^v>J-
OCT 2 9 1954
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
NIHIL OBSTAT:
Fr. Gabriel Coyle, O.P., S.T.L.
Fr. Hilary Carpenter, O.P., S.T.L. , B.Litt.
IMPRIMATUR:
Fr. Bede Jarrett, O.P.,
Prior Provincial.
June 22, 1929 :
In festo B. Innocentii V.
NIHIL OBSTAT:
Georgius D. Smith, S.T.D.,
Censor deputatus.
IMPRIMATUR:
Edm. Can. Surmont,
Vicarius generalis.
Westmonasterii,
die 29 A prills, 1929.
THE SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES
OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS
THE FOURTH BOOK
LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN FATHERS
New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, San Francisco
BENZIGER BROTHERS
PRINTERS TO THE HOLY APOSTOLIC SEE
First fubliihea in 1929
Made and Printed in Great Britain
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. FOREWORD ------- I
II. THAT IN GOD THERE ARE GENERATION, PATERNITY, AND FILIA-
TION -------6
III. THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD ----- 8
IV. THE OPINION OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD :
AND ITS REFUTATION - - - - "9
V. THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD :
AND ITS REFUTATION - - - - 1 5
VI. CONCERNING THE OPINION OF ARIUS ABOUT THE SON OF GOD l8
VII. REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS - - -22
VIII. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED BY ARIUS IN SUPPORT
OF HIS VIEW - - - - - 29
IX. EXPLANATION OF THE TEXTS QUOTED BY PHOTINUS AND
SABELLIUS - - - - - - -40
X. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION AND PROCES-
SION - - - - - - -42
XI. THE MEANING OF GENERATION IN GOD, AND OF THE SCRIP-
TURAL REFERENCES TO THE SON OF GOD - - "47
XII. HOW THE SON OF GOD IS CALLED THE WISDOM OF GOD - 59
XIII. THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE SON IN GOD - - - 60
XIV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE
DIVINE GENERATION - - - 65
XV. OF THE HOLY GHOST : THAT HE IS IN GOD - - 72
XVI. REASONS FOR WHICH CERTAIN MEN HAVE DEEMED THE HOLY
GHOST TO BE A CREATURE - - - - 72
XVII. THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS TRUE GOD - - - "75
XVIII. THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON - - 82
XIX. THE MEANING OF STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE ABOUT THE
HOLY GHOST - - - - - - -85
XX. OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED BY SCRIPTURE TO THE HOLY GHOST
IN RESPECT OF ALL CREATURES - - - - 88
XXI. OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, AS REGARDS
THE GIFTS BESTOWED BY GOD ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE 90
V
vi CONTENTS
CHAPTER AGE
XXII. OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, ACCORDING
AS HE MOVES THE CREATURE TO GOD - - - 94
XXIII. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE, AGAINST THE
DIVINITY OF THE HOLY GHOST - - - "97
XXIV. THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON - - IO3
XXV. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THAT THE HOLY
GHOST PROCEEDS NOT FROM THE SON : AND THEIR
SOLUTION - - - - - - III
XXVI. THAT THERE ARE NO MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD :
NAMELY, THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY GHOST II3
XXVII. OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD, AS HANDED DOWN IN
HOLY SCRIPTURE - - - - - Il6
XXVIII. THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION - - II7
XXIX. THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS CONCERNING THE INCARNA-
TION - - - - - - -II9
xxx. the error of valentine about the incarnation - i23
xxxi. the error of apollinaris concerning christ's body - 1 26
xxxii. the error of arius and apollinaris concerning
Christ's soul ------ 128
xxxiii. the errors of apollinaris, who said that christ had
not a rational soul j and of origen, who said
that christ's soul was created before the world 130
xxxiv. the error of theodore of mopsuestia concerning the
union of the word with man - - " *33
xxxv. against the error of eutyches - - - "145
xxxvi. the error of macarius of antioch, who said that
there was only one will in christ - - - 151
xxxvii. refutation of those who maintained that christ's
body and soul were not united together - - 1 54
xxxviii. refutation of those who hold that in the person
of christ there are two hypostases or supposits 1 57
xxxix. the teaching of the catholic church on the incarna-
tion of christ ----- 160
xl. objections against faith in the incarnation - - 162
xli. how we are to understand that the son of god was
incarnate - - - - - - i 64
xlii. that it was most becoming to the word of god that
he should take human nature - - - 1 69
CONTENTS vii
CHAPTER PAGE
XLIII. THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD DID NOT
EXIST BEFORE IT WAS ASSUMED, BUT WAS ASSUMED BY
THE. WORD AT THE MOMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION - 170
XLIV. THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD WAS PER-
FECT IN BODY AND SOUL AT THE MOMENT OF CONCEPTION 1 72
XLV. THAT IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE BORN OF A
VIRGIN ------- 174
xlvi. the christ was conceived by the holy ghost - - 177
xlvii. that christ was not the son of the holy ghost accord-
ing to the flesh - - - - - 1 78
xlviii. that we must not say that christ is a creature - - 179
xlix. reply to the objections given above against the in-
carnation ------ 180
l. that original sin is transmitted by our first parent
to his posterity ----- 183
li. arguments against original sin - 186
lii. reply to the above arguments - 189
liii. arguments that would seem to show that it was not
fitting that god should be incarnate - - 195
liv. that it was fitting for god to be incarnate - "199
lv. reply to the arguments given above against the fit-
tingness of the incarnation - - - - 204
lvi. of the necessity of the sacraments - - - 2l8
lvii. of the difference between the sacraments of the old
and of the new law - - - - - 219
lviii. the number of the sacraments of the new law - - 220
lix. baptism ------- 222
lx. confirmation ------ 223
lxi. the eucharist ... - 224
lxii. the error of unbelievers concerning the sacrament
of the eucharist ----- 225
lxiii. solution of the foregoing difficulties : and first
with regard to the changing of the bread into
Christ's body ------ 229
lxiv. solution of the difficulties as regards place - - 233
lxv. solution of the objections on the part of the
accidents ------ 234
lxvi. solution of the objections on the part of action and
PASSION ------ 236
viii CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGB
LXVII. SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN REGARD TO BREAKING
OF THE HOST ------ 239
XLVHI. EXPLANATION OF THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE - - 24O
LXIX. WHAT KIND OF BREAD AND WINE SHOULD BE USED IN
THIS SACRAMENT .... - 240
LXX. THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE : AND FIRST THAT IT IS POS-
SIBLE FOR A MAN TO SIN AFTER RECEIVING SACRA-
MENTAL GRACE ------ 243
LXXI. THAT A MAN WHO HAS SINNED AFTER RECEIVING THE
GRACE OF THE SACRAMENT CAN RETURN TO GRACE - 246
LXXII. THE NECESSITY OF PENANCE AND OF ITS PARTS - - 248
LXXIII. THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION - - - 253
LXXIV. THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER ----- 257
LXXV. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ORDER - - - - 260
LXXVI. OF THE EPISCOPAL DIGNITY : AND THAT ONE BISHOP IS
OVER ALL ------ 261
LXXVII. THAT THE SACRAMENTS CAN BE DISPENSED BY WICKED
MINISTERS ------ 264
LXXVIII. THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY - - - - 266
LXXIX. THAT OUR BODIES WILL RISE AGAIN THROUGH CHRIST - 268
LXXX. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE RESURRECTION - - - 27 1
LXXXI. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS - - 273
LXXXII. THAT MAN WILL RISE AGAIN IMMORTAL - - - 280
LXXXIII. THAT AFTER THE RESURRECTION THERE WILL BE NO USE
OF FOOD OR VENERY ----- 283
LXXXIV. THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE
THE SAME NATURE AS BEFORE - - - - 292
LXXXV. THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE
A DIFFERENT DISPOSITION FROM THAT WHICH THEY
HAD BEFORE ------ 295
LXXXVI. THE QUALITY OF GLORIFIED BODIES - - 296
LXXXVII. THE PLACE OF THE GLORIFIED BODIES ... 299
LXXXVIII. THE SEX AND AGE OF THOSE WHO WILL RISE AGAIN - 300
LXXXIX. THE QUALITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION AS
REGARDS THE DAMNED ----- 301
XC. HOW INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES CAN SUFFER FROM A
MATERIAL FIRE - - - - - - 303
XCI. THAT THE SOUL WILL RECEIVE ITS PUNISHMENT OR RE-
WARD, AS SOON AS IT DEPARTS FROM THE BODY - 306
CONTENTS ix
CHAPTER PAGE
XCII. THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEATH THE SOULS OF THE JUST
HAVE THEIR WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON THE GOOD 3II
XCIII. THAT THE SOULS OF THE WICKED AFTER DEATH HAVE THEIR
WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON EVIL - - "313
XCIV. THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF WILL OF THE SOULS IN PUR-
GATORY - - - - - - "3 I 4
XCV. THE COMMON CAUSE OF THIS UNCHANGEABLENESS IN ALL
SOULS AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY - 315
XCVI. THE LAST JUDGEMENT - - - - - -3*7
XCVII. THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGEMENT - 318
THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
FOURTH BOOK
CHAPTER I
FOREWORD
Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways : and seeing we have
heard scarce a little drop of his word, who shall be able to behold the
thunder of his greatness ? (Job xxvi. 14).
For as much as the human intellect acquires knowledge
in a manner conformable with its nature, it cannot by itself
arrive at an intuitive knowledge of the divine substance in
itself, since the latter infinitely transcends the whole range
of things sensible, nay all other beings whatsoever.
Nevertheless, seeing that man's perfect good consists in
his knowing God in some way, lest so noble a creature
should seem to be utterly void of purpose, through being
unable to obtain its own end, man has been given the
means of rising to the knowledge of God. For, since all
the perfections of things come down from God the summit
of all perfection, man begins from the lowest things and
rising by degrees advances to the knowledge of God : thus
too, in corporeal movements, the way down is the same as
the way up, and they differ only as regards their beginning
and end.
Now this descent of perfections from God presents a
twofold aspect. In the first we look at it from the view-
point of the origin of things : since divine wisdom, that
there might be perfection in things, established a certain
order among them, so that the universe might be made up
of the highest as well as the lowest things. The second
2 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
aspect is that of the things considered in themselves ; for,
since causes rank higher than effects, the things caused
first fall short of the first cause, namely God, while they
transcend their own effects, and so on until we come to
those things that are caused last. And because in God, the
summit of all things, there is found the most perfect unity ;
and since the more a thing is one, the greater its power
and worth, it follows that the further we recede from the
first principle, the more do we find things to be diversified
and varied. Consequently the things that proceed from God
must needs derive unity from their principle, and multi-
plicity from the ends to which they are ordained. Accord-
ingly from the diversity of things we consider the diversity
of ways, as beginning from one principle and terminating
in different things.
Wherefore our intellect is able to mount by these ways
to the knowledge of God; and yet by reason of the weak-
ness of our intellect we are unable to know perfectly the very
ways themselves. Because, as our senses, wherein our
knowledge begins, are directed to exterior accidents, such
as colour, smell, and the like, which are by themselves
sensible, the intellect is scarcely able through suchlike
externals to arrive at the knowledge of what lies within,
even in those things whose accidents it grasps perfectly
through the senses. Much less, therefore, will it be able to
succeed in comprehending the nature of those things, of
whose accidents but few can be grasped by the senses, and
still less the nature of those things whose accidents cannot
be grasped, although it may be partly gathered from certain
effects that fall short of those things. But, even though-
the very natures of things were known to us, nevertheless
their order, in so much as by divine providence they are
both referred one to another and directed to their end,
could be but little known to us, since we cannot succeed in
knowing the purpose of divine providence.
iWherefore, if the ways themselves are known by us but
imperfectly, how can they serve us as a means of obtaining
perfect knowledge of their principle, which transcends them
CHAPTER I 3
out of all proportion ? Even if we knew those same ways
perfectly, not yet should we have perfect knowledge of
their principle.
Since then it was but a meagre knowledge of God that
man was able to obtain in the above ways by a kind of
intellectual insight, God of His overflowing goodness, in
order that man's knowledge of Him might have greater
stability, revealed to man certain things about Himself
which surpass the human intelligence. In this revelation a
certain order is observed, in keeping with human nature,
so that the imperfect leads to the perfect, as happens in
other things subject to movement.
Accordingly, at first, these things are revealed to man,
yet so that he understands them not, but merely believes
them as things heard by him, because his intellect, in this
state of life wherein it is connected with sensibles, is
utterly unable to rise so as to behold such things as
transcend all proportion to the senses : but, when freed
from this connection with the senses, then it will be raised
so as to behold the things revealed.
Hence man's knowledge of divine things is threefold.
The first is when man, by the natural light of reason, rises
through creatures to the knowledge of God. The second
is when the divine truth which surpasses the human intelli-
gence comes down to us by revelation, yet not as shown to
him that he may see it, but as expressed in words so that
he may hear it. The third is when the human mind is
raised to the perfect intuition of things revealed.
This threefold knowledge is indicated by the words of
Job quoted above. — The words, These things are said in
part of his ways refer to the knowledge in which our intel-
lect rises to the knowledge of God by the way of creatures.
And because we know these ways but imperfectly, he
rightly adds in -part : since we know in part, as the Apostle
says (i Cor. xiii. 9). The words that follow, And seeing
we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, refer to the
second knowledge, wherein divine things are revealed to
our belief by way of speech : because faith, as it is said, is
4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
by hearing, and Hearing is by the word of Christ, 1 of
which it is also said (Jo. xvii. 17) : Sanctify them in truth.
Thy word is truth. Wherefore, since the revealed truth in
divine things is offered not to our sight but to our belief,
he rightly says we have heard. And whereas this imperfect
knowledge flows from that perfect knowledge whereby the
divine truth is seen in itself, when revealed to us by God by
means of the angels who see the face of the Father, the
expression drop is appropriate : hence it is said (Joel iii. 18) :
In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness. But
since not all the mysteries which the angels and blessed
know through seeing them in the first truth, are revealed to
us, but only a certain few, he says pointedly a little. For
it is said (Ecclus. xliii. 35, 36) : Who shall magnify him as
he is from the beginning? There are many things hidden
from us, that are greater than these: for we have seen but
a few of his works. Again the Lord said to his disciples
(Jo. xvi. 12): J have yet many things to say to you: but
you cannot bear them now. Moreover these few things
that are revealed to us are proposed to us figuratively and
obscurely, so that only the studious can succeed in under-
standing them, while others revere them as things occult,
and so that unbelievers are unable to deride them. Hence
the Apostle says (1 Cor. xiii. 12) : We see now through
a glass in a dark manner; wherefore Job adds signifi-
cantly the word scarce, to indicate difficulty. — When he
goes on to say, Who shall be able to behold the thunder
of his greatness? he is referring to the third knowledge,
whereby the first truth shall be known as an object not of
belief but of vision, for we shall see him as he is (1 Jo. iii 2),
wherefore he says behold. Nor shall a small portion of
the divine mysteries be perceived, but the divine majesty
itself shall be seen, and the entire perfection of good
things: hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod xxxiii. 19) :
J will show thee all good; wherefore he says rightly great-
ness. Nor will the truth be revealed to man obscurely,
but made clearly manifest : wherefore our Lord said to His
1 Rom. x. 17.
CHAPTER I 5
disciples (Jo. xvii. 25) : The hour cometh when I will no
more speak td you in proverbs, but will show you plainly
of the Father; hence the word thunder is significant as indi-
cating manifestation.
Now the passage quoted is suitable to our purpose :
because hitherto we have spoken of divine things, in as
much as natural reason is able to arrive at the knowledge
of them through creatures ; imperfectly however and as far
as its own capacity allows, so that we can say with Job : Lo,
these things are said in part, of his ways.
It remains then for us to speak of those things that
God has proposed to us to be believed, and which surpass
the human intelligence. In what manner we are to proceed
in this matter we are taught by the words quoted above.
For seeing that we scarce hear the truth in the words of
Holy Writ, coming down to us like a little drop, and since,
in this state of life, no man is able to behold the thunder
of His greatness, we must proceed in such sort that the
things delivered to us in the words of Holy Writ shall
serve as principles. Thus we shall endeavour in some
fashion to grasp what is delivered to us in a hidden manner
by the aforesaid words, and to defend them from the
attacks of unbelievers ; yet so as not to presume that we
understand them perfectly. For such things are to be
proved by the authority of Holy Writ, and not by natural
reason : and yet we must show that they are not opposed
to natural reason, so as to defend them from the attacks of
unbelievers. This manner of procedure has in fact already
been decided on at the outset of this work. And since
natural reason rises to the knowledge of God through
creatures, while on the other hand the knowledge of God by
faith comes down to us by divine revelation, and since the
way of ascent is the same as that of descent, we must needs
proceed by the same way in those things above reason
which are an object of faith, as that which we followed
hitherto in those matters concerning God which we in-
vestigated by reason.
Accordingly we shall treat in the first place of those
6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
things concerning God which are above reason and are
proposed to our belief, such as belief in the Trinity
(Ch. ii.-xxvi.).
Secondly we shall treat of those things above reason that
have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation
and things that follow in sequence thereto (Ch. xxvii.-
lxxviii.).
Thirdly we shall treat of those things above reason to
which we look forward in man's last end, such as the
resurrection and glory of the body, the eternal happiness
of souls, and matters connected therewith (Ch. lxxix.-xcvii.).
CHAPTER II
THAT IN GOD THERE ARE GENERATION, PATERNITY,
AND FILIATION
Let us then commence our treatise with the mystery of
divine generation, and lay down first of all what we must
hold according to the teaching of Holy Writ : after which
we shall put forward the arguments set up by unbelievers
in opposition to the truth of faith ; by answering which we
shall ensure the purpose of this treatise.
Accordingly Holy Writ delivers to us the names of
paternity and filiation in God, when it declares Jesus Christ
to be the Son of God, and this occurs very often in the New
Testament. For it is said (Matth. xi. 17) : No one knoweth
the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the
Father but the Son. Again Mark begins his gospel with
the words : The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ,
Son of God: and John the Evangelist says this frequently :
for it is said (iii. 35) : The Father loveth the Son, and he
hath given all things into his hand, and (v. 21): As the
Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life; so also the Son
giveth life to whom he will. Again the Apostle Paul fre-
quently makes use of similar expressions : thus he says
(Rom. i. 1-3) : Separated unto the gospel of God, which
CHAPTER II 7
he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scrip-
ture, concerning his Son, and (Heb. i. 1.-2) : God who at
sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to
the fathers, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by
his Son. This is also expressed, albeit less frequently, in
the writings of the Old Testament, for it is written (Prov.
xxx. 4) : What is his name, and what is the name of his
Son if thou knowest? and we read (Ps. ii. 7) : The Lord
hath said to me: Thou art my son, and again (Ps. lxxxviii.
27) : He shall cry out to me : Thou art my father. And
though some would twist the last two passages into a
different meaning, so that the words The Lord hath said
to me : Thou art my son be referred to David himself ; and
the words He shall cry out to me : Thou art my father be
ascribed to Solomon, the context in each passage shows
the case to be wholly otherwise. For neither are the suc-
ceeding words applicable to David, This day have I be-
gotten thee, nor again the words that follow, / will give
thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts
of the earth for thy possession, since his kingdom did not
extend to the utmost parts of the earth, as attested by the
story of the Books of Kings. Nor again can the words
He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father be applied to
Solomon, since the text goes on (verse 30) : I will make his
seed to endure for evermore, and his throne as the days of
heaven. Hence we are given to understand that since in
the passages quoted certain things may apply to David and
Solomon, and some things not at all, these words are said
of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scrip-
ture, as figures of someone else in whom the whole passage
is fulfilled.
And seeing that the names Father and Son are conse-
quent to some sort of generation, Scripture has not failed
to mention the name of the divine generation. For in the
psalm, as we have remarked, we read : This day have I
begotten thee, and it is also written (Prov. viii. 24, 35) :
The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived
. . . before the hills I was brought forth, or, according to
8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
another reading, 1 Before the hills, the Lord begot vie. It
is also said (Isa. lxvi. 9) : Shall not I that make others to
bring forth children, myself bring forth? saith the Lord.
Shall I that give generation to others, be barren? saith the
Lord thy God. And though one might say that this should
be referred to the multiplication of the children of Israel
after their return from captivity into their own land, seeing
that it was said before (verse 8) :Sion hath been in labour
and hath brought forth her children, yet this does not
conflict with our purpose. For in whatever sense the text
be taken, the argument that is quoted as urged by God re-
mains firm and stable, namely, that if He gives genera-
tion to others, He himself should not be barren. Nor
would it be becoming that He who makes others to beget
in reality, Himself should beget, not really, but figura-
tively ; since a thing should be more excellent in the cause
than in the effect, as we have proved above. 2 More-
over it is said (Jo. i. 14) : We have seen his glory, the
glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, and
again (verse 18) : The only-begotten Son, who is in the
bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. Again Paul
says (Heb. i. 6) : When he bringeth in the first-begotten
into the world, he saith: Let all the angels of God adore
him.
CHAPTER III
THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD
We must also observe that Holy Writ employs the afore-
said expressions to denote the creation of things : for it is
said (Job xxxviii. 28, 29): Who is the father of rain? or
who begot the drops of dew? Out of whose womb came
the ice? and the frost from heaven, who hath gendered it?
Lest, therefore, the words paternity, filiation, and genera-
tion should convey nothing but the idea of the efficacy of
1 Tpb Se irdvrcov Powa>v ytwa /if (Sept. Version, Prov. viii, 25).
* Bk. I., ch. xxiii.
CHAPTER IV 9
the creation, the authority of Scripture does not omit to
declare the Godhead of Him whom it describes as son and
begotten, so that the aforesaid generation denotes some-
thing more than creation. For it is said (Jo. i. i) : In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God. And that the name Word desig-
nates the Son is shown from what follows, for he adds :
And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us: and
we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten
of the Father. Again Paul says (Tit. iii. 4) : When the
goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared. Nor
did the Scripture of the Old Testament leave this unsaid,
since it calls Christ by the name of God : for it is said
(Ps. xliv. 7, 8) : Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever:
the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness.
Thou hast loved justice, and hatedst iniquity: and that
these words refer to Christ is clear from what follows :
Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of
gladness above thy fellows. It is also written (Isa. ix. 6) :
For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us: and the
government is upon his shoulder: and his name shall be
called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father
of the world to come, the Prince of peace. Accordingly we
are taught from Holy Writ that the Son of God, begotten
of God, is God. And Peter confessed that Jesus Christ is
the Son of God when he said (Matth. xvi. 16) : Thou art
the Christ, the Son of the living God. Therefore He is not
merely the only-begotten, but is also God.
CHAPTER IV
THE OPINION OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE SON OF
GOD : AND ITS REFUTATION
Certain perverse men have presumed to measure the truth
of the above doctrine according to their own ideas, and
have devised various inept opinions about the aforesaid
io THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
matter. Some of these observed that Scripture is wont to
call sons of God those who are sanctified by grace, accord-
ing to the words of Jo. i. 12 : He gave them the power to
be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name,
and of Rom. viii. 16 : The Spirit himself giveth testimony
to our spirit, that we are the sons of God, and of 1 Jo. iii. 1 :
Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed
on us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of
God. Moreover Scripture declares the like to be born of
God, for it is said (James i. 18) : For of his own will hath
he begotten us by the word of truth, and (1 Jo. iii. 9) :
Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed
abideth in him. Again, what is more remarkable still, the
divine name is ascribed to them : thus the Lord said to
Moses (Exod. vii. 1) : Behold I have appointed thee the
God of Pharao, and (Ps. lxxxi. 6) : / have said: You are
gods, and all of you sons of the most High: and as the
Lord said (Jo. x. 35) : He called them gods, to whom the
words of God were spoken. Thus then, in their opinion,
Jesus Christ was a mere man born of the Virgin Mary, and
through the merits of His holy life was accorded, above all
others, the honour of the Godhead ; and they reckoned that,
like other men, He was a son of God by the spirit of
adoption, and begotten of Him by grace, and that the
Scriptures call Him God by reason of His being in some
way like to God ; not by nature, but by a kind of fellowship
in the divine goodness : even as it is said of the saints
(2 Pet. i. 4) : That . . . you may be made partakers of the
divine nature, flying the corruption of that concupiscence
which is in the world.
They strove to strengthen their position by the authority
of Holy Writ. For the Lord said (Matth. xxviii. 18) : All
power is given to me in heaven and on earth: since had
He been God before time, He would not have received
power in time.
Again, it is said of the Son that He was made to him
(i.e., to God) of the seed of David according to the flesh
and that He was predestinated the Son of God in power;
CHAPTER IV ii
and that which is predestinated and made is seemingly not
eternal.
Again the Apostle says (Philip, ii. 8, 9) : He became 1
obedient unto death; even to the death of the cross. For
which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given
him a name which is above all names. Whence it would
seem to follow that it was through the merit of His obedience
and passion that He was crowned with divine honour and
exalted above all things. Again Peter says (Acts ii. 36) :
Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly
that God hath made both Lord and Christ this same Jesus
whom you have crucified. Seemingly, therefore, He was
made God in time, and not born so, before time. More-
over, in confirmation of their opinion they quote those
passages of Scripture which would seem to imply defects
in Christ; for instance that He was borne in a woman's
womb, that He advanced in age, that He suffered from
hunger and was overcome with fatigue, and subject to
death, that He was ever making progress, that He con-
fessed His ignorance of the day of judgement, and was
stricken with the fear of death, and the like, all of which
are incompatible in one who is God by nature. Hence
they conclude that He was graced with the divine honour
through His merits, and that He was not God by nature.
This position was taken up first by certain of the early
heretics, Cerinthus and Ebion, was renewed by Paul of
Samosata, and later on adopted by Photinus : wherefore
those who followed his teaching were called Photinians.
Nevertheless it is clear to those who weigh carefully these
passages of Holy Writ that they do not admit of the inter-
pretation favoured by the opinion of these men.
For Solomon by saying (Prov. viii. 24) : The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived clearly shows
that this conception took place before the existence of any-
thing corporeal. Hence, it follows that the Son begotten
of God did not receive from Mary the beginning of His
existence. And though they endeavoured to distort these
1 Vulg., becoming.
12 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
and other like passages with a false interpretation, by
saying that they should be referred to predestination,
namely that before the creation of the world it was decreed
that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary,
but that He was not the Son of God before the creation of
the world; yet it is clear from what follows that He was
before Mary not only in predestination but also in reality.
For after the words of Solomon quoted above it is added
(verses 29, 30) : When he balanced the foundations of the
earth, I was with him forming all things ; whereas had He
existed merely as predestinated, He could not have been
doing anything.
The same is to be gathered from the words of the
evangelist John : for after saying, In the beginning, was
the Word, whereby we are to understand the Son of God,
as we have shown ; lest anyone should take this in the
sense of predestination, he adds (verse 3) : All things were
made by him, and without him was made nothing: which
could not be true had He not existed in reality before the
world.
Again, it is said of the Son of God (Jo. iii. 13) : No man
hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from
heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven; and again
(Jo. vi. 38) : / came down from heaven, not to do my own
will, but the will of him that sent me. It is, therefore,
clear that He existed before He came down from heaven.
Moreover, according to the above opinion, He advanced
by merit from manhood to Godhead: whereas the Apostle
shows on the contrary that, being already God, He became
man. For he says (Philip, ii. 6, 7) : [Who] Being in the
form of God, thotight it not robbery to be equal to God;
but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being
made in the likeness of men, and in habit formed as a man.
The above opinion, therefore, is irreconcilable with the
words of the Apostle.
Again. Among those who received the grace of God,
Moses was copiously endowed : for it is said of him (Exod.
xxxiii. 11) that the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a
CHAPTER IV 13
man is wont to speak to his friend. If, then, Jesus Christ
is to be called God merely on account of the grace of
adoption, like other saints, Moses might be called the son
of God for the same reason as Christ, although Christ was
endowed with more abundant grace : since even among the
other saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and
yet all are equally to be called sons of God. But Moses is
not called son of God for the same reason as Christ : since
the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as son from
servant, for he says (Heb. iii. 5, 6) : Moses indeed was
faithful in all his house as a servant, for a testimony of
those things which were to be said: but Christ as a Son in
his own house. It is, therefore, clear that Christ is not
called the Son of God by the grace of adoption, as other
saints are. The same may be gathered from several other
passages of Scripture which call Christ the Son of
God in a special way above others : sometimes indeed by
singling Him out from others and calling Him son, as when
the voice of the Father was heard from heaven : This is my
beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased (Matth. iii. 17);
sometimes by calling Him the Only Begotten; for instance
(Jo. i. 14) : We have seen his glory, the glory, as it were,
of the Only Begotten of the Father; and again (Jo. i. 18) :
The Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father,
he hath declared him; whereas were He called son in
common with the others, He could not be called the Only
Begotten : and sometimes by calling Him the First-Born,
so as to imply a sonship derived by others from Him, ac-
cording to Rom. viii. 29, Whom he foreknew, he also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his
Son; that he might be the first-born amongst many
brethren, and (Gal. iv. 4, 5), God sent his Son . . . that
we might receive the adoption of sons. Therefore He is
Son in a different way from those who are called sons
through a likeness to His sonship.
Moreover. Certain works in Holy Writ are ascribed to
God so exclusively that they are inapplicable to another,
such as the sanctification of souls and the remission of
i 4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
sins : for it is said (Levit. xx. 8) : I am the Lord that
sanctify you, and (Isa. xliii. 25) : I am he that blot out thy
iniquities for my own sake. Now Scripture ascribes both of
these to Christ: for it is said (Heb. ii. 11) : Both he that
sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one, and
(Heb. xiii. 12) : Jesus, that he might sanctify the people by
his own blood, suffered without the gate. Moreover our
Lord Himself declared that He had the power to forgive
sins, and confirmed His assertion with a miracle (Matth.
ix. 6) : and the angel foretold this of Him, saying (Matth.
i. 21) : He shall save his people from their sins. Therefore
Christ, who both sanctifies us and forgives us our sins, is
called God, not as those are called gods who are sanctified
and forgiven their sins, but as having both the power and
the nature of the Godhead.
Those passages of Scripture whereby they endeavoured
to show that Christ is not God by nature are of no avail to
prove their contention. For we confess that in Christ the
Son of God, after the mystery of the Incarnation, there
were two natures, namely the human and the divine :
wherefore both those things that are proper to God are
said of Him by reason of His divine nature, and those
things that would seem to savour of imperfection are said
of Him by reason of His human nature, as we shall more
fully explain further on. 1 For the present, in the matter
of the divine generation, let it suffice that we have shown
that, according to the Scriptures, Christ is called the Son
of God, and God, not only as a mere man by the grace of
adoption, but also on account of His divine nature.
1 Ch. xxvii. seqq.
CHAPTER V 15
CHAPTER V
THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF
GOD : AND ITS REFUTATION
For as much as all who have a right conception of God
are firmly persuaded that there can be but one who is God
by nature, some, gathering from the Scriptures that Christ
is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, confessed
indeed that Christ the Son of God and God the Father are
one God ; yet that God is not called Son by nature or from
eternity, but assumed the appellation of Son from the
moment that He was born of the Virgin Mary in the
mystery of the Incarnation : so that whatever Christ under-
went in the flesh was ascribed by them to the Father ; for
instance, that He was the son of a virgin, conceived by and
born of her, that He suffered, died, and rose again, and
whatever else Scripture relates of Him in the flesh.
They endeavoured to confirm this contention by the
authority of Scripture. For it is said (Deut. vi. 4) : Hear,
O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord: and (Deut. xxxii.
39) : See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God
besides me: and (Jo. xiv. 9-1 1) : He that seeth me seeth the
Father also . . . the Father who abideth in me, he doth
the works. . . . I am in the Father, and the Father in me.
From all these texts they imagined that God the Father
Himself is called the Son, after being born of the Virgin.
This was the opinion of the Sabellians, who were also
styled Patripassionists, because they contended that the
Father suffered, and believed that Christ was the Father
Himself.
Now, though this opinion differs from the former in the
matter of Christ's Godhead (since the latter confesses that
Christ was God in truth and nature, whereas the former
denied this), nevertheless as to the question of generation
and sonship both opinions agree. Because, just as the
former opinion asserts that the sonship and generation,
whereby Christ is called Son, did not precede Mary, so
16 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
also does the latter. Consequently neither opinion refers
generation and sonship to the divine nature, but only to the
human. The latter opinion has this also peculiar to it that
it asserts that when we speak of the Son of God we do not
indicate a subsistent person, but a property adventitious
to a pre-existing person : since the Father assumed the
appellation of Son by reason of His having taken flesh
from the Virgin, not as though the Son were a subsistent
person distinct from the Father. The falseness of this
position can be clearly proved by the authority of Scripture.
For the Scriptures call Christ not only the son of the
Virgin, but also the Son of God, as we have shown above. 1
But it is impossible for a person to be his own son : for,
since the son is begotten of his father, and the begetter
gives being to the begotten, it would follow that the giver
of being would be identified with the receiver, and this is
quite impossible. Therefore God the Father is not the Son,
but the Father and Son are distinct.
Again. The Lord said (Jo. vi. 38) : / came down from
heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that
sent me: and (Jo. xvii. 5): Glorify me thou, O Father,
with thyself. From these and like passages it is clear that
the Son is other than the Father.
It might be said, however, according to this opinion,
that Christ is called the Son of God the Father in respect
only of His human nature, because, to wit, God the Father
created and sanctified the human nature that Christ
assumed. Accordingly as God He is Father of Himself
as man : wherefore there is nothing to prevent the same
one as man being distinct from Himself as God.
But, in that case, it would follow that Christ is styled the
Son of God even as other men, by reason either of creation
or of sanctification. But we have shown that Christ is not
called the Son of God for the same reason as other holy
men. Therefore it cannot be understood in the aforesaid
manner that the Father is Christ and His own Son.
Further. Where there is one subsistent supposit plural
1 Ch. iv.
CHAPTER V 17
predication is inadmissible. Yet Christ spoke of Him-
self and the Father in the plural, when He said (Jo. x.
30) : J and the Father are one. Therefore the Son is not
the Father.
Again. If the Son is not distinct from the Father, except
through the mystery of the Incarnation, before the Incar-
nation they were not distinct at all. Yet we find from
Scripture that the Son was distinct from the Father even
before the Incarnation. For it is said (Jo. i. 1) : In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the [Word was God. Hence the Word that was with
God was in some way distinct from Him : for we are wont
to speak of one person as being with another. The Be-
gotten of God says (Prov. viii. 30) : I was with him forming
all things, and this implies some kind of fellowship and
distinction. It is also said (Osee i. 7) : / will have mercy
on the house of Juda, and I will save them by the Lord
their God, where God the Father speaks of the people to be
saved by God the Son, as by a person distinct from Himself
and worthy of the name of God. It is also said (Gen. i. 26) :
Let us make man to our image and likeness, where the
plurality and distinction of man's makers are expressly
indicated ; and Scripture teaches that man was created by
God alone. Consequently God the Father and God the
Son were two distinct Persons even before Christ became
man. Therefore the Father is not called the Son by reason
of the mystery of the Incarnation.
Moreover. True sonship refers to the supposit which
is called son : for the hand and foot are not properly called
sons, but the man whose parts they are. Now the terms
paternity and sonship denote distinction in those of whom
they are said, even as begetter and begotten. Hence if one
is really a son, he must be a distinct person from his father.
Now, Christ is truly the Son of God, for it is said (1 Jo.
v. 20) : That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ.
Consequently Christ must be a supposit distinct from the
Father; and therefore the Father is not the Son.
Besides. After the mystery of the Incarnation the Father
18 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
bore witness to the Son (Matth. iii. 17) : This is my . . .
Son. Now in pointing Him out thus He referred to the
supposit. Therefore Christ is a distinct supposit from the
Father.
The arguments whereby Sabellius endeavoured to estab-
lish his position do not prove his contention, as we shall
show more fully further on. 1 For the fact that God is one,
or that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father,
does not prove that the Father and Son are one supposit :
because two things that are distinct supposits may be one
in some respect.
CHAPTER VI
CONCERNING THE OPINION OF ARIUS ABOUT THE
SON OF GOD
While it is inadmissible according to sacred doctrine that
the Son of God should have had His origin in Mary, as
Photinus said, or that He who was God and Father from
eternity should begin to be the Son by taking flesh, as
Sabellius contended, there were others who accepted the
teaching of Scripture, that the Son of God existed before
the mystery of the Incarnation, and even before the creation
of the world. And since this Son is distinct from God the
Father, they deemed Him not to be of the same nature as
God the Father : for they were unable to understand, and
unwilling to believe, that any two, distinct in personality,
should have one essence and nature. And seeing that,
according to the teaching of faith, the nature of God the
Father is alone believed to be eternal, they thought that
the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, though
He was the Son before other creatures. And since what-
ever is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by
God, they taught that the Son of God was made out of
nothing, and a creature.
1 Ch. ix.
CHAPTER VI 19
Since, however, they were forced by the authority of
Scripture to acknowledge the Son as God, as we have
observed above, they said that He was one with God the
Father, not indeed by nature, but by a certain unity of
mind, and by a participation of the divine likeness surpass-
ing that of other creatures. Wherefore seeing that in the
Scriptures the highest creatures, which we call angels, are
styled gods and sons of God — for instance (Job xxxviii.
4, 7) : Where wast thou . . . when the morning stars
praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful
melody? and (Ps. lxxxi. 1) : God hath stood in the congre-
gation of gods, — it follows that He must be styled God and
Son of God, above the others, as being of higher rank than
other creatures ; so much so that God the Father created all
other creatures through Him. They strove to confirm this
opinion by the teaching of Holy Writ. For addressing
the Father the Son says (Jo. xvii. 3) : This is eternal life,
that they may know thee, the only true God. Therefore
the Father is the only true God : so that as the Son is not
the Father He cannot be true God.
Again. The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 14-16) : Keep the
commandment without spot, blameless, unto the coming of
our Lord Jesus Christ. Which, in his times, he shall show
who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings
and Lord of lords. Who only hath immortality, and in-
habiteth light inaccessible. In these words we find indi-
cated the distinction between God the Father represented
as showing and Christ represented as shown. Therefore
God the Father alone, represented as showing, is Mighty,
King of kings and Lord of lords, He alone hath immor-
tality and inhabiteth light inaccessible. Therefore only the
Father is true God and consequently the Son is not.
Further. The Lord said (Jo. xiv. 28) : The Father is
greater than I; and the Apostle said that the Son is subject
to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 28) : When all things shall be
subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be
subject unto him, namely the Father, that put all things
under him. If however the nature of the Father and the
20 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Son were one, there would also be one greatness and one
majesty ; for the Son would not be less than, nor subject to,
the Father. In their opinion then it follows from the Scrip-
tures that the Son is not of the same nature with the Father.
Again. The nature of the Father cannot be subject to
want. But want is found in the Son ; for Scripture declares
that He receives from the Father ; and to receive is a sign
of want. Thus, it is written (Matth. xi. 27) : All things are
delivered to me by my Father, and (Jo. iii. 35) : The Father
loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand.
Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as
the Father.
Moreover. To be taught and to be helped are signs of
need. Now, the Son is taught and helped by the Father.
For it is said (Jo. v. 19, 20) : The Son cannot do anything
of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing, and so the
Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things which
himself doth. Again, the Son said to the disciples
(Jo. xv. 15) : 'All things, whatsoever I have heard of my
Father, I have made known to you. It would seem, there-
fore, that the Son is not of the same nature as the
Father.
Further. To receive a commandment, to obey, to pray,
and to be sent are, apparently, signs of subjection. Now,
these things are related of the Son. For the Son says
(Jo. xiv. 31) : As the Father hath given me commandment,
so do I ; and it is said (Philip, ii. 8) : Being made obedient
(to the Father) unto death: and (Jo. xiv. 16) : I will ask the
Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete. Again,
the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4) : When the fulness of the time
was come, God sent his Son. Therefore the Son is less
than the Father and subject to Him.
Again. The Son is glorified by the Father, as He Him-
self declares (Jo. xii. 28) : Father, glorify my name ; and
the text goes on : A voice . . . came from heaven : I have
both glorified it, and will glorify it again. Also the Apostle
says that God raised Jesus Christ from the dead (Rom.
viii. 11), and Peter declared that He was exalted by the
CHAPTER VI 21
right hand of God (Acts ii. 33). From these texts it would
seem to follow that He is less than the Father.
Moreover. There can be no defect in the nature of the
Father. But in the Son we find a lack of power; for He
says (Matth. xx. 23) : But to sit at my right or left hand is
not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is pre-
pared by my Father. Also a lack of knowledge : for He
says (Mark xiii. 32) : But of that day or hour no man
knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the
Father. We also find in Him a lack of mental composure,
since Scripture asserts that He was affected by sorrow,
anger, and like passions. Therefore seemingly the Son
is not of the same nature as the Father.
Again. It is expressly stated in Scripture that the Son
of God is a creature : for it is said (Ecclus. xxiv. 12) : The
Creator of all things . . . said to me: and he that made
me rested in my tabernacle : and again (verse 14) : From
the beginning and before the world was I created. There-
fore the Son is a creature.
Further. The Son is numbered among creatures, for it
is said in the person of Wisdom (Ecclus. xxiv. 5) : / came
out of the mouth of the most High, the first-born before all
creatures. Also, the Apostle says that the Son is the First-
Born of all creatures (Coloss. i. 15). It would seem then
that the Son is of the same order as creatures, being placed
in the first rank among them.
Moreover. The Son said, when He prayed to the Father
for His disciples (Jo. xvii. 22) : The glory which thou hast
given to me I have given to them: that they may be one as
we also are one. Hence He wished His disciples to be
one, even as the Father and Son are one. Now, He did not
wish His disciples to be one in essence. Therefore the
Father and the Son are not one in essence : and thus the
Son is a creature and subject to the Father.
This is the opinion of Arius and Eunomius; and
apparently it arose from the statements of the Platonists,
who said that the supreme God is the Father and Creator
of all, and that from Him first of all there emanated
22 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
a Mind containing the forms of all things, and transcend-
ing all : and this mind they called the Paternal Intelligence.
Below this they placed the World-Soul, and beneath this
other creatures. Accordingly, they referred to this Mind
whatever is said in the Scriptures concerning God the Son,
especially because Holy Writ calls the Son of God by the
names of Wisdom and Word of God. The opinion of
Avicenna is in agreement with this view ; for above the
Soul of the first heaven he placed the First Intelligence
that moves the first heaven, and higher still above all he
placed God. Hence the Arians supposed the Son of God
to be a creature transcending all other creatures, and that
by His means God created all things. This was especially
in keeping with the opinion of certain philosophers who
held that things proceeded from the first principle in a
certain order, so that by the first creature all other things
were created.
CHAPTER VII
REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS
One has only to study carefully the statements of Holy
Writ to perceive that this opinion is clearly in opposition
to the divine Scriptures. For Holy Scripture gives the
name of son of God to Christ in one sense, and to the
angels in another. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. i.
5) : To which of the angels hath he said at any time : Thou
art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee? affirming that
this was said of Christ. But according to the aforesaid
opinion the angels would be called sons of God in the
same sense as Christ : since the same appellation of son-
ship would apply to both in respect of the sublime nature
wherein they were created by God. Nor does it matter
if Christ were of a more exalted nature than the angels,
since even among the angels there are various orders, as
we have shown above; 1 and yet the same degree of son-
1 Bk. III., ch. lxxix.
CHAPTER VII 23
ship applies to all. Therefore Christ is not said to be the
Son of God in the sense laid down by the aforesaid
opinion.
Again. Since, by reason of creation, the appellation of
divine sonship applies to many, for it applies to all the
angels and saints, it follows that if Christ were called Son
for the same reason, He would not be the Only-Begotten,
although, on account of the sublimity of His nature, He
might be called the First-Born among the others. But
Scripture states that He is the Only-Begotten (Jo. i. 14) :
We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-
Begotten of the Father. Therefore He is not called the
Son of God by reason of creation.
Further. The name son is aptly and truly given to one
born of living beings, among whom the thing begotten
proceeds from the begetter : in other cases, the appellation
of sonship is applied not literally, but metaphorically, as
when disciples or wards are called sons. Hence, if Christ
were called Son merely by reason of creation, since what
is created by God does not emanate from His substance,
Christ would not truly be called Son. But He is called
truly Son (1 Jo. v. 20) : That we may be in his true Son,
Jesus Christ. Therefore He is called Son of God, not as
though He were created by God with however sublime a
nature, but as begotten of God's substance.
Moreover. If Christ be called the Son by reason of
creation, He is not true God, because no creature can be
called God, save by reason of a certain likeness to God.
Now Jesus Christ is true God. For John, after saying
(1 Jo. v. 20) : That we may be in his true Son, adds : This
is the true God and life eternal. Therefore Christ is not
called the Son of God by reason of creation.
Further. The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 5) : Of whom is
Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God
blessed for ever, Amen, and (Tit. ii. 13) : Looking for the
blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and
our Saviour Jesus Christ. Moreover it is said (Jerem.
xxiii. 5, 6) : I will raise up to David a just branch, and
24 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
immediately afterwards : And this is the name they shall
call him: The Lord, our just one; where the Hebrew has
the tetragrammaton, the name that is certainly applied to
God alone. Wherefore it is clear that the Son of God is
truly God.
Moreover. If Christ is the true Son, it follows of neces-
sity that He is true God : because he who is born of another
cannot truly be called his son, even if begotten of the
latter's substance, unless he issue from him in likeness of
species : for the son of a man must needs be a man.
Accordingly, if Christ be the true Son of God, He must
needs be true God : therefore He is not a creature.
Again. No creature receives the whole fulness of divine
goodness, because, as we have already made clear, perfec-
tions come from God to creatures by a kind of descent.
Now, in Christ is the whole fulness of divine goodness :
for the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 9) : In him dwelleth all the
fulness of the Godhead. Therefore Christ is not a creature.
Besides. Although an angel's intelligence has more
perfect knowledge than a man's, it is far below the divine.
Now, Christ's intelligence is not inferior to the divine :
for the Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 3) that in Christ are hid
all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Therefore
Christ, the Son of God, is not a creature.
Moreover. As we have proved above, 1 whatever God has
in Himself is His essence. Now, the Son has whatever the
Father has: for the Son said (Jo. xvi. 15): All things
whatsoever the Father hath, are mine: and addressing the
Father (Jo. xvii. 10) : All my things are thine, and thine
are mine. Therefore Father and Son have the same essence
and nature : and consequently the Son is not a creature.
Further. The Apostle says (Philip, ii. 6, 7) that the Son
was in the form of God, before He emptied Himself. Now
the form of God can have no other meaning but the nature
of God, even as the form of a servant means the nature of
man. Therefore the Son is of divine nature, and conse-
quently He is not a creature.
1 Bk. I., Chs. xxi., xxii.
CHAPTER VII 25
Again. Nothing created can be equal to God. Now, the
Son is equal to the Father, for it is said (Jo. v. 18) : The
Jews sought to kill him, because he did not only break the
sabbath, but also said God was his father, making himself
equal to God. Thus the evangelist, whose testimony is
true, tells us that Christ said He was the Son of God, and
equal to God, and that for this reason the Jews persecuted
Him. Nor can any Christian doubt that what Christ said
of Himself was true, since also the Apostle declares that it
was not robbery that He deemed Himself equal to God
(Philip, ii. 6). Hence the Son is equal to the Father, and
therefore He is not a creature.
Moreover. We read that there is none like to God, not
even among the angels, who are called the sons of God :
Who, says the Psalmist (Ps. lxxxviii. 7) among the sons of
God shall be like to God? and (Ps. lxxxii. 2) : O God, who
shall be like to thee? Now this must be taken as referring
to perfect likeness, as is proved from what has been said
in the First Book. 1 But Christ declares His perfect likeness
to the Father, even as living, for He said (Jo. v. 26) : As
the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son
also to have life in himself. Therefore Christ must not be
reckoned among the created sons of God.
Further. No created substance resembles God in His
essence : for any perfection found in any creature what-
soever is less than what God is : so that it is impossible
to know through any creature what God is. Now, the
Son resembles the Father : for the Apostle says (Coloss.
i. 15) that He is the image of the invisible God. And lest
we should think this to mean an imperfect image, that
does not reflect the essence of God, so that it would not be
possible to know by it what God is — as when a man is said
to be God's image (1 Cor. xi. 7) — the Apostle shows that
He is a perfect image reflecting the very substance of God
when he says (Heb. i. 3) : Being the brightness of his
glory, and the figure of his substance. Therefore the Son
of God is not a creature.
