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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA
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THE
"SUMMA THEOLOGICA
' OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
PART II.
(FIRST PART)
>)
LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN
PROVINCE
THIRD NUMBER
(QQ. XC— CXIV.)
R. & T. WASHBOURNE, LTD.
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
AND AT MANCHESTER, BIRMINGHAM, AND GLASGOW
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F. INNOCENTIUS APAP., O.P., S.T.M.,
Censor Theol.
Jinprimatur.
EDM. CANONICUS SURMONT,
ViCARius Generalis.
Westmonasterii.
APPROBATIO ORDINIS.
Ilihil (Dbstnt.
F. H. RAPHAEL MOSS. O.P., S.T.L.
F. V. J. McNABB, O.P., S.T.B.
imprimatur.
F. HUMBERTUS EVEREST, O.P., S.T.B.
Prior Provinxialis.
LONDINI,
Die 7 Martii, 1915.
CONTENTS
TREATISE ON LAW
{a) In General
ilUESTION
XC. OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW
XCI. OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW
XCII. OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW
(6) In Particular
XCin. OF THE ETERNAL LAW - - - -
XCIV. OF THE NATURAL LAW . - - -
XCV. OF HUMAN LAW - - - - -
XCVL OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW - . .
XCVir. OF CHANGE IN LAWS . - - . -
XCVIII. OF THE OLD LAW - . . - *
XCIX. OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW - . -
C. OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW
CI. OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES
CII. OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS
CIII. OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS
CIV. OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS - - - -
CV. OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS
CVI. OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW,
CONSIDERED IN ITSELF - - . -
CVII. OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD
CVIII. OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW
LAW -------
PAGE
I
9
22
27
40
53
63
76
84
99
113
148
159
225
239
248
280
291
304
TREATISE ON GRACE
CIX. OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE
ex. OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE
CXI. OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE - - -
CXII. OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE - - -
CXIII. OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE - - .
CXIV. OF MERIT - _ _ _ -
323
346
356
368
379
403
TREATISE ON LAW
THE '^SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART.
QUESTION XC.
OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW.
{In Four Articles.)
We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts.
Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of
whose temptations we have spoken in the First Part
(Q. CXI v.). But the extrinsic principle moving to good is
God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and
assists us by His Grace : wherefore in the first place we must
speak of law; in the second place, of grace.
Concerning law, we must consider — (i) Law itself in
general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three
points offer themselves for our consideration: (i) Its essence;
(2) The different kinds of law ; (3) The effects of law.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether law is something pertaining to reason ?
(2) Concerning the end of law. (3) Its cause. (4) The pro-
mulgation of law.
First Article,
whether law is something pertaining to reason ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that law is not something pertaining
to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 23) : / see
another law in my members, etc. But nothing pertaining to
reason is in the members; since the reason does not make
n- 3 I
Q. 90. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 2
use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something
pertaining to reason.
Obj. 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but
power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of
reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason:
because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of
which we have spoken above (Q. LVIL). Nor again is it
an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the
act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.
Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
Obj. 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to
it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move
to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. IX.,
A. i). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to
the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i. ff., De
Const. Prin.) : Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of
law.
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to
forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated
above (Q. XVII., A. f). Therefore law is something per-
taining to reason.
/ answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby
man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for lex
(law) is derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one
to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the
reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident
from what has been stated above (Q. I., A. i ad 3) ; since it
belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first
principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher
(Phys. ii.). Now that which is the principle in any genus,
is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in
the gemls of numbers, and the first movement in the genus
of movements. Consequently it follows that law is some-
thing pertaining to reason.
Reply Obj. 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it
may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which
measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it
follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. —
3 THE ESSENCE OF LAW Q- 9o. Art. i
Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this
way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something
by reason of some law : so that any inclination arising from a
law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation
as it were. And thus the inchnation of the members to
concupiscence is called the law of the members.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as, in external action, we may con-
sider the work and the work done, for instance the work of
building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we
may consider the act itself of reason, i.e., to understand and
to reason, and something produced by this act. With
regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the
definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism
or argument. And since also the practical reason makes
use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated
above (Q. XIII., A. 3; Q. LXXVL, A. i) and as the Philoso-
pher teaches {Ethic, vii.) ; hence we find in the practical
reason something that holds the same position in regard
to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition
holds in regard to conclusions. Suchlike uniyer^sal^ propoj
sitions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions
have the nature of law. And these propositions are some-
times under our actual consideration, while sometimes they
are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply Obj. 3. Reason has its power of moving from the
will, as stated above (Q. XVII., A. i) : for it is due to the
fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its com-
mands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order
that the volition of what is commanded may have the
nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of
reason. And in this sense is to be imderstood the saying
that the will of the sovereign has the force of law ; otherwise
the sovereign's will would savour of lawlessness rather than
of law.
Q. 90. A RT. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
Second Article.
whether the law is always directed to the
common good ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the law is not always directed
to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law
to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to
certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is
not always the common good.
Obj. 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But
human actions are concerned with particular matters.
Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.
Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says [Etym. ii.) : If the law is based
on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law. But
reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the
common good, but also of that which is directed to private
good. Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of
all, but also to the private good of an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that laws are enacted
for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens.
I answer that, As stated above (A. i), the law belongs to
that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their
rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human
acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the
principle in respect of all the rest : wherefore to this principle
chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. — Now the
first principle in practical matters, which are the object of
the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of
human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q. II., A. 7;
Q. III., A. i). Consequently the law must needs regard
principally the relationship to happiness. || Moreover, since
every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect ;
and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the
law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal
happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above
definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the
5 THE ESSENCE OF LAW Q. 90. Art. 2
body politic: for he says (Ethic, v.) that we call those legal
matters just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happi-
ness and its parts for the body politic : since the state is a
perfect community, as he says in Polit. i.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the
principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus
in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief
among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and
these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of tire.
Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common
good, any other precept in regard to some individual work,
must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far
as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is
ordained to the common good.
Reply Obj. i. A command denotes an application of a law
to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the
common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to par-
ticular ends. And in this way commands are given even
concerning particular matters.
Reply Obj. 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular
matters: but those particular matters are referable to the
common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as
to a common final cause, according as the common good is
said to be the common end.
Reply Obj. 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to
the speculative reason except that which is traced back to
the hrst indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm
with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to
the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands
to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.
Third Article.
whether the reason of any man is competent
to make laws ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the reason of any man is compe-
tent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. ii 14) that
Q. 90. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 6
when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those
thing that are of the law, . . . they are a law to themselves.
Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can
make a law for himself.
Obj. 2. Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, ii.), the
intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue. But every
man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of
any man is competent to make laws.
Obj. 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs
the state, so every father of a family governs his household.
But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state.
Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his
household.
On the contrary, Isidore says [Etym. v. ; and the passage is
quoted in Decretals, Dist. 2) : A law is an ordinance of the
people, whereby somethijtg is sanctioned by the Elders together
with the Commonalty.
I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and
foremost the order to the common good. Now to order
anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole
people, or to someone who is the vicegerent of the whole
people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either
to the whole people or to a public personage who has care
of the whole people : since in all other matters the directing
of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end
belongs.
Reply Obj. i. As stated above (.4. 1 ad 1), 3. law is in a
person not only as in one that rules, but also by participa-
tion as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a
law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he
receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text
goes on : Who show the work of the law written in their hearts.
Reply Obj. 2. A private person cannot lead another to
virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice
be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should
have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue,
as the Philosopher says [Ethic, x.). But this coercive power
is vested in the whole people or in some public personage,
7 THE ESSENCE OF LAW Q- 90. Art. 4
to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state
further on (Q. XCIL, A. 2 ad 3; II.-IL, Q. LXIV., A. 3).
Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Reply Obj. 3. As one man is a part of the household, so a
household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect
community, according to Polit. i. And therefore, as the
good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the
common good ; so too the good of one household is ordained
to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community.
Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make
certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have
properly the force of law.
Fourth Article,
whether promulgation is essential to a law ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that promulgation is not essential
to a law. For the natural law above all has the character
of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation.
Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.
Obj. 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one
to do or not to do sormething. But the obligation of ful-
filling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is
promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is
not essential to a law.
Obj. 3. Further, the binding force of a law extends even
to the future, since laws arc binding in matters of the futtire,
as the jurists say [Cod. i., tit. De lege et constit.). But pro-
mulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is
not essential to a law.
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals (Append.
Grat.) that laws are established when they are promulgated.
I answer that, As stated above (A. i), a law is imposed on
others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure
is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and
measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the
binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be~
Q. 90. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8
applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such
application is made by its being notified to them by pro-
mulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the
law to obtain its force.
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law
may be gathered; and it is nothing else than "an ordinance of
reason"^lor the common good/ made by him who has care of
the community; and promulgated.
Reply Ohj. i. The natural law is promulgated by the very
fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known
by him naturally.
Reply Ohj. 2. Those who are not present when a law is pro-
mulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is
notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has
been promulgated.
Reply Ohj. 3. The promulgation that takes place now,
extends to future time by reason of the durability of written
characters, by which means it is continually promulgated.
Hence Isidore says [Etym. ii.) that lex (law) is derived from
legere (to read) hecause it is written.
QUESTION XCI.
OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW.
{In Six Articles.)
We must now consider the various kinds of law: under
which head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether there
is an eternal law ? (2) Whether there is a natural law ?
(3) Whether there is a human law ? (4) Whether there is a
Divine law ? (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or
several ? (6) Whether there is a law of sin ?
First Article,
whether there is an eternal law ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there is no eternal law. Because
every law is imposed on someone. But there was not some-
one from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since
God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.
Obj. 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. But
promulgation could not be from eternity : because there was
no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity.
Therefore no law can be eternal.
Obj. 3. Further, a law implies order to an end. But
nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone
is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.) : That
Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be
otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, K. 1 ad 2\ AA.
3, 4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason
9
Q. 91 . Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 10
emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community.
Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine
Providence, as was stated in the First Part (Q. XXII.,
A A. I, 2), that the whole community of the universe is
governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of
the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe,
has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's con-
ception of things is not subject to time but is eternal,
according to Prov. viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of
law must be called eternal.
Reply Ohj. i. Those things that are not in themselves,
exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and pre-
ordained by Him, according to Rom. iv. 17 : Who calls those
things that are not, as those that are. Accordingly the eternal
concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal
law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of
things foreknown by Him.
Reply Ohj. 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or
in writing ; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated :
because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book
of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from
eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.
Reply Ohj. 3. The law implies order to the end actively,
in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not
passively, — that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to
the end, — except accidentally, in a governor whose end is
extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be
ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God
Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Where-
fore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.
Second Article,
whether there is in us a natural law ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Ohjection 1. It seems that there is no natural law in us.
Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law:
for Augustine says (De Lib. Arh. i.) that the eternal law is that
II THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW Q. 91. Am. 2
by which it is right that all things should he most orderly. But
nature does not abound in supcrlluities as neither does she
fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.
Ohj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to
the end, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). But the directing of
human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the
case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by
their natural appetite ; whereas man acts for an end by his
reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.
Ohj. 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under
the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account
of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other
animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a
natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.
On the contrary, The gloss on Rom. ii. 14: When the Gentiles,
who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the
law, comments as follows: Although they have no written
law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and
is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, A. i ad 1), law,
being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways : in
one way, as in him that rules and measures ; in another way,
as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled
and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure.
Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are
ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above
(A. i); it is evident that ah things partake somewhat of the
eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted
on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their
proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the ^rational
creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent
way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by
being piovideiU l^olh for itself and for others. Wherefore
it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural
inchnation to its proper act and end: and this 2^^i£i£5ii2IL
of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the
natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. iv. 6) :
Offer up the sacrifice of justice, as though someone asked
Q. 91 . Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12
what the works of justice are, adds: Many say, Who showeth
us good things? in answer to which question he says: The
light of Thy countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us : thus
implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we
discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function
of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us
of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural
law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation
of the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 1. This argument would hold, if the natural
law were something different from the eternal law : whereas
it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based
on that which is according to nature, as stated above
(Q. X., A. i) : for every act of reasoning is based on principles
that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in
respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in
respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of
our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural
law.
Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals partake in their
own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature
does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof
in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the par-
ticipation of the eternal law in the rational creature is
properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to
reason, as stated above (Q. XC, A. i). Irrational creatures,
however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner,
wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in
them, except by way of similitude.
Third Article,
whether there is a human law ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that there is not a human law. For
the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as
stated above (A. 2). Now through the eternal law all things
13
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW Q. 91. Art. 3
are most orderly, as Augustine states {De Lib. Arb. i.).
Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all
human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human
law.
Obj. 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure,
as stated above (Q. XC, A. i). But human reason is not a
measure of things, but vice versa (c/. Metaph. x.). Therefore
no law can emanate from human reason.
Obj. 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as
stated in Metaph. x. But the dictates of human reason in
matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ix. 14:
The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels
uncertain. Therefore no law can emanate from human
reason.
On the contrary, Augustine {De Lib. Arb. i.) distinguishes
two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which
he calls human.
/ answer that. As stated above (Q. XC, A. i, ai 2), a law
is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed
that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in
the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to
conclusions, as stated above [ibid.). Accordingly we con-
clude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally
known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions
of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not im-
parted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason,
so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from
general and indemonstrable principles, that the human
reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination i
of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised
by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other
essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above
(Q. XC, A A. 2, 3, 4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
{De Invent. Rhet. ii.) that justice has its source in nature ;
thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility ;
afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were
approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for
the law.
Q. 91. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14
Reply Ohj. i. The human reason cannot have a full par-
ticipation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according
to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the
part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of
Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain
general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single
truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom ; so too,
on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural par-
ticipation of the eternal law, according to certain general
principles, but not as regards the particular determinations
of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the
eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed
further to sanction them by law.
Reply Ohj. 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of
things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are
general rules and measures of all things relating to human
conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure,
although it is not the measure of things that are from
nature.
Reply Ohj. 3. The practical reason is concerned with
practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but
not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason
is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that
inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of
sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be alto-
gether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in
its own particular genus.
Fourth Article,
whether there was any need for a divine law ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that there was no need for a Divine
law. Because, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a
participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is
a Divine law, as stated above (A. i). Therefore there is no
need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and
human laws derived therefrom.
15 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW Q.9T.ART.4
Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 14) that God
left man in the hand of his own counsel. Now counsel is an
act of reason, as stated above (Q. XIV., A. i). Therefore
man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate
of human reason is a human law, as stated above (A. 3).
Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a
Divine law.
Ohj. 3. Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than
irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no
Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them.
Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a
Divine law in addition to the natural law.
On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before
him, saying: Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifica-
tions, 0 Lord.
I answer that. Besides the natural and the human law it
was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a
Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it
is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts
in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to
no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural
faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further
direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural law
and human law which is derived from it. But since man is
ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inpro-
portionate to man's natural faculty, as stated above (0. V.,
A. 5), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural
and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a_
law given by God.JT/ 'if ■ •^'"' /
Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of
human judgment, especially on contingent and particular
matters, different people form different judgments on human
acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In
order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt
what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was
necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law
given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.
Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of
Q. 91. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16
which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent
to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of
exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of
virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in
both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts ; and it was necessary
for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.),
human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since
while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away
with many good things, and would hinder the advance of
the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse.
In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden
and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to super-
vene, whereby all sins are forbidden.
And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. cxviii. 8,
where it is said: The law of the Lord is unspotted, i.e., allowing
no foulness of sin; converting souls, because it directs not
only exterior, but also interior acts ; the testimony of the Lord
is faithful, because of the certainty of what is true and right ;
giving wisdom to little ones, by directing man to an end super-
natural and Divine.
Reply Obj. i. By the natural law the eternal law is par-
ticipated proportionately to the capacity of human nature.
But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a
yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God,
whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.
Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must
proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to
proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the
precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above:
but there is need for certain additional principles, namely,
the precepts of the Divine law.
Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained to an
end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural
powers: consequently the comparison fails.
17 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW Q.^jlAkto
Fifth Article,
whether there is but one divine law ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there is but one Divine law.
Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is
but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to
God as to one king, according to Ps. xlvi. 8 : God is the King
of all the earth. Therefore there is but one Divine law.
Obj. 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which
the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law.
But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since
according to i Tim. ii. 4: He will have all men to be saved,
and to come to the knowledge of the truth. Therefore there is
but one Divine law.
Obj. 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to
the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according
as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural
knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. vii. 12) : The priest-
hood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be
made of the law. But the priesthood is twofold, as stated
in the same passage, viz., the levitical priesthood, and the
priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold,
namely, the Old Law and the New Law.
/ answer that. As stated in the First Part (Q. XXX., A. 3),
distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be
distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are
altogether specifically different, e.g., a horse and an ox.
Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species,
e.g., a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is
divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. iii.
24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to
that of a child under a pedagogue ; but the state under the
New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is no longer under
a pedagogue.
Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws
II. 3 2
Q. 91 . Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 18
is to be taken in connection with the three conditions per-
taining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it
belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its
end, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). This good may be
twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to
this, man was directly ordained l:)y the Old Law: wherefore,
at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the
earthly kingdom of the Chananseans (Exod. iii. 8, 17).
Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to
this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the
very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the
kingdom of heaven, saying (Matth. iv. 17) : Do penance, for
the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Hence Augustine says
{Contra Faust, iv.) that promises of temporal goods are con-
tained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old ;
hut the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.
Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts
according to the order of righteousness (A. 4) : wherein also
the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our
internal acts, according to Matth. v. 20: Unless your justice
abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall
not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Hence the saying that
the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the
mind (3 Sentent., dist. xL).
Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe
its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of
punishment : but the New Law, by love, which is poured into
our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law,
but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says
[Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii.) that in a word the
difference between the Law and the Gospel is this — fear and
love.
Reply Obj. i. As the father of a family issues different
commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one
King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while
they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law,
when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater
capacity for Divine things.
19 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW QoiArtG
Reply Obj. 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved
otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts iv. 12:
There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be
saved. Consequently the law that brings all to salvation
could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But
before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of
whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudi-
ments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare
them to receive Him.
Reply Obj. 3. The natural law directs man by way of
certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the
imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the
Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to
which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same
relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be
twofold, as already explained.
Sixth Article,
whether there is a law in the fomes of sin ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there is no law of the ' fomes '
of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the law is based on
reason. But the ' fomes ' of sin is not based on reason, but
deviates from it. Therefore the * fomes ' has not the nature
of a law.
Obj. 2. Further, every law is binding, so that those who
do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not
called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of
the ' fomes ' ; but rather from his following them. Therefore
the ' fomes ' has not the nature of a law.
Obj. 3. Further, the law is ordained to the common good,
as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). But the * fomes ' inclines us,
not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore
the ' fomes ' has not the nature of sin.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (Rom. vii. 23) : / sec
another law in my members, fighting against the law of my
mind.
Q. 91. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20
/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2; Q. XC, A. i ad i),
the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and
measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is
ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination
which may be found in things subject to the law, is called a
law by participation, as stated above (ibid.). Now those
who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination
from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his
subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects
to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a
military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly;
thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of
some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to
be imder another law, as it were : thus if a soldier be turned
out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercan-
tile legislation.
Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures
have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as
it were, a law for one, is against the law for another:
thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law
of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek
animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine
ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural
condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason:
and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that
nothing either beside or against reason could take man
unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell
under the influence of his sensual impulses : in fact this hap-
pens to each one individually, the more he deviates from
the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to
the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuahty, according
to Ps. xlviii. 21: Man, when he was in honour, did not under-
stand : he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them.
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called
the * fomes,' in other animals has simply the nature of a law,
(yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things),
by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not
21 THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW Q. 91. Art. 6
the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from
the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God,
man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of
its vigour, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so
far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving
man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.
Reply Obj. i. This argument considers the * fomes ' in itself ,
as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature
of a law, as stated above, but according as it results from
the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say
that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard
labour for some misdeed.
Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers law in the light
of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who
deviate from the law become transgressors. But the * fomes '
is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as
stated above.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the ' fomes * as to
its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if
the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other
animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to
the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual.
And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to
reason. But it is called the ' fomes ' in so far as it strays
from the order of reason.
QUESTION XCII.
OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW.
[In Two Articles.)
We must now consider the effects of law ; under which head
there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether an effect of law
is to make men good ? (2) Whether the effects of law are
to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the
Jurist states ?
First Article,
whether an effect of law is to make men good ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it is not an effect of law to make
men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue,
as stated in Ethic, ii. is that which makes its subject good.
But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who
works it in us without us, as we stated above (Q. LV., A. 4) in
giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not
make men good.
Obj. 2. Further, Law does not profit a man unless he
obeys it. But the very fact that a man obe^^s a law is due
to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presup-
posed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good.
Obj. 3. Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as
stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). But some behave well in
things regarding the community, who behave ill in things
regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the business of
the law to make men good.
Obj. 4. Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philoso-
pher says [Polit. iii.). But a tyrant does not intend the
22
23 THE EFFECTS OF LAW Q.92.ART. i
good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit.
Therefore law does not make men good.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, ii.) that the
intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, A. 1 ad2\ A A. 3,4),
a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by
whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any
subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to
that by which it is regulated : thus we see that the virtue of
the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their
being obedient to reason ; and accordingly the virtue of every
subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler, as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i.). But every law aims at being
obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is
evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to
their proper virtue: and since virtue is that which makes its
subject good, it follows that the proper effect of law is to
make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in
some particular respect. For if the intention of the law-
giver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regu-
lated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect
of the law is to make men good simply. If, however, the
intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply
good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition
to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good
simply, but in respect to that particular government. In
this way good is found even in things that are bad of them-
selves : thus a man is called a good robber, because he works
in a way that is adapted to his end.
Reply Obj. i. Virtue is twofold, as explained above
(Q. LXIIL, A. 2), viz., acquired and infused. Now the
fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both,
but in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue;
while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters
it when it already exists. And since law is given for the
purpose of directing human acts ; as far as himian acts con-
duce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore
the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics
Q. 92. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24
{Ethic, ii.) that lawgivers make men good by habituating them
to good works.
Reply Obj. 2. It is not always through perfect goodness
of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through
fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictate
of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above
(Q. LXIIL, A. I).
Reply Obj. 3. The goodness of any part is considered in
comparison with the whole ; hence Augustine says {Conf. iii.)
that unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole.
Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible
that a man be good, unless he be well proportionate to the
common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless
its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common
good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be
virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But
it is enough for the good of the community, that the other
citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of
their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says [Polit. iii.) that
the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but
the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a
good man.
Reply Obj. 4. A tyrannical law, through not being accord-
ing to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a
perversion of law ; and yet in so far as it is something in the
nature of a law, it aims at the citizens being good. For all
it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance
made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed
by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with
respect to that particular government.
Second Article,
whether the acts of law are suitably assigned ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the acts of law are not suitably
assigned as consisting in command, prohibition, permission
and punishment. For every law is a general precept, as the
25 THE EFFECTS OF LAW Q. 92. Art. 2
jurist states (ibid.). But command and precept are the
same. Therefore the other three are superfluous.
Obj. 2. Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects
to be good, as stated above (A. i). But counsel aims at a
higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs
to law to counsel rather than to command.
Obj. 3. Further, just as punishment stirs a man to
good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is
reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward.
Obj. 4. Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make
men good, as stated above (A. i). But he that obeys the
law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good:
because although a good deed may be done through servile
fear, i.e., fear of punishment, it is not done well, as Augustine
says [Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii.). Therefore punishment
is not a proper effect of law.
On the contrary, Isidore says [Etym. v.) : Every law either
permits something, as : 'A brave man may demand his
reward ' .• or forbids something, as : * No man may ask a
consecrated virgin in marriage ' .* or punishes, as : * Let him
that commits a murder be put to death. "^
I answer that. Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason
asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, com-
manding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead
from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demon-
strative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles
to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means
to assent to the precept of the law.
Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts,
in which the law directs, as stated above (Q. XC, AA. i, 2;
Q. XCL, A. 4). Again, there are three kinds of human
acts: for, as stated above (Q. XVIIL, A. 8), some acts are
good genericaDy, viz., acts of virtue; and in respect of these
the act of the law is a precept or command, for the law
commands all acts of virtue [Ethic, v.). Some acts are evil
generically, viz., acts of vice, and in respect of these the law
forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in
respect of these the law permits ; and all acts that are either
Q. 92. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26
not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called
indifferent. — And it is the fear of punishment that law makes
use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect
punishment is an effect of law.
Reply Ohj. i. Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good,
so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking
precept in a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.
Reply Ohj. 2. To advise is not a proper act of law, but
may be within the competency even of a private person,
who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the Apostle, after
giving a certain counsel (i Cor. vii. 12) says: / speak, not the
Lord. Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of
law.
Reply Ohj. 3. To reward may also pertain to anyone : but
to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by
whose authority the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward
is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish.
Reply Ohj. 4. From becoming accustomed to avoid evil
and fulfil what is good, through fear of punishment, one is
sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's
own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads
men on to being good.
QUESTION XCIII.
OF THE ETERNAL LAW.
(7w Six Articles.)
We must now consider each law by itself; and (i) The
eternal law: (2) The natural law: (3) The human law : (4) The
old law: (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel.
Of the sixth law which is the law of the ' fomes,' sufhce what
we have said when treating of original sin.
Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
(i) What is the eternal law ? (2) Whether it is known
to all ? (3) Whether every law is derived from it ?
(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal
law ? (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the
eternal law ? (6) Whether all human things are subject
to it ?
First Article.
whether the eternal law is a sovereign type*
existing in god ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the eternal law is not a sover-
eign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal
law. But there are many types of things in the Divine
mind; for Augustine says [Qq. 83) that God made each thing
according to its type. Therefore the eternal law does not
seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
Ohj. 2. Further, it is essential to a law that it be pro-
mulgated by word, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 4). But
Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the First
* Ratio.
27
Q. 93. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 28
Part (Q. XXXIV., A. i) : whereas type refers to the Essence.
Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx.) :
We see a law above our minds, which is called truth. But
the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. There-
fore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not
the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law
is not the same as the sovereign type.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) that the
eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always
conform.
I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a
type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every
governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those
things that are to be done by those who are subject to his
government. And just as the type of the things yet to be
made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products
of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts
of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the
other conditions be present which we have mentioned
above (Q. XC). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator
of all things, in relation to which He stands as the artificer
to the products of his art, as stated in the First Part (Q. XIV.,
A. 8). Moreover He governs all the acts and movements
that are to be found in each single creature, as was also
stated in the First Part (Q. GUI., A. 5). Wherefore as the
type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things
are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so
the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their
due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the
eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom,
as directing all actions and movements.
Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking in that passage of
the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single
thing ; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction
and plurality, according to their different relations to
things, as stated in the First Part (Q. XV., A. 2). But law
is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the
29 THE ETERNAL LAW Q.qsArt. i
common good, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). And things,
wliich are in themselves different, may be considered as one,
according as they are ordained to one common thing. Where-
fore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.
Reply Obj. 2. With regard to any sort of word, two points
may be considered: viz., the word itself, and that which is
expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something
uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is
signified by the human word. The same applies to the
human mental word, which is nothing else than something
conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts
mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the
intellect of the Father is the name of a Person: but all
things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they
refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of
God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xv.). And among other things expressed by this
Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does
it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God:
yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship
between type and word.
Reply Obj. 3. The types of the Divine intellect do not
stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the
human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by
things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of
itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since
an opinion is tnte or false according as it answers to the reality.
But the Divine intellect is the measure of things : since each
thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect,
as was stated in the First Part (Q. XVL, A. i). Consequently
the Divine intellect is true in itself ; and its type is truth itself.
Second Article.
whether the eternal law is known to all ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the eternal law is not known
to all. Because, as the Apostle says (i Cor. ii. 11), the
Q. 9j. Ari. 2 TH E " SUiMMA THEOLOGICA " 30
tilings tliat arc of (rod no nuui hnowcth, but the Spirit of God.
\^\xi the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind.
Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says {Dc Lib. Arb. i.) the
eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should
be most orderly. But all do not know how all things
are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal
law.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says [De Vera Relig. xxxi.)
that the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man.
But according to Ethic, i. any man can judge well of what he
knows. Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) that
knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us.
I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first,
in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of
that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its
substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can
know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed
who see God in His Essence. But e^^er^ratiQual creature
knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every know-
ledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the
eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine
says [De Vera Relig. xxxi.). Now all men know the truth
to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of
the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the
knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this
respect are more or less cognisant of the eternal law.
Reply Obj. i. We cannot know the things that are of God,
as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us
in their effects, according to Rom. i. 20: The invisible things
of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made.
Reply Obj. 2. Although each one know^s the eternal law
according to his own capacity, in the way explained above,
yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made per-
fectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow
that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way afore-
31 THE ETERNAL LAW Q. 93. Art. 3
said, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are
most orderly.
Reply Obj. 3. To judge of a thing may be understood in
two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its
proper object, according to Job. xii. 11 : Doth not the car
discern words, and the palate of him that eatcth, the taste ?
It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes
when he says that anyone can judge well of what he knows,
by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true.
In another way we speak of a superior judging of a sub-
ordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he
should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge
of the eternal law.
^ Third Article,
whether every law is derived from the eternal law ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not every law is derived from
the eternal law. For there is a law of the ' fomes,' as stated
above (Q. XCI., A. 6), which is not derived from that Divine
law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the
prudence of the flesh, of which the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 7)
that it cannot be subject to the law of God. Therefore not
every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj. 2. Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the
eternal law, because, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 2), the
eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things
should be most orderly. But some laws are unjust, according
to Isa. X. I : Woe to them that make wicked laws. Therefore
not every law is derived from the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) that the
law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits
many things which are punished by Divine providence. But
the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated
above (A. i) . Therefore not even every good law is derived
from the eternal law.
On the contrary. Divine Wisdom says (Pro v. viii. 15) :
By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. But
Q. 93. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 32
the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated
above (A. i). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal
law.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, AA. i, 2), law
denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now
wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the
power of the second mover must needs be derived from the
power of the first mover; since the second mover does not
move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore
we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the
plan of government is derived by secondary governors
from the governor in chief: thus the plan of what is to be
done in a state flows from the king's command to his inferior
administrators : and again in things of art the plan of what-
ever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to
the under- craftsmen who work with their hands. Since
then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief
Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior
governors must be derived from the eternal law. But
these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides
the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake
of mghpreason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence
Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) that in temporal law there is
nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the
eternal law.
Reply Obj. i. The ' fomes' has the nature of law in man,
in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice;
and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the
eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin,
it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of
law, as stated above (Q. XCL, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2. Human law has the nature of law in so far
as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this
respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as
it deviates from reason, it is called an imjust law, and has
the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless even
an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law,
though being framed by one who is in power, is deprived
33 THE ETERNAL LAW Q. 93. Art. 4
from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God,
according to Rom. xiii. i.
Reply Obj. 3. Human law is said to permit certain things,
not as approving of them, but as being unable to direct them.
And many things are directed by the Divine law, which
human law is unable to direct, because more things are
subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very
fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot
direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It
would be different, were human law to sanction what the
eternal law condemns. Consequently it does not follow
that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that
it is not on a perfect equality with it.
Fourth Article.
^^
WHETHER NECESSARY AND ETERNAL THINGS ARE SUBJECT
TO THE ETERNAL LAW ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that necessary and eternal things
are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable
is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for
it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason.
But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's
will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal.
Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the
eternal law.
Obj. 2. Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject
to the King's law. Now the Son, according to i Cor. xv.
28, 24, shall be subject . . . to God and the Father, . . . when
He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him. Therefore
the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Further, the eternal law is Divine providence
as a type. But many necessary things are subject to
Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal
substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even
necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be
II- 3 3
O. 03. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 34
otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws
are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as
explained above (Q. XCIL, A. 2). Therefore necessary
things arc not subject to the eternal law.
/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), the eternal law is
the type of the Divine government. Consequently what-
ever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the
eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine
government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The
application of this distinction may be gathered by looking
around us. For those things are subject to human govern-
ment, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the
nature of man is not subject to human government; for
instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Ac-
cordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it be
contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while
things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not
subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.
Reply Obj. i. We may speak of God's will in two ways.
First, as to the will itself : and thus, since God's will is His
very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine government,
nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal
law. Secondly, we may speak of God's will, as to the
things themselves that God wills about creatures; which
things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are
planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things
God's will is said to be reasonable (rationalis) : though re-
garded in itself it should rather be called their type (ratio) .
Reply Obj. 2. God the Son was not made by God, but
was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject
to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but rather is
Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as
Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi.). But He is said
to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature,
in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater
than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those
necessary things that are created.
35 THE ETERNAL LAW Q. 93. Art. 5
Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says [Mctaph. v.), some
necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus
they derive from something else the fact that they cannot
be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint ;
for whatever is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far
as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.
Fifth Article.
whether natural contingents are subject to the
eternal law ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that natural contingents are not
subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essen-
tial to law, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 4). But a law
cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to
whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore
none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;
and consequently natural contingents are not.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat
of reason, as stated in Ethic, i. But the eternal law is the
supreme type, as stated above (A. i.) Since then natural
contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are
altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject
to the eternal law.
Obj. 3. Further, the eternal law is most efhcient. But
in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are
not subject to the eternal law.
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. viii. 29) : When He
compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters,
that they should not pass their limits.
I answer that. We must speak otherwise of the law of
man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For
the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject
to man. The reason of this is because law directs the
actions of those that are subject to the government of
someone; wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a
law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding
Q. 93. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36
the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the
act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational
creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others,
as stated above (Q. I., A. 2). Consequently man cannot
impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may
be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational
beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pro-
nouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule
which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a
kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject
to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles
of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to
command the whole of nature, according to Ps. cxlviii. 6:
He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away. And thus
all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject
^r-i'.r- - - I - i.i, I, •*
to the eternal law. ConsequentlyQrrational^creatures are
subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine
providence; but not, as (mtional creatures are, through
understanding the Divine commandment.
Reply Ohj. i. The impression of an inward active principle
is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to
men : because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man
a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.
Reply Ohj. 2. Irrational creatures neither partake of nor
are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of
the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the power of
Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason
does. And as the members of the human body are moved
at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of
reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to
reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God,
without, on that account, being rational.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the defects which occur in natural
things are outside the order of particular causes, they are
not outside the order of universal causes, especially of the
First Cause, i.e., God, from Whose providence nothing can
escape, as stated in the First Part (Q. XXII., A. 2). And
37 THE ETERNAL LAW g. 93. Art. 6
since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as
stated above (A. i), hence the defects of natural things are
subject to the eternal law.
Sixth Article.
whether all human affairs are subject to the
eternal law ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not all human affairs are
subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. v. 18) :
// you are led by the spirit you are not under the law. But
the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led
by the spirit of God, according to Rom. viii. 14: Whosoever
are led by the Spirit of God , they are the sons of God. Therefore
not all men are under the eternal law.
Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 7) : The
prudence (Vulg., wisdom) of the flesh is an enemy to God : for
it is not subject to the law of God. But many are those in
whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all
men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law
of God.
Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) that the
eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good,
a life of blessedness. But those who are already blessed,
and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit.
Therefore they are not under the eternal law.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Civ. Dei, xix.) : Nothing
evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by
Him the peace of the universe is administered.
I answer that. There are two ways in which a thing is
subject to the eternal law, as explained above (A. 5) : first,
by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge;
secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e., by partaking
of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle:
and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to
the eternal law, as stated above {ibid.). But since the
rational nature, together with that which it has in common
Q. 93. Art. 6 THE " SUMM.A THEOLOGICA " 38
with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as
it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law
in both ways; because while each rational creature has
some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (A. 2),
it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony
with the eternal law; for we are naturally adapted to he the
recipients of virtue [Ethic, ii.).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent
destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural
inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and,
moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by
passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are
found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural
knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith
and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to
good, there is the added interior motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal
law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked
are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions,
indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclina-
tion thereto, are imperfect : but this imperfection on the part
of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they
suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, accord-
ing as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence
Augustine says [De Lib. Arb. i.) : / esteem that the righteous
act according to the eternal law ; and [De Catech. Rud. xviii.) :
Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God
knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with
most suitable laws.
Reply Ohj. 1. This saying of the Apostle may be under-
stood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under
the law, through being pinned down thereby, against his
will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says
that he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds, through
fear of the punishment threatened by the law, and not from
love of virtue. In this way the spiritual man is not under
the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity
which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly,
39 THE ETERNAL LAW Q. 93. Art. 6
it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man,
who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy
Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy
Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated
above (A. 4 ad 2) ; it follows that such works, in so far as
they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The
Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. iii. 17) : Where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.
Reply Obj. 2. The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject
to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to
actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the
law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer
punishment according to the law of Divine justice. Never-
theless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate
so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and con-
sequently there remains in man the inclination to act in
accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above
(Q. LXXXV., A. 2) that sin does not destroy entirely the
good of nature.
Reply Obj. 3. A thing is maintained in the end and moved
towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity
which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also
the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply
that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve
happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law
that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an
unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the
damned are under the eternal law.
QUESTION XCIV.
OF THE NATURAL LAW.
{In Six Articles.)
We must now consider the natural law; concerning which
there are six points of inquiry: (i) What is the natural
law ? (2) What are the precepts of the natural law ?
(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural
law ? (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all ?
(5) Whether it is changeable ? (6) Whether it can be
abolished from the heart of man ?
First Article,
whether the natural law is a habit ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the natural law is a habit.
Because, as the Philosopher says [Ethic, ii.), there are three
things in the soul, power, habit and passion. But the natural
law is not one of the soul's powers : nor is it one of the
passions; as we may see by going through them one by
one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Obj. 2. Further, Basil (Damascene, De Fide Orthod. iv.)
says that the conscience or synderesis is the law of our mind ;
which can only apply to the natural law. But the synderesis
is a habit, as was shown in the First Part (Q. LXXIX.,
A. 12). Therefore the natural law is a habit.
Obj. 3. Further, the natural law abides in man always, as
will be shown further on (A. 6)'. But man's reason, which
the law regards, does not always think about the natural
law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit.
40
41 THE NATURAL LAW Q. 94 Art. 1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi.)
that a habit is thai whereby something is done when necessary.
But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and
in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural
law is not a habit.
/ answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways.
First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is
not a habit. For it has been stated above (Q. XC, A. i
ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason,
just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which
a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it : for
he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar.
Since then a habit is that by which^we acjL. a law cannot
be a habit groperly and essentially.
Secondly, Ihe term habit may be applied to that which
we hold by a habit : thus faith may mean that which we hold
by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural
law are sometimes considered by reason actually, w^hile
sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this
way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in specu-
lative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the
habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the
principles the habit of which we possess.
Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher proposes there to discover
the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a
principle of action, he mentions only those things which are
principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits and passions.
But there are other things in the soul besides these three:
there are acts; thus to will is in the one that wills; again,
things known are in the knower; moreover its own natural
properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.
Reply Obj. 2. Synderesis is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural
law, which are the first principles of human actions.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the natural law
is held habitually : and this is granted.
To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply
that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which
Q. 94. Art. z THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 42
is in him habitually, on account of some impediment: thus,
on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of
science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age,
a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles,
or the natural law, which is in him habitually.
Second Article.
whether the natural law contains several precepts,
or one only ?
' we proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the natural law contains, not
several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept,
as stated above (Q. XCII., A. 2). If therefore there were
many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that
there are also many natural laws.
Ohj. 2. Further, the natural law is consequent to human
nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as
to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but
one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity
of nature as a whole ; or there are many, by reason of the
number of parts of human nature. The result would be
that even things relating to the inclination of the con-
cupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
Ohj. 3. Further, law is something pertaining to reason,
as stated above (Q. XC, A. i). Now reason is but one in
man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.
On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man
stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles
to matters of demonstration. But there are several first
indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several
precepts of the natural law.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XCL, A. 3), the precepts
of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first
principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason;
because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is
said to be self-evident in two ways : first, in itself ; secondly,
in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident
43 THE NATURAL LAW 0.94. Art. 2
in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of tlie
subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of
the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-
evident. For instance, this proposition, Man is a rational
being, is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says
man, says a rational being : and yet to one who knows not
what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence
it is that, as Boethius says (Dc Hebdom.), certain axioms
or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such
are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as,
Every whole is greater than its part, and, Things equal to one
and the same are equal to one another. But some propositions
are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the mean-
ing of the terms of such propositions : thus to one who under-
stands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an
angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not
evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are
apprehended universally. For that which, before aught
else, falls under apprehension, is being, the notion of which
is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends.
Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same
thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is
based on the notion of being and not-being : and on this
principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv.
Now as being is the first thing that falls under the appre-
hension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under
the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed
, to action : since every agent acts for an end under the aspect
of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical
reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good
is that which all things seek after. Hence tMs is the first_
precept of law, that good is to be done and ensued, and evil is
to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based
upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts
of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. A ,
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil^ ^
o. 94. Art. z THI^: " SUMMA THKOLOGICA " 44
the nature ol a contrary, hence it is that all those things
to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally appre-
hended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects
of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of
>- avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
[ inchnations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.
1 Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good
' in accordance with the nature which he has in common
with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the
preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and
by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of pre-
serving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs
to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination
: to things that pertain to him more specially, according to
that nature which he has in common with other animals:
and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to
belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all
animals [Pandect. Just. I., Tit. I.), such as sexual intercourse,
education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in
man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his
reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a
natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to
live in society : and in this respect, whatever pertains to this
inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to
; live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
Reply Ohj. i. All these precepts of the law of nature
have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they
flow from one first precept.
Reply Ohj. 2. AH the inclinations of any parts whatsoever
of human nature, e.g., of the concupiscible and irascible
parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the
natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated
above : so that the precepts of the natural law are many in
themselves, but are based on one common foundation.
Reply Ohj. 3. Although reason is one in itself, yet it
directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be
ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.
45 THE NATURAL LAW Q. 94. Art. 3
Third Article.
whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the
natural law ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not all acts of virtue are pre-
scribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above
(Q. XC, A. 2) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to
the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained
to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially
in regard to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of
virtue are the subject of natural law.
Ohj. 2. Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous
act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the
natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against
nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.
Ohj. 3. Further, those things which are according to
nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not
common to all : since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious
in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed
by the natural law.
On the contrary, Damascene says [De Fide Orthod. iii.) that
virtues are natural. Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject
of the natural law.
/ answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two
ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such
and such acts considered in their proper species. If then
we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus
all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been
stated (A. 2) that to the natural law belongs everything
to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now
each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is
suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to
give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper
form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to
act according to reason: and this is to act according to
virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue
Q. 94. Art. 3 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 46
are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason
naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak
of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e., in their
proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by
the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to
which nature does not incline at first; but which, through
the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be con-
ducive to well-living.
Reply Obj. i. Temperance is about the natural concu-
piscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are
indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as
other matters of law are ordained to the moral common
good.
Reply Obj. 2. By human nature we may mean either that
which is proper to man — and in this sense all sins, as being
against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene
states (De Fide Orthod. ii.) : or we may mean that nature
which is common to man and other animals; and in this
sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature ; thus
contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all
animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special
name of the unnatural crime.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers acts in themselves.
For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain
acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and
becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being
out of proportion to them.
Fourth Article,
whether the natural law is the same in all men ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the natural law is not the same
in all. For it is stated in the Decretals [Dist. i.) that the
natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the
Gospel. But this is not common to all men; because, as it is
written (Rom. x. 16), all do not obey the gospel. Therefore
the natural law is not the same in all men.
47 THE NATURAL LAW Q. 94. Art. 4
Obj. 2. Further, Things which are according to the law are
said to be just, as stated in Ethic, v. But it is stated in the
same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be
subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even
the natural law is not the same in all men.
Obj. 3. Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural
law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according
to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined
to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others
to the desire of honours, and other men to other things.
Therefore there is not one natural law for all.
On the contrary, Isidore says [Etym. v.) : The natural law
is common to all nations.
I answer that, As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural
law belongs those thing's to which a man is inclined naturally :
and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act
according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the
common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative
reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from
the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is
busied chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be other-
wise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal
principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical
reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters,
about which human actions are concerned : and consequently,
although there is necessity in the general principles, the more
we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we
encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters
truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as
to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as
regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles
which are called common notions. But in matters of action,
truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to
matters of detail, but only as to the general principles : and
where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is
not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that, as regards the general prin-
ciples whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth
Q. 94. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 48
or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all.
As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the
truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all:
thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are
together equal to two right angles, although it is not known
to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical
reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor,
where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is
right and true for all to act according to reason: and from
this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods
entrusted to another should be restored to their owner.
Now this is true for the majority of cases : but it may happen
in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore
unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust ; for instance if
they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's
country. And this principle will be found to fail the more,
according as we descend further into detail, e.g., if one were
to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such
and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because
the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the
number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it
be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to
general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude
and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail,
which are conclusions, as i4! vvfft, of those general principles,
it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to
rectitude and as to knowledge ; and yet in some few cases it
may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles
(just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to
knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion,
or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature ; thus formerly,
theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law,
was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius
Caesar relates {De Bello Gall. vi.).
Reply Ohj. i. The meaning of the sentence quoted is
not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel
49 THE NATURAL LAW g. 94. Art. 5
belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things
that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the
natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian,
after sa^ang that the natural law is what is contained in the
Law and the Gospel, adds at once, by way of example, by
which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be
done by.
Reply Obj. 2. The saying of the Philosopher is to be under-
stood of things that are naturally just, not as general
principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having
rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.
Reply Obj, 3. As, in man, reason rules and commands the
other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the
other powers must needs be directed according to reason.
Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their
inclinations should be directed according to reason.
Fifth Article,
whether the natural law can be changed ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the natural law can be changed.
Because on Ecclus. xvii. q, He gave them instructions, and
the law of life, the gloss says : He wished the law of the letter
to be written, in order to correct the law of nature. But that
which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law
can be changed.
Obj. 2. Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and
theft are against the natural law. But we find these things
changed by God : as when God commanded Abraham to slay
his innocent son (Gen. xxii. 2) ; and when He ordered the
Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians
(Exod. xh. 35) ; and when He commanded Osee to take to
himself a wife of fornications [Osee i. 2). Therefore the
natural law can be changed.
Obj. 3. Further, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the possession
of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of
natural law. But these things are seen to be changed by
n-3 4
Q. 94. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 50
human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is
subject to change.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals {Dist. v.) : The
natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature.
It does not vary according to time, hut remains unchangeable.
I answer that, A change in the natural law may be imder-
stood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this
sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed:
since many things for the benefit of human life have been
added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine
law and by human laws.
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood
by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according
to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural
law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in
its secondary principles, which, as we have said (A. 4), are
certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first
principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it
prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed
in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some
special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as
stated above (A. 4).
Reply Ohj. i. The written law is said to be given for the
correction of the natural law, either because it supplies
what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural
law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain
matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are
naturally evil ; which perversion stood in need of correction.
Reply Ohj. 2. All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die
the death of nature : which death of nature is inflicted by the
power of God on account of original sin, according to
I Kings ii. 6: The Lord killeth and maketh alive. Conse-
quently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on
any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever.
— In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife ;
who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God.
Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command
of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. — The same applies
51 THE NATURAL LAW Q. 94. Art. 5
to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For
whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all
things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner,
whereas it is in this that theft consists. — -Nor is it only in
human things, that whatever is commanded by dod is
right ; but also in natural things, whatever is done by dod, is,
in some way, natural, as stated in the First Part (Q. CV.,
A. 6 ad 1).
Reply Obj. 3. A thing is said to belong to the natural law
in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g.,
that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because
nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say Ihat
for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did
not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense,
the possession of all things in common and universal freedom
are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the dis-
tinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by
nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of
human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed
in this respect, except by addition.
Sixth Article.
whether the law^ of nature can be abolished
from the heart of man ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the natural law can be abolished
from the heart of man. Because on Rom. ii. 14, When the
Gentiles who have not the law, etc., the gloss says that the law
of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the
heart of man when he is restored by grace. But the law of
righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of
nature can be blotted out.
Obj. 2. Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than
the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin.
Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.
Obj. 3. Further, that which is established by law is made
just. But many things are enacted by men, which are
g. 94. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52
contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature
can be abolished from the heart of man.
On the contrary, Augustine says {Conf. ii.) : Thy law is
written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not.
But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural
law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.
/ answer that. As stated above (AA. 4, 5), there belong to
the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are
known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more
detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following
closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the
natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from
men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a par-
ticular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying
the general principle to a particular point of practice, on
account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated
above (Q. LXXVIL, A. 2). — But as to the other, i.e., the
secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from
the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in specu-
lative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclu-
sions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among
some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle
states (Rom. i.), were not esteemed sinful.
Reply Ohj. i. Sin blots out the law of nature in particular
cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the
secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated
above.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although grace is more efficacious than
nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore
more enduring.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument is true of the secondary
precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators
have framed certain enactments which are unjust.
QUESTION XCV.
OF HUMAN LAW.
{In Four Articles. )
We must now consider human law; and (i) this law con-
sidered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Its utiHty
(2) Its origin. (3) Its quality. (4) Its division.
First Article,
whether it was useful for laws to be framed
BY MEN ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it was not useful for laws to be
framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that
man be made good thereby, as stated above (Q. XCIL, A. i).
But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by
means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of
laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.
Ohj. 2. Further, As the Philosopher says [Ethic, v.), men
have recourse to a judge as to animate justice. But animate
justice is better than inanimate justice, which is contained
in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execu-
tion of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges,
than to frame laws in addition.
Ohj. 3. Further, every law is framed for the direction of
human actions, as is evident from what has been stated
above (Q. XC, A A. i, 2). But since human actions are
about singulars, which are infinite in number, matters per-
taining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken
53
Q. 95. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOrxICA " 54
into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who
looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have
been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment
of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there
was no need of hu^an laws.
On the contrary, Isidore says {Etym. v.) : Laws were fuade
that in fear thereof human audacity might he held in check,
that innocence might he safeguarded in the midst of wickedness ,
and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked
from doing harm. But these things are most necessary to
mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws
should be made.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. LXIIL, A. i ; Q. XCIV.,
A. 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the per-
fection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some
kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by
industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing.
Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz., his
reason and his hands ; but he has not the full complement, as
other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of
clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could
suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the
perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man
from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined,
and especially the young, who are more capable of being
trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training
from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue.
And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of
virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or
rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which
is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved,
and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was
necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and
fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing,
and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being
habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly
what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous.
Now this kind of training, v/hich compels through fear of
55 HUMAN LAW Q.95.ART. i
punishment, is the disciphne of laws. Therefore, in order
that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for
laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says [Polit. i.),
as man is the most noble of animals if he he perfect in virtue,
so is he the lowest of all, if he he severed from law and righteous-
ness ; because man can use his reason to devise means of
satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals
are unable to do.
Reply Ohj, i. Men who are well disposed are led willingly
to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion : but
men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless
they are compelled.
Reply Ohj, 2. As the Philosopher says {Rhet. i.), it is hetter
that all things he regulated hy law, than left to he decided hy
judges : and this for three reasons. First, because it is
easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws,
than to find the many who would be necessary to judge
aright of each single case. — Secondly, because those who
make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make;
whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced
as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is
right, by taking many instances into consideration, than
by considering one solitary fact. — Thirdly, because law-
givers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas
those who sit in judgment judge of things present, towards
which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found
in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was
necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how
to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision
of men.
Reply Ohj. 3. Certain individual facts which cannot be
covered by the law have necessarily to he committed to judges,
as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance,
concerning something that has happened or not happened, and
the like.
Q. 95- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 56
X
Second Article.
WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE
NATURAL LAW ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not every human law is derived
from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic, v.)
that the legal just is that which originally was a matter of
indifference. But those things which arise from the natural
law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enact-
ments of human laws are not all derived from the natural
law.
Ohj. 2. Further, positive law is contrasted with natural
law, as stated by Isidore {Etym. v.) and the Philosopher
(Ethic, v.). But those things which flow as conclusions
from the general principles of the natural law belong to the
natural law, as stated above (Q. XCIV., A. 4). Therefore
that which is established by human law does not belong to
the natural law.
Obj. 3. Further, the law of nature is the same for all;
since the Philosopher says (Ethic, v.) that the natural just
is that which is equally valid everywhere. If therefore human
laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow
that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.
Obj. 4. Further, it is possible to give a reason for things
which are derived from the natural law. But it is not
possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the
lawgivers (Pandect. Justin. Lib. I., Tit. III., Art V., De
legibus, etc.). Therefore not all human laws are derived
from the natural law.
On the contrary, TuUy says (Rhetor, ii.) : Things which
emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were
sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.), that
which is not just seems to be no law at all : wherefore the
force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now
inhuman affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right,
57 HUMAN LAW Q. 95. Art. 2
according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason
is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated
above (0. XCL, A. 2 ad 2). Consequently every human
law has iust so much of the nature of law, as it is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects
from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion
of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived
fix)m the natural law in twoways: first, as a conclusion
from premisses, secondly, by way of defermination of certain
generalities. The firsl: way is like to that by which, in
sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the
principles: while the second mode is hkened to that whereby,
in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details:
thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of
a house to some particular shape. Some things are there-
fore derived from the general principles of the natural law,
by way of conclusions; e.g., that one must not kill may be
derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should
do harm to no man : while some are derived therefrom by
way of determination; e.g., the law of nature has it that the
evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this
or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the
human law. But those things which are derived in the
first way, are contained in human law not as emanating
therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural
law also. But those things which are derived in the second
way, have no other force than that of human law.
Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking of those enact-
ments which are by way of determination or specification
of the precepts of the natural law.
Reply Obj. 2. This argument avails for those things that
are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
Reply Obj. 3. The general principles of the natural law
cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of
the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the
diversity of positive laws among various people.
Q. 95. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 58
Reply Ohj. 4. These words of the Jurist are to be under-
stood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining
particular points of the natural law : on which determina-
tions the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as
on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what
is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says [Ethic, vi.) that in such
matters, we ought to pay as much attention to the un-
demonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass
us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations.
Third Article.
WHETHER Isidore's description of the quality of
POSITIVE LAW IS APPROPRIATE ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that Isidore's description of the
quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says:
Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to
the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary,
useful ; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to mis-
understanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the cor/imon
good of the people. Because he had previously expressed
the quality of law in three conditions, saying that law is
anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion,
be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal. There-
fore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
Obj. 2. Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully
says [De Offic. vii.). Therefore after saying honest it was
superfluous to add just.
Obj. 3. Further, written law is condivided with custom,
according to Isidore [Etym. ii.). Therefore it should not be
stated in the definition of law that it is according to the
custom of the country.
Obj. 4. Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways.
It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise:
and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to
human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned
59 HUMAN LAW Q-95Art. 3
with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be neces-
sary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefuhiess.
Therefore it is superfluous to say both necessary and useful.
On the contrary stands the authority of Isidore.
/ answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form
must be determined proportionately to that end; as the
form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii.).
Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a
form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both
these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both
something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure
ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher
measure is twofold, viz., the Divine law and the natural
law, as explained above (A. 2; Q. XCIII., A. 3). Now
the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the Jurist
states {Pandect. Just. i.). Wherefore Isidore in deter-
mining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three con-
ditions; viz., that it foster religion, inasmuch as it is pro-
portionate to the Divine law; that it be helpful to discipline,
inasmuch as it is proportionate to the natural law; and that
it further the common weal, inasmuch as it is proportionate
to the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced
to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters
religion. And when he goes on to say that it should
be just, possible to nature, according to the customs of
the country, adapted to place and time, he implies that it
should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline
depends first on the order of reason, to which he refers by
saying just : — secondly, it depends on the ability of the
agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one
according to his ability, taking also into account the
ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on
children as on adults) ; and should be according to human
customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no
heed to others: — thirdly, it depends on certain circum-
stances, in respect of which he says, adapted to place and
time. — The remaining words, necessary, useful, etc., mean
Q. 95. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 60
that law should further the common weal: so that necessity
refers to the removal of evils; usefulness to the attainment
of good; clearness of expression, to the need of preventing
any harm ensuing from the law itself. — And since, as stated
above (Q. XC, A. 2), law is ordained to the common good,
this is expressed in the last part of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Fourth Article.
WHETHER Isidore's division of human laws is
APPROPRIATE ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that Isidore wrongly divided human
statutes or human law [Etym. v.). For under this law he
includes the law of nations, so called, because, as he says,
nearly all nations use it. But as he says, natural law is that
which is common to all nations. Therefore the law of nations
is not contained under positive human law, but rather
under natural law.
Obj. 2. Further, those laws which have the same force,
seem to differ not formally but only materially. But
statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees, and the
like which he mentions, all have the same force. Therefore
they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no
notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity.
Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate.
Obj. 3. Further, just as, in the state, there are princes,
priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. There-
fore it seems that, as this division includes military law, and
public law, referring to priests and magistrates; so also it
should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the
state.
Obj. 4. Further, those things that are accidental should
be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed
by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide
laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be
called the Cornelian law, another the Falcidiun law, etc.
6i HUMAN LAW o. 95. Art. 4
On the contrary, The authority of Isidon; suihces.
/ answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect
of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a
soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion
of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and
of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; but not
in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely
beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human
law, many things are contained, in respect of any of which
human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in
the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be
derived from the law of nature, as explained above (A. 2).
In this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations
and civil law, according to the two ways in which some-
thing may be derived from the law of nature, as stated
above (A. 2). Because, to the law of nations belong those
things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclu-
sions from premisses, e.g., just buyings and sellings, and the
like, without which men cannot live together, which is a
point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social
animal, as is proved in Polit. i. But those things which are
derived from the law of nature by way of particular deter-
mination, belong to the civil law, according as each state
decides on what is best for itself.
Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be
ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect
human law may be divided according to the different kinds
of men who work in a special way for the common good:
e.g., priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by
governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety
of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are
adapted to these men.
Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be
framed by that one who governs the community of the
state, as shown above (Q. XC, A. 3). In this respect,
there are various human laws according to the various
forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher
(Polit. iii.) one is monarchy, i.e., when the state is governed
Q. 95. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THP:OLOGICA " 62
by one ; and then we have Royal Ordinances. Another form
is aristocracy, i.e., government by the best men or men of
highest rank; and then we have the Authoritative legal
opinions (Responsa Prudentum) and Decrees of the Senate
{Senatus consiilta). Another form is oligarchy, i.e., govern-
ment by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have
Prcetorian, also called Honorary, law. Another form of
government is that of the people, which is called democracy,
and there we have Decrees of the commonalty [Plehiscita) .
There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether
corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally,
there is a form of government made up of all these, and
which is the best: and in this respect we have law
sanctioned by the Lords and Commons, as stated by Isidore
[loc. cit).
Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct
humxan actions. In this respect, according to the various
matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of
laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus
we have the Lex Julia about adultery, the Lex Cornelia
concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way,
not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters
to which they refer.
Reply Ohj. i. The law of nations is indeed, in some way,
natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because
it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion
that is not very remote from its premisses. Wherefore men
easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is distinct from the
natural law, especially from that natural law which is
common to all animals.
The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what
has been said.
QUESTION XCVI.
OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW.
{In Six Articles.)
W'e must now consider the power of human law. Under this
head there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether human law
should be framed for the community ? (2) Whether human
law should repress all vices ? (3) Whether human law is
competent to direct all acts of virtue ? (4) Whether it
binds man in conscience ? (5) Whether all men are subject
to human law ? (6) Whether those who are under the law
may act beside the letter of the law ?
First Article.
whether human law should be framed for the
community rather than for the individual ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that human law should be framed
not for the community, but rather for the individual. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic, v.) that the legal just . . . includes
all particular acts oj legislation . . . and all those matters
which are the subject of decrees, which are also individual
matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions.
Therefore law is framed not only for the community, but also
for the individual.
Obj. 2. Further, law is the director of human acts, as
stated above (Q. XC, A A. i, 2). But human acts are
about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be
framed, not for the community, but rather for the indi-
vidual.
t^3
Q. 96. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 64
Obj. 3. Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts,
as stated above (Q. XC, A A. i, 2). But a measure should
be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in
human acts no general proposition can be so certain as not
to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should
be framed not in general but for individual cases.
On the contrary, The Jurist says [Pandect. Justin. Lib. I.,
Tit. IIL, Art II., De legihus, etc.) that laws should he made
to suit the majority of instances ; and they are not framed
according to what may possibly happen in an individual case.
I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be propor-
tionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common
good; because, as Isidore says (Etym. ii.) that law should be
framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of
all the citizens. Hence human laws should be proportionate
to the common good. Now the common good comprises
many things. Wherefore law should take account of many
things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Be-
cause the community of the state is composed of many
persons ; and its good is procured by many actions ; nor is it
established to endure for only a short time, but to last
for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as
Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xxii.).
Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher [Ethic, v.) divides the legal
just, i.e., positive law, into three parts. For some things are
laid down simply in a general way: and these are the general
laws. Of these he says that the legal is that which originally
was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so
no longer : as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. — Some
things affect the community in one respect, and individuals
in another. These are called privileges, i.e., private laws, as
it were, because they regard private persons, although their
power extends to many matters; and in regard to these, he
adds, and further, all particular acts of legislation. — Other
matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being
applications of general laws to particular cases: such are
decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these,
he adds all matters subject to decrees.
65 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW Q. 96. Art. i
Reply Obj. 2. A principle of direction should be applic-
able to many; wherefore {Metaph. x.) the Philosopher says
that all things belonging to one genus, are measured by
one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were
as many rules or measures as there are things measured
or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use
consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law
would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one
single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made
for the purpose of directing individual actions ; whereas law
is a general precept, as stated above (Q. XCIL, A. 2, Obj. 2).
Reply Obj. 3. We must not seek the same degree of certainty
in all things {Ethic, i.). Consequently in contingent matters,
such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing
to be certain, as being true in the greater number of in-
stances, though at times and less frequently it fail.
X
Second Article.
WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS
ALL VICES ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it belongs to human law to
repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v.) that laws
were made in order that, in fear thereof, man''s audacity might
be held in check. But it would not be held in check suffi-
ciently, unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore
human law should repress all evils.
Obj. 2. Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make
the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless
he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to
human law to repress all vices.
Obj. 3. Further, human law is derived from the natural
law, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 2). But all vices are
contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should
repress all vices.
On the contrary. We read in De Lib. Arb. i. : It seems to me
that the law which is written for the governing of the people
".3 5
Q. 96. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 66
rightly permits these things, and that Divine providence
punishes them. But Divine providence punishes nothing
but vices. Therefore human law rightly allows some vices,
by not repressing them.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, A A. i, 2), law is
framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure
should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as
stated in Metaph. x., since different things are measured
by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men
should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore
says (Etym. ii.), law should be possible both according to
nature, and according to the customs of the country. Now
possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or
disposition : since the same thing is not possible to one who
has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has.
Thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown
man: for which reason the law for children is not the same
as for adults, since many things are permitted to children,
which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are
open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible
to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a
virtuous man.
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings,
the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore
human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous
abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it
is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those
/ that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of
= which human society could not be maintained : thus human
law prohibits murder, theft and suchlike.
Reply Obj. i. Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of
others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly
whereby one's neighbour is injured: and these sins are for-
bidden by human law, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2. The purpose of human law is to lead men to
virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not
lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of
those who are already virtuous, viz., that they should
6; THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW Q. 96. Art. 2
abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being
unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet
greater evils: thus it is written (Prov. xxx. 33): He that
violently hloweth his nose, hringeth out blood ; and (Matth.
ix. 17) that if new wine, i.e., precepts of a perfect life, is put
into old bottles, i.e., into imperfect men, the bottles break, and
the wine runneth out, i.e., the precepts are despised, and
those men, from contempt, break out into evils worse still.
Reply Obj. 3. The natural law is a participation in us of
the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal
law. Now Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. i.) : The law which
is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves un-
punished many things that are punished by Divine providence.
Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a
reason why it should be blamed for what it does. Wherefore,
too, human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden
by the natural law.
Third Article.
i
WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES ACTS OF ALL THE
VIRTUES ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that human law does not prescribe
acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts
of virtue. But human law does not prohibit all vices, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither does it prescribe all
acts of virtue.
Obj. 2. Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue.
But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a
virtue, cannot come under a precept of law. Therefore
human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, law is ordained to the common good, as
stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). But some acts of virtue are
ordained, not to the common good, but to private good.
Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
On the contrary. The Philosopher says {Ethic, v.) that the
law prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man, . . .
and the acts of the temperate man, . . . and the acts of the meek
Q. 96. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68
man : and in like manner as regards the other virtues and
vices, prescribing the former, forbidding the latter.
I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished
by their objects, as explained above (Q. LIV., A. 2; Q. LX.,
A. i; Q. LXII., A. 2). Now all the objects of virtues can
be referred either to the private good of an individual, or
to the common good of the multitude : thus matters of forti-
tude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or
for upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with
the other virtues. But law, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2)
is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no
virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Never-
theless human law does not prescribe concerning all the
acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are
ordainable to the common good, — either immediately, as
when certain things are done directly for the common good, —
or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things
pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed
in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
Reply Obj. i. Human law does not forbid all vicious acts,
by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe
all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice,
just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.
Reply Obj. 2. An act is said to be an act of virtue in two
ways. First, from the fact that a man does something
virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is right, and
an act of fortitude is to do brave things : and in this way law
prescribes certain acts of virtue. — Secondly an act of virtue
is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a
virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from
virtue : and it does not come under a precept of law, but is
the end at which every lawgiver aims.
Reply Obj. 3. There is no virtue whose act is not ordain-
able to the common good, as stated above, either mediately
or immediately.
69 THE 1\)\VER OF HUMAN LAW Q. 96. Art. 4
X
Fourth Article,
whether human law binds a man in conscience ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that human law does not bind a man
in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in
a court of higher power. But the power of man, which
frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore
human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court,
such as is the court of conscience.
Obj. 2. Further, the judgment of conscience depends
chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes
God's commandments are made void by human laws, ac-
cording to Matth. XV. 6: You have made void the command-
ment of God for your tradition. Therefore human law does
not bind a man in conscience.
Obj. 3. Further, human laws often bring loss of character
and injury on man, according to Isa. x. i et seq. : Woe to
them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write in-
justice ; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do violence to the
cause of the humble of My people. But it is lawful for anyone
to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore human laws do
not bind man in conscience.
On the contrary. It is written (i Pet. ii. 19) : This is thanks-
worthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering
wrongfully.
I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust.
If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience,
from the eternal law whence they are derived, according to
Prov. viii. 15: By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just
things. Now laws are said to be just, both from the end,
when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good, — and
from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made
does not exceed the power of the lawgiver, — and from their
form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, accord-
ing to an equality of proportion and with a view to the
common good. For, since one man is a part of the com-
u
Q. 96. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 70
munity, each man, in all that he is and has, belongs to the
community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the
whole ; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order
to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as
these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and
binding in conscience, and are legal laws.
On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first,
by being contrary to human good, through being opposed
to the things mentioned above: — either in respect of the end,
as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome
laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his
own cupidity or vainglory; — or in respect of the author, as
when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power com-
mitted to him; — or in respect of the form, as when burdens
are imposed unequally on the community, although with a
view to the common good. The like are acts of violence
rather than laws; because, as Augustine says {De Lib. Arh. i.),
a law that is not just, seems to he no law at all. Wherefore
such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in
order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a
man should even yield his right, according to Matth. v. 40,
41: If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto
him ; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other
two.
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to
the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law:
and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as
stated in Acts v. 29, we ought to obey God rather than men.
Reply Ohj. i. As the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. i, 2), all
human power is from God . . . therefore he that resisteth
the power, in matters that are within its scope, resisteth the
ordinance of God ; so that he becomes guilty according to
his conscience.
Reply Ohj. 2. This argument is true of laws that are con-
trary to the commandments of God, and which go beyond
the scope of (human) power. Wherefore in such matters
human law should not be obeyed.
71 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW q. 96. Art. 5
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument is true of a law that inflicts
unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from
God does not extend to this: wherefore neither in such
matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid
giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt.
Fifth Article,
whether all are subject to the law ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not all are subject to the law.
For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is
made. But the Apostle says (i Tim. i. 9) : The law is not
made for the just man. Therefore the just are not subject to
the law.
Ohj. 2. Further, Pope Urban says [Decret. xix.) : He that is
guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by
the public law. Now all spiritual men are led by the private
law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of
whom it is said (Rom. viii. 14) : Whosoever are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Therefore not all
men are subject to human law.
Obj. 3. Further, the Jurist says {Pandect. Justin, i.) that
the sovereign is exempt from the laws. But he that is exempt
from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are
subject to the law.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. xiii. i) : Let every
soul be subject to the higher powers. But subjection to a
power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that
power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, AA. i, 2; A. 3
ad 2), the notion of law contains two things; first, that it is
a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive power.
Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First,
as the regulated is subject to the regulator : and, in this way,
whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed
by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one
is not subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether
g. 96. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72
free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or
kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of
another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his
authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher
law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his
command, but not in those matters in which the subject
receives his orders from the emperor : for in these matters, he
is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since
he is directed by that of a higher. In this way, one who is
simply subject to a law, may not be subject thereto in cer-
tain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law.
Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the
coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous
and righteous are not subject to the law, but only the
wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the
will : but the will of the good is in harmony with the law,
whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Where-
fore in this sense the good are not subject to the law, but
only the wicked.
Reply Ohj. i. This argument is true of subjection by way
of coercion : for, in this way, the law is not made for the just
men : because they are a law to themselves, since they shew
the work of the law written in their hearts, as the Apostle says
(Rom. ii. 14, 15). Consequently the law does not enforce
itself upon them as it does on the wicked.
Reply Ohj. 2. The law of the Holy Ghost is above all lav/
framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as
they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject
to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the
guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless the very fact that
spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the
Holy Ghost, according to i Pet. ii. 13: Be ye subject . . .
to every human creature for God^s sake.
Reply Ohj. 3. The sovereign is said to be exempt from the
laiv, as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no
man is coerced by himself, and Taw has no coercive power
save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the
sovereign said to be exempt from the law, because none is
73 THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW Q. 96. Art. 5
competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the
law. ^Wherefore on Ps. L. 6: To Thee only have I sinned, a
gloss says that there, is no man who can judge the deeds of a
king. — But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is
subject to the law by his own will, according to the state-
ment (Extra, De Constit. cap. cum omnes) that whatever law
a man makes for another, he should keep himself. And a wise
authority says : ' Obey the law that thou makest thyself.^
Moreover the Lord reproaches those who say and do not ;
and who hind heavy burdens and lay them on men^s shoulders,
but with a finger of their own they will not move them (Matth.
xxiii. 3, 4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign
is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force ; but he
should fulfil it of his own free-will and not of constraint. —
Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is
expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it accord-
ing to time and place.
Sixth Article.
whether he who is under a law may act beside the
letter of the law ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that he who is subject to a law may
not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says
{De Vera Relig. xxxi.) : Although men judge about temporal
laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they
must pass judgment not on them, but according to them. But
if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he
observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass
judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who
is under a law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to
observe the intention of the lawgiver.
Obj. 3. Further, he alone is competent to interpret the
law who can make the law. But those who are subject to
the law cannot make the law. Therefore they have no
right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should
always act according to the letter of the law.
\
Q. 96. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74
Obj. 3. Further, every wise man knows how to explain
his intention by words. But those who framed the laws
should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom says (Prov. viii. 15):
By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. There-
fore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver
otherwise than b}^ the words of the law.
On the contrary, Hilary says [De Trin. iv.) : The meaning of
what is said is according to the motive for saying it : because
things are not subject to speech, but speech to things. There-
fore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver,
rather than to his very words.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. 4) , every law is directed
to the common weal of men, and derives the force and
nature of law accordingly. Hence the Jurist says [Pandect.
Justin, i.) : By no reason of law, or favour of equity, is it allow-
able for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those
useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man.
Now it happens often that the observance of some point of
law conduces to the common weal in the majority of in-
stances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then
the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he
shapes the law according to what happens most frequently,
by directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore
if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be
hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed.
For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an estab-
lished law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed,
this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, if it
were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain
citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great
loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to them: and
so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to
the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal,
which the lawgiver had in view.
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of
the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden
risk needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone
to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the
75 THE P0\\1':K OF HUMAN LAW Q. 96. Art. 6
state : those alone can do this who are in authority, and who,
on account of suchhkc cases, have the power to dispense
from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not
to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to
authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation,
since necessity knows no law.
Reply Ohj. I. He who in a case of necessity acts beside the
letter of the law, does not judge of the law; but of a particu-
lar case in which he sees that the letter of the law is not to
be observed.
Re-ply Ohj. 2. He who follows the intention of the lawgiver,
does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it
is evident, by reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver
intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must
either act according to the letter of the law, or consult those
in power.
Reply Ohj. 3. No man is so wise as to be able to take
account of every single case; wherefore he is not able suffi-
ciently to express in words all those things that are suit-
able for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver
were able to take all the cases into consideration, he ought
not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but
should frame the law according to that which is of most
common occurrence.
QUESTION XCVII.
OF CHANGE IN LAWS.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider change in laws: under which head
there are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether human law is
changeable ? (2) Whether it should be always changed,
whenever anything better occurs ? (3) Whether it is
abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force
of law ? (4) Whether the application of human law should
be changed by dispensation of those in authority ?
First Article,
whether human law should be changed in any way ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that human law should not be
changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived
from the natural law, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 2). But
the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human
law should also remain without any change.
Ohj. 2. Further, as the Philosopher says [Ethic, v.), a
measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is
the measure of human acts, as stated above (Q. XC,
AA. I, 2). Therefore it should remain without change.
Ohj. 3. Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and
right, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. 2). But that which is
right once is right always. Therefore that which is law
once, should be always law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i.) : A tem-
poral law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.
76
^^ CHANGE IN LAWS Q. 97. Art. i
1 answer thai, As stated above (Q. XCI., A. 3), human law
is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed.
Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human
law : one on the part of reason ; the other on the part of man
whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of
reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance
gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in
speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early
philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards per-
fected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical
matters: for those who first endeavoured to discover some-
thing useful for the human community, not being able by
themselves to take everything into consideration, set up
certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and
these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made
institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in
respect of the common weal.^"^—-^ ^
On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the
law can be rightly changed on account of the changed con-
dition of man, to whom different things are expedient accord-
ing to the difference of his condition. An example is pro-
posed by Augustine {JDe Lib. Arb. i.) : If the people have a
sense of moderation and responsibility , and are most careful
guardians oj the common weal, it is right to enact a law allow-
ing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the
government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on,
the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes,
and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals ; then
the right of appointing their public officials is rightly
forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few
good men.
Reply Obj. i. The natural law is a participation of the
eternal law, as stated above (Q. XCI., A. 2), and therefore
endures without change, owing to the unchangeabJeness and
perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But
the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore
his law is subject to change. — Moreover the natural law
contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting:
Q. 97. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 78
whereas human law contains certain particular precepts,
according to various emergencies.
Reply Ohj. 2. A measure should be as enduring as possible.
But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that
are subject to change. And therefore human law cannot be
altogether unchangeable.
Reply Ohj. 3. In corporal things, right is predicated abso-
lutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always
remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference
to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not
always adapted, as stated above: wherefore rectitude of
this kind is subject to change.
Second Article.
whether human law should always be changed,
whenever something better occurs ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that human law should be changed,
whenever something better occurs. Because human laws
are devised by human reason, like other arts. But in the
other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others,
if something better occurs. Therefore the same should
apply to human laws.
Ohj. 2. Further, by taking note of the past we can provide
for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed
when it was found possible to improve them, considerable
inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old
were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws
should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be
enacted.
Ohj. 3. Further, human laws are enacted about single acts
of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in sin-
gular matters, except by experience, which requires time, as
stated in Ethic, ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on
it is possible for something better to occur for legislation.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals {Dist. xii.) :
It is ahsurd, and a detestahle shame, that we should suffer those
79 CHANGE IN LAWS Q. 97. Art. 2
traditions to he chafiged which xvc have received from the
fathers of old.
I answer that, As stated above (A. i), human law is rightly
changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common
weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is
of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom
avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that what is
done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters,
is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is
changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so
far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should
never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common
weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm
done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either
from some very great and very evident benefit conferred by
the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the
case, due to the fact that either the existing law is clearly
unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore
the Jurist says [Pandect. Justin, i.) that in establishing new
laws, there should he evidence of the henefit to be derived, before
departing from a law which has long been considered just.
Reply Obj. i. Rules of art derive their force from reason
alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the
rule followed hitherto should be changed. But laws derive
very great force from custom, as the Philosopher states
[Polit. ii.) : consequently they should not be quickly changed.
Reply Obj. 2. This argument proves that laws ought to
be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the
sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency, as stated
above. This answer applies also to the Third Objection.
Third Article,
whether custom can obtain force of law ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that custom cannot obtain force of
law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived
from the natural law and from the Divine law, as stated
Q. 97. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 80
above (Q. XCIII., A. 3; Q. XCV., A. 2). But human custom
cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law.
Therefore neither can it change human law.
Obj. 2. Further, many evils cannot make one good. But
he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by
multiplying such acts, nothing good is the result. Now a
law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts.
Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere
custom should obtain force of law.
Obj. 3. Further, the framing of laws belongs to those
public men whose business it is to govern the community;
wherefore private individuals cannot make laws. But
custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore
custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan.) : The
customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors
are to be considered as laws. And those who throw contempt
on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who
disobey the law of God.
I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will
of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the
reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of
man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and
will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech,
so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a
man chooses as good that which he carries into execution.
But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both
changed and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior
movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by
actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a
custom, law can be changed and expounded ; and also some-
thing can be established which obtains force of law, in so far
as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of
the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually de-
clared ; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to
proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly,
custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the inter-
preter of law.
8i CHANGE IN LAWS Q. 97. Art. 3
Reply Obj. i. The natural and Divine laws proceed from
the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot
be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man,
but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom
can prevail over the Divine or natural laws : for Isidore says
(Synon. ii.) : Let custom yield to authority : evil customs should
be eradicated by law and reason.
Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. XCVL, A. 6), human
laws fail in some cases : wherefore it is possible sometimes to
act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law fails;
yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are
multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom
shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be
declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the con-
trary. If, however, the same reason remains, for which
the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that
prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the
custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming
useless, be that it is not possible according to the custom of the
country, which has been stated to be one of the conditions
of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole
people.
Reply Obj. 3. The people among whom a custom is intro- \
duced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and
able to make their own laws, the consent of the whole people
expressed by a custom counts far more in favour of a par-
ticular observance, than does the authority of the sovereign,
who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing
the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot
make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people
have not the free power to make their own laws, or to
abohsh a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless
with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of
law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs
to make laws for that people : because by the very fact that
they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is intro-
duced by custom.
11.3 6
y. 97. Akt. 4. THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 82
Fourth Article.
whether the rulers of the people can dispense from
human laws ?
Wc proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the rulers of the people cannot
dispense from human laws. For the law is established for
the common weal, as Isidore says [Etym. ii.). But the
common good should not be set aside for the private con-
venience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says
[Ethic, i.), the good of the nation is more godlike than the good
of one man. Therefore it seems that a man should not be
dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law.
Ohj. 2. Further, those who are placed over others are
commanded as follows (Deut. i. 17) : You shall hear the little
as well as the great ; neither shall you respect any man's person,
because it is the judgment of God. But to allow one man to
do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect
of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community cannot
grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of
the Divine law.
Obj. 3. Further, human law, in order to be just, should
accord with the natural and Divine laws : else it would not
foster religion, nor be helpful to discipline, which is requisite
to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. ii.).
But no man can dispense from the Divine and natural laws.
Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (i Cor. ix. 17) : A dis-
pensation is committed to me.
I answer that. Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a
measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus
the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to
each member of the household he distributes work and
necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Accordingly
in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very
fact that he directs how some general precept is to be ful-
filled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a
percept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general
83 CHANGE IN LAWS Q. 97. Art. 4
rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some par-
ticular case, either because it would hinder some greater
good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as
explained above (Q. XCVL, A. 6). But it would be dan-
gerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual,
except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emer-
gency, as stated above (ibid.). Consequently he who is
placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a
human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the
law fails in its application to persons or circumstances, he
may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If
however he grant this permission without any such reason,
and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent
dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in
view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dis-
pensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke xii. 42) : Who,
thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser (Douay, —
steward) , whom his lord setteth over his family ?
Reply Ob] . 1. When a person is dispensed from observing
the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of,
but with the intention of benefiting, the common good.
Reply Obj. 2. It is not respect of persons if unequal
measures are served out to those who are themselves un-
equal. Wherefore when the condition of any person re-
quires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it
is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favour.
Reply Obj. 3. Natural law, so far as it contains general
precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensation.
In the other precepts, however, which are as conclusions of
the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation:
for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to
the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to
the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the
public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none
can dispense from public human law, except the man from
whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in
the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none
can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give
special power for that purpose.
QUESTION XCVIII.
OF THE OLD LAW.
{In Six Articles.)
In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and
(i) The Law itself: (2) its precepts. Under the first head
there are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether the Old Law
was good ? (2) Whether it was from God ? (3) Whether
it came from Him through the angels ? (4) Whether it
was given to all ? (5) Whether it was binding on all ?
(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time ?
First Article,
whether the old law was good ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law was not good.
For it is written (Ezech. xx. 25) : / gave them statutes that
were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live. But
a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness
of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law
was not good.
Ohj. 2. Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that
it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says [Etym. ii.).
But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and
hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 8, seq.) : Without
the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law.
But when the commandment came sin revived ; and I died.
Again he says (Rom. v. 20) : Law entered in that sin might
abound. Therefore the Old Law was not good.
84
85 THE OLD LAW q. 98. Art. i
Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that
it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature,
and according to human custom. But such the Old Law
was not: since Peter said (Acts xv. 10) : Why tempt you (God)
to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our
fathers nor we have been able to bear ? Therefore it seems
that the Old Law was not good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vii. 12) : Where-
fore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and
just, and good.
I answer that. Without any doubt, the Old Law was good.
For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it
accords with right reason, so is a law proved to be good if
it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance
with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence which is
in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment,
Thou shall not covet thy neighbour'' s goods [Cf. Exod. xx. 17).
Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these
too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident
that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same
way (Rom. vii.) : / am delighted, says he [verse 22), with the
law of God, according to the inward man : and again (verse 16) :
/ consent to the law, that is good.
But it must be noted that the good has various degrees,
as Dionysius states [Div. Nom. iv.) : for there is a perfect
good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end,
there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is
sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is im-
perfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attain-
ing the end, but is not sufftcient for the realization thereof.
Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a
man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without
being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be
observed that the end of human law is different from the
end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the tem-
poral tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by
directing external actions, as regards those evils which
might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the
Q. 98. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 86
other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to
that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is hin-
dered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal
action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection
of human law, viz., the prohibition and punishment of sin,
does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it
is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to par-
take of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done
save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby charity, which
fulfilleth the law, . . . is spread abroad in our hearts (Rom.
v. 5): since the grace of God is life everlasting [ibid. vi. 23).
But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was
reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (John i. 17), the
law was given by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus
Christ. Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but
imperfect, according to Heb. vii. 19 : The law brought nothing
to perfection.
Reply Obj. 1. The Lord refers there to the ceremonial
precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did
not confer grace unto the remission of sins, although by
fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner.
Hence it is said pointedly, and judgments in which they shall
not live ; i.e., whereby they are unable to obtain life ; and so
the text goes on: And I polluted them, i.e., showed them to
be polluted, in their own gifts, when they offered all that
opened the womb, for their offences.
Reply Obj. 2. The law is said to have been deadly, as
being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account
of its imperfection: in so far as it did not confer grace
enabling man to fulfil what it prescribed, and to avoid what
it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but
taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says [ibid. 11):
Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and
by it killed me. In the same sense when it is said that the
law entered in that sin might abound, the conjunction that
must be taken as consecutive arid not final: in so far as men,
taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both
because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden
8; THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 2
it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a
thing the more from its being forbidden.
Reply Obj. 3. The yoke of the law could not be borne
without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for
it is written (Rom. ix. 16) : // is not of him that willeth, nor of
him that runneth, viz., that he wills and runs in the com-
mandments of God, hut of God that showeth mercy. Where-
fore it is \vi'itten (Ps. cxviii. 32) : / have run the way of Thy
commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart, i.e., by
giving me grace and charity.
Second Article,
whether the old law was from god ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law was not from God.
For it is written (Deut. xxxii. 4) : The works of God are perfect.
But the Law was imperfect, as stated above (A. i). There-
fore the Old Law was not from God.
Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Eccles. iii. 14) : / have
learned that all the works which God hath made continue for
ever. But the Old Law does not continue for ever: since
the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 18) : There is indeed a setting aside
of the former commandment, because of the weakness and un-
profitableness thereof. Therefore the Old Law was not from
God.
Ohj. 3. Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only
evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was
an occasion of sin, as stated above (A. t ad 2). Therefore
the giving of such a law does not appertain to God, to Whom
none is like among the lawgivers (Job xxxvi. 22).
Obj. 4. Further, it is written (i Tim. ii. 4) that God will
have all men to be saved. But the Old Law did not sufftce
to save man, as stated above (A. i). Therefore the giving
of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old
Law was not from God.
On the contrary. Our Lord said (Matth. xv. 6) while speak-
ing to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: You have
Q. 98. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 88
made void the commandment of God for your tradition. And
shortly before [verse 4) He had said: Honour thy father and
mother, which is contained expressly in the Old Law (Exod.
XX. 12; Deut. V. 16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.
/ answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God,
Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old
Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First by bearing
witness to Christ ; wherefore He Himself says (Luke xxiv. 44) :
All things must needs he fulfilled, which are written in the
law . . ., and in the frophets, and in the psalms, concerning
Me : and (John v. 46) : // yoii did believe Moses, you would
perhaps believe Me also ; for he wrote of Me. — Secondly, as
a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing men from idola-
trous worship, it enclosed (concludebat) them in the worship
of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved
through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. iii. 23) :
Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up
[conclusi), unto that faith which was to be revealed. Now it is
evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition
to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say
the same, I mean that it does so either by itself or through
its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby
men would be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, ac-
cording to Matth. xii. 26: If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom
is divided (Vulg., — he is divided against himself). Therefore
the Old Law was given by the same God, from WTiom came
salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.
Reply Obj. i. Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect
simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is
said to be perfect, not simply, but with regard to the con-
dition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children
are perfect in comparison with the condition of those to whom
they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence
the Apostle says (Gal. iii. 24) : The law was our pedagogue in
Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. Those works of God endure for ever which
God so made that they would endure for ever; and these
are His perfect works. But the Old Law was set aside when
89 THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 2
there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were
evil, but as being weak and useless for this time; because,
as the Apostle goes on to say, the law brought nothing to
perfection: hence he says (Gal. iii. 25): After the faith is
come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.
Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above (0. LXXIX., A. 4), God
sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they
may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such
a law as men by their own forces could not fulfil, so that,
while presuming on their own powers, they might find
themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have
recourse to the help of grace.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although the Old Law did not suffice to save
man, yet another help from (lod besides the Law was avail-
able for man, viz., faith in the Mediator, by which the
fathers of old were justified even as we are. Accordingly
God did not fail man by giving him insufficient aids to
salvation.
Third Article,
whether the old law was given through the angels ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law was not given
through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel
means a messenger ; so that the word angel denotes ministry,
not lordship, according to Ps. cii. 20, 21: Bless the Lord all
ye His angels . . . you ministers of His. But the Old Law
is related to have been given by the Lord: for it is written
(Exod. XX. i) : And the Lord spoke . . . these words, and
further on: I am the Lord Thy God. Moreover the same
expression is often repeated in Exodus, and in the later
books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God
immediately.
Obj. 2. Further, according to John i. 17, the Law zcas
given by Moses. But Moses received it from God immedi-
ately: for it is written (Exod. xxxiii. 11) : The Lord spoke to
Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.
Therefore the Old Law was given by God immediately.
Q. 98. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 90
Obj. 3. Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make
a law, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 3). But God alone is
Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls : while the angels
are the ministering spirits, as stated in Heb. i. 14. Therefore
it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels,
since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.
On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal, iii. 19) that the
Law was given (Vulg., — ordained) by angels in the hand of a
Mediator. And Stephen said (Acts vii. 53) : [Who) have
received the Law by the disposition of angels.
I answer that. The Law was given by God through the
angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius
{Ccel. Hier. iv.), viz., that the gifts of God should be brought to
men by means of the angels, there is a special reason why the
Old Law should have been given through them. For it has
been stated (AA. i, 2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and
yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human
race, which was to come through Christ. Now it is to be
observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts,
he that holds the highest place, himself exercises the prin-
cipal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to
the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his
subordinates : thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks
together, but prepares the material by means of the work-
men who assist him under his direction. Consequently it
was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament
should be given by the incarnate God immediately ; but
that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers
of God, i.e., by the angels. It is thus that the Apostle at
the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (i. 2) proves the
excellence of the New Law over the Old; because in the New
Testament God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son, whereas
in the Old Testament the word was spoken by angels (ii. 2).
Reply Obj. i. As Gregory says at the beginning of his
Morals [PrcBf., chap, i.), the angel who is described to have
appeared to Moses, is sometimes mentioned as an angel, some-
times as the Lord : an angel, in truth, in respect of that which
was subservient to the external delivery ; and the Lord, because
91 THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 3
He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power
of speaking. Hence also it is that the angel spoke as per-
sonating the Lord.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii.), it is
stated in Exodus that the Lord spoke to Moses face to face ;
and shortly afterwards we read: ' Show me Thy glory.'
Therejore he perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw
not. Hence he did not see the very Essence of God; and
consequently he was not taught by Him immediately.
Accordingly when Scripture states that He spoke to him face
to face, this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of
the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God
mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by
means of a subordinate creature, i.e., an angel and a cloud. —
Again we may say that this vision face to face means some
kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the
vision of the Divine Essence.
Reply Obj. 3. It is for the sovereign alone to make a law
by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he
promulgates it through others. Thus God made the Law
by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the
angels.
Fourth Article.
whether the old law should have been given to the
jews alone ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the Old Law should not have been
given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for
the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated
above (A A. 2, 3). But that salvation was to come not to
the Jews alone but to all nations, according to Isa. xlix. 6:
It is a small thing that thou shouldst he my servant to raise
up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel.
Behold I have given thee to he the light of the Gentiles, that thou
may est be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth.
Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations,
and not to one people only.
Q. 98. Art. 4 THE *' SUMMA TTTEOLOGTCA " 92
Obj. 2. Further, according to Acts x. 34, 35, God is not a
respecter of persons : but in every nation, he that feareth Him,
and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him. Therefore the
way of salvation should not have been opened to one people
more than to another.
Obj. 3. Further, the law was given through the angels, as
stated above (A. 3). But God always vouchsafed the
ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all
nations: for it is written (Ecclus. xvii. 14) : Over every nation
He set a ruler. Also on all nations He bestows temporal
goods, which are of less account with God than spiritual
goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to
all peoples.
On the contrary. It is written (Rom. iii. 1,2): What advan-
tage then hath the Jew ? . . . Much every way. First
indeed, because the words of God were committed to them : and
(Ps. cxlvii. 9) : He hath not done in like manner to every
nation : and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto
them.
I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the
Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples,
that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the
worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry ;
wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law,
lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
But this reason does not seem fitting: because that
people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made,
which was more grievous, as is clear from Exod. xxxii. and
from Amos v. 25, 26: Did you offer victims and sacrifices to
Me in the desert for forty years, 0 house of Israel ? But you
carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your
idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves.
Moreover it is stated expressly (Deut. ix. 6) : Know therefore
that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in pos-
session for thy justices, for thou art a very stiff-necked people :
but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: That the
Lord might accomplish His word, which He promised by oath
to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
93 THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 4
What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says
(Gal. iii. 16) that to Abraham were the promises rnade and to
his seed. He saith not, ' And to his seeds' as of many : hut
as of one, ' And to thy seed, which is Christ.' And so God
vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that
people, on account of the promise made to their fathers
that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that
the people, of whom Christ was to be born, should be sig-
nahzed by a special sanctification, according to the words
of Levit. xix. 2: Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy. — Nor
again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself
that this promise was made to him, viz., that Christ
should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and
vocation. Hence it is written (Isa. xli. 2) : Who hath raised
up the just one from the east, hath called him to follow him ?
It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous
election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that
the people sprung from them received the law; according to
Deut. iv. 36,37: Ye did (Vulg., — Thou didst) hear His words
out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and
chose their seed after them. — And if again it be asked why He
chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be
born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine in his
commentary on John vi. 44 [Tract, xxvi.) : Why He draiveth
one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish
not to err.
Reply Obj. i. Although the salvation, which was to come
through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was
necessary that Christ should be born of one people, which,
for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; ac-
cording to Rom. ix. 4: To whom, namely the Jews, belongeth
the adoption as of children [of God), . . . and the testament, and
the giving of the Law ; . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom
is Christ according to the flesh.
Reply Obj. 2. Respect of persons takes place in those
things which are given according to due ; but it has no place
in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. Because
he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not
Q. 98. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94
to another, is not a respecter of persons : but if he were a
dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to dis-
tribute them according to personal merits, he would be a
respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of
salvation on the human race gratuitously: wherefore He
is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some
rather than to others. Hence Augustine says [De Prcedest.
Sanct. viii.) : All whom God teaches, He teaches out of pity ;
hut whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not : for
this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the
sin of the first parent.
Reply Ohj. 3. The benefits of grace are forfeited by man
on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among
the latter are the ministries of the angels, which the very
order of various natures demands, viz., that the lowest beings
be governed through the intermediate beings : and also bodily
aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to
beasts, according to Ps. xxxv. 7 : Men and beasts Thou wilt
preserve, 0 Lord.
Fifth Article,
whether all men were bound to observe the old
LAW ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that all men were bound to observe
the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king,
must needs be subject to his law. But the Old Law was
given by God, Who is King of all the earth (Ps. xlvi. 8) .
Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to
observe the Law.
Obj. 2. Further, the Jews could not be saved without
observing the Old Law : for it is written (Deut. xxvii. 26) :
Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and
fulfilleth them not in work, li therefore other men could be
saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews
would be in a worse plight than other men.
Obj. 3. Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish
ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written
95 THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 5
(Exod. xii. 48) : // any stranger be willing to dwell among you,
and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first he
circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the
mamier ; and he shall be as he that is born in the land. But
it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal
observances according to the Divine ordinance, if they
could have been saved without the observance of the Law.
Therefore none could be saved without observing the Law.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix ) that many
of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels.
But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the Law.
Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law.
/ answer that. The Old Law showed forth the precepts
of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own.
Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law con-
tained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old
Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because
they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts
which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding
on any save the Jewish people alone.
The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above
(A. 4), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive
a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was
to be born of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted
for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on
them alone: thus clerics who are set aside for the service
of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity
are not bound; likewise religious are bound by their profes-
sion to certain works of perfection, to which people living
in the world are not bound. In like manner this people
was bound to certain special observances, to which other
peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written (Deut.
xviii. 13) : Thou shall be perfect and without spot before the
Lord thy God : and for this reason they used a kind of form
of profession, as appears from Deut. xxvi. 3: / profess this
day before the Lord thy God, etc.
Reply Obj. i. Whoever are subject to a king, are bound
to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But
Q. 98. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 96
if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants
of his household, others are not bound thereto.
Reply Obj. 2. The more a man is united to God, the better
his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people
were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excel-
lence over other peoples. Hence it is written (Deut. iv. 8) :
What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies
and just judgments, and all the law ? In like manner, from
this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of
the laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living
in the world.
Reply Obj. 3. The Gentiles obtained salvation more per-
fectly and more securely under the observances of the Law
than under the mere natural law : and for this reason
they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now ad-
mitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to
those of the religious^ although they can be saved without
this.
Sixth Article,
whether the old law was suitably given at the time
OF MOSES ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law was not suitably
given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed
man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as
stated above (AA. 2, 3). But man needed this salutary
remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the
Law should have been given immediately after sin.
Obj. 2. Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctifi-
cation of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now
the promise concerning the seed, which is Christ (Gal. iii. 16)
was first made to Abraham, as related in Gen. xii. 7. There-
fore the Law should have been given at once at the time of
Abraham.
Obj. 3. Further, as Christ was born of those alone who
descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the
promise was made; so was He born of no other of the
97 THE OLD LAW Q. 98. Art. 6
descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise
was renewed, according to 2 Kings xxiii. i : The man to
whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of
Jacob . . . said. Therefore the Old Law should have been
given after David, just as it was given after Abraham.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. iii. ig) that the
Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should
come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained by angels
in the hand of a Mediator : — ordained, i.e., given in orderly
fashion, as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting that
the Old Law should be given in this order of time.
/ answer that. It was most fitting for the Law to be given
at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken
from two things in respect of which every law is imposed
on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men
who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains
and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through
being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they
desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should
be given at such a time as would be appropriate for the
overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two
things, viz., of knowledge and of power. He was proud
of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice
him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride
might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the
guidance of his reason without the help of a written law:
and man was able to learn from experience that his reason
was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had
fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.
Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written
law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance : because
by the Law is the knowledge of sin (Rom. iii. 20). — But, after
man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was con-
vinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil
what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. viii.
3, 4), what the Law could not do in that it was weak through
the flesh, God sent (Vulg., — sending) His own Son, . . . that the
justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.
II. 3 '7
Q. 98. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 98
With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as
a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time
when the natural law began to be obscured on account of
the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help
should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that
they might be led from imperfection to perfection; where-
fore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given
between the law of nature and the law of grace.
Reply Ohj. i. It was not fitting for the Old Law to be
given at once after the sin of the first man: both because
man was so confident in his own reason, that he did not
acknowledge his need of the Old Law; and because as yet
the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual
sinning.
Reply Ohj. 2. A law should not be given save to the people,
since it is a general precept, as stated above (Q. XC, AA.
2, 3) ; wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men
certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but
when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form
a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it
was fitting that they should be given a law; for slaves are
not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the
law to he directed, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii.).
Reply Ohj. 3. Since the Law had to be given to the
people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received
the Law, but the whole people, who were marked with the
seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise
made to Abraham, and in which he believed, according to
Rom. iv. II: hence even before David, the Law had to
be given to that people as soon as they were collected
together.
QUESTION XCIX.
OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW.
{In Six Articles.)
We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and
(i) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each
kind of precept. Under the first head there are six points
of inquiry : (i) Whether the Old Law contained several
precepts or only one ? (2) Whether the Old Law con-
tains any moral precepts ? (3) Whether it contains cere-
monial precepts in addition to the moral precepts ?
(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts ?
(5) Whether it contains any others besides these ? (6) How
the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.
First Article,
whether the old law contains only one precept ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the Old Law contains but one
precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as
stated above (Q. XC, AA. 2, 3). Now there is but one Old
Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.
Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 9) : // there
be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word :
Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. But this is only
one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained
but one commandment.
Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Matth. vii. 12) : All things
. . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you
also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets. But
99
Q. 99. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 100
the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the
prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains
but one commandment.
On the contrary y The Apostle says (Ephes. ii. 15) : Making
void the Law of commandments contained in decrees : where
he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments on the
passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many com-
mandments.
/ answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about
something which must be done: and, that a thing must be
done, arises from the necessity of some end. Hence it is
evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to
an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being necessary
or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to
be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly,
precepts may be given about various things as being
ordained to one end. Consequently we must say that
all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their
relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect
of the diversity of those things that are ordained to
that end.
Reply Obj. 1. The Old Law is said to be one as being
ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts,
according to the diversity of the things which it directs to
the end. Thus also the art of building is one according
to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of
a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the
variety of acts ordained thereto.
Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (i Tim. i. 5), the end of
the commandment is charity ; since every law aims at estab-
lishing friendship, either between man and man, or between
man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised
in this one commandment. Thou shall love thy neighbour as
thyself, as expressing the end of all commandments: because
love of one's neighbour includes love of God, when we
love our neighbour for God's sake. Hence the ApostJe
put this commandment in place of the two which are about
the love of God and of one's neighbour, and of which Our
loi PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q 99- Art. 2
Lord said (Matth. xxii. 40) : On these two commandments
dependeth the whole Law and the prophets.
Reply Obj. 3. As stated in Ethio. ix., friendship towards
another arises from friendship towards oneself, in so far as man
looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said,
All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you,
do you also to them, this is an explanation of the rule of neigh-
bourly love contained implicitly in the words, Thou shall
love thy neighbour as thyself : so that it is an explanation
of this commandment.
Second Article,
whether the old law contains moral precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law contains no moral
precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of
nature, as stated above (Q. XCL, AA. 4, 5; Q. XCVIIL,
A. 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature.
Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.
Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law should have come to man's
assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in
regard to things that are of faith, which are above reason.
But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts.
Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law,
which is a Divine law.
Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be the letter that
killeth (2 Cor. iii. 6). But the moral precepts do not kill,
but quicken, according to Ps. cxviii. 93: Thy justifications
I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life.
Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law.
On the contrary, It is wiitten (Ecclus. xvii. 9) : Moreover,
He gave them discipline (Douay, — instructions) and the law
of life for an inheritance. Now discipline belongs to morals;
for the gloss on Heb. xii. 11: Now all chastisement [disci-
plina), etc., says: Discipline is an exercise in morals by means
of difficulties. Therefore the Law which was given by God
comprised moral precepts.
Q. 99. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102
/ answer that, The Old Law contained some moral pre-
cepts; as is evident from Exod. xx. 13, 15: Thou shalt not
kill, Thou shalt not steal. This was reasonable: because,
just as the principal intention of human law is to create
friendship between man and man; so the chief intention
01 the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God.
Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to
Ecclus. xiii. 19: Every beast loveth its like; there cannot
possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely
good, unless man become good: wherefore it is written
(Levit. xix. 2; cf. xi. 45): You shall be holy, for I am holy.
But the goodness of man is virtue, which makes its subject
good (Ethic, ii.). Therefore it was necessary for the Old
Law to include precepts about acts of virtue : and these are
the mora] precepts of the Law.
Reply Obj. i. The Old Law is distinct from the natural
law, not as being altogether different from it, but as
something added thereto. For just as grace presupposes
nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural
law.
Reply Obj. 2. It was fitting that the Divine law should
come to man's assistance not only in those things for which
reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human
reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason
could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal
piinciples of the natural law; but through bsing habituated
to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done
in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts,
which are like conclusions drawn from the universal prin-
ciples of the natural law, the reason of many men went
astray, to the extent of judging to be lawful, things that are
evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority
of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects.
Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things
set forth to which reason cannot, reach, such as the Trinity
of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can
attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to re-
move the manifold errors to which reason is liable.
103 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q. 99. Art. ^
Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves (De Spiritu ct Litera),
even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death,
as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes
what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its
fulfilment.
Third Article.
whether the old law comprises ceremonial, besides
moral, precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law does not comprise
ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that
is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions.
Now human actions are called moral, as stated above (Q. L,
A. 3). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men
should not comprise other than moral precepts.
Obj, 2. Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial
seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship
is the act of a virtue, viz., religion, which, as Tully says
[Rhet. ii.) offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead. Since,
then, the moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated
above (A. 2), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should
not be distinct from the moral.
Obj. 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those
which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine
observes [De Doctr. Christ, ii.), of all signs employed by men
words hold the first place. Therefore there was no need for
the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain
figurative actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. iv. 13, 14) : Ten words
. . . He wrote in two tables of stone ; and He commanded me
at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judg-
ments which you shall do. But the ten commandments of
the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral
precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. 2), the Divine law is
instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while
human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in
Q. 99- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '^ 104
relation to one another. Hence human laws have not con-
cerned themselves with the institution of anything relating
to Divine worship except as affecting the common good of
mankind: and for this reason they have devised many in-
stitutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed
expedient for the formation of human morals ; as may be seen
in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine
law directed men to one another according to the demands
of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order
was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God
not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith,
hope, and love, but also by certain external works, whereby
man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is
these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship.
This worship is called ceremony, — the munia, i.e., gifts, of
Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because,
at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: — or
because, as Maximus Valerius states, the word ceremony
was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine
worship, being derived from a town near Rome called
Caere : since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred
chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most care-
fully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law
which refer to the Divine worship are specially called
ceremonial.
Reply Ohj. i. Human acts extend also to the Divine
worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains
precepts about these matters also.
Reply Ohj, 2. As stated above (Q. XCL, A. 3), the pre-
cepts of the natural law are general, and require to be de-
termined : and they are determined both by human law and
by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which
are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but
of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of
the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct
from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law.
Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, be-
longs to a moral precept; but the determination of this
105 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q. 99. Art. 4
precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and
such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the
ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial pre-
cepts are distinct from the moral precepts.
Reply Obj. 3. As Dionysius says (C03L Hier. i.), the things
of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of
sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul
more when they are not only expressed in words, but also
offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set
forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in
words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but also
by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains
to the ceremonial precepts.
Fourth Article.
whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts,
there are also judicial precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there are no judicial precepts
in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old
Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust, vi.) that in the
Old Law there are precepts concerning the life we have to
lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed.
Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral
precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed
are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of
precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the
Law.
Ohj. 2. Further, a gloss on Ps. cxviii. 102, / have not de-
clined from Thy judgments, says, — i.e., from the rule of life
Thou hast set for me. But a rule of life belongs to the moral
precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be
considered as distinct from the moral precepts.
Ohj. 3. Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice,
according to Ps. xciii. 15 : Until justice he turned into judg-
ment. But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues,
belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts
Q. 99. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 106
include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not
be held as distinct from them.
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. i) : These are the
precepts, and ceremonies, and judgments : where precepts
stands for moral precepts antonomastically. Therefore there
are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
/ answer that, As stated above (A A. 2, 3), it belongs to
the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God.
Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates
of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts
are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined
by Divine or human law, because naturally known prin-
ples are universal, both in speculative and in practical
matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the
universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the
ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general
precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men
is effected by the judicial precepts.
We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in
the Old Law; viz., moral precepts, which are dictated by
the natural law; ceremonial precepts, which are determina-
tions of the Divine worship; and judicial precepts, which
are determinations of the justice to be maintained among
men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. vii. 12) after saying
that the Law is holy, adds that the commandment is just, and
holy, and good : just, in respect of the judicial precepts; holy,
with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word sanctus
— holy — is applied to that which is consecrated to God) ; and
good, i.e., conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Reply Obj. i. Both the moral and the judicial precepts
aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they
are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by
Augustine, viz., under the precepts of the life we have to
lead.
Reply Obj. 2. Judgment denotes execution of justice, by
an application of the reason to individual cases in a de-
terminate way. Hence the judicial precepts have some-
thing in common with the moral precepts, in that they are
107 PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q. 99- Art. 5
derived from reason; and something in common with the
ceremonial precepts, in that they arc determinations of
general precepts. This explains why sometimes judgments
comprises both judicial and moral precepts, as in Deut. v. i :
Hear J 0 Israel, the ceremonies and judgments ; and sometimes
judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Levit. xviii. 4: You
shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts, where
precepts denotes moral precepts, while judgments refers to
judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Reply Obj. 3. The act of justice, in general, belongs to
the moral precepts; but its determination to some special
kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts.
Fifth Article.
whether the old law contains any others besides
the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law contains others
besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Be-
cause the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice,
which is between man and man; while the ceremonial pre-
cepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped.
Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz., tem-
perance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated
above (Q. LX., A. 5). Therefore besides the aforesaid pre-
cepts, the Old Law should comprise others.
Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Deut. xi. i) : Love the Lord
thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judg-
ments and commandments. Now precepts concern moral
matters, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore besides the
moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains
others which are called commandments."^
Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Deut. vi. 17) : Keep the pre-
cepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies
* The commandments {mandata) spoken of here and in the body of
this article are not to be confused with the Commandments {j)rcrccptci) in
the ordinary acceptance of the word.
Q. 99- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 108
which I have (Vulg., — He hath) commanded thee. Therefore
in addition to the above, the Law comprises testimonies.
Ohj. 4. Further, it is written (Ps. cxviii. 93) : Thy justifi-
cations (i.e.. Thy Law, according to a gloss) / will never forget.
Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial,
and judicial precepts, but also others, called justifications.
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. i) : These are the
precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your
God commanded . . . you. And these words are placed at
the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of
the Law are included under them.
/ answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way
of precept ; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment
of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which
have to be done : and to their fulfilment man is induced by
two considerations, viz., the authority of the lawgiver, and
the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit con-
sists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable
or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil.
Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things
should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the law-
giver: e.g., Deut. vi. 4: Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God is
one Lord ; and Gen. i. i : In the beginning God created heaven
and earth : and these are called testimonies. — Again it was
necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be ap-
pointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments
for those who transgress; as may be seen in Deut. xxviii. :
// thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord Thy God . . . He will
make thee higher than all the nations, etc. : and these are
called justifications, according as God punishes or rewards
certain ones justly.
The things that have to be done do not come under the
precept except in so far as they have the character of a
duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule
of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which
prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes
a twofold just, — moral and legal [Ethic, v.).
Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that some-
log PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q. 90 Art. 5
thing must be done, either as being so necessary that with-
out it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being
useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue.
And in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed
by way of absolute command or prohibition, as Thou shall
not kill, Thou shalt not steal : and these are properly called
precepts. Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as
an absolute duty, but as something better to be done.
These may be called commandments ; because they are ex-
pressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example
whereof is seen in Exod. xxii. 26: If thou take of thy neighbour
a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset ;
and in other like cases. Wherefore Jerome [Prcefat. in
Comment, super Marc.) says that justice is in the precepts,
charity in the commandments. — Duty as fixed by the Law,
belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs;
to the ceremonial precepts, as regards Divine matters.
Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punish-
ments and rewards may be called testimonies, in so far as
they testify to the Divine justice. — Again all the precepts
of the Law may be styled justifications, as being executions
of legal justice. — Furthermore the commandments may be
distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be
called precepts which God Himself prescribed ; and those
things commandments which He enjoined [mandavit] through
others, as the very word seems to denote.
From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are
either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordin-
ances have not the character of a precept, but are directed
to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.
Reply Obj. i. Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the
notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determin-
able by law in so far as they belong to justice: of which
virtue religion is a part, as Tully says {Rhet. ii.). Where-
fore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the cere-
monial and judicial precepts.
The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what
has been said.
Q. 99- Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no
Sixth Article.
whether the old law should have induced men to the
observance of its precepts, by means of temporal
promises and threats ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law should not have
induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of
temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the
Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love : hence
it is written (Deut. x. 12) : And now, Israel, what doth the
Lord thy God require of thee, hut that thou fear the Lord thy
God, and walk in His ways, and love Him ? But the desire
for temporal goods leads man away from God : for Augustine
says {Qq. 83), that covetousness is the bane of charity. There-
fore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to
the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy
of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii.).
Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law is more excellent than
human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier
the science, the higher the means of persuasion that it
employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal
threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the
Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Ohj. 3. Further, the reward of righteousness and the
punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally
the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles. ix. 2,
all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked,
to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to
him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices.
Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth
as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the
Divine law.
On the contrary. It is written (Isa. i. 19, 20) : If you he
willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things
of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke Me to
wrath ; the sword shall devour you.
Ill PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW Q. 99- Art. 6
/ answer that, As in speculative sciences men are per-
suaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic
arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to observe
its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now
it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the means
of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil:
wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be
ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on
principles more generally known. And thus also he who
would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts,
needs to move him at first by things for which he has an
affection; just as children are induced to do something, by
means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above
(Q. XCVIIL, AA. I, 2, 3) that the Old Law disposed men
to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect disposes to the
perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect
in comparison to the perfection which was to result from
Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared
to a child that is still under a pedagogue (Gal. iii. 24). But
the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal
things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from the
words of the Apostle (Phil. iii. 13, 15) : Forgetting the things
that are behind, I stretch (Vulg., — and stretching) forth myself
to those that are before. . . . Let us therefore, as many as are
perfect, be thus minded. Those who are yet imperfect
desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God:
whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It
was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men
to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect
have an affection.
Reply Obj. 1. Covetousness whereby man places his end
in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment
of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God
is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according
to Ps. xlviii. 19 : He will praise Thee, when Thou shall do well
to him.
Reply Obj. 2. Human law persuades men by means of
temporal rewards or by punishments to be inflicted by men :
Q. 99. Art 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112
whereas the Divine law persuades men by means of rewards
or punishments to be received from God. In this respect
it employs higher means.
Reply Ohj. 3. As anyone can see, who reads carefully
the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the
people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it ;
and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law
they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain
individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law,
met with misfortunes, — either because they had already
become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them
all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that
their virtue might be tried) ; — or because, while outwardly
fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether
fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, ac-
cording to Isa. xxix. 13 (Matth. xv. 8) : This people honoureth
Me with their lips ; hut their heart is far from Me,
QUESTION C.
OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW.
(In Twelve Articles.)
We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law :
and (i) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts,
(3) the judicial precepts. Under the first head there are
twelve points of inquiry: (i) Whether all the moral precepts
of the Old Law belong to the law of nature ? (2) Whether
the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all
the virtues ? (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old
Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue ?
(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from
one another : (5) Their number ; (6) Their order ; (7) The
manner in which they were given; (8) Whether they are
dispensable ? (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue
comes under the precept of the Law ? (10) Whether the
mode of charity comes under the precept ? (11) The dis-
tinction of other moral precepts. (12) Whether the moral
precepts of the Old Law justified man ?
First Article.
whether all the moral precepts of the old law
belong to the law of nature ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not all the moral precepts
belong to the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus.
xvii. 9) : Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of
life for an inheritance. But instruction is in contradistinc-
tion to the law of nature ; since the law of nature is not learnt,
11- 3 113 8
Q. loo. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 114
but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the
mora] precepts belong to the natural law.
Obj. 2. Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human
law. But human law adds certain things concerning good
morals, to those that belong to the law of nature : as is evi-
denced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all
men, while these moral institutions are various for various
people. Much more reason therefore was there why the
Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances
pertaining to good morals.
Obj, 3. Further, just as natural reason leads to good
morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written
(Gal. V. 6) that faith worketh by chanty. But faith is not
included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith
is above nature. Therefore not all the moral precepts of
the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. ii. 14) that the
Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that
are of the Law : which must be understood of things per-
taining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts
of the Law belong to the law of nature.
/ answer that. The moral precepts, distinct from the cere-
monial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining
of their very nature to good morals. Now since human
morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the
proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good
which accord with reason, and those are called bad which
are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of
speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of
hrst principles, so every judgment of practical reason
proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above
(Q. XCIV. AA. 2, 4) : from which principles one may pro-
ceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For
some matters connected with human actions are so evident,
that after very little consideration one is able at once to
approve or disapprove of them by means of these general
first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject
of judgment without much consideration of the various
115 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. i
circumstances, which all are not competent to do care-
fully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not
possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of
sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy:
and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot
judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as
the articles of faith.
It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are
about matters which concern good morals; and since good
morals are those which are in accord with reason ; and since
also every judgment of human reason must needs be derived
in some way from natural reason ; it follows, of necessity,
that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature ; but
not all in the same way. For there are certain things
which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord
and at once, judges to be done or not to be done : e.g., Honour
thy father and thy mother, and. Thou shalt not kill. Thou shall
not steal : and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. —
And there are certain things which, after a more careful
consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to
the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated,
the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g., Rise up before the
hoary head, and honour the person of the aged man, and the
like. — And there are some things, to judge of which, human
reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught
about the things of God: e.g., Thou shalt not make to thyself
a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything ; Thou shalt not
take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Second Article.
whether the moral precepts of the law are about
all the acts of virtue ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the moral precepts of the Law
are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the
precepts of the Old Law is called justihcation, according to
Q. loo. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 116
Ps. cxviii. 8: / will keep Thy justifications. But justification
is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts
are only about acts of justice.
Ohj. 2. Further, that which comes under a precept has
the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs
to justice alone and to none of the other virtues, for the
proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due.
Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about the
acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.
Obj. 3. Further, every law is made for the common good,
as Isidore says (Etym. ii.). But of all the virtues justice
alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic, v.). Therefore the moral precepts are only about
the acts of justice.
On the contrary, Ambrose says [De Paradiso viii.) that a
sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience
to the commandments of heaven. But there are sins contrary
to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to the Divine
law to direct all the acts of virtue.
/ answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained
to the common good, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2), the
precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to
the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher
(Polit. iv.) teaches that the laws which are made in a state
which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws
of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful
men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one
kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind.
Because human law is ordained for the civil community,
implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men
are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby
men live in communion with one another. This life in
common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper
function consists in directing the human community.
Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of
justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is
only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the
Philosopher explains [Ethic, v.).
117 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. too. Art. 2
But the community for which the Divine law is ordained,
is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the
Ufe to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes pre-
cepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered
in their relations to God. Now man is united to God by
his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore
the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters
whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected
by the acts of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues
set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves : while
the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the reason
in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions.
It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes
precepts about the acts of all the virtues : yet so that certain
matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the
order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation
of precept; while other matters, which pertain to the well-
being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
Reply Ohj. i. The fulfilment of the commandments of
the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other
virtues, has the character of justification, inasmuch as it
is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is
just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason.
Reply Ohj. 2. Justice properly so called regards the duty
of one man to another : but all the other virtues regard the
duty of the lower powers to reason. It is in relation to
this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks [Ethic, v.) of
a kind of metaphorical justice.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has
been said about the different kinds of community.
Third Article.
whether all the moral precepts of the old law are
reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that not all the moral precepts of
the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the deca-
Q. loo. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 118
logue. For the first and principal precepts of the Law are,
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and, Thou shalt love thy
neighbour, as stated in Matth. xxii. 37, 39. But these two
are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. There-
fore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts
of the decalogue.
Ohj. 2. Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to
the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among
the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz.. Re-
member that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. Therefore the
moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the
decalogue.
Obj. 3. Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts
of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are
only such as regard acts of justice; as may be seen by
going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.
Oji the contrary, The gloss on Matth. v. 11: Blessed are ye
when they shall revile you, etc., says that Moses, after pro-
pounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail. Therefore
all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the pre-
cepts of the decalogue.
/ answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from
the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself
is said to have given the precepts of the decalogue ; whereas
He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses.
Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the know-
ledge of which man has immediately from God. Such
are those which with but slight reflection can be gathered
at once from the first general principles: and those also
which become known to man immediately through divinely
infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not
reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz., first
general principles, for they need no further promulgation
after being once imprinted on the natural reason to which
they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do
evil to no man, and other similar principles: — and again
those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be
119 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 3
in accord with reason; since the people receive these prin-
ciples from God, through being taught by wise men. Never-
theless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts
of the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first
general principles are contained in them, as principles in
their proximate conclusions; while those which are known
through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions
in their principles.
Reply Ohj. i. Those two principles are the first general
principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human
reason, either through nature or through faith. Wherefore
all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as
conclusions to general principles.
Reply Ohj. 2. The precept of the Sabbath observance is
moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give
some time to the things of God, according to Ps. xlv. it:
Be still and see that I am God. In this respect it is placed
among the precepts of the decalogue : but not as to the
fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial pre-
cept.
Reply Ohj. 3. The notion of duty is not so patent in the
other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about
the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the
people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Where-
fore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts
of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the
Law.
Fourth Article.
whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably
distinguished from one another ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For wor-
ship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the precepts are
about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the begin-
ning of the decalogue, Thou shall not have strange gods he/ore
Me, belongs to faith: and that which is added, Thou shall
Q. loo. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 120
not make . . . any graven thing, etc., belongs to worship.
Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine says
(Q. LXXL in Exod.), but two.
Ohj. 2. Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are
distinct from the negative precepts; e.g., Honour thy father
and thy mother, and. Thou shalt not kill. But this, / am the
Lord thy God, is affirmative : and that which follows. Thou
shalt not have strange gods before Me, is negative. Therefore
these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says [loc.
cit), make one.
Ohj. 3. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 7) : / had not
known concupiscence, if the Law did not say : * Thou shalt
not covet. ^ Hence it seems that this precept, Thou shalt
not covet, is one precept; and, therefore, should not be
divided into two.
On the contrary stands the authority of Augustine who,
in commenting on Exodus {loc. cit.) distinguishes three pre-
cepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our
neighbour.
/ answer that. The precepts of the decalogue are differently
divided by different authorities. For Hesychius when com-
menting on Levit. xxvi. 26, Ten women shall hake your hread
in one oven, says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observ-
ance is not one of the ten precepts, because its observance,
in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes
four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, I am the
Lord thy God ; the second. Thou shalt not have strange gods
hefore Me, (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two pre-
cepts, in his commentary on Osee x. 10, On thy — Vulg.,
their — two iniquities) ; the third precept according to him
is, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing ; and the
fourth, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain. He states that there are six precepts pertaining to
our neighbour ; the first. Honour thy father and thy mother ;
the second. Thou shalt not kill-; the third. Thou shalt not
commit adultery ; the fourth, Thou shalt not steal ; the fifth,
Thou shalt not hear false witness ; the sixth. Thou shalt not covet.
But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the pre-
121 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 4
cept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the
precepts of the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the
decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (Matth.
vi. 24), No man can serve two masters, the two statements,
/ am the Lord thy God, and, Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me seem to be of the same nature and to form one
precept. Hence Origen (Ho/n. viii. in Exod.), who also dis-
tinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these
two under one precept; and reckons in the second place,
Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing ; as third. Thou
shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain ; and as
fourth. Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day. The
other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
Since, however, the making of graven things or the like-
ness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of
their being worshipped as gods — for God commanded an
image of the Seraphim (Vulg., — Cherubim) to be made and
placed in the tabernacle, as related in Exod. xxv. 18 —
Augustine more fittingly unites these two, Thou shalt not
have strange gods before Me, and. Thou shalt not make . . .
any graven thing, into one precept. Likewise to covet
another's wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs
to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other
things, which are desired for the purpose of possession,
belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augus-
tine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the
coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the
coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes three
precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our
neighbour. And this is better.
Reply Obj. i. Worship is merely a declaration of faith:
wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned
as distinct from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts
should be given about worship rather than about faith,
because the precept about faith is presupposed to the pre-
cepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity.
For just as the first general principles of the natural law
are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need
Q. TOO. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 122
no promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and
self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith : for he
that Cometh to God, must believe that He is (Heb. xi. 6). Hence
it needs no other promulgation than the infusion of faith.
Reply Ohj. 2. The affirmative precepts are distinct from
the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus
that man should honour his parents does not include that
he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include
the former. But when an affirmative precept is included
in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct
precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that
Thou shall not steal, and another binding one to keep another's
property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same
way there are not different precepts about believing in God,
and about not believing in strange gods.
Reply Ohj. 3. All covetousness has one common ratio:
and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment
about covetousness as though it were one. But because
there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore
Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against covet-
ing: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the
diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic, x.).
Fifth Article.
whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably
set forth ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose
(De Paradiso viii.), is a transgression of the Divine law and a
disobedience to the commandments of heaven. But sins are
distinguished according as man sins against God, or his
neighbour, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does
not include any precepts directing man in his relations to
himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God
and himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are insufficiently enumerated.
123 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 5
Obj. 2. Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance per-
tained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of
other solemnities, and the offering of sacrifices. But the
decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observ-
ance. Therefore it should contain others also, pertaining
to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
Obj. 3. Further, as sins against C}od include the sin of
perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of
lying against the teaching of God. But there is a precept
forbidding perjury, Thou shall not take the name of the Lord
thy God in vain. Therefore there should be also a precept
of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.
Obj. 4. Further, just as man has a natural affection for
his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the
commandment of charity extends to all our neighbours.
Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity,
according to i Tim. i. 5: The end of the commandment is
charity. Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents,
so should there have been some precepts referring to children
and other neighbours.
Obj. 5. Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin
in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely
in theft and adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it
is said, Thou shall not commit adultery, Thou shall not steal,
is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when
it is said, Thou shall not covet thy neighbour's goods, and.
Thou shall not covet thy neighbour"* s wife. Therefore the same
should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide
and false witness.
Obj. 6. Further, just as sin happens through disorder of
the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder
of the irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate
concupiscence, when it is said. Thou shall not covet. There-
fore the decalogue should have included some precepts
forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. There-
fore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are
unfittingly emmierated.
On the contrary. It is written (Deut. iv. 13) : He shewed you
Q. loo. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124
His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten
words that He wrote in two tables of stone.
I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), just as the precepts
of human law direct man in his relations to the human
community, so the precepts of the Divine law direct man in
his relations to a community or commonwealth of men
under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright
in a community, two things are required: the first is that
he behave well to the head of the community; the other
is that he behave well to those who are his fellows and
partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that
the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts
ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second place,
other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men
who are his neighbours and live with him under God.
Now man owes three things to the head of the community :
first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity
to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honour to
another: and this is the sense of the first commandment,
in the words, Thou shalt not have strange gods. — Reverence
to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious
to him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. —
Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which
his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third
commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in
memory of the creation of all things.
To his neighbours a man behaves himself well both in
particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom
he is indebted, by paying his debts : and in this sense is to
be taken the commandment about honouring one's parents.
— In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either
by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is
done to one's neighbour, — sometimes in his person, i.e., as
to his personal existence ; and this is forbidden by the words,
Thou shalt not kill : — sometimes in a person united to him,
as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited
by the words. Thou shalt not commit adultery : — sometimes
125 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. icx).Art. 5
in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid;
and with regard to this it is said, Thou shall not steal. —
Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said. Thou shall
not bear false witness against thy neighbour : — harm done
by thought is forbidden in the words. Thou shall not covet.
The three precepts that direct man in his behaviour
towards God may also be differentiated in this same way.
For the first refers to deeds ; wherefore it is said. Thou shall
not make . . . a graven thing : the second, to words ; wherefore
it is said, Thou shall not lake the name of the Lord thy God
in vain : the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification
of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, requires
repose of the heart in God. — Or, according to Augustine
{In Ps. xxxii. : Serm. i), by the first commandment we
reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second,
the Divine truth; by the third. His goodness whereby we
are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end.
Reply Obj. i. This objection may be answered in two
ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be
reduced to the precepts of charity. Now there was need for
man to receive a precept about loving God and his neigh-
bour, because in this respect the natural law had become
obscured on account of sin : but not about the duty of loving
oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained
its vigour: or again, because love of oneself is contained
in the love of God and of one's neighbour : since true self-
love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this
reason the decalogue includes those precepts only which
refer to our neighbour and to God.
Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the
decalogue are those which the people received from God
immediately; wherefore it is written (Deut. x. 4): He wrote
in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words,
which the Lord spoke to you. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at
once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it
is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand
that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his
Q. loo. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 126
neighbour. But that, in matters which regard himself and
not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself,
is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that every-
one is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore
the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard
to himself, reach the people through the instruction of men
who are versed in such matters ; and, consequently, they are
not contained in the decalogue.
Reply Ohj. 2. All the solemnities of the Old Law were
instituted in celebration of some Divine favour, either in
memory of past favours, or in sign of some favour to come :
in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the
same purpose. Now of all the Divine favours to be com-
memorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was
called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; where-
fore the reason for this precept is given in Exod. xx. 11:
In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, etc. And of all
future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the
mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the
future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed
in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written
(Isa. Iviii. 13) : // thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath,
from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath
delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious. Because these
favours first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especi-
ally by the faithful. — But other solemnities were celebrated
on account of certain particular favours temporal and
transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory
of the past favour of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign
of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal and
transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath.
Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other
solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of
the decalogue.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Apostle says (Heb. vi. 16), men swear
by one greater than themselves ; and an oath for confirmation
is the end of all their controversy. Hence, since oaths are
common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special
127 MORAL PRECEPTS OE OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 5
prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According to
one interpretation, however, the words. Thou shall not lake
the name of the Lord thy God in vain, are a prohibition of false
doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: Thou shall not
say that Christ is a creature.
Reply Obj. 4. That a man should not do harm to anyone
is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore
the precepts that forbid the doing of harm are binding on
all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural
reason that a man should do one thing in return for another,
unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's
debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away
from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of
generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching.
Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kind-
ness or service to be done to anyone except to one's parents.
On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to
their children for any favours received, but rather the reverse
is the case. — Again, a child is a part of his father; and
parents love their children as being a part of themselves, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic, viii.). Hence, just as the
decalogue contains no ordinance as to man's behaviour
towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no
precept about loving one's children.
Reply Obj. 5. The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness
of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable
or useful good, are, of themselves, objects of appetite: and
for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the
deed but also in the desire. But murder and falsehood
are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural
for man to love his neighbour and the truth) : and are
desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently
with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was
necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins
of deed.
Reply Obj. 6. As stated above (Q. XXV., A. i), all the
passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of
the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the
Q. loo. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 128
decalogue arc, as it were, the iirst elements of the Law,
there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but
only of the concupiscible passions.
Sixth Article.
whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set
in proper order ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ten precepts of the deca-
logue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's
neighbour is seemingly previous to love of God, since our
neighbour is better known to us than God is; according to
I John iv. 20: He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth,
how can he love God, Whom he seeth not ? But the fkst three
precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven
pertain to the love of our neighbour. Therefore the pre-
cepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.
Obj. 2. Further, acts of virtue are prescribed by the
affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the
negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his com-
mentary on the Predicaments, vices should be uprooted
before virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts
concerning our neighbour, the negative precepts should have
preceded the affirmative.
Obj. 3. Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's
actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or
outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting,
which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in
order.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (Rom. xiii. i) : The things
that are of God, are well ordered (Vulg., — Those that are, are
ordained of God). But the precepts of the decalogue were
given immediately by God, as stated above (A. 3). There-
fore they are arranged in becoming order.
/ answer that, As stated above (AA. 3, 5 ad i), the pre-
cepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready
to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing is so much
129 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 6
the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more
grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover it is clear,
since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a
man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is su-
premely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life
and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the
precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man to God;
since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in
an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its
end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject
to the commander, and the opposite of this is most
grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in
co-ordination with the other soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God,
the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully,
by having nothing in common with His enemies. The
second is that he should show Him reverence: the third
that he should offer Him his service. Thus, in an army, it
is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a
compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander :
and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting
in some point of service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behaviour to-
wards his neighbour, it is evident that it is more repugnant
to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe
the due order as to those persons to whom he is most in-
debted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct
man in his relations to his neighbour, the first place is given
to that one which regards his parents. Among the
other precepts we again find the order to be according to
the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant
to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by
thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys
life in one already living is more grievous than adultery,
which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery
is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply Obj. i. Although our neighbour is better known than
God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God
"• 3 9
Q. TOO. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 130
is the reason for the love of our neighbour, as shall be de-
clared later on (II.-IL, Q. XXV., A. i; Q. XXVL, A. 2).
Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded
precedence of the others.
Reply Ohj. 2. Just as God is the universal principle of
being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of
being in respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding
parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God.
This argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative
precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then
it is not altogether cogent. For although in the order of
execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown,
according to Ps. xxxiii. 15: Turn away from evil, and do
good, and Isa. i. 16, 17 : Cease to do perversely ; learn to do
well ; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice,
because the crooked line is known by the straight (De Anima i.) :
and by the law is the knowledge of sin (Rom. iii. 20). Where-
fore the affirmative precept demanded the first place.
However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which
is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God,
which belong to the first table, an affirmative precept is
placed last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply Obj. 3. Although sin of thought stands first in the
order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position
in the order of reason.
Seventh Article.
whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably
formulated ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative pre-
cepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the negative pre-
cepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter
there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. There-
fore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept
131 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. 7
of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative
and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that
affirmative precepts should be framed in some matters,
and negative precepts in others.
Ohj. 2. Further, Isidore says [Etym. ii.) that every law is
based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue
belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason should
have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the
first and third.
Obj. 3. Further, by observing the precepts man deserves
to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern
the rewards of the precepts. Therefore the promise should
have been included in each precept, and not only in the
second and fourth.
Ohj. 4. Further, the Old Law is called the law of fear, in
so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means
of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts of the
decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of
punishment should have been included in each, and not
only in the first and second.
Ohj. 5. Further, all the commandments of God should
be retained in the memory: for it is written (Pro v. iii. 3):
Write them in the tahles of thy heart. Therefore it was not
fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the
third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the
precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. xi. 21) that God made
all things, in measure, number, and weight. Much more
therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating
His Law.
/ answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the
precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written (Deut.
iv. 6) : This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of
nations Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things
in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident
that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
Reply Obj. 1. Affumation of one thing always leads to
the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite
Q. loo. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 132
does not always lead to the affirmation of the other. For it
follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does
not follow that if it is not black, it is white : because negation
extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one
ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the
negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary
dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a
service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate
of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a
service or kindness to those from whom he has received
kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are
two whose favours no man can sufficiently repay, viz.,
God and man's father, as stated in Ethic, viii. Therefore
it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one
about the honour due to parents, the other about the cele-
bration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favour.
Reply Ohj. 2. The reasons for the purely moral precepts
are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason.
But some of the precepts include ceremonial matter, or a
determination of a general moral precept ; thus the first
precept includes the determination. Thou shall not make a
graven thing ; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is
fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason in
each case.
Reply Ohj. 3. Generally speaking men direct their actions
to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts
in which it seemed that there would be no useful result,
or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary
to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already
on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from
them : wherefore a promise of reward is added to the precept
about honouring one's parents. The same applies to the
precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that
men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit
which they think they can get by entering into a compact
with the demons.
Reply Ohj. 4. Punishments are necessary against those
who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic, x. Wherefore
133 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. ,00. Art. 8
a threat of punishment is only affixed to those precepts of
the law which forbade evils to which men were prone.
Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general
custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury
on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that
a threat is affixed to the first two precepts.
Reply Obj. 5. The commandment about the Sabbath was
made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special
mention of the memory is made therein. — Or again, the
commandment about the Sabbath has a determination
affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law, where-
fore this precept needed a special admonition.
Eighth Article.
whether the precepts of the decalogue are
dispensable ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong
to the natural law. But the natural law fails in some cases
and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher
says [Ethic, v.). Now the failure of law to apply in certain
particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above
(Q. XCVL, A. 6; Q. XCVIL, A. 4). Therefore a dispensa-
tion can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
Ohj. 2. Further, man stands in the same relation to human
law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense
with the precepts of a law made by man. Therefore, since
the precepts of the decalogue arc ordained by God, it seems
that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are
God's vicegerents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor.
ii. 10) : For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned any-
thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,
Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the
decalogue.
Ohj. 3. Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is
one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation
Q. loo. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134
is given by men in this precept : for instance, when according
to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or
enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the
decalogue are dispensable.
Obj. 4. Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained
by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was
granted in this precept; for it is written (i Machab. ii. 4):
And they determined in that day, saying : V/hosoever shall come
up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against
him. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
On the contrary are the words of Isa. xxiv. 5, where some
are reproved for that they have changed the ordinance, they
have broken the everlasting covenant ; which, seemingly, apply
principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation.
/ answer that, Ks> stated above [loc. cit. cf. Obj. i), pre-
cepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular
case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the inten-
tion of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of
every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common
good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby
the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore
there be any precepts which contain the very preservation
of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue,
such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and
therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some com-
munity a law were enacted, such as this, — that no man
should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or
betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do
anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of
dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordi-
nate to the above, and determining certain special modes of
procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensa-
tion, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases
would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which con-
tain the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the
safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some
city that from each ward some men should keep watch as
135 MORAL PRECEPTS OE OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. S
sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this
on account of some greater utihty.
Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very in-
tention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of
the lirst table, which direct us to God, contain the very order
to the common and final good, which is God; while the
precepts of the second table contain the order of justice
to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to
anyone, and that each one be given his due ; for it is in this
sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue.
Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no
dispensation whatever.
Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is not speaking of the
natural law which contains the very order of justice: for
it is a never-failing principle that justice should be preserved.
But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of
observing justice, which fail to apply in certain cases.
Reply Obj. 2. As the Apostle says (2 Tim. ii. 13), God
CO ntinueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself. But He would
deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order
of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore
God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him
not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His
justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to
one another.
Reply Obj. 3. The slaying of a man is forbidden in the
decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something
undue : for in this sense the precept contains the very essence
of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to
be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes
of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary
to the precept of the decalogue; and such a kilUng is no
murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes
[De Lib. Arb. i.). — In like manner when a man's property
is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this
is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's com-
mand, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not
Q. loo. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 136
theft; since it was due to them by the sentence of God. —
Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did
not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain
by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death:
for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men,
both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our flrst
parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by
Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God
would be. — Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of
fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either
of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself
one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author
of the institution of marriage.
Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue,
as to the essence of justice which they contain, are un-
changeable: but as to any determination by application
to individual actions, — for instance that this or that be
murder, theft, or adultery, or not — in this point they admit
of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely,
in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution,
as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human au-
thority, namely in such matters as are subject to human
"N jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of
God: and yet not in all respects.
Reply Ohj. 4. This determination was an interpretation
rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to
break the Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human
welfare ; as Our Lord proves (Matth. xii. 3 seq.) .
Ninth Article.
whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept
of the law ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the mode of virtue falls under
the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that
deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds of forti-
tude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the
137 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. ,00. Art. 9
other virtues. But it is commanded (Deut. xvi. 20) that
thou shall follow justly after that which is just. Therefore
the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
Obj. 2. Further, that which belongs to the intention of
the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the
intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men
virtuous, as stated in Ethic, ii. : and it belongs to a virtuous
man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue falls
under the precept.
Obj. 3. Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist
properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this
falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is written (Ps.
xcix. 2) : Serve ye the Lord with gladness ; and (2 Cor. ix. 7) :
Not with sadness or necessity : for God loveth a cheerful giver;
whereupon the gloss says: Whatever ye do, do gladly ; and
then you will do it well ; whereas if you do it sorrowfully , it
is done in thee, not by thee. Therefore the mode of virtue
falls under the precept of the law.
On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts
unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher ex-
plains {Ethic, ii. ; v.). Now whoever transgresses a precept
of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow
that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would deserve
to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to
the intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue,
by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of
virtue does not fall under the precept.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XC, A. 3 ^i 2), a pre-
cept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which
the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly
under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through
fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic, x., because that
properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the
penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human
law are differently situated as to the appointment of
penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for
those things which come under the judgment of the law-
giver: for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict
Q. TOO. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138
given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent
to judge only of outward acts; because man seeth those things
that appear, according to i Kings xvi. 7: while God alone,
the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the
inward movements of wills, according to Ps. vii. 10: The
searcher of hearts and reins is God.
Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of
virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine
law; in some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by
the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither
by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of
virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in
Ethic, ii. The first is that man should act knowingly : and
this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human
law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does acci-
dentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law,
certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be
punishable or pardonable.
The second point is that a man should act deliberately,
i.e., from choice, choosing that particular action for its own
sake ; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of
volition and of intention, about which we have spoken
above (QQ. VHL, XU.): and concerning these two. Divine
law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For
human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, but
slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to Matth.
V. 22: Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger
of the judgment.
The third point is that he should act from a firm and im-
movable principle : which firmness belongs properly to a
habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted
habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall
under the precept either of Divine or of human law, since
neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the
law, who gives due honour to his parents and yet has not
the habit of filial piety.
Reply Obj. i. The mode of doing acts of justice, which
falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance
139 MORAL PRl^XEPTS OF OLD LAW o. loo. Airr. .j
with right; but not that they be done from the habit of
justice.
Reply Obj. 2. The intention of the lawgiver is twofold.
His aim, in the hrst place, is to lead men to something by
the precepts of the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his
intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the pre-
cept: and this is something leading or disposing to virtue,
viz., an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the
matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in
other things is the end the same as that which conduces to
the end.
Reply Obj. 3. That works of virtue should be done with-
out sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for
whoever works with sadness works unwillingly. But to
work with pleasure, i.e., joyfully or cheerfully, in one
respect falls under the precept, viz., in so far as pleasure
ensues from the love of God and one's neighbour (which
love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and
in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far
as pleasure ensues from a habit ; for pleasure taken in a work
proves the existence of a habit, as stated in Ethic, ii. For an
act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through
its proceeding from a becoming habit.
Tenth Article.
whether the mode of charity falls under the precept
of the divine law ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the mode of charity falls under
the precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Matth.
xix. 17) : // thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments :
whence it seems to follow that the observance of the com-
mandments suffices for entrance into life. But good works
do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done
from charity: for it is written (i Cor. xiii. 3): // / should
distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver
my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profUcth me
Q. loo. Art. io THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140
nothing. Therefore the mode of charity is included in the
commandment.
Ohj. 2. Further, the mode of charity consists properly
speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under
the precept; for the Apostle says (i Cor. x. 31): Do all to
the glory of God. Therefore the mode of charity falls under
the precept.
Ohj, 3. Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under
the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the
law without having charity. Now what can be done with-
out charity can be done without grace, which is always
united with charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts
of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius,
as Augustine declares [De Hceres. Ixxxviii.). Therefore the
mode of charity is included in the commandment.
On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins
mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the
precept, it follows that whoever acts otherwise than from
charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts
otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that
whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does,
however good this may be in itself : which is absurd.
/ answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this ques-
tion. For some have said absolutely that the mode of
charity comes under the precept ; and yet that it is possible
for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because
he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor
(say they) does it follow that a man not having charity
sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind:
because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act
from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for
such time as one is in a state of charity. — On the other
hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether
outside the precept.
Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Be-
cause the act of charity can be considered in two ways.
First, as an act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept
of the law which specially prescribes it, viz.. Thou shalt
141 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q loo. Art. io
love the Lord thy God, and Thou shalt love thy neighbour.
In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not
impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of
charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity,
and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act
of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts
of the other virtues, i.e., inasmuch as the acts of the other
virtues are ordained to charity, which is the end of the com-
mandment, as stated in i Tim. i. 5 : for it has been said above
(Q. XIL, A. 4) that the intention of the end is a formal
mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the
second opinion is true in saying that the mode of charity
does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this
commandment, Honour thy father, does not mean that a man
must honour his father from charity, but merely that he
must honour him. Wherefore he that honours his father,
yet has not charity, does not break this precept: although
he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for
which reason he deserves to be punished.
Reply Obj. i. Our Lord did not say. If thou wilt enter into
life, keep one commandment ; but keep all the commandments :
among which is included the commandment concerning the
love of God and our neighbour.
Reply Obj. 2. The precept of charity contains the injunc-
tion that God should be loved from our whole heart, which
means that all things would be referred to God. Conse-
quently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he
also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that honours
his father and mother, is bound to honour them from
charity, not in virtue of the precept, Honour thy father and
mother, but in virtue of the precept. Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart. And since these are
two affirmative precepts, not binding for aU times, they
can be binding, each one at a different time: so that it
may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honouring
his father and mother, without at the same time break-
ing the precept concerning the omission of the mode of
charity.
Q. TOO. Art. ti THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142
Reply Ohj. 3. Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law,
unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible
without charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius
maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace.
Eleventh Article.
whether it is right to distinguish other moral pre-
cepts of the law besides the decalogue ?
Wc proceed thus to the Eleventh Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it is wrong to distinguish other
moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because,
as Our Lord declared (Matth. xxii. 40), on these two com-
mandments of charity dependeth the whole law and the
prophets. But these two commandments are explained by
the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there
is no need for other moral precepts.
Ohj. 2. Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the
judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q. XCIX.
AA. 3, 4). But the determinations of the general moral
precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts:
and the general moral precepts are contained in the deca-
logue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated
above (A. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down
other moral precepts besides the decalogue.
Ohj. 3. Further, the moral precepts are about the acts
of all the virtues, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore, as the
Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts per-
taining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there
should have been added some precepts pertaining to the
other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth.
And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming
to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those
of the decalogue.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xviii. 8) : The law oj the
Lord is unspotted, converting souls. But man is preserved
from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted to God by
other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. There-
143 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. ii
fore it was right for the Law to include other moral pre-
cepts.
/ answer that, As is evident from what has been stated
(Q. XCIX., AA. 3, 4)., the judicial and ceremonial precepts
derive their force from their institution alone : since before
they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether
things were done in this or that way. But the moral pre-
cepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural
reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now
of these there are three grades: for some are most certain,
and so evident as to need no promulgation; such as the com-
mandments of the love of God and our neighbour, and others
like these, as stated above (A. 3), which are, as it were, the
ends of the commandments ; wherefore no man can have an
erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more
detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can
easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because
human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led
astray concerning them : these are the precepts of the deca-
logue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which
is not so evident to everyone, but only to the wise; these
are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to
the people by God through Moses and Aaron.
But since the things that are evident are the principles
whereby we know those that are not evident, these other
moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to
the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus
the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the worship
of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts for-
bidding things relating to the worship of idols: thus it is
written (Deut. xviii. 10, 11) : Neither let there be found among
you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them
to pass through the fire : . . . neither let there he any wizard
nor charmer, nor anyone thai consulteih pythonic spirits, or
fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. — The
second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added
the prohibition of blasphemy (Levit. xxiv. 15 seq.) and the
prohibition of false doctrine (Deut. xiii.). — To the third
Q. 100. Art. ii THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 144
commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. —
To the fourth commandment prescribing the honour due to
parents, is added the precept about honouring the aged,
according to Levit. xix. 32: Rise up before the hoary head,
and honour the person of the aged man ; and likewise all pre-
cepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our
betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. — To
the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the
prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted
on our neighbour, according to Levit. xix. 16: Thou shalt
not stand against the blood of thy neighbour : likewise the
prohibition against hating one's brother {ibid. 17) : Thou
shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. — To the sixth command-
ment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition
about whoredom, according to Deut. xxiii. 17: There shall
be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger
among the sons of Israel ; and the prohibition against un-
natural sins, according to Levit. xviii. 22, 23: Thou shalt not
lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast. —
To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is
added the precept forbidding usury, according to Deut.
xxiii. 19 : Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury ;
and the prohibition against fraud, according to Deut. xxv.
13 : Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag ; and univer-
sally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. —
To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony,
is added the prohibition against false judgment, according
to Exod. xxiii. 2 : Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the
opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth ; and the pro-
hibition against lying {ibid. 7) : Thou shalt fly lying ; and the
prohibition against detraction, according to Levit. xix. 16:
Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people.
— To the other two commandments no further precepts are
added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil desires.
Reply Obj. i. The precepts of the decalogue are ordained
to the love of God and our neighbour as pertaining evidently
to our duty towards them; but the other precepts are so
ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently.
145 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. loo. Art. n
Reply Obj. 2. It is in virtue of their institution that the
ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations oj the
precepts of the decalogue, not by reason of a natural instinct,
as in the case of the superadded moral precepts.
Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of a law are ordained for the
common good, as stated above (Q. XC, A. 2). And since
those virtues which direct our conduct towards others per-
tain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue
of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the
common good of the species ; hence precepts bearing directly
on these virtues aie given, both in the decalogue and in
addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the
orders to be given by the commanders in the war, which is
undertaken for the common good: as is clear from Deut.
XX. 3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus) : Be
not afraid, do not give back. In like manner the prohibition
of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it
is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said
(Deut. xxi. 20) in the person of parents: He slighteth hearing
our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to de-
bauchery and bapquetings.
Twelfth Article.
whether the moral precepts of the old law
justified man ?
We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the moral precepts of the Old
Law justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. ii. 13) :
For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but
the doers of the Law shall be justified. But the doers of
the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. There-
fore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of
justification.
Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Levit. xviii. 5) : Keep My
laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in
them. But the spiritual life of man is through justice.
Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a
cause of justification.
11. 3 10
o. loo. Art. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146
Obj. 3. Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than
human law. But human law justifies man; since there is
a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law.
Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 6) : The letter
killeth : which, according to Augustine [De Spir. et Lit. xiv.),
refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral
precepts did not cause justice.
/ answer that, Just as healthy is said properly and first of
that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that
which is a sign or a safeguard of health; so justification
means first and properly the causing of justice; while
secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may denote a
sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken
in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by
the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed
men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also
signified, because as Augustine says [Contra Faust, xxii.),
even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ,
But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we
must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as
in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken
in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by be-
coming possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according
as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification
is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice,
like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or
the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated
(Q. LXIIL, A. 4). The acquired virtue is caused by works;
but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His
grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are speaking
now, and in respect of which a man is said to be just before
God, according to Rom. iv. 2: If Abraham were justified by
works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. Hence
this justice could not be caused by the moral precepts,
which are about human actions: wherefore the moral pre-
cepts could not justify man by causing justice.
H, on the other hand, by justification we understand the
147 MORAL PRECEPTS OF OLD LAW Q. ,00. Art. 12
execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified
man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial pre-
cepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in
so far as they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas
taken individually they contained that which is just, not in
itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law.
Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify
man save through the devotion and obedience of those who
complied with them. — On the other hand the moral and
judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular,
contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts
contained that which is just in itself according to that
general justice which is every virtue according to Ethic, v. :
whereas the judicial precepts belonged to special justice,
which is about contracts connected with the human mode
of life, between one man and another.
Reply Obj. i. The Apostle takes justification for the exe-
cution of justice.
Reply Obj. 2. The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law
is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty
of death, which the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in
this sense the Apostle quotes this passage (Gal. iii. 12).
Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of human law justify man by
acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring
now, but only about that justice which is before God.
QUESTION CI.
OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and lirst
we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause;
thirdly, their duration. Under the first head there are
four points of inquiry: (i) The nature of the ceremonial
precepts: (2) Whether they are figurative ? (3) Whether
there should have been many of them ? (4) Of their various
kinds.
First Article.
whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts con-
sists in their pertaining to the worship of god ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the nature of the ceremonial
precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship
of God. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were given
certain precepts about abstinence from food (Levit. xi.) ;
and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g.
(Levit. xix. 19) : Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven
of two sorts ; and again (Num. xv. 38) : To make to themselves
fringes in the corners of their garments. But these are not
moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law.
Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain
to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man.
Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in
no way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the
nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist m their
pertaining to Divine Worship.
148
140 THE CRREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. lor. Art. i
Obj. 2. Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts
are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were
so called from the ccfci (candles) which are lit up on those
occasions. But many other things besides solemnities
]Xirtain to the worship of God. Therefore it does not seem
that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their per-
taining to the Divine worship.
Obj. 3. Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts
are patterns, i.e., rules, of salvation: because the Greek
;)^at/?e is the same as the Latin salve. But all the precepts of
the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain
to the worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts
which pertain to the Divine worship are called ceremonial.
Obj. 4. Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doctr. Perplex, iii.)
that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is
no evident reason. But there is evident reason for many
things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observ-
ance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of the
Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which
is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts
are not those which pertain to the worship of God.
On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xviii. 19, 20) : Be thou
to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew
the people the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping.
I answer that, As stated above (Q. XCIX., A. 4), the cere-
monial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts
whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial pre-
cepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he
is directed to his neighbour. Now man is directed to God
by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts
are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine
worship. — The reason for their being so called was given
above {ibid., A. 3), when we established the distinction
betv.^een the ceremonial and the other precepts.
Reply Obj. i. The Divine worship includes not only
sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God
immediately, but also those things whereby His worshippers
are duly prepared to worship Him : thus too in other matters,
Q. loT. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150
whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science
whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of
the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's wor-
shippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain
preparation of the ministers, with the view of fitting them
for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a
king make use of certain special observances. Consequently
such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
Reply Ohj. 2. The alleged explanation of the name does
not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not
contain many instances of the lighting of candles in solem-
nities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were fur-
nished with oil of olives, as stated in Levit. xxiv. 2. Never-
theless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine
worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals:
so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the
observance of solemnities.
Reply Ohj. 3. Neither does this explanation of the name
appear to be very much to the point, since the word ceremony
is not Greek but Latin. We may say, however, that, since
man's salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem
to be rules of salvation, which direct man to God: and ac-
cordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called
ceremonial precepts.
Reply Ohj. 4. This explanation of the ceremonial pre-
cepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are
called ceremonial precisely because there is no evident
reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since
the precepts referring to the Divine worship must needs be
figurative, as we shall state further on (A. 2), the consequence
is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
Second Article,
whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that the ceremonial precepts are not
figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express
151 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. tot. Art. 2
himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augus-
tine states (De Doctr. Christ, iv.) : and this seems very
necessary in the framing of a law: because precepts of law
are proposed to the populace ; for which reason a law should
be manifest, as Isidore declares [Etym. ii.). If therefore
the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something,
it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these
precepts without explaining what they signified.
Obj. 2. Further, whatever is done for the worship of God,
should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the per-
formance of actions in representation of others, seems to
savour of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly
the actions performed in theatres were done to represent
the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things
should not be done for the worship of God. But the cere-
monial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated
above (A. i). Therefore they should not be figurative.
Ohj. 3. Further, Augustine says {Enchirid. iii., iv.) that
God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity. But
the precepts of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative.
Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative.
Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said (John iv. 24) : God is a
spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and
in truth. But a figure is not the very truth: in fact one is
condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial pre-
cepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be
figurative.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 16, 17) : Let
no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a
festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which arc
a shadow of things to come.
I answer that. As stated above (A. i ; Q. XCIX., AA. 3, 4),
the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship
of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and
external. For since man is composed of soul and body,
each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the
soul by an interior worship ; the body by an outward wor-
ship: hence it is written (Ps. Ixxxiii. 3): My heart and my
Q. TOT. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 152
flesh have rejoiced in the living God. And as the body is
ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship
is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship
consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect
and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways
in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships
God are rightly united to God, his external actions are
applied in various ways to the Divine worship.
For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will
gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external
worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely
in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge
and affection, according to Isa. li. 3: Joy and gladness shall
he found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of 'praise.
But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze
upon the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of
Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain
sensible figures, as Dionysius states [Ccel. Hier. i.) ; in various
ways, however, according to the various states of human
knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine
Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that
manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares
(Heb. ix. 8). Hence the external worship of the Old Law
needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be
manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ,
Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation.
But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and
therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something
future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or
present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not
yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is
what the Apostle says (Heb. x. i) : The Law has (Vulg., —
having) a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image
of the things : for a shadow is less than an image ; so that
the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to
the Old.
Reply Ohj. i. The things of God are not to be revealed
to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he
would be in danger of downfall, were he to despise what
153 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. ioi.Art. 3
he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the
Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people
under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at
least implicitly by using those figures to the honour of God.
Reply Ohj. 2. Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical
expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so
does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of
the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in
both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible figures.
Reply Ohj. 3. Augustine is speaking there of internal
worship ; to which, however, external worship should be
ordained, as stated above.
The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection : because
men were taught by Him to practise more perfectly the
spiritual worship of God.
Third Article.
whether there should have been many ceremonial
precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there should not have been
many ceremonial precepts. For those things which con-
duce to an end should be proportionate to that end. But
the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (A A. i, 2), are
ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing
of Christ. Now there is but one God, of Whom are all things,
. . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things (i Cor.
viii. 6). Therefore there should not have been many cere-
monial precepts.
Obj. 2. Further, the great number of the ceremonial pre-
cepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the
words of Peter (Acts xv. 10) : Why tempt you God, to put a
yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers
nor we have been able to bear ? Now the transgression of
the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since,
therefore, every law should conduce to man's salvation, as
Isidore says (Etym. ii.), it seems that the ceremonial pre-
cepts should not have been given in great number.
Q. loi. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 154
Obj. 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the
outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above (A. 2) .
But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship:
since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship
God in spirit and in truth, as stated in John iv. 23. There-
fore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee viii. 12) : 7 shall write
to them (Vulg., — him) My manifold laws ; and (Job xi. 6):
That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that
His Law is manifold.
I answer that. As stated above (Q. XCVL, A. i), every
law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds
of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by the
precepts of the law, as stated above (Q. XCV., A. i) ; some,
inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or
rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and im-
proved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly,
with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the
Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For
in that people there were many prone to idolatry ; wherefore
it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial pre-
cepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God.
And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary
on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every
single one : and again, to lay many obligations on suchlike
men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by their
duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for
the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good,
it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial
precepts; both because thus their mind was turned to God
in many ways, and more continually; and because the
mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these cere-
monial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and
afforded men many considerations, which needed to be
signified by various ceremonies.
Reply Obj. i. When that which conduces to an end is
sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices
for one end: thus one remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices
155 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS O. tot. Art. 3
sometimes to restore man to health, and then the remedy
needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces
to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiphed:
thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is
not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old
Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing the
mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence;
and for subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle
says (Heb. vii. 18., 19): There is a setting aside of the former
commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness
thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection. Conse-
quently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.
Reply Obj. 2. A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser trans-
gressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore,
in order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which
would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all
the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in con-
sequence find many occasions of disobedience did not pre-
vent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts.
Reply Obj. 3. The Old Law lessened bodily worship in
many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in
every place and by any person. Many suchlike things did
it enact for the lessening of bodily worship ; as Rabbi Moses
the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex, iii.). Nevertheless it
behoved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much
as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.
Fourth Article.
whether the ceremonies of the old law are suitably
divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments,
and observances ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law
are unsuitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacra-
ments and observances. For the ceremonies of the Old
Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the
sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which Christ
Q. Toi. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 156
delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God (Eph. v. 2).
Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies.
Ohj. 2. Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New.
But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the
Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should be no dis-
tinction between sacrifices and sacraments.
Ohj. 3. Further, a sacred thing is something dedicated to
God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were
said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts
were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above (A. i).
Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore sacred
things should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies.
Ohj. 4. Further, Observances are so called from having
to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be
observed: for it is written (Deut. viii. 11) : Observe (Douay, —
Take heed) and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord
thy God, and neglect His commandments and judgments and
ceremonies. Therefore the observances should not be con-
sidered as a part of the ceremonies.
Obj. 5. Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part
of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to
come (Coloss. ii. 16, 17) : and the same may be said of the
oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle
(Heb. ix. 9) : and yet these do not seem to be included
in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above
division of ceremonies is unsuitable.
On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called
a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies
(Num. XV. 24) : They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices
and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require. Of the sacra-
ment of Order it is written (Levit. vii. 35) : This is the anoint-
ing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies. Of sacred things
also it is written (Exod. xxxviii. 21) : These are the instru-
ments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies
of the Levites. And again of the observances it is written
(3 Kings ix. 6) : If you . . . shall turn away from following Me,
and will not observe (Doua.y, — keep) My . . . ceremonies which
I have set before you.
157 THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. loi. Art. 4
/ answer that, As stated above (A A. i, 2), the ceremonial
precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this
worship we may consider the worship itself, the worshippers,
and the instruments of worship. The worship consists
specially in sacrifices, which are offered up in honour of God.
— The instruments of worship refer to the sacred things,
such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. — With re-
gard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The
first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is
effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of
the ministers; and to this the sacraments refer. The second
point is their particular mode of life, whereby they are
distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to
this pertain the observances, for instance, in matters of food,
clothing, and so forth.
Reply Obj. i. It was necessary for the sacrifices to be
offered both in some certain place and by some certain
men: and all this pertained to the worship of God. Where-
fore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so
too their sacraments and sacred things foreshadowed the
sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while their
observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people
under the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. The sacrifice of the New Law, viz., the
Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sancti-
fication : for He sanctified the people by His own blood (Heb.
xiii. 12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the
sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but fore-
shadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In
order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart
from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were
figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to
certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united.
Reply Obj. 3. The sacrifices and sacraments were of
course sacred things. But certain things were sacred,
through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and yet were
not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the
common designation of sacred things.
Q. 101. Art. 4 THE " SUJVIMA THEOLOGICA " 158
Reply Obj. 4. Those things which pertained to the mode of
Hfe of the people who worshipped God, retained the common
designation of observances, in so far as they fell short of
the above. For they were not called sacred things, because
they had no immediate connection with the worship of God,
such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort
of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as
they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.
Reply Obj. 5. Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed
place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason
the solemn festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred
things.-— The oblations and gifts are counted together with
the sacrifices ; hence the Apostle says (Heb. v. i) : Every
high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in
things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and
sacrifices.
QUESTION CIl.
OL- J HE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS.
{In Six Articles.)
We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial pre-
cepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial pre-
cepts ? (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts
was literal or hgurative ? (3) The causes of the sacrifices.
(4) The causes of the sacraments. (5) The causes of the
sacred things. (6) The causes of the observances.
First Article.
whether there was any cause for the ceremonial
precepts ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there was no cause for the
ceremonial precepts. Because on Ephes. ii. 15, Making
void the law of the commandments, the gloss says, i.e., making
void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, by substituting
decrees, i.e., evangelical precepts, which are based on reason.
But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason,
it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable
decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason
for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
Ob]'. 2. Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature.
But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there
was no reason save that man's obedience might be tested;
as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii.), concerning the pro-
hibition about the tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law
159
Q. 102. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " i6o
there should have been some precepts for the purpose of
testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.
Obj. 3. Further, man's works are called moral according
as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any
reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ
from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there
was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the reason of
a precept is taken from some cause.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xviii. 9) : The command-
ment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. But
the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God. There-
fore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if
they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial
precepts have a reasonable cause.
I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. i.), it is the function of a wise man to do everything
in order, those things which proceed from the Divine wisdom
must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states (Rom.
xiii. i). Now there are two conditions required for things
to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their
due end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters
of action: since those things that happen by chance outside
the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously
but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which
is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the
end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever
conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason
for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is
its end, as stated in Phys. ii. Now it is evident that the
ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law,
were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is \vritten
(Deut. iv. 6) : This is your wisdom and understanding in the
sight of nations. Consequently we must needs say that
the ceremonial precepts were ordained to a certain end,
wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered.
Reply Ob], i. It may be said that there was no reason for
the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was
no reason in the very nature of the thing done : for instance
i6i CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 2
that a garment should not be made of wool and linen.
But there could be a reason for them in their relation to
something else : namely, in so far as something was signified
or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of
the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of
God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act.
Reply Ohj. 2. The reason for the prohibition concerning
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not that this
tree was naturally evil: and yet this prohibition was reason-
able in its relation to something else, in as much as it signi-
fied something. And so also the ceremonial precepts of
the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation
to something else.
Reply Ohj. 3. The moral precepts in their very nature
have reasonable causes: as for instance. Thou shall not
kill, Thou shall not steal. But the ceremonial precepts
have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else,
as stated above.
Second Article.
whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal
cause or merely a figurative cause ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ceremonial precepts have
not a literal, but merely a figurative, cause. For among
the ceremonial precepts, the chief were circumcision and the
sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any
but a figurative cause: because each was given as a sign.
For it is written (Gen. xvii. 11) : You shall circumcise the flesh
of your foreskin, that it may be for a sign of the covenant
between Me and you: and of the celebration of the Passover it
is written (Exod. xiii. 9) : It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and
as a manorial before thy eyes. Therefore much more did the
other ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason.
Obj. 2. Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause.
But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated
above (Q. CL, A. 2). Therefore they have no other than
a figurative cause.
n. 3 u
g. 102. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162
Obj. 3. Further, if it be a matter of indifference wliether a
certain tiling, considered in itseff, be done in a particular way
or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are
certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be
a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one
way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be
offered, and other such particular circumstances. Therefore
there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Ofd Law.
On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts fore-
shadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament:
for it is written (i Cor. x. 11) that all {these things) happened
to them in figure. Now in the stories of the Old Testament,
besides the mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense.
Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides
their figurative causes.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. i) , the reason for what-
ever conduces to an end must be taken from that end.
Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for
they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that par-
ticular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as
the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a
way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as
Jerome says on Osee i. 3. Accordingly the reasons for the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two
ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to
be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are
literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or
recall certain Divine benefits ; or remind men of the Divine
excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was
then required in those who worshipped God. — Secondly,
their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their
being ordained to foreshadow Christ : and thus their reasons
are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from
Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the
allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Chiistian people,
which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of future
glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ,
which refers to the anagogical sense.
i63 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
Reply Obj. 1. Just as the use oi inetaphorical expressions
in Scripture belongs to the hteral sense, because the words
are employed in order to convey that particular meaning;
so also the meaning of those legal, ceremonies which com-
memorated certain Divine benehts, on account of which
they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged
to that time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes.
Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebra-
tion of the Passover was its signihcation of the delivery
from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's cove-
nant with Abraham, we assign the literal cause.
Reply Obj. 2. This argument would avail, if the ceremonial
precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come,
and not for the purpose of worshipping God then and there.
Reply Obj. 3. As we stated when speaking of human laws
(Q. XCVL, AA. I, 6), there is a reason for them in the
abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which
depend on the judgment of those who frame them; so also
many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the
Old Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause;
whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.
