The Sudan Campaign, 1896-1899

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Sudan CAMPAiCN

i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M

^■■hp

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by 'An Officer'

1 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1

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■

1

The CELLAR BOOK SHOP

Box 6, CollC);? Park Sla.

Detroit 21, Mich. - U.S.A.

S^tSlQ

K

SUDAN CAMPAIGN

1 8 9 6—1 8 9 9

/ /

i

SUDAN CAMPAIGN

/

1896-1899

By 'AN OFFICER'

WITS ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, PLANS, ETC.

< -

LONDON

CHAPMAN & HALL, Ld.

1899

J)

Richard Clay A Sokb, Limited,

LONDOV A BUNOAV.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAliR

Abyssinians defeat Italians at Adua — Dongola Expedition
ordered — Situation on the Frontier — Previous events — Assault
on Murat Wells — Wad Nejumi's Invasion — Dervish Raids —
Fight at Sarras — Actions at Gemaizeh, Tokar, and Handoub . 1

CHAPTER II

Sirdar's Plan for Dongola Expedition — Advance to Akasheh
— Cavalry and Camel Corps Work — Roddy Owen's birthday —
Railway construction — Lieutenant Girouard, R.E. — The
Transport Corps — Fighting near Suakim — Captain Fen wick's
gallantry — Cavalry fight near Akasheh — Abortive Raid on
Railway ....... 10

CHAPTER III

Progress of the Railway — North Staffordshire Regiment —
Concentration at Akasheh — Night march on Ferket — Battle
of Ferket — Occupation of Suarda — Sirdar's Plans — i^larching
of 7th Battalion — Line of communications — Supply arrange-
ments — Cholera — Railway reaches Kosheh — Pulling boats up
Cataracts — Building new Gunboats — Trying desert march to
Absarrat » . .27

vi CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV

PAOB

Railway broken by Floods — Sirdar's energy — Repairing
Railway — More Floods and Accidents — Cylinder of new Gun-
boat bursts . . . . .49

CHAPTER V

Leaving Kosheh for Dongola — Strength of the Force —
Cavalry reconnaissance — Wreck of a Gunboat — Action at
Hafir — Crossing the river — Gunboats at Dongola — March on
Dongola — Entry into Dongola — Occupation of Debbeh, Korti,
and Merowi — Sirdar's Plans . . . . .56

CHAFTER VI

Reaction — Camel Corps in the Bayuda Desert — Quiet
pi'ogress — Sirdar's plan — Desert Railway, Haifa to Abu
Hamed — Reconnaissance of Desert — Camel riding . . 72

CHAPTER VII

Completion of Halfa-Kerma Railway — Cavalry Skirmish
at Essalamat — Dervishes under Mahmud massacre Jaalin and
occupy Metemmeh — Progress of Railway — Dervishes at Abu
Hamcd reconnoitred — Sirdar's Plan — General Hunter's
Column starts for Abu Hamed — Capture of Abu Hamed . 98

CHAPTER VIII

Critical position — Supply difficulties — Disaster to Camel .
Convoy — Gunboats in the Cataracts — Dervishes evacuate
Berber — General Hunter reconnoitres Berber — Khalifa's
Plans — Difficult line of communications — We occupy Berber —
Desert Railway reaches Abu Hamed — Railway construction . 112

CONTENTS vii

CHAPTER IX

PAUK

Bombardment of Metemmeh — Dervish raids — Suakim-
Berber route open — Progress of Telegraph — Italians hand
over Kassala to the Egyptians . . .128

CHAPTER X

Critical situation — Rumours of a Dervish advance — Sirdar
alters his dispositions — English Brigade to the front —
Mahmud advances — Sirdar concentrates — Cavalry reconnais-
sance — Mahmud enti-enches himself on the Atbara . .134

CHAPTER XI

Sirdar destroys Shendi — Reason for attack — General Hunter
reconnoitres — Battle of Atbara . . .146

CHAPTER XII

Altered situation after Battle of Atbtira — Preparations for
the final advance — Railway reaches Abadieh — New Gunboats
erected — Railway construction — All Steamers and Boats
collected at Atbara . . . . .162

CHAPTER Xni

British Reinforcements — Advance to Wad Hamed
commences — Whole Force concentrated at Wad Hamed — The
Shabluka Pass — Detail of the Force — On the March . .173

CHAPTER XIV

Arrival at Kerreri Hill and Village Egaiga — Omdurman
sighted — Gunboats and Howitzers bombard Omdurman —
Advance of Dervishes — Awaiting a night attack — Dervishes

viii CONTENTS

PAOB

attack in the morning — Manwuvring of Egyptian Cavalry —
Camel Corps in danger — Dervishes driven off with great
loss — We advance on Omdurman in echelon — 21st Lancers
charge — MacDonald's Brigade attacked by Klialifa's force —
Dispositions to relieve MacDonald — MacDonald hotly engaged
— Ali Wad Helu's force attacks rear of MacDoniild's Brigade
— Dervishes divided and sun*ounded — Rout of Dervishes —
Pursuit — Entry into Omdurman — Surrender of ita Garrison —
Searching for Khalifa — Neufeld — The casualties on both
sides ........ 185

CHAPTER XV

Interior of Omdurman — The Dervish wounded — Tlie
Mahdi's Tomb — Dervish Steamer surrenders — Wliite men at
Fashoda — Flotilla leaves for Fashoda — Major Marchand at
Fashoda — British troops return to Cairo . . . 225

CHAPTER XVI

The Eastern Sudan — Capture of Gedaref — Critical sitmition
at Credaref — Reinforcements sent — Ahmed Fedil attempts to
cross Blue Nile at Roseires — Defeated with great loss by
Colonel Lewis — Expedition against Khalifa unsuccessful —
Conclusion ....... 234

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAOB

Dervislies captured at Feiket . . . . . ,37

Artillery ........ 39

El Tnhra, Gordon's steamer . . .65

Sakiyeh at Dongola. Dervish prisoners ulonjjjside . . 69

Camel corps ........ 79

Camel corps ....... 81

Desert travelling, old style and new . . . . .83

Starting on a long desert ride ..... 87

Arab desert police, Suakim . . . . .89

Spiking parties in front of train . . . . . 117

Plate-laying party returning to camp after work . . 121

English troops arriving at Haifa . . . . .135

Sirdar's camp, Rasel Hudi on Athara ..... 142

Egy])tian artillery . . . . . . .156

Sirdar inspecting guard of honour <m his return to Halfix after battle

ofAtbara ........ 159

Hut in Atl>ara fort ...... 166

The gunlxxit in sections loaded on to train to go across to Abadieh . 167
Haifa workshops . . . . . .170

The Melik with troops steaming up to Khartum . . .176

Carriage used by Gordon. NeufeM in background . . 222

The Bordevt, Gordon's steamer captured at Khartum 232

IX

MAPS

PAOK

1. Showing situation at commencement of Campaign

To face page 2
11. Showing positions of Dervish and Egyptian forces and rail-
head just before attack on Ferkct . . . .29

III. Showing line of communications, Cairo to Suarda . . 41

IV. Illustrating advance on Dongula . . To fdce |Xij/e 56
V. Showing what was known of Nubian Desert wlieu Siixlar

decided to make Rtiilway across it . . To face page 77
VI. Showing what l>ecame known of Desert from reconnaissances

To face page 79

VII. Showing situation just before advance on A])u Hamed . 101
VIII. Line of communications, Cairo to Berber, when Berber was

first occupied . .... To face page 119
IX. Mahmud's advance ti» the Atbara and the Sirdar's counter-
moves ..... To face page 141
X. Showing situation just before Battle of Atbara . . 149
XI. Showing altered situation after Battle of Atbara . . 165
XII. Line of communications for Khartum Expedition

Tofac^page 174

XIII. Showing advance from river Atbara to Omdurman . . 183

XIV. The Sudan ..... To face page 260

X

DIAGRAMS

PAOK

I. Advance on Ferket . . .31

II. Attack on Ferket ..... 35

III. Action at Hafir .59

IV. Capture of Dongola ..... 67
V. Attack on Abn Hamed .107

VI. Battle of Atbara .153

VII. Showing position on afternoon of 1st September .189

VIII. Battle of Omdurman ..... 193

IX. Showing situation when Dervish first attack had been driven

off, and Sirdar decided to move on Omdnrnian .199

X. Showing situation when MacDonald's Brigade was attacked

by Khalifa ... . . 203

XI. Showing deployment of Col. MacDonald's Brigade . 207

XII. Showing Lewis's Brigade coming into action against Khalifa's

flank ....... 209

XIII. Showing change of front of MacDonald's Brigade 211

XIV. Showing general advance of Aiiglo-Egvptians and rout of

Dervishes .214

XV. Omdurman ....... 221

Capture of Gedaref ...... 245

XI

Note. — The seniles of the Diagrams and Maps are different to the
ones ordinarily used, owing to the original drawings having to be
reduced to fit the size of the book.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN

18 9 6—1 8 9 9

CHAPTER I

On the 8tli March, 189G, the Abyssinians defeated
the Italians at the battle of Adua. This encouraged the
Dervishes to attack the Italians at Kassala, where, after
some severe fighting, the Italians were victorious.

Having, however, retreated from Abyssinian ten-itory,
the Italians considered that Kassala was of no further
use to them, and not worth the expense and trouble of
garrisoning. They therefore decided to evacuate it.

This decision having been made, it now became neces-
sary for her Majesty's Government to decide whether
they intended ever to reconquer the Sudan. If so, it
was most undesirable that the important strategic point
Kassala should fall into the hands of the Dervishes,
'['he importance of Kassala will become evident when
the tale of the operations is unfolded.

Her Majesty's Government, having decided to att<3mpt

the reconquest of the Sudan, prevailed upon the Italians

to retain Kassala until we were in a position to take it

. over. Since the Italians wished to hand the place over as

B

2 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

soon as possible, the commencement of the reconquest
of the Sudan was ordered forthwith.

It will be as well to give a brief summary of the
events of the previous few years, and explain the relative
positions of the Dervish and Eg}"ptian forces.

Since 1886 the frontier station of the Eg}^tian army
on the Nile had been at Wady Haifa, with later an
advance post at Sarras, thirty-three miles further soutli
and connected by rail with Haifa. Wady Haifa is at
the northern end of the Second Cataract, which for over
one hundred miles impedes communication on the river ;
consequently, with an advance post at Sarras it was
difficult for the Dervishes to advance in any numbers,
whereas our water communication was open right down
to Shellal.

In the Nubian Desert on the east there was a caravan
route from Abu Hamed to Korosko, but water could only
be obtained at one place, Murat AVells, which were forti-
fied and held by the friendly Ababdeh Arabs and a com-
pany of Egyptian troops. Further still to the east is a
caravan route connecting Berber and Assouan, with wells
every day's journey. These wells also were held by
friendly Arabs, and would not supply a large force.
These two caravan routes were the only lines on which
the Dervish could have advanced through the Nubian
Desert, while in the Libyan Desert on the west their
only line of advance was the Arbain or forty days route
between Assiout in Lower Eg}^t, and Darfur. This
route we had also blocked by holding the oasis of Sheb.
On several occasions the Dervishes had tried either
determined advances or else raids on these lines. At

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SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 3

one time they attempted to capture Murat Wells by a
coup'de-main. Riding from Abu Hamed, they went a
distance of about one hundred and thirty miles across
the desert to Gebel Raffat, a hill about twenty miles to
the west of Murat Wells, where some rain-water had
collected. Murat Wells fort at this time had no regular
troops in its garrison. Having watered and rested at
Raffat, the Dervishes the next day stole up under cover
of the hills to within a few hundred yards of the fort,
and then attempted to rush the surprised garrison,
several of whom were outside looking after their flocks.
The Ababdeh though surprised rose to the occasion.
The gate of the fort was slammed just as the leading
Dervishes reached it, and after some hand-to-hand fight-
ing, and a good expenditure of ammunition, the Dervishes
retired to the opposite hills, from which they kept up a
fusillade which prevented any one going to the wells for
water all through that day and the following night.
Again at sunrise the Dervishes attempted an assault,
but being again driven off* with severe loss the remnant
returned to Abu Hamed.

Saleh Bey, the gallant sheikh of the Ababdehs, who
had conducted the defence, was unfortunately mortally
wounded. After this the Murat garrison was strength-
ened by some Egyptian infantry. The English officer
in charge of the reinforcement found the place in a very
unsanitary condition, owing to the fact that the Ababdeh
would not bury the dead Dervishes.

Along the Nile Wad Nejumi had made a determined
invasion in 1889, and it was on this occasion that the
hardest fight of these days took place. It arose almost

4 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

unexpectedly from a reconnaissance which the Egyptian
forces were making when they encountered Wad Nejumi's
advancing forces at Argin. The Dervishes had been
making a long desert march in order the better to con-
ceal their whereabouts, and had come down to the river
at Argin. The Egyptian force attempted to drive them
thirsty into the desert again. The Dervish fights well
)at all times, but when he is fighting for water as well as
for love of fighting he is a rough customer to tackle, and
for a long time it was a hand-to-hand ding-dong busi-
ness. To take one instance — Captain Fenwick in com-
mand of half a battalion found himself driven back and
back by superior numbers, until at last his rear rank
were standing in the river, and it would have gone hard
with him had not Colonel (now General) Hunter re-
inforced him in the nick of time. It was this fio^ht at
Argin which broke the spirit of Nejumi's followers, and
facilitated their final overthrow at Toski a few days later.
A typical instance occurred at this time of the hard luck
which always attends the giving of medals. Captains
Nason and Fenwick, wounded at Argin, were sent down
to the Cairo Hospital, so that on the day on which Toski
was fought they were a few miles north of the medal
zone. As English troops were present at Toski, the
blue and white medal ribbon was given as well as the
Khedive's star ; but as no English troops were present
at Argin, only the Khedive's star was given to the two
above-mentioned wounded officers.

After Wad Nejumi's invasion had failed the
Dervishes confined themselves to raiding. In this they
w^ere occasionally successful. A small party would start

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 5

from the Dervish outpost at Akasheh, and taking a
plentiful supply of water-skins would drop them out in
the desert about twenty-five miles from ' Haifa ; they
would then swoop down on some village behind Haifa,
murdering man, woman, and child, carry oflF whatever
they could find, and then evade the pursuit of the Haifa
garrison by going straight into the desert to the spot
where they had dropped their water-skins; having
watered their horses they would be off" again, while their
pursuers, having no water, would be unable to follow. So
bold did they get, that on one occasion they descended
on the ofticers playing polo outside Haifa, causing them
to relinquish the game and bolt for the Haifa gate. On
another occasion, when General Knowles was reviewing
the Haifa garrison, the parade was broken up quickly to
allow some of the troops to go in pursuit of raiding
Dervishes. Only a few months before the Dongola
Expedition, the raiders had galloped through Tewfikieh
within a mile of Haifa, slashing at the unarmed and
inoffensive inhabitants, several of whom were drowned
in attempting to save themselves by the river. Again,
another time they captured our outpost fort at Khor
Moussa three miles south of Haifa, but held it only for a
few hours, as it was promptly re-captured by the 13th
Battalion under Captain Machell. It was in order to
cut off" the retreat of the raiders that we established
an advance post at Sarras, thirty-three miles south of
Haifa. Before we occupied this the Dervishes had been
wont to use it as a base for raiding, but when occupied
by us it enabled the garrison there to cut off* the retreat
of the raiders, and it proved an excellent measure. The

6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

Dervishes only raided where it was fairly safe. They
never attacked troops, only defenceless villages, and they
had as much objection as any one else to finding their
line of retreat cut.

The importance which they attached to Sarras was
evident from the way in which they fought for it. In
fact, next to Argin, it was the stiffest fight of those
days. The Dervishes got right into the centre of our
infantry line, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which
at first the Dervishes slowly bore back the Egj^ptian
troops.

Major Rundle, commanding the artillery in the centre
of our position, saw a confused mass of friends and
enemies gradually coming on to his guns. If the guns
were overwhelmed before the supports came up, the
centre of the position would have been lost and a rout
probable. He therefore loaded up his guns with case,
and delayed as long as possible before firing into friends
and foes alike. Fortunately the tide of victory turned,
and gradually every Dervish who had penetrated our
firing line was killed.

A similar state of things existed at Suakim. The
tribes in the neighbourhood, stirred up by Osman Digna,
constantly attempted to worry the garrison. In fact, in
1888 they practically besieged the place, but the action
of Gemaizeh turned them out of their trenches, and
caused a great number of the tribes, notably the powerful
Hadendowa, to assume a neutral attitude ; a severe blow
was dealt to the Dervishes in this district when their
base at Tokar was captured in 1893, and after this the
district became comparatively safe, nearly all the tribes-

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 7

men refusing to respond to the calls of Osman Digna in
his attempt to organize raids. That gentleman became
notorious for his ability in planning raids in which he
took care to look well after his own skin. He had always
relays of horses ready, and after a raid would gallop for
eighty miles without stopping. Tokar was a great loss
to the Dervishes, as it was a fertile spot, which supplied
them with plenty of food, and formed a base from which
to raid. Here also they fought hard to retain their
advantage, and very nearly caught our attacking force
unprepared ; but the steadiness of the Egyptian troops
was all that could be desired, and though some Dervishes
got right up to the square they got no further.

It was near Suakim that Osman Digna was nearly
captured by Sir Herbert Kitchener, at that time
Governor of Suakim. He received news that Osman
Digna was comfortably established at Handoub, about
fifteen miles distant. He asked for permission from
Cairo to attack him. At this time the strictest instruc-
tions had been issued that no advance was to be made of
even the smallest kind, and so Cairo forbade the use of
the Suakim troops on this venture, but recommended
that the friendly tribes should be incited to attack, while
a few cavalry might be allowed to be in reserve to give
the tribesmen confidence. On receipt of this Colonel
Kitchener quickly collected a motley crowd of friendly
Arabs, and at sunset paraded them to receive ammuni-
tion. Captain Hickman, while superintending the dis-
tribution of ammunition, noticed that several of the men
belonging to the Sudanese regiments of the gamson
had brought their arms, and dressed in gallaheas had

8 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

mixed themselves with the Arab levies. He reported
this to Colonel Kitchener, and asked what he should do.
" Oh, give them ammunition and say nothing," was the
answer. With this scratch lot of scallywags and a few
cavalry Colonel Kitchener and Captain Hickman started
oflF at sunrise the next morning, and completely surprised
t)sman Digna and his men at prayers. Osman Digna as
usual leaped on his horse and galloped away. His fol-
lowers, thinking they were attacked by a large force, fled
precipitately, many being shot down. But the friendly
Arabs, instead of following up the Derv'ishes immediately,
scattered among the huts looting the Dervish property.
The Dervishes finding they were not followed stopped,
and soon got over their alarm when they saw that they
were in larger numbers than their attackers, and quickly
grasped the opportunity afforded to attack the friendlies
while scattered in search of loot. C-harging back the
Dervishes drove the friendlies out, and the only thing
that saved disaster was the presence of the men from
the Sudanese regiments. Colonel Kitchener and Captain
Hickman collected these, and gradually the Arabs rallied
on them ; Captain Hickman then brought up the cavalry
which had been waiting in support. The Dervishes had
stopped, hesitating, and the moment for a charge ap-
peared to be nearing when Colonel Kitchener was hit by
a bullet. With difficulty he kept his saddle, and the
friendlies seeing this ran, leaving the few Sudanese and
cavalry to look after themselves. Colonel Kitchener was
badly hit, but Captain Hickman kept things together.
The cavalry threatened each flank of the Dervishes
alternately, and the Sudanese retired steadily firing.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 9

Thus the whole way back to Suakim did the Dervishes
threaten to overwhelm them, but always hesitated before
the determined front and the watchful cavalry.

Colonel Kitchener's wound was a curious one which
puzzled the doctors. The bullet broke his jaw, and then
went down his throat without doing further damage,
but it fairly puzzled the doctors to find it, as Colonel
Kitchener did not know till some time afterwards that
he had swallowed it.

This brief and necessarily incomplete sketch of the
fighting previous to 1896 will give some idea of the
situation when the Government ordered an advance to
Dongola. On every line of advance the Dervishes had
tested our defence to their cost, and their raiding bases
had been captured, with the result that the tribes on our
side of the frontier felt secure from raids, and being
confident in our power were either friendly or neutral.

CHAPTER II

It was therefore in March 1896 that her Majesty's
Government decided to once more attempt the conquest
of the Sudan. Doubtless there was considerable dis-
cussion over the oft-debated question of the route to
be taken, whether by Suakim-Berber or Suakim-Kassala,
or by direct advance up the Nile. A discussion of these
routes does not come within the compass of this book,
which aims simply at giving an account of the campaign
as it occurred; wiser heads than mine have discussed
before now the relative merits of the three routes.

Whatever the reasons adduced may have been, the
fact remains that, whether right or wrong, it was decided
as a first measure to reconquer Dongola, and that as
the preliminary stages of the advance were not likely
to meet with much opposition, the regenerated Egyptian
army was to carry out the work as long as possible, and
to be re-inforced if necessary by British troops.

A fortunate consequence of the decision to employ
the Egyptian army only was that it caused the under-
taking to be put in the hands of the man who proved
himself to be w^onderfully fitted for the task.

Colonel Sir Herbert Kitchener, K.C.M.G., Sirdar of

10

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896--1899 11

the Egyptian army, was called upon to forthwith
arrange a scheme for, and carry out, the expedition to
Dongola.

Let us examine the problem that presented itself to
him. The main body of the Dervish garrison of the
Dongola province was in Dongola itself, but there was
a considerable number, variously estimated at from two
thousand to three thousand, at Suarda (see Map L),
with advance posts at Ferket and Akasheh.

Evidently then the first thing was to defeat the force
in the neighbourhood of Ferket and Suarda. This
meant advancing one hundred miles from Sarras fight-
ing a battle, and maintaining the force on the ground
won. How was the force to be supplied on the march
to the battle, and more especially after it ? Behind
them would be one hundred miles of continuous cataract,
preventing the supplies being brought by river; to
bring them by camel over one hundred miles of bad
road through the burning desert, where not an ounce
of food could be got, would mean a most stupendous
number of camels for even a small force. A baggage
camel will carry 300 lbs. twenty miles a day. He eats
10 lbs. of food a day. He occupies ten days in going
one hundred miles and back, in which time he eats
100 lbs., so he only brings up 200 lbs. for the force.
He must have rest every now and again, and he will
die on the least provocation. To take a month's supply
one hundred miles for ten thousand men, about fifteen
thousand camels are required, and then when a further
advance of two hundred miles is made to Dongola and
Mcrowi, what is to be done then ?

12 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

The Sirdar hit on exactly the right solution. He
determined to take everj" advantage possible of the
river, to carry supplies on it wherever it could be done,
to supplement it with camel transport where it could
not be done, and to make a raihcay. This meant
gradu<al advance. At first, an advance to the furthest
limit that alternate boat and camel service would supply.
As the railway advanced, push on the boats and camels.

Let us examine the river. From Haifa to Ferket,
a distance of about one hundred miles, the river at low
Nile is impassable for boats; at high Nile boats can
sail up parts of it, but must be pulled up most of the
way. From Ferket to Kassinger, at highest Nile, boats
can sail the whole way ; at low Nile navigation is inter-
rupted (see Map I.) at Suarda and between Kaibar and
Hannek.

The Sirdar^s plan, therefore, was to advance to Akasheh
a small force, and entrench it there to cover the railway
construction. This small force could be supplied by
camel convoys, which halted every night at an en-
trenched post, and were convoyed by a guard. When
the railway had proceeded as fiir as safety permitted,
e would rapidly bring up his whole force and drive
the Dervashes out of Ferket and Suarda. As they were
just as much governed by questions of supply, they
would then be unable to keep any permanent force
north of Hannek, and he could safely continue the con-
struction of his railway to Ferket, while in the mean-
time camels worked between rail-head and the force.
When the railway reached Ferket he would bring up
a big reserve of supplies, wait till high Nile, then put

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 13

it into boats which could sail right up to Dongola,
Merowi, Kassinger, thus supplying the force.

To carry his force across the river, to tow barges on
<^m days, to scout up the river, to bombard river forts
preliminary to a landing, to enfilade fortifications, to
make life on the river-bank unbearable for the enemy,
to do all these things he would have gunboats drawing
two feet of water. When the river rose the gunboats
lying at Haifa were to be pulled up the cataracts to
Ferket, and three new ones should be taken in sections
by rail to Ferket and launched. Thus he would have
<5omplete command of the river, and could supply a big
force, which, when the time came, he would move
swiftly to the destruction of the Dervishes.

It looks a simple plan, but it needed a man who knew
the country and the enemy to make it, and a mistake
in the scheme would be heavily paid for. Any one
who has seen the inhospitable, barren, grilling Batn el
Haggar, will understand what a mistake in the supply
of a force would mean. It stopped the Romans, Greeks,
and Persians. Simple as the plan looks, it was not so
simple to execute, but luckily Sir Herbert Kitchener
was as capable to execute as he was to plan.

In the previous chapter I have shown how the
Egyptian army had for the past ten years been con-
stantly sparring with the Dervishes. This living in a
continual state of minor warfare had been a most
excellent training for our officers, and there were few
details connected with moving troops about the barren
country or the tactics of the Dervishes which were
not known to Kitchener, Hunter, Bundle, MacDonald.

14 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

Maxwell, Lewis, and at least a score more who had
spent the previous twelve years on the frontier. So the
Sirdar had under him a set of officers fully trained to
carry out the scheme he had arranged with the least
friction or waste of time and labour.

It was, I think, on the 21st March that the Sirdar
ordered Colonel Hunter to advance from Haifa with the
force there and occupy Akasheh, which was about sixteen
miles north of Ferket. Colonel Hunter lost no time
in carrying out these instructions. He met with no
opposition, only a few Dervishes being seen. Colonel
Hunter entrenched a brigade, some guns, and cavalry
at Akasheh, and established posts at Wady Atira and
Ambigol, under protection of which the camel convoys
halted at night, and continued their march by day,
escorted by troops. A telegraph-line was laid by
Lieutenant Manifold, R.E., from Haifa to Akasheh,
arriving at that place almost as soon as the troops.
There were no spare instruments at Haifa, so it was
worked with ones that were improvised by Lieutenant
Manifold out of old electric bells, etc., until proper
instruments from Cairo arrived. It was considered
certain that the Dervishes would attack the convoys,
and if they had they certainly would have done con-
siderable damage. There was no road for the convoys.
They had to clamber in long straggling line up and
down steep rocky hills, and it would have been quite
possible for the Dervishes to cut up one end or other
of the convoys before the escort could interfere. The
escort could not be scattered too much or they would
be beaten in detail, so that there were some splendid

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 15

opportunities for the Dervishes, but they never took
them. No doubt they found it hard to get unobserved
through our cavalry and camel screen. Daily the
cavalry used to scout from Akasheh towards Ferket,
and were in constant touch with the Dervish cavaJrj^
scouts. A cavalry oflScer told me he never had such
a good time as during this outpost duty. He said it
was like going out hunting every day, one never knew
what would turn up. One day they would be trying
to outride and capture a weaker patrol, the next they
would be dodging and watching a stronger one.

Major Broad wood, second in command of the cavalry,
collected a lot of useful information scouting by himself.
On one occasion he climbed to the top of Ferket hill,
and looked down into Ferket, about one mile off, where
the whole Dervish force was holding a prayer parade
in full dress. Having studied them and made a good
guess at their numbers. Major Broadwood retired, and
the next Friday rode up the west bank of the river,
and from a hill on that side again watched the Dervish
church parade, and found they had been slightly re-
inforced since the previous week. The Alighat Arabs
were also utilized to prevent the Dervishes skirting
right round Akasheh and cutting in behind. Ambigol
Wells in the desert, about six miles from the river, and
Moghrat Wells, also about six miles from the river, were
the only points where water could be got in the desert.
These were fortified and held by detachments. The
Alighat Arabs then rode daily along the line Akasheh-
Ambigol Wells, Moghrat Wells. They were placed
under the supervision of Major Roddy Owen, to whom

i6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

they soon became devoted. In order to ensure that
they did their daily ride, he made them bring written
messages from one post to another, stating the time
and place they last left. Roddy Owen was determined
if possible to have a fight on his birthday. He said
lie had had a fight on two previous birthdays, and he
meant to again if it could be done. When the day
(iame round the cavalry were out scouting as usual,
and a battalion of infantry was in support, so Roddy
Owen went ahead with his friendly Arabs, and showing
himself at Ferket, tried to draw the Dervishes on to
the cavalry and infantry behind. In this he was
unsuccessful, so he did not fight that birthday.

Under cover of the dispositions just described, the
railway began to be made. As already stated, a railway
existed from Haifa to Sarras (thirty-three miles). It
had been constructed by order of Ismail in the time
of Gordon, and had been carried on a further distance
of fifty-five miles to Akasheh in the Nile Expedition of
1884. This last fifty-five miles had been torn up by
the Dervishes when we retreated. The sleepers had
been burnt, the fish-plates, bolts, etc., made into spears;
the rails, being too heav}^ to carry away, were tossed
down the embankment, a few of them badly bent and
twisted, but the majority unharmed. The formation
level remained practically complete, except in a few
places where floods and sandstorms had made small
breaches.

Two engines and a few trucks only were running
between Haifa and Sarras. The remaining engines
w^hich had been used in the 1884 expedition were either

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 17

on the scrap-heap as worn out, or had been lying idle,
some of their parts being taken to repair the two
engines that were running. There were small work-
shops at Haifa, with native workmen under one or two
European superintendents.

It was necessary, therefore, to utilize the railway
material on the spot at once, and to supplement it as
<juickly as possible with the many things that it wanted.
Measures were taken to procure engines, trucks, sleepers,
rails, machinery for shops, fitters and workmen, fore-
men, platelayers, and all the various accessories of a
railway. The gauge of the existing thirty-three miles
was three feet six inches, so this determined the gauge
of the railway — in many ways a convenient one, but
inconvenient for a military railway, because, since the
railway at the Cape is the only other one in the world,
I believe, of the same gauge, there is no ready-made
supply of locomotives and rolling stock. Everything
had to be made to order, shipped to Alexandria, and
then taken a thousand miles up river, the greater part
of the way by sailing-boats, with three transhipments
between Alexandria and Haifa. Naturally this took
time. In fact, the new engines only came into use
during the last month of the expedition, in September,
and then they were very disappointing. The new
trucks arrived quicker, but in the meantime all the old
engines and rolling stock long since condemned were
patched up and made to struggle on to the imminent
danger of all concerned. A railway battalion was
formed by enlisting under the conscription act several
hundred of the fellaheen, who had no more idea how to

i8 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

lay a railway than to fly. To superintend them several
so-called native platelayers were sent up from Lower
Egypt. Naturally they proved, with few exceptions, to
be all the useless scoundrels discharged from the Lower
Egypt railways ; the same w^th the engine-drivers, they
were nearly all native stokers, with the most limited
knowledge of how to drive or look after an engine,
and with the most reckless disregard of consequences.
When one puts an ignorant but reckless native engine-
driver on a patched-up, condemned locomotive with no
brakes, to drive a train of worn-out trucks along a
track laid by men who have never seen a rail and
don't understand a straight line, or the necessity for
exactitude ; and when this track climbs up and down
and in and out among switchback gradients and sharp
corners, then you get all the elements required to
produce the most exciting and exhilarating railway
travelling.

To lick this mob into shape, to teach them to lay
a proper track and to lay it fast, to make good the
accidents caused by the sporting native engine-drivers,
to put order and organization into the railway, the
Sirdar got five Royal Engineer subalterns, and the one
he put in charge of the whole happened to be, with the
Sirdar's usual luck, the very man for the post. Lieu-
tenant Girouard, R.E., knew exactly what was wanted,
and had the head, the energy, and the pluck to do it.
He was here, there, and everywhere, instructing, swear-
ing, shoving things along, gradually getting organization
and system to take the place of chaos, and under his
able guidance every one became slowiy, but noticeably.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 19

more proficient at the work ; but it was real hard work
for him and the oflScers and men under him. As bad
luck would have it, the summer of 1896 was the hottest
known for years, and the Batn el Haggar desert,
through which the operations were being conducted,
is quite the hottest part of the Sudan. The ther-
mometer over and over again rose to IIG"* in the shade,
often to 120'', and once or twice to 127'' and 129°. In
this weather the expeditionary force had to march or
sit grilling in tents, or sometimes without shelter ; to
pull boats day after day up the cataract ; and to work
from sunrise to sunset, and often through the night,
making a railway.

While the railway is hammering steadily forward, we
wiU turn to the organization of the transport. As soon
as the campaign began, veterinary oflScers were sent to
the camel districts to buy camels. The natives soon
heard that camels were wanted ; it was a bad time of
year to buy, because camels were in great requisition to
carry the crops to the railways, but still sufficient were
produced, and all day long veterinary officers were
examining and passing camels. They were then marched
up to Wady Haifa. The ^personnel of the transport
corps was, like the railway battalion, raised by using
the conscription act to enlist the required number of
fellaheen. Now, strange as it may seem, it is never-
theless a fact, that though the Egyptian often depends
entirely upon camels to carry his farm produce to
market, and although he uses and works with camels
from his babyhood, yet he is absolutely ignorant of how
to look after and work a camel so as to get the most

20 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

work out of him. I have seen an Egyptian transport
man detected by the transport officer carrying all his
stable paraphernalia and worldly treasures iiiside the
panel of the camel saddle, having removed some of the
stuffing to make room for a bottle, a knife, a bit of
biscuit, and goodness knows what else, and then he
positively could not understand for a long time why it
is calculated to give a camel a sore back.

He also is under the impression that a camel will carry
any amount, and when he has loaded him until even he
thinks the weight is enough, then he does not think he
is adding to its weight by putting his fat self on the t»op
of all, thus saving the trouble of walking.

Another objection to the raw, untutored Egyptian
peasant as a transport soldier is, that he positively does
not know what you are talking about when you tell
him he must do as he is told, and that punctuality
is necessary. He is quite ready to do as he is told
and to be punctual if only you will explain what
these things mean. It is something he has not heard
of before.

To illustrate his absolute ignorance of discipline I will
relate the following true story. When the new camels
arrived at Haifa, the Sirdar said he would inspect them.
He stood under a tree, and the camels were told to file
past him. Just as the leading man got opposite the
Sirdar with his camel he stopped, thereby blocking the
whole string of camels behind, and proceeded leisurely
to light a cigarette, or rather I should say he attempted
to do so, but was made to move on by the transport
officer in a forcible manner which quite astonished him,

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 21

and I don't suppose to this day he can understand why
he wasn't allowed to light that cigarette.

I have, I fear, enumerated first all the bad points of
the raw Egyptian as a transport man, not because he
has no good ones, but in order to show the difficulties
the transport officers had to contend with.

In fairness to the Egyptian I must add that, when
trained he makes the most excellent transport man. He
is capable of being taught and disciplined, and when this
is done he follows out his instructions most carefully,
and takes the keenest interest in his camel's welfare ; also
it is unnecessary to teach him to load quickly and to
make the load balance. This he knows better than
any one, but he has to be shown how to put the load in
the most convenient place for the camel. Last, but not
least, he has wonderful powers of endurance. Hour
after hour he can tramp steadily on, often eating only
biscuit ; two or three hours' sleep and on he goes again
through the hottest day, but you must give him water.
Food he can do without, but he wants plenty of water,
more than an Englishman.

The Sirdar's knowledge of the men of the country
enabled him to select exactly the right ones to hustle
and train the mob into a first-class transport corps,
although there was no time for quiet instruction. The
transport had to come into existence at once, and work
at breaking strain, so the officers had to be up and
about during the short rests, and on the march teaching
and bustling the raw recruits into their work.

Two of the English officers were lent from the police
force, so they knew the language and the characteristics

22 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

of the men they had to deal with thoroughly. A third
oflScer had won his commission from the ranks fighting
on the frontier, and had years of experience. Major
Kitchener, brother of the Sirdar, was put in charge of
the whole to organize and direct. Nothing is more
tiring than marching with a convoy of camels whose
pace is only two and a half miles an hour. An hour
before sunrise they would be off, between twelve and
three a halt would be made, when camels and saddles
had to be inspected, and when that was done the only
shade to be got was by stretching a blanket from one
rock to another ; oflF again at three and right on till ten,
eleven, or twelve, report aiTival, find what loads are to be
taken on the morrow, arrange them for loading, see the
men feed the camels, — of course they aren't doing so, —
two or three hours for sleep, and off again.

By this means the pile of supplies at Akasheh was
daily getting higher. When the railway reached
Moglirat Wells, a few trains of supplies were run
there ; while the camels were taking that away the
railway pushed on.

In the meantime things were not quite quiet at
Suakim. In the middle of April Osman Digna turned
up in his old haunts between Tokar and Suakim. The
friendly tribes tried to resist him, and called on the
Government for support. Colonel Lloyd reported that
there seemed a chance of catching Osman Digna, so was
given permission to try. The scheme was that the 10th
BattaUon at Tokar was to unite with the Suakim force,
and then they would surround and defeat Osman Digna.

The Suakim force was preceded by some reconnoitring

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 23

cavalry under Captain Fenwick, who had orders not to
engage the Dervishes, but if possible to get through to
Major Sydney, commanding the 10th Battalion (Sudan-
ese), and so keep up communication till the junction was
effected.