1 Ch. xxix.
26 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Again. Nothing contained in a genus is the universal
cause of the things contained in that genus; thus, the
universal cause of mankind is not a man, because nothing
is its own cause; whereas the sun, which is outside the
human genus, is the universal cause of human generation,
and still more so is God.
Now, the Son is the universal cause of creatures : for it
is said (Jo. i. 8) : All things were made by him; and Be-
gotten Wisdom says (Prov. viii. 30) : I was with him
forming all things: and the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 16):
In him were created all things in heaven, and on earth.
Therefore He is not of the genus of creatures.
Besides. From what has been proved in the Second
Book, 1 it is clear that the incorporeal substances called
angels cannot be formed otherwise than by creation : and
it has also been proved that no substance but God can
create. 2 Now Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the cause
of the angels, by giving them their being : for the Apostle
says (Coloss. i. 16) : Whether thrones, or dominations, or
principalities, or powers. All things were created by him
and in him. Therefore the Son is not a creature.
Further. Since the action of a thing is consequent to
its nature, the proper action of A cannot be assigned to B,
if the nature of A is not proper to B : thus a thing that
has not human nature, cannot produce a human action.
Now, actions proper to God are also proper to the Son, such
as to create, as we have already proved, to uphold and
conserve all things in being, and to wash away sins. And
these things are proper to God, as we have shown above.
Now, it is said of the Son (Coloss. i. 17) that by him all
things consist, and (Heb. i. 3) : Upholding all things by
the word of his power, making purgation of sins. There-
fore the Son of God is by nature divine, and not a creature.
An Arian indeed might say that the Son does these things,
not as the principal agent, but as the latter's instrument,
and that He acts, not by His own power, but only by that
of the principal agent; but this view is precluded by the
1 Ch. lxxxvii. a Bk. II., ch. xxi.
CHAPTER VII 27
words of our Lord (Jo. v. 19) : What things soever he doth,
these the Son also doth in like manner. Thus even as the
Father works of Himself and by His own power, so too
does the Son.
We may further conclude from this that Father and
Son have the same might and power. For not only does
He say that the Son works in like manner as the Father,
but that He does the same things in like manner. Now, if
the same work proceed from two agents in like manner,
this can happen either when they have dissimilar parts
in the action — thus the same work proceeds from the prin-
cipal agent and the instrument — or when they have similar
shares in the action, and then they must combine together in
one power : and this power sometimes results from the com-
bined forces of the various agents at work, as when many
hands row a boat ; for all row alike, and while each one is
not strong enough to produce the required result, their
combined strength suffices to urge the boat forward. But
this cannot be said of the Father and the Son, for the
Father's power is not imperfect but infinite, as we have
proved. 1 Therefore the power of Father and Son must
be identical. And, since power is consequent to nature,
it follows that nature and essence must be identical in
Father and Son.
This follows also from what we have said above. For
if the Son is divine in nature, as we have proved in many
ways, since the divine nature cannot be manifold, as we
proved above, 2 it follows of necessity that the nature and
essence of Father and Son are numerically the same.
Again. Our ultimate happiness is in God alone, who
must be the sole object of our hope and worship. 3 Now
our happiness is in God the Son : for He said (Jo. xvii. 3) :
This is eternal life : That they may know thee, namely the
Father, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. It is also
said (1 Jo. v. 20) of the Son, that He is true God and life
eternal. And it is certain that by eternal life Holy Writ
means final beatitude : for Isaias, quoted by the Apostle
1 Bk. I., ch. xliii. q Bk. I., ch. xlii. 3 Bk. III., ch. cxx.
28 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
(Rom. xv. 12), says : There shall be a root of Jesse, and he
that shall rise up to rule the Gentiles : in him the Gentiles
shall hope. Again, it is said (Ps. lxxi. 11): All kings of
the earth shall adore him: all nations shall serve him; and
(Jo. v. 23) : That all men may honour the Son, as they
honour the Father; and (Ps. xcvi. 7) : Adore him, all you
his angels, which words the Apostle applies to the Son
(Heb. i. 6). Therefore it is evident that the Son of God
is true God.
Moreover this same conclusion follows from the argu-
ments adduced above to prove against Photinus, that
Christ is God, not by creation but in very truth.
Accordingly the Catholic Church, taught by the fore-
going and like texts of Holy Writ, confesses that Christ is
in truth and by nature the Son of God, co-eternal with and
equal to the Father, true God having the same essence
and nature with the Father, born, neither created nor
made. Hence it is clear that the Catholic faith alone con-
fesses true generation in God, since it refers the generation
of the Son to the Son's receiving His divine nature from
the Father. On the other hand, heretics refer this genera-
tion to some extraneous nature ; Photinus and Sabellius
referring it to the human nature, while Arius refers it
not to the human nature, but to a created nature, of
higher rank than other creatures. Arius differs also from
Sabellius and Photinus, in that he asserts this generation
to have been anterior to the world, while the latter deny
that it was before the Virgin-Birth. Sabellius differs too
from Photinus, in that he confesses Christ to be God in
truth and by nature, while this is denied by Photinus and
Arius, the former holding Christ to be a mere man, while
the latter contends that He was a most excellent creature
combining together the divine and human natures in a
kind of fusion. These allow a distinction of person between
Father and Son, whereas Sabellius denies it. Accord-
ingly the Catholic faith, taking the middle way, confesses
with Arius and Photinus, and against Sabellius, that
Father and Son are distinct Persons, and that the Son is
CHAPTER VIII 29
begotten, but the Father unbegotten : and with Sabellius,
but against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is God in
truth and by nature, and of the same nature with the
Father, yet distinct from Him in person. Even from such
things may we gather the Catholic truth : since, as
Aristotle says, even error bears witness to truth : and
error is at variance, not only with truth, but also with
itself.
CHAPTER VIII
SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED BY ARIUS IN
SUPPORT OF HIS VIEW
Since then truth cannot be opposed to truth, it is evident
that the texts of the Written Truth which the Arians quote
in support of their error cannot be in agreement with their
opinion. For, as we have shown from the divine Scriptures,
that Father and Son have but one identical divine essence
and nature, in respect of which each of them is true
God, it follows that Father and Son are not two Gods,
but only one God. Because, if they were two Gods, it
would follow that the divine essence is shared between
them, just as in two men there are two numerically dis-
tinct human natures : especially seeing that the divine
nature and God are not distinct, as we have proved above : x
whence it follows of necessity, since there is one divine
nature in Father and Son, that Father and Son are one
God. Accordingly, though we confess both the Father
to be God, and the Son to be God, we do not abandon the
position that there is but one God, which we proved in the
First Book, 2 by both reason and authority. Therefore,
although there is but one God, we confess that this may be
predicated of both Father and Son.
When, then, our Lord, addressing the Father, said
(Jo. xvii. 3) : That they may know thee, the only true God,
we must not gather that the Father alone is true God. as
1 Bk. I., ch. xxi. * Ch. xlii.
30 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
though the Son were not true God — because the authority
of Scripture clearly proves that the Son is true God — but
that the one only true Godhead belongs to the Father, yet
in such a way that it belongs also to the Son. Wherefore
our Lord said significantly : That they may know thee, the
only true God, not as though (the Father) were the only
God ; but : That they may know thee, and then added, the
only true God, to show that the Father, whose Son He
declared Himself to be, is God, because in Him is the only
true Godhead. And since the true Son must needs have
the same nature with the Father, it follows that the only
true Godhead belongs to the Son, rather than that it should
be excluded from Him. Hence John, as though expound-
ing these words of our Lord, ascribes to the true Son both
of these things which our Lord here ascribes to the Father,
namely, that He is true God, and that in Him is eternal life
(i Jo. v. 20) : That we may know the true God, and may
be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life.
Even though the Son had confessed that the Father alone
was true God, He must not for that reason be understood
to exclude Himself from the Godhead : because, as Father
and Son are one God, as we have proved, whatever is
predicated of the Father, by reason of His Godhead,
amounts to the same as though it were said of the Son,
and vice versa. For when our Lord said (Matth. xi. 27) :
No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth any-
one know the Father, but the Son, we are not to conclude
that knowledge of Himself is denied to either the Father or
the Son.
Whence it is evident that true Godhead is not excluded
from the Son by the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. vi. 15) :
Which in his time he shall shew, who is the Blessed and
only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords. For the
Father is not named in these words, but only something
common to Father and Son. For it is explicitly stated that
the Son also is King of kings and Lord of lords (Apoc. xix.
13), where it is said : He was clothed with a garment
sprinkled with blood, and his name is called The Word of
CHAPTER VIII 31
God, and afterwards (verse 16) : And he hath on his gar-
ment, and on his thigh written: King of kings and Lord
of lords. Nor is the Son excluded by the words that
follow : Who alone hath immortality (1 Tim. vi. 16), since
He clothes with immortality them that believe in Him, hence
it is said (Jo. xi. 26) : He that . . . believeth in me shall
not die for ever. It is also certain that the subsequent
words also may apply to the Son : Whom no man hath
seen, nor can see (1 Tim. vi. 16), because our Lord said
(Matth. xi. 27) : No one knoweth the Son but the Father.
Nor would it avail to object that He appeared visibly, for
this happened in the flesh : since He is invisible as to His
Godhead, even as the Father : wherefore the Apostle says
in the same epistle (iii. 16) : Evidently great is the mystery
of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh. Nor does
it affect the issue to say that the above text refers to the
Father only, because the text implies a distinction between
the one who shows and the one shown, since the Son also
shows Himself, for He says (Jo. xiv. 21) : He that loveth
me, shall be loved of my Father ; and I will love him, and
will manifest myself to him: wherefore we say to Him
(Ps. lxxix. 20) : Show thy face, and we shall be saved.
As to our Lord's words (Jo. xiv. 28), The Father is greater
than I, the Apostle teaches how they should be understood.
For seeing that a comparison is made between greater and
less, the words must be understood of the Son in respect of
His abasement. The Apostle, however, ascribes this abase-
ment to His assuming the form of a servant, yet so that He
is equal to the Father in respect of the form of God. For he
says (Philip, ii. 6, 7) : Who being in the form of God,
thought it not robbery to be equal to God: but emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant. Nor must we wonder
that, for this reason, He is called less than the Father,
seeing that the Apostle declares Him to have been made
lower than the angels : We see, he writes, Jesus who was
made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of
death, crowned with glory and honour (Heb. ii. 9).
Hence too it is evident, that the Son is stated to be
32 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
subject to the Father in the same sense, namely in respect
of His human nature : this is clear from the context. For
the Apostle had said before (i Cor. xv. 21) : By a man
came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead: and
afterwards (verses 23, 24) he had added that everyone shall
rise in his own order, first of all Christ, and then they that
are of Christ, and then : Afterwards the end, when he shall
have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father.
Then, having declared the nature of this kingdom, namely
that all things must be made subject to Him, he goes on
to say (verse 28) : When all things shall be subdued unto
him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him
that put all things under him. Therefore the context shows
that this is to be understood of Christ as man : for as such
He died and rose again : because, as God, since He does
all that the Father does, as we have shown, He also subdued
all things to Himself. Wherefore the Apostle says (Philip,
iii. 20, 21) : We look for the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ,
who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the
body of his glory, according to the operation whereby also
he is able to subdue all things to himself.
The fact that in the Scriptures the Father is said to
give to the Son, whence it follows from Scripture that the
Son receives from the Father, does not prove that He is
in want of anything. In fact this is requisite in order
that He be the Son. For He could not be called Son,
were He not begotten of the Father, and whatever is
begotten receives from the begetter the latter's nature.
When therefore, we read that the Son receives from the
Father, nothing else is indicated but the Son's generation,
whereby the Father gave His nature to the Son. This can
be gathered from the thing given, for He says (Jo. x. 29) :
That which my Father hath given me, is greater than all.
Now, that which is greater than all is the divine nature,
whereby the Son is equal to the Father. This is proved
by our Lord's very words. For He had said that no man
would be able to pluck His sheep from His hand : and in
proof of this He utters the words quoted, namely that what
CHAPTER VIII 33
His father had given Him, is greater than all. And because,
as He concludes, no one can wrest from the hand of His
Father, it follows that neither can anyone wrest from the
hand of the Son : and this would not follow, unless by
that which the Father had given Him, He were equal to
the Father. Accordingly in order to express this more
clearly He says (verse 30) : / and the Father are one. In
like manner the Apostle says (Philip, ii. 9, 10) : And
(God) hath given him a name which is above all names:
that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those
that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. Now,
the name that is above all names, and which every creature
reveres is none other than the name of the Godhead. There-
fore this giving by begetting signifies the begetting itself,
whereby the Father gave the Son true Godhead. The same
conclusion follows from the statement that all things were
given Him by the Father : since all things could not have
been given to Him, unless the whole fulness of the God-
head that is in the Father were also in the Son. Accord-
ingly by saying that the Father had given to Him, He
declares Himself to be the true Son ; and this is against
Sabellius : and from the greatness of the thing given, He
declares Himself to be equal to the Father; and this is
against Arius.
It is clear, then, that this giving is no indication of
want in the Son : for the Son was not before He received,
since in Him to be begotten and to receive were one and
the same : and the fulness of that which was given was
incompatible with want in Him who received. Nor can it
be objected against what we have said, that Scripture
asserts the Son to have received from the Father in course
of time. Thus our Lord after His resurrection, said to
His disciples (Matth. xxviii. 18) : All power is given to
me in heaven and in earth: and the Apostle says (Philip, ii.
8, 9) that for this cause God hath exalted him, and hath
given him a name which is above all names, because He
became obedient unto death: as though He had not this
name from eternity. For Scripture is wont to describe
3
34 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
things as being or made, when they come to our know-
ledge. Now, that the Son received from eternity universal
power and the divine name, was made known to the world
by the preaching of the disciples. This is shown by the
words of God Himself, for our Lord said (Jo. xvii. 5) :
Glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory
which I had before the world was: for He asks that His
glory, which from eternity, as God, He received from the
Father, should be manifested in Him now that He was
made man.
Hence it is clear how the Son is taught, whereas He is
not ignorant. For it has been shown 1 that in God intel-
ligence and being are one and the same. Wherefore com-
munication of divine nature is also communication of
intelligence. Now, communication of intelligence may be
called showing, speaking, or teaching. Therefore, since
by His birth the Son received the divine nature from the
Father, we may speak either of Him as hearing from the
Father, or of the Father as showing to Him, or employ
other like expressions of Scripture : not as though the
Son were previously ignorant or nescient, and was after-
wards taught by the Father. For the Apostle declares
(1 Cor. i. 24) that Christ is the power of God and the
wisdom of God: and it is impossible for wisdom to be
ignorant, or power to be weak.
Therefore the words : The Son cannot do anything of
himself (Jo. v. 19) do not argue weakness of action in the
Son : but, as in God to act is the same as to be, and
action is identified with essence, as we have proved above, 2
so the Son is said to be unable to act of Himself, but to
act with the Father, even as He cannot be of Himself, but
only of the Father. For were He of Himself, He would
not be the Son. Accordingly, even as it is impossible for
the Son not to be the Son, so is it impossible that He act
of Himself. But since the Son receives the same nature
as that which the Father has, and consequently the same
power, although the Son is not of Himself (a se) nor works
1 Bk. I., ch. xlv. 2 Ibid.
CHAPTER VIII 35
of Himself, yet He is by Himself (per se) and works by
Himself : because, even as He is by His own nature which
He received from the Father, so does He work by His
proper nature received from the Father. Wherefore after
our Lord had said : The Son cannot do anything of him-
self, in order to show that although the Son works not of
Himself, yet does He work by Himself, He added : What
things soever he doth — namely, the Father — these the Son
also doth in like manner.
From the foregoing it is also clear in what sense the
Father commands the Son, and the Son obeys the Father,
or prays to the Father, or is sent by the Father. For all
these things are ascribed to the Son as subject to the
Father, and this is only in respect of the human nature
which He had assumed, as we have shown. Wherefore the
Father commands the Son as subject to Him in His human
nature. The very words of our Lord declare this. For
when He said (Jo. xiv. 31), That the world may know that
I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me com-
mandment, so do I, what this commandment was is indi-
cated by the words that follow, Arise, let us go hence.
For He said this when He was going to His Passion : and
it is clear that the command to suffer applied to the Son
in respect only of His human nature. Likewise, when He
said (Jo. xv. 10), If you keep my commandments you shall
abide in my love; as I also have kept my Father's com-
mandments, and do abide in his love, it is clear that these
commandments regarded the Son, in so far as He was, as
man, beloved of His Father ; just as He loved His disciples
as men. The Apostle shows that the Father's command-
ments to the Son are to be referred to the human nature
assumed by the Son, when he teaches that the Son was
obedient to the Father in things appertaining to human
nature. For he says (Philip, ii. 8) that he became obedient
to the Father, unto death. The Apostle also shows that
prayer becomes the Son in respect of His human nature,
for he says (Lleb. v. 7) that in the days of his flesh with
a strong cry and tears, offering up prayers and supplica-
36 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
tions to him, that was able to save him from death, (He)
was heard for his reverence. The Apostle shows in what
respect He is said to be sent by the Father, when he says
(Gal. iv. 4) : God sent his Son, made of a woman: where-
fore He is said to be sent by reason of His being made of
a woman : and it is certain that this applies to Him in
respect of the flesh which He assumed.
It is therefore clear that none of these texts proves that
the Son was subject to the Father, except as regards His
human nature.
We must however observe that the Son as God is also
said to be sent by the Father invisibly, without prejudice
to His equality with the Father. We shall prove this
farther on, when we treat of the mission of the Holy Ghost.
It is likewise clear that from the Son being glorified, raised
up, or exalted by the Father, we cannot argue that the Son
is less than the Father, save in respect of His human nature.
For the Son needs not to be glorified as receiving glory
anew, since He declares that He had it from the beginning
of the world : but it was fitting that His glory, which was
concealed beneath the weakness of His flesh, should be
made manifest, through the glorification of His body and
the working of miracles, in the faith of believers. Where-
fore it is said of this concealment (Isa. liii. 3) : His look
was, as it were, hidden and despised; whereupon we
esteemed him not. In like manner Christ was raised from
the dead, in as much as He suffered and died, that is, accord-
ing to the flesh; for it is said (1 Pet. iv. 1) : Christ having
suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same
thought. And it behoved Him to be exalted for as much as
He was humbled : for the Apostle says (Philip, ii. 8, 9) :
He humbled himself, being made obedient unto death . . .
for which cause God also hath exalted him.
Accordingly, by the fact that the Father glorifies, raises
up, and exalts the Son, the Son is not proved to be less
than the Father, except in His human nature : because, in
His divine nature whereby He is equal with the Father,
there is but one power, and one operation of both Father
CHAPTER VIII 37
and Son. Wherefore the Son by His own power not only
exalts Himself, according to the words of the Psalmist
(Ps. xx. 14) : Be thou exalted, O Lord, in thy own
strength; but also raises Himself from the dead, as stated in
His own words (Jo. x. 18) : / have power to lay down my
life, and I have power to take it up again. Moreover He
glorifies not only Himself, but also the Father, for He says
(Jo. xvii. 1) : Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify
thee; not that the Father is concealed under the veil of
assumed flesh, but by the invisibility of His nature. In
this way the Son also is concealed in respect of His divine
nature : since the words of Isaias (xlv. 15), Verily thou art
a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour, apply to
Father and Son in common. And the Son glorifies the
Father, not by bestowing glory on Him, but by manifest-
ing Him to the world : for He says (Jo. xvii. 6) : I have
manifested thy name to men.
We must not believe that there is any lack of power in
the Son of God, since He says (Matth. xxviii. 18) : All
power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Hence His
words (Matth. xx. 23) : To sit on my right hand, is not
mine to give you, but to them for whom it is prepared by
my Father, do not prove that the Son has not the power of
distributing the heavenly seats, since these seats signify
the participation in eternal life, the bestowal of which He
declares to belong to Him, when He says (Jo. x. 27, 28) :
My sheep hear my voice: and I know them, and they
follow me; and I give them life everlasting. It is also said
(Jo. v. 22) that the Father . . . hath given all judgement to
the Son: and it is a part of judgement to bestow eternal life
on certain persons for their merits. Wherefore it is said
(Matth. xxv. 33) that the Son of Man shall set the sheep
on his right hand, but the goats on his left. Therefore it
is in the power of the Son to set a man either on His right or
on His left, whether both be referred to different participa-
tions of glory, or one to glory and the other to punishment.
Accordingly the passage quoted must be interpreted accord-
ing to the foregoing. For we are told in the first place
38 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
(Matth. xx. 20 seqq.) that the mother of the sons of Zebedee
came to Jesus, begging of Him that one of her sons might
sit at His right hand, and the other at His left : and she
seems to have been urged to make this request through
relying on her blood relationship with the man Christ.
Accordingly our Lord by His answer denied, not that
He had the power to give what was asked, but that it was
His to give to them for whom the request was made. For
He did not say : " To sit on My right or left hand is not
mine to give to any man " ; rather does He declare that it
was His to give to them for whom it was prepared by His
Father. For this belonged to Him, not as the son of the
Virgin, but as the Son of God. Consequently, to give to
this or that one was not in His power on account of His
relationship as son of the Virgin ; whereas it was His to
give to them for whom it was prepared by His Father in
eternal predestination; because He was the Son of God.
Moreover our Lord Himself declares that even this pre-
paration is in the power of the Son of God, when He says
(Jo. xiv. 2) : In my Father's house there are many man-
sions ; if not, I would have told you, that I go to prepare
a place for you. Now, these many mansions are the various
degrees of participation in heavenly bliss, which God has
prepared in His eternal predestination. When then our
Lord says : If not — that is, if there were not sufficient man-
sions prepared for those who were to be taken up into
heaven — and adds : I would have told you that I go to
prepare a place for you, He shows that this preparation lies
in His power.
Nor can it be admitted that the Son knew not the day
of His coming, seeing that in him are hid all the treasures
of wisdom and knowledge, as the Apostle says (Coloss.
ii. 3), and that He knows perfectly something greater,
namely the Father. But this means that the Son, as a man
living among men, conducted Himself as an ignorant man,
by not revealing the matter to His disciples. For Scripture
is wont to describe God as knowing something, when He
makes others know it, for instance (Gen. xxii. 12) : Now
CHAPTER VIII 39
/ know that thou j ear est God; that is, "I have caused thee
to know" : and thus contrariwise, the Son is said not to
know that which He does not make us know.
As to sorrow, fear, and the like, it is clear that such
things were in Christ as man : so that they argue no depre-
ciation in the Son's Godhead.
When wisdom is described as created, in the first place
this may refer, not to that Wisdom which is the Son of
God, but to the wisdom which God has bestowed on
creatures. For it is said (Ecclus. i. 9, 10) : He created her
— namely, wisdom — in the Holy Ghost . . . and he poured
her out upon all his works. It may also refer to the created
nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense would be :
From the beginning and before the world, was I created;
that is, I was predestined to be united to a creature (ibid.
xxiv. 14). Or again wisdom is said to be both created
and begotten, so as to insinuate the manner of divine
generation. Because, when a thing is begotten, it receives
the nature of its begetter, and this savours of perfection :
whereas when a thing is generated here below, the begetter
itself is changed, and this savours of imperfection : while
in creation, the Creator undergoes no change, but the
creature does not receive the nature of the Creator. Accord-
ingly, the Son is said to be both created and begotten, so
that from creation we gather the unchangeableness of the
Father, and from generation the identity of nature in Father
and Son. Thus did the Council expound Scripture, as
may be gathered from the works of Hilary. 1
When the Son is said to be the First-Born of creatures,
this does not imply that the Son is to be reckoned among
creatures, but that the Son proceeds from the Father,
and receives from the Father from whom creatures pro-
ceed and receive. The Son however receives identity of
nature, whereas creatures do not : wherefore the Son is
called not only the First-Born, but also the Only Begotten,
on account of the singular mode of that reception.
The words of our Lord to His Father in reference to His
1 Hilary, De Synodis.
40 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
disciples, That they may be one, as we also are one (Jo.
xvii. 22), prove that Father and Son are one in the same
way as it behoves the disciples to be one, namely, by love.
But this manner of union does not exclude unity of nature,
rather does it prove it. For it is said (Jo. iii. 35) : The
Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into
his hand: and this shows that the fulness of the Godhead
is in the Son, as we have already stated. Hence it is clear
that the authority of Scripture invoked by the Arians in
support of their view is in no way opposed to the truth as
declared by the Catholic Faith.
CHAPTER IX
EXPLANATION OF THE TEXTS QUOTED BY PHOTINUS
AND SABELLIUS
In sequence to the foregoing animadversions it is clear
that the texts also of Holy Scripture quoted by Photinus
and Sabellius fail to support their errors.
For our Lord's words after His resurrection, All power
is given to me in heaven and in earth (Matth. xxviii. 18),
do not imply that He received this power then for the first
time, but that the power which the Son of God had received
from eternity began to be manifested in Him after He had
become man, through His victory over death in His resur-
rection.
When the Apostle says in reference to the Son (Rom.
i. 3), Who was made to him of the seed of David, the sense
is clear from the words that follow, according to the flesh.
For he did not say that the Son of God was made absolutely,
but that He was made of the seed of David, according to
the flesh, by taking human nature : even so it is said
(Jo. i. 14) : The Word was made flesh. Wherefore it is
plain that the words that follow (verse 4), Who was pre-
destinated the Son of God, refer to the Son in His human
nature. Because it was not of human merits, but of the
CHAPTER IX 41
grace of God predestinating, that human nature was united
to the Son of God, so that a man could be called the Son
of God.
Likewise when the Apostle (Philip, ii. 8) says that God
exalted Christ on account of the merits of His Passion, we
must refer this to His human nature, in which was the
abasement of His Passion. Consequently the subsequent
words, He gave him a name, which is above all other
names, refer to the fact that the name appropriate to the
Son from His eternal birth was to be manifested, in the
faith of the multitude, as appropriate to the Son incarnate.
Wherefore again, it is evident that Peter's statement that
God made Jesus both Christ and Lord (Acts ii. 36) must
be referred to the human nature, wherein Christ began to
have in course of time, that which He had from eternity in
His divine nature.
Again, the passages invoked by Sabellius in support of
the unity of the Godhead (Deut. vi. 4), Hear, O Israel, the
Lord our God is one Lord, and, See ye that I alone am,
and there is no other God besides me (ibid, xxxii. 39), are
not opposed to the view of the Catholic Faith, which
declares that Father and Son are not two Gods, but one
God, as we have said.
Likewise the words The Father, who abideth in me,
he doth the works, and, J am in the Father, and the Father
in me (Jo. xiv. 10), prove not unity of person, as Sabellius
pretended, but of essence, which Arius denied. For if
Father and Son were one person, it would not be right to
say that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father,
since, properly speaking, a supposit is not said to be in
itself, but only by reason of its parts. Because, as the
parts are in the whole, and that which is proper to the
parts may be ascribed to the whole, sometimes a whole is
spoken of as being in itself. But this manner of speaking
does not apply to things appertaining to God, in whom
there are no parts, as we have proved. 1 Consequently,
since the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in
1 Bk. I., ch. xx.
42 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
the Father, the Father and Son are not one in person : but
it follows that they are one in nature. For this being once
granted, it is quite evident how the Father is in the Son,
and the Son in the Father. Because, as the Father is His
own essence, since in God there is no distinction between
the essence and the one who has the essence, as proved
above, * it follows that whoever has the essence of the Father,
is the Father, and in like manner, that whoever has the
essence of the Son, is the Son. Hence, as the essence of
the Father is in the Son, and the essence of the Son is in
the Father, since both have the same essence, as the Catholic
Faith teaches, it clearly follows that the Father is in the
Son, and the Son in the Father. Thus the same text refutes
the errors of both Sabellius and Arius.
CHAPTER X
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION
AND PROCESSION
Now that we have considered the whole question carefully,
we see clearly that Holy Writ requires us to believe that
the Father and Son, though distinct in Person, are never-
theless one God, having one essence or nature. Since
however, it is far removed from the nature of creatures,
that any two things should be distinct supposits and yet
have but one essence, human reason, which takes its prin-
ciples from the properties of creatures, encounters many
difficulties in this mystery of the divine generation.
For, seeing that the generation which comes under our
observation, is a kind of change, and that corruption is
contrary thereto, seemingly there can scarcely be genera-
tion in God who is unchangeable, incorruptible, and
eternal, as we have proved above. 2
Again. If generation is a change, then whatever is
generated must be changeable. Now, that which is
1 Bk. I., ch. xxii. ' Bk. I., Chs. xii., xv.
CHAPTER X 43
changed passes from potentiality to act, because move-
ment is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such.
Accordingly, if the Son of God is begotten, seemingly
He is not eternal, for He would pass from potentiality to
act : neither would He be God, because He would not be
pure act, but something with an admixture of potentiality.
Further. That which is begotten receives its nature from
the begetter. Therefore, if the Son is begotten of God
the Father, it follows that He receives His nature from the
Father. But it is impossible that He received from the
Father a nature numerically distinct from the Father's, yet
specifically the same, as happens in univocal generations,
for instance, when man begets man, or fire generates fire.
For it has been shown above 1 that there cannot be several
Godheads in number. Seemingly also it is impossible that
He received a nature numerically the same as the Father's,
since if He received a part thereof, it would follow that the
divine nature is divisible ; and if He received the whole,
seemingly it would follow, if the divine nature were wholly
transfused into the Son, that it would cease to be in the
Father, who in begetting would therefore be corrupted.
Nor could it be said that the divine nature overflows from
the Father into the Son by way of superabundance, as the
spring water flows into the stream, and yet the spring does
not run dry, because the divine nature not only cannot
be divided but also cannot increase. It would seem to
follow therefore, that the Son received from the Father
a nature neither numerically nor specifically the same as
the Father's, but altogether different in kind : as happens
in equivocal generation — for instance, when animals be-
gotten of putrid matter are engendered by the power of
the sun, without attaining to the specific nature of the sun.
It follows, then, that God's Son is neither His true Son,
since He has not His Father's nature, nor true God, since
He receives not the divine nature.
Besides. If the Son receives His nature from God the
Father, we must distinguish in Him the receiver and the
1 Bk. I., ch. xlii. ; Bk. IV., ch. ix.
44 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
nature received : for nothing receives itself. Therefore
the Son is not His own essence or nature : and conse-
quently, He is not true God.
Moreover. If the Son of God is not distinct from the
divine essence, since the divine essence is subsistent, as
we have proved 1 (meanwhile it is clear that the Father is
the divine essence), it would seem to follow that Father
and Son are identical with the same subsistent thing. Now
a person is a subsistent intellectual nature. Therefore, if
the Son is the divine nature, it follows that Father and
Son are identical in person. On the other hand, if the
Son is not the divine essence, He is not true God : for we
have proved that God is the divine essence. 2 Seemingly
then, either the Son is not true God, as Arius stated, or
He is not personally distinct from the Father, as Sabellius
asserted.
Again. That which is the principle of individuality in
A cannot be in B, if A and B are individually distinct
from each other ; since what is common to many things
cannot be a principle of individuality. Now it is by His
own essence that God is individualized : because it is not
a form in matter, so that it could be individualized by
matter. Consequently there is nothing in God the Father
to individualize Him, except His essence. Therefore His
essence cannot be in any other supposit. Either then it
is not in the Son, and consequently the Son is not true
God, as Arius asserts : or the Son is not personally distinct
from the Father, and both are the same person, as Sabellius
contends.
Further. If Father and Son are two supposits or
persons, and nevertheless one in essence, there must be
in them, besides the essence, something whereby they are
mutually distinct : for the essence is stated to be common
to both, and what is common cannot be a principle of dis-
tinction. Hence, that whereby Father and Son are dis-
tinct must be distinct from the divine essence. Conse-
quently the Person of the Son is composed of two things,
1 Bk. I., ch. xxii. a Bk. I., ch. xxi.
CHAPTER X 45
and likewise the Person of the Father, namely, the common
essence and a principle of distinction. Both, therefore, are
composites, and neither of them is true God.
Someone, however, might say that they are distinguished
by sole relation, because one is the Father, and the other,
the Son ; and that relative predication seemingly implies,
not some other thing in the subject, but only a relation ;
and consequently that we cannot conclude that there is
composition in the divine persons. But this reply would
seem insufficient to solve the above objection.
For there can be no relation without something absolute :
because in every relative term there must be an absolute
foundation besides the notion of relativity : thus a servant
is something absolute besides his relationship to his master.
Accordingly, the relation whereby Father and Son are
mutually distinct, must be founded on something absolute.
Either then this absolute something is one only, or there
are two absolute things. If there is but one, it cannot be
the foundation of a twofold relation, unless we except the
relation of identity, which cannot cause a distinction : thus
A is the same as A. If then the relation be such as to
require distinction, we must presuppose a distinction of
absolutes. Therefore it would seem impossible for the
Persons of Father and Son to be distinguished by relations
alone.
Moreover it must be admitted that the relation which
distinguishes Father from Son is either real or merely
logical. If it be real, it is not, seemingly, to be identified
with the divine essence, since this is common to Father
and Son. Consequently there will be something in the
Son, that is not His essence, and so He will not be truly
God ; because we have proved 1 that there is nothing in God
besides His essence. On the other hand, if this relation
be merely logical, it cannot effect a personal distinction
between Son and Father, since distinction of persons
implies a real distinction.
Again. Every relative depends on its correlative. But
1 Bk. I., ch. xxiii.
46 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
that which depends on another cannot be true God. Con-
sequently, if the Persons of Father and Son are distin-
guished by their relations, neither will be true God.
Further. If the Father be God, and if the Son be God,
it follows that God is predicated substantially of Father and
Son, since the Godhead cannot be an accident. Now, a
substantial predicate is truly that about which it is predi-
cated : because, when I say : Man is an animal, the thing
that is truly a man is an animal ; so, too, when I say :
Socrates is a man, that which is really Socrates is a man.
Hence it would seem to follow that there cannot be plurality
of subjects, since there is unity on the part of the sub-
stantial predicate : for Socrates and Plato are not one man,
though they are one in point of human nature, nor are
man and ass one animal, though they are one in animality.
Therefore if Father and Son are two Persons, it is seem-
ingly impossible that they be one God.
Moreover. Opposite predicates indicate plurality of
the things about which they are predicated. Now, opposites
are predicted of God the Father and God the Son ; thus
the Father is God unbegotten and begetting, whereas the
Son is God begotten. Therefore seemingly, it is not pos-
sible that Father and Son be one God.
From these and similar arguments certain men, presum-
ing to measure the mysteries of God by their own reason-
ing, endeavour to impugn the doctrine of divine generation.
Since, however, truth is mighty in itself, and is not
weakened by any assault, we must proceed to show that
the truth of faith cannot be overthrown bv reason.
CHAPTER XI 47
CHAPTER XI
THE MEANING OF GENERATION IN GOD, AND OF THE
SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES TO THE SON OF GOD
To carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that
where things differ in nature, we find different modes of
emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things
proceed in a more intimate way. Now, of all things the
inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no
emanation is possible except by the action of one on
another : thus, fire is engendered from fire when an ex-
traneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the
quality and form of fire.
The next place to in anima te bodies belongs to plants,
whence emanation proceeds from within, for as much as the
plant's intrinsic humour is converted into seed, which being
committed to the soil grows into a plant. Accordingly,
here we find the first traces of life : since living things are
those which move themselves to act, whereas those which
can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It
is a sign of life in plants that something within them is
the cause of a form. Yet the plant's life is imperfect
because, although in it emanation proceeds from within,
that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in
the end becomes altogether extraneous : thus the humour
of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventu-
ally becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit
distinct from the branch, though united thereto ; and when
the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree,
and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force
another plant. Indeed if we consider the matter carefully
we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is
something extraneous : since the intrinsic humour of the
tree is drawn through the roots from the soil whence the
plant derives its nourishment.
There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of
life, which is that of the sensitive soul, the proper emana-
48 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
tion whereof, though beginning from without, terminates
within. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more
does it penetrate within : for the sensible object impresses
a form on the external senses, whence it proceeds to the
imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the
memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation,
the beginning and the end are in different subjects : for no
sensitive power reflects on itself. Wherefore this degree
of life transcends that of plants in so much as it is more
intimate; and yet it is not a perfect life, since the emana-
tion is always from one thing to another. ^ Wherefore the
highest degree of life is that which is according to the
intellect : for the intellect reflects on itself, and can under-
stand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the
intellectual life : because the human mind, though able
to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from with-
out : for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as
we have already made clear. 1 ) Accordingly, intellectual life
is more perfect in the a ngel s whose intellect does not pro-
ceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge,
but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the
highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible
species is altogether within them, it is not their very sub-
stance, because in them to understand and to be are not the
same thing, as we have already shown. 2 j Therefore, the
highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose under-
standing is not distinct from His being, as we have proved. 3
Wherefore the intelligible species in God must be the
divine essence itself. By intelligible species I mean that
which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing
understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself
that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but
is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is
expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible
species is known as the inner word, that is signified by the
outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the
thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that
1 Bk. II., ch. xx. * Bk. II., ch. Hi. 8 Bk. I., ch. xlv.
CHAPTER XI 49
to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding
its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it
reflects on its action : for which reason sciences that treat
of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas.
Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not
the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as under-
stood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being
of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its
act. I Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intel-
ligible species in Him is His act of understanding; and
since in Him the act of understanding is the thing under-
stood (for by understanding Himself He understands all
other things, as we have proved 1 ), it follows that in God
understanding Himself, understanding, the thing under- v^.
stood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same. <
With these principles before our eyes, we can to some
extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For
it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the
same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator
impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. Because as
our faith declares the Son begotten of God must have
true Godhead and be true God : and the Godhead is not
a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as
we have proved. 2
Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as
that which we observe in plants ; or again in animals, which j
in common with plants have the powers of nutrition and
generation : because something that was in the plant or
animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species
and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the
generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since He
is indivisible ; and the Son begotten of God is not ex-
traneous to the Father who begets Him, but is in Him, as
proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can
the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such
as we find in the sensitive soul : for God does not receive
from without the ability to cause an impression on another
1 Bk. I., ch. xlix. 8 Bk. I., ch. xvii.
4
50 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
thing, since otherwise He would not be the first agent.
Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed
by means of bodily instruments ; whereas God is manifestly
incorporeal. Consequently generation in God must be
understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. It be-
hoves us to explain this as follows.
It is evident from what has been already proved 1 that
God understands Himself. Now even- understood thing,
as such, must be in the one who understands : because to
understand means the apprehension of the object under-
stood by the intellect : wherefore our intellect in understand-
ing itself, remains within itself, not only as essentially one
with itself, but as understanding the object of its appre-
hension. Therefore God must needs be within Himself
as the understood object is in the one who understands.
Now the understood object in the one who understands is
the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God
understanding Himself is God's word, or God understood,
even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone under-
stood. Hence it is said (Jo. i. i) : The Word was with God.
But since the divine intellect does not pass from poten-
tiality to act, but is always in act, as we proved above,* it
follows of necessity that God has always understood Him-
self. Now for the very reason that He understands Him-
self His Word must be in Him, as we have shown.
Therefore God's Word must have been in Him always :
and consequently His Word is co-eternal with Him, and
does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that
we conceive within ourselves — namely, the intelligible
species — comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence
it is said (Jo. i. i) : In the beginning was the Word. And
since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is
also pure act, as we have proved,* it follows that the very
substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding,
or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived
within the mind, otherwise of the intelligible species, con-
sists in its being understood. Therefore the same being is
1 Bk. I., ch. xlvii. * Bk. I., ch. hi. * Bk. I., ch. xvi.
CHAPTER XI 51
that of the divine Word and of the divine Intellect, and
therefore of God Himself, since He is His own act of
intelligence. Now God's being is His essence or nature,
which is God Himself, as we proved above. 1 Therefore
the Word of God is the divine Being and Essence, and
God in very truth.
It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For
when our intellect understands itself, the being of the
intellect is not identified with its act of understanding;
because the substance of the intellect was in potentiality
to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually.
Consequently the being of the intelligible species is distinct
from the act of understanding, since its being consists in
its being understood. Therefore in the man who under-
stands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real
man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a
man understood, that is, the likeness of a true man, appre-
hended by the intellect. Whereas the Word of God, for
the very reason that it is God understood, is true God
having by nature the divine being, because the natural
being of God is not distinct from His act of understanding,
as we have already stated. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 1) : The
Word was God: which shows, since the statement is
absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth.
For man's word cannot be called a man simply and abso-
lutely, but only with a qualification, namely a man under-
stood. Hence this statement would be untrue. The word
is a man, whereas this may be true, The word is a man
understood. Accordingly when it is stated, The Word
was God, this shows that the divine Word is not merely
an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed
a real and subsistent being : because the true God is sub-
sistent, since He is supremely per se being. Nevertheless
the Godhead is not in the Word so as to be the same in
species and distinct numerically ; because the Word has the
nature of God, in as much as God's understanding is His
being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very
1 Bk. I., ch. xxii.
52 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
being of God. Therefore the Word has the divine essence
itself, identical not merely in species, but even in number.
Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided
numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine
nature is wholly immaterial. Wherefore it is impossible
that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated
in number. Consequently the divine Word has the one
identical nature in common with God : so that the Word
of God, and God whose Word He is are not two Gods,
but one God. That with us, two having human nature
are two men, is because human nature is divided numeric-
ally in two subjects. Now it was shown above 1 that
things which in creatures are divided, in God are one
simply : thus in creatures essence and existence are dis-
tinct ; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is
distinct from its essence or nature : for an individual man
is neither his humanity nor his existence, whereas God is
His essence and His existence.
And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever
pertains to His subsistence, essence, or existence, is most
truly in God : for it befits Him not to be in another, in as
much as He is subsistent; to be a particular thing, in as
much as He is an essence ; and to be in act, by reason of
His existence* Consequently as in God intelligent being, the
act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is His
Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains
to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to
the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God.
Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species,
to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter's
] act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual
! operation ; for the intellect by understanding conceives and
forms the understood species or idea which is the interior
word. i Therefore God's Word must needs proceed from
Him by reason of His act of intelligence. Hence God's
Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose
Word He is, as to Him from whom He proceeds; for such
1 Bk. I., ch. xxxi.
CHAPTER XI 53
a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since
then in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence,
and the intelligible species or word, are essentially one,
and since for this reason each one of these must needs be
God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation
between them, for as much as the Word is referred to the
cause of His conception, as to the source whence He pro-
ceeds. Hence John the Evangelist, lest the phrase The
Word was God should seem to remove any distinction
whatsoever between the Word and God the speaker and
conceiver of the Word, added (verse 2) : The same was in
the beginning with God, as though to say: "This same
Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way dis-
tinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be
described as being with God."
Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and
image of the thing understood : for when the likeness of
a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar,
if it is by way of being a principle ; or else it is an image,
if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness, as
to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our
own intellect : because in the mind of the craftsman there
is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle
of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is com-
pared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate.
On the other hand the image which our mind conceives of
a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an
image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence
takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed
by natural things. Now since God understands both Him-
self and other things, as we have shown, 1 His act of under-
standing is the principle of the things understood by Him,
because they are caused by Him through His intellect and
will : whereas to that intelligible being, which is Himself,
He is compared as a thing to its principle : since this in-
telligible being is identical with the intellect understanding
it, and the Word conceived is an emanation thereof. Con-
1 Bk. I., ch. xlix.
54 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
sequently the Word of God is compared to other things
understood by God as their exemplar, and to God Himself
whose Word He is, as His image. Hence it is said of the
Word of God that He is the image of the invisible God
(COIOSS. i. 15). VKfrtsM
There is however this difference between intellect and
sensed that the latter apprehends the external accidents of
things, such as colour, taste, quantity, and the like, where-
as the former penetrates within : and since all knowledge
is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and
known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness
of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect
a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence
the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar
of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word
of God is the image of God, as we have shown, He must
needs be God's image in respect of the essence. Wherefore
the Apostle says (Heb. i. 3) that he is the figure of his
substance. Now the image of a thing is twofold. There
is the image that has not the same nature as that which it
represents; whether it represent it as to its external acci-
dents — thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet
it is not a man — or whether it represent it as to its sub-
stance, for the intellect's idea of a man is not a man,
because the Philosopher says (3 De Anima, text. 38) : Not
a stone, but its image, is in the soul. But an image that
has the same nature as the thing it represents, is like the
king's son, in whom we see his father's image, and who
has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown
that God's Word is the image of the Speaker in His very
essence, and that He has the same nature in common with
Him. Consequently God's Word is not only His image
but also His Son : because it is not possible to be both the
image of another and of the same nature as that other with-
out being this other's son, so long as we speak of living
beings : because that which proceeds from a living being
in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said
(Ps. ii. 7) : The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son.
CHAPTER XI 55
Since then the Word of God is called the Son of God,
we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the pro-
cession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God
is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally :
and this is in keeping with what we have been saying, and
may be understood from the operation of our own intellect.
For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the
first principles of matters intelligible, whereof the intelligible
concepts, or interior words, exist therein and proceed there-
from naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters
which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to
know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not
in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to
seek them. Now it is evident that God understands Him-
self naturally, even as He exists naturally : since His act
of intelligence is His being, as we have proved. 1 \Hence
the Word spoken by God understanding Himself, proceeds
from Him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the
same nature with God speaking and is His image it
follows that the term of this natural procession is the image
of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now
the essence of true generation in living things is that the
thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and
with the same nature. Therefore God's Word is truly
begotten of God's utterance; and His procession may be
called a begetting or birth\ Hence it is said (Ps. ii. 7) :
This day have I begotten thee; that is to say, " in eternity,"
which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or
future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of
the Arians that the Father begot the Son by His will;
because that which is done voluntarily is not natural. Since
however what God understands of Himself is not less than
what is in Him (else He would not understand Himself
perfectly, nor would His being be His act of intelligence),
the Word of God must needs be essential to God. Now
this Word is the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God
is essential to the Father.
1 Bk. I., ch. xlv.
56 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
This is also clear, because since the Son of God is His
true Son, He has the species and nature of the Father.
Now a certain quantity is due to every nature; wher fore
here below a son is brought to equality with his fat. .er at
the term of generation and growth, unless some defect
occur through indisposition of matter and weakness of the
active force in generation. That at first the son is born
less than his father, is because animal generation passes
from potentiality to act, and the animal is brought gradu-
ally from imperfection to perfection. Now none of these
things can occur in the divine generation, because it is
not a generation from matter, nor does it involve a process
from potentiality to act, nor can there be a defect in the
power of God generating, since His power is infinite.
Hence the Son of God must be equal to the Father.
Again. If the Son be not equal to the Father, His great-
ness must be numerically distinct from the Father's :
because the same identical quantity cannot be greater or
less than itself. Now God's greatness is not distinct from
His essence, as we made clear in the First Book. 1 Con-
sequently the essence of the Son will be numerically dis-
tinct from the Father's : and we have proved the contrary
to be the case. We must therefore say that the Son is
equal to the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. v. 18) that Jesus
said God was his Father, making himself equal to God:
and (Philip, ii. 6) that He thought it not robbery to be equal
to God.
We must also take note that the thing begotten, so long
as it remains in the begetter, is said to be conceived. Now,
God's Word is begotten of God in such wise that He does
not depart from God but abides in Him, as stated above.
Rightly therefore may God's Word be described as con-
ceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says (Prov.
viii. 24) : The depths were not as yet, and I was already
conceived.
There is however a difference between the conception
of God's Word and the material conception which we
1 Chs. xxii., xxiii.
CHAPTER XI 57
observe in animals : because the offspring, during the
period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and
unable to subsist by itself apart from its begetter : where-
fore when an animal's body is begotten, the conception of
the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed
from its begetter by being brought forth from the womb.
"| On the other hand, God's Word, abiding in God the
Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from
God the Speaker : for no distinction of place is needed
where, as stated above, there is only a distinction of
relationship.! Accordingly in the generation of the Word
of God conception is the same as birth : wherefore after
Wisdom had said : / was already conceived, the text, after
a few words, continues (verse 25) : Before the hills I was
brought forth.
Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings
include movement and consequently some kind of suc-
cession — since the term of conception is the existence in
the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the
term of birth, the separate existence of the offspring apart
from the parent — it follows that in corporeal beings what
is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring
while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the
other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and
brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence
it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate
existence as soon as it is brought forth : thus the illumin-
ated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is
no succession in the diffusion of light. 1 And if this is the
case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply
to the Word of God, not only because His conception and
birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are
in eternity, where there can be no yesterday nor morrow.
Hence after the words of Wisdom (Prov. viii. 25) : Before
the hills I was brought forth, lest this might seem to imply
that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text
1 At the time of St Thomas it was thought that the movement of light
was instantaneous.
58 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
continues (verse 27) : When he prepared the heavens, I was
present. Accordingly whereas in the carnal generation of
animals there is first conception, then gestation and asso-
ciation without separate existence, of offspring with parent,
in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous :
since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and
present. And seeing that what is begotten is brought forth
from the womb ; even as the generation of God's Word is
called birth, in order to indicate His perfect distinction
from His begetter, so in like manner it is called generation
from the womb, according to Ps. cix. 3, From the womb,
before the day-star, have I begotten thee. Yet because the
distinction between word and speaker is not such as to
hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already
stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought
forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is
He said to be in the bosom of the Father (Jo. i. 18), to show
that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in
the speaker.
Now we must observe that the carnal generation of
animals is effected by an active and a passive function :
the father takes an active part, while the mother's part is
passive : so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the
father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as
regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring
its nature and species, while conception and gestation
belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive.
Accordingly since, as we have stated, the procession of
the Word lies in the fact that God understands Himself
(and God understands Himself, not by a passive power,
but by an active power, so to speak, because the divine
intellect is not in potentiality but in act only), it follows
that in the generation of God's Word, there is no place
for a mother but only for a father. Consequently the
parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal
generation, are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in
the generation of the Word : thus the Father is said to
give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget Him.
CHAPTER XII 59
CHAPTER XII
HOW THE SON OF GOD IS CALLED THE WISDOM OF GOD
Seeing that we have applied to the generation of the Word
the things that are said of divine Wisdom, it remains to
be shown how divine Wisdom, in whose person those
things are said, may be taken to be the Word of God.
And that we may obtain knowledge of things divine from
human things, it behoves us to observe that in man wisdom
is a habit perfecting our mind in the knowledge of the
highest — namely divine — things. And when, through the
habit of wisdom there arises in our intellect an idea of
divine things, this very idea or inward word is wont to
be called wisdom, by that figure of speech whereby acts
and species are denominated from the habits from which
they proceed : thus sometimes a just action is called justice,
a brave action bravery, and a virtuous action is commonly
called virtue : and in this way a man's wise conceptions
are called wisdom. Now in God wisdom must be referred
to the fact that He knows Himself. But since He knows
Himself not by an intelligible species but by His essence —
indeed His very act of intelligence is His essence — there-
fore God's wisdom cannot be a habit, but is the divine
essence. Now it is evident from what has been said, that
the Son of God is the Word and concept of God under-
standing Himself. Wherefore the Word of God is rightly
called conceived or begotten Wisdom, as being the wise
conception of the divine mind : hence the Apostle calls
Christ the wisdom of God (i Cor. i. 24). Now the word
of wisdom conceived in the mind is a manifestation of the
understander's wisdom, even as all our habits are revealed
by their acts. Since then divine Wisdom is called light,
because it consists in a pure act of knowledge (for the
manifestation of light is its refulgence, which proceeds
from it), the Word of divine Wisdom is fittingly called the
splendour of light, according to the words of the Apostle,
who says of the Son (Heb. i. 3) : Being the brightness of
60 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
his glory. Hence the Son ascribed to Himself the mani-
festation of the Father, when He said (Jo. xvii. 5, 6) :
Father . . . I have manifested thy name to men. Yet
though the Son who is God's Word is rightly called
begotten Wisdom, the name Wisdom taken absolutely
must needs be common to Father and Son, since the
Wisdom that shines through the Word is the essence of
the Father, as we have said above, and the Father's essence
is common to Him and the Son.
CHAPTER XIII
THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE SON IN GOD
Since God by understanding Himself understands all
other things, as we proved in the First Book; 1 and since
He understands Himself in one simple glance, for His
act of understanding is His being : it follows of necessity
that there is only one Word of God. And as in God the
generation of the Son is nothing else but the conception
of the Word, it follows that there is but one generation
in God, and but one Son begotten of the Father. Hence
it is said (Jo. i. 14) : We saw his glory, the glory, as it
were, of the only-begotten of the Father, and again
(verse 18) : The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom
of the Father, he hath declared him to us.
It would seem however to follow from the foregoing
that there is yet another word of the divine Word, and
another son proceeding from the Son. £or_we proved that
the Word of God is true God : consequently whatever
belongs to God belongs to the Word of God. Now God
of necessity understands Himself : therefore the Word
of God also understands Himself. If then, because God
understands Himself, there is in God the Word begotten
of Him, it would seem to follow that we must ascribe to
the Word also, yet another word, in as much as He under-
1 Chs. xlix., 1.
CHAPTER XIII 61
stands Himself : and thus there will be a word of the Word,
and a son of the Son. And this other Word, if it be God,
will also understand Himself, and will have another Word,
so that there will be an infinite process of divine genera-
tions.
This objection may be solved from what has already
been said. For while we have proved that the Word of
God is God, we have also shown that He is not another
God distinct from the God whose Word He is, but is
wholly one with Him, and distinct only as the Word pro-
ceeding from Him. Now as the Word is not another
God, so neither is He another intellect, nor consequently
has He another act of understanding. And yet it does
not follow that the Word has His own word by reason of
His understanding Himself : because, as stated above, the
Word is distinct from the Speaker solely in that He pro-
ceeds from Him. Wherefore all other things must be
ascribed in common to God who speaks — that is, the Father
■ — and to the Word who is the Son, because the Word also
is God. This alone is to be ascribed to the Father exclu-
sively, that the Word proceeds from Him, and to the Son
exclusively, that He proceeds from God speaking. Hence
we gather that the Son is not impotent, though unable to
beget a son, whereas the Father does beget a Son : because
Father and Son have the same power, even as they have
the same Godhead. And since in God generation is the
intelligible conception of the Word, according as God
understands Himself, it follows that in God the power of
begetting is identical with His power of understanding
Himself. And since in God the act of understanding
Himself is one and simple, it follows that also His power
of understanding Himself, which is identical with His act,
is but one. By the same power therefore, both the Word
is conceived, and the Speaker of the Word conceives ; and
consequently by the same power the Father begets and
the Son is begotten. Therefore the Father has no power
that the Son has not; yet the Father has the generative
power for the purpose of begetting, but the Son for the
62 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
purpose of being begotten : and these differ but relatively,
as already explained.
Seeing however that the Apostle ascribes a word to
the Son, whence it would seem to follow that the Son has
a son, and that the Word has a word, we must inquire
into the meaning of the Apostle when he makes this state-
ment. For he says (Heb. i. 2, 3) that God in these days
hath spoken to us by his Son, and afterwards : Who being
the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance,
and upholding all things by the word of his power, etc.
Now we must gather the meaning of this passage from
what we have been saying. For we said that the concept
of Wisdom, namely, the Word, is rightly called Wisdom.
We may go yet further so as to see that even the external
effect, which results from the concept of Wisdom, may
itself be called wisdom : in the same way as an effect may
assume the name of its cause. Thus we call it wisdom not
only when a man thinks wisely, but also when he works
wisely : and therefore the manifestation of divine wisdom
in creatures is called the Wisdom of God, according to
Ecclus. i. 9, 10, He created her — that is, Wisdom — in the
Holy Ghost; and afterwards adds : and he poured her out
upon all his works. Accordingly the effect of the Word
receives the name of word : for even with us the vocal ex-
pression of the inward word is called a word, being as
it were the word of a word, because it indicates the inward
word. Wherefore not only is the concept of the divine
intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the
revelation of the divine concept in visible works is called
the Word's word. In this way are we to understand that
the Son upholds all things by the ivord of his power, as
also the passage in Ps. cxlviii. 8, Fire, hail, snow, ice,
stormy winds, which fulfil his word; because, to wit, the
effects of the divine concept are accomplished in the world
by created forces.
Now since God in understanding Himself, understands
all other things, as stated above, it follows that the Word
conceived in God through His understanding Himself, is
CHAPTER XIII 63
the only word expressing all things. Yet He is not in
the same way the Word of God, as of other things : because
He is the Word of God as proceeding from God, whereas
He is the word of other things, not as proceeding from
them, because God does not acquire knowledge from things,
but rather brings things into being by His knowledge, 1 as
we have proved above. Consequently the Word of God
must needs be the perfect type of all the things that have
been made. In what way He can be the proper type of
each single thing is plain from our treatise in the First
Book, 2 where it was shown that God has proper knowledge
of all things. Now whosoever makes a thing with intel-
ligence, works by means of the idea which he has of that
thing as made : thus the material house is made by the
builder from the idea of a house that is in his mind. And
we have shown above that God brings things into being,
not by natural necessity, but as an intellectual and volun-
tary agent. Wherefore God made all things by His
Word, who is the type of things made by Him. Hence
it is said (Jo. i. 3) : All things were made by him: also in
accord with this, Moses in his account of the creation uses
such expressions of each of the works as : God said : Be light
made, and the light was made . . . and God said: Let
there be a firmament (Gen. i. 3, 6), and so on. All this is
expressed in the words of the Psalmist (Ps. cxlviii. 5) : He
spoke, and they were made. For to speak is to utter a
word. Accordingly the statement that God sp&ke, and
they were made means that He spoke the Word whereby
He brought things into being, as by the perfect idea of
them.
And since the same cause conserves and brings things
into being, as all things were made by the Word, so are
they conserved in being by God's Word : wherefore the
Psalmist says (Ps. xxxii. 6) : By the word of the Lord the
heavens were established, and the Apostle says that the Son
upholds all things by the word of his power (Heb. i. 3) :
and we have already stated how this is to be understood.
1 Bk. II., ch. xxiv. '" Ch. lxv.
64 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
There is however a difference to be noted between the
Word of God and the idea in the mind of the craftsman.
The Word of God is God subsistent, whereas the crafts-
man's idea of his handiwork is not a subsistent thing, but
merely an intelligible form. Now a non-subsistent form
is not, properly speaking, competent to act (since to act
belongs to that which is perfect and subsistent), but is
competent to be acted by, since it is a principle of action
whereby the agents act. Hence the craftsman's idea of the
house does not make the house, but the craftsman makes
the house by it. On the other hand since God's word, who
is the idea of things made by God, is subsistent, He acts
and is not merely something acted by. Wherefore the
Wisdom of God says (Prov. viii. 30) : I was with him form-
ing all things, and our Lord said (Jo. v. 17) : My Father
worketh until now and I work.
It must also be observed that the thing made with the
intelligence pre-exists in the mind even before it exists in
itself : thus the house exists in the builder's mind before it
is actually built. Now, the Word of God is the type of all
things made by God, as we have proved. Therefore all
things made by God must have pre-existed in the Word of
God, before existing in their own nature. Now, the mode
of existence of that which is in another follows the mode
of that in which it is, and not its own mode : thus the house
in the mind of the builder has an ideal and immaterial
existence. Hence things must have pre-existed in the Word
of God according to the mode of the Word. And the mode
of the Word is that He is one, simple, immaterial ; and not
merely living, but life itself, since He is His own being.
Consequently things made by God, pre-existed in the
Word from eternity, in a mode wholly devoid of matter
and composition, since in Him they were nothing else but
the Word Himself who is life. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 3, 4) :
That which was made, was life in him, namely, in the
Word. Now, as he who works by intelligence and the idea
that is in him, brings things into being, so too the teacher,
by the knowledge that is in him, produces knowledge in his
CHAPTER XIV 65
disciple, for the disciple's knowledge is drawn from the
knowledge of his teacher, as a copy thereof. Now, God by
His intelligence is the cause not only of all things that sub-
sist in nature, but also of all intellectual knowledge, as
proved above. 1 It follows, therefore, that the Word of God,
who is the idea of the divine intellect, must be the cause of
all intellectual knowledge : hence it is said (Jo. i. 4) : Life
was the light of men, because like a light the Word, who is
life, and in whom all things are life, reveals the truth to
men. Nor is it the fault of the Word that all men attain
not to the knowledge of the truth, but that some remain in
the dark. This is due to the fault of men who are not con-
verted to the Word, and are unable to comprehend Him
fully : wherefore darkness remains in them, more or less,
according as they are more or less converted to the Word
and comprehend Him. Hence John, in order to remove all
deficiency from the Word's manifestive power, after saying
that he is the light of men, adds that he shines in the dark-
ness, and the darkness did not comprehend it : because dark-
ness is due, not to the light not shining, but to the fact that
some do not comprehend the light of the Word : even so,
when the material sun is shining throughout the world,
there is no darkness, save to one whose eyes are shut or
weak.
This, then, is what to some extent we are able to learn
from Holy Writ, concerning the divine generation and
power of the Only Begotten Son of God.
CHAPTER XIV
SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE
DIVINE GENERATION
Since then truth excludes all error and banishes all doubt,
it will be easy to solve the objections which seemed to raise
difficulties in the matter of the divine generation.
1 Bk. III., ch. lxxvi.
66 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
For it is clear from what has been already established that
in God we place an intelligible begetting, but not such as
obtains in material things, the engendering of which is a
kind of change and the antithesis of corruption. Because
even the word of our intellect is conceived without change,
nor is there a corruption that is antithetical to it : and we
have already explained how the begetting of the Son of
God is like to the conception of that same word. In like
manner the word conceived in our mind does not pass from
potentiality to act, except in so far as our intellect passes
from potentiality to act; and yet the word is not begotten
of our intellect, until the latter is in act, and once it is in
act, the conceived word is there. But the divine intellect
is never in potentiality, but only in act, as we have proved
above. 1 Therefore it begets the Word without passing
from potentiality to act ; just as one act gives rise to another ;
as, for example, light to brightness, and the intellect in act
to the idea. Wherefore it is clear also that by being be-
gotten the Son of God is none the less true God or eternal ;
rather in fact must He needs be coeternal with God whose
Word He is, since the intellect in act is never without its
word.
And because the Son of God is not begotten materially
but intelligibly, it is foolish to doubt whether the Father
gave Him His nature wholly or in part. For it is evident
that if God understands Himself, the whole fulness of Him
must be contained in the Word. And yet the substance
given to the Son ceases not to be in the Father, for even
with us the thing understood does not cease to have its
proper nature, although the idea is the intelligible image
of the very nature of the object understood. From the fact
that the divine begetting is not material, it is clear that there
is no need to distinguish in the Son of God the recipient
and the nature received. In material generations it must be
otherwise, inasmuch as the matter of the being begotten
receives the form of the begetter. It is not so, however,
with intelligible generations : because the word does not
1 Bk. I., ch. lv.
CHAPTER XIV 67
arise from the intellect in such a way that a part thereof be
presupposed as receiving, while a part flows out of the intel-
lect : but it originates entirely from the intellect, even as in
us one word wholly arises from another, as a conclusion
from principles. Now, when a thing in its entirety arises
from another, it is impossible to indicate a recipient and a
thing received, because all that arises issues from the source
whence it arises. In like manner it is plain that the unity
of the divine begetting is not destroyed, because there
cannot be a distinction of several subsistent beings. For
the divine essence, though subsistent, cannot be severed
from the relation that we must needs ascribe to God for as
much as the conceived Word of the divine mind proceeds
from the divine utterance ; because both the Word is the
divine essence, as we have proved, and God who speaks
the Word that proceeds from Him, is also the divine
essence, nor are they distinct but identical. Moreover these
relations are not accidents in God but subsistent ; for
nothing can be accidental to God, as we have proved above. 1
Accordingly there are several subsistent beings, if we con-
sider the relations ; but one subsistent being if we consider
the essence. Hence we say that there is one God, because
there is one subsistent essence; and that there are three
persons on account of the distinction between the subsistent
relations. In human beings the distinction of persons
regards not the specific essence, but certain things that
are in addition to the specific nature ; because in all human
persons there is one specific nature, and yet there are
many persons, since men are distinguished by things that
are in addition to the nature. In God, therefore, we must
not say that there is but one person by reason of the
unity of the subsistent essence, but that there are several
on account of the relations.
Hence it is clear that whatever is the principle of indi-
viduality in one is not necessarily in another : since neither
is the divine essence in another God, nor paternity in the
Son. And although two persons, namely Father and Son,
1 Bk. I., ch. xxiii.
68 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
are distinct not in essence but by relation, nevertheless this
relation is not really distinct from the essence, seeing that
relation in God cannot be an accident. Nor shall we find
this impossible if we consider carefully our conclusions in
the First Book, 1 where we proved that in God are the per-
fections of all things, not by a kind of agglomeration, but
by the unity of His simple essence. For the various perfec-
tions which in the creature are manifold in form, in God
are one owing to the simplicity of His essence : thus man,
as an animal, is by one form a living being, by another is
wise, and by another, just : while all these things belong
to God by His essence. Hence as wisdom and justice are
accidents in man, whereas in God they are identified with
the divine essence, so a relation such as paternity or son-
ship though an accident in man, in God is the divine
essence.
Now we assert that God's wisdom is His essence, while
our wisdom is something additional to the essence, not as
though the divine wisdom falls short of ours, but because
God's essence so transcends ours, that such things as
wisdom and justice which in us are not essential to our
being, belong to God perfectly by reason of His essence.
Consequently whatever belongs to us in respect of our
essence and wisdom as mutually distinct, must be ascribed
to God in respect of His essence as identical : and the same
applies to other matters. Accordingly, since the divine
essence is identical with the relations of paternity or son-
ship, it follows that whatever belongs to paternity must
belong to God, although paternity is in the essence. Now
it is proper to paternity to be distinguished from sonship :
because a father is related to his son as to some other man,
and the notion of father is that he is the father of a son.
Although then, God the Father is the divine essence, and
so too is God the Son, He is distinct from the Son in so
much as He is the Father, although He is one with Him,
in so much as each is the divine essence. Whence also
it is evident that though in God relation is not apart from
1 Ch. xxviii.
CHAPTER XIV 69
something absolute, yet in God it is compared to the abso-
lute otherwise than in creatures. Relation in creatures is
compared to the absolute as accident to its subject ; this
is not so in God, in whom they are identical, even as in
other things that are predicated of God. Now the same
subject cannot have in itself contrary relations ; for instance,
a man cannot be both father and son in the same respect.
The divine essence, however, on account of its absolute per-
fection, is identical with wisdom, justice, and other like
things which in us belong to various species. And so
nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both
paternity and sonship, and Father and Son being one
God, although the Father is not the Son : because it is the
same essence that has being naturally, and its own intelli-
gible Word.
From what has been said we may also conclude that
relations in God are real and not merely logical. Because
every relation which results from a thing's proper opera-
tion, power, quantity, or the like, exists in that thing
really, otherwise it would be merely a logical relation.
Take for example knowledge and the thing known. The
relation of knowledge to the thing known results from
the action of the knower, and not from any action of the
thing known : because the object known is unchanged in
itself when it is understood and when it is not understood.
Consequently the relation is really in the knower, and only
logically in the object known : because that which is under-
stood is said to be known in relation to knowledge, as a
consequence of the relation which knowledge bears to it.
The same is to be observed in right and left hand : for in
animals there are distinct functions from which arise the
relations of right to left. Wherefore that relation is really
in the animal ; so that whichever way the animal turns,
the relation always remains the same : for its right side
can never be called its left side. On the other hand, in-
animate beings which are devoid of such functions, have
no such relationship really in them; the relationship of
right and left is ascribed to them in reference to some
70 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
animal ; thus the same pillar is said to be now on the
right, now on the left, according to the different positions
of the animal. Now the relation of the Word to God
speaking, whose Word He is, is in God, for as much as
God understands Himself; and this operation is in God,
or rather is God Himself, as we have proved. 1 It follows,
then, that the aforesaid relations are really and truly in
God, and not only according to our way of thinking.
Although there is relationship in God, it does not follow
that in God there is something having a dependent exist-
ence. In us relations have a dependent existence, because
their being is distinct from that of substance, wherefore
they have their own mode of existence in accordance with
their own nature, as other accidents have. For since all
accidents are forms superadded to a substance, and caused
by the principles of that substance, it follows that their
existence is something additional to the existence of the
substance and dependent thereon. Moreover each one of
them will derive its order of precedence according as, in
its proper nature, it is nearer to the substance, or more
perfect. Hence a relation that is really adventitious to a
substance, in point of existence comes last and is most
imperfect. It comes last, because it presupposes not only
the existence of the substance, but also that of other acci-
dents, by which the relation is caused : thus oneness in
quantity causes equality, and oneness in quality causes
likeness. It is also most imperfect, because the proper
notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something
else : so that its proper being, which it adds to the sub-
stance, depends not only on the being of the substance,
but also on the being of something extraneous. Now this
cannot occur in God, because in Him there is no other
being besides His substance : since all that is in God is
substance. Accordingly, as in God the being of wisdom is
not dependent on the substance, because it is the being
of His substance, so the being of relation is dependent
neither on His substance nor on something extraneous,
1 Bk. I., ch. xlvii.
CHAPTER XIV 71
because even the being of relation is the being of His sub-
stance. Therefore, the fact that there are relations in God
does not argue the presence of dependent being in Him,
but only of a certain habitude, wherein the essence of
relationship consists : thus because we ascribe wisdom to
God, it does not follow that this is something accidental
in Him, but only that it is a perfection, corresponding to
our notion of wisdom.
Hence it is also evident that, although created relations
are found to involve imperfection, it does not follow that
the divine Persons, who are distinguished by relations,
are imperfect, but it follows that this distinction is the
least of all.
From what has been said, it is also manifest that,
although God is predicated of Father and Son substan-
tially, it does not follow, if Father and Son are two persons,
that they are two Gods : for they are two by reason of the
distinction of subsistent relations, yet they are one God on
account of the unity of the subsistent essence. But among
men it is not the case that several are one man, because
the essence of human nature is not numerically one in
both, nor is the essence of human nature subsistent so
that human nature be called man. Since then in God there
is unity of essence and distinction of relations, it clearly
follows that there is no reason why there should not be
opposites in the one God, but only such as result from
the distinction of relations : such as Begetter and Begotten,
which are mutually opposed relatively ; and Begotten and
Unbegotten, which are mutually opposed as affirmation
and negation. For wherever there is distinction, there
must needs be opposition of affirmation and negation :
since there is no distinction, where there is no difference
of affirmation and negation : because in all respects one
must be the same as the other, and thus they are absolutely
the same, and in no way distinct.
We have now treated sufficiently of the divine genera-
tion.
72 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
CHAPTER XV
OF THE HOLY GHOST I THAT HE IS IN GOD
The authority of Holy Writ not only reveals the existence
in God of Father and Son, but also numbers the Holy
Ghost with them. Thus our Lord says (Matth. xxviii. 19) :
Going, teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : and John
declares (1 Jo. v. 7) : There are three who give testimony
in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost.
Moreover, Holy Writ witnesses to a kind of procession of
this same Holy Spirit : for it says (Jo. xv. 26) : When the
Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father,
the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, he shall
give testimony of me.
CHAPTER XVI
REASONS FOR WHICH CERTAIN MEN HAVE DEEMED THE
HOLY GHOST TO BE A CREATURE
Some have deemed the Holy Ghost to be a creature, higher
than other creatures : and they appealed to the authority of
Scripture to confirm this assertion. For it is said (Amos iv.
13) according to the Septuagint version : Behold he that
formeth the mountains and createth the Spirit, and
declareth his word to man. Again it is said (Zach. xii. 1) :
Thus saith the Lord, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and
layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit
of man in him. Therefore it would seem that the Holy
Spirit is a creature.
Again. Our Lord says, speaking of the Holy Ghost (Jo.
xvi. 13) : He shall not speak of himself : but what things
soever he shall hear, he shall speak. Whence it would seem
to follow that He never speaks on His own authority, but
only in obedience to the commands of a master ; for to speak
CHAPTER XVI 73
what is heard seems to pertain to a minister. Therefore,
seemingly, the Holy Ghost is a creature subject to God.
Further. To be sent would seem to be the mark of an
inferior : since authority is implied in one who sends. Now
the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son : for our
Lord said (Jo. xiv. 26) : The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost,
whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you
all things: and (Jo. xv. 26) : When the Paraclete cometh,
whom I will send you from the Father. Therefore, seem-
ingly, the Holy Ghost is less than both Father and Son.
Also. Where Holy Scripture associates the Son with
the Father in things pertaining to the Godhead, it makes
no mention of the Holy Ghost ; as when our Lord says
(Matth. xi. 27) : No one knoweth the Son, but the Father:
neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, without
mentioning the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (Jo. xvii. 3) :
This is eternal life : That they may know thee, the only true
God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: and here again
there is no mention of the Holy Ghost. Again, the Apostle
says (Rom. i. 7) : Grace to you, and peace from God our
Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ: and (1 Cor. viii.
6) : To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all
things, and we unto him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by
whoyn are all things, and we by him: and here again
nothing is said of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, seemingly,
the Holy Ghost is not God.
Moreover. Whatsoever is in motion is a creature :
for it was proved in the First Book 1 that God is immovable.
Now, Holy Scripture ascribes movement to the Holy Spirit :
for it is said (Gen. i. 2) : The spirit of God moved over the
waters, and (Joel ii. 28) : / will pour out my spirit upon all
flesh. Therefore, apparently, the Holy Ghost is a creature.
Further. Whatsoever can be increased or divided is
changeable and created. Now this would seem to be
ascribed to the Holy Ghost in the sacred writings. Thus
the Lord said to Moses (Num. xi. 16, 17) : Gather unto me
seventy men of the ancients of Israel . . . and I will take
1 Ch. xiii.
74 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
of thy spirit, and give to them. It is also stated that Eliseus
besought Elias (4 Kings ii. 9, 10) : / beseech that in me
may be thy double spirit, and Elias answered : If thou see
me when I am taken from thee, thou shalt have what thou
hast asked. Seemingly then, the Holy Ghost is subject to
change, and is not God.
Again. There can be no sorrow in God, since it is a
passion. But God is impassible. The Holy Ghost, how-
ever, is affected by sorrow ; wherefore the Apostle says
(Eph. iv. 30): Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God. It is
also said (Isa. lxiii. 10) : They provoked to wrath and
afflicted his Holy Spirit. 1 Therefore, seemingly, the Holy
Ghost is not God.
Besides. It is not fitting that God should pray, but rather
that prayer should be addressed to him. Now prayer is
becoming to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Rom. viii. 26) :
The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groan-
ings. Therefore the Holy Ghost is, seemingly, not God.
Moreover. No one gives fittingly that over which he has
no dominion. But God the Father gives the Holy Ghost,
and so too does the Son : for our Lord says (Lk. xi. 13) :
Your Father in heaven will give the good Spirit to them that
ask him: and Peter says that God gives the Holy Ghost to
them that obey him (Acts v. 32). Wherefore it would seem
that the Holy Ghost is not God.
Again. If the Holy Ghost be true God, He must needs
have the divine nature : and so, since He proceeds from
the Father (Jo. xv. 26) it follows of necessity that He
receives the divine nature from Him. Now, he that
receives the nature of the one that produces him, is be-
gotten by him : since it is proper to the one begotten to be
brought forth in specific likeness to his principle. There-
fore the Holy Ghost would be begotten, and consequently
He would be the Son : and this is surely contrary to Faith.
Again. If the Holy Ghost receives the divine nature
from the Father, and is not begotten, it follows that the
divine nature is bestowed in two ways, namely by way of
1 Vulg., the Spirit of his Holy One.
CHAPTER XVII 75
generation, as the Son proceeds, and by the way in which
the Holy Ghost proceeds. Now, seemingly, it is inconsis-
tent with unity of nature to be bestowed in two ways : as
can be proved by a review of the various natures. Seeing
then that the Holy Ghost does not receive the (divine)
nature by way of generation, it must follow, apparently,
that He does not receive it at all : and consequently that
he is not God.
This was the opinion of Arius, who maintained that the
Son and Holy Ghost are creatures : but that the Son is
greater than the Holy Ghost, and that the Holy Ghost is
subservient to the Son : even as he maintained that the Son
is less than the Father. As regards his teaching about the
Holy Ghost, he was followed by Macedonius, who rightly
held the Father and Son to be of one and the same sub-
stance, but refused to believe this about the Holy Ghost,
and contended that He is a creature. Hence by some the
Macedonians are called Semi-arians, because they partly
agree with the Arians, and partly disagree.
CHAPTER XVII
THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS TRUE GOD
It can be clearly shown by the authority of Holy Writ that
the Holy Ghost is God.
No temple is consecrated save to God alone : wherefore
it is said (Ps. x. 5) : The Lord is in his holy temple. Now,
temples are dedicated to the Holy Ghost : for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. vi. 19) : Know you not that your members are
temples of the Holy Ghost? Therefore the Holy Ghost is
God. This argument is enhanced by the fact that our
members, which the Apostle declares to be the temple of
the Holy Ghost, are also the members of Christ. For he
had already said (verse 15) : Know you not that your bodies
are the members of Christ? And it would be unfitting,
since Christ is true God, as we have proved above, if
76 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Christ's members were the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless
the Holy Ghost were God also.
Again. The service of latria is given by the saints to God
alone: for it is said (Deut. vi. 13): Thou shalt fear the
Lord thy God, and thou shalt serve him only. Now the
saints serve the Holy Ghost : for the Apostle says (Philip.
iii. 3) : We are the circumcision, who serve the divine
spirit .- 1 and although some codices read : Who serve in
the spirit of the Lord, the Greek and older Latin codices
have : Who serve the divine Spirit : 2 also, from the Greek,
it is plain that the text refers to service of latria, which is
due to God alone. Therefore the Holy Ghost is true God,
and the worship of latria is due to Him.
Further. The sanctification of man is a work belonging
exclusively to God : for it is said (Levit. xxii. 9) : I am the
Lord who sanctify them. Now, it is the Holy Ghost who
sanctifies: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. vi. 11): You are
washed . . . you are sanctified . . . you are justified in
the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the spirit of our
God; and (2 Thess. ii. 12) : For that God hath chosen you
first fruits unto salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit, and
faith of the truth. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.
Again. As the body derives natural life from the soul,
so does the soul derive the righteous life from God : where-
fore our Lord says (Jo. vi. 58) : As the living Father hath
sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth
me, the same also shall live by me. Now, this latter
life comes to us through the Holy Ghost : hence it is added
(ibid. 64) : It is the Spirit that quickeneth : and the Apostle
says (Rom. viii. 13) : // by the Spirit you mortify the deeds
of the flesh, you shall live. Therefore the Holy Ghost is
of divine nature.
Also. In order to prove His divinity against the Jews,
who could not bear that He should make Himself equal to
God, our Lord claimed the power of raising the dead to
life. Here are His words (Jo. v. 21) : As the Father raiseth
up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life>
1 Vulg. , who in spirit serve God. * 01 nvevpaTi 0e$ Xarpevovns.
CHAPTER XVII 77
to whom he will. Now the power of raising the dead to
life belongs to the Holy Ghost : for the Apostle says (Rom.
viii. n) : // the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the
dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the
dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of
his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore the Holy Ghost
is of divine nature.
Again. Creation is the work of God alone, as we have
proved above. 1 Now creation belongs to the Holy Ghost,
for it is said (Ps. ciii. 30) : Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit
and they shall be created; and (Job xxxiii. 4) : The Spirit
of God made vie. Also it is said of God (Ecclus. i. 9) that
he created her, namely Wisdom, in the Holy Ghost. There-
fore the nature of the Holy Ghost is divine.
Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11) : The Spirit
searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For
what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of
a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God
no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now, no creature
is able to comprehend all the depths of God. This is
manifest from the words of our Lord (Matth. xi. 27) : No
one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone
know the Father, but the Son. It is also said in the person
of God (Isa. xxiv. 16) : My secret to myself. Therefore
the Holy Ghost is not a creature^
Also. According to the foregoing comparison of the
Apostle, the Holy Ghost is to God as the spirit of man
is to man. Now man's spirit is within him, and is not of a
different nature from him : but is a part of him. There-
fore the Holy Ghost is not of a different nature from
God.
Moreover. If we compare the above words of the Apostle
with the words of the prophet Isaias, we shall see clearly
that the Holy Ghost is God. For it is said (Isa. lxiv. 4) :
The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things
thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee. Now, the
Apostle after quoting these words says, as quoted above,
1 Bk. II., ch. xxi.
78 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
that the Spirit searcheth the deep things of God. Hence
it is evident that the Holy Ghost knows those depths of
God, which God has prepared for them that wait for Him.
Wherefore, if none but God hath seen these things, as
Isaias says, it is clear that the Holy Ghost is God.
Again. It is said (Isa. vi. 8, 9) : I heard the voice
of the Lord, saying: Whom shall I send? and who shall
go for us? And I said: Lo, here am I, send me. And he
said : Go, and thou shalt say to this people : Hearing hear,
and understand not. Now, Paul ascribes these words to
the Holy Ghost : wherefore it is related that Paul said to
the Jews (Acts xxviii. 25, 26) : Well did the Holy Ghost
speak to our fathers by Isaias the prophet, saying: Go
to this people and say to them: With the ear you shall
hear, and you shall not understand. Therefore manifestly
the Holy Ghost is God.
Further. It is clear from the Holy Scriptures that God
spoke through the prophets • for it is declared by God
Himself (Num. xii. 6) : // there be among you a prophet
of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak
to him in a dream, i.e. by my Spirit. It is also said
(Ps. lxxxiv. 9) : I will hear what the Lord God will speak
in me. Now it is quite evident that it was the Holy Ghost
who spoke through the prophets : for it is said (Acts i. 16) :
The scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy
Ghost spoke before by the mouth of David. Again our
Lord (Matth. xxii. 43, 44) asked the Scribes why they said
that Christ is the Son of David, since the latter said, in-
spired by the Holy Ghost: The Lord said to my Lord:
Sit on my right hand. Again, it is said (2 Pet. i. 21) :
Prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but
the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.
Therefore it is clearly proved from Holy Writ that the
Holy Ghost is God.
Again. Scripture declares that the revelation of mysteries
is a work peculiar to God : thus it is said (Dan. ii. 28) :
There is a God in heaven that revealeth mysteries. Now
the revelation of mysteries is shown to be the work of the
CHAPTER XVII 79
Holy Ghost : for it is said (i Cor. ii. 10) : To us God hath
revealed them by his Spirit; and (ibid. xiv. 2) : The Spirit
speaketh mysteries. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.
Further. To teach inwardly is a work proper to God :
for it is said of God (Ps. xciii. 10) : He that teacheth man
knowledge : and (Dan. ii. 21) : He . . . giveth wisdom to the
wise, and knowledge to them that have understanding.
Now clearly this is the work of the Holy Ghost : for our
Lord said (Jo. xiv. 26) : The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost,
whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you
all things. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.
Moreover. Those that have the same operation must
have the same nature. Now the Son and the Holy Ghost
have the same nature. For the Apostle declares (2 Cor.
xiii. 3) that Christ speaks in the saints : Do you seek a
proof of Christ that speaketh in me. And clearly this is
also the work of the Holy Ghost : for it is said (Matth.
x. 20) : It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your
Father that speaketh in you. Therefore the Son and the
Holy Ghost have the same nature, and consequently the
Father also : seeing that we have shown that the Father
and Son have one nature. 1
Moreover. It is proper to God to dwell in the souls of
the saints : hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. vi. 16) : You
are the temple of the living God: as God saith : I will dwell
in them. And the same Apostle ascribes this to the Holy
Ghost : for he says (1 Cor. iii. 16) : Know you not that
you are the temple of God; and that the Spirit of God
dwelleth in you? Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.
Again. It is proper to God to be everywhere : for he
says (Jerem. xxiii. 24) : Do I not fill heaven and earth?
And this also belongs to the Holy Ghost : for it is said
(Wis. i. 7) : The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole
world: and (Ps. cxxxviii. 7) : Whither shall I go from thy
Spirit? or whither shall I fly from thy face? and (ibid. 8) :
If J ascend into heaven thou art there, etc. Also, our Lord
said to his disciples (Acts i. 8) : You shall receive the
1 Bk. IV., ch. xi.
80 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall
be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and
Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth.
Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is everywhere, since
he dwells in men in every part of the world. Therefore
the Holy Ghost is God.
Further. The name of God is expressly given to the
Holy Ghost in Holy Writ. Thus Peter says (Acts v. 3) :
Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou
shouldst lie to the Holy Ghost? and afterwards (verse 4) :
Thou hast not lied to men, but to God. Therefore the Holy
Ghost is God.
Again. It is said (1 Cor. xiv. 2) : He that speaketh in a
tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no
man heareth. Yet the Spirit 1 speaketh mysteries. Hence
we are given to understand that the Spirit spoke in those
who spoke in divers tongues. And further on (verse 21)
he says: In the law it is written: In other tongues and
other lips I will speak to this people: and neither so will
they hear me, saith the Lord. Therefore the Holy Ghost,
who speaks mysteries in various lips and tongues, is God.
Again. The above text continues further on (verses
24, 25) : If all prophesy, and there come in one that be-
lieveth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all,
he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made mani-
fest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God,
affirming that God is among you indeed. Now, it is clear
from what had been said previously, viz., that the Spirit
speaketh mysteries, that the revelation of the secrets of the
heart is the work of the Holy Ghost. And this is a sign
proper to the Godhead : for it is said (Jerem. xvii. 9, 10) :
The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable,
who can know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart, and
prove the reins. Wherefore, even an unbeliever is led by
this sign to conclude that he who speaks these secrets of
hearts, is God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.
Again. Further on the text continues (verses 32, 33) :
1 Vulg., By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries.
CHAPTER XVII 81
The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.
For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace. Now,
the graces of the prophets, indicated by the spirits of the
prophets, are from the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy
Ghost who distributes these graces so that they cause not
dissension but peace, is shown to be God, from the words :
He is the God, not of dissension, but of peace.
Moreover. It is the work of God alone, to adopt any-
one as a son of God : for no spiritual creature is the son of
God by nature, but only by the grace of adoption. Hence
the Apostle (Gal. iv. 4, 5) ascribes this work to the Son of
God, who is true God : God sent his Son . . . that we
might receive the adoption of sons. Now, the Holy Ghost
is the cause of this adoption : for the Apostle says (Rom.
viii. 15) : You have received the Spirit of adoption of
sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). Therefore the
Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is God.
Again. If the Holy Ghost be not God, He must be a
creature. Now, it is plain that He is neither a corporeal
nor a spiritual creature. For no creature is infused into a
spiritual creature, since it is impossible to participate in
a creature, and rather it is the creature that participates.
Now the Holy Ghost is infused into the souls of the
saints, so that they participate in Him as it were : for we
read that Christ, 1 and also the Apostles, 2 were filled with
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God, and
not a creature.
If, however, anyone say that the aforesaid works which
are proper to God, are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, not as
though they were exercised by him authoritatively, as
God, but ministerially, as a creature, we reply that this
is clearly shown to be untrue, from the words of the Apostle
(1 Cor. xii. 6) : There are diversities of operations, but the
same God, who worketh all in all: and afterwards having
enumerated the various divine gifts, he continues (verse
11): All these things one and the same Spirit worketh,
dividing to every one according as he will. In these words
1 Isa. xi. 2, 3. * Acts ii. 4.
82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
he clearly indicates that the Holy Ghost is God, both by
ascribing to Him works which previously he had ascribed
to God, and by stating that the Holy Ghost does those
works according as He will. Therefore it is evident that
the Holy Ghost is God.
CHAPTER XVIII
THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON
Some have denied that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent
person. Of these some have contended that He is the
Godhead of Father and Son ; an opinion ascribed to certain
followers of Macedonius. Others maintained that He is
merely some accidental perfection bestowed by God on
our souls ; for instance, wisdom, charity, or the like, in
which we participate, as in any other created accidents.
Against this view we must show that the Holy Ghost is
nothing of the kind.
For, properly speaking, accidental forms have no opera-
tion ; it is their subject that operates, according as he will :
thus a wise man uses his wisdom when he chooses. Now,
the Holy Ghost works according as He will, as we have
shown. 1 Therefore the Holy Ghost must not be reckoned
an accidental perfection of the soul.
Again. The Scriptures teach us that the Holy Ghost
is the cause of all the perfections of man's soul. Thus
the Apostle says (Rom. v. 5) : The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given
to us: and (1 Cor. xii. 8) : To one indeed by the Spirit is
given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of
knowledge, according to the same Spirit: and so on.
Therefore the Holy Ghost is not to be recKoned a mere
accidental perfection of the human soul, since He is Him-
self the cause of all such perfections.
1 Ch. xvii.
CHAPTER XVIII 83
The teaching of Holy Writ is also opposed to the con-
tention that the name of the Holy Ghost signifies the
essence of Father and Son, so that in consequence He
would be personally distinct from neither. For it is stated
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jo. xv. 6),
and that He receives from the Son (Jo. xvi. 14) : neither of
which can be referred to the divine essence, seeing that
the divine essence does not proceed from the Father, nor
does it receive from the Son. Therefore we must infer
that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.
Again. Holy Writ clearly speaks of the Holy Ghost
as of a subsistent divine person. Thus it is said (Acts
xiii. 2) : As they were ministering to the Lord, and fast-
ing, the Holy Ghost said to them: Separate me Saul and
Barnabas for the work whereunto I have taken them: and
further on (verse 4) : So they, being sent by the Holy
Ghost, went. Again (Acts xv. 28) the Apostles said : It
hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost, to lay no further
burden upon you, etc. Now, these things would not be
said of the Holy Ghost, were He not a subsistent person.
Therefore the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.
Moreover. Seeing that the Father and the Son are sub-
sistent divine persons, the Holy Ghost would not be
numbered together with them, unless He also were a sub-
sistent divine person. Now He is clearly numbered
together with them, when our Lord says to His disciples
(Matth. xxviii. 19) : Going therefore, teach all nations, bap-
tizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and
of the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (2 Cor. xiii. 13) : The
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God,
and the communication of the Holy Ghost, be with you
all: and (Jo. v. 7) : There are three who give testimony in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. These
texts show clearly that He is not only a subsistent person,
even as the Father and the Son, but also that He has the
one same essence with them.
Someone might endeavour to evade the foregoing argu-
ments by drawing a distinction between the Spirit of God
84 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
and the Holy Spirit : since some of the above quotations
speak of the Spirit of God, and some, of the Holy Ghost.
Nevertheless the identity of the Spirit of God with the
Holv Spirit is clearly indicated by the words of the Apostle
in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, where after saying :
To us God hath revealed them by the Holy Spirit, 1 in
confirmation of this he adds : For the Spirit searcheth all
things, yea the deep things of God, and then concludes :
So the things also that are of God, no man knoiveth but
the Spirit of God. Hence it clearly follows that the Holy
Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.
Again, this is clear from our Lord's words (Matth.
x. 20) : It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your
Father that speaketh -within you: in place of which Mark
has (xiii. 11) : It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost.
Hence it is clear that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of
God are one and the same.
Accordingly, since it is evident in many ways from the
foregoing passages that the Holy Ghost is not a creature,
but is true God, it follows that we must not conclude that
when we speak of the Holy Ghost filling the souls of holy
persons and dwelling therein, the sense is the same as
when we describe the devil as filling and inhabiting certain
persons. Thus we read of Judas (Jo. xiii. 27) that after
the morsel, Satan entered into him. Again, Peter, accord-
ing to some versions, said (Acts v. 3) : Ananias, why hath
Satan filled 2 thy heart? For, since the devil is a creature,
as we have seen above, 3 he cannot fill a man as though a
man could participate of the devil ; nor can he dwell in a
man's soul participatively or substantially. But he is
said to fill some men by the effect of his wickedness :
wherefore Paul said to a certain man (Acts xiii. 10) : O
full of all guile, and of all deceit, child of the devil!
Whereas the Holy Ghost, being God, dwells in the soul
by His substance, and makes us good by participation of
1 Vulg., by his Spirit.
* The Greek followed by the A.V. reads inMpwoev,
8 Bk. III., ch. x.
CHAPTER XIX 85
Him : for He is His own goodness, since He is God :
which cannot be true of any creature. This, however, does
not hinder Him from filling the souls of holy men by the
effect of His power.
CHAPTER XIX
THE MEANING OF STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE
ABOUT THE HOLY GHOST
For as much as we are taught by the authority of Holy
Scripture, we firmly hold that the Holy Ghost is true God,
subsistent and personally distinct from the Father and the
Son. We must now consider how this truth is to be
understood in both respects, so that we may be able to
defend it against the attacks of unbelievers.
For greater clearness, we must begin by observing that
in every intellectual nature there is a will : because the
intellect is actuated by an intelligible form, in as much as
it actually understands : even as a natural thing acquires
the actuality of natural being, by its own form. Now,
a natural thing, by the form that perfects it in its species,
has an inclination to its proper operations, and to the
proper end to which it attains by its operation : since,
such as a thing is, such is its operation, and such the end
to which it tends. Hence from the intelligible form there
results in the intelligent being an inclination to its proper
operations and end. This inclination of the intellectual
nature is the will, and is the principle of those operations
that are in our power, and whereby the intellect operates
for the sake of an end : because the end and the good are
the object of the will. Consequently in every intelligent
being there is a will.
Now, since several acts are seen to belong to the will,
such as desire, delight, hate, and so forth, we find that the
one principle and root of all is love. This may be ex-
plained as follows : — The will, as stated above, 1 is in in-
1 Bk. III., ch. lxxxviii.
86 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
tellectual beings, what the natural inclination is in natural
beings : and this inclination is known as the natural appe-
tite. Now the natural inclination arises from the natural
thing having through its form (which we have stated to be
the principle of its inclination) an association with or apti-
tude for the thing to which it is moved ; for instance, a
heavy body in reference to a lower position. Wherefore
this too is the source of every inclination of the will, for
as much as by the intelligible form something is appre-
hended as suitable or attractive. Now, to be attracted
towards a thing, as such, is to love it. Wherefore every
inclination of the will, as well as of the sensitive appetite,
has its origin in love. Thus through loving a thing, we
desire it if it be absent, we rejoice in it when it is present ;
we grieve when we are parted from it; whatever parts us
from the object loved is to us an object of hate and anger.
Consequently that which is loved is not only in the
intellect of the lover, but also in his will : yet not in the
same way. For it is in his intellect by its specific like-
ness : whereas it is in his will, as the term of a movement
is in its proportionate motive principle, by reason of the
proportion and aptitude of the principle to that term.
Thus, in a sense, the higher place is in the flame,
because fire is volatile, and consequently is proportionate
and apt for such a place : and the kindled fire is in the
kindling fire by the likeness of its form.
Since, then, we have proved that there is a will in every
intellectual nature, and since God is an intelligent being,
as we have shown, 1 it follows that there is a will in Him :
not that His will is something over and above His essence,
as neither is His intellect, as we have proved above : 2 but
that His will is His very substance : 3 and seeing that God's
intellect also is His very substance, it follows that in God
intellect and will are one and the same. It has been suffi-
ciently explained in the First Book 4 how things that else-
where are many are one in God.
1 Bk. I., ch. xliv. ■ Bk. I., ch. xlv.
* Bk. I., ch. lxxiii. * Bk. I., ch. xxxi.
CHAPTER XIX 87
And since we have proved 1 that God's operation is His
very essence, and that His will is His essence, 2 it follows
that in God will is not power or habit, but act. Now we
have shown that every act of the will springs from love.
Therefore there is love in God. Also since, as we proved
in the First Book, 3 the proper object of the divine will is
the goodness of God, it follows that He Himself and His
goodness are the first and principal object of His love.
Now it has been shown that the beloved object must be,
in a sense, in the lover's will. Therefore, since God loves
Himself, it follows that God is in His own will as the
object loved is in the lover. Now the beloved object is in
the lover, in as much as it is loved, and love is an act of
the will : and the act of God's will is His being. There-
fore God's being by way of love in His will is not acci-
dental being, as in us, but essential being. Consequently
God considered as existing in His will is truly and sub-
stantially God.
