THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
^ihU (Pbstat.
Fr. INNOCEKTIUS APAP, O.P.. S.T.M.
Censor Theol,
ImprimntaT.
EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT
ViCARIDS GeNERALIS.
Westmonasterii.
APPROBATIO ORDINIS.
^ihtl dDbstat.
Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.M.
Fr. FABIANUS DIX. O.R, B.A.
Imprimatur.
Fr. BEDA JARRETT. O.P.. S.T.L.. M.A..
Prior Provincialis ANCLiiE,
LONDINI,
Aug, 4, 1921.
THE
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
>>
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT)
QQ. LXIX.— LXXXVI.
LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN
PROVINCE
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1921
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PAGE
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38
CONTENTS
TREATISE OF THE RESURRECTION
(a) Before the Resurrection
'"lxix' of the place where souls are received after
death - - ' "
LXX. OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE
BODY --■""'
LXXI. OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD -
LXXII. OF PRAYERS ADDRESSED TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN 75
LXXIII. OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT- 87
LXXIV. OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION - 94
{b) The Resurrection Itself
LXXV. OF THE RESURRECTION ITSELF
LXXVI. OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION
LXXVII. OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION - 137
LXXVIII. OF THE TERM PFHEKEFROM OF THE RESURRECTION - I48
LXXIX. OF THE IDENTITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN - 15^
LXXX. OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESUR-
_ - - 168
RECTION - - "
LXXXI. OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN - 1 86
LXXXII. OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED 195
211
LXXXIII. OF THE SUBTLETY
LXXXIV. OF THE AGILITY ,, »>
246
LXXXV. OF THE CLARITY ,, >> " " ^
LXXXVI. OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DAMNED AFTER THE
RESURRECTION - " " ' "53
1X8
129
TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS
THE " SUMMA THEOLOGIGA "
THIRD PART (SUPPLEMENT).
QUESTION LXIX.
OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND
FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER
DEATH.
{In Seven Articles.)
In sequence to the foregoing we must tieat of matters con-
cerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the
sacraments whereby man is deHvered from the death of sin,
we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is
deHvered from the death of punishment. The treatise on
the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely
the things that precede, those that accompany, and those
that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak
(i) of those things which partly, though not wholly, precede
the resurrection; (2) of the resurrection itself and its cir-
cumstances ; (3) of the things which follow it.
Among the things which precede the resurrection we must
consider (i) the places appointed for the reception of bodies
after death; (2) the quality of separated souls, and the
punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the suffrages
whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living;
(4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs pre-
ceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world's final
conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.
Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:
(i) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after
III. 6 z
Q. 69. ART. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOCxICA " 2
death ^ (2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately
after death ^ (3) WTiether they are able to leave those places ?
(4) Whether the Umbo of hell is the same as Abraham's
bosom > (5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the
damned ^ (6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the
same as the Umbo of children ? (7) Whether so many places
should be distinguished ?
First Article.
WHETHER PLACES ARE APPOINTED TO RECEIVE SOULS
AFTER DEATH ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that places are not appointed
to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says [De
Hebdom.) : Wise 7nenare agreed that incorporeal things are not
in a place, and this agrees \vith the words of Augustine
[Gen. ad Lit. xii.): We can answer without hesitation that the
soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or
that it is not conveyed locally. Now the soul separated from
the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (ibid.).
Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception
of souls.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever has a definite place has more
in common with that place than with any other. Now
separated souls, hke certain other spiritual substances, are
indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said that they agree
with certain bodies, and differ from others, since they are
utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore
places should not be assigned for their reception.
Obj. 3. Further, Nothing is assigned to separated souls
after death, except what conduces to their punishment or
to their reward. But a corporeal place cannot conduce to
their punishment or rewaid, since they receive nothing
from bodies. Therefore definite places should not be
assigned to receive them.
On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place,
and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with the holy
3 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q.69.ART.1
angels, as Strabus* says. Since then angels even as separated
souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should
also be assigned to receive separated souls.
Further, this appear^ from Gregory's statement [Dial, iv.)
that souls after death are conveyed to various corporeal
places, as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop
of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of King Theo-
doric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to hell. There-
fore after death souls have certain places for their reception.
/ answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend
on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal
world is governed by God by means of the spiritual world,
as asserted by Augustine [De Trin. iii.) and Gregory
(Dial iv.). Hence it is that there is a certain fittingness
by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal
substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to
the more noble substances : wherefore also the philosophers
held that the order of separate substances is according to the
order of movables. And though after death souls have no
bodies assigned to them whereof they be the forms or deter-
minate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are
appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their /
degree of nobihty (wherein they are as though in a place, ^
after the manner in which incorporeal things can be in a
place), according as they more or less approach to the first
substance (to which the highest place is fittingly assigned),
namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven
to be (Ps. cii. 19, Isa. Ixvi. i). Wherefore we hold that those
souls that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven,
and that those souls that are deprived of that share are
assigned to a contrary place.
Reply Ohj. I. Incorporeal things are not in place after
a manner known and famihar to us, in which way we say
that bodies are properly in place; but they are in place after
a manner befitting spiritual substances, a manner that
cannot be fully manifest to us.
Reply Ohj. 2. Things have something in common with or
* Bede, Hexam, i. ad Gen. i. 2.
Q. 69. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 4
a likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing
a same qiiaUty : thus hot things have something in common,
and incorporeal things can have notliing in common \\ith
corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by a kind of pro-
portionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply
the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus
the Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the
principle of spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal hfe. In
this way certain souls have more in common with certain
places: for instance, souls that are spiritually enhghtened,
wdth luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness
by sin, with dark places.
Reply Ohj. 3. The separated soul receives nothing directly
from corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are
maintained by their respective places : yet these same souls,
through knowing themselves to be appointed to such places,
gather joy or sorrow therefrom; and thus their place conduces
to their punishment or reward.
Second Article.
whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell
immediately after death ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that no souls are conveyed
to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on
Ps. xxxvi. 10, Yet a little while and the wicked shall not he,
says that the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this
life they will not yet he where the saints will he when it is said
to them: Come ye blessed of My Father. Now those saints
will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not
go immediately up to heaven.
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says {Enchir. cix.) that the
time which lies between man* s death and the final resurrection
holds the souls in secret receptacles according as each one is
worthy of rest or of suffering. Now these secret abodes
cannot denote heaven and hell, since also after the final
resurrection the souls will be there together with their
5 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 2
bodies : so that he would have no reason to distinguish be-
tween the time before and the time after the resurrection.
Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven until
the day of judgment.
Obj. 3. Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that
of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at
the same time, so that each one may have the greater joy
in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from a gloss on
Heb. xi. 40, God providing some better thing for us — that the
common joy may make each one rejoice the more. Much more,
therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the
end, so as to be awarded to all at the same tim.e.
Obj. 4. Further, Punishment and reward, being pronounced
by the sentence of the judge, should not precede the judg-
ment. Now hell fire and the joys of heaven will be awarded
to all by the sentence of Christ judging them, namely at
the last judgment, according to Matth. xxv. Therefore
no one will go up to heaven or do^vn to hell before the day
of judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. v. i) : If our earthly
house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house
not made with hands, but reserved in heaven."^ Therefore,
after the body's dissolution, the soul has an abode, which
had been reserved for it in heaven.
Further, the Apostle says (Philip, i. 23): I desire (Vulg., —
Having a desire) to be dissolved and to be with Christ. From
these words Gregory argues as follows [Dial, iv.) : // there
is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that
Paul's soul is in heaven likewise. Now it cannot be gainsaid
that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article of faith.
Therefore neither is it to be denied that the souls of the saints
are borne to heaven. That also some souls go down to hell
immediately after death is evident from Luke xvi. 22, And
the rich man died, and he was buried in hell.
I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity
whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end
of their movement, so in souls there is merit or demerit
* Vulg., — eternal in heaven. Cf. i Pet. i. 4.
Q. 69. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 6
whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are
the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a body is con-
veyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levit3^ unless there
be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being
broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way,
receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be
an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing
first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of
the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed.
And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their
reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from
the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven,
unless it be held back by some debt, for which its flight must
needs be delayed until the soul is first of all cleansed. This
truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical
Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy Fathers : wherefore
the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dial. iv.
and in De Eccl. Dogm. Ixxxviii.
Reply Oh j. i. The gloss explains itself: for it expounds
the words, They will not yet he where the saints will he, etc.,
by saying immediately afterwards : That is to say, they will
iwt have the douhle stole which the saints will have at the
resurrection.
Reply Ohj. 2. Among the secret abodes of which Augustine
speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some
souls are detained before the resurrection. The reason
why a distinction is drawn between the time before and the
time after the resurrection is because before the resurrection
the}^ are there without the body whereas afterwards they
are with the body, and because in certain places there are
souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. 3. There is a kind of continuity among men as re-
gards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying
of Acts xvii. 24, 26, God . . . hath made of one all mankind:
whereas He has fashioned souls independently of one another.
Consequently it is not so fitting that all men should be
glorified together in the soul as that they should be glorified
together in the body. Moreover the glory of the body is not
7 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 3
so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be
more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were
delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor
could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account
of the joy of each one being increased by the common joy.
Reply Ohj. 4. Gregory proposes and solves this very
difficulty (Dial, iv.) : // then, he says, the souls of the just are
in heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice
on the judgment day ? And he answers : Surely it will he a
gain to them at the judgment, that whereas now they enjoy
only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also
that of the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they
bore sorrow and torments for the Lord. The same is to be
said in reference to the damned.
Third Article.
whether the souls who are in heaven or hell
are able to go from thence ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article: —
Objectio7i I. It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell
are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says [Be Cur a
pro Mort. xiii.) : If the souls of the dead took any part in the
affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself
whom not for a single night would my loving mother fail to
visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to abide
with me: and from this he concludes that the souls of the
departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they
would be able to do so if they were to leave their abode.
Therefore the}' do not go forth from their abode.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Ps. xxvi. 4) : That I may
dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, and
(Job vii. 9) : He that shall go down to hell shall not come up, i
Therefore neither the good nor the wicked quit their
abode.
Obj. 3. Further, As stated above (A. 2), abodes are awarded
to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after
death neither the rewards of the saints nor the punishments
Q. 69. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
8
of the damned are increased. Therefore they do not quit
their abodes.
On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius
addresses him thus: For thou say est that the souls of the
apostles and martyrs have taken up their abode either in
Abraham's bosom or in the place of refreshment, or under
the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their graves
when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for
God ? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison
them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their
Lord, them of whom it is written : They follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth ? And if the Lamb is everywhere,
therefore we must believe that those also who are with Him are
everywhere. Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of
the departed do not leave their abode.
Further, Jerome argues as follows [ibid.) : Since the devil
and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and are
everywhere present with wondrous speed, why should the
7nartyrs, after shedding their blood, be imprisoned and unable
to go forth ? Hence we may infer that not only the good
sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their
damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander
about everywhere.
Further, The same conclusion may be gathered from
Gregory [Dial, iv.), where he relates man}^ cases of the dead
having appeared to the living.
I answer that. There are two ways of understanding a
person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from
thence simply, so that heaven or hell be no longer his place :
and in this way no one who is finally consigned to hell or
heaven can go from thence, as we shall state further on
(Q. LXXL, A. 5, ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood
to go forth for a time : and here we must distinguish what
behts them according to the order of nature, and what
according to the order of Divine providence ; for as Augustine
says [De Cura pro Mort. xvi.) : Human affairs have their limits
other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature's works
differ from those which are done miraculously. Consequently,
9 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 3
according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned
to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communica-
tion with the living. For according to the course of nature
men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united
to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises
from the senses : nor would it be fitting for them to leave their
abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs
of the living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition
of Divine providence separated souls sometimes come forth
from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the
book quoted above, relates of the martyr Fehx who appeared
visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the
barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur some-
times to the damned, and that for man's instruction and
intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living;
or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are
detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances
related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is,
however, this difference between the saints and the damned,
that the saints can appear when they will to the living,
but not the damned ; for even as the saints while living in the
flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and
work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the
Divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this
gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be
endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they
are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will :
while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes
permitted.
Reply Ohj. i. Augustine, as may be gathered from what
he says afterwards, is speaking according to the common
course of nature. And yet it does not follow, although the
dead be able to appear to the living as they will, that they
appear as often as when living in the flesh : because when they
are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed
to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but what
they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else
they are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their
Q. 69. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" lo
grief for their unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear
to others.
Reply Ohj. 2. The authorities quoted speak in the sense
that no one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do
not imply that one may not come forth for a time.
Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above (A. i, ad 3) the soul's place
conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul,
through being consigned to that place, is affected either by
joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at being consigned
to such a place remains in the soul even when it is outside
that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honour of sitting
on a throne in the church incurs no dishonour when he
leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually,
the place remains assigned to him.
We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.
Reply Ohj. 4. Jerome is speaking of the apostles and
martyrs in reference to that which they gain from their
power of glory, and not to that which befits them as due to
them by nature. And when he says that they are every-
where, he does not mean that they are in several places or
everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.
Reply Ohj. 5. There is no parity between demons and
angels on the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the
damned on the other. For the good or bad angels have
allotted to them the office of presiding over men, to watch
over them or to try them ; but this cannot be said of the souls
of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is
competent to the souls of the saints that they can be where
they will ; and this is what Jerome means to say.
Reply Ohj. 6. Although the souls of the saints or of the
damned are sometimes actually present where they appear,
we are not to believe that this is always so: for sometimes
these apparitions occur to persons whether asleep or awake by
the activity of good or wicked angels in order to instruct or
deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear
to others and tell them many things in their sleep ; and yet
it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine proves
from many instances [De Cura pro Mort. xi., xii.).
II SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 4
Fourth Article.
whether the limbo of hell is the same as
abraham's bosom ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the hmbo of hell is not
the same as Abraham's bosom. For according to Augustine
{Gen. ad Lit. xxxiii.) : I have not yet found Scripture jnentioning
hell in a favourable sense. Now Abraham's bosom is taken
in a favourable sense, as Augustine goes on to say (ibid.) :
Surely no one would be aUowed to give an unfavourable signi-
fication to Abraham's bosoiyi and the place of rest whither the
godly poor man was carried by the angels. Therefore Abra-
ham's bosom i5 not the same as the hmbo of hell.
Obj. 2. Further, Those who are in hell see not God. Yet
God is seen by those who are in Abraham's bosom, as may
be gathered from Augustine (Conf. ix. 3) who, speaking of
Nebridius, says : Whatever that be, which is signified by that
bosom, there lives my Nebridius, and further on: Now lays
he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy
fountain, and drinketh as 7nuch as he can receive wisdom in
proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy. Therefore Abra-
ham's bosom is not the same as the hmbo of hell.
Obj. 3. Further, The Church prays not that a man be
taken to hell : and yet she prays that the angels may carry
the departed soul to Abraham's bosom. Therefore it would
seem that Abraham's bosom is not the same as Hmbo.
On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus
was taken is called Abraham's bosom. Now he was taken
to hell, for as a gloss* on Job xxx. 23, Where a house is
appointed for every one that liveth, says, hell was the house
of aU the living until the coming of Christ. Therefore Abra-
ham's bosom is the same as limbo.
Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gen. xhv. 38) : You will
bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell : wherefore Jacob
knew that he would be taken to hell after his death. There-
* S. Gregoiy [Moral, xx.).
Q. 69. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12
fore Abraham likewise was taken to hell after his death;
and consequently Abraham's bosom would seem to be a part
of heU.
I answer that, After death men's souls cannot find rest
save by the merit of faith, because he that cometh to God must
believe (Heb. xi. 6) . Now the first example of faith was given
to men in the person of Abraham, who was the first to sever
himself from the body of unbelievers, and to receive a special
sign of faith: for which reason the place of rest given to men
after death is called Abraham's bosom, as Augustine declares
{Gen. ad Lit. xii.). But the souls of the saints have not at
all times had the same rest after death; because, since
Christ's coming they have had complete rest through en-
I joying the vision of God, whereas before Christ's coming they
j had rest through being exempt from punishment, but their
'desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end.
Consequently the state of the saints before Christ's coming
may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and
thus it is called Abraham's bosom, and as regards its lack
: of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly,
before Christ's coming the limbo of hell and Abraham's
bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially : and
consequently, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from
being after Christ's coming, and from being altogether
distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally
may be parted from one another.
Reply Obj. i. The state of the holy Fathers as regards
what was good in it was called Abraham's bosom, but as
regards its deficiencies it was called hell. Accordingly,
neither is Abraham's bosom taken in an unfavourable
sense, nor hell in a favourable sense, although in a way
they are one.
Reply Obj. 2. The place of rcct of the holy Fathers was
called Abraham's bosom before as well as after Christ's
coming, but in different wa3^s. For since before Christ's
coming the saints' rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it
was called both hell and Abraham's bosom, wherefore God
was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ
13 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 5
the saints' rest is complete through their seeing God, this
rest is called Abraham's bosom, but not hell by any means.
It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for
the faithful to be brought.
Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident : and
the same meaning applies to a gloss on Luke xvi. 22, It
came to pass that the beggar died, etc., which says : Abraham's
bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the kingdom of
heaven.
Fifth Article.
whether limbo is the same as the hell of the
DAMNED ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the limbo of hell is the
same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have
bitten^ hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took
some from thence but not all. Now He would not be said
to have bitten hell if those whom He set free were not part
of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since those
whom He set free were shut up in hell, the same were shut
up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the same
as hell, or is a part of hell.
Obj. 2. Further, In the Creed Christ is said to have
descended into hell. But He did not descend save to the
limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is
the same as hell.
Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Job xvii. 16): All that I
have shall go down into the deepest hell (Douay, — pit). Now
since Job was a holy and just man, he went down to limbo.
Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest hell.
On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption.] But the
saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is not
the same as hell.
Further, Augustine says {Gen. ad Lit. xii.): I do not see
how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus received was
in hell. Now the soul of Lazarus went down into limbo.
Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.
* Allusion to Osee xiii. 14. f Office of the Dead, Resp. vii.
Q. 69. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14
/ answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be dis-
tinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, or as
to the quality of the places, inasmuch as souls are punished
or rewarded in certain places. Accordingly if we consider
the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect of the aforesaid
quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are distinct,
both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was
not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there
is eternal punishment, whereas the saints were detained but
temporally in the Umbo of the Fathers. On the other hand,
if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is
probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that
they are continuous as it were, yet so that some higher part
of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who
are in hell receive diverse punishments according to the
diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned
are consigned to darker and deeper parts of hell according
as they have been guilty of graver sins, and consequently
the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of
sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than
all those who were condemned to punishment.
Reply Ohj. i. When Christ, by His descent, deUvered the
Fathers from limbo. He is said to have hitten hell and to
have descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the
same as to situation.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Ohj. 3. Job descended, not to the hell of the damned,
but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the
deepest place, not in reference to the places of punishment,
but in comparison with other places, as including all penal
places under one head. — Again we may reply with Augustine
{Gen. ad Lit. xii.) who says of Jacob: When Jacob said to his
sons, " You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to
hell," he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled
with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but
the hell of sinners. The saying of Job may be expounded in
the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather
than an assertion.
15 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q.Gq.Art.g
Sixth Article.
whether the limbo of children is the same as
the limbo of the fathers ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the Umbo of children is
the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment
should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers were detained
in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original sin.
Therefore the place of punishment should be the same for
both.
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii.) : The pun-
ishment of children who die in none hut original sin is most
lenient. But no punishment is more lenient than that of
the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of punishment is the
same for both.
On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purga-
tory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so
temporal punishment in the limbo of the Fathers and eternal
punishment in the limbo of the children were due to original
sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be not the same it
would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the
limbo of the Fathers the same.
I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo
of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of
punishment or reward. For children have no hope of the
blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover,
shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as regards
their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of
both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is
placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have
stated in reference to limbo and hell (A. 5).
Reply Ohj. i. The Fathers did not stand in the same
relation to original sin as children. For in the Fathers
original sin was expiated in so far as it infected the
person, while there remained an obstacle on the part of
nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not yet
complete. On the other hand, in children there is an
Q. 69. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16
obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of
nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed
to the Fathers and to children.
Reply Ohj. 2. Augustine is speaking of punishments due
to some one by reason of his person. Of these the most
lenient are due to those who are burdened with none but
original sin. But lighter still is the punishment due to
those who are debarred from the reception of glory by no
personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this
very delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.
Seventh Article,
whether so many abodes should be distinguished ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that we should not distinguish
so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to
souls on account of sin, so are they due on account of merit.
Now there is only one abode due on account of merit,
namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be more
than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.
Ohj. 2. Further, Abodes are appointed to souls after death
on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place
where they merit or demerit. Therefore only one abode
should be assigned to them after death.
Ohj. 3. Further, The places of punishment should corre-
spond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin,
namely original, venial, and mortal. Therefore there should
only be three penal abodes.
Ohj. 4. On the other hand, it would seem that there should
be many more than those assigned. For this darksome air
is the prison house of the demons (2 Pet. ii. 17), and yet it is
not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned
by certain authors. Therefore there are more than five
abodes.
Ohj. 5. Further, The earthly paradise is distinct from the
heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the
earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related of Enoch
17 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 69. Art. 7
and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not counted
among the live abodes, it would seem that there are more
than five.
Obj. 6. Further, Some penal place should correspond to
each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in
original sin who has committed only venial sins, none of the
assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear
that he would not be in heaven, since he would be without
grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the
limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo
of children, since there is no sensible punishment there,
which is due to such a person by reason of venial sin : nor
would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal
punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him :
nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not
guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should
be assigned.
Ohj. 7. Further, Rewards and punishments vary in quan-
tity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now
the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we
should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which
souls are punished or rewarded after death.
Ohj. 8. Further, Souls are sometimes punished in the
places where they sinned, as Gregory states {Dial. iv.).
But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. Therefore
this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially
since some are punished for their sins in this world, as the
Master said above (iv. Sent. D. 21).
Ohj. 9. Further, Just as some die in a state of grace and
have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment,
so some die in mortal sin and have some good for which they
would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace
with venial sins an abode is assigned where they are pun-
ished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purga-
tory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally
an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some
good works.
Ohj. 10. Further, Just as the Fathers were delayed from
III. 6 2
Q. 69. Art. 7 THE '^ SUMMA THEOLOGICA" i8
obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ's coming, so are
they now detained from receiving the glory of the body.
Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the saints before
the coming of Christ from the one where they are received
now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are
received now from the one where they ^^dll be received after
the resurrection.
/ answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished
according to the souls' various states. Now the soul united
to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul
separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or
evil for its merits ; so that after death it is either in the state
of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered
from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final
retribution, this happens in two ways : either in the respect
of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and
thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original
sin it is the hmbo of children. On the other hand, if it be
in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final
reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person,
and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from
receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they
have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature,
and thus We have the hmbo of the Fathers, where the
Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of
the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated.
Reply Ohj. i. Good happens in one way, hut evil in
many ways, according to Dionysius [Div. Nom. iv.) and the
Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 6) : wherefore it is not unfitting if there
be one place of bhssful reward and several places of punish-
ment.
Reply Ohj. 2. The state of meriting and dementing is one
state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit:
wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to
all : whereas of those who receive according to their merits
there are various states, and consequently the comparison
fails.
Reply Ohj. 3. One may be punished in two ways for
19 SOUL'S ABODE AFTER DEATH Q. 6y. Art. 7
original sin, as stated above, cither in reference to the
person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently there
is a twofold hmbo corresponding to that sin.
Reply Ohj. 4. This darksome air is assigned to the demons,
not as the place where they receive retribution for their
merits, but as a place befitting their office, in so far as they
are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among
the abodes of which we are treating now: since hell fire is
assigned to them in the first place (Matth. xxv.).
Reply Ohj. 5. The earthly paradise belongs to the state
of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive
for their merits ; and consequently it is not reckoned among
the abodes whereof we are treating now.
Reply Ohj. 6. This supposition is impossible.* If, how-
ever, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell
eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be pun-
ished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace
annexed to it : wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin,
which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell.
And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin
without grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be
punished eternally.
Reply Ohj. 7. Diversity of degrees in punishments or
rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to
the diversity of state that we distinguish various abodes.
Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Ohj. 8. Although separated souls are sometimes
punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow
that this is their proper place of punishment: but this is
done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we
may be deterred from sin. That souls while yet in the flesh
are punished here for their sins has nothing to do ^vith the
question, because a punishment of this kind does not place
a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas
we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned
after the state of merit or demerit.
Reply Ohj. 9. It is impossible for evil to be pure and
* Cf. I.-II.. Q. LXXXIX., A. 6.
Q. 60. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20
without the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is
^vithout any admixture of evil. Consequently those who
are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a supreme good
must be cleansed of all evil ; wherefore there must needs be
a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence
without being perfectly clean. But those who will be
thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and conse-
quently the comparison fails, since those who are in hell can
receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past goods
avail for the mitigation of their punishment.
Reply Ohj. 10. The essential reward consists in the glory
of the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from
the soul, is entirely founded as it were on the soul : and con-
sequently lack of the soul's glory causes a difference of state,
whereas lack of the body's glor}- does not. For this reason,
too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to the
holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious
bodies : whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls
of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of souk.
1
QUESTION LXX.
OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE
BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED
ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the general quality of the soul
after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it
by material fire. Under this head there are three points of
inquiry: (i) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul ? (2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid
powers remain in the soul ? (3) Whether the separated
soul can suffer from a material fire ?
First Article.
whether the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul ?*
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the sensitive powers
remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De
Spir. et Anim. xv.) : The soul withdraws from the body taking
all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding
and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers. Now
sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive
powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the
separated soul.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says [De Eccl. Dogm. xvi.):
We believe that 7nan alone has a substantial soul, which lives
though separated from the body, and clings keenly to its senses
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVIL. A. 8.
21
O. 70. Art. I THE " SUIVIMA THEOLOGICA " 22
and wits. Therefore the soul retains its senses after being
separated from the body.
Ohj. 3. Further, The soul's powers are either its essential
parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties.
Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated
from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties.
Therefore it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its
powers after being separated from the body.
Ohj. 4. Further, A whole is not entire if one of its parts
be lacking. Now the soul's powers are called its parts.
Therefore, if the soul lose any of its powers after death, it
will not be entire after death: and this is unfitting.
Ohj. 5. Further, The soul's powers co-operate in merit
more even than the body, since the body is a mere instru-
ment of action, while the powers are principles of action.
Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together with
the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much more, there-
fore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded
together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose
them.
Ohj. 6. Further, If the soul after separation from the body
loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught.
For it cannot be said that it is dissolved into some matter,
since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that which
entirely comes to naught is not restored in identity; where-
fore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same
identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Phil-
osopher {De Anima, ii.), as the soul is to the body so are the
soul's powers to the parts of the body, for instance the sight
to the eye. But if it were not identically the same soul that
returns to the body, it would not be identically the same man.
Therefore for the same reason it would not be identical^ the
same eye, if the visual power were not identicall}^ the same ;
and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity,
and consequent^ neither would the whole man be identically
the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul
to lose its sensitive powers.
Ohj. 7. Further, If the sensitive powers were to be cor-
23 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. i
rupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow that they
are weakened when the body is weakened. Yet this is not
the case, for according to De Animas i., if an old man were
given the eye of a young man, he would, without doubt, see as
well as a young man. Therefore neither are the sensitive
powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix.) : Of
two substances alone does man consist, soul and body ; the soul
with its reason, and the body with its senses. Therefore the
sensitive powers belong to the body : and consequently when
the body is corrupted the sensitive powers remain not in
the soul.
Further, The Philosopher, speaking of the separation of
the soul, expresses himself thus (Met. xii.): 7/, however,
anything remain at last, we must ask what this is : because
in certain subjects it is not impossible, for instance if the soul
be of such a disposition, not the whole soul but the intellect ;
for as regards the whole soul this is probably impossible. Hence
it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body,
but only the intellective powers of the soul, and consequently
not the sensitive or vegetative powers.
Further, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says
(DeAnima, ii.) : This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting
from the corruptible : for it is hereby clear that the remaining
parts are not separable as some maintain. Therefore the
sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul.
I answer that, There are many opinions on this question.
For some, holding the view that all the powers are in the
soul in the same way as colour is in a body, hold that the
soul separated from the body takes all its powers away with
it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it would follow
that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these
cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the
aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because
it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to
be able belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject
of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that where
Q. 70. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24
we find power there we find action. Now it is evident that
certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the prin-
ciples, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the
soul as united to the body, because they are not performed
except through the medium of the body, — such as to see, to
hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that suchlike powers
belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to
the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the
principle of the properties of a composite being. Some
operations, however, are performed by the soul without a
bodily organ, — for instance to understand, to consider, to
will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul,
the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the soul
not only as their principle but also as their subject. There-
fore, since so long as the proper subject remains its
proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted
they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers
which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs
remain in the separated body, while those which use a
bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is
corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the
sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some
draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for
they say that they are of two kinds — some being acts of
organs and emanating from the soul into the body are
corrupted with the body; others, whence the former origi-
nate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the
body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary
powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement
seems unreasonable : because the soul, by its essence and not
through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of
those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any form,
from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter,
is the origin of the properties which result naturally in the
composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers
in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the
organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same
reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by
25 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. i
means of which these mean powers flow from the essence of
the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have to stop it is
better to do so at the first step.
Hence others say that the sensitive and other hke powers
do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted
sense, namely radically, in the same way as a result is in
its principle: because there remains in the separated soul
the ability to produce these powers if it should be reunited
to the body; nor is it necessary for this ability to be any-
thing in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above.
This opinion appears to be the more reasonable.
Reply Ohj. i. This saying of Augustine is to be under-
stood as meaning that the soul takes away with it some of
those powers actually, namely understanding and intelH-
gence, and some radically, as stated above.*
Reply Ohj. 2. The senses which the soul takes away with
it are not these external senses, but the internal, those,
namely, which pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect
is sometimes called sense, as Basil states in his commentary
on the Proverbs, and again the Philosopher {Ethic, vi. 11) . If,
however, he means the external senses we must reply as
above to the first objection.
Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above the sensitive powers are
related to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject,
but as compared to their origin: wherefore the conclusion
does not follow.
Reply Ohj. 4. The powers of the soul are not called its
integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of suchlike
wholes is that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly
in one of the parts, but partially in the others; thus in the
soul the soul's energy is found perfectly in the intellective
part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the powers
of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, the
latter will remain entire and undiminished, although the
sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the
king's power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared
his authority.
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 8, ad i, and infra A. 2, ad i.
O. 70. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
26
Reply Ohj. 5. The body co-operates in merit, as an essential
part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however,
do not co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of acci-
dents. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply Ohj. 6. The powers of the sensitive soul are said
to be acts of the organs, not as though they were the essen-
tial forms of those organs, except in reference to the soul
whose powers they are. But they are the acts of the organs,
by perfecting them for their proper operations, as heat is the
act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating. Where-
fore, just as a hre would remain identically the same,
although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold
of water that has been heated returns not identically the
same, although the water remains the same in identity), so
the organs will be the same identically, although the powers
be not identicallv the same.
Reply Ohj. 7. The Philosopher is speaking there of these
powers as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his
saying that old age is an affection not of the soul, hut of that
in which the soul is, namely the body. For in this way the
powers of the soul are neither weakened nor corrupted on
account of the body.
Second Article.
whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain
in the separated soul ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the acts of the sensitive
powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says
(De Spiritu et Aninia, xv.) : When the soul leaves the body it
derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these
(namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible
faculties) according to its merits. But the imagination, the
concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive powers. There-
fore the separated soul will be affected as regards the sensi-
tive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason
of them.
27 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATPT Q. 70. Art. 2
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says [Gen. ad Lit. xii.) that the
body feels not, hut the soul through the body, and further on :
The soul feels certain things, not through the body but without
the body. Now that which befits the soul without the body
can be in the soul separated from the body. Therefore the
soul will then be able to feel actually.
Obj. 3. Further, To see images of bodies, as occurs in
sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive
part. Now it happens that the separated soul sees images
of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus Augustine
says [Gen. ad Lit. xii.) : For I see not why the soul has an image
of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite
dead, it sees some things which many have related after returning
to life from this suspended animation and yet has it not when
it has left the body through death having taken place. For it is
unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its body,
except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said
before of those who lie senseless that they have a certain
image of their own body, by which they are able to be borne to
corporeal places and by means of sensible images to take cog-
nizance of such things as they see. Therefore the separated
soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive powers.
Obj. 4. Further, The memory is a power of the sensitive
part, as proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated
souls will actually remember the things they did in this
world : wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (Luke xvi. 25) :
Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.
Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a sensi-
tive power.
Obj. 5. Further, According to the Philosopher (De Anima,
iii.) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part.
But joy and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and
similar emotions which according to our faith we hold to be
in separated souls, are in the irascible and concupiscible.
Therefore separated souls will not be deprived of the acts
of the sensitive powers.
On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body
cannot remain in the separated soul . Now all the operations
Q.70.ART.2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 28
of the sensitive powers are common to the soul and body:
and this is evident from the fact that no sensitive power
exercises an act except through a bodily organ. Therefore
the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensi-
tive powers.
Further, The Philosopher says (De Anima, i.) that when
the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves, and
the same applies to all the acts of the sensitive powers.
Therefore the separated soul does not exercise the act of any
sensitive power.
I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the
sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exercises
through the body ; and these do not remain in the separated
soul: and internal acts which the soul performs by itself;
and these will be in the separated soul. This statement
would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who
held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance
nowise dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is
united to the thing moved. This is an evident consequence of
transmigration which he held. And since according to him
nothing is in motion except what is moved, and lest he should
go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves itself,
and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own
movement. Accordingly^ there would be a tw^ofold move-
ment of the soul, one by which it moves itself, and another
whereby the body is moved by the soul : so that this act to
see is first of all in the soul itself as moving itself, and
secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves
the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher {De
Anima, i.) who proves that the soul does not move itself,
and that it is nowise moved in respect of such operations as
seeing, feehng, and the Hke, but that such operations are
movements of the composite only. We must therefore
conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain
in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.
Reply Ohj. i. Some deny that this book is Augustine's:
for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augus-
tine's works, and added things of his own. Hence we are
29 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. 2
not to take what is written there, as having authority. If,
however, its authority should be maintained, it must be said
that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with
imagination and other like powers, not as though such
affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the
sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good
or ill, according to the things which it committed in the
body through the imagination and other like powers: so
that the imagination and suchlike powers are not supposed
to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the
merit of that affection.
Reply Ohj. 2. The soul is said to feel through the body,
not as though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by
itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of
the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That which is
added, namely that the soul feels some things without the
body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such
things without the outward movement of the body that
takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and
Hke passions do not occur without any bodily movement.
It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according
to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as
stated above.
Reply Ohj. 3. Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout
that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is
clear that there is no comparison between the soul of a
sleeper and the separated soul : since the soul of the sleeper
uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal images are
impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or
we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to
the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective
power, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and
material conditions. Wherefore Augustine's comparison
holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal
things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried
out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated
soul intellectively : but not that they are in the separated
soul imaginatively.