Third Article.
whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the
ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices ?
We proceed thus to the Jliird Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that no suitable cause can be
assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For
those things which were offered in sacrifice, are those which
are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain
animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such sus-
tenance ; according to Ps. xlix. 13 : Shall I eat the flesh of
bullocks ? Or shall I drink the blood of goats ? Therefore
such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God.
Obj. 2. Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were
offered in sacrifice to God, viz., oxen, sheep and goats; of
birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but specially.
(}. I02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164
in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows.
Now many other animals are more noble than these. Since
therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems
that not only of these three should sacrifices have been
offered to Him.
Ohj. 3. Further, just as man has received from God the
dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received
dominion over fishes. Consequently it was unfitting for
fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.
Ohj. 4. Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are
commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the
dove are commanded to be offered, so also should the young
of the turtledove.
Ohj. 5. Further, God is the Author of life, not only of
men, but also of animals, as is clear from Gen. i. 20, seq.
Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that
living animals rather than slain animals should be offered
to God ; especially as the Apostle admonishes us (Rom.
xii. i), to present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing
unto God.
Ohj. 6. Further, if none but slain animals were offered in
sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they
were slain. Therefore it was unfitting that the manner of
immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds
(Levit. i. 15, seq.).
Ohj. 7. Further, every defect in an animal is a step
towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals
were offered to God, it was unreasonable to forbid the
offering of an imperfect animal, e.g., a lame, or a blind, or
otherwise defective animal.
Ohj. 8. Further, those who offer victims to God should
partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle
(i Cor. X. j.^): Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers
of the altar ? It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers
to be denied certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood,
the fat, the breast-bone and the right shoulder.
Ohj. 9. Further, just as holocausts were offered up in
honour of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-
i65 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
offerings. But no female animal was offered up to God as
a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both
quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that
female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and
sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should not be
offered up in peace-offerings.
Obj. 10. Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of
one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction
among them, so that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of
certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was
allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-offerings, as laid
down in Levit. vii. 15, seq.
Obj. II. Further, all sins agree in turning us from God.
Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of
sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins.
Obj. 12. Further, all animals that were offered up in
sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz., slain. Therefore
it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil
should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an
offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour, some-
times of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, some-
times in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.
Obj. 13. Further, whatever things are serviceable to us
should be recognized as coming from God. It was there-
fore unbecoming that besides animals, nothing but bread,
wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God.
Obj. 14. Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward
sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God.
But in the inward sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted
by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents ; for
it is written (Ecclus. xxiv. 27) : My spirit is sweet above
honey. Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey,
and of leaven which makes bread savoury, should be for-
bidden in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt
which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste.
Consequently it seems that things pertaining to the cere-
monies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.
On the contrary, It is written (Levit. i. 13) : The priest shall
Q. T02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 166
offer it all and hum it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and
most sweet savour to the Lord. Now according to Wis. vii. 28,
God loveth none hut him that dwelleth with wisdom : whence it
seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely
done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were
wisely done, as having reasonable causes.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. 2), the ceremonies of
the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz., a literal cause,
according as they were intended for Divine worship; and a
figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended
to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies
pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting
cause.
For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were
intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices
can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice
represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the
offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to
direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that
whatever he has is from God as from its first principle, and
direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the
offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some
of his own belongings in honour of God, as though in recog-
nition of his having received them from God, according to
the saying of David (i Paral. xxix. 14) : All things are Thine :
and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand. Where-
fore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that
God is the first principle of the creation of all things, and
their last end, to which all things must be directed. — And
since, for the human mind to be directed to God aright, it
must recognize no first author of things other than God,
nor place its end in any other; for this reason it was for-
bidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God,
according to Exod. xxii. 20: He that sacrificeth to gods, shall
he put to death, save only to the Lord. Wherefore another
reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of the
sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn
from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the
i6y CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish
people until after they had fallen into idolatry, by wor-
shipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were
instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices,
might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols.
Thus it is written (Jer. vii. 22) : / spake not to your fathers
and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them
out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-
offerings and sacrifices.
Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind
after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave
His Son; wherefore it is written (John iii. 16) : God so loved
the world, as to give His only-begotten Son ; that whosoever
believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting.
Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ
Himself delivered Himself . . . to God for an odour of sweet-
ness (Eph. V. 2). And for this reason all the other sacri-
fices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow
this one individual and paramount sacrifice, — the imperfect
forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says (Heb.
X. 11) that the priest of the Old Law often offered the same
sacrifices, ivhich can never take away sins : but Christ offered
one sacrifice for sins, for ever. And since the reason of the
figure is taken from that which the figure represents, there-
fore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law
should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.
Reply Obj. i. God did not wish these sacrifices to be
offered to Him on account of the things themselves that
were offered, as though He stood in need of them: where-
fore it is written (Isa. i. 11) : I desire not holocausts of rams ^
and fat of fallings, and blood of calves and lambs and buck-
goats. But, as stated above. He wished them to be offered
to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; — in order to signify
the right ordering of man's mind to God; — and in order
to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by
Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. In all the respects mentioned above {ad i),
there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than
Q. I02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 168
others, being offered up in sacrifice to God. First, in order
to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other
animals to their gods, or made use of them in their sor-
ceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had
been dwelling) considered it abominable to slay these
animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice
to their gods. Hence it is written (Exod. viii. 26) : We shall
sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God.
For they worshipped the sheep ; they reverenced the ram
(because demons appeared under the form thereof) ; while
they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by
them as something sacred.
Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right order-
ing of man's mind to God: and in two ways. — First, because
it is chiefly by means of these animals that human life is
sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake
of a most clean food : whereas other animals are either wild,
and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they
be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese : and
nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. — These
birds especially were offered in sacrifice, because there were
plenty of them in the land of promise. — Secondly, because
the sacrificing of these animals represented purity of heart.
Because as the gloss says on Levit. i.. We offer a calf, when
we overcome the pride of the flesh ; a lamb, when we restrain
our unreasonable motions ; a goat, when we conquer our
wantonness ; a turtledove, when we keep chaste ; unleavened
bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity.
And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and sim-
plicity of heart.
Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be
offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as
the same gloss observes, Christ is offered in the calf, to denote
the strength of the cross ; in the lamb, to signify His innocence ;
in the ram, to foreshadow His Headship ; in the goat, to signify
the likeness of ' sinful flesh. "^^ The turtledove and dove
denoted the union of the two natures ; or else the turtledove
* An allusion to Col. ii. 11 {Textus Receptus).
i69 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
signified chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity.
The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with
the water of Baptism.
Reply Ohj. 3. Fish through Hving in water are further
removed from man than other animals, which, Hke man,
live in the air. Again, fish die as soon as they are taken
out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple
like other animals.
Reply Ohj. 4. Among turtledoves the older ones are
better than the young; while with doves the case is the
reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doctr. Per-
plex., iii.), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to
be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but
what is best.
Reply Ohj. 5. The animals which were offered in sacrifice
were slain, because it is by being killed that they become
useful to man, forasmuch as God gave them to man for
food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire : because it
is by being cooked that they are made fit for human con-
sumption.— Moreover the slaying of the animals signified
the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death
on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain
in man's stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins.
— Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying
of Christ.
Reply Ohj. 6. The Law fixed the special manner of slay-
ing the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways
of killing, whereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. —
Or again, as Rabbi Moses says [loc. cit.), the Law chose that
manner of slaying which was least painful to the slain animal.
This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any
mangling of the animals slain.
Reply Ohj. 7. It is because unclean animals are wont to
be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to
offer thern in sacrifice to God: and for this reason too they
were forbidden (Deut. xxiii. 18) to offer ^A^ hire of a strumpet
or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God. For the same
reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day,
Q. T02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170
because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not
yet firm on account of its exceeding softness.
Reply Obj. 8. There were three kinds of sacrifices. There
was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire :
this was called a holocaust, i.e., all burnt. For this kind of
sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to
His majesty, and love of His goodness: and typified the
state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels.
Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that as the whole
animal by being dissolved into vapour soared aloft, so it
might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to
him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be
offered to Him.
Another sacrifice was the sin-offering, .which was offered
to God on account of man's need for the forgiveness of
sin: and this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying
for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was
burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the
priests to signify that remission of sins is granted b}^ God
through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this
sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or
specially for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was
burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should
have the use of that which was offered for their own sins,
to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them.
Moreover, this would not be satisfaction for sin: for if the
offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it
was offered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not
been offered.
The third kind of sacrifice was called the peace-offering,
which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the
welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment
of benefits already received or yet to be received : and this
typifies the state of those who are proficient in the obser-
vance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided
into three parts : for one part was burnt in honour of God ;
another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and
the third 1 part to the use of the offerers ; in order to
171 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
signify that man's salvation is from God, by the direction
of God's ministers, and through the co-operation of those
who are saved.
But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were
not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers :
the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in
honour of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar
(Levit. ix. 9, 10). The reason for this was, first, in order
to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the
blood and eat the fat of the victims, according to Deut.
xxxii. 38 : Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the
wine of their drink-offerings. — Secondly, in order to form
them to a right way of living. For they were forbidden
the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding
of human blood; wherefore it is written (Gen. ix. 4, 5):
Flesh with Mood you shall not eat : for I will require the blood
of your lives : — and they were forbidden to eat the fat, in
order to withdraw them from lasciviousness ; hence it is
written (Ezech. xxxiv. 3) : You have killed that which was
fat. — Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God:
because blood is most necessary for life, for which reason
I fe is said to be in the blood (Levit. xvii. 11, 14): while fat
is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to
show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency of all
good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt
up in His honour. — Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the
shedding of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity,
whereby He offered Himself to God for us.
In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right
shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order
to prevent a certain kind of divination which is known
as spatulamantia, so called because it was customary in
divining to use the shoulder-blade {spatula), and the
breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore
these things were taken away from the offerers. — This
also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to
instruct the people, — this was signified by the breast-bone,
which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order
Q. I02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 172
to bear with human frailty — and this was signified by the
right shoulder.
Reply Ohj. 9. Because the holocaust was the most perfect
kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for
a holocaust: because the female is an imperfect animal. —
The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the
poverty of the offerers, who were unable to offer bigger
animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and
no one was bound to offer them against his will, hence
these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but
among the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was
obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account
of their lofty flight, were befitting the perfection of the
holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings, because their
song is doleful.
Reply Ohj. 10. The holocaust was the chief of all the
sacrifices: because all was burnt in honour of God, and
nothing of it was eaten. The second place in holiness,
belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the
court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice (Lev. vii . 6,
15). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings
of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but
anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the ex-voto
peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on
the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound
to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on
account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of
the benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by
reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him.
Reply Ohj. 11. Sins are more grievous by reason of the
state of the sinner, as stated above (Q. LXXHL, A. 10):
wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered
for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private
individual. But, as Rabbi Moses says, we must take note
that the more grievous the sin, the lower the species of animal
offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very hase animal ,
was offered for idolatry ; while a calf was offered for a priest's
ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince.
173 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
Reply Obj. 12. In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in
view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could
not have a four-footed animal at their disposal, might at
least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird
might at least offer bread; and that if a man had not even
bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.
The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ
Who is the living bread (John vi. 41, 51). He was indeed
an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of
nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was like flour in
the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like
perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in
the fire, i.e., formed by the Holy^ Ghost in the oven of the
virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He
suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as
on a gridiron.
Reply Obj. 13. The products of the soil are useful to man,
either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink,
and of these wine was offered; or as seasoning, and of these
oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they
offered incense, which both smells sweetly and binds easily
together.
Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ ; and the
wine. His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens
the grace of Christ; salt. His knowledge; incense. His
prayer.
Reply Obj. 14. Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to
God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices
to idols; and in order to denote the absence of all carnal
sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice
to God. — 'Leaven was not offered, to denote the exclusion
of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in
the sacrifices to idols.
Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the cor-
ruption of putrefaction : for sacrifices offered to God should
be incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of
wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh.
Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which
Q. I02. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 174
is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odour
of a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both
rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice of jealousy did
not proceed from devotion, but rather from suspicion,
therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. v. 15).
Fourth Article.
whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the
ceremonies pertaining to holy things ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that no sufficient reason can be
assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to
holy things. For Paul said (Acts xvii. 24) : God Who made
the world and all things therein ; He being Lord of heaven
and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands. It was
therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or
temple should be set up for the worship of God.
Obj. 2. Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed
except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of
the Old Law. Therefore it should not have been changed
by the building of a temple.
Obj. 3. Further, the Divine law, more than any other
indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an
increase of divine worship requires multiplication of altars
and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law.
Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there should
have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.
Obj. 4. Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained
to the worship of God. But in God we should worship
above all His unity and simplicity. Therefore it seems
unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by
means of veils.
Obj. 5. Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e., God,
appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that
the first movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up
for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been
built so as to point to the east rather than the west.
175 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
Obj. 6. Further, the Lord commanded (Exod. xx. 4) that
they should not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness
of anything. It was therefore unfitting for graven images
of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple.
In like manner the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick,
the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there
without reasonable cause.
Ohj. 7. Further, the Lord commanded (Exod. xx. 24) :
You shall make an altar of earth unto Me : and again {ibid.,
26) : Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar. It was
therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be com-
manded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or
brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up
to it except by steps. For it is written (Exod. xxvii. 1,2):
Thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be
five cubits long, and as many broad, . . . and three cubits
high . . . and thou shalt cover it with brass : and (Exod.
XXX. 1,3): Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense,
of setim wood . . . and thou shall overlay it with the purest
gold.
Obj. 8. Further, in God's works nothing should be super-
fluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything
superfluous to be found. But one cover suffices for one
tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to
furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz., curtains,
curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-
coloured skins (Exod. xxvi.).
Obj. 9. Further, exterior consecration signifies interior
holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore
unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be conse-
crated, since they were inanimate things.
Obj. 10. Further, it is written (Ps. xxxiii. 2) : / will bless
the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth.
But the solemn festivals were instituted for the praise of
God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should
be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that it seems that
there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to
holy things.
Q. I02. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 176
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. viii. 4) that those
who offer gifts according to the law, . . . serve unto the
example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered
to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle : See, says He,
that thou make all things according to the pattern which was
shown thee on the mount. But that is most reasonable,
which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the
ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.
I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external
worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man's
tendency is to reverence less those things which are com-
mon, and indistinct from other things ; whereas he admires
and reveres those things which are distinct from others in
some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among
men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by
their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and
to possess vaster and more beautiful abodes. And for this
reason it behoved special times, a special abode, special
vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine
worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought
to greater reverence for God.
In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed
above (A. 2; Q. C, A. 12; Q. CI., A. 2), was instituted that
it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Nov^ that
which foreshadows something should be determinate, so
that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently,
certain special points had to be observed in matters per-
taining to the worship of God.
Reply Ohj. i. The divine worship regards two things:
namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship
Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, is confined to
no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part,
for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, who
worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there
was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up
for the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through
coming together with the thought that the place was
set aside for the worship of God, they might approach
177 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain
things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or
human nature might be signified by the arrangement of
various details in such temple or tabernacle.
To this Solomon refers (3 Kings viii. 27) when he says:
// heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee,
how much less this house which I have built for Thee ? And
further on {ibid. 29, 30) he adds: That Thy eyes may be
open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said : My
name shall be there ; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to the
siipplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel. From
this it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set
up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally,
but that God's name might dwell there, i.e., that God might
be made known there by means of things done and said
there; and that those who prayed there might, through
reverence for the place, pray more devoutly, so as to be
heard more readily.
Reply Obj. 2. Before the coming of Christ, the state of the
Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the
Law, which was effected in Christ alone : but it was changed
as regards the condition of the people that were under the
Law. Because, at first, the people were in the desert,
having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in
various wars with the neighbouring nations; and lastly, at
the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people
was one of great peace. And then for the first time the
temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed
by God, had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is
written (Gen. xxii. 2) that the Lord commanded Abraham
to offer his son for a holocaust upon one of the mountains
which I will show thee : and it is related further on [ibid. 14)
that he called the name of that place, The Lord seeth, as though,
according to the Divine prevision, that place were chosen
for the worship of God. Hence it is written (Deut. xii. 5, 6) :
You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall
choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and
victims.
II. 3 12
Q. 102. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178
Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by
the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for
three reasons assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the
Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the
Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each
tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes
and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not
built until they had a king who would be able to quell
such quarrels. Until that time a portable tabernacle was
employed for divine worship, no place being as yet
lixed for the worship of God. This is the literal
reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and
the temple.
The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that
they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which
was changeable, signifies the state of the present changeable
life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, sig-
nifies the state of future life which is altogether unchange-
able. For this reason it is said that in the building of the
temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to signify
that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from
the future state. — Or else the tabernacle signifies the state
of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens
the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at
the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was
built with the co-operation of the Gentiles, viz., the Tyrians
and Sidonians.
Reply Obj. 3. The reason for the unity of the temple or
tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal
reason was the exclusion of idolatry. For the Gentiles put
up various temples to various gods: and so, to strengthen
in the minds of men their belief in the unity of the God-
head, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one
place only. — ^Another reason was in order to show that
bodily worship is not acceptable of itself : and so they were
restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and every-
where. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice
whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable
179 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Akt. 4
to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and
temples is permitted in the New Law.
As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of
God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets,
there were, even under the Old Law, various places, called
synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together
for the praise of God; just as now there are places called
churches in which the Christian people gather together
for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of
both temple and synagogue : since the very sacrifice of the
Church is spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice
is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative
reason may be that hereby is signified the unity of the
Church, whether militant or triumphant.
Reply Ohj. 4. Just as the unity of the temple or taber-
nacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church,
so also the division of the tabernacle or temple signified the
distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from
which we arise to the worship of God. Now the tabernacle
was divided into two parts: one was called the Holy of
Holies, and was placed to west ; the other was called the
Holy Place,"^ which was situated to the east. Moreover
there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there
are two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of
the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Be-
cause the different parts of the world are thus betokened by
the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was
called the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which
is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is
called the Holy Place signified the corporeal world. — Hence
the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by
a veil, which was of four different colours (denoting the four
elements), viz., of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e.,
flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying water, be-
cause the purple tint was made from certain shells found
in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the colour
of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying lire: — and this
* Or Sanctuary. The Douay version uses both expressions.
Q. 102. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 180
because matter composed of the four elements is a veil
between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-
priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner
tabernacle, i.e., the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught
that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that
(higher) world: whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e.,
the Holy Place, the priests entered every day : whereas
the people were only admitted to the court ; because the
people are able to perceive material things, the inner nature
of which only wise men by dint of study are able to discover.
But with regard to the figurative reason, the outward
tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened
the state of the Old Law, as the Apostle says (Heb. ix. 6,
seq.) : because into that tabernacle the priests always entered
accomplishing the offices of sacrifices. But the inner taber-
nacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either
the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law,
which is a kind of beginning of the glory to come. To
the latter state Christ brought us; and this was signified
by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy
of Holies. — The veil betokened the concealing of the spiri-
tual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was
adorned with four colours: viz., that of linen, to designate
purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which
the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signi-
fying the twofold love of God and our neighbour; and violet,
in token of heavenly contemplation. — With regard to the
state of the Old Law the people and the priests were situ-
ated differently from one another. For the people saw the
mere corporeal sacrifices which were offered in the court:
whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the
sacrifices, because their faith in the mysteries of Christ was
more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle.
This outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a veil ;
because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ
were hidden from the people, while they were known to the
priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they
were subsequently in the New Testament {cf. Ephes. iii. 5).
I
i8i CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
Reply Obj. 5. Worship towards the west was introduced
in the Law to the exchision of idolatry: because all the
Gentiles, in reverence to the sun, worshipped towards the
east ; hence it is written (Ezech. viii. 16) that certain men
had their hacks towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces
to the east, and they adored towards the rising of the sun.
Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the
Holy of Holies to westward, that they might adore toward
the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact
that the whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained
to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the
west, according to Ps. Ixvii. 5: Who ascendeth unto the west ;
the Lord is His name.
Reply Obj. 6. Both literal and figurative reasons may be
assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The
literal reason is in connection with the divine worship.
And because, as already observed {ad 4), the inner tabernacle,
called the Holy of Holies, signified the higher world of
spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three
things, viz., the ark of the testament in which was a golden
pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed,
and the tables (Heb. ix. 4) on which were written the ten
commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between
two cherubim that looked one towards the other: and over
the ark was a table, called the propitiatory, raised above the
wings of the cherubim, as though it were held up by them;
and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of
God. For this reason it was called the propitiatory, as
though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers
of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by
the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the
ark of the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that
sat on the propitiatory. — These three things denote three
things in that higher world: namely, God Who is above
all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no like-
ness of Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But
there was something to represent His seat; since, to wit,
the creature, which is beneath God, as the seat is under the
Q. I02. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 182
sitter, is comprehensible. — Again in that higher world
there are spiritual substances called angels. These are
signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other,
to show that they are at peace with one another, according
to Job XXV. 2: Who maketh peace in . . . high places. For
this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken
the multitude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their
receiving worship from those who had been commanded to
worship but one God. — Moreover there are, enclosed as it
were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of what-
soever takes place in this world, just as in every cause are
enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the
types of the works of his craft. This was betokened by the
ark, which represented, by means of the three things it
contained, the three things of greatest import in human
affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the
testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod
of Aaron; and life, denoted by the manna which was the
means of sustenance. — Or else these three signified the three
Divine attributes, viz., wisdom, in the tables; power, in
the rod; goodness, in the manna, — both by reason of its
sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God
that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved as
a memorial of the Divine mercy. — Again, these three things
were represented in Isaias' vision. For he saw the Lord
sitting upon a throne high and elevated ; and the seraphim
standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory
of the Lord; wherefore the seraphim cried out : All the
earth is full of His glory (Isa. vi. i, 3). — And so the images
of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this
was forbidden by the first commandment; but as a sign of
their function, as stated above.
The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world,
also contained three things, viz., the altar of incense, which
was directly opposite the ark; the table of proposition, with
the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the
northern side ; and the candlestick, which was placed towards
the south. These three things seem to correspond to the
i83 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
three which were enclosed in the ark; and they represented
the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because,
in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering
the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was
necessary to express them more manifestly than they are in
the Divine or angelic mind. — Accordingly the candlestick
betokened, as a sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was
expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. —
The altar of incense signified the office of the priest, whose
duty it was to bring the people to God : and this was signified
also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling
incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people
acceptable to God: for it is written (Apoc. viii. 3) that the
smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the justifications
of the saints [cf. ibid. xix. 8). Moreover it was fitting that
the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark,
by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle, by the altar of
incense : because the priest is the mediator between God and
the people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted
by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government,
i.e., the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so
to speak. — The table signified the sustenance of life, just
as the manna did: but the former, a more general and a
coarser kind of nourishment ; the latter, a sweeter and more
delicate. — Again, the candlestick was fittingly placed on the
southern side, while the table was placed to the north:
because the south is the right-hand side of the world, while
the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Ccelo et
Mundo ii. ; and wisdom, like other spiritual goods, belongs
to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs to
the left, according to Prov. iii. 16: In her left hand {are)
riches and glory. And the priestly power is midway between
temporal goods and spiritual wisdom ; because thereby both
spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed.
Another literal signification may be assigned. For the
ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent
forgetfulness of the Law, wherefore it is written (Exod.
xxiv. 12) : / will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law,
g. I02. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 184
and the commandments which I have written : that thou may est
teach them to the children of Israel. — The rod of Aaron was
placed there to restrain the people from insubordination
to the priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num.
xvii. 10) : Carry hack the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of
the testimony, that it may he keft there for a token of the re-
bellious children of Israel. — The manna was kept in the ark
to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the
children of Israel in the desert ; wherefore it is written
(Exod. xvi. 32) : Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto
generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread
wherewith I fed you in the wilderness. — The candlestick was
set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnifi-
cence of a house depends on its being well lighted. Now
the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes
[Antiquit. iii.), to signify the seven planets, wherewith the
whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was
placed towards the south; because for us the course of the
planets is from that quarter. — The altar of incense was
instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a
sweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the taber-
nacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the
shedding of blood and the slaying of animals. For men
despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-
smelling things are much appreciated. — The table was placed
there to signify that the priests who served the temple
should take their food in the temple: wherefore, as stated
in Matth. xii. 4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat
the twelve loaves which were put on the table in memory
of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the
middle directly in front of the propitiatory, in order to ex-
clude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of
the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of the moon,
wherefore it is written (Jerem. vii. 18) : The women knead
the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.
In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holo-
causts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people
possessed were offered to God : and consequently the people
i85 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the
priest could be present in the court. But the priests alone,
whose function it was to offer the people to God, could
approach the inner altar, whereon the very devotion and
holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar
was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court, to the
exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed
altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols.
The figurative reason for all these things may be taken
from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, Who was fore-
shadowed therein. Now it must be observed that to show
the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures
were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For He
was foreshadowed by the propitiatory, since He is a pro-
pitiation for our sins (i John ii. 2). — This propitiatory was
fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written
(Heb. i. 6) : Let all the angels of God adore Him. — He is also
signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of
setim-wood, so was Christ's body composed of most pure
members. Moreover it was gilded: for Christ was full of
wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. And
in the ark was a golden pot, i.e.. His holy soul, having
manna, i.e., all the fulness of the Godhead (Coloss. ii. 9). Also
there was a rod in the ark, i.e., His priestly power: for He
was made a . . . priest for ever (Heb. vi. 20) . And therein
were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ
Himself is a lawgiver. — ^ Again, Christ was signified by the
candlestick, for He said Himself (John viii. 12) : / am the
Light of the world ; while the seven lamps denoted the
seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in
the table, because He is our spritual food, according to
John vi. 41, 51 : / am the living bread : and the twelve loaves
signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. — Or again,
the candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching,
and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. — Again,
Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and in-
cense. Because all works of virtue must be offered by us
to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the
Q. 102. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 186
body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holo-
causts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind,
are offered to God in Christ, by the spiritual desires of the
perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to
Heb. xiii. 15: By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of
praise always to God.
Reply Ob]'. 7. The Lord commanded an altar to be made
for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honour of God, and
for the upkeep of the ministers who served the tabernacle.
Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord
issued a twofold precept. One was at the beginning of the
Law (Exod. xx. 24, seq.) when the Lord commanded them to
make an altar of earth, or at least not of hewn stones ; and
again, not to make the altar high, so as to make it neces-
sary to go up to it by steps. This was in detestation of
idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their altars
ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy
and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord
commanded (Deut. xvi. 21) : Thou shall plant no grove, nor
any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God : since idolaters
were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, on account of
the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. — There was
also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we
must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the
true nature of flesh, as regards His humanity — and this is
to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His God-
head, we must confess His equality with the Father, — and
this is not to go up to the altar by steps. Moreover we
should not couple the doctrine of Christ to that of the
Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness.
But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to
the honour of God, there was no longer reason to fear these
occasions of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the
altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be con-
spicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense, which
was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so
precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry.
Since, however, the reason for the precept. Thou shall
i87 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
not go lip by steps linto My altar (Exod. xx. 26) is stated
to have been lest thy nakedness he discovered, it should be
observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of
preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles
uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later
on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the
sake of decency: so that without any danger the altar
could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacri-
fices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but moveable.
Reply Ohj. 8. The body of the tabernacle consisted of
boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with cur-
tains of four different colours, viz., twisted linen, violet,
purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however,
covered the sides only of the tabernacle ; and the roof of
the tabernacle was covered with violet-coloured skins; and
over this there was another covering of rams' skins dyed red;
and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair,
which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also
reached to the ground and covered the boards of the taber-
nacle on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings
taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the
tabernacle, that it might be an object of respect. Taken
singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry
heaven, which is adorned with various stars; the curtain
(of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the
firmament; the skins dyed red denoted the empyrean
heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven
of the Blessed Trinity.
The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards
of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the
faithful of Christ, who compose the Church. The boards
were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colours:
because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four
virtues: for the twisted linen, as the gloss observes, signifies
the flesh refulgent with purity ; violet signifies the mind de-
sirous of heavenly things ; purple denotes the flesh subject to
passions ; the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the
midst of the passions enlightened by th: love of God and our
Q. I02. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188
neighbour. The coverings of the building designate prelates
and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly
manner of life, signified by the violet coloured skins: and
who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by
the skins dyed red; and austere of life and patient in ad-
versity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were
exposed to wind and rain, as the gloss observes.
Reply Ohj. 9. The literal reason for the sanctification of
the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated
with greater reverence, being deputed, as it were, to the
divine worship by this consecration. — The figurative
reason is that this sanctification signified the sanctification
of the living tabernacle, i.e., the faithful of whom the
Church of Christ is composed.
Reply Ohj. 10. Under the Old Law there were seven tem-
poral solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be
gathered from Num. xxviii., xxix. There was a continual
feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and
evening: and this continual feast of an abiding sacrifice
signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal
feasts the first was that which was repeated every week.
This was the solemnity of the Sabbath, celebrated in memory
of the work of the creation of the universe. — Another
solemnity, viz., the New Moon, Was repeated every month,
and was observed in memory of the work of the Divine
government. For the things of this lower world owe their
variety chiefly to the movement of the moon; wherefore
this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full
moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used to
offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. — And
these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole
human race ; and hence they were repeated more frequently.
The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and
they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred
especially on that people. For there was the feast of the
Passover in the first month to commemorate the blessing of
being delivered out of Egypt. — The feast of Pentecost was
celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving
i8g CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 4
of the Law. — The other three feasts were kept in the seventh
month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them,
just as the seventh day. For on the first of the seventh
month was the feast of Trumpets, in memory of the delivery
of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns,
which they represented by the horns which they blew. —
The feast of Trumpets was a kind of invitation whereby
they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which
was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast of Ex-
piation, in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer
of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the
calf. After this was the feast of Scenopegia or of the Taber-
nacles (i.e., tents), which was kept for seven days, to com-
memorate the blessing of being protected and led by God
through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence
during this feast they had to take the fruits of the fairest tree,
i.e., the citron, and trees of dense foliage,"^ i.e., the myrtle,
which is fragrant, and branches of palm-trees, and willows
of the brook, which retain their greenness a long time ; and
these are to be found in the Land of promise ; to signify that
God had brought them through the arid land of the wilder-
ness to a land of delights. — On the eighth day another feast
was observed, of Assembly and Congregation, on which the
people collected the expenses necessary for the divine wor-
ship : and it signified the uniting of the people and the peace
granted to them in the Land of promise.
The figurative reason for these feasts was that the con-
tinual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity
of Christ, Who is the Lamb of God, according to Heb. xiii. 8 :
Jesus Christ yesterday and to-day, and the same for ever. —
The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ,
as stated in Heb. iv. The Neomenia, which is the beginning
of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive
Church by Christ's preaching and miracles. — The feast of
Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the
apostles. — The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching of
the apostles. — The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing
* Douay and A. V. and R.V. read : Boughs of thick trees.
Q. 102. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190
of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Taber-
nacles signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they
walk by advancing in virtue. — The feast of Assembly or
Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in
the kingdom of heaven : wherefore this feast is described as
most holy (Levit. xxiii. 36). These three feasts followed
immediately on one another, because those who expiate
their vices should advance in virtue, until they come to see
God, as stated in Ps. Ixxxiii. 8.
Fifth Article.
whether there can be any suitable cause for the
sacraments of the old law ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there can be no suitable cause
for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things
that are done for the purpose of divine worship should not
be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written
(Deut. xii. 31) : Thou shall not do in like manner to the Lord
thy God : for they have done to their gods all the abominations
which the Lord abhorreth. Now worshippers of idols used to
knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related
(3 Kings xviii. 28) that they cut themselves after their manner
with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood.
For this reason the Lord commanded (Deut. xiv. i) : You
shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead.
Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed
by the Law (Levit. xii. 3).
Obj. 2. Further, those things which are done for the
worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity;
according to Ps. xxxiv. 18: / will praise Thee in a grave
(Douay, — strong) people. But it seems to savour of levity
for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was unfittingly
commanded (Exod. xii. 11) that they should eat the Paschal
lamb in haste. Other things too relative to the eating
of the lamb were prescribed, which seem altogether un-
reasonable.
igi CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
Obj. 3. Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were
figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal
lamb signified the sacrament of the luicharist, according to
I Cor. V. 7: Christ our Pasch is sacrificed. Therefore there
should also have been some sacraments in the Old Law
to foreshadow the other sacraments of the New Law, such as
Confirmation, ExtremeUnction, and Matrimony, and so forth.
Obj. 4. Further, purification can scarcely be done except
by removing something impure. But as far as God is con-
cerned, no bodily thing is reputed impure, because all bodies
are God's creatures; and every creature of God is good, and
nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving (i Tim.
iv. 4). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified
after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection.
Obj. 5. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xxxiv. 4) : What can
he made clean by the unclean ? But the ashes of the red
heifer [cf. Heb. ix. 13) which was burnt, were unclean,
since they made a man unclean: for it is stated (Num.
xix. 7 seq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered
unclean until the evening ; likewise he that burnt her ; and
he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly
prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by
being sprinkled with those cinders.
Obj. 6. Further, sins are not something corporeal that
can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be
cleansed from sin by means of something unclean. It was
therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of
the people that the priest should confess the sins of the
children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might
carry them away into the wilderness: while they were
rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the
purpose of purification, by burning it together with the calf
outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes
and their bodies with water (Levit. xvi.).
Obj. 7. Further, what is already cleansed should not be
cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second
purification to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house;
as laid down in Levit. xiv.
Q. I02. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192
Ohj. 8. Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed
by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore
it seems unreasonable that the Lord ordered (Exod. xxx. 18
seq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the
priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the
temple; and that He commanded (Num. viii. 7) the Levites
to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave
all the hairs of their flesh.
Ohj. 9. Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed
by that which is less Therefore it was unfitting that, in
the Law, the higher and lower priests, as stated in Levit. viii.
(c/. Exod. xxix.), and the Levites, according to Num. viii.,
should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily
sacrifices, and bodily oblations.
Ohj. 10. Further, as stated in i Kings xvi. 7, Man seeth
those things that appear, hut the Lord heholdeth the heart.
But those things that appear outwardly in man are the
disposition of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was
unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to
the higher and lower priests, as related in Exod. xxviii.
{cf. Levit. viii. 7, seq.). It seems, moreover, unreasonable
that anyone should be debarred from the priesthood on
account of defects in the body, as stated in Levit. xxi. 17,
seq. : Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath
a hlemish, he shall not offer bread to his God. . . . if he he blind,
if he he lame, etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments
of the Old Law were unreasonable.
On the contrary. It is written (Levit. xx. S): I am the Lord
that sanctify you. But nothing unreasonable is done by
God, for it is written (Ps. ciii. 24) : Thou hast made all things
in wisdom. Therefore there was nothing without a reason-
able cause in the sacraments of the Old Law, which were
ordained to the sanctification of man.
7 answer that. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 4), the sacra-
ments are, properly speaking, things applied to the wor-
shippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way,
to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship
of God belonged in a general way to the whole people ; but
193 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5.
in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who
were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in
these sacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned
the whole people in general; while others belonged to the
ministers.
In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first
was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and
this institution was brought about, — for all in general, by^
circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any
of the legal observances, — and for the priests, by their
consecration. The second thing required was the use of
those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus,
as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal
banquet, to which no uncircumcised man was admitted,
as is clear from Exod. xii. 43, seq. : and, as to the priests, the
offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of
proposition and of other things that were allotted to the use
of the priests. — The third thing required was the removal
of all impediments to divine worship, viz., of uncleannesses.
And then, as to the people, certain purifications were insti-
tuted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses;
and also expiations from sins; while, as to the priests and
Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of
the hair were instituted.
And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal,
in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the
time being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to
foreshadow Christ : as we shall see by taking them one by one.
Reply Obj. i. The chief literal reason for circumcision
was in order that man might profess his belief in one God.
And because Abraham was the first to sever himself from
the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred for
this reason he was the first to receive circumcision. This
reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. iv. 9, seq.) thus:
He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of
the faith which he had, being uncircumcised ; because, to wit,
we are told that unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice,
for the reason that against hope he believed in hope, i.e.,
"•3 13
g. 102. Art. 5 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 194
against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope
that is of grace, that he might he made the father of many
nations, when he was an old man, and his wife an old and
barren woman. And in order that this declaration, and imita-
tion of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts
of the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign as they
could not forget, wherefore it is written (Gen. xvii. 13) :
My covenant shall he in your flesh for a perpetual covenant.
This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child
is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is
considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore
neither are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was
not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign
of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the
parents, whose love for their children increases as they be-
come used to their presence and as they grow older, should
withdraw their children from circumcision. — A second
reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in
that member. — A third motive may have been to revile the
worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honour to that
part of the body. — The Lord's prohibition extended only
to the cutting of oneself in honour of idols: and such was
not the circumcision of which we have been speaking.
The figurative reason for circumcision was that it fore-
shadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be
brought about by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in
the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the
dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment
comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our
first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the
generative member. Hence the Apostle says (Coloss. ii.
11) : You are circumcised in Christ with circumcision not made
hy hand in despoiling of the hody of the flesh, hut in the circum-
cision of Our Lord Jesus Christ.
Reply Ohj. 2. The literal reason of the paschal banquet
was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out
of Egypt. Hence by celebrating this banquet they declared
that they belonged to that people which God had taken to
195 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 3
Himself out of Egypt. For when they were delivered from
Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on
the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that
they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped
the ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or
rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the
danger of extermination which threatened the Egyptians.
Now two things are to be observed in their departure from
Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians
pressed them to go forth speedily, as related in Exod. xii. 33 ;
and there was the danger that anyone who did not hasten
to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians.
Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they
ate. For they Were commanded to eat unleavened bread,
as a sign that it could not he leavened, the Egyptians pressing
them to depart ; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time
to prepare ; and that they should not break a bone thereof,
because in their haste there was no time to break bones.
Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written:
You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes on your
feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste :
which clearly designates men at the point of starting on
a journey. To this also is to be referred the command:
In one house shall it he eaten, neither shall you carry forth
of the flesh thereof out of the house : because, to wit, on ac-
count of their haste, they could not send any gifts of it.
The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by
the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because
the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of
Christ according to i Cor. v. 7 : Christ our pasch is sacrificed.
The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the
destroyer, by being sprinkled on the transoms, signified
faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the
faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered from sin
and death, according to i Pet. i. 18: You were . . . redeemed
. . . with the precious hlood . . . of a lamh unspotted. The
partaking of its flesh signified the eating of Christ's body in
the Sacrament ; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to
Q. 102. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196
signify Christ's Passion or charity. And it was eaten with
unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful
who partake of Christ's body, according to i Cor. v. 8: Let
us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.
The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins,
which is required of those who receive the body of Christ.
Their loins were girt in sign of chastity : and the shoes of
their feet are the examples of our dead ancestors. The
staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral
authority: and it was commanded that the paschal lamb
should be eaten in one house, i.e., in a catholic church, and
not in the conventicles of heretics.
Reply Ohj. 3. Some of the sacraments of the New Law
had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law.
For Baptism, which is the sacrament of Faith, corresponds
to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col. ii. 11, 12) : You
are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of Our Lord Jesus
Christ ; buried with Him in Baptism. In the New Law the
sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of
the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New
Law corresponds to all the purifications of the Old Law.
The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of
the pontiff and of the priests. To the sacrament of Con-
firmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace,
there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law,
because the time of fulness had not yet come, since the Law
brought no man (Vulg., — nothing) to perfection (Heb. vii. 19).
The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction,
which is an immediate preparation for entrance into glory,
to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law,
since the price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did
indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but
not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with the Church,
for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under
the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which
is contrary to the nature of a sacrament.
Reply Obj. 4. As already stated, the purifications of the
Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to
197 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. T02. Art. 5
the divine worship: which worship is twofold; viz., spiritual,
consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal,
consisting in sacrifices, oblations, and so forth. Now men
are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereb^^ men
were said to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry, murder,
adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were purified
by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community
in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not that those
carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating
sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins which was
to be effected by Christ, and of Which those of old became
partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while
taking part in the figurative sacrifices.
The impediments to external worship consisted in certain
bodily uncleannesses ; which were considered in the first place
as existing in man, and consequently in other animals also,
and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man him-
self uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself
and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything
proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was already
subject to corruption, or exposed thereto : and consequently
since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was
considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises
from corruption of the humours, which break out externally
and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also con-
sidered unclean; and, again, women suffering from a flow
of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at
the monthly course or at the time of conception) ; and, for
the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered
from a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal
pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humour
issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some
unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by
touching any unclean thing whatever.
Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for
these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the
reverence due to those things that belong to the divine
worship : »botli because men are not wont, when unclean, to
Q. I02. Art. 5 THR " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198
touch precious things : and in order that by rarely approach-
ing sacred things they might have greater respect for them.
For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid unclean-
nesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to
touch things belonging to the worship of God, so that when
they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and
humility. Moreover, in some of these the literal reason was
that men should not be kept away from worshipping God
through fear of coming in contact with lepers and others
similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases.
In others, again, the reason was to avoid idolatrous worship;
because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes em-
ployed human blood and seed. All these bodily unclean-
nesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water,
or, in the case of those which were more grievous, by some
sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of
the uncleanness in question.
The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that
they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of
any corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the
death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened
the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both because heretical
doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no
doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with error,
as Augustine says (QucBst. Evang. iii.), just as on the sur-
face of a leprous body one may distinguish the healthy
parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a
woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the unclean-
ness of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered
up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal
loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words, for the seed
is the word of God. The uncleanness of sexual intercourse
and of the woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of
original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods
signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by
pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted
by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness
arising from consent in another's sin, according to 2 Cor.
199 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
vi. 17: Go out from among them, and he ye separate . . . and
touch not the unclean thing.
Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was
contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was
touched in any way by an unclean man, became itself
unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of
the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted not
only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses
states [Doctr. Perplex, iii.) of a woman in her periods. The
mystical sense of this was that to God the wicked and his
wickedness are hateful alike (Wis. xiv. 9).
There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things con-
sidered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in
a house or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men
through a corrupt humour causing putrefaction and cor-
ruption in the flesh; so, too, through some corruption and
excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind
of corruption in the stones with which a house is built, or
in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the
name of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment was deemed
to be unclean: both because al] corruption savoured of
uncleanness, as stated above, and because the Gentiles wor-
shipped their household gods as a preservative against this
corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, where
this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be de-
stroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid
all occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of
vessels, of which it is written (Num. xix. 15) : The vessel that
hath no cover, and binding over it, shall he unclean. The
cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might
easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean.
Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention of
idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or
the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into
the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to
the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels
in honour of the nocturnal deities whom they call JancB.
The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that
Q. 102. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200
the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the
assembly of heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment sig-
nified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind ; the leprosy
of a woollen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers;
leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy
on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in
the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has
neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the
veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity
of discipline.
Reply Ohj. 5. As stated above [ad 4), there was a twofold
uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the
mind or in the body; and this was the graver uncleanness ;
the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and
this was less grave, and was more easily expiated. Because
the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins,
since all corruption is due to sin, and signifies sin: whereas
the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling
of a certain water, of which water we read in Num. xix. For
there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory
of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And
a cow is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus
that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, accord-
ing to Osee iv. 16: Israel hath gone astray like a wanton
heifer : and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped
heifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee x. 5 :
{They) have worshipped the kine of Bethaven. And in
detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed out-
side the camp; in fact, whenever sacrifice was offered
up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt
outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this
sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, the priest
dipped his finger in her blood, and sprinkled it over against
the door of the tabernacle seven- times ; for the number seven
signifies universality. Further, the very sprinkling of blood
pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood
that was offered up was not poured out, but was collected
together, and men gathered round it to eat in honour of
201 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because
God appeared to Moses in a lire, and the Law was given
from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together
with all that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated
altogether; just as the cow was burnt with her skin and her
flesh, her blood and dung being delivered to the flames. To
this burning were added cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet
twice dyed, to signify that just as cedar- wood is not liable to
putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its
colour, and hyssop retains its odour after it has been dried ;
so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole
people, and for their good behaviour and devotion. Hence
it is said of the ashes of the cow: That they may be reserved
for the multitude of the children of Israel. Or, according to
Josephus [Antiq. iii.), the four elements are indicated here:
for cedar-wood was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on
account of its earthiness; hyssop, to signify the air, on
account of its smell ; scarlet twice dyed, to signify water, for
the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which
are taken out of the water: — thus denoting the fact that
this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements.
And since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry,
both he that burned her, and he that gathered up the ashes, and
he that sprinkled the water in which the ashes were placed,
were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to
show that whatever was in any way connected with idolatry
should be cast aside as being unclean. From this unclean-
ness they were purified by the mere washing of their clothes ;
nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account
of this kind of uncleanness, because otherwise the process
would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water
became unclean, so that if he were to sprinkle himself he
would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him,
that one would have become unclean, and in like manner,
whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely.
The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red
cow signified Christ in respect of his assumed weakness,
denoted by the female sex; while the colour of the cow
Q. I02. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202
designated the blood of His Passion. And the red cow was
of full age, because all Christ's works are perfect, in which
there was no blemish ; and which had not carried the yoke,
because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of
sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they
blamed Him for transgressing the law of Moses by breaking
the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered to
Eleazar the priest, because Christ was delivered into the
hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated without
the camp, because Christ suffered outside the gate (Heb. xiii. 12).
And the priest dipped his finger in her blood, because the mys-
tery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated.
It was sprinkled over against . . . the tabernacle, which
denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation
of the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and
this seven times, in token either of the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is com-
prised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of
Christ should be burnt with fire, i.e., they should be under-
stood spiritually; for the skin and flesh signified Christ's
outward works; the blood denoted the subtle inward force
which quickened His external deeds: the dung betokened
His weariness, His thirst, and all suchlike things pertaining
to His weakness. Three things were added, viz., cedar-
wood, which denotes the height of hope or contemplation;
hyssop, in token of humility or faith; scarlet twice dyed,
which denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three that
we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this
burning were gathered by a man that is clean, because the
relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles,
who were not guilty of Christ's death. The ashes were put
into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism
receives from Christ's Passion the power of washing away
sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and
he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes,
were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either
because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to
death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the
203 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
evening, i.e., until the end of the world, when the remnants
of Israel will be converted; or else because they who handle
sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract
certain uncleannesses, as Gregory says [Pastor, ii.) ; and this
until the evening, i.e., until the end of this life.
Reply Obj. 6. As stated above [ad 5), an uncleanness
which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body
was expiated by sin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were
wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since
some were neglectful about expiating such sins and unclean-
nesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation;
it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day of the
seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered
for the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says
(Heb. vii. 28), the Law maketh men priests, who have in-
firmity, it behoved the priest first of all to offer a calf for
his own sins, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the
molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust,
which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by the
ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the
glory of God. — Then he offered two he-goats for the people :
one of which was offered in expiation of the sins of the
multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and
from its skin clothes are made having a pungent odour; to
signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After
this he-goat had been immolated, its blood was taken,
together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies,
and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify
that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleannesses of
the children of Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and
calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to
denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however,
burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt
thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt
without the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done
whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the
multitude of sins. The other goat was let loose into the
wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the
Q. T02. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204
Gentiles worshipped in desert places, because it was unlaw-
ful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the
effect of the sacrifice which had been offered up. Hence
the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the
sins of the children of Israel: as though that goat were to
carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be
devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment
of the people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the
people, either because the forgiveness of the people's sins
was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head
written lists of sins were fastened.
The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was
foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power;
and by the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful ; and
by the he-goat, on account of the likeness of sinful flesh
(Rom. viii. 3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins
of both priests and people: since both those of high and
those of low degree are cleansed from sin by His Passion.
The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into the
Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom
of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion.
Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because Christ
suffered without the gate, as the Apostle declares (Heb.
xiii. 12). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's God-
head, Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ
suffered, not by going to another place, but by restraining
His power: or it' may signify the base concupiscence which
we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to
Our Lord acts of virtue.
With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who
burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which
we assigned [ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer.
Rej)ly Obj. 7. The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of
his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is
shown by the words of Lev. xiv. 3, seq., where it is said that
the priest, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed,
shall command him that is to be purified : consequently, the
leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in
205 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to the society
of men and to the worship of God. It happened sometimes,
however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the
legal rite, when the priest erred in his judgment.
Now this purilication of a leper was twofold: for, in the
first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he
was restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the
worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first
purification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for
himself two living sparrows, . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet,
and hyssop, in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop
should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so
that the cedar- wood was like the handle of an aspersory:
while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory
which was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow which
was immolated . . . over living waters. These things he
offered as an antidote to the four defects of leprosy: for
cedar- wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered
against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling
herb, was offered up against the stench ; a living sparrow was
offered up against numbness; and scarlet, which has a vivid
colour, was offered up against the repulsive colour of leprosy.
The living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain,
because the leper was restored to his former liberty.
On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship,
and was restored to the society of men; but only after
having shaved all the hair of his body, and washed his
clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes,
and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was
offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of
sin: and some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the
tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, and on the
thumb of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot ;
because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed
and felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were em-
ployed: viz., blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil,
to denote the healing of the disease; and living waters, to
wash away the filth.
g. I02 Art. 5 THE " SUMMA TH1^:0L0GICA " 206
The figurative reason was that the Divine and human
natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of
which, in likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an
earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of
Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The other
sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained
living, because the Godhead cannot die : hence it flew away,
for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion.
Now this living sparrow, together with the cedar-wood and
scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e., faith, hope, and
charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into the water for
the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the
faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his
tears man washes his clothes, i.e., his works, and all his
hair, i.e., his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the man
to be cleansed is moistened with some of the blood and oil,
in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words;
and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are
moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters
pertaining to this purification, or to that also of any
other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond
what applies to other sacrifices, whether for sins or for
trespasses.
Reply Ohjs. 8 and 9. Just as the people were initiated by
circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers
by some special purification or consecration: wherefore
they are commanded to be separated from other men, as
being specially deputed, rather than others, to the ministry
of the divine worship. And all that was done touching
them in their consecration or institution, was with a view
to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of
purity, power, and dignity. Hence three things were done
in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified;
secondly, they were adorned* and consecrated ; thirdly, they
were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be
purified by washing in water, and by certain sacrifices; but
* Ornabantur. Some editions have ordinahantur , — were ordained :
the former reading is a reference to Lev. viii. 7-9.
207 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
the Levites in particular shaved aU the hair of their bodies,
as stated in Lev. viii. {cf. Num. viii.).
With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecra-
tion was performed as follows. First, when they had been
washed, they were clothed with certain special garments
in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-
priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unction : to
denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by
him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on to the
lower parts of the body; according to Ps. cxxxii. 2: Like
the precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the
heard, the heard of Aaron. But the Levites received no other
consecration besides being offered to the Lord by the children
of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed
for them. The lesser priests were consecrated on the hands
only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip
of their right ear and the thumb of their right hand, and the
great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of
the sacrificial animal, to denote that they should be obedient
to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by
touching their right ear) ; and that they should be careful
and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by
the moistening of the right foot and hand) . They themselves
and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the
animal that had been sacrificed, in memory of the blood of
the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At
their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: a
calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the
molten calf ; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacri-
fice of Abraham, whose obedience it behoved the high-priest
to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, which was as a
peace-offering, in memory of the delivery from Egypt
through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in
memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people.
In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the
fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were
placed on their hands, to show that they received the
power of offering these things to the Lord : while the Levites
Q. I02. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208
were initiated to the ministry by being brought into the
tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry
touching the vessels of the sanctuary.
The figurative reason of these things was that those who are
to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should
be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the
waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is a
sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have
also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e., all evil thoughts.
They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be conse-
crated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling
of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the
fulfilment of their spiritual ministry.
Reply Ohj. 10. As already stated (A. 4), the purpose of
the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine
worship: and this in two ways; — ^first, by excluding from
the worship of God whatever might be an object of con-
tempt ; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all
that seemed to savour of reverence. x\nd, indeed, if this
was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels,
and in the animals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be
observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to
obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed that
they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so
deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same
reason it was also commanded that the choice of those who
were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made
in a broadcast manner from any family, but according to
their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them
distinction and nobility.
In order that they might be revered, special ornate vest-
ments were appointed for their use, and a special form of
consecration. This indeed is the general reason of ornate
garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vest-
ments. First, he had a linen tunic. — Secondly, he had a
purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed little
bells [and as it were) pomegranates of violet, and purple, and
scarlet twice dyed. — Thirdly, he had the ephod, which
209 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
covered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle ; and
it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice
dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders he bore two
onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children
of Israel. — Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the same
material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast,
and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational there were
twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were
graven the names of the children of Israel, in token that the
priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore
their names on his shoulders; and that it was his duty ever
to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast,
bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord com-
manded the Doctrine and Truth to be put in the rational:
for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth
were written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on
the rational was placed a stone which changed colour ac-
cording to the various things which were about to happen
to the children of Israel: and this they call the Truth and
Doctrine. — Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made of the four
colours mentioned above. — Sixthly, there was the tiara or
mitre which was made of linen. — Seventhly, there was the
golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was in-
scribed the Lord's name. — Eighthly, there were the linen
breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness, when they went
up to the sanctuary or altar. — Of these eight vestments the
lesser priests had four, viz., the linen tunic and breeches,
the belt and the tiara.
According to some, the literal reason for these vestments
was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial
globe ; as though the high- priest confessed himself to be the
minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written
(Wis. xviii. 24) : In the robe of Aaron was the whole world
described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out
of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt signified the
ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic denoted
the air by its colour: its little bells betoken the thunder;
the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its many
n.3 14
Q. 102. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210
colours, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones
denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The
twelve precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs
of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the
rational, because in heaven are the types [rationes) of earthly
things, according to Job xxxviii. 33: Dost thou know the
order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem)
thereof on the earth ? The turban or tiara signified the
empyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor
of the universe.
The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains
or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify
the various vices and sins from which they should be
free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e.,
he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame, i.e.,
vacillating and uncertain of purpose : that he must not have
a little, or a great, or a crooked nose, i.e., that he should
not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in
another, or even exercise some base occupation: for the
nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odours. It is
forbidden that he should have a broken foot or hand, i.e., he
should not lose the power of doing good works or of ad-
vancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a swelling
either in front or behind (Vulg., — if he he crookhacked) : by
which is signified too much love of earthly things : — if he be
blear-eyed, i.e., if his mind is darkened by carnal affections:
for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter. He is
also rejected if he have a pearl in his eye, i.e., if he pre-
sumes in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white
robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected if he have a
continued scab, i.e., lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have
a dry scurf, which covers the body without giving pain, and
is a blemish on the comeliness of the members ; which denotes
avarice. Lastly, he is rejected if he have a rupture or hernia ;
through baseness rending his heart, though it appear not in
his deeds.
The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers.
