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THE - SUMMA THEOLOGICA

II. ii. 4

HihU ©bstai.

Fr. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P.. S.T.M.
Censor Theol.

Imprimatur.

EDUS. CANONICUS SURMONT
Vicarios Generalis.

Westmonasterii.

APPROBATIO ORDINIS.

|tihil ©bsiat.

Fr. VINCENTIUS McNABB, O.P., S.T.M.
Fr. FABIANUS DIX, O.P., B.A.

imprimatnr.

Fr. BEDA JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L., M.A.,
Prior Provincialis Anglic.

LONDINI,

Feb. 4 1922.

THE

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART II.
(SECOND PART)

OO. CI.— CXL.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN

PROVINCE

LONDON

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BENZIGER BROTHERS: NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO
1922 All rights reserved

CONTENTS

QUESTION PAGE

CI. OF PIETY ------ I

CII. OF OBSERVANCE - - - - - IO

Parts of Observance and Contrary Vices

cm. of dulia - - - - - -17

civ. of obedience - - - - 25

cv. of disobedience - - - - - 40

cvi. of gratitude - - - - "45

cvii. of ingratitude - - - ~ 57

cviii. of vengeance - - - - - 64

cix. of truth - - - - - 76

Opposed to Truth

cx. of lying - - - - - 85

cxi. of dissimulation and hypocrisy - - "99
cxii. of boasting - ----- 109

cxiii. of irony - - - - - -ii4

cxiv. of friendliness - - - - -il8

Opposed to Friendliness

cxv. of flattery - - - - -i23

cxvi. of quarrelling - - - - - 1 28

cxvii. of liberality - - . - - 1 32

Opposed to Liberality,

cxvih. of covetousness - - - - - 1 44

CXIX. OF PRODIGALITY - - - - - l6l

CXX. OF EQUITY - - - - - -1 68

CXXI. OF THE GIFT OF PIETY - - - - 1 72

CXXII. OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE - - - 1 76

vi CONTENTS

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE

QUESTION PAGE

CXXIII. OF FORTITUDE - 193

CXXIV. OF MARTYRDOM ....

Vices opposed to Fortitude

215

CXXV. OF FEAR - - 227

CXXVI. OF FEARLESSNESS ----- 235

cxxvn. of (excessive) daring - - . _ 239

Parts of Fortitude

cxxviii. of the parts of fortitude, in general - 243

cxxix. of magnanimity ----- 249

cxxx. of presumption opposed to magnanimity - 268

cxxxi. of ambition ,, ,, „ - 273

cxxxii. of vainglory ,, }j „ 277

cxxxiii. of pusillanimity „ „ „ 288

cxxxiv. of magnificence ----- 293

cxxxv. of meanness opposed to magnificence - - 302

cxxxvi. of patience ----- 306

cxxxvii. of perseverance - 3i7

cxxxviii. of the vices opposed to perseverance- - 326

cxxxix. of the gift of fortitude ... 330

cxl. of the precepts of fortitude - - - 334

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART.

QQ. CI.-CXL

QUESTION CI.

OF PIETY.
(In Four Articles.)

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of
which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly
four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety: (i) To
whom does piety extend ? (2) What does piety make one
offer a person ? (3) Whether piety is a special virtue ?
(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the
sake of religion ?

First Article.

whether piety extends to particular human

individuals ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not extend to
particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei x.) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the wor-
ship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term evcrefteia.
But the worship of God does not denote relation to man,
but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely
to certain human individuals.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, i.) : Piety, on her
day, -provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of
the heart with works of mercy. Now the works of mercy are

II. ii. 4 I

Q. 101. Aft. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 2

to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ, i.).
Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special
persons.

Obj. 3. Further, In human affairs there are many other
mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic, viii.ii, 12), and on each of them
is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the
virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. hi. 5, Having
an appearance indeed of piety (Douay, — godliness). Therefore
piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is
by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-
wishers of our country and render them faithful service.

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in
various ways, according to their various excellence and the
various benefits received from them. On both counts God
holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us
the first principle of being and government. In the second
place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and
nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his
parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it
belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong
to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one's parents
and one's country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given
to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend
from the same parents, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic, viii. 12). The worship given to our country includes
homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our
country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.

Reply Obj. 1. The greater includes the lesser: wherefore
the worship due to God includes the worship due to our
parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Malach. i. 6) :
If I be a father, where is My honour ? Consequently the
term piety extends also to the divine worship.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x.), the
term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy,

3 PIETY Q.xoi.Art.2

in the language of the common people ; the reason for which
I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these
works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom
has led to the application of the word " pious " to God Himself.
Reply Obj. 3. The relations of a man with his kindred
and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of
his toeing than other relations : wherefore the term piety is
more applicable to them.

Second Article,
whether piety provides support for our parents ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that piety does not provide support
for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue,
Honour thy father and thy mother, belongs to piety. But
this prescribes only the giving of honour. Therefore it does
not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents.

Obj. 2. Further, A man is bound to lay up for those
whom he is bound to support. Now according to the
Apostle (2 Cor. xii. 14), neither ought the children to lay up
for the parents. Therefore piety does not oblige them to
support their parents.

Obj. 3. Further, Piety extends not only to one's parents,
but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as
stated above (A. 1.). But one is not bound to support all
one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one
bound to support one's parents.

On the contrary, Our Lord (Matth. xv. 3-6) reproved the
Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their
parents.

/ answer that, We owe something to our parents and
fellow-citizens in two ways: essentially, and accidentally.
We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as
such: and since he is his son's superior through being the
principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and
service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it
befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to

Q. ioi. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 4

him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his
children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor,
it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like
instance, all of which come under the head of service due.
Hence Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that piety gives both
duty and homage : duty referring to service, and homage to
reverence or honour, because, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei. x.), we are said to give homage to those whose memory
or presence we honour.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Our Lord's interpretation
(Matth. xv. 3-6), the honour due to our parents includes
whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is
that support is given to one's father because it is due to him
as to one greater.

Reply Obj. 2. Since a father stands in the relation of
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his
son : and consequently he is bound to support him not only
for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the
other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is
accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein
he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long
time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply Obj. 3. As Tully says (loc. cit.), we owe homage
and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our
country ; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our
parents, and to others according to our means and their
personal claims.

Third Article.

whether piety is a special virtue distinct from

other virtues ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a special virtue
distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and
homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to
piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.

5 PIETY Q.101.ART.3

Obj. 2. Further, It is proper to religion to give worship
to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x.). Therefore piety is not distinct
from religion.

Obj. 3. Further, Piety, whereby we give our country wor-
ship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which
looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general
virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 1, 2). There-
fore piety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.)
as a part of justice.

/ answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object
under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice
consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there
is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a
special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to
that which is its connatural principle of being and govern-
ment. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays
duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those
who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is a protestation of faith,
hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God,
so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear
towards our parents and country.

Reply Obj. 2. God is the principle of our being and govern-
ment in a far more excellent manner than one's father or
country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a
distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents
and country. But things relating to creatures are trans-
ferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as
Dionysius says (Div. Norn, i.) : wherefore, by way of ex-
cellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God,
by way of excellence, is called Our Father.

Reply Obj. 3. Piety extends to our country in so far as the
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards
the good of our country, considered as the common good :
wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general
virtue than piety has.

Q.ioi.Art.4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 6

Fourth Article.

whether the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection I. It seems that the duties of piety towards one's
parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For
Our Lord said (Luke xiv. 26) : If any man come to Me, and
hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and
brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be
My disciple. Hence it is said in praise of James and John
(Matth. iv. 22) that they left their nets and father, and fol-
lowed Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites
(Deut. xxxiii. 9): Who hath said to his father, and to his
mother : I do not know you ; and to his brethren : I know you
not ; and their own children they have not known. These have
kept Thy word. Now a man who knows not his parents and
other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit
the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should
be omitted for the sake of religion.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Luke ix. 59, 60) that in
answer to him who said : Suffer me first to go and bury my
father, Our Lord replied : Let the dead bury their dead: but go
thou, and preach the kingdom of God. Now the latter pertains
to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one's father.
Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake
of religion.

Obj. 3. Further, God is called Our Father by excellence.
Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the
duties of piety, so do we worship God by religion. There-
fore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
the worship of religion.

Obj. 4. Further, Religious are bound by a vow which
they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion.
Now in accordance with those observances they are hin-
dered from supporting their parents, both on the score of
poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the

7 PIETY Q. 101.ART.4

score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister
without the permission of their superior. Therefore the
duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for
the sake of religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees
(Matth. xv. 3-6) who taught that for the sake of religion
one ought to refrain from paying one's parents the honour
we owe them.

/ answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now
no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to
the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De
Oppos.), good is not opposed to good. Therefore it is impossible
that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that
the act of one be excluded by- the act of the other. Now, as
stated above (I.-IL, Q. VII., A. 2: Q. XVIIL, A. 3), the act
of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto,
and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue,
but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and
homage to one's parents according to the due mode. But
it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his
father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Luke xii. 52,
the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred.

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one
away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act
of piety to pay worship to one's parents to the prejudice of
God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.) : Though thou
trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn
not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's
parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion
gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to
our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God,
then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to
set piety aside for the sake of religion.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory expounding this saying of Our Lord
says (Horn, xxxvii. in Ev.) that when we find our parents to

Q. ioi. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8

be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by
hating and fleeing from them. For if our parents incite us to
sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as
regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense
that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred,
because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not
the idolaters (Exod. xxxii.). James and John are praised
for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that
their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it
possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they
followed Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his
father because, according to Chrysostom {Horn, xxviii. in
Matth.), Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such
as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates
under these circumstances. For after the burial the will had
to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly,
because there were others who could see to the funeral. Or,
according to Cyril's commentary on Luke ix., this disciple's
■request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he
might support a yet living father in the latter' s old age, until at
length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not
grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred,
to take care of him.

Reply Obj. 3. Whatever we give our parents out of piety
is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which
we perform with regard to any of our neighbours are offered
to God, according to Matth. xxv. 40: As long as you did it
to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me. Accordingly,
if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so
that they have no other means of support, provided they
incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them
for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves
to their service without sin, or if they can be supported
without our assistance, it is lawful to forgo their service,
so as to give more time to religion.

Reply Obj. 4. We must speak differently of one who is yet
in the world, and of one who has made his profession in

9 PIETY Q.101.ART.4

religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents
unable to find support without him, he must not leave them
and enter religion, because he would be breaking the com-
mandment prescribing the honouring of parents. Some say,
however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave
them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be
to tempt God : since, while having human means at hand, he
would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's
assistance. On the other hand, if the parents can find
means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to
abandon them and enter religion, because children are not
bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity,
as stated above. He that has already made his profession
in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world:
wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his
parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ,
and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Neverthe-
less he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and
his religious state withal, to make pious efforts for his
parents' support.

QUESTION CII.

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS

PARTS.

(In Three Articles.)

We must now consider observance and its parts, the con-
siderations of which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of
inquiry: (i) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct
from other virtues ? (2) What does observance offer ?
(3) Of its comparison with piety.

First Article.

whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from

other virtues ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special
virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are dis-
tinguished by their objects. But the object of observance
is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (Dc
Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is by observance that we pay worship and
honour to those who excel in some kind of dignity. But
worship and honour are paid also by piety to our parents,
who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct
virtue from piety.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as honour and worship are due to
those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due
to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no
special virtue whereby we pay honour and worship
to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore ob-
servance, whereby we pay worship and honour to those who

ii OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 1

excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other
virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, We have many duties towards those
who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is
required by law, according to Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to
all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due, etc. Now the
fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal
justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is
not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully (loc. cit.) reckons observance along
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

I answer that, As explained above (QQ. CI., AA. 1, 3:
LXXX.), according to the various excellences of those persons
to whom something is due, there must needs be a correspond-
ing distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just
as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle
in a particular way, which character is found in God in a
universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises
providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father
in a p articular way, since a father is the principle of generation,
of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the per-
fection of human life: while a person who is in a position
of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to
certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil
matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare,
a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is
that all such persons are designated as fathers, on account
of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants
of Naaman said to him (4 Kings v. 13) : Father, if the prophet
had bid thee do some great thing, etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby
worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship
our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby
worship and honour are paid to persons in positions of
dignity.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 3, ad 2), religion
goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although
piety properly so called is distinct from religion : and in the

Q. 102. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12

same way piety can be called observance by way of excel-
lence, although observance properly speaking is distinct
from piety.

Reply Obj. 2. By the very fact of being in a position of
dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but
also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore
it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inas-
much as he is the governor of others. On the other hand,
the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does
not give him the character of a principle in relation to others,
but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a
special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and
honour to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch
as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for
positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone
on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same
virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to special justice, properly speak-
ing, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe any-
thing. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to
those who make good use of their position of dignity, as
neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Conse-
quently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not
to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as
stated above (Q. LVIIL, A. 6).

Second Article.

whether it belongs to observance to pay worship
and honour to those who are in positions of

DIGNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to observance
to pay worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity.
For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x.), we are said to
worship those persons whom we hold in honour, so that
worship and honour would seem to be the same. Therefore

13 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 2

it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and
honour to persons in positions of dignity.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to justice that we pay what
we owe : wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it
is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honour
to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who
are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly
defined as giving worship and honour to all.

Obj. 3. Further, Not only do we owe honour to persons
of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear
and a certain payment of remuneration, according to
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . .to all men their dues; tribute to whom
tribute is due ; custom to whom custom ; fear to whom fear ;
honour to whom honour. Moreover, we owe them reverence
and subjection, according to Heb. xiii. 17, Obey your prelates,
and be subject to them. Therefore observance is not fittingly
defined as paying worship and honour.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is by
observance that we pay worship and honour to those who excel
in some kind of dignity.

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignit}'
to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones
to their due end : thus a sailor governs his ship by steering
it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and
power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a
position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together
with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the
exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence
there is due to him honour, which is the recognition of some
kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his
government, there is due to him worship, consisting in
rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by
repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we
receive from him.

Reply Obj. 1. Worship includes not only honour, but also
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the
relations between man and man.

Q. 102. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LXXX.), debt is two-
fold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by
law; and thus man owes honour and worship to those persons
in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other
is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty :
it is in this way that we owe worship and honour to persons
in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply Obj. 3. Honour is due to the excellence of persons
in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank : while
fear is due to them on account of their power to use compul-
sion: and to the exercise of their government there is due
both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the com-
mand of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repay-
ment of their labour.

Third Article,
whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that observance is a greater virtue
than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by
observance is compared to a father who is worshipped by
piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the
household which a father governs is part of the state which
is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater,
and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore obser
vance is a greater virtue than piety.

Obj. 2. Further, Persons in positions of dignity take care
of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the
private good, which we ought to set aside for the common
good : wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the
danger of death for the sake of the common good. There
fore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in posi-
tions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays
worship to one's kindred.

Obj. 3. Further, Honour and reverence are due to the
virtuous in the first place after God. Now honour and
reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser-

15 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 3

vance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore observance
takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts
of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion,
which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honour-
ing our parents, which refers to piety. Therefore piety
follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence.

/ answer that, Something may be paid to persons in
positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the
common good, as when one serves them in the administration
of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to
observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that
which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers
specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this
belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety.
Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must
needs take into consideration the different relations in which
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both
virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our
parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to
us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and
education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
substance than external government, the principle of which
is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this
reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch
as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom
we are more strictly bound.

Reply Obj. 1. The prince is compared to the father as
a universal to a particular power, as regards external
government, but not as regards the father being a principle
of generation : for in this way the father should be compared
with the divine power from which all things derive their
being.

Reply Obj. 2. In so far as persons in positions of dignity
are related to the common good, their worship does not
pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The rendering of honour or worship should

Q. T02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16

be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as
considered in himself, but also as compared to those who
pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered
in themselves, are more worthy of honour than the persons
of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation,
on account of the benefits they have received from their
parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship
and honour to their parents than to virtuous persons who
are not of their kindred.

QUESTION CIII.

OF DULIA.
(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall
consider (i) dulia whereby we pay honour and other things
pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position:
(2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honour is a spiritual or a corporal thing ?

(2) Whether honour is due to those only who are in a higher
position ? (3) Whether dulia, which pays honour and
worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue,
distinct from latria ? (4) Whether it contains several
species ?

First Article,
whether honour denotes something corporal ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that honour does not denote some-
thing corporal. For honour is showing reverence in ac-
knowledgement of virtue, as may be gathered from the
Philosopher (Ethic, i. 5). Now showing reverence is some-
thing spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated
above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honour is some-
thing spiritual.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3),
honour is the reward of virtue. Now, since virtue consists
chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something
corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit.
Therefore honour does not consist of corporal things.

Obj. 3. Further, Honour is distinct from praise, as also
n. ii. 4 17 2

Q. 103. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 18

from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external
things. Therefore honour consists of things internal and
spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. v. 3,
Honour widows that are widows indeed, and {verse 17), let
the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour
etc., says {Ep. ad Ageruch.): Honour here stands either for
almsgiving or for remuneration. Now both of these pertain
to spiritual things. Therefore honour consists of corporal
things.

/ answer that, Honour denotes a witnessing to a person's
excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honoured seek
a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, i. 5, viii. 8). Now witness is borne either before God
or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts,
the witness of one's conscience suffices; wherefore honour,
so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal
movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknow-
ledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence
before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness,
save by means of signs, either by wrords, as when one pro-
claims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds,
for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external
things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like.
Accordingly honour consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply Obj. 1. Reverence is not the same as honour: but
on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honour,
in so far as one man honours another out of the reverence he
has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honour,
in so far as a person is honoured in order that he may be held
in reverence by others.

Reply Obj. 2. According to the Philosopher {ibid.),
honour is not a sufficient reward of virtue : yet nothing in
human and corporal things can be greater than honour,
since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs
in acknowledgement of excelling virtue. It is, however,
due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made
known, according to Matth. v. 15, Neither do men light a

ig DULIA Q. 103. Art. i

candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that
it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense honour
is said to be the reward of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Praise is distinguished from honour in
two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal
signs, whereas honour consists of any external signs, so that
praise is included in honour. Secondly, because by paying
honour to a person we bear witness to a person's excelling
goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we
praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand,
honour is given even to the best, which is not referred to
an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, i. 5).

Glory is the effect of honour and praise, since the result
of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his
goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The
word glory signifies this, for glory is the same as KXvpla,
wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. xvi. 27 observes that
glory is clear knowledge together with praise.

Second Article,
whether honour is properly due to those who are

ABOVE US ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that honour is not properly due to
those who are above us. For an angel is above any human
wayfarer, according to Matth. xi. n, He that is lesser in the
kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. Yet
an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honour him
(Apoc. xxii. 10). Therefore honour is not due to those who
are above us.

Obj. 2. Further, Honour is due to a person in acknowledge-
ment of his virtue, as stated above (A. 1: Q. LXIIL, A. 3).
But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous.
Therefore honour is not due to them, as neither is it due to the
demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature.

Q. 103. Art 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. xii. 10) : With
honour preventing one another, and we read (1 Pet. ii. 17) :
Honour all men. But this would not be so if honour were
due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honour is not
due properly to those who are above us.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written (Tob i. 16) that Tobias had
ten talents of silver of that with which he had been honoured by
the king: and we read (Esther vi. n) that Assuerus honoured
Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence :
This honour is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to
honour. Therefore honour is paid to those also who are
beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honour is
not due properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Philosopher sa}-s [Ethic, i. 12) that
honour is due to the best.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), honour is nothing
but an acknowledgement of a person's excelling goodness.
Now a person's excellence may be considered, not only in
relation to those who honour him, in the point of his being
more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to
other persons, and in this way honour is always due to a
person, on account of some excellence or superiority. For the
person honoured has no need to be more excellent than those
who honour him ; it may suffice for him to be more excellent
than some others, or again he may be more excellent than
those who honour him in some respect and not simply.

Reply Obj. 1. The angel forbade John to pay him, not
any kind of honour, but the honour of adoration and
latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to
pay the honour of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of
John himself, for which Christ equalled him to the angels
according to the hope of glory of the children of God: wherefore
he refused to be honoured by him as though he were superior
to him.

Reply Obj. 2. A wicked superior is honoured for the
excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being
God's minister, and because the honour paid to him is paid
to the whole community over which he presides. As for

21 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 3

the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be
looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honour.

Reply Obj. 3. In every man is to be found something that
makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, accord-
ing to Philip, ii. 3, In humility, let each esteem others better
than themselves, and thus, too, we should all be on the alert
to do honour to one another.

Reply Obj. 4. Private individuals are sometimes honoured
by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity
but on account of some excellence of their virtue : and in this
way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honoured by kings.

Third. Article,
whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from

LATRIA ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue
distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. vii. 1, 0 Lord my God,
in Thee have I put my trust, says : Lord of all by His power, to
Whom dulia is due ; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria.
Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from
that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is
not a distinct virtue from latria.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, viii. 8),
to be loved is like being honoured. Now the charity with which
we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neigh-
bour. Therefore dulia whereby we honour our neighbour
is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honour God.

Obj . 3. Further, The movement whereby one is moved
towards an image is the same as the movement whereby
one is moved towards the thing represented by the image.
Now by dulia we honour a man as being made to the image
of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. ii. 22, 23) that
they esteemed not the honour of holy souls, for God created man
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby
God is honoured.

Q. 103. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 22

On the contrary, Augustine says (Dc Civ. Dei x.) that the
homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he com-
manded servants to obey their masters, and which in Greek is
called dulia, is distinct Jrom latria, which denotes the homage
that consists in the worship of God.

I answer that, According to what has been stated above
(0. CI., A. 3), where there are different aspects of that which
is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those
dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different
aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man
under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount
lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely
subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain
likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises
a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore
dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct
virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of
God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by
observance we honour all those who excel in dignity, while
dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their
master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of ex-
cellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence,
inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now
the creature does not partake of the power to create by
reason of which latria is due to God : and so this gloss drew
a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but
dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a
creature.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason why we love our neighbour is
God, since that which we love in our neighbour through
charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which
we love God is the same as that with which we love our
neighbour. Yet there are other friendships distinct from
charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is
loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving

23 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 4

God and another for serving man, and for honouring the one
or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply Obj. 3. Movement towards an image as such is
referred to the thing represented by the image : yet not every
movement towards an image is referred to the image as such,
and consequently sometimes the movement to the image
differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accor-
dingly we must reply that the honour or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in
respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness
of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not
always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image
is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement
towards the thing need not be towards its image. Where-
fore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds
somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His
image.

Fourth Article,
whether dulia has various species ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that dulia has various species. For
by dulia we show honour to our neighbour. Now different
neighbours are honoured under different aspects, for instance
king, father and master, as the Philosopher states (Ethic, ix. 2).
Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates
the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into
specifically different virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, The mean differs specifically from the
extremes, as pale differs from white and black. No\v hyper-
dulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for
it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to
God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother
of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as in the rational creature we find

Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24

the image of God, for which reason it is honoured, so too in
the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the
aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the
aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish
a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since
honour is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for in-
stance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria
is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is
dulia.

/ answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one
way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence
paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and
thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar
virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense
as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia
signifies servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this
sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the
species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.),
for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one
aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the
disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.

Reply Obj. 2. Hyper dulia is the highest species of dulia
taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that
which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to
God.

Reply Obj. 3. Man owes neither subjection nor honour to
an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such
creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross
of Christ, the honour we pay to it is the same as that
winch we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the
same honour as the king himself, according to Damascene
(De Fide Orthod. iv.).

QUESTION CIV.

OF OBEDIENCE.
(In Six Articles.)

We must now consider obedience, under which head there
are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether one man is bound to
obey another ? (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue ?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues : (4) Whether God
must be obeyed in all things ? (5) Whether subjects are
bound to obey their superiors in all things ? (6) Whether
the faithful are bound to obey the secular power ?

First Article,
whether one man is bound to obey another ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that one man is not bound to obey
another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine
ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by
his own counsel, according to Ecclus. xv. 14, God made man
from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.
Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Obj. 2. Further, If one man were bound to obey another,
he would have to look upon the will of the person command-
ing him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone,
which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. There-
fore man is bound to obey none but God.

Obj. 3. Further, The more gratuitous the service the more
is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not
gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey
others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good
deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done

Q.io4.Art.i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26

out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey
another.

On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. xiii. 17) : Obey
your prelates and be subject to them.

I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed
from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the
human will. In natural things it behoved the higher to
move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the
natural power bestowed on them by God : and so in human
affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in
virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move
by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in
virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower
natural things need to be subject to the movement of the
higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of
natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their
superiors.

Reply Obj. 1. God left man in the hand of his own counsel,
not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will,
but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled
by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left
the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just
as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things,
so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For
Gregory says (Moral, xxxv.), When we humbly give way to
another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts.

Reply Obj. 2. The will of God is the first rule whereby
all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will
approaches more than another, according to a divinely
appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues
a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other
man who obeys him.

Reply Obj. 3. A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two
ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because,
to wit, one is not bound to do it ; in another way, on the part
of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a
deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious,
chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore

27 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 2

although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially
before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also
the inward will.

Second Article.

whether obedience is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is not a special
virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But
disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De
Par ad. viii.) that sin is to disobey the divine law. Therefore
obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Every special virtue is either theological
or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since
it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a
moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess
and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one
praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obe-
dience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it
holds its own. But every special virtue is the more to be
praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a
man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic, ii. 4.
Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Virtues differ in species according to
their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to
be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there
are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. There-
fore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special
virtues.

On the contrary, Obedience is reckoned by some to be a
part of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.).

I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good
deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs
properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience
to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely estab-
lished order of things, as shown above (A. 1), and therefore

Q. 104. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 28

it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order,
as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii.).* Again, this act
has a special aspect of praise worthiness by reason of its
object. For while subjects have many obligations towards
their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their
commands, stands out as special among the rest. Where-
fore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a
command tacit or express, because the superior's will,
however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man's
obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as
by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he
understands his superior's will.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents the one same material
object from admitting two special aspects to which two
special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending
his king's fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing
the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice,
by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the
aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts
of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts
of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I.-II.,
Q. XCVL, A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a
matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things
for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden.
Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as
considering formally and intention ally the aspect of precept,
it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin:
because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one
perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the
intention of fulfilling a precept ; and for disobedience that
one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other
hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the perform-
ance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and
disobedience for the omission of that action through any
intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue,
and disobedience a general sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Obedience is not a theological virtue, for

* Cf. P. i Q. V., A. 5.

20, OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art 2

its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior,
whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the
superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject
obeys promptly, according to Tit. hi. 1, Admonish them to be
subject to princes, and to obey at a word, etc.

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice,
and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency.
Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but
of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either
whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to
obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q. XCII.,
A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in
the person who retains another's property, and deficiency
in the person who does not receive his due, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic, v. 4), so too obedience observes the mean
between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obe-
dience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own
will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does
not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience
will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was
stated above concerning justice (Q. LVIII., A. 10).

Reply Obj. 3. Obedience, like every virtue, requires the
will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards
that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of
obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another's will.
Wherefore obedience makes a man's will prompt in fulfilling
the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If
that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its
own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in
agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own
will, and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but
on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed
is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself,
is repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable
matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except
on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral, xxxv.)
that obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in
agreeable matters, because, to wit, one's own will seems to

Q. 104. Art, 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 30

tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept,
but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that it increases
in disagreeable or difficult matters, because there one's own will
tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be under-
stood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other
hand, according to the judgement of God, Who searches the
heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedi-
ence, while holding its own, is none the less praiseworthy,
provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly*
to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply Obj. 4. Reverence regards directly the person that
excels: wherefore it admits of various species according to
the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other
hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and
therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience
is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him,
it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though
the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.

Third Article.

whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that obedience is the greatest of the
virtues. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 22) : Obedience is
better than sacrifices. Now the offering of sacrifices belongs
to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown
above (Q. LXXXL, A. 6). Therefore obedience is the
greatest of all virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedi-
ence is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and pro-
tects them when ingrafted. Now the cause is greater than the
effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that evil
should never be done out of obedience : yet sometimes for the
sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing.
Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something

* Cf. Q. LXXXIL, A. 2.

31 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 3

better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of
other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.

On the contrary, Obedience deserves praise because it
proceeds from charity: for Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that
obedience should be practised, not out of servile fear, but from
a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through
love of justice. Therefore charity is a greater virtue than
obedience.

/ answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God
and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous
act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering
to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which
is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created
goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives
greater praise from his adhering to God than from his con-
temning earthly things. And so those, namely the theo-
logical, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are
greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt
some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a
man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the
virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man
may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of these are ex-
ternal goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and
the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the
chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes
use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the
virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for
God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral
virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.

Hence Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedience is rightly
preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is
slain, whereas by obedience we slay our own will. Wherefore
even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God
through being performed out of obedience to God's will.
For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's
goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the
fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to

Q.io4.Art.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 32

obedience, they could not be meritorious : as neither would
they be if they were done without charity, which cannot
exist apart from obedience. For it is written (r John ii. 4, 5) :
He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His com-
mandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him
in very deed the charity of God is perfected : and this because
friendship makes the same liking and disliking.

Reply Obj. 1. Obedience proceeds from reverence, which
pays worship and honour to a superior, and in this respect
it is contained under different virtues, although considered
in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special
virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance;
while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents,
it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from
reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to
devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore
from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God
than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, in a sacrifice we
slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will,
as Gregory says (loc. cit.). As to the special case in which
Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God
than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites
against the commandment of God.

Reply Obj. 2. All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under
a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as
acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their
generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and
protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience
takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons.
First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept,
one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without
considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there
be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept,
that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such
a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime
nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to
command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion

33 OBEDIENCE Q. ro4. Art. 4

of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all
virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all
virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of good. There is that
to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God,
and so forth : and by no means may such a good be set aside
on account of obedience. But there is another good to
which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought
sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we
are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by
falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (ibid.), he who
forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them
many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good. Thus the
loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other
goods.

Fourth Article,
whether god ought to be obeyed in all things ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A Hide : —

Objection 1. It seems that God need not be obeyed in all
things. For it is written (Matth. ix. 30, 31) that Our Lord
after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying:
See that no man know this. But they going out spread His
fame abroad in all that country. Yet they are not blamed
for so doing. Therefor0 it seems that we are not bound to
obey God in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is bound to do anything contrary
to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things
contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay
his innocent son (Gen. xxii.); and the Jews to steal the
property of the Egyptians (Exod. xi.), which things are
contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman
who was an adulteress (Osee hi.), and this is contrary to
chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever obeys God conforms his will
to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are
not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine
11. ii. 4 3

Q. 104. Art, 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 34

will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I.-II., Q. XIX.,
A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all
things.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xxiv. 7) : All things
thai the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is
moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as
natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now
just as God is the first mover of all things that are moved
naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown
above (I.-II., Q. IX., A. 6). Therefore just as all natural
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural neces-
sity, so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are
bound to obey the divine command.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal
the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force
of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral, xix.), gave
an example to His servants ivho follow Him, that they might
wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed
against their will, in order that others might profit by their
example.

Reply Obj. 2. Even as God does nothing contrary to nature
(since the nature of a thing is what God does therein, according
to a gloss on Rom. xi.), and yet does certain things contrary
to the wonted course of nature; so too God can command
nothing contrary to virtue, since virtue and rectitude of
human will consist chiefly in conformity with God's will and
obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the
wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command
given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary
to justice, since God is the author of life and death. Nor
again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the
Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all
things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor
was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take
an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human
generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman
is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the

35 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 5

persons aforesaid did not sin, neither by obeying God nor
by willing to obey Him.

Reply Obj. 3. Though man is not always bound to will
what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God
wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly
through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey
God's commands in all things.

Fifth Article.

whether subjects are bound to obey their
superiors in all things ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that subjects are bound to obey their
superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Coloss. iii. 20) :
Children, obey your parents in all things, and farther on
(verse 22) : Servants, obey in all things your masters according
to the flesh. Therefore in like manner other subjects are
bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, Superiors stand between God and their
subjects, according to Deut. v. 5, I was the mediator and
stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His
words. Now there is no going from extreme to extreme,
except through that which stands between. Therefore the
commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of
God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. iv. 14) : You ... re-
ceived me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus, and
(1 Thess. ii. 13) : When you had received of us the word of the
hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, butf as it
is indeed, the word of God. Therefore as man is bound to obey
God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as religious in making their profes-
sion take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow
obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity
and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to
obey in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts v. 29) : We ought to obey
God rather than men. Now^sometimes the things commanded

Q. 104. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36

by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not
to be obeyed in all things.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1. 4), he who obeys
is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him,
by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is
moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity.
That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may
happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance
arising from the stronger power of some other mover ; thus
wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water inter-
vene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable
with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the
latter 's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto
in every respect. Thus, a humour is sometimes subject to
the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as
regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there
are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to
obey his superior in all things. First on account of the
command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom.
xiii. 2, They that resist (Vulg., — He that resisteth) the power,
resist the ordinance of God (cf. S. Augustine, De Verb.
Dom. viii.). // a commissioner issue an order, are you to
comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul ? Again
if the proconsul command one thing and the emperor another,
will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter ?
Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another,
you must disregard the former and obey God. Secondly, a
subject is not bound to obey his superior, if the latter com-
mand him to do something wherein he is not subject to
him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii.): It is wrong to
suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man : for the better
part of him is excepted. His body is subjected and assigned
to his master, but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters
touching the internal movement of the will man is not
bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in
things that have to be done externally by means of the body :
and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound

37 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 5

to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the
body, for instance in those relating to the support of his
body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants
are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their
parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of re-
maining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters
concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a
subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of
his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general
in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters
touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his
father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the
care of the household; and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1. When the Apostle says in all things, he
refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's
authority.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is subject to God simply as regards
all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound
to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are
not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain
things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior
stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect
of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by
Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.

Reply Obj. 3. Religious profess obedience as to the regular
mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their
superiors : wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters
only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this
obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey
even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance
of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary
to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case
would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience ; one,
sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when
one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which
obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience,
which obeys even in matters unlawful.