Moreover, the fact that a thing is in the will as a beloved
object in a lover, bears a certain relation to the idea con-
ceived by the intellect, and to the thing itself the idea of
which is called the word : because a thing would not be
loved, were it not known in some way : nor is it the mere
idea of the beloved object that is loved, but the object in
as much as it is a good in itself. Hence the love, whereby
God is in His own will as the beloved in the lover, must
proceed both from the Word of God, and from God who
utters the Word.
And seeing that we have proved that the object loved
is not in the lover as to its specific likeness, as the object
understood is in an intelligent being : and, since whatever
proceeds from another as begotten, proceeds from its be-
getter as to its specific likeness : it follows that the pro-
cession of a thing to its being in a will as the beloved
object in the lover is not by way of generation, while the pro-
cession of a thing to its being in an intellect is by way of
1 Bk. I., ch. xlv. 2 Bk. I., ch. lxxiii.
8 Bk. I., ch. lxxx.
88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
generation, as we have shown above. Therefore God pro-
ceeding by way of love, does not proceed as begotten :
and consequently cannot receive the name of Son. Since
however the beloved object exists in the lover as inclining
and, as it were, inwardly impelling the lover to the thing
loved, and since the breath (spiritus) is a living being's
impulse from within itself, it is becoming that God, pro-
ceeding by way of love, should receive the name of Spirit,
because with God to breathe is to love. 1 Hence the Apostle
ascribes a certain impulse to spirit and love : thus he says
(Rom. viii. 14) : Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are the sons of God, and (2 Cor. v. 14) : The charity
of Christ presseth us. And as every intellectual movement
is denominated from its term, and as the aforesaid love is
that by which God Himself is loved, it is becoming that
God, proceeding by way of love, be called the Holy Spirit :
because things consecrated to God are wont to be called
holy.
CHAPTER XX
OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED BY SCRIPTURE TO THE HOLY
GHOST IN RESPECT OF ALL CREATURES
In the light of what has already been said, we must now
consider the effects ascribed by Scripture to the Holy
Ghost.
We have already shown 2 that God's goodness is the
reason for His willing other things to exist, and that by
His will He brought things into being. Therefore the
love whereby He loves His own goodness is the cause of
things being created. Hence, as stated at the beginning of
the Metaphysics, 5 certain philosophers of old said that the
love of the gods was the cause of all things. Dionysius
also says* that God's love did not allow him to be fruit-
1 Ejus spiratione quasi quadam aspiratione existente : literally, His
Spiration being a kind of aspiration.
* Bk. I., ch. lxxxvi. 8 Bk. I., lect. v.
* Div. Nom. iv.
CHAPTER XX 89
less. Now we established in the foregoing chapter that
the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves
Himself. Hence the Holy Ghost is the cause of the
creation : and this is indicated (Ps. ciii. 30) : Send forth
thy Spirit and they shall be created. Also, seeing that the
Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an
impelling and moving force, any movement that God
causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy
Ghost. Now the first change wrought by God in things
is that whereby he produced the various species out of
formless created matter. Wherefore Holy Scripture
ascribes this work to the Holy Ghost : thus it is said
(Gen. i. 2) : The Spirit of God moved over the waters.
For Augustine would have the waters to signify the
primary matter over which the Spirit of the Lord is said to
move, not as being in motion, but as the principle of
movement.
Again. God's government of the world is understood to
be a kind of movement, forasmuch as God directs and
moves all things to their respective ends. Accordingly
if impulse and movement belong to the Holy Ghost as
love, it is fitting that government and increase be ascribed
to the Holy Ghost. Hence it is said (Job xxxiii. 4) : The
Spirit of God made me; and (Ps. cxlii. 10) : Thy good
Spirit shall lead me into the right land. And, since to
govern subjects is the proper function of a lord, it is
fitting that lordship be ascribed to the Holy Ghost : thus
the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 17) : Now the Lord is a Spirit:
and we say in the Creed : I believe in the Holy Ghost,
Lord.
Again. Life is revealed especially in movement : for
we say that a thing lives when it moves itself, and in a
general way we ascribe life to all things that move them-
selves to action. If then impulse and movement are
ascribed to the Holy Ghost as love, life also is fittingly
ascribed to Him. Thus it is said (Jo. vi. 64) : It is the
Spirit that quickeneth: and (Ezech. xxxvii. 6) : I will give
you Spirit and you shall live. Also, in the Creed we
90 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
confess our belief in the Holy Ghost, the life-giver. This
is in harmony with the name spirit: for an animal's body
lives by the vital spirit which is diffused throughout its
members by the principle of life.
CHAPTER XXI
OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, AS REGARDS
THE GIFTS BESTOWED BY GOD ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE
With regard to the effects wrought by God in the rational
nature exclusively, it is to be observed that in whatsoever
way we become like to a divine perfection, that particular
perfection is said to be given to us. Thus God gives us
wisdom, according as in any way we become like the
divine wisdom. Hence, since the Holy Ghost proceeds as
the love whereby God loves Himself, as we have shown; 1
forasmuch as we become like this love, by loving God,
the Holy Ghost is said to be given to us by God. Thus
the Apostle says (Rom. v. 5) : The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is
given to us. It is however to be noted that things which
we receive from God, must be referred to God as their
efficient and exemplary cause. He is their efficient cause,
in as much as an effect is produced in us by His opera-
tive power : and He is their exemplary cause, in as much
as what we receive from Him, reflects Him in some way.
Since then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one same
power and one same essence, it follows that whatever
God works in us, is wrought by Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost together as its efficient cause. But the word of
wisdom, whereby we know God, and which God implants
in us, properly speaking, reflects the Son : and, in like
manner, the love whereby we love God, properly reflects
the Holy Ghost. Thus although the charity that is in
us is the effect of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost; in a
1 Ch. xvi.
CHAPTER XXI 91
special way it is said to be in us from the Holy Ghost.
Now, the divine effects not only have their beginning in the
divine operation, but also are upheld in their being thereby,
as proved above. 1 Again, nothing can work where it is
not, because worker and work must needs be actually
together, even as the mover and the thing moved. Hence,
wherever we find a divine effect, God must be there as its
efficient cause. Therefore, since charity whereby we love
God, is in us from the Holy Ghost, it follows that the Holy
Ghost is in us, so long as charity remains in us. Where-
fore the Apostle says (1 Cor. iii. 16) : Know you not that
you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God
dwelleth in you? Seeing then that by the Holy Ghost
we are made lovers of God, and that every beloved object
is in its lover as such, it follows that by the Holy Ghost,
the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence our Lord
said (Jo. xiv. 23) : We will come to him, that is to him
that loves God, and will make our abode within him: and
(1 Jo. iii. 24) : In this we know that he abideth in us, by
the Spirit which he hath given us.
Again. It is clear that God must love very much those
whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the
Holy Ghost : for He would not bestow so great a good
except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord's
Person : I love them that love me (Prov. viii. 17), not as
though we had first 2 loved God, but because he hath first
loved us (1 Jo. iv. 10). Now everything that is loved is
in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Ghost
is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in
God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. iv. 16) : He that abideth in
charity, abideth in God, and God in him : and again
(ibid. 13) : In this we know that we abide in him, and he
in us ; because he hath given us of his Spirit.
Now, it is proper to friendship that a man reveals his
secrets to his friend : because friendship unites their affec-
tions, and of two hearts makes one ; and consequently
when a man reveals something to his friend, he would
1 Bk. III., ch. lxv. a The Vulgate omits first.
92 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
seem not to have taken it out of his own heart. Hence
our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. xv. 15) : J will not now
call you servants . . . but I have called you friends, be-
cause all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father,
I have made known to you. Since then we are made the
friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it is fittingly said that
the divine mysteries are revealed to men by the Holy
Ghost. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 9, 10) :
It is written: That eye hath not seen, nor ear heard,
neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things
God hath prepared for them that love him: but to us God
hath revealed them by his Spirit, etc.
Again, man's speech is based on the things he knows :
and therefore it is fitting that man should speak divine
mysteries by the Holy Ghost, according to the texts (1 Cor.
xiv. 2) : By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries: and (Matth.
x. 20) : For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your
Father that speaketh in you. Also, it is said of the
prophets (2 Pet. i. 21) that the holy men of God spoke,
inspired by the Holy Ghost. Hence the words about the
Holy Ghost in the Creed : Who spoke by the prophets.
Now it is part of friendship not only that a man share
his secrets with his friend, on account of the union of
hearts, but the same union requires that he should share
his belongings with him ; because, since a man regards his
friend as his other self, it follows that he will succour him
as he would succour himself, by sharing his goods with
him. Hence it is said to be a mark of friendship that a
man in both will and deed should seek the good of his
friend. Thus it is said (1 Jo. iii. 17) : He that hath the
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need,
and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity
of God abide in him? This is especially true of God,
whose will is efficacious in the production of its effect :
and therefore all God's gifts are fittingly stated to be
given us by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. xii. 8 :
To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom;
and to another the word of knowledge, according to the
CHAPTER XXI 93
same Spirit, and after enumerating many otherls, the
text continues : All these things one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.
Again, it is manifest that in order to reach the place of
fire, a body needs to be assimilated to fire and become
light so as to acquire the movement of fire : so too, man
in order to reach the happy state of divine fruition, which
belongs to God by nature, needs first to be assimilated to
God by spiritual perfections, and then to perform works in
accordance with those perfections, and thus at length to
reach the aforesaid state of happiness. Now spiritual
gifts are bestowed on us by the Holy Ghost, as we have
shown : and thus by the Holy Ghost we are conformed
to God; by Him we are enabled to perform good works;
and by Him the way is prepared to heaven. These three
are insinuated by the Apostle (2 Cor. i. 21, 22) : God hath
anointed us, and hath sealed us, and given the pledge of
the Spirit in our hearts: 1 and (Eph. i. 13, 14) : You were
sealed 2 with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge
of our inheritance. This sealing apparently alludes to
the likeness of conformity; the anointing, to man's being
enabled to perform works of perfection ; and the pledge,
to the hope which spurs us on to our heavenly inheritance,
which is perfect bliss.
And, since a man adopts another as his son because
he wishes him well, so that the latter becomes his heir,
the adoption of the sons of God is fittingly ascribed to the
Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 15 : You have re-
ceived the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry :
Abba (Father).
Now, if a man becomes another's friend, by this very
fact all offence is removed : since friendship is opposed to
offence : hence it is said (Prov. x. 12) : Charity covereth
all sins. Wherefore as we are made the friends of God
by the Holy Ghost, it follows that God forgives us our
sins through Him : hence our Lord said to His disciples
1 The text of the Vulgate differs slightly, but the sense is the same.
2 Douay, signed.
94 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
(Jo. xx. 22, 23) : Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins
you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and for this
reason those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost are
denied forgiveness of their sins (Matth. xii. 31), because
they have not that through which man receives forgiveness.
Hence too, we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or
washed by the Holy Ghost : Send forth thy Spirit, and
they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the
earth (Ps. ciii. 30), and : Be renewed in the Spirit of your
mind (Eph. iv. 23), and : // the Lord shall wash away the
filth of the daughters of Sion, and shall wash away the
blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of
judgment, and by the spirit of burning (Isa. iv. 4).
CHAPTER XXII
OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, ACCORDING
AS HE MOVES THE CREATURE TO GOD
Now that we have considered the works of God in us
which the Scriptures ascribe to the Holy Ghost, it remains
for us to consider how the Holy Ghost moves us to God.
In the first place mutual intercourse would seem to belong
to friendship in a very special manner. Now, man's inter-
course with God consists in contemplating Him : thus the
Apostle says (Philip, iii. 20) : Our conversation is in
heaven. Since, then, the Holy Ghost makes us to be
lovers of God, it follows that by Him we are made con-
templators of God. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 18) :
But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open
face, are transformed into the same image from glory to
glory , as by the Spirit of the Lord.
It also belongs to friendship that a man delight in the
presence of his friend, and rejoice in his words and
deeds : also that he find in him consolation in all his
troubles : hence it is especially to our friends that we have
recourse for comfort in time of sorrow. Since then the
CHAPTER XXII 95
Holy Ghost makes us to be friends of God, and causes
Him to live in us, and us in Him, as we have proved,
it follows that it is through the Holy Ghost that we rejoice
in God, and are comforted in all the hardships and afflic-
tions of the world. Hence it is said (Ps. 1. 14) : Restore
unto me the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with
thy 1 perfect Spirit, and (Rom. xiv. 7) : The Kingdom of
God . . . is justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost,
and (Acts ix. 31) : The church had peace . . . and was
edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and was filled
with the consolation of the Holy Ghost. For this reason
our Lord calls the Holy Ghost by the name of Paraclete
or Consoler (Jo. xiv. 26) : But the Paraclete, the Holy
Ghost, etc.
It also belongs to friendship that a man consent to the
things which his friend wills. Now God's will is made
known to us in His commandments. Therefore it belongs
to our love for God, that we fulfil His commandments,
according to Jo. xiv. 15 : // you love me, keep my com-
mandments. Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost makes us
lovers of God, it is He also who leads us to fulfil the
commandments of God, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Rom. viii. 14) : Whosoever are led by the Spirit
of God, they are the sons of God.
We must observe, however, that the sons of God are
led by the Holy Ghost, not as though they were slaves,
but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of
one's own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of
ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly : and what
we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under com-
pulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the
cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes
nothing to the action, for instance, when a man is com-
pelled to move by force : or it may be partly voluntary,
as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is
less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is
more opposed thereto. Now, the Holy Ghost inclines us
1 The Douay translation has a perfect spirit.
96 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inas-
much as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the
sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and
for love, not slavishly and for fear : wherefore the Apostle
says (Rom. viii. 15) : You have not received the Spirit
of bondage again in fear ; but you have received the spirit
of adoption of sons.
Now the will is directed to that which is truly good : so
that when, either through passion or through an evil habit
or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good,
he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something ex-
traneous, if we consider the natural direction of the will ;
but if we consider the act of the will, as inclined towards
a seeming good, he acts freely when he follows the pas-
sion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will
remains the same, he refrain from what he desires through
fear of the law which forbids the fulfilment of his desire.
Accordingly, when the Holy Ghost, by love inclines the
will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He
removes both the servitude whereby a man, the slave of
passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the
servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his
will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the
friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii.
17) : Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty, and
(Gal. v. 18) : // you are led by the Spirit, you are not under
the law. For this reason the Holy Ghost is said to mortify
the deeds of the flesh, in as much as the sufferings of the
flesh do not turn us from the true good, to which the Holy
Ghost leads us by love, according to Rom. viii. 13 : // by
the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.
CHAPTER XXIII 97
CHAPTER XXIII
SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE, 1 AGAINST
THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY GHOST
It remains for us to reply to the arguments given above,
whereby it was contended that the Holy Ghost is not God,
but a creature.
Here we must remark in the first place that the word spirit
is apparently derived from the respiration of animals, which
is a certain movement of the air by inhalation and exhala-
tion. Hence the name spirit is given to any impulse or
movement of an aerial body. Thus the wind is called a
spirit (Ps. cxlviii. 8) : Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy spirits, 2
which fulfil his word. Thus too the subtle vapour diffused
throughout the members of the body to facilitate movement
is called spirit. Again, since air is invisible, the name
spirit is applied also to any kind of motive power or in-
visible substance. Hence both the sensitive and the rational
soul, as well as angels and God Himself, are called spirits :
and in a special way God proceeding by way of love,
because love implies a certain motive power. Thus when
Amos says (iv. 13) : He that createth the spirit, he refers
to the wind, as our translation more clearly expresses it :
and this is in keeping with the context : He that formeth
the mountains. When Zacharias says of God (xii. 1) that
he formeth the spirit of man, he is speaking of the human
soul : wherefore we cannot conclude that the Holy Ghost
is a creature.
In like manner the words of our Lord in reference to the
Holy Ghost (Jo. xvi. 13), He shall not speak of himself:
but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak, do not
prove that the Holy Ghost is a creature. For we have
proved 3 that the Holy Ghost is God proceeding from God :
whence it follows that He receives His essence from another,
even as we have shown in reference to the Son. 4 Wherefore
since, in God, knowledge, power and operation are the
1 Ch. xvi. * Douay, winds. 3 Ch. xvii. 4 Ch. xiv.
7
98 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
divine essence, all knowledge, power, and operation of the
Son and Holy Ghost are from another ; but in the Son they
are from the Father alone, whereas in the Holy Ghost, they
are from Father and Son. Since, then, one of the operations
of the Holy Ghost is to speak in holy men, as we have
shown, 1 for this reason He is said not to speak of Himself,
because He does not work of Himself. In Him, to hear is
to receive knowledge, even as He receives His essence,
from Father and Son. Thus we acquire knowledge by
hearing : and Scripture is wont to speak of divine things
after the manner of human. Nor need we stress the use of
the future tense when he says : He shall hear, because, in
the Holy Ghost, to receive is eternal : for verbs of any tense
can apply to eternity, since eternity embraces all time.
For the same reason it is clear that the mission whereby
the Holy Ghost is said to be sent by the Father and the
Son, is no proof that He is a creature. For it has been said 1
that the Son of God is said to be sent in as much as He
appeared to men by taking visible flesh : so that He began
to be in the world after a manner in which He was not there
hitherto, that is to say visibly, whereas He was always there
invisibly as God. Now, it was owing to the Father that
the Son did this : wherefore in this respect He is said to
have been sent by the Father. Now, the Holy Ghost also
appeared visibly, both in the form of a dove over Christ at
the Baptism, and under the form of fiery tongues over the
Apostles. And, though He did not become a dove or fire,
as the Son became man, nevertheless He appeared under
these visible forms as signs of Himself. Hence He also was
in the world in a new way, that is to say, visibly : and this
was owing to the Father and Son ; for which reason He is
said to be sent by the Father and the Son : and this does
not indicate subjection in Him, but procession.
There is also another way in which both the Son and
Holy Ghost are said to be sent, but invisibly. For it is
clear from what has been said that the Son proceeds from
the Father, as the Father's knowledge of Himself, and that
1 Ch. xvii.
CHAPTER XXIII 99
the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, as God's love
for Himself. Hence, as we have already said, when by the
Holy Ghost a man becomes a lover of God, the Holy Ghost
dwells in Him ; and thus is in man in a new way, namely by
dwelling in him in respect of a new effect. That the Holy
Ghost produces this effect in a man is owing to the Father
and the Son : and for this reason He is said to be sent
invisibly by them. In like manner the Son is said to be
sent invisibly into a man's mind, when through his know-
ledge of God, a man comes to love God. Wherefore it is
clear that neither does this kind of mission in the Son
imply subjection on the part of the Holy Ghost, but only
procession from another.
Nor does it argue against the divinity of the Holy Ghost,
that Father and Son are sometimes associated without men-
tion of the Holy Ghost, as neither is it an argument against
the divinity of the Son, that the Father is sometimes spoken
of without mention being made of the Son. For thus Scrip-
ture insinuates tacitly that when anything pertaining to the
Godhead is said of one of the Three, it is to be referred to
all of them, because they are one God. Nor indeed can God
the Father be understood apart from His Word and Love,
nor vice versa; and for this reason, in any one of the Three,
all Three are implied, so that sometimes the Son is men-
tioned alone, in reference to that which is common to the
Three, for instance (Matth. xi. 27) : Neither doth anyone
know the Father, but the Son: and yet both Father and
Holy Ghost know the Father. In the same way it is said
(1 Cor. ii. 11) of the Holy Ghost : The things that are of
God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: and yet it is
certain that both Father and Son have this knowledge.
It is also evident that it cannot be proved that the Holy
Ghost is a creature, from the fact that Holy Writ ascribes
to Him things that savour of movement. Such things are
to be taken metaphorically since Holy Writ sometimes
ascribes movement to God : for instance (Gen. iii. 8) :
When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in
paradise ; and (Gen. xviii. 21) : J will go down and see
ioo THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
•whether they have done according to the cry. Hence, the
words, The Spirit of the Lord moved over the water, must
be taken as stated above, as when we say that the will in-
clines to its object, or that love pursues the beloved. Some
however refer these words, not to the Holy Ghost, but to
the air, the natural place of which is above the waters:
wherefore to indicate the manifold changes of the air, it is
said that it moved above the waters. — The words, / will
pour out my spirit upon all flesh (Joel ii. 28), must be taken
as referring to the sending of the Holy Ghost by Father
and Son, of which we have spoken above. The expression
pour out indicates the abundant effect of the Holy Ghost, in
that it will not confine itself to one person, but will reach
many, from whom it will flow forth, as it were, on to others,
as may be seen when corporeal things are poured forth.
In like manner the words (Num. xi. 17), I will take of thy
spirit, and will give to them refer, not to the essence or
person of the Holy Ghost, since He is indivisible, but to
His effects whereby He dwells in us, for they can increase
and decrease in man. Yet the sense is not that the identical
effect taken from one person is bestowed on another, but
that the effect which is increased on the one hand is similar
to that which is decreased on the other. Nor does this
necessitate subtraction from one person, if another receive
an addition, because a spiritual thing can be shared by
several at once, without detriment to any one of them.
Consequently it does not follow that Moses must have been
deprived of any of his spiritual gifts, in order that they
might be bestowed on others : this bestowal refers to the
act or office, because the Holy Ghost accomplished through
several persons, that which previously He had effected
through Moses alone. Thus again Eliseus did not ask that
the essence or person of the Holy Ghost might be doubled
in him, but that he might receive the Holy Ghost's twofold
effect bestowed on Elias, namely prophecy and the working
of miracles. Yet it is not unreasonable that one man should
have a more abundant share of the Holy Ghost's gifts than
another, whether twice as much or in any other proportion
CHAPTER XXIII 101
of excess, since every man's power is measurable and finite :
but Eliseus would not have presumed to ask that he might
surpass his master in a supernatural effect.
It is also plain that, as is customary in Holy Writ, human
passions are ascribed to God metaphorically. Thus it is
said (Ps. cv. 40) : The Lord tvas exceedingly angry with
his people: for God is said to be angry, by reason of a like-
ness in the effect : because he punishes, and angry people
do this : wherefore it is said (ibid. 41) : And he delivered
them into the hands of the nations. In the same way the
Ploly Ghost is said to grieve, on account of a likeness in
the effect : because He abandons sinners, even as men who
are grieved abandon those who grieve them.
It is also a usual mode of expression in Holy Writ, to
ascribe to God that which God works in man, according to
Gen. xxii. 12 : Now I know that thou fearest God, that is,
J have made thee know. In this sense it is said that the
Holy Ghost asks, because He makes us ask : since He
causes the love of God in our hearts so that we desire to
enjoy Him, and through desire, we ask.
Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love with which God
loves Himself; and with the same love God loves Himself
and other things for the sake of His own goodness ; where-
fore it is evident that the love with which God loves us
pertains to the Holy Ghost : also the love with which we
love God, since it is he who makes us lovers of God, as
proved above. 1 As regards both of these, it is fitting that
the Holy Ghost be given to us. As to the love with which
God loves us, it is in keeping with our usual mode of speak-
ing, when we say that a man gives his love to another when
he begins to love him. It is true indeed that God does not
begin to love anyone in time, if we consider the divine will
with which He loves us : but the effect of His love is caused
in us in time, when He draws us to Himself. As to the love
with which we love God, it is fitting, because the Holy
Ghost causes this love in us. Hence in respect of this love
He dwells in us, as we have shown, and thus we possess
1 Ch. xx.
102 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Him as one in whose wealth we share. And because it is
owing to the Father and the Son, that the Holy Ghost
dwells in us and is possessed by us, through the love which
He causes in us, He is fittingly said to be given to us by
the Father and the Son. Nor does this prove Him to be
less than the Father and the Son, but that He proceedeth
from them. He is also said to give Himself to us, in as
much as the love, by which He dwells in us, is caused in us
by Him as well as by the Father and the Son.
Now, though the Holy Ghost is true God, and has the
true divine nature from Father and Son, it does not follow
that He is a Son. For a man is a son because he is be-
gotten ; and consequently if one thing receive from another
the latter's nature, otherwise than by being begotten, the
conditions of sonship would be lacking. Thus if by a
power granted him by God, one man were to fashion another
from some part of his body, or from some extraneous matter
like a work of art, the result would not be called his son,
since he would not be born of him. Now, the procession of
the Holy Ghost does not satisfy the conditions of birth, as
we have shown. 1 Therefore, although the Holy Ghost
derives the divine nature from Father and Son, He cannot
be called their Son. And it is reasonable that in God alone
can the divine nature be communicated in several ways :
because in God alone is operation identified with being.
Hence, since in Him, as in every intellectual nature, there
is intelligence and will, it follows that what proceeds in
Him by way of intelligence, as a word does, and by way of
love and will, as love does, must have divine being, and
must be God. Consequently both Son and Holy Ghost are
true God.
We have said enough about the divinity of the Holy
Ghost. Any other difficulties touching His procession must
be considered in the light of what we have said about the
nativity of the Son.
1 Ch. xix.
CHAPTER XXIV 103
CHAPTER XXIV
THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON
Now some are in error about the procession of the Holy-
Ghost, and hold that He does not proceed from the Son.
Accordingly, we must show that the Holy Ghost does
proceed from the Son.
It is evident from Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost is
the Spirit of the Son : for it is said (Rom. viii. 9) : If any
man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his. And, lest
anyone say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is
distinct from the Spirit of the Son, it is plain from the words
of the same Apostle that the same Holy Spirit is the
Father's and the Son's. For the words quoted above, If
any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his, are
preceded by these : // so be that the Spirit of God dwell in
you. Now, the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of
Christ, merely because Christ possessed Him as man,
according to Lk. iv. 1 : Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost,
returned from the Jordan; since it is said (Gal. iv. 6) :
Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son
into your hearts, crying: Abba (Father). Accordingly, the
Holy Ghost makes us to be sons of God in as much as He
is the Spirit of the Son of God. Now, we become sons of
God by adoption, through being conformed to Him who is
Son of God by nature, according to Rom. viii. 29 : Whom
he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of his Son: that he might be the first-born
among many brethren. Hence the Holy Ghost is the Spirit
of Christ in as much as He is the natural Son of God. But
the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ by
reason of any other relationship, save that of origin, since
this is the only distinction to be found in God. Therefore
we must say that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ, in
the sense that He proceeds from Him.
Again. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, according
to Jo. xv. 26 : When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will
104 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
send from the Father. Now, the sender has a certain
authority in respect of the person sent. Hence we must say
that the Son has a certain authority in respect of the Holy
Ghost; not an authority of dominion or greatness, but only
in point of origin. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds
from the Son. — But someone might say that the Son also
is sent by the Holy Ghost, because our Lord declares that
in Himself was fulfilled the saying of Isaias (Lk. iv. 18) :
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: . . . to preach the
Gospel to the poor he hath sent me. To this we reply that
the Son is sent by the Holy Ghost in respect of His human
nature. Now, the Holy Ghost did not assume a created
nature in such wise that in respect of that nature He could
be said to be sent by the Son, or that the Son has authority
in relation to Him. It follows therefore that with regard to
the eternal Person, the Son has authority over the Holy
Ghost.
Moreover. The Son says of the Holy Ghost (Jo. xvi. 14) :
He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine, and
shall show it to you. Now, He cannot be said to receive
what is the Son's, unless He receive from the Son — for
example, if He be said to receive the divine essence (which
is the Son's) from the Father. Hence the text continues :
'All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine; therefore
I said that he shall receive of mine. For if whatsoever the
Father has, is the Son's, it follows that the Father's
authority, in as much as He is the principle of the Holy
Ghost, must be the Son's also. Consequently as the Holy
Ghost receives from the Father of what is the Father's, so
from the Son He receives of what is the Son's.
Besides, we can quote the authority of the Doctors of
the Church, even of the Greeks. Thus Athanasius says
(Svmbol. Fid.) : The Holy Ghost is from the Father and
the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceed-
ing. Cyril also in his epistle received by the Council of
Chalcedon says: He is called the Spirit of Truth, 1 and is
the Spirit of Truth: for he proceeds therefrom, as also from
1 Jo. xv. 26.
CHAPTER XXIV 105
God the Father. And Didymus says (De Spir. Sancto) :
Neither is the Son distinct, save in those things which he
receives from the Father, nor is the Holy Ghost of another
substance, besides what is conceded, namely that He is
from the Son and proceeds from Him. For this word
procession, among all those that indicate origin, is the
widest in its signification. Thus, in whatever way anything
is from anything else, it is said to proceed therefrom : and
since divine things are better expressed in general than in
special terms, the word procession as denoting the origin of
the divine Persons is to be specially noted. Hence, if it be
granted that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, or flows from
the Son, it follows that He proceeds from Him.
Again. We read in the decree of the Fifth Council r 1
In all things we follow the teaching of the holy Fathers
and Doctors of the Church, of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil,
Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose,
Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril,
Leo, Probus : and we subscribe to all that they taught
concerning the true faith, and the condemnation of heresies.
Now, it is clear from many of Augustine's works, especially
the Book on the Trinity and his Commentary on John, that
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Therefore it must
be granted that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
The same may be evidently proved by reason.
Apart from the distinction of matter, which can have no
place in the divine Persons, there can be no distinction in
things except by way of opposition : since things which are
in no way distinct from one another can be together in the
same subject, so that they cannot be a cause of distinction :
thus white and triangular, albeit diverse, yet, because they
are not opposed to each other, can be in the same subject.
Now, according to the teaching of the Catholic Faith, we
must grant a distinction between the Son and the Holy
Ghost : otherwise there would not be three, but two Persons.
Consequently, this distinction must result from some kind
of opposition. But, it cannot be the opposition of affirma-
1 II Constantinople, sess. i.
106 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
tion and negation, since such is the distinction between
being and non-being. Nor can it be the opposition of
privation and habit, since such is the distinction between
perfect and imperfect. Nor can it be the opposition of con-
trariety, since such is the distinction between things having
different forms : for contrariety is difference of form, as the
philosophers teach : and such a difference is incompatible
in the divine Persons, in as much as they have one form,
even as they have one essence : thus the Apostle speaking
of the Son, says (Philip, ii. 6) : Who, being in the form of
God, namely of the Father. It follows, therefore, that one
divine Person is not distinct from another save by relative
opposition : thus the Son is distinct from the Father in
respect of the relative opposition between a father and his
son. For there can be no other relative opposition in God,
save that which is according to origin : since relative oppo-
sition is founded either on quantity, as double and half, or
on action and passion, as master and servant, mover and
moved, father and son.
Again, of those relatives that are founded on quantity,
some are based on difference in quantity, as double and
half, more and less ; some on unity itself — e.g., same, which
signifies one in substance, and equal, which signifies one in
quantity, and like, which signifies one in quality.
Accordingly, the divine Persons cannot be distinguished
by relations based on diversity of quantity, because this
would destroy the equality of the three Persons; nor by
relations based on unity ; because such relations do not
cause distinction ; in fact they are more akin to conformity,
although it may be that one or the other of them presup-
poses distinction. But in all the relations based on action
and passion, one of them is always subject and unequal in
power; except only in relations of origin, where no in-
feriority is indicated, because in their case something pro-
duces its like and equal in nature and power. Wherefore
it follows that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished
save by relative opposition of origin. Therefore, if the
Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, He must proceed from
CHAPTER XXIV 107
Him : since it cannot be said that the Son proceeds from
the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of
the Son, and is given by Him.
Again. Both Son and Holy Ghost proceed from the
Father. Consequently the Father must be related to both
Son and Holy Ghost as the principle is related to that
which proceeds from it. Now He is related to the Son by
reason of paternity, but not so to the Holy Ghost, since
then the Holy Ghost would be His Son : for paternity is
a relation to none but a son. Therefore there must be
another relation in the Father, whereby He is related to
the Holy Ghost; and this is called spiration. In like
manner, since there is a relation in the Son, whereby He is
related to the Father, and which is called filiation, there
must also be in the Holy Ghost another relation whereby
He is related to the Father, and which is called procession.
Thus there are two relations corresponding to the origin of
the Son from the Father, one in the Person who is the
origin, and one in the Person originated, namely paternity
and filiation ; and again two relations corresponding to the
origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession.
Hence paternity and spiration do not constitute two
persons, but belong to the one Person of the Father,
because they are not opposite to each other. Neither,
therefore, would filiation and procession constitute two
Persons, but would belong to one Person, unless they
were opposed to one another. Now, no other opposition is
possible, save that of origin. Therefore there must be
opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost,
so that the one proceeds from the other.
Further. Things that have something in common, if
they be distinct from each other, must be distinguished by
per se differences, and not by differences accidentally be-
longing to what they have in common. Thus man and
horse agree in animal nature, and are differentiated, not
by black and white which are accidental to animal, but by
rational and irrational which belong to animal per se:
because, since animal means that which has a soul (anima),
108 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
it follows that it must be differentiated in the point of its
having this or that kind of soul ; for instance, rational or
irrational. Now it is manifest that the Son and the Holy
Ghost agree in the point of proceeding from another, since
each is from the Father : and, accordingly, the Father is
fittingly distinguished from both, in that he is innascible.
If, then, the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, this must
be by distinctions which divide per se the fact of being from
another : and such distinctions must needs be of the same
kind, that is distinctions of origin, so that one of them pro-
ceed from the other. It follows, therefore, that the Holy
Ghost must proceed from the Son, in order to be distinct
from Him.
Moreover. Someone might say that the Holy Ghost is
distinct from the Son, not because He proceeds from Him,
but on account of the difference in the origin of each from
the Father : but this comes to the same. For if the Holy
Ghost is other than the Son, their respective origins or pro-
cessions must differ. Now, two origins cannot differ save as
to term, principle, or subject : thus the origin of a horse
differs from the origin of an ox as regards the term, for as
much as these two origins terminate in specifically distinct
natures. On the part of the principle — thus in the same animal
species, there may be some animals engendered by the active
force of the sun alone, while others are engendered by the
same force co-operating with the active power of seed. On
the part of the subject, the engendering of one horse differs
from that of another, for as much as the specific nature is
received into a different matter. Now, this distinction on the
part of the subject cannot be ascribed to the divine Persons,
since they are utterly devoid of matter. Again, on the part
of the term, if one may use the expression, there can be no
difference in the processions, because the Holy Ghost by
proceeding, receives one and the same divine nature as the
Son receives by being born. Consequently the distinction
of their respective origins can only be on the part of the
principle. Now, it is plain that the Father alone is the
principle of the Son's origin. Therefore, if the Father alone
CHAPTER XXIV 109
be the principle of the procession of the Holy Ghost, the
procession of the Holy Ghost will not be distinct from the
generation of the Son, and so the Holy Ghost will not be
distinct from the Son. Consequently, if there is a distinc-
tion of processions and of Persons proceeding, we must
conclude that the Holy Ghost is not from the Father alone,
but from the Father and the Son.
Again, someone might say that the processions differ as
to the principle, in as much as the Father produces the Son
as the Word proceeding from His intellect ; and the Holy
Ghost, as the love proceeding from His will : and then we
shall have to say that the two processions and the two pro-
ceeding Persons are distinct by reason of the difference
between will and intellect in God the Father. But will and
intellect are not really distinct in God the Father, but only
logically, as we have proved. 1 Consequently, there will
only be a logical distinction between the two processions,
and the two proceeding Persons. Now, things that differ
only logically are predicated of one another : for it is true
that God's will is His intellect and vice versa. Hence it
will be true that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and vice versa:
which is the impious statement of Sabellius. Therefore, to
account for the distinction between the Holy Ghost and the
Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by way
of the intelligence, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will,
unless we add that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
Further. From the very fact that the Holy Ghost is said
to proceed by way of the will, and the Son by way of the
intellect, it follows that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Son : because love proceeds from the word, since we cannot
love a thing unless we first conceive it in the word of our
hearts.
Again. If we consider the various species of things, we
shall observe a certain order in them, in that living beings
are above lifeless things, animals above plants, and man
above other animals ; and that there are various grades in
each one of these, in respect of their various species. Hence
1 Bk. I., chs. xlv., lxxiii.
no THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Plato said that species are like numbers, which differ speci-
fically by the addition or subtraction of unity. Conse-
quently, in substances devoid of matter, there can be no
distinction but by reason of order. Now, the divine Persons
are immaterial, and in them there can be no order but that
of origin. Therefore two Persons cannot proceed from one,
unless one of them proceed from the other : and thus, the
Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son.
Again. The Father and Son, as regards the unity of
essence, do not differ save in that the one is the Father, and
the other the Son. Whatsoever, therefore, is in addition
to this, is common to Father and Son. Now, to be the
principle of the Holy Ghost is in addition to paternity and
filiation : since the relation whereby the Father is father is
distinct from that whereby He is the principle of the Holy
Ghost, as stated above. Therefore it is common to Father
and Son, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost.
Moreover. Whatsoever is not against the nature of a
thing, can be ascribed to it, unless there be something acci-
dental in the way. Now, to be the principle of the Holy
Ghost is not incompatible in the Son, neither as God (since
the Father, who is God, is the principle of the Holy Ghost),
nor as Son (since the procession of the Holy Ghost differs
from that of the Son) : and to proceed from a principle by
one kind of procession is not incompatible with being the
principle of another's procession. Consequently, it is not
impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Ghost.
Now, what is not impossible is possible : and in God, what
is possible is not different from what is. Therefore the Son
is the principle of the Holy Ghost.
CHAPTER XXV in
CHAPTER XXV
ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THAT THE HOLY
GHOST PROCEEDS NOT FROM THE SON; AND THEIR
SOLUTION
Some men, in their obstinate opposition to the truth, adduce
arguments to the contrary : but they scarcely deserve a
reply. They say that when our Lord spoke of the proces-
sion of the Holy Ghost, He stated that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father, and makes no mention of the
Son, as when He says (Jo. xv. 26) : When the Paraclete
shall come, "whom I will send you from the Father, the
Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father. Therefore,
as we must not believe anything about God save what we
are taught by the Scriptures, we must not say that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Son.
Now this is utter nonsense. By reason of the unity of
essence, whatsoever the Scripture says about one Person,
must be understood to apply to another Person, even though
an exclusive term be employed, unless it be incompatible
with the latter Person's personal property. For, though it
is said (Matth. xi. 27) : No one knoweth the Son, but the
Father, neither the Son Himself, nor the Holy Ghost is
excluded from knowledge of the Son. Hence, even were it
said in the Gospel that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father alone, this would not imply that He does not pro-
ceed from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the
Son's property, as we have proved. 1 Nor need we wonder
if our Lord said that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father, without mentioning Himself, because He is wont
to refer all things to the Father, from whom He has what-
soever He has. Thus He says (Jo. vii. 16) : My doctrine
is not mine, but his that sent me; that is, the Father's : and
we find many such utterances of our Lord, stressing the
Father's authority as principle. And yet, in the passage
quoted above, He does not wholly omit to say that He is
1 Ch. xxiv.
ii2 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
the principle of the Holy Ghost, for He calls Him the
Spirit of Truth, and He had previously called Himself the
Truth. 1
They also object that in some Councils it was forbidden,
under pain of anathema, to make any addition to the Creed
approved by the Councils : and that in this Creed no men-
tion is made of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the
Son. Wherefore they argue that the Latins who made this
addition to the Creed are anathematised.
But this avails nothing : because it is stated in the
decree of the Council of Chalcedon, 2 that when the Fathers
assembled at Constantinople confirmed the doctrine of the
Council of Nicea, they did not imply that the previous
Council contained less doctrine, but their object was to
explain the mind of the Fathers by quoting the authority
of Scripture against those who denied that the Holy Ghost
is the Lord. In like manner we must say that the proces-
sion of the Holy Ghost is implicitly recognized in the Creed
of Constantinople, in as much as it states that He proceeds :
because what applies to the Father, applies also to the
Son, as we have said above. Moreover the authority of the
Roman Pontiff suffices to make this addition : by which
authority the early Councils were confirmed.
They also argue that since the Holy Ghost is simple, He
cannot proceed from two Persons; and that if He proceed
from the Father perfectly, He does not proceed from the
Son ; and adduce many similar arguments, which can easily
be solved even by those who are not far advanced in
theology.
For the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost, on account of the unity of the divine power, and by
one productive act produce the Holy Ghost. Thus too the
three Persons are one principle of the creature, and create
by one action.
1 John xiv. 6.
a Cf. Summ. Theol., P. I., Q. xxxvi., A. 2, ad 2.
CHAPTER XXVI 113
CHAPTER XXVI
THAT THERE ARE NO MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD,
NAMELY, THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY GHOST
i We gather from what has been said in the preceding chap-
j ters that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons,
■ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one
God, being distinct in relations alone. The Father is dis-
tinct from the Son by the relation of paternity, and by
innascibility : the Son from the Father, by the relation of
sonship ; the Father and the Son from the Holy Ghost by
spiration, as it may be called : and the Holy Ghost from
Father and Son, by the procession of love, whereby He
proceeds from both.
Besides these three Persons there is no fourth in the
divine nature.
Since the divine Persons agree in essence, they cannot
be distinct save by relations of origin, as we have already
made clear. 1 Now these relations of origin do not arise
from a procession tending to external things (for thus the
thing that proceeds is not of the same essence as its prin-
ciple), but from a procession that remains within. And it
is only in the working of the intellect and will that a thing
is found to proceed so as to remain within its principle, as
we have explained. 2 Wherefore the divine Persons cannot
be multiplied except in so far as this is necessitated by the
processions of intellect and will in God. Now in God there
can be only one procession according to the intellect,
because His act of intelligence is one, simple and perfect ;
since in understanding Himself, He understands all things
else, so that in God there can be but one procession of the
Word. In like manner there can be but one procession of
love, since the divine volition is one and simple : because
in loving Himself, He loves all other things. Consequently
in God there can be no more than two proceeding Persons :
one by way of intelligence, as word, namely the Son ; the
1 Ch. xxiv. * Ch. xi.
8
ii4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
other by way of love, namely the Holy Ghost. There is
also one Person who does not proceed, namely the Father.
Therefore there are but three Persons in the Trinity.
Again. The Persons are distinguished according to pro-
cession. Now in respect of procession, there are but three
modes possible in a Person : either He proceeds not at all,
like the Father ; or, as the Son, He proceeds from one that
does not proceed ; or, like the Holy Ghost, He proceeds
from one who proceeds. Therefore there cannot be more
than three Persons. And although, in other living beings,
relations of origin can be multiplied — thus in human nature
there can be many fathers, and many sons — in the divine
nature this is quite impossible. For since in one nature
filiation is of one species, it cannot be multiplied except in
respect of its matter or subject, as in the case of other forms.
Hence, as in God there is no matter or subject, and as the
very relations are subsistent, as we have proved, 1 there
cannot be several filiations in God. The same applies to
the other relations : and thus in God there are but three
Persons.
Someone may object that since the Son is perfect God,
He has perfect intellectual power, and consequently He can
produce a Word; and in like manner, as there is infinite
goodness in the Holy Ghost, whereby He is the principle
of the communication of goodness, He will be able to
bestow the divine nature on another.
To this we reply that the Son is God, as begotten, and
not as begetting : wherefore the intellectual power is in
Him as in one proceeding by way of word, and not as
in the one producing the word : and, in like manner,
since the Holy Ghost is God as proceeding, infinite good-
ness is in Him as the recipient, and not as communi-
cating the infinite goodness to another. For they are not
distinguished from one another except by the relations
alone, as we have shown. Hence the whole fulness of the
Godhead is in the Son, identically the same as that which
is in the Father; but in the Son it is with the relation of
1 Ch. xiv.
CHAPTER XXVI 115
birth; in the Father, with the relation of active genera-
tion : so that were the Father's relation ascribed to the
Son, there would no longer be any distinction between
them : and the same applies to the Holy Ghost.
We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity
in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding
itself, produces its word within itself : this word is the
intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea,
existing in the soul : and when it loves itself, it repro-
duces itself in the will as loved. Further than this it
does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle,
when by love it returns to the very substance whence the
procession began in the idea : there is however a proces-
sion towards external effects, when through love of self
one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in
the mind; the mind itself in its natural existence, which
is the starting-point of the procession ; in the intellect,
the conception of the mind ; and in the will, the mind
loved. Yet these three are not one nature, since the
mind's act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition
is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this
reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not
persons, since they are not subsistent : nor is the mind,
in its natural existence, a person, for it is not the whole
subsistence, but only part of the subsistence, that is to
say, of man. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness
to the divine Trinity, as regards the processions which
multiply the Persons. For we have sufficiently shown
that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely /
the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine pro-
cession : God begotten, as the word is conceived in the
intellect, and this is the Son : and God proceeding as love,
namely, the Holy Ghost. There are no further proces-
sions within the divine nature, but only those that
terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls
short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in
that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one nature, and
each of them is a perfect Person, since God's very being
n6 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence
the divine likeness is reproduced in man, as the likeness
of Hercules is reproduced in stone, in respect of the form
represented, but not by community of nature : wherefore
God's image is stated to be in the human mind (Gen.
i. 26) : Let us make man to our own image and likeness.
In other things also there is a likeness to the Trinity,
inasmuch as each thing is one in its substance, informed
by a certain species, and has a certain order. Now, as we
have already clearly stated, the intellectual concept in
intelligible being is like the information of the species in
natural being : and love is like the inclination or order
of a natural thing. Hence in natural things species repre-
sents the Son remotely, and order represents the Holy
Ghost. Hence, on account of the likeness in irrational
things being remote and obscure, we say that there is in
them a trace but not an image of the Trinity, according
to Job xi. 7 : Peradventure thou ivilt understand the steps
of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly.
We have now said enough about the Trinity.
CHAPTER XXVII
OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD, AS HANDED
DOWN IN HOLY SCRIPTURE
In speaking of the divine generation we observed that
certain things are befitting the Son of God, our Lord
Jesus Christ, in respect of His divine nature, and others
in respect of His human nature, by taking which in time
the eternal Son of God wished to become incarnate.
Wherefore we must now proceed to treat of the mystery
of the Incarnation. Of all the divine works this surpasses
reason more than any : since one cannot imagine God
doing anything more wonderful, than that God the Son,
true God, should become true man. And because it is the
most wonderful of all, it follows that all other wonders
CHAPTER XXVIII 117
are directed to faith in this the greatest of all wonders :
since in every genus, what is greatest is the cause of the
rest.
Our faith in the Incarnation is based on divine
authority. For it is said (Jo. i. 14) : And the Word was
made flesh, and dwelt amongst us : and speaking of the Son
of God, the Apostle says (Philip, ii. 6, 7) : Who, when
he was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be
equal with God; but emptied himself, taking the form of
a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit
found as a man. The same is clearly indicated by the
words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, since at times
He ascribes to Himself lowly and human things that
belong to Him in His assumed human nature, for in-
stance, The Father is greater than I (Jo. xiv. 28), My
soul is sorrowful unto death (Matth. xxvi. 38) : while
sometimes He says of Himself sublime and divine things,
such as certainly belong to Him in His divine nature :
for instance, / and the Father are one (Jo. x. 30), and,
All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine (Jo.xvi. 15).
The same is shown by the very things He is related to
have done. That He feared, grieved, hungered, died, are
things pertaining to His human nature : that by His own
power He healed the sick, raised the dead, commanded
the obedience of the earth's elements, that He cast out
devils, forgave sins, raised Himself from the dead when
He willed, that at last He ascended into heaven — all these
things point to a divine power in Him.
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION
Some, through abuse of the words of the Scriptures, have
conceived false notions about the divine and human natures
of our Lord Jesus Christ.
For instance Ebion and Cerinthus and, after them, Paul
u8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
of Samosata and Photinus, said that Christ was a mere
man : and they ascribed divinity to Him not as though
He were God by nature but because by His deeds He had
merited to surpass others in His share of divine glory, as
we stated above. 1 Now this view, in addition to what we
have already said about it, destroys the mystery of the
Incarnation.
In this view, God would not have taken flesh, and
become man : but fleshly man would have become God :
and consequently there would have been no truth in the
sentence of John (i. 14) : The Word was made flesh, but
rather should he have said that Flesh was made the Word.
In like manner the Son of God would not have come
down and emptied Himself, but man would have been
raised and glorified, so that the Apostle could not say
truly, Who, when he was in the form of God . . . emptied
himself, taking the form of a slave (Philip, ii. 6, 7) : and
it would have been only the man that was raised to divine
glory ; of which it is said (verse 9) : For which cause God
also hath exalted him.
