(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "The "Summa theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas"

-co 


^M^av ^_ 


z= 


=■0 


x=^ 


^c— 





=0 

= o 


■ 


= (£) 




=^C^- 


- 


CO 






ORBHW 






THE - SUMMA THEOLOGICA 






II. ii. 4 



HihU ©bstai. 

Fr. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P.. S.T.M. 
Censor Theol. 

Imprimatur. 

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT 
Vicarios Generalis. 

Westmonasterii. 



APPROBATIO ORDINIS. 

|tihil ©bsiat. 

Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.M. 
Fr. FABIANUS DIX, O.P., B.A. 

imprimatnr. 

Fr. BEDA JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L., M.A., 
Prior Provincialis Anglic. 



LONDINI, 

Feb. 4 1922. 



THE 

SUMMA THEOLOGICA 



55 



OF 



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 



PART II. 
(SECOND PART) 

OO. CI.— CXL. 



LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY 



FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN 

PROVINCE 




LONDON 

BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD. 

28 ORCHARD STREET, W. i 8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. 4 

BENZIGER BROTHERS: NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO 
1922 All rights reserved 



CONTENTS 



QUESTION PAGE 

CI. OF PIETY ------ I 

CII. OF OBSERVANCE - - - - - IO 



Parts of Observance and Contrary Vices 

cm. of dulia - - - - - -17 

civ. of obedience - - - - 25 

cv. of disobedience - - - - - 40 

cvi. of gratitude - - - - "45 

cvii. of ingratitude - - - ~ 57 

cviii. of vengeance - - - - - 64 

cix. of truth - - - - - 76 

Opposed to Truth 

cx. of lying - - - - - 85 

cxi. of dissimulation and hypocrisy - - "99 
cxii. of boasting - ----- 109 

cxiii. of irony - - - - - -ii4 

cxiv. of friendliness - - - - -il8 

Opposed to Friendliness 

cxv. of flattery - - - - -i23 

cxvi. of quarrelling - - - - - 1 28 

cxvii. of liberality - - . - - 1 32 

Opposed to Liberality, 

cxvih. of covetousness - - - - - 1 44 

CXIX. OF PRODIGALITY - - - - - l6l 

CXX. OF EQUITY - - - - - -1 68 

CXXI. OF THE GIFT OF PIETY - - - - 1 72 

CXXII. OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE - - - 1 76 

V 



vi CONTENTS 



TREATISE ON FORTITUDE 

QUESTION PAGE 

CXXIII. OF FORTITUDE - 193 

CXXIV. OF MARTYRDOM .... 



Vices opposed to Fortitude 



215 



CXXV. OF FEAR - - 227 

CXXVI. OF FEARLESSNESS ----- 235 

cxxvn. of (excessive) daring - - . _ 239 

Parts of Fortitude 

cxxviii. of the parts of fortitude, in general - 243 

cxxix. of magnanimity ----- 249 

cxxx. of presumption opposed to magnanimity - 268 

cxxxi. of ambition ,, ,, „ - 273 

cxxxii. of vainglory ,, }j „ 277 

cxxxiii. of pusillanimity „ „ „ 288 

cxxxiv. of magnificence ----- 293 

cxxxv. of meanness opposed to magnificence - - 302 

cxxxvi. of patience ----- 306 

cxxxvii. of perseverance - 3i7 

cxxxviii. of the vices opposed to perseverance- - 326 

cxxxix. of the gift of fortitude ... 330 

cxl. of the precepts of fortitude - - - 334 



THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART. 

QQ. CI.-CXL 

QUESTION CI. 

OF PIETY. 
(In Four Articles.) 

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of 
which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly 
four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: (i) To 
whom does piety extend ? (2) What does piety make one 
offer a person ? (3) Whether piety is a special virtue ? 
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the 
sake of religion ? 

First Article. 

whether piety extends to particular human 

individuals ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not extend to 
particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De 
Civ. Dei x.) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the wor- 
ship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term evcrefteia. 
But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, 
but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely 
to certain human individuals. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, i.) : Piety, on her 
day, -provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of 
the heart with works of mercy. Now the works of mercy are 

II. ii. 4 I 



Q. 101. Aft. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 2 

to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ, i.). 
Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special 
persons. 

Obj. 3. Further, In human affairs there are many other 
mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as 
the Philosopher states (Ethic, viii.ii, 12), and on each of them 
is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the 
virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. hi. 5, Having 
an appearance indeed of piety (Douay, — godliness). Therefore 
piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens. 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is 
by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well- 
wishers of our country and render them faithful service. 

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in 
various ways, according to their various excellence and the 
various benefits received from them. On both counts God 
holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us 
the first principle of being and government. In the second 
place, the principles of our being and government are our 
parents and our country, that have given us birth and 
nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his 
parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it 
belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong 
to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents 
and one's country. 

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given 
to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend 
from the same parents, according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic, viii. 12). The worship given to our country includes 
homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our 
country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these. 

Reply Obj. 1. The greater includes the lesser: wherefore 
the worship due to God includes the worship due to our 
parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Malach. i. 6) : 
If I be a father, where is My honour ? Consequently the 
term piety extends also to the divine worship. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x.), the 
term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, 



3 PIETY Q.xoi.Art.2 

in the language of the common people ; the reason for which 
I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these 
works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom 
has led to the application of the word " pious " to God Himself. 
Reply Obj. 3. The relations of a man with his kindred 
and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of 
his toeing than other relations : wherefore the term piety is 
more applicable to them. 

Second Article, 
whether piety provides support for our parents ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide support 
for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, 
Honour thy father and thy mother, belongs to piety. But 
this prescribes only the giving of honour. Therefore it does 
not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents. 

Obj. 2. Further, A man is bound to lay up for those 
whom he is bound to support. Now according to the 
Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 14), neither ought the children to lay up 
for the parents. Therefore piety does not oblige them to 
support their parents. 

Obj. 3. Further, Piety extends not only to one's parents, 
but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as 
stated above (A. 1.). But one is not bound to support all 
one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one 
bound to support one's parents. 

On the contrary, Our Lord (Matth. xv. 3-6) reproved the 
Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their 
parents. 

/ answer that, We owe something to our parents and 
fellow-citizens in two ways: essentially, and accidentally. 
We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as 
such: and since he is his son's superior through being the 
principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and 
service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it 
befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to 



Q. ioi. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 4 

him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his 
children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, 
it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like 
instance, all of which come under the head of service due. 
Hence Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that piety gives both 
duty and homage : duty referring to service, and homage to 
reverence or honour, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei. x.), we are said to give homage to those whose memory 
or presence we honour. 

Reply Obj. 1. According to Our Lord's interpretation 
(Matth. xv. 3-6), the honour due to our parents includes 
whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is 
that support is given to one's father because it is due to him 
as to one greater. 

Reply Obj. 2. Since a father stands in the relation of 
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a 
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his 
son : and consequently he is bound to support him not only 
for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the 
other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is 
accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein 
he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long 
time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the 
successors of their children, but children of their parents. 

Reply Obj. 3. As Tully says (loc. cit.), we owe homage 
and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our 
country ; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our 
parents, and to others according to our means and their 
personal claims. 

Third Article. 

whether piety is a special virtue distinct from 

other virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue 
distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and 
homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to 
piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity. 



5 PIETY Q.101.ART.3 

Obj. 2. Further, It is proper to religion to give worship 
to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to 
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x.). Therefore piety is not distinct 
from religion. 

Obj. 3. Further, Piety, whereby we give our country wor- 
ship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which 
looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general 
virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 1, 2). There- 
fore piety is not a special virtue. 

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) 
as a part of justice. 

/ answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object 
under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice 
consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there 
is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a 
special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to 
that which is its connatural principle of being and govern- 
ment. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays 
duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those 
who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is a protestation of faith, 
hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, 
so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear 
towards our parents and country. 

Reply Obj. 2. God is the principle of our being and govern- 
ment in a far more excellent manner than one's father or 
country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a 
distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents 
and country. But things relating to creatures are trans- 
ferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as 
Dionysius says (Div. Norn, i.) : wherefore, by way of ex- 
cellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, 
by way of excellence, is called Our Father. 

Reply Obj. 3. Piety extends to our country in so far as the 
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards 
the good of our country, considered as the common good : 
wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general 
virtue than piety has. 



Q.ioi.Art.4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 6 

Fourth Article. 

whether the duties of piety towards one's parents 
should be omitted for the sake of religion ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that the duties of piety towards one's 
parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For 
Our Lord said (Luke xiv. 26) : If any man come to Me, and 
hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and 
brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be 
My disciple. Hence it is said in praise of James and John 
(Matth. iv. 22) that they left their nets and father, and fol- 
lowed Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites 
(Deut. xxxiii. 9): Who hath said to his father, and to his 
mother : I do not know you ; and to his brethren : I know you 
not ; and their own children they have not known. These have 
kept Thy word. Now a man who knows not his parents and 
other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit 
the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should 
be omitted for the sake of religion. 

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Luke ix. 59, 60) that in 
answer to him who said : Suffer me first to go and bury my 
father, Our Lord replied : Let the dead bury their dead: but go 
thou, and preach the kingdom of God. Now the latter pertains 
to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's father. 
Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake 
of religion. 

Obj. 3. Further, God is called Our Father by excellence. 
Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the 
duties of piety, so do we worship God by religion. There- 
fore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of 
the worship of religion. 

Obj. 4. Further, Religious are bound by a vow which 
they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. 
Now in accordance with those observances they are hin- 
dered from supporting their parents, both on the score of 
poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the 



7 PIETY Q. 101.ART.4 

score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister 
without the permission of their superior. Therefore the 
duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for 
the sake of religion. 

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees 
(Matth. xv. 3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion 
one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honour 
we owe them. 

/ answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now 
no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to 
the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De 
Oppos.), good is not opposed to good. Therefore it is impossible 
that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that 
the act of one be excluded by- the act of the other. Now, as 
stated above (I.-IL, Q. VII., A. 2: Q. XVIIL, A. 3), the act 
of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, 
and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue, 
but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and 
homage to one's parents according to the due mode. But 
it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his 
father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Luke xii. 52, 
the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of 
kindred. 

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one 
away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act 
of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of 
God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.) : Though thou 
trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn 
not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the 
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. 
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's 
parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion 
gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to 
our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, 
then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to 
set piety aside for the sake of religion. 

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory expounding this saying of Our Lord 
says (Horn, xxxvii. in Ev.) that when we find our parents to 



Q. ioi. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8 

be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by 
hating and fleeing from them. For if our parents incite us to 
sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as 
regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense 
that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, 
because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not 
the idolaters (Exod. xxxii.). James and John are praised 
for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that 
their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it 
possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they 
followed Christ. 

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his 
father because, according to Chrysostom {Horn, xxviii. in 
Matth.), Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such 
as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates 
under these circumstances. For after the burial the will had 
to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, 
because there were others who could see to the funeral. Or, 
according to Cyril's commentary on Luke ix., this disciple's 
■request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he 
might support a yet living father in the latter' s old age, until at 
length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not 
grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, 
to take care of him. 

Reply Obj. 3. Whatever we give our parents out of piety 
is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which 
we perform with regard to any of our neighbours are offered 
to God, according to Matth. xxv. 40: As long as you did it 
to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me. Accordingly, 
if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so 
that they have no other means of support, provided they 
incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them 
for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves 
to their service without sin, or if they can be supported 
without our assistance, it is lawful to forgo their service, 
so as to give more time to religion. 

Reply Obj. 4. We must speak differently of one who is yet 
in the world, and of one who has made his profession in 



9 PIETY Q.101.ART.4 

religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents 
unable to find support without him, he must not leave them 
and enter religion, because he would be breaking the com- 
mandment prescribing the honouring of parents. Some say, 
however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave 
them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be 
to tempt God : since, while having human means at hand, he 
would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's 
assistance. On the other hand, if the parents can find 
means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to 
abandon them and enter religion, because children are not 
bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, 
as stated above. He that has already made his profession 
in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: 
wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his 
parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, 
and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Neverthe- 
less he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and 
his religious state withal, to make pious efforts for his 
parents' support. 



QUESTION CII. 

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS 

PARTS. 

(In Three Articles.) 

We must now consider observance and its parts, the con- 
siderations of which will manifest the contrary vices. 

Under the head of observance there are three points of 
inquiry: (i) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct 
from other virtues ? (2) What does observance offer ? 
(3) Of its comparison with piety. 

First Article. 

whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from 

other virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special 
virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are dis- 
tinguished by their objects. But the object of observance 
is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (Dc 
Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is by observance that we pay worship and 
honour to those who excel in some kind of dignity. But 
worship and honour are paid also by piety to our parents, 
who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct 
virtue from piety. 

Obj. 2. Further, Just as honour and worship are due to 
those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due 
to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no 
special virtue whereby we pay honour and worship 
to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore ob- 
servance, whereby we pay worship and honour to those who 

10 



ii OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 1 

excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other 
virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, We have many duties towards those 
who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is 
required by law, according to Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to 
all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, etc. Now the 
fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal 
justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is 
not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues. 

On the contrary, Tully (loc. cit.) reckons observance along 
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues. 

I answer that, As explained above (QQ. CI., AA. 1, 3: 
LXXX.), according to the various excellences of those persons 
to whom something is due, there must needs be a correspond- 
ing distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just 
as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle 
in a particular way, which character is found in God in a 
universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises 
providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father 
in a p articular way, since a father is the principle of generation, 
of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the per- 
fection of human life: while a person who is in a position 
of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to 
certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil 
matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, 
a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is 
that all such persons are designated as fathers, on account 
of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants 
of Naaman said to him (4 Kings v. 13) : Father, if the prophet 
had bid thee do some great thing, etc. 

Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby 
worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship 
our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby 
worship and honour are paid to persons in positions of 
dignity. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 3, ad 2), religion 
goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although 
piety properly so called is distinct from religion : and in the 



Q. 102. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12 

same way piety can be called observance by way of excel- 
lence, although observance properly speaking is distinct 
from piety. 

Reply Obj. 2. By the very fact of being in a position of 
dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but 
also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore 
it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inas- 
much as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, 
the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does 
not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, 
but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a 
special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and 
honour to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch 
as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for 
positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone 
on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same 
virtue. 

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to special justice, properly speak- 
ing, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe any- 
thing. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to 
those who make good use of their position of dignity, as 
neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Conse- 
quently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not 
to special justice, which is a principal virtue. 

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as 
stated above (Q. LVIIL, A. 6). 

Second Article. 

whether it belongs to observance to pay worship 
and honour to those who are in positions of 

DIGNITY ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to observance 
to pay worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity. 
For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x.), we are said to 
worship those persons whom we hold in honour, so that 
worship and honour would seem to be the same. Therefore 



13 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 2 

it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and 
honour to persons in positions of dignity. 

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to justice that we pay what 
we owe : wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it 
is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honour 
to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who 
are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly 
defined as giving worship and honour to all. 

Obj. 3. Further, Not only do we owe honour to persons 
of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear 
and a certain payment of remuneration, according to 
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . .to all men their dues; tribute to whom 
tribute is due ; custom to whom custom ; fear to whom fear ; 
honour to whom honour. Moreover, we owe them reverence 
and subjection, according to Heb. xiii. 17, Obey your prelates, 
and be subject to them. Therefore observance is not fittingly 
defined as paying worship and honour. 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is by 
observance that we pay worship and honour to those who excel 
in some kind of dignity. 

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignit}' 
to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones 
to their due end : thus a sailor governs his ship by steering 
it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and 
power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a 
position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: 
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together 
with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the 
exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence 
there is due to him honour, which is the recognition of some 
kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his 
government, there is due to him worship, consisting in 
rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by 
repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we 
receive from him. 

Reply Obj. 1. Worship includes not only honour, but also 
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the 
relations between man and man. 



Q. 102. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14 

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXX.), debt is two- 
fold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by 
law; and thus man owes honour and worship to those persons 
in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other 
is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty : 
it is in this way that we owe worship and honour to persons 
in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects. 

Reply Obj. 3. Honour is due to the excellence of persons 
in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank : while 
fear is due to them on account of their power to use compul- 
sion: and to the exercise of their government there is due 
both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the com- 
mand of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repay- 
ment of their labour. 

Third Article, 
whether observance is a greater virtue than piety? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater virtue 
than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by 
observance is compared to a father who is worshipped by 
piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the 
household which a father governs is part of the state which 
is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, 
and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore obser 
vance is a greater virtue than piety. 

Obj. 2. Further, Persons in positions of dignity take care 
of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the 
private good, which we ought to set aside for the common 
good : wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the 
danger of death for the sake of the common good. There 
fore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in posi- 
tions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays 
worship to one's kindred. 

Obj. 3. Further, Honour and reverence are due to the 
virtuous in the first place after God. Now honour and 
reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser- 



15 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 3 

vance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore observance 
takes the first place after religion. 

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts 
of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, 
which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honour- 
ing our parents, which refers to piety. Therefore piety 
follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence. 

/ answer that, Something may be paid to persons in 
positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the 
common good, as when one serves them in the administration 
of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to 
observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to 
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that 
which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers 
specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this 
belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. 
Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must 
needs take into consideration the different relations in which 
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both 
virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our 
parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to 
us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and 
education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's 
substance than external government, the principle of which 
is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this 
reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch 
as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom 
we are more strictly bound. 

Reply Obj. 1. The prince is compared to the father as 
a universal to a particular power, as regards external 
government, but not as regards the father being a principle 
of generation : for in this way the father should be compared 
with the divine power from which all things derive their 
being. 

Reply Obj. 2. In so far as persons in positions of dignity 
are related to the common good, their worship does not 
pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above. 

Reply Obj. 3. The rendering of honour or worship should 



Q. T02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16 

be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as 
considered in himself, but also as compared to those who 
pay them. Wherefo r e, though virtuous persons, considered 
in themselves, are more worthy of honour than the persons 
of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, 
on account of the benefits they have received from their 
parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship 
and honour to their parents than to virtuous persons who 
are not of their kindred. 



QUESTION CIII. 

OF DULIA. 
(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall 
consider (i) dulia whereby we pay honour and other things 
pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position: 
(2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands. 

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether honour is a spiritual or a corporal thing ? 

(2) Whether honour is due to those only who are in a higher 
position ? (3) Whether dulia, which pays honour and 
worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, 
distinct from latria ? (4) Whether it contains several 
species ? 

First Article, 
whether honour denotes something corporal ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that honour does not denote some- 
thing corporal. For honour is showing reverence in ac- 
knowledgement of virtue, as may be gathered from the 
Philosopher (Ethic, i. 5). Now showing reverence is some- 
thing spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated 
above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honour is some- 
thing spiritual. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3), 
honour is the reward of virtue. Now, since virtue consists 
chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something 
corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. 
Therefore honour does not consist of corporal things. 

Obj. 3. Further, Honour is distinct from praise, as also 
n. ii. 4 17 2 



Q. 103. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 18 

from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external 
things. Therefore honour consists of things internal and 
spiritual. 

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. v. 3, 
Honour widows that are widows indeed, and {verse 17), let 
the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour 
etc., says {Ep. ad Ageruch.): Honour here stands either for 
almsgiving or for remuneration. Now both of these pertain 
to spiritual things. Therefore honour consists of corporal 
things. 

/ answer that, Honour denotes a witnessing to a person's 
excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honoured seek 
a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher 
{Ethic, i. 5, viii. 8). Now witness is borne either before God 
or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts, 
the witness of one's conscience suffices; wherefore honour, 
so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal 
movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknow- 
ledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence 
before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, 
save by means of signs, either by w r ords, as when one pro- 
claims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, 
for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external 
things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. 
Accordingly honour consists of signs, external and corporal. 

Reply Obj. 1. Reverence is not the same as honour: but 
on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honour, 
in so far as one man honours another out of the reverence he 
has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honour, 
in so far as a person is honoured in order that he may be held 
in reverence by others. 

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher {ibid.), 
honour is not a sufficient reward of virtue : yet nothing in 
human and corporal things can be greater than honour, 
since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs 
in acknowledgement of excelling virtue. It is, however, 
due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made 
known, according to Matth. v. 15, Neither do men light a 



ig DULIA Q. 103. Art. i 

candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that 
it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense honour 
is said to be the reward of virtue. 

Reply Obj. 3. Praise is distinguished from honour in 
two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal 
signs, whereas honour consists of any external signs, so that 
praise is included in honour. Secondly, because by paying 
honour to a person we bear witness to a person's excelling 
goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear 
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we 
praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, 
honour is given even to the best, which is not referred to 
an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the 
Philosopher {Ethic, i. 5). 

Glory is the effect of honour and praise, since the result 
of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his 
goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The 
word glory signifies this, for glory is the same as KXvpla, 
wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. xvi. 27 observes that 
glory is clear knowledge together with praise. 

Second Article, 
whether honour is properly due to those who are 

ABOVE US ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that honour is not properly due to 
those who are above us. For an angel is above any human 
wayfarer, according to Matth. xi. n, He that is lesser in the 
kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. Yet 
an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honour him 
(Apoc. xxii. 10). Therefore honour is not due to those who 
are above us. 

Obj. 2. Further, Honour is due to a person in acknowledge- 
ment of his virtue, as stated above (A. 1: Q. LXIIL, A. 3). 
But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. 
Therefore honour is not due to them, as neither is it due to the 
demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature. 



Q. 103. Art 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20 

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. xii. 10) : With 
honour preventing one another, and we read (1 Pet. ii. 17) : 
Honour all men. But this would not be so if honour were 
due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honour is not 
due properly to those who are above us. 

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Tob i. 16) that Tobias had 
ten talents of silver of that with which he had been honoured by 
the king: and we read (Esther vi. n) that Assuerus honoured 
Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence : 
This honour is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to 
honour. Therefore honour is paid to those also who are 
beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honour is 
not due properly to those who are above us. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher sa}-s [Ethic, i. 12) that 
honour is due to the best. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), honour is nothing 
but an acknowledgement of a person's excelling goodness. 
Now a person's excellence may be considered, not only in 
relation to those who honour him, in the point of his being 
more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to 
other persons, and in this way honour is always due to a 
person, on account of some excellence or superiority. For the 
person honoured has no need to be more excellent than those 
who honour him ; it may suffice for him to be more excellent 
than some others, or again he may be more excellent than 
those who honour him in some respect and not simply. 

Reply Obj. 1. The angel forbade John to pay him, not 
any kind of honour, but the honour of adoration and 
latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to 
pay the honour of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of 
John himself, for which Christ equalled him to the angels 
according to the hope of glory of the children of God: wherefore 
he refused to be honoured by him as though he were superior 
to him. 

Reply Obj. 2. A wicked superior is honoured for the 
excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being 
God's minister, and because the honour paid to him is paid 
to the whole community over which he presides. As for 



21 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 3 

the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be 
looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honour. 

Reply Obj. 3. In every man is to be found something that 
makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, accord- 
ing to Philip, ii. 3, In humility, let each esteem others better 
than themselves, and thus, too, we should all be on the alert 
to do honour to one another. 

Reply Obj. 4. Private individuals are sometimes honoured 
by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity 
but on account of some excellence of their virtue : and in this 
way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honoured by kings. 

Third. Article, 
whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from 

LATRIA ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue 
distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. vii. 1, Lord my God, 
in Thee have I put my trust, says : Lord of all by His power, to 
Whom dulia is due ; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria. 
Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from 
that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is 
not a distinct virtue from latria. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, viii. 8), 
to be loved is like being honoured. Now the charity with which 
we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neigh- 
bour. Therefore dulia whereby we honour our neighbour 
is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honour God. 

Obj . 3. Further, The movement whereby one is moved 
towards an image is the same as the movement whereby 
one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. 
Now by dulia we honour a man as being made to the image 
of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. ii. 22, 23) that 
they esteemed not the honour of holy souls, for God created man 
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him. 
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby 
God is honoured. 



Q. 103. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 22 

On the contrary, Augustine says (Dc Civ. Dei x.) that the 
homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he com- 
manded servants to obey their masters, and which in Greek is 
called dulia, is distinct Jrom latria, which denotes the homage 
that consists in the worship of God. 

I answer that, According to what has been stated above 
(0. CI., A. 3), where there are different aspects of that which 
is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those 
dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different 
aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man 
under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount 
lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely 
subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain 
likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises 
a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore 
dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct 
virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of 
God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by 
observance we honour all those who excel in dignity, while 
dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their 
master, dulia being the Greek for servitude. 

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is called piety by way of 
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of ex- 
cellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, 
inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now 
the creature does not partake of the power to create by 
reason of which latria is due to God : and so this gloss drew 
a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of 
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but 
dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a 
creature. 

Reply Obj. 2. The reason why we love our neighbour is 
God, since that which we love in our neighbour through 
charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which 
we love God is the same as that with which we love our 
neighbour. Yet there are other friendships distinct from 
charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is 
loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving 



23 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 4 

God and another for serving man, and for honouring the one 
or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue. 

Reply Obj. 3. Movement towards an image as such is 
referred to the thing represented by the image : yet not every 
movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, 
and consequently sometimes the movement to the image 
differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accor- 
dingly we must reply that the honour or subjection of dulia 
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in 
respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness 
of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not 
always refer this to God actually. 

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image 
is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement 
towards the thing need not be towards its image. Where- 
fore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds 
somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence 
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His 
image. 

Fourth Article, 
whether dulia has various species ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that dulia has various species. For 
by dulia we show honour to our neighbour. Now different 
neighbours are honoured under different aspects, for instance 
king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (Ethic, ix. 2). 
Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates 
the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into 
specifically different virtues. 

Obj. 2. Further, The mean differs specifically from the 
extremes, as pale differs from white and black. No\v hyper- 
dulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for 
it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to 
God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother 
of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species 
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia. 

Obj. 3. Further, Just as in the rational creature we find 



Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24 

the image of God, for which reason it is honoured, so too in 
the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the 
aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the 
aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish 
a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since 
honour is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for in- 
stance, to the wood of the Holy Cross. 

On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria 
is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is 
dulia. 

/ answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one 
way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence 
paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and 
thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar 
virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken 
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one 
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense 
as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia 
signifies servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this 
sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the 
species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.), 
for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one 
aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the 
disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases. 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes dulia in a wide sense. 

Reply Obj. 2. Hyper dulia is the highest species of dulia 
taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that 
which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to 
God. 

Reply Obj. 3. Man owes neither subjection nor honour to 
an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such 
creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross 
of Christ, the honour we pay to it is the same as that 
winch we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the 
same honour as the king himself, according to Damascene 
(De Fide Orthod. iv.). 



QUESTION CIV. 

OF OBEDIENCE. 
(In Six Articles.) 

We must now consider obedience, under which head there 
are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether one man is bound to 
obey another ? (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue ? 
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues : (4) Whether God 
must be obeyed in all things ? (5) Whether subjects are 
bound to obey their superiors in all things ? (6) Whether 
the faithful are bound to obey the secular power ? 

First Article, 
whether one man is bound to obey another ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that one man is not bound to obey 
another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine 
ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by 
his own counsel, according to Ecclus. xv. 14, God made man 
from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. 
Therefore one man is not bound to obey another. 

Obj. 2. Further, If one man were bound to obey another, 
he would have to look upon the will of the person command- 
ing him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone, 
which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. There- 
fore man is bound to obey none but God. 

Obj. 3. Further, The more gratuitous the service the more 
is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not 
gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey 
others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good 
deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done 

25 



Q.io 4 .Art.i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26 

out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey 
another. 

On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. xiii. 17) : Obey 
your prelates and be subject to them. 

I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed 
from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the 
human will. In natural things it behoved the higher to 
move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the 
natural power bestowed on them by God : and so in human 
affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in 
virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move 
by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in 
virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower 
natural things need to be subject to the movement of the 
higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of 
natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their 
superiors. 

Reply Obj. 1. God left man in the hand of his own counsel, 
not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, 
but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled 
by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left 
the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just 
as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, 
so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For 
Gregory says (Moral, xxxv.), When we humbly give way to 
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts. 

Reply Obj. 2. The will of God is the first rule whereby 
all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will 
approaches more than another, according to a divinely 
appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues 
a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other 
man who obeys him. 

Reply Obj. 3. A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two 
ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, 
to wit, one is not bound to do it ; in another way, on the part 
of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a 
deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, 
chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore 



27 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 2 

although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt 
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially 
before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also 
the inward will. 

Second Article. 

whether obedience is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special 
virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But 
disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De 
Par ad. viii.) that sin is to disobey the divine law. Therefore 
obedience is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every special virtue is either theological 
or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since 
it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a 
moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess 
and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one 
praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obe- 
dience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it 
holds its own. But every special virtue is the more to be 
praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a 
man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic, ii. 4. 
Therefore obedience is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 4. Further, Virtues differ in species according to 
their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to 
be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there 
are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. There- 
fore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special 
virtues. 

On the contrary, Obedience is reckoned by some to be a 
part of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). 

I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good 
deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs 
properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience 
to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely estab- 
lished order of things, as shown above (A. 1), and therefore 



Q. 104. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 28 

it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, 
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii.).* Again, this act 
has a special aspect of praise worthiness by reason of its 
object. For while subjects have many obligations towards 
their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their 
commands, stands out as special among the rest. Where- 
fore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a 
command tacit or express, because the superior's will, 
however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's 
obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as 
by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he 
understands his superior's will. 

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents the one same material 
object from admitting two special aspects to which two 
special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending 
his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing 
the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, 
by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the 
aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts 
of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts 
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I.-II., 
Q. XCVL, A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a 
matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things 
for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. 
Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as 
considering formally and intention ally the aspect of precept, 
it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: 
because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one 
perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the 
intention of fulfilling a precept ; and for disobedience that 
one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other 
hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the perform- 
ance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and 
disobedience for the omission of that action through any 
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, 
and disobedience a general sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Obedience is not a theological virtue, for 

* Cf. P. i Q. V., A. 5. 



20, OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art 2 

its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, 
whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the 
superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject 
obeys promptly, according to Tit. hi. 1, Admonish them to be 
subject to princes, and to obey at a word, etc. 

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, 
and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. 
Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but 
of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either 
whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to 
obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q. XCII., 
A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in 
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency 
in the person who does not receive his due, according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic, v. 4), so too obedience observes the mean 
between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obe- 
dience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own 
will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does 
not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience 
will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was 
stated above concerning justice (Q. LVIII., A. 10). 

Reply Obj. 3. Obedience, like every virtue, requires the 
will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards 
that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of 
obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will. 
Wherefore obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling 
the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If 
that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its 
own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in 
agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own 
will, and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but 
on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed 
is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, 
is repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable 
matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except 
on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral, xxxv.) 
that obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in 
agreeable matters, because, to wit, one's own will seems to 



Q. 104. Art, 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 30 

tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, 
but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that it increases 
in disagreeable or difficult matters, because there one's own will 
tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be under- 
stood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other 
hand, according to the judgement of God, Who searches the 
heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedi- 
ence, while holding its own, is none the less praiseworthy, 
provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly* 
to the fulfilment of the precept. 

Reply Obj. 4. Reverence regards directly the person that 
excels: wherefore it admits of various species according to 
the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other 
hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and 
therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience 
is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, 
it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though 
the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically. 

/ 

Third Article. 

whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest of the 
virtues. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 22) : Obedience is 
better than sacrifices. Now the offering of sacrifices belongs 
to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown 
above (Q. LXXXL, A. 6). Therefore obedience is the 
greatest of all virtues. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedi- 
ence is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and pro- 
tects them when ingrafted. Now the cause is greater than the 
effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that evil 
should never be done out of obedience : yet sometimes for the 
sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing. 
Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something 

* Cf. Q. LXXXIL, A. 2. 



31 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 3 

better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of 
other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues. 

On the contrary, Obedience deserves praise because it 
proceeds from charity: for Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that 
obedience should be practised, not out of servile fear, but from 
a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through 
love of justice. Therefore charity is a greater virtue than 
obedience. 

/ answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God 
and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous 
act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering 
to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which 
is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created 
goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives 
greater praise from his adhering to God than from his con- 
temning earthly things. And so those, namely the theo- 
logical, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are 
greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt 
some earthly thing in order to adhere to God. 

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a 
man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the 
virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man 
may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are ex- 
ternal goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and 
the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the 
chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes 
use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the 
virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for 
God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral 
virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God. 

Hence Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedience is rightly 
preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is 
slain, whereas by obedience we slay our own will. Wherefore 
even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God 
through being performed out of obedience to God's will. 
For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's 
goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the 
fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to 



Q.io 4 .Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 32 

obedience, they could not be meritorious : as neither would 
they be if they were done without charity, which cannot 
exist apart from obedience. For it is written (r John ii. 4, 5) : 
He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His com- 
mandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him 
in very deed the charity of God is perfected : and this because 
friendship makes the same liking and disliking. 

Reply Obj. 1. Obedience proceeds from reverence, which 
pays worship and honour to a superior, and in this respect 
it is contained under different virtues, although considered 
in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special 
virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence 
for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; 
while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, 
it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from 
reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to 
devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore 
from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God 
than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, in a sacrifice we 
slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will, 
as Gregory says (loc. cit.). As to the special case in which 
Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God 
than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites 
against the commandment of God. 

Reply Obj. 2. All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under 
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as 
acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their 
generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and 
protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience 
takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. 
First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, 
one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without 
considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there 
be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, 
that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such 
a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime 
nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to 
command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion 



33 OBEDIENCE Q. ro 4 . Art. 4 

of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all 
virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all 
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature. 

Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of good. There is that 
to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, 
and so forth : and by no means may such a good be set aside 
on account of obedience. But there is another good to 
which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought 
sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we 
are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by 
falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (ibid.), he who 
forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them 
many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from 
starvation, through being deprived of every good. Thus the 
loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other 
goods. 

Fourth Article, 
whether god ought to be obeyed in all things ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth A Hide : — 

Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in all 
things. For it is written (Matth. ix. 30, 31) that Our Lord 
after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: 
See that no man know this. But they going out spread His 
fame abroad in all that country. Yet they are not blamed 
for so doing. Therefor it seems that we are not bound to 
obey God in all things. 

Obj. 2. Further, No one is bound to do anything contrary 
to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things 
contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay 
his innocent son (Gen. xxii.); and the Jews to steal the 
property of the Egyptians (Exod. xi.), which things are 
contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman 
who was an adulteress (Osee hi.), and this is contrary to 
chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things. 

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever obeys God conforms his will 
to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are 
not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine 
11. ii. 4 3 



Q. 104. Art, 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 34 

will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XIX., 
A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all 
things. 

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxiv. 7) : All things 
thai the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is 
moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as 
natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now 
just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved 
naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown 
above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 6). Therefore just as all natural 
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural neces- 
sity, so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are 
bound to obey the divine command. 

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal 
the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force 
of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral, xix.), gave 
an example to His servants ivho follow Him, that they might 
wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed 
against their will, in order that others might profit by their 
example. 

Reply Obj. 2. Even as God does nothing contrary to nature 
(since the nature of a thing is what God does therein, according 
to a gloss on Rom. xi.), and yet does certain things contrary 
to the wonted course of nature; so too God can command 
nothing contrary to virtue, since virtue and rectitude of 
human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and 
obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the 
wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command 
given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary 
to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor 
again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the 
Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all 
things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor 
was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take 
an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human 
generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman 
is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the 






35 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 5 

persons aforesaid did not sin, neither by obeying God nor 
by willing to obey Him. 

Reply Obj. 3. Though man is not always bound to will 
what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God 
wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly 
through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey 
God's commands in all things. 

Fifth Article. 

whether subjects are bound to obey their 
superiors in all things ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey their 
superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Coloss. iii. 20) : 
Children, obey your parents in all things, and farther on 
(verse 22) : Servants, obey in all things your masters according 
to the flesh. Therefore in like manner other subjects are 
bound to obey their superiors in all things. 

Obj. 2. Further, Superiors stand between God and their 
subjects, according to Deut. v. 5, I was the mediator and 
stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His 
words. Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, 
except through that which stands between. Therefore the 
commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of 
God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 14) : You ... re- 
ceived me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus, and 
(1 Thess. ii. 13) : When you had received of us the word of the 
hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but f as it 
is indeed, the word of God. Therefore as man is bound to obey 
God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors. 

Obj. 3. Further, Just as religious in making their profes- 
sion take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow 
obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity 
and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to 
obey in all things. 

On the contrary, It is written (Acts v. 29) : We ought to obey 
God rather than men. Now^sometimes the things commanded 



Q. 104. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36 

by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not 
to be obeyed in all things. 

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1. 4), he who obeys 
is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, 
by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is 
moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. 
That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may 
happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance 
arising from the stronger power of some other mover ; thus 
wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water inter- 
vene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable 
with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the 
latter 's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto 
in every respect. Thus, a humour is sometimes subject to 
the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as 
regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there 
are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to 
obey his superior in all things. First on account of the 
command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. 
xiii. 2, They that resist (Vulg., — He that resisteth) the power, 
resist the ordinance of God (cf. S. Augustine, De Verb. 
Dom. viii.). // a commissioner issue an order, are you to 
comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul ? Again 
if the proconsul command one thing and the emperor another, 
will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter ? 
Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, 
you must disregard the former and obey God. Secondly, a 
subject is not bound to obey his superior, if the latter com- 
mand him to do something wherein he is not subject to 
him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii.): It is wrong to 
suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man : for the better 
part of him is excepted. His body is subjected and assigned 
to his master, but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters 
touching the internal movement of the will man is not 
bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone. 

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in 
things that have to be done externally by means of the body : 
and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound 



37 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 5 

to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the 
body, for instance in those relating to the support of his 
body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants 
are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their 
parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of re- 
maining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters 
concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a 
subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of 
his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general 
in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters 
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his 
father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the 
care of the household; and so forth. 

Reply Obj. 1. When the Apostle says in all things, he 
refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's 
authority. 

Reply Obj. 2. Man is subject to God simply as regards 
all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound 
to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are 
not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain 
things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior 
stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect 
of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by 
Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law. 

Reply Obj. 3. Religious profess obedience as to the regular 
mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their 
superiors : wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters 
only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this 
obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey 
even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance 
of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary 
to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case 
would be unlawful. 

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience ; one, 
sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when 
one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which 
obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, 
which obeys even in matters unlawful. 



O. 104. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 38 



Sixth Article, 
whether christians are bound to obey the secular 

POWER ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to 
obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matth. xvii. 25, 
Then the children are free, says: // in every kingdom the 
children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, 
then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all 
kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom. Now Christians, 
by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according 
to John i. 12 : He gave them power to be made the so7is of God, 
to them that believe in His name. Therefore they are not 
bound to obey the secular power. 