Now there are four things that are necessary to all His
211 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 5
ministers, viz., chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life,
signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion,
betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted
by the mitre covering the head. — But the high- priests needed
four other things in addition to these. First, a continual
recollection of God in their thoughts ; and this was signifii d
by the golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name
of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with
the shortcomings of the people: this was denoted by the
ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they
had to carry the people in their mind and heart by the
solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the
rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by perform-
ing works of perfection ; and this was signified by the violet
tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of
the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine
things united in the high-priest to his godly mode of life.
In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity
of faith and concord in good morals: because his doctrine
should hold together in such a way that it should not rend
asunder the unity of faith and peace.
Sixth Article.
whether there was any reasonable cause for the
ceremonial observances ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that there was no reasonable cause
for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle
says (i Tim. iv. 4), every creature of God is good, and nothing
to he rejected that is received with thanksgiving. It was there-
fore unfitting that they should be forbidden to eat certain
foods, as being unclean according to Lev. xi. {cf. Deut. xiv.).
Ohj. 2. Further, just as animals are given to man for food,
so also are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gen. ix. 3) : As the
green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you. But the Law did
not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being unclean,
although some are most harmful, for instance, those that
Q. T02. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212
are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any
animals have been prohibited as being unclean.
Obj. 3. Further, if the matter from which a thing is gene-
rated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated
therefrom is unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since
therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems
that in like manner neither should blood have been forbidden
as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood.
Obj. 4. Further, Our Lord said (Matth. x. 28; cf. Luke
xii. 4), that those should not be feared that kill the body,
since after death they have no more that they can do : which
would not be true if after death harm might come to man
through anything done with his body. Much less therefore
does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh
be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in
what is said, Exod. xxiii. 19 : Thou shall not boil a kid in the
milk of its dam.
Obj. 5. Further, all that is first brought forth of man and
beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to
the Lord (Exod. xiii.). Therefore it is an unfitting command
that is set forth in Lev. xix. 23 : when you shall be come into
the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall
take away the un circumcision'^ of them, i.e., the first crops, and
they shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of them.
Obj. 6. Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's
body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have
been forbidden to the Jews: for instance (Lev. xix. 19):
Thou shall not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts : and
(Deut. xxii. 5) : A woman shall not be clothed with man's
apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel : and further
on (verse 11) : Thou shall not wear a garment that is woven of
woollen and linen together.
Obj. 7. Further, to be mindful of God's commandments
concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is un-
suitably prescribed (Deut. vi. 8, seq.) that they should hind
the commandments of God as a sign on their hands; and
that they should write them in the entry ; and (Num. xv. 38,
* PrcBputia, which Douay version renders ,^^5/ fruits.
213 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 6
scq.) that they should make to themselves fringes in the
corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue, that
. . . they may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord.
Obj. 8. Further, the Apostle says (i Cor. ix. 9) that God
doth not take care for oxen, and, therefore, neither of other
irrational animals. Therefore without reason is it com-
manded (Deut. xxii. 6): If thou find, as thou walkest by the
way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt 7tot take the dam
with her young ; and (Deut. xxv. 4) : Thou shalt not muzzle
the ox that treadeth out thy corn ; and (Lev. xix. 19) : Thou
shalt not 7nake thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind.
Obj. 9. Further, no distinction was made between clean
and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any dis-
tinction have been made about the cultivation of plants.
Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed (Lev. xix. 19) : Thou
shalt not sow thy field with different seeds ; and (Deut. xxii. 9,
seq.)\ Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds; and:
Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together.
Obj. 10. Further, it is apparent that inanimate things arc
most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was
unfitting to debar man from taking the silver and gold of
which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses
of idols, as expressed in the commandment of the Law
(Deut. vii. 25, seq.). It also seems an absurd commandment
set forth in Deut. xxiii. 13, that they should dig round about
and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased of.
Obj. II. Further, piety is required especially in priests.
But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of
one's friends: wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing
(Tob. i. 20, seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of
piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby de-
livered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsis-
tent for these things to be forbidden to priests (Lev. xxi.).
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. xviii. 14) : But thou art
otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God : from which words
we may gather that these observances were instituted by
God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore
they are not without reason or cause.
Q. I02. Art. g THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214
I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above (A. 5),
were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among
them the priests themselves were specially set apart for
that purpose. And just as other things that are applied to
the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular
way so that they be worthy of the worship of God; so
too in that people's, and specially the priests', mode of
life, there needed to be certain special things befitting the
divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the
worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery
of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things
pertaining to Christ, according to i Cor. x. 11: All these
things happened to them in figures. Consequently the reasons
for these observances may be taken in two ways, first accord-
ing to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly,
according as they foreshadow something touching the Chris-
tian mode of life.
Reply Ohj. i. As stated above (A. 5, ad 4, 5), the Law
distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that
of sin, whereby the soul was defiled; and another consisting
in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some
way infected. Speaking then of the first-mentioned un-
cleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man,
by reason of its nature; wherefore we read (Matth. xv. 11) :
Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man ; hut what
Cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man : which words are
explained (verse 17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods
can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes
of them against obedience or a vow, or from excessive con-
cupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for
which reason some refrain from wine and flesh-meat.
If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in
some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is un-
clean, either because like th-e pig they feed on unclean
things ; or because their life is among unclean surroundings :
thus certain animals, like moles and mice and suchlike, live
underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant
smell; or because their flesh, through being too moist or too
215 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 6
dry, engenders corrupt humours in the human body. Hence
they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals,
i.e., animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their
earthiness; and in like manner they were forbidden to eat
the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet,
because such are very fierce and their flesh is very dry, such
as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they
were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the flesh of
which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of
their exceeding humidity. In like manner certain fish
lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their
excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. They were,
however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a
divided hoof, because in such animals the humours are well
absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are
they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too
earthy, which is shown by their having not a flat but a
cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the
drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are an indication,
because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered.
Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as
hens, partridges, and the like. — Another reason was detesta-
tion of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and especially the
Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up
these forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for
the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those
animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped
them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from
eating them, as stated above (A. ^ ad 2). The third reason
was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they
were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured
easily and promptly.
With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to
partake of those of any animal whatever without exception.
Blood was forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that
they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated
above (A 3. ad 8) ; and in order to shun the idolatrous rite
whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and
Q. I02. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 216
to gather together around it for a banquet in honour of the
idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable.
Hence the Lord commanded the blood to be poured out and
to be covered with earth (Lev. xvii. 13). — For the same
reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been
suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these animals
would not be separated from the body: or because this form
of death is very painful to the victim ; and the Lord wished
to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational
animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men,
through being used to be kind to beasts. They were for-
bidden to eat the fat : both because idolaters ate it in honour
of their gods ; and because it used to be burnt in honour of
God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious,
which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses [Doctr. Per-
plex, iii.). — The reason why they were forbidden to eat the
sinews is given in Gen. xxxii. 32, where it is stated that the
children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched
the sinew 0/ Jacob's thigh and it shrank.
The figurative reason for these things is that all these
animals signified certain sins, in token of which those
animals were prohibited. Hence Augustine says [Contra
Faustum vi.) : // the swine and lamb be called in question, both
are clean by nature, because all God's creatures are good : yet
the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain significa-
tion. Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each
of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of the
sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed : but in
signification, the one is clean, the other unclean. The animal
that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in
signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the
two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two
natures in Christ : of the distinction of good and evil. While
chewing the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and
a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either
of these is spiritually unclean. — In like manner those fish
that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because
fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales
217 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 6
signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual
cleanness. — Of birds certain special kinds were forbidden. In
the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden:
in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of
powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on
very small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The
kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudu-
lent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows an army,
expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those
who like others to die or to fight among themselves that
they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify
those who are blackened by their lusts; or those who lack
kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it
had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though
a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those
who fight for God's cause, and at the same time are taken
up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at
night, but cannot see in daytime, denotes those who are
clever in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters.
The gull, which both flies in the air and swims in the water,
signifies those who are partial both to Circumcision and to
Baptism : or else it denotes those who would fly by contem-
plation, yet dwell in the waters of sensual delights. The
hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those
who assist the strong to prey on the poor. The screech-owl,
which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the
lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness.
The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time
under water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the
waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long
beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as
the stork : it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself
with the ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright
in colour, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food
from deep places on land or water: it may denote those
who seek earthly profit through an external brightness of
virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East : it has a long beak,
and its jaws are furnished with foUicules, wherein it stores
g. I02. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218
its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it : it is a
figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding
up the necessities of life. The coot* has this peculiarity
apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swim-
ming, and a cloven foot for walking : for it swims like a duck
in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks
only when it bites, since it dips all its food in water : it is a
figure of the man who will not take advice, and does nothing
but what is soaked in the water of his own will. The heron,t
commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose /^^^ are swift
to shed blood (Ps. xiii. 3). The plover, J which is a garrulous
bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest
on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a
groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those
who are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground,
signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge,
seek none but earthly things. — Of fowls and quadrupeds
those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer
than the fore-legs, so that they can leap : whereas those were
forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those
who abuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists, so that they
are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. — By the
prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to understand
the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing
sin.
Reply Ohj. 2. Men were wont to eat plants and other
products of the soil even before the deluge : but the eating of
flesh seems to have been introduced after the deluge; for it
is written (Gen. ix. 3) : Even as the green herbs have I delivered
. . . all flesh to you. The reason for this was that the eating
of the products of the soil savours rather of a simple life;
whereas the eating of flesh savours of delicate and over-
careful living. For the soil gives birth to the herb of its
own accord ; and suchlike products of the earth may be had
* Douay, — porphyrion. St. Thomas's description tallies with the
coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet
differing from one another.
t Vulg., — herodionem.
j Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vul-
gate,— charadrion ; charadrius is the generic name for all plovers.
219 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS g. 102. Art. 6
in great quantities with very little eliort: whereas no small
trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal.
Consequently God being wishful to bring His people back to
a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds
of animals, but not those things that are produced by the
soil. — Another reason may be that animals were offered to
idols, while the products of the soil were not.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has
been said {ad i).
Reply Ohj. 4. Although the kid that is slain has no percep-
tion of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would
seem to savour of heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was
intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served
up on the same dish. — It might also be said that the Gentiles
in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of
kids in this manner, for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet :
hence (Exod. xxiii.) after the solemnities to be celebrated
under the Law had been foretold, it is added: Thou shalt 7iot
boil a kid in the milk of its dam. The figurative reason for
this prohibition is this: — the kid, signifying Christ, on ac-
count of the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. viii. 3), was not to
be seethed, i.e., slain, by the Jews, in the milk of its dam,
i.e., during His infancy. — Or else it signifies that the kid,
i.e., the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam,
i.e., should not be cajoled by flattery.
Reply Ohj. 5. The Gentiles offered their gods tb.e first-
fruits, which they held to bring them good luck : or they
burnt them for the purpose of sorcery. Consequently (the
Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the
first three years as unclean: for in that country nearly all
trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that
are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft or from a
cutting : but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds
encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time
for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered what hap-
pened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth
year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered to
God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten.
g. I02. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220
The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact
that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from
Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away
to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of
the Law, i.e., Christ, was to be offered to God. — Or again,
that we should mistrust our first efforts, on account of their
imperfection.
Reply Ohj. 6. It is said of a man in Ecclus. xix. 27, that
the attire of the body . . . shows what he is. Hence the Lord
wished His people to be distinguished from other nations,
not only by the sign of circumcision, which was in the flesh,
but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore they
were forbidden to wear garments woven of woollen and linen
together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel,
or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous
worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used
garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover
in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armour; while,
conversely, in the worship of Venus men donned women's
attire. — The second reason was to preserve them from lust:
because the employment of various materials in the making
of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the
use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an incentive
to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figura-
tive reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment
woven of woollen and linen signified that it was forbidden
to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with
the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. — It also signifies
that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform
other duties of men: or that man should not adopt the
effeminate manners of a woman.
Reply Ohj. 7. As Jerome says on Matth. xxiii. 6, the Lord
commanded them to make violet-coloured fringes in the four
corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might he distin-
guished from other nations. Hence, in this way, they pro-
fessed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this
sign reminded them of their Law.
When we read: Thou shall hind them on thy hand, and they
221 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 6
shall he ever before thy eyes (Vulg., — they shall he and shall
move between thy eyes), — the Pharisees gave a false interpreta-
tion to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a
parchment, and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that
it moved in front of their eyes : whereas the intention of the
Lord in giving this commandment was that they should be
bound in their hands, i.e., in their works; and that they
should be before their eyes, i.e., in their thoughts. The
violet-coloured fillets which were inserted in their cloaks
signify the godly intention which should accompany our
every deed. — It may, however, be said that, because they
were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people, it was neces-
sary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the
observance of the Law.
Reply Obj. 8. Affection in man is twofold: it may be an
affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If
a man's affection be one of reason, it matters not how man
behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to
man's power, according to Ps. viii. 8 : Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet : and it is in this sense that the Apostle
says that God has no care for oxen ; because God does not ask
of man what he does with oxen or other animals.
But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved
also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity
is caused by the afflictions of others ; and since it happens
that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is pos-
sible for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard
to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a
man practise a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more
disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it is
written (Pro v. xii. 10) : The just regardeth the lives of his
beasts : hut the bowels of the wicked are cruel. Consequently
the Lord, in order to inculcate pity to the Jewish people,
who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practise pity even
with regard to dumb animals, and forbade them to do certain
things savouring of cruelty to animals. Hence He pro-
hibited them to boil a kid in the milk of its dam ; and to
muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn; and to slay the dam
Q. I02. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222
with her young. — It may, nevertheless, be also said that these
prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the
Egyptians held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the
grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers
were wont to ensnare the mother bird with her young during
incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing
fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children: — also
because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother
sitting on her young.
As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal
reason may have been threefold. The first was to show
detestation for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed
various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce
various effects, and on various kinds of things according to
their various conjunctions. — The second reason was in con-
demnation of unnatural sins. — The third reason was the
entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because
animals of different species do not easily breed, unless
this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are
aroused by seeing such things. Wherefore in the Jewish
traditions we find it prescribed, as stated by Rabbi Moses,
that men shall turn away their eyes from such sights.
The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities
of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth
the corn, i.e., from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doc-
trine, as the Apostle states (i Cor. ix. 4, seqq.). — Again, we
should not take the dam with her young : because in certain
things we have to keep the spiritual senses, i.e., the offspring,
and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e., the mother,
for instance in all the ceremonies of the Law. It is also
forbidden that beasts of burden, i.e., any of the common
people, should be allowed to engender, i..e, to have any
connection, with animals of another kind, i.e., with Gentiles
or Jews.
Reply Ohj. 9. All these minglings were forbidden in agri-
culture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyp-
tians in worshipping the stars employed various combina-
tions of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent
223 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 102. Art. 6
the various conjunctions of the stars. — Or else all these
minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural
vice.
They have, however, a figurative reason. For the pro-
hibition : Thou shall not sow thy field with different seeds, is
to be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition
to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual
vineyard. — Likewise the field, i.e., the Church, must not be
sown with different seeds, i.e., with Catholic and heretical
doctrines. — Neither is it allowed to plough with an ox and
an ass together ; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man
in preaching, for one would hinder the other.
Reply Ohj. 10.* Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden (Deut.
vii.) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but
because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which idols
were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is
clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (verse 26) :
Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou
become an anathema, like it. Another reason was lest, by taking
silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which
the Jews were inclined. The other precept (Deut. xxiii.) about
covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of
bodily cleanliness ; and in order to keep the air wholesome ; and by
reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which
stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell;
as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after expressing the
command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: For the Lord
thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and to give up
thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e., clean), and let no
uncleanness appear therein. The figurative reason for this precept,
according to Gregory {Moral, xxxi.). is that sins which are the fetid
excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we
may become acceptable to God, according to Ps. xxxi. i : Blessed are
they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. Or else
according to a gloss, that we should recognize the unhappy condition
of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a
puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination.
Reply Ohj. 11. Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use,
in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Where-
fore, in order to extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship,
the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who
at fixed times served in the temple, should not incur an
* The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices.
The solution given here is found in some editions, and was supplied
by Nicolai.
Q. 102. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224
uncleanness at the death of anyone except of those who were
closely related to them, viz., their father or mother, and
others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest had
always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; where-
fore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, how-
ever nearly related to him. — They were also forbidden to
marry a harlot or one that has been put away, or any other
than a virgin : both on account of the reverence due to the
priesthood, the honour of which would seem to be tarnished
by such a marriage: and for the sake of the children who
would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most
of all to be avoided when the priestly dignity was passed on
from father to son. — Again, they were commanded to shave
neither head nor beard, and not to make incisions in
their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For
the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard,
wherefore it is written (Baruch vi. 30) : Priests sit in their
temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards
shaven. Moreover, in worshipping their idols they cut them-
selves with knives and lancets (3 Kings xviii. 28). For this
reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do
the contrary.
The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should
be entirely free from dead works, i.e., sins. And they should
not shave their heads, i.e., set wisdom aside; nor should
they shave their beards, i.e., set aside the perfection of
wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e., they
should not incur the sin of schism.
QUESTION cm.
OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial pre-
cepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before
the Law ? (2) Whether at the time of the Law the cere-
monies of the Old Law had any power of justification ?
(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the
coming of Christ ?
First Article.
whether the ceremonies of the law were in existence
before the law ?
We proceed tJms to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ceremonies of the Law were
in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts
were ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated above (Q. CL,
A. 4). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for
it is written (Gen. iv. 3, 4) that Cain offered, of the fruits of
the earth, gifts to the Lord, and that Ahel offered of the firstlings
of his flock, and of their fat. Noe also offered holocausts to
the Lord (Gen. xviii. 20), and Abraham did in like manner
(Gen. xxii. 13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
preceded the Law.
Ohj. 2. Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar
were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But
these preceded the Law. For we read (Gen. xiii. 18) that
A brahani . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord ; and (Gen.
II. 3 225 15
Q. 103. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 226
xxviii. 18) that Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up
for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it. Therefore the legal
ceremonies preceded the Law.
Obj. 3. Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to
have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the
Law, as appears from Gen. xvii. In like manner the priest-
hood preceded the Law; for it is written (Gen. xiv. 18) that
Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God. There-
fore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.
Obj. 4. Further, the distinction of clean from unclean
animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated
above (Q. C. IL, A. 6 ad i). But this distinction preceded the
Law; for it is written (Gen. vii. 2, 3) : Of all clean beasts take
seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two
and two. Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.
On the contrary, It is written (Deut. vi. i) : These are the
precepts, and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God com-
manded that I should teach you. But they would not have
needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid cere-
monies had been already in existence. Therefore the legal
ceremonies did not precede the Law.
/ answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q. CI.,
A. 2; Q. CIL, A. 2), the legal ceremonies were ordained for
a double purpose ; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing
of Christ. Now whoever worships God must needs worship
Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external
worship. But the fixing of the divine worship belongs
to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our rela-
tions with our neighbour is a matter determined by the
judicial precepts, as stated above (Q. XCIX., A. 4). Conse-
quently, as among men in general there were certain judicial
precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, but
ordained by human reason; so also there were some cere-
monies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according
to the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since,
however, even before the Law some of the leading men were
gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that
a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to
227 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 103. Art. t
worship God in a certain definite way, which would be both
in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of
Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by other
things that they did, according to i Cor. x. 11: All .. .
things happened to them in figure. Therefore there were some
ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal cere-
monies, because they were not as yet established by legisla-
tion.
Reply Obj. i. The patriarchs offered up these oblations,
sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a
certain devotion of their own will, according as it seemed
proper to them to offer up in honour of God those things
which they had received from Him, and thus to testify that
they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all.
Reply Obj. 2. They also established certain sacred things,
because they thought that the honour due to God demanded
that certain places should be set apart from others for the
purpose of divine worship.
Reply Obj. 3. The sacrament of circumcision was estab-
lished by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot
be called a sacrament of the Law as though it were an insti-
tution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the
Law. Hence Our Lord said (John vii. 22) that circumcision
was not of Moses, but of his fathers. — Again, among those
who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence before
the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the
priestly dignity to the firstborn.
Reply Obj. 4. The distinction of clean from unclean
animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to
eating them, since it is written (Gen. ix. 3) : Everything that
moveth and liveth shall be meat for you : but only as to the
offering of sacrifices, because they used only certain animals
for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinc-
tion in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered
illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by
any law, but from dislike or custom : thus even now we see
that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some
countries, while people partake of them in others.
Q. 103. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228
Second Article.
whether, at the time of the law, the ceremonies of
the old law had any power of justification ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law
had the power of justification at the time of the Law.
Because expiation from sin and consecration pertains to justi-
fication. But it is written (Exod. xxix. 21) that the priests
and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood
and the anointing of oil; and (Levit. xvi. 16) that, by
sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated the sanc-
tuary from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from
their transgressions and . . . their sins. Therefore the cere-
monies of the Old Law had the power of justification.
Ohj. 2. Further, that by which man pleases God pertains
to justification, according to Ps. x. 8: The Lord is just and
hath loved justice. But some pleased God by means of cere-
monies, according to Levit. x. 19 : How could I . . . please
the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart? There-
fore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justifi-
cation.
Ohj. 3. Further, things relating to the divine worship
regard the soul rather than the body, according to Ps.
xviii. 8 : The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.
But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of
the Old Law, as stated in Lev. xiv. Much more therefore
could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by
justifying it.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (Gal. ii.)*: If there had
been a law given which could justify (Vulg., — give life), Christ
died in vain, i.e., without cause. But this is inadmissible.
Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer
justice.
I answer that. As stated above (Q. CIL, A. 5 ^^ 4), a two-
* The first words of the quotation are from iii. 21 : St. Thomas
probably quoting from memory, substituted them for ii. 21, which
runs thus: If justice b& by the Law, then Christ died in vain.
229 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 103. Art. 2
fold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One
was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other was
corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship;
thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be
unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of
irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies
of the Old Law had the power to cleanse : because they were
ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the
removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were con-
tracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law.
Hence the Apostle says (Heb. ix. 13) that the blood of goats
and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being spYi}ikled, sanctify
such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh. And just as
this uncleanness which was washed away by suchlike cere-
monies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the
ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly
before (verse 10) justices of the flesh: justices of the flesh,
says he, being laid on them until the time of correction.
On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from
uncleanness of the soul, i.e., from the uncleanness of sin.
The reason of this was that at no time could there be expia-
tion from sin, except through Christ, Who taketh away the
sins (Vulg., — sin) of the world (John i. 29). And since the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet
really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could
not really contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ
already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of
the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse
from sin : thus the Apostle says (Heb. x. 4) that it is impos-
sible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken
away ; and for this reason he calls them (Gal. iv. 9) weak
and needy elements : weak indeed, because they cannot take
away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy,
i.e., from the fact that they do not contain grace within
themselves.
However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the
minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incar-
nate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in
Q. 103. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230
Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies
was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed
Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered
up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed
sins away, but because they were professions of faith which
cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in
the terms employed: for it is written (Lev. iv. 26, v. 16) that
in offering the sacrifice for sin the priest shall pray for him . . .
and it shall be forgiven him, as though the sin were forgiven,
not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and
devotion of those who offered them. — It must be observed,
however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old
Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure of
that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ.
It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law
the ceremonies had no power of justification.
Reply Obj. i. That sanctification of priests and their sons,
and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them,
by sprinkling them with blood, had no other effect but to
appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impedi-
ments from them, to the cleansing of the flesh, as the Apostle
states (Heb. ix. 13), in token of that sanctification whereby
lesus sanctified the people by His own blood [ibid. xiii. 12). —
Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to
the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgive-
ness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be
the subject of sin is stated to be expiated.
Reply Obj. 2. The priests pleased God in the ceremonies
by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the
reality foreshadowed ; not by reason of the things considered
in themselves.
Reply Obj. 3. Those ceremonies which were prescribed in
the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose
of taking away the defilement of leprosy. This is clear from
the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man
until he was already healed : hence it is written (Lev. xiv. 3, 4)
that the priest, going out of the camp, when he shall find that
the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified
231 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 103. Art. 3
to offer, etc. ; whence it is evident that the priest was ap-
pointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing.
But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of
taking away the uncleanness of irregularity.^ — They do say,
however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, the
leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God,
but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle
that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she
had drunk the water on which the priest had heaped curses,
as stated in Num. v. 19-27.
Third Article.
whether the ceremonies of the old law ceased at the
coming of christ ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law
did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written
(Baruch iv. i) : This is the book of the commandments of God,
and the law that is for ever. But the legal ceremonies were
part of the Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to
last for ever.
Obj. 2. Further, the offering made by a leper after being
cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel
commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to make this
offering (Matth. viii. 4). Therefore the ceremonies of the
Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming.
Obj. 3. Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect
remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain
reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were ordained to the
worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended
to be figures of Christ. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old
Law should not have ceased.
Obj. 4. Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of
Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the
blessing of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of
other Divine favours, as stated above (Q. CIL, A. 4 ad 10;
A. 5 ^^ i). But Abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even
Q. 103. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 232
by us : and the blessing of creation and other Divine favours
should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision
and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Coloss. ii. 16, 17) : Let
no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of
a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, ivhich
are a shadow of things to come : and (Heb. viii. 13) : In saying
a new {testament), he hath made the former old : and that
which decay eth and groweth old, is near its end.
I answer that. All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law
were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above (Q. CI.,
A A. I, 2). Now external worship should be in proportion
to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope, and
charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject
to variations according to the variations in the internal
worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished.
One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly
goods, and in the means of obtaining them, — in both of
these considered as things to come. Such was the state of
faith and hope in the Old Law. — Another state of the in-
terior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in
heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means of
obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past.
Such is the state of the New Law. — The third state is that
in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is
believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to
come. Such is the state of the Blessed.
In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to the
worship of God will be figurative ; there will be naught but
thanksgiving and voice of praise (Isa. li. 3). Hence it is
written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apoc. xxi. 22) :
/ saw no temple therein : for the Lord God Almighty is the
temple thereof, and the Lamb. Proportionately, therefore,
the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which fore-
shadowed the second and third states, had need to cease
at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies
had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the
state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein
233 CEREMONIAL PRECICPTS Q. i<>3- Art. 3
heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine
favours whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing
of the present.
Reply Ohj. i. The Old Law is said to be /or ever simply
and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts ; but as regards
the ceremonial precepts it lasts for ever in respect of the
reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed.
Reply Obj. 2. The mystery of the redemption of the human
race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said
then: It is consummated (John xix. 30). Consequently the
prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether
through their reality being fulfilled. As a sign of this, we
read that at the Passion of Christ the veil of the temple was
rent (Matth. xxvn. 51). Hence, before Christ's Passion,
while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law
and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ
had already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And
for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded
the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.
Reply Ohj. 3. The literal reasons already given (Q. CIL)
for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was
founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the
advent of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased,
and all the reasons referring thereto.
Reply Ohj. 4. The faith of Abraham was commended in
that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to
come, in which all nations were to be blessed. Wherefore,
as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to
make profession of Abraham's faith by means of circum-
cision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing
needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz., Baptism,
which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, accord-
ing to the saying of the Apostle (Coloss. ii. 11, 12) : You are
circumcised with circumcision not made hy hand, in despoiling
of the body of the flesh, hut in the circumcision of Christ, buried
with Him in Baptism.
As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first
creation, its place is taken by the Lord's Day, which recalls
Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234
the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of
Christ. — In Hke manner other solemnities of the Old Law
are supplanted by new solemnities: because the blessings
vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favours granted
us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place
to the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast
of Pentecost when the Old Law was given, to the feast of
Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit:
the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the
first rays of the sun, i.e., Christ, by the fulness of grace: the
feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles : the feast of
Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors : the feast
of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church Dedication : the
feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels,
or else to the feast of All Hallows.
Fourth Article.
whether since christ's passion the legal ceremonies
can be observed without committing mortal sin ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that since Christ's Passion the legal
ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin.
For we must not believe that the apostles committed
mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His
fulness they were endued with power from on high (Luke
xxiv. 49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies
after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts
xvi. 3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and (Acts xxi. 26)
that Paul, at the advice of James, took the men, and . . .
being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice
of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an
oblation should be offered for every one of them. Therefore
the legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of
Christ without committing mortal sin.
Obj. 2. Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in
shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of
the Church complied with this observance; for it is stated
2J5 CKKEMONIAL PRl£(:i^:iTS g. 103. Art. 4
(Gal. ii. 12) that, when certain men had come to Antioch,
Peter withdrew and separated himself from the Gentiles.
Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's
Passion without committing mortal sin.
Ohj. 3. Further, the commands of the apostles did not
lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic
decree that the Gentiles should observe certain ceremonies
of the Law: for it is written (Acts xv. 28, 29) : It hath seemed
good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon
you than these necessary things : that you abstain from things
sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled,
and from fornication. Therefore the legal ceremonies can
be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal
sin.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. v. 2) : // you he
circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. But nothing
save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's fruit.
Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be cir-
cumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.
/ answer that. All ceremonies are professions of faith, in
which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can
make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by
words: and in either profession, if he make a false declara-
tion, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is
the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came
before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith
is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For
by them was it said: Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear
a son, where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we
express the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and
say that she conceived and bore. In like manner the cere-
monies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to
be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him
as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it
would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profes-
sion of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the
fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would
be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the
Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 236
fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is
the teaching of Augustine (Contra Faust, xix.), who says:
It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and
rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of
image : but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered
and risen again ; of which our sacraments, in which Christians
share, are the actual representation.
Reply Obj. i. On this point there seems to have been a
difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For
Jerome [Super Galat. ii. 11, seq.) distinguished two periods
of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion,
during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead, since
they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion;
nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But
immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only
dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but
also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of
mortal sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion
the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real
earnest; but only by a kind of pious pretence, lest, to wit,
they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion.
This pretence, however, is to be understood, not as though
they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the
sense that they performed them without the mind to observe
the ceremonies of the Law : thus a man might cut away his
foreskin for health's sake, not with the intention of observing
legal circumcision.
But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order
to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to
the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have
made use of pretence, in things pertaining to the salvation
of the faithful; therefore Augustine [Epist. Ixxxii.) more
fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the
time that preceded the Passion' of Christ, during which the
legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another
period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which
the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The
third is a middle period, viz., from the Passion of Christ
237 CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS Q. 103. Art. 4
until the publication of the Gospel, during which the
legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had
neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because
it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to
observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them
so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though
faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observ-
ances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those
who were converted from heathendom to Christianity should
observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was
born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise
Titus, who was of heathen nationality.
The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the con-
verted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal
ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden to
observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that
there is a difference between these rites. For heathenish
ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as pro-
hibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial
ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being
instituted by God as a figure of Christ.
Reply Obj. 2. According to Jerome, Peter withdrew him-
self from the Gentiles by pretence, in order to avoid giving
scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence
he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand,
Paul in like manner made a pretence of blaming him, in
order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he
was. — But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because
in the canonical Scripture (viz.. Gal. ii. 11), wherein we must
not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter was to be
blamed. Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault:
and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretence.
Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal cere-
monial for the time being; because this was lawful for him
who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive
minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should
scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal
to the Gentiles.
Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238
Reply Ohj. 3. Some have held that this prohibition of the
apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually : namely,
that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of
murder ; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence
and rapine; the prohibition of things offered to idols, that
of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in
itself: which opinion they gathered from certain glosses,
which expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense. — Since,
however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even
by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give this
special commandment to those who were converted to Christ
from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods
were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of
legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus
Jerome says on Ezech. xliv. 31 [The priest shall not eat of
anything that is dead) : He condemns those priests who from
gluttony did not keep these precepts.
But since certain foods are more delicate than these and
more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why
these should have been forbidden more than the others.
We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold
that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the pur-
pose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, but
in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side
by side. Because blood and things strangled were loath-
some to the Jews by ancient custom ; while the Jews might
have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the
latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these
things were prohibited for the time being, during which the
Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as
time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed
also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged,
wherein Our Lord taught that not that which entereth into
the mouth defileth a man (Matth. xv. 11) ; and that nothing
is to he rejected that is received with thanksgiving (i Tim. iv. 4).
— With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made,
because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.
QUESTION CIV.
OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all
we shall consider them in general; in the second place we
shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are
four points of inquir}^: (i) What is meant by the judicial
precepts ? (2) Whether they are figurative ? (3) Their
duration. (4) Their division.
First Article.
whether the judicial precepts were those which
directed man in relation to his neighbour ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the judicial precepts were not
those which directed man in his relations to his neighbour.
For judicial precepts take their name from judgme^it. But
there are many things that direct man as to his neighbour,
which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the
judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his
relations to his neighbour.
Ohj. 2. Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from
the moral precepts, as stated above (Q. XCIX., A. 4). But
there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his
neighbour: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts
of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not
so called from directing man as to his neighbour.
Ohj. 3. Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God,
so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbour, as stated
239
Q. 104. Art. t THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240
above (Q. XCIX., A. 4; Q. CL, A. i). But among the cere-
monial precepts there are some which concern man himself,
such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which
we have already spoken (Q. CIL, A. 6 ad i, 6). Therefore
the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as
to his neighbour.
On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. xviii. 8) among
other works of a good and just man, that he hath executed
trite judgment between man and man. But judicial precepts
are so called from judgment. Therefore it seems that the
judicial precepts were those which directed the relations
between man and man.
I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated
above (Q. XCV., A. 2; Q. XCIX., A. 4), in every law, some
precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason
itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought
to be done or to be avoided. These are called moral pre-
cepts : since human morals are based on reason. — At the same
time there are other precepts which derive their binding
force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, con-
sidered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of
something due or undue) ; but from some institution, Divine
or human : and such are certain determinations of the moral
precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by
Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination
to God, they are called ceremonial precepts : but when they
refer to man's relations to other men, they are called judicial
precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the
judicial precepts : viz., first, that they refer to man's relations
to other men ; secondly, that they derive their binding force
not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
Reply Obj. i. Judgments emanate through the official pro-
nouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs,
and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs
to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only
litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are
concluded between man and man, and whatever matters
concern the community at large and the government thereof.
241 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 104. Ari. i
Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which
concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed
to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which
ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as
supreme judge.
Reply Obj. 2. This argument holds in respect of those
precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbour,
and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of
reason.
Reply Obj. 3. Even in those precepts which direct us to
God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates
when it is quickened by faith ; such as that God is to be loved
and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which
have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine institu-
tion. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices
that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to
the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship
Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end;
wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of
ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for
the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained
to his neighbour as to his end, so as to need to be disposed
in himself with regard to his neighbour, for such is the rela-
tionship of a slave to his master, since a slave is his master's
in all that he is, as the Philosopher says [Polit. i.). Hence
there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all
such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the
principle in moral matters, holds the same position, in man,
with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge
holds in the state. — Nevertheless we must take note that,
since the relations of man to his neighbour are more subject
to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more
precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his
neighbour, than whereby he is directed to God. For the
same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial
precepts in the Law.
n. 3 16
Q. 104. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 242
Second Article,
whether the judicial precepts were figurative ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the judicial precepts were not
figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial pre-
cepts to be instituted as figures of something else. There-
fore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no
difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Ohj, 2. Further, just as certain judicial precepts were
given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other
heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other
peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done.
Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of
the Old Law figures of anything.
Ohj. 3. Further, those things which relate to the divine
worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the
things of God are above our reason, as stated above (Q. CI.,
A. 2, ad 2), But things concerning our neighbour are not
above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which
direct us in relation to our neighbour should not have been
figurative.
On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both
in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Exod. xxi.).
/ answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways.
First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted
principally that it may be the figure of something. In this
way the ceremonial precepts are figurative ; since they were
instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow
something relating to the worship of God and the mystery
of Christ. — But some precepts are figurative, not primarily
and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the
judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they
were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but
in order that they might regulate the state of that people
according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did
foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire
state of that people, who were directed by these precepts,
243 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 104. Art. 3
was tigurative, according to i Cor. x. 11: All . . . things
happened to thcni in figure.
Reply Obj. i. The ceremonial precepts are not figurative
in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
Reply Obj. 2. The Jewish people were chosen by God that
Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire
state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as
Augustine states {Contra Faust, xxii.). For this reason
even the judicial precepts that were given to this people
were more figurative than those which were given to other
nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are
expounded in the mystical sense : but not the wars and deeds
of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more
famous in the eyes of men.
Reply Obj. 3. In this people the direction of man in regard
to his neighbour, considered in itself, was subject to reason.
But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it
was above reason : and in this respect it was figurative.
Third Article,
whether the judicial precepts of the old law bind
FOR EVER ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the judicial precepts of the Old
Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to
the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of
the virtue of justice. Now justice is perpetual and immortal
(Wis. i. 15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.
Obj. 2. Further, Divine institutions are more enduring
than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of
human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the
judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
Obj. 3. Further, the xApostle says (Heb. vii. 18) that there is
a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the
weakness and unprofitableness thereof. Now this is true of
the ceremonial precept, which could (Vulg., — can) not, as to
the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and
Q. 104. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244
in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh, as the
Apostle declares (Heb. ix. 9, 10). On the other hand, the
judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of
the purpose for which they were instituted, viz., to establish
justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial
precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain
their efficacy.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (Heb. vii. 12) that the
priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation
also be made of the Law. But the priesthood was transferred
from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also
transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in
force.
/ answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever,
but were annulled by the coming of Christ : yet not in the
same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial
precepts were annulled so far as to be not only dead, but also
deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ,
especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the
other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because
they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For
if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be
observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance
they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though
they derived their binding force through being institutions
of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to
observe them thus.
The reason for this difference may be gathered from what
has been said above (A. 2). For it has been stated that the
ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in them-
selves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of fore-
shadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. — On the other
hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they
might be figures, but that they might shape the state of
that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently,
when the state of that people changed with the coming of
Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the
Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in
245 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. lo^. Art. 3
Gal. iii. 24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are
instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for th(3
performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not
prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of
observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is
prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that
the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has
not yet come.
Reply Obj. 1. The obligation of observing justice is indeed
perpetual. But the determination of those things that are
just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs
be different, according to the different states of mankind.
Reply Obj. 2. The judicial precepts established by men
retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of
government remains the same. But if the state or nation
pass to another form of government, the laws must needs
be changed. For democracy, which is government by the
people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy,
which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows
{Polit. iv.). Consequently when the state of that people
changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.
Reply Obj. 3. Those judicial precepts directed the people
to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that
state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a
change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there
was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had
been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed
to be changed also.
Fourth Article.
whether it is possible to assign a distinct division
of the judicial precepts ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that it is impossible to assign a
distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the
judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another.
But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to
Q. 104. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 246
the relationship between man and man, and which are made
use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are
infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign
a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Obj. 2. Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on
moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be
capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to
the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct
division of the judicial precepts.
Obj. 3. Further, because there is a distinct division of the
ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by
describing some as sacrifices, others as observances. But the
Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial pre-
cepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct
division.
On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs
be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable
to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was
ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should
have a distinct division.
I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing
or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct
division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be
a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be ren-
dered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that
the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were
directed in their relations to one another, are subject to
division according to the divers ways in which man is
directed.
Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one,
of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second, of the
subjects among themselves ; a third, of the citizens to
foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household,
such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife
to her husband ; of the master to his servant : and according
to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of
judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are
laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and
247 THE JUDICIAL PRFXEPTS Q. 104. Art. 4
relating to his office, and about the respect due to him : this
is one part of the judicial precepts. — Again, certain precepts
are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for
instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties:
this is the second part of the judicial precepts. — Again,
certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for
instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the
way to receive travellers and strangers: this is the third
part of the judicial precepts. — Lastly, certain precepts are
given relating to home life: for instance, about servants,
wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial
precepts.
Reply Obj. i. Things pertaining to the ordering of relations
between one man and another are indeed infinite in number :
yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to
the different relations in which one man stands to another,
as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. The precepts of the decalogue held the first
place in the moral order, as stated above (Q. C, A. 3) : and
consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should
be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and
ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived,
not from natural reason, but from their institution alone.
Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.
Reply Obj. 3. The Law alludes to the division of the
judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are
prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.
QUESTION CV.
OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts:
under which head there are four points of inquiry: (i) Con-
cerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the
rulers. (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with
another. (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners.
(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.
First Article.
whether the old law enjoined fitting precepts
concerning rulers ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law made unfitting
precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher
says {Polit. iii.), the ordering of the people depends mostly on
the chief ruler. But the Law contains no precept relating
to the institution of the chief ruler ; and yet we find therein
prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly (Exod.
xviii. 21) : Provide out of all the people wise (Vulg., — able)
men, etc. ; again (Num. xi. 16) : Gather unto Me seventy men of
the ancients of Israel ; and again (Deut. i. 13) : Let Me have
from among you wise and understanding men, etc. Therefore
the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of
the people.
Ohj. 2. Further, The best gives of the best, as Plato states
{Tim. ii.). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation
is to be ruled by a king: because this kind of government
248
249 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. i
approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine govern-
ment, whereby God rules the world from the beginning.
Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people,
and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter,
as indeed they were allowed (Deut. xvii. 14, 15) : When thou
. . . shall say : I will set a king over me . . . thou shall set
him, etc.
Ohj. 3. Further, according to Matth. xii. 25 : Every kingdom
divided against itself shall he made desolate : a saying which
was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction was
brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the
Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general
well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden
the kingdom to be divided under two kings : nor should this
have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read
of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet
Ahias the Silonite (3 Kings xi. 29 seq.).
Ohj. 4. Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit
of the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb.
V. i; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in
human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means
of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the Law : such as
the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore
in like manner certain things should have been determined
for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more that
they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated
in Exod. xxiii. 8: You shall not (Vulg., — Neither shall thou)
take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of
the just.
Ohj. 5. Further, as a kingdom is the best form of govern-
ment, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord
appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law; for it
is wTitten (i Kings viii. 11) : This will be the right of the king,
that shall reign over you : He will take your sons, etc. There-
fore the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the
institution of rulers.
On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for
the beauty of its order (Num. xxiv. 5) : How beautiful are
Q. 105. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 250
thy tabernacles, 0 Jacob, and thy tents, 0 Israel. But the
beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establish-
ment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision
for the people with regard to its rulers.
/ answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning
the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that
all should take some share in the government : for this form
of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends
itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in Polit. ii. The
other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of
government, or the different ways in which the constitutions
are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the
Philosopher states (Polit. iii.), nevertheless the first place
is held by the kingdom, where the power of government is
vested in one ; and aristocracy, which signifies government by
the best, where the power of government is vested in a few.
Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or
kingdom, wherein one is given the power to preside over all;
while under him are others having governing powers: and
yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because
all are eligible to govern, and because the rulers are chosen
by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly
kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aris-
tocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority;
partly democracy, i.e., government by the people, in so far
as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people
have the right to choose their rulers.
Such was the form of government established by the
Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the
people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all ;
so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-
two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it is
written (Deut. i. 15) : I took out of your tribes men wise and
honourable, and appointed them rulers : so that there was an
element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical govern-
ment in so far as the rulers were .chosen from all the people ;
for it is written (Exod. xviii. 21) : Provide out of all the people
wise (Vulg., — able) men, etc.; and, again, in so far as they
251 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. i
were chosen by the people; wherefore it is written (Deut.
i. 13): Let me have from among you wise (Vulg., — able) men,
etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the
rulers was well provided for by the Law.
Reply Ohj. i. This people was governed under the special
care of God: wherefore it is written (Deut. vii. 6) : The Lord
thy God hath chosen thee to he His peculiar people : and this
is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the
chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (Num. xxvii. 16) :
May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a
man, that may he over this multitude. Thus by God's orders
Josue was set at the head in place of Moses: and we read
about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God
raised . . . up a saviour for the people, and that the spirit
of the Lord was in them (Judges iii. 9, 10, 15). Hence the
Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but
reserved this to Himself, as appears from Deut. xvii. 15:
Thou shall set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose.
Reply Ohj. 2. A kingdom is the best form of government
of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the
power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into
tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very
virtuous man : for it is only the virtuous man that conducts
himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher
observes [Ethic, iv.). Now perfect virtue is to be found in
few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and
avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence
from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly
authority with full power, but gave them judges and gover-
nors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked
Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He
granted them a king, as is clear- from His words to Samuel
(i Kings viii. 7) : They have not rejected thee, hut Me, that I
should not reign over them.
Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He
did establish the manner of election from the very beginning
(Deut. xvii. 14, seqq.): and then He determined two points:
first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord's
Q. 105. Art. t THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 252
decision; and that they should not make a man of another
nation king, because such kings are wont to take Httle
interest in the people they are set over, and consequently to
have no care for their welfare : — secondly. He prescribed how
the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to
himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots
and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth : because through
craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake
justice. — He also appointed the manner in which they were
to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they
should continually read and ponder on God's Law, and
should ever fear and obey God. — Moreover, He decided
how they should behave towards their subjects: namely,
that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat
them, and that they should not depart from the paths of
justice.
Reply Ohj. 3. The division of the kingdom, and a number
of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people
for their many dissensions, specially against the just rule of
David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit.
Hence it is written (Osee xiii. 11) : / will give thee a king in My
wrath ; and [ibid. viii. 4) : They have reigned, hut not by Me:
they have been princes, and I knew not.
Reply Ohj. 4. The priestly ofhce was bequeathed by suc-
cession from father to son: and this, in order that it might
be held in greater respect, if not any man from the people
could become a priest : since honour was given to them out
of reverence for the divine worship. Hence it was necessary
to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as
to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and sacrifices, that
they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the other
hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the
whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions,
from which to derive a living : and so much the more, since
the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth
for to make too much show of magnificence : both because
he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny,
arising from such things, and because, if the rulers were not
253 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS o. 105. Art. 2
very rich, and il their office involved much work and anxiety,
it would not tempt the ambition of the common people;
and would not become an occasion of sedition.
Reply Obj. 5. That right was not given to the king by
Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would
usurp that right, by framing unjust laws, and by degener-
ating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is
clear from the context that follows: And yoti shall be his
slaves (Douay, servants) : which is signilicative of tyranny,
since a tyrant rules his subjects as though they were his
slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them
from asking for a king; since the narrative continues: But
the people would not hear the voice of Samuel. — It may happen,
however, that even a good king, without being a tyrant,
may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and
centurions; and may take many things from his subjects
in order to secure the common weal.
Second x\rticle.
whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed
as to the relations of one man with another ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the judicial precepts were not
suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with
another. Because men cannot live together in peace, if one
man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have
been approved by the Law : since it is written (Deut. xxiii. 24) :
Going into thy neighbour's vineyard, thou mayst eat as many
grapes as thou pleasest. Therefore the Old Law did not make
suitable provisions for man's peace.
Obj. 2. Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall
of states has been the holding of property by women, as the
Philosopher says {Polit. ii.). But this was introduced by
the Old Law; for it is written (Num. xxvii. 8) : When a man
dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter.
Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision for the welfare
of the people.
c). 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 254
Obj. 3. Further, it is most conducive to the preservation
of human society that men may provide themselves with
necessaries by buying and sclHng, as stated in Polit. i.
But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it pre-
scribes that in the 50th year of the jubilee all that is sold
shall return to the vendor (Levit. xxv. 28). Therefore in
this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting com-
mand.
Obj. 4. Further, man's needs require that men should be
ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do
not return the pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. xxix. 10) :
Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they
were afraid to be defrauded without cause. And yet this
was encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed
(Deut. XV. 2) : He to whom any thing is owing from his friend
or neighbour or brother, cannot demand it again, because it is
the year of remission of the Lord ; and (Exod. xxii. 15) it is
stated thaf if a borrowed animal should die while the owner
is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution.
Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge
is lost: for it is wTitten (Deut. xxiv. 10): When thou shalt
demand of thy neighbour any thing that he oweth thee, thou
shalt not go into his house to take away a fledge ; and again
(verses 12, 13) : The fledge shall not lodge with thee that night,
but thou shalt restore it to him fresently. Therefore the Law
made insufficient provision in the matter of loans.
Obj. 5. Further, considerable risk attaches to goods
deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great
caution should be observed in such matters: hence it is
stated in 2 Mach. iii. 15 that the friests . . . called ufon
Him from heaven. Who made the law concerning things given
to be keft, that He would f reserve them safe, for them that
had defosited them. But the precepts of the Old Law
observed little caution in regard to deposits: since it is
prescribed (Exod. xxii. 10, 11) that when goods deposited
are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary.
Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this matter.
Obj. 6. Further, just as a workman offers his work for
255 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no
need for the tenant to pay his rent as soon as he takes a
house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescrip-
tion (Lev. xix. 13) that the wages of him that hath been hired
by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning.
Obj. 7. Further, since there is often pressing need for a
judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was there-
fore unfitting that the Law (Deut. xvii. 8, 9) should com-
mand them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on
doubtful matters.
Obj. 8. Further, it is possible that not only two, but
three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is
unreasonably stated (Deut. xix. 15) that in the mouth of two
or three witnesses every word shall stand.
Obj. 9. Further, punishment should be fixed according
to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written
(Deut. XXV. 2): According to the measure of the sin, shall the
measure also of the stripes be. Yet the Law fixed unequal
punishments for certain faults: for it is wTitten (Exod.
xxii. i) that the thief shall restore five oxen for one ox, and
four sheep for one sheep. Moreover, certain slight offences
are severely punished: thus (Num. xv. 32, seqq.) a man is
stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and (Deut.
xxi. 18, seqq) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on
account of certain small transgressions, viz., because he
gave himself to revelling . . . and banquetings. Therefore
the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.
Obj. 10. Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xxi.),
Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punish-
ment, indemnity, prison, sir c pes, retaliation, public disgrace,
exile, death, slavery. Now some of these were prescribed
by the Law. Indemnity, as when a thief was condemned
to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. Prison, as when
(Num. XV. 34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned.
Stripes; thus (Deut. xxv. 2), if they see that the offender
be worthy of stripes ; they shall lay him down, and shall cause
him to be beaten before them. Public disgrace was brought
on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his
g. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 256
deceased brother, for she took off his shoe from his foot, and
did spit in his face [ibid. 9). It prescribed the death penalty,
as is clear from Lev. xx. 9: He that curseth his father, or
mother, dying let him die. The Law also recognized the
lex talionis, by prescribing (Exod. xxi. 24) : Eye for eye,
tooth for tooth. Therefore it seems unreasonable that the
Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments,
viz., exile and slavery.
Obj. II. Further, no punishment is due except for a
fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. There-
fore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them (Exod.
xxi. 29) : // the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman, it
shall be stoned : and (Lev. xx. 16) : The woman that shall
lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same.
Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations
of one man with another were unsuitably regulated by the
Law.
Obj. 12. Further, the Lord commanded (Exod. xxi. 12)
a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a
dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the
slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently
punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is
unfittingly prescribed (Deut. xxi. i, 4) that when there shall
be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known
who is guilty of the murder . . . the ancients of the nearest
city shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the
yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into
a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown ;
and there they shall strike off the head of the heifer.
On the contrary. It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps.
cxlvii. 20) that He hath not done in like manner to every
nation ; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to
them.
I answer that. As Augustine says [De Civ. Dei. ii.), quoting
Tully, a nation is a body of men united together by consent to
the law and by community of welfare. Consequently it is of
the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the
citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the relations of one
257 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
man with another are twofold : some are effected under the
guidance of those in authority: others are effected by the
will of private individuals. And since whatever is subject
to the power of an individual can be disposed of according
to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between
one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers,
depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men
are subject. On the other hand, the power of private
persons is exercised over the things they possess: and con-
sequently their dealings with one another, as regards such
things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying,
selling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided suffi-
ciently in respect of each of these relations between one
man and another. For it established judges, as is clearly
indicated in Deut. xvi. 18: Thou shalt appoint judges and
magistrates in all its (Vulg., — thy) gates, . . . that they may
judge the -people with just judgment. It also directed the
manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to
Deut. i. 16, 17: Judge that which is just, whether he he one
of your own country or a stranger : there shall he no difference
of persons. It also removed an occasion of pronouncing
unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to accept bribes
(Exod. xxiii. 8; Deut. xvi. 19). It prescribed the number
of witnesses, viz., two or three: and it appointed certain
punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state farther on
[ad 10).
But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing,
says the Philosopher [Polit. ii.) that the things possessed
should be distinct, and that the use thereof should be partly
common, and partly granted to others by the will of the
possessors. These three points were provided for by the
Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves
were divided among individuals: for it is written (Num.
xxxiii. 53, 54) : / have given you the land for a possession :
and you shall divide it among you hy lot. And since many
states have been ruined through want of regulations in the
matter of possessions, as the Philosopher observes [Polit. ii.) ;
therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the
n-3 17
Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 258
irregularity of possessions. The first was that they should
be divided equally, wherefore it is written (Num. xxxiii. 54) :
To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a
lesser. A second remedy was that possessions could not be
alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should
return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of
possessions (c/. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the
removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead
should be succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place,
the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother;
fourthly, the father's brother; fifthly, any other next of kin.
Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of
property, the Law enacted that heiresses should marry
within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. xxxvi, 6.
Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects,
the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly,
as regards the care of them; for it was prescribed (Deut.
xxii. 1-4). Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's
ox or his sheep go astray ; but thou shalt bring them back to
thy brother, and in like manner as to other things. — Secondly,
as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a
friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any
away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was pre-
scribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bimches of grapes
and fruit, should be left behind for them (Lev. xix. 9;
Deut. xxiv. 19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh
year was common property, as stated in Exod. xxiii. 11 and
Lev. XXV. 4.
Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by
the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus
it is written (Deut. xiv. 28, 29): The third day thou shalt
separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the
stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow . . . shall come
and shall eat and be filled. And there was a transfer for a
consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting
out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning
all of which we find that the Law made ample provision.
Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided suffi-
259 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
ciently concerning the mutual relations of one man with
another.
Reply Ohj. i. As the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. 8), he that
loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the Law : because, to wit,
all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning our
neighbour, seem to aim at the end that men should love
one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their
own goods to others: because, as stated in i John iii. 17:
He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up
his bowels from him : how doth the charity of God abide in him ?
Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give
of their own to others readily: thus the Apostle (i Tim. vi. 18)
commands the rich to give easily and to communicate to
others. Now a man does not give easily to others if he
will not suffer another man to take some little thing from
him without any great injury to him. And so the Law
laid down that it should be lawful for a man, on entering
his neighbour's vineyard, to eat of the fruit there: but not
to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a
grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the peace: for
among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not
disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship
and accustoms men to give things to one another.
Reply Obj. 2. The Law did not prescribe that women
should succeed to their father's estate except in default of
male issue: failing which it was necessary that succession
should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the
father, who would have been sad to think that his estate
would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed
due caution in the matter, by providing that those women
who succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within
their own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal pos-
sessions, as stated in Num. xxxvi. 7, 8.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says {Polit. ii.), the
regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation
of a state or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes,
it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states,
that anyone should sell his possessions, except to avoid a
Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 260
manifest loss. For if possessions were to be sold indis-
criminately, they might happen to come into the hands of a
few : so that it might become necessary for a state or country
to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in
order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way
that while provision was made for men's needs, by allowing
the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the
same time the said danger was removed, by prescribing
the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed.