Nor would our Lord's words be true (Jo. vi. 38), J
came down from heaven, but only His words (Jo. xx. 17),
I ascend to my Father: and yet Scripture unites these two
statements (Jo. iii. 13) where our Lord says : No man hath
ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven,
the Son of Man, who is in heaven: and (Eph. iv. 10) : He
that descended is the same also that ascended above all
the heavens. Again, in this case, it could not be said
that the Son was sent by the Father, nor that He came
out from the Father, in order to come into the world, but
only that He went to the Father : and yet He unites both
together (Jo. xvi. 5): I go to him that sent me: and
(ibid. 28) : I, came out from the Father, and came into the
world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father;
and both of these bear witness to the human and divine
natures.
1 Ch. iv.
CHAPTER XXIX 119
CHAPTER XXIX
THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS CONCERNING THE
INCARNATION
Others there were who denied the true doctrine of the
Incarnation, and invented a fictitious imitation of it. The
Manicheans, in fact, said that the Son of God assumed
not a real but an imaginary body : so that He could not
be a real man, but only seemed to be one. They pretended
that whatever He did as man — for instance, that He was
born, that He ate, drank, walked, suffered, and was
buried — was all unreal, though having some semblance
of reality. Consequently they reduced the whole mystery
of the Incarnation to a work of fiction. Now in the first
place this view entirely sets at nought the authority of
Scripture. For since the likeness of flesh is not flesh, and
the likeness of walking is not walking, and so on ; the
Scripture lies when it says, the Word was made flesh, if
it were but imaginary flesh : it lies again when it says
that Jesus walked, ate, died, and was buried, if these
things happened to a mere imaginary apparition. Now,
if the authority of Scripture be allowed to suffer in the
slightest degree, our faith loses all its stability, for it is
based on Holy Writ, according to Jo. xx. 31, These
things are written that you may believe.
Someone, however, might say that Holy Scripture is not
lacking in truth, if it records apparitions as though they
were real facts : because the likenesses of things are equi-
vocally and metaphorically called by the names of the things
themselves ; thus the picture of a man is called a man : and
Holy Writ is wont to speak in this way, for instance (1 Cor.
x. 4) : The Rock was Christ. Thus in Scripture many
corporeal terms are applied to God for no other reason but
likeness : for instance, He is called a lamb, a lion, and so
forth.
. Yet, though it be true that the likenesses of things are
120 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
sometimes called by the names of the things they represent :
it is not becoming for Holy Scripture to relate an entire
incident with such a double meaning, unless one were able
to elucidate the truth from other passages of Scripture :
because this would lead men, not to knowledge, but to
deception : and yet the Apostle says (Rom. xv. 4) that
whatsoever things were written, were written for our learn-
ing, and (2 Tim. iii. 16) : All scripture, inspired of God, is
profitable to teach . . . and to instruct. Moreover the
whole Gospel story would be a poem and a fable, if
imaginary things were portrayed as being real : whereas it
is said (2 Pet. i. 16) : We have not followed cunningly
devised fables, when we made known to you the power
. . . of our Lord Jesus Christ.
Moreover, whenever Scripture relates apparitions and
not realities, this is quite clear from the manner of the
narrative. Thus it is said (Gen. xviii. 2) : And when he
(that is, Abraham) had lifted up his eyes, there appeared
to him three men: whereby we are given to understand that
they were men in appearance only. Hence he adored God
among them, and witnessed to his Godhead, saying (verse
27) : J will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes ;
and again (verse 25) : Thou who judgest all the earth, wilt
not make this judgment. When Isaias, Ezechiel, and other
prophets describe their visions, we are not led into error,
because such things are set down, not as an historical narra-
tive, but as descriptive of the prophecy; moreover they
always use some expression to indicate an apparition :
for instance (Isa. vi. 1), / saw the Lord sitting upon a high
throne, (Ezech. i. 3, 4), The hand of the Lord was there
upon him: and I saw, and behold a whirlwind came out of
the north, etc., and (ibid. viii. 3), The likeness of a hand
was put forth, and took me . . . and brought me in the
vision of God into Jerusalem.
Again, we ought not to be led into error, if Scripture
uses metaphors in speaking of divine things. In the first
place, these metaphors are taken from things of so little
account, that it is clear that the statements are to be taken
CHAPTER XXIX 121
metaphorically and not literally. Secondly, what is hidden
inside metaphors in one part of Scripture, is stated else-
where in Scripture in proper terms, which express the truth
clearly. Now this does not apply to the case in point :
because Scripture nowhere affords authority for denying
the reality of what it relates of Christ's human nature.
Yet it might be said that Scripture does this implicitly
when the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 3) : God, sending his
own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, or when he says
(Philip, ii. 7) : Being made in the likeness of men, and in
habit found as a man. But such an interpretation is for-
bidden by the context. For he does not say simply : In the
likeness of flesh, but of sinful flesh, because Christ had real
flesh — not sinful flesh, since there was no sin in Him, but
like sinful flesh, since He had passible flesh, and such as
man's flesh had become through sin. In like manner, a
fictional interpretation of the words, being made in the like-
ness of men is excluded by the addition of the words, taking
the form of a servant: because it is clear that form here
means nature and not semblance, since the Apostle had
said, Who, being in the form of God; for it is not sug-
gested that Christ was a semblance of God. The fictional
sense is also excluded by the subsequent words, Becoming
obedient unto death. Therefore likeness here does not
indicate the likeness of simulation, but true likeness of
species, just as all men are said to be like in species.
Still more emphatically does Holy Scripture exclude any
suspicion of a ghostly apparition. For it is related (Matth.
xiv. 26) that the disciples, seeing Jesus walking upon the
sea, were troubled, saying: It is an apparition ; and they
cried out for fear. Our Lord took the right way to un-
deceive them ; for thus the narrative continues : And im-
mediately Jesus spoke to them saying: Be of good heart,
it is I, fear not. Yet it hardly seems reasonable to suppose
that the disciples would be unaware of it, if He had assumed
only an imaginary body, seeing that He had chosen them
that they might bear witness to the truth from what they
saw and heard ; and, if they were aware of it, then the
122 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
thought that it was an apparition should not have made
them afraid.
And still more did our Lord, after His resurrection,
remove from the minds of His disciples any doubt of the
reality of His body. Thus (Lk. xxiv. 37-39) it is related
that the disciples being troubled and frighted, supposed
that they saw a spirit, when they saw Jesus : and He said to
them: Why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise
in your hearts? See my hands and feet, that it is I myself.
Handle and see ; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as
you see me to have. For it would have been useless to tell
them to feel, if He had but an imaginary body.
Again. The apostles show themselves to be suitable wit-
nesses of Christ. Thus Peter says (Acts x. 40, 41) : Him,
that is, Jesus, God raised up the third day, and gave Him to
be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-
ordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with
Him after He arose again from the dead: and the Apostle
John says at the beginning of his epistle (1 Jo. i. 1,2): To
that which we have seen with our eyes, which we have
looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of
life . . . we bear witness. Now it is impossible for a valid
witness of the truth to be afforded by things that happen not
really but only in appearance. Consequently, if Christ's
body was but imaginary, if He did not really eat and drink,
if He was not really seen and handled, but only in imagina-
tion, it follows that the apostles' witnessing of Christ was
unfitting ; and thus that their preaching was vain, and vain
also our faith, as Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 14).
Moreover, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really
die. Therefore He did not really rise again. Consequently,
the apostles are false witnesses, since they preached to the
world that He had risen again : wherefore the Apostle says
(1 Cor. xv. 15): We are found false witnesses of God:
because we have given testimony against God; that he hath
raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up, if the dead
rise not again.
Further. Falsehood is not the right way to the truth,
CHAPTER XXX 123
according to Ecclus. xxxiv. 4, What truth can come from
that which is false? Now Christ came into the world in
order to manifest the truth : for He said (Jo. xviii. 37) :
For this was I born, and for this came I into the world;
that I should give testimony to the truth. Therefore there
was nothing false in Christ. Yet there would have been, if
what is related of Him was only imaginary : since that
which is not what it seems to be, is false. Therefore all
the things related about Christ happened in reality.
Again. It is stated (Rom. iii. 24, 25) that we are justified
in Christ's blood, and (Apoc. v. 9) it is said : Thou hast
redeemed us to God, in thy blood. Consequently, if Christ
had not real blood, neither did He really shed it for us, and
we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. There-
fore it is useless for us to be in Christ.
Again. If Christ's coming into the world was nothing
but imaginary there was nothing new in His coming :
since even in the Old Testament, God appeared to Moses
and the prophets, under many figures, as the New Testa-
ment frequently declares. But this would void the entire
teaching of the New Testament. Therefore the Son of
God assumed a real, and not an imaginary, body.
CHAPTER XXX
THE ERROR OF VALENTINE ABOUT THE INCARNATION
The opinion of Valentine about the mystery of the Incar-
nation was somewhat akin to the foregoing. He said that
Christ's body was not earthly but brought by Him from
heaven : and that He received nothing from His Virgin
Mother, but merely passed through her as water through
an aqueduct.
He seems to have been led into this error by certain
passages of Holy Scripture. Thus it is said (Jo. iii. 13
and 31) : No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that
124 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
descended from heaven, the son of man, who is in heaven.
. . . He that cometh from above, is above all. And our
Lord said (Jo. vi. 38) : J came down from heaven, not to do
my own will, but the will of him that sent me. And (1 Cor.
xv. 47) : The first man was of the earth, earthly : the second
man, from heaven, heavenly. They take all these texts to
mean that we must believe Christ to have come down from
heaven even as regards His body.
Now this opinion of Valentine, like that of the Mani-
cheans mentioned above, comes from a false principle :
for they believed that all earthly things were created by
the devil. Wherefore, since the Son of God appeared that
he might destroy the works of the devil (1 Jo. iii. 8), it was
not fitting that He should take a body formed from a
creature of the devil. In fact Paul says (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15) :
What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what con-
cord hath Christ with Belial? And, since like fruits come
from the same root, this view leads to the same false issue
as the preceding.
Every species has fixed essential principles, namely its
matter and form, which go to constitute the specific nature
in things composed of matter and form. Now, just as
human flesh and bone and the like are matter proper to
a man, so fire, air, water, earth, and like objects of the
senses, are the matter of flesh and bone and the parts
thereof. Hence, if Christ's body were not earthly, neither
had He real flesh and bone, and He was wholly an
imaginary being : and consequently He was not a real,
but an imaginary man. And yet, as we have observed,
He said : A spirit hath not flesh and bone, as you see me
to have (Lk. xxiv. 39).
Again. A heavenly body is naturally incorruptible and
unchangeable, and cannot be moved from its connatural
position. Now it was unbecoming that the Son of God
should detract from the dignity of the nature He assumed,
nay, rather was it becoming that He should raise it. There-
fore He did not bring down from heaven a heavenly or
incorruptible body, nay, rather was it an earthly and pas-
CHAPTER XXX 125
sible body which He assumed, and rendered incorruptible
and heavenly.
Again. The Apostle says (Rom. i. 3) that the Son of
God was made to him of the seed of David according to
the flesh. Now David's body was of the earth. There-
fore Christ's body was also.
Moreover. The same Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4) that God
sent his Son, made of a woman; and it is said (Matth.
i. 16) that Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of
whom ivas born Jesus, who is called Christ. But He
would not be described as made or born of her, if He
only came through her as through a channel, taking
nothing from her. Therefore He took His body from her.
Further. Mary could not be called His mother, as the
Evangelist declares her to have been, unless He had re-
ceived something from her.
Again. The Apostle says (Heb. ii. 11, 12): Both he
that sanctifieth, namely Christ, and they who are sancti-
fied, namely Christians, are all of one. For which cause
he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: I will
declare thy name to my brethren; 1 and further on (verse
14) : Therefore, because the children are partakers of flesh
and blood, he also himself in like manner hath been
partaker of the same. Now, if Christ had but a heavenly
body, it is plain that, since we have an earthly body, we
are not all of one with Him : and consequently we cannot
be called His brethren, nor was He a partaker of flesh
and blood. For it is well known that flesh and blood are
composed of the lower elements, and are not of a heavenly
nature. Clearly, therefore, this opinion is opposed to the
statement of the Apostle.
As to the arguments on which that view is based, they
are evidently absurd. For Christ came down from heaven,
not as to His body and soul, but as God. We may gather
this from our Lord's very words. Thus, after saying (Jo.
iii. 13) : No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that
descended from heaven, He added, the Son of Man, who
1 Ps. xxi. 28.
126 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
is in heaven: thereby showing that He came down from
heaven in such wise as not to cease to be there. Now it
is proper to God to be on earth and yet fill heaven also,
according to the saying of Jeremias (xxiii. 24), I fill
heaven and earth. Therefore the Son of God did not, as
God, come down from heaven by local movement : since
that which is moved locally approaches one place in such
a way as to leave another place. Consequently, the Son
of God is said to come down from heaven, in as much
as He united an earthly substance to Himself : even so the
Apostle says that He emptied Himself, in as much as He
took the form of a servant, although He did not forfeit
His Godhead by so doing.
As to the principle on which this view is based, we
have already proved it to be erroneous : for it has been
shown, 1 that bodies were created not by the devil, but by
God.
CHAPTER XXXI
THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS CONCERNING CHRIST'S BODY
More absurd still was the error of Apollinaris concerning
the mystery of the Incarnation. He agreed with the above-
mentioned errors, in that he asserted that Christ's body
was not taken from the Virgin : but his impiety went so
far as to contend that Christ's flesh was formed from
some part of the Word. He was led into this error by
the text (Jo. i. 14), And the Word was made flesh, which
he understood to mean that the Word was transformed
into flesh : just as the text (Jo. ii. 9), When the chief
steward had tasted the water made wine indicates that the
water was transformed into wine. It is easy to see how
impossible this is, if we take note of what was proved
above. 2
For we proved that God is utterly unchangeable. Now
it is evident that whatsoever is transformed is changed.
1 Bk. II., chs. vi., xv. 2 Bk. I., chs. xiii., xv.
CHAPTER XXXI 127
Since, then, the Word of God is true God, as we have
proved, 1 it was impossible for the Word of God to be
transformed into man.
Again. Since the Word of God is God, He is simple :
for it was proved 2 that there is no composition in God.
Accordingly, if some part of the Word was changed into
flesh, it follows that the whole Word was changed. Now
that which is changed into something else, ceases to be
what it was before : thus water, changed into wine, is no
longer water, but wine. Therefore, according to this view,
after the Incarnation, the Word of God would utterly
cease to be. But this is impossible, both because the
Word of God is eternal, according to Jo. i. 1, In the
beginning was the Word; and because, even after the
Incarnation, Christ is called the Word, according to Apoc.
xix. 13, He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with
blood: and his name is called, the Word of God.
Further. Things that have not common matter and
genus cannot be changed one into the other : you cannot
change a line into whiteness, because they differ generic-
ally : and a body fashioned from the elements cannot be
changed into a heavenly body, or into an incorporeal sub-
stance, or vice versa, since they are not of the same matter.
Now, since the Word of God is God, He agrees neither in
genus nor in matter with anything else : for God is not
in a genus, and is void of matter. Therefore it was impos-
sible for the Word of God to be changed into flesh or
into anything else.
Again. Flesh, bones, and blood and the parts thereof
are essentially composed of some determinate matter.
Hence, if according to the above view the Word of God
was changed into flesh, it would follow that in Christ there
was no real flesh or anything else of the kind ; and so He
would not be a real, but only an imaginary man. Other
equally absurd consequences would follow, all of which
we have exposed when refuting Valentine. 3
Accordingly it is evident that the text of John, And the
1 Ch. iii. ■ Bk. I., ch. xxviii. 3 Ch. xxx.
128 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was
transformed into flesh : but that He took flesh in order to
live among men and appear to them visibly. Hence the
text continues, And dwelt amongst us, and we saw his
glory, etc. Baruch too says of God (iii. 38) that he was
seen upon earth, and conversed with men.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND APOLLINARIS CONCERNING
CHRIST'S SOUL
There have been false views not only about Christ's body,
but also concerning His soul.
Arius asserted that Christ had no soul, and that He
assumed only a body, the Godhead supplying the place
of a soul. Apparently he was forced to hold this view,
through maintaining that the Son of God is a creature and
less than the Father. For, in order to prove this latter
statement, he chose those texts of Scripture that stress
human weakness in Christ; and lest any one should refute
his argument, by saying that these texts refer to Christ
not in His divine, but in His human nature, he wickedly
denied that Christ had a soul. Thus when things were
said of Christ which could not be said of the human body,
for instance, that He marvelled, feared, prayed, it was
necessary to conclude that the Son of God was an inferior
being. In support of his view he quoted the above text
of John : The Word was made flesh; which, according to
him, proved that the Word took flesh alone, and not a
soul. In this particular point Apollinaris followed him.
From what we have already said it is clear that we cannot
hold this opinion.
For we have proved 1 that God cannot be the form of a
body. Since then the Word of God is God, 2 it is impossible
for Him to be the form of a body, so as in a body to take
1 Bk. I., ch. xxvii. * Chs. iii., xi., xiv.
CHAPTER XXXII 129
the place of a soul. This argument avails against Apol-
linaris, who confessed that the Word of God is God : and,
though Arius denied this, still the same argument avails
against him, since it is impossible not only for God to be
the form of a body, but also for any of the supercelestial
spirits, supreme among whom Arius placed the Son of
God — except according to the opinion of Origen, who held
human souls to be of the same species as the supercelestial
spirits, an opinion which we have refuted already. 1
Again, if you subtract what is essential to man, that
which remains is not a real man. Now evidently the soul
especially is essential to man, since it is his form. Hence,
if Christ had no soul, He was no real man. And yet the
Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 5) : There is one mediator of God
and men, the man Christ Jesus.
Further. The essence not only of man, but of each of
his parts depends on the soul : wherefore, when the soul
has departed, the eyes, flesh, and bones of a dead man are
so called equivocally, like an eye in a picture or statue.
Accordingly, if Christ had no soul, it follows that neither
His flesh nor any of His human parts were real. And yet
our Lord witnesses to the contrary (Lk. xxiv. 39) : A spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.
Further. That which is engendered of a living being
cannot be called its son, unless it be produced thereby in
the same species : thus a worm is not the son of the animal
in which it is engendered. Now, if Christ had no soul, He
would not be of the same species as other men : because
difference of form causes difference of species. Conse-
quently, we would be unable to say that Christ is the son
of the Virgin Mary, or that she is His mother : and yet
this is asserted in the Gospels.
Moreover. It is explicitly stated in the Gospel that Christ
had a soul : for instance (Matth. xxvi. 38), My soul is
sorrowful even unto death, and (Jo. xii. 27), Now is my
soul troubled. And, should they say that by soul is meant
the Son of God, because in their opinion He takes the place
1 Bk. II., ch. xcv.
9
i 3 o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
of soul and flesh, we refer them to the words of our Lord
(Jo. x. 18) : / have power to lay it (namely, my soul 1 ) down,
and I have power to take it up again. From these words
we gather that in Christ, besides His soul, there was some-
thing that had the power to lay down that soul, and to take
it up again. But it was not in the power of His body to
be united to the Son of God, or to be separated from God,
since this surpasses the power of nature. Therefore we are
given to understand that Christ's soul was distinct from the
Godhead of the Son of God, to whom rightly that power
is ascribed.
Again. Sorrow, anger, and the like are passions of the
sensitive soul, as the Philosopher asserts. 2 Now these
things were in Christ, as the Gospels declare. Therefore in
Christ there was a sensitive soul, which evidently differs
from the divine nature of the Son of God.
Since, however, it might be said that the Gospels ascribe
human things to Christ metaphorically, even as Holy Scrip-
ture in many places ascribes such things to God, we must
needs refer to something that must be taken in its proper
sense. For just as we must understand literally and not meta-
phorically the other bodily things which the Evangelists
relate about Christ, so must we not give it a metaphorical
interpretation when we read that He ate, or as a conse-
quence, was hungry. Now hunger is only in one having
a sensitive soul, since hunger is the appetite for food.
Therefore Christ had a sensitive soul.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE ERRORS OF APOLLINARIS, WHO SAID THAT CHRIST HAD
NOT A RATIONAL SOUL, AND OF ORIGEN, WHO SAID THAT
CHRIST'S SOUL WAS CREATED BEFORE THE WORLD
Convinced by the authority of Scripture, Apollinaris con-
fessed that there was in Christ a sensitive soul, but one
without mind or intellect; so that the Word supplied the
1 Douay, life. 7 Phys.
CHAPTER XXXIII 131
absence of mind and intellect in that soul. But neither
does this suffice to avoid the absurdities mentioned above.
For man takes his human species from his having a
human mind and reason. Accordingly, if Christ had no
such thing, He was not really a man, nor of the same species
as we are : because a soul devoid of reason belongs to a
different species from that to which a rational soul belongs :
since, according to the Philosopher, 1 in definitions and
species, the addition or subtraction of an essential differ-
ence changes the species, as unity in numbers. Now
rational is a specific difference. Therefore, if in Christ the
soul was sensitive, but not rational, it was of a different
species from ours which is possessed of reason. Conse-
quently Christ would not have been of the same species as
we are.
Again. There are various species among irrational sensi-
tive souls ; as evidenced by irrational animals that differ
specifically, each one of which is specified by its own soul.
Hence the irrational sensitive soul is a genus containing
many species. Now a thing cannot be in a genus without
being in one of its species. Consequently, if Christ's soul
belonged to the genus of irrational sensitive souls, it must
have belonged to one of the species of that genus, such as
the soul of a lion, or horse, or some other beast : which is
utterly absurd.
Further. The body stands in relation to the soul as
matter to form, and as an instrument to the principal agent.
Now matter must needs be proportionate to the form, and
the instrument to the principal agent. Consequently there
must be a diversity of bodies corresponding to the diversity
of souls. Our very senses bear witness to the fact that
various animals are provided with a variety of members
according to the requirements of their respective souls.
Hence if Christ had not a soul like ours, His body would
not have been provided with the same members as ours.
Moreover. Apollinaris admits that the Word of God is
truly God, therefore he must also admit that the Word of
1 8 Metaph.
i 3 2 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
God cannot be astonished ; since those things astonish us,
the cause of which we know not. Now no astonishment
could affect a sensitive soul, since it belongs not to a sensi-
tive soul to trouble about knowing the causes of things.
Yet Christ was astonished, as can be proved from the
Gospels : for it is stated (Matth. viii. 10) that Jesus hearing
the words of the centurion, marvelled. Therefore in Christ,
besides the divinity of the Word and a sensitive soul, there
was something else which made it possible for Him to
marvel : and this is a human mind. Hence it is clear from
all that has been said, that Christ had a real human body,
and a real human soul.
Accordingly, the text of John, The Word w as made flesh,
does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh : nor
that the Word assumed flesh alone, or a sensitive and not
a rational soul. According to the wonted manner of Scrip-
ture, the part is put for the whole : so that The Word was
made flesh is the same as The Word was made man. In
the same way soul is sometimes used by Scripture to indi-
cate man. Thus (Exod. i. 5) it is said : All the souls that
came out of Jacob's thigh were seventy : and flesh also, thus
(Isa. xl. 5) it is said: All flesh together shall see that the
mouth of the Lord hath spoken. Accordingly, in the text
in question, flesh stands for the whole man, and indicates
the assumption by the Word of the weakness of human
nature.
Now if, as we have shown, Christ had human flesh and
a human soul, it is evident that His soul did not exist before
the conception of His body. For it has been proved 1 that
human souls do not exist before their respective bodies.
Consequently it is clear that the teaching of Origen is
false, in asserting that in the beginning and before the
creation of the material world, Christ's soul was created
at the same time as all other spiritual creatures, and
assumed by the Word : and that at length towards the end
of time it was clothed with flesh for the salvation of man-
kind.
1 Bk. II., ch. Ixxxiv.
CHAPTER XXXIV 133
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE ERROR OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA CONCERNING THE
UNION OF THE WORD WITH MAN
It is clear then from what has been said, that neither was
the Godhead lacking in Christ, as Ebion, Cerinthus and
Photinus contended; nor a true human body, as the
Manicheans with Valentine erroneously maintained; nor
again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris asserted.
Accordingly, since these three, viz. Godhead, human soul,
and a real human body, were united in Christ, it remains
for us to seek from the teaching of the Scriptures, what we
are to hold in regard to this union.
Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius his follower ex-
plained this union in the following manner. They said
that in Christ a human body and a human soul were joined
together in a natural union, so that they formed a man of
the same species as we are, and that God dwelt in this
man as in His temple, that is to say by His grace, as in
other men. Hence the words of Christ to the Jews (Jo.
ii. 19), Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise
it up, which words the Evangelist expounds by saying
(verse 21) : But he spoke of the temple of his body. Hence
too the Apostle says (Coloss. i. 19) that in him, it hath
well-pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell. As
a result there was between that man and God, a further
union of affection, in that the man adhered to God by
His good will, and God in His will accepted Him, accord-
ing to Jo. viii. 29 : He that sent me is with me; and he
hath not left me alone: for I do always the things that
please him. Hence we may take the union between that
man and God, to be the union of which the Apostle says
(1 Cor. vi. 17) : He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.
And just as, by reason of this union, names which properly
belong to God are applied to men, so that in various
i 3 4 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
passages of Scripture they are said to be gods, and sons
of God, also lords, Saints, and Christs : so too, divine
names may be applied to this man, so that, by reason of
God dwelling in Him and being united to Him in a bond
of affection, He may be called God, the Son of God, Lord,
the Holy One, and Christ. Yet, since there was a greater
fulness of grace in this man than in other holy men, He
was the temple of God more than the rest of men, and
more closely united to God in the bond of affection, and
by a special privilege shared in the divine names. For
this reason, on account of the excellence of His grace, He
received a share of divine honour and dignity, and was
adored together with God.
It follows from all this that the Person of the Word of
God is distinct from the person of this man who is
adored together with God's Word. And if we speak of
them as being one person, this is on account of the afore-
said union of affections, so that this man and the Word
of God would be called one person, as man and wife are
said to be no longer two, but one flesh. Now a union of
this kind does not allow of our saying of the one what we
say of the other (for not all that is true of the husband is
also true of the wife, or vice versa). And so, with regard
to the union of the divine Word with this man, they
think it necessary to observe that whatsoever is proper
to that man, as being part of human nature, cannot be
said truly of the divine Word or of God : for instance it
is proper to that man to be born of the Virgin, that He
suffered, died, and was buried, and so on : all such things,
they assert, cannot be said of God or the Word of God.
Since, however, certain names, though belonging chiefly
to God, are nevertheless applied to men, such as, Christ,
Lord, Holy, and even Son of God, there is no reason why
the aforesaid predicates should not be applied to them.
Thus, according to them, it is quite correct to say that
Christ, the Lord of glory, or the Holy of Holies, or the
Son of God, was born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and
was buried : wherefore they contend that the Blessed
CHAPTER XXXIV 135
Virgin should be called, not the Mother of God or of the
divine Word, but the Mother of Christ.
Careful consideration, however, will show that this view
excludes the truth of the Incarnation. According to this
view, the Word of God was united to that man merely by
the indwelling of grace, resulting in a union of wills.
Now the Word of God by dwelling in man does not
become incarnate : for the divine Word, and God Him-
self, has dwelt in all holy men from the creation of the
world, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor.
vi. 16) : You are the temple of the living God, as the
Lord saith: I will dwell in them. Such an indwelling
cannot be styled incarnation, else God would have often
become incarnate since the beginning of the world. Nor
is the idea of incarnation realized by the divine Word, or
God, dwelling in that man with a greater plentitude of
grace, since more or less makes no difference in the kind
of union. Seeing then that the Christian religion is
based on faith in the Incarnation, it is clear that this view
destroys the very foundation of the Christian religion.
Moreover. The falseness of this view is evident from the
very terminology of Scripture. For Scripture is wont to
indicate the indwelling of the divine Word in holy men, in
the following manner : The Lord spoke to Moses, or The
Lord said to Moses, or The Word of the Lord came to
Jeremias, or some other prophet, The Word of the Lord
came 1 by the hand of Aggeus the prophet. But never is
it said that the Word of God was made either Moses, or
Jeremias, or any other. Yet it is in this singular way that
the Evangelist describes the union of the divine Word
with Christ's flesh, when he says : The Word was made
flesh, as we have observed above. Hence it is manifest
that, according to the teaching of Scripture, the Word
of God was not in the man Christ merely by dwelling in
Him.
Again. That which has been made so-and-so, is what-
ever it has been made : thus that which has been made a
1 Vulg. , factum est — i.e., was made.
136 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
man, is a man; and that which has been made white, is
white. Now, the Word of God was made man, as stated
above. Therefore the Word of God is man. But when
two things are distinct in person, hypostasis, or supposits,
one of them cannot be predicated of the other. Thus
when I say, Man is an animal, the very same thing that
is an animal is a man ; and when I say, Man is white, the
man himself is declared to be white, albeit whiteness is
extraneous to the notion of humanity. Consequently by
no means can I say that Socrates is Plato, or any other
individual of the same or of another species. Accord-
ingly, if the Word was made flesh, that is to say man, as
the Evangelist declares, it is impossible for the divine
Word and that man to be two persons, hypostases, or
supposits.
Further. Demonstrative pronouns refer to a person,
hypostasis, or supposit : for no one would say, J run,
meaning that another runs, except metaphorically, if this
other runs in his stead. Now this man, Jesus by name,
says of Himself (Jo. viii. 58) : Before Abraham was, I
am, and : / and the Father are one (Jo. x. 30), and many
similar statements, which clearly refer to the divinity of
the Word. Therefore it is manifest that the person and
hypostasis of Him who said these things is the Person of
the Son of God.
Moreover. It is evident from what has been said that
neither did Christ's body come down from heaven, which
was the error of Valentine; nor His soul, as Origen
erroneously asserted : wherefore it follows that it was the
Word who is said to have come down from heaven, not
by local movement, but in reference to His union with a
lower nature, as we have already stated. 1 Now this man
speaking in His own person said that He came down
from heaven (Jo. vi. 51) : / am the living bread, which
came down from heaven. Therefore that man's person or
hypostasis must be the Person of the Word of God.
Again. It is evident that ascent into heaven applies
1 Ch. xxx.
CHAPTER XXXIV 137
to the man Christ who, while the Apostles looked on, was
raised up (Acts i. 9) : while descent from heaven applies
to the Word of God. Now, the Apostle says (Eph.
iv. 10), He that descended is the same also that ascended.
Therefore that man's person and hypostasis is the Person
and hypostasis of the Word of God.
Again. One whose origin is from the world, and who
was not in existence before the world, cannot be said to
come into the world. Now, the man Christ, as to His flesh,
had His origin from the world, since He had a real human
and earthly body, as we have proved : x and as to His soul
He was not in existence before the world, since He had
a real human soul which, by its nature, does not exist
before its union with the body. It follows then that it is
not by reason of His human nature that this man is said to
come into the world. Yet He says that He Himself came
into the world (Jo. xvi. 28) : J came forth from the
Father, He says, and am come into the world. Thus then
it is clear that something pertaining to the Word of God
is truly said of this man : since it belongs to the divine
Word to come into the world, as John the Evangelist
expressly declares (Jo. i. 10, 11) : He was in the world, and
the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.
He came unto his own, etc. Therefore the person and
hypostasis of the man who said the words quoted above,
must be the Person and Hypostasis of the Word of God.
Again. The Apostle says (Heb. x. 5) : When he cometh
into the world, he saith: Sacrifice and oblation thou
wouldest not: but a body thou hast fitted to me. Now He
that cometh into the world is the Word of God, as we have
shown. 2 Therefore it is to the Word of God that a body
is fitted, in such wise to wit, that it was His own body.
But this could not be said, unless the hypostasis of
the Word of God were also the hypostasis of that man.
Therefore the Word of God and this man have the one and
the same hypostasis.
Moreover. Any change or suffering affecting the body of
1 Ch. xxvii. a Ch. xi.
138 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
a man, can be ascribed to the person to whom that body
belongs : thus if Peter's body be wounded, scourged, or
dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies.
Now the body of this man was the body of God's Word,
as we have shown. Hence whatsoever that body suffered,
the Word of God may be said to have suffered. Rightly,
therefore, may we say that the Word of God, or God,
suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried : whereas
those men denied this.
Again. The Apostle says (Heb. ii. 10) : It became him,
for whom are all things, who had brought many children
into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation, by his
passion. From this we gather that He for whom are all
things, who brings men into glory, and who is the author
of man's salvation, suffered and died. Now these four
things belong exclusively to God, and are ascribed to no
one else. For it is said (Prov. xvi. 4) : The Lord hath made
all things for himself: and of God's Word it is said (Jo.
i. 3) : All things were made by him: and (Ps. lxxxiii. 12) :
The Lord will give grace and glory: and elsewhere (Ps.
xxxvi. 39) : But the salvation of the just is from the Lord.
Therefore it is evidently right to say that God, the Word
of God, suffered and died.
Moreover. Though a man may be called a lord, by reason
of his sharing in the divine lordship; no man, nor indeed
any creature, can be called the Lord of glory : because God
alone by nature possesses the glory of the happiness to
come ; while others possess it by the gift of grace. Hence it
is said (Ps. xxiii. 10) : The Lord of hosts, he is the king of
glory. Now the Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 8) that the Lord of
glory was crucified : For if they had known it, they never
would have crucified the Lord of glory. Therefore it may
be truly said that God was crucified.
Further. The Word of God is the Son of God by nature,
as we have shown :* and man, by reason of God dwelling
in him, is called a son of God by the grace of adoption.
Hence, according to the opinion aforesaid, we shall find in
1 Chs. xi., xiv.
CHAPTER XXXIV 139
our Lord Jesus Christ both kinds of sonship : because the
indwelling Word is God's Son by nature, and the man in
whom He dwells is God's son by the grace of adoption.
Consequently that man cannot be called God's own, or
only-begotten, Son, but only God's Word, who by reason
of the special manner of His birth, was the only offspring
of the Father. Now Scripture ascribes passion and death
to God's own and only-begotten Son. For the Apostle
says (Rom. viii. 32) : God spared not even his own Son
but delivered him up for us all. Again it is said (Jo. iii.
16) : God so loved the world, as to give his only-begotten
Son, that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but
may have life everlasting. That he is speaking of being
delivered up to death is clear from his using the same terms
in relation to the crucified Son of Man (ibid. 14, 15) : As
Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son
of man be lifted up : that whosoever believeth in him, may
not perish, but may have life everlasting. Again the
Apostle declares Christ's death to be a sign of God's love
for the world (Rom. v. 8, 9) : God commendeth his charity
towards us; because when as yet we were sinners, accord-
ing to the time, Christ died for us. Rightly, therefore, may
we say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.
Again. A man is said to be his mother's son, because
he derives his body from her, although he does not receive
his soul from her, but from another source. Now the body
of this man was taken from the body of His Virgin Mother :
and it has been shown that the body of this man is the body
of God's natural Son, that is, of the Word of God. There-
fore it is right to call the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of
God's Word, and even the Mother of God, although the
Word's Godhead is not from her : because it is not neces-
sary for a son to receive his entire substance from his
mother, but only his body.
Moreover. The Apostle says (Gal. iv. 4) : God sent his
Son, made of a woman. Now from these words we are
able to gather the sense in which the Son of God was sent.
For we are told that He was sent in as much as He was
140 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
made of a woman : and this would not be true unless the
Son of God had been in existence before He was made
of a woman : since what is sent into something must
exist before being in that thing. Now, according to
Nestorius, this man who is an adopted son, was not
in existence before being born of a woman. Hence the
words, God sent his Son, cannot refer to an adopted son,
but to His Son by nature, namely God, the divine Word.
But it is through being made of a woman, that a man is
said to be the son of a woman. Therefore God, the divine
Word, is the Son of a woman. Perhaps, however, someone
might object that the saying of the Apostle means, not that
the Son of God was sent to be the son of a woman, but that
the Son of God, who was made of a woman and under the
Law, was sent to redeem those who were under the Law : in
which case the words his Son refer, not to His Son by
nature, but to this man who is son by adoption. But this
interpretation is excluded by the very words of the Apostle.
For no one can absolve from a law, except he be above the
law, that is, the author of the law. Now the Law was given
by God : and therefore God alone can free anyone from the
bondage of the Law. But the Apostle ascribes this to the
Son of God, of whom He is speaking. Therefore the Son
of God, of whom he is speaking, is God's Son by nature.
Therefore it is true to say that God's Son by nature,
namely, the divine Word of God, was made of a woman.
Moreover. The same conclusion follows from the fact
that the redemption of mankind is ascribed to God Him-
self (Ps. xxx. 6) : Thou hast redeemed me, Lord, God of
truth.
Again. The adoption of the sons of God is the worK of
the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 15, You have
received the Spirit of adoption of sons. Now the Holy
Ghost is not a gift of man, but of God. Therefore the
adoption of sons is effected, not by a man, but by God.
>Jow it is the work of the Son of God, sent by God, made
of a woman : as evidenced by the Apostle continuing the
text (Gal. iv. 5), That we might receive the adoption of
CHAPTER XXXIV 141
sons. Therefore the text of the Apostle (Gal. iv. 4) refers
to God's Son by nature : and consequently God, the Word
of God, was made of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin
Mother.
Further. John says (i. 14) : And the Word was made
flesh. Now He did not take flesh except of a woman.
Therefore the Word was made flesh of a woman, that is to
say, of the Virgin Mother. Therefore the Virgin is the
Mother of the Word of God.
Moreover the Apostle says that Christ is from the
fathers according to the flesh, who is over all things, God
blessed for ever. But He is not from the fathers except
through the Virgin. God therefore who is over all things
is from the Virgin according to the flesh. The Virgin
therefore is the Mother of God according to the flesh.
Moreover. The Apostle, speaking of Jesus Christ, says
(Philip, ii. 6, 7) : Who being in the form of God . . .
emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made
in the likeness of men. From these words it is clear that
if, with Nestorius, we distinguish in Christ two persons,
namely the man, who is a son by adoption, and the
Word of God, who is God's son by nature, these words
cannot refer to this man. For if this man were a mere
man He was not first in the form of God, and afterwards
made in the likeness of men; on the contrary, after being
a man, He became a participator in the Godhead ; whereby
He was not emptied but exalted. Therefore the text means
that the Word of God who first was from eternity in the
form of God, namely in the nature of God, afterwards
emptied himself, being made in the likeness of men. Nor
can this kenosis mean simply the indwelling of God's
Word in the man Christ Jesus : because from the begin-
ning of the world, God's Word has dwelt in all holy men
by grace, and yet He did not empty Himself by so doing.
For God in giving a share of His own goodness to creatures
suffers no loss, but in a sense is exalted, for as much
as the height of His perfection is manifest by the goodness
of creatures; and the greater the creature's goodness, the
142 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
more is God exalted. Hence, if the Word of God dwelt with
greater plenitude in the man Christ than in other holy
persons, he emptied Himself less in Him than in the
others. Consequently it is clear that the union of the
Word with human nature, does not merely mean, as
Nestorius contended, that God's Word dwelt in that man,
but that the Word of God was truly made flesh. For
there can be no kenosis, save in the sense that the Word
of God emptied, i.e., lowered Himself, not by putting away
His own greatness, but by putting on human lowliness :
thus if the soul existed before the body, we might say that
it becomes a corporeal substance, namely man, not by a
change in its own nature, but by being united to a cor-
poreal nature.
Again. It is evident that the Holy Ghost dwelt in the
man Christ : since it is said (Lk. iv. i) that Jesus being
full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan. Con-
sequently, if the Incarnation of the Word means nothing
more than that the Word of God dwelt with the greatest
plenitude in that man, we shall have to say that the Holy
Ghost also became incarnate : which is utterly contrary
to the teaching of faith.
Further. It is certain that the Word of GodMwells in
the holy angels; for they are filled with understanding,
by participating in the Word. Thus the Apostle savs
(Heb. ii. 16) : Nowhere doth he take hold of the angels ;
but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold. It clearly
follows then that the assumption of human nature by the
Word does not merely mean His dwelling therein.
Again. If, as Nestorius contended, there are two dis-
tinct personalities in Christ, namely the Word of God, and
the man, the Word of God cannot possibly be given the
name of Christ. This is evident, both from the way of
speaking, usual in Scripture, where, before the Incarna-
tion of our Lord, God or His Word is never given the
name of Christ, and from the very meaning of that name.
For Christ is so called because He is anointed with the oil
of gladness, i.e., with the Holy Ghost, as Peter expounds
CHAPTER XXXIV 143
it (Acts x. 38). Now it cannot be said that the Word of
God was anointed by the Holy Ghost, since then the Holy
Ghost would be greater than the Son, as the sanctifier is
greater than the sanctified. Consequently this name
Christ can only indicate the man. When therefore the
Apostle says (Philip, ii. 5) : Let this mind be in you, which
was also in Christ Jesus, he is referring to the man. Now
he continues : Who, being in the form of God, thought
it not robbery to be equal with God. Therefore we may
say with truth that this man is in the form, that is to say,
in the nature, of God, and equal with God. And, though
men are called gods, or children of God, on account of
God dwelling in them, they are never said to be equal
with God. Therefore the man Christ is called God, not
merely because God dwelt in Him.
Moreover. Though the name of God is applied to holy
men, on account of indwelling grace, none of the things
that belong to God alone, such as the creation of heaven
and earth, and the like, are ever ascribed to any saint by
reason of the grace dwelling in him. Yet the creation of
all things is ascribed to the man Christ. For it is said
(Heb. iii. 1, 2) : Consider the apostle and high-priest of
our confession, Jesus Christ, who is faithful to him that
made him, as was also Moses in all his house. Now
these words refer to the man, and not to the Word of God,
both because as we have shown, the Word of God, accord-
ing to the view of Nestorius, cannot be called Christ, and
because the Word of God was not made, but begotten.
And the Apostle continues : This man was counted worthy
of greater glory than Moses, by sq much as he that hath
built the house, hath greater honour than the house.
Hence the man Christ built the house of God : wherefore
the Apostle goes on to prove this : For every house is built
by some man: but he that created all things is God.
Accordingly, the Apostle proves that the man Christ built
the house of God, from the fact that God created all things.
But this argument would prove nothing unless Christ
were God the Creator of all. Thus then the creation of all
144 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
things, which is the work of God alone, is ascribed to this
man. Therefore the man Christ is God in Person, and
not merely by God dwelling in Him.
Further. It is quite clear that the man Christ ascribes
many divine and supernatural attributes to Himself. For
instance (Jo. vi. 40), J will raise him up in the last day:
and (Jo. x. 28), J give them life everlasting. And it would
indicate the highest degree of pride, if the man who spoke
thus were not God in Person, and merely had God dwell-
ing in Him. But this accusation cannot be brought against
the man Christ, who says (Matth. xi. 29) : Learn of me,
because I am meek and humble of heart. Therefore this
man and God are one and the same Person.
Moreover. Just as the Scriptures state that this man
was exalted: Being exalted . . . by the right hand of God
(Acts ii. 33), so do they say that God was emptied: He
emptied himself (Philip, ii. 7). Wherefore, even as sub-
lime things may be ascribed to the man by reason of the
union — for instance, that He is God, that He raises the
dead to life, and so forth — so may lowly things be attri-
buted to God, for instance that He was born of the Virgin,
that He suffered, died, and was buried.
Again. Relative terms, nouns or pronouns, relate to
the same supposit. Now the Apostle, speaking of the
Son of God, says (Coloss. i. 16) : In him were all things
created, in heaven, and on earth, visible and invisible,
and afterwards he adds : And he is the head of the body,
the Church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the
dead. Now it is clear that the words, In him were all
things created, refer to the Word of God ; and the words,
the first-born from the dead, to the man Christ. Conse-
quently the Word of God and the man Christ are one
suppositum, and, therefore, one Person : and whatsoever
is said of that man may be ascribed to the Word of God,
and vice versa.
Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. viii. 6) : One Lord,
Jesus Christ, by whom are all things. Now Jesus Christ,
the name of that man, by whom are all things, evidently
CHAPTER XXXV 145
is the name of the Word of God. Accordingly, the Word
of God and this man, are one Lord, neither two lords
nor two sons, as Nestorius maintained : and hence it
follows too, that the Word of God and this man are one
Person.
Now, if we consider the matter carefully, this opinion
of Nestorius, as regards the Incarnation, differs but little
from the opinion of Photinus, since both of them asserted
that this man was God solely by reason of indwelling
grace. Photinus, however, asserted that this man merited
to be called God and to be raised to glory, through His
Passion and good works : whereas Nestorius admitted that
He had this name and glory from the moment of His
conception, by reason of the singular fulness of God dwell-
ing in Him. But as regards the eternal generation of the
Word, they differed utterly, since Nestorius admitted it,
whereas Photinus denied it altogether.
CHAPTER XXXV
AGAINST THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES
We have proved in many ways that the mystery of the
Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God's
Word, and man, are united in one and the same Person.
Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study
of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accom<
panied by its personality. And the same would seem u
apply to human nature : since that which subsists in an
intellectual or rational nature is the definition of a person.
Hence seemingly it is impossible that there be one person
with two natures, divine and human.
In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations
have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard against
Nestorius, the unity of Person in Christ, contended that
there was also but one nature in Christ, so that, although
before the union there were two distinct natures, divine
146 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
and human, in the very union they coalesced into one.
Hence he said that Christ's Person was of two natures,
but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was
condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.
The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways.
We have proved above 1 that in Jesus Christ there was
a body, a rational soul, and the Godhead. It is moreover
evident that Christ's body, even after the union, was not
the Godhead of the Word} since that body, even after the
union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within
the lines of its members : all of which is foreign to the
divine nature of the Word ; as we have sufficiently proved
above. 1 Likewise Christ's soul, after the union, was dis-
tinct from the divine nature of the Word, since, even after
the union, it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear,
and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the Godhead
of the Word, as we have shown. 2 Now the human soul
and body constitute the human nature. Wherefore, even
after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct
from the Godhead of the Word, which is the divine nature.
Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.
Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to
nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of
its having a form, even as that which is made by art : for
we do not call the building a house, until it has the form
designed by art ; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form
pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural
thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two
forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of
Jesus Christ, the Apostle says (Philip, ii. 6, 7) that when
he was in the form of God . . . He took the form of a
servant. Now we cannot say that the form of God is the
same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it
has already ; so that, if the form of God and the form of a
servant are the same, since He already had the form of God,
He would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can
it be said that, through the union, the form of God in
1 Bk. I., ch. xx. * Bk. I., ch. lxxxix.
CHAPTER XXXV 147
Christ was destroyed; because then, after the union, Christ
would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form
of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then He
would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither
can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with
the form of God, because when things are made into a
mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly
destroyed ; wherefore it could not be said that He took the
form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according
to the words of the Apostle, we must say that, after the
union, there were two forms in Christ, and consequently
two natures.
Further. The word nature was first employed to signify
the coming into being of things by nativity, and thence it
was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of
generation ; and then further still to signify the intrinsic
principle of movement in a movable thing : and since this
principle is matter or form, nature also stands for the form
or matter of a natural thing having within itself the prin-
ciple of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter
constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of
the word nature is made to extend to the essence of anything
existing in nature; so that the nature of a thing is its
essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that
we are using the term now, and in which we say that there
are a divine and a human nature in Christ. Accordingly
if, as Eutyches maintained, the human and the divine
nature were two before the union, and if through the union
they combined together to form one nature, this must have
been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of
many. This happens, first of all, by mere co-ordination :
thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an
army. Secondly, by co-ordination and composition : thus
a house is made of many conjoined parts co-ordinated and
bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice
to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that
are formed by co-ordination or composition are not natural
things ; and their unity is not unity of nature. The third
148 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
way in which one thing is made of several, is by mixture :
thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet
neither does this way apply to the case in point. First,
because only those things can be mixed together which
agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be
active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does
not apply to our case : since it has been proved 1 that God
is immaterial and wholly impassible. Secondly, because
it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which
far exceeds the other : thus if one were to put a drop of
wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no
mixture; but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs
placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire ;
they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power.
Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of
man, because God's power is infinite, as we have proved. 2
Therefore a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible.
Thirdly, because granted that such a mixture were made,
neither nature would retain its integrity : because the in-
gredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Con-
sequently, after the two natures, namely the divine and
human, have been mixed together, neither nature would
remain, but a tertium quid: and so Christ would be neither
God nor man. Therefore we cannot admit the explanation
of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before
the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus
Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two
natures into one. Consequently it must be explained by
saying that only one of the natures remained after the
union. Either then in Christ there was only the nature
of God, and what in Him seemed human was purely
imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature
was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained :
both of which views we have already refuted. 3 Therefore
it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only
one after, the union.