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Rom. vii. 4) : You . . . are 
become dead to the law by the body of Christ, and the law 
mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. 
Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular 
power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testa- 
ment. Much more, therefore, since they have become 
members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of 
subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular 
princes. 

Obj. 3. Further, Men are not bound to obey robbers, who 
oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De 
Civ. Dei iv.) : Without justice, what else is a kingdom but 
a huge robbery ? Since therefore the authority of secular 
princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its 
origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians 
ought not to obey secular princes. 

On the contrary, It is written (Tit. iii. 1): Admonish them 
to be subject to princes and powers, and (1 Pet. ii. 13, 14) : Be 
ye subject . . . to every human creature for God' s sake : whether 
it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him. 

I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of 
justice, according to Rom. iii. 22, The justice of God by 



39 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 6 

faith of Jesus Christ : wherefore faith in Christ does not 
void the order of justice, but strengthens it. Now the order 
of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else 
the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in 
Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of 
obeying secular princes. 

Reply Obj. i. As stated above (A. 5), the subjection 
whereby one man is bound to another regards the body ; not 
the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life 
we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, 
but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by 
saying of himself (Rom. vii. 23) that in his mind he served 
the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore 
those that are made children of God by grace are free from 
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily 
bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, 
as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. vi. 1, Whosoever are servants 
under the yoke, etc. 

Reply Obj. 2. The Old Law was a figure of the New Testa- 
ment, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. 
And the comparison with human law does not stand, because 
thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound 
by divine law to obey his fellow-man. 

Reply Obj. 3. Man is bound to obey secular princes in so 
far as this is required by the order of justice. Wherefore if 
the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he com- 
mands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey 
him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal 
or danger. 



QUESTION CV. 

OF DISOBEDIENCE. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider disobedience, under which head there 
are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a mortal sin ? 
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins ? 

First Article, 
whether disobedience is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mortal 
sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from 
Ambrose's definition given above (Q. CIV. A. 2, Obj. 1). 
Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would 
be mortal. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.) that dis- 
obedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a 
mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience. 

Obj. 3. Further, A person is said to be disobedient when 
he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often 
issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible 
to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, 
it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is 
absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin. 

On the contrary, Those who are disobedient to parents are 
reckoned (Rom. i. 30: 2 Tim. iii. 2) among other mortal sins. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12: I. -II., 
Q. LXXIL, A. 5: Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1), a mortal sin is one 
that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual 

40 



41 DISOBEDIENCE Q. 105. Art. i 

life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbour. The 
charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, 
as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). Therefore to be dis- 
obedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, 
because it is contrary to the love of God. 

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept 
of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to 
the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary 
to the love of God, according to Rom. xiii. 2, He that resisteth 
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. It is also contrary 
to the love of our neighbour, as it withdraws from the 
superior who is our neighbour the obedience that is his due. 

Reply Obj. 1. The definition given by Ambrose refers to 
mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin 
is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, 
but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, 
properly and essentially, but only when one contemns 
a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. 
And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in con- 
tempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not 
a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally 
to another species of sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Vainglory desires display of excellence. 
And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one 
be not subject to another's command, it follows that dis- 
obedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to 
hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial 
sin is a disposition to mortal. 

Reply Obj. 3. No one is bound to do the impossible: 
wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays 
them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil 
them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors 
should refrain from making a multitude of precepts. 



Q.io 5 .Art.2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 42 

Second Article, 
whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most 
grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 23) : It is like 
the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to 
refuse to obey. But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, 
as stated above (O. XCIV., A. 3). Therefore disobedience 
is the most grievous of sins. 

Obj. 2. Further, The sin against the Holy Ghost is one 
that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (0. XIV., 
A. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept 
which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. 
Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, 
and consequently is the most grievous of sins. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 19) that by 
the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. Now 
the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore 
disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others 
that are caused thereby. 

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more 
grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some 
sins are against the very person of the commander, such as 
blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the 
most grievous of sins. 

/ answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin : for 
one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. 
First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, 
although a man should take even 7 care to obey each superior, 
yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, 
in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set 
aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. 
Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more 
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to 
disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things 
commanded. For the person commanding does not equally 



43 DISOBEDIENCE Q. 105. Art. 2 

desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such 
person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest 
to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, 
according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the 
intention of the person commanding. As to the command- 
ments of God, it is evident that the greater the good com- 
manded, the more grievous the disobedience of that com- 
mandment, because since God's will is essentially directed 
to the good, the greater the good, the more does God wish 
it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the com- 
mandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one 
who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbour. 
On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the 
greater good : hence, when we are bound by a mere precept 
of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a 
greater good, but through setting aside that which is more 
in the intention of the person commanding. 

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must 
correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because 
the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept, 
from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than 
a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being 
a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever 
sins against his neighbour acts also against God's command- 
ment. — And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet 
graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The dis- 
obedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less 
grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made 
the precept, because reverence for the person commanding 
should give rise to reverence for his command. In like 
manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such 
as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we 
mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would 
be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone. 

Reply Obj. 1. This comparison of Samuel's is one, not of 
equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to 
the contempt of God, just as idolatry does, though the latter 
does so more. 



Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 44 

Reply Obj. 2. Not every disobedience is a sin against the 
Holy Ghost, but only that to which obstinacy is added : for 
it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes 
sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good 
would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may 
hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the 
Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which 
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins. 

Reply Obj. 3. The first sin of our first parent, from which 
sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience con- 
sidered as a special sin, but pride, from which the man pro- 
ceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems 
to take disobedience in its relation to every sin. 



QUESTION CVI 

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE. 

(In Six Articles.) 

We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and 
ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of 
inquiry: (i) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct 
from other virtues ? (2) Who owes more thanks to God, 
the innocent or the penitent ? (3) Whether man is always 
bound to give thanks for human favours ? (4) Whether 
thanksgiving should be deferred ? (5) Whether thanks- 
giving should be measured according to the favour received 
or the disposition of the giver ? (6) Whether one ought to 
pay back more than one has received ? 

First Article. 

whether thankfulness is a special virtue, 
distinct from other virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that thankfulness is not a special 
virtue, distinct from other virtues. For we have received 
the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now 
the honour which we pay to God in return belongs to the 
virtue of religion, and the honour with which we repay our 
parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thank- 
fulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues. 

Obj. 2. Further, Proportionate repayment belongs to com- 
mutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 4). 
Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (ibid.). 
Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an 

45 



Q 106. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 46 

act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, 
distinct from other virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, Acknowledgement of favour received is 
requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the 
Philosopher {Ethic, viii. 13 ; ix. 1). Now friendship is associated 
with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man 
is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which 
it belongs to repay favours received, is not a special virtue. 

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part 
of justice (De Inv. Rhet. ii.). 

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LX., A. 3), the 
nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to 
various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater 
always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found 
primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle 
of all our goods : secondarily it is found in our father, because 
he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbring- 
ing: thirdty it is found in the person that excels in dignity, 
from whom general favours proceed; fourthly it is found in 
a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and 
private favours, on account of which we are under par- 
ticular obligation to him. 

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a 
person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe 
a benefactor from whom we have received some particular 
favour, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God 
due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, 
and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in 
dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give 
thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the 
foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the 
one that precedes, as falling short thereof. 

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so 
is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving 
thanks to God was reckoned above (Q. LXXXIIL, A. 17) 
among things pertaining to religion. 

Reply Obj. 2. Proportionate repayment belongs to commu- 
tative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance 



47 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 2 

when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. 
But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankful- 
ness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid 
spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when 
compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis hi.). 

Reply Obj. 3. Since true friendship is based on virtue, 
whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle 
to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive 
to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by re- 
payment of favours, although repayment of favours belongs 
specially to the virtue of gratitude. 

Second Article. 

whether the innocent is more bound to give 
thanks to god than the penitent ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the innocent is more bound 
to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater 
the gift one has received from God, the more is one bound 
to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater 
than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the 
innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the 
penitent. 

Obj. 2. Further, A man owes love to his benefactor 
just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says 
(Conf. ii.) : What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare 
to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that 
so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy 
mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee ? 
And farther on he says: And for this let him love Thee as 
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been 
recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself 
to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved. Therefore 
the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the 
penitent. 

Obj. 3. Further, The more a gratuitous favour is con- 
tinuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the 



Q. io6. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 48 

favour of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent 
than in the penitent. For Augustine says (ibid.): To Thy 
grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted 
away my sins as it were ice To Thy grace I ascribe also what- 
soever I have not done of evil ; for what might I not have done ? 
. . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what 
evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy 
guidance I committed not. Therefore the innocent is more 
bound to give thanks than the penitent. 

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vii. 47) : To whom 
more is forgiven, he loveth more* Therefore for the same 
reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. 

/ answer that, Thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) in the 
recipient corresponds to the favour (gratia) of the giver: 
so that when there is greater favour on the part of th^ giver, 
greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now 
a favour is something bestowed gratis : wherefore on the 
part of the giver the favour may be greater on two counts. 
First, owing to the quantity of the thing given : and in this 
way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he 
receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, 
a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, 
a favour may be said to be greater, because it is given more 
gratuitously ; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to 
give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives 
from God is more gratuitously given : since, whereas he was 
deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Where- 
fore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, con- 
sidered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the 
penitent is greater in relation to him : even as a small gift 
bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift 
is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, 
in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such 
h ^ and now, rather than of what is such absolu* "dy, as the 
Philosopher observes (Ethic, hi.) in treating of the voluntary 
and the involuntary. 

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 

* Vulg., — To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less. 



49 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 3 



Third Article. 

whether a man is bound to give thanks to every 

benefactor ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that a man is not bound to give 
thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself 
just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5, 
He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good ? But a 
man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to 
pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving 
is not due to every benefactor. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gratitude is a repayment of an act of 
grace. But some favours are granted without grace, and 
are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore grati- 
tude is not always due to a benefactor. 

Obj. 3. Further, No thanks are due to one who works for 
his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favours 
for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to 
them. 

Obj. 4. Further, No thanks are due to a slave, for all 
that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does 
a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due 
to every benefactor. 

Obj. 5. Further, No one is bound to do what he cannot 
do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times 
that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no 
advantage to him to be repaid for a favour he has bestowed. 
Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being 
virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem 
equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favour may 
be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore 
seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for 
favours received. 

Obj. 6. Further, No one is bound to do for another what 
is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it 
happens that repayment of a favour would be hurtful or 

n. ii. 4 4 



Q. 106.ART.3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 50 

useless to the person repaid. Therefore favours are not 
always to be repaid by gratitude. 

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. v. 18) : In all things 
give thanks. 

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; 
wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i.) that God turns all 
things to Himself, because He is the cause of all : for the effect 
must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. 
Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the 
beneficiary 7 . Hence the natural order requires that he who 
has received a favour should, by repaying the favour, turn 
to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as 
stated above with regard to a father (Q. XXXI., A. 3: 
O. CI., A. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honour and 
reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of 
principle ; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, 
if he need it. 

Reply Obj. 1. In the words of Seneca (De Benef. v.), 
just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, 
and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful 
who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's 
so too, no man confers a favour on himself, he is but following 
the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts 
him, and to seek what is profitable. Wherefore in things that 
one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or 
ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except 
by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly 
spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically 
in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding 
justice {Ethic, v. n), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of 
man are considered as though the} 7 were various persons. 

Reply Obj. 2. It is the mark of a happy disposition to see 
good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred 
a favour, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient 
should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes 
less thanks, than if the favour had been conferred duly, 
since in fact the favour is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De 
Benef. ii.) promptness enhances, delay discounts a favour. 



51 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 3 

Reply Obj. 3. As Seneca observes (De Bene/, vi.), it 
matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his 
own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that 
considers himself only, and benefits because he cannot other- 
wise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder 
for his cattle. And farther on : If he has done it for me in 
common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am 
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what 
was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height 
of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the 
giver has been the loser thereby. 

Reply Obj. 4. As Seneca observes [De Benef. iii.), when a 
slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part 
of his service : when he does more than a slave is bound to do, 
it is a favour : for as soon as he does anything from a motive 
of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer 
called service. Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, 
when he does more than his duty. 

Reply Obj. 5. A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if 
he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the 
heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends 
chiefly on the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii.) : 
Who receives a favour gratefully, has already begun to pay it 
back : and that we are grateful for favours received should be 
shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing 
but everywhere. From this it is evident that however well 
off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness 
by showing him reverence and honour. Wherefore the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, viii. 14) : He that abounds should be 
repaid with honour, he that is in want should be repaid with 
money : and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi.): There are many 
ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen 
to owe them ; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable 
and pleasant conversation without flattery. Therefore there 
is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in 
his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as 
Seneca says (De Benef. vi.), it were inhuman to desire this 
in one from whom you have received no favour; how much 



Q. io6. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52 

more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his 
debtor ! 

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, 
nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, 
that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so 
wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and 
consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as here- 
tofore. And yet, as far as it is possible without sin, the 
kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, ix. 3). 

Reply Obj. 6. As stated in the preceding reply, repay- 
ment of a favour depends chiefly on the affection of the heart : 
wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to 
prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's 
carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed 
to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De 
Bene/, vii.) : It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and 
safeguard my repayment. 

Fourth Article, 
whether a man is bound to repay a favour at once ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to repay a 
favour at once. For we are bound to restore at once what 
we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term 
prescribed for the repayment of favours, and yet this repay- 
ment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a man is 
bound to repay a favour at once. 

Obj. 2. Further, A good action would seem to be all the 
more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater 
earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his 
duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more 
praiseworthy to repay a favour at once. 

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (De Bene/, ii.) that it is 
proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly. Now repay- 
ment ought to equal the favour received. Therefore it 
should be done at once. 



53 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 4 

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Bene/, iv.) : He that 
hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude 
but of indebtedness. 

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favour two things 
are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and 
the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying 
the favour. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment 
should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says {De Benef. ii.) : 
Do you wish to repay a favour ? Receive it graciously. As 
regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will 
be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of 
choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, 
favour for favour, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but 
a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De 
Belief, iv.), he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling 
debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful. 

Reply Obj. i. A legal debt must be paid at once, else the 
equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's 
property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on 
the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid 
in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands. 

Reply Obj. 2. Earnestness of the will is not virtuous 
unless it be regulated by reason ; wherefore it is not praise- 
worthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness. 

Reply Obj. 3. Favours also should be conferred at a 
convenient time, and one should no longer delay when the 
convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in 
repaying favours. 

Fifth Article. 

whether in giving thanks we should look at the 
benefactor's disposition or at the effect ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that in repaying favours we should 
not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the effect. 
For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence con- 
sists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in re- 
paying favours we should look at the effect. 



Q. 106. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 54 

Obj. 2. Further, Thanksgiving, whereby we repay favours, 
is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between 
giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favours we 
should consider the effect rather than the disposition of the 
benefactor. 

Obj. 3. Further, No one can consider what he does not 
know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. 
Therefore it is impossible to repay a favour according to the 
benefactor's disposition. 

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Bene/, i.): We are some- 
times under a greater obligation to one who has given little with 
a large heart, and, has bestowed a small favour, yet willingly. 

I answer that, The repayment of a favour may belong to 
three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. 
It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character 
of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like : and in such cases 
repayment must be made according to the quantity received. 

On the other hand, repayment of a favour belongs, though 
in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue 
of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. 
For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the 
cause of friendship ; so that in the friendship that is based 
on the useful, repayment should be made according to the 
usefulness accruing from the favour conferred, and in the 
friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with 
regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this 
is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic, viii. 13. 
And likewise, since gratitude regards the favour inasmuch as 
it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the 
giver, it follows again that repayment of a favour depends 
more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. 

Reply Obj. 1. Every moral act depends on the will. 
Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is 
deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, 
but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says 
(De Benef. i.) : A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but 
in the disposition of the giver or doer. 

Reply Obj. 2. Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as 



55 THANKFULNESS Q. io6.Art.g 

a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the 
genus of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). Hence it 
does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in 
both virtues. 

Reply Obj. 3. God alone sees man's disposition in itself: 
but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can 
know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known 
by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance 
through his doing it joyfully and readily. 

Sixth Article. 

whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass 
the favour received ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the repay- 
ment of gratitude to surpass the favour received. For it is 
not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for 
instance, to one's parents, as the Philosopher states 
(Ethic, viii. 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impos- 
sible. Therefore gratitude for a favour does not tend to 
something yet greater. 

Obj. 2. Further, If one person repays another more than 
he has received by his favour, by that very fact he gives 
him something in his turn, as it were. But the latter owes 
him repayment for the favour which in his turn the former 
has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a 
favour will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on 
indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, 
since the indefinite removes the nature of good (Metaph. ii. 
text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not 
surpass the favour received. 

Obj. 3. Further, Justice consists in equality. But more 
is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in 
every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favour 
received is sinful and opposed to justice. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, v. 5): We 
should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious 



Q. 106. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 56 

to them in return, and this is done by repaying more than 
we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do 
something greater. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the 
favour received according to the intention of the benefactor; 
who seems to be deserving of praise, chiefly for having con- 
ferred the favour gratis without being bound to do so. 
Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to 
bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem 
to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity 
of the favour received : because so long as he repays less or 
an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only 
to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always 
inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 3, ad 5, A. 5), in repaying 
favours we must consider the disposition rather than the 
deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, 
which a son receives from his parents, namely, to be and to 
live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the 
Philosopher states (Ethic, viii. 14). But if we consider the 
will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for 
the son to pay back something greater to his father, 
as Seneca declares (De Benef. hi.). If, however, he were 
unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for 
gratitude. 

Reply Obj. 2. The debt of gratitude flows from charity, 
which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to 
Rom. xiii. 8, Owe no man anything, but to love one another. 
Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of grati- 
tude has no limit. 

Reply Obj. 3. As in justice, which is a cardinal virtue, we 
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider 
equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor 
of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to 
give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something 
over and above what he has received. 



QUESTION CVII. 

OF INGRATITUDE. 

(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there 
are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether ingratitude is always 
a sin ? (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin ? (3) Whether 
every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether favours 
should be withdrawn from the ungrateful ? 

First Article, 
whether ingratitude is always a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. 
For Seneca says (De Benef iii.) that he who does not repay a 
favour is ungrateful. But sometimes it is impossible to 
repay a favour without sinning, for instance if one man has 
helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not 
a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not 
always a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is in the power of the person 
who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. 
Arb. iii.: Retract, i.), no man sins in what he cannot avoid. 
Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid 
ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of 
repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet 
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii.) that to forget a kindness is 
the height of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always 
a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, There would seem to be no repayment in 

57 



Q. 107. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " s8 

being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle 
(Rom. xiii. 8), Owe no man anything. Yet an unwilling 
debtor is ungrateful, as Seneca declares (De Bene/, iv.). 
Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin. 

On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins 
(2 Tim. iii. 2), where it is written: Disobedient to parents, 
ungrateful, wicked, etc. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CVL, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) 
a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now 
a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. 
Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. Gratitude regards a favour received: and 
he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favour 
but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except per- 
haps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been 
deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, 
whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repay- 
ment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit 
a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and 
this is contrary to gratitude. 

Reply Obj. 2. No man is excused from ingratitude through 
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will 
suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated 
above (Q. CVL, A. 6, ad 1). 

Forgetfulness of a favour received amounts to ingratitude, 
not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, 
that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from 
negligence. For, as Seneca observes {De Bene/, iii.), when 
forgetfulness of favours lays hold of a man, he has apparently 
given little thought to their repayment. 

Reply Obj. 3. The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of 
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. 
Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems 
to arise from lack of love for his benefactor. 



59 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 2 

Second Article, 
whether ingratitude is a special sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. 
For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. 
But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is 
not a special sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, No special sin is contained under different 
kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing 
different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or some- 
thing similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore 
ingratitude is not a special sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca writes {De Bene/, iii.): It is un- 
grateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to 
repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. Now 
these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. There- 
fore ingratitude is not a special sin. 

On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or 
thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a 
special sin. 

I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency 
of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue : thus 
illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. 
Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way 
of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for 
things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is 
due, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 4). But still more opposed 
to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, be- 
cause the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 6), 
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude 
is properly denominated from being a deficiency of grati- 
tude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species 
from the opposite habit : for blindness and deafness differ 
according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore 
just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also 
is ingratitude one special sin. 



Q. 107. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 60 

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their 
order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these 
is to recognize the favour received, the second to express 
one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the 
favour at a suitable place and time according to one's 
means. And since what is last in the order of generation 
is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first 
degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favour, 
the second when he declines to notice and indicate that he 
has received a favour, while the third and supreme degree is 
when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favour, 
whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, 
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that 
it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for 
good, to the second to find fault with a favour received, and 
to the third to esteem kindness as though it were un- 
kindness. 

Reply Obj. 1. In every sin there is material ingratitude 
to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may 
pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a 
favour is actually contemned, and this is a special sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some 
special sin from being found materially in several kinds of 
sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found 
in many kinds of sin. 

Reply Obj. 3. These three are not different species but 
different degrees of one special sin. 

Third Article, 
whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Third A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal 
sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But 
one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin: 
else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore 
no ingratitude is a venial sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, A sin is mortal through being contrary 



61 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 3 

to charity, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). But in- 
gratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude 
proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 1, ad 3, 
A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (De Bene/, ii.) : Between the 
giver and the receiver of a favour there is this law, that the 
former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter 
should never forget having received. Now, seemingly, the 
reason why the giver should forget is that he may be un- 
aware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove 
ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if 
ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always 
a mortal sin. 

Obj. 4. On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of 
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca {ibid.), 
sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives 
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from 
whom he has received. But this would seem to put the 
recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude 
is not always a mortal sin. 

/ answer that, As appears from what we have said above 
(A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere 
omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favour 
received, or to express his appreciation of it, or to pay some- 
thing in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, 
as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 6), the debt of gratitude requires 
a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not 
bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin 
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises 
either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclina- 
tion to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may 
happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward con- 
tempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful 
to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity. 

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only 
omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. 
This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial 
sin, according to the kind of thing that is done. 



Q.io 7 .Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62 

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude 
arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of 
ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the 
imperfect character. 

Reply Obj. 1. By committing a venial sin one is not un- 
grateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect 
ingratitude : but there is something of ingratitude in a venial 
sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God. 

Reply Obj. 2. When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not 
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the 
habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof. 

Reply Obj. 3. Seneca also says (De Benef. vii.): When we 
say that a man after conferring a favour should forget about it, 
it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the 
recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say : 
He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish 
it abroad and boast about it. 

Reply Obj. 4. He that is unaware of a favour conferred 
on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he 
be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless com- 
mendable at times that the object of a favour should remain 
in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when 
Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to 
avoid popularity ; and because the kindness is all the greater 
through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on 
whom he is conferring the favour. 

Fourth Article. 

whether favours should be withheld from the 

ungrateful ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that favours should be withheld from 
the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. xvi. 29) : The hope of 
the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice. But this 
hope would not melt away unless favours were withheld from 
him. Therefore favours should be withheld from the un- 
grateful. 



63 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 4 

Obj. 2. Further, No one should afford another an occasion 
of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favour 
is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favours 
should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. 

Obj. 3. Further, By what things a man sinneth, by the same 
also he is tormented (Wis. xi. 17). Now he that is ungrateful 
when he receives a favour sins against the favour. There- 
fore he should be deprived of the favour. 

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vi. 35) that the 
Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Now 
we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him 
{ibid. 36). Therefore we should not withhold favours from 
the ungrateful. 

i" answer that, There are two points to be considered with 
regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he de- 
serves to suffer, and thus it is certain that he deserves to be 
deprived of our favour. The second is, what ought his bene- 
factor to do ? For in the first place he should not easily 
judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De 
Bene/, iii.), a man is often grateful although he repays not, 
because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of 
repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his un- 
gratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this 
by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. 
If, however, the more he repeats his favours, the more 
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from 
bestowing his favours upon him. 

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted speaks of what the 
ungrateful man deserves to suffer. 

Reply Obj. 2. He that bestows a favour on an ungrateful 
person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and 
love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of 
ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower. 

Reply Obj. 3. He that bestows a favour must not at once 
act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a 
kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated 
favours. 



QUESTION CVIII. 

OF VENGEANCE. 
(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there 
are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether vengeance is law- 
ful ? (2) Whether it is a special virtue ? (3) Of the manner 
of taking vengeance: (4) On whom should vengeance be 
taken ? 

First Article, 
whether vengeance is lawful ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For 
whoever usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs 
to God, for it is written (Deut. xxxii. 35, and Rom. xii. 19) : 
Revenge to Me, and I will repay. Therefore all vengeance is 
unlawful. 

Obj. 2. Further, He that takes vengeance on a man 
does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the 
wicked, for a gloss on Cant. ii. 2, As the lily among the thorns, 
says : He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one. 
Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked. 

Obj. 3. Further, Vengeance is taken by inflicting punish- 
ment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is 
not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra 
Adamant, xvii.). Therefore at least in the New Testament 
all vengeance is unlawful. 

Obj. 4. Further, A man is said to avenge himself when he 
takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seem- 
ingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have 

6 4 



65 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. i 

wronged him : for Chrysostom* says : Let us learn after Christ's 
example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to 
suffer God's wrongs, not even by listening to them. Therefore 
vengeance seems to be unlawful. 

Obj. 5. Further, The sin of a multitude is more harmful 
than the sin of only one : for it is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 5-7) : 
Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation 
of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false 
calumny. But vengeance should not be taken on the sin 
of a multitude, for a gloss on Matth. xiii. 29, 30, Lest per- 
haps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow, says 
that a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the 
sovereign. Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful. 

On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save 
what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for 
vengeance on His enemies : for it is written (Luke xviii. 7) : 
Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night ? 
as if to say: He will indeed. Therefore vengeance is not 
essentially evil and unlawful. 

/ answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a 
penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the 
matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the 
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil 
of the person on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, 
then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take 
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary 
co the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor 
is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly 
inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating 
one that hates him : for a man may not sin against another 
just because the latter has already sinned against him, since 
this is to be overcome b\' evil, Which was forbidden by the 
Apostle, who says (Rom. xii. 21) : Be not overcome by evil, but 
overcome evil by good. 

If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to 
some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of 

* Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Horn. v. in Matth. falsely ascribed to 
S. Chrysostom. 

11. ii. 4 5 



Q. 108. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 66 

the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may 
amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others 
be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God 
honoured), then vengeance maybe lawful, provided other due 
circumstances be observed. 

Reply Obj. i. He who takes vengeance on the wicked in 
keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what 
belongs to God, but makes use of the power granted him by 
God. For it is written (Rom. xiii. 4) of the earthly prince 
that he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon 
him that doeth evil. If, however, a man takes vengeance 
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what 
is God's and therefore sins. 

Reply Obj. 2. The good bear with the wicked by enduring 
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves 
receive from them : but they do not bear with them so as to 
endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbour. 
For Chrysostom* says : It is praiseworthy to be patient under 
our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. 

Reply Obj. 3. The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and 
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone 
properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized 
by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved 
by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the 
Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit. 

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a wrong done to a person 
reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of 
that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made 
fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings i.) ; 
likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kings ii.) ; 
and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him 
into exile (XXIII., Q. iv., Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far 
as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should 
bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts 
of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness 
of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.). 

Reply Obj. 5. When the whole multitude sins, vengeance 

* Cf. Obj. 4 and footnote. 



6y VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. i 

must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole 
multitude — thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red 
Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Exod. 
xiv.), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed 
(Gen. xix.) — or as regards part of the multitude, as may 
be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf. 

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making 
amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to 
bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment nils the 
rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num. xxv.) commanded 
the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the 
multitude. 

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of 
the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be 
separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on 
them: provided, however, that this can be done without 
scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and 
severity forgone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom 
the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if 
it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: 
unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm 
to the multitude, either spirituahy or temporally, than would 
the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment. 

Second Article, 
whether vengeance is a special virtue? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection i. It seems that vengeance is not a special 
and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for 
their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil 
deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to 
a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. 
Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be ac- 
counted a special virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, There is no need to appoint a special 
virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by 
the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the 



Q.io8.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68 

virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore 
vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, There is a special vice opposed to every 
special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed 
to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue. 

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons it a part 
of justice. 

/ answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic, ii. i), apti- 
tude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of 
virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. 
Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow 
in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the 
natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclina- 
tion there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a 
special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which 
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the 
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself 
against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges 
those which have already been inflicted on him, with the 
intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. 
And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (loc. cit.) 
that by vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general 
whatever is obscure* (i.e. derogatory), either by self-defence 
or by avenging it. Therefore vengeance is a special virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to 
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, 
arising from the bestowal of a particular favour, belongs to 
the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, 
so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of com- 
mutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending 
the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it 
belongs to the virtue of revenge. 

Reply Obj. 2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by re- 
moving an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent 
danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervour of love, signifies the 
primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the 

* Obscurum. Cicero wrote obfuturum: but the sense is the same as 
S. Thomas gives in the parenthesis. 



69 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 3 

wrong done to God and his neighbour, because charity makes 
him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue 
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory 
(Horn, xxvii. in Ev.), there are no green leaves on the bough 
of good works, unless charity be the root. 

Reply Obj. 3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one 
by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, 
which exceeds the measure in punishing : while the other is 
a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in 
punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov. xiii. 24) : He that 
spareth the rod hateth his sow. But the virtue of vengeance 
consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with 
regard to all the circumstances. 

Third Article. 

whether vengeance should be wrought by means of 
punishments customary among men ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be 
wrought by means of punishments customary among men. 
For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But Our 
Lord forbade (Matth. xiii. 29) the uprooting of the cockle, 
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. There- 
fore sinners should not be put to death. 

Obj. 2. Further, All who sin mortally seem to be deserv- 
ing of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin 
mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such 
persons should be punished with death : and this is evidently 
false. 

Obj. 3. Further, To punish a man publicly for his sin 
seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a 
harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is 
taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems 
that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin. 

On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine 
law as appears from what we have said above (I. -II., 

Q- cv., A. 2 ). 



Q. 108. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 70 

/ answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it 
tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not 
influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from commit- 
ting sin, through fear of losing those things which they 
love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would 
be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin 
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. 
Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, 
his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his 
country and his good name. Wherefore, according to 
Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi.), Tully writes thai 
the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment : namely, death, 
whereby man is deprived of life; stripes, retaliation, or the 
loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safet}'; 
slavery, and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of free- 
dom ; exile, whereby he is banished from his country ; fines, 
whereby he is mulcted in his riches ; ignominy, whereby he 
loses his good name. 

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the 
cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted to- 
gether with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted 
by death, not only without danger, but even with great 
profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punish- 
ment of death may be inflicted on sinners. 

Reply Obj. 2. All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal 
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance 
with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punish- 
ments of this life are more of a medicinal character ; where- 
fore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone 
which conduce to the grave undoing of others. 

Reply Obj. 3. The very fact that the punishment, whether 
of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made 
known at the same time as the sin, makes man's will averse 
to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the 
enticement of the example of sin. 



71 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4 



Fourth Article. 

whether vengeance should be taken on those who 
have sinned involuntarily ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken 
on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of 
one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one 
man is punished for another, according to Exod. xx. 5, 
I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the 
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. 
Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed 
(Gen. ix. 25), and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were 
struck with leprosy (4 Kings v.). Again the blood of 
Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of 
punishment, for they said (Matth. xxvii. 25) : His blood be 
upon us and upon our children. Moreover, we read (Josue vii.) 
that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their 
enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were 
overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the 
sons of Heli (1 Kings iv.). Therefore a person is to be 
punished without having deserved it voluntarily. 

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is voluntary except what is in a 
man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what 
is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the 
administration of the Church on account of being infected 
with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on 
account of the depravity or evil deeds of the people. There- 
fore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins. 

Obj. 3. Further, Ignorance makes an act involuntary. 
Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus 
the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in 
invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Gen. xix.). 
Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were 
swallowed up together with them (Num. xvi.). Moreover, 
dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded 
to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 



Q. 108. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72 

xv.). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those 
who have deserved it involuntarily. 

Obj. 4. Further, Compulsion is most opposed to volun- 
tariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punish- 
ment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. 
Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have 
deserved it involuntarily. 

Obj. 5. Further, Ambrose says on Luke v. that the ship in 
which Judas was, was in distress ; wherefore Peter, who was 
calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about 
those of others. But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. 
Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having 
voluntarily deserved it. 

On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every 
sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. hi.: 
Retract, i.). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on 
those who have deserved it voluntarily. 

/ answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. 
First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way 
punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of 
punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he 
who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will 
suffers something that is contrary to his will. Wherefore, 
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as 
stated above (I. -II., Q. LXXXI., A. 1), it follows that no one is 
punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. 
Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not 
only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future 
sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is 
sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not 
without cause. 

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never 
removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the 
medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair 
the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that 
it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And 
since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while 
temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is 



73 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4 

punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. 
Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this 
present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one 
is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, 
neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter 
punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual con- 
demnation. 

Reply Obj. I. A man is never condemned to a spiritual 
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punish- 
ment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master 
of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punish- 
ment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and this 
for three reasons. First, because one man may be the 
temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in 
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, 
are a belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession 
of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is trans- 
mitted to another, either by imitation, as children copy the 
sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as 
to sin with greater daring ; or by way of merit, as the sinful 
subjects merit a sinful superior, according to Job xxxiv. 30, 
Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of 
the people ? Hence the people of Israel were punished for 
David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings xxiv.). This 
may also happen through some kind of consent or conni- 
vance: thus sometimes even the good are punished in tem- 
poral matters together with the wicked, for not having con- 
demned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix.). 
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, 
whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest 
he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the 
punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body, 
as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. 
Josue viii.). The saying of the Lord, Visiting the iniquity 
of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth 
generation, seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, 
since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for 
some future time, in order that the descendants at least 



Q.io8.Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74 

may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the 
descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take 
vengeance on them. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine states (loc. cit.), human judg- 
ment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is 
manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own 
sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's 
hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons 
in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man 
is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments, so as to 
know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore 
according to human judgment a man should never be con- 
demned without fault of his own to an inflictive punish- 
ment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man 
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to 
a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his 
part, but not without cause: and this in three ways. 

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, 
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good : thus for 
being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the 
administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through 
pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from re- 
ceiving sacred orders. 

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits 
is not his own but common property : thus that an episcopal 
see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good 
of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics. 

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on 
the good of another : thus in the crime of high treason a son 
loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent. 

Reply Obj. 3. By the judgment of God children are 
punished in temporal matters together with their parents, 
both because they are a possession of their parents, so that 
their parents are punished also in their person, and because 
this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might 
imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be 
punished still more severely. 

Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other 



75 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4 

irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are 
punished; and also in horror of sin. 

Reply Obj. 4. An act done through compulsion of fear is 
not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntari- 
ness, as stated above (I.-IL, Q. VI., AA. 5, 6). 

Reply Obj. 5. The other apostles were distressed about 
the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is 
punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as 
stated above (Reply Obj. 1, 2). 



QUESTION CIX. 

OF TRUTH. 
(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. 
Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether 
truth is a virtue ? (2) Whether it is a special virtue ? (3) 
Whether it is a part of justice ? (4) Whether it inclines to 
that which is less ? 

First Article, 
whether truth is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the 
first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then 
the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth 
is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7), 
it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning 
himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this 
is not always praiseworthy — neither in good things, since 
according to Prov. xxvii. 2, Let another praise thee, and not 
thy own mouth — nor even in evil things, because it is written 
in condemnation of certain people (Isa. iii. 9) : They have 
proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid 
it. Therefore truth is not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is either theological, or 
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, 
because its object is not God but temporal things. For 
Tully says (De Jnv. Rhet. ii.) that by truth we faithfully repre- 
sent things as thev are, were, or will be. Likewise it is not one 

7 6 



77 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. i 

of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a 
moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and 
deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. 
Therefore truth is not a virtue. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and 
in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other 
virtues. 

/ answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for 
that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus 
truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: 
because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is 
the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between 
the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signi- 
fied, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the 
First Part (Q. XVI., A. 1: Q. XXL, A. 2). Secondly, truth 
may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in 
which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truth- 
fulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true 
is a good act : and virtue is that which makes its subject good, 
and renders his action good. 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes truth in the first sense. 

Reply Obj. 2. To state that which concerns oneself, in so 
far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. 
Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it 
is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed 
with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed, 
the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise one- 
self without due cause even for that which is true : and it is 
also sinful to publish one's sin, by praising oneself on that 
account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly. 

Reply Obj. 3. A person who. says what is true, utters 
certain signs which are in conformity with things ; and such 
signs are either words, or external actions, or any external 
thing. Now' these external things are the subject-matter 
of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned 
with the use of the external members, in so far as this use 
is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore 
truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral 



Q. 109. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 78 

virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency 
in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on 
the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the 
true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a 
mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason 
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the 
mean between one that says more than the truth about 
himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part 
of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one 
ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known 
one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding 
them when one ought to make them known. 

Second Article, 
whether truth is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that truth is not a special virtue. 
For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness 
is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, 
because it makes its subject good. Therefore truth is not a 
special virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, To make known what belongs to oneself 
is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs 
to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known 
by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, The truth of life is the truth whereby one 
lives aright, and of which it is written (Isa. xxxviii. 3): / 
beseech Thee . . remember how I have walked before Thee in 
truth, and with a perfect heart. Now one lives aright by any 
virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above 
(I. -II., Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore truth is not a special 
virtue. 

Obj. 4. Further, Truth seems to be the same as simplicity, 
since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a 
special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is 
required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a 
special virtue. 



79 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 2 

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues 
(Ethic, ii. 7). 

/ answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in 
making a man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find 
a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary 
that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since 
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni hi.) good consists in 
order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found 
where there is a special order. Now there is a special order 
whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly 
ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: 
and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Where- 
fore it is evident that truth is a special virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. The true and the good are convertible as to 
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing 
is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, 
even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the 
intellect understands the will and many things besides, and 
the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many 
others. Wherefore the true considered in its proper aspect 
as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is 
something appetible : and in like manner the good considered 
in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something 
true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue 
includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be 
a special virtue, just as the true is a special good; yet it is not 
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, 
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. 

Reply Obj. 2. The habits of virtue and vice take their 
species from what is directly intended, and not from that 
which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a 
man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue 
of truth, as something directly intended: although it may 
belong to other virtues consequently and beside his prin- 
cipal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely : 
and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a con- 
sequence beside his principal intention. 

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing 



Q.109.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 80 

is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like 
anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains 
its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude 
of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or 
rectitude is common to every virtue. 

Reply Obj. 4. Simplicity is so called from its opposition 
to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing out- 
wardly while having another in his heart - so that simplicity 
pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not 
indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by 
excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and 
intends another. 

Third Article, 
whether truth is a part of justice ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice. 
For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. 
But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another 
man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. 
Therefore truth is not a part of justice. 