The reason for this law was to prevent confusion of posses-
sions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction
among the tribes.
But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct
estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in per-
petuity, like moveable goods. Because the number of
houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed
limit to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded,
while the number of houses in a town could be increased.
On the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but in a
village that hath no walls, could not be sold in perpetuity:
because such houses are built merely with a view to the cul-
tivation and care of possessions ; wherefore the Law rightly
made the same prescription in regard to both (Lev. xxv.).
Reply Ohj. 4. As stated above {ad i), the purpose of the
Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready
to come to one another's assistance: because this is a very
great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these
facilities for helping others in the matter not only of gratui-
tous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers:
because the latter kind of succour is more frequent and
benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for
this purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that
men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be
less inclined to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as
stated in Deut. xv. 7, seqq. — Secondly, by forbidding them
to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either
by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life in
security; and by prescribing that when this had been done
26i THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
they should be restored at once. For it is written (Deut.
xxiii. 19) : Thou shall not lend to thy brother money to usury :
and (xxiv. 6) : Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper
millstone to pledge ; for he hath pledged his life to thee : and
(Exod. xxii. 26) : If thou take of thy neighbour a garment in
pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset. — Thirdly,
by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting payment.
Hence it is written (Exod. xxii. 25) : If thou lend money to
any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou
shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner. For this reason,
too, it is enacted (Deut. xxiv. 10, 11) : When thou shalt
demajid of thy neighbour anything that he oweth thee, thou
shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt
stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath :
both because a man's house is his surest refuge, wherefore
it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house ; and
because the Law does not allow the creditor to take away
whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor
to give what he needs least. — Fourthly, the Law prescribed
that debts should cease altogether after the lapse of seven
years. For it was probable that those who could con-
veniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh
year, and would not defraud the lender without cause.
But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same
reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there
was for renewing the loan on account of their need.
As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted
that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they
were lent, they perished or deteriorated in his absence, he
was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or
deteriorated while he was present and taking proper care
of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially
if they were hired for a consideration: because they might
have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had
remained in possession of the lender, so that if the animal had
been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained
something by the loan which would no longer have been
gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when
Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 262
animals were hired for a consideration: because then the
owner received a certain price for the use of the animals;
wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving in-
demnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge
of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not
hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should
receive something by way of restitution at least to the value
of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.
Reply Ohj. 5. The difference between a loan and a deposit
is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use
of the person to whom they are transferred, whereas a
deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain
cases there was a stricter obligation of returning a loan
than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter
might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e., either
through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in
deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an
extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy,
or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was
bound to restore to the owner whatever was left of the
animal thus slain) : whereas in the other cases mentioned
above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to
take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly,
the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable
cause, for instance by theft: and then the depositary was
bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as
stated above [ad 4), he who held an animal on loan, was
bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it de-
preciated or died: because he was held responsible for less
negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible
in case of theft.
Reply Ohj. 6. Workmen who offer their labour for hire,
are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore
the Law commanded wisely that they should be paid at once,
lest they should lack food. But they who offer other com-
modities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor are they in such
need of their price in order to gain a livelihood : and conse-
quently the comparison does not hold.
263 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. ±
Reply Ohj. 7. The purpose for which judges are appointed
among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in
matters of justice. Now a matter may be doubtful in two
ways. First, among simple-minded people : and in order to
remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed (Deut. xvi. 18)
that judges mid magistrates should be appointed in each
tribe, to judge the people with just judgment. — Secondly, a
matter may be doubtful even among experts: and there-
fore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law pre-
scribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen
by God, where there would be both the High-Priest, who
would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies
of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people, who
would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just
as even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court
either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written
(Deut. xvii. 8, 9) : // thou perceive that there he among you a
hard and doubtful matter in judgment, . . . and thou see that
the words of the judges within thy gates do vary ; arise and
go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and
thou shall come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the
judge that shall he at that time. But suchlike doubtful matters
did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the people were
not burdened on this account.
Reply Ohj. 8. In the business affairs of men, there is no
such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we
must be content with a certain conjectural probability,
such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Con-
sequently, although it is quite possible for two or three
witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor
probable that they succeed in so doing : wherefore their testi-
mony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver
in giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in
order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth,
the Law commanded that they should be most carefully
examined, and that those who were found untruthful should
be severely punished, as stated in Deut. xix. 16, seqq.
There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular
(}. I05. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 264
number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons,
Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy
Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons ; and sometimes
as three: as Augustine observes on John viii. 17: In your
law it is written that the testimony of two men is true.
Reply Ohj. g. A severe punishment is inflicted not only
on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other
reasons. First, on account of the greatness of the sin,
because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a
greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a habitual
sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by
severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire
for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily
deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished.
Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin
and of concealing it: for suchlike sins, when discovered,
should be more severely punished in order to deter others
from committing them.
Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees
may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The
first is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then,
if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether
excused from punishment; for it is written (Deut. xxii. 25,
seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not
guilty of death, because she cried, and there was no man
to help her. But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily,
and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins
from passion, the sin is diminished: and the pimishment,
according to true judgment, should be diminished also;
unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be
severely punished in order to deter others from committing
such sins, as stated above. — The second degree is when a
man sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be
guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in
acquiring knowledge: yet he was not punished by the judges
but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written
(Lev. iv. 2) : The soul that sinneth through ignorance, etc.
This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of
265 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all
were bound to know. — The third degree was when a
man sinned from pride, i.e., through deliberate choice or
malice: and then he was punished according to the great-
ness of the sin.* — The fourth degree was when a man
sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was
to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the com-
mandment of the Law.t
Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punish-
ment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely
to happen most frequently (Exod. xxii. 1-9) : wherefore, as
regards theft of other things which can easily be safe-
guarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their
value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a
thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it hap-
pened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields.
Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by
ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As
to cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because
the}^ are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as
sheep do ; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted
in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for
one ox. And this I say, imless perchance the animal
itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in
that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the
case of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that
he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. —
Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that a cow is
useful in five ways : it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing,
for food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various pur-
poses : and therefore for one cow five had to be restored.
But the sheep was useful in four ways: for sacrifice, for
meat, for milk, and for Us wool. — ^The unruly son was slain,
not because he ate and drank: but on account of his stub-
bornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death,
as stated above. — As to the man who gathered sticks on
the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, w^hich
* Cf. Deut. XXV. 2. t 0/- Num. xv. 30, 31.
Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 266
commanded the sabbath to be observed, to testify the
belief in the newness of the world, as stated above (Q. C,
A. 5) : wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.
Reply Ohj. 10. The Old Law inflicted the death penalty
for the more grievous crimes, viz., for those which are com-
mitted against God, and for murder, for stealing a man,
irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest.
In the case of theft of other things it inflicted punishment
by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutila-
tion it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise
for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less
degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public
disgrace.
The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law
in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was un-
willing to avail himself of the privilege granted by the Law,
whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of re-
mission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave
for ever. — Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not
wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Exod. xxii. 3.
The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by
the Law: because God was worshipped by that people
alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry:
wherefore if any man were exiled from that people abso-
lutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For
this reason it is related (i Kings xxvi. 19) that David said
to Saul : They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have
cast me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance
of the Lord, saying : Go, serve strange gods. There was,
however, a restricted sort of exile : for it is written in Deut.
xix. 4 [cf. Num. XXXV. 25) that he that striketh (Vulg., —
killeth) his neighbour ignorantly, and is proved to have had
no hatred against him, shall flee to one of the cities of refuge
and abide there until the death of the high-priest. For then
it became lawful for him to return home, because when the
whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot their private
quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so
eager to kill the slayer.
267 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 2
Reply Obj. 11. Dumb animals were ordered to be slain,
not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment
to their owners, who had not safeguarded their beasts from
these offences. Hence the owner was more severely punished
if his ox had butted anyone yesterday or the day before (in
which case steps might have been taken to avoid the danger),
than if it had taken to butting suddenly. — Or again, the
animal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men
should be horrified at the sight thereof.
Reply Obj. 12. The literal reason for this commandment,
as Rabbi Moses declares [Doctr. Perplex, iii.), was because
the slayer was frequently from the nearest city: wherefore
the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the
hidden murder. This was brought about in three ways.
In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had
taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly,
the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of
his beast, and if the murder were previously discovered,
the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the
heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in
order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of that city would
readily make known the murderer, if they knew who he was:
and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign
would escape about the matter. — Or again, this was done
in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder.
Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal
and full of strength, especially before it has been put
under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder,
however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his
life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the
striking off of its head ; and that the murderer, as vile and
abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which
was betokened by the fact that the heifer after being slain
was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place.
Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the
flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had
done no sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e., it never
knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed
Q. 105. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 268
in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of
Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is
shown to be the arch-murderer.
Third Article.
whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners
were framed in a suitable manner ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the judicial precepts regarding
foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts
X. 34, 35) : In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter
of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and
worketh justice is acceptable to Him. But those who are
acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church
of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Deut.
xxiii. 3) that the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the
tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord
for ever : whereas, on the other hand, it is prescribed [ibid. 7)
to be observed with regard to certain other nations: Thou
shall not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother ; nor the
Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land.
Obj. 2. Further, we do not deserve to be punished for
those things which are not in our power. But it is not in
a man's power to be an eunuch, or born of a prostitute.
Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Deut. xxiii. i, 2)
that an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shall not enter
into the church of the Lord.
Obj. 3. Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers
to be molested: for it is written (Exod. xxii. 21) : Thou shall
not molest a stranger, nor afflict him ; for yourselves also were
strangers in the land of Egypt : and (xxiii. 9) : Thou shall not
molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for
you also were strangers in the land of Egypt. But it is an
affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law
unsuitably permitted them (Deut. xxiii. 19, 20) to lend
money to the stranger for usury.
Obj. 4. Further, men are much more akin to us than
269 THE JUDICIAL PRFXEPTS Q. 105 Art. 3
trees. But we should show greater care and love for these
things that are nearest to us, according to Ecclus. xiii. 19:
Every beast loveth its like : so also every man him that is
nearest to himself. Therefore the Lord unsuitably com-
manded (Deut. XX. 13-19) that all the inhabitants of a
captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-
trees should not be cut down.
Ohj. 5. Further, every one should prefer the common good
of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common
good is sought in a war which men fight against their
enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Deut.
XX. 5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for instance
a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a
vineyard, or who had married a wife.
Ohj. 6. Further, no man should profit by his own fault.
But it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted:
since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore
the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from
the toil of battle (Deut. xx. 8).
On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. viii. 8):
All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse
in them.
I answer that, Man's relations with foreigners are two-
fold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of
relation the Law contained suitable precepts. For the
Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations
with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed through
their land as travellers. — Secondly, when they came to dwell
in their land as new-comers. And in both these respects the
Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written
(Exod. xxii. 21) : Thou shall not molest a stranger [advenam) ;
and again [ibid, xxiii. 9) : Thou shall not molest a stranger
(peregrino) . — Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be
admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship.
With regard to these a certain order was observed. For
they were not at once admitted to citizenship: just as it
was the law with some nations that no one was deemed
a citizen except after two or three generations, as [the
Q. 105. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 270
Philosopher says [Polit. hi.). The reason for this was that
if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a
nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, many
dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having
the common good firmly at heart might attempt something
hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed
in respect of certain nations that had close relations with
the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were bom
and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau,
Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellow-
ship of the people after the third generation ; whereas others
(with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the
Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to
citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet more
hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them,
were to be held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Exod.
xvii. 16): The war of the Lord shall he against Amalec from
generation to generation.
In like manner with regard to hostile relations with
foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in
the first place, it commanded that war should be declared
for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Deut. xx. 10) that
when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first
make an offer of peace. — Secondly, it enjoined that when
once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly
persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order
that they might be the more heedful of this command, it
ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should
hearten them by promising them God's aid. — Thirdly, it
prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle
to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the way,
should be sent home. — Fourthly, it enjoined that they should
use moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by
sparing women and children, and by not cutting down the
fruit-trees of that country.
Reply Ohj. i. The Law excluded the men of no nation
from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the
welfare of the soul: for it is written (Exod. xii. 48) : // any
271 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 3
stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase
of the Lord ; all his males shall first he circumcised, and then
shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be
as that which is horn in the land. But in temporal matters
concerning the public life of the people, admission was not
granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above:
but to some, i.e., the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third
generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in
detestation of their past offence, i.e., the peoples of Moab,
Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for
a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing this
may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one
nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may
refrain from similar crimes.
Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man
to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of
virtue: thus it is related (Judith xiv. 6) that Achior, the
captain of the children of Ammon, was joined to the people
of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred. — ^The same
applies to Ruth the Moabite, who was a virtuous woman
(Ruth iii. 11) : although it may be said that this prohibition
regarded men and not women, who are not competent to
be citizens absolutely speaking.
Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says {Polit. iii.), a man
is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly,
in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has
all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating
or voting in the popular assembly. On the other hand, any
man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he
dwells within the state, even common people or children
or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in matters per-
taining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by
reason of their base origin, were excluded from the ecclesia,
i.e., from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation.
The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to
receive the honour due to a father, especially among the
Jews, where the divine worship was continued through
carnal generation : for even among the heathens, those who
Q. 105. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 272
had many children were marked with special honour, as the
Philosopher remarks [Polit. ii.). — Nevertheless, in matters
pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discrimin-
ated from others, as neither were strangers, as already
stated: for it is written (Isa. Ivi. 3): Let not the son of the
stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying : The Lord
will divide and separate me from His people. And let not
the eunuch say : Behold I am a dry tree.
Reply Ohj. 3. It was not the intention of the Law to
sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only
to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the Jews to
avarice ; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards
those out of whom they made a profit.
Reply Ohj. 4. A distinction was observed with regard to
hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were
not among those which had been promised to them. When
they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had
fought against God's people; whereas the women and
children were spared. But in the neighbouring cities which
had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain,
on account of their former crimes, to punish which God
sent the Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is
written (Deut. ix. 5) : Because they have done wickedly, they
are destroyed at thy coming in. — ^The fruit-trees were com-
manded to be left untouched, for the use of the people
themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined
to be subjected.
Reply Ohj. 5. The builder of a new house, the planter of
a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from
fighting, for two reasons. First, because man is wont to
give all his affection to those things which he has lately
acquired, or is on the point of having, and consequently he
is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Where-
fore it was likely enough that on account of this affection
they would fear death all the more, and be so much the
less brave in battle. — Secondly, because, as the Philos-
opher says (Phys. ii.), it is a misfortune for a man if he is
prevented from ohtaining something good when it is within his
273 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 4
grasp. And so lest the surviving relations should be the
more grieved at the death of these men who had not entered
into the possession of the good things prepared for them;
and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the
sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from
the danger of death by being removed from the battle.
Reply Ohj. 6. The timid were sent back home, not that
they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might
be the losers by their presence, since their timidity and flight
might cause others to be afraid and run away.
Fourth Article.
whether the old law set forth suitable precepts
about the members of the household ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the Old Law set forth un-
suitable precepts about the members of the household. For
a slave is in every respect his master's property, as the
Philosopher states {Polit. i.). But that which is a man's
property should be his always. Therefore it was imfitting
for the Law to command (Exod. xxi. 2) that slaves should
go out free in the seventh year.
Obj. 2. Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an
animal, e.g., an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Deut.
xxii. 1-3) with regard to animals, that they should be
brought back to the owner if they be found going astray.
Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. xxiii. 15):
Thou shall not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee.
Obj. 3. Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy
more even than the human law. But according to human
laws those who illtreat their servants and maidservants are
severely punished : and the worse treatment of all seems to be
that which results in death. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Exod. xxi. 20, 21) that he that striketh his
bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his
hands . . . if the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be
subject to the punishment, because it is his money.
11.3 18
o. 105. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 274
Obj. 4. Further, the dominion of a master over his slave
differs from that of the father over his son [Polit. i., iii.).
But the dominion of master over slave gives the former the
right to sell his slave or maidservant. Therefore it was
unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his daughter to
be a servant or handmaid (Exod. xxi. 7).
Obj. 5. Further, a father has power over his son. But
he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish
him for his offences. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded
(Deut. xxi. 18 seqq.) that a father should bring his son to
the ancients of the city for punishment.
Obj. 6. Further, the Lord forbade them (Deut. vii. 3, seqq.)
to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded
the dissolution of such as had been contracted (i Esdras x.) .
Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive
women from strange nations (Deut. xxi. 10 seqq.)
Obj. 7. Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within
certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to
Levit. xviii. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded
(Deut. XXV. 5) that if any man died without issue, his brother
should marry his wife.
Obj. 8. Further, as there is the greatest familiarity
between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest
fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can
be sundered. Therefore it was imfitting for the Lord to
allow (Deut. xxiv. 1-4) a man to put his wife away, by writing
a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her
again to wife.
Obj. 9. Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her
husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his
father. But the Law did not command any sacrifice to be
offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant
to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore it seems
to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the
sacrifice of jealousy in order to investigate a wife's adultery
(Num. V. 12 seqq.). Consequently it seems that the Law
put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members
of the household.
275 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS o. 105. Art. 4
Oil the contrary, It is written (Ps. xviii. 10) : The judgments
of the Lord are true, justified in themselves.
I answer that. The mutual relations of the members of a
household regard e very-day actions directed to the neces-
sities of life, as the Philosopher states {Polit. i.). Now the
preservation of man's life may be considered from two
points of view. First, from the point of view of the indi-
vidual, i.e., in so far as man preserves his individuality:
and for the purpose of the preservation of life, considered
from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods,
by means of which he provides himself with food and
clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling
of which he has need of servants. Secondly, man's life is
preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of
generation, for which purpose man needs a wife, that she
may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations
of the members of a household admit of a threefold combina-
tion: viz., those of master and servant, those of husband
and wife, and those of father and son : and in respect of all
these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts.
Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them to be
treated with moderation, — both as to their work, lest, to
wit, they should be burdened with excessive labour, where-
fore the Lord commanded (Deut. v. 14) that on the Sabbath
day thy manservant and thy maidservant should rest even as
thyself : — and also as to the infliction of punishment, for it
ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them free
(Exod. xxi. 26, 27). Similar provision was made in favour
of a maidservant when married to anyone (ibid. 7, scqq.).
Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who
were taken from among the (Hebrew) people, the Law pre-
scribed that they should go out free in the seventh year
taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes
(ibid. 2, scqq.) : and furthermore it was commanded (Deut.
XV. 13) that they should be given provision for the journey.
With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions
as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance,
that they should marry a wife from their own tribe (Num.
Q. 105. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 276
xxxvi. 6) : and this lest confusion should ensue in the
property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry
the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without
issue, as prescribed in Deut. xxv. 5, 6: and this in order that
he who could not have successors according to carnal
origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and
that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten.
It also forbade them to marry certain women ; to wit, women
of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith;
and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural
respect due to them. — Furthermore it prescribed in what
way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that
they should not be slandered without grave reason: where-
fore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who
falsely accused his wife of a crime (Deut. xxii. 13, seqq.).
Also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detri-
mental to his son (Deut. xxi. 15, seqq.). Again, that a man
should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather
that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away
(Deut. xxiv. i). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal
love from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public
duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he
might be free to rejoice with his wife.
With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to
educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is
written (Exod. xii. 26 seqq.) : When your children shall say to
you : What is the meaning of this service ? you shall say to
them : It is the victim of the passage of the Lord. Moreover,
they are commanded to teach them the rules of right con-
duct: wherefore it is written (Deut. xxi. 20) that the parents
had to say: He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth
himself to revelling and to debauchery.
Reply Obj. i. As the children of Israel had been delivered
by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound
to the service of God, He did not wish them to be slaves in
perpetuity. Hence it is written (Lev. xxv. 39, seqq.): If
thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou
shall not oppress him with the service of bondservants : but he
277 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. 4
shall he as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My
servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt : let them
not he sold as hondmen : and consequently, since they were
slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse
of time they were set free.
Reply Ohj. 2. This commandment is to be understood as
referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to
help him in committing some sin.
Reply Ohj. 3. With regard to the ill-treatment of servants,
the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it
was certain or not : since if it were certain, the Law fixed a
penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the ser-
vant, who was ordered to be given his liberty: while for slay-
ing, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the servant
died under the blow of his master. — If, however, the hurt
were not certain, but only probable, the Law did not impose
any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if
the servant did not die at once after being struck, but after
some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a
result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a
free man, yet so that he did not die at once, but walked
ahroad again upon his staff, he that struck him was quit of
murder, even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he
was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim
of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his
own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his
very person, was the property of his master. Hence the
reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set
down as being because it is his money.
Reply Ohj. 4. As stated above {ad i), no Jew could own
a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense,
as a hireling for a fixed time. And in this way the Law
permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell
his son or daughter. This is shown by the very words of the
Law, where we read: // any man sell his daughter to he a
servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out.
Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but
even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according
Q. 105. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 278
to Lev. XXV. 39, 40 : // thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell
himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of
bondservants : but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner.
Reply Obj. 5. As the Philosopher says [Ethic, x.), the
paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but
not that of coercion, whereby rebellious and headstrong
persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord
commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the rulers
of the city.
Reply Obj. 6. The Lord forbade them to marry strange
women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they
should be led astray into idolatry. And specially did this
prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt
near them, because it was more probable that they would
adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman
was willing to renounce idolatry and become an adherent
of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the
case with Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said
to her mother-in-law (Ruth i. 16) : Thy people shall be my
people, and thy God my God. Accordingly it was not per-
mitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved
her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein
she was taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in
token that she renounced idolatry for ever.
Reply Obj. 7. As Chrysostom says [Horn, xlviii. super
Matth.), because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews,
who did everything with a view to the present life, it was
ordained that children should be born to the dead man through
his brother : thus affording a certain mitigation to his death.
It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or
one next of kin should marry the wife of the deceased, because
the offspring of this union would not be looked upon as that of
the deceased : and, moreover, a stranger would not be under the
obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his
brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account
of his relationship. Hence it is evident that in marrying
the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's
place.
279 THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS Q. 105. Art. .,
Reply Obj. 8. The Law permitted a wife to be divorced,
not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account
of the Jews' hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Matth.
xix. 8). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the
treatise on Matrimony (SuppL, Q. LXVIL).
Reply Obj. 9. Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery,
both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddcnly, since the
eye of the adulterer observeth darkness (Job. xxiv. 15). But
this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a
servant in respect of his master: because the latter infidelity
is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice:
nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous
woman.
QUESTION CVI.
OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW.
CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.
{In Four Articles.)
In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the
Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place
we must consider it in itself ; secondly, in comparison with
the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are
contained in the New Law. Under the first head there are
four points of inquiry: (i) What kind of law is it ? i.e., is it
a written law or is it instilled in the heart ? (2) Of its
efficacy, i.e., does it justify ? (3) Of its beginning: — should
it have been given at the beginning of the world ? (4) Of
its end: i.e., whether it will last until the end, or will another
law take its place ?
First Article,
whether the new law is a written law ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law is a written law.
For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the
Gospel is set forth in writing, according to John xx. 31:
But these are written that you may believe. Therefore the
New Law is a written law.
Obj. 2. Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is
the natural law, according to Rom. ii. 14, 15: [The Gentiles)
do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have
(Vulg., — show) the work of the law written in their hearts. If
therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts,
it would not be distinct from the law of nature.
280
28i THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL Q. 106. Art. i
Obj. 3. Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those
who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law
that is instilled in the heart is common to those who are in
the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testa-
ment: for it is written (Wis. vii. 27) that Divine Wisdom
throiigh nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she makcth
the friends of God and ^prophets. Therefore the New Law is
not instilled in our hearts.
On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New
Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled
in our hearts. For the Apostle, quoting the authority of
Jeremias xxxi. 31, 33: Behold the days shall come, saith the
Lord ; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the
house of Juda, a new testament, says, explaining what this
testament is (Heb. viii. 8, 10) : For this is the testament which
I will make to the house of Israel . . .by giving (Vulg., — I will
give) Afy laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write
them. Therefore the New Law is instilled in our hearts.
I answer that. Each thing appears to be that which pre-
ponderates in it, as the Philosopher states [Ethic, ix.). Now
that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament,
and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy
Ghost, which is given through faith in Christ. Consequently
the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost,
which is given to those who believe in Christ. This is mani-
festly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom. iii. 27) : Where
is . . . thy boasting ? It is excluded. By what law ? Of
works ? No, but by the law of faith : for he calls the grace
itself of faith a law. And still more clearly it is written
(Rom. viii. 2) : The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus,
hath delivered me from the laiv of sin and of death. Hence
Augustine says [De Spir. et Lit. xxiv.) that as the law of
deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith
inscribed on the hearts of the faithfiil : and elsewhere, in the
same book [ibid, xxi.): What else are the Divine laws written
by God Himself on our hearts, but the very presence of His
Holy Spirit ?
Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that
Q. io6. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 282
dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and per-
taining to the use of that grace : such things are of secondary
importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful
needed to be instructed concerning them, both by word and
writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what
they should do. Consequently we must say that the New
Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts,
but that secondarily it is a written law.
Reply Ohj. i. The Gospel writings contain only such things
as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing
us thereto, or by directing us to the use thereof. Thus
with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain
matters pertaining to the manifestation of Christ's Godhead
or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through
which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with
regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the
contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to
receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for the world, i.e.,
worldly men, cannot receive the Holy Ghost (John xiv. 17).
As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of
virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort
men in divers ways.
Reply Ohj. 2. There are two ways in which a thing may be
instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature,
and thus the natural law is instilled into man. Secondly,
a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on
to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New Law
is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he
should do, but also by helping him to accomplish it.
Reply Ohj. 3. No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost
except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit:
and by faith in Christ man belongs to the New Testament.
Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into
them belonged to the New Testament.
283 THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL Q. ioG. Art. 2
Second Article,
whether the new law justifies ?
We proceed thus to the Seco7id Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law does not justify.
For no man is justified unless he obey God's law, according
to Heb. V. 9. He, i.e., Christ, became to all that obey Him
the cause of eternal salvation. But the Gospel does not
always cause men to believe in it: for it is written (Rom.
X. 16): All do not obey the Gospel. Therefore the New Law
does not justify.
Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the
Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because trans-
gression increased at its advent: for it is stated (Rom.
iv. 15) : The Law worketh wrath : for where there is no law,
neither is there transgression. But much more did the
New Law increase transgression: since he who sins after
the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment,
according to Heb. x. 28, 29 : A man making void the Law of
Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses.
How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,
who hath trodden under-foot the Son of God, etc. ? Therefore
the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify.
Obj. 3. Further, justification is an effect proper to God,
according to Rom. viii. 33: God that justifieth. But the
Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore
the New Law does not justify any more than the Old Law.
On the contrary. The Apostle says (Rom. i. 16) : / am not
ashamed of the Gospel : for it is the power of God unto salvation
to everyone that believeth. But there is no salvation but to
those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel
justifies.
/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), there is a twofold
element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element,
viz., the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And
as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says
(De Spir. et Lit. xvii.) : There, i.e., in the Old Testament,
the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly
Q. io6. Ari. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 284
might he afraid ; here, i.e., in the New Testament, it is given
in an inward manner, that they may he justified. — ^The other
element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the
teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct
human affections and human actions. And as to this, the
New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor.
iii. 6) : The letter killeth, hut the spirit quickeneth : and Augus-
tine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv., xvii.) by saying that
the letter denotes any writing that is external to man, even
that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the
Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would
kill, imless there were the inward presence of the healing
grace of faith.
Reply Ohj. i. This argument is true of the New Law, not
as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e., as to
the dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in
words or in writing.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the grace of the New Testament
helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in
good that he cannot sin: for this belongs to the state of
glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the
New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as being
ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help
given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said to
work wrath : because as far as it is concerned it gives man
sufficient help to avoid sin.
Reply Ohj. 3. The same God gave both the New and the
Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law
written on tables of stone: whereas He gave the New Law
written in the fleshly tahles of the heart, as the Apostle
expresses it (2 Cor. iii. 3). Wherefore, as Augustine says
[De Spir. et Lit. xviii.), the Apostle calls this letter which is
written outside man, a ministration of death and a ministration
of condemnation : whereas he calls the other letter, i.e., the Law
of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the
ministration of justice : hecause through the gift of the Spirit
we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due
to transgression.
285 THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL o. loO. Art. 3
TiiiKD Article.
WHETHER THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law should have been
given from the beginning of the world. For there is no
respect of persons with God (Rom. ii. 11). But all men have
sinned and do need the glory of God (ibid. iii. 23). Therefore
the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the
beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succour
to all.
Obj. 2. Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they
live in various times. But God, Who will have all men to
be saved (i Tim. ii. 4), commanded the Gospel to be preached
in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew
and Mark. Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have
been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the begin-
ning of the world .
Obj. 3. Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for
all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal
matter. But God provided man from the beginning of the
world with things that are necessary for the health of his
body, by subjecting to his power whatever was created for
the sake of man (Gen. i. 26-29). Therefore the New Law
also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should
have been given to man from the beginning of the world.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (i Cor. xv. 46) : That was
not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural. But
the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was not
fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world.
/ answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it was
not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning
of the world. The first is because the New Law, as stated
above (A. i), consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost:
which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin,
which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out of man
through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ:
Q. 106. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA/THEOLOGICA " 286
wherefore it is written (John vii. 39): As yet the Spirit was
not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. This reason
the Apostle states clearly (Rom. viii. 2, seqq.) where, after
speaking of the Law of the Spirit of life, he adds: God sending
His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, of sin* hath con-
demned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might
he fulfilled in us.
A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the
New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at
once from the outset, but through an orderly succession of
time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this
reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. iii. 24, 25) : The Law
was our pedagogue in Christ that we might he justified hy
faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under a
pedagogue.
The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law
is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all
to be left to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that
through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and
acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is set down by
the Apostle (Rom. v. 20) : The Law entered in, that sin might
abound : and when sin abounded grace did more abound.
Reply Obj. i. Mankind on accoimt of the sin of our first
parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace : and so
from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it
is given, it is mercifully given, as Augustine states in his book
on the perfection of justice {cf Epist. ccvii.). Consequently
it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God,
from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all
from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be
published in due course of time, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2. The state of mankind does not vary accord-
ing to diversity of place, but according to succession of
time. Hence the New Law avails for all places, but not
* S. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the et [and),
after sinful flesh. The text quoted should read thus, — in the likeness
of sinful flesh, and a sin offering [nepl afxaprlas) , hath, etc.
I
28; THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL Q. loo. Am. 4
for all times: although at all times there have been some
persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated above
(A. I ad 3).
Reply Obj. 3. Things pertaining to the health of the body
are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does
not destroy: whereas things pertaining to the health of the
soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin.
Consequently the comparison will not hold.
Fourth Article.
whether the new law will last till the end of
the world ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law will not last till
the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (i Cor.
xiii. 10), when that which is perfect is come, that which is in
part shall be done away. But the New Law is in part, since
the Apostle says {ibid. 9) : We know in part and we prophesy
in part. Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and
will be succeeded by a more perfect state.
Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord (John xvi. 13) promised His
disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost,
the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows not yet
all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we
must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will
be revealed by the Holy Ghost.
Obj. 3. Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son
and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct
from the Father and the Son. But there was a state corre-
sponding with the Person of the Father, viz., the state of the
Old Law, wherein men were intent on begetting children:
and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of
the Son: viz., the state of the New Law, wherein the clergy
who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son)
hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third
state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual
men will hold the first place.
Q. io6. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 288
Obj. 4. Eurthcr, Our Lord said (Matth. xxiv. 14) : This
Gospel of the kingdom shall he preached in the whole world . . .
and then shall the consummation come. But the Gospel of
Christ is already preached throughout the whole world : and
yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the
Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but
another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like
unto another Law.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. xxiv. 34) : / say to
you that this generation shall not pass till all [these) things be
done : which passage Chrysostom (Hom. Ixxvii.) explains as
referring to the generation of those that believe in Christ.
Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ will last
until the consummation of the world.
/ answer that, The state of the world may change in two
ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus
no other state will succeed this state of the New Law.
Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the
Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now no
state of the present life can be more perfect than the state
of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer to the
last end than that which is the immediate cause of our
being brought to the last end. But the New Law does this :
wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. x. 19-22) : Having there-
fore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by
the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which He hath dedicated
for us . . . let us draw near. Therefore no state of the present
life can be more perfect than that of the New Law, since the
nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is.
In another way the state of mankind may change according
as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or
less perfectly. And thus the state of the Old Law under-
went frequent changes, since at times the laws were very
well kept, and at other times were altogether unheeded.
Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change
with regard to various places^ times, and persons, according
as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less
perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to look forward to a
28q THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL Q. ior).ART.4
state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost
more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto, especially
the apostles who received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e.,
sooner and more abundantly than others, as a gloss expounds
on Rom. viii. 23.
Reply Ohj. i. As Dionysius says [Eccl. Hier. v.), there
is a threefold state of mankind ; the first was under the Old
Law; the second is that of the New Law; the third will take
place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first
state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the
state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and
imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with the
advent of which the present state will be done away as
expressed in that very passage [verse 12) : We see now through
a glass in a dark manner ; hut then face to face.
Reply Ohj. 2. As Augustine says [Contra Faust, xix.),
Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise
to give the Holy Ghost was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but
in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained
that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they held to be the
Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of
the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid
promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord
promised them a second time (Acts i. 5) : You shall he bap-
tized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence : which we
read as having been fulfilled in Acts ii. However, these
foolish notions are refuted by the statement (John vii. 39)
that as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet
glorified ; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was
given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and
Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the senseless
idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some
other time.
Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in
respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things,
to wit, that we are bound to believe and to do. But He
did not teach them about all future events : for this did not
regard them according to Acts i. 7: It is not for you to know
II. 3 19
Q. io6. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 290
the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own
power.
Reply Ohj. 3. The Old Law corresponded not only to the
Father, but also to the Son : because Christ was foreshadowed
in the Old Law. Hence Our Lord said (John v. 46) : // you
did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also ; for
he wrote of Me. In like manner the New Law corresponds
not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost ; according to
Rom. viii. 2: The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, etc.
Hence we are not to look forward to another law corre-
sponding to the Holy Ghost.
Reply Obj. 4. Since Christ said at the very outset of the
preaching of the Gospel : The kingdom of heaven is at hand
(Matth. iv. 17), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of
Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching
of the Gospel of Christ may be understood in two ways.
First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge
of Christ : and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the
whole world even at the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom
states {Hom. Ixxv. in Matth.). And in this sense the words
that follow, — and then shall the consummation come, refer to
the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking
literally.- — Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be
understood as extending throughout the world and pro-
ducing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be
founded in every nation. And in this sense, as Augustine
writes to Hesychius [Epist. cxcix.), the Gospel is not
preached to the whole world yet, but, when it is, the con-
summation of the world will come.
QUESTION CVII.
OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the New Law as compared with the
Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law ?
(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old ? (3) Whether the
New Law is contained in the Old ? (4) Which is the more
burdensome, the New or the Old Law ?
First Article,
whether the new law is distinct from the old law ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law is not distinct
from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those
who believe in God : since without faith it is impossible to
please God, according to Heb. xi. 6. But the faith of olden
times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on
Matth. xxi. 9. Therefore the law is the same also.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich.
discip.) that the difference between the Law and Gospel is
small, "^ — fear and love (timor et amor). But the New and
Old Laws cannot be differentiated in respect of these two
things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of
charity: Thou shall love thy neighbour (Lev. xix. 18), and:
Thou shall love the Lord thy God (Deut. vi. 5). — In like
manner neither can they differ according to the other
difference which Augustine assigns [Contra Faust, iv.),
* Referring to the Latin words timor and amor.
291
Q. 107. Art. r THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 292
viz., that the Old Testament contained temporal promises,
whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal
promises : since even the New Testament contains tem-
poral promises, according to Mark x. 30 : He shall receive
a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren,
etc. : while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises
spiritual and eternal, according to Heb. xi. 16: But now they
desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country, which is said
of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law
is not distinct from the Old.
Obj. 3. Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both
laws by calling the Old Law a law of works, and the New
Law a law of faith (Rom. iii. 27). But the Old Law was
also a law of faith, according to Heb. xi. 39: All were (Vulg.,
— All these being) approved by the testimony of faith, which he
says of the fathers of the Old Testament. In like manner
the New Law is a law of works: since it is written (Matth.
V. 44) : Do good to them that hate you ; and (Luke xxii. 19) :
Do this for a commemoration of Me. Therefore the New Law
is not distinct from the Old.
On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. vii. 12) : The
priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation
also be made of the Law. But the priesthood of the New
Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle
shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct.
I answer that. As stated above (Q. XC, A. 2; Q. XCL,
A. 4), every law ordains human conduct to some end.
Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways,
considered from the point of view of the end. First, through
being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be
specific, especially if such ends are proximate. Secondly,
by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the
end. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species
through being directed to different terms: while according
as one part of a movement is nearer to the term than another
part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is
assessed.
Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from
293 NEW LAW COMPARED WITH OLD Q. 107. Art. i
one another in two ways. First, through being altogether
diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse
ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government,
would differ specifically from a law ordained to government
by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished
from one another, through one of them being more closely
connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus
in one and the same state there is one law enjoined on men
of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which
pertains to the common good; and another law regulating
the education of children who need to be taught how they
are to achieve manly deeds later on.
We must therefore say that, according to the first way,
the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because
they both have the same end, namely, man's subjection to
God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old
Testament, according to Rom. iii. 30: It is one God that
jiistificth circurncision by faith, and uncircumcision through
faith. — According to the second way, the New Law is
distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a
pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal. iii. 24),
whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the
law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Coloss. iii. 14)
that it is the bond of perfection.
Reply Obj. i. The unity of faith under both Testaments
witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above
(O. LXIL, A. 2) that the object of the theological virtues,
among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a
different state in the Old and in the New Law: since what
they believed as future, we believe as fact.
Reply Obj. 2. All the differences assigned between the Old
and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection
and imperfection. For the precepts of every law prescribe
acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not pos-
sessed of a virtuous habit, are directed in one way to perform
virtuous acts, while those w^ho are perfected by the possession
of virtuous habits are directed in another way. For those
who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are directed
Q. 107. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 294
to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some out-
ward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the
promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honour, riches,
or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men
who were imperfect, that is, who had not yet received
spiritual grace, was called the law of fear, inasmuch as it
induced men to observe its commandments by threatening
them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing tem-
poral promises. — On the other hand, those who are possessed
of virtue, are inchned to do virtuous deeds through love of
virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment or
reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence
from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called the
Law of love : and it is described as containing spiritual and
eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of
charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves
to those objects, not as to something foreign but as to some-
thing of their own. — For this reason, too, the Old Law is
described as restraining the hand, not the will (Peter Lombard,
— Sent, iii.) ; since when a man refrains from some sins through
fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply from
sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through
love of righteousness : and hence the New Law, which is the
Law of love, is said to restrain the will.
Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old
Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy
Ghost, looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and
in this respect they belonged to the New Law. — In like
manner in the New Testament there are some carnal men
who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New
Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Testa-
ment, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment
and by temporal promises.
But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity,
nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom
charity . . . is spread abroad in our hearts {Rom. v. 5).
Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CVL, AA. i, 2), the
New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-
295 NEW LAW COMPARED WITH OLD (J. 107. Art. z
eminence is derived from that very grace which is given
inwardly to behevers, and for this reason is called the grace
of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain
deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not
consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law.
As to those mider the Old Testament who through faith
were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the
New Testament: for they were not justified except through
faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament.
Hence of Moses the Apostle says (Heb. xi. 26) that he
esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure
of the Egyptians.
Second Article,
whether the new law fulfils the old ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law does not fulfil
the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But
the New Law voids or excludes the observances of the Old
Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. v. 2) : // you he circumcised,
Christ shall profit you nothing. Therefore the New Law is
not a fulfilment of the Old.
Ohj. 2. Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of
another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law
precepts that were contrary to precepts of the Old Law.
For we read (Matth. v. 27-32) : You have heard that it was
said to them of old: . . . Whosoever shall put away his wifCy
let him give her a hill of divorce. But I say to you that whoso-
ever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery.
Furthermore, the same evidently applies to the prohibition
against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating
one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to have done
away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the
different kinds of foods (Matth. xv. 11) : Not that which goeth
into the mouth defileth a man : hut what cometh out of the mouth,
this defileth a man. Therefore the New Law^ is not a fulfil-
ment of the Old.
Ohj. 3. Further, whoever acts against a law does not
Q. 107. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 296
fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against
the Law. For He touched the leper (Matth. viii. 3), which
was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have fre-
quently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of
Him (John ix. 16) : This man is not of God, who keepeth not
the sabbath. Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law : and so
the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfilment of the Old.
Obj. 4. Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral,
ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above (Q. XCIX., A. 4).
But Our Lord (Matth. v.) fulfilled the Law in some respects,
but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial pre-
cepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not a com-
plete fulfilment of the Old.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. v. 17) : / am not
come to destroy, but to fulfil : and went on to say {verse 18) :
One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be ful-
filled.
I answer that. As stated above (A. i), the New Law is
compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now
everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the im-
perfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by
supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.
Now two things in the Old Law offer themselves to our
consideration: viz., the end, and the precepts contained in
the Law.
Now the end of every law is to make men righteous and
virtuous, as was stated above (Q. XCIL, A. i): and conse-
quently the end of the Old Law was the justification of
men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but
foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised
it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the
Old by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion.
This is what the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 3, 4): What the
Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the like-
ness of sinful fiesh . . . hath condemned sin in the fiesh, that
the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us. — And in
this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised,
according to 2 Cor. i. 20: Whatever are the promises of God,
297 NEW LAW COMPARED W ITH OLD Q. 107. Ak
r. 2
in Him, i.e., in Christ, they are ' y^«.'* — Again, in this
respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed.
Hence it is written (Coloss. ii. 17) concerning the ceremonial
precepts that they were a shadow of things to come, hut the
body is of Christ : in other words, the reality is found in
Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality;
whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure.
Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in
His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He
was willing to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal
observances, which were binding for the time being; accord-
ing to Gal. iv. 4: Made under the Law. — In His doctrine He
fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by
explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the
case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the
Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior
act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that
the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. —
Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by
prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes
of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and
this is more safely avoided, by abstaining altogether from
swearing, save in cases of urgency. — Thirdly, Our Lord ful-
filled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of
perfection: this is clearly seen in Matth. xix. 21 [of. Mark
X. 21 ; Luke xviii. 22) where Our Lord said to the man who
affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law:
One thing is wanting to thee : // thou wilt he perfect, go, sell
whatsoever thou hast, etc.
Reply Obj. i. The New Law does not void observance of
the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as
stated above (Q. CIIL, AA. 3, 4). Now the latter were
figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very
fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled when those
things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it
follows that they are no longer to be observed: for if they
* The Doiuiy version reads thus: All the promises of God are in
Him, 'It is.'
Q. 107. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 298
were to be observed, this would meaa that something is
still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the
promise of a future gift holds no longer when it has been
fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the
legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Contra Faust, xix.,)
those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts
of the Old Law. For what Our Lord commanded about a
man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the
Law prescribed. For the Law did not say : ' Let him that
wills, put his wife away ': the contrary of which would be not
to put her away. On the contrary, the Law was unwilling that
a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay,
so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through
being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our
Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife oiight not easily
to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornica-
tion. The same applies to the prohibition about swearing,
as stated above. — The same is also clear with respect to the
prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to
revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreason-
ably: whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more
completely by commanding them to abstain from it alto-
gether.— With regard to the hatred of one's enemies. He
dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by ad-
monishing us to hate, not the person, but his sin. — As to
discriminating between various foods, which was a cere-
monial matter. Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed :
but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only
in token of something else, as stated above (Q. CIL, A. 6 ad i).
Reply Obj. 3. It was forbidden by the Law to touch a
leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain unclean-
ness of irregularity, as also by touching the dead, as stated
above (Q. CIL, A. 5 ad ^. But Our Lord, Who healed the
leper, could not contract an uncleanness. — By those things
which He did on the sabbath. He did not break the sab-
bath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel:
both because He worked miracles by His Divine power,
299 NEW LAW COMPAKIi:!) WITH OLD o. 107. Art. 1
which is ever active among things; and because His works
were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Phari-
sees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on
the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He
excused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the
sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according
to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who
thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works
of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the
intention of the Law.
Reply Obj. 4. The reason why the ceremonial precepts of
the Law are not mentioned in Matth. v. is because, as stated
above (ad i), their observance was abolished by their fulfil-
ment.— But of the judicial precepts He mentioned that of
retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to
all the others. With regard to this precept. He taught that
the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be
sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out
of revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man
to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains
still in the New Law.
Third Article,
whether the new law is contained in the old ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law is not contained
in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith :
wherefore it is called the law of faith (Rom. iii. 27). But
many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which
are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is
not contained in the Old.
Obj. 2. Further, a gloss says on Matth. v. 19, He that
shall break one of these least commandments, that the lesser
commandments are those of the Law, and the greater com-
mandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the
greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the
New Law is not contained in the Old.
Q. 107. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 300
Ohj. 3. Further, who holds the container holds the con-
tents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old,
it follows that whoever had the Old Law had the New: so
that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once
they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is not contained
in the Old.
On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. i. 16, there was
a wheel in the midst of a i&hcel, i.e., the New Testament within
the Old, according to Gregory's exposition.
/ answer that, One thing may be contained in another in
two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place.
Secondly, virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as the com-
plement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains
its species, and a seed contains the whole tree, virtually.
It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old:
for it has been stated (A. i) that the New Law is compared
to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence Chrysostom,
expounding Mark iv. 28, The earth of itself bringeth forth
fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in
the ear, expresses himself as follows : He brought forth first
the blade, i.e., the Law of Nature ; then the ear, i.e., the Law
of Moses ; lastly, the full corn, i.e., the Law of the Gospel.
Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the
ear.
Reply Obj. i. Whatsoever is set down in the New Testa-
ment explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained
in the Old Testament as a matter of belief, but implicitly,
under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things
which we are bound to believe, the New Law is contained
in the Old.
Reply Obj. 2. The precepts of the New Law are said to
be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their
being set forth explicitly. But as to the substance itself of
the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained
in the Old. Hence Augustine says {Contra Faust, xix.) that
nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He
expressed Himself by saying : * But I say unto you,' are to
be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they thought
301 NEW LAW COMPARED WITH OLD Q. 107. Art. 4
that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord
declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother
is to be looked on as a kind of murder. And it is in the point
of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the New
Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing,
however, prevents the greater from being contained in the
lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed.
Reply Obj. 3. What is set forth implicitly needs to be
declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old
Law, a New Law also had to be given.
Fourth Article,
whether the new law is more burdensome than
THE OLD ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law is more burden-
some than the Old. For Chrysostom, in his commentary
on Matth. v. 19, He that shall break one of these least com-
mandments, says: The commandments given to Moses are
easy to obey : Thou shall not kill ; Thou shall not commit
adultery : but the commandments of Christ are difficult to
accomplish, for instance : Thou shall not give way to anger,
or to lust. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome
than the Old.
Obj. 2. Further, it is easier to make use of earthly pros-
perity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testa-
ment observance of the Law was followed by temporal
prosperity, as may be gathered from Deut. xxviii. 1-14;
whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe
the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. vi. 4-10: Let us exhibit
ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribula-
tion, in necessities, in distresses, etc. Therefore the New
Law is more burdensome than the Old.
Obj. 3. The more one has to do, the more difficult it is.
But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the
Old Law forbade perjury, while the New Law proscribed
even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his
Q. 107. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 302
wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law forbade
divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Matth. v. 31 seqq.,
according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New
Law is more burdensome than the Old.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xi. 28) : Come to Me,
all you that labour and are burdened : which words are ex-
pounded by Hilary thus: He calls to Himself all those that
labour under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are bur-
dened with the sins of this world. And further on He says
of the yoke of the Gospel: For My yoke is sweet and My
burden light. Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden
than the Old.
I answer that, A twofold difficulty may attach to works
of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned.
One is on the part of the outward works, which of them-
selves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this
respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than the
New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies pre-
scribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which,
in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few
precepts to those of the natural law; although afterwards
some were added, through being instituted by the holy
Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that moderation
should be observed, lest good conduct should become a
burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the Queries
of Januarius {Ep. LV.) that, whereas God in His mercy
wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public
solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments,
certain persons make it a slave's burden ; so much so that the
state of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the
Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more
tolerable.
The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to
interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done
with promptitude and pleasure. It is this difficulty that
virtue solves: because to act, thus is difficult for a man
without virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy to him.
In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more
303 NEW LAW^ COMPARED WITH OLD Q. 107. Art. 4
burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law
prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which
were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases,
although they were forbidden in some, without, however,
any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now
this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the
Philosopher states {lithic. v.) that it is easy to do what a
righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way,
viz., with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man
who is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (i John
V. 3) that His commandments are not heavy : which words
Augustine expounds by saying that they are not heavy to the
man that loveth ; whereas they are a burden to him that loveth
not.
Reply Ohj. i. The passage quoted speaks expressly of the
difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of
interior movements.
Reply Ohj. 2. The tribulations suffered by those who
observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself.
Moreover they are easily borne, on account of the love in
which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says in
his book on the Lord's words (Serm. Ixx.), love makes light
and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our
power.
Reply Ohj. 3. The object of these additions to the precepts
of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it pre-
scribed, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.).
Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more
burdensome, but rather that it is a lighter burden.
QUESTION CVIII.
OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW
LAW.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider those things that are contained in
the New Law: under which head there are four points of
inquiry: (i) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or
to forbid any outward works ? (2) Whether the New Law
makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding
external acts ? (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts
it directs man sufficiently ? (4) Whether it fittingly adds
counsels to precepts ?
First Article.
whether the new law ought to prescribe or prohibit
any external acts ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law should not pre-
scribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is
the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Matth. xxiv. 14:
This Gospel of the kingdom shall he preached in the whole
world. But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior,
but only in interior acts, according to Luke xvii. 21: The
kingdom of God is within you ; and Rom. xiv. 17 : The kingdom
of God is not meat and drink ; hut justice and peace and joy
in the Holy Ghost. Therefore the New Law should not
prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Ohj. 2. Further, the New Law is the law of the Spirit
(Rom. viii. 2). But where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
304
305 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Art. i
liberty (2 Cor. iii. 17). Now there is no liberty when man is
bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the
New Law does not prescribe or forbid any external acts.
Ohj. 3. Further, all external acts are understood as re-
ferrible to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the
mind. But this is assigned as the difference between the
New and Old Laws that the Old Law restrains the hand,
whereas the New Law curbs the mind. Therefore the New Law
should not contain prohibitions and commands about ex-
terior deeds, but only about interior acts.
On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made
children of light : wherefore it is written (John xii. 36) :
Believe in the light that you may be the children of light. Now
it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds of
light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to Ephes.
V. 8 : You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord.
Walk . . . as children of the light. Therefore the New Law
had to forbid certain external acts and prescribe others.
/ answer that, As stated above (0. CVL, AA. i, 2), the New
Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which
is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. Now
men become receivers of this grace through God's Son
made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence
flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (John i. 14): The
Word was made flesh, and afterwards : /w// of grace and truth ;
and further on : Of His fulness we all have received, and grace
for grace. Hence it is added that grace and truth came by
Jesus Christ. Consequently it was becoming that the
grace which flows from the incarnate Word should be given
to us by means of certain external sensible objects; and that
from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to
the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.
Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection
with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to
grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted
in the New Law, e.g.. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the
like.
In the second place there are those external acts which
II. 3 20
Q. io8. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 306
ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must
observe a difference. For there are some which are neces-
sarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace
consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such ex-
ternal works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law;
thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is
forbidden; for it is written (Matth. x. 32, 33): [Every one)
that shalt confess Me before men, I will also confess him before
My Father. . . . B^it he that shall deny Me before men, I will
also deny him before My Father. — On the other hand, there
are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping
with faith that worketh through love. Such works are not
prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its
primitive institution; but have been left by the Law-
giver, i.e., Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And
so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or
avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such
matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Wherefore
also in this respect the Gospel is called the law of liberty
(cf . Reply Obj. 2) : since the Old Law decided many points
and left few to man to decide as he chose.
Reply Obj. i. The kingdom of God consists chiefly in in-
ternal acts : but as a consequence all things that are essential
to internal acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus
if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and
spiritual joy, all external acts that are incompatible with
righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to
the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden in
the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things
that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance,
to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of
God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted:
21 le kingdom of God is not meat and drink.
Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher {Metaph. i.)
what is free is cause of itself. Therefore he acts freely, who
acts of his own accord. Now man does of his own accord
that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature:
since a habit inclines one as a second nature. If, however, a
307 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Art. 2
liabit be in opposition to nature, man would not act accord-
ing to his nature, but according to some corruption affecting
that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy Ghost is
like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to
act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are be-
coming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it.
Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in
two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or
avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves neces-
sary or opposed to salvation, and come under the pre-
scription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it
also makes us comply freely with these precepts and pro-
hibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings
of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is
called the law of perfect liberty (James i. 25).
Reply Obj. 3. The New Law, by restraining the mind from
inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand
from inordinate acts, which ensue from inward movements.
Second Article.
whether the new law made sufficient ordinations
about external acts ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law made insufhcient
ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh
through charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law,
according to Gal. v. 6: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision
availeth anything, nor uncircumcision : but faith that worketh
through charity. But the New Law declared explicitly cer-
tain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in
the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity. There-
fore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds,
which were not fixed in the Old Law.
Obj. 2. Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments
instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above
(Q. CL, A. 4; Q. CIL, A. 4). But in the New Law, although
certain sacraments are instituted, yet no sacred things
Q. io8. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 308
seem to have been instituted by Our Lord; for instance,
pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple or of the
vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast.
Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about
external matters.
Ohj. 3. Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain
observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were
there certain observances pertaining to the people: as was
stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of
the Old Law (Q. CL, A. 4; Q. GIL, A. 6). Now in the New
Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to
the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Matth. x. 9:
Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor
other things which are mentioned here and Luke ix., x.
Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful
should also have been instituted in the New Law.
Ohj. 4. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and cere-
monial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But
in the New Law there are no judicial precepts. Therefore
the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external
works.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. vii. 24) : Every one
. . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall he likened
to a wise man that huilt his house upon a rock. But a wise
builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building.
Therefore Christ's words contain all things necessary for
man's salvation.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. i), the New Law had
to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are
essential for the reception or right use of grace. And since
we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ
alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments
whereby we obtain grace: viz., Baptism, Eucharist, Orders
of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the
apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indis-
soluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through
the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His
institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them
309 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Art. 2
with oil (Mark v\. 13). These are the sacraments of the
New Law.
The right use of grace is by means of works of charity.
These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to
the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law.
Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as
regards external action. — The determination of these works
in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the cere-
monial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neigh-
bour, to the judicial precepts, as stated above (Q. XCIX.,
A. 4). And therefore, since these determinations are not
in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace
wherein the Law consists, they do not come under a
precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of
man; some relating to inferiors, — as when a precept is
given to an individual; others, relating to superiors,
temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common
good.