1 Bk. I., Chs. xvi., xvii. a Bk. I., ch. xliii.
3 Chs. xxviii. seqq.
CHAPTER XXXV 149
Further. Two complete natures never combine together
to form one, because each is a whole in itself ; whereas when
one thing is made out of several, these come under the
heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of
a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a
nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking ; because
neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a
nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete
nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot
possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both
or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since
we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and
true man. 1 Therefore it is impossible that there be but one
nature in Christ.
Again, one nature may result from two permanent
things — either as from bodily parts; for instance an animal
is made of various members : and this does not apply to
the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal :
— or as one thing is made from matter and form ; for
instance, an animal from soul and body : and neither does
this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor
can He be the form of anything, as proved above. 2
Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we
have proved, 3 it is impossible that there be but one nature
in Him.
Further. Subtraction or addition of an essential prin-
ciple diversifies the species of a thing, and therefore
changes the nature, which is nothing but the essence as
indicated by the definition, as we have stated. 4 For this
reason we observe that a specific difference added to or
subtracted from a definition causes a difference of species ;
thus a rational and an irrational animal differ in species :
even so, in numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity
gives us various species of numbers. Now the form is
an essential principle. Hence every additional form makes
another species and another nature, in the sense in which
1 Chs. xxviii. seqq. 2 Bk. I., chs. xvii., xxvii.
3 Chs. xxviii. seqq. * Ch. xxxiii.
150 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
we speak of nature now. 1 Therefore if the divine nature
of the Word be added to the human nature as a form,
another nature will be the result : and consequently Christ's
will be not a human nature, but some other : even as an
animate body is of another nature from that which is a
body only.
Moreover. Things that have not a common nature are
not alike in species; as, for instance, man and horse. Now
if Christ's nature is composed of the divine and human
natures, it is evident that other men will not have the
same nature as Christ. Therefore He will not be like us
in species : and this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
(Heb. ii. 17) : It behoved him, in all things, to be like unto
his brethren.
Again. Form and matter always make together one
species, which can be predicated of many individuals,
actually or potentially, as far as the specific ratio is con-
cerned. If then the divine nature be added, like a form,
to the human nature, from this combination there must
needs result some common species that can be predicated of
several individuals. But this is clearly false : since there is
but one Jesus Christ, God and man. Therefore the divine
and human natures did not constitute one nature in Christ.
Moreover. The statement of Eutyches, that before the
union there were two natures in Christ, is also seemingly
against faith. For, since human nature is composed of
soul and body, it follows that either Christ's body, or
Christ's soul, or both, existed before His Incarnation :
and this is shown to be false, by what we have said above.
It is, therefore, against faith to say that there were two
natures in Christ before the union, and that after the
union, there was one.
1 Ch. xxxiii.
CHAPTER XXXVI 151
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE ERROR OF MACARIUS OF ANTIOCH, WHO SAID THAT
THERE WAS ONLY ONE WILL IN CHRIST
The opinion of Macarius 1 of Antioch, who said that there
were but one operation and will in Christ, seemingly
amounts to the same as the foregoing. Each nature has
its proper operation : because the form, which gives each
nature its particular species, is the principle of operation :
wherefore, as various natures have their respective forms,
so have they their respective actions. Consequently, if in
Christ there be but one action, it follows that He has but
one nature : and this is the heresy of Eutyches. There-
fore it is false that there is only one operation in Christ.
Again. In Christ the divine nature is perfect, whereby
He is consubstantial with the Father ; also a perfect human
nature, whereby He is of the same species as we are.
Now it belongs to the perfection of the divine nature to
have a will, as we have proved. 2 Likewise it belongs to
the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a
man is free. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.
Moreover. The will is a power of the soul even as
the intellect. Therefore if Christ had no other will
besides that of the Word, for the same reason, He had
no other intellect besides the Word's : and so we come
back to the error of Apollinaris.
Further. If Christ had but one will, He must have
had the divine will alone : because the Word could not
lose the divine will which was His from all eternity.
Now merit does not pertain to the divine will : since
it belongs to one tending to perfection. Accordingly,
by His passion, Christ would not have merited, either
for Himself or for us : the contrary of which is taught
by the Apostle (Philip, ii. 8, 9) who says that Christ
was made obedient to the Father, unto death . . . for
which cause God hath exalted him.
1 Seventh century. 2 Bk. I., ch. lxxii.
152 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Again. If there was not a human will in Christ, it
follows that there would have been no free-will in Him
in respect of the nature assumed : for by His will man
is free, so that the man Christ would have acted not in
the manner of a man, but in the manner of other animals
that are void of free-will. Consequently His actions were
neither virtuous nor worthy of praise or imitation. There-
fore there was no point in His saying (Matth. xi. 29) :
Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart; and
(Jo. xiii. 15) : / have given you an example that, as I have
done to you, so you do also.
Again. Even an ordinary man, though he has but one
personality, has several appetites and operations corre-
sponding to his various natural principles. Thus in his
rational faculty he has a will ; in the sensitive faculty he
has a concupiscible and an irascible appetite; and besides
these he has a natural appetite resulting from the natural
forces in him. Again, with his eyes he sees, with his
ears he hears, with his mind he understands : and all
these are different operations. The reason of this is that
operations are differentiated not only according to the
various operative subjects, but also according to the various
principles of operation in one and the same subject, from
which principles these various operations take their species.
Now the divine nature is much further removed from human
nature than the various principles of human nature are
from one another. Therefore the divine and human natures
in Christ have each their respective distinct will and
operation, although Christ in the two natures is one
Person.
Again. It is clearly proved by the authority of Holy
Scripture that there were two wills in Christ. Thus He
says (Jo. vi. 38) : / came down from heaven, not to do my
own will, but the will of him that sent me; and (Lk.
xxii. 42) : Not my will, but thine be done. Hence, it is
clear that in Christ there was His own will, besides the
will of His Father. Now there certainly was in Him a
will common to Him and His Father : since, as Father
CHAPTER XXXVI 153
and Son have the one nature, so have they the one will.
Therefore there are two wills in Christ.
It is the same with His operations. Christ had one
operation common to Him and the Father : for He says
(Jo. v. 19) : What things soever the Father doth, these
the Son also doth in like manner. There is also in Him
another operation that is not becoming to the Father,
as, for instance, sleep, hunger, eating, and so forth, all
of which both actions and passions are ascribed by the
Evangelist to the man Christ. Therefore there was not
only one operation in Christ.
Apparently this opinion originated through its authors
being unable to distinguish between simple unity and unity
of order. They observed that the human will in Christ was
subordinate to the divine will, so that every act of the
human will of Christ was in accordance with the disposition
of His divine will. In like manner all Christ's human
operations, whether of action or of passion, were in accord-
ance with the disposition of His divine will, as He says
Himself (Jo. viii. 29) : I do always the things that please
him. Besides, Christ's human operation derived a certain
divine efficacy through His union with the Godhead, even
as the action of the secondary agent acquires efficacy from
the principal agent. Consequently His every action or
passion was salutary : for which reason Dionysius (De Div.
Nom., ii.) calls Christ's human operations theandric — i.e.,
God-man-like ; as well as because it is the action of God
and man. And so, observing that in Christ human will
and operation are infallibly subordinate to the divine, they
concluded that Christ has but one will and operation ;
although, in fact, unity of order and simple unity are not
the same.
154 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
CHAPTER XXXVII
REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO MAINTAINED THAT CHRIST'S
BODY AND SOUL WERE NOT UNITED TOGETHER
In the foregoing chapters we have refuted the opinions of
Nestorius and Eutyches, by proving that as laid down by
our Faith, there is but one Person in Christ, and two
natures. Seeing, however, that this would seem to be in
contradiction with natural reason, certain later writers pro-
pounded the following view of the union. Man consists of
a soul and body united together : and this particular soul
together with this particular body constitutes this particular
man, which signifies not only a hypostasis or a person, but
a hypostasis and a person. Wherefore, lest they should
have to admit in Christ a hypostasis or Person of the
Word, they maintained that His body and soul were not
united, so as to form one substance : and in this way they
hoped to avoid the heresy of Nestorius. Again, it would
seem impossible for that which was not part of a thing's
nature to become part of its substance, without a change
taking place in that thing. Now the Word is altogether
unchangeable. And so, lest they should be constrained to
admit that the assumed body and soul belonged to the
nature which the Word had from all eternity, they con-
tended that the Word assumed a human soul and body
accidentally, just as a man puts on his clothes. In this
way they wished to avoid the error of Eutyches. This
view, however, is utterly contrary to faith.
Soul and body, by being united, constitute a man, because
the form, when added to the matter, makes the species.
Consequently, if soul and body were not united in Christ,
He was not a man : whereas the Apostle says (i Tim. ii.
5) : (One) mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.
Again. Each one of us is said to be a man, in the sense
that a rational soul forms part of our being. Hence, if
Christ is said to be a man, not in that sense, but merely
because He had a soul and body, without their being united,
CHAPTER XXXVII i55
it would be an equivocation to call Him a man, and He
would not belong to the same species as we do : which is
contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. ii. 17) that it
behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren.
Further. Not any kind of body, but only a human body,
belongs to human nature. Now a body is not human
unless it be quickened by union with the soul : and it is
an equivocation to speak of eyes, hands, feet, flesh, and
bone when they are no longer united to the soul. Conse-
quently it would not be true to say that the Word assumed
human nature, if He assumed a body and soul that were
not united together.
Again. The human soul is naturally disposed to be
united to the body. Hence a soul that is never united to
a body, so as to constitute a being, is not a human soul :
because that which is natural must be always. Hence, if
Christ's soul is not united to the body, so as to constitute
a being, it follows that it is not a human soul, and that
human nature was not in Him.
Further. If the Word was accidentally united to the
soul and body, as though it were clothed with them, human
nature was not the nature of the Word. Consequently,
after the union, the Word did not subsist in two natures,
as neither does a man, when clothed, subsist in two natures :
and Eutyches, for saying this, was condemned in the Coun-
cil of Chalcedon.
Moreover. That which happens to a man's clothes does
not happen to him : thus he is not said to be born, when he
puts his clothes on, nor to be wounded, if his coat is torn.
If then the Word donned a soul and body, as a man puts
on his clothes, we cannot say that God was born, or suffered,
by reason of the body He assumed.
Again. If the Word took human nature merely as a
cloak, so as to be seen by human eyes, it was useless for
Him to take a soul, which is naturally invisible.
Moreover. According to this view, the Son would have
taken human flesh, in the same way as the Holy Ghost
assumed the form of a dove, under which He appeared.
156 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Now, this is clearly false : since neither do we say that the
Holy Ghost was made a dove, nor that He is less than the
Father in respect of the nature assumed.
Again. If we regard the matter carefully, it is evident
that this view leads to the absurdities involved in various
heresies. For as much as it asserts that the Son of God was
accidentally united to soul and flesh, as a man to his clothes,
it agrees with the opinion of Nestorius who held this union
to signify the indwelling of the Word of God in man : since
God could no' clothe man by bodily contact, but only by
His indwelliiig grace. For as much as it holds the union of
the Word with human soul and flesh to be accidental, it
follows that, after the union, the Word was not subsistent
in two natures, which was the opinion of Eutyches : since a
thing does not subsist in that which is united to it acci-
dentally. For as much as it maintained that soul and flesh
were not united so as to constitute a being, this view agrees
partly with Arius and Apollinaris, who said that Christ's
body was not animated by a rational soul ; and partly with
the Manicheans, who contended that Christ was not a real
man, but only an imaginary one. For if the soul be not
united to the body, so as to constitute a being, whatever
appeared in Christ to make Him like other men, made of
soul and body, was merely imaginary.
This view seems to have been based on the words of the
Apostle (Philip, ii. 7), In habit found as a man: for they
did not realize that this was said metaphorically. Now we
must not look for likeness in every detail in metaphorical
expressions. Accordingly the assumed human nature bears
a certain resemblance to a man's clothes, in so far as the
Word was made visible in the flesh, as man is seen in his
clothes. But the comparison does not imply that in Christ
the union of the Word with human nature was accidental.
CHAPTER XXXVIII 157
CHAPTER XXXVIII
REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO HOLD THAT IN THE PERSON OF
CHRIST THERE ARE TWO HYPOSTASES OR SUPPOSITS
In order to avoid the absurdities involved in the foregoing
opinion, some others held that in our Lord Jesus Christ one
substance resulted from the union of soul and flesh, a man
namely, of the same species as other men. They say that
this man is united to the Word of God, not indeed in
nature, but in person : so that there would be one person of
God's Word and of this man. But, since this man is an
individual substance, that is to say a hypostasis and sup-
posit, they draw a distinction between this hypostasis and
the Word of God, although they admit that both are but
one person. On account of this unity, they admit that we
say that this man is the Word of God, or that the Word of
God is this man, the sense being : The Word of God is a
man — i.e., the person of the Word of God is the person of the
man and vice versa. For this reason they state that what-
ever may be predicated of the Word of God, may be predi-
cated of this man, and vice versa: but with a qualification,
so that when it is said : God suffered, the sense is : The
man who is God, by reason of the unity of person, suffered:
and when it is said : A man created the stars, the sense is :
He who is a man, etc.
This opinion, however, must necessarily fall into the
error of Nestorius.
If we observe the difference between hypostasis and
person, we shall see that they do not differ altogether; in
fact, person is a kind of hypostasis, since it is a hypostasis
of a particular nature, namely rational. This may be seen
from the definition given by Boethius : Person is an indi-
vidual substance of rational nature. Hence, though not
every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of rational
nature is a person. Accordingly, if from the mere union
of soul and body there resulted in Christ a particular sub-
stance which is a hypostasis, namely this man, it follows
158 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
that from this union there resulted a person. Consequently
there would be two persons in Christ — the newly consti-
tuted person of this man, and the Person of the Eternal
Word : and this is the error of Nestorius.
Again. Even though the hypostasis of this man were
not a person, still the hypostasis of the Word of God is
the same as His Person. Hence, if the hypostasis of the
Word of God is not the hypostasis of this man, neither
will the Person of the Word be the person of this man ;
and so it will be false that, as they say, the person of this
man is the Person of the Word of God.
Moreover. Granted that there be a distinction between
the Person and the hypostasis of the Word of God, or of
this man, the only conceivable difference would be that
the person adds some property to the hypostasis. For it
cannot add anything of the genus of substance, since
hypostasis is the chief thing in the genus of substance,
being called a first substance. Accordingly if the union
be effected in the person and not in the hypostasis, it
follows that it is effected in an accidental quality : and this
again is the error of Nestorius.
Further. Cyril says in a letter to Nestorius that was
approved in the Council of Ephesus .- 1 // anyone does not
confess that the Word of God the Father was united to
flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with his flesh is one,
the same person being both God and man, let him be
anathema. In fact nearly all the decrees of the councils
declare that this savours of the error of Nestorius, who
said that there were two hypostases in Christ.
Again. Damascene says : 2 We acknowledge the union
of two perfect natures, united not only in the ^poo-un-ov, i.e.
person, as Nestorius the enemy of God maintained, but
hypostatically. Whence it is clear that Nestorius main-
tained that there was one person, but two hypostases.
Further. Hypostasis and supposit must needs be the
same : since, according to the Philosopher, 3 all the other
1 P. I., ch. xxvi., can. 2. * 3 De Fid. Orthod. to.
3 De Praedic, cap. De Substantia.
CHAPTER XXXVIII 159
things are predicated of the first substance, that is to say
hypostasis, namely both universals in the genus of sub-
stance, and accidents. Consequently, if there are two
hypostases in Christ, there are also two supposits.
Moreover. If the Word and this man have different
supposits, neither supposit presupposes the other. Now,
if the supposits be distinct, things predicated of them are
also distinct : since divine predicates do not apply to the
supposit of the man, except by reason of the Word, nor
vice versa. Consequently we must make a distinction in
the things that Scripture says of Christ, that is to say
between divine and human predicates. Now this is against
the declaration of Cyril, which was confirmed in the
Council r 1 // anyone ascribe to two persons or subsistences,
such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scrip-
tures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by
himself of himself, and applies some of them to the man,
taken as distinct from the Word of God, and others (as
though they were true of God alone) only to the Word of
God the Father, let him be anathema.
Again. According to this view, things that are applic-
able to the Word of God by reason of His nature could
not be predicated of the man, save on account of their being
associated in one Person. And this they indicated by
inserting a qualifying phrase, where they explain the
sentence, This man created the stars, thus, The Son of
God who is this man, etc. And so on in like manner with
other such sentences. So that when we say, This man is
God, the sense is, The Word of God, who is this man,
is God. Now Cyril condemns these expressions : 2 If any-
one dare to say that the assumed humanity is to be co-
adored, and co-glorified, and co-named God, together with
the Word of God, as one with another (since the prefix
" co-" always signifies this) instead of giving one and
the same adoration and one and the same glory to the
Emmanuel, as the Word made flesh, let him be accursed.
Further. If this man differs in supposit from the Word
1 Council of Ephesus, P. I., ch. xxvi., can. 4. 2 Ibid., can. 8.
160 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
of God, He can have no association with the Person of
the Word, except through the fact of His being assumed
by the Word. But this is foreign to the right sense of
faith. Thus Felix, Pope and martyr, is quoted in the
Council of Ephesus, 1 as saying : We believe that Jesus
our God, born of the Virgin Mary, is the Eternal Son
and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in
such sort that there be another besides him. For the Son
of God did not assume a man, so that there was another
besides him; but while he remained perfect God, he became
a perfect man, and took flesh of the Virgin.
Again. Things that differ in supposit are several simply,
and they are not one except relatively. If then in Christ
there are two supposits, it follows that He is simply two,
and not one, except relatively. In that case Jesus would
be no more, since a thing exists in so far as it is one : so
that whatsoever is not one simply is simply non-existent.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE
INCARNATION OF CHRIST
From the foregoing chapters it is plain that according to
the tradition of Catholic faith we must confess that in
Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect
human nature composed of a rational soul and human
flesh. Also that these two natures are united in Christ, not
by mere indwelling, nor accidentally as a man to his
clothes, nor by mere personal habitude and property, but
in one hypostasis and one supposit. In this way alone
can we safeguard the teaching of the Scriptures about the
Incarnation.
We have already observed that Holy Scripture,
without making any distinction, ascribes divine things to
the man ; and to God, things pertaining to the man :
1 P. II., Act. i.
CHAPTER XXXIX 161
wherefore in both cases it is the same one to whom
reference is made. But, seeing that opposite state-
ments cannot be true about the same subject in the same
respect, and whereas the divine and human things that
are said about Christ are opposed to one another,— for
instance, that He suffered and was impassible, that He
died and was immortal, and so on, — it follows that divine
and human things must be said of Christ in different
respects. Accordingly, as regards the subject of which
these things are predicated, we must make no distinction,
and hold to unity; but as regards the things in respect
of which these predications are made, a distinction is to
be observed. Natural properties are attributed to a thing
in respect of its nature : thus, a stone falls down in respect
of its nature as a heavy body. Accordingly, since divine
and human things are attributed to Christ in different
respects, it follows that in Christ there are two distinct
unmixed natures. Now natural properties are attributed
to something that belongs by its own nature to the genus
of substance, and this is a hypostasis or supposit of
that nature. And, since human and divine things pre-
dicated of Christ are attributed to one undivided subject,
it follows that Christ is one hypostasis and one supposit
subsisting in the human and divine natures. In this way
divine things are truly and properly attributed to that man,
in as much as that man indicates a supposit of both
natures, human and divine : while, vice versa, human
things are attributed to the Word, in as much as He is a
supposit of human nature. Hence also it is clear that
although the Son took flesh, it does not follow that either
Father or Holy Ghost became incarnate, since the Incarna-
tion was effected by union, not in the nature common to
the three Persons, but in the hypostasis or person, wherein
the three Persons are distinct ; and thus, even as in the
Trinity there are several Persons subsisting in one nature,
so in the mystery of the Incarnation is there one Person
subsisting in two natures.
ii
i62 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
CHAPTER XL
OBJECTIONS AGAINST FAITH IN THE INCARNATION
This view of the Incarnation, as laid down by the Catholic
Faith, is beset with a number of difficulties which have led
the enemies of the Faith to impugn this mystery. It has
been proved 1 that God is neither a body nor a force in a
body. But, if He took flesh, it follows that, after the In-
carnation, either He was transformed into a body, or that
He became a force in a body. Therefore it would seem
impossible for God to be incarnate.
Again. Whatsoever acquires a new nature, is subject to
substantial change : because when a thing is generated, it
acquires a nature. Hence, if the Person of the Son of
God became subsistent in human nature, it would seem that
He was substantially changed.
Further. No hypostasis extends beyond the nature in
which it subsists; rather does nature extend beyond the
hypostasis, seeing that it includes many hypostases. And
thus, if by the Incarnation the hypostasis of the Son of
God became a hypostasis of human nature, it would follow
that, after the Incarnation, the Son of God was not every-
where, since human nature is not everywhere.
Moreover. One and the same thing has only one quid-
dity, for this is its essence, which is one in each one thing.
Now the quiddity of a thing is its nature, because its nature
is indicated by its definition. Therefore, seemingly, one
hypostasis cannot subsist in two natures.
Again. In things devoid of matter, the quiddity is not
distinct from the thing, as we proved above: 2 and this is
especially true of God, who is not only His own quiddity,
but also His own being. Now human nature cannot be
the same as a divine hypostasis. Therefore, seemingly, a
divine Person cannot subsist in human nature.
Again. Nature is more simple and more formal than
the hypostasis that subsists in it : since the common nature
1 Bk. L, ch. xx. * Bk. I., chs. xxi., xxii.
CHAPTER XL 163
is confined to a particular hypostasis by the addition of
something material. If then a divine hypostasis subsists
in human nature, it would appear to follow that human
nature is more simple and more formal than the divine
hypostasis : and this is altogether impossible.
Further. It is only in things composed of matter and
form that the singular differs from its quiddity, in that the
singular is individualized by signate matter, which is not
included in the quiddity and specific nature : for this or
that matter is included in the designation of Socrates, but
not in the definition of human nature. Consequently every
hypostasis that subsists in human nature is constituted by
signate matter : and this cannot be said of a divine hypo-
stasis. Therefore it would seem impossible for the hypo-
stasis of the Word of God to subsist in human nature.
Moreover. In Christ the soul and body were not less
effective than in other men. Now by their union, in other
men, they constitute supposit, hypostasis, or person.
Hence, in Christ also, a supposit, hypostasis, or person
results from the union of soul and body. But this is not
the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God,
because this is eternal. Therefore in Christ there is, seem-
ingly, another supposit, hypostasis, or person besides
the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God.
Further. As human nature in general consists of a soul
and body, so do this soul and this body make this man, or
a human hypostasis. Now in Christ there were this soul
and this body. Therefore from their union apparently there
resulted a hypostasis : and so the same conclusion follows
as above.
Again. This man Christ considered as formed merely
of soul and body, is a substance. But He is not a substance
in general. Therefore He is a particular substance; and
consequently a hypostasis.
Moreover. If in Christ there is but one supposit of
both human and divine natures, it follows that the divine
hypostasis is included in the definition of this man Christ.
But it is not included in the definition of other men.
164 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Therefore man is predicated equivocally of Christ and of
other men : so that He would not be of the same species as
we are.
Further. We have proved 1 that in Christ are these
three, body, soul, and divinity. Now the soul, being a
more noble thing than the body, is not the body's sup-
posit but its form. Neither, therefore, is something
divine a supposit of human nature; but rather ought we
to say that it informs human nature* ^
Further. Whatsoever accrues to a thing that is already
complete in being, is accidental thereto. Now, since the
Word of God is eternal, it is clear that the flesh assumed
by Him, acmie^&ro Him when He was already complete
in being. Therefore He came by it accidentally.
CHAPTER XLI
HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SON OF GOD
WAS INCARNATE
In order to reply to these objections, we must begin by
going into the question a little more deeply. While
/ Eutyches maintained that the union of God with man was
effected in the nature, whereas Nestorius held that it was
effected neither in the nature nor in the person, the Catholic
Faith teaches that it was effected in the person, and not in
the nature. And so it would seem necessary to know first
of all what is meant by being united in the nature, and by
being united in the person.
The word nature has various meanings. It may
mean either the birth of a living being, or the principle
of generation and movement, or matter and form. It is
also sometimes used to signify a thing's essential definition,
which contains all that belongs to the species of that thing ;
thus we say that human nature is common to all men, and
so on. Accordingly, those things are united in nature
1 Chs. xxviii. seq.
CHAPTER XLI 165
which go to form the complete species of a thing ; thus, for
instance, the soul and body are united together to form the
species of an animal ; and, generally speaking, whatsoever
things are the parts of a species. Now it is impossible for
anything extraneous to be united in unity of nature to a
species that is already complete, without doing away with
the species. For, since species are like numbers, in which
either the addition or the subtraction of unity changes the
species, if any addition be made to an already complete
species, the result must needs be another species. Thus, if
you add sensibility to a substance that is only animate, you
have another species : because animal and plant are dif-
ferent species. On the other hand something not belonging
to the integrity of the species may be found in an individual
of another species ; for instance white or clothed in Socrates
or Plato, or a sixth finger, and so forth. Consequently nothing
hinders things from being united in an individual, that
are not united in one complete species : for instance, human
nature, whiteness, and music in Socrates, and whatsoever
things may be united together in one subject. And, since
an individual substance is called a hypostasis, and an indi-
vidual rational substance is called a person, it is reasonable
to say that all these are united together in the hypostasis,
or person. Hence it is possible for things not to be united
in the nature, and yet united in the hypostasis or person.
Accordingly, taking the union of God and man in Christ
as a fact, heretics, disregarding the path of truth, have ex-
plained this fact in various ways. Some deemed this union
to be like the union of things in one nature. Such were
Arius and Apollinaris, who contended that the Word sup-
plied, in Christ's body, the place of the soul or mind. Such
also was Eutyches, who held the existence of the two
natures of God and man before the Incarnation, but of
only one after the Incarnation. But their view involves
an utter impossibility. For it is evident that the nature of
the Word, from all eternity, was most perfectly complete,
and wholly incorruptible and unchangeable. Therefore it
is impossible for anything extraneous to the divine nature,
166 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
such as human nature or a part of it, to be joined to the
Word in unity of nature.
Others, realizing the impossibility of this view, adopted
the contrary position. For when a thing of a certain
nature receives the addition of something that does not
belong to the integrity of its nature, this would seem
either to be an accident, such as whiteness or music, or to
bear an accidental relationship to that thing, such as a
ring, clothes, a house, and the like. Seeing then that
human nature is joined to the Word of God, and yet
does not belong to the integrity of His nature, they con-
cluded that human nature was united to the Word acci-
dentally. And since it is evident that it cannot be an
accident in the Word of God, both because in God there
cannot be any accidents, as we have proved, 1 and because
human nature, through being in the genus of substance,
cannot be the accident of anything ; it seemed to follow
that human nature was joined to the Word, not as an
accident, but as bearing an accidental relationship thereto.
Wherefore Nestorius maintained that Christ's human
nature was, as it were, the temple of the Word, so that
the union of the Word with human nature would be re-
duced to a kind of indwelling. And since a temple is
individually distinct from one who dwells in it, and since
individuality in human nature is personality, he concluded
that human nature and the Word had distinct person-
alities : so that the Word and the man were two persons.
In order to avoid this difficulty, others imagined
that human nature was so assumed that properly
speaking, it could have no personality. They said,
in effect, that the soul and body, in which the in-
tegrity of human nature consists, were assumed by the
Word in such a way, that the soul was not united to the
body so as to form a substance : and they said this lest
they should be forced to admit that the substance thus
formed was a person. They maintained that the Word is
united to the soul and body, as though these were related
1 Bk. I., ch. xxiii.
CHAPTER XLI 167
to it accidentally, even as clothes are related to the one
who is clothed : thus somewhat following in the footsteps
of Nestorius.
Since all this has been refuted above, 1 we must hold that
the union of the Word with man is such that neither are
the two natures fused into one; nor does the Word stand
related accidentally to human nature, as a substance — a
man for instance — to something extraneous, as, for in-
stance, his house or his clothes. But we hold that the
Word subsists in human nature, as made His own nature
by the Incarnation, so that the body is truly the body of
the Word of God, and the same with the soul : and that
the Word of God is truly man. And though man cannot
perfectly explain this union, we shall nevertheless en-
deavour as best we can to say something for the building
up of faith, so as to defend the Catholic Faith from the
attacks which unbelievers direct at this mystery.
In all created things nothing bears so great a re-
semblance to this union, as the union of soul and body.
Greater still would be the resemblance, as Augustine says
(Contra Felician.), were there but one intellect in all men,
as some indeed have maintained. If this were true we
should have to say that the already existing intellect would
become united to the human concept in such a way that
the two together would form one person, just as we say
that the already existing Word was joined to human
nature in one person. Hence, on account of this re-
semblance between the two unions, Athanasius says in his
Creed : As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God
and man are one Christ. Now the body is united to the
rational soul, both as the matter and as the instrument of
the soul. But the above resemblance does not regard the
former mode of union. For thus there would be one
nature made of God and man, since matter and form are
the proper constituents of the specific nature. The re-
semblance, therefore, regards the union of soul with the
body as its instrument. In fact, the statements of the early
1 Ch. xxxiv.
168 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Doctors are in agreement with this, who considered the
human nature in Christ to be an instrument of the God-
head, even as the body is the instrument of the soul. For
the body and its parts are the instruments of the soul
otherwise than extraneous instruments : thus a man's spade
is not so much his own instrument as his hand is, since
many can work with that spade, whereas that hand is
employed for the special work of that man's mind. Hence
a man's hand is an instrument united and proper to him,
whereas the spade is distinct from him and common to
many. Now let us apply this to the union of God with
man. All men in comparison with God are instruments
of His works, for it is God that worketh in you both to
will and to accomplish, according to his good will, as the
Apostle says (Philip, ii. 13). Now other men are em-
ployed by God as extraneous and separate instruments,
so to speak, since He moves them not only to their own
proper operations, but also to those that are common to
all rational creatures, such as understanding the truth,
loving what is good, doing what is right. But human
nature was assumed by Christ, that it might be an instru-
ment in works belonging to God alone, such as cleansing
from sins, enlightening our minds by grace, and perfect-
ing us unto eternal life. Accordingly Christ's human
nature is compared to God as a proper and united instru-
ment, as the hand is compared to the soul.
Nor is it out of keeping with the usual course of nature,
that a thing be naturally the proper instrument of that
which is not its form. Thus the tongue, as the instrument
of speech, is the proper instrument of the understanding,
and yet, as the Philosopher proves (3 De Anima), the
understanding is not the form of any part of the body. In
like manner, there may be an instrument that does not be-
long to the specific nature, and yet belongs to the individual
on the part of the matter, as, for instance, a sixth finger,
or something of the kind. In this way, therefore, nothing
prevents our saying that human nature by its union with
the Word became, as it were, the Word's instrument, not
CHAPTER XLII 169
separate but united : and yet human nature does not belong
to the nature of the Word, nor is the Word its form ; but
it does belong to the Person of the Word.
We must not, however, look for perfect resemblance in
the above examples. We must realize that the Word of
God was able to unite Himself to human nature in a
manner far more sublime and penetrative than that of the
union of the soul with any proper instrument whatsoever :
especially seeing that He is united to the whole human
nature through the intellect. And, although the Word of
God by His power penetrates all things, as preserving
and upholding them, it is possible for Him to be united
in a much more sublime and ineffable manner with intel-
lectual creatures, in as much as they are able properly to
enjoy Him and participate in Him.
CHAPTER XLII
THAT IT WAS MOST BECOMING TO THE WORD OF GOD
THAT HE SHOULD TAKE HUMAN NATURE
From what has been said it is clear that it was most be-
coming that the Person of the Word should assume human
nature.
Since the assumption of human nature was directed to
the salvation of mankind, and since the ultimate salvation
of man is that man should be perfected in his intellectual
faculty by the contemplation of the First Truth, it was
fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word
who proceeds from the Father by an intellectual emanation.
Again. There would seem to be a certain affinity between
the Word and human nature : since man derives his species
from his being rational. Now the Word is akin to reason ;
hence the Greek Aoyo? stands for word or reason. Therefore
the Word was most fittingly united to the rational nature :
since it is also on account of this affinity that Holy Scrip-
ture ascribes the expression image both to the Word and to
170 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
man. Thus the Apostle says that the Word is the image
of the invisible God (Coloss. i. 15), and that man . . . is
the image and glory of God (1 Cor. xi. 7).
Moreover. The Word bears a certain affinity not only to
rational nature, but also to all creatures in general : because
the Word contains the types of all things created by God,
just as the craftsman has in his mind the types of all his
handiwork. Accordingly, all creatures are just the real
expression and reproduction of the types contained in the
concept of the divine Word : for which reason all things are
said to have been made by Him. It was fitting, therefore,
that the Word should be united to a creature, namely human
nature.
CHAPTER XLIII
THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD DID NOT
EXIST BEFORE IT WAS ASSUMED, BUT WAS ASSUMED BY
THE WORD AT THE MOMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION
Since the Word assumed human nature into unity of
Person, as we have proved, 1 it follows that human nature
did not exist before it was united to the Word.
For, if it was already in existence, there must have
existed, before the union, an individual with that human
nature; because a nature cannot exist except in an indi-
vidual. Now an individual of human nature is a hypostasis
and a person. Consequently we shall have to say that the
human nature to be assumed by the Word pre-existed in
some hypostasis or person. Therefore if this already exist-
ing hypostasis or person remained after the nature was
assumed, there would have been two hypostases or persons,
one of the Word, the other, of a man : so that the union
would not have taken place in the hypostasis or person :
and this is against faith. On the other hand, if that hypo-
stasis or person did not remain in the nature wherein it
1 Ch. xli.
CHAPTER XLIII 171
existed before being assumed by the Word, it must have
been destroyed : for no individual can cease to be what it
is, without being corrupted. Hence this man who was in
existence before the union, must have been destroyed : and
consequently the human nature in Him must have been
destroyed also. Therefore it was impossible for the Word
to assume an already existing man, in unity of person.
Moreover. It would derogate from the perfection of the
Incarnation of the Word of God, if He lacked any of those
things that are natural to man. Now it is natural to man
to be born in human fashion : and the Word of God would
not have been born in human fashion if He had assumed
an already existing man. For this man would have been
a perfect man from his birth : and consequently his birth
could not be ascribed to the Word of God, nor would the
Blessed Virgin be called the mother of the Word. Now
our faith holds that He was like us in all natural things
save sin ; and that the Son of God, as the Apostle declares,
was made and born of a woman, and that the Virgin is the
Mother of God. Therefore it was not fitting that He should
assume an already existing man.
Hence it follows that He united human nature to Him-
self from the first moment of His conception. Just as it
behoved the Word of God to have a human birth, in order
to be a real natural man, like us in all natural things, so
was it fitting that He should have a human conception :
since in the order of nature a man is conceived before he
is born. Now, if the human nature about to be assumed
had existed in any state whatever before being united to
the Word, that conception could not be ascribed to the
Word of God, so that He might be said to have a human
conception. Therefore it behoved the Word of God to be
united to human nature from the very beginning of its
conception.
Again. In the generation of a human being, the active
form aims at completing human nature in a definite indi-
vidual. But, if the Word of God did not assume human
nature at the very beginning of its conception, the active
172 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
force, before the union, would have been directed to the
formation of another human individual, that is a human
hypostasis or person ; and, after the union, it would have
directed the whole process of generation to another hypo-
stasis or person, namely the Word of God, who was being
born in human nature. Accordingly, there would not have
been one generation, since it would have been directed to
two persons; nor would the whole process have been
uniform, and this would seem foreign to the order of nature.
Therefore it was fitting that the Word of God should
assume human nature, not after conception, but at the
moment of conception.
Further. The order of human generation would seem to
demand that the same one should be born as was con-
ceived, and not another : seeing that conception is directed
to birth. Consequently, if the Son of God had a human
birth, it was fitting that He should have a human concep-
tion, and not assume an already existing man.
CHAPTER XLIV
THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD WAS
PERFECT IN BODY AND SOUL AT THE MOMENT OF CON-
CEPTION
Hence it follows that the rational soul was united to the
body at the very beginning of the conception.
The Word of God assumed the body through the medium
of the rational soul : because the human body is not more
adapted to be assumed by God than other bodies, except
on account of the rational soul. Therefore the Word of
God did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since
then the Word of God assumed the body at the very
moment of its conception, it follows that at that very
moment the rational soul was united to the body.
Again. Given that which comes later in the process of
generation, we must grant what comes before in that pro-
CHAPTER XLIV 173
cess. Now the last thing in the process of generation is
a complete being, and this complete being is the individual
thing generated, which in human generation is a hypostasis
or person for the completion of which both a soul and body
are required. Given, then, the personality of the man that
is begotten, both rational soul and body must be in exist-
ence. Now the personality of the man Christ is no other
than the personality of the Word of God : and the Word
of God took to Himself a human body in the very moment
of conception. Therefore the personality of that man was
there : and consequently the rational soul must have been
there also.
It would, moreover, have been unbecoming for the Word,
who is the fount and origin of all perfections and forms, to
be united to that which lacked form and natural perfection.
Now a body in the making is, before animation, without
form and natural perfection. Therefore it was unfitting for
the Word of God to be united to a body without a soul : and
consequently it behoved that soul to be united to the body
from the very beginning of conception.
From this we may also conclude that the body assumed,
was formed from the very beginning of its conception, since
it was not meet for the Word of God to assume anything
unformed. Now the soul, like any natural form, requires
its proper matter : and the proper matter of the soul is a
body with organs, since the soul is the active principle of
a physical, organic body that is potentially a living being.
Hence if, as already proved, 1 the soul, from the first
moment of conception, was united to the body, it follows
that this same body had limbs and form from the first
moment of conception. Even in the order of generation
the body is limbed before the advent of the rational soul :
so that if this latter has taken place, the former must have
taken place already. Nor is there any reason why the body
should not continue to grow until it has reached its appointed
stage of development, even after the advent of the soul.
Accordingly, with regard to the man assumed, we must
1 Ch. xliii.
i74 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
hold that at the first moment of His conception, His body
was limbed and formed, though it was not yet fully
developed.
CHAPTER XLV
THAT IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE BORN
OF A VIRGIN
Hence it follows that it behoved this man to be born of a
virgin mother, without natural seed.
The seed of the male is required as the active principle in
human generation, on account of the active power it con-
tains. Now, according to what has been said, the active
power, in the generation of Christ, could not be natural,
since the natural power does not instantly cause the entire
formation of the body, but needs time for that purpose : and
the body of Christ was formed and limbed from the first
moment of its conception, as we have proved. 1 Therefore
the human generation of Christ was without natural seed.
Again. In the generation of any animals whatsoever
the seed of the male draws to itself the matter provided
by the female : as though the power therein contained
aimed at its own perfection as the end of the whole process
of generation : hence, as soon as this process is complete,
the seed itself, developed and complete, is the offspring
that is born. Now, in the human generation of Christ,
the ultimate term of generation was union with the divine
Person, but not the formation of a human person or hypo-
stasis, as proved above. 2 Therefore, in this generation,
the active principle could not be the seed of a man, but the
power of God alone, so that even as, in the ordinary
generation of man, the seed of the male attracts to itself
the matter provided by the female, so, in the generation of
Christ, the Word of God took the same matter into union
with Himself.
In like manner it is clear that even in the human genera-
1 Ch. xliv. » Ch. xli.
CHAPTER XLV 175
tion of God's Word, there should be evidence of some
property of the spiritual generation of the Word. Now
a word, as produced by the utterer, whether by interior
concept, or by outward speech, causes no detriment to the
utterer, rather indeed does it perfect him. Therefore it
was fitting that, in the process of His human generation,
the Word of God should be so conceived and born, that the
integrity of His Mother should remain intact. Besides it
clearly behoved the Word of God, by whom all things
were made and preserved in their integrity, to be born in
such a manner that His Mother's integrity remained
wholly unimpaired. Consequently it was fitting that He
should be born of a virgin.
Nor is this manner of generation derogatory to the true
and natural human nature of Christ, although He was
begotten otherwise than other men. For, seeing that
God's power is infinite, as proved above, 1 and that all
causes derive from it their power of producing an effect,
it is evident that any effect whatsoever that is produced by
any cause can, in the same species and nature, be pro-
duced by God, without the aid of that cause. Wherefore,
just as the natural power in human seed produces a real
man, having the human species and nature, so too the
divine power which endowed the seed with that power,
can produce the effects of that power, without its assistance,
by forming a real man, having the human species and
nature.
Someone, however, may object that, to be begotten
naturally, a man's body must be fashioned naturally from
the seed of a man, and from whatever it is that the woman
supplies ; and therefore Christ's body was not of the same
nature as ours, if it was not begotten of a man's seed.
But this objection is easily answered according to Aris-
totle's opinion, 2 who held that the seed of the male does
not form a substantial part of the embryo, but is merely
the active principle; and that the whole matter of the
body is supplied by the mother. Accordingly, as regards
1 Bk. I., ch. xliii. * I De Gener. Animal.
176 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
its matter, Christ's body differs not from ours : because
our bodies also are formed from the material supplied by
the mother.
But even if one were not to admit this opinion of
Aristotle, the above objection would not stand. For like-
ness or unlikeness, as regards matter, depends not on
the condition of the matter at the beginning of genera-
tion, but on its condition when generation is terminated :
thus air generated from earth does not differ from air
generated from water, because though earth and water
differ at the beginning of the process, the action of the
generator brings them to a same state of being. Accord-
ingly, the material that is taken from the woman only,
can by God's power be brought to the same state, when
the process of generation is terminated, as would result
were the material taken from both man and woman. Con-
sequently there will be no unlikeness through difference of
material, between Christ's body which was formed by
God's power, from material taken from His mother only,
and our bodies which are formed by Nature's power,
although the material from which they are fashioned is
taken from both parents. Thus the slime of the earth
from which God formed the first man (who without doubt
was a real man, and like us in every way) surely differs
more from the material taken from both parents, than does
the material taken from the woman only, from which
Christ's body was formed.
Consequently Christ's birth of a virgin is nowise dero-
gatory either to the reality of His human nature, or to
His likeness to us. For, although the forces of nature
require definite material for a definite effect to be produced
therefrom, the power of God, that can produce all things
out of nothing, is not confined, in His action, to definite
material. Neither does it derogate from the dignity of
Christ's Mother, that she was a virgin both in conceiving
and in giving birth, so as to forbid us to hail her as the
true and natural Mother of God's Son. Through the
agency of the divine power she supplied the natural matter
CHAPTER XLVI 177
for the generation of Christ's body : and this is all that is
required on the mother's part. Whereas all that conduces
to the loss of virginity in other mothers is directed, not to
motherhood, but to fatherhood, its purpose being that the
seed of the male may reach the place adapted for genera-
tion.
CHAPTER XLVI
THAT CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED BY THE HOLY GHOST
Although every divine work that has its effect among
creatures is common to all the Trinity, as we have shown
above, 1 the fashioning of Christ's body by divine power,
although common to the three Persons, is fittingly ascribed
to the Holy Ghost.
This is, seemingly, becoming to the Incarnation of the
Word. For, just as our word, which is conceived in our
mind, is invisible but becomes perceptible to the senses
when it is spoken; so the Word of God is invisible as
regards His eternal generation in the bosom of the Father,
but became visible to us through the Incarnation. Where-
fore the Incarnation of God's Word is like the vocal utter-
ance of our word. Now we give expression to our word
by means of the breath (per spiritum) whereby we form
words expressive of our thoughts. It is therefore fitting
that the flesh of the Son of God should be formed by His
Spirit. This is also in keeping with human generation.
For the active power of human seed is actuated by the
spirit in drawing to itself the material provided by the
mother; the same power being derived from the spirit
whose purity accounts for the whiteness of the foam-like
semen. Accordingly, when the Word of God took to
Himself a body from a virgin, it was fitting that this
body should be fashioned by the Holy Ghost.
This was also fitting, as indicating the motive of the
1 Bk. IV., ch. xxi.
12
178 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Incarnation of God's Word. For this motive could be
no other but God's love for man whose nature He wished
to unite to Himself in unity of person. Now, in God, it
is the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love, as proved above. 1
Therefore the work of the Incarnation is fittingly ascribed
to the Holy Ghost.
Moreover, Holy Scripture is wont to ascribe all graces
to the Holy Ghost; because that which is freely given
would seem to be bestowed through the love of the
giver. Now no grace has been bestowed on man greater
than his union with the divine Person. Therefore this
work is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.
CHAPTER XLVII
THAT CHRIST WAS NOT THE SON OF THE HOLY GHOST
ACCORDING TO THE FLESH
Although we speak of Christ as having been conceived by
the Holy Ghost and the Virgin, the Holy Ghost cannot be
called His father, in respect of His human generation, as
the Virgin is called His Mother.
For the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature
in Christ out of His own substance, but by His power alone
was He the active principle in its production. Conse-
quently the Holy Ghost cannot be called Christ's father in
respect of His human generation.
Moreover we should be led to a false conclusion if Christ
were called the son of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that
the Word of God has a distinct personality in as much as
He is the Son of God the Father. Hence, if He were called
son of the Holy Ghost, according to his human nature, we
might conclude that Christ was two sons : since the Word
of God cannot be the son of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore,
since sonship refers to the person and not to the nature, it
would follow that there are two persons in Christ, which
1 Ch. xix.
CHAPTER XLVIII 179
is contrary to the Catholic Faith. It would also be un-
fitting if the Father's authority and name were transferred
to another Person : and this would be the case if the Holy
Ghost were called the Father of Christ.
CHAPTER XLVIII
THAT WE MUST NOT SAY THAT CHRIST IS A CREATURE
It is also evident that, although the human nature assumed
by the Word is a creature, it cannot be said, without quali-
fication, that Christ is a creature.
To be created is to be made. Now, since being made
terminates in being simply, it belongs to that which has
substantial being, and this is the complete individual sub-
stance, which, if it be of intellectual nature, is called a
person or again a hypostasis. On the other hand forms,
accidents, even parts are not said to be made, save in
reference to something, because they are not self-subsistent,
but subsist in something else ; hence, when a thing is made
white, it is said to be made, not simply, but relatively.
Now in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person besides
that of the Word of God, who is uncreated, as proved
above. 1 Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is a
creature ; although we can say so, with a qualification ; for
instance, that He is a creature, as man, or in respect of His
human nature. Now, although the statement that an indi-
vidual substance is made one of its proper attributes — acci-
dents, for instance, or parts — cannot be made simply, but
only relatively ; nevertheless we can predicate of a subject
simply whatever results naturally and appropriately from
its accidents or parts : thus seeing is predicated of a man
simply, as a consequence of his having eyes : curly haired,
by reason of his hair, and visible, because he is coloured.
Hence whatsoever results properly from human nature can
be predicated simply of Christ; for instance, that He is a
1 Ch. xxxviii.
i8o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
man, that He is visible, that He walked, and so on : where-
as, whatsoever is proper to the Person cannot be attributed
to Christ in reference to His human nature, except with
a qualification, expressed or implied.
CHAPTER XLIX
REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST
THE INCARNATION
Bearing these things in mind, we can now easily reply to
the above objections 1 against faith in the Incarnation.
We have shown that the Incarnation of the Word does
not mean that the Word was changed into flesh, or united
to the body as its form. 2 Therefore from the fact that the
Word became incarnate, it does not follow, as the first
objection maintained, that God is really a body, or a bodily
power.
Likewise, from the fact that the Word assumed human
nature, we cannot conclude that He was substantially
changed. No change took place in God's Word Himself,
but only in the human nature assumed by the Word. It
was in reference to that nature that the Word was both
begotten and born in the course of time, but not in reference
to Himself.
The third objection proves nothing. A hypostasis does
not extend beyond the nature from which it has its sub-
sistence. Now the Word of God does not derive subsistence
from human nature ; nay rather He draws human nature to
His own subsistence or personality : since He subsists, not
through it, but in it. Hence nothing prevents the Word
of God from being everywhere, although the human nature
assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.