Obj. 2. Further, Truth pertains to the intellect: whereas 
justice is in the will, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4). 
Therefore truth is not a part of justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, According to Jerome truth is threefold, 
namely, truth of life, truth of justice, and truth of doctrine. 
But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life com- 
prises all virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3) : truth of justice 
is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and 
truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. 
Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice. 

On the contrary, Tully {De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons truth 
among the parts of justice. 

J answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXX.), a virtue is 
annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, 
through having something in common with justice, while 
falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue 
of truth has two things in common with justice. In the 



8i TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 3 

first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, 
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to 
another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the 
things that concern himself. In the second place, justice 
sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue 
of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which 
concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the 
proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this 
virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, 
but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one 
man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore 
truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secon- 
dary virtue to its principal. 

Reply Obj. 1. Since man is a social animal, one man 
naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the pre- 
servation of human society. Now it would be impossible 
for men to live together, unless they believed one another, 
as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue 
of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due. 

Reply Obj. 2. Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. 
But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and 
members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, 
and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of 
the will. 

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of which we are speaking now 
differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding 
Article {ad 3). 

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way 
we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude 
regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in 
this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, 
because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, 
whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude 
of the law in those judgements which refer to another man : 
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do 
with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the 
truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be 
understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a 

n. ii. 4 6 



Q. 109. Art, 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 82 



"j 



man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man con- 
fesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. 
This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain 
directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because, 
to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief 
intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philo- 
sopher says [Ethic, iv. 7) in describing this virtue : We are not 
speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this 
apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned. 

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation 
of truths relating to science. Wherefore neither does this 
truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth 
whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself 
to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not 
other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Never- 
theless since truths of science, as known by us, are something 
concerning us, and pertain to us, in this sense the truth 
of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other 
kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, 
what he knows. 

Fourth Article. 

whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that 

which is less ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not 
incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood 
by saying more, so does one by saying less : thus it is no more 
false that four are five, than that four are three. But every 
falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided, as the Philosopher 
declares [Ethic, iv. 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not 
incline to that which is less rather than to that which is 
greater. 

Obj. 2. Further. That a virtue inclines to the one extreme 
rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's 
mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other : thus 
fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the 
mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the 



83 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 4 

other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to 
the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to 
that which is less. 

Obj. 3. Further, To forsake the truth for that which is 
less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to 
subtract therefrom ; and to forsake the truth for that which 
is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to 
deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add some- 
thing to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of 
truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it 
seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather 
than to that which is less. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7) that 
by this virtue a man inclines rather from the truth towards 
that which is less. 

I answer that, There are two ways of inclining from the 
truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a 
man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance 
science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice 
to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater : and in 
this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the 
Philosopher says (ibid.) , this seems to be more prudent because 
exaggerations give annoyance. For those who represent 
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoy- 
ance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: 
whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source 
of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their modera- 
tion. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 6) : Though I 
should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish : for I will 
say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of 
me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth 
from me. 

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so 
as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not 
belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this 
would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repug- 
nant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of 
truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should 



Q. iog. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 84 

be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught 
with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is 
more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has 
what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what 
one has. 

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 



QUESTION CX. 

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF 

LYING. 

(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (i) 
lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the 
opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of 
inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is 
always opposed to truth ? (2) Of the species of lying : 
(3) Whether lying is always a sin ? (4) Whether it is always 
a mortal sin ? 

First Article, 
whether lying is always opposed to truth ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed 
to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. 
But lying is compatible with truth, since he that speaks the 
truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine 
(Contra Mendac. iii.). Therefore lying is not opposed to 
truth. 

Obj. 2. Further, The virtue of truth applies not only to 
words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic, iv. 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's 
speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, 
for Augustine says (Contra Mend, xii.) that a lie is a false 
signification by words. Accordingly, it seems that lying is not 
directly opposed to the virtue of truth. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Contra Mend., loc. cit.) 
that the liar's sin is the desire to deceive. But this is not 

85 



Q. 1 10. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 86 

opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. 
Therefore lying is not opposed to truth. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend, x.): Let 
no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. 
Wherefore a false staten ent uttered with intent to deceive is 
a manifest lie. But this is opposed to truth. Therefore 
lying is opposed to truth. 

/ answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, 
its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, 
which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power 
moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate 
object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the 
will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated 
above ( I.-IL, Q. XVIII., AA. 6, 7). 

Now it has been said above (Q. CIX., A.i, ad 3) that 
the virtue of truth — and consequently the opposite vices — 
regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this 
manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing 
sign with the thing signified ; because every representation 
consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. 
Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet 
they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do 
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the 
result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral 
act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the 
intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifesta- 
tion or statement is the true or the false. And the intention 
of a bad will may bear on two things : one of which is that 
a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect 
of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived. 

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood 
of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the 
intention to deceive, then there is falsehood — materially, 
since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will 
to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will 
to impart a falsehood. 

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal 
falsehood, from the fact, namely, that a person intends to 



87 LYING Q. no. Art. i 

say what is false; wherefore also the word mendacium (lie) 
is derived from its being in opposition to the mind. Conse- 
quently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it 
is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is 
beside the intention of the speaker : so that it is not a perfect 
lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental, 
for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on 
the other hand, one utters a falsehood formally, through 
having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, 
yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it 
contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and 
attains the specific nature of a lie. 

That a person intends to cause another to have a false 
opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species 
of lying, but to a perfection thereof, even as in the physical 
order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even 
though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy 
body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in 
accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is 
evident that lying is directly and formally opposed to the 
virtue of truth. 

Re fly Obj. i. We judge of a thing according to what is 
in it formally and essentially, rather than according to what 
is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in 
opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the 
truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a 
falsehood with the intention of telling the truth. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, ii.), 
words hold the chief place among other signs. And so 
when it is said that a. lie is a false signification by words, the 
term words denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a 
person intended to signify something false by means of signs, 
he would not be excused from lying. 

Reply Obj. 3. The desire to deceive belongs to the per- 
fection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any 
effect belong to the species of its cause. 



Q. no. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88 



Second Article. 

whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, 
jocose and mischievous lies ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided 
into officious, jocose and mischievous lies. For a division 
should be made according to that which pertains to a thing 
by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (MeUph. 
vii. text. 43: De Part. Animal, i. 3). But seemingly the 
intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is some- 
thing beside and accidental to the species of that act, so 
that an indefinite number of effects can result from one 
act. Now this division is made according to the intention 
of the effect : for a jocose lie is told in order to make fun, an 
officious lie for some useful purpose, and a mischievous he 
in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly 
divided in this way. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv.) gives 
eight kinds of lies. The first is in religious doctrine; the 
second is a lie that profits no one and injures someone ; the 
third profits one party so as to injure another ; the fourth is 
told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving; the fifth is told 
out of the desire to please ; the sixth injures no one, and profits 
someone in saving his money ; the seventh injures no one and 
profits someone in saving him from death ; the eighth injures no 
one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the 
body. Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is 
insufficient. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7) divides 
lying into boasting, which exceeds the truth in speech, and 
irony, which falls short of the truth by saying something 
less: and these two are not contained under any one of 
the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the 
aforesaid division of lies is inadequate. 

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. v. 7, Thou wilt destroy all 
that speak a lie, says that there are three kinds of lies ; for some 



89 LYING Q. tio.akt. 2 

are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone', and 
there is another kind of lie that is told in fun ; but the third 
kind of lie is told out of malice. The first of these is called 
an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mis- 
chievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three 
kinds. 

/ answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, 
with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper 
and essential division of lying. In this way, according to the 
Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the 
lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to boasting, 
and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs 
to irony. This division is an essential division of lying 
itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated 
in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equalitj', to 
which more and less are in essential opposition. 

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature 
as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or 
diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. 
Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends 
to injure another, and this is called a mischievous lie, while 
the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good — 
either of pleasure and then it is a jocose lie, or of usefulness, 
and then we have the officious lie, whereby it is intended to 
help another person, or to save him from being injured. In 
this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid. 

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with 
respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this 
increase or diminish their gravity : and in this way the divi- 
sion comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. 
Here the first three kinds are contained under mischievous 
lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie 
in religious doctrine, or against man, and this either with 
the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second 
kind of lie, which profits no one, and injures someone; or with 
the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting 
another, and this is the third kind of lie, which profits one, 
and injures another. Of these the first is the most grievous, 



Q. no. Art, 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " go 

because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated 
above (I. -II., Q. LXXIIL, A. 9): and the second is more 
grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is dimin- 
ished by the intention of profiting another. 

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we 
have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity with- 
out addition or diminution, and this is the lie which is told 
out of mere lust of lying and deceiving. This proceeds from 
the habit, wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7) that 
the liar, since he lies from habit, delights in lying. 

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin 
of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told 
with a desire to please : and the remaining three are comprised 
under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another 
person is intended. This usefulness regards either external 
things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which profits 
someone in saving his money; or his body, and this is the 
seventh kind, which saves a man from death; or the morality 
of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which saves him 
from unlawful defilement of his body. 

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the 
more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore 
a careful consideration of the matter will show that these 
various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity : 
since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, 
and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life 
of the body. 

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 

Third Article, 
whether every lie is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is 
evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the 
Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false : since 
their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often 
differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them 



91 LYING Q. no. Art. 3 

must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every 
lie is a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, No one is rewarded by God for sin. But 
the mid wives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for 
it is stated that God built them houses (Exod. i. 21). There- 
fore a lie is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, The deeds of holy men are related in 
Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But 
we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus 
(Gen. xii. and xx.) we are told that Abraham said of his wife 
that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he 
was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen. xxvii. 27-29). 
Again, Judith is commended (Judith xv. 10, 11) although 
she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin. 

Obj. 4. Further, One ought to choose the lesser evil in 
order to avoid the greater : even so a physician cuts off a 
limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by 
raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone 
slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, 
to save another from committing murder, or another from 
being killed. 

Obj. 5. Further, It is a lie not to fulfil what one has 
promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: 
for Isidore says (Synonym, ii.) : Break your faith when you 
have promised ill. Therefore not every lie is a sin. 

Obj. 6. Further, Apparently a lie is a sin because thereby 
we deceive our neighbour : wherefore Augustine says (Contra 
Mend, xxi.) : Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that 
is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems him- 
self an honest man when he deceives others. Yet not every 
lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a 
jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the 
intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving 
pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in 
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. vii. 14): Be not 
willing to make any manner of lie. 

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect 



Quo. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 9 2 

of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in 
order for an action to be good it must be right in every 
respect: because good results from a complete cause, while 
evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts 
(Div. Nont. iv.). Now a he is evil in respect of its genus, 
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words 
are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and 
undue for anyone to signify by words something that is 
not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7) 
that lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness 
is good and worthy of praise. Therefore every he is a sin, 
as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i.). 

Reply Obj, 1. It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion 
is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scrip- 
ture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because 
faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on 
the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain 
people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred 
writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says 
(De Consens. Evang. ii.) : He that has the wit to understand 
that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, 
will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter 
by what words that sense is expressed. Hence it is evident, 
as he adds (ibid.), that we must not judge that someone is 
lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and 
in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen 
or heard. 

Reply Obj. 2. The midwives were rewarded, not for their 
lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which 
latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated 
(Exod. ii. 21) : And because the midwives feared God, He built 
them houses. But the subsequent lie was not meritorious. 

Reply Obj. 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes 
(Contra Mend, v.), the deeds of certain persons are related 
as examples of perfect virtue : and we must not believe that 
such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements 
appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements 
to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says 



93 LYING Q. no. Art. 3 

(Contra Mend., loc. cit.): We must believe that whatever is 
related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being 
worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically. 
As to Abraham when he said that Sara was his sister, he 
wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his 
sister since she was the daughter of his father, as Augustine 
says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi. : Contra Mend. x. : Contra Faust. 
xxii.). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gen. xx. 12): 
She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the 
daughter of my mother, being related to him on his father's 
side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, 
was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's 
birthright was due to him by right : and he made use of this 
mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in 
order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, 
i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews. 

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on 
account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposi- 
tion, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy senti- 
ment that they were moved to do certain undue things. 
It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holof ernes, 
but for her desire to save the people, to which end she 
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that 
her words contain truth in some mystical sense. 

Reply Obj. 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures 
one's neighbour, but also on account of its inordinateness, 
as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to 
make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury 
or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in 
order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity 
when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful 
to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger 
whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth 
prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra 
Mend. x.). 

Reply Obj. 5. A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind 
to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary 
to what he has in mind : but if he does not keep his promise, 



Q. no. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94 

he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He 
may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has 
promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned 
in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, 
if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and 
the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Bene/, iv.), 
for a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary for 
everything to remain unchanged : otherwise neither did he 
lie in promising — since he promised what he had in his 
mind, due circumstances being taken for granted — nor was 
he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circum- 
stances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though 
he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go 
(2 Cor. i.), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which 
prevented him. 

Reply Obj. 6. An action may be considered in two ways. 
First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Ac- 
cordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is 
of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the 
speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the 
way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical 
or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet 
in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says {Contra Mend, v.), 
it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively : because every 
statement must be referred to the thing stated : and when a 
thing is done or said figuratively , it states what those to whom 
it is tendered understand it to signify. 

Fourth Article, 
whether every lie is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it 
is written (Ps. vi. 7) : Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, 
and (Wis. i. 11) : The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. Now 
mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. 
Therefore every lie is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is against a precept of the 



95 LYING Quo. Art. 4 

decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept 
of the decalogue : Thou shalt not bear false witness. There- 
fore every lie is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i. 36) : 
Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes 
the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does 
not keep faith with him, when he lies to him : and whoever 
breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity. Now no one is said to 
break his faith or to be guilty of iniquity, for a venial sin. 
Therefore no lie is a venial sin. 

Obj. 4. Further, The eternal reward is not lost save for 
a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, 
being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says 
{Moral, xviii.) that we learn from the reward of the midwives 
what the sin of lying deserves : since the reward which they 
deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received 
in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the 
lie of which they were guilty. Therefore even an officious lie, 
such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the 
least of lies, is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says [Contra Mend, xvii.) 
that it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but 
not even to wish to lie. Now it is a mortal sin to act against 
a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal 
sin : and consequently so also is a He told by anyone else, 
otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others. 

On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. v. 7, Thou wilt 
destroy, etc. : There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously 
sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, 
or for the sake of our neighbour' s good. But every mortal 
sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not 
mortal sins. 

/ answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that 
is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with 
God, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12; Q. XXXV., A. 3). 
Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways : first, 
in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, 
accidentally. 



(). no. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 96 

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its 
false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is 
contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or 
corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed 
not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of 
faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a 
mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about 
something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, 
for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to 
moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on 
one's neighbour, since it causes him to have a false opinion, 
wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our 
neighbour, and consequently is a mortal sin On the other 
hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about 
some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, 
then the he in question does no harm to one's neighbour: 
for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent 
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of 
this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin. 

As regards the end in view, a he may be contrary to 
charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring 
God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to 
religion; or in order to injure one's neighbour, in his person, 
his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal 
sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbour, and 
one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of com- 
mitting a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not 
contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under 
this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, 
where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious 
lie, where the good also of one's neighbour is intended. 
Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of 
scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus 
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not 
deterred through scandal from lying publicly. 

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to the mis- 
chievous he, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. v. 7, Thou 
wilt destroy all that speak a lie. 



97 LYING Q. no. Art. 4 

Reply Obj. 2. Since all the precepts of the decalogue are 
directed to the love of God and our neighbour, as stated 
above (Q. XLIV., A. 1, ad 3 : I. -II., Q. C, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is 
contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is 
contrary to the love of God and our neighbour. Hence it 
is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our 
neighbour. 

Reply Obj. 3. Even a venial sin can be called iniquity in 
a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; 
wherefore it is written (1 John iii. 4) : Every* sin is iniquity. 
It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking. 

Reply Obj. 4. The lie of the midwives may be considered 
in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness 
towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, 
for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For 
this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his 
exposition of Isa. lxv. 21, And they shall build houses) 
explains that God built them spiritual houses. Secondly, it 
may be considered with regard to the external act of 
lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal 
reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving 
of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of 
their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting 
an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must under- 
stand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by 
that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already 
merited.it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection 
understands the words to mean. 

Reply Obj. 5. Some say that for the perfect every lie is 
a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no 
circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous 
unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance 
of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except 
perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, 
for instance if it be against his vow : and this cannot apply 
to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a 
jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps 

* Vulg., — And sin is iniquity. 
II. ii. 4 7 



Q. no. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 98 

accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in 
this sense the saying of Augustine that it is a precept of 
perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie: 
although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, 
for he begins by saying Unless perhaps it is a precept, etc. 
Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to 
safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard 
the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and 
if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin : but 
it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in 
other matters. 



QUESTION CXI. 

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY. 
(In Four Articles.) 

In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypo- 
crisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: 
(i) Whether all dissimulation is a sin ? (2) Whether hypo- 
crisy is dissimulation ? (3) Whether it is opposed to truth ? 
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin ? 

First Article, 
whether all dissimulation is a sin ? 

We proceed this to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. 
For it is written (Luke xxiv. 28) that our Lord pretended 
(Douay, — made as though) he would go farther; and Ambrose 
in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham, i.) says of 
Abraham that he spoke craftily to his servants, when he said 
(Gen. xxii. 5) : / and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, 
and after we have worshipped, will return to you. Now to 
pretend and to speak craftily savour of dissimulation : and 
yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abra- 
ham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, No sin is profitable. But according to 
Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. ii. n, When Peter 
(Vulg., — Cephas) was come to Antioch: — The example of Jehu, 
king of Israel, who slew the priests of Baal, pretending that he 
desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is 
useful and sometimes to be employed; and David changed his 
countenance before Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings xxi. 13). 
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin. 

99 



Q. in. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " ioo 

Obj. 3. Further, Good is contrary to evil. Therefore if 
it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil. 

Obj. 4. Further, It is written in condemnation of certain 
people (Isa. iii. 9) : They have proclaimed abroad their sin 
as Sodom, and they have not hid it. Now it pertains to 
dissimulation to hide one's sin. Therefore it is repre- 
hensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never 
reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not 
a sin. 

On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. xvi. 14, In three years, etc., 
says : Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate 
holiness. But to sin openly is always a sin: Therefore dis- 
simulation is always a sin. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 3: Q. CX., 
A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself out- 
wardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now out- 
ward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly 
just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something 
different from that which is in one's mind, so also is it con- 
trary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify 
the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly 
denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is 
properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it 
matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, 
as stated above (Q. CX., A. 1, Obj. 2). Wherefore, since 
every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 3), it follows 
that also all dissimulation is a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii.), 
To pretend is not always a lie : but only when the pretence 
has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our 
pretence refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a 
representation of the truth. And he cites figures of speech 
as an example, where a thing is pretended, for we do not 
mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something 
else that we wish to say. In this way Our Lord pretended 
He would go farther, because He acted as if wishing to 
go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either 
because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory 



ioi HYPOCRISY Q. in. Art. i 

(Horn, xxiii. in Ev.) ; or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. 
ii.), because, as He was about to go farther away from them 
by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on 
earth by their hospitality. 

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose 
(loc. cit.) says that Abraham foretold what he knew not : for 
he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son. but 
by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. 
It is evident therefore that neither dissembled. 

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome employs the term simulation in a 
broad sense for any kind of pretence. David's change of 
countenance was a figurative pretence, as a gloss observes 
in commenting on the title of Ps. xxxiii., I will bless the Lord 
at all times. There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation 
from sin or He, because he was a wicked man, since he 
departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings x. 
29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an 
earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for 
his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal. 

Reply Obj. 3. Some say that no one may pretend to be 
wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good 
deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument 
proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, 
by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance 
of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both 
because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although 
he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the 
wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is 
evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing 
simulated, whether this be good or evil. 

Reply Obj. 4. Just as a man lies when he signifies by 
word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from 
saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful ; so also does 
a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things 
he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he 
omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's 
sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that 
we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words 



Q. in. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102 

of Isaias (loc. cit.), that the second plank after shipwreck 
is to hide ones sin, lest, to wit, others be scandalized 
thereby. 

Second Article, 
whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as 
dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. 
But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what 
one does inwardly, according to Matth. vi. 2, When thou 
dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the 
hypocrites do. Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dis- 
simulation. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 7) : Some there 
are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain 
the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these 
to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing 
to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice. Now 
those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining 
the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward 
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation 
is not the same as hypocrisy. 

Obj. 3. Further, Hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. 
For Our Lord says of hypocrites (Matth. xxiii. 5) that all 
their works they do for to be seen of men : and Gregory says 
(Moral, xxxi. loc. cit.) that they never consider what it is that 
they do, but how by their every action they may please men. 
But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but 
in the outward action : wherefore a gloss on Job xxxvi. 13, 
Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God, says that 
the dissembler simulates one thing and does another ; he 
pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show 
of poverty and fills his purse. Therefore hypocrisy is not 
the same as dissimulation. 

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x.) : ' Hypocrite ' 
is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin ' simulator,' for 



103 HYPOCRISY Q.ui.Art.2 

whereas he is evil within, he shows himself outwardly as being 
good ; v7t6 denoting falsehood, and Kpivis judgment. 

I answer that. As Isidore says {ibid.), the word hypocrite is 
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage 
with a disguised face, by changing the colour of their com- 
plexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they 
simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another 
under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in 
their acting. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii.) that 
just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts 
of those they are not [since he that acts the part of Agamemnon 
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the 
Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes 
to seem what he is not is a hypocrite : for he pretends to be just 
without being so in reality. 

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimula- 
tion, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when 
one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates 
the person of a just man. 

Reply Obj. i. The outward deed is a natural sign of the 
intention. Accordingly when a man does good works 
pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks 
by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates 
a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says 
(Moral, xxxi.) that hypocrites make God's interests subservient 
to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct 
they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves 
the applause of their approval: and so they make a lying 
pretence of having a good intention, which they have 
not. although they do not pretend to do a good deed without 
doing it. 

Reply Obj. 2. The habit of holiness, for instance the 
religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one 
is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a 
man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of 
entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, 
he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound 
to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, 



Q. in. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 104 

however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to 
make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and 
a dissembler. 

Reply Obj. 3. In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two 
things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing 
signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is 
considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with 
the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible 
objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign. 



Third Article, 
whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of 

TRUTH ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the 
virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is 
a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither 
of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: 
for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any 
virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as 
stated in Matth. vi. 1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially 
opposed to the virtue of truth. 

Obj. 2. Further, All dissimulation seems to proceed from 
guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity Now guile is 
opposed to prudence as above stated (Q. LV., A. 4). 
Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed 
to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity. 

Obj. 3. Further, The species of moral acts is taken from 
their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of 
gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job xxvii. 8, What 
is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by 
violence, says : A hypocrite, or, as the Latin has it, a dissimu- 
lator, is a covetous thief : for through desire of being honoured for 
holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life 
which is not his.* Therefore since covetousness or vainglory 

* The quotation is from S. Gregory's Moralia, Bk. XVIII. 



105 HYPOCRISY Q.ih.Art. 3 

is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is 
hypocrisy or dissimulation. 

On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above 
(A. i). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore 
dissimulation or hypocrisy is also. 

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher (M eta ph. text. 
13, 24, x.), contrariety is opposition as regards form, i.e. the 
specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation 
or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one 
way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposi- 
tion or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the 
very species of the act, and this species depends on that 
act's proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind 
of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character 
which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows 
that it is directly opposed to truth, whereby a man shows 
himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in 
Ethic, iv. 7. 

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may 
be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a 
remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of 
that kind. 

Reply Obj. 1. The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards 
it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he 
wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he 
wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not 
opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes 
to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs 
acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, 
but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his 
hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to 
that virtue. 

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4, 5), the 
vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it 
belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are 
apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, 
by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds : and it stands in 
relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now 



Q. in. Art. 4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 106 

guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and some- 
times secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly 
to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this 
way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of 
truth as stated above (0. CIX., A. 2, ad 4). There is, how- 
ever, a mere logical difference between them, because by 
truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing 
signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend 
to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and 
pretending another outwardly. 

Reply Obj. 3. Gain or glory is the remote end of the dis- 
sembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species 
from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show 
oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens 
to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further 
purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher 
says (Ethic, iv. 7), and as also we have said above with 
regard to lying (Q. CX., A. 2). 

Fourth Article. 
whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal 
sin. For Jerome says on Isa. xvi. 14: Of the two evils it is less 
to sin openly than to simulate holiness: and a gloss on Job i. 21,* 
As it hath pleased the Lord, etc., says that pretended justice is 
no justice, but a twofold sin: and again a gloss on Lament, iv. 6, 
The iniquity . . . of My people is made greater than the sin of 
Sodom, savs : He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into 
hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom. 
Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy 
is always a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 8) that hypo- 
crites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it 
pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a 
hypocrite always sins mortally. 

* S. Augustine, on Ps. lxiii. 7. 



107 HYPOCRISY Qui. Art. 4 

Obj. 3. Further, No one deserves the anger of God and 
exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. 
Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy accord- 
ing to Job xxxvi. 13, Dissemblers and crafty men prove the 
wrath of God : and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing 
God, according to Job xiii. 16, No hypocrite shall come 
before His presence. Therefore hypocrisy is always a 
mortal sin. 

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a 
kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to 
lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin. 

Further, The intention of a hypocrite is to appear to 
be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore 
hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin. 

Further, Hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says 
(Moral, xxxi. 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal 
sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy. 

/ answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of 
holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a 
hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to 
both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but 
only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont 
to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: 
for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through 
mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends 
to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, 
then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived 
of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not 
always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will 
depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love 
of God or of his neighbour, it will be a mortal sin : for instance 
if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false 
doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, 
though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good 
in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be 
not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance 
when a man takes pleasure in the pretence itself: of such 
a man it is said in Ethic, iv. 7 that he would seem to be 



Q. in. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 108 

vain rather than evil; for the same applies to simulation as 
to a lie. 

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the 
perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual 
welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin 
always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin. 

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. 



QUESTION CXII. 

OF BOASTING. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts 
of lying according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7). Under 
the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of 
inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed ? (2) Whether 
it is a mortal sin ? 

First Article, 
whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of 

TRUTH ? 

We proceed thus to the First A Hide : — 

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is not opposed to 
the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But 
it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man 
makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written 
(Esther i. 3, 4) that Assuerus made a great feast . . . that he 
might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom, and the 
greatness and boasting of his power. Therefore boasting is 
not opposed to the virtue of truth. 

Obj. 2. Further, Boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. 
xxiii. 4) to be one of the four species of pride, when, to wit, 
a man boasts of having what he has not. Hence it is written 
(Jerem. xlviii. 29, 30) : We have heard the pride of Moab, he 
is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and 
his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the 
Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according 
to it. Moreover, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 7) that boasting 
arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are 

109 



Q. ii2. Art. i THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no 

opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is 
opposed, not to truth, but to humility. 

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting seems to be occasioned by 
riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. v. 8): What hath pride 
■profited us ? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches 
brought us ? Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin 
of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. 
Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7, iv. 7), 
that boasting is opposed to truth. 

/ answer that, Jactantia (boasting) seems properly to 
denote the uplifting of self by words : since if a man wishes 
to* throw (jactare) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And 
to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself 
above oneself.* This happens in two ways. For some- 
times a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in him- 
self, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: 
and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. xii. 6) : 
I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which 
he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. In another way 
a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above 
that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of 
things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem 
them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly 
the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the 
uplifting of self above what others think of one : although in 
either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting 
properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess. 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes boasting as exceeding 
men's opinion. 

Reply Obj. 2. The sin of boasting may be considered in 
two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and 
thus it is opposed to truth, as stated (in the body of the 
article and Q. CX., A. 2). Secondly, with regard to its 
cause, from which more frequently though not always it 
arises : and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving 
and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly 
* Or tall-talking, as we should say in English. 



Ill BOASTING Q.i 12. Art. i 

by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of 
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes 
to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of 
vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit. 
Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, 
is a kind of pride ; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is 
very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons 
boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster 
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, 
and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory con- 
sidered as its end. 

Reply Obj. 3. Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. 
First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides him- 
self on his riches. Hence (Prov. viii. 18) riches are signifi- 
cantly described as proud (Douay, — glorious). Secondly, 
as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic, iv. 7 
some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the 
sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, 
so as to make profit thereby ; for instance, they pretend to 
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination. 



Second Article, 
whether boasting is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For 
it is written (Prov. xxviii. 25) : He that boasteth, and puffeth 
himself, stirreth up quarrels. Now it is a mortal sin to stir 
up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, accord- 
ing to Prov. vi. 19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is forbidden in God's law is a 
mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. vi. 2, Extol not thyself 
in the thoughts of thy soul, says : This is a prohibition of boast- 
ing and pride. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither 
an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end 
of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7), the 
boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for 



Q. ii2. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112 

no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honour, 
sometimes for the sake of money. Thus it is evident that it 
is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it 
must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always 
a mortal sin. 

On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according 
to Gregory {Moral, xxxi. 17). Now vainglory is not always 
a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the 
very perfect avoid. For Gregory says {Moral, viii. 30) that 
it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the 
glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the 
praise awarded them. Therefore boasting is not always a 
mortal sin. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., A. 4), a mortal sin 
is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting 
may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a he, 
and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial, 
sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which 
is contrary to God's glory — thus it is said in the person of the 
king of Tyre (Ezech. xxviii. 2) : Thy heart is lifted up, and 
thou hast said : I am God — or contrary to the love of our 
neighbour, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks 
out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee 
who said (Luke xviii. 11) : / am not as the rest of men, extor- 
tioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican. Some- 
times it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things 
that are against neither God nor his neighbour. 

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, 
namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory : and then 
if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a 
mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin : other- 
wise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man 
breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this 
very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and 
injury of his neighbour: wherefore boasting of this kind is 
more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 7) that a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler 
than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honour. Yet it is 



113 BOASTING Q. 112. Art. 2 

not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not 
to injure another man. 

Reply Obj. 1. To boast in order to stir up quarrels is a 
mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the 
cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and 
consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that 
account. 

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss speaks of boasting as arising 
from pride that is a mortal sin. 

Reply Obj. 3. Boasting does not always involve a mis- 
chievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of 
God or our neighbour, either in itself or in its cause. That 
a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an 
inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks {Ethic, iv. 7) : 
wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he 
were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn 
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it 
would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought 
our mind to rest as in its last end. 

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve 
an officious lie: provided it be done without injury to others, 
for then it would at once become a mischievous lie. 



II. ii. 4 



QUESTION CXIIL 

OF IRONY* 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider irony, under which head there are 
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether irony is a sin ? (2) Of 
its comparison with boasting. 

First Article, 
whether irony is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that irony, which consists in be- 
littling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's 
being strengthened by God : and yet this leads one to belittle 
oneself, according to Prov. xxx. 1, 2, The vision which the 
man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by 
God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men. 
Also it is written (Amos vii. 14) : Amos answered ... 7 am 
not a prophet. Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles 
himself in words, is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, 
bishop of the English (Regist. xii.) : It is the mark of a well- 
disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not 
guilty. But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed 
mind. Therefore irony is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is not a sin to shun pride. But some 
belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride, according to 
the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 7). Therefore irony is not a sin. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. 

* Iron}' here must be given the signification of the Greek slpu>via, 
whence it is derived: — dissimulation of one's own good points. 

114 



115 IRONY Q. 113. Art. i 

xxix.): If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not 
a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying. 

I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur 
in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a 
man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers 
and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which 
in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does 
not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, 
except through corruption of one of its circumstances. 
Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, 
for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the 
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by 
denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he 
perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is 
always a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold 
folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has 
human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 
iii. 18, If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let 
him become a fool that he may be wise. But there is another 
wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to 
say, is foolishness with God. Accordingly, he that is streng- 
thened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in 
the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human 
things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted 
continues, and the wisdom of men is not with me, and farther 
on, and* I have known the science of the saints. 

It may also be replied that the wisdom of men is that which 
is acquired by human reason, while the wisdom of the saints 
is that which is received by divine inspiration. 

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, sinee, to wit, 
he was not of the race of prophets : hence the text goes on, 
nor am I the son of a prophet. 

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a 

man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem 

himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common 

righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of 

* Vulg., — and I have not known the science of the saints. 



Q. n 3 . Art. 2 THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 116 

perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But 
he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge 
to be sinful: which wo aid be a lie of irony. 

Reply Obj. 3. A man should not commit one sin in order 
to avoid another : and so he ought not to lie in any way at all 
in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says {Tract, xliii. 
in Joan.) : Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth : and 
Gregory says (Moral, xxvi. 3) that it is a reckless humility 
that entangles itself with lies. 



Second Article, 
whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin 
than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking 
truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake 
truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. 
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7), 
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. 
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 25) : When 
he shall speak low, trust him not : because there are seven mis- 
chiefs in his heart. Now it belongs to irony to speak low. 
Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 7) : Those 
who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, 
seemingly, in their manners. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., AA. 2, 4), one lie 
is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the 
matter which it is about — thus a lie about a matter of religious 
doctrine is most grievous — and sometimes on account of the 
motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous 
than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie 
about the same matter, either by words, or by any other 
outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person : 
so that in this respect they are equal. 



ii7 IRONY Q. 113. Art. 2 

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, 
namely, the desire of gain or honour: whereas irony arises 
from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable 
to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philo- 
sopher says (loc. cit.) that boasting is a more grievous sin than 
irony. 

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles him- 
self for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive 
cunningly : and then irony is more grievous. 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument applies to irony and boast- 
ing, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or 
on account of its matter : for it has been said that in this way 
they are equal. 

Reply Obj. 2. Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, 
the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that 
a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking 
in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, 
or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so 
doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus 
Our Lord said of certain men (Matth. vi. 16) that they dis- 
figure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast. 
Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and 
boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason 
they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 7) that it is the practice of boasters both to make 
overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves : 
and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he 
was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly 
or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory. 

Reply Obj. 3. According to the words of Ecclus. xix. 23, 
There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior 
is full of deceit, and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks 
of the man who, through deceitful humility, speaks low 
wickedly. 



QUESTION CXIV. 

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affa- 
bility, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarrel- 
ling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two 
points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a special virtue ? 
(2) Whether it is a part of justice ? 

First Article, 
whether friendliness is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that friendliness is not a special 
virtue. For the Philosopher saj^s (Ethic, viii. 3) that the 
perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue. Now 
any virtue is the cause of friendship: since the good is lovable 
to all, as Dionysius states (Div. Norn. iv.). Therefore 
friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of 
every virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6) of 
this kind of friend that he takes everything in a right manner 
from those he loves not and are not his friends. Now it seems 
to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of 
friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incom- 
patible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is 
not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue observes the mean, according as 
a wise man decides (Ethic, ii. 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 
vii. 5) : The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and 

118 



H9 FRIENDLINESS Q. n 4 . Art. i 

the heart of fools where there is mirth: wherefore it belongs 
to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure {Ethic, ii. 9). 
Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic, iv. 6), is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but 
fears to give pain. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not 
a virtue. 

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts 
of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. iv. 7) : Make thyself 
affable to the congregation of the poor. Therefore affability, 
which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: I. -II., 
Q. LV., A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there 
is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind 
of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above 
(Q. CIX., A. 2). And it behoves man to be maintained in a 
becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual 
relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, 
so that they behave towards one another in a becoming 
manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains 
the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called 
friendliness. 

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher speaks of a twofold 
friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affec- 
tion whereby one man loves another and may result from 
any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity 
(Q. XXIII. , A. 1, A. 3, adi: QQ. XXV., XXVI.), what things 
belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another 
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; 
this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a 
certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a 
becoming manner towards those with whom he is in 
contact. 

Reply Obj. 2. Every man is naturally every man's 
friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 
xiii. 19) that every beast loveth its like. This love is signified 
by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words 
or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. 
Hence there is no dissimulation in this : because we do not 



Q. 114. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 120 

show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat 
strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united 
to us by special friendship. 

Reply Obj. 3. When it is said that the heart of the wise 
is where there is mourning it is not that he may bring sorrow 
to his neighbour, for the Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 15): //, 
because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not 
now according to charity : but that he may bring consolation 
to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. vii. 38, Be not wanting 
in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn. 
Again, the heart oj fools is where there is mirth, not that they 
may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. 
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures 
with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, 
which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to 
Ps. cxxxii. 1, Behold how good and how pleasant it is for 
brethren to dwell together in unity. 

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6), for the 
sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid 
some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from 
bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the 
Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 8) : Although I made you sorrowful 
by my epistle, I do not repent, and farther on (verse 9), I am 
glad ; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you 
were made sorrowful unto penance. For this reason we should 
not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in 
order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to 
their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. 
Hence it is written (Ecclus. vii. 26) : Hast thou daughters ? 
Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay 
towards them. 

Second Article, 
whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that this kind of friendship is not 
a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another 
man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing 



121 FRIENDLINESS Q.h 4 .Art. 2 

that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom 
we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6), 
this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those 
who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance 
to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I.-IL, 
Q. LX., A. 5: Q. LXI., A. 3). Therefore this virtue is a 
part of temperance rather than of justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, To give equal things to those who are 
unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. LIX., 
AA. 1, 2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6), 
this virtue treats in like manner known and unknown, com- 
panions and strangers. Therefore this virtue rather than 
being a part of justice is opposed thereto. 

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i.) accounts 
friendship a part of justice. 

/ answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being 
annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common 
with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice 
is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks 
the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to 
another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to 
pay, or by some debt arising out of a favour received. 
For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that 
we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless 
at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them 
for some good purpose. 

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. CIX., A. 3, ad 1), 
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in 
equity, the manifestation of truth without which human 
society could not last. Now as man could not live in society 
without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the 
Philosopher says (Ethic, viii.), no one could abide a day with 
the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural 
equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow- men; 
unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for 
their good. 

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures 



Q.ii 4 .Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 122 

of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellow- 
ship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one 
man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures 
need not to be curbed as though they were noisome. 

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher does not 
mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same 
way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says 
{ibid.), it is not fitting to please or displease acquaintances 
and strangers in the same way. The likeness consists in this, 
that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner. 



QUESTION CXV. 

OF FLATTERY. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid 
virtue: (i) Flattery, and (2) Quarrelling. Concerning flat- 
tery there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether flattery is 
a sin ? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin ? 