Q.70.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 30
Reply Ohj. 4. As stated in the first book of Sentences,
memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a
power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over
past time; and in this way the act of the memory will not
be in the separated soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says
{De Anima, i., text. 66) that when this, the body to wit, is
corrupted, the soul remenihers not. In another way memory is
used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains
to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts
from all differences of time, since it regards not only the past
but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv.). Taking memory in this sense the separated
soul will remember.*
Reply Ohj. 5. Love, joy, sorrow, and the hke, have a two-
fold signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the
sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated
soul, because in this way they are not exercised without a
definite movement of the heart. In another way they denote
acts of the will which is in the intellective part : and in this
way they will be in the separated soul, even as delight will
be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God,
namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In
this sense the Philosopher says [Ethic, vii. 14) that God's joy
is one simple delight.
Third Article.
whether the separated soul can suffer from a
bodily fire ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul cannot
suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad
Lit. xii.) : The things that affect the soul well or ill after its
separation from the body, are not corporeal hut resemble
corporeal things. Therefore the separated soul is not punished
with a bodily fire.
Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine (ibid.) says that the agent is
* Cf. P. I., Q. LXXVII., A. 8; g. LXXXIX., A. 6.
31 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. 3
always more excellent than the patient. But it is impossible
for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul.
Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.
Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher [De Gener. i.)
and Boethius {De Duab. Natiir.) only those things that
agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one
another. But the soul and corporeal fire do not agree in
matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and
corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into
one another, as Boethius says [ibid.]. Therefore the sepa-
rated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.
Obj. 4. Further, Whatsoever is patient receives something
from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily
fire, it will receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever
is received in a thing is received according to the mode of
the recipient. Therefore that which is received in the soul
from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now
the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are its
perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul
suffer from the bodily lire, this will not conduce to its
punishment, but rather to its perfection.
Obj. 5. Further, If it be said that the soul is punished
merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say
{Dial, iv.) ; on the contrary, — If the soul sees the fire of hell,
it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not
the organs by which sensitive or imaginative vision is
effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision
to be the cause of sorrow, since there is no sorrow contrary
to the pleasure of considering, according to the Philosopher
{Top. i.) . Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.
Obj. 6. Further, If it be said that the soul suffers from the
corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now
it is held by the body while living in the body ; on the con-
trary,— The soul while living in the body is held by the
body in so far as there results one thing from the soul and
the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not
be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be
held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.
Q. 70. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 32
Ohj. 7. Further, Every bodily agent acts by contact.
But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since
contact is only between corporeal things whose bounds come
together. Therefore the soul suffers not from that fire.
Ohj. 8. Further, An organic agent does not act on a
remote object, except through acting on the intermediate
objects; wherefore it is able to act at a fixed distance in
proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons
to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the
place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in
this world : and yet they are not then free from punishment,
for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so
neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do
not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire
of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing of
an elemental nature has such a power that its action can
reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that
the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted
by a corporeal fire.
On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a cor-
poreal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with
demons. Now demons suffer therefrom since they are
punished by that fire into which the bodies of the damned
will be cast after the resurrection, and which must needs be
as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our
Lord (Matth. xxv. 41), Depart from Me, you cursed, into
everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil, etc. There-
fore separated souls also can suffer from that fire.
Further, Punishment should correspond to sin. Now
in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful
concupiscence. Therefore it is just that it should be pun-
ished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering
therefrom.
Further, There is greater union between form and matter
than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of
spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from
being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an
obstacle to its suffering from a body.
33 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. 3
I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called
metaphorically, nor an imaginary lire, but a real corporeal
fire, we must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment
from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (Matth. xxv. 41)
that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who
are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that they
can thus suffer is explained in many ways. For some have
said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the
soul suffer from the fire : wherefore Gregory {Dial, iv.) says :
The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it. But this
does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the
fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the seer ; wherefore it
cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes,
however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally,
in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as something hurtful,
and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire,
there must needs be some relation of the soul to the fire,
according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul. Hence
others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn
the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to
itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with
fear and sorrow, in fulfilment of Ps. xiii. 5, They have trem-
bled for fear, where there was no fear. Hence Gregory says
[Dial, iv.) that the soul burns through seeing itself aflame. But
this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul
would suffer from the fire, not in reality but only in appre-
hension : for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may
result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes {Gen.
ad Lit. xii.), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that
one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the
thing that is present to one's fancy. Moreover, this kind
of suffering would be more unlike real suffering than that
which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated
to result from real images of things, which images the soul
carries about with it, whereas the former results from false
fancies which the erring soul imagines : and furthermore, it
is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are
endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for
III. 6 3
Q.70.ART.3 THE '^SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 34
a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed
thereby. Hence others say that it is necessary to admit
that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire:
wherefore Gregory says {Dial, iv.) : We can gather from the
words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not only
by seeing it, but also by feeling it. They explain the possi-
bihty of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire
can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing,
and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly,
as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For
the order of Divine justice demands that the soul which by
sinning subjected itself to corporeal things should be sub-
jected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts
not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the
principal agent : wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire
seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent should act
on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have
explained the sanctification of the soul by the sacraments
(P. III., Q. LXIL, AA. I, 4). But, again, this does not
seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on
which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural action
besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal
agent : in fact it is by fulfiUing the former that it effects the
latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body
that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood
produces the shape of a house. Hence we must allow the
fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire,
in order that it may be the instrument of Divine justice in
the punishment of sin : and for this reason we must say that
a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be
hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is
in some way united to a body : for thus we observe that the
corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis. ix. 15). Now
a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In one way as
form to matter, so that from their union there results one
thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body
both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the
body : but it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is
35 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. 3
united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is
united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is united to
place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way
created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in
one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now
although of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an
incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to
detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is con-
fined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek
another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be
subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the
instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain
a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering
it from fulfiUing its own will, that is by hindering it from
acting where it will and as it will. This way is asserted
by Gregory (Dial. iv.). For in explaining how the soul can
suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as
follows: Since Truth declares the rich sinner to he con-
demned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the
wicked are imprisoned in flames? Juhan* says the same
as quoted by the Master (iv. Sent. D. 44) : If the incorporeal
spirit of a living man is held hy the body, why shall it not he
held after death hy a corporeal fire ? and Augustine says [De
Civ. Dei, xxi.) that just as, although the soul is spiritual and
the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united
to the body as giving it life, and on account of this union con-
ceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as
receiving punishment therefrom, and from this tcnion conceives
a loathing. Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid
modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the
soul suffers from a corporeal fire : so as to say that the fire
of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to
it as a thing placed is united to a place: that as the instru-
ment of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained
as it were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to
the spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something
hurtful to it is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory
* Bishop^of Toledo, Prognostic ii.
Q.70.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 36
{Dial, iv.) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from
the above quotations.
Reply Ohj. i. Augustine speaks there as one inquiring:
wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding
as quoted above [De Civ. Dei, xxi.). Or we may reply that
Augustine means to say that the things which are the
proximate occasion of the soul's pain or sorrow are spiritual,
since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the
fire as hurtful to it : wherefore the fire as apprehended is the
proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire
which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its
distress.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the soul is simply more excellent
than the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the
soul, in so far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine
justice.
Reply Ohj. 3. The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking
of the action whereby the patient is changed into the nature
of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul :
and consequently the argument is not conclusive.
Reply Ohj. 4. By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing
on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is
not to the point.
Reply Ohj. 5. In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused
by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as
such can nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the
sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the sight
so as to be seen, there may be accidentally something
corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony
of the organ. Nevertheless, intellectual vision may cause
sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful,
not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way
no matter which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire
is distressed.
Reply Ohj. 6. The comparison does not hold in every
respect, but it does in some, as explained above.
Reply Ohj. 7. Although there is no bodily contact between
the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact be-
37 SOUL'S QUALITY AFTER DEATH Q. 70. Art. 3
tween them (even as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual,
touches the heaven, when it moves it, with a spiritual
contact) in the same way as a painful object is said to touch,
as stated in De General, i. This mode of contact is sufficient
for action.
Reply Obj. 8. The souls of the damned are never outside
hell, except by Divine permission, either for the instruction
or for the trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside
hell they nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared
for their punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the
immediate cause of their distress, as stated above, wherever
they are, they suffer from hell-fire. Even so prisoners,
though outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the prison,
seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence just as the
glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the essen-
tial, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be
outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to
their glory, so the punishment of the damned is nowise
diminished, if by God's permission they happen to be
outside hell for a time. A gloss on James iii. 6, inflameth
the wheel of our nativity, etc., is in agreement with this, for
it is worded thus: The devil, wherever he is, whether in the
air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his
flames. But the objection argues as though the corporeal
fire tortured the spirit immediately in the same way as it
torments bodies.
QUESTION LXXI.
OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD.
{In Fourteen Articles.)
We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under
this head there are fourteen points of inquiry : (i) Whether
suffrages performed by one person can profit others ?
(2) W^hether the dead can be assisted by the works of the
Hving ? (3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the
dead ? (4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those
who perform them ? (5) Whether suffrages profit those
who are in hell ? (6) Whether they profit those who are in
purgatory ? (7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?
(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are in heaven ?
(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the
altar, and almsgiving profit the departed ? (10) Whether
indulgences granted by the Church profit them ?
(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed ?
(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that
person more than others ? (13) Whether suffrages for
many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each
individual ? (14) Whether general suffrages avail those for
whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special
and general suffrages together avail those for whom they
are offered ?
First Article.
whether the suffrages of one person can profit
OTHERS ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the suffrages of one person
cannot profit others. For it is written (Gal. vi. 8) : What
38
39 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q.yi.ARx. i
things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap. Now if one
person reaped fruit from the suffrages of another, he would
reap from another's sowing. Therefore a person receives
no fruit from the suffrages of others.
Ohj. 2. Further, It belongs to God's justice, that each one
should receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm
(Ixi. 13) says: Thou wilt render to every man according to his
works. Now it is impossible for God's justice to fail. There-
fore it is impossible for one man to be assisted by the works
of another.
Ohj. 3. Further, A work is meritorious on the same count
as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary.
Now one man is not praised for the work of another. There-
fore neither can the work of one man be meritorious and
fruitful for another.
Ohj. 4. Further, It belongs to Divine justice to repay
good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man
is punished for the evildoings of another ; indeed, according
to Ezech. Xviii. 4, the soul that sinneth, the same shall die.
Therefore neither does one person profit by another's good.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. cxviii. 63) : I am a par-
taker with all them that fear Thee, etc.
Further, All the faithful united together by charity are
members of the one body of the Church. Now one member
is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted
by the merits of another.
I answer that, Our actions can avail for two purposes.
First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious
work a man obtains the state of bliss. Secondly, for some-
thing consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man
merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment.
And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two
ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer:
the difference being that merit rehes on justice, and prayer
on mercy; since he who prays obtains his petition from the
mere hberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we must
say that the work of one person nowise can avail another for
acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be
Q. 71. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 40
able to merit eternal life by the works which I do, because
the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the
recipient, and each one is disposed by his owtl and not by
another's actions, — disposed, that is to say, by being worthy
of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one
may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring
a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for
another:* and since the impetration of prayer depends on
the liberality of God \^'hom we pray, it may extend to what-
ever is ordinately subject to the Divine power. On the other
hand, as regards that wliich is consequent upon or accessory
to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only
by way of prayer but even by way of merit : and this happens
in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the
root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works.
^^^Ierefore all who are united together by charity acquire
some benefit from one another's works, albeit according to
the measure of each one's state, since even in heaven each
one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the
communion of saints Is laid dowTi as an article of faith.
Secondly, through the intention of the doer who does certain
works specially for the purpose that they may profit such
persons : so that those works become somewhat the works of
those for whom they are done, as though the}^ were bestowed
on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them either
for the fulfilment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose
that does not change their state.
Reply Ohj. i. This reaping is the receiving of eternal life,
as stated in Jo. iv. 36, And he that reapeth . . . gathereth
fruit unto life everlasting. Now a share of eternal life is not
given to a man save for his o\vn works, for although we may
impetrate for another that he obtain hfe, this never happens
except by means of his owti works, when namely, at the
prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits
eternal Hfe.
Reply Ohj. 2. The work that is done for another becomes
his for whom it is done : and in like manner the work done
* Cf. I.-II., Q. CXIV., A. 6.
41 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71 Art. 2
by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it
is not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit
of the works done by a man who is one with him in charity,
or of works done for him. This also happens according to
human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is
accepted in heu of another's.
Reply Ohj. 3. Praise is not given to a person save according
to his relation to an act, wherefore praise is in relation to
something [Ethic, i. 12). And since no man is made or shown
to be well or ill disposed to something, by another's deed,
it follows that no man is praised for another's deeds save
accidentally, in so far as he is somewhat the cause of those
deeds, by giving counsel, assistance, inducement, or by any
other means. On the other hand, a work is meritorious to
a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but also in
view of something consequent upon his disposition or state,
as evidenced by what has been said.
Reply Ohj. 4. It is directly contrary to justice to take away
from a person that which is his due : but to give a person
what is not his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses
the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. Now a person
cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless he be deprived
of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming
that one should be punished for another's sins, as it is that
one should acquire some advantage from the good deeds of
another.
Second Article.
whether the dead can be assisted by the works of
the living ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted
by the works of the hving. First, because the Apostle says
(2 Cor. V. 10) : We must all he manifested before the judgment
seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of
the body, according as he hath done. Therefore nothing can
accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done
after his death and when he is no longer in the body.
Q. 71- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 42
Obj. 2. Further, This also seems to follow from the words
of Apoc. xiv. 13, Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . .
for their works follow them.
Obj. 3. Further, It belongs only to one who is on the way
to advance on account of some deed. Now after death
men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of
Job xix. 8, refer : He hath hedged in my path round about, and
I cannot pass. Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by
a person's suffrages.
Obj. 4. Further, No one is assisted by the deed of another,
unless there be some community of life between them. Now
there is no community between the dead and the hving, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic, i. 11). Therefore the suffrages
of the living do not profit the dead.
On the contrary are the words of 2 Machab. xii. 46 : Itis . . ,
a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they
may be loosed from sins. But this would not be profitable
unless it were a help to them. Therefore the suffrages of
the Hving profit the dead.
Further, Augustine says [De Cura pro Mort. i.): Of no
small weight is the authority of the Church whereby she clearly
approves of the custom whereby a commendation of the dead
has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the
Lord God at His altar. This custom was established by the
apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a sermon
on suffrages for the dead, where he expresses himself thus:
Realizing the nature of the Mysteries the disciples of the
Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of
those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring
and life-giving Mysteries. This is also confirmed by the
authority of Dionysius [Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions
the rite of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and,
moreover, asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the
dead. Therefore we must believe this without any doubt.
I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the
members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but
also to the dead who die in charity. For charity which is
the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
43 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 2
has no end: Chanty never falleth away (i Cor. xiii. 8). More-
over, the dead live in the memory of the Hving : wherefore
the intention of the Hving can be directed to them. Hence
the suffrages of the hving profit the dead in two ways
even as they profit the hving, both on account of the bond
of charity and on account of the intention being directed to
them. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages
of the living profit them so as to change their state from
unhappiness to happiness or vice versa ; but they avail for
the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that
involves no change in the state of the dead.
Reply Ohj. i. Man while living in the body merited that
such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he
is assisted thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the
result of the things he has done in the body.
Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the
sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribu-
tion which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal
glory or eternal unhappiness : for then each one will receive
only according as he himself has done in the body. Mean-
while, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the
living.
Reply Ohj. 2. The words quoted refer expressly to the
sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening
words : Blessed are the dead, etc. Or we may reply that deeds
done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above.
Reply Ohj, 3. Although, strictly speaking, after death
souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect
they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed
awhile in their advance towards their final award. Where-
fore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so
that they can no more be changed by any works in respect
of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is
not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others
in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their
final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although the communion of civic deeds,
whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the
Q. 71. Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 44
dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic hfe,
the communication of the spiritual life is possible between
them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to
Whom the spirits of the dead live.
Third Article,
whether suffrages performed by sinners profit
THE DEAD ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages performed by
sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to Jo. ix. 31,
God doth not hear sinners. Now if their prayers were to
profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by
God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them do not
profit the dead.
Ohj. 2. Further, Gregory says [Pastoral, i. 11) that when
an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered
party is provoked to harsher measures. Now every sinner is
offensive to God. Therefore God is not incHned to mercy
by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently their suffrages
are of no avail.
Ohj. 3. Further, A person's deed would seem to be more
fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits
naught for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can
he merit for another.
Ohj. 4. Further, Every meritorious work must be a living
work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done
by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are
done cannot be assisted thereby.
Ohj. 5. On the contrary, No man can know for certain
about another man whether the latter be in a state of sin or
of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were profitable
that are done by those who are in a state of grace, a man
could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and
consequently many would be deterred from obtaining
suffrages.
Ohj. 6. Further, According to Augustine [Enchir. cix.),
45 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 3
as quoted in the text (iv. Sent. D. 45), the dead are assisted
by suffrages according as while Hving they merited to be
assisted after death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is
measured according to the disposition of the person for whom
they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs
not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons.
/ answer that, Two things may be considered in the
suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done,
for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacra-
ments have their efficacy from themselves independently of
the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whom-
soever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of
the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider
the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction ;
because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be
considered — in one wav in so far as it is his own deed, and
thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself or to
another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and
this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering
suffrages, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest
when he performs the burial service in church. And since
one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is under-
stood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (Ccsl. Hier. xiii.),
it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner,
profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the
instrument of another: for the work of the instrument
belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although
he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state
of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the
principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do
any work of mercy at the command of his master who has
charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command
suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person
having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the
departed, even though the persons by whom they are per-
formed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if
those persons were in charity, because then those works
would be meritorious on two counts.
Q. 71. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 46
Reply Ohj. i. The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes
not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is
worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes
hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for something accept-
able to God. For God dispenses His goods not only to the
righteous but also to sinners (Matth. v. 45), not indeed on
account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence
a gloss on Jo. ix. 31, God doth not hear sinners, says that
he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeifig clearly.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the sinner's prayer is not accept-
able in so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God
on account of another in whose stead or at whose command
he offers the prayer.
Reply Ohj. 3. The reason why the sinner who performs
these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not
capable of profiting by reason of his own indisposition.
Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit
another, who is disposed.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although the sinner's deed is not living in
so far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is
another's, as stated above.
Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense
would seem to show that it matters not whether one
obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must
reply to them also.
Reply Ohj. 5. Although one cannot know for certain
about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one
may infer it with probabihty from what one sees outwardly
of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Matth. vii. 16).
Reply Ohj. 6. In order that suffrage avail another, it is
requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable
of availing by it : and a man has become capable of this by
his own works which he did in his life-time. This is what
Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works must
be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the
person for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on
the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing
them or by commanding them.
47 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 4
Fourth Article.
whether suffrages offered by the living for the
dead profit those who offer them ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages offered by the
Hving for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For
according to human justice a man is not absolved from his
own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a
man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that
by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for
whom he offered them.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever a man does, he should do it
as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one.
Therefore if one who by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead
person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one
ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another.
Obj. 3. Further, If the satisfaction of one who satisfies
for another profits him equally with the one for whom he
satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third person if he
satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and
so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by one work of
satisfaction ; which is absurd.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxiv. 13) : My prayer
shall be turned into my bosom. Therefore, in like manner,
suffrages that are offered for others profit those who satisfy.
Further, The Damascene says in the sermon On those who
fell asleep in the faith : Just as when about to anoint a sick
man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he, namely
the anointer, shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to
anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbour s salva-
tion first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbour.
And thus the question at issue is answered.
I answer that. The work of suffrage that is done for another
may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punish-
ment by way of compensation which is a condition of satis-
faction : and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted
Q. 71. Art. 5 THE ''SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 48
as belonging to the person for whom it is done, while absolv-
ing him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the
performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this
compensation we have to consider the equality of justice:
and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt
without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners
require a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Secondly,
it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it
has as proceeding from its root; which is charity : and in this
way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but
also and still more the doer.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections : for the first
considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction,
while the others consider it as meritorious.
Fifth Article,
whether suffrages profit those who are in hell ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages profit those who
are in hell. For it is written (2 Machab. xii. 40) : They found
under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols
. . ., which the law forbiddeth to the Jews, and yet we read
further on [verse 43) that Judas sent twelve thousand drachms
of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be offered for the sins of the
dead. Now it is clear that they sinned mortally through
acting against the Law, and consequently that they died
in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages
profit those who are in hell.
Obj. 2. Further, The text (iv. Sent. D. 45) quotes the
saying of Augustine (Enchir. ex.) that those whom suffrages
profit gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement
of their damnation. Now only those who are in hell are
said to be damned. Therefore suffrages profit even those
who are in hell.
Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says {Eccl. Hier. cap ult.) : //
here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how
much more do they, after death, profit those alone who are
49 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 5
worthy of their holy prayers ? Hence we may gather that
suffrages are more profitable to the dead than to the hving.
Now they profit the hving even though they be in mortal
sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be
converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the
dead who are in mortal sin.
Obj. 4. Further, In the Lives of the Fathers (iii. 172: vi. 16)
we read, and the Damascene relates in a sermon of his
[De Defunct.), that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead
man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose
head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a
pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he con-
fessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of
Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit
even those who are in hell.
Ohj. 5. Further, Tii Damascene in the same sermon relates
that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from
heaven saying to him: / have heard thy voice, and I pardon
Trajan : and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same
sermon, the whole East and West are witnesses. Yet it is
clear that Trajan was in hell, since he put many martyrs to a
cruel death (ibid.). Therefore the suffrages of the Church
avail even for those who are in hell.
On the contrary, Dionysius says {Eccl. Hier. vii.) : The
high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he
would act counter to the Divine order, and consequently he
says [ibid.) that he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because
his prayer for them would not be heard. Therefore suffrages
avail not those who are in hell.
Further, Gregory says [Moral, xxxiv.) : There is the same
reason for not praying then (namely after the judgment day)
for men condemned to the everlasting fire, as there is now for
not praying for the devil and his angels who are sentenced to
eter'tial punishment, and for this same reason the saints pray
not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, forsooth,
knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment,
they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers
before they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge.
lu. 6 4
Q. 71. Art. 5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 50
Further, The text (iv. Sent. D. 45) quotes the words of
Augustine (Serm. xxxii. de Verb. Apost.) : // a man depart
this life without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacra-
ments, in vain do his friends have recourse to suchlike acts of
kindness. Now all the damned come under that head.
Therefore suffrages profit them not.
/ answer that, There have been three opinions about the
damned. For some have said that a twofold distinction
must be made in this matter. First, as to time; for they
said that after the judgment day no one in hell will be
assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day
some are assisted by the suffrages of the Chmxh. Secondly,
they made a distinction among those who are detained in
hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, those namely
who have died without faith and the sacraments, and
these, since they were not of the Church, neither by grace
nor by name,* the suffrages of the Church cannot avail;
while others are not very bad, those namely who belonged
to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, fre-
quented the sacraments and performed works generically
good, and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to
avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which
troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since
the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite
in duration) that a multipHcity of suffrages would take away
that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen
(Peri Archon. i.; cf. Gregory, Moral, xxxiv.) : and conse-
quently they endeavoured in various ways to avoid this
difficulty. For Praepositivusf said that suffrages for the
damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed
from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but
for a time, namely till the judgment day : for their souls will
be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the
punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this
opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which
leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be
* Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii. post Dom. Pass.
t Gilbertus Praepositivus, Chancellor of the See of Paris, a.d. 1206.
51 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 5
restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is
impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be
expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned,
their punishment will nowise be interrupted. For this reason
the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another ex-
planation. These said that the process in the diminution of
punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a
line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is
never destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal
but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin
by taking away a quarter of the whole and, secondly, a
quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second
quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say
by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment
is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate
part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many
ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite
division which is applicable to continuous quantity cannot
be transferred to spiritual quantity : secondly, because there
is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth,
should diminish the punishment less than the first : thirdly,
because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be
diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt
be done away: fourthly, because in the division of a line
we come at length to something which is not sensible, for a
sensible body is not indefinitely divisible : and thus it would
follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment
would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer
be a punishment. Hence others found another explanation.
For Antissiodorensis* (iv. Sent Tract. 14) said that suffrages
profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their
punishment, but by fortifying the person punished : even as
a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face
in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better,
and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again
is impossible, because according to Gregory {Moral, ix.) a
man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as
* William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais.
Q. 71. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52
his guilt deserves ; and consequently some suffer more, some
less, from the same fire; wherefore since the guilt of the
damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less
punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presump-
tuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men,
and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also
unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off
from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed
are in touch with the works of the hving. Secondly, because
they have entirely come to the end of life, and have received
the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in
heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the
body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory
essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same
with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punish-
ment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the
saints be increased as to the essential reward. However, we
may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which,
according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said
that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting
their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of
punishment, but by withdrawing from the damned some
matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew
themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and
this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages
are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according
to the general law, because as Augustine says {De Cura pro
Mort. xiii.) — and this appHes especially to the damned — the
spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men
do or of what happens to them in this life, and consequently
they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless
this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in
despite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of
great uncertainty; wherefore it is safer to say simply that
suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend
to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.
Reply Ohj. i. The donaries to the idols were not found on
those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they
53 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 5
were carried off in reverence to the idols: but they took
them as conquerors because they were due to them by right
of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness :
and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus
suffrages could profit them. Or we may say, according to
some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in
danger, they repented of their sin, according to Ps. Ixxvii. 34,
When He slew them, then they sought Him : and this is a
probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for
them.
Reply Ohj. 2. In these words damnation is taken in a
broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include
also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely
expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not entirely, but
diminished.
Reply Ohj. 3. Suffrage for a dead person is more accept-
able than for a living person, as regards his being in greater
want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can.
But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from
the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be
said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for
praying for the dead as for the living.
Reply Ohj. 4. This assistance did not consist in a diminish-
ment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the
same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see
one another, and in this they had a certain joy, not real but
imaginary, in the fulfilment of their desire. Even so the
demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin,
although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as
neither is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that
they take pity on our ills.
Reply Ohj. 5. Concerning the incident of Trajan it may
be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at
the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace
whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in conse-
quence was freed from punishment. The same appKes to all
those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of
whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must
Q. 71. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 54
needs say likewise of all such persons that they were con-
signed to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their
owTi merits according to justice : and that according to higher
causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be
recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.
Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not
simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that
his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the
judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general
result of suffrages, because things happen differently in
accordance with the general law from that which is per-
mitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the
bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of
the Divine power as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi.).
Sixth Article.
WHETHER SUFFRAGES PROFIT THOSE WHO ARE IN
PURGATORY ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages do not profit
even those \\^o are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part
of hell. Now there is no redemption in hell,*- and it is
written (Ps. vi. 6), IVho shall confess to Thee in hell P There-
fore suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory.
Obj. 2. Further, The punishment of purgatory is finite.
Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages,
it would be possible to have such a great number of suffrages,
that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and con-
sequently the sin entirely unpunished : and this would seem
incompatible with Divine justice.
Obj. 3. Further, Souls are in purgatory in order that they
may be purified there, and being pure may come to the
kingdom. Now nothing can be purified, unless something
be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered by the hving do
not diminish the punishment of purgatory.
Obj. 4. Further, If suffrages availed those who are in
* Of&ce of the dead, Resp. vii.
55 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 6
purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which
are offered at their behest. Yet these do not always avail:
for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so
many suffrages to be offered for him that if they were offered
they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment.
Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is
released from punishment, they will profit him nothing.
For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are
discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer needs
them, since he is already released. Therefore suffrages do
not avail those who are in purgatory.
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv. Sent. D. 45),
Augustine says (Enchir. ex.) : Suffrages profit those who are
not very good or not very had. Now such are those who are
detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.
Further, Dionysius says {Eccl. Hier. vii.) that the godlike
priest in praying for the departed prays for those who lived a
holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through human
frailty. Now such persons are detained in purgatory.
Therefore, etc.
/ answer that. The punishment of purgatory is intended to
supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed
in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above (AA. i, 3:
Q. XIII., A. 2), the works of one person can avail for another's
satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the suffrages
of the living, without any doubt, profit those who are in
purgatory.
Reply Ohj. i. The words quoted refer to those who are in
the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for
those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We
may also reply with Damascene (Serm. de Dormientihus)
that such statements are to be explained with reference to
the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the
merits of those who are consigned to those punishments.
But according to the Divine mercy which transcends human
merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the
righteous, than is implied by the expressions quoted in the
aforesaid authorities. Now God changes His sentence hut
Q. 71. Art. 6 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 56
not his counsel, as Gregory says {Moral, xx.) : wherefore the
Damascene {loc. cit.) quotes as instances of this the Nine-
vites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that the
sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted
by the Divine mercy.*
Reply Ohj. 2. It is not unreasonable that the punishment
of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the
multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not follow that the
sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one
undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other.
Reply Ohj. 3. The purifying of the soul by the punish-
ment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the
guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as
stated above (Q. XIIL, A. 2), the guilt of one person can be
expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his
stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by
another satisfying for him.
Reply Ohj. 4. Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the
action of the agentf and the action done. By action done
I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect
incidental to that action, — thus from the giving of alms
there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God
for the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent
may be considered in relation either to the principal agent
or to the executor. I say, then, that the dying person, as
soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him,
receives the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are
discharged, as regards the efhcacy of the suffrages that
results from the action as proceeding from the principal
agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising
from the action done or from the action as proceeding from
the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages
are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be
released from his punishment, he will in this respect be
deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back
upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it
* Cf. P. I., Q. XIX., A. 7, ad 2.
•f Ex of ere operante and ex opere operato.
57 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 7
is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal
matters by another's fault, — and the punishment of pur-
gatory is temporal, — although as regards the eternal retri-
bution none can be defrauded save by his own fault.
Seventh Article,
whether suffrages avail the children who are
IN LIMBO ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh A Hide : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages avail the children
who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except
for another's sin. Therefore it is most becoming that they
should be assisted by the suffrages of others.
Ohj. 2. Further, In the text (iv. Sent. D. 45) the words of
Augustine {Enchir. ex.) are quoted: The suffrages of the
Church obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad.
Now children are not reckoned among those who are very
bad, since their punishment is very light. Therefore the
suffrages of the Church avail them.
On the contrary, The text {ibid) quotes Augustine as
saying {Serm. xxxii. De Verb Ap.) that suffrages avail not
those who have departed hence without the faith that works by
love. Now the children departed thus. Therefore suffrages
avail them not.
I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in
limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence,
since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works
of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential
reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot
profit the children in limbo.
Reply Obj. i. Although original sin is such that one person
can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the
souls of the children in limbo are in such a state that they
cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time
for obtaining grace.
Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is speaking of those who are not
very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what
Q. 71. Art. 8 THE ^' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 58
precedes: Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any
alms whatsoever, are offered for those who have been baptized^
etc.
Eighth Article.
whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that in some way suffrages
profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words of the
collect in the mass:* Even as they (i.e., the sacraments)
avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing.
Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the
altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.
Obj. 2. Further, The sacraments cause what they signify.
Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped
into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in
heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit those
who are in heaven.
Obj. 3. Further, The saints rejoice in heaven not only in
their own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it
is written (Luke xv. 10) : There is (Vulg., — shall be) joy before
the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance. Therefore
the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the
good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages
also profit them.
Obj. 4. Further, The Damascene says (Serni. deDormient.)
quoting the words of Chrysostom: For if the heathens, he says,
burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much
more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together
with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought
to ashes like him, but that thou may est surroundhim with greater
glory by so doing ; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou
mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that
thou mayest add to his meed and reward ! And thus the same
conclusion follows.
On the contrary, As quoted in the text (iv. Sent. D. 15),
Augustine says {De Verb. Ap. Serm. xvii.) : It is insulting
* Postcommunion, Feast of S. Andrew, Apostle.
59 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 8
to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to commend
ourselves to his prayers.
Further, To be assisted belongs to one who is in need.
But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever.
Therefore they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church.
I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature impHes the
giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who
suffers no default : since no one is competent to be assisted
except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven
are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of
God's house (Ps. xxxv. 10), they are not competent to be
assisted by suffrages.
Reply Ohj. i. Suchlike expressions do not mean that the
saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our
observing their feasts, but that we profit thereby in cele-
brating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through
our knowing or praising God, and through His glory thus
increasing somewhat in us, there accrues something, not
to God, but to us.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the sacraments cause what they
signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything
that they signify : else, since they signify Christ, they would
produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they
produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in
virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it
does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful
departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the
saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the
sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered.
Reply Ohj. 3. Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all
our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased
their joy is also increased formally, but only materially,
because every passion is increased formally in respect of the
formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the
saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself,
in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for otherwise
their essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would
vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied,
Q. 71. Art. 9 THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 60
wherein they rejoice with God as the formal aspect of their
joy, it does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that
they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow
that they are assisted by our works.
Reply Ohj. 4. The sense is not that an increase of meed
or reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by
a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may
reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from
suffrages through having, while hving, provided for suffrage
to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.
Ninth Article.
whether the prayers of the church, the sacrifice
of the altar and alms profit the departed ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the souls of the departed
are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the
sacrifice of the altar and alms, or that they are not assisted
by them chiefly. For punishment should compensate for
punishment. Now fasting is more penal than almsgiving
or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than
any of the above.
Ohj. 2. Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with
these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii., Q. ii., cap. 22):
The souls of the departed are released in four ways, either by
the offerings of priests, or the alms of their friends, or the
prayers of the saints, or the fasting of their kinsfolk. Therefore
the three mentioned above are insufficiently reckoned by
Augustine [De Cura pro Mort. xviii.).
Obj. 3. Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments,
especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and
other sacraments ought to be offered for the departed
equally with or more than the sacrament of the altar.
Obj. 4. Further, This would seem to follow from the words
of I Cor. XV. 29, // the dead rise not again at all, why are
they then baptized for them ? Therefore Baptism avails as
suffrage for the dead.
6i
SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71- Art. 9
Obj. 5. Further, In different masses there is the same
sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the
mass, be reckoned among the suffrages, it would seem that
the effect would be the same whatever mass be said for a
deceased person, whether in honour of the Blessed Virgin
or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems con-
trary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed
a special mass for the dead.
Obj. 6. Further, The Damascene {Serm. de Dormient.)
teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead.
Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar,
but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages
for the dead.
/ answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead
in so far as the latter are united to the living in charity, and
in so far as the intention of the living is directed to the dead.
Consequently those whose works are by nature best adapted
to assist the dead, which pertain chiefly to the communica-
tion of charity, or to the directing of one's intention to
another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs
cliiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical
unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole
Church is united and incorporated, namely Christ: where-
fore the Eucharist is as it were the origin and bond of charity.
Again, chief among the effects of charity is the work of alms-
giving: wherefore on the part of charity these two, namely
the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief
suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention
directed to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because
prayer by its ver^^ nature implies relation not only to the
person who prays, even as other works do, but more directly
still to that which we pray for. Hence these three are
reckoned the principal means of succouring the dead, although
we must allow that any other goods whatsoever that are
done out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.
Reply Obj. i. When one person satisfies for another, the
point to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction
reach the other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one
Q. 71. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62
passes to another, rather than even the punishment under-
gone by way of satisfaction; although the punishment ex-
piates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as it
is a kind of medicine. And consequently the three aforesaid
are more profitable to the departed than fasting.
Reply Ohj. 2. It is true that fasting can profit the departed
by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being
directed to the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by
its nature contain anything pertaining to charity or to the
directing of the intention, and these things are extrinsic
thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine did not
reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the suffrages
for the dead.