O. 104. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 38

Sixth Article,
whether christians are bound to obey the secular

POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that Christians are not bound to
obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matth. xvii. 25,
Then the children are free, says: // in every kingdom the
children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free,
then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all
kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom. Now Christians,
by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according
to John i. 12 : He gave them power to be made the so7is of God,
to them that believe in His name. Therefore they are not
bound to obey the secular power.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Rom. vii. 4) : You . . . are
become dead to the law by the body of Christ, and the law
mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament.
Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular
power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testa-
ment. Much more, therefore, since they have become
members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of
subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular
princes.

Obj. 3. Further, Men are not bound to obey robbers, who
oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei iv.) : Without justice, what else is a kingdom but
a huge robbery ? Since therefore the authority of secular
princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its
origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians
ought not to obey secular princes.

On the contrary, It is written (Tit. iii. 1): Admonish them
to be subject to princes and powers, and (1 Pet. ii. 13, 14) : Be
ye subject . . . to every human creature for God' s sake : whether
it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.

I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of
justice, according to Rom. iii. 22, The justice of God by

39 OBEDIENCE Q. 104. Art. 6

faith of Jesus Christ : wherefore faith in Christ does not
void the order of justice, but strengthens it. Now the order
of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else
the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in
Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of
obeying secular princes.

Reply Obj. i. As stated above (A. 5), the subjection
whereby one man is bound to another regards the body ; not
the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life
we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul,
but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by
saying of himself (Rom. vii. 23) that in his mind he served
the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore
those that are made children of God by grace are free from
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily
bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters,
as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. vi. 1, Whosoever are servants
under the yoke, etc.

Reply Obj. 2. The Old Law was a figure of the New Testa-
ment, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth.
And the comparison with human law does not stand, because
thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound
by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is bound to obey secular princes in so
far as this is required by the order of justice. Wherefore if
the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he com-
mands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey
him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal
or danger.

QUESTION CV.

OF DISOBEDIENCE.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider disobedience, under which head there
are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a mortal sin ?
(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins ?

First Article,
whether disobedience is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is not a mortal
sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from
Ambrose's definition given above (Q. CIV. A. 2, Obj. 1).
Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would
be mortal.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.) that dis-
obedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a
mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.

Obj. 3. Further, A person is said to be disobedient when
he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often
issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible
to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin,
it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is
absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Those who are disobedient to parents are
reckoned (Rom. i. 30: 2 Tim. iii. 2) among other mortal sins.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12: I. -II.,
Q. LXXIL, A. 5: Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1), a mortal sin is one
that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual

41 DISOBEDIENCE Q. 105. Art. i

life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbour. The
charity of God requires that we obey His commandments,
as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). Therefore to be dis-
obedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin,
because it is contrary to the love of God.

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept
of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to
the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary
to the love of God, according to Rom. xiii. 2, He that resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. It is also contrary
to the love of our neighbour, as it withdraws from the
superior who is our neighbour the obedience that is his due.

Reply Obj. 1. The definition given by Ambrose refers to
mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin
is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept,
but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience,
properly and essentially, but only when one contemns
a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end.
And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in con-
tempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not
a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally
to another species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Vainglory desires display of excellence.
And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one
be not subject to another's command, it follows that dis-
obedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to
hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial
sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply Obj. 3. No one is bound to do the impossible:
wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays
them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil
them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors
should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.

Q.io5.Art.2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 42

Second Article,
whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that disobedience is the most
grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings xv. 23) : It is like
the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to
refuse to obey. But idolatry is the most grievous of sins,
as stated above (O. XCIV., A. 3). Therefore disobedience
is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The sin against the Holy Ghost is one
that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (0. XIV.,
A. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept
which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning.
Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost,
and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. v. 19) that by
the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners. Now
the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore
disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others
that are caused thereby.

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more
grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some
sins are against the very person of the commander, such as
blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the
most grievous of sins.

/ answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin : for
one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways.
First, on the part of the superior commanding, since,
although a man should take even7 care to obey each superior,
yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority,
in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set
aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority.
Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more
grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to
disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things
commanded. For the person commanding does not equally

43 DISOBEDIENCE Q. 105. Art. 2

desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such
person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest
to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous,
according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the
intention of the person commanding. As to the command-
ments of God, it is evident that the greater the good com-
manded, the more grievous the disobedience of that com-
mandment, because since God's will is essentially directed
to the good, the greater the good, the more does God wish
it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the com-
mandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one
who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbour.
On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the
greater good : hence, when we are bound by a mere precept
of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a
greater good, but through setting aside that which is more
in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must
correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because
the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept,
from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than
a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being
a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever
sins against his neighbour acts also against God's command-
ment.— And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet
graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The dis-
obedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less
grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made
the precept, because reverence for the person commanding
should give rise to reverence for his command. In like
manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such
as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we
mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would
be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply Obj. 1. This comparison of Samuel's is one, not of
equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to
the contempt of God, just as idolatry does, though the latter
does so more.

Q. 105. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 44

Reply Obj. 2. Not every disobedience is a sin against the
Holy Ghost, but only that to which obstinacy is added : for
it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes
sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good
would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may
hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the
Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which
lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 3. The first sin of our first parent, from which
sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience con-
sidered as a special sin, but pride, from which the man pro-
ceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems
to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.

QUESTION CVI

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE.

(In Six Articles.)

We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and
ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of
inquiry: (i) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct
from other virtues ? (2) Who owes more thanks to God,
the innocent or the penitent ? (3) Whether man is always
bound to give thanks for human favours ? (4) Whether
thanksgiving should be deferred ? (5) Whether thanks-
giving should be measured according to the favour received
or the disposition of the giver ? (6) Whether one ought to
pay back more than one has received ?

First Article.

whether thankfulness is a special virtue,
distinct from other virtues ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that thankfulness is not a special
virtue, distinct from other virtues. For we have received
the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now
the honour which we pay to God in return belongs to the
virtue of religion, and the honour with which we repay our
parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thank-
fulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, Proportionate repayment belongs to com-
mutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 4).
Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (ibid.).
Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an

Q 106. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 46

act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Acknowledgement of favour received is
requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, viii. 13 ; ix. 1). Now friendship is associated
with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man
is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which
it belongs to repay favours received, is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part
of justice (De Inv. Rhet. ii.).

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LX., A. 3), the
nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to
various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater
always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found
primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle
of all our goods : secondarily it is found in our father, because
he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbring-
ing: thirdty it is found in the person that excels in dignity,
from whom general favours proceed; fourthly it is found in
a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and
private favours, on account of which we are under par-
ticular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a
person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe
a benefactor from whom we have received some particular
favour, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God
due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents,
and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in
dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give
thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the
foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the
one that precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so
is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving
thanks to God was reckoned above (Q. LXXXIIL, A. 17)
among things pertaining to religion.

Reply Obj. 2. Proportionate repayment belongs to commu-
tative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance

47 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 2

when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much.
But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankful-
ness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid
spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when
compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis hi.).

Reply Obj. 3. Since true friendship is based on virtue,
whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle
to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive
to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by re-
payment of favours, although repayment of favours belongs
specially to the virtue of gratitude.

Second Article.

whether the innocent is more bound to give
thanks to god than the penitent ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the innocent is more bound
to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater
the gift one has received from God, the more is one bound
to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater
than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the
innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent.

Obj. 2. Further, A man owes love to his benefactor
just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says
(Conf. ii.) : What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare
to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that
so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy
mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee ?
And farther on he says: And for this let him love Thee as
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been
recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself
to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved. Therefore
the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the
penitent.

Obj. 3. Further, The more a gratuitous favour is con-
tinuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the

Q. io6. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 48

favour of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent
than in the penitent. For Augustine says (ibid.): To Thy
grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted
away my sins as it were ice To Thy grace I ascribe also what-
soever I have not done of evil ; for what might I not have done ?
. . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what
evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy
guidance I committed not. Therefore the innocent is more
bound to give thanks than the penitent.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vii. 47) : To whom
more is forgiven, he loveth more* Therefore for the same
reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.

/ answer that, Thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) in the
recipient corresponds to the favour (gratia) of the giver:
so that when there is greater favour on the part of th^ giver,
greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now
a favour is something bestowed gratis : wherefore on the
part of the giver the favour may be greater on two counts.
First, owing to the quantity of the thing given : and in this
way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he
receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking,
a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly,
a favour may be said to be greater, because it is given more
gratuitously ; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to
give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives
from God is more gratuitously given : since, whereas he was
deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Where-
fore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, con-
sidered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the
penitent is greater in relation to him : even as a small gift
bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift
is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars,
in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such
h ^ and now, rather than of what is such absolu* "dy, as the
Philosopher observes (Ethic, hi.) in treating of the voluntary
and the involuntary.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

* Vulg., — To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less.

49 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 3

Third Article.

whether a man is bound to give thanks to every

benefactor ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that a man is not bound to give
thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself
just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. xiv. 5,
He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good ? But a
man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to
pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving
is not due to every benefactor.

Obj. 2. Further, Gratitude is a repayment of an act of
grace. But some favours are granted without grace, and
are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore grati-
tude is not always due to a benefactor.

Obj. 3. Further, No thanks are due to one who works for
his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favours
for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to
them.

Obj. 4. Further, No thanks are due to a slave, for all
that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does
a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due
to every benefactor.

Obj. 5. Further, No one is bound to do what he cannot
do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times
that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no
advantage to him to be repaid for a favour he has bestowed.
Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being
virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem
equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favour may
be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore
seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for
favours received.

Obj. 6. Further, No one is bound to do for another what
is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it
happens that repayment of a favour would be hurtful or

n. ii. 4 4

Q. 106.ART.3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 50

useless to the person repaid. Therefore favours are not
always to be repaid by gratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. v. 18) : In all things
give thanks.

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause;
wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i.) that God turns all
things to Himself, because He is the cause of all : for the effect
must needs always be directed to the end of the agent.
Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the
beneficiary7. Hence the natural order requires that he who
has received a favour should, by repaying the favour, turn
to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as
stated above with regard to a father (Q. XXXI., A. 3:
O. CI., A. 2), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honour and
reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of
principle ; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support,
if he need it.

Reply Obj. 1. In the words of Seneca (De Benef. v.),
just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others,
and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful
who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's
so too, no man confers a favour on himself, he is but following
the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts
him, and to seek what is profitable. Wherefore in things that
one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or
ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except
by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly
spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically
in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding
justice {Ethic, v. n), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of
man are considered as though the}7 were various persons.

Reply Obj. 2. It is the mark of a happy disposition to see
good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred
a favour, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient
should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes
less thanks, than if the favour had been conferred duly,
since in fact the favour is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De
Benef. ii.) promptness enhances, delay discounts a favour.

51 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 3

Reply Obj. 3. As Seneca observes (De Bene/, vi.), it
matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his
own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that
considers himself only, and benefits because he cannot other-
wise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder
for his cattle. And farther on : If he has done it for me in
common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what
was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height
of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the
giver has been the loser thereby.

Reply Obj. 4. As Seneca observes [De Benef. iii.), when a
slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part
of his service : when he does more than a slave is bound to do,
it is a favour : for as soon as he does anything from a motive
of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer
called service. Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave,
when he does more than his duty.

Reply Obj. 5. A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if
he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the
heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends
chiefly on the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii.) :
Who receives a favour gratefully, has already begun to pay it
back : and that we are grateful for favours received should be
shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing
but everywhere. From this it is evident that however well
off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness
by showing him reverence and honour. Wherefore the
Philosopher says {Ethic, viii. 14) : He that abounds should be
repaid with honour, he that is in want should be repaid with
money : and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi.): There are many
ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen
to owe them ; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable
and pleasant conversation without flattery. Therefore there
is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in
his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as
Seneca says (De Benef. vi.), it were inhuman to desire this
in one from whom you have received no favour; how much

Q. io6. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52

more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his
debtor !

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue,
nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state,
that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so
wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and
consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as here-
tofore. And yet, as far as it is possible without sin, the
kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the
Philosopher says {Ethic, ix. 3).

Reply Obj. 6. As stated in the preceding reply, repay-
ment of a favour depends chiefly on the affection of the heart :
wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to
prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's
carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed
to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De
Bene/, vii.) : It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and
safeguard my repayment.

Fourth Article,
whether a man is bound to repay a favour at once ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that a man is bound to repay a
favour at once. For we are bound to restore at once what
we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term
prescribed for the repayment of favours, and yet this repay-
ment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a man is
bound to repay a favour at once.

Obj. 2. Further, A good action would seem to be all the
more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater
earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his
duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more
praiseworthy to repay a favour at once.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (De Bene/, ii.) that it is
proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly. Now repay-
ment ought to equal the favour received. Therefore it
should be done at once.

53 THANKFULNESS Q. 106. Art. 4

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Bene/, iv.) : He that
hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude
but of indebtedness.

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favour two things
are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and
the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying
the favour. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment
should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says {De Benef. ii.) :
Do you wish to repay a favour ? Receive it graciously. As
regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will
be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of
choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once,
favour for favour, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but
a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De
Belief, iv.), he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling
debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful.

Reply Obj. i. A legal debt must be paid at once, else the
equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's
property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on
the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid
in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply Obj. 2. Earnestness of the will is not virtuous
unless it be regulated by reason ; wherefore it is not praise-
worthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.

Reply Obj. 3. Favours also should be conferred at a
convenient time, and one should no longer delay when the
convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in
repaying favours.

Fifth Article.

whether in giving thanks we should look at the
benefactor's disposition or at the effect ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that in repaying favours we should
not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the effect.
For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence con-
sists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in re-
paying favours we should look at the effect.

Q. 106. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 54

Obj. 2. Further, Thanksgiving, whereby we repay favours,
is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between
giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favours we
should consider the effect rather than the disposition of the
benefactor.

Obj. 3. Further, No one can consider what he does not
know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition.
Therefore it is impossible to repay a favour according to the
benefactor's disposition.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Bene/, i.): We are some-
times under a greater obligation to one who has given little with
a large heart, and, has bestowed a small favour, yet willingly.

I answer that, The repayment of a favour may belong to
three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship.
It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character
of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like : and in such cases
repayment must be made according to the quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favour belongs, though
in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue
of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt.
For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the
cause of friendship ; so that in the friendship that is based
on the useful, repayment should be made according to the
usefulness accruing from the favour conferred, and in the
friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with
regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this
is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic, viii. 13.
And likewise, since gratitude regards the favour inasmuch as
it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the
giver, it follows again that repayment of a favour depends
more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.

Reply Obj. 1. Every moral act depends on the will.
Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is
deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done,
but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says
(De Benef. i.) : A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but
in the disposition of the giver or doer.

Reply Obj. 2. Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as

55 THANKFULNESS Q. io6.Art.g

a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the
genus of justice, as stated above (Q. LXXX.). Hence it
does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in
both virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. God alone sees man's disposition in itself:
but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can
know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known
by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance
through his doing it joyfully and readily.

Sixth Article.

whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass
the favour received ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that there is no need for the repay-
ment of gratitude to surpass the favour received. For it is
not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for
instance, to one's parents, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic, viii. 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impos-
sible. Therefore gratitude for a favour does not tend to
something yet greater.

Obj. 2. Further, If one person repays another more than
he has received by his favour, by that very fact he gives
him something in his turn, as it were. But the latter owes
him repayment for the favour which in his turn the former
has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a
favour will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on
indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite,
since the indefinite removes the nature of good (Metaph. ii.
text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not
surpass the favour received.

Obj. 3. Further, Justice consists in equality. But more
is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in
every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favour
received is sinful and opposed to justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, v. 5): We
should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious

Q. 106. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 56

to them in return, and this is done by repaying more than
we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do
something greater.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the
favour received according to the intention of the benefactor;
who seems to be deserving of praise, chiefly for having con-
ferred the favour gratis without being bound to do so.
Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to
bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem
to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity
of the favour received : because so long as he repays less or
an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only
to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always
inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 3, ad 5, A. 5), in repaying
favours we must consider the disposition rather than the
deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence,
which a son receives from his parents, namely, to be and to
live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic, viii. 14). But if we consider the
will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for
the son to pay back something greater to his father,
as Seneca declares (De Benef. hi.). If, however, he were
unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for
gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2. The debt of gratitude flows from charity,
which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to
Rom. xiii. 8, Owe no man anything, but to love one another.
Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of grati-
tude has no limit.

Reply Obj. 3. As in justice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider
equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor
of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to
give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something
over and above what he has received.

QUESTION CVII.

OF INGRATITUDE.

(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there
are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether ingratitude is always
a sin ? (2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin ? (3) Whether
every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether favours
should be withdrawn from the ungrateful ?

First Article,
whether ingratitude is always a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin.
For Seneca says (De Benef iii.) that he who does not repay a
favour is ungrateful. But sometimes it is impossible to
repay a favour without sinning, for instance if one man has
helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not
a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not
always a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is in the power of the person
who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib.
Arb. iii.: Retract, i.), no man sins in what he cannot avoid.
Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid
ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of
repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii.) that to forget a kindness is
the height of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always
a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, There would seem to be no repayment in

Q. 107. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " s8

being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle
(Rom. xiii. 8), Owe no man anything. Yet an unwilling
debtor is ungrateful, as Seneca declares (De Bene/, iv.).
Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins
(2 Tim. iii. 2), where it is written: Disobedient to parents,
ungrateful, wicked, etc.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CVL, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6)
a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now
a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue.
Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Gratitude regards a favour received: and
he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favour
but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except per-
haps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been
deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good,
whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repay-
ment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit
a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and
this is contrary to gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2. No man is excused from ingratitude through
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will
suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated
above (Q. CVL, A. 6, ad 1).

Forgetfulness of a favour received amounts to ingratitude,
not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect,
that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from
negligence. For, as Seneca observes {De Bene/, iii.), when
forgetfulness of favours lays hold of a man, he has apparently
given little thought to their repayment.

Reply Obj. 3. The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free.
Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems
to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.

59 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 2

Second Article,
whether ingratitude is a special sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection I. It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin.
For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor.
But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is
not a special sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No special sin is contained under different
kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing
different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or some-
thing similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore
ingratitude is not a special sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca writes {De Bene/, iii.): It is un-
grateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to
repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. Now
these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. There-
fore ingratitude is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or
thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a
special sin.

I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency
of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue : thus
illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is.
Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way
of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for
things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is
due, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 4). But still more opposed
to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, be-
cause the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 6),
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude
is properly denominated from being a deficiency of grati-
tude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species
from the opposite habit : for blindness and deafness differ
according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore
just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also
is ingratitude one special sin.

Q. 107. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 60

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their
order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these
is to recognize the favour received, the second to express
one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the
favour at a suitable place and time according to one's
means. And since what is last in the order of generation
is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first
degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favour,
the second when he declines to notice and indicate that he
has received a favour, while the third and supreme degree is
when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favour,
whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover,
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that
it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for
good, to the second to find fault with a favour received, and
to the third to esteem kindness as though it were un-
kindness.

Reply Obj. 1. In every sin there is material ingratitude
to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may
pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a
favour is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some
special sin from being found materially in several kinds of
sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found
in many kinds of sin.

Reply Obj. 3. These three are not different species but
different degrees of one special sin.

Third Article,
whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Third A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal
sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But
one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin:
else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore
no ingratitude is a venial sin.

Obj. 2. Further, A sin is mortal through being contrary

61 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 3

to charity, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12). But in-
gratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude
proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 1, ad 3,
A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Seneca says (De Bene/, ii.) : Between the
giver and the receiver of a favour there is this law, that the
former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter
should never forget having received. Now, seemingly, the
reason why the giver should forget is that he may be un-
aware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove
ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if
ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always
a mortal sin.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca {ibid.),
sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from
whom he has received. But this would seem to put the
recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude
is not always a mortal sin.

/ answer that, As appears from what we have said above
(A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere
omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favour
received, or to express his appreciation of it, or to pay some-
thing in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because,
as stated above (Q. CVL, A. 6), the debt of gratitude requires
a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not
bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises
either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclina-
tion to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may
happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward con-
tempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful
to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity.

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only
omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary.
This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial
sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.

Q.io7.Art.3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude
arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of
ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the
imperfect character.

Reply Obj. 1. By committing a venial sin one is not un-
grateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect
ingratitude : but there is something of ingratitude in a venial
sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.

Reply Obj. 2. When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the
habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof.

Reply Obj. 3. Seneca also says (De Benef. vii.): When we
say that a man after conferring a favour should forget about it,
it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the
recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say :
He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish
it abroad and boast about it.

Reply Obj. 4. He that is unaware of a favour conferred
on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he
be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless com-
mendable at times that the object of a favour should remain
in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when
Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to
avoid popularity ; and because the kindness is all the greater
through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on
whom he is conferring the favour.

Fourth Article.

whether favours should be withheld from the

ungrateful ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that favours should be withheld from
the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. xvi. 29) : The hope of
the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice. But this
hope would not melt away unless favours were withheld from
him. Therefore favours should be withheld from the un-
grateful.

63 INGRATITUDE Q. 107. Art. 4

Obj. 2. Further, No one should afford another an occasion
of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favour
is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favours
should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.

Obj. 3. Further, By what things a man sinneth, by the same
also he is tormented (Wis. xi. 17). Now he that is ungrateful
when he receives a favour sins against the favour. There-
fore he should be deprived of the favour.

On the contrary, It is written (Luke vi. 35) that the
Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Now
we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him
{ibid. 36). Therefore we should not withhold favours from
the ungrateful.

i" answer that, There are two points to be considered with
regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he de-
serves to suffer, and thus it is certain that he deserves to be
deprived of our favour. The second is, what ought his bene-
factor to do ? For in the first place he should not easily
judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De
Bene/, iii.), a man is often grateful although he repays not,
because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of
repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his un-
gratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this
by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time.
If, however, the more he repeats his favours, the more
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from
bestowing his favours upon him.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage quoted speaks of what the
ungrateful man deserves to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2. He that bestows a favour on an ungrateful
person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and
love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of
ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.

Reply Obj. 3. He that bestows a favour must not at once
act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a
kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated
favours.

QUESTION CVIII.

OF VENGEANCE.
(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there
are four points of inquiry: (i) Whether vengeance is law-
ful ? (2) Whether it is a special virtue ? (3) Of the manner
of taking vengeance: (4) On whom should vengeance be
taken ?

First Article,
whether vengeance is lawful ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For
whoever usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs
to God, for it is written (Deut. xxxii. 35, and Rom. xii. 19) :
Revenge to Me, and I will repay. Therefore all vengeance is
unlawful.

Obj. 2. Further, He that takes vengeance on a man
does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the
wicked, for a gloss on Cant. ii. 2, As the lily among the thorns,
says : He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one.
Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.

Obj. 3. Further, Vengeance is taken by inflicting punish-
ment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is
not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra
Adamant, xvii.). Therefore at least in the New Testament
all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 4. Further, A man is said to avenge himself when he
takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seem-
ingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have

65 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. i

wronged him : for Chrysostom* says : Let us learn after Christ's
example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to
suffer God's wrongs, not even by listening to them. Therefore
vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Obj. 5. Further, The sin of a multitude is more harmful
than the sin of only one : for it is written (Ecclus. xxvi. 5-7) :
Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation
of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false
calumny. But vengeance should not be taken on the sin
of a multitude, for a gloss on Matth. xiii. 29, 30, Lest per-
haps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow, says
that a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the
sovereign. Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.

On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save
what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for
vengeance on His enemies : for it is written (Luke xviii. 7) :
Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night ?
as if to say: He will indeed. Therefore vengeance is not
essentially evil and unlawful.

/ answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a
penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the
matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the
avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil
of the person on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there,
then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary
co the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor
is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly
inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating
one that hates him : for a man may not sin against another
just because the latter has already sinned against him, since
this is to be overcome b\' evil, Which was forbidden by the
Apostle, who says (Rom. xii. 21) : Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good.

If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to
some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of

* Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Horn. v. in Matth. falsely ascribed to
S. Chrysostom.

11. ii. 4 5

Q. 108. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 66

the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may
amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others
be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God
honoured), then vengeance maybe lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.

Reply Obj. i. He who takes vengeance on the wicked in
keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what
belongs to God, but makes use of the power granted him by
God. For it is written (Rom. xiii. 4) of the earthly prince
that he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon
him that doeth evil. If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what
is God's and therefore sins.

Reply Obj. 2. The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves
receive from them : but they do not bear with them so as to
endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbour.
For Chrysostom* says : It is praiseworthy to be patient under
our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most wicked.

Reply Obj. 3. The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone
properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized
by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved
by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the
Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a wrong done to a person
reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of
that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made
fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings i.) ;
likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kings ii.) ;
and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII., Q. iv., Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far
as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should
bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts
of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness
of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i.).

Reply Obj. 5. When the whole multitude sins, vengeance

* Cf. Obj. 4 and footnote.

6y VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. i

must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole
multitude — thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red
Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Exod.
xiv.), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed
(Gen. xix.) — or as regards part of the multitude, as may
be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making
amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to
bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment nils the
rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num. xxv.) commanded
the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the
multitude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of
the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be
separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on
them: provided, however, that this can be done without
scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and
severity forgone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom
the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if
it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude:
unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm
to the multitude, either spirituahy or temporally, than would
the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

Second Article,
whether vengeance is a special virtue?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that vengeance is not a special
and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for
their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil
deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to
a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice.
Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be ac-
counted a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, There is no need to appoint a special
virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by
the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the

Q.io8.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68

virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore
vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, There is a special vice opposed to every
special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed
to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons it a part
of justice.

/ answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic, ii. i), apti-
tude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of
virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause.
Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow
in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the
natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclina-
tion there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a
special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself
against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges
those which have already been inflicted on him, with the
intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done.
And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (loc. cit.)
that by vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general
whatever is obscure* (i.e. derogatory), either by self-defence
or by avenging it. Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt,
arising from the bestowal of a particular favour, belongs to
the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins,
so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of com-
mutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending
the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it
belongs to the virtue of revenge.

Reply Obj. 2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by re-
moving an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent
danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervour of love, signifies the
primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the

* Obscurum. Cicero wrote obfuturum: but the sense is the same as
S. Thomas gives in the parenthesis.

69 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 3

wrong done to God and his neighbour, because charity makes
him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory
(Horn, xxvii. in Ev.), there are no green leaves on the bough
of good works, unless charity be the root.

Reply Obj. 3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one
by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality,
which exceeds the measure in punishing : while the other is
a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in
punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov. xiii. 24) : He that
spareth the rod hateth his sow. But the virtue of vengeance
consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.

Third Article.

whether vengeance should be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should not be
wrought by means of punishments customary among men.
For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But Our
Lord forbade (Matth. xiii. 29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. There-
fore sinners should not be put to death.

Obj. 2. Further, All who sin mortally seem to be deserv-
ing of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin
mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such
persons should be punished with death : and this is evidently
false.

Obj. 3. Further, To punish a man publicly for his sin
seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a
harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is
taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems
that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin.

On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine
law as appears from what we have said above (I. -II.,

Q- cv., A. 2).

Q. 108. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 70

/ answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it
tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not
influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from commit-
ting sin, through fear of losing those things which they
love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would
be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most.
Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety,
his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his
country and his good name. Wherefore, according to
Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi.), Tully writes thai
the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment : namely, death,
whereby man is deprived of life; stripes, retaliation, or the
loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safet}';
slavery, and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of free-
dom ; exile, whereby he is banished from his country ; fines,
whereby he is mulcted in his riches ; ignominy, whereby he
loses his good name.

Reply Obj. 1. Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the
cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted to-
gether with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted
by death, not only without danger, but even with great
profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punish-
ment of death may be inflicted on sinners.

Reply Obj. 2. All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance
with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punish-
ments of this life are more of a medicinal character ; where-
fore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone
which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

Reply Obj. 3. The very fact that the punishment, whether
of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made
known at the same time as the sin, makes man's will averse
to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the
enticement of the example of sin.

71 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4

Fourth Article.

whether vengeance should be taken on those who
have sinned involuntarily ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that vengeance should be taken
on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of
one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one
man is punished for another, according to Exod. xx. 5,
I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation.
Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed
(Gen. ix. 25), and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were
struck with leprosy (4 Kings v.). Again the blood of
Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of
punishment, for they said (Matth. xxvii. 25) : His blood be
upon us and upon our children. Moreover, we read (Josue vii.)
that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their
enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were
overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the
sons of Heli (1 Kings iv.). Therefore a person is to be
punished without having deserved it voluntarily.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is voluntary except what is in a
man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what
is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the
administration of the Church on account of being infected
with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on
account of the depravity or evil deeds of the people. There-
fore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.

Obj. 3. Further, Ignorance makes an act involuntary.
Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus
the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in
invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Gen. xix.).
Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were
swallowed up together with them (Num. xvi.). Moreover,
dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded
to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings

Q. 108. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72

xv.). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.

Obj. 4. Further, Compulsion is most opposed to volun-
tariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punish-
ment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin.
Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have
deserved it involuntarily.

Obj. 5. Further, Ambrose says on Luke v. that the ship in
which Judas was, was in distress ; wherefore Peter, who was
calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about
those of others. But Peter did not will the sin of Judas.
Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having
voluntarily deserved it.

On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every
sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. hi.:
Retract, i.). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on
those who have deserved it voluntarily.

/ answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways.
First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way
punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of
punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he
who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will
suffers something that is contrary to his will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. LXXXI., A. 1), it follows that no one is
punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.
Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not
only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future
sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is
sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not
without cause.

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never
removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the
medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair
the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that
it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And
since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while
temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is

73 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4

punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own.
Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this
present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one
is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part,
neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter
punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual con-
demnation.

Reply Obj. I. A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punish-
ment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master
of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punish-
ment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and this
for three reasons. First, because one man may be the
temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body,
are a belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession
of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is trans-
mitted to another, either by imitation, as children copy the
sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as
to sin with greater daring ; or by way of merit, as the sinful
subjects merit a sinful superior, according to Job xxxiv. 30,
Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of
the people ? Hence the people of Israel were punished for
David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings xxiv.). This
may also happen through some kind of consent or conni-
vance: thus sometimes even the good are punished in tem-
poral matters together with the wicked, for not having con-
demned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix.).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship,
whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest
he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the
punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body,
as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup.
Josue viii.). The saying of the Lord, Visiting the iniquity
of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation, seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity,
since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for
some future time, in order that the descendants at least

Q.io8.Art.4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 74

may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the
descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take
vengeance on them.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine states (loc. cit.), human judg-
ment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is
manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own
sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God's
hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons
in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man
is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments, so as to
know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore
according to human judgment a man should never be con-
demned without fault of his own to an inflictive punish-
ment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to
a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his
part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good : thus for
being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the
administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through
pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from re-
ceiving sacred orders.

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits
is not his own but common property : thus that an episcopal
see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good
of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics.

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on
the good of another : thus in the crime of high treason a son
loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent.

Reply Obj. 3. By the judgment of God children are
punished in temporal matters together with their parents,
both because they are a possession of their parents, so that
their parents are punished also in their person, and because
this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might
imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be
punished still more severely.

Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other

75 VENGEANCE Q. 108. Art. 4

irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are
punished; and also in horror of sin.

Reply Obj. 4. An act done through compulsion of fear is
not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntari-
ness, as stated above (I.-IL, Q. VI., AA. 5, 6).

Reply Obj. 5. The other apostles were distressed about
the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is
punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as
stated above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).

QUESTION CIX.

OF TRUTH.
(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto.
Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether
truth is a virtue ? (2) Whether it is a special virtue ? (3)
Whether it is a part of justice ? (4) Whether it inclines to
that which is less ?

First Article,
whether truth is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the
first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then
the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth
is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7),
it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning
himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this
is not always praiseworthy — neither in good things, since
according to Prov. xxvii. 2, Let another praise thee, and not
thy own mouth — nor even in evil things, because it is written
in condemnation of certain people (Isa. iii. 9) : They have
proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid
it. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue,
because its object is not God but temporal things. For
Tully says (De Jnv. Rhet. ii.) that by truth we faithfully repre-
sent things as thev are, were, or will be. Likewise it is not one

77 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. i

of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a
moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and
deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is.
Therefore truth is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and
in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other
virtues.

/ answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for
that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus
truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue:
because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is
the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between
the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signi-
fied, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the
First Part (Q. XVI., A. 1: Q. XXL, A. 2). Secondly, truth
may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in
which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truth-
fulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true
is a good act : and virtue is that which makes its subject good,
and renders his action good.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes truth in the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2. To state that which concerns oneself, in so
far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically.
Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it
is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed
with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed,
the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise one-
self without due cause even for that which is true : and it is
also sinful to publish one's sin, by praising oneself on that
account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly.

Reply Obj. 3. A person who. says what is true, utters
certain signs which are in conformity with things ; and such
signs are either words, or external actions, or any external
thing. Now' these external things are the subject-matter
of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned
with the use of the external members, in so far as this use
is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore
truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral

Q. 109. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 78

virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency
in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on
the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the
true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a
mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the
mean between one that says more than the truth about
himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part
of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one
ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known
one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding
them when one ought to make them known.

Second Article,
whether truth is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection I. It seems that truth is not a special virtue.
For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness
is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness,
because it makes its subject good. Therefore truth is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, To make known what belongs to oneself
is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs
to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known
by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The truth of life is the truth whereby one
lives aright, and of which it is written (Isa. xxxviii. 3): /
beseech Thee . . remember how I have walked before Thee in
truth, and with a perfect heart. Now one lives aright by any
virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above
(I. -II., Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore truth is not a special
virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, Truth seems to be the same as simplicity,
since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a
special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is
required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a
special virtue.

79 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 2

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues
(Ethic, ii. 7).

/ answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in
making a man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find
a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary
that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since
according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni hi.) good consists in
order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found
where there is a special order. Now there is a special order
whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly
ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified:
and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Where-
fore it is evident that truth is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The true and the good are convertible as to
subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing
is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another,
even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the
intellect understands the will and many things besides, and
the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many
others. Wherefore the true considered in its proper aspect
as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is
something appetible : and in like manner the good considered
in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something
true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue
includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be
a special virtue, just as the true is a special good; yet it is not
possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. The habits of virtue and vice take their
species from what is directly intended, and not from that
which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a
man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue
of truth, as something directly intended: although it may
belong to other virtues consequently and beside his prin-
cipal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely :
and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a con-
sequence beside his principal intention.

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing

Q.109.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 80

is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like
anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains
its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude
of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or
rectitude is common to every virtue.