First Article, 
whether flattery is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For 
flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order 
to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, accord- 
ing to Prov. xxxi. 28, Her children rose up and called her 
blessed: her husband, and he praised her. Moreover, there is 
no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. x. 33, 
I ... in all things please all men. Therefore flattery is not 
a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Evil is contrary to good, and blame to 
praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is 
it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. 
Therefore flattery is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Detraction is contrary to flattery. 
W T herefore Gregory says (Moral, xxii. 5) that detraction is 
a remedy against flattery. It must be observed, says he, 
that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often 
allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate 
praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the 

123 



Q. 115. Art i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124 

tongue of the detracter may humble. But detraction is an 
evil, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., AA. 2, 3). Therefore 
flattery is a good. 

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. xiii. 18, Woe to them 
that sew cushions under every elbow, says, that is to say, 
sweet flattery. Therefore flattery is a sin. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIV., A. 1, ad 3), 
although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or 
affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom 
one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question 
of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. 
Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly 
to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would 
therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere inten- 
tion of pleasing he is said to be complaisant, according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6) : whereas if he do it with the intention 
of making some gain out of it, he is called a flatterer or 
adulator. As a rule, however, the term flattery is wont to 
be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue 
in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary 
behaviour towards their fellows. 

Reply Obj. 1. One may praise a person both well and ill, 
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. 
For if while observing other due circumstances one were to 
wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby 
to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in 
good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. 
But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a 
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since 
perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. ix. 24, The sinner is 
praised in the desires of his soul ; or they may be uncertain, 
according to Ecclus. xxvii. 8, Praise not a man before he 
speaketh, and again (ibid. xi. 2), Praise not a man for his 
beauty; or because there may be fear lest human praise 
should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, 
(ibid. xi. 30), Praise not any man before death. Again, in like 
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster 
charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein. 



125 FLATTERY Q. ii 5 .Art. 2 

But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of 
vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, 
according to Ps. Hi. 6, God hath scattered the bones of them that 
please men, and according to the words of the Apostle 
(Gal. i. 10), /// yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of 
Christ. 

Reply Obj. 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circum- 
stances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good. 

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing hinders two vices being contrary 
to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so 
is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, 
but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks 
to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks 
not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times 
he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation. 

Second Article, 
whether flattery is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, 
according to Augustine (Euchirid. xii.), a thing is evil because 
it is harmful. But flattery is most harmful, according to 
Ps. ix. 24, For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, 
and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the 
Lord. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant.): Nothing so 
easily corrupts the human mind as flattery : and a gloss on 
Ps. lxix. 4, Let them be presently turned away blushing for 
shame that say to me : 'Tis well, 'Tis well, says: The tongue of 
the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor. 
Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever does harm by words, harms 
himself no less than others: wherefore it is written 
(Ps. xxxvi. 15): Let their sword enter into their own heaHs. 
Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: 
hence a gloss on Ps. cxl. 5, Let not the oil of the sinner fatten 
my head, says: The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind 
by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive 



Q.ii 5 .Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 126 

of vice. Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in him- 
self. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI. , 
Cap. 3) : The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in 
flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office. Now 
such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal 
sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin. 

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory 
(xli., de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, if one desire 
to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own 
choice, or out of necessity. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIL, A. 2), a mortal 
sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flatteiy is some- 
times contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary 
to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very 
matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for 
this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice 
he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbour, whom 
he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, 
according to Isa. v. 20, Woe to you that call evil good. 
Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters 
another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in 
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is 
written (Prov. xxvii. 6) : Better are the wounds of a friend 
than the deceitful kisses of an enemy. Thirdly, by way of 
occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his 
intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In 
this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion 
were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent 
downfall, as may be understood from what has been said 
above concerning scandal (Q. XLIIL, AA. 3, 4). If, how- 
ever, one man flatters another from the mere craving to 
please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to 
acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary 
to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial 
sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted speak of the flatterer 
who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to 



127 FLATTERY Q. h 5 .Art.2 

harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does 
harm to goods that are of greater consequence, namely, 
spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since 
the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient 
cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a 
sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above 
(Q. XLIII., A. i, ad 3: I.-IL, Q. LXXIIL, A. 8, ad 3: 
Q. LXXX., A. 1). 

Reply Obj. 2. This argument applies to one that flatters 
with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms 
himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the 
sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional 
cause of the harm he does to others. 

Reply Obj. 3. The passage quoted refers to the man 
who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him. 



QUESTION CXVI 

OF QUARRELLING. 
(In Two Articles.) 



We must now consider quarrelling; concerning which there 
are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is opposed to the 
virtue of friendship ? (2) Of its comparison with flattery. 



First Article. 

whether quarrelling is opposed to the virtue of 
friendship or affability ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that quarrelling is not opposed to 
the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarrelling seems 
to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord 
is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. XXXVII. , A. 1). 
Therefore quarrelling is also. 

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 21): An angry 
man stirreih up strife. Now anger is opposed to meekness. 
Therefore strife or quarrelling is also. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (James iv. 1) : From 
whence are wars and quarrels (Douay, — contentions) 
among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences 
which war in your members ? Now it would seem contrary 
to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore 
it seems that quarrelling is opposed not to friendship but 
to temperance. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarrelling to 
friendship {Ethic, iv. 6). 

J answer that, Quarrelling consists properly in words, 

128 



I2Q QUARRELLING Q.h6.Art.i 

when, namely, one person contradicts another's words. 
Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For 
sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person 
who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him 
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this 
seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. 
Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker 
being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagree- 
able : whence arises quarrelling, which is opposed to the afore- 
said friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave 
agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6) that those who are opposed 
to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care 
for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome. 

Reply Obj. i. Contention pertains rather to the contra- 
diction of discord, while quarrelling belongs to the con- 
tradiction which has the intention of displeasing. 

Reply Obj. 2. The direct opposition of virtues to vices 
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from 
many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although 
quarrelling arises at times from anger, it may arise from 
many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly 
opposed to meekness. 

Reply Obj. 3. James speaks there of concupiscence 
considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, 
a gloss on Rom. vii. 7 says : The law is good, since by for- 
bidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil. 

Second Article. 

whether quarrelling is a more grievous sin than 

flattery ?■ 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that quarrelling is a less grievous 
sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For 
the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to 
be. Now flattery does more harm than quarrelling, for 
it is written (Isa. iii. 12) : My people, they that call thee 

II. ii/4 9 



Q. ii6.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 130 

blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps. 
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarrelling. 

Obj. 2. Further, There appears to be a certain amount 
of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and 
thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without 
deceit, for he contradicts openly, Now he that sins 
deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic, vii. 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin 
than quarrelling. 

Obj. 3. Further, Shame is fear of what is vile, according 
to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 9). But a man is more ashamed 
to be a flatterer than a quarreller. Therefore quarrelling is 
a less grievous sin than flattery. 

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the 
spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now 
quarrelling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual 
state : for it is written (1 Tim. iii. 2, 3) that it behoveth a bishop 
to be . . . not quarrelsome ; and (2 Tim. ii. 24) : The servant 
of the Lord must not wrangle. Therefore quarrelling seems 
to be a more grievous sin than flattery. 

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. 
In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and 
thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue 
the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has 
a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the 
quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure, sins 
more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds 
in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them 
as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is 
sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends 
by deception to acquire undue honour or gain; while some- 
times quarrelling is more grievous, for instance, when one 
intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker 
to contempt. 

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the flatterer may do harm by 
deceiving secretly, so the quarreller may do harm sometimes 
by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is 
more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it 



131 QUARRELLING Q. h6.Art. 2 

were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous 
sin than theft, as stated above (Q. LXVL, A. 9). 

Reply Obj. 2. In human acts, the more grievous is not 
always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its 
source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby 
the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins 
are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. 
In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit 
are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain 
weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although 
sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a 
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accom- 
panied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarrelling, 
through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently 
more grievous. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the objection, shame regards 
the vileness of a sin: wherefore a man is not always more 
ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence 
it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarrel- 
ling, although quarrelling is more grievous. 



QUESTION CXVII. 

OF LIBERALITY. 
[In Six Articles.) 

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, 
namely, covetousness and prodigality. 

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry: 
(i) Whether liberality is a virtue ? (2) What is its matter ? 
(3) Of its act : (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather 
than to take ? (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice ? 
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues. 

First Article, 
whether liberality is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For 
no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a 
natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than 
for others : and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the 
contrary, since, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 1), 
it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he 
leaves for himself the lesser things. Therefore liberality is not 
a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Man sustains life by means of riches, 
and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as 
stated in Ethic, i. 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to 
happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, 
for the Philosopher says of him {Ethic, iv. 1) that he is inclined 
neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away. 

Obj. 3. Further, The virtues are connected with one 
another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with 

132 



133 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. i 

the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be 
liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or 
spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore 
liberality is not a virtue. 

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.)that the Gospel 
contains many instances in which a just liberality is incul- 
cated. Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not 
pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue. 

/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. ii. 19), it 
belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. Now 
we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are 
within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, 
but also those that are without, such as the things of this 
world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore 
since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it 
follows that liberality is a virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (Serm. lxiv. de 
Temp.) and Basil [Horn, in Luc. xii. 18) excess of riches is 
granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the 
merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to 
have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably 
spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we 
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual 
goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the 
first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man 
even in temporal firings to attend so much to others as to 
lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore 
Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) ; It is a commendable liberality not 
to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want. 

Reply Obj. 2. It does not belong to a liberal man so to 
give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, 
nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby 
happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 
r) that the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus 
to be of help to certain people; and Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) 
that Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all 
at once, but to dispense them : unless he do as Eliseus did, who 
slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by 



Q.ii 7 .Art.i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134 

any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfec- 
tion, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. CLXXXIV., 
Q. CLXXXVI., A. 3), 

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving 
away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of 
virtue, is directed to happiness. 

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1), those 
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal ; 
and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of any 
other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) : If you assist 
another to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not 
to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give 
for the sake of boasting rather than of pity. Wherefore those 
who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain 
evil works, are not liberal. 

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much 
on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even 
as men perform works of other virtues, before having the 
habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous 
people, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXV., A. 1). In like 
manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, 
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) : 
Liberality is proportionate to a mans substance, i.e. his means 
for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the 
giver : and Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) that it is the heart that 
makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value. 

Second Article, 
whether liberality is about money ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection I. It seems that liberality is not about money. 
For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. 
Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated 
in Ethic, v. 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, 
it seems that it is about passions and not about money. 

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man to make use 
of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real 



i 3 5 LIBERALITY Q. 117- Art. 2 

than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher {Polit. i. 
5, 6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money. 

Obj. 3. Further, Different virtues have different matter, 
since habits are distinguished by their objects. But ex- 
ternal things are the matter of distributive and commutative 
justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) that 
liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money. 

I answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 
ibid.) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. 
Hence liberality is also called open-handedness {largitas), 
because that which is open does not withhold things 
but parts with them. The term liberality seems also to 
allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he 
frees {liberat) it, so to speak, from his keeping and owner- 
ship, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. 
Now those things which are the subject of a man's free- 
handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which 
are denoted by the term money. Therefore the proper 
matter of liberality is money. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality 
depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the 
giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to 
the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of 
pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the 
interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while 
exterior money is the object of those same passions. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in his book De Discipline 
Christi {Tract, de divers, i.) , everything whatsoever man has 
on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of 
'pecunia' {money), because in olden times men's possessions 
consisted entirely of 'pecora' {flocks). And the Philosopher 
says {Ethic, iv. 1) : We give the name of money to anything 
that can be valued in currency. 

Reply Obj. 3. Justice establishes equality in external 
things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the 
regulation of internal passions : wherefore money is in one 
way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice. 



Q.ii 7 .Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 136 

Third Article, 
whether using money is the act of liberality ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that using money is not the act of 
liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But 
using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice 
and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of 
liberality. 

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man, not only to 
give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and 
keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. 
Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as 
the proper act of liberality. 

Obj. 3. Further, The use of money consists not only in 
giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money 
refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of 
liberality: for Seneca says (De Bene/, v.): A man is not 
liberal by giving to himself. Therefore not every use of 
money belongs to liberality. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) : In 
whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use 
of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to 
money will make the best use of riches. Now such is the 
liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of 
liberality. 

/ answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, 
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. XVIII., A. 2). Now the object 
or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money 
value, as stated in the foregoing Article {ad 2). And since 
every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, 
since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. 
Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all 
external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper 
act of liberality is making use of money or riches. 

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to liberality to make good use of 
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of 



137 LIBERALITY Q. 1 1 7. Art. 3 

liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make 
use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, 
in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it 
belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special 
aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfil- 
ment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in 
relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as 
we shall explain farther on (Q. CXXXIV.). 

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a virtuous man not only to 
make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to 
provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs 
to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against 
the foe, but also to sharpen. his sword and keep it in its 
sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use 
money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order 
to make fitting use of it. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions 
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate 
matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before 
all that a man should not be prevented from making any 
due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. 
Now there is a twofold use of money : one consists in apply- 
ing it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the 
designation of costs or expenditure ; while the other consists 
in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the 
head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be 
not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from 
spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. 
Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, 
according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1). The saying of 
Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving : for a man is not 
said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to 
himself. 



Q. 117. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138 



Fourth Article, 
whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to 

GIVE ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a liberal 
man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral 
virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong 
very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. 
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 1) that those who 
have not earned money, but have received the money earned by 
others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experi- 
enced the want of it. Therefore it seems that giving does not 
chiefly belong to the liberal man. 

Obj. 2. Further, No man is sorry for what he intends 
chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal 
man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he 
give to all, as stated in Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.). Therefore it does 
not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give. 

Obj. 3. Further, In order to accomplish what he intends 
chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal 
man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic, iv. 
loc. cit.) ; and yet by begging he might provide himself with 
the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he 
does not chiefly aim at giving. 

Obj. 4. Further, Man is bound to look after himself rather 
than others. But by spending he looks after himself, 
whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it 
belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. loc. cit.) 
that it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving. 

I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. 
Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the 
acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: 
while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to 
facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting 
with a thing — for instance, when we throw something — the 



139 LIBERALITY Q. 1 1 7. Art. 4 

farther we put it away the greater the force (virtus) employed. 
Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds 
from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. 
But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more 
perfect, since virtue is a kind of perfection (Phys. vii. text. 17, 
18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving. 

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest 
it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is 
not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since 
more things have to be considered in money's use, which is 
likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened 
to rest. As to those who, having received money that others 
have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having 
experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole 
cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue 
of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely 
removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them 
all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfre- 
quently, the fear of want that results from the experience 
of want hinders those who have acquired money from using 
it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love 
they have for it as being their own effect, according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1). 

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in this and the preceding Article, 
it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and 
consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a 
use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is 
contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. 
Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not 
giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving some- 
thing unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved 
at both : but especially at the former, since it is more opposed 
to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to 
all : since his act would be hindered were he to give to every- 
one : for he would not have the means of giving to those to 
whom it were fitting for him to give. 

Reply Obj. 3. Giving and receiving are related to one 
another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not 



Q.ii 7 .Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140 

the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since 
liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the 
liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. 
Hence the verse : 

In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many 
Should give often, take seldom, ask never. 

But he makes provision in order to give certain things 
according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his 
own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that 
he may make a liberal use thereof. 

Reply Obj. 4. To spend on oneself is an inclination of 
nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly 
to a virtue. 

Fifth Article, 
whether liberality is a part of justice ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. 
For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing 
is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is 
not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it. 

Obj. 2. Further, Justice is about operations, as stated 
above (Q. LVIII., A. 9: I. -II., Q. L., AA. 2, 3): whereas 
liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, 
which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong 
to temperance rather than to justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs chiefly to liberality to give 
becomingly, as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly 
belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, 
as stated above (QQ. XXX., XXXI.). Therefore liberality 
is a part of charity rather than of justice. 

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i.): Justice has 
to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellow- 
ship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also 
called liberality or kind-heartedness. Therefore liberality per- 
tains to justice. 

/ answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since 



141 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. 5 

justice pays another what is his, whereas liberality gives 
another what is one's own. There are, however, two points 
in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed 
chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned 
with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different 
aspect, as stated in this Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). 
Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part 
of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Although liberality does not consider the 
legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral 
due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on 
an obligation : so that it answers to the idea of due in the 
lowest degree. 

Reply Obj. 2. Temperance is about concupiscence in 
pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight 
in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. 
Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance. 

Reply Obj. 3. The giving of beneficence and mercy pro- 
ceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards 
the person to whom he gives : wherefore this giving belongs 
to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises 
from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, 
in that he desires it not nor loves it : so that when it is fitting 
he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom 
he knows not. Hence it belongs not to charity, but to 
justice, which is about external things. 

Sixth Article, 
whether liberality is the greatest of the 

VIRTUES ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is the greatest of the 
virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine 
goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to 
God, Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not 
(James i. 5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the 
virtues. 



Q. n 7 . Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142 

Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine {De Trin. vi. 8), 
in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be 
best. Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to 
liberality, since the good is self -communicative, according 
to Dionysius {Div. Norn. iv.). Hence Ambrose says {De 
Offic. i.) that justice inclines to severity, liberality to goodness. 
Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, Men are honoured and loved on account 
of virtue. Now Boethius says {De Consol. ii.) that bounty 
above all makes a man famous : and the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 1) that among the virtuous the liberal are the most 
beloved. Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues. 

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) that justice 
seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality 
is more pleasing. The Philosopher also says {Rhet. i. 9) that 
brave and just men are honoured chiefly and, after them, those 
who are liberal. 

I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; where- 
fore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater 
good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: 
in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, 
consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to 
set in order one's own affection towards the possession and 
use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates 
desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes pre- 
cedence of liberality : and so do fortitude and justice, which, 
in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time 
of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are pre- 
ceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine 
good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human 
good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the 
good of the individual ; and of the last named the good of the 
body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. 

Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and 
in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by 
reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man 
readily makes use of it, whether for himself, or for the good 
of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain 



143 LIBERALITY Q.h 7 .Art.6 

excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, 
we should judge of things according to that which is com- 
petent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, 
rather than according to that which pertains to them con- 
sequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the 
greatest of virtues. 

Reply Obj. I. God's giving proceeds from His love for 
those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the 
things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the 
greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality. 

Reply Obj. 2. Every virtue shares the nature of goodness 
by giving forth its own act : and the acts of certain other 
virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth. 

Reply Obj. 3. The friendship whereby a liberal man is 
beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he 
were better than others, but that which is based on utility, 
because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule 
men desire above all others For the same reason he becomes 
famous. 



QUESTION CXVIII. 

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE 
FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS. 

(In Eight Articles.) 

We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality : and 
(i) covetousness : (2) prodigality. 

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: 
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin ? (2) Whether it is a 
special sin ? (3) To which virtue it is opposed : (4) Whether 
it is a mortal sin ? (5) Whether it is the most grievous of 
sins ? (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin ? 
(7) Whether it is a capital vice ? (8) Of its daughters. 

First Article, 
whether covetousness is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For 
covetousness (avaritia) denotes a certain greed for gold 
(arts aviditas*), because, to wit, it consists in a desire for 
money, under which all external goods may be comprised. 
Now it is not a sin to desire external goods : since man desires 
them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to 
man, and because by their means man's life is sustained 
(for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). 
Therefore covetousness is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is against either God, or one's 
neighbour, or oneself, as statedabove (I. -II., Q. LXXII., A. 4). 
But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against 

* The Latin for covetousness avaritia is derived from aveo to 
desire; but the Greek (friXapyvpta signifies literally love of money: 
and it is to this that S. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2. Obj. 2). 

144 



145 COVETOUSNESS Q.hS.Art. i 

God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theo- 
logical virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again 
is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to glut- 
tony and lust, of which the Apostle says (i Cor. vi. 18) : He 
that commiUeth fornication sinneth against his own body. In 
like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neigh- 
bour, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. 
Therefore covetousness is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Things that occur naturally are not sins. 
Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind 
of defect, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 1). There- 
fore covetousness is not a sin. 

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. xiii. 5): Let your 
manners be without covetousness, contented with such things 
as you have. 

I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due 
measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or 
deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for 
an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since what- 
ever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with 
the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with 
health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i. 6). External 
goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as 
stated above (Q. CXVIL, A. 3: I.-IL, Q. II., A. 1). Hence 
it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in 
a certain measure, in other words, that man seek, according 
to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they 
are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition 
of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this 
measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. 
This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as 
immoderate love of possessing. It is therefore evident that 
covetousness is a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. It is natural to man to desire external things 
as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, 
in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the 
nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and 
therefore is a sin. 

11. ii. 4. 10 



Q. n8. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146 

Reply Obj. 2. Covetousness may signify immoderation 
about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard 
immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, 
when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is 
due. In this way it is a >in directly against one's neighbour, 
since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, with- 
out another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot 
be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may 
signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man 
has for riches, when, for instance, a man loves them, desires 
them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by 
covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes 
disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the 
sins of the flesh. 

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just 
as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal 
for the sake of temporal things. 

Reply Obj. 3. Natural inclinations should be regulated 
according to reason, which is the governing power in human 
nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid 
of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to 
have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they 
exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches. 

Second Article, 
whether covetousness is a special sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a special 
sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii.): Covetousness, 
which in Greek is called ^cXapyupla, applies not only to silver or 
money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately. 
Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, 
because sin consists in turning away from the immutable 
good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated above (I. -II., 
Q. LXXI., A. VI., Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a 
general sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to Isidore (Etym. x.), the 



147 COVETOUSNESS Q. h8.Art. 2 

covetous (avarus) man is so called because he is greedy for 
brass {avidus ceris), i.e. money : wherefore in Greek covetous 
ness is called cfytXapyvpia, i.e. love of silver. Now silver, 
which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value 
of which can be measured by money, as stated above 
(Q. CXVIL, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore covet ousness is a desire 
for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a 
general sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Rom. vii. 7, For I had not 
known concupiscence, says : The law is good, since by forbidding 
concupiscence, it forbids all evil. Now the law seems to forbid 
especially the concupiscence of covetousness : hence it is 
written (Exod. xx. 17) : Thou shall not covet thy neighbour's 
goods. Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all 
evil, and so covetousness is a general sin. 

On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with 
other special sins (Rom. i. 29), where it is written: Being 
filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness 
(Douay, — avarice) , etc. 

/ answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, 
as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXXIL, A. 1). Now the object 
of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite 
tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good in- 
ordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the 
useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And 
riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since 
they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. 
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as 
it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are 
comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness 
(avaritia) is denominated. 

Since, however, the verb to have, which seems to have been 
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof 
we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things 
(thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so 
forth, as stated in De Prcedicamentis) , consequently the term 
covetousness has been amplified to denote all immoderate 
desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says 



Q. 118. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 148 

in a homily (xvi. in Ev.) that covetousness is a desire not only 
for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when 
prominence is immoderately sought after. In this way covetous- 
ness is not a special sin : and in this sense Augustine speaks 
of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objec- 
tion. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First 
Objection. 

Reply Obj. 2. All those external things that are subject to 
the uses of human life are comprised under the term money, 
inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there 
are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, 
such as pleasures, honours, and so forth, which are desirable 
under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things 
is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special 
vice. 

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the inordinate concu- 
piscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand 
that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions, it is 
also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained 
by means of those possessions. 

Third Article, 
whether covetousness is opposed to liberality ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not opposed 
to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matth. v. 6, 
Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, says 
{Horn. xv. in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one 
general, and the other special, to which covetousness is 
opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic, v. 2). 
Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality. 

Obj. 2. Further, The sin of covetousness consists in a man's 
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this 
measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness 
is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality. 

Obj. 3. Further, Liberality is a virtue that observes the 
mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states 



149 COVETOUSNESS Q. 118.ART.3 

{Ethic, i. 7; iv. 1). But covetousness has no contrary and 
opposite sin, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, v. 1, 2). 
Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality. 

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 9) : A covetous man 
shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall 
have no fruits from them. Now not to be satisfied with money 
and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which 
observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetous- 
ness is opposed to liberality. 

/ answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with 
regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect 
of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man 
obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining 
another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this 
sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. xxii. 27) : Her 
princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey 
to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness. 
Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections 
for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches 
too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be 
unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to 
liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above 
(Q. CXVTL, A. 2, ad 3, A. 3, ad 3, A. 6). In this sense covet- 
ousness is spoken of (2 Cor. ix. 5) : That they would . . . 
prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a 
blessing, not as covetousness, where a gloss observes : Lest 
they should regret what they had given, and give but little. 

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speak- 
ing of covetousness in the first sense : covetousness in the 
second sense is called illiberality* by the Philosopher. 

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs properly to justice to appoint 
the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from 
the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither 
take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints 
the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, 
and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of 
money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these 

* avektv&epia. 



Q. 1 18. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150 

proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter 
from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, 
which latter depends on the rule of reason. 

Reply Obj. 3. Covetousness as opposed to justice has no 
opposite vice : since it consists in having more than one 
ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have 
less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. 
But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of 
prodigality opposed to it. 

Fourth Article, 
whether covetousness is always a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always a mortal 
sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. 
But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. 
For the Apostle after saying (Rom. i. 29) : Being filled with 
all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness (Douay, — avarice), 
etc., adds [verse 32) : They who do such things are worthy oj 
death. Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, The least degree of covetousness is to 
hold to one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a 
mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii. 18): It is 
the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back, the naked 
man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man's money 
that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou 
mightest succour. 

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since 
it is contrary to the love of our neighbour. Much more 
therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, No one is struck with spiritual blindness 
save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the 
light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom,* Lust for 
money brings darkness on the soul. Therefore covetousness, 
which is lust for money, is a mortal sin. 

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. iii. 12, If any man build 

* Horn. xv. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to S. John 
Chrysostom. 



151 CO VETOUSNESS Q. 1 1 8. Art. 4 

upon this foundation, says (cf. S. Augustine, De Fide et 
Opev. xvi.) that he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in 
the things of the world, how he may please the world, which 
pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds 
wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it 
is said of him that he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. There- 
fore covetousness is sometimes a venial sin. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is two- 
fold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a 
mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetous- 
ness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's 
property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are 
mortal sins, as stated above (Q. LXVL, AA. 6, 8). Yet 
venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason 
of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. LXVL, A. 6, 
ad 3), when we were treating of theft. 

In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed 
to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of 
riches. Accordingly, if the love of riches becomes so great 
as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, 
through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of 
God and his neighbour, covetousness will then be a mortal 
sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love 
stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, 
yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, 
and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in 
opposition to God or his neighbour, then covetousness is a 
venial sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. Covetousness is numbered together with 
mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a 
mortal sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is 
bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either 
through fear of their want or on account of his having too 
much. 

Reply Obj. 3. Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings 
darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, 
by preferring the love of riches to the love of God. 



Q. i is. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 152 



Fifth Article, 
whether covetousness is the greatest of sins ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the greatest of 
sins. For it is written (Ecclus. x. 9) : Nothing is more wicked 
than a covetous man, and the text continues : There is not a 
more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteih 
even his own soul to sale. Tully also says (De Offic. i., under 
the heading — True magnanimity is based chiefly on two 
things) : Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money. 
But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness 
is the most grievous of sins. 

Obj. 2. Further, The more a sin is opposed to charity, the 
more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed :o 
charity: for Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII. qu. 36) that 
greed is the bane of charity. Therefore covetousness is the 
greatest of sins. 

Obj. 3. Further, The gravity of a sin is indicated by its 
being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost 
is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But 
covetousness in an incurable sin : hence the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 1) that old age and helplessness of any kind makemen 
illiberal. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins. 

Obj. 4. Further, The Apostle says (Eph. v. 5) that covetous- 
ness is a serving of idols. Now idolatry is reckoned among 
the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also. 

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, 
according to Prov. vi. 30. But theft pertains to covetous- 
ness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins. 

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an 
evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: 
while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire 
of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be con- 
sidered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is 
despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good 
the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is 



153 COVETOUSNESS Q.ii8.Art. 5 

against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is 
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a 
sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, 
and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the 
degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good 
to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and 
then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin : for it 
is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher 
good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of 
human goods : since it is less than the good of the body, and 
this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the< 
Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetous- 
ness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to 
external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, 
however, corruption or privation of good is the formal 
element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the 
material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from 
the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from 
that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence 
we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most 
grievous of sins. 

Reply Obj. i. These authorities speak of covetousness 
on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. 
Hence (Ecclus. x. 10) it is given as a reason that the covetous 
man setteth his own soul to sale ; because, to wit, he exposes 
his soul — that is, his life — to danger for the sake of money. 
Hence the text continues : Because while he liveth he hath cast 
away — that is, despised — his bowels, in order to make money. 
Tully also adds that it is the mark of a narrow mind, namely, 
that one be willing to be subject to money. 

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is taking greed generally, in 
reference to any temporal good, not in its special accepta- 
tion for covetousness : because greed for any temporal good 
is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from 
the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good. 

Reply Obj. 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable 
in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against 
the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for 



Q. 118. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 154 

instance, because a man contemns God's mercy, or His 
justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are 
healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the 
greater gravity of the sin. On the other hand, covetousness 
is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which 
human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient 
one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and 
consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. 
Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the 
sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more 
dangerous. 

Reply Obj. 4. Covetousness is compared to idolatry on 
account of a certain likeness that it bears to it : because the 
covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an ex- 
ternal creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater 
subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine 
honour, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an 
external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not 
for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness 
is as grievous a sin as idolatry. 

Sixth Article, 
whether covetousness is a spiritual sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual 
sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But 
the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external 
riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the 
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for 
it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in 
old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall 
into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual 
sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, A sin of the flesh is one by which man's 
body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle 
(1 Cor. vi. 18), He that committeth fornication sinneth against 



155 COVETOUSNESS Q. n8. Art.6 

his own body. Now covetousness disturbs man even in his 
body; wherefore Chrysostom {Horn. xxix. in Matth.) com- 
pares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by 
the devil (Mark v.) and was troubled in body. Therefore 
covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin. 

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxxi.) numbers covetous- 
ness among spiritual vices. 

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections : and 
all the affections or passions of the soul have their term 
in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher 
{Ethic, ii. 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some 
spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consum- 
mated in the carnal senses — for instance, the pleasures of the 
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are 
those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of 
the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are 
consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are 
consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of 
the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man 
takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor 
of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin. 

Reply Obj. I. Covetousness with regard to a bodily object 
seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, 
forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he 
possesses riches : wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Never- 
theless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely 
spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of 
spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely 
carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect 
of a bodily object. 

Reply Obj. 2. Movement takes its species from the term 
whereto and not from the term wherefrom. Hence a vice of 
the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the 
flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the 
flesh. 

Reply Obj. 3. Chrysostom compares a covetous man to 
the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former 
is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by 



Q. 118. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 156 

way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom 
we read in Mark v., stripped himself, the covetous man 
loads himself with an excess of riches. 



Seventh Article, 
whether covetousness is a capital vice ? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a capital 
vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, 
and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a 
principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore 
covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice. 

Obj. 2. Further, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV., 
AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have principal 
ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But 
this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the 
aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to 
an end, as stated in Ethic, i. 5. Therefore covetousness is 
not a capital vice. 

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xv.) that covetous- 
ness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For 
there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful 
for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. 
And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are 
incited to greed for other people's property. Therefore covetous- 
ness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice 
in respect of other vices. 

On the contrary, Gregory [Moral, xxxi.) reckons covetous- 
ness among the capital vices. 

I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital 
vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other 
vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is 
that through desire thereof man sets about doing many 
things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is 
happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, 
as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., AA. 4, 7, 8) : wherefore the more 
a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the 



157 COVETOUSNESS Q. 118. Art. 7 

more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness 
is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's 
appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great 
promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii.) : 
the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 5), 
is that we use money in token of taking possession of some- 
thing, and again it is written (Eccles. x. 19) : All things obey 
money. Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, 
is a capital vice. 

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is perfected in accordance with 
reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclina- 
tion of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive 
appetite do not belong chiefly, to the same genus, and conse- 
quently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to 
principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a 
principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good 
of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because 
it regards money, which occupies a principal place among 
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article. 

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end 
that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result 
from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
iv. 1) that a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave. 

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that money is directed to some- 
thing else as its end : yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining 
all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. 
Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the 
Article. 

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising 
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. XXXVI., 
A. 4, ad 1: I.-IL, Q. LXXXIV., A. 4), provided that itself 
be frequently the source of others. 



Q. 1 1 8. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 158 



Eighth Article. 

whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, rest- 
lessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are 
daughters of covetousness ? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of covetousness 
are not as commonly stated, namely, treachery, fraud, false- 
hood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. 
For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above 
(A. 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed 
to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to 
charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, 
insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no con- 
nection with covetousness. 

Obj. 2. Further, Treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to 
pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's 
neighbour. Therefore they should not be reckoned as 
different daughters of covetousness. 

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore (Comment, in Deut.) enumerates 
nine daughters of covetousness; which are lying, fraud, 
theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, 
inhumanity, rapacity. Therefore the former reckoning of 
daughters is insufficient. 

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1) mentions 
many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he 
calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are sparing, 
tight-fisted, skinflints* miser s,-\ who do illiberal deeds, and of 
those who batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers 
of the dead, and robbers. Therefore it seems that the afore- 
said enumeration is insufficient. 

Obj. 5. Further, Tyrants use much violence against their 
subjects. But the Philosopher says (ibid.) that tyrants who 
destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called 
illiberal, i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be 
reckoned a daughter of covetousness. 

* KV/JUVOirpLaTTJS. \ Kt/J.filK€S. 



i 5 g COVETOUSNESS Q. h8.Art.8 

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxxi.) assigns to covetous- 
ness the daughters mentioned above. 

/ answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices 
which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of 
an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possess- 
ing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place 
it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives 
rise to insensibility to mercy, because, to wit, a man's heart 
is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches.* 
In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in 
receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered 
in two ways. First as in the thought (affectu). In this way 
it gives rise to restlessness, by hindering man with excessive 
anxiety and care, for a covetous man shall not be satisfied with 
money (Eccles. v. 9). Secondly, it may be considered in 
the execution (effectu). In this way the covetous man, in 
acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, 
which pertains to violence, sometimes deceit, and then if he 
has recourse to words, it is falsehood, if it be mere words, 
perjury if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse 
to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have fraud ; if 
persons, then we have treachery, as in the case of Judas, who 
betrayed Christ through covetousness. 

Reply Obj. 1. There is no need for the daughters of a 
capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a 
sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being 
directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to 
have daughters, and another for it to have species. 

Reply Obj. 2. These three are distinguished as stated in 
the Article. 

Reply Obj. 3. These nine are reducible to the seven afore- 
said. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under 
falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just 
as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised 
under fraud ; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness ; 
rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species 
thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to 
mercy. 

* See Q. XXX. A. 1. 



Q. iiS.Art.s THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 160 

Reply Obj. 4. The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species 
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For 
a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a 
defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be sparing ; 
if nothing, he is tight-fisted : if he gives with great reluctance, 
he is said to be a k.v^lvoitp'kt'tt)^ {skinflint), a cummin-seller, 
as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things 
of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or 
covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two 
wa}rs. In one way, through making money by disgraceful 
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works 
by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through 
sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making 
a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case 
of usury, or by labouring much to make little profit. In 
another way, in making money by unjust means, whether 
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by 
despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as 
gamblers do. 

Reply Obj. 5. Just as liberality is about moderate sums 
of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take 
great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but 
unjust. 



QUESTION CXIX. 

OF PRODIGALITY. 

(In Three Articles.) 

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there 
are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether prodigality is 
opposite to covetousness ? (2) Whether prodigality is a sin ? 
(3) Whether it is a graver sin than covetousness ? 

First Article, 
whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not opposite to 
covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same 
subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and 
covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetous- 
ness. 

Obj. 2. Further, Opposites relate to one same thing. But 
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain 
passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas 
prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the 
soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything 
else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to 
covetousness. 

Obj. 3. Further, Sin takes its species chiefly from its end, 
as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXII., A. 3). Now prodigality 
seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the 
sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially 
is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke xv. 13) 
of the prodigal son that he wasted his substance living riot- 
ously. Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to 
temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness 
and liberality. 

11. ii. 4. 161 11 



Q. 119. Art t THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7 : iv. 1) 
that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to 
which we give here the name of covetousness. 

/ answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another 
and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now 
covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of 
excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, 
the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he 
ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful 
of them than he ought : and as regards external action, 
prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in re- 
taining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, 
denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and 
retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed 
to covetousness. 

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents opposites from being in 
the same subject in different respects. For a thing is de- 
nominated more from what is in it principally. Now just 
as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing 
is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, 
so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. 
Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be prodigal, 
while he who is deficient in giving is said to be covetous. 
Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, 
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes 
(Ethic, iv. 1) , And in like manner it happens sometimes that 
a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet 
at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due 
either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in 
giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven 
to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it 
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not 
for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares 
not whence or how he receives Wherefore he is prodigal 
and covetous in different respects. 

Reply Obj. 2. Prodigality regards passions in respect of 
money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them. 

Reply Obj. 3. The prodigal does not always exceed in 



163 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 2 

giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of 
temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as 
not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of 
something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to 
intemperance, both because through spending too much 
on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects 
of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more 
prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous 
goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 1) that many a -prodigal ends 
in becoming intemperate. 

Second Article, 
whether prodigality is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For 
the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 10): Covetousness (Douay, — 
Desire of money) is the root of all evils. But it is not the root 
of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodi- 
gality is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18): 
Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate 
to others. Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. 
Therefore prodigality is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to prodigality to exceed in 
giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But 
this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of 
our Lord (Matth. vi. 34), Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow, 
and (Matth. xix. 21), Sell all (Vulg., — what) thou hast, and 
give to the poor. Therefore prodigality is not a sin. 

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his 
prodigality. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the opposition 
between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and 
deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. 
Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the 
good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin, 



Q. 1 1 9 . Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164 

Reply Obj. 1. Some expound this saying of the Apostle 
as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of 
habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the 
fomes* whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking 
of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good : 
and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises 
from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some 
temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to 
others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But 
to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that 
the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for 
he had said previously (verse 9) : They that will become rich, 
etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be the root of all 
evils, not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but 
because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from 
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of 
covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great 
expense in order to curry favour with certain persons from 
whom he may receive riches. 

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give 
and communicate their riches, according as they ought. 
The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher 
remarks (Ethic, iv. i), his giving is neither good, nor for a good 
end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give 
much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and 
flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing. 

Reply Obj. 3. The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, 
not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and 
above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal 
man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. 
Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their 
possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish 
from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not 
prodigal but perfectly liberal. 

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. LXXXI. A. 3. ad 2. 



165 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 3 

Third Article. 

whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than 

covetousness ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is a more grievous 
sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures 
his neighbour by not communicating his goods to him, 
whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) that the corruption of riches, 
which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his 
very being. Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, 
according to Ecclus. xiv. 5, He that is evil to himself, to whom 
will he be good? Therefore prodigality is a more grievous 
sin than covetousness. 