This helps us to reply to the fourth objection. Every sub-
sistent thing must have but one nature, through which it
has being simply : wherefore the Word of God has being
1 Ch. xl. ■ Ch. xli.
CHAPTER XLIX 181
simply, through the divine nature alone, and not through
human nature. It is owing to the latter that He has a
particular kind of being, namely that He is a man.
The fifth objection is solved in the same way. It is im-
possible that the nature through which the Word subsists,
be other than the Person of the Word. Now He subsists
through the divine and not through the human nature :
drawing the latter to His own subsistence, so as to subsist
therein, as we said before. It does not follow, then, that
the human nature is identified with the Person of the Word.
Wherefore the sixth objection also is answered. For the
hypostasis is less simple, either in reality or as existing in
the mind, than the nature whereby it has being ; — in reality,
when the hypostasis is not its own nature ; in the mind only,
in those things where the hypostasis is identical with the
nature. Now the hypostasis of the Word is not
constituted simply by human nature, so as to exist
by it : by it, the Word had this only, that He was a man.
Hence it does not follow that the human nature is more
simple than the Word, considered as Word, but only in as
much as the Word is this man.
Hence follows the reply to the seventh objection. It
does not follow that the hypostasis of God's Word is simply
constituted by signate matter : but only in as much as He
is this man. For it is only in this sense that He is consti-
tuted by human nature, as stated above.
That the human soul and body in Christ were drawn into
the personality of the Word, without constituting another
person besides the Person of the Word proves, not that
they were less effective, but that they had greater excellence.
For a thing has better being, when united to its betters,
than when it is by itself : thus the sensitive soul has better
being in man than in other animals : in these it is the
principal form, but not in man.
Hence again we gather the reply to the ninth objection.
This soul and this body were truly in Christ, and yet they
did not give Him another personality from that of the
Word of God, since they were assumed into the personality
1 82 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
of the divine Word. Even so the body, when it is without
the soul, has its own species : but when it is united to the
soul, it takes its species from the soul.
Hereby is indicated the reply to the tenth objection. It
is clear that this man Christ is a substance, not a universal
but a particular, substance : also that He is a hypostasis,
and yet not a distinct hypostasis from that of the Word :
because human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of
the Word, that the Word might subsist in the human as
well as in the divine nature. Now that which subsists in
human nature is an individual man. Therefore, when we
say, This man, the Word is indicated. — If however some-
one were to apply this same argument to human nature, so
as to say that it is a substance, not universal, but particular,
and consequently a hypostasis, he would clearly be in the
wrong. For human nature, even in Socrates or Plato, is not
a hypostasis : it is that which subsists in human nature that
is a hypostasis. When it is said that it is a substance, and
a particular substance, the sense is not the same as when
we say that a hypostasis is a particular substance. Accord-
ing to the Philosopher, 1 substance has a twofold significa-
tion. In the first place it may indicate a subject in the
genus of substance, namely a hypostasis ; secondly, it may
mean what a thing is, namely its nature. Nor are the
parts of a substance called particular substances as though
they subsisted of themselves : but they subsist in the whole.
Hence they cannot be called hypostases, seeing that none
of them is a complete substance : otherwise there would be
as many hypostases in a man as there are parts.
The eleventh objection is answered thus. Equivocation
consists in applying the same name to various forms,
but not to different supposits. Thus there is no equivoca-
tion if man stands at one time for Plato, at another time
for Socrates. Accordingly, the term man, whether applied
to Christ or to other men, always indicates the same form,
namely human nature, and consequently the predication
here is univocal. The only way in which it has a different
1 5 Metaph., viii.
CHAPTER L 183
signification is that when it is applied to Christ, it stands
for the uncreated hypostasis, whereas when it is applied
to other men, it stands for the created hypostasis.
And yet the hypostasis of the Word is not said to be the
supposit of the human nature, as though it were the
subject, and the latter were its form, as the twelfth objec-
tion suggested. This would indeed be necessary, if the
hypostasis of the Word were constituted in being simply,
by the human nature, which we have shown to be false.
The hypostasis of the Word is said to be the supposit
of human nature, as drawing it to His own subsistence;
even as a thing is drawn to something better, to which it
is united.
From the fact that the Word already existed from
eternity, it does not follow that human nature is joined to
the Word accidentally, as the last objection concluded.
The Word assumed human nature in order to be truly
man. Now to be a man is to be a kind of substance.
Since then the hypostasis of the Word is a man through
being united to human nature, this nature is not joined
to Him accidentally : for accidents do not give substantial
being.
CHAPTER L
THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED BY OUR FIRST
PARENT TO HIS POSTERITY
In the preceding chapters we have shown there is nothing
impossible in what the Catholic Faith affirms concerning the
Incarnation of the Son of God : and consequently we must
now show that it was fitting for the Son of God to take to
Himself human nature. Seemingly, the Apostle assigns as a
reason of this fittingness, original sin which was contracted
by all men. Thus he says (Rom. v. 19) : As by the disobedi-
ence of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the
obedience of one, many shall be made just. Since, how-
ever, the Pelagian heretics denied original sin, we must
1 84 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
prove that men are born in original sin. In the first
place we must quote the words of Gen. ii. 15, 17 : The
Lord God took man, and put him into paradise . . . And
he commanded him saying: Of every tree of paradise thou
shall eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat
of it, thou shalt die the death. Seeing, however, that
Adam did not actually die on the very day on which he
ate, the words, Thou shalt die the death must be under-
stood to mean, Thou shalt be under the ban of death.
Now there would be no purpose in saying this if man
were created with the necessity of dying. Consequently
we must say that death and the necessity of dying is a
punishment inflicted on man for sin. Now a punishment is
not inflicted justly except on those who are guilty. There-
fore in all who are thus punished there must be some
guilt. Now all men are punished thus, even from the
moment of their birth : for as soon as he is born man is
under the ban of death, so that some die as soon as they
are born, and are taken from the womb to the grave.
Therefore some kind of sin is in them. But this is not
actual sin, for infants have not the use of free-will, with-
out which no sin is imputed to a man, as appears from
what we have stated above. 1 We must conclude, then,
that they have contracted original sin.
This is expressly indicated in the words of the Apostle
(Rom. v. 12) : As by one man sin entered into this world,
and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in
whom all have sinned. Now it cannot be said that by one
man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, be-
cause in that case sin would only enter into those who, by
sinning, imitate the first man ; and since through sin death
entered into the world, only those would die who sin in
imitation of the first man. But the Apostle excludes this
interpretation when he goes on to say (verse 14) : Death
reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have
not sinned, after the similitude of the transgression of
1 Bk. III., chs. cxxix. seq.
CHAPTER L 185
Adam. Hence the Apostle did not mean that by one man
sin entered into the world by way of imitation, but by
way of origin. Moreover, if the Apostle were speaking
of the entrance of sin into the world by mere imitation,
he would have said that sin had entered into the world by
the devil rather than by one man. Thus it is said explicitly
(Wis. ii. 24, 25) : By the envy of the devil, death came into
the world: and they follow him that are of his side.
Again. David says (Ps. 1. 7) : Behold I was conceived
in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me.
Now this cannot refer to actual sin, seeing that David
was conceived and born of lawful wedlock. Therefore his
words must refer to original sin.
Moreover. It is said (Job xiv. 4) : Who can make him
clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou
who only art? Whence it is clearly to be gathered that
man contracts uncleanness through being conceived of
seed. And this must refer to the uncleanness of sin, for
which alone is man brought into judgement : because the
preceding verse reads : And dost thou think it meet to
open thy eyes upon such an one, and to bring him into
judgement with thee? Therefore man from his very origin
contracts a guilt that is called original sin.
Again. Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church
are remedies for sin, as we shall prove further on.
Now it is the universal custom of the Church to give
baptism to children soon after birth. Consequently there
would be no purpose in doing so unless they were stained
with some sin. But this is not actual sin, because they
have no free-will without which no one is accounted guilty
of sin. Therefore, since God and the Church do nothing
without a purpose, we must conclude that they have con-
tracted original sin. Someone, however, may say that
infants are baptized, not that they may be cleansed from
sin, but that they may enter the kingdom of heaven. For
they cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless they are
baptized : since our Lord said (Jo. iii. 5) : Unless a man
be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot
1 86 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
enter into the kingdom of heaven. But this objection is
futile. No one is excluded from the kingdom of God, save
on account of sin. For the end of every rational creature
is to obtain beatitude, which is nowhere but in God's king-
dom. And this kingdom is the orderly society of those
who enjoy the vision of God, wherein true beatitude con-
sists, as proved above. 1 Now nothing fails to obtain its
end except through some sin. Therefore, if children
before being baptized, cannot enter into the kingdom of
God, we must admit that there is some sin in them : and
consequently, according to the teaching of Catholic faith,
we must hold that men are born with original sin.
CHAPTER LI
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORIGINAL SIN
There are, however, some points that would seem to be in
contradiction with the truth. One man's sin is not im-
puted to others : wherefore it is said (Ezech. xviii. 19) :
The son beareth not the iniquity of his father. 2 The reason
for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed for that
which is not in our power. Now those things are in our
power, that we do freely. Therefore the sin of the first
man is not imputed to all mankind.
Someone, however, might reply that through one man
sinning, all men sinned in him, as the Apostle seems to
say (Rom. v. 19) : and thus it is not a case of one man's
sin being imputed to another. Yet, seemingly, this reply
is not conclusive ; because when Adam sinned, those who
were born of him were not yet in existence; they only
existed virtually as in their first origin. Now only one
who is actually in existence can sin, since to sin is to act.
Therefore we did not all sin in Adam. And if it be said
that we sinned in Adam, in the sense that he transmitted
1 Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. seqq.
* Vulg., Why hath not the son borne, etc.
CHAPTER LI 187
his sin to us together with our nature; this again is
apparently impossible. An accident does not pass from
one subject to another, and therefore it cannot be trans-
mitted, unless its subject be transmitted. Now the sub-
ject of sin is the rational soul, which is not transmitted to
us from our first parent, but is created by God for each one
separately, as we have proved. 1 Therefore sin cannot be
transmitted to us from Adam through our origin.
Again. If other men contract sin from their first parent,
because they trace their origin to him, it would seem that
Christ must have been subject to original sin, seeing that
He also traces His origin to him : and this is contrary to
faith.
Moreover. That which a thing receives through its
natural origin, is natural to it : and that which is natural
to a thing is not its fault : thus it is not a mole's fault that
it is blind. Therefore sin could not be contracted from the
first man by other men. If someone reply that sin is
transmitted from the first parent to his posterity through
their origin, considered not as natural but as vitiated ; this
reply will not stand. A fault does not occur in nature's
work, except through a fault in a natural principle : thus a
defect in the seed of animals leads to the birth of mon-
strosities. Now we cannot assign any defect of a natural
principle in human seed. Consequently a vitiated origin
cannot account for the transmission of original sin from
our first parent to his posterity.
Again. Faults in the works of nature, due to a defective
principle, do not occur always or even frequently, but in
the minority of cases. Therefore, if sin is transmitted by
the first parent to his posterity through a vitiated origin,
it will be contracted, not by all, but by a few.
Further. If a vitiated generation occasions the transmis-
sion of a defect to the offspring, this defect must be of the
same kind as the fault in the origin, because like effects
have like causes. Now the origin or generation of man is
an act of the generating power, which has no part in the
1 Bk. II., ch. Ixxxvi.
1 88 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
reason ; and consequently it cannot be the subject of a fault
of a sinful kind, since virtue and vice can only be in acts
that are to some extent subject to reason : thus a man is
not blamed if, on account of a vitiated generation, he is
born a leper or blind. Therefore it is quite impossible
for a culpable fault to be transmitted from the first parent
to his posterity, through a vitiated generation.
Again. Sin does not destroy the good of nature : where-
fore natural good remains even in the demons, according
to Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv.). Now generation is an
act of nature. Therefore human generation could not be
vitiated by the first man's sin, in such a way that his sin
would be transmitted to his posterity.
Moreover. Man begets his like in species. Hence a
son is not necessarily like his parents in things that are not
connected with the nature of the species. Now sin has no
connection with the specific nature, since it is not accord-
ing to nature; in fact, it is a corruption of the natural order.
Therefore it does not follow that, because the first man
sinned, other sinners should be born of him.
Again. Children take after their proximate rather than
their remote progenitors. Now it may happen that the
immediate progenitors are sinless, and commit no sin in
the act of procreation. Therefore all men are not born
sinners on account of the sin of their first parent.
Besides, if sin was transmitted by the first man to his
posterity, since good is more effective in its action than
evil, as we have proved, 1 much more were Adam's re-
pentance and righteousness transmitted by him to others.
Moreover. If the sin of the first man is transmitted to
his posterity by generation, for the same reason the sins
of other parents are transmitted to their children. Thus
the burden of sin would be greater in the later descendants
than in the first. And this would be the case all the more
if sin were transmitted from parent to child, whereas re-
pentance cannot be transmitted.
1 Bk. III., ch. xii.
CHAPTER LII 189
CHAPTER LII
REPLY TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS
We must, in the first place, observe that there are certain
probable signs of original sin in the human race. For
since God watches over men's actions, so as to assign
rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as
we have already shown, 1 we can conclude that where there
is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human
race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual.
Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all
others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger,
thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal
is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters
difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily
falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome
his animal propensities, which sometimes even obscure his
mental vision. Someone however might reply that these
defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but
natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the con-
ditions of matter. For the human body, being composed
of contrary elements, must needs be corruptible; and the
sensitive appetite must needs incline to things in which the
senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason.
Again, the possible intellect is in potentiality to all things
intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its
very nature to acquire them through the senses, and there-
fore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is
easily led astray by the imagination.
Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will
appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having
fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God
has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the
former might dominate the latter, and, should any obstacle
to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God by
a special and supernatural act of kindness would remove it.
1 Bk. III., ch. cxl.
igo THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Wherefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature
than the body, we believe that it was united to the body
under such conditions, that there can be nothing in the
body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives : and in
like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual
appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not
hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary,
dominates them. Hence, according to the teaching of
faith, we affirm that man was, from the beginning, so
fashioned that as long as his reason was subject to God,
not only would his lower powers serve him without hin-
drance; but there would be nothing in his body to lessen
its subjection ; since whatever was lacking in nature to
bring this about God by His grace would supply. Whereas
no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his
lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body
became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it
receives from the soul. Accordingly, although these defects
seem natural to man absolutely, if we consider his nature
from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine
providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man's
nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that
these defects are penal, and consequently that the human
race was originally infected with sin. Having made these
remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections.
It is not unreasonable, as the first objection affirmed, to
say that because one man sinned all men have contracted
sin through their origin, although each one is praised or
blamed for his own actions. For we must not speak in the
same way of things that regard the individual, as of things
that regard the nature of the whole species : because, as
Porphyry says, 1 by sharing the same species, many men
are like one man. Accordingly, a sin belonging to one
individual or person, is not imputed to the fault of any
other but the sinner, because they are different persons.
But if there be a sin that pertains to the whole specific
nature, it is not unreasonable that it be transmitted from
1 Praedicab. ch. De specie.
CHAPTER LII 191
one man to another, even as the specific nature is. Now
sin is an evil of the rational nature, and evil is the privation
of good, and, consequently, if we are to judge whether a
certain sin pertains to the common nature or to a particular
person, we must see what good it deprives one of. Accord-
ingly, actual sins which are committed by mankind in
general, deprive the person of the sinner of a good, such
as grace and the right order among the parts of the soul :
consequently they are personal sins, and when one man-
sins, another is not blamed. On the other hand, the first
sin of the first man deprived the sinner not only of his own
personal good — namely, grace and due order in the soul,
but also of the good belonging to the common nature.
For, as we said above, 1 human nature was so fashioned
when it was first brought into being that the lower powers
were perfectly subject to the soul, the reason to God, and
the body to the soul, God supplying by grace that which
nature lacked for the purpose. Now this boon, which
some call original justice, was bestowed on the first man
in such wise that he was to transmit it together with human
nature to his posterity. But when the first man sinned, his
reason rebelled against God, and the consequence was that
his lower powers ceased to be perfectly subject to reason,
and his body to his soul. And this, not only in the first
man that sinned, but also in his posterity, who were to
have inherited the aforesaid original justice. Hence the
sin of the first man, from whom all others are descended,
according to the teaching of faith, was not only a personal
sin, in so far as it deprived the first man himself of his own
good, but also a sin of nature, in as much as the result of
that sin was that both he and his posterity were deprived
of a gift bestowed on the entire nature. Wherefore this
defect transmitted by our first parent to others, is culpable
also in those others, in as much as all men are reckoned as
one man, through sharing in one common nature. And
this sin proves to be voluntary in reference to the will of
our first parent, just as the hand's deed may be sinful, on
1 Bk. III., ch. lxxxi.
192 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
account of the will of the first mover — namely, the reason :
so that in reference to the sin of nature we look upon the
members of the human race as being parts of the common
nature, just as in the case of a personal sin there are various
parts in one man.
Accordingly, it is true to say with the Apostle (Rom. v.
19) that, because one man sinned, all others sinned in him,
as the second argument 1 stated : not that other men were
actually in him, but virtually, as in their first origin. Nor
are they said to have sinned in him by their own deed, but
as sharing in his nature which was corrupted by sin.
The third objection argued thus : If sin is transmitted
by our first parent to his posterity, seeing that the rational
soul is the subject of sin, it follows that the rational soul
is transmitted together with the semen. But this does not
follow. This sin of nature, which we call original sin, is
transmitted in the same way as the specific nature, and
although the rational soul completes that nature, it is not
transmitted with the semen : the body alone is thus trans-
mitted, being naturally adapted to receive such a soul, as
proved above. 3
Although, according to the flesh, Christ was descended
from our first parent, he did not contract the stain of
original sin, as the fourth objection argued : because from
our first parent he received only the matter of a human
body, and the power which fashioned his body was not
derived from our first parent, but from the Holy Ghost,
as we have proved. 3 Consequently he received human
nature from Adam, not as from its efficient cause, but as
from its material principle.
We must also note that the reason why these defects are
transmitted to us through our natural origin, is that our
nature is deprived of the assistance of grace, bestowed on
it in our first parent, and destined, together with nature,
to be transmitted to his posterity : and since this privation
was the consequence of his deliberate sin, the defects result-
ing therefrom took the form of sin. Accordingly, these
1 Ch. 1. 2 Bk. II., ch. lxxxvi. 3 Ch. xlvi.
CHAPTER LII 193
defects are both culpable in reference to their first prin-
ciple, which was Adam's sin, and natural, in reference
to nature already destitute : wherefore the Apostle says
(Eph. ii. 3) : We were by nature children of wrath. Thus
the fifth objection is answered.
Thus it is clear that the vicious origin which is the cause
of original sin, is due to the lack of a principle — namely
the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its
creation. In a sense this gift was natural, not because it
resulted from the principles of nature, but because it was
bestowed on man in such a way that it was to be trans-
mitted by him together with his nature : the sixth objection
took natural as signifying that which results from natural
principles.
In the same sense the seventh objection speaks of the
defect of a natural principle as belonging to the specific
nature : and it is true that whatever results from this defect
occurs in the minority of cases. But the defect of original
sin results from our being deprived of a principle that is
additional to the principles of the species, as stated above.
We must also observe that the act of the generative power
cannot be an actual sin, for this depends on the will of the
individual, whereas the act of the generative power is not
obedient to reason or the will, as the eighth objection
argued. But original sin pertains to nature ; so that there
is nothing to prevent its being in the act of the generative
power, seeing that such acts are said to be natural.
The ninth objection can easily be solved from what has
been said. By sin man is not deprived of the natural good
which belongs to his specific nature : but he could, by the
sin of his first parent, be deprived of the gratuitous good
bestowed on his nature, as already stated.
Again, from what we have been saying, we can easily
reply to the tenth objection. Since being deprived and
being in want are correlatives, it follows that children
resemble their parents as regards original sin, in as much
as the gift bestowed on nature in the beginning would
have been transmitted by parents to their posterity.
13
194 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Although this gift was not included in the species, never-
theless, it was given by God gratuitously to the first man,
that he might transmit it to the entire species. In the same
way the sin which caused man to lose that good is trans-
mitted to the whole species. We must also observe that
although a man is cleansed from original sin by the sacra-
ments of grace, so that it ceases to be imputed to him as a
sin, this cleansing regards him personally ; nor is he
entirely healed : whereas original sin is transmitted to pos-
terity by an act of nature. Accordingly, even though there
be no original sin in the one who generates, considered as
an individual, and though there may be no sin in the act
of generation, as the eleventh objection suggested, never-
theless, original sin, through infecting the nature, infects
both the generator, who is nature's principle of generation,
and the act whereby he generates.
Again we must note that the actual sin of the first man
affected the whole nature, because on account of the gift
bestowed on it this nature was still perfect : but when this
nature, through his sin, was deprived of that gift, his act
became simply natural. Hence by his act he could neither
satisfy for the whole nature, nor restore the gift of nature :
but he could only make satisfaction, to a certain extent, for
himself. This suffices as a reply to the twelfth objection.
In like manner the thirteenth objection is solved. When
subsequent parents sin, nature is already deprived of the
gift originally bestowed on it : and consequently their sin
does not cause a defect to be transmitted to their posterity,
but only one that affects them personally.
Accordingly, it is neither unfitting nor unreasonable that
men should have contracted original sin, as the Pelagian
heresy which denied original sin declared.
CHAPTER LIU 195
CHAPTER LIII
ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT IT WAS
NOT FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD BE INCARNATE
Since unbelievers look upon the doctrine of the Incarna-
tion as folly, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor.
i. 21), It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching
to save them that believe, and whereas it is foolish to preach
not only what is impossible, but also what is unfitting, they
attack the Incarnation not only on the ground that Catholic
faith teaches what is impossible, but also because it is un-
reasonable and unbecoming the divine goodness. It be-
comes the divine goodness that all things should retain
their order. Now the order of things requires that God
should be exalted above all, and that man's place should
be among the lower creatures. Therefore it becomes not
the divine majesty to be united to human nature.
Again. If it were fitting that God should become man,
this must have been on account of some consequent benefit.
But whatever this benefit was, God, since He is almighty,
could have brought it about by His mere will. Seeing
then that whatever is done fittingly, should be done as
quickly as possible, it was not fitting that God should unite
human nature to Himself, for the sake of that benefit.
Further. Since God is the universal cause of all, it
behoves Him especially to seek the good of the universe.
But the assumption of human nature pertains only to the
good of man. Therefore, if it behoved God to take some
other nature, it was not fitting that He should take human
nature only.
Moreover. The more things are like to each other, the
more fittingly are they united together. Now the angelic
nature is more like and akin to God than human nature is.
Therefore it was not fitting that God should pass over
the angelic nature and be united to human nature.
Again. If God took human nature, this would seem to
1 96 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
provide an obstacle to man's understanding of the truth,
which in him is a principle of knowledge. For he would
be liable to fall into the error of those who deny that God
is exalted above all bodies. Therefore it was of no profit
to human nature that it should be assumed by God.
Moreover. We know by experience that many errors
have arisen concerning the Incarnation. Therefore it
would seem that it was not good for man's salvation that
God should become incarnate.
Again. Of all God's works the Incarnation is apparently
the greatest. Now one would expect that the greatest work
would be productive of the greatest benefit. Hence if the
Incarnation of God was directed to the salvation of all, it
would seem fitting that He should have saved the whole
human race : in fact, the salvation of all men would seem
a fitting result to expect from so great a work.
Further. If God took human nature in order to save
mankind, it would seem proper that His divine nature
should have been made clear to men by adequate signs.
Now this apparently was not the case, since other men, by
God's power alone, and without God being united to their
nature, worked miracles like those that Christ worked, and
even greater. Therefore God's Incarnation seemingly did
not provide sufficiently for man's salvation.
Again. If it was necessary for man's salvation, that
God should take flesh ; seemingly He ought to have taken
human nature at the very beginning of the world, and not
towards the end of time, seeing that there have been men
since the world's beginning : for it would seem that the
salvation of all previous men was neglected.
Further. For the same reason He ought to have con-
tinued to dwell with men until the end of the world, so as
to teach and guide men by His presence.
Moreover. It is most profitable to man that His hope of
future bliss should have a strong foundation. Now God
incarnate would have inspired man with this hope much
more, had He taken an immortal, impassible, and glorious
flesh, and shown it to all men. Therefore, seemingly, it
CHAPTER LIII 197
was unfitting that He took a body subject to death and
infirmities.
Moreover. It would seem proper that He should have
enjoyed an abundance of worldly possessions, and have
lived in the midst of wealth and the highest honours in
order to show that all the things in the world come from
God. Nevertheless we are told that the contrary was the
case, that He lived the life of a poor and humble man, and
suffered a shameful death. Therefore, the teaching of faith
concerning God incarnate would seem to be unbecoming.
Further. By suffering humiliations He hid His divinity
very considerably, and yet it was most necessary that men
should acknowledge His Godhead, if He was God incar-
nate. Therefore the teaching of faith is, seemingly, out
of keeping with the salvation of mankind.
Someone might reply that the Son of God suffered death
out of obedience to His Father; but this does not seem
reasonable.
Obedience consists in conforming oneself to the will of
one who commands. Now the will of God the Father
cannot be unreasonable. Consequently, if it was not be-
coming for God made man to die, since death is seemingly
incompatible with the divinity that is life itself, His death
is not sufficiently explained by saying that He died out of
obedience to the Father.
Again. God's will is not inclined to the death of men,
even of sinners, but rather that they should live, according
to Ezech. xxxiii. II, I desire not the death of the wicked,
but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Much
less, therefore, could it be God's will that the most perfect
man should die.
Moreover. It seems wicked and cruel to command an
innocent man to be put to death, and especially to be put
to death for sinners, who deserve themselves to die. Now
the man Christ Jesus was innocent. Therefore it would
have been wicked, if he had suffered death at the com-
mand of God the Father.
Someone might say that this was necessary in order to
198 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
show forth His humility : thus the Apostle says (Philip, ii.
8) : He humbled himself being become obedient unto death.
But neither is this reply to the point. In the first place,
humility is commended in one who has a superior to whom
he can be subject, and this cannot be said of God. There-
fore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be humbled
unto death. Secondly, men could be sufficiently taught
humility by divine words, which they are bound to believe,
and by human examples. Therefore it was not necessary,
as an example of humility, that the Word of God should
either take flesh or submit to die.
And if it be replied again that it was necessary for Christ
to suffer death and other ignominies, according to the
Apostle, who says that He was delivered up for our sins
(Rom. iv. 25), and that He was offered . . . to exhaust the
sins of many : neither is this to the point.
First, because only God's grace cleanses man from sin.
Secondly, if any atonement was required, it was proper
for the one who had sinned to atone : since, according to
God's just judgement, every one shall bear his own burden. 1
Again, if it was fitting that someone more than a mere
man should atone for mankind, it were enough, seemingly,
if an angel had taken flesh and offered satisfaction : since
an angel has a higher nature than man.
Further. Sin is not expiated by sin ; on the contrary, it
is aggravated thereby. Hence, if Christ was to atone by
His death, His death should have been one in which sin had
no part : in other words, He should have died, not a violent,
but a natural death.
Again. If it behoved Christ to die for the sins of men,
He should have died more than once, since men sin often.
Someone, however, might reply that it was especially on
account of original sin that it behoved Christ to be born
and to suffer : since that was the sin which had infected
the whole of the human race, on account of the first man's
sin. But this does not seem possible. For if other men
do not suffice to atone for original sin, neither, apparently,
1 Gal. vi. 5.
CHAPTER LIV 199
was Christ's death sufficient to atone for the sins of man-
kind, since He died in His human, and not in His divine,
nature.
Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of man-
kind, it were surely unjust that men should still suffer
punishments which Scripture declares to have been inflicted
for sin.
Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of man-
kind, there would be no need to seek further forgiveness
of one's sins. And yet all who have their salvation at
heart seek forgiveness. Therefore Christ did not take
away the sins of mankind sufficiently. These and like
arguments might appeal to some as indicating that the
doctrine of the Catholic Faith about the Incarnation is
inconsistent with the majesty and wisdom of God.
CHAPTER LIV
THAT IT WAS FITTING FOR GOD TO BE INCARNATE
Nevertheless, if we consider the mystery of the Incarna-
tion carefully and reverently, we shall discover such a
depth of divine wisdom, as will surpass all human know-
ledge ; according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. i. 25),
The foolishness of God is wiser than men. Hence it is
that those who study this mystery with reverence discover
more and more its marvellous secrets.
In the first place we must note that the Incarnation of
God was a most effective assistance to man in his road to
heaven. For we have proved 1 that man's perfect happi-
ness consists in seeing God face to face. Now, on account
of the immeasurable distance between his nature and God's,
a man might deem it impossible for him to reach a state,
wherein the human intellect is immediately united to the
divine essence, as the intellect is united to its idea. Con-
1 Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. seqq.
200 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
sequently he would be discouraged in his search after
happiness, and would hold back in despair. But when he
knows that God consented to personal union with human
nature, he is convinced that he can be united to God by
his intellect, so as to see Him face to face. Therefore it
was most fitting for God to assume human nature, in order
to raise in man the hope of finding happiness; and hence
it is that after Christ's Incarnation men began to have
greater hopes of obtaining the happiness of heaven, accord-
ing to His own words (Jo. x. 10), J am come that they may
have life, and may have it more abundantly. At the same
time man is freed of the obstacles that hinder him from
gaining happiness. For, since his perfect beatitude con-
sists solely in the enjoyment of God, as we have proved, it
follows that whosoever seeks his end in things beneath
God, places an obstacle to his obtaining a share in true
beatitude. Now, if man remained in ignorance of his own
worth, he would easily be led to place his end in things
beneath God. For it is through considering themselves
in their corporeal and sensitive nature, which they have in
common with other animals, that some seek a kind of
animal happiness in things pertaining to the body and
carnal pleasures. Others, considering the superiority in
some respects of certain creatures over man, made such
things the object of their religion, by worshipping either
the world and its parts, on account of their great size and
duration ; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, by
reason of their surpassing man, both in immortality and
intellectual acumen : and so man deemed that his happi-
ness is to be found in such things, for as much as they are
above him. Now, though in certain respects man is indeed
below some creatures, and in some ways like the very
lowest, nevertheless, in the order of the end, nothing is
above man, save only God, in whom alone man's perfect
happiness consists. Accordingly, man's worth in that he
is destined to be blessed with the immediate vision of God,
is most fittingly indicated by God, by His taking human
nature immediately to Himself. Hence we find that, as a
CHAPTER LIV 201
result of the Incarnation of God, a great number of people
gave up the worship of angels, demons, and all manner of
creatures, renounced even the pleasures of the flesh and all
bodily goods, and gave themselves to the worship of God
alone. To Him alone they look for perfect happiness, in
accordance with the Apostolic exhortation (Coloss. iii. 1,
2), Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting
at the right hand of God: mind the things that are above,
not the things that are upon the earth.
Again. Whereas man's perfect happiness consists in a
knowledge of God, surpassing the faculty of every created
intellect, as proved above, 1 it was necessary that man
should have a foretaste of this knowledge, so that he might
be directed towards that same knowledge in its fulness :
and we have shown that this is provided by faith. 2 Now
the knowledge whereby man is directed to his last end
ought to be most certain, since it is the principle on which
all things are directed to the last end : so, too, those prin-
ciples that we know naturally are most certain. Now we
cannot have absolutely certain knowledge about a thing,
unless it is either evident in itself, like the first principles
of demonstration, or is resolved into self-evident premisses,
like the conclusion of a demonstration. Since then faith
teaches us to believe concerning God things which cannot
be self-evident to us, because they surpass the faculty of
the human intellect, it was necessary for these things to
be revealed to man by one to whom they are self-evident.
And though they are to a certain extent self-evident to all
those who see the divine essence, nevertheless, in order
that man's knowledge might be absolutely certain, it was
necessary that it should be derived from its first principle —
namely, God — to whom it is naturally self-evident, and by
whom it is manifested to all. Even so, scientific certainty
is not attained without recourse to the first indemonstrable
principles. Therefore, that man might obtain perfect certi-
tude about the truth of faith, it was fitting that he should
be instructed by God made man, so as to receive divine
1 Bk. III., chs. xxxvii. seqq. s Bk. III., ch. xl.
202 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
instruction in a human way. Hence it is said (Jo. i. 18) :
No man hath seen God at any time : the only begotten Son,
who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him:
and our Lord Himself says (Jo. xviii. 37) : For this was I
born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give
testimony to the truth. And for this reason we find that,
after Christ's Incarnation, men had greater evidence and
more certain knowledge of divine things, according to
Isa. xi. 9, The earth is filled with the knowledge of the
Lord.
Again. Since man's perfect happiness consists in the
enjoyment of God, it was necessary for man's affections to
be disposed to desire it, since he has a natural desire for
happiness. Now the desire for the enjoyment of a thing
is caused by love of it. Hence it was necessary for man,
who seeks perfect happiness, to be urged to the love of
God. But nothing is a greater incentive to love someone
than the experience of his love for us. And God's love for
man could not be proved more effectively than by His con-
senting to personal union with man : since it is peculiar to
love that it unites lover and beloved, as far as this is pos-
sible. Therefore, since man seeks perfect happiness, it
was necessary for God to become man.
Moreover. Friendship is based on a certain equality,
and consequently it would seem that those who are very
unequal cannot be united in friendship. And so, that
friendship between man and God might be more intimate,
it was well for man that God should become man — since
friendship between man and man is natural — in order that
by knowing a God made visible to us, we might be drawn
to the love of things invisible.
It is also evident that heaven is the reward of virtue.
Consequently those who are on their way to heaven should
be disposed by virtue. Now we are incited to virtue by
word and example; and a man's example and word incite
us to virtue so much the more efficaciously, as we are firmly
convinced of his goodness. But it was not possible to
be infallibly certain of a mere man's goodness, since even
CHAPTER LIV 203
the most holy men have at times been found wanting.
Wherefore, that man might be strengthened in virtue, it
was necessary for him to be taught virtue by the word and
example of God incarnate. For which reason our Lord
said (Jo. xiii. 1.5) : I have given you an example, that as I
have done to you, so you do also.
Again. Just as virtue prepares man for heaven, so sin
debars him therefrom. Now sin, which is opposed to
virtue, debars man from heaven, not only because it brings
disorder into the soul, by leading it away from its due end,
but also because it offends God, to whom, as the director
of human actions, man looks for this heavenly reward.
Moreover, sin is contrary to divine charity, as we have
fully proved. 1 Again, when a man is conscious of sin,
he loses hope, which he needs in order to go to heaven.
Therefore, as sin abounds in the human race, man needs a
remedy for it. But none can provide this remedy, save
God alone, who is able not only to move man's will to
good, so as to bring him back to the right order, but also
to condone the offence committed against Himself ; since
an offence is not forgiven, save by the person offended.
In order that man's conscience may be eased of his past
sin, he must be certified of God's forgiveness. But he
cannot be certified of this except by God Himself. There-
fore it was fitting to the human race, and expedient for the
obtainment of heavenly bliss, that God should become
man, so that man would both receive from God forgiveness
of his sins, and be certified of that forgiveness by God
made man. Hence our Lord said (Matth. ix. 6): Thai you
may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to for-
give sins : and the Apostle says (Heb. ix. 14) that the blood
of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead
works, to serve the living God.
Again. We are taught by the tradition of the Church
that the whole human race is infected with sin. Now it
has been proved 2 that the order of divine justice requires
that without atonement sin be not forgiven by God. But no
1 Bk. III., ch. civ. a Bk. III., ch. clviii.
204 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
mere man was able to atone for the sin of the whole human
race, because any single mere man is something less than
the whole assembly of the human race. Therefore, in
order that the human race might be delivered from the
common sin, it was necessary for atonement to be made by
one who was both man, from whom atonement was due,
and something more than man, so that his merit would
suffice to atone for the sin of the whole human race. Now
in the order of heavenly bliss nothing is greater than man,
save God alone : because the angels, although they are
above man, as regards their natural condition, are not
above him in the order of the end, since their heaven is
the same as his. Consequently, for man to obtain heaven,
it was necessary that God should become man, in order to
take away the sin of the human race. This is expressed in
the words of John the Baptist concerning Christ (Jo. i. 29) :
Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the
sin of the world. And, again, the Apostle says (Rom. v.
18) : Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men unto
condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto justifica-
tion of life.
From these and like arguments we may conclude that far
from being inconsistent with the divine goodness, it was
most expedient for man's salvation that God should become
man.
CHAPTER LV
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE
FITTINGNESS OF THE INCARNATION
There should be no difficulty in solving the objections
given above. 1
It is not contrary to the order of the universe, as the
first objection maintained, that God should become man.
Although the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature
1 Ch. liii.
CHAPTER LV 205
of man, nevertheless, according to the order of his nature,
man has God for his end, and is adapted for union with
God by his intellect. The personal union of God with
man exemplifies and endorses that union, although each
nature retains its own property, so that neither did the
divine nature lose anything of its excellence, nor was the
human nature raised above the limits of its species. We
must also note that, by reason of the perfection and un-
changeableness of the divine goodness, God suffers no loss
of dignity through the approach, however near, of any
creature, although this is a gain to the creature : even so,
He communicates His goodness to creatures, without any
detriment to Himself. Likewise, though God's will suffices
to make all things, His wisdom requires that each individual
thing, according as it is expedient for it, should be the
object of His providence : thus to each thing He has
fittingly appointed its appropriate cause. Consequently,
although God was able by His will alone to bring about
all the benefits that we ascribe to the Incarnation, as the
second objection stated, it was nevertheless expedient for
human nature that they should be brought about by God
made man, as we may gather somewhat from the arguments
given above. 1
The third objection is easily answered. Man is com-
posed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing as it
were on the boundaries of both, so that whatsoever is done
for man's good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus
the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to
a certain extent, are subject to him : while the higher
spiritual creature — namely, the angel — has the same last
end to obtain as man, as we have already shown. 2 Accord-
ingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all
should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom,
more than in any other, He unites Himself to all creatures.
We must also observe that the rational creature alone
acts of itself : for irrational creatures are driven by their
own bias, rather than act of themselves : so that they are
1 Ch. liv. a Bk. III., chs. xlvii. seqq.
206 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents.
Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature
capable of acting of itself, as principal agent : because an
instrumental agent acts through being moved to action,
whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accord-
ingly? ^ God were to do anything by means of an irrational
creature, all that is required in accordance with that
creature's natural condition is that it be moved by God,
and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal
union, so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent
with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational
nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume
not an irrational, but a rational creature — that is to say,
either an angel or a man. And though the angelic nature,
as regards its natural properties, is more excellent than
human nature, as the fourth objection argued, it was never-
theless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed.
— First, because in man sin is reparable, in as much as his
choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn
from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man's
reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs,
can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just
as an angel's apprehension is unchangeable, since he
has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too
is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either
not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is
moved unchangeably : and therefore his sin is irreparable.
Since then, as we learn from Scripture, the expiation of
sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation, it
was more fitting that God should assume the human than
the angelic nature. — Secondly, because God assumed the
creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have
already proved. 1 Hence it was more fitting that He should
assume the human than the angelic nature ; because, in
man, nature and person are distinct, in as much as he is
composed of matter and form ; whereas, in the angel, they
are not distinct because he is immaterial. — Thirdly, because
1 Ch. xxxiv.
CHAPTER LV 207
an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to
knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the
senses. Hence, for an angel, it was enough that, through
his intelligence, he learned divine things from God :
whereas man's natural condition required that through his
senses he should learn about himself from God : and this
was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance
between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for
him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; wherefore he
needed, more than the angel, to be assumed by God, so
that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again,
since man was the terminus of creation, as though postu-
lating all other creatures in the natural order of generation,
he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so
as to complete the circle of creation.
The assumption of human nature by God does not prove
an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The
assumption of human nature, as we have stated, x was made
in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Conse-
quently there is no occasion for us to agree with those who
held that God is not above all, and said that He is the soul
of the world, or something of the kind. It is true, as the
sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning
God's Incarnation ; yet, surely, many more came to an end
after the Incarnation. Even as, in keeping with the defec-
tible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the
creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine
goodness ; so neither is it a matter for astonishment, if after
the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose
through the defectible nature of the human mind. And
yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more
diligent search of the truth in divine things : even so does
God direct to some good the evils that occur among
creatures.
Although all created good is small in comparison with
the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created
things can be greater than the salvation of the rational
1 Ch. xli.
208 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that
same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind
was the result of God's Incarnation. Therefore, as the
seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit
from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men
should be saved through God's Incarnation, but only those
who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the
sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is
indeed sufficient to save all men : that not all are saved is
due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to
receive the fruit of the Incarnation, by adhering to God
incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be de-
prived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God
incarnate or not adhere to Him : else man's good would
be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and
undeserving of praise.
The Incarnation of God was made known to man by
adequate signs. The Godhead cannot be better evidenced
than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is
proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature, by
performing a work that is above nature, whose author He
is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity,
if works are done that transcend the laws of nature,
such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, raising
the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works
as these : hence, when He was asked (Lk. vii. 20), Art
thou he that art to come, or look me for another ? He
proved His divinity by these works, replying, The blind
see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear,
the dead rise again, etc. And there was no need to create
another world, for this was neither in the plan of divine
wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be
contended that like miracles are related to have been done
by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must
observe that Christ's way of doing them was very different,
and more God-like. Others did these things by praying;
Christ, by commanding, as acting by His own power.
Moreover, not only did He do these things Himself, but
CHAPTER LV 209
gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others
who worked miracles by merely calling on His name.
Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men's bodies,
but also on their souls : which latter works are much greater.
Thus, for instance, through Him and the invocation of His
name, the Holy Ghost was given, by Whom men's hearts
were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds sud-
denly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the
tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God's
truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of
Christ's divinity, for no mere man could have done them.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 3, 4) that the salvation
of mankind having begun to be declared by the Lord, was
confirmed unto us by them that heard him: God also
bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers
miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost.
Although God's Incarnation was necessary for the salva-
tion of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objec-
tion states, for God to become incarnate from the very
beginning of the world. — In the first place, a God incarnate
was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as
stated above. 1 Now it is not expedient to offer a man a
remedy for sin, unless he first acknowledge his fault, so
that no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God,
who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above. 2 Now
man could presume on himself, in point of knowledge,
and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he
should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn
by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural
knowledge was insufficient, since, before the time of the
written law, he disobeyed the law of nature : and his own
strength was inadequate, since even when, by the law, he
knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus,
when at length man no longer presumed either on his
knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that
he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by
Christ's Incarnation : the grace of Christ, to wit, supply-
1 Ch. liv. 3 Ibid.
210 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
ing his lack of knowledge, by removing his doubts, and
strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest
he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race
has experienced three states, before the law, under the
law, and under grace. — Secondly, perfect law and doctrine
were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now such
is the condition of human nature, that it does not reach per-
fection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection
before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example
of this in the education of children : we instruct them at
first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the
great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if
a man were to tell his audience things they have never
heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would
not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds
beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary.
Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his
salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elemen-
tary instruction, through the patriarchs, the law, and the
prophets; and that at length in the fulness of time, the
perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth.
Hence, the Apostle says (Galat. iv. 4) : When the fulness
of the time was come, God sent his Son into the world :
and (ibid. iii. 24, 25) : The law was our pedagogue in
Christ . . . but . . . we are no longer under a pedagogue.
— It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great
king should be preceded by heralds, that his subjects may
be ready to receive him with due respect ; so was it proper
that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by
many things, in order that men might be ready to receive
God incarnate. This was done by promises and admoni-
tions preceding him, whereby man's mind was prepared
to believe the more easily in one who was already an-
nounced, and to receive Him the more earnestly on account
of the promises made of old.
Although the coming of God incarnate into the world
was so necessary for man's salvation, there was no need
for Him to live among men until the end of the world, as
CHAPTER LV 211
the tenth objection contended. This would have been
detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate
God, since, seeing Him in the flesh and like the rest of
men, they would have esteemed Him no better than others.
On the other hand, when He withdrew His presence from
among men, after doing wonders on earth, they began to
revere Him all the more. For this very reason He did not
give His disciples the fulness of the Holy Ghost, while as
yet He lived among them, because His absence would make
their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit.
Hence He said to them (Jo. xvi. 7) : // / go not, the Para-
clete will not come to you: but, if I go, I will send him
to you.
It was not expedient for God to take impassible and
immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather
that He should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering
and death. — In the first place, it was necessary for man
to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the
Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine
love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be
evident to man, it was necessary that God should take
flesh like that of other men — namely, passible and mortal.
For, had He taken impassible and immortal flesh, men
who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind would have
deemed it to be imaginary and not real. — Secondly, it was
necessary for God to take flesh, in order to atone for the
sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown, 1 one man can
atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take
upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and
not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from
the sin of the human race is death as well as other suffer-
ings of the present life, as indicated above. 2 Wherefore
the Apostle says (Rom. v. 12) that by one man sin came
into the world, and by sin death. Hence it was expedient
that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without
sin, so that by suffering and dying for us He would make
atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the
1 Bk. III., ch. clviii. 2 Chs. l.-lii.
212 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
words of the Apostle (Rom. viii. 3), God sent his Son in
the likeness of sinful flesh — that is to say, " having flesh
like to that of sinners, passible and mortal " : and he adds,
that of sin he might condemn 1 sin in the flesh — that is to
say, " that by the pain He bore in His flesh for our sins He
might take our sins away."— Thirdly, since His flesh was
subject to suffering and death, He was the more able to
give us an example of virtue, by His fortitude in over-
coming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use
He made of them. — Fourthly, we are the more raised to
the hope of immortality, seeing that He was transformed
from the state of suffering and mortal flesh, *to that of a
flesh that knows neither suffering nor death : and so we also
hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed
in flesh, passible and mortal. Whereas had He taken im-
passible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who
know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have
had no reason to hope for immortality. — Moreover, the
office of Mediator required that He should be a partner
with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in
power and glory, so that He might take away from us that
which He shared with us — namely, suffering and death ;
and lead us to that which He shared with God : since for
this was He Mediator, that He might unite us to God.
In like manner it was not expedient that God incarnate
should, in this world, lead a life replete with wealth and the
highest honour or dignity, as the twelfth objection argued.
— In the first place, seeing that man's mind was given to
earthly things, He came to withdraw it from them, and to
raise it to heavenly things. Hence it behoved Him, by His
example, to draw men to the contempt of riches and of other
things on which worldly men set their heart, and that He
should lead a poor and hidden life in this world. — Secondly,
if He had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position,
the works He did as God would have been put down to His
worldly power rather than to His Godly might. Hence it
was a very strong proof of His divinity that, without the
1 Vulg., And of sin he condemned, etc.
CHAPTER LV 213
help of the secular arm, He converted the whole world to
better things.
Hence, it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be
answered. It is, indeed, far from being untrue that,
according to the Apostle's teaching, the incarnate Son of
God suffered death in obedience to His Father's com-
mand. God's commands to men concern acts of virtue;
and according as a man's virtuous acts are more perfect,
the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the
virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred.
Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was
most obedient to God : for no act of charity is more perfect
than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord Him-
self declared (Jo. xv. 13), Greater love than this no man
hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. There-
fore Christ, by dying for the salvation of man, and for the
glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect
charity, and was most obedient to God.
Nor was this incompatible with His Godhead, as the
fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made
in the Person that both natures retained their respective
properties, divine, namely, and human, as we have stated
above : l hence, though Christ suffered even death, besides
those things which belonged to His human nature, His
Godhead remained impassible, although on account of the
unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This
is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies,
the soul remains immortal.
It must also be observed that although God wills not the
death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless
He wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with forti-
tude and braves the danger of death through charity.
Thus did God will Christ's death, in as much as Christ
accepted death through charity, and bore it with
fortitude.
Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for
God the Father to have willed Christ's death, as the six-
1 Chs. xli., xlvi.
214 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
teenth objection argued. For He did not compel Him
against His will, but it pleased Him that Christ should
accept death through charity : indeed He wrought this
charity in Christ's soul.
Likewise there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ
was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give
an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth
objection asserted, that humility is not in God : since the
virtue of humility consists in this, that a man keeps to his
own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but
is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility
is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above
all. If however someone out of humility, subject himself
at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because
he looks upon as superior to himself in some respect, one
who is simply his equal or inferior. Accordingly, though
the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in His
divine nature, it is becoming to Him in His humanity.