Reply Obj. 4. Simplicity is so called from its opposition
to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing out-
wardly while having another in his heart - so that simplicity
pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not
indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by
excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and
intends another.

Third Article,
whether truth is a part of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice.
For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due.
But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another
man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice.
Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, Truth pertains to the intellect: whereas
justice is in the will, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 4).
Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, According to Jerome truth is threefold,
namely, truth of life, truth of justice, and truth of doctrine.
But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life com-
prises all virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3) : truth of justice
is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and
truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues.
Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice.

On the contrary, Tully {De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons truth
among the parts of justice.

J answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXX.), a virtue is
annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue,
through having something in common with justice, while
falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue
of truth has two things in common with justice. In the

8i TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 3

first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation,
which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to
another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the
things that concern himself. In the second place, justice
sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue
of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which
concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the
proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this
virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers,
but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one
man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore
truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secon-
dary virtue to its principal.

Reply Obj. 1. Since man is a social animal, one man
naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the pre-
servation of human society. Now it would be impossible
for men to live together, unless they believed one another,
as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue
of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.

Reply Obj. 2. Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect.
But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and
members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth,
and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of
the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The truth of which we are speaking now
differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding
Article {ad 3).

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way
we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude
regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in
this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life,
because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself,
whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude
of the law in those judgements which refer to another man :
and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do
with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the
truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be
understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a

n. ii. 4 6

Q. 109. Art, 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 82

man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man con-
fesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice.
This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain
directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because,
to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief
intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philo-
sopher says [Ethic, iv. 7) in describing this virtue : We are not
speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this
apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned.

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation
of truths relating to science. Wherefore neither does this
truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth
whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself
to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not
other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Never-
theless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to us, in this sense the truth
of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other
kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed,
what he knows.

Fourth Article.

whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that

which is less ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not
incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood
by saying more, so does one by saying less : thus it is no more
false that four are five, than that four are three. But every
falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided, as the Philosopher
declares [Ethic, iv. 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not
incline to that which is less rather than to that which is
greater.

Obj. 2. Further. That a virtue inclines to the one extreme
rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's
mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other : thus
fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the
mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the

83 TRUTH Q. 109. Art. 4

other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to
the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to
that which is less.

Obj. 3. Further, To forsake the truth for that which is
less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to
subtract therefrom ; and to forsake the truth for that which
is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to
deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add some-
thing to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of
truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it
seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather
than to that which is less.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7) that
by this virtue a man inclines rather from the truth towards
that which is less.

I answer that, There are two ways of inclining from the
truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a
man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance
science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice
to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater : and in
this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the
Philosopher says (ibid.) , this seems to be more prudent because
exaggerations give annoyance. For those who represent
themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoy-
ance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others:
whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source
of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their modera-
tion. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 6) : Though I
should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish : for I will
say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of
me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth
from me.

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so
as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not
belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this
would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repug-
nant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of
truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should

Q. iog. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 84

be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught
with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is
more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has
what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what
one has.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION CX.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF

LYING.

(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (i)
lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the
opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of
inquiry: (1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is
always opposed to truth ? (2) Of the species of lying :
(3) Whether lying is always a sin ? (4) Whether it is always
a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether lying is always opposed to truth ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed
to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another.
But lying is compatible with truth, since he that speaks the
truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine
(Contra Mendac. iii.). Therefore lying is not opposed to
truth.

Obj. 2. Further, The virtue of truth applies not only to
words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher
(Ethic, iv. 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's
speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words,
for Augustine says (Contra Mend, xii.) that a lie is a false
signification by words. Accordingly, it seems that lying is not
directly opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Contra Mend., loc. cit.)
that the liar's sin is the desire to deceive. But this is not

Q. 1 10. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 86

opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice.
Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend, x.): Let
no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive.
Wherefore a false staten ent uttered with intent to deceive is
a manifest lie. But this is opposed to truth. Therefore
lying is opposed to truth.

/ answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things,
its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will,
which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power
moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate
object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the
will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated
above ( I.-IL, Q. XVIII., AA. 6, 7).

Now it has been said above (Q. CIX., A.i, ad 3) that
the virtue of truth — and consequently the opposite vices —
regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this
manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing
sign with the thing signified ; because every representation
consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason.
Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet
they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do
something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the
result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral
act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the
intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifesta-
tion or statement is the true or the false. And the intention
of a bad will may bear on two things : one of which is that
a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect
of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood
of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the
intention to deceive, then there is falsehood — materially,
since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will
to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will
to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal
falsehood, from the fact, namely, that a person intends to

87 LYING Q. no. Art. i

say what is false; wherefore also the word mendacium (lie)
is derived from its being in opposition to the mind. Conse-
quently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it
is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is
beside the intention of the speaker : so that it is not a perfect
lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental,
for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on
the other hand, one utters a falsehood formally, through
having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true,
yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it
contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and
attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false
opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species
of lying, but to a perfection thereof, even as in the physical
order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even
though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy
body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in
accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is
evident that lying is directly and formally opposed to the
virtue of truth.

Re fly Obj. i. We judge of a thing according to what is
in it formally and essentially, rather than according to what
is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in
opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the
truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a
falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ, ii.),
words hold the chief place among other signs. And so
when it is said that a. lie is a false signification by words, the
term words denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a
person intended to signify something false by means of signs,
he would not be excused from lying.

Reply Obj. 3. The desire to deceive belongs to the per-
fection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any
effect belong to the species of its cause.

Q. no. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88

Second Article.

whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious,
jocose and mischievous lies ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided
into officious, jocose and mischievous lies. For a division
should be made according to that which pertains to a thing
by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (MeUph.
vii. text. 43: De Part. Animal, i. 3). But seemingly the
intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is some-
thing beside and accidental to the species of that act, so
that an indefinite number of effects can result from one
act. Now this division is made according to the intention
of the effect : for a jocose lie is told in order to make fun, an
officious lie for some useful purpose, and a mischievous he
in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly
divided in this way.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv.) gives
eight kinds of lies. The first is in religious doctrine; the
second is a lie that profits no one and injures someone ; the
third profits one party so as to injure another ; the fourth is
told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving; the fifth is told
out of the desire to please ; the sixth injures no one, and profits
someone in saving his money ; the seventh injures no one and
profits someone in saving him from death ; the eighth injures no
one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the
body. Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is
insufficient.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7) divides
lying into boasting, which exceeds the truth in speech, and
irony, which falls short of the truth by saying something
less: and these two are not contained under any one of
the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the
aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. v. 7, Thou wilt destroy all
that speak a lie, says that there are three kinds of lies ; for some

89 LYING Q. tio.akt.2

are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone', and
there is another kind of lie that is told in fun ; but the third
kind of lie is told out of malice. The first of these is called
an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mis-
chievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three
kinds.

/ answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First,
with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper
and essential division of lying. In this way, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the
lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to boasting,
and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs
to irony. This division is an essential division of lying
itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated
in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equalitj', to
which more and less are in essential opposition.

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature
as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or
diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended.
Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends
to injure another, and this is called a mischievous lie, while
the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good —
either of pleasure and then it is a jocose lie, or of usefulness,
and then we have the officious lie, whereby it is intended to
help another person, or to save him from being injured. In
this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with
respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this
increase or diminish their gravity : and in this way the divi-
sion comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection.
Here the first three kinds are contained under mischievous
lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie
in religious doctrine, or against man, and this either with
the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second
kind of lie, which profits no one, and injures someone; or with
the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting
another, and this is the third kind of lie, which profits one,
and injures another. Of these the first is the most grievous,

Q. no. Art, 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " go

because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated
above (I. -II., Q. LXXIIL, A. 9): and the second is more
grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is dimin-
ished by the intention of profiting another.

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we
have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity with-
out addition or diminution, and this is the lie which is told
out of mere lust of lying and deceiving. This proceeds from
the habit, wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7) that
the liar, since he lies from habit, delights in lying.

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin
of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told
with a desire to please : and the remaining three are comprised
under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another
person is intended. This usefulness regards either external
things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which profits
someone in saving his money; or his body, and this is the
seventh kind, which saves a man from death; or the morality
of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which saves him
from unlawful defilement of his body.

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the
more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore
a careful consideration of the matter will show that these
various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity :
since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good,
and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life
of the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Third Article,
whether every lie is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is
evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the
Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false : since
their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often
differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them

91 LYING Q. no. Art. 3

must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every
lie is a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No one is rewarded by God for sin. But
the mid wives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for
it is stated that God built them houses (Exod. i. 21). There-
fore a lie is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The deeds of holy men are related in
Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But
we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus
(Gen. xii. and xx.) we are told that Abraham said of his wife
that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he
was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen. xxvii. 27-29).
Again, Judith is commended (Judith xv. 10, 11) although
she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, One ought to choose the lesser evil in
order to avoid the greater : even so a physician cuts off a
limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by
raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone
slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie,
to save another from committing murder, or another from
being killed.

Obj. 5. Further, It is a lie not to fulfil what one has
promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises:
for Isidore says (Synonym, ii.) : Break your faith when you
have promised ill. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 6. Further, Apparently a lie is a sin because thereby
we deceive our neighbour : wherefore Augustine says (Contra
Mend, xxi.) : Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that
is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems him-
self an honest man when he deceives others. Yet not every
lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a
jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the
intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving
pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in
Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. vii. 14): Be not
willing to make any manner of lie.

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect

Quo. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 92

of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in
order for an action to be good it must be right in every
respect: because good results from a complete cause, while
evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts
(Div. Nont. iv.). Now a he is evil in respect of its genus,
since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words
are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and
undue for anyone to signify by words something that is
not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 7)
that lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness
is good and worthy of praise. Therefore every he is a sin,
as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i.).

Reply Obj, 1. It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion
is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scrip-
ture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because
faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on
the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain
people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred
writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says
(De Consens. Evang. ii.) : He that has the wit to understand
that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense,
will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter
by what words that sense is expressed. Hence it is evident,
as he adds (ibid.), that we must not judge that someone is
lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and
in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen
or heard.

Reply Obj. 2. The midwives were rewarded, not for their
lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which
latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated
(Exod. ii. 21) : And because the midwives feared God, He built
them houses. But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes
(Contra Mend, v.), the deeds of certain persons are related
as examples of perfect virtue : and we must not believe that
such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements
appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements
to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says

93 LYING Q. no. Art. 3

(Contra Mend., loc. cit.): We must believe that whatever is
related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being
worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically.
As to Abraham when he said that Sara was his sister, he
wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his
sister since she was the daughter of his father, as Augustine
says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi. : Contra Mend. x. : Contra Faust.
xxii.). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gen. xx. 12):
She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the
daughter of my mother, being related to him on his father's
side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born,
was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's
birthright was due to him by right : and he made use of this
mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in
order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people,
i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on
account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposi-
tion, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy senti-
ment that they were moved to do certain undue things.
It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holof ernes,
but for her desire to save the people, to which end she
exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that
her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

Reply Obj. 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures
one's neighbour, but also on account of its inordinateness,
as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to
make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury
or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in
order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity
when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful
to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger
whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth
prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra
Mend. x.).

Reply Obj. 5. A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind
to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary
to what he has in mind : but if he does not keep his promise,

Q. no. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94

he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He
may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has
promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned
in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly,
if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and
the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Bene/, iv.),
for a man to be bound to keep a promise it is necessary for
everything to remain unchanged : otherwise neither did he
lie in promising — since he promised what he had in his
mind, due circumstances being taken for granted — nor was
he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circum-
stances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though
he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go
(2 Cor. i.), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which
prevented him.

Reply Obj. 6. An action may be considered in two ways.
First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Ac-
cordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is
of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the
speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the
way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical
or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet
in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says {Contra Mend, v.),
it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively : because every
statement must be referred to the thing stated : and when a
thing is done or said figuratively , it states what those to whom
it is tendered understand it to signify.

Fourth Article,
whether every lie is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it
is written (Ps. vi. 7) : Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,
and (Wis. i. 11) : The mouth that belieth killeth the soul. Now
mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul.
Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is against a precept of the

95 LYING Quo. Art. 4

decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept
of the decalogue : Thou shalt not bear false witness. There-
fore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i. 36) :
Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes
the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does
not keep faith with him, when he lies to him : and whoever
breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity. Now no one is said to
break his faith or to be guilty of iniquity, for a venial sin.
Therefore no lie is a venial sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The eternal reward is not lost save for
a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost,
being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says
{Moral, xviii.) that we learn from the reward of the midwives
what the sin of lying deserves : since the reward which they
deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received
in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the
lie of which they were guilty. Therefore even an officious lie,
such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the
least of lies, is a mortal sin.

Obj. 5. Further, Augustine says [Contra Mend, xvii.)
that it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but
not even to wish to lie. Now it is a mortal sin to act against
a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal
sin : and consequently so also is a He told by anyone else,
otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. v. 7, Thou wilt
destroy, etc. : There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously
sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking,
or for the sake of our neighbour' s good. But every mortal
sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not
mortal sins.

/ answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that
is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with
God, as stated above (Q. XXIV., A. 12; Q. XXXV., A. 3).
Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways : first,
in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly,
accidentally.

(). no. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 96

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its
false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is
contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or
corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed
not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of
faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a
mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about
something the knowledge of which affects a man's good,
for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to
moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on
one's neighbour, since it causes him to have a false opinion,
wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our
neighbour, and consequently is a mortal sin On the other
hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about
some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence,
then the he in question does no harm to one's neighbour:
for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent
particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of
this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.

As regards the end in view, a he may be contrary to
charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring
God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to
religion; or in order to injure one's neighbour, in his person,
his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal
sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbour, and
one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of com-
mitting a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not
contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under
this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie,
where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious
lie, where the good also of one's neighbour is intended.
Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of
scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus
again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not
deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to the mis-
chievous he, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. v. 7, Thou
wilt destroy all that speak a lie.

97 LYING Q. no. Art. 4

Reply Obj. 2. Since all the precepts of the decalogue are
directed to the love of God and our neighbour, as stated
above (Q. XLIV., A. 1, ad 3 : I. -II., Q. C, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is
contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is
contrary to the love of God and our neighbour. Hence it
is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our
neighbour.

Reply Obj. 3. Even a venial sin can be called iniquity in
a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice;
wherefore it is written (1 John iii. 4) : Every* sin is iniquity.
It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 4. The lie of the midwives may be considered
in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness
towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God,
for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For
this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his
exposition of Isa. lxv. 21, And they shall build houses)
explains that God built them spiritual houses. Secondly, it
may be considered with regard to the external act of
lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal
reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving
of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of
their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting
an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must under-
stand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by
that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already
merited.it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection
understands the words to mean.

Reply Obj. 5. Some say that for the perfect every lie is
a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no
circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous
unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance
of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except
perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person,
for instance if it be against his vow : and this cannot apply
to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a
jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps

* Vulg., — And sin is iniquity.
II. ii. 4 7

Q. no. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 98

accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in
this sense the saying of Augustine that it is a precept of
perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie:
although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously,
for he begins by saying Unless perhaps it is a precept, etc.
Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to
safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard
the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and
if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin : but
it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in
other matters.

QUESTION CXI.

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY.
(In Four Articles.)

In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypo-
crisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether all dissimulation is a sin ? (2) Whether hypo-
crisy is dissimulation ? (3) Whether it is opposed to truth ?
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether all dissimulation is a sin ?

We proceed this to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin.
For it is written (Luke xxiv. 28) that our Lord pretended
(Douay, — made as though) he would go farther; and Ambrose
in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham, i.) says of
Abraham that he spoke craftily to his servants, when he said
(Gen. xxii. 5) : / and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder,
and after we have worshipped, will return to you. Now to
pretend and to speak craftily savour of dissimulation : and
yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abra-
ham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, No sin is profitable. But according to
Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. ii. n, When Peter
(Vulg., — Cephas) was come to Antioch: — The example of Jehu,
king of Israel, who slew the priests of Baal, pretending that he
desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is
useful and sometimes to be employed; and David changed his
countenance before Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings xxi. 13).
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Q. in. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " ioo

Obj. 3. Further, Good is contrary to evil. Therefore if
it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.

Obj. 4. Further, It is written in condemnation of certain
people (Isa. iii. 9) : They have proclaimed abroad their sin
as Sodom, and they have not hid it. Now it pertains to
dissimulation to hide one's sin. Therefore it is repre-
hensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never
reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not
a sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on Isa. xvi. 14, In three years, etc.,
says : Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate
holiness. But to sin openly is always a sin: Therefore dis-
simulation is always a sin.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 3: Q. CX.,
A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself out-
wardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now out-
ward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly
just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something
different from that which is in one's mind, so also is it con-
trary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify
the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly
denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is
properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it
matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way,
as stated above (Q. CX., A. 1, Obj. 2). Wherefore, since
every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., A. 3), it follows
that also all dissimulation is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii.),
To pretend is not always a lie : but only when the pretence
has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our
pretence refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a
representation of the truth. And he cites figures of speech
as an example, where a thing is pretended, for we do not
mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something
else that we wish to say. In this way Our Lord pretended
He would go farther, because He acted as if wishing to
go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either
because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory

ioi HYPOCRISY Q. in. Art. i

(Horn, xxiii. in Ev.) ; or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang.
ii.), because, as He was about to go farther away from them
by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on
earth by their hospitality.

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose
(loc. cit.) says that Abraham foretold what he knew not : for
he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son. but
by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do.
It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.

Reply Obj. 2. Jerome employs the term simulation in a
broad sense for any kind of pretence. David's change of
countenance was a figurative pretence, as a gloss observes
in commenting on the title of Ps. xxxiii., I will bless the Lord
at all times. There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation
from sin or He, because he was a wicked man, since he
departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings x.
29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an
earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for
his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal.

Reply Obj. 3. Some say that no one may pretend to be
wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good
deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument
proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil,
by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance
of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both
because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although
he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the
wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is
evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing
simulated, whether this be good or evil.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as a man lies when he signifies by
word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from
saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful ; so also does
a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things
he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he
omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's
sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that
we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words

Q. in. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102

of Isaias (loc. cit.), that the second plank after shipwreck
is to hide ones sin, lest, to wit, others be scandalized
thereby.

Second Article,
whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds.
But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what
one does inwardly, according to Matth. vi. 2, When thou
dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the
hypocrites do. Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dis-
simulation.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 7) : Some there
are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain
the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these
to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing
to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice. Now
those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining
the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward
habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation
is not the same as hypocrisy.

Obj. 3. Further, Hypocrisy consists in the mere intention.
For Our Lord says of hypocrites (Matth. xxiii. 5) that all
their works they do for to be seen of men : and Gregory says
(Moral, xxxi. loc. cit.) that they never consider what it is that
they do, but how by their every action they may please men.
But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but
in the outward action : wherefore a gloss on Job xxxvi. 13,
Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God, says that
the dissembler simulates one thing and does another ; he
pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show
of poverty and fills his purse. Therefore hypocrisy is not
the same as dissimulation.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x.) : ' Hypocrite '
is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin ' simulator,' for

103 HYPOCRISY Q.ui.Art.2

whereas he is evil within, he shows himself outwardly as being
good ; v7t6 denoting falsehood, and Kpivis judgment.

I answer that. As Isidore says {ibid.), the word hypocrite is
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage
with a disguised face, by changing the colour of their com-
plexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they
simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another
under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in
their acting. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii.) that
just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts
of those they are not [since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the
Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes
to seem what he is not is a hypocrite : for he pretends to be just
without being so in reality.

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimula-
tion, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when
one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates
the person of a just man.

Reply Obj. i. The outward deed is a natural sign of the
intention. Accordingly when a man does good works
pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks
by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates
a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says
(Moral, xxxi.) that hypocrites make God's interests subservient
to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct
they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves
the applause of their approval: and so they make a lying
pretence of having a good intention, which they have
not. although they do not pretend to do a good deed without
doing it.

Reply Obj. 2. The habit of holiness, for instance the
religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one
is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a
man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of
entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness,
he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound
to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If,

Q. in. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 104

however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to
make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and
a dissembler.

Reply Obj. 3. In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two
things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing
signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is
considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with
the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible
objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.

Third Article,
whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of

TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the
virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is
a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither
of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue:
for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any
virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as
stated in Matth. vi. 1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially
opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, All dissimulation seems to proceed from
guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity Now guile is
opposed to prudence as above stated (Q. LV., A. 4).
Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed
to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.

Obj. 3. Further, The species of moral acts is taken from
their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of
gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job xxvii. 8, What
is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by
violence, says : A hypocrite, or, as the Latin has it, a dissimu-
lator, is a covetous thief : for through desire of being honoured for
holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life
which is not his.* Therefore since covetousness or vainglory

* The quotation is from S. Gregory's Moralia, Bk. XVIII.

105 HYPOCRISY Q.ih.Art.3

is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is
hypocrisy or dissimulation.

On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above
(A. i). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore
dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher (M eta ph. text.
13, 24, x.), contrariety is opposition as regards form, i.e. the
specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation
or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one
way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposi-
tion or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the
very species of the act, and this species depends on that
act's proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind
of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character
which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows
that it is directly opposed to truth, whereby a man shows
himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in
Ethic, iv. 7.

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may
be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a
remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of
that kind.

Reply Obj. 1. The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards
it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he
wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he
wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not
opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes
to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs
acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake,
but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his
hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to
that virtue.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. LV., AA. 3, 4, 5), the
vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it
belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are
apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose,
by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds : and it stands in
relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now

Q. in. Art. 4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 106

guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and some-
times secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly
to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this
way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of
truth as stated above (0. CIX., A. 2, ad 4). There is, how-
ever, a mere logical difference between them, because by
truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing
signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend
to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and
pretending another outwardly.

Reply Obj. 3. Gain or glory is the remote end of the dis-
sembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species
from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show
oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens
to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further
purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic, iv. 7), and as also we have said above with
regard to lying (Q. CX., A. 2).

Fourth Article.
whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal
sin. For Jerome says on Isa. xvi. 14: Of the two evils it is less
to sin openly than to simulate holiness: and a gloss on Job i. 21,*
As it hath pleased the Lord, etc., says that pretended justice is
no justice, but a twofold sin: and again a gloss on Lament, iv. 6,
The iniquity . . . of My people is made greater than the sin of
Sodom, savs : He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into
hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.
Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy
is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 8) that hypo-
crites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it
pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a
hypocrite always sins mortally.

* S. Augustine, on Ps. lxiii. 7.

107 HYPOCRISY Qui. Art. 4

Obj. 3. Further, No one deserves the anger of God and
exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin.
Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy accord-
ing to Job xxxvi. 13, Dissemblers and crafty men prove the
wrath of God : and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing
God, according to Job xiii. 16, No hypocrite shall come
before His presence. Therefore hypocrisy is always a
mortal sin.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a
kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to
lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

Further, The intention of a hypocrite is to appear to
be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore
hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.

Further, Hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says
(Moral, xxxi. 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal
sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.

/ answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of
holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a
hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to
both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but
only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont
to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin:
for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through
mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends
to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin,
then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived
of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not
always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will
depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love
of God or of his neighbour, it will be a mortal sin : for instance
if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false
doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment,
though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good
in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be
not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance
when a man takes pleasure in the pretence itself: of such
a man it is said in Ethic, iv. 7 that he would seem to be

Q. in. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 108

vain rather than evil; for the same applies to simulation as
to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the
perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual
welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin
always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

QUESTION CXII.

OF BOASTING.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts
of lying according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7). Under
the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of
inquiry: (1) To which virtue is it opposed ? (2) Whether
it is a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of

TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the First A Hide : —

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is not opposed to
the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But
it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man
makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written
(Esther i. 3, 4) that Assuerus made a great feast . . . that he
might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom, and the
greatness and boasting of his power. Therefore boasting is
not opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, Boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral.
xxiii. 4) to be one of the four species of pride, when, to wit,
a man boasts of having what he has not. Hence it is written
(Jerem. xlviii. 29, 30) : We have heard the pride of Moab, he
is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and
his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the
Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according
to it. Moreover, Gregory says (Moral, xxxi. 7) that boasting
arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are

109

Q. ii2. Art. i THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no

opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is
opposed, not to truth, but to humility.

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting seems to be occasioned by
riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. v. 8): What hath pride
■profited us ? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches
brought us ? Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin
of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality.
Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7, iv. 7),
that boasting is opposed to truth.

/ answer that, Jactantia (boasting) seems properly to
denote the uplifting of self by words : since if a man wishes
to* throw (jactare) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And
to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself
above oneself.* This happens in two ways. For some-
times a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in him-
self, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be:
and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. xii. 6) :
I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which
he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. In another way
a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above
that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of
things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem
them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly
the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the
uplifting of self above what others think of one : although in
either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting
properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument takes boasting as exceeding
men's opinion.

Reply Obj. 2. The sin of boasting may be considered in
two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and
thus it is opposed to truth, as stated (in the body of the
article and Q. CX., A. 2). Secondly, with regard to its
cause, from which more frequently though not always it
arises : and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving
and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly
* Or tall-talking, as we should say in English.

Ill BOASTING Q.i 12. Art. i

by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes
to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of
vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit.
Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself,
is a kind of pride ; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is
very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons
boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting,
and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory con-
sidered as its end.

Reply Obj. 3. Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways.
First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides him-
self on his riches. Hence (Prov. viii. 18) riches are signifi-
cantly described as proud (Douay, — glorious). Secondly,
as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic, iv. 7
some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the
sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves,
so as to make profit thereby ; for instance, they pretend to
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

Second Article,
whether boasting is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For
it is written (Prov. xxviii. 25) : He that boasteth, and puffeth
himself, stirreth up quarrels. Now it is a mortal sin to stir
up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, accord-
ing to Prov. vi. 19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is forbidden in God's law is a
mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. vi. 2, Extol not thyself
in the thoughts of thy soul, says : This is a prohibition of boast-
ing and pride. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither
an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end
of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7), the
boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for

Q. ii2. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112

no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honour,
sometimes for the sake of money. Thus it is evident that it
is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it
must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always
a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according
to Gregory {Moral, xxxi. 17). Now vainglory is not always
a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the
very perfect avoid. For Gregory says {Moral, viii. 30) that
it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the
glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the
praise awarded them. Therefore boasting is not always a
mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., A. 4), a mortal sin
is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting
may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a he,
and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial,
sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which
is contrary to God's glory — thus it is said in the person of the
king of Tyre (Ezech. xxviii. 2) : Thy heart is lifted up, and
thou hast said : I am God — or contrary to the love of our
neighbour, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks
out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee
who said (Luke xviii. 11) : / am not as the rest of men, extor-
tioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican. Some-
times it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things
that are against neither God nor his neighbour.

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause,
namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory : and then
if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a
mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin : other-
wise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man
breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this
very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and
injury of his neighbour: wherefore boasting of this kind is
more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 7) that a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler
than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honour. Yet it is

113 BOASTING Q. 112. Art. 2

not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not
to injure another man.

Reply Obj. 1. To boast in order to stir up quarrels is a
mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the
cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and
consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that
account.

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss speaks of boasting as arising
from pride that is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3. Boasting does not always involve a mis-
chievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of
God or our neighbour, either in itself or in its cause. That
a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an
inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks {Ethic, iv. 7) :
wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he
were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it
would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought
our mind to rest as in its last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve
an officious lie: provided it be done without injury to others,
for then it would at once become a mischievous lie.

II. ii. 4

QUESTION CXIIL

OF IRONY*

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider irony, under which head there are
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether irony is a sin ? (2) Of
its comparison with boasting.

First Article,
whether irony is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that irony, which consists in be-
littling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's
being strengthened by God : and yet this leads one to belittle
oneself, according to Prov. xxx. 1, 2, The vision which the
man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by
God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men.
Also it is written (Amos vii. 14) : Amos answered ... 7 am
not a prophet. Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles
himself in words, is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine,
bishop of the English (Regist. xii.) : It is the mark of a well-
disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not
guilty. But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed
mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, It is not a sin to shun pride. But some
belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride, according to
the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm.

* Iron}' here must be given the signification of the Greek slpu>via,
whence it is derived: — dissimulation of one's own good points.

114

115 IRONY Q. 113. Art. i

xxix.): If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not
a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying.

I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur
in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a
man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers
and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which
in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does
not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus,
except through corruption of one of its circumstances.
Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth,
for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by
denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he
perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is
always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold
folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has
human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor.
iii. 18, If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let
him become a fool that he may be wise. But there is another
wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to
say, is foolishness with God. Accordingly, he that is streng-
thened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in
the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human
things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted
continues, and the wisdom of men is not with me, and farther
on, and* I have known the science of the saints.

It may also be replied that the wisdom of men is that which
is acquired by human reason, while the wisdom of the saints
is that which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, sinee, to wit,
he was not of the race of prophets : hence the text goes on,
nor am I the son of a prophet.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a

man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem

himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common

righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of

* Vulg., — and I have not known the science of the saints.

Q. n3. Art. 2 THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 116

perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But
he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge
to be sinful: which wo aid be a lie of irony.

Reply Obj. 3. A man should not commit one sin in order
to avoid another : and so he ought not to lie in any way at all
in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says {Tract, xliii.
in Joan.) : Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth : and
Gregory says (Moral, xxvi. 3) that it is a reckless humility
that entangles itself with lies.

Second Article,
whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking
truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake
truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it.
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony.
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 25) : When
he shall speak low, trust him not : because there are seven mis-
chiefs in his heart. Now it belongs to irony to speak low.
Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 7) : Those
who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious,
seemingly, in their manners.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CX., AA. 2, 4), one lie
is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the
matter which it is about — thus a lie about a matter of religious
doctrine is most grievous — and sometimes on account of the
motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous
than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie
about the same matter, either by words, or by any other
outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person :
so that in this respect they are equal.

ii7 IRONY Q. 113. Art. 2

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive,
namely, the desire of gain or honour: whereas irony arises
from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable
to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philo-
sopher says (loc. cit.) that boasting is a more grievous sin than
irony.

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles him-
self for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive
cunningly : and then irony is more grievous.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument applies to irony and boast-
ing, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or
on account of its matter : for it has been said that in this way
they are equal.

Reply Obj. 2. Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal,
the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that
a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking
in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes,
or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so
doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus
Our Lord said of certain men (Matth. vi. 16) that they dis-
figure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.
Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and
boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason
they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 7) that it is the practice of boasters both to make
overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves :
and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he
was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly
or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the words of Ecclus. xix. 23,
There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior
is full of deceit, and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks
of the man who, through deceitful humility, speaks low
wickedly.

QUESTION CXIV.

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affa-
bility, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarrel-
ling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two
points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a special virtue ?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice ?

First Article,
whether friendliness is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that friendliness is not a special
virtue. For the Philosopher saj^s (Ethic, viii. 3) that the
perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue. Now
any virtue is the cause of friendship: since the good is lovable
to all, as Dionysius states (Div. Norn. iv.). Therefore
friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of
every virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6) of
this kind of friend that he takes everything in a right manner
from those he loves not and are not his friends. Now it seems
to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of
friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incom-
patible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is
not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue observes the mean, according as
a wise man decides (Ethic, ii. 6). Now it is written (Eccles.
vii. 5) : The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and

118

H9 FRIENDLINESS Q. n4. Art. i

the heart of fools where there is mirth: wherefore it belongs
to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure {Ethic, ii. 9).
Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic, iv. 6), is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but
fears to give pain. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not
a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts
of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. iv. 7) : Make thyself
affable to the congregation of the poor. Therefore affability,
which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: I. -II.,
Q. LV., A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there
is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind
of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above
(Q. CIX., A. 2). And it behoves man to be maintained in a
becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual
relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,
so that they behave towards one another in a becoming
manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains
the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called
friendliness.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher speaks of a twofold
friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affec-
tion whereby one man loves another and may result from
any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity
(Q. XXIII. , A. 1, A. 3, adi: QQ. XXV., XXVI.), what things
belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds;
this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a
certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a
becoming manner towards those with whom he is in
contact.

Reply Obj. 2. Every man is naturally every man's
friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus.
xiii. 19) that every beast loveth its like. This love is signified
by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words
or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us.
Hence there is no dissimulation in this : because we do not

Q. 114. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 120

show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat
strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united
to us by special friendship.

Reply Obj. 3. When it is said that the heart of the wise
is where there is mourning it is not that he may bring sorrow
to his neighbour, for the Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 15): //,
because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not
now according to charity : but that he may bring consolation
to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. vii. 38, Be not wanting
in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.
Again, the heart oj fools is where there is mirth, not that they
may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures
with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures,
which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to
Ps. cxxxii. 1, Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
brethren to dwell together in unity.

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6), for the
sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid
some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from
bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the
Apostle says (2 Cor. vii. 8) : Although I made you sorrowful
by my epistle, I do not repent, and farther on (verse 9), I am
glad ; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you
were made sorrowful unto penance. For this reason we should
not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in
order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to
their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further.
Hence it is written (Ecclus. vii. 26) : Hast thou daughters ?
Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay
towards them.

Second Article,
whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection I. It seems that this kind of friendship is not
a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another
man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing

121 FRIENDLINESS Q.h4.Art.2

that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom
we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6),
this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those
who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance
to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I.-IL,
Q. LX., A. 5: Q. LXI., A. 3). Therefore this virtue is a
part of temperance rather than of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, To give equal things to those who are
unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. LIX.,
AA. 1, 2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6),
this virtue treats in like manner known and unknown, com-
panions and strangers. Therefore this virtue rather than
being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i.) accounts
friendship a part of justice.

/ answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being
annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common
with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice
is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks
the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to
another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to
pay, or by some debt arising out of a favour received.
For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that
we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless
at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them
for some good purpose.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. CIX., A. 3, ad 1),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in
equity, the manifestation of truth without which human
society could not last. Now as man could not live in society
without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic, viii.), no one could abide a day with
the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural
equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow- men;
unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures

Q.ii4.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 122

of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellow-
ship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one
man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures
need not to be curbed as though they were noisome.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher does not
mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same
way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says
{ibid.), it is not fitting to please or displease acquaintances
and strangers in the same way. The likeness consists in this,
that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.

QUESTION CXV.