Obj. 2. Further, A disorder that is accompanied by a 
laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of 
covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable cir- 
cumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend 
their own, lest they be driven to accept from others : whereas 
the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance 
that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality 
to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes 
{Ethic, iv. 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin 
than covetousness. 

Obj. 3. Further, Prudence is chief among the moral virtues, 
as stated above (Q. LVL, A. 1, ad 1 : I.-IL, Q. LXL, A. 2, 
ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than 
covetousness is : for it is written (Prov. xxi. 20) : There is 
a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and 
the foolish man shall spend it : and the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 6) that it is the mark of a fool to give too much and 
receive nothing. Therefore prodigality is a more grievous 
sin than covetousness. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. ibid.) that 
the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man. 

I answer thai, Prodigality considered in itself is a less 



Q. 119. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 166 

grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. 
First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite 
virtue : since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs 
to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the 
covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man 
is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous 
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in 
Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.). Thirdly, because prodigality is easily 
cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, 
which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to 
a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes 
him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, 
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its 
likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is 
not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. CXVIII., A. 5, 
ad 3). 

Reply Obj. 1. The difference between the prodigal and 
the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself 
and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins 
against himself by spending that which is his, and his means 
of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal 
to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the 
dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor 
whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like 
manner the covetous man sins against others, by being 
deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through 
deficiency in spending : wherefore it is written (Eccles. vi. 2) : 
A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give 
him the power to eat thereof. Nevertheless the prodigal man 
exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet 
so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits 
neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his 
own goods for his own profit. 

Reply Obj. 2. In speaking of vices in general, we judge of 
them according to their respective natures : thus, with regard 
to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and 
with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. 
That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance 



167 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 3 

points already to several additional sins, wherefore the 
prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic, iv. 1. That 
an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs 
to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, 
yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls 
for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest 
he be forced to give to others. 

Reply Obj. 3. All vices are opposed to prudence, even as 
all virtues are directed by prudence : wherefore if a vice be 
opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed 
less grievous. 



QUESTION CXX. 

OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY. 
(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider epikeia, under which head there are 
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether epikeia is a virtue? 
(2) Whether it is a part of justice ? 

First Article, 
whether "epikeia"* is a virtue? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that epikeia is not a virtue. For 
no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet epikeia does 
away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is 
just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. 
Therefore epikeia is not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De vera Relig. xxxi.) : 
With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgement 
on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and 
established, the judge must pronounce judgement not on them 
but according to them. But seemingly epikeia pronounces 
judgement on the law, when it deems that the law should not 
be observed in some particular case. Therefore epikeia is 
a vice rather than a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently it belongs to epikeia to 
consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher 
states (Ethic, v. 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone 
to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the 
Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under 
Law i. : It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret 



168 



169 EQUITY Q. 120. Art. i 

between equity and law. Therefore the act of epikeia is 
unlawful : and consequently epikeia is not a virtue. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher {Ethic, v. 10) states it to 
be a virtue. 

/ answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XCVL, A. 6), 
when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with 
which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent sin- 
gulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not 
possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every 
single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what 
commonly happens : although if the law be applied to certain 
cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious 
to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the 
law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority 
of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be 
injurious — for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in 
deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, 
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to 
fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad 
to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the 
law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common 
good. This is the object of epikeia which we call equity. 
Therefore it is evident that epikeia is a virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Epikeia does not set aside that which is 
just in itself but that which is just as by law established. 
Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the 
law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the 
law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is 
written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v. : 
Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the 
letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver. 

Reply Obj. 2. It would be passing judgement on a law to 
say that it was not well made ; but to say that the letter of 
the law is not to be observed in some particular case is 
passing judgement not on the law, but on some particular 
contingency. 

Reply Obj. 3. Interpretation is admissible in doubtful 
cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law 



Q. 120. Art 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170 

without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the 
case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of 
execution. 

Second Article. 

whether " epikeia " is a part of justice ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that epikeia is not a part of justice. 
For, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 7), justice is twofold, 
particular and legal. Now epikeia is not a part of par- 
ticular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal 
justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal 
justice, since its operation is beside that which is established 
by law. Therefore it seems that epikeia is not a part of 
justice. 

Obj. 2. Further, A more principal virtue is not assigned 
as the part of a less principal virtue : for it is to the cardinal 
virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are as- 
signed as parts. Now epikeia seems to be a more principal 
virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived 
from eiri, i.e. above, and hiiccuov, i.e. just. Therefore epikeia 
is not a part of justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, It seems that epikeia is the same as 
modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. iv. 5), Let 
your modesty be known to all men the Greek has eVtet/ceta.* 
Now, according to Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.), modesty is a part 
of temperance. Therefore epikeia is not a part of justice. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, v. 10) that 
epikeia is a kind of justice. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue has 
three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. 
A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated 
essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen 
in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of 
many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox : and 
sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to 
priority and posteriority, as being of substance and accident. 

* TO €TTl€lK€S. 



171 EQUITY Q.i 20. Art. 2 

Accordingly, epikeia is a part of justice taken in a general 
sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states 
{Ethic, v. 10). Wherefore it is evident that epikeia is a sub- 
jective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with 
priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice 
is subject to the direction of epikeia. Hence epikeia is by 
way of being a higher rule of human actions. 

Reply Obj. 1. Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, 
and in one way is contained under it, and in another way 
exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies 
with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as 
regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more 
account, then epikeia is the more important part of legal 
justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which com- 
plies with the law with regard to the letter, then epikeia is a 
part not of legal justice but of justice in its general accepta- 
tion, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it. 

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher states {Ethic, v. 10), 
epikeia is better than a certain, namely, legal, justice, which 
observes the letter of the law : yet since it is itself a kind of 
justice, it is not better than all justice. 

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to epikeia to moderate something, 
namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But 
modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates 
man's outward life — for instance, in his deportment, dress, 
or the like. Possibly also the term eirie'tKeia is applied in 
Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. 



QUESTION CXXI. 

OF PIETY. 

{In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; 
namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of 
inquiry : (i) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost ? 
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it ? 

First Article, 
whether piety is a gift ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts 
differ from the virtues, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXVIII., 
A. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 3). 
Therefore piety is not a gift. 

Obj. 2. Further, The gifts are more excellent than the 
virtues, above all the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. 
LXVIII., A. 8). Now among the parts of justice re- 
ligion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice 
is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a 
gift rather than piety. 

Obj. 3. Further, The gifts and their acts remain in heaven, 
as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 6). But the act of 
piety cannot remain in heaven : for Gregory says {Moral, i.) 
that piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of 
mercy: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will 
be no unhappiness.* Therefore piety is not a gift. 

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the 
eleventh chapter of Isaias {verse 2: Douay, — godliness).^ 

* Cf. Q. XXX. A. 1. j Cf. Q- LII. A. 4, footnote. 

172 



173 PIETY 0. 121. Art i 

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXVIII., A. i: 
Q. LXIX., AA. i, 3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual 
dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion 
of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this 
effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, 
according to Rom. viii. 15, You have received the spirit of 
adoption of sons, whereby we cry : Abba (Father). And since 
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's 
father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's 
instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, 
is a gift of the Holy Ghost. 

Reply Obj. 1. The piety that pays duty and worship to 
a father in the flesh is a virtue : but the piety that is a gift 
pays this to God as Father. 

Reply Obj. 2. To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion 
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father 
in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay 
worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to 
pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion 
is greater than the virtue of piety : while the gift of piety is 
greater than religion. 

Reply Obj. 3. As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and 
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all 
his kindred on account of their being related to his father, 
so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to 
God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to 
God. Hence it belongs to piety to honour the saints, and 
not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands 
them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, ii.). Con- 
sequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappi- 
ness. And although this act has no place in heaven, 
especially after the Day of Judgement, yet piety will exer- 
cise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial 
affection: for it is then above all that this act will be ful- 
filled, according to Wis. v. 5, Behold how they are numbered 
among the children of God. The saints will also mutually 
honour one another. Now, however, before the Judgement 
Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in 
this unhappy state. 



Q. i2i. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 174 



Second Article. 

whether the second beatitude, " blessed are the 
meek," corresponds to the gift of piety ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the second beatitude, Blessed 
are the meek, does not correspond to the gift of piety. For 
piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather 
belongs the fourth beatitude, Blessed are they that hunger and 
thirst after justice, or the fifth beatitude, Blessed are the 
merciful, since, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of 
mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude 
does not pertain to the gift of piety. 

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of piety is directed by the gift 
of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of 
the gifts (Isa. xi.). Now direction and execution extend 
to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, Blessed 
are they that mourn, corresponds to the gift of knowledge, 
it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety. 

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits correspond to the beatitudes 
and gifts, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXX., A. 2). Now 
among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with 
piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. 
Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the 
gift of piety. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte 
i.) : Piety agrees with the meek. 

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a 
twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to 
the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to 
have followed this : wherefore he assigns the first beatitude 
to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, 
Blessed are the meek, to piety, and so on. Another congruity 
may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each 
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beati- 
tudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and 
thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to 



175 PIETY Q. 121. Art. 2 

piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude 
has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness 
removes the obstacles to acts of piety. 

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. 

Reply Obj. 2. Taking the beatitudes and gifts according 
to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs 
correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them accord- 
ing to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, 
although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated 
above. 

Reply Obj. 3. In the fruits goodness and benignity may 
be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so 
far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above. 



QUESTION CXXII. 

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE. 

(In Six Articles.) 

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which 
head there are six points of inquiry : (i) Whether the precepts 
of the decalogue are precepts of justice ? (2) Of the first 
precept of the decalogue : (3) Of the second: (4) Of the 
third: (5) Of the fourth: (6) Of the other six. 

First Article. 

whether the precepts of the decalogue are 
precepts of justice ? 

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : — 

Objection I. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue 
are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver 
is to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue, as 
stated in Ethic, ii. 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic, v. 1, the 
law prescribes about all acts of all virtues. Now the precepts 
of the decalogue are the first principles of the whole Divine 
Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not per- 
tain to justice alone. 

Obj. 2. Further, It would seem that to justice belong 
especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with 
the moral precepts, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XCIX., A. 4). 
But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as 
stated above (I. -II., Q. C, A. 3). Therefore the precepts 
of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Law contains chiefly precepts about 
acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about 
public officers and the like. But there is no mention of 

176 



177 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. i 

these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems 
that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong 
to justice. 

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue are divided 
into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the 
love of our neighbour, both of which regard the virtue of 
charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to 
charity rather than to justice. 

On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby 
we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another 
by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one con- 
sider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the deca- 
logue pertain to justice. 

/ answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first 
principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to 
them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now 
it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is 
essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one 
towards another. Because in those matters that relate to 
himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of him- 
self, and that he may do as he likes : whereas in matters that 
refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under 
obligation to render to another that which is his due. 
Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to 
justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts 
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth 
precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of 
justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly 
so called, which is observed among equals. 

Reply Obj. 1. The intention of the law is to make all men 
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all 
giving them precepts about those things where the notion 
of duty is most manifest, as stated above. 

Reply Obj. 2. The judicial precepts are determinations 
of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's 
neighbour, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations 
of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. 
Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue : and 

II. ii. 4. 12 



Q. 122. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178 

yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, 
and therefore pertain to justice. 

Reply Obj. 3. Thing? that concern the common good 
must needs be administered in different ways according to 
the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a 
place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among 
the judicial precepts. 

Reply Obj. 4. The precepts of the decalogue pertain to 
charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. i. 5, The end of the 
commandment is charity: but they belong to justice, inasmuch 
as they refer immediately to acts of justice. 

Second Article. 

whether the first precept of the decalogue 
is fittingly expressed ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the deca- 
logue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound 
to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. xii. 9, 
How much more shall we (Vulg., — shall we not much more) 
obey the Father of spirits and live ? Now the precept of 
piety, whereby man honours his father, is expressed affirma- 
tively in these words: Honour thy father and thy mother. 
Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, 
whereby all honour God, be expressed affirmatively, espe- 
cially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation. 

Obj. 2. Further, The first precept of the decalogue per- 
tains to religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, 
since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept 
three acts are forbidden : since we read first : Thou shalt not 
have strange gods before Me; secondly, Thou shalt not make 
to thyself any graven thing ; and thirdly, Thou shalt not adore 
them nor serve them. Therefore the first precept is unfit- 
tingly expressed. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De decern chord, ix.) that 
the first precept forbids the sin of superstition. But there are 
many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above 



179 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q.i 22 .Art. 2 

(Q. XCIL, A. 2). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid 
idolatry alone. 

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture. 

/ answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, where- 
fore it behoved the precepts of the Law to be set in order 
according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of 
man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed 
in the order of generation. The first is that the first part 
is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of 
an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in 
building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation : 
and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of 
the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use 
of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will 
depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since 
man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the 
first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation 
of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is 
the last end of man's will. 

The second thing to be observed in the order of genera- 
tion is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have 
to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and 
afterwards sows his seed, according to Jerem. iv. 3, Break 
up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns. Hence 
it behoved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as 
to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief 
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, accord- 
ing to Matth. vi. 24, You cannot serve God and mammon. 
Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of 
false gods is excluded. 

Reply Obj. 1. In point of fact there is one affirmative 
precept about religion, namely: Remember that thou keep 
holy the Sabbath Day. Still the negative precepts had to be 
given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion 
might be removed. For though affirmation naturally pre- 
cedes negation, yet in the process of generation negation, 
whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in 
the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning 



Q. 122. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 180 

God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account 
of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. ii.) 

Reply Obj. 2. People worshipped strange gods in two 
ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without 
having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a 
long time the ancient Romans worshipped gods without using 
images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, 
Thou shalt not have strange gods. Among others the worship 
of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so 
the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the 
words, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing, as also 
the worship of those same images, by the words, Thou shalt 
not adore them, etc. 

Reply Obj. 3. All other kinds of superstition proceed from 
some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all 
are understood to be forbidden by the words, Thou shalt not 
have strange gods. 

Third Article. 

whether the second precept of the decalogue 
is fittingly expressed ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of the deca- 
logue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, Thou shalt 
not take the name of thy God in vain is thus explained by a 
gloss on Exod. xx. 7: Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to 
be a creature, so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, 
a gloss on the words of Deut. v. 11, Thou shalt not take the 
name of . . . thy God in vain, adds, i.e. by giving the name of 
God to wood or stone, as though they forbade a false confes- 
sion of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now 
unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. 
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, 
whereby superstition is forbidden. 

Obj. 2. Further, The name of God is taken for many 
purposes — for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, 
and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, 
according to Col. iii. 17, All whatsoever you do in word or in 



181 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 3 

work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord. Therefore the precept 
forbidding the taking of God's name in vain seems to be 
more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, 
and thus should have preceded it. 

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Exod. xx. 7 expounds the 
precept, Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, 
namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would 
seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing 
without judgement. But false swearing, which is without 
truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are 
much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather 
have forbidden them. 

Obj. 4. Further, Blasphemy or any word or deed that is 
an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. There- 
fore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been 
forbidden by this precept. 

Obj. 5. Further, God's names are many. Therefore it 
should not have been said indefinitely: Thou shalt not take 
the name of . . . thy God in vain. 

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. 

/ answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue 
it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before 
establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed 
to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to 
wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to 
whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, 
by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is con- 
temned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated 
above (Q. XCVTL, in the preamble, and in the Article that 
follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing 
man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him : and 
when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, 
he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, accord- 
ing to Isa. xxviii. 20, The bed is straitened, so that one must 
fall out, i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out 
from man's heart, and a short covering cannot cover both. 
On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing 
man from honouring God after he has acknowledged Him. 



Q. 122. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 182 

Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to 
worship, before honouring Him we have acknowledged. 

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is 
placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that 
pertains to irreligion. 

Reply Obj. 1. These expositions are mystical. The literal 
explanation is that which is given Deut. v. n : Thou shall 
not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, namely, by swearing 
on that which is not* 

Reply Obj. 2. This precept does not forbid all taking of 
the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in 
confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because 
men are wont to take God's name more frequently in this 
way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence 
all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by 
this precept : and it is in this sense that we are to take the 
explanation quoted in the First Objection. 

Reply Obj. 3. To swear to nothing means to swear to that 
which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is 
chiefly called perjury, as stated above (Q.XCVIII.,A. i,ad^). 
For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing 
is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On 
the other hand, when a man swears without judgement, 
through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity 
on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the 
swearer. 

Reply Obj. 4. Just as when we instruct a man in some 
science, we begin b}/ putting before him certain general 
maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by 
instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are 
the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or 
by command, to those things which are of most common 
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts 
of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is 
of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does 
not fall so often into the latter sin. 

* Vulg., — for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon 
a vain thing. 



183 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4 

Reply Obj. 5. Reverence is due to the Divine names on 
the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the 
part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is 
expressed in the singular : Thou shalt not take the name of . . . 
thy God in vain: since it matters not in which of God's names 
perjury is committed. 

Fourth Article. 

whether the third precept of the decalogue, concern- 
ing the hallowing of the sabbath, is fittingly 
expressed ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the deca- 
logue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly 
expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general 
precept : since Bede in commenting on Luke xiii. 14, The ruler 
of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath, 
says {Comment, iv.): The Law forbids, not to heal man on 
the Sabbath, but to do servile works, i.e. to burden oneself with 
sin. Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is 
written (Exod. xxxi. 13) : See that you keep My Sabbath : 
because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations. 
Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and 
moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts 
of the decalogue. 

Obj. 2. Further, The ceremonial precepts of the Law 
contain sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances, 
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. CI., A. 4). Now sacred things 
comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and 
sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred 
days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting 
to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention 
only that of the Sabbath. 

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever breaks a precept of the deca- 
logue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the obser- 
vances of the Sabbath did not sin — for instance, those who 
circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests 



Q. 122. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 184 

who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias 
(3 Kings xix.), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount 
of God, Horeb, must have travelled oh a Sabbath : the priests 
also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as 
related in Josue vii., must be understood to have carried it 
on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Luke xiii. 15) : Doth not 
every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . 
and lead them to water ? Therefore it is unfittingly placed 
among the precepts of the decalogue. 

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue have to 
be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law 
this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the 
Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook 
their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. There- 
fore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is un- 
fittingly expressed. 

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. 

I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed 
by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated 
above (AA. 2, 3), it remained for the third precept to be 
given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it 
belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the 
Divine scriptures teach us the interior worship under the guise 
of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given 
to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for 
the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, con- 
sisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting 
of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law was necessary re- 
specting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. 
Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and 
common principles of the Law, and consequently the third 
precept of the decalogue prescribes the exterior worship of 
God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This 
universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, 
from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh 
day : and in sign of this we are commanded to keep holy the 
seventh day — that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. 
Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath 



185 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4 

the reason for it is given: For in six days the Lord made 
heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day. 

Reply Obj. 1. The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, 
understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. 
It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to set 
aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there 
is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for 
each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, 
and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, 
man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by 
which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a 
certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine 
things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as 
this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the 
Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, 
it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as 
representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh 
day : as also in its moral signification, as representing cessation 
from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, 
too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept 
in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoy- 
ment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing 
the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, 
as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept. 

Reply Obj. 2. The other ceremonies of the Law are signs 
of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of 
the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, 
the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that 
it should be placed among the general precepts of the deca- 
logue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law. 

Reply Obj. 3. Two things are to be observed in the hallow- 
ing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is 
that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified 
in the words : Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. 
For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are 
applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation 
from work, and is signified in the words (Exod. xx. n), On 
the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work. The kind of work 



Q. i22. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 186 

meant appears from Levit. xxiii. 3, You shall do no servile* 
work on that day. Now servile work is so called from servi- 
tude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the 
servant of sin, according to John viii. 34, Whosoever com- 
mitteth sin is the servant of sin, and in this sense all sinful 
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man 
serves another. Now one man serves another not with his 
mind but with his body, as stated above (Q. CIV., AA. 5, 6, 
ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called 
servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the 
servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which 
pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. 
In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath 
day, because that would be contrary to the end of the 
Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works 
on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself 
with works connected with God's service. For this reason, 
according to John vii. 23, a man'f receives circumcision on the 
Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken: and for 
this reason too we read (Matth. xii. 5), that on the Sabbath 
days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, i.e. do corporal 
works on the Sabbath, and are without blame. Accordingly, 
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break 
the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it 
is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise 
any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. 
Wherefore a gloss on Num. xxviii. says that smiths and like 
craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of 
the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes 
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the 
Sabbath, and are without blame. 

On the other hand, those works that are called servile in 
the first or second way are contrary to the observance of 
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying 
himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from 
applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by 

* Vulg., — You shall do no work on that day. 
t Vulg., — If a man, etc. 



187 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4 

lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast 
day is more against this precept than to do some other but 
lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decern 
chord, iii.): It would be better if the Jew did some useful work 
on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre : and 
their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the 
Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the 
new moon. It is not, however, against this precept to sin 
venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy 
holiness. 

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual 
worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong 
properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, 
in so far as they are common to those who serve and those 
who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is 
bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his 
neighbour, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well- 
being of the body, according to Prov. xxiv. 11, Deliver them 
that are led to death: secondarily as regards avoiding damage 
to one's property, according to Deut. xxii. 1, Thou shalt not 
pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but 
thou shalt bring them back to thy brother. Hence a corporal 
work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily 
well-being does not profane the Sabbath : for it is not against 
the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as 
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the 
Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought 
in self-defence on the Sabbath day (1 Machab. ii.), nor Elias 
when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For 
this same reason our Lord (Matth. xii. 3) excused His dis- 
ciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need 
which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is 
directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary 
to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written 
(John vii. 23) : Are you angry at Me because I have healed the 
whole man on the Sabbath day? And again, a bodily work 
that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external 
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord 



Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188 

says (Matth. xii. 11): What man shall there be among you, 
that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the 
Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up ? 

Reply Obj. 4. In the New Law the observance of the Lord's 
day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not 
by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church 
and the custom of Christian people. For this observance 
is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in 
the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord's 
day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are 
permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the 
Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And 
again, in the New Law dispensation is more easily granted 
than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, 
on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to 
the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even 
in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are 
changeable in point of place and time. 

Fifth Article. 

whether the fourth precept, about honouring one's 
parents, is fittingly expressed ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about 
honouring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this 
is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a 
part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of 
which we have spoken (QQ. CI., CIL, seq.). Therefore it 
seems that there should not have been given a special 
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others. 

Obj. 2. Further, Piety pays worship not only to one's 
parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood 
kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated 
above (Q. CL, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this 
precept to mention only the honouring of one's father and 
mother. 

Ob]. 3. Further, We owe our parents not merely honour 



189 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 5 

but also support. Therefore the mere honouring of one's 
parents is unfittingly prescribed. 

Obj. 4. Further, Sometimes those who honour their 
parents die young, and on the contrary those who honour 
them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to 
supplement this precept with the promise, That thou may est 
be long-lived upon earth. 

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. 

/ answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed 
to the love of God and of our neighour. Now to our parents, 
of all our neighbours, we are under the greatest obligation. 
Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, 
a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, 
who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is 
the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain 
affinity to the precepts of the First Table. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 2), piety directs 
us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common 
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general 
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety 
rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some 
special debt. 

Reply Obj. 2. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt 
to one's kindred and country: since it is because we are born 
of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. 
Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first 
precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather 
than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this 
precept of honouring our parents is understood to command 
whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as 
secondary matter included in the principal matter. 

Reply Obj. 3. Reverential honour is due to one's parents 
as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them acci- 
dentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery, 
or the like, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 2). And since that 
which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is 
accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the 
Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a 



Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190 

special precept of honouring our parents: and this honour, 
as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and 
whatever else is due to our parents. 

Reply Obj. 4. A long life is promised to those who honour 
their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to 
the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle 
(1 Tim. iv. 8) : Piety (Douay, — Godliness) is -profitable to all 
things, having promise of the life that now is and of that 
which is to come. And with reason. Because the man who 
is grateful for a favour deserves, with a certain congruity, 
that the favour should be continued to him, and he who is 
ungrateful for a favour deserves to lose it. Now we owe 
the favour of bodily life to our parents after God : wherefore 
he that honours his parents deserves the prolongation of 
his life, because he is grateful for that favour : while he that 
honours not his parents deserves to be deprived of life 
because he is ungrateful for the favour. However, present 
goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except 
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated 
above (I. -II., Q. CXIV., A. 12), wherefore sometimes in 
accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, 
which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful 
to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who 
are undutiful to their parents, live longer. 

Sixth Article. 

whether the other six precepts of the decalogue 
are fittingly expressed ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the 
decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient 
for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbour; 
but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to 
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to all men their dues. Now the last 
six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbour. 
Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed. 

Obj. 2. Further, These precepts forbid murder, adultery, 



igi PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 6 

stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries 
can be inflicted on one's neighbour, as appears from those 
which have been specified above (QQ. LXXIL, seq.). There- 
fore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly 
expressed. 

Obj. 3. Further, Concupiscence may be taken in two ways. 
First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. vi. 21, The desire 
(concupiscentia) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom : 
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 
iv. 1., From whence are wars and contentions among you? 
Are they not . . .from your concupiscences which war in your 
members ? Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not 
forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first 
movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against 
a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of 
the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. There- 
fore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include 
some that forbid concupiscence. 

Obj. 4. Further, Murder is a more grievous sin than 
adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the 
desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have 
precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery. 

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. 

/ answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays 
that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is 
bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly 
so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, 
after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man 
pays what is due to God, and after the fourth precept per- 
taining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents 
— which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any 
special reason — it was necessary in due sequence to give 
certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, 
which pays to all indifferently what is due to them. 

Reply Obj. 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general 
to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, 
which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted 
on one's neighbour, had to be given a place, as general 



Q. 122. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192 

precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the 
other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbour are paid in 
different ways to diffe r ent people: hence it did not behove 
to include affirmative precepts about these duties among 
the precepts of the decalogue. 

Reply Obj. 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our 
neighbour are reducible to those that are forbidden by these 
precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of gener- 
ality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on 
the person of our neighbour are understood to be forbidden 
under the head of murder as being the principal of all. 
Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's 
neighbour, especially by way of lust, are understood to be 
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under 
the head of damage done to property are understood to be 
forbidden together with theft : and those that are comprised 
under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are 
understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of 
false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice. 

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do 
not include the prohibition of first movements of concupi- 
scence, that do not go farther than the bounds of the sen- 
suality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent 
of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure. 

Reply Obj. 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concu- 
piscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect 
of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a 
certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft 
has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of 
its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. 
Hence the concupiscence of theft and adulter}' had to be 
forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence 
of murder. 



QUESTION CXXIII. 

OF FORTITUDE. 

(In Twelve Articles.) 

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider 
fortitude. We must (i) consider the virtue itself of for- 
titude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; 

(4) the precepts that pertain to it. 

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: 
(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; 
(3) the vices opposed to fortitude. 

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: 
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue ? (2) Whether it is a 
special virtue ? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear 
and daring ? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death ? 

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters ? (6) Whether 
endurance is its chief act ? (7) Whether its action is 
directed to its own good ? (8) Whether it takes pleasure 
in its own action ? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly 
with sudden occurrences ? (10) Whether it makes use 
of anger in its action ? (n) Whether it is a cardinal 
virtue ? (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal 
virtues. 

First Article, 
whether fortitude is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For 
the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 9) : Virtue is perfected in 
11. ii. 4 193 13 



Q. 123. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 194 

infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. There- 
fore fortitude is not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, If it is a virtue, it is either theological, 
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained 
among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual 
virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above 
(I.-IL, Q. LVIL, A. 2; LXII., A. 3). Neither, apparently, 
is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to 
the Philosopher {Ethic, hi. 7, 8): Some seem to be brave 
through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of 
which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral 
virtue, and some are called brave on account of certain passions; 
for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonour, 
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral 
virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated 
above (I.-IL, Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a 
virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, 
since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above (loc. cit.). 
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least 
results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it 
seems that fortitude is not a virtue. 

On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv., xxi., xxii.) 
numbers fortitude among the virtues. 

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, ii. 6) 
virtue is that which makes its subject good, and renders its 
work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking 
now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work 
good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason, 
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv. 22). Wherefore it 
belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his 
work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: 
first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the 
intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude 
of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; 
thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment 
of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is 
hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. 



195 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. i 

First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to 
something other than what the rectitude of reason requires ; 
and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. 
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that 
which is in accordance with reason, on account of some 
difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this 
obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to 
resist the aforesaid difficulty, even as a man, by fortitude 
of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. 

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as 
it conforms man to reason. 

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in 
the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, 
of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to 
fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of 
the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or 
fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and 
this belongs to the perfection that is called humility. 

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a person performs the exterior 
act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some 
other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 8) 
mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by 
way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude 
without having the virtue. This may be done in three 
ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult 
as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in 
three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, 
through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; some- 
times it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming 
dangers— when, for instance, one has often experienced 
escape from danger ; and sometimes this is owing to a certain 
science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill 
and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers 
of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending 
themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i.), 
No man fears to do what he is confident of having learnt to 
do well. Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude 
without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, 



Q. i2 3 . Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196 

whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of 
anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, 
but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as 
honour, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be 
avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss. 

Reply Obj. 3. The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned 
a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, 
is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor 
is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man 
should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of 
his natural temperament, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXIII., 
A. 1). 

Second Article, 
whether fortitude is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. 
For it is written (Wis. viii. 7) : She teacheth temperance, 
and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where the text 
has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is 
common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general 
virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) : Fortitude is 
not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honour of the 
virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an 
inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of 
dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding 
covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue; and he says 
the same further on in connexion with other vices. Now 
this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude 
is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude would seem to derive its name 
from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand 
firm, as stated in Ethic, ii. Therefore fortitude is a general 
virtue. 

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxii.) numbers it among 
the other virtues. 



197 FORTITUDE Q 123 Art. 2 

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4), 
the term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as 
simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense 
it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, 
since as the Philosopher states {Ethic, ii), it is requisite 
for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, 
fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing 
and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult 
to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore 
Tully says (Rhet. ii.), that fortitude is deliberate facing of 
dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense fortitude 
is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special 
matter. 

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (De Ccelo 
i. 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. 
Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting 
corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, 
as stated in Met. v. 17. And since this latter meaning is 
the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme 
limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a 
general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts 
well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the 
first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a 
special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to 
stand firm against all kinds of assaults. 

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, 
as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. 
Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate 
matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he 
that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, 
is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less 
difficult. 

Reply Obj. 3. This objection takes fortitude in the first 
sense. 



Q. i2 3 . Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198 

Third Article, 
whether fortitude is about fear and daring ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear and 
daring. For Gregory says (Moral, vii. ) : The fortitude of the 
just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, 
to quench the lusts of the present life. Therefore fortitude 
seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and 
daring. 

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.), that it 
belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But 
this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and 
daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external 
dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring. 

Obj. 3. Further, Not only daring, but also hope, is opposed 
to fear, as stated above (I .-II., Q. XLV., A. 1, ad 2) in the 
treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be 
about daring any more than about hope. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, ii. 7; iii. 9) 
that fortitude is about fear and daring. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the 
virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws 
the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn 
from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, 
which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, 
as stated above (I. -II., Q. XLIL, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on 
passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult 
thi ngs, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. 
And it behoves one not only firmly to bear the assault of 
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately 
to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel 
them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the 
future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. 
Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing 
fear and moderating daring. 

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude 



199 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 3 

of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. 
Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to tem- 
perance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which 
pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by 
saying: To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal 
reward. 

Reply Obj. 2. Dangers and toils do not withdraw the 
will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are 
an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately 
about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, 
these being the objects of those passions. 

Reply Obj. 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the 
object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is 
about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of 
approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XLV., 
A. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal 
evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's 
definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that 
fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about 
hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as 
stated above (I.-IL, Q. XLV., A. 2). 

Fourth Article, 
whether fortitude is only about dangers of 

DEATH ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about 
dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv.) 
that fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake 
of the object beloved: and {Music, vi.) he says that fortitude 
is the love which dreads no hardship, not even death. There- 
fore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also 
about other afflictions. 

Obj. 2. Further, All the passions of the soul need to be 
reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other 
virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not 
only about fear of death, but also about other fears. 



Q. 123. Art 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200 

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is about extremes. But fear 
of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, 
as stated in Ethic, hi. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is 
not about fear of death. 

On the contrary, Andronicus says that fortitude is a virtue 
of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of 
death. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the 
virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn 
from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now 
it behoves one to hold firmly the good of reason against 
every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent 
to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must 
be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason 
in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm 
against great things, will in consequence stand firm against 
less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to 
the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme : 
and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does 
away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De 
Morib. Eccl. xxii.) that the soul is shaken by its fellow body, 
with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed 
with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed. There- 
fore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of 
death. 

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner 
of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply 
through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through 
bearing well even the greatest evils ; while through bearing 
others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense. 

Reply Obj. a. Since fear is born of love, any virtue 
that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence 
moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which 
moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates 
the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with tem- 
perance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is 
natural : and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying 
the fear of death. 



201 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 5 

Reply Obj. 3. In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding 
right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in 
accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue. 



Fifth Article. 

whether fortitude is properly about dangers 
of death in battle ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly about 
dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are 
commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not com- 
mended in connexion with . battle. Therefore fortitude is 
not properly about dangers of death in battle. 

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) that fortitude 
is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters : and Tully 
(De Offic. i.), under the heading, ' That it pertains to forti- 
tude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,' says: 
Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater 
importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be 
qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are 
many things in civil life that are more important and more 
glorious than those connected with war. Now greater forti- 
tude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not 
properly concerned with death in battle. 

Obj. 3. Further, War is directed to the preservation of 
a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. 
Dei xix.) that wars are waged in order to insure peace. 
Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to 
the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country, 
since this same peace is the occasion of much licence in 
morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude 
is not about the danger of death in battle. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that 
fortitude is chiefly about death in battle. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 4), fortitude streng- 
thens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is 
that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue ; and it is essential 



Q.i2 3 .Art. 5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 202 

to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to 
pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger 
of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, 
storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not 
seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. 
On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in 
battle come to man directly on account of some good, 
because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just 
fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is 
the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle ; 
secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or 
even private individual does not refrain from giving a just 
judgement through fear of the impending sword, or any 
other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs 
to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, 
not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as 
occur in singular combat, which may be called by the 
general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted 
that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring 
in battle. 

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger 
of any other kind of death ; especially since man may be in 
danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus 
may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear 
of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey 
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck 
or robbers. 

Reply Obj. 1. Martyrs face the fight that is waged against 
their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign 
good which is God ; wherefore their fortitude is praised above 
all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards 
warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been 
valiant in battle.* 

Reply Obj. 2. Personal and civil business is differentiated 
from the business of war that regards general wars. How- 
ever, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death 
arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and 
* Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34. 



203 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 6 

so with regard to these also there may be fortitude properly 
so called. 

Reply Obj. 3. The peace of the state is good in itself, nor 
does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of 
it. For there are many others who make good use of it ; and 
many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, 
are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, 
and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh. 



Sixth Article. 

whether endurance is the chief act of 
fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief act 
of fortitude. For virtue is about the difficult and the good 
(Ethic, ii. 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to 
endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of forti- 
tude. 

Obj. 2. Further, To be able to act on another seems to 
argue greater power than not to be changed by another. 
Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to 
persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes 
perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude 
to attack rather than to endure. 

Obj. 3. Further, One contrary is more distant from the 
other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely 
not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary 
to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude 
above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it 
regards attack rather than endurance. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that 
certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they 
endure affliction. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3), and according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 9), fortitude is more concerned to 
allay fear, than to moderate daring. For it is more difficult 
to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger 



Q.i2 3 .Art.6 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 204 

which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very 
nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack 
belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring- 
whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore 
the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand 
immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them. 

Reply Obj. 1. Endurance is more difficult than aggression, 
for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly 
implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, 
whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though 
one were the stronger party ; and it is more difficult to con- 
tend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because 
he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas 
the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; 
and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than 
by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length 
of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden 
movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for 
a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something 
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 8.) that 
some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; 
this is not the behaviour of a brave man. 

Reply Obj. 2. Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the 
body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely 
(fortissime) to good, the result being that it does not yield 
to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue con- 
cerns the soul rather than the body. 

Reply Obj. 3. He that endures fears not, though he is 
confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not 
present to the aggressor. 

Seventh Article. 

whether the brave man acts for the sake of 
the good of his habit ? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — 
Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act 
for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of 



205 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 7 

action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. 
Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows 
the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for 
the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his 
habit. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii.) : We 
love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold 
to counsel us to be virtuous, namely by saying that we should 
desire virtue for its own sake, without loving happiness. If 
they succeed in their endeavour, we shall surely cease to love 
virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake 
of which alone we love virtue. But fortitude is a virtue. 
Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude 
but to happiness. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv.) 
that fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake. 
Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better, 
since the end must needs be better than what is directed 
to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the 
sake of the good of his habit. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7) that 
to the brave man fortitude itself is a good: and such is an end. 

/ answer that, An end is twofold : proximate and ultimate. 
Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a 
likeness of that agent's form into something else: thus the 
end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat 
into some passive matter: and the end of the builder is to 
introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever 
good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the 
remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made 
external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, 
human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly 
we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proxi- 
mate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for 
he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his 
remote end is happiness or God. 

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections : for the 
First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a 



Q. 123. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206 

habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in 
act, as stated. The other two objections consider the 
ultimate end. 

Eighth Article, 
whether the brave man delights in his act ? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man delights in his 
act. For delight is the unhindered action of a connatural 
habit (Ethic, x. 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from 
a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore 
the brave man takes pleasure in his act. 

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. v. 22, 
But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, says that 
deeds of virtue are called fruits because they refresh man's 
mind with a holy and pure delight. Now the brave man per- 
forms acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act. 

Obj. 3. Further, The weaker is overcome by the stronger. 
Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue 
than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of 
death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes 
the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man 
does all things with pleasure. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that 
the brave man seems to have no delight in his act. 

I answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XXXI., AA. 3, 4, 5) 
where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is two- 
fold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other 
is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. 
It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, 
since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the 
principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain 
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul — for 
instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man 
loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary 
for acts of virtue, and things connected with them — but also 
to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, 
such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one 



207 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 8 

side, has something that affords him delight, namely as 
regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and 
the end thereof : while, on the other hand, he has cause for 
both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and 
for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Machab. vi. 30) that 
Eleazar said : / suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am 
well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee. 

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible 
to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious 
assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise 
the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than 
bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, 
while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that 
he felt as though he were walking on roses. 

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from 
being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight 
of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man 
prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to 
whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, ii. 3 ; iii. 9) that it is not necessary for a brave man to 
delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not 
to be sad. 