Accordingly the New Law had no other external works
to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacra-
ments, and those moral precepts which have a necessary
connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not
kill, or steal, and so forth.
Reply Obj. i. Matters of faith are above human reason,
and so we cannot attain to them except through grace.
Consequently, when grace came to be bestowed more abun-
dantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit
points of faith. On the other hand, it is through human
reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the
rule of human action, as stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3;
Q. LXHL, A. 2). Wherefore in such matters as these there
was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral
precepts of the Law, which proceed from the dictate of
reason.
Reply Obj. 2. In the sacraments of the New Law grace is
bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ:
consequently they had to be instituted by Him. But in
the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the
Q. io8. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 310
consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, or, again, in
the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the
institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful,
since they have not of themselves any necessary connection
with inward grace.
Reply Ohj. 3. Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts
not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and
they can be understood in two ways. First, following
Augustine [De Consensu Evang. xxx.), as being not com-
mands, but permissions. For He permitted them to set
forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since
they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those
to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say:
For the labourer is worthy of his hire. Nor is it a sin, but a
work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of
livelihood with him, without accepting supplies from those
to whom he preaches; as Paul did (i Cor. ix. 4, seqq.).
Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy
men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid
upon the apostles for the time during which they were
sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the
disciples, being yet as little children under Christ's care,
needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such
as all subjects receive from their superiors: and especially
so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to re-
nounce the care of temporalities, so as to become fitted for the
preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor
must we wonder if He established certain fixed modes of
life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the
people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of the
Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His
Passion, as though the disciples had by their means become
sufficiently practised. Hence He said (Luke xxii. 35, 26) :
When I sent you without purse and scrip and shoes, did you
want anything ? But they said : Nothing. Then said He
unto them : But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and
likewise a scrip. Because the time of perfect liberty was
already at hand, when they would be left entirely to their
311 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Art. 3
own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with
virtue.
Reply Ohj. 4. Judicial precepts also, are not essential to
virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only
in regard to the common notion of justice. Consequently
Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of
those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of
others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old
Law, some of them He explained, because they were mis-
understood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on
(A. 3, ad 2).
Third Article.
whether the new law directed man sufficiently as
regards interior actions ?
Wc proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the New Law directed man in-
sufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten
commandments of the decalogue directing man to God and
his neighbour. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of
them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of
adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by
omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man
insufficiently.
Ohj. 2. Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our
Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter
of divorcing a wife, of punishment by retaliation, and
of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other
judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (Q. CIV.,
A. 4; Q. CV.). Therefore, in this respect, He directed
human life insufficiently.
Ohj. 3. Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and
judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our
Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He
ordained insufficiently.
Ohj. 4. Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well
disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal
end whatever. But there are many other temporal goods
Q. io8. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 312
besides the favour of man: and there are many other good
works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. Therefore
Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of
these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought we
to shun the glory of human favour.
Obj. 5. Further, solicitude for the necessary means of
livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude
even other animals share with man: wherefore it is written
(Prov. vi. 6, S): Go to the ant, 0 sluggard, and consider her
ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and
gather eth her food in the harvest. But every command issued
against the inclination of nature is an unjust command,
forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature. Therefore
it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude
about food and raiment.
Obj. 6. Further, no act of virtue should be the subject
of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, ac-
cording to Ps. xciii. 15 : Until justice be turned into judgment.
Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade
judgment: and consequently that the New Law directed
man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Serm. Dom. in
Monte, i.): We should take note that, when He said: * He
that hear eth these My words,' He indicates clearly that this
sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a
Christian's life is formed.
I answer that. As is evident from Augustine's words just
quoted, the sermon, which Our Lord delivered on the moun-
tain, contains the whole process of forming the life of a
Christian. Therein man's interior movements are ordered.
Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude ; and after
commending the authority of the apostles, through whom
the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated. He
orders man's interior movements, first in regard to man
himself, secondly in regard to his neighbour.
This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, cor-
responding to man's two interior movements in respect of
any prospective action, viz., volition of what has to be
313 CONTENTS OF THK NEW LAW Q. to8. Art. 3
done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first
place. He directs man's will in respect of the various pre-
cepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain
not merely from those external works that are evil in them-
selves, but also from (the corresponding) internal acts, and
from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second place He
directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works,
we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches,
which is to lay up treasures on earth.
Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in re-
spect of his neighbour, by forbidding us, on the one hand,
to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and,
on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things
if he be unworthy.
Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the
Gospel; viz., by imploring the help of God; by striving to
enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being
wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He
declares that we must observe His commandments, and that
it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work
miracles, or merely to hear His words.
Reply Ohj. i. Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling
those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not
rightly understand: and this affected chiefly those precepts
of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition
of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and
not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about
murder and adultery rather than about theft and false
witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder,
and the movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to
be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing
or of bearing false witness. — They held a false opinion about
perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin;
but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and to be
taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence
to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable
as a good thing ; and that it is better to speak without oaths,
unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them.
Q. io8. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 314
Reply Ohj. 2. The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the
judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they con-
sidered certain matters contained in the Law of Moses by
way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely,
divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from strangers.
Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife
(Matth. V. 32) ; and to receive usury (Luke vi. 35), when He
said: Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.
In another way they erred by thinking that certain things
which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice' sake,
should be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for
temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies ; and this
in respect of three precepts. For they thought that desire
for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concern-
ing punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept was
given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might
seek revenge. Wherefore, in order to do away with this,
Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his
mind to suffer yet more if necessary. — They thought that
movements of covetousness were lawful, on account of those
judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of what had
been purloined, together with something added thereto,
as stated above (0. CV., A. 2, ad 9); whereas the Law com-
manded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not
to encourage covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches
that we should not demand our goods from motives ol
cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if
necessary. — ^They thought that the movement of hatred was
lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about
the slaying of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered
this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above (0. CV.,
A. 3, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord
teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be
ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts
are to be taken as binding the mind to he prepared to fulfil
them, as Augustine says {ibid.).
Reply Obj. 3. The moral precepts necessarily retained their
force under the New Law, because they are of themselves
315 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Art. 3
essential to virtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not
necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had
been fixed by the Law : this was left to man to decide in
one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us be-
comingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On
the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts
was totally abolished by the advent of the reality; where-
fore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing
on this occasion when He was giving the general points of
His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that
the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was
to be changed into a spiritual worship: as is evident from
John iv. 21, 23, where He says ; The hour cometh when you
shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the
Father . . . hut . . . the true adorers shall adore the Father in
spirit and in truth.
Reply Ohj. 4. All worldly goods may be reduced to three, —
honours, riches, and pleasures; according to i John ii. 16:
All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, which
refers to pleasures of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the
eyes, which refers to riches, and the pride of life, which refers
to ambition for renown and honour. Now the Law did not
promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary,
it forbade them. But it did promise exalted honours and
abundant riches ; for it is written in reference to the former
(Deut. xxviii. i) : // thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy
God, . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations ; and
in reference to the latter, we read a little further on [verse 11) :
He will make thee abound with all goods. But the Jews
so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to
think that we ought to serve God, with these things as the
end in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teach-
ing, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for
human glory. And He mentions three works, to which all
others may be reduced : since whatever a man does in order
to curb his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and
whatever a man does for the love of his neighbour, comes
under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does for
Q. io8. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 316
the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And
He mentions these three specially, as they hold the princi-
pal place, and are most often used by men in order to
gain glory. — In the second place He taught us that we must
not place our end in riches, when He said: Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth (Matth. vi. 19).
Reply Ohj . 5. Our Lord forbade, not necessary but in-
ordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to
be avoided in temporal matters. First, we must not place
our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the neces-
sities of food and raiment. Wherefore He says: Lay not
up for yourselves, etc. — Secondly, we must not be so anxious
about temporal things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore
Our Lord says [ibid. 32) : Your Father knoweth that you have
need of all these things. — Thirdly, we must not add pre-
sumption to our solicitude; in other words, we must not
be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own
efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets
aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his
stature [ihid. 27). — We must not anticipate the time of
anxiety ; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not
of the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says
[ihid. 34): Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow.
Reply Ohj. 6. Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of
justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn
from the unworthy. But he forbade inordinate judgment,
as stated above.
Fourth Article.
whether certain definite counsels are fittingly
proposed in the new law ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that certain definite counsels are
not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are
given about that which is expedient for an end, as we stated
above, when treating of coimsel (Q. XIV., A. 2). But the
same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain
definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
317 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW u. io8. Art. 4
Ubj. 2. Further, counsels regard a greater good. But
there are no delhiite degrees oi the greater good. There-
fore dehnite counsels should not be given.
Obj. 3. Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection.
But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore
it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be
contained in the Gospel.
Obj. 4. Further, many matters pertaining to the life of
perfection are found among the commandments, as, for
instance. Love your enonics (Matth. v. 44), and those pre-
cepts NNliich Our Lord gave His apostles (ibid. x.). There-
fore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law:
both because they are not all mentioned; and because they
are not distinguished from the commandments.
On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great
use, according to Prov. xxvii. 9: Ointment and perfumes
rejoice the heart : and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the
soul. But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. There-
fore His counsels are supremely useful and becoming.
/ answer that, The difference between a counsel and a com-
mandment is that a commandment implies obligation,
whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom
it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law
of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and
not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must
therefore understand the commandments of the New Law
to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain
the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law brings
us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that
render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious.
Now man is placed between the things of this world, and
spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that
the more he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws
from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves
wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his
end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he
does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence
this disorder is removed by the commandments. Never-
Q. io8. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 318
theless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, he does not
need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since
he can, while using the things of this world, attain to
eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in
them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving
up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evan-
gelical counsels are given for this purpose.
Now the goods of this world which come into use in human
life, consist in three things: viz., in external wealth per-
taining to the concupiscence of the eyes ; carnal pleasures
pertaining to the concupiscence of the flesh ; and honours,
which pertain to the pride of life, according to i John
ii. 16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as
possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover,
every form of the religious life that professes the state of
perfection is based on these three : since riches are renounced
by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the
pride of life by the bondage of obedience.
Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accord-
ance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe
any one of them in a particular case, this is taking that
counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that
particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an alms
to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the
counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when
a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures
that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel
for that particular time. And again, when a man follows
not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully,
he follows the counsel in that particular case : for instance,
if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if
he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be
avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be
reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.
Reply Ohj. i. The aforesaid counsels, considered in them-
selves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being
ill-disposed, it happens that some of them are inexpedient,
because their disposition is not inclined to such things.
319 CONTENTS OF THE NEW LAW Q. io8. Akt. 4
Hence Our Lord, in proposing the evangelical counsels,
always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the
counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty
(Matth. xix. 21), He begins with the words: If thou wilt be
perfect, and then He adds: Go sell all thou hast. In like
manner when He gave the coimsel of perpetual chastity,
saying {ibid., 12): There are eunuchs who have made them-
selves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, He adds straight-
way: He that can take, let him take it. And, again, the
Apostle (i Cor. vii. 35), after giving the counsel of virginity,
says: And this I speak for your profit ; not to cast a snare
upon you.
Reply Obj. 2. The greater goods are not definitely fixed
in the individual ; but those which are simply and absolutely
the greater good in general are fixed: and to these all the
above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3. Even the counsel of obedience is understood
to have been given by Our Lord in the words: And (let him)
follow Me. For we follow Him not only by imitating His
works, but also by obeying His commandments, according
to John x. 27: My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow
Me.
Reply Obj. 4. Those things which Our Lord prescribed
about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings
(Matth. v., Luke vi.), may be referred to the preparation
of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation ; for
instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies,
and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence
these things are placed among the precepts. But that any-
one should actually and promptly behave thus towards an
enemy when there is no special need, is to be referred to the
particular counsels, as stated above. — As to those matters
which are set down in Matth. x. and Luke ix. andx., they
were either disciplinary commands for that particular time,
or concessions, as stated above (A. 2 ad ^). Hence they are
not set down among the counsels.
TREATISE ON GRACE
II. 3 21
QUESTION CIX.
OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE.
{In Ten Articles.)
We must now consider the exterior principle of human
acts, i.e., God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by
Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of
God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects.
The first point of consideration will be threefold; for we
shall consider (i) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself,
as to its essence; (3) its division.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry —
(i) Whether without grace man can know anything ?
(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any
good ? (3) Whether without grace man can love God above
all things ? (4) Whether without grace man can keep the
commandments of the Law ? (5) Whether without grace
he can merit eternal life ? (6) Whether without grace man
can prepare himself for grace ? (7) Whether without grace
he can rise from sin ? (8) Whether without grace man can
avoid sin ? (9) Whether man having received grace can do
good and avoid sin without any further Divine help ?
(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good ?
First Article,
whether without grace man can know any truth ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that without grace man can know
no truth. For, on i Cor. xii. 3: No man can say, the Lord
Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost, the gloss says: Every truth, by
323
Q. log. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 324
whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy
Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know
truth without grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says [SoUl. i.) that the most
certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to he
seen. Now God Himself is He Who sheds the light. And
reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the
mind are the senses of the soul. Now the bodily senses, how-
ever pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun's
light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot,
by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light : and this
pertains to the aid of grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, the human mind can only understand
truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine [De Trin. xiv.).
But the Apostle says (2 Cor. iii. 5) : Not that we are sufficient to
think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves ; hut our sufficiency
is from God. Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth
without the help of grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says [Retract, i.) : / do not
approve having said in the prayer, 0 God, Who dost wish the
sinless alone to know the truth ; for it may he answered that
many who are not sinless know many truths. Now man is
cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 1. 12 : Create a
clean heart in me, 0 God, and renew a right spirit within my
bowels. Therefore without grace man of himself can know
truth.
/ answer that. To know truth is a use or act of intellectual
light, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. v. 13) : All that
is made manifest is light. Now every use implies movement,
taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing
movements, as is clear from the Philosopher [De Anima, iii.).
Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is
required not merely the form which is the principle of the
movement or action, but there is also required the motion
of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of
corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter
how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about altera-
tion, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it
325 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. i
is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the
motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover,
so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are re-
duced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence
no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is sup-
posed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved
by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His
providence, and not by a necessity of nature, as the motion
of the heavenly body. Now not only is. every motion from
God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is
from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the
intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon
God in two ways : first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it
has the form whereby it acts ; secondly, inasmuch as it is
moved by Him to act.
Now every form bestowed on created things by God has
power for a determined act, which it can bring about in pro-
portion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which
it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can
only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human /
understanding has a form, viz., intelligible light, which of
itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things,
viz., those we can come to know through the senses. Higher
intelligible things the human intellect cannot know, unless
it be perfected by a stronger light, viz., the light of faith
or prophecy which is called the light of grace, inasmuch as ^
it is added to nature.
Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth
whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may
be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new
light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth
in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural know-
ledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some
by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason,
even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what
nature can do.
Reply Ohj. i. Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from
the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving
Q. 109 Art. 2 THi: " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 326
us to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelHng
in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual
gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with
regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and
especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the
Apostle speaks.
Reply Ohj. 2. The material sun sheds its light outside us;
but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us.
Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's
enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what
pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is re-
quired no further knowledge, but only for such things as
surpass natural knowledge.
Reply Ohj. 3. We always need God's help for every
thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act ;
for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear
from Augustine [De Trin. xiv.).
Second Article,
whether man can wish or do any good without grace ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: —
Objection i. It seems that man can wish and do good
without grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is
master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of
his willing, as stated above (Q. L, A. i; Q. XHL, A. 6).
Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the
help of grace.
Obj. 2. Further, man has more power over what is accord-
ing to his nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now
sin is against his nature, as Damascene says {De Fide Orthod.
ji.) ; whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature,
as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. i). Therefore since man can
sin of himself, much more would it seem that of himself he
can wish and do good.
Obj. 3. Further, the understanding's good is truth, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi.) Now the intellect can
of itself know truth, even as every other thing can work its
327 THK NECESSITY OF (iRACE Q. 109. Art. 2
own operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man,
of himself, do and wish good.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. ix. 16): It is
not of him that willeth (i.e., to will), nor of him that runneth
(i.e., to run), hut of God that showeth mercy. And Augustine
says (De Corrcpt. et Gratia, ii.) that without grace men do
nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act.
I answer that, Man's nature may be looked at in two ways :
first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin;
secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first
parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help
of ("od as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever*
as stated above (A. i). But in the state of integrity, as
regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his
natural endowments could wish and do the good propor-'
tionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue;
but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue.
But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what
he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it
by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature^
is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every/
natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can,;
by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular
good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like;
yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short
in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some
movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the
movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine
he be cured.
And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a
gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one
reason, viz., in order to do and wish supernatural good;|
but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz., in,l
order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry outf V
works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Be-'
yond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that
he may be moved to act well.
Reply Obj. 1. Man is master of his acts and of his willing
Q. 109. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA ITHEOLOGICA '* 328
or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can
be bent to one side or another. And although he is master
of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only
be by a previous deliberation; and since it cannot go on to
infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free-
will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the
human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves
in a chapter on Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii.). Hence
the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of
its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much
more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is
hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.
Reply Ohj. 2. To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good
which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now
as every created thing has its being from another, and,
considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be pre-
served by another in the good which pertains to its nature.
For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall
into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.
Reply Ohj. 3. Man cannot even know truth without
Divine help, as stated above (A. i) . And yet human nature
is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than
in regard to the knowledge of truth.
Third Article.
whether by his own natural powers and without
grace man can love god above all things ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article: —
Objection i. It seems that without grace man cannot love
God above all things by his own natural powers. For to
love God above all things is the proper and principal act of
charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity,
since the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost Who is given to us, as is said Rom. v. 5. There-
fore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above
all things.
Obj. 2. Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to
329 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. 3
love God above all things is to tend above oneself. There-
fore without the help of grace no created nature can love
God above itself.
Obj. 3. Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is
due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things.
Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the
best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to
add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural
powers alone, cannot love God above all things.
On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made
with only natural endowments; and in this state it is
manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did
not love God equally with himself, or less than himself,
otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God
above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone,
can love God more than himself and above all things.
/ answer that, As was said above (P. i., Q. LX., A. 5),
where the various opinions concerning the natural love of
the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature,
could by his natural power, do the good natural to him
without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not
without the help of God moving him. Now to love God
above all things is natural to man and to every nature,
not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature
according to the manner of love which can belong to each
creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all
to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit
(to be sought and loved) since all things act according as
they are naturally fit as stated in Phys. ii. Now it is mani-
fest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole;
hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves
its own proper good on account of the common good of the
whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says {Div.
Nom. iv.) that God leads everything to love of Himself . Hence
in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of him-
self and of all other things to the love of God as to its end ;
and thus he loved God more than himself and above all
things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short
Q. 109. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 330
of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it
is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account
of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that
in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of
grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love
God above all things naturally, although he needed God's
help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature
man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.
Reply Ohj. i. Charity loves God above all things in a
higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above
all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of
natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object
of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellow-
ship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of
God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every
habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by
the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.
Reply Ohj. 2. When it is said that nature cannot rise above
itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn
to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect
by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is
shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to
understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the
proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all
things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature,
as was said above.
Reply Ohj. 3. Love is said to be best, both with respect to
the degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving,
and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love
is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude,
as was said above.
Fourth Article.
whether man without grace and by his own natural
powers can fulfil the commandments of the law ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:^
Objection i. It seems that man without giace, and by his
own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law
331 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. 4
For the Apostle says (Rom. ii. 14) that the Goitiks who
have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law.
Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without
grace. Hence a man can fuUil the commandments of the
Law without grace.
Obj. 2. Further, Jerome (Pelagius) says in his Exposition
of the Catholic Faith that they are anathema who say God
has laid impossibilities upon man. Now what a man cannot
fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can
fulhl all the commandments of himself.
Obj. 3. Further, of all the commandments of the Law,
the greatest is this. Thou shall love the Lord thy God with
thy whole heart (Matth. xxii. 37). Now man with his natural
endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above
all things, as stated above (A. 3) . Therefore man can fulfil
all the commandments of the Law without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Hceres, Ixxxviii.)
that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that they believe that
without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments.
I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the com-
mandments of the Law. — The first regards the substance of
the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude,
and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of
perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law;
otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state,
since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine
commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man
cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing
grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be
fulfilled not merely as regards the substance of the act, but
also as regards the mode of acting, i.e., their being done out
of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect
nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil
the commandments of the law without grace. Hence,
Augustine [De Corrept. et Grat. ii.) having stated that without
grace men can do no good whatever, adds: Not only do they
know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly
what they know. Beyond this, in both states they need the
Q. 109. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 332
help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments,
as stated above (AA. 2, 3).
Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says {De Spiv, et Lit. xxvii.),
do not he disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those
things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this,
in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were
naturally made.
Reply Obj. 2. What we can do with the Divine assistance
is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Phil-
osopher {Ethic, iii.) : What we can do through our friends, we
can do, in some sense, by ourselves. Hence Jerome (Pelagius)
concedes {ibid.) that our will is in such a way free that we
must confess we still require God's help.
Reply Obj. 3. Man cannot, with his purely natural endow-
ments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above
(A. 3).
Fifth Article,
whether man can merit everlasting life without
GRACE ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: —
Objection 1. It seems that man can merit everlasting life
without grace. For Our Lord says (Matth. xix. 17) : //
thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; from which
it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with
man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of our-
selves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life
of himself.
Obj. 2. Further, eternal life is the wage or reward bestowed
by God on men, according to Matth. v. 12: Your reward
is very great in heaven. But wage or reward is meted by
God to everyone according to his works, according to Ps. Ixi.
12: Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.
Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is
within his power to reach everlasting life.
Obj. 3. Further, everlasting life is the last end of human
life. Now every natiural thing by its natural endowments can
attain its end. Much more, therefore, may man attain to
everlasting life by his natural endowments, without grace.
333 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. 5
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vi. 23): The
grace of God is life everlasting. And as a gloss says, this is
said that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads
us to everlasting life.
I answer that. Acts conducing to an end must be propor-
tioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of
its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that
nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which
exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate
to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding /
the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what
we have said above (Q. V., A. 5). Hence man, by his
natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works
proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher
force is needed, viz., the force of grace. And thus without
grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can per-
form works conducing to a good which is natural to
man, as to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends,
and the like, as Augustine says (Resp. contra Pelag. iii. Cf.
Hypognostic* iii.).
Reply Ohj. i. Man, by his will, does works meritorious ^
of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book,
for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared
with grace by God.
Reply Ohj. 2. As the gloss upon Rom. vi. 23, The grace
of God is life everlasting, says. It is certain that everlasting life
is meted to good works; but the works to which it is meted,
belong to God's grace. And it has been said (A. 4), that to
fulfil the commandments of the Law, in their due way,
whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace.
Reply Ohj. 3. This objection has to do with the natural
end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be
raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower
natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover
his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to
health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher
observes {De Coelo ii.).
* To be found among the works of S. Augustine.
Q. 109. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 334
Sixth Article.
whether a man, by himself and without the external
aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that man, by himself and without
the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.
For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above
(A. 4, ad i). But it is written (Zach. i. 3) : Turn ye to Me . . .
and I will turn to you. Now to prepare for grace is nothing
more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man
of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare
himself for grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing
what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do
God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Matth. vii. 11)
that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him. But
what is in our power, is in us to do. Therefore it seems to
be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare
for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare
himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is
impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond
what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without
grace, can prepare himself for grace.
Ohj. 4. Further, it is written (Pro v. xvi. i) that it is the
part of man to prepare the soul. Now an action is said to
be the part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence
it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for
grace.
On the contrary, It is written (John vi. 44) : No man can
come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him.
But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be
drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself
without the help of grace.
/ answer that, The preparation of the human will for good
is twofold: — the first, whereby it is prepared to operate
rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will
335 THE NFXESSITY OF fxRACE Q. 109. Art. 6
cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which
is the principle of meritorious works, as stated above (A. 5).
There is a second way in which the human will may be taken
to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in <
order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is
not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in
the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we ^1^-
must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the
soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two
ways do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above
(AA. 2, 3). Now that we need the help of God to move us,
is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every
cause must direct its effect to its end, and hence since the
order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers,
man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the
first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any
of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier is
bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the
leader of the army — and towards following the standard
of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And
thus since God is the first Mover simply, it is by His motion
that everything seeks Him under the common notion of
good, whereby everything seeks to be likened to God in its
own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Norn, iv.) that God-
turns all to Himself. But He directs righteous men to
Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which
they wish to cling, according to Ps. Ixxii. 28, it is good for
Me to adhere to my God. And that they are turned to God
can only spring from God's having turned them. Now to
prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God ;
just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light
of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by
turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that^
man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace
except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.
Reply Ohj. i. Man's turning to God is by free-will; and
thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can ^
only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to
Q. 109. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 336
Jer. xxxi. 18 : Convert me and I shall he converted, for Thou
art the Lord, my God ; and Lament, v. 21 : Convert us, 0 Lord,
to Thee, and we shall he converted.
Reply Ohj. 2. Man can do nothing unless moved by God,
according to John xv. 5 : Without Me, you can do nothing.
Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this
is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.
Reply Ohj. 3. This objection regards habitual grace, for
which some preparation is required, since every form requires
a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order
that man should be moved by God, no further motion is
presupposed, since God is the First Mover. Hence we need
not go to infinity.
Reply Ohj. 4. It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since
he does this by his free-will. And yet he does npt do this
without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to
Himself, as was said above.
Seventh Article,
whether man can rise from sin without the help
OF GRACE ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Ohjection i. It seems that man can rise from sin without
the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes
place without grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed
to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written (Eph. v. 14) :
Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee. Therefore
man can rise from sin without grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health,
as stated above (Q. LXXI., A. i ad 3). Now, man, by force
of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the
external help of medicine, since there still remains in him
the principle of life, from which the natural operation
proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man
may be restored by himself, and return from the state of
sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, every natural thing can return by itself
337 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE g. loy. Art. 7
to the act belitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself
to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by
itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against
nature, as is clear from Damascene [De hide Orthod. ii).
Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to
the state of justice.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. ii. 21; cf. iii. 21):
For if there had been a law given which could give life — then
Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. Hence with equal
reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can be justified,
Christ died in vain, i.e., to no purpose. But this cannot
fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be j ustified ,
i.e., he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.
/ answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin
without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the
act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above (Q. LXXXVH.,
A. 6), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of
sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him
what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by
sinning, as was clearly shown above (Q. LXXXV., A. i;
Q. LXXXVL, A. i; Q. LXXXVH. , A. i), viz., stain, cor-
ruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs
a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through
the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as
man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject
to God's; and this order being overthrown, the consequence
is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered.
Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by
sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.
Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored
except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the
shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back,
except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is
necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order
of nature can only be restored, i.e., man's will can only be
subject to God when God draws man's will to Himself, as
stated above (A. 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment
can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offence
11.3 --
y. 109. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 338
was committed and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order
that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace,
both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal
motion of God.
Reply Obj, 1. To man is bidden that which pertains to
the act of free-will, as this act is required in order that man
should rise from sin. Hence when it is said, Arise, and
Christ shall enlighten thee, we are not to think that the com-
plete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace;
but that when man by his free-will, moved by God, strives
to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.
Reply Obj. 2. The natural reason is not the sufficient
principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace.
This principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence
man cannot be restored by himself; but he requires the lights
of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were
infused into a dead body for its resurrection.
Reply Obj. 3. When nature is perfect, it can be restored
by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but
without exterior help it cannot be restored to what sur-
passes its measure. And thus human nature undone by
reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but cor-
rupted, as stated above (Q. LXXXV.) ; nor can it be restored,
by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the super-
natural good of justice.
Eighth Article,
whether man without grace can avoid sin ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that without grace man can avoid
sin. Because no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as
Augustine says [De Ditab. Anim. x., xi.; De Libero Arbit. iii.).
Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem
that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.
Obj. 2. Further, men are corrected that they may not
sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin,
correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which is
absurd.
339 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. 8
Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Ecclus. xv. 18) : Before man
is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall
be given him. But by sinning no one ceases to be a man.
Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and
thus man can avoid sin without grace.
On the contrary, Augustine says {De Perfect Jnst. xxi.) :
Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer Lead us not
into temptation [and they deny it who maintain that the help
of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that
the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without
doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathemc.tized
by the tongues of all.
I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in
the state of perfect nature ; secondly, in the state of corrupted
nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without
habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially ;
since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is accord-
ing to our nature. — and in the state of perfect nature man
could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have done it
without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this had
been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into
nothingness.
But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to
heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from
sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the
mind, — the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence
the Apostle (Rom. vii. 25) says in the person of one who is
restored: / myself, with the m^nd, serve the law of God, but
with the flesh, the law of sin. And in this state man caii
abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his
reason, as stated above (Q. LXXIV. A. 5); but man cannot
abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption
of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed,
repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinfu
and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting
one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not
always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above
(Q.LXXIY., A. 3, ad 2).
So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is
Q. 109. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 340
restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal
sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be
always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains
for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says
[Super Ezech. Norn, xi.) that a sin not at once taken away by
repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins : and this
because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the
reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should
place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that
all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the
judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower
appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate
movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring
since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise,
since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the con-
sequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For
when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling
to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or
avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving
or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks
His commandments, and thus sins mortally : especially since,
when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived
end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic, iii.) ; although with premeditation of his reason a
man may do something outside the order of his preconceived
end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man
cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help
occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned
aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back
to the due order.
Reply Obj. i. Man can avoid each but not every act of
sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since
it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare him-
self to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without
grace does not excuse him from sin.
Reply Obj. 2. Correction is useful in order that out of the
sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate ;
if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort
341 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. ioq. Art. q
that whilst the noise of correction is outivardly resounding and
punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing him
to will, as Augustine says [De Corr. et Grat a vi.). Correction
is therefore necessary, from the fact that man's will is required
in order to abstain from sin ; yet it is not sufficient without
God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. vii. 14) : Consider
the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised.
Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (Hyfognostic iii.), this
saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect
nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he was
able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills,
is given to him ; but his willing good, he has by God's assist-
ance.
Ninth Article.
whether one who has already obtained grace, can,
of himself and without further help of grace,
do good and avoid sin ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: —
Objection i. It seems that whoever has already obtained
grace, can by himself and without further help of grace, do
good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if
it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given
to us that w^e may do good and keep from sin. Hence if
with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either
useless or imperfect.
Obj. 2. Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us
according to i Cor. iii. 16: Know you not that you are the
temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you ? Now
since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He is sufficient to
ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a
man who has obtained grace can do the above two things
without any further assistance of grace.
Obj. 3. Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs
further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep
free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet another
grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace.
Therefore we must go on to infmity; which is impossible.
Q. 109. Art. 9 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 342
Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in
order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says [De Natura et Gratia, xxvi.)
that as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see
unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a
man, even if he is most righteous, live righteously unless he
be helped by the eternal light of justice. But justification is
by grace, according to Rom. iii. 24: Being justified freely by
His grace. Hence even a man who already possesses grace
needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.
^\ g / answer that, As stated above (A. 5), in order to live
righteously a man needs a twofold help of God — first, a
habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed,
and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds
meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the capability
of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order
to be moved by God to act.
"^ ' Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not
need a further help of grace, e.g., a further infused habit.
Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e., in order
to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two
reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing
can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion.
vSecondly, for this special reason — the condition of the state
of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the
mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh,
whereby it serves the law of sin, Rom. vii. 25. In the intel-
lect, too, there remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby,
as is written (Rom. viii. 26) : We know not what we should
pray for as we ought; since on account of the various turns
of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves
perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, accord-
ing to Wis. ix. 14 : For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful
and our counsels uncertain. Hence we must be guided and
guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For
which reason also it is becoming in those who have been
born again as sons of God, to say: Lead us not into temptation^
and Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven, and what-
343 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE Q. 109. Art. 10
ever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining
to this.
Reply Ohj. i. The gift of habitual grace is not therefore
given to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for
every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from
Him. Hence if after having received grace man still needs
the Divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to
no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the
Divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be
fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect,
inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated
above.
Reply Ohj. 2. The operation of the Holy Ghost, which
moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of
habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this
effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and
protects us.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument merely proves that man
needs no further habitual grace.
Tenth Article.
whether man possessed of grace needs the help of
grace in order to persevere ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: —
Ohjection i. It seems that man possessed of grace needs
no help of grace to persevere. For perseverance is some-
thing less than virtue, even as continence is, as is clear
from the Philosopher (Ethic, vii.). Now since man is
justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in order
to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the
help of grace to have perseverance.
Ohj. 2. Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But
perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems
that, together with grace, perseverance is given to the other
infused virtues.
Ohj. 3. Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. v. 20) more
was restored to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost
Q. 109. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 344
by Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to
persevere; and thus man docs not need grace in order to
persevere.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii.) : Why is
perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God ?
For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does
not give, and what is in our power without His giving it ?
Now perseverance is besought by even those who arc
hallowed by grace ; and this is seen, when we say Hallowed
be Thy name, which Augustine confirms by the words of
Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii.). Hence man, even when
possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by
God.
I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First,
to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands stead-
fastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what
is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as con-
tinence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher
says {Ethic, vii.). Secondly, perseverance may be called
a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in
good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance is
infused together with grace, even as continence and the other
virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding
in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perse-
verance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace,
but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding
him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from
the preceding article. And hence after anyone has been
justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the
aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from
evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to
whom perseverance in grace is not given.
Reply Obj. i. This objection regards the first mode of
perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.
Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine, says {DeNatura et Gratia, xliii.
Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii.) in the original state man received
a gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given
345 THE NECESSITY OE GRACE Q. 109. Art. 10
him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the
gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift
of 'persevering, and thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's
fault. Nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere,
with the gift of grace in the state of innocence in which
the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is
now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it
is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the
flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be
able to persevere but will be unable to sin.
QUESTION ex.
OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the grace of God as regards its
essence ; and under this head there are four points of inquiry :
(i) Whether grace implies something in the soul ? (2)
Whether grace is a quality ? (3) Whether grace differs
from infused virtue ? (4) Of the subject of grace.
First Article,
whether grace implies anything in the soul ?
We proceed thus to the First Article: —
Objection i. It seems that grace does not imply any-
thing in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God
even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Gen. xxxix.
21) that the Lord gave to Joseph favour (gratiam) in the
sight of the chief keeper of the prison. Now when we say that
a man has the favour of another, nothing is implied in
him who has the favour of the other, but an acceptance is
implied in him whose favour he has. Hence when we,
say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is impUed
in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance.
Ohj. 2. Further, as the soul quickens the body so does
God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Deut. xxx. 20):
He is thy life. Now the soul quickens the body immediately.
Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God
and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the
soul.
Ohj. 3. Further, on Rom. i. 7, Grace to you and peace, the
346
347 THE GRACE OF GOD Q. no. Art. i
gloss says: Grace, i.e., the remission of sins. Now the remis-
sion of sin implies nothing in the soul, but only in Ciod,
Who does not impute the sin, according to Ps. xxxi. 2:
Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin.
Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.
On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enligh-
tened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine
says [De Natura et Gratia xxii.) : The light of truth rightly
deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus
deserted become blind. Therefore grace implies something
in the soul.
I answer that, According to the common manner of speech,
grace is usually taken in three ways, First, for anyone's love,
as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good
graces of the king, i.e., the king looks on him with favour.
Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are
accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly,
it is taken for the recompense of a gift given gratis, inasmuch
as we are said to be grateful for benefits. Of these three
the second depends on the first, since one bestows something
on another gratis from the love wherewith he receives him
into his good graces. And from the second proceeds the
third, since from benefits bestowed gratis arises gratitude.
Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies
something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given
gratis; secondly, the acknowledgement of the gift. But as
regards the first, a difference must be noted between the
grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature's
good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature
flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the good of the
creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by
the good pre-existing in things ; and hence man's love does
not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes
it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every
love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in
the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love.
And according to this difference of good the love of God
to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common,
Q. no. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 348
whereby He loves all things that arc (Wis. xi. 25), and thereby
gives things their natural being. But the second is a
special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above
the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine
good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone
simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the
eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God,
there is signified something bestowed on man by God.
Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies God's
eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch
as God gratuitously and not from merits predestines or
elects some; for it is written (Eph. i. 5): He hath predesti-
nated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of
the glory of His grace.
Reply Obj. i. Even when a man is said to be in another's
good graces, it is understood that there is something in him
pleasing to the other; even as anyone is said to have God's
grace — with this difference, that what is pleasing to a man in
another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing
to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said
above.
Reply Obj. 2. God is the life of the soul after the manner
of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body
after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no
medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself,
informs the matter or subject; whereas the agent informs the
subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it
causes in the matter.
Reply Obj. 3. Augustine says {Retract, i.) : When I said
that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our
reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that
peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general grace, but
that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins.
Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God's gifts
pertain to grace. And hence the remission of sins does not
take place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will
appear later (Q. CXIII., A. 2).
349 THE GRACE OF GOD Q. no. Art. 2
Second Article,
whether grace is a quality of the soul ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not a quality of
the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the
action of a quality is not without the action of its subject,
and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself.
But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore
grace is not a quality.
Ohj. 2. Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality.
But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we
can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal,
as stated above (Q. CIX., AA. i, 2, 3). Therefore grace is
not a quality.
Ohj. 3. Furthermore, no quality remains after it has
ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is
not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to nothing, since
it was created from nothing, hence it is called a new creature
(Gal. vi. 15).
On the contrary, on Ps. ciii. 15, That he may make the
face cheerful with oil ; the gloss says : Grace is a certain
beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love. But beauty of
soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace
is a quality.
/ answer that, as stated above (A. i), there is under-
stood to be an effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever
is said to have God's grace. Now it was stated (Q. CIX.,
A. i) that man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two
ways: — First, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to
know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous
effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul ;
for motion is the act of the mover in the moved. Secondly,
man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a
habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this
reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less
for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatuial
Q. no. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 350
good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may
acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural
creatures, that not merely does He move them to their
natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and
powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they
may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and
thus the movements whereby they are moved by God
become natural and easy to creatures, according to
Wis. viii. i: she . . . ordereth all things sweetly. Much more
therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards
the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or
supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him
sweetly and promptly ^o acquire eternal good ; and thus the
gift of grace is a quality.
Reply Ohj. i. Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the
soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after
the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing
white, and justice, just.
Reply Ohj. 2. Every substance is either the nature of the
thing whereof it is the substance, or is a part of the nature,
even as matter and form are called substance. And because
grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a
substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul.
Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the
soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the
case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates
in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of
the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the
soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participa-
tion of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of
the soul, though not in its mode of being
Reply Ohj. 3. As Boethius (pseudo-Beda) says [Sentent.
Philosoph. ex AristoL), the being of an accident is to inhere.
Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but
because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to
a being rather than to be a being (Metaph. vii.). And
because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is,
351 THE GRACE OF GOD Q. no. Art. 3
properly speaking no accident comes into being or is cor-
rupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted
inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with
this accident. And thus grace is also said to be created
inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e., are
given a new being out of nothing, i.e., not from merits,
according to Eph. ii. 10, created in Jesus Christ in good works.
Third Article,
whether grace is the same as virtue ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is the same as virtue.
For Augustine says [De Spir. et Litt. xiv.) that operating
grace is faith that worketh by charity. But faith that worketh
by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.
Obj. 2. Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined.
But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers
fit grace, since it makes its subject good, and his work good,
and it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously
etc. Therefore grace is virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not
in the fourth species of quality; viz. form which is the abiding
figure of things, since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it
in the third, since it is not a passion nor a passion-like
quality, which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is
proved in Physic, viii. ; and grace is principally in the mind.
Nor is it in the second species, which is natural power or
impotence ; since grace is above nature and does not regard
good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must
be in the first species which is habit or disposition. Now
habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself
is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. LVIL,
AA. I, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.
On the contrary. If grace is virtue, it would seem before all
to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is
neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying
grace. Nor is it charity, since grace foreruns charity, as
Q. no. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 352
Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the
Saints [Do Bono Persev. xvi.). Therefore grace is not
virtue.
/ answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were
identical in essence, and differed only logically, — in the
sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man
pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously; — and of virtue
inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Master
seems to have thought this (2 Sent., Dist 27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue,
this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic, vii.),
virtue is a disposition of what is perfect, — and I call perfect
what is disposed according to its nature. Now from this it is
clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-
existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed
with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest
that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke
above (Q. LV., seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is
fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he
is a man ; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher
manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation
to some higher nature, i.e., in relation to a participation of
the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. i. 4: He hath given
us most great and most precious promises ; that by these you
may he made partakers of the Divine Nature. And it is in
respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born
again sons of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is some-
thing besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to
this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a par-
ticipation of the Divine Nature is something besides the
infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to
this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. v. 8) : For you were
heretofore darkness, hut now light in the Lord. Walk then as
children of the light. For as the acquired virtues enable a
man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason,
so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the
light of grace.
353 THE GRACE OF GOD Q. no. Art. 4
Reply Obj. I. Augustine calls /a//A tliat workcth by cJiariiy
grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity
is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Reply Obj. 2. Good is placed in the defmition of virtue
with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature
essential or participated. Now good is not attributed
to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in
man, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3. Grace is reduced to the hrst species of
quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a cer-
tain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues,
as their principle and root.
Fourth Article.
whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a
subject, or in one of the powers ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not in the essence of
the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For
Augustine says {Hypognost. iii.) that grace is related to the
will or to the free will as a rider to his horse. Now the will
or the free-will is a power, as stated above (Part I., Q.
LXXXIIL, A. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the soul,
as in a subject.
Obj. 2. Further, Man's merit springs from grace as Augus-
tine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. iv.). Now merit consists
in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that
grace is a perfection of a powxr of the soul.
Obj. 3. Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper
subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence,
must be capable of grace. But this is false; since it would
follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore
the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace.
Obj. 4. Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its
powers. Now what is prior may be understood without
what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be
taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or
II. 3 23
Q. no. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 354
power of the soul — viz., neither the will, nor the intellect,
nor anything else; which is impossible.
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God.
But generation terminates at the essence prior to the
powers. Therefore grace is in the soul's essence prior to
being in the powers.
/ answer that, This question depends on the preceding.
For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in
the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul's powers
are the proper subject of virtue as stated above (Q. LVL,
A. i). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said
that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every
perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue,
as stated above (Q. LV., A. i; Q. LVL, A. i). Hence it
remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, so has it a subject
prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of
the soul. For as man in his intellective power participates
in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and
in his power of will participates in the Divine love through
the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does
he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a
likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply Ohj. i. As from the essence of the soul flow its
powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the
virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into
the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is com-
pared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the
same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse — but
not as an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the second objec-
tion. For grace is the principle of meritorious works
through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is
the principle of vital deeds through the medium of the
powers.
Reply Ohj. 3. The soul is the subject of grace, as being in
the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul
is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the
powers are natural properties of the soul following upon
355 THE GRACE OF GOD o. no. Art. 4
the species. Hence the soiil differs specifically in its essence
from other souls, viz., of dumb animals and of plants.
Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the
human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the
subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,
inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply Obj. 4. Since the powers of the soul are natural
properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be
without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the
soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species,
not that it would actually have these powers, but on account
of the essence of such a species, from which these powers
naturally flow
QUESTION CXI.
OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE.
{In Five Articles.)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which
head there are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether grace is
fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying
grace ? (2) Of the division into operating and co-operating
grace. (3) Of the division of it into preventive and sub-
sequent grace. (4) Of the division of gratuitous grace.
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous
grace.
First Article.
whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying
grace and gratuitous grace ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not fittingly divided
into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a
gift of God, as is clear from what has been already stated
(Q. ex., A. i). But man is not therefore pleasing to God
because something is given him by God, but rather on the
contrary; since something is freely given by God, because
man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying
grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, whatever is not given on account of
preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good
is given to man without preceding merit, since nature is
presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given
gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with grace.
Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down
356
357 THE DIVISION OF GRACE Q. utArt. i
as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus
of grace.
Obj. 3. Further, members of a division arc mutually
opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are
justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom.
iii. 24: Being justified freely (gratis) by His grace. Hence
sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous
grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace,
viz., to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with
regard to the first he says (Eph. i. 6) : He hath graced tis in
His beloved Son. And with regard to the second (Rom.
ii. 6) : And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace
is no more grace. Therefore grace can be distinguished by
its having one only or both.
/ answer that. As the Apostle says (Rom. xiii. i), those
things that are of God are well ordered (Vulg., — those that are,
are ordained by God). Now the order of things consists in
this, that things are led to God by other things, as Diony-
sius says [Coel. Hier. iv.) . And hence since grace is ordained
to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so
that some are led to God by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace; — one whereby man
himself is united to God, and this is called sanctifying grace;\
— the other is that whereby one man co-operates with another
in leading him to God, and this gift is called gratuitous *^
grace, since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability
of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas
it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather
that he may co-operate in the justification of another,
it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that
the Apostle says (i Cor. xii. 7): And the manifestation of the
Spirit is given to every man unto utility, i.e., of others.
Reply Obj. i. Grace is said to make pleasing, not effi-
ciently, but formally, i.e., because thereby a man is justified,
and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, according
to Col. i. 21. He hath made us worthy to be made partakers
of the lot of the saints in light.
Q. III. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 358
Reply Ob], 2. Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given,
excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in
two ways: — first, as arising from merit; and this regards the
person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to
Rom. iv. 4: Now to him that worketh, the reiiuard is not reckoned
according to grace, hut according to debt. The second debt
regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to
a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human
nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God
is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the
creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordina-
tion may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature
should have certain conditions or properties, and that by
doing certain works it should attain to something further.
And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first
sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in
neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of
grace.
Reply Ohj. 3. Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of
gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of
grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence
gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common
name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two
parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-
sanctifying grace.
Second Article.
whether grace is fittingly divided into operating
and co-operating grace ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not fittingly divided
into operating and co-operating grace. For grace is an
accident, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 2). Now no accident
can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called
operating.
Obj. 2. Further, if grace operates anything in us it
assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace
works this. For Augustine says, on John xiv. 12, the
359 THE DIVISION OF (iRACE Q. iTr.ART.2
works that I do he also shall do, says [Scrni. clxix.) : lie M'Jio
created thee ivitJiout thyself, xcill not justify tliee u'lthont
thyself. Therefore no grace ought to be called simply
operating.
Obj. 3. Further, to co-operate seems to pertain to the
inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace
works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. ix. 16:
It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, hit of
God that sheweth mercy. Therefore no grace ought to be
called co-operating.
Obj. 4. Further, division ought to rest on opposition.
But to operate and to co-operate are not opposed; for one
and the same thing can both operate and co-operate.
Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and
co-operating.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib.
Arbit. xvii.) : God by co-operating with us, perfects what He
began by operating in us, since He who perfects by co-operation
with such as are willing, begins by operating that they may
will. But the operations of God whereby He moves us to
good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided
into operating and co-operating.
/ answer that. As stated above (Q. CX., A. 2) grace may
be taken in two ways ; firbt, as a Divine help, whereby God
moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift
divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into
operating and co-operating. For the operation of an effect
is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover.
Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does
not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation
is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that
we speak of operating grace. But in that effect in which
our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not
only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with
reference to this that we speak of co-operating grace. Now
there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act
of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing
Q. III. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 360
moved, and God is the mover ; and especially when the will,
which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence,
inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we
speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior
act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown
above (Q. XVII., A. 9) the operation of this act is attributed
to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both
by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the
act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating,
it is with respect to this that we speak of co-operating grace.
Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: He
operates that we may will; and when we will, He co-operates
that we may perfect. And thus if grace is taken for God's
gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good,
it is fittingly divided into operating and co-operating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again
there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other
form; the first of which is being, and the second, operation;
thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to
give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as
it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is
called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle
of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is
called co-operating grace.
Reply Ohj. i. Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental
quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally,
as whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply Ohj. 2. God does not justify us without ourselves,
because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's
justification [justitice) by a movement of our free - will.
Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace,
but the effect ; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.
Reply Ohj. 3. One thing is said to co-operate with another
not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal
agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man
is helped by God to will the' good, through the means of
operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended,
grace co-operates with us.
36i THE DIVISION OF (xRACK (). iii.Ain. 3
Reply Obj. 4. Operating and co-operating grace are the
same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects,
as is plain from what has been said.
Third Article.
whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient
and subsequent grace ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article: —
Objection 1. It seems that grace is not fittingly divided
into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of
the Divine love. But God's love is never subsequent, but
always prevenient, according to i John iv. 10: Not as
though ive had loved God, but because He hath first loved us.
Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and
subsequent.
Ob]. 2. Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in
man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. xii. g: My
grace is sufficient for thee. But the same thing cannot be
before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided
into prevenient and subsequent.
Obj. 3. Further, grace is known by its effects. Now
there are an infinite number of effects, — one preceding
another. Hence if with regard to these, grace must be
divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem
that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes
note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy.
Now both are said in Ps. Iviii. 11 : His mercy shall prevent me,
and again, Ps. xxii. 6: Thy mercy will follow me. Therefore
grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and co-
operating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it
divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we
consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us:
of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire
good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed;
Q. 1 1 T. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 362
the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory.
And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us,
is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch
as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect
to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to this
effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called prevenient
and subsequent on account of the same effect viewed
relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine
says [De Natura et Gratia xxxi.) : It is frevenient, inasmuch
as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are
strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and
subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified.
Reply Obj. i. God's love signifies something eternal;
and hence can never be called anything but prevenient.
But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can precede and
follow another; and thus grace may be both prevenient
and subsequent.
Reply Obj. 2. The division into prevenient and subsequent
grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its
effects, as was already said of operating and co-operating
grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to
glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace
whereby we are at present justified. For even as the
charity of earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same
be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither
implies imperfection.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the effects of grace may be
infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, neverthe-
less all are reduced to some of a determinate species, and
moreover all coincide in this, — that one precedes another.
Fourth Article,
whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the
APOSTLE ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: —
Objection i. It seems that gratuitous grace is not rightly
divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by
363 THE DIVISION OF GRACE Q. ui.Art. 4
God, may be called a gratuitous grace. Now there are ai)
inHnite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by (iod as
regards both the good of the soul and the good of the body —
and yet they do not make us i)leasing to God. Hence
gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain
division.
Obj. 2. Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from
sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace,
since we are justified by it, according to Rom. v. i: Being
justified therefore by faiih. Hence it is not right to place
faith amongst the gratuitous graces, especially since the
other virtues are not so placed, as hope and charity.
Obj. 3. Further, the operation of healing, and speaking
divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of
speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowledge, accord-
ing to Dan. i. 17: And to these children God gave knoidedge
and understanding in every book and imsdom. Hence it is
not correct to divide the grace of healing and kinds of tongues
against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of
speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.
Obj. 4. Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the
Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, forti-
tude, and fear, as stated above (Q. LXVIII., A. 4). There-
fore these also ought to be placed amongst the gratuitous
gifts.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (i Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10):
To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom ; and
to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit,
to another, the working of miracles ; to another, prophecy ; to
another, the discerning of spirits ; to another divers kinds of
tongues ; to another interpretation of speeches.
I answer that, As was said above (A. i), gratuitous grace
is ordained to this, viz., that a man may help another to be
led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving
interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exteriorly
by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace em-
braces whatever a man needs in order to instruct another
in Divine things which arc above reason. Now for this,
Q. III. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOCxICA " 364
three things are required: First, a man must possess the
fulness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable
of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm or
prove what he says, otherwise his words would have no
weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly presenting
to his hearers what he knows.
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as
may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach
another in any science must first be certain of the principles
of the science, and with regard to this there \s faith, which
is certitude of invisible things, the principles of Catholic
doctrine. Secondly, it behoves the teacher to know the
principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the
word of wisdom, which is the knowledge of Divine things.
Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge
of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes;
and thus we have the word of knowledge, which is the know-
ledge of human things, since the invisible things of Him . . .
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made
(Rom. i. 20).
Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason
rests upon arguments ; but the confirmation of what is above
reason rests on what is proper to the Divine power, and this
in two ways; — first when the teacher of sacred doctrine
does what God alone can do, in miraculous deeds, whether
with respect to bodily health — and thus there is the grace
of healing, or merely for the purpose of manifesting the
Divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still
or darken, or that the sea should be divided — and thus
there is the working of miracles. Secondly when he can
manifest what God alone can know, and these are either
future contingents — and thus there is prophecy, or also the
secrets of hearts, and thus there is the discerning of spirits.
But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom
in which a person can be understood, and thus there is
kinds of tongues ; or it can regard the sense of what is said»
and thus there is the interpretation of speeches.
Reply Obj. i. As stated above (A. i), not all the benefits
365 THE DIVISION OF GRACE Q. hi.Art. 4
divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but
only those that surpass the power of nature — e.<f^., that a
fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of
knowledge and the like ; and such as these are here set down
as gratuitous graces.
Reply Obj. 2. Faith is enumerated here under the gratui-
tous graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but
as implying a super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a
man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things
as belong to the faith. With regard to hope and charity,
they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is
ordained thereby to God.
Reply Obj. 3. The grace of healing is distinguished from
the general working of miracles because it has a special
reason for inducing one to the faith, since a man is all
the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of
bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, too, to speak
with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special
efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as
special gratuitous graces.
Reply Obj. 4. Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered
among the gratuitous graces in the same way as they are
reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e., inasmuch
as man's mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy
Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge ; for thus they
are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. LXVIIL,
AA. I, 4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous
graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fulness of knowledge
and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of
Divine things, but may instruct others and overpower
adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the word of
wisdom and the word of knowledge that are placed in the
gratuitous graces, since, as Augustine says {De Trin. xiv.).
It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order
to reach everlasting life, and another thing to know how this
may benefit the godly and may be defended against the un-
godly.
Q. 111. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 366
Fifth Article.
whether gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace. For the people's good is better than the
individual good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, ii.). Now
sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone,
whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good
of the whole Church, as stated above (AA. i, 4). Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Obj. 2. Further, it is a greater power that is able to act
upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as
greater is the brightness of the body that can illuminate
other bodies, than of that which can only shine but cannot
illuminate; and hence the Philosopher says [Ethic, v.) that
justice is the most excellent of the virtues, since by it a man
bears himself rightly towards others. But by sanctifying
grace a man is perfected only in himself ; whereas by gratui-
tous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Obj. 3. Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than
what is common to all ; thus to reason, which is proper to man
is nobler than to feel, which is common to all animals.
Now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the
Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the more
exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is
nobler than sanctifying grace.
0)1 the contrary. The Apostle (i Cor. xii. 31), having
enumerated the gratuitous' graces, adds: And I shew unto
you yet a more excellent way ; and as the sequel proves he is
speaking of charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace.
Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous
grace.
/ answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is
ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is
always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace
367 THE DIVISION OF GRACE o. hi.Art. 5
ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end,
whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is pre-
paratory to the end; i.e., by prophecy and miracles and so
forth, men are induced to unite themselves to their last
end. And hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous
grace.