Reply Ohj. 3. Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, where-
fore just as by generation being does not accrue save to the
object generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the
person baptized, as regards the deed done : and yet as regards
the deed of the doer whether of the baptizer or of the
baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious
works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the sign of
ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done
its effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the
other sacraments.
Reply Ohj. 4. According to a gloss this passage may be
expounded in two ways. First, thus: // the dead rise not
again, nor did Christ rise again, why are they haptized for
them ? i.e. for sins, since they are not pardoned ij Christ rose
not again, hecause in Baptisin not only Christ's passion hut
also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense the
cause of our spiritual resurrection. Secondly, thus: There
have been some misguided persons who were baptized for
those who had departed this Hfe without baptism, thinking
that this would profit them: and according to this explan-
ation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely
according to the opinion of certain persons.
Reply Ohj. 5. In the of&ce of the mass there is not only a
sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the mass
contains two of the things mentioned by Augustine (loc. cit.),
63 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 10
namely prayer and sacrifice. As regards the sacrifice offered
the mass profits equally the departed, no matter in whose
honour it be said : and this is the principal thing done in the
mass. But as regards the prayers, that mass is most profit-
able in which the prayers are appointed for this purpose.
Nevertheless, this defect may be suppHed by the greater
devotion, either of the one who says mass, or of the one who
orders the mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of
the saint whose suffrage is besought in the mass.
Reply Obj. 6. This offering of candles or oil may profit
the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms : for they
are given for the worship of the Church or for the use of the
faithful.
Tenth Article.
WHETHER THE INDULGENCES OF THE CHURCH PROFIT
THE DEAD ?
We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the indulgences granted
by the Church profit even the dead. First, on account of
the custom of the Church, who orders the preaching of a
crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence for
himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten souls,
both of the Hving and of the dead. But this would amount
to a deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore
indulgences profit the dead.
Obj. 2. Further, The merit of the whole Church is more
efiicacious than that of one person. Now personal merit
serves as a suffrage for the departed, for instance in the case
of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the merit of the
Church whereon indulgences are founded.
Obj. 3. Further, The indulgences of the Church profit
those who are members of the Church. Now those who are
in purgatory are members of the Church, else the suffrages
of the Church would not profit them. Therefore it would
seem that indulgences profit the departed.
On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a
person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the indul-
Q.yi.ART.io THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 64
gence.* Now there can be no such cause on the part of the
dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church,
and it is for such a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted.
Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit not the dead.
Further, Indulgences are regulated according to the
decision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, in-
dulgences could avail the dead, it would be in the power of
the party granting them to release a deceased person entirely
from punishment : which is apparently absurd.
/ answer tktU, An indulgence may profit a person in two
ways: in one way, principally; in another, secondarily-. It
profits principally the person who avails himself of an in-
dulgence, who, namely, does that for which the indulgence
is granted, for instance one who \dsits the shrine of some
saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for
which indulgences are granted, indulgences camiot avail
them directly. However, they profit secondarily and in-
directly the person for whom one does that which is the cause
of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes
not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if
the form of indulgence be such as this : Whosoever does this
or that shtzU gain so much indulgence, he who does this cannot
transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is
not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention
of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence
indulgences derive their value, as stated above (Q. XXML,
A. 3, ad 2), If, however, the indulgence be granted in this
form: Whosoever does this or thai, he, his father, or any other
person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain
so much indTdgence, an indulgence of this kind v^-ill avail not
only a hving but also a deceased person. For there is no
reason why the Church is able to transfer the common
merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the h\ing and not
to the dead. Xor does it follow tliat a prelate of the Church
can release souls from purgatory just as he hsts, since for
indulgences to avail there must be a fitting cause for granting
them, as stated above (Q. XXVI., A. 3).
• 01 Q. XXV.. A. 2.
65 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q.71.ART. ii
Eleventh Article,
whether the burial service profits the dead ?
We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the burial service profits
the dead. For Damascene [Serm. de Dormient.) quotes
Athanasius as saying: Even though he who has departed in
godliness he taken up to heaven^ do not hesitate to call upon God
and to hum oil and wax at his tomb; for such things are
pleasing to God and receive a great reward from Him. Now
the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the burial
service profits the dead.
Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine [De Cura pro
Mori, iii.), In olden times the funerals of just men were cared
for with dutiful piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves pro-
vided, and themselves while living charged their children touching
the burial or even the translation of their bodies. But they
would not have done this unless the tomb and things of this
kind conferred something on the dead. Therefore the Hke
profit the dead somewhat.
Obj. 3. Further, No one does a work of mercy on some
one's behalf unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is
reckoned among the works of mercy, therefore Augustine
says (ibid.) : Tobias, as attested by the angel, is declared to have
found favour with God by burying the dead. Therefore such-
like burial observances profit the dead.
Obj. 4. Further, It is unbecoming to assert that the
devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of
devotion, arrange for their burial in some rehgious locality.
Therefore the burial service profits the dead.
Obj. 5. Further, God is more inclined to pity than to
condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some
if they be unworthy : wherefore Gregory says [Dial, iv.) :
If those who are burdened with grievous sins are buried in the
church this will lead to their more severe condemnation rather
than to their release. Much more, therefore, should we say
that the burial service profits the good.
III. 6 5
Q. 71. Art. II THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 66
On the contrary, Augustine says {De Cura pro Mort. iii.):
Whatever service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but
an office of humanity. ^^ • • \ tu
Further, Augustine says [ibid. : De Civ. Dei, i.) : 1 he
funereal equipment, the disposition of the grave, the solemnity
of the obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help
to the dead. . , .
Further, Our Lord said (Luke xii. 4)^ Be not afraid of
them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they
can do. Now after death the bodies of the saints can be
hindered from being buried, as we read of having been done
to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist.
V I) Therefore the dead take no harm if theu- bodies
remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does
not profit them. i, u f
I answer that. We have recourse to burial for the sake oi
both the hving and the dead. For the sake of the hving,
lest their eyes be revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse,
and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this as
regards the body. But it profits the hving also spuitually
inasmuch as our behef in the resurrection is confirmed
thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead
in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial
place, wherefore a monu7nent takes its name from remem-
brance, for a monument is something that recaUs the mind
(monens mentem), as Augustine observes {De Civ. Dei, i.,Ue
Cura pro Mort. iv.). It was, however, a pagan error that
burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest for his
soul- for they beheved that the soul could not be at rest
until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous
and absurd. r j.u a a
That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead,
does not result from the action done, but rather f roni the action
itseU of the doer : when, to vAt, the dead person himself, or
another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place,
and commends him to the patronage of some saint by whose
prayers we must beheve that he is assisted, as well as to the
suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more
67 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q.7r.ARr.ix
frequently and more specially for those who are buried in
Z"oZ ^"' '"'^' '^"^^ ^' ^- ^-^ f- the display o"
the obsequies are prohtable to the hving, as being a con
directly but indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to nitv
n^tVuSr.""'"'"^? ^° P^^^' °^ ''^ ^° ^- as the ouSaT
on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adorn
Tdeadtr^r H^°^ '' '' ^" ^^^ ^^"^ '^' ^!>^^^
p ., ^!. ^^""'"^ "^""""g th« ^°^ks of mercy.
JfyOb). I. By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of
Z ?h' r ''T '^'^" ^"''^^^^"y' -t'^- - offering them to
the Church and as giving them to the poor, or as doine^Ms
in reverence of God. Hence aftpr +L ^4 ^
rpprl • n^. -7 J „ ^^^^'^' ^"er the words quoted we
read . For oil and candles are a holocaust
Reply Obj 2. The fathers of old arranged for the burial
theXt°o/S; "e" ^° T ^'^* ''' '''''' "^^^^ ^-"-
me Object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling
m a dead body, but in order to confirm the behef in thf
resurrection, as Augustine says {DeCiv-DeiiT. Hence also
Si^vlf ct- °tf b'r' h" ^ ^^"' °^ P-nlse, wlere' they
Delieved Christ s birth and death would take place WhosP
resurrection is the cause of our rising again. ^ ' ^""'
Reply Obj. 3. Since flesh is a part of man's npt„r„
has a natural affection for his flesh, accLZg to EpTVT
tMsTaral" f 1-'" '"^^^^^'- ^-- - a'corrce wfth
this natural affection a man has during life a rertp^n .^
tude for what will become of his body a ter death IT
would grieve If he had a presentiment Sat stmShirg^n'^
toward would happen to his body. ConseouTntrfhr
who love a man. through being conLmed toT oL thev
ai: "For a :'°"^ '^"^^'^' ''''' "^ body tth o^^
care. For as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iV Tf n fn,u-
garment and rin,, and .HaLel such U^s tie ir/Ta'rtl
those whom they leave behind the Greater their Zl 7
Q. 71. ART. 12 THE •• SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68
devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange
for their friends to be buried in holy places smce by so
doing they commend their dead to the suffrages of the
saints, as stated above. u^hpin?
Reblv Obi. 5. The wicked man dead takes no harm by being
buried in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a
burial place unfitting for him by reason of human glory.
Twelfth Article.
WHETHER SUFFR-^GES OFFERED FOR ONE DECEASED PERSON
PROFIT THE PERSON FOR WHOM THEY ARE OFFERED
MORE THAN OTHERS ?
We ■Proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—
Objection I. It would seem that suffrages offered for one
deceased person are not more profitable to the one for
whom they are offered, than to others, .^-^^^''^^''fl
is more communicable than a material hght Now a
material hght, for instance of a candle, though kindled for
Te p rson'only. avails equally all those who are gathered
together, though the candle be not ht for them. Therefore,
hK suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be
offered for one person in particular, do not avail him any
more than the others who are in purgatory.
Obi. 2. Further, As stated in the text (iv. Sent. J). 45).
suffrages avail the dead in so far as during thts hfe they
.nerited that they might avail then afterwards.* ISow some
merited that suffrages might avail them more than those
to whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more
by those suffrages, else their merits would be rendered
""X't-^Further, The poor have not so many suffrages
given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered
for certain people profit them alone, or profit them more
than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is contrary
to our Lord-s saying (Luke vi. 2o) : Blessed are ye poor, for
yours is the kingdom of God.
* S. Augustine, Enchiridion ex.
69 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 12
On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine
justice. But if a person pay another's debt human justice
releases the latter alone. Therefore since he who offers
suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of the person
for whom he offers them, they proft this person alone.
Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies some-
what for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can
satisfy for a hving person. Now where one satisfies for a
livmg person the satisfaction counts only for the person for
whom it is offered. Therefore one also who offers suffrages
profits him alone for whom he offers them.
^ / answer that, There have been two opinions on this ques-
tion. For some, hke Praepositivus, have said that suffrages
offered for one particular person do avail chiefly, not the
person for whom they are offered, but those who are most
worthy. And they instanced a candle which is ht for a rich
man and profits those who are with him no less than the
rich man himself, and perhaps even more, if they have
keener sight. They also gave the instance of a lesson
which profits the person to whom it is given no more than
others who hsten with him, but perhaps profits these others
more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed out
to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appoint-
ing certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they
said that the Church did this to excite the devotion of the
faithful, who are more incHned to offer special than common
suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than
for strangers. Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages
avail more those for whom they are offered. Now both
opinions have a certain amount of truth: for the value of
suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value
IS derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which
makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail
more the person who is more full of charity, although they
are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of
suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by
reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods
of another after death in respect of the diminution of
Q. 71- Art. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 70
punishment ; for after death there is no possibility of obtain-
ing or increasing grace, whereas during Hfe the works of
others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In
the second place suffrages derive their value from being
appHed to another person by one's intention. In this way
the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and there
can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for
whom they are offered : in fact, they avail him alone in this
way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed
to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards
the remission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the
person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is
more truth in the second opinion than in the first.
Reply Ohj. i. Suffrages avail, after the manner of a hght,
in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a
certain amount of consolation: and this is all the greater
according as they are endowed with a greater charity. But
in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to another by
the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light,
but rather the payment of a debt : and it does not follow,
if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid
likewise.
Reply Ohj. 2. Such a merit is conditional, for in this way
they merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for
them, and this was merely to render themselves fit recipients
of those suffrages. It is therefore clear that they did not
directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but made
themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit
of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their merit is
rendered unavailing.
Reply Ohj. 3. Nothing hinders the rich from being in
some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards
the expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing
in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor
are shown to be better off by the authority quoted.
71 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 13
Thirteenth Article.
whether suffrages offered for several are of as
much value to each one as if they had been
offered for each in particular ?
We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that suffrages offered for
several are of as much value to each one as if they had been
offered for each in particular. For it is clear that if one
person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others receive
the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a person for
whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is
reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be
offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it
were offered for each in particular.
Ohj. 2. Further, It is to be observed that according to
the common practice of the Church, when Mass is said for
one deceased person, other prayers are added for other
deceased persons. Now this would not be done, if the
dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose some-
thing thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as
above.
Ohj. 3. Further, Suffrages, especially of prayers^ rely on
the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no
difference whether He helps by means of many or by means
of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many or a few.
Therefore if the one same prayer be said for many, each
one of them will receive as much assistance as one person
would if that same prayer were said for him alone.
On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If
therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much value
to each one as if it were offered for one alone, it would
seem that the Church ought not to have appointed a Mass
and prayer to be said for one person in particular, but that
Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed:
and this is evidently false.
Further, A suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if
Q. 71. Art. 13 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72
it be divided among many it avails less for each one than
if it were offered for one only.
/ answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered
according as it is derived from the virtue of charity uniting
the members of the Church together, suffrages offered for
several persons avail each one as much as if they were
offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished if
its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it in-
creased; and in like manner joy increases through being
shared by many, as Augustine says (Conf. viii.). Conse-
quently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no
less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the
value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfac-
tion applied to the dead by the intention of the person
offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular
avails him more than that which is offered for him in
common with many others ; for in this case the effect of the
suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those
for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it is evident that
this question depends on the first ; and, moreover, it is made
clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the
Church.
Reply Ohj. i. Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction
do not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does ;
for teaching, like any other action, produces its effect
according to the disposition of the recipient. But they
profit after the manner of the payment of a debt, as stated
above (A. 12, ad i) ; and so the comparison fails.
Reply Ohj. 2. Since suffrages offered for one person avail
others in a certain way, as stated (A. i), it follows that
when Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for
prayers to be said for others also. For these prayers are
said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage be
applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer offered
for them in particular may profit them also.
Reply Ohj. 3. Pra^^er may be considered both on the part
of the one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed:
and its effect depends on both. Consequently though it is
73 SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD Q. 71. Art. 14
no more difficult to the Divine power to absolve many than
to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of one who prays
thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one.
Fourteenth Article.
whether general suffrages avail those for whom
special suffrages are not offered, as much as
special suffrages avail those for whom they are
offered in addition to general suffrages ?
We proceed thus to the Fourteenth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that general suffrages avail
those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as
special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in
addition to general suffrages. For in the life to come each
one will be rewarded according to his merits. Now a person
for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted
after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are
offered. Therefore the former will be assisted by general
suffrages as much as the latter by special and general
suffrages.
Ohj, 3. Further, The Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages
of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ
whole, has infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one
offering of the Eucharist for all in general is of sufficient
value to release all who are in purgatory : and consequently
general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special
and general suffrages together.
On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one.
Therefore special suffrages, together with general suffrages,
are more profitable to the person for whom they are offered
than general suffrages alone.
/ answer that, The reply to this question depends on that
which is given to the twelfth inquiry (A. 12) : for if the
suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indif-
ferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and conse-
quently one for whom the special suffrages are not offered
will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are
Q. 71. Art. 14 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74
offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the
suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently,
but those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no
doubt that general and special suffrages together avail a
person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the
Master, in the text (iv. Sent. D. 45), mentions two opinions:
one, when he says that a rich man derives from general,
together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which
a poor man derives from special suffrages alone ; for although
the one receives assistance from more sources than the
other, he does not receive a greater assistance: the other
opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom
special suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not
a more complete release, because each will be finally released
from all punishment.
Reply Ohj. i. As stated above (A. 12, ad 2) the assistance
derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object
of merit, but conditionally as it were: hence the argument
does not prove.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the power of Christ Who is con-
tained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet
there is a definite effect to which that sacrament is directed.
Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those
who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of the altar :
even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not
released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, where-
fore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction
for one sin. Nevertheless, if anything from special suffrages
be left over for those for whom they are offered (for instance
if they need them not) we may well beheve that by God's
mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages
are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damas-
cene {Serm. de Dormient.) who says : Truly God, forasmuch
as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange
for an exchange of deficiencies : and this exchange is effected
when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.
QUESTION LXXIL
OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN
HEAVEN.
{In Three Articles.)
We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in
heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers ?
(2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us ?
(3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always
granted ?
First Article.
whether the saints have knowledge of our
PRAYERS ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the saints have no know-
ledge of our prayers. For a gloss on Isa.lxiii. 16, Thou art
our father and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel hath
been ignorant of us, says that the dead saints know not what
the living, even their own children, are doing. This is taken
from Augustine [De Cura pro Mort. xiii.), where he quotes
the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words : If
such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening
to the people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves
in watching and helping the affairs and actions of the living ?
Therefore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.
Obj. 2. Further, the following words are addressed to
King Joas (4 Kings xxii. 20): Therefore (i.e., because thou
hast wept before Me), 7 will gather thee to thy fathers . . .
that thy eyes may not see all the evils which I will bring upon
75
Q. 72. Art. i THE '* SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 76
this place. But Joas would have gained no such advantage
from his death if he were to know after death what was
happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death
know not our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of
our prayers.
Ohj. 3. Further, The more perfect a man is in charity, the
more he succours his neighbour when the latter is in danger.
Now the saints, in this life, watch over their neighbour,
especially their kinsfolk, when these are in danger, and
manifestly assist them. Since then, after death, their
charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds,
much more would they watch over their friends and kindred
and assist them in their needs : and yet, seemingly, they do
not. Therefore it would seem that our deeds and prayers
are not known to them.
Ohj. 4. Further, Even as the saints after death see the
Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated (Matth. xviii. 10)
that their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father.
Yet the angels through seeing the Word do not therefore
know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed from
their lack of knowledge by the higher angels,* as Dionysius
declares [Ccel. Hier. vii.). Therefore although the saints
see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other
things that happen in our regard.
Obj. 5. Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now
prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs
to God alone to know our prayers. Therefore our prayers
are unknown to the saints.
On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job xiv. 21,
Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall
not understand, says [Moral, xii.) : This does not apply to
the souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of Almighty
God's glory we must nowise believe that anything outside that
glory is unknown to them. Therefore they are cognizant of
our prayers.
Further, Gregory says [Dial, ii.) : All creatures are little to
the soul that sees God : because however little it sees of the
♦ Cf. P. I., Q. CVL, A. I.
77 PRAYER ADDRESSED TO SAINTS Q. 72. Art. 1
Creator s light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it.
Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints
being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our
regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then
distance does not prevent these things, as appears from the
authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the saints are
cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below.
Further, Unless they were aware of what happens in our
regard they would not pray for us, since they would be
ignorant of our needs. But this is the error of Vigilantius,
as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore the
saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard.
/ answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium
for knowing all things, and this is evident from the fact that
God, by seeing His essence, sees all things. But it does not
follow that whoever sees God's essence knows all things,
but only those who comprehend the essence of God:* even
as the knowledge of a principle does not involve the know-
ledge of all that follows from that principle, unless the whole
virtue of the principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since
the souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence,
it does not follow that they know all that can be known by
the Divine essence, — for which reason the lower angels are
taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels,
though they all see the essence of God; but each of the
blessed must needs see in the Divine essence as many other
things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the
perfection of a man's happiness requires him to have
whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss : and each one
wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself.
Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish
to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it
follows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to
their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation:
for thus they become God's co-operators, than which nothing
is more Godlike, as Dionysius declares [Ccel. Hier. iii.).
Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such
* Cf. P. I., Q. XII., AA. 7, 8.
Q. 72. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 78
things as are required for this purpose ; and so it is manifest
that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers
of those who have recourse to their assistance.
Reply Ohj. i. The saying of Augustine is to be understood
as referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls,
which knowledge is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But
he is not speaking of their knowledge in the Word, for it is
clear that when Isaias said this, Abraham had no such
knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before
Christ's passion.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the saints, after this life, know
what happens here below, we must not believe that they
grieve through knowing the woes of those whom they loved
in this world: for they are so filled with heavenly joy, that
sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore if after death
they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled
by their removal from this world before their woes occur.
Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve some-
what, if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones:
and since the soul of Josias was not glorif.ed as soon as it
went out from his body, it is in this respect that Augustine
uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have
no knowledge of the deeds of the hving.
Reply Ohj. 3. The souls of the saints have their will fully
conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things
willed; and consequently, although they retain the love of
charity towards their neighbour, they do not succour him
otherwise than they see to be in conformity with the dis-
position of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed
that they help their neighbour very much by interceding
for him to God.
Reply Ohj. 4. Although it does not follow that those who see
the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that
pertain to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.
Reply Ohj. 5. God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of
the heart : yet others know them, in so far as these are re-
vealed to them, either by their vision of the Word or by
any other means.
79 PRAYER ADDRESSED TO SAINTS Q. 72. Art. 2
Second Article.
whether we ought to call upon the saints to
pray for us ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that we ought not to call upon
the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends
to pray for him, except in so far as he believes he will more
easily find favour with them. But God is infinitely more
merciful than any saint, and consequently His will is more
easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will
of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the
saints mediators between us and God, that they may inter-
cede for us.
Ohj. 2. Further, If we ought to beseech them to pray for
us, this is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable
to God. Now among the saints the holier a man is, the
more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we ought
always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for us with
God, and never the lesser ones.
Ohj. 3. Further, Christ, even as man, is called the Holy
of Holies, and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray.
Yet we never call upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore
neither should we ask the other saints to do so.
Obj. 4. Further, Whenever one person intercedes for an-
other at the latter's request, he presents his petition to the
one with whom he intercedes for him. Now it is unneces-
sary to present anything to one to whom all things are
present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the saints
our intercessors with God.
Obj. 5. Further, It is unnecessary to do a thing if, without
doing it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved
in the same way, or else not achieved at all. Now the saints
would pray for us just the same, or would not pray for us
at all, whether we pray to them or not : for if we be worthy
of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we
prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray
Q. 72. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 80
not for us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems
altogether unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.
On the contrary, It is written (Job v. i) : Call . . . if there
he any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints.
Now, as Gregory says {Moral, v. 30) on this passage, we call
up07i God when we beseech Him in humble prayer. Therefore
when we wish to pray God, we should turn to the saints, that
they may pray God for us.
Further, The saints who are in heaven are more accept-
able to God than those who are on the way. Now we
should make the saints, who are on the way, our intercessors
with God, after the example of the Apostle, who said
(Rom. XV. 30) : I beseech you . . . brethren, through 04ir Lord
Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you
help me in your prayers for me to God. Much more, there-
fore, should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us
by their prayers to God.
Further, An additional argument is provided by the
common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers of
the saints in the Litany.
/ answer that, According to Dionysius {^ccl. Hier. v.) the
order estabhshed by God among things is that the last should
be led to God by those that are midway between. Wherefore,
since the saints who are in heaven are nearest to God, the
order of the Divine law requires that we, who while we
remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be
brought back to God by the saints who are between us and
Him: and this happens when the Divine goodness pours
forth its effect into us through them. And since our return
to God should correspond to the outflow of His boons upon
us, just as the Divine favours reach us by means of the
saints' intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought
back to God, that we may receive His favours again. Hence
it is that we make them our intercessors with God, and our
mediators as it were, when we ask them to pray for us.
Reply Obj. i. It is not on account of any defect in God's
power that He works by means of second causes, but it is
for the perfection of the order of the universe, and the more
8i PRAYER ADDRESSED TO SAINTS Q. 72. Art. 2
manifold outpouring of His goodness on things, through His
bestowing on them not only the goodness which is proper
to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others.
Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we
need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the
saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be
observed.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the greater saints are more accept-
able to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to
pray to the lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because
sometimes one has greater devotion for a lesser saint than
for a greater, and the effect of prayer depends very much
on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness,
for continual attention to one thing makes a person weary;
whereas by praying to different saints, the fervour of our
devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is
granted to some saints to exercise their patronage in certain
special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against the fire
of hell. Fourthly, that due honour be given by us to all.
Fifthly, because the prayers of several sometimes obtain
that which would not have been obtained by the prayers
of one.
Reply Ohj. 3. Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular
persons (supposita). Hence, were we to say: Christ, pray
for us, except we added something, this would seem to refer
to Christ's person, and consequently to agree with the
error either of Nestorius, who distinguished in Christ the
person of the son of man from the person of the Son of God,
or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is less
than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church
says not : Christ, pray for us, but Christ, hear us, or have
mercy on us.
Reply Ohj. 4. As we shall state further on (A. 3) the saints
are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they
notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God
to grant those prayers a gracious hearing, or because they
seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be
done according to His providence.
III. 6 6
Q. 72. ART. 3 THE "SUMMATHEOLOGICA" 82
Reply Ohj. 5. A person is rendered worthy of a saint's
prayers for him by the very fact that in his need he has
recourse to him with pure devotion. Hence it is not un-
necessary to pray to the saints.
Third Article.
WHETHER THE PRAYERS WHICH THE SAINTS POUR FORTH
TO GOD FOR US ARE ALWAYS GRANTED ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article :—
Objection I. It would seem that the prayers which the
saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted.
For if they were always granted, the saints would be heard
especially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But
they are not heard in reference to these things; wherefore it
is stated in the Apocalypse (vi. Ii) that on the martyrs
beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, tt was
said to them that they should rest for a little while ttll the number
of their brethren should be filled up* Much less therefore,
are they heard in reference to matters concerning others.
Ohi. 2. Further, It is written (Jer. xv. i) : If Moses and
Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is mi towards tUs
people. Therefore, the saints are not always heard when
they pray God for us. , , ^ u
Obi 3 Further, The saints in heaven are stated to be
equal to the angels of God (Matth. xxii. 30). But the angels
are not always heard in the prayers which they offer up to
God. This is evident from Dan. x. 12, 13, where it is written :
I am come for thy words : but the prince of the kingdom of the
Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days. But the angel
who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking
of God to be set free ; and yet Ihc fulfilment of his prayer was
hindered. Therefore neither are other saints always heard
by God when they pray for us. , . ,
Obj 4 Further, Whosoever obtains something by prayer
merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the
* Vulg.,— <«•« their fellow-servants and their brethren . . . should
be filled up.
% PRAYER ADDRESSED TO SAINTS Q „ a., ,
this IS not Irae. because then the Chm^h. ^°'f""y- '''"
dead wodd be unnecess.,7 ^'^°' '" ""
, ^,"*"""«')'. It is written (2 Machab ,v ,.i. ti- ■
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is clear (tom wli. foll^ ,„ °f 'f ' ^Z P"*''" ««' Sranted
another, but that when we are deL 1 . ^'"^ ^'"' """^
^Une heard : and afte^dst l^^^^t^X^^^^
words: If the apostles and martyrs Myetl^ufT''^
pray for others, while thev are JllZr I ^f ^^' ^^^^ ^^«
much more can thev d7 1 !''^'''*'-^'''*^'»'''^^'^'- f^ow
triumph isZadylt:' "'''^ ''' '""'''' ''' -^^->'' ^^^
y ^irst. by .^^,«, prayer, when by their prayers they
Q. 72. Art. 3 THE '* SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 84
seek a hearing of the Divine clemency on our behalf:
secondly, by interpretive prayer, namely by their merits
which, being known to God, avail not only them unto glory,
but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of
Christ's blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways
the saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain
what they ask, yet on our part they may fail so that we
obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far as they are said
to pray for us by reason of their merits avaihng on our
behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking some-
thing for us in their prayers, their prayers are always
granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they
ask save for what they will to be done ; and what God wills is
always fulfilled, — unless we speak of His antecedent will,
whereby He wishes all men to he saved.* For this will is not
always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also which the
saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled
sometimes.
Reply Ohj. i. This prayer of the martyrs is merely their
desire to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of
those who will be saved, and their consent to God's justice in
punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on Apoc. vi. 11, How
long, 0 Lord, says: They desire an increase of joy and the
fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God's justice.
Reply Ohj. 2. The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel
according to their state in this life. For we read that they
withstood God's anger by praying for the people. And yet
even if they had been living at the time in question, they
would have been unable to placate God towards the people
by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same
people : and it is thus that we are to understand this passage.
Reply Ohj. 3. This dispute among the good angels does
not mean that they offered contradictory prayers to God,
but that they submitted contrary merits on various sides
to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God's pronouncing
sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says
(Moral, xvii.) in explanation of the aforesaid words of
♦ a. P. I., Q. XIX., A. 6, ad i.
85 PRAYER ADDRESSED TO SAINTS Q. 72. Art. 3
Daniel : The lofty spirits that are set over the nations never
fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, hut they justly judge
and try their deeds. And when the guilt or innocence of any
particular nation is brought into the debate of the court above,
the ruling spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost
in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is
victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their
eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain, wherefore
neither do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear
that their prayers are always heard.
Reply Obj. 4. Although the saints are not in a state to
merit for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they
are in a state to merit for others, or rather to assist others
by reason of their previous merit: for while living they
merited that their prayers should be heard after their
death.
Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count,
and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain
equation of the act to the end for which it is intended, and
which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of
a prayer depends on the liberality of the person supplicated.
Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the
person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited
either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for :
and so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting,
it does not follow that they are not in the state of
impetrating.
Reply Obj. 5. As appears from the authority of Gregory
quoted above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but
what they see to be in the Divine will: and so neither do
they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer fruitless, since
as Augustine says (De Prced. Sanct.*) : The prayers of the
saints profit the predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-
ordained that they shall be saved through the prayers of
those who intercede for them: and consequently God also
wills that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled
through their prayers.
* De Dono Persever. xxii.
Q. 72. Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
86
Reply Ohj. 6. The suffrages of the Church for the dead
are as so many satisfactions of the Hving in heu of the dead :
and accordingly they free the dead from the punishment
which the latter have not paid. But the saints in heaven
are not in the state of making satisfaction ; and consequently
the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages of
the Church.
QUESTION LXXIII.
OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the signs that will precede the
judgment: and under this head there are three points of
inquiry: (i) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's
coming to judgment ? (2) Whether in very truth the sun
and moon will be darkened ? (3) Whether the powers of
the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come ?
First Article.
WHETHER ANY SIGNS WILL PRECEDE THE LORD'S COMING TO
JUDGMENT?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the Lord's coming to
judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is
written (i Thess. v. 3) : When they shall say : Peace and
security ; then shall sudden destruction come upon them. Now
there would be no peace and security if men were terrified by
previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming.
Ohj. 2. Further, Signs are ordained for the manifestation
of something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore
it is written (i Thess. v. 2) : The day of the Lord shall come
as a thief in the night. Therefore signs ought not to
precede it.
Ohj. 3. Further, The time of His first coming was fore-
known by the prophets, which does not apply to His second
coming. Now no such signs preceded the first coming of
Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the second.
87
Q. 73. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88
On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 25) : There shall
be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars, etc.
Further, Jerome* mentions fifteen signs preceding the
judgment. He saj's that on the first day all the seas will
rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the second day
all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that
scarcely will they be visible; on the third day they will be
restored to their pre\dous condition; on the fourth day all
the great fishes and other things that move in the waters
will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea,
roar at one another contentiously ; on the fifth day, all the
birds of the air will gather together in the fields, waihng to
one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the sixth day
rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together
from the west to the east; on the seventh day all the stars,
both planets and fixed stars, will throw out fiery tails like
comets; on the eighth day there \vill be a great earthquake,
and all animals will be laid low; on the ninth day all the
plants will be bedewed as it were \vith blood; on the tenth
day all stones, httle and great, will be divided into four
parts dashing against one another; on the eleventh day all
hills and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust;
on the twelfth da\^ all animals will come from forest and
mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on
the thirteenth day all graves from east to west will open to
allow the bodies to rise again; on the fourteenth day all men
will leave their abode, neither understanding nor speaking,
but rushing hither and thither Hke madmen ; on the fifteenth
day all will die and will rise again with those who died long
before.
1 amwer that, \Vhen Christ shall come to judge He will
appear in the form of glory, on account of the authority
becoming a judge. Now it pertains to the dignity of
judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to
reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs will
precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judg-
* S. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix. 4. He quotes S. Jerome, but
the reference is not known.
89 SIGNS PRECEDING JUDGMENT Q. 73 Art. i
ment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to sub-
jection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the judg-
ment, being forewarned by those signs. But it is not easy
to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which
we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesy-
chius about the end of the world {Ep. Ixxx.), refer not only
to Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the
sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming ol Christ in ceaselessly
visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them
carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming
advent, as he remarks: because these signs that are men-
tioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have
been from the beginning of the human race : unless perhaps
we say that at that time they will be more prevalent:
although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will
foretell the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned
by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he
found them written in the annals of the Hebrews: and,
indeed, they contain very little likelihood.
Reply Ohj. i. According to Augustine [Ad Hesych. ; loc.
cit.) towards the end of the world there will be a general
persecution of the good by the wicked : so that at the same
time some will fear, namely the good, and some will be secure,
namely the wicked. The words: When they shall say:
Peace and security, refer to the wicked, who will pay little
heed to the signs of the coming judgment : while the words
of Luke xxi. 26, men withering away, etc., should be referred
to the good.
We may also reply that all these signs that will happen
about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur
within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the
judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men
be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day,
yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think
themselves to be in peace and security, after the death of
Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the
world is not at once destroyed, as they thought hitherto.
Reply Ohj. 2. The day of the Lord is said to come as a
Q. 73- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 90
thief, because the exact time is not known, since it will not
be possible to know it from those signs: although, as v/e
have already said, all these most manifest signs which will
precede the judgment immediately may be comprised
under the judgment day.
Reply Ohj. 3. At His first advent Christ came secretly,
although the appointed time was known beforehand by the
prophets. Hence there was no need for such signs to
appear at His first coming, as will appear at His second
advent, when He will come openly, although the appointed
time is hidden.
Second Article.
whether towards the time of the judgment the sun
and moon will be darkened in very truth ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that towards the time of the
judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth.
For, as Rabanus says, commenting on Matth. xxiv. 29,
nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun, moon, and
stars will then he deprived 0} their light, as we know happened
to the sun at the time of our Lord's passion.
Ohj. 2. Further, The light of the heavenly bodies is
directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by its
means and not only by their movement they act upon this
lower world, as Averroes says {De Subst. Orhis.). But
generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light
remain in the heavenly bodies.
Ohj. 3. Further, According to some the inferior bodies
will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now
heavenly bodies act not only by movement, but also by hght,
as stated above (Ohj. 2). Therefore as the movement of
heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly bodies.
On the contrary. According to astronomers the sun and
moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this darken-
ing of the sun and moon is stated to be simultaneous, when
the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the darkening
will not be in very truth due to a natural ecHpse.
91 SIGNS PRECEDING JUDGMENT Q. 73- Art. 2
Further, It is not seemly for the same to be the cause of
a thing's failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall
come the hght of the luminaries will increase according to
Isa. XXX. 26, The light of the moon shall he as the light of the
sun, and the light of the sun shall he sevenfold. Therefore it
is unfitting for the light of these bodies to cease when our
Lord comes.
/ answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in respect
of the very moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible
that they will be darkened through being bereft of their
light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise again the
whole world will be renewed, as we shall state further on
(Q. LXXIV.). If, however, we speak of them in respect
of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is pos-
sible that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and other
luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at various
times or all together, in order to inspire men with fear.
Reply Ohj. i. Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding
the judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment
day is over the words of Isaias shall be fulfilled.
Reply Ohj. 2. Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for
the purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies,
but also for their own perfection and beauty. Hence it
does not follow that where generation ceases, the light of the
heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it will increase.
Reply Ohj. 3. It does not seem probable that the
elemental qualities will be removed from the elements,
although some have asserted this. If, however, they be
removed, there would still be no parallel between them and
light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one
another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is
a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way
of a principle regulating things in opposition to one another
and bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a
parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for move-
ment is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it must
needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this
cannot be said of light.
Q. 73- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 92
Third Article.
whether the virtues of heaven will be moved
when our lord shall come ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the virtues of heaven
will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the
virtues of heaven can denote only the blessed angels. Now
immobiUty is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will
be impossible for them to be moved.
Ohj. 2. Further, Ignorance is the cause of wonder [Met. i. 2).
Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as
Gregory says [Dial, iv.; Moral, xii.), what do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all. Therefore it will be impossible
for them to be moved with wonder, as stated in the text
(iv. Sent. D. 48).
Ohj. 3. Further, All the angels will be present at the
Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated (Apoc. vii. 11):
All the angels stood round about the throne. Now the virtues
denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it should
not be said of them rather than of others, that they are
moved.
On the contrary, It is written (Job xxvi. 11) : The pillars of
heaven tremble, and dread at His beck. Now the pillars of
heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. Therefore
the virtues of heaven will be moved.
Further, It is written (Matth. xxiv. 29) : The stars shall
fall from heaven, and the virtues (Douay, — powers) of heaven
shall be moved.
I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels,*
as Dionysius states {Coel. Hier. xi.). For sometimes the
name of virtues is appropriated to one order, which accord-
ing to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but
according to Gregory (Hom. in Ev. xxxiv.) is the highest
order of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is em-
ployed to denote all the heavenly spirits in general. In
♦ Cf. P. I., Q. CVIII., A. 5, ad i.
93 SIGNS PRECEDING JUDGMENT Q. 73 Art. 3
the question at issue it may be taken either way. For in
the text {loc, cit.) it is explained according to the second
acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then they
are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of
the world, as stated in the text. It can also be explained
in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order;
and then that order is said to be moved more than the others
by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (loc.
cit.) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which
especially will be worked about that time : or again, because
that order — since, according to Dionysius [loc. cit), it belongs
to the middle hierarchy — is not limited in its power, where-
fore its ministry must needs regard universal causes. Conse-
quently the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move
the heavenly bodies which are the cause of what happens
in nature here below. And again the very name denotes
this, since they are called the virtues of heaven. Accordingly
they will be moved then, because they will no more produce
their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies : even
as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no
longer fulfil the of&ce of guardians.
Reply Ohj. i. This movement changes nothing pertaining
to their state; but refers either to their effects which may
vary without any change on their part, or to some new
consideration of things which hitherto they were unable
to see by means of their concreated species, which change
of thought is not taken from them by their state of blessed-
ness. Hence Augustine says [De Trin. iii.) that God moves
the spiritual creature through time.
Reply Ohj. 2. Wonder is wont to be about things surpass-
ing our knowledge or ability : and accordingly the virtues of
heaven will wonder at the Divine power doing such things,
in so far as they fail to do or comprehend them. In this
sense the blessed Agnes said that the sun and moon wonder
at His beauty : and this does not imply ignorance in the
angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has
been said.
QUESTION LXXIV.
OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION.
{In Nine Articles.)
We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration:
and under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(i) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place ?
(2) Whether it will be effected by fire ? (3) Whether that
fire is of the same species as elemental fire ? (4) Whether
that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens ? (5) Whether
that fire will consume the other elements ? (6) Whether it
will cleanse all the elements ? (7) Whether that fire pre-
cedes or follows the judgment ? (8) Whether men are to
be consumed by that fire ? (9) Whether the wicked will
be involved therein ?
First Article,
whether the world is to be cleansed ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not to be any
cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean
needs cleansing. Now God's creatures are not unclean,
wherefore it is written (Acts x. 15) : That which God hath
cleansed, do not thou call common, i.e. unclean. Therefore
the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed.
Ohj. 2. Further, According to Divine justice cleansing is
directed to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as in-
stanced in the cleansing after death. But there can be no
stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, seem-
ingly, they need not to be cleansed.
94
95 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. i
Obj. 3. Further, A thing is said to be cleansed when any
foreign matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom:
for the removal of that which ennobles a thing is not called
a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it pertains to
the perfection and nobihty of the elements that something
of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of
a mixed body is more noble than the form of a simple body.
Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of
this world can possibly be cleansed.
On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind of
cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it is
written (Apoc. xxi. i) : I saw a new heaven and a new earth :
for the first heaven and the first earth was gone. Therefore the
elements shall be cleansed.
Further, a gloss* on i Cor. vii. 31, The fashion of this
earth passeth away, says: The beauty of this world will
perish in the burning of worldly flames. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
/ answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made for
man's sake, it follows that, when man shall be glorified in
the body, the other bodies of the world shall also be changed
to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place
for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now in order
that man obtain the glory of the body, it behoves first of all
those things to be removed which are opposed to glory.
There are two, namely the corruption and stain of sin, —
because according to i Cor. xv. 50, neither shall corruption
possess incorruption, and all the unclean shall be without the
city of glory (Apoc. xxii. 15), — and again, the elements
require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere
they be brought to the newness of glory, proportionately
to what we have said with regard to man. Now although,
properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the sub-
ject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin
corporeal things contract a certain unfittingness for being
appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we
find that places where crimes have been committed are
* S. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xx. 16.
Q. 74. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 96
reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein,
unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly that part
of the world which is given to our use contracts from men's
sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this
respect it needs to be cleansed. In Uke manner with regard
to the intervening space, on account of the contact of the
elements, there are many corruptions, generations and
alterations of the elements, which diminish their purity:
wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also,
so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.
Reply Ohj. i. WTien it is asserted that every creature of
God is clean we are to understand this as meaning that its
substance contains no alloy of evil, as the Manichees main-
tained, saying that evil and good are two substances in some
places severed from one another, in others mingled together.
But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture
of a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is incon-
sistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor does this
prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although
not mingled with it as part of its substance.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although corporeal elements cannot be the
subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed
in them they contract a certain unfitness for receiving the
perfection of glory.
Reply Ohj. 3. The form of a mixed body and the form of
an element may be considered in two ways: either as
regards the perfection of the species, and thus a mixed body
is more perfect, — or as regards their continual endurance;
and thus the simple body is more noble, because it has not
in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by
something extrinsic : whereas a mixed body has in itself the
cause of its corruption, namely the composition of con-
traries. Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible
in part is incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a
mixed body. And since incorruption belongs to the per-
fection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is
more in keeping with the perfection of glory, than the per-
fection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in
97 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. 2
itself some principle of incorruption, as the human body has
the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although
a mixed body is somewhat more noble than a simple body a
simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than
if It exist in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple
bodies are somewhat in potentiaHty, whereas, existing by
themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection.
Second Article.
WHETHER THE CLEANSING OF THE WORLD WILL BE
EFFECTED BY FIRE ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article :
Objection I. It would seem that this cleansing will not
be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world it
needs to be cleansed hke the other parts. Now the same
tiling should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore
It would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.
Obj. z. Further, Just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has
water. Since then all things are not capable of being
cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by water,—
which distinction is moreover observed by the old law —it
would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all
things.
Obj. 3. Further, This cleansing would seem to consist in
purifying the parts of the world by separating them from
one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world
from one another at the world's beginning was effected by
God's power alone, for the work of distinction was carried
out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the
separation was effected by the act of the intellect which
moves aU things (cf. Arist. Fhys. viii., text. ^^). Therefore
it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will
be done immediately by God and not by fire.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xlix. 3) : A fire shall
burn before Eim, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him •
and afterwards in reference to the judgment [verse 4) • He
shall call heaven from above, and the earth to judge His people
Q. 74- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGIC A " 98
Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing of the world
^^^ll be by means of fire.
Further, It is written (2 Pet. iii. 12) : The heavens being on
fire will he dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burn-
ing heat. Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.
/ answer that, As stated above (A. i) this cleansing of the
\\'orld wdll remove from it the stain contracted from sin,
and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be a dis-
position to the perfection of glory ; and consequently in this
threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be effected
by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the
elements, its natural properties are more Hke the properties
of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light.
Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active
virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the
admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere
of fire is far removed from our abode ; nor are we so f amihar
with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so
that it is not so hable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most
efiicacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of
rarefaction.
Reply Ohj. i. Fire is not employed by us in its proper
matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a
foreign matter: and in this respect it will be possible for
the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state.
But in so far as it has an admixture of some foreign matter
it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be
cleanser and cleansed under different aspects; and this is
not unreasonable.
Reply Ohj. 2. The first cleansing of the world by the deluge
regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was
most prevalent then was the sin of concupiscence, and con-
sequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by
means of its contrary, namely water. But the second
cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of
mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to
be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water
tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore the
99 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. 3
natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by
water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the
prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world
were already growing old, because then, according to
Matth. xxiv. 12, the chanty of many shall grow cold, and
consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by
fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be
cleansed by fire : some things, however, cannot be cleansed
by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths
and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be
cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally
destroyed by fire.
Reply Ohj. 3. By the work of distinction things received
different forms whereby they are distinct from one another :
and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is
the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things
will be restored to the purity wherein they were created,
wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its
Creator to this effect ; and for this reason is a creature em-
ployed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.
Third Article.
whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed
will be of the same species with elemental fire ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the fire in question is not
of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes
itself. But that fire will consume the four elements accord-
ing to a gloss on 2 Pet. iii. 12. Therefore that fire will not
be of the same species as elemental fire.
Ohj. 2. Further, As power is made known by operation,
so is nature made known by power. Now that fire will
have a different power from the fire which is an element:
because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this fire cannot
do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species as this.
Ohj. 3. Further, In natural bodies those that are of the
same species have the same movement. But that fire will
Q. 74. Art. 3 THE ^'SUMMA THEOLOGICA" loo
have a different movement from the fire that is an element,
because it wdll move in all directions so as to cleanse the
whole. Therefore it is not of the same species.
On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx.), and his
words are contained in a gloss on i Cor. vii. 31, that the
fashion of this world will perish in the burning of worldly
flames. Therefore that fire will be of the same nature as
the fire which is now in the world.
Further, Just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so
was the past cleansing by water; and they are both com-
pared to one another, 2 Pet. iii. 5. Now in the first cleansing
the water was of the same species with elemental water.
Therefore in hke manner the fire of the second cleansing will
be of the same species with elemental fire.
I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this ques-
tion. For some say that the element of fire which is in its
own sphere will come down to cleanse the world: and they
explain this descent by way of multiplication, because the
fire will spread through finding combustible matter on all
sides. And this will result all the more then, since the
virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements. Against
this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this
fire will come down, but also the statement of the saints
that it will rise up; thus (2 Pet. iii. 10) it is declared that
the fire of the judgment will rise as high as the waters of
the deluge; whence it would seem to follow that this fire
is situated towards the middle of the place of generation.
Hence others say that this fire will be generated towards
the intervening space through the focussing together of the
rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focussed
together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of
glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will
strike. But this again does not seem probable: for since
the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed
positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the virtue of
the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be
known to those who observe the movements of the stars,
and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Conse-
loi THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 3
qiiently others, following Augustine, say that just as the
deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world,
so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly
flames {De Civ. Dei, xx.). This burning is nothing else but
the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that by
their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will
take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the
Divine power : and from all these causes thus assembled the
fire that will burn the surface of this world will result. If
we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they
differ as to the cause producing this fire and not as to its
species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some
lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own
sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture
of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case
then, since fire cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become
its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the
fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.
Reply Obj. i. The fire in question, although of the same
species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see
that of two fires of the same species one destroys the other,
namely the greater destroys the lesser, by consuming its
matter. In like manner that fire will be able to destroy
our fire.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as an operation that proceeds from
the virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is
its virtue an indication of its essence or nature, if it proceed
from the essential principles of the thing. But an operation
that does not proceed from the virtue of the operator does
not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for
the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue of the
mover rather than that of the instrument, since it shows
forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the
first principle of the action, whereas it does not show forth
the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it is suscep-
tive of the influence of the principal agent as moving that
instrument. In Hke manner a virtue that does not proceed
from the essential principles of a thing does not indicate
Q. 74. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102
the nature of that thing except in the point of susceptibility.
Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no indication
of the nature of water except in the point of its being recep-
tive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that
has this virtue from being of the same species as water that
has it not. In like manner it is not imreasonable that this
fire, which will have the power to cleanse the surface of the
world, will be of the same species as the fire to which we are
used, since the heating power therein arises, not from its
essential principles, but from the divine power or operation :
whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such
as heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed
to instrumental virtue (iv. Sent. D. i, qu. i, A. 4).* The
latter is more probable since that fixe will not act save as the
instrument of the Divine power.
Reply Obj. 3. Of its own nature fire tends only upwards;
but in so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when
it is outside its own sphere, it follows the site of combustible
matter. Accordingly it is not unreasonable for it to take
a circular or a downward course, especially in so far as it
acts as the instrument of the Divine power.
Fourth Article,
whether that fire will cleanse also the higher
HEAVENS ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that that fire will cleanse also
the higher heavens. For it is written (Ps. ci. 26, 27):
The heavens are the works of Thy hands : they shall perish
but Thou remainest. Now the higher heavens also are the
work of God's hands. Therefore they also shall perish in
the final burning of the world.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (2 Pet. iii. 12): The heavens
being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt
with the burning heat of fire. Now the heavens that are
distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, wherein
* Cf. P. III., Q. LXII., A. ^, ad 1.
103 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 4
the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they also
will be cleansed by that fire.
Ohj. 3. Further, The purpose of that fire will be to remove
from bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory.
Now in the higher heaven we find this indisposition both as
regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, and as regards
natural deficiency, since a gloss on Rom. viii. 22, We know
that every creature groafieth and is in labour even until now, says :
All the elements fulfil their duty with labour : even as it is not
without labour that the sun and moon travel their appointed
course. Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed
by that fire.
On the contrary, The heavenly bodies are not receptive
of impressions from without.
Further, A gloss on 2 Thess. i. 8, In a flame of fire giving
vengeance, says: There will he in the world a fire that shall
precede Him, and shall rise in the air to the same height as
did the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge
did not rise to the height of the higher heavens but only 15
cubits higher than the mountain summits (Gen. vii. 20).
Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire.
I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be for the
purpose of removing from bodies the disposition contrary to
the perfection of glory, and this perfection is the final con-
summation of the universe : and this disposition is to be found
in all bodies, but differently in different bodies. For in
some this indisposition regards something inherent to their
substance: as in these lower bodies which by being mixed
together fall away from their own purity. In others this
indisposition does not regard something inherent to their
substance ; as in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to
be found contrary to the final perfection of the universe,
except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not
any kind of movement, but only local movement, which
changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance,
quantity, or quality, but only its place which is extrinsic to
it. Consequently there is no need to take anything away
from the substance of the higher heavens, but only to set
Q. 74. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 104
its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to
rest not by the action of a counter agent, but by the mover
ceasing to move ; and therefore the heavenly bodies will not
be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the action of any creature,
but in Heu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God's
will alone.
Reply Ohj. i. As Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx.): Those
words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be
cleansed by the fire of the final conflagration. Or we may
reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are
said to perish as regards their movement whereby now they
are moved without cessation.
Reply Ohj. 2. Peter explains himself to which heavens he
refers. For before the words quoted, he had said {verses
5-7): The heavens . . . first, and the earth . . . through
water . . . perished . . . which . . . now, by the same word
are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day of judgment.*
Therefore the heavens to be cleansed are those which before
were cleansed by the waters of the deluge, namely the aerial
heavens.
Reply Ohj. 3. This labour and service of the creature, that
Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than
the successive movements whereby they are subject to time,
and the lack of that final consummation which they will attain
in the end. Nor did the empyrean heaven contract any
stain from the sin of the demons, because they were expelled
from that heaven as soon as they sinned.
Fifth Article,
whether that fire will consume the other elements ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the fire in question
will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on
2 Pet. iii. 12 says: This exceedifig great fire will engulf the four
elements whereof the world consists : yet it will not so engulf all
things that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of
* The entire text differs somewhat from S. Thomas's quotation ;
but the sense is the same.
4
105 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 5
them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better fashion.
Therefore it would seem that at least two of the elements
are to be entirely destroyed by that fire.
Ohj. 2. Further, It is written (Apoc. xxi. i): The first
heaven and the first earth have passed away and the sea is no
more. Now the heaven here denotes the air, as Augustine
states (De Civ. Dei, xx.); and the sea denotes the gathering
together of the waters. Therefore it would seem that these
three elements will be wholly destroyed.
Obj. 3. Further, Fire does not cleanse except in so far as
other things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses
the other elements, they must needs become its matter.
Therefore they must pass into its nature, and consequently
be voided of their own nature.
Obj. 4. Further, The form of fire is the most noble of the
forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now all
things will be brought to the most noble state by this
cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly
transformed into fire.
On the contrary, A gloss on i Cor. vii. 31, The fashion of
this world passeth away, says : The beauty, not the substance,
passeth. But the very substance of the elements belongs to
the perfection of the world. Therefore the elements will
not be consumed as to their substance.
Further, This final cleansing that will be effected by fire
will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by
water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of the
elements. Therefore neither will the former which will be
the work of fire.
/ answer that, There are many opinions on this question.
For some say that all the elements will remain as to their
matter, while all will be changed as regards their imperfec-
tion ; but that two of them will retain their respective sub-
stantial form, namely air and earth, while two of them,
namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form
but wiU be changed to the form of heaven. In this way
three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will be called
heaven; although air will retain the same substantial form
Q. 74. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 106
as it has now, since even now it is called heaven. Where-
fore (Apoc. xxi. i) only heaven and earth are mentioned:
/ saw, says he, a new heaven and a new earth. But this
opinion is altogether absurd : for it is opposed both to philo-
sophy— which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to
be in potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have
neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety — and to
theology, since according to this opinion the perfection of the
universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured
on account of two of the elements being destroyed.
Consequently heaven is taken to denote the fifth body,
while all the elements are designated by earth, as expressed
in Ps. cxlviii. 7, 8, Praise the Lord from the earth and after-
wards, Fire, hail, snow, ice, etc.
Hence others say that all the elements will remain as
to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities
will be taken from them: even as they sa}^ too, that in a
mixed body the elements retain their substantial form with-
out having their proper qualities, since these are reduced to
a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seem-
ingly the following words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei, xx.)
would seem in agreement with this: In this conflagration
of the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were
befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire :
and the substance itself will have those qualities that become
an immortal body.
However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper
qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial
form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms
remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for a
time by some violent action : thus in hot water we see that
by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which
it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water
remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to
the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper
passions : nor is it probable that in this final consummation
the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection.
Wherefore it would seem that the reply to this question
107 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 5
should be that the elements will remain as to their substance
and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from
the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and
from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual
action and passion : because when once the movement of the
first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be
impossible in the lower elements : and this is what Augustine
calls the qualities of corruptible elements, namely their un-
natural dispositions by reason of which they come near to
corruption.
Reply Obj. i. That fire is said to engulf the four elements
in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is
said further that it will consume two entirely, this does not
mean that two of the elements ^re to be destroyed as to
their substance, but that two will be more changed from the
property which they have now. Some say that these two are
fire and water which excel the others in their active quahties,
namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of cor-
ruption in other bodies ; and since then there will be no action
of fire and water which surpass the others in activity, they
would seem especially to be changed from the virtue which
they have now. Others, however, say that these two are
air and water, on account of the various movements of
these two elements, which movements they derive from the
movement of the heavenly bodies. And since these move-
ments will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the
disturbances of winds and so forth), therefore these elements
especially will be changed from the property which they have
now.
Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx.), when
it is stated : And the sea is no more, by the sea we may under-
stand the present world of which he had said previously
(xx. 13) : The sea gave up the dead that were in it. If, however,
the sea be taken literally we must reply that by the sea two
things are to be understood, namely the substance of the
waters, and their disposition, as containing salt and as to the
movement of the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this
second, but as to the first.
Q. 74. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
108
Reply Obj. 3. This fire will not act save as the instrument
of God's providence and power; wherefore it will not act
on the other elements so as to consume them but only so as
to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for that which becomes
the matter of fire, to be voided of its proper species entirely,
as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of its
species that remains returns to its proper and former state
as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same
with the elements after they are cleansed by fire.
Reply Obj. 4. In the elemental parts we must consider
not only what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also
what is befittmg it in its relation to the whole. I say, then,
that although water would be more noble if it had the form
of fire, as like\vise would earth and air, yet the universe
would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to
assume the form of fire.
Sixth Article,
whether all the elements will be cleansed by that
FIRE ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that neither will all the ele-
ments be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated
already (A. 3), \W11 not rise higher than the waters of the
deluge. But the waters of the deJuge did not reach to the
sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of fire be
cleansed by the final cleansing.
Obj. 2. Further, A gloss on Apoc. xxi. i, I saw a new heaven,
etc., says: There can be no doubt that the transformation of the
air and earth will be caused by fire ; but it is doubtful about
water, since it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself
Therefore at least it is uncertain that all the elements will be
cleansed.
Obj. 3. Further, A place where there is an everlasting stain
is never cleansed. Now there wiU always be a stain in hell.
Since, then, hell is situated among the elements, it would
seem that the elements \vill not be wholly cleansed.
109 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 6
Obj. 4. Further, The earthly paradise is situated on the
earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the
waters of the deluge reached it, as Bede says (Comm. in
Exod. v.), as is stated in ii. Sent. D. 7. Therefore it would
seem that the elements will not all be wholly cleansed.
On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (A. 5, Ohj. i) on
2 Pet. iii. 12 declares that this fire will e^igulf the four elements.
I answer that, Some* say that the fire in question will
rise to the summit of the space containing the four elements :
so that the elements would be entirely cleansed both from
the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of the elements
were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry
which stained the higher regions), and again from corrup-
tion, since the elements are corruptible in all their parts.
But this opinion is opposed to the authority of Scripture,
because it is written (2 Pet. iii. 7) that those heavens are
kept in store unto fire, which were cleansed by water; and
Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xx.) that the same world which
perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire. Now it is clear
that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of
the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits
above the mountain tops; and moreover it is known that
vapours or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot
pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit;
and so the stain of sin did not reach the aforesaid space.
Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibihty by the
removal of something that might be consumed by fixe:
whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements
arising from their mingling together to be consumed by
fire. And these impurities are chiefly roimd about the earth
as far as the middle of the air : wherefore the fire of the final
conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters
of the deluge rose to a height which can be approximately
calculated from the height of the moimtains which they sur-
passed in a fi^ed measure.
We therefore grant the First Objection,
Reply Obj. 2. The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss,
* S. Bona venture, iv. Sent. D. 47, A. 2, Q. 3.
Q. 74. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no
because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power
of cleansing, yet not such a power as will be competent to the
future state, as stated above (A. 5; A. 2, ad 2).
Reply Obj. 3. The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly
to remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints ; and
consequently in this cleansing all that is foul will be brought
together to the place of the damned: so hell will not be
cleansed, and the dregs of the whole earth will be brought
thither, according to Ps. Ixxiv. 9, The dregs thereof are not
emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink.
Reply Obj. 4. Although the sin of the first man was com-
mitted in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners,
as neither is the empyrean heaven: since from both places,
man and devil were expelled forthwith after their sin. Con-
sequently that place needs no cleansing.
Seventh Article.
whether the fire of the final conflagration is to
follow the judgment ?
We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the fire of the final confla-
gration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine [De Civ.
Dei, XX.) gives the following order of the things to take
place at the judgment, saying: At this judgment we have
learnt that the following thi^igs will occur. Elias the Thesbite
will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will persecute,
Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good sJtall be
separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and
shall be renewed. Therefore the burning will follow the judg-
ment.
Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {ibid.) : After the wicked
have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of
this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames. There-
fore the same conclusion follows.
Obj. 3. Further, When the Lord comes to judgment He
will find some men living, as appears from the words of
I Thess. iv. 16, where the Apostle speaking in their person,
Ill THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. 7
says: Then we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of
the Lord.* But it would not be so, if the burning of the
world were to come first, since they would be destroyed by the
fire. Therefore this fire will follow the judgment.
Obj. 4. Further, It is said that our Lord will come to
judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagra-
tion would seem to be the execution of the sentence of
Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. There-
fore that fire will follow the judgment.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xcvi. 3): A fire shall
go before Him.
Further, The resurrection will precede the judgment,
else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the burn-
ing of the world wiU precede the resurrection, for the saints
who will rise again will have spiritual and impassible bodies,
so that it will be impossible for the fire to cleanse them, and
yet the text (iv. Sent. D. 47) quotes Augustine {De Civ. Dei,
XX.) as saying that whatever needs cleansing in any way
shall be cleansed by that fire. Therefore that fire will
precede the judgment.
/ answer that, The lire in question will in reality, as regards
its beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be
gathered from the fact that the resurrection of the dead will
precede the judgment, since according to i Thess. iv. 13-16,
those who have slept shall be taken up . . . in the clouds . . .
into the air . . . to meet Christ coming to judgment. Now
the general resurrection and the glorification of the bodies
of the saints will happen at the same time ; for the saints in
rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by
I Cor. XV. 43, It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory:
and at the same time as the saints' bodies shall be glorified,
all creatures shall be renewed, each in its own way, as appears
from the statement (Rom. viii. 21) that the creature . . . itself
shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the
liberty of the glory of the children of God. Since then the
burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal,
* Vulg., — who are left, shall he taken . . . to meet Christ — the
words who remain, etc., are from verse 14.
Q. 74. Art 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
112
as stated above (AA. i, 4); it can clearly be gathered that
this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will precede
the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof,
whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.
Reply Ohj. i. Augustine is speaking not as one who decides
the point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from
his continuing thus: That all these things are to happen is a
matter of faith, but how and in what order we shall learn more
then by experience of the things themselves than now by seeking
a definite conclusion by arguing about them. Methinks, how-
ever, they will occur in the order I have given. Hence it
is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same
answer appUes to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3. All men shall die and rise again : yet those are
said to be found ahve who will live in the body imtil the
time of the conflagration.
Reply Obj. 4. That fire will not carry out the sentence of
the judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked : in
this respect it will follow the judgment.
Eighth Article,
whether that fire will have such an effect on men
as is described ?
We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this fire will not have
such an effect on men as is described in the text (iv. Sent.
D. 47). For a thing is said to be consumed when it is re-
duced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not
be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that
they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire
will not consume the wicked, as stated in the text.
Obj. 2. Further, If it be said that it will consume the bodies
of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary.
As the bodies of the wicked, so will those of the good be
brought to ashes : for it is the privilege of Christ alone that
His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it will consume
also the good who will then be found.
113 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74- Art. 8
Ohj. 3- Further, The stain of sin is more abundant in the
elements, as combining together to the formation of the
human body wherein is the corruption of the fomes* even
in the good, than in the elements existing outside the human
body. Now the elements existing outside the human body
will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much there-
fore will the elements in the human body whether of the
good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently
the bodies of both will need to be destroyed.
Ohj. 4. Further, As long as the state of the way lasts the
elements act in like maimer on the good and the wicked.
Now the state of the way will still endure in that conflagra-
tion, since after this state of the way death will not be
natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire. Therefore
that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and conse-
quently it does not seem that any distinction is made between
them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the
text.
Ohj. 5. Further, This fire will have done its work in a
moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the
living in whom there will be many things to be cleansed.
Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing.
I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far
as it will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument
of Divine justice as well as by the natural virtue of fire.
Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will act in
like manner on the wicked and good who will be alive, by
reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as it
acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently
on different people as regards the sense of pain. For the
wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas
the good in whom there wiU be nothing to cleanse will feel
no pain at all from the fire, as neither did the children in the
fiery furnace (Dan. iii.); although their bodies will not be
kept whole, as were the bodies of the children : and it will be
possible by God's power for their bodies to be destroyed
without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter
* Cf. I.-IL, Q. LXXXIII., A. 3; Q. XCI., A. 6.
ni. 6 8
Q. 74. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 114
for cleansing will be found, will suffer pain from that fire,
more or less according to their different merits.
On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire
will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone,
since the good will all have impassible bodies.
Reply Ohj. i. Consumption there signifies being brought,
not to nothing, but to ashes.
Reply Ohj. 2. Although the bodies of the good will be
reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby,
as neither did the children in the Babylonian furnace. In
this respect a distinction is drawn between the good and the
wicked.
Reply Ohj. 3. The elements that are in human bodies,
even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But
this will be done, by God's power, without their suffering
pain.
Reply Ohj. 4. This fire will act not only according to the
natural power of the element, but also as the instrument
of Divine justice.
Reply Ohj. 5. There are three reasons why those who will
be found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One
is because there will be few things in them to be cleansed,
since they will be already cleansed by the previous fears
and persecutions. The second is because they will suffer
pain both while li\dng and of their own will : and pain suffered
in this fife voluntarily cleanses much more than pain inflicted
after death, as in the case of the martyrs, because if anything
needing to he cleansed he found in them, it is cut off hy the
sickle of suffering, as Augustine says (De Unic. Bap. xiii.),
although the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in
comparison with the pain endured m purgatory. The third
is because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in
shortness of time.
115 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. 9
Ninth Article,
whether that fire will engulf the wicked ?
We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that that fire will not engulf
the wicked. For a gloss on Mai. iii. 3, He shall purify the
sons of Levi, says that it is a fire consuming the wicked and
refining the good ; and a gloss on i Cor. iii. 13, Fire shall try
every man's work, says: We read that there will be a twofold
fire, one that will cleanse the elect and will precede the judgment,
another that will torture the wicked. Now the latter is the
fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is
the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of the
final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the
wicked.
Obj. 2. Further, That fire will obey God in the cleansing of
the world : therefore it should receive its reward like the otluer
elements, especially since fire is the most noble of the ele-
ments. Therefore it would seem that it ought not to be cast
into hell for the punishment of the damned.
Obj. 3. Further, The fire that will engulf the wicked
will be the fire of hell : and this fire was prepared from the
beginning of the world for the damned; hence it is written
(Matth. XXV. 41): Depart . . . you cursed . . . into ever-
lasting fire which was prepared for the devil, etc., and (Isa.
XXX. 33) : Thopheth is prepared from yesterday, prepared by
the king, etc., where a gloss observes: From yesterday — i.e.,
from the beginning — Thopheth — i.e., the valley of hell. But
this fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the
beginning, but will result from the meeting together of the
fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell
which will engulf the wicked.
On the contrary are the words of Ps. xcvi. 3, where it is said
of this fire that it shall burn His enemies round about.
Further, It is written (Dan. vii. 10): A swift stream of fire
issued forth from before Him ; and a gloss adds, to drag sinners
into hell. Now the passage quoted refers to that fire of which
we are now speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes
Q. 74- Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA'" 116
on the same words : In order to punish the wicked a7id cleanse
the good. Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be
plunged into hell together with the wicked.
/ answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and the
renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the
renewal of man : and consequently the cleansing and renewal
of the world must needs correspond with the cleansing and
renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be cleansed in one
way by the separation of the wicked from the good : where-
fore it is said (Luke iii. 17): Whose fan is in His hand, and
He will purge His floor, a7id will gather the wheat, i.e. the
elect, into His ham, hut the chaff, i.e. the wicked, He will
burn with unquenchable fire. Hence it will be thus with the
cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly and vile will be
cast with the wicked into hell, and all that is beautiful and
noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect : and
so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration, as Basil
says in Ps. xxviii. 7, The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of
fire, because whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross
matter will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked ,
and whatever is subtle and Hghtsome will remain above for
the glory of the elect.
Reply Ohj. i. The fire that will cleanse the elect before
the judgment will be the same as the fire that will bum the
world, although some say the contrary. For it is fitting that
man, being a part of the world, be cleansed with the same
fire as the world. They are, however, described as two fires,
that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in
reference to their respective offices, and somewhat in refer-
ence to their substance : since the substance of the cleansing
fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above.
Reply Ohj. 2. This fire will be rewarded because whatever
it contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and
cast into hell.
Reply Ohj. 3. The punishment of the wicked, even as the
glory of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than
before. Wherefore, just as charity will be added to the
higher creature in order to increase the glory of the elect.
117 THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION Q. 74. Art. 9
so too whatever is vile in creatures will be thrust down into
hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Conse-
quently it is not unbecoming that another fire be added to
the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning
of the world.
QUESTION LXXV.
OF THE RESURRECTION.
{In Three Articles.)
In the next place we must consider things connected with
and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be
considered will be the resurrection itself ; the second will be
the cause of the resurrection ; the third its time and manner ;
the fourth its term wherefrom; the fifth the condition of
those who rise again.
Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry :
(i) WTiether there is to be a resurrection of the body ?
(2) Whether it is universally of all bodies ? (3) Whether
it is natural or miraculous ?
First Article,
whether there is to be a resurrection of the body ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that there is not to be a resur-
rection of the body: for it is written (Job xiv. 12): Man,
when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens
he broken. But the heavens shall never be broken, since the
earth, to which seemingly this is still less appHcable, standeth
for ever (Eccles. i. 4). Therefore the man that is dead shall
never rise again.
Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by
quoting the words: / am the God of Abraham, and the God
of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead
but of the living (Matth. xxii. 32 ; Exod. iii. 6). But it is clear
that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and
118
119 THE RESURRECTION Q. 75. Art. i
Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore
there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.
Ohj. 3. Further, The Apostle (i Cor. xv.) seemingly proves
the resurrection from the reward for labours endured by
the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone,
they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can
be sufficient reward for labour in the soul alone : since it is not
necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the
worker, and the body is the soul's instrument. Wherefore
even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they
did in the body, the soul is punished without the body.
Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body,
but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which con-
sists in their being taken from the death of sin and xmhappi-
ness to the life of grace and glory.
Ohj. 4. Further, The last (state) of a thing is the most
perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most
perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body,
since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels,
and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous
nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final
state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the
body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.
Ohj. 5. Further, Bodily death is the punishment inflicted
on man for his own transgression, as appears from Gen. ii.,
even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul
from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man
never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the
sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be
any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there
will be no resurrection.
On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 25-26) : I know that
my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the
earth, and I shall he clothed again with my skin, etc. There-
fore there will be a resurrection of the body.
Further, The gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam,
as appears from Rom. v. 15. Now death was brought in
by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death.
Q. 75. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGTCA " 120
Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored from
death to life.
Further, The members should be conformed to the head.
Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul,
since Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more
(Rom. vi. 8). Therefore men who are His members will live
in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a
resurrection of the body.
I answer that, According to the various opinions about
man's last end there have been various opinions holding or
denying the resurrection. For man's last end which all men
desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man
is able to attain this end in this Hfe : wherefore they had no
need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be
able to attain to his perfection : and so they denied the resur-
rection. But this opinion is confuted wdth sufficient proba-
bility by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the
human body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge
and \drtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of
happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of De Civ. Dei
(xix. 3). Hence others maintained that after this there is
another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the
soul only, and they held that such a life sufhced to satisfy
the natural desire to obtain happiness : wherefore Porphyrins
said as Augustine states [De Civ. Dei, xxi.): The soul, to be
happy, must avoid all bodies : and consequently these did
not hold the resurrection. This opinion was based by
various people on various false foundations. For certain
heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil
principle, but that spiritual things are from the good prin-
ciple : and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the
height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body,
since the latter withdraw^s it from its principle, the participa-
tion of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical
sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or
fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body.