Reply Obj. 1. The vehemence of the action or passion of 
one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore 
the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man 
from feeling delight in its proper operation. 

Reply Obj. 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on 
account of their end; yet they can be painful by their 
nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. 
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that to perform 
deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in 
so far as one attains the end. 

Reply Obj. 3. In the brave man spiritual sorrow is over- 
come by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is 
more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in 
evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the 
end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of 
great bodily pain, 



Q. 123. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208 



Ninth Article. 

whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden 

occurrences ? 

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly 
with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things 
occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says 
(De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that fortitude is the deliberate facing of 
danger, and bearing of toil. Therefore fortitude does not 
deal chiefly with sudden happenings. 

Ob]. 2. Further, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.): The brave 
man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he 
takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning- 
tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his fore- 
thought, lest he should say afterwards: This befel me because I 
did not think it could possibly happen. But it is not possible 
to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. 
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with 
sudden happenings. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 8) that 
the brave man is of good hope. But hope looks forward to the 
future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. 
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with 
sudden happenings. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 8) that 
fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death. 

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the 
operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice : and 
thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences : because the 
brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that 
may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear 
them more easily: since according to Gregory {Horn. xxv. 
in Ev.), the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we 
are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed 
with the shield of foreknowledge. The other thing to be con- 
sidered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the 



209 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 10 

virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about 
sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher 
(Ethic, iii. 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in 
sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. 
Wherefore if a person without forethought does that 
which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account 
of some sudden ganger, this is a very strong proof that 
habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind. 

Yet is it possible for a person, even without the habit of 
fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long fore- 
thought : in the same way as a brave man prepares himself 
when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objec- 
tions. 

Tenth Article. 

whether the brave man makes use of anger in 

his action ? 

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use 
anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instru- 
ment of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now 
man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay 
it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De 
Memoria ii.), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does 
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man 
should not employ anger for his action. 

Obj. 2. Further, If a man is competent to do a thing by 
himself, he should not seek the assistance of something 
weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent 
to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is 
impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i.) : Reason by 
itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also 
to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason 
to seek help from anger P the steadfast from the unstaid, the 
trusty from the untrustworthy , the healthy from the sick ? 
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger. 

Obj. 3. Further, Just as people are more earnest in doing 
deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account 

11. ii. 4 14 



Q. 123. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210 

of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic. 
iii. 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through 
sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for 
the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow 
nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should 
not employ anger. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. loc. cit.) 
that anger helps the brave. 

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIV., A. 2), 
concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference 
of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the 
Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from 
the mind of a wise or good man : whereas the Peripatetics, 
of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men 
both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified 
by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in 
their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above 
{loc. cit.), gave the name of passions to all the movements 
of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport them- 
selves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the 
command of reason, so that it may co-operate by rendering 
action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should 
employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, 
modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other 
hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immo- 
derate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they 
called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason 
severed them altogether from virtue. 

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for 
his action, but not immoderate anger. 

Reply Obj. 1. Anger that is moderated in accordance with 
reason is subject to the command of reason : so that man uses 
it at his will, which would not be the case were it immo- 
derate. 

Reply Obj. 2. Reason employs anger for its action, not as 
seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive 
appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of 
the body Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be 



2ii FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 10 

more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer 
is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a 
follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by 
him directly at Aristotle. 

Reply Obj. 3. Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), 
has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs 
anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by 
itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for 
which it employs anger rather than the other passions, 
since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, 
so that it directly co-operates with fortitude in attacking. 
On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to 
the thing that hurts ; though accidentally it helps in aggres- 
sion, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above 
(I. -II. , Q. XLVII. , A. 3), or as making a person expose himself 
to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner 
desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to 
which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet 
accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as 
one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, hi. 5) : Of all the cases in which 
fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a 
man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for 
a purpose, i.e. for a due end; this is true fortitude . 

Eleventh Article, 
whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal 
virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10) , anger is closely allied 
with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal 
passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Therefore 
neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, The object of virtue is good. But the 
direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is 
endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.). 
Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. 



Q. 123. Art. u THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212 

Obj. 3. Further, The cardinal virtues are about those 
things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a 
door turns upon a hinge {car dine). But fortitude is about 
dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human 
life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal 
or principal virtue. 

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral, xxii.), Ambrose in his 
commentary on Luke vi. 20, and Augustine (De Moribus 
Eccl. xv.), number fortitude among the four cardinal or 
principal virtues. 

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., 0. LXL, AA. 3, 4), 
those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have 
a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in 
common. And among other conditions of virtue in general 
one is that it is stated to act steadfastly, according to Ethic, ii. 4. 
Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfast- 
ness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more 
praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. 
Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accor- 
dance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the dis- 
pleasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly 
than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36) : 
There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires 
pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts 
are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain. 
And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are 
mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them 
that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a 
cardinal virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Daring and anger do not co-operate with 
fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness 
is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave 
man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above 
(I.-II.,Q. XXV., A. 4). 

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue is directed to the good of reason 
which it behoves to safeguard against the onslaught of 
evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body, as 
contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, 
as the end, which it intends to safeguard. 



213 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 12 

Reply Obj. 3. Though dangers of death are of rare occur- 
rence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, 
since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on 
account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adver- 
saries. 

Twelfth Article, 
whether fortitude excels among all other 

VIRTUES ? 

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all other 
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offtc. i) : Fortitude is higher, 
so to speak, than the rest. 

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is about that which is difficult 
and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. 
Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, the person of a man is more excellent 
than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's 
person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of 
death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other 
moral virtues are about other and external things. There- 
fore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues. 

Obj. 4. On the contrary, Tully says (DeOjfic. i.): Justice is 
the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good 
man. 

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i. 19): Those 
virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to 
others. Now liberality seems to be more useful than forti- 
tude. Therefore it is a greater virtue. 

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi.), In things 
that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good: wherefore 
the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is 
man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.) Prudence, 
since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: 
while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice 
to establish the order of reason in all human affairs : whereas 
the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they 
moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from 



Q. 123. Art. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214 

reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude 
holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the 
greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason : 
and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures 
of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. 
Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and 
the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles 
thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence 
ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance 
fourth, and after these the other virtues. 

Reply Obj. 1. Ambrose places fortitude before the other 
virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch 
as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to 
civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (ibid.): 
Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher so to 
speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil 
matters. 

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue essentially regards the good rather 
than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is 
measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty. 

Reply Obj. 3. A man does not expose his person to dangers 
of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore 
the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on 
justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) that fortitude 
without justice is an occasion of injustice ; since the stronger 
a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker. 

The Fourth argument is granted. 

Reply Obj. 5. Liberality is useful in conferring certain 
particular favours : whereas a certain general utility attaches 
to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. 
Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i. 9) that just and brave 
men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and 
peace. 



QUESTION CXXIV. 

OF MARTYRDOM. 
(In Five Articles). 

We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there 
are rive points of inquiry: (i) Whether martyrdom is an act 
of virtue ? (2) Of what virtue is it the act ? (3) Concerning 
the perfection of this act: (4) The pain of martyrdom: 
(5) Its cause. 

First Article, 
whether martyrdom is an act of virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of 
virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyr- 
dom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the 
Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom 
Hilary says (Super Matth. i.) that they attained the ripe age 
of eternity through the glory of martyrdom. Therefore 
martyrdom is not an act of virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. 
Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. LXIV., 
A. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i.) that during persecution 
certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened 
their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their 
lives, and their martyrdom is honoured in the Catholic Church 
with most solemn veneration. Therefore martyrdom is not 
an act of virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do 
an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court 

215 



Q. 124. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 216 

martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and 
rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue. 

On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save 
to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it 
is written (Matth. v. 10) : Blessed are they that suffer persecu- 
tion for justice sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 
Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue. 

J answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL. AA. 1, 3), 
it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. 
Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper 
object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above 
(Q. CIX., AA. 1, 2; Q. CXXIIL, A. 12). And martyrdom 
consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice 
against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident 
that martyrdom is an act of virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that in the case of the 
Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously ac- 
celerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. 
Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is 
better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by 
God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire 
by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for 
Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just 
as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is 
conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal 
grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit 
of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of 
the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon 
on the Epiphany (De Diver sis lxvi.), as though he were 
addressing them : A man that does not believe that children 
are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being 
crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough 
to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body 
wherein you could endure suffering for Christ Who was to suffer. 

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says (loc. cit.) that possibly the 
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine 
authority thus to honour the memory of those holy women* 

* Cf. Q. LXIV., A. i,ad2. 



217 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 2 

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of the Law are about acts of 
virtue. Now it has been stated above (Q. CVIII. , A. 1, ad 4) 
that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be 
understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in 
the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and 
such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way 
certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the 
preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a 
man should act according to reason. And this observation 
would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, 
which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly 
inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of 
acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to 
endure it in moderation. 



Second Article, 
whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of 
fortitude. For the Greek /xdprvp signifies a witness. Now 
witness is borne to the faith of Christ, according to Acts i. 8, 
You shall be witnesses unto Me, etc., and Maximus says in a 
sermon: The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which 
those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood. Therefore 
martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, A praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the 
virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and 
without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the 
chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a 
sermon: The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs. 
Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyr- 
dom, according to John xv. 13, Greater love than this no man 
hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Moreover 
without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 
1 Cor. xiii. 3, // / should deliver my body to be burned, and 
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore martyr- 
dom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude. 



Q. 124. Art, 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on S. Cyprian: 
It is easy to honour a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a 
great thing to imitate his faith and patience. Now that which 
calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which 
it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience 
rather than of fortitude. 

On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart, et Conf. ii.): 
Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you ? Most 
valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength 
of your courage ? Now a person is praised on account of 
the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom 
is an act of fortitude. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 1, seq.), 
it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of 
virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers 
of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. 
Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strength- 
ened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice 
notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the 
imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular 
contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a 
sermon (loc. cit.): The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an 
unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted 
in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine. Wherefore 
it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude ; for which 
reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs : They 
became valiant in battle. * 

Reply Obj. 1. Two things must be considered in the act of 
fortitude. One is the good wherein the brave man is 
strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude ; the other is 
the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the 
contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in 
this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic 
fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for 
the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, 
so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good 

* Heb. xi. 34. 



219 MARTYRDOM Q. 124, Art. 3 

of Divine justice, which is through faith in Christ Jesus, 
according to Rom. hi. 22. Thus martyrdom is related to 
faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude 
as the eliciting habit. 

Reply Obj. 2. Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, 
as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue com- 
manding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being 
its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. 
Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and 
of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests 
both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, 
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails 
not without charity. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIII. . A. 6), the chief 
act of fortitude is endurance : to this and not to its secondary 
act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since 
patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. 
endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their 
patience. 

Third Article. 

whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest 

perfection ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the 
greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter 
of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because, 
to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem 
that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle 
says (Rom. x. 10), With the heart we believe unto justice, but 
with the mouth confession is made unto salvation, and it is 
written (1 John iii. 16), that we ought to lay down our lives 
for the brethren. Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to 
perfection. 

Obj. 2. Further, It seems to point to greater perfection 
that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, 
than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom : 
wherefore Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedience is 



Q. 124. art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220 

preferable to all sacrifices. Therefore martyrdom is not 
an act of the greatest perfection. 

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem better to do good to others 
than to maintain oneself in good, since the good of the nation 
is better than the good of the individual, according to the 
Philosopher {Ethic, i. 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom 
profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to 
many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects 
is more perfect than the act of martyrdom. 

On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin, xlvi.) prefers 
martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. 
Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the 
highest degree. 

/ answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two 
ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as 
compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this 
way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of 
death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because 
endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so 
far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of 
virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of 
virtue being the end is better. 

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in 
comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love 
of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to 
belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says 
(Col. hi. 14), that charity . . . is the bond of perfection. Now, 
of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the 
perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is 
proved to be so much the greater, according as that which 
he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he 
chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident 
that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself 
most, and on the other hand he hates death more than any- 
thing, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of 
bodily torment, from fear of which even dumb animals 
refrain from the greatest pleasures, as Augustine observes 
(QQ. LXXXIIL, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is 



221 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 3 

clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts 
in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest 
charity, according to John. xv. 13: Greater love than this 
no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. 

Reply Obj. 1. There is no act of perfection, which is a 
matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of 
precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine 
declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii.) that a man is under the 
obligation of observing continency, through the absence 
or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the 
perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary 
for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary 
for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many 
holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly 
love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. 
As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring 
to the preparation of the mind. 

Reply Obj. 2. Martyrdom embraces the highest possible 
degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we 
read of Christ (Phil. ii. 8) that He became obedient unto 
death. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself 
more perfect than obedience considered absolutely. 

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers martyrdom accord- 
ing to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no 
excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is 
fortitude more excellent than all virtues. 

Fourth Article. , 
whether death is essential to martyrdom ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to martyr- 
dom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption 
(Epist. ad Paul, et Eustoch.) : I should say rightly that the 
Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended 
her days in peace: and Gregory says (Horn. iii. in Ev.): 
Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet 
the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even 



Q. 124. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222 

if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we 
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit 
Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death. 

Obj. 2. Further, We read of certain women as commended 
for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity 
of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity 
is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the 
integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened 
in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes 
and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr 
should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity 
of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she 
were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also 
Lucy said: If thou causest me to be violated against my will., 
my chastity will gain me a twofold crown. 

Obj. 3. Further, Martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But 
it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other 
hardships, as Augustine declares {Music, vi.). Now there are 
many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer 
for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped 
of one's goods, as mentioned in Heb. x. 34, for which reason 
we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, 
notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is 
not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death. 

Obj. 4. Further, Martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated 
above (A. 2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious 
act after death. Therefore it is before death; and con- 
sequently death is not essential to martyrdom. 

On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs 
that in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been 
vanquished in living without faith. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called 
as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us 
to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, 
as stated in Heb. xi. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom 
that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed 
that he despises all things present, in order to obtain in- 
visible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the 



223 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 4 

life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises 
all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise 
both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer 
bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified 
against Job (Job ii. 4): Skin for skin, and all that a man 
hath he will give for his soul (Douay, — life) i.e. for the life 
of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom 
requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake. 

Reply Obj. 1. The authorities quoted, and the like that 
one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of simili- 
tude. 

Reply Obj. 2. When a woman forfeits the integrity of the 
flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the 
Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers 
this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through con- 
tempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her 
testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently 
this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of 
God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed 
worthy of a reward, as Lucy said. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (O. CXXIII., AA. 4, 5), 
fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers 
consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr 
merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture 
of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death. 

Reply Obj. 4. The merit of martyrdom is not after death, 
but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the 
fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It 
happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time 
after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after 
suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship 
inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. 
The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in 
this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these 
hardships. 



Q. 124. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224 



Fifth Article. 

whether faith alone is the cause of 
martyrdom ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that faith alone is the cause of 
martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. iv. 15, 16): Let none 
of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter 
of other men's things. But if as a Christian, let him not be 
ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name. Now a man 
is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. 
Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom 
to those who suffer. 

Obj. 2. Further, A martyr is a kind of witness. But 
witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called 
a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for 
witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be 
a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry 
or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. 
Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. 

Obj. 3. Further, Those virtuous deeds would seem to be 
of most account which are directed to the common good, 
since the good of the nation is better than the good of the indi- 
vidual, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, i. 2). If, then, 
some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would 
seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for 
the defence of their country. Yet this is not consistent 
with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyr- 
dom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone 
is the cause of martyrdom. 

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 10): Blessed are 
they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, which pertains 
to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's 
commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also 
the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other 
virtues can be the cause of martyrdom. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so 



225 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 5 

called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body 
unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to 
any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with 
godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore 
Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is 
the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom 
is the truth of faith. 

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, 
but also outward profession, which is expressed not only 
by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, 
whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to 
James ii. 18, I will show thee, by works, my faith. Hence it 
is written of certain people (Tit. i. 16) : They profess that they 
know God but in their works they deny Him. Thus all virtuous 
deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions 
of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires 
these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way 
they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the 
Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the 
Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the 
faith, but for reproving adultery. 

Reply Obj. 1. A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a 
person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith 
in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds 
by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. viii. 9, If any man 
have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His; and again 
because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to 
Gal. v. 24, They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh 
with the vices and concupiscences. Hence to suffer as a 
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, 
which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any 
good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because 
this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith. 

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of other sciences has no connexion 
with the worship of the Godhead : hence it is not called truth 
according to godliness, and consequently the confession 
thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. 
Yet, since every he is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., AA. 3, 4), 

11. ii. 4 15 



Q. i2 4 .Art. 5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 226 

avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, 
may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin 
against the Divine Law 

Reply Obj. 3. The good of one's country is paramount 
among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the 
proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human 
good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, 
for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any 
human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the 
cause of martyrdom. 



QUESTION CXXV. 

OF FEAR.* 

(In Four Articles). 

We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: 
(i) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring. 

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: 
(1) Whether fear is a sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to 
fortitude ? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether 
it excuses from sin, or diminishes it ? 

First Article, 
whether fear is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a 
passion, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIII. , A. 4: Q. XLII.) 
Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated 
in Ethic, ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems 
that fear is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing that is commanded in the 
Divine Law is a sin : since the law of the Lord is unspotted 
(Ps. xviii. 8). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is 
written (Eph. vi. 5) : Servants, be obedient to them that are 
your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling. 
Therefore fear is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, 
for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De 

* S. Thomas calls this vice indifferently fear or timidity. The 
translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the 
connexion with the passion of fear. Otherwise cowardice would be a 
better rendering. 

227 



Q. 125. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228 

Fide Orthod. iii.). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 7) that a man would be 
insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes 
nor deluges, inspired him with fear. Therefore fear is not a 
sin. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. x. 28) : Fear ye 
not them that kill the body, and it is written (Ezech. ii. 6) : 
Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words. 

I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account 
of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act 
consists in order, as stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: Q. CXIV., 
A. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject 
to the ruling of reason . And reason dictates that certain things 
should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to 
be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more 
than others ; and among things to be sought after, that some 
are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more 
a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to 
be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain 
goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be 
avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the 
reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit 
others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and 
sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to 
shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is 
neither inordinate nor sinful. 

Reply Obj. 1. Fear in its generic acceptation denotes 
avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include 
the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every 
other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions 
call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither 
praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only 
those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner. 

Reply Obj. 2. The fear which the Apostle inculcates is 
in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear 
lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters. 

Reply Obj. 3. Reason dictates that we should shun the 
evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which 
profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them. 



229 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art 2 

Second Article, 
whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary 
to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, 
as stated above (Q. CXXIIL, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear 
is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on 
Ps. cxxvii. 1, Blessed are all they that fear the Lord, says that 
it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, 
or to lose worldly goods. Again a gloss on Matth. xxvii. 44, 
He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word, says that 
evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of 
contempt. Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to 
fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, The chief reason why a man is com- 
mended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger 
of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death 
through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates 
(De Civ. Dei i.) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar's slave, 
gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears 
a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed 
thereto. 

Obj. 3. Further, All despair arises from fear. But 
despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated 
above (Q. XX., A. 1 ; I.-IL, Q. XL., A. 4). Neither therefore is 
the sin of fear opposed to fortitude. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7; iii. 7) states 
that timidity is opposed to fortitude. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3: I.-IL, 
Q. XLIIL, A. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears 
save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is 
not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but 
ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every 
virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while 
inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate 
love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner 



Q. 125. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230 

inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous 
man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss 
of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that 
which has the danger of death for its object, as we find 
proved in Ethic, iii. 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of 
this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of 
death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomasti- 
cally* opposed to fortitude. 

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to inordinate 
fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to 
various virtues. 

Reply Obj. 2. Human acts are estimated chiefly with refer- 
ence to the end, as stated above (I. -II., Q. I., A. 3: Q. XVIII., 
A. 6) : and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to 
danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who 
exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from 
slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary 
to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7), 
that to die in order to escape poverty, want, or something 
disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for 
to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I. -II., Q., XLV., A. 2), fear 
is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning 
of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs 
daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other 
hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not 
follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any 
kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. 
Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another 
kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is 
opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the 
argument does not prove. 

* Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the 
general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: 
and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to 
denote inordinate fear of the danger of death. 



231 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art 3 

Third Article, 
whether fear is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, 
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. XXIII., A. 1), fear is in the irascible 
faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is 
none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I.-IL, 
Q. LXXIV., A. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every mortal sin turns the heart wholly 
from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges vii. 3, 
Whosoever is fearful, etc., says that a man is fearful when 
he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly 
terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage. 
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Mortal sin is a lapse not only from 
perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make 
one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a 
gloss on Deut. xx. 9, What man is there that is fearful and 
fainthearted ? says: We learn from this that no man can take 
%p the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he, 
still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches. Therefore fear is 
not a mortal sin. 

On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell 
due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to 
Apoc. xxi. 8, But the fearful and unbelieving and the abomin- 
able, etc., shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire 
and brimstone which is the second death. Therefore fear is a 
mortal sin. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through 
being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what 
ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now some- 
times this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive 
appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's 
consent : and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial 
sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches 
to the rational appetite which is called the will, which 



Q. MS- Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 232 

deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason : 
and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, some- 
times a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger 
of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to 
do what is forbidden, or L o omit what is commanded by the 
Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin : otherwise it is a venial 
sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers fear as confined 
to the sensuality. 

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss also can be understood as referring 
to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or 
better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his 
whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. 
Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen never- 
theless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot 
be persuaded to put fear aside : thus sometimes a man sins 
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned 
aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing. 

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man 
aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment 
of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Suchlike 
fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and some- 
times it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable 
cause for fear. 

Fourth Article, 
whether fear excuses from sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. 
For fear is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not 
excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore 
fear does not excuse from sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, If any fear excuses from sin, most of all 
would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the 
saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, 
seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of 
necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. 
Therefore fear does not excuse from sin. 



233 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art. 4 

Obj. 3. Further, All fear is of evil, either temporal or 
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, 
because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one 
from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from 
sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 6) one 
should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not 
a result of one's own wickedness. Therefore it seems that 
in no sense does fear excuse from sin. 

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I., Q. I., Cap. 
Constat.): A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly 
ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so 
far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason 
judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. 
Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned 
in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: 
thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss 
of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from 
sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give 
something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin 
were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom 
he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through 
fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason 
are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according 
to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly 
excused from sin, because suchlike fear would be inordinate. 
Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils 
of the body ; and evils of the body more than evils of external 
things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, 
namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as 
blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of 
money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order 
to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused 
from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, 
for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because 
when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity 
of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 1) 
says that these things that are done through fear are not 



Q. 125. Aet. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234 

simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and in- 
voluntary. 

Reply Obj. 1. Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinful- 
ness, but in the point of its involuntariness. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although death comes, of necessity, to all, 
yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and conse- 
quently an object of fear. 

Reply Obj. 3. According to the opinion of Stoics, who held 
temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in con- 
sequence that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that 
therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to 
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii.) these temporal things are 
goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion 
of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to 
be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake 
to renounce that which is good according to virtue. 






QUESTION CXXVI. 

OF FEARLESSNESS. 
(In Two Articles). 

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness : under which 
head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a 
sin to be fearless ? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude ? 

First Article, 
whether fearlessness is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For 
that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not 
a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov. 
xxviii. 1): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread. 
Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear. 

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is so fearful as death, according 
to the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 6). Yet one ought not to fear 
even death, according to Matth. x. 28, Fear ye not them that 
kill the body, etc, nor anything that can be inflicted by man, 
according to Isa. li. 12, Who art thou, that thou shouldst be 
afraid of a mortal man ? Therefore it is not a sin to be 
fearless. 

Obj. 3. Further, Fear is born of love, as stated above 
(Q. CXXV., A. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of 
virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine 
(De Civ. Dei xiv.), the love of God to the abasement of self 
makes us citizens of the heavenly city. Therefore it is seem- 
ingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly. 

235 



Q. 126. Art. 1 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 236 

On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 2) 
that he feared not God nor regarded man. 

I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly 
judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of 
that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which 
results from the love of temporal goods. And every man 
has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and 
whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, 
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, 
but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence 
it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, 
to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, 
one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is 
natural cannot be wholly lost : for which reason the Apostle 
says (Eph. v. 29) : No man ever hated his own flesh. Where- 
fore even those that slay themselves do so from love of 
their own flesh, which they desire to free from present 
stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and 
other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that 
he loves them* less than he ought. But that he fear none 
of these things cannot result from an entire lack of lcve, 
but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him 
to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. 
This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on 
self and despising others, according to the saying of 
Job xli. 24, 25: He (Vulg., — who) was made to fear no one, 
he beholdeth every high thing : and sometimes it happens 
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iii. 7) that the Celts., through lack of intelligence, fear 
nothing.^ It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, 
whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dulness 
of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be 
invincible. 

* Viz., the contrary goods. One would expect se instead of ea. 
We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less 
than he ought. 

t "A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there 
were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, 
as is said to be the case with the Celts." 



237 FEARLESSNESS Q. 126. Art. 2 

Reply Obj. 1. The just man is praised for being without 
fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether 
fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. i. 28) : He that is without 
fear cannot be justified. 

Reply Obj. 2. Death and whatever else can be inflicted 
by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us 
forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man 
in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards 
the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written 
(Prov. xiv. 16): A wise man feareth and declineth from evil. 

Reply Obj. 3. Temporal goods are to be despised as 
hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same 
score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written 
(Ecclus. xxxiv. 16) : He that feareth the Lord shall tremble 
at nothing. But temporal goods are not to be despised, 
in so far as they are helping us instrument ally to attain 
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love. 

Second Article, 
whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to 
fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no 
act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since 
if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring 
to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to forti- 
tude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Fearlessness is a vice, either through 
lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of 
folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride 
is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. 
Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. 

Obj. 3. Further, Vices are opposed to virtue and extremes 
to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the 
one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on 
the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearless- 
ness is not opposed thereto. 



Q. 126. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238 

On the contrary, The Philosopher {Ethic, iii.) reckons 
fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3), fortitude 
is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral 
virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which 
it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man 
should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that 
he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so 
forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either 
by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is 
opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man 
fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fear- 
lessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far 
as a man fears not what he ought to fear. 

Reply Obj. 1. The act of fortitude is to endure death 
without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but accord- 
ing to reason: this the fearless man does not do. 

Reply Obj. 2. Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts 
the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude 
directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it 
from being opposed to other virtues. 

Reply Obj. 3. The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude 
by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. 
Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there 
is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes 
in different respects. 



QUESTION CXXVII. 

OF DARING.* 

(In Two Articles). 

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are 
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether daring is a sin? 
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude ? 

First Article, 
whether daring is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is 
written (Job. xxxix. 21) concerning the horse, by which 
according to Gregory (Moral, xxxi.) the godly preacher is 
denoted, that he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men* But 
no vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin 
to be daring. 

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, vi. 9), 
one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has 
been counselled. But daring helps this quickness in doing* 
Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy. 

Obj. 3. Further, Daring is a passion caused by hope, as 
stated above (I. -II., Q. XLV., A. 2) when we were treating 
of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a 
virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a 
sin. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. viii. 18) : Go not on 
the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils. Now 

* Excessive daring or foolhardiness. 

t Vulg., — he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men. 

239 



Q. 127. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240 

no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. 
Therefore daring is a sin. 

J answer that, Daring, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIII. , 
A. 1: Q. LV.), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes 
moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks 
moderation, either by caress or by deficiency, and on this 
account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the 
passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, 
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive 
anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring 
as implying excess is accounted a sin. 

Reply Oh 7. 1. The daring spoken of there is that which is 
moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the 
virtue of fortitude. 

Reply Obj. 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking 
counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act 
quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; 
for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to 
prudence, as stated above (Q. LVIIL, A. 3). Wherefore 
daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy 
as it is directed by reason. 

Reply Obj. 3. Some vices are unnamed, and so also 
are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks {Ethic. ii, 7; 
iv. 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be 
applied to certain vices and virtues : and in order to designate 
vices we employ especially the names of those passions the 
object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger 
and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, 
and so we use them rather to designate virtues. 



Second Article, 
whether daring is opposed to fortitude? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to forti- 
tude. For excess of daring seems to result from presump- 
tion of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is 



241 DARING Q. 127. Art. 2 

opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to 
humility rather than to fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Daring does not seem to call for blame, 
except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring 
person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others 
whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But 
this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as 
designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to 
justice. 

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is concerned about fear and 
daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3). Now since 
timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of 
fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of 
a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the 
point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed 
to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such 
vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice 
in opposition to fortitude. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and 
Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to 
fortitude. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVL, A. 2), it belongs 
to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter 
about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that 
denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is 
opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now 
daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, 
and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is 
evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is 
concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIL, 

A. 3)- 

Reply Obj. 1. Opposition between vice and virtue does not 
depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's 
very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring 
be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its 
cause. 

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the direct opposition of a vice does 
not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its 

11. ii. 4 16 



Q. 127. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 242 

effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Where- 
fore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this. 

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of daring consists in a man 
taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to 
him : and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as 
such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from 
that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no 
contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does 
not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as 
the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7), the daring are precipitate 
and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present, 
namely through fear. 



QUESTION CXXVIII. 

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE. 

We must now consider the parts of fortitude : first we shall 
consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we 
shall treat of each part. 

Article. 

whether the parts of fortitude are suitably 

assigned ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection i. It seems that the parts of fortitude are 
unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) assigns 
four parts to fortitude, namely magnificence, confidence, 
patience, and perseverance. Now magnificence seems to 
pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about 
money, and a magnificent man must needs be liberal, 
as the Philosopher observes {Ethic, iv. 2). But liberality 
is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. CXVIL, A. 5). There- 
fore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as 
hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, 
but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should 
not be reckoned a part of fortitude. 

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude makes a man behave aright 
in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not 
essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they 
are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude. 

Obj. 4. Further, According to Tully (loc. cit.) patience 
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same 
to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude 
and not a part thereof. 

243 



Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244 

Obj. 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue 
should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But 
perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written 
(Matth. xxiv. 13) : He that shall persevere to the end he 
shall be saved. Therefcre perseverance should not be 
accounted a part of fortitude. 

Obj. 6. Further, Macrobius {De Somn. Scip. i.) reckons 
seven parts of fortitude, namely magnanimity, confidence, 
security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability. 
Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, 
and these are, courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manli- 
ness, perseverance, magnificence. Therefore it seems that 
Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete. 

Obj. 7. Further, Aristotle {Ethic, iii.) reckons five parts of 
fortitude. The first is civic fortitude, which produces 
brave deeds through fear of dishonour or punishmen 
the second is military fortitude, which produces brave deeds 
as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the 
fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, 
especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a 
man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; 
the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely 
through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds 
of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above 
enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts 
of fortitude are unfitting. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue 
can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and 
potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot 
have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several 
specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special 
matter. 

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts 
assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things 
the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude ; 
and potential parts, because what fortitude practises in face 
of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain 
other virtues practise in the matter of certain minor hard- 



245 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128 

ships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary 
virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. CXXIII- 
AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and 
endurance. Now two things are required for the act of 
aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, 
and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. 
In this respect Tully mentions confidence, of which he says 
(loc. cit.) that with this the mind is much assured and firmly 
hopeful in great and honourable undertakings. The second 
regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in 
not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In 
this respect Tully mentions magnificence, which he describes 
as being the discussion and administration, i.e., accomplish- 
ment of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad 
and noble purpose of mind, so as to combine execution with 
greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined 
to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of 
death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because 
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they 
be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they 
will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed 
thereto as secondary virtues to principal : thus magnificence 
is referred by the Philosopher {Ethic, iv.) to great expenses, 
and magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence, 
to great honours. Again, two things are requisite for the 
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the 
mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its great- 
ness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this 
respect he mentions patience, which he describes as the volun- 
tary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for 
the sake of virtue or profit. The other is that by the prolonged 
suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose 
courage, according to Heb. xii. 3., That you be not wearied, 
fainting in your minds. In this respect he mentions per- 
severance, which accordingly he describes as the fixed and 
continued persistence in a well considered purpose. If these 
two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they 
will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred 



Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 246 

to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from 
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal. 

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence in the matter of liberality 
adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion 
of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that 
is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this 
respect, it belongs. 

Reply Obj. 2. Hope whereby one confides in God is 
accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. XVII., 
A. 5; I. -II., Q. LXIL, A. 3). But by confidence which 
here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, 
yet under God withal. 

Reply Obj. 3. To venture on anything great seems to 
involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. 
Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are 
referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other 
great things, they have a certain connexion with fortitude 
by reason of the imminent danger. 

Reply Obj. 4. Patience endures not only dangers of 
death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive 
sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In 
this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: 
but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part 
thereof. 

Reply Obj. 5. Perseverance as denoting persistence in a 
good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every 
virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense 
stated in the body of the Article. 

Reply Obj. 6. Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid 
mentioned by Tully, namely confidence, magnificence, 
forbearance, which he puts in the place of patience, and 
firmness, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he 
adds three, two of which, namely magnanimity and security, 
are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But 
Macrobius is more specific in. his enumeration. Because 
confidence denotes a man's hope for great things : and hope 
for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to 
great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. 



247 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128 

For it has been stated above (I. -II., Q. XL., A. 2) that hope 
presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for. 

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the 
certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magni- 
tude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness 
unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's 
own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on 
account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat 
contrary to hope, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XL., A. 4, ad 1). 
Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He 
adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised 
under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnifi- 
cence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason 
Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplish- 
ing great things, but also in discussing them generously 
in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, 
so that one may be called persevering through not desisting 
on account of delays, and constant through not desisting 
on account of any other obstacles. 

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount 
to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius 
he mentions perseverance and magnificence, and with Macro- 
bius, magnanimity. Strength of will is the same as patience 
or forbearance, for he says that strength of will is a habit 
that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, 
and to endure what reason says should be endured — i.e. good 
courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines 
it as strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose. 
Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says 
that manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of 
virtue. Besides magnificence he mentions dv8paya6la, 
i.e. manly goodness which we may render strenuousness. 
For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the 
accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, 
but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude 
to that accomplishment, and this belongs to avSpayaOla, 
strenuousness: wherefore he says that dvSpayadia is the 
virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works. 



Q. i28 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 248 

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be 
reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully. 

Reply Obj. 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short 
of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the 
act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above 
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned 
parts but modes of fortitude. 



QUESTION CXXIX. 

OF MAGNANIMITY.* 
(In Eight Articles). 

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, 
including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by 
Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall 
substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accord- 
ingly we shall consider (i) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; 
(3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we 
shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. 

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: 
(1) Whether magnanimity is about honours ? (2) Whether 
magnanimity is only about great honours ? (3) Whether 
it is a virtue ? (4) Whether it is a special virtue ? (5) Whether 
it is a part of fortitude ? (6) Of its relation to confidence : 
(7) Of its relation to assurance : (8) Of its relation to goods 
of fortune. 

First Article. 

whether magnanimity is about honours ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about 
honours. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as 
its very name shows, since magnanimity signifies greatness 
of mind, and mind denotes the irascible part, as appears 
from De Anima iii. 42, where the Philosopher says that in 
the sensitive appetite are desire and mind, i.e. the concupis- 
cible and irascible parts. But honour is a concupiscible 

* Not in the ordinary restricted sense, but as explained by the 
author. 

249 



Q. 129. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 250 

good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems 
that magnanimity is not about honours. 

Obj. 2. Further, Sine** magnanimity is a moral virtue, it 
must needs be about either passions or operations. Now 
it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of 
justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But 
honour is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not 
about honours. 

Obj. 3. Further, The nature of magnanimity seems to 
regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be 
magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the 
virtuous are praised not for desiring honours, but for shun- 
ning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honours. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that 
magnanimity is about honour and dishonour. 

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes 
stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue 
bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about 
which it is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, 
which consists in the right use of such matter. And since 
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man 
is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to 
do some great act. 

Now an act may be called great in two ways : in one way 
proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be 
called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of 
some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a 
very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely 
great when it consists in the best use of the greatest 
thing. 

The things which come into man's use are external things, 
and among these honour is the greatest simply, both because 
it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a 
person's virtue, as stated above (Q. OIL, AA. 1, 2); and 
because it is offered to God and to the best; and again 
because, in order to obtain honour even as to avoid shame, 
men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be 
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely 



251 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. i 

and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of 
things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that 
magnanimity is about honours. 

Reply Obj. 1. Good and evil absolutely considered regard 
the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of 
difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is 
that magnanimity regards honour, inasmuch, to wit, as 
honour has the aspect of something great or difficult. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although honour is neither a passion nor an 
operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, 
which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity 
is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately 
about honour as the object of hope: even so, we have stated 
(Q. CXXIIL, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude that it is 
about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of 
fear and daring. 

Reply Obj. 3. Those are worthy of praise who despise riches 
in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain 
them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, 
one were to despise honours so as not to care to do what is 
worthy of honour, this would be deserving of blame. Ac- 
cordingly magnanimity is about honours in the sense that 
a man strives to do what is deserving of honour, yet not so 
as to think much of the honour accorded by man. 

Second Article, 
whether magnanimity is essentially about great 

HONOURS ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essentially 
about great honours. For the proper matter of magna- 
nimity is honour, as stated above (A. 1). But great and little 
are accidental to honour. Therefore it is not essential to 
magnanimity to be about great honours. 

Obj. 2. Further, Just as magnanimity is about honour, 
so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meek- 
ness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore 



Q. 129. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 252 

neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great 
honour. 

Obj. 3. Further, Small honour is less aloof from great 
honour than is dishonour. But magnanimity is well 
ordered in relation to dishonour, and consequently in relation 
to small honours also. Therefore it is not only about great 
honours. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7) that 
magnanimity is about great honours. 

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii. 
17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to under- 
stand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the 
extreme limit of that power, as stated in de Ccelo i. 116. 
Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every 
operation of that power, but in such operations as are great 
or difficult : for every power, however imperfect, can extend 
to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential 
to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated 
in Ethic, ii. 3. 

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) 
in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of 
view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it 
is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some 
particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the 
act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other 
difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve 
a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which 
moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty 
regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the 
passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius 
states (Div. Nom. iv. 4). 

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that 
the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises 
chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in 
others from the things that are the objects of the passions. 
The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, 
unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, 
which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to 



253 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 2 

reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these 
passions regard only that which is great in such passions: 
thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temper- 
ance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and 
likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other 
hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason 
arising from the external things themselves that are the 
objects of those passions : such are the love or desire of money 
or of honour. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue 
not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, 
but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things 
external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being 
necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire 
of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little 
sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large 
sums of money, namely magnificence. 