Acting under these orders, Captain Fenwick was
proceeding through the thick bush, when his patrols
came back to say they had stumbled right into the
Dervishes. A retirement at the trot was ordered ;
hardly had the word been given than the Dervishes
appeared and began to gain. Captain Fenwick tried to
call a halt to face about, but so thick was the bush
that his men were scattered, and few heard the order.
Captain Fenwick pulled up, j umped off, took a carbine
from a fallen trooper, shouted to another who galloped
past him to pass the word to rally round him, and then,
standing alone, proceeded to fire at the on-coming
Dervishes. The trooper who had been told to pass the
word to halt and rally managed to do so, and gradually
they grouped round Captain Fenwick, coming in by
ones and twos from the bush. Captain Fenwick dis-
mounted them all, and firing volleys they fought their
way to a small eminence in open ground ; on this
they lay down. The Dervishes, shouting and yelling
to each other to assemble, every moment increased in
numbers. Captain Fenwick knew he must husband his
ammunition, so only allowed one or two picked shots to
fire, while he himself took a carbine, and whenever a
Dervish showed himself he fired. When a number of
them tried to charge a steady volley rang out. Captain
Fenwick did not expect to escape, it only required one

24 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

rush of the Dervishes and they would be annihilated ;
but fortunately the Dervishes were not Osman Digna\s
picked fighting men, they were only his scall}^'ags,
and the determined front checked them. A few would
come on and be bowled over, but no organized rush
was made.

Towards dawn some steady volleys rang out not far
off. Another body of Dervishes had found the 10th
Battalion zeribahed for the night and had attacked them,
but the Dervishes round Captain Fenwick, thinking the
10th Battalion were advancing to his relief, drew oflF,
and early in the morning another force hastily sent on
by Colonel Lloyd relieved Captain Fenwick, who had
fired one hundred and fifty rounds himself, and very few
of them wasted. The force followed up the Dervishes,
but they w^ould not await an attack, and left the district
altogether.

In May the Sirdar, finding the time was approaching
when he could advance, ordered the Eg}'ptian troops at
Suakim to come to Haifa, their place at Suakim and
Tokar being taken by Indian troops.

The Suakim garrison proceeded by steamer to Kosseir,
and from there marched across the desert to Keneh, and
then up the Nile. A desert march of one hundred and
eighty miles in May, with the thermometer at 115° in the
shade, is not a pleasant experience, but the troops did
first-rate marching. The 1st BattaUon, which was the
last to cross, had a very bad march, as they found one
set of wells quite dry. They were therefore forced to
march straight on without water, and do a double march
to the next wells. Many of them only just reached

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 25

the end, and several would not have reached if they
had not been driven on by force.

In the meantime the Dervishes had begun to think
that the continued presence of a force at Akasheh and
the advance of the railway meant business, and urgent
commands were coming from Dongola and Omdurman
to drive the unbelievers out of Akasheh and tear up
their railway.

The Dervish commander at Ferket knew this was no
easy matter, so he asked for reinforcements, but in the
meantime, in order to show his zeal, he determined to
make a demonstration, which he could describe in his
despatches as a brilliant victory.

Accordingly, on the 21st May the whole Dervish
force in Ferket, about two thousand infantry and three
hundred cavalry, marched out towards Akasheh. At
the same time Colonel Bum-Murdoch was conducting a
larger cavalry reconnaissance than usual, in fact he had
about six hundred Egyptian cavalry with him. About
nine miles from Akasheh the Dervish advancing force was
sighted. Colonel Burn-Murdoch, finding that the ground
was bad for charging the Dervish cavalry, ordered a
retirement to more suitable ground in the rear. The
retirement was begun at the trot, and immediately a
cloud of sand was raised obscuring everything. The
Dervish cavalry were closer than had been thought, and
galloping hard they managed to get into the tail of the
retiring Egyptian squadrons. So thick was the cloud of
dust that those in front knew nothing of the Dervishes
being amongst the rear squadrons for some time ; when
it became known, word was passed to halt and turn

26 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

about. This was not so easy to do. The trot had
become a canter, and the dust prevented the order being
passed quickly. Nevertheless they soon managed to
pull up, and turning about, put the Dervish cavalry to
flight. Our casualties were, I believe, nine killed and
wounded only.

Colonel Burn-Murdoch, seeing that the whole of the
Dervish infantry was advancing, then dismounted his
men and fired volleys. The Dervishes exchanged shots
and then marched back to Ferket, and sent a report of
a brilliant victory over the infidels to Omdurman.

They next turned their attention to the railway,
which had now reached Ambigol Wells, sixty-four miles
from Haifa. A raid had been long expected, and
rail-head was guarded by a battalion which furnished
outposts day and night to protect the railway battalion,
who were all innocent of drill or musketry training.
About 9 p.m. on the 1st of June the alarm was
sounded, and firing was heard from a hill about a mile
ofi" the railway camp. The troops stood to arms, but
the Dervishes did not mean business, and hadn't the
slightest intention of charging. Having fired off* their
rifles at an impossible range, they mounted their camels
and were off*. The camel corps from Akasheh got the
news by wire and went in pursuit, but the Derv^ishes
liad too much of a start, and got back to Ferket, where
no doubt they reported that they had entirely destroyed
the railway.

CHAPTER III

The Sirdar now thought that the railway had advanced
as far as was safe. For the last fortnight it had been
advancing rapidly. The railway battalion could now lay
a mile in a day, but though the pace of their work had
improved, its quality was not yet what it afterwards
became. Two engines had fallen to the bottom of a
fifteen-foot bank, another train was so badly wrecked
that it blocked the line for two days, thus cutting ofi"
the rail-head supply of water, so that all those who did
not go back to the break-down had to march to the
river. An engine or tioiek simply off the line was a
daily occurrence of no importance whatever so long
as it had not turned over. Often after working all day
an officer and break-down gang would have to go back
at night to put a train on the line, and till that train
came in the camp was without water.

Still, in spite of these little contretemps no damage
was done ; the two engines had been raised from the
bottom of the fifteen-foot bank and were running again.
One or two drivers were driving with one arm in a
ding, and Haifa Hospital had a few more patients than

usual

27

28 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

Everything was now ready for an advance on Ferket.
The concentration was carried out with the utmost de-
spatch. Although the fight was fought on the 7th June,
it was not until the evening of the 4 th that the Egyj)-
tian troops, located at distances of from sixteen to one
hundred miles from Ferket, began to move for a con-
centration, which was nevertheless complete at Akasheh
on the afternoon of the 6th.

The North StaflFordshire Regiment had been brought
from Cairo to garrison Haifa. The Eg}^tian army had
yet to win the confidence of the public, and it was
thought by those in authority in Cairo that in case the
Eg}^tian army was defeated there should be a garrison
of British troops at Haifa for them to fall back on. It
was hard lines on the English battalion to have to wait
at Haifa while the Egyptian army went to Ferket, but
such is the fortune of war.

On the 4th June the troops garrisoning the rear-most
posts on the river began to move forward, and each
post as they passed joined them. The main part of
the troops were at Haifa, and all the afternoon of the
4th, and through the following night, the railway was
pouring them into Ambigol Wells. Providence looked
after them on the railway. There were no brake-blocks
to the engines ; the ones ordered had not had time to
arrive, the ones improvised had worn out, so they ran
away down every hill, and generally failed to get up
the opposite one till the third attempt ; but get up they
did, and put all the troops into Ambigol Wells before
1 a.m. on the 5th. As yet practically none of the
new stores and rolling stock had had time to arrive.

MAP 31

lirtch m 32 Mij99.

I I 1

Iftle^io

limliufl

I

io

4,€jml Jl^U»

OONftO

WAOY

HAL FA

30 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

80 that it was simply with the old patched-up material
that the railway successfully played its part in the
concentration.

On the 5th the troops that had arrived at Ambigol
Wells marched to the river, and then up to Okmeh, a
place about two miles north of Akasheh. The object
of this was that Akasheh should appear to have exactly
the same garrison as usual. Daily the Dervish scouts
reconnoitred the place, but they could not see the troops
just arrived at Okmeh without going round Akasheh,
which they never did. On the afternoon of the 6th
the whole force was concentrated at Akasheh : three
brigades of infantry, three field and one horse battery,
six squadrons cavalry, and the camel corps, about t^n
thousand altogether. The Intelligence Department had
collected a great deal of information about the Dervish
force at Ferket, and estimated them to be about three
thousand strong.

The Sirdar decided to take the main part of his force
along the river, and to send the cavahy, camel corps,
horse battery, and one infantry battalion on transport
camels by the desert route, so as to come down on
Ferket simultaneously from the desert side and so hem
them in.

It required very nice calculation to find out the
exact time at which the two columns should start in
order to arrive simultaneously. Major Broadwood,
from constant scouting, knew both routes perfectly,
and I believe I am right in saying that he was re-
sponsible for the times of starting, which turned out
to be exactly right.

i

32 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

I think it was about 5 p.m. in the afternoon of the
6th that the force began to move out of Akasheh, and
continued marching steadily till about 11.30 p.m. The
ground along the river-bank was execrable, a succession
of steep rocky hills and valleys running down to the
river. It was a moonlight night, but even so it was
difficult going for men and animals from boulder to
boulder. Strict silence was kept, and of course there
were no lights. At 11.30 p.m. the force halted and
lay down for a short sleep, which seemed to have hardly
begun before it was interrupted at 1.30 a.m. by the
order to advance again. As the first shimmer of dawn
began to appear one began to wonder how far oflF we
were, and whether it had been timed right. Soon Fer-
ket hill rose up close at hand, and just as it began to
get a little lighter the slope of the spur from Ferket
hill was reached. The force formed up, Lewis's Brigade
next the river, MacDonald on its left, Maxwell's in
support. No sign of the Dervishes had yet been seen,
but a small block-house became visible on the slope of
Ferket hill. Having formed up, the force moved for-
ward again. Bang! and five Dervishes, one with a
smoking rifle, could be seen running up the hill to get
into the block-house. This could not be allowed. Five
sharp-shooters in that block-house would give a lot of
annoyance. Half a company was told oflf to fire but
missed. Then a maxim was turned on, and laid them
low in succession just before they reached the block-
house.

Just as the river force topped the slope of the spur
from Ferket hill, bang went a gun away on the left in

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 33

the desert. The desert column had arrived absolutely
simultaneously. Half-a-mile in front of the river
column was Ferket village ; the Dervishes, completely
surprised, nevertheless streamed out and ran to their
posts. MacDonald's Brigade went off to the left to
gain touch with the desert column and complete the
hemming-in circle, Maxwell's Brigade came up in line
with Lewis's to fill the gap left by MacDonald's. The
whole line opened fire. Just to the north of Ferket
village was a low line of rocks. The Dervishes kept
up a brisk fire from these, and clung to them till they
were shot and bayoneted by the advancing troops.
About forty horsemen suddenly dashed out of the
houses and tried to charge, they were mowed down in
t^n yards. The Dervishes on the east side, finding
themselves taken in front by the desert column and in
fiank by MacDonald and Maxwell, tried to fly back to
the houses. To do so they had to cross an open bit
of ground. Few survived the independent fire that
was opened as they tried to get over the bare space.
Down into the houses went the troops, and it was
finished.

The cavalry now went off in pursuit of the few that
had got away, and continued the pursuit for two days,
till they arrived opposite Suarda, men and horses pretty
tired. The 12th Battalion followed up on transport
camels in support, as it was expected that Suarda,
the Dervish frontier headquarters, would have a
garrison in it, but there was none ; they had all been
at Ferket, so the cavalry marched in, and the first
phase of the operations was complete. The whole of

34 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

the Dervish advance force was killed or taken prisoner,
and there were none between Hannek and Suarda. The
surprise had been complete. So quickly and unexpectedly-
had the concentration at Akasheh been carried out, that
the Dervishes had received no intelligence ; so accurately
were the two columns timed that hardly a Der%dsh
escaped.

Our casualties were about twenty-five killed and
seventy-five wounded. Only one British officer. Captain
Legge, was wounded. All through the campaign the
British officers of the Egyptian army had extraordinary
luck in action, which is all the more remarkable con-
sidering that they are all mounted.

Among the Dervish slain were many emirs, including
Hammuda, their commander. Colonel Slatin Pasha was
invaluable for identifying the emirs. It was hoped that
Osman Azrak would be found among the killed. This
emir had become almost as notorious as Osman Digna.
He had resided for some time previously under our
protection at Wady Haifa, but one day went over to
the Dervishes, and planned and led several raids. But,
like Osman Digna, he took very good care of his skin,
and fled as soon as the fight began. He took a small
box of treasure and swam across the river with it on
his head. Several very fine camels were captured, and
a great number of donkeys.

Several people thought we should immediately con-
tinue to advance to Dongola, but the Sirdar knew better.
He knew that he had sprung as far as it was possible to
spring, and that the next spring, when the time came to
make it, must not be to Dongola only, but right past

"1*1

a**
i

>l

36 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

it to Merowi and Kassinger, some three hundred and
fifty miles from Ferket. At present the river was low,
and no boats could go beyond Suarda. How, then,
could he supply the force if he advanced at once ? How
would he cross the river without boats ? His gunboats
would have to be left behind, and if he reached the
place he could not possibly keep a big force there. The
province itself would provide practically nothing.

No ; his plan, as I said before, was to bring the
railway to Ferket, run up supplies, and make a base
there. In another two months the river would be
rising, and all his gunboats and barges could be pulled
up the cataracts from Haifa, where they were now lying.

It was thought that the Dervishes in Dongola might
make an advance to dispute the ground we had won,
but they did not move. No doubt they were hindered
from advancing by the same obstacle which hindered us.
From Suarda to Hannek the river was impassable for
boats, the banks were barren and devoid of supplies,
so the neutral strip of cataract and desert lay between
the forces, making them for the time safe from each other.

Accordingly the railway again began to forge ahead.
All the battalions in turn were set to work making the
embankment that would bring it into Ferket. The 7th
Egyptian Battalion, commanded by Fathi Bey, on the
very afternoon of the Ferket fight started back to rail-
head, not that they were now necessary as escort, but to
increase the number of workers. This battalion did most
wonderful matching. On the afternoon of the 5th it
left rail-head, and arrived at Akasheh (nineteen miles)
on the morning of the 6th, left Akasha the same

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 39

afteriioou, marclied to Forket {sixteuii mil«a),iiiiil fought
tliere the morning of the 7th, stnrtKil bttck tlie pame
afternoon, ami rpjiohed rail-head again on the morning
of the 9t!i, that is to say, scventj' miles and a fight in
tlio trourse of three ilavs and a half, during whieh the

tliemionieter was playing ahout Iietwecn 110' and 120'
in the shade.

The main part of the foiec was encamped at Ferket,
while Suarda was held by one brigade. Tho eavalry,
for reasons of supply, were sent baek to Sarras, and now
began one of those weary spells of waiting and working,
of which 80 many had to be gone through during the
next two years, and indeed these times of waiting and

40 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

hard toiling on the Hne of communications are far the
most trying part of a campaign. Truly is it said, *' The
day of battle is the soldier s holiday/* As stated before,
it was the hottest summer known for years. It is
difficult to say whose lot was preferable, that of the
man who was not employed on the line of communi-
cations, and so had little to do but watch the ther-
mometer as he stewed in a grass hut at Ferket, or on
the other hand the lot of the man who was employed on
the line of communications forwarding stores, or working
in the sun on indifferent food from sunrise to sunset,
pulling boats through cataracts, marching witli camel
convoys, or making a railway.

It will be interesting to examine the line of com-
munications at the time that we had advanced to Ferket.
From the base at Cairo stores were forwarded for three
hundred and ninety miles by rail to Naghamadi. There
an English officer was in charge of a gang of men who
took them over the railway, and put them into boats
which sailed one hundred and forty-five miles to Assouan.
There another English officer was in charge, who had the
stores loaded on to a train wliich took them four miles
round the cataract to Shellal, where they were again
put into boats. This work was entirely done by convicts.
At Shellal some of the boats were lashed alongside stern-
wheel steamers, themselves loaded and towed two hundred
and forty miles to Haifa, wliile the remaining boats sailed.
From Haifa the railway carried them sixty-eight miles
to Ambigol Wells, where they were loaded on camels
and carried about thirty-five miles to Ferket. The
Suarda Brigade was supplied by boat from Ferket. In

MAPHE

I I I 1 I • ' ' ^

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too

^«A«/*w» r<rMT««f^> Sm^LJitii

*»AA£*9^ *y t^lu^f

tw^mt. /ii\<Mf

42 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

spite of the length of the line of eommiiuications, and
the frequent transhipments, the supplies reached the
front with wonderful regularity. For fresli meat a
contract was made wdth a Greek who practically never
failed. The animals w^ere driven up the whole w%ay, so
they were pretty muscular when they arrived, but there
was no doubt about the meat being fresli, as one saw^
one's lunch walkinoj about at six in the morning. Small
detachments on the line of communications did not fare
so well as those w^ho were at the front, wliere tlierc w^ere
a large number of troops and a supply depot, but never-
theless every one got a good ration.

All through the campaign, in spite of the length of
the line of communications, the desolation of the country,
w^hich now produ(*ed practically nothing, and tlie number
of posts that had to be fed, the supply otHcers, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Rogers, Captains Drage and T31unt, and
Lieutenant Howard, succeeded in producing a sufficiency
of good supplies, w^hile Lieutenant Gorringe, R.E., per-
formed the duties of D.A.A.G.(B) in such a manner
that no troops were ever without a ration of some sort,
and except on a very few- occasions every one got a full
ration.

And so the time went on while we w\iited for two
things : (1) the completion of the railway to Ferket, and
(2) the rising of the river which would enable the boats
to be brought up the cataract and sail on. After the
force had been encamped for about a fortnight at Ferket
it was found that the dead had not been buried suffici-
ently to prevent the place becoming unsavoury, so it
was decided to move on eight miles to Kosheh, which

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 43

now became the advance base from which the force
wouki eventually start for Dongola.

I think it was in the beginning of July, when we were
already longing for an advance, that we heard there was
cholera in Lower Egypt. At first little attention was
paid to the matter. Cholera had often visited Egypt,
but had never travelled further south than Assouan.
Soon, however, news came that it had reached Assouan
and passed it, and next we heard that it was at Haifa.
Mr. Vallum, who had long superintended Haifa work-
shops, succumbed to it, another Englishman sent up
by the firm who made the gunboats also died, and
the natives were decimated by it. Next it reached
Akasheh and finally Kosheli. The force w^as at once
spread out in the desert half-a-mile from the river, and
everything was done to prevent intercourse, but of
course the camel convoys and the railway brought it in.
Rail-head, {dthough in the desert, where one is usually
free from infectious diseases, was nevertheless attacked,
and to every one's grief Captain Fenwick fell a victim
to it. He must have escaped death at the hands of the
Dervishes at least a dozen times, and it seemed hard
that he should die thus. Another popular officer,
Surgeon Captain Trask, died of it the same day. Curi-
ously enough, he spent a night at rail-head with Fenwick
and the RE. officer. The next morning he rode on to
Kosheh, and died there at 2.30 in the afternoon, exactly
at the same time that Captain Fenwick expired. The
next day Lieutenant Polwhele, RE., died at Haifa, to
which place he had been sent a few days earlier from
rail-head with enteric fever. This was the officer who

44 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

had had charge of rail-head camp, and so mercilessly
had he worked himself in order to teach them how to
lay the track and to push the milway forward, that he
had run down in health and could not resist the fever.
As there was only one officer left at rail-head, Lieutenant
Girouard, R.E., went up from Haifa, but got sun-stroke
at rail-head camp which laid him up for a fortnight, so
that it looked as if fortune was trying to stop the rail-
way ; but nevertheless it continued to advance a mile a
day, although thej'- had to move camp every day as well
to try and shake oflF the cholera. It was about this
time that that officer of world-wide popularity, Roddy
Owen, was also carried oflF by cholera at Ambigol Wells.
What a place for this popular soldier sportsman to end
his days in ! But after all it was on active service, and
so a fitting end to a romantic career. A marble tomb-
stone marks his grave in the desert on which is written,
" Under the Shadow of the Sword is Paradise."

Lieutenant Faimer also succumbed to enteric fever,
so that people began to wonder how much more damage
the cholera and enteric were going to do. A good
number of the soldiers were down with it, and the North
Staffordshire Regiment were suffering pretty severely,
although they had immediately left Haifa and camped
at Gemai. It really seemed quite mthin the bounds
of possibility that twenty-five per cent, of the force
might be destroyed.

One gets to know men thoroughly well on active
service, and it was depressing to see real friends carried
off by disease, so that, what with the heat and either
overwork or else lack of work, life at this time was not

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 45

very rosy, and every one was longing for an advance
which could not come yet.

The Sirdar was, I believe, rather anxious as to what
the cholera would do, but he was nevertheless determined
not to be hurried into a premature advance.

After a time the cholera reached its maximum, and
then the number of cases declined daily. It hung about
for some time, but no further anxiety was felt as to its
doing any considerable damage.

On the 4th August the railway reached Koshelr, one
hundred and eight miles from Haifa, and every one
immediately began to ask, ** When are we going to
advance ? " But a great deal still had to be done. The
river began to rise, and the time came to begin hauling
gunboats, barges, and sailing-boats up the cataract.

This work was placed under the direction of Colonel
Hunter. He had done the same work in the '84 Ex-
pedition, he knew better than any one how to direct
Egyptians, and it was a work that required a man
absolutely without nerves. For instance, at the " Great
Gate " in the cataract there is a narrow channel about
thirty feet wide between rocks which turns and twists,
and through it the water rushes like a mill-race. A
steamer would come up to it with all steam on, and
three ropes were fastened on to bow and sides, on which
several hundred men on the banks were pulling. Higher
and higher the water mounted at the bows till it
threatened to swcimp the steamer ; of course it was im-
perative to keep her bows on to the stream. When she
turned a corner a different arrangement had to be made,
and made at once. A strong pull on the wrong rope and

46 SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899

over she would go. An officer was always standing bj' with
an axe ready to cut any rope on which a pull was being
wTongly made, and often a rope was cut in the nick of
time. Officers and men wore little else but helmet and
boots, so that they could wade and sw4m through bye
channels to get to advantageous points from which to
pull. Now and then a man would lose his footing or
try to swim a dangerous place. Like a flash he would
be gone and sucked under in the eddies.

The banks were steep and rocky. Not a particle of
shade to be found during the halts, and the heat refracted
oflF the rocky hills till it seemed like an oven. And so
it went on till through a huudred miles of cataract four
gunboats, two unarmed steamers, and a quantity of
barges and sailing-boats w^ere safely brought to Kosheh.
While this w^as going on a new gunboat had been
brought in sections by rail from Haifa, and w^as being
put together at Kosheh. It was quite the fashion to go
down and watch the progress of the w^ork on it. It was
attended by ill-luck from the beginning. Two English-
men were sent up by the firm who made it to superintend
its construction. One died of cholera, the other w^as
killed by a heavy w^eight falling on him, so the Royal
Engineers took it over, but it w^as like putting a Chinese
puzzle together without knownng the key. Owing to
the death of the Englishman who had been supervising
the transport of the various parts, several stores and
pieces of the gunboat had got mixed with railway stores,
so frantic wires flew^ between Kosheh and Haifa for such
and such a nut, or rod, or plate of steel. On one occa-
sion Haifa declared they had sent oflF a particular nut.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 47

while Kosheh declared they had not received it. The
inference was that it had fallen oflF in transit on the
railway, so cavalry were sent patrolling along the rail-
way to find the nut. It seemed like looking for a needle
in a bundle of hay, but strange to say it was found. In
spite of difficulties, however, and a storm which nearly
destroyed it by blowing the shear legs on to it, the boat
began to approach completion, and now at last it seemed
as if the time for advance was near. In a few days the
river would be high enough for gunboats and nuggars
to steam and sail on, the railway would have filled
Kosheh with the required amount of supplies. As bad
luck would have it, as the time approached for the
advance the weather became hotter and hotter, and
when the day arrived for the commencement it was
positively stifling. A storm was brewing, and the air
was heavy and fearfully sultry; but the Sirdar would
wait for nothing once he was ready. He had decided
that the Suarda Brigade should mai-ch along the river to
Absarrat, and at the same time the First Brigade from
Kosheh should cut across thirty-eight miles of desert
from Kosheh to Absarrat and join the Second Brigade
there. The Third and Fourth Brigades and other troops
would follow as soon as everything was finally ready.
Two water dep6ts were made in the desert by sending out
water-tanks on camels and leaving them there. The
First Brigade started oflFfrom Kosheh about 4.30 in the
afternoon in stiffing heat. Colonel Hunter in command
decided that the best plan was to march as fast as
possible and get across quickly. About 9 p.m. a
tremendous storm of sand and rain swept over the

48 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

countiy. Nearly every tent and hut in Koshch was
flattened and drenched, and the brigade in the desert
had a terrible time. The storm had no effect in cooling
the atmosphere as more was still brewing, and next day
was terribly hot marching for the troops crossing the
desert. The men drank the liberal water allowance
most improvidently, and soon began to suffer from
thirst. Baggage was taken off the camels and the men
put on them. The whole colimin tailed out for miles,
and every man struggled on the best pace he could, or
lay down to be picked up by the camels or die. Some-
how or other nearly the whole lot managed to get to
Absarrat. Some made their way back to Kosheh, and
a very few expired.

The Second Brigade marching along the river from
Suarda had a similar experience. The country they had
to cross was very rough, but they had the river, and so
they managed to hold out and arrive in good order.

The idea was, that under cover of these two brigades
supplies could be pushed on to Absarrat, and in a few
days' time the river would be high enough for an
advance of the whole force, but ** man proposes, God
disposes."

CHAPTER IV

On the evening of the 28th August, just as prepara-
tions for advance seemed to be approaching completion,
the Sirdar got a telegram to say that twelve miles of
railway were washed away by floods between Sarras and
Moglirat, also damage done near Ambigol Wells, and that
it would take five thousand men three weeks to repair.
Three weeks ! If the force waited that time the river
would have risen and started going down again, and they
might be too late to get the steamers and boats up the
cataracts beyond. The Sirdar said it must be done in
ten days. He rose to the occasion at once. Everybody
was bitterly disappointed, but the Sirdar set the example
in buckling to to put matters right. He decided to go
himself to superintend the work of repair. The floods
had done a certain amount of damage between Akasheh
and Kosheh, but all day long troops had been repairing
it, and about midnight a train reached Kosheh. The
engine-driver had been twenty-four hours on duty, but
the train and two others standing in the station were
immediately loaded with troops and tools, water fantasses,
and rations. I went down to see the arrangements. It
was pitch dark Every staff* oflScer thought it was an

49 B

50 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

occasion requiring zeal, consequently the scene was
highly amusing. One staflF officer would be trying to put
troops into a train while the engineer officer ordered it to
shunt. The staff officer would then threaten the native
engine-driver with instant death if he did not stop
shunting, and the engineer officer threatened him with
slow torture if he did not keep on shunting. However,
about 1 a,m. the first train started off, the Sirdar himself
getting into a truck and going with it. The line between
Kosheh and Akasheh, only roughly repaired after the
floods, was in a very precarious condition, and the train
swayed and jolted along. The engine-driver, who had
been over twenty-four hours on duty, fell asleep, and left
his engine to the stoker, who promptly burnt the boiler
out, and the train came to a standstill, with another one
coming along behind it.

When the other train came up the engine left its
train and shoved the first train over the crest of the
hill which runs down into Akasheh, and then left it
to bring its own train up. The first train, left to
itself, began to move down the hill which runs for
two miles into Akasheh at a sharp gradient, and as the
boiler was burnt out, and the steam brake could not be
applied, it looked as if the train, with Sirdar, troops and
all, would soon be dashing into Akasheh fifty miles an
hour. Fortunately the hand-brakes on the engine and
the brake-van were just enough to hold it, and the second
train again coming up hooked on, and so they both
reached Akasheh.

Only two engines now remained to take the troops
on, so the greater part of the rations and water

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 51

fantasses were left behind to come the next trip. One
officer remarked to the Sirdar that he thought he was
cutting down the allowance of water very low for troops
going into the desert " Well," said the Sirdar, " it will
be a very funny thing if we are going to a place where
the line has been washed out by water if we don't find
some ; " and of course he was right. For the next ten
days the troops repairing the line in the desert got their
water almost entirely from rain-water pools, daily getting
smaller by evaporation, till it became necessary to dig in
the channels where the water had run. It was rather
yellow water, but very wholesome. After leaving
Akasheh the Sirdar's train was not yet free from
accidents. It attempted to cross a place at Ambigol
Wells which had been broken by flood, and was not yet
completely repaired ; in fact, the men were still working
on it. The engine heeled right over and remained in
the middle trembling in the balance, and it took from
10 a.m. till 5 p.m. to jack it up and get it over the
place.

The next day the troops arrived at the south end of
the break and set to work with a will. The railway
battalion and transport and North Stafi'ordshire Regiment
were already at work on the north end of the gap. The
camel corps, in the absence of most of the transport at
the front, were temporarily turned into transport. It
has always been a mystery to me how the troops in the
desert got supplies at this time, considering the dis-
organization of the line of communications caused by the
catastrophe, but nevertheless the rations continued to
arrive regularly, and although it was hand to mouth

52 SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899

there was always something for the hand to put into the
mouth. Two engines were working between Akasheh and
the south end of the gap, bringing water and supplies,
but they were cut off from the shops at Haifa, and were
badly in need of a wash-out and repair. All day long
without a check the work proceeded, the Sirdar directing,
riding from Moghrat to Sarras and back on a camel. Just
as the end seemed to be in view, news came of six miles
washed away at Akasheh, and one of the two engines
remaining on the south side had been caught by the
flood and turned on its side. The remaining engine
could hardly crawl along for want of cleaning and repair.
Its driver had jaundice, but pluckily stuck to his work
day and night. OflF went the Sii'dar to Akasheh to direct
the work there. He was almost the first to reach the
place, and might have been seen with his coat off*, lajdng
out a railway curve for the men to work on. The
cavalry, who had been marching up to take their place
in the advance, were stopped at Akasheh and turned to
the novel work of repairing railway. More battalions
marched from Kosheh to Akasheh and soon got to work.
As if enough accidents had not taken place there must
needs be another, caused by carelessness, at Moghrat.
An Egyptian officer had been sent from a battalion
working on the line to fill the water fantasses at a rain-
water pool near Moghrat station. He was given a
railway truck to put the fantasses in, and was told to
push this to Moghrat, but on no account to allow his
men to get into the truck and run down the hills. He
carried out these instructions till he got within a mile of
Moghrat, and there he found himself on the top of a

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 53

long liill running down to the sfeition. This was too
much temptation. He put all his men into the truck,
and seating himself on the buffer in front, away they
started down the hill. By the time they reached
Moghrat station they w^ere going thirty miles an hour,
the oflScer on the buffer swinging his legs and enjoying
himself immensely. Round the corner they swung, and
there, two hundred yards in front, was the only remain-
ing engine on the line taking water by bucket from the
pool. The officer on the buffer saw at once that his
place was no one for a gentleman, and so jumped off, but
he did not jump clear, and the truck caught him and
completely smashed him. The next second it hit the
engine. The effect was like an explosion. Men and
fantasses were thrown high in the air, and then fell to
the bottom of the high bank. There was no doctor ;
one or two English officers who were there happened to
have a few bandages, with which they did the best they
could for the injured till the doctor arrived in the
afternoon.

It would be as well if I now explained how it was the
railway could be so damaged by rain. In the first place,
such tremendous rain had not been seen in these parts
for twenty years. Most years it does not rain at all in
these regions, and that there had been very little in the
last tw^elve years was shown by the fact that we found
the railway bank made in 1884 almost intact. In the
second place, the countrj^ between Haifa and Kosheh is a
sea of precipitous rocky hills, through which run a few
broad sandy khors or dry water-courses, consequently
there is no other alternative than to lay the railway for a

54 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

great deal of the way in these wat^r-channels. To do
anything else would mean infinite labour, time, and
money, altogether out of the question with a hastily-
constructed military railway, and as rain only comes in
any quantity once in every twenty years, it was reason-
able to expect that we might take the risk. As it was,
thanks tp the Sirdar's energetic direction and the zealous
work of the troops, the whole damage was repaired
twelve days after it had occurred — that is to say,
repaired after a fashion, just sufficiently well to enable
the line to work. After the railway had been completed,
on the 4th August, the Railway Battalion had gone back
on it improving the line, and had got it into very fair
order, when the floods came and undid their work ; and
so now it was indeed a dangerous track over which the
trains brought up the last supplies necessary for the
advance, important amongst which was the coal for the
gtmboata. While the railway was being repaired work
had progressed apace on the gunboat at Kosheh, so that
when the Sirdar returned there she was ready for her
trial. This boat was the apple of the Sirdar's eye. He
knew better than any one the value of gunboats, and he
had daily watched the progress of the work on this one,
and he now was all keenness to see her trial. Alas !
she had not gone two hundred yards before there was a
bang. A cylinder had burst, and all question of her use
in the advance was at an end.

The Sirdar was more upset by this than by anything
that had happened previously. The cholera, the bad
desert march, the flooding of the railway, all these had
seemed to afiect him but little, but his disappointment

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 55

at this last accident for a time got the better of him.
He turned and rode into the desert by himself for a
couple of hours, and it was not till the evening that he
was himself again. There was nothing more now to wait
for, and on the 1 0th September the Sirdar and remaining
troops left Kosheh for the advance on Dongola.

CHAPTER V

It was like going, on Icav^e when we marched out of
Kosheh, after the long hot period of waiting and pre-
paring. The weather was still very hot, but we did not
feel the heat so much now that we knew we should soon
be in touch with the Dervishes, and tiuiiing them out
of Dongola.

The time spent in repairing the railway had not been
wasted at the front. Supplies had been pushed up, and
the telegraph had been laid well on. In fact, the tele-
graph had been laid across the desert before the infantry
crossed, as soon as cavalry had reported it safe. On the
15th September the whole force was concenti-ated at
Fereig, and all the supplies had arrived there by boat.
The force was composed as follows : —

Half a battalion North Staffordshii*e Begiment.

One maxim battery Connaught Rangers.

Six squadrons Egyptian cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burn-
Murdoch.

Camel corps, under Major Tudway.

Three mule and one horse battery.

First Brigade, under Major Lewis ; Ninth and Tenth Sudanese,
and Third and Fourth Egyptian.

Second Brigade, under Major Macdonald; Eleventh, Twelfth,

Thirteenth Sudanese.

56

9"

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 57

Third Brigade, under Major Maxwell; Second, Seventh, and
£ighth Egyptian.

Fourth Brigade, under Major David ; First, Fifteenth, and half
Fifth Egyptian.

Four gunboats, under Commander CJolville, R.N., with Lieutenants
Beatty and Bobertson, B.N., and Captain Oldfield, B.M.A., com-
manding boats.

The total strength was about 12,000.

The Sixth Battalion had been left at Kosheh, and half the Fifth
was to stay at Fereig.

The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Battalions were com-
manded and entirely officered by Egyptian officers. All the others
were commanded by English officers, with two other English offioei's
to each Egyptian and three to each Sudanese battalion.

There were also three unarmed steamers.

On the 1 4th September the cavalry made an extended
reconnaissance nearly as far as Abu Fatmeh. They found
no Dervish force, but got news which confirmed previous
rumours that they had built a fort at Kemia, and in-
tended to fight us there. Kerma is on the east bank,
about six miles above the top of the cataract. During
this reconnaissance they encountered a few Dervish
cavalry, which gave rise to an incident more suitable to
ancient warfare. The emir commanding the Dervish
scouts, seeing one of our squadrons approaching, gal-
loped out brandishing his spear and sword, and making his
horse prance the while he shouted insults at the Egyptians.
An Egyptian trooper promptly took up the challenge
and charged him, but the Dei-vish dodged the lance
point and missed the Egyptian with his sword. Captain
Whitler then put an end to this tournament business
by riding out and shooting the emir. On the 15th we
had a false alarm, which caused the whole camp to stand

58 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

to arms. On the 1 6th the force marched off, the flotilla
steaming and sailing alongside through the cataracts,
which in this part are not rapid enough to make boat-
hauling necessary, but careful steaming was required.
Marching steadily on, the force arrived on the evening
of the 18th within seven miles of Kerma, and it was
expected that Kerma fort would be attacked next day.
As usual, the force lay down to sleep in the ranks, formed
up with their backs to the river ; no fires were allowed,
so that our position should not be known. One gunboat
had had the bad luck to get aground on what was
practically the last rock in the cataract. It was crushing
luck on its commander. Lieutenant Robertson, R.N.,
who had taken an energetic part in bringing steamers
and boats through the cataracts between Haifa and
Kosheh, and now the very last rock was to stop him
taking part in the gunboat fight which occurred the next
day. All night long the gunboats were snorting and
puffing, trying to get the unfortunate one off, but with-
out success. About 7.30 p.m. Captain Mahon of the
cavalry reported that he had been right up to Kerma
fort and found it empty, and the Dervishes had been
busy all day crossing to Hafir, and were still doing so.

