how you voted,
or anything else.
Mr. Dellinger. I did not support the candidacy
Mr. Watson. Did we not have a peace candidate ?
Mr. Dellinger. There were a number of people who ran on their
own interpretation of a peace candidacy.
Mr. Watson. They certainly espoused your philosophy and your
position completely, did they not ?
Mr. Dellinger. I am not able to answer that question intelligently.
Mr. Watson. You know Eldridge Cleaver, don't you ?
Mr. Dellinger. There were a number of people running, including
Eldridge Cleaver and Dick Gregory, at least, who came closer to
my views in relation to the war in Vietnam than other candidates.
But I never conferred with any of them about their platform; I never
studied their platforms at length. I would be unable to say in what
areas I disagreed or agreed with their platform, because I was not
interested in their candidacy.
Mr. Watson. Their platform and their position, as you say, were
certainly far closer to your position than any other candidate.
2816 DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. Than that of George Wallace, Richard Nixon, or
Hubert Humphrey.
Mr. Watson. Fine.
In one of the flyers that your National Mobilization Committee
circulated in Chicago, it is headed up, "Let the People Speak," at
the bottom, again, "Let the People Be Heard."
It starts out in bold letters, The majority of the American people
want the United States to stop the bombing and get out of
Vietnam. * * *"
That is your contention.
How did those who espoused your philosophy fare in the last
-election ?
You contended there that the majority of the American people
•espoused your position. How did your candidates fare in the last
election ?
Mr. Dellinger. First of all, I explained that I had no candidate
and the Mobilization had no candidate.
Mr. Watson. The ones who came closest to espousing your position,
how did they fare ?
Mr. Dellinger. Mr. Watson, you see, if we are running a foot race
and you are holding a chess contest, and you ask me how did your
candidates make out in the chess contest, I have no way of answering.
Mr. Watson. This is a political contest.
Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; and in my conception of politics, we are trying
to organize the American people and encourage them to take grass-
roots, democratic action to develop popular forces of resistance and
popular forces which will incorporate the kind of ideas and attitudes
that we favor in counterinstitutions today.
It is a whole program, but relying on the people, rather than relying
on the present kind of fraudulent elections, in which the candidacies
are rigged, the conventions are rigged, and in which it is necessary to
be a millionaire or to have access to millions of dollars in order to get
the organization and the coverage on TV in order to run. I consider
the last election to have been a denial of democracy. The American
people were given no opportunity to vote on the issues or to have —
well, I will leave it at that, to vote on the issues.
Mr. Watson. Since you contend this was a fraudulent election,
what, under your standards, would be a so-called democratic election ?
Mr. Dellinger. The first thing that I think would have to happen
is that we have to have
Mr. Watson. Get rid of people like me ?
Mr. Dellinger. No; I made very clear that I would be happy if
there was some kind of honorable and useful work which you could
perform. I would be happy for you.
Mr. Watson. At least you give us credit for making one honorable
attempt by giving you an opportunity to articulate your position be-
fore this committee. Have you ever thought about that? But go ahead.
Mr. Dellinger. I think, as I indicated earlier, that political democ-
racy really cannot function effectively and properly in a society which
does not have economic democracy, a society in which the public air-
waves, for instance, are owned by millionaire corporations and are sold
at exorbitant prices — the use of the airwaves sold at exorbitant prices
DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2817
which are beyond the capacity of ordinary poor people, black people,
and other minority groups. That is only one instance.
I don't remember exactly, but I remember, I think, the acknowledged
election expenses of Mr. Nixon or Mr. Humphrey was $12 million.
It is clear that some method has to be found whereby the people-
have a chance to vote without the outcome being determined by, in the
first place, political conventions similar to the Democratic Convention,
which went against the votes of the primaries, secondly, without its
requiring millions of dollars in order to make an effective campaign.
Mr. Watson. Being one of very limited means, I can agree with you
that the costs of an election are, well, astronomical, to say the least.
One final thing. It has caused me some concern. You are a 50-year-
old man. You have spoken here at length, and I have tried not to
interrupt too much. You have stated, or at least inferred, that you
would like to have both sides of the question presented so that the
people can make the decision for themselves.
You must agree that primarily you are dealing in your movement
with young people, are you not, the bulk of them, the overwhelming
majority of them are young people, even teenagers?
Mr. Dellinger. I think if you take any age group that there is
obviously a higher percentage of teenagers than of any other age
group. I think it would be fair to say teenage and 20's. I would not
be sure.