OF FLATTERY.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid
virtue: (i) Flattery, and (2) Quarrelling. Concerning flat-
tery there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether flattery is
a sin ? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether flattery is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For
flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order
to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, accord-
ing to Prov. xxxi. 28, Her children rose up and called her
blessed: her husband, and he praised her. Moreover, there is
no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. x. 33,
I ... in all things please all men. Therefore flattery is not
a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Evil is contrary to good, and blame to
praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is
it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery.
Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Detraction is contrary to flattery.
WTherefore Gregory says (Moral, xxii. 5) that detraction is
a remedy against flattery. It must be observed, says he,
that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often
allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate
praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the

123

Q. 115. Art i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124

tongue of the detracter may humble. But detraction is an
evil, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., AA. 2, 3). Therefore
flattery is a good.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. xiii. 18, Woe to them
that sew cushions under every elbow, says, that is to say,
sweet flattery. Therefore flattery is a sin.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIV., A. 1, ad 3),
although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or
affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom
one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question
of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil.
Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly
to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would
therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere inten-
tion of pleasing he is said to be complaisant, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6) : whereas if he do it with the intention
of making some gain out of it, he is called a flatterer or
adulator. As a rule, however, the term flattery is wont to
be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue
in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary
behaviour towards their fellows.

Reply Obj. 1. One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances.
For if while observing other due circumstances one were to
wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby
to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in
good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship.
But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since
perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. ix. 24, The sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul ; or they may be uncertain,
according to Ecclus. xxvii. 8, Praise not a man before he
speaketh, and again (ibid. xi. 2), Praise not a man for his
beauty; or because there may be fear lest human praise
should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
(ibid. xi. 30), Praise not any man before death. Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster
charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein.

125 FLATTERY Q. ii5.Art.2

But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of
vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil,
according to Ps. Hi. 6, God hath scattered the bones of them that
please men, and according to the words of the Apostle
(Gal. i. 10), /// yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of
Christ.

Reply Obj. 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circum-
stances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing hinders two vices being contrary
to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so
is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said,
but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks
to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks
not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times
he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

Second Article,
whether flattery is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For,
according to Augustine (Euchirid. xii.), a thing is evil because
it is harmful. But flattery is most harmful, according to
Ps. ix. 24, For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul,
and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the
Lord. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant.): Nothing so
easily corrupts the human mind as flattery : and a gloss on
Ps. lxix. 4, Let them be presently turned away blushing for
shame that say to me : 'Tis well, 'Tis well, says: The tongue of
the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor.
Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever does harm by words, harms
himself no less than others: wherefore it is written
(Ps. xxxvi. 15): Let their sword enter into their own heaHs.
Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally:
hence a gloss on Ps. cxl. 5, Let not the oil of the sinner fatten
my head, says: The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind
by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive

Q.ii5.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 126

of vice. Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in him-
self.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI. ,
Cap. 3) : The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in
flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office. Now
such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal
sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory
(xli., de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, if one desire
to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own
choice, or out of necessity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIL, A. 2), a mortal
sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flatteiy is some-
times contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary
to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very
matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for
this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice
he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbour, whom
he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin,
according to Isa. v. 20, Woe to you that call evil good.
Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters
another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is
written (Prov. xxvii. 6) : Better are the wounds of a friend
than the deceitful kisses of an enemy. Thirdly, by way of
occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his
intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In
this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion
were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent
downfall, as may be understood from what has been said
above concerning scandal (Q. XLIIL, AA. 3, 4). If, how-
ever, one man flatters another from the mere craving to
please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to
acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary
to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial
sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted speak of the flatterer
who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to

127 FLATTERY Q. h5.Art.2

harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does
harm to goods that are of greater consequence, namely,
spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since
the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient
cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a
sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above
(Q. XLIII., A. i, ad 3: I.-IL, Q. LXXIIL, A. 8, ad 3:
Q. LXXX., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. This argument applies to one that flatters
with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms
himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the
sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional
cause of the harm he does to others.

Reply Obj. 3. The passage quoted refers to the man
who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

QUESTION CXVI

OF QUARRELLING.
(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider quarrelling; concerning which there
are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is opposed to the
virtue of friendship ? (2) Of its comparison with flattery.

First Article.

whether quarrelling is opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that quarrelling is not opposed to
the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarrelling seems
to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord
is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. XXXVII. , A. 1).
Therefore quarrelling is also.

Obj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 21): An angry
man stirreih up strife. Now anger is opposed to meekness.
Therefore strife or quarrelling is also.

Obj. 3. Further, It is written (James iv. 1) : From
whence are wars and quarrels (Douay, — contentions)
among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences
which war in your members ? Now it would seem contrary
to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore
it seems that quarrelling is opposed not to friendship but
to temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarrelling to
friendship {Ethic, iv. 6).

J answer that, Quarrelling consists properly in words,

128

I2Q QUARRELLING Q.h6.Art.i

when, namely, one person contradicts another's words.
Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For
sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person
who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this
seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity.
Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker
being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagree-
able : whence arises quarrelling, which is opposed to the afore-
said friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave
agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 6) that those who are opposed
to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care
for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.

Reply Obj. i. Contention pertains rather to the contra-
diction of discord, while quarrelling belongs to the con-
tradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

Reply Obj. 2. The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from
many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although
quarrelling arises at times from anger, it may arise from
many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly
opposed to meekness.

Reply Obj. 3. James speaks there of concupiscence
considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus,
a gloss on Rom. vii. 7 says : The law is good, since by for-
bidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.

Second Article.

whether quarrelling is a more grievous sin than

flattery ?■

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection I. It seems that quarrelling is a less grievous
sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For
the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to
be. Now flattery does more harm than quarrelling, for
it is written (Isa. iii. 12) : 0 My people, they that call thee

II. ii/4 9

Q. ii6.Art.2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 130

blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps.
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarrelling.

Obj. 2. Further, There appears to be a certain amount
of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and
thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without
deceit, for he contradicts openly, Now he that sins
deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic, vii. 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin
than quarrelling.

Obj. 3. Further, Shame is fear of what is vile, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 9). But a man is more ashamed
to be a flatterer than a quarreller. Therefore quarrelling is
a less grievous sin than flattery.

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the
spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now
quarrelling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual
state : for it is written (1 Tim. iii. 2, 3) that it behoveth a bishop
to be . . . not quarrelsome ; and (2 Tim. ii. 24) : The servant
of the Lord must not wrangle. Therefore quarrelling seems
to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways.
In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and
thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue
the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has
a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the
quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure, sins
more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds
in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them
as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is
sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends
by deception to acquire undue honour or gain; while some-
times quarrelling is more grievous, for instance, when one
intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker
to contempt.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the flatterer may do harm by
deceiving secretly, so the quarreller may do harm sometimes
by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is
more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it

131 QUARRELLING Q. h6.Art.2

were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous
sin than theft, as stated above (Q. LXVL, A. 9).

Reply Obj. 2. In human acts, the more grievous is not
always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its
source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby
the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins
are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt.
In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit
are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain
weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although
sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accom-
panied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarrelling,
through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently
more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated in the objection, shame regards
the vileness of a sin: wherefore a man is not always more
ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence
it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarrel-
ling, although quarrelling is more grievous.

QUESTION CXVII.

OF LIBERALITY.
[In Six Articles.)

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices,
namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether liberality is a virtue ? (2) What is its matter ?
(3) Of its act : (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather
than to take ? (5) Whether liberality is a part of justice ?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

First Article,
whether liberality is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For
no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a
natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than
for others : and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the
contrary, since, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 1),
it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he
leaves for himself the lesser things. Therefore liberality is not
a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Man sustains life by means of riches,
and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as
stated in Ethic, i. 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to
happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous,
for the Philosopher says of him {Ethic, iv. 1) that he is inclined
neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away.

Obj. 3. Further, The virtues are connected with one
another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with

132

133 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. i

the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be
liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or
spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore
liberality is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.)that the Gospel
contains many instances in which a just liberality is incul-
cated. Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not
pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. ii. 19), it
belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. Now
we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are
within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul,
but also those that are without, such as the things of this
world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore
since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it
follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Augustine (Serm. lxiv. de
Temp.) and Basil [Horn, in Luc. xii. 18) excess of riches is
granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the
merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to
have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably
spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual
goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the
first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man
even in temporal firings to attend so much to others as to
lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore
Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) ; It is a commendable liberality not
to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want.

Reply Obj. 2. It does not belong to a liberal man so to
give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support,
nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby
happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.
r) that the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus
to be of help to certain people; and Ambrose says {De Offic. i.)
that Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all
at once, but to dispense them : unless he do as Eliseus did, who
slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by

Q.ii7.Art.i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 134

any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfec-
tion, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. CLXXXIV.,
Q. CLXXXVI., A. 3),

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving
away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of
virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1), those
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal ;
and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of any
other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) : If you assist
another to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not
to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give
for the sake of boasting rather than of pity. Wherefore those
who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain
evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much
on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even
as men perform works of other virtues, before having the
habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous
people, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXV., A. 1). In like
manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal,
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) :
Liberality is proportionate to a mans substance, i.e. his means
for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the
giver : and Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) that it is the heart that
makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.

Second Article,
whether liberality is about money ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection I. It seems that liberality is not about money.
For every moral virtue is about operations and passions.
Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated
in Ethic, v. 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue,
it seems that it is about passions and not about money.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man to make use
of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real

i35 LIBERALITY Q. 117- Art. 2

than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher {Polit. i.
5, 6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money.

Obj. 3. Further, Different virtues have different matter,
since habits are distinguished by their objects. But ex-
ternal things are the matter of distributive and commutative
justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) that
liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv.
ibid.) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things.
Hence liberality is also called open-handedness {largitas),
because that which is open does not withhold things
but parts with them. The term liberality seems also to
allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he
frees {liberat) it, so to speak, from his keeping and owner-
ship, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto.
Now those things which are the subject of a man's free-
handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which
are denoted by the term money. Therefore the proper
matter of liberality is money.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality
depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the
giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to
the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of
pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the
interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while
exterior money is the object of those same passions.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in his book De Discipline
Christi {Tract, de divers, i.) , everything whatsoever man has
on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of
'pecunia' {money), because in olden times men's possessions
consisted entirely of 'pecora' {flocks). And the Philosopher
says {Ethic, iv. 1) : We give the name of money to anything
that can be valued in currency.

Reply Obj. 3. Justice establishes equality in external
things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the
regulation of internal passions : wherefore money is in one
way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

Q.ii7.Art.3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 136

Third Article,
whether using money is the act of liberality ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that using money is not the act of
liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But
using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice
and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of
liberality.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man, not only to
give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and
keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money.
Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as
the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 3. Further, The use of money consists not only in
giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money
refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of
liberality: for Seneca says (De Bene/, v.): A man is not
liberal by giving to himself. Therefore not every use of
money belongs to liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) : In
whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use
of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to
money will make the best use of riches. Now such is the
liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of
liberality.

/ answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object,
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. XVIII., A. 2). Now the object
or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money
value, as stated in the foregoing Article {ad 2). And since
every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that,
since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money.
Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all
external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper
act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to liberality to make good use of
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of

137 LIBERALITY Q. 1 1 7. Art. 3

liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make
use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt,
in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it
belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special
aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfil-
ment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in
relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as
we shall explain farther on (Q. CXXXIV.).

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a virtuous man not only to
make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to
provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs
to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against
the foe, but also to sharpen. his sword and keep it in its
sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use
money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order
to make fitting use of it.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate
matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before
all that a man should not be prevented from making any
due use of money through an inordinate affection for it.
Now there is a twofold use of money : one consists in apply-
ing it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the
designation of costs or expenditure ; while the other consists
in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the
head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be
not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from
spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts.
Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1). The saying of
Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving : for a man is not
said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to
himself.

Q. 117. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138

Fourth Article,
whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to

GIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to a liberal
man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral
virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong
very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches.
Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 1) that those who
have not earned money, but have received the money earned by
others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experi-
enced the want of it. Therefore it seems that giving does not
chiefly belong to the liberal man.

Obj. 2. Further, No man is sorry for what he intends
chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal
man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he
give to all, as stated in Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.). Therefore it does
not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

Obj. 3. Further, In order to accomplish what he intends
chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal
man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic, iv.
loc. cit.) ; and yet by begging he might provide himself with
the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he
does not chiefly aim at giving.

Obj. 4. Further, Man is bound to look after himself rather
than others. But by spending he looks after himself,
whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it
belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. loc. cit.)
that it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving.

I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money.
Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the
acquisition of money is like generation rather than use:
while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to
facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting
with a thing — for instance, when we throw something — the

139 LIBERALITY Q. 1 1 7. Art. 4

farther we put it away the greater the force (virtus) employed.
Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds
from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves.
But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more
perfect, since virtue is a kind of perfection (Phys. vii. text. 17,
18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest
it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is
not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since
more things have to be considered in money's use, which is
likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened
to rest. As to those who, having received money that others
have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having
experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole
cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue
of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely
removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them
all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfre-
quently, the fear of want that results from the experience
of want hinders those who have acquired money from using
it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love
they have for it as being their own effect, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1).

Reply Obj. 2. As stated in this and the preceding Article,
it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and
consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a
use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is
contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act.
Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not
giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving some-
thing unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved
at both : but especially at the former, since it is more opposed
to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to
all : since his act would be hindered were he to give to every-
one : for he would not have the means of giving to those to
whom it were fitting for him to give.

Reply Obj. 3. Giving and receiving are related to one
another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not

Q.ii7.Art.5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140

the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since
liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the
liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg.
Hence the verse :

In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many
Should give often, take seldom, ask never.

But he makes provision in order to give certain things
according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his
own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that
he may make a liberal use thereof.

Reply Obj. 4. To spend on oneself is an inclination of
nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly
to a virtue.

Fifth Article,
whether liberality is a part of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is not a part of justice.
For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing
is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is
not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it.

Obj. 2. Further, Justice is about operations, as stated
above (Q. LVIII., A. 9: I. -II., Q. L., AA. 2, 3): whereas
liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money,
which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong
to temperance rather than to justice.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs chiefly to liberality to give
becomingly, as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly
belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity,
as stated above (QQ. XXX., XXXI.). Therefore liberality
is a part of charity rather than of justice.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i.): Justice has
to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellow-
ship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also
called liberality or kind-heartedness. Therefore liberality per-
tains to justice.

/ answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since

141 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. 5

justice pays another what is his, whereas liberality gives
another what is one's own. There are, however, two points
in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed
chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned
with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different
aspect, as stated in this Article and above (A. 2, ad 3).
Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part
of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Although liberality does not consider the
legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral
due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on
an obligation : so that it answers to the idea of due in the
lowest degree.

Reply Obj. 2. Temperance is about concupiscence in
pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight
in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul.
Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance.

Reply Obj. 3. The giving of beneficence and mercy pro-
ceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards
the person to whom he gives : wherefore this giving belongs
to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises
from a person being affected in a certain way towards money,
in that he desires it not nor loves it : so that when it is fitting
he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom
he knows not. Hence it belongs not to charity, but to
justice, which is about external things.

Sixth Article,
whether liberality is the greatest of the

VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that liberality is the greatest of the
virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine
goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to
God, Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not
(James i. 5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the
virtues.

Q. n7. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142

Obj. 2. Further, According to Augustine {De Trin. vi. 8),
in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be
best. Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to
liberality, since the good is self -communicative, according
to Dionysius {Div. Norn. iv.). Hence Ambrose says {De
Offic. i.) that justice inclines to severity, liberality to goodness.
Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Men are honoured and loved on account
of virtue. Now Boethius says {De Consol. ii.) that bounty
above all makes a man famous : and the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 1) that among the virtuous the liberal are the most
beloved. Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) that justice
seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality
is more pleasing. The Philosopher also says {Rhet. i. 9) that
brave and just men are honoured chiefly and, after them, those
who are liberal.

I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; where-
fore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater
good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways:
in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way,
consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to
set in order one's own affection towards the possession and
use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates
desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes pre-
cedence of liberality : and so do fortitude and justice, which,
in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time
of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are pre-
ceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine
good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human
good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the
good of the individual ; and of the last named the good of the
body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.

Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and
in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by
reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man
readily makes use of it, whether for himself, or for the good
of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain

143 LIBERALITY Q.h7.Art.6

excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however,
we should judge of things according to that which is com-
petent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,
rather than according to that which pertains to them con-
sequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the
greatest of virtues.

Reply Obj. I. God's giving proceeds from His love for
those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the
things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the
greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality.

Reply Obj. 2. Every virtue shares the nature of goodness
by giving forth its own act : and the acts of certain other
virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth.

Reply Obj. 3. The friendship whereby a liberal man is
beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he
were better than others, but that which is based on utility,
because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule
men desire above all others For the same reason he becomes
famous.

QUESTION CXVIII.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE
FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS.

(In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality : and
(i) covetousness : (2) prodigality.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin ? (2) Whether it is a
special sin ? (3) To which virtue it is opposed : (4) Whether
it is a mortal sin ? (5) Whether it is the most grievous of
sins ? (6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin ?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice ? (8) Of its daughters.

First Article,
whether covetousness is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For
covetousness (avaritia) denotes a certain greed for gold
(arts aviditas*), because, to wit, it consists in a desire for
money, under which all external goods may be comprised.
Now it is not a sin to desire external goods : since man desires
them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to
man, and because by their means man's life is sustained
(for which reason they are spoken of as his substance).
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every sin is against either God, or one's
neighbour, or oneself, as statedabove (I. -II., Q. LXXII., A. 4).
But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against

* The Latin for covetousness avaritia is derived from aveo to
desire; but the Greek (friXapyvpta signifies literally love of money:
and it is to this that S. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2. Obj. 2).

144

145 COVETOUSNESS Q.hS.Art. i

God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theo-
logical virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again
is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to glut-
tony and lust, of which the Apostle says (i Cor. vi. 18) : He
that commiUeth fornication sinneth against his own body. In
like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neigh-
bour, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Things that occur naturally are not sins.
Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind
of defect, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 1). There-
fore covetousness is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. xiii. 5): Let your
manners be without covetousness, contented with such things
as you have.

I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due
measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or
deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for
an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since what-
ever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with
the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with
health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i. 6). External
goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as
stated above (Q. CXVIL, A. 3: I.-IL, Q. II., A. 1). Hence
it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in
a certain measure, in other words, that man seek, according
to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they
are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition
of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this
measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately.
This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as
immoderate love of possessing. It is therefore evident that
covetousness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. It is natural to man to desire external things
as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin,
in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the
nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and
therefore is a sin.

11. ii. 4. 10

Q. n8. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146

Reply Obj. 2. Covetousness may signify immoderation
about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard
immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things,
when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is
due. In this way it is a >in directly against one's neighbour,
since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, with-
out another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot
be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may
signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man
has for riches, when, for instance, a man loves them, desires
them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by
covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes
disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the
sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just
as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal
for the sake of temporal things.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural inclinations should be regulated
according to reason, which is the governing power in human
nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid
of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to
have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they
exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.

Second Article,
whether covetousness is a special sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a special
sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii.): Covetousness,
which in Greek is called ^cXapyupla, applies not only to silver or
money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately.
Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something,
because sin consists in turning away from the immutable
good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated above (I. -II.,
Q. LXXI., A. VI., Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a
general sin.

Obj. 2. Further, According to Isidore (Etym. x.), the

147 COVETOUSNESS Q. h8.Art.2

covetous (avarus) man is so called because he is greedy for
brass {avidus ceris), i.e. money : wherefore in Greek covetous
ness is called cfytXapyvpia, i.e. love of silver. Now silver,
which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value
of which can be measured by money, as stated above
(Q. CXVIL, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore covet ousness is a desire
for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a
general sin.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Rom. vii. 7, For I had not
known concupiscence, says : The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil. Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness : hence it is
written (Exod. xx. 17) : Thou shall not covet thy neighbour's
goods. Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all
evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.

On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with
other special sins (Rom. i. 29), where it is written: Being
filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness
(Douay, — avarice) , etc.

/ answer that, Sins take their species from their objects,
as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXXIL, A. 1). Now the object
of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite
tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good in-
ordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the
useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And
riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since
they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as
it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are
comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness
(avaritia) is denominated.

Since, however, the verb to have, which seems to have been
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof
we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things
(thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so
forth, as stated in De Prcedicamentis) , consequently the term
covetousness has been amplified to denote all immoderate
desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says

Q. 118. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 148

in a homily (xvi. in Ev.) that covetousness is a desire not only
for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when
prominence is immoderately sought after. In this way covetous-
ness is not a special sin : and in this sense Augustine speaks
of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objec-
tion. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. All those external things that are subject to
the uses of human life are comprised under the term money,
inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there
are certain external goods that can be obtained by money,
such as pleasures, honours, and so forth, which are desirable
under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things
is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special
vice.

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the inordinate concu-
piscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand
that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions, it is
also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained
by means of those possessions.

Third Article,
whether covetousness is opposed to liberality ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not opposed
to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matth. v. 6,
Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, says
{Horn. xv. in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one
general, and the other special, to which covetousness is
opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic, v. 2).
Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

Obj. 2. Further, The sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this
measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness
is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.

Obj. 3. Further, Liberality is a virtue that observes the
mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states

149 COVETOUSNESS Q. 118.ART.3

{Ethic, i. 7; iv. 1). But covetousness has no contrary and
opposite sin, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, v. 1, 2).
Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. v. 9) : A covetous man
shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall
have no fruits from them. Now not to be satisfied with money
and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which
observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetous-
ness is opposed to liberality.

/ answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with
regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect
of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man
obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining
another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this
sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. xxii. 27) : Her
princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey
to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness.
Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections
for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches
too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be
unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to
liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above
(Q. CXVTL, A. 2, ad 3, A. 3, ad 3, A. 6). In this sense covet-
ousness is spoken of (2 Cor. ix. 5) : That they would . . .
prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a
blessing, not as covetousness, where a gloss observes : Lest
they should regret what they had given, and give but little.

Reply Obj. 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speak-
ing of covetousness in the first sense : covetousness in the
second sense is called illiberality* by the Philosopher.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs properly to justice to appoint
the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from
the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither
take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints
the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections,
and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of
money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these

* avektv&epia.

Q. 1 18. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150

proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter
from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt,
which latter depends on the rule of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Covetousness as opposed to justice has no
opposite vice : since it consists in having more than one
ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have
less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment.
But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of
prodigality opposed to it.

Fourth Article,
whether covetousness is always a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always a mortal
sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin.
But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness.
For the Apostle after saying (Rom. i. 29) : Being filled with
all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness (Douay, — avarice),
etc., adds [verse 32) : They who do such things are worthy oj
death. Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The least degree of covetousness is to
hold to one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a
mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii. 18): It is
the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back, the naked
man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man's money
that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou
mightest succour.

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since
it is contrary to the love of our neighbour. Much more
therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, No one is struck with spiritual blindness
save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the
light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom,* Lust for
money brings darkness on the soul. Therefore covetousness,
which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. iii. 12, If any man build

* Horn. xv. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to S. John
Chrysostom.

151 CO VETOUSNESS Q. 1 1 8. Art. 4

upon this foundation, says (cf. S. Augustine, De Fide et
Opev. xvi.) that he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in
the things of the world, how he may please the world, which
pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds
wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it
is said of him that he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. There-
fore covetousness is sometimes a venial sin.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is two-
fold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a
mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetous-
ness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's
property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are
mortal sins, as stated above (Q. LXVL, AA. 6, 8). Yet
venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason
of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. LXVL, A. 6,
ad 3), when we were treating of theft.

In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed
to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of
riches. Accordingly, if the love of riches becomes so great
as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man,
through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of
God and his neighbour, covetousness will then be a mortal
sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love
stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much,
yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God,
and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in
opposition to God or his neighbour, then covetousness is a
venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Covetousness is numbered together with
mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a
mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is
bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either
through fear of their want or on account of his having too
much.

Reply Obj. 3. Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings
darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity,
by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.

Q. i is. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 152

Fifth Article,
whether covetousness is the greatest of sins ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the greatest of
sins. For it is written (Ecclus. x. 9) : Nothing is more wicked
than a covetous man, and the text continues : There is not a
more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteih
even his own soul to sale. Tully also says (De Offic. i., under
the heading — True magnanimity is based chiefly on two
things) : Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money.
But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2. Further, The more a sin is opposed to charity, the
more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed :o
charity: for Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII. qu. 36) that
greed is the bane of charity. Therefore covetousness is the
greatest of sins.

Obj. 3. Further, The gravity of a sin is indicated by its
being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost
is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But
covetousness in an incurable sin : hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 1) that old age and helplessness of any kind makemen
illiberal. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 4. Further, The Apostle says (Eph. v. 5) that covetous-
ness is a serving of idols. Now idolatry is reckoned among
the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also.

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft,
according to Prov. vi. 30. But theft pertains to covetous-
ness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an
evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good:
while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire
of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be con-
sidered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is
despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good
the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is

153 COVETOUSNESS Q.ii8.Art.5

against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a
sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use,
and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the
degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good
to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and
then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin : for it
is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher
good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of
human goods : since it is less than the good of the body, and
this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the<
Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetous-
ness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to
external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since,
however, corruption or privation of good is the formal
element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the
material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from
the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from
that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence
we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most
grievous of sins.

Reply Obj. i. These authorities speak of covetousness
on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
Hence (Ecclus. x. 10) it is given as a reason that the covetous
man setteth his own soul to sale ; because, to wit, he exposes
his soul — that is, his life — to danger for the sake of money.
Hence the text continues : Because while he liveth he hath cast
away — that is, despised — his bowels, in order to make money.
Tully also adds that it is the mark of a narrow mind, namely,
that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine is taking greed generally, in
reference to any temporal good, not in its special accepta-
tion for covetousness : because greed for any temporal good
is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from
the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

Reply Obj. 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable
in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against
the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for

Q. 118. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 154

instance, because a man contemns God's mercy, or His
justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are
healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the
greater gravity of the sin. On the other hand, covetousness
is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which
human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient
one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and
consequently the more one gives way to covetousness.
Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the
sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more
dangerous.

Reply Obj. 4. Covetousness is compared to idolatry on
account of a certain likeness that it bears to it : because the
covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an ex-
ternal creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater
subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine
honour, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an
external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not
for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness
is as grievous a sin as idolatry.

Sixth Article,
whether covetousness is a spiritual sin ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual
sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But
the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external
riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for
it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in
old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall
into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual
sin.

Obj. 3. Further, A sin of the flesh is one by which man's
body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle
(1 Cor. vi. 18), He that committeth fornication sinneth against

155 COVETOUSNESS Q. n8. Art.6

his own body. Now covetousness disturbs man even in his
body; wherefore Chrysostom {Horn. xxix. in Matth.) com-
pares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by
the devil (Mark v.) and was troubled in body. Therefore
covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxxi.) numbers covetous-
ness among spiritual vices.

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections : and
all the affections or passions of the soul have their term
in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, ii. 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some
spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consum-
mated in the carnal senses — for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are
those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of
the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are
consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are
consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of
the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man
takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor
of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply Obj. I. Covetousness with regard to a bodily object
seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul,
forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he
possesses riches : wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Never-
theless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely
spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of
spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely
carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect
of a bodily object.

Reply Obj. 2. Movement takes its species from the term
whereto and not from the term wherefrom. Hence a vice of
the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the
flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the
flesh.

Reply Obj. 3. Chrysostom compares a covetous man to
the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former
is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by

Q. 118. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 156

way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom
we read in Mark v., stripped himself, the covetous man
loads himself with an excess of riches.

Seventh Article,
whether covetousness is a capital vice ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a capital
vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean,
and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a
principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore
covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, As stated above (I.-II., Q. LXXXIV.,
AA. 3, 4), those vices are called capital which have principal
ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But
this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the
aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to
an end, as stated in Ethic, i. 5. Therefore covetousness is
not a capital vice.

Obj. 3. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xv.) that covetous-
ness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For
there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful
for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness.
And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are
incited to greed for other people's property. Therefore covetous-
ness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice
in respect of other vices.

On the contrary, Gregory [Moral, xxxi.) reckons covetous-
ness among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital
vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other
vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is
that through desire thereof man sets about doing many
things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is
happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life,
as stated above (I.-II., Q. I., AA. 4, 7, 8) : wherefore the more
a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the

157 COVETOUSNESS Q. 118. Art. 7

more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness
is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's
appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great
promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii.) :
the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, v. 5),
is that we use money in token of taking possession of some-
thing, and again it is written (Eccles. x. 19) : All things obey
money. Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money,
is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is perfected in accordance with
reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclina-
tion of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive
appetite do not belong chiefly, to the same genus, and conse-
quently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to
principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a
principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good
of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because
it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end
that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result
from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv. 1) that a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that money is directed to some-
thing else as its end : yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining
all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually.
Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the
Article.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. XXXVI.,
A. 4, ad 1: I.-IL, Q. LXXXIV., A. 4), provided that itself
be frequently the source of others.

Q. 1 1 8. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 158

Eighth Article.

whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, rest-
lessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are
daughters of covetousness ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of covetousness
are not as commonly stated, namely, treachery, fraud, false-
hood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy.
For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above
(A. 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed
to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to
charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice,
insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no con-
nection with covetousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to
pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's
neighbour. Therefore they should not be reckoned as
different daughters of covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Isidore (Comment, in Deut.) enumerates
nine daughters of covetousness; which are lying, fraud,
theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence,
inhumanity, rapacity. Therefore the former reckoning of
daughters is insufficient.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 1) mentions
many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he
calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are sparing,
tight-fisted, skinflints* miser s,-\ who do illiberal deeds, and of
those who batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers
of the dead, and robbers. Therefore it seems that the afore-
said enumeration is insufficient.

Obj. 5. Further, Tyrants use much violence against their
subjects. But the Philosopher says (ibid.) that tyrants who
destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called
illiberal, i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be
reckoned a daughter of covetousness.

* KV/JUVOirpLaTTJS. \ Kt/J.filK€S.

i5g COVETOUSNESS Q. h8.Art.8

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxxi.) assigns to covetous-
ness the daughters mentioned above.

/ answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices
which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of
an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possess-
ing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place
it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives
rise to insensibility to mercy, because, to wit, a man's heart
is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches.*
In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in
receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered
in two ways. First as in the thought (affectu). In this way
it gives rise to restlessness, by hindering man with excessive
anxiety and care, for a covetous man shall not be satisfied with
money (Eccles. v. 9). Secondly, it may be considered in
the execution (effectu). In this way the covetous man, in
acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force,
which pertains to violence, sometimes deceit, and then if he
has recourse to words, it is falsehood, if it be mere words,
perjury if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse
to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have fraud ; if
persons, then we have treachery, as in the case of Judas, who
betrayed Christ through covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no need for the daughters of a
capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a
sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being
directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to
have daughters, and another for it to have species.

Reply Obj. 2. These three are distinguished as stated in
the Article.

Reply Obj. 3. These nine are reducible to the seven afore-
said. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under
falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just
as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised
under fraud ; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness ;
rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species
thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to
mercy.

* See Q. XXX. A. 1.

Q. iiS.Art.s THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 160

Reply Obj. 4. The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For
a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a
defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be sparing ;
if nothing, he is tight-fisted : if he gives with great reluctance,
he is said to be a k.v^lvoitp'kt'tt)^ {skinflint), a cummin-seller,
as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things
of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or
covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two
wa}rs. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works
by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through
sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making
a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case
of usury, or by labouring much to make little profit. In
another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by
despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as
gamblers do.

Reply Obj. 5. Just as liberality is about moderate sums
of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take
great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but
unjust.

QUESTION CXIX.

OF PRODIGALITY.

(In Three Articles.)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there
are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether prodigality is
opposite to covetousness ? (2) Whether prodigality is a sin ?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin than covetousness ?

First Article,
whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same
subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and
covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetous-
ness.

Obj. 2. Further, Opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain
passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas
prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the
soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything
else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Sin takes its species chiefly from its end,
as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXII., A. 3). Now prodigality
seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the
sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially
is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke xv. 13)
of the prodigal son that he wasted his substance living riot-
ously. Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to
temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness
and liberality.

11. ii. 4. 161 11

Q. 119. Art t THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 162

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7 : iv. 1)
that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to
which we give here the name of covetousness.

/ answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another
and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now
covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of
excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches,
the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he
ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful
of them than he ought : and as regards external action,
prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in re-
taining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary,
denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and
retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed
to covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing prevents opposites from being in
the same subject in different respects. For a thing is de-
nominated more from what is in it principally. Now just
as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing
is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate,
so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving.
Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be prodigal,
while he who is deficient in giving is said to be covetous.
Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic, iv. 1) , And in like manner it happens sometimes that
a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet
at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due
either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in
giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven
to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not
for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
not whence or how he receives Wherefore he is prodigal
and covetous in different respects.

Reply Obj. 2. Prodigality regards passions in respect of
money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

Reply Obj. 3. The prodigal does not always exceed in

163 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 2

giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of
temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as
not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of
something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much
on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects
of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more
prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous
goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 1) that many a -prodigal ends
in becoming intemperate.

Second Article,
whether prodigality is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For
the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 10): Covetousness (Douay, —
Desire of money) is the root of all evils. But it is not the root
of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodi-
gality is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18):
Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate
to others. Now this is especially what prodigal persons do.
Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to prodigality to exceed in
giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But
this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of
our Lord (Matth. vi. 34), Be not . . . solicitous for to-morrow,
and (Matth. xix. 21), Sell all (Vulg., — what) thou hast, and
give to the poor. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his
prodigality.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the opposition
between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and
deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue.
Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the
good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin,

Q. 1 19. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164

Reply Obj. 1. Some expound this saying of the Apostle
as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of
habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the
fomes* whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking
of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good :
and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises
from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some
temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to
others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But
to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that
the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for
he had said previously (verse 9) : They that will become rich,
etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be the root of all
evils, not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but
because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of
covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great
expense in order to curry favour with certain persons from
whom he may receive riches.

Reply Obj. 2. The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give
and communicate their riches, according as they ought.
The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher
remarks (Ethic, iv. i), his giving is neither good, nor for a good
end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give
much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and
flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing.