In like manner there are two virtues about honours, one 
about ordinarv honours. This virtue has no name, but 
is denominated by its extremes, which are tyiXoriixla, i.e. love 
of honour, and a(f)i\oTi/j,la, i.e. without love of honour: for 
sometimes a man is commended for loving honour, and 
sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both 
these things may be done in moderation. But with regard 
to great honours there is magnanimity. Wherefore we 
must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is 
great honour, and that a magnanimous man tends to such 
things as are deserving of honour. 

Reply Obj. 1. Great and little are accidental to honour 
considered in itself: but they make a great difference in 
their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed 
in the use of honour, for it is much more difficult to observe 
it in great than in little honours. 

Reply Obj. 2. In anger and other matters only that which 
is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this 
alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with 
riches and honours which are things existing outside the 
soul. 

Reply Obj. 3. He that makes good use of great things 



Q. 129. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 254 

is much more able to make good use of little things. Ac- 
cordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honours 
as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honours 
as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot 
sufficiently honour virtue which deserves to be honoured 
by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honours, because 
he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise 
them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like 
manner he is not cast down by dishonour, but despises it, 
since he recognizes that he does not deserve it. 

Third Article, 
whether magnanimity is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. 
For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magna- 
nimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: 
because the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the 
greatest things {Ethic, iv. 3). Therefore magnanimity is 
not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, He that has one virtue has them all, 
as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have a 
virtue without having magnanimity : since the Philosopher 
says (Ethic, iv. 3) that whosoever is worthy of little things 
and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not 
magnanimous. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue is a good quality of the mind, as 
stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). But magnanimity implies 
certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, iv. 3) of a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, 
his voice deep, and his utterance calm. Therefore magna- 
nimity is not a virtue. 

Obj. 4. Further, No virtue is opposed to another virtue. 
But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since the magnani- 
mous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others, 
according to Ethic, iv. {Inc. cit.). Therefore magnanimity is 
not a virtue. 



255 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 3 

Obj. 5. Further, The properties of every virtue are praise- 
worthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call 
for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is 
unmindful of favours; secondly, he is remiss and slow of 
action; thirdly, he employs irony* towards many; fourthly, 
he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he 
holds to the barren things rather than to those that are 
fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue. 

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men 
(2 Machab. xv. 18): Nicanor hearing of the valour of Judas' 
companions, and the greatness of courage (animi magnitudi- 
nem) with which they fought for their country, was afraid to 
try the matter by the sword. Now, only deeds of virtue are 
worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists 
in greatness of courage is a virtue. 

/ answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in 
safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is 
man's proper good. Now among external human things 
honours take precedence of all others, as stated above 
(A. 1: I. -II., Q. 11, A. 2., Obj. 3). Therefore magnanimity, 
which observes the mode of reason in great honours, is a 
virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher again says (Ethic, iv. 3), 
the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes, in so 
far as he tends to what is greatest, but in the matter of becom- 
ingness, he follows the mean, because he tends to the greatest 
things according to reason, for he deems himself worthy 
in accordance with his worth (ibid.), since his aims do not 
surpass his deserts. 

Reply Obj. 2. The mutual connexion of the virtues does 
not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent 
to practise the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act 
of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, 
but only to great men. On the other hand, as regards the 
principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues 
are connected together, since their habits reside together 
in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition 

* Cf. Q. CXI1I. 



O. i2 9 . Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 256 

thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of 
magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magna- 
nimity, whereby he is disposed to practise that act if it were 
competent to him according to his state. 

Reply Obj. 3. The movements of the body are differen- 
tiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions 
of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there 
accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. 
For quickness of movement results from a man being intent 
on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, 
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; 
these are few and require great attention, wherefore they 
call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking 
is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about 
anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are 
busy only about great things. And just as these disposi- 
tions of bodily movements are competent to the magnani- 
mous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too 
in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these 
conditions are found naturally. 

Reply Obj. 4. There is in man something great which he 
possesses through the gift of God; and something defective 
which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. 
Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself 
worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds 
from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, 
magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; 
and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such 
as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility 
makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his 
own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others 
in so far as they fall away from God's gifts : since he does not 
think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their 
sake. Yet humility makes us honour others and esteem them 
better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts 
in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. xiv. 4): 
In his sight a vile person is contemned* which indicates 

* Douay. The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth, etc. 



257 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 3 

the contempt of magnanimity, but he honoureth them that 
fear the Lord, which points to the reverential bearing of 
humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and 
humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem 
to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed accord- 
ing to different considerations. 

Reply Obj. 5. These properties in so far as they belong to a 
magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great 
praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the 
magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has 
received favours, this points to the fact that he takes no 
pleasure in accepting favours from others unless he repay 
them with yet greater favour; this belongs to the perfection 
of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in 
the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is 
said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking 
in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy 
himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, 
such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third 
place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as 
either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny 
of himself great things that are true, but because he does not 
disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of 
those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says 
(Ethic, iv. 3), it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great 
towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming 
towards the middle class. In the fourth place, it is said that 
he cannot associate with others : this means that he is not at 
home with others than his friends: because he altogether 
shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of 
mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, 
according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, 
fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed 
any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the 
virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is 
sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with 
magnanimity. 

11. ii. 4 17 



Q. 129. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 258 

Fourth Article, 
whether magnanimity is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a special 
virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. 
But the Philosopher states {Ethic, iv. 3) that whatever is 
great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous. Therefore 
magnanimity is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of different virtues are not 
ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different 
virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is 
stated in Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.) that it belongs to the magnanimous 
not to avoid reproof (which is an act of prudence), nor to act 
unjustly (which is an act of justice), that he is ready to do 
favours (which is an act of charity), that he gives his services 
readily (which is an act of liberality), that he is truthful (which 
is an act of truthfulness), and that he is not given to complain- 
ing (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity 
is not a special virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is a special ornament of 
the soul, according to the saying of Isaias (lxi. 10), He 
hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, and after- 
wards he adds, and as a bride adorned with her jewels. 
But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as 
stated in Ethic, iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general 
virtue. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7) distinguishes 
it from the other virtues. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 2), it belongs 
to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a 
determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the 
mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honours, 
as stated above (AA. 1, 2) : and honour, considered in itself, 
is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered 
in itself is a special virtue. 

Since, however, honour is the reward of every virtue, as 



259 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 4 

stated above (Q. CIIL, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason 
of its matter it regards all the virtues. 

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity is not about any kind of 
honour, but great honour. Now, as honour is due to virtue, 
so great honour is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence 
it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in 
every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy 
of great honours. 

Reply Obj. 2. Since the magnanimous tends to great 
things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve 
a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. 
Now it savours of excellence that a man is beneficent, 
generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready 
to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other 
virtues. On the other hand it is a proof of defect, that a 
man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, 
that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any 
virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth 
indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. 
Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, 
because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external 
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous 
man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are 
contrary to his excellence or greatness. 

Reply Obj. 3. Every virtue derives from its species a 
certain lustre or adornment which is proper to each virtue: 
but further adornment results from the very greatness of 
a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all 
virtues greater as stated in Ethic, iv. 3. 

Fifth Article, 
whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part of 
fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magna- 
nimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca 
says (De Quat. Virtut.): If magnanimity, which is also called 



Q. 129. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 260 

fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance: 
and Tully says (De Offic. i.): If a man is brave we expect him 
to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from decep- 
tion. Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3) says that 
a magnanimous man is not <pi\oKiv8vpo<;, that is, a lover of 
danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself 
to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common 
with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof. 

Obj. 3. Further, Magnanimity regards the great in things 
to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in 
things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import 
than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important 
virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof. 

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Soma. Scip. i.) and 
Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude. 

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXL, A. 3), a 
principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a 
general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of 
the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because 
a firm standing is necessary in every virtue, according to 
Ethic, ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues 
that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult 
to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to 
stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal 
is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter. 

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, 
wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for 
or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is con- 
firmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all 
things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any 
others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees 
with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult 
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the 
mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. 
Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because 
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal. 

Reply Obj. I. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, v. 1, 3), 



26 1 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 5 

to lack evil is looked upon as a good, wherefore not to be 
overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, 
is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great 
good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to 
magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity 
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a 
difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of 
the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnani- 
mity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7), is a distinct 
virtue from fortitude. 

Reply Obj. 2. A man is said to love danger when he 
exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be 
the mark of one who thinks many the same as great. This 
is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no 
one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a 
thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are 
truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose 
himself to danger, since he does something great in the act 
of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence 
the Philosopher says (ibid.) that the magnanimous man 
is not fjUfcpoKLvSwos, i.e. endangering himself for small 
things, but fieyaXoKlvSwos, i.e. endangering himself for 
great things. And Seneca says (De Quot. Virtut.): Thou 
wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a 
rash man, nor fear est them like a coward. For nothing makes 
the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life. 

Reply Obj. 3. Evil as such is to be avoided : and that one 
has to withstand it is accidental, in so far, to wit, as one 
has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But 
good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only 
accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the 
ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so 
essentially is always of more account than that which is 
so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is 
always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult 
in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes pre- 
cedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good 
is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in 
this particular respect. 



Q. 129. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 262 

Sixth Article, 
whether confidence belongs to magnanimity? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong to 
magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only 
in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. iii. 4, 5, 
Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that 
we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of our- 
selves. But this seems inconsistent with the idea of 
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to 
magnanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, Confidence seems to be opposed to fear, 
according to Isa. xii. 2, / will deal confidently and will not 
fear. But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. 
Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than 
to magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, Reward is not due except to virtue. 
But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. iii. 6, 
where it is said that we are the house of Christ, if we hold 
fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end. Therefore 
confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this 
is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius condivides it with 
magnanimity (De Somn. Scip. L). 

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii.) seems to substi- 
tute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the 
preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this. 

/ answer that, Confidence takes its name irom fides (faith) : 
and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. 
But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job xi. 18, 
Thou shall have confidence, hope being set before thee. Where- 
fore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man 
derives hope through believing the word of one who promises 
to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong 
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion 
about something, not only on account of another's state- 
ment, but also on account of something we observe in another, 



263 MAGNANIMITY Q. 120. Art. 6 

it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having 
something, which hope we conceive through observing 
something either in oneself — for instance, through observing 
that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long ; 
or in another, for instance, through observing that another 
is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he 
will receive help from him. 

Now it has been stated above (A. 1, 2 ad) that magnani- 
mity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Where- 
fore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope 
arising from some observation which gives one a strong 
opinion taat one will obtain a certain good, it follows that 
confidence belongs to magnanimity. 

Reply Gbj. 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3), it 
belongs tc the magnanimous to need nothing, for need is a 
mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood accord- 
ing to the mode of a man, hence he adds or scarcely anything. 
For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every 
man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human 
assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is 
sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, 
in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous 
man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of 
excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who 
are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own 
ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be con- 
fident in himself. 

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 2: 
Q. XL., A. 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope 
is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about 
the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety 
of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object 
is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, 
wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, 
however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect 
of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of 
good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly 
to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope 



Q. i2 9 . Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 264 

causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in 
consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude. 

Reply Obj. 3. Confidence, as stated above, denotes a 
certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened 
by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection 
may call for commendation of the act, so that it become 
meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of 
virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence 
cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions 
of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among ;he parts 
of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified 
with magnanimity by Tully (loc. cit.), but as an integral 
part, as stated in the preceding Question. 

Seventh Article, 
whether security belongs to magnanimity? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong to 
magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q. CXXVIIL, 
ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But 
fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security 
is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not 
belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. 
Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x.) that a man is 
said to be secure because he is without care. But this seems 
to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honourable 
things, according to 2 Tim. ii. 15, Carefully study to present 
thyself approved unto God. Therefore security does not 
belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the 
virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue is not its own reward. But 
security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to 
Job xi. 14, 18, // thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity 
that is in thy hand being buried thou shalt sleep secure. There- 
fore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any 
other virtue, as a part thereof. 



265 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 7 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) under the heading: 
Magnanimity consists of two things, that it belongs to mag- 
nanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, 
nor to fortune. But a man's security consists in this. 
Therefore security belongs to magnanimity. 

/ answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii. 5), fear 
makes a man take counsel, because, to wit, he takes care 
to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from 
the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: where- 
fore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, 
just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope 
directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards 
fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately 
to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to for- 
titude. 

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause 
of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above 
when we were treating of the passion (I. -II., Q. XLV., A. 2). 
Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in 
so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly 
to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair. 

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because 
it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it 
denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. 
Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a 
condition thereof. 

Reply Obj. 2. Not all security is worthy of praise but only 
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when 
one should not fear : in this way it is a condition of fortitude 
and of magnanimity. 

Reply Obj. 3. There is in the virtues a certain likeness 
to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above 
(I. -II., Q. V., AA. 3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain 
security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect 
security belongs to virtue's reward. 



Q. 129. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 266 



Eighth Article, 
whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce 
to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i. : 
De vita beata xvi. ) : virtue suffices for itself. Now magnanimity 
makes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). 
Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magna- 
nimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, No virtuous man despises what is helpful 
to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever 
pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says {De Offic. i.) 
under the heading: Magnanimity consists of two things, 
that a great soul is commended for despising external things. 
Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of 
fortune. 

Obj. 3. Further, Tully adds (ibid.) that it belongs to a 
great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to 
depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise 
man. And Aristotle says (Ethic, iv. 3) that a magnanimous 
man does not grieve at misfortune. Now troubles and mis- 
fortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one 
grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore 
external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that 
goods of fortune seem to conduce to magnanimity. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity 
regards two things : honour as its matter, and the accomplish- 
ment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune 
conduce to both these things. For since honour is conferred 
on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multi- 
tude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, 
the result is that they show greater honour to those who 
possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are 
useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we 
can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and 



267 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 8 

friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce 
to magnanimity. 

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, 
because it can be without even these external goods; yet 
it needs them in order to act more expeditiously. 

Reply Obj. 2. The magnanimous man despises external 
goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to 
be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet 
he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful 
for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds. 

Reply Obj. 3. If a man does not think much of a thing, 
he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved 
at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does 
not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, 
he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much 
cast down by their loss. 



QUESTION CXXX 

OF PRESUMPTION. 
(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; 
and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by 
excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, 
and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity 
which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the 
first head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether 
presumption is a sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to magna- 
nimity by excess ? 

First Article, 
whether presumption is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. For 
the Apostle says: Forgetting the things that are behind, I 
stretch forth (Vulg., — and stretching forth) myself to those that 
are before. But it seems to savour of presumption that one 
should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presump- 
tion is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, i. 7) we 

should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish 

human things because we are men, or mortal things because 

we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal: 

and (Met. i.) that man should pursue divine things as far as 

possible. Now divine and immortal things are seemingly 

far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially 

26S 



269 PRESUMPTION Q. 130. Art. i 

in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presump- 
tion is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. Hi. 5): Not 
that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of 
ourselves. If then presumption, by which one strives at 
that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that 
man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which 
is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxxvii. 3) : wicked 
presumption, whence earnest thou ? and a gloss answers : 
From a creature s evil will. Now all that comes of the root 
of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin. 

/ answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is 
ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought 
to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human 
reason in opposition to the order established in general 
throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now 
it is established throughout all natural things, that every 
action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor 
does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its 
ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary 
to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what 
is above his power : and this is what is meant by presumption, 
as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that pre- 
sumption is a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders that which is above the 
active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the 
passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed 
of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed 
as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass 
the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and 
presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue 
to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs 
to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a 
man to endeavour to advance towards perfect virtue. In 
this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things 
that were before him, namely continually advancing forward. 

Reply Obj. 2. Divine and immortal things surpass man 



Q. 130. Art. 2 THE ' : SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 270 

according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed 
of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can 
be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect 
the Philosopher says that man ought to pursue immortal 
and divine things, not that he should do what it becomes 
God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect 
and will. 

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, hi. 3), what 
we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a 
sense. Hence since we can think and do good by the help 
of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence 
it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplish- 
ment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous 
if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's 
assistance. 

Second Article. 

whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity 

by excess ? 

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed 
to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted 
a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above 
(Q. XIV., A. 2 : Q. XXL, A. 1). But the sin against the Holy 
Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. 
Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to magnanimity that one should 
deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to 
be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small 
things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption 
is not directly opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, The magnanimous man looks upon 
external goods as little things. Now according to the 
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3), on account of external fortune 
the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they 
deem external goods as something great. Therefore presump- 
tion is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only 
by deficiency. 



271 PRESUMPTION Q. 130. Art. 2 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7; iv. 3) 
that the vain man, i.e. a vapourer or a wind-bag, which 
with us denotes a presumptuous man, is opposed to the 
magnanimous man by excess. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad. 1), 
magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity 
of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own 
ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is 
becoming to us. 

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which 
he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes 
falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion 
to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not 
exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed 
to magnanimity by excess. 

Reply Obj. 1. It is not every presumption that is accounted 
a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one con- 
temns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence 
in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by 
reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies con- 
tempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather 
to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, 
in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's 
own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity. 

Reply Obj. 2. Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to 
tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont 
to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers 
in something small. If, however, such a man be called 
presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed 
to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary 
honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2). 

Reply Obj. 3. No one attempts what is above his ability, 
except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. 
In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards 
quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or 
knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards 
the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and 
worthy of great things,, by reason of something that does 



Q. 130. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 272 

not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods 
of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3), 
those who have these things without virtue, neither justly 
deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called 
magnanimous. 

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in 
excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something 
great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to 
suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while some- 
times it is something great, not simply, but only in the 
opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising 
and wronging others. This savours of an excess of 
magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. 
Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that when magna- 
nimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, 
proud, haughty, restless, and bent on excelling in all things, 
whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of 
virtue. Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man 
sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although 
in appearance he surpasses him. 



QUESTION CXXXI. 

OF AMBITION. 
(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider ambition: and under this head 
there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a sin ? 
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess ? 

First Article, 
whether ambition is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For 
ambition denotes the desire of honour. Now honour is 
in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: 
wherefore those who care not for honour are reproved. 
Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something 
deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired. 

Obj. 2. Further, Anyone may, without sin, desire what 
is due to him as a reward. Now honour is the reward of 
virtue, as the Philosopher sta.tes( Ethic, i. 12; iv. 3; viii. 14). 
Therefore ambition of honour is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, That which heartens a man to do good 
and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now 
honour heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 8) that with the bravest men, 
cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour: and 
Tully says (De Tusc. Quczst. i.) that honour fosters the arts. 
Therefore ambition is not a sin. 

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xiii. 5) that charity is 
II. ii. 4 273 18 



Q. 131. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 274 

not ambitious, seeketh not her own. Now nothing is contrary 
to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2), honour 
denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his ex- 
cellence. Now two things have to be considered with 
regard to man's honour. The first is that a man has not 
from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it 
were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count 
honour is due principally, not to him but to God. The 
second point that calls for observation is that the thing in 
which man excels is given to him by God, that he may 
profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be 
pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this 
enables him to profit others. 

Now the desire of honour may be inordinate in three 
ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excel- 
lence which he has not : this is to desire more than his share 
of honour. Secondly, when a man desires honour for him- 
self without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's 
appetite rests in honour itself, without referring it to the 
profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate 
desire of honour, it is evident that it is always a sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. The desire for good should be regulated 
according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be 
sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honour in disaccord 
with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who 
care not for honour in accordance with reason's dictate that 
they should avoid what is contrary to honour. 

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is not the reward of virtue, as 
regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek 
for it as his reward : since the reward he seeks is happiness, 
which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward 
of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than 
honour whereby to reward the virtuous; which honour 
deceives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness 
to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate 
reward, as stated in Ethic, iv. 3. 

Reply Obj. 3. Just as some are heartened to do good and 



275 AMBITION Q. 131. Art. 2 

disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honour, 
if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordin- 
ately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many 
evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he 
obtains honour. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that 
the good as well as the wicked covet honours for themselves, but 
the one, i.e. the good, go about it in the right way, whereas 
the other, i.e. the wicked, through lack of the good acts, make 
use of deceit and falsehood. Yet they who, merely for the 
sake of honour, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, 
according to the Philosopher [Ethic, iii. 8), where he says 
that they who do brave things for the sake of honour are 
not truly brave. 

Second Article. 

whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity 

by excess ? 

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed to 
magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one 
extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption 
is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above 
(Q. CXXX., A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to 
it by excess. 

Obj. 2. Further, Magnanimity is about honours; whereas 
ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is 
written (2 Machab. iv. 7) that Jason ambitiously sought 
the high priesthood. Therefore ambition is not opposed to 
magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, Ambition seems to regard outward show: 
for it is written (Acts xxv. 27) that Agrippa and Berenice 
. . . with great pomp (ambitione) . . . had entered into the 
hall of audience* and (2 Para. xvi. 14) that when Asa died 
they burnt spices and . . . ointments over his body with very 
great pomp [ambitione). But magnanimity is not about 

* Praetorium. The Vulgate has auditorium, but the meaning is 
the same. 



Q. 131. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 276 

outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to 
magnanimity. 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) that the more a 
man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself 
alone to dominate others. But this pertains to ambition. 
Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies 
inordinate love of honour. Now magnanimity is about 
honours and makes use of them in a becoming manner. 
Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magna- 
nimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered. 

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity regards two things. It 
regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that 
the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. 
In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by 
excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great 
deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnani- 
mity regards is its matter, viz. honour, of which it makes 
right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magna- 
nimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be 
exceeded in various respects. 

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is due to those who are in a position 
of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate : 
and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignit}' 
pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inor- 
dinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of 
honour, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding 
his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous. 

Reply Obj. 3. The very solemnity of outward worship 
is a kind of honour, wherefore in such cases honour is wont 
to be shown. This is signified by the words of James 
(ii. 2, 3): If there shall come into your assembly a man having 
a golden ring, in fine apparel, . . . and you . . . shall say to 
him: Sit thou here well, etc. Wherefore ambition does not 
regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of 
honour. 



QUESTION CXXXII. 

OF VAINGLORY. 

(In Five Articles.) 

We must now consider vainglory: under which head there 
are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether desire of glory is a 
sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity ? (3) Whether 
t is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether it is a capital vice ? (5) Of 
its daughters. 

First Article, 
whether the desire of glory is a sin ? 

We Proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. 
For no one sins in being likened to God : in fact we are com- 
manded (Eph. v. L): Be ye . . . followers of God, as most 
dear children. Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate 
God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written 
(Isa. xliii. 6, 7): Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters 
from the ends of the earth. A nd every one that calleth on My 
name, I have created him for My glory. Therefore the desire 
for glory is not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, That which incites a man to do good is 
apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men 
to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Qucest. i.) that glory 
inflames every man to strive his utmost : and in Holy Writ 
glory is promised for good works, according to Rom. ii. 7 : 
To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . 
glory and honour* Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin. 

* Vulg., — Who will render to every man according to his works, to 
them indeed who . . . seek glory and honour and incorruption, eternal 
life. 

2 77 



Q. 132. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 278 

Obj. 3. Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that glory 
is consistent good report about a person, together with praise : 
and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra 
Maximin. iii.), viz. that glory is, as it were, clear knowledge 
with praise. Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown : 
indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to 
Ecclus. xli. 15, Take care of a good name, and Rom. xii. 17, 
Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in 
the sight of all men. Therefore the desire of vainglory is 
not a sin. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v.): He is 
better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise 
is sinful. 

I answer that, Glory signifies a certain charity, wherefore 
Augustine says (Tract, lxxxii., c, cxiv. in Joan.) that to 
be glorified is the same as to be clarified. Now clarity and 
comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word 
glory properly denotes the display of something as regards 
its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a 
bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is 
clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are 
far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes 
that somebody's good is known and approved by many, 
according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.):* I must not 
boast while I am addressing one man. 

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not 
only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the 
knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one 
considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now 
it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good: for it 
is written (1 Cor. ii. 12): Now we have received not the spirit 
of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know 
the things that are given us from God. Likewise it is not a sin 
to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is 
written (Matth. v. 16): Let your light shine before men. 
Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: 
but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it 
* The quotation is from Livy (Hist., Lib. XXII., C. 39). 



279 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. i 

is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. iv. 3, Why 
do you love vanity, and seek after lying ? 

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on 
the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a 
man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for 
instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: 
secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, 
for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, 
on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he 
does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such 
as God's honour, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbour. 

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says on John xiii. 13, You call 
Me Master and Lord ; and you say well (Tract, lviii. in Joan.) : 
Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to 
beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He 
may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge 
of God is our need, not His : nor does any man know Him 
unless he be taught of Him Who knows. It is therefore 
evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for 
ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own 
glory for the good of others, according to Matth. v. 16, That 
they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is 
in heaven. 

Reply Obj. 2. That which we receive from God is not vain 
but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward 
for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. x. 17, 18): 
He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who 
commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God com- 
mendeth. It is true that some are heartened to do works of 
virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the 
desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous 
who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as 
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v.). 

Reply Obj. 3. It is requisite for man's perfection that he 
should know himself; but not that he should be known by 
others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, 
however, be desired as being useful for something, either 
in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may 



Q. 132. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 280 

become better by reason of the good they know to be in 
another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testi- 
mony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself 
strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this 
sense it is praiseworthy that a man should take care of his 
good name, and that he should provide good things in the 
sight of God and men : but not that he should take an empty 
pleasure in human praise. 

Second Article, 
whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed to 
magnanimity. For, as stated above (Ai), vainglory consists 
in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to false- 
hood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to 
covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment 
is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these 
vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vain- 
glory is not opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, Vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, 
opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems 
inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way 
of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are 
opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CXXX., A. 2: 
Q. CXXXL, A. 2) : and these differ from vainglory. There- 
fore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Philip, ii. 3, Let nothing be 
done through contention, neither by vainglory, says: Some 
among them were given to dissension and restlessness, con- 
tending with one another for the sake of vainglory. But 
contention* is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither 
therefore is vainglory. 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) under the heading, 
Magnanimity consists in two things : We should beware of 
the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a mag- 

* Cf. Q. XXXVIII. 



28 1 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 2 

nanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammelled. 
Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIIL, A. 1, ad 3), glory 
is an effect of honour and praise: because from the fact that 
a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires 
charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity 
is about honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2), 
it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man 
uses honour moderately, so too does he use glory in modera- 
tion. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly 
opposed to magnanimity. 

Reply Obj. 1. To think so much of little things as to glory 
in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it 
is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic, iv.) that honour is 
of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of 
other things that are sought for honour's sake, such as power 
and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity 
to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the 
magnanimous man (Ethic, iv.) that he cares more for truth 
than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnani- 
mity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, 
as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is 
said of the magnanimous man (Ethic, iv., loc. cit.), that he 
cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon 
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this 
from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other 
virtues. 

Reply Obj. 2. He that is desirous of vainglory does in 
truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in 
what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the 
preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is- 
opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because 
the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, 
and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXVIL, A. 2, ad 2), 
the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. 
Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to 
magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he 



Q. 132. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 282 

deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3) 
that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because 
nothing is great in his estimation. 



Third Article, 
whether vainglory is a mortal sin ? 

We proceed thus to the Third A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. 
For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal 
sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward : for it is 
written (Matth. vi. 1) : Take heed, that you do not give justice 
before men, to be seen by them : otherwise you shall not have a 
reward of your Father Who is in heaven. Therefore vainglory 
is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever appropriates to himself that 
which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring 
vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is 
proper to God. For it is written (Isa. xlii. 8) : / will not give 
My glory to another, and (1 Tim. i. 17) : To ... the only 
God be honour and glory. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently a sin is mortal if it be most 
dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this 
kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. ii. 4, God, 
Who proveth our hearts, says : Unless a man war against the 
love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, 
for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as 
one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when 
it is given. Chrysostom also says (Horn. xix. in Matth.) 
that vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all 
our inward possessions. Therefore vainglory is a mortal 
sin. 

On the contrary, Chrysostom says* that while other vices 
find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds 
a place even in the servants of Christ. Yet in the latter there 
is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin. 

* Horn. xiii. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to S. John 
Chrysostom. 



283 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 3 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV.. A. 12: Q. CX., 
A. 4: Q. CXIL, A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary 
to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, 
does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love 
of one's neighbour: yet as regards the love of God it may 
be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason 
of the matter about which one glories: for instance when 
one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence 
we owe God, according to Ezech. xxviii. 2, Thy heart is 
lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God, and 1 Cor. iv. 7, 
What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast 
received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it ? 
Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in 
which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jerem. ix. 23, 24): 
Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the 
strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man 
glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, 
that he understandeth and knoweth Me, Or again when a man 
prefers the testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in 
reproval of certain people (John xii. 43) : For they loved the 
glory of men more than the glory of God. 

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, 
on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his 
intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even 
virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears 
not from doing even that which is against God. In this 
way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De 
Civ. Dei v. 14) that this vice, namely the love of human 
praise, is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory 
more than it fears or loves God, that Our Lord said (John v. 44) : 
How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, 
and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek ? 

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, 
be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the 
matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks 
glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin. 

Reply Obj. 1. No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: 
wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal 



Q. 132. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 284 

life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though 
that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when 
a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, 
and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal 
sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, 
desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For 
the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a 
virtuous or rich man. 

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, 
not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a 
disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presump- 
tuous and too self-confident : and so it gradually disposes a 
man to lose his inward goods. 

Fourth Article, 
whether vainglory is a capital vice ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital sin. 
For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly 
not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride. 
Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice. 

Obj. 2. Further, Honour would seem to take precedence 
of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inor- 
dinate desire of honour is not a capital vice. Neither 
therefore is the desire of vainglory. 

Obj. 3. Further, A capital vice has a certain prominence. 
But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a 
sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as 
an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail 
thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore 
vainglory is not a capital vice. 

On the contrary, Gregory [Moral, xxxi.) numbers vain- 
glory among the seven capital vices. 

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two 
ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: 
and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. 



285 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 4 

Gregory, however (Moral, xxxi.), reckons pride to be the 
queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate 
offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice : and not 
without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on 
(0. CLIL, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. 
But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain 
perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of 
every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice 
seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, 
and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of 
vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods 
that are the means whereby man acquires honour, glory 
seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch 
as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness: since 
good is naturally loved and honoured by all. Wherefore, 
just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires 
honour in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in 
the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. 
Hence on account of its close connexion with excellence, 
which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. 
And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire 
thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice. 

Reply Obj. 1. It is not impossible for a capital vice to 
arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the 
Article and I. -II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 2) pride is the queen 
and mother of all the vices. 

Reply Obj. 2. Praise and honour, as stated above (A. 2), 
stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it pro- 
ceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For 
the reason why a man loves to be honoured and praised 
is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the 
knowledge of others. 

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory stands prominent under the 
aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this 
suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always 
necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal 
sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can 
dispose man thereto. 



Q.132.ART.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 286 



Fifth Article. 

whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably 
reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, 
hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and 
love of novelties ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory 
are unsuitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, 
hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity* 
For according to Gregory (Moral, xxiii.) boastfulness is 
numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not 
arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as 
Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.). Therefore boastfulness should 
not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory. 

Obj. 2. Further, Contention and discord seem to be the 
outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice 
condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they 
are not the daughters of vainglory. 

Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Horn. xix. in Matth.) 
that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philan- 
thropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it 
is an established custom among men. Therefore eccen- 
tricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of 
vainglory. 

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. 
xxxi.), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXXIV., A. 5: 
Q. XXXV., A. 4: I.-IL, 0. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), the vices 
which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the 
end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now 
the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own 
excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4) : and to this end a 
man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by 
words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they 
be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties 

* Praesumptio novitatum, literally presumption of novelties. 



287 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 5 

which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, 
it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make 
known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to 
another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the 
intellect, and thus we have obstinacy, by which a man is 
too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to 
believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, 
and then we have discord, whereby a man is unwilling to 
give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as 
regards speech, and then we have contention, whereby a man 
quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly, as regards deeds, 
and this is disobedience, whereby a man refuses to carry 
out the command of his superiors. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXII., AA. 1, 2), 
boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior 
cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according 
to Ethic, iv., is directed sometimes to gain, but more often 
to glory and honour, and thus it is the result of vainglory. 

Reply Obj. 2. Anger is not the cause of discord and con- 
tention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a 
man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the 
will and words of others. 

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is reproved in connexion with 
almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in 
one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbour, 
seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. 
But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as 
though this were something novel. 



QUESTION CXXXIII. 

OF PUSILLANIMITY. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head 
there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether pusillanimity 
is a sin ? (2) To what virtue is it opposed ? 

First Article, 
whether pusillanimity is a sin ? 

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For 
every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a 
man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3). Therefore pusillanimity is 
not a sin. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says [ibid.) that a 
fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great 
goods, yet does not deem hi7nself worthy of them. Now no one 
is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the 
Philosopher again says {ibid.), none but the virtuous are 
truly worthy of honour. Therefore the fainthearted are 
virtuous : and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, Pride is the beginning of all sin (Ecclus. 
x. 15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, 
since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while 
the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is 
worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin. 

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3) that 
he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to befaint- 

288 



289 PUSILLANIMITY Q. 133- Art 1. 

hearted. Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less 
worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Elias, who 
were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they 
both humbly declined (Exod. iii. n: Jerem. i. 6). There- 
fore pusillanimity is not a sin. 

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be 
avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: 
for it is written (Coloss. iii. 21): Fathers, provoke not your 
children to indignation, lest they be discouraged. Therefore 
pusillanimity is a sin. 

/ answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclina- 
tion is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. 
Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an 
action that is commensurate with its power : as is evident 
in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now 
just as presumption makes a man exceed what is propor- 
tionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so 
pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate 
to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commen- 
surate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is 
pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in 
the earth the money he had received from his master, and 
did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished 
by his master (Matth. xxv. ; Luke xix.). 

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher calls those evil who injure 
their neighbour: and accordingly the fainthearted is said 
not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, 
by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For 
Gregory says (Pastoral, i.) that if they who demur to do good 
to their neighbour in preaching be judged strictly, without 
doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have 
done had they been less retiring. 

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous 
habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, 
or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. 
Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which 
he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are 
worthy of great honour, and yet through not trying to make 

11. ii. 4 19 



Q. 133. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 290 

use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes 
mortally. 

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy 
of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability 
which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or 
from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use 
those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity. 

Reply Obj. 3. Even pusillanimity may in some way be 
the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to 
his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent 
for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is 
written (Prov. xxvi. 16): The sluggard is wiser in his own 
conceit than seven men that speak sentences. For nothing 
hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and 
having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore 
Gregory says {Pastor, i.) of Moses that perchance he would 
have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a 
numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have 
been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his 
Creator. 

Reply Obj. 4. Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the 
office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthi- 
ness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insuffi- 
ciency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obsti- 
nately lest they should fall into pride. 

Second Article, 
whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity ? 

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to 
magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that 
the fainthearted man knows not himself : for he would desire 
the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself. 
Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. There- 
fore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence. 

Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord calls the servant wicked and 
slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use 



2gi PUSILLANIMITY Q. 133- Art. 2 

of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv., 
loc. cit.) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now 
sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, 
as stated above (Q. XLVIL, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity 
is not opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, Pusillanimity seems to proceed from 
inordinate fear : hence it is written (Isa. xxxv. 4) : Say to the 
fainthearted : Take courage and fear not. It also seems to 
proceed from inordinate anger, according to Coloss. iii. 21, 
Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be 
discouraged. Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, 
and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity 
is not opposed to magnanimity. 

Obj. 4. Further, The vice that is in opposition to a par- 
ticular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more 
unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike 
magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillani- 
mity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more 
grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the 
saying of Ecclus. xxxvii. 3, wicked presumption, whence 
earnest thou ? Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to 
magnanimity. 

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ 
as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names 
denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore 
pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity. 

i" answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three 
ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its 
very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it 
differs as great and little differ in connexion with the same 
subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great 
things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man 
shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, 
it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the 
part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification, 
and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what 
one falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be 
considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from 



O. 133. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 292 

the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated 
above (0. CXXXIL, A. 2, ad 3), opposition between vice 
and virtue depends rather on their respective species than 
on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly 
opposed to magnanimity 

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers pusillanimity as 
proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot 
be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in 
respect of its cause : because ignorance of this kind does not 
proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering 
one's own ability, according to Ethic, iv. 3, or in accomplish- 
ing what is within one's power. 

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers pusillanimity from 
the point of view of its effect. 

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the point of view 
of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always 
a fear of the dangers of death : wherefore it does not 
follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to 
fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the 
aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to 
take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which dis- 
heartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, 
however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries 
inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is 
disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity. 

Reply Obj. 4. According to its proper species pusillanimity 
is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man with- 
draws from good things, which is a very great evil according 
to Ethic, iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be wicked 
on account of pride whence it proceeds. 



QUESTION CXXXIV. 

OF MAGNIFICENCE. 
(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed 
to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of 
inquiry : (i) Whether magnificence is a virtue ? (2) Whether 
it is a special virtue ? (3) What is its matter ? (4) Whether 
it is a part of fortitude ? 

First Article, 
whether magnificence is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. 
For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated 
above (I. -II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have the other 
virtues without having magnificence: because the Philo- 
sopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that not every liberal man is magni- 
ficent. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Moral virtue observes the mean, accord- 
ing to Ethic, ii. 6. But magnificence does not seemingly 
observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. 
Now great and little are opposed to one another as extremes, 
the mean of which is equal, as stated in Met. x. Hence 
magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. 
Therefore it is not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is opposed to a natural inclina- 
tion, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above 
(Q. CVIII., A. 2: Q. CXVII., A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according 
to the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 2) the magnificent man is not 

293 



Q. i34- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 294 

lavish towards himself : and this is opposed to the natural 
inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magni- 
ficence is not a virtue. 

Obj. 4. Further, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, vi. 4) 
act is right reason about things to be made. Now magnificence 
is about things to be made, as its very name denotes.* 
Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue. 

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine 
power. But magnificence [virtutis) belongs to Divine 
power, according to Ps. lxvii. 35: His magnificence and 
His power is in the clouds. Therefore magnificence is a 
virtue. 

/ answer that, According to De Ccelo i. 16, we speak of 
virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing s power, not 
as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit 
of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. 
Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence 
takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. 
Hence magnificence denotes a virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. Not every liberal man is magnificent as 
regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to 
perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal 
man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in 
respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained 
above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad 2), as also (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1) 
when we were treating of the connexion of virtues. 

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that magnificence observes the 
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done : yet 
it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which 
it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of 
magnanimity (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad 1). 

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to magnificence to do something 
great. But that which regards a man's person is little in 
comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even 
the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the 
magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish 
towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but 

* Magnificence = magna facere — i.e. to make great things. 



295 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134- Art. 2 

because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything 
regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man 
accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are 
done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are 
of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to 
provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic, iv. 
Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi. 5) there 
must needs be a virtue of act, i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the 
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act : and 
this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but 
a virtue. 