Before sunrise on the 19th September the force moved
off, and about 9.30 came up to Kerma fort, to find it
evacuated. It was a thick loop-holed mud wall, with
embrasures for guns, and an inner fort. It commanded
an excellent field of fire, and would have necessitated
some loss to troops capturing it, but the gunboats could
have knocked it about a lot. Passing the fort, the force
went on till Kerma village was reached, and there halted

Army

D/ACAA/t S I

6o SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

just opposite Hafir. The gunboats were steamiug aloug
side, and as they came opposite Hafir puffs of smoke
and the report of guns revealed the Dervish position
on the other bank. It was an excellent position. The
navigable channel of the river at this point is not very
wide, and to get through the gunboats would have to
pass close by the Derv^ish position. As soon as the gun-
boats saw the Der\-ishes they steamed up and engaged
them. The Dervishes were occupying some excellently
placed low trenches connecting six earth gun emplace-
ments. Several Der\ashes could also be seen firing from
the tops of the palm-trees, from which they were soon
dislodged by the maxims, and if they were not killed by
the bullets, they certainly must have been by their fall
to the ground. Behind in the desert could be seen about
three thousand Dervish horse and foot, waiting out of range
of the gunboats to fall on any force that attempted to
cross the river. It looked a very stiff nut to crack. The
gunboats were having a pretty warm time. They are
provided with steel plates, w^liich protect the greater part
of the boat from rifle fire ; but people w^alking about from
one part of the boat to the other are exposed, and of course
the boats w^ere not proof against shell fire. They seemed
tremendous big targets for the Dervishes to hit, but not
more than four or five shells hit them the ^ whole day,
and fortunately they did no harm. One shell passed
right througli the magazine of a gunboat, but did not
explode, and did not touch any ammunition. After the
bombardment had proceeded about half-an-hour Com-
mander Colville was hit in the wTist ; for the moment
he was somewhat overcome, and the native reis in the

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 61

conning-tower with liim, who did not relish his position
at all, thought it an excellent opportunity to turn his boat
round and retreat. These boats turn very easily, and before
Commander Colville realized what the reis was doing he
had whisked the boat round and was going down stream.
The Dervishes were so elated at this that they jumped
up on to the parapet and brandished their rifles, but
speedily took shelter again when the two other gunboats
stood in a bit closer and let fly their maxims. Com-
mander Colville soon made the native reis bring up
the gunboat again, and so the bombardment proceeded.
After another hour, Commander Colville drew off" the
boats, and steaming back to the force reported that he
could not make much impression, and asked that they
might be assisted by the artiUery from the east bank.
All the artillery and the British maxim battery accord-
ingly took up their position opposite Hafir, and com-
menced to bombard with some effect. The Dervishes
replied to them with rifle fire, but their gun fire did not
reach. The gunboats again went up and continued
bombarding. While this was going on, the officers of
the land force were watching the proceedings through
their glasses, and arguing as to the right way of taking
the position. " My dear sir, what we ought to do
now is all to get in boats, scoot across, and wipe 'em
out."

" Rot, my good man ; we should be as thick as flies on
the boats, and they'd pot us all before we get across.
What we ought to do is to send half the force up stream
and half down, and that would divide that mobile
force of theirs, and then we would cross simultaneously.

62 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

come round behind them, and unite in mopping them
up.

" Not a bit of it, my dear sir ; we ought to leave a
small force to make a feint at crossing here, and send
the whole lot to cross at Argo Island," etc. etc.

But the Sirdar had a plan by which he was going to
get the position without losing a man of his land force.
The Dervish, like every one else, hates to know that
there is a force behind him doing goodness knows what ;
also he thinks that every one is like himself, and will
ill-treat his women-kind if they are captured, conse-
quently if he knows a force is behind him, he will leave
any position to see what that force is doing. About
12.30 the Sirdar, having thoroughly pounded their
position, ordered the gunboats to run past it and pro-
ceed to Dongola. The gunboats had a very hot time
passing the position, the Dervishes redoubling their
efforts, and subsequent examination showed that hardly
a square inch of the gunboats had escaped being hit.
However, the shells mostly missed them, and they all
got safely by with a loss of twenty-one killed and
wounded, and proceeded to Dongola. This manoeuvre
at first appeared to have no effect, and the Dervishes
still replied briskly to our artillery. We afterwards
heard that about half-past one a piece of shell wounded
the Dervish commander. Wad Bishara, in the head. This
was a most fortunate occurrence, as he was a first-class
man, and indeed he had taken up a splendid position,
and altogether showed more generalship than any
other Dervish commander that we subsequently met.
Although wounded, he tried to make his men stick to

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 63

the position, but they insisted on going back to Dongola
to protect their wives and property from the gunboats ;
accordingly during the night, unknown to us, they
inarched away to Dongola, leaving behind several boats
containing grain, and a small steamer which had been
sunk in shallow water in the bombardment. The next
morning one awoke with some curiosity. We knew it
had been decided that if the Dervishes still occupied
their position we were to cross and turn them out, which
would mean stiff fighting. The news soon spread that
the place was evacuated, and we got orders to get on to
steamers and boats and cross, as Dongola lies on the
west bank.

Every one, when they reached the other bank, was
much interested in the Dervish position, of which
Diagram III. is a sketch. In the trenches could be seen
each man's little pile of empty cartridge cases, a handful
of dates, and here and there a half-eaten sheep or goat.
The trenches were very cunningly made, with neat
loopholes, so well made, in fact, that they had been
little damaged by the bombardment ; on the other hand,
the gun emplacements were ver}^ inferior, and had been
much knocked about. The natives of the \411age said
that few Dervishes had been killed, but confirmed the
report of Wad Bishara's wound.

During the whole of the 20th all through the night,
and till 1 p.m. on the 21st, the steamers and boats were
crossing the troops, transport animals, and supplies.
The gunboats returned, and reported that they had
found Dongola devoid of any garrison, but they had
seen the whole Dervish force marching from Hafir to

64 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

garrison Dongola, and reported them to be about five
thousand. They had recently been reinforced by seven
hundred Sudanese from Omdurman. At 5 p.m. on the
21st the force started to march the thirty-five miles
which lay between them and Dongola. Marching was
continued till midnight, a halt till 4 a.m., then marched
again till 9.30 a.m., halt during the heat of the day,
march again from 4 p.m. till midnight ; starting again
at 4 a.m. on the 23rd we arrived about 8.30 at a place
which was believed to be within about six miles of
Dongola. It was a perfect position if they chose to
attack us. Here a halt was made for the whole day
to rest the troops, before what was expected to be a
hard fight the next day. Double rations were issued.
• The Intelligence Department were in communication
with spies in Dongola. The gunboats were bombarding
the place. The Dervishes replied pluckily to the gun-
boats. Time and again their little brass guns were
knocked over, but they always put them up and
managed to keep them going. The land force were
rather sore at the gunboats having all the fun, and
I think an oflficer expressed the opinion of all when
he said, " Damn those gunboats, why can't they shut
up? they will fiighten them all away."

Soon after we had bivouacked we were all surprised
by the arrival of the gunboat whose cylinder had burst
at Kosheh. Colonel Cochrane, commanding line of
communications, had managed to get the cylinder of
another similar gunboat, also under construction, put
into the place of the damaged cylinder, and he now
turned up triumphant on the boat. Next day the gun-

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 65

boat did good service in bombarding Dongola. The
deck nearly gave way when they fixed the 12-pounder,
but they shored it up with telegraph poles and con-
tinued firing.

In the afternoon the Sirdar assembled the Brigadiers,
and informed them he intended to attack Dongola the

nest day, that the enemy were about five thousand
strong, that their riflemen were posted behind the
fortifications of the town, and that all their spearmen
and cavalry would be on the ridge to the west of the
town, from which they intended to hurl themselves on
our flank. Lewis's Brigade supported by David's was
to attack the town. MacDonald's, supported by Max-
well's, would attack the ridge. The North Staffordshire

66 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

and maxims would be in the centre, the cavalry, camel
corps, and horse artillery on the right flank. It was
in this order that the force moved off at 5 a.m. the
following morning. As the ground the whole way to
Dongola was perfectly open, we were able to march
with a front of two brigades and the Staffords in line,
with the cavalry and camel corps on the right, and
though many men had seen bigger forces, all agreed
that one could not see a finer sight than when, with
Dongola in the foreground, this force was marching on
a broad front in perfect formation as if at a review to
attack the place. The distance to Dongola was much
further than had been anticipated. We expected to
reach the place at 9 a.m., but at 10 a.m. we had
not sighted it. About this time the cavalry scouts
reported that they had found the enemy in position as
expected, about two thousand on the ridge, remainder
in the town, and soon we were all able to see the enemy
on a ridge about two thousand yards off. On the
plain in front of them was a body of cavalry manoeu-
vring with such precision that we thought at first they
must be ours, until a glance to our flank showed that
our cavalry was still there. The Intelligence Depart-
ment had that morning published the fact that the
Dervishes had held a council of war the previous night,
at which they had determined to fight, and now when
they began firing their brass guns, it looked as if we
were going to have a run for our money. Our cavalry
and camel corps were now told to work round the
Dervish flank, while MacDonald's Brigade was ordered
to attack the ridge in front. Lewis's Brigade was to

[y.

Ui

I'

^l^fwmdl^

" ■ ■ ■ ^ 1

Jinrhm riMiles

- (Appro 5) ^

68 SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899

advance on the town, supported by David's, while
Maxwell's was to fill the gap between MacDonald
and Lewis. No sooner had our cavalry started off than
the Dervishes on the ridge disappeared from view. This
looked rather like a bolt, but it might be that the
Dervishes had retired a few hundred yards from the edge
of the ridge, and were ambushed in a hollow. Accord-
ingly MacDonald halted at the foot of a ridge, and sent
a staff officer up to see what was on top. He returned
to say that the Dervish infantry were not visible, the
Dervish cavalry were about five hundred yards off retir-
ing steadily before our cavalry. Just then the horse
artillery began to open fire, and MacDonald continued
advancing with mounted officers scouting in front, as
there were numerous small valleys sufficient to hide a
large force. Meanwhile the remainder of the force was
advancing on the town preceded by the Sirdar and
staff, the cavalry were following up the retreating
Dervishes, and the horse artillery, accompanying them,
could be heard firing. Some of the Dervish cavalry
turned at bay to cover the retreat and charged
towards our cavalry. Captain Adams's squadron charged
to meet them. Just as Captain Adams was within a
few lengths of the leading emir, Adams's horse fell,
throwing him to the ground. The emir galloped over
him, slashing at him with his sword, but missed him.
The Egyptian squadron defeated the Dervish one, and
continued the pursuit. It soon became patent to all
that we were not going to get a fight. The town was
found to be empty. Several of the Sirdar's staff
remonstrated with him for riding right ahead of every

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1B96— 1899 69

one. It was quite possible that one or two fanatics
might be lurking behind, who could easily distinguish
Tiim by his flag, but he continued to ride in front. It
was now about mid-day, and since the prospect of a
fight had faded, the long march of seven hours began
to be feit. The men had finished their water-bottles

i J

^*^SI

and were very thirsty, but we had to march on past the
town, which seemed as if it was never going to end.
We finally halted on the south side of it. To reach
the proper river bank, we had to cross an overflow from
the Nile, which was about a foot deep with stagnant
water. Several of the Staff'ordshire drank from this
while crossing, and eousequently suffered severely from
enteric fever about a fortnight later. About an hour

70 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

after we had reached our bivouac, we were all surprised
to see the cavalry returning. I never heard what was
the reason for so short a pursuit, doubtless there were
excellent ones, but it caused a good deal of surprise at
the time. It made no difference, however, to the
Dervish losses. They knew it would be impossible to
retreat along the river as the gunboats would prevent
it, so the whole Dervish force, bolting in a disorganized
rabble, had struck into the desert to try and reach
Khartum by a desert route which is used by caravans.
The wells, however, were not suflficient to supply so
many, several did not know the road, so very few ever
reached Omdurman. They were afterwards found lying
dead in the desert in groups of fifty and a hundred.
In many cases, one could see holes dug in the sand
with their hands in the vain endeavour to get water. So
hurried had been their flight, that mothers with babes
in arms had dropped them, and the cavalry and horse
artillery came back laden with black and brown babies.
They had also made a much more useful capture in
the shape of seven hundred Sudanese riflemen, better
known as " blacks." These, finding themselves deserted,
had surrendered. Four hundred of the best of them were
promptly enlisted in the Egyptian army, and sent to
Haifa to be trained. The remaining three hundred not
being considered physically fit, were sent to work with
the railway battalion. Dongola was not exactly the place
one would choose to live in. It is barely above water
at high Nile, so that we found the whole place saturated
and full of every sort of fly. The old fortifications of
the town were in very fair order. There were no

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 ^\

valuables, but a good many curiosities, such as shirts of
mail, war drums, etc. One officer was lucky enough
to get a genuine Crusader's sword with an English
crest and Latin motto engraved on it. The gunboats
took additional troops on board, and without resistance
went right up to Debbeh, Korti, and Merowi, which
were quite empty. MacDonald's Brigade soon left
Dongola to garrison these places. Merowi is nearly the
limit of the navigable stretch of Nile in this part. At
Kassinger, eighteen miles from Merowi, begins the
Fourth Cataract, which blocks navigation for one
hundred and thirty-five miles to Abu Hamed. Between
Merowi and Omdurman lies the Bayuda Desert, so at
present we were at the end of our tether. Some
people at home began to ask why we did not imme-
diately continue to advance. The Sirdar was as keen
and determined to advance as any one, but on quite
a difierent plan, which necessitated a good many days
of hard work before the next advance began.

Thus the first phase of the campaign was over. It
was by far the stifiest bit of work of the whole three
years. The exceptional heat and rains, and the cholera,
added to the fact that the war machine was being to a
great extent freshly organized, and started on its work
while money was short; all these considerations made
the Dongola Expedition harder work than the sub-
sequent phases of the campaign, when everybody was
thoroughly trained, and knew their work, and when the
heat, though bad, was not unprecedentedly so.

CHAPTER VI

When an expedition reaches its goal, and the strain
of urgency is removed, a reaction sets in. Small in-
dispositions that one does not notice while struggling
to reach the goal begin to make themselves felt. One
notices that one has run down considerably in health
and energy. Six months of hot weather in a tent or
hut or without any shelter, with indifferent food, with
frequent calls on one for exceptional spm-ts of hard work,
take it out of fellows ; so that when the objects of the
expedition had been attained, fellows began to speculate
on the chance of leave. Although it was confidently
expected that an advance to Khartum would ultimately
take place, it hardly seemed at this time within the
scope of *' practical politics ; " it was in the dim future,
and was something one must take care to be in, but in
the meantime why not a little leave instead of stewing
in a grass hut at some ruined, steaming, fly-blown place
on the Nile, watching the men building mud huts, which
certainly would be cooler, but not very enticing to a
man who is feeling run down ? Another effect of the
reaction is that one notices how beastly the food is, how

monotonous and dreary the country, how hard it is to

72

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 73

amuse oneself; one longs for the sight of fresh green
vegetables, fresh butter, to find that one's things are
not smothered in sand, to get out of sight and smell
of a camel, to see a real green field ; or with the many
who are living entirely or almost by themselves on the
long line of communications, there is a strong desire to
walk into a mess again and hear several fellows chaffing
one another, to go to a theatre where one will forget
ammunition, equipment, camels, water supply, food
arrangements, boats, railways, angareebs, natives, drill,
baggage, etc. , etc. The Sudan campaigners had to stand
this test of discipline and endurance a good deal during
the three years' campaign. As I stated before, and as
the Sirdar said in his speech to the troops at Cairo, these
times of waiting and working in monotonous uncomfort-
able places are far the greatest tests of discipline and
soldierly qualities that troops have to undergo.

Although every one was hoping for leave, it could not
be granted. The intelligence from Omdurman was that
the Khalifa was very angry at the loss of Dongola, and
was planning an attack in force, so all had to remain on
the frontier. In a few special cases leave for one month
to Cairo was granted. Fortunately the tribes in the
Bayuda Desert had come over to our side and were
holding all the wells for us, backed up by the camel
corps, who had hard work for many months to come
patrolling the Bayuda Desert, to watch and inspire
confidence in the friendlies.

The next few months, although there appeared to be
little of importance going on, were nevertheless the time
during which the foundations of a great deal of the after

74 SUDAN CAMPAIQN, 1896— 1899

success of the campaign was being laid. There was not
the same urgency and strain, so there was time for
instruction, and all departments profited by it. The
transport, although still working on the portages, had
their education thoroughly completed in care of saddles
and camels, loading and unloading baggage quickly, and,
in the manner most convenient to the camel, turning
out prepared in every detail at the shortest notice and
punctual to the moment, and in a hundred and one other
dodges, small in themselves, but essential to a perfect
transport corps, which means untold advantage to the
health and comfort of a force. The transport camps
quickly arranged would nevertheless have done credit
to a crack cavalry regiment for neatness and comfort
of man and beast. The same could hardly be said of
their clothes, but here again their practical common-
sense was shown. Many had cut holes in the corners
of corn-sacks to put their arms through, others had cut
holes to put their legs through, and either way it made
a most serviceable coat. They patched their clothes
with anything they could get, and it was not uncommon
to see a man wearing trousers of which the right leg was
blue, the left khaki, and the seat a bit of a corn-sack.
When the transport requisitioned for clothes they were
given the cast-off clothes of the railway battalion.
When the railway battalion requisitioned for clothes
they were given the cast-off clothes of the transport
to patch their garments with, and no man's trousers
were condemned unless both knees and the seat were
gone.

While the transport was being perfected in their

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 75

duties, an even more important improvement was taking
place in the railway battalion. The railway was being
extended one hundred miles further from Kosheh to the
head of the Third Cataract at Kerma, so that Dongola
might then be connected by alternate rail and steamer
with Cairo, and be independent of camel transport. The
railway also was profiting by the fact that there was not
so much need now of excessive hurry, and Lieutenant
Blakeney, R.R, was teaching them not only to lay a
track quickly but in first-rate style. The result was
that the rail-head party was soon organized in such
a way, that they could with ease and comfort lay two
miles of first-rate track in a day. The advantage of this
training was incalculable when the big desert line was
made later on.

Two more gunboats which had been ordered at the
commencement of the campaign were run up by rail in
sections and put together. The one which had been so
hastily put together was thoroughly overhauled, and all
these three boats afterwards proved first-rate.

The " blacks " captured at Dongola were going through
recruits' drill and musketry at Haifa under the super-
vision of Captain Fergusson, so as to form the nucleus of
a new Sudanese battalion which was being raised. Two
more Egyptian battalions, two more Egyptian squadrons,
and one more battery were being recruited -and trained
in Cairo.

The Sirdar meanwhile had made his plan, and was busy
arranging for the next and most important part of the
campaign. He argued that the only way for a big force
to advance was by the Nile, that to supply that big force

76 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

there must be a railway going by the shortest route, no
matter how many miles of desert it might have to cross,
that the key of the Sudan was Berber, that the key of
Berber was Abu Hamed. The key of the Sudan would
not require anything like so big a force to take it that
the stronghold itself at Omdurman would require, con-
sequently the key might easily be captured, the line of
communication to it perfected, and then no matter how
big a force was required to capture the stronghold, that
force could then with ease be brought up and supplied,
and not only that, but when it reached the stronghold it
could continue to operate right on to the confines of the
Sudan. On the other hand, to try to send a big force at
once across the Bayuda Desert to Omdurman was a
gambler's throw, and if successful, the uncertain line
of communication would necessitate the immediate re-
duction of the force, so that it could not reap the full
fruits of its victory, and would be living from hand to
mouth for many months, Avhile the line of communications
was being improved.

Arguing thus, he decided entirely on his own responsi-
bility, contrary to the opinion of eminent engineers and
of many who knew Egjrpt and the Sudan well, to make
a railway over two hundred and thirty-five miles of
absolutely unmapped and waterless desert from Haifa
to Abu Hamed, which was garrisoned by the Dervishes.
To appreciate ^the boldness of this scheme, it must be
borne in mind, first, that when the Sirdar decided on it,
no one knew anything of the desert between Murat
Wells and Abu Hamed. Very few Europeans had
ever crossed it, and they had made no maps. All the

13'.

s

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 77

information to be got from them was that it was very
hilly and bad for a railway. The caravan route from
Murat Wells to Abu Hamed was roughly mapped, but
no survey of the slightest use to a railway had ever been
made, consequently it was not known what difficulties
might be encountered. The country between Korosko
and Murat Wells was well mapped, and known to be
difficult for a railway. Secondly, it must be borne in
mind that the only wells in this desert were Murat
Wells; none existed between Wady Haifa and Abu
Hamed, where the railway was to be made ; also it was
known that Said Pasha had formerly made determined
attempts to find water in this desert, causing wells two
hundred to three hundred feet deep to be sunk in several
places, but without success. This lack of water would
be a great impediment to the railway. If none were
found it would mean that engines would have to run
two hundred and thirty-four miles out and two hundred
and thirty-four back without water, before the line
reached the other end. This meant that every engine
would have to draw about fourteen truciks, carrying
fomrteen fifteen-hundred-gallon tanks of water for
its own consumption, thus greatly reducing the
number of trucks available for railway material,
and so retarding the progress of the line. Again, such a
distance is a tremendous long run for an engine, and an
engine breaking down and blocking a line on Avhich three
thousand men are depending for their water is a serious
matter. The water supply of the construction party
was another consideration. Supposing the line to be
easy, three thousand men would be required at rail-head.

78 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

if there was heavy work more would be required.
Every man must be allowed three gallons a day, so that
nine thousand gallons is the minimum that must go by
train daily to rail-head ; six more trucks daily carrying
nothing but water instead of railway material. If a
serious accident happened on the line, if floods came
or anything caused it to be blocked for forty-eight hours,
the rail-head party would die of thirst.

Fortunately the Sirdar was not to be deterred by any
of these considerations, and decided to take all the risks
and make the line. He knew that he had the right man
to plan and execute it in Lieutenant Girouard, R.E.,
who had already overcome all difficulties on the Dongola
line, and created an excellent railway constructing
machine out of w^hat at first seemed most unpromising
material.

Engineer officers were therefore sent out to explore
the desert and find out the best route for the railway.
As Abu Hamed was stiU held by the Dervishes the line
could not be completely reconnoitred, but Lieutenant
Cator, R.E. (who died three weeks later), accompanied
by the Ababdeh Arabs, rode as close as possible, and
from this and several other Engineer officers' reports,
it was found that whereas the country between Korosko
and Abu Hamed was extremely difficult for a railway,
there appeared to be an extraordinarily convenient belt
of easy country between Wady Haifa and Abu Hamed.
Though the country rose to a good height, it appeared
to be a fairly gradual ascent. The descent into Abu
Hamed was believed to be difficult but could not be
examined, and had to be left to the future. Another

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 79

result of the Engineer oflScera' reports was that wells
were suuk in two places in the desert, which seemed
to be the only places where water could possibly be
found. It was a foriom hope, nothing was expected
of it. No one could hope to find water in a dreary
waste, in which not even a bush six inches high grows

for a hundred milea One or two patches of dwarfed
thorn bushes were to be found in a few places in the
desert, separated by several miles. Nevertheless at both
the places which were tried, water in abundance was
found at a depth of seventy feet, and at distances of
seventy-seven and one hundred and twenty-six miles
from Wady Haifa. The importance of this in expediting
the construction of the line will be readily understood.

So SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

After the success at these two wells, several more were
dug in other parts of the desert, but in every case
without success.

One of the features of campaigning in the Sudan
is camel reconnaissance. As stated before, the camel
corps were busy patrolling the Bayuda Desert, Engineer
officers were reconnoitring the Nubian Desert, and Staff
and other officers are constantly finding themselves
doing long camel rides. Since this is the case, it will
perhaps not be out of place if I give a description of
a long desert camel ride. Let the reader imagine that
with myself he has been told off to ride from Haifa
to Murat Wells to inspect the fort there, and then to
make a detour to see if any rain-water has been caught
in the rock basins, which are known to exist in a few
places in the desert, and which occasionally furnish
water which might be used by raiding Dervishes.

First of all, what time of year is it ? This is an
important matter. If it is winter it will be bitterly
cold sleeping out at night. It will be beautifully fresh
and invigorating between sunrise and 10.30 a.m., rather
unpleasantly hot but still bearable till 3.30 p.m., and
then cool and pleasant till sunset starts one shivering
again. If it is summer — well, let us suppose it is
summer ; then we have got a very unpleasant experi-
ence before us, but we must make our preparations.
We are each possessed of two camels, a riding one and
a baggage one, both bred in the desert and bought from
desert Arabs. There are camels and camels. Nothing
is more ungainly than the Lower Egypt big lumbering
camel ; on the other hand, one cannot see a finer sight

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1S96— 1899 81

tlian a good desert "liadjin" or riding camol, with a
well-turned-out Arab sheikh on its back. TaH, with
a fine short-haired white coat, its small head held well
up, clean long legs, large well-shaped hump, keeping
its head up and not stretched down when it trots ; on
its back a clear-eyed, copper- eolourotl, good-looking

Arab, dressed in white with rod leather boots coming
above his knees, round his waist a coloured sash siiow-
ing off his spare but well-knit figure, on his head a
ueatly-wound coloured turban, on his left arm in an
ornamentid leather and crocodile skin case a silver-
handled dagger, in his bolt a revolver, slung on the
side of his saddle a ailvcr-hilted straight sword in a

82 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

scabbard of ornamental red leather with silver tip, also
a round rhinoceros-hide shield, behind his saddle a
rifle. The saddle itself is a cup-shaped *' macloufa" with
pommel in front and behind. It is covered with rod
leather, the pommels being ornamented in various ways ;
it is almost hidden by a long, double, w^hite sheepskin
hanging well down on either side over a pair of fine
"hoorgs." The whole makes up a picture which cannot
be surpassed even by a fine rider on a well-bred horse,
especially if one sees it in the desert a hundred miles
from anywhere. We are then each possessed of a good
riding camel and also of a w^ell-bred baggage camel,
almost a " hadjin," but not quite. This will not be
enough, because we must load them light as we want
to travel fast and keep our baggage with us. We
therefore borrow^ another or get it from the transport.
We will take one servant to cook for us and one camel
boy, who will ride one baggage camel and lead another,
and with the assistance of the Arab guide will feed and
look after all the camels when we halt. Now, as to the
loads. We must carry three days' water for our two
selves and two servants, the guide looks after himself
This means two gallons per man per day : that is,
twenty-four gallons for three days. We will therefore
fill four or five waterskins according to their size. If w^e
were not going to Murat Wells we would carry it in two
fantasses and one waterskin. The fantasses (water tanks)
do not leak like a skin, but the Murat water corrodes
them, and a drink of Murat water w^hich has been two
days in a fantass and one day in a waterskin is about
as nastv in colour and taste as one can imaojine.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 85

We must next pack up twelve days' food and liquor
for ourselves. This will go into two lime-juice boxes
about two feet square by six inches deep and into a pair
of hoorgs (big leather bags thrown across a camel and
hanging one on each side). On one side of the hoorg
we put enough food for three days, so as not to unpack
the boxes every halt ; in the other bag of the hoorg go
sauce-pan, frying-pan, kettle, iron teapot, four iron cups,
four knives, four forks, four spoons, and, so as to make
the weight equal, a bottle of whisky, bottle of claret,
bottle of lime juice, and tin of milk. The next thing to
be thought of is forage for the camels, 10 lbs. of doura
per camel per day. We must carry three days' forage,
so that means 150 lbs. of doura. Don't forget firewood,
as not a stick shall we find to light our camp fire.

Next we make up two small rolls of bedding each,
two blankets and a pillow (sounds luxurious, but it is
almost a necessity, it makes so much difference). Inside
the bedding rolls arc a few clothes. Each roll of bedding
is about two feet six inches long and fifteen inches in
diameter. They go one each side of our macloufas under
the seat against the panel, then put a blanket over the
seat of the macloufa, on top of that a " furoa'' (sheepskin).
On the back pommel sling sword and revolver, so that
revolver does not touch the camel or it will gall it,
also a full canvas water-bottle and haversack with odds
and ends; see that nothing except the sword scabbard
touches the camel; anything that does will gall him.
Your own camel is now ready, lightly loaded as he
should be. The servant's camel will have the hoorgs
containing food and cooking pots, while hanging on

86 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

each side so as to balance will be a half-full waterskin
(full ones would make load too much). The camel boy
rides on top of the camel carrying forage, and leads a
camel carrying the water and firewood. These last two
camels are heavily loaded at present, but they are fresh
now, and their loads of water and forage will rapidly
diminish. We will start in the afternoon; the pre-
parations and loading up for a long journey cannot be
hurried, however one may try. Once one gets into the
desert one's Arab guide and the servants will load up
and start off in a very short time, but they will dawdle
over the first start; consequently, if we tried to start
in the morning we should not get off till it was getting
hot. So we order the start to be made at 3 p.m.,
and at 4 p.m. everything is ready. The camels were
watered at ten o'clock in the morning, and are now
loaded ready for us. Directly a camel feels one's
weight coming on him he jumps up like an earthquake,
so a good dodge for mounting is to catch hold of the
back pommel, bend one's knee and put the crook of it
on the near front corner of the saddle ; supposing the
camel jumps up when one has done only that, it does
not throw one. With the right hand on the rear
pommel and one's knee crooked over the corner of the
saddle one is perfectly secure, and can slide into the
seat with ease at one's leisure. The novice, on the
other hand, puts his right leg right over the saddle,
the camel jumps up and throws him backwards.

However, at length we are off. Just before we start
we are told to go and see on our way if the Arabs have
left water as directed at the place to which a well-

SUDAN CA.\fPAIGN, 1896—1899

87

digging pnrty is to be sent for the railway. Tliis means
a bit of a detour, so we do not follow the ordinary
track. About 5 p.m. it begins to cool. Both our
camel-s and ourselves are fresh, and it is very pleasant
to be swinging along in the open desert. Going into
the desert one gets the same feeling of independence
and freedom from worry which one gets on board ship.

For three days, at any rate, no letters or telegrams
can reach one. One is alone with natnre like the most
veritable savage. The camel is undoubtedly the animal
for long journeys. The only tiling against him is that
his pace is not quite fast enough, so one has to ride
many hours in order to cover a long distance. Good
riding camels, such as I assume we are on, can go
flcven miles an hour, but they cannot keep it up for

88 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

one hundred and fifteen miles, so as that is to be our
journey we cannot go more than four to four and a half
miles an hour. We ought to do thirty-five miles a day,
so we must ride about nine hours daily, and what with
short halts and occasionally walking, it means being in
the saddle at least ten hours a day. Having left at
4 p.m. we halt at 7 p.m., the camels' customary feed-
ing time. As we are not to be halted long the saddles
are not taken off, only the loads. In front of each
camel is spread a sack, and on that his feed of doura
is placed ; if you do not put a sack under it he will
not touch it. In a few minutes one's servant has lit
a fire, and soon produces a meal consisting of soup, a
tin of Indian curry, biscuits and jam. At 8.30 p.m.
we are off again. Not very good for the digestion, ])ut
that is a detail we don't consider in the Sudan, and
we ride till 11 p.m. For tliis part of the journey we
are dependent on the guide ; during the day we can
find our way about the desert, especially if we have
ridden it before, but at night it is very difficult with-
out taking a lot of trouble to constantly watch one's
compass, so it is better to follow the guide, who is going
by the stars and does it with ease, chatting away mean-
while. The Arabs have names for all the constellations
though they group them in a different way. They have
a certain amount of practical knowledge of astronomy,
and know when to expect certain stars, etc. At 11 p.m.
we halt and lay our sheepskin and blankets on the
sand, but first make a hole for your hip and dig the
sand to make it soft. These two operations make alt
the difference to one's comfort. This is the best part

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1B99 89

of a desert ride. One is pleasantly tired, the air is
beautifully fresli and cool after tlie burning day, not
a vestige of a cloud, so all the stars are twinkling
overhead through the clear atmosphere like myriads
of diamonds set in a lovely blue. Absolute stillness
and a sense of boundless space and freedom have a

soothing effect and one dro]>s off to sleep. A hand
on one's shoulder wakes one to see the Arab bending
over one. He knows the value of travelling while it
is cool. It seems to be still night, hut over in the East
there is just a suspicion of dimness about tlie stara.
While the camel.'i are being fed and we are rolling up
our bedding the servant makes some cocoa, which is

-90 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

very refreshing. One doesn't feel inclined to eat, but
swallows some biscuit so as to have something to start
on. By the time everything is ready it is almost light,
and half-an-hour after the start the sun appears and
we swear at him as he rises. As I said before, it is the
middle of summer, so that very soon aft^r the suns
-jippearance he makes himself felt. Being still low on
the horizon it glances up off the sand, and seems to get
under one's helmet; however, it is not yet really hot,
so we chat away with one another and with the guide.
We are not likely to come on any camel tracks here,
but if w^e did he would tell you when the camels passed,
last night or this morning or the day before yesterday,
whose camels they were, and the pace they w-ere travel-
ling. The latter is quite easy. One can very soon
notice the different patterns made by a camel's feet on
the sand when w^alking, jogging or trotting out, but it
always beat me how an Arab could tell the freshness
of the tracks within an hour, and the way in Avhieh they
knew the shape of footmark of half the riding camels in
the Sudan.

Presently we come upon some pieces of ostrich eggs,
some of them about five inches across. They are varied
in colour from mauve to yellow. The Arab tells us
how long ago there used to be almost yearly rains in
this desert, so that a certain amount of rough grass grew
in it, and the ostriches used to breed and feed here, but
now there is not a blade of grass and the ostriches have
all gone south. As I said before, we are not riding on
the ordinary camel track, and we have now got into
quite the orthodox desert — simply a vast extent of sand.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 91

Hills are just visible on each side dodging up and down
in the mirage, but in front there is nothing hardly to be
seen except a few faint hill-tops. The guide is directing
his course on one of them. We dip down into a hollow,
the hill-top is lost to view, and nothing is on the
horizon to steer by, but half-an-hour afterwards we
reach the crest of a slope and find that we are marching
exactly on the same hill-top ; the guide has not swerved
an atom. About nine o^clock one begins to want
breakfast, but a halt must not be made for another two
hours at least. If we were to halt for breakfast we
should not be ready to start again till almost eleven, and
then it would be too hot, so we munch a biscuit and
jog steadily on, while the heat gets steadily worse, the
glare of the sand seems to burn the eyes and the shim-
mering of the mirage tires them ; conversation flags,
and from now till four o'clock in the afternoon one
exists in a miserable state of hot monotony. Soon after
eleven it is evident that the camels are feeling the heat,
so we must halt. As far as we are concerned the halt
is no rest ; it would be better to be riding through the
heat of the day instead of sitting still grilling in the sun,
but we have to consider the camels, and one of the first
rules in their care is not to work them between eleven
and three, or better still between ten and four.

The novice thinks it would be good to take his macloufa
off the camel to make a nice seat, but it is a mistake to
sit on it, as it forces the stufling up so that the wood
panel will bear on the camel and gall him. We put our
blankets on the sand, and try to while away time till our
servant produces a hot, repulsive tinned sausage, and

92 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

some tea, biscuit and jam. It is too hot to talk, but we
have brought a small strip of canvas, and a few sticks
with some rope. It seems too small to be of any use,
but it makes all the difference, so we put it up and He
under it. The best thing to do is to read a novel. It
is too hot to sleep, but one tries to, taking good care
that one's helmet is over one's head. The temperature
is anything from 110° to 125° in the shade, if there was
such a thing; slowly the time drags on, till at two
o'clock we sit up to have some soup and some tinned
nastiness. At 2.30 we begin loading up and start
again at three. In an hour's time it appears to be a
little cooler, and w^e begin to emerge from our comatose
state and become human beings once more. Conversa-
tion begins again, and the Arab tells us the names of the
various hills we are now coming to ; also that, near that
distant hill just visible, there are moufflon to be found,
though it is difficult to get near them. They are very
"feliy, and live a hundred miles from the river in the heart
of the desert, feeding on " gush," a grassy plant which
grows here and there in the desert. There are different
kinds of "gush," but there is one kind which contains
a lot of moisture, and camels, gazelle, and moufflon,
when they feed on it, can go without drinking water for
three months. The " gush " requires little rain ; one
shower of rain in the year is enough for it. In the
northern part of the Nubian Desert they get a little
rain every year, so " gush " grows plentifully in the
khors. In the southern and western parts, rain, and
consequently also " gush," is much scarcer.

Presently we notice that the Arab is looking keenly at

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 93

something ahead. " What is that ? " he says, pointing
ahead. We can see nothing, but a desert Arab can see
as well with his eyes as we can with field-glasses ; eager
to satisfy his curiosity he makes his camel break into a
swift trot. He does this without any effort, and it is
impossible to see or describe how he does it. If we
want to quicken our pace we have to use the whip and
drum with our heels, but he glides off instantly with
apparently no effort. He almost disappears from view,
and when we come up with him again we find him
standing in the midst of a number of broken earthen-
ware water-pitchers. The Arab is as astonished as we
are. We are well away from the ordinary camel track,
so he has never seen them before, nor has he heard of
them. They are quite a different shape to any Egyptian
or Arab pot. They are exactly the same shape as
Greek pitchers. Just as this occurs to lis, the Arab
says, " Those do not belong to this country, they are
very, very ancient, they belonged to the Greeks."

The Arabs know all about Alexander's conquest of
the country, and there are many traces of the Greeks,
so perhaps this is another. If so, what do these broken
pitchers mean ? Was there a well here ? Did they
belong to a force that got lost in the desert ? Ask
another.

(In consequence of this discovery some men were
sent to dig at this place, but did not find water.)