Reply Obj. 3. The excess in prodigality consists chiefly,
not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and
above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal
man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary.
Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their
possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish
from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not
prodigal but perfectly liberal.

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. LXXXI. A. 3. ad 2.

165 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 3

Third Article.

whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than

covetousness ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures
his neighbour by not communicating his goods to him,
whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 1) that the corruption of riches,
which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his
very being. Now he that injures himself sins more grievously,
according to Ecclus. xiv. 5, He that is evil to himself, to whom
will he be good? Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.

Obj. 2. Further, A disorder that is accompanied by a
laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of
covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable cir-
cumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend
their own, lest they be driven to accept from others : whereas
the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance
that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality
to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes
{Ethic, iv. 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin
than covetousness.

Obj. 3. Further, Prudence is chief among the moral virtues,
as stated above (Q. LVL, A. 1, ad 1 : I.-IL, Q. LXL, A. 2,
ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than
covetousness is : for it is written (Prov. xxi. 20) : There is
a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and
the foolish man shall spend it : and the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 6) that it is the mark of a fool to give too much and
receive nothing. Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. ibid.) that
the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.

I answer thai, Prodigality considered in itself is a less

Q. 119. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 166

grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons.
First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite
virtue : since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs
to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the
covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man
is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous
man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in
Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.). Thirdly, because prodigality is easily
cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age,
which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to
a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes
him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover,
prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its
likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is
not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. CXVIII., A. 5,
ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1. The difference between the prodigal and
the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself
and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins
against himself by spending that which is his, and his means
of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal
to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the
dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor
whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like
manner the covetous man sins against others, by being
deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through
deficiency in spending : wherefore it is written (Eccles. vi. 2) :
A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give
him the power to eat thereof. Nevertheless the prodigal man
exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet
so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits
neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his
own goods for his own profit.

Reply Obj. 2. In speaking of vices in general, we judge of
them according to their respective natures : thus, with regard
to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and
with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess.
That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance

167 PRODIGALITY Q. 1 19. Art. 3

points already to several additional sins, wherefore the
prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic, iv. 1. That
an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs
to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise,
yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls
for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest
he be forced to give to others.

Reply Obj. 3. All vices are opposed to prudence, even as
all virtues are directed by prudence : wherefore if a vice be
opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed
less grievous.

QUESTION CXX.

OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY.
(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider epikeia, under which head there are
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether epikeia is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice ?

First Article,
whether "epikeia"* is a virtue?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that epikeia is not a virtue. For
no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet epikeia does
away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is
just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity.
Therefore epikeia is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De vera Relig. xxxi.) :
With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgement
on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and
established, the judge must pronounce judgement not on them
but according to them. But seemingly epikeia pronounces
judgement on the law, when it deems that the law should not
be observed in some particular case. Therefore epikeia is
a vice rather than a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently it belongs to epikeia to
consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic, v. 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone
to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the
Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under
Law i. : It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret

168

169 EQUITY Q. 120. Art. i

between equity and law. Therefore the act of epikeia is
unlawful : and consequently epikeia is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher {Ethic, v. 10) states it to
be a virtue.

/ answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XCVL, A. 6),
when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with
which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent sin-
gulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not
possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every
single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what
commonly happens : although if the law be applied to certain
cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious
to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the
law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority
of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be
injurious — for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in
deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness,
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to
fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad
to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the
law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common
good. This is the object of epikeia which we call equity.
Therefore it is evident that epikeia is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Epikeia does not set aside that which is
just in itself but that which is just as by law established.
Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the
law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the
law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is
written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v. :
Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the
letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver.

Reply Obj. 2. It would be passing judgement on a law to
say that it was not well made ; but to say that the letter of
the law is not to be observed in some particular case is
passing judgement not on the law, but on some particular
contingency.

Reply Obj. 3. Interpretation is admissible in doubtful
cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law

Q. 120. Art 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170

without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the
case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of
execution.

Second Article.

whether " epikeia " is a part of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that epikeia is not a part of justice.
For, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 7), justice is twofold,
particular and legal. Now epikeia is not a part of par-
ticular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal
justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal
justice, since its operation is beside that which is established
by law. Therefore it seems that epikeia is not a part of
justice.

Obj. 2. Further, A more principal virtue is not assigned
as the part of a less principal virtue : for it is to the cardinal
virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are as-
signed as parts. Now epikeia seems to be a more principal
virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived
from eiri, i.e. above, and hiiccuov, i.e. just. Therefore epikeia
is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, It seems that epikeia is the same as
modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. iv. 5), Let
your modesty be known to all men the Greek has eVtet/ceta.*
Now, according to Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.), modesty is a part
of temperance. Therefore epikeia is not a part of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, v. 10) that
epikeia is a kind of justice.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue has
three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential.
A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated
essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen
in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of
many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox : and
sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to
priority and posteriority, as being of substance and accident.

* TO €TTl€lK€S.

171 EQUITY Q.i 20. Art. 2

Accordingly, epikeia is a part of justice taken in a general
sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states
{Ethic, v. 10). Wherefore it is evident that epikeia is a sub-
jective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with
priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice
is subject to the direction of epikeia. Hence epikeia is by
way of being a higher rule of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1. Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice,
and in one way is contained under it, and in another way
exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies
with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as
regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more
account, then epikeia is the more important part of legal
justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which com-
plies with the law with regard to the letter, then epikeia is a
part not of legal justice but of justice in its general accepta-
tion, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher states {Ethic, v. 10),
epikeia is better than a certain, namely, legal, justice, which
observes the letter of the law : yet since it is itself a kind of
justice, it is not better than all justice.

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to epikeia to moderate something,
namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But
modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates
man's outward life — for instance, in his deportment, dress,
or the like. Possibly also the term eirie'tKeia is applied in
Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

QUESTION CXXI.

OF PIETY.

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice;
namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of
inquiry : (i) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost ?
(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it ?

First Article,
whether piety is a gift ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts
differ from the virtues, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXVIII.,
A. 1). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 3).
Therefore piety is not a gift.

Obj. 2. Further, The gifts are more excellent than the
virtues, above all the moral virtues, as stated above (Q.
LXVIII., A. 8). Now among the parts of justice re-
ligion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice
is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a
gift rather than piety.

Obj. 3. Further, The gifts and their acts remain in heaven,
as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXVIII., A. 6). But the act of
piety cannot remain in heaven : for Gregory says {Moral, i.)
that piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of
mercy: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will
be no unhappiness.* Therefore piety is not a gift.

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the
eleventh chapter of Isaias {verse 2: Douay, — godliness).^

* Cf. Q. XXX. A. 1. j Cf. Q- LII. A. 4, footnote.

172

173 PIETY 0. 121. Art i

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXVIII., A. i:
Q. LXIX., AA. i, 3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual
dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion
of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this
effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God,
according to Rom. viii. 15, You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry : Abba (Father). And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's
father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's
instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father,
is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. The piety that pays duty and worship to
a father in the flesh is a virtue : but the piety that is a gift
pays this to God as Father.

Reply Obj. 2. To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion
does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father
in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay
worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to
pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion
is greater than the virtue of piety : while the gift of piety is
greater than religion.

Reply Obj. 3. As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and
worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all
his kindred on account of their being related to his father,
so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to
God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to
God. Hence it belongs to piety to honour the saints, and
not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands
them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, ii.). Con-
sequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappi-
ness. And although this act has no place in heaven,
especially after the Day of Judgement, yet piety will exer-
cise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial
affection: for it is then above all that this act will be ful-
filled, according to Wis. v. 5, Behold how they are numbered
among the children of God. The saints will also mutually
honour one another. Now, however, before the Judgement
Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in
this unhappy state.

Q. i2i. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 174

Second Article.

whether the second beatitude, " blessed are the
meek," corresponds to the gift of piety ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the second beatitude, Blessed
are the meek, does not correspond to the gift of piety. For
piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather
belongs the fourth beatitude, Blessed are they that hunger and
thirst after justice, or the fifth beatitude, Blessed are the
merciful, since, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of
mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude
does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of piety is directed by the gift
of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of
the gifts (Isa. xi.). Now direction and execution extend
to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, Blessed
are they that mourn, corresponds to the gift of knowledge,
it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits correspond to the beatitudes
and gifts, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXX., A. 2). Now
among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with
piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness.
Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the
gift of piety.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
i.) : Piety agrees with the meek.

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a
twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to
the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to
have followed this : wherefore he assigns the first beatitude
to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude,
Blessed are the meek, to piety, and so on. Another congruity
may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each
gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beati-
tudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and
thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to

175 PIETY Q. 121. Art. 2

piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude
has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness
removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Taking the beatitudes and gifts according
to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs
correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them accord-
ing to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them,
although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated
above.

Reply Obj. 3. In the fruits goodness and benignity may
be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so
far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

QUESTION CXXII.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE.

(In Six Articles.)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which
head there are six points of inquiry : (i) Whether the precepts
of the decalogue are precepts of justice ? (2) Of the first
precept of the decalogue : (3) Of the second: (4) Of the
third: (5) Of the fourth: (6) Of the other six.

First Article.

whether the precepts of the decalogue are
precepts of justice ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection I. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue
are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver
is to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue, as
stated in Ethic, ii. 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic, v. 1, the
law prescribes about all acts of all virtues. Now the precepts
of the decalogue are the first principles of the whole Divine
Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not per-
tain to justice alone.

Obj. 2. Further, It would seem that to justice belong
especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with
the moral precepts, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XCIX., A. 4).
But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. C, A. 3). Therefore the precepts
of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, The Law contains chiefly precepts about
acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about
public officers and the like. But there is no mention of

176

177 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. i

these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems
that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong
to justice.

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue are divided
into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the
love of our neighbour, both of which regard the virtue of
charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to
charity rather than to justice.

On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby
we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another
by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one con-
sider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the deca-
logue pertain to justice.

/ answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first
principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to
them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now
it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is
essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one
towards another. Because in those matters that relate to
himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of him-
self, and that he may do as he likes : whereas in matters that
refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under
obligation to render to another that which is his due.
Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to
justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts
of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth
precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of
justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly
so called, which is observed among equals.

Reply Obj. 1. The intention of the law is to make all men
virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all
giving them precepts about those things where the notion
of duty is most manifest, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The judicial precepts are determinations
of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's
neighbour, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations
of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God.
Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue : and

II. ii. 4. 12

Q. 122. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 178

yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue,
and therefore pertain to justice.

Reply Obj. 3. Thing? that concern the common good
must needs be administered in different ways according to
the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a
place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among
the judicial precepts.

Reply Obj. 4. The precepts of the decalogue pertain to
charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. i. 5, The end of the
commandment is charity: but they belong to justice, inasmuch
as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

Second Article.

whether the first precept of the decalogue
is fittingly expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the deca-
logue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound
to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. xii. 9,
How much more shall we (Vulg., — shall we not much more)
obey the Father of spirits and live ? Now the precept of
piety, whereby man honours his father, is expressed affirma-
tively in these words: Honour thy father and thy mother.
Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion,
whereby all honour God, be expressed affirmatively, espe-
cially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

Obj. 2. Further, The first precept of the decalogue per-
tains to religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion,
since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept
three acts are forbidden : since we read first : Thou shalt not
have strange gods before Me; secondly, Thou shalt not make
to thyself any graven thing ; and thirdly, Thou shalt not adore
them nor serve them. Therefore the first precept is unfit-
tingly expressed.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De decern chord, ix.) that
the first precept forbids the sin of superstition. But there are
many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above

179 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q.i22.Art.2

(Q. XCIL, A. 2). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid
idolatry alone.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

/ answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, where-
fore it behoved the precepts of the Law to be set in order
according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of
man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed
in the order of generation. The first is that the first part
is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of
an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in
building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation :
and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of
the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use
of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will
depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since
man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the
first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation
of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is
the last end of man's will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of genera-
tion is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have
to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and
afterwards sows his seed, according to Jerem. iv. 3, Break
up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns. Hence
it behoved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as
to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief
obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, accord-
ing to Matth. vi. 24, You cannot serve God and mammon.
Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of
false gods is excluded.

Reply Obj. 1. In point of fact there is one affirmative
precept about religion, namely: Remember that thou keep
holy the Sabbath Day. Still the negative precepts had to be
given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion
might be removed. For though affirmation naturally pre-
cedes negation, yet in the process of generation negation,
whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in
the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning

Q. 122. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 180

God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account
of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. ii.)

Reply Obj. 2. People worshipped strange gods in two
ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without
having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a
long time the ancient Romans worshipped gods without using
images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words,
Thou shalt not have strange gods. Among others the worship
of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so
the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the
words, Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing, as also
the worship of those same images, by the words, Thou shalt
not adore them, etc.

Reply Obj. 3. All other kinds of superstition proceed from
some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all
are understood to be forbidden by the words, Thou shalt not
have strange gods.

Third Article.

whether the second precept of the decalogue
is fittingly expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of the deca-
logue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, Thou shalt
not take the name of thy God in vain is thus explained by a
gloss on Exod. xx. 7: Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to
be a creature, so that it forbids an error against faith. Again,
a gloss on the words of Deut. v. 11, Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . thy God in vain, adds, i.e. by giving the name of
God to wood or stone, as though they forbade a false confes-
sion of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now
unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion.
Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,
whereby superstition is forbidden.

Obj. 2. Further, The name of God is taken for many
purposes — for instance, those of praise, of working miracles,
and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do,
according to Col. iii. 17, All whatsoever you do in word or in

181 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 3

work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord. Therefore the precept
forbidding the taking of God's name in vain seems to be
more universal than the precept forbidding superstition,
and thus should have preceded it.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Exod. xx. 7 expounds the
precept, Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,
namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would
seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing
without judgement. But false swearing, which is without
truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are
much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather
have forbidden them.

Obj. 4. Further, Blasphemy or any word or deed that is
an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. There-
fore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been
forbidden by this precept.

Obj. 5. Further, God's names are many. Therefore it
should not have been said indefinitely: Thou shalt not take
the name of . . . thy God in vain.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

/ answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue
it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before
establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed
to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to
wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to
whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly,
by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is con-
temned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated
above (Q. XCVTL, in the preamble, and in the Article that
follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing
man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him : and
when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship,
he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, accord-
ing to Isa. xxviii. 20, The bed is straitened, so that one must
fall out, i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out
from man's heart, and a short covering cannot cover both.
On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing
man from honouring God after he has acknowledged Him.

Q. 122. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 182

Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to
worship, before honouring Him we have acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is
placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that
pertains to irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1. These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Deut. v. n : Thou shall
not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, namely, by swearing
on that which is not*

Reply Obj. 2. This precept does not forbid all taking of
the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in
confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because
men are wont to take God's name more frequently in this
way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence
all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept : and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 3. To swear to nothing means to swear to that
which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is
chiefly called perjury, as stated above (Q.XCVIII.,A. i,ad^).
For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing
is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On
the other hand, when a man swears without judgement,
through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity
on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.

Reply Obj. 4. Just as when we instruct a man in some
science, we begin b}/ putting before him certain general
maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by
instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are
the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or
by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts
of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is
of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does
not fall so often into the latter sin.

* Vulg., — for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon
a vain thing.

183 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4

Reply Obj. 5. Reverence is due to the Divine names on
the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the
part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is
expressed in the singular : Thou shalt not take the name of . . .
thy God in vain: since it matters not in which of God's names
perjury is committed.

Fourth Article.

whether the third precept of the decalogue, concern-
ing the hallowing of the sabbath, is fittingly
expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the deca-
logue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly
expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general
precept : since Bede in commenting on Luke xiii. 14, The ruler
of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath,
says {Comment, iv.): The Law forbids, not to heal man on
the Sabbath, but to do servile works, i.e. to burden oneself with
sin. Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is
written (Exod. xxxi. 13) : See that you keep My Sabbath :
because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations.
Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and
moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts
of the decalogue.

Obj. 2. Further, The ceremonial precepts of the Law
contain sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances,
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. CI., A. 4). Now sacred things
comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and
sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred
days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting
to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention
only that of the Sabbath.

Obj. 3. Further, Whoever breaks a precept of the deca-
logue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the obser-
vances of the Sabbath did not sin — for instance, those who
circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests

Q. 122. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 184

who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias
(3 Kings xix.), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount
of God, Horeb, must have travelled oh a Sabbath : the priests
also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as
related in Josue vii., must be understood to have carried it
on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Luke xiii. 15) : Doth not
every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . .
and lead them to water ? Therefore it is unfittingly placed
among the precepts of the decalogue.

Obj. 4. Further, The precepts of the decalogue have to
be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law
this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the
Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook
their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. There-
fore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is un-
fittingly expressed.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed
by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated
above (AA. 2, 3), it remained for the third precept to be
given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it
belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the
Divine scriptures teach us the interior worship under the guise
of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given
to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for
the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, con-
sisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting
of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law was necessary re-
specting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs.
Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and
common principles of the Law, and consequently the third
precept of the decalogue prescribes the exterior worship of
God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This
universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world,
from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh
day : and in sign of this we are commanded to keep holy the
seventh day — that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God.
Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath

185 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4

the reason for it is given: For in six days the Lord made
heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day.

Reply Obj. 1. The precept about hallowing the Sabbath,
understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial.
It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to set
aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there
is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for
each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep,
and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason,
man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by
which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a
certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine
things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as
this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the
Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again,
it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as
representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh
day : as also in its moral signification, as representing cessation
from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense,
too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept
in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoy-
ment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing
the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue,
as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

Reply Obj. 2. The other ceremonies of the Law are signs
of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of
the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely,
the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that
it should be placed among the general precepts of the deca-
logue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law.

Reply Obj. 3. Two things are to be observed in the hallow-
ing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is
that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified
in the words : Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day.
For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are
applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation
from work, and is signified in the words (Exod. xx. n), On
the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work. The kind of work

Q. i22. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 186

meant appears from Levit. xxiii. 3, You shall do no servile*
work on that day. Now servile work is so called from servi-
tude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the
servant of sin, according to John viii. 34, Whosoever com-
mitteth sin is the servant of sin, and in this sense all sinful
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man
serves another. Now one man serves another not with his
mind but with his body, as stated above (Q. CIV., AA. 5, 6,
ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called
servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the
servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which
pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work.
In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath
day, because that would be contrary to the end of the
Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works
on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself
with works connected with God's service. For this reason,
according to John vii. 23, a man'f receives circumcision on the
Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken: and for
this reason too we read (Matth. xii. 5), that on the Sabbath
days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, i.e. do corporal
works on the Sabbath, and are without blame. Accordingly,
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break
the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it
is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise
any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing.
Wherefore a gloss on Num. xxviii. says that smiths and like
craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of
the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the
Sabbath, and are without blame.

On the other hand, those works that are called servile in
the first or second way are contrary to the observance of
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying
himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from
applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by

* Vulg., — You shall do no work on that day.
t Vulg., — If a man, etc.

187 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4

lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast
day is more against this precept than to do some other but
lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decern
chord, iii.): It would be better if the Jew did some useful work
on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre : and
their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the
Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the
new moon. It is not, however, against this precept to sin
venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy
holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual
worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong
properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile,
in so far as they are common to those who serve and those
who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is
bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his
neighbour, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-
being of the body, according to Prov. xxiv. 11, Deliver them
that are led to death: secondarily as regards avoiding damage
to one's property, according to Deut. xxii. 1, Thou shalt not
pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but
thou shalt bring them back to thy brother. Hence a corporal
work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily
well-being does not profane the Sabbath : for it is not against
the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the
Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought
in self-defence on the Sabbath day (1 Machab. ii.), nor Elias
when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For
this same reason our Lord (Matth. xii. 3) excused His dis-
ciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need
which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is
directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary
to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written
(John vii. 23) : Are you angry at Me because I have healed the
whole man on the Sabbath day? And again, a bodily work
that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord

Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188

says (Matth. xii. 11): What man shall there be among you,
that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the
Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up ?

Reply Obj. 4. In the New Law the observance of the Lord's
day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not
by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church
and the custom of Christian people. For this observance
is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in
the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord's
day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are
permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the
Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And
again, in the New Law dispensation is more easily granted
than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works,
on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to
the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even
in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are
changeable in point of place and time.

Fifth Article.

whether the fourth precept, about honouring one's
parents, is fittingly expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about
honouring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this
is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a
part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of
which we have spoken (QQ. CI., CIL, seq.). Therefore it
seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

Obj. 2. Further, Piety pays worship not only to one's
parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood
kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated
above (Q. CL, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this
precept to mention only the honouring of one's father and
mother.

Ob]. 3. Further, We owe our parents not merely honour

189 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 5

but also support. Therefore the mere honouring of one's
parents is unfittingly prescribed.

Obj. 4. Further, Sometimes those who honour their
parents die young, and on the contrary those who honour
them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to
supplement this precept with the promise, That thou may est
be long-lived upon earth.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

/ answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed
to the love of God and of our neighour. Now to our parents,
of all our neighbours, we are under the greatest obligation.
Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God,
a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents,
who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is
the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain
affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 2), piety directs
us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety
rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some
special debt.

Reply Obj. 2. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt
to one's kindred and country: since it is because we are born
of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us.
Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first
precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather
than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this
precept of honouring our parents is understood to command
whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Reply Obj. 3. Reverential honour is due to one's parents
as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them acci-
dentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery,
or the like, as stated above (Q. CI., A. 2). And since that
which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is
accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the
Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a

Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190

special precept of honouring our parents: and this honour,
as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and
whatever else is due to our parents.

Reply Obj. 4. A long life is promised to those who honour
their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to
the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle
(1 Tim. iv. 8) : Piety (Douay, — Godliness) is -profitable to all
things, having promise of the life that now is and of that
which is to come. And with reason. Because the man who
is grateful for a favour deserves, with a certain congruity,
that the favour should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favour deserves to lose it. Now we owe
the favour of bodily life to our parents after God : wherefore
he that honours his parents deserves the prolongation of
his life, because he is grateful for that favour : while he that
honours not his parents deserves to be deprived of life
because he is ungrateful for the favour. However, present
goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated
above (I. -II., Q. CXIV., A. 12), wherefore sometimes in
accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments,
which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful
to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who
are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

Sixth Article.

whether the other six precepts of the decalogue
are fittingly expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the
decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient
for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbour;
but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to all men their dues. Now the last
six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbour.
Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 2. Further, These precepts forbid murder, adultery,

igi PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 6

stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries
can be inflicted on one's neighbour, as appears from those
which have been specified above (QQ. LXXIL, seq.). There-
fore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly
expressed.

Obj. 3. Further, Concupiscence may be taken in two ways.
First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. vi. 21, The desire
(concupiscentia) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom :
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James
iv. 1., From whence are wars and contentions among you?
Are they not . . .from your concupiscences which war in your
members ? Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not
forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first
movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against
a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of
the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. There-
fore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include
some that forbid concupiscence.

Obj. 4. Further, Murder is a more grievous sin than
adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the
desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have
precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

/ answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays
that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is
bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly
so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence,
after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man
pays what is due to God, and after the fourth precept per-
taining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents
— which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason — it was necessary in due sequence to give
certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called,
which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.

Reply Obj. 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general
to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts,
which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted
on one's neighbour, had to be given a place, as general

Q. 122. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192

precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the
other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbour are paid in
different ways to different people: hence it did not behove
to include affirmative precepts about these duties among
the precepts of the decalogue.

Reply Obj. 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbour are reducible to those that are forbidden by these
precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of gener-
ality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on
the person of our neighbour are understood to be forbidden
under the head of murder as being the principal of all.
Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's
neighbour, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under
the head of damage done to property are understood to be
forbidden together with theft : and those that are comprised
under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are
understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of
false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do
not include the prohibition of first movements of concupi-
scence, that do not go farther than the bounds of the sen-
suality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent
of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.

Reply Obj. 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concu-
piscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect
of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a
certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft
has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of
its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible.
Hence the concupiscence of theft and adulter}' had to be
forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence
of murder.

QUESTION CXXIII.

OF FORTITUDE.

(In Twelve Articles.)

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider
fortitude. We must (i) consider the virtue itself of for-
titude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto;

(4) the precepts that pertain to it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered:
(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;
(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue ? (2) Whether it is a
special virtue ? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear
and daring ? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death ?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters ? (6) Whether
endurance is its chief act ? (7) Whether its action is
directed to its own good ? (8) Whether it takes pleasure
in its own action ? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly
with sudden occurrences ? (10) Whether it makes use
of anger in its action ? (n) Whether it is a cardinal
virtue ? (12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal
virtues.

First Article,
whether fortitude is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For
the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 9) : Virtue is perfected in
11. ii. 4 193 13

Q. 123. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 194

infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. There-
fore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, If it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained
among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual
virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above
(I.-IL, Q. LVIL, A. 2; LXII., A. 3). Neither, apparently,
is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to
the Philosopher {Ethic, hi. 7, 8): Some seem to be brave
through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of
which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral
virtue, and some are called brave on account of certain passions;
for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonour,
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral
virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated
above (I.-IL, Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a
virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Human virtue resides chiefly in the soul,
since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above (loc. cit.).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least
results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it
seems that fortitude is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv., xxi., xxii.)
numbers fortitude among the virtues.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, ii. 6)
virtue is that which makes its subject good, and renders its
work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking
now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work
good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv. 22). Wherefore it
belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his
work accord with reason. This happens in three ways:
first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the
intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude
of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice;
thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment
of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is
hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason.

195 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. i

First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to
something other than what the rectitude of reason requires ;
and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that
which is in accordance with reason, on account of some
difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this
obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to
resist the aforesaid difficulty, even as a man, by fortitude
of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as
it conforms man to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in
the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body,
of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to
fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of
the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or
fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and
this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a person performs the exterior
act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some
other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 8)
mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by
way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude
without having the virtue. This may be done in three
ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult
as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in
three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance,
through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; some-
times it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming
dangers— when, for instance, one has often experienced
escape from danger ; and sometimes this is owing to a certain
science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill
and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers
of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending
themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i.),
No man fears to do what he is confident of having learnt to
do well. Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude
without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion,

Q. i23. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 196

whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of
anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end,
but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as
honour, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be
avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply Obj. 3. The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned
a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection,
is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor
is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man
should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of
his natural temperament, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXIII.,
A. 1).

Second Article,
whether fortitude is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue.
For it is written (Wis. viii. 7) : She teacheth temperance,
and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where the text
has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is
common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general
virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) : Fortitude is
not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honour of the
virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an
inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of
dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding
covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue; and he says
the same further on in connexion with other vices. Now
this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude
is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude would seem to derive its name
from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand
firm, as stated in Ethic, ii. Therefore fortitude is a general
virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxii.) numbers it among
the other virtues.

197 FORTITUDE Q 123 Art. 2

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4),
the term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as
simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense
it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue,
since as the Philosopher states {Ethic, ii), it is requisite
for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly,
fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing
and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult
to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore
Tully says (Rhet. ii.), that fortitude is deliberate facing of
dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense fortitude
is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special
matter.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (De Ccelo
i. 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power.
Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting
corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action,
as stated in Met. v. 17. And since this latter meaning is
the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme
limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a
general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts
well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the
first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a
special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to
stand firm against all kinds of assaults.

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense,
as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds.
Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate
matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he
that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear,
is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less
difficult.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection takes fortitude in the first
sense.

Q. i23. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198

Third Article,
whether fortitude is about fear and daring ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear and
daring. For Gregory says (Moral, vii. ) : The fortitude of the
just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence,
to quench the lusts of the present life. Therefore fortitude
seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and
daring.

Obj. 2. Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.), that it
belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But
this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and
daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external
dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring.

Obj. 3. Further, Not only daring, but also hope, is opposed
to fear, as stated above (I .-II., Q. XLV., A. 1, ad 2) in the
treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be
about daring any more than about hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, ii. 7; iii. 9)
that fortitude is about fear and daring.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws
the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn
from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear,
which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty,
as stated above (I. -II., Q. XLIL, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on
passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult
thi ngs, which can withdraw the will from following the reason.
And it behoves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately
to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel
them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the
future, which seems to come under the notion of daring.
Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing
fear and moderating daring.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude

199 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 3

of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues.
Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to tem-
perance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which
pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by
saying: To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal
reward.

Reply Obj. 2. Dangers and toils do not withdraw the
will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are
an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately
about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils,
these being the objects of those passions.

Reply Obj. 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the
object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is
about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of
approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XLV.,
A. 1). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal
evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's
definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that
fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about
hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as
stated above (I.-IL, Q. XLV., A. 2).

Fourth Article,
whether fortitude is only about dangers of

DEATH ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about
dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv.)
that fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake
of the object beloved: and {Music, vi.) he says that fortitude
is the love which dreads no hardship, not even death. There-
fore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also
about other afflictions.

Obj. 2. Further, All the passions of the soul need to be
reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other
virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not
only about fear of death, but also about other fears.

Q. 123. Art 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is about extremes. But fear
of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears,
as stated in Ethic, hi. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is
not about fear of death.

On the contrary, Andronicus says that fortitude is a virtue
of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of
death.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn
from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now
it behoves one to hold firmly the good of reason against
every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent
to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must
be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason
in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm
against great things, will in consequence stand firm against
less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to
the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme :
and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does
away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Morib. Eccl. xxii.) that the soul is shaken by its fellow body,
with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed
with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed. There-
fore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of
death.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner
of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply
through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through
bearing well even the greatest evils ; while through bearing
others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.

Reply Obj. a. Since fear is born of love, any virtue
that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence
moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which
moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates
the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with tem-
perance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is
natural : and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying
the fear of death.

201 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 5

Reply Obj. 3. In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding
right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in
accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.

Fifth Article.

whether fortitude is properly about dangers
of death in battle ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly about
dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are
commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not com-
mended in connexion with . battle. Therefore fortitude is
not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) that fortitude
is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters : and Tully
(De Offic. i.), under the heading, ' That it pertains to forti-
tude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,' says:
Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater
importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be
qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are
many things in civil life that are more important and more
glorious than those connected with war. Now greater forti-
tude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not
properly concerned with death in battle.

Obj. 3. Further, War is directed to the preservation of
a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix.) that wars are waged in order to insure peace.
Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to
the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country,
since this same peace is the occasion of much licence in
morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude
is not about the danger of death in battle.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii.) that
fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 4), fortitude streng-
thens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is
that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue ; and it is essential

Q.i23.Art.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 202

to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to
pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger
of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness,
storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not
seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good.
On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in
battle come to man directly on account of some good,
because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just
fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is
the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle ;
secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or
even private individual does not refrain from giving a just
judgement through fear of the impending sword, or any
other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs
to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death,
not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as
occur in singular combat, which may be called by the
general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted
that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring
in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger
of any other kind of death ; especially since man may be in
danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus
may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear
of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck
or robbers.

Reply Obj. 1. Martyrs face the fight that is waged against
their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign
good which is God ; wherefore their fortitude is praised above
all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards
warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been
valiant in battle.*

Reply Obj. 2. Personal and civil business is differentiated
from the business of war that regards general wars. How-
ever, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death
arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and
* Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.

203 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 6

so with regard to these also there may be fortitude properly
so called.

Reply Obj. 3. The peace of the state is good in itself, nor
does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of
it. For there are many others who make good use of it ; and
many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges,
are much greater than those which are occasioned by it,
and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.

Sixth Article.

whether endurance is the chief act of
fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief act
of fortitude. For virtue is about the difficult and the good
(Ethic, ii. 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to
endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of forti-
tude.

Obj. 2. Further, To be able to act on another seems to
argue greater power than not to be changed by another.
Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to
persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes
perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude
to attack rather than to endure.

Obj. 3. Further, One contrary is more distant from the
other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely
not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary
to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude
above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it
regards attack rather than endurance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that
certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they
endure affliction.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3), and according to the
Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 9), fortitude is more concerned to
allay fear, than to moderate daring. For it is more difficult
to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger

Q.i23.Art.6 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 204

which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very
nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack
belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring-
whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore
the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand
immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply Obj. 1. Endurance is more difficult than aggression,
for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly
implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person,
whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though
one were the stronger party ; and it is more difficult to con-
tend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because
he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas
the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come;
and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than
by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length
of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden
movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for
a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 8.) that
some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present;
this is not the behaviour of a brave man.

Reply Obj. 2. Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the
body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely
(fortissime) to good, the result being that it does not yield
to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue con-
cerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply Obj. 3. He that endures fears not, though he is
confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not
present to the aggressor.

Seventh Article.

whether the brave man acts for the sake of
the good of his habit ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not act
for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of

205 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 7

action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution.
Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows
the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for
the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
habit.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii.) : We
love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold
to counsel us to be virtuous, namely by saying that we should
desire virtue for its own sake, without loving happiness. If
they succeed in their endeavour, we shall surely cease to love
virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake
of which alone we love virtue. But fortitude is a virtue.
Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude
but to happiness.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv.)
that fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God's sake.
Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better,
since the end must needs be better than what is directed
to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the
sake of the good of his habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7) that
to the brave man fortitude itself is a good: and such is an end.

/ answer that, An end is twofold : proximate and ultimate.
Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a
likeness of that agent's form into something else: thus the
end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat
into some passive matter: and the end of the builder is to
introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever
good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the
remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made
external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done,
human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly
we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proxi-
mate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for
he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his
remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections : for the
First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a

Q. 123. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206

habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in
act, as stated. The other two objections consider the
ultimate end.

Eighth Article,
whether the brave man delights in his act ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man delights in his
act. For delight is the unhindered action of a connatural
habit (Ethic, x. 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from
a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore
the brave man takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. v. 22,
But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, says that
deeds of virtue are called fruits because they refresh man's
mind with a holy and pure delight. Now the brave man per-
forms acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 3. Further, The weaker is overcome by the stronger.
Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue
than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of
death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes
the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man
does all things with pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that
the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.

I answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XXXI., AA. 3, 4, 5)
where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is two-
fold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other
is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul.
It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue,
since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the
principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul — for
instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man
loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary
for acts of virtue, and things connected with them — but also
to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact,
such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one

207 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 8

side, has something that affords him delight, namely as
regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and
the end thereof : while, on the other hand, he has cause for
both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and
for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Machab. vi. 30) that
Eleazar said : / suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am
well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible
to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious
assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise
the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than
bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius,
while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that
he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from
being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight
of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man
prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to
whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, ii. 3 ; iii. 9) that it is not necessary for a brave man to
delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not
to be sad.

Reply Obj. 1. The vehemence of the action or passion of
one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore
the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man
from feeling delight in its proper operation.

Reply Obj. 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on
account of their end; yet they can be painful by their
nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 9) that to perform
deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in
so far as one attains the end.

Reply Obj. 3. In the brave man spiritual sorrow is over-
come by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is
more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in
evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the
end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of
great bodily pain,

Q. 123. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208

Ninth Article.

whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden

occurrences ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly
with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things
occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says
(De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that fortitude is the deliberate facing of
danger, and bearing of toil. Therefore fortitude does not
deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Ob]. 2. Further, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.): The brave
man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he
takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-
tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his fore-
thought, lest he should say afterwards: This befel me because I
did not think it could possibly happen. But it is not possible
to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences.
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with
sudden happenings.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 8) that
the brave man is of good hope. But hope looks forward to the
future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences.
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with
sudden happenings.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 8) that
fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the
operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice : and
thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences : because the
brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that
may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear
them more easily: since according to Gregory {Horn. xxv.
in Ev.), the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we
are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed
with the shield of foreknowledge. The other thing to be con-
sidered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the

209 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 10

virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about
sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher
(Ethic, iii. 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in
sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature.
Wherefore if a person without forethought does that
which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account
of some sudden ganger, this is a very strong proof that
habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person, even without the habit of
fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long fore-
thought : in the same way as a brave man prepares himself
when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objec-
tions.

Tenth Article.

whether the brave man makes use of anger in

his action ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the brave man does not use
anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instru-
ment of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now
man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay
it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De
Memoria ii.), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man
should not employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2. Further, If a man is competent to do a thing by
himself, he should not seek the assistance of something
weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent
to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is
impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i.) : Reason by
itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also
to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason
to seek help from anger P the steadfast from the unstaid, the
trusty from the untrustworthy , the healthy from the sick ?
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as people are more earnest in doing
deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account

11. ii. 4 14

Q. 123. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210

of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic.
iii. 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through
sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for
the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow
nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should
not employ anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. loc. cit.)
that anger helps the brave.

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIV., A. 2),
concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference
of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the
Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from
the mind of a wise or good man : whereas the Peripatetics,
of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men
both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified
by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in
their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above
{loc. cit.), gave the name of passions to all the movements
of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport them-
selves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the
command of reason, so that it may co-operate by rendering
action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should
employ both anger and the other passions of the soul,
modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other
hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immo-
derate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they
called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason
severed them altogether from virtue.

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for
his action, but not immoderate anger.

Reply Obj. 1. Anger that is moderated in accordance with
reason is subject to the command of reason : so that man uses
it at his will, which would not be the case were it immo-
derate.

Reply Obj. 2. Reason employs anger for its action, not as
seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive
appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of
the body Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be

2ii FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 10

more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer
is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a
follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by
him directly at Aristotle.

Reply Obj. 3. Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6),
has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs
anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by
itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for
which it employs anger rather than the other passions,
since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow,
so that it directly co-operates with fortitude in attacking.
On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to
the thing that hurts ; though accidentally it helps in aggres-
sion, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above
(I. -II. , Q. XLVII. , A. 3), or as making a person expose himself
to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner
desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to
which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet
accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as
one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic, hi. 5) : Of all the cases in which
fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a
man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for
a purpose, i.e. for a due end; this is true fortitude .

Eleventh Article,
whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal
virtue. For, as stated above (A. 10) , anger is closely allied
with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal
passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Therefore
neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The object of virtue is good. But the
direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is
endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.).
Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.

Q. 123. Art. u THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212

Obj. 3. Further, The cardinal virtues are about those
things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a
door turns upon a hinge {car dine). But fortitude is about
dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human
life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal
or principal virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral, xxii.), Ambrose in his
commentary on Luke vi. 20, and Augustine (De Moribus
Eccl. xv.), number fortitude among the four cardinal or
principal virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., 0. LXL, AA. 3, 4),
those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have
a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in
common. And among other conditions of virtue in general
one is that it is stated to act steadfastly, according to Ethic, ii. 4.
Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfast-
ness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more
praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede.
Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accor-
dance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the dis-
pleasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly
than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 36) :
There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires
pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts
are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain.
And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are
mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them
that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a
cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Daring and anger do not co-operate with
fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness
is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave
man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above
(I.-II.,Q. XXV., A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue is directed to the good of reason
which it behoves to safeguard against the onslaught of
evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body, as
contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason,
as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

213 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 12

Reply Obj. 3. Though dangers of death are of rare occur-
rence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently,
since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on
account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adver-
saries.

Twelfth Article,
whether fortitude excels among all other

VIRTUES ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude excels among all other
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offtc. i) : Fortitude is higher,
so to speak, than the rest.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is about that which is difficult
and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things.
Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, the person of a man is more excellent
than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man's
person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of
death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other
moral virtues are about other and external things. There-
fore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, Tully says (DeOjfic. i.): Justice is
the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good
man.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i. 19): Those
virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to
others. Now liberality seems to be more useful than forti-
tude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi.), In things
that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good: wherefore
the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is
man's good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.) Prudence,
since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially:
while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice
to establish the order of reason in all human affairs : whereas
the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they
moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from

Q. 123. Art. 12 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 214

reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude
holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the
greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason :
and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures
of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason.
Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and
the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles
thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence
ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance
fourth, and after these the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Ambrose places fortitude before the other
virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch
as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to
civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (ibid.):
Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher so to
speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil
matters.

Reply Obj. 2. Virtue essentially regards the good rather
than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is
measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3. A man does not expose his person to dangers
of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore
the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on
justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) that fortitude
without justice is an occasion of injustice ; since the stronger
a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker.

The Fourth argument is granted.

Reply Obj. 5. Liberality is useful in conferring certain
particular favours : whereas a certain general utility attaches
to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice.
Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i. 9) that just and brave
men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and
peace.

QUESTION CXXIV.

OF MARTYRDOM.
(In Five Articles).

We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there
are rive points of inquiry: (i) Whether martyrdom is an act
of virtue ? (2) Of what virtue is it the act ? (3) Concerning
the perfection of this act: (4) The pain of martyrdom:
(5) Its cause.

First Article,
whether martyrdom is an act of virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of
virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyr-
dom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the
Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom
Hilary says (Super Matth. i.) that they attained the ripe age
of eternity through the glory of martyrdom. Therefore
martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing unlawful is an act of virtue.
Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. LXIV.,
A. 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i.) that during persecution
certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened
their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their
lives, and their martyrdom is honoured in the Catholic Church
with most solemn veneration. Therefore martyrdom is not
an act of virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, It is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do
an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court

215

Q. 124. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 216

martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and
rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save
to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it
is written (Matth. v. 10) : Blessed are they that suffer persecu-
tion for justice sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.

J answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL. AA. 1, 3),
it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason.
Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper
object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above
(Q. CIX., AA. 1, 2; Q. CXXIIL, A. 12). And martyrdom
consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice
against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident
that martyrdom is an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that in the case of the
Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously ac-
celerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily.
Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is
better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by
God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire
by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for
Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just
as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is
conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal
grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit
of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of
the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon
on the Epiphany (De Diver sis lxvi.), as though he were
addressing them : A man that does not believe that children
are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being
crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough
to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body
wherein you could endure suffering for Christ Who was to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says (loc. cit.) that possibly the
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine
authority thus to honour the memory of those holy women*

* Cf. Q. LXIV., A. i,ad2.

217 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 2

Reply Obj. 3. The precepts of the Law are about acts of
virtue. Now it has been stated above (Q. CVIII. , A. 1, ad 4)
that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be
understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in
the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and
such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way
certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the
preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a
man should act according to reason. And this observation
would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom,
which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly
inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of
acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to
endure it in moderation.

Second Article,
whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of
fortitude. For the Greek /xdprvp signifies a witness. Now
witness is borne to the faith of Christ, according to Acts i. 8,
You shall be witnesses unto Me, etc., and Maximus says in a
sermon: The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which
those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood. Therefore
martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, A praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the
virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and
without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the
chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a
sermon: The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs.
Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyr-
dom, according to John xv. 13, Greater love than this no man
hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Moreover
without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to
1 Cor. xiii. 3, // / should deliver my body to be burned, and
have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore martyr-
dom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude.

Q. 124. Art, 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says in a sermon on S. Cyprian:
It is easy to honour a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a
great thing to imitate his faith and patience. Now that which
calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which
it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience
rather than of fortitude.

On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart, et Conf. ii.):
Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you ? Most
valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength
of your courage ? Now a person is praised on account of
the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom
is an act of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 1, seq.),
it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of
virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers
of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle.
Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strength-
ened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice
notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the
imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular
contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a
sermon (loc. cit.): The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an
unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted
in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine. Wherefore
it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude ; for which
reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs : They
became valiant in battle. *

Reply Obj. 1. Two things must be considered in the act of
fortitude. One is the good wherein the brave man is
strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude ; the other is
the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the
contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in
this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic
fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for
the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death,
so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good

* Heb. xi. 34.

219 MARTYRDOM Q. 124, Art. 3

of Divine justice, which is through faith in Christ Jesus,
according to Rom. hi. 22. Thus martyrdom is related to
faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude
as the eliciting habit.

Reply Obj. 2. Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom,
as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue com-
manding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being
its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it.
Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and
of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests
both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails
not without charity.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIII. . A. 6), the chief
act of fortitude is endurance : to this and not to its secondary
act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since
patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz.
endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their
patience.

Third Article.

whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest

perfection ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the
greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter
of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because,
to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem
that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle
says (Rom. x. 10), With the heart we believe unto justice, but
with the mouth confession is made unto salvation, and it is
written (1 John iii. 16), that we ought to lay down our lives
for the brethren. Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to
perfection.

Obj. 2. Further, It seems to point to greater perfection
that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience,
than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom :
wherefore Gregory says {Moral, xxxv.) that obedience is

Q. 124. art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220

preferable to all sacrifices. Therefore martyrdom is not
an act of the greatest perfection.

Obj. 3. Further, It would seem better to do good to others
than to maintain oneself in good, since the good of the nation
is better than the good of the individual, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, i. 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom
profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to
many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects
is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin, xlvi.) prefers
martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection.
Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the
highest degree.

/ answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two
ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as
compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this
way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of
death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because
endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so
far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of
virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of
virtue being the end is better.

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in
comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love
of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to
belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says
(Col. hi. 14), that charity . . . is the bond of perfection. Now,
of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the
perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is
proved to be so much the greater, according as that which
he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he
chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident
that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself
most, and on the other hand he hates death more than any-
thing, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of
bodily torment, from fear of which even dumb animals
refrain from the greatest pleasures, as Augustine observes
(QQ. LXXXIIL, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is

221 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 3

clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts
in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest
charity, according to John. xv. 13: Greater love than this
no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.

Reply Obj. 1. There is no act of perfection, which is a
matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of
precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine
declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii.) that a man is under the
obligation of observing continency, through the absence
or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the
perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary
for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary
for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many
holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly
love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord.
As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring
to the preparation of the mind.

Reply Obj. 2. Martyrdom embraces the highest possible
degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we
read of Christ (Phil. ii. 8) that He became obedient unto
death. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself
more perfect than obedience considered absolutely.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers martyrdom accord-
ing to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no
excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is
fortitude more excellent than all virtues.

Fourth Article. ,
whether death is essential to martyrdom ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that death is not essential to martyr-
dom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption
(Epist. ad Paul, et Eustoch.) : I should say rightly that the
Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended
her days in peace: and Gregory says (Horn. iii. in Ev.):
Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet
the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even

Q. 124. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222

if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit
Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.

Obj. 2. Further, We read of certain women as commended
for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity
of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity
is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the
integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened
in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes
and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr
should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity
of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she
were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also
Lucy said: If thou causest me to be violated against my will.,
my chastity will gain me a twofold crown.

Obj. 3. Further, Martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But
it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other
hardships, as Augustine declares {Music, vi.). Now there are
many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer
for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped
of one's goods, as mentioned in Heb. x. 34, for which reason
we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus,
notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is
not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.

Obj. 4. Further, Martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated
above (A. 2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious
act after death. Therefore it is before death; and con-
sequently death is not essential to martyrdom.

On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs
that in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been
vanquished in living without faith.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called
as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us
to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible,
as stated in Heb. xi. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom
that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed
that he despises all things present, in order to obtain in-
visible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the

223 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 4

life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises
all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise
both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer
bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified
against Job (Job ii. 4): Skin for skin, and all that a man
hath he will give for his soul (Douay, — life) i.e. for the life
of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom
requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.

Reply Obj. 1. The authorities quoted, and the like that
one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of simili-
tude.

Reply Obj. 2. When a woman forfeits the integrity of the
flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the
Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers
this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through con-
tempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her
testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently
this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of
God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed
worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (O. CXXIII., AA. 4, 5),
fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers
consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr
merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture
of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.

Reply Obj. 4. The merit of martyrdom is not after death,
but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the
fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It
happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time
after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after
suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship
inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues.
The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in
this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these
hardships.

Q. 124. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224

Fifth Article.

whether faith alone is the cause of
martyrdom ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that faith alone is the cause of
martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. iv. 15, 16): Let none
of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter
of other men's things. But if as a Christian, let him not be
ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name. Now a man
is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ.
Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom
to those who suffer.

Obj. 2. Further, A martyr is a kind of witness. But
witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called
a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for
witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be
a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry
or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous.
Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

Obj. 3. Further, Those virtuous deeds would seem to be
of most account which are directed to the common good,
since the good of the nation is better than the good of the indi-
vidual, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, i. 2). If, then,
some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would
seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for
the defence of their country. Yet this is not consistent
with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyr-
dom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone
is the cause of martyrdom.

On the contrary, It is written (Matth. v. 10): Blessed are
they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, which pertains
to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's
commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also
the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other
virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so

225 MARTYRDOM Q. 124. Art. 5

called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body
unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to
any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with
godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore
Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is
the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom
is the truth of faith.

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief,
but also outward profession, which is expressed not only
by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds,
whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to
James ii. 18, I will show thee, by works, my faith. Hence it
is written of certain people (Tit. i. 16) : They profess that they
know God but in their works they deny Him. Thus all virtuous
deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions
of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires
these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way
they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the
Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the
Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the
faith, but for reproving adultery.

Reply Obj. 1. A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a
person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith
in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds
by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. viii. 9, If any man
have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His; and again
because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to
Gal. v. 24, They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh
with the vices and concupiscences. Hence to suffer as a
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith,
which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any
good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because
this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of other sciences has no connexion
with the worship of the Godhead : hence it is not called truth
according to godliness, and consequently the confession
thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom.
Yet, since every he is a sin, as stated above (Q. CX., AA. 3, 4),

11. ii. 4 15

Q. i24.Art.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 226

avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary,
may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin
against the Divine Law

Reply Obj. 3. The good of one's country is paramount
among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the
proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human
good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine,
for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any
human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the
cause of martyrdom.

QUESTION CXXV.

OF FEAR.*

(In Four Articles).

We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude:
(i) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to
fortitude ? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether
it excuses from sin, or diminishes it ?

First Article,
whether fear is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a
passion, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIII. , A. 4: Q. XLII.)
Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated
in Ethic, ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems
that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing that is commanded in the
Divine Law is a sin : since the law of the Lord is unspotted
(Ps. xviii. 8). Yet fear is commanded in God's law, for it is
written (Eph. vi. 5) : Servants, be obedient to them that are
your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling.
Therefore fear is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Nothing that is naturally in man is a sin,
for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De

* S. Thomas calls this vice indifferently fear or timidity. The
translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the
connexion with the passion of fear. Otherwise cowardice would be a
better rendering.

227

Q. 125. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 228

Fide Orthod. iii.). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 7) that a man would be
insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes
nor deluges, inspired him with fear. Therefore fear is not a
sin. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matth. x. 28) : Fear ye
not them that kill the body, and it is written (Ezech. ii. 6) :
Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.

I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account
of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act
consists in order, as stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: Q. CXIV.,
A. 1). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject
to the ruling of reason . And reason dictates that certain things
should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to
be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more
than others ; and among things to be sought after, that some
are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more
a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to
be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain
goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be
avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the
reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit
others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and
sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to
shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is
neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear in its generic acceptation denotes
avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include
the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every
other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions
call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither
praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only
those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner.

Reply Obj. 2. The fear which the Apostle inculcates is
in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear
lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters.

Reply Obj. 3. Reason dictates that we should shun the
evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which
profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

229 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art 2

Second Article,
whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary
to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death,
as stated above (Q. CXXIIL, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear
is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on
Ps. cxxvii. 1, Blessed are all they that fear the Lord, says that
it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers,
or to lose worldly goods. Again a gloss on Matth. xxvii. 44,
He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word, says that
evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of
contempt. Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, The chief reason why a man is com-
mended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger
of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death
through fear of slavery or shame. Thus Augustine relates
(De Civ. Dei i.) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar's slave,
gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears
a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.

Obj. 3. Further, All despair arises from fear. But
despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated
above (Q. XX., A. 1 ; I.-IL, Q. XL., A. 4). Neither therefore is
the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7; iii. 7) states
that timidity is opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XIX., A. 3: I.-IL,
Q. XLIIL, A. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears
save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is
not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but
ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every
virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while
inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate
love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner

Q. 125. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230

inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous
man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss
of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that
which has the danger of death for its object, as we find
proved in Ethic, iii. 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of
this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of
death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomasti-
cally* opposed to fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1. The passages quoted refer to inordinate
fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to
various virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Human acts are estimated chiefly with refer-
ence to the end, as stated above (I. -II., Q. I., A. 3: Q. XVIII.,
A. 6) : and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to
danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who
exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from
slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary
to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7),
that to die in order to escape poverty, want, or something
disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for
to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I. -II., Q., XLV., A. 2), fear
is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning
of daring. Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs
daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other
hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not
follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any
kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind.
Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another
kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is
opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the
argument does not prove.

* Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the
general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle:
and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to
denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.

231 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art 3

Third Article,
whether fear is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For,
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. XXIII., A. 1), fear is in the irascible
faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is
none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I.-IL,
Q. LXXIV., A. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Every mortal sin turns the heart wholly
from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges vii. 3,
Whosoever is fearful, etc., says that a man is fearful when
he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly
terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage.
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Mortal sin is a lapse not only from
perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make
one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a
gloss on Deut. xx. 9, What man is there that is fearful and
fainthearted ? says: We learn from this that no man can take
%p the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he,
still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches. Therefore fear is
not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell
due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to
Apoc. xxi. 8, But the fearful and unbelieving and the abomin-
able, etc., shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire
and brimstone which is the second death. Therefore fear is a
mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through
being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what
ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now some-
times this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive
appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite's
consent : and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial
sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches
to the rational appetite which is called the will, which

Q. MS- Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 232

deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason :
and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, some-
times a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger
of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to
do what is forbidden, or Lo omit what is commanded by the
Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin : otherwise it is a venial
sin.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers fear as confined
to the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 2. This gloss also can be understood as referring
to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or
better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his
whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy.
Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen never-
theless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot
be persuaded to put fear aside : thus sometimes a man sins
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned
aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing.

Reply Obj. 3. This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man
aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment
of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Suchlike
fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and some-
times it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable
cause for fear.

Fourth Article,
whether fear excuses from sin ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fear does not excuse from sin.
For fear is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not
excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore
fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 2. Further, If any fear excuses from sin, most of all
would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the
saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear,
seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of
necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear.
Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

233 TIMIDITY Q. 125. Art. 4

Obj. 3. Further, All fear is of evil, either temporal or
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin,
because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one
from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from
sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 6) one
should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not
a result of one's own wickedness. Therefore it seems that
in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I., Q. I., Cap.
Constat.): A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly
ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so
far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason
judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others.
Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned
in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided:
thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss
of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from
sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give
something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin
were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom
he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through
fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason
are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according
to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly
excused from sin, because suchlike fear would be inordinate.
Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils
of the body ; and evils of the body more than evils of external
things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul,
namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as
blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of
money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order
to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused
from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat,
for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because
when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity
of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 1)
says that these things that are done through fear are not

Q. 125. Aet. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 234

simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and in-
voluntary.

Reply Obj. 1. Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinful-
ness, but in the point of its involuntariness.

Reply Obj. 2. Although death comes, of necessity, to all,
yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and conse-
quently an object of fear.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the opinion of Stoics, who held
temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in con-
sequence that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that
therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii.) these temporal things are
goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion
of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to
be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake
to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

QUESTION CXXVI.

OF FEARLESSNESS.
(In Two Articles).

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness : under which
head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a
sin to be fearless ? (2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude ?

First Article,
whether fearlessness is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For
that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not
a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov.
xxviii. 1): The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.
Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.

Obj. 2. Further, Nothing is so fearful as death, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic, iii. 6). Yet one ought not to fear
even death, according to Matth. x. 28, Fear ye not them that
kill the body, etc, nor anything that can be inflicted by man,
according to Isa. li. 12, Who art thou, that thou shouldst be
afraid of a mortal man ? Therefore it is not a sin to be
fearless.

Obj. 3. Further, Fear is born of love, as stated above
(Q. CXXV., A. 2). Now it belongs to the perfection of
virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv.), the love of God to the abasement of self
makes us citizens of the heavenly city. Therefore it is seem-
ingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

235

Q. 126. Art. 1 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 236

On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 2)
that he feared not God nor regarded man.

I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly
judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of
that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which
results from the love of temporal goods. And every man
has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and
whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure,
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein,
but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence
it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin,
to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless,
one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is
natural cannot be wholly lost : for which reason the Apostle
says (Eph. v. 29) : No man ever hated his own flesh. Where-
fore even those that slay themselves do so from love of
their own flesh, which they desire to free from present
stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and
other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that
he loves them* less than he ought. But that he fear none
of these things cannot result from an entire lack of lcve,
but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him
to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves.
This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on
self and despising others, according to the saying of
Job xli. 24, 25: He (Vulg., — who) was made to fear no one,
he beholdeth every high thing : and sometimes it happens
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iii. 7) that the Celts., through lack of intelligence, fear
nothing.^ It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice,
whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dulness
of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be
invincible.

* Viz., the contrary goods. One would expect se instead of ea.
We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less
than he ought.

t "A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there
were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea,
as is said to be the case with the Celts."

237 FEARLESSNESS Q. 126. Art. 2

Reply Obj. 1. The just man is praised for being without
fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether
fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. i. 28) : He that is without
fear cannot be justified.

Reply Obj. 2. Death and whatever else can be inflicted
by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us
forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man
in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards
the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written
(Prov. xiv. 16): A wise man feareth and declineth from evil.

Reply Obj. 3. Temporal goods are to be despised as
hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same
score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. xxxiv. 16) : He that feareth the Lord shall tremble
at nothing. But temporal goods are not to be despised,
in so far as they are helping us instrument ally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

Second Article,
whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to
fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no
act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since
if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring
to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to forti-
tude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fearlessness is a vice, either through
lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of
folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride
is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom.
Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Vices are opposed to virtue and extremes
to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the
one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on
the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearless-
ness is not opposed thereto.

Q. 126. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238

On the contrary, The Philosopher {Ethic, iii.) reckons
fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3), fortitude
is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral
virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which
it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man
should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that
he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so
forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either
by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is
opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man
fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fear-
lessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far
as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of fortitude is to endure death
without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but accord-
ing to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

Reply Obj. 2. Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts
the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude
directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it
from being opposed to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3. The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude
by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear.
Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there
is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes
in different respects.

QUESTION CXXVII.

OF DARING.*

(In Two Articles).

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether daring is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude ?

First Article,
whether daring is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is
written (Job. xxxix. 21) concerning the horse, by which
according to Gregory (Moral, xxxi.) the godly preacher is
denoted, that he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men* But
no vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin
to be daring.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, vi. 9),
one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has
been counselled. But daring helps this quickness in doing*
Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Obj. 3. Further, Daring is a passion caused by hope, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. XLV., A. 2) when we were treating
of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a
virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a
sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. viii. 18) : Go not on
the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils. Now

* Excessive daring or foolhardiness.

t Vulg., — he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men.

239

Q. 127. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240

no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin.
Therefore daring is a sin.

J answer that, Daring, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIII. ,
A. 1: Q. LV.), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes
moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks
moderation, either by caress or by deficiency, and on this
account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the
passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive
anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring
as implying excess is accounted a sin.

Reply Oh 7. 1. The daring spoken of there is that which is
moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking
counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act
quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful;
for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to
prudence, as stated above (Q. LVIIL, A. 3). Wherefore
daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy
as it is directed by reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Some vices are unnamed, and so also
are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks {Ethic. ii, 7;
iv. 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be
applied to certain vices and virtues : and in order to designate
vices we employ especially the names of those passions the
object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger
and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object,
and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

Second Article,
whether daring is opposed to fortitude?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to forti-
tude. For excess of daring seems to result from presump-
tion of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is

241 DARING Q. 127. Art. 2

opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to
humility rather than to fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Daring does not seem to call for blame,
except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring
person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others
whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But
this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as
designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to
justice.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is concerned about fear and
daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3). Now since
timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of
fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of
a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the
point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed
to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such
vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice
in opposition to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and
Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to
fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVL, A. 2), it belongs
to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter
about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that
denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is
opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now
daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion,
and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is
evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is
concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIL,

A. 3)-

Reply Obj. 1. Opposition between vice and virtue does not
depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's
very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring
be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its
cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the direct opposition of a vice does
not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its

11. ii. 4 16

Q. 127. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 242

effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Where-
fore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of daring consists in a man
taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to
him : and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as
such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from
that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no
contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does
not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as
the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7), the daring are precipitate
and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present,
namely through fear.

QUESTION CXXVIII.

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE.

We must now consider the parts of fortitude : first we shall
consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we
shall treat of each part.

Article.

whether the parts of fortitude are suitably

assigned ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) assigns
four parts to fortitude, namely magnificence, confidence,
patience, and perseverance. Now magnificence seems to
pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about
money, and a magnificent man must needs be liberal,
as the Philosopher observes {Ethic, iv. 2). But liberality
is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. CXVIL, A. 5). There-
fore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as
hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude,
but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude makes a man behave aright
in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not
essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they
are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

Obj. 4. Further, According to Tully (loc. cit.) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same
to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude
and not a part thereof.

243

Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244

Obj. 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue
should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But
perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written
(Matth. xxiv. 13) : He that shall persevere to the end he
shall be saved. Therefcre perseverance should not be
accounted a part of fortitude.

Obj. 6. Further, Macrobius {De Somn. Scip. i.) reckons
seven parts of fortitude, namely magnanimity, confidence,
security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability.
Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude,
and these are, courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manli-
ness, perseverance, magnificence. Therefore it seems that
Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Obj. 7. Further, Aristotle {Ethic, iii.) reckons five parts of
fortitude. The first is civic fortitude, which produces
brave deeds through fear of dishonour or punishmen
the second is military fortitude, which produces brave deeds
as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the
fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion,
especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a
man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;
the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely
through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds
of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above
enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts
of fortitude are unfitting.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XLVIII.), a virtue
can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and
potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot
have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several
specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special
matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts
assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things
the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude ;
and potential parts, because what fortitude practises in face
of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain
other virtues practise in the matter of certain minor hard-

245 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128

ships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary
virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. CXXIII-
AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and
endurance. Now two things are required for the act of
aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind,
and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression.
In this respect Tully mentions confidence, of which he says
(loc. cit.) that with this the mind is much assured and firmly
hopeful in great and honourable undertakings. The second
regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in
not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In
this respect Tully mentions magnificence, which he describes
as being the discussion and administration, i.e., accomplish-
ment of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad
and noble purpose of mind, so as to combine execution with
greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined
to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of
death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they
be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they
will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed
thereto as secondary virtues to principal : thus magnificence
is referred by the Philosopher {Ethic, iv.) to great expenses,
and magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence,
to great honours. Again, two things are requisite for the
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the
mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its great-
ness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this
respect he mentions patience, which he describes as the volun-
tary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for
the sake of virtue or profit. The other is that by the prolonged
suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose
courage, according to Heb. xii. 3., That you be not wearied,
fainting in your minds. In this respect he mentions per-
severance, which accordingly he describes as the fixed and
continued persistence in a well considered purpose. If these
two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they
will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred

Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 246

to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence in the matter of liberality
adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion
of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that
is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this
respect, it belongs.

Reply Obj. 2. Hope whereby one confides in God is
accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. XVII.,
A. 5; I. -II., Q. LXIL, A. 3). But by confidence which
here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself,
yet under God withal.

Reply Obj. 3. To venture on anything great seems to
involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous.
Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are
referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other
great things, they have a certain connexion with fortitude
by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply Obj. 4. Patience endures not only dangers of
death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive
sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In
this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude:
but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part
thereof.

Reply Obj. 5. Perseverance as denoting persistence in a
good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every
virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense
stated in the body of the Article.

Reply Obj. 6. Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid
mentioned by Tully, namely confidence, magnificence,
forbearance, which he puts in the place of patience, and
firmness, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he
adds three, two of which, namely magnanimity and security,
are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But
Macrobius is more specific in. his enumeration. Because
confidence denotes a man's hope for great things : and hope
for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to
great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity.

247 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128

For it has been stated above (I. -II., Q. XL., A. 2) that hope
presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the
certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magni-
tude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness
unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's
own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on
account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat
contrary to hope, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XL., A. 4, ad 1).
Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He
adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised
under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnifi-
cence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason
Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplish-
ing great things, but also in discussing them generously
in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance,
so that one may be called persevering through not desisting
on account of delays, and constant through not desisting
on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount
to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius
he mentions perseverance and magnificence, and with Macro-
bius, magnanimity. Strength of will is the same as patience
or forbearance, for he says that strength of will is a habit
that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted,
and to endure what reason says should be endured — i.e. good
courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines
it as strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose.
Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
that manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of
virtue. Besides magnificence he mentions dv8paya6la,
i.e. manly goodness which we may render strenuousness.
For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the
accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy,
but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude
to that accomplishment, and this belongs to avSpayaOla,
strenuousness: wherefore he says that dvSpayadia is the
virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Q. i28 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 248

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be
reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply Obj. 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short
of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the
act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned
parts but modes of fortitude.

QUESTION CXXIX.

OF MAGNANIMITY.*
(In Eight Articles).

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude,
including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by
Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall
substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accord-
ingly we shall consider (i) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence;
(3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we
shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnanimity is about honours ? (2) Whether
magnanimity is only about great honours ? (3) Whether
it is a virtue ? (4) Whether it is a special virtue ? (5) Whether
it is a part of fortitude ? (6) Of its relation to confidence :
(7) Of its relation to assurance : (8) Of its relation to goods
of fortune.

First Article.

whether magnanimity is about honours ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not about
honours. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as
its very name shows, since magnanimity signifies greatness
of mind, and mind denotes the irascible part, as appears
from De Anima iii. 42, where the Philosopher says that in
the sensitive appetite are desire and mind, i.e. the concupis-
cible and irascible parts. But honour is a concupiscible

* Not in the ordinary restricted sense, but as explained by the
author.

249

Q. 129. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 250

good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems
that magnanimity is not about honours.

Obj. 2. Further, Sine** magnanimity is a moral virtue, it
must needs be about either passions or operations. Now
it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of
justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But
honour is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not
about honours.

Obj. 3. Further, The nature of magnanimity seems to
regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be
magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the
virtuous are praised not for desiring honours, but for shun-
ning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honours.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that
magnanimity is about honour and dishonour.

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes
stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue
bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about
which it is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act,
which consists in the right use of such matter. And since
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man
is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to
do some great act.

Now an act may be called great in two ways : in one way
proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be
called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of
some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a
very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely
great when it consists in the best use of the greatest
thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things,
and among these honour is the greatest simply, both because
it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a
person's virtue, as stated above (Q. OIL, AA. 1, 2); and
because it is offered to God and to the best; and again
because, in order to obtain honour even as to avoid shame,
men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely

251 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. i

and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of
things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that
magnanimity is about honours.

Reply Obj. 1. Good and evil absolutely considered regard
the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of
difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is
that magnanimity regards honour, inasmuch, to wit, as
honour has the aspect of something great or difficult.

Reply Obj. 2. Although honour is neither a passion nor an
operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope,
which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity
is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately
about honour as the object of hope: even so, we have stated
(Q. CXXIIL, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude that it is
about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of
fear and daring.

Reply Obj. 3. Those are worthy of praise who despise riches
in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain
them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however,
one were to despise honours so as not to care to do what is
worthy of honour, this would be deserving of blame. Ac-
cordingly magnanimity is about honours in the sense that
a man strives to do what is deserving of honour, yet not so
as to think much of the honour accorded by man.

Second Article,
whether magnanimity is essentially about great

HONOURS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not essentially
about great honours. For the proper matter of magna-
nimity is honour, as stated above (A. 1). But great and little
are accidental to honour. Therefore it is not essential to
magnanimity to be about great honours.

Obj. 2. Further, Just as magnanimity is about honour,
so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meek-
ness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore

Q. 129. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 252

neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great
honour.

Obj. 3. Further, Small honour is less aloof from great
honour than is dishonour. But magnanimity is well
ordered in relation to dishonour, and consequently in relation
to small honours also. Therefore it is not only about great
honours.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7) that
magnanimity is about great honours.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii.
17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to under-
stand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the
extreme limit of that power, as stated in de Ccelo i. 116.
Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every
operation of that power, but in such operations as are great
or difficult : for every power, however imperfect, can extend
to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential
to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated
in Ethic, ii. 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same)
in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of
view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it
is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some
particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the
act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other
difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve
a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty
regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the
passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv. 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that
the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises
chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in
others from the things that are the objects of the passions.
The passions themselves have no great power of resistance,
unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite,
which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to

253 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 2

reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these
passions regard only that which is great in such passions:
thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temper-
ance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and
likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other
hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason
arising from the external things themselves that are the
objects of those passions : such are the love or desire of money
or of honour. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue
not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions,
but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things
external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being
necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire
of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little
sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large
sums of money, namely magnificence.