And His humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by
reason of His divine nature : because personal worth adds
to the praise of humility, as for instance when a great man
has through necessity to suffer an indignity. Now no
man is of greater worth than one who is God : and con-
sequently most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-
God, who suffered the infamies which it behoved Him to
suffer for man's salvation. For pride had made men lovers
of worldly glory. Wherefore, that He might transform
man's mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of
divine glory, He was willing to suffer death, not any kind,
but the most humiliating death. There are those who,
though they fear not death, abhor an ignominious death,
and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord
heartened men by the example of His death.
Again, although men might have been taught humility
by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged,
nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and
all the more effectively, as the goodness of the doer is
known with greater certainty. So that however many other
CHAPTER LV 215
men might be examples of humility, it was still most
expedient that we should be incited by the example of a
Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility
is all the more wonderful as His majesty is the more
sublime.
It is also clear from what has been said that it behoved
Christ to suffer death, not only that He might give an
example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but
also that He might wash away the sins of others. This
was done when He who was sinless was willing to suffer
the death due to sin, in order that He might take upon Him-
self the punishment due to others by atoning for them.
And, though God's grace alone suffices for the remission
of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless
when sin is remitted something is required of him whose
sin is forgiven — namely, that he offer satisfaction to the
one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable
to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all, by suffering
a voluntary death through charity.
And although in the punishment of sins the sinner him-
self should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged,
nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear
the punishment of another. The reason is that when a
punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness
of the person to be punished : whereas when it is a question
of atonement, when a person, in order to placate one whom
he has offended, accepts punishment willingly, we look at
the charity and good-will of him who atones ; and especially
when one man atones for another. Consequently one
man's atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as
we have shown. 1
No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as
proved above : 2 nor could an angel suffice for the purpose,
as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though
superior to man in certain natural properties of his, in the
participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be
restored by means of atonement, is man's equal. More-
1 Bk. III., ch. clvin. * Ch. Hv.
216 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
over, man's dignity would not be fully repaired if he were
beholden to an angel for his atonement.
It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ's death
derived its power of atonement from His charity whereby
He accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wicked-
ness of His executioners, who sinned by slaying Him : for,
as the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out
by sin.
Although Christ's death atoned for sin, there was no
need for Him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third
objection maintained. Christ's death sufficed to expiate
the sins of all men ; both by reason of the sublime charity
whereby He suffered death, and on account of the dignity
of the person who made satisfaction, since He was both
God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs,
the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account
is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to
the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of
the offender.
Christ's death sufficed to atone for the sins of all man-
kind : because, although He died only in His human nature,
as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet His death was
rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered,
the Person, namely, of God the Son. For, just as it is a
greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity, 1 so is
it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity, that a
person of higher rank suffer willingly for others.
Yet although by His death Christ made sufficient satis-
faction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the
twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting
from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have
become participators in Christ's redemption. It was fitting
and profitable that the punishment should remain after the
guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faith-
ful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their
head. Wherefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings
before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that
1 Bk. III., ch. cxliv.
CHAPTER LV 217
His faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality.
Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ's
suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of His glory;
according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. viii. 17),
Heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so
if ive suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with
him. — Secondly, if man were to become immune from
death and suffering, as soon as he comes to Christ, many
would come to Him for the sake of these advantages of
the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul :
and this is against Christ's purpose, since He came into
the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods
to spiritual things. — Thirdly, if men became impassible and
immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be
compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ : and this would
diminish the merit of faith.
Although Christ, by His death, atoned sufficiently for
the sins of mankind, as the twenty-sixth objection argued,
each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ's
death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation,
just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause
of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied
to each individual, that the latter may have its share in
the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect
of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through
carnal origin : and the effect of Christ's death reaches
each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby
man is united to and incorporated with Christ. There-
fore each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and
to receive the other things in which the power of Christ's
death is effective.
Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from
Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural
procreation, but through the endeavour of the good-will
whereby a man adheres to Christ; consequently that
which each one receives from Christ is his own personal
good; so that it is not transmitted by him to his children,
as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source
2i8 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents
be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreason-
able, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their
children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments
of salvation.
In some measure then we have shown that the teach-
ing of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the
Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable.
CHAPTER LVI
OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS
We have already observed 1 that Christ's death is a kind
of universal cause of man's salvation, and that a universal
cause needs to be applied to each individual effect. Con-
sequently it was necessary for man to be supplied with
certain remedies, so that thereby the benefit of Christ's
death might be brought to him. These remedies are
called the sacraments of the Church : and it was expedient
that they should be supplied to man under the guise of
visible signs.
First, because God provides for man, as for other
things, according to the condition of his nature. Now
it is a condition of man's nature that he be naturally led
to things spiritual and intelligible by objects of sense.
Therefore it was expedient for man to receive spiritual
remedies under the guise of sensible signs.
Secondly, Instruments should be proportionate to the
first cause. Now the first and universal cause of man's
salvation is the incarnate Word, as we have already stated. 2
Wherefore it was fitting that the remedies whereby the
power of the universal cause reaches mankind should bear
some likeness to that cause — namely, that in them the
divine power should work invisibly under visible signs.
1 Ch. lv. 2 Ibid.
CHAPTER LVII 219
Thirdly, man had fallen into sin by adhering to visible
things unduly. Lest therefore it might be thought that
visible things are evil by nature, and that for this reason
it was sinful to adhere to them; it was expedient that by
means of visible things man should receive salutary
remedies. For thus it was made evident that visible things
are by their nature good, as being created by God; and
that they become hurtful to man, through his adhering
to them inordinately ; whereas they are beneficial to him,
as long as he makes proper use of them.
Hereby we refute the error of certain heretics, who
would remove all such visible elements from the sacraments
of the Church. And naturally so, since they deem all
visible things to be evil by nature, and to be produced by
an evil author. We have refuted this in the Second
Book. 1
Nor is it unreasonable that spiritual well-being be dis-
pensed by means of visible and corporeal things; since
these visible elements are, as it were, instruments of God's
Incarnation and Passion. Now an instrument is effec-
tive not by virtue of its nature, but by virtue of the prin-
cipal agent, by whom it is applied to act. So too these
visible elements effect spiritual well-being, not by any
property of their nature, but by Christ's institution, from
which they derive their instrumental efficacy.
CHAPTER LVII
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SACRAMENTS OF
THE OLD AND OF THE NEW LAW
The next point to consider is that since these visible sacra-
ments derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion, and in
a certain way represent it, they ought to be of such a
nature as to be in keeping with the salvation wrought by
1 Chs. iv. seqq.
220 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Christ. Now this salvation, before Christ's Incarnation
and death, was indeed promised, but not actually realized :
the Word by His Incarnation and Passion wrought this
salvation. Accordingly, the sacraments which preceded
Christ's Incarnation needed to be such as to signify, and,
so to speak, promise salvation : whereas the sacraments
that followed Christ's Passion needed to be such as to
give salvation to man, and not merely signify it.
Thus we avoid the opinion of the Jews, who believe
that the sacraments of the law, as being instituted by
God, ought to be observed for ever, since God repents
not, neither does He change. But it does not argue
change or repentance in a man, if he makes various
arrangements to fit various times. Wherefore, even as a
father gives certain commands to his son when a child,
and others when he is grown up, so too God delivered
one kind of sacraments and precepts before the Incarna-
tion, to signify the future, and another kind after the
Incarnation, to show forth the present and commemorate
the past.
Still more absurd is the error of the Nazarenes and
Helonites, who held that the sacraments of the law are to
be observed together with (those of) the Gospel : since
such an error implies a contradiction. By observing the
sacraments of the Gospel they admit that the Incarnation
and other mysteries of Christ are things of the past :
whereas, by observing the sacraments of the law, they
hold that those things are yet to come.
CHAPTER LVIII
THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW
Since, as stated above, 1 the remedies of spiritual welfare
have been given to man under sensible signs, it follows
that the remedies which give life to the soul differ from one
1 Ch. lvi.
CHAPTER LVIII 221
another in a manner that corresponds with the life of the
body.
In the life of the body there is a twofold order. There
are those who propagate and direct this life in others, and
there are those who are propagated and directed, with this
life in view. Three things are essentially necessary to
the life of the body, and a fourth is required accidentally.
In the first place, a thing needs to receive life by genera-
tion or nativity ; secondly, it needs growth so as to attain
to its proper size and strength ; thirdly, it needs nourish-
ment, for the preservation of the life thus generated and
developed. These are essentially necessary to natural
life, since without them the body cannot live : hence to
the vegetative soul which is the principle of life, are
assigned the three natural forces of generation, growth,
and nutrition. Since, however, the life of the body meets
with obstacles, which cause the body to ail, a fourth thing
is necessary accidentally, and this is that the living being
be healed of its ailments.
Accordingly, there are also in the spiritual life — first,
spiritual regeneration by Baptism ; secondly, spiritual
growth bringing the soul to perfect strength by Confirma-
tion ; thirdly, spiritual nourishment by the sacrament of
the Eucharist; and fourthly, spiritual healing, which is
given either to the soul only, by the sacrament of Penance,
or, when it is expedient, to the body through the soul, by
the sacrament of Extreme Unction. These concern those
who are propagated and safeguarded in the life of the
soul. The propagators and directors of the life of the
body are required from two points of view — namely, in
respect of natural origin, which concerns the parents, and
in respect of state control, whereby man is assured a
peaceful life, and this regards kings and governors. Thus
is it also in the life of the soul. There are those who
propagate and safeguard the spiritual life, by a purely
spiritual administration ; to these corresponds the Sacra-
ment of Orders ; and these are those who propagate and
safeguard the spiritual life by ministering to both body
222 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
and soul : this is the object of the sacrament of Matrimony
in which husband and wife are joined together, in order
to beget children, and bring them up in the fear of God.
CHAPTER LIX
BAPTISM
In accordance with what we have been saying, we shall
be able to gather what are the peculiar effects and the
appropriate matter of each sacrament. And first, with
regard to spiritual regeneration, which is the result of
Baptism.
The generation of a living thing is the change of a
lifeless into a living being. Now man is deprived of
spiritual life in his origin, by original sin, as we have
already stated, 1 and whatsoever sins a man commits in
addition to this, deprive him of life. Hence it was neces-
sary that Baptism, which is spiritual birth, should have
the power to remove original sin and all the actual sins a
man has committed. Now the sensible sign in a sacra-
ment should be adapted to signify the spiritual effect of
that sacrament : and water is the easiest and handiest
means of removing dirt from the body. Therefore Bap-
tism is fittingly conferred with water, hallowed by the
Word of God. Moreover, since the generation of one
thing is the corruption of another, and since that which
is generated loses its previous form and the properties
resulting therefrom, it follows that Baptism, which is
spiritual generation, removes not only sins which are con-
trary to spiritual life, but also all guilt of sin : so that it
not only washes sin away, but removes all debt of punish-
ment. Hence no satisfaction for sin is demanded in the
sacrament of Baptism.
Again. By generation a thing acquires its form ; hence
1 Ch. 1.
CHAPTER LX 223
it acquires, at the same time, the operation that results
from that form, and the place that is becoming to it : thus,
as soon as it is kindled, fire tends upwards as towards its
proper place. Wherefore, since Baptism is spiritual genera-
tion, as soon as a man is baptized he is fit for spiritual
action, such as the reception of other sacraments and so
forth; and a place befitting the spiritual life — namely,
eternal happiness — is due to him. For this reason, if a
man die immediately after being baptized, he is forthwith
admitted into heaven ; wherefore Baptism is said to open
the gates of heaven.
Again we must observe that a thing can be born but
once : so that, since Baptism is spiritual generation, a
man is but once baptized. It is also evident that the dis-
order which, through Adam, came into the world, infects
man but once : wherefore Baptism, which is chiefly a
remedy for that disorder, may not be repeated. It is also
a general rule that, when a thing is once consecrated, so
long as it remains intact it must not be reconsecrated, lest
the consecration seem to have been invalid. Conse-
quently, since Baptism is a kind of consecration of the
person baptized, it must not be repeated : and thus the
error of the Donatists or Rebaptizers 1 is refuted.
CHAPTER LX
CONFIRMATION
The perfection of spiritual strength is attained, properly
speaking, when a man dares to confess his faith in Christ
in the presence of anyone, whosoever it be ; and is not held
back by confusion or fear : since fortitude dispels in-
ordinate fear. Accordingly, the sacrament whereby
spiritual strength is conferred on one who is regenerate,
makes him a soldier of Christ's faith. And, as soldiers
carry the banner of the prince under whom they fight,
1 Known later under the name of Anabaptists.
224 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
those who receive the sacrament of Confirmation receive
the banner of Christ — namely, the sign of the cross — by
which he fought and conquered. They receive this sign
on their brow, to indicate that they are not ashamed to
make public profession of their faith in Christ. More-
over, the cross is signed on them with a mixture of oil
and balsam, called chrism : the reason of which is as
follows. Oil signifies the power of the Holy Ghost, by
whom Christ, as the word implies, was anointed : so that
Christians take their name from Christ, as fighting under
Him. Balsam, on account of its fragrance, signifies a
good name, which those should have, who live among
worldly people, that marching forth on to the field of
battle from the hidden stronghold of the Church, they
may make public profession of their faith in Christ. More-
over, this sacrament is fittingly conferred by bishops only.
For they are the commanding officers of the Christian
army : and in worldly warfare it belongs to the com-
mander-in-chief to choose those whom he appoints to
military service. Hence those who receive this sacrament
are chosen for service in the spiritual combat : for which
reason the bishop lays his hand upon them, to signify
that they receive strength from Christ.
CHAPTER LXI
THE EUCHARIST
Just as the life of the body needs material nourishment,
not only that the body may grow, but also for its natural
upkeep, lest it wear away through continual dissolution,
and lose all its strength : so too was spiritual nourishment
needed for the spiritual life, so that those who have been
born again may both be sustained and grow in virtue.
And since spiritual effects are bestowed under visible
symbols, as stated above, 1 it was fitting that this spiritual
1 Ch. lvi.
CHAPTER LXII 225
element should be given to us under the forms of those
things which man uses most commonly for the nourish-
ment of the body. Such are bread and wine : wherefore
this sacrament is conferred under the appearances of bread
and wine.
We must take note however that in corporeal things
there is a difference between the union of begetter with
begotten, and that of nourishment with the subject
nourished. The begetter and the begotten need not be
united in substance, but only in likeness and power :
whereas nourishment needs to be united to the body,
nourished in its very substance. Consequently, that the
material symbols may correspond to their spiritual effects,
in Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, the mystery
of the Incarnate Word is united to us in one way ; and in
another way in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is
spiritual nourishment. The Word Incarnate is present
in the sacrament of Baptism by His power only : whereas
we believe Him to be present in the sacrament of the
Eucharist, in His very substance. And because our sal-
vation was consummated by Christ's passion and death,
wherein His blood was separated from His body, the
sacrament of His body is delivered to us separately under
the form of bread, and His blood under the form of wine :
so that this sacrament is a memorial and representation of
our Lord's Passion. Thus were fulfilled our Lord's words
(Jo. vi. 56), My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink
indeed.
CHAPTER LXII
THE ERROR OF UNBELIEVERS CONCERNING THE
SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST
Even as, when Christ spoke the above words, some of the
disciples were troubled and exclaimed (Jo. vi. 61) : This
saying is hard; and who can hear it? so again heretics have
arisen and denied the truth of the Church's teaching. They
226 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
say that this sacrament contains the body and blood of
Christ, not in reality, but only in signification. Thus, when
Christ said, This is my body, His meaning would be,
"This signifies or represents My body," in the same
way as the Apostle says (i Cor. x. 4), And the rock was
Christ — i.e., represented Christ. To support this interpre-
tation they quote all the similar expressions of Scripture.
As a plea for holding this opinion, they allege the words
of our Lord who, wishing to allay the scandal occasioned
to His disciples by His speaking of His body and blood
as meat and drink, explained Himself by saying (Jo. vi.
64) : The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and
life, as though His previous statement were to be taken,
not literally, but in a spiritual sense.
Moreover, they are led to hold this view by the many
difficulties which would seem to follow from the teaching
of the Church in this matter, and on account of which this
saying of Christ and of the Church seems hard to them.
In the first place, it is hard to see how the true body of
Christ begins to be present on the altar. A thing begins
in two ways, to be where it was not before : either by
local movement, or by something else being changed into
it : thus fire begins to be in a place, either by being kindled
there, or by being brought there. Now it is clear that
the true body of Christ was not always present on this or
that altar : since the Church declares that Christ ascended
bodily into heaven. And it is seemingly impossible for
anything here below to be changed anew into Christ's
body. For surely nothing is changed into that which
is already in existence, since that into which a thing is
changed, acquires existence by that change. And it is
evident that Christ's body was already in existence,
through having been conceived in the Virgin's womb.
Consequently it is seemingly impossible that He begin
to be present on the altar through something else being
changed into Him. — But neither could He begin to be
there by local movement; since whatsoever is moved thus
begins to be in another place in such a way as not to be
CHAPTER LXII 227
where it was before. And so, since Christ begins to be
present on this altar where this sacrament is being
enacted, we shall have to say that He is no longer in
heaven whither He had ascended. Moreover no local
movement terminates in two places at the same time. Now
it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated on several
altars simultaneously. Therefore it is impossible that
Christ begin to be present there by local movement.
A second difficulty is one of place. As long as a thing
remains entire, its parts are not scattered about in various
places. Now, in this sacrament, it is plain that the bread
and wine exist apart in separate places. If then Christ's
flesh be under the appearance of bread, and His blood
under the appearance of wine, it would seem to follow
that Christ does not remain entire, but that whenever this
sacrament is enacted His blood is separated from His
body. — Moreover it seems impossible for a greater body
to be enclosed in the space of a smaller body. And yet
it is evident that Christ's body is greater in quantity than
the bread that is offered on the altar. Therefore seem-
ingly it is not possible for the whole body of Christ to be
where there seems to be bread. And if His whole body
is not there then, but only part of it, we come back to the
first difficulty, namely, that whenever this sacrament is
enacted, the parts of Christ's body are separated. — Fur-
ther, one body cannot be in several places. Yet it is clear
that this sacrament is celebrated in several places. There-
fore, seemingly, it is impossible for Christ's body to be
truly present in this sacrament : unless one were to say that
one part of Him is here, and another part there. And
thus again it follows that the celebration of this sacrament
involves the division of Christ's body into parts : whereas
it would seem that the size of Christ's body is insufficient
to be divided into as many parts as there are places in
which this sacrament is enacted.
A third difficulty arises from what our senses perceive
in this sacrament. Even after the consecration, we clearly
perceive all the accidents of bread and wine, namely,
228 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
colour, taste, smell, shape, quantity, and weight : and
about these things we cannot be deceived, because the
senses are not deceived about their proper sensible objects.
Now these accidents cannot be subjected in Christ's body :
nor can they be in the air immediately surrounding it :
since several of them are natural accidents, and require a
subject of a certain particular nature differing from
that of the human body or the air. Nor can they exist
by themselves, seeing that the very essence of an accident
is to be in something : and accidents, since they are forms,
cannot be individualized, save by a subject : so that,
apart from a subject, they are universal forms. It follows
then that these accidents are in their respective deter-
minate subjects, namely, the substances of bread and wine.
Therefore the substance of bread and wine is present, and
not the substance of Christ's body : since two bodies,
seemingly, cannot be in the same place.
A fourth difficulty arises from the fact that the bread
and wine have the same action, and undergo the same
changes, after the consecration, as before. Thus the wine,
if it were taken in great quantity, would heat and inebriate :
the bread would strengthen and nourish. Moreover, if
they be kept for a long time and carelessly, they are
liable to putrefy, and to be consumed by mice. Again,
they can be burnt and turned into ashes and steam. All
these things are incompatible with Christ's body, which
according to faith is impassible. Therefore it would seem
that the substance of Christ's body cannot be present in
this sacrament.
A fifth difficulty regards especially the breaking of the
bread : since this breaking is apparent to the senses ; and
is impossible without a subject. And it is absurd to say
that the subject of that breaking is Christ's body. There-
fore, seemingly, Christ's body is not there, but the sub-
stance of bread and wine.
For these and like reasons the teaching of Christ and
the Church appears to be hard.
CHAPTER LXIII 229
CHAPTER LXIII
SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTIES : AND FIRST
WITH REGARD TO THE CHANGING OF THE BREAD INTO
CHRIST'S BODY
Although the operation of the divine power in this sacra-
ment is too sublime and hidden for human research, lest
unbelievers should deem the teaching of the Church on
this question to be impossible, we must endeavour to show
that it involves no impossibility whatsoever.
The first point to consider, then, is how Christ's body
begins to be present under this sacrament. It is, in fact,
impossible for this to take place by local movement of
Christ's body : both because it would follow that it ceases
to be in heaven, whenever this sacrament is enacted ; and
because then this sacrament could only be celebrated in
one place at a time, since the same local movement cannot
terminate in more than one place ; and because local move-
ment cannot be instantaneous but needs time, whereas
the consecration is effective in the last instant of the pro-
nouncement of the words. It remains, therefore, to be
said that the true body of Christ begins to be present in
this sacrament, through the substance of the bread being
changed into the substance of His body, and the sub-
stance of the wine into the substance of his blood.
Hence we see how false are the opinions of those who
say that in this sacrament the substance of the bread exists
together with the substance of Christ's body, as well as
the opinion of those who say that the substance of the
bread is annihilated, or that it is reduced to primal matter.
In either case it follows that, in this sacrament, Christ's
body begins to be present by local movement : and we
have proved this to be impossible.
Moreover, if the substance of the bread is present in
this sacrament together with Christ's body, He should
have said, Here is my body, rather than, This is my
body: because Here points to the substance seen, which
230 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
would be the substance of bread, if it remains in this
sacrament together with Christ's body.
Likewise it is seemingly impossible that the substance
of the bread be wholly annihilated. It would follow that
a considerable portion of matter originally created has re-
turned into nothingness, on account of the frequent cele-
bration of this mystery. Nor is it becoming that the
divine power should annihilate anything in the sacrament
of salvation.
It is impossible for the substance of the bread to be
reduced to primal matter, since primal matter cannot exist
without a form. Unless indeed primal matter be taken
to signify the elementary bodies : but then, if the substance
of the bread is resolved into these, this would, of neces-
sity, be perceptible to the senses ; seeing that the corporeal
elements are objects of sense. Moreover this would
involve local change and the corporeal alteration of con-
traries, which cannot occur instantaneously.
It must however be observed that this changing of the
bread into Christ's body is brought about in a manner
different from all natural changes. In all natural changes,
the subject remains, in which various forms succeed one
another : and these forms may be either accidental — as
when white is changed into black — or substantial — as
when air is changed into fire : hence these are called formal
changes. But in the aforesaid change, one subject passes
into another, and the accidents remain : wherefore this is
called a substantial change. How and why these acci-
dents remain, we shall discuss later on. At present we
have to inquire how one subject is changed into another :
since nature cannot do this. For every work of nature
presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individualized :
so that nature cannot make this substance to be that sub-
stance; for instance, that this finger be that finger. But
matter is subject to the divine power; since by it was it
brought into being : wherefore it is possible, by the divine
power, for this or that individual substance to be Changed
into this or that already existing substance. For just as,
CHAPTER LXIII 231
by the power of a natural agent, whose operation does not
go beyond the changing of a form in an already existing
subject, the whole of one thing is changed into the whole
of another by a change of species or form (for instance
this air into this already kindled fire), so by the power of
God, which presupposes no matter, but produces it, this
matter is changed into that matter and, consequently, this
individual into that; for matter is the principle of indi-
viduality, just as form is the principle of the species. Now
it is clear that in the aforesaid change of the bread into
Christ's body there is no common subject remaining after
the change, seeing that a change is wrought of the primal
subject which is the principle of individuality. And yet
something must remain, in order that it should be true to
say, This is my body : which words both signify and
effect this change. And since, as we have proved, neither
the substance of the bread, nor any prior matter remains,
it follows that there remains that which is besides the sub-
stance of the bread : namely, that which is accidental to
it. Therefore the accidents of the bread remain even after
the aforesaid change.
Among these accidents a certain order is to be noted.
Of all accidents, dimensive quantity adheres most closely
to substance : afterwards, with quantity as a medium, the
substance is affected with qualities : for instance with
colour by means of the surface. Hence the division of
the other accidents is incidental to the division of quan-
tity. Further, qualities are the principles of actions and
passions, as well as of certain relationships, for instance
of father and son, master and servant, and so on; while
some relationships are founded immediately on quantity,
for instance greater and lesser, double and half, and the
like. Accordingly, after the aforesaid change, the acci-
dents of the bread must be said to remain in such wise,
that dimensive quantity alone remains without a subject,
while the qualities are founded thereon as their subject,
and consequently actions, passions, and relations also.
Wherefore, in this change, the contrary happens to that
232 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
which is the rule in natural transmutations, where the sub-
stance remains as the subject of change, while the acci-
dents are changed : whereas here, on the contrary, acci-
dent remains and subject passes away. This change
cannot, properly speaking, be described as a movement
in the physical sense, that requires a subject : it is a kind
of sequence of substances, just as in creation existence
follows non-existence, as stated above. 1
This then is one reason why the accident of the bread
must needs remain, so that something may be found to
remain in the aforesaid change. But there is yet another
cogent reason. If the substance of the bread be changed
into Christ's body, and the accidents of the bread pass
away, the result of such a change would be that Christ's
body, in its substance, is not where the bread was before ;
since Christ's body would bear no relation to that place.
On the other hand, after the change, the dimensive quan-
tity, whereby the bread occupied that place, remains ;
while the substance of the bread is changed into Christ's
body, which thus comes to be under the dimensive quan-
tity of the bread, and consequently occupies the place of
the bread ; by means however of the bread's dimensions.
Other reasons might be assigned, both from the point
of view of faith which is of things invisible, and from the
point of view of merit, which is so much greater as this
sacrament is more invisibly enacted : for Christ's body is
hidden under the accidents of bread, with a view to a more
handy and more fitting use of this sacrament. It would
indeed be revolting to the partakers, and repulsive to the
beholders, if the faithful received Christ's body under its
own form. Wherefore Christ's body is offered as meat,
and His blood as drink, under the appearance of bread
and wine, which are man's most common form of meat
and drink.
1 Bk. II., ch. xix.
CHAPTER LXIV 233
CHAPTER LXIV
SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES AS REGARDS PLACE
Now that we have made these observations regarding the
mode of the change, the way is, to a certain extent, pre-
pared for the solution of the other difficulties. We have
already stated that when this sacrament is enacted Christ's
body occupies a place in reference to the dimensions of
the bread, which remain after the substance of the bread
has been changed into Christ's body. Hence whatever
belongs to Christ must needs be in that place, according
to the exigencies of the aforesaid change.
We must observe, then, that in this sacrament some-
thing is present by virtue of the change, and something
by natural concomitance. By virtue of the change there
is, in this sacrament, that which is the natural term of the
change. Thus under the appearance of bread is Christ's
body, into which the substance of the bread is changed, as
indicated by the words of consecration, This is my body.
Likewise, under the appearance of wine is Christ's blood,
as signified by the words, This is the chalice of my blood,
etc. By natural concomitance all other things are there,
which are not the term of the change but are really united
to that term. For it is plain that Christ's Godhead or His
soul are not the term of the change ; and yet both Christ's
soul and His divinity are present under the appearance
of bread, because both are united to His body. — If how-
ever this sacrament had been celebrated during the three
days succeeding Christ's death, Christ's soul would not
have been present under the appearance of bread, since it
was not then really united to His body. Neither would
His blood have been present under the appearance of
bread, nor His body under the appearance of wine, since
they were both separated in death. Now, however, since
Christ's body, in His natural form, is not without His
blood, both His body and His blood are present under
either species : but, under the appearance of bread, His
234 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
body is present by virtue of the change, and His blood,
by natural concomitance : and conversely under the species
of wine.
Thus it is plain how to solve the difficulty about the
inequality between Christ's body and the place occupied
by the bread. The substance of the bread is directly
changed into the substance of Christ's body. But the
dimensions of Christ's body are in the Sacrament, by
natural concomitance, and not by virtue of the change, since
the dimensions of the bread remain. Hence Christ's body
is related to that place, not through its own dimensions, so
that it need to be equal to the place, but through the
dimensions of the bread which remain, and to which the
place is equal.
Hence also it is clear how to reply to the objection about
plurality of places. Christ's body, as regards its own
dimensions, is in but one place, but through the dimensions
of the bread which has been changed into His body, it is
present in as many places as this change is celebrated in :
not indeed by being divided into parts, but remaining
entire in each place : since each consecrated host is changed
into the whole body of Christ.
CHAPTER LXV
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF THE
ACCIDENTS
Having solved the difficulty about place, we have now to
reply to the objection that arises out of the remaining acci-
dents. For there is no denying that the accidents of bread
and wine remain, seeing that one's senses are an infallible
witness thereto. And yet Christ's body and blood are not
affected by them, since this could not happen without their
being altered : nor are they susceptible of such accidents ;
as neither is the substance of air. It follows then that they
are without a subject, but as explained above; namely,
CHAPTER LXV 235
that only dimensive quantity subsists without a subject,
and affords a support to the other accidents. Nor is it im-
possible that an accident be without a subject, by the divine
power. We must judge of the upholding of things, as of
their production into being. Now the divine power can
produce the effects of any second causes whatsoever, with-
out these second causes, even as it could fashion man with-
out seed, and cure a fever without the operation of nature.
This is because God's power is infinite, and because He
bestows on every second cause its active energy ; so that
He can uphold the existence of the effects of second causes,
without the second causes themselves. Thus then, in this
sacrament, He upholds the accident in its being, although
the subject that upheld it is no longer there. This is
especially applicable to dimensive quantities (which the
Platonists held to subsist even of themselves), since we can
think of them as separate. Now it is evident that God can
do more in His works, than the mind can in its thoughts.
And it is peculiar to "dimensive quantity, as compared with
other accidents, that it is individualized by itself : the
reason being that position, i.e., the order of the parts in
the whole, is included in the very notion thereof; since it
is defined as quantity having position. 1 Now, wherever it
is possible to understand various parts of the same species,
we must needs understand individual distinction : since
many things of the same species must needs be many
individuals. For this reason we cannot apprehend several
whitenesses, except in as much as they are in various sub-
jects : but we can apprehend several lines, even as con-
sidered in themselves, because, since position is contained
in the notion of a line, difference of position suffices for
distinction of lines. And, since dimensive quantity alone
is by its very nature sufficient to occasion a multiplicity of
individuals in the same species, it would seem to be the
foundation of this multiplicity : thus in the genus of sub-
stance multiplicity is according to material dimensions ; in
fact, it is inconceivable in matter apart from dimensions;
1 Aristotle, Categ., iv.
236 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
seeing that without quantity, all substance is indivisible,
as the Philosopher states. 1 Now it is evident that as
regards other accidents, the number of individuals in the
same species depends on the number of subjects. Con-
sequently, since in this sacrament we postulate per se sub-
sistent dimensions, which are the foundation of the other
accidents, it does not follow that these accidents are not
individualized : because they retain the dimensions which
are the foundation of individuality.
CHAPTER LXVI
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF ACTION
AND PASSION
Having made these observations, we come to deal with the
fourth objection. In some ways it presents no difficulty :
in one respect however the solution is not quite so easy.
From what we have already said, it is surely fitting that,
in this sacrament, we should observe the same action (of
the elements) after (the consecration), as was to be noticed
before in the substance of bread and wine, for instance it
affects the senses in the same way, or the surrounding air
or anything else, by its odour, or colour. We said, in fact, 2
that the accidents of bread and wine remain in this sacra-
ment : and among those accidents are the sensible qualities,
which are the principles of these actions. Again, as re-
gards certain passions, i.e., alterations in these accidents,
there is no great difficulty, so long as we bear in mind
what has already been said. We stated that the dimensions
are the subject of the other accidents, and consequently
these other accidents must be considered to be subject to
alteration, in the same way as though the substance (of
bread and wine) were actually present : thus, for instance,
the wine would be subject to heating, or cooling, or a
change of taste, and so on.
1 i Phys. * Ch. lxiii.
CHAPTER LXVI 237
A greater difficulty, however, is presented by the genera-
tion and corruption which are observed to happen in this
sacrament. Thus, were a man to partake of the sacramental
food in any quantity, he could be nourished, and he could
even be made drunk with the wine, according to the saying
of the Apostle (1 Cor. xi. 21), One indeed is hungry, and
another is drunk. Now these things would be impossible,
unless flesh and blood were produced by this sacrament :
since nourishment is changed into the substance of the
body nourished. It is true that some reply that this sacra-
ment cannot nourish a man, but can only strengthen and
refresh him, as the smell of wine stimulates him. But re-
freshment only lasts for a time, and does not suffice to
nourish him, if he remain for a long time without food :
and it is easy to prove by experiment that it is possible
for a man to be nourished with this sacramental food for a
considerable time. Moreover it is astonishing that they
should deny that a man can be nourished with the sacra-
mental elements through refusing to admit that they can
be changed into flesh and blood : for it is apparent to the
senses, that by putrefaction or burning they are changed
into another substance, namely ashes and dust : and yet
this would seem difficult, since apparently it is impossible
for accidents to be transformed into substance, and it is
unbelievable that Christ's body, which is impassible, be
changed into another substance.
Perhaps someone will say that, as the bread is changed
miraculously into Christ's body, so are the accidents
miraculously changed into a substance. But, in the first
place, it would seem inconsistent with the miraculous, that
this sacrament should putrefy, or be destroyed by burning.
Secondly, the putrefaction and burning that happen to this
sacrament observe the ordinary course of nature, which is
out of keeping with the course of miraculous effects.
Accordingly, to solve this difficulty a well-known explana-
tion has been devised, which finds favour with many.
They say that when this sacrament is changed into flesh or
blood by the process of nutrition, or into ashes by burning
238 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
or putrefaction, neither the accidents nor the substance of
Christ's body are changed into another substance, but, by
a divine miracle, the substance of the bread that was there
before, returns, and therefrom are generated the things
into which this sacrament is observed to be changed. But
this is utterly impossible.
We have already proved 1 that the substance of the bread
is changed into the substance of Christ's body. Now that
which has been changed into something else cannot return
unless this other thing be changed back again into it.
Hence, if the substance of bread returns, it follows that the
substance of Christ's body is changed into bread : and this
is absurd.
Again. If the substance of bread returns, it follows that
it returns either while the appearances of bread are still
there, or riter they have disappeared. But as long as the
appearances of bread are there, the substance of bread can-
not return, since as long as they remain, the substance of
Christ's body remains present under them : so that it would
follow that the substance of bread and the substance of
Christ's body are both there at the same time. Yet neither
can the substance of bread return after the appearances of
bread have disappeared : both because the substance of
bread must have its proper appearances ; and because, after
the appearances of bread have disappeared, there is already
another substance generated there, the generation of which
was supposed to involve the return of the bread's substance.
It would seem, therefore, better to say that in the con-
secration, just as the substance of the bread is miraculously
changed into Christ's body, so by a miracle the accidents
are made to subsist, which is proper to a substance. Con-
sequently they produce all the effects and undergo all the
changes, which the substance would produce or undergo,
if it were present : and therefore without any further
miracle they can inebriate, nourish, be reduced to ashes
or dust, in the same way and order, as though the sub-
stance of bread and wine were present.
1 Ch. lxiii
CHAPTER LXVII 239
CHAPTER LXVII
SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN REGARD TO BREAKING OF
THE HOST
The fifth objection now remains to be considered. From
what has been said it is clear that as subject of the breaking
we can postulate the dimensions that subsist of themselves.
Nor does the breaking of these dimensions involve the
breaking of the substance of Christ's body, because
Christ's body remains entire in each portion. This may
seem difficult, yet it may be explained in accordance with
what has been already said. 1 It has been stated that in this
sacrament Christ's body is present in its substance, by
virtue of the sacrament ; and that the dimensions of Christ's
body are present by natural concomitance with His sub-
stance, and in a manner contrary to that in which a body
is in a place naturally. For a body is in a place naturally,
through its dimensions whereby it is commensurate with
the place. For the relation of a substantial thing to its
container differs from that of a quantitative thing to that
in which it is. A quantitative whole is contained by a
whole, in such a way that it is not wholly in any single
part, but each part is in itself, and the whole in the whole :
hence a natural body is wholly in the whole place, and
yet is not wholly in each part of the place, but each part
of the body fits into its own part of the place; because a
body is in a place through its dimensions. On the other
hand, if a substantial totality is wholly in the whole of
something, it is also wholly in each part of that thing.
Thus the whole nature and species of water is in each part
of the water, and the whole soul is in each part of the
body. Since then Christ's body is in the Sacrament by
reason of its substance, into which the substance of the
bread has been changed, while the bread's dimensions re-
main ; just as the whole species of bread was present in
each part of the dimensions, so the whole body of Christ
1 Ch. Ixiv.
2 4 o THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
is present in each part of those same dimensions. Con-
sequently the subject of this breaking or dividing is not
Christ's body, but the dimensions of bread and wine :
which dimensions remain and, as already stated, are the
subject of the other accidents that remain after the con-
secration.
CHAPTER LXVIII
EXPLANATION OF THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE 1
Having solved these difficulties, we see clearly that the
tradition of the Church concerning the Sacrament of the
Altar contains nothing impossible to God who can do all
things. Nor is this tradition incompatible with the words
of our Lord spoken to those disciples who appeared to be
shocked at this doctrine, The words that I have spoken to
you, are spirit and life (Jo. vi. 64). By these words He did
not intend to say that His real flesh is not given to be eaten
by the faithful, but that it is not given to be eaten carnally ;
namely, that it is to be consumed, not piece-meal under its
proper species, like other flesh-foods; but spiritually, and
not as we are used to partake of other flesh-meats.
CHAPTER LXIX
WHAT KIND OF BREAD AND WINE SHOULD BE USED IN THIS
SACRAMENT
We have already said that this sacrament is celebrated with
bread and wine : hence, the valid celebration of this sacra-
ment requires that the bread and wine used for the purpose
satisfy the essential conditions of bread and wine. Now
wine is no other liquor but that which is pressed from
grapes, and bread, properly speaking, must be made from
grains of wheat. True, the name of bread is given to other
1 Ch. lxii., As a plea, p. 226.
CHAPTER LXIX 241
kinds that supply the lack of wheaten bread; and other
liquors are given the name of wine. But this sacrament
cannot be celebrated with any other kind of bread or wine ;
nor with any bread or wine that is so mixed with other
materials that the species of bread or wine is destroyed.
On the other hand, if the bread or wine be affected by
accidents that do not affect the species of bread or wine,
it is clear that, notwithstanding such accidents, the sacra-
ment may be validly performed. Thus, since it is not
essential to bread that it be leavened or unleavened, and
whichever it happens to be, the essential conditions of
bread remain, the Sacrament may be validly celebrated
with either. For this reason different Churches have
different uses in this respect. Indeed either use is in keep-
ing with the signification of the Sacrament. As Gregory
says in his Register: 1 The Roman Church offers un-
leavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union
of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread,
because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, as
leaven is mixed with the flour: and is true God and true
man.
However, the use of unleavened bread is more becoming
to the purity of the mystic Body, i.e., the Church; in as
much as this purity is represented in this sacrament,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. v. 7, 8),
Christ, our pasch, is sacrificed: therefore let us feast . . .
with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.
This excludes the error of certain heretics who say that
this sacrament cannot be celebrated with unleavened bread :
moreover, such a view is altogether opposed to the
authority of the Gospels. For we are told (Matth. xxvi.,
Mark xiv., Luke xxii.) that our Lord, on the first day of the
Azymes, partook of the pasch with His disciples, and after-
wards instituted this sacrament. Now it was unlawful for
the Jews to have leavened bread in their houses on the first
day of the Azymes (Exod. xii. 15) : and as long as He was
in the world our Lord kept the law. It is, therefore,
1 Innocent III. implicitly, De Sacr. Miss. iv. 4.
16
242 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
evident that He changed unleavened bread into His body,
and gave it to His disciples to eat. Consequently it is
foolish to condemn, in the use of the Latin Church, that
which our Lord observed in the institution of this sacra-
ment.
It must be noted however that some say that He antici-
pated the first day of the Azymes on account of His
imminent Passion, and that he therefore used leavened
bread. In their attempt to prove this they offer two
reasons. In the first place, we are told that our Lord,
before the festival day of the pasch (Jo. xiii. i), kept with
His disciples the supper at which He consecrated His body,
as the Apostle relates (i Cor. xi. 28). Hence it would seem
that Christ kept the supper before the day of the Azymes,
and consequently used leavened bread in consecrating His
body. They think to confirm this by the fact that on the
Friday, on which Christ was crucified, the Jews went not
into the hall of Pilate, that they might not be defiled, but
that they might eat the pasch. Now pasch here means the
Azymes. Therefore they conclude that the supper was
celebrated before the Azymes.
To this we reply that according to the Lord's command-
ment (Exod. xii. 15), the feast of the Azymes was observed
during seven days. The first of these, which was the
fifteenth day of the month, was more holy and solemn than
the others : but since the Jews commenced their festivals
the evening before, they began to eat unleavened bread the
evening of the fourteenth day, and continued to eat it
during the seven following days. Hence we read (ibid. 18,
19) : The first month, the fourteenth day of the month in
the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread, until the one
and twentieth day of the same month in the evening. Seven
days there shall not be found any leaven in your houses.
In the evening of that same fourteenth day the paschal
lamb was slain. Accordingly, the fourteenth day of the
month is called by the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark and
Luke, the first day of the Azymes, because in the evening
the Jews ate unleavened bread, and the pasch, namely the
CHAPTER LXX 243
paschal lamb, was slain. This is what John means by
saying : Before the festival day of the pasch, that is to say,
before the fifteenth day of the month, which day was the
most solemn of all. On this day the Jews desired to eat
the pasch, that is the paschal unleavened bread, but not the
paschal lamb. Consequently there is no disagreement
among the Evangelists, and it is clear that Christ at the
supper consecrated His body from unleavened bread.
Therefore the Latin Church has good reason to use un-
leavened bread in this sacrament.
CHAPTER LXX
THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE : AND FIRST, THAT IT IS POS-
SIBLE FOR A MAN TO SIN AFTER RECEIVING SACRAMENTAL
GRACE
Although the aforesaid sacraments confer grace on man,
the grace bestowed on him does not make him impeccable.
Gratuitous gifts are received into the soul like habitual
dispositions : for man does not always act in accordance
with them. Now nothing prevents the man who has a
habit, from acting either in accordance with it, or against
it : thus a grammarian may speak either grammatically or
ungrammatically. It is the same with the habits of moral
virtue : thus a man who has the habit of justice may per-
form just actions, and may act unjustly. The reason is
because the use of habits is subject to our will : and the
will may be borne to either of two opposite alternatives.
It is therefore clear that the man who has received
gratuitous gifts, can sin by acting against grace.
Again. There can be no impeccability in man without
unchangeableness of will. Now man's will cannot be un-
changeable, except through his obtaining his last end :
because the will is rendered unchangeable by being so
wholly fulfilled, that there is nothing to turn it away from
the object on which it is fixed. But such a fulfilment of
244 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
his will is not becoming to man, unless he has obtained his
last end : since, as long as something remains to be desired,
the will is not fulfilled. Accordingly, man cannot be im-
peccable until he has reached his last end : and this is not
granted to man by sacramental grace, because the sacra-
ments are intended to assist man on his way to that end.
Therefore sacramental grace does not make man im-
peccable.
Further. Every sin is the result of ignorance : where-
fore the Philosopher says (3 Ethic, i) that every bad man
is ignorant: and it is said (Prov. xiv. 22) : They err that
work evil. Consequently then only is man safe from sin,
as regards his will, when he is safe from ignorance and
error in his intellect. Now it is evident that sacramental
grace does not deliver man from all ignorance and error :
since this is the privilege of those whose intellectual gaze is
fixed on that truth which is the supreme criterion of all
truth ; of those, namely, who have obtained their last end,
as shown above. 1 Therefore man is not made impeccable
by the grace of the sacraments.
Moreover. Man's changeableness in vice and virtue
depends not a little on his changeableness in the soul's
passions : because, when those passions are curbed by his
reason, man becomes and remains virtuous ; whereas he
becomes wicked when his reason obeys the impulse of his
passions. Therefore, as long as man is subject to change
in his passions, he is also changeable in vice and virtue.
Now the changeableness which results from the soul's pas-
sions is not removed by sacramental grace, but remains in
man as long as his soul is united to a passible body. It
is therefore evident that man is not made impeccable by
sacramental grace.
Further. It would seem unnecessary to warn against
sin those who cannot sin. Nevertheless the faithful who,
through the sacraments, have already received the grace of
the Holy Ghost, are admonished by the teaching both of
the Gospels and of the Apostle. Thus it is said (Heb. xii.
1 Bk. III., ch. li.
CHAPTER LXX 245
15) : Looking diligently lest any man be wanting to the
grace of God; lest any root of bitterness springing up do
hinder: and (Eph. iv. 30) : Grieve not the Holy Spirit of
God, whereby you are sealed: and (1 Cor. x. 12) : He that
thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.
Again the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. ix. 27) : /
chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: lest per-
haps, when I have preached to others, I myself should
become a castaway. Therefore men are not rendered impec-
cable by the grace they receive in the sacrament.
This puts out of court the error of those heretics who
say that a man cannot sin after receiving the grace of the
Holy Ghost : and that if a man sins, he never had that
grace.
They base their error on 1 Cor. xiii. 8, Charity never
falleth away: and on 1 Jo. iii. 6, Whosoever abideth in
him sinneth not; and whosoever sinneth, hath not seen
him, nor known him: and on ibid. iii. 9, which is still
more explicit, Whosoever is born of God committeth no
sin: for his seed abideth in him and he cannot sin,
because he is born of God. These texts however do not
avail to support their contention. Charity is said never
to fall away, not as though a man who has charity cannot
lose it, since it is said (Apoc. ii. 4) : J have somewhat
against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity; but
because the other gifts of the Holy Ghost imply some
kind of imperfection, — as, for instance, the spirit of
prophecy and the like, — and therefore are made void, when
that which is perfect is come, whereas charity will remain
in that state of perfection. — The sense of the texts quoted
from the epistle of John is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
by which man is adopted or is born again as a son of God,
as far as they are concerned, have such great power that
they can keep man from sin : and man cannot sin as long
as he lives in accordance with them ; but he can act against
them, and sin by abandoning them. Thus it is said that
whosoever is born of God cannot sin in the same sense as
one might say that what is hot cannot make a thing cool
246 THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES
(yet it can become cool, and then it will cool something
else) ; or that a just man does not perform unjust actions ;
that is, as long as he acts as a just man.
CHAPTER LXXI
THAT A MAN WHO HAS SINNED AFTER RECEIVING THE
GRACE OF THE SACRAMENT CAN RETURN TO GRACE
It follows from what has been said in the preceding chap-
ter that a man who falls into sin after receiving sacramental
grace can be restored to grace.
As already stated, as long as we live here below, the will
is changeable as to vice and virtue. Consequently, just as
man can sin after receiving grace, so too, seemingly, he can
return to virtue. Again. It is evident that good is more
powerful than evil : since evil acts not, save by virtue of a
good, as we proved above. 1 Hence, if a man's will is turned
away from the state of grace by sin, much more can he be
recalled from sin, by grace.
Further. As long as he is a wayfarer, man's will is not
unchangeable. Now, as long as he is here below, a man
is on the way to his last end. Therefore his will is not so
unchangeably turned to evil, as to be unable by divine
grace to return to that which is good.
Moreover. It is evident that sacramental grace delivers
a man from the sins committed by him before he received
the grace of the sacraments. For the Apostle says (i Cor.
vi. 9-1 1) : Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers
. . . shall possess the kingdom of God. . . . And such
some of you were ; but you are washed, but you are sancti-
fied, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus
Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. It is also clear that
the grace bestowed in the sacraments does not lessen, but
increases the good of nature. Now it is part of the good
of nature that a man can be restored from the state of sin to
the state of righteousness ; since the possibility for good is
1 Bk. III., ch. xiv.
CHAPTER LXXI 247
a good in itself. Therefore if a man happen to sin
after receiving gra