Again at 7 p.m. we halt for some dinner and to
feed the camels. While we are waiting for dinner we
hear the splash of water, and looking round see the
servant wasting some precious water by washing the

94 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

plates I This is a most heinous offence. Water in the
desert is more precious than gold and is only used for
drinking. The plates can be thoro.ughly cleaned by
rubbing them in the sand. The same method will,
unfortunately, not do for cleaning ourselves, and it is
very uncomfortable having to spend three hot days and
nights without a wash, and it adds considerably to the
fatigue. The next day passes in the same way as the
first, except that instead of cooling about four o'clock,
it appears to be, if possible, hotter. The air is still and
oppressive. The setting of the sun makes no difference,
and wc pour with perspiration. This means that a
storm is coming. The camels have known it for some
time, and have tried to stop and even turn round. There
is nothing visible to betray the coming of the storm, only
the oppressive heat and the camels- behaviour, but pre-
sently a black cloud can be seen rising rapidly on the hori-
zon, and soon a dense yellow wall is seen to be advancing
in the distance. It is no use trying to go on ; nothing
would persuade the camels to, nor would even the Arab
be able to find his way. We rapidly dismount, the
camels turn their backs to the coming storm, but before
we have half unloaded it is upon us. A positive wall
of sand, through which one cannot see six feet, come&
surging over the desert and strikes one with a rush,
stinging the face and hands. Now for several hours we
shall be enveloped in sand. There is no chance of
dinner, so we bury our heads under a blanket, and with
this protection manage to eat some biscuits without
swallowing much sand. Then we lie down to leeward
of our saddles, wrap ourselves in blankets and go to

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1895- 1899 9f

sleep. When we awake the storm is practically over ;
our eyes, noses, and ears are absolutely full of sand,
also our hair and clothes ; it is caked all over one's skin,
it is everywhere. We have lost some time, so we must
shove along to-day. Another day passes in the same
way, and when we lie down at night w^e are beginning
to feel pretty weary, but the next day ought to take us
into Murat fort.

About ten the next morning one of the camels
begins to go lame. An examination of his feet shows
he has not cut them on a stone — it seems to be some-
where in the thigh ; however, go he must. When the
mid-day halt is made, the Arab gets a piece of rope round
the lame camel's hind-foot ; the camel boy holds his
head while the Arab pulls at the hind-leg with all his
might. After repeating this performance a few times
he rubs it well wath '*sem,'' a sort of inferior cooking
butter, with which one's servant spoils one's food. The
result of this strange treatment is that the camel
goes sound. We must keep an eye on the camels now.
They have been three days without water, and are
making the peculiar gurgling groan they make when the)^
are thirsty. They can smell water a long way off, and if
we do not watch them, they are quite likely to get up
like a flash all together and stampede for the wells, which
are now within about twelve miles. It would be very
unpleasant for us, fatigued as we are, to have to walk
the last twelve miles and arrive without any baggage.
We cut the mid-day halt a bit shorter to-day as we are
keen to get to the wells. We are longing for a bath and
a rest. We shall be able to buy a sheep and have fresh

96 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

meat, also goats' milk, and we can get a native string
bedstead to lie on and a good tent. The thought of
these luxuries makes us urge the camels on. We are
now in the hilly country, riding in a narrow khor, fairiy
sprinkled with gush, between conical-shaped precipitous
hills of black and brown rock. The track twists and
turns, until rounding a comer, we come upon a view
which rewards us for our long ride. At the end of the
rocky gorge, about half-a-mile in front, a high stone
wall connects three or four blockhouses on the rugged
hills. Walking about below, driving in their flocks, are
a number of picturesque Arabs, and in the foreground,
coming to meet us at a spanking trot, is the Arab
sheikh, accompanied by a few followers. I have already
described what a perfect picture he makes, and as he
comes up, he pulls up his camel and swings him round
without an effort, as he leans over to touch hands.
Every bit of the natural savage that is in us rejoices at
our surroundings. Here we are in the heart of the
desert, one hundred and twenty miles from an English-
man, in the midst of the bold, free, picturesque Arabs,
surrounded by desolate yet grand scenery, tinted by the
setting sun with the pink and mauve hues peculiar to
Egypt. We feel that existence here must be a struggle,
and we are exhilarated by the consciousness of our power
to contend with the desert.

We rest ourselves and the camels the whole of the
next day, luxuriating in baths and the other luxuries I
have named, and in the afternoon of the following day
we start off on a detour in the desert, to see if there
is water at one of the places where it is frequently

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 97

found to have been caught in a rock basin. I will not
weary the reader with further descriptions, which would
only be repetition. After two days we return to Murat,
rest another day, and then start back for Haifa, which
seems like a metropolis of luxury when we reach it with
sun-blistered lips and peeling face after our ten days'
trip in the desert.

H

CHAPTER VII

On the 4th May, 1897, the railway which was being
constructed to connect the Dongola province with Haifa
reached its terminus at Kerma, just above the Hannek
cataract, two hundred and three miles from Haifa. The
completion of this line enabled the construction of the
big desert line to forthwith proceed apace. Fifteen
miles of it had already been laid, but now the wliole of
the railway battalion came down off the other line, and
work began on the new one in earnest.

In the meantime there was practically nothing to

break the monotony of life on the frontier at Merowd,

Debbeh, and Korti. On one occasion the Intelligence

Department had received news that the Dervishes at

Abu Hamed were going to ride to Gebel Kuror in the

Nubian Desert, w^here there was a rock water-basin, and

having watered there, they were going to raid the

railway. Captain King immediately took his company

of camel corps out to Gebel Kuror and emptied the

water out of the rock. It was a curious place to find

water in. In order to get it they had to climb up a

small precipice, fill buckets, and let them down with a

rope. But the Dervishes did not carry out their plan,

98

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 99

in fact they probably never intended to. It was, I
think, in June that the cavahy made a reconnaissance
part of the way to Abu Hamed in order to collect
information about the road, cataracts, strength of
Dervishes at Abu Hamed, etc. They reached Essalamat
without seeing any Dervishes, and then turned to come
back. Captaiu Peyton's squadron was doing rear-guard,
and at midday they halted to water the horses. A
picket of ten troopers under an Egyptian subaltern
remained mounted about three hundred yards in rear,
when suddenly round the corner came half-a-dozen
Dervish cavalry, who were much surprised to see the
Egyptians.

The Dervishes turned round and disappeared round
the hill with the Egyptian picket in pursuit. When
they also rounded the hill, they found themselves in
front of about one hundred Dervish cavalry. They
pulled up to turn round, but they probably would not
have escaped if Captain Peyton and the remainder of
his squadron had not at that moment turned up and
charged. The nimibers were about equal, so it was
hammer-and-tongs. Captain Peyton was surrounded
by four or five Dervishes, but they had tackled a man
who had won prizes at the military tournament for
skill at arms, and he speedily despatched three of his
assailants, but a fourth speared him from behind. He
managed to keep his saddle, and his trumpeter came to
his assistance, but he would probably have been killed
if the remaining squadrons had not at that moment come
up and put the Dervishes to flight.

This was the only skirmish which occurred during

loo SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

this period of waiting, though we managed to stir up
the friendly Arabs to raid the Dervish cattle, etc.

At the end of June or beginning of July, the Intelli-
gence Department got news that the Khalifa had decided
to send a big force under his trusty general Mahmud to
occupy that strategic point Metemmeh. This was the
capital of the Jaalin tribe, and they knew what it meant
to have a Dervish army billeted on them. It meant the
robbery of all their property and food. They sent a
deputation to the Khalifa asking him not to send the
army there, and they would be responsible for holding
Metemmeh against the " Turks." The Khalifa was very
angry with them for making this request, and refused
to alter his plan, so the Jaalin decided to throw in their
lot with us and resist Mahmud when he arrived. Two
sheikhs of the Jaalin came over to Merowi and asked
for arms, ammunition, and assistance. It was a ticklish
problem. The whole thing might be a cock-and-bull
story got up to obtain arms and ammunition, and
perhaps entrap a small force at Metemmeh. The
Sirdar decided to send them arms and ammunition, but
not to go to Metemmeh to help them ; if he did so, he
would have to take the whole Egyptian army and a
British brigade, leaving the Dervish garrisons of Abu
Hamed and Berber on his flank and rear, while it would
be impossible to run supplies across the Bayuda Desert
for so big a force. When the British desert column
crossed in 1884 they were only two thousand five
hundred strong, and yet there was the greatest diflSculty
to supply even this small number.

The Sirdar, therefore, ordered six thousand rifles and

linch "ea'JaMile^t

'< ,

/oo/fties

Otfi

Omourm/in

I02 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

a good quantity of ammunition to be sent to them, but
Mahmud had heard that the Jaalin had sent to us for
help, and before the rifles reached them he had swooped
down on Metemmeh.

His first attack was repulsed, but his second was
successful, and six thousand Jaalin men, women, and
children were massacred in the usual Dervish fashion.
Old women were killed, young ones made prisoners.
The remnant of the tribe fled to our post at Jakdul
W ells in the desert, and from tlierc arrived destitute at
Merowi.

At the end of July the desert railway had reached a
point one hundred and fifteen miles from Haifa in
the middle of the desert. It was now nearer to the
Dervish force at Abu Hamed than our most advanced
post on the Nile. The last raised Egyptian battalion
was stationed at rail-head to protect it, but they had
only done about six months' drill, so could hardly be
called seasoned troops.

The Ababdeh Arabs, with their head-quarters at Murat
Wells forty miles off, continually patrolled across the
front of rail-head, about forty miles ahead of it, on the
look-out for tracks of any Dervishes that might be bent
on raiding.

It seemed rather cool cheek making a railway towards
a place which was still in the hands of the enemy, while
the construction party of three thousand men depended
for their water upon a single line of hastily-constructed
railway. Two or three times they had to go on half
and quarter rations of water, drawing on the reserve
which was always kept. On one occasion, when half

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 '©S

rations of water had twice been issued, there was only
one tank left for the next issue when the water train
turned up. The Nile was now rapidly rising, and as
rail-head would soon be dangerously near Abu Hamed,
it became imperative to take that place.

The Ababdeh Arabs under Abd el Azim were ordered
to make a reconnaissance to ascertain the strength of
the place. This they did in a very ingenious way, and
sent in a report that could not have been made better
even by an officer from the Staff College. They did
not ride direct on Abu Hamed, but on a small village
called Abteen, about seven miles below it. As they
approached from the desert they opened out into a long
line, and riding rapidly forward, they drove in front of
them every man they came across, and gradually closing
in they surrounded the place and enclosed in it all its
inhabitants, so that no one could get away to give the
Dervishes warning. They then got hold of the village
sheikh, and having threatened him with every threat
imaginable, they got the most complete and, as it turned
out, the most accurate information of the Dervish
strength and dispositions. They then watered their
camels, and in order to avoid pursuit, they took all the
inhabitants, man, woman, and child, out into the desert
with them, so that they could not send news to the
Dervishes. About six miles out they released them all,
and rode back to Murat Wells.

They reported that there were about four hundred
and fifty Dervish riflemen and fifty cavalry in Abu
Hamed, also about six hundred of the local inhabitants
armed only with spears and clubs, that they could not

I04 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896 -1899

keep a bigger force there on account of the dijQBculty of
supply, but that they expected to get news of our
advance, and then they would be reinforced from
Berber. They intended to fight unless gunboats
attacked them, but their position was quite open on the
river side, and untenable against gunboat attack. They
had made shelter-trenches round the houses w^hich were
right down on the river and overlooked by low hills,
which came close to them. They had one gun, and
their commander was Mohammed Zain, and they
expected us to come when the Nile was nearly high
between 15th and 20th August.

The Sirdar decided to send a small column under
Major-General Hunter to take the place. In order that
this column should not find Abu Hamed strengthened
by reinforcements from Berber, it was essential that its
departure should be kept a secret as long as possible,
also that it should start earlier than the Dervishes
expected, and march rapidly. The country between
Kassinger, our advance post, and Abu Hamed is terribly
bad for marching. There is not even a track, and one
has to climb up and down steep rocky hills.

In order that the force might move rapidly over this
country it must be a small one, and as the Dervish
garrison of Abu Hamed was small, there was no necessity
to send a large force. The column was therefore about
two thousand seven hundred strong, consisting of Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Sudanese Battalions, and the Third
Egyptian, with one mule battery and twenty-five
troopers to scout. Colonel MacDonald commanded the
infantry, and General Hunter was in command of the

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 105

whole. The date of departure and the composition of the
force was kept a profound secret to the very last moment ;
only the Sirdar and Generals Hunter and Rundle knew
it, so that it caused general surprise when, on the Slst
July, quite ten or fifteen days before any one expected
it, the column left Kassinger at short notice. At the
same time the camel corps and friendly Arabs made a
demonstration towards Metemmeh as if we intended to
attack Mahmud.

Four gunboats were also ordered to try and get to
Abu Hamed at the same time as the column, though
it was practically known to be impossible for them to
get through the cataracts in time.

The column which left Kassinger had one hundred
and eighteen miles of bad country in front of it to be
got over as rapidly as possible, in order to reach Abu
Hamed before it was reinforced from Berber.

It was the hottest time of the year, so General
Hunter did most of the marching by night. Although
this is no doubt the best thing to do in hot weather, it
has the drawback of depriving men of their sleep, as
no one can sleep well in the hot day. The result was,
that after two or three days' marching, every one had
the greatest difficulty to keep awake even on the march.
The ground was execrable and the column had to go
in single file, while the transport tailed out for miles ;
nevertheless, the hundred and eighteen miles was accom-
plished in seven and a half days, that is, at the rate of
fifteen and a half miles a day, which, considering the
heat and the country traversed, shows the excellent
marching power of the " Black" and the Egyptian.

io6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

By 2 a.m. on the 7th August, General Hunter s force
was within one and a half miles of Abu Hamed. The
transport was zeribahed on the river, and the whole
force lay down for a short rest, having just completed
sixteen miles.

About 4 a.m. the force moved off, leaving half of the
Third Battalion (Egyptian) as escort to the transport in
a zeriba on the river.

The Ababdeh Arabs with the General had drawn a
map of the place in the sand. (This they can do
excellently.)

General Hunter decided to attack both along the
river-bank from the cast and also from the desert.
About 5 a.m. the force was formed up within about a
quarter of a mile of Abu Hamed, but from the nature
of the ground not a sign of either Dervishes or trenches
could be seen ; the only thing visible was their tall
observation tower made of spars. The general impres-
sion was that the place was empty, and Major Kincaid,
E.E., rode forward to reconnoitre it. As seen from
the map the ground is peculiar. The desert in the
neighbourhood has a general and easy slope to the
river, but when within two hundred yards of the river
bank drops suddenly, so that Abu Hamed lies at the
bottom of a sort of crater. Major Kincaid rode to the
edge of this crater and looked down into the place.
Not a human being could he sec. About eighty yards
off him were some trenches which appeared empty, so
he got out his pocket-book to write a message to the

General. He wrote, '' There is no enem " Bang 1

crash ! wh-t ! wht ! wht ! came the bullets past his

io8 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

ears. A few black heads had popped over the trenches
eighty yards off, and fired a volley and missed him !

Major Kincaid turned about to return with his
information, but was not in time to stop the General
and all the Staff also riding to the edge of the crater.
Bang ! crash ! again this time a larger volley, and at
only eighty yards* range, but, incredible to relate, not
one of the group of mounted officers was hit. The
Staff turned about in double quick time, and the
General ordered the battery to bombard the place.
The infantry were drawn up only two hundred yards
off the trenches, but out of sight. It was expecting
a good deal of troops to ask them to stand idle within
two hundred yards of the enemy for half-an-hour while
the artillery bombarded, so Colonel MacDonald, in order
to keep them employed, dressed the line on markers
as if at a review.

It was curious to see punctilious drill going on within
a stone's throw of the enemy's unseen trenches. The
artillery soon found that the nature of the ground
prevented them from doing more than hit the tops of
the houses, while the Dervishes were lying perfectly
quiet, so they changed their position so as to enfilade
the trenches (see Diagram V.), and came into action
within one hundred yards of them.

StiU the Dervishes held their fire, but even now the
artillery could not depress their guns enough to hit the
majority of trenches, so General Hunter ordered the
infantry to assault.

As soon as our troops reached the edge of the crater
a roar of musketry broke out from the Dervish trenches,

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 109

and a hail of bullets was poured at our men, but
fortunately, as before, most of it went high. Colonel
MacDonald's intention was to rush the place with the
bayonet, but without any word of command, first the
Eleventh and then the other battalions broke into rapid
independent firing, and no one could advance without
getting shot by their own side, so there w^ere our troops
on the sky-line with the enemy shooting at them from
a trench eighty yards off. In the first few seconds
four out of the five mounted officers of the Tenth
Battalion were brought to the ground, two killed and
two with their horses shot; every man of the colour
party was either killed or wounded. It was a most
unpleasant position. Colonel MacDonald immediately
came out in front swearing at the men and knocking
up their rifles. The other officers did the same, and in
a few minutes our firing ceased.

At the same time the Dervishes began to bolt from
the trenches into the houses behind, and our troops
rushed forward to enter the place with them. Then, as
an officer said, " It was like crowding into the pit of a
theatre on a Saturday night." There were narrow open-
ings between the houses, which soon became crammed
with a struggling mass of Dervishes and our troops,
and then it was like Donnybrook fair, " wherever you
see a head hit it."

The black is a splendid chap at house fighting, and
they rapidly worked through the place, though it must
be admitted some of their methods are almost as
dangerous to friend as to foe. Before entering a house
they fire several volleys into it (and as it is mud most
of the bullets come out the other side), then they rush

no SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

in, and if a Dervish comes for them, they stick their
bayonet in and at the same time pull the trigger.
Before turning a corner from one street to another they
reach their rifle round the corner and pull the trigger
on chance, regardless of the fact that there may be
some of their own troops coming up the street. Never-
theless they are Al at clearing an enemy out of a
village. In a twinkling they were all over the place,
on the roofs, through the windows, and in no time had
worked through the place and formed up beyond, firing
volleys at the few flying Dervish cavalry, who were the
only ones to escape.

The local inhabitants, who had been armed only with
spears and clubs, made practically no resistance, and were
all taken prisoners and soon released, but the genuine
Dervishes refused with few exceptions to surrender, and
died fighting. One man, who was an excellent shot,
had hidden in a small house on the river, from which
he picked off" one after another half-a-dozen men who
advanced to dislodge him. Colonel MacDonald, hearing
about it, ordered a gun to be brought up. The gun
fired several rounds through the house, and then one
or two men went forward to fiad the bits of the man
as they expected, but crack went his rifle again and
another man dropped. The gun now reduced the house
to ruins, and this time when they went up there was no
shot fired, but not a trace of the man could be found.
He had probably slipped into the river. Our casualties
were about twenty-five killed and fifty-five wounded,
about eighty in all. It was marvellous that the casualty
list was not bigger considering the amount of ammunition
let off* on both sides. It can probably be explained by

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 in

the fact that the Dervishes were so overwhelmed by our
fire that they could not aim, and what little aim they
did take was bad, owing to the well-known difficulty of
firing up-hill. Two of the best English officers in the
Sudan were, however, killed, Major Sidney and Lieu-
tenant Fitzclarence, both in the Tenth Battalion. This
battalion, by the way, had worse luck than any other
during the whole campaign, 1896 — 1899. Out of the
five English officers in the battalion when the Dongola
Expedition began two were killed, one wounded, one
died of cholera, one was invalided home, and another,
who filled one of the vacancies, died of enteric. It
is true this battalion was in the front line in every
engagement during the three years, but the Ninth and
Eleventh Battalions, which had almost as much fighting,
were very much more lucky.

The Dervish emir Mohammed Zain was found hiding
under a bed. When brought up before General Hunter,
the following conversation took place : —

General H. Why did you fight ? Didn^t you know
it was useless ?

Mohammed Zain. I knew you had only three times
as many men as I had, and every one of my men is
worth four of yours; you could not fire till you were
quite close up, and at that range our rifles were as good
as yours, and any way I have killed a lot of your men.

General H. What will Mahmud do now ? Will he
stay looting and robbing at Metemmeh, or will he come
down here to attack me ?

Mohammad Zain. He will be down here in five days'
time to wipe you out.

CHAPTER VIII

The position of General Hunter s small force at Abu
Hamed was such as to cause a certain amount of
anxiety. The victualling of the place by camels over
one hundred and eighteen miles of atrocious country
was a slow process, and Mahmud with a big force might
be down any day to find the place without sufficient
supplies to stand a ten days' siege till the arrival of a
relieving force, which itself would increase the difficulty
of supply.

Gunboats were badly needed both to strengthen the
garrison and to reconnoitre up the river to find out
the intentions of the Dervishes, but they were ^still
struggling in the cataracts. A quantity of supplies
in boats were being pulled through the cataracts by
a detachment under Captain Doran, but it was a
lengthy process, as the cataracts were very difficult,
and Captain Doran had a tough job in front of him.
For some time, therefore, no reserve of supplies could
be piled up at Abu Hamed, and to add to the difficulty,
a disaster occurred to a big camel convoy that was
crossing from Korosko to Abu Hamed. It occurred
in this way.

112

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 113

About five hundred new camels had been bought in
Lower Egypt, and were being brought up the Nile by
some freshly recruited transport men. When they
reached Korosko, they were ordered to march across the
desert to Abu Hamed with supplies for that place.
Accordingly they started oflF in two convoys. The first,
consisting of two hundred and fifty camels, was under
the command of an Egyptian officer. The remaining
two hundred and fifty started a day later under Lieu-
tenant Mackay of the transport. The camels were
Lower Egyptian ones, unaccustomed to the desert and
to going without water. The men in charge were raw
recruits, equally unaccustomed to the desert and a short
water allowance ; the loads were rather heavy, but as if
this was not enough to contend with, an unusual heat-
wave came on as soon as they had left Korosko.
Occasionally, when there has been no wind for some
time, the desert heats up like an oven, and a breath-
less stifling heat hangs over it. These heat-waves
are well known by the Arabs, and they never attempt
to travel through them. The camels felt the heat
tremendously, and could not be got to travel at the
usual rate. Consequently at the end of the third
day, instead of reaching Murat Wells, the first convoy
under the Egyptian officer was still a long way from
that place.

There was no discipline among the raw recruits, the
convoy got into disorder, and finally stampeded. One
Egyptian subaltern succeeded in collecting a few and
taking them to Gebel Raffat, where there was some rain
water in the rocks. The Egyptian officer in charge

114 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

and a few others reached Murat Wells in an exhausted
state.

In the meantime Lieutenant Mackay was having the
same difficulty with his convoy of two hundred and
fifty. He took four and a half days instead of three to
reach Murat, but he kept order in his convoy, and
forced the camels on. His own camel was too exhausted
to carry him the last sixteen miles, so he had to walk
that distance without any water ; but he brought all his
convoy into Murat Wells, though every man and camel
was absolutely dead beat, and could not have gone five
miles further.

The Arabs at Murat Wells went in search of the
convoy that stampeded, and succeeded in rescuing
several, but eleven men and two hundred camels were
either lost or found dead from thirst. As soon as men
and animals were sufficiently recovered. Lieutenant
Mackay took them into Abu Hamed without further
mishap.

In the meantime the gunboats under Commander
Keppel, II.N., were having a hard time of it in the
cataracts. The usual plan was followed of attaching
ropes on which several hundred men pulled while the
gunboat put on all steam, but at the first bad place the
leading gunboat capsized and was wrecked. A side
current caught it and swung the bows round so that
the rope came across the deck. The men on the rope,
in the hope of saving her, pulled all the harder, whereas
they ought to have let go.

The result was she capsized in a twinkling ; Lieu-
tenant Beatty, RN., in command of her, although a

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 115

good swimmer, was twice sucked under in the eddies,
but the second time he saw a loose telegraph pole, and
catching hold of that he managed to stay on the surface
till he drifted ashore. As the capsized gunboat went
dashing down the cataract, some men on the bank said
they thought they heard some knocking inside her, so
they followed it down until it ran aground, and then
ripped open the bottom plates, and out crawled the
engineer and stoker alive and well. This mishap did
not serve to encourage the other gunboats, but they
managed to negotiate the place safely, and went on in
the same fashion pulling and steaming through the next
hundred miles. One of the reises (native steersmen)
had a most dangerous habit of leaving the tiller and
falling on his knees to pray just at the critical moments,
and Commander Keppel had to instruct him that the
right time to pray was before and after the critical
moment and not exactly when it occurred.

Had only one hundred Dervishes turned up on the
steep hills overlooking the river they could have caused
infinite annoyance and delay, but they were probably
deterred from this by the fact that we held all the wells
in the Bayuda Desert, and the tribes there were friendly
to us.

While General Hunter was waiting at Abu Hamed
for the gunboats, news reached him that the Dervish
Emir Zekki, in command at Berber, was evacuating
that place.

Confirmation of this news also reached Merowi, but
of course it was only rumour and not to be relied on.
However, as soon as the first gunboat reached Abu

Ii6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

Hamed, General Hunter went on board and proceeded
up the river. The Ababdeh Arabs about two hundred
strong, under Ahmet Bey Khalifa, rode along the bank
mounted on fast camels, so that in the event of meeting
a big force of Dervishes they could escape. When the
gunboat was going through the cataract near Umha-
sheya, about thirty miles from Berber, it struck a rock.
The nearest pillow and blankets were stuffed into the
hole to keep the water out. Immediately the accident
occurred three or four fellows rushed to the place with
blankets and pillows, but it was observed that each man
brought somebody else's bedding and not his own.
This mishap caused some delay, and the Ababdeh Arabs
got ahead of the gunboat, and approaching Berber
cautiously, they were told by the natives that the
Dervishes had left. With some trepidation they rode
into the place, and found it was evacuated by the
Dervishes.

It seemed surprising that the Dervishes should have
evacuated so important a place as Berber ; but the
Khalifa probably thought that our main advance was
going to be on Metemmeh, in the same way that the
British desert column advanced in 1884, and that we
had captured Abu Hamed only to protect our flank
and rear.

Arguing thus, he would decide that the big struggle
must be at Metemmeh, and he could not allow Mahmud
to go to reinforce Berber, or we should take Metenmieh.
As he could not reinforce Berber it was no good allowing
the five thousand men there to be destroyed. The
Atbara was in flood, so gunboats could steam right up

a

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111

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41

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V

SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899 119

it, and cut off the escape of the Berber garrison. These
were probably the reasons which induced the Khalifa to
order the evacuation of Berber, so that the Sirdar's
strategy in threatening Metemmeh while he advanced to
Abu Hamed and Berber was successful.

When General Hunter reported that Berber was
evacuated, the Sirdar was confronted with another
problem. There was a certain amount of difficulty in
supplying Abu Hamed, which would be considerably
increased if he advanced one hundred and thirty miles
further to Berber. The force sent there would have
to be small ; if the Dervishes came down to it in
numbers our main body would have to march a long
way to reinforce the place, and to supply them would
be difficult. To appreciate the difficulty, let us examine
the line of communications. From Cairo supplies went
by rail three hundred and ninety miles to Naghamadi,
from thence by boat one hundred and forty-five miles
to Assouan, then four miles by rail round the cataract
to Shellal, from there two hundred and twenty miles
by boat to Haifa, then two hundred and three miles
by rail to Kerma (the other desert line was not yet
completed), from Kerma one hundred and eighteen
miles by boat to Kassinger, and from there slowly and
with difficulty were either pulled through the cataracts,
or carried by camel to Abu Hamed ; from there to
Berber, one hundred and thirty miles, boats could sail
for the next three months, after which the falling Nile
would cause navigation to be broken at two cataracts
necessitating two camel portages. From this it is easy
to understand the urgency and importance of the desert

I20 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

railway uuder construction from Wady Haifa to Abu
Hamed. When that was completed, supplies would
reach the latter place eighteen days earlier than by the
existing route. Fortunately the railway was forging
ahead at a tremendous pace. In the month of August
forty-five miles were completed, bringing the total
amount laid up to one hundred and sixty miles, that is,
eighty-five miles from Abu Hamed. There was every
reason to expect this pace would be kept up, so no
doubt this materially assisted the Sirdar to decide on
taking the risk of occupying Berber.

The occupation was at first of a very slender nature.
The gunboats took four hundred men up and disem-
barked tliem on an island opposite Berber, while the
gunboats moored alongside.

MacDonald's Brigade soon followed, and on its arrival
the place was properly occupied. Three more battalions
left Kassinger for Abu Hamed ; each battalion had to
pull boats through the cataracts containing two months'
supplies for themselves.

As there was a chance of Dervishes raiding down on
them while they were busy in the cataracts, the orders
for their departure were kept absolutely secret as long
as possible, and the battalions had to start on the
shortest notice. For instance, the Second Battalion,
commanded by Major Pink, got the order to start at
10 a.m. one morning, and at 1 p.m. it had moved off,
having broken up a camp in which it had been some
months, and drawn supplies and equipment for the
expedition in front of it.

Here I must relate an amusing example of the expe-

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 123

dients that have to be thought of on active service for
carrying on work with the means at hand. The Sirdar
happened to visit Kassinger about this time, and
noticed a number of coils of telegraph-wire which he
had thought were already forwarded to the front. The
commandant of the station explained that he had been
forbidden to send it forward on camels as they were all
required for carrying food, and that he had only got
donkeys on which to load the wire. He explained that
two coils of wire were much too heavy for one donkey,
and that one coil of wire could not be fastened so as to
stay on, but always fell off though he had tried every
means of fastening it on.

"Oh!" said the Sirdar, "Fll show you how to
do it : bring me a donkey and a coil of wire." The
Sirdar then placed the coil of wire on the ground, backed
the donkey till his hind-feet were inside the coil, then
lifting up the coil passed it up his hind-legs and along
his body till it rested on the saddle, and the donkey
was inside the coil, having been, so to speak, threaded
through it. There was no chance of the coil falling off
now, and away the donkey went.

It must have been an anxious time for the Sirdar
between the occupation of Berber and the completion of
the desert railway to Abu Hamed, but he did not have
to wait long. On the 31st October the railway reached
that place, so that in less than thi^ee months after the
capture of Abu Hamed trains were running into it.
Between the 15 th May and 31st October two hundred
miles of railway had been constructed, that is at the
rate of one and one-sixth miles a day, during the hottest

124 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

time of the yctor, through a previously unmapped and
waterless desert. The quality of the line was also good,
and trains carrying two hundred tons of supplies, drawn
by engines weighing fifty tons without tender, ran
twenty-five to thirty miles an hour with safety.

It would perhaps interest some readers if I described
shortly the organization and working of the railway
corps while constructing the desert railway.

I have already told how R.E. subalterns had made
rough reconnaissance maps on camel-back of the
desert. These had enabled the general line of the
railway to be decided on, but more detail survey was
of course required to supplement this. Accordingly a
survey camp wna located always six miles in advance
of rail-head. In this camp were two R.E. subalterns,
one sapper, and eighteen Egyptians, working with
theodolite and level, putting in pegs every hundred
feet to mark the line, while information as to the height
of the railway bank or cutting at eacli of these pegs
was sent back to rail-head daily. The survey party was
supplied with water and rations by camel from rail-head.
In the event of being attacked they were sufficiently
strong to be able to force their way back to rail-head
camp, -six miles distant, as the Dervishes could not
possibly send more than a raiding party of, at the
outside, three hundred camelmen.

The next stage was the construction of the embank-
ment. By the greatest fortune and by dint of taking
every care to locate the line so as to conform to the
ground as far as possible, the embankment required
was very slight, for long distances it did not exceed one

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 125

foot in height, occasionally it ran up to two feet, but
very seldom over that. Thus it was possible for the
party engaged in constructing the embankment to live
at rail-head camp — a great convenience for reasons of
supply. Had it been necessary to locate construction
parties in the heart of the desert ahead of the railway,
the question of their supply would have been a difficult
one.

The embankment party, about fifteen hundred strong,
started in the early morning from rail-head camp, taking
their day's rations and cooking-pots with them. They
always kept one day's work ahead of the rails, throwing
up from one and a quarter to one and a half miles of
embankment daily, returning to camp at sunset. They
therefore had longer hours, further to march, and harder
work than any one.

Behind the bankmakers came the plate-laying party
laying the rails and sleepers. This party, about one
thousand strong, was organized exactly like a machine :
each separate piece of work had a particular gang of
men always doing that same work, and of such a
strength that, while keeping up with gangs doing other
work; it did not work faster than them. A train of
railway material would ai-rive at rail-head, with rails on
some trucks, sleepers in others, while the proper com-
plement of fish-plates and bolts were in boxes on each
rail-truck. Immediately the train arrived a few men
jumped into the sleeper trucks and quickly passed them
out to gangs told off* to carry them to the front of the
train, where they were laid on the embankment ; other
men adjusted them at right angles to the line and

126 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

spaxjed them correctly ; next came gangs carrying rails
which they placed on the sleepers, while others adjusted
them so as to butt against each other. While some
men put on the fish-plates another puts chalk marks
on the rail to show where it should be spiked. Then
follow the vspiking parties, each consisting of five men,
one at each end of the sleeper levering it up to the rail,
two spiking, one gauging and superintending. Behind
the spiking parties are three or four men roughly
straightening the line by levering it with bars ; behind
them follows up the engine with its train without wait-
ing for the line to be ballasted, so as to have the rails
and sleepers as close as possible to the working party.
Behind the train they are packing earth under the
sleepers and getting the line correctly graded ; and again
behind them a few men with bars are straightening it
truly, then a big party fills in with earth. Ilalf-a-mile
further back a second lot of straightcners, lifters, and
fiUers-in are improving the work, while behind all
come the most skilful platelayers giving the finishing
touches.

The whole of the embankment party and the plate-
laying parties were in one camp at rail-head, under
the direction of two, sometimes one, R.E. subalterns;
while for security against attack there was half a
battalion of the last-raised Egyptian Battalion under
the command of a British captain, who was in military
command of the camp.

Every four or five days the camp would be moved
forward. Rations and water came daily by rail from
Haifa. Every twenty miles there was a station, or

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 . 127

rather just a loop siding to allow trains to pass. Each
station had a station-master, two pointsmen, and a
telephone clerk (all native), living in a tent

Wady Haifa was the base, on the proper organization
of which the whole progress of the work depended. It
was divided into separate departments — workshops,
traffic, buildings, stores and maintenance, each under
the control of an R.E. subaltern, assisted by native
officers, while the workshop department had tlie advan-
tage of the valuable experience of Mr. Saunderson and
Mr. Adams, who had come from big workshops in
England.

The building or works department built workshops
and stores, engine-pits, etc., sunk wells in the desert,
and later on put up what bridges were required.

The workshops put together new engines and trucks,
patched up old ones, and repaired the running ones.

The traffic department controlled the passing of
trains by telephone, the marshalling and allotment of
trucks, the loading of trains, the teaching of natives
to become signalmen, pointsmen, station-masters, etc.

The stores and maintenance department requisitioned
stores, kept an eye on their passage up the river, stacked
and stored them in the right places, and at the same
time controlled and watched the platelaying gangs that
were always maintaining and improving the line.

A detachment of R.E. non-commissioned officers and
men from one of the railway companies were employed
in the workshops, driving engines and superintending
the various departments, but the bulk of engine-drivers
and artisans were of every nationality under the sun.

CHAPTER IX

Now at last Khartum began to be within the sphere
of " practical politics," but first we had to strengthen our
still precarious hold on Berber. At the end of
November the Nile for five miles between Neddi and
Bashtinab, and for fifteen miles between Umhasheyo
and Geneinetti was impracticable for boats, so the boats
were distributed on the intervening spaces of good water,
and camels carried supplies round the cataracts. Owing
to the length of the river between Abu Hamed and
Berber, and the necessity of portages, supplies took
several days in getting from one place to the other, and
it was not a line of communication suitable for connect-
ing what was to be eventually the advanced base of a
big expedition, so the Sirdar decided to at once extend
the railway to Berber.

In order to slightly quicken transport, two small

steamers were brought up from Merowi and placed one

on each stretch of fair water. One of these steamers was

the one that was captured from the Dervishes at Hafir

and sunk by our gunboats dining the bombardment.

She had been patched up, and did a tremendous lot of

useful work during the remainder of the expedition. It

128

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 129

was considered very doubtful if she bad enough steam
power to get through the cataracts between Merowi and
Abu Hamed. Her boiler was about eighteen years old,
and had not had much attention when she was in the
hands of the Dervishes. However, Captain Bainbridge
was told to try and get her through the cataracts. This
officer had had more experience than any one at pulling
steamers and boats through cataracts, and was quite an
expert at it. He had, however, no easy task in getting
this small steamer through, and it was only by screwing
the safety-valve down and chancing the boiler bursting
that he did it.

On one occasion the boat could make no headway up
a narrow rapid channel, and for half-an-hour it remained
absolutely stationary with the engines going full speed
ahead, during which time it was a toss up whether she
got up or was dashed down the cataract. Eventually a
possibility was seen of edging into an easier channel, and
the boat slowly moved up.

'Soon after Berber had been properly occupied, the
gunboats under Commander Keppel, R.N., steamed up to
bombard Metemmeh. They found the Dervishes quite
ready for them. Several forts had been built along the
river-bank, and behind in the desert was the Dervish
entrenched position. The gunboats bombarded briskly
all day, keeping close to the east bank, where the Dervish
guns could hardly reach them, while their own fire was
just as effective as at shorter range. At night they
tied up to an island, and early next morning again ran
up to Metemmeh. It was hardly light, so they expected
to surprise the forts, but hardly had they fired the first

I30 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

gun before an answering shell came over their heads;
As before they lay within about fifty yards of the east
bank, while the forts were on the west. They had just
begun to wann to the work, when suddenly from the
buslies behind, within fifty yards, there w^as a rattle of
musketry. As an oflicer said at the time, it was a case of
" front seat behind the funnel for me, please ; " but a
maxim swung round, and very soon made the bushes too
hot for their occupants. After bombarding for some
time the gunboats ran past and went right on to the
beginning of the Shabluka Cataract, then turned,
and on their way back again bombarded Metemmeh.
The gunboats were hit by the Dervish sliell in two or
three places, but not in any vital part, though one had
to be towed Imck as her steam-pipe had been cut by
a shell.