Reply Obj. I. As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii.), a
multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the
multitude itself, viz., the order of the army; the second is
separate from the multitude, viz., the good of the leader: —
and this is the better good, since the other is ordained to it.
Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of
the Church, w4iich is ecclesiastical order, whereas sancti-
fying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which
is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.
Reply Obj. 2. If gratuitous grace could cause a man to
have sanctifying grace, it would follow that gratuitous grace
was the nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that
enlightens is more excellent than that of an object that is
lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another
to have union with God, which he himself has by sanctifying
grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. Hence
gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent, even as
in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it pro-
duces heat in other things, is not more noble than its sub-
stantial form.
Reply Obj. 3. Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end;
and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary;
for what is proper is ordained to what is common as 10 an
end. Hence there is no comparison.
QUESTION CXII.
OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE.
[In Five Articles.)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this
head there are five points of inquiry : (i) Whether God alone
is the efficient cause of grace ? (2) Whether any disposi-
tion towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient,
by an act of free-will ? (3) Whether such a disposition can
make grace follow of necessity ? (4) Whether grace is
equal in all ? (5) Whether anyone may know that he has
grace ?
First Article,
whether god alone is the cause of grace ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that God alone is not the cause of
grace. For it is written (John i. 17) : Grace and truth came
by Jesus Christ. Now, by the name Jesus Christ is under-
stood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the
created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the
cause of grace.
Obj. 2. Further, there is this difference between the
sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the
sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacra-
ments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacra-
ments of the New Law are certain visible elements. There-
fore God is not the only cause of grace.
Obj. 3. Further, according to Dionysius {Coel. Hier. iii.,
iv., vii., viii.), Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both
lesser angels and men. Now the rational creature is cleansed,
368
369 THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. 112. Art. i
enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not
the only cause of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. Ixxxiii. 12) : The Lord
will give grace and glory.
I ansiver that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since
the cause must always be more powerful than its effect.
Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created
nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine
Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is
impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is
as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a par-
taking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as
it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.
Reply Ohj. i. Christ's humanity is an organ of His God-
head, as Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii). Now an
instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal
agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent.
Hence Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own
power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it,
whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Reply Ohj. 2. As in the person of Christ the humanity
causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the
principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New
Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally
caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power
of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to
John iii. 5 : Unless a man he horn again of water and the Holy
Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.
Reply Ohj. 3. Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels
or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through
grace. Hence Dionysius says [Coel. Hier. vii.) that this
cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else
than the assumption of Divine knowledge.
".3 24
Q. 112. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 370
Second Article,
whether any preparation and disposition for grace
IS REQUIRED ON MAN'S PART ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that no preparation or disposition
for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle
says (Rom. iv. 4), To him that worketh, the reward is not
reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. Now a
man's preparation by free-will can only be through some
operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of
grace.
Obj. 2. Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not pre-
paring himself to have grace. But to some who are going
on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who
received grace whilst he was breathing out threatenings and
slaughter against the disciples of the Lord (Acts ix. i). Hence
no preparation for grace is required on man's part.
Obj. 3. Further, an agent of infinite power needs no
disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter,
as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, which is
called a new creature (Gal. vi. 15). But only God, Who has
infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (A. i). Hence
no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Amos iv. 12) : Be prepared
to meet thy God, 0 Israel, and (i Kings vii. 3) : Prepare your
hearts unto the Lord.
I answer that. As stated above (Q. CXI., A. 2), grace is
taken in two ways: — First, as a habitual gift of God.
Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good.
Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation
of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in dis-
posed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a
help from God to move us to good, no preparation is re-
quired on man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine
help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the
help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the
good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared
371 THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. 112. Art. 2
for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will
moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself,
according to Prov. xvi. i. It is the part of man to prepare
the soul ; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-
will. Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God,
and that man's steps are guided by God.
Reply Ohj. I. A certain preparation of man for grace is'
simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation
is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already pos-
sessed,— but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there
is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes
the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion.
But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified
by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen
farther on (Q.CXI v., A. 2).
Reply Ohj. 2. Since a man cannot prepare himself for
grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of
no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation
instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written
(Ecclus. xi. 23) : It is- easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to
make the poor man rich. Now it sometimes happens that
God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this
preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him
suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace
suddenly, according to John vi. 45: Everyone that hath
heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me. And
thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in
the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God
to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace
suddenly.
Reply Ohj. 3. An agent of infinite power needs no matter
or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of
something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the
thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the
matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise,
when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is re-
quired which He Himself does not bring about.
Q. 112. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 372
Third Article.
whether grace is necessarily given to whoever
prepares himself for it, or to whoever does what
HE CAN ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is necessarily given to
whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does
what he can, because, on Rom. v. i. Being justified . . . by
faith, let us have peace, etc., the gloss says: God welcomes
whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with
Him. But it is impossible for injustice to be with God.
Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever
flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says {De Casu Diaboli. iii.) that
the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is
that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it.
But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be re-
moved also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace
it is bestowed on them of necessity.
Obj. 3. Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from
Dionysius {Div. Nom. iv.). Now the good of grace is better
than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms neces-
sarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem
that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares
himself for grace.
On the contrary^ Man is compared to God as clay to the
potter, according to Jer. xviii. 6: As clay is in the hand of
the potter, so are you in My hand. But however much the
clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from
the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself,
he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
/ answer that. As stated above (A. 2), man's preparation
for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as
moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two
^ays: — First, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no
necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace
exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be
373 THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. 112. Am. 3
considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus
it has a necessity — not indeed of coercion, but of infalli-
bility— as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's
intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine
in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono
Perscv. xiv.) that by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is
most certainly liberated. Hence if God intends, while
moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain
to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to
John vi. 45: Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath
learned cometh to Me.
Reply Obj. i. This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God
by a meritorious act of their free-will, already informed
with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be
against the justice which He Himself established. — Or if it
refers to the movement of free-will before grace, it is speak-
ing in the sense that man's flight to God is by a Divine
motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Reply Obj. 2. The first cause of the defect of grace is on
our part ; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on
God's, according to Osee xiii. 9: Destrtiction is thy own, 0
Israel ; thy help is only in Me.
Reply Obj. 3. Even in natural things, the form does not
necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by
the power of the agent that causes the disposition.
Fourth Article,
whether grace is greater in one than in another ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not greater in one than
in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as
stated above (Q. CX., A. i). Now it is written (Wis. vi. 8) :
He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all.
Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.
Obj. 2. Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot
be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it
joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater
Q. 112. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 374
or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in
another.
Obj. 3. Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above
(0. ex., A. I, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life.
Hence, neither is there in grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. iv. 7) : But to every one
of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of
Christ. Now what is given in measure, is not given to all
equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.
/ answer that, As stated above (Q. LH., AA. i, 2; Q. LVL,
A A. I, 2), habits can have a double magnitude: — one, as
regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be
more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the
other on the part of the subject, which more or less partici-
pates in the habit inhering to it.
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace
cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins
man to the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards
the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one
may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another.
And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who
prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared
for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we
must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man pre-
pares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by
God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought
on the part of God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace vari-
ously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church
may result from these various degrees; even as He insti-
tuted the various conditions of things, that the universe
might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said
(Eph. iv. 7) : To every one of us is given grace according to
the measure of the giving of Christ, having enumerated the
various graces, he adds {verse 12) : For the perfecting of the
saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ.
Reply Obj. i. The Divine care may be looked at in two
ways: — First, as regards the Divine act, which is simple
and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since
375 THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. 112. Art. 5
by one simple act He administers great things and little.
But, scco)idly, it may be considered in those things which
come to creatm-es by the Divine care ; and thus, inequality is
found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts
for some, and lesser gifts for others.
Reply Ohj. 2. This objection is based on the first kind of
magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordain-
ing to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains
to a greater or less participation of the same good. For
there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in
grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation.
Reply Ohj. 3. Natural life pertains to man's substance,
and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the
life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it
more or less.
Fifth Article,
whether man can know that he has grace ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that man can know that he has
grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul.
Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things
that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from
Augustine [Gen. ad lit. xii.). Hence grace may be known
most certainly by one who has grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace.
But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he
has knowledge, according to Wis. vii. 17: The Lord hath
given me the true knowledge of the things that are. Hence,
with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows
that he has grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, light is more knowable than darkness,
since, according to the Apostle (Eph. v. 13), all that is jnade
manifest is light. Now sin, which is spiritual darkness,
may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much
more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known.
Ohj. 4. Further, the Apostle says (i Cor. ii. 12) : Now we
have received not the Spirit of this world, hut the Spirit that is
Q 112. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 376
of God ; that wc may know the things that arc given us from
God. Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who
receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit
knows the grace given to him.
Ohj. 5. Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham
(Gen. xxii. 12): Now I know that thou fearcst God, i.e., /
have made thee know. Now He is speaking there of chaste
fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may
know that he has grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. ix. i) : Man knoweth
not whether he he worthy of love or hatred. Now sanctifying
grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no
one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.
/ answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: —
First, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he
has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times
to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them
even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works
with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the
evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul
(2 Cor. xii. 9) : My grace is sufficient for thee.
Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and
with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he
has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had
when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it
is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is
obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no
one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he
does not know its principle. But the principle of grace
and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence
is unknown to us, according to Job xxxvi. 26. Behold God
is great, exceeding our knowledge. And hence His presence
in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty,
according to Job ix. 11: // He come to me, I shall not see
Him ; if He depart I shall not understand. And hence man
cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according
to I Cor. iv. 3, 4: But neither do I judge my own self . . . but
He that judgeth me is the Lord.
377 THE CAUSE OF GRACE Q. 112. Art. 5
Thirdly, things arc known conjccturally by signs; and
thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious
of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and
inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And
thus it is written (Apoc. ii. 17) : To him that overcometh I will
give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, hut he that
receiveth it, because whoever receives it knows, by ex-
periencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not
receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is
imperfect; hence the Apostle says (i Cor. iv. 4): / am not
conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified,
since, according to Ps. xviii. 13 : Who can understand sins P
From my secret ones cleanse nie, 0 Lord, and from those of
others spare Thy servant.
Reply Ohj. i. Those things which are in the soul by their
physical reality, are known through experimental know-
ledge; in so far as through acts man has experience of
their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that
we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life,
we observe that there is life in us.
Reply Ohj. 2. It is an essential condition of knowledge
that a man should have certitude of the objects of know-
ledge; and again, it is an essential condition of faith that a
man should be certain of the things of faith, and this,
because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge
or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise
with grace and charity and suchlike, which perfect the
appetitive faculty.
Reply Ohj. 3. Sin has for its principal object commutable
good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace
is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light,
according to i Tim. vi. 16: Who . . . inhahiteth light inac-
cessihle.
Reply Ohj. 4. The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts
of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these
we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know
for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. —
Q. 112. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 378
Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged
knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds
(verse 10) : But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.
Reply Ohj. 5. What was said to Abraham may refer
to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of
which we are cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham
had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had
the fear of God. — Or it may refer to a revelation.
QUESTION CXIII.
Ov THE EFFECTS OF GRACE.
{1)1 Ten Articles.)
We have now to consider the effect of grace; (i) the justi-
fication of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating
grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of co-operating
grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(i) What is the justification of the ungodly ? (2) Whether
grace is required for it ? (3) Whether any movement of the
free-will is required ? (4) Whether a movement of faith is
required ? (5) Whether a movement of the free-will
against sin is required ? (6) Whether the remission of sins
is to be reckoned with tlie foregoing ? (7) Whether the
justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden ?
(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justifi-
cation. (9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is
God's greatest work ? (10) Whether the justification of
the ungodly is miraculous ?
First Article.
whether the justification of the ungodly is the
remission of sins ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the justification of the ungodly
is not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only
to justice, but to all the other virtues, as stated above
(Q. LXXL, A. i). Now justification signifies a certain
movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission
of sin is justification, since movement is from one contrary
to the other.
379
Q. 113. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 380
Obj. 2. Further, everything ought to be named from what
is predominant in it, according to De Aninia ii. Now the
remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according
to Acts XV. 9: Purifying their hearts by faith ; and by charity,
according to Pro v. x. 12 : Charity cover eth all sins. Therefore
the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or
charity rather than justice.
Obj. 3. Further, the remission of sins seems to be the
same as being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and
we are afar off from God by sin. But one is called before
being justified according to Rom. viii. 30: And whom He
called, them He also justified. Therefore justification is not
the remission of sins.
On the contrary, On Rom. viii. 30, Whom He called, them
He also justified, the gloss says, i.e., by the remission of sins.
Therefore the remission of sins is justification.
/ answer that, Justification taken passively implies a
movement towards justice, as heating implies a movement
towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a
certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two ways: —
First, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man's act, and
thus justice is placed amongst the virtues, — either as par-
ticular justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating
them in relation to his fellow-man, — or as legal justice,
which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their
relation to the common good of society, as appears from
Ethic. V.
Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a cer-
tain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man,
in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the
inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e.,
to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls
justice metaphorically speaking {Ethic, v.). Now this justice
may be in man in two ways: — First, by simple generation,
which is from privation to form; and thus justification may
belong even to such as are not in sin, when they receive
this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received
original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought
38i THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q. 113. Art. i
about in man by a movement from one contrary to the
other, and thus justification implies a transmutation from
the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice. And
it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the
ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. iv. 5) : But to him
that worketh not, yet helieveth in Him that justifieth the ungodly,
etc. And because movement is named after its term
ivhereto rather than from its term whence, the transmutation
whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from
the state of ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its
name from its term whereto, and is called justification of the
ungodly.
Reply Ohj. i. Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the dis-
order of a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice,
as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to
I John iii. 4: Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also
iniquity ; and sin is iniquity. And thus the removal of any
sin is called the justification of the ungodly.
Reply Ohj. 2. Faith and charity imply a special directing
of the human mind to God by the intellect and will ; whereas
justice implies a general rectitude of order. Hence this
transmutation is named after justice rather than after
charity or faith.
Reply Ohj. 3. Being called refers to God's help moving
and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God
is not the remission of sins, but its cause.
Second Article.
whether the infusion of grace is required for the
remission of guilt, i.e., for the justification of
the ungodly ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article: —
Ohjection i. It seems that for the remission of guilt, which
is the justification of the migodly, no infusion of grace is
required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary
without being led to the other, if the contraries are not
immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace
Q. 113. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 382
are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state
of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt.
Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being
brought to a state of grace.
Obj. 2. Further, the remission of guilt consists in the
Divine imputation, according to Ps. xxxi. 2: Blessed is the
man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin. Now the
infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated
above (Q. CX., A. i). Hence the infusion of grace is not
required for the remission of guilt.
Obj. 3. Further, no one can be subject to two contraries
at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and
miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of waste-
fulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserli-
ness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it
hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness
he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is
remitted without grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. iii. 24) : Justified freely
by His grace,
I answer that, By sinning a man offends God, as stated
above (Q. LXXI., A. 5). Now an offence is remitted to
anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with
the offend^'^ Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at
peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby
God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of
the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as
regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes inter-
rupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once
more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us,
which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is
made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out.
Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without
the infusion of grace.
Reply Obj. i. More is required for an offender to pardon
an offence, than for one who has committed no offence,
not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that
one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other
383 THE EFFFXTS OF GRACE Q. 113. Art. 2
offends him, then the forgiveness of the offence can only
spring from a special good-will. Now God's good-will is
said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence
although a man before sinning may be without grace and
without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can
only be because he has grace.
Reply Obj. 2. As God's love consists not merely in the
act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of
grace, as stated above (Q. CX., A. i), so likewise, when God
does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain
effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds
from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by
God.
Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i.),
if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it
would be enough if Scripture warned us thus : ' My son, hast
thou sumed ? do so no more ?'' Now this is not enough, but
it is added: ' But for thy former sins also pray that they may
be forgiven thee.' For the act of sin passes, but the guilt
remains, as stated above (Q. LXXXVIL, A. 6). Hence when
anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a con-
trary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but
he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the
guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to
each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein
sin has its guilt.
Third Article.
whether for the justification of the ungodly is
required a movement of the free-will ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article: —
Objection 1. It seems that no movement of the free-will
is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we
see that by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and some-
times adults are justified without a movement of their free-
will: hence Augustine says {Confess, iv.) that when one of
his friends was taken with a fever, he lay for a long time
senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he i(>as despaired
Q 113. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 384
0/, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated;
which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not
confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can
justify a man without the sacraments, and without any
movement of the free-will.
Ohj. 2. Further, a man has not the use of reason when
asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-
will. But Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom
when asleep, as related in 3 Kings iii. and 2 Paral. i. Hence
with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes
bestowed by God on man without the movement of his
free-will.
Ohj. 3. Further, grace is preserved by the same cause
as brings it into being, for Augustine says [Gen. ad lit. xii.)
that so ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him.
Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his
free-will. Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a
movement of the free-will.
On the contrary, It is written (John vi. 45) : Every one
that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.
Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will,
since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence no one
comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement
of the free-will.
/ answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought
about by God moving man to justice. For He it is that
justifieth the ungodly according to Rom. iv. 5. Now God
moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in
natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved
differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He
moves man to justice according to the condition of his
human nature. But it is man's proper nature to have free-
will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God's
motion to justice does not take place without a movement of
the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace
that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the
gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.
Reply Obj. 1. Infants are not capable of the movement of
385 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q. 1 13. Art j
their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls
that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought
about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from
which they are justified, does not come to them from their
own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given
them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the
same reason holds good with madmen and idiots, that have
never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one
who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it
either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justi-
fying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other
sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament,
and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it
was in this way that he of wliom Augustine speaks was
regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he
assented to the Baptism.
Reply Obj. 2. Solomon neither merited nor received
wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his
sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would
be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his
person (Wis. vii. 7) : / wished, and understanding was given
unto me.
Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but
was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. xii. 6: //
there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. In such
cases the use of free-will remains.
And yet it must be observed that the comparison between
the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not
hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains
a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a
man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a
movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect
which precedes the will; hence without any complete mo\'e-
ment of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with
the gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are re\'ealed
to men in sleep, according to Job xxxiii. 15, 16: ]Vhe)i deep
sleep falleth upon men and they are sleepi)ig in their beds,
"• 3 25
Q. 113. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 386
• then Ho opencth the cars of men, and teachmg, instructeth
them in what they are to learn.
Reply Obj. 3. In the infusion of justifying grace there is
a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a
proper movement of the human soul is required in order
that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the
conservation of grace is without transmutation : no move-
ment on the part of the soul is required but only a con-
tinuation of the Divine influx.
Fourth Article.
whether a movement of faith is required for the
justification of the ungodly ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: —
Objection i. It seems that no movement of faith is required
for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justi-
fied by faith, so also by other things, viz., by fear, of which
it is written (Ecclus. i. 27): The fear of the Lord driveth out
sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified; and again by
charity, according to Luke vii. 47 : Many sins are forgiven
her because she hath loved much ; and again by humility,
according to James iv. 6: God resisteth the proud and giveth
grace to the humble: and again by mercy, according to Pro v.
XV. 27 : By mercy and faith sins are purged away. Hence
the movement of faith is no more required for the justifica-
tion of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid
virtues.
Obj. 2. Further, the act of faith is required for justification
only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man
may know God in other ways, viz., by natural knowledge,
and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required
for the justification of the ungodly.
Obj. 3. Further, there are several articles of faith. There-
fore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the
ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every
article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems
inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay
387 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE 0.113. Art 4
of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required
for the justilication of the migodly.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. v. i) : Being justified
therefore by faith, let us have peace with God.
I answer that, As stated above (A. 3) a movement of free-
will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inas-
much as man's mind is moved by God. Now God moves
man's soul by turning it to Himself according to Ps. Ixxxiv. 7
(Septuagint) : Thou wilt turn us, 0 God, and bring its to life.
Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of
the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now
the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. xi. 6:
He that conieth to God must believe that He is. Hence a
movement of faith is required for the justification of the
ungodly.
Reply Obj. i. The movement of faith is not perfect unless
it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the
ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the
movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by
being subject to Him ; hence an act of filial fear and an act
of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and
the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when
one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as
the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of
mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it,
and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation,
inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can
either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues
towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the
love of our neighbour.
Reply Obj. 2. By natural knowledge a man is not turned
to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the
cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not
suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes
the knowledge of faith, as stated above (Q. LXVIIL, A. 4,
ad-^).
Reply Obj. 3. As the Apostle says (Rom. iv. 5), to him that
. . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is
Q 113. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 388
reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.
Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an
act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that
God justifies man through the mystery of Christ.
Fifth Article.
whether for the justification of the ungodly there
is required a movement of the free-will towards
SIN ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: —
Objection i. It seems that no movement of the free-will
towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly.
For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to
Prov. X. 12: Charity covereth all sins. Now the object of
charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the
imgodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required.
Obj. 2. Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not
to look back, according to Philip, iii. 13, 14: Forgetting the
things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those
that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the
supernal vocation. But whoever is stretching forth to
righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to
forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of
his free-will.
Obj. 3. Further, in the justification of the ungodly one
sin is not remitted without another, for it is irreverent to
expect half a pardon from God (Cap., Sunt plures: Dist. iii.
De Poenit.). Hence, in the justification of the ungodly,
if man's free-will must move against sin, he ought to think of
all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great
space of time would be required for such thought, and
because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins
as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the
ungodly no movement of the free-will is required.
On the contrary. It is written (Ps. xxxi. 5) : / will confess
against myself my injustice to the Lord ; and Thou hast for-
given the wickedness of my sin.
389 THE EFFFXTS OF GRACE Q. 113 Art 5
/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), the justification of
the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human
mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of
justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard
both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local move-
ment is related to both terms of the movement. Now it
is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves
the term whence and nears the term nDhereto. Hence
the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a move-
ment of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to
justice.
Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in^
an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augus-
tine says on the words the hireling flecth, etc. (John x. 12):
Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul's
outpouring; fear is the soul's flight; your soul goes forward
when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid. Hence
in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts
of the free-will — one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the
other whereby it hates sin.
Reply Obj. i. It belongs to the same virtue to seek one
contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to
charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the
soul is separated from God.
Reply Obj. 2. A man ought not to return to those things
that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he
ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought
to recall them to mind, in order to detest them ; for this
is to ily from them.
Reply Obj. 3. Previous to justification a man must detest V
each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this
remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement
of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which
are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man
is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry
even for those he does not remember, if they w'ere present
to his memory; and this movement co-operates in his justifi-
cation.
Q. T13. Art. 0 THE " SUMMA TTTEOLOrxICA " 390
Sixth Article.
whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned
amongst the things required for justification ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the remission of sins ought not
to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification.
For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with
those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reck-
oned together with his body and soul. But the justifica-
tion of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated
above (A. i). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to
be reckoned amongst the things required for the justifica-
tion of the ungodly.
Ohj. 2. Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins
are the same ; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are
the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together
with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore
the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the
infusion of grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from
cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin;
since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But
an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since
things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, con-
divided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission
of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required
for the justification of the ungodly.
On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing
we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part
of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the
justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Isa. xxvii. 9):
This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should he taken away.
Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst
the things required for justification.
I ansi^)er that, There are four things which are accounted
to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz., the
infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards
391 THE EFFFXTS OF GRACE Q.iivArt. 6
God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin,
and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as
stated above (A. i), the justification of the ungodly is a
movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state
of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby
one thing is moved by another, three things are required : —
first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of
the moved ; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or
the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine
motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the
free-will which is moved, there are two movements, — of
departure from the term whence, and of approach to the
teim whereto ; but the consummation of the movement or
the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in
the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the
ungodly completed.
Reply Ohj. i. The justification of the ungodly is called the
remission of sins, even as every movement has its species
from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are re-
quired in order to reach the term, as stated above (A. 5).
Reply Ohj. 2. The infusion of grace and the remission of
sin may be considered in two ways: — First, with respect to
the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for
by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly,
they may be considered on the part of the objects ; and thus
they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken
away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things
generation and corruption differ, although the generation of
one thing is the corruption of another.
Reply Ohj. 3. This enumeration is not the division of a
genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must
be simultaneous; but it is a division of the things required
for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration
we may have what precedes and what follows, since some
of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede
and some follow.
g. T 13. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 392
Seventh Article.
whether the justification of the ungodly takes
place in an instant or successively ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the justification of the ungodly
does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as
already stated (A. 3), for the justification of the ungodly
there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of
the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of
counsel, as stated above (Q. XIII., A. i). Hence, since
deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this
implies succession, the justification of the ungodly would
seem to be successive.
Ohj. 2. Further, the free-will's movement is not without
actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand
many things actually and at once, as stated above (P. I.,
Q. LXXXV., A. 4). Hence, since for the justification of
the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will
towards several things, riz., towards God and towards sin,
it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly
to be in an instant.
Ohj. 3. Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g.,
blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its sub-
ject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated above
(Q. CXII., A. 4). Hence it is not received suddenly by its
subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is
required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem
that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.
Ohj. 4. Further, the free-wall's movement, which co-
operates in justification, is meritorious ; and hence it must
proceed from grace, without which there is no merit, as we
shall state further on (Q. CXIV., A. 2). Now a thing
receives its form before operating by this form. Hence
grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards
God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at
once.
Ohj. 5. Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there
393 THE EFFFXTS OF (iRACE Q. 113. Art 7
must be an instant when it iirst dwells in the soul; so, too,
if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in
sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise oppo-
sites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence they
must be two successive instants; between which there must
be time, as the Philosopher says [Phys. vi.). Therefore the
justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but
successively.
On the contrary. The justification of the ungodly is caused
by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy
Spirit comes to men's minds suddenly, according to Acts
ii. 2: And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a
mighty wind coming, upon which the gloss says that the
grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts. Hence the
justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instan-
taneous.
/ answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly con-
sists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by
grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the
infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without
succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not
suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because
that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time
to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the
matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial
form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of
itself is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated
by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated (0. CXH.,
A. 2) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs
no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And
sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of
grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and suc-
cessively, as stated above (0. CXH., A. 2, ad 2). For the
reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter
is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some
disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we
see that the stronger the agent, the more speedil}^ is the
matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is
Q. IT3. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 394
infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to
its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement
is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification of
the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.
Reply Obj. i. The movement of the free-will, which con-
curs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to
detest sin, and to draw near to God ; and this consent takes
place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that de-
liberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of
justification, but a way to justification; as local movement
is a way to illumination, and alteration to generation.
Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (P. L, Q. LXXXV., A. 5),
there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at
once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand
the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are
united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same
manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in
so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's
movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's move-
ment towards God, since a man detests sin, as contrary to
God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justifica-
tion of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin
and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and
withdraws from another simultaneously.
Reply Obj. 3. The reason why a form is not received
instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can
inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be sud-
denly received in the air, which can be illumined more and
less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the dis-
position of the matter or subject, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 4. The same instant the form is acquired, the
thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant
it is generated moves upwards, and if its movement was
instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant.
Now to will and not to will, — the movements of the free-
will,— are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the
justification of the ungodly must not be successive.
Reply Obj. 5. The succession of opposites in the same
395 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q. 113. Art 7
subject must be looked at differently in the things that are
subject to time and in those that are above time. For in
those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the
previous form inheres in the subject; but there is the last
time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres
in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in
time we are not to consider one instant as immediately
preceding another instant, since neither do instants succeed
each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is
proved in Physic, vi. But time is terminated by an instant.
Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything
is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form;
but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant
of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term
of the movement.
But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if
there be any succession of affections or intellectual concep-
tions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not
measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even
as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above
(P. I., Q. LIIL, AA. 2, 3). In these, therefore, there is a
last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in
which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in
between, since there is no continuity of time, which this
would necessitate.
Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself,
above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch
as it understands with continuity and time, with respect to
the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species,
as stated above (P. I., Q. LXXXV., AA. i, 2). We must,
therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the
condition of temporal movements, i.e., we must say that
there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time;
whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in
all the time previous sin inhered.
Q. 113. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 396
Eighth Article.
whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first
of the things required for the justification of
the ungodly ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth A rticle : —
Objection 1. It seems that the infusion of grace is not what
is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly.
For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good,
according to Ps. xxxiii. 15 : Turn away from evil, and do
good. Now the remission of sins regards the turning away
from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to
good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the
infusion of grace.
Ohj. 2. Further, the disposition naturally precedes the
form to which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement
is a disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore it
naturally precedes the infusion of grace.
Ohj. 3. Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely
to God. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed
before the movement takes place. Hence the remission of
sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally
before the infusion of grace.
On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect.
Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is re-
quired for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above
(A. 7). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.
/ answer that. The aforesaid four things required for the
justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since
the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated
above (A. 7) ; but in the order of natiu'e, one is prior to
another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion
of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards God;
the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth,
the remission of sin.
The reason for this is that in every movement the motion
of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter,
or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term
397 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q 113. Art. 8
of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests,
is last. Now the motion of God the mover is the infusion
of grace, as stated above (A. 6) ; the movement or disposi-
tion of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and
the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as
stated above (A. 6). Hence in their natural order the first
in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace;
the second is the free-will's movement towards God; the
third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is
being justified detests sin because it is against God, and
thus the free-will's movement tow^ards God naturally pre-
cedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is its
cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of
sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end,
as stated above (A A. i, 6).
Reply Obj. I. The withdrawal from one term and approach
to another may be looked at in tw^o ways: — first, on the
part of the thing moved, and thus the withdraw^al from a
term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the
subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior
to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its
movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other
way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it:
acts for the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its
light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the
part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of dark-
ness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated,
to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior
to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in
time. And since the infusion of grace and the remission of
sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature
the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But
if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is
the other way about, since in the order of nature the being
freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. —
Or it may be said that the term whence of justification is
sin; and the term whereto is justice; and that grace is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin and of the obtaining of justice.
Q. 113. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THKOLOGICA " 398
Reply Obj. 2. The disposition of the subject precedes the
reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows
the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed.
And hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception
of grace in the order of nature, and follows the infusion of
grace.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says [Phys. ii.), in move-
ments of the soul the movement toward the speculative
principle or the practical end is the very first, but in exterior
movements the removal of the impediment precedes the
attainment of the end. And as the free-will's movement is
a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves
towards God as to its end, before removing the impediment
of sin.
Ninth Article.
WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNGODLY IS GOD'S
GREATEST WORK ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the justification of the ungodly
is not God's greatest work. For it is by the justification
of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer.
Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is
greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a
greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
Obj. 2. Further, the justification of the ungodly is or-
dained to the particular good of one man. But the good of
the universe is greater than the good of one man, as is plain
from Ethic, i. Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a
greater work than the justification of the ungodly.
Obj. 3. Further, to make something from nothing, where
there is nought to co-operate with the agent, is greater
than to make something with the co-operation of the re-
cipient. Now in the work of creation something is made
from nothing, and hence nothing can co-operate with the
agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes
something from something, i.e., a just man from a sinner,
and there is a co-operation on man's part, since there is a
399 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q. 113. Art. 9
movement of the free-will, as stated above (A. 3). Hence
the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work.
Oil the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxliv. 9) : His tender
mercies are over all His works, and in a Collect (Tenth Sunday
after Pentecost) we say: 0 God, Who dost shoiv forth Thine
all-niighti^icss most by pardoning and having mercy, and
Augustine, expounding the words, greater than these shall
he do (John xiv. 12), says that for a just man to be made
from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth.
I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways : —
first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work
of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made
from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on
account of what is made, and thus the justification of the
ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in
the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and
earth, wliich terminates at the good of mutable nature.
Hence, when Augustine says that for a just man to be made
from a sinner is greater than to, create heaven and earth, he
adds, for Heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justifica-
tion of the ungodly shall endure.
Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great
in two ways : — first, in absolute quantity, and thus the gift
of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the
ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is
greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly, a
thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity,
and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater
than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of
grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy
of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the
worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification
are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: Let hi/n that
can, judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than
to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal
power, one betokens greater mercy.
And thus the reply to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2. The good of the universe is greater than
Q. 113. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 400
the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same
genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the
good of nature in the whole universe.
Reply Ohj. 3. This objection rests on the manner of acting,
in which way creation is God's greatest work.
Tenth Article.
whether the justification of the ungodly is a
miraculous work ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the justification of the ungodly
is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater
than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly
is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from
the quotation from Augustine (A. 9). Hence the justifica-
tion of the ungodly is a miraculous work.
' Ohj. 2. Further, the movement of the will in the soul is
like the natural inclination in natural things. But when
God works in natural things against the inclination of their
nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to
the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly
is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man
moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of
the ungodly is miraculous.
Ohj. 3. Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is
justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly
obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is
miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God.
On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural
power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond
natural power; for Augustine says (De Freed. Sanct. v.) that
to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity
belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and charity belongs
to the grace of the faithful. Therefore the justification of the
ungodly is not miraculous.
/ answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three
things: — ilvQ first is on the part of the active power, because
401 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE Q. 113. Art. ro
they can only be performed by Divine power ; and they are
simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above
(P. I., Q. CV., A. 7). And thus both the justification of
the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally
speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is
miraculous.
Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that
the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such
matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above
the natural power of such a body. And thus the justifica-
tion of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is
naturally capable of grace; since from its having been
made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace,
as Augustine says, in the above quotation.
Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides
the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when
a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of
healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus
the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous
and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course
of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and
that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect con-
version, that it may afterwards become perfect; because
chanty begun merits increase, and when increased merits
perfection, as Augustine says [In Epist. Joan., Tract, v.).
Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it
reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in
the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same
time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the
conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as
miraculous.
Reply Obj. i. Certain miraculous works, although they
are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards
the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such
effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle.
Reply Obj. 2. It is not a miraculous work, whenever a
natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise
it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a
II. 3 26
Q. 113. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 402
stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes
place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally
does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the
ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence
the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in
this respect.
Reply Ohj. 3. A man naturally acquires wisdom and
knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence
it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside
this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justify-
ing grace by his ow^n action, but by God's. Hence there is
no parity.
QUESTION CXIV.
OF MERIT.
{fii Ten Articles.)
We must now consider merit, which is the effect of co-operat-
ing grace ; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry :
(i) Whether a man can merit anything from God ?
(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life ?
(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life
condignly ? (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instru-
mentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit ?
(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself ?
(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else ? (7) Whether
anyone can merit restoration after sin ? (8) Whether he
can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity ?
(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance ? (10) Whether
temporal goods fall under merit ?
First Article,
whether a man may merit anything from god ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that a man can merit nothing from
God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another
his due. But hy all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient
return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher
says [Ethic, viii.). Hence it is written (Luke xvii. 10):
When you have done all these things that are cojnmanded you,
say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that ivhich
we ought to do. Hence a man can merit nothing from
God.
403
Q. 114. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 4^4
Ohj. 2. Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing
from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God
nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or
another man, but not God, for it is written (Job xxxv. 7) :
If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He
receive of thy hand. Hence a man can merit nothing from
God.
Obj. 3. Further, whoever merits anything from another
makes him his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him.
Now God is no one's debtor; hence it is written (Rom. xi. 35) :
Who hath first given to Hijn, and recompense shall he made
him ? Hence no one can merit anything from God.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. xxxi. 16) : There is a
reward for thy work. Now a reward means something
bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a
man may merit from God.
/ answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a
reward means something given anyone in return for work
or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to
give a just price for anything received from another, so also
is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil.
Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philo-
/sopher [Ethic, v.), and hence justice is simply between those
that are simply equal ; but where there is no simple equality
between them, neither is there simple justice, but there may
be a certain manner of justice, as when we say, ' right of
parents or lords,' as the Philosopher says, in the same book.
And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character
of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple
right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply,
but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is
found there ; . since the child merits something from his father
and the slave from his lord.
Now it is clear that between God and man there is the
greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all
man's good is from God. Hence there can be no justice
of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a
certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own
405 MERIT Q.I 14. Art. I
manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is
in man from Ciod. Hence man's merit with Ciod only exists
on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man
obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God
gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things
by their proper movements and operations obtain that to
which they were ordained by God ; differently, indeed, since
the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence
its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other
creatures.
Reply Obj. i. Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he
ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby
anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.
Reply Obj. 2. God seeks from our goods not profit, but
glory, i.e., the manifestation of His goodness; even as He
seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to
Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence
we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues
to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.
Reply Obj. 3. Since our action has the character of merit,
only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does
not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own,
inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.
Second Article,
whether anyone without grace can merit eternal
LIFE ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that without grace anyone can merit
eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely
ordained to, as stated above (A. i). Now man by his nature
is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally
wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his natural endow-
ments and without grace can merit beatitude which is
eternal life.
Obj. 2. Further, the less a work is due, the more meritori-
ous it is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one
Q. 114. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 406
who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has
only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from
God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature,
it would seem that his works are more meritorious with
God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life
to some extent, much more may he who has no grace.
Obj. 3. Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely sur-
pass human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit
from another, even though he has not hitherto had his
grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a man
without grace may merit eternal life.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. vi. 23) : The grace
of God, life everlasting.
I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in
two states, as was said above (Q. CIX., A. 2) ; — the first,
a state of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his
sin; — the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are
before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of
man in the first state, there is only one reason why man
cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural
endowments, viz., because man's merit depends on the
Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatso-
ever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the propor-
tion of the powers which are the principles of its act ; for it is
a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its
i/powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the
proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its know-
ledge and desire, according to i Cor. ii. 9: Eye hath not seen,
nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man. And
hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle
of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added
', a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we speak
of man as existing in sin, a second reason is added to this,
viz., the impediment of sin. For since sin is an offence
against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from
what has been said above (Q. LXXL, A. 6; Q. CXHI., A. 2),
no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal
life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin
407 MERIT o. 114.AKT2
being forgiven, which is brought about by grace. For the
sinner deserves not life, but death, according to Rom. vi. 23:
The wages of sin is death.
Reply Obj. i. God ordained human nature to attain the
end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help
of grace ; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal
life.
Reply Obj. 2. Without grace a man cannot have a work
equal to a work proceeding from grace, since the more
perfect the principle, the more perfect the action. Put the
objection would hold good, if we supposed the operations
equal in both cases.
Reply Obj. 3. With regard to the first reason adduced, the
case is different in (lod and in man. For a man receives
all his power of well-doing from God, and not from man.
Hence a man can merit nothing from God except by His
gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying (Rom. xi. 35) :
Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to
him ? But man may merit from man, before he has received
anything from him, by what he has received from God.
But as regards the second proof taken from the impedi-
ment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, since one
man cannot merit from another whom he has offended,
unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled.
Third Article.
whether a man in grace can merit eternal life
condignly ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : — ■
Objection 1. It seems that a man in grace cannot merit
eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 18) :
The sufferings of this time are not worthy (condignue) to be
compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.
But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints
would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of
men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.
Obj. 2. Further, on Rom. vi. 23, TJie grace of God, life
g. 114. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 4(^8
everlasting, a gloss says: He might have truly said'. ' The
wages of justice, life everlasting '; but He preferred to say ' The
grace of God, life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads
us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits.
Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives
it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would seem
that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting con-
dignly.
Obj. 3. Further, merit that equals the reward, would
seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can
equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge and
our desire, and, moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the
wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with grace
a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.
hsri On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair
judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life ever-
lasting is granted by God, in accordance with the judgment
of justice, according to 2 Tim. iv. 8: As to the rest, there
is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just
judge, will render to me in that day. Therefore man merits
everlasting life condignly.
/ answer that, Man's meritorious work may be considered
in two ways: — first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as
it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is
considered as regards the substance of the work., and inas-
much as it springs from free-will, there can be no condignit}/
because of the very great inequality. But there is con-
gruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would
seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should
[yf^ reward him according to the excellence of his power.
^^ If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch
as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us
to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting con-
dignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the
power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting
according to John iv. 14: Shall become in him a fount of
water springing up into life everlasting. And the worth of
the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man,
409 MERIT Q.I 14. Art. 4
being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as
a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of
adoption, according to Rom. viii. 17: If sons, heirs also.
Reply Ohj. i. The Apostle is speaking of the substance of
these sufferings.
Reply Ohj. 2. This saying is to be understood of the first
cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz., God's mercy.
But our merit is a subsequent cause.
Reply Ohj. 3. The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have
at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it
virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree
is virtually. So likewise by grace the Holy Ghost dwells
in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting;
hence, 2 Cor. i. 22, He is called the pledge of our inheritance.
Fourth Article.
whether grace is the principle of merit through
charity rather than the other virtues ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that grace is not the principle of
merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For
wages are due to work, according to Matth. xx. 8 : Call the
labourers and pay them their hire. Now every virtue is a
principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative
habit, as stated above (Q. LV., A. 2). Hence every virtue
is equally a principle of merit.
Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (i Cor. iii. 8) : Every man
shall receive his own reward according to his labour. Now
charity lessens rather than increases the labour, because as
Augustine says {De Verbis Dom. Serm. Ixx. dc Temp.), love
makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing.
Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any
other virtue.
Obj. 3. Further, the greatest principle of merit would
seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But
the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be
the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove
Q. 114- Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 410
for the faith patiently and bravely even till death. Hence
other virtues are a greater principle of merit than
charity.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (John xiv. 21) : He that
loveth Me, shall he loved of My Father; and I will love him and
will manifest Myself to him. Now everlasting life consists
in the manifest knowledge of God, according to John xvii. 3 :
lliis is eternal life : that they may know Thee, the only true
and living God. Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly
with charity.
/ answer that. As we may gather from what has been
stated above (A. i) human acts have the nature of merit
from two causes: — first and chiefly from the Divine ordina-
tion, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which
man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-
will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the
power of voluntary acts by acting of himself. And in both
these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we
must first bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the
enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to
the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of charity,
whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to
this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by
charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first
to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as
their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it
manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly.
Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness,
merit is chiefly attributed to charity.
Reply Ohj. i. Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end
for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the
habit to which the end pertains always commands the
habits to which the means pertain, as was said above
(Q. IX., A. I).
Reply Ohj. 2. A work can be toilsome and difficult in two
ways: — first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the
greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit;
and thus charity does not lessen the toil — rather, it makes us
411 MERIT g. 1 14. Art. 5
undertake the greatest toils, for it docs great things, if it
exists, as Gregory says (Uoin. in Evang. xxx.). Secondly,
from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a
ready will is hard and difhcult to all of us, and this toil
lessens merit and is removed by charity.
Reply Obj. 3. The act of faith is not meritorious unless
faith . . . workcth by charity (Gal. v. 6). So, too, the acts of
patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man
does them out of charity, according to i Cor. xhi. 3 : // /
should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it
profiteth me nothing.
Fifth Article,
whether a man may merit for himself the first grace ?
Wc proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that a man may merit for himself
the first grace, because, as Augustine says [Ep. clxxxvi.),
faith merits justification. Now a man is justified by the
first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first
grace.
Obj. 2. Further, God gives grace only to the worthy.
Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he
has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the first
grace condignly.
Obj. 3. Further, with men we may merit a gift already
received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master,
he merits it by a good use of it in his master's service. Now
God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, there-
fore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace
already received from God.
On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to
reward of works, according to I^om. iv. 4: Now to him that
worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but
according to debt. Now a man merits what is reckoned to
him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a
man may not merit the first grace.
/ answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two
Q. 114. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 412
ways: — first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is
manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the
Apostle says (Rom. xi. 6), if by grace, it is not now by works. —
Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the
thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit
of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the pro-
portion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in
the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz., sin.
But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed can-
not come under merit, since reward is the term of the work,
but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated
above (Q. CIX.). But if anyone merits a further gratuitous
gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the
first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for
himself the first grace.
^^- Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says [Retract, i.), he was
deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning
of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted
us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is
in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification.
But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the
beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow
from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first
grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though
man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he
believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a move-
ment of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly,
as stated above (Q. CXIIL, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2. God gives grace to none but to the worthy,
not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace
He makes them worthy. Who alone can make him clean that
is conceived of unclean seed (Job xiv. 4).
Reply Obj. 3. Man's every good work proceeds from the
first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of
man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts
of grace and gifts of men.
413 MERIT Q. 114. Art. 6
Sixth Article,
whether a man can merit the first grace for
ANOTHER ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth A rticle : —
Objection i. It seems that a man can merit the first grace
for another. Because on Matth. ix. 2, Jesus seeing their
faith, etc., a gloss says: How much is our personal faith worth
with God, Who set such a price on another's faith, as to heal
the man both inwardly and outivardly ! Now inward healing
is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the
first grace for another.
Obj. 2. Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but
efficacious, according to James v. 16: The continued prayer
of a just man availeth much. Now he had previously said:
Pray one for another, that you may be saved. Hence, since
man's salvation can only be brought about by grace, it
seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.
Obj. 3. Further, it is written (Luke xvi. 9) : Make unto
you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall
fail they 7nay receive you into everlasting dwellings. Now it
is through grace alone that anyone is received into ever-
lasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit ever-
lasting life as stated above (A. 2; Q. CIX., A. 5). Hence
one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. xv. i) : If Moses and
Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this
people — yet they had great merit with God. Hence it seems
that no one can merit the first grace for another.
/ answer that. As shown above (AA. i, 3, 4), our works
are meritorious from two causes: — first, by virtue of the
Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; — secondly,
according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do
them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since
it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his
power, God should by His super-excellent power work still
higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can
merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone;
Q. 1 14. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 414
since each one of us is moved by God to reach life ever-
lasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does
not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is moved
by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of
life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as
He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human
salvation, according to Heb. ii. 10: Who hath brought many
children into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation.
But one may merit the first grace for another congruously ;
because a man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous
and in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man's
desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there
may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation
the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the
passage from Jeremias speaks.
Reply Ohj. i. A man's faith avails for another's salvation
by congruous and not by condign merit.
Reply Ohj. 2. The impetration of prayer rests on mercy,
whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may
impetrate many things from the Divine mercy in prayer,
which he does not merit in justice, according to Dan. ix. 18:
For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers
before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies.
Reply Obj. 3. The poor who receive alms are said to
receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impe-
trating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting con-
gruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inas-
much as by these works of mercy, exercised towards the
poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.
Seventfi Article,
whether a man may merit restoration after a fall ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It seems that anyone may merit for himself
restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of
God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly
be besought of God than to be restored after a fall, as
415 MERIT Q.I 14. Art 7
Augustine says,* according to Ps. Ixx. 9: When my strength
shall fail, do not Thou forsake me. Hence a man may merit
to be restored after a fall.
Ohj. 2. Fm'ther, a man's works benefit himself more than
another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for
another his restoration after a fall, even as his first grace.
Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration
after a fall.
Ohj. 3. Further, when a man is once in grace he merits
life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown
above (A. 2; Q. CIX., A. 5). Now no one can attain life
everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would
seem that he merits for himself restoration.
On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. xviii. 24) : If the just
man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . .
all his justices which he hath done shall not he rememhered.
Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise
again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration after
a fall.
/ answer that. No one can merit for himself restoration
after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He
cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason of this
merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this
motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all
benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he
is restored, do not fall under merit — the motion of the pre-
ceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous
merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, is
prevented from having its effect on account of the impedi-
ment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more,
therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the
obstacle which is in him whcrtnerits, and in him for whom it is
merited ; for both these are in the same person. And there-
fore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after
a fall.
Reply Ohj. 1. The desire whereby we seek for restoration
after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby
* Cf. Ennar. i. super Ps. Ixx.
Q. 1T4. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 416
this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends
to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of
merit, but only on mercy.
Reply Ohj. 2. Anyone may congruously merit for another
his first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on
the part of him who merits), such as is found when anyone
recedes from justice after the merit of grace.
Reply Ohj. 3. Some have said that no one absolutely
merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace, — but
only conditionally, i.e., if he perseveres. But it is unreason-
able to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is
not more, but less meritorious than preceding acts, on
account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said
that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but
by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the pre-
ceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as
natural causes fail of their effects on account of a super-
vening impediment.
Eighth Article,
whether a man may merit the increase of grace or
CHARITY ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that a man cannot merit an increase
of grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward
he merited, no other reward is due to him ; thus it was said
of some (Matth. vi. 2) : They have received their reward.
Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or
grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been increased,
he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.
Ohj. 2. Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But
the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown
above (AA. 2, 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace
or charity than he has.
Ohj. 3. Further, what falls under merit a man merits by
every act flowing from grace or charity, as by every such
act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore, the increase
of grace or charity falls under merit, it would seem that by
417 MERIT Q.I 14. Art. 8
every act quickened by charity a man would merit an in-
crease of charity. But what a man merits, he infallibly
receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for
it is written (2 Tim. i. 12) : / Imow Whom I have believed,
and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have
committed unto Him. Hence it would follow that grace or
charity is increased by every meritorious act ; and this would
seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are not very
fervent, and would not suffice for the increase of charity.
Therefore the increase of charity does not come under
merit.
O71 the contrary, Augustine says in his commentary on
John's epistles (cf. Ep. clxxxvi.) that charity merits increase,
and being increased merits to be perfected. Hence the increase
of grace or charity falls under merit.
/ answer that, As stated above (AA. 6, 7), whatever the
motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit.
Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last
term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the
movement. But the term of the movement of grace is
eternal life ; and progress in this movement is by the increase
of charity or grace according to Prov. iv. 18: But the path
of the just as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth
even to perfect day, which is the day of glory. And thus the
increase of grace falls under condign merit.
Reply Obj. i. Reward is the term of merit. But there is
a double term of movement, viz., the last, and the inter-
mediate, which is both beginning and term; and this term
is the reward of increase. Now the reward of human
favour is as the last end to those who place their end in it;
hence such as these receive no other reward.
Reply Obj. 2. The increase of grace is not above the
virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its
quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtuality of the
seed, although above its quantity.
Reply Obj. 3. By every meritorious act a man merits the
increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace
which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given
II. 3 27
Q. 114. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 418
at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased
at once, but in its own time, viz., when a man is sufficiently
disposed for the increase of grace.
Ninth Article,
whether a man may merit perseverance ?
V/e proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that anyone may merit persever-
ance. For what a man obtains by asking, can come under
the merit of anyone that is in grace. Now men obtain
perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it would be
useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer,
as Augustine says [De Bono Persev. ii.). Therefore perse-
verance may come under the merit of whoever has
grace.
Obj. 2. Further, it is more not to be able to sin, than not
to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for
we merit eternal life, of which impeccability is an essential
part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e.,
to persevere.
Obj. 3. Further, increase of grace is greater than perse-
verance in the grace we already possess. But a man may
merit an increase of grace, as was stated above (A. 8).
Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the
grace he has already.
On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God,
imless it is hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious
works, who do not obtain perseverance ; nor can it be urged
that this takes place because of the impediment of sin,
since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and thus if any-
one were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him
to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under
merit.
/ answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible
towards good and evil, there are two ways of obtaining
from God perseverance in good: — first, inasmuch as free-
will is determined to good by consummate grace, which will
419 MERIT Q. 114. Art. 9
be in glory ; secondly, on the part of the Divine motion,
which inclines man to good unto the end. Now, as ex-
plained above (AA. 6, 7, 8), that which is related as a term
to the free-will's movement directed by God the mover,
falls under human merit; and not what is related to the
aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear that
the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid
movement, falls under merit; but perseverance of the way-
farer does not fall under merit, since it depends solely on
the Divine motion, which is the principle of all merit.
Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, on whom-
soever He bestows it.
Reply Obj. i. VVe impetrate in prayer things that we do
not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon
of their sins, which they do not merit, as appears from
Augustine on John ix. 31, Now we know that God doth not
hear sinners, otherwise it would have been useless for the
publican to say: 0 God, he merciful to me a sinner, Luke
xxiii. 13. So too may we impetrate of God in prayer the
grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others,
although it does not fall under merit.
Reply Obj. 2. The perseverance which is in heaven is
compared as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the
perseverance of the wayfarer, for the reason given in the
body of the article.
In the same way may we answer the third objection which
concerns the increase of grace, as was explained above.
Tenth Article.
whether temporal goods fall under merit ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —
Objection i. It seems that temporal goods fall under
merit. For what is promised to some as a reward of justice,
falls under merit. Now, temporal goods were promised in
the Old Law as the reward of justice, as appears from
Deut. xxviii. Hence it seems that temporal goods fall under
merit.
Q. II4.ART. lo THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 420
Obj. 2. Further, that would seem to fall under merit,
which God bestows on anyone for a service done. But
God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for services
done for Him. For it is written (Exod. i. 21) : And because
the midwives feared God, He built them houses; on which the
gloss {Moral, xviii.) says that life everlasting might have been
awarded them as the fruit of their good-will, but on account of
their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward. And
it is written (Ezech. xxix. 18) : The King of Babylon hath
made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and
there hath been no reward given him, and further on: And it
shall be wages for his army. ... I have given him the land of
Egypt because he hath laboured for me. Therefore temporal
goods fall under merit.
Obj. 3. Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit.
But on account of the demerit of sin some are punished
by God with temporal punishments, as appears from the
Sodomites, Gen. xix. Hence temporal goods fall under
merit.
Obj. 4. On the contrary, What falls under merit does not
come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard the good
and the wicked alike; according to Eccles. ix. 2: All things
equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to
the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth
victims and to him that despiseth sacrifices. Therefore tem-
poral goods do not fall under merit.
I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or
wage, which is a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold —
the first, simply; the second, relatively. Now man's good
simply is his last end, (according to Ps. Ixxii. 27 : But it is
good for me to adhere to my God), and consequently what
is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under
merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is
what is good to him now, or what is a good to him re-
latively; and this does not fall under merit simply, but
relatively.
Hence we must say that if temporal goods are con-
sidered as they are useful for virtuous w^orks, whereby
421 MERIT Q. 114.ART. lo
we are led to heaven, they fall directly and simply under
merit, even as increase of grace, and everything whereby
a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace.
For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal
goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life ; and thus
these temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written
(Ps. xxxiii. 10) : For there is no want to them that fear
Him, and again, Ps. xxxvi. 25: I have not seen the just for-
saken, etc.
But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves,
they are not man's good simply, but relatively, and thus
they do not fall under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch
as men are moved by God to do temporal works, in which
with God's help they reach their purpose. And thus as
life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice
in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above (AA. 3, 6),
so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature
of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby
men's wills are moved to undertake these works, even though,
sometimes, men have not a right intention in them.
Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says {Contra Faust, iv.), in
these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to
come. For the carnal people were adhering to the promises
of the present life; and not merely their speech hut even their life
was prophetic.
Reply Obj. 2. These rewards are said to have been divinely
brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in
relation to the malice of their wills, especially as regards the
King of Babylon, since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to
serve God, but rather in order to usurp dominion. So, too,
although the midwives had a good will with regard to saving
the children, yet their will was not right, inasmuch as they
framed falsehoods.
Reply Obj. 3. Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment
on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped
to reach life everlasting. But to the just who are aided by
these evils they are not punishments but medicines as stated
above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 8).
Q. 114. Art. 10 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 422
Reply Obj. 4. All things happen equally to the good and
the wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or
evil; but not as regards the end, since the good and not the
wicked are led to beatitude by them.
And now enough has been said regarding morals in
general.
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