Mr. Watson. Most of them are young ?
Mr. Delunger. Who are actively opposed to the war m Vietnam.
I obviously have a number of associations with people who are in
their 20's or 30's or in their teens.
Mr. Watson. Well, before the Vietnam war, I am sure you have not
confined your activity only to the Vietnam war. You have been critical
of the American institutions all along?
Mr. Dellinger. I have been critical of capitalism, imperialism. I
have been critical of the invasion of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala.
Mr. Watson. And if the Japanese war were to begin today, you
would still be critical of the U.S., its religious institutions, and all its
institutions, basically, would you not ?
Mr. Dellinger. I don't want to leave a misimpression on the earlier
question. It probably is fair to say that at least half, or the majority,
of my own time and work is with people closer to my own age,
although I work with individuals a good deal younger.
If the United States withdraws from Vietnam and the war ends,
I hope, myself, to continue fighting against American imperialism.
I would like to see Puerto Rico a free and independent country, rather
than to have to suffer culturally and cultural genocide. I would like to
see the Green Berets withdrawn from Bolivia, Guatemala, and the
other Latin American countries. I would like to see the American air
bases withdrawn from Okinav/a and Okinawa able to have some kind
of peaceful and democratic society. I would like to see the vast power
of the American corporations over the American people eliminated so
that we could have a real democracy here. I would like to see the black
people win their liberation and full equality.
Mr. Watson. It is fair to say that your program against America
will continue?
2818 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Mr. Dellinger. My program for America will continue, and for
the American people.
Mr. Watson. Did it ever occur to you, as a 50-year-old man, that
to the young people whom you rally to these various causes you might
suggest there might be some virtue in going out and working hard in
order to improve their lot in life? Have you ever urged that upon
them?
Have you ever pointed out to them that there might be some value in
attending school and completing their education in order that their lot
might be improved in life and help them improve the lives of others?
Have you ever encouraged that line?
Mr. Deelinger. I believe in hard work and self-discipline, a lot of
the old-fashioned virtues. However, I do not belie A^e in people improv-
ing their lot at the expense of other people. I am opposed to the kind
of atomized and individualistic method of trying to move to the top.
^Ir. Watson". In other words, everyone must be absolutely economi-
calh^ equal ? That is your philosophy ?
Mr. Dellinger. As a matter of fact, I probably believe more in
economic equality than a Communist country like the Soviet Union
does, where they have greater gaps in income, more difference between
rich and poor, than I think is healthiest and best. However, I do not
believe in a monolithic, sterile society in which everybody is the same.
Mr. AVatson. If they are in your status, how could it be otherwise
than sterile ?
Mr. Dellinger. In the richest country in the world, we have an
infant mortality rate which, if I remember correctly, is ITtli in tlie
world. In other words, there are 16 countries poorer than us that have
a better infant mortality rate than we do.
I do not consider that it would be imposing on the individuality or
the full creative development of a father and a mother or a child if we
achieved the kind of availability of medical resources and of diet and
of healthy conditions, freedom from rats, freedom from slums, freedom
from other privations, which would eliminate that kind of infant
mortality.
I think one might extend this into many other areas, I think for
everybody, for example, to be able to have the advantages of a higher
education, but not a higher education which is a training for the Ameri-
can corporate empire, but a higher education which is a training to be
useful and to be equal. For everybody to have that would not impose
on their individuality, not impose a dull conformity.
Mr. Watson. In other words, we would have individualism of total
economic equality. Is that your interpretation of true freedom?
Mr. Bellinger. Again, I would rather let my words stand for my
opinion.
Mr. Watson. One final thing. Earlier, you stated you have encour-
aged yomig people to go out and work hard, to stay in school
Mv. Bellinger. No. I did not say that.
Mr. Watson. Oh, you have not urged them to do that ?
Mr. Bellinger. I didn't say that, either. I said that I do believe in
hard work.
Mr. Watson. Thank you very much.
Mr. IcHORD. One more question, before the meeting is adjourned.
DISRUPTION OF 19 68 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2819
The Chair has been handed a copy of the National Guardian of
September 9, 1967. On page 5 there is an article by Mary Hamilton,
entitled "SNCC leader asks for guns."
I will hand the article to you, but as a preface for my question, I will
read to you the opening paragraph :
Rap brown's message to white radicals : "Buy us some guns or do what John
Brown did — pick up your gun and go out and shoot our enemy." To blacks he
•said : "Brother, you better get your guns."