This was the first of many reconnaissances by the
gunboats. One gunboat was always on patrol for a w^eek
at a time, making life unbearable for the Dervishes, so
that the gunboat fellows had plenty of small sku-mishes,
and a trip on one of these patrols was eagerly sought
after. An Egyptian brigade w^as now encamped at the
junction of the Atbara with the Nile, and set to work to
build a fort, inside which were built huts for stores and
men, and everything was done to prepare the place for
being the advance base of the Khartum Expedition. The
gunboats made it their head-quarters, and started from
it on their patrols.

Before the Eg}'Ytian Brigade had occupied Atbara
camp, the Dervishes had made two very impudent raids,
the first behind Berber and within four miles of it. They

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 131

carried off some cattle and women, and had the good
fortune to capture the camel post, which happened to be
passing at the time. Captain King's company of the
camel corps and the Ababdeh Arabs went in pursuit,
and pressed them so closely that the Dervishes had to
leave the cattle and women, and also dropped one mail-
bag, but kept the remainder and got away. It would
have been curious if one could have seen the Khalifa
puzzling over the various letters from home to officers
at Berber, in which no doubt the Khalifa was not
referred to in flattering terms. One of the lost letters
was a very long list of stores required by the railway for
the Berber extension. It was on its way to the Sirdar,
who was at Berber. He was delighted when he heard of
the loss .of this letter. He said, ** Now the Khalifa will
see the amount of things Tim asked to provide the force
with. I wonder what he would say if one of his emirs
sent in a long requisition like that ? he'd probably cut
his head off."

Another raid was made by the Dervishes actually on
to the village straight opposite Berber. The gunboats
took some troops across, and the Dervishes fled. It was
to stop these raids that troops were established in forts
on both banks of the Nile at the Atbara junction. This
measure proved successful, and only one other raid was
subsequently made, and then the raiders were mostly
captured. In order that the villagers might protect
themselves, they were armed with Kemingtons. They
were naturally very much on the qui vicCy and inclined
to fire at any horsemen on the chance of their being
Dervishes ; the result was, that the day after the arms

132 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

were issued General Hunter and his Staff, while riding
from Berber to Atbara, were fired at the whole way.

I should have mentioned before, that in November
General Hunter took a small flying column to Adarama,
the head-quarters of Osman Digna, in the hopes of
catching that gentleman. Adarama is on the Atbara,
about forty miles from its mouth, and was Osman
Digna's favourite residence. Needless to say, that wily
individual was not at home, but his village was burnt and
a large quantity of supplies taken. It must have been
annoying to Osman Digna to find the tables turned, and
a raid being made on his own house.

Communication was now open with Suakim, and Major
Sparkes, commanding the Fourth Battalion at that place,
rode through to Berber, being the first European to
travel this way since 1883. The sheikhs of the tribes
living near this highway came to see the Sirdar at
Berber, and asked if he would recognize their ancient
right to levy toll on caravans. Having received an
answer in the afiirmative, they declared their loyalty to
the Egyptian Government, and never gave any trouble.

Lieutenant Manifold, R.E., having brought the
telegraph to Berber, started to connect that place by
telegraph with Suakim. Parties were also sent out to
improve the water supply at wells along the route.

We must now turn our attention in another direction.
It will be remembered that the Italians had agreed not
to evacuate Kassala until such time as we were in a
position to take it over, provided that we did so within
a reasonable time.

Now that we had Berber we were in a position to

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 133

occupy Ko^sala, and the importance of this place
immediately becomes evident. Kassala lies at the head
of the Atbara, down which a force could easily advance
on Berber. It is the centre of a grain district which
could supi)ort a large Dervish force, consequently were
it in the hands of the Dervishes, they could constantly
threaten Berber, and no advance could be made to
Khartum while it was possible for a Dervish force to
come down the Atbara behind us. Had not the Italians
therefore held on to Kassala, we should have been
obliged to send a force to take the place from the
Dervishes.

As it was, however, the Sixteenth Egyptian Battalion
and some camel corps took the place over from the
Italians. Since the Italian defeat at Adua, their Govern-
ment had prohibited any military operations, conse-
quently the Dervishes had some posts close to the place.
As soon as Colonel Parsons arrived at Kassala, he sent a
force of Arab irregulars, raised by the Italians, to turn
the Dervishes out of their posts. This they did with
great dash, and the Dervishes were driven right out of
the district and retired to Gedaref, a place some way
further south. A very holy man (whose name I forget),
who was the sheikh of this district, but had been living
under our protection at Suakim, was brought back to his
own place at Kassala, and received with great enthusiasm.

,(■

CHAPTER X

•

The position was now changed. Whereas at the
end of the Dongola Expedition the Sirdar had the
advantage of operating on interior lines, and could
threaten either Metemmeh or Berber, now the Khalifa
was on the inside of the circle, and ought to be able
to keep our troops marching and countermarching, by
threatening first Merowi and then Berber. In view of
the fact that both places were liable to attack, the
Sirdar had his army about equally divided, and we
have seen how broken was communication between Abu
Hamed and Berber, so that troops would take ten
days to march from one to the other. Consequently
for one half of the army to reinforce the other would
require time. The railway could not immediately
advance, as the material ordered for the extension did
not begin to arrive till January. It was rather a
critical position, but the Khalifa did not at first appear
to realize his advantage, and it looked as if we were
going to have another long weary spell of uneventful
waiting.

An amusing incident occun-ed at Berber which well

illustrates the "Black's" character. After the Abu

134

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il

ill llLSM^^^B

Bi''> *• "*

^^^HB

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 137

Hamed fight Colonel MacDonald had soundly rated the
men who began the independent firing without orders.
Well, one night at Berber, Colonel MacDonald, while
sleeping as usual in the court-yard round his hut, was
woke up by a black soldier properly dressed in drill
order without arms. When asked what he wanted, he
said, " My battalion is very sorry that you are angry
with them for firing without orders at Abu Hamed,
but we know best what to do, we have been fighting
since we were boys, we know the Dervishes, and we
know the best way to turn them out of a place, so just
you leave things to us, and we'll pull you through."
The "Black" then turned about, and was outside the
courtyard before Colonel MacDonald recovered from his
surprise and exploded.

In January the railway again began to advance, and
every day now decreased the Khalifa s chance of scoring
a success. The people at Berber did not believe much
in the permanency of our occupation, and the sheikh
was caught sending letters to the Khalifa saying,
** Now is the time to come and destroy the Turks, they
have only a few battalions here, and cannot bring any
more ; Mahmud's army would take the place easily."

In January news came that the Khalifa was about to
utilize in a blundering way the advantage of his
position, and it was reported that Mahmud was going
to attack Berber and destroy the railway, the insidious
effect of which the Khalifa had begun to realize. He
had, of course, never seen a railway, but spies explained
to him that it was " like a steamer, except that it went
on wheels on the land, and could not go in the water,

^

/

138 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

and every time it came it brought a pile of supplies as
high as a mountain."

The Sirdar immediately altered his dispositions, and
brought all the Egyptian army except one battalion
and the camel corps from Merowi to Berber. At the
same time the Fourth Battalion (Egyptian) under Major
Sparkes marched from Suakim to Berber, accomplishing
the two hundred and seventy miles in the extra-
ordinaiily short period of thirteen days, that is, at
the rate of twenty-one miles a day. The greatest
distance covered in one day was thirty miles. This
performance w'as one more proof of the Eg}"ptian's
wonderful strength and endurance, and was the record
march in a campaign in which a great many good
marches were made. An English brigade from Cairo
was also speedily sent up, and camped at the end of
the railway. From this point it could march to rein-
force the Egyptian army at Berber, or if the Khalifa,
after threatening Berber, sent a force to attack
Merowi and Korti, then the English brigade could be
railed back to Haifa, up the other line to Kerma, from
there by steamers to Merow^i, and reach that place in
six or seven days, that is to say, at least five or six
days before the Dervishes could. Had the Khalifa
continued (as he ought to have) threatening first one
and then the other, we should probably have been
obliged to advance and attack them in their fortified
position at Metemmch, thus further lengthening the
line of communications, and losing a good many men
at Metemmeh.

It was a great treat to see British troops again.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 139

The brigade consisted of the Cameron Highlanders,
Seaforth Highlanders, Lincolnshire and Warwickshire
Regiments, commanded by General Gatacre, who im-
mediately set himself energetically to work to get the
brigade in training.

Just as a prize-fighter requires to go into training for
a fight, so does a soldier require to for a campaign ; so
General Gatacre adopted the methods of the trainer,
i:)lcnty of the best food that could be obtained, early
rising and lots of marching. He had excellent material
to work on, and at the end of a short time the brigade
was as hard and fit as they could be. Two companies
of the Warwickshire w^re sent to Merowi, as their arrival
there would be reported with great exaggeration in
numbers to the Khalifa.

Another result of keeping the British Brigade back
at rail-head was, that Malimud never expected to meet
them when he came down. He had heard of their
coming up the Nile, but thought they were still some
way from Berber.

Now that the force at Berber was increased, it be-
came necessary to increase the amount of camel trans-
port, so Beshir Bey, the sheikh of the Bisharin tribe
in the Nubian Desert, was called upon to produce a
thousand camels by a certain day.

Beshir Bey w^as a pretty good scoundrel, and his men
are the biggest scoundrels unhung. They lived on the
line of wells connecting Berber with Assouan, and
previous to this campaign had made a lot of money by
running ammunition to the Dervishes — in fact, they
were hand-in-glove with them, as correspondence taken

I40 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

at Berber proved. They now took over the transport
work at the portages so as to release the regular
transport for work at the front. They looted the
goods they were transporting in the most barefaced
way, and of course punctuality had no meaning for
them, and they were as truculent as possible. Captain
Bainbridge, who was in charge of them, had a worrying
time of it, and finally he caused quite a sensation
by putting Beshir Bey in the guard-room. To appre-
ciate the effect this had on the Arabs, the reader
must imagine what he would think if the subaltern in
command of the Guard at the Bank of England were
to put the Lord Mayor in the guard-room. However,
it did Beshir Bey a lot of good, though I don't wish to
insinuate that the same treatment would do the Lord
Mayor good.

Although rumours of the Dervish intention to advance
continued to come in, the time went on without any
actual movement, and the railway forged ahead, every
day shortening the line of communications, and bring-
ing the various parts of our line more into touch.

The gunboats were busy watching the Dervishes, and
one day reported that Mahmud had during the night
crossed the whole of his force to Shendi. They next
reported that small parties of them were coming down
the Nile. The Sirdar had an Egyptian brigade in
Atbara fort, and the remainder of the Egyptian army
at Berber, and the British Brigade received orders to
march as quickly as possible to that place. Rail-head
was now fifty-four miles south of Abu Hamed. General
Gatacre got the order to march at 1 p.m., just as the

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 141

brigade was returniDg from a long route march. At
8 p.m. they entrained and travelled to rail-head.
Early the next morning they started marching. It was
now the month of March, and the weather was still
cool in the mornings and afternoons, but hot at mid-
day. It was thought that the Dervishes would march
rapidly down the Nile, so it was necessary for the
British Brigade to march hard to reach the force at the
Atbara before the Dervishes did. The value of the
marching training they had had was now evident ; they
reached a place four miles north of Berber in four and
a half days from the time they left rail-head, fifty-four
miles south of Abu Hamed. Consequently they had
marched seventy-four miles in four and a half days,
that is, at the rate of sixteen and a half miles a day.
On arrival at Berber they were much disappointed to
hear that the Dervishes had made no further move,
and after resting a day they marched fourteen miles
further on to a camp half-way between Berber and
the Atbara.

For the next few days the Dervishes made no move,
and it looked as if they were changing their minds,
but about the 10 th March the gunboats reported
that all Mahmud's force was on the move down the
Nile. Lieutenant Beatty's gunboats had a smart
skirmish, driving a body of them pfi" an island on which
they had landed to get food. Major Sitwell was
wounded in this affair ; the bullet came from the flank
and scored the flesh all along his back, but just missed
the backbone by a hair's-breadth. It was supposed that
the Dervishes were coming straight down the Nile and

143 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

would attack Atbara fort. As this was au excellent
position for us to .defend, the Sirdar did not show his
whole force at the Atbara fort in order to entice them
to attack it. He bad one Egyptian brigade in the
fort, and the whole of the remainder of the force were
concentrated at Kenur, four miles north of the Atbara.

From this place they could march to the Atbara, and
take the Dervishes in flank Jis soon as they had given
themselves away by crossing it and attacking the fort.

The gunboats continued to send word of the Dervish
advance, and were daily engaged with them, but one
day they reported that no Dei-vishes were to !« seen
anywhere along the bank, and they appeared to have

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 143

struck eastwards inland. The cavalry were imniediately
sent to reconnoitre. They searched the country twenty-
fire miles south of the Atbara without seeing any
Dervishes, but got news that they had left the Nile at
Kabati, and were marching across the desert to strike
the Atbara, and from there go round our flank to
Berber. It was evident that this was what they were
doing, so the Sirdar moved his force to Hudi on the
Atbara, leaving one battalion in the fort at the mouth
of the Atbara, and one in Berber. The advantage of
our position now can be seen by a glance at the map.
If the Dervishes wanted to go round our flank on to
Berber they would have to make a very long desert
march without w^ater, impossible for a big force, w^hile
we could attack them in flank while they were doing it.
At the same time, we blocked their further advance
down the Atbara. Small parties of them might ride
round on camels to raid Berber or the line of com-
munications behind. To guard against this there was a
battalion in Berber, and no boats or convoys were
moving between Geneinetti and the Atbara. Every-
thing that was required was now at the Atbara fort,
and was sent from there by camel. Geneinetti and
also rail-head were too far ofi" for them to raid.

At the same time there was a certain amount of
anxiety as long as their whereabouts were unknown.
The cavalry were continually on the look-out for them,
and one day reported their arrival on the Atbara. It
was, of course, supposed they would attack forthwith,
and the ground round our bivouac was well cleared.
A brigade was always on outpost duty while the cavalry

i

144 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

»

reconnoitred. Two or three days after their arrival on
the Atbara, the cavaby came in contact with a body of
their cavalry coming to reconnoitre us. It was just
beyond the outposts, who were able to fire at the
Dervishes. This, together with the reports sent in,
led to the idea that the Dervishes were coming to
attack, so the Sirdar formed up the force to receive
them, but it soon turned out that the Dervish cavalry
were only trying to reconnoitre us, and were not
supported by any infantry. This state of affairs went
on from day to day, Mahmud sitting at Nakhila while
we were at Hudi daily expecting an attack. Our
cavalry were very busy keeping touch with the Dervishes
and constantly skirmishing with them. It was very
difiicult country for cavalry to work in as it was thickly
covered with bush, so that most unexpected encounters
took place. On one occasion the cavalry had completed
their morning reconnaissance, all patrols had come in
and reported the country quite clear of the enemy
for fifteen miles in every direction. Accordingly, they
began watering and feeding the horses; the English
officers were squatting on the ground together having
some lunch, when suddenly their attention was attracted
by grunts from the Marquis of Tullibardine, whose
mouth was so full of bread that he could not speak, and
could only grunt and point with his fork. Looking in
the direction in which he was pointing they saw a group
of Dervish horsemen dashing down on them. The
English officers were in a group by themselves, the
remainder of the cavalry on the river one hundred yards
off. Every officer sprang for his horse. Captain Baring,

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 145

who was nearest to the Dervishes, was so closely pressed
that while he was in the act of mounting, and before
he had quite thrown his leg over the saddle, he was
obliged to shoot the leading Dervish to prevent being
cut down. As it was, most of the officers would cer-
tainly have been cut down if it had not been that one
troop of cavalry was on guard and mounted, andf they
dashed up to the rescue, and assist<5d the officers to put
the Dervishes to ffight.

CHAPTER XI

As the days went by, and the Dervishes still continued
inactive, the Sirdar decided on a measure which it was
hoped would stir them to attack us. The Dervishes
had left a certain amount of proj^erty and food that
they could not carry in their forts at Shendi under tha
charge of those who were unable to march with them.
The Sirdar directed the Fifteenth Battalion under Major
Hickman, which had been left at Atbara fort, to proceed
on the gunboats to Shendi, take the place, destroy the
forts, and bring back the supplies. This was thoroughly
accomplished by Major Hickman, and in due time the
news reached the Dervishes, but still they showed no
inclination to move, though Osman Digna sent some of
his men to try and capture Adarama (his own home)
from the friendly Arabs who w^ere holding it for us.
These had orders to evacuate the place if attacked, but
they twice defeated Osman Digna s men.

The Dervishes were now suffering considerably from

hunger. Their arrangements for suj)ply were very

sketchy, and they were now living on dom nuts. The

nuts that grow on the dom palms have a kernel of hard

vegetable ivory. When ground into powder it makes

146

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 147

bread of a very sustaining nature. Each man was
issued two nuts a day. It was hardly a fighting man's
allowance, but still Mahmud was not inclined to assume
the offensive, and he continued to improve the entrench-
ments of his position until every man and animal was
provided with cover. He had learnt now that a much
bigger force was in front of him than he had expected.

This unexpected delay on the part of the Dervishes
was of course very disappointing to our force. The
British Brigade was exceedingly uncomfortable. They
had left their camp under the impression that they were
going to have a fight the next day, and be back in camp
in forty-eight hours, consequently they had brought prac-
tically no baggage. The Egyptian army, on the other
hand, after two years' campaigning, were up to every
wrinkle, and knew how to combine the utmost mobility
with the utmost comfort possible under the circum-
stances. Any battalion could start off at a moment's
notice with little transport, and yet have everything
they wanted, and make a comfortable camp with shelter
from the sun in no time. The British Brigade very
soon learnt the tricks of the trade, but at present they
were having a poor time of it.

It soon became evident that the Dervishes were not
likely to make a determined attack, and that if left
alone they would continue in their present position for
an indefinite time, keeping our force on the qui vive,
and stopping the numerous preparations which had yet
to be made. The railway would soon be dangerously
near to them. It was spurting ahead, and while the
two forces had been watching one another on the Atbara

148 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

the railway had advanced thirty-three miles. On one
occasion three miles were laid in one day. It would
soon be at Abadieh, and then the new gunboats would
be run up and put together. But none of this could
be done if Mahmud occupied his threatening position
on our flank. Consequently it was evident that the
Dervish position would have to be attacked. Here
were eighteen thousand Dervishes, who had obligingly-
marched some distance to put their heads into the
lion's mouth ; it would never do for this army to return
intact to swell the force which we should meet later at
Khartum. The Sirdar had given them every induce-
ment to attack him, but as they had declined it was
now necessary to adopt the more awkward alternative
of attacking them. Accordingly the Sirdar ordered
General Hunter to reconnoitre the Dervish position
and report on it. General Hunter was escorted by the
whole of the cavalry under Lieut. -Colonel Broad wood
and a maxim battery. The Dervishes, hearing of their
approach, were under the impression that the whole of
our force were coming to attack them, consequently
they all retired behind their entrenchments, and allowed
our cavalry to stand on a commanding ridge within six
hundred yards and take stock of them. The Dervishes
were adopting their usual tactics of holding their fire
for short range. They must have been very disap-
pointed when General Hunter, after noting everything
he wanted, turned about and retired. After the cavalry
had proceeded about four miles homewards, they came
across Bimbashi Butler quietly resting under a tree near
the river. This officer had left the Nile at DarmaU in

t

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Miles fo

A^a.cic€A,

zo

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ISO SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

order to join the force on the Atbara, and in order to
save time he had cut across the desert, but had struck
across at a httle too great an angle, and so had struck
the Atbara a few miles below the Dervish camp, whereas
he imagined he was just below our own camp, and
intended as soon as he was rested to go on up the
Atljara, in which case he would have ridden straight
into the Dervishes. The providential meeting with
our cavalry saved him from an unpleasant experience.
Geneml Hunter reported the Dervish position to be so
strong that it was deemed necessary to make another
reconnaissance, to discover if possible some weak point
in it. Accordingly General Hunter again proceeded
with the cavalry and a maxim battery. Again they
crowned the ridge overlooking the Dervish position, but
this time the Der\'ish cavalry dashed out from the tianks
and galloped round to cut oft* our cavalry, while the
footmen swarmed out like ants. Things looked rather
ugly. If every one kept cool and behaved all right,
there was no reason why they should not pull through,
but a retirement under such circumstances w^as a difficult
thing to carry out well. Lieut. -Colonel Broad wood,
ho\vever, made excellent dispositions, and the retirement
proceeded like a drill. They soon found, however, that
some Dervish cavalry were drawn up across their line of
retreat, so Captain Perse's squadron was ordered to cut
a way through. This was speedily carried out, Captain
Perse receiving a bullet in the left fore-arm. In the
meantime the maxims were doing excellent service. In
fact, there is no doubt that they saved the situation.
The Dervish cavalry simply couldn't face them. As

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 151

soon as a body of horsemen were seen to be collecting
for a charge, the maxims were turned on to them and
dispersed them. Aft^r a bit the Dervish footmen were
sliaken off and left behind, and then there was no more
anxiety, thougli the Dervish cavalry followed for eight
miles.

In tlie afternoon of the 7tli April the Anglo-Egyptian
force left their bivouac. The force consisted of eight
squadrons of Egyptian cavalry under Lieut. -Colonel
Broadwood, one company camel corps (Captain King),
one Britisli brigade of four battalions under Brigadier-
General Gatacre, three Egyptian brigades commanded
by General Hunter, while the brigadiers were Lieut. -
Colonels MacDonald, Maxwell, and Lewis. One English
maxim battery, two Egyptian maxim batteries, four
Egyptian mule batteries, and a rocket party under
Lieutenant Beatty, R.N., — about fourteen thousand all
told.

The nature of thii Dervish position was w-ell known
from General Hunter's reconnaissances. It was more or
less of an oval resting on the river, honeycombed with
trenches, and surrounded by a zeriba. It reseml)led Abu
Hamed on a larger scale, in that it lay at the bottom
of a kind of crattn*, of which the radius was about six
hundred yards, so that it would be impossible to open
fire at a greater range, which was evidently the reason
which caused the Dervishes to take up sucli a position.

The force marched in the desert away from the belt
of trees and undergrowth along the river; about 11
p.m. a halt was made in order to give the men a short
sleep. At 2 a.m. th(i march wns resumed, and at sunrise

152 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

the force topped the low line of hills overlooking the
Dervish position six hundred yards off. Hardly a
Dervish could be seen. Here and there a black head
popped up for a moment only ; our force was formed up
as shown in the diagram. The British Brigade on the
left, two Egj^ptian brigades on the right, Lieut. -Colonel
Lewis's Brigade in support behind the left, as the Dervish
cavalry appeared to be inclined to threaten that flank.
At 6.30 a.m. the guns began to bombard, the Dervishes
all the while remaining quite still and hidden in their
trenches. It was very curious standing inactive and
unmolested within six hundred yards of the enemy,
watching the effect of the artillery fire, just as one
would a game of football, waiting in suspense for the
order to advance. After an hour and a half the bom-
bardment ceased. The infantry were all ready for an
advance. The British Brigade had the Cameron High-
landers in line, the other three regiments in column
behind. This formation had l)een adopted on account
of the diftictulty that was expected in getting through
the zeriba. The Cameron Highlanders were to pull
away the bushes and make gaps through which the
columns were to rush. The Egyptian Brigades were in
their usual attack formation. Colonel MacDonald had
three battalions in front line, one in support. Each
battalion had four companies in line, two in support.
Colonel Maxwell had two battalions in front line, two
in support ; while each battalion had four companies in
front lino, two in support. Owing to the confonnation
of the ridge on which our force was drawn up, the left
of the line was a little further from the Dervish position

U' 'ft*:

154 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

than the right, so that the British had further to go.
About 8.10 the Sirdar ordered the advance, and the
whole Hne stepped oft*, the artillery pushing to the front
and keeping up their fire right up to the trenches.
The Dervishes held their fire till we were within three
hundred yards. Then a mass of black heads appeared,
and there was a roar of musketry. It was a terrific
volley, but fortunately it went high as usual. They
kept up a very hot fire, but ours was hotter, and in a
few seconds the Dervishes dared not show their heads
above the trenches, but put their rifles on the parapet
and jmlled the trigger without aiming. Our advance
was steady but rapid. The zeriba was nothing, and the
whole line was soon in the trenches, from which the
Dervishes got up and bolted like rabbits. Right
through about two hundred yards of trenches, pits,
entanglements, and small palisades the troops worked
their way, till they stood on the river-bank firing at the
Dervishes flving to the bush on the other side. When
working through the trenches the Eleventh Battalion
under ilajor Jackson found themselves opposite Mah-
mud's stronghold, guarded by his picked bodyguard.
The first company, one liundred strong, which advanced
to take it had ninety men hit, but the company behind
was close at their heels, and cleared the bodyguard out.
Though the fighting through the trenches only took
twenty minutes, it was hot work at dose quarters.
Some of the Dervishes bolted, firing as they went,
others lay low in deep pits and fired at point-blank
range. Capttiin Findlay, who was yards in front of
his men, was mortally wounded in hand-to-hand fight.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 155

Major Urquhart of the same regiment was killed, but
the British showed their usual aptitude for bayonet
fighting, and most of their casualties occurred before
they reached the zeriba. Once in they were more than
a match for the. Dervishes.

The Egyptian army advanced with great dash, and
worked through the pits and trenches very quickly.
All mounted officers were ordered to dismount. General
Hunter was the only officer in the firing line who
remained mounted, and riding as he was at the head of
the division, waving his helmet and shouting encourage-
ment to the men, it was a miracle that he escaped. As
soon JUS the position was taken the cavalry attempted to
pursue, but the dense bush was absolutely impracticable
for tliem, and they were obliged to give up, but pursuit
was unnecessary. The Dervishes were entirely broken
up. They could not go to the Nile, for the gunboats
were watching it; tliey could only go up the Atbara,
and then try and strike across the desert to hit the Nile
higher up.

The importance of Kassala was now demonstrated, as
it prevented the fugitives retiring to that grain district
and reforming there, while the Kassala garrison was for
a long time busy in hunting them down and captur-
ing them. As a matter of fact, few ever returned to
Khartum. Out of seventeen thousand that had been
present at the fight, about five thousand were killed,
one thousand taken prisoners, four or five thousand
more must have perished in fliglit from wounds and
hunger ; the remainder scattered. Our casualties were
five hundred an<l seventy killed and wounded, of which

IS6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1B96— 1899

the largest proportion to numbers engaged were British,
their killed and wouuded totalling up to about one
hundred and fifty. A large number of officers of the
British Brigade were hit. Major Urquhart, Captain
Findlay, and second Lieutenant Gore were killed, and
no less than twenty-one other officers wounded. The

Egyptian army had five British otficern wounded, but
of course the peicentage of British officers to Egj^tian
is very small.

It was generally considered that the cause of the
British suffering most was due to their reusing fire at
the zeriba ; their discipline and coolness was such that
their advance was absolutely like a drill. They began

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 157

by volley firing, and changed by order to independent.
Their shooting was excellent. Not a Dervish could
live above ground, but the majority of their casualties
occurred at the zeriba, when they ceased fire and the
officers came out in front. The cessation of fire and the
short interval that intervened before they were hand
to hand was the fatal period, especially for the officers.
The Eg5rptian army, on the other hand, though their
shooting was not so good, never ceased firing, and kept
up a hail of bullets which prevented the Dervishes
taking aim, so that, though the enemy likewise poured
out a perfect hailstorm of bullets, yet it was mostly
misdirected.

The column formation of the British, which had been
adopted on account of the difficulty expected at the
zeriba, no doubt increased their casualties.

After the firing had ceased some men of the Tenth
Battalion Sudanese found Mahmud hiding in the case-
mate in which he had taken shelter during the engage-
ment. Some men of the Ninth attempted to dispute
the possession of the prisoner, for whom the Sirdar
offered a reward of £100, and Mahmud would probably
have been killed if Captain Franks, R.A., had not come
up and ordered him to be taken to the Sirdar. Mahmud
was very truculent when confronted with the Sirdar,
and when asked why he came to fight against us, he
said, ** Because I have to obey orders the same as you
have to."

General Hunter had offered £100 for Osman Digna,
but that cur had bolted at the commencement of the
fight as usual. The Battle of Atbara was the first

158 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

occasion on which a force of Derv^ishes superior in numbers
had been turned out of a strongly entrenched position
at the point of the bayonet. The same thing was done
at Gemaizeh, but there the Egyptian army was superior
in numbers, and during the present campaign the Sirdar
had always contrived to outnumber his enemy ; it was
satisfactory, therefore, that the Egyptian army obtained
this opportunity of showing their ability to cope with
superior numbers in close combat — a fact which was
doubted by many who did not know them. Of course
they were assisted by as fine a British brigade as one
could wish to see, but the fact remains that they were
still inferior in numbers, and yet behaved exactly as
they should have done.

The filth and smell of the Dervish camp was beyond
description. They had absolutely no sanitary an-ange-
ment, and now that dead and dying men and mangled
animals were strewn everywhere, it was altogether a
fearful place. The small pools of water in the dry bed
of the Atbara were also polluted, so it was deemed
advisable that the force should assemble and lie down
for rest in the clean desert away from the filth ; but it
was very trying sitting through the heat of the day
in the glaring sun. Now that the fight was over the
inevitable reaction set in, and men began to feel the
fatigue of the marching and fighting; the hot sun
beating down did not help to lessen the discomfort.
The march back to the Atbara was a trying experience
for the wounded. They had to be carried thirty miles
on stretchers, which was the most comfortable way of
transporting them under the circumstances. Colonel

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 161

Lewis's Egyptian Brigade performed this arduous seir-
ice, again demonstrating the extraordinary strength and
endurance of the Egyptian .

Since the population of Berber had expected a Dervish
victory, and one of their sheikhs had been sending in-
formation to the enemy, it was deemed advisable that
they should see Mahmud captive with their own eyes,
otherwise they would probably not believe it. The
Sirdar, therefore, ordered Captain Doran to decorate
the town of Berber, and prepare it for the triumphal
entry of the troops with Mahmud and the other
prisoners.

Captain Doran found it somewhat difficult to carry
out the order, as flags and bunting are not to be found
in the Berber shops. The ladies of Berber, however,
came to his rescue, and offered him all sorts of gay-
coloured clothing, and in twenty-four hours the place
was transformed by having gaudy-coloured female
garments festooned across the streets. The natives
turned out and lined the streets to see the troops enter,
and satisfy themselves as to Mahmud's capture, a fact
which pleased the populace, but not some of the sheikhs.
These gentlemen, however, came up and offered their
congratulations to the Sirdar.

CHAPTER XII

It may possibly be asked by some why the victory al
the Atbara was not immediately followed by an advance
up the Nile. It was, but not in a manner apparent tc
the ordinary observer. It was not likely that the Sirdar,
having destroyed the force which had held the imix)rtan1
strategic point ^letemmeh, would allow the Dervishes tc
re-occupy that place. In fact, as soon as the Dervishes
had quitted it, he had ordered the Jaalin to occupy it,
and now that it was in our possession the Khalifa nc
longer possessed the power to threaten both Dongola
and Berber. The whole country up to the Shabluka
Cataract was now ours, but it was not in the least bil
necessary to send any of the aimy one hundred miles
up to Aletemmeh, and thereby increase the difficulty
of supply. With the Jaalin at Metemmeh and Colonel
Wingate's spies, we should get ample notice if the
Khalifa was about to send another force to attempt the
capture of that place, and with our steamers wc could
put a force there before he could. As regards an im-
mediate advance on Khartum itself, the Sirdar kne^
full well that though the force he had destroyed contained

some of the Khalifa's best troops, yet three times theii

162

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 "63

number of his picked troops still remained, who would
be in no way demoralized by Mahmud's defeat. An
advance now would have to be carried out without the
all-important gunboats, and even if successful, without
the gunboats it would be impossible to follow up the
success by a rapid swoop up both the Niles. The Sirdar
knew that the right time to advance on Khartum was at
high Nile if the full fruits of victor}^ were to be reaped,
and subsequent events proved him right.

It was then the general opinion that a vote of thanks
and a handsome testimonial ought to be presented to
Mahmud for having provided some excitement and
entertainment for a couple of months, which would
otherwise have been spent in monotonous waiting.

It was now the middle of April, so that we knew we

had only about three and a half months more to wait

before the advance, but they would be hot months. The

troops returned to their previous quarters, the Eg}^tian

battalions to the Atbara fort, where they resumed the

work of building store huts and hospitals, and otherwise

preparing it as our future base ; the Sudanese brigades

returned to Berber, and the British to Darmali, where

they proceeded to make themselves as comfortable as

possible, and everything was done to keep the troops in

health during the ensuing hot weather. A small theatre

was rigged up, where smoking concerts were held. A

race meeting was got up, also sports, and every week

one of the steamers took some men on board and took

them for a trip down the Nile. Route marching was

carried out in the early morning. In this manner the

troops kept in health, and though, of course, the doctors

i64 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

had their hands pretty full, still when the time came for
the brigade to take the field again, they turned out as
fit as they could be. At the end of April the railway
reached Abadieh, and in a week the place was transformed.
What had been a bare waste of sand by the bank of the
Nile, with hardly a man in sight, became in a few days
a veritable dockyard humming with busy workers.
Three new gunboats were brought up in sections by rail
and were launched. Temporary workshops sprang up.
Three Egyptian battalions came to work at the place,
and built themselves huts in a few days. Captain
Hobbs, who was in charge of all the sailing-boats, had
collected them here for repairs, and boats, sails, and
masts were lying all along the shore in every stage
of repair, while Captain Hobbs, accompanied by a
red- headed Egyptian, whom he called his Director of
Stores, walked up and down hastening the progress of
the work.

Major Gordon, RE., and ]Mr. Bond of the Naval
Engineers were superintending the construction of the
gunboats. The sections were riveted together, and the
boilers and machinery then put in, and the superstructure
built up. When completed they looked very formidable,
as the upper deck was a considerable height above the
water, completely protected by steel plates against rifle-
fire, with loopholes for musketry and maxims. They
carried two six-pounder quick-firers, one small howitzer,
and four maxims. They were also provided with an
electric search-Ught. Unfortunately their powers of
steaming did not equal their looks, and though every-
thing possible to improve it was done, they always

»0

I

ft. ^ «>S ^-o

1(^ «

i66 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

rt'raained mucli slower tliaii the other gunboats, and were
almost useless for tlie important duty of towing troops.
Some wag nicknamed them the "Gordon Greyhounds," ■
though their defective steaming had nothing to do with
Major Gordon. At the same time as tlie gunboats were
being built, eight steel double-deck troop barges were
brought up in sections by rail and put together in like

manner. In the meanwhile the railway was pushing on,
and at tlic cml of June reached Atbara fort, which was
to be its teiTuinus till Khartum was taken.

lietwcen March 189G and June 1898, live hundred
and fifty miles of railway had been constructed. The
work had proceeded steadily and uninterruptedly in
spite of tlie heat, tlie difficulty of training natives to
the work, and the lack of water in a huge unmapped.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896- 1899 169

desert, the other end of which was held by the enemy,
and in which the construction party lived for six months
at the risk of being cut off from water, and so dying of
thirst and liable to attacks from the Dervishes. The
immense distance of Wady Haifa from the sea must also
be taken into consideration, and the number of trans-
shipments necessary to get the railway materials and
stores to Wady Haifa. No amount of speed in laying
the materials would be of any use if the constant supply
of material was not kept up, so that Colonel Maxwell
commanding at Haifa, Captain Pedley at Assouan, Major
Gordon at Cairo, and the other officers and non-commis-
sioned officers on the line of communications, were all
parts of the continuous working railway machine. While
for the battalions of the ai-my there were often periods
of rest (irksome, no doubt, but still rest), for the officers
and men of the railway there was none. It was one long,
steady, hard grind for two and a quarter years, through
the hottest weather, on indifferent food, through a barren
and desolate country. They had, however, the satisfac-
tion of knowing that, with the Sii-dar to plan and
Lieutenant Girouard to organize and direct, their energy
was expended in the most useful and remunerative
way.

As soon as the railway reached the Atbara, supplies were
poured into that place ; two trains, bringing about three
hundred and fifty to four hundred tons between them,
arrived daily. It was trying work for the European
engine-drivers. Their turns for driving came frequently,
and driving an engine in the Sudan in hot weather is
terribly trying for u white man, but during the whole

1^) SLOAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

time of railway construction, the engine-drivers stuck to
their work in the most admirahle way, though some
fluccumbed. With a hot furnace in front of him, a
foot-plate so hot that it could hardly be stood on, a
hot 3U11 above, every part of the engine too hot to
touch, and the glare of the desert in his eyes, the lot

of an engine-driver was not a pleasiuit one, iind it was
little wonder if they occasionally lust theii- tempers with
Egyptian station-masters. The Egyptian made a capital
station-master when he had learnt his work, but some of
his ways are very exasperating to a white man, and it
was not an uncommon tiling to see the engine-driver
leave liis engine and chase the station-master into the
desert. One engine-driver had a standing feud with

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 171

one of the station-masters, and his arrival and departure
at this station was always accomplished amid a shower of
missiles to and from the engine, until it finished up by
the engine-driver firing a revolver at the stntion-master
as he entered and left the station.

About the middle of July, the Fifteenth and First
Egyptian Battalions left Atbara and proceeded up both
banks of the Nile, cutting wood and stacking it on the
banks ready for the use of the steamers. Under cover of
the Jaalin at Met^mmeh, the telegraph was pushed for-
ward. Sergeant Dennett, R.E., who was in charge of
the party, in his zeal to get the telegraph well forward,
pushed on beyond Me temmeh, and telegraphed back that
he had seen Dervish cavalry. lie was still proceeding
to work ahead but was ordered to stop.