The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the begin-
ning of the Second Book (ii. Sent. D. 4, qu. i, A. 3).*
P Cf. P. 1., Q. XLIX., A. 3.
121 THE RESURRECTION Q. 75. Art. i
Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the
soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument,
or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this
opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul
alone, man would not be baulked in his natural desire for
happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection.
But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De
Anima, ii.), where he shows that the soul is united to the body
as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be
happy in this Ufe, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. i. The heavens will never be broken as to their
substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their
movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower
things: for this reason the Apostle says (i Cor. vii. 31):
The fashion of this world passeth away.
Reply Ohj. 2. Abraham's soul, properly speaking, is not
Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards
the others). Hence life in Abraham's soul does not suffice
to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of
Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be
life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and
although this life were not actually when these words were
uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection.
Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest
subtlety and efficacy.
Reply Ohj. 3. The soul is compared to the body, not only
as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also
as form to matter : wherefore the work belongs to the com-
posite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows
[De Anima, i.). And since to the worker is due the reward
of the work, it behoves man himself, who is composed of soul
and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial
offences are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as
having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the
punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a
retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought
separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to
ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.
Q. 75. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 122
Reply Ohj. 4. Other things being equal, the state of the
soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body,
because it is a part of the whole composite; and every
integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and
though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not
simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more con-
formed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature
requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine per-
fection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed
to an immovable God when it is in movement than when
it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its move-
ment, and its rest is its undoing.
Reply Ohj. 5. Bodily death was brought about by Adam's
sin which was blotted out by Christ's death: hence its
punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes
everlastmg death through impenitence will not be expiated
hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.
Second Article.
whether the resurrection will be for all without
exception ?
We proceed thus to the Secoiid Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the resurrection will not
be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. i. 5):
The wicked shall not rise again in judgment. Now men will
not rise again except at the time of the general judgment.
Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.
Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Dan. xii. 2): Many of those
that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake. But these words
imply a certain restriction. Therefore aU will not rise
again.
Obj. 3. Further, By the resurrection men are conformed to
Christ rising again ; wherefore the Apostle argues (i Cor. xv.
12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again.
Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again
who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone.
Therefore they alone shall rise again.
123 THE RESURRECTION Q. 75. Art. 2
Ohj. 4. Further, Punishment is not remitted unless the
fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment
of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven
to all, all will not rise again.
Ohj, 5. Further, As we are born again by the grace of
Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those
who die in their mother's womb can never be bom again :
therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently
all will not rise again.
On the contrary, It is said (Jo. v. 28, 25): All that are
in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, . . . and
they that hear shall live. Therefore the dead shall all rise
again.
Further, It is written (i Cor. xv. 51) : We shall all indeed
rise again, etc.
Further, The resurrection is necessarv in order that those
who rise again may receive punishment or reward accord-
ing to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due
to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others'
merits, as to children. Therefore aU wiU rise again.
/ answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes
from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise
in all the members of that same species. Now such is the
resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above
(A. i), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the
human species, so long as it is separated from the body.
Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body.
Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise
again.
Reply Ohj. i. As a gloss expounds these words, they refer
to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not
rise again in the particular judgment. Or else they refer
to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who wiU
not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged.*
Reply Ohj. 2. Augustine {De Civ. Dei, xx.) explains many
as meaning all: in fact, this way of speaking is often met
with in Holy Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the
* John iii. 18.
Q. 75. Art. 3 THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124
children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise
again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no
sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining
of the senses.
Reply Ohj. 3. All, both good and wicked, are conformed to
Christ, while Hving in this life, as regards things pertaining
to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters per-
taining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the
restoration of natural Ufe, but not in the likeness of glory,
except the good alone.
Reply Ohj. 4. Those who have died in original sin have, by
dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punish-
ment of original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin,
they can rise again from death : for the punishment of original
sin is to die, rather than to be detained by death.
Reply Ohj. 5. We are bom again by the grace of Christ
that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ
whereby it came about that He took our nature, since it is
by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things.
Hence those who die in their mother's womb, although they
are not bom again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise
again on account of the conformity of their nature with
Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the
perfection of the human species.
Third Article,
whether the resurrection is natural ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the resurrection is natural.
For, as the Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iii.), that which is
commodity observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals
contained under it. Now resurrection applies commonly to
all. Therefore it is natural.
Ohj. 2. Further, Gregor^r says {Moral, xiv.): Those who do
not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought
certainly to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does
the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection ?
125 THE RESURRECTION Q. 75- Art. 3
And he offers as examples the light which as it were dies . . .
and is withdrawn from our sight . . . and again rises anew,
as it were, and is recalled — the shrubs which lose their greenery,
and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed — and the seeds
which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were :
which same example is adduced by the Apostle (i Cor. xv.
36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known
save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.
Obj. 3. Further, Things that are against nature abide not
for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the
life that is restored by the resurrection will last for ever.
Therefore the resurrection will be natural.
Obj. 4. Further, That to which the entire expectation of
nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such
a thing is the resurrection and the glorification of the saints
according to Rom. viii. 19. Therefore the resurrection will
be natural.
Obj. 5. Further, The resurrection is a kind of movement
towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now move-
ment is natural if it terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v.,
text. 59) : and the everlasting union of soul and body will be
natural, for since the soul is the body's proper mover, it has
a body proportionate to it : so that the body is likewise for
ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives
for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.
On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation
to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the
resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is not
natural.
Further, Things of the one species have one fixed way of
origin : wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never
of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Com-
mentator says on Phys. viii. Now the natural way of man's
origin is for him to be begotten of a like m species: and
such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will
not be natural.
/ answer that, A movement or an action stands related to
nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action
Q. 75- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 126
whereof nature is neither the principle nor the term: and
such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature
as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any-
other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward
movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest.
Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle
and term: for instance, the downward movement of a stcne.
And there is another movement whereof nature is the term,
but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something
above nature {as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is
natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is above nature),
and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or
fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to be the
principle and not the term, because natural principles are ap-
pointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend.
Therefore the action or movement that is related to nature
in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous
if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from
any other principle. The action or movement that is related
to nature in the second way is simply natural : but the action
that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described
as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so
far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature :
but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent.
For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according
to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that
nature and whatever results from that nature [Phys. ii.).
Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be
described as natural unless its principle be natural. Now
nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resur-
rection terminates in the fife of nature. For nature is the
principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is, — either
the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light
bodies and in the natural alterations of animals, — or the
passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The
passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive
potentiality which always has an active principle correspond-
ing to it in nature, according to Met. ix., text. 10 : nor as to this
127 THE RESURRECTION Q. 75 Art. 3
does it matter whether the active principle in nature corre-
spond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate
perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition
in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the
generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or
in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato
and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle
of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul
with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the
demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be
produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process
of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive
potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclina-
tion to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for
the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resur-
rection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural
except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.
Reply Ohj. i. The Damascene is speaking of those things
that are found in all individuals and are caused by the
principles of nature. For supposing by a divine operation
all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one
place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not
follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is
a natural property of man.
Reply Ohj. 2. From natural things one does not come by
a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but
by the induction of reason one may know something
above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance
to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body
resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of
fruition, as the Master says (ii. Sent. D. i) : and in like manner
the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are con-
firmatory evidences of our faith in the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument regards an operation which
terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to
nature. Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argu-
ment is not to the point.
Reply Ohj. 4. The entire operation of nature is subordinate
Q. 75- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 128
to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art
is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence just
as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable
save by the operation of the higher art that produces the
form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the
last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view
is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which
reason the attaining thereto is not natural.
Reply Obj. 5. Although there can be no natural move-
ment terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-
natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as explained
above.
QUESTION LXXVI.
OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the cause of our resurrection.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry : (i) Whether
Christ's resurrection is the cause of our resurrection ?
(2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is ? (3) Whether
the angels are ?
First Article.
whether the resurrection of christ is the cause of
our resurrection ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the resurrection of Christ
is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause,
the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the
resurrection of the other dead did not foUow at once. There-
fore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.
Ohj. 2. Further, An effect cannot be unless the cause pre-
cede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if
Christ had not risen again : for God could have delivered man
in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not
the cause of ours.
Ohj. 3. Further, The same thing produces the one effect
throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will
be common to all men. Since then Christ's resurrection is
not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of
others.
Ohj. 4. Further, An effect retains some likeness to its
cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the
III. 6 129 9
Q. 76. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 130
wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. There-
fore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs.
On the contrary, In every genus that which is first is the
cause of those that come after it [Met. ii., text. 4). Now Christ,
by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called the firstfruits
of the^n that sleep (i Cor. xv. 20), and the first-begotten of
the dead (Apoc. i. 5). Therefore His resurrection is the cause
of the resurrection of others.
Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with
our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection
which is by justification. But Christ's resurrection is the
cause of our justification, as appears from Rom. iv. 25, where
it is said that He rose again for our justification. Therefore
Christ's resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection.
I answer that, Christ by reason of His human nature is
called the mediator of God and men : wherefore the Divine
gifts are bestowed on men by means of Christ's humanity.
Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death
save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can
we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection
wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ,
in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of
grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace,
because of His fulness we all have received . . . grace for
grace (John i. 16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun,
and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as
Grod is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection,
but as God and man rising again. He is the proximate and,
so to say, the imi vocal cause of our resurrection. Now a
imi vocal efficient cause produces its efiect in likeness to its
own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an
exemplar cause in relation to that eftect. This happens in
two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the
agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action
by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats :
and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this
likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle
of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance.
131 CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION Q. 76. Art. i
if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the be-
getter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the
whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the white-
ness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in
the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness
in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is
the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that
wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal
efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our
resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which
is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written
(Rom. viii. 11): He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead
shall quicken also your mortal bodies. And this very resur-
rection of Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is
the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the
Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh,
as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene
instances as an example {De Fide Orthod. iii.) the touch of
His body whereby he healed the leper (Matth. viii. 3).
Reply Obj. 1. A sufficient cause produces at once its effect
to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to
which it is directed by means of something else, no matter
how sufficient it may be : thus heat, however intense it be,
does not cause heat at once in the first instant, but it begins
at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is
its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection
is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrec-
tion, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely
the Divine power which will work our resurrection in like-
ness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works
by means of His will which is nearest to the effect ; hence it
is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straight-
way after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but
that it should happen at the time which God's will has
decreed.
Reply Obj. 2. God's power is not tied to any particular
second causes, but that He can produce their effects either
immediately or by means of other causes: thus He might
Q. 76. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 132
work the generation of lower bodies even though there were
no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the
order which He has estabhshed in things, the movement of
the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies.
In like manner according to the order appointed to human
things by Divine providence, Christ's resurrection is the
cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed another
order, and then our resurrection would have had another
cause ordained by God.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument holds when all tlie things of
one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect
to be produced in the whole of that species. But it is not
so m the case in point, because Christ's humanity is nearer
to His Godhead, Whose power is the first cause of the resur-
rection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ's
Godliead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes
the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising
again.
Reply Ohj. 4. The resurrection of all men will bear some
resemblance to Christ's resurrection, as regards that which
pertains to the hfe of nature, in respect of which all were
conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal
life; but in the saints who were conformed to Christ by
grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to
glory.
Second Article.
whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause
of our resurrection ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the sound of the trumpet
will not be the cause of our resurrection . For the Damascene
says [De Fide Orthod. iv.): Thou must believe that the resur-
rection will take place by God's will, power, and nod. There-
fore since these are a sufficient cause of our resurrection,
we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause
thereof.
Ohj. 2. Further, It is useless to make sounds to one who
133 CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION Q. 76. Art. 2
cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. There-
fore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them.
Obj. 3. Further, If any sound is the cause of the resurrec-
tion, this will oniy be by a power given by God to the sound :
wherefore a gloss on Ps. Ixvii. 34, He will give to His voice
the voice of power, says, — to arouse our bodies. Now from the
moment that a power is given to a thing, though it be given
miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in
the man bom blind who, after being restored to sight, saw
naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection,
the resurrection would be natural: which is false.
On the contrary, It is written (i Thess. iv. 15) : The Lord
Himself will come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet
of God ; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise.
Further, It is written (John v. 28) that they who are in the
graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and {verse 25)
they that hear shall live. Now this voice is called the trumpet,
as stated in the text (iv. Sent. D. 43). Therefore, etc.
/ answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way
be united together, since mover and moved, maker and
made, are simultaneous (Phys. viii.). Now Christ rising
again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore
at the resurrection of bodies, it behoves Christ to work the
resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign.
According to some this sign will be literally Christ's voice
commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the
sea and the storm ceased (Matth. viii. 26). Others say that
this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance
of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of
Matth. xxiv. 2y: As lightning cometh out of the east, and
appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the
Son of man be. These rely on the authority of Gregory* who
says that the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the
Son appearing to the world as judge. According to this, the
visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice,
because as soon as He appears all nature will obey His
command in restoring human bodies : hence He is described
* Moral, xxxi. as quoted by Albert the Great, iv. Sent. D. 42, A. 4.
Q. 76. Art. 2 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134
as coming with commandment (i Thess. iv. 15). In this way
His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command,
is called His voice : which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes
called a cry-,* as of a crier summoning to judgment; some-
times the sound of a trumpet,! either on accoimt of its dis-
tinctness, as stated in the text (iv. Sent. D. 43), or as being
in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament :
for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council,
stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and those who
rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to
the battle in which the world shall fight . . . against the
tmwise (Wis. v. 21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.
Reply Obj. 1. In those words the Damascene touches on
three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection :
to wit, the Di\dne will which commands, the power which
executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds bidding,
in resemblance to our own affairs : since it is very easy for us
to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is
much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants
execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which
sign is called a nod : and this nod is a kind of cause of that
execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish
our will. And the Di\ine nod, at which the resurrection
wiU take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, w^hich
aU nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the
dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet,
as explained above.
Reply Obj. 2. As the forms of the Sacrament have the
power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through
being spoken: so this sound, w^hatever it be, will have an
instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being
perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by
the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the
organ of perception, and not because it is known : since judg-
ment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent
to the awakening and is not its cause. '
Reply Obj. 3. This argument would avail, if the power
* Matth. XXV. 6. t i Cor. xv. 52; i Thess. iv. 15.
135 CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION Q. 76. Art. 3
given to that sound were a complete being in nature : because
then that which would proceed therefrom would have for
principle a power already rendered natural. But this power
is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the
forms of the Sacraments (iv. Sent. D. i; P. iii., Q. LXII.,
AA. I, 4).
Third Article.
whether the angels will do anything towards
the resurrection ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the angels will do nothing
at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows
a greater power than does begetting men. Now when men
are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means
of the angels. Therefore neither wiU the resurrection,
which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the
ministry of the angels.
Ohj. 2. Further, If this is to be ascribed to the instru-
mentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially
referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles.
Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, accord-
ing to the text (iv. Sent. D. 43). Therefore the resurrection
will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.
On the contrary, It is stated (i Thess. iv. 15) that the Lord
. . . shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an
archangel . . . and the dead shall rise again. Therefore
the resurrection of the dead will be accompHshed by the
angelic ministry.
/ answer that, According to x\ugustine {De Trin. ii.) just as
the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by
the more subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies
ruled by God by the rational spirit of life : and Gregory speaks
in the same sense (Dial. iv.). Consequently in all God's
bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now
in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the trans-
mutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the
mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration
Q. 76. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
136
of the human body ; wherefore in this respect God will employ
the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the
soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will it
be reunited to the body immediately by God without any
operation of the angels : and in like manner He Himself wiD
glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as
He immediately glorifies man's soul. This ministry of the
angels is called their voice, according to one explanation
given in the text (iv. Sent. D. 43).
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from
what has been said.
Reply Ohj. 2. This ministry will be exercised chiefly by
one Archangel, namety Michael, who is the prince of the
Church as he was of the Synagogue (Dan. x. 13, 21). Yet he
will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher
orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders will,
in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-
operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual
to whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this
voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels.
QUESTION LXXVII.
OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the time and manner of the resur-
rection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed
until the end of the world ? (2) Whether that time is hidden ?
(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time ?
(4) Wliether it will happen suddenly ?
First Article.
whether the time of our resurrection should be
delayed till the end of the world ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the time of the resurrection
ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all
may rise together. For there is more conformity between
head and members than between one member and another,
as there is more between cause and effect than between
one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head,
did not delay His resurrection until the end of the world,
so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there
is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to be de-
ferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again
together with the others .
Ohj. 2. Further, The resurrection of the Head is the cause
of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of
certain members that desire nobility from their being closely
connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the
137
Q. 77- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138
world, but followed immediately after Christ's resurrection,
as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and
John the Evangelist.* Therefore the resurrection of others
will be so much nearer Christ's resurrection, according as
they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit.
Ohj. 3. Further, The state of the New Testament is more
perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the
state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of
the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according
to Matth. xxvii. 52: Many of the bodies of the saints, that had
slept, arose. Therefore it would seem that the resurrection
of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the
end of the world, so that all may rise together.
Ohj. 4. Further, There will be no numbering of years after
the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the
dead, the years are still reckoned until the resurrection of
others, as appears from Apoc. xx. 4, 5. For it is stated there
that / saw . . . the souls of them that wefe beheaded for the
testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God, and further on :
And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.
And the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were
fi^iished. Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed
until the end of the world, that all may rise together.
On the contrary. It is written (Job xiv. 12) : Man when he
is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken,
he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep, and it is a question
of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men
will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavens
shall be broken.
Further, It is written (Heb. xi. 39) : All these being approved
by the testimony of faith received not the promise, i.e. full
beatitude of soul and body, since God has provided something
better for us, lest they should be consummated, i.e. perfected,
without us, — in order that, as a gloss observes, through all re-
joicing each one might rejoice the more. But the resurrection
will not precede the glorification of bodies, because He will
reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His
* Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii., among S. Jerome's works.
139 TIME OF RESURRFXTION Q. 77. Art. i
glory (Phil. iii. 21), and the children of the resurrection will
be as the angels . . . in heaven (Matth. xxii. 30). Therefore
the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world,
when all shall rise together.
/ answer that, As Augustine states [De Trin. iii.) Divine
providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should he
ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies:
wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to
variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies.
Hence it would be contrary to the order established in
things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies
were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there
remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, accord-
ing to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men
to immortal life conformably to Christ Who rising again
from the dead dieth now no more (Rom. vi. 9), the resurrection
of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world
when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason,
too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the
heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will
return to mortal bodies such as we have now, — whether, as
Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the
same body at the end of the great year, or that it would
return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that any
soul will enter any body, as stated in De Anima, i., text. 53-
Reply Obj. i. Although the head is more conformed to the
members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite
in order that it have influence over the members) than one
member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality
over the members which the members have not ; and in this
the members differ from the head and agree with one another.
Hence Christ's resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and
through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our
own resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ's
members is not the cause of the resurrection of other
members, and consequently Christ's resurrection had to pre-
cede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at
the consummation of the world.
Q. 77 Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140
Reply Obj. 2. Although among the members some rank
higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they
do not attain to the character of headship so as to be the
cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ
does not give them a right to rise again before others as
though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we
have said in reference to Christ's resurrection : and if it has
been granted to others that their resurrection should not be
delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by
special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of con-
formity to Christ.
Reply Obj. 3. Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption,*
seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the saints with
Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the
resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a resuscita-
tion (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a
resurrection such as will be at the end of the world, — or
really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body,
and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says
on Matth. xxvii. 52. The latter seems more probable,
because, as Jerome says (ibid.), in order that they might bear
true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that
they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection
hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing witness
to Christ's resurrection : and that by bearing witness thereto
they might lay the foundation of the taith of the New Testa-
ment : wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne
by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died
after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be
observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrec-
tion before Christ's, we must take this statement as made in
anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history.
For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ,
since He is the firstfruits of them that sleep [i Cor. xv. 20),
although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrec-
tion, as in the case of Lazarus.
Reply Obj. 4. On account of these words, as Augustine
* Ep. X. ad Paul, et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious.
141 TIME OF RESURRECTION Q. 77- Art. 2
relates (De Civ. Dot, xx.), certain heretics asserted that there
will be a first resurrection of the dead that they may reign
with Christ on earth for a thousand years ; whence they were
called chiliasts or millenaricms. Hence Augustine says
(ibid.) tliat these words are to be understood otherwise,
namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise
again from their sins to the gift of grace : while the second
resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the
Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other elect
reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ
in glory as regards all, special mention being made of the
martyrs, because they especially reign after death who
fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a
thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole
of the present time wherein the saints now reign with
Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality
more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10,
whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multipHcation of
ten by its square, for 10x10 = 100, and 100x10 = 1,000.
Again in Ps. civ. 8, The word which He commanded to a
thousand^ i.e. all, generations.
Second Article,
whether the time of our resurrection is hidden ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that this time is not hidden.
Because when we Imow exactly the beginning of a thing,
we can know its end exactly, since all things are measured by
a certain period [De General, ii.). Now the beginning of the
world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known
exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and
judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.
Obj. 2. Further, It is stated (Apoc. xii. 6) that the woman
who represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that
there she might feed (Vulg., — they should feed her) a thousand
two hundred sixty days. Again (Dan. xii. 11), a certain fixed
number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years,
Q. 77. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142
according to Ezech. iv. 6: ^ day for a year, yea a day for a
year I have appointed to thee. Therefore the time of the end
of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly
from Holy Writ.
Ohj. 3. Further, The state of the New Testament was
foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly
the time wherein the state of the Old Testament endured.
Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the
state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the
New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore
it is said (Matth. xxviii. 20): Behold I am with you . . . to
the consummation of the world. Therefore the time of the
end of the world and of the resurrection can be known
exactly.
On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels
will be much more unknown to men : because those things to
which men attain by natural reason are much more clearly
and certainly known to the angels by their natural know-
ledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by
means of the angels as Dionysius asserts {Coel. Hier. iv.).
Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as
appears from Matth. xxiv. 36: Of that day and hour no one
knoweth, no not the angels of heaven. Therefore that time
is hidden from men.
Further, The apostles were more cognizant of God's
secrets than others who followed them, because they had
the firstfruits of the spirit (Rom. viii. 23), — before others in
point of time and more abundantly, as a gloss observes.
And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very
matter, He answered them (Acts i. 7) : It is not for you to
know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own
power. Much more, therefore, is it hidden from others.
/ answer that, As Augustine says (83 Qucest. qu. Iviii.)
as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our
Lord's coming and lasts until the end of the world, it is uncertain
of how many generations it will consist : even so old age, which
is man's last age, has no fixed time according to the measure
of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time
143 TIME OF RESURRECTION Q. 77- Art. 2
as all the others. The reason of this is because the exact
length of future time cannot be known except either by
revelation or by natural reason : and the time until the resur-
rection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the
resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will
be simultaneous as stated above (A. i). And all things that
are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are
reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the move-
ment of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular,
it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for
ever : and consequently the time between this and the resur-
rection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it
cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the
watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when
the apostles asked Him about this Christ answered (Acts i. 7) :
It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father
hath put in His own power, whereby, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei, xviii.): He scatters the fingers of all calculators and
bids them be still. For what He refused to tell the apostles.
He will not reveal to others : wherefore all those who have
been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved
to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says {ibid.), stated
that from our Lord's Ascension to His last coming 400
years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness
of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the false-
ness of those who even now cease not to calculate.
Reply Obj. i. When we know a thing's beginning and also
its end it follows that its measure is known to us: where-
fore if we know the beginning of a thing the duration of
which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are
able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is known
to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly
movement is God's ordinance alone, which is unknown to us.
Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we
are imable to know its end.
Reply Obj. 2. The thousand two hundred sixty days
mentioned in the Apocalypse {loc. cit.) denote all the time
during which the Church endures, and not any definite
Q. 77- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 144
number of years. The reason whereof is because the preach-
ing of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years
and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of
days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days
appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to
elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of
Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the
duration of his persecution.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the state of the New Testament
in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testa-
ment it does not follow that individuals correspond to indi-
viduals : especially since all the figures of the Old Testament
were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei, xviii.)
answers certain persons who wished to liken the number
of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the
plagues of Egypt, in these words: / do not think that the
occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic
of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown
nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the
other, not i^ideed hy a prophetic spirit, hut by the guess-work
of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and
sometimes not. The same remarks would seem appHcable to
the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such
conjectures about the future foretold some things that were
true, and in others was deceived.
Third Article.
whether the resurrection will take place at
night-time ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the resurrection will not
be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be till the
heavens be broken (Job xiv. 12). Now when the heavenly
movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there
will be no time, neither night nor da}^ Therefore the resur-
rection will not be at night-time.
Obj. 2. Further, The end of a thing ought to be most per-
145 TIME OF RESURRECTION Q. 77. Art. 3
feet. Now the end of time will be then : wherefore it is said
(Apoc. X. 6) that time shall he no longer. Therefore time ought
to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently
it should be the daytime.
Ohj. 3. Further, The time should be such as to be adapted
to what is done therein : wherefore (John xiii. 30) the night
is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from
the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are hidden
at the present time wiU then be made most manifest, because
when the Lord shall come He will bring to light the hidden
things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of
the hearts (i Cor. iv. 5). Therefore it ought to be during
the day.
On the contrary, Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of
ours. Now Christ's resurrection was at night, as Gregory
says in a homily for Easter (xxi. in Ev.). Therefore our
resurrection will also be at night-time.
Further, The coming of our Lord is compared to the
coming of a thief into the house (Luke xii. 39, 40). But
the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our
Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the
resurrection will take place, as stated above (Q. LXXVL,
A. 2). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.
/ answer that. The exact time and hour at which the resur-
rection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the
text (iv. Sent. D. 43). Nevertheless some assert with suffi-
cient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the
moon being in the east and the sun in the west ; because the
sun and moon are believed to have been created in these posi-
tions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed
by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that
Christ arose at such an hour.
Reply Ohj. i. When the resurrection occurs, it will not
be time but the end of time; because at the very instant
that the heavens will cease to move the dead will rise again.
Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they
occup3^ now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said
that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.
III. 6 10
Q. 77. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146
Reply Ohj. 2. The most perfect disposition of time is said
to be midday, on account of the light given by the siin.
But then the city of God will need neither sun nor moon,
because the glor^^ of God will enhghten it (Apoc. xxii. 5).
Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resur-
rection be in the day or in the night.
Reply Ohj. 3. That time should be adapted to manifesta-
tion as regards the things that will happen then, and to
secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence either may
happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day
or in the night.
Fourth Article.
whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or
by degrees ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the resurrection will not
happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of
the dead is foretold (Ezech. xxxvii. 7, 8) where it is written:
The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold the sinews
and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched
out over them, but there was no spirit in them. Therefore the
restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion
with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.
Obj. 2. Further, A thing does not happen suddenly if it
require several actions following one another. Now the
resurrection requires several actions following one another,
namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the
body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the resurrection
will not be sudden.
Obj. 3. Further, All soimd is measured by time. Now
the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection,
as stated above (Q. LXXVL, A. 2). Therefore the resurrec-
tion will take time and will not happen suddenly.
Obj. 4. Further, No local movement can be sudden as
stated in De Sensu et Sensato, vii. Now the resurrection
requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes.
Therefore it will not happen suddenly.
147 TIME OF RESURRECTION Q. 77 Art. 4
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xv. 51, 52): We shall
all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an
eye. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.
Further, Infinite power works suddenly. But the Damas-
cene says (De Fide Orthod. iv.) : Thou shall believe in the resur-
rection to be wrought by the power of God, and it is evident that
this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.
/ answer that, At the resurrection something will be done
by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately
by the power of God, as stated above (Q. LXXVL, A. 3).
Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels
will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible
point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we
mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done
immediately by God's power will happen suddenly, namely
at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be
done, because the higher power brings the lower to perfection.
Reply Obj. i. Ezechiel spoke, like Moses, to a rough people,
and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six
days into days, in order that the uncultured people might
be able to understand, although all things were made together
according to Augustine {Gen. ad Lit. iv.), so Ezechiel expressed
the various things that will happen in the resurrection,
although they will all happen together in an instant.
Reply Obj. 2. Although these actions follow one another
in nature, they are all together in time : because either they
are together in the same instant, or one is in the instant that
terminates the other.
Reply Obj. 3. The same would seem to apply to that
sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the
sound will produce its effect in its last instant.
Reply Obj. 4. The gathering of the ashes which cannot be
without local movement will be done by the ministry of the
angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on
account of the facility of operation which is competent to
the angels.
QUESTION LXXVIII.
OF THE TERJM WHEREFROM OF THE RESURRECTION.
{In Three Articles.)
We must now consider the term wherefrom of the resurrec-
tion; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether death is the term wherefrom of the resurrection
ia every case ? (2) Whether ashes are, or dust ? (3) Whether
this dust has a natural incHnation towards the soul ?
First Article.
whether death will be the term wherefrom of the
resurrection in all cases ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that death will not be the term
wherefrom of the resurrection in all cases. Because some
shall not die but shall be clothed with immortaUty: for it
is said in the creed that our Lord will come to judge the
living and the dead. Now this cannot >efer to the time of
judgment, because then all will be ali\'j; therefore this dis-
tinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently
all will not die before the judgment.
Ohj. 2. Further, A natural and common desire cannot be
empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now accord-
ing to the Apostle (2 Cor. v. 4) it is a common desire that
we would not he unclothed hut clothed upon. Therefore there
will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death,
but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.
Ohj. 3. Further, Augustine says {Enchir. cxv.) that the
four last petitions of the Lord's prayer refer to the present
148
149 TERM OF RESURRECTION Q.78.ART. i
life : and one of them is : Forgive us our debts (Douay, — tres-
passes). Therefore the Church prays that all debts may
be forgiven her in this hfe. Now the Church's prayer can-
not be void and not granted: If you ask the Father anything
in My name, He will give it you (Jo. xvi. 23). Therefore
at some time of this Hfe the Church will receive the remission
of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound
by the sin of our first parent is that we be bom in original
sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church
that men be bom without original sin. But death is the
punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the
world there will be some men who will not die : and so the
same conclusion follows.
Obj. 4. Further, The wise man should always choose the
shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who
shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of
the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards
rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who
is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall
be found Hving.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xv. 36) : That which
thou sowest is not quickened except it die first, and he is speak-
ing of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.
Further, It is written [ibid. 22): As in Adam all die, so
also in Christ all shall be made alive. Now all shall be made
alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all
shall rise again from death.
/ answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question,
as may be seen in the text (iv. Sent. D. 43). However, the
safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise
again from death : and this for three reasons. First, because
it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned
human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by
the act of nature derive their origin from him should con-
tract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors
of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with
Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and
resurrection is not predicted properly except of that which
Q. 78. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150
has fallen and perished, as the Damascene says [De Fide
Orthod. iv.). Thirdty, because it is more in harmony with
the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted
and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption :
thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be
corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore
since human nature has incurred the defect of the neces-
sity of death, it cannot return to immortaUty save by means
of death. It is also m keeping with the order of nature for
another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii., text. T,the
movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,
just as the movement ot the heart is a kind of life of the whole
body : wherefore even as all the members become dead on the
heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement
ceases nothing can remain living mth that life which was
sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such
is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that
those who shall live after the movement of the heaven
comes to a standstill must depart from this life.
Reply Obj. i. This distinction of the dead and the living
does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the
whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were
living at some time, and dead at some time : but it applies
to that particular time which shall precede the judgment
immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall
begin to appear.
Reply Obj. 2. The perfect desire of the saints cannot be
void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being
void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be unclothed,
but clothed upon, namely if that be possible : and this desire
is called by some a velleity.
Reply Obj. 3. It is erroneous to say that any one except
Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who
would be conceived without original sin would not need the
redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ
would not be the Redeemer of all men.* Nor can it be
said that they needed not this redemption, because it was
♦ See Editor's note at the beginning of Part III., Second Number.
151 TERM OF RESURRECTION Q. 78. Art. 2
granted to them that they should be conceived without sin.
For, this grace was vouchsafed, — either to their parents, that
the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as
that sin remained they were unable to beget without com-
municating original sin), — or to nature itself which was healed.
Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of
Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and
one cannot be dehvered from an evil or absolved from a
debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil : and conse-
quently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the
Lord's prayer, unless all were bom debtors and subject to
evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil
cannot be applied to one who is bom without a debt or free
from evil, but only to one who is bom with a debt and is
afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it
follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not,
that they are bom without original sin, although death is a
punishment of original sm; because God can of His mercy
remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past
fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punish-
ment (Jo. viii.) : and in Kke manner He can deliver from
death those who have contracted the debt of death by being
bom in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if
they die not, therefore they were bom without original sin.
Reply Obj. 4. The shortest way is not always the one to be
chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for
attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what
we have said.
Second Article,
whether all will rise again from ashes ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all will not rise again
from ashes. For Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of
ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His
flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. xv. 10; Acts ii. 27,
31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.
Obj. 2. Further, The human body is not always burnt.
Q. 78. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 152
Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burnt.
Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.
Obj. 3. Further, The body of a dead man is not reduced to
ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again
at once after death, according to the text (iv. Sent. D. 43),
namely those who will be found li\dng. Therefore all will
not rise again from ashes.
Obj. 4. Further, The term wherefrom corresponds to the
term whereto. Now the term whereto of the resurrection is
not the same in the good as in the wicked: We shall all
indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed (i Cor. xv. 51).
Therefore the term wherefrom is not the same. And thus,
if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise
again from ashes.
On the contrary, Ha3'mo says (on Rom. v. 10, For if when
we were enemies): All who are born in original sin lie under the
sentence : Earth thou art and into earth shall thou go. Now
all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were
bom in original sin, either at their birth within the womb
or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will
rise again from ashes.
Further, there are many things in the human body that do
not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be re-
moved. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.
/ answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown
(A. i) that all rise again from death prove also that at the
general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless
the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection,
be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of
grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resiurrection, so
does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. iii. 21). And
thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may
be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish
that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death
was inflicted by Di\ine justice as a punishment on man, so
was the decay of the body, as appears from Gen. iii. 19,
Earth thou art and into eaiih shall thou go.*
* Vulg., — Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return.
153 TERM OF RESURRECTION Q. 78- Art. 2
Moreover the order of nature requires the dissokition not
only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling
of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back
to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the
prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both
caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and
when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure
elements.
Reply Obj. i. Christ's resurrection is the exemplar of ours
as to the term whereto, but not as to the term wherefrom.
Reply Obj. 2. By ashes we mean all the remains that are
left after the dissolution of the body, — for two reasons.
First, because it was the common custom in olden times to
bum the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it
became customary to speak of the remains of a human body
as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution,
which is the flame of the fomes* whereby the human body
is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this
infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its
primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by
fire it is said to be reduced to ashes; wherefore the name
of ashes is given to those things into which the human body
is dissolved.
Reply Obj. 3. The fire that will cleanse the face of the
earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of
those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other
mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.
Reply Obj. 4. Movement does not take its species from
its term wherefrom but from its term whereto. Hence the
resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs
differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be
glorious, in respect of the term whereto, and not in respect of
the term wherefrom. And it often happens that the term
whereto is not the same, whereas the term wherefrom is the
same, — for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness
to whiteness and to pallor.