At the bottom of the same column this is written :
Dave Bellinger, a leader of the Mobilization Committee and a pacifist, told his
audience that "as a white person I do not believe it is up to me to tell black people
what method to use."
Did you attend that meeting on August 29 in New York's Village
Theatre?
Mr. Bellinger. Yes ; I was chairman and one of the speakers at that
meeting at which Rap Brown also spoke.
Mr. IcHORD. Didn't you feel constrained to advocate your position
of nonviolence which you have taken in the anti-Vietnam war move-
ment in regard to this problem ?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes ; part of what I said that night, which may or
may not be reported in that article, did include an advocacy of non-
violence. But a statement similar to one I made many times here,
about a certain reluctance on my part, who not having had to suffer
what the North Vietnamese or the black people or the Puerto Ricans
suffered, to be self-righteous about the method they use. That does
not mean that I do not enter into dialogue with Rap Brown or others.
I happen to have a great deal of respect for Rap Brown, who I think
has been presented very inaccurately in the American press.
Mr. IcHORD. You don't believe that the problems of the Negro in
the ghettos will be solved hj taking up guns, do you ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, I am perfectly willing to discuss that with
you at some other time, or with Rap Brown or others, but I myself
have not picked up a gun. I am not about to stand in judgment of black
IDeople who are assaulted and attacked and who feel that carrying a
gun sometimes will save their lives or save the lives of their children.
Mr. IcHORD. There being no other questions, the Chair
Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, if I may make one more statement.
^I'ou said you visited the coffeehouse in Columbia, South Carolina?
Mr. Dellinger. Yes : I did.
Mr. Watson. That is my home. You went in and out without any
difficulty at all, and no one tried to give you any trouble. Is that
correct ?
Mr. Dellinger. Well, perhaps I should say that I arrived after
dark one evening and left while it was still dark and that, while I was
there, I conferred with some people who had just gotten out of jail,
had been picked up illegally, and there were a number of different
incidents. Some were framed on marijuana charges, although they
did not smoke or possess marijuana. Others were picked up on
technical violations of going through red lights.
Mr. Watson. Of course, you only talked with them. You did not
talk with the other side ?
Mr. Dellinger. It is fair for you to bring that out.
2820 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
I talked with people who told me that, and had given the history
of some of the persecution of radicals, black people, hippies, antiwar
people, in your State.
I don't consider it impossible that this may have happened, but I
certainly am not in a position to render a judgment on it, or state
dogmatically that it did.
Mr. GuTMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you drop the gavel, if I may,
assuming that we are finished with Mr. Dellinger, Mr. Rubin has been
directed to appear tomorrow morning at 10 in executive session. As
you know — I think you have a copy — he handed out a release here,
and I will hand a copy in and ask that it be marked in the record, if I
may, on his behalf, because it sets forth his position.
Mr. IcHORD. Do you represent Mr. Rubin ?
Mr. GuTMAN. Yes.
Mr. IcHORD. I thought Mr. Kunstler was representing him.
Mr. GuTMAisr. I am associated with Mr. Kunstler.
Mr. IcHORD. The Chair will take this under advisement.
The Chair will declare the meeting in adjournment until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning, at which time the subcommittee will meet in
executive session.
(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the sub-
committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 10 a.m., Friday^
December 6, 1968.)
INDEX
Individuaxs
A Page
Abbott, Robert 2792
Allen, Robert L., Jr 2909
B
Bailey, John 2730, 2749
Ballan, Sam. (See Marcy, Sam.)
Binb 2754, 2805
Boyd, Malcolm 2809
Brightman, Carol D 2809
Brophy, Jolin 2692
Brown, John Pairman 2809
Brown, H. Rap 2819
Burchett, Wilfred 2791, 2792, 2794, 2800
C
Clark, Bronson Pettibone 280&
Cleaver, Eldridge 2720. 2724. 2815
Coffin (William Sloane, Jr.) 2750
Conlisk, James B., Jr 2762
Cook, Robert Merten 2809
Cooks, Stoney 2809
D
Daley, Richard J 2730.
2736, 2738, 2740, 2743, 2749, 2751, 2759, 2760, 2763, 2765. 2770
Daniel (Larissa) 2714
Davis, Rennard Cordon (Rennie) 2689,2701,2706,2767,2768,2809,2810
Dellinger, David 2689.