As the Nile was now fiiirly higli. Captains Bun-
bury, Bainbridge, Oldficld, and Borton were ordered
to brin<? the four steamers on the Dono^ola reach of
the river through the cataracts to Abu Ilamed and
then up to Atbara. One of the four steamers was
the ill-fiited Tc6, which had been WTCcked last year
in tlie cataract. She had been righted and repaired,
and as she had been wrecked two years running her
name was changed to Hafir, in the hope tliat her luck
would change.

Tw^o out of the three battalions at Merowi and Debbeh
were ordered up to the Atbara, bringing w^tli them
through the cataracts a number of sailing-boats, so
that by the beginning of August the whole flotilla
was assembled at the Atbara, consisting of ten gun-
boats, five unanned steamers, eight troop barges, and

172 SUDAN CAAfPAIGN, 1896— 1899

a quantity of sailing-boats, probably three or four
hundred.

The pile of supplies at the Atbara was now enormous
and was daily increasing, but would soon be complete.
The Sirdar had decided to have enough supplies at or
south of the Atbara to last the force till the end of
October.

CHAPTER XIII

With the railway complete to the Atbara and supplies
piled up there, the flotilla of steamers and sailing-boats
also collected at the Atbara, and the Nile nearly high,
nothing more was wanted to complete the preparation
for an advance on Khartum. The Sirdar had decided
that the force in the field must be increased by four
battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, one field
battery, one battery of the new five-inch Howitzers, two
forty-pounders, one company of engineers, and A.S.O.
and R.A.M.C. in proportion. To meet this demand the
following troops had been collected in Cairo, and were
now awaiting orders to proceed to the front : —

Twenty-first Lancers.

Thirty-second Field Battery Royal Artillery.

Thirty-seventh Howitzer Battery Royal Artilliery.

Two forty-pounders Royal Artillery.

Second Company Royal Engineers.

First Battalion Grenadier Guards.

Second Battalion Rifle Brigade.

First Battalion Fifth Fusiliers.

Lancashire Fusiliers.

Remount Depot.

The infantry were to be brigaded together, and called

173

174 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

the Second Brigade, under Colonel Lyttelton. The First
Brigade, which had fought at the Atbara, was now com-
manded by Colonel Wauchope, as Major-GeneralGatacre
had been appointed divisional commander.

It will be interesting to examine the line of communi-
cations for the Khartum Expedition, along which these
reinforcements had now to be sent. From Cairo by
rail to Assouan five hundred and thirty-five miles (thirty-
six hours), from Assouan to Haifa two hundred and
twenty miles in barges towed by steamers (four days),
from Haifa to Atbara l)y rail three hundred and eighty-
five miles (thirty-six hours), that is to say, from Cairo to
Atbara seven days, sometimes eight or even nine.

Every one who took part in the campaign was struck
with admiration of the Sirdar's genius and perseverance
in having thought out and made such a perfect line of
communications through such difficult and inhospitable
country. Every one looked upon Khartum as already
ours. There we^re probably a few hundred men in the
British ami}' capable of carrying out what remained to
be done to capture Khartum, but we are fortunate if
we possess more than a handful who could have carried
out the operations of the last two yeai's, and made
preparations for the final coup so successfully and with
such little loss of men, money, and time.

It was arranored that the reinforcements in Cairo
should leave by half battalions, squadrons, and batteries
at a time, each one dav behind the other. The first to
leave were, I think, half a battalion of the Rifle Brigade,
who left Cairo on the 27th July. All the stores and sup-
plies for these troops had preceded them to the front.

1

]

/

I

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896- 1899 i75

While the reinforcements are steadily travelling up
we will return to the front to narrate the events taking
place there.

On -the 3rd August the First and Second Egyptian
Brigades, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel MacDonald, left Berber, and on the 4th
embarked at the Atbara on barges, boats, and steamers.
There were four steamers, each towing two double-
deck troop barges and two sailing-boats. The inability
of the new gunboats to tow barges against the high
Nile current had made it impossible to spare more
steamers for this duty, so that the men were literally
packed on board. No one except the Sirdar believed
that that number of men could by any means be got
into the boats supplied. One officer reported to the
Sirdar that he had been ordered to put three hundred
and fifty men on to a barge, that he had managed to
put on two hundred and eighty but could not see how
to put any more on.

** Oh, I think you can,'* said the Sirdar ; " come back
and let me know when you have done it,'' and somehow
or other it was done, and the two brigades were all
stowed away. As one officer remarked, "When they
get to the other end it will be like unpacking a new ])ox
of biscuits, they'll have to pull the middle man out with
a jerk before any of the others can move."

As the steamers moved off, with the water almost
level with the gunwales of the barges, many prophesied
that they would not reach their destination, but they
did. The British troops subsequently had exactly
double the room that had been allowed to the Egj^tian,

176 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

but they considered themselves crowded, and with reason.
It was, however, the beat way of getting to the front
rapidly. Under cover of the two Egyptian brigades
supplies were now pushed forward in boats, and a dep6t
was formed on Nasri Island, a few miles below the
Shabluka Cataract, and only about sixty miles from

1 "

Khartum. The Eg3^tian brigades were disembarked
at Wad Habeshi on the west bank, two or three miles
below Shabluka Cataract, but the disembarkation was
hardly complete before the Nile made a sudden rise
which flooded the site of the camp, but was at the same
time too shallow to allow of boats coming close to dry
land, so the troops had to be re-embarked as quickly as

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 177

possible aud taken on a short distance to a more suitable
site at Wad Hamed. This caused a delay of about
thirty-six hours, the meaning of which could not be
communicated to Atbara, so that there was considerable
anxiety there at the non-return of the steamers. When
they did return the Sirdar went oflF in one of the smaller
steamers that were towing supplies.

Lieutenant Gorringe, R.E., who had throughout the
campaign acted as D.A.A.G. (B), had his hands full ar-
ranging and telling off steamers and boats for troops and
supplies, so that the right kind and quantity of stores and
supplies should be at the right place at the right time.
But everything went without a hitch as usual. The
First British Brigade was the next to go up to Wad
Habeshi, so that now there was a steady stream of
troops from Cairo to Wad Habeshi, one thousand two
hundred and fifty-five miles. On the 21st August
the last of the reinforcements reached Atbara. The
Lancers marched from Atbara to Wad Habeshi, and
a very trying march it was for them, as the high
Nile had flooded up the khors, necessitating very long
detours. This regiment, however, was simply bursting
with keenness. They had never been on service before,
and they meant business. They didn't mean to return
to Cairo without having a thundering good slap at
the Dervishes. Every private was as keen as he
could be, and prepared to ride any nimiber of horn's if
he could only get his lance into a Dervish. They had
an unusual big average of years of service, and were all
as hard as nails, in fact, as some one remarked, " Those
men are regular Thrusters." In the meantime, the

N

178 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

camel corps, under Major Tudway, had marched across
the Bayuda Desert to Metemmeh and on to Wad
Hamed.

In this way a force of about twenty- three thousand
men, which on the 27th July had been strung out
between Cairo and the Atbara, was on the 23rd August
at Wad Hamed and at a camp about ten miles further
on, a distance of one thousand two hundred and sixty
miles from Cairo. The only mishap had been the wreck
of the flagship, with Commander Keppel and General
Bundle on board. This gunboat had been so strained
by towing heavy barges that the joints of her plates
suddenly opened, and before she could reach the bank
she sank, but no lives were lost. The Shabluka Cataract,
through which the flotilla now had to pass, is a most ex-
traordinary place. The Nile, which at Khartum is about
one mile wide, narrows down in running through the
Shabluka defile to a width of about two hundred and
fifty yards, in some places only one hundred and fifty
yards. Steep hills of black rock rise straight up out
of the river, and between these the water races and
swirls along in and out, turning right-angle corners,
so that navigation is extremely difficult. The scenery
is grand, as the bold ruggedness of the rocky hills
is here and there relieved by a patch of palm trees
and vegetation between the cliffs and the river. It
was this defile which had prevented the gunboats
from running up and shelling Khartum during the pre-
vious months. The Dervishes had built very cunning
forts on the water's edge, and as the width of the stream
would have necessitated the gunboats coming within

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896^-1899 179

one hundred yards of them, they could not have passed
them. These forts, however, would become untenable
as soon as we crowned the hills overlooking them, and
were therefore now evacuated, as the Dervishes had
decided to make their stand at Omdurman and not at
the Shabluka, as was at one time expected.

A reconnaissance by the cavalry and gunboats having
ascertained that the whole of the Shabluka Pass (twenty
miles) was clear of the enemy, both on the water's edge
and on the hills above, the boats were sent forward with
supplies to make a dep6t at Gebel Royan, an island
near the southern end of the cataract, while the Egyptian
army moved forward and camped on the bank opposite.
Gebel Royan, being within forty miles of Omdurman,
was to be the last dep6t, and an hospital was established
here. It was at this place that the force was for the
first time camped all together. It was composed as
follows : —

BRITISH TROOPS.

Twenty-first Lancers, commanded by Colonel Martin.
Thirty-second Field Battery R. A., commanded by Major Williams.
Thirty-seventh Howitzer Battery, commanded by Major Elmslie.
Two forty-pounders, commanded by Lieutenant Weymouth.
Second Company R.E., commanded by Major Arkwright.
One Maxim Battery.

Infantry Division, com3ianded by Major-General Gatacre.

First Brigade {Colonel Waucfiope),

First Battalion Cameron Highlanders (Colonel Money).
First Battalion Seaforth Highlanders (Colonel Murray).
First Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment (Lieutenant-
Colonel Forbes).
First Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment (Colonel Yerner).

i8o SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

^Second Brigade (Colonel Lt/ttelton,)

Fii*st Battalion Gi'enadier Guai-ds (Colonel Hatton).

Second Battalion Rifle Brigade (Colonel Howard).

First Battalion Fifth Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel Money).

Second Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel Colling-

wood).
R.A.M.C. in proportion under Surgeon-General Taylor as P.M.O.
A.S.C. and O.S.C. in proportion.

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.

Eight Squadrons of Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood.
One Horse Artillery Battery and four mule Batteries under

Colonel Long.
Camel Corps under Major Tudway.

Infantry Division, commanded by Major-General Hunter.

Fh*3t Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel MacDon<dd).

Ninth Sudanese (Major Walter).
Tenth Sudanese (Major Xason).
Eleventh Sudanese (^lajor Jackson).
Second Egyptian (Major Pink).

Second Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Mavwell),

Twelfth Sudanese (Lieutenant-Colonel Townsend).
Thirteenth Sudanese (Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Dorien).
Fourteenth Sudanese (Major Shekleton).
Eighth Egyptian (Colussi Bey).

TJiird Brigade (Lieutenant-Cohnel Lewis),

Third Egyptian (Lieutenant-Colonel Sillem).
Fourth Egyptian (Major Sparkes).
Seventh Egyptian (Fathy Bey).
Fifteenth Egyptian (Major Hickman).

Forirth Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Collinson).

First Egyptian (Captain Doran).
Sixteenth Egyptian (Major Bunbury).
Seventeenth Egyptian (1)
Eighteenth Egyptian (Captain Matchett).
Ten gunboats under Commander Keppel, R.N.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 181

It was a splendid force, in excellent condition, well fed,
equipped and clothed, bursting with keenness, and with
absolutely unbounded confidence in the skill and ability
of their commander, Sir Herbert Kitchener.

The weather now was not as hot as usual at this time
of year, although of course it was very hot. Every
night there was a sand-storm, sometimes accompanied
by rain and thunder. Practically nothing had been
seen so far of the Dervishes. Our cavalry only had
seen their scouts retiring before them and lighting up
signal fires, which were repeated all the way to Omdur-
man. When the British division were making a zeriba
at their camp opposite Gebel Eoyan, a single Dervish
horseman galloped up, threw his spear into the zeriba,
and galloped away.

On the 28 th August the Egyptian army left the
Gebel Eoyan camp and marched on ten miles, the
British division following in the afternoon. The next
day a most violent sand-storm was raging all day, it was
impossible to see ten yards ahead. The force remained
halted while supplies came up, the steamers going back
and towing up the sailing-boats. The cavalry went out
and reconnoitred. I must say I do not envy the lot of
a cavalry soldier on the march. He is the first to leave
the camp and the last to return to it, and then he must
see to his horse before he thinks of himself. Apparently
he never sleeps or eats.

The next day the force moved off all together. The
cavalry spread out in a screen on the front and flank.
The infantry marched on a broad front of three brigades,
each in the formation selected by its commander. Most

i8o SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

Second Brigade {Colatid LffiteU&ii,)

Fii*st Battalion Gi*enadier Guards (Colonel Hatton).

Second Battalion Eifle Brigade (Colonel Howard).

First Battalion Fifth Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel Money).

Second Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieutenant-Colonel Colling-

wood).
R.A.M.C. in proportion under Surgeon-General Taylor as P.M.O.
A.S.C. and O.S.C. in proportion.

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.

Eight Squadrons of Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Broad wood.
One Horse Artillery Battery and four mule Batteries under

Colonel Long.
Camel Corps under Major Tudway.

Infantry Division, commanded by Major-General Hunter.

First Brigade (LietUenant-Colond MacDmiald),

Ninth Sudanese (Major Walter).
Tenth Sudanese (Major Nason).
Eleventh Sudanese (Major Jackson).
Second Egyptian (Major Pink).

Second Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell),

Twelfth Sudanese (Lieutenant-Colonel Townsend).
Thirteenth Sudanese (Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Dorien).
Fourteenth Sudanese (Major Shekleton).
Eighth Egyptian (Colussi Bey).

TJdrd Brigade (LietUenant-Colonel Leicis),

Third Egyptian (Lieutenant-Colonel Sillem).
Fourth Egyptian (Major Sparkes).
Seventh Egyptian (Fathy Bey).
Fifteenth Egyptian (Major Hickman).

Fourth Bngade (Lieutenant-ColoTiel ColUnson),

First Egyptian (Captain Doran).
Sixteenth Egyptian (Major Bunbury).
Seventeenth Egyptian (])
Eighteenth Egyptian (Captain Matchett).
Ten gunboats under Commander Keppel, R.N.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 181

It was a splendid force, in excellent condition, well fed,
equipped and clothed, bursting with keenness, and with
absolutely unbounded confidence in the skill and ability
of their commander, Sir Herbert Kitchener.

The weather now was not as hot as usual at this time
of yeai*, although of course it was very hot. Every
night there was a sand-storm, sometimes accompanied
b)" rain and thunder. Practically nothing had been
seen so far of the Dervishes. Our cavalry only had
seen their scouts retiring before them and lighting up
signal fires, which were repeated all the way to Omdur-
man. When the British division were making a zeriba
at their camp opposite Gebel Eoyan, a single Dervish
horseman galloped up, threw his spear into the zeriba,
and galloped away.

On the 28 th August the Egyptian army left the
Gebel Royan camp and marched on ten miles, the
British division following in the afternoon. The next
day a most violent sand-storm w^as raging all day, it was
impossible to see ten yards ahead. The force remained
halted while supplies came up, the steamers going back
and towing up the sailing-boats. The cavalry went out
and reconnoitred. I must say I do not envy the lot of
a cavalry soldier on the march. He is the first to leave
the camp and the last to return to it, and then he must
see to his horse before he thinks of himself Apparently
he never sleeps or eats.

The next day the force moved off all together. The
cavalry spread out in a screen on the front and flank.
The infantry ntarched on a broad front of three brigades,
each in the formation selected by its commander. Most

i82 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

generally three battalions in front line in half battalion
column, and one battalion in support in company
column. A British brigade was next the river, with
the other British brigade behind them ; on the right of
the British two Egyptian brigades, one behind the
other, and on their right two more Egyptian brigades.
The batteries marched each with its brigade. The
transport, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener, its
energetic director, marched between the British and
the Egyptian forces. As already explained, the discipline
of the transport was perfect. They loaded up and
assembled from the various parts of the camp in no
time, and then marched like a well-drilled regiment.
Their loads were put on in the manner most convenient
to the camel. The saddles were in first-rate order, and
the animals properly fed and looked after, so that very
few fell out. In this way the comfort of the force was
secured by the arrival of their baggage at the same time
as the troops, the importance of which cannot be over-
estimated when marching long hours in hot weather.
In fact, the whole war machine was now so perfect
that everything went like clockwork, and the ordinary
discomfort of active service was far less than in the
preceding stages of the campaign. The usual hour
for starting was 5 a.m., and we kept mai-ching with
occasional short halts till 2 p.m., and were generally
settled down in camp by 4 p.m. The cavalry always
reconnoitred four or five miles ahead, and remained out
until the bivouac was finished and the troops were in
position.

Practically no tents were carried, so it did not take

MAP Trnr

I I i

7o

OMDUKMA

WA» MAMC

/,^0yayt.

HUjA^d,

h^t^dyStf^,

i84 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

long to settle down. We now bivouacked in a hollow
oblong formed of battalions in double company column,
and a zeriba was made all round. In this way we had
arrived on the 31st August within about eight miles of
Kerreri Ridge, that is to say, within about fifteen or
sixteen of Omdunnan.

We had all along expected to find the Dervishes
drawn up on Kerreri Ridge, and while we were settling
down in bivouac the cavalry were pushing on to
reconnoitre it, supported by gunboats. We soon heard
the gunboats firing, and heard later that there were
Dervishes at Kerreri, and the Lancers, thirsting for a
fight, had succeeded in having a small brush with them,
but the Dervish force there was apparently a small one.

CHAPTER XIV

On the 1st September we moved oflF with the expect-
ation of having to assault the Kerreri Ridge. There
had been a good deal of rain in the night, which, though
it gave us a soaking, had the effect of cooling the air,
and the first part of the march was quite pleasantly
cool, but the heat which comes on a few hours after
rain is always by far the most trying. Kerreri Ridge
came nearer and nearer without any signs of the enemy,
and it soon became apparent that it was unoccupied.
Every one was now eager to crown the ridge, as I
think most people like myself thought that we should
then see Omdurman below us about two miles further
on. The men were all keen to see over the other side,
and though keeping their formation they regularl)'- raced
up the ridge.

It was rather a disappointment to find that we could

not yet see Omdurman, though the big white dome of

the Malidi's tomb was just visible about eight miles off.

We got a grand view, however, of the Nile, with the

gunboats steaming up to bombard Omdurman, while

on our right front we could see our cavalry about to

work round to the west of the town to reconnoitre it.

i8s

i86 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

Below on the river-bank, about a mile off and on rising
ground, could be seen the village of Egaiga, offering us
a most excellent position. The Sirdar moved the force
down to it, and we began to bivouac and prepare a
meal. While we were engaged we heard the gun-
boats and howitzers opening fire on Omdurman. The
howitzer battery was disembarked on Tuti Island after
that island and the east bank of the Nile had been
cleared of the few Dervishes on them by the friendly
Jaalin tribe, under Major Stuart-Wortley, assisted by
the gunboats.

It was most satisfactory to hear the first shell burst
in Omdurman, after all the months (for some the years)
of looking forward to this day.

The gunboats were replied to by several forts con-
structed on the river-bank, but the shooting of the
gunboats was too good for the forts, and one after
another their guns were dismounted by our shells pass-
ing through the embrasures. The gunboats had their
usual luck in not being hit by shell. It only required
one to send a gunboat to the bottom, but though the
shells hit and damaged their superstructure their hulls
and machinery were never hit.

In the meantime the cavalry (the Egyptian squadrons
under Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood, the Lancers under
Colonel Martin) had got within a mile of Omdurman,
and were rewarded by a splendid sight. The Dervish
army issued from the town, and moving wdth the utmost
precision and rapidity in formed and disciplined bodies,
were soon formed up in one long line five miles in
length. To see this line brandishing their spears, firing

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 187

off their rifles, and shouting to Allah was a splendid
sight. Having indulged in these antics they all advanced,
their cavalry spurring out to follow up our cavalrj^ who
were steadily retiring, having sent in word to the Sirdar
that the Dervish army was advancing. The Sirdar gave
the troops as much time as possible to have a meal, but
there was no time for any cooking before we formed up
as shown in Diagram VIL, and waited for the Dervishes,
who were hidden from view behind some hilly ground
about two miles on our left front. It was now about
3 p.m., and excessively hot. It was not the time we
should have chosen for a fight, as the force had been
marching since 5 a.m., but they had quite enough go
left in them.

The Dervish force after advancing about a mile had
halted, while their cavalry tried to get through ours
and observe the dispositions of our infantry. This led
to some very pretty sparring, in which our cavaby com-
pletely prevented theirs from gaining any information.

About 5 p.m. the Sirdar altered our position and
placed us as shown in Diagram VIII. , at the same
time ordering us either to make a zeriba, or, where the
ground was soft, to make a small shelter-trench. We
were now allowed to pile arms, lie down in position, and
prepare a meaL From now on we remained prepared
for attack, the men lying down in the ranks, and only
a certain number at a time being allowed to fetch water
or leave the ranks. As soon as it was dark the cavalry
came inside the infantry, while gunboats enfiladed the
front and rear of our position. It was thought that
the Dervishes meant to make a night attack, and this

1 88 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

report was confirmed b)' spies, who said they were now
bivouacked in the desert about four miles off, and that
they intended to march round us during the night, and
attack from the rear. A night attack was the Dervishes'
only chance of success. Had they attacked at night
wth the same determination wdth which they subse-
quently attacked in the daytime, it is most probable that
they would have reached our lines, and a hand-to-hand
fight ensued. Owing to the darkness, we could not
have fired with any effect until they were within two
hundred yards, and that distance would not have given
sufficient time to destro)^ their overwhelming numbers.
I heard this opinion expressed by many men that
evening who knew what they were talking about.

The Sirdar emplo5"ed a ruse to dissuade the Dervishes
from a night attack. He sent spies, who were to
profess themselves deserters from us, and inform the
Khalifa that ire were going to make a night attack on
the Dervishes. We all, of course, lay down that night
fully dressed and armed, and officers as well as men
took it in turn to keep awake and on the alert.
Every one had the utmost confidence that victory would
be ours in the course of the next day or two, but as
one did one's turn of sentry-go that night one's mind
natundly reviewed the momentous issues which were
now hanging in the scale. Here we were one thousand
three hundred miles from the nearest reinforcement
at Cairo, about to assault the stronghold of the fanatical
savagery of the Sudan. Our goal was invested with
the glamour of romance from being the death-place of
a national hero, and a goal to reach which several lives

192 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

the foot of Gebel Surgam now opened a tremendous
fire, heedless of the fact that the range was two
thousand seven hundred yards, so that hardly a bullet
fell in the zeriba. Our artillery, how^ever, was firing
splendidly, and one could see the bursting shells making
gaps in their masses. The Dervishes on our left front
were apparently waiting for their left to get right round
us, when they evidently intended to rush simultaneously
upon us. They reckoned, however, without Colonel
Broad wood. That officer was giving the Dervish left
plenty of employment, and was handling his chivalry
and camel coi-ps so as to delay them, draw them off,
and prevent them attacking simultaneously. Finding
they were suffering from our artillery the Dervishes soon
got tired of waiting for their left to get round, and the
remainder advanced to attack with a great shouting. It
was a splendid sight. A huge amphitheatre, lit up by
a blazing sun, in w^hich a mass of fearless men, clad in
gay-coloured jibbahs, waving countless flags, and follow-
ing reckless horsemen, w^ere rushing forward wath
absolute confidence of victory and absolute contempt
of death. On they came, firing as they ran, and their
bullets now began to whiz round us. Their attack was
being launched mainly on the First British and Second
Egyptian Brigades. Our artillery were firing as fast as
they could load, and when the enemy had got within
nine hundred yards the First British and Second Egyp-
tian Brigades opened fire. The fire discipUne of the
British throughout the action was a treat to w^atch ;
exactly as on parade they changed from volley-firing to
independent and back to voUey-fiiing as might be

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 191

had reserved their fire so long that they had not had
time to kill us before we reached them. The Khalifa
therefore had decided to come out in the open, to begin
firing at long range, and trust to the bravery, fanaticism,
and numbers of his men to overpower us with a rush.

As soon as the Sirdar heard the Dervishes were
advancing, he ordered us back to the splendid position
we had just vacated. Spare ammunition was placed
close behind the troops, three gunboats were drawn
up enfilading the front face, three more enfilading the
rear face. The others were bombarding Omdurman,
thereby detaining about five thousand Dervishes in that
place. About 6.15 a.m. we heard the shouts of the
advancing horde, and presently they could be seen
coming from Gebel Surgam and moving across our front.
The Egyptian cavalry, camel corps, and horse artillery
could be seen retiring steadily before them, also moving
across our front and retii'ing northwards so as not to
mask our fire. The 21st Lancers, who had gone out
along the river-bank, were similarly retiring, and now
came into the zeriba. The Dervishes moved with extra-
ordinary rapidity, shouting songs to Allah, and soon
the head of the long line of flags had reached the
Kerreri range of hills. Our artillery now (6.50 a.m.)
opened fire. A mass of Dervishes came into view over
the rising ground running out from the foot of Gebel
Surgam, so that they formed a huge crescent which
was rapidly extending and curling round its horns,
while an apparently inexhaustible supply of flags and
black humanity issuing from behind Gebel Surgam kept
the line of the crescent unbroken. The Dervishes at

• r

194 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

ordered, coolly and without any hurry. Their shooting
too was admirable ; they began knocking them over at
nine hundred yards, and within three hundred nothing
could live. The Egj^tian troops were as steady, but
they cannot shoot so well. Although the Dervishes
were falling in hundreds their advance seemed at first
to be unchecked; numbers dropped, but others were
rushing on, and coming nearer and nearer, till it almost
seemed as if they would reach us; but within three
hundred yards of the British and within two hundred
of the Egyptian Brigade scarcely a Dervish could hve.
A few miraculously escaped till within fifty yards or so
and then dropped. One or two daring horsemen calmly
stood within one hundred yards, imploring their men to
come on. The buUet-s must have been whistling past
them in hundreds, but for a few minutes they seemed
to have a charmed life. It could not last, however, and
they soon bit the ground. The rush was checked, but
only temporarily. There was a fold in the ground
about four hundred yards from us, and here they took
cover and kept up a pretty good fire, and it was at
this time that the British sustained the bulk of their
casualties. The Sirdai* had some close shaves. He and
his Staff*, being mounted, were rather prominent marks.
One staff officer got a bullet through his shoulder-strap,
General Rundle*s horse was wounded, two gallopers had
their horses shot, so it was evident the enemy were
firing at the Staff". Now and again the enemy would
try to rush forward from their cover, always with the
same result.

In the meantime the cavalry and camel corps

(^ rli \

196 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

main attack on the zeriba. The other ten thousand
so of the Dervish left made a show of attacking thi
rear force of our position ; but by this time the attaci
oil our left front had been beaten back, the attack 01
our rear was not pushed home with the same vigour
in fact, our infantry on that face did not open fire, ano
the artillery alone were able to force them to tak*
shelter in the hills, whence they occasionally fired a
few shells at us with a fair amount of accuracy. The
32nd Field Battery was meanwhile searching the
ground ou our left front with shrapnel in the most
excellent manner, and finally the Dervishes concealed
in the folds of the ground there suddenly fled to the
shelter of Gcbel Surgam, the infantry and maxims
doing tremendous execution on them as they ran. At
8.15 a.m. the attack had thus been thoroughly defeated,
and the Dervishes having retired were now in two
large groups^the larger under the Khalifa out of sight
behind Gebel Surgam, the other out of sight in and
behind Kerreri Hills, while about ten thousand having
followed Colonel Broadwood some miles northwards
had turned back to join the Kerreri group. Colonel
Broadwood followed on the heels of these ten thousand
as soon as they turned southwards.

The moment had now come for us to assume the
offensive. The Dervishes had left Omdurman and come
into the open, and the Sirdar was determined they
shoiUd stay there, and not return to Omdurman to make
a stubborn house-to-house fight. He therefore deter-
mined to march to Omdiu-man as quickly as possible,
and ordered the force to issue from the zeriba and move

SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899 195

appeared to be in difficulties on Kerreri Hills.
Colonel Broad wood had achieved his object in prevent-
ing about twenty thousand Dervishes attacking simul-
taneously with the others, but now that he w^as on the
hills the camel corps began to get into difficulties.
The camel is fast on the plain, but put him on a rocky
hill and he is the most awkward animal alive. The
Dervishes instantly perceiving the difficulties of the
camel corps, and moving wdth great rapidity, seemed
to have every chance of cutting them off; the horse
artillery supporting the camel corps remained in their
position so long, that they had to limber up to retire
within a few yards of the Dervishes, who with one
volley killed seven horses in one team, so that gun had
to be abandoned. Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood was
on the point of charging to the assistance of the camel
corps. It would have been disastrous to charge twenty
thousand Dervishes with eight hundred cavalry, but it
looked as if it would have to be done. The Sirdar,
however, had seen the sta,te of affairs, and had sent
Lieutenant Roberts to order Major Gordon's gunboat to
go to their assistance. The gunboat arrived in the nick
of time, and w^as able to pour in a deadly fire on the
Dervishes at close range, while the artillery on the
south side of the zeriba was also able to hit them.
This gave the camel corps a respite, and by excellent
management they extricated themselves and retired into
the zeriba. About ten thousand of the Dervish left
now tried to cut off Colonel Broadwood and his cavalry.
He played with them, and kept leading them further
and further north, thereby preventing them joining the

196 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

main attack on the zeriba. The other ten thousand or
so of the Dervish left made a show of attacking the
rear force of our position ; but by this time the attack
on our left front had been beaten back, the attack on
our rear was not pushed home with the same vigour,
in fact, our infantry on that face did not open fire, and
the artillery alone were able to force them to take
shelter in the hills, whence they occasionally fired a
few shells at us with a fair amount of accuracy. The
32nd Field Battery was meanwhile searching the
ground on our left front with shrapnel in the most
excellent manner, and finally the Dervishes concealed
in the folds of the ground there suddenly fled to the
shelter of Gebel Surgam, the infantry and maxims
doing tremendous execution on them as they ran. At
8.15 a.m. the attack had thus been thoroughly defeated,
and the Dervishes having retired w^ere now in two
large groups — the larger under the Khalifa out of sight
behind Gebel Surgam, the other out of sight in and
behind Kerreri Hills, while about ten thousand having
followed Colonel Broadwood some miles northwards
had turned back to join the Kerreri group. Colonel
Broadwood followed on the heels of these ten thousand
as soon as they turned southwards.

The moment had now come for us to assume the
offensive. The Dervishes had left Omdurman and come
into the open, and the Sirdar was determined they
should stay there, and not return to Omdurman to make
a stubborn house-to-house fight. He therefore deter-
mined to march to Omdurman as quickly as possible,
and ordered the force to issue from the zeriba and move

I

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 197

to the south in echelon of brigades from the left. The
probable reason of this formation was that we should
have in our rear the large unbroken body of Dervishes
on the Kerreri Hills, and they might at any moment
fall on the rear, in which case the echelon formation
would make it easy to repulse them, while at the same
time it w^as suited to repel a flank attack. The large
body of Dervishes under the Khalifa, who were hidden
behind Gebel Surgam, were supposed by most people,
I think, to have fled towards Omdurman, and I do not
think their presence there was known, consequently we
were about to execute a flank march in close proximity
to the enemy, while a large body of them were also in
our rear. It w^as a manceuvre which would require some
skill to carry out. MacDonald's Brigade, which was to
be the outside one of the echelon, had of course, in order
to reach its proper position in the echelon, to march about
a mile diagonally into the desert, while of course each
brigade except the pivot one had also to swing out some
diatfince, and with a big force of six brigades it would
reRiire some little time before the formation of the
echelon was complete, and the force could move off;
bift the Sirdar was determined at all costs to get to
Omdurman before the defeated Dei'vishes could rally
there, consequently he allowed very little time for the
force to get into echelon, and ordered the British
brigades, who were the pivot, to move oft* while the
brigades in rear struggled to make up their distance as
besllfithey could. MacDonald's Brigade being the outside
one, and having the furthest to go, was thus left quite
a niilB behind the remainder of the force. The camel

198 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

cori)s kept in rear of MacDonald's Brigade, watching
the Dervishes on Kerreri Hills, while Collinson's Brigade
marched along the river escorting the transport. The
wounded were put into boats and guarded by the gun-
boats. The Egyptian cavalry were out of sight on the
other side of Kerreri Hills, but were marching up to
bring up the rear of the force, and help the camel corps
keep an eye on the Dervishes on Kerreri Hills, and give
notice of their movements. The 21st Lancers preceded
the infantry, reconnoitring the ground towards Omdur-
man, but the extent of their front did not enable them
to discover and give notice of the Khalifa's force behind
Gebel Surgam. An incident occurred when the force
began to leave the zeriba. A group of war correspond-
ents rode out to see what amount of Dervishes had
fallen in the attack. They had not gone far before a
wounded Baggara sprang up and came for them with
his spear. The correspondents all fired at him, but with-
out effect, and scattered in all directions. Lieutenant
Smythe, seeing what was going on, rode up, and interpos-
ing himself between the Baggara and the infidel he had
selected to slay, fired at the charging Arab. He hit
him but failed to stop him, and the Arab thrust his
spear through the front of Smythe's coat and into his
arm, but before he could make another thrust Smythe
blew his brains out. For thus saving the War Corre-
spondent he was awarded the V.C.

To return to the progress of the battle : the Lancers
were trotting ahead with scouts in front and on the
flank, when suddenly the scouts came upon a khor which
only became visible at a distance of a few yards, and

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200 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

was filled with Dervishes, who opened fire. Had the
Lancers attempted to retire they must all have been shot
down. Without a second's hesitation Colonel Martin
gave the order to wheel into line and charge. It was
an awkward place for cavalry ; tha descent into the khor
was steep, there was a serried array of Dervishes waiting
in it, and the bank on the other side was equally steep.
It required a good horse to negotiate it, and any one
that fell was literally cut to pieces. The Lancers had
been longing for a rough-iind-tumble, and, by Jove, they
had got it with a vengeance. A hail of bullets swept
over them as they dashed at the khor, and then it was
every man for himself The mass of Dervishes stopped
the impetus of the charge, and each man had to cut his
way through at the walk, scramble up the other side,
and form up beyond. Lieutenant GrenfelFs horse
pecked and fell, throwing him into the Dervishes never
to rise again. When his body was afterwards recovered
a spear was found to have penetrated the back of his
watch and stopped the hands at 8.22 a.m. Second
Lieutenant Nesliam got a bullet through his right
fore-arm, a cut on the right shoulder, and as his sword-
arm fell powerless to his side they pulled away his
sword ; another man cut his left fore-arm to the bone
so that his reins dropped, another cut his helmet off his
head and slashed his right thigh, another had seized
his horse's head, but Nesham had shot him just before
his arm was disabled, and he now dug his spurs into
his horse once more. It made a great plunge and took
him clear ; as he went they aimed more blows at him,
which cut his saddlery in five places and wounded his

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 201

horse, but he got away and is now recovering from his
wounds. Lieutenant Molyneux and Captain Kenna
after charging through returned again into the melee,
and by making gallant rescues earned the V.C. Private
Byrne also earned the V.C. ; though wounded and dis-
armed he refused to leave a dismounted officer, and
kept his assailants at bay by knocking them over wdth his
horse till help arrived. As he was so engaged he was

heard to ejaculate, " the he's broken my pipe."

The loss of the short pipe which he was smoking at the
time enraored him far more than his wounds. Out of three
hundred and twenty men and horses who went into
the charge, sixty men and one hundred and nineteen
horses were killed or wounded. After riding through,
the Lancers formed up on the other side, and dismounting,
opened fire with their carbines, and so finally cleared
the Dervishes off the ground and forced them to retire.
They thus came successfully out of a contest with
about two thousand of the enemy. Several people
at home want<3d to know how it was the Lancers did
not discover the Dervish ambush sooner, but the khor
or nullah in which the Dervishes were hidden could
not be seen by an observer fifty yards distant, who
would imagine an unbroken plain was stretching out
in front of him. It was, therefore, a perfect place for
an ambush.

After the force had left the zeriba about two miles
behind, heavy firing was heard in the rear, and the
Sirdar was informed tliat MacDonald's Brigade, separated
by about a mile from the rest of the force (the cause has
been already explained), was being attacked by a very

202 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896- 1899

large body of Dervishes coming from behind Gebel
Surgam. The position of the force at this moment is
shown in Diagram X. The Sirdar immediately ordered
a movement which, if successful, would mean the cutting
in two of the Dervish force, the surrounding on three
sides of one-half, and on two sides of the other half,
while the whole lot would be debarred from retreating
to Omdurman, and would only have the desert to fly to ;
but while the movement was being carried out, that is
to say, for about half-an-hour or more, it would be
necessary for MacDonald's Brigade to sustain the attack
of the whole Dervish army attacking in front and rear.
The orders given by the Sirdar were that Colonel
Wauchope's British Brigade was to immediately hurry
to MacDonald's assistance. All other brigades were to
march to their right. This would in time cause Lewis's
Brigfule to catch the attacking Dervishes in flank.
Maxwell's Brigade would capture Gebel Surgam, and
descending the other side of it come on to the flank and
rear of the Khalifa's force, while the Second British
Brigade, doubling round on the outside of our line, would
be still more in the Dervish rear and absolutely cut oflf
their retreat. The '^amel corps were helping MacDonald,
delaying as long as possible the attack of Ali Wad
Helu's men from Kerreri Hills who were threatening
MacDonald's rear. The Egyptian cavalry by hovering
near these men also delayed their attack. It was
evident that at this moment everything depended
on MacDonald's Brigade. If they were overpowered
Lewis's and CoUinson's Brigades would also be caught
unsupported and similarly overwhelmed. We will now

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204 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

therefore follow the fortunes of MacDonald's Brigade
from the moment that it left the zeriba.