* Cf. I.-II., Q. LXXXII., A. 3.
Q. 78. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 154
Third Article.
whether the ashes from which the human body will
be restored have any natural inclination towards
the soul which will be united to them ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the ashes from which the
human body will be restored will have a natural inclination
towards the soul which will be united to them. For if
they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand
in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore
it would make no difference whether the body that is to be
united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from
others: and this is false.
Ohj. 2. Further, The body is more dependent on the soul
than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from
the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, where-
fore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its
desire for the body, as Augustine says {Gen. ad Lit. xii.).
Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from
the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.
Ohj. 3. Further, It is written (Job xx. 11): His hones shall
ho filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with
him in the dust. But vices are only in the soul. Therefore
there will stiU remain in those ashes a natural inclination
towards the soul.
On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into
the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals.
But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a
lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the
elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that
soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul
in those parts into which the human body has been changed.
The first proposition is made evident on the authority of
Augustine [Enchir. Ixxxviii.): The human hody, although
changed into the suhstance of other bodies or even into the ele-
ments, although it has become the food and flesh of any animals
whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul
155 TERM OF RESURRECTION Q. 78. Art. 3
which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing
man.
Further, To every natural inclination there corresponds a
natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now
the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul
by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any
natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.
/ answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For
some say that the human body is never dissolved into its
very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a
certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural
incHnation to the same soul. But this assertion is in con-
tradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above,
as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is
composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component
parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the ele-
ments into which the human body is dissolved retain more
light, through having been united to the soul, and for this
reason have a natural inclination to human souls. But
this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are
of the same nature and have an equal share of light and
darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those
ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only
by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that
those ashes should be reunited to the soul : it is on this accoimt
that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not
others.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2. The soul separated from the body remains
in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It
is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison
fails.
Reply Obj. 3. These words of Job do not mean that the
vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they
remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby
those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which
will suffer eternally for the sins committed.
QUESTION LXXIX.
OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN,
AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY.
{In Three Articles.)
In the next place we must consider the conditions of those
who rise again. Here we shall consider : (i) Those which con-
cern the good and wicked in common; (2) those which con-
cern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked.
Three things concern the good and wicked in common,
namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: ;ind
we shall inquire (i) about their identity; (2) about their
integrity; (3) about their quality.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(i) Whether the body will rise again identically the same ?
(2) Whether it will be the selfsame man ? (3) Whether it
is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same
parts in which they were before ?
First Article.
whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited
to the same identical body ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the soul will not be re-
united to the same identical body at the resurrection, for
thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain (i Cor.
XV. 37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to
sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same
body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resur-
rection.
Obj. 2. Further, To every form some matter is adapted
156
157 IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 79. Art. i
according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some
instrument. Now the body is compared to the soul as matter
to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resur-
rection the soul will not be of the same condition as now (for
it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life
to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast
down into the life of the brutes, if it lived as a brute in this
world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body,
but either a heavenly or a brutish body.
Ohj. 3. Further, After death, as stated above (Q. LXXVIIL,
A. 3), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now
these elemental parts into which the human body has been
dissolved do not agree with the human bod}^ dissolved
into them, except in primary matter, even as any other
elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body
were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would
not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither
will it be the selfsame body if it be restored from these parts.
Ohj. 4. Further, There cannot be numerical identity where
there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the
form of the mixed body, which form is an essential part of
the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in
numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be identi-
cally the same. The minor is proved thus: That which
passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed
in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be
identity where there is distinction of existence : and existence,
which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being inter-
rupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a
mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death,
since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities
from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a
mixed body does not return in identity.
On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 26): In my flesh I
shall see God my Saviour (Vulg., — my God), where he is
speaking of the vision after the resurrection, as appears
from the preceding words : In the last day I shall rise out of
the earth. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.
Q. 79. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 158
Further, The Damascene says {De Fide Orthod. iv.) : Resur-
rection is the second rising of that which has fallen. But the
body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise
again the same identically.
/ answer that, On this point the philosophers erred and
certain modem heretics err. For some of the philosophers
allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to
bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the
mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be
naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation.
Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they held
that this second union was not with the selfsame body that
was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the
same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species
when the soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary
to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death
from the body of a man into the body of some other animal
to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for
instance into the body of a dog on account of lust, into the
body of a Hon on account of robbery and violence, and so
forth, — and into a body of the same species when the soul
has led a good life in the body, and having after death ex-
perienced some happiness, after some centuries began to
wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a
human body. But this opinion arises from two false sources.
The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united
to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accident-
ally, as mover to the thing moved,* or as a man to his clothes.
Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul
pre-existed before being infused mto the body begotten of
natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies.
The second is that they held intellect not to differ from
sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to
surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive
power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of
his bodily complexion ; and hence it was possible for them to
assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal,
* Cf. P. I.. Q. LXXVI., A. I.
159 IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 79- Art. i
especially when the human soul has been habituated to
brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the
Philosopher {De Anima, ii.), and in consequence of these
being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.
In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted.
Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philo-
sophers : while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly
bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory
relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition
of Job xix. 26, In my flesh I shall see my God, etc. Moreover
these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that
they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed
to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless
the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a
second rising, and the same thing rises that falls : wherefore
resurrection regards the body which after death falls rather
than the soul which after death Uves. And consequently
if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not
be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.
Reply Ohj. i. A comparison does not apply to every parti-
cular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain
sown and the grain that is born thereof are neither identical,
nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a
husk, yet is bom with one: and the body will rise again
identically the same, but of a different condition, since it
was mortal and will rise in immortaHty.
Reply Ohj. 2. The soul rising again and the soul living in
this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and
misery, which is an accidental difference. Hence it foUows
that the^body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in
condition, so that a difference of bodies corresponds propor-
tionally to the difference of souls.
Reply Ohj. 3. That which is understood as though it were
in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption,
because when that which comes afterwards is removed
that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Com-
mentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in De
Substantia Orbis, m the matter of things subject to generation
Q. 79. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 160
and corruption, we must presuppose unde terminate dimen-
sions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able
to receive various forms in its various parts. WTierefore after
the separation of the substantial form from matter, these
dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the
matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it
receive, is more identified with that which was generated from
it, than any other part of matter existing under any form
whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to
restore the human body will be the same as that body's
previous matter.
Reply Ohj. 4. Even as a simple quality is not the substantial
form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposi-
tion whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so
the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting
from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substan-
tial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the
disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now
the human body has no substantial form besides this form
of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any
previous substantial form, this would give it substantial
being, and would establish it in the genus of substance:
so that the soul would be united to a body already estab-
lished in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be
compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter,
in respect of their being established in the genus of substance
by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body
would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philo-
sophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima, ii., text. 4
seq. ; i., text. 52). It would also follow that the human body
and each of its parts w^ould not retain their former names
in the same sense, which is contrary to the teaching of the
Philosopher. Therefore since the rational soul remains,
no substantial form of the human body falls away into
complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms
does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the self-
same body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is
resumed as stated in a previous reply {ad 2).
i6i IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 79. Art. 2
Second Article.
whether it will be identically the same man that
shall rise again ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that it will not be identically
the same man that shall rise again. For according to the
Philosopher (De Gener. ii.): Whatsoever things are changed in
their corruptible substance are not repeated identically. Now
such is man's substance in his present state. Therefore
after the change wrought by death the selfsame man cannot
be repeated.
Obj. 2. Further, 'N^Tiere there is a distinction of human
nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore
Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, since each
has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature
of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has
now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The
minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human
nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and
substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now suchlike
forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently
they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature
results from union of parts. Now the same identical union
as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because
repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies
number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are in-
compatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated
union : therefore the union is not the same, and consequently
there is not the same human nature nor the same man.
Obj. 3. Further, One same man is not several animals:
wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same
identical man. Now where sense is not the same, there is
not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary
sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in
the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed
in identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not
HI. 6 II
Q.79ART.2 THE '^SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162
be tlie same identical animal, and consequently he will not
be the same man.
Ohj. 4. Further, The matter of a statue ranks higher in the
statue than the matter of a man does in man : because artifi-
cial things belong to the genus of substance by reason of
their matter, but natural things by reason of their form,
as appears from the Philosopher [Phys. ii., text. 8, seq.), and
again from the Commentator (De Anima, ii.) . But if a statue
is remade from the same brass, it will not be the same
identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the
same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.
On the contrary, It is written (Job xix. 27) : Whom I myself
shall see . . . and not another, and he is speaking of the vision
after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man
will rise again.
Further, Augustine says {De Trin. viii.) that to rise again
is naught else hut to live again. Now unless the same identical
man that died return to life, he would not be said to live
again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary
to faith.
/ answer that, The necessit}^ of holding the resurrection
arises from this, — that man mav obtain the last end for
which he was made ; for this cannot be accomplished in this
Hfe, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above
(0. LXXV., AA. I, 2) : otherwise man would have been made
in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was
made. And since it behoves the end to be obtained by the
selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it appear
to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame
man to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul
being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there
would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man
were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises
again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary
to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by
movement or natural change. For he shows the difference
between the recurrence that occurs in generation and corrup-
i63 IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 79. Art. 2
tion and that which is observed in the movement of the
heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement
returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has
a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand,
things subject to generation and corruption return by genera-
tion to specific but not numerical identity, because from
man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until
a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the same
specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air
water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the self-
san^e fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the
argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is con-
cerned, is not to the point. We may also reply that the
form of other things subject to generation and corruption
is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the
corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul.
For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the
being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is
made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being
of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not dis-
tinct from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body
would be accidental. Consequently there has been no inter-
ruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it
impossible for the selfsame man to return on account of an
interruption in his being, as is the case with other things
that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted alto-
gether, since their form remains not, and their matter remains
under another being. Nevertheless neither does the self-
same man recur by natural generation, because the body of
the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his
begetter : hence his body is numerically distinct, and conse-
quently his soul and the whole man.
Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions about humanity and
about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of
the whole and the form of the part are really one and the
same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch
as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch
as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to
g. 79. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164
this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the rational
soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed,
there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain
even after death, albeit not imder the aspect of humanity,
because the composite does not derive the specific nature
from a separated humanity. The other opinion, which
seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna's, according to whom
the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some
other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole
resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing
both within itself. This form of the whole is called the
essence or quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there
will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul,
there will be, of necessity, the same humanity. The first
argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity
was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct
form supervening form and matter ; which is false : and the
second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity,
because union impHes action or passion, and though there
be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of
humanit}^ because the action and passion from which
humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity,
wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a
distinction of humanity : for it is clear that generation and
resurrection are not the selfsame movement. Yet the identit}'
of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for
this reason: and in Hke manner neither is the identity of
humanity prevented, if we take union for the relation itself :
because this relation is not essential to but concomitant
with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms
that are composition or order {Phys. ii., text. 13), as are the
forms of things produced by art, so that if there be anotlier
distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.
Reply Obj. 3. This argument affords a very good proof
against those who held a distinction between the sensitive
and rational souls in man : because in that case the sensitive
soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in
other animals; and consequently in the resurrection there
i65 IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 70. Art. 2
would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither
the same animal nor the same man. But if we assert that
in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and
sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question,
because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul
as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensi-
tive power, we know its definition as from an accidental
form that contributes more than any other to our know-
ledge of the quiddity [DeAnima, i., text. 2). Accordingly after
death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational
soul, according to its substance : whereas the sensitive powers,
according to some, do not remain. And since these powers
are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot
prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the
animal's parts : nor are powers to be called perfections or acts
of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.
Reply Ohj. 4. A statue may be considered in two ways,
either as a particular substance, or as something artificial.
And since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of
its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular
substance, it is the selfsame statue that is remade from the
same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus
of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form
which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also. Conse-
quently it does not return identically the same, nor can the
statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the
soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the
comparison fails.
Third Article.
whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by
the resurrection, return to the same parts of the
body that were dissolved into them ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem necessary for the ashes of the
human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same
parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the
Philosopher, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part
O. 79. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 166
of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil (De
Anima, ii., text. 9) . Now it is necessary that after the resur-
rection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore
it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return
to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same
parts of the soul.
Obj. 2. Further, Difference of matter causes difference of
identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts,
each part will not be remade from the same matter of which
it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same
identically. Now if the parts are different the whole will
also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to
form [Phys. ii., text. 3). Therefore it will not be the selfsame
man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.
Obj. 3. Further, The resurrection is directed to the end
that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different
parts of the body are employed in different works, whether
of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each
part must needs return to its former state that it may be
rewarded in due measure.
On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on
their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in
order that the same artificial thing be remade, from the same
matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to
the same position. Neither therefore is it necessary in man.
Further, Change of an accident does not cause a change
of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident.
Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change of
identity.
/ answer that, In this question it makes a difference
whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to
identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity.
As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may
speak of parts in two ways : first as of the various parts of a
homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh,
or the various parts of bone ; secondly, as of various parts of
various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone
and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter
i67 IDENTITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 79. Art. 3
will return to another part of the same species, this causes
no change except in the position of the parts : and change of
position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous
wholes : and so if the matter of one part return to another
part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole.
Thus is it in the example given in the text (iv. Sent. D. 44),
because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same,
not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which
it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homo-
geneous, although it is not according to its artificial form.
But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another
part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a
change not only in the position of parts, but also in their
identity : yet so that the whole matter, or something belong-
ing to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to
another; but not if what was superfluous in one part is
transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being
taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak
of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts,
such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers
(De Civ. Dei, xxii.). It is thus clear how the transference
of matter from one part to another destroys the identity,
and how it does not.
But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that
even the parts wiU retain their position at the resurrection,
especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although
perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails
and hair.
Reply Ohj. 1. This argument considers organic or hetero-
geneous parts, but not homogeneous or like parts.
Reply Ohj. 2. A change in the position of the parts of matter
does not cause a change of identity, although difference of
matter does.
Reply Ohj. 3. Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed
to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due,
not to the part but to the whole.
QUESTION LXXX.
OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE
RESURRECTION.
[In Five Articles.)
We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the
resurrection. Under this head there are five points of in-
quiry: (i) Wliether all the members of the human body
will rise again therein ? (2) Whether the hair and nails
will ? (3) WTiether the humours will ? (4) WTiether what-
ever the body contained belonging to the truth of human
nature mil rise again ? (5) Whether whatever it contained
materially will rise again ?
First Article.
whether all the members of the human body will
rise again ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that not aU the members of the
human body will rise again. For if the end be done away
it is useless to repair the means . Now the end of each member
is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine
works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting
to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital
members, for then they shall neither marry, nor he married
(Matth. xxii. 30), it would seem that not aU the members
shall rise again.
Ohj. 2. Further, The entrails are members: and yet they
wiU not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since
thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since nothing is
168
i69 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. i
empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all
rise again.
Ohj. 3. Further, The body shall rise again that it may be
rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now
the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and
who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be
rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed,
since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since
the punishment of the member would redound to the punish-
ment of the man. Therefore the members will not all rise
again with man.
On the contrary, The other members belong more to the
truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be
restored to man at the resurrection according to the text
(iv. Sent. D. 44). Much more therefore does this apply to the
other members.
Further, The works of God are perfect (Deut. xxxii. 4).
But the resurrection wiU be the work of God. Therefore
man will be remade perfect in aU his members.
/ answer that, As stated in De Anima, ii., the soul stands
in relation to the body not only as its form and end, hut also
as efficient cause. For the soul is compared to the body as
art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says {Ethic.
Magn. vii. 11), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the
product of art is aU contained implicitly and originally in
the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of
the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly
in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be
perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in
the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole
that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly un-
folded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full
proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it
behoves man's body to correspond entirely to the soul, for
it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears
to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again
perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he
may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently aU the
Q. 80. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170
members that are now in man's body must needs be restored
at the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. i. The members may be considered in two ways
in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of
matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to
agent, since tJie whole body is compared to the whole soul in tJie
same way as one part is to another [DeAnima, ii., text. 9). If then
the members be considered in the light of the first relation-
ship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect being
of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection :
but if they be considered in the light of the second relation-
ship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow
that when the operation fails the instrument is useless,
because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the
operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence
it will be necessar\^ for the virtue of the soul's powers to be
shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never
proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby
glorified.
Reply Ohj. 2. The entrails will rise again in the body even
as the other members : and they will be filled not with vile
superfluities but with goodly humours.
Reply Ohj. 3. The acts whereby we merit are not the acts,
properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man;
even as the work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but
to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which
was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate
with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man him-
self merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with
his whole being serves God.
Second Article.
whether the hair and nails will rise again in the
human body ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
0 jection i. It would seem that the hair and nails will not
rise again in the human bod}'. For just as hair and nails
171 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 2
result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other
superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with
the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.
Ohj. 2. Further, Of all the superfluities that are produced
from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature,
since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise
again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and
nails.
Ohj. 3. Further, Nothing is perfected by a rational soul
that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails
are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for we do not feel with
them according to DeAnima, iii., text. 66. Therefore since the
human body rises not again except because it is perfected by
a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not
rise again.
On the contrary, It is written (Luke xxi. 18) : A hair of your
head shall not perish.
Further, Hair and nails were given to man as an ornament.
Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise
again with all their adornment. Therefore they ought to
rise again with the hair.
/ answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is
to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to
its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an
organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the
accomplishment of the work intended, and these instruments
belong to the primary intention of art : and it also uses other
instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments,
and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the
art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath
for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts
of an animated body, some are directed to the accomplish-
ment of the soul's operations, for instance the heart, liver,
hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping
of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit ; and thus hair and
nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Conse-
quently, although they do not belong to the primary per-
fection of the human body, they belong to the secondary
Q. 80. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 172
perfection : and since man will rise again with all the perfec-
tions of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise
again in him.
Reply Ohj. i. Those superfluities are voided by nature, as
being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the
perfection of the human body. It is not so with those super-
fluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and
nails which she needs for the protection of the members.
Reply Ohj. 2. Seed is not required for the perfection of the
individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the perfection
of the species.
Reply Ohj. 3. Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and
so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would
not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected
by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely
the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the
rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation
of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these
will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the
individual.
Third Article,
whether the humours will rise again in the body ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection 1. It would seem that the humours will not rise
again in the body. For it is written (i Cor. xv. 50) : Flesh
and Mood cannot possess the kingdom of God. Now blood is
the chief humour. Therefore it will not rise again in the
blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much
less in others.
Ohj. 2. Further, Humours are intended to make up for
waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste.
Therefore the body will not rise again with humours.
Ohj. 3. Further, That which is in process of generation in
the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul.
Now the humours are still in process of generation because
they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not
yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human body
173 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 3
is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is
perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humours will
not rise again.
On the contrary, Wliatever enters into the constitution of
the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies
to the humours, as appears from the statement of Augustine
[De Spir. et Anima, xv.) that the body consists of functional
members ; the functional members of homoge^ieous parts ; and
the homogeneous parts of humours. Therefore the humours
will rise again in the body.
Further, Our resurrection will be conformed to the resur-
rection of Christ. Now in Christ's resurrection His blood
rose again, else the wine would not now be changed into His
blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will
rise again in us also, and in Hke manner the other humours.
/ answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human
nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise
again, as stated above (AA. i, 2). Hence whatever humidity
of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must
needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity
in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the
perfection of the individual, — either because it is on the way
to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine,
sweat, matter, and so forth, — or because it is directed by
nature to the preservation of the species in some individual,
either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by
the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these
humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to
the perfection of the person rising again.
The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet
reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the
individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this
is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite
form and is contained among the parts of the body, for in-
stance the blood and the other humours which nature has
directed to the members that are produced or nourished
therefrom : and yet they have certain definite forms like the
other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again
Q. 80. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 174
with the other parts of the body: while another kind of
humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from
the form of humour to the form of member. Humidities of
this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection
each part of the body will be established in its form, so that
one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity
that is actually in transition from one form to another will
not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a
twofold state, — either as being at the beginning of its trans-
formation, and thus it is called ros, namely the humidity
that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins, — or as in
the course of transformation and already beginning to under-
go alteration, and thus it is called cambium : but in neither
state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that
which has already reached its ultimate perfection that
nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already
undergone transformation and become incorporate with the
members. This is called gluten, and since it belongs to the
substance of the members it will rise again just as the mem-
bers will.
Reply Ohj. i. In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood
do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of
flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations
of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his
letter to Consentius {Ep. cxlvi.) that flesh and blood here
s gnify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and
blood; wherefore the Apostle's words continue: Neither
shall corruption possess incorruption.
Reply Obj.2. Just as the members that serve for generation
will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human
nature, and not for the operation accomplished now by
them, so will the humours be in the body not to make up
for waste, but to restore the integrit}^ of human nature and
to show forth its natural power.
Reply Ohj. 3. Just as the elements are in the course of
generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are
their matter, 3^et not so as to be always in transition when
in the mixed body, so too are the humours in relation to the
175 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 4
members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts
of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they,
like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe,
so too the humours belong to the perfection of the human
body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach
its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although
the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have.
But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection
from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode,
so too the humours are in some way perfected by the rational
soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect parts.
Fourth Article.
whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth
of human nature will rise again in it ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that what was in the body,
belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise
again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human
nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other
animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged
to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the
ox or of other animals will also rise agaai : which is inad-
missible.
Obj. 2. Further, Adam's rib belonged to the truth of human
nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam's rib wiU rise
again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise
again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore
whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature
will not aU rise again in him.
Obj. 3. Further, It is impossible for the same thing from
different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something
in different men to belong to the truth of human nature,
for mstance if a man were to partake of human flesh which
would be changed into his substance. Therefore there will
not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth
of human nature.
Q. 80. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 176
Obj. 4. Further, If it be said that not all the flesh partaken
of belongs to the truth of human nature, and that conse-
quently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man
and some in the other, — on the contrary: That which is
derived from one's parents would especially seem to belong
to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of
nothing but human flesh were to beget children, that which
his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of
other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from
the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves {De Gen.
Animal, i.). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human
nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human
nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.
Ohj. 5. Further, If it be said that what was changed into
seed was not that which belonged to the truth of human
nature in the flesh of the men eaten, but something not belong-
ing to the truth of human nature, — on the contrary: Let
us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in
which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the
truth of human nature, since whatever is in them is derived
from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into
seed, that which belonged to the truth of human nature in
the embryos — and after these have received a rational soul,
the resurrection applies to them — must needs belong to the
truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed.
And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects,
it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of
human nature in both to rise again in both of them.
On the contrary, WTiatever belonged to the truth of human
nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through
being perfected by the rational soul that the human body
is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged
to the truth of human nature will rise again in each one.
Further, If anything belonging to the truth of human nature
in a man be taken from his body, this wiU not be the perfect
body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man wiU be
removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom
it was promised (Luke xxi. 18) that not a hair of their head
177 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 4
should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of
human nature in a man will rise again in him.
/ answer that, Everything is related to truth in the same way
as to being {Met. ii.), because a thing is true when it is as it ap-
pears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna
{Met. ii.) says that the truth of anything is a property of the being
immutably attached thereto. Accordingly a thing is said to
belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs
properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares
the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the
true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being.
In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth
of human nature, we must observe that there have been three
opinions on that question. For some have maintained that
nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature,
and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature,
all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was
created ; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible
for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached
therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part
multiphes in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity b}^
growth, and so on; and that thus was the whole human race
multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever
is produced by nourishment, although it seem to have the
appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth
of human nature.
Others held that something new is added to the truth of
human nature by the natural transformation of the food
into the human body, if we consider the truth of human
nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of
the generative power is directed : but that if we consider the
truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation
and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is
directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth
of the human nature of the individual, not primarily but
secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature,
first and foremost, consists in the radical humour, that
namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human
III. 6 12
Q. 80. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178
race was originally fashioned : and that what is changed from
food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to
the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but
secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally
to the truth of human nature in another individual who is
begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that
seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something
belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the
begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture,
as others maintain . And thus the nutrimental humour in one
becomes the radical humour in another. The third opinion
is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth
of human nature even in this mdividual, because distinction
in the human body does not require that any signate material
part must needs remain throughout the whole Hfetime; any
signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it
remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it,
albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow.
And thus the nutrimental humour is not distinct from the
radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical
when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced
by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that
it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation by
the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutri-
mental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the
way to give nourishment. These three opinions have been
more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book
(ii. Sent. D. 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition
here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned.
It must accordingly be observed that this question requires
different answers according to these opinions. For the
first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of
multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of
human nature, both as regards the number of individuals
and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without
taking into account that which is produced from food ; for
this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the
destruction that might result from the action of natural
179 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 4
heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting.
Wherefore since at the resurrection it behoves human nature
to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat
tend to destroy the natural humour, there will be no need
for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but
that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the
human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid
perfection in number and quantity by being detached and
multiphed. The second opinion, since it maintains that what
is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quan-
tity in the individual and for the multiplication that results
from generation, must needs admit that something of this
product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so
much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature
in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all
that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this
man who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs
chiefly to the truth of human nature in him : while of that which
afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will
rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity ;
and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of
human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the per-
fection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humour
is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in
this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a
man's body, will all be restored, and of that which w^as
added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required
to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First,
because that which was added was intended to restore what
was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to
the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which
came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous
humour to the first radical humour results in the whole mixture
not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the
first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example {De
Gener. i.) the mixing of water with wine, which always
weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine
becomes watery : so that although the second water be drawn
Q. 80. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 180
into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine
as perfect!}' as the first water added to the wine. Even so
that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does
not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which
was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the
same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resur-
rection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains
that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature
principally wdll rise again, but not the whole of what belongs
to the truth of human nature secondarily.
The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and
in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it main-
tains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all
belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion
does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole
lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and
primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something
ebbing and flowing, that belongs to the truth of human
nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and
not on account of the primary being of the species, as the
second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts
that are not beside the intention of the nature generated
belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they
have of the species, since thus they remain ; but not as regards
what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent
to ebb and flow : so that we are to understand that the same
thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole popu-
lation of a city, for each individual is cut oft" from the popu-
lation by death, while others take their place: wherefore
the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but
remain formally, since these others occupy the very same
offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn,
so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame.
In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others
are being restored to the same shape and position, all the
parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as
to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.
On the other hand, the third opinion agrees with the
i8i INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 4
second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly
do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as
those which come first : and consequently the third opinion
asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second
opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For
it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed
will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human
nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because
it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which
same order the second opinion applied to those things that
are produced afterwards from food, in which point also
these two opinions agree.
Reply Obj. i. A natural thing is what it is, not from its
matter but from its form : wherefore, although that part of
matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh
rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not
follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a
man: else one might conclude that the clay from which
Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second
opinion, however, grants this argument.
Reply Obj. 2. That rib did not belong to the perfection of
the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplica-
tion of the species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam
but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the be-
getter, but in the begotten.
Reply Obj. 3. According to the first opinion it is easy to
reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never
belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it
did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh
was eaten : and thus it will rise again in the latter but not
in the former. But according to the second and third
opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he ap-
proached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue
of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will
rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he
first was directed to the resurrection by union with the
rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus
in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human
Q. 80. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 182
nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again
in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection
in the first will rise again in him and not in the second ; but
in the second its place is taken either by something of that
wliich was the product from other food, or if he never
partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution
is made by Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity
requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age.
Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither
does the ebb and flow of parts.
Reply Obj. 4. According to the first opinion this argument
is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed
is not from the surplus food : so that the flesh eaten is not
changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But
according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is
impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed
into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed
is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus
of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into
seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of
the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the
product. Hence, according to the rule already laid down
{ad 3) , whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in
the person bom of the seed ; while the remaining matter will
rise again in liim of whose flesh the seed was the product.
Reply Obj. 5. The embryo is not concerned with the
resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which
state much has been added to the seminal substance from
the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the
mother's womb. Consequently on the supposition that
a man partook of such food, and that some one were be-
gotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal
substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that
seed ; unless it contain something that would have belonged
to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being
eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the
first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten
flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again
i83 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 5
in the first, the Divine power supplying dcficiences in both.
The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it
does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food : but there
are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the
Second Book (ii. Sent. D. 30; P. L, Q. CXIX., A. 2).
Fifth Article.
WHETHER WHATEVER WAS MATERIALLY IN A MAN'S
MEMBERS WILL ALL RISE AGAIN ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that whatever was materially
in a man's members will all rise again. For the hair,
seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than the
other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise
again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body,
as Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xxii.) quoted in the text
(iv. Sent. D. 44). Much more therefore whatever was
materially in the other members will all rise again.
Obj. 2. Further, Just as the parts of the flesh are per-
fected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as
to matter. But the human body is directed to the resurrec-
tion through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore
not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter
will all rise again.
Obj. 3. Further, The body derives its totality from the
same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But
division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter
the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is
divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in
respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of
matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again :
which is inadmissible.
On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent
in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If,
therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb
and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again
will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in quantity.
Q. 80. Art. 5 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 184
Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature
in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if
the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the
parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that
in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the
truth of human nature in another : which is absurd.
I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed
to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the
truth of human nature, because it is in this respect that it
bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in
man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human nature
in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if
we consider the totality of matter ; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end
would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third
opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable
than the others. Vv^herefore the whole of what is in man
will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species
which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order
of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the
totality of matter. The second and first opinions, however,
do not make this distinction, but distiaguish between parts
both of which have the species and matter. But these two
opinions agree in that they both state that what is produced
from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality
of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion
maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was
engendered from food, whereas the second holds that some-
thing, but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above (A. 4).
Reply Obj. i. Just as all that is in the other parts of the
body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species,
but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair.
In the other parts something accrues from nourishment
which causes growth, and this is reckoned as another part,
if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another
place and position in the body, and is under other parts of
dimension: and there accnies something which does not
cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing ;
and this is not reckoned as another part of the whole con-
i85 INTEGRITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q. 80. Art. 5
sidered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy
another place or position in the body than that which was
occupied by the part that has passed away : although it may
be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of
matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however,
is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing
growth of the body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not
however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be
immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed
expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the
case when something wiU be lacking to the other parts, for
then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the sur-
plus of hair.
Reply Ohj. 2. According to the third opinion parts of
species are the same as parts of matter : for the Philosopher
does not make this distinction [De Gener. i.) in order to
distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the
same parts may be considered both in respect of species, as
to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in
respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and
species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no
relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under
such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed
to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which
draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of
matter say that although the rational soul perfects both
parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means
of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally
directed to the resurrection.
Reply Ohj. 3. In the matter of things subject to generation
and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite
dimensions before the reception of the substantial form.
Consequently division which is made according to these
dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and
definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form ;
wherefore division that is made in reference to definite
quantity regards the species especially when definite position
of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the
human body.
QUESTION LXXXI.
OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the quality of those who rise again.
Under this head there are four points of inquir}^ : (i) Whether
all will rise again in the youthful age ? (2) Wliether they
will be of equal stature ? (3) Whether all will be of the
same sex ? (4) Whether they will rise again to the animal
Hfe?
First Article,
whether all will rise again of the same age ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all will not rise again of
the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take
nothing pertainmg to man's perfection from those who rise
again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the
perfection of man, since old age is the age that demands
reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youth-
ful age.
Ohj. 2. Further, Age is reckoned according to the length
of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to
have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who
were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age.
Ohj. 3. Further, That which belonged most to the truth
of human nature in each individual will especially rise
again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the
more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human
nature, because in the end, through the strength of the
species being weakened the human body is Hkened to watery
186
i8y QUALITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q.Si.Art. i
wine according to the Philosopher {De Gencr. i.). Therefore
if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that
they should rise again in the age of childhood.
071 the contrary, It is written (Eph. iv. 13): Until we all
meet . . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of
the fulness of Christ. Now Christ rose again of youthful age,
which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine
says [Be Civ. Dei, xxii.). Therefore others also will rise
again of a youthful age.
Further, Man will rise again at the most perfect stage of
nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage
in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that
age.
/ answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of
human nature, because as God founded human nature
without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect.
Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it
has not 3^et attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly,
because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection.
The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged:
and consequently in each of these human nature will be
brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate
perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the move-
ment of growth terminates, and from which the movement
of decrease begins.
Reply Ohj. i. Old age calls for reverence, not on account
of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of
the soul's wisdom which is taken for granted on account
of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect
there will remain the reverence due to old age on account
of the fukiess of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but
the defect of old age will not be in them.
Reply Ohj. 2. We speak of age not as regards the number
of years, but as regards the state which the human body
acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to have been
formed in the youthful age on account of the particular
condition of body which he had at the first day of his forma-
tion. Thus the argument is not to the point.
Q. 8i. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188
Reply Obj. 3. The strength of the species is said to be
more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the
ability to transform nourishment in a certain way, even as
it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In
youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the term of
completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to
the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection
which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection
which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humours have
not yet reached their ultimate disposition.
Second Article,
whether all will rise again of the same stature ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all will rise again of the
same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive
quantity, so is he b}^ the quantity of time. Now the quantity
of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all
wiU rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive
quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so
that all will rise again of the same stature.
Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says {De Anima, ii. 41)
that all things of the same nature have a certain limit and
measure of size and growth. Now this limitation can only
arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well
as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since
aU men have the same specific form, there should be the
same measure of quantity in respect of matter in aU, unless
an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set
right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of
the same stature.
Obj. 3. Further, It will be impossible for man in rising
again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power
which first formed his body; for otherwise those who could
not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature
will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is false.
Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the
i8g QUALITY AFTER RESURRECTTON Q.8i.Art.2
power which will restore the human body by the resurrection,
and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the self-
same, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and
all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored
are equally disposed to receive the action of that power.
Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the
same quantity : and so the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each indi-
vidual's nature. Now the nature of the individual will not
be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its
natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural
quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature .
Further, Human nature will be restored by resurrection
unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the
same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise
again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of
stature.
I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will
be restored not only in the selfsame species but also in the
selfsame individual: and consequently we must observe in
the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific
but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature
has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails
without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of
latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure;
and each individual in the human species aims at some degree
of quantit}^ befitting his individual nature within the bounds
of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if
there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in
the addition of something to or the subtraction of something
from the aforesaid quantity : the measure whereof is gauged
according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and of
humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the
same power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same
quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which
would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not
erred or failed : and the Divine power will subtract or supply
what was excessive or lacking in man.
Q. 8i. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190
Reply Ohj. i. It has already been explained (A. i, ad 2)
that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though
the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because
the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is in-
different to a great or small quantity.
Reply Ohj. 2. The quantity of a particular individual
corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to
the nature or matter of the individual : wherefore the con-
clusion does not follow.
Reply Ohj. 3. The quantity of those who will be raised
from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power,
because the latter does not belong to the power of the body,
— ^nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before
the resurrection, — but to nature which the individual had
at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of
some defect was imable to effect the due quantity that is
befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the
defect at the resinrrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner
in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due
bounds of nature.
Third Article,
whether all will rise again of the male sex ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all will rise again of the
male sex. For it is written (Ephes. iv. 13) that we shall all
meet unto a perfect man, etc. Therefore there \vill be none
but the male sex.
Ohj. 2. Further, In the world to come all pre-eminence
will cease, as a gloss observes on i Cor. xv. 24. Now woman
is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women
will rise again not in the female but in the male sex.