2690-2745 (testimony), 2746-2820 (testimony), 2772, 2805
Dellinger, Elizabeth P 2809
Dreyer, Thome Webb 2809^
Dulles (John Foster) 2729
Duncan, Donald 2722
E
Egleson, Nick 2799," 2800, 280&
Eisenhower (Dwight D.) 2775
F
Finch, Roy 2693
Flacks, Richard 2809
Flanagan, John Ross 2809
Fruchter, Norman David 2809
G
Gandhi (Mahatma) 2772, 2776. 2785
Gardner, Tom 2809
Glassman, Carol 2809
Goodman (Mitchell) 2750
Greenblatt, Bob (Robert) 2690, 2755, 2784, 2785, 2790, 2791
^ Incorrectly spelled "Egleston" In this reference.
i
ti INDEX
Page
Gregory, Dick 2815
Gutman, Jeremiah S 2690, 2691,
2710, 2718 2719, 2728, 2740, 2746-2748, 2750, 2751, 2754, 2767, 2770,
2771, 2778, 2783, 2797, 2798, 2802, 2809, 2812, 2813, 2820
H
Ha Van Lau 2790
Halliewell, Steven E 2809
Hamilton, Mary 2819
Harriman, Averell 2703, 2724, 2783, 2784,2790, 2791
Harden. Thomas 2701, 2706, 2723, 2736, 2767, 12799, 2800, 2807, 2809, 2814, 2815
Healy (Joseph J.) 2754,2755,2769
Hitler. Adolf 2776. 2808
Humphrey. Hubert (Horatio) 2730, 2749, 2752, 2816, 2817
Hutton, Bobby 2720, 2740
J
Jencks, Christopher 2809
Johnson, Lyndon (Baines) 2718.
2719, 2730, 2749, 2774, 2801, 2814, 2815
Johnson, Walter Russell 2809
Jordan (Charles H.) 2799
K
Kahin (George M.) 2800
Kahn, Herman 2719
Kennedy. Ted (Edward M.) 2752-2354
Kennedy (John Fitzgerald) 2721-2723,2725,2726
Kennedy (Robert F.) 2801
Kine. Carole Yvonne 2809
Kopkind, Andrew David 2809
Kramer, Robert (Bob) 2809
Kunstler (William M.) 2820
Ky. {See Nguyen Cao Ky.)
L
Lewis (John W.) 2800
Liljenstople, Otto 2755
Lowell, Robert 2782
Lynd, Staughton 2712, 2800
M
MacArthur (Douglas) 2775
Macdonald. Dwight 2782
Malcolm X 2720-2724, 2726, 2811
^IcCarthy (Eugene) 2752-2754
McCarthy (Joseph) 2718,2729
McCarthv, Mary 2808
McEldowney, Carol Cohen 2809
Meany (George) 2801
Morrison, Norman 2712
Morse, Leon 2809
Mungo. Raymond A. (Ray) 2809,2814,2815
Muste, A. J 2693, 2695, 2712, 2808
N
Newton, Huey (P.) 2720
(Nguyen Cao) Ky 2806
Nixon (Richard M.) 2732,2801,2816,2817
Norberg, Douglas Craig 2809
Norden, Erie 2724, 2726
INDEX iii
O
Page
Oswald, Lee Harvey 2811, 2812
P
Park (Chung Hee) 2730
Percv (Charles H.) 2801
Phan Van Chuoung 2783, 2790
B
Raskin (Marcus) 2750
Reagan (Ronald) 2801
Reuther (Walter P.) 2801
Rockefeller (Nelson) 2801
Romnev ( George) 2801
Rosenberg (Ethel) 2811
Rosenberg (Julius) 2811
Rothstein, Vivian Emma 2809
Rubin ( Jerry ) 2690, 2691, 2820
Rustin, Bayard 2693
S
Schwarzschild, Steven Samuel 2798, 2799, 2802-2805, 2809, 2813, 2814
Siqueiros, David 2781, 2782
Smith, Adam 2732
Spook (Benjamin) 2750
Stalin, Josef 2722, 2727, 2739
Stem, Sol 2809
Stone. I. F 2829
Sweeney, Dennis 2809
Syngman Rhee 2730
T
Tillman. John P., Jr 2809
Tran Van Anh 2783, 2790
Trotsky, Leon 2723, 2782
V
Vance, Cyrus 2724, 2790
Vigier, Jean-Pierre 2781
W
Walker. Charles . 2693
Walker (Daniel) 2734, 2740, 2751, 2818
W^allace, George (C.) 2816
Warren (Earl) 2722
Waskow, Arthur 2770, 2771, 2776, 2783
Webster, Barbara 2809
Weinberger, Eric 2705, 2706, 2808, 2809
Werner, Henry William 2809
Wilson, John Augusta 2809
Wright, Willie T 2809
X
Xuan Thuy 2784, 2790
Y
Young, Ron 2809
Young (Stephen M.) 2721,2722
Iv INDEX
ORGANIZATIONS
A
AFSC. (See Religious Society of Friends, American Friends Service
Committee. )
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). (See entry under Re-
ligious Society of Friends. ) Pag»
Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine (Shriners) __ 2736, 273.S
B
Black Muslims. (See Nation of Islam. )
Black Panthers. (See Black Panther Party.)