Second Article, 
whether magnificence is a special virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a special 
virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing 
something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do 
something great, if the virtue be great : as in the case of one 
who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great 
work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a 
special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly that which tends to a thing 
is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to mag- 
nanimity to tend to something great, as stated above 
(Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2). Therefore it belongs to magna- 
nimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnifi- 
cence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, Magnificence seems to belong to holiness, 
for it is written (Exod. xv. n) : Magnificent (Douay, — 
Glorious) in holiness, and (Ps. xcv. 6) : Holiness and magni- 
ficence (Douay, — Majesty) in His sanctuary. Now holiness 
is the same as religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXL, A. 8). 
Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. 
Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other 
special virtues (Ethic, ii. 7; iv. 2). 

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do (facere) 






Q. 134. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 296 

something great, as its name implies. Now facer e may be 
taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. 
Strictly facer e means to work something in external matter, 
for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in 
a broad sense facere is employed to denote any action, 
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, 
or remain in the agent, as to understand or will. 

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing 
of something great, the doing {f actio) being understood in 
the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done 
is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to 
consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work 
produced (factum) by the act is something great, namely in 
quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence 
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue. 

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from 
doing something great, the doing (facere) being understood 
in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1 It belongs to every perfect virtue to do 
something great in the genus of that virtue, if doing (facere) 
be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, 
for this is proper to magnificence. 

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend 
to something great, but also to do great works in all the 
virtues, either by making (faciendo), or by any kind of 
action, as stated in Ethic, iv. 3 : yet so that magnanimity, in 
this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other 
virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct 
their principal intention, not to something great, but to that 
which is proper to each virtue : and the greatness of the thing 
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the 
virtue. 

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to 
do something great, doing (facere) being taken in the strict 
sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great 
things. Hence Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that magni- 
ficence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty 
undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, 






297 MAGNIFICENCE Q.i 34 Art. 3 

discussion referring to the inward intention, and adminis- 
tration to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just 
as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, 
it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that 
can be produced in external matter (factibili). 

Reply Obj. 3. The intention of magnificence is the produc- 
tion of a great work. Now works done by men are directed 
to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the 
honour of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work 
especially in reference to the Divine honour. Wherefore the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that the most commendable 
expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices: and 
this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason 
magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief 
effect is directed to religion or holiness. 

Third Article. 

whether the matter of magnificence is great 

expenditure ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence is 
not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about 
the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as 
stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 2). Therefore magnificence 
is not about expenditure. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every magnificent man is liberal (Ethic. 
iv. 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about 
expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly 
about expenditure, but about gifts. 

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to magnificence to produce 
an external work. But not even great expenditure is 
always the means of producing an external work, for instance 
when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore 
expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence. 

Obj. 4. Further, Only the rich are capable of great expen- 
diture. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, 
since the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, 



Q. i 34 . Art 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 298 

but are sufficient for themselves, as Seneca says {De Ira i. : 
De vita beata xvi.). Therefore magnificence is not about 
great expenditure. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that 
magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions 
in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds 
liberality in scale. Therefore it is only about great expen- 
diture. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to mag- 
nificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the 
doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, 
for great works cannot be produced without great expendi- 
ture. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in 
order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming 
manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. loc. cit. ) 
that a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work 
with equal, i.e. proportionate, expenditure. Now expendi- 
ture is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be 
hindered from making that outlay if he love money too 
much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to 
be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man 
uses to produce a great work, and also the very money 
which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as 
the love of money, which love the magnificent man mode- 
rates, lest he be hindered from spending much. 

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2), those 
virtues that are about external things experience a certain 
difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about 
which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides 
arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the 
need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; 
namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, 
and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the 
use of money. 

Reply Obj. 2. The use of money regards the liberal man 
in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it 
regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an 
ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due 



299 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134- Art. 3 

use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles 
to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs 
to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent 
man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, 
and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay. 

Reply Obj. 3. The magnificent man also makes gifts of 
presents, as stated in Ethic, iv. 2, but not under the aspect 
of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed 
to the production of some work, for instance in order to 
honour someone, or in order to do something which will 
reflect honour on the whole state: as when he brings to 
effect what the whole state is striving for. 

Reply Obj. 4. The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, 
and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so 
that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of 
fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of 
virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the 
outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. 
Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are 
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though 
little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in 
proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative 
terms, as the Philosopher says (De Prcedic. Cap. Ad aliquid). 

Fourth Article, 
whether magnificence is a part of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part of 
fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, 
as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of 
fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a 
part of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and darings. 
But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, 
but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. There- 
fore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about 
actions, rather than to fortitude. 



Q. 134. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 300 

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 2) that 
the magnificent man is like the man of science. Now science 
has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. 
Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of 
fortitude. 

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) and Macrobius 
{De Somn. Scip. i.) and Andronicus reckon magnificence 
to be a part of fortitude. 

/ answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special 
virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, 
since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter : 
but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as 
secondary to principal virtue. 

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, 
two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). 
The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the prin- 
cipal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded 
thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the 
point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and 
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it 
is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence 
falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which 
fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that 
threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which 
magnificence tends derives its difficulty from the disposses- 
sion of one's property, which is of much less account than 
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted 
a part of fortitude. 

Reply Obj. 1. Justice regards operations in themselves, 
as viewed under the aspect of something due : but liberality 
and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related 
to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For 
liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and 
desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible 
faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and 
spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On 
the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in refer- 
ence to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as 



301 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134. Art. 4 

magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely 
expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is 
apparently in the irascible part. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although magnificence does not agree with 
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as to the condition of 
its matter : since it tends to something difficult in the matter 
of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult 
in the matter of fear. 

Reply Obj. 3. Magnificence directs the use of art to some- 
thing great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. 
Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the mag- 
nificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of 
expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially 
necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, 
since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the 
risk of a great loss. 



QUESTION CXXXV. 

OF MEANNESS.* 
(In Two Articles). 

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: 
under which head there are two points of inquiry : (i) Whether 
meanness is a vice ? (2) Of the vice opposed to it. 

First Article 
whether meanness is a vice ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For 
just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate 
little things : wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent 
do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore 
likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 2) that 
careful reckoning is mean. But careful reckoning is appa- 
rently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance 
with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv. 4). There- 
fore meanness is not a vice. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 2) that 
a mean man is loth to spend money. But this belongs to 
covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a 
distinct vice from the others. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii.) accounts 
meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence. 

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. I., A. 3: 

* Parviftcentia, or doing mean things, just as magnificentia is 
doing great things. 

302 



303 MEANNESS Q. 135. Art. i 

Q. XVIII., A. 6), moral acts take their species from their 
end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from 
that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus ) 
because he intends to do something little [parvum). Now 
according to the Philosopher [Prcedic. Cap. Ad aliquid) great 
and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean 
man intends to do something little, this must be understood 
in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little 
or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself 
to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly 
the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of 
his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the 
expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce 
a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 4) 
that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce 
a more magnificent result. On the other hand, the mean man 
intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher 
says [Ethic, iv. 2) that he seeks how he may spend least. As 
a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, 
he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as 
he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that the 
mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the 
magnificent work, for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend. 
Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe 
the proportion that reason demands betv/een expenditure 
and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in 
failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it 
is manifest that meanness is a vice. 

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue moderates little things, according 
to the rule of reason : from which rule the mean man declines, 
as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for 
moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of 
reason in moderating great or little things : hence meanness 
is a vice. 

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii. 5), fear 
makes us take counsel: wherefore a mean man is careful in 
his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending 
his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this 



Q. 135. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 304 

is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because 
then a man does not regulate his affections according to 
reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in 
pursuance of his inordinate affections. 

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the magnificent man has this in 
common with the liberal man, that he spends his money 
readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common 
with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. 
Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary 
expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, 
which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore mean- 
ness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher 
says {Ethic, iv. 2) that although meanness and its contrary 
vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither 
do they harm one's neighbour, nor are they very disgraceful. 

Second Article, 
whether there is a vice opposed to meanness ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed to 
meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magni- 
ficence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is 
opposed to meanness. 

Obj. 2. Further, Since meanness is a vice by deficiency, 
as stated above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed 
to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. 
But those who spend much, where they ought to spend 
little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according 
to Ethic, iv. 2, and thus they have something of meanness. 
Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness. 

Obj. 3. Further, Moral acts take their species from their 
end, as stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend exces- 
sively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as 
stated in Ethic, iv., loc. cit. But this belongs to vainglory, 
which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above 
(Q. CXXXI., A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to mean- 
ness. 



305 MEANNESS Q. 135. Art. 2 

On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher 
who (Ethic, ii. 8; iv. 2) places magnificence as a mean be- 
tween two opposite vices. 

/ answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and 
great are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just 
as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, 
so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it 
exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist be- 
tween expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that 
the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less 
than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due pro- 
portion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice 
opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, 
by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This 
vice is called in Greek fiavavala, so called from fiavvos, 
because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. 
It is also called airvpoicaXia, i.e. lacking good fire, since 
like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence 
in Latin it may be called consumptio (waste). 

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence is so called from the great 
work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess 
of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed 
to meanness. 

Reply Obj. 2. To the one same vice there is opposed the 
virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. 
Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to mean- 
ness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, 
by spending much where it behoved to spend little. But 
it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, 
which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far 
as when it behoves to spend much, it spends little or nothing. 

Reply Obj. 3. Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by 
the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, 
whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders 
this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as 
vainglory or any other. 



II. H. 4 2Q 



QUESTION CXXXVI. 

OF PATIENCE. 

(In Five Articles.) 

We must now consider patience. Under this head there 
are five points of inquiry : (i) Whether patience is a virtue ? 
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues ? (3) Whether 
it can be had without grace ? (4) Whether it is a part of 
fortitude ? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity ? 

First Article, 
whether patience is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For 
the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says 
(De Trin. xiv.). Yet patience is not there, since no evils 
have to be borne there, according to Isa. xlix. 10 and 
Apoc. vii. 16, They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the 
heat nor the sun strike them. Therefore patience is not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, No virtue can be found in the wicked, 
since virtue it is that makes its subject good. Yet patience 
is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the 
covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may 
amass money, according to Eccles. v. 16, All the days of his 
life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery 
and in sorrow. Therefore patience is not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits differ from the virtues, as 
stated above (I. -II., Q. LXX., A. 1, ad 3). But patience 
is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. v. 22). Therefore patience 
is not a virtue. 

306 



307 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. i 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Patientia i.): The 
virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of 
God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it 
upon us. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 1), the 
moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they 
safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the 
passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to 
hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10, The 
sorrow of the world worketh death, and Ecclus. xxx. 25, 
Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it. Hence 
the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason 
against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this 
patience does. Wherefore Augustine says {De Patientia ii.) : 
A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal 
mind, i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, lest he abandon 
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to 
better things. It is therefore evident that patience is a 
virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. The moral virtues do not remain in heaven 
as regards the same act that they have on the way, in rela- 
tion, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not 
remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to 
the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be 
in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters 
pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point 
of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, 
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying 
the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence 
Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.) that patience itself will 
not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils 
have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience 
will be eternal. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Patientia ii: v.) 
properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear 
evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing 
them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, 
their patience is neither marvellous nor praiseworthy, for it 






Q. 136. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 308 

is no patience at all : we may marvel at their hardness of 
heart, but we must refuse to call them patient. 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XL, A. 1), the 
very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue 
afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic, i. 8. Now 
the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. 
Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue; but as to the 
pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially 
in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being 
overcome by sorrow. 

Second Article, 
whether patience is the greatest of the virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of the 
virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the 
greatest. Now patience hath a perfect work (James i. 4). 
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues. 

Obj. 2. Further, All the virtues are directed to the good 
of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience ; 
for it is written (Luke xxi. 19): In your patience you shall 
possess your souls. Therefore patience is the greatest of 
the virtues. 

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly that which is the safeguard 
and cause of other things is greater than they are. But 
according to Gregory (Horn. xxxv. in Ev.) patience is the 
root and safeguard of all the virtues. Therefore patience is 
the greatest of the virtues. 

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues 
which Gregory [Moral, xxii.) and Augustine (De Morib. 
Eccl. xv.) call principal. 

/ answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed 
to good. For it is virtue that makes its subject good, and 
renders the latter s work good (Ethic, ii. 6). Hence it follows 
that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other 
virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good 
more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which 



309 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 2 

are effective of good, incline man more directly to good than 
those which are a check on the things which lead man away 
from good: and just as among those that are effective of 
good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater 
good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than pru- 
dence and justice); so too among those that are a check on 
things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is 
the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. 
But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures 
of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw 
man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is 
the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest 
of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological 
virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish 
man in good, but .also of fortitude and temperance which 
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good. 

Reply Obj. 1. Patience is said to have a perfect work in 
bearing hardships : for these give rise first to sorrow, which 
is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is 
moderated by meekness ; thirdly, to hatred, which charity 
removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice for- 
bids. Now that which removes the principle is the most 
perfect. 

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this 
respect, that it is more perfect simply. 

Reply Obj. 2. Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; 
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so 
far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked 
by hardships and disturb the soul. 

Reply Obj. 3. Patience is said to be the root and safe- 
guard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and 
preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their 
obstacles. 



Q. 136. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 310 



Third Article, 
whether it is possible to have patience without 

GRACE ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have patience 
without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, 
the more is it possible for the rational creature to accom- 
plish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake 
of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for 
evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of 
grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii.) that men endure 
many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sin- 
fully. Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without 
the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this 
is to be truly patient. 

Obj. 2. Further, Some who are not in a state of grace 
have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: 
hence some heathens are related to have endured many 
hardships rather than betray their country or commit some 
other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore 
it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help 
of grace. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is quite evident that some go through 
much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. 
Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily 
health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the 
help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, 
and this is to be truly patient . 

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxi. 6): From Him, i.e. 
from God, is my patience. 

I answer that, As Augustine says {De Patientia iv.), the 
strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one 
willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake 
of that which gives pleasure. The reason of this is because 
sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, 
wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their 



3H PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 3 

own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows 
that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure 
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation 
of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now 
the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural 
goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred 
to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is 
evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, 
according to 1 Cor. xiii. 4, Charity is patient. 

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity 
save through grace, according to Rom. v. 5, The charity of 
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is 
given to us. Therefore it is clearly impossible to have 
patience without the help of grace. 

Reply Obj. 1. The inclination of reason would prevail in 
human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt 
nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it 
is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils 
for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights 
here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to 
come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and 
yet it is this that pertains to true patience. 

Reply Obj. 2. The good of a social virtue* is commensurate 
with human nature; and consequently the human will can 
tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not 
without the help of God's grace, f On the other hand, the 
good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend 
thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails. 

Reply Obj. 3. Even the endurance of those evils which a 
man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from 
the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence 
there is no comparison between this endurance and patience 
which proceeds from a supernatural love. 

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. LXI., A. 5. f Cf. I.-IL, Q. CIX., A. 2. 



Q. 136. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 312 

Fourth Article, 
whether patience is a part of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : — 

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of forti- 
tude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is 
apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above 
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; 
and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the 
Liber Sententiarum Prosperi* that patience consists in en- 
during evils inflicted by others. Therefore patience is not a 
part of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and daring, as 
stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3), and thus it is in the iras- 
cible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and conse- 
quently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore 
patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance. 

Obj. 3. Further, The whole cannot be without its part. 
Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no 
fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man 
does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person 
who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of 
fortitude. 

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons it a part 
of fortitude. 

/ answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of forti- 
tude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal 
virtue. For it belongs to patience to suffer with an equal 
mind the evils inflicted by others, as Gregory says in a homily 
(xxxv. in Ev.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by 
others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that 
are connected with the danger of death, and about these 
evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this 
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays 
claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore 
patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal 

* The quotation is from S. Gregory (Horn. xxxv. in Ev.). 



313 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 4 

virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave 
(Sent. 811). 

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to fortitude to endure, not any- 
thing indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, 
namely dangers of death : whereas it may pertain to patience 
to endure any kind of evil. 

Reply Obj. 2. The act of fortitude consists not only in 
holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but 
also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by 
things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience 
is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, 
which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while 
patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be 
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves 
in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (patiendo) things 
which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be 
inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly 
in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible 
faculty. 

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of forti- 
tude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not 
regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Neverthe- 
less patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, 
although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance 
is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures 
of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures 
of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows 
inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to tem- 
perance to control these sorrows besides their contrary 
pleasures : whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake 
not the good of virtue on account of suchlike sorrows, 
however great they be. 

Reply Obj. 3. It may be granted that patience in a certain 
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact 
that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers 
of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection 
argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man 
should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts 



Q. 136. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 314 

evils on him; for Chrysostom* says on Matth. iv. 10, Begone 
Satan, that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own 
wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked : 
and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii.) 
that the precepts of pacience are not opposed to the good of the 
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight 
against our enemies. But in so far as patience regards all 
kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to 
principal virtue. 

Fifth Article, 
whether patience is the same as longanimity ?t 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as longa- 
nimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i.) that we speak 
of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, 
but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted. 
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. v. 4) : The Most High is a 
patient rewarder. Therefore it seems that patience is the 
same as longanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, The same thing is not contrary to two 
things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby 
one awaits a delay : for one is said to be impatient of delay, 
as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the 
same as longanimity. 

Obj. 3. Further, Just as time is a circumstance of wrongs 
endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience 
on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity 
which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a 
long time, is not distinct from patience. 

Obj. 4. On the contrary, a glossj on Rom. ii. 4, Or despisest 
thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffer- 
ing? says: It seems that longanimity differs from patience, 

* Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to S. John 
Chrysostom. 

f Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on 
account of the comparison with magnanimity. 

I Origen, Comment in Ep. ad Rom. ii. 



315 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 5 

because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose 
are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a 
deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently. 

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind 
to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind 
to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magna- 
nimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, 
fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does 
longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common 
with magnanimity than with patience. 

Nevertheless it may have something in common with 
patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like 
fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if 
this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas 
if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, 
because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature 
to cause sorrow, according to Prov. xiii. 12, Hope that is 
deferred afflicteth the soul. Hence there may be patience 
in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. 
Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised 
under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for 
good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man 
endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which 
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect 
of grievous evil. 

For this reason Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) in defining patience, 
says that patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance 
of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit. 
By saying arduous he refers to constancy in good; when he 
says difficult he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is 
the proper object of patience; and by adding continued or 
long lasting, he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has 
something in common with patience. 

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objec- 
tions. 

Reply Obj. 3. That which is a long way off as to place, 
though distant from us, is not simply distant from things 
in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time : 



Q. 136. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 316 

hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as 
to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since 
what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us. 
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, 
however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this 
gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through 
weakness, merely because they persist a long time in 
evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longa- 
nimity : whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems 
to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through 
pride are stated to be borne with patience. 



QUESTION CXXXVII. 

OF PERSEVERANCE. 

(In Four Articles.) 

We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed 
to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four 
points of inquiry : (i) Whether perseverance is a virtue ? 
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude ? (3) Of its relation to 
con -tancy : (4) Whether it needs the help of grace ? 

First Article, 
whether perseverance is a virtue ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. 
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 7), continency 
is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a 
virtue, as stated in Ethic, iv. 9. Therefore perseverance is 
not a virtue. 

Obj. 2. Further, By virtue man lives aright, according to 
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii. 19). Now according to the same 
authority (De Per sever, i.), no one can be said to have per- 
severance while living, unless he persevere until death. There- 
fore perseverance is not a virtue. 

Obj. 3. Further, It is requisite of every virtue that one 
should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as 
stated in Ethic, ii. 4. But this is what we understand by 
perseverance: for Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that perse- 
verance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-con- 
sidered purpose. Therefore perseverance is not a special 
virtue, but a condition of every virtue. 

317 



Q. i37- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 318 

On the contrary, Andronicus* says that perseverance is a 
habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those 
to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are in- 
different. Now a habit that directs us to do something 
well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perse- 
verance is a virtue. 

I answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, ii. 3), 
virtue is about the difficult and the good; and so where there is 
a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special 
virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or 
difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's very species, 
which is considered in respect of the proper object of that 
act : secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long 
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence 
to persist long in something good until it is accomplished 
belongs to a special virtue. 

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special 
virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of 
touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other 
moderates fear and daring in connexion with dangers of 
death (which also is something difficult in itself), so persever- 
ance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in 
the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires. 

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is taking perseverance 
there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are 
most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, 
not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, 
for the most part are not endured for a long time, because 
often they soon pass away : wherefore it is not on this account 
that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among 
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures 
of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of 
life : such are the lack of food and the like, which at times 
call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure 
these things for a long time for one who grieves not much 
at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods ; as in the 
case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not 
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is 

* Chrysippus : in De Affect. 



319 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137. Art. i 

strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect 
virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perse- 
verance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but 
something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other 
hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence 
in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has 
even perfect virtue : for even if it is less difficult for him to 
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Where- 
fore suchlike perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue 
derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from 
the aspect of difficulty. 

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the 
same name: thus Augustine says {Tract, in Joan, lxxix.): 
Faith is to believe without seeing. Yet it is possible to have 
a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor 
man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the 
act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, 
begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for 
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not 
complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term 
perseverance is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby 
one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of perse- 
vering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance 
chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by 
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not 
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold : one is the 
end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly 
speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end 
of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere 
to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his 
work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues 
whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such 
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end 
of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which 
are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not 
accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that 
Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consum- 
mate act of perseverance. 



Q. 137. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 320 

Reply Obj. 3. Unchangeable persistence may belong to 
a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end 
that is proper to that virtue ; and thus to persist in good for 
a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called 
perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, 
by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject : and thus 
unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, 
inasmuch as virtue is a quality difficult to change. 

Second Article, 
whether perseverance is a part of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part of 
fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, viii. 7), 
perseverance is about pains of touch. But these belong to 
temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temper- 
ance rather than of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Every part of a moral virtue is about 
certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perse- 
verance does not imply moderation of the passions: since 
the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it 
to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems 
that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather 
of prudence which perfects the reason. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i.) that no 
one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other 
virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the 
other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its 
part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, 
but is itself a principal virtue. 

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons perse- 
verance as a part of fortitude. 

J answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 2: I. II., 
Q. LXL, AA. 3, 4), a principal virtue is one to which is 
principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise 
of virtue, inasmuch as it practises it in connexion with its 
own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. 



321 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 2 

In accordance with this it has been stated (0. CXXIII., A. 2) 
that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes 
firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, 
namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of neces- 
sity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm 
endurance of something difficult must be annexed to forti- 
tude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance 
of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good 
work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so 
difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perse- 
verance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal 
virtue. 

Reply Obj. 1. The annexing of secondary to principal 
virtues depends not only on the matter,* but also on the 
mode, because in everything form is of more account than 
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance 
seems to have more in common with temperance than 
with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with 
fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty 
arising from length of time. 

Reply Obj. 2. The perseverance of which the Philosopher 
speaks (Ethic, vii. 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but 
consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. 
But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain 
passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of 
the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the 
irascible. 

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as 
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained 
to the end, according to Matth. xxiv. 13, He that shall perse- 
vere to the end, he shall he saved. Hence it is incompatible 
with suchlike perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no 
longer endure to the end. 

* Cf. Q. CXXXVI., A. 4 ad 2. 



11. ii. 4 21 



Q. 137. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 322 



Third Article, 
whether constancy pertains to perseverance ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain to 
perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as 
stated above (Q. CXXXVIL, A. 5): and patience differs 
from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain 
to perseverance. 

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is about the difficult and the good. 
Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, 
but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. 
Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than 
to perseverance. 

Obj. 3. Further, If constancy pertained to perseverance, 
it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote 
a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macro- 
bius (De Somn. Scip. i.) condivides constancy with firm- 
ness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above 
(Q. CXXVIIL, A. 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain 
to perseverance. 

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one 
stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand 
to certain things, as appears from the definition given by 
Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance. 

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to 
end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: 
but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to 
persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly 
makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that 
arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas con- 
stancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties 
arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perse- 
verance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, 
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action 
is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises 
from external obstacles. 



323 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 4 

Reply Obj. 1. External obstacles to persistence in good 
are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is 
about sorrow, as stated above (Q. CXXXVL, A. 1). Hence 
constancy agrees with perseverance as to end : while it agrees 
with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. 
Now the end is of most account : wherefore constancy per- 
tains to perseverance rather than to patience. 

Reply Obj. 2. It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: 
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any 
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed 
which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance 
which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain 
to both. 

Reply Obj. 3. Constancy pertains to perseverance in so 
far as it has something in common with it : but it is not the 
same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the 
Article. 

Fourth Article, 
whether perseverance needs the help of grace ?* 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the 
help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above 
(A. 1). Now according to Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) virtue 
acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclina- 
tion of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does 
not need the help of grace. 

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of Christ's grace is greater than 
the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from 
Rom. v. 15 seq. Now before sin man was so framed that 
he could persevere by means of what he had received, as Augus- 
tine says {De Correp. et Grat. xi.). Much more therefore 
can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, perse- 
vere without the help of a further grace. 

Obj. 3. Further, Sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult 
than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the 
wicked (Wis. v. 7) : We . . . have walked through hard ways. 

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. CIX., A. 10. 



Q. 137. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 324 

Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of 
another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of 
virtue without the help of grace. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i.): We hold 
that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto 
the end, in Christ. 

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2: A. 2, ad 3), 
perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes 
the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this 
way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other 
infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the 
act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense 
it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous 
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as 
stated above (I. -II., Q. CIX., A. 10), when we were treating 
of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its 
very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from 
it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is 
not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, 
to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to 
choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to 
accomplish. 

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is 
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, 
and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow 
that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchange- 
ably until death. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi.), 
it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to 
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in 
human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, 
by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the 
possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore 
the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will 
rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a hap- 
piness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, 
although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered 
in faith. 



325 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 4 

Reply Obj. 3. Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but 
he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of 
grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned 
man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be 
delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing 
good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, 
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs 
the help of grace for that end. 



QUESTION CXXXVIIL 

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE. 

(In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; 
under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Of 
effeminacy; (2) Of pertinacity. 

First Article, 
whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to 
perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, Nor adulterers, 
nor the effeminate, nor Hers with mankind, expounds the text 
thus: Effeminate — i.e. erotic, subject to womanish complaints. 
But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is 
not a vice opposed to perseverance. 

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, vii. 7) that 
delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But to be delicate seems 
akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed 
to perseverance but to temperance. 

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (ibid.) that the 
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. Now im- 
moderate fondness of amusement is opposed to evrpaireXLa, 
which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in 
Ethic, iv. 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perse- 
verance. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vii. 7) that 
the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate. 

* Mollities, literally softness. 
326 



327 EFFEMINACY Q. 138. Art. i 

1 answer that, As stated above (O. CXXXVIL, AA. 1, 2), 
perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man 
does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of 
difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, 
seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account 
of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we 
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be 
soft if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not 
declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for 
walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not 
said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence 
the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii. 7) that it is no wonder, if 
a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures 
or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against 
them. Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impel- 
ling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says 
(De Offic. i.) under the heading True magnanimity consists 
of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down 
by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself 
unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. Moreover, pleasure 
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the 
lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of 
pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the 
Philosopher (loc. cit.). properly speaking an effeminate man is 
one whc withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused 
by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion. 

Reply Obj. 1. This effeminacy is caused in two ways. 
In one way, by custom : for where a man is accustomed to 
enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the 
lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, 
because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the 
frailty of his temperament. This is how women are com- 
pared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii., loc. cit.): 
wherefore those who are subject to womanish complaints 
are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it 
were. 

Reply Obj. 2. Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure : wherefore 
it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. 



Q. 138. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 328 

Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor 
anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written 
(Deut. xxviii. 56) : The tender and delicate woman, that could 
not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness 
(Douay, — niceness). Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. 
But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, 
while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for 
instance toil or the like. 

Reply Obj. 3. In play two things may be considered. 
In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate 
fondness of play is opposed to evrpaireXia. Secondly, 
we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to 
toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be 
unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto 
to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately. 

Second Article, 
whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — ■ 

Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to 
perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.) than perti- 
nacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed 
to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above 
(O. CXXXIL, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not apposed 
to perseverance. 

Obj. 2. Further, If it is opposed to perseverance, this is so 
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by 
excess : because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure 
and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 9) 
they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions 
are rejected. And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be 
the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore 
pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance. 

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the persevering man persists 
in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the 
temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and 
the meek against anger. Bwt pertinacity is over-persistence 






329 PERTINACITY Q. 138. Art. 2 

in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to 
perseverance more than to other virtues. 

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that perti- 
nacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But 
superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. XCII., 
A. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance. 

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x.) a person is said to 
be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly 
tenacious. Pervicacious has the same meaning, for it sig- 
nifies that a man perseveres in his purpose until he is vic- 
torious : for the ancients called ' vicia ' what we call victory. 
These the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 9) calls lacxpoyvoo/xoves, 
that is head-strong, or IStoyvfofioves, that is self-opinionated, 
because they abide by their opinions more than they 
should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he 
ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is 
clear that perseverance is commended for observing the 
mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, 
and effeminacy for falling short of it. 

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why a man is too persistent 
in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make 
a show of his own excellence : wherefore this is the result of 
vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above 
(Q. CXXVII., A. 2, ad 1: Q. CXXXIII., A. 2), that opposi- 
tion of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on 
their species. 

Reply Obj. 2. The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting 
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he 
takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the 
persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, 
seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary 
pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man. 

Reply Obj. 3. Although the other virtues persist against 
the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended 
for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to 
continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in over- 
coming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed 
to perseverance. 



QUESTION CXXXIX. 

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE. 
(In Two Articles.) 

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, 
and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are 
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether fortitude is a gift ? 
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond 
to it? 

First Article, 
whether fortitude is a gift ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the 
virtues differ from the gifts : and fortitude is a virtue. There- 
fore it should not be reckoned a gift. 

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of the gifts remain in heaven, 
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXVIIL, A. 6). But the act of 
fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says 
(Moral, i.) that fortitude encourages the fainthearted against 
hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven. There- 
fore fortitude is not a gift. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, ii.) 
that it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the 
deadly pleasures of the passing show. Now noisome pleasures 
and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of 
fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift 
corresponding to the virtue of fortitude. 

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other 
gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. xi. 2). 

/ answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of 

330 






331 GIFT OF FORTITUDE Q. 139. Art. i 

mind, as stated above (O. CXXIIL, A. 2: I.-IL, Q. LXI., 
A. 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing 
good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods 
or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his 
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness 
in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on 
account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous 
work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude 
denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above 
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 2). 

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, 
in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, 
and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses 
human nature : for sometimes it is not in a man's power to 
attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since 
these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the 
Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting 
life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from 
all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the 
mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. 
It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy 
Ghost. For it has been stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXVIIL, 
AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by 
the Holy Ghost. 

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind 
in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go 
so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers : this 
belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost. 

Reply Obj. 2. The gifts have not the same acts in heaven 
as on the way: for there they exercise acts in connexion 
with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude 
there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil. 

Reply Obj. 3. The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of 
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, 
but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any 
difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed 
by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly 
with the greater goods. 



Q. 139. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 332 

Second Article. 

whether the fourth beatitude: 'blessed are they 
that hunger and thirst after justice,' corre- 
sponds to the gift of fortitude ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth beatitude, Blessed 
are they that hunger and thirst after justice, does not corre- 
spond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not 
the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. 
Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the 
act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to 
the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude. 

Obj. 2. Further, Hunger and thirst after justice imply a 
desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to 
which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, 
corresponds, as stated above (0. XLV.). Therefore this 
beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to 
the gift of wisdom. 

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits are consequent upon the 
beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according 
to Ethic, i. 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none 
pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beati- 
tude correspond to it. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Semi. Dom. in 
Monte i.): Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since 
those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving 
earthly and material things, must toil. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXI., A. 2), Augustine 
makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to 
the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same 
time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he 
ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and 
thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude. 

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, 
as stated (A. 1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it 
is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which 



333 GIFT OF FORTITUDE Q. 139- Art. 2 

receive the common designation of works of justice, but 
furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which 
may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. 

Reply Obj. 1. As Chrysostom says (Horn. xv. in Matth.), 
we may understand here not only particular, but also 
universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds 
according to Ethic, v. 1, wherein whatever is hard is the 
object of that fortitude which is a gift. 

Reply Obj. 2. Charity is the root of all the virtues and 
gilts, as stated above (O. XXIII., A. 8, ad 3: I. -II., 
0. LXVIII., A. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to for- 
titude may also be referred to charity. 

Reply Obj. 3. There are two of the fruits which correspond 
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which 
regards the enduring of evils; and longanimity, which may 
regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods. 



QUESTION CXL. 

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE. 
(In Two Articles.) 

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (i) The 
precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts. 

First Article. 

whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably 
given in the divine law ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — ■ 

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are 
not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law 
is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains 
precepts of fortitude (Deut. xx.). Therefore precepts of 
fortitude should have been given in the New Law also. 

Obj. 2. Further, Affirmative precepts are of greater 
import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include 
the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable 
for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts 
in prohibition of fear. 

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is one of the principal virtues, 
as stated above (O. CXXIII., A. 2: I.-IL, Q. LXL, A. 2). 
Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end : 
wherefore they should be proportionate to them. There- 
fore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed 
among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief 
precepts of the Law. 

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these 
precepts. 

334 



335 PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 140. Art. i 

/ answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end 
intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must 
needs be framed in various ways according to the various 
ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs 
there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and 
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of 
the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: where- 
fore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and 
of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to 
God. For this reason it is written (Deut. xx. 3, 4): Fear ye 
them not : because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, 
and will fight for you against your enemies. 

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly 
goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude accord- 
ing to the requirements of those goods. 

Reply Obj. 1. The Old Testament contained temporal 
promises, while the promises of the New Testament are 
spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra 
Faust, iv.). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the 
people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, 
in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New 
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the posses- 
sion of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to 
Matth. xi. 12, The kingdom of heaven suffer eth violence, and 
the violent bear it away. Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 
v. 8, 9) : Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth 
about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in 
faith, as also James (iv. 7) : Resist the devil, and he will fly 
from you. Since, however, men while tending to spiritual 
goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, 
precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, 
that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according 
to Matth. x. 28, Fear ye not them that kill the body. 

Reply Obj. 2. The law gives general directions in its 
precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of 
danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to 
some common good. Hence the precepts of fortitude are 
negative rather than affirmative. 



Q. 140. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 336 

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIL, A. 1), the 
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first 
principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. 
Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly 
about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is 
manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not 
so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers 
of death. 

Second Article. 

whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude 
are suitably given in the divine law ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the parts of 
fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just 
as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also 
are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated 
above (Q. CXXVIII.). Now we find precepts of patience 
in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore 
there should also have been precepts of magnificence and 
magnanimity. 

Obj. 2. Further, Patience is a very necessary virtue, since 
it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says 
(Horn, in Ev. xxxv.). Now the other virtues are com- 
manded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have 
been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. 
Dom. in Monte i.), as to the preparedness of the mind. 

Obj. 3. Further, Patience and perseverance are parts of 
fortitude, as stated above (O. CXXVIII: Q. CXXXVI., A. 4: 
Q. CXXXVIL, A. 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are 
not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). 
Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should 
have been negative and not affirmative. 

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which 
they are given by Holy Writ. 

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly 
about such things as are necessary for right living. Now 
in order to live aright man needs not only the principal 



337 PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE Q. i 4 o.Art. 2 

virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Where- 
fore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the 
acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the 
secondary and annexed virtues. 

Reply Obj. i. Magnificence and magnanimity do not 
belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a 
certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their 
respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence 
come under the counsels of perfection rather than under pre- 
cepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, 
rather than of precepts about magnificence and magna- 
nimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the 
present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by 
reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account 
of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of 
precepts of patience and perseverance. 

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. III., A. 2), although 
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not 
binding for always, but according to place and time. Where- 
fore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues 
are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, 
in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when 
necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be under- 
stood in the same way. 

Reply Obj. 3. Fortitude, as distinct from patience and 
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one 
must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine 
what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, 
patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and 
toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially 
in general, what is to be done in such cases. 



Printed in England 



The "Summa Theologica" of 
St. Thomas Aquinas, in English 

Edited by THE DOMINICAN FATHERS 



Demy Svo. Volumes. Cloth. 
FIRST PART. 
QQ. i- 26 Of God and the Divine Attributes. 
27- 49 The Blessed Trinity — The Creation. 
50- 74 The Angels — The Work of Six Days. 
75- 94 Treatise on Man. 
95-119 On Man {continued) — The Divine 
Government. 



Revised 
Editions Ready. 

Revised Editions 
Preparing. 



SECOND PART. (Prima Secunda .) 

QQ. 1- 48 The End of Man — Human Acts — Passions. [Ready. 

49- 89 Habits — Virtues and Vices. [Ready. 

90-114 Law and Grace. [Ready- 

SECOND PART. {Secunda Secunda.) 

QQ. I- 46 Faith, Hope, and Charity. [Ready. 

47- 79 Prudence — Justice. [Ready. 

80-100 Justice {continued) — The Interior and Exterior Acts 

of Religion. [Ready- 

101-140 Piety, Observance, and Contrary Vices — Fortitude. 

[Ready. 

141- 1 70 Temperance, its Integral, Subjective and Potential 
Parts, and Contrary Vices. [Ready. 

171-189 Gratuitous Graces — Active and Contemplative Life 
— States of Life. [Ready. 

THIRD PART AND SUPPLEMENT. 

QQ. 1- 26 The Incarnation. [Ready. 

27- 59 The Christology (including St. Thomas's Mariology). 

[Ready. 

60- 83 The Sacraments in General — Baptism — Confirmation 

— Holy Eucharist. [Ready. 

84-Supp. 33 Penance (including last seven questions of the Third 

Part) — Extreme Unction. [Ready. 

34- 68 Holy Orders — Matrimony. [Nearly Ready. 

69- 86 Treatise on the Last Things. [Ready. 

87- 99 Purgatory. [Nearly Ready. 

Orders for the entire work are received. Forthcoming Volumes will be charged as 

they appear. 



BURNS OATES & WASHBOURNE LTD. 

28 ORCHARD STREET 8-10 PATERNOSTER ROW 

VV. 1 LONDON E.C. 4 

BENZIGER BROTHERS - - NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO 



IINDING LIST JUN 15 1938 



University oi Toronto 
Library 



DO NOT 

REMOVE 

THE 

CARD 

FROM 

THIS 

POCKET 




Acme Library Card Pocket 
LOWE-MARTIN CO. LIMITED 



W* 



1 



isMi 



s 



m 



RfflS 



selfi 






M 







. . ■ ' .