As already explained, this brigade had to march dia-
gonally into, the desert to take up its place on the
extreme flank of the echelon, and in so doing found
itself being left further and further behind. After
marching about a mile, this brigade, being more in the
desert than the remainder, came into sight of the
Khalifa's force behind Gebel Sui'gam, which was hidden
from the remainder, but owing to the distance, and the
folds of the ground, the Dervishes appeared at first to
be there in small numbers, and it was supposed that they
were the rear of the retreating Dervishes. Colonel
MacDonald, however, slightly changed the direction of
his march to the right, in order to march direct on them,
and not expose his flank to them. At the same time, he
sent to Colonel Lewis, whose brigade was rapidly getting
out of sight, to say what he was doing, and ask him to
assist by clearing out the few Dervishes who were on
Gebel Surgam, and so take the ones behind it in flank
while he was taking them in front. Colonel MacDonald
had no option in attacking, as, had he attempted to
follow the force to Omdurman, his flank would have
passed \\ithin a few hundred yards of the Dervishes.
Colonel Lewis had just received peremptory orders to
hurry up and make up his distance, so not thinking
the Dervishes were in large numbers behind Gebel
Surgam, he sent back to Colonel MacDonald to say his
orders forbade him complying with his request. Colonel
MacDonald had, therefore, to fight his way through the
Khalifa's force by himself. As the brigade advanced, it

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 205

soon became evident that it was the main body of the
Dervishes confronting them, and that far from retreating,
they were marshalling for an attack, no doubt thinking the
brigade was an easy prey. It must also be remembered
that Ali Wad Helu*s force of about twenty thousand men
was in the Kerreri Hills behind, but at this moment they
were keeping concealed, and not showing any signs of
coming on. When MacDonald's brigade arrived within
seven hundred yards of the enemy the Dervishes opened
a pretty hot fire. MacDonald halted to deploy, his in-
tention being to advance another two hundred yards.
In order to deploy, he ordered the Ninth Battalion
(Sudanese), which was leading, to deploy into line, the
mule battery and maxims to come up on their left, the
Tenth Battalion (Sudanese) to come up on their left, the
Second Egyptian again on their left, and the Eleventh
Sudanese on the extreme left, each battalion to have
four companies in front line, two in support. His inten-
tion was, when the deployment was complete, to advance
two hundred yards before opening fire ; but the guns,
when they got the order to come up, thought they were
required to come into action, and promptly did so. The
Dervish fire meanwhile was getting pretty hot, and they
had started to advance, whereupon the Ninth Battalion
became very excited, and could with difficulty be re-
strained from charging forward. Without any orders
they opened independent firing. Each battalion as it
came up, hearing the firing on its right, thought the
order had been given to open independent fire, and did
so. The Ninth Battalion w^ere now almost out of hand.
If they broke line and rushed forward into the mass of

2o6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

dervishes in front the game would be up. Our game was
to keep them at bay by our fire until we had killed so
many that we could charge the remainder. There were
about twenty thousand Dervishes, all the Khalifa's picked
troops with the Khalifa himself commanding. Colonel
MacDonald, seeing how the brigade was getting out of
hand, rode out in front, and riding down in front of the
line, knocked up their rifles and shouted to them to cease
fire. The battalion officers and non-commissioned officers
did the same, and after a few minutes, in which Colonel
MacDonald galloped up and down in front of the line,
they all ceased fire and ordered arms. Colonel MacDonald
kept them standing quite still while he harangued them
for a couple of minutes in no measured terms. It w^as
very unpleasant for them standing still in the open
under a hot fire without being able to reply to it, but
it had the effect of getting them thoroughly in hand,
and from that time on they worked like a machine.
The Dervishes took advantage of the cessation of fire,
and pushed forward to within about four hundred yards,
from whence their riflemen poured in a heavy but fright-
fully ill-aimed fire. Colonel MacDonald now ordered firing
to recommence by company volleys. After a few minutes
the Dervishes launched their attack. With a great
yelling they rose up and rushed forward, headed by
about two hundred mounted emirs, galloping as hard
as theii' horses could lay legs to the ground. Colonel
MacDonald ordered independent firing to commence.
The guns fired case shot, and every rifle and maxim fired
as fast as they could load. It was a stirring moment.
It must have been a terrific fire for the Dervishes to

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2o8 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

face. So rapid was our fire, that above the sound of the
explosions could be heard the swish of our bullets going
through the air just like the swish of water. It literally
swept away the line of charging Dervishes. One or tw^o
horsemen got within one hundred yards, and it really
looked as if they would reach us. The leading emir was
hit twice, one could see him reel in his saddle, but he
still came on at full gallop, and was just lifting his spear
when he fell within forty yards of our line, exactly as if
he had been knocked off by the branch of a tree. The
Dervishes behind, seeing the slaughter of the ones in
front, stopped and lay down about four hundred yards off,
whence they kept up a pretty hot fire. At this moment
the movements ordered by the Sirdar began to take
effect. Lewis's Brigade, although still some way from
MacDonald's, could be seen coming up fast, three bat-
talions deployed, one in support, and they soon opened
a fire on the flank of the Khalifa s force which was
attacking MacDonald's Brigade. Maxwell's Brigade could
also be seen clearing the Dervishes off Gebel Surgam,
and establishing his maxims there. Two batteries had
arrived to reinforce MacDonald, having been sent by
General Hunter, and it seemed as if the moment had
come for MacDonald to advance against the Dervishes in
front of him and roll them back on the Khalifa's black
flag (which was a prominent mark). He would thus
co-operate with Maxwell's and Lewis's Brigades, who w^ere
also converging on the Khalifa's flag. Just as MacDonald,
however, was about to give the order to advance,
Capta^in Henry of the camel corps rode up and in-
formed him that at least ten thousand Dervishes were

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210 SUDAN, CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

coming down from Kerreri Hills to attack him in his
right rear. Colonel MacDonald was for a moment dis-
posed to disregard them and go for the ones in front,
but at this moment the body of Dervishes referred to
came in sight in large numbers, moving rapidly on to
the rear of the brigade. There was only just time to
make arrangements to meet them. Colonel MacDonald
sent his galloper to tell the Eleventh Battalion on the
left to come across and form up facing the rear with
their backs to the backs of the Ninth Battalion. As it
seemed doubtful whether the Eleventh Battalion could
get across in time, ]MacDonald swung back half of the
Ninth Battalion, so that this battalion made an arrow-
head. They were ordered to open independent firing,
while Major Laurie's Battery came into action on the
right of the Ninth firing case. This slightly checked the
Dervishes, who had begun a heavy fire, and the Eleventh
Battalion, after having twenty- seven men hit while
marching across, had time to form up with admirable
st-eadiness and order; but when they opened fire the Der-
vishes were within three hundred yards and still coming
on, while the Khalifa's force were still attacking the other
face of the brigade, so that it was under a heavy cross-
fire, fortunately very ill-directed. Captain Peak's Battery,
which had just come up, came into action on the right of
the Eleventh, and the camel corps, who had all along
been watching and sparring with Ali Wad Helu's force,
now dismounted and formed on the right of the brigade.
The fire of Colonel Lewis's Brigade was now having
a marked effect on the Khalifa's force, so Colonel
MacDonald moved the Tenth Battalion from the front

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212 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

face to the rear face of the arrow-head in which the
brigade was now formed, while the Second Battalion,
moving to the right with the precision of a drill parade,
filled the gap made by the removal of the Tenth. The
Third battery (Captain De Rougemont's) came into
action between the Tenth Battalion and the camel corps,
so that now there were one and a half battalions firing
at the Khalifa's force, while two and a half battalions,
camel coi'ps, and three batteries were firing the other way
at Ali Wad Helu's force. The infantry were firing inde-
pendent firing, the guns firing case. The noise was
deafening, and was added to by the bursting of the
Dervish shells, which, however, were bursting too close
to us to do any damage. MacDonald s trumpeter was
shot at his side. The casualties of the brigade gra-
dually rose to one hundred and sixty-eight, while
those of the camel corps on its right rose to forty.
It was the last effort of the Dervishes, their last
chance, and bravely they tried to push home, but the
ground was open, and nothing could live in the open
against our fire. MacDonald's Brigade had now been
heavily engaged for well over an hour, and the ammu-
nition began to get very low. More had been sent for,
but had not yet arrived. The Dervish attack, how-
ever, was weakening, and Colonel MacDonald saw the
moment was approaching when he should advance and
charge ; but the Dervish line overlapped his right so
much that he decided to wait until he was joined by
Colonel Wauchope's British Brigade, which was now
close by and coming up fast. Since there was nothing
more to fear from the Khalifa's force, who were being

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 213

rapidly enveloped by Maxwell's and Lewis's Egyptian
and Lyttelton's British Brigades, Colonel MacDonald
wheeled the Second Battalion and half of the Ninth
into line with the remainder of his force. As Colonel
MacDonald rode up to the officer commanding the Ninth
Battalion to tell him to bring up the left half of his
battalion in line with the right half, that officer's horse
suddenly whipped round, and let fly a tremendous kick
at Colonel MacDonald, catching him fair on the leg
just below the knee. It was a wonder that it did not
break his leg. As it was, the pain was so great that he
nearly fainted. He succeeded, however, in recovering
himself almost immediately, and continued directing his
brigade. Colonel Wauchope sent the Lincolnshire Regi-
ment to prolong MacDonald's right, and brought the
remainder of his brigade up on the left of MacDonald's.
Colonel Broadwood had for some time been hovering on
the Dervish left with the Egyptian cavalry, waiting for
the right moment to charge. As soon as MacDonald
saw the Lincolnshire Regiment on his right, he ordered
the cease fire (the brigade had only two rounds a man
left), and riding out in front, ordered the brigade to
advance. The bands struck up, the Sudanese shook
their rifles aloft, and though keeping good time and
steady pace, they literally danced along ; several of them
produced whistles which they blew vigorously. They
were only waiting for MacDonald to give the signal, and
let them loose to rush headlong on the enemy, but he
kept them in hand, advancing steadily all in line; it
looked as if the next minute would bring us hand to
hand with the Dervishes. The whole armv was now in

214 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

one long irregular line advancing simultaneously, Lyttel-
ton's, Maxwell's, and Lewis's brigades enveloping the
Khalifa's force ; Wauchope's and MacDonald's, the camel
corps and cavalry advancing on and outflanking Ali
Wad Helu's force, completely cutting them off both
from the Khalifa and Omdurman, so that both the
Dervish forces had to fight it out where they were, or
fly to the desert. It was a splendid spectacle, but it was
too much for the Dervishes. Time after time they had
hurled themselves in vain against us, their whole force
had failed to overwhelm one brigade, and now they saw
our whole army advancing in line exultant with absolute
confidence of victory ; thousands of their bravest lay
dead on the field, their leaders had seen the day was
Ibst, and, after the manner of Dervish leaders, had fled.
It was not to be supposed that the rank and file would
struggle any longer ; sullenly they gave way, then
broke and fled, and instantly Colonel Broad wood saw
the moment he had been waiting for had come, and
charged in with his cavalry, turning their retreat into a
rout. Here and there single Dervishes made a brave
but futile rush at our line. At 11.50 a.m. the infantry
halted, and the battle was won. It had lasted more or
less continuously for five hours, and if we include the
ground covered by the Egyptian cavalry on our right
and the Lancers on our left, it had spread over a tract of
country about ten miles long by two miles wide. It
was fortunate that Ali Wad Helu's attack on MacDonald's
Brigade was not made simultaneously with the Khalifa's
attack. As I have explained, about a quaiter of an
hour elapsed between the two attacks, so that Colonel

2i6 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

MacDonald was able to have his whole brigade in line
to repel the first attack, and then had time to change
front to the right rear to resist the second attack. Had
the two attacks been simultaneous, the sheer weight of
numbers would probably have overwhelmed the brigade,
and then sweeping on, the Dervishes would have found
Lewis's and CoUinson s Brigades equally detached, and
they would not have been defeated until they had come
upon the two British and the Second Egyi)tian Brigades.
The bravery of the Dervishes was beyond all praise.
The Khalifa s body-guard had died to a man round his
black flag, the last man standing by it continuing to
fire on our battalions till he fell. The ground for yards
round the flag was piled with corpses, and the flag was
guarded only by dead men when our men reached it.
Major Hickman, commanding the Fifteenth Battalion,
pulled it up, and sent it to the Sirdar. Slatin Pasha
rode up and inquired from a wounded Dervish near the
flag whether the Khalifa was killed. The man rep^ed
that the Khalifa had been protected by a hole being dug
for him in the ground, and he had only been gone ten
minutes, having mounted on a fast camel.

The Sirdar was now anxious to follow up his success
by entering Omdurman as soon as possible. There
were about five thousand Dervishes in that place, and
several fugitives from the battlefield would succeed in
entering it, so unless he could get there quick we might
yet have some house-to-house fighting. The Sirdar
ordered Lewis's and MacDonald's Brigades to stay on
the ground and collect our wounded, and send them to
the boats as quickly as possible, and then follow on to

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 217

Omdurman. The two British Brigades and Maxwell's
marched down to the river at Khor Shambat close to
Omdurman, so that the men might get a much-needed
drink of water, and a short halt after the hard work of
the morning. It was now veiy hot, as it was two
o'clock before the troops reached Khor Shambat. The
Sirdar said the British Brigades might rest till 3.45,
but he only gave Maxwell's Brigade half-an-hour, and
at 2.30 p.m. he took them with him to enter Omdur-
man, telling the British to follow later. He had
the Khalifa's black flag flying behind his, and as he
approached Omdurman the gunboats opened fire on
him, thinking they were firing at the Khalifa, and not
dreaming we had reached Omdurman so quickly. The
flag was quickly furled, and a galloper sent to stop
the gunboats. The Thirty-second Field Battery had
come into action about half-an-hour previously on a
small eminence outside Omdurman and was shelling it.
In . spite of all remonstrances the Sirdar insisted on
riding ahead of the brigade as they approached Omdur-
man. The Dervishes were uncertain what to do. They
knew the day was lost, but if they were to be massacred
they would sooner die fighting. They could hardly
comprehend a conqueror having mercy, though the
Sirdar had sent a captured Dervish to explain that if
they laid down their arms their lives would be spared.
They were consequently undecided when the Sirdar
arrived. He, however, continued to ride coolly into the
town, telling the Dervishes he would spare their lives if
they laid down their arms. The question at that
particular moment was whether they would spare his

i

2i8 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

life, not whether he would spare theirs, but by sheer
bluff and by coolly riding steadily forward the Sirdar
gained his point. The Dervishes knew that their cause
was lost, and they knew that it was the Sirdar and not
only one of his brigadiers who was promising them
their lives, and so they laid down their arms to him,
though they would not have relied on the promise of a
subordinate officer. In this way the Sirdar obtained
possession of the town with practically no house-to-
house fighting, and so saved the many lives which such
fighting would have cost.

Pressing on they next came to a high w^alled
enclosure, in which some natives said there were two
thousand Baggara prepared to fight to the death. The
Sirdar requested Colonel Maxwell to assault the place
with his brigade ; but when an entrance was made it
was found to be empty, and they pressed on to the
Khalifa s house, from which the sound of his war-horn
had been heard summoning his followers to rally, so
that it was hoped he would be found there. Colonel
Maxwell had succeeded in doubling a company of
Sudanese in front of the Sirdar. As they entered a
narrow passage close to the Khalifa's houses two Baggara
hoi-semen dashed out of a gate and hurled themselves
on the Sudanese. The leading horseman speared a
Sudanese with a great spear about fifteen inches broad ;
it took off the top of the man's head just like the top of
an egg. Of course they were shot before they could do
any more, and as our men entered the doorway from
which they had come they saw a small body of horse-
men disappearing down a lane. It is thought by some

I

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 219

that these were the rear-guard of the Khalifa's escort,
and that the two men who had charged had done so in
the hope of gaining a little time. It was disappointing
for the Sirdar to find when the Khalifa's house was
reached that he had made good his escape.

While the Sirdar, General Hunter, and their Staffs
were standing in the courtyard, a shell came in and
burst right in the courtyard, killing poor Howard, the
correspondent of the Times, who after riding tlirough
the charge with the 21st Lancers in the morning was
now killed at the end of the day by one of our own
shells. The Thirty-second Field Battery had had no
orders to discontinue bombarding, and had no idea that
any of our troops had yet entered the town. The
courtyard was very soon vacated, and a galloper sent to
order the Thirty-second Field Battery to cease fire.

The Sirdar next visited the prison, and released
Neufeld, the Austrian trader, who had spent thirteen
years as a captive in Omdurman. He was loaded with
chains, and dressed as he was in a Dervish jibba and
turban, it would have been difticult to distinguish him
from a Dervish had it not been for his complexion,
which was a good deal paler than that of the English
officers surrounding him, as, owing to his imprisonment,
he was not in the least bit sunburnt. He had been
employed in the Khalifa s arsenal superintending the
manufacture of powder, and he said that the Khalifa
had visited him only a short time previously, and
upbraided him with the badness of the powder, saying
that was the only reason of his defeat. He had also
announced his intention of killing Neufeld, but at that

220 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

moment the Khalifii was told that the Sirdar was enter-
ing the town, so he had hurriedly disappeared to look
after his own safety. There were several Greeks and
some nuns, who had been living in the town unable to
escape, and were now rejoiced at the return of their
liberty. Neufeld said that none of the inhabitants had
dreamt we should win, and the Khalifa had been so
confident of success that he had invited all his emirs to
dine with him after the battle, and we found the meal
in course of preparation when we arrived.

About 5 p.m. the remaining five brigades reached
the north end of Omdurman and began to enter. Om-
durman is a rabbit-warren of mud hovels, six miles long
by about half-a-mile wide. One street (at parts very
narrow) runs down the length of this, so that it was a
matter of time for so big a force to thread their way
through to the centre, where a road led out at right-
angles to the place which the Sirdar had selected for
bivouac outside the town on the east side. Had the
force known where they were marching to the quickest
way would have been to march outside the tow^n ; but,
presumably for reasons of impressing the inhabitants,
the orders were to march through the town. The result
was that a block very soon occurred. Diirkness came
on, and camels, guns, and men seemed to be inextricably
mixed and blocked. Although most of the brigades had
reached the outskirts of Omdurman at 5 p.m., they
nearly all took till 11 or 12 at night before they
reached their bivouac, and one brigade, unable te reach
the spot, bivouacked in an open place in the town.
The transport had not a notion where their brigades

232 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

were, so very few got their baggage that night Captain
"Watson, the Sirdar's A.D.C., had arranged a capital
dinner for the Staff, and had all their baggage neatly
laid out for thorn in an open apace in the town, but he
could not find the Sirdar and his Staff. They, however,
succeeded in getting something to eat from the Guards,
and then lay down on the bare ground, aft«r sending

men to try and find Watson. General Hunter and his
Staff' were er|ually unlucky in getting their baggage.
Every one was pretty well dead beat when they reached
their bivouacs between 11 and 12 that night. We
had stood to arms at 3.30 a.m., and had been on the
go ever since, marching and fighting through a long
hot day, with vei-y little to eat and drink. But what
di<l fatigue and absence of baggage matter now that
Onuliirmnn was taken ?

SUDAN CAMPAIGN^ 1896— 1899 223

Every man in the force must have felt happier that
night than he had ever felt before, and if men, who had
only been working for this climax for three or four
years, or even three or four months, felt happy, what
must have been the feelings of the Sirdar, Generals
Hunter and Rundle, and the score of right-hand men of
the Sirdar, who had been working and fighting for this
goal for fourteen years ! All the work was now crowned
w^ith a success more ample than the most sanguine could
have hoped for. The Dervishes were absolutely pulver-
ized, Omdurman and the whole Nile valley was ours.
Gordon was avenged. The casualties on our side were
about five hundred, of which about one hundred and
fifty were killed. Out of the five hundred casualties
about one hundred and fifty were British, the remainder
Egyptian, the largest percentage being amongst the •
21st Lancers, and next with MacDonald's Brigade,
whose casualty list was one hundred and sixty-
eight. Of the Dervishes quite fifteen thousand were
killed. Officers sent out the next day counted eleven
thousand eight hundred dead on the battlefield ; to
these must be added those killed by the bombai-dment
in Omdurman and in the desert during pursuit. Several
thousand more were wounded and taken prisoners. The
remainder had fled, or taken up the r6lc of peaceful
inhabitants. From reports of the Greeks in Omdurman,
and from estimation of the numbers seen by the distance
they covered when extended, there is not a doubt that
one is making no exaggeration, but rather the contrary,
by saying that the Dervish army which took the field
on the 2nd September numbered fifty thousand. Our

224 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

force was about fourteen thousand Egj^ptian and nine
thousand British, total twenty-three thousand. The
smallness of our loss was due to the facts that the Danish
fire was extraordinarily inaccurat<5, and that the open-
ness of the ground enabled us to keep the greater part
of the enemy at a distance. Had the Dervishes stayed
in Omdurman and fought there as pluckilj'- as they
fought in the open, or had they made a night attack,
the casualty list w^ould have been very different. The
Egyptian cavalry continued the pursuit until late at
night, but their horses were dead beat. For the last
forty-eight hours they had had very little rest. The
high Nile had made the country sw^ampy for some
distance from the usual river-bank, and as the gunboat
carrying their supplies could not get near sound ground
or find the cavalry, they were obliged to return.

CHAPTER XV

The next morning the Sirdar sent the news of the
victory down by steamer. It was apparently awaited
at home with some anxiety, as for the last two days
telegraphic communication had been interrupted. The
telegraph line had been placed on poles as far as Wad
Hamed, where the force had concentrated. When the
concentration w^as completed there was no more
necessity for the telegraph as far as the Sirdars con-
venience w^as concerned, as the force was all together and
had all its supplies with it, consequently the Sirdar had
not considered it worth while to allow Lieutenant
Manifold, R.E. (in charge of telegraphs), to buy an
insulated cable such as is ordinarily used for laying
along the ground behind a force, so the bare wire which
would subsequently be raised on poles was laid on the
march. As long as the weather was dry it w^orked
well, but the rain storms that occurred had wetted the
ground too much to allow messages to pass over the
bare wire.

Going round the town one could see the damage that

had been done to Omdurman by the howitzer battery

and the gunboats. The embrasures of all the forts were

225 Q

226 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

much knocked about. The top of the dome of the
Mahdi's Tomb was knocked off, and there were several
large holes in it. There were many Dervishes Ipng
dead in the streets who had been killed by the bombard-
ment. One narrow street was absolutely paved with
them. The inhabitants told us, with what truth it is
difficult to say, that on one occasion there were one
hundred Dervishes praying in the courtyard of the
mosque : a lyddite shell burst in their midst, and
only two came out unwounded. The Dervish arsenals
were found to be stocked with a quantity of the most
heterogeneous war material : guns and Remingtons,
drums and accoutrements from Hicks Pashas and
Gordon's armies, Italian magazine rifles bought from
the Abyssinians, elephant guns, cheap revolvers, shot
guns, shirts of mail, some of them dating from the
Crusades, others made to copy them, helmets, speai*s,
shields, swords, Sudanese drums of every description.
There were many signs of the bus)'' preparation of arms
and ammunition that had been o^oinoj on. In the Emir
Yunes' house, which was a small arsenal, could be seen
in one corner piles of old rifles, in another various parts
of rifles for repairing old ones, and in another a pile of
rifles that had been so prepared. In the same way
there were powder, caps, bullets, half-made up cartridges
and ammunition ready for issue. Here also were to be
seen the famous copper drums celebrated throughout the
Sudan, also two European carriages, one of which had
belonged to Gordon. The other was the identical one
in which Said Pasha, a former Khedive of Egypt, had
driven all the way from Cairo, drawn over the desert by

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 227

oamels. There was very little of any value found. The
Khalifa, although confident of victory, had nevertheless
taken the precaution of sending all his treasure away.
It is supposed that it was sent to Gebel Gedir many
hundred miles south-west. The filth and smell of the
town was terrible. There were no good houses, only
mud hovels, in which human beings had crowded
together, killing their animals for food inside their
hovels or just outside the door, and leaving the parts
they did not eat to rot and smell w^here they lay.
Sanitary arrangements were nil. The recent rain had
made pools in the streets in which dead animals and
corpses were lying and rotting. It w^as curious to
observe amidst such barbaric existence the remnants of
a former semi- civilization in the crippled but still
working w^orkshops, and a crazy telegraph line still in
use. The only building of any pretension was the
Mahdi's Tomb, which was a well-built stone structure
wdth big white dome rising to a height of about seventy
feet. The courtyards outside were enclosed by a high,
well-built stone wall. Since so much of the Dervish
fanaticism centred in the Mahdi's Tomb, and since they
believed that even though dead he was capable of
working wonders against the infidels, and since the
tomb would probably become a goal for pilgrimages and
a rallying point in case of rebellion, it was considered
wise that it should be destroyed. Consequently the
whole thing was completely rased to the ground. The
day after the fight the troops w^ere allowed a much-
needed and well-earned rest; Arab irregulars on fast
camels were sent in pursuit of the Khalifa ; the women

228 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

of the town and what other inhabitants had not fled
were sent out to bring in the Dervish wounded from
the battlefield. Several of them were treated by our
doctors, although they were busy with our owti wounded.
Other Dervishes were taken into their houses in the
town and looked after by their women. Charges have
been made in the newspapers that wounded men were
wantonly killed by the troops. This was not the case,
but several of the Dervish wounded were killed by our
men in self-defence only, for the wounded Dervishes
would sham death when we advanced until our men
were right on top of them, and would then jump up
and attack them. Needless to sav, such men were
quickly despatched, and the frequency of the occmTence
caused the men to be pretty wary in passing over
wounded, and to fire on the slightest sign of a Dervish
jumping up. Unfortunately there were a few dastardly
camp-followers, who for a short time, when ever}' one
was too busy to stop them, looted and, if necessary,
killed the fallen Dervishes, but they were soon stopped.
Our own wounded were much more fortunate than
wounded men can usually expect to be. Very little
time elapsed before their wounds were dressed. Doctors
and medical stores were present in abundance. Then
there was no carr}'ing the wounded long distances in
stretchers, which is so painful for them. As soon as
they were sufticiently strong they were taken by
steamers to Atbara and Abadieh, where there was ample
accommodation for them in roomy, well-roofed, mud-
brick hospitals. When convalescent they travelled by
alternate rail and steamer to Cairo.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 229

On the 4 til September representiitives of every
regiment and corps paraded at the ruined sit<5 of Gordon's
Palace at Khartum. A short thanksgiving service was
held by the chaplains of all denominations, and then the
British and Egyptian flags were simultaneously hoisted.
The oflicers suri'ounding the Sirdar, w^ho was visibly
moved, shook hands with him and offered their heartiest
congratulations, and in so doing expressed the feelings
of every man of the force.

It was, I think, on the following day that a Dervish
•steamer hove in sight from the south flying a white flag
in token of surrender, and was soon alongside Omdur-
man. The Dervish commander of the boat was much
surprised to find us in possession of the town. The
steamer was observed to be absolutely covered with
l)ullet marks from small calibre rifles. The Dervish
explained that the Khalifa, having heard of the arrival
of white men at Fashoda, had sent him to defeat them.
He said he found them entrenched at Fashoda flying
ii flag w^hich he had never seen before. After a hot
engagement of a few hours he had drawn off", and had
returned to Omdurman to get sufficient reinforcements
to wipe them out, having also told all the Dei'vishes on
the river-bank in that neighbourhood to attack them.
There was, of course, much discussion as to who the
white men could be, but it was generally agreed that it
must be Marchand's party. The Sirdar, having settled
all the most pressing business at Omdurman, started for
Fashoda with a flotilla of five gunboats, on board of
which were one hundred men of the Cameron High-
landers, the Eleventh Sudanese Battalion (Major Jack-

230 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

son), half of the Thirteenth Battalion, and Captain
Peak's Batte^}^ At Renk, about one hundred miles
south of Khartum, they found a small Dervish force,
which at once opened fire on the gunboats with their
one gun, but they were very soon put to flight or
captured, and the flotilla proceeded.

Numerous hippopotami were seen, and on one occa-
sion one of the boats towed by the steamers appeared
to be aground, but it was found to have only run foul
of a hippopotamus. Two lions and numbers of every
kind of deer were seen. The banks were wooded, and
flooded for miles on each side. The stream was sluggish,
and the gunboats could steam at a good pace against
it. It is unnecessary to repeat what is matter of uni-
versal knowledge, how Major Marchand's gallant band,
after having accomplished an heroic march across Africa,
were found entrenched at Fashoda with their ammuni-
tion almost exhausted, waiting for the Dervishes to re-
appear in force to administer the coxi'p de grdce; of how
the Sirdar established the Eleventh Battalion under
Major Jackson and Captain Peak's Battery at Fashoda,
and then proceeding as far as possible up the Sobat, left
half the Thirteenth Battalion there ; and of the subse-
quent negotiations which ensued, and finished by the
French evacuating Fashoda and leaving the whole Nile
valley to us. The Shilluk tribe, who inhabited the neigh-
bourhood of Fashoda, received us wdth great joy. We
had several Shilluks serving in the ranks of our Sudanese
regiments, and they were very useful in arranging the
good understanding. The Sirdar sent a Shilluk sergeant
of long service to summon the chiefs to interview him.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 231

The Sirdar was somewhat surprised, and rendered ahnost
suspicious by the fact that, though there were evidently
plenty of Shilluks about, not more than seven made
their appearance at a time, they would then disappear
and seven more would take their place. The Shilluk
sergeant hastened to explain that he had found the
Shilluks coming in large numbers to greet him in their
national costume, which consisted of stark nakedness.
He had told them the great white Pasha would be very
angry at such disrespect; accordingly they had with
difficulty succeeded in raising seven loin-cloths, which
the entire tribe were taking it in turn to wear in order
to be presented to him. In view of the time this would
take, the Sirdar said he would be quite willing to receive
them in their national costume.

Another amusing incident arose as follows. It was
thought that the Sudanese in our ranks would be per-
plexed at meeting white men at Fashoda, and be unable
to understand the delicate relations between them and us.
As it was most necessary to avoid any untoward accident
which would precipitate hostilities, it w^as decided to
try to expLiin the delicate situation to the men. Accord-
ingly, several of the black sergeants were summoned,
and it was explained to them that we should find white
men at Fashoda, and that though they were our friends,
they were not English nor Egyptian officials, and that
they disputed our right to Fashoda, etc., etc. The
state of the case having been carefully explained to
them, they were told to inform the men. This they
were overheard to do in the following short and pithy
sentence : — ** When we reach Fashoda we shall find

231 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899

white men, but tliey are not ' Ingleesi,' tliey are thieves
and robbers." After that, the officer who had endea-
voured to explain the situation felt it was no good wasting
any more breath.

Wliile the Sirdar was proceeding up to Fashoda the
wliole of the Britisli troops left Oradurman on their

return to Cairo. They went down to the Atbara in
iiailiug-boats, tying up every uight to the bank to sleep.
Every night a storm of sand and rain came on which
required exertions to be made to prevent the boats being
wrecked. In the daytime it was difficult to get shelter
from the sun in the open boats, so that it was not a very
pleasant experience, but it was a very expeditious way

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896-1899 233

of getting the troops down. Several men travelled down
in the Bordein, the historic steamer in which Sir Charles
Wilson went to Khartum in 1885, to find it in the hands
of the Mahdi. The steamer had been used by the Der-
vishes ever since, and was now the most extraordinary
patchwork apology for a steamer you could imagine.
Her machinery was in a crazy condition. There was no
safety-valve to the boiler or steam gauge, and the only
way the engineer could tell how much st^am he had was
by opening the steam-whistle, and guessing from the
strength of the whistle what pressure of steam there
was.

By the end of September idl the British troops were
back in Cairo, that is to say, the Sirdar had only taken
ew\\t weeks to mobilize and conduct twenty-tliree
thousand men to Khartum, fight a battle, and send
nine thousand of them back to Cairo. In that time
five thousand of them had travelled two thousand
six hundred and forty miles, four thousand of them
had travelled one thousand four hundred and thirty
miles, and the remainder from one hundred and eighty
to five hundred miles, which will give an idea of the
admirable line of communications.

CHAPTER XYI

Although the battle of the 2nd September had over-
thrown the Dervish power, and the British troops had
been able to return, and several officers of the Eg}^tian
army were granted leave, yet there still remained some
very hard work to be done in the Eastern Sudan.

It will be remembered that Gedaref, about one

hundred and thirty miles south-w^est of Kassala, and

about one hundred and eighty miles east of the White

Nile, was garrisoned by a Dervish force about five

thousand strong under Ahmed Fedil. This emir had

been ordered to join the Khalifa at Omdurman, and

after considerable delay had set out to do so, leaving

part of his force at Gedaref, but unfortunately had not

reached Omdurman in time to be destroyed watli the

remainder. As soon as he had withdrawn his main

body from Gedaref, the Sirdar had ordered the Kassala

garrison under Colonel Parsons to occupy that place.

1 am sure I shall be pardoned by the officer who sent

the following account of the operations to his corps

journal, if 1 insert it here ; otherwise I should be obliged

to omit these interesting and important operations,

without which the stor)^ of the campaign would be

234

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 231?

incomplete. It was only by a mere chance that I
obtained a copy of the Royal Engineer's Jotinial, in
which the following account appears : —

Extract from Royal Engineer's JoumaL

" The readers of the Royal Engineer's Journal may
care to hear something of recent events in the Eastern
Sudan, where we are having a little campaign all to
ourselves, and with no newspaper correspondents to
chronicle events. The writer arrived at Kassala at the
end of April last, just as detachments from its garrison
were returning after a successful visit to the Upper
Atbara, where between Fasher and Ossobri they com-
pleted the dispersal of the fugitives from Mahmud's
army, and brought many of them back as prisoners
to Kassala. A period of inaction followed, broken, so
far as regards the writer, by a reconnaissance visit to
the Atbara in May, which resulted in his being the
only Egyptian casualty in a skirmish with Dervishes.
Nature, however, aided by the best and kindest of
medical treatment, worked wonders, and before the
end of June I was as well and strong as ever.

** As the days went on our minds at Kassala were con-
tinually exercised as to the part, if any, we were to play
in the coming campaign. With but a fortnightly post,
and wdth a long, expensive, and circuitous telegraphic^
connection vid Massowah with the outer world, we
were very much cut off, and so far as the Nile was
concerned we gleaned most of our news out of the
English papers. It w^as very tantalizing to be at once
so near and yet so far. When August came it w^as

236 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896- 1899

obvious that we were not to join in the advance on
Khartum, and that our only hope of action lay in the
Eastern Sudan. Our eyes turned naturally therefore
on Gedaref, where, at a distance of some one hundred
and thirty miles south-west of us, was assembled the army
of Ahmed Fedil, reputed to number from five thousand
to six thousand men. As the greatest amount of fight-
ing men we could withdraw from Kassjxla for offensive
purposes did not exceed one thousand four hundred,
it was clear that so long as the bulk of Fedil's army
was at Gedaref we would have to remain inactive ; our
hope, therefore, was that the Khalifa would withdraw
some at least of the Gedaref garrison to assist him
at Omdurman. Our intelligence patrols brought us
word on many o(*casions that orders had gone to Fedil
to come to the Khalifa, l)ut for a long time he preferred
the security of Gedaref, and it was not until a few days
before the fall of Boga that Fedil marched west to the
Bhie Nile. On the 5th September we got confirmation
of this intelligence, simultaneously with the news of
the Sirdar's victory of three days before, and on the
7th we started for the Atbara. The force which left
Kassala was composed as follows: — four hundred and
fifty men of the Sixteenth Egyptian (Fellaheen) Battalion,
which, recently raised, was to have its first experience
of active service ; four hundred and fifty men of the
local Arab Battalion, a corps which had done good work
under the Italians, and which had been taken over by
the Egyptian Government on the occupation of Kassala ;
eighty men of the Egyptian Slavery Department camel
c<n*ps ; and three hundred and seventy Arab irregulars.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 237

the command of which latter fell to the writer. One sectioa
of field hospital also accompanied the force. The camel
corps was composed of blacks, most of whom had served
their time in the Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian
army. The irregulars were organized in * bands' bjr
tribes, under the leadership of sheikhs ; there was one
band of Beni Amirs, two of Shukriahs, and three of
Hadendowas. Neither the Arab battalion nor the ir-
regulars could be termed in our sense * regulars ' ; they
all had had a certain amount of drill and training, but
the Arab nature does not adapt itself, as does the
Egyptian, to solid drill and European methods. Their
value lay in their excellent marching powers, in their
dash, and in the smallness of their wants. What little
clothing and equipment was required was entirely carried
by the man himself, and his daily ration was but one
pound of flour.

"Two days' marching brought the force to El Fasher,
at which point it was decided to cross the Atbara. The
river was there four hundred yards wide, and with a
current of three to four miles per hour, and to a force
unsupplied with bridging material, proved a formidable
obstacle. We took with us barrels from Kassala for
rafts, and as much local-made rope as we could lay liands
on; but the crossing of the river was solved by the
carpenters of the Egyj^tian Battalion, who most cleverly
constructed boats, the framework of which was made
of the wood growing by the river, and the covering
formed of canvas which was available. Oars were made
with bits of board nailed to straight tree branches. In
these boats we were able to carry from twenty-five to

238 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

thirty men at a trip, and with fewer men a considerable
ijuantity of stores. The Shukriah Arabs made some of
tlieir native rafts, on which, towed by swimmers, some
of the irregulars crossed, but the bulk of the work fell
on our six boats. Our three hundred and fifty camels
and our horses and mules were swum across by the
Shukriah Arabs, the camels being supported in front
by inflated skins. With these primitive means of cross-
ing, it took six days to transfer our force and its supplies
for sixteen days to the left bank of the river, and it was
not until Saturday, 17 th September, that we commenced
our march south.