In like manner there are two virtues about honours, one
about ordinarv honours. This virtue has no name, but
is denominated by its extremes, which are tyiXoriixla, i.e. love
of honour, and a(f)i\oTi/j,la, i.e. without love of honour: for
sometimes a man is commended for loving honour, and
sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both
these things may be done in moderation. But with regard
to great honours there is magnanimity. Wherefore we
must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is
great honour, and that a magnanimous man tends to such
things as are deserving of honour.

Reply Obj. 1. Great and little are accidental to honour
considered in itself: but they make a great difference in
their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed
in the use of honour, for it is much more difficult to observe
it in great than in little honours.

Reply Obj. 2. In anger and other matters only that which
is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this
alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with
riches and honours which are things existing outside the
soul.

Reply Obj. 3. He that makes good use of great things

Q. 129. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 254

is much more able to make good use of little things. Ac-
cordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honours
as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honours
as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot
sufficiently honour virtue which deserves to be honoured
by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honours, because
he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise
them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like
manner he is not cast down by dishonour, but despises it,
since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

Third Article,
whether magnanimity is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue.
For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magna-
nimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme:
because the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the
greatest things {Ethic, iv. 3). Therefore magnanimity is
not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, He that has one virtue has them all,
as stated above (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have a
virtue without having magnanimity : since the Philosopher
says (Ethic, iv. 3) that whosoever is worthy of little things
and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not
magnanimous. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue is a good quality of the mind, as
stated above (I.-II., Q. LV., A. 4). But magnanimity implies
certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 3) of a magnanimous man that his gait is slow,
his voice deep, and his utterance calm. Therefore magna-
nimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, No virtue is opposed to another virtue.
But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since the magnani-
mous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others,
according to Ethic, iv. {Inc. cit.). Therefore magnanimity is
not a virtue.

255 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 3

Obj. 5. Further, The properties of every virtue are praise-
worthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call
for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is
unmindful of favours; secondly, he is remiss and slow of
action; thirdly, he employs irony* towards many; fourthly,
he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he
holds to the barren things rather than to those that are
fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men
(2 Machab. xv. 18): Nicanor hearing of the valour of Judas'
companions, and the greatness of courage (animi magnitudi-
nem) with which they fought for their country, was afraid to
try the matter by the sword. Now, only deeds of virtue are
worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists
in greatness of courage is a virtue.

/ answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in
safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is
man's proper good. Now among external human things
honours take precedence of all others, as stated above
(A. 1: I. -II., Q. 11, A. 2., Obj. 3). Therefore magnanimity,
which observes the mode of reason in great honours, is a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher again says (Ethic, iv. 3),
the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes, in so
far as he tends to what is greatest, but in the matter of becom-
ingness, he follows the mean, because he tends to the greatest
things according to reason, for he deems himself worthy
in accordance with his worth (ibid.), since his aims do not
surpass his deserts.

Reply Obj. 2. The mutual connexion of the virtues does
not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent
to practise the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act
of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man,
but only to great men. On the other hand, as regards the
principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues
are connected together, since their habits reside together
in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition

* Cf. Q. CXI1I.

O. i29. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 256

thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of
magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magna-
nimity, whereby he is disposed to practise that act if it were
competent to him according to his state.

Reply Obj. 3. The movements of the body are differen-
tiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions
of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there
accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements.
For quickness of movement results from a man being intent
on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things;
these are few and require great attention, wherefore they
call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking
is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about
anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are
busy only about great things. And just as these disposi-
tions of bodily movements are competent to the magnani-
mous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too
in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these
conditions are found naturally.

Reply Obj. 4. There is in man something great which he
possesses through the gift of God; and something defective
which accrues to him through the weakness of nature.
Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself
worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds
from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,
magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue;
and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such
as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility
makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his
own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others
in so far as they fall away from God's gifts : since he does not
think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their
sake. Yet humility makes us honour others and esteem them
better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's gifts
in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. xiv. 4):
In his sight a vile person is contemned* which indicates

* Douay. The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth, etc.

257 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 3

the contempt of magnanimity, but he honoureth them that
fear the Lord, which points to the reverential bearing of
humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and
humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem
to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed accord-
ing to different considerations.

Reply Obj. 5. These properties in so far as they belong to a
magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great
praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the
magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has
received favours, this points to the fact that he takes no
pleasure in accepting favours from others unless he repay
them with yet greater favour; this belongs to the perfection
of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in
the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is
said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking
in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy
himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works,
such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third
place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as
either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny
of himself great things that are true, but because he does not
disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of
those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says
(Ethic, iv. 3), it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great
towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming
towards the middle class. In the fourth place, it is said that
he cannot associate with others : this means that he is not at
home with others than his friends: because he altogether
shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of
mind. But he associates with all, both great and little,
according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said,
fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed
any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the
virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is
sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with
magnanimity.

11. ii. 4 17

Q. 129. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 258

Fourth Article,
whether magnanimity is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a special
virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue.
But the Philosopher states {Ethic, iv. 3) that whatever is
great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous. Therefore
magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of different virtues are not
ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different
virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is
stated in Ethic, iv. (loc. cit.) that it belongs to the magnanimous
not to avoid reproof (which is an act of prudence), nor to act
unjustly (which is an act of justice), that he is ready to do
favours (which is an act of charity), that he gives his services
readily (which is an act of liberality), that he is truthful (which
is an act of truthfulness), and that he is not given to complain-
ing (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity
is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Every virtue is a special ornament of
the soul, according to the saying of Isaias (lxi. 10), He
hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, and after-
wards he adds, and as a bride adorned with her jewels.
But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as
stated in Ethic, iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general
virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7) distinguishes
it from the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 2), it belongs
to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a
determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the
mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honours,
as stated above (AA. 1, 2) : and honour, considered in itself,
is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered
in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honour is the reward of every virtue, as

259 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 4

stated above (Q. CIIL, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason
of its matter it regards all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity is not about any kind of
honour, but great honour. Now, as honour is due to virtue,
so great honour is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence
it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in
every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy
of great honours.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the magnanimous tends to great
things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve
a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect.
Now it savours of excellence that a man is beneficent,
generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready
to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other
virtues. On the other hand it is a proof of defect, that a
man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils,
that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any
virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth
indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear.
Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect,
because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous
man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are
contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply Obj. 3. Every virtue derives from its species a
certain lustre or adornment which is proper to each virtue:
but further adornment results from the very greatness of
a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all
virtues greater as stated in Ethic, iv. 3.

Fifth Article,
whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnanimity is not a part of
fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magna-
nimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca
says (De Quat. Virtut.): If magnanimity, which is also called

Q. 129. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 260

fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance:
and Tully says (De Offic. i.): If a man is brave we expect him
to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from decep-
tion. Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3) says that
a magnanimous man is not <pi\oKiv8vpo<;, that is, a lover of
danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself
to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common
with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.

Obj. 3. Further, Magnanimity regards the great in things
to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in
things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import
than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important
virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Soma. Scip. i.) and
Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. LXL, A. 3), a
principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a
general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of
the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because
a firm standing is necessary in every virtue, according to
Ethic, ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues
that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult
to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to
stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal
is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death,
wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for
or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is con-
firmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all
things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any
others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees
with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the
mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm.
Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because
it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. I. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, v. 1, 3),

26 1 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 5

to lack evil is looked upon as a good, wherefore not to be
overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death,
is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great
good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to
magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a
difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of
the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnani-
mity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, ii. 7), is a distinct
virtue from fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2. A man is said to love danger when he
exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be
the mark of one who thinks many the same as great. This
is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no
one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a
thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are
truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose
himself to danger, since he does something great in the act
of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence
the Philosopher says (ibid.) that the magnanimous man
is not fjUfcpoKLvSwos, i.e. endangering himself for small
things, but fieyaXoKlvSwos, i.e. endangering himself for
great things. And Seneca says (De Quot. Virtut.): Thou
wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a
rash man, nor fear est them like a coward. For nothing makes
the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life.

Reply Obj. 3. Evil as such is to be avoided : and that one
has to withstand it is accidental, in so far, to wit, as one
has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But
good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only
accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the
ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so
essentially is always of more account than that which is
so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is
always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult
in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes pre-
cedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good
is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in
this particular respect.

Q. 129. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 262

Sixth Article,
whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that confidence does not belong to
magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only
in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. iii. 4, 5,
Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that
we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of our-
selves. But this seems inconsistent with the idea of
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to
magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Confidence seems to be opposed to fear,
according to Isa. xii. 2, / will deal confidently and will not
fear. But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude.
Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than
to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Reward is not due except to virtue.
But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. iii. 6,
where it is said that we are the house of Christ, if we hold
fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end. Therefore
confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this
is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius condivides it with
magnanimity (De Somn. Scip. L).

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii.) seems to substi-
tute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the
preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

/ answer that, Confidence takes its name irom fides (faith) :
and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody.
But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job xi. 18,
Thou shall have confidence, hope being set before thee. Where-
fore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man
derives hope through believing the word of one who promises
to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion
about something, not only on account of another's state-
ment, but also on account of something we observe in another,

263 MAGNANIMITY Q. 120. Art. 6

it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having
something, which hope we conceive through observing
something either in oneself — for instance, through observing
that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long ;
or in another, for instance, through observing that another
is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he
will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1, 2 ad) that magnani-
mity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Where-
fore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope
arising from some observation which gives one a strong
opinion taat one will obtain a certain good, it follows that
confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply Gbj. 1. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3), it
belongs tc the magnanimous to need nothing, for need is a
mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood accord-
ing to the mode of a man, hence he adds or scarcely anything.
For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every
man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human
assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is
sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly,
in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous
man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of
excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who
are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own
ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be con-
fident in himself.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (I.-II., Q. XXIII., A. 2:
Q. XL., A. 4), when we were treating of the passions, hope
is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about
the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety
of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object
is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope,
wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since,
however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect
of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of
good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly
to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope

Q. i29. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 264

causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in
consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3. Confidence, as stated above, denotes a
certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened
by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection
may call for commendation of the act, so that it become
meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of
virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence
cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions
of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among ;he parts
of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified
with magnanimity by Tully (loc. cit.), but as an integral
part, as stated in the preceding Question.

Seventh Article,
whether security belongs to magnanimity?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that security does not belong to
magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q. CXXVIIL,
ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But
fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security
is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not
belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.
Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x.) that a man is
said to be secure because he is without care. But this seems
to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honourable
things, according to 2 Tim. ii. 15, Carefully study to present
thyself approved unto God. Therefore security does not
belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the
virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue is not its own reward. But
security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to
Job xi. 14, 18, // thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity
that is in thy hand being buried thou shalt sleep secure. There-
fore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any
other virtue, as a part thereof.

265 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 7

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) under the heading:
Magnanimity consists of two things, that it belongs to mag-
nanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man,
nor to fortune. But a man's security consists in this.
Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

/ answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii. 5), fear
makes a man take counsel, because, to wit, he takes care
to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from
the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: where-
fore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear,
just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope
directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards
fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately
to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to for-
titude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause
of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above
when we were treating of the passion (I. -II., Q. XLV., A. 2).
Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in
so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly
to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because
it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it
denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion.
Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a
condition thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Not all security is worthy of praise but only
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when
one should not fear : in this way it is a condition of fortitude
and of magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 3. There is in the virtues a certain likeness
to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above
(I. -II., Q. V., AA. 3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain
security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect
security belongs to virtue's reward.

Q. 129. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 266

Eighth Article,
whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce
to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i. :
De vita beata xvi. ) : virtue suffices for itself. Now magnanimity
makes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3).
Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magna-
nimity.

Obj. 2. Further, No virtuous man despises what is helpful
to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever
pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says {De Offic. i.)
under the heading: Magnanimity consists of two things,
that a great soul is commended for despising external things.
Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of
fortune.

Obj. 3. Further, Tully adds (ibid.) that it belongs to a
great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to
depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise
man. And Aristotle says (Ethic, iv. 3) that a magnanimous
man does not grieve at misfortune. Now troubles and mis-
fortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one
grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore
external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that
goods of fortune seem to conduce to magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity
regards two things : honour as its matter, and the accomplish-
ment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune
conduce to both these things. For since honour is conferred
on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multi-
tude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem,
the result is that they show greater honour to those who
possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are
useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we
can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and

267 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. 8

friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce
to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself,
because it can be without even these external goods; yet
it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

Reply Obj. 2. The magnanimous man despises external
goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to
be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet
he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful
for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 3. If a man does not think much of a thing,
he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved
at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does
not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune,
he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much
cast down by their loss.

QUESTION CXXX

OF PRESUMPTION.
(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity;
and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by
excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition,
and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity
which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the
first head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether
presumption is a sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to magna-
nimity by excess ?

First Article,
whether presumption is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. For
the Apostle says: Forgetting the things that are behind, I
stretch forth (Vulg., — and stretching forth) myself to those that
are before. But it seems to savour of presumption that one
should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presump-
tion is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, i. 7) we

should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish

human things because we are men, or mortal things because

we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal:

and (Met. i.) that man should pursue divine things as far as

possible. Now divine and immortal things are seemingly

far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially

26S

269 PRESUMPTION Q. 130. Art. i

in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presump-
tion is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (2 Cor. Hi. 5): Not
that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of
ourselves. If then presumption, by which one strives at
that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that
man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which
is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xxxvii. 3) : 0 wicked
presumption, whence earnest thou ? and a gloss answers :
From a creature s evil will. Now all that comes of the root
of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.

/ answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is
ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought
to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human
reason in opposition to the order established in general
throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now
it is established throughout all natural things, that every
action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor
does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its
ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary
to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what
is above his power : and this is what is meant by presumption,
as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that pre-
sumption is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. Nothing hinders that which is above the
active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the
passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed
of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed
as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass
the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and
presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue
to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs
to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a
man to endeavour to advance towards perfect virtue. In
this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things
that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.

Reply Obj. 2. Divine and immortal things surpass man

Q. 130. Art. 2 THE ': SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 270

according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed
of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can
be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect
the Philosopher says that man ought to pursue immortal
and divine things, not that he should do what it becomes
God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect
and will.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, hi. 3), what
we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a
sense. Hence since we can think and do good by the help
of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence
it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplish-
ment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous
if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God's
assistance.

Second Article.

whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity

by excess ?

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that presumption is not opposed
to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted
a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above
(Q. XIV., A. 2 : Q. XXL, A. 1). But the sin against the Holy
Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity.
Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to magnanimity that one should
deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to
be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small
things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption
is not directly opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, The magnanimous man looks upon
external goods as little things. Now according to the
Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 3), on account of external fortune
the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they
deem external goods as something great. Therefore presump-
tion is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only
by deficiency.

271 PRESUMPTION Q. 130. Art. 2

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7; iv. 3)
that the vain man, i.e. a vapourer or a wind-bag, which
with us denotes a presumptuous man, is opposed to the
magnanimous man by excess.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad. 1),
magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity
of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own
ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is
becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which
he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes
falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion
to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not
exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed
to magnanimity by excess.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not every presumption that is accounted
a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one con-
temns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence
in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by
reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies con-
tempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather
to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless,
in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's
own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 2. Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to
tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont
to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers
in something small. If, however, such a man be called
presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed
to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary
honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. No one attempts what is above his ability,
except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is.
In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards
quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or
knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards
the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and
worthy of great things,, by reason of something that does

Q. 130. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 272

not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods
of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3),
those who have these things without virtue, neither justly
deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called
magnanimous.

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in
excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something
great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to
suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while some-
times it is something great, not simply, but only in the
opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising
and wronging others. This savours of an excess of
magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion.
Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that when magna-
nimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed,
proud, haughty, restless, and bent on excelling in all things,
whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of
virtue. Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man
sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although
in appearance he surpasses him.

QUESTION CXXXI.

OF AMBITION.
(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider ambition: and under this head
there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a sin ?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess ?

First Article,
whether ambition is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not a sin. For
ambition denotes the desire of honour. Now honour is
in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods:
wherefore those who care not for honour are reproved.
Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something
deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.

Obj. 2. Further, Anyone may, without sin, desire what
is due to him as a reward. Now honour is the reward of
virtue, as the Philosopher sta.tes( Ethic, i. 12; iv. 3; viii. 14).
Therefore ambition of honour is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, That which heartens a man to do good
and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now
honour heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus
the Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 8) that with the bravest men,
cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour: and
Tully says (De Tusc. Quczst. i.) that honour fosters the arts.
Therefore ambition is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. xiii. 5) that charity is
II. ii. 4 273 18

Q. 131. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 274

not ambitious, seeketh not her own. Now nothing is contrary
to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIII., AA. 1, 2), honour
denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his ex-
cellence. Now two things have to be considered with
regard to man's honour. The first is that a man has not
from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it
were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count
honour is due principally, not to him but to God. The
second point that calls for observation is that the thing in
which man excels is given to him by God, that he may
profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be
pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this
enables him to profit others.

Now the desire of honour may be inordinate in three
ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excel-
lence which he has not : this is to desire more than his share
of honour. Secondly, when a man desires honour for him-
self without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's
appetite rests in honour itself, without referring it to the
profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate
desire of honour, it is evident that it is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1. The desire for good should be regulated
according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be
sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honour in disaccord
with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who
care not for honour in accordance with reason's dictate that
they should avoid what is contrary to honour.

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is not the reward of virtue, as
regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek
for it as his reward : since the reward he seeks is happiness,
which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward
of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than
honour whereby to reward the virtuous; which honour
deceives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness
to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate
reward, as stated in Ethic, iv. 3.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as some are heartened to do good and

275 AMBITION Q. 131. Art. 2

disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honour,
if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordin-
ately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many
evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he
obtains honour. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that
the good as well as the wicked covet honours for themselves, but
the one, i.e. the good, go about it in the right way, whereas
the other, i.e. the wicked, through lack of the good acts, make
use of deceit and falsehood. Yet they who, merely for the
sake of honour, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous,
according to the Philosopher [Ethic, iii. 8), where he says
that they who do brave things for the sake of honour are
not truly brave.

Second Article.

whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity

by excess ?

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that ambition is not opposed to
magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one
extreme opposed to it on the one side. Now presumption
is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above
(Q. CXXX., A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to
it by excess.

Obj. 2. Further, Magnanimity is about honours; whereas
ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is
written (2 Machab. iv. 7) that Jason ambitiously sought
the high priesthood. Therefore ambition is not opposed to
magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Ambition seems to regard outward show:
for it is written (Acts xxv. 27) that Agrippa and Berenice
. . . with great pomp (ambitione) . . . had entered into the
hall of audience* and (2 Para. xvi. 14) that when Asa died
they burnt spices and . . . ointments over his body with very
great pomp [ambitione). But magnanimity is not about

* Praetorium. The Vulgate has auditorium, but the meaning is
the same.

Q. 131. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 276

outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to
magnanimity.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) that the more a
man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself
alone to dominate others. But this pertains to ambition.
Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies
inordinate love of honour. Now magnanimity is about
honours and makes use of them in a becoming manner.
Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magna-
nimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.

Reply Obj. 1. Magnanimity regards two things. It
regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that
the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability.
In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by
excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great
deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnani-
mity regards is its matter, viz. honour, of which it makes
right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magna-
nimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be
exceeded in various respects.

Reply Obj. 2. Honour is due to those who are in a position
of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate :
and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignit}'
pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inor-
dinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of
honour, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding
his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous.

Reply Obj. 3. The very solemnity of outward worship
is a kind of honour, wherefore in such cases honour is wont
to be shown. This is signified by the words of James
(ii. 2, 3): If there shall come into your assembly a man having
a golden ring, in fine apparel, . . . and you . . . shall say to
him: Sit thou here well, etc. Wherefore ambition does not
regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of
honour.

QUESTION CXXXII.

OF VAINGLORY.

(In Five Articles.)

We must now consider vainglory: under which head there
are five points of inquiry: (i) Whether desire of glory is a
sin ? (2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity ? (3) Whether
t is a mortal sin ? (4) Whether it is a capital vice ? (5) Of
its daughters.

First Article,
whether the desire of glory is a sin ?

We Proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin.
For no one sins in being likened to God : in fact we are com-
manded (Eph. v. L): Be ye . . . followers of God, as most
dear children. Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate
God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written
(Isa. xliii. 6, 7): Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters
from the ends of the earth. A nd every one that calleth on My
name, I have created him for My glory. Therefore the desire
for glory is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, That which incites a man to do good is
apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men
to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Qucest. i.) that glory
inflames every man to strive his utmost : and in Holy Writ
glory is promised for good works, according to Rom. ii. 7 :
To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . .
glory and honour* Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

* Vulg., — Who will render to every man according to his works, to
them indeed who . . . seek glory and honour and incorruption, eternal
life.

2 77

Q. 132. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 278

Obj. 3. Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that glory
is consistent good report about a person, together with praise :
and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra
Maximin. iii.), viz. that glory is, as it were, clear knowledge
with praise. Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown :
indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to
Ecclus. xli. 15, Take care of a good name, and Rom. xii. 17,
Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in
the sight of all men. Therefore the desire of vainglory is
not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v.): He is
better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise
is sinful.

I answer that, Glory signifies a certain charity, wherefore
Augustine says (Tract, lxxxii., c, cxiv. in Joan.) that to
be glorified is the same as to be clarified. Now clarity and
comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word
glory properly denotes the display of something as regards
its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a
bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is
clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are
far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes
that somebody's good is known and approved by many,
according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.):* I must not
boast while I am addressing one man.

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not
only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the
knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one
considers one's own good as being worthy of praise. Now
it is not a sin to know and approve one's own good: for it
is written (1 Cor. ii. 12): Now we have received not the spirit
of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know
the things that are given us from God. Likewise it is not a sin
to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is
written (Matth. v. 16): Let your light shine before men.
Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin:
but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it
* The quotation is from Livy (Hist., Lib. XXII., C. 39).

279 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. i

is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. iv. 3, Why
do you love vanity, and seek after lying ?

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on
the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a
man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for
instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable:
secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory,
for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly,
on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he
does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such
as God's honour, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbour.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says on John xiii. 13, You call
Me Master and Lord ; and you say well (Tract, lviii. in Joan.) :
Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to
beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He
may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge
of God is our need, not His : nor does any man know Him
unless he be taught of Him Who knows. It is therefore
evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for
ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own
glory for the good of others, according to Matth. v. 16, That
they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is
in heaven.

Reply Obj. 2. That which we receive from God is not vain
but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward
for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. x. 17, 18):
He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who
commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God com-
mendeth. It is true that some are heartened to do works of
virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the
desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous
who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v.).

Reply Obj. 3. It is requisite for man's perfection that he
should know himself; but not that he should be known by
others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may,
however, be desired as being useful for something, either
in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may

Q. 132. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 280

become better by reason of the good they know to be in
another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testi-
mony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this
sense it is praiseworthy that a man should take care of his
good name, and that he should provide good things in the
sight of God and men : but not that he should take an empty
pleasure in human praise.

Second Article,
whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not opposed to
magnanimity. For, as stated above (Ai), vainglory consists
in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to false-
hood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to
covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment
is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these
vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vain-
glory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Vainglory is not, like pusillanimity,
opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems
inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way
of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are
opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q. CXXX., A. 2:
Q. CXXXL, A. 2) : and these differ from vainglory. There-
fore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, A gloss on Philip, ii. 3, Let nothing be
done through contention, neither by vainglory, says: Some
among them were given to dissension and restlessness, con-
tending with one another for the sake of vainglory. But
contention* is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither
therefore is vainglory.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i.) under the heading,
Magnanimity consists in two things : We should beware of
the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a mag-

* Cf. Q. XXXVIII.

28 1 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 2

nanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammelled.
Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIIL, A. 1, ad 3), glory
is an effect of honour and praise: because from the fact that
a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires
charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity
is about honour, as stated above (Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2),
it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man
uses honour moderately, so too does he use glory in modera-
tion. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly
opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1. To think so much of little things as to glory
in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it
is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic, iv.) that honour is
of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of
other things that are sought for honour's sake, such as power
and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity
to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous man (Ethic, iv.) that he cares more for truth
than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnani-
mity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise,
as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is
said of the magnanimous man (Ethic, iv., loc. cit.), that he
cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this
from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other
virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. He that is desirous of vainglory does in
truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in
what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the
preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is-
opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because
the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation,
and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXVIL, A. 2, ad 2),
the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects.
Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to
magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he

Q. 132. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 282

deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3)
that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because
nothing is great in his estimation.

Third Article,
whether vainglory is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Third A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin.
For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal
sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward : for it is
written (Matth. vi. 1) : Take heed, that you do not give justice
before men, to be seen by them : otherwise you shall not have a
reward of your Father Who is in heaven. Therefore vainglory
is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whoever appropriates to himself that
which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring
vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is
proper to God. For it is written (Isa. xlii. 8) : / will not give
My glory to another, and (1 Tim. i. 17) : To ... the only
God be honour and glory. Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Apparently a sin is mortal if it be most
dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this
kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. ii. 4, God,
Who proveth our hearts, says : Unless a man war against the
love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power,
for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as
one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when
it is given. Chrysostom also says (Horn. xix. in Matth.)
that vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all
our inward possessions. Therefore vainglory is a mortal
sin.

On the contrary, Chrysostom says* that while other vices
find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds
a place even in the servants of Christ. Yet in the latter there
is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

* Horn. xiii. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to S. John
Chrysostom.

283 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 3

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. XXIV.. A. 12: Q. CX.,
A. 4: Q. CXIL, A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary
to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself,
does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love
of one's neighbour: yet as regards the love of God it may
be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason
of the matter about which one glories: for instance when
one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence
we owe God, according to Ezech. xxviii. 2, Thy heart is
lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God, and 1 Cor. iv. 7,
What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast
received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it ?
Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in
which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jerem. ix. 23, 24):
Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the
strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man
glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this,
that he understandeth and knoweth Me, Or again when a man
prefers the testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in
reproval of certain people (John xii. 43) : For they loved the
glory of men more than the glory of God.

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity,
on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his
intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even
virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears
not from doing even that which is against God. In this
way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei v. 14) that this vice, namely the love of human
praise, is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory
more than it fears or loves God, that Our Lord said (John v. 44) :
How can you believe, who receive glory one from another,
and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek ?

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain,
be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the
matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks
glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1. No man, by sinning, merits eternal life:
wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal

Q. 132. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 284

life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though
that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when
a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory,
and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal
sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Not every man that is desirous of vainglory,
desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For
the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a
virtuous or rich man.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin,
not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a
disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presump-
tuous and too self-confident : and so it gradually disposes a
man to lose his inward goods.

Fourth Article,
whether vainglory is a capital vice ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that vainglory is not a capital sin.
For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly
not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride.
Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

Obj. 2. Further, Honour would seem to take precedence
of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inor-
dinate desire of honour is not a capital vice. Neither
therefore is the desire of vainglory.

Obj. 3. Further, A capital vice has a certain prominence.
But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a
sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as
an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail
thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore
vainglory is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory [Moral, xxxi.) numbers vain-
glory among the seven capital vices.

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two
ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number:
and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices.

285 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 4

Gregory, however (Moral, xxxi.), reckons pride to be the
queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate
offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice : and not
without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on
(0. CLIL, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence.
But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain
perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of
every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice
seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices,
and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of
vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods
that are the means whereby man acquires honour, glory
seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch
as it denotes the manifestation of a man's goodness: since
good is naturally loved and honoured by all. Wherefore,
just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires
honour in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in
the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things.
Hence on account of its close connexion with excellence,
which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable.
And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire
thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not impossible for a capital vice to
arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the
Article and I. -II., Q. LXXXIV., A. 2) pride is the queen
and mother of all the vices.

Reply Obj. 2. Praise and honour, as stated above (A. 2),
stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it pro-
ceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For
the reason why a man loves to be honoured and praised
is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the
knowledge of others.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory stands prominent under the
aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this
suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always
necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal
sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can
dispose man thereto.

Q.132.ART.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 286

Fifth Article.

whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably
reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness,
hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and
love of novelties ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: —

Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of vainglory
are unsuitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness,
hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity*
For according to Gregory (Moral, xxiii.) boastfulness is
numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not
arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as
Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.). Therefore boastfulness should
not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.

Obj. 2. Further, Contention and discord seem to be the
outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice
condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they
are not the daughters of vainglory.

Obj. 3. Further, Chrysostom says (Horn. xix. in Matth.)
that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philan-
thropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it
is an established custom among men. Therefore eccen-
tricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of
vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral.
xxxi.), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. XXXIV., A. 5:
Q. XXXV., A. 4: I.-IL, 0. LXXXIV., AA. 3, 4), the vices
which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the
end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now
the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own
excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4) : and to this end a
man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by
words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they
be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties

* Praesumptio novitatum, literally presumption of novelties.

287 OF VAINGLORY Q. 132. Art. 5

which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false,
it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make
known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to
another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the
intellect, and thus we have obstinacy, by which a man is
too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to
believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will,
and then we have discord, whereby a man is unwilling to
give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as
regards speech, and then we have contention, whereby a man
quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly, as regards deeds,
and this is disobedience, whereby a man refuses to carry
out the command of his superiors.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXII., AA. 1, 2),
boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior
cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according
to Ethic, iv., is directed sometimes to gain, but more often
to glory and honour, and thus it is the result of vainglory.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger is not the cause of discord and con-
tention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a
man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the
will and words of others.

Reply Obj. 3. Vainglory is reproved in connexion with
almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in
one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbour,
seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former.
But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as
though this were something novel.

QUESTION CXXXIII.

OF PUSILLANIMITY.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head
there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether pusillanimity
is a sin ? (2) To what virtue is it opposed ?

First Article,
whether pusillanimity is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For
every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a
man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3). Therefore pusillanimity is
not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says [ibid.) that a
fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great
goods, yet does not deem hi7nself worthy of them. Now no one
is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the
Philosopher again says {ibid.), none but the virtuous are
truly worthy of honour. Therefore the fainthearted are
virtuous : and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Pride is the beginning of all sin (Ecclus.
x. 15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride,
since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while
the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is
worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 4. Further, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3) that
he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to befaint-

288

289 PUSILLANIMITY Q. 133- Art 1.

hearted. Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less
worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Elias, who
were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they
both humbly declined (Exod. iii. n: Jerem. i. 6). There-
fore pusillanimity is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be
avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided:
for it is written (Coloss. iii. 21): Fathers, provoke not your
children to indignation, lest they be discouraged. Therefore
pusillanimity is a sin.

/ answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclina-
tion is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature.
Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an
action that is commensurate with its power : as is evident
in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now
just as presumption makes a man exceed what is propor-
tionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so
pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate
to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commen-
surate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is
pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in
the earth the money he had received from his master, and
did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished
by his master (Matth. xxv. ; Luke xix.).

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher calls those evil who injure
their neighbour: and accordingly the fainthearted is said
not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally,
by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For
Gregory says (Pastoral, i.) that if they who demur to do good
to their neighbour in preaching be judged strictly, without
doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have
done had they been less retiring.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous
habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit,
or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue.
Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which
he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are
worthy of great honour, and yet through not trying to make

11. ii. 4 19

Q. 133. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 290

use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes
mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy
of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability
which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or
from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use
those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 3. Even pusillanimity may in some way be
the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to
his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent
for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is
written (Prov. xxvi. 16): The sluggard is wiser in his own
conceit than seven men that speak sentences. For nothing
hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and
having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore
Gregory says {Pastor, i.) of Moses that perchance he would
have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a
numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have
been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his
Creator.

Reply Obj. 4. Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the
office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthi-
ness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insuffi-
ciency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obsti-
nately lest they should fall into pride.

Second Article,
whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity ?

We proceed thus to the Second A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to
magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 3) that
the fainthearted man knows not himself : for he would desire
the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself.
Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. There-
fore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.

Obj. 2. Further, Our Lord calls the servant wicked and
slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use

2gi PUSILLANIMITY Q. 133- Art. 2

of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv.,
loc. cit.) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now
sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence,
as stated above (Q. XLVIL, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Pusillanimity seems to proceed from
inordinate fear : hence it is written (Isa. xxxv. 4) : Say to the
fainthearted : Take courage and fear not. It also seems to
proceed from inordinate anger, according to Coloss. iii. 21,
Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be
discouraged. Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude,
and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity
is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 4. Further, The vice that is in opposition to a par-
ticular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more
unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike
magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillani-
mity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more
grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the
saying of Ecclus. xxxvii. 3, 0 wicked presumption, whence
earnest thou ? Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to
magnanimity.

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ
as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names
denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore
pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

i" answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three
ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its
very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it
differs as great and little differ in connexion with the same
subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great
things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man
shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly,
it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the
part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification,
and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what
one falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be
considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from

O. 133. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 292

the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated
above (0. CXXXIL, A. 2, ad 3), opposition between vice
and virtue depends rather on their respective species than
on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly
opposed to magnanimity

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers pusillanimity as
proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot
be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in
respect of its cause : because ignorance of this kind does not
proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering
one's own ability, according to Ethic, iv. 3, or in accomplish-
ing what is within one's power.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument considers pusillanimity from
the point of view of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument considers the point of view
of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always
a fear of the dangers of death : wherefore it does not
follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to
fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the
aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to
take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which dis-
heartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If,
however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries
inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is
disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 4. According to its proper species pusillanimity
is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man with-
draws from good things, which is a very great evil according
to Ethic, iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be wicked
on account of pride whence it proceeds.

QUESTION CXXXIV.

OF MAGNIFICENCE.
(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed
to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of
inquiry : (i) Whether magnificence is a virtue ? (2) Whether
it is a special virtue ? (3) What is its matter ? (4) Whether
it is a part of fortitude ?