Ohj. 3. Further, That which is produced incidentally and
beside the intention of natiire will not rise again, since all
error will be removed at the resurrection. Now the female
sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a
fault in the formative power of the seed, which is imable to
bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore
igi QUALITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q.81.ART.3
the Pliilosopher says {Dc Animal, xvi., i.e. De General.
Animal, ii.) that the female is a misbegotten male. There-
fore the female sex will not rise again.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xxii.) : Those
are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise
again.
Further, At the resurrection God will restore man to what
He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from
the man's rib (Gen. ii. 22). Therefore He will also restore
the female sex at the resurrection.
/ answer that. Just as, considering the nature of the indi-
vidual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also,
considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is
due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is
becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees
whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quan-
tity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature,
so wiU they rise again of different sex. And though there
be difference of sex there wiU be no shame in seeing one
another, since there will be no lust to invite them to shame-
ful deeds which are the cause of shame.
Reply Obj. i. When it is said: We shall all meet Christ
unto a perfect man, this refers not to the male sex but to the
strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women.
Reply Obj. 2. Woman is subject to man on account of
the frailty of nature, as regards both vigour of soul and
strength of body. x\fter the resurrection, however, the
difference in those points will be not on accoimt of the
difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits.
Hence the conclusion does not foUow.
Reply Obj. 3. Although the begetting of a woman is beside
the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of
universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection
of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex
as stated above {ad 2).
Q. 8r. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192
Fourth Article,
whether all will rise again to animal life ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that they \vill rise again to
the animal life, or in other words that they will make use
of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our
resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is
said to have ate after His resurrection (John xxi., Luke
xxiv). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and
in like manner beget.
Obj. 2. Further, The distinction of sexes is directed to
generation; and in like manner the instruments which
serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now
man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exer-
cise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.
Obj. 3. Further, The whole man will be beatified both in
soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic, i. 7), consists in a perfect opera-
tion. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the
soul and all the members should have their respective acts
after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows
as above.
Obj. 4. Further, After the resurrection there will be perfect
joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures,
since happiness according to Boethius is a state rendered
perfect by the accumulation of all goods (De Consol. iii.), and
the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since then there is
much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive
powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal
life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will
have less spiritual bodies.
On the contrary, It is written (Matth. xxii. 30) : In the
resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married.
Further, Generation is directed to supply the defect
resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the hvunan
race : and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to
increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the
193 QUALITY AFTER RESURRECTION Q.8r.ART.4
human race will already have the number of individuals
preordained by God, since generation will continue up to
that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due
quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste
affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative
and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.
/ answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to
man on account of his primary perfection, which consists
in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature,
since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the
action of natural causes ; but the necessity of the resurrection
regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which
consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently
those natural operations which are directed to cause or
preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not
be in the resurrection : such are the actions of the animal life
in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the
movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at
the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget,
pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary
perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the
resurrection.
Reply Obi. i. When Christ partook of that meal. His
eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature
needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to
prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He
had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His dis-
ciples. There wiU be no need of such proof at the general
resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is
said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which
lawyers say that a dispensation is a relaxation of the general
law : because Christ made an exception to that which is
common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of
food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Reply Ohj, 2. The distinction of sexes and the difference
of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of
human nature both in the species and in the individual.
HI. 6 13
Q. 8i. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 194
Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose,
although they lack their animal operations.
Reply Obj. 3. The aforesaid operations do not belong to
man as man, as also the Philosopher states {Ethic, x. 7),
wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist
therein. But the human body will be glorified by an over-
flow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the
body will be subject to reason.
Reply Obi. 4. As the Philosopher says {Ethic, vii. 12, x. 5),
the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are
applied to man for the removal of weariness ; or again, they
are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures
inordinately, as though they were real pleasures : just as a
man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not
dehghtful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow
that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of
beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain
heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover,
according to the Philosopher's teaching, would seem to
have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none
but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought
for their own sake; wherefore these alone are requisite for
beatitude.
QUESTION LXXXII.
OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE
BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION.
{In Four Articles.)
We must now consider the conditions under which the
blessed rise again, and (i) the impassibility of their bodies :
(2) their subtlety : (3) their agility : (4) their clarity. Under
the first head there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether
at the resurrection the saints will rise again impassible
in body ? (2) Whether all will be equally impassible ?
(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies
insensible ? (4) Whether in them all the senses are in act ?
First Article.
whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible
after the resurrection ?
We proceed thiis to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the bodies of the saints will
not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything
mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be
a mortal rational animal, for such is the definition of man,
which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the
body will be passible.
Ohj. 2. Further, Whatever is in potentiality to have the
form of another thing is passible in relation to something
else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another
thing (De Gener. i.). Now the bodies of the saints will be in
potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrec-
195
Q. 82. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196
tion; since matter, according as it is under one form, does
not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of
the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common
with the elements, because they will be restored out of the
same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore
they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will
be passible.
Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher (De Gener.
i.), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and
passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints
will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even
as now. Therefore they will be passible.
Obj. 4. Further, In the human body the blood and humours
will rise again, as stated above (Q. LXXX., AA. 3, 4). Now,
sickness and suchlike passions arise in the body through
the antipathy of the humours. Therefore the bodies of the
saints will be passible after the resurrection.
Obj. 5. Further, Actual defect is more inconsistent with
perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes
merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain
actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars
of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ,
it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we
grant their bodies to be passible.
On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because
increase of passion results in loss of substance.* Now the
bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrec-
tion, according to i Cor. xv. 42, It is sown in corruption,
it shall rise in incorruption. Therefore the}'' will be impas-
sible.
Further, The stronger is not passive to the weaker. But
no body mil be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of
which it is written (i Cor. xv. 43) : // is sown in weakness,
it shall rise in power. Therefore they will be impassible.
/ answer that, We speak of a thing being passive in two
ways.f First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is
called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the
* Aristotle, Topic, vi. i. f Cf. I.-II., Q. XXII., A. i.
197 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. i
receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it.
The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the
removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to
perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we
use the word passive properly, and thus the Damascene defines
passion (De Fide Orthod. ii. 22) as being a movement contrary
to nature. Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is
called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its
operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient
is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimi-
lates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as
such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was
confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense
there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the
saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be im-
passible.
The reason however of this impassibility is assigned dif-
ferently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the con-
dition of the elements, which will be different then from what
it is now. For they say that the elements will remain then,
as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active
and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true:
because the active and passive qualities belong to the per-
fection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored
without them in the body of the man that rises again, they
would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these quali-
ties are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused
by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for
the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore
others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of
their proper acti\dties, the Divine power so doing for the
preservation of the human body. This however would seem
to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active
and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the
elements), and according as one or the other preponderates
the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions,
and this must apply to the bodies of those who rise again,
for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of
Q. 82. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198
which demand different complexions. Moreover, according
to tliis, impassibihty could not be one of their gifts, because
it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance,
but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the
power of God, which might produce the same effect in a
human body even in this state of life. Consequently others
say that in the body itself there will be something preventing
the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth*
or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the
composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the
elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for
the rational soul ; but that in this state of life, on account of
the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body
is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection
the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the
human body wdll be made impassible in likeness to the
heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body
does not enter materially into the composition of a human
body, as was proved above (ii. Sent. D. 12, Q. I., A. i). More-
over it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power
of a heavenl}^ body, should endow the human body with a pro-
perty of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body,
since the Apostle ascribes to Christ's power the transformation
of the human body, because such as is the heavenly, such also
are they that are heavenly (i Cor. xv. 48) . and He will reform
the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory,
according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue
all things unto Himself (Phil. iii. 21). And again, a heavenly
nature cannot exercise such power over the human body
as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by
reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must
sa}^ otherwise that all passion results from the agent over-
coming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own
bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient
except tliiough the weakening of the hold which the form
* The other four being the elements. This fifth element was
known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which
they held heavenly bodies to be formed.
199 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. i
of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion
which is against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that
we are speaking now : for matter is not subject to one of two
contraries, except through the cessation or at least the
diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it
Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly
subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly
subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the
glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the
disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul ; and conse-
quently those bodies will be impassible.
Reply Ohj. i. According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo, ii. ii),
mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man,
because they did not believe that the whole man could be ever
immortal, for they had no experience of man otherwise
than in this state of mortality. Or we may say that since,
according to the Philosopher {Met. vii., viii.), essential
differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ acci-
dental differences in order to signify essential differences
from which the accidental differences result. Hence
mortal is put in the definition of man, not as though mortal-
ity were essential to man, but because that which causes
passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely
composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will
not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul
over the body.
Reply Ohj. 2. Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and
this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality.
For the form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining
it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And
since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome
matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from
sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form
through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrec-
tion, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and
it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion,
because it will be immutably subject to God, which was
not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently
Q. 82. Art. i THE " SUIVIMA IHEOLOGICA " 200
those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality
as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality
will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body,
so that it will never be realized by actual passion.
Reply Ohj. 3. The elemental qualities are the instruments
of the soul, as stated in De Anima, ii., text. 38, seq., for the
heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of
nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal
agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument,
no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accord-
ance with the disposition of the principal agent. Con-
sequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection,
no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities
that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has
the preservation of the body in view.
Reply Ohj. 4. According to Augustine [Ep. ad Consent, cv.)
the Divine power is able to remove whatever qualities He will
from this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining.
Hence even as in a certain respect He deprived the fiames
of the Chaldees^ furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies
of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another
respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the
wood, so will He remove passibility from the humours while
leaving their nature unchanged. It has been explained in thp
Article how this is brought about.
Reply Ohj. 5. The scars of wounds will not be in the saints,
nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect,
but as signs of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints
suffered for the sake of justice and faith : so that this will in-
crease their own and others' joy (cf . P. III., Q. LIV., A. 4, ad 3).
Hence Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xxii. 20) : We feel an
undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see
in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which
they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see
them, for this will not make them less comely but more glorious.
A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the
body, yet not of the body but of virtue. Nevertheless those
martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their
201 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. 2
limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection
of the dead, for to them it is said (Luke xxi. 18) : A hair of
your head shall not perish.
Second Article,
whether all will be equally impassible ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all will be equally im-
passible. For a gloss on i Cor. xv. 42, It is sown in corrup-
tion, says that all have equal immunity from suffering. Now
the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from suffering.
Therefore all will be equally impassible.
Ohj. 2. Further, Negations are not subject to be more
or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of
passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject
than in another.
Ohj. 3. Further, A thing is more white if it have less
admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of
passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will
all be equally impassible.
On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit.
Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others.
Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would seem
to be greater in some than in others.
Further, Impassibility is condivided with the gift of
clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according
to I Cor. XV. 41. Therefore neither will impassibility be
equal in all.
/ answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two
ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be
considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or
privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be
equal in all the blessed. On the other hand, if we consider
it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person
than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul
over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's
unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one
Q. 82. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202
who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of
impassibility.
Reply Obj. 1. This gloss is speaking of impassibility in
itself and not in relation to its cause.
Reply Obj. 2. Although negations and privations con-
sidered in themselves are not increased nor diminished,
yet they are subject to increase and diminution in relation
to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome
from having more and greater obstacles to light.
Reply Obj. 3. Some things increase not only by receding
from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus
light increases. Consequently impassibility also is greater
in one subject than in another, although there is no passi-
bility remaining in any one.
Third Article.
whether impassibility excludes actual sensation
from glorified bodies ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that impassibility excludes
actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to
the Philosopher {De Anima, ii., text. 118), sensation is a kind
of passion. But the glorified bodies mil be impassible.
Therefore they will not have actual sensation.
Obj. 2. Further, Natural alteration precedes spiritual*
alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being.
Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will
not be subject to natural alteration. Therefore they will
not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for
sensation.
Obj. 3. Further, Whenever actual sensation is due to a
new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that
state there will be no new judgment, because our thoughts
will not then be changeable, as Augustine says [De Trin. xv. 16) .
Therefore there will be no actual sensation.
* Aniymilem, as though it were derived from animus — the mind.
Ci. P. I.-II.. Q. L., A. I, 3"; Q. LIL, A. i, 3°.
203 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. 3
Obj. 4. Further, When the act of one of the soul's powers
is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now
the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the contem-
plative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul
will have no actual sensation whatever.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. i. 7) : Every eye shall
see Him. Therefore there will be actual sensation.
Further, According to the Philosopher {De Anima, i.),
the animate is distinct from the inanimate hy sensation and
movement. Now there will be actual movement since they
shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds (Wis. iii. 7).
Therefore there will also be actual sensation.
/ answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation
in the bodies of the blessed : else the bodily life of the saints
after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than
to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection,
because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ultimate act
of life, for which reason sleep is described as half -life.*
But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of
sensation.
For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible,
and consequently not susceptible to strange impressions,
and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they
will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from
sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impos-
sible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain
the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense
is to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima,
ii., text. 51, 54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection,
were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving
species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active
power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with
sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed
on them ; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive
power never becomes active. Consequently others say
* This is what Aristotle says : The good and the had are in sleep
least distinguishable : hence men say that fay half their lives there is no
difference between the happy and the unhappy {Ethic, i. 13).
Q. 82. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204
that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not
indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the
higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from
the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers wiU then
receive from the higher. But tliis mode of reception does
not result in real sensation, because every passive power,
according to its specific nature, is determined to some special
active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that
with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore
since the proper active principle in external sensation is
a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention
thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of
sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagina-
tion or other higher powers, there \\ill be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons
(in whom there is this kind of outflow of species towards
the organs of sense, on accoimt of the powerful influence of
the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to
them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say
with others that sensation in glorified bodies \vill result
from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are trans-
muted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a
natural transmutation, when namely the organ is disposed
by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul
which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is
heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant tlirough
contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual
transmutation, as when a sensible quahty is received in
an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when,
namely, the species or the intention of a quality, and not
the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the
species of whiteness and yet docs not itself become white.
Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation,
properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species
in matter but without matter; that is to say without the
material being which the species had outside the soul {De
Anima, ii., text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of
205 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. 3
the recipient, because in this way the quality is received
according to its material being. Consequently this kind of
reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second,
which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the
nature of the recipient.
Reply Obj. i. As already explained, by this passion that
takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the afore-
said reception of species, the body is not drawn away from
natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change.
Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does not
exclude this kind of passion.
Reply Obj. 2. Every subject of passion receives the action
of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be
a thing that is naturally adapted to be altered by an active
principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural
alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural
precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally
adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does
not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air
is not receptive of colour, according to its natural being, but
only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way
alone is it altered : whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies
are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not
spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be
any natural alteration, and consequently there will be only
spiritual alteration.
Reply Obj. 3. Just as there will be new reception of species
in the organs of sensation, so there wiU be new judgment in
the common sense : but there will be no new judgment on the
point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees
what he knew before. The saying of Augustine, that there
our thoughts will not be changeable, refers to the thoughts of the
intellectual part : therefore it is not to the point.
Reply Obj. 4. When one of two things is the type of the
other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder
or lessen its attention to the other : thus a phj^sician while
considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind
the rules of his art concerning the colours of urine. And
Q. 82. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206
since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all
things that will be done or known by them, their attention
to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing any-
thing else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God,
nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one
power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely
engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such
an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from
the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or mem-
bers should receive. And since in the saints all the powers
will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely
without thereby hindering the operation of another power
even as it was with Christ.
Fourth Article.
whether in the blessed, after the resurrection,
all the senses will be in act ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that all the senses are not in
act there. For touch is the first of all the senses {De Anima,
ii.). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense of
touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the altera-
tion of an animal body by some external body preponderating
in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch
is capable of discerning : and such an alteration will then be
impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.
Ohj. 2. Further, The sense of taste assists the action of the
nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be
no such action, as stated above (Q. LXXXL, A. 4). There-
fore taste would be useless there.
Ohj, 3. Further, Nothing will be corrupted after the resur-
rection because the whole creature will be invested with a
certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense of smell
cannot have its act without some corruption having taken
place, because smell is not perceived without a volatile evap-
oration consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the
sense of smell is not there in its act.
207 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. 4
Obj. 4. Further, Hearing assists teaching (Dc Sensu et
Sensaio, i.). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will
require no teaching by means of sensible objects, since they
will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God.
Therefore hearing will not be there.
Obj. 5. Further, Seeing results from the pupil receiving
the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection
this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will
be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of
the senses. The minor is proved thus: — That which is
actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species ; and
consequently a mirror placed under the sun's rays does not
reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil
like the whole body will be endowed with clarity. There-
fore it wiU not receive the image of a coloured body.
Obj. 6. Further, According to the science of perspective,
whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply
to the glorified bodies. Therefore they wiU not have actual
sense of sight. The minor is proved thus : Whenever a thing
is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the
distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a
greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that
the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object.
Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that
it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently
it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see
now : and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would
seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified
bodies.
On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more
perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature
in the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore
all the senses will be actual there.
Further, The sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than
the body is. But the body will be rewarded or pimished on
account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore
all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded, and
in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure
Q. 82. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208
and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the
senses.
I answer that, There are two opinions on this question.
For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the
sensitive powers, but that only two senses will be in act,
namely touch and sight ; nor will this be owing to defective
senses, but from lack of medium and object ; and that the
senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the
integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom
of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the
medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For
in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the
medium in hearing and smelling {De Anima, ii., text. 76,
97). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium
in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (ibid. text. 28,
94). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell
will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of
the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also
be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps.
cxlix. 6, The high praises of God shall be in their mouthy
that hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God. The
same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdr. xii. 27,
With singing and with cymbals. Wherefore, according to
others we must say that smelling and hearing will be in act
there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being
affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from
what we have said (Q. LXXXL, A. 4) : imless perchance we
say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being
affected by some neighbouring humour.
Reply Obj. i. The qualities perceived by the touch are
those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the
body of an animal has, through its tangible qualities accord-
ing to the present state of life, a natural aptitude to be
affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the object
of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most
material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of
material alteration connected with it. Yet material altera-
tion is onty accidentally related to the act of sensation which
209 IMPASSIBILITY Q. 82. Art. 4
is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently the
glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are
immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to
spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with
the body of Adam, which could neither be burnt by fire,
nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such
things.
Reply Obj. 2. Taste, in so far as it is the perception of
food, will not be in act ; but perhaps it wiU be possible in so
far as it is cognizant of flavours in the way mentioned above.
Reply Obj. 3. Some have considered smell to be merely a
volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true;
which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten to a
corpse on perceiving the odour from a very great distance,
whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to travel
from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole
corpse were to be dissolved into vapour. This is confirmed
by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise
their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the
medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a
spiritual alteration, without any evaporation reaching the
organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due
to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity;
wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in
order for the smeU to be perceived. But in the glorified
bodies odour wiU be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise
.hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ
with a spiritual alteration, like the odour of a volatile evap-
oration. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints,
because it will not be hindered by any humidity : and it will
take cognizance not only of the excellences of odours, as
happens with us now on account of the very great humidity
of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odours.
Reply Obj. 4. In heaven there will be vocal praise (though
indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will
affect the organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration.
Nor win it be for the sake of learning whereby they may
acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of the
HI. 6 14
Q. 82. Art. 4 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210
sense and for the sake of pleasure. How it is possible for
the voice to give sound there, we have already stated
(ii. Sent. D. 2; Q. II., A. 2, ad 5).
Reply Obj. 5. The intensity of light does not hinder the
spiritual reception of the image of colour, so long as the
pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that
however much the air be filled with light, it can be the
medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the more
clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault
through defective sight. The fact that the image of an
object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the
Sim's rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception
being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection : because
for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown
back by an opaque bod}^ for which reason lead is affixed to
the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so
that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of
a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of
the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and conse-
quently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight
keen rather than defective.
Reply Obj. 6. The more perfect the sense the less does
it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now
the smaller the angle at which the sight is affected by the
visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is
that a stronger sight can see from a distance more than a
weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller
the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of
a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see by
the very least alteration (of the organ) ; and consequently
at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from
a much greater distance.
QUESTION LXXXIII.
OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED.
{In Six Articles.)
We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the
blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body ?
(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same
place with another not glorified body ? (3) Whether by a
miracle two bodies can be in the same place ? (4) Whether
a glorified body can be in the same place with another
glorified body ? (5) Whether a glorified body necessarily
requires a place equal to itself ? (6) Whether a glorified
body is palpable ?
First Article,
whether subtlety is a property of the glorified
BODY ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that subtlety is not a property
of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass
the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory siu:-
passes the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature.
Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body,
it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle
than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be
more subtle than the wind and the air, which was condemned
by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates
(Moral, xiv.).
Ohj. 2. Further, As heat and cold are simple qualities of
bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and
211
Q. 83. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA *' 212
other qualities of the elements will not be intensified in the
glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact they
will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, therefore, will
subtlety be in them more than it is now.
Obj. 3. Further, Subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity
of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within
equal dimensions are said to be more subtle ; as fire in com-
parison with air, and air as compared with water, and water
as compared with earth. But there will be as much matter
in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimen-
sions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle
then than now.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xv. 44) : It is sown a
corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual, i.e. a spirit -like,
body. But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily
subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.
Further, The more subtle a body is the more exalted it is.
But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore
they will be most subtle,
I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power
to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii. that a subtle
thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts. Now that a
body has the power of penetrating may happen through
two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, especially
in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because
penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an
obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of
matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety:
and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over
the matter, the term subtlety has been transferred to those
bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and
are most fully perfected thereby : thus we speak of subtlety
in the sun and moon and Hke bodies, just as gold and similar
things may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly
complete in their specific being and power. And since
incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term
subtlety is applied to them, not only by reason of their sub-
stance, but also on account of their power. For just as a
213 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. t
subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it
reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said
to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic
principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing.
In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because
he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size:
and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly
people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified
bodies in different ways.
For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei,
xiii. 12), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual
substances are said to be subtle : and they said that at the
resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit,
and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being
spiritual the bodies of those who rise again (i Cor. xv. 44).
But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body
cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community
of matter between them: and Boethius proves this {De duah,
Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and one's
body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again
a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body.
Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle's meaning, just as
he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural
(animale) bodies, as being changed into souls (animam):
and this is clearly false.
Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain
at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety
by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising
again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates
{Moral, xiv.). But this again cannot be maintained, be-
cause our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection,
as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must
believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover
the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did
the body of our Lord, according to Luke xxiv. 39, A spirit
hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have, and Job xix. 26,
In my flesh I shall see God, my Saviour: and the nature of
flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.
Q. 83. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214
Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned
to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account
of the most complete perfection of the body. But this
completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth,
or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant in
them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the
fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a
body, as we have shown above (ii. Sent. D. 12, qu. i).
Secondly, because granted that it entered into the composi-
tion of the human body, it would be impossible to account
for its having a greater predominance over the elemental
nature then than now, unless, — either the amount of the
heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus
human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless
perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is
inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again), —
or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties
of the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over
the body, and in that case a natural power would be the
cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.
Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by
reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will
result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is
the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which
dominion the glorified body is said to be spiritual, as being
wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby
the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its partici-
pating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the
soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul
in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the
soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the first
reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after
that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body.
Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of
spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says
(Moral, xiv.) that the glorified body is said to be subtle as a
result of a spiritual power.
This sufiices for the Replies to iht Objections which refer
to the subtlety of rarefaction.
215 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 2
Second Article.
whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified
body is able to be in the same place with another
body not glorified ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that by reason of this subtlety
a body is able to be in the same place with another body
not glorified. For according to Philip, iii. 21, He will
reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His
glory. Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same
place with another body, as appears from the fact that after
His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors
being shut (John xx. 19, 26). Therefore also the glorified
bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the
same place with other bodies not glorified.
Obj. 2. Further, Glorified bodies will be superior to all
other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain
bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same
place together with other bodies. Much more therefore
is this befitting glorified bodies.
Obj. 3. Further, A heavenly body cannot be severed,
at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it
is written (Job xxxvii. 18) that the heavens . . . are most
strong, as if they were of molten brass. If then the subtlety
of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place
together with another body, it wiU never be able to ascend
to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous.
Obj. 4. Further, A body which is unable to be in the same
place with another body can be hindered in its movement
or even surrounded by others standing in its way. But this
cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they wiU be
able to be together in the same place with other bodies.
Obj. 5. Further, As point is to point, so is line to fine,
surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can
* The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or
heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of
God. Cf. P. I., Q. LVI.. A. 3.
Q. S3. Art. 2 THE " SUIMMA THEOLOGICA " 216
be coincident, as in the case of two lines touching one another,
and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one
another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch one
another, because contiguous things are those whose boundaries
coincide {Phys. vi.). Therefore it is not against the nature
of a body to be in the same place together with another
body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the
nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body.
Therefore a glorified body, b}^ reason of its subtlety, will
be able to be in the same place together with another
body.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): Difference of
accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ
not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. If we were
to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one
has a different place ; and it is quite inconceivable that they
should all occupy the same place. Therefore if we suppose
two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one
body numerically.
/ answer that. It cannot be maintained that a glorified
body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place
with another body, unless the obstacle to its being now in the
same place with another body be removed by that subtlety.
Some say that in the present state this obstacle is its gross-
ness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place ; and that
this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But there
are two reasons why this cannot be maiatained. First
because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes
is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter
in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that per-
tains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body,
both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And
the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by
reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on
account of any defect of nature . For since fulness is opposed
to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in
a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum
is defined by the Philosopher [Phys. iv.) as being a place not
217 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 2
filled by a sensible body. And a body is said to be sensible
by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all
of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain
that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as
evidenced by the body of our Lord (Luke xxiv. 39) : nor will
it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat,
cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified
body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place :
for it would seem madness to say that the place in which
there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their
aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-
existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a
place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter,
those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held
the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place
wherein suchlike dimensions exist apart from a sensible body ;
and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being
together with them in the same place. This is made clear
by the Philosopher iPhys. iv.; Met. iii.), where he considers
it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but
separate dimensions, to be together with another natural
sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a
glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless
it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the
same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser
does not involve the removal of the greater.
Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's
being now in the same place with another body can nowise
be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can pre-
vent a body from occupying the same place together with
another body, except something in it that requires a different
place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place
is not required by any quality of the body, because a body
demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if
we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold,
heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid
distinction, as the Philosopher proves {Phys. iv.), and as is
Q. 83. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218
self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the
necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does
not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity.
Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a
place through its matter. It remains therefore that the
necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place
results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a
place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its
definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying
a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing
from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its
dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a
separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two
parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct places,
else one hne added to another would not make something
greater, and this is against common sense . The same appHes
to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter
demands place, through being the subject of dimension, the
aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just
as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of
a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible
for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without
there be distinction of place. And since distinction of
matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals,
it follows that, as Boethius says {De Trin.), we cannot possibly
conceive two bodies occupying one place, so that this distinc-
tion of individuals requires this difference of accidents.
Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its
dimension ; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid
necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body.
Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it
to be in the same place together with another body, but it
will be possible for it to be together with another body by the
operation of the Divine power : even as the body of Peter
had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing
of Peter's shadow (Acts v. 15) not through any inherent
property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the
faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible for a
219 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 2
glorified body to be in the same place together with another
body for the perfection of glory.
Reply Ohj. i. That Christ's body was able to be together
with another body in the same place was not due to its
subtlety, but resulted from the power of His Godhead after
His resurrection, even as in His birth.* Hence Gregory
says {Horn. xxvi. in Ev.): The same body went into His
disciples the doors being shut, which to human eyes came from
the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth. Therefore there
is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies
on account of their subtlety.
Reply Obj. 2. Light is not a body as we have said above
(ii. Sent. Q. XHL, A. 3; P. L, Q. LXVIL, A. 2): hence the
objection proceeds on a false supposition.
Reply Obj. 3. The glorified body will pass through the
heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of
its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which will assist them
in all things at will.
Reply Obj. 4. From the fact that God will come to the
aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows
that they cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.
Reply Obj. 5. As stated in Phys. iv., place is not befitting
a point : hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only
accidental, because the body of which it is a term is in a
place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole
body, so the term of the place corresponds to the term of the
body. But it happens that two places have one term, even
as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently
though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet the
same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the
two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous
bodies are said to coincide.
* Cf. P. III., Q. XXVIII., A. 2, ad 3.
Q. 83. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220
Third Article.
whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies
to be in the same place ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that not even by a miracle is it
possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is
not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at once two
and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true
at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to be in the
same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor
is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the
same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same
as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them.
If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate :
which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the
bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a
placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason
the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of
the place. Now things that are the same with one and the
same thing are the same with one another. Therefore the
dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot
have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the same
whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they
were two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two.
Ohj. 2. Further, A thing cannot be done miraculously either
against the common principles, — for instance that the part
be not less than the whole; since what is contrary to
common principles implies a direct contradiction: — or con-
trary to the conclusions of geometry which are infallible
deductions from common principles, — for instance that the
three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right
angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that
is contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the
definition from the defined is to make two contradictories
true at the same time. Now it is contrary to common prin-
ciples, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the defini-
221 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art 3
tion of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. There-
fore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved
as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles
touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular
bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in
them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is
contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than
one straight line between two points : yet this would be the
case were two bodies in the same place, since between two
given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would
be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in
that place.
Ohj. 3. Further, It would seem impossible that by a miracle
a body which is enclosed within another should not be in
a place, for then it would have a common and not a proper
place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two
bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot be
done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing
two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater
than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be
enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater
body will be its common place ; while it will have no proper
place, because no given surface of the body will contain it,
and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a
proper place.
Obj. 4. Further, Place corresponds in proportion to the
thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that
the same body is at the same time in different places, except
by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacrament of the
Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that
two bodies be together in the same place.
On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son
by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary
for two bodies to be together in the same place, because the
body of her child when coming forth did not break through
the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is possible
for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.
Further, This may again be proved from the fact that
Q. 83. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222
our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut
(John XX. 19, 26).
/ answer that, As shown above (A. 2) the reason
why two bodies must needs be in two places is that dis-
tinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore
we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each
loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues
to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence
it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be
together unless each retain its distinct being which it had
hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided
in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being
depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proxi-
mate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since
the first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the
second causes be done away, as appears from the first pro-
position of De Causis, therefore by God's power and by that
alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance
as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of
God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its
distinct being from that of another body, although its matter
be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other
body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two bodies
to be together in the same place.
Reply Obj. i. This argument is sophistical because it is
based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it
supposes the existence, between two opposite superficies
of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which
dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of the
place would have to be identified: because it would then
follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place
would become one dimension, if each of them were identified
with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is
false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a
new place, it would follow that a change takes place in the
dimensions of the place or of tiling placed : since it is impos-
sible for two things to become one anew, except one of them
be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other
223 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 3
dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupy-
ing the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing,
but begs the question, because according to this nothing else
has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are
the same as the dimensions of the place ; excepting that the
dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the
bounds of the place, and that the distance between the
boimds of a place is commensurate with the distance between
the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be
distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus
that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one
place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same
place, which is the chief question at issue.
Reply Obj. 2. Granted that by a miracle two bodies be
together in the same place, nothing follows either against
common principles, or against the definition of a line, or
against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above
(A. 2), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents
in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinc-
tion, namely on account of the placing of the parts, besides
the reason of individuality and distinction which is common
to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter
which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood
as being distinct from another, either because it is in another
subject (in which case we are considering a material line),
or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which
case we are considering a mathematical line, which is under-
stood apart from matter) . Accordingly if we remove matter,
there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of
a different placing : and in like manner neither can there be
a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimen-
sions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose
one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom
unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine
miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of
place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these
are not distant from one another in place, on account of
the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a
Q. 83. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224
difference of points, and thus different lines described on
two bodies that are in the same place are dra\vTi from different
points to different points ; for the point that we take is not
a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a
line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point
which is its term. In like manner the two circles described
in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are
two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could
not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the dis-
tinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one
another they still remain two. Even so a circle described
by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other
circle described by the locating body.
Reply Obj. 3. God could make a body not to be in a place ;
and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain
body is not in a place, because the greater body is the place
of the lesser bod}^ by reason of its superficies which is
described by contact with the terms of the lesser body.
Reply Obj. 4. It is impossible for one body to be miracu-
lously in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally
on the altar), although it is possible by a miracle for two
bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several
places at once is incompatible with the individual, by
reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would
follow that it is divided as to place. On the other hand,
to be in the same place with another body is incompatible
with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the
nature of unity is perfected in indi vision {Met. v.), whereas
distinction from others is a result of the nature of unity.
Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places
at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack
reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not
imply a contradiction, as explained above. Hence the com-
parison fails.
225 SUBTLETY Q. 83. ART.4
Fourth Article.
whether one glorified body can be in the same place
together with another glorified body ?
We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that a glorified body can be
in the same place together with another glorified body.
Because where there is greater subtlety there is less resist-
ance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-
glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glorified body :
and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body,
Ohj. 2. Further, Even as a glorified body will be more
subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body
be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glorified body
can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more
subtle glorified body can be in the same place with a less
subtle glorified body.
Ohj. 3. Further, The body of heaven is subtle, and wiU
then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be
able to be in the same place with the body of heaven, since
the saints will be able at wiU to travel to and from earth.
Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to occupy the
same place.
On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that
is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot
be in the same place, although a body and a spirit can be
in the same place, as stated above (i. Sent, D. 37, Q. III.,
A. 3; P. I., Q. LIL, A. 3), Therefore neither will two glori-
fied bodies be able to be in the same place.
Further, If two bodies occupy the same place, one is
penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark
of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the
glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two
glorified bodies to be in the same place.
/ answer that, The property of a glorified body does not
make it able to be in the same place with another glorified
body, nor again to be in the same place with a non-glorified
HI. 6 15
Q. S3. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 226
body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for
two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be in the
same place, even as a glorified bod\' with a non-glorified body.
Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in
the same place with another glorified body, both because a
becoming order will be observed in them, which demands
distinction, and because one glorified body wiW not be in
the w^y of another. Consequentl}' two glorified bodies will
never be in the same place.
Reply Obi. i. This argument supposes that a glorified
body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place
\nth another body : and this is not true.
The same answer apphes to the Second Objection.
Reply Obi. 3. The body of heaven and the other bodies
will be said equivocall}' to be glorified, in so far as they will
have a certain share in glory, and not as though it were
becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human
bodies .
Fifth Article.
whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body
will no longer need to be in an equal place ?
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —
Objectio^i I. It would seem that b}^ \drtue of its subtlety,
a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place.
For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of
Christ according to Pliil. iii. 21. Now^ Christ's body is not
bound by this necessity of being in an equal place : where-
fore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions
of a consecrated host. Therefore the same ^^ill be true of
the glorified bodies.
Obi. 2. Further, The Pliilosopher proves [Phys. iv., text.
53, 76) that two bodies are not in the same place, because
it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the
smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same
part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two
bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a
glorified bod}' will be in the same place \\ith another body.
227 SUBTLETY q. 83. Art. 5
as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for
it to be in an}^ place however small.
Obj. 3. Further, Even as a body is seen by reason of its
colour, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now
the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will
be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-
glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore
its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's >\iU that it
will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a
little or great qu^mtity at will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Phys. iv., text. 30)
that whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to] itself.
Now the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will
occupy a place equal to itself.