'' On the following morning we reached Mogatta, the
point on the river bank from which we were to strike
for Gedaref, and at once formed a post wherein to leave
the hea\dost of our baggage, and some of our ammunition
and supplies.

*'At about 5 p.m. firing was heard at our outposts,
and proved to be from a patrol of forty men sent from
Gedaref to see if any troops from Kassala had crossed
the xltbara. A hundred men sent out from our post
quickly dispersed the patrol, killing some and taking
five prisoners. The remainder of the patrol hurried
straight back to Gedaref, and so put an end to any
hopes of our surprising that place.

'' The day of 19th September was spent at Mogatta in
making final arrangements, and settling what was to be
left behind there and what taken forward with the force.
As the march to Gedaref was but two days, and as food
supplies were known to abound there, but five days'
food was caiTied. One hundred and fifty rounds of

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 239

ammunition per man was taken, water for two days —
a considerable item — and the smallest possible quantity
of baggage. By this means the number of transport
camels to accompany the fighting force was reduced
to about one hundred and seventy. We started on
our march from Mogatta at daylight on the 20th
September, and with a rest from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m.
covered some twenty- two miles by 8 p.m., when we
halted for the night. The first ten miles was through
a thorn scrub so thick that the whole force had to
march in single file. The bush then became less dense,
but the grass was so rank and long, and the surface of
the ground so broken, that except for short intervals the
movement in single file had to be maintained.

** On the morning of the 21st we marched at 5 a.m.,
and at 7 a.m. our advanced guard fired on some Dervish
horsemen who had come out to scout for us. A couple
of hours later we neared Wad Akabu, the outlying
village of the Gedaref district, and some four and a half
liom\s distant from El Gedaref itself. There had always
been an observation post at Wad Akabu, and it was
not thought unlikely that we should here encounter
resistance. We formed battle array therefore just
before the village came in sight, but as we approached
closer the villagers came out to tell us that the Dervish
post had retired earlier in the day. We moved through
the village to a rain-pond south of the village, and there
made our midday halt. From the villagers we gleaned
information, some of which proved true and some of
which proved false.

*'A11 our previous reports had told us that so far

240 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

Gedaref was ignorant of the fall of Khartum, but at
Wad Akabu we heard that at last the news had reached
the Dervishes, but that it had had no effect in altering
their determination to fight, and that we would find
them drawn up outside Gedaref. Then we heard that
FediVs army had gone to Boga, and that half of it
was destroyed there and the rest scattered. This
information, as we learnt to our cost later, was entirely
false. Fedil never got nearer to Khartum than Rufaa,
and his army was at the time entirely intact and on the
Blue Nile.

*' At four o'clock in the afternoon we continued our
march for a couple of hours, when we bivouacked in
square, with our camels inside, and with posts thrown
out to the front on all fom' sides.

'' The term * Gedaref applies not only to the village
or town which was our immediate objective, but also to
a district of considerable extent surrounding the main
village of El Gedaref, or, as it is sometimes called, Suk
Abu Sinn. This district which we had now entered is
composed of undulating country of great fertility. The
summer rainfall is considerable, and after its commence-
ment dhura crops are very widely sowti, whilst the
rain-water collected in the khors and bottoms serves to
supply the villages scattered hither and thither through-
out the district. In happier days Suk Abu Sinn has
been a town of considerable size and great prosperity,
and even after the Dervish occupation the local Arab
population (Shukriali tribe) remained and continued to
annually gi'ow their crops. Gedaref was therefore a
great source of grain supply for the Dervishes generally.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 241

and Khartum was indebted to it for a large quantity of
its food.

" The march was resumed at daylight on the 22nd in
the following order : — Arab Battalion, Arab irregulars,
Sixteenth Battalion, hospital, baggage train, rear guard.
After about an hour's marching, Baggara horsemen
were seen on the hills in front watching our approach,
but they retired as we advanced. At about 8.30 a.m.
we approached a ridge of hills some few hundred feet
high, and beyond which was known to be, at a distance
of about three miles, Suk Abu Sinn. Behind the
western end of this ridge and near some convenient
water a halt of short duration was made to collect the
force before a further advance. When the order to
march was given, a quarter of an hour brought us to a
hillock from the top of which all things w^ere made plain.
Below us about a hundred feet lay a broad-bottomed
grass-grown valley running from north-west to south-
east, bounded on the north by the ridge to the western
edge of which we had just advanced, and on the
south-west by a lower ridge, which, running south-
east, ultimately died away in the plain after a couple
of miles. For convenience I will call this latter the
southern ridge, as opposed to the northern ridge already
mentioned.

** From the hillock top the whole Dervish force could
be seen one and a half miles away drawn up in the
valley bottom and on the lower slopes of the southern
ridge ; their riflemen were in lines, whilst behind them
were bodies in square formation. We could make
out altogether about six separate large groups. The

242 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

Dervishes had been waiting for us in the open since
the previous evening, and with their banners waving
and brandished swords and spears it was easy to see
that they meant fighting. Their numbers we afterwards
ascertained were one thousand five hundred riflemen and
one thousand seven hundred spearmen, a very different
quantity to the eight hundred riflemen and two hundred
spearmen that we had expected to meet.

'' Once the enemy were seen there was no delay on
our part ; our commander gave the order for the force
to move at once to the southern ridge, whence we would
at once command the Dervishes, and at the same time
insert ourselves between them and their stronghold.
The distance, about three-quarters of a mile, was
covered at a rapid pace, and necessarily so, because
we had only just time to reach a suitable position on
the ridge when rifle shots from below showed that the
Dervishes were advancing to the attack. Our force
formed line to the left to meet the advance, the Arab
Battalion on the right, the Eg}'ptian Battalion in the
centre, and half the Arab irregulars on the left. The
Dervishes moved up the hill in open line formation,
firing as they came ; our line replied, and advanced
forward slowly to meet them. The nature of the
ground necessarily divided the Dervish attack into two
— one of which opposed the Arab Battalion on our
right, the other of which was directed against the
Egyptian Battalion and the irregulars. The Arab
Battalion pressed forward and drove back those opposed
to them, and moving south towards the lower ground
with one company, occupied the hillock indicated on

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 243

plan, and with another a village in the valley similarly
indicated (see Diagram, p. 245).

" We must now return and pursue the fortunes of our
baggage train. This followed our fighting troops, but
at a considerably slower pace, and hardly had it started
from our original rendezvous when a strong body of
Dervishes were seen working on to the northern ridge
with the view of following our force on its march.
Seeing this, the Egyptian officer in command of half
the irregulars took it on himself to remain behind to
endeavour to check this advance, an endeavour in
which he was but for a very short time successful.
The Dervishes in numbers worked round the valley
top, and very soon were seen drawn up on the higher
and northern portion of the southern ridge prepared to
advance not only on the baggage train, but also on the
rear of our line, now on the lower slopes of the same
ridge. It was an anxious moment, and after consulta-
tion the Egyptian Battalion turned about to meet the
new foe in rear, whilst the irregulars advanced down
the slopes to hold in check the frontal attack.

'* The Dervishes from the hill- top lost no time, and
with banners waving advanced down the slope.

*'The baggage train offered a tempting object of
attack with its long line of slowly-moving camels. Our
camel corps, dismounted from their camels, worked for
its protection, and these steady old soldiers showed they
had not forgotten their past army service by the cool-
ness of their fire and their gallantry under difficulties.
The Dervishes, however, were not to be denied, and
pushing on caused a retirement of the irregulars and

244 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

others with the baggage train, and got in among the
baggage animals, killing some and dragging off others.
The Egyptian Battalion, however, took up a position
from which their fire flanked our retiring troops, and at
the same time did execution among the advancing
Dervishes.

'* Meantime the irregulars, who had advanced to
check the Dervishes in the valley, found their enemies
retiring before them, and seeing the baggage train in
difliculties returned to its assistance ; in this they were
accompanied by the portion of the Arab Battalion
which had not advanced to the lower hillock or to
the village in the plain. These returning troops were
successful in stopping the retirement of the baggage
guard just as the steady fire of the Egyptian Battalion
was commencing to tell on the Dervishes. Tiiis jfire,
continuous and rapid, effected heavy losses, and at last,
in the twinkling of an eye, the Dervishes turned and
fled down the southern slopes of the southern ridge.
Their course lay along the valley bed in the direction
of Suk Abu Sinn, and they were followed and kept on
the move by all available men of the Arab Battalion and
irregulars. When those in pursuit reached the hollow
north-east of the town they halted to collect themselves,
and sent civilians up into the houses to see if the place
was held or not. Tiie Dervishes had, however, gone,
and the troops advanced up on to the parade ground
outside the walled enclosure, wherein had lived Achmed
Fedil, to find Nur Angur, a Dervish leader of fame, with
two hundred and fifty of his men, waiting to surrender.
This was a happy termination to a day of varying

246 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

fortune, on which our victory was due not to any
tactical fault on the part of the Dervishes, but rather
to their bad shooting on the one hand and to the
fighting qualities of the camel corps and the Fellaheen
Battalion on the other. The latter fought in line
throughout, and its conduct was a striking tribute to
the efficacy of steady drill as a means to discipline.

** Our victory, although complete, was not gained
without serious loss, as our casualty roll of forty killed
and sixty wounded showed. It was estimated that
the Dervishes left close on five hundred dead on the
battlefield. On the second morning after our arrival
at Gedaref, Nur Augur gave us the first intimation of
the possibility of Ahmed Fedil returning to Gedaref.
Fedil had never got nearer than Rufaa to Khartum,
and his army was still intact. From Rufaa he retired
towards Abu Harras, but the arrival of steamers there
from Khartum showed him that his chances of crossing
the Nile near that point were small, and he accordingly
moved to Gebel Araing, a place two and a half days' march
from Gedaref, and there considered his future action.
Events showed how valuable was this information given
by Nur Angur, and by this act and by his subsequent
services in obtaining intelligence he rendered us very
material assistance. The Nur, a Dongalaui by birth,
the husband of seventy wives and the father of a
hundred children, is a man of between fifty and sixty
years of age. His life has been a varied one, and would
be well worth the writing. Years ago he served as a
Mudir in the Sudan under Gordon Pasha, and was in
the Government service for a long period before the

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 247

force of circumstances transformed him into a Dervish.
His career under the Mahdi and subsequently under
his successor was full of incident. He took a pro-
minent part in the fighting against the desert column
in 1884-85, and later on commanded in several of the
engagements which took place between the Dervishes
and Italians in the Eastern Sudan. A man of con-
siderable education and intelligence, he was able to
appreciate better than others how hopeless the Dervish
cause was once Khartum had fallen, and it was for
this reason that he elected to stay at Gedaref and
surrender instead of taking refuge in flight. Directly
we heard that the return of Ahmed Fedil was at all
possible w^e began to look about us, and set our house
in a state of defence.

** The Beit Zeki, as was called the enclosure where
Ahmed Fedil had lived, stands at the highest part of
a flat-topped hill, if indeed we can give the name of hill
to a rise in the ground not exceeding twenty -five to
thirty feet. From the summit the ground falls gently
on all sides, and here and there were scattered brick
houses and enclosures, the dwellings of the more im-
porta,nt Dervishes, but the vast majority of the people
dwelt in straw huts or tulkuls, which in great numbers
surrounded the Beit Zeki, and whose tops could be seen
above the crops of dhura and millet with which the
whole area was covered ; the com stood from seven
to fourteen feet high, and made it a matter of great
difficulty to form any idea of the * lie ' of the ground.
In the v(dley bottom east of the Beit Zeki lay the five
wells which form the water supply of Suk Abu Sinn,

248 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

and to maintain command of which must be an essential
portion of any scheme of defence.

"Happily within a few yards of the most southern
of the wells was situated the Bait el Mai, or treasury,
a square brick enclosure, on to the central yard of which
faced the various rooms where the business of the place
had been transacted. This enclosure, well adapted for
defence, was allotted to the Arab Battalion. The Beit
Zeki was occupied by the Egyptian Battalion, the camel
corps, and the hospital. The bulk of the irregulars
were placed in a brick enclosure north-east of the Beit
Zeki, whilst the remainder held a smaller enclosure,
which from its position flanked both the Bait el Mai
and the main fort of the irregulars.

'* These four works covered very effectively the eight
hundred yards between the Beit Zeki and the wells, and
it was easy to see that time alone was required to make
the position as a whole a very strong one. Much, how-
ever, had to be done ; banquettes from which the soldiers
could shoot over the wall tops or through loopholes had
to be made, superfluous interior walls had to be removed,
whilst, most pressing of all, the field of fire had to be
cleared. It was this latter which formed at first the
main work not only of the soldiers but also of all the
available civilians ; the corn was trodden and broken
down, the straw tukuls were burnt, and the brick
buildings, where desirable, were knocked down. The
work of defence was continued on successive days,
although we got no additional intelligence as to Ahmed
Fedil's movements; but just as we were beginning to
think that Nur Angur was the victim of a nervous

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 249

delusion the blow came. On the 27 th we sent a camel
corps patrol out sixteen miles along the western road
by which an advance on Ahmed Fedil's part would
come, and they returned about 4 p.m. announcing all
clear. An hour later, however, an infantry outpost,
placed about four miles out, fired on six Baggara horse-
men advancing from the west — horsemen who must
have been close on the tracks of our returning camel
corps. The approach of horsemen from the threatened
direction led to the order for a strong camel corps patrol
to again reconnoitre on the next day the western road.

" On the morning of the 28 th we had not to wait
long for news ; before they had gone three miles the
camel corps heard the drums and trumpets of advancing
horsemen, who were evidently not coming to surrender.
In a little time longer, bodies of infantry and a camel
baggage train were seen behind the horsemen, and we
at once knew that Fedil had returned to claim his own
again. There was no indecision about his movements.
He halted his baggage train a couple of miles from our
position, and at once advanced to the attack. Fedil
doubtless expected to find Gedaref very much as he
left it, but his riflemen must have been very much sur-
prised by the change. The Dervishes pushed up through
the dhura from the west and opened fire against the
Beit Zeki from south, west, and north, and at the
same time engaged the western and northern faces of
the irregulars' fort. A little. later the attack developed
still further to the east, and a direct frontal attack was
launched from the north against the irregulars' out-
work (No. 3 on Diagram). The Dervishes developed a

250 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

very considerable fire everywhere, and dodging in and
out among the dhura and between the tukuls were not
very easy to see. Despite the heavy fire wdth which
their advance was met, our enemy pushed on with great
pertinacity and dash, and on the nortli some of them
succeeded in occupying tukuls within sixty or seventy
yards of the Beit Zeki. The defence, however, was
too strong, and after about one and a half hours the
Dervishes fell back on all sides. A short pause then
followed, during which Fedil rallied his forces, and wnth
the aid of his reserves prepared to launch a second
attack. This advance, directed in the main against the
western and northern faces of the Beit Zeki, met the
same fote as its predecessor, and very soon a few isolated
Dervishes in tukuls were all that maintained fire against
us. A hundred of the irregulars were sent out and
cleared the tukuls, and then Fedil drew off his forces
into the valley west of the town. The two brass guns
that had been taken on the 22nd and mounted in the
Beit Zeki did considerable service during the day, and
it wa.s to us no mean satisfaction to thus turn Fedirs
weapons against himself. The Bait el Mai, or water
fort, was never seriously attacked, as a single shell and
a couple of well-aimed volleys served to disperse the
few Baggara horsemen that watched our position from
the east.

'' The Dervishes must have finally retired at about
1 p.m., but it w'as not for some time that we realized
that they liad ended their efforts, and we quite expected
further figliting later in the day or early next morning.
An inspection of the ground surrounding our forts made

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 251

on the 29th showed us how severely the Dervishes had
been punished, and the estimate of five hundred killed
docs not err on the side of excess. Several deserters
who came in were alike in their reports as to the large
number of wounded, and put down the total casualties
at more than one ' n^6 ' (eight hundred to one thousand).
The fact that our losses on the 28tli were but five killed
and thirteen wounded bears eloquent testimony to the
advantage which troops fighting behind fortifications
have against those who attack them from the open.

** During the 29th and 30th the army of Ahmed
Fedil, which, after allowing for its losses, must still have
numbered three thousand five hundred men, remained
encamped a couple of miles west of us on the lower
ground, and we had leisure to note its apparent strength,
its train of camels, and its doings genemlly. The
Dervishes spent their days in collecting dhura from
adjacent villages and resting after their labours. On
the morning of the 30th, being a Friday, they had
their usual weekly parade, and in one long line their
horsemen and their footmen made quite an imposing
array. The chief business transacted at the parade was
the decapitation of three men who had been sent from
us to Fedil with messages, and we can but suppose that
the Dervish general thought this the best way of show-
ing to his troops the contempt whi("h lie, at all events,
entertained for * the enemies of God.'

" The Egyj^tian force in possession of Gedaref w^as not
from its numbers adequate to attack Fedil, or rather
not sufficient to do so without undue risk of losing
possession of (iedaref. If we had moved out w^ith our

252 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

whole force it would have been possible for Fedil to
work round and re-occupy the place ; after leaving a
sufficient guard in the forts our little force would have
been too small to undertake the offensive. After all,
too, our main object had been obtained, the Egyptian
flag waved over Gedaref, and an Egyptian garrison was
firmly planted there. It remained, therefore, but to let
the process of time or the advent of additional Egyptian
troops dispose of Fedil*s defeated army. The curious
thing was that he should still remain with his am-
munition nearly exhausted, and when the leader for
whom he was fighting had long ago fled from Khartum.
The fanatical spirit, however, dies hard in the Sudan,
and in still maintaining allegiance to his master and
hostility to the ' Turks,' Fedil was only doing what
the Dervishes had always done before. On the Upper
Atbara, after the defeat of Mahmud, the routed and
half-starved Dervishes (blacks as well as Arabs) resolutely
refused to accept offers of pardon, and fought whenever
they had the chance ; and Fedil was only pursuing the
same course under very much easier circumstances.

'' On the morning of the 1st October Ahmed Fedil's
army was on the move, and wound its way across the
plain and over the hills to the village of El Assar,
where Fedil halted, and where, with plenty of com and
water available, he was able to make for himself a com-
fortable resting-place. This village, about three hours
south-west of Suk Abu Sinn, was a safer place for Fedil
than his previous encampment situated on the road
from Abu Harras — the road by which Egyptian rein-
forcements were certain to arrive ; and at El Assar he

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899 253

was favourably placed for a further retreat to the
south .

" After the fight of the 28th September a good deal of
work remained to be done by the garrison of Gedaref
— camels had to be sent back to bring ammunition to
replenish our much diminished and scanty stock ; our
defences had to be completed, as well as the work of
making the dirty and insanitary surroundings of Gedaref
more suitable for prolonged occupation by troops. The
Shukriah Arabs from adjacent villages kept coming in
in large numbers with their flocks and their herds and
all their worldly possessions, and to dispose of this
floating and perturbed population was in itself a task.

"As regards obtaining intelligence as to the doings
of Ahmed Fedil, the followers of Nur Angur were given
arms, and pushed forward to watch what was going on
at Assar. These men, intimately acquainted with the
country, and under a leader wlio was a master in the
arts of Dervish warfare, brought daily and often liourly
information, with the result of keeping our commander
well acquainted with whatever was happening near
FediFs head-quarters. The Sirdar was naturally kept
informed by telegram through Kassala of the course of
events, whilst letters were sent by camel to El Medinah
on the Blue Nile, where a communication from the chief
of the Staff" had informed us an Egyptian post had been
established.

"News from outside, however, seemed a long time
coming ; but at last, on the morning of the 11th October,
a camel man from Kassala brought a telegram from the
Sirdar to say that General Rundle in force was on the

254 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896- 1899

way to Gediiref, aud that he would probably be able to
march from Abu H arras ou or about the 10th October.

** It seems probable that iu a very few days after these
words are writt<^n (October 11), the actors on the Gedaref
stage will no longer be exclusively drawn from the
garrison of Kassala, and the present seems therefore a
fitting point at which to bring this narrative to a
close."

Here the account in the Royal Engineers Journal
ends, and I must continue the narrative as best I can,
although I did not participate in the operations.

News of Colonel Parsons' position at Gedaref having
reached the Sirdar, he sent General Bundle with a force
to a^ssist. Messengers liad been sent to Ahmed FediFs
force promising them their lives if they surrendered, but
that individual liad returned to attack Colonel Parsons
at Gedaref General Rundle proceeded up the Blue
Nile until he arrived at Abu Harras, from which it was
necessary to Ijranch off into the desert to reach Gedaref.
There was a long waterless march in front of him. He
could not supply his whole force with water, and many of
them were down with fever. The whereabouts of Ahmed
Fedil were also uncertain. Gunboats patrolled right up
the Blue Nile to prevent him crossing, and Colonel
Collinson started with the Twelfth Battalion to reinforce
Colonel Parsons. If such reinforcement was not suf-
ficient, he was to let General Rundle know, and he would
follow with the remainder. Colonel Collinson had a
difficult waterless march, and on approaching Gedaref
was attacked at night, but easily repulsed the Dervishes
and effected a junction with Colonel Parsons. The next

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 255

day Colonels Parsons and Collinson rode out to recon-
noitre the Dervish position with a view to deciding on
the best means of attack. On reaching it they found
Ahmed FediFs force in full retreat, and a large number
of them deserted and surrendered to us. Ahmed Fedil
now kept constantly on the move raiding villages, and it
was difficult to get accurate information of his where-
abouts. The only thing to do was to manoeuvre so as
to gradually force him on to the Blue Nile, where he
could be tracked down.

After several weeks of watching the Blue Nile to
prevent Ahmed Fedil crossing it, Colonel Lewis, on
the 11th February, received news that Ahmed Fedil with
two thousand followers was on the point of crossing
at Roseires, about ten miles distant. Although Colonel
Lewis only had the Tenth Battalion (Lieut. -Colonel
Nason's) with him, whose numbers were reduced by
fever and casualties to a little over four hundred, he
immediately set out to intercept Ahmed Fedil. On
arrival at Roseires, he found the Dervishes in the act
of crossing. About one thousand had crossed to the
other bank, while one thousand more were on an island
in mid-stream. Colonel Lewis's force at once opened
fire, but it was soon apparent that the Dervishes meant
to continue crossing and get clear away. Our men
were therefore directed to try and find the ford by
which the Dervishes had crossed to the island. After
a few unsuccessful attempts the ford was found, and
under a hot fire from the Dervishes the Tenth Battalion
waded across to the lower end of tlie island. It was
now seen that the Dervishes were strongly posted on

256 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

the crest of the small hill in the centre of the island,
separated from our men by about two hundred yards
of perfectly open ground without a scrap of cover,
while the Dervishes on the left bank of the river had
posted themselves so as to pour an enfilading fire
across the open piece of ground which our men would
have to cross.

The Tenth Battalion quickly formed up, and then
without the least hesitation charged in the most gallant
style across the open glacis through a perfect hail of
bullets from front and flank. Over a hundred out of
our four hundred men fell in this short distance,
together with Major Fergusson and six Egyptian officers,
but the remainder never wavered, and charging straight
on they drove them from their position, and pouring
a murderous fire into them as they ran they mowed
them down in numbers, driving tliem to the water s
edge, where the survivors, about six hundred, tlirew
down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners.
It was fortunate that their resistance ceased, as our men
had exhausted their ammunition. Ahmed Fedil, with
the Dervishes who had previously crossed to the left
bank, made off, and after several days gained the White
Nile, in the hope of crossing it and joining the Khalifa.
Only Ahmed Fedil and a few personal followers succeeded
in doing this ; the remainder were intercepted by the
patrolling gunboats, and surrendered themselves to the
number of about one thousand. The action at Roseires,
though a small one, was the stiffest hand-to-hand fight
of the whole campaign, as the casualty list shows. Out
of four hundred and thirty officers and men one English

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 257

ofificer was wounded, three Egyptian officers killed, five
wounded, and one hundred and fifty men killed and
wounded. The battalion throughout behaved beautifully.
Not for a second did they hesitate, in spite of the
superior numbers and the difficulty of crossing an open
space swept by frontal and flanking fire. Captain
Jennings, R.A.JM.C, behaved most gallantly. While
our charging troops swept on and closed with the
enemy, lie remained in the deadly open space still
swept by the flanking fire of the Dervishes on the
east bank, and with the assistance of the slightly
wounded he succeeded in getting all the wounded
carried off" the fire-swept zone and placed under cover,
returning again and again to the open ground to carry out
this service, thereby saving many lives. Major Fergusson,
who was wounded, had taken part in six previous actions
in the campaign, and was the onlj^ officer of the battalion
who had been wdth it since the commencement of the
Dongola Expedition ; of the other four two had been
killed, one died, one was invalided.

This action disposed of the last Dervish force in the
field in the Eastern Sudan. There now remained only
the force under the Khalifa himself.

When the Khalifa fled from Omdurman he was obliged
to follow the Xile for one hundred and eighty miles as far
as Ed Duem, which is the first place where a line of water-
pools makes it possible to strike south-east into the
desert. Following this route, he had not halted until he
had reached Lake Sherkeleh, about one hundred and
twenty miles south-east from Ed Duem. Here he had
been joined by the remnant of his forces, and promptly

8

258 SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899

proceeded to raid the neighbouring tribes in order to col-
lect supplies. The Sirdar established the second Egyptian
Battalion at Ed Duem under Lieutenant-Colonel Pink.
To this post the Arabs constantly brought news of the
Khalifa, complaining of the way in which they were
being raided, and asked for assistance ; but, native like,
thought their request would not be granted unless they
minimized the difficulty of the undertaking, conse-
quently they understated the strength of the Khalifa's
force, and made out that he had only seven hundred
men. These reports having been forwarded to the Sii'dar,
he decided to send his brother, Colonel Kitchener, to
attack the Khalifa. To do this he gave him four hun-
dred and fifty of the Fourteenth Sudanese Battalion under
Lieutenant-Colonel Shekleton, four hundred and fifty of
the Second Eg}"ptian Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel
Pink, and about fifty Arab cavalry (ex-Dervishes) under
Lieutenant-Colonel Mitford and Major Williams, while
Lieutenant-Colonel Tudway acted as Staff officer to the
column. They had a difficult march in front of them,
as they could not rely on getting water for one hundred
and twenty miles, that is to say, until they were close to
the Khalifa, but the usual arrangements for carrying water
and economizing it were made. After a trying march
they arrived within a short dist<ance of the position, and
heai'd with dismay that the Khalifa had used up all the
water at his camp, and had moved to the place w^here
they had hoped to water. This meant very careful
husbanding of the w\ater they still had with them.
They soon came upon the deserted encampment of the
Khalifa, and here another unpleasant fact was revealed.

SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896— 1899 259

Far from being the encampment of seven hundred men
it was the camp of a few thousand, and it became evident
to Colonel Kitchener that his force was not big enough.
However, he decided to reconnoitre the enemy and
obtain accurate information. Accordingly he moved on
till within three miles of the Khalifa. Here he formed
a zeriba, and sent Lieutenant-Colonel Mitford and
Major Williams to reconnoitre with their fifty ex-Dervish
cavalry, who turned out first-rate scouts. Mitford and
Williams soon found the enemy drawn up for a fight,
and estimated that there were no less than four thousand
men with rifles and about three thousand spearmen.
They returned with this intelligence to Colonel Kitchener,
who of course decided it would be madness to engage
the enemy. Accordingly he immediately retired. The
Khalifa started in pursuit, but halted when he reached
Colonel Kitcheners deserted zeriba. His emirs did
their best to persuade him to follow up Colonel Kitchener,
but he was convinced the Egyptians had a large force
concealed, on to which they were trying to draw him,
and he refused to follow up, fortunately for Colonel
Kitchener. The force, however, had a very trying march
back to the river on very short water allowance.

Though the Khalifa thus escaped destruction, it is
only a respite. His days are numbered. In the coming
autumn, when the rains have fallen and filled up all
water-pools in the desert, the Sirdar intends, so we hear,
to at any rate drive him beyond the limits of the Sudan,
even if he has not the fortune to capture him. At the
same time Darfur and Kordofan will be taken over. The
only task then remaining will be to cut through the Sudd

26o SUDAN CAMPAIGN, 1896—1899

from Faslioda to Duffile, to open communication with
the Lakes and Uganda. This will be a difficult, tedious,
and dangerous undertaking. Baker, Gessi, and Gordon
all nearly lost their Uves, and spent months wandering
through the dreary Sudd in days when it was not so
overgrown as now. But once it is done it will be com-
paratively easy to keep the channel open, and steamers
can then ply from Khartum to the cataract at Duffile.
There a short railway will perhaps turn the cataract,
and then on in steamers to the lakes. When the rail-
way reaches Kliartum, as it will in the autumn, when
Mr. Khodes's railway reaches Tanganyika, and when the
Sudd is cut through, we shall have steam and telegraphic
communication from Cairo to the Cape. This will
suffice for many, many years to come. It will be gener-
ations before the time comes when steamer and boat
communication from Khartum to the lakes will not
suffice to fully develop and work the countries bor-
dering the Nile. Far more urgent and useful lines
await the immediate attention of the railway en-
gineer — first from the Red Sea to Kassala, Gedaref,
and the Blue Nile, and secondly westwards from Khar-
tum to Darfur. "When those hues are completed we
shall have steam communication with every part of the
Sudan. It is unnecessary to point out the strategic
value of the first when we consider the position of our
powerful and warlike neighbour Abyssinia. The recent
operations against Ahmed Fedil in the neighbourhood
of Gedaref demonstrated the difficulty of moving and
supplying even a small force in that neighbourhood,
and showed up a weak spot in our frontier.

1^

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SUDAN CAAfPAIGN, 1896-1899 261

But now I am leaving the domain of accomplished
facts and launching into the regions of speculation. It
is time that I closed the account of the Sudan campaign.
To any one who took part in it, it was, I think, evident
that the success and smooth working of the operations
were due (1) to the genius and untiring perseverance of
our commander, (2) to the speed and thoroughness with
which Lieutenant Girouard carried out the laying of the
railway, (3) to the fact that all men in responsible
positions were men who had spent several years on the
frontier, and so had acquired such a thorough knowledge
of the country and its people, that they knew exactly
how to carr}^ out a campaign, which has given to us the
whole of the Nile valley, the Eastern Sudan to the Red
Sea and the Abyssinian border, the Bahr el Ghazal,
Kordofan and Darfur in the Western Sudan. British
dominion from the Cape to Cairo is an accomplished
fact ; and tliough the campaigns of Egypt have not been
productive of such battles as occurred in the Peninsula,
the Crimea, and in India, yet we may find that the
future African historian will consider the battles of Tel
el Kebir and Khartum as decisive in African history as
the battle of Plassy was in the history of India.

THE END.

Richard Clay A Sok«, Limited,

*■>] \ LOXDON A BUKOAV.

> (

I

!

CHARLES NEDFELD-S NEW BOOK.

H prisoner of the Ikbaleeta

TWELVE YEARS' CAPTIVITY IN OMDURMAN,

By CHARLES NEUFELD.

With Illustuationr, Maps, and Plans.

SECOND EDITION
Demy 8vo, 12j.

SOME PRESS OPINIONS.

The Olohe says : — '* Mr. Neufeld certainly has a remarkable story to tell —a
story full of excitement and characterized to some extent by variety. As a
narrative of personal adventure it is absorbing. ... Of the horrors endured by
liim in prison the author gives a vivid and heartrending description. . . . Mr.
Neufeld hns a valuable chapter on the subject, *How Gordon Died.* It will be
read with the greatest interest. 'J he whole l)ook is sure to appeal powerfully to a
large number of readers, and to take a leading place in the literature of African
warfare."

The Daily News says : — ** Mr. Neufeld's book is indispensable to a thorough
study of recent Soudanese history."

The Westmiiistcr GazeUe saya: — "Truth is stranger thsn fiction and often
more exciting, and readers of Mr. Neufeld's narrative will hardly need to be re-
minded of the fact The work jiromises to be one of the successful books of the
year.'*

The PaU Mall Gazette says : — " It is wonderful that any man should have
lived through a year of it ; and, indeed, the problem which the book most natur-
ally suggests is to ask how men did live. Many also will be keen to hear the
story of Gordon's death as it was told to Mr. Neufeld by the body-servant who
slept at Gordon's door and brought the final alarm. The story has the rins of
tnitli about it, and is a fine tale of a fight ; more consonant, too, with probability
than the version hitherto accepted, which represents the white Pasha as standing
to be cut down."

The Iforniiiq Post says : — ** Independent of Mr. Neufeld's personal experiences
his book contains much valuable information."

The Liverpool Post says : — "A dramatic interest attaches to the narrative in
which Mr. Charles Neufeld relates his twelve years' experiences at Omdurman.
He has endeavoured to tell a ]>lain, unvarnished tale, but the directness makes
the account of his captivity all the more vivid. This is one of those cases in
which word painting is unnecessary ; the facts are too remarkable and striking,
and the statement of them is enough. All the accounts we have had hitherto
concerning the inspiration and character of Mahdism in the Soudan become faint
hearsay beside this relation of Neufeld. The book is fascinating even when we
are following the writer through its gloomiest horrors. At the close the reader is
left with the conviction that never was a greater benefit conferred on mankind
than when at Kerreri British powers swept away in headlong ruin this portentous
recnidesceuce of fanatical barbarism."

The Bimiingham Gazette says: — ** A record of almost indescribable suffering,
Mr. Neufeld 's stoiy is plainly written and frankly told. . . . Mr. Neufeld's
book is a graphic piece of historv, and a valuable contribution to the story of the
Soudan during its last years of horror . . . The volume is well illustrated."

CHAPMAN & HALL, Ltd., LONDON.

• MR. BENNET BURLEIGH'S TWO BOOKS ON THE SOUDAN.

Strbar anb Ikbaltfa

OR

THE RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN.
By BENNET BURLEIGH.

With Portraits, numerovs Illustrations, Maps, and Plan of Battle.

FOURTH EDITION,
Demy 8vo, 12«.

The Daily JVcm-j Hay« :— " Picturesque, 8])irited, and trustworthy narrative. . . . The book
conipriiM*8 a MUiiiiiiary of the military situation, and a glance at the probable courae of the
renewed ()i>erationH which are now on the point of couiniencing."

The Pall Mall Gazttti aaj'8 :—'* Nothing could be more timely. It i« unnecessary at this
time of day to MCM'ak of Mr. Burleigh's familiar style . . . always to the point, clear, ojid
>igorous ; or of liis nutter — the matter of an ex)»erienced, shrewd, and fearlesji war corre-
HiK>ndt>nt. The book \a Just the b<K>k for the occasion, and will make the tale that is coming
directly more real to many of us. Mr. Burleigh gives a few useful introductory ohaiiters
dealing with previous events, and a very interesting nccount of a triji to Kassala, ' our new
jtossession ' ; but in the main it is the story of the Atbara camxmign. The b(»ok makes good
roftding, entirely aiiart fh)m its timely instructiveness."

The W*»tmui*ter (rozftU says :— " The book is profoundly interesting. Readers familiar with
the author's letters in the Z)tt*7y Telffrmph do not need to be told that he is a master of \i>id
and ](icture.s(iue narrative. Mr. Burleigh has been an eye-witness during the course of all the
camiMiigns in the Soudan in which British troops have been employed, and therefore writes out
of full knuwle<lge and exi)erience."

Ikbattoum CampaioHt 1898

OR

THE RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN.

By BENNET BURLEIGH.
With Maps, Plans of Battles, Illustrations, and Portrait of the Author.

THIJtD £DITIOX.
Demy 8vo, 12«.

LiUraturt says :— " Mr. Bennet Burleigh has done wisely in vraiting to bring out his con-
tiniution of the story of the Soudan until he could round it off with some decent approach to
completion of subject, if not maturity of judgment. . . . But his book has a distinct value of
its own, in spite of anything tliat his predecessors have produceil, for he g.ithers uj) in one
coherent whole the progress of events from the advance sfter the Atbara to the initiation of the
Gordon Memorial College and the conclusion of the Fashoda incident. . . . Tlie camjiaign
itself was worthy of a more permanent record ftom the same pen which gave us so many \ivid
scenes while it was actually In progress, and Mr. Burleigh has considerably increased the \'nlue
of his original work by revisions and additions, and m»>re especially by incorpomting with it
many iMtjiers and letters from oftl'-isl sources, which are here very conveniently placed beside
the reconl of the events to which they refer."

The Athentyuia says :— "Mr. Bennet Burleigh has had the advantage of much experience of
Egypt and the Skmdan, and his Khartoum Cauipaign, 1898 (Chapman A Hall), will hold its owni
bt^sidp any other volume prof\uced by the correspondents who accompanied the expedition.
Alt<jgether his lMK)k is on appn>priate setpiel to his Sittlar and Khalij'a. . . . The illustnitions
are abundant and ni)prt>i»riate."

The Ihiili/ Chronicle says : — " Here we have an attempt at last to render an account of the
late ramiMiijiU on the Nile in a manner at once readable and instructive. ... It is very good,
an<l it is the best we are likely t^» hav»> for some ye irs at ouy rate, ... It is impassible to
resist the conviction that Mr. Diu-leigh feels every word he has written."

♦

CHAPMAN & HALL, Ltd., LONDON.

To avoid fine, this book should be returned on
or before the date last stamped below

tOM-«*S7-l77Sf

I

.'■ DT 106.5 .5M3 C.I

cl Th«8ud«nctmpilgn, 189APN2126 ^- ri O

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