First Article,
whether magnificence is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a virtue.
For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated
above (I. -II., Q. LXV., A. 1). But one may have the other
virtues without having magnificence: because the Philo-
sopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that not every liberal man is magni-
ficent. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Moral virtue observes the mean, accord-
ing to Ethic, ii. 6. But magnificence does not seemingly
observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness.
Now great and little are opposed to one another as extremes,
the mean of which is equal, as stated in Met. x. Hence
magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme.
Therefore it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is opposed to a natural inclina-
tion, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above
(Q. CVIII., A. 2: Q. CXVII., A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according
to the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 2) the magnificent man is not

293

Q. i34- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 294

lavish towards himself : and this is opposed to the natural
inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magni-
ficence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4. Further, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, vi. 4)
act is right reason about things to be made. Now magnificence
is about things to be made, as its very name denotes.*
Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine
power. But magnificence [virtutis) belongs to Divine
power, according to Ps. lxvii. 35: His magnificence and
His power is in the clouds. Therefore magnificence is a
virtue.

/ answer that, According to De Ccelo i. 16, we speak of
virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing s power, not
as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit
of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great.
Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence
takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue.
Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every liberal man is magnificent as
regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to
perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal
man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in
respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained
above (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad 2), as also (I.-II., Q. LXV., A. 1)
when we were treating of the connexion of virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. It is true that magnificence observes the
extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done : yet
it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which
it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of
magnanimity (Q. CXXIX., A. 3, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3. It belongs to magnificence to do something
great. But that which regards a man's person is little in
comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even
the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the
magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish
towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but

* Magnificence = magna facere — i.e. to make great things.

295 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134- Art. 2

because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything
regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are
done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are
of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to
provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic, iv.
Reply Obj. 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi. 5) there
must needs be a virtue of act, i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the
appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act : and
this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but
a virtue.

Second Article,
whether magnificence is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a special
virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing
something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do
something great, if the virtue be great : as in the case of one
who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great
work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a
special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Seemingly that which tends to a thing
is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to mag-
nanimity to tend to something great, as stated above
(Q. CXXIX., AA. 1, 2). Therefore it belongs to magna-
nimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnifi-
cence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Magnificence seems to belong to holiness,
for it is written (Exod. xv. n) : Magnificent (Douay, —
Glorious) in holiness, and (Ps. xcv. 6) : Holiness and magni-
ficence (Douay, — Majesty) in His sanctuary. Now holiness
is the same as religion, as stated above (Q. LXXXL, A. 8).
Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.
Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other
special virtues (Ethic, ii. 7; iv. 2).

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do (facere)

Q. 134. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 296

something great, as its name implies. Now facer e may be
taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense.
Strictly facer e means to work something in external matter,
for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in
a broad sense facere is employed to denote any action,
whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut,
or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing
of something great, the doing {f actio) being understood in
the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done
is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to
consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work
produced (factum) by the act is something great, namely in
quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence
does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from
doing something great, the doing (facere) being understood
in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1 It belongs to every perfect virtue to do
something great in the genus of that virtue, if doing (facere)
be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly,
for this is proper to magnificence.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend
to something great, but also to do great works in all the
virtues, either by making (faciendo), or by any kind of
action, as stated in Ethic, iv. 3 : yet so that magnanimity, in
this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other
virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct
their principal intention, not to something great, but to that
which is proper to each virtue : and the greatness of the thing
done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the
virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to
do something great, doing (facere) being taken in the strict
sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great
things. Hence Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that magni-
ficence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty
undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,

297 MAGNIFICENCE Q.i34Art.3

discussion referring to the inward intention, and adminis-
tration to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just
as magnanimity intends something great in every matter,
it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that
can be produced in external matter (factibili).

Reply Obj. 3. The intention of magnificence is the produc-
tion of a great work. Now works done by men are directed
to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the
honour of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work
especially in reference to the Divine honour. Wherefore the
Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that the most commendable
expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices: and
this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason
magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief
effect is directed to religion or holiness.

Third Article.

whether the matter of magnificence is great

expenditure ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence is
not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about
the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as
stated above (Q. CXVII., A. 2). Therefore magnificence
is not about expenditure.

Obj. 2. Further, Every magnificent man is liberal (Ethic.
iv. 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about
expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly
about expenditure, but about gifts.

Obj. 3. Further, It belongs to magnificence to produce
an external work. But not even great expenditure is
always the means of producing an external work, for instance
when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore
expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.

Obj. 4. Further, Only the rich are capable of great expen-
diture. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues,
since the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune,

Q. i34. Art 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 298

but are sufficient for themselves, as Seneca says {De Ira i. :
De vita beata xvi.). Therefore magnificence is not about
great expenditure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 2) that
magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions
in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds
liberality in scale. Therefore it is only about great expen-
diture.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to mag-
nificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the
doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary,
for great works cannot be produced without great expendi-
ture. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in
order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming
manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. loc. cit. )
that a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work
with equal, i.e. proportionate, expenditure. Now expendi-
ture is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be
hindered from making that outlay if he love money too
much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to
be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man
uses to produce a great work, and also the very money
which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as
the love of money, which love the magnificent man mode-
rates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated above (Q. CXXIX., A. 2), those
virtues that are about external things experience a certain
difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about
which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides
arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the
need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use;
namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general,
and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the
use of money.

Reply Obj. 2. The use of money regards the liberal man
in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it
regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an
ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due

299 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134- Art. 3

use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles
to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs
to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent
man in relation to some great work which has to be produced,
and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.

Reply Obj. 3. The magnificent man also makes gifts of
presents, as stated in Ethic, iv. 2, but not under the aspect
of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed
to the production of some work, for instance in order to
honour someone, or in order to do something which will
reflect honour on the whole state: as when he brings to
effect what the whole state is striving for.

Reply Obj. 4. The chief act of virtue is the inward choice,
and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so
that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of
fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of
virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the
outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply.
Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though
little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in
proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative
terms, as the Philosopher says (De Prcedic. Cap. Ad aliquid).

Fourth Article,
whether magnificence is a part of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part of
fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality,
as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of
fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a
part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and darings.
But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear,
but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. There-
fore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about
actions, rather than to fortitude.

Q. 134. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 300

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 2) that
the magnificent man is like the man of science. Now science
has more in common with prudence than with fortitude.
Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of
fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) and Macrobius
{De Somn. Scip. i.) and Andronicus reckon magnificence
to be a part of fortitude.

/ answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special
virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude,
since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter :
but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as
secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue,
two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. LXXX.).
The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the prin-
cipal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded
thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the
point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and
difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it
is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence
falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which
fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that
threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which
magnificence tends derives its difficulty from the disposses-
sion of one's property, which is of much less account than
danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted
a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Justice regards operations in themselves,
as viewed under the aspect of something due : but liberality
and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related
to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For
liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and
desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible
faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and
spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On
the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in refer-
ence to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as

301 MAGNIFICENCE Q. 134. Art. 4

magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely
expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is
apparently in the irascible part.

Reply Obj. 2. Although magnificence does not agree with
fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as to the condition of
its matter : since it tends to something difficult in the matter
of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult
in the matter of fear.

Reply Obj. 3. Magnificence directs the use of art to some-
thing great, as stated above and in the preceding Article.
Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the mag-
nificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of
expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially
necessary on account of the greatness of both those things,
since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the
risk of a great loss.

QUESTION CXXXV.

OF MEANNESS.*
(In Two Articles).

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence:
under which head there are two points of inquiry : (i) Whether
meanness is a vice ? (2) Of the vice opposed to it.

First Article
whether meanness is a vice ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that meanness is not a vice. For
just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate
little things : wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent
do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore
likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. 2) that
careful reckoning is mean. But careful reckoning is appa-
rently praiseworthy, since man's good is to be in accordance
with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv. 4). There-
fore meanness is not a vice.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 2) that
a mean man is loth to spend money. But this belongs to
covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a
distinct vice from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic, ii.) accounts
meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

/ answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. I., A. 3:

* Parviftcentia, or doing mean things, just as magnificentia is
doing great things.

302

303 MEANNESS Q. 135. Art. i

Q. XVIII., A. 6), moral acts take their species from their
end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from
that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus )
because he intends to do something little [parvum). Now
according to the Philosopher [Prcedic. Cap. Ad aliquid) great
and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean
man intends to do something little, this must be understood
in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little
or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself
to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly
the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of
his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the
expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce
a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 4)
that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce
a more magnificent result. On the other hand, the mean man
intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher
says [Ethic, iv. 2) that he seeks how he may spend least. As
a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is,
he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as
he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that the
mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the
magnificent work, for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend.
Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe
the proportion that reason demands betv/een expenditure
and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in
failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it
is manifest that meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue moderates little things, according
to the rule of reason : from which rule the mean man declines,
as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for
moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of
reason in moderating great or little things : hence meanness
is a vice.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii. 5), fear
makes us take counsel: wherefore a mean man is careful in
his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending
his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this

Q. 135. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 304

is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because
then a man does not regulate his affections according to
reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in
pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply Obj. 3. Just as the magnificent man has this in
common with the liberal man, that he spends his money
readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common
with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend.
Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary
expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure,
which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore mean-
ness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher
says {Ethic, iv. 2) that although meanness and its contrary
vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither
do they harm one's neighbour, nor are they very disgraceful.

Second Article,
whether there is a vice opposed to meanness ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that there is no vice opposed to
meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magni-
ficence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is
opposed to meanness.

Obj. 2. Further, Since meanness is a vice by deficiency,
as stated above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed
to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending.
But those who spend much, where they ought to spend
little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according
to Ethic, iv. 2, and thus they have something of meanness.
Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Obj. 3. Further, Moral acts take their species from their
end, as stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend exces-
sively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as
stated in Ethic, iv., loc. cit. But this belongs to vainglory,
which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
(Q. CXXXI., A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to mean-
ness.

305 MEANNESS Q. 135. Art. 2

On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher
who (Ethic, ii. 8; iv. 2) places magnificence as a mean be-
tween two opposite vices.

/ answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and
great are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just
as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work,
so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it
exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist be-
tween expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that
the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less
than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due pro-
portion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice
opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion,
by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This
vice is called in Greek fiavavala, so called from fiavvos,
because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything.
It is also called airvpoicaXia, i.e. lacking good fire, since
like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence
in Latin it may be called consumptio (waste).

Reply Obj. 1. Magnificence is so called from the great
work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess
of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed
to meanness.

Reply Obj. 2. To the one same vice there is opposed the
virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice.
Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to mean-
ness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work,
by spending much where it behoved to spend little. But
it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work,
which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far
as when it behoves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply Obj. 3. Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by
the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason,
whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders
this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as
vainglory or any other.

II. H. 4 2Q

QUESTION CXXXVI.

OF PATIENCE.

(In Five Articles.)

We must now consider patience. Under this head there
are five points of inquiry : (i) Whether patience is a virtue ?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues ? (3) Whether
it can be had without grace ? (4) Whether it is a part of
fortitude ? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity ?

First Article,
whether patience is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For
the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xiv.). Yet patience is not there, since no evils
have to be borne there, according to Isa. xlix. 10 and
Apoc. vii. 16, They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the
heat nor the sun strike them. Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, No virtue can be found in the wicked,
since virtue it is that makes its subject good. Yet patience
is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the
covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may
amass money, according to Eccles. v. 16, All the days of his
life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery
and in sorrow. Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits differ from the virtues, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. LXX., A. 1, ad 3). But patience
is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. v. 22). Therefore patience
is not a virtue.

306

307 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. i

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Patientia i.): The
virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of
God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it
upon us.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 1), the
moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they
safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the
passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to
hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10, The
sorrow of the world worketh death, and Ecclus. xxx. 25,
Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it. Hence
the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason
against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this
patience does. Wherefore Augustine says {De Patientia ii.) :
A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal
mind, i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to
better things. It is therefore evident that patience is a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The moral virtues do not remain in heaven
as regards the same act that they have on the way, in rela-
tion, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not
remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to
the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be
in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters
pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point
of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience,
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying
the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence
Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.) that patience itself will
not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils
have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience
will be eternal.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Patientia ii: v.)
properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear
evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing
them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil,
their patience is neither marvellous nor praiseworthy, for it

Q. 136. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 308

is no patience at all : we may marvel at their hardness of
heart, but we must refuse to call them patient.

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XL, A. 1), the
very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue
afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic, i. 8. Now
the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts.
Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue; but as to the
pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially
in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being
overcome by sorrow.

Second Article,
whether patience is the greatest of the virtues ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the greatest of the
virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the
greatest. Now patience hath a perfect work (James i. 4).
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, All the virtues are directed to the good
of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience ;
for it is written (Luke xxi. 19): In your patience you shall
possess your souls. Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.

Obj. 3. Further, Seemingly that which is the safeguard
and cause of other things is greater than they are. But
according to Gregory (Horn. xxxv. in Ev.) patience is the
root and safeguard of all the virtues. Therefore patience is
the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues
which Gregory [Moral, xxii.) and Augustine (De Morib.
Eccl. xv.) call principal.

/ answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed
to good. For it is virtue that makes its subject good, and
renders the latter s work good (Ethic, ii. 6). Hence it follows
that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other
virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good
more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which

309 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 2

are effective of good, incline man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away
from good: and just as among those that are effective of
good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater
good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than pru-
dence and justice); so too among those that are a check on
things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is
the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good.
But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures
of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw
man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is
the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest
of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological
virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish
man in good, but .also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Reply Obj. 1. Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships : for these give rise first to sorrow, which
is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is
moderated by meekness ; thirdly, to hatred, which charity
removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice for-
bids. Now that which removes the principle is the most
perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this
respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Reply Obj. 2. Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so
far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked
by hardships and disturb the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. Patience is said to be the root and safe-
guard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and
preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their
obstacles.

Q. 136. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 310

Third Article,
whether it is possible to have patience without

GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that it is possible to have patience
without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing,
the more is it possible for the rational creature to accom-
plish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake
of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for
evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of
grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii.) that men endure
many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sin-
fully. Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without
the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this
is to be truly patient.

Obj. 2. Further, Some who are not in a state of grace
have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils:
hence some heathens are related to have endured many
hardships rather than betray their country or commit some
other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore
it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help
of grace.

Obj. 3. Further, It is quite evident that some go through
much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body.
Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily
health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the
help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul,
and this is to be truly patient .

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. lxi. 6): From Him, i.e.
from God, is my patience.

I answer that, As Augustine says {De Patientia iv.), the
strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one
willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake
of that which gives pleasure. The reason of this is because
sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul,
wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their

3H PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 3

own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows
that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation
of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now
the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural
goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred
to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is
evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity,
according to 1 Cor. xiii. 4, Charity is patient.

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity
save through grace, according to Rom. v. 5, The charity of
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is
given to us. Therefore it is clearly impossible to have
patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The inclination of reason would prevail in
human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt
nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it
is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils
for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights
here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to
come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and
yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2. The good of a social virtue* is commensurate
with human nature; and consequently the human will can
tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not
without the help of God's grace, f On the other hand, the
good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend
thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the endurance of those evils which a
man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from
the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence
there is no comparison between this endurance and patience
which proceeds from a supernatural love.

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. LXI., A. 5. f Cf. I.-IL, Q. CIX., A. 2.

Q. 136. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 312

Fourth Article,
whether patience is a part of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth A rticle : —

Objection 1. It seems that patience is not a part of forti-
tude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is
apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure;
and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the
Liber Sententiarum Prosperi* that patience consists in en-
during evils inflicted by others. Therefore patience is not a
part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and daring, as
stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3), and thus it is in the iras-
cible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and conse-
quently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore
patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The whole cannot be without its part.
Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no
fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man
does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person
who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons it a part
of fortitude.

/ answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of forti-
tude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal
virtue. For it belongs to patience to suffer with an equal
mind the evils inflicted by others, as Gregory says in a homily
(xxxv. in Ev.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by
others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that
are connected with the danger of death, and about these
evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays
claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal

* The quotation is from S. Gregory (Horn. xxxv. in Ev.).

313 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 4

virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave
(Sent. 811).

Reply Obj. 1. It belongs to fortitude to endure, not any-
thing indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure,
namely dangers of death : whereas it may pertain to patience
to endure any kind of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of fortitude consists not only in
holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but
also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by
things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience
is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear,
which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while
patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves
in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (patiendo) things
which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be
inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly
in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible
faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of forti-
tude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not
regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Neverthe-
less patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance,
although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance
is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures
of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures
of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows
inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to tem-
perance to control these sorrows besides their contrary
pleasures : whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake
not the good of virtue on account of suchlike sorrows,
however great they be.

Reply Obj. 3. It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact
that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers
of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection
argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man
should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts

Q. 136. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 314

evils on him; for Chrysostom* says on Matth. iv. 10, Begone
Satan, that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own
wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked :
and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii.)
that the precepts of pacience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight
against our enemies. But in so far as patience regards all
kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue.

Fifth Article,
whether patience is the same as longanimity ?t

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that patience is the same as longa-
nimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i.) that we speak
of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer,
but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted.
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. v. 4) : The Most High is a
patient rewarder. Therefore it seems that patience is the
same as longanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, The same thing is not contrary to two
things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby
one awaits a delay : for one is said to be impatient of delay,
as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the
same as longanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as time is a circumstance of wrongs
endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience
on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity
which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a
long time, is not distinct from patience.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, a glossj on Rom. ii. 4, Or despisest
thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffer-
ing? says: It seems that longanimity differs from patience,

* Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to S. John
Chrysostom.

f Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on
account of the comparison with magnanimity.

I Origen, Comment in Ep. ad Rom. ii.

315 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 5

because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose
are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a
deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind
to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind
to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magna-
nimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring,
fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does
longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common
with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with
patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like
fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if
this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas
if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly,
because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature
to cause sorrow, according to Prov. xiii. 12, Hope that is
deferred afflicteth the soul. Hence there may be patience
in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows.
Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised
under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for
good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man
endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which
regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect
of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) in defining patience,
says that patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance
of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.
By saying arduous he refers to constancy in good; when he
says difficult he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is
the proper object of patience; and by adding continued or
long lasting, he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has
something in common with patience.

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objec-
tions.

Reply Obj. 3. That which is a long way off as to place,
though distant from us, is not simply distant from things
in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time :

Q. 136. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 316

hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as
to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since
what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.
We grant the fourth argument. We must observe,
however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this
gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through
weakness, merely because they persist a long time in
evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longa-
nimity : whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems
to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through
pride are stated to be borne with patience.

QUESTION CXXXVII.

OF PERSEVERANCE.

(In Four Articles.)

We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed
to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four
points of inquiry : (i) Whether perseverance is a virtue ?
(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude ? (3) Of its relation to
con -tancy : (4) Whether it needs the help of grace ?

First Article,
whether perseverance is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a virtue.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 7), continency
is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a
virtue, as stated in Ethic, iv. 9. Therefore perseverance is
not a virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, By virtue man lives aright, according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii. 19). Now according to the same
authority (De Per sever, i.), no one can be said to have per-
severance while living, unless he persevere until death. There-
fore perseverance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, It is requisite of every virtue that one
should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as
stated in Ethic, ii. 4. But this is what we understand by
perseverance: for Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that perse-
verance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-con-
sidered purpose. Therefore perseverance is not a special
virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

317

Q. i37- Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 318

On the contrary, Andronicus* says that perseverance is a
habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those
to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are in-
different. Now a habit that directs us to do something
well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perse-
verance is a virtue.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, ii. 3),
virtue is about the difficult and the good; and so where there is
a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special
virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or
difficulty on two counts. First, from the act's very species,
which is considered in respect of the proper object of that
act : secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long
in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence
to persist long in something good until it is accomplished
belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special
virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of
touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other
moderates fear and daring in connexion with dangers of
death (which also is something difficult in itself), so persever-
ance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in
the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is taking perseverance
there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are
most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure,
not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death,
for the most part are not endured for a long time, because
often they soon pass away : wherefore it is not on this account
that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among
other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures
of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of
life : such are the lack of food and the like, which at times
call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure
these things for a long time for one who grieves not much
at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods ; as in the
case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not
violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is

* Chrysippus : in De Affect.

319 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137. Art. i

strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect
virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perse-
verance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but
something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other
hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence
in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has
even perfect virtue : for even if it is less difficult for him to
persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Where-
fore suchlike perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue
derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from
the aspect of difficulty.

Reply Obj. 2. Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the
same name: thus Augustine says {Tract, in Joan, lxxix.):
Faith is to believe without seeing. Yet it is possible to have
a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor
man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the
act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit,
begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not
complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term
perseverance is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby
one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of perse-
vering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance
chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by
persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold : one is the
end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly
speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end
of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere
to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his
work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues
whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such
as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end
of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which
are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not
accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that
Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consum-
mate act of perseverance.

Q. 137. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 320

Reply Obj. 3. Unchangeable persistence may belong to
a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end
that is proper to that virtue ; and thus to persist in good for
a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called
perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly,
by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject : and thus
unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue,
inasmuch as virtue is a quality difficult to change.

Second Article,
whether perseverance is a part of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance is not a part of
fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher {Ethic, viii. 7),
perseverance is about pains of touch. But these belong to
temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temper-
ance rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Every part of a moral virtue is about
certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perse-
verance does not imply moderation of the passions: since
the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it
to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems
that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather
of prudence which perfects the reason.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i.) that no
one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other
virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the
other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its
part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue,
but is itself a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons perse-
verance as a part of fortitude.

J answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 2: I. II.,
Q. LXL, AA. 3, 4), a principal virtue is one to which is
principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise
of virtue, inasmuch as it practises it in connexion with its
own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment.

321 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 2

In accordance with this it has been stated (0. CXXIII., A. 2)
that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes
firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm,
namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of neces-
sity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm
endurance of something difficult must be annexed to forti-
tude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance
of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good
work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so
difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perse-
verance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. The annexing of secondary to principal
virtues depends not only on the matter,* but also on the
mode, because in everything form is of more account than
matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance
seems to have more in common with temperance than
with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with
fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty
arising from length of time.

Reply Obj. 2. The perseverance of which the Philosopher
speaks (Ethic, vii. 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but
consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will.
But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain
passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of
the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the
irascible.

Reply Obj. 3. Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as
denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained
to the end, according to Matth. xxiv. 13, He that shall perse-
vere to the end, he shall he saved. Hence it is incompatible
with suchlike perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no
longer endure to the end.

* Cf. Q. CXXXVI., A. 4 ad 2.

11. ii. 4 21

Q. 137. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 322

Third Article,
whether constancy pertains to perseverance ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that constancy does not pertain to
perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as
stated above (Q. CXXXVIL, A. 5): and patience differs
from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, Virtue is about the difficult and the good.
Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works,
but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence.
Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than
to perseverance.

Obj. 3. Further, If constancy pertained to perseverance,
it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote
a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macro-
bius (De Somn. Scip. i.) condivides constancy with firm-
ness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above
(Q. CXXVIIL, A. 6). Therefore constancy does not pertain
to perseverance.

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one
stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand
to certain things, as appears from the definition given by
Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to
end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good:
but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to
persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly
makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that
arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas con-
stancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties
arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perse-
verance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action
is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises
from external obstacles.

323 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 4

Reply Obj. 1. External obstacles to persistence in good
are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is
about sorrow, as stated above (Q. CXXXVL, A. 1). Hence
constancy agrees with perseverance as to end : while it agrees
with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty.
Now the end is of most account : wherefore constancy per-
tains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply Obj. 2. It is more difficult to persist in great deeds:
yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any
length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed
which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance
which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain
to both.

Reply Obj. 3. Constancy pertains to perseverance in so
far as it has something in common with it : but it is not the
same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the
Article.

Fourth Article,
whether perseverance needs the help of grace ?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the
help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above
(A. 1). Now according to Tully (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) virtue
acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclina-
tion of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does
not need the help of grace.

Obj. 2. Further, The gift of Christ's grace is greater than
the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from
Rom. v. 15 seq. Now before sin man was so framed that
he could persevere by means of what he had received, as Augus-
tine says {De Correp. et Grat. xi.). Much more therefore
can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, perse-
vere without the help of a further grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult
than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the
wicked (Wis. v. 7) : We . . . have walked through hard ways.

* Cf. I.-IL, Q. CIX., A. 10.

Q. 137. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 324

Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of
another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of
virtue without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i.): We hold
that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto
the end, in Christ.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1, ad 2: A. 2, ad 3),
perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes
the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this
way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other
infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the
act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense
it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous
help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. CIX., A. 10), when we were treating
of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its
very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from
it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is
not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace,
to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to
choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to
accomplish.

Reply Obj. 1. The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is
concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit,
and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow
that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchange-
ably until death.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi.),
it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to
persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in
human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however,
by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the
possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore
the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will
rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a hap-
piness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these,
although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered
in faith.

325 PERSEVERANCE Q. 137- Art. 4

Reply Obj. 3. Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but
he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of
grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned
man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be
delivered by God's grace. On the other hand, by doing
good he does not make himself to be persevering in good,
because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs
the help of grace for that end.

QUESTION CXXXVIIL

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance;
under which head there are two points of inquiry: (i) Of
effeminacy; (2) Of pertinacity.

First Article,
whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to
perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, Nor adulterers,
nor the effeminate, nor Hers with mankind, expounds the text
thus: Effeminate — i.e. erotic, subject to womanish complaints.
But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is
not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, vii. 7) that
delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But to be delicate seems
akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed
to perseverance but to temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (ibid.) that the
man who is fond of amusement is effeminate. Now im-
moderate fondness of amusement is opposed to evrpaireXLa,
which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in
Ethic, iv. 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perse-
verance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, vii. 7) that
the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.

* Mollities, literally softness.
326

327 EFFEMINACY Q. 138. Art. i

1 answer that, As stated above (O. CXXXVIL, AA. 1, 2),
perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man
does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of
difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this,
seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account
of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we
understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be
soft if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not
declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for
walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not
said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii. 7) that it is no wonder, if
a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures
or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against
them. Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impel-
ling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says
(De Offic. i.) under the heading True magnanimity consists
of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down
by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself
unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure. Moreover, pleasure
itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the
lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of
pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the
Philosopher (loc. cit.). properly speaking an effeminate man is
one whc withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused
by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply Obj. 1. This effeminacy is caused in two ways.
In one way, by custom : for where a man is accustomed to
enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the
lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition,
because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the
frailty of his temperament. This is how women are com-
pared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic, vii., loc. cit.):
wherefore those who are subject to womanish complaints
are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it
were.

Reply Obj. 2. Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure : wherefore
it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures.

Q. 138. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 328

Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor
anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written
(Deut. xxviii. 56) : The tender and delicate woman, that could
not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness
(Douay, — niceness). Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.
But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures,
while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.

Reply Obj. 3. In play two things may be considered.
In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate
fondness of play is opposed to evrpaireXia. Secondly,
we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to
toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be
unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto
to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

Second Article,
whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — ■

Objection 1. It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to
perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral, xxxi.) than perti-
nacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed
to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above
(O. CXXXIL, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is not apposed
to perseverance.

Obj. 2. Further, If it is opposed to perseverance, this is so
either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by
excess : because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure
and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 9)
they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions
are rejected. And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be
the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore
pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as the persevering man persists
in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the
temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and
the meek against anger. Bwt pertinacity is over-persistence

329 PERTINACITY Q. 138. Art. 2

in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to
perseverance more than to other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that perti-
nacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But
superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. XCII.,
A. 1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x.) a person is said to
be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly
tenacious. Pervicacious has the same meaning, for it sig-
nifies that a man perseveres in his purpose until he is vic-
torious : for the ancients called ' vicia ' what we call victory.
These the Philosopher (Ethic, vii. 9) calls lacxpoyvoo/xoves,
that is head-strong, or IStoyvfofioves, that is self-opinionated,
because they abide by their opinions more than they
should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he
ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is
clear that perseverance is commended for observing the
mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean,
and effeminacy for falling short of it.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why a man is too persistent
in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make
a show of his own excellence : wherefore this is the result of
vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above
(Q. CXXVII., A. 2, ad 1: Q. CXXXIII., A. 2), that opposi-
tion of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on
their species.

Reply Obj. 2. The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting
inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he
takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the
persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful,
seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary
pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the other virtues persist against
the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended
for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to
continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in over-
coming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed
to perseverance.

QUESTION CXXXIX.

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE.
(In Two Articles.)

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude,
and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are
two points of inquiry: (i) Whether fortitude is a gift ?
(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond
to it?

First Article,
whether fortitude is a gift ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the
virtues differ from the gifts : and fortitude is a virtue. There-
fore it should not be reckoned a gift.

Obj. 2. Further, The acts of the gifts remain in heaven,
as stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXVIIL, A. 6). But the act of
fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says
(Moral, i.) that fortitude encourages the fainthearted against
hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven. There-
fore fortitude is not a gift.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, ii.)
that it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the
deadly pleasures of the passing show. Now noisome pleasures
and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of
fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift
corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other
gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. xi. 2).

/ answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of

330

331 GIFT OF FORTITUDE Q. 139. Art. i

mind, as stated above (O. CXXIIL, A. 2: I.-IL, Q. LXI.,
A. 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing
good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods
or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness
in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on
account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous
work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude
denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 2).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost,
in order that he may attain the end of each work begun,
and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses
human nature : for sometimes it is not in a man's power to
attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since
these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the
Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting
life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from
all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the
mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary.
It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy
Ghost. For it has been stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXVIIL,
AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by
the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1. Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind
in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go
so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers : this
belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2. The gifts have not the same acts in heaven
as on the way: for there they exercise acts in connexion
with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude
there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.

Reply Obj. 3. The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers,
but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any
difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed
by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly
with the greater goods.

Q. 139. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 332

Second Article.

whether the fourth beatitude: 'blessed are they
that hunger and thirst after justice,' corre-
sponds to the gift of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the fourth beatitude, Blessed
are they that hunger and thirst after justice, does not corre-
spond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not
the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice.
Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the
act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to
the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Hunger and thirst after justice imply a
desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to
which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude,
corresponds, as stated above (0. XLV.). Therefore this
beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to
the gift of wisdom.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits are consequent upon the
beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according
to Ethic, i. 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none
pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beati-
tude correspond to it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Semi. Dom. in
Monte i.): Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since
those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving
earthly and material things, must toil.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXI., A. 2), Augustine
makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to
the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same
time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he
ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and
thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because,
as stated (A. 1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it
is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which

333 GIFT OF FORTITUDE Q. 139- Art. 2

receive the common designation of works of justice, but
furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which
may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply Obj. 1. As Chrysostom says (Horn. xv. in Matth.),
we may understand here not only particular, but also
universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds
according to Ethic, v. 1, wherein whatever is hard is the
object of that fortitude which is a gift.

Reply Obj. 2. Charity is the root of all the virtues and
gilts, as stated above (O. XXIII., A. 8, ad 3: I. -II.,
0. LXVIII., A. 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to for-
titude may also be referred to charity.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which
regards the enduring of evils; and longanimity, which may
regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.

QUESTION CXL.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE.
(In Two Articles.)

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude: (i) The
precepts of fortitude itself; (2) The precepts of its parts.

First Article.

whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably
given in the divine law ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : — ■

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of fortitude are
not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law
is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains
precepts of fortitude (Deut. xx.). Therefore precepts of
fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

Obj. 2. Further, Affirmative precepts are of greater
import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include
the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable
for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts
in prohibition of fear.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is one of the principal virtues,
as stated above (O. CXXIII., A. 2: I.-IL, Q. LXL, A. 2).
Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end :
wherefore they should be proportionate to them. There-
fore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed
among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
precepts of the Law.

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these
precepts.

334

335 PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 140. Art. i

/ answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end
intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must
needs be framed in various ways according to the various
ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs
there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of
the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: where-
fore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and
of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to
God. For this reason it is written (Deut. xx. 3, 4): Fear ye
them not : because the Lord your God is in the midst of you,
and will fight for you against your enemies.

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly
goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude accord-
ing to the requirements of those goods.

Reply Obj. 1. The Old Testament contained temporal
promises, while the promises of the New Testament are
spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra
Faust, iv.). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the
people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest,
in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the posses-
sion of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to
Matth. xi. 12, The kingdom of heaven suffer eth violence, and
the violent bear it away. Hence Peter commands (1 Pet.
v. 8, 9) : Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth
about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in
faith, as also James (iv. 7) : Resist the devil, and he will fly
from you. Since, however, men while tending to spiritual
goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers,
precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law,
that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according
to Matth. x. 28, Fear ye not them that kill the body.

Reply Obj. 2. The law gives general directions in its
precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of
danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to
some common good. Hence the precepts of fortitude are
negative rather than affirmative.

Q. 140. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 336

Reply Obj. 3. As stated above (Q. CXXIL, A. 1), the
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first
principles, which need to be known to all from the outset.
Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly
about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is
manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not
so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers
of death.

Second Article.

whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude
are suitably given in the divine law ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the parts of
fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just
as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also
are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated
above (Q. CXXVIII.). Now we find precepts of patience
in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore
there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, Patience is a very necessary virtue, since
it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says
(Horn, in Ev. xxxv.). Now the other virtues are com-
manded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have
been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i.), as to the preparedness of the mind.

Obj. 3. Further, Patience and perseverance are parts of
fortitude, as stated above (O. CXXVIII: Q. CXXXVI., A. 4:
Q. CXXXVIL, A. 2). Now the precepts of fortitude are
not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).
Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should
have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which
they are given by Holy Writ.

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly
about such things as are necessary for right living. Now
in order to live aright man needs not only the principal

337 PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE Q. i4o.Art.2

virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Where-
fore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the
acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the
secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply Obj. i. Magnificence and magnanimity do not
belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a
certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their
respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence
come under the counsels of perfection rather than under pre-
cepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels,
rather than of precepts about magnificence and magna-
nimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the
present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by
reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account
of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of
precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply Obj. 2. As stated above (Q. III., A. 2), although
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not
binding for always, but according to place and time. Where-
fore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues
are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind,
in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when
necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be under-
stood in the same way.

Reply Obj. 3. Fortitude, as distinct from patience and
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one
must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine
what is to be done in particular. On the other hand,
patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and
toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially
in general, what is to be done in such cases.

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