Black Panther Party (knovpn variously as Black Panthers, Black Panther
Political Party, Black Panther Political Party for Self Defense, and
Black Panther Party for Self -Defense (BPSD) ) 27.36
C
Chicago Peace Council 27.5.5
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 2723,2724-
Congress for Cultural Freedom 2782
Czechoslovak Peace Committee 2799, 2805
F
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 2805
Fifth Avenue Parade Committee. {See Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace
Parade Committee.)
Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee 2698,2706
Havana Cultural Congress. (See International Cultural Congress, Jan-
uary 1968, Havana, Cuba.)
I
International Cultural Congress, January 1968, Havana, Cuba__ 2777, 2778, 2780
L
Liberation News Service 2S14
Libertarian Press 2693, 2694, 2701, 2714
M
Monthly Review Press 2729
N
NATO. (See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.)
NLF. (See National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.)
Nation of Islam (NOI) (also known as Black Muslims) 2724,2725
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (also
referred to as the Walker Commission or the President's Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence) 2734.2810,2813
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (also known as the
National Liberation Front (NLF)) 2711.
2712, 2773, 2784, 2786, 2799, 2805. 2806
Central Committee 2806
National Liberation Front (NLF). (-See National Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam.)
National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (NMC)
(formerly known as Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in
Vietnam) (see also November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in
Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic Justice) 2694-
2709, 2718, 2723, 27.33, 2736. 2744. 2747, 2752. 2754, 2755, 2757,
2759, 2762, 2789, 2796, 2810, 2812, 2814, 2816, 2819
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2753
November 8 Mobilization Committee. (See November 8 Mobilization Com-
mittee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic
Justice.)
INDEX
November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human
Rights, and for Economic Justice (predecessor to Spring Mobilization
Committee To End the War in Vietnam) (see also National Mobiliza- Page
tioB Committee To End the War in Vietnam) 2696
President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. {See
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. )
R
Radio Havana ., 2733, 2735, 2739, 2746
Religious Society of Friends :
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 2805
Revolutionary Contingent (RC) 2772.2775
: SNCC. ( See Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. )
Shriners. (See Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine.)
Slovak Peace Committee 2799, 2805
Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (formerly
known as November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for
Human Rights, and for Economic Justice) {see also National Mobiliza-
zation Committee To End the War in Vietnam) 2696,2697
rStudent Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 2819
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 2799
U
vUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of 2714, 2818
United States Government:
Central intelligence Agency (CIA) 2714
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2810
;University Christian Association (also known as Dwight Hall) 2692
W
Walker Commission. (See National Commission on the Causes and Pre-
vention of Violence.)
War Crimes Tribunal 2715, 2781
War Resisters League 2698
YIP. (See Youth International Party.) (also known as Yippies)
Yippies. (/See Youth International Party) (YIP)
Youth International Party (YIP) (also known as Yippies) 2709
Z
Zengakuren - — . 2775
PUBLICATIONS
D
•Dissent (magazine) 2799, 2804, 2813, 2814
E
iEl Mundo (newspaper) 2777-2779
G
.Guardian 2796
L
Liberation 2693-2715, 2724, 2733, 2770, 2795, 2799
O
Other Side, The (book) (Thomas Hayden and Staughten Lynd) 2800
/
vi INDEX
R
Ramparts (magazine) 2S14
Realist, The (magazine) 2724,2720
U
United States in Vietnam, The (book) (George M. Kahin and John
W. Lewis) 2S00
V
Vietnam Courier 2796
Vietnam North (book) (Wilfred Burchett) 2800
Vietnamese Studies 2800
Viet-Report 2800
W
Walker Commission Report (Report to the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence.) ^40, 2755
o
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