Further, The dimensions of a place and of that which is in
that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv., text. 30, 76, jy.
Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the
place the same thing would be greater and smaller than
itself, which is absurd.
/ ariswer that, A body is not related to place save thiough
the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a
located body is confined through contact with the locating
body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place
smaller than its quantity, unless its proper quantity be
made in some way less than itself : and this can only be under-
stood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in
respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter wliich
at first is subject to a greater qucmtity is afterwards subject
to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the
glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at
N\ill, so that when they list, they are able to have a great
quantity, and when they list, a small quantity. But tliis
is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is
intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detri-
ment* of its substance. Hence hi incorruptible, i.e. heavenly,
bodies, there is only local movement, which is not accord-
ing to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change
♦ a. I.-IL. g. XXIL. A. 1.; q. XLL, A. i.
g. 83. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228
of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible
with the impassibihty and incorruptibility of a glorified
body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body
would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because
since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes
the same matter would be under great dimensions and some-
times under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied
and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the
quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may
be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that the
parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one
another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small
it may become. And some have held this to be the case,
saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will
be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body : and
that in like manner its parts can be one within the other,
so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass
through the minutest opening in another body: and thus
they explain how Christ's bod}^ came out of the Virgin's
womb ; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being
shut. But this is impossible ; both because the glorified body
will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same
place with another body, and because, even if it were able
to be in the same place with another body, tliis would not
be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say ;
and again because this would be inconsistent with the right
disposition of the human body, which requires the parts
to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance
from one another. WTierefore this will never happen,
not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that
the glorified body will always be in a place equal to
itself.
Reply Ohj. i. Christ's body is not locally in the Sacra-
ment of the Altar, as stated above (iv. Sent. D. 10, Q. I.,
A. I, a^ 5; P. III., Q. LXXVII., A. 5).
Reply Ohj. 2. The Philosopher's argument is that for the
same reason one part might permeate another. But this
permeation of the parts of a glorified body into one another
229 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 6
is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection
does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3. A body is seen because it acts on the sight:
but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change
in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when
it will, and not seen when it will.* On the other hand, being
in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason
of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its colour.
Consequently the comparison fails.
Sixth Article.
whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety,
will be impalpable ?
We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the glorified body, by
reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says
[Horn. XXV. in Ev.) : What is palpable must needs be corruptible.
But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is
impalpable.
Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is palpable resists one who
handles it. But that which can be in the same place with
another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body can
be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable.
Obj. 3. Further, Every palpable body is tangible. Now
every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the
quahties of the one touching it. Since then in the glorified
bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced
to a supreme degree of equahty, it would seem that they are
impalpable.
On the contrary, Our Lord rose again with a glorified body ;
and yet His body was palpable, as appears from Luke xxiv.
39: Handle, and see ; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones.
Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable.
Further, This is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Con-
stantinople, as Gregory states [Moral, xxiv.) : for he said that
in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.
* Of. \\ III., Q. LV., A. 4.
Q. 83. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230
/ answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not
conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities
whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to be
affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies:
but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the touch;
wherefore the air which never resists that which passes
through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but
not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be
palpable for two reasons, namely on accoimt of its tangible
quahties, and on account of its resisting that which touches
it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible
qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found
save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary
to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the
heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are
sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither
are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he
says [loc. cit. Obj. 1) that whatever is palpable must needs be
corruptible. Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature
those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the
touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the
spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the
touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to resist
any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the
same place together with it: although, according to its
pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy
the same place with another body, and thus offer no resist-
ance to a passing body. Wierefore according to its nature
the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be
impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power.
Hence Gregory says {loc. cit.) that our Lord offered His flesh
to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed
doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His resurrec-
tion His body was unchanged in nature though changed in
glory.
Reply Obj. 1. The incorruptibility of a glorified body does
not result from the nature of its component parts; and it
is on account of that nature that whatever is palpable is
231 SUBTLETY Q. 83. Art. 6
corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does
not prove.
Reply Obj. 2. Although in a way it is possible for a glorified
body to be in the same place with another body : nevertheless
the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one
touching it, and thus it is palpable.
Reply Obj. 3. In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities
are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according
to equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate
mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion
in each part. Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be
most delightful, because a power always delights in a becom-
ing object, and is grieved by excess.
QUESTION LXXXIV.
OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED.
{In Three Articles.)
We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed
in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points
of inquiry: (i) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile ?
(2) Whether they will move ? (3) Whether they wiU move
instantaneously ?
First Article,
whether the glorified bodies will be agile ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the glorified bodies will
not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to
be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will,
after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according
to a gloss) in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air (i Thess.
iv. 16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.
Ohj. 2. Further, No body that moves with labour and pain
can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move
thus, since the principle of their movement, namely the
soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would
always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not
agile.
Ohj. 3. Further, Of all the animal operations sense sur-
passes movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property
is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation
Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them a s
perfecting them in movement.
Ohj. 4. Further, Nature gives different animals instru-
232
233 AGILITY Q. 84. Art. i
ments of different disposition according to their different
powers: hence she does not give instruments of the same
disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God's works
are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then
the glorified body's members will have the same disposition,
shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that
it will have no agility other than it has now.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xv. 43) : It is sown in
weakness, it shall rise in power, that is, according to a gloss,
mobile and living. But mobihty can only signify agihty
in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile.
Further, Slowness of movement would seem especially
inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified
bodies will be most spiritual according to i Cor. xv. 44.
Therefore they will be agile.
/ answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject
to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing
in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was even so
in the case of Adam's body, but also from the glorified
soul there wiU flow into the body a certain perfection,
whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and
this perfection is called the gift of the glorified body. Now
the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also
as its mover ; and in both ways the glorified body must needs
be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore
even as by the gift of subtlety the body is whoUy subject
to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being,
so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover,
so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the
movements and actions of the soul.
Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the
fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be predomi-
nant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently
observed that it does not seem probable (Q. LXXXIL, A. i;
Q. LXXXIII., A. i). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it
to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.
Reply Obj. i. Glorified bodies are said to be borne by
the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they!needed
Q. 84. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234
them, but in order to signify the reverence which both
angels and all creatures will show them.
Reply Ohj. 2. The more the power of the moving soul
dominates over the body, the less is the labour of movement,
even though it be counter to the body's nature. Hence
those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who
through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the
moving spirit, labour less in being moved. And since,
after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the
body, both on account of the perfection of its own power,
and on account of the glorified body's aptitude resulting
from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul,
there will be no labour in the saints' movements, and thus
it may be said that the bodies of the saints will be agile.
Reply Ohj. 3. By the gift of agility the glorified body will
be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for
sensation, and for the execution of all the other operations
of the soul.
Reply Ohj. 4. Even as nature gives to fleeter animals
instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity,
so God will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other
than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and
quantity, but in that property of glory which is called
agiHty.
Second Article.
whether the saints will never use their agility
for the purpose of movement ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Ohjection i. It would seem that the saints will never use
their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to
the Philosopher (Phys. iii., text. 6, 14), movement is the act of
the imperfect. But there will be no imperfection in glorified
bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement.
Ohj. 2. Further, All movement is on account of some
need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake
of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no
235 AGTLTTY Q. 84. Art. 2
need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, Ixiii.),*
all thou wiliest will be there, and nothing that thou wiliest not.
Therefore they will not move.
Obj. 3. Further, According to the Philosopher (De Ccelo
et Mundo, ii.), that which shares the Divine goodness without
movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it
with movement. Now the glorified body shares the Divine
goodness more excellently than any other body. Since
then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain
altogether without movement, it seems that much more
will human bodies remain so.
Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says [De Vera Relig. xii.) that
the soul being established in God will in consequence estab-
lish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God,
that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore
in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.
Obj. 5. Further, The more noble a body is, the more noble
a place is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the
most exalted of all has the highest place of all, according
to Heb. vii. 26, Made higher than the heavens, where a glossf
says, in place and dignity. And again each glorified body
will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according
to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one
of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the
resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither
by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have
reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies
will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently
will not be moved.
On the contrary, It is written (Isa. xl. 31) : They shall run
and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint; and (Wis. iii. 7) :
(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.
Therefore there will be some movement in glorified
bodies.
I answer that. It is necessary to suppose that the glorified
bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was
* Cf. Q. LXX., A. 2,adi.
t Gloss on Heb. i. 3, On the right hand of the majesty.
Q. 84. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 236
moved in His ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints,
which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean.*
But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely
that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them;
so that by actually putting into practice that which is in
their power, the\^ may show forth the excellence of Divine
wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed
by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's
wisdom will shine forth with great evidence : for sense can
only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies
can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified
bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their
happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be every-
where present to them; thus Gregor\^ says of the angels
[Horn, xxxiv. in Ev.) that wherever they are sent their course
lies in God.
Reply Ohj. i. Local movement changes nothing that is
intrinsic to a thing, but onl}' that which is without, namely
place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as
to those things which are within {Phys. viii., text. 59),
although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it
is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another
place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time,
for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not incon-
sistent with the perfection of glor}^ as neither is the defect
whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such-
like defects will remain in glorified bodies.
Reply Ohj. 2. A person is said to need a thing in two ways,
namely absolutely and lelatively. One needs absolutely
that without which one cannot retain one's being or one's
perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not
be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice
them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively
when without it some end we have in view cannot be
obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way.
It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account
of need, for they will be imable to show forth their motive
* Cf. footnote Q. LXXXIII., A. 2.
237 AGILITY Q. 84. Art. 3
power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing
prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.
Reply Ohj. 3. This argument would prove if the glorified
body were unable even without movement to share the
Divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly
bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved,
not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine
goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order
to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the movement
of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except
the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation
and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence
the argument does not prove.
Reply Ohj. 4. Local movement takes nothing away from
the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it
does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated
above [ad i).
Reply Ohj. 5. The fitting place assigned to each glorified
body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the
accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward
is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because
that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing the
body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the
glorified body, but rather does it receive splendour there-
from), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of
that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.
Third Article.
whether the movement of the saints will be
instantaneous ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Ohjectiofi I. It would seem that the movement of the saints
will be instantaneous. For Augustine says {De Civ. Dei,
lib. xxii., cap. xxx.) that wherever the spirit listeth there will
the body he. Now the movement of the will, whereby the
spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore
the body's movement will be instantaneous.
Ohj. 2. Further, The Philosopher {Phys. iv., text. 71, seq.)
Q. 84. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238
proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because
it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since
a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in
motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there
would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in
a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio
of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resist-
ance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two
movements that take place in time must needs be propor-
tional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other.
But in hke manner no full place can resist a glorified body since
this can be in the same place with another body, no matter
how this may occur ; even as neither can a vacuum resist a
body. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.
Ohj. 3. Further, The power of a glorified soul surpasses
the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to
speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time.
Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.
Ohj. 4. Further, Whatever is moved equally soon to what
is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now
such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant
the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved
is imperceptible : wherefore Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrec-
Hone, Ep. cii., Q. i) that the glorified body reaches equally soon
to any distance, like the sun's ray. Therefore the glorified
body is moved instantaneously.
Obj. 5. Further, Whatever is in motion is moved either in
time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the
glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not
be then according to Apoc. x. 6. Therefore this movement
will be instantaneous.
On the contrary, In local movement space, movement and
time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi.,
text. 37, seq. Now the space traversed by a glorified
body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement
and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible.
Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous.
Further, A thing cannot be at the same time wholly in
239 AGILITY Q. 84. Art. 3
one place and partly in another place, since it would follow
that the remaining part is in two places at the same time,
which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly
in a term wherefrom and partly in a term whereto, as is proved
in Phys. vi., text. 32: while whatever has been in motion is
wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed : and it is
impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have
been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously
is being moved and has been moved at the same time.
Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be
instantaneous.
/ answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point.
For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to
another without passing through the interval, just as the
will passes from one place to another without passing through
the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the
movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be in-
stantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified
body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature,
just as it will never cease to be a body. [Moreover, when the
will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essen-
tially transferred from place to place, because in neither
place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place
after being directed by the intention to another: and in
this sense it is said to move from one place to another.
Hence others say that it is a property of the nature of a
glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval
and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power
of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power
of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval,
and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is
impossible, since it implies a contradiction : wliich is proved
as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in
motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is
wholly in A is not in motion ; and in like manner when it is
wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore
if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly
in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is
Q. 84. Art. 3 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240
either nowhere, or partly in A and partly in B, or wholly in
some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C
and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be no-
where, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without
a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it
to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way
in the intervening space ; for since B is a place distant from
A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of
Z which is in B is not continuous \vith the part which is in A.
Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in
C, and partly in some other place that intervenes between C
and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z
does not pass from A to B unless first of all it be in all the
intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from
A to B \vithout ever being moved, which implies a contra-
diction, because the very succession of places is local move-
ment. The same appHes to any change whatever having two
opposite terms, each of w^hich is a positive entity, but not to
those changes which have only one positive term, the other
being a pure privation, since between affirmation and nega-
tion or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that
which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote
from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something
that causes either of them or disposes thereto : so that while
that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed
into affirmation, and vice versa ; wherefore in such things
to be changing precedes to be changed, as is proved in
Phys. vi., text. 40, seq. Nor is there any comparison with
the movement of an angel, because being in a place is pre-
dicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is
clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from
one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.
Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the
glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from
this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or
more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in
all the intervening places, which is impossible. To this,
however, they reply that, although it is the same instant
241 AGILITY Q. 84. Art. 3
really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which
different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because
an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its
reality and not according to our way of considering it-
Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different
way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not
simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered
in a different wa^^ does not make it possible for one point of
place to contain things that are locaUy distant from one
another. Hence others with greater probability hold that
a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short
as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified
body can pass tlu-ough the same space in less time than
another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time,
no matter how short a space we may take.
Reply Obj. 1. That which is little lacking is as it were not
lacking at all ; w^heref ore we say : I do so and so at once, when
it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that
Augustine speaks when he says that wheresoever the will
shall he, there shall the body be forthwith. Or we may say
that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will : so
that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously
wiiere it cannot be, and consequently w^hatever instant the
will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in
w'hatever place the will shall determine.
Reply Obj. 2. Some have demurred to this proposition of
the Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes.
They say that the ratio of one wiiole movement to another
whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resist-
ing medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio
of the intervenmg mediums gives us the ratio of retarda-
tions attending the movements on account of the resistance
of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed
speed, either fast or slow^ through the mover overcoming
the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of
the medimn ; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, wiiich have
nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not
move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to
III. 6 16
Q. 84. Art. 3 THE " SUIMIVIA THEOLOGICA " 242
the power of the mover in comparison with the movable.
Consequently it is clear that even if we suppose something
to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves in-
stantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which
that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the
mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.
But this reply, as the Commentator observes {ibid.), pro-
ceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined
that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the
medium is a part of movement added to the natural move-
ment, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover
in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added
to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is
not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an
addition has been made.* And so there would not be the
same proportion between one whole sensible movement and
another, as between the retardations resulting from the re-
sistance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination,
because each part of a movement has as much speed as the
whole movement : whereas not every part of a line has
as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has.
Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the move-
ment affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines :
and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement
is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of
the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.
Consequently, in order to imderstand the Philosopher's
argument, as the Commentator explains (ibid.), we must
take the whole as being one, that is we must take not only
the resistance of the movable to the mo\dng power, but also
the resistance of the medium through which the movement
takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so
that we take the amount of retardation in the whole move-
ment as being proportionate to the moving power in com-
parison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way
it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something ex-
* The same applies to mathematical quantities : for instance the
ratio of 2 -f I to 4 -f- 1 is not as 2 to 4.
243 AGILITY Q. 84. art. 3
trinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the
mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient,
as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it
is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself,
either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary move-
ment, as appears in violent movements, or at least because
it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention
of the mover ; and suchlike resistance even heavenly bodies
offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the
power of the mover, by reason only of something else and
not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of
heavy and light things, because by their very form they
are inclined to such a movement : for the form is an impres-
sion of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy
and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance,
neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a
contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in
so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions,
is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no
resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance
is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the
resistance results from both, as may be seen in the move-
ments of animals. Accordingly when in a movement there
is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the
heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured
according to the proportion of the mover to the movable,
and the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these,
since if there be no medium at all their movement is still
a movement in time. On the other hand, in those move-
ments where there is resistance on the part of the medium
only, the measure of time is taken only according to the
obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium
be removed there will be no longer an obstacle; and so
either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an
equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum,
because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum,
that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it
moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine
Q. S4. ART. 3 THE ■• SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244
another body more subtle in the same proportion than the
body which mied the space, and then if this body fiU some
other equal space it %\ill move in as little time through that
plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, smce by
as much as the subtlety of the mediimi is increased by so
much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle
the medium the less it resists. But in those other move-
ments where resistance is offered by both the movable and
the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to
the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of
both movable and medium together. Hence granted that
the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to
hinder it does not follow that the movement is mstantaneous,
but th'at the time is measured according only to the resist-
ance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency
if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through
a space fflled with the most subtle body imaginable, smce
the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less
is it naturaUy inclined to retard the movement. Where-
fore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will
naturaUv retard the movement less than does the resist-
ance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium
will add no retardation to the movement.
It is therefore evident that although the medium ofier
no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible
for them to be in the same place with anotner body, never-
theless their movement will not be instantaneous, because
the movable body itself wiU resist the motive power, from
the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have
said in reference to the heavenly bodies.
Reply Obj. 3- Although the power of a glorified soul
surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glonfied soul,
it does not surpass it infinitely, because both powers are
finite- hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous
movement. And even if its power were simply infinite, it
would not follow that it causes an instantaneous move-
ment unless the resistance of the movable were overcome
altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable
245 AGILITY Q. 84. Art. 3
to the mover, that results from opposition to such a move-
ment by reason of its being incHned to a contrary movement,
can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power,
nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety
towards the place which the mover intends by the move-
ment cannot be overcome altogether, except by depriving
it of its being in such and such a place or position. For
just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the
more according as whiteness is the more distant from black-
ness, so a body resists a certain place through having an
opposite place, and its resistance is all the greater, according
as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take
away from a body its being in some place or position, except
one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it re-
quires a place or position : wherefore so long as it retains the
nature of a body, it can nowise be imoved instantaneously,
however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified
body will- never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never
be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.
Reply Ohj. 4. In the words of Augustine, the speed is said
to be equal because the excess of one over the other is
imperceptible, just as the time taken by the whole move-
ment is imperceptible.
Reply Ohj. 5. Although after the resurrection the time
which is the measure of the heaven's movement will be no
more, there will nevertheless be time resulting from the
before and after in any kind of movement.
QUESTION LXXXV.
OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES.
{In Three Articles.)
We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies
at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points
of inquiry : (i) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified
bodies ? (2) Whether this clarity will be \1sible to the non-
glorified eye ? (3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity
be seen by a non-glorified body ?
First Article,
whether clarity is becoming to the glorified
BODY ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that clarity is unbecoming
to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna
(Natural, vi. 3), every luminous body consists of transparent
parts. But the parts of a glorified body will not be trans-
parent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth
is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not light-
some.
Obj. 2. Further, Every lightsome body hides one that
is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is
echpsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is
behind it. But the glorified bodies wdll not hide that
which is \\ithin them, for as Gregory says on Job xxviii. 17,
Gold or crystal camiot equal it [Moral, xviii.) : There, that is
in the heavenly country, the grossness of the members will not
hide ones mind from another's eyes, and the very harmony
246
247 CLARITY Q. 85. Art. i
of the body will he evident to the bodily sight. Therefore those
bodies will not be lightsome.
Ohj. 3. Further, Light and colour require a contrary
disposition in their subject, since light is the extreme point
oj visibility in an indeterminate body; colour, in a determinate
body {De Sensu et Sensato, iii.). But glorified bodies will have
colour, for as Augustine says {De Civ. Dei, xxii.), the body's
beauty is harmony of farts with a certain charm of colour :
and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack
beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be light-
some.
Ohj. 4. Further, If there be clarity in the glorified
bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body,
just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and
agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater
disposition to clarity than another, for instance the eye
than the hand, the spirits* than the bones, the humours
than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting
for those bodies to be lightsome.
On the co7itrary, It is written (Matth. xiii. 43) : The just
shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father, and
(Wis. iii. 7) : The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro
like sparks among the reeds.
Further, It is written (i Cor. xv. 43) : It is sown in dis-
honour, it shall rise in glory, which refers to clarity, as
evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the
rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. There-
fore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.
/ answer that. It is necessary to assert that after the
resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on
account of the authority of Scripture which makes this
promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some
to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate
in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we
have often remarked (Q. LXXXIV., A. i), it is better to
say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul's
glory into the body. For whatever is received into any-
* Cf. footnote, Q. LXXXII., A. 3.
Q. 85. Art. i THE " SODIA THEOLOGICA " 248
thing is received not according to the mode of the source
whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient.
WTierefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received
into the body as corporeal. And consequently according
to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater
merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle
affirms (i Cor. xv. 41). Thus in the glorified body the glory
of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known
the colour of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory
says on Job. xxviii. 17, Gold or crystal cannot equal it.
Reply Ohj. i. Avicenna is speaking of a body that has
clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is
not thus but rather by the merit of virtue that the glorified
bod}^ will have clarit3^
Reply Ohj. 2. Gregory compares the glorified body to
gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account ot
its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should say
that they will be both transparent and lightsome ; for that
a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact
that the clarity of that body results from the density of the
lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency.
Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as
stated above : and the density of the glorified body will not
deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of
a crystal deprive cr^'stal.
Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to
crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account
of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in
crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the
glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation
is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the
glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of
Gregory.
Reply Ohj. 3. The glory of the body will not destroy
nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain
the colour due to it by reason of the nature of its component
parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting
from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies which have
249 CLARITY Q. 85. Art. 2
colour by their nature aglow with the resplendence cf the
sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.
Reply Ohj. 4. Even as the clarity of glory will overflow
from the soul into the body according to the mode of the
body, and is there otherwise than in the soul, so again it
will overflow into each part of the soul according to the
mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the
different parts should have clarity in different ways, accord-
ing as they are differently disposed thereto by their nature.
Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body,
for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed
in their regard.
Second Article.
whether the clarity of the glorified body is
visible to the non-glorified eye ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the clarity of the glorified
body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible
object should be proportionate to the sight. But a non-
glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory,
since this differs generically from the clarity of nature.
Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen
by a non-glorified eye.
Obj. 2. Further, The clarity of the glorified body will be
greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity
of the sun also will then be greater than it is now, according
to Isa. XXX. 26, and the clarity of the glorified body will be
much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire
world will receive greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye
is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of
the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able
to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.
Obj. 3. Further, A visible object that is opposite the eyes
of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion
to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified body that is
opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them :
which is evident in the case of the disciples who saw our
Q. 85. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 250
Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its
clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-
glorified eye.
On the contrary, A gloss on Philip, iii. 21, Made like to the
body of His glory, says : It will he like the clarity which He
had in the Transfiguration. Now this clarity was seen by
the non-glorified e3'es of the disciples. Therefore the clarity
of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified eyes also.
Further, The wicked will be tortured in the judgment by
seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. v. 2. But
they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their
clarity. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity- of the
glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified e^-e,
except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless this
clarity were so named equivocall\% because light by its
essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and sight
by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even
as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the
appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether in-
capable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named
equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in the
point at issue, because then nothing would be made known
to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be
Hghtsome : even so a person who says that a dog* is in the
heavens conveys no knowledge to one w^ho knows no other
dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity
of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.
Reply Obj. i. The clarity of glory will differ generically
from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its
species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason
of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity
of glory be.
Reply Obj. 2. Just as a glorified body is not passible to
a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul,j so in
virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of
the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight,
* The dog star. t Cf. Q. LXXXII., A. i.
251 CLARITY Q. 85. Art. 3
in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather
gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action
of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight,
and by scattering the spirits* asunder. Hence, though
the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the
sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes
it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone
(Apoc. xxi. 11).
Reply Ohj. 3. The clarity of the glorified body results
from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to
the will, so as to be seen or not seen according to its command.
Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to
show forth its clarity or to hide it : and this was the opinion
of Praepositivus.
Third Article.
whether a glorified body will be necessarily
seen by a non-glorified body ?
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that a glorified body will be
necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified
bodies will be Hghtsome. Now a lightsome body reveals
itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will
be seen of necessity.
Ohj. 2. Further, Every body which hides other bodies
that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight,
from the very fact that the other things behind it are hidden.
Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are
behind it from being seen, because it will be a coloured body.
Therefore it will be seen of necessity.
Ohj. 3. Further, Just as quantity is something in a body,
so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity
will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified body
be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore
neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the will,
so that a body be able not to be seen.
On the contrary, Our body will be glorified in being made
* Cf. footnote, Q. XXXII., A. 3.
Q. 85. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 252
like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now
after the resurrection Christ's body was not necessarily
seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at
Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 31). Therefore neither \nll the glori-
fied body be necessarily seen.
Further, There the body \vill be in complete obedience
to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be
visible or invisible.
/ answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts
on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through
its acting or not acting on an external object. Wherefore
a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any pro-
perty pertaining to its perfection being changed. Conse-
quently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body
to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body
will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not
be a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.
Reply Obj. i. This clarity will be obedient to the glorified
body so that this \vill be able to show it or hide it.
Reply Obj. 2. A body's colour does not prevent its being
transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because
the sight cannot be affected by two colours at the same time,
so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the colour of
the glorified body will be completely in the power of the
soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight.
Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body
that is behind it.
Reply Obj. 3. Quantity is inherent to the glorified body
itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered
at the soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering
some alteration incompatible with its impassibihty. Hence
there is no comparison between quantity and visibility,
because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be
removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality
will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the
soul's command.
QUESTION LXXXVI.
OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES
OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN.
{In Three Articles.)
We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies
of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are
three points of inquiry: (i) Whether the bodies of the
damned will rise again with their deformities ? (2) Whether
their bodies will be corruptible ? (3) Whether they will be
impassible ?
First Article.
whether the bodies of the damned will rise
again with their deformities ?
We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the bodies of the damned
will rise again with their deformities. For that which was
appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except
the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results
from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are
appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these defor-
mities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that
they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.
Ohj. 2. Further, Just as the saints wiU rise again to final
happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappi-
ness. Now when the saints rise again nothing wiU be taken
from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore
nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the
wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But
such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.
253
Q. 86. Art. i THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA "
254
Ohj. 3. Further, Just as deformity is a defect of the pas-
sible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of
movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned
at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile.
Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity
be taken away.
On the contrary, It is wTitten (i Cor. xv. 52) : The dead
shall rise again incorriiptihle ; where a gloss says : The dead,
i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again incorrupt-
ible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs. Therefore the wicked
will rise again without their deformities.
Further, There will be nothing in the damned to lessen
the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain
by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the
lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole
body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these
defects.
I answer that. Deformity in the human body is of two
kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb; thus we say that
a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due pro-
portion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind,
without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned,
since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole.
Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the
parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place, —
which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due pro-
portion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and
like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which some-
times result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and
doubtful {Enchir. xcii.) as the Master remarks (iv. Sent. D. 44).
Among modem masters, however, there are two opinions
on this point. For some say that suchlike deformities and
defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they
consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost
unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But
this w^ould seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the
rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to
its previous condition : wherefore those who die under perfect
255 CONDITIONS OF THE DAMNED Q. 86. Art. i
age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above
(Q. LXXXL, A. i). Consequently those who had natural
defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will
be restored without those defects or deformities at the resur-
rection, unless the demerit of sin prevent ; and so if a person
rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for
his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according
to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be
damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet
have deformities and defects which one who is about to be
damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins.
Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise again
with them, while the other who had them not in this life,
and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though
deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punish-
ment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact
it would seem that a man is more punished on account of
the pains which he suffered in this world ; which is absurd.
Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned
nature will wholly restore the body's nature at the resur-
rection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the
body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural
principles (for instance fever, purbhndness, and so forth)
will be entirely done away at the resurrection: w^hereas
those defects in the human body which are the natural result
of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and
the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will
be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the
resurrection.
Reply Ohj. i. Since in every tribunal punishment is in-
flicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the
punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for
some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend
not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the
damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that
there they will undergo the same punishments as they have
in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there the}'
shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.
g. S6. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 256
Reply Obj. 2. There is no parity between the good and the
wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not
altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints
requires that they should be altogether exempt from all
e\dl; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not
exclude all good, because if a thing he wholly evil it destroys
itself, as the Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 5). Hence it is
necessary for the good of their nature to underhe the unhap-
piness of the damned, which good is the work of their
perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the
perfection of its species.
Reply Obj. 3. Slowness of movement is one of those defects
which are the natural result of the principles of the human
body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison
fails.
Second Article.
whether the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible ?
We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the bodies of the damned
will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries
must necessarily be corruptible. Now the bodies of the
damned ^vill be composed of the contraries whereof they are
composed even now, else they would not be the same,
neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. There-
fore they will be corruptible.
Obj. 2. Further, If the bodies of the damned will not be
corruptible, this wiU be due either to nature, or to grace,
or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will
be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory,
since they wiU lack these things altogether. Therefore they
wiU be corruptible.
Obj. 3. Further, It would seem inconsistent to withdraw
the greatest of punishments from those who are in the
highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is the greatest
of punishments, as the Pliilosopher declares {Ethic, iii. 6).
Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned.
257 CONDITIONS OF THE DAMNED Q. 86. Art. 2
since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. There-
fore their bodies will be corruptible.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. ix. 6) : In those days
men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire
to die, and death shall fly from them.
Further, The damned will be punished with an everlasting
punishment both in soul and body (Matth. xxv. 46) : These
shall go into everlasting punishment. But this would not be
possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore their
bodies will be incorruptible.
/ answer that, Since in every movement there must needs
be a principle of movement, movement or change may be
withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first through
absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an
obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a
kind of change : and consequently a body which is corrupt-
ible on account of the nature of its principles may be ren-
dered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal
of the principle which leads to corruption, and in this way
the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since
the heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its
local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue
thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows that at the
cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any
agent that can change the body by altering it from its
natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the
cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality
capable of altering the human body from its natural quaUty.
Now corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration.
Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and
this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for
ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with
the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on
(A. 3), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the
purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corrup-
tion of one thing another is generated.
Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption
being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was
III. 6 17
Q. 86. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 258
incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in
man's body were withheld by the grace of innocence from
conducing to the body's dissolution: and much more will
they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly
subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection
the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibihty will be united
together in the bodies of the blessed.
Reply Obj. 1. The contraries of which bodies are com-
posed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles.
For the first active principle thereof is the heavenly move-
ment : wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is
necessary for a body composed of contraries to be corrupted
imless some more powerful cause prevent it : whereas if the
heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which
a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even
in accordance with nature, as explained above. But the
philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly
movement; and consequently they held that a body com-
posed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance
with nature.
Reply Obj. 2. This incorruptibility will result from nature,
not as though there were some principle of incorruption in
the bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of
the active principle of corruption, as sho^^^l above.
Reply Obj. 3. Although death is simply the greatest of
punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a
certain respect, to a cessation of pimishments; and conse-
quently the removal of death may contribute to the increase
of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic, ix. 9),
Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be. . . . But we must
not apply this to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed
in sorrow. Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant,
but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death,
which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the
greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of
the primary good, namely being, with which other things
are withdrawn. But in so fax as it deprives one of a wicked
life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for
259 CONDITIONS OF THE DAMNED Q. 86. Art. 3
pains, since it puts an end to them ; and consequently the
withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by
making them everlasting. If however we say that death is
penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel,
without doubt the damned wiU continue to feel a far greater
pain: wherefore they are said to be in everlasting death,
according to the Psalm (xlviii. 15) : Death shall feed upon
them.
Third Article,
whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible }
We proceed thus to the Third Article : —
Objection i. It would seem that the bodies of the damned
will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher
{Topic, vi.), increase of passion results in loss of substance.
Now if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs
at length be done away (Phys. i.). Therefore if the bodies of
the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they
will at length be done away and corrupted : and this has been
shown to be false (A. 2). Therefore they will be impassible.
Obj. 2. Further, Every agent likens the patient to itself.
If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the
fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume
bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disinte-
grates them. Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be
passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and
thus the same conclusion follows as before.
Obj. 3. Further, Those animals, for instance the sala-
mander, which are said to remain living in fire without being
destroyed, are not distressed by the fire : because an animal
is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way
is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the damned can,
like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being
corrupted, as Augustine asserts {De Civ. Dei, xxi.), it would
seem that they will suffer no distress there: which would
not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. There-
fore, etc.
Obj. 4. Further, If the bodies of the damned be passible,
Q. 86. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 260
the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will sur-
pass all present bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints
will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes
happens that the soul is severed from the body through
excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be
passible, the souls ^vill be separate from the bodies through
excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted : which
is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.
On the contrary, It is written (i Cor. xv. 52) : And we shall
be changed : and a gloss says : We, — the good alone, — will be
changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory.
Frnther, Even as the body co-operates with the soul in
merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the
former co-operation not only the soul but also the body will
be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like manner
the bodies of the damned will be punished ; which would not
be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be
passible.
/ answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the
damned not being consumed by the fire will be the Divine
justice by which their bodies will be consigned to everlast-
ing punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the
natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body
or on the part of the active causes ; for since passiveness is
a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corre-
sponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of
another. For a form may be received into a subject materi-
ally according to its natural being, just as the air receives
heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this
manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call
passion of nature. In another waj^" one thing is received
into another spiritually by way of an intention, just as the
likeness of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil :
this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the like-
ness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of
reception is another mode of passion which we call passion
of the soul. Since therefore after the resurrection and the
cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible
26i CONDITIONS OF THE DAMNED Q. 86. Art. 3
for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated
above (A. 2), it will not be possible for any body to be passive
with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode
of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even
as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has
ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is
after the manner of the soul, since the air wiU both receive
light from the sim, and will convey the variety of colours to
the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the
bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified
bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner
patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since
they wiU receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will
the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to
be passible.
Reply Ohj. i. The Philosopher is speaking of the passion
whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition.
But this kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the
damned, as stated above.
Reply Ohj. 2. The likeness of the agent is in the patient in
two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus
it is in all univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot
makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly,
otherwise than in the agent, and thus it is in all equivocal
agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which
is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient materi-
ally: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is
materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the crafts-
man. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent
materially, but is received into the patient spiritually : thus
whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received,
whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring
medium . And so it is in the case at issue, because the species
which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the
bodies of the damned ; thus it is that the fire wiU assimilate
the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them
withal.
Reply Ohj. 3. According to the Philosopher {De Prop.
Q. 86. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 262
Element.), no animal can live in fire. Galen also (De simp,
medic.) says that there is no body which at length is not con-
sumed by fire; although sometimes certain bodies may
remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The instance
of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it
cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed,
as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow
that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption
from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire,
because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please
or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural
action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as
regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object
is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the
contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence
subdued colours and harmonious sounds are pleasing,
whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.
Reply Obj. 4. Pain does not sever the soul from the body,
in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels
the pain, but in so far as the passion of the soul leads to
the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus
it is that we see that through anger the body becomes
heated, and through fear, chilled : whereas after the resurrec-
tion it will be impossible for the body to be changed from
its natural disposition, as stated above (A. 2). Conse-
quently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the
body from the soul.
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